PREMISES AND ASSUMPTIONS OF THE OTTOMAN STATE TRADITION
PARADIGM: A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF METİN HEPER'S
CONTRIBUTION

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
THE MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

SAFİYE YELDA KAYA

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

SEPTEMBER 2005

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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September 2005, 137 pages

In this thesis, Metin Heper's analysis of the Ottoman state and state-society relations is examined. Heper's analysis is evaluated as an exemplar of the Ottoman state tradition paradigm. The examination of Heper's studies is intended to shed light on the premises and assumptions of this paradigm.

In particular, the study focuses on the way Heper characterizes Ottoman state-society relations in contradistinction to the prevalent pattern of state-society relations in Western social formations so as to demonstrate the assumptions Heper builds upon. Heper's account of the Ottoman state tradition is discussed on the basis of an examination of his comparative perspective. The conceptual framework Heper relies on is delineated and certain methodological problems of his approach are indicated.

Keywords: State Tradition, Ottoman State, Patrimonialism, Metin Heper.

ÖZ

OSMANLI DEVLET GELENEĞİ PARADİGMASININ ÖNCÜLLERİ VE
VARSAYIMLARI: METİN HEPER'İN ÇALIŞMALARI ÜZERİNE ELEŞTİREL
BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

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Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Galip Yalman

Eylül 2005, 137 sayfa

Bu çalışmada, Metin Heper'in Osmanlı devleti ve devlet-toplum ilişkileri yaklaşımı incelenmektedir. Heper'in çalışmaları, Osmanlı devlet geleneği paradigmasının bir örneği olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Heper'in çalışmaları ışığında, söz konusu paradigmanın öncülleri ve varsayımları açığa çıkarılmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Bu çalışma, Heper'in yaklaşımını şekillendiren varsayımları ortaya çıkarmak üzere, Heper'in Osmanlı devlet-toplum ilişkilerini, Batılı toplumsal formasyonlarda tespit ettiği devlet-toplum ilişkileri modeline karşıt olarak betimleyiş biçimine odaklanmaktadır. Heper'in Osmanlı devlet geleneğini ele alış biçimi, sunduğu karşılaştırmalı perspektif temelinde tartışılmaktadır. Heper'in kullandığı kavramsal çerçeve tanımlanmakta ve yaklaşımındaki kimi metodolojik sorunlara işaret edilmektedir.

Anahtar sözcükler: Devlet Geleneği, Osmanlı Devleti, Patrimonyalizm, Metin Heper.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In Turkey, Süavi Aydın writes, social scientists have at their disposal "a magical explanatory tool which is put to the purpose of explaining social phenomena", a conceptual construct which is seen as the answer to all possible questions regarding Turkish politics and social structure: "state tradition" (1998: 63).

The undeniable predominance of the state tradition paradigm could not be expressed more succinctly. Social scientists of quite different persuasions have relied on this paradigm in their attempts to explicate state-economy and state-society relations in Turkey. A few representative studies within this genre will be briefly presented below. Before that, though, three tenets common to all researchers who seem to be working within the paradigm should be noted. First, there is what might be called a "state versus society" assumption, which has permeated so many studies on Turkish politics. In accordance with this assumption, economic, social and political developments in Turkey are examined on the basis of a dichotomy between, for instance, "state and civil society", "bureaucracy and bourgeoisie", "state elites and the political elites" and so on. Second, the idea of "tradition" implies historical continuities. Consequently, the state tradition paradigm posits a historical continuity running from the Ottoman Empire to modern Turkey (Aydın, 1998: 63), a continuity allegedly based on the "unchanging essence of the state" (Aydın, 1998: 77-78). Third, there is the underlying notion of, what Yalman (2002: 24) calls, "the Ottoman/Turkish state as the constitutive agent of the social formation", aloof from the society and possessing "a logic and interests of its own". In those accounts of Ottoman-Turkish politics and state-society relations informed by the state tradition paradigm, it is, thus, the nature of the state from which derives the peculiarities of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation.

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One way of demonstrating the influence of the state tradition paradigm is to explore the way in which *étatist* policies of the Turkish state from 1930s to 1950 are accounted for. This is because it is there that the paradigm in question is quite visible (Yalman, 2002: 26-28). Take the example of Ahmet İnsel's *Düzen ve Kalkınma Kıskacında Türkiye* (1996). İnsel's starting point is the "constitution of the economic sphere in Turkey by the state" (1996: 42). The predominant tendency among researchers in Turkey, İnsel argues, has been one of relating Turkish *étatisme* solely to state's attempt to "create a national bourgeoisie" (1996: 48). In those accounts in which *étatisme* is seen in this light, to clarify, state's pivotal role in the constituting of the economic sphere is associated with the exigencies of economic backwardness. Such an approach tends to underline the particular experiences of state-led industrialization common, more or less, to all late-developing countries. Therein lies the problem with this kind of analyses, İnsel asserts, since they turn a blind eye to "Turkey's historical-social specificity" (1996: 48). The key to Turkey's specificity for İnsel is the "patrimonial state tradition" (1996: 115), which characterized the Ottoman Empire throughout its history, and left its imprint on the Republic (1996: 43).

Thus, İnsel posits a continuity between the Ottoman state and the Turkish state, a continuity he tries to substantiate on the grounds of the alleged perpetuation of a patrimonial attitude towards the "periphery" (1996: 86). This attitude, İnsel writes, consisted in an innate drive to suffocate any "peripheral activities born out of the social" and reluctance to grant a "legitimate sphere of autonomy" to the forces of the periphery (1996: 258). The patrimonial stance toward the periphery constituted the bedrock of the social order Ottoman state established and stringently safeguarded, an order whose most prominent features were state ownership of land accompanied by state's exclusive right of taxation, close supervision of artisanal and commercial activities, a pattern of "stratification" which was based on the division between the ruler and the ruled over and which excluded any (privileged) stratum or (autonomous) organization that would stand between the two ends of the divide (1996: 61-89). İnsel's argument is that when evaluating the *étatisme* of 1930s and 1940s, one should take into consideration the patrimonial tradition Turkish state has been a heir to. In this sense, *étatisme*, as a negation of the economy as an

"autonomous sphere" (1996: 42), should be perceived as "a new aspect of patrimonialism" (1996: 165), a new way of dominating the society (1996: 46).

On the other hand, in his *Türkiye'de Merkeziyetçi Zihniyet, Devlet ve Din* (1998), Etyen Mahçupyan ponders on the particular configuration of state-society relations which link present-day Turkey to its Ottoman past. He, too, alludes to the perpetuation of a "state tradition" (1998: 44). Unlike İnsel, though, he does not designate the factor which makes it legitimate to view the Turkish state as a continuation of its predecessor as an unchanging "patrimonial" attitude toward the society. Instead, he accords priority to the supposed fact that both states were, and the Turkish state still is, "carriers of authoritarian mentality" (1998: 49). Otherwise stated, according to him, Turkish state fell heir to the "authoritarian mentality" of the Ottoman state. Ottoman state, Mahçupyan argues, had been characterized by this mentality ever since its inception, while the ensuing pattern of state-society relations was only "reinforced" by Ottoman modernization (1998: 61). Thus Mahçupyan postulates a continuity between the configurations of state-society relations in the classical phase of the Empire on the one hand and in its last centuries on the other. In both phases, that is, the authoritarian mentality entailed that the state, unbound by any kind of "societal control" (1998: 44), was entirely independent of the society, and as such, it wielded "absolute authority" (1998: 78). Moreover, the legitimacy of the state was self-referential (1998: 44); the state, thus, was accountable to no one and it demanded of the subject population nothing less than unswerving loyalty (1998: 78).

The idea that, from early nineteenth century on, modernizing elites sought to resurrect this order, and thereby, to revitalize the overwhelming power of the state (1998: 45, 107) leads Mahçupyan to denote the fundamental principle the founding cadre of the Turkish Republic carried on to modern Turkey as "statism" (1998: 64-67). What is at issue here is, thus, a continuity in terms of the "mentality" those controlling the state apparatus operated on. During the early republican period, authoritarian mentality, now in the form of statism, provided the solid foundation upon which the Kemalist cadre framed the "ideal" order to be constituted. Statism, in a way quite reminiscent of the pristine Ottoman mentality, Mahçupyan continues, drew an insurmountable boundary between the state and the society and assigned to

the former an exclusive prerogative to "impose norms upon the society" (1998: 64-65). For, it was the state and only the state which was endowed with the knowledge as to the "right" norms to be pursued (1998: 64-65). The society, on the other hand, was expected to conform the norms put forward by the state (1998: 64). Consequently, it was their pretensions to having acquaintance with the "common good" which provided both the Ottoman bureaucrats and Kemalists with the wherewithal to subordinate the society to the state (1998: 61). It is Mahçupyan's contention that the same mentality has, in the later decades of the Turkish Republic, continued to guide the way the state reacted, as shown by the example of the three military interventions which were all infused with the statist (authoritarian) mentality and directed towards "consolidating the statist structure" (1998: 146-147).

Mahçupyan briefly mentions the way traditional Ottoman order diverged from the pattern of state-society relations in the West (1998: 37-38), an issue İlkay Sunar touches upon in more detail in his *State and Society in the Politics of Turkey's Development* (1974). According to Sunar, at the root of the Western pattern of state-society relations, which was brought into being in full force in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, lies a notion of society as "an *independent* field of human action, without the informing presence of any 'outside' authority" (1974: 2). The precedents of such a notion of society, Sunar continues, are to be found in the "feudal" societies of medieval Europe (1974: 3). "In Medieval Europe", he writes, "the independence of the society was largely the function of civil guarantees which feudal lords held against the intervention of royal authority" (1974: 3). Sunar, thus, attributes a long-term historical significance to the rights and immunities enjoyed by feudal lords, as well as "corporate bodies" (1974: 3), at the expense of king's power: inasmuch as rights and immunities served as "guarantees . . . against the intervention of the state" (1974: 7), they contributed to the eventual emergence of the "independent" society. The latter, however, was given full reign only with the advent of the "independent market" in the nineteenth century, which then became the "core institution of the society" (1974: 6-7). As a result, the state, the "political center", came to possess a rather limited role, namely, one of ensuring the external conditions within which the self-regulating market would function unimpeded (1974: 8).

As for the traditional Ottoman order, Sunar argues that it corresponded to "a contrasting type of society to that of the feudal West" (1974: 3). This was so because, in the absence of Western-type "legally immune communities" (1974: 4) which would "act independently of the political center" (1974: 5), Ottoman "model of society" was such that "social relationships and institutions were sustained by the direction imparted by the state" (1974: 5). Consequently, it might well be said that the traditional Ottoman order lacked the "medieval seeds" of the independent society. Furthermore, Sunar asserts that Ottoman order failed to indigenously develop an "independent market"; in the Ottoman case, he continues, the market was "an *adjunct* to the polity" (1974: 17). That is to say, the market was subordinated to the requirements of political authority so much so that it was no more than a "regulated" (1974: 17) and "dependent" (1974: 15) structure. In addition, the "interests that could rise to positions of political power as a consequence their place in the market" were "closely regulated and supervised" by the political center (1974: 17). As a result, Ottoman political center did not let develop, what might be called, the would-be torchbearers of the independent market society, i.e. the entrepreneurial middle classes. Following Şerif Mardin, who holds that the "corporate bodies with autonomous jurisdiction . . . formed the institutional base of civil society in the West" (1969: 264) and that particularly important in the development of civil society was the "autonomy of urban power that came with the expansion of capitalism" (1974: 412), Sunar puts the specificity of the Ottoman order *vis-à-vis* Western societies as the absence of civil society (1974: 4). The absence, or at the very least, the weakness of civil society in the Ottoman case, Mardin argues, is to be explained by the presence of a state anxious to maintain its "authority over the nodal points of society" (1973: 172), and therefore, inimical to rival foci of autonomous power (1967: 118-119).

It is certainly true that the studies mentioned in the last couple of pages, upon closer examination, can be shown to diverge from one another in many respects. My aim, however, has been to show that, in terms of their basic premises, they are informed by the same paradigm, the paradigm I have referred to as the "state tradition". What makes it plausible to argue that these studies can be lumped together as exemplars of a single paradigm, in other words, is the idea that they set out from a

common assumption: that the economic, social, and political developments in Ottoman-Turkish history should be accounted for in terms of the specific attributes of the Ottoman-Turkish state, conceived as an agent possessing a rationality of its own.

In the chapters to follow, the studies of one of the leading representatives of the state tradition paradigm will be examined, namely, Metin Heper. This examination, I hope, will provide insights into the anatomy of the state tradition paradigm.

Much the same way as the researchers I have mentioned in the previous pages, the thrust of Metin Heper's approach to the issues in Ottoman-Turkish politics is the idea that for a sound understanding of the current state of affairs in Turkey, one should take into consideration of the legacy of the Ottoman past. Hence Heper, too, tends to underscore the historical continuities that link, in particular, the attitudes of Turkish state and bureaucracy to the specificities of Ottoman form of rule. I have chosen to focus upon primarily on his reflections on the Ottoman state, because I am particularly interested in the way Heper justifies his argument for the presence of a state tradition in Turkey on the basis of the historical origins of this alleged phenomenon. So what will follow is a critical evaluation of Heper's writings on Ottoman state and bureaucracy, complemented, when necessary, with his account of state-society relations in Republican Turkey.

It is certainly the case that Heper's remarks on the Ottoman state and state-society relations serve as a prelude to his discussion of Turkish politics. That is to say, Heper's real interest remains with Turkish politics, the Turkish state and the pattern of state-society relations that has been obtaining in modern Turkey. Accordingly, he takes up the issue of the Ottoman state in order to furnish his readers with the historical background of contemporary phenomena of, for instance, the "strong state", ineffectual civil society and so on. It goes without saying that his discussion of the Ottoman state occupies a relatively minor place. What I do in the thesis is to highlight his reflections on the Ottoman state in an attempt to substantiate the idea that they add up to an exemplar of, what I call, the Ottoman state tradition paradigm.

I would at once like to state that I have not chosen to study Heper's account of the Ottoman state on the grounds that it amounts to an original contribution to the debate. On the contrary, as I occasionally try to show in the thesis, Heper's account of the Ottoman state relies on the writings of some students of Ottoman history as well as those of certain political scientists who study Ottoman state-society relations in order to underscore the historical continuities that conditioned Turkish politics. Furthermore, in certain respects, Heper's remarks on the Ottoman Empire take from, what might be called, the centuries-old "conventional wisdom" as to the nature of non-Western/Oriental societies. Nevertheless, I believe that Heper's account of the Ottoman state is worth studying because of my contention that he is one of the leading scholars who explicate state-society relations in Turkey on the basis of a supposed state tradition and that, accordingly, his reflections on the Ottoman state may shed light on the way contemporary state of affairs in Turkey is associated with, and accounted for in terms of, the legacy of the pattern of state-society relations which is asserted to have obtained in the Ottoman Empire.

In my opinion, part of what makes Heper an intriguing intellectual figure is his commitment to comparative analysis of state-society relations. Although many of his studies are specifically on Ottoman Empire (as well as Turkey), Heper at the same time tries to evaluate, albeit quite concisely, state-society relations in the Ottoman social formation in contradistinction to those in Western European social formations, and to lesser extent, those in other non-Western societies. His method, as shall be seen in the thesis, is one of proposing oppositionalities, most notably between the Ottoman and Western social formations. This aspect of Heper's approach seems to me to be quite important, as the way he characterizes state-society relations in the West has a direct import on his assessment of the Ottoman state and its relation to the society. Put more clearly, Heper's method is one of delineating the peculiarities, specifically, of the Ottoman state on the basis of the divergences it effected from the Western European pattern(s) of state-society relations. Consequently, I devote a great deal of space to his discussion of state-society relations in Western social formation in order to bring to light the presuppositions he builds upon when characterizing the Ottoman-Turkish state. One question I have in mind is the following: To what extent Heper's remarks serve to underpin the

argument for the "uniqueness" of the Ottoman social formation (Yalman, 2002). To this aim, I also take up the topic of the supposed specificity of the Ottoman-Turkish state *vis-à-vis* other non-Western societies.

In the thesis, thus, I try to critically evaluate Heper's contribution to the state tradition paradigm, primarily on the basis of the comparative analysis of Ottoman and Western state-society relations he has elaborated over more than thirty years. On reading his studies, I have become convinced that Heper has introduced quite remarkable modifications in his analyses over the course of time. As a result, I have decided to examine his studies in three separate chapters, each corresponding, in my opinion, to a noticeably distinct way of approaching the issue of Ottoman state and bureaucracy comparatively.

In the second chapter, I deal with Heper's earliest analyses of Ottoman state and bureaucracy, corresponding, roughly, to what he has written from 1970 to 1980. Here, Heper builds upon a grand contrast between "organic" and "induced" patterns of modernization, pertaining respectively to Western and non-Western settings. Accordingly, he evaluates the Ottoman Empire as an instance of "induced" modernization. As Heper accords high priority to the nature of Ottoman modernization in bringing about the specific attributes of the Ottoman-Turkish state and of state-society relations, it is his discussion of the two diverging patterns of modernization, as well as their historical origins, which I specifically focus upon.

In the third chapter, I take up Heper's more subsequent studies, that is, those he has written between 1980 and 1985. In these studies, Heper directs his attention to the contrasting patterns of state-society relations in the West on the one hand and in the Ottoman Empire on the other prior to the advent of modernization. That is to say, this time, he attempts to account for the divergences between the two cases in their medieval and early-modern phases. These divergences he tries to capture through a contrast between "feudalism" and "patrimonialism". As the latter terms seem to be central to Heper's analysis of this period, I discuss, in more general terms, the twin concepts of feudalism and patrimonialism alongside Heper's own analysis of Ottoman and Western social formations.

In the fourth chapter, I focus upon the analyses Heper has made in the late eighties and throughout the nineties. In his most recent studies, Heper introduces a typology of strong states, on the basis of which he distinguishes two historically distinct patterns of state-society relations in Western Europe. He, then, tries to situate the case of Ottoman-Turkey within this typology, in order to underscore the similarities it evinced with certain European countries. The bulk of the chapter is devoted to a discussion of Heper's renewed comparative perspective. In this chapter, I also deal with the theoretical approach Heper has come to draw upon in devising the typology of strong states.

In conclusion, I make a general assessment of Heper's contribution to the state tradition paradigm, followed by a brief discussion of the problems of the paradigm as exemplified in the studies of Metin Heper.

CHAPTER 2

ORGANIC VERSUS INDUCED PATTERNS OF MODERNIZATION

2.1 Ottoman-Turkish Bureaucracy: Lingering Substantive Rationality

The question Metin Heper poses and tries to answer in *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State* is the following: "Why have the bureaucratic norms of the guardian-caste bureaucracy of the patrimonial Ottoman state persisted in the (at least formally) modern nation-state of the Turkish Republic and not been transformed into norms of a merit bureaucracy?" (1971a: 7). "A corollary question", Heper continues, "is why substantive rationality as a criterion of bureaucratic action was perpetuated and not replaced by formal rationality" (1971a: 7). The persistence of substantive rationality is, for Heper, the basic characteristic which sets apart the Ottoman-Turkish case from the Western bureaucratic development (1971a: 4, 11, 313; 1971b: 444; 1976a: 511). For in the West, instrumental rationality came to replace substantive rationality; otherwise put, the bureaucracies in Western countries gradually acquired an instrumental role in the polity (1971a: 7-9; 1971b: 423-426).

It seems convenient to argue that in his earlier studies on the Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucracy[1] the problem which Heper attempts to account for is this persistence of substantive rationality on the part of the bureaucracy.

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[1] These studies are Heper, 1971a; Heper, 1971b; Heper, 1976a; Heper, 1976b; Heper, 1980b; Heper and Berkman, 1979 and finally Heper, Kim and Pai, 1980. The reason why these studies are assessed here under a single heading is not just their temporal proximity. As will be apparent in the following pages, it seems that they at the same time converge due to a basic similarity in respect of the problem(s) they adress. On the other hand, some of what Heper wrote during the very same period (1970-1980) are left out to be analyzed in the subsequent chapter as they seem to be informed by a different problematic.

Accordingly, the divergence of the Ottoman-Turkish political and administrative development from, what he perceives as, the Western pattern is explicated by means of a contrast between instrumental and substantive rationalities. These terms need clarification. Instrumental (formal) rationality of the bureaucracy denotes its performing "rational action when political ends are given" (1971b: 425). That is, a bureaucracy with instrumental rationality is a "policy-implementing bureaucracy" (1971a: 8), which implies a subordinate role in the polity. On the other hand, a bureaucracy having substantive rationality occupies a much more important role in the polity as its function is not confined to the implementation of policies formulated by "political elites"; rather such a bureaucracy assumes, at the expense of other political actors, the functions of "rule articulation" and "rule aggregation" as well (1971a: 4). Hence it might be termed a policy-making bureaucracy. Thus whereas a bureaucracy with instrumental rationality performs its function on the basis solely of "administrative norms", a bureaucracy with substantive rationality embodies, and acts according to, "political norms" (1971a: 34).[2]

The bulk of Heper's work under discussion in fact concerns modern Turkey, though his remarks on the nineteenth century developments in Ottoman bureaucracy too occupy considerable space. As is well known, this is the period of Ottoman-Turkish attempts at "modernization" or "westernization". In his analysis of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation of this period, Heper above all examines the contradictions wrought by the process of modernization in the bureaucracy. Yet he does not deal with the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucratic development as a unique case in this sense; on the contrary, he consistently draws attention to the similar experiences of other "modernizing nations" (1971a: 5), or in other words, "developing countries" (1971b: 429). Then the subject is a uniform process at work in the bureaucratic organizations of all "non-Western settings" (1971b: 429). This is the phenomenon Heper elucidates by use of the expression "uneven bureaucratic development". "Uneven bureaucratic development", which will be discussed in more detail towards the end of this chapter, underlines the basic feature of contemporary

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[2] The concepts of instrumental and substantive rationality are derived indirectly from Max Weber as Heper, on one occasion (1976a: 511, note 29), in his discussion of the subject refers to Bendix's work (1962), which is an intellectual biography of Weber.

non-Western polities, i.e. the "extensive involvement of bureaucracies in the political process of the developing countries" (1971b: 430). Heper's aim, it might be argued, is to find out the causes of this phenomenon in the context of the Ottoman-Turkish case. To this aim, Heper makes use of comparisons with the Western pattern of modernization. Then, it would not be incorrect to assert that, in these early writings, Heper's point of departure is the historical processes of modernization.

Heper nevertheless presents an examination of the traditional Ottoman order, which we now turn.

2.2 Accounting for the Initial Divergence Between Western and Ottoman Patterns of Development: Different Trajectories of "Historical Bureaucratic Empires"

The concept of patrimonialism, which will come to prominence in Heper's characterization of the Ottoman social formation in his later studies, does not yet occupy a central place in the earlier studies referred above. In *Bureaucracy in the Ottoman-Turkish State* (1971a), for instance, the concept is evoked only sporadically and does not yet have an explanatory significance. That is, Heper does not account for the specific attributes of the Ottoman social formation in terms of its patrimonial nature. Far from being a guiding theme, the concept appears in very few occasions.[3] In none of these instances is any description of "patrimonialism" given. Neither does Heper specify the characteristics of the Ottoman system which made it patrimonial. Rather, he first presents a description of the classical Ottoman system and only then he dubs certain aspects of that system as "patrimonial". Hence it is fair to assert that the concept of patrimonialism does not yet possess a constitutive function in Heper's earlier analyses of the Ottoman case.

This brings one to another tenet of these earlier studies, i.e. Heper's characterization, on the basis of S. N. Eisenstadt's *The Political Systems of Empires* (1963), of the Ottoman state as an instance of "historical bureaucratic empires" (see

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[3]And it appears always in adjectival phrases: the "Ottoman patrimonial state" (1971a: 7), the "earlier patrimonial system" of the Ottoman empire (1971a: 87), the "patrimonial framework" of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy (1971a: 314), to cite a few examples.

Heper, 1971a: 4; Heper, 1976a: 508). Although, as is the case with "patrimonialism", the reference to the concept is infrequent, for a number of reasons Eisenstadt's analysis of historical bureaucratic empires seems to have provided a crucial backdrop for Heper's collation of Ottoman and Western patterns of administrative and political development, which makes it necessary to say a few words on Eisenstadt's study.

Heper (1971a: 4) cites first the "autonomy" of bureaucratic institutions and second the "higher echelons and councils" becoming "a channel of bureaucratic struggle" as the two "distinguishing characteristics" of historical bureaucratic empires. In Eisenstadt's own account, on the other hand, there seems to be a more crucial criterion, namely political centralization and the creation of a certain level of "generalized power", which means "power not embedded in the structure of ascriptive groups, and usable in a generalized way, to implement different goals" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 19). And those ascriptive groups, from whom the ruler wrests the prerogative to make political decisions, are, most notably, "traditional aristocratic, tribal, or patrician groups" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 14). Thus in order for an historical bureaucratic polity to come into being, the ruler should establish his "monopoly of authoritative political decision-making" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 369), for it is always the ruler who sparks off the process leading to the development of such polities (Eisenstadt, 1963: 13; Eisenstadt, 1964a: 236). From here derives Eisenstadt's interest in political struggles obtaining between the ruler and various "elites"— a feature of historical bureaucratic polities Heper mentions. The stages of these struggles, on the other hand, are not just higher bureaucratic positions but also various kinds of "representative institutions" like the "European parliaments and assemblies of estates" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 22). The essence of the struggle between the ruler and the representatives of traditional groups lies in the former's attempt to monopolize political decision making at the expense of the existing privileges of the latter, who in turn resist the monarchial project of centralization (Eisenstadt, 1963: 14, 18; Eisenstadt, 1964a: 236-237).

Regarding the second feature of historical bureaucratic empires which Heper mentions, that is, the autonomy acquired by bureaucratic institutions, the key term for Eisenstadt seems to be "differentiation". In other words, Eisenstadt tries to come to terms with the development of the autonomy of the political sphere via the concept

of differentiation. The autonomy of the political sphere consists in the development of "autonomous political goals by the rulers", of "a limited differentiation of the political activities and roles" and of "specific organizations of administration and political struggle" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 19). The formulation of autonomous goals by the ruler is closely related to the development of generalized power (Eisenstadt, 1964a: 238). Further, the development of autonomous political power is more about the "application of political power for specifically political goals" than "pure arbitrariness of political power" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 364-5). Hence the autonomy attained by the political sphere in historical bureaucratic empires is in no sense an obsolete residue of traditional political systems; rather historical bureaucratic political systems are much more akin to the modern ones in this respect. Accordingly, Eisenstadt, in whose opinion the political systems of historical bureaucratic empires "stand between . . . the 'traditional' and the 'modern' political systems" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 4), constantly asserts that historical bureaucratic polities have only limited autonomy, that is, limited in comparison with modern political systems.

Lastly in order to give an idea as to how the category of historical bureaucratic empires is situated in his general framework, it should be noted that Eisenstadt devices a typology of political systems involving seven different types. Though the typology in its entirety need not concern us here, it is vital to point out that patrimonial and feudal political systems are enlisted as two distinct types in addition to historical bureaucratic and modern political systems (Eisenstadt, 1963: 10). Furthermore Eisenstadt cites both the Ottoman Empire, throughout its history, and European states "from the fall of the feudal systems through the Age of Absolutism" as notable exemplars of historical bureaucratic empires (Eisenstadt, 1963: 11), whereas the political systems of pre-Ottoman Middle East and pre-absolutist Europe are lumped together in the category of feudal political systems in the above-mentioned typology (Eisenstadt, 1963: 10).

It looks as if Eisenstadt's scheme has permeated Heper's early writings, though the influence is not all-encompassing. First of all, the precarious status of the concept of patrimonialism might well be the result of Heper's adoption of the category of historical bureaucratic empires. Heper, nevertheless, employs the concept

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of patrimonialism in some rare occasions, because, it might be argued, the category of historical bureaucratic empires, from Heper's point of view, is not discriminating enough to take account of the dissimilarities between Ottoman and Western patterns of development. On the other hand, patrimonialism is not the only concept which is currently accorded a trivial status, but will later come to possess a much more critical standing; this is equally true for "feudalism". Retrospectively it is apparent that there is a correlation between the limited function served by the concept of patrimonialism and de-emphasis of "feudalism". For in his more recent works, as shall be seen below in the following chapter, Heper attempts to elucidate the variant political outcomes in Ottoman-Turkish society on the one hand, and Western societies on the other, through a grand contrast between patrimonialism and feudalism respectively. There, patrimonialism and feudalism are counterposed against each other as two distinct types of socio-political structures.

Having endorsed the category of historical bureaucratic empires, which by definition leaves out patrimonial and feudal political systems as distinct types, logically it thus becomes inconvenient for Heper to consistently pursue the feudalism-patrimonialism contrast. In any event, the object of analysis in these earlier studies is at variance with that of his later works. Here, the object of analysis is *centralized* empires or states, just like in Eisenstadt's (1963) study, which means that pre-absolutist Europe is of little interest to Heper. Though it should be noted that Heper does not explicitly state that the European states from the advent of royal absolutism on were historical bureaucratic; nonetheless his adoption of Eisenstadt term, as well as the constant references to his work, and the way he tries to account for the divergence of the Ottoman case from the Western pattern might legitimately taken to mean that he draws on Eisenstadt's frame.

In his later studies, on the other hand, Heper's analyses cover a broader historical period when it comes to Europe: there, he is very much concerned with medieval European order and its effects on the subsequent development of European polities. It is only then that European *parlements* and estate structures come to the fore in Heper's analyses.

In the early works, to repeat, Heper's narrative commences with the centralization of political power, or what Eisenstadt calls, the development of

generalized power (Eisenstadt; 1963: 19). This makes hardly any difference, though, in respect of his analysis of the Ottoman state, as the latter, Heper asserts, was centralized almost since its inception, or better, as the Ottoman rulers aspired to build a centralized polity from the very beginning (1971a: 71-72; 1980a: 82-83; 1980c: 9; 1992a: 172). This might explain the peculiar way in which Heper contrasts Western and Ottoman patterns of development. The comparison under discussion appears on the surface to be ahistorical; for Heper juxtaposes two social configurations of quite different historical periods, that is, Ottoman state from roughly fourteenth century on and "Western" states mostly of seventeenth century (see Heper, 1971a: 13-21). This idiosyncracy, however, seems to have been dictated by the problematic within which Heper works.

Although Eisenstadt formulates a general category of historical bureaucratic empires, he does not hold that the societies which it includes are similar in every respect; on the contrary, he notes that there may be many "cultural and historical differences between them" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 12). Nevertheless he argues that "at least some of these differences can most profitable be regarded as variations of [their] common qualities, or as factors which influence such variations" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 12). Now Heper's comparative analysis of the "initial institutionalization patterns in the West and in the Ottoman-Turkish state" (1971a: 13) may well be related to this assertion of Eisenstadt's. This is because Heper sets out to compare the two patterns through common categories, which, moreover, are derived from Eisenstadt. Hence Heper's comparative analysis is couched in terms of, most notably, varying degrees of "structural-functional differentiation" and of the development of "free floating resources" (see 1971a: 12-14; 1971b: 433-434; 1976a: 507-508).

For Eisenstadt, as has been seen, it is the ruler who initiates the process leading to the emergence of historical bureaucratic polities. This might be termed the "subjective" prerequisite since what is at issue is the "emergence of political entrepreneurs, the Emperors and their immediate entourage, who had the vision and the ability to create new political entities" (Eisenstadt, 1964a: 237). There is, however, an "objective", or as Eisenstadt puts it, "external" precondition for the emergence of historical bureaucratic empires: the "development, within all

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institutional spheres of a society, of certain limited levels of differentiation, together with what we shall call 'free-floating' resources" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 27). Differentiation refers to the "ways through which the main social functions or the major institutional spheres of society become dissociated from one another, attached to specialized collectivities and roles, and organized in relatively specific symbolic and organizational frameworks within the confines of the same institutionalized system" (Eisenstadt, 1964b: 376); and as such it is related to the degree of "division of labor" in a given society (Eisenstadt, 1964b: 378). It is differentiation in this sense which brings about the development of free-floating resources, meaning resources "not embedded within or committed beforehand to any primary ascriptive-particularistic group" (Eisenstadt, 1963: 27). It should be added that the resources to be freed are "manpower, economic resources, political support and cultural identifications" (Eisenstadt, 1963, 27).

All these processes Eisenstadt outlines are related to, or have a bearing upon, the development of generalized and autonomous political power referred to above. For one thing, it is quite obvious that the process of differentiation is at work in the political sphere too and that its differentiation from other institutional spheres of society is, as has been shown, central to the advent of historical bureaucratic polities. But equally important is the impact of social differentiation at large on the political sphere. Herein lies the significance of free-floating resources. As it is through differentiation that resources are freed, the former contributes to the tendency toward the generalization of power in that it puts an end to the monopolization of resources by traditional groups. When various resources cease to be in the patrimony of, say, aristocracy or the Church, then they become available for the use of the ruler (1964a: 238). Thus in this way the differentiation of institutional spheres, which are by definition "external" to the political sphere, furnishes the ruler with the wherewithal to build autonomous political power.

