

**CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION CAPACITIES OF
THE EUROPEAN UNION: THE CASE OF CYPRUS CONFLICT**

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ABSTRACT

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With the end of Cold War international order entered into a period that is characterized by continuous crises and instability. Within this order European Union, like the rest of the world, felt the necessity of re-evaluating its policies since they realized that the current policies were not sufficient to meet the challenges of the new world order. As a consequence of this EU has been trying to develop its capabilities to conduct crisis management and conflict resolution. Besides, the EU intends to strengthen its influence in international relations. This thesis analyzes the EU's maturing capacities in managing the international security challenges and the impacts of those capabilities on the resolution of the complicated conflict in Cyprus. Within this framework this study begins with examining the basics of conflict study. Then it explores the role EU intends to play in international politics, the progress of the EU structure in conflict management and the related defence and security issues and the future prospects including the formation of European military capacities. Strategies and instruments of the EU for conflict management are analyzed. Finally it assesses the mediator role of EU in Cyprus. Possible strategies that the EU may apply in Cyprus are evaluated. Furthermore, thinking past experiences of crisis resolution within the EU framework, the study argues about application of the Aland and Belgium models in Cyprus case. The thesis concludes that with its capabilities and the determination for strengthening its role in conflict management, EU has a high chance for resolving Cyprus conflict – especially in the long-run- by using its creativity and flexibility against conflicted issues.

Keywords: Crisis management and Conflict resolution, European Union conflict management strategies, mediation, Cyprus conflict.

ÖZ

AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ'NİN KRİZ YÖNETİMİ VE ANLAŞMAZLIK ÇÖZÜMÜ KONUSUNDAKİ YETENEKLERİ ÜZERİNE BİR ARAŞTIRMA: KIBRIS DAVASI

ÜNSALDI, MENEKŞE

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Bölümü

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Soğuk Savaşın bitmesi ile birlikte uluslararası düzen krizler ve değişkenlikle tanımlanan bir döneme girdi. Bu yeni düzenin içinde tıpkı dünyanın geri kalanı gibi Avrupa Birliği de politikalarını yeniden gözden geçirme gereğini hissetti çünkü güncel politikalar yeni dünya düzeninin zorlukları ile başetmek için yeterli değildi. Bunun sonucu olarak o zamandan beri Avrupa Birliği kriz yönetimi ve anlaşmazlık çözümü konusundaki yeteneklerini geliştirmeye çalışıyor. Bunun yanısıra Avrupa Birliği uluslararası ilişkilerde etkisini arttırmayı tasarlıyor. Bu tez Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslararası güvenlik sorunlarını kontrol altında tutmak için gelişen kapasitesini ve Birliğin bu yeteneklerinin komplike Kıbrıs meselesi üzerindeki etkilerini analiz ediyor. Bu çerçevede içinde çalışma anlaşmazlık (çatışma) konusunun esaslarını inceleyerek başlıyor. Daha sonra Avrupa Birliği'nin uluslararası politikada oynamaya niyetlendiği rolü, AB yapısının kriz yönetimi konusunda gösterdiği gelişmeyi ve bununla bağlantılı savunma ve güvenlik konularındaki gelişimini araştırıyor. Avrupa Birliği'nin anlaşmazlık çözümü ile ilgili strateji ve araçlarını analiz ediyor. Son olarak AB'nin Kıbrıs'taki arabulucu rolünü değerlendiriyor. Birliğin Kıbrıs'ta kullanabileceği olası stratejileri analiz ediyor. Ayrıca Avrupa Birliği çatısı altında geçmiş uyuşmazlık çözümü deneyimlerini düşünerek, Aland ve Belçika modellerinin Kıbrıs davasına uygulanabilirliğini tartışıyor. Tez, yetenekleri ve savunma ve güvenlikteki rolünü güçlendirme kararlılığı ile, Avrupa Birliği'nin

zellikle uzun dnemde atıřma konularında yaratıcılıđını ve esnekliđini kullanarak Kıbrıs sorununu zmede byk řansı olduđu sonucuna varıyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kriz ynetimi ve uyurřmazlık (anlařmazlık, atıřma) zm, Avrupa Birliđi'nin uyurřmazlık (atıřma) ynetimi stratejileri, arabuluculuk, Kıbrıs sorunu

To My Parents

,

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CEEC	Central and Eastern European Countries
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIA	Conflict Impact Assessment
CPN	Conflict Prevention Network
CSCE	Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe
ECAP	European Capability Action Plan
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
EDC	European Defence Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EMP	Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
EPC	European Political Co-operation
EOKA	National Organization for Cypriot Fighters
ESDI	European Security and Defence Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
EU	European Union
IGC	Intergovernmental Conference
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
PHARE	Poland-Hungary Assistance for Recovering Economies
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
SBAs	Sovereign Base Areas
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty on European Union

TMT	“Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı”
TRNC	Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

This study focuses on European Union's crisis management and conflict resolution capacities and possible impacts of it on the future of the long lasting conflict in Cyprus. Because of the importance of its geographical position as a base in the Mediterranean -in the middle of the three continents, Cyprus' past is full of invasion and war. It can be claimed that its strategic position still designates the Island's destiny. New policies of the big powers on the Middle East once more time increased the importance of Cyprus. The reason behind why the Cyprus question became such important and urgent for a while is:

For a number of reasons, but above all else because the strategic island of Cyprus is part of the "grand new design" of the extended map of the Middle East. This map encompasses the sources of power and oil and natural gas in Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. In other words, the new extended map of the Middle East includes, in addition to the above, Iran, Afghanistan and some states bordering China and Russia, as drawn by Pentagon cartographers of the United States. This map certainly includes the strategies "aircraft-carrier" island of Cyprus.¹

As a matter of fact the stage is the same however the actors have been changing. However, recently the most impressive actor among the other well-known actors (e.g. the U.N. and Britain) is the European Union.

Although the EC/EU has never played a critical role in the Cyprus conflict until 1990s compared to the United Nations or Britain, with the Greek Cypriots' membership application EC/EU activities have been following an increasing trend both economically and politically. In economical terms EU funds, agreements and policies have been shaping economic conditions of the Greek side of the Island. With regards to the Turkish side economic embargo is the most obvious fact in the economy. Hence the EC/EU decisions also affect the Turkish side. Politically Cyprus' membership in the European Union is enough to show the Union's interest in the Island.

¹ Yüksel Söylemez, "End Game in Cyprus", *Turkish Daily News*, 23 February 2004, http://www.unannanplan.agrino.org/turkish_daily_news_23_february_2004.htm

The European Union has been improving its policies and capacities especially on the fields such as security, foreign relations and conflict management. One reason behind its interest in such issues is its desire to take a more active part in the international arena and back up his political influence by its economic power. Another reason is related to the changes in the circumstances of international arena after the end of Cold War (e.g. end of bi-polar system and the following crisis in different regions but especially in the Eastern Europe). In 1990s both the EU and other international organizations realized the importance of conflict management so as to secure peace and stability in their regions as well as in other regions where they have interest like the Middle East or the former Soviet Union states with rich natural resources. As a result conflict management related issues such as conflict prevention, resolution, military intervention, humanitarian aid etc. have become popular in international politics.

With regards to conflict management, the thesis starts with a chapter that explains the theory of conflict study including its description, types, variables affecting the conflict situations and strategies for resolution notably international mediation. "What is meant by conflict in international relations?" is the first question that the chapter examines. While examining conflict the difference between crisis and conflict is evaluated. Then the possible reasons behind international conflict are examined. The objective of this part is to tell why Cyprus conflict is chosen as a case study and what makes Cyprus conflict so special and long-lasting. Of course it is the variables, which determines the course of conflict. That is the number of parties, their motivations, beliefs, perception are the factors that affect the conflict situation. This is why each conflict situation is unique.

Chapter 1 continues with studying different strategies to solve conflict. These strategies are gathered under basically three methods: Primitive, modern and civilized methods. The strategies under these methods are classified according to their destructiveness. For example war is classified under primitive method however mediation is among the civilized methods. It is thought that principles of the European Union are more appropriate for using civilized methods. Although the Union works on strengthening its military capabilities, the reason is mostly for preventive purposes. Thus, among the conflict management strategies the emphasize is given to mediation. Mediation means assistance of a third party to conflicted parties in the search of a settlement.

European Union has never been directly played such a role until now in Cyprus but in the future it is expected that the Union may undertake such a role. Because of this reason both the mediators and mediation techniques are examined in the first chapter. The answers of questions like “why a third party would like to intervene in other’s disputes as a mediator?” and “why do the conflicted parties accept a mediator?” are examined. Moreover chapter 1 discusses the issues of neutrality and impartiality among the characteristics of a mediator. The content of this chapter is prepared for giving a general idea about conflict management aiming to clarify why Cyprus conflict is chosen as a case study in this thesis and in what ways the European Union may intervene in the Cyprus conflict within the framework of conflict management theory.

Chapter two focuses on conflict management in the European Union. In the chapter incentives of the EC/EU to improve its conflict management capacities - especially in the 1990s- are examined. The chapter evaluates historical progress of the Union’s policies regarding foreign policy, security and crisis management issues. This chapter tries to analyse why the EU felt the necessity to strengthen its policies on such matters. In this respect the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) are analyzed since the Union coordinates most of its conflict management activities under these policies. Another part of the chapter is separated to tell strategies of the European Union in crisis management. In that part the difference between European crisis management activities before 1990s and after the Cold war are examined. Strategies of the Union in different phases of conflict management (e.g. Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-building) are evaluated. As a preventive diplomacy, early warning system and Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) program² are analyzed. CIA is a program to understand elements in the conflict in order to mitigate conflict and promote peace in a more systematic manner. Having such a program indicates the importance given to conflict prevention issues by the Union. Regarding conflict resolution techniques, EC/EU may apply mediation. Actually the Union is expected to apply mediation in Cyprus case however it has not involved in mediation activities directly. Until now the EU supported UN mediation attempts

² Fraser Cameron (2000),” International Conflict Resolution: Challenges and Strategies” (The European Union and Conflict Prevention) Presentation at the Special Libraries Association Annual Conference, 13 June 2000, Philadelphia. Available online: <http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/FCSpeechConfPrev.htm>

such as the latest Annan Plan. Military intervention is another choice in conflict resolution; however the Union is yet developing its military capabilities and the institutions to coordinate policies in military field. Finally the European Union has strategies and policies for the peace-building phase such as strengthening civil administration, election assistance and monitoring, help development of the economy and democracy etc. Some instruments can be used in one or more phases such as technical and humanitarian assistance programs. Such programs are available for both conflict prevention and peace building activities. Likewise policies towards strengthening democracy, social consciousness and human rights are helpful in the long-run for promoting peace and stability within states and in the region. The Union applies Europeanization strategy to adopt values like democracy, respect for human rights etc. The aim of Europeanization strategy is to export European values and understanding to target country. The origin of this strategy depends on the assumption that democratic countries can solve their disputes in a more peaceful manner. European Union applies “conditionality” and “lesson-drawing” as the instruments for Europeanization. Conditionality is a rewarding system but these rewards depend upon some conditions. If the target country realizes certain conditions such as applying policies against discrimination, then the Union gives some reward like the right to make use of funds of the EU. On the other hand lesson-drawing depends on the idea that the target country may take some policies or applications of the EU as a model and put it into practice.

There are other instruments that EC/EU has been using against conflict situations. The main instrument among the others is the economy which is logical taking into account the economical power at the Union’s possession. Depending on its strong economy European Union is able to provide various funds to third countries. These funds are usually classified according to their purposes such as the technical assistance funds, funds for development cooperation or humanitarian aid. The EC/EU has been making agreements within the framework of Common Commercial Policy with the third countries and these agreements at the same time serves for strengthening cooperation and hence preventing conflicts among the parties joined in that agreement. Lome Convention, of which 70 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (so called ACP countries) are signatures, is given as an example for these agreements in the chapter. Other than these agreements, the EC/EU has

been adopting more extensive and detailed projects for conflict management. Regarding the Union's long-term conflict management policies the example of Barcelona Process was evaluated. Barcelona Process, which is also called as Europe-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), is a multi purpose project. It involves EU Member States and the Mediterranean countries which also include Turkey and the Cyprus. The main reason behind EMP is to promote peace and stability in the region so as to guarantee the southern border of the Union. The EMP is given a separate part in the 2nd chapter. In this part the EU's aim behind the formation of EMP and within the EMP context the Union's long-term conflict prevention strategies are described. The reason behind the importance of the EMP in Cyprus case is the fact that the long-term policies EU has been trying to adopt in the EMP for conflict management constitute examples for the Cyprus case. Besides as a part of the EMP, these policies have already been affective in Cyprus.

With regards to the European Union and the Cyprus conflict, chapter 3 begins with telling a brief history of the island so as to explain the roots of the conflict. It mentions about the relation of the two conflicted sides on the island - Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots- before Turkey's intervention and the division of the island. Moreover it tells London and Zurich Agreements and the political and social order that the Agreements brought to the island as well as the following events that led to Turkey's intervention in 1974. Then it evaluates the events that constitute milestones in EU-Cyprus relations such as the Association Agreement in 1972, financial protocols, Customs Union Agreement in 1987, Greek Cypriot application for membership in 1993 and the gaining of membership status of Cyprus in the EU on 1 May 2004.

Chapter 3 goes on assessing the differences in Greek and Turkish Cypriots' perspectives about a settlement in Cyprus. These differences are the basic reason behind the extension of the conflict in Cyprus. The disagreement begins with the content of political settlement and even extends to the some basic concepts like equality and "just" settlement. Any suggested plan for settlement should include detailed measures against the problematic issues between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots such as ownership, administration, sovereignty, equality etc. As a mediator it is the EU's responsibility to take into account opinions and perspectives of each party. Besides as it is told in Chapter 1, knowing the situation and the conflicted parties and other

circumstances that affect the conflict is the first step in mediation process. In one part of the Chapter the mediation activities beginning from 1960s to the recent Annan Plan of the U.N. in 2004 are examined. Since, the mediation attempts also became a part of the history of the conflict in Cyprus and it is thought that any story about the Cyprus conflict would be incomplete without mentioning the patient mediation activities that lasted about more than half a century.

After evaluating what has been done in Cyprus by other international powers so far, the Chapter goes on looking over the EC/EU attempts and the consequences of these attempts in the Island. In this respect the time period that is worth mentioning is the pre-accession period that begins with the Greek Cypriot application in 2003 and extends to the Union's official acceptance of their full membership status in 2004. The chapter argues that during this period the EU applied carrot-stick policy to both the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots and by this way tried to support the U.N. activities for conflict resolution. However, with the ratification of full membership status of Cyprus the EU lost its master-card against the Greek side. Since, the Union cannot be contented with the carrot-stick policy that it has been using until recently. The European Union should apply other existing strategies which are mentioned in Chapter 2 or maybe develop new approaches to be able to solve the long-lasting Cyprus conflict. The rest of the Chapter 3 is dedicated to possible EU approaches for conflict management in the long-run in Cyprus. One of these strategies is the Europeanization which is expected to improve democracy, basic rights, desire for peace etc and by that way influence the opinions of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots against each other as well as against the conflict hence enables a settlement in the Island. Another strategy the EU may use is called "New Alley's Path" which is an approach depending on the success of Non Governmental Organizations (NGO) to affect policy makers' decisions by organizing people. This strategy may be used whenever the policy makers resist in taking necessary steps for settlement. Actually such a strategy is used just before the referendum for the approval of the Annan Plan in the Turkish Cypriot side. Lesson-drawing is another strategy that can be used by the EU. The examples for this strategy chosen within the EU: Exemptions given to Aland and the administrative framework of the Belgium Federal system.

The final part of the thesis is the conclusion part about the conflict management capacities of the European Union and the possible effects of the Union's policies and applications in the settlement of the Cyprus conflict. European Union's involvement in the conflict is a chance for both the Cypriots and the Union. On the one hand for the Cypriots, the EU is able to offer new possibilities. Above all the Union brought an optimism and hope for settlement in a time of desperation and weariness. On the other hand Cyprus case will provide a challenge and experience for the EU to improve and strengthen its abilities in conflict management. Besides at the end if it has a part in settling the conflict in Cyprus, this would definitely increase the Union's prestige both in international arena and among its member.

CHAPTER 1

THE THEORY OF CONFLICT STUDY

1.1. Introduction

It may be claimed that conflict between states has been shaping international politics of 20th century.³ Maybe the best description of the present era has come from Hoffman and Kissinger by the word “revolutionary”.⁴ Since with the end of Cold War the balances in international system that were shaped after the World War II, have collapsed and the new order not yet taken its final form. It is not unusual to see crises during such transition periods because most of the times a crisis situation constitutes the best environment for change and progress.

It is generally agreed on that the international crises, which we study today, begin with the foundation of modern state system in 1648. The source of crises depends on the biggest dilemma of man: Man is a social living form and cannot live alone; however, he/she also cannot live with others because in coexistence with others, conflict inevitably arises. Social organization of state was shaped in order to prevent conflict between its citizens. It has the organized authority endowed with the legitimate supreme coercive power to guarantee the integrity and survival of each citizen.

In international society the situation is basically different. International society has no supreme power to organize and control actions of states. With no recognized “government” and no “written” constitution, the states system can be defined as “the loosest of all political associations”.⁵ This lack of authority in

³ For the purpose of this study conflict would have one and only one meaning for the rest of the thesis that is the political conflict.

⁴ Stanley Hoffman (1977), *The State of War: Essay on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (Pall Mall, London 1965) p. viii; and Henry A. Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy*, 3rd edn (Norton: New York) p. 53

⁵ Maurice Keens-Soper (1978), “The Practice of a state system” in M. Donealan (ed.) *The Reason of States: A Study in International Political Theory* (Allen & Unwin, London) p. 29.

international arena creates an environment such that every state is the guardian and guarantor of its own interests. This anarchic nature of international politics has been widely accepted as the basic reason lying behind most of the conflicts. However, any explanation of conflict, which bases on solely nature of international politics, would be inadequate. Since even the basic characteristics such as number of major actors or the duration of conflict vary from case to case.

This chapter begins studying conflict by first defining what is meant with the word “conflict” and tells the difference between crisis and conflict concepts. Analyzing causes of conflict situations is another important issue since the most successful way to handle a conflict situation is to control it before it expands. Besides the underlying causes of a conflict situation is a kind of indicator that gives clues about complexity of conflict. In this respect for example Cyprus conflict is classified as a complex one and this is one of the reasons why Cyprus is chosen as a case study.

Each conflict situation is unique and has its own characteristics. Hence it is important to know variables that affect conflict situation to be able to solve it. These variables vary from conflicting parties –the primary actors- to the environment and the third parties. Having enough information about the conflict is the primary precondition for conflict resolution. Only after then appropriate strategies can be formed and applied such as negotiations, meetings, mediation or military intervention depending on how serious the conflict situation is. Among the strategies of conflict resolution, a special emphasis is given to mediation since it is considered as the most humanist and democratic way to intervene a conflict situation. Moreover it is expected that the European Union may undertake such a role in the Cyprus conflict.

1.2. Theoretical Approaches to Conflict Study

Conflict is defined by Berkovitch and Jackson (1997) as a process of interaction between two or more parties that seek to thwart, injure or destroy their opponent because they perceive that they have incompatible goals or interests.⁶ What Berkovitch & Jackson explains is the general definition of

⁶ Berkovitch & Jackson (1997), University of Canterbury (New Zealand), Available online at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/conflict_dataset_catalog/Internationa%20Conflict

conflict that states the reason purely as the opposition or difference of opinions, desires, interests etc.

According to Frank Pfetsch political conflict is the clashing of overlapping interests around national values and issues (e.g. independence, borders & territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power); the conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude by at least two parties (states, groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue their interests and win their case. In this definition the researcher defines both the parties of conflict and the opposition or differences that lead to conflict situation.⁷

Bloomfield approaches conflict with a different description in his Bloomfield-Leiss Dynamic Phase Model. He tells that conflict is a dynamic process in the sense of passing through some or all of a sequence of distinctive “phases” which are: Dispute (indicated by parties quarrelling about an issue); conflict (involving the development of a military option on at least one side); hostilities (fighting between organized groups); post hostilities conflict (where military options still exist); post hostilities dispute (a situation where the dispute remains unsettled) and finally comes settlement.⁸

All these descriptions define conflict as a process that contains a period of time. That is exactly what Pfetsch meant while adding “duration” among the characteristics of conflict in his definition. Conflict contains a larger meaning of its own and that is the fact that differentiates a conflict situation from a crisis situation. Despite the fact that the two words –conflict and crisis- are generally used interchangeably, they have actually different meanings. International crisis and international conflict are related but not synonymous. Harvey & Mor explain the interaction between the two concepts by claiming that every crisis reflects ‘a state of conflict’, but not every conflict is reflected in crisis.⁹ The Oxford

⁷ Frank Pfetsch, Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict, University of Heidelberg. Available online at: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/conflict_dataset_catalog/KOSIMO.htm

⁸ Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton (1997), *Managing International Conflict: From Theory to Policy. A Teaching Tool Using CASCON*, New York: St. Martin's Press. Available online at: <http://web.mit.edu/cascon>; http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/conflict_dataset_catalog/CASCON.htm

⁹ Frank P. Harvey & Ben D. Mor (1998) (eds.), *Conflict in World Politics: Advances in the Study of Crisis, War & Peace*, London, McMillan Press Ltd., p. 35

dictionary explains crisis as a turning point of something. For the conflict situation crisis means the peak point of a conflict such as crisis in Cyprus conflict that started with the Greek Cypriots ordering of S-300 missiles from Russia. That was a critical point in Cyprus conflict; it might have caused a war between the parties involved in the conflict. That is why Charles Herman tells that those crises are most commonly thought of as international positions between the prolongation of peace and the outbreak of war.¹⁰ Besides, usually a crisis situation focuses on a single issue such as a border dispute, economic boycott etc. There are some common characteristics that can be seen in almost every crisis situations such as: Crisis involves surprise, shortness of time for decision and unpredictability. Likewise the European Commission also differentiates the two concepts hence describes conflict management and crisis management in two different definitions. According to the Commission conflict management is “actions undertaken within the main objective to prevent the vertical (intensification of violence) or horizontal (territorial spread) escalation of existing violent conflicts” whereas crisis management is describes as “actions to prevent the eruption or escalation of conflicts, and consolidating peace and internal stability in a period of transition”.¹¹ However, because of the complicated nature of conflict study, it is not always possible to understand whether a situation is a crisis situation or conflict situation. For the purpose of this thesis, crisis management and conflict management are the same concepts that include crisis-oriented tasks including conflict prevention, conflict avoidance and conflict resolution. Hence, the two terms will be used interchangeably.

