

**SOCIALIST PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES:  
THE CASE OF TİP IN THE 1960S**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY  
SERPİL GÜVENÇ**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND  
POLITICAL SCIENCES**

**DECEMBER 2005**

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. Dr. Feride Acar  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

\_\_\_\_\_  
Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman  
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members:

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes	(METU, IR)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman	(METU, ADM)	_____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Ferdan Ergut	(METU, HIST)	_____

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Surname: Serpil Güvenç

Signature :

## ABSTRACT

### SOCIALIST PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES: THE CASE OF TİP IN THE 1960s

Serpil Güvenç

M.S., Department of Public Administration and Political Sciences

Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman

December 2005, 207 pages

In this study, the foreign policy perspectives of the Turkish socialist left during the 1960s are evaluated. TİP (Turkish Labour Party) is chosen as a case study and its theoretical approach and practical proposals pertinent to Turkey / USA relations, Turkey / USSR relations, Turkey / European Union relations and the Cyprus Problem are discussed by comparison to some domestic and foreign political parties and important left wing currents of the period in question.

Key Words: Turkish Labour Party, Foreign Policy, Cyprus, Turkish / American Relations.

## ÖZ

### DIŞ POLİTİKA KONULARINDA SOSYALİST PERSPEKTİFLER: 1960'LARDA TİP DENEYİ

Serpil Güvenç

Yüksek Lisans, Kamu Yönetimi ve Siyasal Bilimler

Tez Yöneticisi: Yrd. Doç. Dr. Galip Yalman

Aralık 2005, 207 sayfa

Bu çalışmada, 1960'lı yıllarda Türkiye'de Sosyalist Sol hareketin dış politikaya ilişkin teorik perspektifleri, TİP (Türkiye İşçi Partisi) örneği üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda, TİP'in, Türk / Amerikan İlişkileri, Türkiye / Sovyetler Birliği ilişkileri, Türkiye/Avrupa Birliği ilişkileri ve Kıbrıs konularındaki teorik yaklaşımları ve pratiğe ilişkin önerileri, yurt içi ve yurt dışı bazı önemli sol siyasal akımlarla karşılaştırmalı bir değerlendirmeye tabi tutularak tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Türkiye İşçi Partisi, Dış Politika, Kıbrıs, Türk/Amerikan İlişkileri

To  
My parents  
Şekibe and Halit Çelenk

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful to the Public Administration and Political Science Branch of the Social Sciences Institute of METU for granting me the opportunity of benefiting from the privilege of education of this university. In this context, I owe special thanks to my advisor, Dr. Galip Yalman for his immense valuable assistance, attention and scientific contributions to facilitate and improve the conditions for my study during my education period and the preparation of the thesis.

I am most appreciative of all my friends and colleagues, above all of Hacer Fidan, Nuran Sepetçi, Demet Dinler, Nuran Aytemur, Bengi Demirci, Başak Alpan, for their generous help and encouragements. In this context, it will not be an exaggeration to argue that, if it were not for Hacer Fidan's invaluable support and care in particular, together with competency in her career, the completion of this study would be seriously hampered.

Above and beyond all this precious assistance, I would like to offer my gratitude to my family, to my daughter without the encouragement and support of whom my voyage in the field of social sciences would never go beyond an incomplete dream, to my husband for his patience, precious help and comments, and to my son for his help in compensating my health problems by virtue of his youth during this study.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	iii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	viii
CHAPTER	
1- INTRODUCTION .....	1
2- TURKISH LABOUR PARTY (TİP) .....	7
2.1. The Birth of TİP .....	12
2.2. Ideological Premises of TİP .....	14
2.3. The Impact of External and Domestic Ideological Sources .....	16
2.3.1. TİP and the Impact of European Communist Thought .....	16
2.3.2. TİP and Third Worldism .....	21
2.3.3. Kemalist Ideology and TİP .....	37
2.3.4. Impact of TKP Heritage on TİP .....	44
3- TİP’S APPROACH TO THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES DURING THE 1960S .....	59
3.1. Turkey – United States Relations .....	63
3.1.1. Bilateral Agreements .....	72
3.1.1.1. U-2 Plane Incident .....	74
3.1.1.2. Missiles Crisis .....	75
3.1.1.3. Advent of the Issue of Bilateral Agreements and American Bases to the Parliament by TİP .....	78
3.1.1.4. Re-appraisal of the Bilateral Agreements .....	85
3.1.2. From Bilateral Agreements to American Bases .....	91
3.1.3. NATO and TİP .....	95
3.1.3.1. Right and Left Wing Parties on NATO .....	95
3.1.3.2. TİP and YÖN Against NATO .....	98
3.1.3.3. Method of the Struggle – Passive Resistance .....	102
3.1.3.4. Socialist and Independence Struggles – “Two Faces of the Same Coin” .....	105

3.2. TİP and the Common Market .....	113
3.2.1. Discussions on the Common Market in the Grand National Assembly .....	114
3.2.2. Opposition to Common Market: TİP and YÖN .....	115
3.3. TİP and USSR .....	119
3.3.1. Discussions on Warsaw Pact Intervention to Czechoslovakia .....	126
3.3.2. The Attitude of Some Communist Parties on the Intervention to Czechoslovakia .....	129
4- TİP ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE .....	131
4.1. Impact of the Cyprus Issue on Foreign Policy of Turkey and on the Legitimacy of the Turkish Left .....	137
4.2. Two Different Perspectives Adopted by TİP on the Cyprus Issue	139
4.2.1. Initial Perspective – Defence of “National Treaty” .....	139
4.2.2. Final Perspective – Closer to a Nationalistic and Militaristic policy .....	144
4.3. Other Left Wing Positions on the Cyprus Issue .....	152
4.3.1. Internal Perspectives: Approaches of YÖN and MDD .....	152
4.3.2. External Perspectives .....	161
4.3.2.1. Approach of TKP .....	161
4.3.2.2. Approach of AKEL .....	163
5- CONCLUSION .....	170
BIBLIOGRAPHY .....	184
APPENDICES	
A: Written Question of Sadi Koçuş on Bilateral Agreements and American Bases .....	193
B: Oral Question by TİP on Bilateral Agreements and American Bases .....	195
C: The Issue of National Bourgeoisie in Comintern and CPSU .....	199
D: Aybar’s Bursa Speech on the Cyprus Issue .....	202
E: First Declaration of TİP on the Cyprus Issue .....	204
F: Second Declaration of TİP on the Cyprus Issue .....	205
G: The Main Points of the Soviet Thesis on Cyprus .....	206

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

The decade of 1960s witnessed a variety of changes in domestic and international arena. Of the important domestic events of the period, one may count the 27 May 1960 military coup giving birth to the 1961 Constitution, the Cyprus Crisis, the quantitative and qualitative development of the working class parallel to the development of capitalism in the country, and the foundation of Turkish Labour Party (TİP). Sharing the views of Yalman, one may assert that, the 1961 Constitution, created the basis for the restructuring of state/civil society relations in relation to the balance of class forces and for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic, the anticipation of the establishment of a democratic form of state appeared as a concrete possibility through a military coup. In spite of some limitations, the Constitution of 1961 paved the way for the social segments of the society external to the power bloc to establish their own economic and legal political organizations (Yalman, 2002: 14)<sup>1</sup>. Of the most important of these legal political organizations, was the Turkish Labour Party (TİP) established on February 1961. By the fulfilment of the legal organizational prerequisites, TİP succeeded in entering the elections held on October 1965. Although the outcome was the re-seizure of the power by one party, representing a coalition of the factions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, an equally significant event was the entry of a legal socialist party, TİP, to the Parliament of Turkey. TİP sent fifteen delegates to the National Assembly by winning approximately 3% of the total votes.

---

<sup>1</sup> Yalman further argued that, the establishment of a more democratic state was not the harbinger of a new hegemony for the bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Turkish bourgeoisie had reservations on the legal framework of the Constitution providing the right of organization and strike of the working class. Hence, despite the achievement of a comparatively high level of economic development and welfare, intense class struggles were witnessed during the 1960s. To Yalman, the significance of the period of 1960s compared to the preceding one was the emergence of a potential threat, that is, the working class, for the bourgeoisie. Criticising the views which link the inability of the Turkish bourgeoisie to become a hegemonic class due to its dependence on state, he argued that, it would be more realistic to explain this fact on the basis of its impatience related to the emergence of a working class which had the objective of changing the prevailing social relations (Yalman, 2002: 14- 15).

The international conditions of the period of the 1960s that may have been influential on the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey and on the emergence and ideological structuring of TİP can be summarized as follows: After the dissolution of colonialism, a significant group of countries of Asia and Africa emerged into the world political scene following the Second World War. Adoption of a position of non-alignment in foreign policy views, support of peace and independence, the attempt to achieve economic development and progress and the rehearsal of national control over the domestic sources were a number of the main characteristics of this movement which instigated their recognition as a point of reference to many underdeveloped countries. The existence of the Soviet Union and the Socialist bloc, the rise of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism due to aggressive policies of USA especially concerning the Vietnam war, the success of the Algerian War of independence, the Cuban Revolution and other progressive mass movements in Latin America that brought independence to much wider areas were events that shook loose the “forward bastions of imperial rule” in Perry Anderson’s words. The Cultural Revolution of China “was described as an important event of the era invoking “the ideals of the Paris Commune” by the same scholar (Anderson, 1999: 90). The wave of student revolt followed by labour unrest in Europe, the attempts of building socialism in a number of underdeveloped countries through an exercise of “non-capitalist path” were other characteristic historical conditions of the 1960s.

As mentioned above, the foundation of TİP and its representation in the Turkish Parliament was an event worthy of note for the Turkish history. Ahmad argued that for the first time in decades, a party, the Turkish Labour Party (TİP) which “openly represented interests clashing directly with the ruling classes” was allowed to function. Its influence on Turkish politics during the ten years of existence was totally “out of proportion to its size and representation in the Assembly” (Ahmad, 1977; 187). TİP was founded by twelve union leaders on 13 February 1961. Almost a year after the establishment, Mehmet Ali Aybar was chosen as the leader of TİP. Aybar’s presence and the participation of some prominent left wing intellectuals amongst who were Behice Boran and Çetin Altan, pointed to a new era in terms of the success of TİP. Among the issues through which TİP tried to develop an awareness and sensitivity, one may notice the concept of

independence in foreign policy.<sup>2</sup> At a meeting of the Bakırköy party organization, Aybar stated that, Turkey was confronted with two interconnected problems, “a new struggle for independence and the task of the construction of socialism” (quoted in Lipovsky, 1992; 21). In his opinion, forty four years after the achievement of national liberation, Turkish nation was obliged to start the “second war of national liberation” and that the socialists of the country, including him, were determined to engage in this struggle “until the last American soldier leaves Turkey” (Aybar, 1968; 498-499). The major contradiction of the society during the period of 1960s was the one “between the entire nation and a gang of compradors” (ibid: 657). This declaration was a new voice, signifying a departure from the traditional foreign policy maintained since 1940’s. According to Karpat, due to the attempts of TİP, Turkish foreign policy became the “chief issue” of Turkey and helped the “crystallization of the ideological stand” of TİP (Karpat, 1967: 168).

In my view, the impasse of the Turkish foreign policy, brought to the surface by the Turkish Left, TİP and YÖN movement in particular during the period of 1960s, such as political and economic independence, anti-imperialism, non-alignment, problems pertinent to bilateral agreements and American bases, and NATO membership seem to retain their significance when viewed through the recent political domestic and international circumstances. In this context, the growing inclination of the students of social sciences to study the theoretical and practical approaches of the Turkish Left of the 1960s in relation to domestic and foreign topics is encouraging. In addition, these studies may provide valuable contributions for the recent theoretical and practical issues of socialism and anti-imperialism by the transfer of the experience of the past to the new generations.

This study, which may be considered as an extension of the recent studies on the Turkish Left, is an attempt to investigate the foreign policy views of TİP between 1965 and 1969. In this respect, the grounds for the point of departure of the foreign policy of TİP in terms of theory and practice from the other political parties, in other

---

<sup>2</sup> The Cyprus issue and the event called the “Johnson letter” produced a deep impact on foreign policy issues of Turkey during the 1960s. Paving the way for the discussion of the Turkish foreign policy, they facilitated the introduction of the alternative foreign policy proposals of the Turkish Left and TİP to the political arena. This issue will be dealt in detail in the fourth chapter of this study.

words, the conflict and/or consensus relationship between the traditional or “national” foreign policy of Turkey – the official view of the state – and of TİP will be examined in detail. To a certain extent, it will entail the study of the impact of TİP’s foreign policy approach on the political medium of the country including the political parties in the Parliament and on public opinion as well. Some minor questions aiming to throw light on the major question will inevitably be posed such as a brief research of the convergent and divergent aspects of the foreign policy of TİP with regard to some of the left wing groups and political parties inside and outside of Turkey such as YÖN, MDD (National Democratic Revolution group) and TKP and AKEL in some cases (as the Cyprus issue). Another minor question may be whether TİP was affected by the general chauvinistic climate of Turkey or by nationalistic tendencies embedded in socialism of the 1960s in underdeveloped countries regarding its foreign policy perspectives or not. In this respect, the impact of the important internal and external currents and political organizations of the period such as the non-aligned movement, the European currents of communism, TKP and Kemalism will be dealt with.

National Assembly minutes of the period in question, books, speeches and writings of the party leaders as Aybar, Boran and Aren and the party documents – such as the party programme and the party regulations - and resolutions of the main party congresses will be the primary sources of investigation of this study. Articles and books of Turkish and foreign scholars and authors analysing the Turkish left and the socio-economic and political conditions of the period will be utilized in addition to the studies dealing with the socio-economic and political developments in Asian and African countries concerning the period in question.

The study is planned to consist of five chapters. In the second chapter, the establishment and the structure of TİP will be examined in addition to the main ideological sources influential on the shaping of its ideological premises in order to establish a theoretical basis for the rest of the study, that is, for the sections in which the foreign policy views of TİP will be elaborated. The history of the foundation of TİP - as a legal socialist party - by a number of trade unionists in February 1961 and represented by fifteen deputies in the Turkish Parliament following the general elections of 1965 will be presented in the same chapter. In this context, a quick shot

at the socioeconomic conditions of Turkey concerning the period in question such as the alterations related to the working classes - growing industrial proletariat, the rise of the unionised labour, the increase in the class consciousness of the working class - the mounting dependence of the country on foreign capital and on foreign loans accompanied by the increasing impact of the comprador bourgeoisie will also be considered in brief in relation to their explanatory role on the birth and practice of TİP. As indicated, the internal and international movements and currents of thought likely to influence the ideological stance of the Party such as Kemalism, the TKP (Turkish Communist Party) tradition, and the Third World (non-aligned) movement in addition to the tradition of the European social democratic parties will be studied in order to elaborate the significance of the practical and theoretical contribution of TİP in relation to foreign policy topics. Hence, special attention will be paid to issues as the views of the party on the non-capitalist path to development and on classes other than the working class- especially on the national bourgeoisie- and to the problem of the national front and its components. TİP' s point of view on these issues – which are closely connected to foreign policy headings discussed by the Turkish Left in the period in question - is expected to highlight the theoretical aspects of the problem questioned in this study.

Following the two preliminary chapters, the foreign policy perspectives of TİP during the period 1965-1969, the major question of the thesis, will be discussed in detail in the third chapter. Following a brief summary on US/Turkey relations<sup>3</sup>, TİP's political struggle, together with all the other socialist and communist currents and groups of Turkey, directed to the issues such as the total abrogation of all bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the United States, the ousting of the American bases, the refusal of membership of NATO and of EEC (European Economic Community) will be studied in depth through a brief comparison of these

---

<sup>3</sup> In this connection, the main motive of the Turkish foreign policy, its “national” character, that is, its pro-Western feature will be briefly discussed. I shall attempt to show that the climate of the international conditions such as the post war US policies –Truman doctrine and Marshall plan - the Cold war, the emergence of a socialist bloc after the Second World War were equally influential in the foreign policy choices of the Turkish ruling classes intertwining with their own class interests. My second intention will be to demonstrate that the re-examination of the Turkish foreign policy beginning in the aftermath of the 27 May Revolution was a deviation towards a somewhat balanced position but did not bring forth an alteration in the traditional line of the foreign affairs.

views to the national foreign policy concept of the Turkish Republic. Given that the study of the foreign policy stance of TİP is not be restricted with its anti-imperialist struggle against the US and Western imperialism, TİP's views on the Soviet foreign policy and the Czechoslovakian intervention of the Warsaw Pact will also be considered together with the ideas of YÖN, MDD and TKP lines on the subject in a comparative manner.

The rationale of devotion of a special chapter (chapter four) to the views of TİP on Cyprus question and interrelated themes such as the London/Zurich agreements, the military intervention of Turkey to Cyprus etc. is firstly due to the significance of the issue for the Turkish politics. As is known, Cyprus events - raising fundamental questions about Turkey's role in the Western alliance - was one of the main foreign policy determinants of the period in question resulting in a widespread public reaction to America and a boost in the dosage of anti-Americanism and anti-imperialism, thus paving the way for a re-evaluation of the Turkish foreign policy. In addition to these, a side effect of the Cyprus crisis, that is, its espousal to the legitimation of the Turkish left and the impact of this opportunity of legitimation on the political stance of the Turkish Left and TİP in particular seemed important for its evaluation under a special topic since it was expected to provide important insights to my minor questions. In sum, I shall endeavour to trace the line followed by TİP on Cyprus problem through a detailed comparison with foreign and domestic left-wing views on this issue to contribute to the evaluation of the consistency of TİP's general approach on foreign policy.

By way of conclusion, the fifth chapter, the arguments developed in the previous chapters of the thesis will be summarized and in addition, the recent implications of these arguments will be elaborated.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **TURKISH LABOUR PARTY (TİP)**

In this chapter, my intention is to examine the foundation and the main premises of TİP in conjunction with the internal and external conditions and sources that shaped its ideological and practical stance. The socio-economic conditions of the country, some important political developments such as the 1961 Constitution, and the political and social conditions of the world affecting the inner developments enabled the legitimization of socialism in Turkey, thus paving the way for the foundation of a legal socialist party, Turkish Labour Party (TİP). Foreign and domestic ideological currents such as Kemalism, Eurocommunism and Third Worldism and the old (TKP) tradition of socialist / communist movement in Turkey were equally influential on the shaping of the ideology and politics of the party echoing in the program and regulations as well as in the speeches and texts of its leaders. The main premises of TİP such as role of the working class as the leading force of the socialist struggle, the stress on the relation of democracy and socialism, the support of parliamentary means to achieve power, the adoption of the non-capitalist path of development – though elaborated quite differently compared to its practice in Third World states – through a state-oriented policy led by the labouring masses, the support of full independence in foreign policy affairs were evaluated, accompanied with a brief comparison to the views of the three currents mentioned above. Finally, the deep impact of TİP on the political agenda of the country and on other political parties of Turkey were referred along with some criticisms of the other important socialist/communist circles or persons such as Hikmet Kıvılcımlı regarding the theoretical stance and practice of the party.

As stated before, one of the most important outcome of the May 27<sup>th</sup> 1960 Revolution was the adoption of a new democratic constitution. The legal democratic framework of the new constitution and the “liberal” and “hopeful” atmosphere created after the 27 May 1960 enabled the left wing currents, previously banned and suppressed, to enter into the political arena. Some speeches of the National Unity

Committee (NUC) members indicated that they had some “social aspirations.” The most significant contribution came from Cemal Gürsel, the Head of State, stating that he allowed the foundation of a small socialist party which could be very “beneficial” as long as it did not have “malicious intentions”, an expression of the official recognition of socialist party. (Karpaz, 1973: 349)

In this period, socialism appeared as a major current of thought and attracted a large support being partly legitimised by the emergence and acceptance of socialist political organizations, one of which was a legally constituted party, namely the Turkish Labour Party (TİP), defended by a group of university professors, teachers, writers, journalists and Marxists coming from the tradition of TKP. Another important branch was a group of intellectuals which gathered around the weekly YÖN, founded in December 1961. Although some Marxists participated in the magazine with their articles, the contributors of the YÖN circle were generally non-Marxist, left-wing radicals. The alternative program of the YÖN group was manifested in the statement known as the YÖN Declaration (Karpaz, 1967:157)<sup>4</sup>. The proposals of YÖN had great similarities with the targets of the program of TİP, a proof of a common understanding on socio-economic issues between these two main left currents of the period. It may be argued that, a socialist movement was born in Turkey, as Landau argued, “independent and free of contacts [from] foreign elements”; and related to the structure of the Turkish society and its historical development, though it had originated from the West regarding its ideological concepts (Landau, 1974:159). In Karpaz’s view, the chief targets of this socialist project were proclaimed as social justice, expansion of production, increased popular

---

<sup>4</sup> In the Declaration, a new “*development philosophy*” was proposed for Turkey due to the serious economic, social and political problems. It consisted of the mobilization of all resources, the increasing of investments, planning of all aspects of economic life, social justice for the masses by putting an end to exploitation. These targets were to be maintained by *a new understanding of etatism* during the implementation of which labour would be the highest value of the society. *Mixed economy* as an economic model was espoused yet *state intervention would be inevitable* since the motive of the private sector depended on profits. An agrarian and tax reform were among the proposals for the establishment of social justice. To initiate an educational mobilization, to pave the way for the Köy Enstitüleri (Village Institutes), to provide equal opportunities for the children of all classes, strengthening of the trade unions, a land reform by the help of which the replacement of ağas (Turkish or Kurdish land owners) by the organized peasants in cooperatives would be achieved, were stated among the targets of the members of YÖN (Özdemir, 1986:295-300, emphasis added, translation mine).

participation in economic and political life, respect for work, a search for a development blueprint, and the importance of state planning<sup>5</sup>.

As stated in the previous section, the world political situation had a crucial stimulus on the domestic events of Turkey. In Barchard's opinion, the softening of the Cold War and the beginning of new economic relationships with the USSR "undermined the sense of being under attack" by the neighbours in the communist bloc. At the same time, the emergence of newly independent countries in Asia and Africa provided Turkish intellectuals with a "reference group" on the international stage. The attempts of these countries to solve economic and social problems by the help of "radical political solutions" pulled the attention of the left-leaning and Marxist intellectuals. The notion of "*underdevelopment*" re-appeared, helping set the problems of national backwardness into a global perspective.<sup>6</sup> In the 1960s, the emergence of the Third World meant that many items of information and discussion, which were related specifically to economic backwardness drawn from abroad, were carried to political arena by the mass media (Barchard, 1976: 27).

The growth and expansion of movement of the toiling masses in relation to the relatively rapid development of capitalism constituted another internal condition for the basis socialism in Turkey and for the establishment of TİP (Yerasimos, 1976:1682). Urbanization rate increased throughout 1960s. In 1945, the ratio of people working in agriculture was 73.7%; in 1970 this ratio decreased to 66.8%. According to the census of industry and working places; the number of the workers counted as 947.100 in 1963, increased to 1.200.000 in 1965. Approximately half of them worked in places in which 10 or more workers were employed. One third of the wage workers were employed in the manufacture industry. In the public sector, 590

---

<sup>5</sup> In Karpat's opinion, this social awakening was the outcome of change of "roles and statuses among social groups" and the increase of political activity which took place in decades prior to the 1961 Revolution. The function of the socialist project was "to formulate" the rising demands and expectations among various groups and "incorporate" them into the political system. Large segments of intelligentsia and bureaucracy, labour leaders and professional organizations sharing these demands supported this socialist project (Karpat, 1967:157).

<sup>6</sup> Kayalı argued that the problem of underdevelopment, the view that the main contradiction existed between the underdeveloped countries and developed capitalist countries, the limitation of democracy in capitalist countries, the superiority of socialism were the concepts of the Kadro movement of 1930s. (Kayalı, 2000:194).

workers were employed per working place whereas in the private sector, this number fell to 67. Working in factories, that is, in big working places facilitated the exchange of ideas amongst a large number of workers, thus having a positive influence on their class consciousness. However, in 1963, approximately 60 percent of the working places, in which more than 500 workers were employed, belonged to the public sector. Between 1960 and 1970, the urban population increased by five million persons, to reach 39 percent of the total. A great percentage of these sections of the working class became familiar with the socialist ideology during the period succeeding the 1965 elections. 60 percent of the workers of the manufacturing sector dwelt in the six big cities; Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir, Adana, Bursa and Aydın and one third of them inhabited in İstanbul. 82 percent of the wage workers dwelling in İstanbul worked in places where more than hundred workers were employed. These developments resulted in the intensification of the class struggle and labour movement (Sosyalizm ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988: 2013).

In Karpat's opinion, the advent of the Marxist thought or the "doctrinaire minded socialists" into the socio-political arena was the last phase of the evolution of Turkish socialist project in the succeeding years of the 27 May Revolution. (Karpat, 1967: 158) A quick review of the socialist/communist movement in retrospect reveals that this "phase" was achieved by a very difficult struggle for democracy. Socialist and especially Marxist ideas and organizations were confronted with a merciless and insistent opposition and violence of the ruling classes since the foundation of the Republic. These repressive measures of various governments intensified throughout the years of the Cold War. The famous articles of 141-142 of the Turkish Penal Code which prohibited freedom of thought and organization under the mask of avoiding propaganda of class struggle and communism were widely used against the socialists, communists and even democrats particularly before and after the military coups of 12<sup>th</sup> of March and 12<sup>th</sup> of September. The concept of "düşünce suçu" (crime of thought)<sup>7</sup> was introduced to the Turkish Law by these articles. Obviously, it was almost impossible to organize legally in Turkey for decades under

---

<sup>7</sup> The concept of "düşünce suçu" is peculiar to Turkey therefore I have translated it as "crime of thought".

the shadow of articles 141-142 of the Turkish Penal Code.<sup>8</sup> One of the best examples was the Turkish Workers and Peasants Party led by Şefik Hüsnü Değmer, [had been] established in 1946 but closed the same year by the authorities. Its members were arrested, jailed and tortured. Thus, the foundation of TİP as a legal socialist party was an outstanding event for the Turkish socialist movement. In spite of all its rejection of links with the past (Aybar quoted in Teziç, 1976:322, and Aren, 1993: 30), TİP was strongly supported by all the fractions of the Türkiye Komünist Partisi (Turkish Communist Party) (TKP) and by the Turkish Left abroad. The assessment of Mihri Belli on the Foundation of the Party is worth mentioning since he was the leader of the MDD (Milli Demokratik Devrim - National Democratic Revolution) group who had serious disagreements regarding the theoretical stance and the practice of TİP. To Belli, TİP was a “roof” under which many “honest” people and “honest” socialists found the opportunity of sheltering, though, “best of socialists” (he meant the people who were previously convicted of the articles 141-142, thus legally deprived of their rights to join a party) were not able to be a member of TİP due to the existence of the 141-142 articles of the Turkish Penal Code (Belli, 1969:16-18). Ünsal developed a rather distinctive approach for the assessment of TİP's behaviour, pointing to a unity between the two lines in the party, that is the ”national”, ”freedom-loving socialist” line of Aybar and that of the ”internationalist”, orthodox Marxist one. This was in effect the same distinction which had resulted in the foundation of two parties – Esat Adil's Türkiye Sosyalist Fırkası (Turkish Socialist Party) and Şefik Hüsnü's Türkiye İşçi ve Köylü Partisi (Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party) – during the midst of 1920s. In his opinion, due to the desire of uniting the two approaches of the past, the narrow concept of ”scientific socialism” and the more wider one ”freedom-loving socialism” were both represented in TİP program (Ünsal, 2002: 146). In spite of the controversial views on TİP's line of socialism, the secret services, the police, civil groups of terror, the

---

<sup>8</sup> Article 141 prohibited the foundation of an organization aiming to establish the domination of a social class over others or the eradication of the main prevailing economical and social system. Article 142 brought punishments for the propagation of socialist ideas. These articles were adopted in 1937 from the Italian Penal Code which reflected the ideology of fascism and the understanding of fascist state. A thorough evaluation of these articles and their implementation in Turkey may be reviewed in Halit Çelenk's book “On 141 and 142”.

right-wing media all evaluated the establishment of TİP as the beginning of a “latent communist movement” (Sosyalizm ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988: 2039)<sup>9</sup>.

## 2.1. The Birth of TİP

TİP was founded by twelve union leaders on 13th of February, 1961. The trade union leaders declared that the main goal of the party was to defend the rights of the labouring classes and become their representative. Many authors and left wing journalists had different interpretations on the foundation of TİP. Özgüden interpreted it as “the outcome of the reaction which came to the fore after 1960 against the ‘non-political (siyaset dışı) trade unionism’ dictated to Turkey by the US since 1946” (Özgüden, 1988: 1998). In his book “100 Soruda Türkiye’de İşçi Hareketleri” Kemal Sülker argued that after 1960s, the labourers were “fed up with entering the National Assembly from the lists of the parties” that were dominated by the employers. They were fed up with asking small quotas in the election lists, a demand mostly rejected so many trade unionists had decided to establish a worker’s party. In almost the same vein, Yalçın Küçük asserted that the trade unionists founded a party in order to enter the Parliament. He defined most of the founders as “trade unionists of 1947” by which he meant a group of unionists who were obliged to pursue good relations with the employers due to the absence of the right of collective bargaining and strike. Nonetheless, sharing the views of Küçük, one may state that TİP was born as a “movement of progressive workers” as YÖN was born as a movement of “progressive intelligentsia” (Küçük, 1979: 552-555).

Soon after the establishment, some left wing intellectuals, among who was Mehmet Ali Aybar, were asked to help in the preparation of the Party Program and the speech of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk dated 1 December 1921, was inserted to the beginning of the program on Aybar’s request (Aybar, 1988a: 177). On 1 February

---

<sup>9</sup> TİP replied these attacks in the pamphlet named “TİP’i Tanıyalım”. It was asserted that “... who insult us as communists must realize that TİP is not communist. Everyone knows that communism is banned according to our laws. If we were communists covertly or overtly, would not the government understand and expose it?” (Sosyalizm ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988: 2039)

1962, almost a year after the establishment, Mehmet Ali Aybar was elected to the leadership of the party<sup>10</sup> changing its whole character and turning it into “an active, political force” (Landau, 1974: 124). Aybar’s presence and the participation of some prominent left wing intellectuals amongst who were Behice Boran and Çetin Altan, pointed to a new era in terms of the success of TİP. During 1962, party organizations flourished in many provinces of Turkey. Turkish Socialist Party, founded in January 1960, joined TİP in 12 May 1962<sup>11</sup> (Özgüden, 1988: 1999). In Boran’s view, though TİP was founded by trade unionists, it was not a “socialist” party at the beginning. Moreover, the first program of the party, in spite of its support for the rights of the working class, was a *humanitarian and progressive one containing reformist demands*. In other words, the party was still under the ideological hegemony of the bourgeoisie. In this context, *she described the history of TİP as a “process of becoming a socialist party”*. To her, the process was initiated after the second year of the establishment of the party and proceeded as “a process spreading from the top to the bottom” (Boran, 1976: 2, emphasis added). Until 1968 extraordinary convention of TİP, the word “socialism” was neither introduced in the Party Program nor in the Party Regulation (Landau, 1974: 134).

The Party could not participate in the first elections held under the new Constitution in 1961. Yet, two senators, Esat Çağa, who was appointed by Gürsel and Niyazi Ağırnaslı, who was elected to the Senate from the RPNP (Republican Peasant Nation Party)<sup>12</sup> joined TİP. By these participations, TİP was able to catch the opportunity of applying to the Court of Constitution for the abrogation of seventy eight laws, mostly related to the Turkish Penal Code including the famous articles of “141-142”, because of their non compliance with the 1961 Constitution (Özgüden, 1988: 1999). The rapid growth of the Party resulted in a counter attack of the ruling

---

<sup>10</sup> Aybar was offered the party leadership only a few weeks after "the Declaration of YÖN". Some of the founders of YÖN tried to establish a stillbirth socialist party of their own, known as “Çalışanlar Partisi” (Karpat, 1967: 161).

<sup>11</sup> The Turkish Socialist Party was founded by intellectuals in January 1960 yet it did not show any significant progress. Union of two parties was realized by the declaration of Minnetullah Haydaroğlu, the General Secretary of the Party on 12 May 1962 (Teziç, 1967: 321).

<sup>12</sup> Esat Çağa resigned from the Party due to a difference in opinion over the Cyprus question on 19 May 1964. Nonetheless, the Party did not lose the right of application to the Court of Constitution due to the presence of Ağırnaslı.

classes who interpreted these developments as a serious threat to their existence. Party meetings, district and regional party centres were attacked; party members were harassed by a series of harsh treatments. In spite of all these obstacles, TİP was able to fulfil the legal requirements for participating in the parliamentary elections of October 1965. It managed to participate in the elections in 51 provinces out of a total of 67<sup>13</sup> and sent 15 delegates to the Turkish Parliament by winning almost 270.000 votes (Lipovsky, 1992:13 - .19).

Most domestic and foreign observers were intrigued with the socialist TİP's entry into the election campaign of 1965 as a unique event in Turkish history. It was suggested that *the 1965 elections largely determined whether Turkey would remain with the West or join the group of neutralist countries by adopting some kind of rigid socialism* (İnce, 1975: 238, emphasis added). The outcome of the 1965 elections was the re-seizure of the power by one party, representing a coalition of the bourgeoisie and the landlords in it, accompanying the entry of the representatives of the labouring masses to the Parliament. In other words, the Parliament was no longer composed of “the representatives of the same class”. This fact was exhibited in an ironical style in Melih Cevdet Anday's article “Five Parties - One Party” (Anday quoted in Teziç 1976, 291). For the first time in the history of Turkey, a legal socialist party had participated in the elections and gained seats in the Parliament achieving the opportunity of using the Parliamentary forum to propagate socialist ideas.

## **2. 2. Ideological Premises of TİP**

TİP and its program was evaluated quite differently by Turkish and foreign political scientists. One of the most striking assessments belonged to Hikmet

---

<sup>13</sup> According to the party's own classification, 382 candidates for the Parliament were classified as follows: 101 workers, farmers and agricultural employees, 27 trade-unionists, 27 craftsmen, 23 small businessmen, five drivers, four women, twenty journalists, three artists, 15 retired officers, 21 technicians, four professors, ten retired teachers, 14 officials, 11 engineers, 36 lawyers, 22 liberal professions, ten businessmen and contractors (Karpas, 1967: 167). Landau argued that at the top of the candidate lists of the Party, there were people who were totally ignorant of the need for socialist action and that TİP had overemphasized its desire to attract electoral support from lower-middle class circles, rather than concentrate on the education and preparation of cadres. As a result, according to Landau, socialist youth movements “organized and acted parallel to TİP instead of being at one with it” (Landau, 1974: 160).

Kıvılcımlı who expressed his views regarding the influence of the intellectuals on the policies of TİP in his article “Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Politika”. To him, filling the ranks of TİP, as leaders in particular, ”intellectuals inevitably brought a lot of their bourgeois intellectualist features with themselves” creating an effect of bourgeois hegemony within the working class called ”bourgeois socialism”. Drawing on Perinçek’s statistical research published in *Aydınlık*, he concluded that the influential elements of the leading cadres were wealthy lawyers, doctors and etc, just like the American Communist party and that those elements had filled in the ranks of TİP due to their conflicting class interests with the finance capital in big centres. The same cadres also formed alliances with the "tefecî-bezirgan" class in small towns as well. He claimed that the theorization of ”freedom loving socialism” in TİP was to a great extent due to the presence of these cadres in the party, arguing that theoretically, there was no other thought or practice more “democratic” or “freedom loving” than socialism. It was “the working class and the people who searched for a new name for democracy and freedom” and discovered the word “socialism” to express these concepts because bourgeois class forgot these slogans –which it had supported – as soon as it won power. Thus, the addition of "democratic" or "freedom loving" adjectives to socialism by some TİP leaders was a "tautology". Finally, he argued that it was not correct to categorize TİP as a petty bourgeois party or a bourgeois party, yet it could not be accepted as a ”labour party” as long as the impact of ”bourgeois socialism” in its ranks continued (Kıvılcımlı, 1969: 377-378).

Tarik Zafer Tunaya, and Dimitir Sismanov argued that TİP program was more than a program of a social democrat party yet it was never a “Marxist / Leninist” one. In Daver’s opinion, the program was a "coalition of ideologies” (quoted in Ünsal, 2002: 143). According to the socialist intellectuals of ANT (Oath) magazine the program was a document elucidating the economic and socio-political conditions of Turkey instead of “a leading text for the struggle of the working class”. In their opinion, although it resembled the “minimum program of a socialist party”, it was unsatisfactory due to the absence of translations of the classical texts of Marxism / Leninism and Marxist - Leninist studies in Turkey, and to the lack of Marxist-Leninist culture of the party members who prepared it. Ünsal asserted that though the dictatorship of the proletariat was rejected in the program, the democratic and

historical leadership of the working class was stressed and that a working class party program in Turkey would never be “as clear as the program of the French or Italian socialist or communist party” since Turkey was a dependent and underdeveloped country where class differences were quite blurred (Ünsal, 2002: 143-146). For some scholars like Cem Eroğul the target of the program and the section dealing with the social, political and material structure, the forces of production of Turkey, that is, the class structure, the stress on the importance of the ownership of the means of production and the principle of the leadership of the working class were sufficient clues to prove the impact of scientific socialism on TİP (Eroğul, 1969: 8-9)<sup>14</sup>. A quick synopsis at the ideas of the party leaders regarding the character of the party and the program itself may shed light on the above allegations.

### **2.3. The Impact of External and Domestic Ideological Sources**

#### **2.3.1. TİP and the Impact of European Communist Thought**

TİP defined itself as follows:

TİP (...) is the political organization, marching to power through legal means and based on history and science, of the Turkish working class and of the groups which arrived consciously at the happy conclusion of seeing unity of fate with it (the working class), and followed its democratic leadership, such as socialist intellectuals, agricultural workers, landlords and sufficiently landed peasants, craftsmen, small businessmen, and salary and wage earners, low income professionals, in a word all citizens leading a life based on their own effort (Karpas 1967, 163, emphasis added)<sup>15</sup>.

---

<sup>14</sup> Eroğul further argued that in TİP program, the reference to objective laws in society parallel to those in nature and the guiding role of science showed that scientific socialism was adopted by TİP. Nonetheless, there were issues contrary to scientific socialism in the program regarding the reference to “freedom and equality” as the “indispensable features of human existence”, an “idealistic” phrase since human existence was determined by social relations. (Eroğul, 1969: 8-9)

<sup>15</sup> The same views were reiterated in other official documents of TİP. For instance, in the introduction of the party regulation, the classes and groups that it intended to support were defined as follows, “*TİP is the political organization of the Turkish working class and of the laboring classes and groups*

In the Party Program, it was also stated that, “the purpose is to end the system of exploitation of man by man and to make Turkey a country where people rely on each other as brothers, cooperate in freedom and equality, and live in an advanced civilization and culture, in full independence in the service of *humanity, peace and democracy*” (Karpat,1973: 360). As indicated, *a peaceful taking of power through parliamentary elections* within the framework of the 1961 Constitution was envisaged. The “staunchest advocate” of this policy was Aybar himself who asserted that 1960 Constitution was closed to “any kind of dictatorial regime” and open to a socialism “attained by means of popular elections”. (Lipovsky, 1992: 43) Attaining power “*through legal means*” (TİP Party Regulation 1968, 4) was emphasized in the party regulations as well. In the program it was declared that, “*TİP (...) comes to power by elections (...) it remains in power and it is removed from the power through elections*” (TİP Program, 1964: 69, emphasis added). Sharing Aybar’s vision, Boran asserted that TİP was “to build socialism by democratic means” and attain power in accordance with the constitution through elections and hand it over in case of losing elections. She argued that TİP never entertained “*non-democratic notions of socialism*” (Lipovsky, 1992: 51-52). The power of TİP would be a “democratic” government founded from bottom to top, consisting of all labouring classes and layers. This espousal of coming to power by parliamentary means did not contradict with Marxism / Leninism since the theory did not dictate the means of attaining power. Yet, the way of attaining power and the nature of power were two different things. Marxism / Leninism envisaged the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary stage in building socialism. If we apply Lipovsky's framework, TİP may be said to be departed from Marxism at this point. The party program clearly stated that there could be no dictatorship of the proletariat or of a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the working class and the peasants (Lipovsky, 1992: 44). If it were not for the theoretical and practical approaches of the party, it may well be argued that this was a tactical choice due to the prevailing articles of the Turkish Penal Code as 141-142. The Leninist model of the party and the idea of the party “as the

---

(farm hands, small farmers, salary and wage earners, craftsmen, artisans, low-income professionals, progressive youth and socialist intellectuals) gathered around its democratic leadership...” ( TİP party regulation, 1968; emphasis added, translation mine).

vanguard of the class” was fully refuted by Aybar who argued that liberties - he meant the bourgeois liberties - did not automatically come to the fore succeeding the change of the basis of relations of production because they were non-existent in countries where socialism had a history of half a century. For him, the main reason for this was the building of socialism in a mistaken way (Lipovsky, 1992: 53). Aren, arguing in the same vein, stated that socialism was associated with “*bloody revolutions*” and “*totalitarian governments*” in the minds of Turkish people yet to support such a method to achieve socialism in Turkey was completely wrong. “Democratic ways of thinking and acting” was gaining grounds, thus to use the state power in the interests of a given class or social stratum, that is, class dictatorship, was not possible any longer. He finally argued that the main feature of socialism was its “human and democratic nature”. (Lipovsky, 1992:65- 66, emphasis added) To Aybar, democracy and socialism were the two faces of the same coin and that the fulfilment of these aspects depended on the realization of a horizontal organization in which the labourers had the right of speech and the right to decide for themselves.<sup>16</sup> The reflections of these ideas may be observed in the program in which great emphasis was put on widening the borders of democratic freedoms and rights and on the need of enforcement of the democratic institutions by the use of necessary changes in the Constitution. TİP genuinely believed that this enforcement, by delimiting the coercion of the collaborator ruling class and the imperialists, would pave the way for socialism. (Sertel, 1978: 182 -183) In this context, freedom of thought was the basic tenet of democratic life according to the party program. The party undertook to turn this freedom into a right which the people could really benefit from in their daily lives. All people could reveal or disseminate alone or collectively their philosophical, political, scientific, or any other kind of thought by speech, writing, pictures, or any other means (Geyikdağı, 1984: 98).

The source of European communism may be traced back to two important names of the German Social Democratic party, Bernstein and Kautsky, two opponents of proletarian dictatorship. Democratic socialism, as an alternative to

---

<sup>16</sup> Lipovsky argued that these views of Aybar, represented in terms of ‘democratic socialism’ had been in use since the end of the nineteenth century, when it denoted one of the premises of ‘state socialism’ preached by Louis Blanc in France and Ferdinand Lassalle in Germany (Lipovsky, 1992: 153).

totalitarian socialism, had been first raised by Kautsky, guided by the proposition "democracy or dictatorship"<sup>17</sup>. In 1951 democratic socialism became the formal ideology of the Socialist International (the Frankfurt Declaration). The West European social democrats defined this concept as "an open theory, which absorbed all the various manifestations of everyday life and its spiritual expression" (quoted in Lipovsky, 1992: 153). During 1970s, three leaders of the communist parties of Italy, France and Spain showed similar political orientations. The main motive of this wave was the serious criticism and rejection of Soviet Marxism known as Leninism or Bolshevism. To put it in another way, this new version of Marxism ought to carry out its first "ideological duel" with Leninism (Mumcu, 1998). A policy of compromise between antagonistic classes was replaced by the notion of class struggle. Spanish communist party leader Carillo envisaged a communist party relevant to the conditions of bourgeois democracy by refuting the concept of proletarian dictatorship, and depicting Leninism as an "outmoded" view. In his opinion, communists ought to aim the "democratization" the capitalist state instead of smashing it. Opening the doors to petty bourgeois revolutionism, and substituting the leadership of labouring classes in place of the working class, he argued that proletariat was not the only revolutionary class in the capitalist society of 1960s<sup>18</sup>. The Italian communist party was the second big party of Italia, a strong candidate to power in opposition to the Christian Democratic Party. Berlinguer's goal was to establish a union with Christian Democrats on the basis of bourgeois parliamentary system and thus come to office<sup>19</sup>. French Communist party, backed by an enormous potential of votes, took into account of establishing a coalition government with the socialists and thus winning power by parliamentary means as well. In Satlıgan's

---

<sup>17</sup> An analysis of the emergence of Eurocommunism in Europe in conjunction with Lenin's approach in "State and Revolution" may be found in Coletti's book "From Rousseau to Lenin", especially in articles "Bernstein and the Marxism of the Second International" and Lenin's "*State and Revolution*" (1974: 45-111 and 219-229).

<sup>18</sup> Bottomore argued that the main premises of the New Left were the strong emphasis on bourgeois rights such as freedom, 'democratic' socialism, support of parliamentary means for gaining power, rejection of economic determinism, stressing on the effect of culture on class hegemony (Bottomore, 1993: 509).

<sup>19</sup> A prominent leader of the Italian Communist party, Palmiro Togliatti defended a 'progressive' democracy in his book "Italian Socialism" written in 1944, focusing on parliamentary transformations. Enrico Berlinguer, leader of the party during 1970s, brought in the concept of 'historical compromise' by which the notion of proletarian dictatorship was totally rejected.

view, European communism, apart from being a new current in socialism, became an important element or actor in relation to world politics. It was based on the rejection of nearly all the main premises of Marxism such as the proletarian dictatorship, the replacement of capitalism by socialism by revolutionary methods and the leadership of the working class. Parliamentary democracy, that is, a peaceful transformation to socialism was supported; in addition the “socialism” to be established ought to be in accordance with the domestic conditions of each country. Communist parties would be de-Stalinized, that is, they would be transformed into “democratic” structures. In other words, the ultimate goal was to co-exist peacefully within the borders and institutions of the bourgeois democracy. (Satlıgan, 2003: 34 and Bottomore, 1993:49) <sup>20</sup> To review the party program and the speeches of the party leaders in view of these main principles of European communism may suffice to perceive the resemblance or influence of the latter. Apart from this, the similarities between Aybar’s ideas on socialism and European communism- especially his refutation and criticisms against the Leninist and Stalinist theory and practice - his defence and genuine belief in the multi-party system<sup>21</sup> strengthens this argument since he was the leader of the party and the author of the party program and regulation .

Nonetheless, sharing the views of Satlıgan, one ought to state that, in order to obtain a fuller picture of TIP’s relation with Eurocommunism ideologically, the dissimilarities between the two ought to be stated as well. Firstly, the strategic inclination of the Eurocommunism was based on an alliance between the communist parties and some factions of the bourgeoisie- with no ties to finance capital- which would result in the establishment of a “progressive” democracy. This approach was reverberated in Turkey by the mediation of TKP. Yet, Aybar fully refuted the presence of a national bourgeoisie or a bureaucracy or any other group such as the

---

<sup>20</sup> For instance, Aybar argued that Marxism-Leninism –which evolved into a “dogma” - was born in USSR during Stalin’s power and was Stalin-oriented. To him, it was a “political ideology” despite the allegations on its scientificity. (Mumcu, 1998: 52)

<sup>21</sup> Satlıgan argued that Aybar’s defence of the Paris Commune and his support of multi-party system in a socialist system did not contradict since the Paris Commune itself was a “multi-party structure”. He also asserted that Mandel, Trotsky and many other scholars attempted to establish a theory of proletarian dictatorship which foresaw the presence of political parties backing capitalism. So Aybar, in Satlıgan’s thought, was the precursor of Poulantzas and Claudin, that is, the left-wing of the Eurocommunism (Satlıgan, 2003: 34).

youth, progressive or military intellectuals which could play a progressive role due to historical conditions. This was a major difference between Aybar's thought and the Eurocommunism. Secondly, a long-lasting alliance with the bourgeoisie that was envisaged to result in the boost of the hegemony of the left in the prevailing of the system was the plan of the communist parties of Europe. Yet, TİP never abandoned the aim of reaching socialism which was considered to be the only solution to the problems of the existing capitalist society. Thirdly, an intrinsic rejection of market and its replacement by a planned economy was the premise of TİP, an aspect not present in Eurocommunism. To Aybar, market economy was the mechanism of distribution of sources in accordance with the capitalist economic principles and that a socialist economy had to be carried on by the help of planning. Planning and market were contradictory concepts, so market should be restricted in favour of planning. The last and most important dissimilarity of TİP and Eurocommunism was its rejection of NATO, EEC and other imperialist organizations (Satlıgan, 2003: 32-33). USA and the imperialism in general were denounced since they were considered to be the cause of every evil in relation to social-economic and political problems. Yet, the European Communist parties mentioned above were situated in NATO countries during the Cold War era and some of them like Italian communist Party supported NATO membership and guaranteed its maintenance in case of the establishment of a communist government in Italy.

### **2.3.2. TİP and Third Worldism**

TİP was closer to Third Worldism with respect to its views on Western alliances and their institutions like NATO, CENTO and EEC in its economic and social policy choices in many aspects. In Aybar's view, Turkish socialist movement, carrying the characteristics of "democracy, populism and independence" was not an "imported item" and not like Western or Eastern forms "because Turkey had its own conditions, inherent in itself only." (Lipovsky, 1992: 64-65) Aybar's populism (halkçılık) also pointed to an understanding of "peasantism". He argued that Turkish citizens value highly the privacy and dignity of man, and that this question was sometimes more important to them than earnings and exploitation. TİP recognized *private property and the right to inheritance*, subject to legal limitation only when

necessitated by public interest (Karpas, 1967:164). Agrarian reform, nationalization of foreign trade, the banks, the insurance companies, credit institutions, foreign capital, some large enterprises in heavy industry- like half-state-owned Ereğli Metal Works- and transport, the need for the industrialization within the state sector, and the just distribution of income were among the demands of TİP program. Planning was an inescapable part of the economic policy. The program rejected Western methods of development as being inapplicable to Turkey<sup>22</sup>. A planned economy “*siding with labour and being implemented and controlled through worker’s participation*” (Karpas, 1967:164) in the lead of the state sector was supported; yet, it would be in the hands of the workers and serve their interests. The state was to establish basic industry and operate it as state property, distribute land to peasants, and adopt a program of land cultivation through a system combining state, cooperative and private farms. *Planning* was seen as obligatory for both “the public and the private sector.” The aim of planning was not to favour the private sector but to provide for the needs of society and for the broad masses of workers. Thus, the activity of the private sector was to be “reoriented” towards supplying the needs of “the national economy”. It would not be permitted to invest capital in branches of the economy that took “illegal profits.” The agrarian program of the Party proposed limiting the area of private property to 50 hectares and distributing it to the peasants free of charge. Peasant committees were planned to be established to participate in the allocation of land. Cooperative organization of the peasantry was also predicted (Lipovsky, 1992:16-7). In the Party regulation of TİP dated 1962, it was asserted that the national independence wars of dependent nations and of the peoples of colonies would be espoused because TİP, as a - peace-loving party- was firmly against imperialism and colonialism and against all foreign interference of the domestic affairs of the countries directly or indirectly. Hence, solidarity of Turkey with these nations, as a country having waged the first War of Independence, was a *political*

---

<sup>22</sup> Belli has a different approach to TİP program worthy of note; in his opinion, it was a national democratic revolution program. If the program were realized to its last target, the outcome would be an independent and a democratic Turkey. The aim of nationalization of foreign trade, banking activities, insurance system was to achieve independence, which was the target of National Democratic Revolution. He argued that these nationalization attempts might also be counted as steps taken towards socialism yet the first aim was to give a national character to those institutions which were the strongholds of imperialism in the country (Belli, 1969: 20).

and *ethical* necessity (quoted in Aybar, 1988a: 261, emphasis added). The approach of TİP towards the Third World was detailed by Aybar in his speech on 10 January 1965 during the meeting of the General Administrative Council of TİP. The sympathy for national liberation movements were voiced by the party leaders on many occasions since TİP considered Turkey as a future participant of the Third World countries. The correspondence between the two approaches could best be detected by reviewing the ideological premises of Third Worldism.

Although the origins of the movement could be traced to the aftermath of the First World War, Third Worldism emerged from the Bandung Conference in 1955, by the attendance of twenty nine countries many of which were victorious states founded in the aftermath of the wars of liberation. The main motives of the Bandung Conference were the establishment of a political unification against imperialist monopolies and of mutual assistance and economic integration (Davidson, 1965: 62, Harris, 1986: 155) For the Third World countries, neo-colonialism and imperialism were the two hindrances for the happiness of the humankind and they voiced their desire for the peaceful solution of international disputes. Immediate termination of interference to domestic policies of nations by foreign powers, the maintenance of peaceful co-existence policy, and the dismantlement of foreign bases built by foreign powers in the lands of small countries were amongst the preconditions of world peace<sup>23</sup>. These demands were supplemented by calls of elimination of nuclear arms leading to a general disarmament policy and concrete measures. A final appeal was related to the need of co-operation of all states of the world in order to decrease the economic and social differences between the developed and underdeveloped countries. The policy of non-alignment did not result from a specific class rule since there were capitalist, socialist and very backward countries amongst the non-aligned. In this respect, non-alliance was a crucial condition to maintain the inner unity of these states resulting in the emergence of the main principles of non-alignment as

---

<sup>23</sup> Sukarno, President of Indonesia, in his opening address to the Asia-Africa Conference known as 'Bandung Conference' started his speech as follows: 'What can we do? We can do much! We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. We can mobilize all the spiritual, all the moral, all the political strength of Asia and Africa on the side of peace. Yes, we! We, the peoples of Asia and Africa, 1.400.000.000 strong, far more than half the human population of the world, we can mobilize what I have called the 'Moral Violence of Nations' in favour of peace (Harris, 1986: 155).

staying out of military blocs. Due to the newly achieved independence, they were extremely enthusiastic – in Aybar’s terms “extremely jealous” - about preserving it in spite of the urging of some reactionary forces of their societies. All of them had problems of economic development. Thus, they would never dare to reject getting aid from both blocs and would never take the risk of going under the yoke of a great power economically and politically. Security was another motive of the non-alliance movement. Almost all of them were obliged to use all their sources for development purposes, yet it was obvious that entering imperialist military and political pacts would inevitably result in getting involved to the military adventures of these countries. So, a unity on the grounds of a neutral<sup>24</sup>, non-aligned and peaceful policy was indispensable for these countries. The main motives of non-alignment were detailed as the maintenance of sovereignty and independence of peoples of the world, the prohibition of resorting to force and coercion amongst the conflicts of independent countries, the achievement of the right of every nation to pursue its own line of development without foreign interference, the abolition of racial segregation (discrimination) and rapid economic development and declared in the Cairo Preparatory meeting held in June 1961 (Melikyan and Etinger, 1969:104). Main contradiction of the world of 1960s was defined by the movement as the one between “the peoples of the world waging a war for the achievement of economic, cultural, social and political independence” and the imperialist, colonialist, neo-colonialist, interventionist forces of the world. This was an attempt to replace the North/South division by East/West. Acknowledgement of equal political weight to all nations and a policy of de-militarization in the international field were considered as a prerequisite for the solution of the problems of underdeveloped countries. For the achievement of economic development, they proposed the fulfilment of some immediate measures such as access to markets of developed countries, supply of financial sources, and stabilization of the prices of foreign trade commodities.

---

<sup>24</sup> By “neutral”, it was not meant to hold an impartial position in all the conflicts between the states of the world. On the contrary, they took sides against the imperialist attacks to the Third World countries. Malawya stated that non-capitalist path to development necessitated a “positive neutralism” which encompassed struggle against imperialism and neo-colonialism in an active way (Malawya, 1965; 84).