Turning now to Heper's analysis, it should first be noted that Heper deals with the processes of structural functional differentiation in relation to the state. Otherwise put, he is more interested in the degree of differentiation within the "political system" itself than he is in differentiation at large. Hence when he employs the term "differentiation", what he has in mind is the extent to which "political and

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administrative functions become separated from economic, religious and other functions" (1971b: 433). On the other hand, when his object of analysis is, for example, Ottoman social structure, Heper does not tend to resort to the term, or its likes (see 1971a: 56-94). To sum up, differentiation seems to be a concept that Heper employs in order to come to terms with the evolution of bureaucratic organizations.

Heper traces the source of the differential patterns of administrative and political development in Ottoman-Turkish and Western societies to the varying characteristics of initial stages of state centralization. Hence he focuses upon on the one hand, the early centuries of the Ottoman state, and on the other hand the period of the rise of "royal monarchies" (1971a: 21) in the West. The gist of his argument is that the variation in the ensuing patterns of development had to do primarily with the extent to which resources were freed from traditional units during the respective periods of the development of centralized political power. Among the resources that Eisenstadt records, it was, Heper argues, the varying degrees to which "cultural identifications" were freed which resulted in the basic discrepancy between the two experiences (1971a: 13). In the Ottoman case, the "process of freeing of cultural identifications" was arrested due to the "fusion of state and religion" (1971a: 13-14). One implication to be derived from this argument is that the other major resources, namely, "manpower", "economic resources" and "political support" were sufficiently freed in the Ottoman case. That is, they were at the disposal of the Ottoman rulers rather than being monopolized by some "traditional" groups. This inference accords with Heper's assertion that both the aristocracy and the warlords as well as the various religious sects and guild organizations, which had enjoyed considerable autonomy and power in the formative years of the state, were gradually subdued (1971a: 71; 1980a: 83, 86; 1980c: 10-11; 1985a: 14-15, 22, 23-24; 1992a: 172, 179). For these must have been the groups which were in a position to monopolize the resources.

So initially the most basic contrast between the Ottoman and Western patterns pertained to state-religion relationship. As opposed to the fusion of state and religion in the Ottoman case, in the West during the advent of absolutist monarchies

"religion and state were separated once and for all" (1971a: 14).[4] During the course of this development, not only did the state and religion emerge as distinct institutional spheres, but also the "state obtained the upper hand" (1971a: 14). In the Ottoman case, on the other hand, "a tradition of sovereignty based on the unity of religion and state" lingered on (1971a: 17). But the state cannot be said to have been the outright dominant component; rather, in Berkes's words, "the state was conceived as the embodiment of religion and the religion as the essence of the state."[5] Thus the kernel of state policies emanated from Islam, or Islamic norms. On the other hand, Heper acknowledges that the embryonic Ottoman state was exposed to both Islamic and non-Islamic influences (1971a: 57); and the latter, it seems, was related to the fact that the founders of the state were warriors committed to the "ghazi tradition" (1971a: 58; 1971b: 438). In addition, Heper also takes note of the fact that in previous Islamic states, there always remained a certain degree of space left for secular legislation by the rulers (1971a: 59) and that in the Ottoman case this space was guaranteed by the "Islamic conception of *urf*", or "customary law", as opposed to "*seriat*", or "Islamic law" (1971a: 17). Though secular law, in the form of *urf*, Heper continues, initially prevailed over religious law, later on the situation was reversed as the hold of Islamic law was gradually strengthened such that in the sixteenth century the Islamic influences reached their zenith (1971a: 20, 59-60, 62; 1971b: 438; 1981: 348). The result was that in the Ottoman state "Islamic norms largely predominated over political and administrative norms" (1971a: 15).

What distinguished the Western experience from the Ottoman state, in this context, was the presence, in the former, of secular state norms (1971a: 21, 28). Needless to say, this had to do with the separation of religion, or the Church, and state. Heper reframes the contrast between the two patterns as a disparity between the "value systems" which pervaded the states in question: a "prescriptive value system" in the Ottoman state versus a "principal value system" in the Western states (1971a:

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[4] This assertion seems to be in line with Eisenstadt's argument that of all historical bureaucratic societies, the European absolute monarchies were the "most differentiated" ones (1963: 31). However, it should be added that Eisenstadt does not assign particular importance to state-religion relations in this respect. For his treatment of differential development of religion and religious organization in historical bureaucratic societies see 1964a, pp. 242-247.

[5] Quoted in Heper, 1971a: 15.

17-31). To clarify, a prescriptive value system consists of rigid and unalterable norms "governing almost every situation in life", whereas a principle value system "does not attempt to regulate economic, political and social life in great detail", which makes it much more flexible (1971a: 17, note 2). Hence in the Ottoman case the predominance of Islamic norms culminated in a static political philosophy which hinged on the maintenance of the social order "as an unalterable tradition" (1971a: 58). The preoccupation with "control" overshadowed the concern for "efficiency" (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 311).

The ascendancy in the states under discussion of two different value frames, or in more general terms, the varying success of the process of "freeing of cultural identifications" had, Heper argues, certain implications on the corresponding bureaucratic organizations. For in the Western states, the unequivocal predominance of secular norms over religious ones cleared the way for the "ensuing structural and functional differentiation" (1971a: 19). Otherwise stated, the cluster of secular norms on which the state functioned was "compatible with the requirements of structural and functional differentiation" (1971a: 33). Thus in the West a differentiated bureaucratic organization eventually emerged. There, to be more precise, "royal household" was transformed into "royal service", which would later be succeeded by a "public service" (1971a: 21). In short, the pursuit of secular norms acted as a catalyst for change in the bureaucratic organizations, such that both in Prussia and France, for example, "professional civil service" was brought into being to "serve the secular ends of an absolute state" (1971a: 24). For elaborate state policies "necessitated . . . the systematic use of administration" by the monarchs (1971b: 423). In France, to cite an example, the structural and functional differentiation of the bureaucratic apparatus owed much to the spur provided by the pursuance of "mercantilist norms" (1971a: 22).

On the other hand, in the Ottoman case there was little room for a structurally and functionally differentiated bureaucratic organization to flourish as state policies were under the sway of religious formulae. In fact, the role of the (civil) bureaucracy in the classical Ottoman polity was markedly limited as the bureaucracy was nothing more than "an aid to the Sultan in his administration along the lines of Islamic principle" (1971a: 29; 1971b: 438). Under these circumstances, Heper continues,

differentiation of bureaucratic functions was substantially slow in coming (1971a: 29).

To reiterate, Heper's argument is that the initial contrast between the bureaucratic development in the West and in the Ottoman Empire hinges on the presence in the former case of secular state norms as opposed to their absence in the latter. However it should at once be noted that, for Heper, this contrast does not capture the overall dissimilarity between the two cases in their entire historical evolution; rather it pertains solely to the initial stages of development of the Western states on the one hand and of the Ottoman state on the other. That is to say, in the later stages the difference did not certainly diminish but took altogether new forms. For the coming of middle class supremacy in politics, Heper argues, drastically altered the whole landscape of European polities (1971a: 8-11, 21-28, 318; 1971b: 423-426; 1976a: 508; 1976b: 485; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306), whereas in the Ottoman case other, though in a way related, processes were at work, to which we will return in the following pages.

Some conclusions might be drawn from what has been presented up to now. Recall that in the Ottoman case, in Heper's view, there was an absence of secular state policies as state norms remained, to a great extent, under the hold of Islamic norms. Sultan's prerogative to formulate and put to effect policies on the basis of considerations for "necessity" and "reason" (1971a: 17), unrestricted by the prescriptive Islamic value system, gradually shrank in importance. Then it might well be asserted that Heper's remarks on the "initial institutionalization pattern" of the Ottoman state boil down to the argument, in Eisenstadt's terms, that what was largely lacking was the "application of political power for specifically political goals". The latter is, as has been noted, the major aspect of the autonomy of political power for Eisenstadt. Otherwise stated, the Ottoman state (or "political system" as Eisenstadt would have it) of the period under discussion was insufficiently autonomous, or better, it was imbued with much less autonomy as compared to its Western counterparts.

Hence Heper does not yet posit the contrast between the two patterns as one of instrumental versus substantive rationality. This is because the rationality possessed by the Western bureaucracies of the period was in no sense instrumental as

the secular state policies in question emanated from the state itself. This means that attitude of the bureaucrats depended on political norms rather than purely administrative ones. Therefore Western "royal service" of the time was far from being "an instrumental arm of the polity" (1971a: 11); on the contrary it enjoyed utmost autonomy (1971b: 423). More important was the nature of the goals, or norms, the bureaucracies imposed on the society. These were not only secular, as has been previously noted, but also "rational" (1971a: 16). The bureaucratic activities were colored by a "political" concept of "efficiency" (1971b: 425). Heper cites "military considerations" and "motives of economic unification" as the kernel of the policies of absolutist monarchies in the West (1971a: 21) and elsewhere asserts that policies of centralization and unification were accompanied by their "economic corollary", namely, "mercantilism" (1971b: 423). Mercantilist policies are quite important in Heper's description of Western states of the early modern era. Though he does not dwell upon the term at any length, it seems that he conceives of mercantilism as a cluster of policies geared toward the aim of "helping business classes" (1971a: 27; 1985a: 100). It is noteworthy that for Heper the adoption of mercantilist policies by the European states had little to do with the pressures coming from the business classes themselves, for the strengthening of the latter came about later on and, more importantly, as a result of the state policies in question (1971a: 27; 1985a: 100). In other words, the middle classes of the period under consideration did not possess that much weight in the polity so as to shape state policies.[6] Thus mercantilist policies were a facet of the substantive rationality on the part of the state. To illustrate, with regard to the economic policy of absolutist France, Heper writes that "royal service . . . impressed *its own* mercantile scheme of order on the local and general economic life" (1971a: 21, emphasis added). It should be added that there are other terms Heper evokes to come to terms with the substantive rationality of

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[6] It should be noted that in some of his later works within this period, Heper tends to emphasize the role of the middle classes in the constitution of the absolutist states. He asserts that their "co-operation . . . with the rulers" paved the way for the "establishment of the centralized state with a royal bureaucracy" (Heper, 1976b: 485; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). For a similar argument see Sugar, 1964: 147.

absolutist states. These are "cameralism" and "reason of state", terms he neither specifies nor relates to mercantilism.[7]

Nonetheless, these three are the shorthands for the kind of bureaucratic orientations which, due to their very absence, turns out to be quite important for Heper's appreciation of the Ottoman state or bureaucracy. In stark contrast to the situation in the West, Heper writes, the Ottoman policy of centralization had to do only with "military considerations" (1971a: 21), which had two implications. First, there was no economic dimension to that policy (1971a: 21). Second, military considerations themselves were "part of the religious belief" (1971a: 21, 30). Hence the argument that the Ottoman policy of centralization cannot be identified as a secular policy. As a result, "until the twentieth century", Heper holds, "neither a secular policy of reason of state, based on military considerations, nor a norm of mercantilism developed" in the Ottoman Empire (1971a: 29). Instead, both "remained subordinate to the Islamic norms" (1971a: 29-30).[8]

It might be concluded that the initial divergence between the bureaucratic patterns in the West and in the Ottoman Empire, for Heper, occasioned from the absence in the Ottoman case of the kind of substantive rationality which characterized the European absolutist states. Otherwise stated, it is the nonexistence of political decisions based on "necessity" and reason", and free of religious commands, which accounts for the peculiarity of the Ottoman state. Yet in view of the respective historical evolutions of bureaucratic administration in the West and in the Ottoman Empire in later centuries, Heper makes use of another contrast, which we now turn.

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[7] Only on two occasions does Heper hint at what cameralism and reason of state stand for in his mind: he states that reason of state concerned "military considerations" (1971a: 29) and that cameralism had an essential "political-economy component" as well as a "legal" dimension (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 311).

[8] The absence of mercantilist policies in the Ottoman Empire is a recurring theme of Heper's writings and will be treated in more detail below in the following chapters.

2.3 The Rise of the Middle Classes in the West: Organic Modernization

The critical landmark in the evolution of Western bureaucracies was the arrival of middle class supremacy (1971a: 8-11, 21-28, 318; 1971b: 423-429; 1976a: 508; 1976b: 485; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). The middle classes[9] in the West first came to dominate the "society" and then the "polity", the latter development Heper calls the coming into being of "bourgeois politics" (1971b: 426-427). For Heper, the fact that middle class supremacy did not remain confined to the economy is hardly surprising, as he asserts from a general point of view that the "components of (a) social system" are functionally interdependent and accordingly that any change in a particular sphere is bound to produce parallel changes in other spheres as well (1971b: 426-427). Thus the eventual development of the "commercial industrial system" in the West, which ensued from wide-ranging structural and valuational changes in society[10], as well as from the policies of absolutist states, necessitated certain transformations in the bureaucratic organizations themselves (1971b: 426).

Heper asserts that "there is a crucial relationship between middle class supremacy in politics and the nature of bureaucratic performance" (1971b: 423-424). In this respect the evolution of Western bureaucracies is a case in point. As has been noted above, prior to the strengthening of the middle classes, Western bureaucracies were characterized by substantive rationality and a political concept of efficiency. They were thus autonomous from major societal groups, and the political norms, or values, they possessed were of their own. As middle classes came to dominate the

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[9] Heper does not concentrate much on the way in which middle classes, or the bourgeoisie, came to existence in the West. But some light might be shed on the issue if Sugar's account (1964), which seems to have influenced Heper a great deal, is taken into consideration. Sugar writes: "The process began in the late Middle Ages with the disintegration of feudal society and the revival of trade and of town life, and early involved the growth of manufacture. This development created a new force in society, the citizen or urban dweller, who derived such political power as he possessed from his economic pursuits" (1964: 147). This must be, more or less, what Heper has in mind, as can be seen, for instance, in his allusion to the way the "burghers develop into self-made capitalists" in the West (1976b: 492; 1985a: 101).

[10] Heper tries to come to terms with these transformations via the concepts of "social mobilization" and "structural functional differentiation", the former denoting the "value transformations" which paved the way for the changes encompassed by the latter concept (1971b: 426). And he adds that all these changes were related to modernization, the process whereby "advanced, nontraditional practices in culture, technology and economic life are introduced and accepted on a considerable scale" (1971b: 426).

economy and the polity, Heper continues, the whole situation began to change. Middle class dominance in the polity, it seems, had two dimensions. The first one had to do with the penetration of the "bureaucratic sector" by middle class values[11], while the second consisted in the more direct participation of the middle classes in politics in the sense of "restricting the prerogatives of their rulers" (1971a: 318). The net result was that the bureaucracies in the West "lost their autonomies in the polity and were induced to adopt . . . a more technical concept of efficiency" (1971a: 8; 1971b: 423). Otherwise put, it was the middle classes who effected this change through "depoliticizing" the bureaucracies (1971a: 316). Thus the bureaucracies no longer had political norms of their own. Instead, bureaucratic norms came to reflect "societal orientations . . . largely represented by the middle classes" (1971b: 427). Heper summarizes the transformation in question as a move "from substantive rationality as reflected in cameralism and in reason of state, toward formal rationality as reflected in narrow specialization in administrative techniques" (1971a: 27-28; 1971b: 425). The function of the bureaucracy was now confined to implementing the policies formulated by "its political masters" (1971b: 427), that is, the "political executive" (1971b: 425). It was in this way that in the West the "mercantilist state" gave way to the "bourgeois state" (1976a: 508). This entailed a much more circumscribed role for the state in relation to the workings of the economy. That is, the state "assumed the role of an arbitrator" (1971a: 27; 1971b: 425).[12]

Heper, drawing on Sugar's analysis (1964), designates the above-mentioned changes which obtained in the West as an "organic" pattern of change (1971a: 37; 1976a: 508; 1976b: 485; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). They were "organic" in the sense of having been "brought about by a middle-class which dominated polity and the society" (1971b: 427). The essence of the transformations in the West was that they consisted in "political-change-as-a-response-to-the-demands-of-the-ruled" (1976a: 508).[13]

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[11] These values are "objectivity, consistency and the like" (1971a: 316).

[12] Heper relates this phenomenon to "rule of law" and "laisez-faire" (1971a: 27; 1971b: 425).

[13] Although Heper's account of the evolution of Western states in this later period gives primary emphasis to the impact of the middle classes, he also notes that in time other "social forces", too, burst into the political scene with new demands and that in turn the state apparatus was "rendered responsive" to such groups (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). "(T)his cycle", Heper writes, "was

2.4 Induced Modernization in the Ottoman Empire

The organic model, on the other hand, does not provide one with many insights into the evolution of late Ottoman and Turkish politics. In its stead, Heper makes use of another construct, that is, the "induced" model of change (1971a: 37; 1976a: 518; 1976b: 485-486; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306-307). Hence whereas Heper explicates the initial divergence between the Western and Ottoman patterns of development on the basis of the presence or absence of secular and rational state policies, when it comes to the latter stages of their respective evolution, i.e. the period following the rise of middle classes in the West[14] and the period of modernization from late eighteenth-early nineteenth century on in the Ottoman Empire, it is the counterpositioning of organic and induced models which emerges as the guiding thread of his comparative analysis. Heper (1976b: 485-486) describes the induced pattern of change as follows:

> Induced development evinces in order of time, (1) an outside stimulus, usually in the form of overwhelming power; (2) the emergence of a leader (or leaders) who seek to elevate their nation to a position of like power; (3) the creation of a new bureaucracy and a change in the political structure; (4) economic change, planned and in part executed by the central government, and (5) the emergence of a middle class followed by a variety of further expressions of collective economic interest.

2.4.1 Ottoman Social Structure and the Absence of Middle Classes

The factor which was responsible for the emergence and perpetuation of this pattern in the Ottoman-Turkish case was the absence of "middle classes capable of inducing an 'organic growth'"(1971b: 442). Thus it can be argued that in the dichotomy between the organic and induced patterns, the touchstone is, respectively, the

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completed during the second part of the nineteenth century" (1976b: 485). This state of affairs constituted the basis of "political development", i.e. the "competent responsiveness of the political system to emerging societal needs", in the West (1976a: 508). Lastly, it should be noted that one of such social groups whose imposition of new demands altered the state was the working classes; it was in this way that the "bourgeois state" was transformed into the "welfare state" (1976a: 508). Heper's brief discussion of the impact of working classes, however, does not have much bearing upon his analysis of Ottoman-Turkish social development.

[14] It is hard to say that Heper makes a clear periodization; nowhere does he mention exactly when the middle classes set out to erode the substantive rationality of Western states.

presence or absence of middle classes. Accordingly, it is the absence of middle classes which explains the peculiar characteristics of late Ottoman development (1971a: 39, 76, 83, 91, 93, 318-319, 323; 1971b: 437-440; 1976a: 510; 1976b: 485, 488-493; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306).

As a result, the absence of secular state policies gives way to another absence, that is, the absence of a bourgeoisie as the explanatory variable in Heper's account. In both cases, the Western pattern is taken as the norm, or the yardstick to assess the nature of the Ottoman case. Hence regarding the later period, that is, the period of Ottoman modernization, the norm against which the Ottoman case is judged is the Western bourgeoisie with, what might be called, an alternative project of its own. For Heper asserts that what was lacking in the Ottoman case was "middle classes as 'carriers of ideas and ideals'"(1971a: 39). That is to say, merchants and traders did exist in the Ottoman Empire; but the problem was that they "lived at the margins of the polity" (1976b: 492). As such, they were unable to develop "autonomous and positive political orientations of [their] own" (1971a: 93). It is, on the other hand, the attributes of the Ottoman structure which, at least partially, accounts for this situation.

The Ottoman social structure was first of all a "bifurcated" structure: the population was rigidly "compartmentalized into two distinct entities, the polity and the strata" (1971a: 72). The strata, or the *reaya*, comprised peasants, merchants and craftsmen, all of whom were seen merely as "subjects who had to pay taxes" (1971a: 72-74). Hence they were far from "playing an effective role in politics" (1971a: 64). The members of the polity, the *askeri*, included all Ottoman bureaucrats: "officers of the court, and military, civil and religious bureaucracies", who enjoyed certain privileges denied to the rest of the population (1971a: 72).

Having given this standard description[15], Heper puts forward an important argument, i.e. that in the Ottoman Empire "it was the polity, not the strata, from which the disequilibrating forces might emerge" (1971a: 69). This was, Heper argues, due to the "objective stratification decisions" taken during the early centuries of state formation (1971a: 63-64, 69-72). These decisions were geared towards

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[15] For an earlier statement in like vein, to which Heper himself constantly refers, see İnalcık, 1964: 44.

"obtaining adequate resources from the strata"[16] (1971a: 63), which rendered it an imperative to "curb any potential autonomous economic power on the part of the members of both the polity and the strata" (1971a: 64). Thus the sultans strived, above all, to establish their monopoly over all the economic resources of the empire.

In contrast to his later studies, however, here Heper does not spend much time on the specific mechanisms through which this monopoly was attained. He notes, though, the relevance of the *tımar* system, which "ruled out the flourishing of any autonomous local aristocracies" (1971a: 74; 1971b: 438-439; 1976a: 509).[17] The contrast is more apparent when it comes to the question of state's attitude towards the growth of commercial capital, since Heper's basic argument in this respect is simply that commercial activities were scorned (1971a: 73; 1976b: 494). Although he notes that merchants as well as artisans were organized in state-regulated guilds (1971a: 73; 1976a: 509), he does not dwell upon its consequences. Only in one of the later studies in this period (1976b: 488) does he mention "confiscatory practices", "sumptuary laws" and the absence of a concept of "legal personality". Consequently, it might be asserted that in these early writings the causal link between the monopolization of economic resources by the sultan and the non-emergence of "genuine" middle classes is not elaborate. In fact, Heper seems to be more interested in the fact that middle classes similar to those in the West failed to emerge in the Ottoman society than he is in the specific ways in which this situation came about.

It should at once be noted that Heper's earlier analyses under scrutiny does not depart from those to come only in respect of the above observations. On the contrary, there is a more cardinal difference; that is, Heper does not yet posit a "state tradition" pertaining to the classical Ottoman period. This putative tradition will later turn out to be the clue as to the operations of the Ottoman state. In his subsequent

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[16] This had its roots, Heper asserts, in the Ottoman political philosophy (1971a: 69-70). In this respect, Heper draws on İnalcık (1964: 43) who contends that the "old Oriental maxim that a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice" provided the kernel of "practical statemanship" in the Ottoman Empire.

[17] The *tımar* system can be said to have been the major aspect of state's control over "free floating resources". Because it enabled the state not only to extract agricultural resources in the form of peasant taxes but also to conscript the peasants into the army, both via its provincial agents, that is, the *tımar*-holders (1971a: 71). Thus it secured state's firm control over the land (the major "economic resource"), the agricultural produce, and also "manpower".

studies, in other words, even when Heper carries on the above mentioned themes, he re-considers them in light of his new construct. The state tradition argument, as will be shown below, postulates a peculiar Ottoman "reason of state" corresponding to a web of premeditated "state norms". That there is not yet a "state tradition" argument in Heper's earlier analyses, on the other hand, is hardly surprising. For, to repeat, in these earlier analyses it is precisely the absence of this kind of (secular) "state norms" which accounts for the peculiarities of the Ottoman state of the classical period.

As the state tradition argument is yet to come, here Heper seems to think that the strategic "decisions" taken by the Ottoman rulers were dictated by certain exigencies. Otherwise stated, it is as if the policies at issue did not emanate from a "reason of state". To illustrate, Heper argues that the decision to monopolize the control over economic resources was "taken to attain absolute power" (1971a: 63); on the other hand, the rulers aspired to have absolute power because the social order they had inherited was a "stratified" one, on which they had to impose "harmony" (1971a: 61, 63; 1976b: 486). Likewise, Heper tends to associate the instituting of a land-system with state ownership of land, the *tımar* system, to the problem of "providing food" for the increasing urban population (1971a: 70-71). In neither case is Heper inclined to relate the policies under consideration to an inherent logic pertaining to the state. The reverse will be the case, however, in his later analyses.

The policy of the prevention of accumulation of wealth concerned not only the merchants and artisans but also the bureaucrats. The latter were simply "salaried functionaries", whose wealth was consfiscated upon their death (1971a: 74). As such, they did not enjoy any "feudal privileges" (1971a: 74). Moreover, they were the target for further regulations since, unlike the members of the strata, they wielded considerable, albeit delegated, power. The latter regulations Heper calls "noetic stratification decisions" (1971a: 63-69). These decisions aimed at making the members of the polity "faithful servants of the Sultan" (1971a: 68). The primary means through which absolute loyalty to the ruler was imparted to the members of the polity were the recruitment and educational systems: the civil and military bureaucrats were recruited from among the non-muslim population and educated in palatine schools in order to make sure that they remain isolated from the subject

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population, whereas the religious bureaucrats, though from muslim families, went through a strict state-regulated education (1971a: 64-68; 1971b: 438; 1976a: 509).[18] All these were designed to "prevent the bureaucratic political orientations from becoming independent" from those of the ruler's (1971a : 63). The ruler's prime orientation, on the other hand, was keeping the social order intact (1971a: 58). The latter was the task assigned to the bureaucratic organization.

What ensued from these stratification decisions, Heper concludes, was a "static social structure" (1971a: 74), which "precluded the possibility of a breakthrough by the rising of an entrepreneurial middle class" (1971a: 76). The bureaucratic organization, on the other hand, served as the guardian of this static order.

2.4.2 Disintegration of the Traditional Order

The whole landscape of the Empire changed, however, with the disintegration of the classical system from late sixteenth century on (1971a: 76). The disintegration set in when "military reverses" (1971a: 439; 1976a: 509-510) and the adverse effects of the growth of European trade on the Ottoman social formation (1971a: 80-82) coalesced to produce a shortage of "economic resources" on the part of the ruling center (1971a: 77). A global change in military technology, too, played a part since it rendered obsolete the cavalry forces provided, in times of war, by *tımar*-holders, the "traditional backbone of the Ottoman army", and necessitated the creation of a standing army equipped with firearms and sustained by the central budget, as a result of which the center's need for new resources was exacerbated (1971a: 82-83). In response to these developments, Ottoman rulers resorted to "new measures of obtaining economic resources" (1971a: 77). These measures had to do with the system of taxation: the abolition of the *tımar* system, the basis of which was the relegation of the right to collect taxes from the peasantry to state-appointed *tımar*-holders, and the "ensuing selling of taxing rights to the so-called tax-farmers"

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[18] It should be added that Heper indicates to the distinctiveness of the religious organization. He notes that Ottoman Empire was characterized by a "dual polity": the "Ruling Institution versus the Moslem Institution" (1971a: 60). The latter was peculiar in that it was not staffed by (non-muslim) officials "having the status of slaves of the Sultan" (1971a: 60).

(1971a: 81). The two measures under consideration were, Heper continues, "unconscious objective stratification decisions" because they were instantly devised to resolve the financial predicament, but their long-term consequences on the "distribution of economic resources" were not foreseen (1971a: 77). The eradication of the *tımar*-system in favour of tax-farming, in other words, ended up destructing the initial pattern of the distribution of resources.

Heper briefly discusses the ways in which the socio-economic structure of the Empire was, in time, drastically altered by the above measures (1971a: 83-94). He gives primary emphasis to two processes, one being the process whereby disgruntled former *tımar*-holders, with the support they derived from peasants over-burdened by taxation, turned themselves into "dissident armed groups against the polity", eventually to seize tax-farming privileges and become provincial magnates (1971a: 86-87). This development signaled the emergence of local notables, the *ayan*, whose status as provincial power-holders was ultimately given legal recognition by the state with the signing of *Sened-i İttifak* (the Pact of Alliance) of 1808 (1971a: 87). The most crucial consequence of this agreement between the ruler and the local notables was the "compartmentalization of power and politics between the central and provincial components of the polity", which undermined ruler's control over the economic resources in the provinces (1971a: 87-88). On the other hand, the second process, which complemented the former, concerns the "tax-farmers, bankers and pashas" network which was brought into being by the practice of leasing tax collection rights in a given district to the highest bidder: prospective tax-farmers were financially backed by (minority) bankers, who made use of their personal relations with (corrupt) bureaucrats to benefit their clients, while these bureaucrats got "considerable kick-backs out of these transactions" (1971a: 84-86). The result was that certain members of the polity as well as the bankers came to acquire considerable wealth (1971a: 85). More important, however, was the fact that "'investment' in land" in the form of "usury" turned out to be a quite lucrative way of profit making especially for those members of the polity who engaged in above-mentioned transactions, thus forcing a change in the land regime toward private property (1971a: 85-86). Heper calls this new avenue of profit making "financial capitalism" (1971a: 85).

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Both processes, Heper concludes, worked against ruler's monopoly over economic resources. Hence the previous pattern of "objective stratification" was shattered. Yet the result was in no sense the emergence of middle classes similar in character to those in the West. As the above account demonstrates, there surely were groups which benefited economically from the changing situations in the Empire but, for Heper, it is not correct to view them as Ottoman counterparts of the middle classes in the West. The reasons for this are threefold: those persons who came to possess extensive control over economic resources as a result of the changes in the system of taxation and later in the land regime, Heper argues, were "members of the polity taking personal advantage of the financial impasse" of the state; second, they thus "never developed an autonomous economic power in isolation from the State"; and finally, they "never spearheaded a transformation into a capitalistic system" (1971a: 83, note 2).[19] Otherwise stated, the problem is not only that they started to accumulate wealth thanks to their official positions, but also that even when they consolidated their riches, they remained dependent on state.

It is interesting to note that Heper does not seem to appraise the case of the Ottoman agents of "financial capitalism" in the light of the example of Western middle classes of the period of the "mercantilist state". If this were the case, it might be argued, Heper would not mind much about the absence of autonomous economic power on the part of the Ottoman nouveau riche. This is because, from Heper's point of view, it should be quite dubious whether Western middle classes of the mercantilist era themselves wielded such power, since he notes that they were supported by the state (1971a: 27). Though, it should be added, Heper does not hint at the mechanisms through which the Western states supported the middle classes, which gives one only a faint idea as to the way he perceives state-middle class relationship during this period.

Although Heper writes this new group of "entrepreneurs" off as would-be middle classes, he tends to think that there indeed were other groups who could have developed into Western-type middle classes, namely, Ottoman merchants and craftsmen. During the classical period, as noted earlier, the latter operated under

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[19] It is remarkable that Heper does not tend to problematize the forms of investment undertaken by these groups. The emphasis is rather on their official status and their resultant dependence on the state.

strict regulations, and as a result they were not in a position to bear their stamp on the society as did their European counterparts. On the other hand it appears that, for Heper, they could well have moved in this direction in the later centuries, had they not been overwhelmed by the dominance of European trade and industry (1971a: 91-92). For the disintegration of the traditional Ottoman order mitigated the adverse effects of the previous "objective stratification decisions" on the accumulation of wealth on the part of merchants and artisans. That is to say, they too could have benefited from the ruler's loss of control over the economy. In the face of the impact of European economic supremacy, however, they could not take the chance. This was a foregone opportunity to effect the transition to a "capitalistic system" (1971a: 79, 91).[20] Apparently, in Heper's view, Ottoman merchants and craftsmen, as members of the "strata" and not the "polity", were "private" agents whose wealth did not depend on official status, unlike, for instance, tax-farmers. This is, it seems, one reason why they were more likely to develop into middle classes when compared to the previously mentioned groups.

To conclude, according to Heper, it was not just the policies of the rulers (i.e. "noetic and objective stratification decisions")[21], which were responsible for the non-emergence of "genuine" middle classes in the Ottoman social formation. The economic developments in the West and their repercussions on the Empire, too, played a part. Thus these two factors together "precluded a breakthrough from the

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[20] The conditions in the Empire, Heper continues, were in fact conducive to the development of capitalism as "[t]rade and commerce was differentiated from agriculture, a certain amount of capital was accumulated, and an adequate working force was liberated from agriculture as reaya were driven off the land or deserted their lands to escape from taxation" (1971a: 91-92).

[21] As previously noted in connection with Heper's analysis of the initial divergence between Western and Ottoman patterns of development, the basic precept guiding the actions of the Ottoman rulers was that of keeping the social order intact. One facet of this orientation was the polity's attitude towards the strata, which Berkes encapsulates as "securing to each category of the ruled no less and no more than it deserved according to its function and station" (quoted in Heper, 1971a: 58). It is quite clear that, for Heper, this stood in stark contrast to the policies of absolutist states in the West, which supported their subjects' quest for enrichment. Hence the argument regarding the absence of mercantilist policies in the Ottoman Empire. Heper concludes that the constitutive "decisions" given by the Ottoman rulers "precluded any radical change in the socio-economic structure of the Empire, such as an attempt *on the part of the polity* to effect an evolution into a capitalistic system through adoption of some sort of a 'bourgeois politics'" (1971a: 79, emphasis added). This assertion indicates that, for Heper, what the Ottoman state lacked was indeed the kind of substantive rationality which its European counterparts possessed. This can be taken as the "indigenous" factor accounting for the non-emergence of Western-type middle classes.

