A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS
OF
TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

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A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS
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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

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ABSTRACT

A CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF
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The thesis is about how the foreign and security policy of Turkey is constructed in a realist world where states follow rationalist policies according to how they see and perceive this world.

The main argument is that Turkey's foreign and security policy has shown an unbroken continuity of a pragmatic and consistent nature guided by rationality that functions in conformity with how the state perceives   the outside material world, through the lenses forming its own identity.

As the focus is on the identity analysis,   the thesis has utilized the constructivist approach in its conventional form. Conventional constructivism, which provides not alternative but complementary explanations to the world run by political realism without rejecting the realist-dominated mainstream scholarship, serves to understand how the material world where realist parameters dominate through rationalistic behavior of states is constructed and thus how the foreign polices of states are formulated. It focuses on the examination of the lenses through which states perceive and construct the world outside. These lenses   simply shape the identity of the state in question.

Building on this theoretical tool, the thesis seeks to provide alternative explanations to the consistency and continuity of Turkish foreign and security policy, in the post-Cold war era till the Iraqi crisis in 2002. It is based on the examination of the lenses forming the identity of the state that has governed the foreign and security policy in general and in respect to the collective identity-building of the state as regards (collective) security in particular.

The assertions of the thesis are as follows: contrary to the arguments of mostly critical studies, in the Turkish foreign and security policy there exists no identity crisis despite the plurality of identities stemming from the multi-dimensionalism in this policy. These identities (sub-identities) may differ depending on the composition of ideational and material factors therein. Yet, they exist in harmony with each other under the guidance of the state (upper) identity. Furthermore, in respect of collective security efforts, arguments regarding Turkey as a security consumer causing instability are also related to identity: that is, the lack of sufficient collective identity which leads to such perceptions about Turkey.

As to the methodology, the thesis is mainly based on the discourse analysis of the official documents, debates, policy papers on the foreign and security policy, as well as speeches/interviews and articles of state personalities who play roles in this policy. This is because such sources reflect the understanding of both the state organs and state personalities (civil and military officials, statesmen and politicians) about the outside world that shapes the lenses (identities), through which Turkey perceives the world in its foreign and security policy.

Keywords: *Turkish Foreign and Security Policy, International Security, Conventional Constructivism, Identity Analysis, Discourse Analysis*

ÖZ

TÜRKİYE'NİN SOĞUK SAVAŞ SONRASI DÖNEMDEKİ
DIŞ VE GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASININ
YAPILANDIRMACI ANALİZİ

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Bu tez, devletlerin nasıl görüp algıladıklarına bağlı olarak rasyonel politikalar izledikleri realist dünyada Türkiye'nin dış politikasının güvenlik boyutu bağlamında nasıl yapılandırıldığı konusu ile ilgidir.

Tezin temel argümanı, Türkiye'nin, dış materyal dünyayı, kendi öz kimliğini oluşturan mercekler arkasından algıladığı şekliyle uyum içinde işlev gören bir rasyonellik ile yönlendirilen pragmatik ve tutarlı bir dış ve güvenlik politikası yürüttüğü yönündedir.

Tezin odak noktası kimlik analizi olduğu cihetle, çalışma yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın konvansiyonel versiyonu temelinde yapılmıştır. Konvansiyonel yapılandırmacı yaklaşım, realist anlayışın egemenliğindeki *mainstream* okulu reddetmeksizin, siyasi realizmin hakim olduğu dünyaya alternatif değil tamamlayıcı açıklamalar getirir. Bu yolla, konvansiyonel yapılandırmacı yaklaşım, realist parametrelerin hakim olduğu ve devletlerin rasyonellik temelinde hareket ettiği materyal dış dünyanın bu devletlerin gözünde nasıl yapılandırıldığını ve dolayısıyla devletlerin dış politikalarının nasıl oluşturulduğunu anlamaya hizmet etmektedir. Bu yaklaşım devletlerin dış dünyayı algılayıp yapılandırmasına hizmet eden merceklerin analizine dayanmaktadır. Bu mercekler devletin kimliğini biçimlendirmektedir.

Bu kuramsal yaklaşım temelinde, tez, 2002 yılındaki Irak krizine kadar Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türk dış politikasındaki tutarlılık ve devamlılığa güvenlik boyutu bağlamında alternatif açıklamalar getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, genel olarak devletin dış ve güvenlik politikasını yöneten kimliğini oluşturan merceklerin analizini içermekte ve özellikle (müşterek) güvenlik bağlamında devletin müşterek kimlik yaratımı konusuna odaklanmaktadır.

Tezin hipotezleri aşağıda sunulmaktadır: Çoğunlukla kritik çalışmaların aksine, Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasında, bu politikanın çok boyutlu niteliğinden kaynaklanan kimliklerin fazlalığına rağmen kimlik krizi yaşanmamaktadır. Alt kimlikler olarak nitelendirilebilecek bu kimlikler içlerindeki sosyo-psikolojik ve materyal etkenlerin kompozisyonuna bağlı olarak farklılık gösterebilirler. Ancak, devletin üst kimliği altında birbirleriyle uyum içinde bulunurlar. Ayrıca, (müşterek) güvenlik uygulamaları bağlamında Türkiye'nin istikrasızlığa yol açan bir güvenlik tüketicisi olduğu yönündeki argümanlar da kimlik olgusu ile ilintilidir. Bu argümanlara Türkiye hakkında böyle algılamalara yol açan müşterek kimlik yetersizliği neden olmaktadır.

Tezin metodolojisi, Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasına dair resmi belgeler, resmi görüşmeler ve siyaset belgeleri ile bu politikada rol oynayan devlet görevlilerinin konuşmaları, mülakatları ve makalelerinin analizini içermektedir. Bunun seçilmesinin nedeni, bu kaynakların hem devlet kurumlarının, hem devlet görevlilerinin (sivil, askeri bürokratlar, devlet adamları ve siyasetçiler) dış dünyayı nasıl algıladığını yansıtmasıdır. Bunlar Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasını oluştururken dış dünyaya bakmakta kullandığı merceklerin (kimliklerin) içeriğini ortaya koymaya hizmet etmektedir.

Anahtar kelimeler: *Türk Dış ve Güvenlik Politikası, Uluslarlararası Güvenlik, Konvansiyonel Yapılandırmacılık, Kimlik Analizi, Belge Analizi.*

In Memory of My Late Mother,
to My Wife and Daughter

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The end of the Cold War that ushered the world into a new era to be called "post-Cold War" is of particular importance *inter alia* for the following two aspects. The first is related to the realm of international relations (IR) theory. The end of the Cold War has reminded us once more how naked the emperor of international relations theory is. It will take more than a couple of tailors to provide the necessary clothes (Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996).

At the end of the Cold war, the failure of IR theory that was dominated by the *mainstream scholarship*[1] on the basis of positivist understanding, to adequately detect and predict patterns of behaviour at the global level that led to the demise of the Communist Bloc was particularly noticeable. Events leading to the end of the Cold War were neither anticipated nor adequately explained by any of the major approaches of the mainstream scholarship in IR theory.

In the course of the Cold War era, international relations became dominated heavily by the positivist understanding in the sense that there is a world out there that functions in line with a system free from values. The world is taken as granted without questioning it. In this understanding, ontological – what constitutes the knowable reality- and epistemological - how knowledge is generated- questions were left mostly unexamined.

The failure of the realist dominated mainstream (rational) scholarship in predicting the end of the Cold War can be attributed to the following reasons:

As it is alien to change, the mainstream scholarship could not see the changes leading to the end of the Cold War. As realists concentrate on relations between great powers on the basis of military power, they could not see social changes either in the USSR leading to the end of the Communist Bloc. As they relate change to only wars, they could not predict the end of Cold War without a war as was the case. Similarly, as their major concern is foreign policies of states, neither could they see how the domestic/internal politics and the social events affected the foreign policy of the USSR.

In this failure, the lack of questioning in these mainstream approaches of social (ideational) factors, domestic developments and identities, all of which were neglected in the positivist understanding, provided further impetus for the critical scholarship that focuses on the constitutive mode of theorizing   working   on the post-positivist understanding of the world.

As clearly seen at the end of the Cold War era, explaining things that are the theoretical mode (*explanatory*) of the mainstream scholarship is not enough to provide a full account of the whole phenomena in world affairs. On the other hand, of great importance in the *constitutive* mode is the understanding that human beings and thus states see the world through their lenses that are constructed according to their background shaped through identities, cultures, values and norms.

In the post-Cold War, it has become evident that normative and subjective side of the world needs to be emphasized so as to balance the objectivist and materialist foundations of the IR discipline.

While such debate in IR theory emerged in the post-Cold War era, IR itself has also gone through a major transformation.   The end of the Cold War, which had long been the symbol of division in Europe for almost half a century, was marked by the fall

of the Berlin Wall on 3 October 1989. The fall of the Berlin wall meant also the collapse of the ideological walls dividing Europe for so many years   by marking the gradual demise of bipolarism.

With this peaceful end, policy makers were tempted to offer various statements on and blueprints for engineering a more peaceful and stable international order. This was normal. Ends of wars have almost always invited a flurry commentary on the past and hopeful speculations on the future world. But, what was unexpected this time, is that statesmen and politicians were referring to the importance of social forces as well. However, despite hopes for a more peaceful world, the post-Cold War has not led to an era of "democratic peace" as once heralded by mostly liberal thinkers and particularly by liberal internationalists.

On the contrary, the world has increasingly witnessed the rise of non-conventional and *asymmetric security threats[2]*. These threats to international security are not purely new phenomena. However, what is new in this sense is the effect of globalization on these threats. Today, in a world where things increasingly become more transboundary and interdependent, owing to the effects of globalization, as in the domino theory, any incident in a country or in region, be it a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, could likely pose threats on other areas. Corollary to this, such threats that transcend borders happen to affect security more rapidly and severely in an ever-expanding magnitude with spillover effects. These threats inevitably necessitate collective responds as they affect almost all states in one way or another.

In such an environment, Europe in particular and the world in general have witnessed more hot conflicts and wars in just one decade in the post-Cold War era, than seen in the whole course of the Cold War years. Thus, it is evident that if the Cold War era was neither peace nor war, the post-Cold War has so far been both peace and war in the same time.

Given these wars and military conflicts continuing to abound through new non-conventional manifestations, one can argue that the core premises of the mainstream scholarship are still present in IR. Today, the world functions as once postulated by realist perspectives: States, being products of coercion, act similar to human nature, i.e. selfish and egocentric. They still live in a brutish-war like environment of an anarchical world order under the threat of their rivals against their survival, in a world where sources are limited in contrary to infinitive desires of selfish states. Under these circumstances, states instinctively pursue policies of self-interest for their survival based on balance of power. Thus, the following can be argued: The mainstream scholarship has failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War. But, in the actual world order, which has replaced the Cold War era, *"practical realism"* (Ashley, 1981) exists in the sense that how diplomats and statesmen approach matters in their work.

States act in pursuit of preservation of their interests and of protection of their security in the face of both conventional and non-conventional security threats, either alone or collectively. Here, the issue of collective security has come under close focus. In the Cold War years, the West and the East regarded each other as the *other* of their *self*, in line with the *self/other dichotomy*. Yet, in the post-Cold war era, it was evident that the world sought for a new other against which sound collective security arrangements could be formed.

In short, if the Cold war was defined as neither peace nor war, the post-Cold War period has become both peace and war. For the post-Cold War era, Wendt formulated 3 kinds of macro-level systemic structures to replace the failed neo-realist systemic structure as developed by Waltz: They are "Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian". The *Hobbesian* structure entails a "distinct posture or orientation of the Self toward the Other" in which the subject position is that of "enemy." In a Hobbesian culture, adversaries observe no limits in their violence toward each other. In the *Lockean* culture, the subject position is "rival," where rivals are competitors who will use violence to advance their interests, but unlike the Hobbesian culture, will refrain from killing each other. The *Kantian* subject position is that of "friend," where allies do not use violence

to settle disputes and work as a team against security threats (Wendt, 1999, 247). Leaving aside the latter, the realist-dominated world seems to be governed by the former two, both of which underline the importance of collective security arrangements among states against a collectively defined common other.

B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

IR theory in the post-Cold War era has undergone an important transformation. Critical approaches like constructivism attacked directly the underlying positivist precepts of mainstream IR theory. They were inward looking, concerned primarily with undermining the very foundations of dominant discourses of IR theory. In this respect, they served a valuable purpose of fracturing and destabilizing the positivist/rationalist hegemony, which can be seen as a necessary first step in the pursuit of establishing a new perspective in world politics. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War brought new interests in the search for ideational, normative and cultural explanations for state behaviours in the international system, as the theoretical problematic of mainstream scholarship became increasingly pronounced by scholars.

Yet, as mentioned earlier, in practice, core premises of realist understanding continue to exist in IR. However, it is not possible to provide a full account of this realist world prevailing in practice only with the mainstream scholarship working on the positivist understanding.

States interpret and constitute the material world through the lenses before their eyes and based on this construction follow realist policies based on rationalism . In this sense the world is not only material but also imagined as it is constructed by states according to their lenses.

Here comes the importance of constructivism to better understand the world and thus provide a fuller picture of the foreign policy of any state in this system. Constructivism serves to understand how the material world where realist parameters

dominate through rationalistic behavior of states is constructed and thus how the foreign polices of states are formulated. It focuses on the examination of the lens through which the state sees and constructs the world outside. The lens is simply shaping the identity of the state in question.

Learning to see the way as a constructivist sees is in this sense as follows: seeing the world as inextricably social and material, seeing people in their world as makers of their world; seeing the world as a never-ending construction project (Kubalkova, 2001).

Constructivism lies between the positivist material world, as to the ontology, and the post-positivist or reflectivist constitution of this world, as to the epistemology. In this context, to better explain the utility of the constructivist theorizing in a positivist material world, by underlying fact that things are not fixed nor given, but that they in fact might change according to their intersubjective formation, one can give the following example about the difference between throwing a stone and a bird into the air (Adler, 1997a, 320) . When throwing the stone into the air, it is easy to predict its route according to the rules of nature and physical calculations. However, when one throws a bird into the air, the route that the bird would follow cannot be predicted *a priori*. The epistemological formation of the bird, i.e. its knowledge and experience, would determine which direction the bird would take. Thus, in order to predict the bird's behavior, one should know the factors in shaping the epistemological formation of the bird based on its identity, values, experience etc. that are all intersubjective by nature. The same is held true for states that are formed by human beings whose perception of the outside is based on inter-subjectivism and reflectivism rather than positivism.

Therefore, it can be argued that international reality is not solely driven by material factors. But it is socially constructed by cognitive structures that give meaning to the material world. Here, Constructivism is welcomed in the sense that it represents a bridge between the two extremes: positivist/rationalist-based mainstream theories and radical interpretive critical theories. Constructivism, albeit drawing from both

positivist/rationalist based mainstream theories and radical interpretive critical theories, seizes the *middle ground* between them.   While the former brand is contested with its positivist/rationalist underpinnings, neglect of domestic and discursive explanations in international relations and with its shortcomings to explain change, the latter is disputed with its heavy reliance on discursive side of international politics and lack of a research program with empirical records.

Constructivism is particularly important for the analysis of foreign policies of states in such a realist-dominated IR. It is argued that foreign policy is at least in part an act of construction; it is what the actors decide it will be. Social construction and foreign policy analysis look made for one another (Smith, 2001, 38)

In foreign policy, what is important is not only how a state perceives   the outside material world and constructs its identity towards it but also how this state is perceived and constructed by other states in the international system. The latter is particularly important as foreign policy is based on such mutual constructions among states against one to another. The events that led to the end of the Cold war, namely, the collapse of the Iron curtain and the disintegration of the USSR prove this point. The end of the Cold war was not of a static nature but the result of a process that can be traced back to the coming to power of Gorbacev as the last president of the USSR in 1985.

The historic policies of Gorbacev as the 'Prestrokia and ' Glasnost', as argued, propelled the USSR into a 'deconstructivist' overhaul of its social, political and economic system, allowing it to eliminate the bureaucratic, oppressive and immobilizing forces of the Stalinist past (Schultze, 1992, 331). His aim was, most likely, to relocate resources to the welfare of the population from the defence expenditures with a view to strengthening the loyalty of the peoples in the republics forming the USSR and thus preventing the disintegration. Yet, arms cuts and even unilateral arms reduction initiated by the Gorbacev leadership was perceived outside as the weakening of the state. This was enough to flare up the popular movements in the satellite states against the Soviet regime that turned out to be irreversible. In short, policies led by Gorbacev to save the

state through various reforms at the expense of cuts in its defence spending and inevitably the decrease of its military might in its satellite countries did also affect the social construction of the image of the USSR among these countries. Although the material power of the USSR might have remained the same at least that time, the imagined power of the state decreased in the eyes of them and the rest of the world. This inevitably led to the polices in these countries to break away with the USSR. Coupled with the Gulf war that showed clearly the dominance of the other Super Power, the USA, thus, it was already impossible to alter the current of the historical changes for the USSR by 1989.

This shows the importance of firstly ideational factors attributed to the material world in foreign policy and of secondly construction rather than existence of this material world. Similarly, it also reflects the importance of constitutive theorizing rather than explanatory one. It is because states act as they perceive and duly construct the outside world through the lenses before their eyes.

The world that we live in is a place, both physical and social. As argued, human beings and thus states are physical beings capable of living in, and acting on, the world only as social beings. Agency is a social condition. The world that states make for ourselves consists of social relations that make sense, and use, of their physical circumstances (Onuf, 2001).

In a similar fashion, foreign policy can be defined as what states make of it, to paraphrase constructivist Wendt (Kubalkova, 2001, 38). In line with Wendt's dictum of 'anarchy is what state make of it', it is also suggested that "society is what states have made of it" and so that "international society is a social construction" (Küçük, 1999) .

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that constructivism is not an alternative but complementary to realist understanding of the world and international relations. It provides additional explanations to the world outside without rejecting this realist world.

Morgenthau had stated that "human beings lived in a brutish war-like situation" (Eralp, no date) and this led realists to argue that men pursue their own interests. This is true. Here, constructivism comes in and rightfully clarifies that interests are not identical nor taken for granted but constructed according to the culture, norms and identities of the state in question. Constructivism thus functions on the premises of the mainstream scholarship but also complements them with societal premises stressing the importance of norms, identity, and culture in shaping foreign policies of states in IR and acts therein.

