CRITICAL THEORY, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

DİLEK AKDENİZLİ

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE
OF
MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

DECEMBER 2005

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

_____

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

_____

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç   (METU, IR)   _____

Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever (METU, IR)   _____

Assoc.Prof. Dr. İdris Bal   (Atılım U., IR)   _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Dilek Akdenizli

Signature   :

ABSTRACT

CRITICAL THEORY, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY

Akdenizli, Dilek

M. Sc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç

December 2005, 101 pages

In the 20th century, Critical Theory has been very influential on every discipline of social sciences including international relations. According to Critical IR Theory, traditional theories are problem solving and try to explain repetition and recurrence, rather than change; however, the main subject matter of an IR theory should be the change itself. The idea of change is also constitutive of Habermasian political thought. Jürgen Habermas, as a critical theorist, has developed the model of Deliberative Democracy to provoke a change in the political life of the Western countries towards a more ethical politics. According to Habermas, such a change will eliminate the legitimacy crisis occurred in Western democracies. Therefore, Habermas aims at strengthening the moral basis of democratic understanding in order to make masses participate actively in decision making processes. According to him, rational consensus must be at the centre of democracy, and it can be reached, only if every part of the deliberation has the opportunity to express their arguments equally. Once the idea of rational consensus

becomes a regulative rule of democracy, it is possible to change the nature of politics, including international politics.

ÖZ

ELEŞTİREL TEORİ, MÜZAKERECİ DEMOKRASİ VE ULUSLARARASI İLİŞKİLER TEORİSİ

Akdenizli, Dilek

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç

20. yüzyılda Eleştirel Teori uluslararası ilişkiler de dahil olmak üzere sosyal bilimlerin her disiplini üzerinde oldukça etkili olmuştur. Eleştirel uluslararası ilişkiler teorisine göre, geleneksel teoriler problem çözücüdürler ve değişimdense yinelenen ve tekrar vuku bulanı açıklamaya çalışırlar; ancak, bir uluslararası ilişkiler teorisinin ana konusu değişimin bizzat kendisi olmalıdır. Değişim düşüncesi Habermasçı siyasi düşüncenin de kurucusudur. Jürgen Habermas, bir eleştirel kuramcı olarak, Batı ülkelerinin politik hayatında daha ahlaki bir siyasete doğru bir değişim başlatmak için Müzakereci Demokrasi Modelini geliştirilmiştir. Habermasa göre böyle bir değişim Batı demokrasilerinde ortaya çıkan meşruiyet krizini yok edecektir. Bu nedenle Habermas kitlelerin karar alma süreçlerine aktif olarak katılması için demokratik anlayışın ahlaki temelini güçlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ona göre, rasyonel konsensus demokrasinin merkezinde olmalıdır ve buna ancak müzakerenin her bir tarafı

argümanlarını eşit oranda ifade etme fırsatı bulursa erişilebilir. Rasyonel konsensus düşüncesi bir kez demokrasinin düzenleyici kuralı haline geldi mi uluslararası politika da dahil olmak üzere siyasetin doğasını değiştirmek mümkün olur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel Teori, Söylem Etiği, İdeal Konuşma Durumu, Müzakereci Demokrasi, Avrupa Birliği, Agonizm

To My Mother

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Faruk Yalvaç for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

I would also like to thank Assoc. Prof. Dr. İdris Bal and Assist. Prof. Dr. Oktay Tanrısever for their suggestions and comments.

I am grateful to Ms. Dilaman Akkartal for her patience and generosity.

Many thanks to my dearest friend, Özlem Kaplan for her infinite support.

My brother Fuat, my sister in law Yaprak and their newly born son, Umut, thank you so much for being in my life.

My very special thanks to Volkan, you are my reason.

Finally I would like to thank my mother, Duygu Akdenizli. I hope you will always be with me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to analyze the views of critical theory on modernism, nature of politics and is implications for international relations theory. However, while trying to understand the nature of both national and international politics from a critical perspective, this thesis also investigates the possibilities for change towards a more just politics.

In today's politics, the efficiency has become the one and only criterion for decision making, and values and normative assessments is getting smaller and smaller in our daily judgments. Politics has turned into a profession which requires mastery of a complex body of knowledge and specialized skills, stemming from both formal education and practical experience, and as a result, masses in the Western democracies have started losing their ties with politics.

Yet the sprit of Enlightenment and the modernist trust in humanity had promised a new world woven by progress and emancipation. With the strong impetus of the Industrial Revolution, progress was relatively achieved at least in the West. However, to meet the demand for emancipation which means "freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness" (Devetak, 1996: 153) modernism totally failed. But what was the reason of this failure? Where did modernism go wrong?

These questions, starting with the foundation of the Institute of Social Research in 1923, were regarded as the main concerns of the Critical theorists. Particularly Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno dealt with the issue of instrumental reason, which was exalted by Enlightenment, and its current consequences, such as Fascism. According to Horkheimer, while excluding the "old" norms and values from consideration, Enlightenment with its over emphasis on the instrumental reason had strengthened the idea of control over nature as well as over others. And this was the foundation stone of Fascism.

On the other hand, Jürgen Habermas, as a contemporary representative of modernist tradition, attempts to revitalize the promise of emancipation by examining the social life in a critical way. According to Habermas, the clues of emancipation should be examined again in Enlightenment. However, first of all, for a social evolution towards emancipation, the symbolic reproduction of social life should be comprehended profoundly. Although Orthodox Marxist theory of social evolution is restricted to the development of productive forces, Habermas asserts that the main focus should be on relations of production and rationalization processes at the level of these relations. For the explanation of social evolution these relations and rationalization processes are even more important than the development of productive forces.

Habermas argues that society has an autonomous capacity to rationalize normative structures in order to accommodate and mitigate the rationalization of productive forces. Therefore, the development of normative structures is the real pacemaker of social evolution.

With more emphasis on the importance of rationalization processes, Habermas tries to reconstruct historical materialism, and the first step towards this end is to create a theory of communicative action. The theory of communicative action is an attempt to explain the development of communicative rationality, in other words, the development of moral-practical forms of reasoning in social life.

According to Habermas, there are three types of interest for all humans: technical interests, practical interests and emancipatory interests. Technical and practical interests drive humans to seek for control over nature as well as other humans. The realization of these interests requires cognitive-instrumental rationality with a success oriented attitude and results in instrumental and strategic actions.

A critical international relations theorist Richard Ashley employs this tripartite division of interest to IR theory. Ashley argues that, different type of interests constitutes different realist IR theories. While technical realism corresponds neo-realism, practical realism corresponds Morgenthau's classical realism. Technical realism considers knowledge an instrument to expand the control over an objectified environment. On the other hand, practical realism more concerns with international law and order. However both technical and practical realism give no chance to a moral progress towards a universal community. What Ashley offers is, instead of denigrating technical and practical realism incorporating them into a higher synthesis. This can only be possible in critical theory guided by the emancipatory interest. According to Ashley, realism of John Herz is the unique example guided by the emancipatory interest.

Linklater applies this division of interests to three traditions of international relations theory: realism, rationalism and revolutionism correspond respectively technical, practical and

emancipatory interests. According to Linklater, realism while dealing with technical efficiency fails to recognize its own conformist character. Rationalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the norms and values, but it cannot overcome the tension between order and justice. However, Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, whom Linklater identifies with revolutionism, predict a universal society of free individuals conforming to cosmopolitan justice.

On the other hand, Habermas argues that in today's politics these technical and practical interests and the cognitive-instrumental rationality are represented as the only types of interest and the only form of reasoning to individuals. Here is the point from which Habermas's rejection arises.

For Habermas, the ignorance of emancipatory interests impedes the full realization of human potential. Relations of domination and conditions of distorted communication cause humans not to realize their emancipatory interests and deny their capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness. Habermas, therefore, gives the development of the communicative rationality a central role in his understanding of the social evolution. According to Habermas, with the consent oriented attitude, the communicative rationality results in moral-practical actions towards mutual understanding and helps the elimination of unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication.

To this end, Habermas states the rules of communicative action under the title of discourse ethics. According to discourse ethics, a principle, norm or arrangement can be valid only "if they can meet with the approval of all those who would be affected by them." In other words, as a form of moral-practical reasoning, discourse ethics

requires an open and non-exclusionary dialog and intersubjective recognition and consent. "Discourse ethics promotes a cosmopolitan ideal where the political organization of humanity is decided by a process of dialogue in which participation is open to all." (Devetak, 1996: 171-172) Therefore, it is universalist, democratic and guided by justice.

As an alternative to the interest-based model of democracy, which has been dominant during the second half of the twentieth century in the West, Habermas has formulated a deliberative model of democracy and reinterpreted the classical notions of democratic theory, especially the concept of popular sovereignty insisting on a normative rather than an interest-based understanding of democracy.

According to Habermas, there is a legitimacy crisis in the Western democracies and reconciliation of democratic legitimacy and rationality is achievable merely through a deliberative procedure. This procedure requires participation rather than representation; participation of all parts in the deliberation under ideal speech condition that no limits are put on the scope and content of the deliberation. The power of rational argumentation in this process ultimately creates the rational consensus among the all parties.

This thesis is an attempt to comprehend deliberative model of democracy and its philosophical roots in Critical Theory. Habermas's deliberative democratic model can be read as a challenge to contemporary interest-based politics, especially in the EU. However, recent developments in the EU are not the main focus of this thesis. Rather emphasis of Critical Theory on a radical change in the nature of national and international politics towards a more inclusive and normative one will be discussed in a theoretical manner.

Chapter 1 traces back to the roots of Critical Theory, particularly in works of Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, who are the most well known members of Frankfurt School. Horkheimer and Adorno have a deep influence on Habermas especially with their sophisticated interpretation of Marxist theory and their challenge to the economic reductionism of orthodox approaches. In this chapter, I also discuss the reflections of Horkheimer's thoughts on the international relations theory, and try to show how Horkheimer's distinction between traditional and critical theories has been echoed in the Post-positivist debate by many IR theorists such as Andrew Linklater and Robert Cox while criticizing realist tradition in IR discipline.

Chapter 2 elaborates the evolution of Habermasian political thought and its influence on critical IR theory. This chapter explains how critical IR theorists, like Richard Asley and Andrew Linklater, employ Habermas's tripartite division of interests to criticize realist understanding of international relations.

Chapter 3 consists of Habermasian understanding of deliberative democracy, its relevance to the European Union and the critiques towards it, particularly coming from Chantal Mouffe. According to Mouffe, the distinction between the political and politics helps to grasp the antagonistic nature of all human societies. Moving from this distinction, she arrives at the idea of unity in a context of conflict and diversity. Here, the creation of us/them distinction has a fundamental importance for democratic politics. Therefore, Mouffe offers conflict, rather than rational consensus, as the center of politics. In this chapter, besides Habermas's contribution to debates on politics, and the alternative model of Chanthal Mouffe will be discussed.

II. CHAPTER ONE: CRITICAL THEORY

2. 1. Philosophical Roots of Critical Theory

Critical Theory, was firstly formulated by the members of the Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute of Social Research), with its well known name Frankfurt School, founded in Germany in 1923. To grasp different aspects of Critical Theory and deliberative democracy it is vital to trace its roots back to Frankfurt School.

Few decades later from its foundation Frankfurt School became the main source of inspiration for many students and intellectuals across Europe and North America in the 1960s and early 1970s. The works of the school influenced their imagination so deeply that the understanding of the New Left was almost totally associated with one of its members, Marcuse. The name of Marcuse was one of the three-M in the political slogans of the students, together with Marx and Mao. (Brown, 1973: 7)

Critical theory diverged from the orthodox Marxism with its sophisticated interpretation of Marxist theory and its emphasis on issues and problems such as mass culture, the family or sexuality which had largely been ignored by orthodox approaches.

However, the writings of critical theorists, especially those of Horkheimer and Adorno, were frequently exposed to many misunderstandings. The large and unusual scope of inquiry and profound philosophical and epistemological critiques of the school's members made them very complicated for the Anglo-American world.

Besides the misunderstandings, members of Frankfurt School had to tackle the attacks coming both from orthodox Marxists and social scientists, who employed conventional approaches, especially positivism, in their researches. But before explicating and assessing central aspects of critical theory, it would be useful to glance at the history and theory of Frankfurt School.

2. 1. 1. Frankfurt School

As it is mentioned before, Frankfurt School as a tradition of thinking was firstly centered around the Institute of Social Research, established in Frankfurt in 1923 as the first Marxist-oriented research center affiliated with a major German university. Felix Weil, son of a multimillionaire Jewish businessman, and Kurt Albert Gerlach, professor of economic science in Frankfurt, realized the necessity of "an institutionalization of Marxist discussion beyond the confines both of middle-class academia and of the ideological narrow-mindedness of the Communist Party" (Wiggershaus, 1995: 16), and after a number of negotiations with the Prussian Ministry of Science, Art and Education they were able "to found an Institute to serve first and foremost for the study and broadening of scientific Marxism." (Wiggershaus, 1995: 17)

The inter-war years had a profound impact on Frankfurt School. The Russian revolution had enhanced the belief in the unity of theory and revolutionary practice, central to the Marxist program. In Berlin, on the 9th of November 1918 a republic was declared; a coalition of Majority Social Democrats and Independent Social Democrats came to power. Majority Social Democrats chose to follow a constitutional course toward parliamentary government and a negotiated peace settlement. However, quickly developing workers' and soldiers' councils were demanding far-reaching changes in the

economy and the military. In Austria, Hungary and Italy a parallel set of events, large-scale protests and strikes were taking place. "Nonetheless, despite the devastation of the war, the strategies of revolutionary socialist movements proved inadequate against the resources and organization of the dominant classes. By the end of 1920, the Russian revolution was isolated." (Held, 1980: 16)

"After the collapse of the German revolution of 1918, many leftist intellectuals returned to university life, hoping that a socialist revolution was still possible in Germany." (Kellner, 1989: 13) The Institute of Social Research was an offshoot of this hope.

During the 1920's, the Institute, as an academic institution of the University of Frankfurt, was directed by Carl Grünberg, "and tended to be empirical, historical, and oriented toward problems of the European working class movement." (Kellner, 1989: 13) Grünberg's understanding of true Marxism, which was not dogmatic and did not seek eternal laws, deeply influenced Critical Theory as it was later developed. As Kellner pointed out:

"According to Grunberg, the object of the materialist conception of history was not eternal categories or universal laws of nature and history but rather 'the given concrete historical world in its change and development, or more precisely, social life in its transformations.' Social life with its all aspects was a reflex of the existing economic system, therefore to discover the causes and laws of social change required to investigate the laws governing the economic system." (Kellner, 1989: 13)

However, his methodology was more inductive than dialectical and his view of history was mainly based on organic evolutionism, anticipating a transition from capitalism to socialism. Yet, the defeat

of the revolutionary movement in Germany remained inexplicable from his point of view. Therefore, this "inductive epistemology did not receive approval of Horkheimer and the other young members" of the Institute. (Jay, 1973: 12)

There were also two important names having a deep impact on later works of the school; Karl Korsch and György Lukács, who were active members of the German and Hungarian Communist parties respectively. In the journal of the institute, Archiv fur die Geschichte des Sozialismus und der Arbeiterbewegung, theoretical works of these two were published very often. (Kellner, 1990: 12)

Lukács and Korsch, while the orthodox Marxism was shaken by events of the 1920s and 1930s, tried to reappraise Maxism and to eliminate the gap between theory and practice. According to them, many concepts, theories and principles in Marx's writings were violated by orthodox Marxism.

First of all, they criticized the determinist and positivist interpretation of historical materialism which put its emphasis on unalterable stages of historical development driven by an autonomous economic base. In doing so, Orthodox Marxism was neglecting human subjectivity and consciousness which were so central in preventing the emergence of a revolutionary agent. The traditional standpoint of orthodox Marxism could not grasp the significance of the objective conditions of action.