Ottoman-Turkish quasi-medieval order by means of the rise of an entrepreneurial middle class" (1971a: 312).[22]

Given the absence of "extensive or influential entrepreneurial middle classes similar in composition" to those in the West (1971b: 439; 1976a: 510), Heper directs his attention to the bureaucratic organization itself as the alternative agent of change. That is, he investigates the impact of the disintegration of the classical Ottoman system on the bureaucracy.

2.4.3 The Emergence of the "Bureaucratic Ruling Tradition"

During the classical period, that is, until late sixteenth century, the sultans had firm control over their functionaries, as noted earlier. The "noetic stratification decisions" guaranteed that the "political orientations" of the bureaucrats were kept in close check. The result was that their political orientations were no different than those of the rulers, the core of which was the ideal of preventing any change in the social order. In this respect, it might be argued that, for Heper, bureaucracy's standing within the traditional Ottoman system was both central and at the same time inconsequential. It was central because the duty of the maintenance of the order, within which the sultan unmistakably had the upper hand, was conferred upon the bureaucracy (1971a: 61, 314). Yet it was inconsequential because the bureaucracy was no more than a mere appendage (1971a: 29; 1971b: 438).

However, the "disequilibrating" tendencies within the bureaucratic organization were unleashed as soon as the disintegration set in. The developments which undermined ruler's monopoly on economic resources had certain "secondary effects" on the bureaucratic organization in that they abated ruler's control over his functionaries (1971a: 77, 88). That is to say, it was not much that the previous noetic stratification decisions were discarded; rather, the "change in the objective stratification", which had resulted from the instituting of the tax-farming system and from the ensuing alterations in land-holding, caused them to become "less effective"

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[22] Heper elsewhere notes that the "first truly economic classes" in the Ottoman Empire were the "minority merchant groups" of the early nineteenth century (1976a: 510, note 26). But he implies that these groups did not have any significant impact on the Ottoman polity.

(1971a: 77). The result was that as ruler's absolute power declined, the Ottoman bureaucrats began to develop "autonomous" political orientations (1971a: 77, 93), which were no longer in accordance with the "political philosophy of the earlier period" (1971a: 90). This was, in fact, the peculiarity of the Ottoman pattern of development: in the absence of Western-type middle classes, the rulers "were losing the power and the loyalty which they once enjoyed, and because of this loss, the other components of the polity, rather than the strata in general benefiting" (1971a: 91). To clarify, whereas in the West the middle classes were gaining political influence at the expense of the "state elites", in the Ottoman Empire the main beneficiary of the attenuation of the absolute power of the sultan was his administrative staff. Because middle classes capable of imposing their own values on the bureaucratic organization failed to emerge, in the Ottoman case, the bureaucrats themselves turned out to be the carriers of reformist projects (1976a: 508). [23]

This state of affairs issued in the emergence of the "bureaucratic ruling tradition" in the beginning of the nineteenth century (1971a: 38-39, 76; 1971b: 440, 442; 1976a: 508, 510; 1976b: 486; 1980b: 73, and Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). The birth of this tradition signaled the coming to prominence in the Ottoman polity of the "modernizing bureaucracy" (1976b: 486; Heper and Berkman: 306). This bureaucracy was radically different from the traditional Ottoman bureaucracy; that is, the modernizing bureaucrats were no longer the "faithful servants of the Sultan". Far from being a barren adjunct to the ruler, the bureaucrats now emerged as the innovative agents in the Ottoman social formation. As for the motives behind their

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[23] In his discussion of the alternative dynamics of change within historical bureaucratic empires, Eisenstadt mentions the "tendency of members of the bureaucratic administration to develop autonomous political orientations and activities" (1964a: 240). But he seems to view this as a universal tendency, that is, one which is *not* confined to, what might be called, "non-Western" historical bureaucratic empires. It is not clear how far Heper has been inspired by Eisenstadt regarding this particular subject, as he does not refer to his work. But it might be inferred that Heper would not be inclined to explore the developments in Europe with reference to the tendency in question. This is because, as we have seen, he posits that in the West the middle classes spurred transformation of the traditional order. Then, according to him, a uniform process was at work in every Western polity of the period under consideration. On the other hand, Eisenstadt contends that "economically and socially more active strata" constituted another potential foci of change within historical bureaucratic empires as they tended to become "hotbeds of revolt and change" in those situations where "they became alienated from the rulers" (1964a: 241). This is, however, a more circumscribed argument since he asserts that the latter pattern was possible only where, "as in Europe", these strata "were not depleted" (1964a: 241). In this respect at least, it might be claimed, there is a subtle similarity with Heper's arguments.

actions, they were committed to the aim of "curbing the disintegration" (1971a: 76) and thus "reinvigorating the Empire" (1976a: 510). Their primary preoccupation in this respect was with "state-saving" (1971a: 39; 1971b: 437; 1983: 209; 1992a: 172, 181). Hence they developed into faithful "servants of the state rather than those of the sultan" (1980a: 85; 1985a: 35). These bureaucrats, Heper insists, did not act on "their own group interests"; on the contrary, having identified themselves with the state, they turned themselves into a "guardian bureaucracy" (1976b: 494).[24] They assumed onto themselves alone the prerogative to "determine the public interest" (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 311). The modernizing bureaucracy thus became the group to formulate and impose new values on the society (1980b: 73).

The upshot was a "bureaucracy-dominated polity" in the true sense of the term, and it was the "bureaucratic orientation toward change" which dictated the way the traditional order was to be reformed (1976a: 508). This presented a downright contrast to the pattern of development in the West, since there, even when the ruler and his bureaucrats did not yet lose their weight in the polity, they were in fact putting into effect policies which had been inspired by "middle class values". That is to say, their orientations were being altered by middle class ascendancy. In the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, the "reformists were not reliant upon or indebted to the economic classes in the manner of their European counterparts".[25] Otherwise stated, the policy preferences of the Ottoman modernizing bureaucrats had nothing to do with an impact exerted by a rising middle class. Thus, Heper concludes that whereas in the West the impetus for change occasioned from the "socio-economic organization", in the Ottoman case it was "generated primarily within the area of value or 'culture'" (1971a: 312). This is the basic difference, one might say, between the organic and induced models of development in terms of their origins.

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[24] Heper also notes that the bureaucratic ruling tradition did not emerge, out of the blue, in its fully-fledged form. On the contrary, the modernizing bureaucrats who brought it to being initially constituted just a minority within the Ruling Institution, whereas an overwhelming number of bureaucrats were "either corrupt or had traditional loyalties" (1971a: 85, note 1). The former's weight, however, increased over the course of time.

[25] Berkes, quoted in Heper, 1971a: 32.

Hence in the Ottoman Empire, the norms reformist bureaucrats held, and accordingly the policies they formulated, did not mirror the interests of any classes. In other words, modernization was a bureaucratic project in its entirety. According to Heper, this is one characteristic indicating to the "primacy of politics", as opposed to the "primacy of socio-economic factors", in the Ottoman (-Turkish) modernization (1971a: 36, 38). There is, though, one more characteristic of the Ottoman modernization which evinced the primacy of politics, which will be dealt with below.

Having stated that in the Ottoman Empire bureaucracy emerged as the agent of change in the absence of influential middle classes , Heper then proceeds to analyze the nature of this "elite response" (1971a: 39). The latter is, in fact, the major issue which Heper tackles in the bulk of his early studies under consideration here. Though the details of this analysis need not concern us here, for the present purposes, some of what Heper argues regarding the characteristics of the Ottoman modernization should be outlined.

First, there is the form Ottoman modernization took. For Heper, this form can be summarized as "institutional borrowing" from the West (1971a: 6, 31; 1971b: 437, 439; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 307). That modernization proceeded in such a way is hardly surprising as, it might be asserted, the onset of an induced pattern of development in a non-Western social formation like the Ottoman Empire presupposed the prior emergence and consolidation of an organic type of modernization in the West. That is to say, the spark toward modernization in the Ottoman case was brought into being by the success of modernization in Western countries. Thus Heper writes that "[i]n the absence of strong and imposing middle classes, the [Ottoman] bureaucracy was impressed by models of modernization from outside than within" (1971b: 437). As there were no native middle classes capable of dictating on the polity their own scheme of modernization as their European counterparts had managed to do, then, the induced development in the Ottoman Empire got under way at the point where the "superiority of the West" was conceded (1971b: 439; 1976a: 510; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 307). To the Ottoman bureaucrat, however, the superiority in question stemmed from the cluster of institutions which had been inaugurated in Western countries, and accordingly, the bureaucratic strategy in the Empire turned out to be one of "borrowing the end

products of another social order so as to imitate it" (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 307). The problem was that, Heper contends, the "socio-economic" underpinnings of these institutions were ignored (1971b: 437). Therefore, Heper asserts that modernization in the Ottoman case meant "selective Westernization" (1976a: 510).

One important consequence of the Ottoman practice of borrowing institutions was that the process of the structural and functional differentiation of the bureaucratic organization was set in motion (1971b: 437-438, 439-440). Thus, in terms of "organizational patterns", the Ottoman bureaucracy now increasingly resembled its Western counterparts (1971a: 31-32), as a result of the introduction of Western "administrative and political institutions" (1971b: 439). Yet the problem was that the "bureaucratic norms were not in harmony with the new organizational patterns" (1971a: 31). Otherwise put, the process of structural functional differentiation "was not accompanied by appropriate norms" (1971a: 19-20). Heper argues so because according to him the former ideally goes hand in hand with the development of "bureaucratic norms of formal rationality" (1971a: 11-12). Needless to say, Heper derives this principle from Western bureaucratic experience (1971a: 7-8). The persistence of substantive rationality on the part of Ottoman bureaucracy, then, turns out to be the critical factor which differentiated the Ottoman administrative organization from the Western pattern, despite formal similarities the former displayed with the latter (1971a:4, 11, 313; 1971b: 444; 1976a: 511). Hence, in Heper's view, the legacy of Ottoman modernization is a pattern of "uneven bureaucratic development" (1971a: 5-7, 313; 1971b: 440, 443-444) whereby structural and functional differentiation remained unaccompanied by a "flexible (or principal) value system" (1971a: 313; 1971b: 440). The missing link was thus instumental (formal) rationality (1971b: 436; 1976a: 511).

To clarify, the lingering dominance of a prescriptive value system on the part of the Ottoman bureaucracy indicates that the bureaucrats cannot be said to have been acting on purely administrative norms. In contrast to the case of Western bureaucracies, whose norms were progressively depoliticized as a result of the pressure exerted by rising middle classes, Ottoman bureaucrats embodied political norms not reflective of the demands or interests of, say, the middle classes. Rather, Ottoman bureaucrats continued to possess "substantive-prescriptive" orientations

(1971b: 445). This is the basic difference between the Ottoman bureaucracy of the nineteenth century and its Western contemporaries: whereas Western bureaucracies had turned into instrumental bureaucracies, Ottoman bureaucracy still possessed substantive rationality.

In addition to this fundamental divergence, the Ottoman bureaucracy was peculiar in another sense, and this regarded the nature of political norms it was endowed with. The contours of these norms, Heper argues, were furnished by the "Islamic non-Islamic dialectics" (1971a: 32, 313, 319), and this ensued from Ottoman reformer's "one-sided preoccupation with secularization" (1971a: 31). That Ottoman bureaucrats prioritized secularization over all other matters, Heper holds, had to do with the legacy of the traditional Ottoman order, as the latter was characterized by the "absence of middle classes and of well-formulated secular state policies" (1971a: 31). Unfortunately Heper does not elaborate on the putative causal relationship at work here. Nevertheless, it might be inferred that, for Heper, the absence of middle classes in the Ottoman Empire entailed the non-emergence of "rational" demands upon the state from within the ranks of the society. That is to say, the Ottoman bureaucrats were not confronted by a burgeoning "interest group" pressing hard for, for example, an efficient and enabling state. As for the impact of the absence of secular state policies on the later emergence of secularization as the predominant theme in bureaucratic orientations, it might be argued that this corresponded to more or less the same phenomenon. For, the major secular policy Heper mentions in relation to Western states is mercantilism. Consequently, it is apparent that when Heper refers to the absence of secular state policies in the Ottoman Empire, he first and foremost suggests the absence of a tradition of mercantilism. Then, the gist of the matter is that the Ottoman bureaucrats of the nineteenth century did not inherit a tradition of decision-making geared toward *positively* manipulating the socio-economic order. To sum up, the above remark of Heper can be taken to mean that neither the social-economic configuration of the Empire nor the nature of the bureaucratic organization itself were conducive to the formulation of more substantive policies. Heper himself argues that the bureaucratic ruling tradition of the nineteenth century was marked by "a bureaucratic decision-making pattern where valuational premises in the form of secularization

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predominated over factual premises" (1971a: 319). And, in more specific terms, he asserts that fostering "socio-economic development" was far from being the main goal on the agenda of the Ottoman bureaucrat (1971b: 437).

On the other hand, the historical absence of policies of a socio-economic kind in the above sense does not by itself explain the predominance of the concern with secularization which later followed. That is, the question remains: why was it the case that secularization, and not something else, was the pressing issue for the Ottoman bureaucrat? Heper tries to come to terms with this question, again, on the basis of the peculiarities of the traditional Ottoman order. This time he points to the relationship between state and religion, and suggests that Ottoman bureaucrats' exclusive preoccupation with secularization was, in part, "a reaction to the essentially Islamic basis of the State" (1971b: 438). Hence once again the impact of the absence of secular state norms. The carriers of the bureaucratic ruling tradition, thus, redefined their function within the polity in terms of the prerogative of "promulgation of secular legislation outside the jurisdiction of the Islamic traditions and autonomous from them".[26] The latter, Heper continues, replaced the earlier philosophy of "keeping everyone in his place" as the guiding thread of bureaucratic activities (1971b: 439; 1976a: 510; 1981: 348-349; 1979-80: 109). As the bureaucrats identified themselves with the state, the motive behind secularization was that of "preservation and modernization of the state" (1976b: 494). The process of secularization, i.e. the "process which enlarged areas left out of the jurisdiction of the Islamic law" (1971a: 18), was in this way set in motion. One characteristic of the "initial institutional pattern" of the Ottoman state, namely, the unity of state and religion was being eroded.

But secularization, in more general terms, also stood for the process of "differentiation as freeing cultural identifications from traditional commitments" (1971a: 31). Secularization in this broader sense spoke of one of the main contradictions of the Ottoman modernization. For, the induced modernization in the Ottoman Empire "consisted of imposing new sets of values without an effort to relate them to the socio-economic context" (1976a: 518). On the other hand, it is fair to

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[26] Berkes, quoted in Heper, 1976a: 510.

assert that when Heper refers to an initiative pertaining to the realm of "values" on the part of the modernizing bureaucrats, what he has in mind is basically the attempts to modify the value system which governed the functioning of the bureaucratic apparatus. That is, it is the clash between Islamic and non-Islamic values as two mutually contradictory elements within the "prescriptive value system" of the bureaucratic organization which is of concern to Heper (1971a: 314). Hence, when Heper writes that the modernizing bureaucrats "played an important role in spearheading and preserving secular change within the area of value or 'culture'" (1971a: 314), he does not seem to allude to an all-encompassing cultural project which would affect the lives of the subject population in an unmediated fashion. Rather, it might be hold, the clash between the Islamic and secular regarded the universe of discourse of the "elites". Yet, this is not to say that the confrontation which resulted from the tension between secular and Islamic norms was an intra-bureaucratic one. On the contrary, Heper tends to view the (civil) bureaucracy of the nineteenth century as a unitary actor, as will be shown below.[27]

The process of secularization, however, was in no sense a smooth one. On the contrary, the "non Islamic formulae", which guided the actions of the modernizing bureaucrats, "remained in a precarious position and a constant fight had to be given to keep that area free from new attacks" (1971b: 440). The new institutions transplanted to the Empire from European countries were where the secular formula crystallized, and in this sense, it might be asserted, they were the strongholds of the modernizing bureaucrats. As a result, in their defense of the non-Islamic formula, the bureaucrats strived above all to make the "new secularly based institutions firmly established" (1971b: 440). This was a tough task as the institutions were no more than islands of "modernity" in an essentially "traditional" society. For Heper, though, this situation was not an anomaly; rather, this is what an induced modernization is all about. That is, induced modernization "lacks the 'internal consistency' of the organic one" as the "change induced within a system is necessarily partial" (Heper and

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[27] Much to the same effect, furthermore, while discussing the twentieth century developments in Turkey, Heper takes the loss of "cohesion" on the part of the bureaucratic elite as a sign of the gradual erosion of the bureaucratic ruling tradition (1976a: 518-520). Consequently, it is legitimate to conclude that in Heper's perspective the bureaucracy was a cohesive actor until the erosion of the bureaucratic ruling tradition.

Berkman, 1979: 306-307). Hence, the institutions taken over from the already modernized countries are bound to "remain unintegrated with the rest of the system" (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 307). In this respect, the Ottoman experience with modernization exposes the shortcomings of an induced pattern of change.

2.4.4 Center-Periphery Confrontation as an Outcome of Modernization From Above

It is in the context of his analysis of the Ottoman reformist bureaucracy as the promoter of secularization that center-periphery conflict comes to the fore of Heper's scheme. It is fair to assert that in these earlier studies under consideration Heper perceives the conflict between the center and the periphery as a cultural conflict (1976a: 511, 512; 1976b: 487, 492-493). That is to say, unlike his later analyses, where he talks about a much more wide-ranging conflict encompassing economic, social and political dimensions, here the confrontation between the center and the periphery is thought to have been realized in the realm of values. Heper's earlier reflections on the conflict in question are also different from those to come in another respect: here, and this is related to the way in which Heper conceptualizes the nature of the conflict, the clash between the center and the periphery is seen as a product of Ottoman attempts at modernization. Otherwise stated, Heper does not treat it as an inherent peculiarity of the Ottoman (-Turkish) social formation, but as a conflict which ensued from the particular form (induced) modernization assumed in the Empire. Consequently, it can be argued that the center-periphery conflict initially signifies a much more circumscribed phenomenon for Heper, in terms of both aspects mentioned above.[28]

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[28] It should be added that towards the end of the period under consideration, Heper has already come to attribute a new meaning to the center-periphery conflict which sits more comfortably with the arguments in his later writings. To clarify, in 1976b (pp. 493-494) Heper traces the origins of the conflict to the classical Ottoman period and evokes "center's suspicion of the periphery" which "manifested itself in its perception of the incompatibility of urban dwelling and civilization with nomadism, and in the center's integrative ortodoxy versus the periphery's heterodoxy". These remarks are certainly a-typical in terms of the general tenets of Heper's analyses of the period, but they are at the same time not yet elaborate. Heper does not specify the parties of the conflict. Neither does he demonstrate the way center-periphery confrontation was perpetuated throughout long Ottoman centuries. He does not, for instance, mention the local notables as late-coming actors of the conflict. He merely states that with the coming to prominence of the modernizing bureaucracy, the gap

Thus, Heper writes that the center-periphery confrontation "manifested itself as a clash between 'secular' and Islamic formulas" (1976a: 511). One of the two antagonistic parties to this conflict unequivocally was the (civil) bureaucracy as the "defender of the secular formulas pertaining to some superstructure institutions" (1976a: 511). Then, it was the (civil) bureaucracy who constituted the "center", at least in the nineteenth century.[29] On the other hand, Heper does not spend much time on specifying the other party to the conflict, that is, the "periphery". Nonetheless, in the light of his assertion that Ottoman-Turkish modernization brought about a "bureaucracy versus people" contradiction (1976a: 518-519), it might legitimately claimed that for Heper, the "periphery" corresponds to an undifferentiated category of the "people". Yet, it is remarkable that nowhere does Heper state the precise relation of the "people" to the Islamic formula. The reason why this is the case, it seems, stems from the fact that Heper has come to embrace the idea of a conflict between the center and the periphery only later on in this period.[30] Hence the latter does not yet appear to be fully integrated in his general framework. It is more the case that the idea of a center-periphery confrontation, which Heper presumably has derived from Şerif Mardin[31], is superimposed on the general model of induced modernization. As a result, the terms of the conflict between the bureaucracy and the people are not worked out. For instance, given the way Heper describes the tension

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between the center and the periphery "further widened". As a result, his argument regarding a perennial center-periphery conflict seems to be at best rudimentary. Furthermore, even here he still views the confrontation solely as "ideological". On the other hand, it is remarkable that on this sole occasion where he hints at an essentially Ottoman form of confrontation, Heper draws on Mardin (1973), which presages the growing influence of Mardin's perspective on Heper's analysis.

[29] It should be pointed out that Heper's references to the Ottoman "center" are quite vague as he appears to oscillate between two positions: at times he tends to equate the center with the civil bureaucracy (e.g. 1976a: 511), yet on other occasions he notes that the civil bureaucracy was just "an important element of the center" (1976b: 488) alongside military and religious bureaucracies. It is the first position, though, which seems to have pervaded his approach. This is evidenced by his assertion that the nineteenth century was the apogee in terms of the power wielded by the civil bureaucracy. Furthermore, he contends that from the onset of the disintegration of the classical system up until the nineteenth century, the center consisted of "a bureaucratic oligarchy of the civil, military and religious bureaucracies" (1976b: 488). Then, it might be inferred that for Heper the nineteenth century was a turning point regarding the configuration of the center.

[30] Heper does not refer to a conflict between the center and the periphery either in 1971a or in 1971b, whereas later in the period under consideration he briefly mentions it (1976a: 511; 1976b: 487).

[31] The impact of Mardin's perspective is attested to by Heper's reference to his work, while discussing either the "people versus bureaucracy model"(1971a: 2-3) or centre-periphery confrontation (1976a: 511).

between Islamic and non-Islamic norms, it is not clear why common people should have resented secularization attempts by the bureaucrats. Because the impression one is likely to get on reading Heper's account is that the secularization attempts in question primarily concerned state norms. It is certainly correct to assume that these norms, in turn, determined the content of the reform project. Yet the problem is that Heper does not portray this project as one of a frontal assault on the "traditional culture". Though, he mentions the way the "new secular schools", which were created after the example of Western countries in order to rear the new "elite", contributed to the emergence of a cultural conflict as their graduates became alienated from the rest of the population in cultural terms so much so that the bureaucratic elite over the course of time turned out to be "a group apart from other social groups in the society" (1971b: 439; 1976a: 510). In this respect, what differentiated the new bureaucratic elite from the rest of the population was their mastery of "non-traditional knowledge" and their "familiarity with the West" (1976b: 492), which amounted to "cultural eminence" on the part of the former (1976a: 510).

The above circumstances, Heper continues, resulted in a situation where "[c]ultural identification as a determinant of one's status was far more important than the conflict between . . . classes of a primarily economic base" (1976b: 492-493). The primacy of cultural identifications, according to Heper, testifies to the predominance of "cultural cleavages" over "functional cleavages" in the Ottoman(-Turkish) society (1976b: 487). As the above quotation suggests, functional cleavages, which Heper theoretically counterposes against cultural cleavages, correspond to the conflict between different classes (Heper, 1976b: 487; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 322). In the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, the motor of modernization was neither an initiative by a rising middle class nor some form of a class struggle: it is in this sense that one cannot talk about "primacy of socio-economic factors" (1971a: 35-36). The preeminence of cultural tensions in the form of a contradiction between Islamic and non-Islamic norms thus constitutes the second dimension of the "primacy of politics" in the Ottoman(-Turkish) case (1971a: 36).

The argument for the predominance of cultural cleavages over functional ones follows directly from the logic of the construct of induced development, since

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the latter is associated with a pattern where the bureaucratic organization is the dominant component within a given society. Hence the bureaucracy versus people contradiction. Futhermore, the way Heper depicts the historical sequence of an induced pattern of modernization gives one an additional insight into the causes of the primacy of cultural conflicts over class conflicts. For, Heper contends that "economic change" comes about only in the later stages of development, whereas early on the rulers are more preoccupied with effecting, what might be called, certain superstructural changes (Heper, 1976bb: 485-486; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). In this respect, the case of Ottoman-Turkish modernization is no exception, as it was guided by the goals of first "state-saving" and then "nation-building"; "socio-economic development", on the other hand, was brought to bureaucratic agenda much later in the process during the Republican period (1971b: 437).[32] [33] This feature of Ottoman-Turkish modernization goes a long way in explaining the weight cultural conflicts historically carried.

But once a policy of socio-economic development started to be pursued, the whole picture began to change. While the Ottoman bureaucrats failed to "attribute more than a marginal significance to the economic groups" (1976b: 494), with the coming to prominence of the policies for economic development during the

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[32] However, it should be clarified, Heper's argument is not that the state elites of the Republican period prioritized economic development over cultural issues from early on. On the contrary, Heper draws attention to the continuities between Ottoman and Turkish elites' perceptions of reform (1976a: 512) and contends that the "Turkish revolution was primarily a revolution of values" (1979-80: 109; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 308). Yet the republican elites brought to its logical conclusion the secularization policy initiated by their Ottoman predecessors: whereas in the nineteenth century "secular values [had] gradually [taken] their place alongside the Islamic values", stopping short of, however, prevailing over the latter, early in the republican period the predominance of secular values were firmly established (1971a:314). Hence, the "religious-prescriptive value system" of the classical Ottoman bureaucratic organization (1971a: 314) was finally replaced by a "secular-prescriptive value system expressed in principles such as nationalism, populism, and etatism" (1971a: 315; 1976a: 512; 1979-80: 109). What remained intact was, of course, the existence of a prescriptive orientation on the part of the bureaucracy, which is to say that the Turkish bureaucratic elites too possessed substantive rationality.

[33] Though, Heper notes that under the rule of the Young Turks (1908-1918), as well as during the "first decades of the Republic", the rulers pursued a policy of promoting a "Muslim-Turkish entrepreneurial class" (1976b: 494-495). However, Heper continues, "this was a political rather than an economic decision" (1976b: 495). If it is the case that here Heper is making a comparison with the mercantilist policies adopted in the West, and thus taking the latter as the norm, then the above argument sheds light on the way he conceptualizes mercantilism: i.e. an economic policy of promoting business groups for the sake only of private wealth. For an alternative view on mercantilism, see Anderson, 1974: 35-37 and Hintze, 1964: 69.

Republican era, incipient economic groups received state's support (1971b: 442). Then, there came about the last phase of induced development: the emergence of a middle class standing up for its "collective economic interest"(1976b: 485-486; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 306). Thus the "etatist policies of the 1930s", Heper writes, "created a bourgeoisie which could challenge the center" (1976b: 486). This development took place "as an unintended consequence" of the policies in question (1971a: 315; 1976a: 513). Thus the Turkish bourgeoisie, who started to oppose the etatist policies as it "grew in economic strength", demanded political power, which it attained in 1950 with the coming to office of the Democrat Party (1971b: 442). According to Heper, these later developments show that the induced pattern of change was giving way to the organic one (1971a: 315; 1976a: 518-519). In addition, this transition, Heper continues, was bound to alter the "earlier bureaucracy versus people formula" (1976a: 519). Accordingly, Heper goes on to argue that functional cleavages were showing strong signs of replacing cultural issues as the predominant theme of Turkish politics (1976b: 487; Heper and Berkman, 1979: 322). Meanwhile, the increase in the political influence of the bourgeoisie, together with the concomitant mitigation of the towering power of the bureaucratic elite, was contributing to the erosion of the bureaucratic ruling tradition (1976a: 520).

The above arguments on later developments in Turkish politics, though not directly related to our subject, which is confined to Heper's analysis of the Ottoman social formation, are nevertheless significant in that they show that the advent of induced modernization, the emergence of a bureaucratic ruling tradition and the prevalence of cultural conflicts were all by definition inter-related. More importantly, they are suggestive of the extent to which Heper remains optimistic about Turkey's chances of developing into a Western-like polity. That Heper believes the latter is a likely development becomes apparent if it is recalled that an organic pattern of change as well as a polity within which bureaucracy assumes a subordinate role *vis-à-vis* societal groups organized on the basis of functional cleavages are the characteristics of Western countries in Heper's perspective.[34] In contrast to his later

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[34] Although the developments from 1940s on represent a turning point for Heper, he also takes note of the peculiarities of the economic and political order in Turkey. For example, he argues that the bourgeoisie of 1950s was an "underdeveloped bourgeoisie" (1971a: 316; 1971b: 444; 1976a: 513). The Turkish bourgeoisie was underdeveloped because (a) "it depended on and worked through the

works, which will be evaluated in the following chapters, where he displays a more accentuated bias in favour of historical continuities, here Heper acknowledges that historical process might bring about ruptures.

2.5 Uniqueness of the Ottoman Social Formation?

The "bureaucratic ruling tradition" is definitely a concept Heper devices to account for the specificity of the Ottoman-Turkish bureaucratic development. On the other hand, Heper also acknowledges that such a tradition of bureaucracy-dominated politics might be shown to have been present in some other "developing countries" as well (Heper et al., 1980: 153). Thus, he does *not* state that the bureaucratic ruling tradition is necessarily unique to the Ottoman-Turkish social formation. This is quite important for a number of reasons. First, it unambiguously betokens one tenet of these early studies: here Heper does not posit in advance that Ottoman-Turkish society has historically been dissimilar to other non-Western societies. On the contrary, all non-Western/ non-European societies have gone through an essentially similar process, i.e. that of induced modernization, or late development. Thus, at least initially, Heper treats the Ottoman-Turkish case as an instance of the non-Western pattern of historical development. This is the sense in which it is appropriate to suggest that Heper's point of departure is the historical processes of modernization. Second, the above-mentioned assertion demonstrates that the bureaucratic ruling tradition argument is substantially different from the state tradition argument to come. For, the latter is directed towards establishing the uniqueness of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation *vis-à-vis* other non-European societies, as shall be seen below. It should be added that the state tradition which Heper will later come to impart to the Ottoman-Turkish society is not asserted to have originated from Ottoman modernization. When compared to the bureaucratic

state" (1976a: 513, note 38), (b) it "did not develop middle class values . . . and as such, could not impose an administrative value of efficiency on the civil bureaucracy by depoliticizing that bureaucracy" (1971a: 316). All in all, the Turkish bourgeoisie of 1950s were unlike Western bourgeoisies (1971a: 316). Nevertheless, Heper contends that this situation is likely to change as the emergence of a " 'nationalistic' and 'industrializing bourgeoisie' which would require consistent, stable, and rational service from the bureaucracy" is already in sight (1971b: 444).

ruling tradition argument, the state tradition perspective thus represents a significant modification in Heper's analyses. To clarify, according to Heper of the later years, a state tradition had always been there in the Ottoman-Turkish social formation from early centuries of state formation on, and in this sense, the roots of the uniqueness lies in the classical Ottoman order. Accordingly, the advent of induced modernization ceases to be linchpin of his analysis of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation. This is to be expected, as a general model of induced modernization above all serves to underscore the similar historical processes experienced by all non-European countries, rather than the uniqueness of a particular non-European social formation. However, it is not the case that Heper in his later works ceases to emphasize the "induced" nature of the Ottoman modernization; to the contrary, he continues to explicate Ottoman modernization in comparable terms. Yet, this time he devotes more attention to the classical Ottoman period. This concern for the traditional Ottoman order seems to have sprung from his endeavour to find out the uniqueness of Ottoman-Turkey. On the other hand, it might retrospectively be argued that Heper's earlier reflections on the classical Ottoman era, which have been outlined in the previous pages, are in a sense unavailing because they fail to underpin the case for the uniqueness of the Ottoman social formation. One can go as further to claim that Heper's initial description of the classical Ottoman order, which is built on the non-separation of religion and the state and the absence of rational state norms, are variations on the theme of the "traditional society", his reference to historical particulars such as the *tımar* system notwithstanding.

On the other hand, as has been outlined in detail above, one central question Heper addresses in his early works relates to the way Ottoman bureaucratic organization diverged from its Western counterparts. This topic continues to occupy a considerable place in his later works, too. But, again, the terms of Heper's comparison is drastically altered, the most distinguishable novelty being his consistent usage of the feudalism-patrimonialism contrast. Moreover, in his later works, Heper no longer talks in term of the differential developments of "bureaucratic organizations" or "bureaucracies", but in terms of the varying characteristics of "states" on the one hand in the Ottoman Empire and in the West on the other.

CHAPTER 3

FEUDALISM VERSUS PATRIMONIALISM

3.1 Feudal Political Structures of Western Societies

As a preliminary to his discussion of the traditional Ottoman order, Heper takes up the question of how to define feudalism. This question, he writes, is of utmost importance for a sound understanding of the Ottoman social and political structure, as shown *a contrario* by the fact that the lack of a definitive concept of feudalism in the then current literature on the Ottoman Empire has produced inept accounts of the historical evolution of the Ottoman polity (1980c: 5). Those accounts, Heper explicates, err in assuming a gradual development towards feudalism in the Empire precisely because they fail to specify the exact nature of "feudalism" and consequently take the decline of the central authority as a token of feudalization (1980a: 81-82; 1980c: 3-4, 5; 1985a: 36-37). A clear statement as to what feudalism is, on the other hand, will reveal that the Ottoman Empire had been patrimonial not only in the classical period but throughout its history (1980c: 5).