Many of these nations chose socialism peculiar to their domestic conditions since they had to find solutions to the enormous poverty succeeding the foreign invasion. In the beginning, nationalism was not only a reaction to the colonial administrations; it was also a movement of societal renovation and birth. Nationalism of some African and Asian leaders emerged from their own sufferings and some from their Marxist world views (Melikyan and Etinger, 1968: 98) Thus, sharing Davidson's idea, it may be asserted that the source of socialism of these countries during 1960s was nationalism and, socio-economic problems that the governments were confronted with after the achievement of liberation paved the way for the nourishment of Marxism (Davidson, 1965: 102 -118). Zaninovich cites five main motives for the appeal of Marxist ideas in underdeveloped countries of Africa and Asia in particular. First of all, the African and Asian leaders took for granted that socialism was necessary for the restoration of the "egalitarian and humanist" principles of those societies. Moreover, they argued that "African traditional social system" was basically "communalistic", that is, "socialistic", resembling a society where "all live with all and all for all". This was actually an attempt of harmonising Marxian socialist thought and the romanticized notion of pre-industrial society (Zaninovich, 1970: 142). Secondly, with respect to world politics, exploited and exploiting nation dimension in Marxist thought afforded a rationale for them to create a "third force" in international political arena especially against the Western capitalist system<sup>25</sup>. Thirdly, the lack of an industrializing phase or economic base and an effective division of labour necessitated a rapid economic growth under state control. The model to be used was found in the practice of the USSR especially during the Stalin period. The fourth dimension was in effect "a morally indignant

---

<sup>25</sup> Gadzey argued that in view of the etatist-socialist regimes of Africa and Asia, the very expansion of Western influence and power into Africa constituted the exploitation of one nationality by another. Thus, African development could only come through some form of struggle with the international capital and capitalists who would do everything, including the alienation of the domestic bourgeoisie, to perpetuate Africa's dependency. These regimes of Ghana, Tanzania, and Guinea had strong socialist orientations. Anyhow, most of these regimes preferred the label "African Socialism" to emphasize their objective of discovering uniquely African paths to development that are neither Western (capitalist) nor socialist (orthodox) (e.g. Ujama in Tanzania). To distinguish African socialism from Marxism/Leninism, Africanists denied the existence of class distinctions and class struggle in their countries. Gadzey further argued that, in spite of this denial, class formation was further accelerated during colonialism but social class formations along income differentials really took off with the institution of "socialist command economies" in post colonial Africa (Gadzey, 1995: 95-96-105).

sense of deprivation” as a legacy from the colonial period which rejected the Western capitalist models (ibid. 130).

Karpat, pointing to another aspect of the question, argued that socialism in these countries was actually an extension of nationalism. It appeared as a rejection of capitalism, and of class differentiation. It also seemed as an egalitarian movement to eradicate differences of wealth and position and thus pave the way for social integration required for the survival of the modern state. Its ethics and morale came from both, Islam and the West. To Karpat, the latter was one of the main sources of this type of socialism since the intellectuals of these countries based their ideas from Fabianism, Darwinism, Bergsonism, welfare socialism and Marxism. Socialist arguments in favour of social justice, egalitarianism, and elimination of class differences were based primarily on the writings of Western socialists, though class struggle was rejected. Socialism in these countries was usually led by intellectual elites, who are firmly “anti-communist, anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and anti-Western”. The acceptance of economic growth as the “vehicle of social progress” transformed socialism into a method of action and the governments of these nations were made responsible for drawing up and enforcing plans for economic development (Karpat, 1968: 15-17).

The choice of “the non-capitalist road to development” that would lead to socialism – a preference of Ghana, Guinea, Tanganyika, and many countries in North Africa - was also due to the influence of the socialist ideals on many Asian and African leaders who had been in Europe before 1955 and to the influence and guidance of the USSR<sup>26</sup>. The notion of non-capitalist path of development- a policy of the USSR recommended for the newly established states of Asia and Africa- continued to be supported in the succeeding meetings of the world communist parties until 1950-60s. A search was observed for a necessity of some revisions in the foreign policy of the USSR and of the socialist camp on the national and colonial

---

<sup>26</sup> To Clarkson, this development theory formulated by the USSR for underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa was not the outcome of a novel Marxist/Leninist analysis but a re-evaluation of the global balance of power and the warming of the Soviet attitude towards these newly emergent non-aligned states. In sum, he considered it as a change in the foreign policy of the Soviet Union (Clarkson, 1979; 46).

question after the Second World War. It was argued that imperialism was no more a danger for the underdeveloped countries that freed themselves from its yoke since the socialist camp took over the protection of these countries in the conditions of “peaceful co-existence”. (Scram & Encausse, 1969: 69) The role of the formation of an “*intermediate zone*” was assigned to the young national states of Asia and Africa; this would be the establishment of a “third way” neutral and independent between the capitalist and the socialist world. Khrushchev’s speech in the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) was a good example of these aspirations. He argued that despite the importance of political freedom in colonies and semi-colonies, achievement of economic independence was the “first and essential precondition”. In order to create an independent national economy and to raise the living standards of their peoples, these countries – although they were not a part of the socialist system – might benefit the achievements of the socialist system. For instance, instead of “begging for modern equipment”, they could get it from the USSR and the socialist camp without going under any “military or political obligation” (Scram & Encausse, 1969: 282-283). A crucial point in the new Soviet thesis was the re-evaluation of the notion of “independence”. Given that it was limited to independence from the foreign capital, nationalization of foreign corporations was recommended as the first thing to be done by African and Asian states. A neutral stance – staying out of blocs- was the criterion for the progressiveness of a state rather than its internal attitude. (Scram & Encausse, 1969:87) As to their economic development, the necessity of “developing a state capitalist sector” in a planned economy was suggested by the USSR for these countries ruled by the national bourgeoisie. The adoption of a socialist orientation was not amongst the priorities of the Soviets in relation to these countries because it was assumed that state capitalism played a progressive role in the East. A distinction was made between the “Western state capitalism” - a monopolistic and reactionary practice due to the hegemony of the monopolies over the state machinery- and the “state capitalism” in the East –which targeted the avoidance of the expansion of monopolies and which had emerged from an anti-imperialist movement. In this respect, Scram and Encausse argue that since the Second Congress of the Comintern, a “provisional and conditional” alliance with the bourgeoisie or with the bourgeois

leadership of a national liberation movement was regarded as an “objectively progressive” attitude, due to the weakness of the proletariat and the ill-organized peasantry. Nonetheless, the theses of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU were a genuine shift towards the theses of the Muslim countries represented in the Comintern (Scram & Encausse, 1969: 70-71). 21<sup>st</sup> Congress of the CPSU might be evaluated as a half- retreat from the position of the former Congress adopted on the issue of national bourgeoisie. In spite of its obligation to establish a state “along democratic lines”, and to accomplish economic and social policies in accord with the demands of the masses and to eliminate the feudal remnants while waging a war of independence against imperialism, the bourgeoisie would avoid all demands of the working class by all means due to its class nature. Thus, the bourgeois leaders of the underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa could well become involved in economic and political alliances with Western capitalism. This approach, rejecting the *eternal* character of the national front, might be evaluated as *the end of the policy of alliance with national bourgeoisie*. The implication of the probability of resorting to violence by the bourgeoisie against the working class was a serious dissimilarity from the Khrushchev’s report according to which this option was not “inevitable especially in countries where capitalism was weak”. Khrushchev’s envision that it was possible to reach socialism by parliamentary methods in these countries was another issue being questioned. Despite all these inquisitive approaches, it was accepted that the national front had to be maintained as long as the bourgeoisie did not engage in serious compromises with imperialism (Scram & d’Encausse, 1969: 74-74). The Soviet theorists of the 23<sup>rd</sup> congress of the CPSU, defined the path of development of backward countries like Egypt as “non-capitalist” similar to Khrushchev. Anyhow, from then on, the revolutionary situations in these countries, the issue of leadership of the national bourgeoisie (including the military or intellectual elite and sometimes bureaucracy), their choices of the means to be adopted for development, the relation of the nature of political power and the classes in power were deeply studied. It was finally asserted that in spite of its rejection of the presence of a communist party in the political system and its nationalism, the armed forces of Asian and African countries might assume the role of a vanguard and feel itself obliged to fulfil the historical mission of representing the interests of

the nation instead of those of the class from which it had issued. As a natural outcome of this position, it was asserted that the choice of the non-capitalist path of development depended not on the social origins of the groups holding power nor even on the conditions in which they have taken power, but above all on the real political situation and on the political consciousness of the masses. This stance could be summarised as follows; no matter what class, group or institution served as the agent of economic progress, in the long run, economic development would lead to progressive changes in the political and social system (Schram and d'Encausse, 1969: 90-91-96).

Nonetheless, development by following a capitalist road seemed quite unattainable since the interests of Western companies contradicted with the requirements of these countries (Davidson, 1965:124-125)<sup>27</sup>. The leaders of these states soon realized that the development of private sector in Africa meant an indirect colonialism hindering the economic development of the country. In sum, as a result of the high credits for loans and inconvenient conditions offered by Western capital, they shifted towards the Soviet Union and towards a state capitalism. USSR opened credits for their economic growth and industrialization with very low interest rates.<sup>28</sup> Thanks to this behaviour of the USSR, the African governments were no longer afraid of the absence of capital if they took measures in the direction of restricting the private sector. (Davidson, 1965:129-130) This was an important step to solve the

---

<sup>27</sup> Nkrumah was one of the African leaders who fully grasped the essence of capitalist imperialism. In his view, colonialism was “giving with one hand and taking back with the other.” It was a false independence given by the old colonialist to its old colony and which enabled the former to control the latter by methods beyond politics. If an underdeveloped country continued to invite foreign companies with advantageous conditions, a large part of the industry of the country would fall back into the hands of these firms, that is it would be a semi-colony (quoted in Davidson, 1965: 124).

<sup>28</sup> The Western governments that rejected granting loans with an interest of % 5-6 decreased these rates when the USSR opened credits to Africans with a rate of interest of % 2.5 (Davidson, 1965: 129-130). Malawya - the former minister of energy of India- in his “Economic Co-operation between the Soviet Union and the Underdeveloped Countries” discussing in the same vein, asserted that the loans supplied by the Soviet Union had very low rate of interests as %2.5. The dates of payments were quite advantageous as well. Moreover, mode of payment was not in cash but in the form of commodities produced by these countries. Malawya further argued that these conditions compelled the Western monopolies to decrease their date of payments and interest rates and accept the payments to be done in the form of commodities (Malawya, 1965: 34). He also put forth the robbery of the Western monopolies in terms of the rate of interests of loans and credits supplied to underdeveloped countries by referring to OECD reports (ibid.: 58).

economic and social problem of development by a state capitalism<sup>29</sup>, an inevitable route for many non-aligned, underdeveloped countries (Davidson, 1965:147). Prior to this choice, an attempt to develop by the private sector was exercised by some countries. For instance, between the years 1951-61, in Ghana, private sector progressed enormously by attainment of great loans from the state, yet this capital accumulation was not used to develop capitalism in the country. Thus, it was observed that to depend on the private sector was a real danger for underdeveloped states (Davidson, 1965:115). This experiment taught the leaders the vanity of an expectation of capitalist development by private sector, as was done in other advanced countries and an exercise of a non-capitalist path to development recommended by the socialist bloc to pass to socialism for underdeveloped countries took start<sup>30</sup>. It was put into practice in accordance with the social and economic conditions of these countries. The absence of modern social classes (except Egypt) and a national bourgeoisie in particular hindered the implementation of parliamentary democracy and led to the choice of a one-party system, actually the establishment of an authoritarian, strong government, generally a socialist leaning one, for the operation of the economic program.<sup>31</sup> In sum, it was an experience of

---

<sup>29</sup> According to Clarkson, state capitalism reflected the contradictory nature of the ruling factions of the bourgeoisie. These groups had opposing interests with imperialism and the large landowners; yet on the other hand they were connected to them socially and economically. (Clarkson, 1979; 48)

<sup>30</sup> According to the retired minister of Energy of India, Malawya, the rationale of the non-capitalist road to development was the establishment of a socialist society, the eradication of the economic underdevelopment of old colonies and dependent nations, and the creation of social conditions that hinder the formation of social classes and the development of capitalist relations and finally to eliminate the old international division of labour. On ideological scale, it comprised the rejection of capitalism based on the private ownership of the means of production and the strengthening of the public sector in economic realm. On political scale, it meant the eradication of tribal structure and feudal remnants and the realization of national democracy by the support of national political parties. He further asserted that this road did not protect the development of capitalism in the country thus it did not eliminate the probability of being influenced by imperialist powers. Thus, it represented the conflict between the socialist and capitalist roads (Malawya, 1965; 84).

<sup>31</sup> The ideas embedded in a speech of Nyrere express the subjective conditions of these countries fairly well. He argued that whereas the Western political parties emerged out of economic and social inequalities, their equivalents in Asia and Africa were actually “committees or national movements founded against the foreign exploiters”, representing the interests and demands of all nation instead of a class. Since colonization was over, their task had come to an end. “To import the idea of parliamentarism” was useless since the tribal (kabile) system was a democratic one (Davidson, 1965: 109-111).

socialism peculiar to Africa to the socio-economic and cultural conditions of these countries<sup>32</sup>.

We may recall once again the analysis of Boran on development/underdevelopment issues, non capitalist path to development and the socio economic conditions of Turkey compared to Afro - Asian countries to present a picture of convergences and divergences between TİP's views and these worldist ideas. Boran, following Bettellheim, argued that the term "underdeveloped" was misleading because the difference between advanced and underdeveloped countries was not only a question of development. It was an "unbalanced" and "distorted" development due to the exploitation of foreign capital. Thus, a road of development aiming socialism and its final targets was necessary to strengthen independence and for the success of development. Yet, in underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa, working class was almost non-existent or too weak to carry out the socialist struggle or take the lead. The same was true for the other classes which lacked or showed quite different characteristics than their Western equivalents. Given that scientific socialism was conditioned by the emergence of capitalism in social evolution and by the arising of working class; it would be contradictory to allege that these countries could pass to socialism without experiencing the capitalist stage (Boran, 1992: 177). She agreed that the newly established Asian and African states and Turkey ought to be in search of an economic development that targeted the fulfilment of two tasks; firstly, elimination of feudal remnants accompanied by the achievement of capital accumulation for rapid industrialization and launching modern technology. Secondly, this development project ought to be compatible with the specific conditions of these countries reinforced by the practice of social justice and security for the labouring masses. In spite of these common characteristics, she argued that, "national democratic revolution"<sup>33</sup> was specifically formulated for the newly established

---

<sup>32</sup> For instance, Nyrere argued that African tradition carried with it a main component of socialism, that is, the system of co-operatives and that the basis of African socialism was intensive family. Social groups were not divided as natural enemies or brothers in African societies. He claimed that all of them were "brothers" and they were the members of an "ever growing family", arguing that "*ujama*" was the basis of African socialism (quoted in Davidson, 1965: 120-121).

<sup>33</sup> Two ideological and political understandings prevailed in the Turkish socialist movement during the second half of 1960s. The first was the indivisibility of socialist and national/democratic struggles supported by TİP. The second concept, the National Democratic Revolution (MDD) , also a name

underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. The postulate for the sources of this revolution was the non-capitalist path of development during which the country was to be ruled by a coalition consisting of “intermediate” (ara sınıflar) classes – petty urban bourgeoisie, intellectual / ruling group - and the urban and rural labourers, pursuing an “etatist” policy. The outcome would be a “state capitalism” though a “progressive and positive one”<sup>34</sup>, due to its espousal of political and economic independence, economic development and industrialization (Boran, 1992: 323).

In her opinion, this route was not compatible with the socio-economic conditions of Turkey for the following reasons. Firstly, although Turkey was an underdeveloped country, Turkish working class was qualitatively and quantitatively stronger than those of Asia and Africa and thus was able to lead the struggle for socialism and accept responsibility of the movement in the country against the hegemonic class (Boran, 1992: 206)<sup>35</sup>. In addition, socialist-leaning intellectuals were equipped well to assist the revolutionary class. Secondly, “classical” democratic rights such as multi-party system, general elections, secret vote, eight hours working day, right to establish trade unions, right of collective bargaining and strike were existent in Turkey in spite of their deficiencies. Moreover, Turkish bourgeoisie, though weak and dependent to foreign loans and credits, had succeeded

---

given to the group supporting this view, was envisaged by Mihri Belli and the ‘Proletarian Revolutionaries’. Belli argued that Turkey, as an underdeveloped country where semi-feudal relations survived in addition to an emergent capitalism, was under the economic and political dependence of USA. Thus, Turkish revolutionaries were confronted with two fundamental tasks; the attainment of national independence and the elimination of feudal remnants. To him, these tasks could solely be fulfilled by an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution called “a national-democratic revolution”. The motive forces of the revolution were the whole nation, except the big landowners and the comprador bourgeoisie. To him, national bourgeoisie existed yet it occupied a secondary position compared to comprador bourgeoisie. Anyhow, recognition of the existence of this faction of bourgeoisie did not retain him from pointing to the dual nature of it, that is, its hostility to socialism due to its class nature and its hostility to imperialism due to its suppression by this force. He argued that, socialists should either neutralize the national bourgeoisie or to succeed to attract it to the revolutionary struggle (Lipovsky, 1992; 109-110).

<sup>34</sup> These views of Boran remind one of the evaluations of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU which made a distinction between state capitalism in the East and Western state capitalism. It was argued that the state capitalism in the East was the outcome of the anti-imperialist movement and its interests were contrary to those of monopolies. On the other hand, Western state capitalism was reactionary due to its entailing of the domination of monopolies over the state (Scram & D’Encausse, 1969: 70).

<sup>35</sup> She argued that this feature of the working class of Turkey overruled the thesis according to which weak working classes of underdeveloped countries could only fulfil their revolutionary tasks in co-operation with the international working class movement- that is, by the help of socialist states (Boran, 1992: 206).

in abrogating autocracy and establishing a republic, which took important steps in the direction of the establishment of capitalism. From the beginning of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, a state-owned business enterprise sector, comprising a great percentage of the national economy, was created. Contrary to Turkey, newly established Asian and African states were in an attempt to establish a sector of national economy (Boran, 1970:6). Thirdly, Turkey had never been a colony in spite of foreign intervention, maintaining the characteristic of an independent state. In her opinion, Turkey was dissimilar to Latin American states in which an enormous amount of foreign capital was invested accompanying a strong US hegemony as well. Moreover, the ruling classes of those countries were in closer collaboration with their foreign colleagues –American business and capital circles- and their armies were tools of terror and coercion in the service of the oligarchic class (Boran, 1992: 322- 323). These arguments expressed the disparities of Turkey’s conditions to those of Asian and African states. In addition, TİP supported a struggle based on parliamentary system, in which political parties won and lost power through general elections. Although a type of state capitalism was espoused by TİP<sup>36</sup>, it was to be led by the working class party. The existence of classes and thus class struggle were not denied, on the contrary, a struggle between labour and capital was of utmost importance for TİP. For instance Aybar asserted that the working class would play its historical mission of uniting all the labouring masses and layers “as if in a simultaneous fashion” under its “democratic and scientific leadership” (Sommer, 2003: 48-49). Aybar’s views were reiterated in the program which argued that once the workers became organized and “acquired class consciousness” nobody could oppose them any longer in carrying out their “historical mission in achieving social progress and democracy” (Karpas, 1967:163). In sum, one may argue that TİP’s rhetoric regarding the emphasis on class, class struggle, the experiencing of a etatism in the service and control of the working class, accompanying its leadership did not

---

<sup>36</sup> In the same article, Boran argued that the nationalization of foreign trade, banking and insurance would result in a greater expansion of the state sector yet this sector would not be maintained as a “state capitalism in the service of and controlled by the bourgeoisie”. On the contrary, it would be under the command and in favour of the labouring people by which it would acquire a socialist essence. She further asserted that Turkey was experiencing the bourgeois democratic revolution since sixty years and the hegemonic relations of production were capitalist. As a result of the etatism policy of TİP, national economy would be relieved of capitalist relations of production (Boran, 1992: 197).

coincide with the experience of the non-capitalist path of the Third World, a natural outcome of the difference between the levels of development of those countries and Turkey.

According to the 1964 program of TİP, socio-economic progress for the emancipation of Turkey was achievable solely on the basis of the “*non-capitalist path to development*” based on mixed economy since it was not possible for Turkey to develop by capitalism, that is, by the “private sector”. The nature of power had to be altered for the achievement of this aim. Non-capitalist path was defined as “*a planned etatism siding with labour and carried on and controlled by the labouring masses*”. In such a system, state sector would be “the leading” one and “substantial enough in order to control the economy”. Private sector was described as auxiliary to state sector within the framework of the plan. It was the labour class to “benefit from this choice” since the interests of big landowners, traders or industrialists contradicted with the aims of non-capitalist path to development. Thus, non-capitalist path would solely “be feasible under the government of the labourers”. Aybar defined the non-capitalist path as a “recipe of TİP for passage to socialism” and argued that it would be preserved ‘as long as it was a “necessary system to pave the way for socialism” (Özman, 2002: 221-2, translation mine). He also asserted that 1960 Constitution was “open to non-capitalist path of development”. Anyhow TİP did not propose a “third way” between socialism and capitalism by its support of non-capitalist path<sup>37</sup> (Özman, 2002: 182, emphasis added).

TİP believed that the first condition for economic development was to follow a non-capitalist path because the Western development models and the hypothesis that the capitalist way was suitable for development were both proved to be unsuccessful. Ünsal quoted the ideas of Western scholars like Dobb, Sweezy, Baran, and Oscar Lange sharing the same views with those of TİP. For instance, Duverger argued that the Third World could not modernize by capitalist methods Ünsal further asserted that, non-capitalist path, as an “etatist method”, based on “planning and mixed economy” was not a novelty for Turkey but TİP brought in a new practice dissimilar

---

<sup>37</sup> Contrary to this, Lipovsky argued that TİP leaders were in a search of a third way between socialism and capitalism (Lipovsky, 1992 : 153).

to that of RPP or DP<sup>38</sup> (Quoted in Ünsal, 2002: 123-4).

To deal with TİP's perspectives on the economic policy to be pursued under its government in a detailed way is important since they were closely linked to the revolutionary preferences of the party. In Boran's view, mixed economy was not "the third path" and the nature of the social system and the direction of development – to capitalism or to socialism- would be determined by the class composition of power (Lipovsky, 1992:14-5)<sup>39</sup>.

---

<sup>38</sup> Ünsal puts forth a somewhat different view on the importance of state. To him, the views on the importance of the state in the passage to socialism neither belonged to Marxism nor to TİP. Since the period of the Ottoman Empire, state was the starting point of the economic and social reforms. Turkish Republic also leaned on the state sector since 1930s. The main target was the foundation of a "national capitalist class". Even in 1970s, the state sector was the greatest capitalist in Turkey due to the amount of capital accumulation in its hands. Some scholars argued that non- capitalist path to development were put forth by the Western economists for a solution of the economic and social problems of the Third World countries. TİP's choice of non- capitalist path of development instead of "socialist model of development" was a *tactical* issue due to the political conjuncture of those days. Turkey was a more developed capitalist country than the Third World ones. TİP put weight on a *more socialistic discourse* after the 1965 elections due to this reality (Ünsal, 2002: 125- 126, emphasis added). In the same vein with Boran, he asserted that etatism for TİP ought to be exercised by siding with labour and supported by a plan. It was the people who should participate in the preparation and practice of the plan, not a group of bureaucrats representing the ruling class. Private sector would be secondary to the main- state sector (ibid.: 123-4).

Yalman, in a different vein, argued that the aim of the JP government of 1965 in its support of plan was to break the ties of planning with the etatist past (heritage). He further asserted that, a closer look at the program of the party would reveal that, JP re-shaped planning so as to put an end to fears and suspicions of the employees since it aimed to materialize its project of hegemony (Yalman, 2002; 19).

<sup>39</sup> Yerasimos comprehends the non-capitalist path proposal of TİP in a quite different way and thus criticizes the party policy on this matter. In his view, the party proposed a three-staged process to introduce socialism to the Turkish society. Firstly, the party would fight for the functioning of the constitutional rights and freedoms and for their defence against the big bourgeoisie and imperialism. This stage also included the training of the working class and the petty peasantry. As a result of this step, the workers and peasants would carry their own party to power by democratic means. Secondly, after winning power, a state capitalism would be executed aiming a passage to socialism in the framework of an advanced democracy by the working class supported by peasants and by a section of petty bourgeoisie. Third stage was the enactment of socialism (Yerasimos, 1976: 1674-75). To Yerasimos, by introducing the term non-capitalist path of development to the program, a chaos of concepts was brought in by TİP because socialism was implied by the use the concept of non-capitalist path. Yet, according to TİP program, socialism was the task of the third stage, not that of the second. Yerasimos argued that this situation could be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, TİP might have found the second stage unnecessary. Yet, a closer look would invalidate this option. In effect, the third step was replaced by the second because TİP proposed the preservation of private sector, which meant the transfer of the development program from the second stage to the third. To Yerasimos, the proposed model of TİP was not suitable for the practice of a socialist type of production. TİP leadership began to use the term domestic socialism to solve this contradiction but it was insufficient to solve the chaos. Thus, the anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist struggle to be performed under the leadership of the working class was directly transformed into a struggle for socialism by the party. He argued that, as a consequence, what TİP named as socialism was indeed the national democratic revolution (ibid, 1683, emphasis added).

She asserted that TİP supported the nationalization of the massive means of production and exchange and believed in the training and enlightening of the working class and all the labouring masses in order to make them the conscious force of national development and progress because it targeted the foundation of socialism with its program based on “the principles of scientific socialism”. A “planned, etatist, mixed” economy, in which industrialization- the primary issue- could only be accomplished by the labouring classes in the government of TİP. Etatism would be the “leading force” in national economy and in the social and cultural life of the country, in which private sector would also exist. The first task of TİP in case of power was to put into practice an agrarian reform (Toprak reformu). Turkey was an underdeveloped, non- industrial, agrarian country with a low level of agrarian techniques; therefore it could not pass to a socialist system immediately after the achievement of power. According to Boran, these targets of the party, based on scientific socialism, overlapped with the structural conditions of the country. Like Aybar, Boran accepted that the party program might “lead to socialism” on the condition that “leaders who have correctly evaluated the conditions of Turkey” would put it into practice. She pointed to the difficulty of the task of maintaining the capitalist sector of the mixed economy “within the borders of the central planning and in line with the interests of the development of the national economy” and to avoid the attempts of the capitalist classes to damage the new system, to transform the state sector from “*state capitalism to a system with a socialist content*” under the conditions of a sharp class struggle and under the continuing influence of capitalism (Boran, 1992: 104, emphasis added).

The discussion of non-capitalist path of development may directly be linked to the discussion of this topic in the Third International as *the transitory stage of development* necessary for the passage to a socialist society in underdeveloped countries. In this context, Lenin’s speech concerning the capitalist stage of economic development in these countries was of primary importance. He openly stated that these countries *need not experience* the capitalist stage if “the victorious revolutionary proletariat conducted a systematic propaganda” among them and if “the Soviet governments aided them with all means at their disposal.” This assertion pointed to the possibility of the “non-capitalist path of development” which was the

thesis of TİP approved for Turkey as well. <sup>40</sup> (Lenin, 1966: 284-286, emphasis added)

One may assert that the choice of the non-capitalist path of development of TİP had significant similarities with Comintern's views regarding this issue and especially with the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress views of the CPSU apart from its sharp emphasis on the leadership of the working class party, on the structure of the National Front and on national bourgeoisie.

### **2.3.3. Kemalist Ideology and TİP**

Since the 1920s, political parties and groups of the Turkish socialist / communist movement were influenced by Kemalism. A successful war of independence and its being one of the first examples had a deep impact on the left groups and parties. Many scholars argued that, due to the existence of a dependent relationship between the Turkish Left and Kemalism, Kemalist principles “tainted with a socialist orientation on the social and economic level” were applied to the “reality of Turkey” by some sections of the left, resulting in a “moulding the Kemalist elements with Marxist terminology” (Lipovsky, 1992:107 and Köker, 1991: 31-32). The attempt to synthesize the two concepts –Kemalism and socialism- was not only related to the problems of the legitimacy of the Turkish Left; concrete political development paved the way for it. A Kemalist reform, that is, its modernization project, was the “*minimum*” (short-term) program of Turkish communists and socialists. It is for sure that no section of the left ever considered Kemalism as its final target, that is, the eradication of the capitalist system of exploitation and the establishment of a socialist society ruled by the labouring classes. Socialist movement in Turkey as in the rest of the Near East was part of the general movement of modernization. (Karpat, 1973: 341) Modernity is a process related to the development of capitalism. This process includes the disintegration of pre-capitalist structures and the formation of a national market, expansion of

---

<sup>40</sup> Scram and D'Encausse argued that this was the schema of Marx/Engels – the possibility of escaping the capitalist stage for Russia in case of a support of the victorious proletariat of the Western countries- transposed to Asian and African countries, which were much more backward than Russia during the days of Marx/Engels (Scram & D'Encausse, 1969: 30).

commodity production, emergence of wage-labour as the dominant category and development of technology. In effect all of these transformations exhibit the sum total of a process caused by capitalist development in social, economic, cultural, ethical ideological, political and institutional realms. The concept of late modernity is used for countries like Turkey, indicating the fulfilment of the modernization project, undertaken by a “decisive willpower” or a conscious leadership, equipped with the knowledge of modernity, which strove to realize the foundation of capitalism by the omission of some necessary steps (Çulhaoğlu, 2002: 170-171). Socialist movement in Turkey was concerned with economic development, social justice, taxation, industrialization, worker’s rights, education and a variety of welfare problems which corresponded to the modernization program of the bourgeoisie and to the minimum (short-term) program of socialism. Due to this correspondence of some common points in both projects socialism was classified as a modern current by many scholars. (Karpat, 1973: 341-342) Some scholars as Çulhaoğlu argued that the late modernity process of Turkey entailed a type of collectivism and a type of “toplumculuk” (societalizm). Moreover, in 1930s, it exhibited similar features to those of Germany (in force during the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century) such as protectionism, social security and education, which constituted an important rationale of the mental confusion of the Left regarding the Kemalist modernization project. In addition, the late modernization project, accelerated by the foundation of the Turkish Republic, brought the Left in contact with the Kemalist state instead of an organized civil society, that is, the public realm. Thus, Left had to adopt the task of equipping the political power” with an ideological perspective and framework for its pragmatic requirements” To Çulhaoğlu, the negation of liberalism by Kemalism while affirming etatism, laicism, nationalism, populism (Halkçılık) and corporatism was another source of uncertainty for socialists and communists. He further argued that this long absence of liberalism – more probably due to the effect of Great Depression in the world - created a serious hindrance for the Left to declare its principles against it, though it attempted to clear its position by expressing the disparities of the socialist project and that of Kemalism on the issues stated above (Çulhaoğlu, 2002: 173).<sup>41</sup>. Nonetheless, in Çulhaoğlu's view, the support given to modernist-oriented

---

<sup>41</sup> It was further argued that the dilemma and confusion of the Left was put to an end during the period

Kemalist reforms for the elimination of feudal remnants –minimum (short- term) program of the Left - and for the establishment of capitalism during 1930s was a “correct” stance since the other alternative would be to delay the class struggle until all the necessary measures were taken by the Kemalist bourgeoisie for the transformation to capitalism. The intertwining of both, some modernist and short-term socialist targets may be traced by referring to TİP’s and YÖN’s positions, and to the behaviour of the Comintern regarding these policies.

As mentioned before, Aybar demanded the inclusion of the parts of the speech of Atatürk - dated 1 December 1921 – related to populism (halkçılık) , imperialism and capitalism - to the beginning of the first party program of TİP (Aybar, 1988a: 177) His books and his speeches consist of examples of his personal dedication to the war of independence<sup>42</sup> and to the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist behaviour of Mustafa Kemal especially during the first years of the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Evaluating the ideology of Kemalism by referring to the declaration of the Turkish Great National Assembly in 1926, and to Mustafa Kemal’s speeches, he argued that Atatürk was unsurprisingly against capitalism and imperialism because the country had waged a war of independence, as a result of which, she had to break its ties with capitalism and imperialism. Aybar further asserted that Turkish people (nation) were described by Atatürk as “a society of labourers based on labour for its survival”, emphasizing that the ones who “preferred to live without labouring” would be “isolated”. *Atatürk’s populism was a doctrine according to which” the system of the society was based on labour.”* By stating that the system brought to Turkey by the foundation of the Republic “neither resembled socialism nor democracy”, Atatürk meant that this regime was different than that of the USSR and the European regimes. To Aybar, due to the sociological basis of his explanations, it was impossible for Atatürk to reject socialism; thus what he had actually meant was to stress that socialism and democracy would be shaped under the special historical

---

1960-1980 by the investiture of a line encompassing the disparities of the Left and Kemalism (Çulhaoğlu, 2002: 173).

<sup>42</sup> Aybar’s dedication to the national war of independence was due to his own childhood experiences. Sargın asserted that Aybar witnessed the occupation of İstanbul by the imperialist navy and his voice “trembled” and his eyes became “moist” as he told this story during a General Administrative Council meeting (Sargın, 2001:337).

conditions of Turkey. The regime in Atatürk's mind during the years of the national war of independence was based on labour through the achievement of civil liberties and parasitic means of survival were strongly prohibited (Aybar, 1995: 42). According to Aybar, Atatürk was aware that independence meant to be free in the field of economic, financial, political, military, cultural, judicial issues. Aybar was influenced by the policy of Atatürk which emphasized the importance of *staying out of military blocs* (Aybar, 1988a: 127). Aybar went as far to state that, a new method of war was introduced by the war of independence - the defence of every inch of the motherland since the young Turkish Republic was extremely meticulous on the independence of its army and on financial independence (Aybar, 1988a: 131)<sup>43</sup>. To Aybar, the social doctrine of "the Turkey of war of independence" was the establishment of a "people's state fighting for independence based on labour" (Aybar, 1988a:137) and the ideology of that state was "Kemalism", a "*left-wing ideology*". Whether "Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues were consciously aware of it or not, their way pointed to left".<sup>44</sup> In Aybar's view, Mustafa Kemal's speech

---

<sup>43</sup> In spite of his admiration for Mustafa Kemal, Aybar was well aware of the political zigzags experienced during the days of foundation of the Turkish Republic. He argued that although the economic conditions of the country were enormously bad, it was an unforgivable mistake of Mustafa Kemal to ask for foreign aid because exchange of loans was only possible between two countries of equal strength (Aybar, 1988a :132). He further admitted that in İzmir İktisat Kongresi Atatürk pursued a completely different line than his former speeches in which imperialism and capitalism were denounced. In this congress, while acknowledging the existence of social classes he argued that their interests did not conflict. In Aybar's opinion, Turkey thus moved "towards capitalism step by step" and the bourgeois class, "a dream of İttihat and Terakki", began to build up its hegemony by the help of Law. To Aybar, this was unacceptable since a genuine struggle continued between laborers and bourgeois class in the Turkish society of those days due to the choice of capitalism <sup>43</sup> (Aybar, 1995: 42- 45).

<sup>44</sup> It is interesting to observe the defence of a thesis in full contradiction with that of Aybar's in Soviet sources. For instance, it was argued that the following laws were promulgated in 1920 for strengthening the position of the hegemony of the weak Turkish bourgeoisie; law of national pact (Misak-I Milli) dated 18 July 1920, law of Betrayal of the Nation (Vatana Hiyanet) dated 29 April 1920, law of mobilisation for war (Seferberlik) dated 9 June 1920 and 3 November 1920, the law related to abrogation of all guerrilla forces dated 11 September 1920, the law related to the organization of gendarme and police forces dated 7 June 1920, the law related to the invalidity of all treaties signed between the Sultanate and foreign governments dated 16 March 1920, the law of the foundation of courts of Independence dated 11 September 1920, the Constitution of 1921 and many others. These laws were acted in order to strengthen "basis of the newly established capitalist system". It was further argued that that the foundation of the national sovereignty and the unity of power brought in by the constitution of 1921 did not "mean the defence of the interests of the labouring masses and their participation to the administration of the state" because it was not possible to "speak of the realization of the sovereignty of all nation under bourgeois hegemony" (Samsutdinov, 1999: 278-279).

stressing the importance of labour and the isolation of parasitic elements in society meant being a “leftist in thought” and politics to be pursued in order to fulfil the requirements of such a society was a “left policy”. Mustafa Kemal and his colleagues were not leftists yet the policy they supported was “leftist” because there was “no other choice” and because a nation forced “to bow in front of capitalism” would never “rise” by the practice of capitalism<sup>45</sup> (Aybar, 1988a: 137-138). He argued that Kemalism pulled the attention of Asian and African nations due to its opposition to capitalism and imperialism.

Boran reiterated Aybar’s vision on the national war of independence stating that the latter was “anti-capitalist” due to its “anti-imperialism”. Due to the subjective and objective conditions, a “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” had emerged during the Republic period and stepping back from its revolutionary position it had achieved during the war of liberation, retreated to “the ideological boundaries of its class” (Boran, 1992: 35-38)<sup>46</sup>. In 1962, Aybar would claim that TİP’s point of departure was Kemalism. In his opinion, TİP had relieved Kemalism from being a frozen ideology because TİP was a “*hundred percent national doctrine party*”, inspired by the realities of 1960s. In Ünsal’s opinion, this line of thought, being closer to “left Kemalism” more than to socialism, resembled the ideas of the YÖN declaration. Respect to Kemalism would inevitably lead TİP to nationalism since the hegemonic ideology was “nationalism” and it was not “coincidental” for TİP leaders to put too much stress on “the nationalism of Turkish socialism”<sup>47</sup> and on the hegemonic ideology. From the very first pages of the program, TİP was described as a “nationalist organization”, a follower of the Kemalist “principles” (quoted in Ünsal, 2002; 119-120, emphasis added). In my opinion this stance was partly due to the attempt of legitimation of the party, TİP genuinely believed that socialism did not

---

<sup>45</sup> To Aybar, “kapitalizmin dize getirdiği bir ulus, kapitalizme sarılarak ayağa kalkamaz” (1988a: 138).

<sup>46</sup> Yalçın Küçük argued that both TİP and YÖN movements put great emphasis of the nationalism of the socialists, which was a “non-scientific” product of the Cold War. It was non-scientific because it was not possible for socialists to resist to the pressures exerted on them by the conditions of the Cold War. So, instead of stressing the essence of socialism, they brought in one of the outcomes of socialism, “Second war of independence” (Küçük, 1979: 560).

<sup>47</sup> To Kayalı, another concept named as “Turkish socialism” rose during 1960s and the most plain arguments on that concept could be observed in Şevket Süreyya’s articles. The concept was frequently used in YÖN and in Hilmi Özgen’s articles. Avcioğlu used the same concept in the beginning as well.

contradict to Kemalism; moreover, it would help to pave the way for the accomplishment of socialist principles. Genuine nationalism was defined as “the prevention of the Turkish nation from domestic and foreign exploitation” and the most nationalist behaviour was the one which “grasped the whole nation” and which distributed “a just share for everyone” and which contributed to “the use of personal talents in the most productive way”. To view nationalism and populism (*halkçılık*) as two different things was unthinkable since being a Turk meant having “ties of citizenship to the Turkish state”. Turkish nationalism was not “a racist, exploitative, aggressive ideology which scorned other nations”, on the contrary, it did not demand the inauguration of discrimination of religion, race, language and cult<sup>48</sup>.

To Ünsal, nationalism for TİP was to be against foreign repression. The view of nationalism of TİP consisted of the “left nationalism” that could be traced to 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, the nationalism of national independence, and the currents of national liberation witnessed in the Third World countries in 1960s (Ünsal, 2002: 119-120-121). In spite of differences in thought among the socialist/communist left on the economic and social conditions of Turkey of 1960s, the urgency of a struggle for liberation against imperialism targeting a socialist society, an immediate need for industrialization which primarily called for heavy industry investments required for development, the necessity of a central planning and a non-aligned policy rejecting membership of military blocks were issues beyond dispute. According to Lipovsky, they did not contradict with the priorities of Kemalism especially in its policies adopted during the first years of foundation of the Turkish Republic. Aybar extrapolated these shared aspects by defining Kemalism as a “left ideology”, an

---

<sup>48</sup>In this context, Balibar’s views on nationalism and underdeveloped countries are worth mentioning. In his opinion, although it was totally unjust to equate the nationalism of the exploited to the nationalism of the exploiters or to equate the nationalism of liberation to the nationalism of occupation, it was not possible to deny that there was a common feature between the nationalism of the Algerian FLN and the nationalism of the occupation army of France. The contradiction rested in the history itself and in the obscurity of defining nationalism since it had been enriched by concepts such as citizenship, patriotism, populism, chauvinism, hostility to foreigners. He further argued that racism was not significant in all nationalisms or in every period, yet it was a necessary tendency for their establishment and the articulation of racism and nationalism, their correspondence in all national liberation movements, ought to be comprehended in a dialectical manner. To him, nationalism continuously produced racism and vice versa. If the official nationalism was not so racist, nationalism would not rise as the new ideology of the new nation. The third world nationalisms emerged from the nationalism of the racism of the colonialists (Balibar and Wallerstein, 1995: 66-72).

approach which caused some scholars to characterize TİP as the socialist current “closest to Kemalism” (Lipovsky, 1992:108)<sup>49</sup>. Sharing the views of Kayalı, one may define this period succeeding 1960 Revolution as a synthesis, that is, the “*transformation of Atatürk reformism or revolution into Marxism*”. Two examples cited by Kayalı were Çetin Altan’s “Atatürk’ün Sosyal Görüşleri” and Fethi Naci’s “Atatürk’ün Temel Görüşleri”, in which both authors attempted to attest the interconnection between the Marxist and Kemalist ideas. Belli’s statement on the absence of “Chinese wall between Kemalism and Marxism” was the second significant example of this process. In Kayalı’s opinion, the understanding born in Turkey in the midst of 1960s could well be defined as a process of “decorating Kemalism with a social appearance“. This was “*a new concept of Kemalism, different than the one observed in the previous periods*” (Kayalı, 2000: 175-178).

The nationalist and anti-imperialist “heritage” of Kemalism has found its reflections in TİP program as well. Six arrows of the RPP are amongst the principles of TİP program though accompanied by a new interpretation. (Ünsal, 2002: 112) To Ünsal, TİP program was influenced by the following; the economic, social and political conditions of the country, the level of the class struggle, the six principles of the RPP program, Kemalism, TKP tradition, 1961 Constitution, Turkish Penal Code and the Law of Political Parties (Ünsal, 2002: 113).

The impact of the Turkish Penal Code and Law of Political Parties is obvious due to their restrictive articles on socialist and communist thought and organization yet to decide for the influence of TKP tradition on TİP, its relation with Kemalism and the resolutions of the Comintern ought to be inspected. In the face of their involvement in the previous activities of the communist movement, TİP leaders frequently attempted to isolate themselves from this heritage by arguing that “the

---

<sup>49</sup> Kemalist and modernist influence revealed itself in the following issues as well. In the 1961 program of TİP *free education* for all was one of the proposals. Adults were to be offered equal educational opportunities. Schools would be opened to upgrade the skills of workers as well as the use of popular universities. Vocational and technical subjects were to receive a heavier emphasis. All educational institutions were to be *secular*. The personal religious and philosophical beliefs of the citizens would be respected sincerely. It was declared that, as long as it was not against public order, general morality or laws promulgated for such purposes, all kinds of worships, religious rituals and ceremonies would be free. All kinds of coercive measures due to one’s religious and philosophical beliefs would be prohibited (Geyikdağı, 1984: 96).

responsibility of building socialism in Turkey” rested on the shoulders of TİP the book of socialism from “a” to “z” would be written through the daily struggles of TİP, hence opening the door to “the future of the country” (quoted by Yetkin from a speech of Aybar, 1970: 35)<sup>50</sup>. However, it should be noted that this attitude of the party leaders was rejected by İleri<sup>51</sup> arguing that TİP was “the historical continuation of the Turkish Communist Party” (İleri, 1988: 1959).

#### **2.3.4. Impact of TKP Heritage on TİP**

In effect, the relation of the left with Kemalism which took start with the establishment of TKP during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was a good example of the impact of this heritage. During the national war of independence and the previous years of the foundation of Turkish Republic, the subjective conditions of the country created a genuine hindrance for the interference of the communists to the process of building the new Republic, their presence and activities were tolerated to a certain extent until the establishment of the new constitutional order and with the promulgation of the Law of Maintenance of Order in 1925, all leftist organizations were banned. While some were eliminated like TKP, the rest were persuaded to join the Kemalist cadres or adopt its ideology such as the Kadro movement (Aytemur, 2000: 32).

The first two main principles of the official program of the TKP endorsed in the Party Congress of 1926 stated that TKP was the resolute enemy of all reactionary forces (feudal ağas, men of religion, big landowners, bourgeoisie, the old aristocracy, retired soldiers of the old regime etc) and of imperialism which formed the social basis of the revival of monarchy. The Party would participate in every struggle waged against these forces. It was further asserted that as long as Kemalists fought against *foreign imperialism and feudal reactionary elements*, TKP would support this

---

<sup>50</sup> This attitude was reiterated by Boran in a more cautious and moderate way. She argued that, in the Turkey of 1960s, a significant political background that would play a determining role in relation to the political and ideological means and thus facilitate the organization of a party of the laboring class aiming the foundation of socialism was non-existent. This absence was due to the illegal conditions enforced on the political cadres in the previous years (Boran, 1976: 2).

<sup>51</sup> Rasih Nuri İleri, a member of the TKP founded by Şefik Hüsni, was expelled from TİP in the wake of the Malatya Congress.

movement and do its best to advance its struggle. Yet, *TKP would oppose to and fight against all attempts of the Kemalist party to compromise to imperialism* (Türkiye Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi, 1979: 196-19 emphasis added).

In this connection, TKP accepted the “*National Treaty (Misak-I Milli)*” as one of its principles. According to the Party, the economic structure of Turkey, like many other countries of the Near East could be characterized by “the absence of large national industry” which pointed up the necessity of “creating a united front against European and American imperialism in the East”. On the other side, two choices existed for the Turkish economy - based mainly on small holdings and peasant producers- to solve its problems; coming to an agreement with the Western powers or “producing the economic innovations and organizations necessary to enable Turkey to resist imperialism in future and to confirm and continue the participation of peasant majority in the burgeoning national revolution”. In TKP’s opinion, the second road was to be followed for the good of Turkey and also for the interests of the Soviet Union, “the strong supporter of Turkey’s freedom and independence” (Harris, 1967: 153-155).

Thus, the anti-imperialist struggle of the Turkish people was supported since it was “waged against the world imperialism” and was in favour of the interests of the labouring classes and of international proletariat` in spite of its bourgeois leadership. It was further argued that “the development of Anatolian national movement” would help “the creation of class consciousness and pave the way for the future socialist revolution” (Tuncay, 1991: 280). Led by these principles, Turkish communists participated in the guerrilla movements and took part in the propaganda activities against the Sultanate and the invaders (Samsutdinov, 1999:345). TKP supported Ankara government to the extent that it proposed to unite with it in an anti-imperialist front.

Nonetheless, contrary to many arguments on this issue, it seems quite hard to assert that TKP was completely blind and deaf about the character of Kemalist ideology and the anti-communist and anti-labour deeds of the Kemalist government. A good example may be found in the writings of Sefik Hüsnü in the journal of Communist International. In the article” Türk Milliyetçiliğinde devrimci dalganın

geri çekilmesi”, he asserted that the national revolutionary movement in Turkey was ”progressive” and deserved support of communists because it paved the way for proletarian revolution by eliminating feudalism and the remnants of the Sultanate and because it gave a deadly strike to imperialism. Yet, the political line of Kemalism showed that the national liberation movement was “*petty bourgeois in essence*”, its tendency pointed towards “*capitalism* “ and thus *fulfilled every necessity for the capital accumulation of the young bourgeoisie after winning power*. To Hüsni, a section of the Anatolian feudals was in a “process of transformation into bourgeois capitalists and were in close solidarity with the young Anatolian bourgeoisie” represented by Mustafa Kemal and his friends. The attempts of capital accumulation were due to the economic interests of this class that Kemalists depended on. This accumulation realized by the hands of the national bourgeoisie resulted in an enormous exploitation of the labouring masses giving rise to the intensification of class struggle. Thus, the labouring masses had to fight against these policies of the government with all their might. It seems that Kemalists were supported due to their opposition to feudalism and imperialism and also for their apparent friendship towards the Soviet Union (Hüsni, 1977: 35-42)<sup>52</sup>. In another article “Türkiye’de Komünist Hareket” (The communist movement in Turkey), Hüsni asserted that the *young Kemalist bourgeoisie’s hard attacks on communists* could only be explained by “*their extremely advanced class consciousness*” (Hüsni, 1977: 63, emphasis added)<sup>53</sup>. In 1930, Kemalist bourgeoisie was accused by TKP of “abandoning the revolutionary positions” and search for the maintenance of its power by making use of its friendship with the Soviet Union and of imperialism. To TKP, it was obvious that the “*hegemonic tendency of Kemalism*” emerging from its “class character” would *push it towards “the camp of reaction and to the imperialist finance centres”* (Hüsni, 1977: 131, emphasis added). It was further argued that Kemalist movement

---

<sup>52</sup> TKP expressed its ideas for the Turkish National Revolution during the Third Congress of the Communist International dated 12 July 1921. It was argued that Ankara government “increased the inspection on communists” while it tried to “wage a war against imperialism”. Pointing to the foundation of the “official TKP” by the Kemalist government by which the elimination of the TKP was aimed, Comintern asserted that the government would be supported as long as they continued to struggle for national independence (Tuncay, 1991: 361).

<sup>53</sup> These views were reiterated in his article “Çin Devrimi Kemalist Yolu İzleyemez” (Hüsni, 1977: 128).

was supported by the Communist world due to the revolutionary stance of the Kemalists – in spite of its transitory character - and to the goal of its struggle, that is, the elimination of the imperialist bourgeoisie worldwide. Kemalist attacks to Turkish communists proved that Kemalist bourgeoisie was aware that the support of the Communist International might result in a “more radical transformation” in the country. Hüsni further argued that due to its inclusion of capitalist development, it was “impossible to achieve real independence under the leadership of national bourgeoisie in underdeveloped countries.” Anyhow, to support the “bourgeois elements which had grasped the leadership of the national movement” and to push it “towards a more revolutionary ground as far as possible” was totally “logical and necessary” since there was “no national working class organized politically and capable of leading the national movement“ (Hüsni, 1977: 142).

Why TKP did supported the war of independence led by Kemalists whose bourgeois character was best known to it?

The answer lies in the resolutions and discussions of the Communist International during 1920s. Due to the unlikelihood of a socialist revolution in Europe in the immediate future, a search had begun for new forces capable of achieving victory of socialism on a world scale. Thus, the problems of revolution in non-European countries was taken to the agenda of the Second Congress of the Communist International and dealt in detail concerning their relation with the Soviet Revolution. The central problem was the conditions of collaboration of communists with the bourgeoisie in the non-European countries.

Prior to the days of the Third International, Lenin expressed his views in “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism” about the evolution of the world in the twentieth century. In his opinion, although imperialism caused the corruption of the European proletariat by donating them a small part of the profits from the colonies, in dependent colonial countries it played a different role so as to serve the development of nationalist tendencies. To Lenin, the importance of national movements in colonies were beyond doubt and that these struggles against imperialism should be regarded as an integral part of the overall struggle of the proletariat for its liberation, since the national struggle could not achieve its aims

without the destruction of the colonial system (Scram & D'Encausse, 1969: 24). Lenin's speech, on national question, to explain the thesis of the International approved by the commission, is crucial to comprehend the views of the Comintern. To him, the world was divided into oppressor and oppressed nations, the latter being dependent on the former in a state of colonies or semi-colonies. The present world situation following the imperialist war, exhibited "reciprocal relations between peoples and the world political system as a whole" which were determined by the struggle waged by "a group of imperialist nations against the Soviet movement and the Soviet states headed by Soviet Russia. " It was beyond doubt that *any national movement* could only be a "*bourgeois democratic*" movement, since the overwhelming mass of the population in the backward countries consisted of peasants<sup>54</sup> who represented bourgeois-capitalist relationships and that it would be utopian to believe that "proletarian parties in these backward countries, if indeed they could emerge in them, and find the chance to pursue communist tactics and communist policy, without establishing definite relations with the peasant movement" and without giving it effective support. To him, the imperialist bourgeoisie did its best to implant a reformist movement among the oppressed nations and that there has been a certain "*rapprochement* between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and that of the colonies", so that very often - perhaps even in most cases - "the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries, while it does support the national movement, was in full accord with the imperialistic bourgeoisie", that is, joined forces with it against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes. He further argued that, *communists, should and will support bourgeois-liberation movements in the colonies "only when they are genuinely revolutionary, when their exponents (advocates) do not hinder our work of educating and organising in a revolutionary spirit the peasantry and the masses of the exploited"*. If those

---

<sup>54</sup> To understand the emphasis Lenin put on peasantry, especially the poor peasants, one should trace him back to 1905. At the time of the 1905 revolution, he referred to the "revolutionary dictatorship of the workers and peasants" stating that hegemony in this joint dictatorship would belong to the proletariat – or "to the party of the proletariat". During the same days, he referred to the concept of "uninterrupted revolution". In Russia, the working class was strong and organized though small in number. Yet, in colonies of the twentieth century, the proletariat was either absent or too weak to lead the struggle. In 1912, Lenin had evolved a realistic concept on the social forces in backward countries of the East, attributing the principal role to peasants, yet not forgetting that "the East" definitely "embarked on the path of the West" (Schram and D'Encausse, 1969: 19-23).

conditions did not exist, the communists in these countries “*should combat the reformist bourgeoisie, to whom the heroes of the Second International also belong*”. As observed from the long quotation above, the support for the national democratic movements was not without condition as is generally stressed by many scholars. The motive of espousal was to pave the way for the final goal, the accomplishment of socialism. The likelihood of a non-capitalist path and the necessity of uniting with the peasantry –especially the poor peasants- were emphasized (Lenin, 1968; 240-245, emphasis added).

A quick glance at some other resolutions of the Second Congress may be informative as well. In the resolution on the Eastern question, it was stated that the Communist parties of the East should give support *for a certain length of time* to local national movements aiming at “the overthrow of the power of Western-European imperialism, always provided that these movements do not conflict with the world proletariat’s class revolutionary aspirations to overthrow world imperialism“(Schram and D’Encausse, 1969: 170). This position was reiterated in many cases. For instance, during the Fourth congress of the Communist International (5 Nov - 5 Dec 1922), on the “Thesis on the East“, it was argued that, due to the superiority of antagonisms amongst the imperialists in colonies, the danger of reconciliation of bourgeois nationalism with one or more imperialist states – that wage war against each other- was greater. The working class of these colonies was aware of the *possibility and inevitability of some temporary and partial compromises that could be donated to the revolutionary struggle of liberation due to its stance against imperialism, in order to take a breath*. It was further argued that the working class would “react to any open attempt of the national ruling classes to allow imperialism to participate in power” (Türkiye’de Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi, 1979: 65-66)<sup>55</sup>. TKP as a communist party loyal to the Communist International as all the

---

<sup>55</sup> Third International was also well aware of the attitude of the Kemalist government against the communists. A good example of this can be traced in the minutes of the Third World Congress of the Third Communist International dated 12 July 1921. It was declared that “Ankara government” waged a war of Independence against the “Allied States and at the same time tried to destroy the communist movement”. The murder of Mustafa Suphi and the “imprisonment of many others” was a proof of “the (...) struggle of Kemal against communists”. The official communist party founded by Mustafa Kemal was founded for provocation and in order to eliminate “the influence of communism”. Yet the Anatolian peasants and workers were conscious of the inevitable support they had to give to this

communist parties of those times, followed and strove for the adaptation of these principles to Turkey' social conditions. For a final note, it should be stated that the hostile attitude of the national movement and its leadership cadres –as witnessed in the Turkish case – against the native communist movement was well known to the International and its leaders as well.<sup>56</sup>

The goal of these long references was to point to the realistic yet inevitable support given to Kemalists by TKP in accordance with the resolutions of the Third International and also to show that Lenin's or International's support was not an open-ended one, which ignored the class nature of the "national" young bourgeoisie of the East. The support given to the Kemalist project was partly due to its modernist principles that were considered to pave the way for a more developed society. Sharing the approach of Yerasimos, one may argue that, TKP, in accordance with the resolutions of the Third International, approved and supported the anti-imperialist activities of the leadership of the national liberation in Anatolia yet the class structure, that is, its nature as an exploiting class, was never misinterpreted. TKP's goal was to participate in the national independence struggle without assimilating itself in this national cadre and by "preserving its independence as a

---

movement as long as the war of independence continued because the elimination of imperialists and the Allied States was the basis and start of the world revolution to end all kinds of slavery (Türkiye Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi, 1979: 60-61).