Constructivism is not interested in how things are but how they become what they are. Its importance for international relations is the emphasis on the ontological reality of intersubjective knowledge and on the epistemological and methodological implication of this reality. Constructivism thus complements the mainstream scholarship in giving a fuller account of world affairs that are still governed according to realist parameters. Constructivism does indeed help contemporary IR advance a more complete picture of 'what makes the world hang together' (Checkel, 2004).

It is evident that today each of these competing theoretical approaches captures important aspects of world politics. Yet, no single approach can adequately explain with comprehensiveness and subtlety the full range of phenomena that make up the ever-evolving complex international system (Walt, 1998).

Realism as a theoretical perspective derives its strength from its capacity to argue from necessity. It seeks to describe reality, solve problems and understand the continuation of world politics (Eralp, 2001) . On the other hand, constructivism is particularly useful to give a fuller account of world politics at present thanks to its focus on epistemology and its contextual arguments in the sense that things are space and time-bound and constructed according to the perception of actors. One has to live with the fact that there are categories of theory, which are often incommensurable and perhaps incompatible.

By the same token, constructivist understanding is perhaps the best theoretical approach for a PhD student of a diplomatic career. As a diplomat having worked almost 15 years in different parts of the world and international organizations, ranging from Iran, Nigeria to Switzerland, and from the Council of Europe to NATO, it is my strong conviction that the world is realist as all states follow realist policies based on rationalism. Thus, the theoretical assumption that the world is run by realism is also verified through my own experience in the diplomatic service.

My second observation in the profession is that each state follows policies acting rationally only on the basis of how it sees the world through the lens before its eyes. As such lenses are formed through the background formation of states, in terms of their culture, norms, values, history and experience, states might perceive the same world differently and act differently even if acting rationally. Thus, constructivism with its special emphasis on the identity as the lens in question, suits well to my experiences in the field.

Yet, although intersubjective construction of the outside world is a fact, as a diplomat I still feel more comfortable with the existence of one material world outside. In this sense, I am ontologically positivist in the sense that there is a world out there despite the fact that the perception and thus construction of this world is interpretevist and intersubjective. This perfectly suits the understanding of constructivist theorizing. Constructivism stresses the significance of meaning but assumes, at the same time, the existence of an *a priori* reality (Zehfuss, 2002, 10).

It is argued that "the complete diplomat of the future should remain cognizant of realism's emphasis on the inescapable role of power, help liberalism's awareness of domestic forces in mind and reflect on constructivist vision of change (and its focus on identity-building) as necessary" (Walt, 1998, 11).

It is clearly understood that the end of the Cold War encompasses an entire class of events, which are almost impossible to capture by a single theory. As Walt says, the

world still awaits the article (x) to bring out one unique theory to fully cover the post-Cold War theoretical debates (Walt, 1998).   While waiting, constructivism complementing the mainstream scholarship can serve as a useful tool to provide a fuller account of the present international system with particular emphasis on collective security.

In sum, this thesis is based on the   understanding that in the world where realist parameters function, states follow rational policies according to how they see and perceive the world. Constructivism serves as the right theoretical tool in this regard.

C. PURPOSES OF THESIS

In view of the foregoing that marks profound changes both in theory and in practice in IR, what can be said about Turkey? Here, this constitutes the main core of the thesis. In a world that has witnessed the transformation of international   security affairs in the post-Cold War era, the constructivist analysis of   polices followed by Turkey vis-à-vis collective security under these circumstances is the subject matter of the thesis.

The purpose of the thesis is then as follows: to analyze in an empirical study the Turkish foreign policy with special emphasis on its security dimension in the light of the constructivist understanding   and thus provide a fuller picture of these policies of Turkey in the post Cold War era.

As stated earlier, the subject matter will be examined through the paradigmatic lenses of constructivism, with a view to contributing to research in the literature on collective security arrangements in general and on Turkey's security perceptions and policies as an indispensable part of its foreign policy in particular.

As the thesis is about how the foreign policy of Turkey as regards its security dimension is constructed in a realist world, the conventional form of constructivism is

the most appropriate version for a comparative analysis vis-à-vis the mainstream scholarship to assess the theoretical suitability of constructivism in IR theory in this regard. It is because constructivism in its conventional form does not reject such premises prevalent in mainstream scholarship, but provide different, yet complementary explanations. It is thus interpreted as a *via media* approach. Importance of the conventional constructivism is that it does not disregard the existence of a world out there. Yet, despite its existence, constructivists argue that this world is socially constructed. For this reason, it is also called "ontological realist".

This thesis in short intends to demonstrate the utility of constructivism in foreign and security policies by addressing identity as the lenses, through which states see and thus construct the material world in international relations. Social identity of states and their strategic cultures are hypothesized as important drives in the formulation and execution of foreign and security policies. Constructivists argue that national interests and foreign policy strategies states adopt are to a significant degree a function of state identity . They also focus on the constitutive role of ideational factors particularly within the context of domestic level of foreign policy making and the role of identity in constructing national interests. All these clearly attest to the utility of constructivism in this study.

Having underlined the importance of constructivism for this thesis, one should also mention why collective security efforts[3] are focused on in this thesis. Firstly, as to the theory, they constitute an adequate field to asses the value of constructivism. It is because such security efforts are related to forming collective identities of the *self* against a common enemy, i.e. the *other* in a world governed by realist parameters. As the issue of identity-building is best explained by constructivism, such security efforts remain as an area where one can better assess the utility of constructivism in completing the mainstream scholarship. In this context, September 11 has led to a more conducive era for identity- formation in line with the self-other dichotomy, thus further justifying the relevance of constructivism for collective security efforts. Thus, one can see that constructivism also helps better to explain collective security formations that are constitutive of collective identities.

Collective security efforts are an indispensable part of national security. This is particularly valid in the post-Cold War era where states increasingly face security threats of mainly asymmetric nature that transcend borders due to the globalized world. These threats definitely necessitate common efforts by states to preserve their own security through collective security measures.

Under the circumstances of the Post-Cold War era, collective security efforts have become directly related to the national security and thus the foreign policy of Turkey. The whole edifice of hopes for a better security environment lies with all members of the international community. In this process, undoubtedly Turkey just like other members of the democratic world cannot afford to indulge in the comforting, but also deceptive illusion of the present era.

Naturally, the study will focus on Turkey's policies in the security field. However, as such policies are part of national security and closely related to the general conduct of the foreign and security policy of a state, not only issues related to its security dimension also other issues of the Turkish foreign policy will be touched upon to the extent they are relevant for the study.

In summary, the theoretical perspective to be applied is constructivism in its conventional form. The period to be examined is the post-Cold War era until the Iraqi crisis in 2002 leading to war. Within this framework, Turkey's foreign policy with special emphasis on its security dimension will be analysed as the case study. The research is in fact driven by the question of how best one can provide a fuller account of the security policies followed by Turkey in the post-Cold War era.

In this context, one should also underline why the research is limited to the period in the post-Cold War that lasted till the Iraqi crisis in 2002. In fact, the Iraqi crisis and its aftermath can be rightly seen as a new era for the conduct of international relations in many aspects. The US' increasing drift to unilateralism whatever it is called "policy of

hot preemption" or "coercive diplomacy" or "compellance", risking the established collective security arrangements, the occupation of a UN member-state even if a rough state, and the implicit if not unequivocal legitimization of this occupation by the UN through its Security Council resolutions suffice to implicate the importance of this period. Yet, it is also evident that this period is still in the making. Thus, given the fact that the process shaping the Iraqi crisis is not yet completed, it is deemed adequate to limit the scope of the research with events in the post-Cold war era till the dawn of the Iraqi crisis in 2002.

D. ASSUMPTIONS OF THESIS

As already stated above, in the world that is run by realist parameters, states follow rational policies according to how they see and perceive the world. Turkey is no exception to this. As once stated by an academic observer, Turkey is a country surrounded with reality.   Indeed, the realist understanding of international relations which was erected upon an 'anarchical' external environment in which the states' primary objective is 'survival' may, on a broader scale, explain the main motives behind the Turkish foreign and security policy (see Bilgin, 2004, 40).

The Turkish foreign policy is in this sense an example of a consistent policy following an unbroken continuity. Despite the different policies that might sometimes lead to the claims of identity crisis, the identity that governs the foreign policy has not changed since the lenses through which policy makers of the state see the outside world remained the same. However this does not deny the existence of plurality of identities in the conduct of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

The existence of a multitude of identities does not lead to identity clashes or crises. It is because they are varieties of an upper (state) identity. Each sub-identity is composed of the constant variables of the upper identity. In other words, for example, the foreign policy identity that is formed with regard to Central Asian Turkic countries contains the elements of internationalism, westernism, secularism, territorial nationalism

and other determinants of the upper-identity that shapes the Turkish foreign and security policy. In addition to this, this sub-identity also contains other elements of mainly ideational factors based on commonalities deriving from language, religious and kinship. It is only normal because policy makers of the state and thus the state itself see this region through this particular lens (sub-identity) that consists of such ideational factors. Yet, as the constant variables of the upper identity remain in this sub-identity, these additional elements do not cause clashes between it and the upper identity. On the contrary, it can only enrich the upper identity as its variety on this particular section of the foreign policy of Turkey, as it has the same constant variables of the upper identity.

Constructivism serves best in this process in the following aspects:

To analyze how Turkey sees the outside world through its upper (state) identity.

To analyze what lies inside the upper and sub- identities as ideational and material factors.

To explain the existence of plurality of identities and their nature that can be changed according to policy options as sub-identities under the arch of the upper identity.

The main argumentation of the thesis is thus as follows: The constructivist approach is needed to give a fuller account of Turkey's perceptions and policies regarding international security and collective security efforts in the Post-Cold War era. It is because Turkey is a country that acts for survival being located in a triangle of three conflict-ridden regions, i.e. the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. This clearly matches the core parameters of realism. Yet, given its history and geo-strategic location, being the crossroads of several civilizations and once home to different cultures and peoples in its adjacent regions, not to mention its role once as the caliphate of Islam, Turkey's foreign policy is of a multidimensional nature even if this was not always reflected in practice.

Constructivists argue that there are other variables that may be more important than anarchy and power for explaining state behaviour. Explanations based primarily on interests and the material distribution of power cannot fully account for important international phenomena. The importance of a country is driven by perceptions. As argued by one scholar, "all national security strategies start with a mental image of the world" (see Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, 14).

In Turkish foreign policy, the state acts through constructed identities consisting of norms and values in its policy choices. All those issues in the Turkish foreign policy, such as "Greek", "Cyprus" or "Armenian" are guided by also socially constructed norms and according to the sub-identities that are formed in relation to these issues. This sometimes let policy makers follow policies that might be argued as not rational in the sense of realist understanding which posits that human beings and thus states are rational. In the formation of strategic interests of Turkey, the state has not solely been guided by realist parameters and rational choice. In this policy making, socially constructed identities influence the decisions of the state. For instance, Turkey's policy towards Azerbaijan or Bosnia cannot be only explained by realist concerns such as those of balance of power and area of influence vis-à-vis its rivals, i.e. Armenia and Russia in the context of Azerbaijan or Greece in the context of Bosnia and the whole Balkans. They are also shaped by the identity formed by the Turkish state in relation to these regions and countries.

Thus, it can be argued that the lenses through which Turkey sees the world and shapes its policy are products of both realist and intersubjective factors such as identities. Furthermore, in order to provide a fuller account of Turkey's polices for collective security, not only realist concerns but also the identities of state vis-à-vis the problems faced need also to be considered in light of the construction by other states of the image of Turkey in the world affairs. This is particularly important in the post-September 11 era where the perceptions of Turkey seem to have changed in the eyes of the outside world (mainly its allies and EU members) (see Bağcı & Kardaş, 2003). In

other words, the paradigmatic lenses of Turkey utilized to see the outside world in formulating its foreign and security policies should be analyzed.

Turkey therefore constitutes a good case study to asses constructivism in the sense that identities also are important in shaping strategic interests of the country that are assumed to be formed rationally according to the realist parameters. Constructivism is a set of paradigmatic lenses through which we observe all socially constructed reality.

Yet, the general review of the literature on Turkish foreign policy, of which the polices followed by Turkey in the field of security and collective security constitute an indispensable part, shows the dominance of realist approaches in the related works. Existing studies often emphasize the pragmatic and self-interested nature of Turkish foreign policy. They often ignore how those interests were formed in the first place, for which constructivism serves as a valuable theoretical tool as stated earlier.

According to them, Turkey's basic foreign policy directions have been shaped by history and geopolitics. Turkish decision makers are nationalist, but realist leaders. All of them have attached to Turkey's national interests utmost importance, in accordance with Turkey's national power. These analysts in general accept that there has been continuity in Turkish foreign policy since the 1920s. It is clear that they speak with the terms of the traditional-realist school of thought in international politics. Yet, these studies do not necessarily focus on the examination of the lenses that are used to see the world in the formulation of this realist foreign policy. Thus, they fail to account for a fuller analysis of the reason of why the Turkish foreign policy shows its unbroken continuity.

In this context, the importance of identity as to foreign policy has gradually attracted the attention of scholars of Turkish studies in the literature. However, they primarily concentrate on identities that shape Turkish foreign and security policy, without attempting to analyse the paradigmatic lens as a whole, through which the Turkish state perceives the world. True, identities form an important part of this lens.

State identity is the basis of interest. Identity even in anarchical system where rationality persists, helps shaping interests of the state. Thus, identity- based explanations offer a better understanding of a state's preferences and interests, and consequently its foreign policy priorities.

But, explaining only identities does not fully account either for the policies followed by Turkey both in foreign and security fields. To this end, the formation of the lenses as identities with a view to their contents and the composition of ideational and material factors therein   should be analysed. In this context, in order to provide a fuller account of how the Turkish state perceives the world in its foreign and security policy, constructivism as a theoretical tool is needed as it can help scholars understand the nature and content of the lenses before the eyes of the Turkish state.   Similarly, constructivism helps to support the arguments that there exists no identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy with its explanation of the existence of multiple identities that can be kept in harmony rather than clashes under the upper identity. Last but not least, this theoretical approach provides explanations in terms of collective identity-building to the identity problematic of Turkey mainly with the EU countries. All these are not fully covered in the literature despite some relevant studies that will be analysed in Chapter 5. Nor is such approach applied in relation to policies followed by Turkey exclusively concerning collective security. Thus, this proposed research aims to contribute to the literature as food for thought in these regards.

E. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

Foreign policy studies are an outgrowth of international relations and decision making studies. While there have been attempts to form a general theory of foreign policy (Rosenau, 1966), this goal has not been achieved, largely because of the complexity of the field. Foreign policy studies are in some ways even more complex than international relations, because of the variety of approaches and methods involved. The nature of foreign policy studies is summed up by one foreign policy scholar as "...somewhat unusual in that it deals with both domestic and international arenas,

jumping from individual to state to systemic levels of analysis, and attempts to integrate all of these aspects into a coherent whole" (Gerner, 1995, 17).   In other words, there are factors both inside and outside the state that affect its foreign policy. Those favoring an inside approach advocate inquiries involving factors such as perception, psychological needs, and cultural influences (Legg & Morrison, 1981).   Advocates of an outside approach such as Waltz (1979) or Wendt (1999), attempt to understand the ramifications of international structures.

In view of the foregoing, the thesis will adopt a combined research design utilizing both approaches with a view to focusing all relevant factors to the fullest possible extent that help better analyze the foreign and security policy of Turkey as regards its policies in the field of collective security. Constructivism in its focus on domestic factors without ignoring the importance of the effects of international system is in this sense the best approach for such a combined research design.

As regards methodology, an empirical one will be utilised as to the related developments and events and their analysis in view of existing literature on Turkish foreign and security policy. The methodology regarding the collection of data and their analysis will be a combination of behaviouralist and traditionalist views (Tanrısever, 2001) in the following sense: The behavioralist approach is utilised to the extent that it allows for statistical collection of data and systematic analysis.

Yet, in line with the general argument of the traditionalist view that the essence of politics is not quantification but qualitative difference and that scholars should make use of judgement, intuition and insight as essential in arriving at their conclusions without ignoring data that they deem relevant and reliable, the study will pay particular attention to examination of related texts and discourses. Discourses in texts are important because they produce meanings and in doing so actively construct the reality upon which policy is based. As argued, deeds as discourses link the material and the social. Social reality is linguistically constituted; material reality is 'out there' (See Onuf, 1989) .

Discourses are speech acts that are of particular importance in two aspects: First, they are the reflection of the identity in foreign policy. Discourses written or spoken of the state officials and institutions are the products and thus reflection of the identity of the state in foreign policy.   Second, such speech acts also help understand the contents of the identity. It is because such discourses written or spoken by state officials and organs in return do directly contribute to the shaping of the identity that make them use such texts and speeches. Therefore, there exists a continuous circle of interaction through speech acts in the formation and implementation of the states identity in the foreign and security policy of states.

Discourse analysis thus requires that statements be evaluated to understand not only what they mean, but also the structure of discourse they embody and its effects, divorced from the intentions of speakers. Rather than the intentions of speakers that enter into a dialogue, discourse analysis is interested in their reproduction or contestation of a certain discourse (Rumelili, 2002).

Analysis of official texts (decisions, minutes, documents, declarations etc.) and of interviews is important as they reflect the understanding of both the state organs and state personalities (civil and military officials, statesmen and politicians)   about the outside world that shapes the lenses through which Turkey sees the world in its foreign and security policy.

In this process, the study is mainly based on the discourse analysis of the official documents, debates, policy papers as well as speeches and articles of state personalities who play roles   in the foreign and security policy. In this context, the following state organs   that play/ed indispensable roles in the policy and decision-making and their implementation of the Turkish foreign and security policy will be focused on[4]:

- The Turkish Government, as the main body responsible for the making and execution of the foreign and security policy.

- The President, as the part of the execution with important roles in the field of foreign and security policy in practice and as the chief of the armed forces .

- The Parliament, as the sole body of legislation with the power to decide on the deployment of Turkish troops abroad and the invitation of foreign troops into the country.

- The Ministry of Foreign affairs (civil bureaucracy),   as the state organ that prepares and implements the foreign policy.