Heper then goes on to consider the pros and cons of two alternative conceptions of feudalism. The first one, namely the "political-economic conceptualization of feudalism", employed most notably by Marxist researchers, Heper finds wanting in specificity (1980c: 5-7). In his critique of the political-economic conception, Heper draws heavily on Perry Anderson (1974), who objects to the notion of feudalism as a universal phenomenon to be found virtually in any pre-capitalist society and commits himself to delineating "feudal mode of production" in such a way to underscore the "unique nature of Western feudalism" (Hirst, 1975: 447). Hence in a passage which Heper cites (1980c: 6), Anderson argues that Marxists have erroneously defined feudal mode of production "as the

combination of large landownership with small peasant production, where the exploiting class extracts the surplus from the immediate producer by customary forms of extra-economic coercion" (1974: 401). According to Anderson, the problem with such a conception is that, due to the elevation of the presence of extra-economic forms of surplus appropriation to the status of the sole criterion, the characteristics of "juridical and constitutional systems", or "political and legal superstructures", are effectively left out as irrelevant to a definition of feudalism (1974: 401). However, Anderson continues, the presence of extra-economic coercion is common to all pre-capitalist modes of production and thus cannot be used as a yardstick to differentiate the feudal mode from non-feudal ones (1974: 403). On the other hand, the precise form of extra-economic coercion in a particular mode is determined by the latter's "political, legal and ideological superstructures", which, as a result, should be made *the* criterion for "establishing any comprehensive typology of pre-capitalist modes of production" (1974: 404). Approvingly mentioning the above arguments (1980c: 6-7), Heper avails himself of Anderson's polemic against "orthodox" Marxism to discard the "political-economic" conception of feudalism. Yet he derives the contours of a different understanding of feudalism not directly from Anderson but from non-Marxist literature.

The alternative to the political-economic conception, Heper writes, is seeing feudalism as a "system of law and rule" (1980c: 6). The bedrock of feudalism thus understood is the "feudal relation" (1980c: 6). This "legal" relation is based on "careful delineation of the rights and obligations of the parties" (1980c: 6). The most significant feature of "feudal-*constitutional* political structures" (1980c: 5, emphasis added), Heper continues, is that "sovereignty and political authority is dispersed among various units" (1980c: 6). Although Heper does not dwell at length on the specifities of feudalism conceived in this way as a political regime in general, much of what he has written on the actual political configuration of Western societies is in fact underlain by such a conception. What follows is a more detailed depiction of the notion of feudalism Heper employs. This depiction, though, is not confined to Heper's scattered references to the topic; the latter are supplemented with similar

accounts as to the nature, in particular, of Western feudalism, some of which Heper himself draws upon.[35]

The first thing to note about the concept of feudalism which Heper adheres to is that it is arrived at through a consideration of the specific features of European medieval societies (Haldon, 1993: 53-54). The chief ingredient of feudalism conceived in this fashion is a "specific form of relationship between lords and vassals" (Beik, 1982: 22), what Heper refers to as the "feudal relation". According to Heper, one basic characteristic of the feudal relation is that the parties are equal in terms of "social status" (1980c: 11), that is, the lord/ king/ ruler and his vassals are equals. Hence the relationship is not asymmetrical so much so that vassals do not just have obligations but also certain rights which the ruler should not abridge (1980c: 6). The fief-holders are, thus, the ruler's "contractual partners" and not his "personal dependents" (Bendix, 1960: 333, note 6), which culminates in "relations of reciprocal obligation" (Bendix, 1964: 36). Heper's depiction of the feudal relation is akin to Max Weber's (1964; 1978) account of "Occidental, fully developed feudalism" (1978: 1078). For Weber, the feudal relation is characterized by vassals' standing in an "external relationship to the lord" (1978: 1069), which involves "free contract" rather than "patrimonial dependence" (1978: 1072), and which brings about "contractual stipulation of rights and duties" (1978: 1074).[36]

The similarities Heper's account displays with Weber's notion of Western feudalism are not confined to the above issue. Heper asserts that in time Western fief came to include both a title to hereditary possession and absolute control over the land on the part of the vassals (1980c: 11). While both developments signaled the

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[35] Most notably, Bendix, 1964 and Weber, 1978.

[36] It is important to note that unlike Heper, who strictly counterposes feudalism against patrimonialism, Weber argues that feudatory relationship should be "treated as an extreme and marginal case of patrimonialism" (1978: 1069). This seems to be the case due to a number of reasons. First, the "feudatory relationship . . . is so much shaped by the purely personal loyalty bond with the lord" (1978: 1069). Thus, the feudal relation is extra-patrimonial, but still personal. Second, it is a "solution to a specific practical problem, namely that of political domination by a patrimonial prince over, and with the help of, *local patrimonial lords*" (1978: 1069, emphasis added). Hence the power vassals possess "over their retainers" is itself patrimonial (1978: 1056), because the (political) rights they enjoy, which constitute the very basis of their power, are "treated as private rights" (1964: 353). In other words, each vassal is a patrimonial ruler in his own domain, that is, in the "manor" (1978: 1073). As a result it might be argued that the specificity of Western feudalism resides in the particular extra-patrimonial relationship between the king and the local lords; the nature of their power, however, remains patrimonial.

entrenchment of the rights of fief-holders, the second one in particular gave rise to a situation in which the king had unlimited rights over the land only in his demesne, but had to respect his vassals' seigneurial rights over remaining lands (1980c: 10). A further development which took place in Western middle ages, and which Heper attributes a greater significance, is that fief came to include the granting of "personal political rights" (1980c: 11). It is this latter development which produced the dispersion of sovereignty and political authority among the king and his vassals (1980c: 6). Hence, in the period of "full-blown" feudalism (1980c: 11), the fief emerged as "an amalgam of property and sovereignty" (Anderson, 1974: 408).

Similarly, Weber, too, points out that "the transition to a hereditary basis took place relatively early in the Middle Ages" (1964: 374).[37] The transition to the "full fief", combining "seigneurial rights and income-yielding political powers" (1978: 1073), on the other hand, becomes complete when "governing powers" and "corresponding economic advantages" are "appropriated" by fief-holders (1964: 347-8). This later developments give rise to the instituting of "decentralized patrimonialism" (1964: 349), or in other words, "estate-type patrimonialism" (1978: 1028, 1086) as opposed to "pure patrimonialism". In this type, which is peculiar to the West, not only are there "limitations on the [ruler's] power of free election of his administrative staff" (1964: 348), for according to Weber feudal lords are "members of the administrative staff" of the king as certain service obligations (primarily of a military character) are expected of them (1964: 376); but at the same time there takes place a "quantitative division of authority" (1978: 1082).

For Weber, the most critical consequence of appropriation of political powers[38], alongside hereditary possession of fiefs, is that under such conditions the ruler "has only limited 'discipline' over the vassal" (1978: 1079). This is so because, on the one hand, the vassal's, and his successors', right to the fief is secure since the only pretext available to the ruler for wresting the fief away from the vassal is

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[37] Whereas Heper argues that initially feudal lords had only usufruct over the land (1980c: 11), it seems that for Weber the fief is by definition "vassal's personal property for the duration of the feudatory relationship" (1978: 1074). Thus, it appears that, according to Weber, vassals in the West had always enjoyed "the property rights of a landlord" (Bendix, 1960: 361).

[38] "The two powers" which Weber considers "specifically political" are "military and judicial authority" (1978: 1013).

"felony" (1964: 375; 1978: 1079), making the title to the fief virtually independent of the discretion of the ruler. On the other hand, due to appropriation, the vassals come to "exercise independent rights" (1964: 353) as opposed to what may be called "delegated" rights. Thus each vassal, in his individual patrimonial domain, happens to enjoy "*personal* rights of exploitation and jurisdiction over dependent peasants" (Anderson, 1974: 409), the latter being "patrimonial dependents" of the vassal rather than of the ruler himself (Weber, 1964: 375).[39] Hence, the "direct relationship" between the king and peasants is "cut off" (Weber, 1978: 1058), as vassals acquire the rights to tax, call to military service, and penalize their personal dependents (Weber, 1964: 376; Weber, 1978: 1058). All in all, the result is that "the power of the ruler over his vassals is more or less precarious" (Bendix, 1960: 374). Although "the lord is powerful *vis-à-vis* the individual vassal", he is nevertheless "powerless with regard to the interests of all vassals" (Weber, 1978: 1079).

"The typical antinomy of the pre-modern political community in Western Europe", Bendix writes, concerned precisely this relationship between the rulers and their vassals[40], and "became manifest with every demand by secular rulers for increased revenue and military service", to which "local notables typically responded by uniting into estates that could extract further guarantees or increases of their existing privileges by way of compensating for the greater services demanded of them" (1964: 35-36; 1966: 78). The unision of feudal lords into estates, or in Weber's words, their organizing "as members of an autonomous corporate group" is unique to the West (Weber, 1978: 1079). This development had the impact of altering the relative balance of powers between the kings and feudal lords, since the latter were then in a position to "press their demands with particular strength" (Weber, 1978: 1080). In addition, there were the "feudal courts" which dealt with legal disputes regarding the distribution and inheritance of fiefs, and which were composed of vassals themselves (Bendix, 1960: 374; Weber, 1978: 1080). These

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[39] This is so precisely because of the "political rights granted to" the vassal (Weber, 1978: 1083). That is, it is vassal's appropriation of political powers which renders peasants his, rather than the ruler's, patrimonial dependents.

[40] Bendix seems to echo Weber, who contends that the "clashes between local notables and central powers . . . became one of the most important determinants of western medieval development" (1978: 1056).

institutions, too, proved critical in that they served as yet another avenue for the safeguarding of vassals' privileges, thus causing further deterioration in the towering position of the overlord (Bendix, 1960: 374; Weber, 1978: 1080).

Bendix argues that one characteristic of Western feudalism which followed from the particular nature of the feudatory relation was the presence of "an ideology of rights" on the part of the vassals (1964: 37).[41] "The vassal's consciousness of his rights", Bendix continues, provided a solid foundation for the espousal of the "autonomy of feudal jurisdictions" (1964: 37-38). Feudal lords being "ideologically" and organizationally this powerful, it became inconvenient for the rulers to square off against the former's special privileges (Weber, 1978: 1040). To the contrary, vassals' "collective consent was necessary for any extra-suzerain actions by the monarchy" (Anderson, 1978: 410). Ergo, politics turned out to be a "by-product of established privileges" (Bendix, 1966: 74): at the center of politics were "jurisdictional disputes and their settlement" (Bendix, 1964: 38). Variegated privileges of parties being consecrated in law, such a system, Weber argues, tends to "transform all problems of administration into problems of law and adjudication" (Bendix, 1960: 366).

According to Weber, the need on the part of the ruler for securing the "collective consent" of the feudal lords, or more generally, the imperative of reaching "special agreements from case to case" between the rulers and their fief-holders brought into being the polity of estates, *Ständestaat*, in the West (Bendix, 1960: 376-377).[42] *Ständestaat* arose at the point when "temporary alliances between the various power holders", those between the ruler and his vassals referred to above being one, which had previously been dictated by extra-ordinary circumstances, turned into "a chronic condition" (Weber, 1978: 1086). Vassals' assembling into an "autonomous corporate group" was the first step toward the polity of estates (Weber, 1978: 1086); yet this development was conditioned by "new administrative requirements" (Weber, 1978: 1086): as "administrative and military costs mounted

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[41] Similarly, Weber writes that "the essence of feudalism is status consciousness" (1978: 1081).

[42] Weber's and Bendix's concept of *Ständestaat* will be treated briefly here. For in his works under consideration, Heper makes hardly any reference to *Ständestaat*, whereas the latter will come to occupy a central place in his later works, which will be discussed in the following chapter. It should at once be added that in those studies of late Heper draws on Poggi (1978), rather than either Weber or Bendix, in delineating the characteristics of the polity of estates in the West. Poggi's notion of *Ständestaat* as well will be presented in the third chapter.

under conditions of an expanding money economy", "[t]he large sums of money then required could not be obtained by the normal methods of feudal or of patrimonial administration" (Bendix, 1960: 377). The need for above mentioned associations on a consistent basis thus set in with full force (Bendix, 1960: 377). In this way, "privileged persons" were transformed into "Estates" and the "temporary association into a permanent political structure" (Weber, 1978: 1087).

This political structure came to include not just feudal aristocracy but also the "urban bourgeoisie" and the church (Bendix, 1960: 375). For the aristocracy did not remain as the sole holder of special (political) privileges. While aristocracy's participation in the estate system was secured through "hereditary privilege", in the cases of the church and of the "municipal corporations" it was "institutional immunity" which made them parties to the "struggle over the distributions of rights and obligations" (Bendix, 1964: 42). And while "a universal church which pits its organizational power against the absolute claims of secular rulers and . . . subjects these claims to the juridical conception of canon law" should best be treated as "one-historical peculiarity of kingship in the Occidental tradition" (Bendix, 1964: 34), that is, it had been in place throughout the Middle Ages, confronting the "secular authority" of the rulers with its "spiritual authority" (Held, 1992: 81); municipal corporations emerged as yet another form of autonomous jurisdiction thanks to the fragmentation of authority between the rulers and feudal lords, which "permitted the growth of autonomous towns" (Anderson, 1974: 410).

As a consequence, *Ständestaat* seems to denote not only a tripartite struggle over immunities and privileges but also a tripartite "system of alliances". Better, it refers to a permanent structure of alliances between various power holders, alliances being founded on the accommodation of conflicting claims. Hence Weber defines *Ständestaat* as follows:

> A characteristic feature was the appropriation of political rights by individuals and corporations after the manner of private property in merchandise. Another prevalent characteristic was that these owners of privileges would hold conventions in order to settle political affairs through compromises. (...) Every political action was dependent . . . upon an agreement among these independent owners of prerogatives, and it was the purpose of estate conventions to accomplish this end.[43]

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[43] Quoted in Bendix, 1960: 376.

It is tenable to argue that it is this kind of an analysis of the political dynamics within "feudal polities" which underlies Heper's characterization of feudalism as a form of government. Heper's remarks on the legacy of feudalism in terms both of tangible organizational residues and of "political culture" are highly compatible with the perspective on feudal systems presented in the last couple of pages. It is the former which we now turn.

It has already been noted that Heper attributes a particular importance to the feudal dispersion of "sovereignty and political authority". This results from his conviction that "legal estates like the aristocracy and the church" had the effect of "thwarting the center from establishing absolutist rule" in the West (1980c: 6). Hence the notion of *Ständestaat*, which has been depicted in the preceding pages.[44] For Heper, then, feudal division of political authority was important precisely because it acted as a "brake" on ruler's discretionary and arbitrary power (1990a: 127). Consequently, it can be surmised that the legacy of feudalism in the West is a political tradition whereby the power of the central authority is circumscribed by autonomous organization of privileged strata. Moreover, Heper contends that the feudal notion of "reciprocal rights and law" (1990a: 127) contributed to the emergence of "political systems based on rule of law" (1980c: 6). Taking into account Heper's assertion that rule of law (alongside "individualism") is one major dimension of liberalism (1993: 16), it could be inferred that, in this respect, feudalism facilitated the arrival of liberal regimes.[45] On the other hand, as for "feudal preconditions of democracy" (1990b: 100), Heper is quite explicit. The impression one gets from what he writes is that according to him "democracy" is *essentially* a Western phenomenon, hence a notion of democracy as "a unique attribute of the West" (Hirst, 1975: 471), whose medieval foundations had been provided by the

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[44] There nevertheless seems to be a minor difference. For, at least in his studies under consideration here, Heper seems to view the contribution "bourgeoisie" made to the delimitation of the power of the central authority as a post-feudal phenomenon (see 1990a: 127) rather than as a part and parcel of the tradition of the *Ständestaat*. Given the fact that Heper makes just a few references to the role of the church, which will be cited below, it might be argued that according to him the primary agent in this political process whereby the supremacy of the "center" was eroded was the feudal aristocracy. Thus the aristocracy turns out to be the "countervailing power" par excellence, as will be detailed below.

[45] Heper, in fact, hints at the causal affinity between feudal political structure and liberalism in relation to the status of the church in the West. He asserts that the "confrontation between the state and the church facilitated the development of liberalism" in the West (1980c: 13).

struggles undertaken primarily by aristocracy in its efforts to curb the power of the central authority (1990a: 127; 1990b: 100-101). It goes without saying that for Heper, the arrival of democracy had to do with the counterbalancing of the power of the "state" by "societal" actors. In general, democracy, as Heper understands it, is "based on the principle of accommodation of conflicts between social strata" (Köker, 1990: 93).[46] To the extent that feudal political arrangements can be said to have been founded on, what might be called, the principle of accommodation of conflicts between *privileged* strata, then, it is not surprising that Heper sees in feudalism an anticipation of democracy.

It should lastly be noted that feudalism, Heper argues, has left its imprint on "political culture" in the West (1980c: 4-6). In accordance with his perception of the nature of feudal political arrangements, Heper contends that the political culture that "feudal-constitutional political structures" has given rise to are characterized by such tenets as "respect for the rights of both the state and of the individuals", "tolerance" and "trust in state" (1980c: 6). Western political culture, then, is marked by consensual relations not only between the state and the society but also between various societal interests.

It is important to note that Heper is not alone in positing a continuity between feudal and modern political arrangements. Weber, too, for instance, finds in feudal dispersion of authority an approximation, albeit "in a primitive fashion", of the "idea of the social contract as the basis of the distribution of political power, an idea which led to constitutionalism" (1978: 1082). Thus he notes that there is an affinity between feudalism and "constitutional government" (1978: 1082). In similar fashion, Bendix traces the origins of "representative government" in the West to the same phenomenon, that is, fragmentation of political authority, so characteristic of "medieval political life":

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[46] To be more specific, according to Heper, the characteristics of a democratic regime are political participation (2002-3: 161), the presence of "a wide scope of conflict and competition" (1993: 16), political equality (2002-3: 161), and "majority vote" (1993: 16; 2002-3: 161). It might be inferred that, for Heper, the precedents of the first two date back to the feudal period.

[C]ertain persons and groups were exempted from direct obedience to the commands issued by or in the name of the ruler. This "immunity" guaranteed that within the delimited sphere of their authority these persons and groups were entitled to exercise the legal powers of government. (...) This system of negative and positive privileges (which may be called "immunities" and "autonomous jurisdiction") became the legal foundation of representative government in Western Europe, because it accorded positive, public rights to particular persons and groups within the political community. This institution of public rights on the part of certain privileged subjects is more or less unique to Western Europe. (Bendix, 1966: 78-79)

All these arguments lend support to Haldon's contention that in the "legal/institutional" (1993: 72) perspectives on feudalism, according to which "societies can be 'feudal' if their institutional arrangements approximate to those of western Europe at the appropriate time" (1993: 54)[47], one concern is to "understand the essence of European culture" (1993: 64). In the case of Heper, this essence is given by the centuries-long anticipation of "democracy", in the form of efforts to curb the power of the "center". When it comes to the analysis of the Ottoman-Turkish social formation through the attempted contrast between feudalism and patrimonialism, one major assumption on the part of Heper, as one commentator has argued, seems to be that of the absence of a "cultural heritage conducive to democracy" (Köker, 1990: 91), which is itself the result of the absence of Western "feudal" institutions and/or arrangements in the Ottoman case. Though, the primary question which preoccupies Heper is better put as that of the differential "state"-"society" relations in "feudal" Europe and "patrimonial" Ottoman social formation, which, nevertheless, have a bearing upon the respective prospects for the viability of democracy in the two settings.

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[47] Altough it is contentious whether Weber, and thus his disciple Bendix, strictly adhere to such a concept of feudalism, Heper definitely belongs to that camp. The status of Weberian perspective seems to be vague in this respect because Weber treats the concept of feudalism (as well as that of patrimonialism) as an ideal type (Bendix, 1960: 330-379), that is, as an heuristic device to be used to assess the degree to which a particular case approximates the theoretically constructed model. Thus feudalism in this sense has no geographical connotation. Weber's analysis of feudalism presented in the last couple of pages, on the other hand, pertains specifically to "fully developed, Occidental feudalism", as previously noted. When it comes to the search for the "essence of European culture", however, Heper's and Weber's accounts seem to converge. For, Weber is as committed to the study of "long-term civilizational differences" (Turner, 1992: 35-36) as he is to a dynamic comparative analysis of different historical configurations.

3.2 Ottoman Patrimonialism

Only on a single occasion does Heper make general comments on "patrimonial political systems" (1980c: 5, note 4). In such systems, Heper argues, "the center is considered as the guardian of the social order" (1980c: 5, note 4). The "political elites", that is, the members of the center, strive to maintain social order as it has always been and to "monopolize political activities and economic resources" (1980c: 5, note 4). Accordingly, these elites try to exclude the periphery from the affairs of the center: their actions are oriented towards "preventing the periphery from impinging directly and autonomously on the center and from participating in central decision making" (1980c: 5, note 4).

This portrayal of patrimonialism strikes one as an antithesis of the political process which culminated in the emergence of *Ständestaat* in the West. However, the problem is not only about the extent to which the representatives of the periphery are permitted to have a say in "decision making". As can be gathered from above, it is also about the control over economic resources, and most notably the land. Yet it seems that in this respect too, it is the characteristics of (Western) feudalism in contradistinction to which patrimonialism is defined. That this is the case can be seen in Heper's account of Ottoman patrimonialism.

One cardinal feature of the Ottoman order which makes it legitimate to call the latter "patrimonial" relates to the land regime, i.e. state ownership of land (1980a: 83). "When the Ottoman administration was first established in Anatolia", Heper writes, "[a]ll feudal rights which limited the state's control over the land and peasants were abolished" (1980a: 83; 1980c: 10-11; 1985a: 23). The reason why Heper holds that in pre-Ottoman period "feudal rights" had been in place is his conviction that there had been local power holders, *beys*, recognized as legitimate by the Seljuk sultan, who wielded "autonomous powers" within their "estates" (1980a: 82; 1980c: 9; 1985a: 22). Thus, it was their having "political authority" independent of the sultan which conferred on the rights over the land *beys* enjoyed their "feudal"

nature (1980a: 82; 1980c: 9; 1985a: 22).[48] This is a further indication of Heper's adherence to a conception of feudalism centered around parcellized sovereignty.

The status of Ottoman *tımar*-holders, on the other hand, was nothing close to that of the *beys*. For one, they unequivocally were state agents who, after state ownership of land was secured, "collected taxes in the localities *on behalf of the state* (1980a: 83; 1985a: 23, emphasis added). Otherwise put, *tımar*-holders had no personal rights over the land. Over the peasants, on the other hand, they only had "supervisory powers": they "had to see to it that the peasants kept their assigned lands under cultivation, and paid their taxes" (1980a: 84; 1980c: 11; 1985a: 23). In any event, in legal terms, "the peasants were equals with the fief-holders" (1980a: 84; 1980c: 11; 1985a: 23). In stark contrast to the situation in the West, however, there was a profound asymmetry in terms of "status" between the ruler and the recipients of *tımar* grants as they were in no way "equals" (1980c: 11). Furthermore, again in contrast to the Western fief, *tımar* grants did not include "extensive political-territorial rights" (1980a: 83; 1980c: 11; 1985a: 23; 1992a: 179). As such, *tımar*-holders never enjoyed "autonomous political power" as the latter, Heper writes, "is exercised independently; it is not based on delegated powers" (1980a: 84; 1980c: 12).

It should be noted in passing that Heper's remarks on the *tımar* system seem to be consonant with Weber's definition of "benefice" in contradistinction to fief. Weber (1978: 1073-1074) writes:

> The benefice is a lifelong, not a hereditary, remuneration for its holder in exchange for his real or presumed services; the remuneration is an attribute of the office, not of the incumbent. (...) The income of the benefice, accruing to the office, not to the person, is only used and not personally owned.

Weber himself asserts that Ottoman *tımar* did not include "appropriation of governmental offices" and that it should be considered as benefice rather than fief (Weber, 1964: 352). Though, it should be added that Weber in no sense views benefice as alien to the European scene; on the contrary, he notes that the

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[48] On the other hand, Heper implies that their rights over the peasants cannot be characterized as feudal since the peasants were not enserfed (1980a: 82; 1980c: 9; 1985a: 22). However, it should be noted that in his general discussion of feudalism Heper does not bring up the issue of serfdom as an integral ingredient of feudalism.

"transitions" between fief and benefice are "fluid" (Weber, 1978: 1073). For instance, he explicates the occasional clashes between the monarchy and members of the parliaments in France up to the Revolution in terms of the conflict over the appropriation of benefices (Weber, 1978: 1033-1034). In more general terms, he argues that it is virtually impossible to definitely designate a particular case as belonging either to the category of "feudalism based on fiefs" or that of "feudalism based on benefices" owing to the presence of "gradual imperceptible transitions" (Weber, 1964: 373, 380). Although he contends that the difficulty applies as well to the Ottoman case (1964: 380), he is nevertheless comfortable with characterizing the *tımar* as benefice. Furthermore, Weber hints at the implications the precise nature of *tımar* had on the extent of the power of the central authority when he notes that it was in part through the "quasi-prebendal definition of the fief" that the "Turkish feudal system achieved a relatively strong centralization" in its classical age (Weber, 1978: 1079), "prebend" being a term Weber at times "used interchangable with benefice" (Turner, 1996: 203). Thus it might be argued that the contrast between the "fully developed" Western fief and Ottoman *tımar* corresponds to yet another contrast between an historical pattern whereby authority is profoundly decentralized and one whereby there exists a vastly superior central authority. This is in fact the insight Turner (1996) has derived from Weber. Feudalism and prebendalism (the latter might well be called "feudalism based on benefices"), Turner writes, correspond to two different "forms of property in land": the former is founded on "decentralized personal rights", whereas it is "centralized impersonal rights" which characterize the latter (Turner, 1996: 202-203). Property rights being centralized in the state, Turner continues, "under prebendalism the centre is relatively stronger than under feudalism" (Turner, 1996: 251).

Turning now back to Heper, one conclusion Heper draws from the non-existence of peripheral agents enjoying "autonomous political power" is that "*Ständestaat* was alien to the Ottoman scene" (1992a: 179). That is, all kinds of legitimate power in the localities derived directly from the state; absent was a plurality of foci of legitimate political power as legitimacy remained bound up with "service to the state" (1980a: 98).

In "patrimonial political structures", Heper asserts, ruler's discretion prevails (1980c: 5), to the detriment of, what might be called, "well-established rights of individuals" (Weber, 1978: 1030). This was quite evident in the Ottoman case, Heper argues, since "[t]hrough the granting or withdrawing of berats (imperial certificates), the sultans could . . . decide whether a person belong to a tax-free or a tax-paying group" (1980a: 84). Otherwise stated, the dividing line between "privileged state servitors and ordinary taxpayers" (Faroqhi, 2002: 352) was drawn by the sultan. The privileges that made one a member of the center were "granted as an act of grace" by the ruler "without being bound by any formal rules" (Weber, 1964: 345). Those privileges, though, the ruler could withdraw as instantaneously as he granted them (Bendix, 1960: 335). Absent, then, was any form of "established position" (Faroqhi, 1994: 550), which at once resulted from and contributed to the supreme stature of central authority. Hence Ottoman rulers were at the same time in a position to wreak havoc with existing "societal" hierarchies at will. This was the case even in the early centuries of the Ottoman state when an administrative apparatus staffed by "a royal household full of slaves" was established, as a result of which "the old Turkish aristocracy was gradually removed from its position of a ruling class" (1980a: 83). It should be added that the old Turkish/Ottoman aristocracy Heper refers to composed of the descendants of warlords with whom the founders of the Ottoman state cooperated in military campaigns (1985a: 21-23; 1987a: 14). From Heper's point of view, Ottoman state's hostility to autonomous status on the part of the residual aristocracy is understandable since a patrimonial ruler, as Weber writes, "does not support status barriers, which he considers inconvenient limitations of his own power" (Weber, 1978: 1102). The rationale behind constituting an administrative apparatus staffed by "dependent officials" itself is to undermine the status of "landed notables who . . . possess independent source of power"; that is, the patrimonial ruler uses his "dependent officials as a weapon in the struggle with the independent landlords" (Bendix, 1960: 354). Ottoman rulers largely succeeded in their struggle, as they managed to turn the "old Ottoman aristocracy" into a dependent group, whose "status could now be determined by the center" (1980a: 83; 1980c: 10; 1985a: 22).

From the highest palatine officials to the governors in distant localities, thus, all state functionaries were dependent on the sultan, which gave Ottoman administration its genuinely "centralized" character (1980a: 82-83). Conversely, though, Ottoman centralization was achieved thanks to the military power of state founders, who seized by force the territories of the old aristocracy (1985a: 22). Only then Ottoman ruling center managed to transform "the empire made up of vassal principalities into a true empire ruled by a centralized administration" (1985a: 22) through the deployment of dependent officials at all levels of government.

The first "peripheral" force which confronted the ruling center was in this way subdued in early Ottoman centuries (1985a: 22-3). According to Heper, this attitude of the ruling center toward the periphery, which culminated in the subjugation of the old Ottoman aristocracy, was in no sense incidental. Although it was conjuncturally determined by aristocracy's reluctance to aid the Ottoman ruler in his military campaign at the beginning of the fourteenth century (1985a: 22), center's aversion to such peripheral groups is better seen as a steady feature. For Ottoman "political philosophy" was marked by its hostility towards "intermediary powers standing between the state and its subjects" (1980c: 7). The strata which mediates the relations between the state and the subject population, according to this philosophy, should only be the state agents, that is, the "ruling cadre committed to securing the supremacy and the interests of the state" (1980c: 7). Consequently, for Heper, Ottoman political philosophy essentially shut out an aristocracy- the foremost intermediary structure of the pre-modern era (1985a: 117).

Another feature which, according to Heper, ensured state's supremacy in the polity, again, ensued from the absence of the "feudal relation". That is, in the Ottoman case, the relationships between the center and the periphery were not governed by "an idea of reciprocal rights and obligations" (1980c: 8-9, 13). The latter, as has been shown, is asserted to have developed out of the feudatory relation in the West. On the other hand, in the Ottoman Empire, "rights" belonged to the state, whereas the periphery only had obligations to perform (1980c: 9). As a result, it was ruler's discretion, and not mutual recognition of rights and jurisdictions, which set the parameters of the relationship between the center and the periphery (1980c: 7).

It is Heper's contention that this pattern more or less continued throughout the whole history of the Ottoman Empire. This is the reason why he asserts that Ottoman Empire had always been patrimonial (1980c: 5) as opposed to those who argue that the period "extending from the second half of the sixteenth to the early decades of the nineteenth century" (the period of disintegration/decline), which witnessed the "gradual weakening of the center" and the rise of local notables in the provinces, signaled the progressive feudalization of the Ottoman order (1980a: 81; 1980c: 3; 1985a: 36).[49]

It has been previously argued that the foremost significance of feudalism for Heper is the way in which it paved the way for the development of certain "political institutions", or in more general terms, a certain pattern of politics in the West. To reiterate, this Western pattern was characterized by the presence of channels for the representation of collective "peripheral" interests, by which stroke the power of central authority was closely checked. In this respect, one might say, feudalism and patrimonialism are diametrically opposed since the latter leaves no room for "countervailing powers" (1985a: 14; 1987a: 14; 1988: 3; 1991a: 12). This was the case in the Ottoman Empire, where periphery was "almost totally subdued by central authority" (1985a: 14; 1987a: 14). Thus Heper portrays "patrimonial polities" as "hopelessly conflict-ridden societies, which could not be organized against the center, and therefore could not pose any countervailing power" (1988: 3). As can be inferred from this expression, the reason peripheral forces could not rise to a status of "countervailing power" was precisely their inability to politically organize. Needless to say, Heper is again alluding to the absence of Western estate-systems in patrimonial structures, as will be elaborated below. Since the estate structures, Heper holds, served to delimit the power of the central authority in the West, their absence in the Ottoman case signifies a wholly different state of affairs: "a disorganized periphery in the face of an *omnipotent* state" (1985a: 103, emphasis added). This was the essence of the "Ottoman tradition", which republican Turkey would be a heir to (1985a: 102-103). Hence the whole discussion of patrimonialism versus feudalism

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[49] Heper's analysis of the case of Ottoman local notables will be returned to toward the end of the chapter.

boils down to the argument that the Ottoman state was exceptionally strong when compared to its Western (feudal) counterparts.

Just as "feudal-constitutional political structures" gave birth to a particular political culture in the West, so did patrimonialism in the Ottoman Empire. "The most distinguishing characteristic" of the Ottoman (-Turkish) political culture was an "ever-present tension" (1980a: 98; 1985a: 15-16), which "derived from the bureaucratic center's nervousness toward the periphery" (1985a: 16), and which in turn "produced suspicion, distrust, arbitrariness, and unethical maneuvering" (1980a: 98) as well as intolerance (1979-80: 108-109; 1980c: 5; 1985a: 3). Absent were "respect for law by both the rulers and the ruled" and "understanding and acceptance of their duties as well as their rights by all citizens" (1980a: 92-93). All these attributes of the Ottoman political culture, it might be concluded, occasioned from the absence of any kind of legally delineated and mutually respected norms guiding the relations between the center and the periphery, which itself resulted from the overwhelming dominance of center's discretion (1980c: 5).

