

THE SECURITY PERCEPTION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND ITS
MILITARY DOCTRINES IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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ABSTRACT

The Security Perception of the Russian Federation and Its Military Doctrines in the Post-Cold War Era

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In this thesis, the Russian Federation is investigated to understand if it still tries to continue its classic Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War era and its views concerning national security, as reflected in Russia's military doctrines. It is so obvious that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia as an independent entity in the post-cold war era have compelled the Russian Federation to redefine its national interests. In this context, it experienced a crisis of describing its identity and national interests in changing security environment. Although in the early years of Yeltsin it preferred close cooperation with the West, then abandoned this approach. It was implied that "some states and coalitions" were still "main threats" to the security of the Russian Federation in the military doctrine and the "near abroad policy" re-gained importance. In addition, with the inauguration of Putin as Russian President, the reaction of the Russian Federation regarding both internal and external security issues displayed the growing significance of traditional interests and old-style security issues. Thus, in this thesis, it is asserted that the Russian Federation still tries to sustain its well-known traditional interests, the classic Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War period. Therefore, this study tries to explain this argument through examining the effects of imperial past, transformation years and its situation in the new security environment of post-Cold War era under Yeltsin and Putin.

Key words: The Russian Federation, security, military doctrine, imperial legacy,
Near Abroad

ÖZ

Rusya Federasyonu'nun Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Dönemde Güvenlik Algılayışı ve Askeri Doktrinleri

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Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları

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Bu tezde, Rusya Federasyonu, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde halen klasik Sovyet tipi güvenlik algılayışını sürdürmeye çalışıp çalışmadığını anlamak için incelenmiştir ve ulusal güvenlik hakkındaki görüşlerini kavrayabilmek için askeri doktrinleri de ayrıca bu çalışmada araştırılmıştır. Sovyetler Birliği'nin dağılmasının ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Rusya'nın bağımsız bir varlık olarak ortaya çıkışının Rusya Federasyonu'nu ulusal çıkarlarını yeniden tanımlamaya zorladığı çok açıktır. Bu bağlamda, yeni kimliğini ve ulusal çıkarlarını değişen güvenlik ortamında tanımlamada krizler yaşamıştır. Her ne kadar Yeltsin'in ilk yıllarında, Batı ile yakın bir işbirliği tercih etse de, sonradan bu görüşü terk etmiştir. “Bazı devletler ve koalisyonlar” halen Rusya Federasyonu'nun güvenliğine “ana tehditler” olarak düşünülmüştür ve “Yakın Çevre Politikası” yeniden önem kazanmıştır. Ayrıca, Putin'in Rusya Devlet Başkanı olarak göreve gelmesiyle, Rusya Federasyonu'nun hem iç hem dış güvenlik sorunlarına ilişkin tutumu, geleneksel çıkarların ve eski tarz güvenlik sorunlarının artan önemini göstermiştir. Bu sebeple bu tezde, Rusya Federasyonu'nun soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde halen iyi bilinen geleneksel çıkarlarını, klasik Sovyet tipi güvenlik algılayışını sürdürmeye çalıştığı iddia edilmiştir. Bu yüzden, bu çalışma bu iddiayı, imparatorluk geçmişinin etkilerini, değişim yıllarını ve soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde Yeltsin ve Putin devirlerinde onun yeni güvenlik ortamındaki yerini inceleyerek açıklamaya çalışmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rusya Federasyonu, güvenlik, askeri doktrin, imparatorluk mirası, Yakın Çevre

To my mother and my father

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Cold War which lasted more than four decades and the bipolar world came to an end and fifteen newly emerged states entered the stage of world politics. In this sense, the Russian Federation was recognized as the legal inheritor of the Soviet Union in the international arena. Moreover, it inherited social, economic, political, military and security problems as the successor of the Soviet Union in the transition period. Therefore, one of the problems what it tried to solve in this new period was its security issue in the new world order.

In order to define its security perception, it faced with challenging questions including; what does the Russian identity mean?, what are the priorities of the Russian Federation?, is “the enemy of the Cold War” still the same? what are the internal and external threats in the post-Soviet environment? in the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. In the light of these issues, firstly, there have been debates concerning national interests and threat perceptions of the state. In the early years of Yeltsin era, there has been a change regarding “the enemy of the Cold War”. The West was not perceived as a threat to the security of the Russian Federation anymore, however, this honeymoon proved to be short-lived. In the draft of new military doctrine, “some states and coalitions”, meaning United States of America (USA) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), were still regarded “basic threats” for the security of the Russian Federation.

Moreover, in the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the classic Soviet style of security perception has continued to be the policy of the federation in spite of American-Russian rapprochement on the surface after September 11 attacks in the United States of America. After these attacks, the entrance of the United States (US) into “Russian spheres of influence areas” was not welcomed by the Russian Federation, in spite of its so-called approval of American existence in these

regions in the name of fight against terrorism. The strengthening of Russia's place in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and on global scale has been the goal of President Putin. Besides, there is still sensitivity regarding NATO enlargement. In the light of these data, this thesis aims to explore the security perception of the Russian Federation and its military doctrines in the new world order on the basis of two questions: How the new world order's security environment has been affected the security insight of the Russian Federation and its military doctrines in the post-Cold War era and to what extent this security understanding regarding external and internal threats can change in the light of the developments.

While examining these two topics, the main aim of this thesis is to explain that the Russian Federation still tries to sustain its classic and well-known Soviet style of security perception in the post-Cold War era. In this context, it is necessary to mention that the existing literature handles the subject from this point of view. What is ambivalent because of the transition period of the country are the stances of the authorities of the Russian Federation and their abstention from the explanation of the certain manner regarding security issues and what we see as the result of this approach is that the "so-called rapprochement" between Russia and the West on the surface. In this sense, in order to define its security priorities and internal and external threats, it also tried to constitute a new military doctrine. Because, the military doctrine is the officially approved system of concepts related to war, threats, armed forces and security issues. Therefore, in order to grasp the Russian security perception, the two Russian Military Doctrines (1993, 2000) and other official papers connected with these doctrines would/ should be under the area of interest of this study.

Throughout four centuries, expansionism and threatening its neighbours became the goals of the Russian security insight. In addition to that, this "beleaguered" state has always been perceived with ambivalence by the West in the Cold War years and it is still hard to comprehend the Russian mentality in the post-Cold War international system. It is also obvious that the Russian perception regarding security issues can not change in such a short period of time. So, choosing this topic as a thesis is very difficult because of this transition period and

enduring debates concerning security issues and national interests inside the country and the discussions regarding the Russian perception of security and its new place in the international arena.

After the end of the Cold War, the traditional security theory that puts security to one sector has vanished and the post- Cold War security theory which is a mixture of wider agenda of security issues including military, political, economic, environmental, and societal is current in the new world order because of the strict and inevitable interaction of the states. So, it is expected that these conditions of new world order should make fundamental effects in the Russian security mentality. Today, the stance of Russia towards security issues can not be thought without this known fact. But what is more important is that the basic and well-known Soviet style of security perception and old-style security interests are still on the agenda.

Today, Russia can not be considered without its history and it should not be forgotten that it was one of the super powers of the Cold War era. The conditions of today are the indispensable part of its imperial past. In order to grasp Yeltsin and Putin periods, it is vital to scrutinize these earlier times. Because of this reason, it is tried to inquire the main topic of this thesis in five chapters. First of all, in order to reflect the imperial heritage, the Tsarist understanding of expansionism is tried to be given briefly. In the second chapter of this study, after introduction, it is also aimed to reflect the security heritage of the Russian Federation and mostly dwelt on Cold War “super power mentality” in order to comprehend today’s Russian security insight. Soviet Union tried to define its security in global terms in the Cold War years. The classic and well-known Soviet style of security understanding is a natural consequence of this thought. The Soviets sought to establish permanent military relations in its sphere of interest periphery via Soviet security sub-systems. However, the course of relations commenced to change with the famous policies of “glasnost” and “perestroika” of President Mikhail Gorbachev. So, special emphasis would be given to his policies in terms of security and new military doctrine in his presidency period.

In the third chapter of this thesis, it is firstly planned to cite about the matters of the transition period in the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. Because, the

discussions regarding the new position of the Russian Federation in the new world order and problems in defining security policy, are the inescapable result of this painful period. In spite of continuing debates, the new military doctrine was tried to be constituted by the authorities, thus, the security understanding of this doctrine will also be explored in the third chapter of this study. In the fourth chapter, the stance towards the “enemy” of the Cold War, regional sensitiveness and the Chechen Issue as an internal threat to the federation’s security will be under the interest of this study. Because they are vital topics that must be taken into consideration while examining the security perception of the Russian Federation in the new world order.

In the fifth chapter, it is intended to reflect the security understanding in the period of President Vladimir Putin. When he came to the power, he defined his policies with the articulate slogans, such as “strengthening the Russian state” and “dictatorship of the law.” Because, he accepted these policies as the basic solution for socio-economic and military problems. According to President Putin, what both Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried but failed was to strengthen Russia's economy and military, so, he is diligent on economic and security issues and we observe the reflections of this thought in the new military doctrine in his presidency period. In the sixth chapter, it is intended to explore the developments on security in the presidency of Putin. After the September 11 attacks, he took a pro-Western course, however, we might evaluate his approach in the long-run, therefore, the causes of this rapprochement should be appraised in this study. Moreover, in addition to stance towards the West, the other parts in the Russian sphere of influence areas and internal threats should be analysed with all aspects.

In the analysis of this thesis, a qualitative research technique has been used together with a comprehensive literature review. Therefore, a qualitative analysis of primary sources which are composed of the 1993 and 2000 Russian Military Doctrines and other formal documents related to these doctrines have been investigated while answering the main question of this topic. Besides, books, articles, dailies and internet sources have been explored as the secondary resources of this study. These resources have been used to provide a consistent and coherent basis for the main argument of this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In order to comprehend the security perception of the Russian Federation in the post-Cold War era, it is necessary to scrutinize the security concept of the Soviet Union and its security mentality . Because, the two super powers of the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union, described their securities in global scale. Moreover, the Tsarist Russia with its ambitions of expansionism as the predecessor of the Soviet Union can not be neglected in order to grasp imperial security understanding. In the second chapter, it is intended to find out the legacies of the Soviet Union and even briefly Tsarist Russia in terms of security insight. Thus, the main aim of this chapter is to inquire the previous periods in order to understand the historical background of the Russian security perception.

2.1. Imperial Legacy

The roots of the first Russian state which is based on Kiev, goes back to the ninth century. However, this powerful state proved to be short-lived.¹ Because, this mighty state began to lose its power on the consequence of the division of the state into principalities.² What this weakness caused for the Russians was the Mongol (or Tatar) yoke from 1240 to 1480, but, through their common language and religion, they could survive over two centuries and defeated the Mongols.³ Moreover, it is interpreted by Swift that the Mongol rule was an opportunity for the rulers of the small city of Moscow for that they could expand their territories by purchase and conquest at the result of getting on well

¹ John Swift, *Peter the Great*, London: Hodder & Stoughton Educational, 2000, p.11

² Daniel C. Diller, *Russia and the Independent States*, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1993, p.12

³ Nikolai N. Petro, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Russian Foreign Policy: From Empire To Nation State*, New York: Longman, 1997, pp.1-2

with Mongols and once Mongols weakened due to the fact that internal disputes, it was an occasion for Moscow to declare its independence in the time of Ivan III, also known as Ivan the Great (1462-1505).⁴ What is vital for us is that this Mongol invasion is used as a trump in order to justify of later Russian expansionism in the Tsarist Period.⁵

In 1472, Ivan the Great titled as “tsar”, the Russian version of Latin word “caesar”, and legitimated this title through the marriage with the niece of the last Byzantine emperor, thus, from the time of Ivan the Great, tsars fostered the idea of Moscow as the “Third Rome” while Rome and Constantinople had been the first and the second. This view was commented as the legitimacy of Orthodox faith and arrangement of the relations between church and state throughout the centuries when they fought against the Roman Catholic rulers.⁶

Besides, the seizure of Novgorod by Ivan the Great in 1478 was an important event for expanding the territory of the state, however, according to the majority of the scholars what was more important was the acquisition of a multi-ethnic empire character of the state with the conquest of Kazan in 1552 by the Muscovite tsar, Ivan IV, the Terrible. Because, the Khanate of Kazan was the first independent polity to gain and in addition to that it had a historical tradition, dynastic legitimacy and was composed of the people not only spoke a different language but also belonged to a different religion; Islam, and civilization.⁷ According to Mehmet Saray in his article, the seizure of Kazan was very significant both in the history of Russia and the whole of Eurasia. Because it gave the Russians an opportunity to gain the control of the Volga waterway to the Caspian Sea in order to conquer Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556.⁸ Referring to

⁴ Swift, *op. cit.*, p.11

⁵ Karen Dawisha, Bruce Parrott (eds), *Russia and the New States of Eurasia: The Politics of Upheaval*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p.27

⁶ Petro, Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, pp.2-3

⁷ Andreas Kappeler, *The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History*, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2001, pp.14-16

⁸ Mehmet Saray, *Ruslar'ın Orta Asya'yı Ele Geçirmeleri*, (Translation from Central Asian Survey, Vol.1 No:2/3, September 1982-January 1983 by Erkut Gökten), Ankara: ODTÜ Mimarlık Fakültesi Basım İşliği, 1984, p.1

Acton, it is also vital to mention that the acquisition of the vast territories under Moscow's rule took decades, whereas the local tribes of the east of the Urals could not display a significant resistance, thus, the Russians gained the territories reaching to Siberia.⁹ The Muscovite rulers struggled for the inheritance of the Golden Horde (The Tatar State) at that time, therefore, Russian east politics in the following centuries can be defined as "the gathering of the lands of the Golden Horde".¹⁰ Russian eastward expansion continued throughout the seventeenth century, although it had serious internal turmoil, with the seizure of Siberia which caused to reach its border to the Pacific. Moscow also signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk that stipulated the move of border to the Argun River and the Stanovoi Mountain with powerless China in 1689, and at last in 1858 with the acquisition of new Chinese territory, the current border between Russia and China was determined.¹¹

Moreover, it won victories against the Ottoman Empire with the annexation of Crimea and against Persia with the seizure of vital areas of the Caucasus in 1870's and following years. Therefore, Mehmet Saray in his article emphasizes that eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are not only important for Russian expansionism in Asia but also in Europe and the Middle East.¹² What is striking for us that Europe was not able to be indifferent to Russian expansionism from that time and began to perceive Russia as a peril.

According to Lee, Russia's debut on to the European scene began in the eighteenth century because of the transformation of the scene itself; it had been a century ago when Sweden, Poland and the Ottoman Empire had taken the advantage of Moscow's troubles and had controlled of Eastern Europe.¹³ However, it was now a time for Russia to become a leading European power in the reign of Peter I, Peter the Great (1672-1725), at the beginning of the

⁹ Edward Acton, *Russia: The Present & The Past (The Tsarist and Soviet Legacy)*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc., 1995, p.12

¹⁰ Kappeler, *op. cit.*, p.22

¹¹ Petro, Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, p.3

¹² Saray, *op. cit.*, pp.2-3

¹³ Stephen J. Lee, *Peter the Great*, London: Routledge, 1993, p.15

eighteenth century.¹⁴ Peter's policy intensified on securing Russia's northern flank, thus, this paved the way for success in the Great Northern War against Sweden, resulted by the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721. The territories of today's Estonia and Latvia was captured and hence, his purpose of moving the capital to St. Petersburg may be commented as Russia's permanent existence in the Baltic region, a maritime access to the West.¹⁵ What is more, until his reign, Russia had been perceived as backward, isolated, elemental and huge state by Europe. It was interpreted as "a relative latecomer on the international scene".¹⁶ It was on a diplomatic mission to the Western Europe, Peter was influenced by Western culture and came to understand the significance of its advanced technology on both military and navy.¹⁷ Thus, his modernization of the Russian army and formation of a navy are the outcomes of his early impressions.¹⁸ Besides, referring to Diller, it should be evaluated as the most striking point that when the Senate gave Peter the title of emperor, which was used instead of tsar, the Russian Empire was officially formed.¹⁹ The expanding empire always wanted to step up its gains and continued to threaten its neighbours after the death of Peter the Great.

The time of Catherine the Great (1762-1796) testifies its abiding desires. Because the Empire expanded its territories from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The gains against the Ottoman Empire marks consolidating Russia's southern flank and seizure of the northern coast of the Black Sea, while its expansion in the Central Europe results the disappearance of Poland from the map.²⁰ All above mentioned expansionism mentality refers to the Russian Empire's borders reach to

¹⁴ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.14

¹⁵ Acton, *op. cit.*, p.38

¹⁶ Henry Kissinger (a), *Does America Need a Foreign Policy?*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001, p.70

¹⁷ Diller, *op. cit.*, pp.14-15

¹⁸ James Cracraft, *The Revolution of Peter the Great*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003, p.29

¹⁹ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.15

²⁰ Acton, *op. cit.*, pp.38-39

the Baltic, the Arctic and the Pacific in the north, while to the Black Sea and the Caspian region in the south. Therefore, with the additional gains of the nineteenth century in the Central Asia, this made the Empire equal to one sixth of the surface of the earth.²¹ In addition to that, it is substantial to mention that the reign of Catherine the Great consolidated the Russian Empire mentality. Margot Light, referring to the Tsarist statesman, Sergei Witte, says that “ever since the time of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great there has been no such thing as Russia; only a Russian empire.”²² What is astonishing are that the lasting effect of this perception to the recent debates regarding Russian identity, and consequently, its impact on the designation of the limits of new security understanding. Thus, the imperial heritage is still being investigated in the Federation and it is obscure for the Russians to admit the loss of imperial power.

Therefore, the Tsarist expansion mentality and imperial insight are the clues in order to grasp the security understanding of the successive times. As a matter of fact, Rühl, referring to Klyuchevsky and Vernadsky, indicates that the Tsarist time expansionism is generally defined by the Russians as “a vital necessity for security on the vast Eurasian plain”, where no natural barricades exist in order to resist for the attacks.²³ Therefore, to Kissinger’s way of thinking, expansionism became the repeating theme of Russian mentality. Russia preferred threatening all its neighbours to the improvement of the prosperity of its own people, thus, in the Russian perception, the centuries of this sacrifice have been transformed into a task, to some extent for security, and to some extent for a better Russian morality.²⁴ Hence, the Russians saw expansionism as a crucial excuse “to live” and to be able to last imperial legacy.

²¹ Petro, Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, p.4

²² Margot Light (a), “Foreign Policy Thinking”, in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, Margot Light (eds), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1996, p.36

²³ Lothar Rühl, “The Historical Background of Russian Security Concepts and Requirements”, in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed), *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda*, New York: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1997, p.27

²⁴ Kissinger (a), *op. cit.*, p.71

2.2. Soviet Union's Perception Concerning Security In the Pre-Cold War World

After the time of Catherine the Great, Alexander I was influenced by Western ideas and new concepts regarding Enlightenment began to be queried in his early period. However, then, his refusal of his earlier liberal thoughts caused a tension among small part of aristocratic army officers who organized a secret society in St. Petersburg, targeting to establish a constitutional monarchy in their country which at the end resulted with the failed Decembrist revolt after the death of Alexander I.²⁵ According to Diller, what was important concerning this unsuccessful revolt was in spite of many coups and coup attempts in Russian history, this was the first to be made by revolutionary principles and paved the way for the next generations of Russian revolutionaries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.²⁶ Therefore, after the failed Decembrist revolt, the Russian revolutionary movement gained pace and questions regarding Russia, Russian identity, Russian development, divergencies between the Western style of transformation and the tradition began to be inquired.²⁷ In this context, it can be interpreted that the basis of the debates concerning Russian identity, the place and direction of the Russian Federation in the transition period, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, goes back to this time, hence, the origin of these problems is more serious than it is reckoned and is connected with its painful and restless history.

Moreover, according to McCauley, there was a convenient atmosphere for the doctrine of socialism in the country due to the fact that Russia was natural socialist territory.²⁸ So, at the beginning of the twentieth century, although Nicholas II, the last Russian tsar, tried to prevent these trends by his conservative policies and imposed widespread censorship, because of threat of famine and terrible living conditions of the peasants and workers, he could not succeed in to

²⁵ Diller, *op. cit.*, pp.17-18

²⁶ *Ibid*, p.18

²⁷ Martin McCauley (a), *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1949*, Edinburgh Gate: Pearson Education Limited (third edition), 2003, pp.31-32

²⁸ *Ibid*, p.32

curb the Revolution of 1905 and the Revolution of 1917, which was accelerated by the First World War (1914-18) burden and conditions.²⁹ The Revolution of 1917 is a landmark in the Russian history. Because with the October Revolution, the world witnessed another Russian perception of the worldview with the overthrow of the tsar and the Bolshevik seizure of power from the provisional government on 25 October/ 7 November 1917 and in addition to that, Bolshevik leader Lenin cited that they were ready to build socialism after the victory.³⁰

Yet, there was much to do, because, although the Bolsheviks took over Petrograd, they had to build their authorities in the rest part of the country. What this resulted was the creation of the “Red Army” with the socialist principles instead of the old tsarist army and by the end of the year the Bolsheviks could control most of the important centers in the country.³¹ While the internal situation necessitates struggle with the other rebellious groups, the Bolsheviks had to accept to negotiate with the Germans at the end of the World War I. In other words, the struggle with internal enemies was more important than the struggle with the foreign enemy, the Germans, in the short term, whereas in the long term it would be the defeat of Imperial Germany.³² Because, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk forced Russia to recognize the independence of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland in the German control and this was evaluated as the great loss and humiliation by most part of the society.³³ Moreover, Georgia, Finland and the Ukraine gained independence as they were in the German zone of influence.³⁴ Therefore, the other segments of the society were composed of anti-Bolshevik (White) forces- the tsar’s army, conservatives, liberals, Mensheviks and other groups- were discontented with the post-World War I environment. Owing to the fact that the hard conditions of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and the deterioration of

²⁹ Diller, *op. cit.*, pp.25-29

³⁰ Martin McCauley (b), *The Soviet Union 1917-1991*, New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc. (second edition), 1993, p.11

³¹ Diller, *op. cit.*, pp.34-36

³² McCauley (b), *op.cit.*, p.23

³³ Diller, *op. cit.*, pp.36-37

³⁴ McCauley (b), *op. cit.*, p.24

economic situation by the war, the Bolsheviks decided to initiate a brand new policy which was called as “War Communism” targeting to construct a communist society and economic system for also combatting the anti-Bolsheviks, yet, the most challenging problem for the success of this programme was the “Civil War” between Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks and at the end it concluded with the victory of the Bolsheviks in 1921.³⁵

What was striking for Soviet Russia during War Communism was that it came to understand that the revolutionary flood had weakened in the West, because, it demanded the support of the proletariat of the Western nations, however, absence of expected revolutions in the Western Europe was a disappointment. What is more, it could not obtain its required aid from East because of dissensions concerning basic principles of the revolution. Therefore, according to McCauley, Soviet Russia, which stumbled between the West and the East, gave its precedence to secure its own national frontiers and treaties were signed.³⁶ The other significant issue that we can not neglect is that the Bolsheviks inherited an empire and they had to cope with this imperial legacy. Thus, when we inquire the stances of the Bolsheviks to this heritage in the early years following the revolution, we observe their depiction of themselves as “defenders both of Russia and of the empire’s non-Russian minorities” and that was why they called themselves as “defenders of the Russian fatherland against foreign invasion”.³⁷ They, before seizing power, had supported the idea of national self-determination for the minorities of the Russian Empire. In addition to that, after coming to power, the Bolsheviks issued “The Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia,” which officially announced the right of non-Russian ethnic groups in order to establish independent states. But what was remarkable was that this was only a theoretical explanation, but not a government policy for Lenin and his comrades, hence, this did not mean that the states which had long been a part of

³⁵ Diller, *op. cit.*, pp.36-38

³⁶ McCauley (b), *op.cit.*, p.39

³⁷ Dawisha and Parrott, *op. cit.*, p.8

the Russian Empire could secede.³⁸ Besides, what Lenin was touchy was the imperial Russian legacy and claimed that “the new Soviet state was much more than a successor state to the Russian empire”.³⁹ Therefore, the Bolsheviks eventually preferred to establish the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) on December 30, 1922, which was composed of Russian, Belorussian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian republics and the Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tajik republics were added to USSR in 1929.⁴⁰ But, McCauley emphasizes that some nation states including Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania remained outside of the state.⁴¹ Hence, this affected the Russian security insight in the pre-World War II era.