The characteristics of conflict depend on the substance, the intensity and the scope of the conflict. Several theories have been formed on international conflict so as to understand its roots. Kenneth Waltz, for example, divides theories of conflict into those, which attribute it to the nature of man (proud, power-crazed etc.), those, which lay it at the nature of state (capitalist, dictatorial and so on) and those, which emphasize the influence of the

¹⁰ Charles F. Herman (1972), *International Crises: Insight From Behavioural Research*, The Free Press, New York (Collier- McMillian Limited, London), CH 2, p. 21

¹¹ Santa Maria da Feria European Council Guidelines, 19-20 June 2000.

anarchical state-system.¹² However, as Waltz himself also accepts, the first case has never been very persuasive especially with the secularisation in the West and the associated rise of moral relativism. The theories that fit Waltz's second and third cases have been more influential in describing conflict situations such as theories that emphasize economic, ideological or racial sources of conflict (the nature of state) and those which lay stress on the power/security struggle (the nature of international political system).

While all these theories attempt to explain the conflict with its own logic, in contemporary world conflicts usually include more than one variable that influence it. Hence it is logical that the deepest conflicts are the ones that one or more factors- power/security rivalry, economic competition, ideological antipathy and racial prejudice- overlap.

1.3. Variables Affecting the Course of Conflict

Conflict requires at least two parties or two analytically different units or entities.¹³ There must be interaction among parties in which actions and counteractions are mutually opposed.

The characteristics of the parties have a great role in shaping the conflict situation. Values and motivations, objectives of the parties, their physical, intellectual and social resources for resolving conflict, their beliefs about conflict, strategies and tactics and their positions in international arena are among the important factors that affect the course of conflicts. Moreover, the prior relationship among the conflicting parties may have a great role in solution. Nations having common history and culture can solve their problems easier than the nations totally alien to each other. Regarding the European Union, for example, common history and culture constitutes one basic reason behind its success. Knowing each others' priorities and considerations European countries can reach a compromise even on the most controversial issues. On the other hand if this common history includes long-lasting wars and

¹² Kenneth Waltz (1959), *Man, The State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, (Columbia University Press, New York and London) p. 28

¹³ Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict- Toward an Overview and Synthesis" in Clagett G. Smith (eds.) (1971), *Conflict Resolution: Contributions of Behavioural Sciences*, (University of Notre Dame Press, London), p. 8

rooted conflicts such as the case between Greece and Turkey then it may become a disadvantage for the conflicting parties.

Conflict arises from “position scarcity” and “resource scarcity”.¹⁴ Conflict relations involve attempts to gain control over scarce resources and positions, or to influence actions and behaviours of others in certain directions. Hence, a conflict situation has always included an exercise of power.

The environment within which the conflict occurs is another important variable affecting the course of conflict. A third party as a superior power may undertake a great role in resolving or even preventing conflict from the beginning by using its facilities, imposing restraints, encouragements or applying different strategies and tactics of waging or resolving conflict. Even without a superior power, the interested audiences to the conflict may have an effect. Such as the role of the United States during Cold War in preventing conflict between Greece and Turkey-two NATO members.

Of course another important factor is the nature of the event giving rise to conflict. It is hard to analyse this because of the incredible variety of issues leading to conflicting situation. Taking into consideration the characteristics of events, parties employ different tactics and strategies.

The capability of guessing the consequences of the conflict to each of the participants and to other interested parties beforehand may also affect the course of conflict by affecting the evaluations of the parties. If a conflict situation is thought as a zero-sum-game, then the parties can gain only at each other's expense. And if at least one of the parties thinks that conflict will have destructive consequences, it may prevent the conflict from the beginning by assuming a humble attitude.

As it is mentioned before that the characteristics of the parties in conflict is one of the most important variable shaping the conflict, another important issue is the number of parties. It is always preferred to reduce multiple- party conflict to two party conflicts via coalitions and blocs because when there are more than two parties in a conflict, it becomes more difficult to reach a common solution in which all parties can achieve at least some gain over previous power positions. An increase in the number of parties leads to communication failure and makes alternative solutions useless. Thus, it is practical to reduce the

¹⁴ Ibid. P. 15

number of parties to understand power relations and to make intermediary efforts more effective.

Parties to conflict are frequently interested in different subjects, have different values and different priorities. Thus the position of opposing parties often seems not only inconsistent but also fixed and hard to change. To solve the conflict either the parties to conflict or a third negotiator should discover shared interests. For example, providing peace in Europe was the shared interest of France and Germany that helped them solving their conflict on Saar. Having a common history from which they got painful lessons is another factor that eased the solution. The still fresh memories of the Second World War might have reminded them the probable consequences of a new conflict in Europe.

1.4. Strategies of International Conflict Resolution

Philosophers like Hegel and Marx may defend conflict as a necessary instrument of change and progress; however the common thought about the conflict is that conflict is discard and the opposite of harmony. Therefore it must be resolved.

As there are a variety of reasons for conflict, there are also a variety of methods for resolving or controlling it. Some of them can be summarized as; negotiation, judicial settlement, meetings, arbitration, mediation, violence or force and so on. Different problems necessitate different solutions. Methods of resolution are fundamentally related to the nature of conflict. For example, mediation cannot be used as an effective method to solve a conflict between unorganised groups, since mediation requires representatives or authorities to speak on behalf of each group so that agreements become binding.¹⁵

Although each conflict situation is unique in its own; still there are some rules that should be applied in every conflict resolution such as the need for continued communication between the parties and the conformity with international norms and procedures. Moreover there are also some common limitations that may affect the course of conflict such as interdependence

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 26

between parties, third parties' interest in conflict or intersection of other conflict systems.

Hence, in order to understand and solve a conflict, it is necessary to know the characteristics of not only the parties but also the conflicting situation. One must know the peculiarities of parties in conflict, their prior relationship, the history of the event that lead to conflict, environment within which the conflict occurs, the interested audiences, strategies and tactics employed by the parties, consequences of conflict to each of the participants and to other interested parties.

There is a wide range of specific methods to end a conflict. However, it is useful to collect those methods under three headlines: Primitive methods, which are highly destructive (suppression; total war), modern methods, which are partially destructive (limited war; bargaining), and civilized methods that include problem solving.¹⁶

Primitive method assumes that one group will be better if the other is wiped out. On the other hand modern method presupposes that the groups are interdependent so they must find a way to continue their peaceful coexistence. Finally civilized approach can be applied in small units, which like each other but have oppositions and they are aware of the fact that happiness of each depends on happiness of the other.

Suppression has been one of the chief instruments for handling conflict. Especially when the suppressed party is much weaker compared to the suppressing party. Then suppression may be highly effective. However, if the power balance between the conflicting parties is close, that suppression may lead to war. This is the biggest risk in using suppression as a conflict resolution method.

War is the most primitive form and least sensible method of conflict resolution but it is also the most widespread method used throughout the history. However the basic disadvantage of war is the fact that it is destructive. Especially when the fighting parties have equal strength, then neither of them can conquer the other and both sides suffer severe losses. Hence modern methods prefer limited war instead. However, limited war method necessitates

¹⁶ Elise Bouilding (1961) (eds.), *Conflict Management in Organizations*, Herbert A. Shepard, " Security Study: Responses to Situations of Competition and Conflict" (Michigan: Braun & Bromfield Inc.) p.33

a total control over the situation. Hence one party must be highly superior to other. Because of this reason, limited war is usually used when an organization or a group interferes the conflict situation so as to end it. Such as the role of NATO in the former Yugoslavia: NATO applied direct military pressure against Serbian forces to bring about an end to both the Bosnian (1992) and Kosovo (1999) crises.

Bargaining lies somewhere between the limited war and problem solving.¹⁷ After an ineffective bargaining both parties feel deprived, and each feels he gave more than he got. This situation often leads into limited war. In good bargaining, on the other hand, each party gives something that matters little to him and gets something, which means a great deal. This leads to problem solving.

A stable bargaining situation depends on personal trust and mutual respect between bargainers. The amount of trust needed to handle conflict changes drastically in different methods. For example at the suppression and war, there is complete absence of trust. There is a minimum amount of trust needed in order to engage in limited war. Bargaining presupposes more trust, and a definite philosophy of coexistence.¹⁸ Each party can count on the fact that the other party needs him. In situations of trust, the bargaining becomes more of a ceremonial function than a battle. In Cyprus case, for example, there is the need for coexistence arising from sharing limited land of an island however the concept of mutual trust is at the minimum which sabotages the bargaining process.

Problem solving depends on the capacity for mutual identification. It is based on the assumption that a solution will not be satisfactory to one party unless it also is satisfactory to the other party. In short, solution must be satisfactory to every one involved. Getting groups to think together from the beginning leads more directly to problem solving and may even bypass the bargaining situation.

The efficiency of these conflict-resolving methods depends on the conflicting parties' ability to apply them as well as on their capacity to lay aside distrust while they work together on resolving conflict so as to find a solution that will

¹⁷ Charles F. Herman, p. 217

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 218

satisfy all of the parties' interest. Unfortunately in many cases conflicting parties are unable to deal with their problems on their own. In this case they voluntarily agree the assistance of a third party, a mediator to start the mediation process.

1.5. Role of International Mediation in Conflict Resolution

People in conflict have a number of procedural options for managing and resolving it. However, the most agreeable way to reach a mutually agreed solution to conflict is through negotiation. In negotiation the parties voluntarily agree to talk over their dispute and by this way they educate each other about their needs and interests so that they can engage in a bargaining process.

If the parties are unable to initiate negotiation process by themselves or if they reach an impasse, then they may need assistance of a third party who is outside of the dispute. Mediation is the intervention of an acceptable third party who has limited or no authoritative decision-making power in negotiation process so as to assist the involved parties to voluntarily reach a mutually acceptable settlement of the issues in dispute.

The main characteristic that differentiates mediation from other conflict resolution methods is that it is a voluntary form of intervention. The parties of conflict are free to accept or reject mediation as well as the mediator's proposal. Hence, they retain their control over dispute. Mediation is non-coercive, non-violent and definitely non-binding form of intervention.¹⁹

Mediation- one form of third-party assistance in conflict resolution- has a long history. It has been used in almost all cultures of the world. Jewish communities in biblical times used mediation to solve conflicts. This Jewish tradition was soon carried over to emerging Christian communities. Until the Renaissance, the Catholic and Orthodox Churches were the main mediation and conflict management organizations in the Christian World. Mediation has also a long tradition in Islamic cultures. In the traditional societies in Middle East, problems were often resolved through a community meeting of elders.

¹⁹ Jacob Bercovitch, " The Structure and Diversity of Mediation in International Relations" in Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (eds.) (1992), *Mediation in International Relations Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, (ST. Martin's Press, Inc., New York), p.4

With the rise of secularism and secular societies in the West, the use of mediation has grown significantly. However, with the 20th century mediation has formally institutionalised and developed into a recognized profession.

There are two important questions that should be asked about the parties in the mediation process. First, why third parties wish to intervene in others' disputes? Second, why the conflicted parties accept a mediator to intervene their dispute? Third parties' motivation to mediate depends basically on self-interest.²⁰ It is the primary concern of especially states and organizations. A state may desire to gain an important role in international arena or spread her ideas so that enhance its position. From the viewpoint of conflicted parties, they accept a mediator when a dispute is too complex to be solved by their own efforts and become too costly to both parties. Conflicting parties may need to call a mediator into negotiation when: Communication between parties is poor; there are multiple issues in dispute and the parties disagree about their priorities; misperceptions and stereotypes are hindering productive negotiations; there is serious disagreement over data; the parties have value differences that divide them; and finally when the parties are having difficulties starting negotiations or have reached an impasse in their bargaining.

1.5.1. Mediators:

Mediators enter conflict that has reached various levels of development and intensity to assist parties in resolving disputes. They generally have limited or no binding decision-making power. Hence a mediator cannot force parties. This very characteristic differentiates a mediator from a judge.

The mediator assists the parties in examining their interests and needs; exchanging ideas. He helps them to negotiate and to redefine their relationship in a way that will lead them to a settlement. The fact that the mediator does not have decision-making authority makes the mediation process more attractive in the eyes of conflicting parties. Since from the beginning, the parties know that they can retain the ultimate control of the outcome. Depending on the situation the mediator may assume a variety of roles while assisting parties. First of all

²⁰ William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation in the Post- Cold War Era", in *Managing Global Chaos*, eds. Chester Crocker, Fen Hampson and Pamela Aall, (1996) (United States Institute of Press: Washington), p. 446

the mediator is the opener of communication channels. He can initiate communication between parties if there is not any communication or he can facilitate better communication if the parties are already talking.

The mediator is a process facilitator by providing a procedure and helping parties when they face problems. The mediator works as a legitimizer by helping parties recognize the right of others to be involved in negotiations. The mediator assists parties by offering them new resources: He can link them to outside experts and resources such as lawyers, technical experts, decision makers that may enable acceptable settlement options. Besides the mediator is a problem explorer. He leads people to examine a problem from a variety of viewpoints, assists in defining basic issues and explores mutually acceptable solutions. During negotiations, the mediator behaves like a leader who takes the initiative to move the negotiations forward and sometimes he may be the scapegoat by sharing responsibility or blame for an unpopular decision that the parties are nevertheless willing to accept.

The critical role attributed to a mediator in mediation process sometimes becomes a real disadvantage for the mediation as a method of conflict resolution. Since the progress of mediation is heavily dependent on the personal qualifications and professional skills of a mediator or an available group of knowledgeable and trusted mediators. Mediators are classified in three broad types: Social network mediators, authoritative mediators and independent mediators.²¹ This classification depends on the relationship of the mediator with involved parties as well as the interest the mediator has in the negotiation.

Social network mediators are those who had a prior relationship with the parties in the past and will continue its relationship in the future. They are part of a continuing and common social network. They may be a personal friend, business colleague, a religious figure or a respected community leader or elder known by all parties. Social network mediator is generally someone who is very concerned with promoting stable relationship between parties, maybe because of personal reasons or because he may have a commitment to maintain harmony in broader social networks. The social network mediator should not be necessarily important but he must be perceived by everyone to be fair. Only

²¹ Christopher W. Moore (2003), *The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict*, Jossey-Bass Publishers, California, p. 43

power he has is the relationship he had with the parties, the trust and respect that the parties have for him.

Second type of mediator is the authoritative mediator who has an authoritative relationship to the parties. That is the mediator is in a superior position in relation with the parties involved and he has actual or potential capacity to influence the outcome of a dispute. On the other hand authoritative mediators avoid committing directly to the decisions of the parties, instead they usually try to influence the decisions of the parties indirectly and attempt to persuade them to arrive at their own conclusions. Influence of the authoritative mediators comes from their formal positions in a community or organization as well as their personal status or reputation.

Generally authoritative mediators have a strong interest in the outcome of a dispute. For example Henry Kissinger had strong vested interests when he mediated Arab-Israeli disengagement negotiation in 1975. The same is valid for President Carter when he acted as mediator in the Camp David Egyptian-Israeli peace talks. Because the United States has had long standing political, economic and strategic interests in the Middle East, she has played the role of mediator so as to promote stability in the region. The same example is applicable in the former Yugoslavia: The U.S. ambassador Richard Holbrooke and various U.N. mediators involved in the conflict of the former Yugoslavia basically because they sought solutions that met the interests of the national governments, which they represent.

The third type of mediator is the independent mediator. He is called independent because unlike other two types of mediators, independent mediator has no direct ongoing relationship with the parties. He is neutral in his relationship with the parties. Neutrality and impartiality are the characteristics of independent mediator. Hence independent mediators are most generally people who accept mediation as his or her profession such as adviser or clergy: An adviser is an independent "outsider" and may have little or no connection with the dispute or disputants. What an independent mediator does is to lead the parties to help them make their interests explicit and assist the parties in developing some fair and mutually agreed settlements.

Impartiality and neutrality are two critical concepts that are used for defining characteristics of different types of mediators. Unfortunately impartiality and

neutrality are among the most disputable concepts in international mediation.²² In mediation impartiality is the stance the mediator takes toward the disputed issues. A mediator being impartial means he has no preference in favour of one of negotiators, their interests or the ideas they represent. On the other hand neutrality refers to the relationship between intervener and the disputant parties. In the case of independent mediators, for example, they do not have ongoing relations with the parties from which they could directly and significantly benefit. Unlike social network mediators, independent mediators are not tied into the social networks of the parties.

Neutrality and impartiality are sometimes counted on the top of the list of characteristics that a mediator should have for an effective mediation. On the other hand some people argue that mediators need not be neutral to be accepted or effective. They put forward the idea that a pre-existing good relationship with one of the parties may even aid effective communication and facilitate development of creative proposals.

Actually, impartiality and neutrality do not necessarily mean that a mediator has no personal opinions regarding the outcome of a dispute or the disputants. Such a supposition would not be realistic since no one can be entirely impartial. However, what is meant by impartiality and neutrality is the ability of the mediator to separate his or her opinion about the outcome or the relationship that he or she has with the disputing parties.

Because of the fact that there is no such technology available to measure the existence of such concepts, the final decision about impartiality and neutrality of a mediator lies totally in the judgement of the parties.

1.5.2. Mediation Techniques:

A mediator like a scientist works with a program while intervening in negotiations. He analyses the dispute, builds hypothesis and then test those hypothesis by intervening in the dispute. At the first place a mediator collects data about dispute through observation and interviews with the interested parties. By this way he analyses the conflict. Then he develops hypothesis

²² Jacob Bercovitch, p. 6

about the causes of conflict, study on theories that explain and solve the conflict. After finding the appropriate theory, then comes the intervention. Intervention means at the same time testing of the hypothesis because the causes of intervention also shows if the hypothesis is verified or nullified.

All negotiations pass through three distinct phases in which different techniques are employed by mediators. The three phases of negotiation are: Pre-negotiation, negotiation and implementation.²³ In pre-negotiation phase, the major task is to get the parties agree on negotiation. During this phase mediators try to provide communication between the conflicted parties; make initial contacts with the parties; build credibility; educate the parties about the process and increase commitment to procedure. The mediator collects and analyses relevant data about the people, dynamics and characteristics of conflict. Depending on this data he designs a detailed plan for mediation by selecting strategies against the expected moves of the conflicting parties. After this preparation the mediator is ready for beginning the mediation session. Then starts the second phase: Negotiation. While beginning negotiation, mediator establishes ground rules and behavioural guidelines, draw the frame of discussion issues by identifying broad topic areas. During discussions mediator tries to identify hidden interests of the disputing parties so as to inform the parties about each other's interests.

Mediators in the second phase act like formulators. This means preparing alternative formulas for negotiations in the frame of which the parties trade away things they value less in order to get others they value more so that a common understanding of the problem and its solution take form. In order to do this, mediator first reviews the interests of the parties then evaluate how interests can be met by available options. At the same time he develops awareness among the parties that they should take into consideration multiple options so as to reach a settlement. The negotiation phase ends with the formulation of the best alternative option.

Finally in the implementation phase, the mediator identifies procedural steps to operationalize the agreement by forming an enforcement and commitment mechanism. This phase also includes mediator's monitoring of the compliance

²³ Lawrence Susskind and Eileen Babbitt, "Overcoming the Obstacles to Effective Mediation of International Disputes" in *Mediation in International Relations Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, eds. Jacob Bercovitch and Jeffrey Z. Rubin (1992), (MacMillan Press Ltd: New York), p. 36.

and workability of the agreement. To do this while formalizing the settlement an evaluation and monitoring procedure is established.

In all these phases cooperation of the conflicted parties with the mediator is the most critical point. The extent of the mediator's power in negotiation process depends on the conflicted parties' needs. The stronger the parties felt need for a settlement, the more power is available to the mediator; the less the parties want an agreement, the more the mediator must work to formulate an acceptable settlement for both parties.

During negotiations, mediators may use their trumps against the disputants. They may use sanctions to worsen one or both parties' situations so as to increase their motivation and will for settlement. They may also offer incentives to one or both sides. If these are not enough then mediators may threaten to withdraw from negotiations. Such threats are effective only when the parties believe that mediated negotiation is the best alternative they have.

Each mediation attempt has its own characteristics depending on the variables present in the conflict case. Mediators modify their activities according to the variables such as the level and intensity of conflict and the timing of mediator's entry; the power balance of disputants; the complexity of the issue.

As it is explained before, mediation is the intervention of a mediator into an ongoing system of relationship. There is an explicit assumption in this definition: the system works independently of the intervener.²⁴ Intervener joins the event in some point. He may enter a dispute in its early stages or he may join the issue when the parties have been negotiating and have reached an impasse. In each case the strategies of the mediator change. For example, in an early stage what a mediator does is to prepare the parties psychologically to bargaining. On the other hand if the mediator enters the event in later phases then he will follow a strategy in order to help the conflicted parties to overcome psychological barriers to settlement. The mediator should prepare them until both parties become ready to re-evaluate their policies.

Another important factor in negotiation is the power balance of the parties. Since, in order to reach mutually acceptable settlement that will last long, all

²⁴ C. Argyris (1970), *Intervention Theory and Method: A Behavioural Science View*, Reading Mass: Addison –Wesley, p. 15.

parties must have something in the hand to use against the other while bargaining. According to Lovell this is a prerequisite for a satisfactory settlement.²⁵ If the power balance between the parties is not too extreme then the mediator's job will be to assist the parties in using right strategies so as to reach a settlement. However if the power of the parties is not equal in comparison to each other, then the mediator should follow such a strategy that the settlement at the end should also meet needs of the weaker party. Otherwise that agreement would not hold over time. The critical point here is that the mediator should avoid becoming embroiled in the conflict while trying to assist or empower the weaker party. Since it may put the mediator in a position in which a mediator becomes an advocate.

Regarding complexity of the issue; the complexity level varies from case to case. Mediators must design intervention strategies that meet the requirement of the complexity of the specific issue. In some cases mediators may skip some stages or not so much work on it. For example, a complex case may require detailed data collection procedures or multiple interviews over a period of months. On the other hand in another case, some simple interviews maybe enough to understand the causes and dynamics of the conflict. All these variables may effect the duration and the content of the stages of mediation as well as the role of mediators and the strategies they choose.