To conclude, it is this contrast between feudalism and patrimonialism as two opposed political structures which Heper sees as illuminating for an understanding of the specific attributes of the Ottoman state, and therefore of "state"-"society" relations. It is now the time to look over Heper's characterization of the Ottoman state in more detail, starting with its relation to religion/ religious norms.

3.3 Peculiarities of the Ottoman State

3.3.1 The Relationship Between the State and Religion

Heper now presents a revised view on the relationship between state and religion within the traditional Ottoman order. It is true that he still carries on some of his previous arguments, like that on the scope left for secular legislation in all (previous) Islamic states (1980a: 100, note 8; 1980c: 12, note 12; 1985a: 24). But this time, he sets out to substantiate his argument that Ottoman-Turkey has historically occupied "a distinct place within the constellation of Muslim countries" (1993: 12).

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From a general point of view, Heper asserts that it is wrong to posit an "undifferentiated 'Muslim context'" (1981: 347). For, this would imply a notion of "tradition", in this particular case Islam, "as having an almost total structuring effect upon society" (1993: 5). However, Heper continues, in order to understand the weight Islam historically has had in a particular Muslim country, "sociological", that is "non-religious", factors as well should be taken into consideration (1981: 346-347; 1993: 6-8). Only in this way one can establish "distinct clusters and unique cases" (1981: 347).

Heper then goes on to uncover the factors which rendered the Ottoman Empire "almost a unique case in itself" within the cluster of Muslim societies (1981: 347). According to Heper, this uniqueness derives from the fact that "compared with other Islamic states, the influence of religion was greatly constrained in the Ottoman Empire" (1993: 8). This was so because in the Empire, the way the state functioned was based on the "supremacy of secular norms over and above the Islamic ones" (1992a: 177). Thus, the assertion that the influence of religion was to a large extent limited means that state policies cannot be said to have emanated from religious norms. Needless to say, this is a significant modification of Heper's earlier perception of the relationship between the Ottoman state and Islam, as he now contends that power was exercised in a predominantly secular fashion. It could at once be stated that Heper has now come to see the nature of Ottoman state power in a new light, which will be discussed below, and this novel view on the role of Islam is in fact related to this more general alteration in his perspective. For the time being, however, it suffices to note that Heper in these more recent studies posits a secular Ottoman "reason of state", which guided the way state power was employed.

The limited import of Islamic norms, or conversely the predominance of secular norms, was facilitated by the "earlier Turkic-Iranian state traditions" that the Ottoman Empire succeeded to, for they provided the principle that "if the public interest or *raison d'état* required it, the ruler could take measures that would conflict with the sacred law" (1980a: 100, note 8; 1985a: 24). Hence the Ottoman rulers

acquired the leverage to "flout the law of Islam" (1981: 348).[50] This is the reason why Heper asserts that the "Ottoman state was sovereign *vis-à-vis* Islam" (1985a: 27).

It is quite obvious that Heper's revised view on state-religion relation in the Ottoman Empire renders obsolete the framework he used to employ in comparing the initial configuration of the Ottoman state on the one hand, and those in the West on the other, according to which the specificity of the Ottoman state lay in the absence of secular state norms. The contrast becomes even more visible if Heper's following assertion is taken into account: "In the Ottoman case", he writes, "the state as a distinct entity, with 'sovereignty' and 'autonomy', and supporting resources, always existed" (1981: 348). "Sovereignty" and "autonomy", as Heper elsewhere points out, correspond to, respectively, state's "independence in formulating goals for society" and its "independence in working out its internal organization"(1985a: 5-6). Consequently, it might be maintained that Heper's present account of the Ottoman state of the classical period now resembles his earlier depiction of the centralized states in the West. That is, there is not much difference between the Ottoman state and its Western counterparts in terms of the extent to which the predominance of secular norms was entrenched. Hence Heper contends that in the Empire "there was little need" either for "institutional secularization as disengagement" or for "institutional secularization as differentiation" (1981a: 348).

It might thus be argued that the particular relation between state norms and Islamic norms, which Heper previously used as a yardstick to differentiate the Ottoman state from the Western ones, now turns out to be the key to the specificity of the Ottoman state *vis-à-vis* other "Islamic" states. However, this is not to say that, in Heper's mind, the Ottoman state can be assimilated to its Western counterparts in respect of its relation to the "religious institution". True, he now states that the religious institution in the Empire was "a prop for and subservient to the state" (1981: 348). It follows that the Ottoman state was akin to its Western contemporaries as both functioned predominantly as secular authorities. Heper nevertheless

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[50] Just like in his earlier studies, Heper again acknowledges that the influence of religion on the state gradually increased; nevertheless he asserts that this in no sense turned the Ottoman state into a "truly Islamic one" (1981: 348).

perceives a critical difference here, which had to do with, again, the non-separation between the state and the religious institution in the Ottoman case. "With the merger of state and religion", Heper holds, "the supremacy of the state in the Ottoman polity was guaranteed" (1980a: 85). As Islam was not institutionalized within a distinct and independent organization, not only did the rulers had firm control over religious functionaries (1980a: 85; 1985c: 13 1985a: 27), but more importantly, Islam failed to emerge as "an autonomous force or power *vis-à-vis* the state"(1980a: 84-85; 1985a: 27). This state of affairs presented a stark contrast to the "situation in Catholic realms" (1985a: 27), where an independent religious organization with "its own resources" and "rights *vis-à-vis* the secular authority" did exist (1990a: 127). The presence of such a religious institution in the West had important repercussions on the scope of state power, since "the Church played a pivotal role in counterbalancing the power of central authority" in Western societies (1990a: 127). Hence in the West, Heper continues, the Church in its confrontation with the state facilitated the "development of liberalism" (1980c: 13) and contributed to the consolidation of democracy (1990a: 127). On the other hand, Heper argues, the merger of state and the religious institution in the Ottoman Empire was a factor which helped strenghten state's hand *vis-à-vis* the society (1980c: 13). The supremacy of the state arising from its incorporation of the religious institution entailed the "weakness" of Ottoman society.

3.3.2 From Personal Rule to "Enlightened Despotism": The Birth of the Ottoman "Reason of State"

Turning now to Heper's characterization of the Ottoman state, it should immediately be noted that, according to him, the traits of the latter had undergone certain changes over the course of time. That is, even within the classical period, the Ottoman state cannot be said to have remained essentially unaltered. More specifically, the reason of state referred to above was a later development since, Heper asserts, a tendency toward "personal rule" stamped the initial configuration of the Ottoman polity (1985a: 24; 1987a: 14; 1992a: 173). Where personal rule predominates, that is, within a "personalist polity", decisions are made and unmade at the whim of the

ruler, and subsequently there is a dearth of "fixed state norms" unbridled from the person of the ruler (1987a: 16). Under such conditions, the bureaucratic apparatus is nothing but a "personal instrument of the ruler" (1985b: 103; 1987a: 15-16). That there was a tendency towards personal rule in the formative years of the Ottoman state is quite explicable given the exigencies of state formation: Ottoman rulers not only faced external threats coming from neighbouring kingdoms, they at the same time had to grapple with numerous foci of autonomous power in order to establish their authority firmly within the realm (1985a: 23-24; 1992a: 173). The "fear of disintegrative influences" which followed culminated in personal rule (1992a: 173).

The period of personal rule was, however, short-lived. "Once the central authority was more or less intact" (1985a: 25, 1992a: 174), Heper writes, there came into being the beginnings of the "Ottoman version of *raison d'état*" (1985a: 26). Otherwise stated, personal and arbitrary rule gave way to "rule based on carefully delineated norms", or "enlightened despotism" (1985a: 28).[51] The cluster of fixed (and secular) state norms was fabricated through sultan's use of customary law, *örf-i sultani* (1985a: 25; 1992a: 174). The exercise of secular power via *örf-i sultani* did not entail arbitrariness on the part of the sultan as it was "based on the measuring rods of 'necessity' and 'reason' and not on the personal whims of the sultan" (1985a: 25). Hence, it might be asserted that it was the state norms in question which authoritatively determined the way secular power was to be employed. Consequently, Heper asserts that state norms were "impersonal" in that they transcended the will of any individual sultan, who was, in any event, "expected to conform to them" (1987a: 14). The development of secular and static state norms thus signalled the depersonalization of authority (1992a: 173). The sultanate, though, remained as the "locus of the state" (1985a: 31), since the "sultans ruled as well as reigned": there still was "an identity between the sultan and the state" (1980a: 85). Accordingly, the bureaucrats were regarded as "*emanations* from, and, in turn, as

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[51] On one occasion Heper designates this transition as one from personal rule, which is by definition "detraditionalized" (i.e. the ruler is not obliged to abide by any kind of traditional norms in employing his discretionary power) (1987a: 22, note 28), to "*traditional* patrimonialism" (1987a: 14, emphasis added). The stress on "tradition" is important in that it directs attention to the idea that ruler's discretion was superseded by impersonal norms. As will be seen in the following chapter, in his subsequent studies Heper tries to avoid dubbing the Ottoman state as patrimonial to the extent that he associates patrimonialism with personal and arbitrary rule.

extensions of, the ruler" (1985a: 29). Yet it might be asserted that the bureaucratic organization was no longer a neutral instrument to be employed by the ruler in a capricious fashion, because it was permeated by the very same norms which guided ruler's actions. What united the members of the administrative organization was a "common outlook" (1985a: 31), "based on the principles of 'necessity' and 'reason' and bound up with the norm of rationality" (1992b: 150; 1993: 8), which they acquired through "organizational socialization" (1985a: 25; 1991b: 198; 1992a: 174; 1993: 8). The name given to this particular outlook pertaining to the ruling group was "*adap*", which amounted to a "secular and state oriented tradition" (1985a: 25; 1992a: 174; 1992b: 150; 1993: 8) The bureaucrats could assimilate the ideals and norms contained in this common outlook smoothly as they had no ties whatsoever with social groups (1992a: 179). As "slaves of the sultan", they were thus exposed to no interest other than that of the state. Nevertheless, Heper is cautious enough to add that despite the "image of a household" administrative organization conjured (1985a: 28-9), Ottoman rule was "enlightened" (1985a: 25, 28).

As for the precise content of the set of norms which guided the exercise of state power during the classical period, Heper cites the centrality of the idea articulated in the notion of the "circle of justice": "a ruler can have no power without soldiers, no soldiers without money, no money without the well-being of his subjects, and no popular well-being without justice" (1985a: 25). It is from this maxim that Heper deduces an idea of the Ottoman state as genuinely committed to peasant welfare (1980a: 86-87; 1980c: 15-16; 1985a: 25-26, 36, 106). Although he clings to the argument that preservation of the existing order was the highest ideal (1985a: 25-26), he now seems to give more emphasis to the overarching concern with popular well-being. This is not to say that from Heper's point of view, the two concerns are unrelated, for he asserts that Ottoman political philosophy stipulated the perpetuation of the social order "under the reign of justice" (1985a: 26). Justice itself meant the maintenance of the social order "as an unalterable tradition by securing to each category of the ruled no less, and no more than its function and station deserved" (1985a: 26). Hence, once again, the ruler's interest in "keeping everyone in his place". In Heper's account, then, justice and order turn out to be almost coterminous, and more importantly, both had to do with resource allocation, as "justice" in

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particular demanded that "scarce resources . . . should be distributed with a view to equity" (1985a: 26). Heper does not stop here, though, and hints that state's interest in equitable distribution of resources was in fact cognate with its preoccupation with establishing its exclusive control over the resources. For instance, he contends that "welfare of society" was identified with that of the state (1992a: 181) and that "welfare of the state" was nothing but the monopolization of the control over "free-floating resources" by the "groups which identified themselves with the state" (1980c: 13; 1985a: 26). Hence he argues that the Ottoman "state had taken unto itself the 'responsibility' of extracting as much surplus as possible to finance its own goals" (1976b: 491). To further illustrate, Heper asserts that one policy which followed from the *adap* tradition was that of "trying to free peasantry from exactions" (1985a: 36). Elsewhere, he points out that this policy, which was "an unchanging and common orientation of the center", served to guarantee state's own extraction of resources in the form of taxes on a regular basis (1980a: 86; 1980c: 15). To the extent that Heper's remarks regarding state's concern for equity can be rephrased, as he himself does occasionally, in terms of the policy of protecting peasant property against encroachments by local power-holders so that the state could get the lion's share of peasant surplus, "justice" turns out to be something more than the shorthand term for a bunch of altruistic acts on the part of the state. However, at times, Heper tends to treat state's attentiveness to peasant well-being as self-explanatory; that is, he does not relate it to the material basis of state power. For instance, he argues that "appealing to the masses" is a part of "Ottoman-Turkish state tradition", which is evinced both in the classical Ottoman period and in the multi-party period of republican Turkey (1985a: 106). In a similar vein, he elsewhere holds that there is a continuity between the orientation of Sultan Süleyman I and Kemalist political philosophy in that peasantry had always been seen as the "genuine master of the country" (1980a: 86-7; 1980c: 15-16).

In any event, the protection of the peasantry is conceived as the cardinal principle of the "Ottoman version of *raison d'état*". For Heper, the former is an unchanging norm, which, it might be argued, displays to the contemporary observer the hidden logic behind the seemingly random acts on the part of the Ottoman state. That is, Heper endows the principle under consideration with an explanatory

significance; it is this principle which sheds light on the "decisions" made by Ottoman sultans, thus uncovering the nature of the over-all order the latter strived to establish. Moreover, it appears that Heper's privileging of the policy of protecting the peasantry as the guiding principle of the Ottoman reason of state sits well with the supposed patrimonialism of the Empire. That is to say, the policy in question and Ottoman state's parsimoniousness in granting "autonomous political power" to its agents in the provinces, as well as its hostility toward intermediary structures, seem to be co-related in Heper's perspective. As a result, the "traditional ideal of the center that there should be no intermediaries *of any sort*" (1980a: 91, emphasis added), composing either of officials or of non-state agents, between the state and the subject population should be regarded as yet another component of the Ottoman reason of state.

This brings one to the question as to against whom the state was supposed to protect the peasantry, or in other words, who were in a position to commit "injustice" against the *reaya*. According to İnalcık, who analyzes the notion of "justice" in comparable terms, "justice" concerned "abuses of power in the provinces" (1993: 72) and it meant the "prevention and elimination of the oppressive acts, *zulm*, by those who exercise power in the name of the ruler" (1993: 71). As such, İnalcık continues, "justice" is the key to our understanding of "the Middle Eastern state" (1993: 71). More important for our purposes here is his contention that the aim was that of protecting the peasants, who "constituted the backbone of the productive classes and the main source of public revenues", against the "exactions of provincial *tımar* holding soldiery and local authorities" (1993: 72). Now, Heper, too, emphasizes central authority's vigorous attempts to control its provincial functionaries and to thwart them from oppressing the peasantry (1980a: 87; 1980c: 16). Nonetheless, it seems to be the case that regarding the classical period, i.e. the era starting with the consolidation of Ottoman rule in Anatolia and stretching to the late sixteenth century, Heper sees "justice" as a *fait accompli*. This might be the result of Heper's assessment of either the effectiveness of the cunning policy of "divide and rule" employed in the provinces, whereby "the fief-holder, tax-farmer, tax collector, local governor, and janissary commander were all played off against each other" (1980a: 86), or of the pervasiveness of the *adap* tradition. It is presumably the latter which

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explains why Heper is, one might say, reluctant to acknowledge the possibility that peasants might have been exploited, oppressed or bullied by state agents during the classical period. This is not to say that the alleged extent of central control is of no relevance, for Heper tends to stress this at times, in which case, though, he might be indicted for overestimating state's capacity of controlling its agents.

3.3.3 "Ottoman Decline"

The importance Heper assigns to the *adap* tradition and to the effective control over state agents in the localities in assuring that state power was employed in such a way as to safeguard the interests of the subject population during the heyday of the Empire can also be gathered from his account of the effects of Ottoman "decline" on the bureaucracy. The disintegration of the traditional order, Heper argues, had the effect not only of undermining state's control over its agents, both palatine and provincial (1980a: 93; 1985a: 31; 1992a: 174), a point Heper has already made in his previous works, but also of eroding the *adap* tradition, the cluster of secular state norms which had together constituted the Ottoman reason of state (1985a: 31; 1992a: 174). Once state norms began to be dismantled, "arbitrary rule" resurfaced (1985a: 31). This time, though, it was not only the sultans who acted despotically, since their authority itself was undermined, as a result of which they increasingly came to depend on palace factions to access to the throne, and then to continue to reign (1985a: 31). Rather, having been freed from traditional restraints, state officials themselves became self-interested in their governmental dealings and "tyrannical" in their relations to the subject population (1985a: 31). Drawing on Mardin (1973: 174), Heper asserts that Ottoman officials turned into "plunderers of their own society" (1976b: 491; 1980a: 91; 1985a: 31). This was true especially in the case of provincial state agents, who squeezed the peasantry whenever they could (1980a: 91). The result was that local notables, who rose to prominence in the period of disintegration mostly due to tax-farming privileges they managed to acquire, and provincial state agents became "rivals in local exploitation" (1980a: 91; 1985a: 39). Once again

building on Mardin (1973: 174), Heper writes that only then Ottoman rule started to show signs of "Oriental Despotism" (1985a: 31).[52]

3.3.4 Ottoman Modernization and the Resurgence of the Reason of State

This state of affairs lasted until the turn of the nineteenth century, when Ottoman modernization was set in motion in full vigour (1985a: 35-36, 44-46; 1992a: 174). Thus, what might be called the period of "oriental despotism" was, for Heper, an interval between the classical Ottoman age, the reign of "justice", and the period of Ottoman modernization. The period of "oriental despotism", to repeat, coincided with, or better, was a product of the disintegration of the traditional Ottoman order. Heper studies the latter, i.e. the process of disintegration, in terms very similar to his previous analyses. On the other hand, his view of Ottoman modernization is somewhat modified, as he now asserts that it was the revival of the *adap* tradition which marked the period of modernization (1985a: 36, 45; 1992a: 174). That is, he no longer perceives the ideas introduced by the reformist bureaucrats as essentially alien to the traditional Ottoman scene. This change in Heper's perspective seems to be consonant with the revived account of the classical Ottoman state he presents: because of his conviction that the rulers and their administrative staff were guided by some form of reason of state in the classical period, he now believes that Ottoman modernizing bureaucrats did have at their disposal an indigenous tradition to draw upon in their attempts to "reinvigorate" the Empire. In his previous studies, on the other hand, modernization is more about bureaucrats' introducing from scratch new ideas, new "orientations" inspired by the success of "organic" development in the West. To reiterate, the crucial difference here is that in those earlier studies, Heper has not yet arrived at a view of the Ottoman state as functioning on static and secular

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[52] It is interesting to note that İnalcık, too, mentions the notion of "oriental despotism" in contradistinction to his account of the nature of Ottoman rule during the classical age (1993: 71). He notes that the image of a "despotic government based on the use of sheer force" is at odds with the way Ottoman state actually functioned on the basis of "justice" (1993: 71). Consequently, he holds that "oriental despotism" is a "misconception of the real state system in the East" (1993: 71). These assertions are in harmony with the above remark of Heper's, which shows the extent to which the polemic against the idea of oriental despotism constitutes an undercurrent in those accounts of the Ottoman state centered around the notion of "justice". Though, in İnalcık this is more evident.

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norms. Otherwise stated, the impression one gets from his previous studies is that Ottoman bureaucracy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did *not* succeed to a tradition of "rational" statecraft, from which to seek inspiration.

All these do not amount to saying that Heper now downplays the role Western ideas and institutions played in bringing about Ottoman modernization. To the contrary, the Western pattern of development remains as the example that Ottoman bureaucrats looked up to. In a nutshell, it can be argued that Heper continues to conceive of Ottoman modernization as "westernization", but this time, in contrast to his previous works, he underlines the continuity between the classical ideals of the Ottoman center and the mentality of the modernizing bureaucracy. To illustrate, he suggests that modernizing bureaucrats of the *Tanzimat* period (1839-1876) in particular were influenced by, and in turn adopted, "European ideas . . . as the only way of saving the Empire" (1985a: 36), but at the same time he constantly argues that some of these ideas were actually in harmony with the norms which used to constitute Ottoman reason of state in the classical period. Thus, he notes the "close affinity" between the French revolutionary idea that the state should have unmediated relations with its subjects and the traditional hostility of the Ottoman state toward intermediary structures (1980a: 91-92; 1980c: 21; 1985a: 39). The latter, he continues, was revived "in a new form" in order to launch an attack on local notables' de facto status as intermediaries, as well as the privileges they attained during the period of disintegration (1980a: 91; 1980c: 21; 1985a: 39). On the other hand, Heper acknowledges that some ideas which Ottoman bureaucrats came to adopt were indeed novel, such as the principle of "equality of all citizens", then again he attempts to show how the bureaucrats used this principle as a weapon to strenghten the state as opposed to peripheral forces, through striving to "mobilize the masses behind the state and against local notables" (1980a: 92; 1985a: 39). In both cases, nonetheless, the ideas or principles in question were used with the aim of reinstituting state's supremacy. Otherwise put, the motive was to revitalize, in changed circumstances, traditional Ottoman ideals regarding the "roles and functions in the Ottoman polity of the state, the center, and the periphery" (1980a: 97).

In the nineteenth century, the *adap* tradition was not just revived, it was "revived in its most secular form" (1985a: 45). As Heper contends that during the

classical period secular norms had already come to prevail over Islamic ones, this should be seen simply as a change in degree, rather than a qualitative break. In other words, state norms were more secular than they had previously been. This situation came about as a consequence of the view Ottoman bureaucrats held regarding Islam: according to them, "Islam had fallen out of phase with life and could not be adapted to modern circumstances" (1981: 349; 1985a: 45; 1993: 8-9). From then on, "reason" indisputably became "the most important criterion" in the formulation of policies (1981: 349; 1985a: 45).

The nineteenth century at the same time witnessed a much more pronounced change, i.e. a shift in the "locus of the state" from the sultan to the (civil) bureaucracy (1985a: 31-35, 45-46).[53] As the state was then "structured in the civil bureaucracy" (1985a: 46), the latter owed allegiance no more to the sultan, but to the state itself. Correspondingly, the bureaucrats strived to "establish their supremacy vis-à-vis the sultan" (1992a: 177) through recourse to the idea of "institutions replacing individual rulers" (1985a: 44). Hence, although they were unequivocally committed to the interests of the state, their primary concern was "that of preserving their autonomy" (1985a: 44). In any case, it might be argued, bureaucratic autonomy was a prerequisite for the overriding concern to "strengthen the center itself" (1985a: 37).

Throughout long Ottoman centuries, though, one feature remained constant: the cluster of norms on which the state functioned emanated from the state, and only from it (1992a: 177). In other words, no "social group" had an impact on the way state power was employed. This was the case during the classical period because the Ottoman state from the very beginning was "sharply distinguished from the social groups" (1992b: 151), and it continued to be the case in the nineteenth century as the bureaucratic elites remained aloof from societal influences and identified themselves with the state (1985a: 45; 1992a: 179). "Substantive rationality" was thus a steady feature of the Ottoman state (1985a: 46).

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[53] A major change which took place within the bureaucratic organization from eighteenth century on, Heper writes, was the coming to prominence in the polity of civil bureaucracy (1985a: 35). Thereafter, the civil bureaucracy emerged as the major agent of reform in the Ottoman Empire.

3.3.5 Center-Periphery Confrontation Revisited

Probably due to his renewed understanding of the nature of the Ottoman state, Heper now attributes a broader meaning to the center-periphery cleavage. He first clarifies what "center" and "periphery" stand for. In what might be called in its narrow sense, "center" means "central authority" (1980c: 14). However, when it refers to "persons" rather than central authority (1980c: 14), then it denotes "those groups which try to uphold state's autonomy and supremacy in the polity" (1980a: 99, note 1; 1980c: 3, note 2). Accordingly, "periphery" stands for "those who try to escape from the regulation of the state" (1980a: 99, note 1; 1980c: 3, note 2). Even that much can betoken that Heper now perceives center-periphery confrontation, or more correctly center–periphery relations since the latter did not necessarily lead to open confrontation, as a much more widespread phenomenon. For one thing, its substance does not seem to be confined to a conflict over values, that is, a conflict between the "secular" and the "Islamic", as can be inferred from above quotations. Further, center-periphery confrontation is no longer asserted to have commenced with the emergence of bureaucratic ruling tradition, though Heper does not tend to use the latter term anymore. On the contrary, the conflict between the center and the periphery is now treated as an essentially Ottoman way of confrontation, or in other words, as a peculiarity of the Ottoman social formation. Thus, Heper contends that in terms of the relations between the center and the periphery, "there is an unmistakable continuity from the classical Ottoman period to the centuries of decline and into the nineteenth century" (1980a: 98; 1980c: 27).

One facet of this continuity is definitely the fact that state's supremacy had never been gravely challenged (1987a: 15), maybe except for a brief period during Ottoman decline when local notables posed a threat to central authority (1992a: 179). This had to do with Ottoman polity's possessing a "strong center" (1979-80: 102). During the initial stages of state-formation, as has been noted, the ruling center was confronted by the "old Ottoman aristocracy", who eventually surrendered to the center (1985a: 21-23; 1987a: 14). Then came a period of relative tranquillity, corresponding to the golden age of the Empire, when no major peripheral force was there to edge central authority, which was nevertheless followed by a period of

disintegration of the established pattern of resource allocation and rule, marked most notably by the rise of local notables in the provinces. It is the latter development which we will now focus upon.

3.4 The Case of Ottoman Local Notables

In his earlier works discussed in the preceding chapter, Heper analyzes the emergence of the bureaucratic ruling tradition against the backdrop of the inability of incipient Ottoman middle classes to come up with a political agenda of their own, which facilitated the reinforcement of the bureaucratic project of change. In similar vein, here, too, Heper associates the eventual coming to prominence of a "statist" project of modernization, through the revival of the *adap* tradition, with the absence of an alternative "societal" project. Thus he writes that in spite of a decline in the extent of state's control over the social life in the Empire, the "periphery" failed to develop a "substitute for the *adap* tradition" (1985a: 32). More specifically, he holds that the Ottoman periphery was unable to question "the basic legitimizing values set by the Ottoman bureaucratic center" (1987a: 15).

It is evident that there is a continuity in Heper's studies in terms of the line of reasoning he pursues: in the absence of influential societal agents, it turns out to be the state actors, already in an advantageous position due to the antecedent "institutionalization pattern" of the state, who get the upper hand and dictate the path to be followed. On the other hand, Heper's analyses under consideration here seem to diverge from the preceding ones in one respect: Heper, this time, concerns himself more with local notables than with Ottoman middle classes. Although he still notes the inferior standing of the "economic middle strata" and their inability to emerge as political actors (1985a: 100-102), it is the "failure" of the Ottoman local notables which he brings to the fore of his analysis.

Ottoman local notables were the major group which benefited from the loosening of the ruling center's control in the provinces during the period of disintegration. They amassed considerable wealth and gained control over the resources through "exploitation of the weaknesses of the center in the localities" (1980a: 96; 1987a: 14). Thus, during the centuries of decline, there did take place a

change in the previous pattern of the distribution of the resources, as the center was obliged to acquiesce to a much smaller share of the peasant surplus (1985a: 34). Consequently, it would not be incorrect to say that Ottoman local notables held sway in "economic" terms. What renders the case of local notables a historical failure for Heper, on the other hand, is their inability to change the "earlier" balance of political power between the center and the periphery, which resulted in continued domination of the periphery by the center (1985a: 34; 1987a: 15). Local notables failed to jeopardize state's supremacy in the polity because they "did not confront the central authority with an alternative project" (1980c: 17). According to Heper, they were "local in the true sense of the word" (1980a: 96; 1980c: 25; 1985a: 15; 1987a: 14), since their purview never extended beyond the localities, from where they derived their "economic" power. In other words, "they were never able and/or interested in translating their economic power into central political power" (1980a: 96; 1987a: 14). Being completely uninterested in "central decision making", they devoted all their energies to consolidate their influence in the provinces (1980a: 91). As such, Ottoman local notables failed to challenge the political arrangements enacted at the center, and thus ended up being "co-opted by the rulers into the existing political framework" (1980a: 97; 1985a: 43). As a result, "the principles of access to political power did not change" (1980a: 97; 1985a: 43).

It is tenable to argue that Heper's interest in local notables derives from his conviction that in the West, the aristocracies played a pivotal role in circumscribing the power of the central state (1980a: 98; 1980c: 6; 1985a: 15; 1990a: 127). More specifically, it might be contended that what Heper does is negatively evaluating the case of Ottoman local notables *vis-à-vis* the example set by the "old landed aristocracies" during the period of absolutist states in the West (1980a: 88; 1985a: 32). Hence it is the latter which Heper uses as a point of reference to assess the case of local notables.

Although Heper compares the "political activities" of these two historical groups, he also takes note of certain dissimilarities in terms of their respective configurations. The most crucial dissimilarity can be expressed as a contrast between what we have referred to as "established position" and what Heper calls "regulated status" (1980a: 88; 1985a: 33), the former pertaining to Western aristocracies and the

latter Ottoman local notables. While in the West aristocracy, as a "legal estate", "emerged independently of the command of the state" (1980c: 6), Ottoman local notables were no more than a "state-made" group (1980c: 26), since "the title of *ayan* itself was obtained by special charters issued by the center" (1980a: 88; 1985a: 33). Hence in stark contrast to the case of Western aristocracies, local notables' authority, as well as their "social prestige" in the localities, were "dependent on the state" (1980a: 87, 97; 1985a: 33).[54] Consequently, employing Hourani's (1968) terminology, Heper asserts that Ottoman local notables had little "social power of their own" (1980a: 87). It is necessary to clarify the latter term. In Hourani's perspective, the "political influence" of Ottoman local notables had two dimensions: the first one relates to their having "access to authority", whereas the second pertains to their having "some social power of their own, whatever its form and origin, which is not dependent on the ruler and gives them a position of accepted and 'natural' leadership" (Hourani, 1968: 46). It is quite obvious that this second aspect comes close to some kind of "established position", as it has a solid foundation in the social structure itself rather than being granted by the ruler. Hence it is easy to see why Heper thinks it was largely lacking in the Ottoman case.[55] Heper then characterizes

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[54] Furthermore, local notables somewhat owed even their "economic wealth" to the state as the basis of the latter was the exploitation of peasantry "through the use of powers delegated to them by the state" (1980a: 97). Hence their economic power had no "autonomous" foundation as they opted for becoming tax-farmers (1985a: 32) rather than engaging in "productive enterprise" (1991a: 14) such as turning themselves into "agricultural entrepreneurs" (1980a: 88). There was a huge gulf between the "English aristocrats" and Ottoman local notables in this respect since the former transformed themselves into "risk-takers in new business ventures" from very early on (1980a: 94; 1985a: 41). While Ottoman local notables were "willing to fill the slots the center saw appropriate for them" (1980a: 88), and therefore were dependent on the state, the English aristocrats strived to influence the state from without in order to "obtain for the merchants and the industrialists the necessary patents and licences" (1980a: 94; 1985a: 41).

[55] It should be pointed out that this is *not* Hourani's contention. Hourani holds that notables did have "social power of their own" and that, in any case, the two above-mentioned aspects of their political power were interrelated: precisely because Ottoman local notables had social power, or a position of "natural leadership", the Ottoman rulers needed them to rule in the provinces (1968: 46). Hence Hourani asserts that Ottoman rulers "had to rely on local intermediaries, and these they found already existing" (1968: 48). It should be added that Hourani views what he calls "politics of notables" not as a sign of "Ottoman decline" but as a peculiar attribute of "urban politics of the Ottoman provinces" (1968: 45). For Heper, on the other hand, "[a]s far as the center was concerned, the participation of local notables in local administration was a stop-gap measure" (1980a: 89).

the relation of local notables to the state as an "outright dependency relationship" (1985a: 15; 1987a: 15).[56]

In this interlacing of dependency, each individual local notable stood in a "vertical relationship with the state" (1980a: 88; 1985a: 33). Each endeavoured to attain favours from the center at the expense of fellow notables. Yet, as "they competed among themselves for official posts at the local level", local notables failed to develop "horizontal ties" (1980a: 88; 1985a: 33). In the absence of such intra-group solidarity, Ottoman local notables never assumed any sort of "estate" characteristics (1985a: 32; 1991a: 14) unlike the case of Western aristocracies.[57] Ottoman polity, then, did not even superficially resemble a "polity of estates" during the period of disintegration (1985a: 32; 1991a: 14).