Through the USSR, Lenin adopted the idea of equal Soviet republics, whereas, Stalin, as the successor of Lenin, never assumed this concept due to the fact that being an imperialist.⁴² Even before he came to power, in 1919 and 1920, the world witnessed harsh utterances of Stalin concerning the discrepancy between the socialist Russia and the capitalist world and he cited that “the earth is too small for both the Entente and Russia, that one of them must perish if peace is to be established on earth”.⁴³ In addition to that, it was incomprehensible for him the loss of the lands that had been part of the empire. Therefore, the main purpose for Stalin during Second World War was to gather in all lands which had acquired in the time of Tsarist Russian Empire, hence, he exalted Ivan the Terrible and Alexander I. Also, Russian Orthodoxy was replaced with Marxism which was universalist, hence, Russia accepted itself as the “saviour of mankind”.⁴⁴ What was more that the state structure and economic conditions were tried to be strengthened. Throughout the first fifteen years following the revolution, the basic components of Peter the Great’s state structure were re-created increasingly and

³⁸ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.39

³⁹ McCauley (a), *op. cit.*, p.32

⁴⁰ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.40

⁴¹ McCauley (a), *op.cit.*, p.32

⁴² *Ibid*, pp.32-33

⁴³ William Taubman, *Stalin’s American Policy: From Entente to Detente to Cold War*, New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982, p.14

⁴⁴ McCauley (a), *op. cit.*, p.33

economic resources were assigned for the purposes of the state in the spirit of fight against the hostile capitalist states. Stalin, in a 1931 address to the Soviet people, uttered:

*Do you want our Socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this, you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop a genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up the socialist economic system.*⁴⁵

Briefly, the new Bolshevik government tried to establish a new state based on the principle of socialism, to struggle with internal threats for the sake of the new regime and to secure its frontiers with the treaties on the leadership of Lenin. Moreover, according to Petro and Rubinstein in their book, the absence of expected revolutions in the Western Europe proved that it was in vain to believe that socialist revolution in Russia would be strengthened by the world revolution which would bring ultimate security for socialist Russia, and by understanding this truth, it preferred to establish the Red Army for the short-term security needs, besides, surprisingly, Lenin was the first Soviet leader to adopt the concept of peaceful coexistence with the capitalist states by realizing that capitalism began to enter stabilization period in Europe.⁴⁶ In the period of Stalin, industrialization and improving the economic situation were the priorities in order to defense the socialist fatherland and the state gained an imperialist character via intension of gathering the lands of old Tsarist Empire. There was a dilemma, because Soviet Russia demanded for the security both in Europe and in Asia yet the state became imperialistic through its socialist ambitions and improved good relations with Hitler's Nazi Germany in the interwar period believing that it would contribute its security both in Europe and in Asia. This can be best explained by the claims of Petro and Rubinstein; because, they assert that in the 1920s no immediate threat towards Soviet security came from any neighbouring state in Europe, but from expansionist Japan, however, in the 1930s Moscow encountered with grave threats to its security in Europe and moreover, the great powers excluded Russia's traditional interests and important decisions were taken without Soviet

⁴⁵ Alexander M. Golts and Tonya L. Putnam, "State Militarism and Its Legacies", *International Security*, Vol.29, No.2 (Fall 2004), p.145

⁴⁶ Petro and Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, pp.20-23

participation with the disbelief in Moscow's sincerity. Stalin mentioned that the main enemy of international communism was the Social Democrats, not the Nazis, therefore, he choosed to cooperate with Germany which comprising exchanges among members of the military and internal security forces by realizing its weakness in both military and politics. Hence, to Petro's and Rubinstein's way of thinking, due to the fact that anxiety about an attack from both sides, the danger of involvement in a two-front war, Stalin decided to sign Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact in 1939.⁴⁷ But what was the most prominent issue for this study regarding the early years of the Soviet Russia was the stance of the United States towards this new Russian state and more seriously towards the new regime which was intended to form ultimately "Communistic world" in the interwar period. As a matter of fact, the seeds of the divergence between Soviet Russia and the United States, the origins of the "Cold War", goes back to this time.

When the United States entered the World War I in 1917, it transformed the course of the events in favour of the Entente Powers and American President Woodrow Wilson broadcasted Wilson Principles that envisages national self-determination for all peoples, representative government, elevation of political changes via constitutional means but not through revolutions, open diplomacy and the establishment of an international organization in a league of nations, so, in this context, the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917 was perceived as the first objection of the Principles of President Wilson because of the cleavages in terms of political thinking.⁴⁸ At first sight, according to Bennett, President Wilson could not comprehend what had happened in this remote land, moreover, he welcomed the Provisional Government and the revolution for its purpose of ideal society by power of people, however, it did not take too long to come to understand the "realities".⁴⁹ Because, the new Soviet regime was born with the international mission; aiming to overthrow of capitalism throughout the world in order to

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, pp.25-34

⁴⁸ McCauley (a), *op. cit.*, p.3

⁴⁹ Edward M. Bennett, *Recognition of Russia: An American Foreign Policy Dilemma*, Massachusetts: Blaisdell Publishing Company, 1970, pp.14-15

establish communism.⁵⁰ This was inexcusable for the United States and although Soviet Union was recognized by Great Britain, France, China, Mexico, Greece, Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Italy in 1924, the United States did not offer diplomatic recognition to this state until 1933.⁵¹

Soviet Union was perceived with ambiguity from the outset. Their targets were incomprehensible for that they promised ultimate security and a world compatible to their system and their premises were “utopic” for that their claim of the world had to be completely Communistic for good life and the future. However, it was so obvious that the Russian security problem was by far more serious than the United States that time, because the Russians were aware of the fact that both Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan coveted their territory.⁵² Therefore, as it was indicated in this study broadly, Soviet Union signed nonaggression pact for ten years with Nazi Germany on August 23, 1939, and this sometimes was called as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact after the negotiation of the foreign ministers of these countries⁵³ and evaluated as a “prelude to the Second World War”.⁵⁴

Although Nazi-Soviet pact signed between Hitler and Stalin, it is vital to mention at that point that it provided no real basis of confidence even between Soviet Russia and Germany.⁵⁵ The both, in fact, targeted expansionism and ultimately, evaluated this pact as a chance to get more from each other. This was a great opportunity for Soviet Russia who had dissatisfied with the conditions of Brest-Litovsk Treaty and had felt beleaguered within this territory.

⁵⁰ Paul Marantz, “Changing Soviet Conceptions of International Security” in Sylvia Woodby, Alfred B. Evans, Jr. (eds), *Restructuring Soviet Ideology: Gorbachev's New Thinking*, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1990, p.108

⁵¹ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.42

⁵² Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp.139-141

⁵³ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.46-47

⁵⁴ Petro and Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, p.36

⁵⁵ Harold Macmillan, *The Blast of War: 1939-1945*, New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1968, p.15

2.3.The Cold War Years

It is also necessary to say that Nazi-Soviet pact accelerated the events in Europe, because with the thrust of Nazi-Soviet Pact at the beginning, on September 1, 1939, Germany occupied Poland and the Second World War (1939-1945) commenced with the declaration of war of Britain and France on Germany.⁵⁶ However, the thrust of this pact would not last long, because, in real, Hitler's secret prey was Russia because of having "Lebensraum".⁵⁷ Stalin also aimed much more land with the thrust of this nonaggression pact. According to Macmillan, throughout its long history Russians had tried to sustain two main policy; reach to the warm seas and to establish a defensive ring of territory on its western borders, hence, they did not hesitate to take the share of eastern Poland in October 1939.⁵⁸

Moreover, in 1940, Hitler and Stalin, the desirous leaders for global hegemony, made a decision concerning vital exclusion of the United States from Eurasia by realizing the geostrategic importance of this region in a secret meeting.⁵⁹ Therefore, what is crucial for us are that apprehension and explanation of Soviet Russia regarding its geopolitic interests in this enormous Eurasian land mass and perception of the threat of the United States which would cause the process going to the Cold War. In this context, what is also remarkable and surprising is that the Russian Federation, as the successor of the Soviet Union, is still vigilant about Eurasia and the existence of the United States via its bases in the region in post-Cold War era. Hence, as it is analyzed in the successive chapters of this study broadly, the basic components of Russian security thinking are connected with its painful history and can not be thought without grasping both pre-Cold War and the Cold War years.

In this context, it should be mentioned that the United States was also alert about Eurasia in the Wartime. She followed an isolanist policy in the interwar

⁵⁶ Petro and Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, p.40

⁵⁷ Henry Kissinger (b), *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994, p.360

⁵⁸ Macmillan, *op. cit.*, pp.15-16

⁵⁹ Zbigniew Brzezinski (a) , *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: BasicBooks, 1997, p.xiv

period, however, the course of the events in Europe compelled her to re-define its security needs in Eurasia. Frederick Sherwood Dunn, cited that “the most important single fact in the American security situation is the question of who controls the rimlands of Europe and Asia” at that time, but, according to Gaddis, the fall of France and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor changed her mentality in the Second World War.⁶⁰

At the beginning years of the Second World War, with the thrust of nonaggression pact with Nazi Germany, Soviet Russia tried to gather the lands which had gained in the time of Tsarist Russian Empire - Poland, the Baltic States and Finland. However, the unexpected Nazi attack on the Russian soil on June 22, 1941, transmuted the course of events for the Soviet Union.⁶¹ Due to the fact that her vulnerable and unprepared position at the outset, and having a common peril of Nazism, Soviet Union preferred cooperation with Grand Alliance and thus, at the end of this Great Patriotic War (1941-1945), the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany paved the way for Russians to be equated as an equal power with victorious states for her wartime cooperation with the United States and Great Britain against Germany.⁶² In other words, although it was implied by Sulzberger that “the most important political development during the last ten years of localized and finally global warfare has been the emergence of the USSR as the greatest dynamic and diplomatic force on the vast Eurasian land mass which stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific oceans” after Japan’s surrender at the end of the Second World War, according to Mackinder, the danger came from the Germans and the Japanese, not from the Russians in this war.⁶³ During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet military art, which was connected with the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine regarding war and the army, was constructed systematically and was enhanced under different military and political

⁶⁰ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Long Peace: Inquiries Into the History*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1987, p.22

⁶¹ Petro and Rubinstein, *op. cit.*, p.41

⁶² *Ibid*, pp.41-47

⁶³ Gaddis, *op. cit.*, p.25

circumstances.⁶⁴ What was striking for Kissinger was that while the Soviet Union was seemed to be unprepared for the war with the lack of equipments and strategy at the beginning, then, she benefited from the disorder in Europe on the leadership of Stalin and stopped the Germans in Stalingrad and hence, she was presumed as a global super power at the end of the war.⁶⁵ What was also remarkable as a repeating theme in the history was that it was the second time for Russians to prevent a desirous leader for seizing whole Europe. Hitler was stopped, while he had been Napoleon in the nineteenth century. But to Kissinger's way of thinking, following these two victories, Russia always defined the peace through "her perceptions" via striving to apply her autocratic rules on a global scale, by the Holy Alliance in the nineteenth century and by the Communism after the Bolshevik Revolution.⁶⁶

In this context, in order to explain why the Cold War came into existence among the Soviet Union and the United States following the World War II, it is vital to mention that The Second World War came to the end through American dominance and eventually with dropping American atomic bomb on a Japanese city, Hiroshima. What this mushroom cloud over Hiroshima signalled was the dawn of a new political age. In 1945, each state in the world, with the exception of the United States and the Soviet Union, was aware of its place, scope for competence with near the zero point of weakness. Hence, there was a common approval that the United States and the Soviet Union emerged from the Second World War as the sole super powers, having adequate capacity in order to apply their policies on a global scale which was named as the Cold War.⁶⁷ According to the definiton of Lerche, Jr., this was "an almost accidental twist of history" that both states perceived themselves as the only state having a capability to conduct a

⁶⁴ Vasillii Danilovich Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corp., 1963, p.234

⁶⁵ Kissinger (b), *op.cit.*, p.349

⁶⁶ Kissinger (a), *op. cit.*, p.71

⁶⁷ Charles O. Lerche, Jr., *The Cold War and After*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965, pp.1-6

global role.⁶⁸ In this sense, Yalta Conference in early February 1945 was the obvious indicator of the process going to the Cold War. Because, the three leaders of the Grand Alliance against Nazi Germany, United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Josef Stalin, gathered at Yalta in order to discuss major issues such as the Russian entry to the war, the creation of United Nations Organization, the post-war administration of Germany, and the future of the governments in the Eastern Europe which seemed to be the most complicated and controversial issue of all.⁶⁹ As a matter of fact, Young points out to the Sovietisation of Eastern Europe after 1944, as the most important event related with the beginning of the Cold War.⁷⁰

Poland was the most divisive matter of Yalta Conference, because, she was at the centre of Stalin's security concerns in Eastern Europe.⁷¹ The future of Poland in Yalta Conference was decided as the formation of a Provisional Government of National Unity which would be comprised of both Communists and non-Communists till the democratic elections, however, then, the seizure of the Communists of the Polish government changed the course of events almost forty years for Poland.⁷² But, Soviet expansionism was not limited with Poland in Eastern Europe, because, Stalin, knowing the destruction and devastation of the war, always aimed to win maximum gain for minimum commitment, and assigned his sources in order to form satellite sphere for the defense.⁷³

This Soviet expansionism was firstly pointed out by "Mr. X". He was George Kennan who alerted Washington about Soviet threat from Moscow. What is more, Kennan is generally considered as the architect of the containment policy

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p.38

⁶⁹ Katherine A. S. Sibley, *The Cold War*, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998, pp.25-26

⁷⁰ John W. Young, *The Longman Companion to Cold War and Detente:1941-91*, London: Longman, 1993, p.103

⁷¹ *Ibid*, p.160

⁷² Sibley, *op. cit.*, p.6

⁷³ Lerche, Jr., *op. cit.*, p.50

which soon came to mean a kind of generalized resistance to Communism.⁷⁴ He believed that if the West was vigilant and adroit, there would be no reason to lose the Cold War through the measures such as Truman Doctrine or Marshall Plan.⁷⁵ However, Kennan was criticized by journalist Walter Lippmann who coined the term “Cold War”. He claimed these policies as an obstacle in the possibility of a solution of the issues.⁷⁶

It should be also mentioned that the divergence between Soviet Russia and the West became evident in 1946 with Churchill’s Iron Curtain speech in which he notified Soviet expansionism dividing Europe into two.⁷⁷ Therefore, in order to prevent Communist threat from the whole Continent, it was necessary to take serious measures for the United States. The Truman Doctrine was issued in order to protect the southern parts of Europe, especially for Greece and Turkey, in same vein, the Marshall Plan was aimed to prevent the intervention of the Communists to European economies and, finally, through establishing NATO, the United States targeted to protect European territory with a militarial organization against Soviet threat.⁷⁸ In this sense, the terms of the treaty indicated that United States was determined to stay in Europe with the intension of defending its new allies in the Western Europe in the case of a Soviet attack. Hence, while the North Atlantic Treaty was accepted in 1949, by the time 1952, it was transformed into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which was soon appreciated as the key element of American foreign policy.⁷⁹

What was so striking was that the Soviet response to these formations was not delayed. Soviet Russia responded to the Marshall Plan with the Molotov Plan

⁷⁴ Nikolai V. Sivachev and Nikolai N. Yakovle, *Russia and the United States: US-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point of View*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979, pp.226-227

⁷⁵ Sibley, *op. cit.*, p.30

⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.3

⁷⁷ Kissinger (b), *op. cit.*, p.442

⁷⁸ Hubert S. Gibbs, “Containment: Europe and the United States”, in Andrew Gyorgy, Hubert S. Gibbs, Robert S. Jordan (eds), *Problems in International Relations*, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1970, p.125

⁷⁹ Lerche, Jr., *op. cit.*, pp.83-84

in 1947 by starting a series of trade agreements with the states in the Eastern Europe, also with Council for Mutual Economic Aid (Comecon) in 1949 by asserting an economic sphere in the eastern part of the Continent.⁸⁰ In addition to that, it is vital to cite that in 1947, Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was formed through intention of unity against American “imperialism” and it was evaluated by the West as an occasion for the Soviets in order to expand the ideas of the revolution. Until 1955, Cominform was operational as the principal formation for Eastern bloc political cooperation.⁸¹ But what was the most important of all was the formation of the Warsaw Pact in May 1955 on the leadership of the USSR. The USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and Albania signed the “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Aid” which established the Warsaw Pact. Besides, the expansion of the treaty into East Germany in 1956 and by other treaties of 1956-57 that paved the way for Soviet Russia to base its troops in the Eastern Europe.⁸²

It was true that by the time Second World War ended, the Red Army occupied Albania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary and, more strikingly, by 1948, all these states formed communist regimes which were perceived as a menace by the United States.⁸³ Thus, what it was seen as a precaution by the West in order to prevent for further Russian expansionism in Europe was the formation of the NATO at the outset of the Cold War. But, neither the Cold War, nor the limits of the NATO was only restricted in Europe. According to Lerche, Jr., a complete answer regarding the scope of the Cold War should be “everywhere”.⁸⁴ As a matter of fact, the Korean War (1950-1953), was accepted as the best indicator of the Cold War as the Far Eastern

⁸⁰ James E. Cronin, *The World the Cold War Made: Order, Chaos, and the Return of History*, New York & London: Routledge, 1996, p.43

⁸¹ Young, *op. cit.*, p.209

⁸² *Ibid*, p.211

⁸³ Diller, *op. cit.*, p.59

⁸⁴ Lerche, Jr., *op. cit.*, p.76

aspect.⁸⁵ To Mastny's way of thinking, Stalin, initially, could not succeed to evaluate the role of NATO, however, then, by observing the military gains of this organization in the Korean War and experiencing the inclusion of West Germany in the US-built defense system, he became more prudent. After the death of Stalin, his successor, Nikita Khrushchev, decided to establish the Warsaw Pact "as a mirror image of NATO".⁸⁶

According to Wolfe, the Warsaw Pact was established in order to negotiate with NATO, and as one expert mentioned, "on the basis of two 'equal' European security organizations". In addition to that, to his way of thinking, in its early years of the Pact, it was seemed to carry a symbolic political role than its cooperative military aspects. Two major bodies, Political Consultative Committee and Joint Command, were intended for the preparation of effective defense in the case of an armed attack.⁸⁷ Besides, according to Russian point of view, the Warsaw Pact was evaluated as a security provider not only for the USSR, but also for the other members of the Pact. As a matter of fact, a Soviet Marshal stated that "The might of the Soviet army is a reliable safeguard of world peace, a reliable guarantee of the security of our Motherland's borders, a guarantee of the security of the fraternal socialist states".⁸⁸

What was more, until 1989, the terms "Warsaw Pact doctrine" and "Soviet doctrine" were accepted as synonymous and Warsaw Pact military doctrine was formed by Soviet domination.⁸⁹ In this context, it should be mentioned that the "military doctrine" signifies the views and concerns accepted by the state regarding the political appraisal of the war, the attitude towards war, the measures

⁸⁵ Richard Crockatt, *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991*, London and New York: Routledge, 1995, pp.100-108

⁸⁶ Vojtech Mastny, "Learning from the Enemy – NATO as a Model for the Warsaw Pact" in Gustav Schmidt (ed), *A History of NATO – The First Fifty Years (Volume 2)*, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp.158-159

⁸⁷ Thomas W. Wolfe, *Soviet Strategy at the Crossroads*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, The Rand Corporation, 1965, p.211

⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.213

⁸⁹ Susan L. Clark, "New Thinking on Security Issues" in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann, Robbin F. Laird (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev*, New York: Aldine De Gruyter, Inc., 1991, p.545

that entail for the readiness of the country economically and spiritually in the case of a war, the obstacles in the preparation of the armed forces, and the methods for conducting war, therefore briefly, this is the officially approved system of concepts concerning the fundamental problems related to the war.⁹⁰ By relying on this explanation, Garthoff said that Soviet military (and political) doctrine was based on a military model of political relations which was constructed on the basis of the Bolshevik conflict-image of the world. This direct application of this “combat frame of reference” to both internal and international relations, approving only perpetual struggle for the annihilation of the other, was the product of Bolshevik revolution. Therefore, according to Garthoff, Soviet political strategy can not be understood without grasping this harsh fact. So, this militarial idea which was established on the view of destroy or be destroyed, surrounded all Soviet politics, more broadly, all Soviet life.⁹¹ Moreover, the Soviet world-view endorsed entirely Clausewitz’s idea that “War is the continuation of politics by other means”, because, Lenin stressed this view many times.⁹² In Dziak’s words, according to Soviet point of view, war and its related doctrine and strategy formed political acts undertaken for political aims.⁹³ Besides, the Soviet Russia implied in the Soviet doctrine that in the case of a probable war with the West, this would take place on the vast territories.⁹⁴ Therefore, what this concern caused was the formation of the mobilization measures. To Yurechko’s way of thinking, the Soviets took premobilization and mobilization measures in the case of crisis situations after the finish of the Second World War. For example, the forces deployed in order to provide direct support to crush the revolts in the Eastern Europe.⁹⁵ Thus, the Warsaw Pact was used as the key element in order to realize

⁹⁰ Sokolovskii, *op. cit.*, p.130

⁹¹ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1953, p.9

⁹² *Ibid*, p.10

⁹³ John J. Dziak, *Soviet Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice*, New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1981, p.2

⁹⁴ N.A., *Sovyet Askeri Gücü*, Ankara: Barok Ofset Matbaacılık, 1987, p.15

⁹⁵ John J. Yurechko, “Soviet Reinforcement and Mobilization Issues”, in Jeffrey Simon (eds), *NATO & Warsaw Pact Force Mobilization*, Washington, DC.: The National Defense University Press, 1988, p.69

these goals of the Soviets throughout the Cold War. The military actions of this pact in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 in the name of the protection of the ruling Communist parties could be given as the striking instances in this sense.⁹⁶ When we examine the late periods of Cold War, we again see the army actively. In the latter half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union tried to expand the scale and scope of its military interventions in the Third World, supporting Cuban troops in interventions in the Civil War in Angola in 1975 and the war between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1977, and Vietnamese troops in the invasion of Cambodia in 1978. Then, in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan as one of the most dramatic events.⁹⁷ All above mentioned amounts to the fact that, the Warsaw Pact in especially Eastern Europe, and the Russian army in the Third World conflicts served for Russian political aims.