<sup>56</sup> Sadrettin Celal's speech in the Fourth Congress of the International dated 20 November 1922 exposed the relation between the Turkish communists and of the Kemalist bourgeoisie as well. He argued that TKP had two enemies since the day of its establishment; "imperialism and the national bourgeoisie". In his opinion, TKP believed that the struggle against the biggest enemy imperialism was of primary importance so it decided to support the Turkish government in its struggle against imperialism. While doing this, it continued to demand democratic reforms for workers and peasants while organizing them. Turkish Great National Assembly gained the support of all East by its espousal of the National Treaty and by the propaganda of anti-imperialism yet, its deeds in the last three years has proved its treachery. The attacks to the Turkish labour unions and TKP on the eve of the Lausanne Conference was a proof of this. To Celal, Ankara government hindered the attempts of all groups or parties that adopted the achievement of democratic reforms in their programmes and did its best to eliminate them. Celal argued that, "National bourgeoisie is no longer revolutionary, it lost this character since the Lausanne Conference" and the Ankara government was ready to compromise contrary to National Treaty "in order to protect its interests, and the interests of the big bourgeoisie of which it is the representative". Finally a letter was sent to the communist comrades in prison in Turkey by of the Communist International (Türkiye'de Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi, 1979: 64-78).

Radek's speech is quite informative on the position of the International on the issue mentioned above as well. To him, the duty of the Turkish communists was "to protect themselves from the repression of the Kemalist government" and "return blow for blow", but at the same time they had to be aware that a long way was ahead of them to walk with the "reactionary bourgeois elements" since time was not ripe for "the final struggle for emancipation" (Scram & D'Encausse, 1969: 193).

communist movement”. In addition, it did its best to fulfil its genuine task, to organize the working class and attempt to unite the poor peasantry to the struggle of the working class to end exploitation (Yerasimos, 1976:1648)<sup>57</sup>.

It may be argued that, despite its closer attitude to Kemalist ideology, TİP, quite similar to its predecessor TKP, had reservations on its class nature, especially for the period succeeding the first years of the liberation war. The common points observed in both programs are worthy of note, which may be interpreted as the impact of TKP on TİP, originating from the views of the Comintern. In this respect, Ünsal's argument related to the effect of TKP amongst others seems to be justified, though TKP's account on Kemalist ideology and practice appeared to be more realistic and distancing.

To conclude: although the question of the nature of TİP is a complex one and needs further research which is far beyond the scope of this work, a number of outcomes may be cited in the light of the above discussions. Firstly, despite some disparities resting in the domestic conditions of Turkey, TİP may well be evaluated as a “Third World” socialist party. The themes that occupy a prominent role in the discourse and practice of the party such as its emphasis of “socialism peculiar to Turkey”, the defence of etatism and mixed economy in which the state sector would play the dominant role, its full support of non-alignment, neutrality and anti-imperialism, its espousal of non-capitalist path that was planned to lead to socialism, the embracing of nationalist views of Kemalism are examples favouring this evaluation. In this connection, the existence of a tension or the conflict/consensus relation between the views of the CPSU -the Soviet theses – and those of TİP may be scrutinized on the basis of non-capitalist path. As indicated, the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CPSU recommended the development of a state capitalist sector in the framework of a plan for the underdeveloped by deliberately neglecting the nature of power in these

---

<sup>57</sup> Anyhow, on 2 December 1922, Celal, in an article published in “Internationale Presse – Kerrespondenz” stated that, for a short period, TKP and all the Turkish communists neglected “their task of class struggle in order to support the Government against Western imperialism”. To Celal, it was done to support the interests of broad masses of people and the “great interests of the world revolution”. (Celal, 1979: 89) In 1927, TKP would admit that Kemalist government was prepared to end its friendship with the Soviet Union and to restore its alliances with Western imperialism. According to TKP and the Turkish communists, this situation necessitated the beginning of a struggle against the Kemalist government (Ali Rıza, 1979: 184).

countries. In other words, this was a concession given to governments ruled by national bourgeoisie. It was taken for granted that state capitalism played a progressive role in countries where pre-capitalist or feudal relations survived. Moreover, a “lasting and sincere” alliance with the national bourgeoisie was regarded as being objectively progressive. The “National Front” described by the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress implied the priority of the national revolution and the postponing of the socialist revolution until the disappearance of Western capitalism. However, it was also envisaged that the interests of the national bourgeoisie and those of imperialism would not contradict for an unlimited period. Some scholars as Schram and d’Encausse interpret the views regarding the ever lasting alliance with the national bourgeoisie as the return of the theses of the Moslem communists which were rejected by Lenin and the Comintern (Schram & d’Encausse, 1969; 70-71)<sup>58</sup>. In view of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress, the concept of “national democracy” corresponded to a new phase which was the envisagement of a national-democratic state, where the relatively unrestricted basic freedoms enjoyed by the labouring masses and their organizations would pave the way to socialism. The emphasis on the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism in countries where the capitalist relations were still weak was another issue of the report of the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress.

As indicated before, non-capitalist path for development as a transitional stage leading to socialism was defined by the party program and supported by TIP leaders. During this stage radical transformations were to be done in order to change the socio-economic structure of the country by the adoption of a democratic- etatist policy siding with the people. This attitude of the party concerning the non-capitalist path survived until 1970s though in varying tones. Especially under the leadership of Boran, more stress appeared to be put on the concept of socialism yet despite the reluctant behaviour in pronouncing the non-capitalist road, the validity of its premises for Turkish society were frequently reiterated. Nonetheless, three crucial priorities of the party in relation to its establishment, the issue of national bourgeoisie, the leadership of the working class and/or its party, and the nature and

---

<sup>58</sup> Lenin and the Comintern, besides other reasons, espoused the alliance with national bourgeoisie on condition that it would be provisional and conditional as indicated in this chapter.

components of the National Front that was to be constructed against imperialism which were maintained throughout the whole life of TİP were points of tension between TİP's understanding of the non-capitalist path to development and that of CPSU starting from the 20<sup>th</sup> Congress of the party. The crux of the revolutionary strategy of the party, that is, the indivisibility of anti-imperialist and socialist struggles took its roots from the unique views of TİP leaders on these issues. Selik asserted that national bourgeoisie might be regarded as a class exploited by imperialism, a "potential force" to fight against it, yet it would never oppose to imperialism as long as it maintained strong ties with the capitalist system (Selik, 1969: 8-9). Moreover, Boran discussed the issue in relation to the nature of the National Front, stating that even if the anti-imperialist forces of the country won power by forming a coalition with all anti-imperialist forces including the national bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie/ intellectual strata, serious problems would arise between the labouring masses and the national bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeois/intellectual strata owing to their unreliable attitudes regarding anti-imperialism, foreign capital and constitutional transformations that would be required to carry out the reforms. (Boran, 1969: 4-5) The most lucid explanation belonged to Özkol, defining the national bourgeoisie as a class in "close relation and alliance with the comprador bourgeoisie". Quoting Fanon<sup>59</sup> and Baran, he argued that the only concern of this class was to increase its share of exploitation from imperialist looting and strengthen its ties with imperialism. In conclusion, he argued that there was no "national" bourgeoisie but a "native" (yerel) bourgeoisie in Turkey (Özkol, 1969: 8-9). The National Front was accepted conditionally by the party as well. To Boran, YÖN's and MDD's argument of "winning power in the form of a coalition of anti-imperialist forces" would not bring any solution to the issue of anti-imperialist struggle due to the cruciality of the problem of leadership. For Boran, the

---

<sup>59</sup> Fanon, in his "The Wretched of the Earth" denounces the national (native) bourgeois class of the old colonies of Asia and Africa. To him, the national bourgeoisie steps "into the shoes of the former European settlement" and considers that the dignity of its country and its own welfare require the occupation of these jobs –doctors, lawyers, etc- by itself. He further asserts that after winning of national independence, national bourgeoisie insists for the take over of foreign companies into its hands. Its mission has nothing to do with transformation of the nation, it forms a "transmission line between the nation and capitalism". To Fanon, this bourgeoisie of the colonial countries identifies itself with the Western bourgeoisie, which, in return, helps it on its "way towards decadence" (Fanon, 1970: 302 -305).

question to be asked ought to be as follows; for the leadership of which class should the socialists struggle? Socialists should never neglect or underestimate the issue of protection of the independence and of development of the working class party. In her opinion, the issue of National Front could solely come to the fore after the fulfilment of this condition. (Boran, 1969: 4-5) As a consequence, socialist and anti-imperialist struggles were to be carried simultaneously. In TİP's opinion, it was not possible to terminate the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle prior to the success of the socialist revolution. Yet, to build socialism necessitated the elimination of feudal remnants and the success of anti-imperialist struggle. Thus, the achievement of the latter (struggle) would be the first stage of the social revolution (Fişek, 1969: 4, Aren, 1970: 2-4). Nonetheless, it must be noted that the tasks of "the first stage of the socialist struggle" were similar to the goals of the non-capitalist path, and non capitalist path to development was not comprehended as a "third way" by TİP. Boran, as mentioned before, determinately stated that TİP did not propose a "Third" way, which was in between capitalism and socialism. On the contrary, TİP's target was the achievement of socialism in the aftermath of non-capitalist path to development.

It is needless to state these views were quite contentious with the Soviet views or policies of the period. In my opinion, this tension may be due to two reasons. Firstly, in TİP's opinion, the socio-economic conditions of Turkey displayed serious differences with those of underdeveloped countries of Asia and Africa. Secondly, if the Soviet thesis may be interpreted as a "policy" more than a "theoretical" approach, it may well be argued that the controversial points between this thesis and that of TİP may be considered as due to the contradiction between the national interests of a country and those of the USSR<sup>60</sup>.

One may speak of a marked impact of Kemalism on TİP, which was a common case in almost all the left wing currents of the period of 1960s. I would not share the

---

<sup>60</sup> Many writers including Kürkçü accuse the Turkish communist movement for their unlimited dependence on the support of the state and the policies of USSR. As an example to this position, Kürkçü argues that the period 1960-1970 was ripe enough for the communists to win power in Turkey yet they preferred to support RPP power instead. This attitude was in accordance with the foreign policy of the USSR in relation to the conflict between the Soviet Union and USA pertinent to the Third World countries (Kürkçü, 199 : 133).

idea of Belge who argued that, when socialism gained a legal and wide recognition in 1960s, the inner dynamics and history of Turkey assimilated this newly nourishing socialism into the boundaries of Kemalism (1991: 119), because the acquaintance of communist movement with Kemalism had a long history preceding the left currents or organizations prior to 1960s. It may well be argued that the impact of Third Worldism and Kemalism were equally influential on TİP. The perspective of the party regarding the relation between nationalism and socialism may contribute as a beneficial example to the interconnected effect of these views. According to Aybar, socialism and nationalism had identical meanings in underdeveloped countries. To be a nationalist was to be a socialist during the epoch of 1960s because it was the socialists who fought in the first ranks of the struggle to liberate the nation from the domestic and foreign exploitation. The condition of being a nationalist meant to fight against the compradors and the landowners, and their foreign accomplice imperialism, all of which caused the people to live in poverty and this was the only way to love the nation. To him, real nationalism was totally different than chauvinism or a fascist understanding of nationalism which targeted the enslavement, humiliation and exploitation of other nations. All nations who fought against imperialism and approached towards socialism were nourished by a humane nationalism. Socialism was first and foremost a national and humane movement (Somer, 2003: 47). In “Social Justice”, Aybar further argued that Turkish nationalism undertook the task of exalting Turkish nation in culture, science, technology, economy and all other areas of social life as dignified member of the nations of the world. Pointing to the need to distinguish Turkish nationalism and the practice of Western nationalism, he asserted that the former was an irredentist, non-chauvinistic, non-regressive and non-racist ideology<sup>61</sup>. Atatürk nationalism served the survival of the Turkish nation as well as encouraging the awakening and liberation of all oppressed nations of the world (Aybar, 1963: 9)<sup>62</sup>.

---

<sup>61</sup> Nonetheless, in Kürkçü' s view, since Kemalism means the rescue of the backbone of the Ottoman Empire, an expansionist policy does not contradict with Kemalism. Inheriting the Ottoman's heritage denotes the inheritance of expansionism as well (Kürkçü, 1991: 136).

<sup>62</sup> Aybar further stated that capitalists and imperialists claimed that socialism was not nationalist. In this way, they attempted to hinder the awakening of nations in the nineteenth century. To him, this claim was proved to be untrue (Aybar, 1968: 563). Thus, it seems difficult to share the view of

Karpat explains this position which relates socialism and nationalism by connotations as independence and exploitation as an example of the socialism of 1960s which appeared in the form of a “distinctive ideology rejecting culturally the Islamic, racialist and Ottoman facets of nationalism” (Karpat, 1973: 341-2)<sup>63</sup>. In almost the same vein, Ünsal argued that TİP’s understanding of nationalism encompassed the nationalist legacy of Kemalism and the form of nationalism observed in the national liberation movements of the Third World countries (Ünsal, 2002:121). In effect, many sections of the Turkish left, including TİP, understood the “revolutionary leap” as a continuation of the National liberation struggle of the 1920s. Some scholars as Aydın argue that the leftist and socialist currents in Turkey developed along two main paths, namely, the internationalist and the particularistic ones and that TİP may be classified in the former (Aydın, 1998: 73-90)<sup>64</sup>. Nonetheless, the deep impact of the “Third Worldism” together with the taint of Kemalist ideology and nationalism felt strongly in the theory and practice of the Party<sup>65</sup> makes it difficult to share this assessment. In addition to these, Aybar’s statement of building “a socialism with a motherland” because “the workers had a motherland” and his claim on the falsity of the dictum of workers of the world unite

---

Çulhaoğlu who situated TİP within the less Kemalist’ section of the Turkish socialist movement of the 60s (Çulhaoğlu, 1991; 169).

<sup>63</sup> In Karpat’s view, the first of the two aspects of this socialist movement – which was a modern current as far as its goals were concerned in Turkey and elsewhere in the Near East – was that socialist ideas in Turkey, like nationalist concepts, though previously borrowed from the West, lost much of their Western essence, that is, the ethical and philosophical sources inspiring it. Moreover, much of its spirit came from traditional cultural sources, including the social ethics of Islam. Secondly, it was free from outside pressure and was obliged to become “democratic”, despite some theoretical aberrations in favour of totalitarianism. To exhibit the relation between the merging of Western thought and traditions, he stated that, a Near Eastern man might praise the virtues of modernism and change and the next moment would begin to prove his nation’s ability to preserve its ardent personality and traditions. This apparently contradicting behaviour was a “basic law of society” which paved the way for change of societies without destroying one’s group or national personality (Karpat, 1973: 342-345).

<sup>64</sup> To Aydın, TİP represented the universalist line whereas MDD movement was the representative of the particularistic one. The particularism of the MDD movement was due to its corporatist tendencies and Third Worldism. Nonetheless, the data presented throughout this study seems quite far from proving the validity of this claim for TİP (Aydın, 1998: 59).

<sup>65</sup> It should obviously be noted that, there existed a crucial difference between the Third World supporters and socialists regarding anti-imperialism. Socialists preferred to be in the ranks of anti-imperialist front due to their socialist world view which rejected the exploitation of labour whereas were the source of anti-imperialism of the Third Worldists was their nationalism which gave priority to “national” and to fighting against the “foreign element in the country” (Aydın, 1998: 59).

(Aybar's speech at the Beşiktaş district Congress quoted in İlke II, 1974: 73) appears to justify the opposite. In this respect, it may be worthwhile to reflect briefly on the ideas of some scholars as Carr and Galissot on the relation between socialism and nationalism as well. To Carr, "The socialization of the nation" has as its "national corollary the nationalization of socialism". This meant that the worker's movement saw the nation-state as the source of the welfare policy, as the framework within which political and social rights were secured. By making use of some of the implications of this "nationalisation of socialism", Galissot argued that the process of identification with the nation was a characteristic of the classical social democracy and resulted in the creation of "*une patrie des prolétaires*" (a proletarian fatherland). To him, the actual course of the historical evolution negated the claim of the Manifest that the workers had no nation. On the contrary, nation-state was the source of their welfare rights and voting rights that organized military service and a common education system, and in that sense, was responsible for the whole process of "political socialisation". Drawing on these conclusions, he argued that the workers ought to take over the country in opposition to ruling classes and bourgeoisie who claim that the nation is exclusively theirs. These ideas, recalling Aybar's statement quoted above, strongly resemble the social democratic parties of the Second International, which considered themselves as part of the nation and denied that they represented workers without a fatherland. They were closely related to their "democratic and socialist road" preference, elevating the working class to the position of membership of the nation and of a part of the national culture. Nonetheless, in Schatzmantel's opinion, these perceptions undermined the idea of any international unity and caused a disunity and separation between the different sections of the socialist movement. In other words, the "nationalization" of the working class led to its integration with the nation-state in the detriment of the socialist internationalism (Schatzmantel, 1993: 55-56). Although one may find it hard to disagree with these views, it should be noted that, the support given to Kemalist Republic and its modernization project by the Turkish socialism or communism is due to some correspondence between the two views. Nonetheless, some of the upshots of the modernization, such as the elimination of feudal remnants were solely the point of departure for the socialist scheme. Turkish socialists and

communists, including TİP, attempted to put emphasis on this point in their account on Kemalism and its theory and practice but this did not restrain them from being influenced by its anti-imperialist stance.

Finally, some ideological tenets of TİP such as the defence of parliamentary means as the sole means of achieving power, its refutation of Leninism and proletarian dictatorship exhibit the impact of the European Left taking its roots from Kautsky`s and Bernstein`s. Thus, one may well assert that, TİP, a Third World socialist party was composed of a fusion of these views discussed above. Its theoretical and practical approach to foreign policy issues of Turkey during the period in question ought to be evaluated in the light of this perspective.

### **CHAPTER 3**

#### **TİP'S APPROACH TO THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES DURING THE 1960s**

The period of my study (1965-1969) holds a particular importance in Turkish-American relations. The unconditional faith of the Turkish governments on the foreign policy of the US - a behaviour rooted in the country since the 1950s - weakened as a result of the tension produced due to the events – such as the approach of the US to the Cyprus question and the letter of the US president Johnson to the Turkish prime minister İnönü - during the Cyprus Crisis. American attitude, in addition to shaking the absolute belief and reliance on the US, created an appropriate ideological medium for the Left to publicize its views on domestic and foreign policy issues. The issue of bilateral agreements, the American bases founded on Turkish soil in line with these agreements and the related articles of NATO Treaty, and the NATO membership of Turkey per se were all questioned. In sum, a process took start for a re-appraisal of the Turkish/American relations. It may be asserted that a preparatory stage was experienced by the events as the U-2 plane incident and the dismantlement of the Jupiter missiles from the American bases devoid of the knowledge of the Turkish government. Together with the Cyprus event, they facilitated the public opinion's comprehension of the economic, political and military dependency of Turkey on the US and paved the way for the Turkish Left to articulate these issues to the defects of the prevailing social system. In other words, the Turkish Left, TİP in particular, brought a new dimension – in fact a class dimension - to the newly emergent foreign policy discussions.

In this chapter, I shall attempt to present the theoretical views and the practical solutions put forward by TİP, which led the campaign for the publicizing of the issues mentioned above in the company of the views of YÖN circle, and the MDD movement, together with a critic of TİP when necessary. At the same time, the views of the other left and right wing political parties of the period as JP, NTP, CP, and RPP on the foreign policy topics stated above will be dealt with. To provide a

comparative vision, a brief summary of the Turkish/American relations between the time interval 1940 and 1960 is considered as helpful to shed light on the discussions pertinent to the issues in question. As a socialist party empathizing with the political views of the non-aligned countries of the Third World to a great extent, TİP's distinctive approach to foreign policy issues was not restricted to USA/Turkey relations. Hence, its views on Turkey's membership to EEC and on the foreign policy of the Soviet Union especially relevant to the military invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact are discussed under special topics.

As indicated very briefly in the previous chapter, anti- American discourse with a strong stress on independence- the spirit of Kuvay-ı Milliye (National Forces) and "Second War of Liberation" - were the two basic concepts throughout the attempt of the Turkish Left to establish its ideological hegemony, serving as a 'springboard' for its rise. On 1966, Doğan Avcıoğlu pointed to the necessity of a national, anti-imperialist struggle since the liberation of the country from dependence on US imperialism was of first and foremost importance. He further argued that, USA carried on a struggle throughout the world in order to protect the capitalist system and that national wars of independence were as dangerous as the discovery of gunpowder for the US. This line of thought was shared by all other factions of the Left including the MDD (National Democratic Revolutionaries)<sup>66</sup> and all other organizations of the Left. For instance, Mahir Çayan<sup>67</sup> argued that the main contradiction of the country was the one between a handful of traitors and the American imperialism. We observe the same stress in the declaration of the Turkish People's Liberation Army and Front (THKPC), carrying the topic Devrimin Yolu". Sharing Bora's views, one may well argue that, TİP akin to other sections of the Left

---

<sup>66</sup> A group of socialists and communists led by Mihri Belli, a prominent figure of the Turkish Communist Party of 1940s, called themselves National Democratic Revolutionaries (MDD group) or proletarian revolutionaries to distinguish themselves from the Turkish Labour Party pertinent to some theoretical and practical issues of socialism in Turkey during the 1960s.

<sup>67</sup> Mahir Çayan was a prominent leader of the youth movement of the 1960s. He attempted to initiate a guerrilla movement by establishing the Turkish People's Liberation Party and Front (THKPC-Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi - Cephesi) aiming to start a war of liberation against the American imperialism. Çayan and the leading cadre of the movement including the members of the organization Turkish People's Liberation Army (THKO – founded by Deniz Gezmiş and some of his comrades) together with the three British hostages were massacred by the Turkish army units in the Black Sea village of Kızıldere village on 30 March, 1972. The Kızıldere meeting was planned to devise a strategy in order to prevent the execution of Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan.

brought anti-Americanism and independency issues to the political agenda of Turkey by making use of very “provocative and nationalistic motives” such as the “occupation of Turkish land”, “the impossibility of the hoisting of Turkish flag in American bases”, “the holy war of independence” (Bora, 2002: 163-165).

In “TİP Tarihi 1”, Aybar argued that, the requirement of the rapid development – an issue embedded in many of the articles of the 1960 Constitution- was again on the political agenda in the aftermath of the 1960 Revolution. Moreover, according to the Constitution, Turkey was a “social” state; *‘siding with the workers, peasants, the ones who were economically weak’*. However, in Aybar’s opinion, unless the “sequence of conditions dictated to our country by imperialism and capitalism” *were broken, the implementation of these principles was out of the question*. The political medium of Turkey was not ripe enough to publicize these issues during the very days of the establishment of TİP since it was small and weak and an attempt to hoist “the flag of national independence” would possibly result in the “suffocation” of the party by the ruling classes (Aybar, 1988a: 221, italics belong to Aybar).

Nonetheless, starting from 1962, the issues related to the need of a change in the official foreign policy were brought forth in the speeches of the party leaders under the slogan of “Second War of National Independence”. For instance, Aybar, during TİP General Administrative Council meeting in Ankara stated that foreign policy issues were discussed in countries ‘ruled by democracy’ and therefore “ought to be discussed” in Turkey too and that foreign policy must be freed from being “a taboo”. Anyhow, he interpreted this move of his own as “a step taken in a field full of dangers” because the discussion of foreign policy issues in Turkey meant discussing the bilateral agreements, the NATO membership and the American bases (Aybar, 1988a: 216)<sup>68</sup>.

As indicated, under the substantial impact of Kemalism like other left-wing currents of the 1960s, TİP espoused the inevitability of a second war of liberation for Turkey. The defence of a second war of liberation in line with an independent

---

<sup>68</sup> Aren, touching upon the same issue, asserted that the most important novelty introduced into the political agenda of Turkey by TİP was the end of the “taboo” called the foreign policy. To him, until the entrance of TİP to the National Assembly, all the political parties used to reach a common understanding on the issues related to foreign policy since it was not open to discussion.

foreign policy can be observed in nearly all of the official party documents. Both, the party regulations and the party program started with Mustafa Kemal's speech dated 1 December 1921 given in the National Assembly. In the section of the Party Regulation related to foreign policy, it was asserted that;

TİP supports a foreign policy according to which our national being and independence are defended meticulously. A peace-loving foreign policy, targeting friendly relations on equal terms with all states and in favour of the United Nations Charter is the one that suits Turkey, a country that has waged a National War of Independence (quoted in Aybar, 1988a: 256, my translation).

In the Party Program, following a detailed description of the foreign policy of Atatürk, it was argued that the principles of this policy were in complete accordance with the foreign policy objectives of TİP. In TİP's opinion, the year 1947 was the initiation of a vicious circle for Turkey. The economic policy preferences depending on foreign aid and credits resulted in underdevelopment. The latter, in return, played an important role in the maintenance of economic and political dependence (Aybar, 1988a: 258-9). The strong emphasis on the need of a general disarmament including the call for an immediate ending of nuclear experiments and the eradication of the nuclear bombs and weapons is a good example illustrating the third worldist character of TİP. In addition to declaration its support for the national independence wars of dependent nations and of the peoples of colonies, TİP was strictly against all agreements that would make the Motherland a "primary target" in a future war which would result in "temporary occupation of our soil by the enemy forces"(Aybar, 1988a: 261-3).<sup>69</sup> In the Program, it was further argued that, TİP, the 'genuine heir' of the philosophy of the War of Independence, carried on its shoulders the "*holy task*" to defend the soil of the "Motherland".

---

<sup>69</sup> It may well be argued that that the Party condemned imperialism and advocated "a foreign policy in accordance with the principles of the Turkish War of Liberation" by which it meant "anti imperialism and full independence from the US". Some of the party leaders even argued that, the strong stress on the Turkish War of Independence meant that TİP was a "continuation of the spirit of the National Forces (Kuvay-ı Milliye) (Aren, 1993: 56).

During the 1965 election campaign, TİP chose to make Turkey's foreign policy the "main" issue (Karpaz, 1973: 361-2)<sup>70</sup>. On the eve of the 1965 elections, Aybar, in reply to İffet Aslan's questions, argued that TİP longed for "a foreign policy that is hundred percent nationalistic (...) nothing but the foreign policy of Atatürk", the first principle of which was the establishment of friendly relations with neighbours for the security of the country. To pursue a foreign policy in accordance with the target of "development of humanity" and in harmony with the "level of development of civilization", siding with all underdeveloped countries in their struggle to free themselves from the yoke of colonization, and building relations with other nations "on the basis of the principle of equality, and of respect of right of sovereignty and independence" were other principles of the foreign policy approach of TİP (Aslan, 1965: 8-9).

One may well argue that the adoption of these themes necessitated an anti-imperialist and anti-American stance in theory and practice, thus TİP defended the abrogation of bilateral agreements and the dismantlement of the American bases in addition to ousting NATO membership of Turkey. In this context, a brief gaze to the Turkish/American relations between 1940 and 1960 may facilitate the comprehension of these views.

### **3.1. Turkey – United States Relations**

According to Ian O. Lesser<sup>71</sup>, the relationship with the US has been a "key dimension" and a "defining element" of Turkish foreign policy for six decades (Lesser, 2004: 83). Indeed, close relations between Turkey and the US was initiated during İnönü period although the maintenance of ties with the West was one of the principles of Atatürk's foreign policy as well. In spite of this tendency, there were

---

<sup>70</sup> Karpaz also argued that, it was not only TİP that raised such views. Avcıoğlu's YÖN also had placed its emphasis on nationalism first and promoted socialism-Marxism as a means to achieve the goals of nationalism, such as economic level and total independence. Bitter anti-Americanism and constant appeals to youth and intellectuals to save Turkey of American "tutelage" was one of Avcıoğlu's points which "endeared him to other leftist groups and permitted them to tolerate his ideological aberrations from orthodox Marxism" (Karpaz, 1973: 365-6).

<sup>71</sup> Lesser is a senior analyst in RAND Corporation –an important think tank establishment influential in the planning of the American foreign policy - and a former member of the State department Policy planning staff.

other determining features in Atatürk period such as close relations with the Soviet Union in addition to maintenance of ties with the West and concern on the country's genuine independence and sovereignty without a desire of "irredenta"<sup>72</sup>, the national defence and security considerations due to the geo-strategic position of the Turkish land in a region where the interests of many big powers competed. These considerations implicit in his dictum "Peace at home, peace abroad" pointed were the basic tenets of the Turkish foreign policy during the years of the foundation of the Turkish Republic, defined as a period of "cautious neutralism" by some scholars. Western orientation of the Turkish foreign policy, a close and strong alliance with the defence system of the West, is identified by Mümtaz Soysal as a "natural outcome" of cultural and social connections with the West, especially with Western Europe since the first modernization efforts of the Ottomans at the end of the eighteenth century (Soysal, 2004: 44).<sup>73</sup>

A Mutual Assistance Treaty, signed by Britain, France and Turkey<sup>74</sup> on 19 October 1939 may be described as one of the important inaugurations of the intensification of the military, economic and political ties between the Turkish governments and the West in the aftermath of Atatürk's loss, interpreted as "the separation of the roads of Turkey and the USSR" (Gönlübol, 1982: 149)<sup>75</sup>. Though Turkey apparently remained neutral throughout the Second World War, it moved towards the West and the US during the Cold War years. The appeal to be integrated into the aid programs of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan during the İnönü

---

<sup>72</sup> Atatürk stated that "Turkey does not desire an inch of foreign territory, but will not give up an inch of what she holds". (Quoted in Vali, 1976: 27) Misak-ı Milli (National Treaty) approved by the Parliament in January 28, 1920, foresaw complete independence in political, economic and military terms and the integrity of territory. (Vali, 1976: 18) Some foreign US analysts as Robins describe this policy as a "low key" and "predominantly incremental" one (Robins quoted in Çelik, 1999: 142).

<sup>73</sup> Many scholars argue that this concern was the motive of initiation of political and military alliances such as Turkey's entrance to Sadabad and Balkan pacts and to Tripartite Alliance with Britain and France immediately after the foundation of the Republic including NATO (Soysal, 2004: 44, Sander, 1993: 69).

<sup>74</sup> In the first article of the Treaty, it was stated that "Turkey will collaborate effectively with France and the United Kingdom, and will lend them aid and assistance in her power". By another agreement signed on the same day, the former colonial powers of the Ottoman Empire granted Turkey financial benefits for the purchase of war material and for the support of her exports (Vali, 1976: 29).

<sup>75</sup> Before signing the treaty with France and Great Britain, Soviet foreign Commissar Molotov tried to persuade Turkey to adopt an attitude of neutrality and close the straits to the "Western Imperialists". These proposals were rejected by the Turkish side (Vali, 1976: 29).

governments of 1940s<sup>76</sup> and the membership of NATO in the wake of the 1950 elections were the crucial milestones of this aspiration. Despite the general opinion that the Soviet demands on the territorial alterations induced Turkey to look for exclusive orientation towards the West and the US in particular, the economic problems- the ascendance of inflation, rapidly ascending prices, the decrease of real wages and salaries and “large profits for semi-legal black market operations, ” shortages rising in the urban areas in post-war period (Keyder, 1979: 15-17) and the decisiveness of the government “ to open up the economy to the native and foreign capital may be asserted as the latent subjective motives of the foreign policy of the period succeeding the Second World War. This strongly Western-oriented foreign policy, conditioned by the domestic one, found its reflection in the latter and influenced it in response. <sup>77</sup> Sharing the views of Ataöv, one may argue that, the weak, “state-created”, collaborator Turkish bourgeoisie, self-reliant on the small-scale industry of consumer goods, thus unable to launch the development of the country was influential on the foreign policy preferences of Turkey (Ataöv, 1969: 176-177).<sup>78</sup> In Keyder's view, the level of world economic integration within the

---

<sup>76</sup> The military aid given to Turkey according to Truman Doctrine did not produce the expected relief in the Turkish economy. On the contrary, although Turkey had not paid for the military apparatus supplied by the US, a considerable amount-which was thought to be used for economic development, that is, to increase production- of the budget was used for their repair (Gönlübol, 1982: 459). The greatest percentage of the donations and the money that was received from the mutual purchasing of goods was used for military purposes. In 1952, Marshall aid halted yet Turkey received aid from the US and Europe under different names such as “Defence Support” (Gönlübol, 1982: 477).

<sup>77</sup> This mutual relation or the complementary nature of both policies was best explained by Mustafa Kemal who stated that “the internal organization of the State” was of particular interest of the foreign policy and upon which it was founded (Vali, 1976: 55).

<sup>78</sup> Kıvılcımlı describes the emergence and character of the comprador bourgeoisie of Turkey as follows: in his opinion, capital was accustomed to “grasping the savings of the workers of its own country or of other countries by the use of economic or political force”. In the West, this seizure resulted in the economic development of the Motherland accompanied by a relative increase in the level of living standards of the masses. The Turkish bourgeoisie lacked the chance of seizing the property of other nations and bringing them to the Motherland, on the contrary, it handed over the belongings of the nation and its wealth to foreign capital which was “far more clever and developed” than itself. Due to these historical, economic and social conditions, the domestic private capital of Turkey or Turkish capitalism became “ultramodern” (that is, it underwent the hegemony of foreign capital) before becoming “modern” (that is, never being able to produce the prosperous development achieved by the Western bourgeoisie during the nineteenth century). Kıvılcımlı further argued that the “inferiority complex” of the Turkish “ultramodern finance capitalists” resulted in a sheer violence against their own nation and in full dependence on “the foreign finance capital in order to veil their weakness” (quoted in Gerger, 1998: 19-20).

post-war conditions, did not allow Turkey to pursue an “isolated pattern of capitalist development with an essentially closed economy” (Keyder, 1979:21)<sup>79</sup>.

When the Democrat Party, born under these conditions, came to office after the 1950 elections, Turkey was already a member of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), and of the Council of Europe. After the foundation of NATO in 1948, the RPP government had already started to sound the major NATO countries on the possibilities of joining the organization. The Democrat government had no intention of changing external relations since they were considered as “an expression of the entire nation” (Ahmad, 1977: 390). In August 1950, Turkey applied officially for membership to NATO. To send troops to Korea during the course of the Korean War which broke out in June 1950 was considered as a beneficial step for this membership.<sup>80</sup> Thanks to the advent of the US containment policies, Turkey was admitted to NATO and became a full member in February 1952 (Zürcher, 1993: 246). After the achievement of NATO membership, the militaristic policy of the organization were adopted as a defining feature of the “national”, “traditional” and “pro-Western” preferences of the Turkish foreign policy.<sup>81</sup> The Democrat decade, was a period of intensified incorporation of Turkey into the world capitalist system, not only in the economic field, but also in the realms of foreign policy and defence. Turkey in these years became a solid- albeit peripheral- part of the political and the military structures which were built by the US and its allies. In effect, after participation to NATO, all international events were evaluated from the point of view of this organization by Turkish authorities. The governments of Turkey

---

<sup>79</sup> RPP, in search for the American political and military support by means of the Marshall Plan (Zürcher, 1993: 219) introduced a multi-party system devoid of the main premises of the bourgeois democracy as freedom of expression of thought and belief, freedom of organization of the labouring masses. The political parties of the opposition were expected to share the same views of domestic and foreign policy (Gerger, 1988: 1942).

<sup>80</sup> A heavy attack was exercised on the Turkish left-wing intellectuals during this period due to their rejection of sending Turkish soldiers to Korea. Among these were Behice Boran, Niyazi Berkes and others. Many of them lost their jobs and were sentenced in courts.

<sup>81</sup> In the government programme of Menderes (this government was in office during the time interval 22 May 1950 and 9 March 1951) it was stated that there was no need to discuss the foreign policy issues since there was a common understanding on this issue adopted by all the members of the Turkish “nation”. The succeeding program dated 24 May 1954, praised the NATO alliance and all other Western countries of Europe stating that the direction of the Turkish foreign would never be shifted from its present line (Öztürk, 1968: 422).

accepted the NATO Treaty as a “national policy “and “a worldview”. Fuat Köprülü, the Foreign Minister of the Democrat Party, stated that “The Atlantic Treaty was a national policy for us”. The permanent principles of the Turkish foreign policy were at the same time “the main principles of NATO” (Ahmad, 1977: 394-96). During Democrat Party period, Turkey sought the possibilities of building new pacts in the Balkans and in the Near East with the guidelines of the US by signing the Balkan Pact with Yugoslavia and Greece directed against the USSR and the Warsaw Pact. (Tuncay, 1995: 180) She also became a founding member of the Baghdad Pact - later transformed into CENTO in 1954 - which included Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan in addition to Great Britain. All these pacts were built against the USSR, forming “the Northern Tier.” On international scale, she took a hostile position against the non-aligned movement.<sup>82</sup> In 5 March 1959, the DP government signed a bilateral pact with the US<sup>83</sup>; in accordance with the Eisenhower Doctrine<sup>84</sup>, which enabled the US to intervene in Turkey’s internal affairs on behalf of the regime (İnce, 1975: 30)<sup>85</sup>. Military bases, the repercussions of which were observed during the Missiles Crisis and U-2 events, were granted to the US without the ratification of the

---

<sup>82</sup> Turkish Foreign Minister Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, in his speech in Bandung, rejected neutralism as a third force in world politics, denouncing it as a political current that would facilitate the implementation of communist causes in the world. This policy against the Third World and against the liberation movements resulted in a great antipathy against Turkey. Nehru, in reply to Zorlu, stated that NATO was one of the greatest protectors of neo-colonialism and that it was “a great humiliation for an Afro-Asian state to be a member of one of the existing military blocs”. The stance of Turkey deeply affected the behaviour of these countries during the Cyprus crisis in the UN (Gönlübol, 1982: 285).

<sup>83</sup> According to this bilateral agreement, the US guaranteed to provide military support to Turkey in case of a “direct or indirect attack” by an enemy. Two main points were put forth by the RPP during the discussions of the agreement in the Great National Assembly in 1960. It was argued that Turkey, already a member of NATO, was not in need of an additional security. Secondly, as emphasized by Bülent Ecevit, the term “indirect attack” in the agreement was an ambiguous one which might be interpreted in a number of ways and cause an invasion of Turkey by the US as witnessed in the Lebanese case. In spite of all these discussions, the agreement was ratified by the National Assembly on 9 May 1960 (Gönlübol, 1982: 320).

<sup>84</sup> In a special address to the American Congress on 5 January 1957, President Eisenhower stated that the Soviet Union planned to dominate the Middle East and to establish pro-Soviet regimes. In his opinion, the US should begin an economic co-operation and military assistance plan including the deployment of the US forces to nations requesting aid. This declaration, known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was in fact a plan of the US to fill the political vacuum pertinent to imperialist interests in the Middle East created by the withdrawal of British imperialism (Vali, 1976: 283-4).

<sup>85</sup> Some analysts of the Turkish history argued that the 1960 revolutionaries feared an American intervention due to this bilateral agreement and were thus cautious in their declarations in order to prevent it (Firat, 1997: 20-21 and İnce, 1975: 48).

Parliament (Keyder, 1979: 24).<sup>86</sup> DP government intentionally paved the way for the deployment of the middle-range ballistic missiles wearing nuclear heads which “targeted the European and Asian soil of the USSR” (The head of the European Allied Forces, General Lauris Norstad's announcement, quoted in Gönlübol, 1982:327)<sup>87</sup>.

Concerns on foreign policy issues were not among the causes of the 27 May Revolution, the first military coup in Turkish history through which the DP power was overthrown. (Gönlübol, 1982: 333) Reasserting the Kemalist principle “Peace at home, peace in the World”, The Declaration of the Revolution indicated a desire to develop peaceful and friendly relations with all nations, especially the neighbours; along with a strong emphasis on the basic loyalty to the Turkish/Western alliance and to NATO and CENTO in particular (Gönlübol, 1982: 333). Harris argues that continuing the US connection as ultimately in Turkey’s national interest was “pre-eminent” in Junta’s policies (Harris, 1972: 286). So, the mutual collaboration with the West and especially with the US continued to develop with an increase in the number of the bilateral agreements signed during this period. For instance, Jupiter Missile agreement was signed by the Junta government (İnce, 1975: 49)<sup>88</sup>. Nonetheless, some attempts of a re-appraisal in foreign policy issues were witnessed from time to time such as attempts for rapprochement with the Soviet Union and the

---

<sup>86</sup> The anti-communist targets in relation to the foreign policy issues overlapped with the domestic repressive political measures of the DP governments. Although DP came to power with promises of democracy, anticommunism reached its peak during its time of office. Fascist laws of the Turkish penal code such as 141-142 to stop all socialist or Marxist activities- put into effect since 1940s- were exercised in the most ruthless fashion against all democrats and socialists and communists during this period, accompanying the greatest detention campaign – the 1951 communist arrest. The penalties for the anticommunist laws in the penal code were increased. Even dead penalty was proposed for the founding members of the communist organisations (Eroğul, 1998: 106).

<sup>87</sup> This deployment, rejected by France and Greece, was approved by only three of the NATO states, Italy, England and Turkey (Gönlübol, 1982: 321).

<sup>88</sup> In relation to the rising new nations and the non-aligned countries of the Third World, the behaviour of the Revolution appeared initially determined to pursue a different course from the previous Democratic Party (DP) policies. This found its basic expression in the Junta’s (16 September 1960) “directive” that is the official statement on principles, published in the Official Gazette. It was stated that the Junta would actively support the cause of the rising nations, their struggle for independence, and their effort to develop and become a peaceful force in world politics. Turkey’s support of the cause of Algerian nationalists in the UN was an implementation of this turn. Nonetheless, Turkish diplomats in the UN sided with the US, Great Britain and France when resolutions related to Angola case and to that of Portugal were brought to councils of the UN (İnce, 1975: 59-61).

third world countries and supporting the Arabs during the Arab-Israeli conflict. One witnesses a few attempts of initiation a treatment on the bilateral agreements during the Ürgüplü government such as efforts to compile all the bilateral agreements and to establish an “Archive of bilateral agreements”. Ürgüplü attempted to initiate an investigation on bilateral agreements to be carried by the National Security Committee (NSC) as well<sup>89</sup>. İlhami Sancar<sup>90</sup>, minister of defence, took over the execution of investigating the issue personally yet the Parliamentary opinion was solely concerned with the security gap that was created as a result of the removal of Jupiter missiles and with the future place of Turkey in the Western alliance (Avcıoğlu, 1965)<sup>91</sup>. There was no question or proposal put forward as the withdrawal from Western alliances such as NATO or a revision or abrogation of bilateral agreements. Actually, the Turkish Parliament was concerned with the likelihood of the lessening of the strategic importance of Turkey which might in turn have resulted in the reduction of foreign aid. Indeed, Turkey’s relations with the US “remained

---

<sup>89</sup> This is the translation of “Milli Güvenlik Konseyi”.

<sup>90</sup> If one considers the intertwining relation between the Turkish army and the ministry of defence, it would not be wrong to state that the minister of defence enunciated the views of the army to a certain extent especially in the aftermath of a military coup. İlhami Sancar - the defence minister of all three İnönü governments in the aftermath of the 27 May 1960 military coup - was forbidden to enter the American bases (Altan, 1976: 81). His interview to İlhami Soysal in YÖN reveals the concerns of the Turkish army related to the US-Turkish relations during 1960s. He argued that although the greatest, most loyal army of NATO belonged to Turkey, the key military decisions in NATO were taken by the US. Complaining about the unfairness of the promotions, the lack of joint defence and equal right of speech for all member states in NATO, the low amount of military aid, he recalled the Johnson Letter and the problems faced by the Turkish army commanders and the misbehaviour of the US personnel against the ministry of defence of Turkey in the American bases. He stated that it was not acceptable for the Turkish army “which made the greatest sacrifice and faced with danger to wait for the decisions of those who resided in London or Washington” (Soysal, 1964: 7).

<sup>91</sup> During the debates on the issue of Jupiter missiles, the question of bilateral agreements were not touched directly yet NATO membership and security issues came to the fore. For instance, Nihat Erim (RPP) asserted that, due to its geographic location, Turkey could never adopt a neutral position in foreign policy matters. Likewise, the New Turkey Party (NTP) and the Nation Party (NP) spokespersons objected to the withdrawal of Jupiters without the consent of Turkey and demanded an update in the Turkish Armed Forces in line with the projected NATO strategy of flexible response, stressing the importance of conventional weapons. The Justice Party (JP) spokesperson demanded information on an alternative system of defence in case the Jupiters were dislocated. The government’s spokesperson argued that they would not object to the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles if they were really obsolete (İnce, 1975:76-7).

excellent” and continued to constitute the most important element of its foreign policy in this period as well<sup>92</sup> .

A brief gaze at the US – Turkish relations through the lens the American side exposes the intertwining structure of the relations. US, as a new rising force – undamaged by both world wars and in serious need of markets due to the increase of the production capacity - undertook the mission of salvation and protection of the capitalist system In Gerger's view, the main targets of the post war US policy were paving the way for the penetration of capital to all parts of the world, building the necessary regional and national regulations based on free enterprise and market so as to trigger the liberal capitalism by force or by persuasion and to open the way for imperialist looting (Gerger, 1998: 25-28). Socialist regimes built in many countries after the defeat of fascism contradicted with these ends, thus Cold War - the name given to the overall attack of capitalism against the socialist world on international scale – was initiated by the US. By the Truman Doctrine - brought into operation in 12 March 1947 - USA took over the defence of “free nations” (anti-communist regimes throughout the world) whose existence was threatened by foreign pressure (USSR) or by militant minorities inside their borders (domestic progressive or socialist movements) (Zürcher, 1993: 218). With the declaration of the Truman Doctrine, US started “a containment policy” against the USSR by all means but especially by the foundation of the military pacts (Gerger, 1998: 31)<sup>93</sup>. With the advent of the Marshall Plan, put into action in June 1947 as an economic supplementary of the Truman Doctrine, financial support was supplied on a gigantic

---

<sup>92</sup> In the programme of İnönü government which took power following the first elections after the military coup of 27 May, it was stated that “the national character of our foreign policy- adopted by all parties in our Grand National Assembly- will be secured” (Koçer 1993, 103) and that “NATO and CENTO alliances, and the US in particular were of special and crucial importance” for the government (Öztürk, 1968: 507). In the program of Demirel government- in power between 27 November 1965 and 3 November 1969 - the character of foreign policy was pointed as “being supported by the whole nation” which proved the need of its foundation on national unity and solidarity (Koçer, 1993: 305). It was also argued that due to many reasons, Turkey had to continue to be a member of NATO and CENTO and preserve its security in a collective system (Öztürk, 1968: 660). The “above-party” governments also maintained this “national” character of foreign policy (Koçer 1993, 306).

<sup>93</sup> Ataöv, in “Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye” stated that, in 1946 the US soldiers were spread to all parts of the world and more than 400 military bases were founded in many countries until 1949 (Ataöv, 1969: 121).

scale to the European countries. The containment policy was completed by the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Aybar, in the third volume of "TIP Tarihi" asserts that, by the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, America adopted a foreign policy principle, that of interference in domestic affairs of other nations, which soon became its main target. The struggle with communism, "a mask used to hide this policy" entailed the first steps of its plans of world hegemony. Its aim was to make the two countries, Turkey and Greece which occupied strategic positions, a springboard. The main target of the bilateral agreements - signed in accordance with this doctrine- was the impediment of the development of the Left (Aybar, 1988c:118 - 237)<sup>94</sup>. Turkey's role was to be "a front line state in containing Soviet expansionism, as a bulwark against communism" (Çelik, 1999:146). In fact, Turkey's geopolitical situation was directly related to the evolution of US strategic concepts. On July 1946, the US Secretary of War, Robert Patterson emphasized to Truman the importance of having "cushions of distance between Soviet areas and areas" vital to the American interests. For Pentagon, the Turks could slow down "a Soviet advance toward Cairo-Suez, thereby affording time for the United States to inaugurate the strategic offensive." Moreover, USSR could be deprived of the control of the Dardanelles. Pentagon considered the use of the Turkish airfields for "launching raids against vital petroleum areas within the Soviet Union and Romania." The military aid was directly related to the expectation of the Pentagon of the Turkish army to "retard the Soviet land offensive, thereby affording time for the US and Great Britain to launch the strategic air campaign from Egyptian bases" (Ahmad, 2004: 26-30). These quotations from the archival documents of the US clearly show that the US approach to Turkey was a strategic one concerning the interests of the US and the imperialist system. Lesser argues that from 1945 through the 1980s, Turkey was a base for power projection, both nuclear and conventional,

---

<sup>94</sup> The first serious flow of foreign aid to Turkey was realized by the military aid provided as a result of Truman Doctrine. In 22 May 1947, the American Congress ratified the "Aid to Turkey and Greece" of totally 400 million\$, 100 of which was Turkey's share. On March 1947 military aid started to come to Turkey in accordance with the "Agreement about the Aid to Turkey" signed in 12 July 1947 between the US and Turkey in Ankara. They were totally used for military purposes (Gönlübol, 1982: 457).

part of the front line in the political struggle with the USSR and broadly “critical to the containment of Soviet power in Eurasia and the Middle East”. (Lesser, 2004: 84)

This brief history reveals the cruciality of the US/Turkey relations for the ruling classes of both countries in which the issue of bilateral agreements and American bases established on Turkish soil were of prime importance. These relations had significant repercussions in the international political arena as well.

### **3.1.1. Bilateral Agreements**

As we have seen from the above summary of the US- Turkey relations, Turkey tied up its security to NATO alliance and to the US in particular under the topic of “common defence” in the aftermath of NATO membership. In addition, it formed a “network” of bilateral agreements with the US, claimed to be signed due to the requirements of the Third article of NATO Treaty.<sup>95</sup> The “Forces Status Agreement” signed by NATO states in 19 June 1951, enabled the foundation of instalments and bases, and keeping military personnel within each other’s territory. Turkey was among those countries which allowed the US to establish bases on its land due to this agreement. Granting privileges to the US personnel located in these areas. The bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the US, ratified by the foreign ministry or by a member of the ministry or by the military authorities<sup>96</sup>, were not approved by the Turkish National Assembly. Moreover, the American side of the agreement might even be a low rank officer. Some of them were written and some were verbal agreements such as a mutual understanding reached succeeding a phone call. Gönlübol asserts that these agreements were signed with respect to the law 5886 ratifying the entrance of Turkey to NATO and with respect to law 6427 ratifying the “Forces Status Agreement” (Gönlübol, 1982: 244-5).

---

<sup>95</sup> This famous third article requires a close co-operation between the sides of NATO agreement in order to achieve a more effective security. For the full text of the agreement, see Gönlübol's “Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919-1973), 504”.

<sup>96</sup> For instance, the establishment of a Military Postal Service for the Americans living in Turkey especially in American bases, which soon became a source of illegal trade, was the result of a verbal bilateral agreement between Fatin Rüştü Zorlu and the Americans during a personal chat. A counsellor of the American Embassy, G. Lewis Schmitt stated that Çiğli radar station was established illegally by a verbal bilateral agreement (Avcioğlu, 1965).

The bilateral agreements pertinent to judicial deprivations of the Turkish authorities were the most problematic. Due to these bilateral agreements, the Turkish authorities were deprived of the right of jurisdiction, in other words, it was impossible to open a court case against an American military personnel who committed a crime in Turkey while “on duty” in Turkish courts and according to Turkish laws.<sup>97</sup> According to Tunçkanat, these privileges were nothing but “administrative capitulations” (Tunçkanat, 1969: 269). In the succeeding years, the borders of “the personnel on duty” were broadened so as to include even the Turkish contractors who worked for the Americans. According to the “Military Facilities Bilateral Agreement” signed in 23 June 1954, the location of the bases and instalments to be established in Turkey were determined by the Americans. The American forces in these bases or instalments, receiving their orders from US, were not linked to NATO but to the US. Joint bases such as İncirlik were administered by both sides yet there were no legal or practical guarantees to prevent the usage of these bases by the US for its interests beyond the obligations of the agreements (Ataöv, 1969:309). The expenses of the common bases were shared by two sides yet the US did not make any payment for utilizing of the base areas. All the requirements of the American personnel – including their children, wives and other assistant personnel- were supplied from the US.<sup>98</sup> The entrance and exit of the American personnel were beyond the control of the Turkish government. The commodities and other equipments brought to Turkey under the heading of the requirements of the American personnel were tax-free. Thus, Americans and even the Turkish contractors who imported these commodities on a “duty-free” base sold them in Turkey at very high prices, a situation which fostered the creation of an American

---

<sup>97</sup> The right of jurisdiction of Turkey was turned over to the American side by a note number 4625 of the Turkish Foreign Ministry dated 28 July 1956. A telling example of the outcome of this bilateral agreement was as follows: in 5 November 1959, an American lieutenant colonel Morrison, after an entertainment in a club in Çankaya outside the working hours, ran over eleven Turkish soldiers walking down the street with his car. The American authorities in Turkey sent a document to the Turkish authorities that he was “on duty” during the accident, thus he had to be handed over to the American side without being tried by the Turkish authorities (Ataöv, 1969: 216). It was asserted that Morrison was released by the American authorities in America and sent to an island for a vacation to get rid of the psychological effects (!) of the event.

<sup>98</sup> This right granted to the Americans had been so abused that the author of this study witnessed the import of the drinking water of the US personnel from the US dwelling in the radar stations in Samsun.

black market (Tunçkanat, 1969: 255). Americans had the privilege of founding their own broadcasting system and their own postal service.<sup>99</sup> The position of the Turkish personnel working in American instalments under the American commandership was also problematic. They were forbidden to use the dining halls, stores and sport centres of these places in equal terms. The flag ceremonies were another source of disagreement since the procedure that was to be followed was not clear. The failure to appreciate the positions of the Turkish commanders in these areas was another source of tension.

Along with the Cyprus Crisis, two important international events provoked the Turkish public opinion and forced the governments to focus on the issue of the bilateral agreements and their repercussions.

#### **3.1.1.1. U-2 Plane Incident**

On May 1960, a spy US plane shot down in the territory of the USSR right after its departure from Adana İncirlik base, caused a serious crisis between the US and the USSR. Turkish authorities became aware of the event only after the announcement of the Soviet Prime Minister Khrushchev. Gary Powers, pilot of the spy plane, admitted that he was employed by the CIA to work in a special air unit to collect information on the Soviet radio stations, radar bases and missiles, adding that his military unit had landed in the Adana İncirlik base of Turkey since 1960 and that a series of spy flights were exercised by them every year since then.<sup>100</sup>

This event for the first time exhibited the lack of control of the American bases in Turkey reflecting the danger of being the target of a nuclear war. It also brought to the agenda the issue of bilateral agreements and American bases which were established and run in accordance with NATO Treaty and bilateral agreements.

---

<sup>99</sup> This privilege was granted to the US personnel by a verbal agreement of the Turkish foreign ministry (Tunçkanat, 1969:302).

<sup>100</sup> U-2 flights were apparently stopped by the declaration of the US President Eisenhower on the grounds that “newer techniques were developed”. However, in the succeeding years, US President Kennedy, in one his speeches, asserted that U-2 flights were “against the international law and therefore had to be stopped.” This announcement showed that these flights from the İncirlik base had continued in spite of the former president’s statement (Sander, 1993: 279-82).

