

IMPORTANCE OF ART IN AUTHENTICATING DASEIN

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

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IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  
IN  
PHILOSOPHY

JANUARY 2006

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **IMPORTANCE OF ART IN AUTHENTICATING DASEIN**

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January 2006, 63 pages

The aim of this thesis is to try to establish a relationship between Heidegger's thought on authenticity and art, and to show the role of art in authentic being of Dasein. Dasein's being authentic depends on Dasein's revealing of itself as itself. In this respect art plays an important role in revealing Dasein as itself. Thus, the relation between art and authenticity can be based on alethia which is the revealing of being as itself. At the same time art plays an important role in authenticating Dasein by its world-disclosing feature as it allows Dasein's own world to reveal itself in its own way.

Keywords: Heidegger, Art, Authenticity, Dasein, Alethia

## ÖZ

### DASEIN'İN OTANTİK OLABİLMESİNDE SANATIN ÖNEMİ

Şenyurt, E. Yasemin

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet İnam

Ocak 2006, 63 sayfa

Bu tezin amacı Heidegger'in otantiklik ile ilgili düşünceleri ile sanat anlayışı arasında bağ kurmaya çalışmak ve Dasein'in otantik olabilmesinde sanatın nasıl bir rolü olduğunu göstermektir. Dasein'in otantik olabilmesi kendinin kendi olduğu gibi açığa çıkabilmesi önemli bir rol oynar. Dolayısıyla sanat ve otantiklik ilişkisi varlığın kendini olduğu gibi açığa çıkarması anlamına gelen alethia üzerinden kurulabilmektedir. Aynı zamanda sanat dünya açılımlayıcı özelliği ile Dasein'in kendine özgü dünyasının kendine özgü bir şekilde açığa çıkmasına olanak tanıdığı için de Dasein'in otantik olabilmesinde önemli bir rol oynamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Heidegger, Sanat, Otantiklik, Dasein, Alethia

To My Uncle and Aunt

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First of all, I am grateful to my supervisor, Ahmet İnam, who contributed alot to the realisation of this thesis.

I am grateful to Ertuğrul Turan, Sanem Kurtar and Yurdagül Kılınç Adanalı for their valuable contributions to the thesis. I am also grateful to my friends Şervan Adar Avşar, Ekim Can Bayram, Eren Ağın, Burçak İsmet, Nilüfer Demirkan, Haldun Soygür, Dilek Türkoğlu and to my family for their support during my work on the thesis.

Finally, I would like to thank Assoc.Prof. Ayhan Sol and Asst.Prof. Ertuğrul Turan, both of whom agreed to take part in the examining committee.

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTERS	
1.DASEIN AND AUTHENTICITY.....	5
1.1 The Priority and the Basic Structure of Dasein .....	5
1.1.1 Ontic and Ontological Priority of “Da-sein” .....	5
1.1.2 The “Mineness”(Jemeinigkeit) of Dasein.....	7
1.1.3 “Being-in-the-World” as the Basic Structure of Dasein.....	8
1.1.3.1 Worldhood of the World.....	9
1.1.3.2 To be in the World.....	11
1.1.3.3 “The They” (Das Man) and Everyday Being in the World.....	12
1.2 Existentiality of Dasein.....	14
1.2.1 Understanding ( <i>Verstehen</i> ).....	14
1.2.2 Situatedness ( <i>Befindlichkeit</i> ).....	15
1.2.3 Discourse ( <i>Rede</i> ).....	17
1.2.4 The Inauthenticity of Dasein as “Falleness” ( <i>Verfallen</i> ).....	18
1.2.5 The Possibility of Uncovering of the “Authentic Possibility” of Dasein.....	19
1.2.5.1 Anxiety ( <i>Angst</i> ).....	21
1.2.5.2 The Experience of Nothingness in Anxiety...	22
1.2.5.3 Uncanniness ( <i>Unheimlichkeit</i> ).....	23
1.2.5.4 The Structural Whole of Dasein’s Being:	



Care ( <i>Sorge</i> ).....	24
2.AUTHENTICITY AND TEMPORALITY.....	27
2.1 Being-towards-death and Authenticity.....	27
2.1.1 What Does Death Mean as an “End?” (Dasein’s “End”?).....	27
2.1.2 Experience of Other’s Death.....	29
2.1.3 Death as a Possibility and Being-a-Whole.....	31
2.1.3.1 Dasein’s Facing with its Own Death.....	32
2.1.3.2 Call (as “Care”) of Conscience.....	34
2.1.3.3 Anticipatory Resoluteness as Having Existential Authenticity.....	36
2.2 Existential Authenticity as Disclosing Dasein’s Temporality.	37
2.2.1 The Temporality of Dasein’s Existential Constitution.....	38
2.2.1.1 Care and Temporality.....	38
2.2.1.2 The Temporality of Being-in-the-World.....	41
2.2.1.3 Inauthenticity and Temporality.....	42
2.2.2 Dasein’s Authenticity and the Original Temporality (Ec-stasis of Temporality).....	43
3. ART AND AUTHENTICITY.....	45
3.1 Heidegger’s Inquiry on the “Origin” of the “Art”.....	45
3.1.1 Whether the “Artist” or the “Artwork” is the Origin of the Art .....	45
3.1.2 Artwork Priority for the “Origin”.....	46
3.1.2.1 Artwork and the Thing	47
3.1.2.2 The Origin of the Work of Art: “World Disclosure”.....	50
3.2 Truth as “Aletheia” and the Work of Art.....	52
3.2.1 The Work and Truth.....	52
3.2.2 Truth and Art.....	53
3.3 The Disclosure of Primordial Relation Between Authenticity and Art.....	55
3.3.1 Dasein’s Authenticity and Truth.....	55

3.3.2 The Influence of the Art as World Disclosure on Authenticating Dasein.....	57
CONCLUSION.....	59
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	61

## INTRODUCTION

Heidegger who commented world, entities-within-the-world and being with others in an existential-ontological analysis regarding Dasein's existence in *Being and Time*, demonstrated the original role of art by discussing the fundamental phenomena that was omitted in this Dasein centered comment in *The Origin of the Work of Art*. Because in a comment that is focused on Dasein's existence the fundamental problem to be discussed has to be the "thingly character of the thing" and meaning of the "world" in this context. At this point A. Mansbach (1997: 158) says that "there is continuity between *Being and Time* and *The Origin of the Work of Art*". According to Mansbach (1997: 159), Heidegger by seeing the fact that he can not pass beyond both Cartesian tradition and anthropocentric approach with only authentic existence and his own thought in *Being and Time*, he assigned art to this hard work in *The Origin of the Work of Art*.

For Heidegger, understanding art can be possible by looking its self, origin and nature and make it to come out from there in every condition. In this context, he criticizes traditional approach by mentioning that especially starting from Plato and Aristotle traditional western metaphysical approach limited art with aesthetics and for this reason reduced art to the phenomenon of beauty. Thus, opposing to traditional aesthetics he proposed that it has to be overthrown. The fundamental thought of Heidegger in this context is to turn back to the great art understanding of Ancient Greece and commenting on what lies in the heart of being great art characteristic of art work. According to Heidegger, great art can be characterized with its inconsumability namely, not being a definite thing. R. Bernasconi (1999: 95) examines as following: "According to Heidegger, the work which is incomplete, incompletable is great art". Great art is more original to aesthetics because when there was no aesthetics what existed was great art. However for Heidegger, when we

come to Plato-Aristotle then aesthetics substitutes great art and an adventure in which art is limited to aesthetics begins.

Heidegger believes that modern age forms the death of art. Great art is dead. In this condition, these questions can be asked: Why did great art die? What make great art be “Great Art”? Heidegger analyzes these questions in both characteristics of great art of commenting the world and earth. Because great art can show itself as a continuous and inconsumable period of commenting. Great art is the comment of disclosure, coming out period of human existence in the duality of earth and world namely its historically and existence itself in this historical adventure. Thus, Heidegger by turning back the work of art to the understanding of great art actually aims to demonstrate nature of art or its being formed by this commenting period. Because according to him, nature of art has an original relationship with truth. The truth which is commented by, again, turning back to the ancient era’s concept of *aletheia* is unconcealedness of beings as it is explained in *The Origin of the Work of Art* (Heidegger, c1993: p176). Thus, Heidegger deals with the fundamental relation between nature of art and unconcealedness of beings.

For Heidegger, art is the one that commented, opened its truth in the work. Art makes thing to come out as themselves by bringing things out of their secretness. The disclosure of things or events one by one (as themselves, as they are) means the disclosure of truth. According to Heidegger, art discloses truth by commenting a world in the world. Art creates a new world in this world as a work of art. Therefore, art can not be satisfied with the world that Dasein finds itself in and in the broadest sense that surrounds Dasein, art can not be limited to it. Because, in the world that Dasein finds itself in, entities or events are unable to come up one by one. Therefore, art opens a new world continuously.

For Heidegger, great art that is in nature of the art, died in the modern age. Because, in modern age, the ability of art that discloses this world is abolished. According to him, the fundamental reason for this is the approach to the work of art as separated from the worlds that is disclosed by it. As it is considered before, the substitution of great art by aesthetics made the work of art be discussed in the relation of it and beauty. For Heidegger, taking art just as in relation to “beauty” is

disregarding of its world opening capability. Neglecting world disclosure capability of art means beginning to see it as a matter of consuming rather than seeing it as the place where truth is revealed.

Seeing work of art as a matter of consumption (for Heidegger), means separating it from its origins namely, from art and nature of art. In this case, art is fallen apart from the characteristic of great art which comments” the historicity of human existence. Therefore, it lost or covered its connection with authenticity of Dasein. According to Heidegger, the relation between authenticity of Dasein and art can only be established in the place where art discloses truth by opening world inside this world. Dasein’s authenticity depends on Dasein’s escape from the coveredness in the ‘they’ area, actually being itself, coming out of itself. Art plays a crucial role in Dasein’s being authentic by making it disclose its own world in work of art since Dasein gains the possibility of disclosing its own world through work of art. Disclosure of Dasein’s specific world means Dasein’s own disclosure as itself. Based on the masterpiece of Heidegger, *Being and Time*, and another work, *The Origin of the Work of Art*, this thesis will bring together the understanding of Dasein’s being authentic that is commented in *Being and Time* and discussion about nature of origin in *The Origin of the Work of Art* and will demonstrate what kind of relation exists between Dasein’s authenticity and nature of the art.

In order to construct this relation in the first part, under the title of *Dasein and Authenticity*, before all else the reason why in Heidegger Dasein has ontic and ontological priority will be explained. In addition to this, it will be demonstrated how this priority is analyzed as being-in-the-world, then it will be discussed what is authenticity and inauthenticity (the possibilities of Dasein) and finally, the relation between Dasein’s existence and authenticity will be shown. In second part, under the title of *Authenticity and Temporality*, it will be discussed what kind of end and possibility “death” is for Dasein. After that the relation of Dasein’s authenticity and temporality will be discussed. In the third part, under the title of *Authenticity and Art*, Heidegger’s understanding of art will be tried to be given by limiting the subject with the discussion of nature of art in Heidegger’s article, *The Origin of the Work of Art* and then the relation between Dasein’s authenticity and art will be considered. For this end, before all else, what kind of relationship exists between Dasein’s

authenticity and truth will be shown and lastly the role of world disclosure feature of the work of art in Dasein's authenticity will be discussed.

# CHAPTER I

## DASEIN AND AUTHENTICITY

The issue, designed under this chapter, is the investigation of why Heidegger gives priority, especially in *Being and Time*, to the existence of Dasein ontically and ontologically and how the structure of this priority is analyzed in terms of Dasein's "mineness" (*Jemeignikeit*) and "*Being-in-the-World*". In this investigation, it will be shown that how Heidegger relates the existence of Dasein and authenticity by mentioning the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity, which are the original possibilities of basic existential structures of Dasein.

### 1.1 The Priority and the Basic Structure of Dasein

This topic will investigate, in Heidegger, the reason of the *existential analysis* about the being of Dasein is prior and the basic structure of this privileged being. For this reason, first of all, the Ontic and the ontologic priority of Dasein in Heidegger will be discussed and then it will be investigated how he elucidated the basic structure of this priority as *Being-in-the-World*.

#### 1.1.1 Ontic and ontological Priority of "Da-sein"

According to Heidegger, the conceptual meaning of Dasein is "being-there". Because, "Da", in German, means "there" and "Sein" means "being". As "being-there", Dasein has first ontic and ontological priority. For Heidegger, Dasein's ontic priority is its "existence" (*Ek-sistenz*) and ontological priority is its understanding (*Verstehen*) of its own "Being" and all of the beings (*seiendes*) which involve it.