1.6. Conclusion

Studying the theories of conflict gives clues about why Cyprus conflict is a special case and deserves more attention. Throughout time the island attracted many nations because of its geographic position in the Mediterranean. For example, in the second half of the 19th century England took the island just for economic reasons- that is the island's position being on the ways of English colonies. It was a critical point that led to today's divided situation on the island since England applied her famous divide and rule policy on the island and separated the two nations who had been living together without problems under the Ottoman rule. Still today Cyprus maintains its critical position as a base in the neighbourhood of the Middle East and for this reason she attracts the

²⁵ H. Lovell (1952), " The Pressure Level in Mediation" *Industrial and Labour Relations Review*, 6 (1), 20-29

interest of the third parties such as U.S., Russia and the EU who may not care about a conflict between Greeks and Turks on an island if the geographic position of that island were not so special.

Cyprus conflict also includes elements of ideological conflict. The differences between Turks and Greeks with regards to their religions have always exacerbated the conflict on the island. Especially the role of Orthodox Church can not be denied during Cyprus conflict. Similarly ethnicity is another accelerator. Living under the Ottoman rule or at least feeling the danger of invaded by them for centuries caused hatred in most of the European nations. Maybe because of this Turks are labelled as “the other”. It is obvious that handling the conflict in Cyprus might be easier if the parties of conflict were not Turks and Greeks.

Finally Cyprus conflict can also be explained by what is called as power/security conflict. The story of arm building on the island started with the same well-known reason: security. The security of the Turkish side is provided by Turkish army on the island. However then the Greek Cypriots felt insecure and they began arm building with the support of Greece. All these above mentioned elements have a share in the complexity of the Cyprus conflict. Maybe each of them has not equal shares or the importance of them changes time to time, still neither of them could be ignored.

The complexity of the conflict is the basic reason why parties could not solve it without help from a third party. Since now the United Nations has been the power that undertook the third party role in the conflict. Now the European Union also tries to support UN mediation activities. The reasons behind the EU’s involvement in Cyprus conflict are the same with the reasons behind why the Union accepted Greek Cypriot Government’s membership: Mainly the island’s geographical importance. However once Cyprus joined the Union, the EU automatically inherited the long-lasting Cyprus conflict. Hence, now there is no chance for the Union but to solve this conflict.

Although EU has never directly involved Cyprus conflict as a mediator until now, if it intends to play such a role or even if it just chooses to support UN activities, the Union has both advantages and disadvantages regarding conflict resolution in Cyprus. For example the Union’s rules and laws, which is called as *acquis-communautaire*, may be helpful by designating norms and procedures

and by this way providing a path for the conflicting parties. Moreover the Union can provide communication between the parties which is an important fact in conflict resolution. EU may choose to act as a mediator in the future however it would depend on the acceptability of it by the parties. In this respect the main disadvantage of the Union is the fact that it may be impartial but obviously not neutral since the Greek Cypriots became a member state. If the Turkish side does not attach so much importance on this neutrality issue then there won't be any problem regarding the Union's mediator role. However Greek Cypriot's membership may also affect negotiations in a positive way since it gives the Turkish side the capability of guessing consequences of continuation of the conflict in the long-run. If Turkish Cypriots conclude that any solution is better than no solution then they may step back in negotiations, of course such a decision will also be depended upon Turkey's position in the European Union.

In any case it is clear that the European Union will undertake a more active role in the Cyprus conflict since the Union voluntarily accepted the membership of one of the conflicted parties. Looking at the principles and objectives of the Union it is obvious that the European Union does not adopt primitive methods like war. Thus it will vote for modern and civilized methods like bargaining, problem solving and mediation. There are enough reasons for the European Union to intervene Cyprus conflict. The same is true for the conflicted parties. They may ask for the mediation of the EU since they are aware that they cannot solve the conflict together and thus necessitate a mediator who has enough capacities and connections with the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as with Greece and Turkey.

If the Union decides to undertake a mediatory role in Cyprus, it would probably be classified as an "authoritative mediator". Since the Union is in a superior position with regards to the conflicted parties and has an actual or potential capacity to influence outcome of the dispute. Besides the Union has a personal interest in the issue since it will also be affected from the outcome of the Cyprus conflict. To what extent the European Union will affect the conflict and lead to a solution at the end depends on the policies and instruments it will pursue and the developments that will take place in Cyprus in the near future. For this goal The EU will depend on its own institutions and policies as well as its cooperation with other states and organizations such as the United Nations (UN), NATO and the United States.

CHAPTER 2

EUROPEAN UNION APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

2.1. Introduction

There is a well-known saying about the EU: The EU is an “economic giant” and a “political dwarf”.²⁶Being the world’s largest, richest and most powerful trade bloc, the EU is a major actor in world economy that shapes the economic decisions of both its members and non-member countries. However when it comes to international politics, it seems; as it is not as powerful as it should be taking into account the EU’s economic power. The areas such as defence and security are still covered mostly by national and intergovernmental activities in EU framework.

In reality European economic-trade policies, foreign and security policy along with its conflict management dimension constitute correlated functional areas: Without an effective economic policy it is almost impossible to have a coherent foreign policy and apply successful conflict management policies. This is one of the reasons why the European Union became more effective on international stage during the fourth quarter of the 20th century: Throughout the Cold War years Western Europe improved its economy and provided political stability by a process of deepening integration. Economic prosperity brought a feeling of self-confidence that has led Western Europe to become more assertive in its relations with other world powers including its close ally, the United States. Then it may not be false to claim that EU’s growing involvement

²⁶ The dichotomy, originally used for Germany and Japan after the World War II

in conflict management is a direct result of its increasing external role on the world stage²⁷ that is arised from the Union's becoming an economic power.

Another reason behind the EC/EU's involvement in conflict management is the changing conditions in international relations after the Cold War. The order that was constructed after the World War II was stable and less dangerous compared to unipolar system. In the bipolar world order, which depended on the U.S.-Soviet antagonism the roles and moves were more or less predictable and under these conditions EC did not feel the necessity to conduct an independent European foreign policy since Europe's security was guaranteed by cooperation with the US and NATO.²⁸ European crisis management was predominantly reactive throughout the 1980s with the objective of reducing negative consequences for Europe of bilateral relations between the superpowers. The typical characteristic of international crisis management was the American leadership. Europe played the role of mediator during periods of tensions to reduce the effects of confrontational superpower policies.²⁹

However the recent changes in international politics- e.g. crises in Soviet economy that led the collapse of political system.³⁰; failure of socialism in Eastern and South Eastern Europe and the following economic and political

²⁷ Fraser Cameron, "The European Union and Conflict Prevention", presentation at the Special Libraries Association Annual Conference, 13 June 2000, Philadelphia, p.1. <http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/FCSpeechConfPrev.htm>.

²⁸ According to Londou and Whitman:
"As long as the Cold War provided a safe harbour status quo, the EC could nestle comfortably alongside the Soviet-American antagonism. Defence was dominated by the US and managed within NATO, thus awkward questions such as defence were kept off the European agenda"
Alice LONDOU & Richard WHITMAN, (1997) (eds.), *Rethinking the EU: Institutions, Interests and Identities*, London: Macmillian, p. 8

²⁹ Knud Erik JORGENSEN (1997) (eds.), *European Approaches to Crisis Management*, Netherlands. Kluwer Law International, p. 108

³⁰ As President Gorbachev said at the November 1990, CSCE Summit in Paris, the major changes in international relations were due in no small part to the historic turn in the Soviet Union " from totalitarianism to freedom and democracy, from the administer-by-command system to a law-governed state and political pluralism, from state monopoly in the economy to diverse and equal forms of ownership and market relations, and from a unitary country to a union of sovereign states based on the principles of a federation....While remaining a great country, my country has become different and will never be its old self again. We have opened up to the world, and the world has opened up to us. This predetermined the radical turn in international relations, a turn towards a fundamentally different perception by states of one another" Quoted in *Soviet News*, Wednesday, 21 November 1990, p. 385

crises in that region- worried EC/EU about their possible effects such as migration³¹, disruption in economic and financial order or a war situation on their borders. Besides the end of bipolar global order and the emergence of a more pluralist and interdependent world has led changes both in the NATO's role and the U.S. foreign policy: Now the U.S. focuses increasingly on homeland defence, counter terrorism and crisis regions beyond Europe, hence Europe has to take more responsibility for its own security. Europeans revalue their traditional policies and felt the necessity to reform them. Discussions on the future of European security have begun to stress on going beyond the traditional Cold War focus on military power and national territorial defence. The dominant idea has been to develop new structures and policies so as to make EC/EU more effective in international relations and provide a stable order at least in European continent and in the neighbourhood for its own sake.

The first signals of this policy transformation were noticed after the Kuwait Crisis, which showed the European States their insufficiency and made them feel embarrassed by their poor performance and lack of coordination. According to Ginsberg the 1990-91 Gulf War exposed two kinds of disagreement:³²

One, the EC's own "gulf" between a lack of unity within its own ranks in the run up to and during the Gulf War operations on the one hand, and the vital interests EC Members had in the Gulf Region, on the other.³³ Two, the imbalance between these vital European interests in the Gulf Region and the purposive action of the United States, under whose leadership an international coalition of the willing, backed by UN Security Council Resolutions, liberated Kuwait and ensured the continual flow of oil to Europe.

³¹ E.g. in 1989, approximately one million people moved from the East to the West- the biggest shift in the continent's population since the immediate post-war years. The majority were ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but the figure includes 320.000 "Bulgarian Muslims" who fled to Turkey. The shifts in population produced some adverse reactions for the host nations, particularly in West Germany. S See Edward Steen (1989), "East Europe votes with its feet" *The Independent*, 2 September 1989, p.1

³² Roy H. GINSBERG (2001), *The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

³³ An Anglo- Belgium dispute erupted during the heat of the Gulf War in January 1991. A British request was refused by Belgium whose position undermined EC and NATO solidarity at a moment of international crisis and contributed to outside as well as inside perceptions of the limits to EFP cohesiveness in international politics.

Kuwait crisis functioned as a first step in the learning process of the European States for handling crisis. The crisis created by Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 caught the EC unprepared militarily as well as institutionally. The EC had no ability to deal with management of out-of-area crisis. Immediately after the Kuwait Crisis new voices appeared among European States that demand leadership and effectiveness in external relations.

The Kuwait crisis caused a change in the Member States' views about establishment of a European capacity for crisis management in three basic ways: First, it caused a strong desire among EC Member States to act as one against the rest of the world. Second, it put the CFSP debate on the top of the agenda. Finally, it created the common sense about creating a military capacity for handling out-of-area crisis. Hence, the member states determined their priorities while forming the basics of new European security arrangements as: Promoting cooperation among members; facilitating communication and sharing information among the Member States; developing common principles, norms and rules; hindering aggressive behaviour; and, providing a basis for collective action, conflict prevention, crisis management and to peaceful resolution of disputes. However the basic change took place in the minds of Europeans regarding security thinking: A more multinational approach to security policy emerged and the "soft security" aspect entered into European's policies.³⁴

On the other hand crises in the former Yugoslavia, and the ineffectiveness of the EC/EU during the crises stiffened the decision of the Union for taking serious steps regarding crises management policies.³⁵ At first

³⁴ Kjell A. Eliassen (1998) (eds.), *Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union*, London: SAGE Publications.

³⁵ There were 3 main crises in the former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 1999 which are the crisis in Croatia-Slovenia (1991), in Bosnia (1992) and Kosovo (1999). All of these crises were formed by a group or groups seeking greater regional autonomy or independence from Belgrade. Mostly as a result of the changes in Eastern and Central Europe with the end of the Cold War and the consequent economic struggles, Yugoslavia attempted to maintain the structure of the federation and the membership of the six constituent republics- Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. The response of the Yugoslav Republic- mostly dominated by Serbia- to the autonomy and secession demands included a combination of direct military tactics and ethnic fomentation such as using fear and ethnic cleansing to attempt to stop the secessionist movements. Hence high levels of violence became the common characteristic of all three crises. Although the combatants involved in crises are all Slavic, there were sharp divides along religious lines between Eastern Orthodox (Serbs, Macedonia), Roman Catholic (Croats, Slovenes) and Muslim (Albanians) groups. Therefore in the conflicts, political and ethnic motives are closely

the break-up of former Yugoslavia was primarily perceived as European crises. When tension rose in Yugoslavia in early 1991, the U.S. immediately declared that it is considered as a “European problem”.³⁶ Following this declaration, the then UN Secretary General Javier Pelez de Cuellar also stated that “the UN (had) no role in Yugoslavia”³⁷ However soon it became apparent that the Yugoslav problem is beyond the capabilities of EU. The case of Bosnia air strikes in 1993 clarifies both the European policy making structures as well as the cooperation of transatlantic community and international organizations with the EC.

After the Serb attacks on Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN declared the Security Council Resolution 752 which acknowledged that it is the responsibility of the international community to bring an end to the fighting. To do so first it was decided to initiate an international peacekeeping operation and it was agreed that the additional measures would be considered in the light of the further developments.

During the following year although peaceful means proved its uselessness, the Western Governments remained divided against military action. Their concern was limited to prevent migration. Their means were economic and military sanctions as well as an attempt to resolve the conflict through negotiations under the auspices of the EC and the CSCE.

However these means did not work and the conflict moved to Bosnia in spring 1992.³⁸With spread of the conflict to another part of the Balkans, the international community once again questioned terms of involvement. Attempts of EC and CSCE to resolve the conflict through international negotiations did not work because crisis management mechanisms of the CSCE were newly

intertwined. In the end of these three conflicts, the former state of Yugoslavia has dissolved into 5 separate states recognized by international community, with Serbia and Montenegro comprising a loose federation.

³⁶ *Financial Times*, 29-30 June 1991.

³⁷ James B. Steinberg (1993), “International Involvement in the Yugoslavia Conflict”, in Lori Fisher Damrosch (ed.), *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in International Conflicts*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press

³⁸ G. Xhudo (1996), *Diplomacy and Crisis Management in the Balkans: A U.S. Foreign Policy Perspective*, New York: St. Martin’s Press, p. 66-69

forming and had never been tested until that time. Besides with lacking sanctions the only thing CSCE relied on was the cooperation of the warring parties, which was an impossible condition in 1991. Furthermore the consensus rule in the CSCE provided the Yugoslav government and Russia, who supports the Yugoslav government, with the opportunity to veto stronger action. Similarly at that time also the EC was neither prepared nor suited for negotiating a peace in the former Yugoslavia. Although it was said that the fighting in Slovenia and Croatia had been ended by the EU-negotiated "Brioni-Accords", actually it was the achievement of Serb objectives in Croatia- namely the control over the Krajina and the reassessment of their interests and their ability to force Slovenia to return to a unified Yugoslavia- that had induced the Serb leadership to accept the cease-fire.³⁹ It was also put forward that during the crisis some EC/EU Member States encouraged Serb aggression by proclaiming their support for a united Yugoslavia.

EC's most trusted crisis management tool- embargos had only limited impact. The economic sanction could only be effective in longer term yet the weakening of Serb economy did not affect its military capabilities or its willingness to continue the war. Similarly the weapon embargo did not meet the expectations since all republics; especially Serbia had built up considerable weapon arsenal over the proceeding years.⁴⁰ Due to apparent lack of success of peaceful measures, western governments agreed on using military force. However, since neither of them desired to join into a ground war, soon the military action became synonymous with air strikes. Regarding air strikes, it is thought that the required military capabilities for the operation could be provided by NATO. The crises in Yugoslavia showed the Union their ineffectiveness especially in the military field and the difficulty in decision making procedures for collective action. Hence, with these crises, the Member states decided to put this issue on the top of their agendas.

The European Union approach to conflict management in the new era is broad, advanced and far-sighted in that it includes long-term policies for not

³⁹A.Maclead (1997), "French Policy toward the War in the Former Yugoslavia: A Bid for International Leadership, *International Journal*, Vol LII, p. 245

⁴⁰ S.P. Ramet (1994), "The Yugoslav Crisis and the West: Avoiding 'Vietnam' and Blundering into 'Abyssinia', *East Europe Politics and Societies*, Vol 8, p. 201

only conflict resolution (e.g. formation of military forces) but also for conflict prevention that includes measures for tackling root causes of conflict such as poverty, human rights, development of democracy and even measures for environmental protection fit in European conflict management understanding.⁴¹

The EC/EU has developed many instruments for conflict management throughout the time. However, maybe the most comprehensive policy of the EC/EU for conflict management is the enlargement policy. By imposing strict conditions called Copenhagen Criteria, the Union helps candidate countries to improve their economic, political and social status in accordance with the European Union's. And by this way the Union extends its zone of peace and prosperity and stability to towards the East.⁴² Other than enlargement policy there are also trade agreements, Partnership and cooperation agreements, association and Europe agreement, the Stability Pact and the Royamount Process for South Eastern Europe, the technical assistance agreements (e.g. PHARE, TACIS, CARDS, MEDA and ALA programs)⁴³, Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM), Conflict Prevention Network (CPN), etc. Meanwhile the EC/EU developed strategies for conflict management such as early warning system, sanctions, election assistance and monitoring, democratization, providing human rights, measures against exportation of small arms and light weapons, Europeanization strategy etc.⁴⁴ According to the Commission "actions in support of democratisation and respect for human rights, including the right to participate in the establishment of free and fair elections can make a major contribution to peace, security and prevention of conflicts".⁴⁵

⁴¹ Article 177 EC explains the basics of the Union's preventive strategy as:

- The sustainable economic and social development of the developing countries, and more particularly the most disadvantaged among them;
- The smooth and gradual integration of the developing countries into the world economy;
- The campaign against poverty in the developing countries.

⁴² Fraser Cameron, p. 4

⁴³ Conflict Prevention: A Commission Contribution, European Commission, 19 January 2001, pp.1-2.

⁴⁴ The Council of European Union, doc. 11044/1/99 REV 1, 3 December 1999.

⁴⁵ Communication from the Commission on EU Election Assistance and Observation, COM (2000) 191 final, p.3.

This chapter explains the EU's existing conflict management approaches, strategies, policies and instruments by first telling how and when these policies were formed and developed and then the chapter continues telling current efforts to enhance these instruments and policies. With regards to the Union's long-term policies for conflict management the Barcelona Process is examined, which also includes Cyprus. The answers given to the questions regarding the Barcelona Process such as "the reasons why such a formation was developed and why the Union has such an interest in the region", "what the Union aims while participating in the Barcelona Process" and "in what ways the Barcelona Process contributes to conflict management of the Union" would also cover Cyprus and give clues on the Union's approach to the Cyprus conflict.

2.2. Historical Evaluation of Formation of European Institutions for Providing Cooperation among the Member States and Dealing Conflict Situations

Although the EU is a global economic power, its role is marginal in issues such as crisis management, conflict resolution, political security and defence. It is ironic since the aim behind its formation is directly related to conflict management: Prevent possible conflicts between the European countries especially between France and Germany. Since the beginning the only concern of the EC/EU has been to promote peace and prosperity among its members. This very ambition has been shaping the efforts of forming a defence community since the European Defence Community (EDC) in the 1950s and it seems as if it is still the main motivation behind the CFSP and ESDP.

Conflict management issues in the European Union are connected with foreign policy and security policy of the Union. The EU is a union of states and the decisions taken in the Union are shaped by the influence and interest of its member states. Thus any action of the Union necessitates political will and a high level of coordination of the members. Common Foreign Policy (CFP) enables the member states to act in harmony against the developments in the international arena including conflict situations. Security is another related element of European conflict management since one main reason behind the EU's concern in conflict management is to guarantee security in Europe and on its borders.

Maybe because of this link among the conflict management, security and foreign relations, EU decided to strengthen its conflict management capacities mainly under CFSP. The extension of the CFSP with the Amsterdam Treaty by the incorporation of the Petersberg tasks is an indicator of the Union's desire on this direction. However the Union has passed through a long way before it formed its policies and institutions regarding conflict management.

For the first time in 1950s some people in EEC felt the deficiency in common policy on defence and security issues in the newly forming EC. There were mainly two issues EC had to face at that time. First one was the increasing Soviet threat: Europe should strengthen its military potential against the Soviet through cooperation. The second was the Germany's remilitarisation. After the World War II, Germany was demilitarised. However, with the Cold War and the outbreak of Korean War Western Allies, especially the US, changed their minds in favour of Germany's rearmament. However, because of the fact that France had suffered grievously from German militarism and expansion far more than either Britain or United States, she severely resisted the idea.

In order to overcome such problematic issues through cooperation among member states Monnet suggested forming European Defence Community (EDC). In 1951 negotiations began to establish EDC in which German units would be integrated into a European Army. After many arguments and hard bargaining, the six Member Nations signed the EDC Treaty on May 27, 1952 in Paris. However, it did not last long. Although all Member States signed the EDC Treaty, French Parliament rejected it in 1954 mainly because of Gaullist hostility for sharing sovereignty over national defence policy and communist opposition to German rearmament. According to some, the supranational nature of the Treaty led such an end for the EDC.

On the other hand, French wanted to show their willingness for cooperation in foreign and security issues with the Community through Fouchet Plan. A committee under the chairmanship of Christian Fouchet, French ambassador to Denmark, drafted a design of European Union of States, which includes plans for foreign and security cooperation. Most of the Member States rejected the plan thinking that it was too intergovernmental in nature.

In April 1969, De Gaulle resigned and a period in European history closed with his resignation. It was important for European integration since being the

most powerful and effective member of the EC, France was acting as a leader and thus had a great influence in the decisions concerning the future of European integration, which was stroked during 1960s by France's blockage to Britain's membership.⁴⁶

Pompidou, De Gaulle's successor as president of France, called for a special summit of the EC's head of state and government in December 1969. It was the first meeting of EC leaders where they arrange their priorities as "completion, deepening and enlargement". It was decided that "enlargement" should come after "completion" and "deepening", where "completion" means finalizing the financing of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and "deepening" means extending EC competences beyond existing policies and activities. Regarding this, Pompidou thought of a system in which foreign policy cooperation realizes through regular meeting of foreign ministers. It seems Member States understood the importance of at least exchanging information on foreign policy issues of mutual interest and appointed Etienne Davignon, a senior Belgium foreign ministry official, to prepare a report. In May 1970 Davignon submitted his report (Luxembourg Report) to the Council. In his report he suggested that European Political Cooperation (EPC) consists of biannual meetings of foreign ministers. By this way Foreign ministers create intergovernmental machinery for political cooperation. EPC based upon the Luxembourg report which set down the guiding principles and goals such as: Greater mutual understanding of international affairs through the exchange of information and regular consultation, conformity of attitudes through harmonisation of views, and joint action when it is applicable, helpful and desirable.