- The Turkish Armed forces (the General Staff)   (military bureaucracy), as the state body empowered in relevant laws and the constitution to carry out military operations in and outside the country with political authorization, not to mention its traditional role in the formation and conduct of not only the security but also foreign policy of the country.

Thus, relevant texts published and/or issued by these organs will be scrutinized as much as they are unclassified and open to publics. In the study the following texts and documents have been reviewed:

Governments programmes, budget speeches, statements of the MFA, Parliamentary debates and decisions, White Papers of the General Staff on the policy of national security and defence politics and articles written by state officials responsible for foreign and security policy.

Naturally, all these texts were examined with reference to   security policies of Turkey, despite the fact that other issues of the Turkish foreign policy in general were also looked upon to the extent they were relevant for the purpose of the study.

The empirical arguments of the thesis are thus based on the analysis of as a broad range of texts as possible. As a guideline in the selection of texts, the approach of Milliken (1999, 234) is adopted to use the grounded theory (Glauser and Strauss, 1967). In grounded theory, the text selection is based on theoretical sampling: "The analyst jointly collects, codes and analyzes his data and decides what data to collect next

and where to find them, in order to develop his theory as it emerges" (Glaser and Straus, 1967, 45). This unstructured form of text collection is guided and controlled by validity checks: The scholar generates provisional theoretical propositions from an initial empirical study, then tests these propositions against new cases and data, and if necessary reformulates the propositions so that they are empirically valid. Milliken (1999, 234) argues that a discourse analysis "can be said to be complete when upon adding new texts, the researcher finds the categories he has generated in his analysis of previous texts."

Apart from the analysis of these written forms of discourses, I have conducted in-depth interviews with the dignitaries (officials and politicians), including H.E. Süleyman Demirel, Former Prime Minister and President, all of whom either had or still have important roles in the conduct of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. The full list of these dignitaries is shown in Appendix A.

As it might be recalled, according to the constructivist view, it is essential to examine the lenses, through which states see and perceive the outside world, in order to better understand how these states formulate and conduct their foreign policy in the international arena. These lenses are indeed the means of epistemology to understand the ontologically positivist world outside.

In this context, corollary to this understanding, it becomes also essential to examine the lenses before the eyes of statesmen and bureaucrats who are in charge of conducting the foreign policy of the state as such polices of states are inevitably shaped by them among other factors. Thus, the interviews focused on this particular subject. The general content of the interviews and the questions asked is to be found in Appendix   B.

Based on the aforementioned research design and methodology, the thesis will be composed of the following chapters.

Following this introductory Chapter 1, Chapter 2 will focus on the literature analysis of constructivism in IR theory in a comparative manner with the mainstream scholarship, and the added value of constructivism for a better analysis of foreign polices of states in international relations will be emphasized with a detailed review of main concepts that are important in the constructivist scholarship , such as identity, interests, culture, norms and speech acts.

Chapter 3 will then follow a similar methodology   focusing on the literature of security studies with a view to underlying the importance of constructivism in the field of security studies.   In the same chapter, furthermore, the literature on   collective security formations will be reviewed in a comparative manner where constructivism will be assessed as the best theoretical tool to account for such formations particularly in the post-Cold War era. In this chapter, in light of former collective security regimes in the world the importance of constructivism and the role of collective identity for collective security efforts in the post-Cold War era will be empirically discussed.

In the light of the foregoing review of constructivism in the general field of IR and the collective security in particular, Chapter 4 will be devoted to the analysis of Turkish foreign policy with special emphasis on its security dimension since the establishment of the Republic till the end of the Cold War era. There, the national identity that is an indispensable part of the state identity shaping the foreign and security policy of the state will be first reviewed. This will be followed by the examination of the state identity shaping the foreign and security policy, along with the structural determinants of this policy in this process.   Based on these factors, the general characteristics of this policy will be analysed in light of the developments in the said period of the state.

Based on this set of discussions, in Chapter 5 the Turkish foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era will be elaborated with special emphasis to identity discussions in light of a historical analysis reflecting upon   the developments in this policy during the previous eras starting from the establishment of the Republic. This chapter will thus focus on the arguments and critics on both identity crisis as regards

the Turkish foreign and security policy, and the perception of Turkey in this period as a security consumer due to the difficulties witnessed in the formation of collective identity.

At the end of the general appraisal of constructivism with regard to Turkey's foreign policy with special emphasis on its security dimension in the post-Cold War era, the following will be analysed in detail: Turkey's relations with NATO; Turkey's relations with the EU in the field of security and Turkey's participation in collective security operations. These three topics will be examined in view of the constructivist understanding with special emphasis on the role of collective identity.

Then, in the concluding Chapter, I will summarize my analyses in light of the findings supporting the main arguments of the thesis and drawing on them I will attempt to propose as food for thought some suggestions with regard to the identity-building in Turkey-EU relations that is of particular importance *inter alia* for the security of Turkey in one way or another.

As a whole, the thesis should be seen by no means as exhaustive in terms of the analysis of theory and literature. Rather it can be considered as thought provoking in the search of a better account of the Turkish foreign and security policy, drawing upon its policies followed in the field of international security, on the basis of identity analysis through constructivism.

NOTES

[1] By "mainstream scholarship", the thesis refers to theoretical approaches that have dominated international relations throughout history since the Cold War, i.e. realism and its variants such as neorealism/structural realism and (neo)liberal institutionalism, all of which work on the basis of positivist rationalism. Rationalism in this context is broadly related to application of rational choice theory to IR questions. It also relates to, most broadly speaking, any positivist exercise in explaining foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behaviour. See for details, FEARON, J. and WENDT, A. (2002) "Rationalism v. Constructivism", in W. Carlsnaes (et al) eds. *Handbook of International Relations*, London: Sage Pub. Ltd and KRAUSE, Kenneth (1998), "Critical Theory and Security Studies", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33(3).

[2] Asymmetric threat is defined as a threat that can cause harm in bigger magnitude than its size. It is also defined as a threat that does not follow the rules of fair warfare including surprise attacks, as well as warfare with weapons used in an unconventional manner. See www.rand.org/news links/terrorism.ntml.

[3] In this thesis, collective security efforts refer to states' policies to cooperate with one another for their own common security, ranging from pure collective defence formations, such as alliances, to cooperative security arrangements.

[4] The Turkish construction stipulates in detail the roles of these state organs. For example , ARTICLE 104 lists the function of the President *inter alia* "to represent the Supreme Military Command of the Turkish Armed Forces on behalf of the Turkish Grand National Assembly", "to decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces", "to appoint the Chief of the General Staff", "to call the National Security Council to meet", " to preside over the National Security Council".

ARTICLE 117 reads as follows: " The Office of Commander-in-Chief is inseparable from the spiritual existence of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and is represented by the President of the Republic.

The Council of Ministers shall be responsible to the Turkish Grand National Assembly for national security and for the preparation of the Armed Forces for the defence of the country.

The Chief of the General Staff is the commander of the Armed Forces, and, in time of war exercises the duties of Commander-in-Chief on behalf of the President of the Republic.

The Chief of the General Staff shall be appointed by the President of the Republic following the proposal of the Council of Ministers; his duties and powers shall be regulated by law. The Chief of the General Staff shall be responsible to the Prime Minister in the exercise of his duties and powers."

ARTICLE 92: "The Power to authorize the declaration of a state of war in cases deemed legitimate by international law and except where required by international treaties to which Turkey is a party or by the rules of international courtesy to send Turkish Armed Forces to foreign countries and to allow foreign armed forces to be stationed in Turkey, is vested in the Turkish Grand National Assembly.

If the country is subjected, while the Turkish Grand National Assembly is adjourned or in recess, to sudden armed aggression and it thus becomes imperative to decide immediately on the deployment of the armed forces, the President of the Republic can decide on the mobilization of the Turkish Armed Forces."

On the other hand, the main advisory body for national security " national security council" is mandated as follows: according to ARTICLE 118, "The National Security Council shall be composed of the Prime Minister, the Chief of the General Staff, Deputy Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice, National Defence, Internal Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, the Commanders of the Army, Navy and Air Forces and the General Commander of the Gendarmerie, under the chairmanship of the President of the Republic.

 The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of the Ministers its views on the advisory decisions that are taken and ensuring the necessary condition with regard to the formulation, establishment, and implementation of the national security policy of the state. The Council of Ministers shall evaluate decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the state, the integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society.

In the absence of the President of the Republic, the National Security Council shall meet under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister."

Similarly the Law regulating the Turkish Armed Forces stipulates the importance of the military as follows: " the duty of the armed forces is to protect and maintain the Turkish land the Turkish Republic as determined by the Constitution" (Article 35) .

CHAPTER 2

CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR THEORY

A. CRITICS OF MAINSTREAM SCHOLARSHIP

History of international relations can be claimed to be as old as the emergence of states. However, International Relations (IR) as a field of study and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) as its sub-field is relatively new.   While the emergence of IR as a separate field can be traced back to the early 20th century, FPA as a distinct study started only in the second half of it, mainly after the Second World War.

FPA directs attention to the attributes of states as units in order to reach conclusions about their relations. In contrast, IR focuses its attention on the relations of states, as a system, in order to learn about the system's attributes. One proceeds from the parts to the whole, the other from the whole to the parts (Kubalkova, 2001,15).

During the relatively short history of the field, theories employing rational actor model, which assumes actors as pursuing pre-given interests in a 'rational' or purposeful way, have established hegemony in both fields.

The intellectual endeavour to contemplate on a question of any academic discipline propels one to engage in understanding its origins and the environment in which it evolved. Thus, to understand better IR theories' stature in both fields after the Cold War, it is useful to evaluate its intellectual origins.

Realism[1] was the dominant theoretical tradition throughout the Cold War. It depicts international affairs as a struggle for power among self-interested states and is generally pessimistic about the prospects for eliminating conflict and war. Realism dominated in the Cold War years because it provided simple but powerful explanations for war, alliances, imperialism, obstacles to cooperation and other international phenomena (Walt, 1998,2).

Realism prevailed over idealism because of the Second World War and has long been recognized as the most prominent theory of war and peace, which is regarded as the most pressing issue in international politics. Although it has many variants, realism as a general approach has a number of characteristics: states are the principal actors in a world without common government; they are unitary and rational actors driven by self-interest; they operate in international anarchy and thus face threats from other states; within this self-help system, they are 'both offensively-oriented and defensively-oriented' (Peou, 2002, 120).

Ideology and historical experience have little impact in realism. Realists downplay the 'democratic peace' thesis and disregard the impact of liberal and non-liberal values on state behavior. And history does not matter: states have similar interests decided in terms of power regardless of time and space; war is a constant possibility, and there is no progress toward perpetual peace. As Robert Jervis puts it, 'To conceive of international politics as a Hobbesian state of nature means not that warfare is constant, but only that it is always a possibility and that actors understand this' (Jervis 1998, 986). International cooperation is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to achieve because of the security dilemma as well as states' concerns about relative gains, but is more likely in a temporary military context. Balance-of-power systems are generally seen as the main recipe for peace and stability (Peou, 2002, 121).

The main arguments of realism can thus be summarized as follows: international relations are shaped by actors that are nation-states (unit of analysis); actors are "rational" and try to maximize their wants (interests) in an objectively knowable world. Yet, national desires are infinitive whereas resources for obtaining them are strictly limited (power-interest dichotomy). Therefore, states could

minimize costs and maximize utility if they pursue their national interests in accordance with their power capabilities in the international system (Eralp, 2001).

Realism is not a single theory, of course, and realist thought evolved considerably throughout the Cold War. As time passed, in which the world witnessed new phenomena and developments, the field of international relations theory, too, observed new approaches to better account for these developments in world affairs, such as decision-making analysis, systemic discussions, behavioralism, structuralism and neo-realism. As argued (Walt, 1998) , they did not change the main core of realist premises but only improved. For instance, as noted by Eralp (no date), behavioralism did not attack on the fundamental assumptions of realism, but challenge traditionalist realist methods to make it more scientific/data oriented. Neo-realism introduced new actors in addition to nation-state without challenging the dominance of the latter. It gave emphasis also economic issues beside the issues of high-politics such as security and military concerns, with a view to transnational firms and thus increasing interdependence among states. Structuralist introduced the concept of structure as a level of analysis .

It is even argued that neo-liberalist institutionalism which gained importance in the Cold War years starting from the early 1970s, accepted many realist assumptions notably the anarchic nature of the international system, though contested its conclusions and gave emphasis on the fact that states can still cooperate even under anarchy. Still, they have drawn increasing criticism for its failure to break more radically with realist assumptions (Hyde-price, 2001).

Within the context of IR, several theories such as classical realism, neo-realism and liberal institutionalism employed rational actor model. It is assumed by all that foreign policies of states are made on behalf of the nations by unitary actors and are used for the maximization of strategic goals. Moreover, each state is depicted as an individual actor with its own goals, options and risk capability. Action is used as a response to problems facing the state. Decisions are made by a cost-benefit form of calculus and are used for maximizing national interest.

A general review of the foregoing seems to suggest that realism has continued to be the main understanding throughout the Cold War though its assumptions have increasingly been improved/refined by the new approaches in time. Together with these approaches that were all rationalist based like realism, the Cold War can be seen as an era of mainstream scholarship.

The intellectual dominance of realist paradigms is even characterized by one scholar to assert   that realism was the dominant discourse from about the start of the late medieval period in 1300 to at least 1989 (Mersheimer, 1998). In this context, the theoretical implications of the end of the Cold War may be summarized as such: the increasing critics of mainstream approaches of IR on the basis of their predictive failure to anticipate the events leading to the demise of the Eastern Bloc.

The debate over theoretical implications of the end of the Cold War is part and parcel of the external-contextual history of IR theory. Taken in this way, it necessarily implies a theoretical turn corresponding to worldly events, as the First and Second World Wars had displayed such points of departures. As argued, the critiques against the mainstream scholarship and the theoretical innovations engendered by the end of the Cold War are of a conjunctural nature mostly determined exogenously to the external developments. The intellectual ferment in the domain of IR theory to the event is appreciated to indicate the weaknesses of existing theoretical approaches, no matter how much the critiques are formulated on the basis of ex post facto explanations.

It is argued, in fact, excellent critiques against neo-realism as the dominant discourse of the theoretical field had already been well-established before the end of the Cold War at the most abstract levels involving philosophical and meta-theoretical discussions (Ashley, 1984; Ruggie, 1986). The critics, nevertheless, were vilified for lack of empirical evidence supporting their arguments. In such a context, the peaceful end of the Cold War provided seemingly the appropriate context in which alternative theories as opposed to conventional ones could present powerful explanations with empirical support.

The impulse of these new approaches was so immense that a leading mainstream theorist of international relations, Robert Keohane (1988), in his presidential address to ISA (International Studies Association) in 1988, conceded that how interpretive-critical approaches constituted a counter block against mainstream ones. Putting the former as 'reflective' and the latter as 'rationalistic,' he confessed that the era of critical thinking was already under way.

This era was later labelled as "Third Debate" by Yosef Lapid's famous work "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-positivist Era" (1989).

In this decade, critical approaches like constructivism attacked directly the underlying positivist precepts of mainstream IR theory. They were inward looking, concerned primarily with undermining the very foundations of dominant discourses of IR theory. In this respect, they served a valuable purpose of fracturing and destabilizing the positivist/rationalist hegemony, which can be seen as a necessary first step in the pursuit of establishing a new perspective in world politics. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War brought new interest in the search for ideational, normative and cultural explanations for state behaviours in the international system, as the theoretical problematique of mainstream scholarship became increasingly pronounced by scholars.

Critical international theory is a broad school, encompassing modern and postmodern variants. These variants are generally united by a number of common intellectual orientations. As Reus-Smit (1996) puts, e*pistemologically*, critical theorists question positivist approaches to knowledge, criticizing attempts to formulate objective, empirically verifiable truth statements about the natural and social world. *Methodologically*, they reject the hegemony of a single scientific method, advocating a plurality of approaches to the generation of knowledge, privileging interpretive strategies. *Ontologically,* they challenge rationalist conceptions of human nature and action, stressing instead the social construction of actors' identities, and the importance of identity in the constitution of interests and action.

The last decade has then seen the emergence of two main intellectual positions in IR theory. These are commonly classified as rationalism and reflectivism. Rationalism is the cover-all term given to what Ole Waever has called the "neo-neo synthesis" , namely the "debate" between neo realism and neoliberalism. Rationalism dominates the mainstream of the discipline, and, despite their differences, neorealism and neoliberalism share basically the same view of the world (ontology), and, crucially, the same view of what counts as reliable knowledge about that world (epistemology).

On the other hand, Reflectivist approaches are often attacked for their epistemological assumptions. In particular they are criticized for not being social science and thereby not counting as reliable knowledge about the world. Reflectivists are thus presented by the mainstream as operating outside of the acceptable realm of academic study; they are not intellectually legitimate (Smith, 2001, 41-42).

Yet, the interpretive approaches start with the understanding that human beings are fundamentally self-interpreting and self-defining . They live in a world of cultural meaning, that is a 'web of meaning' which is comprised of 'intersubjective meanings'. As a consequence, the social world—in contrast to the natural world—is itself partly constituted by self-interpretation and self-definition. That has led to the epistemological claim that knowledge generating activity is in large part an interpretation, a subjective matter as opposed to the positivist claims of objectivity. Finally, the attempt to save interpretation from the positivist mode of analysis and the search for a match between ontology, epistemology, and methodology has raised meta-theoretical concerns.

In sum, in view of the foregoing, international Relations Theory at the end of the Cold War era, has undergone an important transformation. The third debate in its broadest sense—inter-paradigm and post-positivist debates—and the end of the Cold War had significant implications for IR theories. The critical approaches of the third debate attacked directly to the underlying positivist precepts of mainstream IR theory.

In such juncture, the extreme sides whether materialist or subjective, agential or structural ontology, causal or interpretive methodology (causation or constitution), or foundational-explanatory or anti-foundational-interpretive epistemology in aforementioned debates necessarily emerged. The ones who were dissatisfied with both extreme positioning chose another path, *constructivism* (Checkel, 2004).

Constructivism emerged in this environment and became a viable approach to the study of IR and thus FPA as constructivists believe that the FPA/IP split need not have occurred and constructivism provides the "tools for putting the two fields back together.