Why, for Heidegger, Dasein's being an "existence" before all else, in other words ontic priority, is a priority and what consists of the basis of this priority? Being and Time answers this question by determining and analyzing the existence of Dasein before all else and the original distinction between the all other individual things or events that surround Dasein. Thus, what is the distinction between existence of Dasein and all other things or events? Heidegger (1996: 32) finds this distinction in Dasein's ability of making its existence a self-subject, i.e. a subject to be considered by the Dasein itself. Dasein, by making its existence a self-subject, ontically differs from all other things. For Heidegger, the basis of this distinction lies in the understanding of Dasein's nature. For Dasein is, before of all, an "existence" and can be understood in this form. To put it in a different way, "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence" (Heidegger, 1996: 67). Here 'exist' is taken in a "special sense, in which the original force of the Latin prefix 'ex' (out of) is brought back into play" (Naess, 1968: 188). Therefore, one can say that 'existence' has the sense of 'stand out from' as man stands out from entities; he ex-sists. Saying that Dasein's nature is existence means that different from all other things Dasein has kinds of potential existing. All other things except Dasein however, have no possibility of being another way because of being "existed" in that way. It can be assumed that their existence is a kind of continuous necessity. Hence, Heidegger considers Dasein as human existence, in a different context from the western metaphysics.

For Heidegger, the essence of human being cannot be thought of as a biological fact; nor can it be imagined as metaphysically constructed substance. On the other hand, neither anthropology nor psychology could be capable of giving us this essence at all (Günok, 2004: 45).

The meaning of Dasein's having an ontological priority means that its potentiality of understanding the existence of itself and the existence of the things outer to itself. In other words, "Dasein is the only thing that is in relation between itself and between things and understanding this original relation makes it different among the other things" (Pöggeler, 1987: 45). Dasein, with its ontological priority, becomes the basic being of understanding, in this respect a two-way period which goes continually and originally. While one side of this binary-process which is based upon Dasein's existence as an "understanding being", tends to its world and thus to "things-in-world" that surround it, the other tends to Dasein's self existence, ie. Dasein's self



understanding. For Heidegger, this binary form of understanding is always together and can be seen as whole with Dasein's self understanding. Because in *Being and Time*, in all cases Dasein as a human existence is for myself, for my existence (Heidegger, 1996: 27). Consequently, this characteristic of Dasein has to be considered before all else.

### 1.1.2 The "Mineness" (*Jemeinigkeit*) of Dasein

Dasein's existence, in each possible case, is itself and this self is the self of every human being, for being it self. Therefore, according to Heidegger, Dasein is itself in every case whether it is in a relation with its world in the context of its acts or tended its own existence; for, "understanding the being as itself is the most clear and most distinct characteristics of Dasein". (Heidegger, 1996: 32) According to Heidegger, understanding the being however is based on Dasein's originally being itself and understood via itself.

Dasein is towards its being in its self existence and this being is its "ownmost possibility". For Heidegger, Dasein is this possibility in every case and has this possibility but in no case this possibility is only an attribution of Dasein. As discussed in *Being and Time*, the clearest reason for this is that "in every case, fundamentally being its own possibility of Dasein" (Heidegger, 1996: 68). In the view of Heidegger, as being its own possibility fundamentally, Dasein itself can choose or gain but at the same time can loose itself. However, whatever case it would be, in other words whether it chooses and gains, accepts or vice versa Dasein has the possibility (potentiality) of being authentic. Authenticity and inauthenticity are the fundamental being forms or possibilities of Dasein's existence. Heidegger believes that, both of these possibilities are based upon Dasein's mineness. Thus, as Heidegger (1996: 69) examined in *Being and Time*, the priority of the existence (*existential*) that shapes Dasein to the essence (*essentia*) and its being for myself in each case opens a phenomenological area in the analysis of this thing –Dasein-.

As it is examined in possibility of being authentic and inauthentic, in Dasein's mineness it originates and can be understood in this fundamental. However, in

Heidegger, these two possibilities nevertheless prior to creating a distinct pattern for Dasein's existence they should be seen and understood in the fundamentals of "Being-in-the-World". As it is considered in *Being and Time*, "the comment of Being-in-the-World is required for the fundamental design namely proper analysis of Dasein's existence in here" (Heidegger, 1996: 78).

### **1.1.3 "Being-in-the-World" as the Basic Structure of Dasein**

Dasein's fundamental structure is Being-in-the-World. Because for Heidegger, "if the 'cogito sum' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The 'sum' is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that 'I am in a world' (Heidegger, 1996: 254). Heidegger criticizes Descartes in the point of taking 'cogito sum' as a starting point and defining world's existence from this starting point. The clearest reason for this is that for him it is impossible to think world and human-being as two distinct properties in the context of their fundamental structures and meanings. In other words, "there is no man without a world, and no world without Dasein" (Wild, 1963: 669). Hence, for Heidegger, it's pointless to define the world as independent from the existence of Dasein and considering it in an isolated manner. Because, this and some other epistemological views underestimate the act of defining the world, the fundamentals of it namely the thing that precedes it. According to Heidegger, in every case, the prior area of definition requires existence of the world. For this reason, world is both ontologically and existentially prior. Thus, first of all the structure and form of this originality of the connection of world and Dasein has to be understood.

Dasein's being in the world, for Heidegger, is not an extensional relationship like water in glass or dress in cupboard. In another word, "the being-in of Dasein is of a different nature; it is an existential being-in, instead of a spatial being in" (Overenget, c1998: 115); that is to say, "he is in the world by dwelling in it as a field of care, as soldier is in the army, or a doctor is in medicine" (Wild, 1963: 669).

Being-in-the-World has various forms. For instance,

having to do with something, producing something, attending to something and looking after it, making use of something, giving something up and letting it go, undertaking, accomplishing, evincing, interrogating, considering, discussing, determining...(Heidegger, 1996: 83)

What can be seen in these examples is that for Dasein, being in the world means to be used in with this world. Together with Dasein's acquaintanceship with this world this means for it that this acquaintanceship means being pre-acquainted (familiarity with world), being prior to. Heidegger believes that the world itself had to be commented before all else in order to understand this familiarity of Dasein with its world.

### **1.1.3.1 Worldhood of the World**

Heidegger, before all else, takes the world as a phenomenon. As a phenomenon, world has to show itself briefly open as itself. Therefore, according to Heidegger, world should not be considered as the totality of particular things one by one. Being and Time examines as the following:

The world itself is not an entity within-the-world; and yet it is so determinative for such entities that only in so far as 'there is' a world can they be encountered and show themselves, in their Being, as entities which have been discovered. (Heidegger, 1996: 102).

As it can be understood from here, world is the meaningful whole of beings. The fundamental of this meaningfulness is Dasein. Thus, Dasein cannot see the world as a different, isolated thing.

According to Heidegger, for the analysis of the worldhood of the world, first of all the structure of the connection between Dasein and the things one by one or the entities-within-the-world must be analyzed. In this context, Heidegger by making an analysis of the first and prior meaning of Dasein's relationship with entities according to context of the meaning of entities makes the distinction of ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. The best example of this distinction is showing the hammer and hammering connection in Being and Time. According to Heidegger,

when hammer is used for hammering the nail it is uncovered as a thing ready-at-hand. Being and Time examines as following:

The less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is –as equipment. The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ of the hammer. The kind of Being which equipment possesses- in which it manifests itself in its own right- we call “readiness-to-hand” (Heidegger, 1996: 98).

As it can be understood from here, using hammer for hammering does not require knowing, examining, defining or explaining it. However, at this point for Heidegger when hammer lost its actness, for instance divided into parts, started to evaluate as knowledge object than in this context hammer is present-at-hand. Hence, present as simple and as a material.

According to Heidegger, Dasein encounters ready-at-hands in the world. Briefly, Dasein’s first encounter with hammer is not an encounter with the knowledge of its material or its color. Dasein’s first encounter with the hammer is when it first uses the hammer based on the actness of it. Therefore, Heidegger opposes to the belief of first taking the world and human as two separate entities and then asking the question of how human knows the world. First question should not be how Dasein knows the world. It has to be the question, “how does Dasein experience the world?” Because, Dasein is in the world before it knows the world. It is originally in the world and is a worldly being. In Being and Time Heidegger (1996: 250) says the following:

Our task is not to prove that an ‘external world’ is present-at-hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency to bury the ‘external world’ in nullity ‘epistemologically’ before going on to prove it .

The meaning of the world as Heidegger explains as the totality of the ready-to-hands is that world is the totality of relationships. World is the world that Dasein experiences. Hence, dividing world as subject and object, taking them as two separate entities that are closed in themselves and thinking that subject tends to object just for information can only be derivated things. Fundamentally, Dasein is in

a relationship with the world but the base of this relationship is not knowledge but “concern” (*Besorgen*).

### 1.1.3.2 To be in the World

As being-in-the-world, Dasein is abreast with the other entities that surround it and together with the other Daseins, and all these things gain meaning in the being of Dasein. Heidegger (1996: 255) considers as following:

Of course only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an understanding of Being is ontically possible), ‘is there’ Being. When Dasein does not exist, ‘independence’ ‘is’ not either, nor ‘is’ the ‘in-itself’. In such a case this sort of thing can be neither understood nor not understood. In such a case even entities within-the-world can neither be discovered nor lie hidden. In such a case it cannot be said that entities are, nor can it be said that they are not.

As long as Dasein tends to other entities in the world with interest, uses them and considers them, they will have meaning, too. For instance, table in itself has no meaning. Table is meaningful as the table that I eat on it, study on it. Thus, while entities in the world gain meaning because of Dasein, likewise the relationship of these entities with the other entities is possible as long as Dasein exists. Heidegger discloses the fundamentals of the relationship of Dasein with the entities-within-the-world in the abreastness of Dasein with these entities. Dasein is abreast with the other entities exist in the world however this abreastness is different from the one that is between Dasein and other Daseins, and carries different property. This property is explained in Being and Time as following:

Of course Being towards Others is ontologically different from Being towards Things which are present-at-hand. The entity which is ‘other’ has itself the same kind of Being as Dasein. In Being with and towards Others, there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein (Heidegger, 1996: 162).

Heidegger calls Dasein's relationship with others (other Daseins, if we may say) “being-with” (*Mitsein*).

But “by ‘others’ we do not mean everyone else but me- those over against whom the “I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself- those among whom one is too (Heidegger, 1996: 154).

Heidegger does not see other beings as superior or lower than “I”. According to Heidegger, Dasein is like others, Dasein is “being-with”. However, at this point it must be noted that ‘with’ “is not a mathematical, but an existential category” (Günok, 2004: 45) for Heidegger, Dasein’s abreast relationship with the entities-within-the-world and the originality of the relationship with others priorly and most of time is like average everydayness and in everydayness Dasein is defined by the they.

### **1.1.3.3 “The They” (Das Man) and Everyday Being in the World**

According to Heidegger, area of the ‘they’ is an area in which Dasein discloses itself as itself of the ‘they’ and this area is based upon Dasein’s togetherness with others. For Heidegger, the question that has to be asked in the subject of everydayness which is shaped as the area of the ‘they’ in the context of Dasein’s existential analysis is the who is Dasein in everydayness. He believes that in answering this question all existence structures of Dasein, as existence forms of Dasein, will follow this phenomenon. As it is noted in Being and Time as following:

Proximally and for the most part Dasein is fascinated with its world. Dasein is thus absorbed in the world; the kind of Being which it thus possesses, and in general the Being-in which underlies it , are essential in determining the character of a phenomenon which we are now about to study. We shall approach this phenomenon by asking who it is that Dasein in its everydayness (Heidegger, 1996: 149).

The fundamental question in here is, given for everydayness, analysis of the structure of Dasein’s this givenness and thus explaining what kind of selfness is the selfness of everydayness. As it is considered by Heidegger, this annotates in every case an area in which Dasein’s self is self of the ‘they’, namely the area of the ‘they’. Dasein, as itself of the ‘they’, fall away from itself of its being in everydayness and cannot take itself from the ‘they’. As it is noted in Being and Time, “it itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others” (Heidegger, 1996: 164). How Others take back its

Being from Dasein? Dasein is generally and most of the time, like Others and perceives, understands, thinks and acts like them. For Heidegger (1996: 164):

We take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as they (man) take pleasure; we read, see and judge about literature and art as they see and judge; likewise we shrink back from the 'great mass' as they shrink back; we find 'shocking' what they find shocking.

Heidegger embodies the state that Being-There forgets itself, lost in daily life and vanished in Others as inauthenticity of Dasein. In none of the cases Dasein can be itself and can be disclosed to its possibilities. According to Heidegger,

authentic personal existence is attainable only in part by struggle against these impersonal attitudes of Das Man, who runs away from his own fear, his own death, and his own concerns, to lose himself in technical business and the things that anyone interchangeably can do (in Wild, 1963: 669).

In order for being authentic namely being itself's existence and to disclose as itself drawing from the 'they' area is required, because "the danger of 'they' is that Dasein is not aware of its own 'true self' which provides a gate to see its own possibilities" (Turan, 1987: 19). Therefore, for Heidegger, first of all the fundamental structures that shape Dasein's itself which is Dasein's existence and that elucidates it with-in-the-world and as the 'world', has to be analyzed.