According to Lukács, the working-class was still potent to understand and change radically the society. However, reification – the appearance of people's productive activity as something strange and alien to them – was one of the chief barriers to revolutionary consciousness. The productive process which reduced social relations

themselves to thing-like relations and reduced the worker and his/her product to commodities had made the worker lose the revolutionary working-class practice. However, there was still its objective possibility, and the purpose of theory had to be to analyze and expose the gap between the actual and the potential. The theorist as a participant in a continuous class conflict had to orientate theory to the development of consciousness and the promotion of active political involvement. (Held, 1980: 21-22) Although they criticized his Hegelian language, Lukács's theory of reification and his criticisms on the social theory were extremely influential on the critical theorists.

When Max Horkheimer replaced Grünberg as Director of the Instutute in 1930, a number of talented theorists such as Leo Lowenthal, Friedrich Pollock, Erich Fromm, Henryk Grossman, and Herbert Marcuse were already working with the Institute. Later T.W. Adorno, Otto Kirchheimer, Franz Neumann and others joined the Institute, and some theorists like Korsch and Walter Benjamin were also supported.

Max Horkheimer (1895-1973) was the dominant figure in the first decades of Frankfurt School. Very early in his thinking, Horkheimer "challenged orthodox Marxism on the concept of class, the role of the Communist party, and its reliance on implausible teleological metanarrativesAs director of the Institute from 1930-1958, he synthesized the various studies and shaped the programmatic statements that came to be known as Critical Theory... Horkheimer coined the term 'Critical Theory' and used it in print for the first time in 1937 in his programmatic essay 'Traditional and Critical Theory'." (Wood, 2004)

While being basically inspired by Marxism, from 1930 through 1936, Horkheimer and his colleagues used code words like *materialism* and the *economic theory of society* for their version of the Marxist theory. (Dubiel, 1985: 94-95) Inadequacies within classical Marxism and within the dominant forms of bourgeois science and philosophy had led the Institute to develop a supradisciplinary, materialist social theory. Both orthodox Marxism with its dogmatic, reductionist, and objectivist metaphysical materialism, and bourgeois social science which was characterized by a fragmentation of the sciences, utilized excessively objectivist methods, and thus were not able to conceptualize current social and cultural problems. (Kellner, 1990: 12)

The main objective of the Institute under Horkheimer's directorship "was to develop an interdisciplinary social theory which could serve as an instrument of social transformation." (Jay, 1973: 12) The work of the Institute was based on a synthesis of philosophy and social theory and research, in other words, a dialectical inquiry into the relations between social science and philosophy, and the reform of political practice by means of ongoing social critique.

According to Horkheimer, for an adequate social philosophy that could encompass the entire material and spiritual culture of humanity it was vital to constitute a new sort of synthesis between philosophy and the specialized sciences. Horkheimer, defending the importance of philosophy for critical social theory, claimed that the specialized sciences, being based on the separation between science, and philosophy, abstract from the structure and organization of society as a whole to describe limited domains of social experience. For Horkheimer, the separation between science and philosophy had to be overcome in favor of a "dialectical penetration and development of philosophical theory and the praxis of the individual disciplines."

(Kellner, 1990: 13) For Horkheimer, the philosophical drive toward the universal and essential should have been the animating spirit for social research, but philosophy had to be at the same time "sufficiently open to the world to allow itself to be impressed with, and transformed by, progress in concrete studies." (Kellner, 1990: 13)

"The 'social philosophy', according to Horkheimer, was an attempt to elucidate the fate of human beings, insofar as they [were] parts of a community, and not mere individuals. It concern[ed] itself above all with the social life of people: state, law, economy, religion, in short, with the entire material and spiritual culture of humanity." (Bronner, 1989: 33)

However, critical theorists did not simply replace Marxist political economy with general concerns about social philosophy, culture and social psychology. There were many objections in their work to the abstract humanism, philosophical anthropology, existentialism and phenomenology, too. Important questions such as the relationship between the individual and society, the meaning of culture, and the basis of societal life could not be answered with a purely philosophical approach based on an idea of abstract, isolated individual (e.g. Lebensphilosophie, existentialism) or a hypostatized social totality (e.g. Hegelian idealism). According to Horkheimer, there was an urgent need for a dialectical penetration and development of philosophical theory and the praxis of individual scientific disciplines. (Held, 1980: 32)

To investigate current social and political problems, Horkheimer envisaged a program of supradisciplinary research. This project would unite "philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, and psychologists in an ongoing research community who would do together what in other disciplines one individual does alone

in the laboratory, which is what genuine scientists have always done: namely, to pursue the great philosophical questions using the most refined scientific methods; to reformulate and to make more precise the questions in the course of work as demanded by the object; and to develop new methods without losing sight of the universal." (Kellner, 1990: 14)

Horkheimer, trying to answer the great philosophical questions with the refined methods, constituted his criticism upon the deficiencies of the classical German social theories of Kant and Hegel, and the contemporary metaphysical and positivist philosophies.

According to Horkheimer, while grounding social philosophy in the experience and faculties of the particular individual, Kant had neglected the role of society and history. Although Hegel, unlike Kant, situated philosophy within society and history, his idealism and tendency to justify the existing order constrained his philosophy as well. Reducing the historical process to the manifestation of an absolute subject, a World Spirit, Hegel foresaw a unity of the Idea and the world, a state in which the subject fully appropriated its other, the object. According to Horkheimer, history could not be read as neither the manifestation of an absolute subject nor of economic laws as being propagated by orthodox Marxism. As he wrote:

"There can be no formula which lays down once and for all the relationship between the individual, society and nature. Though history cannot be seen as a uniform unfolding of human nature, the opposite fatalistic formula that the course of events is dominated by necessity independent of man is equally naive. " (Held, 1980: 24)

Therefore, both dialectical materialism and Marxist humanism, and the current forms of idealism in the neo-Kantian, neo-Hegelian,

phenomenological, and existential philosophies were criticized by Horkheimer because of their questionable speculative metaphysics. The positivist schools being based on isolated facts were not able to escape unsupportable metaphysical presuppositions and methodological limitations, too. (Bronner, 1989: 33-39) However, it should be noted that critical theorists did not totally exclude the methods of positivist schools. They contributed extensively to empirical inquiry especially with their works on the authoritarian personality. For them, it was a risk to take one type of approach, and therefore several methods had to be supplemented with one another. But empirical work was not a substitute for theoretical analysis. For concepts like society, culture and class, indispensable to all inquiry, could not be simply transcribed into empirical terms. They required theoretical elucidation and appraisal. (Held, 1980: 34)

During the early Horkheimer years, the Institute sought to continue many of Grunberg's projects with regard to topics central to classical Marxism and socialist politics, but from more comprehensive theoretical vantage point. (Kellner, 1990: 15) The Institute's new multidisciplinary program also allowed its members to raise the question of "the interconnections between the economic life of society, the psychic development of the individual and transformations in the realm of culture... including not only the so-called spiritual contents of science, art and religion, but also law, ethics, fashion, public opinion, sport, amusement, life style, etc." (Kellner, 1990: 14) Attention to these topics would eventually produce many of the distinctive contributions of critical theory.

One of these contributions, the study on technically qualified workers and employees in Germany, as the first research project of the Institute's social theory, was "gathering empirical material on their psychological, social, and political attitudes which would be

interpreted in a theoretical framework that encompasses economic theory, sociology, and psychology." (Kellner, 1990: 15)

One of the foremost aims of the institute members in these research projects was to expose the historical roots and assumptions of mass culture, and the distortions and mystifications it perpetuated. (In his recent works the issues of distortions and mystifications were again dealt with by Habermas, as we will examine below.) As a result of these efforts, the Institute "developed a materialist approach to cultural critique and produced one of the first systematic critical theories of mass culture." (Kellner, 1990: 15)

What lay as the basis of the Institute's materialist approach was Horkheimer's critic towards metaphysical systems, absolutism, and all foundationalist theories which attempted to capture the totality of being in a universal philosophical system, as we mentioned briefly above.

According to Horkheimer, the aim of these theories was to discover a metaphysical foundation for knowledge. However, for Horkheimer, the specific views that a materialist held at a given moment were not dictated by any unchanging metaphysical theses. For Horkheimer, a materialist undertakes the:

"...tasks which at any given period are to be mastered with the help of the theory. Thus, for example, criticism of a dogma of religious faith may, at a particular time and place, play a decisive role within the complex of materialist views, while under other circumstances such criticism may be unimportant. Today the knowledge of movements and tendencies affecting society as a whole is immensely important for materialist theory, but in the eighteenth century the need for knowledge of the social totality was overshadowed by

16

questions of epistemology, of natural science, and of politics."
(Horkheimer, 1972: 27)

According to Horkheimer, idealist views, generally advanced
by ruling class ideologues, tried to justify and affirm dominant class
interests. On the other hand, the main focus of materialist theories
was on the explanation with references to material conditions, and
historical situations. Horkheimer especially rejected notions of
metaphysical cognition and absolute truth arguing that there was "an
irreducible tension between concept and being." (Horkheimer, 1972:
27) Unlike metaphysical theses on the identity of thought and being,
of knowledge and the known, Horkheimer believed that concepts
were not organs of absolute knowledge, but simply instruments for
achieving certain goals which were to be constantly developed and
modified in the course of experience. Knowledge was a product of
ever-changing reality, and historical conditions were shaping it.
(Kellner, 1990: 16)

However, traditional theories which operated with a
subject/object model distinguished between subject and object rigidly.
Yet Horkheimer was arguing that totally objective or vice versa could
not be possible since in what we called objective, subjective factors
were at work; and in what we called subjective, objective factors were
at work. (Horkheimer, 1972: 29) While the subject was constituting
objective, in other words material, historical conditions, objective
conditions were in turn constituting the subject. Horkheimer called
this as subject/object dialectic. As he put it:

"A dialectical process is negatively characterized by the fact
that it is not to be conceived as the result of individual unchanging
factors. To put it positively, its elements continuously change in
relation to each other within the process, so that they are not even to

be radically distinguished from each other. Thus the development of human character, for example, is conditioned both by the economic situation and by the individual powers of the person in question. But both these elements determine each other continuously, so that in the total development neither of them is to be presented as an effective factor without giving the other its role." (Horkheimer, 1972: 29)

Horkheimer's essay "Traditional and Critical Theory" (1972) stated the Institute's conception of social theory systematically and comprehensively, spelling out the presuppositions of their project and its relation to traditional theory. Traditional theory from Descartes through positivism was characterized by foundationalism. In foundationalism, a traditional theorist was building the theoretical constructions upon the foundation of his theory formed by theoretical postulates. The goal of traditional theory was unity and harmony. Therefore it tended to be deductive, like natural science and mathematics. (Horkheimer, 1972: 190)

According to Horkheimer, traditional theory thus projected the bourgeois ideal of the harmonious capitalist market unified by calculable laws of supply and demand. As it is clear in this criticism towards traditional theory, critical theory always tried to expose the relationships between theoretical positions and their social environment, and attempted to contextualize or historicize ideas in terms of their roots within social processes. (Kellner, 1990: 19) Horkheimer believed that traditional theory as a part of the social practices constituted capitalism and bourgeois society.

"Its tendencies toward mechanistic materialism reproduced the mechanistic thought and practice of the industrial revolution according to which the world was conceptualized as a machine during

an era in which machines came to dominate human beings. The dominant bourgeois trends of abstract and quantitative thought which informed traditional theory reproduced the tendencies toward abstraction and a mode of quantification that was based on exchange in the capitalist market where value was expressed in abstract, quantitative terms. Just as a bourgeois society governed by exchange value abstracted from values, goals, sentiments, and qualities, so too did traditional theory. And, finally, the fragmentation and division of the sciences reproduced the bourgeois division of labor under capitalism whereby specialization and fragmentation were dominant features of the structure of society." (Kellner, 1990: 19)

However, according to critical social philosophy, there was a complex set of mediations that interconnected consciousness and society, culture and economy, state and citizens, and these relations could best be understood and changed in concrete historical contexts in which one asks:

"...which interconnections exist in a definite social group, in a definite period of time and in a definite country, between the role of this group in the economic process, the transformation of the psychic structures of its individual members, and the totality of the system that affects and produces its thoughts and mechanism." (Kellner, 1990: 14)

According to critical theory, since the dynamics of capitalism play such a constitutive role in social life, only through a theory of society, based on a theory of capitalism, socio-historical processes and developments could be comprehended. For instance, to analyze political or cultural phenomena apart from its constitution in socio-economic processes was an illegitimate abstraction. To avoid such an abstraction one should have contextualized the topic of inquiry

19

within a comprehensive theoretical framework for social analysis and critique.

Critical theory was thus global and historical, and attempted to show the fundamental outlines of socio-economic development and the ways in which capitalism structured social life, as well as the dynamics through which a capitalist society could be replaced by a socialist one. However the Institute always tried to avoid any sort of economic reductionism and traced "the linkages between the economy and the political, social, cultural, and psychic realms while stressing the relative autonomy of the superstructures". (Kellner, 1990: 18)

Horkheimer rejected all versions of economic determinism and reductionism of orthodox Marxism that took the economic dimension of society as the one and only causal factor in explaining social development and structure. According to him, the causal role of cultural factors in history and society had to be analyzed as well. The concrete conditions under which humans suffered could not be grounded in general principles, they had to be comprehended historically and psychologically. The role of a critical theory was to be concerned with transforming the material conditions which produced human suffering towards a more rational society and a more humane form of existence. Traditional approaches were seeking for what was unchanged in the society. However, for a critical social theory, the main subject matter was always the change itself.

2. 1. 2. Members of Frankfurt School

Adorno (1903-1969) was co-director of the Institute with Horkheimer from 1955 onwards. He was born as Theodor Ludwig Wiesengrund, and took his mother's maiden name in 1938 in order to get an American visa. His Dr. Phil. dissertation was on Husserl's phenomenology and completed in 1924 under the supervision of Hans Cornelius. A dissertation on Kierkegaard's aesthetics written under the supervision of the Christian-socialist Paul Tillich in 1930 brought Adorno his status as lecturer (Habilitation). During the Second World War, Adorno wrote several books, including his *Philosophie der neuen Musik* [*Philosophy of Modern Music*, 1949] and *Minima Moralia* (1951). After the war, he wrote prolifically and completed many more books, including *Versuch über Wagner*[*In Search of Wagner*, 1952], *Prismen* [*Prisms*, 1955], and *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit* [*The Jargon of Authenticity*, 1964].

According to Adorno, an administered capitalism was increasingly preventing human autonomy, and this fact was shaping Adorno's critiques of contemporary civilization and culture. The growing commoditification of human beings in an exchange society had neutralized true culture:

"The culture industry piously claims to be guided by its customers and to supply them with what they ask for. But while assiduously dismissing any thought of its own autonomy and proclaiming its victims its judges, it outdoes in its veiled autocracy all the excesses of autonomous art. The culture industry not so much adapts to the reactions of its customers as it counterfeits them. It drills them in their attitudes as if it were itself a customer." (Adorno, 1974: 200-201)

During the years of exile in the USA, with the influence of Adorno, the members of the Institute became more somber and pessimistic about society. This mode was reinforced by the rise of fascism in Europe, the imminence of war and their first-hand appraisal of American capitalism. Any immediate hope for practical application of Critical Theory as a propellant for social change was disappearing. Horkheimer's *Eclipse of Reason* (1946) and his collaboration with Adorno in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* [*Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1947] were produced in such an atmosphere.

In *Eclipse of Reason*, Horkheimer underlined the dangers of instrumental reasoning. He compared and contrasted the roles of rational, objective morality, and the subjective understanding of an individual situation in relation to social norms. The eclipse of reason was occurring with the transition from a reliance on objective rationality to a subjective and functional, or relational understanding of individual and social conditions. The only way to prevent the rise of totalitarianism was to use reason with its full capacity for critical inquiry into social life.

Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno co-authored *Dialektik der Aufklärung (Dialectic of Enlightenment).* In this work they criticized the instrumental rationality and positivistic science prevailing in both the Soviet Union and in Western capitalist countries. This work was questioning of the whole notion of Enlightenment itself. Although Horkheimer and Adorno seemed to view the dialectical development of rationality as the only hope for human freedom, they did not believe that this unfolding occurred systematically.

The catastrophic events of the first half of the twentieth century showed that Enlightenment project had somehow gone wrong.

Positivistic scientists, philosophers, and bourgeois anthropologists were unable to stop barbarism. The very configuration of rationality (in its contemporary instrumentalist form) was implicated in the crisis. But an apparent paradox was arising insofar as the limits of instrumental or purely formal rationality could only be evoked in an immanent way. If it was to be intelligible, any critique of reason had to presuppose some form of rationality; and if a critique of ideology was not formulated intelligibly, to what then did it appeal? Marx had clarified the socio-economic conditions of human liberation, but systems of domination had metastasized.

In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, Horkheimer and Adorno were criticizing the Occidental traditional reason from its early historical origins to the present formal rationality that was propped up in totalitarian fashion. This rationality was excluding nothing. Adorno and Horkheimer argued that, even the special sciences and academic philosophy were simply unconscious forms of an instrumental appropriation of nature. The mode of presentation of critical theory – especially Adorno's – was deliberately paradoxical. It was a hyperactive philosophy, simultaneously denying its own possibility. The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was dominated by a fundamental skepticism about people's ability to use their own will and consciousness to determine the social living conditions of their time. There was no room in classical critical theory for reflecting on the institutions of political will – formation.

According to Horkheimer and Adorno, late capitalist mass culture and the controlling apparatus of fascism had limited the scope of possibilities for an autonomous political will – formation to such an extend that people could no longer be regarded as the subjects of their own living conditions, even from a counterfactual, utopian point of view.

The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* was a negative philosophy of history. It made claims about the historical development of the human species as a whole. The negative constant in the historical process was the increasing power of instrumental reason. History was a history of decline. The curve of that decline had reached its apex in the age of fascism.

Horkheimer's and Adorno's impressive achievement was to articulate a searching analysis of modernity, as well as a novel critique of reason that avoids, on the one hand, Hegelian conceptual reifications of the totality, and, on the other hand, the reductionistic determinism of Marx. But in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* there was "no systematic understanding of either rationality or of freedom, and Adorno and Horkheimer had no desire to simply supplement their account of finite human reason with poetic or mythological discourses such as those indulged in by Nazi intellectuals." (Wood, 2004a)

Consequently, the success of their critique towards positivism and enlightened rationality initially appeared to be limited by the ambivalence of the perspective from which the critique was directed. This was due, in part, to their unwillingness to further the misguided project of Enlightenment by resorting to specialist axioms, or rationalistic postulates. Horkheimer and Adorno showed convincingly that such thinking was a dead end. Far from emancipating humanity by destroying the mythological mode of meaning, Enlightenment itself had produced further oppression and instability because, sublimated beneath its rationalistic and positivistic surface, Western philosophy continued to be informed by conflicting mythologies. "The *Dialectic of Enlightenment* indicates that systematic thinking is, in fact, only apparently rational because

it is grounded in something that simply cannot be demythologized, namely a nonrational (and ultimately self-destructive) irresistible desire to believe. Thus the apparently liberating potential of Enlightenment in fact conceals a secret utopia in the concept of reason." (Wood, 2004a)

Critical Theory attained its consistency through this problematic relation between freedom and system. According to Critical Theory, totalizing, systematic thinking reinforced domination by suppressing real individual differences. The task was to sustain a demythologized critique of instrumental, positivistic rationality without lapsing into it. Both Hegel and Marx had succumbed to this temptation: Hegel's reactionary ontological-theological system of idealism served bourgeois nationalism, and Marx's deterministic-materialist system lost its persuasive power as a result of both the historical turn of events and new ways of thinking in twentieth-century physics. Again, the implication was that the choice between systems of reasoning was free in the sense that it could not be justified theoretically.

According to Adorno and Horkheimer, this inherently paradoxical problematic was shaping our very lives. It was as though we were labouring in vain under a mythic curse: we perceived our fate but seemed unable to alter it. For example, by means of trivial gratifications, global capitalism's consumer culture reinforced itself in a dialectical way by stimulating technology to produce reliance on further trivial gratifications. Moreover, deepening social divisions were reinforced in a similar way, while possibilities for meaningful opposition were eliminated more and more. (Wood, 2004a)

In 1966 Adorno published *Negative Dialektik* [*Negative Dialectics*]. In this inquiry he intended to use the strength of the

subject to break through the deception of constitutive subjectivity. He anticipated post-structuralism by arguing that the dialectical process was by definition negative, not positive. According to Adorno, "dialectical inquiry reveals the untruth of identity and the non-conceptual nature of meaning, for the concept does not exhaust the thing conceived. Identity and the unification of experience occur negatively, by way of suppressing real difference or non-identity. Adorno's insistence on the priority of the real object, in all its irreducible individuality, intends to undermine the totalizing tendencies of philosophies (such as Hegel's) based on conceptual identification. His hope was that, if philosophers recognized the epistemological role of fundamental differences that simply cannot be sublimated, this would lead to the acceptance of individual uniqueness." (Wood, 2004a)

In speculation there is a certain duty to provide the position of a corrective to common sense, the opponent of speculation. There is "the horror of a premonition: what must come to be known may resemble the down-to-earth more than it resembles the sublime; it might be that this premonition will be confirmed even beyond the pedestrian realm, although the happiness of thought, the promise of its truth, lies in sublimity alone." (Wood, 2004a)

Herbert Marcuse (1898-1979) as a member of Frankfurt School became one of the leading intellectuals in the United States in the 1960s. He was born in Berlin, and served in the German army in World War I, and then went to Freiburg to study philosophy with Martin Heidegger from 1928-1933. He always defended Heidegger arguing that Heidegger was the greatest philosopher he had ever encountered. When National Socialism came to power in 1933, Marcuse left Freiburg for Frankfurt, and eventually became a member of the first generation critical theorists.

After fleeing Germany in 1934, Marcuse came to New York, because the Institute was located at Columbia University. Marcuse lived the rest of his life in the United States, however he also kept close ties with Horkheimer and Adorno.

His first major work in English, *Reason and Revolution* (1941) is still accepted as one of the best introductions to Marxist dialectics. In *Eros and Civilization*, published in 1955, Marcuse "criticizes the alienated and repressive character of life in modern industrial societies, and envisions a new form of society that would not be organized around exploitation and restrictions of human development. In his *Soviet Marxism* (1958), Marcuse was one of the first Marxists to openly criticize Stalinist Communism for its distortion of Marx's insights. But Marcuse also identified existing trends in the USSR that might potentially be developed in order to reform Soviet bureaucracy." (Wood, 2004a)

The most influential book of Marcuse, *One Dimensional Man* was published in 1964. In this work he shows how new domination mechanisms of advanced industrialist society had created false needs, and these needs inevitably reinforced established systems of production and consumption. As a result every individual and non-conforming trait is leveled into a one-dimensional existence with no potential for the meaningful critique that enhances social interaction and makes authentic political life possible. Marcuse believed that this critique of the modern industrial societies is the most effective way to prevent this one-dimensional behaviour and thinking.

In 1930, Erich Fromm joined the Institute and quickly established himself as its leading social psychologist. He was born in Frankfurt in 1900. Fromm received his Dr. phil. from the University of Heidelberg in 1925, and trained in psychoanalysis at the

University of Munich and the Psychoanalytic Institute of Berlin. Fromm began his career as a Freudian, but later realized that the role of societal factors in human development is neglected by the Freudian biologically-oriented reductionistic approach to unconscious drives. In his programmatic article "Über Methode und Aufgaben einer analytischen Sozialpsychologie" ["On the Methods and Goals of Analytical Social Psychology"] in the inaugural volume of the *Zeitschrift,* and in a series of articles in the *Zeitschrift,* he gave the foundation for his later influential theory of the social character. His numerous later books include several best sellers. Among the best-known are *Escape from Freedom* (1941), *Man for Himself* (1947), *Psychoanalysis and Religion* (1950), *The Sane Society* (1955), *The Art of Loving* (1956), *Marx's Concept of Man* (1961), *The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness* (1973), and *To Have or to Be?* (1976).

At the time of Adorno's death in 1969, Horkheimer had retired; he died in 1973. Fromm was still alive, but estranged from the Institute. Marcuse was living in the United States, and Lowenthal was teaching at Berkeley. Within three years of Adorno's death, many of the second-generation critical theorists left the Institute to pursue careers elsewhere.

2. 2. Impact of Horkheimer on Critical International Theory

It was not until the 1980s that the fundamental ground on which the discipline of IR stands was challenged by deeper epistemological and ontological criticism. Former debates within the discipline were limited to the questions of purpose (realism vs. idealism) and methodology (behaviorism vs. traditionalism). However, in the 1980s, critical international theory arose with its claim that

"international relations could be other than it is at both the theoretical and practical levels." (Devetak, 1996: 145)

According to critical theory, since our knowledge is always conditioned by historical and material context and the theoretician can never be independent of society, a theory "must include an account of its own genesis and application in society." (Devetak, 1996: 147) It must be a self-reflective theory.

This relationship between knowledge and society led Horkheimer to distinguish between two conceptions of theory; traditional and critical conceptions of theory. Traditional conceptions of theory assume a distance between the theorist and the object of analysis. A theorist can investigate the object as something out there and successfully separate him/herself from it. Therefore, traditional conceptions of theory claim at least to be value free while doing scientific inquiry. However, critical conceptions of theory, recognizing the unavoidability of being under the impact of social matrix, try to achieve emancipation from the existing society, rather than to legitimate and consolidate it. A theory, by shaping knowledge, shapes also social and political life. Therefore, it is a force within a concrete historical situation to stimulate change. A theory allows intervening the process of the making human history.

Traditional approaches of international relations discipline, like realism, usually did not focus on the relationship between knowledge and society. Their only warning is about the dangers of allowing values to influence inquiry. However, in the 1980s, largely with the contribution of critical theory, the third great debate arose and the object domain of international relations was widen to include epistemological issues.

In an attempt to establish a critical international theory, Robert Cox employed Horkheimer's distinction between traditional and critical conceptions of theory, mainly as a response to Waltz's neo-realism. Waltz maintained that theory of international relations needed a more secure and scientific ground and his conception of theory provided such a ground for the study of international relations. First of all, this conception was to share the same epistemology with the natural sciences. This naturally amounted to a radical separation between subject and object. This separation was both possible and necessary for theoretical inquiry. Such an inquiry could make possible to explain the repetitions in international politics. However, being explanatory was not enough for justification of a theory. According to Waltz, the criteria of a valid theory were utility and applicability. The ultimate test of a theory was its usefulness in guiding policy towards given ends, in this case, orientating foreign policy to obtain power and security under international anarchy. (Devetak, 1996: 150)

Cox has called this conception of theory as problem-solving theory – or in Horkheimer's words traditional theory – which takes the world as it finds it, as the given framework for action. In doing so, it works in favor of stabilizing prevailing structures of world order. Therefore, in spite of its claims, it cannot be ideologically neutral. However, critical international theory starts from the connection between knowledge and values, and investigates "the possibilities for theorizing in a manner that challenges injustices and inequalities built into the prevailing world order." (Devetak, 1996: 151) It is an ethical attempt to transform social and political conditions.

Methodologically, a critical international theory insists on holism. In a holistic methodology, a specific structure or object is studied in isolation. Firstly, it is lifted from its context and

abstracted, and then re-inserted into the whole. This reconstruction leads to the construction of a larger picture of the whole as well. This is the point where critical theory diverges from traditional theories.

III. CHAPTER TWO: JÜRGEN HABERMAS AS A MEMBER OF FRANKFURT SCHOOL

Any account of a "second generation" of critical sociologists in Frankfurt School tradition would include reference to such Claus Offe, Oskar Negt, Karl-Otto Apel, Alfred Schmidt, and Albrecht Wellmer. But Jürgen Habermas is by far the best-known member of this generation; in fact, he is one of the most influential thinkers in the entire Frankfurt School tradition.

Jürgen Habermas was born in Düsseldorf, Germany, in 1929.[*] He was 15 when Germany lost the war to the Allies in 1945. He had served in the Hitler Youth and had been sent to defend the western front during the final months of the war. His father was a passive sympathizer with Nazism. Following the Nuremberg trials and the release of documentary films depicting the activities in the concentration camps, Habermas had a political awakening. He believed that all at once he saw that he had been living in a politically criminal system. This horrific realization was to have a lasting impact on his philosophy, vigilance against the repeating of such politically criminal behavior.

Habermas's entrance onto the intellectual scene began in the 1950's with an influential critique of Martin Heidegger's philosophy. He studied philosophy at Universities in Göttingen and Bonn, which he followed with studies in philosophy and sociology at the Institute for Social Research under Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. In

---

[*] This biography was quoted from the web site of European Graduate School, www.egs.edu/ resources/ habermas.html on 15.07.2005

the 1960's and 70's he taught at the University of Heidelberg and Frankfurt am Main. He then accepted a directorship at the Max Planck Institute in Starnberg in 1971. In 1980 he won the Adorno Prize, and two years later he took a professorship at the University of Frankfurt, remaining there until his retirement in 1994.

Habermas embraced Critical Theory of Frankfurt School, a position that views contemporary Western society as maintaining a problematic conception of rationality inherently destructive in its impulse toward domination. He cited the domination over nature by science and technology as exemplary in this regard, And though Frankfurt School included the 18th century Enlightenment in its evaluation of problematic rationalities, Habermas sought to defend aspects of Enlightenment that he believed to be constructive and even emancipatory; the development of solutions to problems through the use of reason and logic, while breaking from habits, the traditional conventions that include the strict obedience of religion and its prohibitions. Because Modernism took on Enlightenment project, it often did so by lamenting the loss of a sense of purpose, coherence and social values in modern society. For Habermas, this tendency is ineffectual, and thus he calls for a return to Enlightenment's privileging of order and reason.

In his work, *Towards Reconstructing Historical Materialism*, Habermas laid out his primary differences with Marx. He viewed Marx' assessment of human evolution as simply an economic progression as too narrow a definition that leaves out any sense of individual freedom, a critique that Habermas held of modern society as a whole. Habermas divided this notion of economic progression, an evolution of societies, from the process of learning that is assumed by Historical Materialism. Marx viewed progress as linear and

deterministic, whereas Habermas argues that the process of learning is dynamic and unpredictable from one epoch to another.

Habermas's primary contribution to philosophy is his development of a theory of rationality. An ongoing element throughout his work is a critique of industrial democracies in the West for the equating humanity with economic efficiency. For Habermas the ability to use logic and analysis, rationality, goes beyond the strategic calculation of how to achieve a chosen goal. There exists a possibility for community, through communicative action that strives for agreement between others — this is rationality itself. Habermas thus stressed the importance for having an "ideal speech situation" in which citizens are able to raise moral and political concerns and defend them by rationality alone.

In 1981 Habermas published *The Theory of Communicative Action*, in which he develops on the concept of an ideal speech situation and an accompanying ethics of discourse. Working with Frankfurt School colleague Karl-Otto Apel, he proposes a model of communicative rationality that takes into account the effect power has upon the situation of discourse and opposes the traditional idea of an objective and functionalist reason. Within societal interactions is the performance of subjective and intersubjective duties that are determined by other capacities of reasoning. The theory is developed into comprehensive social theory from which an ethics of discourse is derived. As a furthering of the speech-act philosophy of J.L. Austin, along with theories of child development as envisioned by Jean Piaget, Habermas and Apel sought to construct a non-oppressive, inclusive and universalist moral framework for discourse, based on the inherent desire in all speech acts for a mutual understanding.