B. CONSTRUCTIVIST TURN IN IR

The contours of IR Theory in recent years have been broadened. The mainstream theories of IR have been seriously challenged by critical approaches. This is because they challenged the underlying ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of conventional approaches in IR Theory. Constructivism[2] emerged as an analytical framework in this regard but it challenged mainstream IR theory largely on ontological grounds. To constructivism, it is the ontology that basically determines epistemology and methodology.

Thus, it is also argued that constructivism is a product of the third debate in the sense that it is related to the confluence of diverse anti-positivistic philosophical and sociological trends (Adler, 2002).

In his 1988 presidential address to the International Studies Association, Robert Keohane noted the rise of a new approach to international politics and put forward a challenge: Success or failure of the new approach would depend on its ability to inspire and support a vigorous program of empirical research (Keohane 1988). Keohane referred to this new approach as a "reflective" approach; since then, the standard name has become "constructivism."

The last decade has witnessed a renaissance in 'social' theorising about international relations. In the American core of the discipline, neo-realists long

denied that relations between states had any social content, and neo-liberals, while acknowledging the existence of an international society, understood social interaction among states as little more than strategically induced institutional co-operation. This rationalist condominium was challenged, however, by the advent of constructivism in the 1990s. Constructivists see international relations as deeply social, as a realm of action in which the identities and interests of states and other actors are discursively structured by intersubjective rules, norms and institutions (Reus-Smit, 2002).

i. **DEFINITION**

Although constructivism is a widely used term in IR, Emanuel Adler (1997, 320) points out that "there is very little clarity and even less consensus as to its nature and substance." The term "constructivism" in the realm of IR and foreign policy studies was initially introduced by Onuf. In simple terms, it means that "people and societies construct, or constitute, each other" (Onuf, 1989,38).

Discussing the subject at the philosophical level, he locates it against the empiricist and realist assumptions of working science. The constructivism, as Onuf (1989, 40) prefers, "does not draw a sharp distinction between material and social realities- the material and the social contaminate each other, but variably—and it does not grant sovereignty to either the material or the social by defining the other out of existence."

Constructivism has two core assumptions. First, the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. Second, these structures shape actor's identities and interests, not just their behaviour (Wendt, 1995). Constructivism takes the world to be emergent and constituted both by knowledge and material factors. Far from denying a reality to the material world, constructivists claim that how the material world shapes, changes, and affects human interaction, and is affected by it, depends on prior and changing epistemic and normative interpretations of the material world. Based on this, it is argued that constructivism uniquely brings an understanding of world politics to theories (Hopf, 1998) .

As argued (Wendt, 1999), constructivism is in this sense a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.

Emanuel Adler (1997, 322) defines constructivism as "the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on a dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world."

"Constructivism is about human consciousness and its role in international life" (Ruggie 1998:856). Constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or "intersubjective" ideas and understandings on social life. Specifically, constructivism is an approach to social analysis that asserts the following: (a) human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational factors, not simply material ones; (b) the most important ideational factors are widely shared or "intersubjective" beliefs, which are not reducible to individuals; and (c) these shared beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors (Adler 1997, Ruggie 1998, Wendt 1999).

Constructivism focuses on "social facts"—things like sovereignty and rights, which have no material reality but exist only because people collectively believe they exist and act accordingly. Understanding how social facts change and the ways these influence politics is the major concern of constructivist analysis.

Constructivism in general embraces mediative epistemology maintaining that there is an objective reality out there but that it is attained and observed through mediation. As Alexander Wendt (1995, 75) , a modernist constructivist, argues,

> all observation is theory-laden in the sense that what we see is mediated by our existing theories, and to that extent knowledge is inherently problematic. But this does not mean that observation, let alone reality is

theory-determined. The world is still out there constraining our beliefs, and may punish us for incorrect ones.

Whether modernist or postmodernist in orientation, constructivists advance three core ontological propositions. The first of these asserts the primacy of normative, or ideational, structures over material structures. This is partly because constructivists hold that systems of meaning define how actors interpret their material environment. As Wendt (1995, 73) puts it, 'material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded'. A further reason for privileging the ideational over the material, associated with the second proposition below, is the constructivist emphasis on how actors' social identities shape their interests and actions, and social identities, they contend, are defined by institutionalized meaning systems. "All institutions have a structural dimension", Wendt and Duvall (1989,60) argue, "made up of one or more internal relations or constitutive principles, that generates socially empowered and interested state agents as a function of their respective occupancy of the positions defined by those principles".

Their third ontological proposition claims that agents and structures are mutually constituted. Constructivists stress the way in which normative, or ideational, structures 'define the meaning and identity of the individual [actor] and the patterns of appropriate economic, political, and cultural activity engaged in by those individuals'. But in spite of the considerable constitutive power they attribute to such structures, constructivists insist that they do not exist independently of the knowledgeable practices of social agents (Reus-Smit, 1996).

In constructivism, constitutive theory is of particular importance as it examines the social structure of action: how norms function in temporal and spatial settings to make some actions possible and others impossible. Significant is the role of identity in constituting action. For instance, as noted by Farrell (2002,57) in explaining why a relatively weak Sweden went to war against the powerful Habsburg empire in 1630, it is argued that Sweden so acted to affirm and play out its identity as a great European power. Previous attempts (short of war) by Swedish leaders to gain

recognition of this identity had failed and had been rudely rebuffed by the Hapsburg emperor in particular.

In short, the main importance of the constitutive theorizing lies with the understanding of the world through a lens. In other words, this theorizing argues that states see the outside world through a lens before their eyes that is composed of inter-subjective values and cognition. This lens and its substance help states perceive and thus construct the outside world.

As in real-world politics, in the study of international relations it has become increasingly fashionable to claim the middle ground. It is a fact that one contender for the middle ground is a general research orientation or school of thought known as constructivism.

In this sense, social constructivism, which builds on the work of the English school, seeks to offer a third way between positivism and postpositivism (Hyde-price, 2001).   It is commonly self-consciously portrayed as an approach that lies between rationalism and reflectivism, and as such it can be seen as a *middle ground* or a *via media* (Smith, 2001,43).

Constructivism is welcomed in the sense that it represents a bridge between the extremes: positivist/rationalist based mainstream theories and radical interpretive critical theories. While the former brand is contested with its positivist/rationalist underpinnings, neglect of domestic and discursive explanations in international relations and with its shortcomings to explain change, the latter is disputed with its heavy reliance on discursive side of international politics and lack of a research program with empirical records. Constructivism, albeit drawing from both theoretical traditions, seizes the middle ground between them.   Adler (2002,98) explains this as follows:

> Constructivism seizes the middle ground because it is interested in understanding how the *material,* subjective and intersubjective worlds interact in the construction of reality, and because, rather than focusing exclusively on how structures constitute agent's identities and interests, it also seeks to explain how *individual agents* socially construct these structures in the first place.

In view of the foregoing, one can thus mention the following in short about constructivism: Constructivism is the result of the theoretical debates which in the 1970s have come to shape a triangle with the three corners of liberalism, realism and radicalism. In the 1980s, that triangle has taken the shape of a kite stretching towards the extreme of rationalism beyond its head, and towards reflectivism at its tail, respectively. The difference between the two is epistemological (Wienner, 2003).

Between these poles of theoretical understanding, constructivism is located somewhere in the middle ground between the two poles of rationalist (e.g. neo-realism, neo-liberal institutionalism) vs. reflectivist (e.g. postmodernist, post-structuralist) approaches which are perceived as diametrically opposed in their fundamental assumptions (Keohane, 1988). Constructivist thinking has subsequently acquired something akin to the role of mediator between incommensurable standpoints.

Most constructivists point out aspects of commonality with and distinction from both extreme poles; they 'juxtapose constructivism with rationalism and post-structuralism' to then 'justify its claim to the middle ground' (Adler 1997b, 321). In a way, for constructivists, seizing the middle ground means distancing themselves from the rationalist and the reflectivist poles, respectively. To be sure, distance to the respective poles varies among different constructivists. Subsequently, analytical tools and theoretical conclusions do not overlap either. In this senses, as argued, instead of seizing the middle ground, constructivists actually contribute to establish a middle ground for those who do not agree with the two extreme poles. This process involves the process of distancing a position from the two extreme poles, and establishing relations among different constructivist approaches as well.

In brief, Keith Krause (1998, 316-17) summarizes the basics of constructivism as follows:

1) The principle actors in world politics whether states or other agents are socially constructed through both ideational and material resources.

2) The actors and subjects in world politics are constituted and endowed collective meanings and identities through practices and representations. The practices can be composed of both discursive and non-discursive elements.

3) World politics is not static and its structures are socially constructed. Change is possible but also difficult because these structures are relatively stable.

4) The attainment of objective knowledge of the subjects, structures and practices of world politics is difficult because the facts are only grasped through mediation. They are collectively mediative facts.

5) The appropriate methodology is interpretivism. The research interests are to examine how the agents see and understand the world; the subjects, practices and how they attach meanings to them.

6) The purpose of theory is neither explanation nor prediction with a view to transhistorical or ahistorical generalizable causal claims but to better understand the outside world within a given time and space framework.

ii. ROOTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism emerged as an approach to break the stalemate that the neorealist and neoliberal debate resulted in. Its critiques of these two dominant theoretical traditions focus on what they take for granted or ignore. Constructivism studies the sources and the content of state interests and preferences which are postulated, and it emphasizes the ideational and social side of international politics which is ignored by neorealism and neoliberalism. In order to grasp better what constructivism is in IR one should investigate its origins.

The imminent origins of constructivism can be found within the Third Debate. As a "meta-theoretical project", not a substantive analysis of international relations, the Third Debate opened a space at the meta-theoretical level to advance

a new perspective on world politics by undermining both the 'rationalist/positivist hegemony' and the very foundations of the dominant discourses of IR theory (Price and Reus-Smit, 1998: 263). Within that space, constructivism emerged.

Constructivism is a branch of international relations theory that draws on phenomenological variants of sociology and social psychology, particularly structuration theory, symbolic interactionism, ethnomethodology, and role-theory.

Here one should start by trying to categorize social constructivist approaches in the context of international relations. As noted by Smith (2001, 39) , its intellectual lineage is a long one, having its philosophical roots in the writings of Weber, and Wittgenstein. In the social sciences the first book to use the phrase "social constructivism" in its title was Berger and Luckmann's The Social Construction of Reality (1966), although the approach was central to the work of the sociologist Alfred Schultz, whose The Phenomenology of the Social World (1967) is the classic statement of a Weberian position.

It is also argued that social constructivism in international relations today remains indebted to Durkheim. John Ruggie (1998, 856) finds the initial roots of constructivism in 'the sociology of Emile Durkheim and Max Weber' resisting the ascending tide of 'utilitarianism and methodological individualism' to which neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories of IR are indebted as their origins and sources in the late nineteenth century.

Durkheim sought to demonstrate how a variety of social outcomes, ranging from patterns of social cooperation to individual feelings of anomie and differential suicide rates were influenced by the different interpersonal bonds of social order that are embodied within the reference groups to which individuals belong, from the family on up to society as a whole. Durkheim held that ideational factors have their own specifity and integrity as a result of which they cannot be reduced to other factors. But, at the same time, these ideational factors are no less ''natural'' than material reality and, therefore, are as susceptible to normal scientific modes of inquiry (Ruggie, 1998, 857) .

There are also two major elements in the constructivist notion of structure both drawn from Anthony Giddens's structuration theory. Material resources represent the first element. Resources are the physical properties and capabilities of actors (in this case states). These include such factors as geography, climate, population, natural resource base, industrial strength, wealth, levels of armaments, and technological and organizational capabilities. Rules make up the second element of structure. As Dessler (1989) notes, rules are "frameworks of meaning...the media through which [states] communicate with one another and coordinate their actions." These rules can be "regulative," in the sense of prescribing and proscribing behavior in defined circumstances (for example, norms and other guides to legitimate action), or "constitutive," in the sense of creating or defining new types of behavior and making that behavior meaningful (for example, conventions and shared beliefs about the nature of the world). In addition, these rules can be either explicit or implicit." When the collection of resources and rules evolves into relatively stable sets of intersubjective meanings across time and space, they are referred to as "institutions." Once "institutionalized" these meanings exist as "objective" and "external" facts defining social reality, and it is only then that structure can be said truly to "exist".

Constructivism can also trace its origins to the "English School". This school, which interprets IR as being social and historical, and which stresses the existence of an international society driven by norms and identity, played a role in promoting constructivist ideas. Similarly, the Copenhagen School, which is formed by a proponent scholar of the English School, Barry Buzan with Ole Weaver, is too considered to have played a role on the evolution of constructivism. Both emphasize the importance of identity-building and shared norms (Adler, 2002, 101) .

As extensively discussed by Reus-Smit in his article (2002), the English School is the Grotian tradition represented by Hedley Bull. From this perspective the international system is a "society" in which states, as a condition of their participation in the system, adhere to shared norms and rules in a variety of issue areas. Material power matters, but within a framework of normative expectations embedded in public and customary international law. Scholars in this tradition have not focused explicitly on how norms construct states with specific identities and interests. But sociological imagery is strong in their work; it is not a great leap from

arguing that adherence to norms is a condition of participation in a society to arguing that states are constructed, partly or substantially, by these norms.

The English School had long emphasized the social aspects of international life, such as the way in which culture conditions the identities of states, and how social dynamics underlie the institutions that sustain international order. Not surprisingly, constructivists and English School scholars have frequently identified each other as fellow travelers, as having complementary projects at the 'social vanguard' of the field.

In view of all these roots influencing it, constructivism seems to be eclectic, yet synthetic in nature. Eclectic because it relies on diverse array of scholarship - structuration theory, post-positivist epistemology, intersubjective ontology, social theory of identity-,   synthetic because it brings them together to form a coherent whole body of theoretical assumptions.

iii. VARIANTS OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism is not monolithic. It basically comes in two forms, though under different labels: "modernists and postmodernists", "problem solving and critical", or "conventional and critical". Indeed, constructivism is part of the critical theory. But as Adler (2002) argues, it has own distinctions that make it a unique approach in IR theories.

The different strands of constructivism can be measured according to the extent of how far they are distant/close from/to critical approaches or from/to mainstream approaches in terms of epistemology and methodology.

There are many attempts in the literature to classify the main currents of constructivist thought in international relations. Ruggie (1998, 35—36) distinguished 3 variants of social constructivism: *neoclassical*, based on intersubjective meanings and derived from Durkheim and Weber; *postmodernist,* based on a decisive epistemological break with modernism and derived from the works of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Derrida; and *naturalistic*, based on the philosophical doctrine of

scientific realism and derived from the work of Bhaskar. Adler (1997a, 335-336), building on the work of Lynch and Klotz, distinguishes four forms of constructivism: *modernist, rule-based, narrative knowing,* and *postmodernist.* For Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner (1998, 675—678), there are also three versions: *conventional, critical*, and *postmodern.* Wendt (1992, 1999) relied at different times on two main strands of theoretical work, the symbolic interactionism of Mead and the scientific realism of, among others, Bhaskar.

Another body of scholarship, poststructural international relations theory, also pursues a radical constructivist position. As noted (Jeppereson, Wendt and Katzenstein, 1996) by beginning with the work of Richard Ashley, poststructuralists have focused on how state identities are, down to their core, ongoing accomplishments of discursive practices. Crucial among these practices is foreign policy, which produces and reproduces the territorial boundaries that seem essential to the state.

Despite this wide range of constructivist understanding , as stated earlier, the variants of constructivism can be kept under two general modes of understanding. They are modernist and post-modernist .

Like critical theory of the Third Debate, constructivism takes modernist and postmodernist forms. The shift away from high epistemological, methodological, and normative debate toward greater analytical engagement has, however, shelved, if not entirely defused, some of the more contentious differences between the two orientations. Constructivists of both persuasions now uphold the importance of question driven research.

The deep epistemological contention of the Third Debate is also reflected within the constructivist camp and it divides the constructivists on epistemological grounds. Modern constructivism has 'minimal foundationalism' whereas critical (post-modern) constructivism is 'anti/non-foundationalist.' However, both forms are situated within a broad range of critical scholarship because constructivism expands the contours of IR theory, promoting theoretical pluralism in Yosef Lapid's (1989) characterization of post-positivist opening within IR.

Both modern and postmodern constructivists emphasize the role and importance of intersubjective structures and collective meanings for understanding the social world.

Again the difference however arises as to the content of those structures. Modernists such as Alexander Wendt (1995: 73) postulate the composition of social structures as "shared knowledge, material resources and practices" and take them as "real and objective, not 'just talk,' " while postmodern constructivists solely rely on discursive practices, and thus downgrade the material resources in forming social structures.

Constructivists for the most part take identities, norms and cultures as independent explanatory variables with constitutive powers but the conceptualization of these terms and their explanatory power differ according to by whom they are employed.

One point of difference is causality—explanatory power—and the other is normative—identity conceptualization. Modern constructivists explore and discover how particular identities are socially constructed and they make use of them through empowering causal roles because they think that the structures of identities, norms and cultures are relatively stable and enduring. Identities are conceptualized in terms of a self-other dichotomy by having recourse to structurationist perspective. Modern constructivists therefore have no normative interest as to the peculiar construction or changing of identities. In contrast to modernists, postmodern constructivists seek to discover not only the myths associated with a particular identity formation but also to discover alternative narratives for that formation. They are also skeptical of causality attributed to contested and constructed identities. They emphasize the contested nature and multiple dimensions of identities. Furthermore, they conceptualize identities in terms of a 'dialogism' incorporating an axiological dimension of value judgment as to the 'other.' They have thus a normative commitment in the sense that identities are defined with a respect for difference in terms of the self-other constitution.

Modern and postmodern constructivists accept the constitutive or quasi-causal power of knowledge, ideas and social practices in contrast to the straight causality of behavioralists or meaning oriented behavioralists . These are valued not as individual level phenomena and properties but in fact as collective, shared ; meanings and practices (Küçük, 1999). For modernists they are social facts though unobservable, because they show resistance when we act upon them. Their   effects and   constitutive   powers   are   known   with   observable   outcomes. Constructivism for all strands is reflexive in the sense that both agents and structures are mutually constructed and they are co-determined.   Individuals   and society constitute each other.

In spite of the different questions they pursue, their common concern with the constitutive role of inter subjective meanings leads modernist and postmodernist constructivists alike to embrace a broadly defined interpretive methodology.