But what was the most prominent issue in the Cold War period was the nuclear escalation between the United States and the Soviet Russia. The increasing nuclearisation of relations between the NATO and the Soviet dominated Warsaw Pact began to escalate with the production of a large Soviet build-up of SS-20 missiles and the US deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and Pershing II missiles to Europe.⁹⁸ But the seeds of this escalation goes back to the creation of NATO and US threat perception at the beginning of the Cold War. The concept of “shield and sword” emerged in US President Truman’s mind that meant advancing the allied armies, the “shield” to the fore, and US’s striking with the atomic “sword”. Therefore, in 1949, Truman called the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and demanded an elaborate report of the plans in the case of an atomic war against the Soviet Russia. Following these days, Truman also requested that atomic weapons should be increased that would cause NATO to be a huge military machine at the end, with the expectation that

⁹⁶ Clark, *op. cit.*, p.554

⁹⁷ Andrew Bennett, *Condemned To Repetition? The Rise, Fall and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism 1973-1996*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: MIT Press, 1999, p.1

⁹⁸ Andrew Butfoy, *Common Security and Strategic Reform: A Critical Analysis*, Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan; New York: St.Martin’s Press, 1997, p.3

Soviet atomic bomb would not come before 1952.⁹⁹ At this point, when Soviet insight was inquired, it was seen that Stalin had no direct defence against a US nuclear monopoly at the outset of the Cold War, however, then, he gave maximum priority to the development of nuclear weapons as a response to the US.¹⁰⁰ By 1953, the Soviet Russia developed its own atomic weapons, and in addition to that, was trying to develop thermo-nuclear breakthrough and long-range rockets. In this sense, what Crockatt emphasizes is that the increasing gap between Soviet military doctrine for that it has a conventional character and a slow pace, and the nuclear arms race because of its rapid tempo.¹⁰¹

The course of the relations with the West began to change with the death of Stalin and the start of a new era with Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev. Through “de-Stalinization” process, hostile manner towards the West was melted in some scale.¹⁰² Because, according to Dallin, the Soviets were affected by the possibility of the destructive nature of nuclear war with the United States and this fear caused to the Soviet commitment to “peaceful coexistence” and for taking disarmament measures. Yet, not all of the parts of the society were moderate. Some Soviet leaders were still looking for the way to change the world balance via developing new Soviet military technology, while others claimed that it was necessary for the Soviet Union to improve its relative power position in order to prevent the United States’s abusing its military power for political ascendancy.¹⁰³ What all these debates displayed us was that there was a divergence within the top officials when it came to “serious” issues, thus, it was very difficult to predict the “real” Soviet approach to the matters.

In the period of Khrushchev, although there were intensions concerning “peaceful coexistence”, the two superpowers tried to expand their powers in the

⁹⁹ Sivachev and Yakovle, *op. cit.*, pp.227-228

¹⁰⁰ J.P.D. Dunbabin, *The Cold War: The Great Powers and Their Allies*, London: Longman Group, 1994, p.156

¹⁰¹ Crockatt, *op. cit.*, p.149

¹⁰² Diller, *op. cit.*, p.64

¹⁰³ Alexander Dallin, *The Soviet Union and Disarmament: An Appraisal of Soviet Attitudes and Intensions*, New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1964, p.92

Third World.¹⁰⁴ Because, local powers demanded the support of the United States and the USSR to provide their own security concerns in the framework of superpower rivalry. Therefore, according to Buzan, Waeber and de Wilde, the two super powers defined their securities in the global scale.¹⁰⁵ So, this claim is vital for us to understand the mentalities of both the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War years.

Throughout the Cold War period there were times when “peaceful coexistence” or “detente” were on the agenda of the two superpowers. However, referring to Crockatt, it could be mentioned that “detente”, in the Brezhnev era, emerged out of the competitive nature of super power relations, and, even on the surface “detente” was seen, competition remained to be a key attribute of those relations in the basis, and, in addition to that, according to him, the global level conditions entailed this process such as Sino-Soviet dissent in mid-1960s which at the end caused Soviet perception of China as a threat from the East.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, Vladimir Petrov emphasizes that stagnation of the Soviet economy was another factor together with the threat from the East for the Soviet evaluation of “detente”, while the failure in Vietnam and decline of support for an activist foreign policy in the country necessitated this process for the United States. What this concerns resulted was the sign of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) between the Soviet Union and the United States in 1972, eventhough there were also some Soviet anxieties concerning the possibility of the breakup of the Warsaw Pact Organization, the escalation of Sino-Soviet hostility and American playing the “Chinese card” against the Soviet Union, or fear regarding serious internal crisis causing to the weakening of the Soviet state. In such cases, some Soviet leaders thought that the “imperialists” would be vigilant to impose “freedom” and “democracy” in Russia.¹⁰⁷ Thus, this Soviet fear obviously reflects the gap

¹⁰⁴ Crockatt, *op. cit.*, pp.173-176

¹⁰⁵ Barry Buzan, Ole Waeber, Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers Inc., 1998, p.64

¹⁰⁶ Crockatt, *op. cit.*, pp.207-211

¹⁰⁷ Vladimir Petrov, *U.S.-Soviet Detente: Past and Future*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (Foreign Affairs Studies), 1975, pp.3-11

between the Soviet Russia and the West in terms of Russian perception of the United States as a potential enemy in any cases.

However, according to Kissinger, what was the most prominent issue in Brezhnev era was Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) due to the fact its ultimate results. Because, the final acts of this conference made the Soviet manner more moderate in Europe and accelerated the fall of the USSR in the short-term. Both Poland and Czechoslovakia benefited from this agreement and ultimately abolished the communist regimes in their countries.¹⁰⁸ Finally, it can be commented that both “peaceful coexistence” and “detente” could not make fundamental changes in the course of the relations of the US and the USSR. Instead, it can be said that the great effort came from Mikhail Gorbachev when he came to power in 1985.

2.4.Gorbachev and New Military Doctrine

First of all, it is vital to mention that when Gorbachev came to power in mid-1980s, there was a change in the realm of security to define it in broader and broader terms.¹⁰⁹ Thus, Gorbachev evaluated the situation of the Soviet Union on the global scale and re-appraised the enemies of the country in the framework of this wind of change in the security.

What was more, he was also aware of the economic and militarial issues of the Soviet Union and the need for reforms. It was a common approval that his policies of perestroika, glasnost, and the “new thinking” on foreign policy were the consequences of this need to improve the economic situation of the country.¹¹⁰ Besides, he also saw the hellish situation of the military.¹¹¹ As a matter of fact, in militarial terms, the results of the “new political thinking” were that the United

¹⁰⁸ Kissinger (b), *op. cit.*, Chapter 29

¹⁰⁹ Butfoy, *op. cit.*, p.7

¹¹⁰ Colin S. Gray, “The Soviet Threat in the 1990s”, in Frederic J. Fleron, Jr., Erik P. Hoffmann, Robbin F. Laird (eds), *Contemporary Issues in Soviet Foreign Policy From Brezhnev to Gorbachev*, New York: Adline De Gruyter, Inc., 1991, p.788

¹¹¹ Roger R. Reese, *The Soviet Military Experience*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000, p.163

States was effectively deterred, and that the USSR reduced the investment on strategic nuclear forces.¹¹²

However, it should be also mentioned that the Russian leaders had always been aware of the fact that it was necessary the existence of a sole and central relentless authority in order to stop the invasions and therefore what Gorbachev took over was this mentality and Yuri Andropov as the predecessor of Gorbachev had ruled the KGB according to this tradition too. By considering this fact, he thought that the menace was coming not only from external wealthy Western powers but also from internal problems.¹¹³ So, as he was prudent concerning the vulnerability of the country at the outset of his rule, he also grasped the need for the reforms. But these reforms ultimately caused to the dissolution of the country in the short term.

According to Dunbabin, Gorbachev era should be splitted into two. Because, until 1987, Gorbachev had let the rise of the defence spending, but, then he quitted this approach and turned towards shifting the military away from its traditional offensive character into his new concept of “reasonable sufficiency” and he decided to reduce Soviet conventional superiority.¹¹⁴ By 1987, he swung towards a brand new political strategy which stressed political liberalization instead of the tightening of authoritarian controls.¹¹⁵ Until Gorbachev, the sense of insecurity from the West became an official policy of the Soviet Union, therefore, very strict control was maintained over Eastern Europe, and in the Third World. But, with Gorbachev, these entrenched feelings regarding insecurity seemed to be changing, and increasing confidence in the resilience of the Soviet system occurred. Thus, what was observed was that the peerless openness of the Soviet press and debates on economic, social, and political problems of the Soviet system.¹¹⁶ In addition to that, Gorbachev let to the discussion of military doctrine.

¹¹² Franklyn Griffiths, “Current Soviet Military Doctrine”, in Murray Feshbach (ed) *National Security Issues of the USSR*, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 249

¹¹³ Cem Akaş, Sevin Okyay, *Gorbaçov'un Rusya'sı*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995, p.46

¹¹⁴ Dunbabin, *op. cit.*, p.186

¹¹⁵ Dawisha, Parrott, *op. cit.*, p.18

¹¹⁶ Marantz, *op.cit.*, p.123

According to Clark, this was a monumental change, because, throughout the Soviet history, Soviet military was the sole power for having a role in the debates regarding security policy, doctrine, and military-technical issues and although military officers outnumbered the civilians in the debates, this was a very important endeavour.¹¹⁷

Besides, at the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress in 1986, he said that the preservation of security should be seen as a political task via political means and cited “security can not be built *ad infinitum* on the fear of retribution - that is, on the doctrines of “containment” or “deterrence””. He also added at the congress that such security could only be “mutual” between the Soviet Union and the United States and ultimately “universal” when the new thinking was understood properly on the global scale. What was more, two new concepts occurred in the presidency of Gorbachev: “reasonable sufficiency” and “defensive (or “non-offensive”) defense”.¹¹⁸

According to Shaposhnikov, in the nuclear-space era, the world became too fragile for war and by understanding this truth, new concept of a demilitarized world emerged. In this context, reciprocity, equality, and mutual security became the key concepts in order to provide international stability and peace. Therefore, the main provisions of this idea were implied in the new Soviet Military Doctrine in 1987. What was striking was that for the first time in history, it was said that the prominent political objective in militarial terms was the task of preventing world war, either nuclear or conventional.¹¹⁹ Christoph Bluth in his book is explaining that by 1987, the following constituted the fundamental principles of Soviet Military doctrine:

- 1)The prevention of war is the most fundamental objective of Soviet military doctrine.
- 2)No war can be considered the continuation of politics.
- 3)Security is mutual.

¹¹⁷ Clark, *op.cit.*, p.545

¹¹⁸ Donald R. Kelley, “Gorbachev’s ‘New Political Thinking’ and Soviet National Security Policy”, in Sylvia Woodby, Alfred B. Evans, Jr. (eds), *Restructuring Soviet Ideology: Gorbachev’s New Thinking*, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1990, pp.137-139

¹¹⁹ Evgeni Shaposhnikov, “The Armed Forces: To a New Quality”, in Teresa Pelton Johnson, Steven E. Miller (eds), *Russian Security After the Cold War: Seven Views from Moscow*, Massachusetts: Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harward University, 1994, p.188

- 4)The primary means of enhancing security are political and not military-technical.
- 5)Not only the political means of security, but also the military-technical means should be “defensive in character”.
- 6)Soviet armed forces should be developed on the basis of the principle of “reasonable sufficiency”.¹²⁰

In this context, there were debates regarding the meaning of “reasonable sufficiency”. What Bluth says is that the notion of “reasonable sufficiency” should be understood as a principle for the unilateral restructuring of Soviet forces. He also claims that it was tried to be constructed in the light of Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika policies.¹²¹

In this point, it should be also mentioned that although it seemed to be a change in Russian security perception on the surface, the suspicion continued mutually. Because, eventhough the claim that the Cold War finished in fact when Gorbachev came to power¹²², to Mueller’s way of thinking, the Cold War was in real about the ideas and finished when the Soviet empire collapsed.¹²³ From Soviet point of view, continuity of socialism was still the purpose. As a matter of fact, in 1987, USSR defense minister, D. I. Iazov stated “Our military doctrine constitutes a system of fundamental views on the prevention of war, military construction, preparation of one’s country and its armed forces to repel aggression, and the methods of waging armed struggle in defense of socialism.”¹²⁴

From the West’s point of view, essayist Frank Carlucci stated that although there were reform initiatives by Gorbachev, the Soviet Union seemed to be a huge militarial power and nothing changed under Gorbachev’s rule. In addition to that, the Soviet Union agreed on the Intermediate-range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in 1987, and in 1988, Gorbachev declared his unilateral arms cuts. However, referring to Carlucci, Mueller says that these measures still left the USSR with a massive military power. They were accepted as important indicators

¹²⁰ Christoph Bluth (a), *The Collapse of Soviet Military Power*, Aldershot and Brookfield: Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited, 1995, p.82

¹²¹ *Ibid*, pp.84-85

¹²² Butfoy, *op.cit.*, p.57

¹²³ John Mueller, “What Was the Cold War About? Evidence from Its Ending”, *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 119 No.4, 2004-05, p.609

¹²⁴ Richard F. Staar, *Foreign Policies of the Soviet Union*, California: Hoover Press, 1991, p.135

for Gorbachev's sincerity, but, with the long-term intension, it was believed that these measures made the country more dangerous adversary for the West and Soviet Union was not accepted as a partner.¹²⁵ Moreover, it was believed that Russian culture, geography, and the components of imperial rule would prevent the radical transformation of the USSR as a player in world politics.¹²⁶

It was so clear that the military had been the only centre to determine the security policy and the doctrine of the Soviet Union throughout its history. What was more, in real, until August 1991, Soviet armed forces sustained its reliability. However, the famous policies of Gorbachev – glasnost and perestroika- shattered the Party's control of the army and Defense Minister Marshal Dmitrii Yazov intended to dethrone Gorbachev while anti-coup officers declined to build the old order. What this resulted was that the collapse of the communist regime and the dissolution of the USSR. However, all these events indicated the formation of reduced but still militarily powerful Russian Federation in Boris Yeltsin's presidency.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Mueller, *op. cit.*, pp.621-622

¹²⁶ Gray, *op.cit.*, p.788

¹²⁷ Richard B. Spence, "Servants or Masters? The Military in the "New Russia"", in Constantine P. Danopoulos and Daniel Zirker (eds), *Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, pp.14-15

CHAPTER 3

THE SECURITY PERCEPTION AND THE MILITARY DOCTRINE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDER YELTSIN

It is so obvious that the break-up of the USSR has affected the balances of power and the security mentality in the world by causing to the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War also marked the end of the bipolar world. The Russian Federation needed to understand that it was not a great power anymore, and, moreover, Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact was dissolved. At first glance, it seemed that the crash of the Communist regime abolished the direct military aggression against Russia and the United States and NATO were not perceived as threats for the Russian Federation in the framework of the search for the new identity, national interests and determining new threats.

However, then, pains and fears concerning transition period and the definition of its new missions of NATO compelled Russia to re-define its interests and identity in the new world order. Moreover, with the draft of Russia's official military doctrine in 1992, it identified the "main threat" as that which derived from "some states and coalitions" by meaning the United States and NATO.

In this vein, the main aim of this chapter is to analyze the changing security environment and its new agenda and of course, the issues of the Russian Federation in the transition period regarding defining its new identity and interests in the post-Cold War era. In the light of these developments, it tried to constitute its new military doctrine and thus, it should be inquired carefully in order to understand if the United States and NATO still constituted the "main threat" to Russia and its security. In brief, it is intended to explore if there is a change in the security insight of the Russian Federation as the successor of the Soviet Union in the presidency of Boris Yeltsin in this chapter.

3.1.Changing Security Environment In the New World Order

The end of the Cold War unraveled the defense of the traditionalist position of the security studies, because the military and nuclear fears of the Cold War had made this field restricted. However, this “narrow” character of the security studies began to widen with the rise of economic and environmental issues in 1970s and 1980s and identity issues and transnational crime in 1990s.¹²⁸ Instead of an integrated global security environment which was constructed via the bipolar confrontation, number of actual and potential regional controversies, conflicts occurred in post-Cold War era. In this context, the post-Soviet security area splitted into several relatively independent geostrategic regions such as Russia with its own security problems, Baltic countries, Ukraine and Moldova, the South Caucasus and the Central Asia.¹²⁹ In other words, the traditional security agenda with alliances, the distribution of military power and arms races has evolved into a new security agenda. But, according to Freedman, what was vital in this point was that as the old security agenda seemed to be lost its importance, it did not suddenly evaporate and began to be recast in order to meet the needs of the post-Cold War world.¹³⁰

During the Cold War, it was necessary for both super powers to mobilize an alliance and sustain its coherence. If everthing went as it was planned, it meant mutual deterrence. But to Freedman’s way of thinking, it was a security dilemma, because, one side’s military provisions, in spite of defensively planned, could emerge offensively to the other side. Moreover, this stance forced to make compensating provisions, leading to a similar response by the first. Thus, this was described as the vicious cycle which meant an arms race and this arms race was thought as the threat to the stability of mutual deterrence.¹³¹ But, with the end of

¹²⁸ Buzan, Waever and de Wilde, *op.cit.*, p.2

¹²⁹ Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia, “Regional Security for Russia, the Caucasus, and Central Asia: Going from Zero-Sum to Positive-Sum Policies”, in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia (eds), *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.249

¹³⁰ Lawrence Freedman, “The New Great Power Politics”, in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold (eds), *Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.21

¹³¹ *Ibid*, p.23

the Cold War, it was observed the end of the Warsaw Pact and new definition of the mission of the NATO. In this sense, when the two Germanies unified, this meant the loss of the Warsaw Pact's utility to the USSR. Therefore, it became no longer a viable military alliance and in the period of Yeltsin, there were no Russian troops in the Eastern Europe meaning the dissolution of the Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact.¹³² Besides, there came the questions about the opposite alliance of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, concerning if it would sustain its existence, and if it could; what would be its new military strategy in the framework of threat perceptions and if it would include the former members of the Warsaw Pact and the Russian Federation.¹³³

The break-up of the USSR formed historic opportunities and historic dangers. The abandonment of Marxism-Leninism and the democratization process in Russia, Ukraine, and other newly independent states of the Soviet Union displayed the chance of a global cooperation through destroying the hostilities of the Cold War. However, the other side of the coin showed serious instability and conflicts in the new states.¹³⁴ Moreover, relatively stable regions through the Cold War balances, the Balkans and the Caucasus, has transformed into the areas of conflict in 1990s such as Nagorno-Karabakh, Osetia and Chechnya in the Caucasus and the parts of Yugoslavia in the Balkans.¹³⁵

It is a real fact that the Russian Federation has inherited a ruined agriculture, primitive social infrastructure, a backward economy, a devastated environment, and a demographically threatened population.¹³⁶ Therefore, we see the importance of non-traditional security problems for Russia. In this context, it is vital to say that the increase of non-traditional threats is to some extent inherited from the Communist past, however, it is also the result of new global, regional,

¹³² Petro and Rubinstein, *op.cit.*, p.183

¹³³ Mustafa Kibaroglu, "Rusya'nın Yeni Ulusal Güvenlik Konsepti ve Askeri Doktrini", *Avrasya Dosyası Rusya Özel*, Vol.6 No.4, Winter 2001, p.96

¹³⁴ Dawisha and Parrott, *op.cit.*, p.1

¹³⁵ Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, p.96

¹³⁶ Zbigniew Brzezinski (b), *The Geostrategic Triad: Living With China, Europe, and Russia*, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press, 2001, p.56

and local factors that appeared in the 1990s.¹³⁷ However, not only non-traditional security problems, but also traditional security issues such as the integrity of the state became an important character of Russian security perception in this new world order. Therefore, what Freedman emphasizes in his article is that the elusive character of both the new agenda and old agenda for both Russia and its neighbours.¹³⁸

Besides, according to Katzenstein, the dissolution of the USSR made impacts not only in its security insight but also in the political and intellectual debates on the global scale.¹³⁹ As a matter of fact, what Chanaa stresses is that the end of the Cold War made an important reorienting of the security priorities of the Western states and civil conflicts, religious and ethnic problems, economic and environmental issues began to be discussed broadly.¹⁴⁰ In addition to that, diversion and illegal export of nuclear and missile materials, technologies, and expertise, drug trafficking and organized crime and international terrorism has taken their places as the non-traditional threats in the security debates.¹⁴¹ But, what was more important was that the growing importance and lasting feature of the traditional threats in the Russian security insight in the post-Cold War era. In order to determine the certain decision on security issues, there were debates in the country about the new identity and national interests, thus, in the successive title, it is vital to scrutinize these issues in order to grasp Russian security insight in the presidency of Yeltsin.

¹³⁷ Irina D. Zviagelskaia and Vitali V. Naumkin, "Non-Traditional Threats, Challenges, and Risks in the Former Soviet South" in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia (eds), *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.226

¹³⁸ Freedman, *op.cit.*, p.21

¹³⁹ Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security", in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed) *The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics*, USA: Columbia University Press, 1996, pp.8-9

¹⁴⁰ Jane Chanaa, "Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects", *Adelphi Paper 344*, Oxford: Oxford University Press: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002, p.15

¹⁴¹ Alexander A. Pikayev, Elena N. Nikitina, and Vladimir Kotov, "Harmful Legacies and Dangerous Weaknesses", in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold (eds), *Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, pp.210-211

3.2.Problems in the Definition of New Identity and the Clash of National Interests

First of all, it is necessary to state that the definition of identity is very connected with the definition of security. As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde indicate their books, “if Russia is defined by Slavophiles or Euro-Asianists, several issues will constitute security problems that would not be considered such if Russia defined itself in a Western way”.¹⁴² Thus, the search of the new identity of Russians was important in order to re-define the limits of new security understanding of Russia with the West, newly independent states and other countries in the new world order, after the end of the Cold War.