It was not just group solidarity based on an awareness of common interests which Ottoman local notables lacked when compared to Western aristocracies. At the same time, one can argue, they never came to enjoy privileges sanctioned by law. Hence Heper mentions the way the Ottoman center treated as precarious the privileges it bestowed upon the notables (1980a: 89). The center, Heper continues, set out to revoke these privileges whenever "it could muster enough power" (1980a: 89). Accordingly, he argues that the state was never willing to grant legitimacy to local notables (1992a: 179), whom it perceived as "a gang of oppressors" (1980a: 89), a necessary evil, it might be put, the state came to rely upon as a result of the diminution in its power. "The powers these groups acquired", Heper holds, "always remained de facto" with the result that no Ottoman counterpart to "European medieval constitutional norms" can be said to have been in the making (1992a: 179). Consequently, it is fair to contend that Ottoman state's "patrimonial" attitude

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[56] In a study which Heper cites as one of the major forerunners of his own perspective (1985a: 17), Kazancıgil puts the gist of the argument as follows: "Obliged to compete for resource allocation through the patrimonial state apparatus, [Ottoman local notables] failed to develop beyond the local sphere a broader power base, autonomous from the state and the ruling elite" (Kazancıgil, 1981: 45).

[57] This alleged feature of Ottoman local notables can be rephrased in Weber's terms as the absence of "status consciousness". Interestingly enough, Weber observes the same phenomenon in relation to the case of the nobility of Tsarist Russia, where the competition among the nobility for court favours ensued from the "lack of a status-based solidarity of interest" (1978: 1066). The result was that in Russia "the nobility was deeply split into coteries and entirely powerless in relation to the ruler" (1978: 1066). The similarity between two accounts does not end here, as Weber argues that "political power proper" and "social prestige" Russian nobility enjoyed were "dependent solely upon office-holding or directly upon court connections" (1978: 1065).

towards peripheral structures was decisive in precluding the evolution of local notables into a Western-type "estate".

It is within this context that Heper counterposes the case of Ottoman local notables against that of Western aristocracies during the period of absolutism when the latter were "subjugated" by centralizing monarchs (1980a: 88; 1985a: 32). What separates the Western aristocracy from Ottoman local notables is the former's aspiring to become a "countervailing force" *vis-à-vis* central authority (1980a: 88; 1985a: 32-33). Ottoman local notables, on the other hand, showed no interest in carrying out a "struggle against absolutism" (1980a: 98). On the contrary, they were "indifferent to the potential strengthening of the center" with the result that there emerged no obstacle to the center's attempt at realizing this very potential (1980a: 91).

In the absence of a politically engaged and well-organized "peripheral" agent, thus, the stage was set for the arrival of, what might be called, the "transformation from above". Hence Heper commits himself to demonstrating that none of the reforms/administrative innovations devised by modernizing bureaucrats during the *Tanzimat* period[58] emerged "as a response to the rising significance of the local notables in the Ottoman polity" (1980a: 97). It would not be inaccurate to conclude that for Heper the case of local notables bares witness to the fact that in the Ottoman(-Turkish) polity a pattern of "political-change-as-a-response-to-the-demands-of-the-ruled" (1976a: 508) was drastically lacking.[59]

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[58] See 1980a: 91-96 and 1985a: 39-42.

[59] One of the most basic assumptions on the part of Heper is that this kind of a tradition continued well into the republican period. He notes, for example, that in Turkish polity transition to democracy was effected as a result of "conscious decisions of bureaucratic elites"; it was not "forced by the rising social groups" (1991a: 17; 1992b: 146).

3.5 The Historical Significance of Western Estates as "Intermediary Structures" and the Repercussions of Their Absence in the Ottoman Social Formation

The case of Ottoman local notables, as noted above, arouses Heper's interest because of his conviction that it was above all the aristocracy who contributed to the delimitation of the power of the central authority in the West. Hence he notes the invaluable part played by the aristocracy in "safeguarding of rights and limitation of force" throughout Western middle ages (1980a: 98; 1985a: 15), as well as, one could add, during the early modern period. Consequently, when Heper scrutinizes the case of Ottoman local notables, the question he has in mind is whether they constituted "an aristocarcy, i.e. a powerful class able to exercise an impact over the affairs of the state" (1980a: 87), a question which he replies in the negative (1991a: 13), not surprisingly given his assessment of their characteristics presented above.

It might be argued that the importance ascribed to the historical role played not only by the aristocracy but also by other "estates", which, as has been shown, underlies Heper's account of the "feudal" West, is at odds with his earlier analyses of the development of Western administrative systems. This is because in those earlier studies, discussed in the previous chapter, Heper comes close to seeing the absolutist monarchy as a "revolutionary agent of change" (Bendix, 1968: 2), either in collaboration with incipient middle classes or otherwise. In those studies, to recall, Heper draws attention to the "substantive rationality" of the absolutist monarchs and their administrative staffs in his account of the initial divergence of the Ottoman administrative development from the Western pattern. There, he tends to conceive absolutist monarchs and their administrative functionaries as "progressive figures whose organizing, unifying, and levelling impulses developed a state which was above traditional vested interests and which acted as a stalking horse for a future bourgeois order" (Beik, 1985: 3-4). Within such a framework, European estates can only be seen as regressive structures which acted as "legal roadblocks in the way of reform" (LaPalombara, 1969: 186).[60] This seems to be the reason why Heper does

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[60] For instance, one observer mentions how the French aristocracy organized in *parlements*, in collaboration with craftsmen organized in guilds, tried to obstruct the royal policy of promoting "free trade" (Myers, 1975: 9-10). Similarly, Weber asserts that appropriated titles to office on the part of the aristocracy could stand in the way of "any attempt at rationalizing the administration through the

not bring up the topic of medieval and early modern estate structures in his earlier studies. However, in his studies under consideration here, it is precisely those "vested interests" organized in legally autonomous corporations which Heper perceives as the key to the uniqueness of the Western pattern of development and which he endows with a long-term historical significance. The irony is that absolutist monarchies set out to undermine these forms of organizations, or autonomous jurisdictions (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 103; Behrens, 1977: 582; Bendix, 1964: 39-40; Bendix, 1966: 79; Bendix, 1968: 3; Turner, 1996: 214; Weber, 1964: 378; Weber, 1978: 1041, 1087) as Heper himself acknowledges when he writes that absolutist monarchies subdued their aristocracies (1980a: 88; 1985a: 32). As a consequence, it is not suprising that Heper no longer pursues the theme of absolutist monarchies as the carriers of "rational" norms which would transform the Western world. For he now situates the essence of the Western pattern in the medieval political institutions of representation whose legacy allegedly survived into the early modern era. It is this very survival in the face of, and despite, the coming into being of absolutism which Heper muses on when evaluating the case of Ottoman local notables as against that of Western aristocracies.

When it comes to the analysis of the Ottoman social formation, it is the absence of Ottoman counterparts to these institutions and/or arrangements which proves critical for Heper in causing the disjuncture between Ottoman and Western patterns of "state"-"society" relations. Heper's assertion that "center" and "periphery" were the "major actors" in Ottoman(-Turkish) politics (1985a: 149) builds on the assumption that a pattern of conflict structured around "estates", as well as "classes of a primarily economic base", was lacking in the Ottoman case (1976b: 493). It has been previously noted that in his studies presently under consideration Heper puts much more emphasis on the absence of legally autonomous estates, especially that of an aristocracy, than he does on the absence of a politically influential middle class. In either case, however, Heper's concern remains with, what might be called, the historical absence of a "societal" force which is in a position to

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introduction of a well-disciplined bureaucracy" and cites French *parlements* in pre-revolutionary period as an example, as the latter "blocked all innovations which would have been detrimental to their traditional rights" (Weber, 1978: 1038).

"hegemonically" organize at least certain sections of the periphery and, thus, to impinge on the state, curbing the latter's exclusive power. In this sense, both the aristocracy and the middle classes turn out to be important for Heper precisely because, according to him, they constituted the "intermediary structures" which moderated the relations between "state" and "society" in the West (1985a: 117).[61] These structures, however, were lacking in the Ottoman Empire (1985a: 117) as a result of which the balance between "state" and "society" emerged as utterly askew since a "disorganized", therefore feeble, periphery faced an "omnipotent state" (1985a: 103). "Not only the economic middle classes but also the aristocracy and religious institution" having been "successfully subdued", Heper writes, "the basic cleavage turned out to be one between a dominant center and a fragmented, particularistic, and segmented periphery" (1985a: 149). The absence of such intermediary structures, thus, entailed that Ottoman state was far too strong when compared to its Western counterparts, both in the "feudal" period and during the era of centralized (absolutist) monarchies.[62]

On the other hand, Heper continues to argue that the basic cleavage in the Ottoman(-Turkish) politics was "cultural" rather than "functional" (1985a: 99, 150). That is, he still thinks that the confrontation between the center and the periphery revolved around cultural cleavages. This time, however, he associates cultural cleavages not with a contradiction between secular and Islamic norms but with the problem of "legitimacy" (1985a: 104-105).[63] This shift in meaning, it seems, sits

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[61] It should once more be noted that it is the impact middle classes exerted on the state, alongside the internal organization and mode of functioning of the latter itself, which Heper dwells on in his earlier analyses. Here, on the other hand, he is much more interested in medieval and early modern estate structures. Nonetheless, in both cases Heper's project remains the same: he tries to come to terms with what İslamoğlu-İnan calls the "uniqueness (or the specific dynamic) of Western development" so as to display "how and why the Ottoman Empire departed from the Western pattern" (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 7).

[62] One can discern yet another modification in Heper's perspective here, for in his previous analyses he seems to be far from asserting that Ottoman state was stronger than Western ones. It might be contended that Heper of the previous period would be inclined to so argue only in relation to the nineteenth century, for instance, since, then, Western political systems had already been transformed by the "social power" wielded by the middle classes, whereas the Ottoman Empire just entered an era of state-led modernization. Prior to that, on the other hand, Ottoman state had been insufficiently autonomous and sovereign as compared to the absolutist states of the West.

[63] Functional cleavages, on the other hand, have to do with the problem of "distribution" (1985a: 104-105).

very well with his reading of Ottoman history via the concept of patrimonialism. For, it might be asserted that it was above all legitimacy which the patrimonial Ottoman state withheld from peripheral agents throughout its history. Heper posits a continuity from Ottoman to Turkish politics in this respect, as the same pattern of conflict between the state and local notables was replicated a couple of centuries later in the confrontation between Kemalist "state elites" and the "political elites" garrisoned in the Democrat Party (1985a: 104; 1991b: 204). Thus, Heper argues that it has always been contending claims to legitimacy which characterized Ottoman-Turkish politics (2002-3: 160-161), rather than a clash between "left" and "right" as the two parties of the struggle over distribution (1985a: 104-105; 1991b: 204).[64]

Consequently, it is fair to argue that Ottoman state's patrimonialism accounts for why the basic confrontation in the Ottoman(-Turkish) social formation turned out to be between the center and the periphery, and why the problem of legitimacy emerged as the most pressing issue. Thus, patrimonialism is, without doubt, *the* explanatory constant in Heper's analysis of the Ottoman social formation.

3.6 A Methodological Note

It has been argued above that Heper's notion of feudalism as a system of rule based on the fragmentation of political authority and the ensuing configuration of the political process as institutionalized bargaining among privileged strata bares resemblance to the Weberian understanding of Western feudalism. An effort has also been made to relate Heper's reflections on Ottoman patrimonialism to the accounts of patrimonialism presented by Weber (1964; 1978) and Bendix (1960; 1964; 1966), a leading disciple of the latter writer. At the same time, however, it has been briefly remarked that there is a methodological discrepancy between the ways the twin concepts of feudalism and patrimonialism are employed on the one hand by Heper and on the other by Weber and Bendix and that the latter scholars propose to conceive of these terms as heuristic tools for comparative analysis. That is to say, Heper's divergence from the Weberian standpoint can be put as follows: according to

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[64] This alleged continuity will be elaborated in more detail in the following chapter.

him, Ottoman Empire was patrimonial and pre-modern Western social formations were feudal, whereas Weber and Bendix try to come to terms with the issues of pre-modern political-administrative structures on the basis of the unceasing tension between feudalism and patrimonialism (Weber, 1978: 1030, 1040-1041, 1058; Bendix, 1960: 359-360, 366-368; Bendix, 1964: 33, 37; Bendix, 1966: 77-78, 79).

Unlike Heper, thus, Weber's starting point is not the alleged feudalism or patrimonialism of a particular historical case, but it is the "always unstable distribution of power between lord and his officials" (Weber, 1978: 1041). The tension the latter created was integral to all "traditional" polities, both those of the Occident and the "Orient", and its roots lay in the historical transition from "patriarchalism", the primitive type of traditional domination, to patrimonialism (Bendix, 1960: 331-334). For, the enlargement of territory, basicly through conquest, which the ruler/lord/king nominally controlled implied that the ruler was "obliged to delegate the direct exercise of authority to others" (Bendix, 1964: 37). Hence the ruler had to rely upon a stratum of local agents or representatives in order to rule (Bendix, 1964: 35-36; Bendix, 1966: 77-78). In this way, the "domestic authority" of the ruler came to be "decentralized through assignment of land" to agents/representatives/officials in the localities (Weber, 1978: 1011). The precise form of decentralization, on the other hand, was everywhere "determined by the struggle for power between the ruler and his retainers and officials" (Bendix, 1960: 347). Consequently, the tension between feudalism and patrimonialism can be understood within this framework determined, above all, by the "problem of political commitment of the periphery to the centre", which issued from the expansion of royal territory (Turner, 1996: 245).

One aspect of the problem definitely relates to the question as to whom the ruler initially delegated his authority. The recipients, as has been shown, could be either dependent officials or "free" vassals (Bendix, 1964: 37). Thus this first dimension, it might be hold, revolves around the following question: "To what extent were certain specific institutional forms imposed upon the ruler, . . . and to what extent were the rulers . . . able to assert their own organizational structures?" (Haldon, 1993: 163). Certain variations in this respect can be shown to have existed

between the respective patterns of decentralization, say, in the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe, as Heper does (1980a: 83; 1985a: 22).

However, the tension between feudal and patrimonial principles of organization was not settled once and for all when land grants were given out to either of the above-mentioned groups. For the struggle for power did not cease to exist. This struggle revolved around the issues of hereditary possession of offices/fiefs and appropriation of governmental powers by fief-holders; for in "all systems of enfeoffment", i.e. all systems of administration based on granting of lands, there was a built in tendency toward "autonomisation of title-holders and privatisation of fiefs in the distant provinces" (Berktay, 1987: 313). The extent to which this tendency was materialized, however, depended on the "balance of forces between the [fief] distributing centre and the beneficiaries" (Berktay, 1987: 313-314). For Weber, the balance of forces in question were, to repeat, "always unstable" (Weber, 1978: 1041) so much so that all traditional polities were marked by the "cyclical nature of the antagonist relationship between . . . centralizing demands and centrifugal tendencies" (Haldon, 1993: 171). At a particular time, the unstable equilibrium could tilt either toward the ruler or toward his officials: either "ruler's personal discretion" or "well-established rights of individuals" prevailed depending on particular historical circumstances (Weber, 1978: 1030). According to Weber, Bendix writes, no particular "government" can be deemed as purely feudal or purely patrimonial, due to the fact that everywhere what one encounters is "amalgamations of the two systems" in varying degrees, as epitomized in the cases of Ottoman Empire and Western Europe (Bendix, 1960: 366-367).

It is nevertheless true that, according to Weber, one can differentiate "Occidental" patrimonialism from its "Oriental" counterpart since it is the tendency toward appropriation of office and decentralization of political authority which was "more frequently found in the Occident", while in the Orient the "discretionary power of the lord" prevailed over appropriation and decentralization (Weber, 1978: 1040).[65] Bendix, who writes that the contrast between feudalism and patrimonialism corresponds to that between, respectively, "the approach of the king" and "the

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[65] Just like Heper, Weber notes that in the Orient absent were "certain Occidental Estate features" (Weber, 1978: 1028).

approach of the landed nobility" (Bendix, 1964: 33), contends that "[w]here the feudal element predominates, the [fiefs] include a guaranteed 'immunity' such that within the territory held in 'fief' the vassal is entitled to exercise certain judicial and administrative powers", whereas "[w]hen patrimonial element dominates, such powers either remain part of the royal jurisdiction or separate grants are made of them so that the king divides the powers he finds it necessary or expedient to delegate" (Bendix, 1964: 37).[66] Then, it was the aristocracies who prevailed in the West, while the rulers in the Orient managed to conquer their privileged subjects. Though, it should be added, it is Bendix's contention that "medieval politics" was characterized by the *constant* tension between feudal and patrimonial principles (Bendix, 1964: 33).

The historical configuration which Weber calls "Occidental, fully developed feudalism" was no exception in this respect. That is, Western feudalism too was imbued with the same contradiction between "feudalism" and "patrimonialism" in the above sense. This can be gathered from Weber's discussion of the vicissitudes of the "principle of *nulle terre sans seigneur*" (Weber, 1978: 1058, 1080). This principle, which was a characteristic of Western feudalism (Weber, 1978: 1080), stipulated that "each peasant was to belong to a patrimonial association and to be represented by a patrimonial lord, so that the ruler would only be entitled to deal with the lords but not with their retainers" (Weber, 1978: 1058). Consequently, the principle under consideration guaranteed the landlords' patrimonial power over the peasants, and as such, the ruler was barred from establishing unmediated relations with the peasants. In addition, this principle mitigated ruler's control over the distribution of fiefs as it provided a legal foundation for the "compulsory granting of fiefs" (Weber, 1978: 1080); that is, a particular domain/estate was legally considered to be in the patrimony of a particular feudal lord and his descendants, and the ruler

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[66] It is necessary to note, once again, that the distinction between feudalism and patrimonialism in the sense Bendix employs them here pertains to the specific forms of relationship between the rulers and their vassals/agents. Thus, for instance, the "powers" at issue here, whose distribution among the ruler and vassals constituted a major item of pre-modern politics, were definitely patrimonial irrespective of the party who came to wield them. Hence Weber explicates "immunity", the foremost of the demands put forward by aristocracies, as follows: "The local landlords demand first and foremost that the patrimonial ruler do not interfere with their own patrimonial power over their retainers and that he directly guarantee it" (Weber, 1978: 1056).

was obliged to abide by this "feudal distribution of power" (Weber, 1978: 1080). However, Weber notes that the policy of *nulle terre sans seigneur* "was fully carried through only in exceptional cases, and then only temporarily" (Weber, 1978: 1058). It was the ruler who abridged this principle since it was in his interest to retain "the power to tax [the peasants] and call them up for military service directly without any mediation" (Weber, 1978: 1058). Thus "whenever the prince could strengthen his position", Weber argues, "his connections with all his subjects became more direct in one way or another" (Weber, 1978: 1058). Hence the rulers strived to reappropriate the fiefs, or in other words, to offset the monopolization of offices by the aristocracy (Bendix, 1960: 375). The significance of these remarks of Weber's is that they decisively show that the status of the "feudal" component was precarious, and dependent on the relative balance of powers, even in the West, where feudalism was fully developed.

Weber's attentiveness to variations over time in the relative balance of powers between the rulers and the feudal lords leads him to view the arrival of absolutist states in Continental Europe as the offshot of a historic alteration in the extent of power the rulers wielded when compared to feudal lords. Since changes in the relative balance of powers coincide with modifications in terms of degree in the balance between feudal and patrimonial principles, within this framework absolutism is conceived as "a relative shift of emphasis in Western European institutions" towards patrimonialism (Bendix, 1966: 79, note 2). Hence Weber designates the age of absolutism as "a renaissance of patrimonialism" (Weber, 1978: 1087). For Weber, the absolutist state was patrimonial (Weber, 1964: 343, 356, 377-378; Weber, 1978: 1041, 1087, 1098) not only because the absolutist king endeavored to "enlarge his realm of discretion by cashiering . . . special rights" enjoyed by the privileged strata (Weber, 1978: 1041), but at the same time because the medium through which he tried to accomplish this mission was "an administrative staff under his personal control" (Weber, 1964: 377). The latter, though, was the prototype of modern bureaucracy (Weber, 1964: 343, 377; Weber, 1978: 1087, 1098). Weber's argument is that the monarch used "bureaucracy" in his struggle against "corporately organized privileged groups" (Weber, 1964: 378). Hence absolutism aspired to do away with *Ständestaat* (Weber, 1978: 1087).

The purpose in illustrating at some length Weber's usage of the concepts of feudalism and patrimonialism is to suggest that there is a latent methodological dissimilarity between Heper's account and Weber's perspective. To repeat, Weber employs these terms in order not only to compare different cases on the basis of the variations in the basic relationship between the rulers and their fief-holders[67], but also to comprehend the transformations that take place over the course of time within an individual case. It might therefore be contended that, for Weber, patrimonialism and feudalism are no more than "labels" to "dynamic forces" (Abou-El-Haj, 1982: 189). While Weber insists that such ideal-typical constructs "cannot be found anywhere in reality" in their pure forms (Weber, 1949: 90), Heper, in contrast, takes feudalism and patrimonialism to be "historical portrayals of empirically existing facts", and not "conceptual instruments for comparison with and the measurement of the reality" (Weber, 1949: 92).

On no grounds, of course, can Heper be accused of gainsaying Weber's methodological insights, for he does not claim to undertake a Weberian analysis of the Ottoman social formation. The argument here is rather that the difference in question helps one discern the assumptions underlying Heper's account of the Ottoman state. For, in downright contrast to Weber who uses the twin concepts of feudalism and patrimonialism to produce a dynamic analysis, Heper's account hinges on a notion of the Ottoman state as *essentially* patrimonial. That is to say, Heper's starting point *is* Ottoman patrimonialism and not the shifting balance of powers between the "center" and the "periphery". True, he notes that Ottoman state had

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[67] It is on the basis of this kind of a treatment of the concepts of feudalism and patrimonialism that Weber tries to come to terms with the peculiarity of English feudalism. According to him, what singles out medieval England from other European countries is its precocious "centralistic development" (Weber, 1978: 1080). Feudal England was characterized not only by the early entrenchment of "central authority" but also by the ensuing absence of Continental estate features (Bendix, 1960: 375). Weber traces the origins of this exceptional pattern of development all the way back to the Norman conquest and argues that the "tight organization and the firm bonds between lord and vassal", which accounts for the centralistic development, "were due to the fact that the feudal polity was constituted on conquered territories" (Weber, 1978: 1080). Furthermore, he asserts that English and "Turkish" feudalisms were alike in this respect (Weber, 1978: 1080). According to Weber, one aspect of the centralistic development of England is its being a particular "admixture between patrimonial and feudal elements" (Bendix, 1960: 371) owing to the fact that English kings resorted to the patrimonial measure of undermining the authority of "the great patrimonial lords", barons, through appointing to administrative posts "some other group of *honoratiores*", that is, the gentry (Weber, 1978: 1059).

initially been confronted by an aristocracy and that it then had not yet come to enjoy an exclusive monopoly either over the resources or in terms of sovereignty. But then comes his narrative of the subjugation of these privileged strata- a development which, one can argue, he takes to have been dictated by "Ottoman political philosophy". In any event, that there had been "peripheral" agents with independent source of power is explicable to Heper if it is assessed in relation to the fact that Ottoman "center" had not yet entrenched itself. For the latter, guided as it was by certain "ideals" as to the "roles and functions . . . of the center and the periphery" (1980a: 97), was destined to dissolve these autonomous structures.

Once the conditions within Ottoman territories were stabilized, center's "ideals" were given full reign to. Needless to say, it was patrimonialism that provided the kernel of these ideals. Ottoman state's aversion to "intermediary structures", its prudence in establishing an administrative apparatus manned by "dependent officials", the stringent measures it put to effect in order to assure that *tımar*-holders, those to whom the sultan delegated the right to collect taxes, would not turn into provincial magnates, and its concern to protect the interests of the peasantry are interwoven in Heper's account to add up to Ottoman patrimonialism.[68] That is, all these institutions and arrangements are deemed to have flowed from patrimonialism, which Heper perceives as, what has been called, the "ideological essence of the state" (İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1987: 44). The problem seems to be that Heper does not view, for instance, the *tımar* system or the "household" like organization of the bureaucracy as contingent outcomes of a particular conjuncture of

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[68] It should be noted that nowhere does Heper explicitly relate Ottoman state's concern with peasant well-being with its patrimonialism. In Weber's account, on the other hand, the connection is quite straightforward (Bendix, 1960: 364; Weber, 1978: 1106-1107). Patrimonial domination, Weber argues, "must legitimate itself as guardian of subjects welfare" (Weber, 1978: 1107). This is because the patrimonial ruler is prompted to "play out the masses" against the "dangerous aspirations of the privileged status groups" (Weber, 1978: 1106-1107). In other words, the patrimonial ruler allies himself "ideologically" with the subject population/peasantry in order to oppose any kind of independent power on the part of aristocratic landholders. Nevertheless, the fact that Heper does not heed this insight is important in itself because it shows the extent to which he considers the concern with popular welfare a peculiarity of the Ottoman state. To clarify the divergence between Heper's and Weber's perspectives, it might be said that Weber would see the same pattern of legitimation as a characteristic of the (patrimonial) absolutist state. On the other hand, Heper argues that during the period of absolutism there was no Western counterpart to Ottoman state's "unwillingness to come to terms with local notables at the expense of the peasants" (1980c: 16). Absolutist monarchs, Heper continues, did not cashier aristocracies' "feudal privileges" which empowered them over the peasants (1980c. 16).

relations between the central authority/the ruler on the one hand and its provincial agents and/or provincial power-holders on the other. That this is indeed the case can be gathered from the way he characterizes Ottoman history from late sixteenth to early nineteenth centuries. As this period witnessed the undermining of the institutions and/or arrangements which Heper conceives as the essence of Ottoman social formation, he tends to explicate this epoch in terms of the disintegration/ decline/ degeneration of the "ideal" system. The alternative would be seeing these later developments, like the transformation of land-holding patterns, as fragments of a wide-ranging "change in the social formation" (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 18). This is not what Heper does, however; as he clings to a bias, widespread among the students of Ottoman history (Faroqhi, 1991: 230-233), toward associating post-sixteenth century developments with "decline" rather than "change" (Owen, 1976: 114). Those changes Weber would suggest that we see as resulting from a historical tilting of the balance of powers between the ruler and provincial power-holders. Heper, however, interprets the latter as a sign of Ottoman decline, and therefore, relates whatever administrative novelty introduced, such as the legal recognition accorded to local notables, with Ottoman state's debility. Such changes, on the other hand, could equally be considered as administrative innovations central authority undertook willy-nilly (Faroqhi, 2002: 370) in order to "adapt itself to changing" social relations (Owen, 1976: 114).

Because he departs from an "ideal" Ottoman order, whose major constituent is patrimonialism, and because he thereby equates dynamism with degeneration, Heper fails to see that Ottoman society "experimented with a multiplicity of modes of change and reform throughout its history, not only in the last centuries of its existence" (Abou-El-Haj, 1987: 149). Moreover, as has been outlined above, Heper evaluates the reforms undertaken in "the last centuries" on the basis of the resurrection, in a new form, of the Ottoman reason of state, though he notes the impact of the West. According to him, Ottoman modernization amounted to a transformation from above, whose contours were drawn by the revitalization of the patrimonial ideals of the Otoman state. Otherwise stated, in his account, *Tanzimat* reforms came about as a result of the "conscious decisions" bureaucratic elites made

in order to save the state, rather than having been given a boost by far-reaching social changes that had been taking place for a couple of centuries.[69]

It is plausible to argue that the reason why Heper presents a portrayal of the Ottoman Empire (up to the nineteenth century) of golden age versus decline variety is that he does not tend to acknowledge that Ottoman social formation was subject to contradictions common to all pre-modern formations. In a nutshell, the nub of these contradictions can be put as a "perennial tension between centralization and decentralization" (Faroqhi, 2002: 354), whose primary manifestation, both in actuality as well as in theory, was a series of oppositions: "'economic rights only' vs. additional rights of a political-juridical nature; grants 'conditional on service' vs. life holdings; the 'proposed term' of a tax-farm vs. its actual term; possession vs. property" (Berktay, 1992: 251). Having separated the Ottoman Empire from all other social formations of similar composition, however, Heper seems to be adhering to what Faroqhi calls a notion of the Ottoman Empire as a "phenomenon *sui generis*" (Faroqhi, 1991: 217). To the extent that post-sixteenth century developments are deemed to have corresponded to the gradual disappearance of the "unique features" of the Ottoman social formation, the foremost being a "centralized, efficient, and rational" state (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 10), then comes the narrative of "decline".

Many commentators have convincingly argued that at the root of the idea of the Ottoman state as a *sui generis* entity, an idea Heper is faithful to, lies what Nalbantoğlu (1993: 349) calls "a non-critical reading of the Ottoman documents", either juristic texts or examplars of the advice literature (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 33-34; Berktay, 1992: 250-251; İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1987: 43-44). Following İslamoğlu and Keyder (1987: 43), it might be contended that the problem here is that the "idea" of Ottoman society and/or state contained in these documents is "taken for its 'real' referrent". In relation to the alleged extent of control state exerted over the society, for instance, these texts are quite misleading since they not only exaggerated state's strength "to the point of omnipotence" (Berktay, 1992: 251-252) but also manufactured an image of the Ottoman state as presiding over "a virtually immobile society" (Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 33). The idea of the Ottoman state as the protector of

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[69] For alternative accounts which allude to indigenous social and economic bases of *Tanzimat* reforms, see Abou-El-Haj, 1991: 64-72; Faroqhi, 1991: 217, and Karpat, 1968: 79-90.

peasant welfare, as well, emanates from the sources in question (Berktay, 1992: 251; İslamoğlu and Keyder, 1987: 43) and, therefore, should better be seen as a legitimizing formula (Abou-El-Haj, 55; Berktay, 1992: 251; İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 20-21).[70] This "ideological" gesture, one could add, can be viewed as yet another aspect of the struggle between the central authority and the provincial power-holders, as the former promised to protect the peasantry against the extortive acts of the latter. For, according to the center, it was the "rival foci of power", benefiting from any decrease in state's control in the provinces, who exploited the peasants (Berktay, 1992: 251).

Hence, it might be concluded, the "picture that posited the *sui generis* nature of an omnipotent and benevolent Ottoman state" (Nalbantoğlu, 1993: 358, note 6) should be subjected to critical evaluation. It is precisely such a picture which underwrites Heper's account of the Ottoman reason of state.

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[70] Faroqhi and Adanır note that Ottoman rulers in the classical period "suffered from a 'legitimacy deficit' " because, on the one hand, "they did not belong to the Quraysh clan from which legitimate caliphs were expected to issue" and, on the other hand, they could not "claim Genghis Khan as their ancestor, the dominant form of legitimation in the Turco-Mongol context of Central Asia" (Faroqhi and Adanır, 2002: 10). As these two forms of legitimation of Turkish-Islamic variety were of no avail, Ottoman rulers clinged to the idea that "their rule was justified by the concrete services they rendered to the Islamic community", one of such "services" being the protection of the interests the subject population (Faroqhi and Adanır, 2002: 10-11). As contained in the notion of the "circle of justice" in the Ottoman context, "state's claim to provide 'protection' and 'justice' " was nevertheless "a rather universal ideological form which . . . sought to sanctify existing social hierarchies" (Berktay, 1992: 252).

CHAPTER 4

TYPOLOGY OF STRONG STATES

4.1 Turkey, the "Developing World", and the "West"

In the preface to his *The State Tradition in Turkey* (1985a), Heper cogently puts the distance he has travelled in some twenty years of pondering on the issues in Ottoman-Turkish state-society relations:

> Over the years my work on Turkish bureaucracy has led me to the conclusion that the political role of that bureaucracy could not be explained with paradigms formulated to explain the bureaucrat-politician relationship in developing countries. For Turkey a more historical approach was needed which compared Turkey with Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries. (1985a: ix)

This assertion is of utmost significance for a number of reasons. First, it is a tacit self-critique in that Heper now repudiates the assumptions he himself have built upon in his earliest studies. For in those studies, which have been discussed above in the second chapter, Heper has resorted to precisely those "paradigms formulated to explain bureaucrat-politician relationship in developing countries", which he now sees as inappropriate for the study of Ottoman-Turkish case. Those paradigms, Heper now argues, which were "influenced by the modernization theory of the 1960s", erred in assuming "a universal development toward the Weberian legal-rational model" (1987b: 186). That is, the idea was that "the more 'developed' and 'modern' a political regime, the greater the extent to which the bureaucracy would be controlled by the political elites, and the greater the emphasis the bureaucracy would place on implementing rather than making decisions" (1987a: 11). Recall that this is exactly what Heper has previously argued in relation to the Ottoman-Turkish polity, where he has speculated a gradual development, on the part of the bureaucracy, from

substantive to instrumental rationality, a development which he has interpreted as an indication of the erosion of the "bureaucratic ruling tradition".

In line with the "assumption of unilinear evolution" (1991b: 192), Heper continues his critique of the modernization paradigm, the studies couched in the terms set by this "convergence theory" (1991b: 192) paid little attention to the particular political and social configurations of individual developing countries prior to their having been exposed to the impact of the West, for the underlying idea was that the "traditional" state "was to be replaced anyway" (Heper and Berkman, 1979: 308). This criticism should apply to Heper's initial analyses as well, since there, at the very least, he prioritizes the impelling logic of the supposedly unitary process modernization over the tenacity of "tradition". Furthermore, it is only in his more subsequent studies, which have been dealt with in the third chapter, that Heper devotes his attention primarily to the "traditional" Ottoman order. That is, it is only there that one can discern the beginnings of an overriding concern with the continuation of an historical tradition of state-society relations running from the classical Ottoman period to modern Turkey.