## **1.2 Existentiality of Dasein**

Heidegger (1996: 167) calls the fundamental structures that shape Dasein's being and discloses it is as 'world' or world itself as existentials. The basic existentials that disclose Dasein as in-world are understanding, situatedness and discourse. Therefore, here under this topic, first of all these three existentials are going to be examined and then the relation between daily life that Dasein is usually in and inauthenticity will be mentioned. Hence, it will be examined that what type of existence state or shape that Dasein is in its daily life for Heidegger. The importance of the definition the existence state or shape of Dasein is reaching the distinction of authenticity and inauthenticity. For Heidegger this two original possibility of Dasein is present as undifferentiated from each other. Therefore, before all else Dasein has to realize

these possibilities. Thus, it will be demonstrated that how Dasein draw back from the meanings of daily life and environment that surround it to its existence and what is the structural unity of this existence.

### 1.2.1 “Understanding”(Verstehen)

According to Heidegger, it is not possible to consider “understanding” just as a mental activity, since understanding is a fundamental existential. The interpretation of Overenget (c1998:123) explains why understanding is a fundamental existential in the following quote: “the essence of Dasein is existence, existence is understanding”. For Heidegger (1996: 185), “as long as it is, Dasein always has understood itself and always will understand itself in terms of possibilities”. Although what possibility indicates may not come to being yet, it has great importance for Dasein. Because, Being-possible can past beyond the limits of Being-actual. Being-actual may be real than the Being-possible but Being-possible is much meaningful than Being-Actual. According to Heidegger, understanding is the awareness of Dasein of its possibility. In this respect understanding is related to future.

Dasein’s being-there discloses, appears with understanding. Therefore, as a being that understands, Dasein is the one that discloses itself. In daily life what is meant by understanding is comprehending and acting. However, for Heidegger (1996: 183),

the kind of Being which Dasein has a potentiality-for-Being, lies in existentially in understanding. Dasein is not something present-at-hand which possesses its competence for something by way of an extra; it is primarily Being-possible.

We face with ready-at-hands in our tendency to world. In our first meeting with the world, we cannot make a judgement that can completely explain them we only interpret ready-to-hands as means. Understanding is a fundamental possibility both for interpretation and judgement. Because, understanding has form of being-as-structure. It gets disclosed in this form. Being-as-structure has three properties. First is fore-having, second is fore-sight. Fore-sight is the form of fore-having that is



reduced to private. The third property of being-as-structure is the fore-conception. It includes both fore-having and fore-sight.

Understanding introduces interpretation, understanding and interpretation together result in judgement. Judgement appears in three forms. First is judgement's statement of property of object. Second is judgement's statement of a property of subject distinct from other properties of subject. Third form of judgement's appearance is communication namely, narration to one another. Thus, "understanding" for Heidegger, constructs a context that is required for the semantic unity of the world and the comprehension of this unity by providing an ontological ground for interpretation and judgement.

### **1.2.2 "Situatedness" (*Befindlichkeit*)**

One of the other fundamental existentials and priorly in the subject of the annotation of the world is situatedness. First of all, Dasein is in the world and exists as Being-in-the-world. Heidegger, in the Dasein's being-in-the-world, calls the fundamental being kind as mood. Dasein always finds itself in this mood. Dasein's finding it self in such a mood is its awareness of its being-in-the-world. Because, Dasein is a being in moods and discloses as moods. Michael Gelven's (1989: 81) examination of this is as follows:

State-of-mind discloses or reveals the fact that Dasein is in the world; but not why or for what purpose. Hence there is always something unknown about one's actual state in the world.

The existential ground of Dasein's being-in-the-world is "thrownness" (*Geworfenheit*). According to Heidegger (1996: 174), Dasein is thrown to the world. As it is explained in *Being and Time*, "an entity of the character of Dasein is its 'there' in such a way that, whether explicitly or not, it finds itself in thrownness". Thrownness is Dasein's disclosed state to its possibilities and in a world that is at present. This presentness is a destiny for Dasein that Dasein is doomed to live.

For Heidegger, Dasein's thrownness is disclosed as moods. In this context, the first mood that in the world and in the disclosed state to possibilities Dasein finds itself is "fear". According to Heidegger, fear is a representation of the uncovering and bringing front of Dasein and world interaction. What makes fear special in this context and what discloses it as a mood is its unidentified origin which cannot be taken back to a worldly entity. Therefore, fear is just a mood; but a passive state. Because, although there is no definite entity that constitutes it, it is the name of affectedness by ambiguity.

Heidegger, that he elucidated the situatedness of Dasein in the mood of fear, therefore separates every self-reaction period from this way of self-discovery period. As it is written in *Being and Time*:

State-of-mind are so far from being reflected upon, that precisely what they do is to assail Dasein in its unreflecting devotion to the world with which it is concerned and on which it expends itself (Heidegger, 1996: 175).

### **1.2.3 "Discourse"(*Rede*)**

The apprehensibility of the mood of Dasein is possible with "discourse". Discourse is not simply speech, silence and hearing also placed in discourse. Heidegger's (1996: 208) explanation of the importance of discourse for Dasein is as follows:

Man shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself.

Discourse is in every case, about something. Discourse has the potentiality of transferring, namely, communication with the entity to which it is related. The possibility of this potentiality in discourse is conducted by hearing. However, for Heidegger, something is required that makes hearing possible. This possibility of hearing is, therefore, keeping silent. Fundamental reason for this is explained in *Being and Time* as: "Keeping silent authentically is possible only in genuine discoursing. To be able to keep silent, Dasein must have something to say" (Heidegger, 1996: 208). According to Heidegger, the most important property of

what is heard in keeping silent is being meaningful namely, apprehensibility. Therefore, the most important feature of discourse is its being meaningful. As it is discussed, understanding is the fundamental existentials of Dasein that understands of both its existence and its world and so in this context disclosure of itself as being-in-the-world. Therefore, understanding makes discourse possible and this dual structure shapes it. The structure that is disclosed as hearing and keeping silent in discourse forms two possibilities for Dasein. Hearing is the one that relates Dasein and the meaningful unity of its environment. This hearing is based upon the inauthentic discourse. Thus, Dasein is disclosed in this hearing to others and entities-within-the-world; generally surrounded by daily life and the others being the *they* of itself. In this context, it is fallen away from itself. In keeping silent, however, Dasein is able to hear both itself and Others. If Dasein manages to shut the voices of Others that come to it from outside and hears its own voice then authentic discourse will disclose itself. According to Heidegger, only in this kind of discourse Dasein could be recalled from its fallenness. Besides, fallenness forms a prior being mood in Dasein's being itself.

#### **1.2.4 The Inauthenticity of Dasein as “Fallenness” (*Verfallen*)**

However, the existential structures of Dasein had been explained however, it must also be analyzed that how these structures can be seen in Dasein's daily life. Discourse, one of the Dasein's existentials, appears as idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity in daily life.

The significance of idle talk is that speaking is being done just for speaking. Another property of idle talk is speech's repeating of the known meanings. Idle talk is a non-grounded discourse with these properties. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1996: 213) says the following:

Discourse, which belongs to the essential state of Dasein's Being and has a share in constituting Dasein's disclosedness, has the possibility of becoming idle talk. And when it does so, it serves not so much to keep Being-in-the-world open for us in an articulated understanding, as rather to close it off, and cover up the entities within-the-world.

Curiosity, likewise in the case of idle talk as being done just for speaking, is trying to see just for seeing. In curiosity, there is no will of understanding or discovery. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger (1996: 217) makes this explanation about curiosity:

Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marveling at them. To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest. Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known.

What consists of ambiguity is idle talk and curiosity. The point in ambiguity is its indifferent manner against entities-within-the-world and other Daseins. For Heidegger (1996: 219),

Dasein is always ambiguously 'there'- that is to say, in that public disclosedness of Being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving', where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at bottom nothing) is happening.

In daily life, "idle talk", "curiosity" and "ambiguity" are the most important indicators of Dasein's fallenness. Heidegger (1996: 225) uses this expression in *Being and Time*: "Being-in-the-world is always fallen". However, the fallenness here is not in a negative meaning. Heidegger (1996: 220) believes that Dasein is fallen away from itself namely to the world. Fallenness, refers to inauthenticity however, if Dasein realizes its fallenness and begins following its possibilities then will become authentic. Otherwise, "we desperately struggle for fitting into patterns that are told us by the norms, speaking words truly, dressing appropriately, etc. This is how we have fallen into inauthenticity" (Magee, 1988: 278).

Therefore, what is the meaning of Dasein's inauthenticity? Heidegger (1996: 220) answers this question by explaining what is not meaning inauthenticity:

On no account, however, do the terms "inauthentic" and "non-authentic" signify 'really not', as if in this mode of Being, Dasein were altogether to lose its Being. 'Inauthenticity' does not mean anything like Being-no-longer-in-the-world, but amounts rather to a quite distinctive kind of Being-in-the-world-the kind which is completely fascinated by the 'world' and by the Dasein with of Others in the 'they'.

Inauthenticity can be defined as: “Inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*) refers to the actual state of Dasein in which it is not aware of its own power of illuminating” (Turan, 1987: 18).

### **1.2.5 The Possibility of Uncovering of the “Authentic Possibility” of Dasein**

There is no chance of changing Dasein’s existence and that it shall die, however it may experience the life between these two incidents (birth and death), by seeing its possibilities and choosing different modes existence. ”Only Dasein can ask: How should I be? How should I exist: should I own my Being or let it be expropriated by everydayness?” (Golomb, 1995: 118) Can human beings choose their own modes of existence in all occasions? Heidegger says that this depends on human beings. According to Heidegger (1996: 68),

in each case Dasein is its possibility, and it ‘has’ this possibility, but not just as a property, as something present-at-hand would. And because Dasein is in each case essentially its own possibility, it can, in its very Being, ‘choose’ itself and win itself; it can also lose itself and never win itself; or only ‘seem’ to do so.

That Dasein cannot choose itself or cannot choose itself seeming to be choosing itself prevents it from having an authentic life. At this point, it is essential to emphasize a point which is important to Heidegger. For Heidegger (1996: 68), “the inauthenticity of Dasein does not signify any ‘less’ Being or any ‘lower’ degree of Being”. Moreover, in order for Dasein to be authentic, perhaps it has to have an inauthentic life. Beside, while Dasein leads to an inauthentic life, it may be authentic, and while it leads an authentic life, it may start leading to an inauthentic life. That Dasein starts to live an authentic life once does not come to mean that it shall permanently live an authentic life after then.

Thus, what is authentic life? What does Dasein’s being authentic or inauthentic mean? A human that has an existence in the world may experience an authentic or inauthentic life. The inauthentic life is a given one that is to say to live according to the possibilities that are granted to us. Whereas the authentic life is to be

aware of our being and also of the fact that we shall disappear or pass away sometime in the future. “By realizing my possibilities, by creating and ‘winning’ myself, reflecting on the meaning of Being and being concerned about its development, I am authentic Dasein”(Golomb, 1995: 94).

In daily life, Dasein postpones asking what is its meaning because of dealing with little issues. Dasein does not question the meaning of its acts, thoughts, does not asks itself the question, “What am I doing?” and thus loses its possibility of being authentic. Dasein may become authentic if only it asks these questions about itself and its life and if only it sees that its life is consist of the totality of possibilities. Because, Dasein can exists in various ways. It can try different existence states in its tendency to the world. Hence, Dasein’s being authentic is actually Dasein’s watching its possibilities. What makes Dasein authentic is the updating of the question about the meaning of the possibilities and existence of itself by realizing it.

In order to be authentic, Dasein has to live anxiety, has to face with the nothingness that appears in the anxiety and has to feel itself uncanniness in this nothingness. Therefore, the possibility of Dasein’s authenticity namely anxiety, nothingness and uncanniness will be examined separately.

#### **1.2.5.1 “Anxiety” (*Angst*)**

Anxiety with fear is another mood in Dasein's being-in-the world. However, for Heidegger, anxiety is more original mood than anxiety and a form of disclosure for Care. Because in fear, although in fear Dasein is in an ambiguous affectedness that is to say it is affected by the entities-in-the-world, by the ambiguity of them. This context, anxiety in none of the cases is based on the entities-in-the-world. Conversely, this anxiety “can be described as a “mood which contrives to disclose us to ourselves, to authentic being” (Naess, 1968: 205). This distinction is given as following in Being and Time: “That in the face of which one has anxiety is not an entity within-the-world” (Heidegger, 1996: 231). The reason for anxiety is “nothingness”. However, nothingness in here refers to the nothingness of the entities-in-the-world that Dasein meets.

Anxiety, is one of the phenomena that forms appearance of the possibility of Dasein's authenticity. Because, anxiety is a mood in which all these meaningless and ambiguity appears in Dasein's drawing from 'the they area'. Heidegger (1996: 232) explains this situation in the following quote:

Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about-its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.

According to Heidegger, anxiety is a form of understanding of Dasein's self as a being-possible and understanding itself in the context of these possibilities. Michael Gelven (1989: 115) considers this as:

Experience of dread is that it does seem to remove us from our concern about the things that are happening around us, and in so doing allows us to reflect upon our own stark and terrifying existence.