In fact, the picture for both the Russian Federation and the West in the new world order was dubious. However, there was a common approval that in the last period of the Soviet Union and the early days of the Russian Federation, the concept of the “enemy of the Cold War” seemed to be vanishing. Because, the re-definition of Soviet security interests in the period of Gorbachev in the mid-1980s had aspired to form a new collective identity in which a critical part of the Soviet leadership no longer perceived the West as the “other”. But according to Herman, through the Strategic Nuclear Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) and the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) the Soviet leaders did not imply the possibility of the USSR’s unilaterally dropping out of the arms race, but meant intensions regarding taking place in the community of democratic states. What was striking in this point for Herman was that even the important disarmament treaties were not enough to overcome the divergence between the East and the West.¹⁴³ Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union the split continued to be the case, however, what was more important was that the Russian Federation had to cope with the problems in re-defining its new identity. Because, it would affect the course of the relations between the West and the Russian Federation in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, the Russians gave a priority to re-defining its new identity after the loss of the Russian empire and “former Soviet space”.

¹⁴² Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde, *op.cit.*, p.120

¹⁴³ Robert G. Herman, “Identity, Norms, and National Security: The Soviet Foreign Policy Revolution and the End of the Cold War”, in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed) *The Culture of National Security Norms and Identity in World Politics*, USA: Columbia University Press, 1996, p.304

In this context, it is vital to mention that the majority of the Russians welcomed the proclamation about the sovereignty in June 1990, because they had suffered from socialism and as a result of this regime from the economic conditions. But, the loss of the empire was not understandable for the Russians.¹⁴⁴ Russian political elites were also confused about what constitutes the Russian nation and state. Because, Russians remained uncertain concerning their boundaries, its future shape and its relations with the newly independent states. Thus, the lack of a coherent, obvious and generally accepted national identity remained to be a problem in the 1990s.¹⁴⁵ Most Russians found it difficult both the loss of empire and the separation from other successor states. Light referring to Roy Allison stresses that it was also hard for the Russian leadership to abandon the control of the “former Soviet space”.¹⁴⁶ Because, the identity of Russia and the idea of Russian statehood have always converged with the existence of an empire and as Light emphasizes; “there has never been a Russian nation-state”.¹⁴⁷ In spite of official explanations about not re-establishing dominance over newly independent states, it was very difficult for the Russian leaders to negotiate as equals with new independent political elites of these countries. Therefore, referring to John Lough, Kozhemiakin and Kanet says that this was a monumental psychological issue of “redefining Russia’s statehood and establishing a new concept of Russian identity”.¹⁴⁸ As a result of this perception, the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) can be evaluated as an endeavour to form a new Russian-dominated Centre by Moscow.¹⁴⁹ In this regard, the CIS was formed at the meeting in Minsk in December 1991 with the aim of protecting

¹⁴⁴ Light (a), *op.cit.*, p.35

¹⁴⁵ Ronald Grigor Suny, “Russia’s Identity Crisis”, in Archie Brown (ed) *Contemporary Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.364

¹⁴⁶ Margot Light (b), “Post-Soviet Russian Foreign Policy: The First Decade”, in Archie Brown (ed) *Contemporary Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.422

¹⁴⁷ Light (a), *op.cit.*, p.36

¹⁴⁸ Alexander V. Kozhemiakin and Roger E. Kanet, “Russia and its Western Neighbours in the “Near Abroad””, in Alexander V. Kozhemiakin and Roger E. Kanet (eds) *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1997, p.29

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p.29

the relations of the members of the former Soviet Union, except for the Baltic states, after the dissolution of the USSR.¹⁵⁰ As a matter of fact, the CIS was seen as a main political and economic mechanism to secure the republic's dominant position in the former Soviet space by the Russians, whereas, it was perceived as a mechanism for accommodating "the imperial encroachments of the self-styled successor of the USSR-Russia" by the Ukraine's nationalist movement, Rukh.¹⁵¹ Therefore, we see the importance of the former Soviet space for the Russians and it was hard to believe the loss of the empire. In this point, another sample which is related to the Russians' reaction to the loss of empire can be displayed through the impressions of Ryszard Kapuscinski. While he was evaluating the transition period of the country, he indicated that nearly all Russians, even the liberals or the educated ones, could not accept the loss of the empire by believing the former geographic boundaries of the Soviet Union and still accepting the newly independent states as their "own".¹⁵²

By relying on these stances, it can be said that the transition period in the framework of a search for new identity for Russia was very painful. It was very difficult to admit the loss of the status of "great power" and the empire. Therefore, the debates about the national interests of Russia developed with these concerns. In addition to that, the re-definition of identity had political, emotional, psychological and irrational dimensions. Because, according to Adomeit, the loss of its sphere of influence in the Central and Eastern Europe and the appearance of the newly independent states affected the debates about new identity, national interests and the limits of the new security insight of the Russian Federation.¹⁵³

¹⁵⁰ Christoph Bluth (b), "Russian Military Forces and Reform", in Mike Bowker, Cameron Ross (eds) *Russia After the Cold War*, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000, p.227

¹⁵¹ Kozhemiakin and Kanet, *op.cit.*, p.29

¹⁵² Ryszard Kapuscinski, "A Normal Life", *Time*, Vol.147 Issue 22, 5/27/96, p.69

¹⁵³ Hannes Adomeit, "Russian National Security Interests", in Roy Allison and Christoph Bluth (eds) *Security Dilemmas in Russia and Eurasia*, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1998, p.23

Shearman in his article mentions that the term national interest refers to “the common good of a society within the bounds of a nation-state”.¹⁵⁴ It is also necessary to mention that almost every country is sensitive about its geography, history, culture, ethnic and political situation while determining its national interests. Moreover, to Stankevich’s way of thinking, basic interests like survival of the state, prosperity and security are common values for all countries.¹⁵⁵ Naturally, we may think that these concerns were also substantial for Russia in determining its national interests after the Cold War. However, Kissinger, in this point, is very sensitive regarding special Russian concerns about identity, interests and security. According to him, a country which had never a friendly neighbour, had a changing borders throughout its history and which had never obviously determined about security concerns should be analysed carefully.¹⁵⁶ What Stankevich also stresses in his article is that Russia is a borderline civilization, located between Europe and Asia.¹⁵⁷ Moreover, to Kissinger’s way of thinking, this exclusive character of Russia is very important in order to understand the Russian insight. According to Kissinger and as it was indicated in the previous chapter, Russians had an understandable anxiety for the security due to the fact that living in a geography without natural boundaries.¹⁵⁸ Therefore, losing the former Soviet space constituted political and psychological problems for the Russians. Thus, determining the new identity and as a result of this, designating the security concerns, became very important for the Russians.

In this sense, high officials from the government, parliamentarians, famous experts on politics and international relations and even the foreign experts have

¹⁵⁴ Peter Shearman, “Defining the National Interest: Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics”, in Roger E. Kanet and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin (eds) *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, London: Macmillan, 1997, p.1

¹⁵⁵ Sergei B. Stankevich, “Toward a New “National Idea””, in Stephen Sestanovich (ed) *Rethinking Russia’s National Interests (Significant Issues Series)*, Vol. XVI No.1, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994, p.24

¹⁵⁶ Henry Kissinger (c), “Russian and American Interests After the Cold War”, in Stephen Sestanovich (ed) *Rethinking Russia’s National Interests (Significant Issues Series)*, Vol. XVI No.1, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994, p.3

¹⁵⁷ Stankevich, *op. cit.*, p.25

¹⁵⁸ Kissinger (c), *op.cit.*, p.3, see also Chapter 2: “Imperial Legacy”

taken place on debates concerning national interests of Russia after the disintegration.¹⁵⁹ However, it is necessary to say that in the late 1980s, the former Orthodox Communists became Slavophiles aiming to restore traditional Russian statehood, as the Social Democrats became Westerners wishing to dismantle the Soviet Empire when the Soviet Union was still alive.¹⁶⁰ Thus, the future and the way of Russia had begun to be discussed from this late Soviet period. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, when the Russian Federation tried to constitute its national security policy in the early 1990s, different views emerged according to different political, economic, and societal interests. Division emerged between the liberals who supported the idea of cooperative approach to the West, and the nationalists who saw the West as a threat.¹⁶¹ Light, in this context, discriminates between Liberal Westernizers who supported a market economy and aspired to follow pro-Western way, and Fundamentalist Nationalists who can be called with their extreme nationalism together with the dislike of economic reform in general.¹⁶²

In this general framework, Francis Fukuyama, referring to Ambassador Lukin's 1992 article, also stresses the existence of the three schools of thought in Russian debate in the early period. He emphasizes "ideologized democratic internationalism" in which universalistic values are more important than the Russian national interests as the first, stresses revanchist Russian chauvinism as the second, and the third is Russian national interest "properly understood" meaning the maximization of a nation's power and influence in order to protect its own autonomy.¹⁶³ Moreover, according to him, the debate on national interests of Russia was inevitable. Because, Marxist-Leninist ideology was no longer

¹⁵⁹ Stankevich, *op.cit.*, p.24

¹⁶⁰ A. Tsipko, "In Defense of Russian Sovereignty", *International Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy & International Relations*, Vol.49 Issue 5, 2003, p.136

¹⁶¹ Celeste A. Wallander, "Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium", *Arms Control Today*, March 2000, available on line at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/cwmr00.asp, accessed on 23.03.2005

¹⁶² Light (a), *op.cit.*, p.34

¹⁶³ Francis Fukuyama, "The Ambiguity of "National Interest"", in Stephen Sestanovich (ed) *Rethinking Russia's National Interests (Significant Issues Series)*, Vol. XVI No.1, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994, pp.10-11

available and could not define the new goals of the Russian state and more importantly, new changed borders and geopolitical position of the country made this debate necessary.¹⁶⁴ In this context, it is vital to mention that in 1992, public dislike to communist ideology, symbols, and political structure was widespread and reached to an enormous size.¹⁶⁵ But, in literature, we also see the existence of the opposite groups, supporters of the old ideology. We also know the importance of the Communist Marxist ideology for the Soviet Union. As a matter of fact, Shenfield in his article, “Post-Soviet Russia in Search of Identity”, is touchy about historical self-identification of the Russians in determining new identity and national interests and groups who only accept Soviet heritage. According to him, the Russians in the search for identity were diverged into four category. To his way of thinking, the first category of self-identification of Neo-Soviet was composed of those who accept the Soviet legacy but oppose the Tsarist heritage. The second was Archaic was composed of those who accept the Tsarist legacy but reject the Soviet heritage. The third was Statist consists of those who accept both the Tsarist and Soviet heritage and the last was Liberal who opposed the legacy of both the Tsarist and the Soviet times.¹⁶⁶

All above mentioned amounts to the fact that different views occurred in the Russian Federation concerning its new identity, the way to follow, its direction to the West or to the other alternatives, and its new status in the world. In this context, what is important for us is that whatever these names, categories, groups have taken, there was a monumental clash of national interests and problems occurred in the search for the new identity after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In such circumstances, the Russian Federation tried to constitute its new military doctrine and tried to make its stance clear on security issues. Thus, it is vital to examine its new military doctrine of 1993 in order to understand its security insight in the early period of the Russian Federation.

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p.10

¹⁶⁵ Sergei Filatov and Liudmila Vorontsova, “New Russia in Search of an Identity”, in Heyward Isham (ed) *Remaking Russia*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1995, p.278

¹⁶⁶ Stephen D. Shenfield, “Post-Soviet Russia in Search of Identity”, in Douglas W. Blum (ed), *Russia’s Future: Consolidation or Disintegration?*, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1994, p.8

3.3.New Military Doctrine(1993): A New Perception?

First of all, it is crucial to grasp if the security perception of the Russian Federation as the successor of the Soviet Union can change in such a short time in the transitional period. It was true that the Russian Federation has faced economic challenges in its early period. Russia's economic and financial dependence on the West has reached to enormous size because of massive capital flight.¹⁶⁷ Moreover, after its independence, President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev supported the idea that the country's fate was depended on the West due to the fact that its commitment to democracy and a market economy, and it is asserted that Russia's long-term economic development and security depended on cooperation with the West. Yet, this Western-oriented policy proved to be short lived because of a strict criticism from the conservatives and nationalists in the country. Thus, what Harada stresses in his article is that a wide-ranging debate emerged in Russia concerning its main direction on its foreign and security policies.¹⁶⁸ In addition to that, we should be prudent about its Soviet past on security issues. As a matter of fact, Gorbachev while evaluating the situation in Russia in April 1995, in Istanbul, in a conference, giving to an answer to a question regarding Yeltsin's policy, mentioned that the situation in Russia was connected with Stalin era, totaliter period, not connected with Yeltsin's policy directly.¹⁶⁹ Thus, in spite of newly emerged threat perceptions of the country after its independence, we may also think the lasting impacts of its totaliter past and the perception of the West as a threat on the security issues after the end of the Cold War.

As a matter of fact, the draft of Russia's official military doctrine in 1992 identified the "main threat" as that which derived from "some states and coalitions" bent on world domination, or regions in it, relying on force to settle the disputes. Therefore, according to Erickson, what was implicit in this draft

¹⁶⁷ Efim S. Khesin, "The Intersection of Economics and Politics in Russia", in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold (eds), *Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.105

¹⁶⁸ Chikahito Harada, "Russia and North-east Asia", *Adelphi Paper 310*, Oxford, Oxford University Press: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997, p.14

¹⁶⁹ Ömer Çendeoğlu and Aslihan Dinç (eds), *Gorbaçov Türkiye'de, İstanbul ve Ankara Konferansları*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1997, p.13

constituted by the General Staff was that the United States and NATO, clearly referred to “some states and coalitions”, and they were still perceived as the “main threat” to Russia and its security.¹⁷⁰ In addition to that, we also observe the efforts to sustain Soviet model army and the existence of the refusal for reforms on the security issues after its independence. However, in the political climate after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these views in favour of preserving the Soviet military model could not take part explicitly for that the danger of an indirect criticism from the President Boris Yeltsin and instead of this, they sought to prevent the discussion of the military reform in a monumental size. Thus, what Golts and Putnam emphasize in their article is that the creation of a comprehensive set of doctrines and concepts in order to answer the main issues related to defense and security policy of the Russian Federation as a precondition for these authorities.¹⁷¹ In such an environment, the Russian Federation adopted its “Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine” on 2 November 1993 which was composed of the political foundations; the military foundations; and the military-technical and economic foundations in the transitional period of Russia via stressing its new position in the new international system.¹⁷²

In this sense, we observe both non-traditional and traditional security issues in the doctrine. Because, this new military doctrine of 1993 dwelled on the Russian Federation’s concern about emerging local and regional conflicts, as well as post-Cold War security problems, such as proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and international crime. What was surprising, in spite of its draft, this military doctrine did not identify any countries as direct threats to Russian security, displaying Russia's turn from the Soviet Union's Cold War rivalry with the West. Yet, what Wallander emphasizes in his article is that confessing Russia's post-Cold War geopolitical reality and the decline in Russian military power through adopting a policy allowing Russia to use nuclear weapons

¹⁷⁰ John Erickson, “ ‘We Have Plenty To Defend Ourselves With...’: Russian Rhetoric, Russian Realism?”, in Stephen J. Cimbala (ed) *The Russian Military Into The Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 8

¹⁷¹ Golts and Putnam, *op.cit.*, pp.126-127

¹⁷² Russian Military Doctrine (1993) available on line at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>, accessed on 07.02.2005

first in an attack by a nuclear-weapon state or any country allied with a nuclear-weapon state.¹⁷³ Therefore, we see its abandonment from the obligation concerning not referring to nuclear power as the first side.¹⁷⁴ By relying on these explanations, we may also see its suspicion about the West and NATO even in the post-Cold War conditions.

Another striking point which should be taken into consideration is that its emphasis on the protection of the CIS countries. In this sense, while on the one hand the doctrine stressed respect for the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the states and non-interference in internal affairs, on the other hand it was implied that self-defence requirements and threats to allies and the Russian population living outside the Russian Federation would not be valid in these circumstances. Therefore, referring to Latter, it can be said that through this new military doctrine, the Russian Federation intended to be the policeman of the CIS and via this doctrine, it was aimed an effective Russian coercion in forcing Georgia to join the CIS.¹⁷⁵ Therefore, the importance of the former Soviet space for the Russian Federation has taken place in the new military doctrine by giving a special emphasis on the CIS.

We also observed the fear concerning the growing internal threats to the Russian Federation in this new military doctrine. Thus, instability and conflicts neighbouring the Federation or its CIS allies were considered to be a great danger and internal threats to the Russian Federation were perceived to be a growing menace. In this sense, the doctrine also dwelled on nationalism and religious intolerance as threats, in addition to a coup or rebellion, terrorism and organised crime with the commitment of the armed forces in order to struggle with these dangers.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷³ Wallander, *op.cit.* , available on line at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/cwmmr00.asp

¹⁷⁴ Osman Metin Öztürk, *Rusya Federasyonu Askeri Doktrinleri*, Ankara: Asam Yayınları, 2001, p.35

¹⁷⁵ Richard Latter, *Internal Security in Russia and its Regions* (Conference report based on Wilton Park Special Conference WPS 93/9 25-29 October 1993: "Russia and its Regions: Can the Centre Hold?", Wilton Park Paper 80), London: HMSO, 1994, p.11

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.11

It was obvious that throughout the Cold War years, the military had prepared for a large-scale war against the enemy. Like in the Cold War period, it was also assumed that in the case of an armed conflict, this could transform into a large-scale war, too. While this fear was in minds, due to the fact that the anxieties about regional conflicts, this new doctrine also intended to establish smaller and more mobile Russian military, with greater rapid deployment capability. In this regard, to Allison's way of thinking, the post-communist Russian military aimed to deal with regional conflicts in the first place. Besides, according to Allison, it was intended that the mobile forces would become an instrument *inter alia* for the armed forces in order to solve "the suppression of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of the citizens of the Russian Federation in foreign states". The third new feature which Allison indicated in his article was that the Russian Armed Forces took a new mission in order to suppress conflicts both on the Russian borders and within the Russian Federation. The last new feature which Allison stressed in the doctrine was that its great emphasis on peacekeeping in broader sense by giving a new political mission to Russian military in peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the United Nations and other international security organizations.¹⁷⁷ In this point, all above mentioned new features of the new military doctrine displayed the new fears, new threats of the post-Cold War security environment and the precautions of the Russian Federation for the military.

We should also indicate that the military doctrine was in many respects unclear and general and it had also some deficiencies and contradictions. According to Bluth, it included ambiguities regarding the new place of the military because of the desire of retaining the former Soviet capabilities for a large-scale war while intending to establish more mobile Russian military.¹⁷⁸ As a matter of fact, there was a common approval that it did not meet the needs of the Russian Federation in post-Cold War environment. Thus, as a result of lasting debates about security issues, we see the formation of Russia's National Security

¹⁷⁷ Roy Allison (a) , "The Russian Armed Forces: Structures, Roles and Policies", in Vladimir Baranovsky (ed), *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1997, pp.177-179

¹⁷⁸ Bluth (b), *op.cit.*, p.227

Concept, signed by Yeltsin in December 1997. In this sense, it stated that the most important threats to Russian security did not come from the international system but from Russia's internal conditions.¹⁷⁹ It was also believed that Russia's internal threats arose from economic decline and the precautions were seen as reform, stability, and development.¹⁸⁰

Therefore, it can be commented that while the Russian Federation was aware of its power and position in post-Cold War environment and tried to reflect these realities in the new doctrine of 1993, and, it was hard to abandon its entrenched traditions which had acquired during the Cold War years, such as an assumption of a large-scale war and the threat perceptions of the military blocs and the alliances although its statement of seeing no state as an enemy. In such conditions, it tried to sustain its relations with the world and had to cope with the internal threats in the light of this insight in the presidency of Yeltsin.

¹⁷⁹ Wallander, , *op.cit.* , available on line at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/cwmr00.asp

¹⁸⁰ Igor Zevelev, "The Redefinition of the Russian Nation, International Security, and Stability", in Victoria E. Bonnell, George W. Breslauer (eds), *Russia in the New Century: Stability or Disorder?*, Boulder: Westview Press, 2001, p.266

CHAPTER 4

RUSSIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND ITS INTERNAL SECURITY UNDER YELTSIN

It was so clear that during the Cold War years, the West and the Soviet Union had to manage with each others instead of resolving the conflict between them. However, after the independence of the Russian Federation, the new security environment of the world, the problems in the field of re-defining the new identity and the national interests, and the formation of the new military doctrine of 1993 made Russia to re-arrange its relations with the West, with the newly independent states as the former Soviet space and with the other states in the world. In addition to that, it had to cope with the internal problems in the new world order as the new threats to its internal security. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to try to designate both old and new threats to the Russian Federation in the presidency of Yeltsin and to analyse the new course of the relations of the Russian Federation with the West, the near abroad, and the other states and to inquire the Chechen Issue and other internal menaces to its security in its early period.

4.1.Stance Towards the West

During the Cold War years, both the Soviet Union and the West were aware of their capacities for the mutual destruction, thus, they did not establish their relations on the basis of a grand bargain. Because, the Cold War atmosphere entailed the insight of perceiving each others as a threat, while also providing relative “stability” for both sides.¹⁸¹ However, with the end of the Cold War, the new Russian state, the Russian Federation, began to improve its relations with the West and foremost with the United States of America both economically and

¹⁸¹ Freedman, *op.cit.*, p.23

politically.¹⁸² What was striking for Kibaroglu in this context was that the extreme optimistic climate caused to the emergence of the ideas supporting that the appearance of the ideological confrontation caused to the end of history in the early 1990s. Yet, what Kibaroglu also stressed in his article was that for the authorities of the security studies there were still problems which did not find its answers such as the appearance of the Warsaw Pact and the status of its opposite alliance; NATO, and, in this sense, they were curious about if NATO would continue or not, and if it would, what would be its perception of menace, and if it would comprise the Russian Federation and the former Warsaw Pact members.¹⁸³ Therefore, the Russian Federation had to cope with these issues and it also wanted to be prudent concerning the new security environment of the post-Cold War and, therefore, in its early transitional period we observed the reflection of this concern in its new military doctrine of 1993 emphasizing no state as its enemy.¹⁸⁴ In this sense, it can be commented that to a great extent, the obligatory economic dependence on the West forced Russia to this insight. As a matter of fact, Weede, referring to Murrell and Olson and Brooks and Wohlforth, stressed that the economic decline and poor economic performance brought about the disintegration of the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁵ Thus, the poor economic condition which the Russian Federation inherited as the successor of the Soviet Union forced Russia to behave more moderate to the West for its economic dependence.