The theory of communicative action was applied by Habermas to politics and law, advocating a "deliberative democracy" in which governmental institutions and laws would be open to free reflection and discussion by the public. A key obstacle to the institution of this forum of open policy making is the legitimacy of private property, as it divides interests and makes unequal the situations of individuals. Habermas believes that within his form of democracy, men and women aware of their interest in self-governance and responsibility would seek to adhere only to the most rational argument.

Habermas's garnered most respect and a teacher and mentor for many theorists working in political sociology, social theory, and social philosophy. Since his retirement from teaching he has continued to be an active thinker and writer.

3. 1. The Question of Enlightenment

Habermas as a modern-day advocate of Enlightenment, is guided by the ideals of rational discourse and the change in the social world through reasonable communicative action. Habermas believes that Enlightenment rationality may still be restored. In this respect, Habermas has been influenced by the practical rationality of Kant rather than by the ontological conceptual system of Hegel. How any Hegelian reification of the totality of being simply reinforces systems of domination had already been shown by Marx and Lukács. But Habermas, like Kant, argues that rational morality has a primacy over speculative reason. Therefore, Habermas's work can be seen both as a continuation of previous Critical Theory and a reaction against it; since he defends Enlightenment project of the rational organization of the public sphere.

Adorno and Habermas lay claim to the tradition of critical theory in their concern for establishing what Horkheimer once described as reasonable conditions of life: an association of free individuals in which each enjoys the same possibilities for self-realization and self-determination as all the rest. (Horkheimer, 1972: 199) Like other Frankfurt theorists, Adorno and Habermas critically target whatever impedes the emergence of such conditions. As Adorno's junior associate at the Institute in the later 1950s, Habermas was much influenced by Adorno's acute criticism of damage that has been inflicted on life under late capitalism. That influence is especially marked in one of his first books, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (1962), where Habermas denounces the manipulation of public opinion and the deterioration of the public sphere in the twentieth century. His trenchant commentary in this early inquiry won Adorno's explicit approval. According to Adorno, Habermas had succeeded in demonstrating the contradiction that exists between the modern emancipation of critical spirit and its simultaneous dampening, when he argued that the public sphere had become a mere commodity that works against the critical principal in order to better market itself. (Adorno, 1996: 283)

Adorno and Habermas are staunch champions of democratic processes and institutions. The rational society to which they devote their work would certainly be a more emphatically democratic one. Along with other researchers at the institute, Adorno and Habermas also orient their theories toward the normative ends of freedom and autonomy. Indeed, as Horkheimer pointed out in his programmatic essay, Traditional and Critical Theory, critical theory has a profoundly ethical trust. It is just this normative orientation that distinguishes critical theory. Horkheimer also states that the goals endorsed by Frankfurt theorists have been forced upon them by

present distress (Horkheimer, 1972: 217). With its two World Wars, the conflicts, famines and diseases that have killed tens of millions of people since 1945, fascism and Stalinism, McCarthyism, the cold war, globalization, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and environmental disasters, the twentieth century exhibited highly destructive tendencies that persist today. It is the suffering these phenomena have caused that gives raise to the normative goals of a critical theory of society. Speaking for the entire tradition, Adorno once wrote that the goal of rationally organized society would be to negate the physical suffering of even the least of its members, and to negate the internal reflexive forms of that suffering (Adorno, 1973: 204).

The image of a future society where suffering would be reduced to a minimum can only spring from a deep understanding of the present (Horkheimer, 1972: 220). On this, Adorno and Habermas also agree. Both theorists tackle the problems responsible for suffering in their penetrating and extensive analyses of social life in the West. From his essay on fascism, the culture industry, the welfare state, and the pervasiveness of Exchange relations, to his more esoteric works on aesthetics and negative dialectics, Adorno plumbed the problematic aspect of life under late capitalism. He insisted that positive change could be effected only on the basis of undiminished, critical insight into this predicament. For his part, Habermas attempt to gain insight into our current predicament by exploring such problems as the crises that periodically afflict capitalism, reification, civil privatism, democratic deficits in the West, and globalization. Sounding a strongly an Adornian note, Habermas remarks in *Between Facts and Norms* that what the twentieth century, more than any other, has thought us is the horror of existing unreason. To put that horror behind us, reason must first put itself on trial. (Habermas, 1996: xii)

Some of the more important precursors of critical theory are Kant, Hegel, Lukacs and Weber. Adorno and Habermas not only draw an aspect of Immanuel Kat's three critiques, they declare themselves partisans of Enlightenment tradition that Kant described in What is Enlightenment? Each sees himself as carrying forward this tradition with its emphasis on rational, autonomous and critical thought. Adorno claimed that his work contributes to enlightenment by promoting the self-critical spirit of reason. His ideal of a rational society in which humanity would no longer be entrapped by the totality it itself fashions (Adorno, 1973: 145). While Habermas will question the extent to which Adorno remains faithful to this process, he places his own work squarely within the modern enlightenment tradition. His work is intended to contribute to the project of enlightenment in which individuals progressively free themselves from superstition and authoritarian belief systems and submit to the unforced force of the better argument alone.

On the other hand, the problem of relativism is the central issue in Habermas's effort to sustain Enlightenment project. Enlightenment project that justifies emancipation from non-democratic polities rests on the following key conceptions:

1) "however diverse cultures and individuals may vary from one another in terms of religious convictions, traditions, sentiments, etc. - reason (at least in potential - a potential that must be developed by education) stands as a universally shared capacity of humanity;

2) such reason is characterized first of all as an autonomy or freedom - a freedom which, for such central figures as Locke and Kant, is capable of giving itself its own law;

3) just as this reason seems capable of discerning universal laws in the domain of mathematics and the natural sciences (witness the success of the Copernican Revolution and Newton) - so reason, it is hoped, is capable of discerning universal laws and norms in the moral and political domains." (Cavalier, 2005)

If one person is to exercise freedom by choosing his/her own goals and projects - this freedom requires that others respect these choices by not attempting to override them and make use of me for their own purposes. This is a universal norm. In Kantian terms, others must never treat a person simply as a means, but always as an end.

But if logically others must respect a person's freedom as an autonomous rationality, then insofar as this person acknowledges others as autonomous rationalities - reciprocity demands that the person respects others' freedom as well. This norm of respect is also central in the political demand for democracy. As resting on the free and rational consent of the governed, only democracies respect and preserve the fundamental humanity of its citizens. (Cavalier, 2005)

The universalism associated with reason and its norms in such Enlightenment thought; however, rejected by relativism arguing that no such universal human characteristics and norms exist. Especially Lyotard strenuously objects to such universalism as an element of the "metanarrative" of Enlightenment, and he seeks to overcome the metanarrative in favor of localized narratives and traditions.

On the other hand, Habermas, "stripping Enlightenment project of its universalist intention suspends its emancipatory

dimension: if the conception of human beings as rational autonomies and the correlative requirement of consent can not be defended as universal in some strong fashion, then we paralyze our capacity to be critical of norms and politics which contradict this conception of human being and the democratic polities this free humanity requires. In short, the loss of the universalist claims of Enlightenment to postmodern (and other sorts of) relativism opens the door to authoritarian politics in all its forms.

For Habermas, the threat of authorianism is an especially forceful reality: as a young man, he witnessed the brutality of the Nazi regime. In order to save human autonomy and modern democracy from the very real threats of fascism, Habermas seeks to reconstruct Enlightenment arguments for reason and universalism in several ways - for example, by developing a richer conception of reason in the light of empirically-oriented research in sociology, psychology, speech-act analysis, etc." (Cavalier, 2005)

In *Theory of Communicative Action*, Habermas states the criteria for evaluating the rationality of human actions. His theory of action is mainly based on a concept of social order and a diagnosis of the failures of contemporary society. According to Habermas, the human form of life is constituted in and through interactions informed by practical rationality. Therefore, a comprehensive social theory must be anchored in the moment of communicative rationality. Though "intersubjective communication imposes formal restraints on consciousness, Habermas's notion of communicative action is by no means a simple throwback to the practical reason of Kant." (Wood, 2004a)

Habermas, unlike Kant, thinks in a historical way considering the traditions in which consciousness is constituted. He also supports

his insights with a sophisticated theory of science and of human language. Thus, Habermas elaborates Kantian practical reason as communicative action. This new configuration contains both the possibilities of the linguistic philosophy and speech act theories of Wittgenstein and Searle, and the American Pragmatist tradition of Pierce, Dewey, and Rorty. However, the modern German tradition also gives Habermas's notion of communicative action a dialectical subtlety generally lacking in Anglo-American approaches, as is evidenced by this quotation from his *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* (1983):

"Communicative action can be understood as a circular process in which the actor is two things in one: an *initiator*, who masters situations through actions for which he is accountable, and a *product* of the transitions surrounding him, of groups whose cohesion is based on solidarity to which he belongs, and of processes of socialization in which he is reared." (Habermas, 1990: 22)

This shows that Habermas's discourse ethics, as we discuss below, is not simply a reduction of morality to equal treatment, as it considers both group solidarity and a universal rational conception of justice. The social world is only accessible from an individual perspective, nevertheless the languages and practices of its members constitute it. A communicative form of life is structured by linguistically mediated rationality. What human beings are also involves the indefinable uniqueness of concrete individual situations. Therefore the meaning of moral judgments is not simply constructed by individuals or groups. "The moral deliberations of individuals and groups must be extended universally because their linguistic conditions of possibility always already imply this universality. Habermas indicates a way beyond the dilemma of modernity insofar as communicative action involves both the recognition of the

41

otherness of the other as well as the universality of the linguistically mediated understanding in and through which individuality as such is disclosed. Put simply, ethics and discourse are two sides of the same coin." (Wood, 2004a)

3. 2. Discourse Ethics

Discourse ethics can be seen as a part of a larger project to sustain, namely Enlightenment project of political emancipation and democracy.

To realize this project, Habermas firstly attempts to ground a discourse ethics in a fundamental assumption of conversation or discourse, particularly in statements such as "you ought not to be a racist", "ought" signifies that the moral norm is not valid solely for the individual who happens to accept them, but valid for all people; they should agree regarding these norms.

The universal validity of our claims, the process of giving and criticizing reasons for accepting or rejecting particular claims, is fundamental to Habermas's communicative action. This process is apparent especially in the natural sciences, law, and criticism. Such argumentation creates universally valid claims, so it can be said that communicative action defines a rationality capable, through discourse, of arriving at universal norms. Relativism is overcome in this way, and universally valid claims might be expected to emerge.

The first of these claims for Habermas is the original freedom of all members of a community. This is the classical argument of Enlightenment requiring the consent of humans as freedom. In a discourse, in which a community seeks to establish a norm or

procedure, acceptance of proposed norms and procedures must be rationally motivated, free and uncoerced. (Habermas, 1993: 36)

Another related condition is equality. Under this condition, all participants have an equal right in the discussion regarding proposed norms and procedures. Here consensus is a requirement, which means the uncoerced agreement of all who are affected by a proposed norm or procedure.

These conditions are stated more formally by Habermas in the form of three principles:

Principle 1: a principle of universalization, one that intends to set the conditions for impartial judgment insofar as it "constrains all affected to adopt the perspectives of all others in the balancing of interests" (Habermas, 1990: 65). The principle of universalization itself states: All affected can accept the consequences and the side effects that general observance of a proposed moral norm can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone's interests and these consequences are preferred to those of known alternative possibilities for regulation. (Habermas, 1990: 65)

Principle 2: "Only those [moral] norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse" (Habermas, 1990: 66). In short, the conditions for the practical discourse out of which universally valid norms may emerge include the participation and acceptance of all who are affected by such norms, as such norms meet their interests.

Principle 3: Consensus can be achieved only if all participants participate freely: we cannot expect the consent of all participants to

follow "unless all affected can freely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual" (Habermas, 1990: 93).

To describe such discourse more clearly, Habermas takes up rules first proposed by Robert Alexy as "the Rules of Reason" (1990). In Habermas's formulation in Discourse Ethics, these are:

1. Every subject with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse.

2a. Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever.

2b. Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse.

2c. Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires, and needs.

3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in (1) and (2). (Habermas, 1990: 86)

Such rules create ideal speech situation, under which each participant has equality and freedom, especially freedom to participate in the discourse in critical ways so as to express one's own attitudes, desires, and needs, and freedom from coercion of several sorts.

Community members' participation in discourse will be unobstructed by ideological prejudices, temporal limitations, and external domination - be it cultural, social, political, or economic.

According to Habermas, these procedural rules must further be accompanied by a sense of solidarity between participants. Such solidarity amounts to concern for the well-being of both one's fellow human beings and of the community at large. As Habermas has put it recently, "under the pragmatic presuppositions of an inclusive and noncoercive rational discourse among free and equal participants, everyone is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and thus project herself into the understandings of self and world of all others; from this interlocking of perspectives there emerges an ideally extended we-perspective from which all can test in common whether they wish to make a controversial norm the basis of their shared practice; and this should include mutual criticism of the appropriateness of the languages in terms of which situations and needs are interpreted. In the course of successfully taken abstractions, the core of generalizable interests can then emerge step by step." (Habermas, 1995: 17)

With the general conditions of ideal speech situation and the rules of reason, as coupled with the sense of solidarity, Habermas describes the necessary conditions of democratic polity as well. Habermas employs these conditions and rules to justify democratic polity over alternative forms, especially supported by relativism.

3. 3. Impact of Habermas on Critical International Theory

The most significant influence of Habermas on critical IR theory has occurred through his tripartite division of interests. Richard Ashley

45

to criticize realist understanding of international relations employs this division of Habermas. According to this division there are three types of interest; technical, practical and emancipatory interests. These interests constitute different theories. For example, by means of this division, it is possible to classify realism into two; technical realism (neo-realism) and practical realism (Morgenthau's classical realism). Technical realism considers knowledge an instrument to expand the control over an objectified environment. In this view politics is defined in terms of efficiency, and the means rather than the ends become the basic concern. There is no room for ethical questioning, as in the case of Waltz's neo-realism. On the other hand, practical realism more concerns with international law and order based on history and morality. According to Ashley, practical realism guided by practical interests in developing communication and mutual understanding can be traced in Morgenthau's writings due to their more hermeneutic and interpretative character. Practical realism emphasizes the importance of traditions, institutions, rules and principles in order to avoid war, and maintain international order.

However both technical and practical realism give no chance to a moral progress towards a universal community. This approach is called as impossibility theorem by Ashley or in Linklater's words immutability thesis. Ashley draws attention to another possibility for theorizing of international relations. What Ashley offers is instead of denigrating technical and practical realism incorporating them into a higher synthesis. This can only be possible in critical theory guided by the emancipatory interest which "is concerned with securing freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness." (Devetak, 1996: 153) According to Ashley, realism of

John Herz is the unique example guided by the emancipatory interest.

Another critical theorist Andrew Linklater also employs the same Habermasian division but applies it to three traditions of international relations theory: realism, rationalism and revolutionism correspond respectively technical, practical and emancipatory interests. In Linklater's view, realism while dealing with technical efficiency fails to recognize its conformist character. On the other hand, rationalism sees international environment as not only anarchic but also societal. It is, in Wightian terminology, an anarchical society. However, although rationalism emphasizes the norms and values, it cannot overcome the tension between order and justice. However, Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, whom Linklater identifies with revolutionism, predict a universal society of free individuals conforming to cosmopolitan justice. Whereas their thoughts have been criticized by realists to be utopian.