Actually during 1950 and 1960s the EC's impact on world affairs was limited by the simple fact that it had only six Member States and it was trying to strengthen its internal administration. It is an argument subject about the

⁴⁶Desmond Dinan, an associate professor in the Institute for Public Policy at George Mason University, explains the situation after De Gaulle as:

"The terms "Eurosclerosis" and "Europessimism" encapsulate the history of European integration in the mid 1970s. After the frustration of the 1960s, the EC seemed set at the start of the 1970s to shake off the shackles of Gaullism and begin an invigorating new phase of its development. "Completion, deepening and enlargement", a slogan popularized by French president Georges Pompidou and endorsed by the six at the Hague Summit of 1969, summed up the optimism of the post De Gaulle era."

Desmond Dinan (1999), *Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration*, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., p. 57

Cyprus conflict that the EC/EU played a minor role in comparison with the UN. However it should be reminded that the crucial turning points in the conflict until 1990s (1955, 1960, 1963-1964, 1967-1968, 1974) took place during a time frame when the EC/EU has not yet organized as a political actor on international stage and had no wish to affect political processes in the third countries.⁴⁷

As the Community grew so did its effectiveness in external relations. By 1975 with its three new members (UK, Denmark and Ireland), the Community had already established formal relations with 46 Africa, Caribbean and Pacific Countries under Lome Agreement and had signed Association Agreements with Greece, Turkey, Malta and Cyprus; cooperation agreements with Israel and Spain; and free trade agreements with EFTA countries. Hence, 1970s was the period when EC had become an actor of some weight on the international arena. Internal and external development in this time period- such as oil crisis and the following economic recession, the collapse of Bretton Woods system etc.- forced the EC to strengthen its position in foreign policy issues. This desire of EC was reflected in the 1973 Copenhagen Report, which stated that Europe had to “make its voice heard in world affairs”⁴⁸ and the 1981 London Report “the Ten should seek increasingly to shape events and not simply to react to them”.⁴⁹ All these dynamics in 1970s prepared the ground for decisions of 1986 Single European Act (SEA).

Signing SEA in 1986 was a big step linking security and foreign policy, revising the Treaty of Rome and drawing the European Parliament closer to the EPC. SEA is known as the Treaty that institutionalised the EPC. At the end of the conference Member States agreed that they would “coordinate their positions more closely on the political and economic aspects of security and endeavour jointly to formulate and implement a European foreign policy”.

⁴⁷ Olga Demetriou, “EU and the Cyprus Conflict Review of the Literature” *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflict Studies*, No. 5, January 2004, p 14.
<http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk>

⁴⁸ EC-EPC Copenhagen Report, July 23, 1973.
See Philippe in De Schoutheete, *The Case for Europe (Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Pub., 2000)*, p 73

⁴⁹ Ibid. P.73-74

However, the well-known policy of the EC at those times was still to act on behalf of its Member States in the field of external economic and political issues. The real momentum for security and foreign policy coordination came with the ending of Cold War. The fall of Berlin Wall and reunification of Germany was only one side of the story. The other part included continuous crisis and regional conflict, which caused an unpredictable international environment in Europe for years. It was the most natural result that European Member States became anxious for their own security and felt the need to take further steps regarding foreign and security issues.

Then came the Treaty on European Union (TEU)⁵⁰ in 1993 with a three pillar institutional structure- the Economic Community (EC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). Among the three, CFSP deserves more attention for the subject matter of this thesis. CFSP was implemented:

.....to safeguard the common values, fundamental interest and independence of the European Union; to strengthen the security of the EU and its Member States; to preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the principles of UN Charter; to promote international cooperation; and to develop and support democracy, rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Two main instruments were defined in TEU to implement the CFSP: Common policies and joint actions...⁵¹

All the Member States agreed on the necessity of joint actions, since the realization of such objectives necessitates systemic cooperation between Member States. Member States decided to implement joint action gradually in areas where all the Member States share important interests. In principle joint actions are adopted by the European Council and once a joint action has been agreed, Member States are obliged to follow it and harmonize their internal policies in accordance with it.

A special meeting of the European Council on October 1993, determined five basic areas for joint actions: Promotion of peace and stability in Europe,

⁵⁰ Also called Maastrich Treaty.

⁵¹ Article J.1 of Title V of the Maastrich Treaty defines the objectives of CFSP

support for the Middle East peace process, cooperation with a democratic South Africa, settlement of the conflict in former Yugoslavia and support for the democratic process in Russia.⁵²

Other innovations the TEU brought were the introduction of European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and designation of Western European Union (WEU) as the EU's future defence arm.

WEU was founded as a new defence organization in October 1954 with an amendment in Brussels Treaty. Its basic aim was to facilitate German entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As a result, Germany joined NATO via the WEU in May 1955. In 1990s WEU provided a ready-made mechanism for Member States to cooperate militarily as well as long-term European defence cooperation. Another mission of WEU was to arrange relations with NATO. For this purpose a declaration attached to the TEU cited WEU's future development "as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance".

The Treaty of Amsterdam modified the CFSP in 1998 by incorporating the Petersberg Tasks into Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) took place in the shadow of the Yugoslav debate. There was general agreement before the IGC on the need to improve the CFSP's effectiveness by making procedural and institutional reforms. Once more, merge of EU and WEU constituted the main point of debate: A majority of Member States wanted the merge. Britain and Denmark were the main opposition against the merge supporting the idea that EU should not be militarised. Hence the only improvement in military implications was the incorporation of the WEU's Petersberg Tasks into the TEU, which indicates the possibility of future EU-WEU peacekeeping operations.

⁵² In reference to this list, some of the examples of joint actions under the CFSP between 1993-1996 are:

- Dispatch of a team of observers for the parliamentary elections in the Russian Federation (Decision of 9 November 1993)
- Observation of elections to the Palestinian Council and the coordination of the international operation for observing the elections (Decision of 25 September 1995)
- Support for EU administration of the town of Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina (Decision of 12 December 1994)
- Support for transition toward a democratic and multiracial South Africa (Decision of 6 December 1993)

Note: These examples are taken from: Christopher Pienning (1997), *Global Europe: The European Union in World Affairs*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Table 2.2, p.41

At the Amsterdam Summit (1997) it was agreed that the WEU would plan and implement the Union's decisions that had defence implications included in Petersberg Tasks: "Humanitarian/Rescue tasks, Peacekeeping and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacekeeping."⁵³

Another important renovation Amsterdam Treaty brought was the designation of the High Representative for the CFSP. Once Henry Kissinger-former U.S. Secretary of State- asked: "Who do I call when I want to speak to Europe?"⁵⁴ Member States could solve the external representation problem with the establishment of the position of High Representative. It was decided that when foreign leaders want to talk to the EU about security matters, the authority they should conduct would be the High Representative who is also the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers.

2.3. European Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution after Amsterdam Treaty: Capabilities & Developments

The Treaty of Amsterdam was a big step taken to refresh pillar two of TEU by incorporating the Petersberg Tasks into the EU Treaty system, establishing the office of the High Representative for the CFSP.

After the disappointing experiences with regards to military intervention in Serbia and Kosovo- where Europe did nothing but depended on U.S. during NATO strikes- for the first time in French- British Summit at St. Malo in December 1998 Member States agreed that:

The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage...This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP... To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to

⁵³ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, June 19, 1992, "Petersberg Declaration", par 4 of Part II, " On Strengthening WEU's Operational Role". François Heisbourg, "European Defence Takes a Leap Forward" *NATO Review* , Spring/Summer 2000, p. 10

⁵⁴ Heinz Gartner, Adrian Hyde-Price and Erich Reiter (2001) (eds.), *Europe's New Security Challenge* London. Lynne Rienner Publishers, p.113

decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crisis...While acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members...The Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capacity for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication... In this regard the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means.⁵⁵

After St. Malo the EU at their council summits in Vienna (December 1998), Cologne (June 1999) and Helsinki (December 1999) have taken pretentious decisions to establish by 2003 a rapid deployment force of 60 thousand to undertake peacekeeping and crisis management tasks (Petersberg Tasks). The force would be subject to deployment within 60 days and would be prepared to deploy for a period of up to one year. In 1999 Helsinki European Council Summit, Member States also established a political/security committee that would be comprised of permanent representatives and a military staff committee, to provide support and guidance for the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force. Besides with the Helsinki Council Summit, the term ESDI was replaced by European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to show all the European defence and security related initiatives.

In order to strengthen military structure of the EU, the starting point of the Member States was to make an audit so as to learn their military capability available for Petersberg Tasks. They finalised the audit in late 1999. What the audit reflected was summarized such as: European forces were 'very weak' in military strategic heavy lift and relied on civilian assets in this area. Capabilities were 'very limited' in intelligence provision at strategic political and military levels, and air mobility, psychological warfare, deployable combined air operation centres etc. According to the audit, European forces highly depend on roads and ground mobility and they lack the capacity for air mobility, which includes helicopters and tactical airlift. Besides reconstruction and

⁵⁵ Joint Declaration issued at the British-French Summit, Saint- Malo, France 3-4 December 1998. Available online: <http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1975>

administrative capabilities are among the weakest sides of European military forces.⁵⁶

In short the report after audit summarized that in 1999; Europe had the capabilities to manage a small, high-intensity operation and any lower intensity conventional military operations. With regards to humanitarian aid and assistance, European forces could meet almost all the requirements. However, they are not capable of managing larger, complex and distant land operations.⁵⁷

The interpretation of WEU military staff to the audit results was that: Audit was a quantitative exercise and could not indicate whether forces were available, deployable and sustainable. Moreover, much of the traditional data included in the audit were superficial and unrealistic.⁵⁸

To be able to sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, the Headline Goal added to the ESDP. The aim is to strengthen European military forces so as to make them militarily self-sustaining, with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat-support services and air and naval elements.⁵⁹

When it comes to action, at the Cologne Summit it was agreed that action would be taken without prejudice to actions by NATO'; on the other hand that phrase changed at Helsinki as 'where NATO as a whole is not engaged'. By this new formula EU Member States created an area for themselves to act autonomously in their actions. U.S. and NATO support is wanted but not a prerequisite for EU operations if they use their own assets and not NATO's. For

⁵⁶ Hans -Christian Hagman (2002), *European Crisis Management and Defence: The Search for Capabilities*, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 353, Oxford University Press, p. 19

⁵⁷ Ibid. p. 20

⁵⁸ Ibid p.20

⁵⁹ The Headline Goal brought standards for European military forces such as:

- One year sustainability
- 60-Day Readiness: EU will be able to deploy up to 60.000 troops within 60 days from an EU Council order.
- Combat Intensity and Complexity: The forces will be capable of the full range of Petersberg Tasks.
- Self-Sustainability: The Headline Goal necessitates forces to be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics and other combat support services.

EU led operations using NATO assets and capabilities, Member States agreed at EU Summit in Nice that NATO will do operational planning.

In February 2002, EU Member States came together in the Capability Improvement Conference and agreed on a voluntary European Capability Action Plan (ECAP). The Plan includes effective organisation of the investment, development and coordination measures in order to improve existing resources and capabilities that are necessary for the EU's activities.

Another decision taken at Helsinki, although not directly linked to the Headline Goal, concerns a different side of conflict management that is non-military or civilian actions for crisis management and conflict prevention. EU has a comparative advantage and self-confidence in this area. At Helsinki Member States agreed that: "... a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States..."⁶⁰

Regarding this issue, an advanced step was taken at the EU Summit at Feira in June 2000. The EU determined four aspects of civilian crisis management, which are police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. The EU Member States committed themselves to the goal of providing up to 5000 police officers for international missions by 2003, with 100 available at 30 days' notice. Besides they accepted the Police Action Plan for this aim at the Gutenberg Summit in June 2001 that includes establishment of operational headquarters, development of a legal framework for police operations, training programs for police and measures for working together with military and civilian components of crisis management.

Regarding strengthening civil administration in third countries as another strategy of conflict management, to support the police force EU Member States agreed to create a pool of 200 officials that include judges, prosecutors as well as a pool of experts in civil administration. During actions emphasize was given to search and rescue, the constitution of refugee camps, logistical support and communication. In the area of rule of law the Union works on establishing a capacity to deploy judges, prosecutors and other legal and penal experts in the

⁶⁰ Presidency Conclusions, European Council, Helsinki, 10 and 11 December 1999.

third countries⁶¹ besides the EU supports local administrations in the areas such as the reconstruction of courts and prisons and the recruitment of local personnel in the legal and penal fields.⁶² Since the Plan, it seems as if the EU showed such a progress in civilian crisis management that the military elements of ESDP became second in the list.

During the EU Summit in Seville in June 2002, further steps had taken both for strengthening non-military aspects of the ESDP and the headline Goal. The scope of them were broadened so as to include instruments for long-term conflict prevention, political dialogue with third countries, non proliferation and arms control and providing assistance to third countries to be able to make them capable of defending themselves against terrorism. However, it is still arguable whether counter-terrorism should be included in CFSP since counter-terrorism may affect territorial issues and states' self defence. Likewise regarding arms control issue restriction on arms exports is thought as another issue that falls under the member states' exclusive competence. For this reason EU Institutions do not have any formal power to affect policies of EU members. However this fact was passed over after the Luxembourg 1991 and Lisbon 1992 European Council Meetings by adoption of non-binding common criteria those regulating arms exports to third countries.⁶³

For the finance of all these newly formed institutions and policies EU Member States agreed on the formula that is used in NATO: Troop-contributing nation will pay for operational expenditures while EU budget pays for institutional administrative costs. The debate about whether the EU should have a separate budget for common costs relating to crisis management operations still continue but as in all other cases regarding finance, officials think that it will take more time for Member States to decide on the issue.

⁶¹ European Parliament, "Instrumentds of Conflict Prevention and Civilian Crisis Management Available to the European Union" *Directorate General for Research-Directorate A STOA-Scientific and Technological Options Assessment* , Briefing Note No. 1/2001, PE nr. 296.707, March 2001, p.7

⁶² Study on Concrete Targets on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. Appendix 3 to Annex I. Presidency Conclusions, Santa Maria da Feira European Council, 19- 20 June 2000.

⁶³ *Bulletin of the European Communities* 6-1991, I.47 and 6-1992, I.28.

Regarding the administration of ESDP, Member States have formed new institutions to coordinate the process. These new institutions include: The post of Secretary General of the Council of European Union/High Representative (SG/HR) for CFSP; the Political and Security Committee to deal with all aspects of EU's foreign and security policy, including ESDP; the Committee for Civilian aspects of crisis management; the Military Committee and the military staff whose mission is to perform early warning assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg Tasks; a police unit in the Council Secretariat as a part of the Police Action Plan. Besides, SITCEN- Joint Situation Centre- was established as a part of intelligence and assessment cell.

In 2002, the EU tested its new ESDP processes, procedures and structures with a manoeuvre on crisis management including Brussels and all other EU Member States. The basic result of this manoeuvre was the need for stronger civil-military coordination. To be able to coordinate, operate and take advantage of all these institutions and policies the Union composed its strategies for long-term as well as direct (short-term) conflict management.

2.4. Strategies of Crisis Management in European Union

The main strategy of the EC/EU for conflict management is its own structure as a security community in which member states share similar values and without using force they solve their disputes with each other.⁶⁴ It constitutes the most comprehensive example for regional security. Knowing this fact the Union has been trying to improve its structure and policies towards conflict management issues in third countries.

During 1960s and 1970s Europe applied two basic strategies: Consultation with big North American ally and declaratory diplomacy. Besides these two, with 1980s, Europe began to use economic sanctions as a newly developing crisis management policy (e.g. Europe applied economic sanctions on the Soviet and Argentina). Economic sanction is still thought as an effective strategy against conflict. On the other hand it may not be affective in the short-

⁶⁴ Fraser Cameron, p. 3

run besides since it disturbs the market, both the EU and the U.S do not prefer using it frequently.⁶⁵

Crisis management understanding in EC/EU in 1990s is different from the previous decade on at least four dimensions: One, there is a wish to play an effective international role as well as a capacity to do so. Second dimension includes the implementation of the classic means for crisis management, which are: diplomatic, military and humanitarian means. Thirdly, in 1990s European States appreciated the importance of links between various means and the capacity they have (e.g. having economic power reinforces political power hence strengthen EU's hand in diplomatic arena). Fourth and the last dimension is the formation of military capabilities for crisis management and conflict resolution.

Although EU had been engaging in foreign policy activities before 1990s, it did not follow a conscious common overarching foreign policy that is obligatory for all Member States. Maybe the basic problem lying behind the EC/EU insufficiency in forming a common foreign policy for years was the difficulty of finding a title for it that puts EC/EU into a category valid in international relations: The EC/EU has never been a state or a political union of states. It still does not fit any category. According to some this fact makes the EU weak both against its Member States and against the third parties. Because of its structure the EU is unable to act consistently and uniformly in international politics since each Member State has its own interests and priorities. Hence, during crisis situations EU sometimes does not act and still at other times it acts too slowly. Under these conditions EU Member States have been discussing a set of clear guiding foreign policy objectives, priorities and strategies.

⁶⁵ In a 1998 extension of New Transatlantic Agenda (NTA) and Joint Action Plan of 1995, the European Union and the United States agreed on that:

“Economic sanctions should be used only when diplomatic and political options have failed or when a problem is so serious as to require more far-reaching action; they will make a maximum effort to ensure that economic sanctions are multilateral in order to receive wide international support and to ensure that the costs of sanctions on the imposing parties are distributed more evenly; whenever possible, sanctions should be taken by the UN Security Council; the objective of multilateral economic sanctions is to exert the greatest possible pressure on the target while avoiding unnecessary hardship and minimizing impact on other countries.”

European Union's strategies on conflict management are developed for three different phases of conflict management: Preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping and peace-building. The underlying philosophy of preventive diplomacy rests on the assumption that conflicts can be avoided if necessary steps can be taken in advance. For this reason the Union adopted a system called early warning. With this system the Union expects to understand possible crisis and prevent them before it enlarges. However, if it is too late to prevent a conflict then the strategies should be adopted for ending the conflict and building peace again such as sanctions, mediation or military intervention. Finally, peacekeeping strategy aims making peace situation long lasting. The Union has various strategies regarding peacekeeping such as strengthening civil administration, election assistance and monitoring, help development of the economy and social life by way of technical and humanitarian assistance programs (e.g. ECHO, PHARE, TACIS), create a consciousness about democratization etc. The Lisbon Report of 1992 implicitly mentions the tasks of peace building and peacemaking, with implications for peacekeeping and enforcement:

The Common Foreign and Security Policy should contribute to ensuring that the Union's external action is less reactive to events in the outside world, and more reactive in the pursuit of interests of the Union and in the creation of a more favourable international environment. This will enable the European Union to have an improved capacity to tackle problems at their roots in order to anticipate the outbreak of crisis. Furthermore, the Union will be able to make clearer to third countries its own aims and interests, and to match more closely those parties' expectations of the Union.⁶⁶

The Lisbon Report also states the conditions under which the European Union should take joint actions: "...the geographical proximity of a region or a country; an important interest in the political and economic stability of a region

⁶⁶ "Report to the European Council in Lisbon on the likely development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy with a view of identifying areas open to joint action vis-à-vis particular countries or groups of countries", Document no.92/257. Available from the European Foreign Policy Bulletin, online at <http://www.warc1.iue.it/iue/efpbll?nd=92%2f257>.

or country; [and/or] the existence of threats to the security interests of the Union".⁶⁷

In recent years, the confusion in the Balkans caused the EU give more weight to conflict prevention. That conflict was extremely important for the EC because of the proximity of the region to its borders. The Yugoslav crisis in early 1990s largely seen as the first EC failure in Balkans in terms of conflict prevention and containment⁶⁸: "The EC made a difficult situation worse, by first insisting on Yugoslavia's territorial integrity, at a time when this course played into Milosevic's hands, and then abruptly changing direction after the Slovenian and Croatian secessions and supporting them against Serbia, despite recommendations of the Badinter Commission⁶⁹ and the danger to Bosnia".⁷⁰ Since the failure in Yugoslavia, the EC/EU has been trying to develop its capabilities in this area. Regarding this, formation of an early warning system comes first.

Early warning is a problematic issue because it includes so many variables to be able to understand the interaction of a wide range of political, economic, military, environmental and social factors. Conflict indicators should be prepared and assessed regularly and their interaction and overall impact should be analysed. It is a complex issue and necessitates teamwork. Numerous actors should be included in different stages of early warning. There is a need for better cooperation between national foreign ministers, national intelligence services as well as international organizations, NGOs, think tanks, etc.

On the other hand, development of an effective early-warning system is not enough alone. Knowing a conflict before it happens is of little value unless it is linked to policy formulation, which results in timely and effective action. Kosovo

⁶⁷ Werner Bauwens and Luc Reyckler (1994) (eds.), *The Art of Conflict Prevention*, Brassey's Atlantic Commentaries No.7 (London: Brassey's) p.141

⁶⁸ Ibid. See p. 41 for the crisis in Former Yugoslavia.

⁶⁹ As violence spread in Croatia, the EC announced on 27 August 1991 that it was establishing a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia and an Arbitration Commission which is known as Badinter Commission.

⁷⁰ Hugh Miall, Oliver Romobotham and Tom Woodhouse (1999), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*, [Cambridge, UK: Polity Press and Blackwell Publishers Ltd.] p. 119

is the most obvious example of it: The failure to prevent crisis in Kosovo was not because of the absence of an early warning system but the absence of political will to take effective action.

Suppose an effective early warning is applicable still one should decide on the right time to take action. Action should come before a conflict occurs or even if it occurs, before it spreads. Since a conflict can spread vertically (becoming more violent) as well as horizontally (involving more actors, countries etc.). According to some, one of the causes of EC failure in Yugoslavia was its inability in the efforts to contain the conflict. Mostly because of Britain's opposition on sending military forces under WEU auspices, the Member States could not reach consensus. According to Bauwens and Reychler "The avoidance of the use of armed force under almost any circumstances weakened the influence of the European Community over the escalating crisis in Yugoslavia".⁷¹

During 1990s, gradually the EU accepted the importance of conflict prevention and took the issue seriously in 1997 by strengthening CFSP and creating the European Commission's Conflict Prevention Network (CPN) for EU.

There is a continuing need to develop ways in which conflict prevention is integrated into existing programs and policies and to overcome "timing" problem. One tool EU uses for conflict prevention is Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) program.⁷² It is a program to understand elements in the conflict in order to mitigate conflict and promote peace in a more systematic manner.