In addition to that, the American President Bush stated his wish that the former communist countries of Russia and its satellites would become democracies and have market economies, allies rather than becoming the enemies of the West.¹⁸⁶ Besides, the West tried to calm the fears of Moscow and, in this sense, it also tried to display its special efforts regarding Russia's anxieties. This was shown in the transformation of the Group of Seven leading industrialized

¹⁸² Kibaroglu, *op.cit.* p.95

¹⁸³ *Ibid*, pp.95-96

¹⁸⁴ See, Russian Military Doctrine (1993) available on line at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>, accessed on 07.02.2005

¹⁸⁵ Erich Weede, "China and Russia: On the Rise and Decline of Two Nations", *International Interactions*, Vol.29 Issue 4, Oct2003, p.344

¹⁸⁶ "New Friends, New Opportunities", *The Economist*, Vol.363 Issue 8279, 6/29/2002

nations (G-7) into a Group of Eight (G-8), comprising the Russian Federation, and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council.¹⁸⁷ Therefore, Freedman in his article, articulated these efforts as an endeavour in order to “ease the pain of Russia’s transition and the loss of its international status”, but, according to him, these developments were insufficient for Moscow to remove its anxieties concerning the West.¹⁸⁸ Moreover, the entrenched perception of regarding each other as an enemy made the situation more complicated. Russia was also disappointed because of insufficient Western aid for its reform programme and, as Harada stressed in his article, the enlargement of NATO and the hurdles the country faced in its endeavours in order to integrate into international economic institutions like the World Trade Organisation and the Paris Club made the situation more difficult. In addition to that, the West opposed Russia’s arms sales which was one of its few resources of hard currency.¹⁸⁹ Thus, to Harada’s way of thinking, these developments affected the stance of Yeltsin government and Russia tended to carry out more assertive and diversified diplomacy which at the end caused to indicate that the country’s national interests diverged from the interests of the USA in foreign-policy concept paper of Russia in April 1993.¹⁹⁰

Moreover, the events in the Balkans displayed that there could not be a common insight between Russia and the Western states in security perception. Therefore, we again observed the split between the West and Russia in the Federation’s early transitional period. Besides, not only the USA but also Europe believed the distinction between Russia and the West. In this context, the views of Vladimir Baranovsky in terms of European perception of Russia is worth mentioning. According to him, Russia was considered to be no longer a military threat, however, the rooted Cold War mentality of “keeping Russians out” transformed into a new mission; via trying to avert the disengagement of Russians

¹⁸⁷ Freedman, *op.cit.*, p.27

¹⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.27

¹⁸⁹ Harada, *op.cit.*, pp.14-15

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p.15

without actually permitting them in.¹⁹¹ However, it was incorrect to expect the loss of the interests of Russia in Europe in spite of this perception in such an environment. To Baranovsky's way of thinking, although Russia seemed to be hesitant, inconsistent or reluctant concerning Europe, it was also believed that to a great extent, to be the most important region owing to the fact that having Russia's vital interests in the international arena.¹⁹² Therefore, instead of establishing a new post-Cold War organizational pattern, the Russian Federation tried to take place in the existing multilateral organizations in Europe.¹⁹³

In this sense, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was evaluated as the most attractive multilateral institution for Russia in terms of its formation, structure and operational mode.¹⁹⁴ Yet, in this point, it was substantial to mention that on the one hand, it was believed to meet the needs of many of Russia's concerns about Europe and deserved its special treatment, however, on the other hand, it was also thought that Russian endeavours to increase the role of the OSCE were motivated by the wish to oppose it to NATO and, in addition to that, Russia believed that the OSCE would limit its freedom for its actions in the former Soviet space. Therefore, according to Baranovsky and Arbatov, Russia remained to be one of the OSCE's most problematic participants.¹⁹⁵

If we appraise the place of the European Union (EU) for Russia in the presidency of Yeltsin, we see it from the economic side. Because, in the 1990s, EU did not consider itself as a military actor.¹⁹⁶ In other words, its security role

¹⁹¹ Vladimir Baranovsky, "Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?", in Archie Brown (ed) *Contemporary Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.431

¹⁹² *Ibid*, p.436

¹⁹³ Vladimir G. Baranovsky and Alexei G. Arbatov, "The Changing Security Perspective in Europe", in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold (eds), *Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.60

¹⁹⁴ Baranovsky, *op.cit.*, p.437

¹⁹⁵ Baranovsky and Arbatov, *op.cit.*, pp.61-62

¹⁹⁶ Tuomas Forsberg, "The EU-Russia Security Partnership: Why the Opportunity was Missed", *European Foreign Affairs Review*, Vol.9 Issue 2, Jun2004, p.247

was evaluated marginal and not threatening to Russian interests.¹⁹⁷ Even, with the adoption of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) of the EU at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999, the perception of the EU for Russia did not change at all. Instead, Russia's medium-term strategy was apt to see CESDP as a mechanism by which Russia could be in the same way with the EU in terms of security issues and, moreover, it was interpreted that it could use to drive a wedge between the European members of NATO and the US.¹⁹⁸ Thus, to sum up, the EU was not perceived as a threat in any condition for Russia in the 1990s. However, what was the most problematic issue for the Russian Federation was NATO.

During the Cold War years, NATO aimed to prevent a large common threat with a collective commitment to territorial defense, however, in the post-Cold War world, NATO no longer had to prevent Soviet military threat.¹⁹⁹ As the consequence of the disappearance of "this kind of menace", it was obvious that the place and the role of NATO would be different for both the West and Russia after the dissolution of the USSR. According to Baranovsky's article, in which he inquired the role of NATO in the new world order, following the end of the cold war, there seemed to be two main scenarios about the future of NATO, and these scenarios were evaluated as acceptable to Russia in principle. The first one based on the premise on the inevitable disappearance of the alliance that looked having lost its reason for its existence, whereas, the second one aimed to define NATO as the core of the future pan-European security system via intention of transformation of the Alliance and in addition to that, inclusion of Russia as *sine qua non*. But, what Baranovsky also dwelt on that none of these two scenarios

¹⁹⁷ Baranovsky and Arbatov, *op.cit.*, p.61

¹⁹⁸ Margot Light, John Löwenhardt, Stephen White, "Russia and the Dual Expansion of Europe", in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, pp.68-69

¹⁹⁹ Dena W. Gurgul, Joanna Sokolska (eds), *Transatlantic Security: New Realities, Changing Institutions*, Warsaw: Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004, pp.11-13

could be implemented in real conditions and followed “a third way” with the special Russian concern.²⁰⁰

From the point of view of the West, there was a decline in the possibility of the revival of the old “Soviet threat” and they proposed to enlarge NATO eastward.²⁰¹ Moreover, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) were established as the institutional developments of NATO in order to strengthen the relations with post-Communist Europe.²⁰²

From Russian side, the Alliance continued to be a challenge for Russia. It was implied through the statement of “the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of the interests of the Russian Federation's military security” that the Russian Federation underlined Russian security insight concerning NATO in its new military doctrine of 1993.²⁰³ Therefore, it tried to be prudent regarding the new place and the mission of NATO in post-Cold War conditions. In this context, what is also salient to mention that there has never been a common or sole Russian strategy towards NATO. In other words, as Khudoley and Lanko stressed in their article, Russian discourse towards NATO did not follow one way.²⁰⁴ As a matter of fact, when it came to the debate of Russia’s membership of PFP, the three separate groups approached this issue differently. As Light, Löwenhardt and White cite, Liberal Westernizers supported signing up, when Pragmatic Nationalists were indecisive, and Fundamentalist Nationalists opposed it in any condition.²⁰⁵ Yet, when NATO expansion came to the agenda, in spite of having various reasons for the opposition, these three different groups united. In addition to this, the Russian public also indicated that

²⁰⁰ Vladimir Baranovsky, “NATO Enlargement: Russia’s Attitudes”, *Prepared for the IISS/CEPS European Security Forum*, Brussels, 9 July 2001, available on line at: <http://www.eusec.org/baranovsky.htm>, accessed on 12.11.2004

²⁰¹ Freedman, *op.cit.*, p.35

²⁰² *Ibid*, p.36

²⁰³ See, Russian Military Doctrine (1993) available on line at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>, accessed on 07.02.2005

²⁰⁴ Konstantin Khudoley, Dmitri Lanko, “Russia, NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States”, *Baltic Defence Review*, Vol.11 Issue 1, Jan2004, p.117

²⁰⁵ Light, Löwenhardt and White, *op.cit.*, p.63

NATO expansion would be harmful for Russia.²⁰⁶ Therefore, the general thought regarding NATO was pessimist in the country.

In addition to Light's, Löwenhardt's and White's discourse, Baranovsky and Arbatov indicated that Russia was suspicious concerning NATO-centered formations as PFP, because, Russia felt restless by the thought of downgrading or marginalizing itself in Europe. Besides, Russia considered this pattern as an obstacle for its influence in the post-Soviet space.²⁰⁷ Moreover, the expansion of NATO to the east was unacceptable for Russia. According to Lothar Rühl, Russia's reaction to the expansion of NATO to the east can be best explained by its classic geopolitical-strategic arguments. Because, to Rühl's way of thinking, the expansion of NATO to the Eastern and Central Europe referred to the destruction of the existing balance which was formed by the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe between NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization.²⁰⁸ Therefore, the legacy of the past continued to be the case concerning Russia's strategic sensitivities in the post-Cold War environment and it could be said that Russian reaction to the enlargement of NATO and to the new formations such as PFP were connected with its concerns in the Eastern and Central Europe.

In this context, it is vital to indicate that in spite of these pessimist events, a kind of peculiar relationship with NATO, like the one which was formed by the May 1997 Founding Act, was tried to be constructed instead of a confrontational model.²⁰⁹ However, it was observed that the optimist climate was undermined with the developments in the Balkans in 1999.

For the first time in its history, NATO went to a war in Kosovo.²¹⁰ What this US-led NATO military action against Yugoslavia injured was that the post-Cold War balances in the realm of security. Because, it was assumed to be based

²⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p.63

²⁰⁷ Baranovsky and Arbatov, *op.cit.*, p.61

²⁰⁸ Rühl, *op.cit.*, p.32

²⁰⁹ Baranovsky and Arbatov, *op.cit.*, p.61

²¹⁰ Antonio Missiroli, "Central European Between the EU and NATO", *Survival*, Vol.46 No.4, Winter 2004-05, p.131

on the United Nations (UN) and the OSCE, and it was also accepted that obedience to UN Charter, and respect to the international law and agreements between Russia and the West, especially to the NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 and to the partnership between Russia and NATO, were necessary for the mutual trust.²¹¹ Moreover, this military action of the Alliance pointed out a landmark in Russian insight of military requirements, because, Russia understood that the West overlooked Russian interests whenever a distinction emerged between them. What was more tragic was that President Yeltsin had committed himself several times to preclude such an intervention and had guaranteed Yugoslavia's security. Therefore, as Arbatov indicated in his article, it was a great humiliation for Russia which at the end caused to the revision of the Russian National Security Concept and to the adoption of new Military Doctrine in 2000.²¹²

NATO's military action echoed in the Russian Federation broadly. As Light, Löwenhardt and White cited in their article, in Kazan, an interviewee explained the view concerning this military action in Kosovo that "the US now openly says it wants to rule the world", by having an opinion that the US tried to use NATO as an instrument in order to reach its aims.²¹³ Therefore, it can be commented that the image of the US and NATO did not change at all for Russia especially after the war in Kosovo and the West was still perceived with ambiguity in the presidency of Yeltsin.

4.2.Expectations About the "Near Abroad"

After the disintegration of the USSR, fifteen new states emerged as sovereign entities, yet, what was more important was that the legacy of the past, the ascendance of Moscow over these states, could not change in such a short time. What Allison indicated in his article was that it took several years for these

²¹¹ Alexei Arbatov (a) , "The Transformation of Russia's Military Doctrine in the Aftermath of Kosovo and Chechnya", in Gabriel Gorodetsky, (ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, p.28

²¹² *Ibid*, pp.28-29

²¹³ Light, Löwenhardt and White, *op.cit.*, p.65

newly emerged states to consolidate their statehood.²¹⁴ Therefore, the impacts of the Soviet legacy over these states was clear. In Central Asia, for example as Starr referring to Alimov stressed, Stalin had drew borders in this area in order to separate common ethnic, linguistic, and historical bonds of people, however, what Starr referring to Kazemzadeh also pointed out in his article was that in spite of this artificiality, these borders became reality in the disintegration and nation building process. Therefore, Starr stressed the enduring cultural impact of Russia and Soviet legacy in this region.²¹⁵ Menon also emphasized in his article that both the tsarist and Soviet imperial heritage could not be erased in the Central Asia and the South Caucasus in a short period of time. Because, according to him, Russia became an imperial center for these regions throughout almost two centuries.²¹⁶

Besides, the “normalization” of the relations between these states and Russia has been too slow. Because, economic infrastructure, trade relations and cultural bonds made the situation more complicated for both sides.²¹⁷ Russia, by grasping its own decline and needing to avert this temporarily, provided subsidies on oil and natural resources to these states. Through its intention for economic integration, Russia aimed to re-assert its power in this area, because it saw this area as its vital security interest.²¹⁸ In addition to that, unlike the old West European empires, “the Russian empire” was accepted as a compact territorial unit.²¹⁹ Thus, it was not a reality to expect the evaporation of Moscow’s influence in these newly independent states in the early post-Cold War period.

²¹⁴ Roy Allison (b), “Russia and the new states of Eurasia”, in Archie Brown (ed) *Contemporary Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.443

²¹⁵ S. Frederick Starr (ed), *The Legacy of History in Russia and the New States of Eurasia*, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1994, pp.10-11

²¹⁶ Rajan Menon (a), “The Security Environment in the South Caucasus and Central Asia: Concept, Setting, and Challenges”, in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia, (eds), *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.13

²¹⁷ Allison (b), *op.cit.*, p.443

²¹⁸ Petro and Rubinstein, *op.cit.*, p.113

²¹⁹ Neil Malcolm and Alex Pravda, “Introduction”, in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, Margot Light (eds), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press Inc., 1996, p.6

As a matter of fact, in order to realize Russian desire to form a new Moscow-dominated Centre, and not to abandon its dominance in the region the CIS was formed.²²⁰ In this sense, 12 of the 15 former Soviet republics, excluding the three Baltic States, formed the CIS at the end of 1991.²²¹ However, as Webber indicated, this formation did not aim to be the successor of the Soviet Union from the side of newly independent states, whereas Russia intended to be “first among equals”.²²² Newly independent states intended to preserve the economic ties in the short term, but, to their way of thinking, national independence was the most substantial issue of all.²²³ Moreover, eminent Russian authorities evaluated the CIS “as a way of restoring Moscow’s influence in the former USSR”, whereas they also knew the intention of newly independent states to move further apart in political and economical sense.²²⁴ Therefore, in the early period of the CIS, the expectations of both sides were different in essence.

In this context, it should be noted that in spite of Russian concerns over the former Soviet states, until 1993, the priority was given to the Western states, however, 1992 and early 1993 marked a watershed in terms of relations with newly independent states. Because, Russia was challenged by these successor states and was aware of the escalation of civil wars in Tajikistan, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan.²²⁵ Therefore, it could not be indifferent to these developments around its borders. In addition to that, Moscow adopted Eurasian “Monroe Doctrine” in 1993.²²⁶ As a matter of fact, the foreign-policy concept

²²⁰ Kozhemiakin and Kanet, *op.cit.*, p.29

²²¹ Mark Webber, “Russian Policy Towards the Soviet Successor States”, in Mike Bowker, Cameron Ross (eds), *Russia After the Cold War*, Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 2000, p.239

²²² *Ibid*, pp.239-241

²²³ Malcolm and Pravda, *op.cit.*, pp.6-7

²²⁴ Dmitri Trenin (a), “After the Empire: Russia’s Emerging International Identity”, in Gabriel Gorodetsky, (ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, p.35

²²⁵ Webber, *op.cit.*, p.242

²²⁶ Malcolm and Pravda, *op.cit.*, p.7

paper listed the CIS as the top priority on 23 April 1993.²²⁷ Moreover, the theoretical ground in order to establish Russian ascendancy and hegemony over these territories, the term “near abroad” was first coined by Presidential Council member Andranik Migranyan, and also Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev supported this idea in his remarks, articles and reports.²²⁸ Thus, with the term “near abroad”, Russia referred to the states which had been the part of the Soviet Union.²²⁹

It should be also mentioned that Russia continued to see former Soviet republics in its sphere of interest, surprisingly including the Baltic states. As a matter of fact, Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev stressed in 1994 that “the countries of the CIS and the Baltics...[constitute] a region where the vital interests of Russia are concentrated...We should not withdraw from those regions which have been the sphere of Russia’s interests for centuries”. Yet, according to Webber, this explanation and intention did not signify to the imperial Russian reconquest of these states, but a desire in order to protect its hegemony and influence over them as a leading regional power. As a matter of fact, the major problem between Russia and the West, or we might say international initiatives, emerged when external initiatives intended to form a lasting influence which would prevent Russian dominance in the former Soviet influence area.²³⁰ Hence, Russian sensitivity to these areas continued in the post-Cold War conditions.

In this context, it is needed to indicate that in order to provide integration between these states and Russia, the series of interstate and interministerial treaties were signed in the framework of the CIS, and, in this sense, apart from the key document, the CIS Charter, the Collective Security Agreement which determined the structures and mechanisms for collective self-defense of the CIS states, was signed in Tashkent in May 1992. As in the article of NATO, an attack to one member was regarded as an attack to all members of the CIS. Yet, what was striking was that while Armenia, Belarus, Russia and Tajikistan supported

²²⁷ Harada, *op.cit.*, p.15

²²⁸ Zevelev, *op.cit.*, p.273

²²⁹ Kozhemiakin and Kanet, *op.cit.*, p.29

²³⁰ Webber, *op.cit.*, pp.244-247

this agreement strongly, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan provided conditional support, and, Moldova, Turkmenistan and the Ukraine rejected it.²³¹

Another Russian concern regarding these newly independent states became its endeavour for the protection of the “other powers” for filling a possible “power vacuum” over them. Therefore, in 1994, Yeltsin declared his target to set up some thirty Russian bases in the CIS countries, and then, a decree on “Russian Strategy With Regard To CIS Member States” that aimed to form a defence union based on common interests and military-political goals of these states was issued. However, what Allison signalled in his article was that Russian capabilities were not enough to realize these goals properly.²³² In order to examine Russian security insight regarding the former Soviet republics, we should be prudent concerning the Caucasus including Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia; the Central Asia which was composed of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; the Slavic ones of Belarus, the Ukraine and its neighbour Moldova, and the Baltics including Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

If we inquire the specific Russian security concerns in the Caucasus after the end of the Cold War, we face the “security complex” insight of the Russian Federation. This approach signified that the Caucasus should be viewed as a “security complex”, and, in the case of a conflict in this region, whether in the northern part of the region or in the southern Caucasian states, this could spill over to the another part of the region easily due to the ethnic or cultural bonds. Therefore, Russian interests in this region in surpassing the conflicts, preventing them to re-occur in the early period of the 1990s was connected with these anxieties. Besides, Russian officials claimed that peace and stability could be provided in the Caucasus, through strengthening federalism and integration.²³³ In this sense, Russia attached great importance to the South Caucasus and signed bilateral mutual assistance and military cooperation agreements. Thus, Armenia

²³¹ Petro and Rubinstein, *op.cit.*, p.115

²³² Allison (b), *op.cit.*, p.445

²³³ Roy Allison (c), “The Military and Political Security Landscape in Russia and the South”, in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia, (eds), *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.28

and Russia signed a bilateral Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance which was composed of the option of mutual military assistance in the case of individual or collective self-defense in conformity with the UN Charter, yet, what was more salient was that in addition to these agreements, to Zagorski's way of thinking, through military cooperation with the South Caucasian states, Russia aimed to maintain its military bases in these states; particularly in Armenia and Georgia. In this context, it is also vital to cite about Russian border troops. Because these troops were located in both Armenia and Georgia, whereas Azerbaijan refused to let Russian border troops.²³⁴

When we investigate Russian concerns regarding the Central Asia, it can be said that the situation is quite different. Because, according to Allison, Russian security interests was less dominant in this region than in the Caucasus. In this sense, Russia firstly gave importance to the solution of Tajik conflict. Because, Russia believed a kind of domino theory by considering Russian withdrawal of military forces from Tajikistan could pave the way to the spread of "Islamic fundamentalism" and non-control of Russia to this region or to the increase of drug trafficking on the Pakistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan route with the fear of loss of the whole region.²³⁵ Thus, what was also important was the emergence of non-traditional Russian security concerns in the region in the post-Cold War period. As a matter of fact, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, apart from corruption and organized crime, narcotics trafficking and proliferation of other harmful materials became a challenge for both Russia and these regions. However, what made the situation more complicated was the claims of inclusion of the Russian military in these illegal events. Therefore, as Lubin indicated the task of Russia was harder than it seemed.²³⁶ Moreover, decline in Russia's economic situation caused to the re-formation of the security policy commitments of most of the CIS states

²³⁴ Andrei V. Zagorski, "Traditional Russian Security Interests in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Perceptions and Realities", in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia, (eds), *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, pp.69-70

²³⁵ Allison (c), *op.cit.*, p.29

²³⁶ Nancy Lubin, "New Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus: An Old Story with a New Twist", in Rajan Menon, Yuri E. Federov, Ghia Nodia, (eds), *Russia, the Caucasus and Central Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, pp.214-215

including the Caucasian and Central Asian ones. Therefore, in the late period of the 1990s, Russia favoured to exert more realistic and minimalist policy to these states by aspiring on refusing the military security access of non-CIS actors and NATO in the Caucasus and Central Asia.²³⁷

When it comes to the investigation of the Slavic states, we see them as a buffer zone between Russia and Europe. Hence, what Petro and Rubinstein indicated was that because of their geopolitical location and historical bonds with Russia, they became important for both Russia and Europe.²³⁸ In this sense, it was very difficult for Russia to accept the separation of Ukraine and Belarus from the Federation.²³⁹ Because, according to “eternal oneness” view, the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian peoples stemmed from the Old Russian nationality and this was connected with Kievan Rus which was formed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.²⁴⁰ In addition to this, the reluctance of Russians to accept Ukrainian statehood in its early period made the situation more difficult, particularly in the case of Ukraine’s strategic place on the Black Sea and in the division of Black Sea Fleet.²⁴¹ In fact, the relative economic ascendancy of Russia transformed the situation in favour of Russia in the solution of this issue.²⁴² In addition to this issue, nuclear weapons also became a problematic between Russia and Ukraine. Because, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, strategic and tactical nuclear weapons were dispersed to both Russia and other former Soviet states and it had been decided that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine would transfer these nuclear weapons to Russia. While there was no problem in the handing over of tactical weapons, strategic weapons became a controversial issue. In this regard, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk implied to have a right in

²³⁷ Allison (c), *op.cit.*, p.55

²³⁸ Petro and Rubinstein, *op.cit.*, p.121

²³⁹ Allison (b), *op.cit.*, p.449

²⁴⁰ Kozhemiakin and Kanet, *op.cit.*, pp.37-38

²⁴¹ Allison (b), *op.cit.*, p.449

²⁴² Roy Allison (d), “Military Factors in Foreign Policy”, in Neil Malcolm, Alex Pravda, Roy Allison, Margot Light (eds), *Internal Factors in Russian Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press Inc., 1996, pp.261-262

order to have a direct control concerning the launching of these weapons in his state.²⁴³ Therefore, Russia had to cope with Ukrainian claims about the use of nuclear weapons and the position of Black Sea fleet. However, it can be commented that the worse economic scene in Ukraine compelled this state to a more moderate manner towards Russia.