According to Linklater, only critical theory is able to evaluate the prevailing order's origin and its historical evolution adequately, and "it is this historical anchoring which prevents critical international theory's normative interest in progressive change from sliding into sheer fantasy." (Devetak, 1996: 155) Therefore, following Habermas, Linklater tries to adopt historical materialism to studies of international relations.

A historical and structural explanation of global power relations is the main focus of critical theory. It does not restrict its scope to the analysis of states' relations; instead it takes in to account the full impact of modernity. However, to grasp the full impact of modernity, the material reproduction of social life by means of productive forces cannot be taken as one and only explanation of

social evolution, the symbolic reproduction of social life should also be considered as an important dimension. This means that forces of production can only be meaningful if they are taken with relations of production together. Although Orthodox Marxist theory of social evolution is restricted to the development of productive forces, Habermas asserts that rationalization processes at the level of relations of production are even more important for the explanation of social evolution. According to Habermas, society has an autonomous capacity to "rationalize normative structures in order to accommodate and mitigate the rationalization of productive forces... the development of normative structures is the pacemaker of social evolution." (Devetak, 1996: 162)

Habermas to reconstruct historical materialism with more emphases on the importance of rationalization processes offers a theory of communicative action. His main focus is the development of communicative rationality or moral-practical forms of reasoning in social life. He makes a distinction between cognitive-instrumental and communicative rationality, which respectively amount to a success oriented and consent oriented attitude. Success oriented actions can also be divided into two, instrumental and strategic actions. Shortly, there are instrumental, strategic and communicative (moral-practical) actions and corresponding rationalities. Technical-instrumental rationalization means to learn how to control nature, strategic rationalization to learn how to control others under conditions of actual or potential conflict, and communicative rationality to attain mutual understanding.

Linklater adopts Habermasian distinction to different traditions of thought within international relations: technical-instrumental rationalization is associated with Marxism; strategic rationalization with realism or neo-realism; diplomatic

rationalization – one of two branches of moral-practical rationality –
with rationalism; and ethical rationalism – the other branch of moral-
practical rationality – with revolutionism. According to Linklater, a
critical international theory starts from the point where the
interplay between these four rationalization processes occurs. Class,
production and the world economy as Marxist scope of inquiry and
state, war and international anarchy from realism should be
amalgamated with the contributions of rationalism and
revolutionism.

3. 3. 1. Hegemony and Historical Structures

Cox's main attempt is to articulate the relationship between the
capitalist world economy and the system of sovereign states within a
single theoretical perspective. In this way, the failure of Marxism to
appreciate the durability of state system would be remedied.
According to Marxism, the expansion of capitalism would eliminate
the international states-system and create a world capitalist society.
Marxism, emphasizing the role of capitalism in shaping the social
relations, maintains that the modes of production and class
antagonism determine the historical evolution from feudalism to
modernity and ultimately to a socialist world society. This economy
based attitude, however largely neglects the impact of the state-
system, nationalism and war. To overcome these deficiencies in
Marxism, Cox has developed the historical structures approach
based on the concepts of production, social forces, hegemony, and the
state drawn from Antonio Gramsci.

According to Cox's historical structures approach, structures,
since they are socially constructed, have an intersubjective
existence. As a result of innumerable often-repeated actions, these
mental constructions become a part of reality with their concrete

effects on human actions. That is to say that a proper historical and social analysis will expose that structures are productions of men rather than given. Differing from the positivist understanding of realism, this ontological view makes possible to pave the way of the structural transformation of world order.

There are three level of structures relevant to change: the organization of production; the form of state; the structure of world order.

According to Cox's historical structures approach, in the level of production, although there are many different modes of social relations of productions, only two types of modes of production can be mentioned; capitalist and redistributive. In capitalist development the only motivation is profit. In redistributive development, decisions are determined by political authority according to political criteria and priorities. However, in both types, states preside over the accumulation.

On the other hand, there are different forms of state shaped in specific historical circumstances. In political-economy terms, mercantilist, liberal, welfare-nationalist, neoliberal, neomercantilist or state capitalist, and redistributive or central planning forms of state have existed throughout the history. Each form of state regulates its modes of social relations of production according to the world economy. The state is an intermediary between social forces shaped by productive forces and a world order determined by state-system and global economy. States are not a singular entity unrelated to the changing nature of social forces, as the traditional realist approach conceives. In Cox's historical structures approach, the state and its functions are conceived as socially and historically determined. Realism neglects the relationship between the state and

civil society. However, "a social theory of a state", that Cox offers, historicizes and locates the state within the web of social relations. As Vico says, the state is a historical product. Its definition must be enlarged "to encompass the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society." (Devetak, 1996: 159) Also the impact of institutions such as press, the church, education system etc. should be analyzed to reveal how they consolidate the state's arrangement of power relations in society.

On the other hand, analysis of world orders should be initiated in social relations, as well. If one state becomes the "hegemonic leader" of the world order, by combining military, political, economic, ideological and cultural forces, a hegemonic social order emerges. Hegemony, as a Gramscian concept, means "a fit between material power, ideology and institutions which frames thought and thereby circumscribes action." (Devetak, 1996: 160) Hegemony as a form of dominance based on a legitimate intersubjective consensus, permeates the whole order. In a hegemonic social order, a particular interest of the hegemonic leader parades itself as universal to the global civil society.

Whether hegemonic or not, the world order is largely determined by the forms of state that compose it. Dominant configurations of social forces shape the form of state. Ongoing restructuring of production creates counter-hegemonic forces and ultimately new historic blocs for social forces. Therefore, change of world order stems from the new political leadership determined by the mutations going on in production.

3. 3. 2. Theory of the State, Critical Security Studies and Emancipation

As a form of moral and political community, the state is taken as a historical and social product in Linklater's works too. This critical view is highly different from realist one. For critical theory, the state "is acquired rather than given in anarchy itself." (Devetak, 1996: 164) Thus, the meaning and institution of state sovereignty are also historically and socially constructed and subject to change. Therefore, Linklater attempts to establish a sociology of state structure and inquire how legal and moral rights and duties of states are culturally constructed and change over time. He also focuses on the moral-practical rationalization of boundaries which unite members of the sovereign state and separate them from others.

Linklater, like Hoffman, defines this concern with the forth image in terms of the dialectics of inclusion and exclusion. According to Linklater in world politics, there are many forms of exclusion based on gender, race, ethnicity, culture, etc. Therefore a critical international theory must analyze the multiple axes of exclusion for a comprehensive account of world politics. The object of inquiry must be extended to encompass the full range of power relations that shapes world politics; and injustices and inequalities must be revealed in order to eliminate them. Critical theory is an attempt to understand the conditions under which emancipation of world politics is possible.

Emancipation, in Ashley's words, is "the securing of freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their own future through full will and

consciousness." (Devetak, 1996: 166) Emancipation, therefore, needs autonomy and security. If there is no security, individuals cannot enjoy their freedoms. Hence, critical international theory differing from realism shifts the focus of security from states to humanity. Security must be generalized across all communities. However, particularistic associations like sovereign states, as criticized earlier by both Kant and Marx too, cause intersocietal estrangement and fear. Therefore, states cannot be the main subjects of security. With their exclusionary formation states are the part of insecurity problem. Security cannot be purchased at the expense of others. It depends on mutual interdependence. Critical international theory, thus, tries to overcome intersocietal estrangement and establish a system of general political security based on universal emancipation. However, such a system should also appreciate the value of difference and provide a balance between universalism and particularism.

IV. CHAPTER THREE: DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY

As an alternative to the mainstream understanding of democracy, which was especially dominant during the second half of the 20th century, John Rawls and Jurgen Habermas have formulated a deliberative model of democracy. The dominant understanding, initiated by Joseph Schumpeter's work, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1947), was questioning the popular sovereignty principle of the classical model of democracy by emphasizing its increasing inadequacy with the development of mass democracy. Schumpeter's new model of democracy putting an emphasis on aggregation of preferences took place through political parties for which people would have the capacity to vote at regular intervals. Stability and order were likely to be result from compromise among interests than mobilizing people towards on illusory consensus on the common good.

Habermas and Rawls in their deliberative model of democracy put this understanding of democracy into question. In their view, the future of liberal democracy depends on recovering its moral dimension.

The main purpose of deliberative democracy is a reformation in communicative terms of classical notions of Democratic theory, especially the concept of popular sovereignty. Their aim is not to relinquish liberalism but to recover its moral dimension and establish a close link between liberal values and democracy. (Mouffe, 2000: 83)

The central claim is that it is possible through adequate process of deliberation, to reach forms of agreement that would satisfy both rationality "understood as defense of liberal rights" and democratic legitimacy "as represented by popular sovereignty". (Mouffe, 2000: 83) In this connection, both Rawls and Habermas try to secure a strong link between democracy and liberalism. However, Habermas states in *Between Facts and Norms* (1996) that, one of the objective of procedural theory of democracy is to bring to the fore the co-originality of fundamental individual rights and popular sovereignty. Habermas puts it in the following:

"On the one side self-government serves to protect individual rights; on the other side, those rights provide the necessary conditions for the exercise of popular sovereignty. Once they are envisaged in such a way, then one can understand how popular sovereignty and human rights go hand in hand and hence grasp the co-originality of civic and private autonomy." (Habermas, 1996: 127)

As it is mentioned above, Habermas argues that there is a co-originality rather than conflict between liberalism and democracy. Through a proper deliberative procedure, this tie can be substantiated.

According to Habermas, moving from an economic understanding of democracy to a normative one is only possible by reconciling rationality and democratic legitimacy through a deliberative procedure. Habermas defends what he claims to be a strictly proceduralist approach in which no limits are put on the scope and content of the deliberation. It is the procedural constraints of ideal speech condition that will eliminate the positions which cannot be agreed to by the participants in the moral discourse.

The features of this discourse are as follows:

1- Participation in such deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, to interrogate and to open debate.

2- All have the right to question the assigned topics of the conversation.

3- All have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied and carried out. There are no prima facie rules limiting the agenda of the conversation, or the identity of the participants, as long as any excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question. (Benhabib, 1996: 70)

According to Habermas, democratic legitimacy comes from this procedure. The procedure consists of collective decisions of equal participants and it reflects not only a mere agreement but a rational consensus which guarantees free approval of every participant and moral impartiality.

The distinction between mere agreement and rational consensus plays a key role in Habermas's approach. Because the idea of rational consensus commands the values of the procedure, which are impartiality, equality, openness, – this means no one and no relevant information is excluded – and lack of coercion and unanimity. There is no room for pressure in this procedure. Only exception is the power of better argument. The more equal and more impartial, the more open that process is and the less participants are

coerced and ready to be guided by the force of the better argument the more likely truly generalizable interest will be accepted by all persons relevantly affected. (Mouffe, 2000: 88)

Habermas accepts the obstacles to the realization of the ideal discourse but these are conceived as empirical ones. Because of the practical and empirical limitations of social life, we will never be able to completely leave aside all our rational universal self. Therefore, ideal speech condition must be conceived as regulative idea.

4. 1. The Structural Transformation

In his path-breaking book *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, Jurgen Habermas further historicizes Adorno and Horkheimer's analysis of the culture industry. Providing historical background to the triumph of the culture industry, Habermas notes how bourgeois society in the late 18th and 19th century was distinguished by the rise of a public sphere that stood between civil society and the state and which mediated between public and private interests. For the first time in history, individuals and groups could shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society.

Therefore, Habermas takes critical public sphere as what today's democracies are lacking and need to develop. However, only within a critical public sphere, relatively equal participants "can formulate a coherent public opinion that both guides and reprimands the governmental apparatus of the nation." (Rogers, 2001: 2)

Jurgen Habermas, in *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,* formulates a deliberative democracy as a democracy in which the people are connected to and can better shape and guide their government. If democratic socialization of the people can be attained, then society opens up new, large-scale democratic possibilities. However, first of all, democracy needs extra-political arenas in civil society in order to develop and socialize the people. Then, a critical public sphere is needed to bridge the growing gap between civil society and (national) government. However, following its institutionalization, democracy is increasingly undermined and decomposes which "is generally recognized as a common problem for contemporary societies, but has yet to be solved in any adequate way". (Rogers, 2001: 5) Other political forces such as the state, media, political parties and interest groups tend to displace the role of the people in the public sphere and tend to usurp the powers of the critical public sphere, itself.

As Thomas Burger puts, the historical narrative of the development and demise of a bourgeois public sphere in Europe during the eighteenth century plays a key role in Habermas's democratic theory. (Burger, 1989: ix) The story of the rise of a critical public sphere starts in the realm of commodity exchange and social labor governed by its own laws and not the state. The realm of private life is separated from the public realm of government, so that a bourgeois stratum, the real carrier of the public from the outset a reading public develops. Public concern regarding the private sphere of civil society is no longer confined to the authorities but is considered by the bourgeois subjects as one that is properly theirs. (Habermas, 1989: 23) This situation leads to a tension between town and court and the bourgeois strata of society gain a critical distance from the state apparatuses and soon develop a public sphere. Therefore, according to Habermas, the foundation of democracy is

the private sphere, civil society, not the state or other political institutions like political parties or the media.

"The 'town' was the life center of civil society, not only economically; in cultural political contrast to the court, it designated especially an early public sphere in the world of letters whose institutions were the coffee houses, the *salons*, and the table societies... 'opinion' became emancipated from the bonds of economic dependence... social equality was possible at first only as an equality outside the state." (Habermas, 1989: 30-35)

The development of a politically educated and active citizenry causes rational debates on public concerns and issues that provide self-clarification and a coherent and empowered public opinion guiding, even demanding the state to follow its social dictates. (Rogers, 2001: 7)

Following Kant's ideas on the public sphere, Habermas argues that "...the public sphere... link politics and morality in a specific sense: it was the place where an intelligible unity of the empirical ends of everyone was to be brought about, where legality was to issue from morality." (Habermas, 1989: 115)

A critical public sphere can bring the state in line with the preexisting moral consensus developed by a reasoning public as the bourgeois public sphere of the 18th century did. In this formulation "public sphere becomes an institution that bridges the divide between the people in civil society (the private sphere) and the state authority (the public domain). Thus, a critical public sphere becomes a basic source of democratic legitimacy". (Rogers, 2001: 9)

According to Habermas, the bourgeois critical public sphere

was not directly against the public authority. However, it "undercut the principle on which existing rule was based." (Habermas, 1989: 28) What the bourgeois public sphere criticized and demanded was an alteration in the claim to rule, in the standards of reason and the forms of the law to which the public wanted to subject domination and thereby change it in substance. (Habermas, 1989: 28)

The belief in dissolution of domination by the rule of law, according to Habermas, "...was a typically bourgeois idea insofar as not even the political safeguarding of the private sphere emancipating itself from political domination was to assume the form of domination... A political consciousness developed in the public sphere of civil society which, in opposition to the absolute sovereignty, articulated the concept of and demand for general and abstract laws and which ultimately came to assert itself (i.e., public opinion) as the only legitimate source of this law." (Habermas, 1989: 81)

Here, Habermas emphasizes Kant's ideal that "the coercive powers of the state be minimized and used primarily to exercise a positive influence upon it ["the universal end of the public" as manifested in the deliberative public sphere.]" (Rogers, 2001: 10) According to Habermas the bourgeois class used their newfound private freedom and "claimed the public sphere regulated from above against the public authorities, to engage them in a debate over the general rules governing relations." (Habermas, 1989: 54)

It is this idealistic conception of the public sphere that has captured the majority of academic attention, and the most important question for many today's scholars has been how to artificially recreate and preserve what developed rather naturally in the bourgeois society of the eighteenth century. Much of the discussion

today is on the make up of an ideal deliberative public sphere that brings all citizens together artificially to critically debate the core issues dividing society. (Rogers, 2001: 11)

In his article "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy" (1989), Joshua Cohen puts in-detail the internal requirements and principles for an ideal deliberative process. Also, Seyla Benhabib emphasizes the vitality of radical proceduralism of the discourse model being evolved in works of Habermas and others. (Benhabib, 1997: 95) However, the problem with all this literature is the choice to pursue democracy artificially through institutions instead of focusing on the need to have and develop a democratic culture. (Rogers, 2001: 11)

The arguments for deliberative democracy are largely institutional and procedurally based. As a consequence, these arguments fail to capture "what precedes a critical public sphere in Habermas's original narrative, the widespread existence of a democratically cultured or socialized people, a people who through participation in the extra-political arenas of civil society underwent similar democratic experiences, developed similar democratic skills, and came to share a similar democratic mindset." (Rogers, 2001: 3)

Also, unlike Habermas, this literature misses another point that when the public sphere becomes institutionalized, when a primarily institutionalized and procedurally based public sphere becomes the principle feature of a democracy, it quickly tends to decompose and deteriorate.