Dasein that meets anxiety cannot live like it has lived before. Because anxiety would make Dasein questions itself and its life. Dasein can escape either these questions or anxiety. It can be seen as the easiest way for Dasein to escape from anxiety however this escape will result in inauthenticity. Because, by anxiety, its relation with other Daseins and Others. How does this relation change? If Dasein prefers to accept anxiety rather than escaping from it maybe it can continue to do the things it previously does but the character of the acts and the relations will change. However, Heidegger, after 'Turn' (Kehre) starts to think historically and says that maybe anxiety did not live in Antiquity or Middle Ages. Anxiety is a mood that modern human faces (Magee, 1988: 282).

### **1.2.5.2 The Experience of Nothingness in Anxiety**

In anxiety, Dasein is driven back into a kind of meaninglessness, a loss of meaning in the environment that surrounds it and from the shared meaning belong to this environmental. In this draw back, Dasein is towards the ambiguity in itself. According to Heidegger, this state of ambiguity is nothing but facing with nothingness. Nothingness for Dasein can be understood as follows:

Dasein never completely determined by the situation in which it finds itself. In so far as it transcends its situation, it is free to decide how it will develop the potential ways of existing which are open to it" (Bossart, 1968: 57).

According to Heidegger, most of the time Dasein cannot grasp the meaning of nothingness for itself and tries to escape from it. However, in daily life, what takes Dasein away from getting lost in the "Others" area is the experience of nothingness. This relation of Dasein that appears in the state of nothingness and anxiety shapes the possibility of comment on its potentiality of authentic potentiality. In Heidegger's (1996: 103) words, "Dasein means being held out into the nothing".

Dasein is the being that can hold itself in nothingness. For this reason, it has a fundamental distinction from other things. This distinction that belongs to Dasein is originally related to its form of existence or mood. What differentiates Dasein from other things or events and brings it in a relation with the nothingness and holds it in this relation is its being ambiguous as an existentiality. In *Being and Time* Heidegger considers this as "the non-comment state of existentiality as a whole as a thing that happened and end". Although other entities and events can be illustrated and told as a one thing, Dasein as being an existentiality is condemned to remain unidentified and ambiguous. When considered in this respect, anxiety invites Dasein to this ambiguity in its existence, to not being an happened and ended entity by facing with nothingness. For Heidegger, to investigate this relationship among Dasein, anxiety and nothingness properly it is required to examine the phenomena of death and temporality. Therefore, what has been said about nothingness and anxiety up to now should be adequate. However, we can continue with a question like this: What kind of ambiguity and meaningless that Dasein falls into by facing nothingness in anxiety? What is the meaning of this ambiguous or meaningless state for Dasein?

### **1.2.5.3 Uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*)**

Dasein finds itself in 'nowhere' in anxiety. This is Dasein's uncanniness. Uncanniness of Dasein, at the same time, is its homelessness. Because, in anxiety



one feels 'uncanny'. Here the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the "nothing and nowhere" (Heidegger, 1996: 233). However, what is meant by Dasein's Being-in-the-world in the concept of Dasein's abreastness with entities and togetherness with other Daseins is Dasein's being familiar with the world. Thus, anxiety takes Dasein away from daily life by retraining Dasein from this familiarity. However, Dasein itself tends to escape this uncanniness.

What is the reason for the state of uncanniness or homelessness? Why does Dasein feel itself homeless? For Heidegger, any Dasein is always indistinctly appreciate way of existence of the world is groundless and unfounded. What is meant by this is that there is no reason for someone to act as in the manner which has been acting presently. Likewise God is not commanding it in this way, human nature also does not imply this (Magee, 1988: 277). Dasein's escape from uncanniness is its "fallenness". In other words, the falling and the subjection to the they can be "characterized as a fleeing from homelessness in anxiety, and as a fleeing into the safety and home-comfort that inauthenticity gives" (Naess, 1968: 208).

#### **1.2.5.4 The Structural Whole of Dasein's Being: Care (*Sorge*)**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger comments all existentials, which define Dasein's being as existential as a whole as care. In another words, definition of Dasein's being as a unity is possible in care that is its structural unity. Therefore, what is care as Dasein's structural unity and "what meaning does it carry?" According to Heidegger, in order to understand what care (*sorge*) is, it has to be differentiated from concern (*Besorgen*) and solicitude (*Fürsorge*). However, three properties of Dasein should be mentioned that makes up care. First of these is Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself. This is its existentiality. What is meant by Dasein's being-ahead-of-itself is that it's being towards future. Existentiality is equivalent of "understanding" that is one of the existence forms of Dasein in this world or discloses as understanding. In the world, Dasein understands itself through its possibilities and from these possibilities. Another property of Dasein that forms it as care is its being-already-in-the-world. Heidegger calls this facticity. Facticity is equivalent of situatedness or discloses as

situatedness. Dasein understands itself through the possibilities but as being-in-the-world it has limitations. The third and the last quality of Dasein that forms it as care is “being-alongside” entities within the world. Heidegger calls this as ‘falling’.

Concern indicates the togetherness of Dasein as being in the world with others. It means providing something, gaining something, interesting with something. Therefore, according to Heidegger, concern deals with Dasein’s acts and activities in daily life and has been an important part of Dasein’s fallenness. Because concern is just what is becoming and becoming at present. If we give an example for the relation of concern and care: As a daily life process, writing a thesis is about concern. However, when I pause writing or postpone writing a thesis or make up excuses for writing then care appears. Generally in daily life it is tried to cover the care. However, when I make a decision about writing and start to write then care discloses itself. Therefore, care is something that feeds concern. “I can only understand care or concern if I have experienced it. Without this, the “transcendental generality of the phenomenon of care would be meaningless to me” (Stack, 1969: 31).

Solicitude (Fürsorge), indicates Dasein’s as being-in-the-world, relation with other Daseins. It has two forms as authentic and inauthentic. In the inauthentic solicitude, Dasein leap itself into others. Heidegger (1996: 158) explains this in the following quote:

This kind of solicitude, which leaps in and takes away ‘care’, is to a large extent determinative for Being with one another, and pertains for the most part to our concern with the ready-to-hand.

Authentic solicitude is, Dasein’s bringing its own being to another Dasein and gives care to others (leaping ahead).

Heidegger insists that care is an existentialia of Dasein since man cannot wholly evolve care (Stack, 1969: 34). Care, is the care that makes Dasein to stand on its feet and carries concern and solicitude. For instance, “when I reflect upon myself, I center upon my interests, my concerns, my excitements, my disappointments, etc., and all of these things can be seen as a kind of caring” (Gelven, 1989: 119). In order

to understand the importance of Care better and why Dasein's being is disclosed as care, Heidegger (1996: 242) tells a story from Latin mythology:

Once when 'Care' was crossing river, she saw some clay; she thoughtfully took up a piece and began to shape it. While she was mediating on what she had made, Jupiter came by. 'Care' asked him to give it spirit, and this he gladly granted. But when she wanted her name to be bestowed upon it, he forbade this, and demanded that it be given his name instead. While 'Care' and Jupiter were disputing, Earth arose and desired that her own name be conferred on the creature, since she had furnished it with part of body. They asked Saturn to be their arbiter, and he made the following decision, which seemed a just one: "Since you Jupiter, have given its spirit, you shall receive that spirit at its death; and since you, Earth have given its body, you shall receive its body. But since 'Care' first shaped this creature, she shall possess it as long as it lives. And because there is now a dispute among you as to its name, let it be called 'homo', for it is made out of humus (earth).

As it is understood from this story, Care provides figure for human. Here it can be seen that human is not consist of just soul and body, that Care has also an important place in human existence. To put it in another way, "care as a primordial structural totality, lies 'before' every factual 'attitude' and 'situation' of Dasein, and it does so existentially a priori; this means that it always lies in them" (Heidegger, 1996: 238). Furthermore, "care ultimately makes possible and gives shape to our ability to make sense of what is around us" (Keller and Weberman, p. 380).

Dasein can get out of nothingness that is met in anxiety by Care. Dasein is thrown to the world and can stand up from where it is been thrown, by Care. Dasein, getting out of the state of being-in-the-world, makes its tendency to the Being also by Care. Even if there is no meaning, no fundamentals namely, no reason for Dasein to live care which is the basis of all meaning can still give meaning to Dasein's life. If Dasein can get out of nothingness by Care then Dasein can be authentic.

## **CHAPTER II**

### **AUTHENTICITY AND TEMPORALITY**

#### **2.1 Being-towards-death and Authenticity**

Care, as the structural unity of the existentials that construct Dasein, have to be disclosed by its existence. For this reason, in *Being and Time* Heidegger starts to look out a ground for the care that is unclear for Dasein's existence, undetermined and in each case being-ahead-of-itself. This ground is one that will define the being of Dasein in the structure of care as an existence. According to Heidegger, it is not any other thing beside the temporal being of Dasein. Therefore, death has to be eluded from actual meaning and has to be disclosed as a phenomenon. Because disclosure of death as phenomenon is also disclosure of the relation of existence and death. Thus, what will define Dasein's existence as a care is disclose of death itself. According to Heidegger, this disclosure will show the connection between Dasein's temporality and itself.

##### **2.1.1 What Does Death Mean as an "End?" (Dasein's "End"?)**

Death is an end for Dasein. Death, however as Dasein's end, in no case can mean simply completing, exhausting, finishing of something. Because as it is analyzed before, Dasein as being an entity in which its essence is in its existence is not a consumable entity. Therefore, elimination of the antinomy, and disagreement between Dasein and death as an end shows itself as a problematic in *Being and Time*. In this context, the definition of death in *Being and Time* is important: "Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility- non relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped"(Heidegger, 1996: 303). Here, the meaning of death as being ownmost possibility is that death for Dasein is a possibility for itself.

According to Heidegger, Dasein is alone in its death. Being death non-relational means is that no one can live another Dasein's death. In other words, death can not be shared. Lastly, death's not being outstripped means that it can not be left behind or passed away. Thus, death is defined in Being and Time as "possibility of the impossibility of any existence at all" (Heidegger, 1996: 307). To put it in another way, death is the most fundamental possibility of Dasein which Dasein can not escape. Hence as an ending death, does not mean an ending like the completing of a construction or painting. Being and Time says the following:

If man is neither ready-to hand nor present-at-hand, his end cannot be the kind of end appropriate to the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, and his wholeness cannot be their wholeness (Heidegger, 1996: 119).

Heidegger examines the death of Dasein i.e. ending of Dasein, differently from the ending of ready-at-hands or present-at-hands. Then, for Heidegger, what kind of ending it is that happens with the ending of Dasein? In Being and Time, the following is said about death:

In death, Dasein has not been fulfilled nor has it simply disappeared; it has not become finished nor is it wholly at one's disposal as something ready-to-hand (Heidegger, 1996: 289).

Death, because it is an original-fundamental possibility for Dasein's existence and as long as Dasein remains as Dasein stays with it and being the possibility for it, is becoming which Dasein's being-ahead is towards. According to Heidegger, the only thing that is defined by Dasein's being existentiality is Dasein's "being-towards-death" as presently and originally. As it is explained in Being and Time: "As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die" (Heidegger, 1996: 289). Therefore, death as an end is not a limit or border for Dasein. However, it carries a very special meaning of the concept of limit. As it is a limit for existentiality, it is not disclosed in every case and as long as Dasein remains Dasein it will be a possibility for it. Heidegger, here explains the concept of limit by going experience of the concept. For him, death as an existential limit for Dasein is a limit as "*peras*". "*Peras*" is an ancient Greek word used for limit and refers to a possibility that makes it continuously giving something as it is or is disclosed. Such that, this possibility is

one that discloses every possibility of Dasein whereas itself cannot be possible. Daniela Vallega-Neu explains this as:

Heidegger thinks of death as a limit in the same way that he reads the Greek word for limit: *peras*, that is, as a limit that gives something free in its limiting. Death is a limit that frees Dasein's ownmost potentiality of being (Vallega-Neu, 2003: 13).

Another point which Being and Time examines is the question of why death can not be experienced in one another's death and why it is just for Dasein itself together with its understanding as an end. According to Heidegger examining this question is another step of forming the relation between Dasein's itself and death.

### **2.1.2 Experience of Other's Death**

According to Heidegger, Dasein's structure of existence in the world is no longer-being-in-the-world. In this context, for Dasein death postulates the impossibility of living in the world forever. However, Dasein lives in the world as long as it remains Dasein. In this case, the relation between Dasein and death, and Dasein's understanding, experience of death seems impossible. Heidegger, examines this problem in a dual plane. First of them is the explanation of the relation between Others' death and Dasein's which analyzes whether Dasein can experience death in the others' death or not during the period that pass in this world.

In others' death, the same case is valid with Dasein's death. In fact, when other dies, it is not being-in-the-world anymore. Meeting with the body of the other is as ready-at-hand. Therefore, being-in-the-world after death becomes ready-at-hand. However, according to Heidegger, there exists a property that differentiates this ready-at-hand, namely the body from other ready-at-hands and that is this ready-at-hand's loss of life.