### 3.1.1.2. Missiles Crisis

The second affair was the dismantlement of the Jupiter missiles during the Cuban Crisis. Since 1960s, Jupiter missiles were located in Turkey by the US and were furnished with nuclear warheads.<sup>101</sup> Starting from the spring of 1962, the USSR sent missiles to Cuba resembling the Jupiters. On 16 November 1962, the US, acknowledging their presence by its espionage network, put an arms embargo on Cuba and stopped the Soviet ships on their way to Cuba.<sup>102</sup> This serious crisis was terminated by an announcement of the Soviet Union that it would halt the deployment of the missiles in Cuba if the US would withdraw its missiles from its military bases in Turkey. A secret agreement was reached between the two countries for the withdrawal of missiles from both Turkey and Cuba. (Gönlübol, 1982: 338-339) Though Turkey rejected the demands for the withdrawal of Jupiters, on 23 January 1963, US government decided to remove the Jupiters on the grounds that they were obsolete and had been superseded by Polaris missiles. In spite of its earlier rejections, the İnönü government had to give consent for the withdrawal. Moreover, Turhan Feyzioğlu, the deputy premier of the government declared that the Turkish government was “much relieved with the idea of getting rid of these provocative weapons solely creating tensions with the Soviet Union.” Nonetheless, a prolonged debate on bilateral agreements and on a need for a revision or readjustment in foreign policy initially took start in the press and continued in the Parliament. For instance, the Republican Peasant Nation party (RPNP) denounced the government’s foreign policy as undignified and submissive to foreign powers (İnce, 1975: 68).

---

<sup>101</sup> During the early 60s, the first reaction came from the USSR by a note sent to President Cemal Gürsel by Khrushchev expressing the concern of the USSR over the deployment of these missiles. Gürsel’s response to Khrushchev was that they were purely defensive in nature and were not directed against the USSR. In May 1962, Khrushchev made another announcement on the missile problem. In 25 October 1962, the Turkish foreign minister Feridun Cemal Erkin was warned by the USSR representative for an urgent removal of the Jupiters from the Turkish territory (Gönlübol, 1982: 338-339).

<sup>102</sup> During this crisis, İnönü government was in office in Turkey. It immediately expressed its support for the US embargo in responding to a letter from Kennedy and became the first government to stop all shipments from Turkey to Cuba. İnönü stated that: “We fulfil our commitments when requested by one of our allies as we would expect our allies to fulfil their commitments when we are faced with danger” (İnce, 1975: 67-8).

The debate on the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles brought in the first criticisms related to the foreign policy of Turkey resulted in the emergence of two positions. The left-inclined and socialist-Marxist section of the public opinion saw the event as the indication of Turkey's obedience to the US and its lack of initiative in world politics. The left urged a loosening of bonds with NATO and the US under the new circumstances created by East-West détente. On the other side, the conservative press, similar to the position of the parliamentary opinion, adopted a stance against the withdrawal of the missiles arguing that Turkey and NATO were in mutual need of each other. (İnce, 1975: 81-82)<sup>103</sup>

Milliyet, a more liberal newspaper, though seemingly satisfied with the İnönü Government's explanations, exposed a shy opposition, stressing that the Polaris missiles would never be alternatives to the Jupiters<sup>104</sup>. A more radical attitude was held by the socialist writers, such as Çetin Altan and İlhan Selçuk who argued that the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles was a US bargain with the Soviet Union using Turkey as a lever in the crisis of the Caribbean. They both asked for a readjustment in foreign policy in order to prevent new shocks from the shifts in US behaviour that could take place in the future due to the start of détente conditions. Doğan Avcıoğlu, the chief editor of YÖN, argued that due to the presence of these missiles, Turkey occupied a central place in the Cuban crisis and that the security of Turkey could not be maintained by foreign assistance (Avcıoğlu, 1963: 3). This article was followed by the other articles of Doğan Avcıoğlu, Türkkaya Ataöv and Mümtaz Soysal. They proposed a rapprochement with the Soviet Union and close relations with the non-aligned countries in line with the foreign policy of Atatürk (Firat, 1997:104). In the issue of YÖN dated 20 June 1962, it was argued that *NATO membership and especially the foreign bases founded on Turkish soil, many of which were the*

---

<sup>103</sup> Such views were supported by for instance by Kafılı in his article "Füzeler ve Türkiye" in Tercüman dated 26 October 1962.

<sup>104</sup> Milliyet, "Türkiye'de Füzeler Sorunu" (16 January 1963) and "Füzeler Sorunu" (4 February 1963). Cumhuriyet, holding a more leftist stance argued that, the decision of withdrawal taken by the US alone was wrong yet this act was in the national interests of Turkey since Turkey was no longer a target of a future war. During the Ürgüplü government, an article by Yılmaz Çetiner was published in Cumhuriyet. In it, it was argued that bilateral defence agreements and NATO connections served mostly to the interests of US at the expense of the poor and underdeveloped Turkey (quoted in Ince, 1975:79).

*outcome of the bilateral agreements*, might cause an unnecessary tension between Turkey and its neighbours (YÖN, 1964a, emphasis added). Haluk Ülman, a professor of the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University, joining in the discussions, asserted that Turkey's NATO membership caused a serious threat instead of providing security resulting in an increase of the defence budget. Moreover, the existence of bilateral agreements and American bases made the country a prime target of a future war. The foreign policy, especially NATO membership and the bilateral agreements had to be revised on the basis of national interests (Firat, 1997: 102-3).

In addition to the above views which took place in the press and in university circles, Anti-American demonstrations became the most important political activity of the leftist currents especially of the left-wing students during the 1960s. These activities were directed particularly to the presence of the US and NATO in Turkey. For instance, the American navy officers of the Six Fleet were thrown to the sea<sup>105</sup> by the left-wing university students in Dolmabahçe. It may well be argued that the rise of anti-Americanism and anti-American activities of the left-wing Turkish youth and its organizations –the leading cadres of which were former TİP members - during 1960s was influential in the formation of the public opinion and on the need for a revision in foreign policy issues. In my opinion, these protests facilitated TİP's Parliamentary opposition pertinent to issues on Turkey's military, economic and political dependence on the US.

---

<sup>105</sup> The Sixth Fleet arrived in İstanbul on 15 July 1968; the left wing youth started demonstrating against it. On 17 July 1968, Vedat Demircioğlu, a law student was beaten and hurled out of the window of the İstanbul Technical University in a subsequent police raid on a student residence hall and died on 24 July 1968. On 19 February 1969, another demonstration of the left wing students protesting the visit of the Sixth Fleet was attacked by the right wing Islamic militants, during which two people were killed. This event is known as the Bloody Sunday. During these events, some American privates were thrown to the Marmara Sea. Some journalists and historians compared these events with the visit of Missouri in 5 April 1946. For instance, in its edition dated 19 July 1968, Yeni Gazete editorialist reminded its readers that twenty years have passed since the battleship Missouri received such a "tumultuous" welcome in İstanbul "while now American soldiers are thrown to the sea" (quoted in Vali, 1976: 143). In the same vein, Ataöv, in "Amerika, NATO, Türkiye" and Oran, in "Türk Dış Politikası" discussed the two events stressing on the change of the public opinion (Ataöv, 1969: 205 and Oran, 2001a: 693).

### 3.1.1.3. Advent of the Issue of Bilateral Agreements and American Bases to the Parliament by TİP

It is for sure that the issue of bilateral agreements in company with other foreign policy issues such as NATO and American bases were carried to the agenda of the Parliament by TİP in a methodical and resolute manner.<sup>106</sup> TİP had actually exhibited its strong will for the annulment of bilateral agreements in its election manifest in which it was stated that if TİP gained power as a result of 1965 elections, it would “revise all agreements and contracts signed between Turkey and foreign countries and the ones which are incompatible with the country’s national sovereignty and independence” would immediately be “abolished” and thus “the political, financial, judicial privileges granted to foreign states will be abrogated” (YÖN, 1965b, translation mine).

The first activity of TİP was a written question<sup>107</sup> directed to the government on 15 December 1965 in the aftermath of the 1965 elections, by which it demanded a full list of documents signed between the US and the Turkish Republic (Aybar, 1988b: 259-60)<sup>108</sup>.

Provoked by this demand and by the results of the voting on Cyprus issue in the UN, Osman Bölükbaşı, the leader of the Nation Party demanded *a revision of the bilateral agreements* which were “unknown by the Parliament”. (NA Minutes, first

---

<sup>106</sup> See Appendix A for the details of the oral question given to the National Assembly by Sadi Koçaş.

<sup>107</sup> See Appendix B for details.

<sup>108</sup> Refik Erduran’s article “Düpedüz” in Milliyet dated 10 November 1965 is a good example to show the impact of TİP in the Parliament on foreign policy issues and its reflection to the public opinion. In Erduran’s view, the most logical argument was brought in by the Prime Minister Demirel as he spoke on the stormy issue pertinent to the occupation of the Turkish soil by the US. Addressing TİP deputies, Demirel stated that he was the head of a government “which has not even won the vote of confidence”, thus could not be held responsible for any deed of the former governments. He posed the following question to İrfan Solmazlı who supported TİP deputies: “You were a member of the NUC, a committee which had the power of enacting verbal laws 1.5 years ago. If the bilateral agreements were against the national interests, why didn’t you change them”? Then he turned to RPP group and asked “Why didn’t you abrogate the bilateral agreements during your government of 3.5 years?” To Erduran’s view, “The power and the characteristic feature of TİP” was that it had not governed Turkey, thus it would never be held responsible for any “mischief”. So apparently TİP was the only political party that had the power or chance to oppose the Justice Party. Erduran further argued that even if TİP deputies were “bag thieves” as alleged by the JP or “even if they had robbed 12 banks”, it would not shadow the arguments they brought to the parliament related to foreign policy issues (translation mine).

meeting, 28<sup>th</sup> Session, 27.12.1965: 22, emphasis added) Also, in another demand presented to the Parliament by Mehmet Altınsoy<sup>109</sup>, we notice the emergence of the question of bilateral agreements. Muzaffer Özdağ, a deputy of the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP), recalled the withdrawal of the Jupiter missiles during the Cuban Crisis and the U-2 event. Declaring that these events took place beyond the will of Turkey as it had been during the event of Admiral Souchon,<sup>110</sup> he referred briefly to the bilateral agreements emphasizing that they went far beyond Turkey's responsibilities emerging from being a member of NATO alliance (NA Minutes, First meeting, 32<sup>nd</sup> Session, 7.1.1966: 249).

TİP continued its efforts for the achievement of the discussion of the issue of bilateral agreements in the Parliament. The written question was pulled back as it was not replied by Demirel Government and an interpellation was presented to the Head of the Parliament by Çetin Altan (TİP) concerning the same issues, on 13 July 1966.<sup>111</sup> Pointing to the extraordinary nature of the political relations between the US and Turkey, Altan argued that 52 secret bilateral agreements were signed between the US and Turkey and these were not within the knowledge of the Parliament (NA Minutes, First meeting, 110<sup>th</sup> session, 13.7.1966: 695-6) Turhan Feyzioğlu<sup>112</sup> (RPP) asserted that although they did not share the views of TİP on the matter, the subject had to be negotiated in the Parliament. (NA Minutes, First meeting, 110<sup>th</sup> session, 13.7.1966, 702) Ekrem Alican, a deputy of the New Turkey Party<sup>113</sup>, declared that the essence of the matter had to be discussed in order to put an end to the “mischief” and *that if there were bilateral agreements against the interests of the Turkish nation they had to be abrogated* (NA Minutes, First meeting, 110<sup>th</sup> session, 13.7.1966: 706-

---

<sup>109</sup> Mehmet Altınsoy, a RPNP deputy of Niğde, was the Minister of State in Ürgüplü Government founded in 20 February 1965.

<sup>110</sup> Admiral Souchon was the top responsible of the two warships Goeben and Breslau which entered – took refuge – the Turkish waters as a *fait accompli* to drag Turkey into the Second World War beyond her will. They were then presented to the Padişah as a gift and their names were changed as Yavuz and Midilli (Aybar, 1995: 34).

<sup>111</sup> For full text of this interpellation, see NA Minutes, First meeting, Session 110, 13.7.1966: 691.

<sup>112</sup> Turhan Feyzioğlu, a former deputy of the RPP, was the founder of the Party of Confidence (Güven Partisi) that may be defined as a right wing and anti-communist party.

<sup>113</sup> New Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi), founder of which was Ekrem Alican, was a right wing political party. It was established on 13 February 1961 (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976: 229).

7, and emphasis added). Nation Party spokesperson Hilmi İşgüzar stated that the government should work on the bilateral agreements and on the conditions of NATO and CENTO alliances and make the necessary alterations in case they contained articles against the sovereignty of the Turkish Republic.<sup>114</sup> JP spokespersons, İhsan Ataöv and Ertuğrul Akça reiterated their chairman's argument that bilateral agreements were signed by the previous governments including the government of the 27<sup>th</sup> May revolution and argued that the chief aim of the government was to sort out a general account of the agreements in order to distinguish their beneficial and detrimental aspects (NA Minutes, First meeting, 110<sup>th</sup> session, 13.7.1966:704)<sup>115</sup>.

Harassed by TİP and the pressure of the public opinion, Prime Minister Demirel pointed out that none of the bilateral agreements had been concluded under the Justice Party rule. Rejecting all the allegations of TİP that Turkey was a satellite of the US, he argued that he had not let “the addition of a comma” to the prevailing bilateral agreements that would be “detrimental to the rights of Turkey”.<sup>116</sup> He accused TİP of *triggering the national feelings* by opposition to NATO and CENTO, arguing that Turkey was a “sovereign and independent country” since the day of its foundation and that NATO and CENTO agreements were signed in order to provide a collective system of support against communism. He refused all the allegations of dependency and intervention of the foreigners to the domestic affairs of the country,

---

<sup>114</sup> During the debates on the sovereignty of the country, the issue of an American officer sitting side by side with the mayor of Adana in the 27 May 1966 ceremony was discussed and Nation Party in particular expressed its abhorrence related to this event (NA Minutes, First meeting, 110th session, 13.7.1966: 710).

<sup>115</sup> According to the information given by Ertuğrul Akça, the Turkish Foreign Ministry had informed the US authorities of the request of the Turkish state to revise the agreements on 7 April 1966 and the same demand was repeated during the visit of the US Foreign minister Dean Rusk who declared that the US was ready to start the negotiations (NA Minutes, First meeting, 110th session, 13.7.1966: 711).

<sup>116</sup> Şevket Süreyya, in “Türk Solunun Dört Zafiyeti-III” stated that the slogan of TİP that, “All the foreign bases in Turkey must be dismantled” pulled the attention of everyone, though the bases were still in operation. He further argued that it was for sure that the main issues or even the copies of these agreements were “absent in the archives of the Foreign Ministry” and that many of them could not even be called as agreements, as for instance like the one “signed by Fatin Rüştü Zorlu”. To him, some of them were signed by one of the sides and were in the form of privileges given to the other side. Some put rules which were thought to be backed by the bilateral agreements, yet they were no more than habits utilized practically by the American officers and sub-officers. In sum, these “degenerations and blindness called the bilateral agreements” were made public by TİP's slogans. Demirel's government was obliged to take into consideration the issue of bilateral agreements. Due to the uncovering of the issue by TİP, it was impossible for any government to ignore it”(Aydemir, 1967: 8-9, translation mine).

stating that this claim of TİP resembled “the allegation that the sun rose from the East” (NA Minutes, first meeting, 110<sup>th</sup> session, 13.7.1966: 712-5).<sup>117</sup> Despite the speech of the prime minister, during the process of investigation, it was observed that insufficient information existed on the exact number of bilateral agreements. Contrary to his allegations that the bilateral agreements were established between US and Turkey due to the third article of the NATO agreement, Demirel would soon admit that not even a file for these documents existed in related ministries and that “some of them were signed by a soldier of a low rank or by a US captain” (Aybar, 1988c: 115-116).

It may well be argued that TİP pulled the attention of the deputies of the other parties on the subject and forced Demirel government to focus on the bilateral agreements and other issues such as NATO alliance and the American bases. In Aydemir's terms, the situation was carried to such a point that it was impossible for any government to neglect the issue (Aydemir, 1967: 8-9).

On 5 January 1967, another interpellation was offered to the Head of the Assembly concerning the Cyprus issue, bilateral agreements and the American bases by Çorum deputy Sarıyüce<sup>118</sup> and his friends. During the negotiations, Turhan Feyzioğlu (RPP) asserted that he had no idea of the content of the articles of these agreements – that is, whether they contained anything against the International Law or not - because he had not read them. His knowledge on them was limited to the information of the press (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> session, 5.1.1967: 75). During the same session, New Turkey Party spokesperson also stated that he had no knowledge about them though he was a member of one of the former governments. He too argued that the bilateral agreements had to be carefully examined to see whether they were in accordance with the national interests of the country or not (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> session, 5.1.1967:109-111). All these speeches

---

<sup>117</sup> To Aybar, the issue was too complicated to be overlooked by playing with the words since the agreements were signed in the name of the Turkish Republic and that all the governments were bound to obey them (Aybar, 1988: 260).

<sup>118</sup> Hasan Latif Sarıyüce was a Çorum deputy of the Nation Party during the period of 1965-1969 in the National Assembly. He gave an interpellation to the head of the Assembly pertinent to the question of bilateral agreements and American bases in Turkey and the Cyprus issue on 5 January 1967.

justified and strengthened the position of TİP on the issue. Boran,<sup>119</sup> in her speech during the same session, gave the exact number and date of signature of bilateral agreements (To Boran, the number of bilateral agreements signed before 1950 were not three but five and they were signed in 23 February 1945, 27 February 1946, 7 May 1946, 12 July 1947 and 7 July 1948 respectively) arguing that these agreements were not based on the Third article of the NATO agreement on the grounds that the most important bilateral agreements were the ones signed in the years 1947 and 1948, prior to Turkey's NATO membership. To her, though the bilateral agreement of 1945 – the first one signed before Turkey's entrance to NATO was apparently an agreement of military aid and information; its last article was related to the reduction of customs, the liberation of exchange of commodities and employment for the American personnel in Turkey which had nothing to do with the essence of the agreement. Thus, a technical agreement was transformed into the one intervening in the right of sovereignty of Turkey. The same was true for the second bilateral agreement signed in 1946, a credit agreement of 10 million \$, by which Turkey was obliged to buy the obsolete military material of the US. In this agreement too, a "mutual" fund was created by the US to be used for "humanly, ethical, and cultural means" to be distributed under its control.(NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> session, 5.1.1967: 90) Boran asserted that in many other agreements there were such articles, granting economic and cultural privileges to the US. Claiming that national defence and security could only be realized in an independent and sovereign country, not by the help of the agreements prepared against the rules of the International Law<sup>120</sup>, she argued that the bilateral agreements were neither related to the

---

<sup>119</sup> She recalled Demirel who had stated in the Assembly that "There are no American bases in Turkey, there are NATO bases; to introduce controversial views on these subjects is against national interests". She also reiterated the cry of the Minister of Defence as "lie!" in reply to the allegations of TİP on the subject from his seat ( NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29th session, 5.1.1967: 81). Demirel, in a press conference on 4 April 1966, replied a question of the journalists regarding the American bases and stated that "There are no bases in Turkey but installations. The agreements are signed by Turkey due to common defence requirements. These instalments are established by the approval of Turkey and belong to us". On 5 April 1966, he made a speech on the same issue and declared that "There are no bases in Turkey that belong to foreign states" but "instalments built in accordance with NATO Treaty and the bilateral agreements regarding the defence requirements of Turkey". In his opinion, one had to differentiate between "a base and an installation". The prime minister further added that "Turkey owns these instalments" (Gönlübol, 1982: 534).

<sup>120</sup> In this context, she counted the rules of the International Law related to independence and sovereignty of states. These were the right to make its own laws and to be able to practice them in all

International Law nor to the Third article of NATO agreement.<sup>121</sup> No logical argument could relate the immunity of the American personnel from the Turkish law and courts while “on duty”, and the right to have their own postal office and broadcasting which was used to entertain the American military personnel and the right for tax-free imports through the PX stores, to the International law or to the NATO Treaty (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> session, 5.1.1967: 82). To her, according to bilateral agreement of 1947, the former US president Johnson was able to prevent the use of NATO weapons in Cyprus dispute and according to bilateral agreement of 1959, American government was offered the right for a military intervention to Turkey. She finally declared that, it was not possible to revise these agreements since they were against the country’s independence and sovereignty rights and the only solution of the problem was their abrogation. Boran concluded her speech stating that the country was confronted with the threat of a nuclear war due to the outcome of these agreements and that Turkey was obliged to pursue the “non-aligned, neutral” foreign policy of Atatürk, based on “a national defence strategy accompanied by the creation of a security belt” (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> session, 5.1.1967: 708).<sup>122</sup>

TİP submitted its views on bilateral agreements once again during the negotiations on the government’s budget in 1968. Boran argued that by virtue of the bilateral agreements “there were US bases, peace corps, 30.000 American soldiers, civilian American personnel, American specialists” in many regions of Turkey. The attempts of the Demirel Government to modify these agreements could solely be

---

parts of the country, the right of adjudication in all parts of the country, the right to decide for war and peace and to be able to use its own army and to control the customs, and finally to control all the administrative and financial affairs in every region of the country.

<sup>121</sup> The Third article was related to privileges offered to the US in order to increase the joint power of protection.

<sup>122</sup> Boran’s emphasis on these issues deserved attention since additional privileges were granted to American personnel working in other American associations such as JUSSMAT (American Aid Association) with each bilateral agreement signed after Turkey’s NATO membership. Many of them were not even published in the official gazette which meant that these additional privileges were not granted to US by the Turkish Parliament. The Military Facilities Agreement signed in 23 June 1954 constituted a series of heavy obligations. Thanks to it, the Turkish government could not get a penny as tax from the US side for any service or equipment or commodity imported to Turkey from US for the requirements of the American personnel and their relatives. The contractors enjoyed the same privileges too (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> session, 5.1.1967: 708).

considered as “some kind of progress”, due to the “positive role and influence of the opposition in countries ruled by democracy”. It was TİP group of 15 deputies that had influenced the Turkish public opinion and the behaviour of the government. Pertinent to the Main agreement (DCA), she claimed that it had to be brought to the National Assembly to be ratified or else it would be null and void since according to the fifth paragraph of the article 65 of the Constitution there was an obligation for the ratification of all the new agreements by the Parliament (NA Minutes, second meeting, 46<sup>th</sup> session, 20.2.1968: 471).

Çağlayangil's (The Minister of Foreign Affairs) reply on the allegations of TİP during the same session deserves attention since they may be considered as a latent confession regarding the claims of TİP. Accusing TİP of revealing the top secret issues of the state<sup>123</sup>, and stating that the bilateral agreements were not devoid of problems (he used the term “çöpsüz üzüm”), he pointed to the restrictions on “the freedom of action” of the Turkish Republic”. It was not easy to establish relations with the great powers and he, as a foreign minister, had spent three months to find out “what the 54 bilateral agreements” were. (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 30<sup>th</sup> session, 6.1.1967:126) Though “the implementation of these agreements had (surpassed) gone beyond their limits”, it was possible to get rid of their troublesome parts by mutual negotiations. (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 30<sup>th</sup> session, 6.1.1967:128).<sup>124</sup> He informed the Parliament on the on-going discussions of the “Main Agreement (Cooperation Agreement concerning Joint Defence (DCA) - Ortak Savunma ile ilgili İşbirliği Anlaşması). According to Çağlayangil, the number of military and civilian personnel of the US, the facilities they would enjoy, the places they would be sent, the commodities they could preserve would be determined by the nominated authorities of both governments in accordance with the 51<sup>st</sup> and the 3<sup>rd</sup>

---

<sup>123</sup> According to the foreign minister, the Turkish state and the US state agreed to co-operate, in accordance with the Third article of the NATO agreement in order to develop the maintenance of their defence against an armed aggression to one of the sides and to preserve the security and defence of the North Atlantic Region, by using the collective or individual legal right of defence, in accordance with the 51st article and in accordance with the aims and principles of the UN (NA Minutes, second meeting, 30th session, 6.1.1967: 126).

<sup>124</sup> In 18 June 1975, Çağlayangil, during his speech in TRT News programme would state that the bilateral agreements were in a mess when they came to power in 1965, and that some of them “did not have any legal basis” (Dış Siyaset Belgeleri (1), 1976: 30).

article of NATO agreement. Moreover, all the real estates built or installed by the US or in the name of US government on the Turkish land allocated for the US would be the property of the Turkish Republic immediately after their establishment. In other words, Turkey would retain the property rights of the bases built on her soil. The characteristic features of these installations were not to be altered without the permission of the government of the Turkish Republic (NA Minutes, Second meeting, 30<sup>th</sup> session, 6.1.1967: 126).<sup>125</sup>

#### **3.1.1.4. Re-appraisal of the Bilateral Agreements**

As indicated in the above speech of the Prime Minister, the irresistible pressures in and out of Parliament obliged the Demirel government to invite Washington to open negotiations “to put bilateral agreements under discipline”, that is, to review and to update them (Dış Siyaset Belgeleri (1), 1976: 30). On 7 April, 1966, Turkish government sent a note to the US government requesting the initiation of negotiations on the bilateral agreements signed between the US and Turkey. (Gönlübol, 1982: 529) In the beginning, the American side rejected this demand stating that they had no “worry of the legality” of these agreements since similar ones were signed between the US and the other states of NATO, and that this revision might provoke a discontent in other regions. They also claimed that these agreements were in full accord with the NATO Treaty, stressing their demand for their preservation. Harris argued that Washington was not actually willing to agree to an “open-ended” defence commitment that “appeared to go considerably beyond the NATO alliance”. Yet, the Turkish side wanted the establishment of a written document in which their right to have a full and detailed knowledge before granting permission to any American activity (Harris, 1972:161). Nevertheless, on 18 April 1966, the Turkish foreign ministry was informed by the American side that the demand of the Turkish government to start negotiations for a revision of the Military Facilities Agreement was accepted (Tunçkanat, 1969: 334). However, the negotiations could only start after nine months, on 20 January 1967 and lasted for

---

<sup>125</sup> A foreign reporter summarized the discussions in the Parliament on bilateral agreements as follows: “The extraordinary side of the discussions was that they became a duel between TİP leaders and Demirel instead of a debate of the old and new parties in power and in opposition” (quoted by YÖN, 1965f).

two and a half years.<sup>126</sup> Finally, on 3 July 1969, a new agreement was signed between the Turkish foreign Ministry and the American Embassy according to which bilateral agreements were compiled in a “Main Agreement” (DCA)<sup>127</sup>.

Turkish society and the press were not informed on the issues discussed during the preparation of the Main Agreement until 1970<sup>128</sup>. In June 1970, Demirel gave an extensive briefing on the DCA on both houses of the Parliament in closed sessions<sup>129</sup>. On the 7 February in 1970, he informed the public opinion by a press conference on the bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and the US. To Demirel, over the twenty five years of NATO alliance, ninety one bilateral agreements were signed and fifty four of them had been in force when his government came to power after 1965 elections. As to the bilateral agreements, he stated that “over ten years preceding 1965 there were scattered agreements *concluded by several authorities not based on any principles*. This was another confession and a verification of the arguments of the left. He further cited that as JP they were against “a practice whose legal grounds and content was not known and *which led to great difficulty and complaint*.” (Emphasis added)<sup>130</sup>. Thirteen of them were of supreme

---

<sup>126</sup> Tunçkanat argues that this was a deliberate delay because the US side had observed that the Turkish General Staff had decided to deal seriously with the issue and even started preparations by the establishment of a commission. The Head of the General Staff Cemal Tural who was known to be insistent on a radical revision was invited to US and was treated in the status of a President of State. To Tunçkanat, the resolute attitude of Tural changed after the visit. The negotiations were thus delayed for nine months and in addition they were carried on in the absence of the members of the General Staff. (Tunçkanat, 1969: 335) On the other hand, Harris, in “Troubled Alliance” argues that to reach a complete set of agreements and, to assemble them took a long time for the Turkish authorities, putting the blame on the Turkish side (Harris, 1972: 162).

<sup>127</sup> The government made an official announcement to the press in which it was declared that as a result of a meticulous process between the US and Turkish governments an agreement was signed in accordance with the main principles of the Third article of the NATO Treaty. Gönlübol argues that the new agreement, similar to the former bilateral agreements, was a secret one and thus only the main principles were made public. To him, the majority of the principles appeared to be “a defence of Demirel government due to heavy pressure of the public opinion” instead of a “renewed agreement” (Gönlübol, 1982: 530).

<sup>128</sup> The main motives of the Agreement called as SOİA (Ortak Savunma ve İşbirliği Anlaşması) in Turkish centres and abbreviated as DCA (Common Defence Agreement) in American organs, was published by Milliyet on 16/17 March 1975.

<sup>129</sup> These closed sessions were held on 23-25 January 1970 in the National Assembly and on 22, 27 and 28 January 1970 in the Senate (Gönlübol, 1982: 530).

<sup>130</sup> He announced in the same conference that they had stopped the flights from these bases in 28 December 1965 when an American reconnaissance B-52 aircraft was lost in the Black Sea. This

importance and were signed under the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement. He asserted that during the negotiations of the bilateral agreements, subjects concerning “multilateral cooperation”, that is, the ones concerning the obligations related to NATO alliance were not discussed. He replied to the criticisms of the left-wing press and those raised by TİP stating that NATO bases in Turkey- such as İncirlik- were aimed at deterrence of attacks to Turkey. Since it was impossible for NATO to take military decisions without the consent of Turkey, these bases could never be used “for any other purpose other than NATO defence”<sup>131</sup> thus the argument that these bases would drag Turkey to a nuclear war against its will was groundless because they were solely “passive defence installations”. As to the nuclear arms located in NATO and American bases, they “menaced to no one” since they could not be used “without the consent” of Turkey. He confirmed TİP’s argument that on 35 million square meters of land (he gave the dimensions of it as 35.000 dönüm as one dönüm is a thousand square meters) there were military installations in which “flight, periodic training, electronic intelligence, communications and scientific activities” were carried on according to the 1954 Military Facilities Agreement. He further stated that “about 23.000” military and civilian Americans dwelt in more than “ten places” in Turkey. He announced that 1954 Military Facilities Agreement was abrogated in 3 July 1969 as a result of “long and meticulous” preparations. The JP government had signed fifteen bilateral agreements with USA since it came to office which were all military agreements yet according to the Prime Minister these agreements in no way were related to the foundation of new installations that would drag Turkey to a war beyond its will. Then, he gave a list of the highlights of the new agreement (Gönlübol, 1982: 532, translation mine). DCA would be run “*under the principles of mutual sovereignty and equality*”, and Turkey’s consent and “*full and absolute*” control was required under any circumstances for any action started from these installations and that Turkey had the right to inspect these places whenever it found it necessary. No joint defence activities would be performed by the US government

---

aircraft was actually shot by the Soviets and a note of protest was sent to the Turkish foreign ministry by the USSR (Ahmad & Ahmad, 1976: 305).

<sup>131</sup> This assertion of the prime minister was totally groundless since these bases, especially İncirlik, were used by the US for its own military purposes as witnessed in the event of U-2 flights and the Lebanese intervention of the US.

before the Turkish Government was given “full and detailed information” of them. The use of Turkish labour force in joint bases was approved in principle and laws of the Turkish Republic were to be observed in regards to the foreign employees and their relatives to be employed in the installations. Although the duration time of the agreement was Turkey’s NATO membership, disagreements would be solved through mutual negotiations and the Council of Ministers of Turkey had the right to “stop the practice of the disagreement under negotiation until it was solved”.<sup>132</sup> The foreign personnel in these installations would be subjected to the “NATO Forces Status Convention signed on 19 June 1951 and the agreement signed on 23 June 1954 (Harris, 1972: 229-234). This meant that the privileges of the American personnel such as the tax-free status and their establishment of free radio stations and etc were supported.<sup>133</sup>

---

<sup>132</sup> It is interesting to note that Demirel Government faced with an American embargo of arms due to Turkish intervention to Cyprus in 1974. On 24 July 1975, The Council of Ministers of Demirel government decided to abrogate the agreement of 3 July 1969 and the activities of all joint defence installations- except İncirlik- were halted and were transferred to the Turkish armed forces. In a press conference held on 2 August 1975, Demirel announced that the privileges as tax-free applications of the American commodities and their free entrance and exit were halted except for the urgent needs of the American personnel and their relatives. The communication networks were put under full control and inspection of the Turkish Armed Forces and no personnel would be allowed to enter or leave the installations without the permission of the Turkish Armed Forces. The flights of the American airplanes were also restricted and they were to obey the rules which were relevant for the other NATO military planes. As to İncirlik Demirel defined two types of activities for it; the ones within the limits of NATO Agreement and the ones related to “some information and transportation according to the Agreement of 1969”. The latter activities were halted by his government which actually meant that in İncirlik and in some other bases activities surpassing the obligations of the NATO Treaty still maintained by the US contrary to his previous declarations in 7 February 1970 (Dış Siyaset Belgeleri (1) 1976, 55-57).

<sup>133</sup> Tunçkanat criticized DCA as follows: In his opinion, although the right of jurisdiction seemed to be turned over to the Turkish courts by DCA, two things outlawed this right. Firstly, 23 June 1954 agreement, by which the framework of the privileges were drawn, was not abrogated. The agreement that was altered was the one dated 23 July 1954. Secondly, according to DCA, if an agreement was not reached between the American and Turkish authorities in two months regarding the duty status of the American criminal, the matter was to be solved in accordance with the US laws. This was actually a return to the original privileged situation for the American side. In addition, according to the note given to the American side by the Turkish Ministry after DCA was signed, it was accepted that every American personnel in Turkey would be recognized as “on duty” during their residence in Turkey (Tunçkanat, 1976: 275-77). Although the property rights of the NATO bases belonged to Turkey, the right of utility was in the hands of the US personnel. The right of inspection and the right of appointment of Turkish staff to these instalments and bases was handed over to Turkey by the DCA, yet the Turkish personnel and the Turkish General Staff lacked the necessary technical knowledge and equipments to carry on the activities in these bases. Even if these deficiencies were compensated, the American commander and the American personnel took orders from the US not from the Turkish General Staff. In Tunçkanat’ view; one of the most important articles of the DCA was the one stating that the support the Turkish defence attempts by the US Government was bound with the resolutions

The text of the DCA was not submitted to the Grand National assembly on the grounds that under Paragraph 3 of Article 65 of the Constitution agreements concluded pursuant to an international convention did not require Parliamentary ratification. This silence caused RPP to call for a “full-dress” debate on the agreement in the Parliament. TİP demanded a chance to debate the accord. The Party reiterated its allegation that a treaty not ratified by the Parliament would be “totally null and void” (Harris, 1972:164)<sup>134</sup>. Due to the intense election campaigns for the 1969 elections, the issue of parliamentary approval was largely deferred. The agreement was publicized by Demirel only after the 1969 elections during a press conference as summarized above.

In sum, though nearly all political parties in the Parliament during 1965 to 1969 period participated in the need of the revision of bilateral agreements, none of them asked for total abrogation, except TİP. By a painstaking struggle on the subject, TİP displayed a serious and real opposition for the elimination of the bilateral agreements. Although the DCA was to a great extent a reiteration of the former agreements with some minute revisions, it was an important achievement of the Turkish Left to force the government to negotiate the issue with the US, to carry the subject to the political agenda of the country and of the Parliament. To be sure, the honour of the struggle given in the Parliament belonged to TİP.

In the following sections, it will be observed that TİP maintained its firm stance in relation to issues like the demise of American bases and membership of NATO. Prior to a study of the perspectives on the American bases and NATO membership of Turkey, a historical updating, in other words, a retrospective view may be helpful for a future reader. DCA was abrogated unilaterally by the Turkish government in 25 July 1975 due to the heavy pressure of the public opinion related to

---

of the American Congress. To wait for an unlimited time for its military needs was highly unlikely for the Turkish Army, which was totally dependent on the US for all its requirements (Tunçkanat, 1969: 347-57). Some of Tunçkanat's views in regards to the bilateral agreement dated 23 July 1954 are shared by Gönlübol as well (Gönlübol, 1982, 526).

<sup>134</sup> This approach of TİP was supported by some parties. For instance the spokesperson of the Party of Confidence argued that the article of the DCA- especially the one related to judicial right of Turkish courts- had to be brought to National Assembly and discussed in a secret session if necessary. (NA Minutes, First meeting, 5th session, 10.11.1969: 99) Yet, none of them gave a serious struggle for its ratification.

the American arms embargo<sup>135</sup> resulting from the Turkish invasion in Cyprus in 1974. (Oran, 2001: 699) A new agreement, “Defence and Economic Cooperation Agreement”, known as SEIA, was signed in Washington<sup>136</sup> yet it did not come into force until 1979. The discussions of a new agreement, in other words, the new SEIA started on the winter of 1979 and the agreement was signed in Ankara on 29 March 1980. It was approved by a resolution of the Council of Ministers on 18 November 1980 in the aftermath of the 12<sup>th</sup> September military coup.<sup>137</sup> The arms embargo which was lifted in September 1978 and the issue of opium production<sup>138</sup> once again caused a wave of anti-Americanism. In Oran’s terms, some “relatively autonomous” middle-sized state reflexes similar to those of the Demirel government in the aftermath of the 1965 elections were witnessed during this period as well. For instance, the right to suspend the status of bases in state of emergency was included

---

<sup>135</sup> The US Senate (17 December 1975) and the House of Representatives (18 December 1975) successively decided the execution of an arms embargo on Turkey due to Turkey’s military intervention to Cyprus. An additional measure was the suspension of 200 million dollars of military aid for the Turkish army. The US arms embargo had two motives; to put pressure on Turkey to result in a step back in Cyprus and to punish her for the intrusion. Though the latter aim was fulfilled, the former was a failure which, contrary to US expectations, resulted in the mounting of anti-American feelings in the public opinion similar to the event of Johnson` Letter. In 9 February 1975, the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs made a declaration stating that the American bases in Turkey may be closed in case the arms embargo was put into effect. The bases were closed on 25 July 1975 and the DCA was abrogated unilaterally as stated above (Oran, 2001a: 707).

<sup>136</sup> This agreement, the predecessor of the 1980 SEIA, was signed in Washington by Çağlayangil and Kissinger in 26 March 1976. Yet, it was not put into force (Oran, 2001a, 708).

<sup>137</sup> The basic principles to be applied in the American bases and installations were determined by the Article 5 of the SEIA according to which the technical operation and activities in the bases would be executed in the wake of programs and targets planned by Turkish co-operation. Also, the coverage of the defence cooperation envisaged in SEIA would not go beyond the obligations arising from the NATO Treaty. In Oran’s view, by this article, unilateral out-of-area operations of the US were hindered. According to the complementary agreement number 3, Turkey granted the US the right to collect information by radars, carry out electromagnetic inspection in space and on earth in the bases of Incirlik, Sinop, Kargaburun, Alemdağ, Kürecik, Mahmurdağ, Şahintepe, Elmadağ, Karataş, Yamanlar, Belbaşı. These bases were spread all over Turkey (Oran, 2001a: 713). An important complementary article was related to the use of Incirlik base. To Uğur Mumcu, the US was allowed to make use of Incirlik for the training of two fleets and the support elements based on rotation and in accordance with NATO plans. The European air squadrons of NATO – which were to function for supporting the NATO Defence Plans - were allowed to enter the base solely for training purposes (Mumcu, 1997: 32-33).

<sup>138</sup> The American government put pressure on Turkey for the prohibition of the production of poppies yet Demirel government only limited the area of production. Anyhow, Erim government appointed by the 12th March military coup banned the production of poppies in all areas after 1972. Though the US had promised to make up for the losses of the peasants by an amount of 30 million dollars, it only paid one third of it. Thus, the decision was reversed in 1 July 1974 with the power of the RPP government headed by Ecevit (Oran, 2001a: 703).

into SEIA. U-2 flights from the American bases were forbidden for a short period during the arms embargo. The Turkish government did not participate in the sanctions initiated by the US against Iran in the wake of the refugee crisis. Oran argues that, these were important steps for a “middle size state” like Turkey, directed to decrease the political and economic dependence on the West<sup>139</sup> (Oran, 2001a: 677). Anyhow, one may well argue that, the cardinal objective of the Turkish foreign policy, its Western orientation and dependency on the US, accompanied by serious negative outcomes on the economic, political and social conditions of Turkey, was maintained in this period. When considered in retrospect, the endurance of economic, political and military dependence on the US and the West seems to justify the theoretical perspectives of TİP pertinent to foreign policy issues and their soundness under the present conditions.

### **3.1.2. From Bilateral Agreements to American Bases**

The issue of bilateral agreements was very important since it was closely related to the issue of American bases in Turkey. In the 37<sup>th</sup> issue of the left-wing magazine *Ant* published on 12 September 1967, the number and place of all American bases in Turkey were cited. The source of information was USAF Installation Directory having the number of AFM 87-3 and dated 25 November 1963<sup>140</sup>. All the American bases world-wide were cited in this source based on the information dated 30 July 1963. (Tunçkanat, 1969: 311)

The question of military bases in Turkey was in the political agenda of TİP since its foundation yet the issue was highly voiced by the party during the 1965 election campaign. In the election manifesto, it was stated that, “43 years after winning the war of independence”; Turkey was obliged to regain its independence. USA which entered the country “under the guise of aid”, settled in “our soil step by step since 1947” and that “35 million square meters of our national land” was under

---

<sup>139</sup> Oran further argued that the external conditions such as the political impact of the non-aligned states in the international arena, the economic rapprochement with the USSR, the petroleum crisis, the political balance in the international conditions due to a multi polar world were conditions that facilitated the nourishment of the possibility of the pursuance of a relatively autonomous foreign policy in addition to the domestic developments (Oran, 2001a:677).

<sup>140</sup> This date is cited as 23 November 1963 by Ataöv (1969: 218).

“American occupation”. Turkish police, Turkish judge, Turkish Commander or even the Turkish Minister were not permitted to enter these bases. These bases were “small America’s where the American flag hoisted on Turkish land”. It was further argued that due to the presence of the American agents- called specialists- in every ministry; all the secrets of the Turkish state were revealed. The task to liberate the country “from the domination of the foreigners” was taken over by the “labouring” masses. Turkey could not be “the satellite” of any country and that USA would be thrown out of the country “as it had entered”. (Sosyalizm ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi, 1988: 475, translation mine) Military bases of foreign countries in Turkey would be immediately closed, to put an end to the probability of being dragged into an unintentional war. This was crucial for both, in order to live as an “honourable nation” and for “the development of the nation” because USA was in alliance with the Turkish `snatchers and landlords (YÖN 1965e).<sup>141</sup>

One may well argue that these bases were used in particular for the interests of the US in the Middle East. Yet, these interests were often controversial to those of Turkey as observed in the U-2<sup>142</sup> and the 1958 Lebanese events<sup>143</sup> (Tunçkanat, 1969: 309-310)<sup>144</sup>.

---

<sup>141</sup> Aybar, in his radio speech dated 26 September 1965 stated that, forty years after a successful war of independence, the Turkish nation “as individuals and as working people” was obliged to win its “independence and freedom once again”. Since 1947, USA penetrated Turkey and that “35 million square meters of this soil of our motherland” was under American occupation. This slogan found great echo in the Turkish press even in the moderate left centres and the liberal ones. For instance, Mete Çubukçu’s article published in Milliyet dated 10 November 1965 “Biri yalan söylüyor ama hangisi?” was as follows: “Çetin Altan argues that 35 millions of square meters of Turkish soil is given to Americans, not to NATO and the military bases established on these areas are directly linked to American Ministry of Defence.” Demirel replies: “35 millions of square meters of Turkish land are not donated to Americans. The military bases on these areas are not under the control of American Ministry of Defence but under the control of NATO.” One of them lies, but who?” In Neue Zürcher Zeitung dated 28 November 1965, TİP spokesman’s speech was discussed as well. The article was as follows: “The spokesman of TİP asserted that 35 millions of square meters of land has been put under the hegemony of the US and that the Turkish politicians, generals and judges are forbidden to enter these places” (YÖN, 1965f).

<sup>142</sup> Çağlayangil, in his interview with İsmail Cem, stated that a great disagreement had emerged between their government and the US on the U-2 flights. He was told that according to a bilateral agreement called “scientific flights agreement” the US planes were granted the right to make flights for scientific and meteorological research on condition that the programs of these flights were to be given to the Turkish side beforehand. Yet, an inquiry revealed that there was no scientific or meteorological research done by these planes; instead, they had very high speeds and flew from very high to record “even a person walking in a Russian forest” and collect intelligence. To Çağlayangil, this was an abuse of the NATO Treaty and “a camouflage” of “a duty surpassing” it, giving birth to a dangerous situation (Cem, 1980: 302-4).

During his reply to critics on the government program, Demirel actually replied to claims of TİP on bilateral agreements and American bases. He stated that “protecting the sovereignty of a country and sustaining the mutual equality and balance in rights and responsibilities between countries” had to be taken as the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy “and that” 35 millions of square meters of military bases belonged to NATO” sharing the same status of the other NATO countries. Arguing that, no country no matter how strong and mighty it were, was able to live on its own in the world conditions of the 1960s, he stressed the need for a “collective security system”. Yet, to be a part of such a system, meant in no way the existence of “a shadow on the independence of the country” or being a “satellite or domino of another country” (quoted in Milliyet, 10 November 1965: 3). It was not only Aybar who put emphasis on the problematic situation created by the presence of American bases. Boran, while arguing on the interpellation given by Sarıyüce and his friends, claimed that, according to the practice of the agreement related to the status of NATO personnel, it was observed that the principle of equivalence did not work. For instance, though there were American bases in Turkey and in some European countries, no bases of these countries existed in the US (NA Minutes, 5.1.1967, 29<sup>th</sup> meeting, Second Session: 83-4).

In the same session of the National Assembly, Çağlayangil - greatly annoyed by the pressure put on the government by the public opinion and by the socialist party - argued that despite the allegations on the status and operation of the American bases “In the press and in the Turkish Parliament”, they gladly observed that the bases “were established by Turkish authorized personnel according to the framework of the NATO agreements” and contrary to the allegations, “the rights and responsibilities” of Turkey corresponded to the “practical situation” (NA Minutes,

---

<sup>143</sup> Kamil Shamoun, the President of Lebanon, was the only pro-American President of the Arab States during 1960s. He had received American aid in 1957 and accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. When Iraq revolution took place and King of Iraq was replaced by progressive and independent forces, Kamil Shamoun demanded help from the US. The US saved the Shamoun government by sending its parachute units from İncirlik airbase in 14 July 1958 and repressed the revolution that had started against the pro-American Shamoun government in Lebanon (Cem, 1980: 272-3).

<sup>144</sup> Tunçkanat refers to an official visit of the Turkish General Staff to İncirlik in 1957. The American Commander of the base had stated that İncirlik was “an air base used by the American air force for the strategic bombardment planes to fly and to land” (Tunçkanat, 1969: 320) In the event of the aircraft dropped by the USSR on the Black Sea in 27 April 1960, a list of such flights were demanded from the US.

5.1.1967, 29<sup>th</sup> meeting, Second Session: 84). TİP protested the visit of a Turkish prime minister to an American base for investigation. In Boran's view, such an attempt was "humiliating" in itself for a sovereign government and moreover it was a justification of the allegations of TİP on the issue (NA Minutes, 5.1.1967, 29<sup>th</sup> meeting, Second Session: 84). Secondly, as long as those bases were under the American command, as long as they were directly connected to Pentagon, as long as the American commanders carried on military operations by themselves, as long as the decisions were taken unilaterally and as long as the trigger of the nuclear arms were held by the American commanders and not by the Turkish authorities, it was impossible to speak of a joint support instalment. Thus, in her opinion, the American bases were in no way could be accepted as joint support bases because a "joint base" meant to be the one that was connected to a joint force Command and administered jointly by both sides on equal terms. Moreover, no warplanes should be allowed to leave these bases without the consent and knowledge of Turkey and an operation against the Middle East countries should be strictly prohibited. If these conditions were not fulfilled, it was impossible "to consider these bases as joint support instalments" they deserved the title of "American bases". She further argued that the information collected by the Americans by means of radar networks in those bases were directly transferred to Pentagon, that is, to the American General Staff in Pentagon and the information found appropriate following filtrations by Pentagon was sent to NATO Headquarters and finally to NATO countries including Turkey. There was "no clue of the foundation of a joint command" in the NATO Treaty which was actually "implemented" by the "Americans". All of the armed forces of Turkey were put under NATO command against the 110<sup>th</sup> article of the Constitution, a situation resulting in the impairing the sovereign rights of Turkey during the 1964 Cyprus crisis (NA Minutes, 5.1.1967, 29<sup>th</sup> meeting, Second Session: 87).

It is for sure that the problem of American bases, the threat they posed for Turkey, and their illegal foundation and operation by the US authorities were carried to the agenda of the Parliament by TİP as the issue of bilateral agreements. The other political parties were forced to discuss the issue and to support the need of the revision of bilateral agreements according to which the American bases were established. Another important aspect of this question was the problematic situation

of the Turkish army in its relations with the American authorities. In spite of its full support of Turkey's NATO membership and obligations, a discontent was especially felt due to issues such as the heavy dependence on American military aid technologically and economically accompanied by the discomfort of the Turkish officers and commanders resting on their relations in the administration and control of the military bases. This discontent might have been a facilitating element in the struggle of TİP on bilateral agreements and American bases and it might be one of the reasons of TİP's heavy emphasis on military issues as observed in the content of Boran's oral question.

### **3.1.3. NATO and TİP**

The fundamental distinction between the foreign policy strands of TİP and other political parties of the political arena representing the official approach revealed itself in regards to NATO, the main stronghold of the West against the socialist system. Thus TİP's approach will be presented together with the official approach in the succeeding section.

#### **3.1.3.1. Right and Left Wing Parties on NATO**

As indicated in the preceding sections of this chapter, the official approach in foreign policy, in other words, foreign policy of the Turkish Republic favoured Western alliances and close relations with the West after the death of Mustafa Kemal in particular. This attitude was endorsed by all civilian and military governments without criticism. Hence, it may be helpful to begin this section with considering the ideas of one of the NUC members on NATO alliance. In a speech in the Senate, Ahmet Yıldız argued that Turkey's NATO membership was the outcome of the political and social exigencies and despite the need for "some reforms" in this organization, abandonment of NATO membership was "out of question". Though it was "mistake" to give all the units of the Turkish army under NATO command, it could be restored by the establishment of a "special force not connected to NATO" (Yıldız, 1965: 4).<sup>145</sup> On April 1968, a retired admiral Sezai Orkunt discussed the

---

<sup>145</sup> In the same vein, Mustafa Ok, an ex-NUC member and the Manisa deputy of the RPP, sent a letter to Prime Minister Demirel referring to the establishment of "a unit which has no connection to

advantages and disadvantages of preservation NATO membership in a series of articles in Cumhuriyet. In his opinion, if Turkey left NATO, the leftist anti-Americanism would weaken, foreign dependence would be eliminated, Turkey would not be involved in any local conflict and finally the dismantling of the American and NATO bases would reduce Turkey's exposure to a nuclear attack. Nonetheless, in Orkunt's view, the disadvantages of abandoning NATO membership were greater than retaining the membership. The country would lose the chance of getting military aid, the absence of which could paralyse the armed forces; moreover it would lose the chance of getting any information from NATO sources in case of a regional war. In his opinion, Turkey should remain in NATO and take measures "to rectify her situation" It is interesting to observe identical results in a report that was prepared by a committee founded by the RPP (Vali, 1976: 159-161).<sup>146</sup> It will not be wrong to argue that the desire for the achievement of a relatively autonomous military reflex beyond NATO obligations while retaining NATO membership reflected the approach of the Turkish army towards this alliance.

Aydın Yalçın's speech in the meeting of the Parliament dated 6 January 1967 demonstrated the views of the JP on the issue. To Yalçın, NATO meant USA and Turkey was the ally of the United States- the only country that could stop "communist imperialism" in the world. After the Second World War, Turkey owed its economic development solely to NATO and the pursuit of<sup>147</sup> a neutral Kemalist position by abandonment of NATO membership in the 1960s would mean the preclusion of the Turkish army from the reach of "F-105 planes or M-45 tanks". It would be doomed to make use of "the Kırıkkale rifles and guns in case of war" (NA

---

NATO". In his opinion, the First army of the Turkish armed forces should be withdrawn from NATO and be used for this purpose. He further argued that Turkey was the poorest of all NATO countries and its budget was ten times smaller than the standard budget of a NATO country. Despite this fact, it was obliged to spend twenty percent of the budget for its defence expenses. He asserted that in the light of some bitter experiences such as the Cyprus event and the Johnson's letter, the NUC group would give full support to the government if it decided "to pull back one of our armies from NATO" and let it "be equipped without utilizing American sources or aid" (OK,1966: 16).

<sup>146</sup> Not all members of the NUC shared these views. For instance, Numan Esin - another member of the NUC and the vice- president of RPNP, stated that Turkey had to abandon NATO in 1969 (Esin, 1966: 11).

<sup>147</sup> He further argued that the national defence expenditures were 7-8% of the budget before entering NATO yet they fell to %4.5-5 after NATO membership (NA Minutes, 6.1.1967, first meeting, 30th session: 98).

Minutes, 6.1.1967, first meeting, 30<sup>th</sup> session: 98). Foreign Minister Çağlayangil reiterated the same themes arguing that the majority of the Parliament was loyal to NATO and the other Western alliances and all the parties favoured the subsistence of military bases in Turkey on the basis of loyalty to NATO and to the West. (NA Minutes, second meeting, 30<sup>th</sup> session, 6.1.1967: 126 and 29.12.1965, second meeting, 30<sup>th</sup> session: 186) The incapability of Turkey to defend itself against a possible military threat and the need of participating in a collective security system was comprehended by all political parties but one (he meant the Turkish Labour Party). Furthermore, the neutral countries were obliged to spend enormous sums for their military expenditures exceeding their gross national product, a reality which was another reason for the NATO membership of Turkey. In the opinion of the minister, NATO was not a “tool of the hegemony of a great state”, on the contrary it was “a tool of security and peace”. Moreover, the preservation of NATO membership did not prevent Turkey from pursuing friendly relations with neighbouring countries. NATO's function of defence was still valid in conditions of détente and it could service effectively (NA Minutes, 20.2.1968, Third meeting, 46<sup>th</sup> session: 481).

RPP's ideas on Western alliances such as NATO and CENTO were not basically very divergent from the theses of Justice Party. Moreover, it is a well known fact that the architect of the NATO membership of Turkey was the RPP power during 1940s. A quick synopsis to the speech of İnönü given in 1962, the election manifesto of the party and some speeches of its prominent members in the Parliament may be sufficient to comprehend the position of this political party regarding the foreign policy discussions of the 1960s. İnönü stated that Turkey was committed to a system therefore “it is impossible for her to become an ally of the USSR or even neutral” (Ahmad, 1977: 401). In the election manifesto of the RPP (1961), while the commitment to the principle of “peace in the world, peace in the motherland” was reiterated, it was argued that the foreign policy views of the party was “a natural outcome of this choice of a Western type of democratic regime” and that this was the principle of alliance with the Western democracies. Due to its geopolitical situation and historical development, Turkey would never be able “to pursue a neutral foreign policy”. Consequently, the membership of NATO was

considered as “an indispensable element” of the foreign policy of Turkey. It was further argued that RPP would develop “its relations with NATO, CENTO and SEATO” (Gönlübol, 1982: 337). In Nihat Erim's<sup>148</sup> opinion, “the advantages of NATO were greater than its disadvantages” (Erim, 1966: 16). and “national policy of Turkey” meant “the defence of NATO membership and approving Common Market” since two parties, JP and RPP who shared these views were supported by nearly 80% of the Turkish population (NA Minutes, 20.2.1968, second meeting, 46<sup>th</sup> session: 494). The Party of Confidence (CP) (NA Minutes, 20.2.1968, second meeting, 46<sup>th</sup> session: 449-451) and Nation Party supported NATO and Turkey's ties to the Western bloc as well stating that despite the serious problems brought in by the bilateral agreements and American bases, NATO membership of Turkey had to be maintained by the provision of equal rights (YÖN, 1966a).