Modernist constructivism has assumed two principal forms. Modifying Waltz's classic typology, these variants can be classified as   'third image constructivism' and 'fourth image constructivism' (Reus-Smit, 1996, 11) . The former accepts the neorealist penchant for systemic theory (Waltz's third image), while the latter adopts a more encompassing perspective that seeks to incorporate domestic and international phenomena (Waltz's second and third images combined). Fourth image constructivism is more concrete and historical, consciously shunning Wendtian systemic theorizing. Concerned with the dynamics of international change, its leading proponents—Kratochwil and Ruggie—treat domestic and international structures and processes as two faces of a single, global social order. They then consider the mutually constitutive relationship between this order and the state. This does not mean that they deny the existence of domestic and international realms, instead they see this partitioning as a unique historical construct, the chief consequence and characteristic of a distinctly modern political order built around territorial sovereign states.

Postmodernist constructivism has also taken two forms, though the distinction here is less one of analytical perspective than empirical focus. In general, postmodernist constructivists are concerned with excavating and interpreting the

intersubjective meanings that comprise the institutional arrangements structuring international political life. Employing the genealogical method of Nietzsche and Foucault, they seek 'to identify the accidents, the minute deviations—or conversely, the complete reversals—the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value for us' (Reus-Smit, 1996,12).

In addition to these variants, even if the application of the label 'constructivist' is limited to those who claim it themselves, there is still a tremendous variety of work left. Some are interested in the significance of norms and identity for the construction of reality. Others make norms defined as shared expectations about appropriate behaviour central to their argument. There are contributions to the question of community building in relation to security issues, explorations of the construction of national interests, analyses of language games (Kubalkova, 2001, 8) .

What is common in all these variants is the constitutive mode of theorizing. In fact, constructivism is rather called "constitutive theory" in the English school. In this regard, its emphasis on the ideational factors in addition to material ones in the construction of foreign policy and international relations and the role of identity in this construction are all shared by these variants.

In this context, among the modernist constructivism lies the conventional constructivism that is the theoretical perspective applied in this thesis.

iv. CONVENTIONAL CONSTRUCTIVISM

The Third Debate, which emerged in the late eighties, challenged the positivist underpinnings of mainstream IR theory. Critical theorists, such as Robert Cox, and poststructural thinkers, such as Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, set out to deconstruct Waltzian neorealism, demonstrating how it cast the boundaries of thought and reason within the discipline (Fierke, 2002,332). Waltz was criticized for blocking out the distinctiveness of culture, for ignoring historical contingency, and for the inability of his theory to account for change. By deconstructing the language

of neorealism, the critics sought to unlock the prison of realist thought and to celebrate the possibility of theoretical diversity (Fierke, 2002,332).

This was not the first time a dominant orthodoxy had met with challengers. But this challenge was qualitatively different insofar as it presented a threat to the scientific foundations of the discipline. Thus, the postmodern challenge in IR was not merely accommodated like others in the past; in this case, senior scholars, responding primarily to demands from students, instead set out to domesticate the critique. Conventional constructivism was the result. While emphasizing the importance of interpretivism and constitutive theorizing, the conventional constructivists maintained many of the methodological assumptions of positivist social science, including the emphasis on causality and hypothesis testing.

As Farrell (2002) puts, the constructivist project is not to change the world, but to understand it. The epistemological approach taken by the constructivists discussed in this essay is a conventional but not a critical one, whose purpose is to build knowledge about the world and contribute to mainstream IR debate.

Conventional constructivism, which is the school mainly dominant in the US, examines the role of norms and identity in shaping international political outcomes. These scholars in contrast to the interpretative and critical/radical variants that enjoy greater popularity in Europe, are largely positivist in epistemological orientation and strong advocates of bridge-building among diverse theoretical perspectives; the qualitative, process-tracing case study is their methodological starting point. Sociology and elements of institutional/organisational theory are sources of theoretical inspiration.

In this respect, a contrasting perspective is offered by Checkel and Adler: radical constructivism should be considered as 'reflectivism,' completely separate from conventional constructivism (Farrell, 2002).

There is a deep divide between radical constructivism and conventional constructivism. The ontology, epistemology, and methodology of radical constructivism is limited; all that exists (ontology) and can be known (epistemology)

is ideational, and the method of studying it (methodology) is limited to discourse analysis, while conventional constructivism admits both a material and ideational reality, it argues that the unobservable can be known, and accepts a variety of methods for studying reality. Thus, radical theories are sufficiently different as to be classified as reflectivist, instead of as constructivist (Kubalkova, 1998) .

The famous "theatre- in fire" scenario of Arnold Wolfers seems to underline the value of conventional constructivism to explain the unexplained by the mainstream scholarship as well as by the critical constructivism. The scenario is a fire where all run for the exists. But absent knowledge of social practices or constitutive norms, structure, even in this seemingly over- determined circumstances, is still indeterminate. Even in a theater with just one door, who goes first? Are they the strongest or the disabled, the women or children, or is it just a mad dash? Determining the outcome will require knowing more about the situation than about the distribution of material power or the structure of authority. Therefore, one will need to know about the norms, culture, institutions, social practices and thus identities that constitute the actors and the structure alike (Hopf, 1998, 173).

This example shows that positivism is valid in the sense that everybody tries to run away from the fire . There is a material danger to them and every one can easily interpret this as a danger unless there is a mental problem they suffer from. This underlines the fact that the world is not totally post-positivist, in which even such material dangers would be constructed as not a danger depending on the intersubjective interpretation of the person who faces the fire.

However, although the fire represents a material danger in the positivist sense, the reaction of people differ . Some run to exist I,   some to exist II or others might even stay put. Therefore, people do not necessarily follow a positivist course in the face of a material threat. Their reaction to the fire depends on their ideas about the fire and the danger it creates. This reflects the importance of ideational factors along with the material conditions of the world.

Constructivism does not wholly disavow the importance of material resources as radical constructivists do but it examines how cognitions are attributed to the

material factors. For example, as put by Farrell (2002), the missiles in a country may pose a threat to some states; and not to others. They may even be regarded by some as tools of security. In other words, the same missiles have different meanings for different actors across time and space because the meanings attached to these material resources differ depending on the nature of social structure (of enmity or amity) between the actors.

It is with conventional constructivism we can see this picture so clear, because conventional constructivism does not reject the positivist world but approaches it with post-positivist tools to better explain the situation. As such, conventional constructivism truly does represent a middle ground between strictly materialist-individualist rationalist perspectives and strictly ideational-structural reflectivist perspectives.

Conventional constructivists have positioned themselves in a "middle ground" between mainstream rationalist approaches to international relations and more critical constructivists (Adler, 1997a).

Yet, it is generally argued that in this middle ground conventional constructivism lies at the closest end of the spectrum to the rationalist side rather than to the critical post-modernist one. This even leads to arguments that social constructivism is mainly a rationalist enterprise, because it shares methodological and epistemological assumptions with rationalism (most obviously with neoliberal institutionalism). By contrast, the gap between social constructivism and reflectivist work is fundamental (Farrell, 2002, and Smith, 2001).

To better understand the *via media* role of conventional constructivism, it is of particular utility to refer to the works of Wendt and Onuf, who are, as generally seen, the real representatives of this variant of constructivism.

Wendt's work is addressed to the 'mainstream' . In his influential "Anarchy Is What States Make of It" (1992), he locates his approach, with respect to the debate

between Realists and liberals, where both sides share a commitment to rationalism and thus the assumption that agents' identities and interests are given.

For him, constructivism is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.

Wendt subscribes to the notion that states are central and to the view that the structures of the international system are crucially important, both fundamental positions of (Neo)Realism. His move away from this position lies in emphasizing intersubjectivity. Structure in Wendt's approach is different from the distribution of capabilities Kenneth Waltz is concerned with. It exists only through process . And, significantly, process, i.e. what people do, is related to meaning. Wendt refers to two fundamental principles of constructivist social theory. Firstly, people's actions are based on meanings and, secondly, meaning arises out of interaction . The significance of meaning rather than material structures encapsulates the move away from Realist claims and it hinges on the concept of identity. Identity makes possible the claim that international politics is constructed. Wendt argues that the way international relations are played out is not given but socially constructed. Briefly, we live in a world in which identities and interests are learned and sustained by intersubjectively grounded.

On the other hand, there is also a powerful tradition within social (modern) constructivism that both paints a very different view of the social world from that painted by Wendt, and opens up real room for the analysis of foreign policy. This, of course, is the strand of constructivism founded by Onuf and carried on by the Miami IR Group.

The key point of difference between this form of social constructivism and that offered by Wendt is that it sees a very different kind of social world, one in which actors, whoever they are, are governed by language, rules, and choices. This view of the social world has its intellectual roots in the work of writers such as Wittgenstein and Winch, and thus, it is a view that does not subscribe to the naturalism of Wendt. It is precisely this form of social constructivism that offers both a role for foreign policy, rather than treating the state as "a pre-social given" that forms its identity only through interactions with other states. Whereas Wendtian social construction offers little room for the social construction of foreign policy from within the state, the Miami IR Group version seems to offer an active role for the domestic construction of foreign policy.

This is supported by the main moves that Onuf makes in his 1989 book, "World of Our Making", and also by his chapter in the 1998 volume edited by Kubalkova, Onuf, and Kowert. Onuf's position is based explicitly on the notion of a speech act and on the claim that "saying is doing: talking is undoubtedly the most important way that we go about making the world what it is" (Onuf 1998, 59). Onuf focuses on three elements of the social world, namely individuals, society, and the rules that link them.

In this sense, as compared by Zefhuss (2002), Wendt's move is limited because he does not take into account the dimension of language and excludes the domestic from consideration. The upshot of all this is that whereas Wendtian social construction offers little room for domestic political influences on foreign policy (it is, after all, self-consciously a structural theory), the version adopted by Onuf and the Miami IR Group opens up the possibility for exactly this kind of domestic influence: indeed, it positively requires it because of how it sees collective social actors gaining agency.

As Wendt fails to pay enough attention to the importance of the speech acts, this part also is covered by Onuf. He (1989) subscribes to the view that the social world is constructed by deeds which may consist in the speaking of words rather than some physical activity. This notion is developed in speech act theory. As Onuf

argues, the distinctive claim of the theory of speech acts is that language is both representative and performative. People use words to represent deeds and they can use words, and words alone, to perform deeds'. Human beings construct reality through their deeds. Crucially, these deeds may be speech acts. Speech acts in turn may, through repetition, be institutionalized into rules and thereby provide the context and basis for meaning of human action.

In view of the preceding arguments, the following can be said for conventional constructivism: To the degree that constructivism creates ontological and epistemological distance between itself and its origins in critical theory, it becomes conventional. Such constructivism does also not reject such premises prevalent in mainstream scholarship, but provide different yet complementary explanations. It is thus interpreted as a *via media* approach. Importance of the conventional constructivism is that it does not disregard the existence of a world out there, but provides a fuller explanation of it . The versions developed by Wendt and Onuf, which complement each other altogether form the theoretical approach that will be applied in this thesis as the conventional constructivism.

C. COMPARISON OF CONSTRUCTIVISM

As a via media /middle ground approach, Constructivism's main analytical competitors have thus been approaches of two kinds: (*a*) materialist theories, which see political behavior as determined by the physical world alone, and (*b*) individualist theories, which treat collective understandings as simply epiphenomena of individual action and deny that they have causal power or ontological status. All constructivist analyses use an ideational ontology and holism in some way.

Constructivism that operates at a different level of abstraction is a different kind of theoretical approach on the one side from realism and liberalism along with their versions, and on the other from critical scholarship (Finnenmore, 2001) .

i.   CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP

Constructivism is critical in the sense that it aims to recover the individual and shared meanings that motivate actors to do what they do.   For both constructivists and critical theorists, the world is socially constructed. Both suggest that international politics- the actors, institutions, power, structure, anarchy, etc.- is not ontologically fixed or eternal, but historically contingent across time and space. They do not take for granted the ontological assumptions held as to international politics. In this sense, as earlier mentioned, to the degree that constructivism creates ontological and epistemological distance between itself and its origins in critical theory, it differs from critical theory . Constructivism is a collection of principles distilled from critical social theory but without the latter's more consistent theoretical and epistemological follow-through (Hopf, 1998) .

Price and Reus-Smit (1998, 260) observe the intimate relationship between critical approaches and constructivism that

> though less preoccupied with meta-theoretical issues and disciplinary critique as the core content of their scholarship than Third Debate theorists, constructivists work with ontological assumptions, conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches that originate in critical social theory.

Where constructivism and critical theories closely converge is the area of ontology. For both constructivists and critical theorists, the world is socially constructed. Both suggest that international politics—the actors,, institutions, power, structure, anarchy, etc.—is. not onto logically fixed or eternal but historically contingent across time and space. They do not take for granted the ontological assumptions held as to international politics. They are all questioning the nature of international politics and all ontological presuppositions are put into reevaluation.

Given this close relationship, Realists even tend to lump constructivists with critical theorists and to dismiss them as postmodernists who "deny the possibility of objective knowledge" and instead see "the possibility of endless interpretations of the world around them." There is indeed a literature that draws on critical theory to attack what it considers to be "totalizing discourses" in security studies, such as

realism. These critical constructivists seek to uncover the meaning of state action, and in so doing, they favor an interpretivist epistemology. As Richard Price notes: "Many forms of constructivist scholarship … are not orientated toward making predictions for explaining the role of culture as an independent variable for state behavior" (Farrell, 2002, 56-57). Equally, many forms are, and there is a discrete and large body of scholarship by conventional constructivists seeking to explain how norms shape actors and agency in world politics. Alexander Wendt (1995, 75) states: "Constructivists are modernists who fully endorse the scientific project of falsifying theories against evidence." Wendt then continues: "There is now a substantial body of constructivist empirical work that embodies a wholly conventional epistemology."

Constructivism shares many of the foundational elements of critical theory. Yet, it still resolves some issues by adopting rules of conduct and conventions like mainstream approaches, rather than following critical theory all the way up the post-moderns critical path.

With few exceptions, the pioneers of critical international theory have either ignored the recent wave of constructivist scholarship, or responded hostilely, condemning what they see as constructivism's masked positivism.

In this regard, constructivism is perhaps most distinct from critical approaches on its value-free stance rejecting the cause of emancipation that is held most important by the latter as an ideology. As Wendt (1995, 76) points out, "social construction talk is like game theory talk: analytically neutral between conflict and cooperation." In the hands of critical constructivists, social theory is a weapon for waging war on inequality and injustice in world politics. But the conventional constructivist project is not about replacing one reality of world politics with another. Rather it seeks to explore how the current reality evolved. By showing how the actors and processes of world politics are constituted, conventional constructivists recognize the possibility of alternative worlds. Some also express sympathy for a world with less war and human want. Constructivists care about the world they live in, but this does not translate into a *commitment* to reconstruct it (Wendt, 1999, 21-2).

ii.   MAINSTREAM SCHOLARSHIP

As emphasized by Reus-Smit (1996), the 1990s have witnessed the emergence of a new 'constructivist' approach to international relations theory and analysis. Rejecting the rationalist precepts of neorealism and neoliberalism, constructivists advance a sociological perspective on world politics, emphasizing the primacy of normative over material structures, the role of identity in the constitution of interests and action, and the mutual constitution of agents and structures. They have put these assumptions into an increasingly sophisticated set of theoretical propositions about international relations, demonstrated through a rapidly expanding body of empirical research. The impact of constructivism on international relations scholarship has been substantial, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that the major axis of debate now lies between constructivists on the one hand, and neorealist and neoliberal rationalists on the other.

Constructivists tend to concentrate on the social structure of state action at the level of the international system. As noted by Farrell (2002, 52), what matters most for realists is the material structure of world politics. States do what they have the power to do. For constructivists, states do what they think most appropriate. In so doing, states are guided by norms that define the identities of the main actors in world politics, i.e., modern, bureaucratic, sovereign states and define the formal rules and accepted practices of the international game. While constructivists are interested in exploring how norms shape world politics in general, much of their work ends up dealing with the normative bases of interstate conflict and state use of violence.

Constructivism empirically discovers and reveals how institutions and practices and identities that mainstream takes as natural, given, are in fact the product of human agency and of social construction. They also accept that intersubjective reality and meanings are critical data for understanding the world. And data must be related to, and situated within, the social environment in which they are gathered in order to understand their meaning.

Constructivism in its conventional form offers an alternative understanding of a number of central themes in IR theory, including the meaning of anarchy and

balance of power, the relationship between state identity and interest, an elaboration of power, and the prospects for change in world politics (Krause, 1998) .

Constructivism shares two broad assumptions with neorealism, neoliberalism and liberalism - commitments to both explanation and rationality. First, constructivism seeks primarily to explain, and not simply to interpret, critique or transform the dynamics of international politics. Like rationalism, it makes causal claims, draws out their observable implications, and tests them against the empirical record. This interest in explanation does not rule out critique. But to equate constructivism with idealism or utopianism distorts its scientific thrust. Second, constructivism endorses rationality assumptions. Like neorealism, neoliberalism, and liberalism, it conceives of international and domestic actors in rational pursuit of interests within constraints. Its attention to identity does not imply a focus on irrational forces in world politics. Most constructivists view human rationality - broadly conceived - as a causal mechanism linking interests, constraints, and action. These twin commitments, to explanation and rationality, distinguish constructivism from postmodern approaches. They make it a thoroughly modern, scientific project.

Constructivism and Mainstream scholarship both share fundamental concerns with the role of structure in world politics, the effects of anarchy on state behaviour, the definition of state interest, the nature of power, and the prospects for change. Yet, they disagree fundamentally on each concern. As noted by Hopf (1998,180), for example, in contrast to the mainstream approaches, anarchy has a multiple meaning in the constructivist approach for different actors based on their own communities of inter-subjective understandings and practices. Similarly, for constructivism, identity is an empirical question to be theorized within a historical context whereas mainstream approaches assume that all units of global politics have only one meaningful identity, that of self-interested states. Furthermore, the concept of power is only material in the understanding of mainstream approaches while it is also discursive for constructivism in the sense it is shaped by knowledge, ideas, culture, ideology and language.

Such a comparison reveals important differences between constructivism and mainstream approaches. While mainstream approaches work on the assumption that

there is one objective and knowable world, constructivist scholars pay more attention to epistemology and focus on how things in world affairs are constructed since the world is not objectively knowable (Krause, 1998 302).