The main objectives of the program are: Increasing coherence and coordination between different actors and instruments; identifying the causes of conflict; assessing, monitoring and mitigating the potential negative consequence of variables causing conflict. CIA comprises of five steps:⁷³

⁷¹ Werner Bauwens and Luc Reychler, p.152

⁷² Fraser Cameron (2000, Available online:
<http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/Defense/FCSpeechConfPrev.htm>

⁷³ Ibid, p.6

1. Conflict Analysis: It includes assessment of a country's conflict risks, root causes of potential conflict at macro and micro levels. To get a balanced and proper picture, this kind of analysis is best done by a coordination of a wide range of interested parties.
2. Analysis on parties of conflict: its aim is to identify positions of the parties in conflict, their perceptions of each other and the situation.
3. Choosing objectives and instruments: The choice of right objectives and instruments in order to handle the conflict is important to achieve maximum cooperation between parties and a maximum coherence between different forms of intervention within a realistic time frame.
4. Risk management: This one includes the assessment of risk that an ongoing conflict poses in different stages and the risk that any intervention may cause.
5. Conflict indicators: Regular monitoring of conflict indicators may help for proper evaluation of situation as well as planning.

Such analyses are helpful also for peacekeeping strategies. However, most of the bureaucrats think that Europe is newly applying them and yet it is far away the high level coordination that is necessary to be able to make good use of these measures.

However, there are some good examples of inter-institutional cooperation in EU. One of them is the Pact on Stability suggested by French Prime Minister Eduard Ballador. In the beginning of 1990s, he thought that there might be some problematic issue regarding borders and minorities with the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries that could endanger Europe's stability. Hence, he suggested the idea of forming a pact with the aim of re-establishing stability and improving early warning. The Pact on Stability was adopted by EU as a joint action and negotiated with CEE countries. After signing, the Pact on Stability was transformed to OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).⁷⁴ OSCE is now responsible for the development of this project.

⁷⁴ The appearance of OSCE goes back to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1973. The CSCE was an open-ended series of conferences during the Cold War. CSCE has been replaced by OSCE in early 1990 with an aim to form an organization with the necessary expertise to tackle with all phases of conflict cycle- preventive diplomacy, crisis management and post conflict rehabilitation. In 1992, the then CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) –without including the military actions- declared that it could conduct peacekeeping operations. Regarding military enforcement actions it is decided that the UN should support the OSCE. Moreover, the UN and OSCE may choose to recourse to NATO and WEU to support them in such operations.

Besides, European Union tackles some of the activities of peacekeeping, peace building and conflict preventing in the framework of OSCE.

There is another EU strategy for conflict prevention, peacekeeping and peace building that deserves attention which is the “Europeanization”. Europeanization is a process that includes altering norms, procedures, governance, preferences, beliefs, social living styles etc. of a country in accordance with the EU’s. It is a long-run strategy aiming at minimizing differences so that removing reasons for conflict (e.g. for conflict prevention). Regarding peace building it is thought that in the long run Europeanization can alter conflicted parties’ perception towards conflict and hence may lead a settlement. However to be able to apply Europeanization strategy there are some necessary conditions. First of all in a conflict situation “the (potential) benefits of Europeanization have to be higher than the benefits of the status-quo for the dominant elites of both conflict entities”⁷⁵ That is the conflicted parties should be aware that they will gain more if they do not insist on preserving their current positions. However it is argued that the elites that decide policies of the country are usually short-term self- interested planners hence they do not think much about the long-term benefits of Europeanization.⁷⁶ Second condition tells that Europeanization should be attractive to both parties. For example in the Cypriot case if Greek side thinks in favour of Europeanization and on the other hand if Turkish side prefer Turkey’s support instead of European’s then Europeanization may not be effective for a settlement. However as a third condition if “Europeanization is attractive for the protector state”⁷⁷ which is Turkey in that case, then Turkish Cypriots may alter its opinion regarding Europeanization. Fourth condition is maybe the most important one among the others telling that benefits of Europeanization should be reliable and they should be received within a visible time period. This

⁷⁵ Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, 2003: “Costs, Commitment, and Compliance. The impact of EU Democratic Conditionality on Latvia, Slovakia and Turkey”, in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41:3, 495-517.

⁷⁶ Nicu Popescu, “Europeanization and conflict resolution: a view from Moldova” in *Europeanization and Conflict Resolution* (Russian Edition), Michael Emerson and Bruno Coppeters (eds.), 2005, <http://www.ecmi.de/jemie/download/l-2004Comment02.pdf>.

⁷⁷ Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, p. 495-517

condition is formalized as: “The longer the temporal distance until the payment of rewards, the lower the incentives for the actors involved in a conflict to change traditional patterns of behaviour.”⁷⁸ For example if the Union offers removing restrictions on trade and free circulation of Turkish Cypriots in the EU within a close date then this would make Turkish Cypriots especially the business elites and ordinary citizens to think it twice. The same condition is also relevant for Turkey. European Union mentions 2014 for Turkey’s “possible” accession to the Union. However changing political conditions in Europe such as elections in Germany in which it is predicted that Angela Merkel- an opponent of Turkey’s full-membership- will succeed German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, reduce chances of Turkey’s EU membership. If Turkey loses its expectations from the Union then under what incentives Turkey and Turkish Cypriots will search for a settlement on the Island.

There are also other conditions under which Europeanization may deepen the conflict between conflicted parties such as when integration through Europeanization is more costly than preserving status quo. In reference to Cyprus conflict if Europeanization cannot provide protection for the Turkish Cypriots then they may support status quo for not losing military protection of Turkey. Likewise if Turkish Cypriots lose their control over political decision making processes under Europeanization, again they may decide in favour of the status quo. On the other hand Europeanization may also cause some risks for the Greek Cypriots. If settlement is reached with some special privileges which are against the Europeanization strategies⁷⁹ of the Greek Cypriots, then the Greek side may also prefer status quo. This may happen for example on an issue like sharing sovereignty or any restriction on the rights of ownership, free movement etc.

European Union makes use of some mechanisms to apply Europeanization strategy. Among these mechanisms one of them called “conditionality” has been frequently mentioned by the Union in recent years. It is a kind of carrot-stick policy. The basic of conditionality depends on changing behaviour of the parties involved either by way of rewarding them or withholding

⁷⁸ Frank Schimmelfenning and Ulrich Sedelmeier (eds), 2005, *The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

⁷⁹ Frank Schimmelfenning, Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, p. 495-517

rewards.⁸⁰ Conditionality especially emphasizes protection of human rights and minority rights, the advancement of democratic principles, good governance including willingness to engage in regional cooperation. European Union applies conditionality on the programs such as PHARE, TACIS etc. Regarding its effects it is thought that “the higher the economic exchange between the EU and a target country, the more likely conditionality will be effective”.⁸¹

Lesson-drawing is thought as another mechanism of Europeanization. Lesson-drawing process is defined as “an instance when knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and so on at one time or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements and so on at another time or place.”⁸² In international relations states sometimes import policies by looking at the relevant examples. After Cyprus’s membership to the EU, for example, the Cyprus case became an example for other non-member states that has a conflict and willing to be a full-member of EU. Since those countries drawn lessons from Cyprus’s membership such that EU can and did accept a divided state and what matters more for Europe is not to use its power to affect parties’ decisions during negotiations but to change existing power structures and by this way search a settlement. Cyprus case has led a new discussion regarding Europeanization: what comes first- conflict resolution or Europeanization. Until Cyprus’ membership the common idea was that European Union would never approve membership of a divided country. However, in the Cyprus case it seems that the Union plans to reach a settlement in the long-run by applying Europeanization strategy on the conflicted parties and Turkey. Of course conditionality and lesson-drawing is not unique with regards to instruments of conflict management in European

⁸⁰ Jeffrey T. Checkel, (2000), *Compliance and Conditionality*, ARENA Working Papers WP 00/18, <http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp00.htm>, p. 18.

⁸¹ Frank Schimmelfenning, Frank Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel, (2002), *The Conditions of Conditionality: The Impact of the European Union on Democracy and Human Rights in European Non-Member States*, Paper Workshop 4, “Enlargement and European Governance”, ECPR Joint Session of Workshops, Turin 22-27 March 2002. <http://www.essex.ac.uk/ECRP/events/jointsession/paperarchive/turin/ws4/Schimmelfennig.pdf>, p.12

⁸² David Dolowitz and David Marsh, “Learning from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy Making”, *Governance* 13:1, 2000; quoted in Helen Brocklehurst, Noel Stoff, Brandon Hamber and Gillian Robinson, “Lessons Drawing from Negotiate Transitions in Northern Ireland and South Africa” paper presented at the 2000 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. <http://www.incore.ulst.ac.uk/publications/pdf/APSAHamberBran.pdf>, p.13

Union. Other than those above mentioned instruments, European Union has various equipments in his case for conflict management.

2.5. Instruments of EU for Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution

EU has various instruments to use in conflict management. They have been invented and developed throughout the time. However economy has always constituted as the motor force that enables the Union to apply its policies (e.g. technical assistance programs, economic sanctions etc.) and it is maybe the key behind the cooperation between the member states. For these reasons it is thought that economy is the main instrument of the Union

With regards to economic relations EC/EU has always had a significant role on world stage where it has the power to conduct the Common Commercial Policy and to conclude different kinds of agreements with individual countries, with group of countries or at a multilateral level. Besides, EC/EU has paid special attention for issues such as economic assistance, development cooperation and humanitarian aid. EU actively helps developing countries by way of special agreements such as the Lome Convention of which 70 countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (so called ACP countries) are signatures. Through the Convention, EU gives practically all industrial and agricultural goods from these countries duty-free access to the single market, without EU products having to be given the same treatment. Many other countries from different regions have also been granted preferential market access such as the countries in the Mediterranean and in Central and Eastern Europe, and a number of countries in Asia and Latin America.

Regarding humanitarian aid, EU is the world's largest donor of aid for refugees; emergency aid and food aid for victims of natural disasters and armed conflicts. EU has provided more than 60% of all humanitarian aid to the former Yugoslavia since the beginning of the war, and through ECHO-European Community Humanitarian Office- it is financing aid efforts in 60 other countries some of which include Rwanda, Liberia, Cambodia, Northern Iraq, Afghanistan, Haiti and Cuba.⁸³

⁸³ "How does the European Union Relate to the World?" Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, L-2985 Luxembourg.

Until 1990s these instruments satisfied the Member States in international arena to reach EU's aims however with the crisis faced in 1990s EU felt the necessity of new instruments in order to tackle with new situations. EU needed to strengthen its identity by reinforcing its capabilities to respond quickly and effectively to the events, if and when necessary, with the ability to use force. EU claim for force arise from its desire for peace and stability in parts of the World close to its own spheres of influence. Since any conflict that may occur in neighbourhood would affect EU's own stability and peace. Hence, in order to guarantee peace at home they should first clean their back garden. Besides it is logical that proximity is a factor that affects the success of policies meaning that it is easier to influence countries in the European continent than China for example.

The peaceful integration of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) has largely filled EU agenda with the end of Cold War. The way EU chooses to hinder any possible conflict in the region has been to inspire democracy and free market economy to its neighbours. Since the dramatic events of 1989, EU Member States have supported the reform programmes in CEEC, providing over 60% of all aid in terms of grant and credits. The EC/EU spending in the PHARE (Poland-Hungary Assistance for Recovering Economies), which was a program planned to realize economic recovery in Poland and Hungary but extended to all of the CEE countries in early 1990s, reached ECU 11 billion from 1990 to 1999. PHARE became the largest single source of assistance in the world for CEE states.⁸⁴ EU has paid a great effort for peaceful integration of these countries to the Union.

At the core of these efforts are the Europe Agreements. EU negotiated with each country for Europe Agreements in order to open up free trade, provide economic and technical assistance and establish closer political dialogue. Europe Agreements are backed up by the PHARE and Tacis Programs that finance technical assistance, infrastructure development, exchange of knowledge and expertise through partnerships, links and networks at all levels. Under the Tacis program, EU negotiated bilateral Partnership Cooperation Agreements also with the Russian and other republics of the former Soviet Union.

⁸⁴ Avery Graham and Fraser Cameron (1998), *The Enlargement of the European Union*, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, p. 18

However, special attention should be given to EU relations with its Mediterranean neighbours under the framework of Barcelona Process, for the sake of explaining EU efforts for conflict management in Cyprus. Since the Barcelona process- the Europe-Mediterranean partnership (EMP) for bringing peace, stability, shared prosperity and understanding in the region- includes also Cyprus.

2.5.1. Barcelona Process (EMP)

The Mediterranean is a strategic crossroad that meets East and West. In security terms the basic risk for Europe comes from its neighbouring regions in the South.⁸⁵ Territorial controversies exist in the Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Israel and the occupied territories, Lebanon, Syria, Greece and Turkey. For the time being Europe faces mainly three risks from these territories: The rise of radical Islamism, an interruption in oil and gas supplies and the rapidly growing demographic imbalances between the South and the North.

The rise of radical Islamism constitutes a real challenge for European security agenda. Europe tries to strengthen its security against the widespread terrorist activities of some Islamic groups. The bombing of Twin Towers on September 11, 2002 and the latest bombing in London in July 2005 once again attracted attention of the Member States' to this issue. It is certain that the Union cannot fight against terrorism inside its borders since the origin of terrorism goes over to different regions of the World and especially to the Middle East. What the EU can do best is to enhance cultural dialogue with other civilizations⁸⁶, pay more attention to conflict prevention⁸⁷, guarantee stability

⁸⁵ Carlos E. Jesus (1997), "European Security and the Mediterranean" in Wifred von Bredow, Thomas Jüger and Gerhard Kümmel (ed.), *European Security*, London: McMillan Press Ltd.,p.55

⁸⁶ Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the European Union, The President of the European Parliament, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 11 September 2002, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/110901/jnt_dec_09_02.htm

⁸⁷ Paragraph 7 of the Declaration on the Contribution of CFSP, Including ESDP, in the Fight against Terrorism, Annex V to the Seville European Council Presidency Conclusions (21-22 June 2002)

and peace and provide democratization and other necessities of the civilized world in the neighbourhood. Besides with Cyprus' membership, the Union's borders have already enlarged to the Mediterranean. Another fact about Europe is that Europe is heavily dependent on the energy supplies of the Middle East and North Africa regions. Thus the oil and gas pipelines not only affect the national security policies of the supplier but also the supplied as well as the transit states.

Other potential threat for Europe is growing population especially in the North Africa states. Today 2.5 million people from Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia live as foreign workers in Europe, mainly in France. Without any measures to change economic and demographic conditions in those countries, EU expects additional migration in near future. It is a soft security issue in European Union.

The Barcelona Process was thought as a result of such considerations. In Barcelona, on 27-28 November 1995, the governments of 27 countries, the Council of Europe and the European Commissions established the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), which is called Barcelona Process, and adopted the Barcelona Declaration.⁸⁸

With EMP, Member States intended to give their future relations a new dimension, based on comprehensive cooperation and solidarity. Their objective was to create a Euro-Mediterranean Area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation that guarantee peace, stability and prosperity through strengthening of democracy, respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, taking necessary measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures.

The adopted Barcelona Declaration outlined three aspects of EMP as political and security partnership, economic and financial cooperation and partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. For the political and security partnership, it is written in the Barcelona Declaration that: The participants express their conviction that peace, stability and security of the Mediterranean

⁸⁸ The 27 Partnership Countries are: The 15 EU Countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK) and the 12 Mediterranean partners situated in Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia) and Mashrek (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority (PA), Lebanon, Syria) and finally Turkey, Cyprus and Malta. Libya currently has observer status at certain meetings. In the "Barcelona III", Stuttgart Conference in Barcelona on 15-16 April 1999, it is decided that Libya could in time become a further partner in the Barcelona Process following the lifting of UN Security Council Sanctions against it and once it accepted the full terms of the Barcelona Declaration and the related actions.

region are common asset that pledge to promote and strengthen by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political dialogue at regular intervals based on observance of essential principles of international law and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external stability.

Senior officials who are responsible for this chapter have coordinated several discussions until now. During these discussions they focused on issues such as peace-building measures, human rights issues conflict prevention and the work programme of the Euro-Mediterranean network of foreign policy institutes.⁸⁹

With reference to political and security partnership of the Barcelona Process, partners agree to work together to reduce military security threats as well as non-military security threats such as illegal immigration, transnational crime and terrorism. They agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law. Believing that rule of law and democracy in political systems can create free and flourishing civil societies who can resolve disputes peacefully, the Declaration emphasized the strengthening of democracies in the region (e.g. Europeanization strategy). Etel Solinger describes the basic reason lying behind the desire for democracy:

In the European experience, stable and mature democracies are considered to be better suited to deal with ethnic and religious fragmentation than non-democracies...In this view, only democracy can be expected to guarantee human rights and personal freedoms. 'Good governance' cannot emanate from regimes that are not accountable.⁹⁰

Partner countries should secure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and

⁸⁹ Euro-Mediterranean Network of foreign policy institutes set up in 1996 under the name of EuroMeSCo- Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission. It now includes more than 37 foreign policy institutes located in partner countries. EuroMeSCo network adopted its work programme for 2001-03 with the objective of concentrating on five areas: Political & Security dialogue in the Euro-Med partnership; interlinkages within the partnership; implications of the common foreign and security policy for the partnership; subregional cooperation and governance issue. For more information, the relevant link is: <http://www.euromesco.net/>

⁹⁰ Etel Solingen, "Constructing a Mediterranean Region: Cultural and Functional Perspectives" Available [on line] : <http://www.igcc.ucsd.edu/publications/conference/papers/cmr.solingen.html> [20 July 2000]

combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. The governments should respect the equal rights of people and their right of self-determination.

Another principle partners took under Barcelona Declaration was to settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law.

In order to prevent military security threats, partners would act in favour of chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, arms control and disarmament agreement such as NPT, CWC etc.

The second goal of EMP is the creation of an area of shared prosperity. Their long-term objectives for economic and financial partnership include socio-economic development; improvement of the living conditions of their population; increase in employment level and reduction in the development gap in Euro-Mediterranean region; encouragement of regional cooperation and integration. To achieve these objectives, parties agreed to establish a partnership based on the progressive establishment of a free trade area by the year 2010; the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action and a substantial increase in EU's financial assistance for economic transition in partner countries. EMP's economic and financial partnership also includes debt relief besides financial assistance.

Regarding partnership in social, cultural and human affairs, Barcelona Declaration states the objective as: "...The participants recognise that the traditions of culture and civilisation throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them, and improving their perception of each other..."

Their objective under this partnership is to increase mutual understanding by way of exchanges. To this end they committed themselves to act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms.

The partners stress the essential nature of development of human resources both as regards to education and training of young people. They express their intention to promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respecting the cultural identity of each partner and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes. They decided to provide closer cooperation in the area of illegal immigration. Such decisions have also been taken regarding the issues like preventing terrorism, fight against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption.

Barcelona Process may be classified among the few examples of EU long-term conflict management policies. With the EMP, EU is trying to foster peace through cooperation and integration on all areas (e.g. economic, social, cultural, security etc.) in the Euro- Mediterranean region. Another importance of EMP is that it may be seen as a clue of Europe's intention regarding its foreign and security policy about behaving independently from America. Barcelona Process is completely a European project. The role of U.S. in EMP has been as an interested observer. However, U.S.'s alienation from the process is not only a result of EU desires: U.S. did not want to integrate itself into the process. The main reason is the divergence between the policies of U.S. and its European allies regarding Mediterranean security. George Joffe, a British analyst, describes the divergence as follows:

It is also increasingly clear that European and American interests in the region are diverging. For Europe, the Middle East crisis is part of its own diplomatic periphery. For the United States, the Middle East is- despite congressional obsession and public concern over Iraq and Iran- now a strategic backwater in which only the question of Israel stability retains official attention.⁹¹

According to Joffe, America being a global superpower has strategic interests all over the world. The level of its commitment in different regions as well as within a region changes time-to-time depending on its interests. On the other hand for EU, Mediterranean is a kind of border that it must provide peace and stability for its own sake all the time. According to Stephan Calleya:

⁹¹ George Joffe " The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Two Years After Barcelona" Available [online]: http://www.riia.org/briefing_papers/bp414.html [20 July 2002]

During the first ten years of the new millennium, the U.S. will shift its foreign policy concerns in the region further east, focusing on the management of relations in the Mashreq and the Persian Gulf. The rest of the Mediterranean will become an EU sphere of influence once a common foreign and security policy is introduced.⁹²

However, for the time being the U.S. has not abandoned the Mediterranean to the EU. Although sometimes they differ in their approach, taking into consideration the big picture EU-American interests go hand in hand regarding conflict management and security issues. Cyprus is also one of the issues that they think in common most of the time and cooperate in international organizations such as the United Nations.

Although the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process is thought as a long-term project, it did not caused a big difference for the peace in Mediterranean region until now. For example EMP was ineffective in ceasing divergences between the policies of Turkey and Greece regarding the Aegean or Cyprus. The process did not caused closer relations between the people of partner countries. Many of them do not even know that their countries participate in such a process. The ineffectiveness of EMP may be thought as an indicator for those who suggest that the Cyprus conflict can be solved in an international arena- such as the EU-, which includes Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and other international actors. Still the European Union accepted Cyprus' membership without waiting for a solution on the Island and now they are trying to decide how to handle this problematic island within the EU framework. The only logical way seems to be reaching a settlement in Cyprus as soon as possible. What will be the EU's role in this peace process is the point that should be examined.

⁹² Stephen Calleya (1999), "Regional Security Challenges in the Mediterranean ", in Stephen J. Blank ed., *Mediterranean Security into the Coming Millennium*, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic-studies institute) p.108

CHAPTER 3

CAPACITIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE CASE OF CYPRUS

3.1. Introduction

Located in the Eastern Mediterranean, Cyprus is an important strategic area with its proximity to the Middle East, North Africa, Turkey and Greece. It constitutes a bridge in the sea between three continents-Asia, Africa and the Europe. Just like many other strategic fields in the world; throughout the history Cyprus has been central to conflicts between East and West. It was conquered too many times by different nations including the Ottomans and Britain who were the rulers of the island in recent history. However, although it changed hands many times, it is only comparatively recently that the problems that form the Cyprus conflict have emerged on the island.

Cyprus conflict includes a variety of problems some of which have bothered international system for centuries. Because of this it is called a “microcosm of the problems”⁹³ and thus provides a perfect case for conflict management activities. The problems in Cyprus range from regional and international security, sovereignty, identity, recognition, statehood and secession to human and minority rights, territory and political rights and ethnicity.