While trying to preserve the democratic bridge between the state and the people, institutionalizing the critical public sphere, apparently, encourages democratic laziness socially. In an

institutionalized public sphere, other institutions like bureaucratic state, political parties, the media and organized interests begin to do what a socially active and democratically conditioned citizenry previously did for itself.

To grasp how the institutionalized public sphere works, Habermas points out the role of private law. According to Habermas, the basis of the institutionalized public sphere is private law. Private law preserving the public/private distinction constitutes the bourgeois public sphere. (Habermas, 1989: 74-75) The basic rights guaranteed by these laws are the framework of a critical public sphere. He argues that these basic rights result in "... the *spheres* of the public realm and of the private (with the intimate sphere at its core); the *institutions* and *instruments* of the public sphere, on the one hand (press and parties), and the foundation of the private autonomy (family and property), on the other." (Habermas, 1989: 83)

For Habermas, a liberal society with a constitutional state is a necessary condition for the development and institutionalization of a critical public sphere. However, it is this liberal basis giving rise to other structural transformations that quickly encourage the decline of a critical public sphere. Here, Habermas argues that "For about a century the social foundations of this sphere have been caught up in a process of decomposition... [as] Tendencies pointing to the collapse of the public sphere are unmistakable, for while its scope is expanding impressively, its function has become progressively insignificant... [T]he dialectic of a progressive 'societalization' of the state simultaneously with an increasing 'stateification' of society gradually destroyed the basis of the bourgeois public sphere— the separation of state and society." (Habermas, 1989: 142)

According to Habermas, with the broadening of the public, the unreconciled interests flood the public sphere and there they are represented in a divided public opinion and the public opinion, in the form of the currently dominant opinion, becomes a coercive force, whereas any kind of coercion was once supposed to be dissolved into the compulsion of reason.

The first recognition of the public as a partner of discussion was in the late 18th century. The British Parliament had to give up its exclusivity. Although only a minority of the (male) population was included, at the time it was possible to believe in a future in which everyone would have the chance of fulfilling the admission requirements in the shape of property and general education or enlightenment. However, the 19th century revealed that the ideal of generalized possession of property would never be realized.

"Instead the political sphere was gradually opened to groups that did not meet the demands concerning economic independency and general education. As a consequence, politics proved not to be a matter of rational discussion and problem solving in order to realize a common good. Rather, it was essentially about conflicting groups fighting to promote their distinctive interests, in agreement with what should become the standard idea of politics in political science." (Loftager, 2002)

On the other hand, unlike the basic liberal fear— the tyranny of the irrational majority, Habermas believes that a highly rational and self-interested group or set of interests becomes dominant. The public sphere, which is supposed to have a universal accessibility, is not universally accessible any more. Rogers explains this situation as follows:

63

"[T]he liberal model of society, which 'had envisaged only horizontal exchange relationships among individual commodity owners', had not foreseen the concentration of social power in a few private hands. In eighteenth (and nineteenth) century Europe, these interests with a disproportionate share of social resources came to dominate the public sphere, thus the label "bourgeois" public sphere. In response to this breakdown of the liberal model, there arose the modern welfare state." (Rogers, 2001: 13)

The expansion of the state's responsibilities makes the state take over the provision of services that hitherto was left to private hands, to the public sphere. Consequently the stateification of society begins. The state grows and starts to provide services for society that previously the active bourgeois people provided for themselves. Hence, the mechanism by which the bourgeois people rather democratically governed their society turns into a political tool of the state manipulating and dominating society.

While the private sphere becomes fragmented as a result of this development, the occupational sphere gains independence as a quasi-public realm. According to Habermas, "the occupation of the political public sphere by the unpropertied masses led to an interlocking of state and society which removed from the public sphere its former basis without supplying a new one. For the integration of the public and private realms entailed a corresponding disorganization of the public sphere that once was the go-between linking state and society. This mediating passed from the public to such institutions as have arisen out of the private sphere (e.g., special-interest associations) or out of the public sphere, e.g., parties... At the same time they endeavor, via mass media that themselves have become autonomous, to obtain the agreement of at least acquiescence of a mediatized public. Publicity is generated from above, so to speak, in order to

create an aura of good will for certain positions." (Habermas, 1989: 177)

As a result, the public sphere becomes a realm where either the state (with all good intentions) or special interest groups dominated become overly active and relieve the people of their democratic responsibilities. However, the manufactured opinion and resurfacing of domination both undermine a democratic public sphere. The main problem is that "a universally accessible public sphere does not entail that all participants will have equal critical and deliberative abilities, i.e. equal democratic skills. Even worse, those who are not akin to the democratic game will not be involved or, if involved, not play with a democratic mindset." (Rogers, 2001: 15)

In a largely institutionalized democracy, the participants who are most knowledgeable and most propertied learn the rules quicker and use them to secure the system to their own advantage. That is why institutional democratic practices tend to decompose.

On the other hand, Habermas's critics, contend that he idealizes the earlier bourgeois public sphere by presenting it as a forum of rational discussion and debate when in fact many social groups and most women were excluded. Critics also contend that Habermas neglects various oppositional working class, plebeian, and women's public spheres developed alongside of the bourgeois public sphere to represent voices and interests excluded in this forum. Yet Habermas is right that in the period of the democratic revolutions a public sphere emerged in which for the first time in history ordinary citizens could participate in political discussion and debate, organize, and struggle against unjust authority. Habermas's account also points to the increasingly important role of the media in politics and everyday life and the ways that corporate interests have colonized

this sphere, using the media and culture to promote their own interests.

4. 2. Deliberative Democracy in the European Union

According to Habermas, Europe is transforming into a new political form which is neither a confederation nor a federation but "an association of sovereign states which pool their sovereignty only in very restricted areas to varying degrees, an association which does not seek to have the coercive power to act directly on individuals in the fashion of nation states." (Habermas, 2001: 10)

Habermas argues that to become more legitimate for its peoples, within this new political form, Europe does not need to invent anything but to conserve the great democratic achievements of the European nation-state, throughout its history, such as formal guarantees of civil rights, levels of social welfare, education and leisure that are the precondition of both an effective private autonomy and of democratic citizenship.

After World War II, there were two immediate purposes in mind of the first generation of dedicated Euro-federalists: to put an end to the bloody history of warfare between European nations, and to contain the potentially threatening power of a recovering post-fascist Germany. Today, everybody believes that these goals have already been achieved. A unified Europe was also the surest path to growth and welfare. Thus the rational expectation of mutual benefits within Europe provided a legitimation through outcomes for an ever-closer Union. (Habermas, 2001: 11) However, economic expectations alone can hardly mobilize political support for the much riskier and more far-reaching project of a political union. This further goal requires the legitimation of shared values.

Today, against perceived threats from globalization, the citizens of Western Europe are prepared to defend the core of a welfare state that is the backbone of a society still oriented towards social, political and cultural inclusion. That is why Habermas believes in their capability of embedding economic arguments for an ever-closer union into a much broader vision. "Rapid economic growth was the basis for a welfare state that provided the framework for the regeneration of postwar European societies. But the most important outcome of this regeneration has been the production of ways of life that have allowed the wealth and national diversity of a multi-secular culture to become attractively renewed." (Habermas, 2001: 11)

Until recently the efforts of the Union were concentrated on the creation of monetary and economic union. However, according to Habermas, today there needs a broader perspective if Europe is not to decay into a mere market, sodden by globalization. Europe should be much more than a market. It stands for a model of society that has grown historically.

Although economic globalization and rapid structural change distribute social costs more unequally, and increases status gaps between winners and losers, and national governments, whatever their internal profiles, are increasingly entangled in transnational networks, and thereby become ever more dependent on asymmetrically negotiated outcomes, democratic governments also have the chance, at least in principle, to counter the undesired social consequences of globalization by complementary social and infrastructural policies.

Here Habermas argues that a European constitution would enhance the capacity of the member states of the Union to act jointly,

without prejudicing the particular course and content of what policies it might adopt. Only through a stronger Union with greater international influence European nations could re-regulate of the global economy, and counterbalance its undesired economic, social and cultural consequences.

On the other hand, considering the limited capacity of the European Council to reach agreements among diverging member-states, and also the enlargement of the EU increasing the complexity of interests, Habermas sees further integration or deepening of the Union as inevitable.

However there are some important problems before the further integration such as the distance of the EU institutions, the over emphasis on economics and the market, the lack of clear values in EU actions and of political opportunity for civil society organizations and their representatives at EU level. If political processes were relatively open, if there were clear entry points for different kinds of participation and influence and if there was a transparent process through which different options were debated, political opportunity would be said to exist. However, this is not the case for the EU.

In the absence of a clearly defined European public political sphere, to take transnationally generated ideas in the field of social policy to the national level and to campaign for them there lead to confusion and frustration. Although there is a need for open and explicit procedures, policy at EU level tends to be developed through intense bureaucratic interactions which are mostly hidden from public view, and the European Parliament, despite the recent increase in its powers, is still failing to bridge the gap. This situation is called democratic deficit of European authorities by Habermas and he sees it as the main source of growing dissatisfaction within the

broader population. "At present, legitimacy flows more or less through the channels of democratic institutions and procedures within each nation-state. This level of legitimation is appropriate for inter-governmental negotiations and treaties. But it falls short of what is needed for the kind of supranational and transnational decision-making that has long since developed within the institutional framework of the Union and its huge network of committees." (Habermas, 2001: 14)

Moreover, so far national governments as the main actors have used the supranational level of the EU to divert political opposition. Andrew Moravscik characterizes it as the two level game. (Moravcsik, 1993: 518). In this model, the economic outcomes of European integration as justifying this domination, and ironically, the EC's democratic deficit may be a fundamental source of its success.

On the other hand, there are also some other questions about the development of democracy in the EU, such as which democratic values and practices, developed for the most part in the context of the nation state, can be applied to international processes, or how far the EU, even if not formally a state, is acquiring state functions, and what kind of a demos or societal base is needed to support democratic practice.

Eurosceptics reject a shift in the basis of legitimation of the Union from international treaties to a European constitution with the argument, there is as yet no European people. According to them, what is missing is the very subject of a constituent process.

However, Habermas argues that a nation of citizens is not a community of fate shaped by common descent, language and history.

A civic, as opposed to ethnic, conception of the nation reflects both the actual historical trajectory of the European nation-states and the fact that democratic citizenship establishes an abstract, legally mediated solidarity between strangers.

According to Habermas, modern democracy and the nation-state have developed in tandem, however, does not indicate a priority of the latter over the former. It rather reveals a *circular process* in the course of which democracy and the nation-state stabilized each other.

"There are two lessons to be learnt from the history of the European nation-states. If the emergence of national consciousness involved a painful process of abstraction, leading from local and dynastic identities to national and democratic ones, why, firstly, should this generation of a highly artificial kind of civic solidarity—a 'solidarity among strangers'—be doomed to come to a final halt just at the borders of our classical nation-states? And secondly: the artificial conditions in which national consciousness came into existence recall the empirical circumstances necessary for an extension of that process of identity-formation beyond national boundaries. These are: the emergence of a European civil society; the construction of a European-wide public sphere; and the shaping of a political culture that can be shared by all European citizens." (Habermas, 2001: 15)

Nevertheless in today's Europe the apprenticeship of European citizenship is still absent. According to Ernst Haas, this is mainly caused by a permissive public opinion characterizing the early days of European integration. (Haas, 1958: xxxii) The public was not directly involved in the process of integration but generally regarded the values and objectives, such as peace, stability and supranationalism, as sound. This allowed the architects of the early

years to set the pattern for future developments by building the formative structures on an intense transnational dialogue between officials, politicians and technical experts. An assembly consisting of national parliamentarians was set up, but was purely advisory. The power of the system lay not in its democratic foundations, but in the problem solving nature of its objectives, the authority of the central institutions, and the binding force of European law.

It was this permissive public consensus which enabled the European Community to develop relatively unnoticed implicit set of economic values. These helped to develop the idea of economic interdependence as a mainly elite activity and to demonstrate the advantages, in terms of the avoidance of political controversy, of separating out the economic from the social and the political.

This situation resulted in audience democracy where people had little direct involvement or interest in the sub-structures of politics, such as political parties, trade unions, party branches. (Manin, 1999: 34) The majority of people was enjoying life and prosperity and had little or no interest in becoming involved in politics in any direct way.

However, recent developments such as the increasing membership and support for certain NGOs, demonstrations against WTO meetings, have revealed that this trend in politics is changing. It can be said that the old forms of organization, especially as conducted through political parties, are no longer appropriate in circumstances where individuals have greater autonomy, more access to information, and cross-cutting interests and values which defy conventional labels. There is a need for a more open system, encouraging debate and participation, and making a wide range of information available. The European Parliament at the moment does

not match this model.

Here Habermas emphasizes the importance of mass communication. According to Habermas, democratic legitimation requires mutual contact between, on the one hand, institutionalized deliberation and decision-making within parliaments, courts and administrative bodies and, on the other, an inclusive process of informal mass communication. The function of the communicational infrastructure of a democratic public sphere is to turn relevant societal problems into topics of concern, and to allow the general public to relate, at the same time, to the same topics, by taking an affirmative or negative stand on news and opinions.

According to Habermas, with the right combination of a Europe of nation-states and a Europe of citizens the historical background of Europe should ease the transition to a post-national democracy based on the mutual recognition of the differences between strong national cultures.

"But the wider the differences—in size of territory and population, economic weight and level of development, political power and cultural form of life or collective identity—between these constituent units, the greater the danger that majority decisions at the higher instances will violate the principles of equal protection and mutual recognition of diversity. Structural minorities limit the range of valid majority decisions. In such situations, legitimacy can only be secured on the condition that some areas are reserved for consensual negotiations." (Habermas, 2001: 18)

To sum up, it can be said that democratic deliberation requires openness and transparency about the content of proposals, the issues at stake and the procedures to be adopted, the aim being to open up

public sphere for debate and action. To this end, plurality and diversity should be recognized and accommodated. The process does not require cultural homogeneity from the participants, only an acceptance of procedures. In a deliberative democracy a broad range of concerns and approaches are regarded as legitimate and of equal value. However, a shift of representation away from interests towards perspectives is needed to reach decisions through debate and persuasion rather than through bargaining and package deals. As a result, the gap between elite interaction and citizens' concerns is eliminated and the legitimacy of the whole system improves.

4. 3. Agonistic Pluralism as an Alternative to Deliberative Democracy

As a representative of Frankfurt School, Jurgen Habermas has mounted a polemical attack against postmodernism. Eventually this attack has found its responce in the writings of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. While thoughts of Habermas and John Rawls have been echoed in the writings of Seyla Benhabib and Joshua Cohen; their deliberative model of democracy has been criticized by William Connolly, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe who have offered an agonistic pluralist model inspired from thoughts of Carl Schmitt, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Jacques Derrida.