Many constructivists change the order of march, as it were, for their research. Instead of beginning with structure, which determines state's interest, as neorealists and neoliberals do, constructivists proceed from identity to interest, and from interest all the way around again to structure, all of which, somewhat vaguely, constitutes culture.

In view of these comparisons, one can draw a main methodological difference between the two approaches. This is related to *"how"* and *"why"* questions. As mentioned by Krause (1998, 317-18) mainstream approaches are concerned with explaining why particular decisions resulting in specific courses of actions were made, while the constructivist one focuses for instance on how threat perceptions, the object of security are socially constructed. Thus, the mainstream mode of scholarship is *explanatory* and the constructivist one is *constitutive* aiming for understanding. How-questions help to understand the nature of threat, the object of security and the possibilities of transformation of security dilemma.   But, mainstream scholars explain them without questioning how they are constructed. Despite this important distinction, it also is argued that these two modes of "how" and "why" are not irrelevant but in fact related. Understanding (constructivist approach) precedes, accompanies, and closes and thus envelops explanation. In return, explanation (mainstream ones) develops understanding analytically.

Similarly, the constructivist approach to FPA that as Hyde-Price (1999) correctly claims, despite its innovative look, is still based on 'realist, positivist and US-centric assumptions', and has many insights to offer: 1) It helps us identify the sources for constructing the national interests which are constitutive for the immediate state actions and behaviours. 2) It saves the identity politics from postmodernists and holds it in a firmer ground that makes it more intelligible in state behaviours. Yet it does not just study the identity impact on foreign policy but looks at the deeper processes of identity and interest formation. 3) It focuses on the

foreign policy making processes within which ideas, culture, knowledge, images, discourses, analogies, metaphors translate into specific policy making proposals to constitute the policy agenda.

Where foreign policy makes sense as the rational pursuit of material interests under constraints - institutional and material, international and domestic - state identity is not central to its explanation. A constructivist might still insist that interests derive from identity - for example, that a state's drive to maximize its wealth or power derives from a sovereign identity. But such a move does not challenge the substance of the rationalist account: it only confirms the rationalist assumption that the pursuit of material interests is the animating force in world politics. One should address rationalist alternatives first, then, not out of any meta-theoretical presumption of their superiority, but for pragmatic reasons. Where they are effective, rationalist arguments are more parsimonious than constructivist alternatives. Only where a interest-based account fails should one put forward a more complex ideational alternative. This clearly shows the close interaction between rationalist and constructivist explanations of the foreign policy.

D.   ANALYSIS OF MAIN   CONCEPTS   IN CONSTRUCTIVISM (IDENTITY, INTERESTS, CULTURE, NORMS,   DISCOURSES (SPEECH ACTS))

The constructivist scholarship approaches   the main concepts that are important in the analysis of IR and foreign polices, such as identity, interest, norms and   culture, with the understanding that they are not given, and thus they need to be analyzed to better account for foreign policies in IR .

Identities:

The identity issue entered into IR full fledged with the critical approaches. However, the mainstream scholarship also acknowledges identity. But, what differs from the latter is that it presumes to know a priori what the self-being is defined.

State as unit is assumed to have a single identity, across time and space whereas constructivism assumes that the selves, or identities, of states are variable, they depend on historical, cultural, political and social context. It also excludes consideration of how specific identities of specific states shape their interests and, thereby, patterns of international outcomes (Hopf, 1998, 176).

Identity concerns in IR have also emerged in the English School, the liberal tradition, and the Copenhagen School. The Copenhagen School, as its representatives affirm, has strong doses of constructivism and is much close to constructivism in their identity and security studies than mainstream in IR. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever point out (1997, 243):

> We prefer to take a social constructivist position 'all the way down.' However, identities as other social constructions can petrify and become relatively constant elements to be reckoned with. Especially, we believe security studies could gain by a constructivism that focuses on how the very security quality is always socially constructed: issues are not security issues by themselves, but defined as such as a result of political processes.

Identities and security issues are socially constructed within a given social structure through numerous processes and social, discursive practices. Buzan and Waever (1997, 243) argue that "when an identity is thus constructed and becomes socially sedimented, it becomes a possible referent object for security." Identity as a relative stable construction not easily malleable, would be an object for security considerations.

As earlier mentioned, the identity *problematique* entered into IR full fledged with the critical theories of the third debate[3]. First, James Der Derian's genealogy of diplomacy demonstrated how the selves and others as human collectivities of states mediate their estrangement by means of diplomacy. Second, Michael J. Shapiro asserted that 'foreign policy is about making an other' and that self-other relations should be understood in their historicity, as emergent entities of historical contingency with a view to time and space. Third, David Campbell in his writing " Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity" describes US foreign policy as a web of discourse and political practice. The US self is narrative of all those discourses and practices regarding its foreign relations. The US in a sense is

an imagined community at its extreme (see Farrell, 2002). In another work, David Campbell notes that because a notion of who/what 'we' are is intertwined with an understanding of who/what 'we' are not and who/what 'we' fear, 'Iraq' exists in a discourse economy out of which the 'United States' (among others) draws and accumulates the moral capital necessary to secure its identity.

Critical approaches to the identity issue in IR theory have been revolving around the margins of the discipline. The constructivist engagement has helped centre it in IR.

Alexander Wendt's (1992) article 'Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power polities' transposed the question of identity formation and collective identity from the margins of the discipline to the mainstream. As Jeffrey Checkel (1998, 325) notes, "constructivists rescued the exploration of identity from postmodernists." Identities are socially and relational (inter-subjectively) defined but they are also constitutive of what/how a particular institution of international social structure is.

So far, constructivist scholars have produced the most influential works about the role of identity and culture in international relations. As opposed to interest based rationalist and realist theories that put interest as the driving force behind all political actions, including the ones at the international level, constructivist scholars argue that the foreign policy interests of a state are socially constructed. That is, the interests of a state depend on the dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world (Yanık, 2002).

In fact, constructivism's central explanatory concept is identity. As debated (see Farrell, 2002), what is identity - and state identity in particular? And how can it be pinpointed in a given empirical context? A third set of questions revolves around the causal mechanisms linking identity and outcomes. How does state identity shape the formulation and pursuit of interests in world politics?

One of the main contributions of constructivism is the notion that state identity fundamentally shapes state preferences and actions. Wendt (1992, 1994) and Katzenstein (1996) helped put identity issues at the centre of much constructivist

theorizing. Constructivists agree that state identities were constructed within the social environment of international and domestic politics. They disagree, however, on the definitions of identity and the weight of international versus domestic environments in shaping state identities. Wendt's systemic constructivism places more emphasis on the impact of the international environment. For the authors in Katzenstein's edited volume (1996), identity was mainly a domestic attribute arising from national ideologies of collective distinctiveness and purpose that in turn shaped states' perceptions of interest and thus state policy.

The ongoing difficulty in identity research is that there is still no clear, agreed on definition of what we mean (and do not mean) by identity, how researchers can plausibly establish what state identities are, or what range of prominent identities may exist in international politics at any particular historical moment. Identity has become a catch-all term, helping to explain richly a wide variety of actions, but it does not yet permit us to suggest that states with particular types of identities will act in particular ways. As long as identity remains unspecified, it will produce very particularistic explanations for state action and provide little hope of contingent generalizations about identity and world politics.

As Finnenmore (2001) notes, Wendt (1999) has moved modern constructivism along in addressing this problem. Wendt argues that identities are rooted in an actor's self-understandings (and are thus subjective) but also depend on whether that identity is recognized by other actors, which gives them an intersubjective quality. Thus, identities are constituted by the interaction of these internal and external ideas. This suggests that the number of possible identities is not infinite and the concept not idiosyncratic, since identity formation is always limited by the array of possible identities in the international system at any historical moment.

Having mentioned the importance of identity in constructivist understanding in IR , one should also dwell on its nature.

The Identity issue has been central in several disciplines of social science: psychology, sociology, literary theory, and social anthropology.

Identification is accepted to be a social concept (Yurdusev, 1997, 18). The process of identity formation is of a kind that develops within a social unit. "Any identification requires a distinction just as any distinction necessitates some identification" (Yurdusev, 1995). This brings us to the dichotomy of the self/other. The self is identified in relation to its position vis-à-vis the other. In other words, all identities exist only with their otherness (Krause, 1998, 312). Without the other, the self actually cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse where consciousness meets (Neuman, 1999,13).

As argued (Weldes & Laffey, 1999, 11), any identity, whether of an individual, a state, or some other social group, is always "established in relation to a series of differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being. Identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty".

Furthermore, these "differences" that define identity also have a tendency "to counter, resist, overthrow, or subvert definitions that apply to them", thereby undermining the identity they supposedly define. Thus, there is always a politics of identity and difference through which difference can, but need not, be transformed into otherness. When it is, it becomes a source of insecurity. An identity is then insecure or threatened "not merely by actions that the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being as other" . Difference and otherness thus stand in a double relation to self-identity: "they constitute it and they threaten it" (Weldes& Laffey, 1999).

As extensively discussed (Chafetz & Spirtas & Frankel, 1998/99), an identity, then, is the mechanism that provides individuals with a sense of self and the means for comprehending the relationship of the self to the external environment. Identity is an inherent part of cognition, and it makes life more predictable and less inchoate, inexplicable, and random by giving actors more of a sense of how their behavior will affect others' behavior toward them.

Identity is not strictly cognitive, however. The cognitive function is accompanied by evaluative and emotional functions that operate simultaneously. At

the same time that actors perceive and make predictions about themselves based on social stimuli, identities evaluate what these stimuli imply about the actors' worth and provide emotional input.   As an example, an actor will likely categorize the destruction of its military by an adversary as a defeat. This act will probably also evoke humiliation and shame and anger, and an assessment of diminished self-worth (Chafetz & Spirtas & Frankel, 1998/99).

In addition to the psychological components, identities comprise social and nonsocial elements. They are social because individuals share identities, or identify with others, in groups. Because individuals belong to multiple groups, identity is not unitary. Multiple groups mean multiple identities (Chafetz & Spirtas & Frankel, 1998/99).

Identities contain nonsocial elements. Physical and other characteristics such as size, race, and language, which strongly resist change, often provide specific identity signals to actors which affect the perceptions of both the actor toward others and others toward the actor.   Similarly, material factors can shape how states (more properly, those that act in the name of states) perceive their relations vis-à-vis other states.

Identification refers to the importance or intensity of an identity. Identification exists along a continuum from absolutely negative to absolutely positive. Absolutely negative describes a zero-sum conflict situation. Absolutely positive identification describes some family relationships and the bonds between soldiers during combat. On the other end of the continuum, the lack of identification indicates the absence of any perceived relationship, and no identity exists.

Identification is of an exclusionary nature for the non-identified. In other words, in the identification of a group of people as a community, this unit is externalized of or disassociated from the values, myths, symbols and attitudes of those (non-identified) with whom the unit does not identify itself (Yurdusev, 1995, 107).

It is also argued that the existence or the perception of threats from the other inevitably strengthens the identity of the self (Yurdusev, 1997). The formation of the self is inextricably intertwined with the formation of its others and a failure to regard the others in their own right must necessarily have repercussions for the formation of the self (Neuman, 1999,35).

In short, states and regional institutions act as actors with identities, and assume that in their interactions, they act upon those identities and these interactions in turn have constitutive effects on their identities.

Theorists (Neuman, 1999) also assert that the identity gaining process is a multi-directional, dynamic and enduring formation. This leads us to the plurality of identity. In other words, a person in a state can posses different identities.

The specification of state identity in any particular case involves a series of interrelated analytical tasks. As Wendt (1999) argues, first, one must delineate the policy area in question. Because states interact with many other states and participate in more than one international institution, they can have multiple, overlapping identities at any point in time. In order to define state identity with any accuracy, then, one therefore first has to delineate a particular policy context - the background against which identity is defined. This first analytical step does not eliminate the problem of multiple identities. Nor does it determine the content of a particular identity in question. A particular set of institutions and actors in a given policy context often will allow for different kinds of state identity. However, delineating a particular policy context does make some state identities more salient than others, and highlight the actors and institutions that figure in their construction.

Thus, these two facts, i.e. the existence of different identities in a society and the possibility that a person can posses plural identities at the same time, raise the problematic of how those different identities can co-habit in a society.

The effort to specify state identity as part of an explanatory strategy must start with a basic definition. For states, like other social groups, identity has both an internal and an external dimension: it is what binds the group together and what

situates it with respect to others. In the state context, the internal dimension is often labeled "national identity," the set of shared norms and narratives that sustain "we-ness" through time. The term "state identity" refers here to the external dimension of national identity, the self-placement of the national political community relative to other states and international institutions. So defined, state identity represents a starting point for the pursuit of interests (Smith,1991) .

Identity, from a level of analysis point of view, is a two-sided construct that serves at the domestic and international levels. At the domestic level, the identity of a state is responsible for providing a basis for solidarity and unity. It is also the self-perception that a state has about itself and other states in the international system. At the international level, on the other hand, it is a guide to weigh the intentions of other states. Identity, at this level, helps states to distinguish their foes from their friends based on ethnic, ideological or other ideational clues. In this regard, collective identity formation is like a pool where states contribute elements from their own identity (Yanık, 2002, 26).

In short, identity politics defines the parameters and the range of inter-state interactions. It also provides one with a lens to perceive the other with whom it is contrasted. However, identity is not something fixed but rather it is socially constructed. The construction is a process of interaction between 'self and 'other,' as a result of which identities are constructed mutually and exclusively (Küçük, 1999).

Interests:

Scholars skeptical of the concept of identity argue that it adds little to our understanding of state actions, and   that we are better served by the concept of interest. Indeed, many international relations scholars turn to the concept of national interest to explain why states follow particular foreign policies. The concept of national interest is often a contentious subject, owing to constant bickering over its definition in specific instances. Great and small issues feature debates over national interest. Debates over national interest are not limited to military issues, but pervade all areas of foreign policy.

As Farrell (2002) notes, Realists have long championed the concept of national interest, inspired by Hans Morgenthau's dictum that "states pursue the national interest in terms of power." Neorealists argue that states are functionally similar, responding to the inducements and constraints of the international environment to guarantee their survival. Stephen Krasner, another realist, has made the most persistent attempt to prove the existence of a national interest. Krasner traces several episodes of U.S. foreign policy in an effort to show that even the United States, a weak state by many standards owing to its divided government, was able to conceive of and carry out policies consistent with its national interest.

The problem with the concept of national interest lies in its circular nature. Realists, reviewing past state policies, may declare these policies to have been in the national interest because they were executed by the state. For the concept of national interest to mean something, realists and other proponents must be able to derive its existence independently of outcomes.

National interest has long been in the research agenda of IR, considering its effect in mobilizing both the state apparatuses and the nation. Related to that particularly within the context of foreign policy, constructivism mainly tries to figure out the answer to the question of 'how norms constitute the security identities and interests of international and transnational actors in particular cases' Adler (1997a) asserts that constructivism also has a particular salience since 'it integrates knowledge and power as part of an explanation of where interests come from.' And he continues that 'national interests are intersubjective understandings about what it takes to advance power, influence and wealth, that survive the political progress, given the distribution of power and knowledge in a society.'

Contrary to the views held by realists, taking it from a constructivist perspective, it is argued that the concept of national interest has important explanatory power if it is taken as a social construction because it is not fixed, natural or universal as realists claim. What is important is its content, which is constituted through various processes and as a result of which the national interests are determined. The construction processes are diverse from the interstate interactions and the domestic plays of state and society to the social structure of the

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international system which all have some constitutive power contingent across time and space. As Weldes (1999) notes that national interests are social constructions created as meaningful objects out of the inter-subjective and culturally established meanings with which the world, particularly the international system and the place of state in it, is understood. More specifically, national interests emerge out of the representations or , to use more customary terminology, out of situation descriptions and problem definitions— through which state officials and others make sense of the world around them.

In view of this, one can see that there is a close relationship between identities and interest of a state.   It can be better seen in the context of how state identity shapes state action? A constructivist approach to this causal nexus involves two distinct analytical steps: the demonstration of the constitution of interests through identity; and the demonstration of the effects of both identity and interests on state action. From a constructivist perspective, the articulation of identity serves to specify state interests: the collective view of a state's place in the world informs particular conceptions of the proper ends and means of its foreign policy. Where state identity does not constitute state interests, constructivist analysis fails. Once links between identity and interest have been demonstrated at the level of discourse, one can go on to explore their effects on action. For constructivists, the articulation of state identity and state interests shape policies by making some actions justifiable and others unjustifiable in the domestic and international political realms. If identity shapes the content of state interests, one should expect state action to be compatible with both interests and identity.

While rationalists consider material interests and constraints as initial conditions, constructivists bring in identity as well. From a constructivist perspective, state identity is never a sufficient cause of state action. It interacts with material considerations and external constraints to constitute the interests that shape its course.

As stated, "identities are the basis of interests" (Wendt, 1992, 398). They provide the necessary lens for actors to define what/how the situation is and what/how a role they are expected to adopt and play in it. Without such a definitional tool, to determine what the interests are at stake for an actor would be difficult. There

is an inextricable relationship between identities and interests, as such that the interests are defined when the roles and identities are constituted. Interests are socially constructed in terms of peculiar social identities of actors in world politics. Interests are not something fixed or constant across different actors but varying constructions with a view to particular definition of actors' social identities and their specific configurations.

Variation in state identity, or changes in state identity, affect the national security interests or policies of states. As put by Katzenstein (1996), identities both generate and shape interests. Some interests, such as mere survival and minimal physical well-being, exist outside of specific social identities; they are relatively generic. But many national security interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others. This was certainly true during the Cold War. Actors often cannot decide what their interests are until they know what they are representing--"who they are"--which in turn depends on their social relationships. A case in point is the current ambiguity surrounding U.S. national interests after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet empire as a dominant "other" occasions instability in U.S. self-conception, and hence ambiguity in U.S. interests. The issue is considerably more pressing in Russia and several other successor states of the Soviet Union.