Some people like to examine Cyprus’ history by dividing it into three main phases: The time period until 1960, from 1960 to 1974 and from 1974 to the present time.⁹⁴ Until 1960 Cyprus was one of the colonies of the United Kingdom hence the problems in the island during this time was considered basically as colonial issues which was settled with the granting of independence and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. From 1960 to

⁹³ Oliver P. Richmond (1998), *Mediation in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*, Frank Cass: London, p.xii

⁹⁴ Joseph S. Joseph (1997), *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, p. 14

1974, there was an internal dispute between the two main population groups on the island -namely Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots- in which external powers were involved such as the two motherlands (Greece and Turkey) and the United Kingdom who were the guarantor powers according to the 1960 settlement. However after 1974 the conflict has turned into an international one with too many actors most of whom prefer to stay behind the scenes lacking the intention of contributing the conflict resolution process.

Actually in the beginning, the main aim of the international fora was not solving the Cyprus conflict but rather finding a solution to the possible effects of it in the region. In other words international interest was directed at preventing the Cyprus problem from spreading to Greece and Turkey and thus ruining the cooperation in NATO in the middle of the Cold War. Since the effort was on preventing war and not promoting peace, the interests of the two conflicting communities became subservient.

Since the end of Cold War, Cyprus is the only divided country remaining in Europe. For many years Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been searching ways to handle their problems so as to reach a lasting settlement. Intercommunal negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations have always ended with a deadlock. In the last few year negotiators have tried every possible way to push the conflicted parties to a common base for at least basic issues. They have proposed financial inducement, structures for long term economic growth, plans for building confidence, maps with alternative divisions of territory and also packages that include suggestions for almost all problematic issues all of which have failed.

However, recently people are more optimistic about reaching a settlement then ever. What has changed is the joining of a new player, who has the power to destroy and rebuild the power balances in the Cyprus conflict. Originally this new player, which is the European Union, is a well known character for the parties however until recently the EU had preferred not to intervene in Cyprus problem. Except oral and written declarations and resolutions, the Community had never played an important role in the conflict. The Cyprus' membership in the European Union and the European Commission's decision at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 to approve Turkey's candidacy for membership raised new expectations for the settlement. It is believed that the EU catalyst can serve some real incentives to the all concerned parties in the conflict to reach a compromise.

Until now not everything happened as expected. Although Cyprus became a permanent member of the European Union, the problems remain on island. European Union is just at the very beginning of a tough struggle, which it must come off.

3.2. The Recent History of Cyprus Conflict: 1960- 2005

In 1878 Cyprus' administration was ceded to the United Kingdom, while it still remained under Ottoman sovereignty.⁹⁵ At those times the famous British policy applied at its colonies was known as "divide at impera" that is divide and rule. Although Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have never in the history of the island shared close relationships, still they had been living side by side until the administration of the island passed over to the U.K. The rooted problems between the two communities on the island began during British administration with the Lord Kimberley's decision in 1923 about ethnical segregation of the island's schools. According to this, teachers would be supplied by the two mainlands. The consequences of this decision were fatal: It fostered a conflicting patriotism between Greek and Turkish Cypriots toward their mother countries- as expected- thus emphasizing an emerging trend towards ethnic segregation.⁹⁶

At first there was not any dispute between the Greeks and Turks in Cyprus. Then, the enemy was Britain. After the Second World War, the Conservative Government that ruled Britain at that time saw Cyprus as more than ever important strategically for the defence of its substantial Middle Eastern interests.⁹⁷ Hence they resisted self-determination as well as *enosis* (union with Greece). Against British policies on the island the Greek Cypriots formed EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters) in 1955 and started a

⁹⁵ With the outbreak of the First World War, Cyprus was annexed by Great Britain. In 1923 Cyprus was officially annexed by Britain after the signing of the Treaty of Peace at Lousanne.

⁹⁶ Sir George Hill (1952), *History of Cyprus*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Vol. IV, p. 496.

⁹⁷ Clement H. Dodd (1999) (eds.), *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives*, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press, p. 8.

campaign of violence against the British on Cyprus.⁹⁸ The aim of EOKA was to end British administration on the island and then unite the island with the motherland Greece.⁹⁹ According to the EOKA, Cyprus has been historically a part of the Hellen Kingdom -hence the Greece - although Greece has never in history possessed the island.

Turkish Cypriots had become seriously worried about the threat of *enosis* as early as in the 1930s. In the second half of 1940s Turkish Cypriots decided to take some serious measures to counter the threat. They had formed the National Unity Party as well as a Turkish Resistance Organization under the name of VOLKAN, which turned into Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı (TMT) after a while.

From 1955 to 1958 EOKA targeted British military as well as civilians and it was targeted in return. During this time the colonial rulers suggested a series of plans to Greek Cypriots that include measures for a gradual development of a limited autonomy. However that did not satisfy the Greek Cypriots. Anxious from the developments in Cyprus, Turkey made several calls in 1955 for Cyprus to be returned to Turkish rule if the British decided to leave.

Maybe because of the consequences of EOKA activities or the changing policies of Britain with its reduced role as a European regional power, in the late 1950s, Britain had come to accept that it needed a base in Cyprus and not Cyprus as a base. Actually, for years the British used two communities on the island in the framework of their “divide et impera” imperial policy to maintain their control over the island while they only needed two Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) in Cyprus- Akrotiri and Dhekelia.¹⁰⁰ Ironically, there may never been a Cyprus conflict, had the British recognized this at the beginning.

Finally in 1957, after a statement made by Averoff, the Foreign Minister of Greece, regarding the fact that independence may well be an acceptable solution for the Cyprus problem, the new British Prime Minister Macmillian

⁹⁸ EOKA was led by General Grivas, who was a Greek Cypriot in the Greek Army.

⁹⁹ According to Reddaway: “The real adversary standing in the way of enosis was not imperial Britain but the geopolitical realities of the island's position in the Eastern Mediterranean”
J. Reddaway (1986), *Burdened with Cyprus*, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p.14.

¹⁰⁰ Glen D. CAMP, *Policy Implications of the East Mediterranean Security Situation*, Cyprus Review, spring 2002, A3.A4, Volume 14, Number 1, p. 33.

decided to allow the island to become independent with two British sovereign basis retaining on the island.

The Turkish Cypriots, totally excluded from the developments, began to voice the slogan TAKSİM (partition or double-enosis) in response to the idea of *enosis* and they used TMT against the activities of EOKA.¹⁰¹ Neither TMT nor EOKA succeeded in realizing the contradictory ideas of *taksim* or *enosis* but they created and deepened the conflict between Greeks and Turks across the region and set up a chain of events that led to the events of 1974.

In 1955 the UN General Assembly decided to call upon a tripartite conference with the participation of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. It was thought that the only way to find a solution to the Cyprus problem is through the process of negotiations. In 1959 Initial Agreement was adopted in Zurich on 11th February and a few days later parties met in London to sign it officially. With Zurich and London Agreements both union (*enosis*) and dichotomy (*taksim*) were outlawed.

Zurich and London Agreements were based on the political equality and administrative partnership of the two communities on the island who were given full autonomy in communal affairs. There were separate municipalities and rights of veto on tax laws. Britain retained an area of 99 square miles for its military bases and access to military installations in the new Republic. The settlement was ensured by the Treaty of Guarantee by way of which the three guarantor powers- Turkey, Greece and Britain- undertake the obligation to safeguard the integrity and independence of Cyprus as well as to prevent the unification of the island with any country or the secession of any part of the island. If the treaty were violated then the three countries would come to an agreement in order to take collective action. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Treaty added that for some cases in which common action cannot be achieved, unilateral action would be reserved to each of the three guarantors so as to restore constitutional order and integrity of the republic. The new constitution was highly complex but it was including all necessary safeguards for Turkish

¹⁰¹ TAKSİM is the popular idea of the Turkish people that the island should be divided between Greece and Turkey.

Cypriots. Hence it was welcomed by the Turkish Cypriots however the Greek Cypriots saw it as “capitulation” dictated by outside powers.¹⁰²

On 15 August 1960, Cyprus became independent. Soon it was understood that the new constitution did not solve the roots of the earlier conflict in 1950s. Although the new constitution did fulfil the important function of providing security, it did not have any machinery for mediation and resolution of internal disputes. Most importantly it did not deal with the identity problem of the Cypriots.¹⁰³ Only one month after the independence declaration, the new President of the Republic -Makarios- showed still remaining understanding of hostility between two communities by stating publicly that some of the negative aspects of the Zurich Agreement for the Greek Cypriots must be resolved.¹⁰⁴ This thought of Makarios was not new, actually it was then understood that under the leadership of Makarios, the Greek Cypriots against the idea of sharing political rights with the Turkish Cypriots had already formed an organization called AKRITAS in 1959 and shaped a plan with the same name so as to realize the old dream of *enosis*. These attempts of the Greek Cypriots became clear on 30 November 1963 when Makarios proposed the amendment of some fundamental provisions of the Constitution among which was the Turkish Cypriot right of veto. The thirteen amendments that Makarios suggested to change in the Constitution were serving an aim to make the Turkish Cypriots nothing more than a minority by way of taking their political rights back which were given them by Zurich Agreements. The Turkish Cypriot community reacted this by withdrawing from the bi-communal government causing a prolonged constitutional anomaly that is still going on. The Turkish Cypriot community justified this withdrawal on the ground that the proposed amendments intended to realize *enosis*.

After one month of the amendment proposal of the Makarios, the fighting began between the Greek and Turkish communities first in Nicosia. Turkey

¹⁰² James A. Stegenga (1968), *The United Nations Force in Cyprus*, Ohio State University, p.26.

¹⁰³ As Denktash wrote: “There is not, and there never has been a Cypriot nation. That may be the misfortune of Cyprus and indeed the root of its problem.” R.R. Denktaş (1988), *The Cyprus Triangle*, London/Boston: Allen and Unwin; Nicosia: Rüstem, these are the opening words of the book.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.* p.27.

stated that it would intervene under the terms of the Treaty if the fighting continued. However Turkey's response did not exceed non-violent military acts: Turkish armed forces were put on alert, Turkish fleet left the Istanbul area for the Eastern Mediterranean and the aircraft flew over Nicosia.

On the other hand the Greek response was an announcement that, if Turkey intervened in Cyprus, Greece would do likewise. On 15 January 1964 a conference was held in London on the Cyprus issue. In the conference Britain proposed forming a peace force in Cyprus. It was agreed by the parties. In February the UN Security adopted a resolution¹⁰⁵ and a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) was formed in the same month. The entry of UN in the Cyprus conflict as a mediator in 1964 caused the dispute's internationalisation through the UN forum. Furthermore, the Security Council Resolution that established UNFICYP provided the (Greek) Cypriot government with legitimacy and therefore international recognition through its reference to the "Government of Cyprus". This act of the Security Council constituted one of the bridge stones of the conflict. The reasons behind the Security Council act were first the Security Council needed a responsible party to deal with in order to stop the bloodshed, second it was under the pressures of the United Kingdom and the United States who wanted to prevent a wider escalation of the conflict.¹⁰⁶ However with this resolution the Turkish Cypriots were denied in international arena and their rights for expressing themselves in international arena was taken. Hence the resolution strengthened the position of the Greek Cypriots over the Turkish Cypriots. The UN negotiation process led a deadlock and caused a tendency for the conflicting parties to look for allies to support them. Turkey was the obvious choice for the Turkish Cypriots to strengthen their position as being the weaker disputant. From this point of view it may be claimed that the Resolution 186 started a chain of events that would lead to the Turkish intervention in 1974.

The events that led to the Turkish intervention were triggered by a military coup that was engineered in Nicosia by officers from Nicosia against the President Makarios. Makarios escaped to London, and Nikos Sampson- an ex-

¹⁰⁵ The Security Council Resolution 186.

¹⁰⁶ Oliver P. Richmond (1998), *Mediation in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*, Frank Cass: London, p. xx

EOKA soldier- was installed as President. On 20 July, Turkey invaded Cyprus and divided the island across an east-west coast by extending their control to some 37% of the island. The superiority of the Turkish forces and the distance between Greece and Cyprus prevented a Greek counterattack.

In February 1975, a Turkish Cypriot Federated State was proclaimed. The following action was taken in November 1983: The Turkish Federated State of Cyprus declared itself to be the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until now Turkey has been the only country that recognized the TRNC.¹⁰⁷ The most recent development regarding the Island is the Cyprus's membership which is officially recognized on 1 May 2005. However without a settlement only the Greek Cypriots enjoy the membership status and both Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots pursue some kind of a wait and see policy - waiting for the next move of the Union.

3.3. Looking Back to EC/EU- Cyprus Relations: From Association Agreement to Membership

Until 1960- the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus- Cyprus was a part of the British Empire and hence she enjoyed preferential treatment within the Commonwealth. Therefore Cyprus did not feel the necessity to search for alternative organizations. Moreover then there was the European Economic Community, which was a newly founded and unknown organization yet¹⁰⁸. Besides, at that time the majority of the Cypriot people that is the Greek Cypriots were more interested in joining Greece than anywhere else.

The main reason behind Cyprus' interest in the community was the U.K. application to the EEC for membership. Because of the fact that as a member of the Commonwealth, Cyprus' goods were heavily exported to British

¹⁰⁷ The UN Security Council Resolution 541 hindered the attempts of some countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh to recognize the newly founded TRNC by stating that: "This declaration is incompatible with the 1960 Treaty concerning the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and 1960 Treaty of Guarantee....Therefore that the attempt to create a "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" is invalid, and will contribute to a worsening of the situation in Cyprus."

¹⁰⁸ Remember that signed in March 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty together with the Treaty that formed the Atomic Energy Community entered into force on 1 January 1958.

market.¹⁰⁹ If Britain were to join the Community, Cyprus would lose preferential trade tariffs, which mean a big gap in the island's trade balances. However, mostly because of France's opposition Britain's application was rejected and without Britain in the Community Cyprus lost its interest since the time the Community started accession negotiations with the United Kingdom.

After preliminary talks, negotiations began in 1971 and on December 1972 the Association Agreement between the EEC and Cyprus was signed. It entered into force on 1 June 1973. There are different reasons for the Cyprus' joining of an Association Agreement with the EEC. These reasons are both economic, as it is told before, and political. The political expectations of Cyprus from the Agreement were the acceptance of Cyprus' European character and confirmation of its international recognition. From the perspective of the Community the economic reasons were secondary when compared to political reasons since Cyprus' market was too small for its exports. However, politically this Agreement would serve economic development of the island and hence the political stability. Political stability has been the key word in European policy for Cyprus due to its strategic position at the crossroad of three continents and the proximity of the island to the Middle East.

In comparison with the association agreement that the EEC concluded with Greece, Turkey and Malta (which had respectively been signed in 1961, 1963 and 1970), the EEC-Cyprus agreement was highly modest including exclusively issues related with trade. Other imported subjects such as free movement rights were not included in the agreement. Likewise, there was not any reference about a possible accession of Cyprus to the Community in the future. The importance of the agreement was that it was explaining the conditions for Cyprus to pass the second stage.¹¹⁰ It is thought that Cyprus needed a 10-years time period for adaptation of its customs and other restrictions on trade so as to realize a Customs Union with the EEC. This 10-years period was divided into two stages. The first stage would be completed by June 1977 and the second by 1982. However, the unexpected events of 1974 and its consequences on the economy led to a delay in the implementation of the second stage. A

¹⁰⁹ At the beginning of the 1970s that country still absorbed 40% of the total exports of the Republic of Cyprus. The figure is more dramatic for agricultural goods: More than 60% of Cyprus' total exports were directed to Britain.

¹¹⁰ It defines the rules for adaptation of Common Customs Tariff and some of the Community policies in the field of competition, taxation, state aid etc.

protocol for the late implementation of the second stage was signed in 1987 laying down the terms for the gradual establishment of the Customs Union.

In order to make the implementation easier for Cyprus the Community decided to make funds available for infrastructure projects in the island. In 1977 first Financial Protocol was signed, which provided ECU 30 Million covered the years 1979-1983. Although the Member States at those times insisted that whole population of the island should benefit from the association, the political situation (its partition) hindered this. On the other hand in 1983 second Financial Protocol was signed. While the Council repeated its view that the association should benefit whole population, this time they added that only Government of the Greek Cypriots could decide whom to benefit from this fund. Hence the authorities of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus were denied any legitimacy.

Signing of the 1987 Customs Union Agreement led close relations between Cyprus and the EC. Thus the EC encouraged the Greek Cypriot Government to apply for full membership. Like other applicant countries, a number of factors influenced the Greek Cypriot Government while taking the decision for membership application. Beyond economic advantages, the EC membership could serve Government of Cyprus' interests in solving Cyprus conflict: By this way the EC could be forced to play an active role in the intercommunal talks and Greece being the member of EC and Turkey not, the Greek Cypriot Government could strengthen its hand in the bargaining.

In spite of the strong opposition of the northern part, the council reacted favourably to the accession request. Since the EC had already accepted the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot Government. Moreover, at those times the only condition for membership was the geographical situation and Cyprus was meeting that condition being a "European" state. Thus there existed no ground for rejection.

In 1993, after three years from the Cyprus' application for membership, the European Commission issued its opinion on Cyprus' application. There were three main messages in this opinion: First, it confirms the eligibility of Cyprus for membership in the light of the developments regarding the progress towards customs union and the ability to comply with the *acquis communautaire*. Second it mentions about the connection between Cyprus conflict and the membership. However, third message includes a paragraph saying that this link

between the conflict and membership will be re-evaluated in the view of absence of progress in intercommunal talks.

According to the 1993 Opinion, a “peaceful, balanced and lasting” settlement was still a prerequisite for Cyprus’s membership. Because, then the EC was thinking that a divided Cyprus could not participate normally in the decision-making process and moreover it could not apply the Community law throughout the island. Maybe more important than these managerial concerns, another reason behind the Commission’s opinion was Turkey’s standing in the conflict: They did not want to irritate a country of strategic, political and economic importance to the Community.

Still, the Commission left an exit for the Greek Cypriot Government by adding the paragraph, which says the Commission will re-examine the situation in the view of the position adopted by each party in intercommunal talks in 1995. This statement of the Community has a historical importance since for the first time the Community envisaged the possibility of a failure of the intercommunal talks and added an alternative to the accession issue by accepting to reconsider it independent of the Cyprus conflict.

In 24-25 June 1994, the Corfu European Council at which Cyprus-EU relations were examined, the twelve rewarded Cyprus for the “significant progress” on the accession road by stating that the next phase of enlargement will include Cyprus also.

The Essen Summit of 9-10 December 1994 did not introduce a difference in the Community’s position. Besides, it is told that the Council would examine new reports to be presented by the Commission in early 1995. However, the same reference to the year 1995 had already been given in the Commission Opinion of 1993. In spite of the pressures of the Greek Cypriot Government, the Twelve abstain from fixing a date for the opening of accession negotiations. However, the date was decided almost automatically when Turkey decided to establish customs union with EC.

Turkey was negotiating for a customs union and some member countries were against this customs union reasoning the human rights situations and Kurdish and Cyprus questions. Greece was one of those countries accusing Turkey for the absence of progress in the settlement of the Cyprus problem. Hence it wanted a guarantee of Cyprus’ accession to the Community before a customs union with Turkey. In some way Turkey and the Community came to an agreement as a result of which Greece refrained from using its veto power

for a customs union with Turkey. Following, in the European Council meeting at Cannes in June 1995, it was decided that the negotiations for the accession with Cyprus would begin 6 months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) taking into account the outcome of that conference.

The accession negotiations had been carried out successfully and led to Cypriot administration's membership to the European Union. As of 1 May 2004, the Greek Cypriot Government is among the ten new members of the EU. Until May, all the initiatives for a settlement were collapsed. The last trial was done in April, which was ended with a referendum for the approval of the Annan Plan for settlement.¹¹¹ Unfortunately, once again the chance for a united Cyprus in the European Union was lost and Cyprus joined the Union without any chance in the status quo. The situation was summarized by the world press as: "An historic attempt to reunify Cyprus torpedoed when the island's majority Greek Cypriot population overwhelmingly rejected a United Nations peace plan. Diplomats said...that Cyprus would enter the EU on 1 May as a partitioned nation. The EU's eastern border will now end in the infamous 'dead zone'.¹¹²

3.4. Different Perspectives of the Two Communities as the Main Reason behind the Dissolution

The two communities on the island have been negotiating for more than 4 decades. Unfortunately, passing time not only changed the standing of the two communities in the international arena (e.g. foundation of the TRNC) but also removed them far away from a settlement.

The disagreement between the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots includes the framework of the political settlement: Although as early 1970s two communities have agreed in principle that the future political settlement would be a bi-communal, bizonal federal republic, they have different perspectives regarding this pre-agreed federation. Being the majority on the island the Greek Cypriots think that the future federation should be the legal continuity of

¹¹¹ The referendum results showed that on the one hand in the North 64.91 percent of Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' and 35.09 voted 'no'. On the other hand, 75.83 percent of Greek Cypriots voted 'no' and only 24.17 percent voted 'yes' for the Annan Plan.

¹¹² *The Observer*, 25.04.2004.

the present Republic of Cyprus. Since the Greek Cypriot government is the only recognized administration on the island, the Greek Cypriots do not want to lose this biggest trump in their hand. On the other hand, this devotion of the Greeks Cypriots' to their republic leads the Turkish Cypriots suspect that the federation is not a real target for the Greek community but only a means to realize the physical reunion of the island.

On the other hand according to some, since 1983 the Turkish Cypriot side has been joining to negotiations with carrying with them (or dragging behind them) the Turkish Republic of Cyprus.¹¹³ The problem of recognition covers the whole of the Turkish Cypriot agenda during negotiations. Especially for the next few years formal recognition of the TRNC was always put on the table as a priority for moving forward in negotiations. The Turkish side defends their case such that since the federation necessitates two distinct states, the recognition of TRNC will be an indicator for the seriousness in the federation as a principle of the possible settlement.

Especially during 1990s the Turkish side insisted strongly on the recognition issue and wanted Greek Cypriot leader Clerides to tell under which title he joins negotiation meetings. According to Turkish Cypriots if Clerides defines himself as the legitimate representative of both the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots then there would be no ground to join any formal negotiation process for Denktaş since Denktaş would not have any formal status as negotiator. On the other hand if Clerides tells that he only represents the Greek Cypriots then he would accept the official representative status of Denktaş as the representative of the Turkish Cypriots and the leading outcome would be that the Republic of Cyprus has no right to act on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot since it has no right to represent them. Finally what arises would be the fact that negotiation process would imply recognition of the head of TRNC and hence the TRNC itself would be automatically recognised.

Clerides responded these questions telling that had he represented both communities he would not need to negotiate with Denktaş, rather he attracted attention to the fact that negotiations are taking place at community level as a result the representatives joining negotiations are nothing more than the political representatives of two ethnic communities.