Second, the above quotation indicates to the fact that Heper is now skeptical concerning the applicability of the category of "developing country" to the Turkish case (1985a: 4). One observation on the part of Heper which arouses this misgiving is that one comes across quite different political formations, as well as different political problems, in Turkey on the one hand and in other "new countries" on the other (1992b: 142-144). For, in most of the latter countries, the polities are riddled with certain problems which ultimately hinge on the "weakness" of the state as a distinctive entity, against a backdrop of increased participation caused by modernization (1985a: 8; 1992a: 171-173; 1992b: 142-144). In the absence of a "generalizing, integrating and legitimating" state (1992a: 173), in most developing/ new/ Third World countries, it has become virtually impossible to balance "responsiveness", i.e. participation, with "responsibility", that is, integration (1992a: 170). As "political institutions that would moderate and redirect the relative power of the social forces" (1991b: 193) failed to emerge, the political turmoils have verged on regime breakdown (1992b: 143); and, on the other hand, in the absence of universally accepted norms and values which would guide the conduct of politics,

these countries have too often drifted towards "personal rule" (1992a: 171) and "charismatic" legitimation (1992b: 143).

It is Heper's contention that the then current state of affairs in Turkish political scene belies its inclusion within the category of "developing countries". This is because, as will be shown below, according to him, Turkey has been grappling with an altogether different set of political problems.

On the other hand, it is imperative to add that Heper's counterposing of Turkey against other developing countries does not only have to do with the respective contemporary political situations in the two settings. For, Heper commits himself to finding out the historical origins of the variance in question. In more general terms, he argues that one has to study the "imprint left on the present political systems by their particular paths of development" in order to comprehend the substance of current political phenomena in any given setting, both "developed" and "developing" (1991b: 195-196). Hence Heper's plea for "a more historical approach". As far as the developing/ new/ Third World countries are concerned, this new-found interest in tenacious "political traditions" runs counter to his erstwhile belief in the leveling impact of the process of (induced) modernization. To clarify, what distinguishes Turkey from, say, Peru or Iran, which can be asserted to have gone through similar processes of (induced) modernization, is the political tradition Turkey has been a heir to, a tradition which had already been in place when its predecessor was exposed to the patronizing impact of the Western world. Accordingly, "once a political tradition is established", Heper writes, "it tends to linger on over different historical periods" (1991a: 8).

The political tradition whose lingering dominance distinguishes modern Turkey from other Third World countries is, according to Heper, its possessing a strong state (1991b: 144; 1992a: 171), whose origins date back to the "early Ottoman centuries" (1985a: 11). It is this tradition which, for instance, accounts for why Turkish polity has never been that much impaired by the kind of political crises which have bedeviled other Third World countries (1992b: 143-144). That is, Turkey does possess a state that can function as "a means of political integration", and, thus, can offset the debilitating impact of the opening up of the political system to ever new interests and/or demands (1992b: 144).

It should at once be stated that in his most recent studies under consideration here, Heper does not pronounce a novel view on the Ottoman Empire, and for that matter modern Turkey. That is, his analysis of the Ottoman state in particular remains essentially the same as the one he presented in the previous period.[71] Yet the novelty is that he has now come to impart a "(strong) state tradition" to the Ottoman social formation. That is to say, the phenomena which he has explicated via the concept of "patrimonialism" in the previous period are now conveyed with resort to the construct of a "state tradition".

As for the way Heper examines the Ottoman-Turkish case in contradistinction to Western social formations, it is here that the construct of the state tradition proves path-breaking as far as Heper's comparative analyses are concerned. As has been demonstrated in the second chapter, in his earliest analyses of Ottoman-Turkish bureaucracy Heper draws upon a grand contrast between organic and induced models of development, corresponding to an oppositionality between, respectively, a (Western) pattern whereby bureaucratic orientations gradually came to be determined by instrumental rationality and one where substantive rationality on the part of the state elites survived. In his subsequent studies, on the other hand, Heper makes use of another grand contrast, this time between Western feudalism and Ottoman patrimonialism. There, furthermore, Heper rarely takes up the issue of the historical experiences of other non-Western countries, one reason of which seems to be that he is much more interested in underlining the uniqueness of the Ottoman social formation than he is in delineating the parallel developments in all late-developing, non-Western systems. On the other hand, in his most recent studies which we are now examining, Heper once more puts his finger on the topic of "developing countries", but only to argue that, as far as their respective "post-renaissance" histories are concerned, Ottoman-Turkish social formation "has more in common with . . . certain European countries than, for instance, with . . . Nigeria, India or Brazil" (1985a: 4). Those former countries whose historical experiences resemble that of Ottoman-Turkey, as hinted in the passage quoted at the beginning of this chapter, are Continental European countries, most notably France and Prussia-

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[71] There is one pronounced difference, though, and that pertains to the status of the concept of patrimonialism, as will be shown below.

Germany. This resemblance has to do with the fact that France and Prussia-Germany too have historically borne a "state tradition" (1983: 211-215; 1985a: 5-10; 1985b: 89-91, 103-108; 1987a: 10-11, 17-19; 1987b: 184-188; 1988: 2; 1991a: 6-7, 8-10; 1992a: 170, 176-177, 178-184; 1992b: 142-144).

It might well be asserted that what Heper has written prior to his employment of the typology of strong states is plagued by a major weakness, namely, insensitivity to historical variations within the "West". Up until now, that is, his remarks on Western social formations have conveyed an image of the "West" as a unitary entity. In his more recent studies, on the other hand, Heper acknowledges that one is bound to come across different sets of state-society relations in the Western world. Consequently, it is fair to say that in his most recent studies, what might be called a problematic of "West versus non-West", though does not disappear, fades away from the picture a little so as to make room for a mode of analysis more attentive to variations both within the "West" and the "non-West". For, the typology of strong states cuts across not only the organic versus induced modernization divide but also the one between patrimonialism and feudalism. This is so because Heper arrives at the conclusion that whereas there have historically been "strong states" in Western Europe, in the developing world Turkey stands as one of the rare examples of a polity with a "state traditon" (1992a: 187).[72]

4.2 Taking the State into Consideration: "Varying Degrees of Stateness"

Heper's modified view on state-society relations in the Western world has a lot to do with the fact that he has become familiar with the then burgeoning studies couched within the parameters of the "state-centric" perspective (Özman and Coşar, 2001: 81-82). This is attested by Heper's recurring references to the works of such leading scholars of this genre as Nettl (1968), Badie and Birnbaum (1983), and Skocpol

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[72] The change in Heper's perspective is nowhere better displayed than one instance (1987a: 12) when he refers to one of his earliest studies where he has argued that "bureaucratic ruling tradition" might be encountered only in developing countries (Heper et al., 1980: 153). This time, however, Heper writes that the gist of the argument of that previous article is the idea that "historical bureaucratic tradition" proves to be the key variable in understanding the "behaviour of public service in *some* countries" (1987a: 12, emphasis added).

(1985). Not unlike those scholars[73], Heper mounts a critique against the "social-determinist assumptions" (1992b: 146) of the then "dominant paradigm" which for a couple of decades had been determining the parameters of research on bureaucratic organizations (1987a: 11). This modernization theory-influenced paradigm (1992b: 142), Heper continues, posited a notion of the state as a "neutral 'transformatory structure' that would be 'captured' by elected regimes, and used as an instrument for their specific political purposes" (1985a: 5). As the state was seen as a supine mechanism "that merely processes inputs into outputs" (Nettl, 1968: 596), the "potentially dominant role of the state elites", as opposed to "political elites" (i.e. representatives of societal interests), "as self-defined guardians of the public interest" was left out of consideration (1992b: 142). In fact, there was hardly "any reference to the phenomenon of the state" (1987a: 11); what was at issue was rather the "government" (1987a: 11; 1991a: 3). Hence, the "role of the state itself" was overlooked, which proved costly as, Heper holds, "ignoring the phenomenon of the state leads to . . . false concepts that disguise the real essence of politics in given polities" (1985a: 10; 1985b: 87).

It is not the case, however, that Heper effects a wholesale rejection of the idea of the state as a "transformatory structure". Certain polities can legitimately be said to possess this kind of a "state", as is the case with Anglo-Saxon countries (1983: 211-212; 1991a: 9). In Britain, in particular, bureaucrats do not claim themselves as the "guardians of the general interest", which their French and German counterparts indeed do (1987a: 10-11); on the contrary, British politics is characterized by a pattern whereby the "general interest emerges spontaneously" (1983: 211), that is, without the "fiat of state elites" (1993: 15), as a result of a process of "conflict, compromise and consensus" carried out by the representatives of societal interests (1993: 15).

The problem is that, Heper continues, the notion of state as a "transformatory structure" does not provide much guidance when it comes to the analysis of "bureaucrat-politician relationships" (1987a: 10) in, for instance, France and Germany where bureaucrats not only assume onto themselves a "guardianship

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[73] See Nettl, 1968: 561, 569-570, 591 and Skocpol, 1985: 4-6.

function" but also despise political elites "as defenders of sectional interests" (1987a: 11). In these latter settings, state emerges as an actor "imposing its policy on civil society" (Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 111), at the very least via "filtering" societal demands through its self-defined norms and values (1983: 211).

Heper contends that the only way to come to terms with such variations is to adopt a "political" conception of sovereignty[74] (1983: 213-214; 1985a: 5; 1988: 2), which amounts to a "political" conceptualization of the state (1985a: 5; 1988: 2). Here, it seems that Heper follows Nettl, whose starting point is the "variableness of the development of stateness in different societies" (Nettl, 1968: 571):

> The sovereignty of the state vis-à-vis other associations and collectivities is an empirical question for each individual case. Thus, one would come across in different polities or, in the same polity in different historcal periods, a greater and lesser degree of "stateness", depending upon the extent to which the major goals of the society are designated and safeguarded by those who claim to represent the state, independently of civil society. (1988: 2).

In line with Nettl's (1968: 591) assertion that "more or less stateness is a useful variable for comparing Western societies", Heper designates France and Germany, where the norms "non-elected elites" are the carriers of help define the "public interest" (1988: 2) "independently of civil society" (1985b: 96), as "societies high in stateness" / "societies bearing a (strong) state tradition" / "state societies" (1992b: 146). This is not, however, an original contribution on the part of Heper. On the contrary, in positing an oppositionality between Continental European and Anglo-Saxon countries on the basis of varying degrees of the "strength" or the "salience" of the state (Nettl, 1968: 579), he is in fact building upon a common "state-centric" theme.[75] [76]

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[74] As has been noted in the previous chapter, sovereignty refers to state's "independence in formulating goals for society" (1985a: 5).

[75] See Birnbaum, 1987: 73-75; Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 105-115, 117, 121-125, and Nettl, 1968: 564, 567, 579.

[76] Özman and Coşar err in assuming that the state-centric perspective posits "in advance" that "the state is by definition autonomous" (Özman and Coşar, 2001: 84). The state-centric argument is rather that the autonomy of the state is "an empirical question" (Nettl, 1968: 565). Consequently, stateness is seen as a "quantitative variable" (Nettl, 1968: 579). Needless to say, Heper's approach is very much consistent with state-centric perspective in this respect.

According to Heper, varying degrees of stateness result in different configurations of state-society relations. Thus in England (and in United States), where there is a "weak" (1992a: 186)/ "minimal" state (1985a: 13; 1988: 4), state and society appear to be "intertwined" (1987b: 187); absent is "a state independent of society" (1985a: 13; 1988: 4). Yet, on the Continent, where there are "strong" states (1985a: 13; 1988: 4) endowed with a mission of "seeking to unify the disparate elements of society" "around rationally-formulated norms" (1992b: 143-144), state and society are "almost two separate entities" (1987b: 187). Because in these latter countries, to clarify, there does exist a state which possesses "a distinctive and independent status" *vis-à-vis* society (1992b: 142).

To conclude, Heper's argument is that if one wants to make head or tail of intersocietal variations in the dominant patterns of "bureaucrat-politician relationships" (1987a: 10), then he/she is to take notice of the differential degrees of stateness in the given settings. The degree of stateness is, thus, the explanatory variable, which should be taken into account in order to understand, for example, the attitudinal pattern of the French bureaucracy.

The "major determinant of stateness", Heper contends, is the "capacity of a society to progressively create dynamic consensus as a resolution of conflicts over fundamental claims" (1988: 3), which hinges on the degree to which the society is able to "reconcile sectional interests smoothly" (1987a: 9). The failure of the society to strike such a consensus issues in the emergence of a state which is "autonomous" (1985a: 5; 1987a: 9) and "sovereign" (1985a: 5; 1988: 3) *vis-à-vis* the society. Otherwise phrased, the result is the arrival of a polity high in stateness, that is, one possessing a "strong state". In the absence of a spontaneous process of conflict resolution, thus, the strong state takes the center stage as "an alternative mode of political integration" and of "legitimation" (1992b: 143). Since conflicts cannot be resolved through "multiple confrontations and bargaining" between societal groups, in such a polity the "scope of substantive norms" is wide (1991a: 10) due to the fact that state elites impose certain values and norms upon the society which is otherwise devoid of cohesion. It is the state which "set[s] the ideological parameters of politics" (1991a: 10). Conversely, in a polity where conflicts are smoothly, and spontaneously, resolved, the state emerges indeed as a "transformatory structure"

(1991a: 9). In such a polity, accordingly, the scope of substantive norms is much lower, as issues are resolved "primarily in terms of *procedural* rules" (1991a: 9). There is no need, thus, for state elites to step up and order the polity. Hence a polity low in stateness or a "weak" state.

4.3 Historical Origins of the Differential Patterns of State-Society Relations within Western Europe

For Heper, the specific degree of stateness that a particular polity happens to have is anything but transient. That is to say, Heper would object to an explanation of why, say, in post-war France there was a high degree of stateness which puts the sole emphasis on exigencies of post-war reconstruction. This is because, as noted above, Heper gives the priority to "tradition", and not, for instance, a conjuncture of more or less evanescent factors. Hence he argues that differential degrees of stateness, and accordingly the varying extents to which societies manage to fabricate "dynamic consensus", have to do with "historical paths that different countries travelled" (1987a: 13). In an attempt to bring to light the reasons for the divergence between Continental European countries and England in terms of their respective degrees of stateness, Heper then directs his attention to "variations in the early forms of Western European states", variations caused precisely by the differential extents to which societies managed to fulfill consensus (1985a: 5; 1987a: 9).

Heper elucidates the variations in early state-building in Western Europe through a distinction between the "centralized feudalism" of England and the "decentralized feudalism" of the Continent (1985a: 6-7, 14; 1987a: 13-14; 1991a: 8-10). In this discussion of different variants of feudalism, Heper once again mentions the *Ständestaat* systems of the Western countries. Despite the fact that *Ständestaat* seems to be quite central to Heper's understanding of Western forms of government, unfortunately, his brief remarks on the subject fail to specify what *Ständestaat* exactly was. On the other hand, whenever Heper mentions *Ständestaat*, he makes reference to one study, namely Gianfranco Poggi's *The Development of the Modern State* (1978). It is, thus, worth outlining, briefly, what *Ständestaat* stands for in Poggi's perspective.

4.3.1 Poggi on *Ständestaat*

Poggi's primary objective is to describe the "development of Western *political* institutions" (Poggi, 1978: 17), and as far as the period up to the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries are concerned, he does this by explicating what he takes as "a historical sequence of three types of rule system: feudalism, *Ständestaat* and absolutism" (Poggi, 1978: 16).

Held notes that there has long been a disagreement among scholars regarding the issue of whether the arrangements associated with *Ständestaat* were "merely extensions of existing feudal relations" or whether they were "novel", and, hence, post-feudal (Held, 1992: 79-80). As can be inferred from above, Poggi takes *Ständestaat* as a "distinctive, novel, and historically unique system of rule" (Poggi, 1978: 43). On the other hand, it seems that according to Heper the polity of estates was indeed an extension of feudal relations (see 1985a: 6-7; 1987a: 13-14; 1991a: 8-10; 1992a: 176). That is to say, Heper seems to be taking the other side of the dispute in assuming that *Ständestaat* was an integral part of the feudal political system.

Poggi, however, makes it fairly clear that the Estates ("*Stände*"), i.e. "the distinctive late-medieval assemblies, parliaments, diets, estate bodies, and so forth associated with the ruler in the governance of the territory" (Poggi, 1978: 42), were qualitatively different from the "assemblies of the feudal period in which the feudatories gathered to offer their counsel to their lord" (Poggi, 1978: 46-47). Before explaining why Poggi thinks this was the case, one further difference between his and Heper's accounts should be noted: while Poggi argues that it was the rise of towns and of "commercial and productive interests" therein which set off the initial spark toward the emergence of the *Ständestaat* (Poggi, 1978: 36-39), no such point can be found in Heper's brief remarks on the subject, which is understandable given his inclination to equate feudalism and the *Ständestaat*.

The rise of towns, Poggi contends, marked the "entrance of a new political force into a system of rule thus far dominated . . . by the two partners in the lord-vassal relation" (Poggi, 1978: 37), since the townsmen demanded and in turn acquired political autonomy (Poggi, 1978: 36-41). In one sense, towns' incorporation into the existing system followed the logic of "feudal" relations: their status as

autonomous entities was based on the feudal notion of "immunity" (Poggi, 1978: 37). Nonetheless, Poggi argues that "towns typically asserted themselves . . . in a way that was novel", because "they claimed rights that were *corporate* in nature" (Poggi, 1978: 37, emphasis added). This latter feature, Poggi holds, was not to be found in the case of the "feudal relation", i.e. the relationship between the lord and the vassal, which was strictly personal: "each feudal relation was entered *intuitu personae*" (Poggi, 1978: 27). Prior to the emergence of the polity of estates, thus, "a network of interpersonal relations" served as the "chief carrying structure" of the feudal system of rule[77] (Poggi, 1978: 25). In fact, it was only after the entry of the towns into politics, which then induced the instituting of a polity of estates, that the "feudal element" (i.e. feudal landlords) "gained a *corporate* identity through, and for the purposes of, participation in the *Stände*" (Poggi, 1978: 42).

Although Poggi argues that the arrival of the *Ständestaat* had to do with the political interests of the urban community which demanded that they "participate effectively and permanently in the management of the wider system of rule" (Poggi, 1978: 42), he also takes note of the fact that the *Stände* "arose very often on the initiative of the ruler himself in his search for financial support" (Poggi, 1978: 52). Hence the problem of raising money for royal policies Weber touches upon.

It is now time to consider why Poggi thinks that the Estates, *Stände*, cannot be said to be an extension of feudal assemblies of the earlier period. Obviously one reason is that the *Stände* included the towns and the clergy as well as the "feudal element", whereas feudal assemblies gathered together only the latter, namely, the feudal aristocracy (Poggi, 1978: 47).[78] Apart from that, as compared to the feudal system of rule, *Ständestaat* was distinct "in being more *institutionalized* in its operations, in having an explicit *territorial* reference, and in being *dualistic*" (Poggi, 1978: 48). All these attributes derived from the characteristics of the *Stände*, which "were the most distinctive component" of the *Ständestaat* type of rule (Poggi, 1978:

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[77] Poggi's depiction of the feudal system of rule will not be examined here, as it very much resembles the accounts of Weber and Bendix discussed in the previous chapter. See Poggi, 1978: 16-35.

[78] Nevertheless, it was the towns and the aristocracy which were "the two key components" of the *Ständestaat* (Poggi, 1978: 51). Hence Poggi seems to write the clergy off as an influential actor. Accordingly, he characterizes the "political process in the *Ständestaat*" as a "three-cornered power struggle" (Poggi, 1978: 51), the third party being, of course, the ruler.

47-48). The first attribute, that is the institutionalized nature of the *Stände*, corresponds to what Weber (1978: 1087) refers to as the transformation of the "temporary association into a permanent" structure. For, Poggi too stresses that assemblies, which under the feudal system of rule had been conveyed simply on an ad hoc basis, later became regularized as well as rule-bound in internal functioning (Poggi, 1978: 47). Territoriality and duality, on the other hand, are not explicitly discussed by Weber and, from Poggi's point of view, they seem to be quite important in endowing the new "system of rule" with its unique features.

The Estates's having a "territorial reference" was a novel feature in that the antecedent assemblies added up to no more than "an elaborate complex of *personal* connections between powerful individuals" (Poggi, 1978: 47). In contrast, *Ständestaat* involved the "gatherings of the Estates of a territory- whether province, *pays*, county, principality, country, *Land*, or realm- understood as a unit with identifiable physical boundaries" (Poggi, 1978: 47). That is, the Estates addressed the ruler as the representatives of particular territories: "they represented the territory to the ruler" (Poggi, 1978: 49). Hence the *Ständestaat* was not "a patchwork of corporate groups each empowered to exercise rule, within its own sphere, over its own members" (Poggi, 1978: 44); the latter was, rather, an attribute of the antecedent feudal system of rule. It was in this way via their status as representatives of particular realms that the Estates could have a say in issues transcending the individual jurisdictions of their components: "immune" fiefs in the case of the aristocracies and "chartered" towns in the case of the urban communes (Poggi, 1978: 51). The Estates, accordingly, emerged as ruler's associates "in those aspects of rule that were understood as characteristically public and general" (Poggi, 1978: 43-44). Territoriality, however, did not mean that the Estates indeed espoused the "interests of the people and the territory", i.e. the interests of the non-privileged, subject masses (Poggi, 1978: 50). For the Estates "saw themselves as *being* the territory", and "when assembled in the Estates they represented no one but themselves; they voiced, and stood on, their own rights" (Poggi, 1978: 50).

The Estates' having a territorial reference was closely related to the third novel feature of the *Ständestaat* system of rule, i. e. its duality (Poggi, 1978: 49). Poggi explicates this latter feature, again, on the basis of its divergence from the

antecedent feudal system of rule. Within feudal system of rule, the ruler held the position of a *primus inter pares vis-à-vis* the feudal lords, and accordingly the feudal assemblies "served not so much to *confront* the ruler with his barons as to *condense* them around him" (Poggi, 1978: 47). Those assemblies, it might be added, were stages where feudal lords could settle *personal* disputes. In contrast, the uniqueness of the *Ständestaat* was that the ruler and the Estates composed "separate and mutually acknowledged political centers" (Poggi, 1978: 48), which had a lot to do with the fact that the Estates had a territorial reference: "Estates stood over against the ruler" precisely because "they represented the territory to him" (Poggi, 1978: 49). At the same time, the way the ruler was envisaged by his privileged subjects was also transformed, since the Estates "acknowledged him as the sovereign, as the embodiment of a higher, more compelling majesty and right" (Poggi, 1978: 52). The power of the ruler, that is, came to possess a "nonfeudal, public" quality (Poggi, 1978: 52). The relationship between the ruler and the Estates, thus, turned out to be asymmetrical in favor of the ruler (Poggi, 1978: 51-52).

Poggi's contention is that the three characteristics outlined above (i.e. institutionalization, territoriality and duality) makes it legitimate to view *Ständestaat* as a novel, and post-feudal, system of rule. The linchpin of the new system of rule were the Estates/ *Stände*, which served the function of "confronting and cooperating with the ruler" (Poggi, 1978: 43). Then it might be said that the Estates performed a dual function: on the one hand, they were devices for corporate resistance to the ruler, and on the other hand, they were indispensable for the ruler in order to receive the assent of his privileged subjects (Poggi, 1078: 52).

Last but not least, Poggi notes that the geographical scope of his study is confined to "continental Western Europe, especially the lands now making up Germany and France" (Poggi, 1978: 17). This confinement is intended, above all, to exclude England from the model of feudalism-*Ständestaat*-absolutism as three successive types of rule. This is because Poggi thinks that the English case defies such a pattern, not only because English feudalism was much more centralized as compared to the Continent where political authority was utterly fragmented (Poggi, 1978: 28), but more importantly because its post-feudal history can be grasped in

terms neither of *Ständestaat* nor of absolutism (Poggi, 1978: 17). Hence, according to Poggi, *Ständestaat* system cannot be said to have been in place in England.

4.3.2 Centralized and Decentralized Variants of Feudalism

As for Heper, it would not be wrong to say that he treats *Ständestaat* as a pan-European tradition despite, it must be added, the references he makes to Poggi's study (1985a: 6-7, 150; 1987a: 13-14; 1991a: 8-10).[79] It can even be argued that he seems to evaluate the English polity as the most successful case of *Ständestaat* (1985a: 6-7; 1987a: 13-14; 1991a: 8-10). Before going on to see how, it is necessary to state what purpose *Ständestaat* serves in Heper's analysis.

As noted above, Heper's argument is that varying degrees of stateness result from the differential extents to which conflicts between political actors can be accommodated smoothly and that British and Continental European polities represent two different patterns of conflict resolution, and accordingly, diverge in terms of the degrees of stateness they respectively have. The reason why Heper takes up the subject of *Ständestaat* is that he attempts to demonstrate the historical origins of the two patterns of conflict resolution on the basis of a comparison between the "English version of *Ständestaat*" and Continental European versions (1991a: 9). These versions corresponded to two distinct ways of conflict resolution, which have had crucial repercussions upon the respective balances of power between state and society in the two settings (1991a: 9-10). Thus the ultimate purpose to which the notion of *Ständestaat* is put is one of underpinning the argument regarding the presence, currently, of a "weak" state in Britain and of "strong" ones on the Continent.

Heper assesses the specific characteristics of the two versions of *Ständestaat* through a comparison between centralized and decentralized feudal structures. Medieval England, he writes, was the prime case of centralized feudalism (1985a: 6; 1987a: 13; 1991a: 8). In medieval England, "kings and barons upheld each other's rights" and there developed, from very early on, "a significant integration between

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[79] However, there are inconsistencies in Heper's studies in this respect, as his arguments at times *imply* that *Ständestaat* is a Continental European phenomenon. See 1985a: 14, 16; 1988: 2.

central and local authority structures" (1985a: 6; 1987a: 13; 1991a: 8-9). These features, Heper continues, make it hard to denote English political structure as "feudalism proper"; rather, this structure seems to have been underpinned by a "national contract" (1985a: 6; 1987a: 13; 1991a: 9).

"Feudalism proper", though, was at place in France, the most outstanding example of decentralized feudalism (1985a: 6-7; 1987a: 13-14; 1991a: 9-10). There, as opposed to the much more integrated structure of England, the "feudal decentralization of authority was more complete than elsewhere" (1987a: 13; 1991a: 9-10), and accordingly, the relations between "central and local authority structures" were conflictual (1991a: 10). Hence, again in contrast to the state of affairs in England, "[t]here was a constant tug of war between the king and the local grandees" (1985a: 7; 1987a: 13; 1991a: 10).

One conclusion that might be drawn from the oppositionality Heper proposes between England and France is that Heper continues to conceptualize feudalism on the basis of parcellization of sovereignty. Consequently, the existence, as the predominant "political" issues, of jurisdictional disputes between power-holders is perceived as an integral part of feudalism. It is the idea that these two traits were relatively absent in England which leads Heper to see England as an atypical case of feudalism. Centralization of authority and consensual relations between the ruler and feudal lords, in other words, defy "feudalism proper".

Heper's characterization of the two distinct forms of *Ständestaat* within Europe corresponds neatly to the distinction he makes between centralized feudalism and decentralized feudalism/feudalism proper. In England, Heper contends, *Ständestaat* emerged as a facet of the "national contract" (1985a: 6; 1987a: 13; 1991a: 9). In an attempt to substantiate this argument, Heper has recourse to Poggi:

> In the English version of *Ständestaat*, Gianfranco Poggi has argued, the representatives of the estates rose above petty political prerogatives of the individual estates. In such *Ständestaaten*, powerful individuals and groups established the terms of their collaboration with the ruler and shouldered their shares of the burdens of rule. (1991a: 9)

It has already been noted that Poggi's examination of the *Ständestaat* does not cover the case of England, whose medieval and early modern history does not fit into Poggi's scheme. On the other hand, in the passage that Heper makes use of,

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Poggi in fact makes a general statement on the *Ständestaat* system of rule (see Poggi, 1978: 43-44). That is, Poggi indeed argues that in the *Ständestaat* systems "the petty political prerogatives of the individual component estates were fused and transformed into more significant claims and wider prerogatives" (Poggi, 1978: 43) and that "powerful individuals and groups . . . dealt with the ruler or his agents, voiced their protests, restated their rights, formulated their advice, established the terms of their collaboration with the ruler, and shouldered their share of the burdens of rule" (Poggi, 1978: 44); but these assertions in no sense pertain to England. Instead, they have to do with the political systems of, most notably, France and Prussia. Among these latter settings, Heper chooses to focus upon France; yet his brief remarks on the French *Ständestaat* contradict Poggi's basic premises.

To begin with, from Heper's point of view, what characterized the medieval and early modern French history is the "weakness . . . of the *Ständestaat* tradition" (1987a: 14). That Heper abuses Poggi's idea of the *Ständestaat* is quite obvious here: For Poggi, *Ständestaat* was much more a French tradition than it was an English one. As for the reason why Heper thinks that French *Ständestaat* system was shaky, the unceasing "tug-of-war" between the king and estates proves critical. To clarify, Heper holds that in France "local grandees were primarily concerned with the preservation of local customs and privileges" (1985a: 7; 1987a: 22, note 9), which very often brought them into confrontation with central authority. That is to say, the critical factor which accounts for Frenchs' divergence from the English version of *Ständestaat* is that in France local grandees "were interested in emphasizing the legal privileges of the estates to which they belonged" rather than in developing "a *modus vivendi* with the kings" (1985a: 7). Otherwise stated, they failed to transcend their "petty political prerogatives". Accordingly, they fell short of doing what their English counterparts successfully did: collaborating with the king and settling disputes peacefully (1985a: 6). All these, Heper asserts, amounted to the weakness of the *Ständestaat* tradition in France.

Heper's argument regarding the failure of the French *Ständestaat* system, however, seems to be at odds with Poggi's notion of the *Ständestaat*. To reiterate, what Heper does is counterposing the French pattern where the estates remained absorbed in the safeguarding of their privileges against the English case where

estates managed to collaborate with the central authority. On the other hand, it seems that for Poggi the *Ständestaat* system of rule in no way excluded a preoccupation, on the part of either the estates or the ruler, with the defence of established privileges: "[T]he constituent elements of the Ständestaat were preeminently interested in questions of privileges and rights: rights of the ruler against those of the Stände, and vice versa; or the respective rights of each estate vis-à-vis the others. On this point there was an essential continuity between the Ständestaat and the feudal system of rule" (Poggi, 1978: 56). As a result, to the extent that Heper associates estates' "rising above their petty political prerogatives" with their renouncing their privileges, he can be accused of ill-treating Poggi's notion of *Ständestaat*. For, Poggi's argument is rather that "individual component estates" traded their "petty political prerogatives" for "more significant claims and wider prerogatives" (Poggi, 1978: 43). This was the price the ruler had to pay in return for their collaboration (Poggi, 1978: 53). To illustrate, in the face of a king desperately in need of additional financial resources, the estate conventions assented to his having access more directly to "economic resources" they themselves controlled; but in turn, they demanded a "wider prerogative", more "significant" than either the legal immunity of the fief or the legal autonomy of the town: "the Estates bartered their consent in return for a claim to direct the attendant fiscal operations themselves" (Poggi, 1978: 52). Such a claim, though, was no less of a "privilege".

It has been noted above that Poggi's concept of the *Ständestaat* rests on the idea that the *Stände* served a two-fold purpose: confrontation and resistance on the one hand and cooperation and support on the other. For Poggi, it might be inferred, the two dimensions were inseperable, and accordingly, the functioning of the *Ständestaat* should be viewed as at once adversarial *and* consensual. In contrast, it appears that Heper dissociates the two dimensions from one another and assigns "cooperation" to the English *Ständestaat* and "confrontation" to the French version. This is in fact the idea lying beneath Heper's attempt to trace the historical origins of the "weak" British state as opposed to "strong" French (and German) state. This is so because, as has been argued above, Heper thinks that the differential natures of English and French *Ständestaat* systems had been the determinant factor in shaping the respective patterns of conflict resolution in the later centuries (1985a: 6-7, 14;

1987a: 13-14; 1991a: 8-10). In England, "[a]s the estates . . . could collaborate with the central authority, and bear their share of the burdens of rule, it was possible for a consensus to emerge through progressive resolution of conflicts" (1985a: 6). Such a pattern has continued into later centuries (1987a: 13) and has molded a tradition of conflict resolution through "politics" (1988: 2; 1985a: 14; 1991a: 9), that is, by means of "multiple confrontations of the parties involved" (1991a: 9). The interests and demands of the parties were in this way "harmonized" (1988: 2). This is the reason why "the dissolving of feudal society was followed by a politically influential parliament": in England, the presence of spontaneous consensus "pre-empted a centralizing, bureaucratic polity" (1991a: 9). There, in addition, political actors managed to strike a "dynamic" consensus (1988: 2) as it was possible to "arrive at different solutions concerning each new issue" (1993: 15). Consensus was dynamic in one further sense: "the ground rules for reaching decisions did not take on primarily a substantive but basically an instrumental coloring" (1988: 2).