Agonistic Pluralism, developed by Chantal Mouffe as an alternative to deliberative democracy, offers conflict, rather than rational consensus, as the center of politics.

According to Mouffe, there are some deficiencies in Habermasian deliberative democracy. First of all, Habermas tries to prove the co-originality of democracy and liberalism neglecting the tension between them. This is a refusal of paradoxical nature of

73

modern democracy. Mouffe states that, " a great part of democratic politics is precisely about the negotiation of that paradox and the articulation of precarious solutions". (Mouffe, 2000: 93)

Presenting argument about rationality does not contribute to creation of democratic citizenship. Democratic individuals can only be created by identification with democratic values or to form a life in accordance with these values.

The idea of elimination of exclusion through rational argumentation and possibility of consensus exclude pluralism from public sphere. Habermas assert that the aim of political theory is to establish universal truths, valid for all independently of the historico-cultural context.

This universalit-rationalist approach reflects the form of Habermasian deliberative democracy. Contrary to Habermas's assertion, Mouffe envisages a contextualist approach under the impact of her reading of Wittgenstein. According to the contextualist approach, liberal-democratic institutions must be seen as defining one possible political language-game among others. Hence, Mouffe thinks that envisaging democratic advances as if they were linked to progress in rationality is not helpful and that we should stop presenting the institutions of liberal western societies as the solution that other people will necessary adopt when they cease to be irrational and become modern.

Democracy, in modern sense, has a peculiarity, because it is a new symbolic framework in which democracy and liberalism have been articulated to each other. Democracy as a form of governance and its tradition are based on the principle of popular sovereignty and its main theme is equality. On the other hand, liberalism insists

on human rights, rule of law and especially fundamental freedoms. According to Mouffe and Laclau, these two traditions, in modern sense, have been articulated to each other contingently. The main themes of these two traditions are conflictual and this conflict cannot be overcome because of the tension between them. This tension is vital to Mouffe's model.

As a starting point, Mouffe takes Schmitt's thesis that homogeneity is a condition of possibility of democracy. Schmitt asserts, "every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second – if the need arises – elimination or eradication of heterogeneity." (Schmitt, 1985: 9)

Mouffe argues that this thesis – interpreted in a certain way – may force us to come to terms with an aspect of democratic politics that liberalism tends to eliminate. The concept of homogeneity, according to Schmitt, is inscribed at the core of the conception of equality. He also asserts that democracy requires a conception of equality as substance, and cannot satisfy itself with abstract conceptions like the liberal one. Therefore, Schmitt denies the idea that the general equality of mankind could serve as a basis for a state or any form of government. Democracy based on the idea of equality cannot be assigned to mankind, but only realized in the sphere of specific people. Thus, democracy must not be formulated on the idea of humanity but the concept of people. General equality of human beings cannot be conceived as political.

According to Mouffe, "by stressing that the identity of a democratic political community highs on the possibility of drawing a frontier between us and them. Schmitt highlights the fact that democracy always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion... Contrary

to those who believe in a necessary harmony between liberalism and democracy, Schmitt makes us see how they conflict, and the dangers the dominance of liberal logic can bring to the exercise of democracy." (Mouffe, 2000: 43-44)

Schmitt argues that there is an opposition between the liberal grammar of equality, which postulates universality and reference to humanity, and the practice of democratic equality, which requires the political moment of discrimination between us and them.

Mouffe agrees with Schmitt on the paradoxal nature of liberal democracy, but she thinks that Schmitt is wrong to present this conflict as a contradiction that is bound to lead liberal democracy to self destruction. (Mouffe, 2000: 52)

Agonistic pluralist model has been developed as an alternative to deliberative model of democracy. In the context of the critique of Habermas, Mouffe thinks that agonistic pluralist model indicates some vital shortcomings of deliberative model of democracy.

As a starting point, Mouffe investigates the concept of the political. According to her, we need a new democratic model able to grasp the nature of political.

The political refers to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. (Mouffe, 2000: 101) Contrary to agonistic pluralist model, deliberative model assumes a public sphere in which power is eliminated and a rational consensus achieved. Therefore, deliberative model rejects the dimension of antagonism and its immunity. This model of democratic politics denies the central role of the conflictual dimension. That is why it is

unable to provide an adequate model of democratic politics contrary to Habermas, the question of power and antagonism is the center of Mouffe's approach.

Mouffe's conceptualization of antagonism arises from the concept of the political. To grasp the nature of political requires accepting antagonism. Politics – as a different concept from the political – reflects an organized practice of the dimension of antagonism. Mouffe states that "politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an us by the determination of a them. This novelty of democratic politics is not to overcoming of this us/them opposition – which is an impossibility – but the different way in which it is established. The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy." (Mouffe, 2000: 101)

From the perspective of agonistic pluralism, them is conceived as not an enemy to be destroyed but an adversary whose right of advocating their ideas cannot be questionable. Mouffe employs the concept of adversary in order to describe a new basis for her democratic model. An adversary is an enemy but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy; liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational consensus. By the means of such a thesis, Mouffe tries to pose the conflictual dimension into politics. However, she accepts compromises but thinks them as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation.

The concept of adversary entails a seperation between antagonism and agonism. "Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle between adversaries." (Mouffe, 2000: 102-103) Hence, Mouffe reformulates the aim of democratic politics as to transform antagonism into agonism. Such an attempt, meanwhile, entails a mobilization of conflicts and passions towards public sphere. Deliberative democracy, by the means of rational consensus, tries to eliminate those conflicts and passions from public sphere.

Mouffe does not reject the idea of consensus. For her, pluralist democracy demands a certain amount of consensus. However, she states that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony as a stabilization of power. Hence, the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot reach a rational consensus in the public sphere.

Deconstruction of Jacques Derrida helps Mouffe to draw a theoretical perspective relevant to her democratic model. The notion of constitutive outside in order to explain the us/them distinction which is vital to the agonistic pluralist model. The antagonism is inherent in all objectivity and the centrality of the us/them distinction in the constitution of collective political identities. The notion of constitutive outside cannot be reduced to dialectical negation. In order to be true outside, the outside has to be incommensurable with the inside, and at the same time, the condition of emergence of the latter. This is only possible if what is outside is not simply the outside of a concrete content but something which puts into question concreteness as such. This is what is involved in the Derridaen notion of the constitutive outside; not a content which would be asserted/negated by another content which would just be its dialectic opposite – which would be the case if we were simply saying that there is no us without a them – but a content which, by showing

the radical undecidability of the tension of its constitution, makes it very positivity a function of the symbol of something exceeding it; the possibility/impossibility of positivity as such. The them is not the constitutive opposite of a concrete us, but the symbol of what makes any us impossible. (Mouffe, 2000: 12)

If collective identities can only be established on the mode of an us/them, it is clear that, under certain conditions, they can always become transformed into antagonistic relations.

In this connection, agonistic pluralism insists on impossibility of a consensus without exclusion. Exclusion and creation of us and them in politics is closely related to the notion of undecidability.

Undecidability is not a condition that can be overcome. A decision in favor of an alternative always excludes another one. However, consensus always excludes its alternative. Therefore, every decision explicitly bears undecidability. Derrida explains undecidability as follows:

"The undecidable remains caught, lodged, at least as a ghost – but an essential ghost – in every decision, in every event of decision. Its ghostliness deconstructs from within any assurance of presence, any certitude or any supposed criteriology that would assure us of the justice of a decision." (Derrida, 1992: 24)

Every consensus seems to stabilize unstable and chaotic. Chaos and instability are irreducible conditions. Without them, politics and ethics could not exist. Constant stability amounts to the end of politics and ethics. Conditions that make pluralist democracy possible, at the same time are the conditions of impossibility of its ultimate fulfillment. Deconstruction shows this double-bind. Hence,

democracy is always to come. Deliberative democracy is at pains to erase the notion of undecidability. By postulating the availability of a non-exclusive public sphere of deliberation where a rational consensus could obtain, they imagine that they can close the gap between legitimacy and rationality.

There is a second domain in political theory in which an approach inspired by Wittgenstein's conception of practices and language-games could also contribute to elaborate an alternative to the rationalistic framework. (Derrida, 1992: 67) For Wittgenstein, to have an agreement on the language used and this implies agreement in forms of life. According to him, procedure only exists as a complex of ensemble. So, the procedure cannot be seen as rules that are created on the basis of principles and then applied to specific cases.

"So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false. It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in forms of life." (Wittgenstein, 1953: 88)

The insights of Wittgenstein also help us to understand the different way of communication and the creation of consensus. As Wittgenstein says, "giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but the end is not certain propositions striking us immediately as true, i.e., it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting that is at the bottom of the language-game." (Wittgenstein, 1969: 204)

Due to its linguistic constitution, the understanding of actions falling with its domain requires the employment of rather different methods of analysis from those used by the natural sciences. The argument for this claim goes roughly as follows. Social and historical

reality is always a symbolically mediated reality; hence the data of social and historical analysis are themselves meaningful. Meaning, in this sense, is understood through contextualization, because meaningful relations are a species of internal relations. One understands the meaning of an event in a novel by locating it within the story being told; one understands the line of poetry or a poetic image through relating it to the poem as a whole; and one understands the meaning of a human action by knowing the reason it was done. But to understand any of these requires knowing the language and culture in which it has a place: childhood does not image innocence in every culture, and to recognize the nod of a head as a bid requires knowing the language game of auctions. The meaning, then, of any particular social or historical datum is determined by its place in the symbolic totality, the language game and form of life of which it is a part. Thus the comprehension of a meaningful element can require no more then relating it to the whole of which it is but a part; and the comprehension of meaningful totalities can require no more than seeing how various parts unite form a whole, or, again in relating them to some larger social or historical totality. Now since we are always immersed in such meaning complexes, we can understand other meaningful realities only by relating them to our own.

Thus the model of understanding here is not that of discovering a cause or making an inductive inference, but rather coming to understand another person, entering into dialogue with another. All understanding of social reality, then involves the understanding of social meanings; and the understanding of social meanings always commences from a given meaningful world and involves entering into a different and unfamiliar meaning complex by tracing its relations with one's own. According to Wittgenstein, agreement is established not on significations but on a form of life. Wittgenstein also shows the

limits of consensus. "Where two principles really do meet which cannot be reconciled with one another, then each man declares the other a fool and heretic. I said I would combat the other man, but wouldn't I give him reasons? Certain; but how far do they go? At the end of reasons comes persuasion." (Wittgenstein, 1969: 204) This insight undermines the objective that those who advocate the deliberative approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles.

V. CONCLUSION

"Philosophers have only tried to understand the world, but the point is, to change it." This expression of Marx in *Theses on Feuerbach* can be quoted to summarize the general understanding of Critical Theory.

This thesis attempted to outline the philosophical roots of critical theory. Critical theory ranges from classical Greek thought to Enlightenment and especially thoughts of Kant, Hegel and Marx. Thinking of Nietzsce and Weber can also be traced within critical theory. However, critical theory as an emblem of a philosophy is mainly elaborated by Frankfurt School whose the most important theoreticians are Max Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse and more recently Habermas. The very purpose of critical theory was to recover a critical potential that had been overrun by recent intellectual, social, cultural, economic and technological trends. Horkheimer takes theory as both an intellectual and practical effort. For him, unlike traditional theory, critical theory should have an emancipatory function. A critical theory does not only describe the world but also understands and develops the conditions for the realization of human potential.

While traditional theory searches for what is ahistorical and transcendental, critical theory refuses the existence of anything ahistorical and identifies the world as a product of ideas and human actions. Critical Theory can be seen as an attack to scientific rationality, which impedes emancipation. Positivism or scientific rationality in social theory enhances the manipulation and control over human potential. Since the only type of legitimate knowledge is

reduced to knowledge based on technology, reason loses its emancipatory function. The state becomes a purely technical and functional institution, and politics begins to be considered only as management within a immutable order. However, the order is not externally given but a product of history and thus subject to change. And a critical theorist is responsible for giving theoretical direction to change towards a just life.

For critical theory, it is not possible to separate the object under observation from our knowledge of it in the same way as the natural sciences. The subject object distinction is not possible in the social sciences. Our knowledge cannot be considered as independent of our existence. It is always conditioned by historical and material context. However, social changes do not only affect our theory and our knowledge but also affect us. We are social and historical products, too. Therefore, the theoretician can never be independent of society, and a theory must include an account of its own genesis and application in society. It must be a self-reflective theory.

One of the most significant examples of traditional theory in international relations discipline can be seen in the works of Kenneth Waltz. Waltz who is the founding father of neo-realism, argued that theory of international relations needed a more secure and scientific basis. First of all, this theory was to share the same epistemology with the natural sciences. This naturally amounted to a radical separation between subject and object. This separation was both possible and necessary for theoretical inquiry. Such an inquiry could make possible to explain the repetitions in international politics. However, being explanatory was not enough for justification of a theory. According to Waltz, the criteria of a valid theory were utility and applicability. The ultimate test of a theory was its usefulness in

guiding policy towards given ends, in this case, orientating foreign policy to obtain power and security under international anarchy.

Cox has called this conception of theory as problem-solving theory – or in Horkheimer's words traditional theory – which takes the world as it finds it, as the given framework for action. On the other hand, critical international theory starts from the connection between knowledge and values, and investigates the possibilities for theorizing in a manner that challenges injustices and inequalities built into the prevailing world order

For Critical Theory, the basic scope of inquiry is the central feature of contemporary society and its historical and social development. Yet, this is not only a scientific attempt but also has a normative purpose; to provoke a social transformation.

A theory, by shaping knowledge, also shapes social and political life. It is a force within a concrete historical situation to stimulate change. Therefore, only through the process of self-understanding and self-reflection, a critique of the existing social order gives way to develop the conditions and realize human potential.

Enlightenment had two basic promises, progress and emancipation, that means freedom from all unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication that prevent humans from making their future through full will and consciousness. It can be said that progress, at least in the West, has been relatively achieved throughout history, although emancipation is still waiting for its turn. According to Habermas, it is necessary to develop normative structures that will challenge the current relations of domination and unacknowledged constraints of social life for emancipation to be achived. Both

85

Horkheimer and Habermas believe that some decisions cannot be made in terms of efficiency and accountability, especially in politics. Moral assessments cannot be excluded from political decisions that affect everyone.

Horkheimer and Habermas underline strongly the importance of morality in politics since they personally experienced how a system excluding morality from politics turned into something irrational and disastrous in the Nazi Germany. However, Habermas diverges from Horkheimer and Adorno with his positive interpretation of Enlightenment. For Horkheimer and Adorno, Enlightenment caused a strong trust in the reason to control over nature, however this instrumental reason was eventually reflected to the human relations strengthening the control over others. Therefore, according to Horkheimer and Adorno, Enlightenment with its overemphasis on the instrumental reason had caused totalitarianism.

On the other hand, Habermas believes that Enlightenment can still provide some signposts for today's politics. For instance in Enlightenment, reason is conceived of as a universally shared capacity of humanity; and such reason is characterized first of all as an autonomy or freedom - a freedom which is capable of giving itself its own law; just as this reason seems capable of discerning universal laws in the domain of mathematics and the natural sciences, so it is also capable of discerning universal laws and norms in the moral and political domains.

However, if reason is capable of being free, then how do people accept their servitude within a system of domination?

To answer this question Habermas suggests inquiring into relations of production and the rationalization processes at the level of these relations rather than the production forces that orthodox Marxism focuses on. According to Habermas, people within the relations of domination and under the influence of distorted communication rationalize the productive forces preserving the relations of domination.

With more emphasis on the importance of rationalization processes, Habermas tries to reconstruct historical materialism, and the first step towards this end is to create a theory of communicative action. The theory of communicative action is an attempt to explain the development of communicative rationality, in other words, the development of moral-practical forms of reasoning in social life.