Norms:

The international arena is often characterized as having a minimalist order because it is "anarchic"-that is, it lacks a sovereign to enforce rules, leaving only appeals to armed force to resolve clashes of interest between states. Scholars of post-World War II international relations, especially in security affairs, consequently tended to downplay the role of norms. Realists focused primarily on material capabilities and argued that norms, where they exist, merely ratify underlying power relationships. And while (neo)liberal theorists more often accorded an independent role to norms, they nevertheless concentrated on explicit contractual arrangements (such as those embodied in regimes) intended to resolve collective action problems. Yet, constructivist argues that norms play a much broader role in world politics, shaping both cooperation and conflict in ways that are invisible to theories that focus either on material structural forces or on individual choice.

It is not to say that approaches such as realism or liberalism are "wrong." Rather, it is that the micro- and macro-foundations of these perspectives are not equipped to account for the full range of political norms and their consequences.

Norms play a major role in constructivist international politics. In general, a norm is defined as (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, 891) "a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity." Norms thus favour certain behaviours as opposed to others.

More specifically, however, norms can be divided into two brands as regulative and constitutive norms (Küçük, 1999). Regulative norms function as ordering and organizing or constraining the behaviours of the actors whereas constitutive norms have far reaching implications; they not only affect the behaviours on the surface but also in a deeper sense create new identities and interests for actors. Constructivists regard norms as constitutive. On the other hand, realists and liberals view norms as merely regulative. Norms are thus taken to be just intervening variables.

Constructivists recognize norms as having objective existence. Norms are not simply ideas floating around inside peoples' heads. Rather norms are shared beliefs that are "out there" in the real world, in the meaning they give to material things (e.g., the acceptability of owning nuclear weapons), and the practices they yield (e.g., the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty) (Farrel, 2002, 60) .

While the sociological perspective rejects the realist preoccupation with uniquely material forces, students of norms cannot afford to ignore the material world. Norms do not float "freely," unencumbered by any physical reality. They are attached to real physical environments and are promoted by real human agents (though norms, of course, are not themselves material). But the relationship of normative to material structures is rarely examined or explicitly theorized, despite the likelihood that the influence of norms may be related to the characteristics of the material structures in which they are embedded or the qualities of the actors that adopt or promote them. Norms backed by the United States are likely to become

more widespread and effectual than otherwise similar norms originating in Luxembourg. While the differing capabilities of these two nations are undoubtedly a matter of interpretation, it is difficult to ignore the overwhelming material contrasts (Katzenstein, 1996).

Cultures:

The use of the term *culture* also follows conventional sociological usage. As typically used, *culture* refers both to a set of evaluative standards, such as norms or values, and to cognitive standards, such as rules or models defining what entities and actors exist in a system and how they operate and interrelate (Jepperson, 1996) .

In this regard [4], Ann Swidler ascribes two major functions to culture. First, for Swidler, culture is a construct that motivates people to commit certain acts and refrain from others. Second, it is also "a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills and styles from which people construct"strategies of action."' In other words, according to Swidler, culture is a basket from which actors can take different elements and piece them together in accordance with their actions.

For Clifford Geertz, on the other hand, culture is "an historically transmitted pattern of meaning embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life." Culture, according to Geertz, is public, which means that the meaning of culture is shared by a certain group of people and it is a collection of symbols that serves as the foundation of meaning.

Partly using the Geertzian definition of culture as a base, Marc Howard Ross identifies five functions of culture in a more comprehensive manner. First, culture, according to Ross, is the frame within which politics occurs. Culture tells people what is dear to them, what is important for them and more important of all, the things that are precious to achieve. Secondly, culture ties individual and collective identities by maintaining the sense of a shared common past and thus a common future. Third, culture defines group boundaries and organizes action within and between them. This

aspect of culture works by laying out the expected associations both within the group and with other individual not belonging to that group. Fourth, culture provides the necessary framework that helps people interpret the actions and the motives of others. Fifth, culture is one of the main sources for political organization and mobilization. Overall, culture, both as a collection of ideas and symbols can be found at the root of numerous political actions.

Culture in this sense is the background that shapes the identity of states. Therefore, culture is an indispensable part of the lens that the states sees the world through.

Speech acts:

IR scholars have tended to treat speech either as "cheap talk," to be ignored, or as bargaining, to be folded into strategic interaction. However, speech can also persuade; it can change people's minds about what goals are valuable and about the roles they play (or should play) in social life. When speech has these effects, it is doing important social construction work, creating new understandings and new social facts that reconfigure politics (Finnemore, 2001, 402) .

It is argued that   language has also played a central role in at least one important strand of positivism. As Fierke (2002, 331) notes, the linguistic turn in analytic philosophy began with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logicos-Philosophicus (1922). The Tractatus inspired the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle, which continues to shape conceptions of positivist social science. From this perspective, current debates in international relations assume a question about whether language is important, while it would be appropriate to move toward a more open discussion about how or why language is important.

As Checkel (2004, 239) notes, interpretative and critical constructivists focus on discourse, the mediation of meaning through language, speech acts and textual analysis. The conventional sort, by theorising roles for arguing, persuasion, deliberation and rhetorical action, see language as a causal mechanism leading to changes in core agent properties. Thus, the question is not 'whether language is

important; the question is rather which approach to language' and how to use it as a practical research tool.

In order to understand the importance of discourses as speech acts , one should look on the constructivist approach utilized by Onuf (1989). Constructivism, according to Onuf, 'applies to all fields of social inquiry' and has the potential to bring together matters which at first seem unrelated . It starts from the belief that human beings are social. Social relations make us human, construct us 'into the kind of being that we are. At the same time, through deeds and speaking, we use the raw materials of nature to make the world what it is . That is to say , constructivism is based on the notion that society and people make each other in an ongoing, two-way process. Deeds , which may consist in speech acts or physical actions, make the world and deeds are able to construct reality. According to Onuf, meaning in human social relations depends on the existence of rules based on such deeds. This rises the importance of discourses as speech acts in state policies in the field of foreign and security policies.

A speech act is the 'act of speaking in a form that gets someone else to act'. Thus language is performative, rather than merely descriptive. Onuf classifies them into three categories, namely assertives, directives and commissives, depending on how the speaker intends to have an effect on the world. The success of speech acts depends on the addressee's response.

In this regard, Onuf (1989, 183) argues:

> speech acts are social performances, that is, they have direct social con
> sequences. Such acts take the generic form, I [verb such as declare, de-
> mand, promise] that [prepositional content]. Because people respond
> to them with their own performances, not always spoken, the pattern
> of speech acts and related performances constitute those practices that
> make the material conditions and artifacts of human experience mean-
> ingful. More specifically, the pattern of speech acts endows practices
> with normativity; they give rise to rules which, in synopsizing that
> pattern, fix preferences and expectations and shape the future against
> the past.

Onuf thus construes the world as made up of a material and a social realm which are distinct, but closely linked. The constructivism Onuf (1989) proposes 'does not draw a sharp distinction between material and social realities' but stresses the role of what is socially made. In this, deeds as speech acts have to be related to both the social and the natural world correctly in order to produce the desired outcomes.

To sum up, the preceding section shows that "identities", "interest", "norms," and "culture" as well as speech acts all matter. As Katzenstein (1996) argues, they impute, furthermore, a higher cultural and institutional content to environments than do the more materialist views informing, for example, neorealist explanations.

Constructivism contends that state identities constitute national interests, and enable and constrain state strategies . Constructivist thus posits that the beliefs, values, norms, and practices embodied and manifested by state identities logically and necessarily matter all the way down. Specifically, constructivists contend that identity generates state interests and strategies in the following ways:

First, the national values inherent in a state's identity establish the ends, ratifications, or utilities sought by states. Thus, identity can literally define a state's interests. Second, certain beliefs embedded in the identification of actors help determine how situations which action, takes place to fulfill these interests should be defined and interpreted . This helps shape state preferences regarding particular actions . As a result, identity matters even with regard to those ends of state policy that tend not to vary across states with different identities.

The state interest in physical security provides, a case in point. This interest is almost certainly universal, regardless of the specifics of a state's identity. Yet, when this interest is implicated, as when a state is confronted with the military preparations or actions of a neighboring state, the policy is rarely unambiguous. What security ..means to that state, what constitute a threat to that security, and how the state. can best ensure its security in a given social context, are all contingent factors, not

objective givens. It is here that a state's identity and the perceived identity of other states, is likely to play a large part in determining the state's behavior.

Identity stands in for interests. It not only serves to populate the world with agents, but it also gives meaning to statements that we call policies. Identity describes the basis for our assumption that an agent's policy statements reveal (or obscure) intentions. We know these things because that is the kind of agent "they" are. And, if we turn out to be mistaken, then we must rethink who "they" are.

As Kowert (2001) puts, identity is central, therefore, to foreign policy choices. Identity is the medium through which national leaders and ordinary citizens alike translate recognition of similarity and difference (in threat, capability, productivity, acclaim, and so on) into ontological statements about international relations. It is the way they "construct" the world, and specifically the agents, they hope to affect through their foreign policies. Constructivism is ideally positioned to offer a theory of agency and, in so doing, to make a vital contribution to the study of foreign policy.

Constructivists argue that national interests and foreign policy strategies states adopt are to a significant degree a function of state identity (Kowert, 2001).

Another distinct aspect of constructivist foreign policy analysis from other ideational and cognitive approaches is its conceptualization of identity and culture as both constitutive of interests not just behavioral and as collective phenomena instead of individual. Therefore, constructivism argues that the effects of identity and culture go deeper. They constitute the content of 'national interest', the sources of 'threat perceptions' and the ideational bases of military strategies.

It can be argued (Katzenstein, 1996) that cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behavior but also the basic character of states--what we call state "identity".

Scholars who explore the impact of national identity and culture on foreign policy behavior consider both national identity and culture as the motives of various interests and thus the actions of the state (see Yanık, 2002). In this sense, culture by determining or limiting the choices available to policymakers or by shaping their perceptions about the other culture became the independent variable of various foreign policy analyses. They argue that there is a two-way arrow between identity and foreign policy, meaning that not only does identity influence the making and the outcome of foreign policy, but also foreign policy outcomes influence the formation of identity .

Norms either define ("constitute") identities in the first place (generating expectations about the proper portfolio of identities for a given context) or prescribe or proscribe ("regulate") behaviors for already constituted identities (generating expectations about how those identities will shape behavior in varying circumstances). Taken together, then, norms establish expectations about who the actors will be in a particular environment and about how these particular actors will behave (Katzenstein, 1996).

That norms can influence identities (and vice versa) does not mean that identities are reducible to norms. Indeed, states adopting particular identities are more likely to conform to some norms over others. If anything, identity can be used to show how states with particular historical and cultural backgrounds adopt a particular norm (Chafetz &Spritas & Frankel, 1998/99).

Cultural or institutional elements of states' environments such as norms also shape the national security interests or (directly) the security policies of states. Norms are collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity.

In view of the foregoing review, one can easily see the relationship among these concepts, i.e. identity, interest, culture, norms and speech acts. This can be better understood in the following chart:

Figure 1: Constructivist interaction process for foreign and security policy

As can be seen in the figure above of my formulation, there is a mutually determining process of interaction in the sense that they all determine each other in a circle of interaction. For example, norms as products of speech acts affect the culture and identity. They are in return shaped by identity, culture as well as interests. In this process speech acts function as the trajectory to carry those effects of these concepts among each other. In other words, they are not independent variables and none of them is taken as granted but open to a process of constant change.

The analysis clearly shows that identity and interest are not totally different concepts and they are not independent from each other. In fact, they constantly shape each other. We cannot know what we want if we do not know who we are.

State identities have two effects therefore; one is direct—shaping the national interests—the other is indirect—affecting the nature of the security system through shaping the interstate normative structure that in turn shapes the practices of actors.

It is also generally argued that interest is always related to material factors while identity is related to ideational factors. However, as the analysis shows, identity as the whole lens is shaped by not only ideational but also material factors. And, interests are also shaped not only by material concerns but also by ideational as it is the product of identity. Therefore, what is more accurate is to make such differentiation between ideational and material factors.

Whether modernist or postmodernist in orientation, constructivists advance three core ontological propositions. The first of these asserts the primacy of normative, or ideational, structures over material structures. This is partly because constructivists hold that systems of meaning define how actors interpret their material environment. As Wendt (1994) puts it, material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded. A further reason for privileging the ideational over the material, associated with the second proposition below, is the constructivist emphasis on how actors' social identities shape their interests and actions, and social identities, they contend, are defined by institutionalized meaning systems. 'All institutions have a structural dimension', Wendt and Duvall (1989) argue, 'made up of one or more internal relations or constitutive principles, that generates socially empowered and interested state agents as a function of their respective occupancy of the positions defined by those principles'.

E. SYNOPSIS ON THE UTILITY OF CONSTRUCTIVISM IN IR

Constructivism as a phenomenon has become inescapable in the post-Cold War era (Zehfuss, 2002). As Checkel (2004) refers to, constructivism is trendy. The fiftieth anniversary issue of the journal International Organization declared the rationalist-constructivist debate to be a central dividing line in the discipline. Conference panels concerning the social construction of concepts involved in the study of international relations and of actors involved in their making proliferate. A growing number of scholars claim to be studying international phenomena in a constructivist vein. Workshops are even held to discuss the merits of constructivism for the study of international issues as such.

Simply speaking, constructivists are able to show how something we cannot directly observe shapes something we can (Farrell, 2002, 62).

Constructivism emerged as an approach to break the stalemate that the mainstream debate resulted in. Its critiques of the mainstream scholarship focus on what it takes for granted or ignore. Constructivism studies the sources and the content of state interests and preferences, which are postulated, and it emphasizes the ideational and social side of international politics, which is ignored by the mainstream scholarship. Constructivism does not challenge science, rationalism and modernity, but makes science more compatible with constructivist understanding of social reality. Constructivism does not reject materialist ontology. But it accepts that material is mediated through human subjectivity. In this context, seizing the *middle ground*, "constructivism is a product of the Third Debate in the sense that it is related to the confluence of diverse anti-positive physiological and sociological trends" (Adler, 1997a, 98).

Yet, constructivism is not exempt from severe criticism as to its theoretical nature. General criticism is that constructivism is an approach not a theory due to its methodological difficulties emanating from subjectivism or as colloquially presented the "anything goes "argument (Krause, 1998, 319). For that reason, some call it "at best, a theory of process not substantive outcome if it is a theory" (Hopf, 1998, 196).

It is generally argued (Ruggie, 1998, 856) that IR constructivists have not as yet managed to formulate a fully fledged theory of their own. As a result, constructivism remains more of a philosophically and theoretically informed perspective on and approach to the empirical study of international relations.

It is generally said that constructivism in IR is not itself a theory of international relations, but rather a theoretically informed approach to the study of international relations. Moreover, constructivism does not aspire to the hypothetico-deductive mode of theory construction.

Wendt has become an exception in this regard . "Constructivism is a structural theory of international politics": "intersubjective structures" explain much of what happens in a world of states (Wendt, 1994, 385).

In short, the generally accepted argument can be as follows: Constructivism is not a substantive theory of politics. It is a social theory that makes claims about the nature of social life and social change. Constructivism does not, however, make any particular claims about the content of social structures or the nature of agents at work in social life. Consequently it does not, by itself, produce specific predictions about political outcomes that one could test in social science research.

Constructivism in this sense is similar to rational choice. Like rational choice, it offers a framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social interaction, but makes no claims about their specific content. In a rational choice analysis, agents act rationally to maximize utilities, but the substantive specification of actors and utilities lies outside the analysis; it must be provided before analysis can begin. In a constructivist analysis, agents and structures are mutually constituted in ways that explain why the political world is so and not otherwise, but the substantive specification of agents and structures must come from some other source. Neither constructivism nor rational choice provides substantive explanations or predictions of political behavior until coupled with a more specific understanding of who the relevant actors are, what they want, and what the content of social structures might be.

Rational choice has been used extensively in the service of materialist and individualist theories such as neorealism and neoliberalism, in which the relevant actors are states who want material security and/or wealth. The substantive predictions of these theories are not predictions of rational choice, however, but of the political arguments that inform it.

The particular findings of these efforts are not the substance of constructivism, however, nor are predictions that flow from these findings the predictions of constructivism any more than Waltzian realism is the prediction or

singular result of rational choice. They are the findings and predictions of scholars, which flow from their chosen substantive starting point for constructivist analysis.

Another criticism is related to the approaches of constructivist understanding to reality. In this regard, Maja Zehfuss's (2002) book offers a postmodernist critique of constructivism in international relations. The central thesis is that constructivist theories are deeply problematic because they accept reality as, at some level, given. According to the author, asserting the existence of an independent material or social reality is problematic not only because reality is a matter of human interpretation but also because such an assertion excludes from consideration alternative ways of thinking, obscures inherent value judgments, and unnecessarily limits responsibility for theoretical and policy choices. Zehfuss concludes that only by rejecting the "politics of reality," as practiced by constructivists (and politicians), can we begin to think and act in ways that address the needs of the marginalized "other" in international politics.

However, constructivism in fact addresses the issue of reality. Indeed, the question of what the reality of international politics is and how it came about is at the heart of the constructivist endeavour. However, the way in which constructivism addresses this issue is, as generally argued (Zehfuss, 2002,35), deeply problematic. Although constructivism is about construction, it takes reality as in many ways given. In other words, constructivism purports to explain construction whilst still taking account of 'reality.' Yet, this can be better understood with its ontological realist stance in the sense that it accepts a priori reality ,i.e. outside world. This is its distinction that separates it from other variants of critical scholarship.

Furthermore, the emphasis on values and norms by the constructivist approach is sometimes criticized for being related to idealist scholarship. But, the main focus of both approaches is fundamentally different. While idealism concerns "what ought to be" (Eralp, no date, 5), constructivism is about how things are constructed Unlike idealism, which takes the world only as it can be imagined, constructivism accepts that not all statements have the same epistemic value and that there is consequently some foundation for knowledge (Adler, 2002).

To sum up, the following can be said about constructivism and its conventional variant in particular: It challenged materialist and rationalist premises of mainstream IR, which have been explicated above. Constructivism takes into account ideas shaped by culture, history as well as experiences and make use of identity and culture in foreign policy analysis. It asserts that state identities and strategic cultures are important factors to shape states' foreign and security policies.

It rejects the extreme historical constructivist position that generalizations about how actors will interpret their environment (political or otherwise) are impossible. Moreover, it rejects the materialist position that the physical reality of this environment governs cultural interpretations of it. And it rejects the tendency of rationalist theory to assume fixed goals and identities of actors.