### **3.1.3.2. TİP and YÖN Against NATO**

It is for sure that the foundation of TİP and the presence of YÖN circle were two important subjective reasons for the spread of socialist ideas all over Turkey. As a result of their efforts, NATO membership of the country came to the fore as an issue of criticism of the Turkish foreign policy. According to these two sources, the national liberation struggle in Turkey had to be waged against western capitalism, especially against the US, and its comprador allies and their supporters. Thus the first step was to break up relations with NATO, an organization representing the interests of the US and the West. The fight against capitalism could take place in the wake of the abandonment of NATO membership. Ahmad argued that radicals and socialists tried to draw parallels between the situation during which Mustafa Kemal and his friends fought against western imperialism and the conditions of today (Ahmad, 1977: 501).

In YÖN, it was argued that the peaceful co-existence policy of the Soviet Union and her view that capitalism was doomed to collapse due to its inner contradictions were important developments of the last decade outdating the

---

<sup>148</sup> Professor Nihat Erim, the spokesperson and a prominent member of the RPP, became the prime minister of the government founded by the military regime of the 12th of March and was murdered by a leftist guerrilla group in the following years.

existence of NATO. YÖN rejected the integration of the Turkish army - an army of half a million soldiers- by the NATO command since this organization was established “to fulfil the security needs of the New York industrialist, London trader, Parisian banker”. Turkey should leave NATO – “an outdated institution - that would in no way provide security of the country” (Soysal, 1965: 3). In the same vein, İlhan Selçuk argued that “NATO legend” had collapsed during the Cyprus experience of Turkey and moreover, CENTO and CIA were organizations that continuously attempted “to overthrow the independent government of many states” (Selçuk, 1965: 3). In Mehmet Kemal’s opinion, Turkey still had the chance to say “damn to NATO, damn to CENTO” (Kemal, 1965: 5).

The thesis of TİP on NATO and CENTO focused on the following arguments:

To begin with, the official argument that Turkey was obliged to enter NATO due to Soviet threats in the wake of the Second World War was unacceptable. The first two bilateral agreements that put the country under the yoke of American imperialism – 1947 and 1948 agreements<sup>149</sup> - were signed before Turkey’s NATO membership in 1952 and Turkey was able to resist to the threats of its northern neighbour for four years before joining NATO. Moreover, the Soviet Union – that lost almost twenty millions of its population during the Second World War - was far too weak to start a new war. The party leadership also asserted that independence of a country ought to be supported against all foreign countries including the US. Anyhow, by the NATO Treaty and by the bilateral agreements succeeding it, Turkey had completely felt under “the tutelage of the US” (Boran, 1992: 334-35).

Secondly, the official argument that Turkey would be more secure by the maintenance of NATO membership was also erroneous since NATO alliance was “a tool of America to fulfil its policy to rule the world”. It was a dream to expect to stay in NATO on equal terms with the US because the latter was the only country authorized to use the nuclear weapons of NATO. This was an intolerable situation for a country like Turkey that waged a war of independence. In addition, the NATO

---

<sup>149</sup> 1947 agreement was actually a military aid agreement signed within the framework of the Truman Doctrine; 1948 Agreement, signed under the name of “Economic Cooperation Agreement” fell within the framework of Marshall Doctrine.

Treaty, as an official document, did not provide an automatic and obligatory support or help for Turkey in case of a foreign attack. Besides, no definition of the term “attack” existed in the related article the NATO Treaty. Instead, a concept of “hostile local activity” existent in the military literature of the NATO documents was an ambiguous one since the decision of whether an attack was a “hostile local activity or not was to be decided by the US unilaterally. In sum, NATO as an “official document” and the organization of “NATO in practice” existed as two different things (Boran quoted in Aybar, 1988c: 183 and 1988b: 275)<sup>150</sup>.

Thirdly, Turkey was the first target of a future world war due to the presence of the NATO bases – which were actually controlled by the Americans – since the USA was able to start a war against the USSR beyond the knowledge and will of Turkey due to the existence of these bases. (Aybar, 1988c:184)

Fourthly, the capacity of defence of Turkey had not been strengthened but weakened in the aftermath of NATO membership. Turkish armed forces were made fully dependent on America, and the initiative of these forces has been weakened in relation to national interests. The adjustment of the Turkish army in full accordance with the American army’s logistical design and organization principles was against national interests and national strategies, a situation which fostered an urgent need for the establishment of a national war industry as a branch of the Turkish heavy industry. (Boran quoted in Aybar, 1988b: 270-272) The integrated command of NATO avoided Turkey from using its right to decide war or peace because NATO command actually meant the control of the US. According to TİP, this situation contrasted with national interests as well. (NA Minutes, 7.1.1966, first meeting, 110th session: 707-8)

Fifthly, there was a general contradiction between the strategy of NATO and that of Turkey. NATO` s strategy and its armed forces were directed to overseas targets because USA was an imperialist country having interests beyond its borders, in all parts of the world. Turkey, on the contrary, was a country that needed an army

---

<sup>150</sup> Boran refers to Johnson’s letter as an example of such a situation in the same speech.

“equipped and trained to protect its own territory” (Boran quoted in Aybar, 1988b: 273).

Sixthly, NATO was not a collective security system as asserted by its supporters. On the contrary, its aim was the protection and maintenance of the capitalist system. The decision of the Turkish ruling classes to enter NATO was not due to Soviet threats but to the maintenance of their hegemonic and privileged positions. They paved the way for petroleum companies, foreign capital and foreign credits due to the absence of national or industrial bourgeoisie. In short, the problem was not to pre-empt the future attack of the Soviets or China or international communism but to prevent the spreading of the socialist world order to other parts of the world (Boran, 1992:340-41). The decision of NATO membership and its maintenance was basically a “political and class-based” choice, far from a military or economic one. NATO was the “military facet for the economic and financial dependence of Turkey on imperialist powers” (NA Minutes, 20.2.1968, second meeting, 46<sup>th</sup> session: 472-3).

It is for sure that TİP was the only party in and out of Parliament which supported the view of the abandonment of Western alliances, a stance which was in accordance with its views on domestic issues. Another important feature of its policy was the evaluation of the problem in terms of class politics. It was not a tactical choice but a political one. In effect, the proposal of abandonment of NATO and CENTO membership overlapped with the demand of abrogation of the bilateral agreements and the dismantlement of American bases and with the defence of a non-aligned, neutral position for Turkey. It may well be argued that the distinctive feature of the foreign policy stance of TİP rested on this point which was in accordance with its socialist and third worldist views. In other words, the foreign policy approach of the party overlapped with its desire to end the domestic exploitation. TİP demanded a radical transformation that strove to bring radical solutions beyond the boundaries of the system whereas the other political parties were in search for modifications of the prevailing structure.

TİP, theoretically well- prepared on the issue, had a short- term program for NATO membership of Turkey in addition to its long-term target, that is, the ousting

of all connections of the country with the organization. It submitted this short-term proposal prior to 1969, the date at which Turkey had the right to end its NATO membership according to the Thirteenth article of the NATO Treaty.<sup>151</sup>

Firstly, Turkey would decrease the amount of Turkish armed forces that were put under NATO Integrated Command and establish an independent and national defence force by the help of these units. This new force would specifically be trained in accordance with the requirements of a future national war of independence. Meanwhile, the Turkish Armed forces remaining in NATO ought to be put under the command of the Turkish General Staff and NATO bases must be directly linked to and commanded by The Turkish General Staff according to the 110<sup>th</sup> article of the Turkish Constitution. Secondly, a national defence industry had to be developed to put an end to the military dependence on one country. Thirdly, the American bases – apart from the ones that were directly connected to NATO- should be ousted and no new base should be given to any foreign country. Fourthly, the radar network of Americans ought to be handed over to Turkey or else its existence should immediately be halted. Fifthly, NATO East Mediterranean Command should be dislocated. (Aybar, 1968: 376-380)

In my opinion, despite the enormous differences in international conditions of the world, the views of TİP on NATO and CENTO constitute remarkable guidelines and a correct alternative for the Turkish foreign policy of today.

### **3.1.3.3. Method of the Struggle – Passive Resistance**

A question may be addressed at this point. What was the practical solution envisaged by TİP for the achievement of the goal of independence?

On July 1966, Aybar started a passive resistance campaign in Mersin at a meeting of the party organization. Reiterating the need for a second war of independence against the American presence in the country, he asserted that Turkey should be transformed into a country where the Americans would feel themselves enclosed “in a circle of loneliness”. All relations with the Americans -except the

---

<sup>151</sup> According to this Article, every NATO member had the right to terminate the membership in the aftermath of twenty years (Ataöv, 1969: 278).

official duties- would be halted. Turkish people would “show their hatred for the Americans by looking deep into their eyes” everywhere. For instance the Turkish driver would not carry an American, a coiffeur would not give service to the wife of an American officer, and the Turkish markets or butchers would not sell any commodity to the Americans. Turkish people would not rent their houses to Americans and no vacant jobs in American instalments or bases would be accepted by the Turkish employees. Thus, the Americans would realize that they were not welcomed in Turkey and thus be urged to leave the country. Aybar gave the same message during the Beyoğlu and Gazi Osman Paşa congresses of the party, arguing that the struggle would be continued “until the last American was expelled from Turkey”. Aybar then specified the tactics of the passive resistance struggle - approved during the second national convention of TİP- stating that as a result of these efforts America would “resort to force to remain in Turkey”. In this case, the “*passive*” form of national-liberation struggle” would take the form of an “*active*” resistance and would be turned into a struggle “not only against America but also against the trio (landowners, compradors and pro-American bureaucrats) that sided with her”. In sum, Aybar envisaged two stages in the imminent “second war of liberation”, that is, a struggle in passive form against the American presence in Turkey and an active struggle against the USA and its local allies. (YÖN 1966b, italics mine) TİP invited all the labouring people together with all progressive, nationalist, honourable citizens, and youth and intellectuals of the country to join the campaign. Towards the end of 1967, Aybar made another speech arguing that as members of TİP, they will “contain every American on duty in Turkey with a circle of hatred and abhorrence” and that every means would be implemented to enable Turkey to abandon the membership of NATO within the boundaries of 1960 Constitution and for the abrogation of the bilateral agreements (Doğan, 2000: 78-79). Nonetheless, demands of some of the congress delegates for supporting the campaign through meetings and quiet marches in order to supplement it with a more serious framework, was rejected (Avcıoğlu, 1966c).

The “passive” resistance tactic was widely criticized by the left-wing circles in many aspects. Firstly, it was argued that the campaign was doomed to failure since it was “unrealistic, fantastic and inapplicable”. In Avcıoğlu's opinion, due to the high

rate of unemployment and the economic crisis, Turkish workers longed to work in American enterprises and instalments instead of boycotting them. Strikes were carried on in American enterprises for wage increases. Thus, it was illogical to make such a call when TİP leaders themselves had not succeeded “in boycotting the US in their own lives”<sup>152</sup>. The formation of a united front would result in a more effective and genuine resistance against American occupation. It was argued that, the Turkish people were far more ahead of the Party in relation to anti-imperialist struggle (YÖN, 1966e and Selçuk, 1966). Another criticism was posed by Lipovsky, asserting that Aybar’s active struggle proposal did not *involve the use of force or arms*. The first and second stages of the second war of liberation were to be carried on by peaceful means within the boundaries of 1960 Constitution, that is, through elections and in the Parliament. Actually, the difference between these stages was simply their limits. In the first one, the struggle was restricted to American presence in the country, whereas in the second, America and its associates were targeted. In effect, passive resistance was the method of both stages (Lipovsky, 1992: 46-7, emphasis added). TİP launched a second anti-NATO campaign on 24 August 1969. It was considered timely since according to NATO Treaty, the member states of NATO were entitled to withdraw from the alliance after giving one year’s notice (Doğan, 2000: 79). Anyhow, in my opinion both campaigns lacked the necessary support for a number of reasons. Firstly, TİP had isolated itself from the youth - consisting of the most energetic sections of the anti-imperialist front - and the other sections of the left which basically shared the same political views in relation to anti-imperialist struggle. Secondly, primacy was given to the Parliamentary struggle and thus, the other methods of struggle were considered as secondary. Moreover, the unconditioned devotion to parliamentary means prevented the Party from putting forth more active, influential and realistic demands and methods.<sup>153</sup> Finally, the

---

<sup>152</sup> This campaign was discussed in New York Times. The newspaper cited that Sadun Aren’s house was rented to an American family and that there was a contradiction between the political stance of the party in foreign affairs and the behaviour of its members regarding this issue (YÖN, 1967a). Le Monde also found the proposal of passive resistance inapplicable since the American personnel and their families lived “intimately” in bases. (YÖN, 1967c)

<sup>153</sup> Aren’s criticism, as a prominent figure in the leading cadre of TİP, on the campaign for passive resistance is worth mentioning. In his view, TİP envisaged imperialism mainly as an internal fact,

incapability of TİP to renew its leading cadres in all parts of the country and train them theoretically for practical activities was of utmost importance for the failure of the proposed struggle as well. Refraining to initiate a more active anti-imperialist struggle resulted in the refusal and obstruction of the other anti-imperialistic activities in many parts of Turkey prompted by the youth organizations. Among these were the anti-imperialist meeting held in Ankara on 12 November 1966, the “anti-NATO demonstration” in the aftermath of 1967, the “anti-imperialist and anti-feudal” meeting held in April 1968 and finally the anti-imperialist student demonstrations against the visits of the American 6<sup>th</sup> Fleet to İstanbul and Izmir.<sup>154</sup> In TİP’s youth magazine, *Dönüşüm*, it was argued that “the socialist youth who believed in the future of the labouring people” had to be careful in order “not to be in line with the youth groups who attempted to shape the faith of Turkey in Beyazıt and Kızılay”. In Rasih Nuri İleri's opinion, the youth of TİP and the Party as an organization were isolated from the anti-imperialist youth activities (İleri, 1987:396). Sharing Ünsal’s argument, we may assert that this “shyness” and fear of “losing control” weakened TİP's influence on university youth to a great extent. The loss of this “dynamic militant group” resulted in a lack of “power of action and desire” and an isolation from the daily problems of the labouring classes. In short, TİP was effective in the Parliament but almost completely non-influential outside it (Ünsal, 2002: 191-200).

#### **3.1.3.4. Socialist and Independence Struggles – “Two Faces of the Same Coin”**

Passive resistance was not the only issue on which TİP and other factions of the left had divergent perspectives. TİP had a quite distinct vision on the style and timing of independence and socialist struggles. In TİP's opinion, the Second War of independence which Turkey had to wage against American imperialism ought to be carried out together with the socialist struggle. This was a crucial condition for its

---

which is represented by the domestic ruling classes of the country. Thus, the passive resistance campaign aiming the expulsion of Americans, contradicted with this understanding (Aren, 1993: 117).

<sup>154</sup> TİP tried to avoid the student-peasant resistances in villages- such as the one in Elmalı village- announcing that these would result in the establishment of a fascist regime in Turkey. The students participating in the boycott movements in universities, the distribution of pamphlets to workers and peasants during the mass movements were obstructed by the Party (Ünsal, 2002: 276).

success since the loss of the first national liberation struggle was due to the negligence of the fight against the feudal remnants and against capitalism. The labouring masses waging the second war of independence ought to be aware that, they strove for a radical transformation, for socialism, while they waged the war against the imperialist hegemony. To struggle only against imperialism was the same as “throwing an intruder out of the house and then abandoning the house” so internal and external exploitation should simultaneously be put to an end “at once” (Lipovsky, 1992: 33). Boran and other leaders of TİP were in full agreement with Aybar on this point. For instance, Boran believed that Turkey had lost “certain gains made in the first national liberation struggle” because the bourgeoisie had increased its strength through being in power. In Çetin Altan's words, exploitation formed “a single whole” (Lipovsky, 1992: 36).

TKP, MDD and YÖN circles strongly opposed to this view of TİP. In TKP's opinion, the level of political consciousness of the masses was weak, the country was ruled by “the most reactionary section of the landowners and the bourgeoisie” and moreover, it was subjected to the economic, political and military domination of imperialism. Under those conditions, the slogan of “socialism, now, today” reduced the alternative of the creation of “a single national-democratic anti-imperialist front” and antagonized the forces that were concerned for the struggle against imperialism and “its henchmen inside the country” (Lipovsky, 1992: 37). Actually, these allegations echoed those of Belli and Avcıoğlu.

Sertel joined in the argument asserting that TİP leaders never realized that the democratic freedoms and rights preceded the establishment of socialism. To her, despite the difficulties that TİP and the working class faced during those days, they did not have a determinate perspective on long or short- term problems of Turkey. Though various stages of development ought to be accomplished prior to socialist struggle, TİP leadership took for granted that it was possible to leap to the socialist stage over the prevailing conditions. Since the organizational level and the consciousness of the working class would not permit the fulfilment of building socialism under the prevailing conditions, the responsibility of “preparing the proletariat to play its historical role was to be “undertaken by the party”. To Sertel, questions such as the following were left unanswered in TİP's proposal: What are the

means of hampering the danger of an open fascist dictatorship in the near future? How would TİP continue to awaken and organize the proletariat under those conditions? In her opinion, the concrete conditions of Turkey revealed the unrealistic approach of TİP pertinent to those problems. Although TİP was correct in accepting that national independence was necessary for the achievement of socialism and democracy, the implementation of this project under the leadership of the proletariat was to be considered as a long-term task. This attitude of the party meant delaying the solution of the most important problems of the country to a far future. Sertel believed that this was a great drawback which resulted in “the loss of many young people from the ranks of the party” and in their shifting in other groups. Another consequence was the obstruction of the development of TİP (Sertel, 1978: 184, translation mine).

The indivisibility of both struggles – the socialist struggle and the national liberation struggle – ensued the question of “united front” and the classes and groups participating in it and the question of leadership.<sup>155</sup>

TİP leaders argued that the indivisibility of the struggle for socialism and for national liberation did not mean that the struggle had to be performed solely by socialists, yet the leadership ought to be “in the hands of the socialist party” (Aybar, 1968: 505-506). In defining the main forces of this struggle, Aybar asserted that it would involve only “workers, peasants, craftsmen, ordinary wage-earners, bold youth, the honest intelligentsia and the other labouring strata of the population”. In this classification, *national bourgeoisie*<sup>156</sup> was ignored because in TİP's opinion it was *non existent*. - Aybar asserted that those proposing an alliance with this class were unaware that of this truth. It may well be argued that TİP's insistence on the

---

<sup>155</sup> Yıldız Sertel's evaluated the distinction between MDD, YÖN and TİP as follows; in her opinion, MDD group handled the question of the methodology of development for Turkey from a quite different perspective. Although they accepted the necessity of the establishment of a democratic anti-imperialist national front, they tried to introduce a “Marxian essence” to this approach. Their defence of a revolution with two stages was correct since it was well known that Kemalist revolution had not been carried to its ultimate target. In Sertel's opinion although TİP insisted that the bourgeois revolution stage had been completed, her adoption of non- capitalist path to development was a proof of her acknowledgment of the undeveloped capitalism in the country and of the lack of capacity of the working class to lead the struggle (Sertel, 1978: 103).

<sup>156</sup> See Appendix C for the details of the arguments on national bourgeoisie in Comintern and CPSU Congresses.

indivisibility of the two struggles depended to a great extent on its views related to the Turkish “national” bourgeoisie. The absence of a class of industrialists “who resist American imperialism” and who do not constitute “a comprador bourgeoisie” meant the lack of national bourgeoisie. Turkish industrialists completely involved in foreign trade, and the credits, licences were “in the hands of the pro-American trio—the landowners, the compradors, and the bureaucrats”. Thus, it was pure fantasy to expect this faction of the ruling class to join in the war of national independence. In TİP’s opinion, to advise a co-operation with “national” bourgeoisie was “like drawing water in a sieve” (Lipovsky, 1992: 30-31). Boran, dealing with another aspect of the question, stated that, even if there existed a “national bourgeoisie”, it had lost its “progressive” nature and to struggle against the growing labour movement was more important to it than to struggle with foreign capital. To her, the “leading elements of the Turkish national bourgeoisie and the middle strata” that share the ideological views of the bourgeois were afraid of the awakening of the labouring classes and were deeply alarmed by “the possibility of their becoming a substantial political force”. In addition to this fact, they would never carry on a “consistent and decisive struggle for independence and for the Constitution”. Their “contradictory position” would avoid them to co-operate with the socialists (Lipovsky, 1992: 30-31)<sup>157</sup>.

TKP’s views contradicted with those of TİP pertinent to the existence of national bourgeoisie and its role in the second war of independence.. To TKP, Turkish national bourgeoisie constituted a great majority of the local bourgeoisie and was a potential force of the democratic revolution directed against imperialism and the feudal remnants. To disregard it, would mean “to serve the interests of imperialism during the national-liberation movement” and that in the conditions of 1960s, “a section of the national bourgeoisie”, which were representatives of the means of production, might “cross over to a position negating the capitalist path of

---

<sup>157</sup> Not all TİP members had similar views in relation to the existence of the national bourgeoisie. For instance, Fethi Naci held that there was a national bourgeoisie among the industrialists, which was under the influence of the compradors (Lipovsky, 1992: 31).

development” (Lipovsky, 1992: 32)<sup>158</sup>. TİP’s approach was controversial to the views of the YÖN circle as well. YÖN assumed that the two struggles were completely different in nature in view of class relations. National liberation struggle was to be performed with all “national” classes and groups including the national bourgeoisie, soldier/civilian/intellectual stratum, and the labouring classes – working class and peasants. The question of leadership was considered as secondary since it was not a question of bargaining. “National bourgeoisie” to YÖN, was considered as an alliance of labouring classes during the elimination of the comprador classes. According to Avcioğlu, it was considered as an ally as long as it contributed in development and industrialisation of the country within the boundaries of the statist planning that would be implemented during the transition period to socialism.<sup>159</sup> As to the indivisibility of the two struggles, YÖN’s views were crucially divergent too. Avcioğlu argued that the road to socialism succeeded the struggle for national liberation and therefore the chief task on “the road to socialist reconstruction” was the “anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle” which was the concern of all “democratic and patriotic” forces. So, the immediate task was not the socialist but the national democratic revolution. (Quoted in Atılgan, 2002: 120) TİP’s demand of hegemony of the struggle of national-liberation was unacceptable to most leftists and patriotic forces including the YÖN circle as well. To them, the socialist slogans of TİP could frighten the progressive section of the Turkish bourgeoisie and weaken the second national-liberation movement by depriving it of its potential allies. Though TİP totally rejected the presence of a progressive potential in RPP even after the adoption of the left of centre policy, YÖN leaders pointed out that the real division was not between the supporters and opponents of the RPP but between reactionaries

---

<sup>158</sup> The issue of “big” bourgeoisie and “national” bourgeoisie was dealt in detail by TKP. Koç, Taşkent, Bayer, Avunduk, Burla groups and Demirel family were defined as the big bourgeoisie which collaborated with foreign capital. Yet, it was argued that the lower and middle groups of the national bourgeoisie were largely damaged by imperialism and by the monopoly capital. Stressing on the unreliability and dual character of this class, TKP argued that, in spite of these features, it could play an active role in the national democratic front against imperialism and reactionary currents. It was further argued that the contradiction between the labouring classes and the national bourgeoisie might well be an antagonistic one (İşçi – Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP, 2003 : 255-257).

<sup>159</sup> Anyhow, Yetkin argued that, Avcioğlu lost all his hopes on the existence of a national bourgeoisie or a national industrialist during the 1970s (quoted in Atılgan, 2002: 119).

and progressive forces. “RPP, at least a section of it”, was to be included in the progressive forces (Lipovsky, 1992: 97).

It may be asserted that, the leading figure of the MDD group, Belli’s ideas formed a intermediary line between YÖN and TİP. To him, national-democratic transformations which were actually the basis of TİP program, were merely a historical stage on the way to socialist revolution that ought to follow the national-democratic one, if Turkey would not “swing back and counter-revolution triumphed”. He was in full accord with Aybar who asserted that all national-democratic transformations, not fortified by the struggle for socialism, would inevitably be under the threat of retreat. As to the indivisibility of the two struggles, Belli had disparate views. He favoured the necessity of the two-phase revolution by virtue of the existence of the vestiges of feudalism and the dependence of the country on the West. In his opinion, the subjection of national-democratic aims to socialist goals might cause a distancing of the “forces capable of supporting the national-democratic revolution but distant from socialist aims”, with the socialists. Erdost, another important figure of the MDD movement, also objected to the presentation of anti-capitalist slogans, arguing that, “national-democratic revolution” was the only slogan to be used in order to break the bonds between the rural and urban bourgeoisie and that of imperialism and feudalism. In this context, Belli evaluated TİP’s program and pointed out to the common points between their views and that of TİP. To him, the program was a national-democratic one and in case of its implementation, Turkey would “not be a socialist but an independent, democratic state”. The agrarian reform and nationalization of various branches of the Turkish economy were not amongst the tasks of a socialist revolution. For instance, agrarian reform did not aim collectivization of land but on the contrary, of the creation of an army of small producers. He asserted that to defend socialist revolution necessitated a call for collectivization instead of distribution of land. As to the national bourgeoisie issue, Belli asserted that it existed but occupied a secondary position compared to that of compradors. Yet, like TKP, he stressed on the dual character of this class and asserted that by the application of correct policies, the socialists might at least succeed in neutralizing it. This position also effected the evaluation of the RPP. Unlike TİP, they did not reject the participation of this party in the united front

especially after the adoption of left of centre policy. In this approach, they were closer to YÖN movement rather than that of TİP (Lipovsky, 1992: 112-113).

Unlike TİP, both TKP and MDD did not put the leadership of the working class, or its party as a condition of the united front. TKP argued that “democratic front could not be, must not be and should not be based on the principles of the dictatorship of this or that class”. Nonetheless, as soon as the tasks of the stage of non-capitalist path were fulfilled and a real progress in the economic conditions of the country was achieved, then, all the forces of the National Democratic front would establish the scientific socialism under the leadership of the working class (İşçi ve Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP, 2003: 259). It should be noted that Belli’s views pertinent to the leadership of the working class in the war of national liberation underwent a considerable change regarding it. During the period 1966-1968, he believed that “the stronger” would win the “hegemony” over the revolution. He did not exclude the possibility of the grasp of the leadership by the left-leaning section of the military and civilian intelligentsia, which he defined as “the most conscious part of the petty-bourgeoisie”. But, later, in 1969-1970, one witnesses him stating unequivocally that that “hegemony in the national-democratic revolution must belong to the proletariat and the poor peasants - the most revolutionary forces of the society”.

As a final note to this section, one may argue that, TİP espoused a narrow national-democratic front consisting of “workers, peasants, craftsmen, ordinary wage-earners, bold youth, the honest intelligentsia and the other labouring strata of the population”, in which the leading role was to be held by the working class, strictly speaking, by itself. In TİP’s opinion, national bourgeoisie was excluded since it did not exist. The necessity of the indivisibility of the two struggles – national liberation and socialist - was maintained throughout its subsistence and this approach was partly due to the party’s belief on the negligible character of feudal vestiges. TKP, MDD and YÖN movements believed in a two-stage struggle of which the first phase was to be the national liberation struggle waged against imperialism and its collaborators, and the second phase was the socialist struggle that was to be given against the capitalist class under the leadership of the working class. Except Belli of 1969s, none of these groups paid attention to the leadership of the working class or

its party during the first phase since all believed in an existent national bourgeoisie no matter how weak or non-influential it were and they all focused on the anti-feudal aspect of the second war of independence.

Looking in retrospect to that period may lead one to state that although the party brought into light the crucial problems of the Turkish foreign policy such as independence, NATO/CENTO membership, American bases and bilateral agreements, they had never been discussed in the regional units or in other organs of the party so as to organize a practice of struggle. They were only transmitted to regional organs by circulars and published in TİP Haberleri. In other words, the theory and praxis of the struggle was not internalized by the party affiliates (Sargın, 2001: 670). A second argument may be posed in relation to united front issue and leadership problem. In my opinion, had TİP been less passive, and more unifying and sensible; a strong united front paving the way to its leadership in the national liberation in the long run could be achieved. Ünsal argues that instead of advocating the socialist revolution jealously – as a political counter attack to national democratic revolutionaries – TİP could have brought together the different factions of the Turkish communism rooted in its foundation under the roof of a single party in the framework of a Kemalist/Marxist unity by the defence of a progressive minimum program aiming democracy under its leadership (Ünsal, 2002: 332). A third criticism may be posed against its approach towards the youth. As a witness of the period under question, I may well argue that it was partly the mistake of TİP to fail to maintain the party affiliation of the youth leaders. If TİP were successful to utilize the energy of the left wing youth and their strong belief in socialism, the result might have been a more democratic Turkey<sup>160</sup>.

Nonetheless, despite these criticisms, the party's emphasis on the subjective conditions of the imperialist struggle, its focusing on the relation between the comprador bourgeoisie and imperialism was noteworthy. In addition, its fundamental perspectives on these issues, thoroughly consistent with its overwhelmingly third worldist features, were suitable for Turkey and were in complete accordance with the

---

<sup>160</sup> Mahir Çayan and Deniz Gezmiş, as many other prominent figures of the 1968 youth movement were former TİP members.

international conditions of the era. In my opinion, despite the enormous differences in international conditions of the world, the views of TİP and the socialist/communist left of Turkey on NATO and CENTO constitute remarkable guidelines and a correct alternative for the Turkish foreign policy of today.

### **3. 2. TİP and the Common Market**

Sharing the views of Bernard Cassen, one may argue that an integrated Europe project, in other words, the building of the EEC or EU was actually determined by the balance of power that emerged in the aftermath of the second world war and was a “will of the US”, not a resolve of the peoples of Europe (Cassen, 2003: 1)<sup>161</sup>. The driving forces were the US determination to contain the Soviet Union and to curb the influence of the French and Italian communist parties, and the US need to secure free markets due to the ongoing and future over-production of the US industry. Thus, funds of the Marshall Plan were distributed through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), established on 16 April 1948, the precursor of the EEC.<sup>162</sup>

As mentioned in earlier sections, the pro-Western inclination of the Turkish foreign policy entailed Turkey’s membership of Western alliances and organizations in addition to NATO. Thus, she appealed to the European Community to participate. On 12 September 1963, Ankara Treaty (Ankara Association Agreement) was signed between Turkey and the European Economic Community (EEC)<sup>163</sup>. By this Treaty, it was envisaged that in twenty years time Turkey would establish a Customs Union<sup>164</sup> with the EEC. This union would be realized by the decrease of the customs executed for the member states of Europe and finally the full membership of Turkey to the

---

<sup>161</sup> Cassen gives a quite detailed historical view on the roots of the project of an integrated Europe in his article “Washington watches over EU and NATO Expansion” dated January 2003 in *Le Monde Diplomatique* yet the above very brief summary may suffice for the aims of this section.

<sup>162</sup> In the Treaty of Rome, the aim of the common commercial policy of the Union was defined as “to contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade (article 110)”. (Cassen, 2003: 6).

<sup>163</sup> The European Community became the European Union in 1992.

<sup>164</sup> The Customs Union was an essential element of a common market according to which all the barriers to trade amongst its members would be abolished and a common customs tariff would be introduced and a common commercial policy would be adopted.

Community was to be achieved. (Aren, 1993:64) In this section, my aim is to put forth the parliamentary discussion on Common Market prior to TİP's entry and then give a detailed framework of the party's perspectives on Common Market by the use of speeches of its leaders and the articles published in the party organs.

### **3.2.1. Discussions on the Common Market in the Grand National Assembly**

The discussions on the subject were held on demand of "urgency" both in the Parliament and the Senate because Turkey was in a hurry to make use of the economic privileges expected as an outcome of the Ankara Association Agreement (generally known as the Ankara Treaty)<sup>165</sup>. The approval of the Treaty by a great majority<sup>166</sup> was the revelation of the convergent views pertinent to the membership of Turkey to the community and to Common Market.

RPP deputies, Turhan Feyzioğlu, Şefik İnan and Coşkun Kırca, pointing to the significance of the Common Market and the European Community for the economic and political future of Turkey, declared that the solidarity among the nations of the Common Market would be strengthened by the creation of a "single European nation". The spokesmen of NTP (New Turkey Party) argued that Turkey ought to enter the EEC due to social and economic reasons or else she would be isolated as a "fish out of water" (Koçer, 1993: 205-6). The Treaty was a step taken towards Westernisation of Turkey and that the EEC would bring "dynamism" to Turkey in view of JP as well, yet the main reason for such enthusiasm was the expectation of the economic facilities as an outcome of the Treaty as mentioned above (Koçer, 1993: 209). In regards to the Demirel governments during 1965-71, the European factor in Turkish foreign policy gained importance and Europe moved to first place in the Turkish foreign trade. Moves were accelerated in furthering the association with the Common Market towards eventual integration. Some circles argued that the JP government's stressing close ties with the Common Market was "destined" to bring a measure of independence from the US in the Western context (İnce, 1975:

---

<sup>165</sup> The Association Agreement, signed in Ankara on 12 September, 1963, prescribed the preparatory, transitional and final stages for Turkey's full membership in the Customs Union.

<sup>166</sup> The Treaty was ratified by the Parliament with one opposing vote. It was brought to the Senate under the demand of urgency and was immediately approved without any discussions as well, again with one opposing vote (Koçer 1993: 206-7).

261-62). RPNP, a participant of the second and third coalitions after the military coup of 27 May, argued that the Treaty would help to protect the prevailing industries as well as the emergent ones (Koçer, 1993:210).

During the 17<sup>th</sup> Party Council of the RPP, a report was prepared on the issue, pointing out to the “inevitability” of the choice of EEC membership despite the economic difficulties it would entail (Koçer, 1993: 208). The left wing of the RPP, a group of deputies who co-operated with Ecevit -which actually represented a rapidly growing social democratic movement during those days- opposed “the accelerated pace of integration” to the Common Market. By 1970 Ecevit was asking serious questions on the issue such as to whether Turkish industrial development would be delayed with an association with the Common Market or not. The RPP opted for a delayed integration with the Common Market (İnce, 1975: 262-3). However, one may well argue that RPP did not oppose Turkey’s Common Market membership but its timing.<sup>167</sup>

### **3.2.2. Opposition to Common Market: TİP and YÖN**

The only structural opposition to EEC membership arose from the socialist / Marxist left circles such as TİP and YÖN. İlhan Selçuk defined the Common Market as an “organization of capitalist imperialism”, asserting that development for Turkey could not be achieved by being a member of such an organization; Turkey, in contrast should mobilize its own forces and start running of her own national resources to achieve development (Aytemur, 2000: 126).

In TİP Program, EEC issue was dealt with a short paragraph, pointing to the contradiction between Turkey’s EEC membership and the need for “a serious program of industrialization”. EEC membership was regarded as a factor that would hamper the economic development and enforce the maintenance of the prevalent

---

<sup>167</sup> Ecevit’s chief economic advisor Besim Üstünel opposed association with the Common Market because in his opinion it would be detrimental to Turkish industry and economy (İnce, 1975: 263). Haluk Ülman, a long-time Foreign Policy advisor of Ecevit has put the matter in these words: “Atatürk developed Turkey’s Western orientation first. Since his time, foreign policy has moved essentially in the same direction. We want to stay in NATO and the Common Market. But we should know where we stand in these organizations and whether our place is congruent with our national interests” (İnce, 1975: 275).

“semi-colonial” economic situation. Thus being “hundred percent” against the realization of this membership, TİP was determined to “protect the newly emerging Turkish industry by the use of Customs Walls against the hegemony of the foreign capital “ (Aren, 1993: 66). In the aftermath of the ratification of the Ankara Treaty, on 14 September, 1963, the leaflet “No to the Common Market”, consisting of the ideas of TİP on the issue was published by TİP. According to TİP, membership of the European Union contradicted to the “esteemed” national interests of Turkey and the spirit of National Treaty. Heavily stressing on the cruciality of the protection of National independence and the necessity of a “hundred percent national” foreign policy, it was argued that some temporary gains such as the possibility of obtaining foreign debts or monetary aid were no more than debt traps which would be paid back with their interests by the labouring masses (Aren, 1993:65). The strategic trajectory of the EEC was “to maintain the survival of colonialism by the use of new methods” and the expectation of favourable outcomes pertinent to the membership of EEC for an underdeveloped country like Turkey was “to speak of the right of survival for a sheep in the mouth of a wolf”. By EEC membership, Turkey would be transformed into a country obliged to sell cheap raw materials and buy in return expensive capital goods, by the sustainment of the underdeveloped, backward, and dependent situation. Another outcome would be the increase in the wealth and hegemony of the landowners and of the speculators which collaborated with foreign capital owners (Aren, 1993: 64-66 and Koçer, 1993: 210-11). These views were discussed and criticised by the deputies of the JP and RPNP in TİP’s absence (Koçer 1993, 211). This exceptional event in Turkish political life was a sign of the impact of socialist ideas in the society when cogent solutions were set forth pertinent to crucial issues of the political agenda. <sup>168</sup> TİP expressed its opposition to membership

---

<sup>168</sup> Seyfi Öztürk, a deputy of RPNP, stated that TİP propagated communist ideas over this issue since the only opposition to the EEC came from the communist world. Tevetoğlu, the spokesperson of the JP in the Senate and an ardent member of the organizations founded for the purpose of struggling against communism in Turkey, declared that, the ideas supported in TİP declaration were similar the announcements of the “iron curtain radios”. To him, to be against the EEC was similar to opposing democracy (Koçer, 1993: 212). Aican, another deputy of the JP who will establish the Party of Confidence in the coming years, stated that, the ideas of the minority must be left aside and the spirit of national unity had to be maintained (Koçer, 1993: 213). Two days after the ratification of the Treaty, Niyazi Ağırnaslı who joined TİP, made a speech in the Senate on the issue. To Ağırnaslı, the participation in the EEC would perhaps bring in one or two short-term remedies on economic situation in the first period of the membership yet in the long run, it would result in the enrichment of a few

of the EEC in its other party organs as well. In the Izmir Congress of the Party held on February 1964, it was reiterated that membership of the European Union contradicted with the aims of the industrialization program of Turkey and the emergent Turkish industry ought to be supported against “the assault of the foreign capital by the practice of customs tariffs” (Aren, 1993: 66). In an additional issue of the magazine “Social Justice” it was argued that, the attempt of the establishment of a Common Market was the first step towards the foundation of a united capitalist Europe and was a sign of the ongoing conflict between the interests of the capitalist states - under the domination of capitalist monopolies. Calling attention to the role and the influence of the US on the Common Market in favour of its interests, it was asserted that the six members of the Common Market had one common target, that is, the defence of the common interests against the “Toplumcu”<sup>169</sup> system in addition to the implementation methods of neo-colonialism towards the underdeveloped countries. By the same token, the relations to be established between the underdeveloped countries and the Common Market, would facilitate “the reinforcement of the power of land owners and the snatcher capital factions” who were mediators and tools of the foreign capital in underdeveloped countries and would also prevent them to follow a “non- capitalist path” to development (Social Justice, 1963: 7, translation mine).

Aybar, in the same vein, argued that if “weak and strong economic units” joined to co-operate in a common organization, the weak one would fall under the yoke of the strong according to the “science of economy”. Citing the views of the liberal economist like Besim Üstünel on the damaging effects of the EEC membership for Turkey, he asserted that ninety five percent of the domestic industry -which was in the hands of the small traders and petty industrialists- would be ruined under the pressure of the monopolization attempts of the big landowners. Moreover, the “pre-capitalist” small and medium agricultural investments, the newly emerging industrial investments of underdeveloped countries would all be purged by the large

---

hundred export traders gaining large sums whereas the newly emerging domestic industry would fade and unemployment and poverty would increase (Koçer, 1993: 213).

<sup>169</sup> “Toplumcu” or people-sided or people-siding was a concept used instead of the term “socialist”, partly due to the prevailing articles of the Turkish Penal Code 141-142.

foreign monopolies. Agrarian labourers would migrate to big cities and some of them would migrate to Europe in search for jobs resulting in a great loss in labour force of the country (Aybar, 1968: 298).

In the article “Common Market is not a Means for Development” published in the issue dated 7 May 1963 of the magazine Social Justice, the structure and the rationale of the Common Market was discussed. It was argued that the six founding states were the advanced industrialized countries of Europe with a share of `industrial section` of approximately 42-53 percent in the National Gross product and the Customs Union was actually an organization of the finance monopolies of the developed industrial states. The official argument that the speed of development of Turkish economy would promote following Turkey’s entry to the Common Market was false because an economic integrity between a country with a great economic power and the one with a small economic power always resulted in favour of the former as a rule of capitalism. The argument that Turkey would not be able to find a market for its exports if she were not an EEC member was also wrong since the harmful effects of this integration would exceed the economic losses of the country. Due to the presence of military, cultural and economic treaties signed with the West, the official argument that Turkey would be isolated from the West unless it participated in the Common Market was unacceptable as well. In TİP’s opinion, access to the Common Market would hinder a future practice of non-capitalist path since the maintenance of Turkey as an agrarian country converged with the interests of the big monopolies of the Common Market countries. Turkish economy had to be saved from the pressures of the foreign monopolies and their domestic collaborators. (Social Justice, 1963: 7)

In sum, it may be argued that TİP’s evaluation of the issue of the EEC membership, emanating from its Third Worldist position, took into consideration the issues of industrialization and independence in regards to the non-capitalist path to development foreseen by the party as a method of development. The prediction of some recent economic problems by TİP such as the burden of debts is indicative of another correct foreign policy approach supported by the Left.

### 3. 3. TİP and USSR

In TİP program and regulations, and in nearly all party documents and speeches of the party leaders, the rejection of foreign hegemony, the support of a foreign policy wherein independence and sovereignty would be jealously protected, a foreign policy that is “hundred percent national” was espoused. This stance was also valid for the USSR as well as for other foreign states.

In his speech at the meeting of the General Administrative Council of the party dated 10 January 1965, Aybar drew a broad framework related to the domestic and international issues including the history of the relations between the two countries under the heading of “Turkish/Soviet rapprochement” arguing that during the years of foundation of the Turkish Republic, Turkey and the USSR had established genuine and strong relations of friendship because both fought against imperialism. Soviet Union and Turkey were friends and the USSR helped Turkey without imposing any economic or political conditions. In return, Turkey did not participate in any alliance against the USSR. Aybar asserted that TİP favoured the establishment of friendly relations with its neighbours and especially with the mighty neighbour - the USSR - which was a “vital necessity for the security of Turkey”. In his opinion these relations ought to be based on mutual belief and confidence to pursue peaceful relations and “the re-establishment of good relations with the USSR should not prevent Turkey from establishing relations with the Western countries based on mutual respect and equality” which are “not contrary to the independence and sovereignty of the country” (Aybar, 1968: 350-351).

Anyhow, the attitude of Aybar on the political regime of the USSR and the ideology on which it was based was quite contradictory. He argued that the type of socialism that he had in mind for Turkey in case of coming to power would be totally dissimilar to Soviet and Chinese models. Firstly, these were not “socialist” regimes due to the maintenance of exploitation and were not ruled by labourers. Secondly, to adapt one of those systems as a model for Turkish socialism would result in a Soviet or Chinese hegemony over Turkey. In Aybar’s view, centralism in Marxism/Leninism obliged a party to link itself to an external centre and TİP strictly

rejected “*the model called Marxist/Leninist by the Soviet*”.<sup>170</sup> He alleged that Marxism was translated into a type of “religion in the hands of those who furnished it with their own label after the seizure of the state in Russia”. Thus, Marxism became a “political doctrine” instead of an issue to be subjected to free scientific search. Drawing on the refutations of the Marxist method and ideology of Western neo-Marxists such as Lucio Coletti<sup>171</sup>, and Sartre – the founder of existentialist philosophy - he rejected dialectical materialism and its use as a method for investigating the structures of societies (Mumcu, 1998: 74-84)<sup>172</sup>. Echoing Althusser, he argued that the only difference between Hegel’s dialectical method and that of Marx was “the replacement of spirit by economy in Marx” (Mumcu, 1998: 88). He asserted that although it did not provide any solution for the problems confronting the society, “dialectics” was a “general science throwing light on science” since according to Marx, its basis was “criticism and revolution” (Mumcu, 1998: 102). In his opinion, starting from the term “scientific socialism”, all “laws” of Marxism-Leninism had to be “reviewed” in full neutrality and justice<sup>173</sup>. Aybar strongly refuted the proletarian dictatorship concept, its understanding and practice by Lenin in the USSR and argued that the source of the problems in the Soviet Union might be found in this interpretation and practice<sup>174</sup>. Awakened by the Khrushchev report of

---

<sup>170</sup> It is interesting to observe that, the prominent Marxist theoretician and militant Gramsci, interpreted by many scholars as an opponent of orthodox Marxism, defended Leninism and Leninist praxis, relating Lenin and Marx as such. The following is a part of Gramsci’s lecture delivered in a party school: “Leninism is the political science of the proletariat which teaches us how to mobilize all the forces necessary to demolish bourgeois dictatorship and to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat. For some, there is no such thing as a Leninism different from Marxism. This is not true. Leninism contains a unique world view without which Marx today could not be understood” (quoted in Paggi, 1979: 114).

<sup>171</sup> Aybar seems to have been greatly influenced by Coletti, especially by his ideas on dialectical materialism and on the on the USSR. Anyhow, Colletti’s views on Lenin and on the scientificity of Marxism/Leninism appear to be quite different (Coletti, 1974: 228-235).

<sup>172</sup> Answering Mumcu’s question of the percentage of scientific characteristic of Marxism, Aybar, recalling Althusserian views on Marxism, stated that Capital which is interconnected with dialectics had to be read once more (Mumcu, 1998: 83).

<sup>173</sup> Aybar further argued that there could not be a term as “scientific socialism” since there was no term like “scientific capitalism”. Socialism and Capitalism both were modes of production. In his opinion, socialism became the hope of humanity thanks to its ethical and humane targets, not because it was based on science (Mumcu, 1998: 132-133).

<sup>174</sup> These views of Aybar will not be examined in depth since such a study is beyond the scope of this thesis yet it is a well known fact that Aybar was against the Leninist party model – which he defined as a bourgeois model of organization- and the revolutionary praxis of Lenin during the Russian

the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the USSR, he had realized that Soviets had deviated from the road to socialism.

The foreign policy of the Soviets troubled Aybar as well. In his opinion, the Soviet foreign policy made use of the same methods of the imperialist states. He defined this policy as if “*the glove imperialism was turned inside out*”. Criticizing Stalin and the Soviet regime, he argued that in Yalta the three leaders shared the world amongst themselves as in the olden times of imperialism.<sup>175</sup> If the aim of the Soviet leader (Stalin) was to spread socialism to other parts of the world, this was unacceptable for Aybar because socialism could not be imposed from outside. USSR and USA were both “super powers making use of the same weapons and the same methods” and both fought in the Middle East by “through the mediation of others”. Both superpowers had divided the world between themselves into regions of hegemony. USA was a capitalist state and the USSR was a dictatorship of bureaucracy under the mask of socialism, where exploitation survived yet both were imperialists. (Aylin, 2002: 54) Soviet Union, “identical to US’, was against” democracy in Turkey” and consequently she was “against TİP which defended independence”. He argued that the Soviet Union which was well aware that “a dictatorship leaning on the Soviet Union would never be established by TİP”, possibly backed “the military activities of the small terrorist groups during the 1970s” (Mumcu, 1998 : 117-118). Since proletarian internationalism began to mean “falling under the yoke of China or the USSR”, TİP would do its best “to stay away from both” (Mumcu, 1998: 118). He asserted that during the preparation of the

---

revolution. He even rejected the use of the term Marxism-Leninism. He argued that Marx’s concept of revolution which consisted of a “natural mass movement” and which aimed “the passage to democratic regime by carrying proletariat to the position of hegemonic class”. According to Aybar, the approach of Marx differed radically from the practice of the USSR (Mumcu, 1998: 112-113). He also argued that Engels’ understanding of the proletarian dictatorship was the model of the Paris Commune yet he and Marx did not bring forth a practice of a communist party in accordance with it (Mumcu, 1998: 115).

<sup>175</sup> In his article “How to fight against imperialism?” Sartre argued that sovereignty should not be defended jealously (since some alliances could be established with other countries or some foundations could be founded in which a part of sovereignty rights might be abandoned) but it should be conquered in order to be able to resist to American imperialism which smashed national structures everywhere it had entered. He further argued that the struggle should be designed according to a perspective of the continuation of an American hegemony because in his opinion, the world was under the hegemony of “not two but one state”. Peaceful co-existence worked in favour of the US instead of its positive aspects (Sartre, 1966: 8-9).

program and the regulation of TİP, these issues were taken into consideration (Özman, 2002: 198-199).

Aybar pointed to the incipient events of disintegration in the Eastern Bloc, the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948, the Albanian breakage, and finally the Chinese/Soviets rupture. Asserting that Poland, Romania, and Hungary and all other peoples' democracies longed for an "independent" solidarity and co-operation in their relations with the USSR, he argued that this was a proof of the "primacy of the importance of the national interests". To him, the conflicts observed in the Eastern Bloc were the signals of a new stage of socialism although they were totally of a different nature than those witnessed in the Western Bloc. The new era witnessed the elimination of the principle of "the leading of the world socialism from one centre" envisaged by the Third International. Citing Togliatti, Aybar asserted that the co-operation amongst the socialist nations should follow a fully democratic line and that the communist parties ought to defend their national interests in the first place. A "multi-centered" system had to be experienced in international solidarity (Aybar, 1968: 353-354).

At this point, Aybar's understanding of socialism has to be recalled because the two issues seem to be interrelated. Arguing that 1917 Russian revolution was against Marx,<sup>176</sup> the socialism advocated by TİP was a "*freedom loving*" and "*smiling*" one.<sup>177</sup> In his opinion, if "the armed left" had won the struggle against the "armed right" during 1970s, Turkish labouring masses would neither achieve a "humanitarian" and "friendly" system, nor a socialist one. On the contrary, Turkey would be a Soviet satellite and a new member of the Warsaw pact. The proof was the position of the countries like Angola, Mozambique and others which had received

---

<sup>176</sup> In his opinion, Russian Revolution, realized under a series of suitable coincidences, was performed in a society in which the structural conditions for the revolution were non-existent. Yet, exploitation continued in the absence of socialist democracy even after sixty five years (Aylin, 2002:54).

<sup>177</sup> It is interesting to observe that it was Aren to use the phrase "humane" and "freedom loving socialism". In YÖN dated 6 February 1963, he argued that socialism was not a rehearsal of the means of a class struggle or a rebellion against violence. Socialism had to be adopted as a system to achieve economic development because the world conditions urged all countries to proceed in this direction. In his opinion, the forces that prevented the other countries from establishing totalitarian regimes would do the same for TİP because the most hegemonic features of socialism were its "humane" and "freedom-loving" ones (Aren, 1963: 3).

Soviet aid. The attempts of building socialism under the control of the Soviet experts in some African countries were solely “milestones of the imperialist policy of the Soviet Union” (Özman, 2002: 154). He argued that Soviet Union imposed her own socialist model as “a Trojan horse” to these countries in order to spread out its hegemony to all parts of the world (Özman, 2002: 200- 219).<sup>178</sup> Quoting the sections of the party program dealing with the support of the independence and sovereignty of the nation, he asserted that these principles were introduced to refute “*the interventionist and imperialist*” policies of both, the USSR and the USA (Özman, 2002: 224). Although Aybar frequently argued that Boran shared the same concerns on the issues mentioned above, one may well notice that her approach was somewhat divergent at least in regards to practical issues.

Boran argued that when a government contrary to American interests won power either by elections or as a result of a war of independence, USA never hesitated to topple it directly or indirectly. Soviet Union, in contrast, supported these countries in their national liberation struggles by providing them the economic and financial aid. As to the economic relations of the USSR with Turkey, Boran was very optimistic. She pointed to the suitable payment conditions of the eight industrial projects signed with the Soviet Union, and asserted that the conditions of these agreements such as the system of payments from state to state and the use of credits for heavy industry investments were in full accord with the development requirements of Turkey. Contrary to Aybar, there was no reference to becoming a satellite as a result of economic aid, and the Soviet aid was seen as a remedy in the process of gaining independence from the West (Boran, 1992: 356-379).

As to the “particularistic” ideas of Aybar such as “socialism particular to Turkey” or to some other country, she argued that socialist systems of all countries had “particular” aspects arising from the historical and national conditions of each

---

<sup>178</sup> Malawya, the minister of energy of India during the 1960s, argued that the advantage of the Soviet aid to underdeveloped countries was its implementation on the basis of equality, its being beneficial to both sides and the lack of political and military conditions which would ruin the independence and sovereignty of these young nations. This aid was not contradictory to the crucial interests of these nations. On the contrary, it helped them to raise the living standard of the people, strengthened their political sovereignty, cleared up the disgusting influence of the colonialism and enabled them to achieve full economic independence (Malawya, 1965: 40-41).

country yet this was not an “absolute particularity”. There were common, international aspects of these systems that enabled one to call them “socialist” such as the abolition of exploitation and nationalization of means of production and as socialist systems became rooted in the world, similarities would gain priority over divergences. It was impossible to achieve the goal of socialism by putting stress on particularities and by rejecting “the international principles of socialism and its being a scientific method”. Such a policy would lead nowhere (Mumcu, 1997:83-85).

Anyhow, Boran, in line with Aybar, argued that the leadership of the Soviet Union of the world communist movement resulted in the theoretical and practical “hegemony” of this country over the international communist movement. Any practice contrasting with the ideas of this leadership was labelled as “deviations from socialism and betrayal of it” by the Soviet theoreticians. This style which was actually “politics” in the narrow meaning of the term brought in a “freezing” of the socialist ideas and the negligence of the scientific aspect of socialism (Boran, 1992: 148-149). She argued that soon after the foundation of other socialist regimes in many parts of the world, the leadership of the Soviet Union and its unconditioned support by the communist/socialist world terminated and ties with this country and the CPSU were loosened because of the primacy of the economic and social problems of these newly established regimes. To Boran, a transformation in the Soviet Union itself was essential since such a type of “socialist internationalism and proletarian dictatorship” was against “the nature of the substance” (Boran, 1992: 150). Nonetheless, in Boran’s view, the problematic relations between the countries of the socialist bloc could not solely be explained by the hegemonic and totalitarian behaviour of Stalin or to the leading role of the USSR. The differences in thought and practice arose from the social, political and economic differences of the emergent socialist states (Boran, 1992: 133 - 140). She further asserted that the Soviet Union drew on “false premises” on the issue of working class internationalism and neglected the reality that nations were the main social units in the twentieth century and thus overlooked the main principles of the socialist internationalism in practice. To her, it was primarily the duty of the worker’s party of a socialist nation to decide for the economic, political and social necessities of its country. No worker’s party or nation, whether in power or in opposition, could be forced to obey

the decisions of other socialist parties pertinent to their domestic problems or else the principles of socialist internationalism would be severely damaged (Boran, 1992: 157).

A glance at the views of Aren on the Soviet model shows that Aybar and Aren almost shared the same views. Aren argued that suspicions raised on the model – fantasy of a classless, unexploited, peaceful and free society - were proved to be true after the collapse of the USSR. This failure also demonstrated that an immediate seizure of state power seemed to be attainable yet to establish a genuine socialism was not. To Aren, in spite of its “revolutionary” features, the Soviet model of party was based on a “strict discipline and hegemony over the trade unions and over the other mass organizations” (Aren, 1993: 248-252).