The theory of communicative action is mainly based on the tripartite division of human interests. According to Habermas, there are three types of human interest: technical interests, practical interests and emancipatory interests. Technical and practical interests drive humans to seek control over nature as well as others. The realization of these interests requires cognitive-instrumental rationality with a success oriented attitude and results in instrumental and strategic actions.

As explained in Chapter Two, critical international relations theorist Richard Ashley employs this tripartite division of interest to IR theory. Ashley argues that, different type of interests constitutes different realist IR theories. While technical realism corresponds neo-realism, practical realism corresponds to Morgenthau's classical realism. Technical realism considers knowledge an instrument to expand the control over an objectified environment. On the other hand, practical realism is more concerned with international law and

order. However both technical and practical realism give no chance to moral progress towards a universal community. Instead of denigrating technical and practical realism Ashley offers incorporating them into a higher synthesis. This can only be possible in critical theory guided by the emancipatory interest. According to Ashley, realism of John Herz is the unique example guided by the emancipatory interest.

Linklater applies this division of interests to three traditions of international relations theory: realism, rationalism and revolutionism correspond respectively to technical, practical and emancipatory interests. According to Linklater, realism while dealing with technical efficiency fails to recognize its own conformist character. Rationalism, on the other hand, emphasizes the norms and values, but it cannot overcome the tension between order and justice. However, Immanuel Kant and Karl Marx, whom Linklater identifies with revolutionism, predict a universal society of free individuals conforming to cosmopolitan justice.

On the other hand, Habermas argues that in today's politics these technical and practical interests and the cognitive-instrumental rationality are represented as the only types of interest and the only form of reasoning to individuals. Particularly the cognitive-instrumental rationality emphasizing the technical and practical interests leads people not to realize their emancipatory interests. Here is the point from which Habermas's rejection arises.

For Habermas, the ignorance of emancipatory interests impedes the full realization of human potential. Relations of domination and conditions of distorted communication cause humans not to realize their emancipatory interests and deny their capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness. However,

people are capable to rationalize normative structures in order to accommodate and mitigate the rationalization of productive forces, and to reveal this capability, according to Habermas, the development of communicative rationality, in other words, the development of moral-practical forms of reasoning in social life is needed.

Habermas, therefore, gives the development of the communicative rationality a central role in his understanding of the social evolution.

Habermas, argues that the communicative rationality results in moral-practical actions towards mutual understanding and helps the elimination of unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication. To this end, it is necessary to follow the rules of communicative action stated by Habermas under the title of discourse ethics.

According to discourse ethics, a principle, norm or arrangement can be valid only "if they can meet with the approval of all those who would be affected by them." In other words, as a form of moral-practical reasoning, discourse ethics requires an open and non-exclusionary dialog and intersubjective recognition and consent. This is called ideal speech condition by Habermas. Ideal speech condition has some procedural constraints. For instance, under this condition participation in a deliberation is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; all participants have the same chances to initiate speech acts, to question, and to open a debate. All participants have the right to question the assigned topics of the conversation. And there are no rules limiting the agenda of the conversation, or the identity of the participants, as long as any excluded person or group

can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question.

These rules also constitute Habermas's deliberative model of democracy which is conceived of as a remedy for the legitimacy crisis. Politics in the West has lost its legitimacy as a result of the exclusion of the masses from the decision making process. Voting has become the only democratic activity which is limited to similar political parties. The status quo is preserved for the sake of prosperity and welfare. This interest-based understanding of politics, however, ignores the human potential that can make the future through full will and consciousness.

Habermas believes that if all people have an opportunity to express themselves without any constraints neither on the scope nor the content of the deliberation, then it is possible to reach a rational consensus among all parts. Through such a process, all decisions affecting the parties become legitimate as they take the approval of all.

On the other hand, to apply this ideal situation to the whole society it is necessary to create a critical public sphere. According to Habermas such a public sphere existed in the bourgeois society of the 18th century. It stood between civil society and the state and mediated between public and private interests. For the first time in history, individuals and groups could shape public opinion, giving direct expression to their needs and interests while influencing political practice. The bourgeois public sphere made it possible to form a realm of public opinion that opposed state power and the powerful interests that were coming to shape bourgeois society.

However, with the welfare state, the expansion of the state's responsibilities made the state take over the provision of services that hitherto was left to private hands, to the public sphere. Consequently the stateification of society began. The state grew and started to provide services for society that previously the active bourgeois provided for itself. Hence, the mechanism by which the bourgeois democratically governed society turned into a political tool of the state manipulating and dominating society. The private sphere became fragmented as a result of this development.

Yet Habermas believes that an institutionalized and procedurally based public sphere will be strong enough to avoid the manipulation and the deterioration, characteristic of the twentieth century. According to Habermas a critical public sphere can formulate a coherent public opinion that both guides and reprimands the governmental apparatus of the nation, bridging the divide between people in civil society (the private sphere) and the state authority (the public domain). Thus, a critical public sphere becomes a basic source of democratic legitimacy.

Within this context, Habermas argues that a liberal society with a constitutional political entity is a necessary condition for the development and institutionalization of a critical public sphere, and being a sui generis entity, the European Union gives a historical opportunity to revitalize the public sphere of the18th century.

According to Habermas, although it is an association of sovereign states, the European Union, does not seek to have the coercive power to act directly on individuals in the fashion of nation states. This provides people with an opportunity of shaping a new political culture that can be shared by all European citizens.

While with a stronger Union, with greater international influence European nations could re-regulate the global economy and counterbalance its undesired economic, social and cultural consequences, they can also become more legitimate for their peoples, by conserving the great democratic achievements of the European nation-state, throughout its history, such as formal guarantees of civil rights, levels of social welfare, education and leisure that are the preconditions of both an effective private autonomy and of democratic citizenship.

However, one of the most important problems of the EU is the lack of political opportunity for the organizations of civil society and their representatives at EU level. For many people political processes are relatively open, there is not any clear entry point for different kinds of participation and influence and there is not a transparent process through which different options are debated. Therefore, political opportunity still does not exist in the EU. Although there is a need for open and explicit procedures, policy at EU level tends to be developed through intense bureaucratic interactions, which are mostly hidden from the public view.

According to Habermas, democratic legitimation requires mutual contact between, on the one hand, institutionalized deliberation and decision-making within parliaments, courts and administrative bodies and, on the other, an inclusive process of informal mass communication. The function of the communicational infrastructure of a democratic public sphere is to turn relevant societal problems into topics of concern, and to allow the general public to relate, at the same time, to the same topics, by taking an affirmative or negative stand on news and opinions.

However, some skeptics reject this optimism saying that there is as yet no European people; there is no any collective singular of a people capable of defining itself as a democratic nation of Europe. Against these arguments Habermas maintains that the skeptics fail to capture the voluntaristic character of a civic nation, the collective identity of which exists neither independent of nor prior to the democratic process from which it springs. He argues that "If the emergence of national consciousness involved a painful process of abstraction, leading from local and dynastic identities to national and democratic ones, why, firstly, should this generation of a highly artificial kind of civic solidarity —a 'solidarity among strangers'— be doomed to come to a final halt just at the borders of our classical nation-states? And secondly: the artificial conditions in which national consciousness came into existence recall the empirical circumstances necessary for an extension of that process of identity-formation beyond national boundaries. These are: the emergence of a European civil society; the construction of a European-wide public sphere; and the shaping of a political culture that can be shared by all European citizens." (Habermas, 2001: 15)

Habermas believes that with the right combination of a Europe of nation-states and a Europe of citizens the historical background of Europe should ease the transition to a post-national democracy based on the mutual recognition of the differences between strong national cultures.

However, for some thinkers such as Chantal Mouffe, Habermas's emphasis on the mutual recognition of the differences is highly problematic. First of all, according to Mouffe, general equality of human beings cannot be conceived as political; democracy must not be formulated on the idea of humanity but on the concept of people. The general equality of mankind could serve as a basis for a

state or any form of government, but not for democracy. Because democracy always entails relations of inclusion-exclusion.

According to this post-structuralist view, collective identities can only be established on the us/them distinction. Creation of us, in this view, requires a constitutive outside which cannot be reduced to dialectical negation. Outside is not simply the outside of a concrete content but something which puts concreteness as such into question. From this questioning us arises. There is always an us/them distinction, and there is an antagonistic relation between them. Here, exclusion is inevitable.

Mouffe argues that antagonism is inherent in human relations, and it can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. Contrary to her agonistic pluralist model, deliberative model assumes a public sphere in which power is eliminated and a rational consensus achieved. Therefore, deliberative model rejects the dimension of antagonism and its immunity. According to Mouffe, this model of democratic politics denies the central role of the conflictual dimension. However, the question of power and antagonism is the center of Mouffe's approach.

According to Mouffe, politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an us by the determination of a them. The task of democratic politics is not to overcoming of this us/them opposition. The crucial issue is to establish this us/them discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. From the perspective of agonistic pluralism, them is conceived as not an enemy to be destroyed but an adversary whose right of advocating their ideas cannot be questionable. An adversary is an enemy but a legitimate enemy, one with whom we have some common ground because we

have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy; liberty and equality. But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational consensus.

Here, Mouffe does not reject the idea of consensus. For her, pluralist democracy demands a certain amount of consensus. However, she states that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony as a stabilization of power. Hence, the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot reach a rational consensus in the public sphere.

However, this perspective conceives of "them" not as an enemy to be destroyed but an adversary whose right of advocating their ideas cannot be questionable. Antagonism is struggle between enemies, while agonism is struggle between adversaries. Therefore, the aim of democratic politics should be transforming antagonism into agonism.

On the other hand, for the transformation of political relations from antagonism into agonism, this perspective is unclear into how this transformation will occur. There is no guarantee for such a transformation.

Habermas also accepts the obstacles for the realization of his model of democracy. He knows that the practical and empirical limitations of social life cannot totally be transcended. However, to provoke a change towards a just life, it is necessary to constitute an ideal model as a beacon. Ideal speech condition is just a regulative idea. However, in the absence of such regulative ideas, chaos is the only thing we have, and it is chaos that paves the way of

totalitarianism. Therefore, deliberative model of democracy should be considered as an ideal model that provides something that we can compare and contrast with our current situation. Without having such a criterion, it is not possible to escape from relativism and to argue alternative forms of community.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Adorno, Theodor W., *Negative Dialectics* (London: Routledge, 1973).

Adorno, Theodor W., *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* translated by E.F.N. Jephcott (New York and London: Verso, 1974).

Adorno, Theodor W. and Max Horkheimer, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* translated by John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1996).

Alexy, Robert, "A Theory of Practical Discourse", translated by David Frisby, in Seyla Benhabib and Fred Dallmayr (eds.), *The Communicative Ethics Controversy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).

Barrett, Michèle, *The Politics of Truth: From Marx to Foucault* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

Benhabib, Seyla, *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).

Benhabib, Seyla, "Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy" in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

Benhabib, Seyla, "3 Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jurgen Habermas" in Craig Calhoun (ed.), *Habermas and the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997).

Best, Steven and Douglas Kellner, *Postmodern Theory: Critical Interrogations* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991).

Bronner, Stephen Eric and Douglas Kellner, *Critical Theory and Society: A Reader* (New York and London: Routledge, 1989).

Brown, Bruce, *Marx, Freud and the Critique of Everyday Life: Toward a Permanent Cultural Revolution* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1973).

Burger, Thomas, "Introduction", in Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

Cavalier, Robert, "Introduction to Habermas's Discourse Ethics", 2004, http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/HaberIntro.html (accessed on 12.10.2004)

Cohen, Joshua, "Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy" in Alan Hamlin, Phillip Petit (eds.), *The Good Polity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

Derrida, Jacques, "Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority" in D. Cornell (ed.), *Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice* (New York: Routledge, 1992).

Devetak, Richard, "Critical Theory" in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996).

Dews, Peter, *Autonomy and Solidarity: Interviews with Jürgen Habermas* (New York: Verso, 1992).

Dubiel, Helmut, *Theory and Politics: Studies in the Development of Critical Theory* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).
Haas, Ernest B. , *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958).

European Graduate School, "Jürgen Habermas – Biography" www.egs.edu/resources/habermas.html (accessed on 15.07.2005)

Habermas, Jürgen, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Toward a National Society: Student Protest, Science, and Politics* translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Communication and the Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon, 1979).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Theory and Practice* translated by John Viertel, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973).

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Logic of the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988).

Habermas, Jürgen, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* translated by Thomas Burger, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989).

Habermas, Jürgen, *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate* translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989a).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action* translated by Christian Lenhardt and S. Weber Nicholsen, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1990).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990a).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Theory of Communicative Action* translated by Thomas McCarthy, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
Habermas, Jürgen, "Justice and Solidarity: On the Discussion Concerning Stage 6", *Philsophical Forum 21*, no. 12 (Fall/Winter 1993), pp. 32-52.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Justification and Application* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993a).

Habermas, Jürgen, "Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks to John Rawls´s Political Liberalism", *Journal of Philosophy*, March 1995.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996).

Habermas, Jürgen, "Why Europe Needs a Constitution?", *New Left Review*, No:11, September-October 2001.

Habermas, Jürgen, *Theory of Communicative Action* translated by Barbara Fultner, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001a).

Habermas, Jürgen, *Postnational Constellation: Political Essays* translated by Max Pensky, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001b).

Held, David *Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1980).

Horkheimer, Max, *Critical Theory* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972).

Horkheimer, Max, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Continuum, 1974).

Horkheimer, Max, *Between Philosophy and Social Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993).
Jay, Martin, *The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research 1923-1950*, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1973).

Kellner, Douglas, *Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity*, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989).

Kellner, Douglas, "Critical Theory and the Crisis of Social Theory" in David Harvey (ed.), *Special issue on Critical Theory, Sociological Perspectives,* Vol. 33, No. 1, 1990, pp. 11-33.

Kelly, Michael, *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault / Habermas Debate* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994).

Laclau, Ernesto, *Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, Populism* (London: New Left Books, 1977).

Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal, *Hegemony & Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (London: Verso Books, 1985).

Loftager, Jørn "Deliberative Democracy and the Legitimacy of Basic Income", *Paper for the 9th International Congress of the Basic Income European Network (BIEN):Income Security as a Right, International Labour Office*, 12-14September 2002, www.etes.ucl.ac.be/bien/Files/Papers/2002Loftager.pdf (accessed on 17.05.2005)

Manin, Bernard, *The Principles of Representative Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Moravcsik, Andrew, "Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining," in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds.), *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 3-42.

Mouffe, Chantal, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso Books, 1994).

Mouffe, Chantal, *Deconstruction and Pragmatism* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Mouffe, Chantal, *Dimensions of Radical Democracy* (London: Verso Book, 1997).

Mouffe, Chantal, *The Challenge of Carl Schmitt*, (London: Verso Book, 1999).

Mouffe, Chantal, *The Democratic Paradox*, (London: Verso, 2000).

Rogers, Michael "The Precursor to Deliberative Democracy", *Rockefeller College Review Working Papers Series*, 2001, www.albany.edu/rockefeller/rockreview/issue1/0110501.pdf (accessed on 28.06.2005)

Schmitt, Carl *The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985).

Schumpeter, Joseph, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (New York: Verso, 1947).

Skinner, Quentin, *The Return of Grand Theory in the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Smith, Anne Marie, *Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary* (London: Routledge, 1998).

Wiggershaus, Rolf, *The Frankfurt School* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1953).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, *On Certainty*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969).

Wood, Kelsey, "Horkheimer, Max" in *The Literary Encyclopedia*, 2004, www.litencyc.com/php/speople.php?rec=true&UID=2208 (accessed on 08.11.2005)

Wood, Kelsey, "Frankfurt School" in *The Literary Encyclopedia*, 2004a, www.litencyc.com/php/stopics.php?rec=true&UID=440 (accessed on 08.11.2005)