In France, on the other hand, the weakness of the *Ständestaat* traditon and the attendant conflicts between the king and the estates impeded the emergence of the kind of consensus found in England (1985a: 7). As the French estates opted to preserve their corporate privileges instead of joining forces with the king, conflicts could only be resolved through "law" (1985a: 16; 1988: 2; 1991a: 10), that is, by means of "recognition of respective legal jurisdictions" (1985a: 16). Conflict resolution through law, however, did not have the "flexibility and dynamism" of "politics" (1988: 2). Very often, though, "law" proved to be of no avail, and the "bitter conflicts" (1988: 2) between the kings and the estates culminated in the arrival of a dominant state which "established the parameters of politics" (1985a: 7). This is the reason why in France "the dissolving feudal society was replaced . . . by a strong executive" (1991a: 10). Thereafter, consensus was "imposed upon the society in the form of static norms" (1985a: 8).

To conclude, Heper's contention is that the "character of early state building" had a far reaching impact on the "subsequent form and substance of political activity in one country as compared with another" (1985a: 5). As has been shown above, according to him, differential processes of "early state building" resulted in divergent patterns of conflict resolution and, consequently, in different degrees of "stateness"

in England on the one hand and on the Continent on the other. Heper chooses to explicate these processes of state building via the notion of *Ständestaat*, which he claims to have taken over from Poggi. Hence the ultimate problem here is that, as noted above, the notion of *Ständestaat* as Poggi employs the term does not lend itself to this kind of a use. That is to say, the endeavor to account for contemporary cross-national variations in the degrees of stateness in Western Europe in terms of the legacy of two different versions of *Ständestaat* system is at best questionable.

Having examined the way in which Heper accounts for the presence of cross-national variations in the degree of state power within Western Europe, we can now turn to his discussion of the Ottoman case in contradistinction to European polities possessing a state tradition.

4.4 Ottoman Empire versus Continental European "State Societies"

One of the most striking characteristics of Heper's latest studies under consideration is that here Heper occasionally tends to refrain from designating the Ottoman state as "patrimonial" (see 1991a: 12; 1991b: 197; 1992a: 176).[80] Though, it is certainly not the case that Heper has come to see the nature of the Ottoman state in a new light; for he continues to build upon the kind of analysis he has done in the previous period. That is to say, he still argues that the characteristic which distinguishes Ottoman social formation from its Western counterparts was the absence of "countervailing powers", but, this time, he does not all the time associate the latter with patrimonialism (1991a: 12; 1991b: 197).[81] In its stead, Heper employs as a label for the Ottoman form of government the category of either "bureaucratic centralism", as opposed to centralized and decentralized variants of feudalism, (1991a: 12) or "imperial-bureaucratic regime", as opposed to "imperial-feudal regimes" of the West

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[80] On the other hand, in 1985a, 1987b and 1988, Heper still talks in terms of the patrimonialism of the Ottoman state. This is more or less the case with 1985b and 1987a where Heper employs the term "*traditional* patrimonialism", as opposed to the earlier form of government based on personal rule, to designate the Ottoman state of the classical period (1985b: 99; 1987a: 14, emphasis added).

[81] It should be added that in those studies where Heper does perceive the Ottoman state as patrimonial, the characteristic which distinguished the Ottoman Empire from Western social formations is again put as the absence of countervailing powers (1985a: 14; 1985b: 99; 1987a: 14; 1987b: 191; 1988: 3, 5). Consequently, it might well be said that the change in terminology makes little difference in respect of Heper's view on the Ottoman Empire.

(1991b: 197). On yet another occasion he simply declares that, while initially patrimonial, Ottoman state later developed into a "strong state" (1992a: 176).

This last instance gives one a clue as to why Heper is now reluctant to call Ottoman state (of the classical period) patrimonial, for he tends to treat "personal rule" and "patrimonialism" as conceptual equivalents (1992a: 176). As has been argued in the previous chapter, according to Heper, it is legitimate to designate Ottoman form of government during the early centuries of state formation as an instance of personal rule, but this is not the case in relation to the classical age, during the course of which impersonal state norms came to prevail over the arbitrary will of the ruler. The novelty Heper has introduced is that, having associated patrimonialism with personal rule, he now characterizes early Ottoman centuries as an era of patrimonialism. He does not tend to do so with regard to later centuries, because, it might be argued, he seems to be assuming, from a theoretical point of view, that personal rule disallows the presence of a strong state. This is so because the latter presupposes the presence of a "continuity in state norms", i.e. a cluster of norms independent of the person of the ruler, which is itself bound up with "institutionalization" (1983: 215). Neither is found, however, in patrimonial states, where personal discretion of the ruler prevails (1983: 215). Furthermore, owing to the absence of institutionalization, patrimonialism entails "a very weak distinction between state and society" (1987b: 191). Thus patrimonialism is not conducive to the emergence of the state as a distinctive entity, let alone that of a "strong state".

Consequently, it is fair to say that Heper's occasional unease over characterizing the Ottoman state as patrimonial stems from his interest in situating the Ottoman-Turkish case within the category of polities with a strong state or, with a state tradition. Hence he critizes the then current "literature on the strong states" for not giving due attention to the *similarities* between Ottoman-Turkish case and Continental European countries (1992a: 176). Instead, Heper continues, the tendency has been one of underscoring the *differences* on the basis of a contrast between "patrimonialism/personal rule" on the one hand and "feudalism/*Ständestaat*" on the

other (1992a: 176).[82] As a result, those working with a typology of strong states, it might be concluded, fail to realize that Ottoman-Turkish society historically belongs to that type.

On the other hand, Heper does not forgo the enterprise to propose an oppositionality between Ottoman-Turkey and (Continental) European cases. The Ottoman Empire, Heper argues, "differed radically from the continental European countries" which historically possess a state tradition (1992b: 145). This is so because the "degree of stateness has been greater" in the Ottoman-Turkish case when compared either with France or Prussia-Germany (1991a: 8). Consequently, Heper argues that as opposed to France and Prussia-Germany, both of which had (strong) state traditions, Ottoman-Turkish history is marked by "an extremely strong state tradition" (1992b: 146). The reason why Ottoman(-Turkish) polity evinced a relatively higher degree of stateness is that the Ottoman "state did not develop alongside the politically-influential social groups, but evolved by making these social groups politically impotent" (1992b: 145). Hence as early as the sixteenth century, there developed in the Ottoman realm "a state isolated from civil society to a greater degree than elsewhere in continental Europe" (1992a: 176-177). Comparatively speaking, the Ottoman state was more autonomous (1985a: 27; 1991a: 21; 1992a: 187) and more sovereign (1985a: 27; 1992a: 177), which qualifies the Ottoman state as the "example of the sovereign and autonomous state *par excellence*" (1985a: 27). "The Ottoman-Turkish polity", Heper argues, should be regarded as "a polar case among the polities with a strong state" (1992a: 187).

It can reasonably be argued that in distinguishing the Ottoman case from its Western counterparts with a (strong) state tradition, Heper draws upon the comparative analysis of state-society relations he has previously made on the basis of the paradigm of "feudalism versus patrimonialism". As noted above, it is still the absence of countervailing powers *vis-à-vis* the state which Heper views as the critical difference distinguishing the Ottoman Empire from Western cases (1985a: 14; 1985b: 99; 1987a: 14; 1987b: 191; 1988: 3, 5; 1991a: 12; 1991b: 197). This absence,

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[82] This assertion, too, should be seen as an undeclared self-criticism due to the fact that it is precisely such a contrast that provides the guiding thread for Heper's earlier comparative analysis of the Ottoman and Western social formations discussed in the previous chapter.

however, he sometimes tries to come to terms with via the concept of patrimonialism, and sometimes via other concepts which nevertheless indicate to the same alleged phenomena. As for the European polities bearing a state tradition, high levels of stateness they had notwithstanding, they, too, were characterized by the presence of countervailing societal forces. "Even at the pinnacle of their powers", Heper holds, "the French and Prussian kings had to grapple with the demands and pressures of their *parlements* and *Stände* respectively" (1992b: 145), and because of that, they "were never given a free rein to the same extent as the [Ottoman] sultans were" (1988: 5). When compared to the situation in the Ottoman Empire, the presence of the *Ständestaat* tradition in France and Prussia entaliled that there the states had "only limited powers" (1992a: 178).

The absence of a *Ständestaat* tradition in the Ottoman Empire is a theme Heper has already pursued in his studies of the previous period. Here Heper again takes up the issue, and in fact he makes more frequent references to it, in order to explain why Ottoman state was stronger than its French and Prussian counterparts (1985a: 32, 107, 149-150; 1991a: 12-14, 18; 1992a: 176-181; 1992b: 148-149). On the other hand, Heper does not seem to have added much to what he has argued in the previous period; that is, he continues to underline the early subordination of the Ottoman aristocracy, the system of central administration by dependent officials, and the peculiarities of the *tımar* system as milestones in the process whereby Ottoman center "altogether smothered the periphery" (1985a: 107).

In the Ottoman Empire, Heper contends, "social groups . . . could neither develop an orientation toward wider issues nor acquire legal-political rights" (1992b: 150). Needless to say, this was related to the absence of a polity of estates. On the Continent, on the other hand, the "strong" state "developed alonside and quite autonomous from social groups", and thanks to the tradition of *Ständestaat*, the latter were able to wield some "political influence" (1992b: 147). Yet, neither in France nor in Prussia were the middle classes the most prominent social groups which were in a posion to have an impact on the affairs of the state: in neither country was there an anticipation of a "bourgeois revolution that suddenly breaks the fetters of capitalist development" (1985b: 89). More specifically, in relation to Prussia, Heper notes that the state was not confronted by "a middle class with political influence"

(1992a: 177-178). Now, it has been shown in the previous chapters that the absence of such a middle class in the Ottoman polity is a recurring theme in Heper's analysis, a theme he still carries on (1985a: 27, 100-102, 149; 1992b: 201). Accordingly, it seems that the absence of politically influential middle classes is conceived as a feature common both to the Ottoman Empire and Prussia, if not to France as well. Then, the critical difference between the Ottoman and Prussian cases had to do with the political weight aristocracy had in Prussia as opposed to the absence of such a class in the Ottoman Empire (1992a: 177-179). For, in Prussia, the state was "confronted by a largely self-governing landed aristocracy- the Junkers" which "combined large scale land ownership with political, judicial, and territorial rights" (1992a: 178). The Junkers, Heper claims, continued to have some political influence despite the fact that the *Ständestaat* order was mitigated first by "the absolutism of the kings, and, in the first part of the nineteenth century, of the bureaucracy" (1992a: 178). That is to say, the presence of a "strong state" notwithstanding, Prussian aristocracy was not "altogether smothered". This is the reason why Prussian polity evinced a "lower" degree of stateness as compared to the Ottoman polity.

As noted above, in explaining why the Ottoman polity evinced a higher degree of stateness than was the case either in France or Prussia, Heper accords high priority to the fact that Ottoman center licensed no peripheral force to participate in decision-making through corporate organizations. Hence in the Ottoman case there was a much more pronounced distance between the state and the society, which resulted above all from the "types of goals" Ottoman rulers pursued (1992b: 149). It was the military origins of the Ottoman state (or of state-founders), Heper argues, which, to a large extent, determined the goals Ottoman rulers emphasized (1985a: 21; 1991a: 13; 1992a: 177; 1992b: 148-149). Ottoman rulers, as "military rulers", gave a very high priority to " 'political' goals of regime consolidation and territorial expansion" (1992a: 177) at the expense of "economic goals" (1992b: 149). In stark contrast to the "strong" states of "seventeeth- and eighteenth-century France and Prussia", Heper continues, Ottoman state showed no interest in "developing the polity's economic strength and growth through mercantilist policies" (1992b: 148). The fact that Ottoman rulers were solely preoccupied with the above-mentioned political goals goes a long way in explaining why they were more autonomous *vis-à-*

vis "social groups" as compared to their French and Prussian counterparts (1991a: 13; 1992a: 177; 1992b: 148-149). For the "de-emphasis of economic goals . . . obviated the need to mobilize social groups" (1992b: 149). Otherwise put, Ottoman state could dispense with their "cooperation and consent" (1991a: 13). Given the fact that, from the point of view of the rulers, *raison d'être* of estate organizations on the Continent was to obtain the "cooperation and consent" of their privileged subjects, it is easy to see why Ottoman rulers did not need *Ständestaat*-type arrangements. By virtue of the nature of the objectives Ottoman rulers pursued, Heper writes, "the sole locus of political activity became the central government, which pursued its political goals in the virtual absence of peripheral authority structures" (1992b: 148). In the Western *Ständestaat*, influential "social groups" bargained with their king and seized further corporate privileges in return for their support for his policies, whereas Ottoman rulers could easily "avoid granting (social) groups political and constitutional rights" (1992b: 149). That the Ottomans set up an administrative apparatus composed of dependent officials, futhermore, entailed that the rulers could accomplish their "political" goals of order and conquest without having recourse to "social groups" (1992a: 177; 1992b: 149).

4.5 State Tradition and Democracy

It is thus a state tradition which Turkey has inherited from Ottoman Empire. According to Heper, the political problems Turkey currently faces have an affinity to those experienced by European countries with a state tradition, rather than the problems other Third World countries are grappling with. In both Turkey and Continental European countries bearing a state tradition, most pressing political issues hinge on the problem of developing a "modus vivendi" between state elites and political elites (1992a: 181). The difference is that in Turkey the problem in question proves much more severe (1985a: 16, 150; 1988: 5; 1992a: 181-189), and this is related to the historical absence of coutervailing societal forces (1988: 5), and particularly, the absence of a *Ständestaat* tradition (1985a: 107). Because, when compared to French and German polities, in Ottoman-Turkish polity the "legitimacy crisis" is bound to be "more critical and longer-lasting" owing to the fact that the

latter polity has historically had a stronger state relatively more reluctant to let the already weakened "periphery" be an influential actor (1985a: 16). On the other hand, the presence of a tradition of *Ständestaat* in a given polity entails that there is a more or less workable convention of reaching consensus for contemporary political actors to build upon. For instance, Heper argues that post-World War II German polity managed to strike a balance between the demands of political and state elites by virtue of the lingering effect of the *Ständestaat* tradition (1985a: 107). Particularly important, Heper contends, has been the fact that from the advent of absolutism and to the turn of the twentieth century "bureaucracy's influence was balanced by aristocratic power" (1992a: 178). "The confrontation of two nearly equal powers", Heper continues, produced a "dual" polity where "each side remained seperate but respectful of one another's spheres of jurisdiction" (1992a: 180-181). Hence the secret of Germans' ability to "reconcile pluralism with their state tradition" (1992a: 182) was the legacy of a pattern of conflict resolution through "law". The latter, on the other hand, was non-existent in the case of Ottoman-Turkish polity where "all problems of law were transformed into problems of administration" (1985a: 16). That is, it was the discretionary power of the center which set the terms of the relations between the state and the society. In lieu of law, thus, there prevailed arbitrariness (1985a: 16, 149). In Continental Europe, law turned out to be at once "the rock on which (the estates) based their claims" (1991a: 10) and "the ultimate check on power" (1992a: 180). Its absence in the Ottoman case, on the other hand, entailed that the peripheral forces were devoid of a legal shield with which they would assert their rights and protect themselves against the state. The result was that whenever the conditions were conducive for peripheral forces to burst into the political scene, they emerged as "over-defiant" (1985a: 17; 1992b: 146) and "irresponsible" (1985a: 150; 1992b: 146), which in turn further reinforced center's hostility toward the periphery (1985a: 17). Forging a compromise, as a result, proved next to impossible (1985a: 33, 98, 149). This pattern, furthermore, continued into the republican period. In contrast to the "dual" and "more integrated" polities of European state societies, in the "essentially monist and, therefore, polarized" Turkish polity, "the state and political elites" has failed to "iron out differences and develop a modus vivendi among themselves" (1992a: 181). Instead, the relations between the

two sets of elites has "passed through cycles of domination, protest, and redomination" (1992a: 182). As opposed to the "static consensus" which obtained in Continental European countries with a state tradition, in the Ottoman-Turkish case the problem was rather one of the "lack of consensus" (1985b: 95). This is the reason why Turkey possessing an "extremely strong state tradition" has proved a much less fertile ground for the "consolidation of democracy" (1992a: 184).

Whereas the solution to the political problems faced by other Third World/ developing countries lies in the creation of political institutions that can absorb increased participation, Turkey's political predicament demands a different solution: in "a milieu infused by a state tradition" (1985a: 149) it is the viability of democracy which is at stake. Hence Heper writes that "in Turkey the prospects of democracy are related, *inter alia*, to the degree to which generalized power . . . can be degeneralized, or particularized" (1992b: 147). That is to say, whereas in other Third World countries the pressing issue is one of consolidating the state, in Turkey it is one of attenuating the power wielded by state elites.

4.6 "Tradition"?

In his earliest studies on Ottoman-Turkish state and bureaucracy, which we have examined in the second chapter, Heper's analysis of the evolution of the Ottoman-Turkish polity has led him to predict that in the foreseeable future Turkey will develop into a "modern" polity: that "substantive rationality" will give way to "instrumental rationality" on the part of the bureaucracy as societal groups eventually rise to prominence, that "functional cleavages" will replace "cultural cleavages" as the main axis of confrontation, and so on. In his studies under consideration here, however, Heper discards these assumptions he has built upon in the past on the grounds that they are plagued by "an unilinear evolutionary bias" (1985a: 19). Evolutionary thinking cannot come to terms with what Heper now perceives as the critical factor which accounts for the specificities of a given polity, namely, "tradition".

In his review of Heper's *The State Tradition in Turkey* (1985a), Schick asserts that "seeking the roots of contemporary phenomena in 'tradition' begs the

question why the tradition survives in the first place" (1987: 154). The question, though, may be better put as follows: Is the phenomenon of "strong state" in twentieth-century Turkey indeed a continuation of the "strong state" of the sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire? Otherwise stated, rather than posing the question as to why a state tradition has lingered on, one should first interrogate whether two phenomena which superficially resemble each other can legitimately be taken to be of the same kind. It is the very idea of "tradition", thus, which should be put to critical evaluation.

Nalbantoğlu, for instance, questions the idea that "the state *étatisme* of the 1930s and 1940s" is a continuation of "the Ottoman *dawla*" (1993: 358, note 6) and cogently argues that what Heper calls the strong state as a modern phenomenon in twentieth-century Turkey had "a qualitatively different rationality" when compared to a pre-modern state dominant *vis-à-vis* society (1993: 358, note 6) and that the former should better be seen, not as an offshot of a transhistorical tradition, but as a product of "exigencies of the times", by which he means the economic difficulties attendant upon World Depression (1993: 352). The idea to be derived from Nalbantoğlu's remarks is that a preoccupation with tradition must not blind us to, what might be called, "strong state" producing conjunctures. Heper's reflections on the evolution of French and Prussian-German polities are quite relevant here. For, in respect of both polities, Heper attempts to trace the origins of the modern phenomena of "strong states" all the way back to medieval history. Hence he imparts a continuity between the "strong states" allegedly produced by highly conflictual relations between the kings and the privileged strata and those of, say, nineteenth-century France or Prussia. The latter, that is to say, are deemed to have been necessitated by the particular centuries-long trajectories of the polities in question. Heper might have benefited from a consideration of what Nalbantoğlu refers to as the exigencies of the times; for, the feature common to nineteenth-century French and Prussian polities might well be put as the exigencies of late development or economic backwardness (see Badie and Birnbaum, 1983: 123-124; Turner, 1984: 59-61; Wood, 1991: 102-105). Such a consideration might provide a better guidance as to the similarities, in terms of their degrees of "stateness", between France, Prussia-Germany and Turkey. Heper in fact hints at this when he writes that in contrast to England, state elites in

France and Prussia had to grapple with "critical problems of modernization and development", which contributed to their having a "unified sense of ideology on the basis of which they tried to control, manipulate and/or transform politics and society" (1991a: 9-10). This might be taken as a recognition of the causal relationship between late development and the emergence of "strong states". Heper does not pursue the point, though, because, it might be argued, he tends to view polities as closed systems whose development is conditioned by indigenous variables, most notably the extent to which political actors manage to reach spontaneous consensus.

In addition, Heper's preoccupation with tradition seems to have led him to an ahistorical notion of "civil society". In his most recent studies, Heper increasingly employs the term civil society in his analysis of both Ottoman and Western social formations. He defines civil society as "an entity effectively impinging on the affairs of the state" (1992a: 178), by which stroke "civil societal powers" becomes synonymous with "countervailing powers" (1992a: 181). In his discussion of the French and Prussian cases, for instance, he treats feudal aristocracy and estates as civil societal structures (see 1991a: 6; 1992a: 170, 178, 180-181). The problem is that civil society defined as "an entity effectively impinging on the affairs of the state" presupposes a distinction between the "state" and the "non-state", or the "political" and the "social" (Wood, 1995: 242-243). However, Heper himself constantly notes, especially in the case of the aristocracy, that Western estates enjoyed political privileges/rights; that is to say, the political authority which belongs solely with the state in the *modern* period was dispersed among central and peripheral agents. A feudal lord wielding territorial rights, for instance, in no way can be treated as part of the "civil society"- he is instead "a fragment of the state" (Wood, 1995: 38-39). Thus, Heper errs in projecting the reality of the modern state as a "distinct realm" (Sayer, 1985: 679) onto pre-modern political structures. Accordingly, he fails to acknowledge that civil society as the realm of the non-state was non-existent in pre-modern social formations. Furthermore, as he takes estates to be civil societal powers, he re-interprets the (strong) state tradition of Ottoman-Turkey in terms of the weakness of civil society (1985a: 16, 32, 34; 1991a: 18; 1992a: 170, 174, 177, 178). Hence, in his account, the state tradition of Ottoman-

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Turkey is accompanied by what might be called a parallel tradition of disorganized, feeble and ineffective civil society.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages, I have examined Metin Heper's analysis of the Ottoman state in an attempt to present his account of the historical origins of the state tradition in Turkey. I have focused particularly on his comparative analysis of state-society relations in the Ottoman social formation on the one hand and in Western social formations on the other. For, it is my contention that it is his comparative perspective which determines the terms of his analysis of the Ottoman state. On account of the observation that Heper has modified his views quite significantly over the course of time, I have examined his studies under three distinct headings. It is now the time to draw some general conclusions.

First, from his earliest studies to the most recent ones, Heper tends to view the Ottoman state as the agent which gave state-society relations in the Empire their particular character. That is to say, it is either the content of state policies or the attitude of the state toward the "periphery" which turns out to be determinant factor in Heper's account of state-society relations in the Ottoman Empire. For instance, when Heper accords priority to the presence of a cultural conflict between the bureaucracy and the "people", as he does in his earliest studies, what leads him to designate the "non-official" segments of the population as an essentially undifferentiated category of the "people" is his idea that Ottoman bureaucracy's privileging of the policy of secularization ensued in the emergence of a unidimensional confrontation, i.e. a confrontation between Islamic and secular norms. On the other hand, when he muses on the absence of *Ständestaat*-type arrangements, it is the state's aversion to intermediary structures and autonomous foci of power which proves the key to this state of affairs. Otherwise put, Heper's argument is that the presence of a disorganized and therefore ineffective "periphery"

in the Ottoman case is to be accounted for in terms of the *raison d'état* of the Ottoman state. Similarly, as for the alleged "weakness" of civil society, a theme Heper uses in his most recent studies, it is again the peculiarities of the Ottoman state which he perceives as the explanatory factor. This is because the fact that the state did not permit the development of "countervailing powers" entails, for Heper, the weakness, if not virtual absence, of civil society. To sum up, in all these instances, Heper inclines toward perceiving the nature of the Ottoman state as the *differentia specifica* of the Ottoman social formation.

As for Heper's comparative perspective, an assertion of İslamoğlu-İnan's (1987), one I have already mentioned, might be of some help in delineating the fashion in which Heper discusses the Ottoman case in contradistinction to Western social formations. In an attempt to underscore the assumptions common to the Orientalist paradigm, the Marxian idea of Asiatic mode of production and the modernization theory, İslamoğlu-İnan writes that in all of these approaches the "primary concern remains with Western development and in showing how and why the Ottoman Empire departed from the Western pattern" (1987: 7). Consequently, she argues that the starting point of the analysis turns out to be a concern with the "uniqueness (or the specific dynamic) of Western development", on the basis of which the Ottoman case is negatively evaluated (1987: 7). It is my contention that Heper's contribution is a case in point. The revisions Heper has effected in his perspective, furthermore, seems to have resulted from changes in the way he perceives the "uniqueness" of the West. That is to say, it seems to be the case that the two strikingly distinct views on the Ottoman state Heper presents, one in his earliest studies and the other in those studies I have examined in the third and fourth chapters, correspond respectively to two ways of accounting for the uniqueness of the Western pattern of development.

To clarify, in his earliest studies, which I have discussed in the second chapter, Heper's account of the Western pattern of development is based on the idea that the "West" had two successive "specific dynamics" in the sense İslamoğlu-İnan employs the term, and these were the absolutist states and the middle classes. Accordingly, the problematic with which Heper approaches Ottoman social formation turns out to be one of the absence of Ottoman counterparts to these

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"dynamics". Starting with Heper's account of the absolutist states, the latter are deemed as progressive agents which laid the foundations of the bourgeois order to come, through formulating and implementing "rational" and secular policies, most notably those directed towards fostering economic development. Hence Heper prioritizes the kind of substantive rationality absolutist states operated on in explicating the specificity of the Western pattern of development. Against this backdrop, he posits a picture of the Ottoman state which hinges on the supposed absence of secular and rational state norms. In his discussion of the absence of secular state norms, Heper mentions the fusion of state and religion as well as the ensuing predominance of Islamic norms in shaping the policies of the state. More importantly, he notes that as opposed to their Western counterparts, the Ottoman rulers were preoccupied solely with the perpetuation of the eternal order. Hence the absence of "rational" state policies, which amounted to a static political philosophy. Then comes his discussion of the rise of the middle classes and the advent of "organic" modernization in the West. Heper, in particular, stresses the impact the former development had on the Western polities. As a result of the arrival of middle class supremacy in the polities, he argues, the substantive rationality on the part of the states/bureaucracies was replaced by instrumental rationality. As opposed to this Western pattern, in elucidating the Ottoman pattern of development, he stresses the absence of politically influential middle classes in the Ottoman Empire, as a result of which, he continues, Ottoman bureaucrats were in a position to carry out a bureaucratic project of modernization. Hence the notions of "induced" modernization and "bureaucratic ruling tradition". The significance of the bureaucratic ruling tradition for Heper is that it entailed a bureaucracy-dominated polity, and therefore, the perpetuation of substantive rationality on the part of the state/bureaucracy. Accordingly, Heper suggests an oppositionality between Ottoman and Western patterns of development on the basis of the contrast between the survival of substantive rationality in the former case and its replacement, via the impact exerted by the middle classes, by instrumental rationality in the latter case.

In his subsequent studies, on the other hand, the "specific dynamic" of the West, this time, relates to the "feudal" political arrangements and especially the *Ständestaat* systems. The historical significance of the latter is that, Heper contends,

they resulted in a pattern of state-society relations whereby the power of the central authority was limited by virtue of the political rights the privileged strata and immune organizations (i.e. feudal aristocracy, the Church and the municipal organizations) enjoyed. The latter, he continues, functioned as "countervailing powers" *vis-à-vis* the central authority, as a result of which the arbitrary and discretionary power of the monarchs was reduced to a minimum. According to Heper, this state of affairs, in the long run, contributed to the emergence of liberal and democratic regimes in the West. Absent in Heper's account is a concern with the absolutist states, which is hardly surprising given the fact that they aspired to do away with the political weight the estate structures had. Otherwise stated, because Heper now sees the estate structures as the unique aspect of the Western pattern of development, he ceases to evaluate the absolutist state as a milestone in the history of Western social formations. As for his account of the Ottoman social formation, in accordance with his renewed view on the Western pattern, he brings to the fore of his analysis the alleged absence of countervailing powers, a phenomenon which accounts for the fact that the Ottoman state was far stronger than its Western counterparts. Heper, however, no longer asserts that there was, in the Ottoman case, a dearth of secular state norms. On the contrary, he argues that from very early on secular norms came to prevail over Islamic ones and that there indeed was an Ottoman version of reason of state which guided the conduct of Ottoman rulers and their bureaucrats. Ottoman reason of state, on the other hand, was colored by a "patrimonial" attitude toward the periphery. This attitude consisted in the Ottoman center's reluctance to recognize "established position" and in its hostility to intermediary structures possessing autonomous power of their own. Consequently, the patrimonialism of the Ottoman state turns out to be the factor which precluded the emergence of countervailing powers *vis-à-vis* the central authority, and hence, the factor which accounts for the divergence between Ottoman and Western patterns of state-society relations.

Heper continues to build upon this comparative framework in his most recent studies, which I have dealt with in the fourth chapter. Heper, this time, introduces a typology of strong states, on the basis of which he underlines the similarities between the political experiences of Ottoman, French and Prussian societies. The similarities

in question have to do with the fact that the three societies belong to the same category, that is, the category of polities with strong states. The typology of strong states undeniably serves to underscore the variations in state-society relations in the West, and subsequently, renders Heper's perspective more attentive to the differences between the Western cases. On the other hand, when it comes to comparing the polities having a state tradition, Heper again uses the absence or presence of countervailing powers as the yardstick. Hence he argues that the Ottoman state was relatively stronger either than the French or the Prussian state, because in the latter countries the phenomena of the strong states were moderated by the presence of countervailing powers. However, in the absence of a *Ständestaat* tradition, Ottoman state emerged as "omnipotent". This is the sense in which Heper's comparative analysis remains substantially the same, his employment of the typology of strong states notwithstanding.

Lastly, I want to touch upon a problem I have addressed in the introductory chapter, namely, Heper's reliance on the "conventional wisdom" as to the nature of Oriental/non-Western societies. This is especially apparent in Heper's later studies where he posits an oppositionality between Western and Ottoman social formations on the basis of the idea that the latter formation lacked countervailing powers. Ottoman social formation, he argues, was marked by the absence of "intermediary structures", an argument he increasingly rephrases in terms of the weakness/absence of civil society. In the West, however, estate organizations served to counterbalance the power of the state. This way of comparing and contrasting Ottoman and Western forms of state-society relations bares resemblance to the centuries-old perspective on "Oriental" political regimes which muse on the idea of "despotism" as the feature distinguishing the former from the regimes of pre-modern Western societies. As to the way Ottoman Empire was perceived, the "analysis of Ottoman 'despotism' as an antithesis to European monarchy was", İslamoğlu-İnan argues, "very much part of the European political discourse since the Renaissance" (1987: 3). Particularly important in this respect were the eighteenth-century contributions to the debate, especially that of Montesquieu, whose "categorization of Oriental regimes as inherently despotic had a long term influence on the observations and commentaries on the Ottoman Empire" (Çırakman, 2002: 109). In Montesquieu's account, despotic

regimes has three major characteristics: "mass of the population is subject to the ruler's arbitrary will"; the ruler "dominates according to his own inclination" rather than following impersonal "customs and laws"; "there are no intermediary social institutions linking the individual to the state" (Turner, 1994: 25). All these amount to the absence of "constitutional checks on central authority as the principal guarantee of political rights" (Turner, 1994: 25). Hence the antithesis to "despotism" was put as "liberty" (Çırakman, 2002: 118), needless to say, the latter was perceived as an attribute of Western political regimes. Liberty in the West was held to have been secured by the estate structures. As the leading twentieth-century scholar of the paradigm of "Oriental despotism", Karl Wittfogel, puts, in "post-feudal Europe the absolutist regimes were restricted. . . by the actual strength of the landed nobility, the Church and the towns".[83]

The similarities Heper's comparative perspective displays with the above-mentioned tradition is too obvious to be stated. The influence of the idea of Oriental despotism, though, is not confined solely to Heper's studies; for, many other accounts of the Ottoman Empire seem to be plagued by similar kinds of assumptions, and this includes Marxian analyses too, which is hardly surprising given the fact that the Marxian concept of Asiatic mode of production borrows heavily from the idea of Oriental despotism (İslamoğlu-İnan, 1987: 3-4; Turner, 1994: 28).

What Heper's perspective has in common with these approaches is a mode of analysis which starts from the features that allegedly "account for the particular character of Western society" and which then sets out to describe non-Western social formations on the basis of the very absence of these features (Turner, 1994: 22). Accordingly, the analysis of non-Western social formations turns out to revolve around "a series of social and historical gaps", such as the absence of classes, of a hereditary aristocracy, of civil society and so on (Turner, 1994: 22). It is my contention that this is the reason why Heper fails to put forward a sound analysis of the Ottoman state and state-society relations. Hence the fruits of his endeavour to trace the origins of the current state of affairs in Turkish politics to the Ottoman past are far from being satisfactory.

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[83] Quoted in Turner, 1994: 29.

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