If the Baltics are examined in the presidency of Yeltsin, it is seen a very different case than the other former Soviet regions. According to Petro and Rubinstein, the weakest political, military and economical bonds of these states with Russia made the situation variant. As a matter of fact, they preferred to separate their ways with the Russian Federation and refused to take a part in the CIS. Moreover, they chose to establish close ties with the Western states and NATO.²⁴⁴ Therefore, in spite of Russian claims concerning this region in its early period, then, Russia had to accept the “Baltic reality”.

In brief, Russia continued to see the former Soviet states, especially the Caucasian states, Central Asian states and Ukraine, in its sphere of interest in the post-Cold War environment. However, the new realities compelled Russia to re-arrange its security insight to these states by considering other balances in the world.

4.3. Attitude Towards Other Regions and States

First of all, it was substantial for the Russian Federation to re-arrange and to re-evaluate its relations with the other states in the post-Cold War world. In this sense, when Russia was disappointed of the West about not meeting its needs and expectations in its early transitional period, views concerning expanding its ties with the East emerged among Russian authorities. Moreover, what was more important was that the foreign-policy concept paper of 1993 listed China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula after the CIS, former Eastern Europe and the USA in the order of priority, and in addition to this, President Yeltsin emphasized Russia as a Eurasian power in 1994 speech.²⁴⁵ However, it was not easy for Russia to

²⁴³ Webber, *op.cit.*, p.243

²⁴⁴ Petro and Rubinstein, *op.cit.*, p.124

²⁴⁵ Harada, *op.cit.*, pp.14-16

improve its relations easily with these states in the framework of its deeply rooted security insight.

According to Kimura, Li and Koh, it was true that Russia has shifted towards East. Because, to their way of thinking, when the Russian Federation lost the Baltic region, Belarus and Ukraine, this made Russia more eastern state than a western state. Thus, this led to the feeling of Eurasian rather than European among Russian people. In addition to this, NATO expansion towards East meant Russian expansion towards East too according to the explanations of the authorities, however, to Kimura's, Li's and Koh's way of thinking, it was not a reality to expect developing relations and ties between Russia and Far Eastern states without any problems in post-Cold War conditions.²⁴⁶ Because, the entrenched Cold War mentality appeared to be the most serious obstacle in order to improve relations with Japan and China. In this sense, Japan, as the ally of Russia's main enemy-the United States- and China, when it began to pose a threat to the Soviet Union in 1960s, had been considered to be perils to Russia's security in the Cold War years.²⁴⁷ Thus, under the communist regime, this security insight of the USSR caused to a great Soviet military build-up in the Russian Far East region. But, with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, both the emerging new security environment and the economic crisis of the Russian Federation, as the successor of the Soviet Union, brought about the reduction of Russian military forces in this area.²⁴⁸

As a matter of fact, it was accepted that the East Asia appeared to be the most secure region of the Russian Federation according to the traditional Russian security insight when it was compared with Western and Southern parts.²⁴⁹ Because, NATO expansion threat from the West and "Islamic fundamentalism"

²⁴⁶ Hiroshi Kimura, Shaojun Li, and Il-Dong Koh, " 'Frontiers Are the Razor's Edge': Russia's Borders with Its Eastern Neighbours", in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, Koji Watanabe (eds), *Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, pp.150-151

²⁴⁷ Viktor N. Pavliatenko, "Russian Security in the Pacific Asian Region: The Dangers of Isolation", in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, Koji Watanabe (eds), *Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.14

²⁴⁸ Harada, *op.cit.*, p.18

²⁴⁹ Pavliatenko, *op.cit.*, p.13

peril from the South were accepted to be more important dangers for the security of the Federation. Even the border problems with China and Japan was tried to be overcome in the framework of a civilized process of negotiations and according to Kunadze, border problems were not considered to be an important peril to the security of the Russian Federation.²⁵⁰

However, the declining position of Russia in economical, political and military fields caused to the emergence of the danger of an economic and even a political secession of Russian Far East region from the Federation. Because, as Pavliatenko stressed in his article, the Russian Far East region and Siberia were accepted to have rich energy and raw material resources which let it to be considered as having an important economic potential. Thus, Russia's decline in economy and its failure to manage serious domestic issues concerning this region brought about new Russian anxieties about possible Chinese territorial claims and increasing demographic expansion.²⁵¹ Moreover, China aspired to increase its nuclear missile capacity in order to have a minimum nuclear deterrent against the United States and Russia and steadily was considered to be an economic power. Thus, what is so striking is that the explanation and comment of Miyamoto in his article. According to him, "Sino-Russian strategic cooperation is not based on good will or common values, but on national interests".²⁵² Besides, according to Harada, the military-industrial complex in Far Eastern region of Russia wanted to promote arms sale to the Asia-Pacific region, particularly to China and South Korea. Especially, China was considered to be the most important arms market for Russia.²⁵³ As Pavliatenko emphasized in his article, this was an indicator of not only the Kremlin authority, but also the place of local authorities, political parties,

²⁵⁰ Georgi F. Kunadze, "Border Problems Between Russia and Its Neighbors: Stable for Now, But Stubborn in the Long Run", in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, Koji Watanabe (eds), *Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, pp.133-148

²⁵¹ Pavliatenko, *op.cit.*, p.13

²⁵² Nobuo Miyamoto, "The Security Environment of Russia's Far East: An Environment of Competitive Cooperation", in Gilbert Rozman, Mikhail G. Nosov, Koji Watanabe (eds), *Russia and East Asia: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.51

²⁵³ Harada, *op.cit.*, p.33

and public opinion in new security environment.²⁵⁴ In addition to this, it can also be commented that the attribute of China as an important arms market made Russia more prudent in its relations with this state and hard Russian economic conditions were another determinant of its stance towards these states in post-Cold War environment.

Moreover, the frustration of Russia concerning the expansion of NATO led it to examine a new strategic partnership with China. In this sense, President Yeltsin went to China for an official visit. The two presidents of these countries, Yeltsin and Zemin, following their talks issued a joint statement and expressed their solution in order to develop a “strategic partnership towards the twenty-first century” in April 1996.²⁵⁵ However, it can be commented that although the scene was quite different when it was compared with the Cold War years, all above mentioned negativities has limited this strategic cooperation between the Russian Federation and China in the post-Cold War era.

In addition to these developments, the legacy of the past was still salient for Russian considerations regarding Japan and South Korea in the new world order. Because, it had been accepted that the US-Japan Security Treaty of 1951 and the US-South Korea Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 through establishing a US-led security network had provided security in regional level in the Cold War years.²⁵⁶ In the post-Cold War environment Russia seemed to have logical reasons in order to accept this security network for the regional stability. However, what was deficit for Russia was that its exclusion from the US-initiated security efforts and having no place in order to sustain its vital security interests in the conflict areas which at the end was considered to bring about to Russia’s isolation in this region.²⁵⁷

Apart from the Russian Far East region, it is also vital to inquire the positions of Turkey and Iran which are located in the near periphery of the Russian Federation and for that their place in the literature in the post-Cold War

²⁵⁴ Pavliatenko, *op.cit.*, p.14

²⁵⁵ Miyamoto, *op.cit.*, p.50

²⁵⁶ Pavliatenko, *op.cit.*, p.18

²⁵⁷ *Ibid*, pp.18-19

era. In this context, Turkey was considered to be a rival of Russia in the Caucasus and Central Asian region. Moreover, its membership of NATO and existence in both US-Turkish naval exercises and PFP exercises in the Black Sea made Russia both sensitive and prudent and these were accepted as a challenge for Russian security. Russia also approached to Nagorno-Karabakh issue with the fear of Turkey's increasing role for an OSCE force in the solution of this problem. Besides, Russian nationalists defined Turkey as "the champion of Turkic Muslim ambitions and the leading power of the Turkic peoples seeking ascendancy over the CIS Central Asian states".²⁵⁸ Moreover, although Russia has not a direct land border with Turkey, it appraised Turkey at least as a potential military challenger because of its capacity of fielding over one million troops in a short period of time, yet, according to Zagorski, this kind of a Turkish military threat was exaggerated and was connected with the historical reasons about Turkey as being "Russia's rival and enemy for five centuries" and a NATO member.²⁵⁹

If we research Russian approach towards Iran, we see it in a more moderate manner than Turkey. The intersection of their security policy interests in the Southern Tier increased Russia's tolerance towards Iran.²⁶⁰ Because, improving the relations with Iran referred to a counterbalancing Turkey. Besides, Russia and Iran had a common interest in supporting endeavours for the protection of full Taliban authority in Afghanistan, and in addition to this, we can not skip arms transfers between these states. But, to Allison's way of thinking, all these developments meant a tactical, not a long-term strategic, cooperation between Russia and Iran.²⁶¹ In this sense, it can be said that all these relations and perceptions of the Russian Federation concerning both the Far Eastern region and Turkey and Iran meant a not radical transformation in Russian security insight, instead of this, Russia preferred tactical manoeuvres for providing its security in short and middle terms.

²⁵⁸ Allison (c), *op.cit.*, pp.35-36

²⁵⁹ Zagorski, *op.cit.*, p.66

²⁶⁰ Allison (c), *op.cit.*, p.36

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, pp.36-37

4.4. Internal Threats for the Federation

First of all, it is very crucial to mention that after the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian Federation has been haunted by the scenarios concerning its own possible disintegration. Andranik Migranyan also indicated “The bomb planted under the USSR by the declaration of Russian sovereignty is, it seems to me, facilitating not only the destruction of the USSR but also –to an even greater extent- the destruction of Russia itself... Where are the geographical boundaries of the republic that is supposed to represent ethnic Russians?” in “Izvestiya” in 1990.²⁶² These fears were fueled by the developments in Tatarstan and Chechnya, however, this kind of dangers concerning potential secessionism proved to be over exaggerated, because, Tatarstan issue was solved via negotiations, and according to Lapidus, Chechen issue could have been solved by a political solution.²⁶³ Yet, it can be commented that the Chechen issue was more complicated than it seemed. Moreover, Chechen issue was accepted to be the indicator of Russia’s loss of its great power status. According to Suny, although Russia desired to re-establish an empire, it was seen that its power was no longer sufficient for this target. As a matter of fact, the first Chechen War (1994-96) was considered to be the sign of Russia’s this kind of weakness.²⁶⁴

The unity of the Russian Federation, in terms of economic, political, and cultural fields, began to be threatened by some non-Russian ethnic groups through national aspirations in the early transitional period of the country.²⁶⁵ Thus, by considering these activities, the new Russian military doctrine of 1993, dwelt on the probability of “illegal activity by nationalist, separatist, or other organizations which is aimed at destabilizing the situation in the Russian Federation or violating its territorial integrity and which is carried out using armed violence” as one of the

²⁶² Gail W. Lapidus, “State Building and State Breakdown in Russia”, in Archie Brown (ed) *Contemporary Russian Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.348

²⁶³ *Ibid*, p.348

²⁶⁴ Suny, *op.cit.*, p.365

²⁶⁵ Dmitri V. Trenin (b) , “The Changing Geopolitical Realities in Europe”, in Alexei G. Arbatov, Karl Kaiser, Robert Legvold (eds), *Russia and the West: The 21st Century Security Environment*, New York, M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1999, p.178

basic internal sources of its military threats.²⁶⁶ According to Rühl, this was absolutely connected with Chechen issue and, in addition to this, the Chechen War was also accepted to be the indicator of the turbulent past of Imperial Russia.²⁶⁷ Hence, we see the effects of its imperial past on security issues.

According to an article in “The Economist”, the first Chechen War also displayed the incorrect tactics and wrong evaluation of President Yeltsin. When the first Russian troops were sent to Chechnya by Yeltsin, he expressed his goal as to “restore constitutional order” and to provide “a normal, peaceful and calm life”. Moreover, Russia’s reaction was calm when Chechnya declared its dependence in 1991, because, this was considered to be a mess, but not a peril for Russia.²⁶⁸ As a matter of fact, although a state of emergency was declared by Yeltsin in 1991, this was transformed by the Supreme Soviet and an economic blockade was taken as the only precaution against this republic.²⁶⁹ Yet, according to a comment in “the Economist”, when Yeltsin began to think this issue as a means in order to boost his cause, via persuasions of hard-liners in Kremlin, this made Chechen issue a deadlock.²⁷⁰

It is vital to mention that the first Chechen War have a number of unique characteristics. It was the first large-scale use of Russian troops on Russian territory against Russian citizens.²⁷¹ As a matter of fact, the new military doctrine of 1993 had stressed “armed conflicts and local wars can in certain conditions escalate into a large-scale war”.²⁷² However, what this assumption of this kind of large-scale war resulted was a failure in the improving of the capacity of the

²⁶⁶ See, Russian Military Doctrine (1993) available on line at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>, accessed on 07.02.2005

²⁶⁷ Rühl, *op.cit.* p.22

²⁶⁸ “Still Calling For Help”, *The Economist*, Vol.374 Issue 8409, 1/15/2005

²⁶⁹ “Russia”, *The Military Balance*, London: Oxford University Press, 1995/96, p.102

²⁷⁰ “Still Calling For Help”, *The Economist*, Vol.374 Issue 8409, 1/15/2005

²⁷¹ “Russia”, *The Military Balance*, London: Oxford University Press, 1995/96, p.104

²⁷² See, Russian Military Doctrine (1993) available on line at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>, accessed on 07.02.2005

military for a smaller regional threats as in the case in Chechnya.²⁷³ In addition to this, the war also obviously displayed the real degree of degradation in the combat readiness of armed forces of Russia. As a result of these developments, it was seen that, in fact, Russia had no combat-ready units.²⁷⁴ Therefore, the failure was inescapable and inevitable for Russia when the military persisted in an insight on a large-scale war against the enemy like in the Cold War years without considering new developments and conditions of the post-Cold War era.

Apart from the threats of the activities of the nationalists and separatists, economic factors were also evaluated as a salient internal threat for the security of the Russian Federation in the new security environment. In the new doctrine of 1993, it was indicated that in order to provide the Russian Federation's military security; economic, political, and social problems should be solved first and foremost.²⁷⁵ Moreover, by grasping the economic decline of the country, it was also stressed in the National Security Concept of the Russian Federation as following: "The major threats to the Russian Federation's security at present and in the near future do not have military characteristics. Most threats are of a domestic nature and center in the fields of domestic administration, economy, society, ecology, information, and morale." However, what was more important was that its special emphasis concerning economic crisis as a major peril to Russia's security.²⁷⁶

In this context, Khesin, in his article, argued that the internal threats for the security of Russia arose because of deepening socio-economic divisions in the country. Moreover, according to him, the increasing structural imbalances in the economy and decreasing of its technological potential ruined the economic and general security of Russia by accepting economic degradation as "the main challenge to Russia's security".²⁷⁷ It should be also mentioned that the economic

²⁷³ Golts and Putnam, *op.cit.* p.121

²⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.135

²⁷⁵ See, Russian Military Doctrine (1993) available on line at: <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/russia-mil-doc.html>, accessed on 07.02.2005

²⁷⁶ Miyamoto, *op.cit.*, pp.46-47

²⁷⁷ Khesin, *op.cit.*, pp.98-101

decline in Russia in 1998 caused to the emergence of a financial crisis. When Russia's financial system collapsed, this referred to a decline in its position in the international arena too.²⁷⁸ Thus, the economic conditions prevented its re-emergence as an equal power with the US and the economic dependence on the West limited its options. In this sense, as the all above mentioned authors stressed, economic decline was the main internal threat for the security of the Russian Federation in Yeltsin's period.

²⁷⁸ Eugene B. Rumer, Celeste A. Wallander, "Russia: Power in Weakness?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 27 Issue 1, Winter 2003-04, p.57

CHAPTER 5

THE SECURITY INSIGHT AND THE NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE IN PUTIN'S RUSSIA

It was so obvious that, after the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as the new President of the Russian Federation, things would not be the same in Russia as in the presidency of Yeltsin. Because, the new Russian President Putin became the focus of interest of the international community with his career. Moreover, when he came to power with the intension of “strengthening the state”, this referred to a radical transformation in the country. It was also seen that with its deficiencies, the Military Doctrine of 1993 did not meet the needs of the Federation. Therefore, in the presidency of him, a new military doctrine, the Military Doctrine of 2000 was adopted. In addition this doctrine, “Russian National Security Concept” of January 2000 was issued. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to inquire the intension of Putin by “strengthening the state”. Because, this issue is also connected with his ideas on both economy and security. In addition to this, by analysing the new Military Doctrine of 2000, it is intended to explore if there is a real change in Russian security perception in the presidency of Putin.

5.1. Putin and His Goal of “Strengthening the State”

When Vladimir Putin was appointed as the new president of the Russian Federation on December 31, 1999, the international community was influenced by his past, because, according to Charap, the observers got curious by his rise to power and were excited about the implications of his career in the KGB.²⁷⁹ The concerns regarding his direction and agenda reached to the top. The West also felt restless about him because of the possibility of the re-emergence of authoritarian rule in Russia as the result of his policies, and as a matter of fact, in an article in “The Economist” these fears were reflected about him along with the questions if

²⁷⁹ Samuel Charap, “The Petersburg Experience: Putin’s Political Career and Russian Foreign Policy”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol.51 No.1, 2004, p. 55

Russia could direct its way into Europe.²⁸⁰ Because, when he firstly, had become the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, he had pushed Russian army into a new war in Chechnya. Therefore, according to Baev, he used the Second Chechen War not only as a political tool for his presidential campaign but also a springboard for his plan in order to revive the Russian State and giving back its great power status.²⁸¹ In this sense, he talked about Russia as “a great, powerful and mighty state” in his speech.²⁸²

Moreover, in his presidential campaign, he articulated his four promises as; “strengthening the Russian state”, introducing a “dictatorship of the law”, struggle with the terrorists in Chechnya, and reviving Russia’s position in international arena.²⁸³ In this sense, in order to understand his purpose in “strengthening the state” and “dictatorship of the law”, it is needed to dwell on his past and views. Thus, it should be noted that when Putin had served as an economic spy in Germany in the name of KGB, he had understood that Russia could only be a great power if it would both economically and militarily robust. Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, as his predecessors, had tried to strengthen Russia's economy and military, but they could not succeed in. Thus, by considering this reality, Putin decided to build a stronger central government in Moscow and planned to use it in order to overcome these problems as soon as it possible.²⁸⁴

Putin also supported a legal framework in order to constitute suitable economic reforms that could at the end bring justice and equity to the country. Besides, he wanted to make radical arrangements in the business sector for both providing the security of the investors’ rights and providing suitable standarts for every segments in the economic sector; Russia's entrepreneurs, small businessmen

²⁸⁰ “Vladimir Putin, Russia’s Post-Cold Warrior”, *The Economist*, Vol.354 Issue 8152, 01/08/2000

²⁸¹ Pavel K. Baev (a) , “The Plight of the Russian Military: Shallow Identity and Self-defeating Culture”, *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol.29 No.1, Fall 2002, p.137

²⁸² Brzezinski (b), *op.cit.*, p.60

²⁸³ “Russia: Strengthening the State”, *Strategic Survey*, 2000/2001, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.109

²⁸⁴ Paul Starobin, David Fairlamb, Stan Crock, “Putin’s Russia”, *Business Week*, 01/17/2000, pp.48-51

as well as the magnates. However, the most important development was about his declaration on “oligarchs” in which he said that the privileges for them was no longer available in Russia.²⁸⁵ In fact, he took precautions for preventing the power of regional governors and oligarchs, and in addition to this, several measures were undertaken to re-assert state control over the media and to increase tax revenues for the budget.²⁸⁶ As a matter of fact, by the time he took the presidency of the country, Russia’s economic decline has reached to nadir and corruption rates were unbelievable. What Brzezinski stressed in his article was that only \$2-\$3 billion was directly invested from abroad in the Russian Federation in 1999, whereas in its neighbour and rival, China, the rate was reached to \$43 billion, moreover, according to the data of Global Competitiveness Report in 1999, Russia’s place was 59, as the last country, among the countries surveyed, while China was ranked as 32, and besides, in an inquiry concerning the corruption rates among 99 states, Russia came as 82.²⁸⁷ All these economic data indicated Russia’s economic dependence on the West and the need for reforms. Hence, by grasping the economic dependency with the West, Brzezinski also pointed out Putin’s evaluation of the West in his early years. According to Brzezinski, Putin’s pragmatism entailed of preventing the entrenched hostility to the West in rebuilding Russia due to the fact that declining economic situation in the country.²⁸⁸

Putin was also aware of worsening militarial conditions in the country. Unlike Yeltsin, he comprehended the saliance of military policy issues, and therefore, he stressed his political commitment for increasing the readiness of armed-forces in order to cope with both the internal and the external threats of the Russian Federation in his presidential campaign.²⁸⁹ In fact, what Golts and Putnam emphasized in their article was that after the inauguration, Putin was

²⁸⁵ “Putin’s Russia”, *The Economist*, Vol. 355 Issue 8170, 05/13/2000

²⁸⁶ “Russia: Strengthening the State”, *Strategic Survey*, 2000/2001, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p.109

²⁸⁷ Brzezinski (b), *op.cit.*, p.57

²⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.60

²⁸⁹ “Russia”, *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000/2001, p.109

much more interested in the armed forces than his predecessor, by considering “ a strictly hierarchical, military-style command system” as the best style for governing a country like Russia.²⁹⁰ This can be best explained by the state militarism in Russia which goes back to the eighteenth century, and finds its reasons in the concept of “defense-mindedness”. To Golt’s and Putnam’s way of thinking, the centrality of the Russian military in the formation of the Russian state was undeniable throughout almost two centuries, and it was believed “Russia’s security is ultimately guaranteed by the ability of its leaders to draw upon the full capacity of the state and its citizens for defense of the homeland”.²⁹¹ However, it should be kept in mind that Russia intended to constitute parliamentary democracy and transition to a market-driven economy from a controlled socialist economy in the early transition period.²⁹² Therefore, an insight over government’s right to demand the mobilization of the whole country and economy for militarial aims could not be accepted if Russia really wanted to adopt Western values.²⁹³ Moreover, it was very difficult for the world to comprehend Putin’s “real aims”, when he said “Several years ago we fell prey to an illusion that we have no enemies. We paid dearly for this” in the last month of 1999 before becoming the President of Russia, and because of this reason “The Economist” indicated that Putin said a kind of “Soviet-style bombast”.²⁹⁴ Hence, this contradiction made the situation incomprehensible for the world, and they tried to perceive the views of Putin on the state, economy and security. Thus, it is needed to inquire the literature concerning the evaluations in order to understand the views of Putin.

In this sense, according to Alex Pravda, Putin can be named as “a sophisticated modern realist”. He grasped the importance of both economic and security components of state power. He viewed cooperation with the West as a

²⁹⁰ Golts and Putnam, *op.cit.*, p.150

²⁹¹ *Ibid*, p.138

²⁹² Miyamoto, *op.cit.*, p.46

²⁹³ Golts and Putnam, *op.cit.*, p.157

²⁹⁴ “Vladimir Putin, Russia’s Post-Cold Warrior”, *The Economist*, Vol.354 Issue 8152, 01/08/2000

necessary attempt in order to rival a world of competitive states. He was also aware of the salience of security issues. Besides, Pravda named him as “traditionalist” in his appraisal of security as the power of the Russian state, whereas he called him as “modernist” because of not giving importance to the quantity of the resources but his emphasis on the quality of the resources which should be applicable not only to “hard” military capacities, but to also “soft” security fields. Therefore, “this sophisticated understanding of security needs” entailed Putin’s stress regarding economic improvement.²⁹⁵ In other words, the complicated situation in the country necessitated the interaction in the solution of the security issues and the economic problems, however, the economic weakness was the key issue for Putin.