In other's death, there is concern as being abreast with other entities within the world and solicitude as being abreast with other Daseins. Graveyard and coffin

are subjects of concern whereas mourning and praying are subjects of solicitude. Hence, death of one another is not examined in the context of concern.

In another's death, Dasein can continue being with another even it loses the other. This is possible if this other is someone that it knows, shares the same life areas. But in this case "what does Dasein experience?" Is Dasein experiencing lost of another even continuing to be with that other? According to Heidegger, only thing that can be experienced and being experienced in the death of other near to Dasein is the experience of pain that is because of the lost of that other. Therefore, for Dasein, death of other can not be experienced whether in which condition and case it is.

How can Dasein's being originally namely, being in the world as always and at present "being-with" and being not able to experience other's death be understood? According to Heidegger no one can take death of another. Heidegger (1996: 284) explains this in *Being and Time* as: "No one can take the Other's dying away from him". Death of another can be an environment for Dasein to think of its own death. However, even if Dasein meet death experience in the environment of others death this can only be an experience for its own death. To Heidegger (1996: 284),

dying is something that every Dasein itself must take upon itself at the time. By its very essence, death is in every case mine, in so far as it 'is' at all.

Death appears in "state-of-mind" which is one of the states of Dasein's being in this world. In "state-of-mind" Dasein firstly experiences death as a thing that happens to another. However, can Dasein grasp the real meaning of death for itself by experiencing death in this way? Heidegger's answer is negative. Because, when death is thought as a thing that happens to others there would be no possibility of death to define Dasein's life. This is, in *Being and Time*, examined as:

In Dasein's public way of interpreting, it is said that 'one dies', because everyone else and oneself can talk himself into saying that 'in no case is it I myself', for this 'one' is the 'nobody' (Heidegger, 1996: 297).

Upon this issue, White makes this interpretation: “The ‘impossibility’ of existence is not something yet to come but rather is what determines existence as finite here and now” (White, 1984: 60).

### **2.1.3 Death as a Possibility and Being-a-Whole**

Death, as being a thing “not happened yet”, being a possibility that is “staying there”, defines Dasein’s existence in every case. Heidegger uses the term “not happened yet” for Dasein’s death. However, what does this not happened yet define exactly? For Gelven (1989: 145):

The not-yet of Dasein’s existence cannot be of the character of ready at hand (as for example, the unpaid portion of a debt is ‘outstanding’), nor as present-at-hand (as for example, the last quarter of the moon is not yet during the three quarter phase), because Dasein is always more than presence-at-hand or readiness-at-hand, or even both combined. Rather, the not-yet element of human existence is something that is already there.

Dasein has to bring itself to its possibility that is ‘not happened yet’ and ‘staying there’. Death’s being not happened yet does not mean that it pick up Dasein randomly. Death is very important for Dasein even if it is not happened yet. Because, death is also a possibility of Dasein as being a thing not happened yet. In every case Dasein is a possibility that is not completed yet. Dasein’s being possibility is disclosed in Care. Then what is the relation between anxiety and death or possibility and death? What does Heidegger want to mean by defining death as a possibility? As it is considered in Heidegger previously death is a possibility that makes all possibilities possible except itself. Therefore, death is the possibility of Dasein’s two fundamental possibilities of being or disclosure namely, authentic and inauthentic. Therefore, how should we understand death as the possibility of all possibilities and being not a possibility of itself or Dasein’s being-possible? Heidegger answers this question by the phenomenon of “not-yet”. According to him, death is Dasein’s “not-yet”. In this condition, what is the meaning of “not-yet” for Dasein?

Heidegger, gives the example of growing of a fruit to comment on the relation between not-yet and Dasein in Being and Time. Likewise the growing of a fruit is its



"not-yet", death is Dasein's "not-yet". However, in the case of fruit, growing's being "not-yet" does not mean will never happen. Heidegger discusses that fruit completes itself by growing but can it be the case for Dasein. Can Dasein complete itself by its death, namely can consume all possibilities of itself? Or is it the case that by death all these possibilities are taken away from Dasein? These questions are answered like this by Heidegger (1996: 289): "Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself".

It must be noted that in Heidegger, death is not an actual entity but a possibility. Because, when we see death as an actual entity then it lost its meaning for Dasein. When Dasein sees death as a possibility its relation with life changes in an original way. Because death, being the possibility of impossible, it allows the other possibilities in life to be seen clearly.

### **2.1.3.1 Dasein's Facing with its Own Death**

In fallenness, although Dasein considers death as a distant thing, death is an approaching thing. However, when we want to define, it will not be enough to define it as approaching thing. Death is the possibility of not being an existence in Dasein that Dasein has to accept. In another words, it is possibility of impossibility. Dasein is thrown to death. Dasein's thrownness to death shows itself in anxiety. Heidegger (1996: 295) explains the relation of death and anxiety in Being and Time as follows:

This anxiety is not an accidental or random mood of 'weakness' in some individual; but as a basic state-of-mind of Dasein, it amounts to the disclosedness of the fact that Dasein exists as thrown Being towards its end.

In the area of the 'they' not much is known or thought about death and this shows that 'they' escape from death. In another words, "everyone dies does not mean that everyone realizes what it means to be going to die" (Gelven, 1989: 149). Although Dasein escapes from facing death, "being-towards-death" shows itself in daily life. However, death is being seen as coincidence in daily life. Death as coincidence which other people face is a familiar event. On the other hand, familiarity to death by this way means banishing from the realization that would be brought by death. Because

death will not grasp attention if it becomes such a familiar event and Dasein will not think that it will happen to itself. Being and Time considers the meaning of death in the Others as :

The “they” has already stowed away an interpretation for this event. It talks of it in a ‘fugitive’ manner, either expressly or else in a way which is mostly inhibited, as if to say, “One of these days one will die too, in the end; but right now it has nothing to do with us (Heidegger, 1996: 297).

In average everydayness of being in the world death is always seen as a thing that will not happen to Dasein, even if it happens, it will not be right now. According to Heidegger (1996: 299): “In explicating everyday Being-towards-death we have clung to the idle talk of the ‘they’ to the effect that one dies too, sometime, but not right away”.

Such an approach to death is turning away from death, its meaning for itself. Dasein’s attempt of not seeing death in daily life shows its being outside of the reality. Dasein accepts the reality of death but what he denies is that it can happen to Dasein one day. Obscurity of the time of death leads to the denial of the reality of Dasein’s own death. Because Dasein disregards the possibility of its death’s happening anytime.

Death may happen at any time and it is for Dasein’s itself. According to Heidegger, thinking death as end of Dasein’s possibilities rather than seeing it as a thing or event that may happen to another one allows a ground for being authentic. Therefore, the only thing that will open Dasein to authenticity is Dasein’s not turning away from death, its own death and analyzing of the fundamental structure of the relation between itself and death. Gelven (1989: 145) says the following about this:

My awareness that I am going to die is sufficient to give me the perspective of totality; I do not have to actually die in order to see my ‘end’.

On the other hand, Dasein will remain in an inauthentic relation between deaths if it escapes from facing its own death. Indeed, Dasein’s approach to death is generally daily and therefore inauthentic. White examines this as: “inauthentic Being toward

death flees anxiety in the face of death by turning it into simple fear in the face of some oncoming event.”(White, 1984: 63) Dasein that becomes authentic feels anxiety rather than fear as fear is related to the actual, anxiety is related to possible.

According to Heidegger seeing and understanding that death is closely related to me makes me to easily see the possibilities in my life and make my choices. If death is a necessity, authenticity is reaching a consciousness of necessity and clearer understanding of possibilities. Golomb (1995: 106) mentions this as “authentic acceptance of one’s death liberates one from losing one’s self in the inauthentic illusions of the anyone”.

### **2.1.3.2 Call (as “Care”) of Conscience**

For Dasein which can be defined as an existence with its possibility of understanding its own death, remaining in the anxietic meeting with, holding this relation requires origin or source of anxiety. For what and how anxiety is Dasein in? What is in the basis of the relation of Care and anxiety according to Heidegger? Being and Time answers this question by phenomenological comments of calling and conscience. Heidegger (1996: 313) defines conscience as: “As a phenomenon of Dasein, conscience is not just a fact which occurs and is occasionally present-at-hand. It is only in Dasein’s kind of Being...” Conscience, as a phenomenon namely in showing its existence in itself, is seen as a calling. Calling of the conscience is calling of Dasein to its own existence, to being itself. For this reason, according to Heidegger, calling in the voice of conscience, is being called or is called to be all Dasein itself. The one that called is not lost in daily life or in ‘they’ area. Whereas the one that called is lost in the ‘they’ area and calling is done for drawing Dasein back from ‘there’.

It has been mentioned that call of the conscience is for Dasein to come to its own being. According to Heidegger, the form or condition of being that has being called by conscience is being-guilty. The concept of guilt that Heidegger forms ontologically refers to a duality that Dasein’s existence is destined and the lack that belongs to Dasein itself, never becoming whole. Dasein is originally lack-in-being.

For Heidegger, the dual plane of being-guilty is based upon thrownness and fallenness. Dasein belong to this duality as long as it remains Dasein. It is a continuous come and go between its possibilities, namely being-possible and the 'they' area. In this context, fallenness is the original in the possibility of Dasein's being. Conscience is opened for the fallen Dasein in the calling. Call of the conscience can be heard in the draw back from all voices, meanings, events that belongs worldly in to the being-guilty namely absolute remaining silent and keeping this silence. According to Heidegger, this is the authentic condition of hearing. In hearing of the calling of conscience, Dasein's answer to the calling can be "willing to have this conscience" (Heidegger, 1996: 314). This answer is Dasein's will to have conscience, Resoluteness.

According to Heidegger, call of conscience says nothing. Then, how can the question of the source of the call namely where is it coming be answered? Heidegger, again relating it with Dasein's own being, says that the call is coming from both Dasein's itself and beyond Dasein. The one that calls is explained in this way in *Being and Time*: "The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice" (Heidegger, 1996: 321). In another words, call comes from Dasein's side that is not in relation between the 'they'. Therefore, call is inviting Dasein to be authentic and the answer to this call namely resoluteness is also resoluteness for being authentic.

At this point, this question arises: If, for Heidegger, conscience is calling Dasein to being authentic, why does not it call more clearly? Because for him, call's being unclear makes Dasein feel itself homeless. In this condition of homelessness Dasein is called to its possibilities.

### **2.1.3.3 Anticipatory Resoluteness as Having Existential Authenticity**

What reveals Dasein's possibilities of being authentic is "anticipatory resoluteness". For Heidegger, "anticipation of death" is not foreseeing an event that supposed to happen in the future. Because, what is foreseen in death is "death's being a possibility for Dasein" (Kurtar, p.100-101). According to Heidegger, anticipatory

resoluteness is Dasein's resoluteness in being itself by foreseeing death. Therefore, in foreseeing death any Dasein will face with being itself namely possibility of being authentic. For this reason, in anticipatory resoluteness what is faced is any Dasein's self authenticity so it is an existential authenticity. In this context, the phenomenon of resoluteness has to be analyzed in order to understand anticipatory resoluteness in Heidegger and how it can have an existential authenticity. Resoluteness in Being and Time is

to the call of conscience there corresponds a possible hearing. Our understanding of the appeal unveils itself as our wanting to have a conscience. But in this phenomenon lies that existentiell choosing which we seek- the choosing to choose a kind of Being-one's-Self which, in accordance with its existential structure, we call 'resoluteness' (Heidegger, 1996: 314).

As it can be seen here, resoluteness is the fundamental form for Dasein to answer conscience and will to have this conscience. Its openness is to hear its own existence and to remain in this openness. However, resoluteness in this sense is not authentic yet namely related to Dasein's own existence. Heidegger, by placing the possibility of resoluteness being authentic in the basis of death says that only a resoluteness that foresees death can be authentic.

Anticipatory resoluteness is said to be disclosing death as Dasein's possibility of being authentic in which death is the possibility of all possibilities except itself. At this point Heidegger (1996: 357) examines a point he has to emphasize about anticipatory resoluteness in Being and Time:

Anticipatory resoluteness is not a way of escape, fabricated for the 'overcoming' of death; it is rather that understanding which follows the call of conscience and which frees for death the possibility of acquiring power over Dasein's existence and of basically dispersing all fugitive Self-concealment.

Foreseeing of death is a condition that creates anxiety. However, by this condition Dasein can face its own existence and can be authentic. In other words,

suppressing awareness of my imminent death, I also hide from the significance of my life, and refrain from taking chances, from realizing

my possibilities. To be afraid death and not to accept this anxiety courageously is to fear life and jettison authenticity (Golomb, 1995: 107).

As a result, for Heidegger, the meaning of anticipatory resoluteness can be examined in the following way: It is Dasein's foreseeing of death, that is awareness of death as it can happen to Dasein at any time, and by this way its will to understand and accept the possibilities of itself rather than the possibilities that presented to it, or more original concept than will; its own resoluteness. Dasein's being resolute to understand and accept its own possibilities means its being open to itself, appear as its own existence.