Having made a cursory survey of the ideas of three leaders of TIP on the Soviet Union and the Soviet aid, it may be argued that Aren, Boran and Aybar agreed on the inapplicability of the Soviet model and on the necessity of full independence related to the domestic and foreign affairs of countries. Yet, Aybar’s correlation of “US” and “USSR” imperialisms and his open and fervent accusations related to the USSR policies usually tainted with anti-communist ingredients, were non-existent in both Boran and Aren. Although they all shared the conviction that independence and sovereignty should be “jealously” defended against every foreign nation including the USSR, Aren and Boran were cautious in their tone and content of criticism of the Soviet policy. Whereas Aybar suggested that several “models” of socialism existed – Soviet, Chinese, Yugoslavian and that socialism was not a single whole only in terms of means of production, Aren and Boran believed that socialism as a “model” was a single whole, and various divergences observed in emergent socialist countries rested in their unique socio-economic conditions. It may well be argued their criticism related to the problems of the socialist bloc were more balanced and less ill tempered than Aybar’s.

Due to these differences, some scholars as Lipovsky argued that Aren and Boran were closer to “pro-Soviet” line (Lipovsky, 1992: 66) although it is hard to speak of a genuine ideological divergence between the views of Aren, Aybar and Boran.

### 3.3.1. Discussions on Warsaw Pact Intervention to Czechoslovakia

Though many historians on Turkish History seem to overemphasize the impact of the events of Czechoslovakia in 1968 on the weakening of TİP, it is for sure that it was one of the milestones in the inner crisis of the Party during those years.

I shall firstly deal with the views of Aybar on the issue and then compare it to the approaches of Boran and Aren in order to point out the convergent and divergent aspects between these approaches.

Aybar's first reference to these events was during his speech in Beşiktaş district congress dated 21 July 1968. In his opinion, socialism in every country had to be established in accordance with its historical conditions and in full independence and there could be no justification for the interference of a socialist state to the domestic affairs of another one. Arguing that the need of defending its independence jealously was inevitable for small states in socialist systems as well, he stated that the "USSR had to abandon her habit of behaving and acting as a big state". He further asserted that the increase in the number of states such as Yugoslavia,<sup>179</sup> Czechoslovakia<sup>180</sup> and Romania would urge the USSR to establish relations based on equality with socialist states and the new medium created by these relations of equality and freedom would strengthen the front against imperialism. In the

---

<sup>179</sup> The speech of Dean Rusk on 24 February 1964 on Yugoslavia may exhibit the meaning of "freedom" brought to Yugoslavia and to the other countries of the world by imperialism. Rusk argued that when Yugoslavia "rejected being controlled by the USSR in 1948", she received substantial amount of military and economic aid from the US. He asserted that after its departure from the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia stopped backing the guerrilla movement in Greece, refrained from criticizing the non-communist forces in Vietnam and Laos, and helped the Venezuelan government in its repression of the progressive forces of the country. In effect, the greatest blow to the guerrilla movement in Greece came from Yugoslavia when it closed its borders and contained the Greece guerrilla forces deployed in her country. In my view, it may serve as a lesson to all partisans of "freedom" to learn that Tito, after setting Yugoslavia free from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviets, sent arms to Batista and rejected to help Castro whose forces were under the threat of the US (Erdoğan, 1968: 46-55).

<sup>180</sup> Some motives of the support of the West for the "movements of freedom" in Eastern European countries may be pursued by the comments in the Western media. For instance, the Wall Street Journal wrote that Europe was the "centre" of the "foreign interests of the USA". If Eastern Europe would succeed in self-determination by the "help of the US", this would mean a defeat for the USSR in line with the US interests. Such a situation would create a serious change of political balance in Europe. Thus, USA would locate itself between the USSR and its satellites. Dubcek was also flattered intensely by TIME magazine where it was stated that he was the man who succeeded in restricting the authority of the Communist party and created a program to liberate the Czech people and bring democracy to Czechoslovakia. To TIME, Dubcek had also accomplished to liberate the economy from bureaucratic control (Erdoğan, 1968: 60-61).

aftermath of the military intervention, Aybar made three consecutive announcements. In his first declaration, he interpreted the situation as the continuation of the remnants of Stalinism. Condemning the involvement, he argued that “the smiling face of socialism should not be shadowed by such deeds.” In the second one, he asserted that the peoples of the Middle Europe had occasionally voiced their “rejection of an experiment of a totalitarian, export socialism”, yet these desires had been “toppled by the intervention of Soviet tanks”. In his opinion, Czechoslovakia was the most developed amongst those states therefore it longed for “a type of production centred on consumption” – a type of production restricted by Comecon. To Aybar, the intervention proved two things, namely, the desire to be a non-aligned country outside the military blocs and independence being an indispensable requirement of socialism. The road to socialism was “a road of non-conditional independence”, far from the influence of the US and Soviet Russia or any other country (Sargin, 2001: 661-3).<sup>181</sup>

Boran expressed her views on Czechoslovakian events in *Milliyet* dated 27 August 1968 in the article “Çekoslovakya Olayları”, a few days after the final announcement of Aybar. Boran argued that the military intervention of the Soviet Union against Czechoslovakia with the participation of four Warsaw pact states could in no way be justified and it was against the principles of socialist internationalism and against the right of independence and equality of nations. To her, the Soviet model was not a “prototype” of a socialist system and that it would inevitably go under radical changes in every country in spite of the desires of the Soviet leaders. She refuted the practice of the Soviet Union for the absence of participation of the Soviet people –the workers, intellectuals, and youth- on the political life of the country (Sargin, 2001: 664-5 and Mumcu, 1998: 27).<sup>182</sup> Dealing with some other allegations related to the invasion such as the beginning of the

---

<sup>181</sup> The three announcements were published in an issue of *TİP Haberleri* with the heading of “Çekoslovakya Olayları hakkında TİP 'in görüşleri”. ( Sargin, 2001:663)

<sup>182</sup> In “Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları”, Boran reiterated her argument that no justification can be stated in favour of the Soviet invasion in Czechoslovakia. To her, even if the allegations pertaining to the revival of capitalism, and the loss of control of the communist party were true, the intervention was still against the sovereignty, independence and equality of nations. She further argued that Brejnev Doctrine – that the independence of nations could be restricted under special conditions- was not a reasonable one (Boran, 1992:158).

counter revolution in Czechoslovakia, she put the blame on the Czech communist party and the working class, arguing that if the Soviets were invited to the country after a serious resistance against the counter revolution by the communist party and the working class, the intervention could then have been tolerable.<sup>183</sup> In her opinion, the vulnerable position of the communist party of Czechoslovakia was due to its isolation from the labouring masses. She further argued that the conditions were ripe for the socialist countries to extend the socialist democracy to the realm of political rights and liberties (Boran, 1992: 160-162).

Although Sargin argued that there was no difference between the viewpoints of Aybar, Boran and Aren on the issue, Boran denied this convergence during her interview with Mumcu, stating that Aybar's stance was "anti-Sovietism" and a "bitter enmity" towards the USSR whereas her position was limited to the "criticism of the situation". She further asserted that her criticism was not directed to the socialist system in general but to the ruling clique of the USSR of the period. Auto criticising her former position during the interview, she stated that to evaluate Dubcek and his collaborators as healthy and skilful elements of the party was wrong and the USSR was correct in trying to stop the rebirth of capitalism in Czechoslovakia. She further argued that she might have been 'confused' in her previous declarations due to the great support of Western communist circles for Dubcek, to the slogans of "Prague spring" and the lack of information on the subjective conditions of the Czechoslovakia (Mumcu, 1997: 55-57).

It was not only Boran who shifted from her original position. During a recent interview, Aren argued that Czechoslovakia was not invaded by the Warsaw pact but was rescued from capitalism, adding that they (probably he meant himself and Boran) had remained silent during the days of intervention in order not to be labelled as siding with the Soviets (Ünlü, 2002: 262).<sup>184</sup>

---

<sup>183</sup> It is interesting to see that these views were compatible with those of Aybar in his speech during the Third congress of TIP in 9 November 1968 in Ankara (Aybar, 1988c : 181-182).

<sup>184</sup> The MDD group was more consistent on the issue, the leaders stated that Dubcek and his colleagues were collaborators of imperialism and the events in Czechoslovakia were a counter revolution. Thus they heralded the Soviet intervention (Ünlü, 2002: 263).

As indicated, a detailed study on the history of Czechoslovakia, the socio-economic and political conditions of the country and its relations with other countries including the USSR and the Western states prior to the intervention, was not carried out neither by TİP nor by the leaders. In his long article “Çekoslovakya’da Devrim ve Karşı Devrim”, Erdoğan, evaluating the socio-economic and political conditions of the Eastern European socialist countries from 1940s to 1960s, pointed out that the deterioration of the relations of the Czech state with the USSR was due to the diverging policies of both nations and the perspectives of their leaders with respect to socialist theory and practice and due to the relations of the Czech government with the West. In Erdoğan's opinion, the road of a Western backed “counter- revolution” was opened by the weaknesses of the Czech communist party, the USSR's foreign policy and the immense attempts of the USA and the other Western countries in addition to other objective and subjective factors in Czechoslovakia (Erdoğan, 1968; 45-61 and 81-87). There are significant convergences between these views of Erdoğan and the renewed perspectives of Boran expressed in her interview with Mumcu.

### **3.3.2. The Attitude of Some Communist Parties on the Intervention to Czechoslovakia**

Czechoslovakian events, in other words, the intervention of the Warsaw pact to Czechoslovakia contributed to a series of divergent interpretations in the world communist movement as well. It was supported by AKEL, Hanoi, North Korea, the communist party of Luxemburg, and German, Greece, Spanish communist parties. French, Italian communist parties and Yugoslavia and Romania fervently rejected the intervention. For the Lebanese communist party, it was a “deed of a handful of Jewish elites”. The American communist party stated that the intervention was an ‘inevitable necessity’. Cuban communist party and Castro gave full support to the intervention. Comparing the situation to a “dog and cat” fight, Chinese communist party declared that both countries- USSR and Czechoslovakia- had close relations with the USA and the West and both were revisionist states. Stressing the refusal of the Chinese people against Soviet invasion, it was declared that the source of the conflict was Dubcek’s enthusiasm of pursuing independent relations with the West. A similar approach was noticed in the declaration of the Albanian communist party,

in which the primary source of the conflict was presented as the Twentieth congress of the CPSU (Erdoğdu, 1968: 87).

## CHAPTER 4

### TİP ON THE CYPRUS ISSUE

In this chapter, my first intention is to review the two different perspectives of TİP on the Cyprus issue, in other words, the nationalistic shift observed in the stance of TİP in the wake of its entry to the Parliament. Prior to it, a brief sketch of the history of the island will be exposed. My second target is to elaborate the convergent and divergent views of some internal and external left wing and communist circles and political parties on some aspects of the Cyprus question so as to clarify TİP's perspective. To serve this purpose of mine, the views of YÖN and MDD circles are chosen as samples of domestic left wing movements; TKP and AKEL are selected as examples to provide a vision on the Cyprus issue in regards to the communist movement outside Turkey. In my opinion, these inner and outer perspectives on the Cyprus problem in a certain extent will contribute to the illumination of the shift in the approach of TİP.

In the wake of the long-lasting struggles of the Greek Cypriots against the British rule in Cyprus, Great Britain announced independence of Cyprus in August 1960. The foreign ministers of Turkey and Greece, with the encouragement of their NATO ally, Great Britain, held bilateral negotiations in Zurich on 5-11 February 1959. On 19 February 1959, an agreement was ratified and signed by Great Britain, Turkey and Greece and also by the leader of Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios and the leader of the Turkish Cypriots, Fazıl Küçük. On 16 August 1960, the London-Zurich accords were signed by the concerned parties, the independent Cyprus Republic was proclaimed<sup>185</sup>. The protection of rights and presence of the

---

<sup>185</sup> In effect, three main agreements were signed which constituted the basis of the Cypriot state. The Treaty of Establishment between Britain, the Cyprus Republic, Greece and Turkey laid down that the island should become an independent sovereign republic and ruled that two base areas totalling 99 square miles be put under the full sovereignty of Britain. The Treaty of Alliance between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus established a tripartite headquarters in Cyprus and allowed the stationing of 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers in Cyprus in order to defend the island against outside aggression and protect the status of Cyprus. Under the Treaty of Guarantee between the Republic of Cyprus, Great Britain, Greece and Turkey; the Republic of Cyprus undertook to maintain its independence, territorial

Great Britain in the island, that is, the two British military bases<sup>186</sup> one installed in the South and the other in the North were maintained by these agreements since the Island, with a British base, was a vital western stronghold in Eastern Mediterranean contributing to the overall Western superiority in the entire Mediterranean and was an important gate to the oil rich Arab Middle East. To put it simply, although Britain's official presence seemed to end, it continued to survive on the island by its bases, in addition to its pre-colonial policies and tactics including the famous "divide and rule"<sup>187</sup>. According to the Constitution of the Cyprus Republic, which encouraged the separation of two ethnic groups, the Turkish Cypriots constituting 18.4% of the population (census of December 1960) were not treated as a minority but as an equal partner of the new state. Naturally, the Turks were pleased with the protection of their existence as a separate community together with the authorization of Turkey to intervene militarily to the island by the Treaty of Guarantee and their effective - though disproportionate- participation in the administration of the state provided by the constitution. In their opinion, the principle of majority rule and the

---

integrity and security and to respect its Constitution and these features of the state were put under the guarantee of Britain, Greece and Turkey. The Treaty also banned the union of Cyprus with any other state and partition of the island, which were previous aims of Greece and Turkey. Article four of the Treaty of Guarantee, which was used by Turkey to justify its attempts of intervention, reads as follows: "in the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty". (quoted in Uslu, 2003: 12)

<sup>186</sup> We know that the size of Cyprus is approximately equal to a city of Turkey having medium dimensions. Its area is about 10.000 square kilometres. The area of the British bases are 256 millions of square meters, that is, they occupy an area that is 7.5 times greater than the area of the American military bases in Turkey occupy compared to the size of Turkey. Fegan argued that, just as in the case of American bases in Turkey, the personnel of the British bases carried English passports and the control of these bases by the Cyprus authorities was out of question. In addition to these bases, about 40-50 places were put under the command of Great Britain for the landing of British air fleets and this country kept an army comprising of 20.000 military personnel in these places (Fegan, 1969: 281-2).

<sup>187</sup> Adamantia Pollis's article "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: the case of Cyprus" is a detailed explanation of these policies. She argues that even before the London/Zurich Treaty, every precaution was taken by the British government to prevent the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots of the island to show a joint reaction against the British survival. The theses summarized in the form of slogans of both sides as "Ya Taksim (division) ya Ölüm (death)", "the preservation of the status quo" and "the return of the island to its previous owner" were spread all over the "Turkish political market" and the "Turkish Cypriot political market" tailing it, by the Ministry of Colonies of Great Britain and the intelligence services of this country. The events of 6/7 September in Turkey and the bombing of Atatürk's house in Salonika were also planned to help this cause of the British Government and they also helped to hide the economic and political problems of the governments of Greece and Turkey during those years (Pollis, 1973: 575-599).

right of self determination were not applicable in the case of Cyprus state. On the other side, the Greek Cypriot side was greatly annoyed by the “extensive priorities and privileges” granted to Turkish Cypriots under the constitution which they thought would hinder the administration of the state (Uslu, 2003: 15)<sup>188</sup>. Moreover, they saw the London/Zurich agreements as obstacles to the full independence of the Cyprus republic due to the approval of foreign intervention. Some analysts argue that the constitution itself was “inherently unworkable” and was deliberately destroyed by the Greek Cypriots in their continuous pursuit of ENOSIS and by the Turkish side in its continuous search for partition (Reddaway and Crawshaw quoted in Uslu, 2003: 17). Although the high degree of accuracy of these views is indisputable, in my opinion, they were results rather than causes. Firstly, as indicated in many articles of these three agreements, it is difficult to believe that the London/Zurich agreements, the primary target of which were the maintenance and protection of interests of imperialism in the island, were designed so as to create a fully independent and sovereign Cyprus state, where two ethnic communities were expected to live in peace. Secondly, it is equally hard to believe that the privileges and equal rights donated to the Turkish Cypriots entered the Constitution by virtue of the adherence of the old British Empire to human and ethnic minority rights. Though it is for sure that the strong nationalist tendencies arising from both communities by the help of internal and external factors largely contributed the outbreak of a serious fight between them, it may be argued that the disagreements that would possibly emerge from the constitution and the London / Zurich agreements favouring the Turkish community were foreseeable and moreover desired results by the imperialist states<sup>189</sup>.

---

<sup>188</sup> The major points of disagreements on the constitution were as follows: The establishment of five separate districts, the 70/30 communal ratio in public service, the establishment of the Cypriot army by the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriot soldiers, the income tax legislation, the separate majority right in the House of Representatives, the veto power of the vice-president. (Uslu, 2003:18)

<sup>189</sup> London/Zurich agreements were criticized by Firat who argued that a “sui generis” state was created by these agreements and it was impossible to speak of a genuine independence since this state did not even have the right to change its constitution. The attempt for such a change would be a cause for intervention. In her opinion, the maintenance of military bases was accepted from the beginning of the establishment and moreover the London/Zurich agreements had no chance of operation since they were rejected by the leaders of two communities. In addition, the agreements stressed the presence of two different communities instead of the creation of a Cypriot citizenship. (Firat, 1997: 612-613) The

Shortly after the establishment of the Cyprus state, Makarios visited Ankara during 22-24 November 1962, and implied his intention to alter the constitution, a demand rejected by İnönü on the basis of existence of London/Zurich agreements. The proposal constituting thirteen Amendments<sup>190</sup> was then submitted to the Cyprus vice-president Fazıl Küçük on 30 November 1962, and was rejected as well. Only a few days later, less than four years after independence, communal violence exploded in 21 December 1963 by the attacks of the Greek Cypriots to Turks. As the proposal of the Turkish government for a unified action with England and Greece in accordance with the agreements did not work, consequently the Turkish Government headed by İnönü sent four aircrafts to pass over the island on 25 December 1963. Turkey's policy favoured the solution of the crisis by interference of NATO yet this approach was bitterly opposed by the Greek partners of the Cyprus Republic. In March 1964, due to the continuation of violence from both sides, especially directed to the Turkish Cypriot Community, Turkish Parliament decided to grant the government full authority for military intervention if necessary. Harris argues that the genuine desire of İnönü government for intervention was largely open to discussion yet the course of events took a different direction when a letter was sent to İnönü in 5 June 1964, by US President Johnson. (Harris, 1972:108)<sup>191</sup> In this letter, Johnson warned the prime minister that NATO allies of Turkey "have not had a chance to consider" whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the

---

same points are emphasized by Hasgüler who identified the Cyprus constitution as a "colony constitution" similar to the Lebanon constitution. To him, both constitutions, prepared by "colonial forces outside the country", led to the "same catastrophe" (Hasgüler, 2002: 24).

<sup>190</sup> Makarios demanded the elimination of the veto rights of both, the president and the vice-president, the abolition of constitutional provisions requiring separate majorities for enactment of certain laws in the House of Representatives, the establishment of unified municipalities, the unification of the administration of Justice and Security forces, the election of president and vice-president of the House of Representatives by the House as a whole, not separately, the modification of the proportion of the proportion of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in public service and the police forces in proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. According to the Turkish side, the adoption of these proposals would put an end to all provisions of the constitution favouring the Turkish side, shifting the balance of power to the Greek side. The Greek side evaluated them as the attempt of Makarios to create a unified Cyprus state and to remove the obstacles for the functioning of an independent state (Uslu, 2003: 20).

<sup>191</sup> It is argued that there were three main reasons for the reluctance of İnönü government for military intervention. Firstly, İnönü was not sure that the world opinion was ready to comprehend the justness of the Turkish cause. Secondly, the Soviet Union's approach to the question and its support for Makarios feared him. Thirdly, the Turkish armed forces were not ready for an amphibious landing in Cyprus (Uslu, 2003: 23).

Soviet Union if Turkey took a step “without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies” which resulted in Soviet intervention. Also he called the attention of İnönü to the obligations of NATO that member countries could not wage war on each other. Johnson also recalled the Turkish/American bilateral agreements by stating that, “Under article IV of the agreement with Turkey of July 1947, I must tell you in all candors that the US cannot agree to the use of any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under the present conditions.”<sup>192</sup> The impact of the letter - which was hidden from the public opinion for a time and then was leaked to the press - went beyond the Cyprus dispute because the foreign policy issues were of great publicity due to the influence of the left wing circles. In Gönlübol’s view, in the aftermath of the appearance of the Johnson’s letter in the press, these criticisms were transformed into enmity of the US and of NATO (Gönlübol, 1982: 516-9) The American attitude toward the Cyprus Crisis had a deep impact on Turkish foreign policy and on the character of the US-Turkish relationship - as indicated briefly in the preceding chapter- and played an important role in shaping Turkish-American relations between 1964 and 1975. In this context, it is important to review the approach of the US toward the Cyprus issue in general prior to dealing with the effects of the Johnson letter on Turkish/ American relations and the rising of anti-imperialist movement in Turkey. It may well be asserted that the US response to the establishment of the Cyprus Republic was positive since it took for granted the maintenance of the British bases meant the safeguarding of the Western interests. In accordance with the international ends of the US foreign policy, the US priorities for Cyprus were the following; the island ought be used as a “bulwark against communism”, the “free democratic institutions” in Cyprus Republic should be strengthened and proliferated so as to facilitate the pursuance of pro-Western policies, the US should enjoy “unrestricted use” of its existing communication facilities, the British sovereign base areas should be maintained and made available to be utilized by “friendly Western nations”. Although the US apparently seemed to be absent in the game at the start of the crisis, she was greatly

---

<sup>192</sup> The armed forces of Turkey were assigned to NATO command since Turkey’s entrance to NATO. Also according to the 1947 bilateral agreement signed between the US and the Turkish government, equipment furnished by the US could not be used for any purpose other than that for which the article was furnished.

annoyed by the three possible upshots of the crisis, firstly, the inter-communal conflicts might weaken the southern flank of NATO and its general cohesion. Secondly, the growing influence of the Cyprus communist party, AKEL, was considered as an important future threat to the “Western interests in the East Mediterranean” and which could pave the way for the boost of the Soviet influence in the region.<sup>193</sup> Thirdly, Cyprus had a great strategic importance for imperialist states which could not be sacrificed in any condition. As to the intensification of the fighting in Cyprus, the US attempted to bring forth NATO-based solutions consisting of negotiations of the conflicting sides who were already NATO members (Uslu, 2003: 13-14). Some important direct and indirect political interventions of the US apart from Johnson letter are worth mentioning to expose the nature of American attitude. On 31 January 1964, a NATO plan was designed in London, encompassing the deployment of a peace keeping force of 10.000 soldiers from NATO countries under British command. Although Turkey and Greece approved the plan “worked out by the US and the British authorities”, on 4 February 1964, it was rejected by Makarios on the grounds that it would be a take-over of the island by NATO (Uslu, 2003: 26-27). On 14 July 1964, Dean Acheson, representative of the US, submitted a proposal, known as the first Acheson Plan, for the solution of the Cyprus question. The plan included the following main points: Cyprus would be free to unite itself with Greece (ENOSIS), a piece of land on the Carpas peninsula in the north-east of Cyprus was to be given to Turkey where it would have the right of stationing military force as well. The right of local self administration would be granted to the Turkish community in a small number of areas where it was in majority. In other parts of the island under Greek control, Turkish Cypriots would enjoy all human and minority rights granted by the Treaty of Lausanne to Turks remaining in Greece. The Greek island of Kasterollorizion (Meis) was to be ceded to Turkey. This was the solution called as “Double Enosis”. Although the Turkish and Greek governments were prepared to discuss the plan, Makarios announced that they would not accept it since

---

<sup>193</sup> Makarios was repeatedly warned by the top authorities of the US including the US president Kennedy and Johnson “to lessen his reliance on AKEL”, to deter its growing influence (Uslu, 2003: 18-19). From 1960 to 1963, the US supplied 20 million \$ of “economic” and “financial” aid to Cyprus, supporting educational and cultural programs to strengthen the conservative political groups against the influence of AKEL (Cotrell and Adams, 1968: 56).

it would put an end to the independent Cyprus state and result in the partition of the island. Another step was the Ball plan, designed by the co-operation of Grivas - EOKA leader- and the US, accepting the union of the island with Greece on condition that the Turks living on the island would be protected and a few bases would be donated to Turkey. When these attempts failed, USA submitted a second Acheson plan in which the following were emphasized. Cyprus was to be free to choose independence or Enosis. A military base was to be leased to Turkey for fifty years on the Carpas peninsula. The Greek government was to guarantee the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community in relation to human and minority rights. The plan was rejected by the Turkish government and Makarios. As observed it was actually Makarios who obstructed the US plans in every step by “throwing a monkey wrench into the machinery” (Acheson quoted in Uslu, 2003: 68). In Acheson’s view, this attitude weakened the NATO nations including Turkey, Greece, USA and Britain, and USSR, Middle Eastern countries and Makarios had won the game. (quoted in Uslu, 2003: 61-69) In sum, Enosis was immanent in all the US solutions, and Turkey was to receive the smallest part of the cake although it stood for a solution within NATO and under the auspices of the US.

The aim of the US president Johnson in sending the famous letter to İnönü may be comprehended better by the help of the above brief outline related to Cyprus events and the US attitude and ends pertinent to Cyprus. Anyhow, for the aims of this study, I wish to continue with the impact of the Johnson letter and the Cyprus issue on the Turkish foreign policy especially in relation to its impact on the Left.

#### **4.1. Impact of the Cyprus Issue on Foreign Policy of Turkey and on the Legitimacy of the Turkish Left**

In Gönlübol’s view, Cyprus events played a decisive role in searching for a need of revision in Turkish foreign policy during 1964-65<sup>194</sup>. Although the military

---

<sup>194</sup> Gönlübol cited many reasons including the economic and political ones that resulted in the restoration of Turkish Foreign policy during the years 1960-70 in a detailed form. To him, one of the most important events which caused this restoration was the Cyprus issue and Johnson’s letter. Turkey’s distancing its relations with the West and the US, accompanied a rapprochement with the USSR. Yankee Go Home voices and slogans were first heard starting from the beginning of 1960’s (Gönlübol, 1982: 514-519).

coup of 27 May did not bring or did not intend to bring any radical changes to the basic principles of the Turkish Foreign Policy, the outbreak of the Cyprus Crisis in December 1963 and the events that took place in its aftermath played an important role in paving the way for a serious revision in the relations of Turkey with the West especially with the US. An increase in anti-Americanism and hostility towards NATO and the West in the public opinion was another upshot. Cyprus issue was perhaps not the sole creator of this situation yet it had “stimulated and triggered a potential that was already present in Turkey”. To him, the effect of Johnson’s letter had been greater than Cyprus event itself (Gönlübol, 1982: 518-9).<sup>195</sup> Actually, throughout 1964, the Cyprus question "monopolizing the attention of the country" was tremendously effectual in exposing Turkey’s isolation in foreign affairs<sup>196</sup> (Ahmad, 1977:188).

As indicated previously, the source of the criticisms on the problems of the Turkish foreign policy was mainly the left-wing journals and left in general.<sup>197</sup> Another crucial outcome of the Cyprus event related to this study, was the start of the

---

<sup>195</sup> To cite some of the comments on the effect of Johnson’s letter on Turkish foreign policy may be helpful in understanding the attempts to restore some aspects of this policy. It was argued that Johnson’s Letter was to shake the Turkish faith, as projected by various media including especially the press that a friendly image of Turkey had prevailed in the U.S. government circles. Erhan argued that the letter was to cast a serious shadow on US neutrality, helping Turkey to confront with her isolation in world politics. (Erhan, 2002: 689-690) Gönlübol pointed three major impacts of the letter: firstly, it demonstrated that Turkey’s only enemy was the USSR in the eyes of the US, secondly, the important thing to US was the interests of NATO, not the interests of Turkey, and thirdly, in case of an absence of a direct attack, US was not intending to operate the mechanisms of NATO to support Turkey (Gönlübol, 1982: 516-7). Oran and İnce asserted that by causing widespread reaction to America, the letter helped Turkey’s rejection of the American proposal of participation in the Multilateral Force, and the foundation of the national arms industry. It also served as a further catalyst in intensifying the left-right split in foreign policy as well as domestic policy, stimulating “a sweeping foreign policy reappraisal in the moderate RPP-inclined and leftist opinion” but also led to a re-orientation in official foreign policy (Oran, 2002: 669-674 and İnce, 1975: 166-67). İnce further argued that the letter brought about the first anti- American youth demonstrations. The university youth organizations in İstanbul in a public statement jointly condemned “leaders who wanted to strengthen their positions at the expense of human rights”. They demanded “new perspectives with our allies” (İnce, 1975: 172).

<sup>196</sup> It must be remembered that the Turkish thesis was completely ignored at the UN.

<sup>197</sup> This point is emphasized by Boran in her book “Türkiye ve Sosyalizmin Sorunları”. She argued that an important outcome of the Cyprus issue was to enable the discussion of foreign policy affairs which were a taboo since then. To her, this issue had revealed the high degree of dependence of Turkey on NATO and America, the lack of freedom of motion of its armed forces. Boran and Aybar were the two main actors of TİP in the National Assembly on foreign policy affairs yet especially the Cyprus issue is dealt with only a few sentences in her book (Boran, 1992: 376).

process of lifting of the embargo practised on the Left due to foreign policy matters. The criticisms directed to US and to the West were no longer a sign of “being a traitor” or a “communist”; on the contrary, they were accepted as a necessary stance for being a nationalist. From 1966 on, the need to change the relations with the US and NATO became the top issue of the Turkish political agenda. It was actually the achievement of the Turkish Left which was able to create a public opinion on the subject when the embargo on itself was lifted. Yet, as Firat rightly argued, the primary condition in order to criticize the relations with the West was to acknowledge the official view on Cyprus, and thus to prove the “nationalism” of the Left related to this issue (1997: 283). By the fulfilment of this condition, the voice of the Left began to be heard on issues related to foreign policy and it was very effective in creating public opinion yet it itself underwent a substantial and qualitative change during this process. Anti-imperialistic discourse overlapped with the nationalistic discourse and Turkish Left adopted nationalistic lines.<sup>198</sup>

Turkish Labour Party took its share of this transformation and it exhibited a serious wavering during this process too. Karpat justified this shift asserting that the Cyprus dispute enabled the party “to inject a much needed nationalist ingredient into its propaganda and thus expand its own influence” (Karpat, 1967:166).

Let’s trace the different positions taken by TİP throughout the whole process of Cyprus dispute.

## **4.2. Two Different Perspectives Adopted by TİP on the Cyprus Issue**

### **4.2.1. Initial Perspective – Defence of “National Treaty”**

In his memories, Sargin stated that TİP was hesitant in expressing its views on the “thorny” issue, the Cyprus question. Aybar frequently expressed his views on some aspects of the issue such as the absence of the demands of the Turkish Cypriot

---

<sup>198</sup> Firat argued that the stance of Mehmet Ali Aybar in relation to Cyprus issue was a good example of this alterance. To Firat, the representative of the Turkish Left, chairman of TİP, Aybar, in his speech on Cyprus issue, stated that Turkey could not have a desire beyond the borders of the National Treaty in 1965, yet, in 1967, he stated that a de-facto situation had to be established by a military intervention and that the question had to be solved between Greece and Turkey since Makarios government was no longer a legitimate one (Firat, 1997: 284).

community to integrate with Turkey and their lack of desire to confront the British power in Cyprus. In his opinion, Turkey should stick to the National Treaty and must never claim any right on any territory beyond her borders. On the eve of the Bursa meeting of the General Directory Council of the party dated 10 May 1964, he explained the views of TİP on Cyprus question as well as other domestic and foreign policy matters. In Sargın's view, although, Aybar passed "beyond the borders of the bulletin" prepared during the meeting of the Party Council pertinent to some issues including Cyprus, this extension was approved instead of causing discomfort amongst the members of the Council. (Sargın, 2001: 223-4) Yet, Aybar's announcement, especially his demand of sticking to the National Treaty in the solution of the Cyprus dispute was distorted by the reporter of Milliyet and was posed as "the refusal of the Cyprus Question by TİP". Sargın and Aybar both in their memories cited the furious reaction of the Turkish right in company with its youth and workers organizations and media. Party centres in many cities of Turkey were attacked by the right-wing activists. (Sargın, 2001: 223-24 and Aybar, 1988a: 235)<sup>199</sup> Before tracing the response of the party against these attacks, the speech of Aybar that caused the fury has to be examined.

---

<sup>199</sup> Aybar explains the events that took place after his Bursa speech as follows: "My speech on Cyprus led to furious reactions in all parts of Turkey. We received hostile telegrams. The members of the party youth distributing my speech to people in the streets were sent out of Ankara by the head commander of the Martial law. The commander prohibited my entrance to Ankara as well". He further stated that, as a result of these reactions, Esat Çağa, Prof. İsmet Sungurbey, Demir Özlü and Necla Sungurbey resigned from TİP. Esat Çağa declared that his resignation was due to "the wrong and unjust deeds of the party leaders". Aybar argued that Çağa was one of the two senators of TİP senators in the Parliament and that he might have asked the party to reassess its thesis or to discuss it once more. Aybar quoted the first form of the thesis of TİP explained in his Bursa speech as consisting of the following points: "In TİP's opinion, the bloody events led by EOKA must be stopped immediately. The armed UN force in the island is responsible for the protection of peace between the two communities. We must immediately act in order to guarantee the security of life and property of our Cypriot collaterals and in order for the UN forces to fulfil their job. Yet, we must refrain from adventurous actions and follow Atatürk's dictum "peace in the world and peace in the Motherland" based on "National Treaty". It was further declared that "Turkish Cypriots must achieve the principal rights, the primary condition for a human living and this status must be guaranteed". In Aybar's view, "in the final analysis, the problematic situation that Turkey was confronted in Cyprus was the result of the deviation of Turkey from the foreign policies of 'National Treaty' built by Atatürk during the War of Liberation". An understanding of foreign policy that can be summarized as "giving bases and getting foreign aid" did not suit the "Turkey of the war of liberation" (italics and dots belong to Aybar, 1988a: 237, translation mine).

In the May 1964 issue of the unofficial magazine of the party, *Social Justice*, the summary of the speech of Aybar on Cyprus question was published.<sup>200</sup> Aybar started his speech by evaluating the approach of the government in relation to the problem and stressed on the importance of the explanation of İnönü regarding “the establishment of a new world and the place of Turkey in this new world”. Citing the bloody events that took place in the island in detail, he stated that they should be solved by the active intervention of the UN forces. To him, though the Turkish community were pleased with London/Zurich agreements and with the new Cyprus Constitution, Makarios and the Greek community were annoyed. He further asserted that the Turkish Cypriot community never had a desire of “being a part of the motherland” and had never fought for such an ambition.<sup>201</sup> As a consequence, the crisis ought to be solved within the principles of the National Treaty and the Turkish Cypriots had to gain their security of life and property as soon as possible (quoted in Sargin, 2001: 224)<sup>202</sup>.

On 13 May, 1964, two days after the “distorted summary” of the Aybar’s speech on Cyprus question, TİP felt itself obliged to make a new announcement on the subject; in Sargin's words, some statements that seemed to be “troublesome” were made “more explanatory” (Sargin, 2001: 224). This bulletin was as follows:

---

<sup>200</sup> See Appendix D for the details of Aybar’s Bursa Speech quoted in Sargin.

<sup>201</sup> Sargin’s memories gives the impression that Aybar was influenced by the struggle of the Greek Cypriots against British colonialism, and was disappointed by the neutral and even collaborative behaviour of the Turkish community in its relations with the colonialist power and its reluctant attitude to become a part of Turkey.

<sup>202</sup> This initial stance of TİP was approved by TKP in the Leipzig Report published in 1964. In the report, it was argued that, for TİP, the Turkish Cypriots never had an ideal- an ideal that was inherited to them - of joining to the Motherland for which blood was shed. Yet, the Greek Cypriots inherited the cause of ENOSIS for which they had shed their blood. Ultra-nationalist and pro- ENOSIS, fascist EOKA has prompted the recent bloody events. The British and Americans had mutual interests in keeping the Middle East under their control and these interests converge with those of the Greek Bourgeoisie. ENOSIS was in favour of the interests of these states. The first thing to be done, according to TİP, was to put an end to the bloody events in the island .The security of life and property of Turkish Cypriots had to be immediately be secured and their status should be guaranteed. TKP further argued that Mehmet Ali (meaning Mehmet Ali Aybar) proposed a round table conference for the solution of the problem. To Aybar, the representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities and of Turkey and Greece and the representative of UN would be the sides of the problem to be solved. In TKP’s view, Aybar supported the independence, territorial integrity, demilitarization of the island and the realization of its neutrality under international guarantee (1963-65 TKP Belgelerinde “İşçi Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP”, 2003: 208, translation mine).

The bloody events that continue (in Cyprus) in line with a plan prepared by the extreme nationalist, pro-ENOSIS, fascist terror organization EOKA, must immediately be stopped. The Turkish Cypriots must be supplied with all their fundamental rights, the right of life and security for which they have shed their blood and a system must be established in the island so as to protect these rights. UN must take serious precautions to stop bloodshed in the island and the pacifist behaviour of these forces must be halted. Cyprus crisis, that has become an extremely serious and worrisome issue of our foreign policy since last December, can only be solved in the light of “National Treaty” and by the help of a foreign policy with personality. Circles that look for an opportunity to attack the party allege the presence of some views on the Cyprus question that do not belong to our President; these are lies that have no connection to us. Our president has never declared that Turkey does not have a cause as Cyprus; this is a big lie (Eylem, 1964: 56, translation mine).

On 30 May 1964, the chiefs of city organizations were invited to Ankara for a meeting to shape the Cyprus policy of TİP. In the wake of the meeting it was announced that the ongoing party policy on Cyprus was approved by all party units. On 5 June 1964, after receiving Johnson’s letter, İnönü called the party leaders to Çankaya to discuss the situation yet Aybar was not invited. TİP protested this unjust and partial behaviour by a telegram on 11 June 1964.

Two articles published in the journal Social Justice exposed quite similar views to those of Aybar’s Bursa speech. In Social Justice dated 17 April 1964, under the heading of “Londra/Zürih Anlaşmaları”, the support of the Turkish Cypriot minority by the British colonialists due to their co-operative behaviour of Great Britain during the occupation years, the rebellion of Greek Cypriots against the British colonialism, Turkey being dragged into the Cyprus issue by England - the main architect of London/Zurich agreements which were prepared first and foremost for the security and maintenance of the British bases- were discussed in detail. Turkish Cypriot leadership was covertly criticized by arguing that though the Greek side had

triggered the tension between the two communities, the vetoes used by the Turkish side were also “unjust” and “unsuitable to the political situation” (Social Justice, 1964: 43-4).

The other article worthy of note belonged to Burhan Cahit Ünal. In the article “Kıbrıs Çıkmazı Dış Politikamızın Çıkmazıdır”, he stated that “the national interests of Turkey and the long-term interests of the peoples of the Middle East” did not converge with “the interests of the imperialists in this region and with the foreign policy pursued by the RPP government”. Pointing to the peace-loving essence of the Atatürk’s foreign policy, “the National Treaty”, he argued that the only “positive” upshot of the Cyprus problem was its “paving the way for the discussion of many foreign policy issues” and enabling the public opinion to investigate the real nature of the agreements signed with our western allies (Ünal, 1964: 4). In his opinion, the strategic and economic interests of the USA would be secured if ENOSİS were realized.<sup>203</sup>

These articles – actually a reiteration of Aybar’s Bursa speech- are of crucial importance since many arguments supported in them were abandoned or reverted in the following years. The significance of the original thesis was beyond all its defence of National Treaty and its emphasis on Lausanne which had forbidden any kind of irredentism of the new Turkish Republic. The logical outcome of this approach was the rejection of any kind of intervention to the Cyprus Republic. In addition, London/Zurich agreements and the constitution were covertly criticized without falling into the trap of nationalism. The themes encompassing the support of ‘national unity in national problems’, defence of military intervention and speaking of a possible “casus belli” regarding the attitude of Greece on Cyprus question were some points noticed in the announcements and speeches of the party in the succeeding years yet non-existent in the original approach of TİP. In YÖN, the Cyprus thesis of TİP in general was cited as follows:

---

<sup>203</sup> In Ünal’s opinion, DP claimed rights on the island because it had already “collaborated with the former colonial power Great Britain to defend the interests of ‘the imperialists in the Middle East’”. RPP, abandoning the National Treaty policy of Atatürk supported DP’s Cyprus policy. The rights given to the Turkish Cypriot community and to Turkey by London/Zurich agreements and the Cyprus constitution were “the outcome of the assistance of Turkey to imperialist England” (Ünal, 1964: 5).

TİP defends a demilitarized Cyprus freed of foreign bases. TİP defends a federal, independent Cyprus based on equal rights of two communities under international guarantee. TİP wishes a round table meeting, with the members of both communities of Cyprus, a representative of the UN, of Turkey and of Greece (YÖN, 1964e, translation mine).

TİP continued to defend this thesis as an ultimate proposal for solution of the Cyprus question which was correct and shared by all factions of the Turkish Left.

#### **4.2.2. Final Perspective – Closer to a Nationalistic and Militaristic Policy**

In the following pages, I shall try to pursue the views of TİP pertinent to Cyprus issue through the speeches of its leaders in the Parliament from 1965 to 1969 in a consecutive order so as to enable an impartial assessment within a historical framework. The views supported by the party leaders in their books will be another point of reference.

Aybar's speech on the general discussion on Cyprus in the National Assembly dated 27 December 1965, almost a month after the October elections, may be evaluated as the point of departure of the approach to nationalistic line related to Cyprus question.

He began his speech by stating that all parties in the National Assembly should try to find a solution to the Cyprus problem "on the basis of national interests" leaving the "infertile debates aside" (NA Minutes, 27/12/1965, first meeting, 28<sup>th</sup> session: 27). Pointing to the harmful impacts of the entry to military pacts on unequal terms, as experienced by Turkey during the Cyprus Crisis (quoted in Aren, 1993: 179) and to the role of played by Great Britain in order to secure her military bases, Aybar argued that the US and Great Britain would side with Greece in the process of the Cyprus crisis. Makarios had succeeded in persuading all the nations participating in the Cairo Conference to accept that his movement was a national one without any implication to ENOSIS, although this was only a "skilful play", not reflecting the truth. In his opinion, as the Makarios government was not a "legitimate" but a "de facto" government, it should not be recognized by the UN and Turkey and should not be accepted as a collocutor as well. Defending the London/ Zurich agreements and

justifying their validity according to international law, he asserted that the Turkish Republic should maintain its military unit in Cyprus and replace it when it was "convenient". Since Cyprus Greek government was not Turkey's collocutor, Turkish government should henceforth accept the Greek government as collocutor and that the Turkish government should warn the Greek government that the "necessary response will be given in case of an attack to our military unit or to our Cypriot collaterals and that such an attack would be counted as a *casus belli* by the Turkish side". In his opinion, though the Turkish state was "peace-loving", the Turkish government ought to let "the Greek government and UN hear this warning" of Turkey (NA minutes, 27/12/1965, first meeting, 28<sup>th</sup> session: 31- 32). Repeating the Cyprus thesis of TİP that "Cyprus should be freed from military bases and should be neutralized under international guarantee and it also should be transformed into a federative and independent country based on the equal rights of the two communities"; Aybar stated that Turkey, Greece, Cyprus Greek Community and Cyprus Turkish Community must be invited to a "round table conference" to negotiate this thesis and it ought to be explained to all nations of the world and to the Third World countries. Every nation in the world should know "the determination of Turkey of keeping its armed and military forces in Cyprus" and that "an attack" to these forces would be taken as a "*raison d'être for war and casus bell*".<sup>204</sup> Aybar concluded his speech stating that "only by the help of this attitude", Cyprus question would be solved in accordance with the needs of Turkey (NA minutes, 27/12/1965, first meeting, 28<sup>th</sup> session: 33, emphasis added)<sup>205</sup>.

---

<sup>204</sup> A week later, in 5 January 1966, Tarık Ziya Ekinci, another TİP deputy, made a speech in the National Assembly, a reiteration of Aybar's speech referred above Ekinci also cited the call of Aybar, who, according to him, full of "nationalist feelings" was a call on the need of dealing with the Cyprus problem beyond domestic and personal political disputes (National Assembly Minutes, Vol. 2, Session 1, Meeting 31: 228 -231).

<sup>205</sup> It should be noted that the Nation Party and the Republican Peasant Nation Party both were in favour of military intervention too. See National Assembly minutes dated 27 December 1965. On the other side, RPP spokesperson Nihat Erim argued that a federative, independent Cyprus state could be achieved by diplomatic means. He asserted that 'a federative system in which the presence and legal rights of both communities were secured' was the federative system supported in "the Moscow resolution dated 6 November 1964". In his opinion, the former RPP governments persuaded "Russia to the establishment of an independent, federative, democratic, sovereign Cyprus state based on the presence of two communities" (NA Minutes, second meeting, 30th session, 29/12/1965:168-9). This was in effect very much similar to the Cyprus Thesis of TİP with the exception that no military intervention to the island was proposed or supported.

In spite of the correctness of the main thesis, Aybar's speech was of utmost importance because, for the first time, the adoption of the approach of the military intervention to an independent Republic recognized by the UN, was raised by TİP. A second new theme in this approach was the rejection of Makarios as a collocator of the Greek Cypriot community. In YÖN's opinion, this allegation was the denial of the participation of the Greek Cypriot community to the round table meeting for the decision of the future of Cyprus state because in the Security Council resolution dated 4 March 1964, Makarios was chosen as the UN collocator (YÖN, 1965g). The demand of military solution to the problem was a significant retreat from the initial stance of the party which was the defence of National Treaty as Atatürk's policy<sup>206</sup>.

Supplementing nationalistic and militaristic elements to the approach of TİP on Cyprus issue continued in the years following 1965 elections. TİP, like the other parties, voted for the authorization of the Demirel government for a military intervention to Cyprus. On this occasion, TİP published two declarations in December 1967.

In the first of these, Demirel government was accused of not using the authorization for intervention due to US pressures and it was argued that Greece was forced to attack Turkey 48 years ago by "American Christians (gavur)". After stressing the importance of Cyprus for the security of Turkey, it was asserted that annexation of Cyprus by Greece would mean that imperialism would put Turkey under its yoke (Dinler, 1990: 83-4).<sup>207</sup>

In the second declaration, government was once more accused of stepping back from military intervention to Cyprus due to the pressure of NATO and the US. In TİP's opinion, by adopting a method bargaining for the solution of the Cyprus

---

<sup>206</sup> It is interesting that in spite of these new elements in Aybar's speech, on 1966, the following resolution was passed in Malatya Congress : " The Party has to pursue a foreign policy within the boundaries and philosophy of the National Treaty, that is, avoiding to implementation of occupational adventures we might be dragged in by imperialism out of our national borders" (Aren, 1993: 274, emphasis added, translation mine).

<sup>207</sup> For an important portion of the first declaration of TİP, see Appendix D.

issue, Turkey had lost the second opportunity of intervention to Cyprus (Dinler, 1990: 83-4).<sup>208</sup>

Similar nationalistic and militaristic themes were observed in the speech of Boran during a panel held on Cyprus issue. She argued that annexation of the island by Turkey was not possible “in the conditions of a realistic foreign policy” so annexation of the island by Greece should be stopped. In her opinion, this was solely possible by the defence of an independent, federative Cyprus free of arms and soldiers. TİP saw the Cyprus problem “as a part of war against imperialism”, thus TİP group in the Parliament “voted for Turkish military intervention to Cyprus”. A socialist party did not mean a “pacifist” one, thus they would not stay with “crossed arms” when national independence of Turkey was concerned. She further argued that if the Cyprus question was approached by an anti-imperialist stance and the appropriate praxis was chosen, it would result in the ousting of American and NATO bases in Turkey and in the winning of anti-imperialist war (Dinler, 1990: 85)<sup>209</sup>.

These perspectives, in which there was almost no reference to the contradictory interests of the bourgeoisie and the labouring masses of the Cypriots, were maintained throughout TİP’s parliamentary experience. One of the crucial speeches in the Parliament belonged to Boran who raised a discussion on the political options on the Cyprus question. In her opinion, the first solution was the annexation of the island by Turkey. Due to the strategic importance of Cyprus, TİP would much appreciate “if it were under the control of Turkey (in the hands of Turkey) as in the time of the Ottoman Empire” yet it was not possible in the meantime. Moreover, this option was not open to discussion as well. Another solution -double annexation and separation- was also an unworkable one since Greece, Makarios, Great Britain were against it. So the only logical solution, in accordance with the “national interests” of Turkey consisted the following ; Cyprus should not belong to any other foreign country; no foreign country should be allowed to establish bases that would result in

---

<sup>208</sup> See Appendix F for a full text of the second declaration of TİP.

<sup>209</sup> Boran reiterated the same views in a panel held in Spor ve Sergi Sarayı by the participation of RPP, TİP and RPNP representatives during the same days. The topic of the panel was “What should an anti-imperialist Cyprus Strategy be” (Dinler, 1990: 85-86, translation mine).

a military hegemony and control over Turkey and over the Middle East states.<sup>210</sup> (NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> Session, 5.1.1967: 77- 79) Reiterating the thesis of TİP, she argued that, if the Cyprus state were “neutralized”, made free of military bases, arms and of soldiers; the main points of opposition between two communities would be eliminated. Such a Cyprus thesis would be available for the Third World countries as well since it was a supportable, solid, logical and just one. The US supported ENOSIS due to the possibility of the maintenance of the English and NATO bases because in case of its realization, it would control Turkey, the Middle East and all the Eastern Mediterranean (NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 29<sup>th</sup> Session, 5.1.1967: 80).<sup>211</sup>

On the occasion of an interpellation presented to the Parliament by Alparslan Türkeş<sup>212</sup> on 4 December 1967, Boran once more accused the Government of refraining from the use of authority for military intervention granted to it by the Turkish National Assembly, and by putting an end to the alert position of the Turkish troops. She asserted that the military intervention, which was a serious matter, lost its significance due to the stepping down of the government. In her opinion, Turkish government was deceived by Makarios, the head of an illegitimate government, and Greece together with Makarios tried to abrogate the London/Zurich agreements by the help of the Turkish government (National Assembly minutes, 4/12/1967, First Meeting, 12<sup>th</sup> Session, 4.12.1967: 327-330). She further argued that the government firstly should convince the world public opinion that Turkey had stopped being a satellite of the US and secondly should put forward a thesis which would bring peace to the region and provide the security of Turkey and also pave the way for an intervention for sustaining this security Turkey ought to have behaved “energetically” to secure peace, since it would be possible to urge the sides of the

---

<sup>210</sup> These allegations were in fact very close to the approach of the government. See NA minutes and Çağlayangil’s speeches on the issue in the same session.

<sup>211</sup> Boran reiterated the same points in her speech on the budget of the Foreign Ministry dated 17 January 1967, nearly ten days after the above speech ( Aren, 1993: 199-200).

<sup>212</sup> Alparslan Türkeş was a former member of the NUC famous for his fascist views. As the leader of the fascist party, he was accused of the murder of many left wing students and TİP members and affiliates during the 12th September coup d'etat yet he was released short after his arrest. In his famous letter to Kenan Evren – head of the junta – he argued that it was incomprehensible for him to be held in prison since his ideas were in power.

dispute to start negotiations by ensuring them of the determinate stance of Turkey. She argued that war was a sanction to force the enemy to political solutions as Yalçın cited<sup>213</sup>, yet Turkey had not achieved the political solution without war. TİP was against war since it was a socialist party preferring peaceful solutions when possible, yet to be “peaceful” did not mean to be “pacifist”<sup>214</sup> In Boran’s view, “peace” was “not a policy of good will, giving concessions and soothing” and a peace-loving person meant the one who knew to fight when necessary (N.A. minutes, 4/12/1967, session 1, meeting 12: 331).<sup>215</sup>

Turhan Feyzioğlu's (the spokesperson of the Security Party) speech following Boran’s reflected the political evenness of the Parliament on Cyprus problem. Asserting that the island should be held under the blockade of the Turkish Navy and Turkish Air Forces to prevent the entrance of the Greek forces and the military equipment, he pointed to the ‘decisive, strong and impatient stance of the Turkish National Assembly’ in national unity and solidarity issues. In his opinion, this situation was satisfactory to reverse the conditions which emerged after the abrogation of the agreements (London/Zurich agreements) by Greece and Makarios (N.A. minutes, 4/12/1967, meeting 1, session 12: 335).

---

<sup>213</sup> At the beginning of the same session, the Spokesperson of the JP, Aydın Yalçın argued that peace was the government’s greatest achievement and this was in agreement with National Treaty and Atatürk’s principle of “peace in the motherland, peace in the world”. In his opinion, for the first time in its history, Turkey had succeeded to live in “continuous” peace between the years 1922 and 1967 due to these principles. In his reply to the representatives of other political parties accusing the government for refraining from war, he argued that the JP government strove to reach the national targets by means of peace as much as possible. War was a sanction to persuade the enemy to accept a political solution and this aim was achieved by the retreat of the Greek units and that both, Greece and the Makarios governments realized the sincerity of Turkey of the defence of its Cypriot collaterals (N.A minutes, 4/12/1967, first meeting, session 12: 321-2).

<sup>214</sup> Boran gave the example of Jesus behaving as a pacifist who turned his other cheek for the attack of its enemy after the first cheek was hit (N.A. minutes, 4/12/1967, meeting 1, session 12: 331).

<sup>215</sup> Anyhow, in 1976, Boran would argue that a peaceful policy should be employed in the solution of problems between Greece and Turkey along with the principles of the National Treaty, and a condition of war and nationalist discourse and activities pertinent to the problem should be prevented. She further asserted that the political problems between Turkey and Greece including Cyprus could solely be solved under the government of the labouring masses in all three countries in accordance with justice and equality. She criticised the Turkish and Cyprus Turkish administrations for supporting the interests of their bourgeoisie. Stressing the need of the employment of a similar status to Cyprus as in Switzerland or Austria (echoing YÖN’s proposal of 1960s), she defended the “democratization of the inner structures of both communities” of Cyprus and the encouragement of the participation of the workers and labouring masses to the administrative structures (Boran, 1976:1-8).

The above mentioned approach of the party in relation to the Cyprus issue continued in 1968 and 1969 as well.<sup>216</sup> In 1968, Boran made a speech on the budget of the ministry of foreign affairs, accusing the government of pursuing a foreign policy “on the same wavelength with NATO and the US”. She argued that since the real aim of the US was the maintenance of British or NATO bases in the island, she might try to come to terms with Makarios and even bargain for the transfer of British bases to NATO. She also criticised the government of supporting the “illegitimate” government of Makarios and ascribing it an ”independent” feature (TÜSTAV arşivi, 2003: 74).

On 22 January 1969, Aybar made a speech in the National Assembly and criticized the two theses of the parliamentary opposition parties that - separation and federation - in terms of availability. He argued that in international politics, defending a thesis favouring the national interests was not a satisfactory condition since it should also be acceptable to the “other party of the dispute” and to the “world public opinion”. There were several obstacles in relation to separation thesis. The first was the presence of the independent Cyprus state, a member of the UN and which had acquired an international status due to the London / Zurich and Nicosia (Lefkoşe) agreements. Thus, Makarios and the Third World countries would reject the separation thesis since Makarios had been successful to persuade them that he was a “sacred fighter who struggled against British imperialism and imperialism in general”. Separation for the US meant giving a base to Turkey “in the size of a garden” (N.A. minutes, 22/1/1969, meeting 1, session 24: 407). He argued that USSR was against any type of separation thesis as well. If separation was realized and the island was to be divided between Greece and Turkey equally, NATO bases would be established on both lands since both countries were NATO members. However, if, after the separation, NATO membership of Turkey would come to an end, the bases on the Greek side would cause a threat for Turkey and for the other

---

<sup>216</sup> After presenting a general review on the events in the Middle East, Boran argued that the government did not dare to carry the Cyprus issue to the UN since the medium was not appropriate for Turkey to achieve a positive outcome. To her, the genuine reason for the support granted to Makarios by the Third World countries was not due to the existent minority and ethnic groups in these countries. The real characteristic of the Third World states was their anti imperialist inclinations and their extreme sensitivity towards Anglo Saxon imperialism.