However, the views of Bobo Lo on Putin is quite different . According to him, what was also striking was that the predominancy of the political-military issues in the agenda of Putin when it was compared with the economic issues of the country. In this context, Bobo Lo indicated that with the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as the new President, “securitization” became the key component of Russian foreign policy. This referred to the primacy of political-military issues over economic priorities. Therefore, to Lo’s way of thinking, although economic issues were seemed to be most important problem of the country, old-style or “hard” security interests remained to keep their saliance. In addition to this, zero-sum, balance of power and sphere of influence mentalities continued to be important in Russia.²⁹⁶

By relying on these explanations it can be said that Putin tried to “strengthen the state” in order to give its great power status back. In this sense, he grasped the need for overcoming militarial and economic problems of the country. In addition to this, because of his “pragmatism”, he became prudent in Russia’s relations with the world, particularly, with the West, in spite of seeing it as the

²⁹⁵ Alex Pravda, “Putin’s Foreign Policy after 11 September: Radical or Revolutionary?”, in Gabriel Gorodetsky, (ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, p.49

²⁹⁶ Bobo Lo (a), “The Securitization of Russian Foreign Policy under Putin”, in Gabriel Gorodetsky, (ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, p.14

main potential enemy as it was implied in the new Military Doctrine of 2000. Thus, it would be very beneficial to inquire this new doctrine in his presidency.

5.2.Evaluation of the New Military Doctrine (2000) in Putin's Period

First of all, because of the new Military Doctrine of 2000 of the Russian Federation is connected with the National Security Concept of 2000, it is necessary to mention that the National Security Concept had been determined before the formation of the new Military Doctrine.²⁹⁷ In this sense, on 10 January 2000, President Putin approved a new National Security Concept concerning Russia's political security policy, then, the draft of the new Military Doctrine of 2000 which was much more specific policy paper dealing with military issues was adopted by the Russian Security Council in late February 2000, and lastly by the elected President Putin in April 2000.²⁹⁸ According to Avulyte, what was important regarding both these documents was that their stress on the elements of Russia's great power concerns, and its material interests in the international economy.²⁹⁹

In this context, referring to Wallander, it should be also mentioned that the problems in the definition of Russia's new identity and clash of national interests, decline in its power in the international arena and its geopolitics has affected and defined Russia's national security policy, thus, the elements regarding Russia's Soviet past, the cultural debates in defining its post-Soviet identity, Russia's limitations in the post-Cold War security environment, and the new economic and political interests remained to be the key issues in the definition of the national security policy of Russia in Putin's period.³⁰⁰ What Wallander also pointed out in his article was that although Putin signed the new concept as one of his first official decisions, this did not mean that it was the product of only Putin's views

²⁹⁷ "Russia", *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000/2001, p.110

²⁹⁸ Ruta Avulyte, "Russian National Security Policy: National Security Concept and Military Doctrine", available on line at: <http://www.avucon.4t.com/Htmlweb/Russia-Security.htm>, accessed on 11.02.2005

²⁹⁹ *Ibid*

³⁰⁰ Celeste A. Wallander, "Wary of the West: Russian Security Policy at the Millennium", *Arms Control Today*, March 2000, available on line at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_03/cwmmr00.asp, accessed on 23.03.2005

or personal leadership, but, it was formed as the result of the elite debate and consensus.³⁰¹ Therefore, the new security concept was formed at the end of a painful discussion period.

The new National Security Concept of 2000 specified the position of Russia in the international community and defined its national interests, the threats to its national security and the objectives in order to ensure its national security.³⁰² What was striking for Kibaroglu regarding this new concept was its emphasis about the formation of an international relations system based on domination of the Western countries in the international community, under US leadership and their efforts for applying unilateral solutions to the problems.³⁰³ Thus, the Russian Federation reflected its reaction to the United States because of ignoring its views on crucial issues.

Besides, the new National Security Concept defined the Military Doctrine of Russia as formal views of the Russian Federation in order to provide its military security.³⁰⁴ In this context, if we inquire the new Military Doctrine of 2000, we see that it has been composed of three basic sections; military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic; in order to provide the military security of the Russian Federation.³⁰⁵

Öztürk, referring to Manilov, evaluated this doctrine as “preventing war doctrine” because of its intention regarding the implementation of a peaceful foreign policy.³⁰⁶ Moreover, although the military doctrine emphasized Russia as “defensive in nature” and was constructed in order “to defend national interests

³⁰¹ *Ibid*

³⁰² See the National Security Concept (2000) available on line at :<http://www.russiaeurope.mid.ru/russiastrat2000.html>, accessed on 11.02.2005

³⁰³ Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, pp.99-100

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p.100

³⁰⁵ See Russian Military Doctrine (2000) available on line at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm> , accessed on 07.02.2005

³⁰⁶ Öztürk, *op.cit.*, p.45

and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies”,³⁰⁷ we should be prudent concerning its reasons in the improvement of the Military Doctrine of 1993 in the aftermath of Kosovo War.

In fact, the new versions of the Russian Security Concept and Military Doctrine were obviously formed after Russian humiliation in 1999, in the US-led NATO military action against Yugoslavia.³⁰⁸ Besides, it should also be kept in mind that National Security Concept and Military Doctrine were changed due to the fact that not only international but also internal developments in the country. As a matter of fact, Avulyte in his article dwelt on the impacts of 1998 crisis and internal political developments in the country, because they made a shift from liberal elements in former President Yeltsin's political coalition. In this sense, the economic crisis of 1998 undermined the liberal views because of displaying Russia's vulnerability to the international economy and financial markets, therefore, the crisis strengthened the position of the Statists by believing “a less Western-dependent, more state-directed policy of economic reform” could provide stability in Russia.³⁰⁹ Hence, according to Avulyte, the economic crisis, Kosovo War, together with Russia's reaction to NATO's enlargement to the east, strengthened the statist arguments, whereas, undermined the liberal arguments on security as they proved “West's intensions toward Russia were not benign”.³¹⁰

As Trenin indicated in his article, the new Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation remained to view the Western alliance as the principal potential enemy, however, it could not be indifferent to the realities along Russia's southern periphery.³¹¹ Moreover, “the violation by certain states of international treaties and agreements in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament” was indicated as the destabilizing factors for the military-political security of the Russian

³⁰⁷ See Russian Military Doctrine (2000) available on line at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm>, accessed on 07.02.2005

³⁰⁸ Arbatov (a), *op.cit.*, p.29, See also Chapter 4; Stance Towards the West

³⁰⁹ Ruta Avulyte, “Russian National Security Policy: National Security Concept and Military Doctrine”, available on line at: <http://www.avucon.4t.com/Htmlweb/Russia-Security.htm>, accessed on 11.02.2005

³¹⁰ *Ibid*

³¹¹ Trenin (a), *op.cit.*, p.35

Federation in the new Military Doctrine.³¹² According to Kibaroglu, although it was not explained clearly, this referred to the intensions of the United States in order to form a national air defence system via ignoring Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty which had been signed between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in 1972.³¹³ Therefore, Russian reaction to the modification or to the abolishment of this treaty should be evaluated as the enduring effects of Soviet concerns for the Russian Federation in the post-Soviet era. It was also mentioned that Russia “attaches priority importance to strengthening the collective security system within the CIS framework on the basis of developing and strengthening the Collective Security Treaty”.³¹⁴ Hence, we might also see the salience of former Soviet space for the security concerns of the Russian Federation and its efforts to sustain and improve the Collective Security Treaty of 1992.

It should be also mentioned that another striking point regarding the new Military Doctrine is its stress on the nuclear weapons. It was indicated in “Free Republic” that the 1997 National Security Concept let the first use of nuclear arms only “in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation,” whereas the new Military Doctrine has intended to the usage of nuclear weapons “in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation”, and therefore, because of this mentality, it was implied that Russia “reserves the right” to use nuclear weapons to respond to all “weapons of mass destruction attacks”.³¹⁵ Hence, we observed Russian intension on nuclear deterrence in this doctrine.

As a matter of fact, to Avulyte’s way of thinking, whenever the conventional forces of Russia weakened, Russia stressed its nuclear deterrent, and therefore, this Russian perception also meant an escape from “no-first-use”

³¹² See Russian Military Doctrine (2000) available on line at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm>, accessed on 07.02.2005

³¹³ Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, p.101

³¹⁴ See Russian Military Doctrine (2000) available on line at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a394aa0466bfe.htm>, accessed on 07.02.2005

³¹⁵ *Ibid*

pledge which had made by Soviet President Gorbachev.³¹⁶ In other words, according to Kibaroglu, this insight meant that Russia could use nuclear weapons as the first side, also referred to a shift from “no-first-use” of nuclear weapons concept which had been accepted in the early 1980s.³¹⁷ Therefore, as Kibaroglu mentioned in his article, the new military doctrine should be analysed carefully because of its emphasis on Russia’s nuclear power capabilities and its intensions regarding these weapons.³¹⁸

By relying on these explanations, it can be said that the Russian Federation continued to see the Western alliance as the main potential adversary with the new Military Doctrine of 2000. In addition to this, former Soviet space continued to remain in its sphere of interest with the intension of strengthening military cooperation in the framework of CIS Collective Security Treaty. Apart from the other characteristics of the Military Doctrine of 2000, Russian emphasis on nuclear weapons should be considered as the most important development. Because, it can be commented that the possible disintegration scenarios concerning the Russian Federation in its early transition period entailed Russian nuclear deterrence mentality.

Besides, it should be also mentioned that both the internal developments, as Nord-Ost (2002) and Beslan (2004), and the external events, like September 11, has caused to the formation of a new document; Defence White Paper (DWP) in 2003.³¹⁹ Moreover, Putin demanded a revision in the National Security Concept, as the result of these new developments.³²⁰ Therefore, the next chapter will aim to explore both internal and external developments in the framework of Russian security insight.

³¹⁶ Ruta Avulyte, “Russian National Security Policy: National Security Concept and Military Doctrine”, available on line at: <http://www.avucon.4t.com/Htmlweb/Russia-Security.htm>, accessed on 11.02.2005

³¹⁷ Kibaroglu, *op.cit.*, pp.101-102

³¹⁸ *Ibid*, p.98

³¹⁹ Marcel de Haas, *Putin’s External & Internal Security Policy*, London: Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, 2005, pp.1-8

³²⁰ *Ibid*, p.12

CHAPTER 6

RUSSIA'S EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND ITS INTERNAL SECURITY UNDER PUTIN

It was seen that with the new National Security Concept of 2000 and Military Doctrine of 2000 Russian perception towards the West did not change at all, hence, the entrenched Cold War mentality remained to be the case. Besides, NATO expansion towards the East was not welcomed by Russia. However, the course of the relations with the West seemed to be changed by the September 11 attacks in the United States of America. But, by considering the rooted Russian mentality towards “the enemy of the Cold War”, we should be prudent regarding Russian mentality towards the West, in spite of American-Russian rapprochement on the surface. Because, the existence of the United States in “Russian spheres of influence areas” was not welcomed by the Russian Federation, in spite of its so-called approval of American entry to these regions in the name of fight against terrorism. Because, we might think that Russian sensitivity towards terrorist attacks on Russian soil entailed this insight.

Moreover, Nord-Ost hostage taking and Beslan events made deep effects in Russian security thinking. In addition to these developments, strengthening Russia's place in the CIS and on global scale has been the aim of President Putin. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to explore the latest developments and their impacts on Russian security insight in the presidency of Putin. Besides, Russian reaction to Iraq War and other events connected with Russian security will be under the area of interest of this chapter.

6.1.The West

Although it is stressed that September 11 attacks in the USA is a watershed in terms of American-Russian relations, as Bukkvoll indicates, there are some indicators that this landmark concerning pro-Western approach goes

back than it seems.³²¹ First of all, it should be noted that both Russia and the United States had the same view in undermining the Taliban government in Afghanistan in the war against terrorism, before the September 11 events in the United States of America in 2001, but, the different views and policies towards the different issues of the world had been the case between them. In this context, if the reasons for this “cooperation” between the United States and Russia were inquired from the Russian point of view, it was seen that Russia had believed that the Taliban regime supported on toppling post-Soviet regimes in Central Asia, and in addition to this, it had thought that the Taliban regime hosted Chechen training camps, therefore, this restricted cooperation had emerged between them.³²²

Moreover, as Maerli pointed out in his article, from the beginning of the 1990s, the US Department of Energy made a cooperation with Russia to install modern nuclear security systems for weapons-usable material which was named “The Material Protection, Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) Program” with the aim of reducing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism threat in the world.³²³ But, it is unmistakable that none of these initiatives is as important as the common interests of the Russian Federation and the United States of America in fight against terrorism after the September 11 attacks. The climate was so positive that even it was speculated that this American-Russian global cooperation could become more important than between the United States and its European allies.³²⁴

In this context, President Putin was the first foreign leader to call American President Bush, after the September 11 attacks in order to suggest Russian support in fight against terrorism. In fact, from this time, Putin supported the US campaign with its diplomatic support, shared intelligence and let the existence of the military bases of the US in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in

³²¹ Tor Bukkvoll, “Putin’s Strategic Partnership with the West: The Domestic Politics of Russian Foreign Policy”, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 22 Issue 3, Sep2003, p.234

³²² Dmitri Trenin (c), “A Farewell to the Great Game?: Prospects for Russian-American Security Cooperation in Central Asia”, *European Security*, Vol. 12 Issue 3/4 , Autumn/Winter2003, pp.21-22

³²³ Morten Bremer Maerli, “U.S.-Russian Naval Security Upgrades”, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 56 Issue 4, Autumn2003, p. 18

³²⁴ Rumer and Celeste, *op.cit.*, pp.58-59

spite of a increasing criticism from domestic politics.³²⁵ According to Lo, September 11 attacks was the opportunity to reflect the “ ‘presidential’ character of Russian foreign policy”.³²⁶ Therefore, we have seen the dominance of President Putin on the decisions following these attacks.

Moreover, as Pravda indicated, following September 11 attacks, there was no meeting of the Security Council of Russia for deciding which way to follow, instead of this, the key decisions have taken by President Putin after the consultation with a few close advisers to him. According to Pravda, what this behaviour displayed was that Putin, “as a specialist in security matters”, faced with no difficulty in transforming his decision into the action and in his stance of adopting a pro-US line regarding the military bases of the US in the former Soviet space and concerning US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.³²⁷ In fact, in December 2001, American President Bush declared that the USA would withdraw from the ABM Treaty regardless of Russian opposition. Yet, Putin by grasping the importance of American partnership, has not reacted something that would damage and prevent this cooperation.³²⁸ However, it should not be forgotten that not everybody in the country had same views with Putin.

In this context, it should be mentioned that following the September 11 attacks, Russian attitude towards the West has been divided into two categories. The one group supported fully integration with the West by claiming this event as an opportunity to overcome past difficulties, whereas, the other group evaluated cooperation with the West as damaging than beneficial for Russian interests.³²⁹

In other words, when Putin let US aircraft to use Russian airspace and more importantly, accepted the existence of the bases of the US forces in the former Soviet space; Central Asia, this was not welcomed by the other segments of

³²⁵ “Russia’s Move Westward”, *Strategic Survey*, 2001/2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.141

³²⁶ Bobo Lo (b), Vladimir Putin and the Evaluation of Russian Foreign Policy, Oxford: Blackwell, 2003 ,p.118

³²⁷ Pravda, *op.cit.*, p.51

³²⁸ “Russia’s Move Westward”, *Strategic Survey*, 2001/2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.142-143

³²⁹ Lo (b), *op.cit.*, pp.115-116

the country.³³⁰ Because, it should be noted that after the end of the Cold War, Caspian Sea became an attractive area because of its rich oil reserves, this competition has also been called as a new “Great Game”, hence, Russia understood the intension of the United States concerning this region and became prudent about American control of this area, whereas, the US, from its point of view, blamed Russia as being “neo-imperialist” due to the fact that its lasting hegemony in the newly independent states of this area.³³¹

Because, Russia remained to be the one of the leading power in the international energy sector in the post-Cold War era. Russia, as the second-largest producer of oil, and the largest producer of natural gas continued to sell its reserves to Europe, and therefore, by considering this reality, Russia wanted to use this asset in order to sustain its economy and budget.³³² But, Putin denied one of the most fundamental principles of the military doctrine with the acceptance of the existence of any third party’s permanent military presence in the CIS.³³³ Thus, Putin’s choice was not welcomed for the concerns of a new “Great Game”, however, he was aware of the “realities” and grasped that he would probably have failed by objecting American existence in the region. Therefore, it can be commented that Putin behaved so, because, it seemed that he had no alternatives. Hence, we can not claim that the perception of Russia towards the West has changed in such a short time.

Putin has been described as a “pragmatist” as a cliché.³³⁴ In fact, he aimed to benefit from US war on terrorism against al-Qaeda and the Taliban by believing that these had provided militarial and financial aid to rebel leaders fighting against Russian troops in Chechnya.³³⁵ Moreover, according Lo, with

³³⁰ Thomas M. Nichols, “Russia’s Turn West”, *World Policy Journal*, Vol.19 Issue 4, Winter 2002/2003, p.14

³³¹ Trenin (c), *op.cit.*, p.22

³³² Rumer and Celeste, *op.cit.*, p.59

³³³ Trenin (c), *op.cit.*, p.23

³³⁴ Lo (b), *op.cit.*, p.131

³³⁵ “Russia’s Move Westward”, *Strategic Survey*, 2001/2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.141

“told you so” attitude, Putin tried to use September 11 attacks as a proof to show its rightfulness on Chechen issue.³³⁶

Putin also aimed to get economic aid from the West by its support on the war against terrorism. According to “the Economist”, Russian rapprochement with the West should be considered mainly for economic reasons, because of Russian desire for foreign trade and foreign investment. Therefore, Putin by realizing this truth, believed that “without economic integration with the West, Russia will never again be strong enough to defend its interests” and thus, it was believed that it has needed “western medicine”.³³⁷ However, it should not be forgotten that hard security problems kept their importance for Russia. It was true that the West considered economic priorities as more important for Putin, yet, according to Lo, hard security issues such as “terrorism, domestic and international, and its relationship with questions of territorial integrity and national sovereignty” and “American plans to develop a strategic missile defence system and the implications for strategic stability” were more important than Russia’s entry to the World Trade Organization or Paris Club debt.³³⁸ Therefore, hard security issues remained to be important for the Russian Federation in the presidency of Putin in the post-September 11 mood.

When we explore developments regarding NATO and Russia, it is seen a new formation. In this sense, at the NATO Permanent Joint Council meeting in 2002, the decision was taken in order to establish a NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in order to reflect the changes after the September 11 attacks between NATO and Russia. In order to display the post-September 11 sensitivities, NRC focused on counter-terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation and arms control issues primarily. What was important regarding the NRC was that it was evaluated as a “reward” for Russia as the result of Putin’s support for the war against terrorism, and in addition to that it was believed that the NRC would soften Russia’s stance to the next wave of NATO enlargement. However, Putin did not change his perception of NATO and stated that he did not believe that NATO enlargement

³³⁶ Lo (b), *op.cit.*, p.124

³³⁷ “New Friends, New Opportunities”, *The Economist*, Vol. 363 Issue 8279, 6/29/2002

³³⁸ Lo (a), *op.cit.*, pp.14-15

would strengthen European security.³³⁹ In addition to this, both the Russian elites and the public continued to see NATO's mission not as a greater military role in the global campaign to fight against terrorism, but as a political organization in which Russia could take part to play a more equal role.³⁴⁰

As a matter of fact, if we inquire Russian reaction to NATO enlargement in the presidency of Putin by looking newly constructed documents, we observe contradictions towards it. Because, the Defence White Paper of 2003 posed the vision of two views; while on the one hand concerns remained to be the case on NATO's enlargement to the new states by also saying the need in order to enhance NATO-Russia partnership, on the other hand DWP also adopted more antagonistic approach stressing Russian expectation concerning the removal of anti-Russian entries from NATO's military planning. Therefore, according to de Haas, this contradiction made the situation more difficult for comprehending the clear Russian intentions in the realm of security.³⁴¹

In the light of these developments, it can be summarized that, in spite of Putin's closeness towards the West, state of mind of the elites did not change after September 11 attacks, and in addition to this, Putin's positive stance towards the West was limited and only manifested in public discourse, by not referring to a structural change of Russian foreign and security policy.³⁴² Bobo Lo also indicated that these developments did not make any "substantial change in Russian security perceptions", because, the Soviet heritage and its post-Soviet past displayed that "old prejudices and stereotypes - in Russia *and* the West – died hard".³⁴³ A striking explanation has come from Thomas Nichols concerning Russian mentality towards the West: "Russia can not (or will not) change", because, he believed that Russia's turn towards the West was insincere and has

³³⁹ "Russia", *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002/2003, pp.87-88

³⁴⁰ "Russia's Move Westward", *Strategic Survey*, 2001/2002, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.146

³⁴¹ De Haas, *op.cit.*, pp.6-7

³⁴² *Ibid*, p.9

³⁴³ Lo (b), *op.cit.*, p.124

emerged as the result of opportunism.³⁴⁴ Lo, also indicated that the key point in order to grasp the insight of Putin administration has not been Westernism, but the intension of maximizing Russian national interests.³⁴⁵ Therefore, it has been seen that Russian security perception towards the West has not change even after the September 11 attacks and it seems that it can not change in the near future.

6.2.The re-interpretation of the “Near Abroad”

In the early years of the transition period, the Russian Federation understood that security could not be provided unilaterally, hence, security was tried to be provided within the CIS, which was composed from post-Soviet states.³⁴⁶ To Nikitin’s way of thinking, in the 1990s even it had been thought that while Western European Union (WEU) would form a Western pillar of Eurasian security, the CIS would constitute an Eastern pillar of Eurasian security by some Russian analysts.³⁴⁷ We all understood that after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia aimed to form the CIS in order to restrict the sovereignties of these states in the areas of security and external economic relations.³⁴⁸

Therefore, by keeping in mind these concerns, in the presidency of Putin, the CIS continued to be important for the security needs of the Russian Federation. Both in the National Security Concept of 2000 and in the Military Doctrine of 2000, the significance of improving relations with these states was indicated, and Russia also underlined the need of cooperation in the military-political fields in the framework of the CIS Collective Security Treaty in these documents.³⁴⁹ In other words, Russia under Putin, has tried to secure most regions

³⁴⁴ Nichols, *op.cit.*, p.13

³⁴⁵ Lo (b), *op.cit.*, p.130

³⁴⁶ Alexander Nikitin, “NATO Enlargement and Russian Policy in the 1990s”, in David Carlton, Paul Ingram, (eds), *The Search for Stability in Russia and the Former Soviet Bloc*, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Company Limited, 1997, p.152

³⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p.156

³⁴⁸ Brzezinski (b), *op.cit.*, p.61

³⁴⁹ De Haas, *op.cit.*, p.2

of the former Soviet Union with a greater CIS integration.³⁵⁰ However, the situation in both Central Asia and the Caucasus was more complicated than it seemed. Moreover, American presence in the “near abroad” was not welcomed by Russia, in spite of its so-called approval in the name of fight against terrorism after the September 11 attacks and this made the scene more obscure.