## **2.2 Existential Authenticity as Disclosure of Dasein's Temporality**

Heidegger, while forming the possibility of Dasein's being itself, being authentic namely existential authenticity as any particular human existence as a resoluteness in which death is foreseen, in the broadest sense namely as a whole he constructs existence's being authentic in temporality. Therefore, existential authenticity requires an analysis of the relation between Dasein's existence and time. For this reason, in *Being and Time* Heidegger, first of all, discusses the relation between time and care which is discussed as Dasein's structural unity and in every case and always already being-ahead-of-itself. This discussion brings the consideration of time as a phenomenon and therefore it is the examination of how Dasein shows itself both in daily life and in its possibility of being itself. In other words, it is the comment of its relation between its existence and time in the basic possibilities of Dasein which are being authentic and inauthentic.

### **2.2.1 The Temporality of Dasein's Existential Constitution**

#### **2.2.1.1 Care and Temporality**

The examination of the relation between care and temporality means first of all, seeing the relation between existentials of Dasein, which gains structural unity and

basis in care, and time. Therefore, Heidegger first of all mentions the relation between understanding and time. As it is discussed before, understanding priorly and existentially, is Dasein's understanding and disclosure of its own possibilities. According to Heidegger, this relation of understanding which is originally with the being-possible of Dasein relates it with one of the basic ectases of time, the future. For Heidegger, future has a special position between the other ectases of time namely past and present. This is a priority and privilege based on the foreseeing structure of the future. Gelven (1989: 179) says that:

To have a future means to expect, to anticipate, and to look forward to.  
Hence the future is meaningful. If the future were merely a not-yet now,  
it could have no meaning for us at all.

In foreseeing, Dasein as being foreseer of its own death is disclosed as an authentic future. According to Heidegger, future is in every case does not need to be foreseen. Because in the 'they' area, the relation of Dasein and future is disclosed as a wait for not being yet. Therefore, whereas inauthentic future is about 'waiting' in authentic future Dasein towards the possibility of being itself by the awareness of the disclosed finiteness in the foreseeing of death.

In authentic present namely moment-of-vision, Dasein forms present by freedom, where as in inauthentic present namely, in making present, Dasein is dependent on conditions. Authentic past is based on repetition whereas inauthentic past is on forgetting. In inauthentic past Dasein can not form bounds with past properly.

Heidegger, after discussing the relation between understanding and time in this way, shows Dasein's disclose of being-in-the-world the second existantiale and time. For this end, the relation of mood and time must be analyzed. Because Dasein, as commented before, is always and in every condition as a worldly being is in a mood. Being in a mood refers to which Dasein's thrownness to the world. Therefore, which exstase of temporality is this thrownness related to? In Being and Time the answers this question as in the following:

Understanding is grounded primarily in the future; one's state-of-mind, however, temporalizes itself primarily in having been (Heidegger, 1996: 390).

At this point, the relation between fear, which is one of the fundamental conditions of Dasein, and temporality has to be considered. Fear is an inauthentic mood of soul. Because, as it is argued, it comes from the being of Dasein, not from the existence itself. Heidegger says that fear can be defined as waiting for a bad thing which is approaching. At this point fear is related to future. However, it can not be said that fear only have staying-being characteristic. In fear, Dasein forgets itself and can not know what to do with its possibilities, truly in a condition of fuzziness. In this condition, fear is related with inauthentic past because forgetting is inauthenticity of the past. On the relation of fear with temporality Being and Time says: "The temporality of fear is a forgetting which awaits and makes present" (Heidegger, 1996: 392).

According to Heidegger, the relation of anxiety and temporality can be understood in the relation of anxiety and temporality can be understood in the context of future. Anxiety is awareness of nothingness indicating the left of familiar world. In anxiety, there is no definite event that is a threat or reason. Therefore, in anxiety there is no expectation that something bad will happen. Anxiety is about foreseeing the death and thus comes from Dasein's impossibility in future. In this sense, anxiety can be disclosed as authentic future.

Another existentials of Dasein, fallenness, comes out in the "present" which is one of the existentials of time. Present is the least important existentials of temporality. Present, as being the place where the events take place may be important for the ordinary understanding of time but it is not so important in temporality. Because present is related to actual rather than possibility.

Fallenness is explained through idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. However, Heidegger takes only curiosity into account in the context of temporality. Curiosity is mostly related to seeing. This mood of seeing is based on „present“. As it has been argued before that, there is no will of understanding in curiosity. Will is toward actualization of possibility as soon as possible rather than waiting it to become thus,



it shows that it is related to inauthentic future. Dasein's condition of finding itself abreast to the entities-within-the-world and will to one of them without understanding and obtaining another shows that "curiosity" is related to inauthentic present. In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1996: 398-399) commented the following:

The fact that curiosity always holds by what is coming next, and has forgotten what has gone before, is not a result that ensues only from curiosity, but is the ontological condition for curiosity itself.

Lastly the relation of discourse and time has to be analyzed. Heidegger says that discourse is not equivalent of any of the ekstases of time. But the closest ekstase to discourse is "present".

According to Heidegger, understanding of time as a phenomenon, namely its showing itself from its own existence is interpreting its ekstases (future, past, present) distinct from the ordinary time. Thus, it has to be a kind of time understanding that is different from the ordinary understanding of time that shows the inauthenticity of daily life but also enables it. As Dasein's disclosure of itself, this authentic time understanding is the period of time that time comes out namely disclosure of its being. Heidegger calls this existential-ontological analysis of time as the temporality of time. For Heidegger, in analysis or understanding of time as temporality what is different from the ordinary time understanding is that in temporality, there is no consecutive and linear period that past is before present or future is after present. In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1996: 375) commented as following:

If this it was the case, care would then be conceived as an entity which occurs and runs its course 'in time'. The being of an entity having the character of Dasein would become something present-at-hand.

Constructing time and Dasein's being's relationship in the understanding the time itself or its existence thus distincts from ordinary time within every case, reaching to a state that postulates itself as origin of the time. Heidegger puts the possibility of disclosure of Dasein in temporality as the understanding of time itself or the existence of time in the heart of this distinction. In another saying, temporality, in the disclosure of trinite temporality meaning that future-past-present, is a whole in the

Dasein's being. None of them can be understood separately from other. Gelven (1989: 181) examines this as following:

Neither the past nor the future can be theoretically described as no-longer or not-yet. The past and the future are significant, they do have meaning, and as such they must be seen as essentially tied to human existing.

As a conclusion, the time itself or the existence of time is Dasein's existence or its temporality. This means that Dasein can be a whole in temporality. Therefore according to Heidegger, care, as the structural unity of the existentials of Dasein can only disclose as a whole in temporality. Hence, in between care and temporality there exists an original and continuous relationship. However since being a care Dasein is always and in every condition discloses in this world so it has to be seen both of these possibilities of coming to be from the point of the relation of time. Therefore, for Heidegger, what kind of temporality is the temporality of Being-in-the-world?

### **2.2.1.2 The Temporality of Being-in-the-World**

The ecstatic unity of temporality, as it is examined, finds its fundamental possibility in Dasein's being. This being is cleared as care. Dasein manifests itself in its clearing in events or entities one by one. According to Heidegger, Dasein discloses in ecstatic temporality as care namely a cleared being.

Dasein's fundamental structure is as it is examined previously, Being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, disclosure of Dasein's being as Being-in-the-world is possible in temporality. In this respect, the prior structure for manifestation of the relation between being-in-the-world and temporality can be understood as concern (*Besorgen*).

For Heidegger, thing that consists concern is "letting-something-be". This is also related to future by having a character of "stand-by". One property of "letting-something-be" is forgotten. In order to transaction Dasein has to forget itself.

In transaction with concern, circumspection of concern brings what is to be transacted more clear state. Therefore, it becomes clear that when and where, what would be done with that mean. Circumspection of concern, at the same time, closes up the environment of Dasein to itself by “bring to life in the eye” namely, it can conceive things that are needed for, even if they are not present. Bring to life in the eye is related with “present”, one of the ekstases of temporality.

However, according to Heidegger, in order to circumspection of concern to realize the “bring to life in the eye” it has to be understood the life goes on. Therefore, concern is not only deal with present but also with past and future.

In the disclosure of Dasein with temporality, world also is disclosed at the same time, simultaneously. In *Being and Time* Heidegger (1996: 417) commented as following: “The world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality”. In this concept the ekstases of temporality is disclosed as the following: The ekstase of Dasein is “for-the-sake-of-itself”. It shows to the old Dasein “what has to be” in the past, and now how to be “in order to”

### **2.2.1.3 Inauthenticity and Temporality**

It was told that when Dasein forgets itself in the they area, does not ask the meaning of its existence and its being mortal and when it is not aware of the possibilities it have this condition is Dasein's inauthenticity. It is required that in order to have inauthenticity and time relation in this context it has to be understood that how time discloses in Dasein's daily life. Because for Heidegger, Dasein's inauthenticity shows itself in daily life.

Daily life is formed through its regulation and routine rather than its possibilities. However, nevertheless there is a condition of boredom for Dasein because of habits. This boredom can be avoided from time to time but can never be completely eliminated. In a daily life like this yesterday, today and tomorrow are so alike that Dasein's past and future are covered in an absolute present. Because everything that are in such sequential moments of time, is locked into “present” in

every case. Dasein in its “present” focused temporality therefore fallen apart from temporality, which discloses as its own existence’s unity in itself. Heidegger believes that this falling is because of Dasein’s seeing itself eternal in ordinary time which is time of being daily or inauthentic time. Therefore, in disclosure of inauthenticity as temporality Dasein is its existence itself that faced with its primordial finitude and is a Dasein that fallen apart from being itself of this finitude.

### **2.2.2 Dasein’s Authenticity and the Original Temporality (Ec-stasis of Temporality)**

In Heidegger’s authentic or original understanding of time, it was mentioned that the existence of time –mode of time-. Therefore, time in this manner can be understood to have a continuous and mutual relationship with Dasein’s existence. For Heidegger, the key term, in the explanation of this relation between Dasein's existence and existence of time, death is Dasein’s death. Death is the only definition in this existence of Dasein which is inconsumable and for this reason lack-of-being. It was mentioned that, the fundamental possibility of death in which all possibilities of existence are impossible in every condition is its form of covering the ambiguity of existence. Therefore, death as being the “*possibility of existence impossibility as a whole*” (Heidegger, 1996: 311) has to have an original relation with temporality by being the possibility of disclosure of this existence. Because death is the origin of Dasein’s temporality.

Heidegger, while defining Dasein's being which is disclosed as care, as being-ahead-of-itself by death, he forms the comment of this definition as Dasein’s finiteness. The problem here is in a finite but continuous being or disclosure, how Dasein discloses temporally. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger calls this time understanding which is based on Dasein’s finiteness and can be understood in the priority of being finite as ec-stasis temporality and comments it as originally, namely prior in the content of existential-ontological. Tina Chanter's (2001:104-105) appraisal is like this:

Death as finiteness has an important place in Heidegger's understanding of time. Temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) is thought in the base of death. (Otherwise is not possible.) Therefore, Heidegger puts his finite understanding of time which he explains it in the basis of death, against the one of western metaphysics which is defined as a flow that is infinite and blind.

Dasein in its original temporality which is based on its death is disclosed as a unity in the ternate ecstasies of time. In this respect, as it is mentioned before, future has a privileged and prior place in the case of foreseeing death. Future is a being continuous but finite or *coming to be* in Dasein's original temporality. According to Heidegger, this being or disclosure which future is coming to is not happened and end or passed away but is a past which is a having been for the ecstatic unity or totality of Dasein. Future, which is coming to the "having been past" as finite and continuously, discloses itself in the point of "moment of vision" which Heidegger (1996: 437) calls as "authentic moment or present" (*augenblick*).

Consequently, Dasein's authenticity as a being, as disclosing Dasein to itself by allowing it to face its possibility of being itself and making this possibility possible, can be understood in the context of death, finiteness and temporality. Analyses of these three phenomena and understanding of their original-mutual relation forms and constructs Dasein's authenticity in Being and Time.

## CHAPTER III

### ART AND AUTHENTICITY

#### 3.1 Heidegger's Inquiry on the "Origin" of the "Art"

##### 3.1.1 Whether the "Artist" or the "Artwork" is the Origin of the Art

The fundamental problem of Heidegger in *The Origin of the Work of Art* is examination of the origin of the art. According to him, the artist is the first subject in this examination. In this respect, Heidegger by furthering his examination on the nature of art asks what makes artist namely what is the possibility of artist being himself. According to Heidegger, what makes artist be "artist" is nothing but the artwork. In this condition, while there will be no artwork without an artist there will also be no artist without an artwork. Moreover, a third entity is needed for both artwork and artist to enable being themselves. For Heidegger, this third entity is "art".