¹¹³ Harry Anastasiou (2000), "Negotiating the Solution to the Cyprus Problem: From Impasse to Post-Helsinki Hope" *The Cyprus Review*, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2000, p.14

The political irony these political manoeuvres exposed is that on the one hand although the Greek Cypriots always insisted that the Cyprus problem is an international issue, when it comes to negotiations they prefer to approach the issue as strictly and purely intercommunal. On the other hand, the Turkish Cypriots always interpreted the issue as originally intercommunal; in negotiations they try to handle the problem as international or better inter-state in nature.¹¹⁴

The meaning of the future federated state is totally different for the two communities. Greek Cypriots desire a tight federation- a strong federal government and weak federal states having some legal powers maybe. Sovereignty should belong to the federated state. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots want a loose federated state and sovereignty should belong to both states. Actually what they want is a separate and homogenously Turkish Cypriot populated territory in which they can form a strong autonomous administration.¹¹⁵

A just constitution, for the Greeks, should confirm in a certain measure the power of majority; for the Turkish Cypriots the constitution should confirm the equality of the two communities.

Regarding equality, there are also different perspectives that reflect the strict thoughts of the two communities that hinder any search of a common way for a settlement: The Greek Cypriots think that equality does not mean equal numerical participation in the government. Since, it is not possible on an island like Cyprus that has a population structure of 80/20. Equality implies equal representation in the negotiating process and in some areas of the decision making power. The Turkish side, on the other hand, thinks just the opposite: Equality means complete equality with the Greek Cypriots in participation in whole areas of the administration and identical powers.

When it comes to settlement, the two communities have different emphasis such that the Greek Cypriot emphasis is on basic freedoms- freedom of movement, settlement and property. On the other hand the basic emphasis of the Turkish side is on security and they believe that security necessitates limitation of some freedoms such as settlement and property.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, p. 19-21.

¹¹⁵ Ahmet Sözen (1998), *The Cyprus Conflict and the Negotiations: A Political and International Law Perspective*, Ankara: Can Reklam, p. 38.

Security is not the concern of only the Turkish side, the Greeks also do not feel them totally secure because of the existence of Turkish military force on the island. The terrible thought of a Turkish expansion is another reason behind their desire to be a part of the European Union. Hence, demilitarisation of the island comes in the first places of their agenda. However, the Turkish side, having the fear of a Greek hegemony, asks for limited reduction of troops.

Not only from the political but also from the sociological point of view the Greek Cypriots demand for a pluralistic society clashes with the Turkish Cypriot demand for ethnic homogeneity.

The demands of each community in Cyprus are not compatible with the other. Besides, both the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots do not understand the true meaning of the negotiations and see it as a zero-sum-game. Thus both parties want to maximize their satisfaction by hanging on their thesis. This inflexibility is the answer of the most common question: Why does the Cyprus problem still remain unsolved in spite of all the attempts of the United Nations until now?

3.5. Looking Over the Mediation Attempts in Cyprus

As it is mentioned before, existence of the Cold War and the power balances it created led the NATO allies to interfere the situation in Cyprus in the first few years of the conflict. Thus, the mediation attempts between 1963 and 1968 mostly included external powers and Turkey and Greece as the two conflicting NATO members. During this period even the Greek and Turkish Cypriots were not given much importance and hence were not invited to most of the discussions. The priority was to prevent any intervention both from Turkey and Greece in the island.

The mediation attempts started in 1963 with Lyndon Johnson's efforts to decrease tension between Turkey and Greece after the outbreak of violence on the island. Then on 15 January 1964, a conference was called in London to find a solution. Greece and Turkey as well as the representatives of the two communities on the island attended to the London Conference. However the London Conference did not end with the desired results since the Greek Cypriots, supported by Greece, proposed that the Turkish Cypriots should give up their partnership rights and status, which were given to them by Zurich and London Agreements. With the failure in London Conference external powers

first offered NATO peacekeeping forces and mediation in January 1964, which was rejected by Makarios due to the fact that inclusion of NATO would serve the interests of Turkey, then they decided that the problem must be handled by the United Nations.

In March 1964, the Security Council passed the Resolution 186 and formed a UN Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP). The summer of 1964 witnessed the Acheson Plan with the initiatives of the United States. A meeting was held in Geneva between the representatives of Greece and Turkey under the auspices of the UN and with the participation of the then American Secretary of State- Dean Acheson. In this meeting Acheson proposed a plan -which was called then the Acheson Plan- stating that: Cyprus would unite with Greece under the conditions that Turkey received the Greek island of Kastellorizon that the two Turkish cantons be established in Cyprus and a military base be ceded to Turkey.¹¹⁶ This plan was also rejected by Makarios and the Greece since, then they were believing that the *enosis* could be achieved without giving any concessions to Turkey or to Turkish Cypriots.

After the Security Council Resolution in 1964, the UN Secretary-General had appointed a diplomat named Sakari Tuomioja as the first UN mediator. Unfortunately, he died and was succeeded by Dr. Galo Plaza. Dr. Plaza prepared a report in which he criticized the 1960 constitution and also any other federal solutions proposed by Turkey. He suggested that Greek Cypriots had refrained from *enosis* hence an independent Cyprus should be founded providing the necessary safety and rights to the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey rejected the report stating that Dr. Plaza had acted as an arbitrator instead of a mediator. However, his report was accepted by Greece and the Greek Cypriots as the basis for negotiations.

In 1967, with the initiative of NATO foreign ministers a meeting was held in Threace where the prime ministers of Turkey and Greece met. Neither of the parties could reach their aims and this meeting was also remembered as one of the failed meetings. However, just after breakdown of the summit talks in Thrace, the Greek troops from the mainland Greece under the leadership of General George Grivas attacked two Turkish villages (Kophinou-Geçitkale and Ayios Theodoros- Boğaziçi). Turkey warned Greece and the two countries almost came to war. The situation was handled by USA and Cyrus Vance, who

¹¹⁶ N.M. Ertekün (1981), *The Cyprus Dispute and the Birth of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*, Lefkoşa: Rüstem & Brother, p. 20.

was the former Secretary of State, by a shuttle diplomacy between Athens, Ankara and Nicosia. As a result Greece accepted to withdraw its troops from Cyprus.

In 1968, the first series of intercommunal talks began between the representatives of the two communities in Cyprus and continued till the coup in 1974.¹¹⁷ The aim of these intercommunal talks was to solve the basic issues on constitutional problems. However, both of the communities defended their thesis as the best solution and could not come to an agreement: The Turkish side demanded regional autonomy in their enclaves while the Greek Cypriots insisted on strong central government and a unitary state.

After Turkey's intervention on 20 July 1974, the UN Security Council held an emergency meeting and adopted Resolution 353 that calls the three Guarantor powers (Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom) to enter into negotiations for the restoration of peace. Following, a conference was held in Geneva with the participation of the foreign ministers of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. After the conference the Guarantor powers declared that a security zone should be set-up, occupied Turkish Cypriot enclaves should be evacuated immediately, and negotiations should be carried out.

In April 1975 a new series of intercommunal talks began in Vienna, which would last for five rounds and would end in 1976. The most significant outcome of the talks was the agreement on population exchange. The Turkish Cypriots had been moved by their own will to the Northern part of the island.¹¹⁸

One year later the summit meetings between Makarios and Denktaş started. They came together twice in 1977 once in January and then in February. They tried to prepare a basis for future negotiations and formed "The Four Guidelines".¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ During the talks, the Turkish Cypriots were represented by Rauf Denktaş and the representative of the Greek Cypriots was Glafcos Clerides.

¹¹⁸ After the talks for the first time in its history the island was partitioned ethnically into two as the North and South.

¹¹⁹ The Guidelines Agreed between Denktaş and Makarios on 12 February 1977:

- 1- We are seeking an independent, non-aligned, bi-communal Federal Republic.
- 2- The territory under the administration of each community should be discussed in the light of economic viability or productivity and land ownership.
- 3- Questions of principles, like freedom of movement, freedom of settlement, the right of property, and other specific matters, are open for discussions, taking into consideration the fundamental basis of a bi-communal federal system and certain practical difficulties which may arise for the Turkish Cypriot community.

After this first summit the successive May 1979 summit meeting came under the auspices of the UN Secretary- General Dr. Kurt Waldheim, which took place between Denktaş and Kyprianou. The outcome of this summit is called “Ten-Point Agreement” and confirmed the previous “Four Guidelines”.¹²⁰

In 1980 Ambassador Hugo Juan Gobbi was appointed as the Special Representative in Cyprus of the UN Secretary General. The intercommunal talks of 1980 to 1981 took place under the auspices of him. These intercommunal talks produced the *evaluation paper*, known as the Interim Agreement or Waldheim Ideas, which summarizes the status of negotiations including the proposals of both parties during the talks.

Then in 1982 Javier Perez de Cuellar became the new Secretary General of the United Nations and quickly began top-level meetings with the two Cypriot leaders- Kyprianou and Denktaş- separately. However, in 1983 Kyprianou announced his unwillingness for the continuation of the intercommunal talks because of the fact that sitting the negotiation table with the Turkish Cypriot leader would mean recognizing him as “equal”. This event led the declaration of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC) by the

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- 4- The powers and functions of the Central Federal Government will be such as to safeguard the unity of the country, having regard to the bi-communal character of the State.

¹²⁰ Ten-Point Agreement of 19 May 1979:

- 1- I was agreed to resume the intercommunal talks on 15 June 1979
- 2- The basis for the talks will be the Makarios-Denktaş guidelines of 1977 and the UN Resolutions relevant to the Cyprus question
- 3- There should be respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms of all-citizens of the Republic
- 4- The talks will deal with all territorial and constitutional aspects
- 5- Priority will be given to reaching agreement on the resettlement of Varosha (Maraş) under UN auspices simultaneously with the beginning of the consideration by the interlocutors of the constitutional and territorial aspects of a comprehensive settlement. After agreement on Varosha has been reached, it will be implemented without awaiting the outcome of the discussion on other aspects of the Cyprus problem
- 6- It was agreed to abstain from any action which might jeopardize the outcome of the talks, and special importance will be given to initial practical measures by both sides to promote good will, mutual confidence and the return to normal conditions.
- 7- The demilitarization of the Republic of Cyprus is envisaged, and matters relating thereto will be discussed
- 8- The independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic should be adequately guaranteed against union in whole or in part with any other country and against any form of partition or secession.
- 9- The intercommunal talks will be carried out in a continuing and sustained manner, avoiding any delay.
- 10- The intercommunal talks will take place in Nicosia.

Turkish Cypriots claiming that with this declaration they make the status of Denktaş equal to Kiprianou's. One year after in 1984 intercommunal talks restarted. This time Cuellar prepared a *Draft Framework Agreement* and presented to the parties.¹²¹ After several modifications, it was accepted both by the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey. The Greek Cypriots leader Kyprianou also announced his satisfaction with the Draft Agreement. Nonetheless, Greece voted against the Draft Agreement so did the Greek Cypriots. However, the result disappointed even the Greek Cypriot people and after this event Kyprianou lost his credibility both among his own people and in the international community and lost the elections in 1988 leaving his place to George Vassiliou.

In 1990, a fresh perspective was added to negotiations with the UN Security Council's adaptation of Resolution 649 which states for the first time that the two communities are treated on "equal footing". Words like "the Government of Cyprus" or "Turkish Cypriot community" was not included in the Resolution. Hence for the first time a Security Council Resolution was highly welcomed by Turkish Cypriots.¹²²

In 1992, the UN made its maybe the biggest attempt by preparing "Set of Ideas" including a map that covers territorial adjustments. Set of Ideas has been the most comprehensive plan that was ever put forth since the beginning of the conflict. The two leaders this time came together in New York to discuss the plan. However, the UN was highly decided and for the first time stated that the Set of Ideas must be accepted wholly and unconditionally. Almost everyone was sure that the Set of Ideas would be a turning point in Cyprus conflict.

¹²¹ According to the Draft Agreement Cyprus would be bicomunal and bizonnal state in which Turkish Cypriots would have "29 plus" percent land. Like the 1960 constitution, there would be a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president. The 70-30 % ratio would be secured in the House of Representatives however in Senate the ratio would be equal. Three of the ministers among the total 10 would be Turkish Cypriot in the cabinet. The agreement would give the Turkish Cypriots the right of veto over all decisions of the federal government. Each community would have its own police force and finally it was also stated that a timetable would be implemented for the withdrawal of Turkish military from the island.

¹²² The Resolution 649 states that:
The Security Council calls upon the leaders of the two communities to pursue their efforts to reach freely a mutually acceptable solution providing for the establishment of a federation that will be bicomunal as regards the constituonal aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects in line with the present resolution and their 1977 and 1979 high-level agreements, and to cooperate on an equal footing, with the Secretary-General in completing, in the first instance and on an urgent basis, an outline of an overall agreement, as agreed in June 1989.

However although Greek Cypriot leader Vassiliou announced that he agreed the plan, Denktaş accepted 91 paragraphs out of 100. It was such a disappointment for the UN that the Secretary General threatened the parties telling that the UN had already spent a lot of time and money in sponsoring the intercommunal talks and wanted parties to find a speedy solution before one of the parties became “scapegoat”.

After the 1992 failure the UN decided to go slow and try to build confidence between the two communities before another serious attempt in future. To realize this in 1993 UN produced a series of “Confidence Building Measures” (CBMs). Especially two measures found affective and discussed. The first one was the opening of the fenced section of Varosha (Maraş) so as to create a kind of free trade zone. The second was the opening of the Nicosia International Airport under the UN administration for civilian passengers and cargo traffic. Greek Cypriots criticised the measures stating that it may lead to the recognition of the TRNC. On the other hand Turkish Cypriots demanded that the embargoes should be lifted from all air and sea traffics in the northern part of Cyprus. Thus, once again a UN effort ended because of the inflexibility of the parties.

Once more time in 1997, the new UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan brought the leaders of the two communities together in New York and later in Geneva to discuss the main framework of the so called Annan Plan.¹²³ Unfortunately this time the timing was against the negotiations since the talks intersected with the EC decision to open accession negotiations with the Greek Cypriot Government on behalf of Whole Island. It is advocated that the membership negotiations might serve as a “catalytic” and support negotiations under U.N. auspices. Soon this “catalytic effect” was used to justify candidacy

¹²³ Annan Plan proposed:

- A common state with two equal components
- Cypriot citizenship
- A six-member presidential council proportional to the population of the two states and a rotating presidency limited to a 10-month time period.
- A transitional Government which will govern for three years
- A two-chamber parliament consists of 48 members each
- Membership of the EU
- Demilitarisation- However Greece and Turkey allowed to maintain limited military forces on the island

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2449071.stm>

of Greek Cypriot's. However with the full membership, this notion failed.¹²⁴ The importance of EU's attempt is that for the first time the Union actively supported UN effort for conflict resolution in Cyprus. Hence, according to Ahmet Sözen "...the EU changed the arithmetic of the Cyprus negotiations as a third party by offering a huge side payment- namely the EU membership for the Island. The EU therefore, became an indirect mediator in Cyprus negotiations".¹²⁵

3.6. What has been done by the EU so far?

The European Union, placed in the middle of the Cyprus problem, has some kind of linkage with all the concerned parties in the conflict. Hence one expects that it could make a positive contribution and could even solve this long-term conflict, if it uses its potential strategically.

Actually the EU has been applying its sticks and carrots to all parties since the Greek Cypriot application for full membership. At the beginning that is in the pre-accession stage what EU wanted to do is to coerce the parties to make concessions for a solution. With regards to the Greek Cypriot side the EU applied its stick by insisting on a solution for full membership such as promoting security, increase in economic well being etc. When it comes to the Turkish side, on the one hand, the EU applied the carrot by promoting them the opportunities of a full membership in the European Union. On the other hand the EU also applied them the stick by reinforcing the international standing of the Greek Cypriot Government while recognising it as the sole legal government of the island.

The stick on the Greek Cypriots had been eliminated with the decision of the EU, which stated that the Cyprus would be accepted to membership regardless of the solution to the Cyprus problem. Besides, with this decision, the EU also planned to increase the pressure it had been applying on both the Turkish Cypriots- and also the Turkey- until that time. However, the result was that EU lost its impartiality and became closer to one of the parties in the

¹²⁴ Thomas Diez (2002), "Last Exit to Paradise? The European Union, the Cyprus Conflict and the Problematic "Catalytic Effect" in Diez T. (ed.) *The European Union and The Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, Post modern Union*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

¹²⁵ Ahmet Sözen, "The Role of the European Union as a Third Party in Resolution of External Conflict: The Case of the Cyprus Problem." IACM 15th Annual Conference. [Http://ssrn.com/abstract=314822](http://ssrn.com/abstract=314822)

conflict. The consequence of this move on the Turkish Cypriots was a deep disappointment and a lack of confidence for the European Union as a mediator in the Cyprus conflict.

With the Greek Cypriot Government's membership, the EU lost almost all its sanctions against the Greek side. Thus it seems that the new strategy is to persuade the Turkish side for a settlement by promoting them the opportunities of joining the Union with the Greeks, especially the economic ones. The main example is the procedure that EU applies for the usage of the EU funds by the Turkish Cypriots. It is stated that the Turkish Cypriots can also benefit from the EU funds only if they apply to the Greek side for them. However such a move would mean the acceptance of the Greek Cypriot Government as the government of the whole island, which is unthinkable for the Turkish side. Still, this policy of the EU caused severe discussions among the Turkish Cypriots regarding the policy TRNC has been applying with Turkey regarding the Cyprus conflict. Discussions even led the resignation of the government on October 20, 2004.

The below utility diagrams show the policy of the Union and its aim by following such a policy in two different circumstances: Before the membership of Cyprus and after membership¹²⁶




Figure 1:




Figure 2:

¹²⁶ The inspiration of using Utility curves as well as Figure 1 are taken from: Andreas P. Kyriacou, "A Viable Solution to the Cyprus Problem in the Context of European Union Accession", *Cyprus Review*, A7= Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2000, p. 39-40

Figure 1 shows the positions of the Greek Cypriots' and Turkish Cypriots' before the membership of Cyprus. Point G shows the status quo of the Greek Cypriots. They want a strong federal system with fewer checks and balances, full enjoyment of freedoms especially the freedom of movement and settlement as well as the right of property and finally complete demilitarisation by which they mean the evacuation of the Turkish military from the island. On the other hand Turkish Cypriot status quo is shown by Point T. Their demands regarding a settlement include confederal arrangement with the necessary checks and balances, limitations for the enjoyment of freedoms especially those which may damage the Turkish Cypriot administration such as freedom of settlement and property and finally a permanent Turkish military presence on the island.

Here the EU enters the conflict offering all its opportunities regarding security, cultural, economic and financial issues. The chance of a possible EU membership causes an outward shift on the Utility curve. Point G' and T' become the ideal points for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the beginning what EU wanted to do was to coerce the parties to find a point on the real utility curve somewhere between Point T and G. The instruments EU has include the opportunities of a possible membership in the Union in case of a settlement. The basic opportunity is the security that the EU can provide to both sides. By this way the Turkish Cypriots may change their minds regarding a permanent Turkish presence on the island.

However, what has realised actually is shown in the second figure: In spite of the EU aim during the pre-accession period for coercing each side of the conflict in making concessions thus moving away their positions to some intermediate point, by accepting Cyprus's full membership it caused a different kind of shift in the utility curve. Under this new circumstance the Greek Government can enjoy every opportunity of the membership hence their utilities increased. On the other hand the Turkish side of the island still has no advantage and thus there isn't any change in their utilities. Such a position leads the situation in the second diagram: Point G' is the new position the Greek Cypriots has on the diagram which shows the EU's failure in realizing their plans that was thought at the beginning for a settlement in Cyprus. The basic reason of this failure may be is because the EU anticipated that the economic and financial benefits would persuade the Turkish side for a settlement with the Greek Cypriots before the membership, however while anticipating this the EU policy makers underestimated the strong Turkish

Cypriot demand for equality. Now, there are no more old balances- both the Greece and the Greek Cypriots joined the Union but neither Turkey nor Turkish Cypriots can use the EU platform- hence it is most possible that the EU will find new policies not only to promote peace on the island but also to be able to apply *acquis communautaire* on the whole of Cyprus.

3.7. Possible EU Approaches for Conflict Resolution in Cyprus

A new era begins in the Cyprus conflict. Now it is time for all parties to reconsider their roles and policies towards Cyprus: For the EU Members now Cyprus conflict became an internal issue which has to be solved as soon as possible for the own sake of the Union. For those like Turkey, who is outside the Union, should consider now on that any action towards Cyprus will be evaluated as an action that is taken towards the Union. For example any intervention to the island after Cyprus' membership will be evaluated as an intervention towards a member of the Union and thus most probably be replied by the Union in return.

After Cyprus's membership, need for a settlement became more urgent since it may have serious implications on the EU-Turkey relations. As it is known Turkey has a Customs Union with the EU. According to the Customs Union agreement Turkey must make the same agreement with all EU Member States no matter when they become a member. This means Turkey must also sign the agreement with the Cypriot government. It has already been stated by the Union. Turkey's position is difficult since on the one hand a Customs Union with the Greek Cypriot government would be against everything Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have been doing since the beginning of the conflict. On the other hand the Customs Union Agreement necessitates it otherwise Turkey will be accused for breaking the agreement.

The European Union does not want to loose Turkey for a dozen of reasons. Hence, for the time being it pretends not to see Turkey's policies against one of its member countries. However, both Turkey and the EU know that this wait and see situation cannot last forever. Soon the Greek and the Cypriot demands inside the Union will force it to take some action against Turkey. The only solution seems to be a settlement for all.