Middle East countries. Separation was technically impossible too because it would result in a huge question of migration in the island. Aybar also stated that, all political parties whether in opposition or in power pursued a passive policy because Turkey had deviated from the road of Atatürk. Recent examples were Johnson's Letter and the invalidation of the authorities donated to Demirel government for military intervention after the visit of Cyrus Vance. The incapability and impotence in the defence of national interests were due to the presence of bilateral agreements, of American bases and of the dependence of Turkey on international capital. The most suitable policy for Cyprus was attempting to obtain international guarantees for the security of life and property of Turkish Cypriot collaterals and to maintain the national security of Turkey. Cyprus had to be prevented from being a threat in the Middle East and ENOSIS should undoubtedly be eliminated (NA minutes, 22/1/1969, meeting 1, session 24: 409). Explaining the thesis of TİP, he asserted that it concentrated on two points; the right of purveyance of soldiers in the island and the maintenance of the right of intervention granted to Greece and to Turkey until the implementation of the new status in a convincing and secure manner. The withdrawal of the Turkish troops should only be realized after the "realization of security conditions". TİP supported the integration of the island to an independent state status under international guarantee on the basis of provision of equal rights of both communities. Turkey, USSR, USA and other countries chosen by the UN would be the guarantor states for this state. This written proposal was handed over to the head of the National Assembly by the party deputies (N.A. minutes, 22/1/1969, meeting 1, session 24: 409-410).

The speeches of Aybar, Boran and some other documents of the party in relation to Cyprus thesis are quoted in detail in order to prevent misunderstandings and to pave the way for the impartiality of evaluations. Although the above citations may suffice to expose the stance of TİP, the views of some significant left-wing parties and groups in and out of Turkey will be reviewed.

### 4.3. Other Left Wing Positions on the Cyprus Issue

#### 4.3.1. Internal Perspectives: Approaches of YÖN and MDD

YÖN's approach to the problem was important since it was one of the significant centres of the Turkish Left during 1960s. The other significance of YÖN's approach was its disparities related to the components of the Cyprus issue compared to TİP's thesis in some points.

Though TİP was highly criticized by YÖN due to its Cyprus stance<sup>217</sup>, YÖN also displayed a shift on the same issue but somewhat in the opposite direction. In YÖN dated 1 May 1963, Avcioğlu argued that Makarios intended to eliminate all guarantees donated to Turkish community and to create an administration under the complete hegemony of Greek Cypriots, criticising USA and Great Britain by adopting a compromising policy towards both Turkey and Greece, an attitude which was considered to facilitate the job of Makarios. This stance of YÖN, ignoring solutions beyond the 1959 agreements, continued until 1964 (quoted in Fırat, 1997:159).

Following the autumn of 1964, a shift was observed accompanying the appearance of İbrahim Çamlı's articles in YÖN (Fırat, 1997: 160-161). In the article "Türk Dış Politikası belirli bir felsefeye dayanmalıdır", Çamlı stated that Cyprus was a good incentive for Turkey to shift towards an independent foreign policy and neutralization was the best foreign policy philosophy. (Çamlı, 1964b) Moreover, in a comment of YÖN pointing to the availability of the foreign policy of Atatürk for the solution of the Cyprus problem, it was argued that Turkey ought to reject the presence of Anglo-Saxon bases in the island despite its "NATO/CENTO membership and loyalty to 1960 agreements" and USSR and the Asia/African

---

<sup>217</sup> İlhami Soysal, in his article "Eğri Oturalım Doğru Konuşalım" argued that Aybar, in his first speech, introduced Cyprus cause as a war of independence of Greeks. When YÖN declared that Cyprus question was "an outcome of Helen imperialism which was dependent on Anglo Saxon imperialism" and that the solution of the problem solution rested in "the establishment of an independent and federative Cyprus state freed of bases by the support of all anti imperialist forces" TİP achieved a "serious Cyprus policy" (Soysal, 1966: 10). Avcioğlu, in his article "TİP'e Dair" also argued that, due to its wrong interpretation of ENOSIS policies, TİP evaluated the Cyprus events as the war of independence of the Greek Cypriots (Avcioğlu, 1966a).

countries should be persuaded to accept the federation thesis of Turkey (YÖN, 1965a).

As observed previously, TİP defended an independent, federative Cyprus state free of bases as well and was in search of options to persuade USSR and Asia/Africa countries to support the Turkish thesis of federation. The leading role of Atatürk's foreign policy for the solution of the problem was another common point between two left wing positions. Yet, an important detail was the evaluation of "London/Zurich agreements" on which YÖN had a totally different attitude. İbrahim Çamlı, in "Kıbrıs'ta Hayal ve Gerçek" stated that, in YÖN's view, it would be "irrelevant to expect USSR and the non-aligned countries to support Turkey's federal state thesis as long as she insisted on the implementation of the London/Zurich agreements". (Çamlı, 1965b) YÖN opposed to the Cyprus constitution as well. Çamlı further argued that the Turkish community which constituted 20 percent of the total population had a share of representation exceeding this percentage in the Assembly (teşrii meclis) and in the governmental mechanisms of Cyprus and its right to veto could very well cause a paralysis in the execution of state affairs (Çamlı, 1964a). He proposed the following solution for Cyprus in the name of YÖN. The only means "to close the door to ENOSİS and to open the door for a federal state" was the thesis of an independent, neutralized Cyprus and the rejection of London/Zurich agreements because these agreements together with the three NATO countries including Turkey restricted the sovereignty of Cyprus. In the issue dated 25 September 1964, YÖN's formula for Cyprus was once more repeated; "A demilitarised, neutralized Cyprus (as experienced in Austrian case) which has broken all its legal and strategic ties with NATO". In YÖN's view, Turkey's support for the London/Zurich agreements was probably due to "the influence of the Anglo-Saxons who do not want the island to break away from Cyprus". It was totally illogical to make the London / Zurich agreements and some articles of the Cyprus constitution the starting point of the Turkish thesis. It was also argued that the Third World countries with "at least 50 votes in the UN" directed the world politics and "Makarios" Cyprus" was a part of this bloc, at least spiritually. It was a mistake of Turkey "to reject to start negotiations which aimed to change the status of Cyprus of 1959 on the eve of December 1963". Turkey might have succeeded in achieving new advantages which

would guarantee the social, economic and cultural developments of the Turkish Cyprus community in return for “the alteration of some of the articles in the Cyprus constitution” which were indeed a hindrance for the execution of the state affairs. (Çamlı, 1965b).

YÖN’s views were convergent to TIP related to British military bases and the role of the US and Great Britain pertinent to Cyprus. YÖN argued that London and Washington primarily considered the Cyprus question as the establishment of maximum security for the military bases, which was main motive for their support of ENOSIS against Makarios. To Washington, ENOSIS meant the alteration of “neutral Cyprus” to a “land of NATO”. In YÖN’s view, USA and England were well aware that EOKA, Church and the Greek bourgeoisie in Cyprus were strong enough to prevent a communist coup d’etat in Cyprus which showed that the interests of the West coincided with the interests of the Greek bourgeoisie. Pointing to the imperialist aims of the American plans, YÖN argued that, the maintenance of Cyprus as a military base would endanger Turkey’s security since she “did not have imperialist desires or an aim of annexation on Cyprus”, thus she should not be involved in the establishment of military bases in this country. An “independent and neutral status for Cyprus similar to Austria” should be achieved through an international conference to be held with the participation all great states and the states of the region (Çamlı, 1964b).

It is interesting to observe the following lines in Çamlı’s article, echoing the themes we have witnessed in the Bursa speech of Aybar. In his opinion, the “Cyprus Greek community and its guerrilla forces EOKA” started the war of liberation against English colonial forces in 1954 which was “a reality to be accepted” and history would “allude to it as a war of independence during which the “Turkish community was only an observer”. This reality was a “low esteem” for Turkish Cypriots in international public opinion. The fact that this struggle was carried “under the flag of ENOSIS and under the flag independence” did not “save the Turkish community from criticism”. Çamlı even went further to claim that if the Turkish community “had joined in the liberation struggle of Cyprus from British colonialism on the side of the anti-enosis wing of Cyprus”, ENOSIS threat might have been eliminated (Çamlı, 1964a).

We observe a critique of Denktaş in YÖN as well. It was argued that the rights of the Turkish community might have been secured and ENOSIS might have been obstructed, if Denktaş had approved “a few changes in the constitution”. Çamlı had divergent views related to the behaviour of the UN peace keeping force as well. Though it was the Greeks who had started the genocide, it was a mistake of Turkey to put the blame on the UN peace units for the massacre of Turks. In Çamlı's opinion, they exhibited an impartial behaviour and actually did not have the right to fire unless they were attacked. Moreover to Çamlı, the events in Cyprus were purposely exaggerated because there were “people who benefited from the preservation of London/Zurich agreements and from the internal problems that would result due to the implementation of these agreements”. These were the people who were not “aware of National Treaty” and who thought that “Turkey’s right to intervene” would result “in annexation or in the total transfer of the island to Turkey”. In his opinion, it was hard for the two communities to live together after eight months of civil war and the solution ought to be searched in the *federal state formula*, which was actually a thesis supported by the Turkish government since the beginning of the crisis. Çamlı defined the federal state as a fully independent state, free of military bases and which was “not bound to any military bloc by any guarantee agreement”.<sup>218</sup> This formula had the chance of approval in the UN and in case of its rejection, other alternatives such as the “Cyprus as a land of UN” or “Cyprus under UN mandate” could be defended by Turkey. One witnesses a reiteration of these views in YÖN dated 24 December 1965 in addition to a new allegation. YÖN claimed that “the threat of military intervention of the Turkish side resulted in crowding the island with Greek soldiers” (Çamlı, 1965e).

---

<sup>218</sup> To İbrahim Çamlı, Turkey was confronted with two dilemmas; one was the desire of ENOSIS of Greece and of the right wing Greek Cypriot community in Cyprus which strove to put an end to the full independence of the island. The other was the possible loss of the rights of the Turkish Cypriot community approved by Cyprus Constitution in case of an alteration of London/Zurich agreements. He cited the following points for the solution of the problem as the proposal of YÖN; Turkey had to reject London/Zurich agreements and put forward the formula of “fully independent and neutralized Cyprus cleared from foreign soldiers and military bases”, which would stop Makarios’ manoeuvres. The annexation of Cyprus to another country -ENOSIS- would thus be prevented. Moreover, the issue of Turkish Cypriot community would be solved separately from the issue of independence of Cyprus in the most favourable conditions by a conference to be established by the UN. A federative solution for the Turkish Cypriot Community or a status providing the economic and social development of this community could be achieved with the support of USSR and it might work more effectively compared to the rights given to them according to the Cyprus Constitution.

In addition to these alternative solutions and the disagreement on 1959 agreements, YÖN's attitude related to Makarios was quite divergent to TİP's perspective as well. In YÖN's view, Makarios government was not an illegitimate one. In YÖN dated 2 October 1964, it was argued that the new plans of the USA for Cyprus - which included some concessions for Turkey in return for ENOSIS - was accepted by both Turkey and Athens yet "the resistance to the plan came from Makarios" (YÖN, 1964b).

Another important divergence between the two left wing circles, YÖN and TİP, was their attitude towards military intervention. YÖN attempted to support diplomatic solutions and heavily criticized TİP for its militaristic behaviour. In YÖN's view, Aybar supported "the thesis of military intervention" openly for the first time, a new thesis different from the previous one. (YÖN, 1965g) It was further argued that Aybar actually contradicted with his own proposal by rejecting Makarios as a legitimate collocutor since the thesis of TİP consisted of a round table meeting by the participation of Turkey, Greece, and the representatives of the two communities of the Cyprus state. To declare that Makarios was not a legitimate collocutor implied the rejection of the participation of the Greek community in the negotiations since Makarios was the leader of the Greek community and the head of Cyprus state. In addition, in the Security Council resolution dated 4 March 1964, UN had selected Makarios as its collocutor (YÖN, 1965g).<sup>219</sup> In YÖN's view, despite its erroneous deeds against the Turkish Cypriot community, Makarios resisted to US plans. In its issue dated 27 October 1964, YÖN argued that the new plans of the USA for Cyprus – consisting of the donation of one of the British bases to Turkey in return for ENOSIS - was accepted by both Turkey and Athens yet "the resistance to the plan came from Makarios"<sup>220</sup> (YÖN, 1964b). Çamlı and/or YÖN also argued that

---

<sup>219</sup> To YÖN, in spite of all these small confusions, the Cyprus thesis of TİP voiced the most correct and the most definite ideas on the subject (YÖN, 1965g).

<sup>220</sup> To New York Times, the Greek society in USA with Greek origin were confused to learn that Makarios had decided to send an official Cyprus delegation to Moscow for military aid. It was also argued that the problem was "whether this man, who does not know what he is doing" would be supported by Moscow or not, and that "this president was sabotaging the desire of ENOSIS of the Hellen world, its desire to make Cyprus to be a part of Greece". Makarios, under the veil of self-determination walked towards "an independent Cyprus, a strategy against ENOSIS". Though he spoke of ENOSIS from time to time, it was for sure that he did not believe in it. The American Greek community had to support the policy of Athens to help Hellenism, ENOSIS and peace instead of

“Turkish foreign ministry was misguided to think that Makarios was a puppet of Athens and that it was possible for London and Washington to make him surrender their wishes (Çamlı, 1964a). In Çamlı’s view, there were two fronts in the Greek section of Cyprus, the left-wing and Makarios siding with the non-aligned countries and close to the USSR and the right wing- EOKA, Grivas - and the Greek Government siding with the US and the Great Britain. Thus, although Makarios oscillated between ENOSIS and independence, he should not be ignored (Çamlı, 1965d).

It may well be argued that TİP and YÖN were of the same opinion on their final target, that is, a federative, independent, neutral Cyprus state free of arms and bases. They both offered a solution outside NATO and the US, supporting the interests of the peoples of the Middle East in relation to the Cyprus problem. Yet, one may well argue that YÖN’s proposal did not comprise a militaristic solution whereas TİP from 1965 to 1969 stood for military intervention in spite of some weak emphasis on peace. Makarios, as a representative of the Cyprus state, was totally ignored and attacked by TİP by the use of the same terminology of the right wing parties in spite of all his pro-Soviet, anti- imperialist and anti-US stance. It may also be important to note that, a criticism of the chauvinistic and militaristic behaviour and deeds of the leadership of the Turkish Cypriot community was either non-existent or quite vague in TİP’s final approach. The support of London/Zurich agreements and rejection of the presence of British bases and the future existence of NATO were seemingly paradoxical positions when one recalls the core of these agreements, that is, the aim to purge the communist influence and organizations in the island and to pave the way for the survival of imperialism. Another point to be

---

supporting Makarios” (quoted in YÖN, 1964b). Another comment on Makarios came from Vali Ferenc. He argued that after independence, Makarios “insisted on pursuing a neutralist policy” and although the British bases were secured thanks to London / Zurich agreements, Makarios “opposed all dealings with NATO”. He further argued that “Makarios would only stand up for ENOSIS on his death bed” although it was impossible for him to declare that he had totally abandoned ENOSIS because this would “deprive him of his post as a president or ethnarch” for sure (Ferenc, 1971: 266-4). A comment quoted by YÖN from a right wing Greece newspaper supporting the Greek government of those days confirmed the above views. Elefteria, calling Makarios as a ‘prostitute’, accused him of shifting towards the thesis of independent, demilitarized and neutral Cyprus under the influence of Galo Plaza. To Elefteria, it was once more proved that Makarios’s policy “would never lead to ENOSIS” (quoted in YÖN, 1965d, translation mine). It seems that Makarios and Athens were not on the same boat on every issue as claimed by TİP.

noted is that, by the defence of London/Zurich agreements and locking itself to a militaristic solution, TİP blocked all alternative solutions of the problem. While attempting to bring a solution to the Cyprus question from the point of view of anti-imperialism, it was imprisoned in the iron cage of a nationalist and militarist behaviour. As a final cautionary note, I should point out that YÖN's approach and proposals - in the wake of Çamlı's articles - were more distancing to the official policy and flexible on Cyprus issue compared to TİP's.

MDD's approach may be defined as an intermediate position between that of TİP and YÖN. Besides the existence of a frequent stress on nationalist themes pertinent to the Cyprus issue such as describing Cyprus as the "national cause" of Turkey and the defence of Turkish military intervention similar to TİP, MDD favoured the foundation of an independent and federative Cyprus free of arms and bases. In Aydınlik's opinion, Makarios - who was against ENOSIS - created an obstacle for American plans pertinent to Cyprus and the Middle East.<sup>221</sup> To be against ENOSIS and NATO, was to support national interests because the US favoured ENOSIS and to pursue a "national" policy in Cyprus issue meant to oppose the presence of American bases in the Middle East. The natural outcome of this national policy was the defence of the establishment of a neutral, independent, demilitarized federal Cyprus state. This would be a democratic state, liberated from the hegemony of imperialism, in which the Turkish and Greek Cypriots would live as equal and free citizens with democratic rights (Aydınlik, 1970: 473).

Fuat Fegan, in a quite different vein than TİP, argued that, the Greek Junta and Makarios should not be "put into the same pot" since the Greek government in the island was a "front of its own" which included right and left elements.<sup>222</sup> He further put emphasis on the fascist policies of the Turkish Cypriot administration, their co-operation with the imperialist forces and the crimes committed by this administration while attempting to sever the Greek and Turkish communities who used to live in

---

<sup>221</sup> Aydınlik argued that CIA agents prepared a plan of fascist coup d'etat -Hermes plan - aiming the elimination of Makarios. By this plan, every organization or person, including Makarios and the Cypriot left wing, who opposed the transfer of the island into a base of NATO would be either killed or made harmless (Aydınlik, 1970: 473).

<sup>222</sup> To Fegan, the Greek government in the island longed for ENOSIS in the long run, which would result in the surrender of Cyprus to imperialist states in the future (Fegan, 1969: 287).

peace for long years. In view, Fegan's view, units “under the command of imperialism” consisting of thousands of Turks were established by Great Britain and used in the massacre of “innocent Greek people”. Perhaps for the first time in a left wing journal the story of Turkish Commando units formed in Cyprus by the British against the national liberation forces of Greeks was cited. Fegan, sharing the view of YÖN, stated that London/Zurich agreements strengthened and guaranteed the presence and interests of British imperialism in the island (Fegan, 1969: 279-288).<sup>223</sup>

Another important article in *Aydınlık* on Cyprus appeared under the signature of Fuat Adalı, consisting of a detailed analysis on the class structure of the Turkish Cypriot community, the anti-democratic behaviour of the ruling class and its representatives –especially of Denктаş and his clique. An election executed in the absence of political parties was defined as the “open dictatorship of a class and its representatives” (Adalı, 1970: 212-223). As regards to Makarios’ position, Belli- the leader of the MDD movement - argued that Makarios was against the hegemonic policies of the USA in Eastern Mediterranean since he openly took sides with the Non-Aligned countries and rejected the Greek Junta (Belli, 1999: 285)<sup>224</sup>. TİP was heavily criticized by the MDD group in relation to its activities in the Parliament pertinent to Cyprus question. In this context, we may go over the main points on the critic of Erdoğan related to the speech of Aybar in the National Assembly. To him, Aybar’s speech on Cyprus was “a retreat and compromise from the general principles of socialism”. A socialist had to unveil the aggressive policy of the US in the region, the reactionary policy of the Greek Government and the activities of the US in order to bring a pro-American government to power in Turkey, while arguing the Cyprus question. Erdoğan claimed that Aybar was `successful in introducing a

---

<sup>223</sup> Fegan tells an interesting story in his article related to the commencement of the Greek/Turkish struggle in the island. To Fegan, on the eve of the events, a British commander collected about ten Greek youngsters from a Greek village and took them to Lefkoşe (Nicosia). On their way back, he dropped these youngsters somewhere near a Turkish village. Some men wearing robes of imams and carrying swords emerged immediately and murdered many of these children. Fegan argued that Greek fields were burned “to complete the mise-en-scene”. This was how the struggle between two communities began (Fegan, 1969: 281).

<sup>224</sup> It should also be noted that in Belli’s view the military intervention of Turkey on 1974 had shortened the life of Greek Junta so ought to be supported. He further argued that the intervention enabled `the safe and sound return of Makarios` to Cyprus, a view shared by some Greeks as well (Belli, 1999: 285-6).

Cyprus policy while neglecting all these points` and he had gone `as far to thank America – a country against which Turkey was waging a war of independence`<sup>225</sup>. Recalling Çağlayanil's gratitude to Aybar, he stated that it was “Erim who was attacked verbally in the Parliament due to his hostile behaviour towards the US” in the “national” cause. Thus, to Erdoğan, Aybar fell to the right of Erim (Erdoğan, 1966: 12).<sup>226</sup>

As noticed easily, the views of three prominent centres of the left – TİP, YÖN and MDD - were convergent on the general features of a Cyprus state yet diverged substantially on some components of the problem. One may argue that the representatives of the National Democratic Revolution (MDD) were more close to YÖN's views on the divergent points.<sup>227</sup>

---

<sup>225</sup> He accused Aybar of being unaware of the UN minutes before speaking in the Assembly since to Erdoğan USA had voted against Turkey in the voting of the article that formed the basis of UN resolution and the one that invalidated the bilateral agreements and all US satellites had voted against Turkey (Erdoğan, 1966: 12).

<sup>226</sup> Anyhow, MDD's support of military intervention was highly criticized by ANT- a monthly in the management of Doğan Özgüden -by yielding to petty bourgeois leadership and exhibiting a hysterical “social chauvinistic” attitude on Cyprus question (ANT, 1970: 47).

<sup>227</sup> The views of the representatives of some important left wing currents are reviewed above. Yet, there were other approaches which criticized both, TİP and MDD. A good example of this position may be traced in the article of the journal ANT “Kesintisiz Devrim yolunda işçi sınıfı partisi için İleri”, dated November 1970. ANT argued that, during 1967 Cyprus Crisis, Türk Solu (a journal published by the supporters of MDD), adopting a “social chauvinistic and hysterical behaviour” supported military intervention to the island just like TİP deputies. To the journal, parliamentary representatives of TİP supported the government's policy on Cyprus and that they were in favour of a military intervention. On the other side, Türk Solu too, dreamt of the beginning of an anti-imperialistic war headed by Demirel-Sunay and Tural triumvirate. ANT quoted the following passage from Türk Solu to prove its argument: “As Turkey, we have to show the world that we are determined to intervene. It is time to abandon the statements as ‘we are ready and determined’ since we are confronted with the task of sending troops to the island equal in number to those of Greece. Our resistance to the Greek fascists in Cyprus will be a turning point in the faith of the Turkish nation that is forced to submit to the American hegemony. Mustafa Kemal's Turkey will be established”. To ANT, the solution was neither to retaliate to the Greek Cypriots nor to declare war to Greece. Since the Turkish Armed Forces were under the command of NATO generals by virtue of NATO Treaty and since the Turkish government followed a foreign policy in line with the US, it would inevitably have to draw back even in conditions of a military success in Cyprus. The solution was the creation of an “independent Cyprus free of military bases in which both communities would live in peace” by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities themselves. No one else but the two sides of the dispute were to sit together and decide for their own future. In ANT's view, if the two communities were able to establish a united front against Anglo Saxon imperialism in Cyprus, that would be a progressive step towards the liberation of the Greek and Turkish peoples in the future. To ANT, the real enemy to be fought was America. Turkish, Greek and Cypriot peoples had to fight with the common enemy, not with themselves (this solution of ANT was first published in ANT dated 21 November 1967: 47, translation mine).

To review the ideas of some communist parties outside Turkey may be informative to comment on TİP.

### **4.3.2. External Perspectives**

#### **4.3.2.1. Approach of TKP**

The views of the pro-Soviet Turkish Communist Party which carried on its activities outside Turkey exhibited some different approaches in the Cyprus issue when compared to that of TİP though both parties converged on the main thesis for the solution of the question. The attitude of the TKP can be traced in the annual committee report of the Leipzig Group of the Turkish Communist Party published in 1964, where it was argued that the party supported the territorial integrity of an independent Cyprus state, free of arms and foreign bases, and liberated from imperialist intervention. According to the report, approaching the question in view of Atatürk's principles such as the National Treaty, TİP "bravely supported a thesis which was close to TKP's". For TKP, Ankara governments, who were tools of imperialist treachery, approached the Cyprus issue by the thesis of "either separation or death", provoking the Turkish minority towards Greeks. Greek and Greek Cypriot reactionaries and Turkish reactionaries both became tools in the hands of imperialism and paved the way for their imperialistic aims, that is, the maintenance of the military bases on the island. Nonetheless, the American and British imperialists felt secure due to the dependency of the Ankara government on imperialism and abandoned the defence of Turkish thesis of separation and shifted towards Greeks and Greek Cypriots, leaving Turkey in isolation in the international arena. This isolation was actually the bankruptcy of dependency policies on NATO and imperialist blocs. The nationalist forces were successful in linking the Cyprus question to the issue of imperialism. The joint pressure of the masses and the democratic forces exerted on the government obliged it to review its foreign policy and to take some steps towards a more independent position and to free itself of imperialist effects in relation to Cyprus policy. It was also argued that, by the Turkish-Soviet declaration signed in Moscow during Erkin's visit, Turkish government accepted the thesis of independent Cyprus having territorial integrity and

free of imperialist influences (1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP, 2003: 221-222).

In the official declarations of TKP, the need to change London/Zurich agreements was accentuated and it was forcefully emphasized that if it were not for the Turkish and Greek governments – two tools of the imperialist powers - the two communities would have lived in peace. Anyhow, a notice was added to the same declaration asserting that, due to some disagreements during the editing of the report on the issue of ENOSIS, some political mistakes related to Makarios were committed and his passive behaviour during the Christmas events and mutual massacres, his partial behaviour towards the Greek and Turkish minorities, were not criticized in the publications of TKP (1963-1965 TKP Belgelerinde İşçi-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP, 2003: 222-223).<sup>228</sup> This final note may be a proof of the presence of some divergent approaches in TKP pertinent to Cyprus issue and Makarios. In the aftermath of a meeting held between the delegations of TKP and GCP (Greek Communist Party), a joint declaration was issued in *Atılım* dated July 1974 -TKP's Central Committee organ. It was argued that the entrance of the 6th Fleet of the US to the territorial waters of Cyprus was rejected by both parties and supporting the just war of the Cyprus people against imperialism, they both denounced the intervention of the comprador Turkish and Greek circles – collaborators of the imperialist forces- to the domestic affairs of the Cyprus state. Both parties were in favour of the territorial integrity and independence of the Cyprus state and supported the view that the two communities ought to arrange their relations by peaceful and brotherly means. In the August issue of the same bulletin, the withdrawal of all foreign units, including the Turkish soldiers, was endorsed together with the refusal of ENOSIS. For TKP, “some reactionary circles in Turkey enforced the chauvinistic sentiments in order to enter to the island and settle there” under the veil of “saving the island”. The same was valid for the Greek Junta which also desired to put an end to the independency of Cyprus and make it a part of Greece. TKP argued that this attempt of the Greek

---

<sup>228</sup> It is quite interesting that TKP seems to take no notice of the chauvinistic and militaristic behaviour of TİP on the issue. One may consider two reasons for this attitude; they may not be aware of the alteration in the party's Cyprus policy or they may have deliberately chosen to overlook.

Junta was rejected by USSR, AKEL, TKP and GCP (Greek Communist Party). (Atılım, 1974: 8).

In 1972, in *Yeni Çağ* (another publication of the TKP) an announcement to the Turkish people was published where it was argued that the US imperialism by the help of NATO was in an attempt to put an end to the independent Cyprus state and make the island a military base for NATO. Supporters of “separatist” Denktaş and “pro-ENOSIS” Grivas provoked both communities against each other and the medium for the entrance of imperialists to the island was thus created by the help of both Ankara and Athens juntas. It was further argued that Makarios government which defended the independency and sovereignty of the island by directly supporting the Turkish and Greek patriots continuously tried to resist imperialism. The resistance of Makarios was supported by the socialist countries, by the peoples of the world who fought for their independence and by all democratic, peace-loving and anti imperialist world public opinion. In the declaration, it was asserted that Turkey faced a danger of war due to the policy based on war and adventure. To intervene with the domestic affairs of an independent country, a member of UN, to try to invade it would create irreversible catastrophes for Turkey (*Yeni Çağ*, 1972: 147).

As observed from the above quotations, TKP was in favour of the withdrawal of all foreign soldiers from the island. The party was against Denktaş and pro-Makarios –accepted the legacy of Makarios government - and forcefully rejected ENOSIS. No sign of militarism or chauvinism is found in the announcements and articles of this pro-Soviet party related to the issue in question yet one must not forget that it survived out of borders of Turkey under the protection of the Soviet Union.

#### **4.3.2.2. Approach of AKEL**

To review AKEL’s approach to the Cyprus problem, its attitude towards ENOSIS, its relations with the Turkish Cypriot Community, its evaluation of London/Zurich agreements is considered to provide some contributory insights. AKEL was the only political organization in Cyprus which favoured the co-operation of different ethnical groups, which had Turkish Cypriots among its members. The

organization secured the membership of ‘Turkish Cypriot fighters’ in its ranks even after the Turkish military intervention to Cyprus on 1974. (Chronicle, 1997: 138) The ten years between 1945 and 1955 witnessed the anti-imperialist struggle of the Greek Cypriots to liberate the British colony Cyprus. It may be argued that the victory over fascism, the presence of a bloc of socialist countries, the development of anti-colonial struggles in many parts of the world accompanying the crisis of the colonial system of capitalism did not only create favourable conditions for the victory of the war of liberation but for the spread of socialist/communist ideas throughout the island. Being well aware of these conditions, AKEL opted for a *tactical position*, “support of Enosis”<sup>229</sup> in order to gain strength in the political arena (İnce, 1975: 160, emphasis added). AKEL’s ENOSIS policy or tactics continued in the wake of the war of liberation too. After 1964, “Self-Determination and ENOSIS” principles were added to the party’s thesis of “non-aligned, independent, joined Cyprus”. On 30 December 1966, AKEL’s central committee adopted a resolution arguing that AKEL was insistent on the unification of Cyprus with Greece “without giving any territorial or administrative compromises” and that this policy of AKEL would be maintained until the achievement of “ultimate victory”. In Kızılyürek’s opinion, AKEL’s decision of support of Enosis targeted to break the monopoly of the nationalism of the Right yet it resulted in the adoption of the nationalist rhetoric as well. Criticising AKEL for the adoption the “ENOSIS but only ENOSIS” policy of the Hellen nationalists, he pointed to the impotence of the party in offering a common political ideal to workers and peasants of both communities of Cyprus. In his opinion, by the adoption of the ENOSIS policy by AKEL, the emergent Cyprus patriotism amongst the labourers and peasants faded away (Kızılyürek, 2003: 224).<sup>230</sup> Similar arguments were employed against AKEL

---

<sup>229</sup> Nonetheless, Ferenc Vali argued that AKEL was “never enthusiastic about ENOSIS” since such a solution would have resulted in a ban on the Communist Party, which was outlawed on the mainland under legal Greek provisions. Moreover, in Cypriote Communist circles, ENOSIS, known as the “NATO solution” for Cyprus, was objected as well. (Vali, 1971:243) Vali further argued that a genuine support of ENOSIS would have been “suicidal” for AKEL (Vali, 1971; 255).

<sup>230</sup> To support his views, Kızılyürek quotes the views of three Marxists of the Greek Communist Party who voiced this reality in their article in 1954 as follows: “If AKEL cannot manage to persuade the Turkish minority to join in its ranks, it will not be the leader of the struggle of the Cyprus people. Turkish labourers who distrust AKEL and Greeks because they are suspicious of Great- Greece

for its espousal of ENOSIS by other scholars as Bernandez who asserted that by entering the rivalry of patriotism for the cause of Enosis instead of confronting with the nationalistic Right, and thus totally neglecting the issue of the integration of two communities, it pursued an “opportunistic” policy<sup>231</sup>. In Fernandez’s opinion, concealing the nationalism of its discourse by the help of self-determination slogans, AKEL spoke of the “the defence of the motherland” instead of defending the co-operation of two communities, and instead of attacking “its own ruling class” and exposing the partial behaviour of the Hellenistic bourgeoisie, it chose to deal with the “foreign enemy” which it held responsible for all the menace in Cyprus. Thus, it weakened its own strength by becoming a part of “the dominant ideology”. Bernandez further argued that great political bravery was required to support proletarian internationalism in a period of immense nationalistic feelings (Bernandez, 1988: 1989, translation mine). These criticisms were endorsed by some AKEL leaders who claimed that AKEL was “imprisoned by ENOSIS” (Kızılyürek, 2002:116-118). Recalling a conversation with the general secretary of AKEL, Sadun Aren pointed to the enormous strength and influence of the nationalist feelings in the most progressive sections of the Cyprus society during 1960s as well (Aren, 1993: 123).<sup>232</sup>

In my opinion, AKEL’s defence of ENOSIS and denouncement of NATO created a paradoxical situation. While rejecting the Acheson plan, it supported the thesis of “undiluted ENOSIS” arguing that the most secure way to reach ENOSIS was to keep alive the independent Cyprus Republic.<sup>233</sup> The slogan of the party “Yes

---

chauvinism. The indifferent behavior of AKEL towards the Turkish minority is nothing but a representation of this chauvinism” ( Kızılyürek, 2003: 263, translation mine).

<sup>231</sup> In Bernandez’s view, the reasons behind this weakness were the level of mobility of the Cyprus Greek society and the relative equilateral characteristics of the social system which targeted dissolving the class differences to a certain extent. The wages of the working class were high, thus the workers and the peasants were not eager to abandon their social rights and strong trade unions for a future project of socialism. He further argued that the Cyprus Greek bourgeoisie was in accord with AKEL too (Bernandez, 1988 : 1989).

<sup>232</sup> Aren recalled his conversation with the general secretary of AKEL who claimed that “no Greek” could dare to reject “ENOSIS” since no Turk” could dare to “support” it. (Aren, 1993: 123) Aren further asserted that AKEL abandoned the defence of ENOSIS in the succeeding years.

<sup>233</sup> This was voiced by Andreas Fantis on 7 July 1964. He argued that the policy of non- alignment was the best way which led to ENOSIS and in case of a referendum for self-determination, AKEL would vote for ENOSIS.

to ENOSIS, No to NATO”<sup>234</sup>, this ambiguous merge was advocated by Papayouannou, the general secretary of AKEL, stating that Greece’s NATO membership was “her domestic affairs” and that AKEL’s line of ENOSIS did not depend on any condition. To him, “the support of ENOSIS did not mean to support NATO or the transfer of British bases to NATO” (Kızılyürek, 2003:119-121)<sup>235</sup>.

AKEL’s relation with Makarios and its continuous support for his policies was another element of its domestic and foreign policy perspective. It may be argued that this stance had two main motives. Firstly, this approach was explicable for a pro-Soviet communist party since Makarios was backed by the Soviet Union<sup>236</sup> due to his anti-imperialist policies of and close political relations with the non-aligned countries. Secondly, AKEL followed the policy of a broad united front – embracing Makarios as well partly due to his reconciliatory policies towards AKEL – and partly due to the resolutions of the CPSU discussed in the second chapter of this study.<sup>237</sup> A quest of legitimation may be another motive of this relation.

---

<sup>234</sup> Though indirectly related with the issue in discussion, there were controversial views on AKEL’s refusal of NATO in regards to the solution of the Cyprus problem. For example, Hasgüler argued that the Cyprus question might have been solved easily if it were not for the Cold War conditions exaggerated by AKEL and the other left circles due to the impact of the Soviet Union (Hasgüler, 2002: 147).

<sup>235</sup> Anyhow, it seems as though there has been a process of self-criticism on the issue of ENOSIS in the party. In the thesis of the Central Committee of AKEL for the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of CCP-AKEL, we read that “*the renewal of the slogan for ENOSIS in the years 1964-67 was a major mistake which was utilized by the enemies of Cyprus.*” It was further argued that, thanks to the rejection of the Ball plan by Makarios and to the support of the USSR in the Security Council (for the resolution of 4<sup>th</sup> March 1964), the independence of Cyprus was “secured”, yet, this outcome made the American imperialists “re-discover ENOSIS”. It is further argued that USA has decided to use the Greek army “to impose this solution” (Acheson plan) “for the alleged ENOSIS of Cyprus with Greece” (Chronicle, 1997: 35, italics mine).

<sup>236</sup> See Appendix G for the main points of the thesis of the USSR on Cyprus issue.

<sup>237</sup> Though this unity was found controversial and AKEL was criticized for cooperating with a “politician who was at the same time a church leader”, AKEL until recently defended the precision of this approach since “the co-operation of the working people with the nationalistic bourgeois class towards the common aim of defending and completing Cyprus’s independence” was correct. In AKEL’s view, “ideological and theoretical differences should not and did not pose and obstacle” and that the party was in favour of “the freedom of consciousness including religious consciousness” (Christofias, 1997). It was also argued that AKEL supported the policy of Makarios who rejected “the plans for double-ENOSIS and partition” and furthermore, Makarios had intertwined against “the assassination of left-wing people during the attacks of Grivas in the years 1955-1959” (Thesis of the Central Committee of AKEL, 25July 1996).

As expected, AKEL supported the annihilation of London/Zurich agreements. According to AKEL, all classes and political parties in the Cyprus society should come together in a “broad united front” and struggle for this ends. The objective of imperialism was not to bridge but to widen the gap between the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus by virtue of these agreements and the foundation stone of the Zurich regime was precisely the idea of separation and the cultivation of antagonism between Greeks and Turks (Chronicle, 1997:138)<sup>238</sup>. In 16 December 1963 an appeal was made by the Party to the Turkish Community to persuade them to participate in the demands for alterations of the London/Zurich agreements and the constitution of Cyprus which included many anti-democratic, unjust and inoperative articles and were sources of conflict between the two communities (Kızılyürek, 2003: 115-6). Although Kızılyürek argued that this attitude was the continuation of nationalistic policies and rhetoric, one may speak of the existence of another strong subjective aim since the first two articles of the London/Zurich agreements were about the ban of the communist party and communist activities in Cyprus. It is a well known fact that, during the negotiations on London/Zurich agreements, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers agreed on a “gentlemen’s agreement” on undertaking the necessary measures for the prohibition of the activities of the Communist Party of Cyprus and of communist activities in Cyprus. Turkey and Greece would support the admission of Cyprus to NATO and the establishment of a NATO base in Cyprus as well (Bernandez, 1988:1959).

A common feature observed in the policies of both political parties, TİP and AKEL, on a national issue like the Cyprus question and on matters pertinent to imperialism and its institutions illustrates an important characteristic of the left wing

---

<sup>238</sup> Anyhow, AKEL identified the negative and positive aspects of London/Zurich agreements as follows: The negative aspects were: their exclusion of the right of self-determination, their attachment of Cyprus to an alliance with Britain, Greece and Turkey against its will, their creation of the guarantee system thus providing for the presence of military contingents from Turkey and Greece, their preservation of the British bases. The divisive and anti-democratic constitution imposed by the agreements was the last negative aspect for AKEL. Yet, there were some positive aspects also. For instance the end of British sovereignty and declaration of independence of Cyprus paving the way for a stable situation and for the taking of power by the people itself was a positive outcome. They also created the preconditions for the reconciliation of the two communities and for the progress of the people of Cyprus (Thesis of the Central Committee of AKEL, 25 July 1996 and Kızılyürek, 2003: 107).

currents of the developing nations of 1960s: an attempt to reconcile the socialist and nationalist discourses, in other words, to articulate the principles of socialism with the national rhetoric. In my opinion, AKEL's support of ENOSIS while rejecting all kinds of imperialist intervention, and TİP's anti-imperialist perspectives on Turkey's relations with the US and NATO together with its support of a military intervention by a NATO member, and its defence of made-in- West London/Zurich agreements, the heavy nationalist ingredients in its literature are typical to this paradoxical situation. Both left wing parties seem to be squeezed between the strong nationalist currents pertinent to some important topics in their societies manipulated ideologically by the bourgeois elements for their class interests, and the theoretical principles and practice of socialism of their era. It appears that both political organizations felt themselves urged to adopt more nationalistic and less socialist positions, frequently trying to amalgamate them, which may partly be accounted for a feature of their third worldist socialist perspectives. Kürkçü, analysing the legitimization attempts of the socialist organizations argued that all communist and socialist movements in Turkish history comprehended this legitimization as a process of legalization by the state (Kürkçü, 1991: 134). Although it seems difficult to extrapolate this argument to the case of AKEL, a strong communist party with a significant popular support and backed by the USSR, a search for legitimization is an undeniable fact in both parties. Perhaps the nationalist leanings aiming a search for legitimization may have a common root when a socialist or communist party preferred to proceed along the parliamentary means.

As a conclusion to this chapter, a few points on TİP's attitude on Cyprus may be cited. Although its general thesis on the Cyprus question displayed a good correlation with the socialist principles, and with a third worldist attitude, it is difficult to state that the same line of thought was maintained on other aspects of the question. It was an ambiguous situation for a socialist party to support a military intervention - except for the defence of its own national territories against an imperialist aggression. This stance, a far right position compared to its left - actually an indirect support of irredentism, contradicted with TİP's support of the National Treaty and its continuous defence of peace as well. In my opinion, TİP's defence of national independence and sovereignty for Turkey contradicted with its defence of

London / Zurich agreements, by which the independence and sovereignty of Cyprus state was obstructed. Sharing the views of Firat, one may state that one of the main motives of the addition of the strong ingredient of nationalism to the discourse of TİP rested on a serious search for legitimation. The uncritical defence of London/Zurich agreements accompanying a militarist tendency in line with the official ideology were typical steps of this process. Looking in retrospect, it is for sure that the original stance of the party was a more socialist-leaning and less nationalistic one. As a final note, one may argue that Bernandez's criticisms for AKEL – excessive nationalist leanings, parliamentarism, and abandonment of proletarian internationalism - were to a certain extent valid for TİP as well.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

The Constitution of May 27 Revolution created an appropriate base for the freedom of thought and organization, and thus opened the way for the emergence and legal recognition of socialist political organizations. In this context, the exploited masses, the working class and the peasants captured the chance of voicing their economic and social demands in an organized form. In other words, it became possible for the oppressed classes to express their frustrations. The advent of the socialist ideas into the legal political arena, first by the establishment and later by the entry of TİP into the Parliament, can be thought of as constituting some of the important events of the period.

TİP focused on the problems of the labouring classes and brought forth class-based solutions. Together with the other leftist circles, it lifted the taboo over the foreign policy issues and initiated an anti-imperialist discourse against the US. In this context, TİP's foreign policy was substantially different from the right wing parties in issues such as the demand of ousting of the American bases and withdrawal of Turkey from NATO/CENTO pacts, refusal of the membership of the EEC, the demand of the abrogation of bilateral agreements. Its resolute anti-imperialist stance and support of national independence in all forms had a deep impact on the political parties on the centre right and the centre left<sup>239</sup> and urged

---

<sup>239</sup> Justice Party adopted an apparently moderate social viewpoint as a response to the ideological and political pressure from socialists, by allegedly accepting an agricultural reform, economic planning and some welfare measures. The successful recruitment of the TİP of the young university students was a point of irritation by the RPP. One may argue that one of the reasons of the policy of "left of centre" of the RPP was the attempt to maintain its votes. According to Szyliowicz, about 300.000 voters from intellectual origin moved to TİP from RPPP between 1961 and 1965 (quoted in Mazaki, 2001: 52-53). Naturally, this was only one of the reasons of the choice of 'left of center policy' by the RPP. Teziç argued that, the preference of "left-of-center" policy was due to two reasons; firstly, from 1965 on, the economic and social problems had gained primacy over the others which forced the RPP to choose a more stable road ; secondly, it had become a necessity for the party to keep the bureaucrats and the intellectuals intact from the influence of the growing TİP, in short to prevent the strengthening of an extreme leftist position in RPP. (Teziç,1976: 293) In the same vein, Ahmad quoted İnönü who stated that the TİP was their "principal rival" (quoted in Mazaki, 2001:135).

them to adopt a somewhat deviating behaviour – a foreign policy with a “personality” - regarding these issues. Put it in another way, in addition to the impact of internal and external conditions, TİP and YÖN movement in particular have been considerably influential on the process of the re-appraisal of the Turkish foreign policy.

In my opinion, the concerns and demands of the Turkish army pertinent to some issues concerning the USA/Turkey relations and NATO acted as a catalyst, facilitating the struggle of the Left. Although it was a topic beyond the scope of this study, I believe that an examination of the impact of the Turkish military on the Turkish Left and TİP in particular is crucial for a better understanding of the Left.<sup>240</sup> However, it is for sure that, despite some apparently similar demands on the bilateral agreements and the implementation of these agreements in relation to the American bases, TİP’s perspectives and those of the Turkish military diverged subsequently on their points of departure and final objectives. Turkish military, as observed in the case of the traditional political parties of Turkey, was in expectancy for some minor improvements pertinent to bilateral agreements and American bases within the boundaries of NATO membership whereas the class-based alternative foreign policy perspective of TİP was developed as an extension of the Party’s understanding of the political economy of Turkey, formulated to a certain extent along the lines of the socialist theory. In other words, TİP regarded the military and economic pacts as NATO/CENTO and EEC as extensions of the capitalist system of exploitation, the primary source of Turkey’s underdevelopment and consequently put the struggle against these forces and their inner accomplices at the top of its political priorities. As I have indicated, both right wing and left wing political parties, and the Turkish military did not correlate Turkey’s NATO membership with issues concerning bilateral agreements and American military bases. Moreover they were not among

---

<sup>240</sup> Kurtulus Kayalı’s “Ordu ve Siyaset” provides a valuable account for some aspects of the relation of TİP and the Turkish military yet this discussion is confined to matters as TİP’s voting for the election of Sunay’s presidency, its attitude towards the 27 May military coup, its being supported by some NUC members, its approach to the unsuccessful coup of Talat Aydemir. The relation between the foreign policy attitude of TİP and the approach of the Turkish military to the same issue is left untouched.

the proponents of an ousting of this membership by the adoption of a radical foreign (and domestic) policy change.

The main theoretical approach of the socialist/ communist left on the above foreign policy topics converged to a certain extent. Yet TİP took a quite different stand on issues such as the composition of a united front and the nature of the struggle to be pursued against imperialism, the national bourgeoisie, the timing and methods of anti-imperialist and socialist struggles. In TİP's opinion, the level of capitalist development in Turkey enabled and necessitated the implementation of socialist and anti-imperialist struggles simultaneously through the leadership of the working class, in effect through its political party, TİP, by parliamentary means. A united front to carry on this struggle was to be established by the participation of workers and peasants and various fractions of the petty bourgeoisie. TİP focused primarily on the domestic accomplices of imperialism, big landowners, state bureaucracy and comprador bourgeoisie, which constituted the internal agents of imperialism. Active struggle against the external imperialist actor, i.e. the US was postponed to the coming years of socialism. This approach was greatly divergent from some important socialist/communist currents such as YÖN, MDD and TKP. The means of the struggle preferred by the left wing groups and TİP were dissimilar as well. Passive resistance was TİP's method of struggle against American imperialism and its accomplices. On theoretical grounds, as Aren also argued by bringing forth such a campaign, TİP contradicted with its own perspectives of anti-imperialism, giving primacy to struggle against the external imperialist actor itself. It is for sure that the passive resistance campaign, during which the anti-imperialist student activities against the US presence in Turkey were obstructed by TİP itself, isolated TİP from an important stronghold, the student base.

As to the relations with the USSR, TİP strove genuinely to distance itself from Lenin and the Soviet experiment in theory and practice by the advocacy of a "Turkish socialism". All TİP leaders shared the idea that TİP should secure its organizational independence pertinent to theoretical and practical issues of anti-imperialism and socialism. As indicated in chapter two of this study, TİP's approach to the USSR and the perspectives of Marxism / Leninism was not only a concern of independence. For instance, as exemplified in Aybar, it turned into a refutation of

Marxist/Leninist principles and a critique of Leninist party model as well as the refusal of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union by equating it to the imperialist policy of the Western imperialism<sup>241</sup>. This approach, though apparently consistent with the orientations of a Third Worldist socialist party, drew nearer to anti-communism from time to time. The pursuit of Aybar's ideas from 1947 to mid 1960s, illustrate the fact that the rationale of this approach did not solely rest on the social, historical and political factors in the Turkish society which triggered anti-communism and hatred against the Soviet Union. In my opinion, it was a political preference more than a tactical one. TİP demonstrated a strong opposition against the military intervention of the Warsaw pact to Czechoslovakia.

Cyprus issue became one of the main foreign policy determinants of the Turkish foreign policy accompanied by a profound impact on domestic affairs. It was one of the important issues paving the way for the anti-imperialist policies of the Turkish Left as well. It may well be asserted that, except for a short period before the Party's entry to the Parliament, a rather more "official" line was observed in the Cyprus policy of TİP compared to the stance of the other factions of the Turkish Left. Despite the correctness of the general thesis, that is, the support of a demilitarized, neutral, independent, federal Cyprus state in which the rights of both communities would be secured, the pendulum swung towards a militaristic and chauvinistic policy. It may not be wrong to state that, one of the main objectives of TİP's Cyprus policy was a search for legitimacy in the eyes of the public opinion and the state.<sup>242</sup> The unconditioned espousal for the London/Zurich agreements and the active support for the Turkish military intervention located the party to the right of the other factions of the Turkish socialist and communist Left. TİP contradicted with its basic foreign policy target, that is, the Kemalist policy of National Treaty by

---

<sup>241</sup> However, it should be noted that Boran, Aren and Aybar's views on Soviet foreign aid and Soviet policies in regards to underdeveloped countries were quite divergent. Whereas USA and USSR were evaluated as two great imperialist powers by Aybar together with his rejection of the Soviet aid, in Boran's and Aren's view, Soviet aid helped the underdeveloped to relieve themselves from the neo-colonialist attacks of the imperialist powers by ensuing investments in the realm of heavy industry. Despite their stress on independence from all foreign powers, they did not characterize the USSR as an imperialist power as Aybar did.

<sup>242</sup> Kürkcü argued that, during the beginning of its foundation process, TİP, similar to other socialists and communist political movements, identified its legitimacy process as legitimation in the eyes of the state (Kürkcü, 1991: 134).

supporting the military intervention to Cyprus. It was equally ambiguous to defend military intervention to an independent, non-aligned state by a NATO member. TİP's defence of the London/Zurich agreements, the objectives of which were to restrict the communist activities and organizations and to protect the interests of imperialism in the island by paving the way for the conflicts between the two communities was another contradiction. While struggling for the independence and sovereignty of its own country against an imperialist aggressor, TİP found itself supporting agreements which seriously restricted the independence and sovereignty of another independent state. One may well argue that TİP, just like AKEL, oscillated between the principles of socialism and those of nationalism. However, as indicated, even AKEL, a pro-Soviet communist party, with a strong public support, could not avoid the nationalistic discourse of ENOSIS while opposing NATO and the US presence in Cyprus. One may well assert that, there existed a considerable amount of nationalist elements in the discourse and praxis of the socialist/communist parties and of socialism in underdeveloped countries during the 1960s.

In effect, the source of these apparent ambiguities of the theoretical and practical perspectives of TİP may be found in its ideological roots as discussed in the second chapter of this study. In my opinion, TİP's ideological formation was an amalgamation of the Kemalist, Third Worldist and Euro communist views bearing their stamp in varying proportions, in addition to its TKP roots. TİP's nationalist tendencies were not only embedded in its Kemalist, Third Worldist and TKP tradition but also in its converging ideas with the classical parties of the Second International.

In sum, the articulation of economic and political independence, the existence of the slogan "hundred percent national, independent, peaceful foreign policy based on equality of nations in foreign affairs" in all versions of the party programs, the views of TİP in relation to NATO and EEC, bilateral agreements, American bases, its support of non-alignment point to a significant correspondence on the main motives of the Third Worldism. This may be the reason why TİP was defined by some scholars like Ünsal as a "small Third Worldist party" (Ünsal, 2003: 247-250). Yet, when the strong emphasis on issues such as the leading role of the working class and the final target of reaching socialism are recalled, it seems hard to share the

perspective of Kurtuluş Kayalı who argued that TİP supported a “Kemalist version of socialism” (Kayalı, 2000: 93).

As mentioned in the first chapter of the thesis, this chapter has an additional target as to elaborate the implications of the debates of 1960s on recent events. In this context, it may be appropriate to deal with the repercussions of bilateral agreements, American bases and Incirlik in particular, and Turkey’s NATO membership and the perspectives of the left of 2000s on European Union membership.

The issue of the American bases continued to be a pain in the neck for Turkey and for the neighbouring states. On 3 October 1982, in the wake of the military coup d’etat of 12<sup>th</sup> September, warmly welcomed by the US, an agreement was signed between the US and Turkey for the modernization of the military bases in Turkey. On 29 November 1982, another bilateral agreement (co-location Operation bases) was signed in Brussels for the establishment of two new airports in Muş and Batman.<sup>243</sup> On 1984, another bilateral agreement “Host Nation Support Agreement” was signed, bringing in facilities for the transportation and logistical requirements of the “Çevik Kuvvet” (Gerger, 1998: 157). These were preparations for the future intrusions of the US to the Gulf region. During the first Gulf War, Turgut Özal, “the most pro-American leader Turkey has ever had” (Barkey, 2005:2) decisively supported the US action by joining the coalition against Iraq in the Gulf War of 1990-91. Providing the US and its allies with the use of Turkey’s air base at Incirlik to bomb Iraq and blocking the use of Iraq-Turkish oil pipeline suddenly drove Turkey into a more “active” role in the fulfilment of the plans of imperialist states in the Middle East. This policy mainly enforced by Özal was continued after the Iraq-Kuwait war by Turkey’s participation in the economic embargo against Iraq and allowing the US and the United Kingdom to use Incirlik for Operation Provide Comfort (OPC) and its successor, Operation Northern Watch (ONW) (Martin, 2004:160-162). Despite the so-called restricted use of Incirlik base by the US according to SEIA, Turkey was never able to control the American activities in these

---

<sup>243</sup> The latent function of these airports was pronounced by the minister of Defence of the US, Richard Perle, as a deterrent to the Soviet Union’s activities in the Gulf region (Gerger, 1998:157).

bases targeting its neighbours<sup>244</sup>. Due to the presence of the American and NATO bases and the bilateral relations between Turkey and the US, the country was once more dragged into a hostile and isolated position and perhaps to an unintended war with its neighbours. In spite of all the drawbacks of the Western alliances and its institutions in Turkey, the Turkish governments continued to espouse the American military existence in Turkey and offered extensive co-operation to the US as experienced recently in the Afghanistan invasion of the US. Contributing to the armed forces headed by the US, Turkey went as far to take over the command for six months in June 2002. By joining in the Afghanistan military intervention of the US, Turkey once more acted against the principles of the National Treaty and adopted an irredentist policy.