In *The Origin of the Work of Art* Heidegger discusses what art is, what the nature of art is, and if art be able to make the existence of artist and artwork possible. *The Origin of the Work of Art* answers the question of "What is art?" as: "Art- this is nothing more than a word to which nothing actual any longer corresponds" (Heidegger, 1996: 143). What does Heidegger try to do by making the examination about the origin of art and discussing that we can not find any correspondence of art in this world? According to Heidegger, there exists no real entity in this world that we can show as art. Only there exists two things that we can show as related to art. These are the artwork and artists. However in this respect, Heidegger takes his discussion one step forward and asks whether it is the artists and artwork that make the existence of art possible or the art itself makes the existence of artists and artwork possible.

The origin of art has been questioned continuously and many answers given for this subject. Related to the subject, J. Young (2001: 16) says the following:

Traditionally, philosophers have answered [this] question by focusing either on the creator of art (Nietzsche's approach) or on the receiver (Kant and Schopenhauer's approach) and then extrapolating to the nature of the work from their chosen vantage point. Heidegger, however, says that he intends to do neither of these things and argues that the origin of the art can neither be artist nor work of art.

### **3.1.2 Artwork Priority for the "Origin"**

Heidegger starts his explanation with trying to understand the nature of art by the fact that the first thing which is seen and come to mind when we say art is the artwork and artists. In this respect, he tries to uncover the place that art comes to reality namely, "whatness" of artwork if there is no reality that can be shown as art.

For him, "artist is one who produces and creates something" (Heidegger, c1993: 184). However, Heidegger does not think that the artist creates from nothing. Artist makes sure the cover on beings is removed and makes unseen be seen.

We can easily communicate with one another thanks to the fact that we use a common language in our daily lives. Likewise, thanks to the common meaning we attribute to a vehicle in our daily lives, we know how to use it. Thanks to these pre-agreed meanings, we see words and sentences as elements facilitating our lives, without too much thinking on them in our daily lives. However, the artist uses the words that we ignore in our daily lives. He or she uses them in a manner that we notice their other meanings, which we have not previously noticed. A word that makes us feel nothing when used in our daily lives makes us experience many feelings at the same time in poetry. The reason that words create very different feelings in us or the reason of the effect created in us when we look at Van Gogh's painting is because of the artist's attitude. Artist lets the being reveal itself. The artist is in a mood of letting be. Heidegger (c1993: 125) says that:

Ordinarily we speak of letting be whenever, for example, we forgot some enterprise that has been planned. 'We let something be' means we do not touch it again...

Thus, the artist approaches beings in a manner that he or she does not give it a meaning by force. To the opposite, he or she stands in front of being so that its meanings come out naturally. "To be sure, the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth"(Heidegger, c1993: 173).

When the artist creates his work, one can claim that he/ she is within the mood. He/she understands the being; he/she can hear the voice of the being within this mood. Therefore, the artist should be prepared to stay within the mood and to interact with the Being. Perhaps Being requests the entire life of the artist in order to enable its voice to be heard. The artist should experience a transition or a conversion in order to enter into the mood. He should adjust his lifestyle in a way that enables him to see or hear Being. When he enters into such a mood, and experiences transition, Being talks to us by using poetry.

What one has to be careful about here is that Heidegger does not think that the artist has a very significant role in the creation of work of art. He (c1993: 166) says that:

It is precisely in great art-and only such art is under consideration here-that the artist remains inconsequential as compared with the work, almost like a passageway that destroys itself in the creative process for the work to emerge.

Therefore, for him, first the work of art exists, and then comes out the artist.

### **3.1.2.1 Artwork and the Thing**

Heidegger believes that artwork is not a foreign entity to us. We continuously encounter artworks whether in squares, in museums, or in our houses. They have the



property of portability thus they carry thingly character. It is hard to accept this thingly character because when we say art an eminent being comes to mind.

How can this thingly character be explained? Heidegger says the following about this thingly character: As we all know, artists use words in poetry, colors in painting, stone in architecture and when it is considered in this respect what consists of the artwork is this thingly character. However, Heidegger says that artwork is much more than this thingly character. So this thing that is much more than thingly character at the same time makes artwork “artwork”. In other words,

the artwork is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other than what the mere thing itself is, *alio agoreuei*. The work makes public something other than itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory (Heidegger, c1993: 145).

Starting from this context, Heidegger derives the conclusion that there exist two facts that consist artwork. First of these is artwork's thingly character whereas what is more than the other thingly character namely what makes artwork “artwork”.

Heidegger says that in order to understand what consist of artwork firstly we should understand what “thingly” is. In daily life door, well, waterfall, cloud and likewise what we encounter or see are all “things”. According to Kant, even God is a “thing”. Therefore, whole universe is a totality of “things”. According to Heidegger, there exists a subject to be discussed at this point. Can we name god or ourselves as “thing”? “A man is not a thing.” (Heidegger, c1993: 147) Also not only for human beings even for animals, plants in nature we can not use the "thing" term easily. Besides, also tools we use in daily life can not be named as “thing”.

In order to explain the concept of “thing” Heidegger firstly mentions three approaches related to the “thing” that is encountered in the western thought and tries to uncover if artwork is a “thing” or not and in this context if it is a “thing” then what kind of thing it is by analyzing three of these approaches one by one. The first definition or approach of “thing” is that something is the totality of its properties. However, for Heidegger, this approach regarding to the “thing” is not enough for differentiating it from the non “thing” entities. Another definition of “thing” is that

“thing” is the totality of sense data. On the other hand Heidegger says that in both of these approaches we lost the “thing” itself. According to the third definition “thing” is as following: “The thing is formed matter” (Heidegger, c1993: 152).

In this respect, Heidegger makes the distinction of equipment, thing and artwork as in the example: A mass of granite is an un-formed matter, has the property of gaining form by itself. Equipments are as being formed “thing” are closer to artwork because they are formed by human hand however they do not have the property of gaining form by itself. Whereas artwork is both have the property of gaining form by itself and made by human hand. Therefore, “equipment has a peculiar position intermediate between thing and work, assuming that such a calculated ordering of them is permissible” (Heidegger, c1993: 155).

However Heidegger stands against this third interpretation of “thing” namely the totality of form and content. Heidegger thinks that to be able to understand this thingly character of “thing” before all else the equipmental character of equipment has to be thought and gives the example of a pair of villager shoes.

According to Heidegger, if the most significant character of a pair of villager shoe or a hammer is asked, the first answer would be “effectiveness”. Villager woman forgets the shoes when she wears them even though they are being effective. The equipmental property of equipment comes out at this point. It is said that the equipmental character of equipment is its “effectiveness”, effectiveness is based upon reliability. When looked to the painting of Van Gogh shoes can be seen but painting reflects lots of emotion even in painting the shoes can only be seen.

Heidegger thinks that when a Van Gogh painting is looked the equipmental character of the shoes has already uncovered it is enough to look at Van Gogh’s painting without reading about the shoes or making observations because as Heidegger (1993: 161) says “this painting spoke”.

Therefore, painting uncovered the existence of the shoes and what are they in reality. This uncovering requires shoes to be understood as “thing”. At this point, Heidegger refers to the *aletheia* concept of ancient Greece. Forwhy, the Greeks

called this unconcealment of beings *aletheia*. This meaning of *Aletheia* can be corresponded with truth although there is not precise concordance, says Heidegger. *The Origin of the Work of Art* tells the following:

We say 'truth' and think little enough in using this word. If there occurs in the work a disclosure of a particular being, disclosing what and how it is, then there is here an occurring, a happening of truth at work (Heidegger, c1993: 161-162).

At this point, while uncovering the equipmental existence of equipment Heidegger discloses what the nature of art is. After making the distinction between thing, equipment and art, Heidegger (c1993, 164) says the following: "But the work is not a piece of equipment that is fitted out in addition with an aesthetic value that adheres to it". In this respect Heidegger (c1993, 165) redefines art as: "Art is truth setting itself to work".

### **3.1.2.2 The Origin of the Work of Art: "World Disclosure"**

Heidegger's first step in elucidating the Greek definition of art as 'happening of truth' is to replace 'happening of truth' with 'opening up of the world' as for him, the artwork is something which opens up a world (Young 19). Thus, for Heidegger every artwork constructs a world. With artwork, one side of the world that man created is seen. However, it can not be thought that world consist of the totality of the entities around us. Stone, plants, animals are all worldless, they belong to environment. Only man can have a world. Discovery of the reality that can not be recognized before artwork is recognized by the artwork. Artwork creates spaces in the earth and with this space it constructs a world.

While artwork is constructing a world something different from the equipment making takes place. Since the fundamental character of equipment is "effectiveness" stone is used and as less resistance as the stone shows much more it will become effective. Yet, while artwork is constructing a world stone is allowed to disclose, color is allowed to shine. In other words, "the work lets the earth be an earth" (Heidegger, c1993: 172).

While art allows the world to disclose, science forces world to disclose, irritates it makes unnecessary interventions to it. To put it in Heidegger (c1993: 172),

colour shines and wants only to shine. When we analyze it in rational terms by measuring its wavelength, it is gone. It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it.

Hence, according to Heidegger, there exists two things that make artwork “artwork”. First of these is artwork’s world disclosure and the second is artwork’s making earth to come out. The world and the earth that exist in artwork are always in competition. However this competition should not be seen as a negative. In artwork, world wants to come out as itself likewise earth wants to appear as earth. When a sculpture is made, both world and earth come out, in fact the earth which passes through the world’s filter comes out. When a painting is done on cave wall both the world of the one who painted, and the state of the cave wall before being painted on, come out. If an example from contemporary world is needed then we can say that in a gallery where a hyper realistic human sculpture is being exhibiting, when the gallery is being wandered that sculpture can be seen as a one that wanders the gallery rather than a sculpture. When it is assumed that sculpture is made of marble if properties of marble is not being accessed by the audience than the value of the sculpture as art is discussed. Or when it is thought that an African totem maker creates a totem representing god, although it defines god namely having a great meaning it keeps the characteristics of stone. The one who looks at it knows that it is made of stone. Even a person who does not know the material can define the material by the work.

At this point Heidegger (c1993: 175) asks the following question: “In what way does truth happen in the work- being of the work, which now means to say, how truth happens in the instigation of strife between world and earth? What is truth?” Truth is being non-hidden. For him, “beauty is one way in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealment”( Heidegger, c1993: 181).

## 3.2 Truth as “Aletheia” and the Work of Art

### 3.2.1 The Work and Truth

According to Heidegger, the significant characteristic of artwork is its uncovering the hidden truth<sup>1</sup>. This “truth” Heidegger says in *The Origin of Work of Art*, is the unconcealment of that which is (being). He also adds that “unconcealment, this never a state that is merely present-at-hand, but a happening. From here he easily relates truth to the happening in a work of art” (Hyland, 1971: 182). Thus for him, truth discloses in artwork because in artwork what is a being clearly comes out in full sense. W. Bossart (1968: 62) examines as following:

Particular beings are disclosed where there is a world. Insofar as a work of art is the coming to pass of the truth, it constitutes a world in which particular beings first appear.

In artwork, the truth of the being comes to reality. In artwork what makes the truth of the being comes to reality is being’s gaining permanence by artwork. Art is up to date has been thought related to beauty, its relation between reality has not been thought because reality is seen to belong to the logic's field. Young’s (2001: 19) interpretation about this case is:

Heideggerian point that art should belong, not in the museum as an object of ‘aesthetic connoisseurship’, but rather in the marketplace as a public ‘happening of truth’.

However, there is a point to be paid attention. Art work, uncovers the truth, the reality but it does not accomplish thin by imitation. Artwork does not become artwork by imitating the reality. In this respect, the reality that Heidegger mentions has to be understood well. Reality for Heidegger is a different reality from the correspondence in western thought i.e. something different from the correspondence of the existents in mind and in the world outside. Heidegger (c1993: 118) explains the “correspondence” in western thought as following:

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<sup>1</sup> In Greek, *aletheia* means the uncovering of the sheets on the being, unfolding of the truth.

Truth is the correspondence of the matter to knowledge. But it can also be taken as saying truth is the correspondence of knowledge to the matter.

According to Heidegger, what is meant by the truth in the artwork is not the correspondence of the subject in artwork and thing in the world. The approach which holds that as much as artwork resembles the real thing the more artistic it becomes which is a view that Heidegger opposes. For Heidegger, *Truth of Being* that comes out in the artwork does not mean imitating the being but creating being from the beginning.

Heidegger considers the Athenian Temple to show how truth comes out in artwork. Temple is made for communicating with gods. With temple what lies in the origins of culture become concrete. Heidegger (c1993: 168) explains this case as following: “The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on themselves”. Heidegger says that the statue of god enables existence of god likewise the temple did.

Literal texts also should not be seen as works in which related events are told. Literal texts hold a meaning beyond the description of daily life. Because, literal texts allow us to encounter entities that we do not encounter in daily life and by this they uncover truth. To be able to see the truth uncovered by artworks allows Dasein to be authentic.