It is expected that now on the European Union will take a more active role in mediation efforts by applying alternative policies considering its past

experiences and the *acquis communautaire*. If the Union –in the future- intends to play mediator role in Cyprus conflict, it will have an advantage in the pre-negotiation phase since it has enough data about the conflict and the conflicted parties. EU is able to provide communication between the two sides because it is in contact with both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots. Greek Cypriot part has trust in the Union. For the Turkish side they evaluate possible advantages of joining the Union and they may accept the Union as a mediator in the Cyprus conflict so as to reach a settlement and join the EU with the Greek side. Besides, international arena may also support the mediation of the Union in Cyprus thinking the prestige of the “EU concept”. It is not a belief in the capabilities of the EU institutions but a belief in the notion of EU. Since EU represents democracy, respect for human rights, peace and economic prospect.¹²⁷

In reference to three phases of mediation, second phase that comes after pre-negotiation is the negotiation phase. During Annan negotiations the EU acted as a supporter of UN mediation attempts. Now if the Union wants to mediate Cyprus conflict, the next step Union may take will be proposal of a new plan or an improvement in the Annan plan so as to direct negotiations on the bases of the plan. European Union has an advantage in determining rules and guidelines since it has *acquis communautaire* that has already been approved and applied in the Greek side of the Island. For example sovereignty problem can be solved within the EU framework since the EU necessitates sharing sovereignty. As a member of the EU, states cannot think sovereignty as an absolute concept.¹²⁸ This is valid for both internal and external sovereignty since internally states transfer some of their legislative powers with reference to EU regulations according to the principle of subsidiarity¹²⁹ and externally, recently the Union coordinates its foreign policy within the CFSP.¹³⁰

¹²⁷ Olga Demetriou, “EU and the Cyprus Conflict Review of the Literature”, *Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts Studies*, No: 5, January 2004, <http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk>

¹²⁸ Thomas Diez, “ Why the EU can Nonetheless be Good for Cyprus?”, *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, University of Birmingham, UK, 2/2002, p.8

¹²⁹ Article 5 of TEC

¹³⁰ K. Glarbo (2001), “Reconstructing a common European Foreign Policy” in Christiansen, T. Jorgensen and Wiener A. (eds), *The Social Construction of Europe*, London: Sage.

Another issue that can be solved within the EU is representation. EU structure enables sub-national entities to represent their member states in the Council of course if they are authorized to do so. Belgium and Germany are the two examples who benefit from this right. For example the German Lander has a representation in Brusells and by this way it can affect the policies by lobbying on policy-makers.¹³¹

In reference to identity issue, the EU can offer a new perspective. Since until now it is thought that one of the reasons behind the Cyprus conflict is that there is no Cypriot identity on the island but there are Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots with separate identities. Hence until now the mediation attempts emphasized the importance of developing a common identity on the Island. On the other hand EU approach supports multiple identities by providing European identity as a common base. That is a person can identify himself both as a Turkish /Greek Cypriot and a European. European identity provides a common sense and at the same time enables preserving national identities. By this way, it is thought that the EU membership may lead a common Cypriot European civic identity and overcome the antagonism of the current “Greek” and “Turkish” identities causes in the Island.¹³² Maybe the best example of the EU’s recognition of multiple identities is the fact that every official language used in Member States are also recognized as official language of the Union. It is expected that with the settlement in Cyprus, Turkish will also become an official language used by the EU.

One main concern of Turkish Cypriots that has been mentioned so many times in negotiations is discrimination- either economic or social. Depending on their past experiences Turkish Cypriots are afraid of Greek Cypriots’ applying discrimination to them by not providing EU funds to Turkish Cypriots for example. On this issue EU regulations emphasize that the member state legislation and exercise of it must be non-discriminatory.¹³³ Those who violate it can be suspended according to Art. 6-7 of TEU.

¹³¹ Thomas Diez, p.7

¹³² Nicos Peristianis, “A Federal Cyprus in a Federal Europe”, *Cyprus Review*, No: 1 (1998), p. 41

¹³³ Article 12 and 13 of TEC

Since the candidacy of the Greek Cypriots did not give the expected results in negotiations and Cyprus joined the EU without a settlement, now EU may think about long-run policies for conflict resolution such as Europeanization. In the long-run EU may help formation of a more pluralistic, democratic and tolerant society which will be able to understand each other's concerns and find common positions for a peaceful settlement on the Island. This may only be happen if the new generations educated in that direction that is purified from the prejudices and stereotypical representations of the previous generations. The basic instrument of the EU while realizing its strategy will be conditionality that is mentioned in the second chapter. Actually the Union has already been applying what is called conditionality in the form of carrot-stick policy in Cyprus issue. However after Greek Cypriot's membership now the Union has more walnuts in its hand to be used against the conflicted parties especially on the Greek side since being a member of the Union, EU policies, decisions and legislative are highly binding on the Greek Cypriots. Another action EU may take in both Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities is to use Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) to improve consciousness of the two communities for peace, settlement and the idea of living together on the Island. EU called this policy as "New Alleys Path".¹³⁴ In this respect EU uses its funds to support these institutions so as to create a common opinion in the society that will affect the decisions of the policy makers. Actually in the Turkish side there are two main NGO movement called as Common Vision Movement and This Country is Ours Platform which came into existence with the cooperation of 91 NGOs. These two organizations try to increase the consciousness of the people and show the international community the willingness of the Turkish Cypriots for settlement by organizing activities such as mass demonstrations.

Lesson-drawing is another choice that EU will most probably use as an instrument in Cyprus case. EU has some models within its own structure which may provide examples for conflict resolution in Cyprus. Among them the most mentioned one is the Aland Model. The place called Aland is a group of islands and islets in the Baltic Sea between Sweden and Finland. The main language of the people living on these islands is Swedish. However, Aland belongs to Finland that is it is a province of Finland. There is an interesting history about this place, which is worth mentioning. For about 6 centuries from 13th to 19th

¹³⁴ Nicos Peristianis, p. 42

century Finland remained under Swedish rule. The same was valid also for the Aland. However in 1809 Sweden was defeated by Russia hence both Finland and Aland passed to Russia. Finland enjoyed exclusive autonomy under Russian rule and developed both the Finnish national identity and the Finnish language. On the other hand Alanders preserved Swedish language as well as their previous culture and customs. When Finland gained independence in 1917, the Alanders wanted to join back to Sweden however their demand was rejected by the Finnish Parliament. This dispute over the ownership of the Aland caused a tension between Finland and Sweden. The League of Nations found a formula for the conflict: Aland would remain as a part of the Republic of Finland but in return Finland would give autonomy which includes a parliament, legislation and provincial government of them as well as the right to use Swedish language so as to secure their culture.

When Finland became a member of the Union in 1995 so did the Aland. However Aland gained a number of exemptions from EU regulation. Moreover EU also endorsed some exemptions, which are against *acquis communautaire*. For example the Aland Parliament- the Lagting- voted against the tax union hence the islands were exempt from EU tax regulations. On the islands it is secured with the law that only citizens of the Aland Islands “may acquire, possess or lease lands in the islands without the need for special permission from the provincial (Aland) government”. The same is true also for business activities throughout the islands although these restrictions are against the basic rights written in EU procedures. Citizens of the Aland Islands are free from compulsory military service. Besides, no troops are allowed to be stationed on the islands. These rights of Alanders are also accepted by the Union. Here comes the basic question: If the Union allowed such exemptions to a regional part of one of its members in the past so as to avoid conflict, then to what extent it can apply this political experience to Cyprus.

It is expected that the experience of Aland both in terms of extensive autonomy and its special EU status may provide a model for a settlement in Cyprus enjoying full membership. In the first sight it seems this new plan may work. Since the two cases are alike in that both concern “linguistically, religiously or otherwise divided sub-communities”.¹³⁵ Moreover both Aland and

¹³⁵ George S. Yiengou , “A Critical Evaluation of the Applicability of the Aland Model into the Conflict Situation in Cyprus with a View to Achieving Peaceful Governance”, *Cyprus Review*, A3 = Volume 14, Number 1, Spring 2002.

Cyprus conflicts involve larger neighbours. However one must keep in mind that there are some definite differences between Cyprus and Aland islands, which may ruin the plan. The basic difference is the fact that in Cyprus there are two different societies who have a tragic history and hence they are distrustful to each other for years. Not only the Greek and Turkish Cypriots but also their mother countries have a long history of war and conflict. On the other hand there have never been serious events between the people living on Aland Islands and Finland. Besides, the relations between Finland and Sweden have always been good. Hence the fact of mutual trust is completely lacking in Cyprus conflict. Another difference is the path of conflicts in two cases: While the conflict on Aland was successfully settled by an international organization and the settlement has been lasted throughout the time, the conflict in Cyprus remained unsolved for decades.

Still by using Aland model EU may provide at least a basis for new discussions, which may lead to a settlement in the end. For example, in reference to the issue of sovereignty, as it was mentioned before, two societies in Cyprus have different demands. The Greek Cypriots want a strong federal government who can apply sovereignty over the entire island. However, the Turkish side prefers a confederal arrangement that permits a separate and sovereign Turkish Cypriot state. The League of Nations solved this issue on Aland by giving it extensive autonomy. The autonomy on Aland gives the Aland parliament power on extensive range of internal matters including education, health, police, internal communication, the postal service, radio, television and full budgetary powers. In that case extensive powers of autonomy can be thought similar to sovereignty and can even replace it. The content of autonomy powers can also be discussed among the conflicting parties.

Regarding the control of powers the Autonomy Act in Aland describes the regulations:

Laws passed by Aland Parliament are inspected by the President of Finland and if the Aland Parliament has exceeded its legislative competence in any way the President can impose his veto. Then the bill cannot come into effect. The President bases his decision upon statements from the Aland Delegation and sometimes from the Supreme Court too. The Aland delegation, half of whose members are appointed by the Government of Finland and half by the Aland Parliament also has

the task of supervising that Åland does not exceed its rights of economic self determination.¹³⁶

In Cyprus case the same regulations may be applied with little differences. The President of the central federal government may inspect the laws of Turkish Parliament however the opinion of another authority may be made compulsory before the final decision and this second authority may be appointed by the EU itself. By this way possible discussions about neutrality can be hindered.

Another major disagreement between Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots arises from the issue of basic freedoms especially the freedoms of settlement and ownership. The Turkish Cypriots state that with the application of the *acquis communautaire* over the whole island the Greek Cypriots, by using their economic power, will possess the whole land in the Turkish part of the island. The Åland model can end this discussion if EU gives the same derogations that was given to Landers and by this way put limitations on land ownership. However the approval of the Greek side must be taken in Cyprus case, which seems difficult. Since the Greek Cypriots give great importance to this ownership issue. EU can enjoy its mediator role by offering such exceptions- they may be temporary or restricted to some specific issues- which may help the conflicting parties in Cyprus to see alternatives in solving their problems and may increase the negotiation capacity.

There are also other cases in EU, which may constitute examples for a settlement in Cyprus. One of them is the administrative system in Belgium. It is suggested that the structure of the Belgium federal system can be used as an example for Cyprus. Before its gaining independence in 1830, Belgium was a part of Netherlands. After independence it was established as a unitary constitutional monarchy but then throughout the time it turned into a federation. The basic reason behind their preference for federation was the population structure in Belgium: There are three different languages actively used as mother languages among the Belgian society: The Dutch-speaking Belgians (58 %), French speaking Belgians (41 %) and the German-speaking ones (less than 1 %). Hence the Belgians formed a complex federal system with six autonomous sub-national units each of which has its own parliament,

¹³⁶ Åland's Landkapsstyrelse, PB 60 SF-22100 [trans.cited in Ladduwahetty, 1955:22]

government and ministerial departments.¹³⁷ The powers of these units are limited to the issues regarding their community and territory such as regional economic development, employment, agriculture, culture, language, education etc. There is also the federal government that deals with foreign policy and defence. The Belgium system depends on reaching consensus between different administrative units. The issues are discussed again and again in special committees, working groups, parliaments etc. However, the administrative system works in such a harmony that at least all these groups reach a common position so that Belgium can be represented as a whole in the European Union. Of course, not always a consensus is reached. At those times the federal government act as an arbitrator by proposing package deals and promoting an environment appropriate for consensus-building. The basic disadvantage of this system for Cyprus is the inability of the two societies in Cyprus in reaching consensus. Once more time the lack of trust blocks the ways of settlement. The Belgian system is time-consuming even in a place like Belgium where they apply this system for years. It will become more and more difficult if the EU tries to apply this complex system in Cyprus. The Cypriots at first place must agree on the underlying principles of the Belgian system only after then they can think about forming a federation: “consensus-building, respect of the jurisdiction of each community and a commitment to federal state (which will be encouraged by the federal government)”.¹³⁸

Although the EU has some experiences in itself, still it never faced such a complex conflict like the conflict in Cyprus. Besides, this time it integrated the conflict to its structure by approving Cyprus’s membership. The main lesson that can be taken from the examples above is the importance of flexibility and creativity in conflict situations. This reminds the interested parties that there is always hope for the settlement in Cyprus this time within the EU framework. Turkey’s future position within the Union will also affect the situation. The Union may become a real platform for the discussion of Cyprus conflict if all the parties can negotiate in it equally, which necessitates the membership of Turkey. Besides it is also expected that during the pre-accession period

¹³⁷ These six autonomous units are: The Flemish, Francophone and German communities, the Flemish and Walloon regions, and the Brussels-Capital region.

¹³⁸ Angelos Sepos, “Belgium’s Federal System in the European Union: A Model for Cyprus?”, *Cyprus Review*, A2 = Volume 13, Number 1, Spring 2001, p.119.

European Union may convince Turkey regarding some issues that increase tension in Cyprus such as the presence of Turkish army on the island.

One thing is certain that all of the parties in the Cyprus conflict are tired of reaching no solution for years. Participation of the European Union brought fresh blood and new enthusiasm. On the other hand it also made the conflict even more complex by adding the EU wing. It is expected that the passing time will cause tension between the EU-Turkey relations as well as within the EU. Hence now there is also the time consideration. In any way EU is still developing its capabilities for conflict issues. The Cyprus conflict provides a real challenge for it. If it achieves solving it, not only the Union will prove its capacity to the world but also it can avoid many troubles that may be faced in the future because of the conflict in Cyprus.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

This thesis tried to analyse the evaluation of European Union's conflict management capabilities, current strategies and the instruments. The Cyprus case is used in the thesis because the conflict in Cyprus includes so many variables and as of May 2004 Cyprus joined among the members of the EU. By accepting Cyprus into the Union without a settlement on the island, European Union willingly imported the conflict and other than its international characteristic the Cyprus conflict also became Europe's internal problem. Considering all these, Cyprus became a stage on which the Union can show all its abilities on crisis management and conflict resolution issues.

First of all it is stated that there are different kinds of conflicts, which arise, from the motives behind the conflict such as economic struggle, race, ideology or power struggle. However most of the conflicts include more than one of these reasons. Because of this every conflict situation necessitates some different kind of resolution method. Moreover the environment that surrounds the conflict adds other variables, which differentiate one conflict situation from the other. Throughout the history people have developed various strategies against conflicts such as negotiation, judicial settlement, arbitration, threat, force and even war. In the past maybe it was more practical to reach a settlement by fighting over the conflict reason since the communication was limited and there were no international organizations so as to hinder conflicted parties or apply those sanctions. Most importantly there were no weapons like an atom bomb that could destroy a whole nation without separating soldiers and civilian. As a result war was counted among the conflict resolution methods. However with the technology of modern world, most humanitarian and less harmful methods became popular since the two World Wars demonstrated the evil consequences of conflicts if they cannot be controlled.

As a result mediation as a method of conflict management took its place at the top of the list in the modern world. There are two important points about

it. First one is that mediation is a voluntary form of intervention. Second, success of the process highly depends on mediator's abilities. In this respect the European Union is founded as a security community and its basic principles are definitely against primitive methods which lead to violence. The Union has most of the abilities for mediation such as the economic power, technology and specialists in all fields. Besides it knows its deficiencies in conflict management and trying to remove them with new institutions, policies etc. For example the EC/EU has been trying to strengthen its military structure by forming a European military power so as to support the Union's policies whenever necessary. Actually the European Union is able to acquire everything it needs, but the main problem regarding the Union is the willingness for participating actively in a conflict situation. Because of the Union's structure, the EU does not have extensive decision and administrative rights over the Member States in international issues. Hence it is unable to insist on the policies against its members. If the Member States have clashing opinions then the decision taking process takes too much time and effort. Because of this the Union has been criticized for being too slow and ineffective during conflict situations. This is among the deficiencies of the EU in conflict management activities. The Union has to take necessary measures to improve coordination among its members in international politics if it wants to be effective in conflict management.

It seems that the EU mostly prefers instruments such as economic sanctions and European funds. Maybe it is because of the fact that cooperation on these actions is easier compared to more radical actions such as military intervention. However, these instruments are affective usually in preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping. Conflict resolution necessitates more serious strategies and instruments. The Yugoslavia crises showed that the EC/EU is not yet prepared for such serious intervention that necessitates instant decision taking and action (e.g. to stop genocide). With regards to conflict management, EU's hand is powerful in "soft security" issues such as humanitarian and technical aids, political and economic instruments to provide a peaceful environment with democracy, market economy, rule of law etc. However, there are also weak sides of the Union that it should improve its abilities such as coordination with other international actors, handling any inconvenience that arises from diverging interests of its members, improving decision making process, taking measures for early action and so on.

In any case the Union believes in its long-run strategies for conflict management and highly invests on them such as early warning system and the Conflict Impact Assessment (CIA) program. It seems that recently Europeanization became favourite policy of the EU. Actually the EC/EU has been applying policies such as supporting market economy, democracy, human rights and rule of law, education, rights for woman etc for many years. With the Europeanization strategy the Union could gather these policies within a framework and developed instruments to be able to apply Europeanization systematically on the target country. As a long-term conflict management policy, the Union has been applying Europeanization strategy in the Balkans and the Mediterranean countries within the framework Barcelona Process. The Union expects that creating a secure and tolerant environment would be conducive to solve some of the problems in those regions automatically. However the effectiveness and duration of Europeanization strategy is unknown especially on an Island with two conflicted parties each have its own culture and perception. Besides there is lack of confidence in both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots against third countries interfered in the conflict except their motherlands (and maybe sometimes they have distrust even against their motherlands). Without confidence in the European Union, the policy makers approach reluctantly to adopt and carry out the Union's policies, rules and laws. The strategy developed to build confidence is called New Alleys Path. For the time being there are organized NGOs in Cyprus to provide positive attitude in society for the EU and its policies. These NGOs have been targeting to reach a settlement by way of constituting consciousness in the people about the necessity of a settlement as soon as possible and affect political decisions by pressing the policy makers.

In reference to Cyprus, throughout the text it is emphasized that the EC/EU has never played a direct mediator role on the island. What the EU has done so far is to support the UN conflict management policies in Cyprus. However after the Cyprus' membership, it is expected that the EU may play a more active role in the future conflict management activities in Cyprus. The European Union may affect the Cyprus conflict in two ways- directly and indirectly. In the case of direct impact the Union may apply conditionality on the Turkish Cypriots such as offering right to benefit from some of the EU funds so as to change the attitudes of political leaders. By the same way it is almost certain that the Union will apply carrot-stick policy to Turkey regarding full

membership to force her accept a more flexible approach towards Cyprus. Moreover in the long run the Union will try to provide a more pluralistic, democratic, free environment of the Island which may affect the perception of the two sides. Recently NGOs work on such a plan that includes exploring history, cleaning school curricula of militant nationalism, increasing cultural and social activities between Turkish and Greek Cypriots.¹³⁹ As an indirect impact the Union will increase the communication between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Besides the Union may provide new benefits that may lead to changes in the demands of the conflicted parties in Cyprus. For example the Turkish Cypriots may decide that they do not need a Turkish army on the Island to protect them since, being a member of the EU would be enough for feeling secure, and instead they may determine that their priority must be providing job for young people so as to cease migration. With regards to the Greek Cypriots the EU membership may decrease their loyalty to Church, which has a rigid standing against existing settlement plans.

Looking over the past experiences and capacities of the European Union, it would be meaningless to expect a settlement plan from the Union like the previous UN plans. However the Union may designate a structure within the context of *acquis communautaire* and by using the examples it has such as the Aland Island. The exemptions applied on Aland may work in Cyprus however both Communities must agree on the content of these exemptions. The referendum results indicate that for the time being the Greek Cypriots want to keep the status-quo and enjoy the advantages of EU membership. Thus, it is not possible to make them accept exemptions against basic rights which they value most such as ownership and free movement. As a result no one should expect a settlement on the Island at least in the short run. The best movement may be to wait until an appropriate environment is formed in Cyprus in which two communities abandon their rigid standing and are willing to reach a settlement. The European Union may not be effective in the short run however the long term strategies may serve best to provide such an environment. Throughout the time Turkey's relations with the Union will provide another factor that will affect the course of conflict on Cyprus. Although the Union told that Cyprus would not be a condition for Turkey's accession still Greece and the

¹³⁹ John Tirman, "Working Towards a Just Peace", December 2000 (Revised 2003), <http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/conflict%20res%20-%20section>

Greek Cypriots may directly or indirectly put the Cyprus conflict on the table during the meetings.

The inclusion of the European Union in the Cyprus conflict may lead another advantage in negotiations. Until now both the Greek and the Turkish Cypriot representatives were uneasy in negotiations because they had very limited manoeuvre opportunities. Any step backwards would be evaluated as "selling Cyprus". However within the EU framework some issues like sharing sovereignty becomes a necessity and this situation stops discussions right from the beginning. As a result the EU may provide more places for manoeuvre to politicians of both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots as well as the Turkish and Greek politicians.

Taking into account the islands past regarding failed mediation attempts, EU seems to be a strong chance- and maybe the only one exists- for a settlement. Both the conflicted parties and the EU have good reasons to cooperate in solving the conflict. For the Greek part, the current situation creates many administrative problems in addition to the old problematic issues such as property rights, free movement, trade etc. Moreover as they joined the Union now they cannot apply *acquis communautaire* on the whole of the island although they stated that their government represents all Cypriots. For the Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, a settlement would mean recognition, economic improvement, enjoying advantages of EU membership and guaranteeing their future. European Union wants to solve the conflict in Cyprus because with Cyprus' membership the conflict automatically turned into a problem of the Union, which must be urgently solved so as to prevent arguments between member states and not to cause tension in relations with Turkey. It is argued that so far the Union could not achieve its plans to coerce the conflicted parties to find a middle way for a settlement. In order to force the two sides for concession there should be some kind of a power balance between them. It is mentioned that Turkey's joining the Union may create such a balance. Because then, the Turkish Cypriots can find a platform in the EU to tell their demands. Thus if EU decides to accept Turkey's membership, this may help the solution in Cyprus by affecting balances in Cyprus conflict.

The European Union is trying to develop its capacities and by this way they want to compensate their inexperience in conflict management. On the other hand with enlargement process it now has too many member states, which makes the decision making harder for them. First of all the Union should

reach a consensus in itself regarding what they want to do for the future of the Union. If they really want to deepen the integration then they should take the necessary decisions and plan the budget according to this target. However, this is an old discussion within the Union that has been going on since 1970s. The historical evaluation in the thesis indicates that the Member States have been taking their side with deepening integration. The European Union has the necessary reasons and motivation to solve the Cyprus conflict. In spite of its inexperience the Union proved its flexibility against conflicts in the past. This flexibility and creativity may constitute the keys of a long lasting solution in Cyprus, if the Union decides to undertake an active mediatory role in future.

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<http://www.euromesco.net/>

United Nations Official Website:
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