Anyhow, during the course of NATO membership, some unexpected reflexes did appear in Turkish/American relations as mentioned above due to the domestic conditions or the temporary divergent national interests of two countries. The more recent event was the rejection, on 1 March 2003, by the Turkish Parliament to allow 62.000 US soldiers to be based on Turkish soil for the invasion of Iraq, most probably due to the rising of anti-American and anti-imperialist wave in the international arena and in Turkey, apart from other reasons related to the heterogeneous composition of the deputies of the party in power. Nonetheless, short after the start of the war, Turkish Parliament, under the heavy pressure of the American side, approved over flights and emergency landings of the aircrafts of the invaders together with medical evacuation from and into Turkey and ground re-supply of petroleum, oils and lubricants, food and non-military supplies to US forces in Iraq. Moreover, AKP government approved the US proposal dated 2003, to permanently redeploy combat aircraft from Germany to Incirlik as an all-purpose logistic hub (Parris, 2005:4). To mend the fences as quickly as possible, it went as far to propose to send troops to Iraq to participate in the invasion, a demand neglected due to the fierce opposition of the Iraqi Kurds. Turkey recently witnessed another

---

<sup>244</sup> For instance, Mumcu, in his article "Hazırlık" argued that the landing of the F-111 aircrafts and Stealth's in İncirlik during the first Gulf War was against the SEIA since these were "war planes" used for "strategic wars in space". He pointed to the use of İncirlik for the preparatory stage of the out-of-area operations of the US in 1991 (Mumcu, 1997, 32-33).

wave of demands on the additional facilities for the use of bases in Turkey together with the establishment of new ones. USA firstly demanded the right of maintenance of 48 war planes in Incirlik and Konya airbases. The demand for the extension of the coverage of the term “training” and the use of the bases for an operation, the duration and borders of which is unknown and the demand for additional sea bases in Samsun and Trabzon for its future operations in the region were among the other requests of the US. By way of the news leaking to the left wing media we learn that the US tried to bypass the National Assembly approval for these demands (Balbay, 2004; 1-8). As indicated, a bilateral relation which is totally destructive and dangerous for Turkey and for the neighbouring states of the Middle East and the Eastern region is still maintained between Turkey and the US. In my opinion, despite some wavering such as the event of 1<sup>st</sup> March, Turkey can never get rid of this dependent relationship unless a popular power representing the classes and groups with interests contrary to the imperialist system takes hold of power as observed in some Latin American countries in recent years. Hence, it may well be argued that, in the near future, Turkey will continue to play the role of a “pivotal state” for American interests, despite some minor disagreements, by virtue of its pro-Western and pro-American foreign policy praxis.

Although the role and maintenance of NATO was apparently called into question by the US and the imperialist system in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, this organization continued to survive by a modification in its strategy, in other words, by the adoption of a “new strategic concept”. In view of the NATO analysts, Atlantic dimension of the organization was no longer at issue, yet the alliance’s “ambit” ought to stretch into the eastern Mediterranean and the “greater Middle East”. It was argued that “America and its allies” should “force” their strategic horizons for the broadening of the principles of NATO and for its evolution to carry out the “peacekeeping out-of-area operations” in the South. The task of fighting against the threat of communism was replaced by a whole series of

self-imposed, new missions as “heading off emergent threats” such as “terrorism, rouge missiles and non-conventional weapons” (the Economist, 1999:18)<sup>245</sup>.

The new role offered to Turkey by the US in the post-Cold War period deserves attention. Lesser argues that, from the perspective of “national interest”, the US interests in Turkey have become “more diverse and diffuse” yet arguably “no less important”. Pointing to the “remarkable progress” in Arab-Israeli relations with the end of the Cold War, he puts forward the expectancy of the establishment of a “strategic relationship” between Turkey and Israel (Lesser, 1997: 2). This relationship was to be the introduction of a new point of contact between Israel and NATO, at a time “when NATO itself is becoming more heavily engaged in the Mediterranean”. The target seems to be an “expanded trilateral or even quadrilateral” co-operation, that is, organization, embracing the US and Jordan. It may not be wrong to argue that these views, describing the framework of the broader Middle East project of the US, put forth the new expectations of the US for Turkey in this project. Her participation in the American military intrusion to the Middle East region is anticipated as a NATO member which is located at the cross-roads of the energy sources of the region, the Caspian oil supply and the Gulf, bridging the geographic boundaries between Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

As a final comment, one may assert that the events experienced in the realm of foreign policy in forty five years were nothing but the justification of the foreign policy perspectives of the Left.

As to the membership of the European Union (EU), it is interesting to observe that the Turkish Left of the 2000s is divided into two ideological camps related to European Union membership in contrast to the 1960s. A brief gaze at these arguments may reveal upshots worthy of note when they are compared to the views of TİP pertinent to this issue during the 1960s. Baydar's article “Yalın Kılıç AB'ye Doğru”, a telling example of a left – leaning EU support, sets forth the some key

---

<sup>245</sup> Cassen argues that not enough attention was paid to the “coincidence” between the decision of EU enlargement taken at Copenhagen and the agreement on NATO enlargement signed in Prague. He further asserts that these two enlargement processes bring forth the strengthening of the political control of the US over Europe, which will be required to serve “as a base for its imperialist ventures and a bulwark to secure its defences”. A second aim of the US is gaining access to new markets for its arms industry (Cassen, 2003:6).

arguments of the debating parties on the EU question. Baydar argued that the common denominator of the “supporters of EEC membership” such as TUSİAD, liberal intellectuals, Kurds, a segment of Islamic organizations, social democrats, and some factions of the Marxists, was their desire for the “replacement of the militarist, hegemonic traditional state understanding” with a “civilian and functional” state - respectful to human rights - at the service of the citizens of the nation. The Marxist supporters of the EU were described by Baydar as the antimilitarist, “democrat, freedom-loving” sections of the Marxist Left, defenders of human rights, opposing the authoritarian, hegemonic state structure and the “dark forces” of the “deep state”. In her opinion, the support of the “nation-state” - one of the arguments of the opponents of the EU membership - was to support the maintenance of the “traditional state ideology” that suffocated “the neck of the people like a lasso” since seventy years. In her opinion, the common denominator of the opponents of the EU – including the Marxists - was their espousal of “open or covert nationalism”, siding with status quo and dogmatism against a “modern, civilized and democratic Turkey”. Being well aware of the ambiguous sociological nature of the EU supporter’s bloc, she claimed that the structure of these two fronts, illustrating “a new sociological structuring of different classes and strata of the society”<sup>246</sup>, did not fit in the old alliances “based on class and ideology” (Baydar, 2002: 5). Heavily criticising the discourse of “national pride” of the EU adversaries, she stated that the so-called “concessions”, that is, the reforms urged by the EU for conditions of membership were the “fundamental criterions” of the level of “civilization, modernization and freedom” of a country.<sup>247</sup> Moreover, opposition to Turkey’s EU membership paved the way her integration with another establishment planned for the participation of Turkey, Israel and the US in the Middle East. She finally argued that though EU was a “union of imperialist monopolies” and a “gigantic mechanism based on exploitation of poor countries”, the project of an alternative world could only be

---

<sup>246</sup> Baydar defines this new type of understanding of society as the one which rejects “all kinds of differences” (Baydar, 2002: 5).

<sup>247</sup> Ahmet Çakmak, in his article “Kavramlar Solcularla Eğleniyor” argues that the right to strike and forming trade unions, civil rights, regulations that will be brought in for employer/employee relations, regulations pertinent to the working conditions of child and woman labour that would be adopted by Turkey as a condition to EU membership will be a “gift of the European workers to their new sisters and brothers” (Çakmak, 2002: 4).

achieved by the communication and assembling of the labour and the peoples of the world. This final argument – known as the participating of the Turkish Left in the building of the “Europe of labour” - is the outline of the theoretical positioning of the EU supporters in Left – leaning circles. Another important argument was posed by Ahmet Çakmak pertinent to the ‘indirect’ impact of the EU membership. In his opinion, the reforms enforced on Turkey would raise the issue of the inevitability of the “technological development”<sup>248</sup> because in societies where money was gained over “cheap labour”, “technological progress” was the only influential means for capital accumulation. Accusing the left wing, opponents of the EU membership, of neglecting this reality due to their “concept fetishism”, he claimed that failure to access to the EU would mean the survival of a “despotic and poor” Eastern structure.<sup>249</sup> In Ömer Laçiner's view, another prominent defender of Turkey's EU membership, the EU opponents of the Marxist Left were afraid of the “considerable economic progress that would accompany the EU membership” which might result in “the abandonment of the socialist revolution ideals of the poor labouring masses” as was the case in the West (Laçiner, 2002: 4).

These arguments call for a summary of the perspectives of the Marxist opponents of the EU and Turkey's EU membership. By drawing on the analysis of imperialism in the twenty first century and recalling the establishment of a bloc in 1998 by the Transatlantic Economic Co-operation Agreement signed between the US and the EU, Öncü and Köse pointed to common understanding reached by these two imperialist forces for the implementation of the economic policies for the restructuring of the capitalist system in the capitalist metropol and the peripheral countries. Explaining the process of the abandonment of the “welfare state” resulting in the loss of many rights gained during the struggle of European labour in the nineteenth and the twentieth century, they disagreed with the expectations of “welfare” for the labouring classes of Turkey as a result of the EU membership

---

<sup>248</sup> Since Turkey is governed by a power bloc of the bourgeoisie, this necessity ought to be felt by these ruling classes.

<sup>249</sup> Çakmak further argued that, though the future of the EU was ambiguous, Turkey should participate in the “struggle of the future colours of the EU” by the EU membership and that different classes would find their counterparts in EU. (Çakmak, 2002:4)

(Öncü & Köse, 2004: 8). Approaching to the issue from another aspect, Seyhan Erdogdu asserted that, “European Social Model” admired by all by virtue of its social protection programmes, that is, the social insurance project consisting of generous provisions for childcare, unemployment, education, social infrastructure, research and development, strong labour unions was not a system either created/supported or adopted by the European Union. On the contrary, European Union produced a ‘weakening impact’ pertinent to those achievements of the welfare state in individual European Union states (Erdogdu, 2005: 1). Calling attention to the limitations of free circulation of the labour, Yüksel Akkaya argued that EU membership was not an “indispensable” condition to defend the rights of labour in Turkey and its free circulation and revolutionary dynamics might be developed through participating in another regional union that may be established by the co-operation of the neighbouring (Middle Eastern or Asian) countries. Pointing to partial behaviour of the EU on issues related to democracy and human rights, he asserted that it was solely sensitive to issues pertinent to women’s rights, ecological issues and ethnic discriminations such as the Kurdish question. A telling example was the attitude of the European Council during the 1980s. The European Council, an important body of the European Union, did not even intend to impose any penalty on Turkey when DİSK (Revolutionary Workers Union Confederation) was closed and its members were tortured and were heavily punished during the trials held in the aftermath of the military coup of 12<sup>th</sup> September 1980. He further asserted that no significant response came from the EU judicial or civil institutions, due to the violation of human rights in Turkey, a final example of which was the bloody attack of the government to the F-type prisons as a consequence of a hunger strike on 2002. Defence of admission to EU for the search of an alternative road to the prevailing system was not a satisfactory argument of the EU opponents because this alternative could not be realized by siding with the “imperialist camp” and by building a policy of revolution on the “crumps” of the gains of the imperialist European states that will be thrown in front of Turkey as a result of EU membership (Akkaya, 2005a: 6 and 2005b, 6).

The details of this debate will be omitted since it is beyond the scope of the thesis. Nonetheless, some complementary arguments may be cited in line with the

EU opponents. Firstly, in spite of the contradictions between the US and European imperialist formations, there appears to be a joint structure of EU and NATO. In other words, seven countries of the former Soviet Union became NATO members and five of them are accrued to the EU, along with three Central European countries that were former NATO members. It is for sure that the EU membership of Romania and Bulgaria will be realized on 2007, two NATO members of the former Warsaw Pact. It is obvious that only six of the 27 members of EU are outside the NATO alliance. Taking into consideration of the enthusiasm of these ex- Warsaw pact states in “pleasing US” in NATO, it would not be wrong to state that there is an overwhelming and undisputable US influence on the EU. Sharing Achcar's views, the world of today is “enmeshed in a network of bases and alliances controlled by the US” (Achcar, 2003:2). Thus, Baydar’s allegation, that is, rescuing Turkey’s from being integrated into pro-American Middle Eastern alliances by EU membership, seems to me an ambiguous and self-contradictory approach. Moreover, such arguments stem from and/or take into account solely the external dynamics for the solution of political and economic issues to a great extent by neglecting the internal factors and domestic struggles to be waged in the country. The expectations of an imported democracy triggered by outer dynamics do not seem to be realistic either. As to the question of the anticipations in regards to the material gains, many analysts including Sertel argue that it is most unlikely to happen since the European budget debates revealed the budget deficiencies, the stagnation, the increasing percentage of unemployment accompanying a considerable decrease in demand in nearly all European countries and the incapability of the EU for transferring money to its members for welfare (Sertel, 2005: 10).

Another aspect of the question is the ambivalence of the praxis of the struggle for the “Europe of Labour” since no concrete project is submitted by its supporters. In my opinion, this approach stems from the ideological perspective by which the struggle to be waged for the nation state is fully refuted and the nation state itself is disregarded as a realm of struggle.

A deeper involvement with the recent aspects of the issue of EU membership of Turkey and the structure of the EU is beyond this study as mentioned before, yet, looking in retrospect, it may be argued that, when considered in retrospect, the

fundamental evaluations of the TİP and the socialist/Marxist left regarding the structure and aims of the EEC and Common Market more closer to the views of the EU opponents of today.

As a final note, sharing the views of Ahmad, one may state that TİP was the “largest” and the most “durable” socialist party in Turkey continuing its activities without interruption until 1971(Ahmad, 1977: 96)<sup>250</sup>. TİP was a unique experience of the Turkish socialist left in its march to power as well. Though other socialist parties were established during the period between 1974 and 1978 after the military coup of 12<sup>th</sup> of March such as the Turkish Socialist Labour Party, the Turkish Workingmen’s Party, the revived TİP, the Socialist Revolutionary Party, the Labour Party, and the Turkish Worker’s and Peasant’s Party, a Parliament representation or the extent of support and popularity of TİP was never achieved.

TİP, despite its shortcomings and limitations, must be credited for its contributions to the establishment of the legitimacy of socialist language in the country’s political discourse. Together with the other left wing currents as YÖN, it brought a class-based perspective to the domestic and foreign policy issues, paving the way for the discussions on the theory and praxis of the anti-imperialist and socialist struggle. Sharing the views of Çelenk, it may well be argued that, if TİP had survived, it might have played a decisive role on the faith of the country, at least on important political issues such as “independence” and “democracy” (Çelenk, 2003: 191).

---

<sup>250</sup> TİP was banned by the Court of Constitution in 20 July 1971. In the public prosecutor’s indictment presented to the Third Military Court of Martial Law, the sixth section of the decisions taken during the Fourth Congress of the Party were found contradictory to the article 57 of the Constitution and the articles of 87 and 89 of the Law of Political Parties. The Court decided the imprisonment of the leading cadres of the Party for six or fifteen years depending on the position occupied in the Party Councils.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Achcar, Gilbert (January 2003), "Auxiliary Americans", *Le Monde Diplomatique* ([english@Monde-diplomatique.fr](mailto:english@Monde-diplomatique.fr))
- Adalı, Fuat (1970), "Kıbrıs'ta Seçimler", *Aydınlık*, 3 (21) : 212-223.
- Adams T.W. & Cottrell A.J. (1968), *Cyprus between East and West*, the John Hopkins University, the John Hopkins press, Baltimore, USA
- Adams, T.W. (1972), *AKEL : The Communist Party of Cyprus*, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Stanford, California
- Ahmad Feroz & Bedia Turgay (1976), *Türkiye'de Çok Partili Politikanın Açıklamalı Kronolojisi (1945-1971)*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara
- Ahmad, Feroz (1977), *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy 1950-1975*, C. Hurst & Company, London
- .....(2003), "The Historical Background of Turkey's Foreign Policy", in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds) Lenore G. M. and Keridis, D., the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Akkaya, Yüksel (2005), "Emeğin Avrupası masalı: Rüyaya evet, 'Riya'ya hayır (1-11)", *Evrensel*, 1- 8 January.
- Altan, Çetin (1976), *Ben Milletvekili İken*; Bilgi Yayınları, İstanbul
- Aren, Sadun (1963), "Dernek ve Sosyalizmin Meseleleri", *YÖN*, 2(60):3
- .....(1993), *TİP Olayı 1961-1971*, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul
- Aslan, İffet (1965), "Partilerin Kaptan Köşkünde", *Meydan*, 1(15): 8-9
- Ataöv, Türkkaya (1969), *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye*, Aydınlik Yayınevi, Ankara
- Avcıoğlu, Doğan (1963), "Füzeler Kalkarken", *YÖN*., 2 (59): 3
- ..... (1965), "Türkiye'de Amerikan Üsleri", *YÖN*, 4 (139): 7-8
- ..... (1966a), "TİP'e Dair", *YÖN* , 5 (168): 3.
- ..... (1966b), "Bir Sosyalist Stratejinin Esasları", *YÖN*, 5 (185): 8-9
- .....(1966c), " Büyük Kongresinden sonra TİP", *YÖN*, 5(192):16
- Aybar, Mehmet Ali (1968), *Bağımsızlık, Demokrasi, Sosyalizm*, Gerçek Yayınları, İstanbul.
- ..... (1988a), *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi 1*, BDS Yayınları, İstanbul
- ..... (1988b), *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi 2*, BDS Yayınları, İstanbul
- ..... (1988c), *Türkiye İşçi Partisi Tarihi 3*, BDS Yayınları, İstanbul
- ..... (1993), *Neden Sosyalizm*, YÖN Yayınları, İstanbul

- Aydemir, Ş. Süreyya (1967), "Türk Solunun dört zayıflığı-111", *KİM*, 9(476): 8-9
- Aydın, Suavi (1998), "Milli Demokratik Devrim`den Ulusal Sol`a – Türk Solunda Özgücü Eğilim", *Toplum ve Bilim*, No. 78, 59-92.
- Aydınlık (1970), "Tek çözüm: Bağımsız, federatif Kıbrıs", *Aydınlık*, 3(18): 470-473.
- Aytemur, Nuran (2000), *The Turkish Left and Nationalism: the Case of YÖN*, unpublished Masters Thesis, ODTÜ, Ankara
- Balbay, Mustafa (24 Mayıs 2004), "Tarihi Belgeler", *Cumhuriyet*, 1-8  
.....(18 Mayıs 2004), "ABD yeni üsler istiyor", *Cumhuriyet*, 8
- Balibar ve Wallerstein (1995), *İrk, Ulus, Sınıf, Metis yayınları*, İstanbul
- Barkey, Henry (2003), "Turkey's Strategic Future: A US Perspective", <http://www.eusec.org/barkey.htm>
- Baydar, Oya (2002); "Yalın Kılıç AB`ye Doğru", *Radikal İKI*, 16 June 2002, 5
- Belli, Mihri. (1969), "Türkiye`de Karşı Devrim", *Türk Solu*, sayı 64, 4 February, 12-24.  
.....(1999), *Mihri Belli'nin Anıları, İnsanlar Tanıdım II*, Doğan Kitapçılık A.Ş., İstanbul
- Bernandez, George (1988), "Kıbrıs Komünist Partisi ve Milliyetçilik", *Sosyalizm ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Vol. 6, 1988-1989.
- Birinci Doğu Halkları Kurultayı Bakü 1920 (Belgeler)*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul
- Bora, Tanıl (2002), "Türkiye`de Siyasal İdeolojilerde ABD / Amerika imgesi", (ed.) Kocabaşoğlu, U. in *Modern Türkiye`de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.3, Modernleşme ve Batıcılık, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 147-169.
- Boran, Behice (1976), "Ege ve Kıbrıs", *Çark Başak*, 1 (13): 1-8  
..... (1992), *Türkiye ve Sosyalizm Sorunları*, Sarmal Yayınevi, İstanbul
- Bottomore, Tom (1993), "Sosyal Demokrasi", *Marksist Düşünce Sözlüğü*, 508-510.
- Cassen, Bernard (2003), "Washington watches over EU and NATO Expansion", *Le Monde Diplomatique*.
- Cem, İsmail (1978), *Tarih Açısından 12 Mart*, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul
- Chronicle of the contemporary tragedy of Cyprus; (July-August 1974)*, A C.C. of AKEL Edition, Southern Cyprus
- Colletti, Lucio (1974), *From Rousseau to Lenin*, Monthly Review Press, USA
- Çakmak, Ahmet (2002), "Kavramlar Solcularla Eğleniyor", *Radikal İKI*, 23 June, 4.
- Çamlı, İbrahim (1964a), "Kıbrıs gerçeği", *YÖN*, 3 (78): 4-5, 3(79): 8-9  
..... (1964b), "Türk Dış politikası belirli bir felsefeye dayanmalıdır", *YÖN*, 3 (86): 3  
..... (1965a), "Kıbrıs işinde gene yanlış ve tehlikeli bir yoldayız", *YÖN*, 4 (95): 13  
.....(1965b), "Kıbrıs içinde Hayal ve Gerçek", *YÖN*, 4 (97): 7

- .....(1965c), “Yalnızlığa doğru”, *YÖN*, 4 (107): 16
- ..... (1965d), “Kıbrıs meselesinin çözümü Üçüncü Dünyanın içerisindedir”, *YÖN*, 4 (108): 7
- ..... (1965e), “Biraz itidal, biraz akıl”, *YÖN*, 5 (143): 3-4.
- Çelenk, Halit (1976), *141-142 Üzerine*, Anka Yayınları, Kabile Matbaası, Ankara
- ..... (1986), *Hukuk*, Süreç Yayınları, İstanbul
- ..... (2003), *Türkiye İşçi Partisinde İç Demokrasi*, Evrensel Basım Yayın, Ayhan Matbaası, İstanbul
- Çelik, Yasemin (1999), *Contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy*, Praeger Publishers, printed in the USA
- Clarkson, C. (1979), “The Political Economy of State Capitalism”, in *The Soviet Theory Of Development*, Macmillan Press, Great Britain, 33-50.
- Çulhaoğlu, Metin (2002), “Modernleşme, Batılılaşma ve Türk Solu”, (ed.) Kocabaşoğlu, U. in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce*, Vol.3, Modernleşme ve Batıcılık, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 170-189
- Davidson, Basil (1965), *Afrika’da Milli Kurtuluş ve Sosyalizm Hareketleri*, Sosyal Yayınlar, İstanbul
- Doğan, Erkan (2000), *Parliamentary Experience of the Turkish Labour Party: 1965-69*, unpublished Master’s thesis, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, İstanbul
- D’Encausse, Helene Carrere & Schram, Stuart R. (1969), *Marxism and Asia*, the Penguin Press, USA
- Erdoğan, Seyhan (2005), “Avrupa Birliği ve Sosyal Politika”, <http://www.sendikanet.org>
- Erdoğan, Vahap (1966) “TİP nereye gidiyor?”, *YÖN*, 5 (189): 10-12
- ..... (1968), “Çekoslovakya’da sosyalizm ve karşı devrim”, *Aydınlık*, 1(1): 45-61 and 81-88.
- ..... (1977), “Demokratik Güçbirliği ve 5 Haziran Seçimleri“, *Ülke* 1 (1): 104-168
- Erhan, Çağrı (2002), “ABD ve NATO ile İlişkiler”, in *Türk Dış Politikası*, (ed) Baskın Oran, Vol.1, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul
- Erim, Nihat (1966), “Türkiye’nin Dış Politika Sorunları“, *YÖN*, 5(156): 16
- Eroğul, Cem (1969a), “TİP Programının Düşünce yapısı”, *Emek*, 1 (4): 8-9
- .....(1969b), “Komünist Partileri Konferansı”, *Emek*, 1 (5): 7
- Esin, Numan (1966), “Ulusal Stratejiye Dönüş Zorunluluğu“, *YÖN*, 5(150):11
- Etinger, Y. & Melikyan, O. (1969), *İttifaksızlar Dünyası*, cev. Yurdakul Fincancı, Anadolu Yayınları, Ankara
- Eylem (1964), “Türkiye İşçi Partisinin Bursa’daki Yönetim Kurulu Toplantısı”, *Eylem*, 1 (4): 56-57.

- Fanon, Frantz (1970), "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness-Africa" in *Imperialism and Under development*, (ed) Rhodes, Robert I., Monthly Review Press, USA
- Fegan, Fuat (Ağustos 1969), "Kıbrıs Meselesi", *Aydınlık*, 2 (10): 276-288.
- Fırat, Melek M. (1997), *1960-71 Arası Türk Dış Politikası ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, Siyasal Kitabevi, Ankara
- Gadzey, T.K. Antony (1995), "The Political Economy of Centralization and Delayed Capitalism in Sub-Saharan Africa" in *The Changing Political Economy of the Third World*, (ed). Dorray, Manochehr, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London
- Gerger, Haluk (1998), *Türk Dış Politikasının Ekonomi Politikası*, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul
- Gevgilili, Ali (1973), *Türkiye'de 1971 Rejimi*, Milliyet Yayınları, İstanbul
- Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* (1982), Cilt: 1 (1919-1973), (ed). Gönlübol, M. Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, Ankara
- Harris, George (1972), *Troubled Alliance, Turkish-American Problems in Historical Perspective: 1945-1976*, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: Washington D.C.
- ..... (1976), *Origins of Communism in Turkey*, The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California.
- Harris, Nigel (1986), *The End of the Third World*, Penguin Books, England
- Hasgüler, Mehmet (2002), *Kıbrıs'ta ENOSİS ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul
- İleri, Rasih. N. (1987), *TİP'de Opportünist Merkezîyetçilik (1966-1968)*, Yalçın Yayınları, İstanbul
- İlke (1974), "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Eleştirisi II", November, 43-95.
- İnce, Nurhan (1974), *Problems and Politics in Turkish Foreign Policy, 1960-1966*, doctoral thesis, submitted to the University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky, USA
- Introductory Speech of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of AKEL, Demetris Christofias during the International Meeting held on 3-4 May 1997 in Larnaka.
- Karpat, Kemal H. (1973), *Social Change and Politics in Turkey – A Structural and Historical Analysis*, Leiden - Newyork -Köln, E.J. Brill
- ..... (1968), *Political and Social Thought in the Arab Countries of the Middle East*, Pall Mall press Ltd, Great Britain
- .....(1967), "Socialism and the Labour Party of Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, Vol. 21, 157-172.
- Kayalı, Kurtuluş (2000), *Türk Düşünce Dünyasının Bunalımı*, İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş. İstanbul
- Kemal, Mehmet (1965), "Her taşın altında", *YÖN*, 4 (129): 7

- Kıvılcımlı, Hikmet (1969), “Türkiye’de Sınıflar ve Politika”, *Aydınlık*, 2 (5): 369-385.
- Kızılyürek, Niyazi (2003), *Milliyetçilik Kıskaçında Kıbrıs*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul
- Koçaş, Sadi (1977), *Atatürk’ten 12 Mart’a – Anılar*, Tomurcuk Yayınevi, İstanbul
- Koçer, Gökhan (1993), *Türkiye’de Dış Politika ve Parlamento*, unpublished doctorate thesis, İstanbul Üniversitesi, İstanbul
- Komintern Belgelerinde Türkiye - 4 “Türkiye Komünist ve İşçi Hareketi”*, Aydınlık Yayınları, İstanbul
- Komintern Belgelerinde Türkiye - 5 “Şefik Hüsnü- Yazı ve Konuşmalar”*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul
- Küçük, Yalçın (1979), *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler (1908-1978)*, Vol. 2, Tekin Yayınevi, Ankara
- Kürkçü, Ertuğrul (1991) “ İyi işte, modernleştik, başımıza gelecek var”, in Sol Kemalizme Bakıyor, (eds) Levent Cinemre, Ruşen Çakır, Metis Yayınları, İstanbul, 125-141.
- Laçiner, Ömer (2002), “Yolda cakılmak mı, yeni bir yol aramak mı?”, *Radikal İKİ*, 23 June, 4.
- Landau, Jacob.M. (1974), *Radical Politics in Modern Turkey*, Leiden- Newyork and Koln, E.J. Brill,
- Lenin, Vladimir. I (1966), “Report on the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions” in *V. I. Lenin Collected Works*, Vol. 31, April-December 1920, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 240-245.
- Lesser O. Ian (1997), “In Search of a Post -Cold War Role”, <http://www.tusiad.org.tr/yayin/private/autumn97/html/lesser.html>
- ..... (2003), “Turkey and the United States: Anatomy of a Strategic Relationship”, in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds) Martin, G. Lenore and Keridis, D., the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Lipovsky, Igor (1992), *The Socialist Movement in Turkey 1960-80*, Leiden- Newyork and Koln, E.J. Brill,
- Malawya, H.D (1965), *Sovyetler Birliği ve Azgelişmiş Ülkeler Arasında ekonomik işbirliği*, cev. Selahattin Hilav, Gerçek yayınları, İstanbul
- Martin G. Lenore (2003), “Turkey’s Middle East Foreign Policy”, in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds) Martin, Lenore G. and Keridis, D., the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Mumcu, Uğur (1997), *Bir Uzun Yürüyüş*, Umag Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara
- ..... (1998), *Aybar ile Söyleşi*, Umag Vakfı Yayınları, Ankara
- .....(1991), “Hazırlık”, *Cumhuriyet*, 12 Ocak, 1
- Öztürk, Kazım (1968), *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetleri ve Programları*, Ak Yayınları limited şirketi, İstanbul

- Ok, Mustafa (1966), "Milli Savunma Stratejisi", *YÖN*, 5(149): 16
- Oran, Baskın (2002), "Dönemin Bilançosu", in *Türk Dış Politikası* (ed). Baskın Oran, Vol 1, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul
- Özdemir, Hikmet (1986), *YÖN Hareketi*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara
- Özgüden, Doğan (1988), "Türkiye İşçi Partisinin Kuruluşu", *Sosyalizm ve Sosyal Mücadeleler Ansiklopedisi*, Vol 6, 1998-1999.
- .....(1967), "Kesintisiz Devrim Yolunda İşçi Sınıfı Partisi için İleri"  
*ANT*, Sayı 47, 11-12.
- Özman, Aylin (2002), *Marksizm ve Sosyalizm Üzerine Düşünceler – Mehmet Ali Aybar*, İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş., İstanbul
- Paggi, Leonardo (1979), "Gramsci's General Theory of Marxism", in Gramsci and Marxist Theory (ed). Chantal Mouffe, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London
- Papayuanu, E. (1969), "AKEL'in Kıbrıs hakkında özel demeci", *Türk Solu*, No. 63, Year 2, 6-7.
- Papayoanu, E. (1972), "Kıbrıs'ın Egemenliği ve Onun Düşmanları", *Yeni Çağ*, 7(97), 532-537.
- Parris, Marc (2005); "Allergic Partners: Can US-Turkish Relations be saved\_?", [http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=spr\\_2005\\_Parris](http://www.turkishpolicy.com/default.asp?show=spr_2005_Parris)
- Perinçek, Doğu (1969), "Türkiye İşçi Partisi Üyelerinin sınıf yapısı", *Aydınlık*, No.3, 205-226.
- Pollis, Adamantia (1973), "Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: the Case of Cyprus", *Comparative Politics*, Vol 5, Issue 4, 575-599
- Salih, Halil İbrahim (1967), *Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord*, The American University, Ph.D., 1967 Political Science, International Law and relations University microfilms, Inc., Ann Harbor, Michigan, USA
- Samsutdinov, A.M. (1999), *Mondros'dan Lozan'a Türkiye Ulusal Kurtuluş Savaşı Tarihi 1918-1923*, Doğan Kitapçılık, İstanbul
- Sander, Oral (1998), *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, İmge Yayıncılık, Ankara
- Sargın, Nihat (2001), *TİP'li Yıllar (1961-1971)*, Felis Yayınevi, İstanbul
- Sartre, Jean. P. (1966), "Emperyalizmle nasıl savaşıılır ?", *YÖN*, 5 (193) : 8-9
- Satlıgan, Nail (2003), "Avrupa Komünizmi ve Klasik Marksizm arasında Mehmet Ali Aybar", in *Mehmet Ali Aybar Sempozyumları 1997-2002*, (ed). Gündüz Vassaf, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih vakfı yayınları, İstanbul
- Savran, Sungur (1992), *Türkiye'de Sınıf Mücadeleleri*, Cilt 1 (1919-1980), Kardelen Yayınları, İstanbul
- Schwarzmantel, John (1993), "Nation versus Class: Nationalism and Socialism in Theory and Practice" in *The Social Origins of Nationalist Movements*, (ed). Coakley, John, Sage Publications, Great Britain
- Selcuk, İlhan (1965), "Yıkma ve Yapma", *YÖN*, 4 (130): 3

- .....(1966), ``Vatan haini, vatan hainidir!``, *YÖN*, 5(188) :3
- Selik, Mehmet (1969), “MDD Fetişizmi”, *Emek*, 1 (3): 12- 13
- Sertel, Yıldız (1978), *Türkiye’de İlerici Akımlar ve Kalkınma Davamız*, Cem Yayınevi, İstanbul
- ..... (2005), “Avrupa’nın Gerçek Yüzü”, *Cumhuriyet Strateji*, year 2, No. 64, 19 September, 2005
- Somer, Kenan (2003), “Aybar’ın düşüncesinde Atatürkçülük, halkçılık ve miliyetçilik izleklerinin yeri” in *Mehmet Ali Aybar Sempozyumları 1997-2002*, (ed). Gündüz Vassaf, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih vakfı yayınları, İstanbul
- Sosyal Adalet (1963), “Ortak Pazar bir Kalkınma Yolu değildir”, *Sosyal Adalet*, 7 May, 5
- ..... (1964), “Kıbrıs”, *Sosyal Adalet*, Sayı 1, 17 Nisan, 42-44
- Soysal, İlhami, (1966), “Eğri Oturalım, Doğru Konuşalım”, *YÖN*, 5 (174): 10-11
- ..... (1969), *Sıfıra Sıfır Elde Var Sıfır*, Kitap Yayınları, İstanbul
- Soysal, Mümtaz, (1965), “Yalnızlık”, *YÖN*, 5 (143): 3
- ..... (1967), “Ahtapotun Kollarında”, *KİM*, 9 (479): 3.
- ..... (2004), “The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy” in *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, (eds) Martin, Lenore G. and Keridis, D., the MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts
- Teziç, Erdoğan (1976), *100 Soruda Siyasi Partiler*, Gerçek Yayınevi, İstanbul
- “The Annual Committee Report of the Leipzig Group of the Turkish Communist Party in 1964”, in *İşçii-Demokrasi Hareketi ve TİP (2003)*, TÜSTAV Yayınları, İstanbul
- The Economist (1999), “Defining NATO’S Aims”, Vol. 351, No: 8116, 24-30 April.
- TKP Merkez Komitesinin Halkımıza Çağrısı, (1972); *Yeni Çağ*, 2 (92): 147.
- Tuncay, Mete (1991), *Türkiye’de Sol Akımlar-1(1908-1925) Belgeler 2*, BDS Yayınları, İstanbul
- .....(1995); “Siyasal Tarih (1950-1960)”, in *Türkiye Tarihi*, Vol. 4., Cem Yayınları, İstanbul, 177-184
- Tunçkanat, Haydar (1970), *İkili Anlaşmaların İçyüzü*, Ekim Yayınevi, Ankara
- Türkeş, Mustafa (1999), *Kadro Hareketi*, İmge Yayınevi, Ankara
- Ünal, B. Cahit (1964), “Kıbrıs Çıkmazı Dış politikamızın Çıkmazıdır”, *Sosyal Adalet*, 8 August, No. 5, 4-5.
- Ünlü, Barış (2002), *Bir Siyasal düşünür olarak Mehmet Ali Aybar*, İletişim Yayıncılık A.Ş., İstanbul
- Ünsal, Artun (2002), *Türkiye İşçi Partisi (1961-1971)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul

..... (2003), "TİP'in Ulusal Bağımsızlık Anlayışı", in *Mehmet Ali Aybar Sempozyumları 1997-2002*, (ed). Gündüz Vassaf, Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih vakfı yayınları, İstanbul, 247-252.

Yalman, Galip (2002): "Tarihsel bir Perspektiften Türkiye'de Devlet ve Burjuvazi", *Praxis*, 2 (5): 14-15

Yetkin, Çetin (1970), *Türkiye'de Soldaki Bölünmeler (1960-1970)*, Toplum yayınları, Ankara

Yerasimos, Stefanos (1976), *Az Gelişmişlik sürecinde Türkiye*, Gözlem Yayınları, İstanbul

Yıldız, Ahmet (1966), "Dış Politika Tartışmalarının Bilançosu", *YÖN*, 5(146): 4

YÖN (1964a) "YÖN'den YÖN'cülere", *YÖN*, 3 (78): 2.

..... (1964b) "Kıbrıs", *YÖN*, 3(79): 10

..... (1964c) "KIBRIS", *YÖN*, 3(80): 4

.....(1965a) "Anglosaxonlar adım adım planlarını uyguluyorlar", *YÖN*, 4(106):4

..... (1965b) "Türkiye'de Amerikan üsleri", *YÖN*, 4(107): 4-5

..... (1965c) "Kıbrıs'ı dümen suyu politikası yüzünden kaybetmek üzereyiz", *YÖN*, 4(108):4

..... (1965d), "Anlaşmaları feshettik ama....", *YÖN*, 4(109):11

.....(1965e) "Seçim Kampanyası başladı", *YÖN*, 4(130): 4

.....(1965f) "Hükümet programının kabulünden sonra Süleyman Demirel'in durumu", *YÖN*, 4(141): 7

.....(1965g), "Mecliste Genel Görüşme", *YÖN*, 5(144): 4

.....(1966a), "Seçim kampanyasının baş yıldızı, Osman Bölükbaşı", *YÖN*, 5 (166): 4

.....(1966b), "TİP Genel Başkanının konuşması", *YÖN*, 5(176):7

.....(1966c), "4. Kolordu", *YÖN*, 5(180): 7

.....(1966d), "Kıbrıs pazarlığı", *YÖN*, 5 (182): 4

..... (1966e), "TİP İstanbul İl kongresi", 5(187): 6

..... (1967a), "New York Times ve Türkiye'deki anti-empyrialist savaş", *YÖN*, 6(200): 5

..... (1967b), "Amerikan üslerinde hayat", *YÖN*, 6(208):10

Zaninovich, George. M. (1970), "Socialist Models and Developing Nations" in *Developing Nations: Quest for a Model*, (eds) Beling, Willard A. and Totten, George O., Litton Educational Publishing. Inc. Canada

Zürcher, J. Erik (1994), *Turkey, A Modern History*, USA & Canada, St Martin's Press, Newyork

## NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (NA) MINUTES

NA Minutes, First Meeting, 30th Session, 29.12.1965  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 30th Session, 29,12,1965  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 28th Session, 27.12.1965  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 28th Session, 27.12.1965  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 110th Session, 13.7.1966  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 31st Session, 5.1.1966  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 32nd Session, 7.1.1966  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 32nd Session, 7.1.1966  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 12th Session, 4.12.1967  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 115th Session, 8.6.1967  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 29th Session, 5.1.1967  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 32nd Session, 13.1.1967  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 30th Session, 6.1.1967  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 30th Session, 6.1.1967  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 36th Session, 25.1.1967  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 46th Session, 20.2.1968  
NA Minutes, Second Meeting, 46th Session, 20.2.1968  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 29th Session, 15.1.1969  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 34th Session, 22.1.1969  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 25th Session, 23.1.1969  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 35th Session, 23.1.1969  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 5th Session, 10.11.1969  
NA Minutes, First Meeting, 18th Session, 22.12.1969

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A

#### Written Question of Sadi Koçaş on Bilateral Agreements and American Bases

Prior to the 1965 elections, in April 1965, Koçaş gave a written question to the Foreign Ministry which consisted of more than ten questions on bilateral agreements, American bases and of the US activities in Turkey. In YÖN's view, this move had saved "the honour of both the Turkish nation and the parliamentarians" (YÖN,1965b). The questions are worth quoting in full text because in my view this request actually exposed the discomfort of at least some sections of the Turkish armed forces on the issue of bilateral agreements and American bases. These questions were as follows:

1. Is there any foreign state or institution in Turkey - which is also a member of the alliance or alliances that we belong to - that has occupied the Turkish soil for its purposes depending on the bilateral agreements signed between Turkey and itself?
2. If so, which state or institution is it?
3. What is the location of the soil under occupation? How many square meters of soil are under occupation? Are there permanent instalments built on it?
4. On which bilateral agreements is this occupation based?
5. Does this occupied land belong to individuals or to the state? Has any land been confiscated for this purpose? If so, what is the amount of money paid for this confiscation by our state?
6. Is there any on-going operation pertinent to confiscation of the same purpose?
7. What is the purpose of establishment of these bases, instalments or other occupations?

8. By whom are these instalments governed? Is there any instalment that is not under the control of Turkish authorities?
9. What is the interest of Turkey in the establishment of these instalments?
10. What is the interest of the founder institution or state in the establishment of these instalments?
11. Is there any rent paid to the (Turkish) people or to the (Turkish) state in return for this occupation? If such compensation exists, what is its amount, if not, what is the rationale for this privilege? (YÖN, 1965d)

## **APPENDIX B**

### **Oral Question by TİP on Bilateral Agreements and American Bases**

Boran, during her discussion on the interpellation given to the Assembly by Saryüce and his friends, repeated the oral question given by TİP to the Demirel government in the wake of its establishment. The full text of the oral question including her brief assessments is as follows:

1. Have these bilateral agreements been ratified by the Parliament?
2. Which of them were not ratified?
3. Are they all still in force? If not, which ones are in force?
4. If there are bilateral agreements signed without the ratification by the Parliament, which of these were signed by the ministry of foreign affairs or by the ministry of internal affairs or by the ministry of economy?
5. When were they signed?
6. Until when are they in force? We wish to know the law (of the Turkish state) on which the approval of these agreements are based.
7. Which office has waived the right of its own broadcasting to the Americans? If such a right is not waived, is this a de facto situation?
8. Have we granted the right of establishing military bases and the right of performing operations on our soil to the state of the USA? If so, what is the essence and the conditions of this right and when were (the agreements related to these operations) they signed, what is the time of duration for these agreements and what is their actual number?
9. Have they been ratified by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey?
10. Are these bases administered by Pentagon or by our General Staff?

11. If these bases are used jointly by Turkey and the US, what is the name of this joint Command?
12. By which law has it been established?
13. What is the basis of division of duties within this joint Command (between the Turkish and American commanders)?
14. Does the authority of giving the last command belong to the American or to the Turkish commander?
15. Is there any Turkish officer, commander or private in these bases, apart from those in charge of the external security of these bases?
16. Are there any Turkish personnel in these bases? If so, are they equally responsible and authorized as the American personnel concerning the use of all weapons, equipments and instalments in these bases? If there is a lack of responsibility and authority, has the Turkish government the opportunity of controlling these bases and be informed of the events taking place in those places?
17. Can we prevent the misuse of these bases by the Americans in order to stop the start of a war triggered by them?
18. Do we have nuclear war headed missiles in Turkey as declared by competent authorities of the American ministry of defence?
19. Is it true that these missiles are kept under the control of Americans and be used solely by the command of the American President? In my opinion, the US will never hand over the right of decision of use of these nuclear arms to another state. This was one of the topics of disagreement between France and the US in NATO. Moreover, ex-foreign minister Ahmet Topaloğlu has declared that the US was entitled to give the last command for the use of these nuclear arms.
20. What is the total area of Turkish soil occupied by these bases?
21. Does the US make a payment in the form of indemnity or rent for her use of this soil? If so, by what amount? We know that no tax is paid to Turkey for

the requirements of the American personnel and their families, imported to Turkey. What is the amount of loss of the Treasury resulting from these tax-free commodities?

22. What is the number of the Americans - who have committed crimes in Turkey- that are not brought in front of Turkish courts for trial since 1947?
23. How many of these were punished by the American courts?
24. What kinds of punishment were given to them?
25. Would they have received the same punishments if they were tried by the Turkish courts? Has the US government paid any indemnity for the losses of our citizens ensuing the crimes of her personnel in Turkey? If so, are these amounts of indemnity identical to the sums paid to the American citizens for similar crimes?
26. Is there any trade union (in the American bases)? If so, what is their relation with the authorities of TUSLOG?
27. Has TUSLOG employed any Turkish personnel? If so, has this institution been respectful to the legal rights of the Turkish workers? Is there a suit (charge) brought against TUSLOG by the Turkish workers or by a (Turkish) trade union? If so, has TUSLOG accepted the right of being tried in front of the Turkish courts? Has it attempted to prevent the execution of verdicts of the Turkish courts?
28. What was the aim of establishment of Tumpane? What is its true identity? Does our government believe that all the bilateral agreements are consistent with our national sovereignty and independence? If not, we want to learn the opinion of the government about these agreements. Which measures are taken by the government for the abrogation of these agreements? (NA Minutes, 5.1.1967, 29th meeting, Second Session, 85 - 87, translation mine)

“Tumpane” and “TUSLOG” may need explanation for a future reader. Tumpane was a company established in Turkey which hired cheap labour in order to give service to American personnel dwelling in American bases and installations. In 1967, a strike started by the Turkish labourers working for the Tumpane company for

wage increase. However, chief commander of NATO, Lemnitzer personally demanded for the postponing of the strike, a request immediately accepted by Prime Minister Demirel. (Soysal, 1967:3)

TUSLOG was another major subcommand of the US air force in Turkey with headquarters in Ankara. Its mission was to provide logistical support for US forces in the area of Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, for the Military Assistance Advisory groups, for the joint US Military Mission for Aid for Turkey (acronyms for JUSMMAT) and for other American units and agencies. The NATO military manoeuvres and war games held in Turkey were logistically supported by TUSLOG. (Vali, 1976: 138) TUSLOG (acronyms for Turkish/American Logistic Organization) is best described by Avcioğlu who stated that American bases in Turkey – such as Incirlik, Çiğli, Karamürsel, Yalova, and Diyarbakır -were directly linked to TUSLOG, which in turn took orders directly from Pentagon. Although the name of this organization echoed a joint defence structure, there was no joint function or activity. Avcioğlu further argued that 'TUSLOG veiling' was necessary for the US and the Turkish governments to get rid of the political and legal drawbacks arising from the Montreux Treaty (Avcioğlu, 1965b).

## APPENDIX C

### **The Issue of National Bourgeoisie in Comintern and CPSU**

The issue of national bourgeoisie – one of the concrete topics of the colonial revolution- was one of the crucial items of the debates of the Comintern. Non-Russian delegates insisting on the fundamental character of national revolutions, asked for the attribution of an important role to national bourgeoisie. Anyhow, Comintern rejected a long lasting alliance with the national bourgeoisie as some Muslims demanded, and declared that national revolution had to be accompanied by social revolution and that the alliance with the bourgeoisie could only be a temporary and conditional one. The leading force was to be the poor peasantry of the Eastern countries, as there was no proletariat. National movements led by the bourgeoisie were refused. Scram and Encausse argued that this was a deviation from Lenin's line and that although Lenin had strongly stressed the necessity of protecting the independence of the communist parties in dependent countries, the possibility of delivering the leadership of national liberation struggle to the bourgeois elements for a temporary period was implicit in his thesis. Lenin's main problem was to find an ally that would enable the weakening of the colonial powers such as Britain and to guarantee the survival of the unique socialist state in the world, the USSR. Anyhow, in my opinion, the conditions put forward by Lenin in the Second Congress of the International for the alliance with the bourgeoisie, may prove this allegation partly false. To Lenin, communists should and will support bourgeois-liberation movements in the colonies "only when they are genuinely revolutionary, when their exponents (advocates) do not hinder our work of educating and organising in a revolutionary spirit the peasantry and the masses of the exploited". If those conditions did not exist, the communists in these countries "should combat the reformist bourgeoisie" (Lenin, 1966: 284). One must emphasize that the ultimate objective of a proletarian dictatorship was never abandoned neither by Lenin nor by Comintern participants, collaboration with bourgeois revolutionaries was considered

as a temporary stage. Anyhow, a tension existed between the interests of the world revolution and the interest of the Soviet State. In the Fourth Congress the collaboration with the national bourgeoisie in the East was clearly recognized yet its temporarity and the necessity of the proletariat to do its best to win the leadership of the movement were stressed (Encausse & Scram, 1969: 43). In the Fifth Congress dated 1924, alliance with the bourgeoisie was found suitable during the bourgeois democratic stage in the backward countries and that it should not be ended as long as imperialism was defeated and `social conflicts had not arisen. In the Sixth Congress in 1928, due to their harmful results, the policy of collaboration with the national bourgeois elements was strongly criticized especially due to the defeat of the Chinese revolutionary movement and a new stance related to the revolutionary tactics in Asia was adopted. It was argued that capitalism had reached a new phase, in which an uncompromising and hostile attitude was adopted against the USSR. So, due to that new situation, tactics of alliance with the national bourgeoisie were refused. It was interesting to observe that the petty bourgeoisie was the most suspected element of the class because it was in a great extent inclined to abandon its revolutionary aspirations with the donation of few compromises. Only in very exceptional cases, temporary collaborations, on condition that their being led by the proletariat, were acknowledged. Priority was given to the efforts of organising the masses and for paving the way for the Soviet power, if necessary by armed uprisings. The struggle of "class against class" had begun. In 1935, on the eve of the 7<sup>th</sup> Congress, the world conditions had changed thanks to the rising fascism and Hitler in Europe. The struggle of "class against class" was replaced by "nation against nation" and all the democratic freedoms were to be defended against authoritarian regimes. A common united front was the order of the day. In colonial countries, anti-imperialist struggle had to be halted for the moment, in order to prevent the destruction of unity on an international level. This meant putting a temporary end to the attempts of the social revolution as well. After the Second World War, the policy of the Soviet Union was the one of an uprising by the workers and peasants against the colonial powers and against the local bourgeoisie. Yet, in these days, a central organ of discussion and decision was out of question since the China had entered amongst the socialist camp as a second divergent line. For Mao Tse-tung, co-operation with the national

bourgeoisie was still on the agenda of the communists. Yet, he defended the communist party leadership – the vanguard of the proletariat. In 1960s, after the death of Stalin, the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist party decided that the contradictions between the national bourgeoisie of the newly independent countries and imperialism were considerably greater than the ones between the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat of those countries. The natural outcome of such a postulate was that collaboration with national bourgeoisie was seen as everlasting and “sincere”. It was argued that as long as imperialism continued, priority was given to national interest. Scram and Encausse assert that “National front” as defined in the Twentieth Congress implied that priority was given to national revolution, the social revolution was to be postponed until the disappearance of Western capitalism for good (Scram & d’Encausse, 1969: 58- 71).

## APPENDIX D

### Aybar's Bursa Speech on the Cyprus Issue

In Sargin's book, Aybar's Bursa speech is summarized as follows: "Cyprus issue has once more become a deeply serious (...) problem since December. The government evaluates our alliances, friendships with other countries and relations with our neighbours by the use of criterion of the Cyprus issue. The Prime minister has implied that we could go to war with our NATO ally, Greece for Cyprus. He bitterly complained of the friendship of America (...) He went further to state that if the allies did not change their attitude, Western alliance might collapse and Turkey would find a place for itself "in a world that would be established according to new conditions". As we all know, bloody events continue in Cyprus since last December. Children, women and elderly people are being killed. The (Turkish) youth are taken as hostages, and villages are burned. In some places, bloody events take the shape of a civil war. It is difficult to assume that these bloody events have started sporadically when one takes into account the type of weapons used during the conflict, and the starting date of the events. They all point to the existence of a previous plan. The bloody events emerged during the Third İnönü government which had a weak majority in the Parliament. Also USA president Johnson had recently been chosen to his post and it was a very weak possibility that he would react seriously on the Cyprus issue. On the other side, The Turkish Cypriots consist of 1/5 of the total population of Cyprus. The Turkish minority are fond of London/Zurich agreements and the new Cyprus Constitution. Yet, the Greek Cypriots are not. Makarios has complained of the London/Zurich agreements and the Constitution before the start of the bloody events. And the most important of all is this: the Turkish Cypriots never had an ideal of "annexation to Motherland", for which they had fought for and died and which was inherited by them (...) Bloody events continue in Cyprus. The first thing to be done is to put an end to those events. The mission of the UN forces is to stop these events. Their active involvement should be provided. Also, taken into

consideration that the Turkish Cypriots have shed their blood for their cause, they should be supplied with the right of property and life, with the fundamental rights that are the conditions of living as a human being. Yet, they can only be achieved in the light of “National Treaty” carried on by a foreign policy of personality. We are a state that has won the war of liberation and that has eradicated the old heritage. We have no demand of land beyond our recent borders and we should not.” (Sargin, 2001: 224-25, italics and translation mine, dots belong to Sargin because he has omitted a certain part of the speech).

## **APPENDIX E**

### **First Declaration of TİP on the Cyprus Issue**

An important portion of the text of the first declaration of TİP on Cyprus issue is as follows:

“The situation in Cyprus has reached a point that (...) it is not possible to wait any more. We cannot shut our eyes to the massacre of our Cypriot collaterals. The authorization of government (for military intervention to Cyprus) is aimed at providing security of life for our collaterals in the island and for intervention to the brutal murders by the use of arms if necessary. The government should use this authorization without paying attention to the advice and pressures of the US. Cyprus issue bears a second significance in addition to the security of our collaterals. It is a question of security for both, Turkey and the Middle East. Cyprus is a springboard for Greece which was urged to attack our country 48 years ago by American Christians (non-Moslems- gavur). If we assess the situation from this point of view; it will be observed that if Cyprus is annexed by Greece, she (Greece) will put us under her yoke and imperialism will hinder the awakening of the Arab countries by threatening them through Cyprus (quoted in Dinler, 1990 : 83-4, translation mine).

## APPENDIX F

### Second Declaration of TİP on the Cyprus Issue

The second declaration of TİP is as follows:

- a. It is against article 56 of the Constitution and against democracy not to inform TİP of the recent events in Cyprus under the guise of our president being abroad.
- b. According to the news, it is comprehended that the government has refrained from its determinate position for military intervention and has decided to carry on the Cyprus question by bargaining.
- c. The foreigners declare that Turkey must immediately stop its threat of war yet they have no immediate demands for the withdrawal of the Greek soldiers from the island and for the maintenance of the security of life of the Turks in Cyprus. Moreover, even if the Greek soldiers leave the island it is very easy to arm the Greeks of the island by the same military equipment.
- d. In spite of all our warnings, Demirel government was not able to resist to the American pressure and for the second time, the right to intervene to Cyprus has been lost.
- e. We declare that a positive solution to the Cyprus problem will never be achieved as long as the influence of USA, NATO and of all great states is maintained. (Dinler, 1990 : 84, translation mine)

## APPENDIX G

### **The Main Points of the Soviet Thesis on Cyprus**

The Soviet Thesis related to Cyprus issue focused on the following points:

1. The sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Cyprus state should be secured and all kinds of foreign intervention should be strictly prohibited.
2. The Soviet Union is against the total or partial annexation of the island by other states.
3. Domestic problems of the Cyprus Republic –including the possibility of the establishment of a federative structure - should be determined by the Cyprus people, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots themselves.
4. The future state system of Cyprus should provide a peaceful co-existence of both communities under the conditions of unfettered security. All activities which pave the way for annexation of the island and obstruct the inter communal dialog should immediately be stopped.
5. Cyprus should be demilitarized, the withdrawal of all foreign military units should be accomplished, the existence of foreign military bases ought to be terminated.
6. All agreements pertinent to the Republic of Cyprus hindering the sovereignty and independence of the country should be abrogated.
7. The solution of the Cyprus question should be processed within the framework of the resolutions of the UN and at its leadership. The initiation of such a process could proceed through an international conference. This conference may consist of all the members of the Security Council, Greece, Turkey, the representatives of Turkish and

Greek Cypriots, and some non-aligned countries. This conference should aim to take resolutions favouring the interests of both communities to live in peace and security.

8. Cyprus Republic should not be the target of a future foreign intervention and this condition should be guaranteed by the guarantor states chosen by the UN. These states could be the members of the Security Council, Greece, Turkey and the representatives of a number of non-aligned countries. (quoted in Hasgüler, 2002:151-152, translation mine)