As it has been indicated in this study, Russia had to accept American presence in Eurasia with the American war against the Taliban in Afghanistan after the September 11 attacks. According to Bremmer, the existence of the United States via its military forces in Georgia, Uzbekistan and the Kyrgyz Republic and the beginning of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline project, meant that nothing would be the same in Central Asia and the Caucasus as before the September 11 attacks.³⁵¹ Besides, according to Wallander, the USA perceived Eurasia as “a global source of vulnerability and threat, because of the transnational reach and operation of terrorism”.³⁵² Therefore, the USA wanted to have an access to the region for the future of Eurasian security.

However, by considering this region in its sphere of interest, Russia did not want to leave this region. Thus, Russia did not want to be marginalised in the Central Asia. In this sense, in December 2002, it signed a military agreement with Kyrgyzstan in order to provide for the stationing aircrafts and troops.³⁵³ In addition to that the Russian belief of “while the Americans are here now, we are in the region forever” is a good explanation in order to grasp Russian mentality concerning the “near abroad”.³⁵⁴ Moreover, according to Baev, when the USA withdraws from the region, it is expected that Russia will try to re-assert its

³⁵⁰ Eric A. Miller, “The Changing Face of Eurasia: Russian and Ukrainian Foreign Policy in Transition”, *Comparative Strategy*, Vol.22 Issue 4, Oct2003, p.377

³⁵¹ Ian Bremmer, “The Future of Eurasia”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol.34, No.2, June 2003, p.238

³⁵² Celeste A. Wallander, “Silk Road, Great Game or Soft Underbelly? The New US-Russia Relationship and Implications in Eurasia”, *Journal of Southeast European & Black Sea Studies*, Vol.3 Issue 3, Sep2003, pp.101-102

³⁵³ Rajan Menon (b), “The New Great Game in Central Asia”, *Survival*, Vol.45 No.2, Summer 2003, p.192

³⁵⁴ Roy Allison (e), “Strategic Reassertion in Russia’s Central Asia Policy”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 80 No. 2, March 2004, p.277

dominance over Central Asia.³⁵⁵ Therefore, it might be said that Russia demanded American presence in the region temporarily and only in the framework of the fight against terrorism.

In this sense, Russian endeavours, not to be excluded from the “near abroad” and to take roles actively, were accelerated in the framework of CIS Collective Security Treaty. Thus, according to Ostankov, the transformation of Collective Security Treaty into a full-pledged military-political organization, Collective Security Treaty Organization, in 2002, should be considered as a springboard which aimed to consolidate the post-Soviet space and to enhance the role of Russia among the newly independent states.³⁵⁶ According to Kormiltsev, with this transformation it was aimed that military cooperation between the CIS countries would acquire concrete form, particularly in the sphere peacekeeping, protection of borders, strengthening regional security.³⁵⁷ Moreover, in order to fight against terrorism in Central Asia, in June 2002, the CIS Anti-terrorist Center was established, and in this sense, large-scale exercises carried out.³⁵⁸ In addition to this, the Russian-led CIS Collective Rapid Reaction Force (CRDF) was established in 2001 in the framework of CIS Collective Security Treaty Organisation and this made its first exercise in 2002 with battalions from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Russia.³⁵⁹ According to Zhenghong, all of these formations under the initiative of the Russian Federation displayed Russian efforts to provide military integration with the CIS countries.³⁶⁰ Besides, these were considered to be the indicators of Russian endeavours to take an important role in the “near abroad”.

³⁵⁵ Pavel K. Baev (b) , “The Evolution of Putin’s Regime”, *Problems of Post-Communism*, Vol. 51 Issue 6, Nov/Dec2004, p.10

³⁵⁶ V. I. Ostankov, “Geopolitical Problems and Possible Solutions in the Context of RF Security”, *Military Thought*, Vol.14 Issue 1, 2005, pp.25-26

³⁵⁷ N. V. Kormiltsev, “Ground Troops within Russia’s Military Security System”, *Military Thought*, Vol. 13 Issue 1, 2004, p.7

³⁵⁸ Zhu Zhenghong, “Regional Security in Central Asia and Russia after 9/11”, *Far Eastern Affairs*, Vol.33 Issue 1, 2005, p.23

³⁵⁹ “Russia”, *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002/2003, p.87

³⁶⁰ Zhenghong, *op.cit.*, p.24

It was also observed that Russia has lost strategic space in Transcaucasia, and this weakening position of Russia emerged as the result of oil projects in the Caspian Sea region and American presence in the “near abroad”, and what was more, Azerbaijan and Georgia expressed their desires to join NATO.³⁶¹ All these developments referred to Russia’s hard and restricted situation in the Caucasus, and these developments were accepted as important threats to the security of Russian Federation.

Moreover, according to Allison, the Iraq War should be considered as a reinforcement of the traditional Russian stress on security relationships and interests in order to sustain a forward security zone in the southern part of the CIS.³⁶² In this context, it should be noted that with the Second Gulf War in March 2003, Western camp divided into two categories.³⁶³ Anti-war “entente active” of four major powers; France, Germany, Russia and China opposed the US- led war in Iraq.³⁶⁴ Putin benefiting from this split between the Transatlantic, Western camp aspired to enhance Russia’s role in the international community.³⁶⁵ The Russian leadership also tried to melt the domestic criticism of the American-led military campaign in Iraq with the intension that the United States would let Russia to sustain its own strategic relationship with Central Asian and the other CIS states.³⁶⁶ Hence, this stance obviously has reflected the contradictory character of Russian mentality.

In order to test the success of Russian policy towards the “near abroad”, it is necessary to scrutinize the views of Brzezinski. In this context, according to him, Russian policy towards “the near abroad” has been composed of three pillars: The first is to apply strict pressure on both Georgia and Azerbaijan in order to prevent the destabilization after their presidents depart from their missions, the

³⁶¹ Y. Y. Ivanov, “Russia’s National Security Problems in Transcaucasia and the Era of Globalization”, *Military Thought*, Vol.14 Issue 1, 2005, pp.53-54

³⁶² Allison (e), *op.cit.*, p.279

³⁶³ De Haas, *op.cit.*, p.8

³⁶⁴ Lanxin Xiang, , “China’s Eurasian Experiment”, *Survival*, Vol.46 No.2, Summer 2004, p.109

³⁶⁵ De Haas, *op.cit.*, p.8

³⁶⁶ Allison (e), *op.cit.*, p.279

second aim was to strengthen the ties between the Slavic nations; Ukrainians and Belarusians, whereas the third one was to apply a pressure to the Baltic states to prevent from joining NATO.³⁶⁷ However, what was dramatic for Russia was that none of these aims could be implemented successfully. Firstly, Rose Revolution in Georgia, then Ukraine's spinnoff displayed that these countries were apt to adopt Western values.³⁶⁸ It should not be also forgotten that throughout the history, Russia feared encroaching of the West from Ukraine to its lands, thus, it should be kept in mind that the new leader of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, is apt to move towards the West.³⁶⁹ Thus, Russian reaction to the Ukrainian elections should be considered from this point of view in terms of its security concerns. Moreover, the Baltics; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became the member of NATO on 29 March 2004.³⁷⁰ Therefore, this development also made a resentment in Russia.

The latest developments in the CIS countries, such as Ukraine and Georgia, made Russian political elites restless with the belief of the CIS has come to the end and has completed its mission. Therefore, National Strategy Institute Director, Stanislav Belkovski, demanded "burying the CIS" and forming a new alliance of countries loyal to Russia, and in this sense, Motherland Duma Deputy Andrei Savelev said "We do not need a new Russia of 'Yeltsinites' within the present borders, but a genuine Russia with its imperial borders" by forming The Motherland bill that would facilitate the procedures for expanding the Russian Federation on March 2005.³⁷¹ However, this bill could not pass from Duma with the belief that it could destroy "the fragile balance of the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation", and following this event, Deputy Yurii Konev from Unified Russia cited "Now is not the time to think about how to break up other states but

³⁶⁷ Brzezinski (b), *op.cit.*, p.62

³⁶⁸ Frank Brown, "Russia: Dwindling Spheres", *Newsweek*, 21 March 2005, p.4

³⁶⁹ "Is Democracy Russia's Future? Putin Again Raises Doubts", *USA Today*, 11/29/2004

³⁷⁰ "NATO'da Tarihi Genişleme", *Cumhuriyet*, 29 March 2004

³⁷¹ Victor Yasmann, "Russia's Wounded Imperial Consciousness", available on line at: <http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/3/7534ACDD-B02B-459C-91F2-39DCB407132B.html> , accessed on 16.03.2005

to take care about the unity and sovereignty of our country”.³⁷² All these developments and explanations referred to Russia’s lasting imperial character. However, economic weakness and other internal conditions prevent Russia’s influence and dominance on the post-Soviet states by concentrating its efforts to itself.

As a matter of fact, what is more important for Bremmer is that although Russia would continue to be an important regional power in Eurasia with its huge natural resources, nuclear weapons and territory which covers much of the Eurasian land, the economic situation as the main obstacle would prevent its endeavours to be a fully developed and to be a sole power in the region.³⁷³ As a matter of fact, according to Bremmer, the American presence in Central Asia, because of the region’s increasing saliance in the war against terrorism and the distribution of energy reserves from the Caspian Sea, would continue.³⁷⁴ Therefore, by considering these developments Russia has to be prudent concerning the region.

In this context, it is very beneficial to reflect the views of Klepatskii on Russia. According to him, to choose the West or the East will be a wrong dilemma, because, Russia’s choice of a multipolar world system does not give a right for a confrontational posture.³⁷⁵ Hence, the best choice for new Russia and its Eurasian position is the multipolarity of international relations in order to both sustain its national interests and promote its security.³⁷⁶ It should be noted that by considering this reality, Russia will try to solve its domestic problems and this will be better in the short and middle terms for Russia.

6.3. Internal Threats to the Security

³⁷² *Ibid*

³⁷³ Bremmer, *op.cit.*, p.238

³⁷⁴ *Ibid*, p.240

³⁷⁵ L. N. Klepatskii, “The New Russia and the New World Order” in Gabriel Gorodetsky, (ed), *Russia Between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, p.9

³⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p.11

The Chechen issue remained to be “a running sore for the Kremlin and Ministry of Defence” in the presidency of Putin.³⁷⁷ However, it has changed its character with the increase in the number of rebel attacks outside the republic and the widespread use of suicide terror attacks.³⁷⁸ In this sense, Chechen terrorists made a hostage taking in Moscow in October 2002, and it was evaluated that this hostage taking brought the Chechen issue into Russia’s capital, but what was more, this terrorists attacks made deep effects on internal security perception of the Russian Federation, thus, both Russian military-political decision makers and Russian society appraised this event as a watershed in terms of internal security insight of the Russian Federation, which was also called as Russia’s “9/11”.³⁷⁹

Following this event, on 29 October 2002, President Putin called for his aides to draft a revision of the National Security Concept of 2000 comprising from provisions regarding increasing the role of the Russian Federation Armed Forces on fight against terrorism, evaluating the internal threats to the national security of the Federation and increasing the readiness of the Russian Federation to act against both terrorists and their sponsors abroad.³⁸⁰ By taking these precautions, Putin aspired to overcome internal terrorism, however, following events obviously displayed the insufficient feature of these measures.

Then, in September 2004, again Chechen terrorists carried out a hostage taking in Beslan which at the end was resulted with the death of more than 300 children, parents and teachers.³⁸¹ According to De Haas, the Russian Federation has adopted a similar policy towards Beslan hostage taking as in the Moscow 2002, and in the same time, Beslan has displayed that new laws and military reforms has not met the internal security needs.³⁸² Moreover, following this event, Putin cancelled direct elections for governors, restricted domestic movements of

³⁷⁷ “Russia”, *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002/2003, p.86

³⁷⁸ “Russia”, *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003/2004, p.86

³⁷⁹ De Haas, *op.cit.*, p.9

³⁸⁰ *Ibid*, p.10

³⁸¹ Katrina Vanden Heuvel, “Putin’s War”, *Nation*, Vol.279 Issue 9, 9/27/2004, p.4

³⁸² De Haas, *op.cit.*, pp.11-12

the citizens, and declared a state of semi-emergency in the North Caucasus zone.³⁸³

But, what was unusual was that the Russian Federation demanded an extraordinary session of the United States Security Council (UNSC) to ask for, and at the end it received an unqualified condemnation of the hostage taking.³⁸⁴ This condemnation was very substantial for Russia, because, UNSC resolution meant the Chechen conflict was the part of international terrorism, which at the same time did not refer to Russia let the international community to interfere in its internal problems.³⁸⁵ In fact, the international community, even the USA, could not make any pressure on Russia regarding Chechen issue. Because, it should be noted that American President's need for support on fight against global terrorism restricted American pressure on Russia in the solution of Chechen issue.³⁸⁶

But, according to De Haas the refusal of Russia of foreign interference on this issue makes the situation more difficult for the solution. Moreover, to his way of thinking, it is a strong possibility that the Russian Federation will not change its Chechen policy in the near future which will not bring a compromise.³⁸⁷ However, what is crucial for Russia in the solution of this issue is that it should base its strategy not on military but on economic solutions. Therefore, amelioration in the economy, and as a result of in the social conditions, will be the keys to overcome the domestic problems which Russia faces today.

As a matter of fact, Igor Ivanov explained that revision in the National Security Concept, as a result of internal issues and particularly Chechen issue, would include to overcome the social-economic problems as well as to fight

³⁸³ Fred Weir, "Putin's Terror Card", *New Internationalist*, Issue 376, Mar2005, p.20

³⁸⁴ De Haas, *op.cit.*, p.11

³⁸⁵ *Ibid*, pp.11-12

³⁸⁶ Jim Hoagland, "Reassessing Putin", *Washington Post*, Sunday, March 13, 2005; Page B07, available on line at: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A28524-2005Mar11.html>, accessed on 22.03.2005

³⁸⁷ De Haas, *op.cit.*, pp.11-12

against terrorism.³⁸⁸ Therefore, this shows the important role of the economy for the solution of internal threats of the Russian Federation in the near future.

6.4. Attitude Towards Other Regions and States

It is very vital to talk about Russian security insight towards China and Russian sensitivity regarding nuclear missiles in the presidency of Putin. In this sense, according to Lo, Russia can not ignore China's rise as a global force, because, Russia is aware of the fact that China is in a modernization process of its nuclear force capabilities. Therefore, in spite of by keeping in mind that it will take long time for China to become a major nuclear power, Putin is prudent on this issue and hence, is looking for new security arrangements including China in order to prevent China's this kind of purpose.³⁸⁹

It should be also noted that another Russian concern about China is regarding its language. Because, Putin thinks that Chinese could become *the lingua franca* in the Russian Far East region. By considering this challenge, Russia has tried to encourage migration from European Russia and ethnic Russians in the Baltic states and Central Asia, however, this attempt could not be implemented successfully.³⁹⁰

Yet, by keeping in mind these Russian concerns, it is also crucial to mention that Russia and China share many security interests and threat perceptions in the post-9/11 era, and in this sense, institutional framework to reflect the post-9/11 mood, was buttressed by the participation of both countries in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping.³⁹¹ Moreover, Russia has also improved its relations with both Central Asian countries and China with the approval of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Charter on June 2003.³⁹² However, according to Pant, the importance of SCO should not be

³⁸⁸ *Ibid*, p.12

³⁸⁹ Lo (b), *op.cit.*, p.89

³⁹⁰ Bobo Lo (c), "The Long Sunset of Strategic Partnership: Russia's Evolving China Policy", *International Affairs*, Vol. 80 No. 2, March 2004, pp.298-299

³⁹¹ *Ibid*, pp.296-297

³⁹² "Russia", *The Military Balance*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003/2004, p.87

exaggerated for Sino-Russian relations, instead of this, it should be grasped that the SCO has aimed of keeping control of Central Asia in order to manage against growth of ethnic terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism and in order to restrict the US influence in the region after September 11 attacks.³⁹³ Thus, Russia has tried to use SCO as a means to weaken US power in Central Asia which can be accepted as a robust indicator of Russian dislike towards the USA in the region.

³⁹³ Harsh V. Pant, "The Moscow-Beijing-Delhi 'Strategic Triangle': An Idea Whose Time May Never Come", *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35 No.3, September 2004, p.315

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

It is unmistakable that the dissolution of the USSR has affected the balances of power and the security mentality in the world by causing to the end of the Cold War. This end also marked the end of the bipolar world of the USSR and the USA. The Russian Federation, as the successor of the USSR, needed to understand that it was not a great power anymore, and, moreover, Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact was dissolved whereas, its opposite, American-led NATO, continued to be effective in the post-Cold War era. In this sense, firstly, it seemed that the end of the Communist regime abolished the direct military aggression against Russia and the United States and NATO were not perceived as threats for the Russian Federation in the framework of the search for the new identity, defining its national interests and determining new threats.

It is also true that the end of the Cold War unraveled the defense of the traditionalist position of the security studies, because the military and nuclear fears of the Cold War had made this field restricted. However, new threats and challenges such as economic problems, environmental issues, identity problems and transnational crime has become the subjects of new security agenda in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, number of actual and potential regional controversies, conflicts occurred in post-Cold War world. In the light of these developments, it has been expected that these new threats and challenges would also matter the security insight of the Russian Federation in the new world order, yet, what was vital for us was that classic Soviet-style security perception has continued to be the case for Russia in the presidencies of both Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin.

Because, it should not be forgotten that throughout four centuries, expansionism and threatening its neighbours became the goals of the Russian security thinking as an indicator of its imperial character, and Russia can not be

considered without its painful history. Moreover, former Soviet space, particularly Central Asia and the Caucasus, remained to be important for the Russian Federation in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, it is obvious that the Russian perception regarding security issues can not change in such a short period of time. It should be also noted that the Soviet Union tried to define its security in global terms in the Cold War years, yet, the course of the relations seemed to be changed with “glasnost” and “perestroika” of President Mikhail Gorbachev in the late period of the Soviet Union. But, although there were initiatives by President Gorbachev, the Soviet Union seemed to be a huge military power and nothing changed under Gorbachev’s rule. Moreover, it was believed that Russian culture, geography, and its imperial character would prevent the radical transformation of the USSR in the realm of security.

After the dissolution of the USSR, the Russian Federation, as the successor of the Soviet Union, has tried to improve its relations with the West due to the fact that obligatory economic dependence in the presidency of Boris Yeltsin. But, what was salient for the authorities of the security studies was that there were still problems which did not find its answers such as the appearance of the Warsaw Pact and the status of its opposite alliance; NATO. In this sense, the lack of expected financial aid from the West and the intensification of the expansion of NATO towards east has compelled the Russian Federation to re-evaluate its stance and insight regarding the West.

As a matter of fact, with the draft of Russia’s official military doctrine in 1992, it identified the “main threat” as that which derived from “some states and coalitions” by meaning the United States and NATO. Therefore, the security perception towards the US and NATO did not change at all for Russia especially after the war in Kosovo and the West was still perceived with ambiguity in the presidency of Yeltsin. In fact, the military action of NATO in Kosovo War pointed out a watershed in Russian security thinking, because, Russia understood that the West overlooked Russian interests whenever a distinction emerged between them, therefore, Kosovo War was a great humiliation for Russia which at the end caused to the revision of the Russian National Security Concept and to the adoption of new Military Doctrine in 2000. Moreover, Russia continued to see the

former Soviet states, especially the Caucasian states, Central Asian states and Ukraine, in its sphere of interest by forming the CIS in the post-Cold War environment in the presidency of Yeltsin.

The activities of the nationalists and separatists in the country, particularly with the Chechen Issue, and economic factors were also evaluated as the important internal threats for the security of the Russian Federation in the presidency of Yeltsin. Moreover, by grasping the economic decline of the country, the economic crisis was evaluated as the major threat to Russia's security.

With the inauguration of Vladimir Putin as the new Russian President in 2000, Russia has become the focus of interest. Putin through his policies of "strengthening the state" and "dictatorship of law" supported that Russia can only be a great power if it is economically as well as militarily strong. Both Mikhail Gorbachev and Yeltsin tried, but failed, to strengthen Russia's economy and military. Thus, Putin has seemed determined to build a stronger central government in the country. Putin also tried to "strengthen the state" in order to give its great power status back. In this sense, he grasped the need for overcoming militarial and economic problems of the country. In addition to this, because of his "pragmatism", he became prudent in sustaining Russia's relations with the world, particularly, with the West, in spite of seeing it as the main potential enemy as it was evaluated in the new Military Doctrine of 2000.

In this sense, after the September 11 attacks in the USA, it was observed a Russian-American rapprochement on the surface. In fact, Putin supported the US campaign in Afghanistan and let the existence of the military bases of the US in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in spite of a increasing criticism from domestic politics. Because, he grasped the importance of both economic and security components of state power, and hence, he evaluated cooperation with the West as a necessary attempt in order to rival a world of competitive states. What was also salient was that the complicated situation in the country necessitated the interaction in the solution of the security issues and the economic problems, however, the economic weakness was the key issue for Putin. As a matter of fact, it should be also grasped that it seemed that Putin had no alternatives in cooperating with the West in order to display its rightfulness on the Chechen

issue. Therefore, it would be wrong to expect that Russian security perception towards the USA can change in such a short period of time. Moreover, NATO expansion was not welcomed in its sphere of interest and continued to be a peril in the presidency of Putin.

It was also seen that old-style security perceptions continued to be the case in his presidency. Thus, although economic issues were seemed to be most important problem of the country, old-style or “hard” security interests remained to keep their saliance. Hence, zero-sum, balance of power and sphere of influence mentalities continued to be important in Russia. The developments, in its “near abroad” has been followed with the anxiety that this can leap to its territory and might affect the whole sphere of influence.

All these developments obviously displayed that Russia has evaluated the situation not because of a change in its point of view, but because of the obligatory circumstances, as a matter of fact, it has been aware of its economic weakness, when it has tried to establish closer bonds with the West. Therefore, as it was seen in Kosovo War and Russian reaction towards NATO enlargement, traditional interests and especially sphere of inflence and so, classic and well-known Soviet-style security perception, have continued to be the case in post-Cold War era for the Russian Federation. But, what is important for the future balances is that the West should understand Russian sensitivities in the realm of security and should not exclude it in while taking decisions. Moreover, the economic problems and the Chechen Issue, as the main challenges for the Russian Federation, should be tried to be solved as soon as it possible. Lastly, it can be commented that in the near future, Russia’s main task will be “Russia” itself.

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