### **3.2.2 Truth and Art**

A work of art is one mode of truth. In order to uncover “the peculiar characteristics of this mode of truth Heidegger contrasts the manufacture of an art craft with the creation of a work of art” (Bossart, 1968: 62). Craft is built on “doing”. Whereas art requires ‘doing’ but also goes beyond it; because art is “creation”. In “creation” truth unfolds. Does truth only unfold in “creation”? According to Heidegger there are several ways of unfolding of truth. For instance, founding a government or self-sacrifice are some ways of it.

How does truth unfold with art? According to Heidegger, truth shows itself in the artwork and does this in the form of world and earth competition and through this competition. This competition brings near the world and the earth.

Why in art does truth unfold rather than craft? Heidegger examines the reason of truth' unfolding in art rather than craft as following: Because, while for both of craft and art the common character is "being made" this character is omitted in craft. The "effectiveness" in craft overruns "being made" and becomes more important. Therefore, truth unfolds in art rather than craft.

In existence of artwork the reality that artwork has to have a creator is important as artwork's character of being "created". Another fact required for artwork's existence is the audience of artwork. With art, whatness of both of the creator of the artwork and audience of the artwork comes out. Art takes out them from being hidden and discloses who they are actually.

At this point, Heidegger defines art as the space where truth unfolds. The actual place where truth comes out is poetry. According to Heidegger art has a poetic nature. However, Heidegger does not think poetry as a weird combination of dreams and thoughts. Poetry brings out beings in to sun light by opening the sheet over them. Therefore, poetry has a privileged condition than the other arts. Heidegger (c1993: 198) explains this thought as following:

Nevertheless, the linguistic work, poetry in the narrower sense, has a privileged position in the domain of arts.

How does poetry take out beings from being hidden? Heidegger says that we have to think on the concept of language in order to answer this question. Language is a communication tool but it can not be understand just as a communication tool. That is why beings are brought to open space by using language. It is impossible to brought things which do not have language to open space. Poetry also takes out beings from being hidden by bringing them to open space through language. Poetry discovers truth in an unusual manner.

### **3.3 The Disclosure of Primordial Relation Between Authenticity and Art**

#### **3.3.1 Dasein's Authenticity and Truth**

Why Dasein is related with truth? Because, for Heidegger Dasein provides unfolding of truth. According to him, truth is rendered possible by Dasein's existence. Truth is related to "openness". Dasein's open existence enables world being open to it. Providing Dasein's open existence beings can disclose themselves as they are. Therefore, as it is disclosure of beings truth is related to Dasein's open existence rather than the correspondence of the thing in mind and the thing in the outside world.

Dasein's being "being-there" is its openness. Dasein is thrown to be there. Thus, Dasein is thrown to openness. Dasein's this thrownness to the openness shows that it is an open being to possibilities. Dasein always finds itself in the continuity of unfolding. At the same time, Dasein hides itself in death which is a possibility of it. Because, with death Dasein can no more be the "being-there" so Dasein's unfolding is not possible.

Therefore, if truth is self disclosure of beings as themselves and if this is possible with Dasein's openness namely being there then does Dasein's death eliminates truth? According to Heidegger, Dasein's death does not eliminate truth. This is so because truth has a dual structure. Truth is both openness and hiding itself. For Heidegger every self hiding is a kind of disclosure too.

Dasein can not disclose itself fully after death. However, Dasein's death as Dasein's self hiding is Dasein's disclosure in a different way. Dasein's death, discloses truth by reporting the end of "disclosure". Dasein continues its state of "disclosure" until facing death.

For Heidegger, truth is not only self disclosure of beings as themselves but also their self hiding. While Dasein's self disclosure as itself shows one side of the truth, Dasein's self hiding in other words its death shows the other side of truth.



For Heidegger, it is shown that Dasein's realization in truth is its authenticity. Truth becomes real in two ways in Dasein's being. Truth emanates by Dasein's self disclosure as itself and Dasein's self hiding. In this condition, Dasein's being authentic is also depending to Dasein's self disclosure as itself or Dasein's self hiding. Dasein's self hiding, namely its death is an important possibility for Dasein's being authentic. Because, if Dasein realizes that death can happen to itself and also it can happen anytime then will see life as a field of possibilities and tries to realize its own possibilities. What provides possibility to Dasein's self disclosure as itself and also to other things' self disclosure as themselves is art.

Art is the space where truth discloses. Owing to art, beings can show themselves as themselves. Individually things or events disclose as themselves through art. Thus, according to Heidegger art allows the unseen Being that we cannot see in daily life that is covered by some way to be seen. It was mentioned that this condition happens in art in other words the disclosure of being as itself is ancient Greece's *aletheia*.

The fundamental element of the relation between art and authenticity is *aletheia* too. In this case, it can be asked that why *aletheia* is the fundamental element of this relationship. Because for Heidegger, Dasein's authenticity depends on its self disclosure as itself. Hence, Dasein's being authentic is related with *aletheia*. When Dasein discloses itself as it is namely when becomes authentic then *aletheia* becomes real. Considering art as being one of the most important fields that *Aletheia* actualizes then art has an important role in Dasein's self disclosure as itself and in *aletheia*'s actualization and depending on these Dasein's being authentic.

According to Heidegger, Dasein who deals with art is the one who allows being to disclose as itself. As long as Dasein stays in this manner earth can disclose as earth itself. At the same time Dasein allows itself to disclose as itself when deals with art. Thus, Dasein can be itself and can draw itself back from the 'they' area in artwork in full sense. Hence, there exist a relation between art and authenticity which finds its basis, possibility and first beginning in *aletheia*.

Dasein takes an important step in being authentic if it sees artwork as artwork and sees the truth and the windows opened by artwork. Because artwork is the

original form of disclosure of truths that are related to life and Dasein itself. Dasein can reach the possibility of being itself without falling in to the fallacy of the conformity of resembling the "they" owing to art. For why art is fed from the being-possible not from the being-actual by passing beyond the daily life and thus, can be saved and maintained in the continuous relation between its possible existence lies in the basis of its nature. In this respect there is an original relation between the nature of the art and being itself of the being-possible of Dasein or disclosure of Dasein namely its authenticity in the basis of this possibility. Henceforth, art is the space for Dasein's own being and thus its authenticity in the subjects of Dasein's being for its own possibilities, disclose its own possibilities with the openness in the nature of art.

Consequently, in modern age where everything even people gain value with their effectiveness and usefulness art has great importance for Heidegger even though it presents nothing in the account of effectiveness and usefulness. The reason for this is that Heidegger pay attention to being authentic rather than effectiveness and usefulness.

### **3.3.2 The Influence of the Art as World Disclosure in Authenticating Dasein**

According to Heidegger, art allows disclosure of both Dasein's own world and world. For why every artwork creates a world. Dasein's world and entities-within-the-world can be seen more clearly owing to the world created by artwork. In Heidegger's words with art world "worlds". What is meant by artwork's opening a world is the disclosure of the selfness of nature, world and Dasein that are not realized in daily life.

Dasein manifests its own world in the artwork through art. At the same time, Dasein understands its own world from the other artworks created by other Daseins. Thus, Dasein takes an important step in being itself by the world artwork opened.

Dasein's understanding of its world and disclosure of its world by artwork makes Dasein authentic. This is so because authenticity of Dasein depends on Dasein success in drawing itself back from the 'they' area and being itself. Dasein can be

successful with art. That is why every Dasein has a world specific world. However, Dasein's specific world can not find the possibility of disclosure in the 'they' area and daily life. Actually authenticity is the disclosure of this specific world of Dasein. Art is playing a crucial role in Dasein's being authentic by making it disclose its own world in work of art.

Dasein forgets itself in the comfort of resembling to the 'they' in daily life. Dasein omits that it has a world different from the 'they' and can be authentic as long as Dasein discloses this world. Dasein loses the possibility of disclosing its own world as long as it defines and limits its own life with the activities in the daily life. Dasein's dealing with art means that remembering itself and living as itself together with the 'they' but without becoming a copy of the 'they' in the sense of disclosing its own world.

Art expects originality and creativity from Dasein. Art wants Dasein to be itself and come out from the daily life in which Dasein lost itself. Art plays a crucial role in Dasein's being authentic as being the representation of Dasein's specific world, representing it in a way specific to Dasein itself.

The difference of Dasein from each of beings in the world namely what makes Dasein itself is its having a world. Therefore, every Dasein has its own world. At this point, can it be said that every Dasein is authentic if every Dasein has its own world? According to Heidegger, it is not possible. It is a must for Dasein to disclose this specific world in an original way in order to be authentic. The most fundamental and original way of disclosing this specific world that belongs to Dasein is art.

Whereas Dasein takes a crucial step in the way to being authentic by disclosing its world through poetry or painting, the reader of the poetry or the audience of the painting can realize his own world by the help of artist through understanding the world of artist. Audience of art can disclose his own world if he realizes that world. It is hard for Dasein to realize its own world in daily life. Art plays an important role in coping with this difficulty. Therefore, art contributes not only artist's being authentic but also to the audience's being authentic.

## CONCLUSION

The conclusion derived from the three-part discussion of authenticity and art relation in Heidegger's thought is:

In the first part, it is demonstrated that before all else the meaning of Dasein's ontic priority, different from all other things, is being able to have possible existence ways, and Dasein's ontological priority is understanding its own existence and the entities that are outside of Dasein. Then, it is explained that in both conditions of being authentic and inauthentic Dasein is itself. It is mentioned that in order to understand Dasein's authenticity or inauthenticity it must be seen and considered as being-in-the-world. While Dasein's condition of being abreast with entities-within-the-world and other Daseins as being-in-the-world it is uncovered that in daily life Dasein is defined by other Daseins i.e. the 'they'. The condition of being defined by the 'them' continuously is demonstrated as Dasein's inauthenticity. Subsequently, Dasein's daily life and how Dasein can draw back from this life to itself is demonstrated by explaining the Dasein's existentials. It is mentioned that to be authentic Dasein must live anxiety, nothingness and uncanniness. Lastly the structure which constructs all existentials that makes Dasein "Dasein" namely Care is discussed. As a conclusion, it is explained that for Dasein's being authentic, it has to draw back itself from the 'they' area, face with nothingness and then convert nothingness to Care.

In the second part, it is shown that the death of Dasein is an end but this end holds different meaning than the other "end"s. The reason for holding a different meaning than the other ends is explained as death for Dasein is a possibility. It is also explained that Dasein can not experience death in another's death. Because, in another's death Dasein never considers death to be able to happen to itself. Death is mentioned as a possibility that is not happened yet has to define every moment of Dasein's life. Dasein's seeing death as a thing that would never happened to itself

refers to Dasein's inauthenticity. It is explained that, Dasein's seeing death as a thing that happens in any time and happens to itself and as being a possibility death's defining Dasein's life refer to Dasein authenticity. Subsequently, the Call of Conscience that invites Dasein to being authentic and the Anticipatory Resoluteness that answers to this call is considered. At last, the relation of authenticity of Dasein and temporality is examined. Dasein's condition of focusing only to "present" and living only "present" in daily life and therefore ignoring the past and the future and resulting in inauthenticity is being mentioned. It is uncovered that Dasein's authenticity is fixed upon death and thus "future". Consequently, it is a must for Dasein to see death as a possibility and this possibility has to define every moment of Dasein's life in order to Dasein's being authenticity. At the same time, again for Dasein to be authentic, it should not lost itself in the "present" of daily life, has to give importance to both future and past but priory to future.

In part three, while discussing what is the origin of the art, it is shown that according to Heidegger the origin of art can not be the artist or the work of art itself. The fundamental reason of this is that the origin of the art is not artist or the work of art itself but understanding the whatness of work of art is shown. In this context for Heidegger, what is seen in the work of art priory is the thingly character of work of art is demonstrated and this thingly character is explained. Subsequently, it is discussed that in Heidegger there must be something else that work of art holds rather than this thingly character. It is explained that this other thing is its disclosure of truth that makes work of art "work of art". In this context, the disclosure of truth in work of art is in its commenting a new world in this world. At last, it is discussed how the relation between Dasein's authenticity and art can be constructed in Heidegger's thought. It is mentioned that Dasein's authenticity depends on Dasein's disclosure of itself as such itself and this is "truth". For Heidegger, it is shown that Dasein's realization in truth is its authenticity. Truth's coming to realization in two ways is shown. First of both is Dasein's self disclosure, the second is Dasein's self hiding. While Dasein's hiding itself namely death shows one side of the truth related to Dasein, disclosing itself namely art shows the other side of the truth related to Dasein. Thus, according to Heidegger, both death and art play crucial role in Dasein's being authentic. However, death in this context is the fundamental space for Dasein to come out as itself whereas art with its world commentative property,

allows Dasein to come out as itself by discovering Dasein's world. Therefore, the space for Dasein's being authentic namely coming out as itself forms in death, by the way the fundamental form in this finite-vanishing space's disclosure is art. In another words, Dasein comments in art and art comments in work of art therefore Dasein is commented as its world in the work of art. Thus, there is an original and continuous relation between authentic existence and art that is based on truth.

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