It is neither pessimist nor optimist (idealist), objectivist or subjectivist, materialist or normative but stands in somewhere between them. It prioritizes and problematizes ontology and it defines ontology in intersubjective terms. It challenges, both the materialist and rationalist precepts of neorealism and neoliberalism respectively. That makes constructivism to address the neglected issues and question the taken-for-granted assumptions in IR. However, in epistemological terms, it holds the middle ground. Furthermore, it does not adhere to particular methodology, but rather it makes use of both positivist and interpretivist methodologies and various research techniques, qualitative or quantitative, generalizing or particularizing. Initially developed as a meta-theoretical project and lacks a well-established theory of its own, constructivism developed its own basic assumptions and conceptual frames and thus produced numerous empirical works. Constructivism thus avoids the pitfalls of both mainstream and critical theories and suggests an alternative approach to the study of IR by providing a research program. All of these qualities make constructivism a viable approach in IR Theory.

A rationalist perspective is concerned with the effects of the material world on individuals, and generally does not consider the interpretive social lenses through which actors see that world, while a reflectivist perspective considers the

interpretation as the most important aspect, denying the constraints of the material world, or abstracting entirely from it.

Constructivism is not simply about the importance of ideas, nor are social factors considered to be independent of material reality. Constructivism is best defined broadly, taking into account the interaction between material reality and social agents, without limiting or dividing the field based on the social science origins (economics or sociology) of theories or based on the objects of inquiry. Constructivism brings together holist and individualist, material and ideational, and normative and rational explanations under a general framework for social inquiry.

To conclude in a nutshell, constructivism does indeed help contemporary IR advance a more complete picture of 'what makes the world hang together'.

NOTES

[1] For the realist scholarship and its problematic at the end of the Cold War see for example the following: ERALP, A. , *Theory in International Relations: Three Major Debates*, (unpublished article); ----- (2001), "Uluslararası İlişkiler Disiplininin Oluşumu: İdealizm-Realizm Tartışması" in A.Eralp (ed) *Devlet, Sistem ve Kimlik*, İstanbul: İletişim GADDIS, John Lewis (1992a), "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, 17 (3): 5-58; -------- (1992 b), "The Cold War, the Long Peace and the Future", in M.J. Hogan (ed), *The End of Cold War*, Cambridge Uni.Press: 21-38;   GUZZINI, Stefano (2002a), "Realisms at war": Robert Gilpin's political economy of hegemonic war as a critique of Waltz's neorealism",   in Daniela Belliti & Furio Cerutti, eds*, La guerra, le guerre*, Trieste: Asterios editore, forthcoming in Italian; ------ (2002b), "The Cold war is what we make of it", when peace research meets constructivism in IR", in Guzzini et al (eds) *Copenhagen Peace research: Conceptual Innovations and Contemporary Security Analysis,* London: Routledge; HERRMAN, Richard K. (….), "Conclusion. The End of the Cold War : What have we learned?", …. : 259-285; JERVIS, Robert (1998), "Realism in the Study of World Politics", *International Organization,* 52(4): 971–991; KENNEDY-PIPE, Caroline (2000), "International History and International Relations Theory: a Dialogue beyond the Cold War", *International affairs*, 76(4): 741-754; KEOHANE, Robert O. and NYE, J.S. (1993), "Introduction: The End of the Cold War" in R. Keohane and S. Hoffman (eds) *After the Cold War*, Harward Uni.Press.: 1-19; LEBOW, Richard N. and RISSE-KAPEN, Thomas (…), "Introduction: International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War" in …….: 1-21; LEBOW, Richard (…), "The Long Peace, the End of the Cold War and the Failure of Realism",   : 23-56; WALTZ, K. (1991)," Evaluating Theories", *The American Political Science Review*, 91(4): 913-917; ------ (2000) , "Structural Realism after the Cold War" , *International Security* , 25 (1) Summer.

[2] For studies on the constructivist scholarship including its conventional variant see for example ADLER, E. (1997a), "Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics", *European Journal of International Relations*, 3(3): 319-363; ---------- (2002),   "Constructivism and International relations" in W. Carlsnaes (et al) *Handbook of International Relations,* London: Sage

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CHAPTER 3

CONSTRUCTIVISM IN SECURITY STUDIES

A. IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY FOR STATES

The thesis is based on the examination of collective security polces of states in the conventional sense. In other words, security issues that pose threats to states in practice in the world affairs and lead them to collective security arrangements are the ones that will be focused on throughout the study.

In simple terms, collective security is related to efforts of a group of states to act together in order to better preserve their own security. Thus, it is part of security studies and of the security concept in general. For that reason, it seems to be of practical value to first touch upon the concept of security itself before focusing on collective security efforts.

Security is an elusive concept. It is a strange phenomenon, a subjective 'feeling', and therefore relational and relative, rather than an objective 'thing' that can be seen and handled. You cannot touch security - you can only feel secure.

It is generally argued that security of nations cannot be defined in general terms, nor can it be determined objectively (Geusau, 1985,2) . Definitions depend on states' perception about threats and safety. Therefore, different definitions of the security concept have arisen over time. On security no precise definition has ever been achieved and probably never be achieved . There appears almost a studied vagueness about the precise definition of terms such as security.

As stated above, security is directly related to the perception of states about their existence. Thus, it is useful first to look upon the roots of state formation and the role of security in this process.

It is argued that coercion has been one of the indispensable stimulants in state building. Tilly (1992, 1), in his book on the development of European states throughout a millennium, defines states as "coercion-wielding organizations that are distinct from households and kinship groups and exercise clear priority in some respects over all other organizations within substantial territories". It is evident that anything, which is gained with coercion, is exposed to threat and thus to implicit vulnerability, as it is not achieved with the free will of others. Corollary to this logic, it can be said that as states are the product of coercion, they are exposed to threats against their security. Naturally, the essential minimum activities of a state have also been related to the use of coercion. As Tilly (1992, 96) states, of these essential activities, war making and protection are directly related to coercion.

This shows the importance of wars in the history of states. Even, it is argued that state structures appeared chiefly as a by-product of ruler's efforts to acquire the means of war that has affected the entire process of state formation. On the other hand, the other state activity of essential nature, 'protection' is also related to " attacking and checking rivals of the rulers' principal allies, whether inside or outside the state's claimed territory" (Tilly, 1975, 10) . In light of these, one can judge first that security has always been a matter of life for states as their creation is coercion-based. Second, due to this, states have deployed both activities, i.e. war making and protection as necessary. In this course of life it was only natural that wars became the principal means by which the realignments of the participants and their boundaries occurred. All make security vital for the survival of states.

Coercion is always bound to insecurity as any state that controls concentrated means of coercion runs the risk of losing advantages when a neighbour builds up its means.

Importance of Tilly's explanation of the state is thus two-fold. First, it underlines the relevance of perception of threats and thus construction of security and insecurity . These are valid arguments in constructivism. Second, it also underlines the importance of survival for states in line with the realist understanding of the world affairs.

In other words, it shows the importance of security as a construction of states in the face of perceived threats in a world that is run by realist parameters where the main concern of states is always to survive. Therefore, Tilly's conceptualization perfectly fits into the approach followed in this thesis.

Security is primarily an issue of a nation's relations with other states or a group of states. In this regard, threat perceptions and insecurities play determining roles in shaping the security policy of states. As to insecurities, they are social productions derived from the recognition of a deceptively simple fact: people "act towards objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them" (Wendt, 1992, 396-97).

In the edited volume entitled "Cultures of Insecurity", Weldes seeks to show the ways in which the state (or any other community) is produced in an attempt to secure its identity and interests. They write:

> in contrast to the received view, which treats the object of insecurity and insecurities themselves as pre-given or natural, and as ontologically separate things, we treat them as mutually constituted cultural and social constructions: insecurity itself is the product of processes of identity construction in which the self and the other, are constituted (Weldes et.al 1999,10).

As to the threat perceptions, one can argue the following: if security is something that can only be felt, it must be security from something — a threat of one sort or dimension or another. For the state, the most obvious threat is that posed by

another state -- a threat of invasion or of control by another power leading to a loss of sovereignty. This is manifest in a military threat, or, very importantly, in the perception of a threat. For example, this offers an explanation of the fact that in the period of the Cold War, the Great Britain did not feel threatened by the United States, but did feel threatened by the USSR. Both had a capability to wipe Great Britain off the face of the earth, yet there was a perception in Britain — whether rightly or wrongly is of no consequence - that the USA had no intention of utilizing that capability to invade Britain or otherwise pose a threat to the security of the country. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, was perceived to harbor hostile intentions. The perception of threat, therefore, is a subtle combination of not only the capability of another power, but the perceived intention of that power to use that capability in a potentially hostile manner (Carey, 2002).

As to the nature of threat, one should mention the role of construction as threats are not always as material as one can see concretely but rather something derived from perceptions.

If security is focused on the survival of the state, then logically security has first call on the resources of the state. It is very noticeable that the first act of newly independent states is to create an armed force and that even in the poorest of states the military are well equipped (or relatively so) and enjoy a high status in society. In this situation to have a problem or issue labeled a 'security issue' ensures that there is a flow of resources to solve or ameliorate the perceived threat or problem. Astute politicians, therefore, begin to promote essentially non-security issues as being matters of high security significance. Some 'threats' thereby become more imaginary than real - or they are generated by skilful publicists! A problem then develops in defining what constitutes a 'threat' - is it 'real' or the product of a fertile imagination? (Carey, 2002, 57).

In view of the foregoing one can rightly argue that security is indispensable for states as they need to protect themselves from perceived threats, be they real(material) or imaginary (ideational). Security is primarily an issue of a state's relations with other

states or non-state groups threatening the security of this particular state. This relationship among states which feel threatened by each other is exposed to *security dilemma[1]*.

B. REVIEW OF SECURITY STUDIES IN IR THEORY

As can be seen from the preceding section, security has two dimensions: avoiding war (its negative dimension) and building peace (its positive dimension). Consideration of the issues of war and peace has played a constitutive role in the development of international relations as a discipline. Indeed, the establishment of international relations as a distinctive discipline in the early twentieth century was itself a response to the traumas of World War I. Although as an academic discipline international relations is relatively new, as argued, it has drawn sustenance from a long intellectual heritage that can be traced back through Thucydides and Machiavelli to Kant. In this process security studies have developed as a distinct body (Hyde-Price, 2001, 28-9).

The end of the Cold War, almost overnight, dissolved the structure around which security studies had crystallized in the latter years of the 1980s and promptly precipitated a paradigmatic crisis (Gaddis, 1992a & b). As noted by (Weldes & Lafey (1999), scholars writing from a distinctively American point of view just before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, argued that security studies had come of age during the 1980s, as neorealism acquired mature hegemonic status within the field and security studies programs secured unprecedented funding as well as institutional and academic recognition. From the vantage point of 1988, they saw the field as centred on the U.S.-Soviet relationship and on discussions of the military balance between the superpower blocs. Although they thought this gave security studies coherence, they also worried that its potential for growth might be stifled by this narrow focus. The sudden and unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union changed all that. The issue—at least for policymakers, to whom scholars in the field had long aspired to speak— was no longer how to manage an arms race and superpower competition, but how to manage the

implosion of a superpower-and the disintegration of a global power structure until recently presumed highly impervious to change, and how to organize not an arms race but graceful disarmament. Meanwhile, with the end of the Cold War there suddenly re-emerged ethnic, nationalist, and other forms of conflict including terrorism as witnessed later in the period that, at least in recent years, had been regarded as secondary or marginal phenomena within the universe of security studies (Weldes & Lafey, 1999) .

It is generally accepted that adherents and critics of the two leading paradigms of international relations, realism and liberalism, did not succeed in explaining adequately, let alone predicting, the peaceful end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union (Katzenstein, 1996).

Security and the study of what constitutes security and how it might be either achieved or overthrown, is academically linked to the 'realist' view of the world. This is an academic tradition going back at least as far as the Greek city states and the writings of Thucydides. This view sees conflict between men – and therefore, states - as being endemic. To a greater or lesser degree, therefore, the international political system can be seen as anarchic. Power, and the struggle for power and the control of resources, is central to this manner of thinking. In this environment, states will only be constrained by agreements - alliances, treaties, even tenets of international law - that they see as being in their own interests. Security in this context concentrates in the military - upon military values, strategies and capabilities - and is concerned with the survival of the state.

Yet, even before the demise of the Cold War, as Hyde-Price (2001, 29) mentions, traditional state-centric and military-focused approaches to security studies were being questioned by a growing number of scholars and practitioners. With the end of the East-West conflict, a major debate has unfolded on the meaning and character of security. This debate has ranged from the epistemological and ontological foundations of security to its appropriate referent object and the composition of the security agenda. Despite a spirited rear-guard action by those who have celebrated the renaissance of security

studies in its traditional form, mainstream opinion in the security studies community has shifted toward a broadened concept of security.

Within security studies, there has been a steady trend since the early 1980s onward towards a broadening of the concept of security to embrace non-military concerns, as well as a widening of the referent object to include societal collectivities beyond the state. This reflects increasing dissatisfaction with the traditional analytical preoccupation with states as the providers of military security. Although this conceptual broadening and widening is a necessary and overdue development, it is not unproblematic (Hyde-Price, 2001, 34).

In this field, one of the most comprehensive definitions on security was made by Alting Von Geusau (1985). He relates (national) security to self-preservation which consists of a three-fold concern: ensuring the physical survival of the population; the physical protection of a nation's territorial integrity and protecting the essential identity of a nation, which is composed of political, economic, social and cultural identities. The threat to security occurs when there exists a capability of hostile nations to produce the negative effects they intend.

Yet, Geusau strictly rejects any attempt to include concerns, such as national interests or the maintenance of influence for various reasons in world politics to the definition of security. However, it is obvious that this definition does not fully cover the parameters of the new security environment evolving in the Euro-Atlantic region in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed.

Studies in this regard have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security[2]. The narrow definition of security trends to focus on material capabilities and the use and central of military force by states. This however contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats. In such a complexity, it is evident that disagreements on the definition

of security are probably unavoidable given the different analytical perspectives on the issue. Yet, in view of the presence of security risks of different natures, it is at least from the practical point of view that security at present should not be regarded as not merely, or even mainly, a matter of military policy, but of broader economic and political policies. For threats to security are not necessarily of a military nature, but they might derive from various other reasons.

This complexity is also related to the problematic of which areas of life are the subject matter of security. In this regard, theoretical debate occurs between two views of security studies, i.e., the 'narrow' versus 'wide' debate. For the followers of the narrow approach to security, *the traditionalists*, it is argued that identifying security issues is easy as they equate security with military issues and the use of force. Stephen Walt, as a proponent of the traditionalist approach, gives perhaps the strongest statement on the traditionalist position, according to Barry Buzan, who is one of the advocates of the wider approach to security. As Buzan (Buzan et.al 1998) indicates, Walt argued in his one of the articles that "security studies is about the phenomenon of war and that it can be defined as the study of the threat, use, and control of military force". Walt also strongly opposed the widening of security studies, as, he argued, by such logic, issues like pollution, disease, child abuse or economic recessions could also be viewed as threats to security. For him, this would destroy the intellectual coherence in security studies making it more difficult to focus on real matters of security affecting the lives of states (1991). Here one can see that the traditionalist view takes only military and political subjects as the sole focus of studies in the security field.

Yet, as stated earlier, this approach has gone into an impasse of dissatisfaction in explaining the events taking place in the international arena later on. As Buzan (Buzan, et al, 1998) points out that the dissatisfaction was stimulated first by the rise of the economic and environmental agendas in international relations during the 1970s and the 1980s and later by the rise of concerns with identity issues and transnational crime during the 1990s. Today it is obvious that this narrow definition does not fully cover the parameters of the new security environment in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War and the break-up of the Soviet Union, the political and intellectual climate has changed. Studies in this regard have articulated very different views about how to define the concept of security.

The narrow definition of security tends to focus on material capabilities and the use of military force by states. This however contrasts with the distinctions among military, political, economic, social, and environmental security threats (Katzenstein, 1996). Thus, with this transforming understanding of what security means today, the advocates of the wider approach concentrate on discussing the dynamics of security in five sectors, that is, military, political, economic, environmental and societal (Buzan et al 1998) . This methodological framework also seems to better serve distinguishing security issues as 'hard' and ' soft'[3].

In view of the above one can draw two common points. Irrespective of which subjects are to be taken up in dealing with security concept, it seems evident that security is about preservation of the existence of states (i.e. survival of states) . And, in this preservation effort, military component is always yet to be present even if as the last resort to be taken. Similarly, the threat perception and the nature of threats perceived are important in determining whether and how the perceived should be taken as a matter of security.

Given the foregoing discussions, it is obviously felt that the concept of security needs to be broadened beyond its traditional preoccupation with national security and military threats. Yet, security studies cannot—and should not—attempt to address all aspects of human injustice, poverty, suffering, misery, and underdevelopment. Issues such as poverty, immigration, and environmental degradation are not intrinsically security issues. They become a concern for security studies only when they threaten to provoke conflict and insecurity. The core concern of security studies is thus conflict (particularly, although not exclusively, violent conflict) between organized political communities—that is, managing conflict and creating the conditions that prevent its occurrence.

It is therefore apparent that security studies faces a major dilemma (Hyde-price, 2001, 28):   On the one hand, it is clear that the traditional definition of security that has dominated the Western literature on the subject is inadequate to explain the multifaceted and multidimensional nature of the problem of international security as faced by the majority of members in the international system. On the other, the often indiscriminate broadening of the definition of security threatens to make the concept so elastic as to render it useless as an analytical tool.

This dilemma lies at the very heart of contemporary security studies. A broad consensus has emerged among both practitioners and academics that the concept of security needs to broadened and widened. However, attempts to broaden the concept so that it includes virtually all aspects of the human condition open the door for realists to reassert a more narrowly focused agenda. What is required is an approach that steers a third way between excessive broadening and traditionalist retrenchment.

Thus one can see that over the past decade, the field of security studies has become one of the most dynamic and contested areas in International Relations. In particular, it has become perhaps the primary forum in which broadly *critical approaches*[4] have challenged traditional largely realist and neorealist theories.

Among the most prominent and influential of these new approaches is the theory of ''securitization'' developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and their collaborators, a body of work that is called the ''Copenhagen School.'' While the Copenhagen School adopts a form of social constructivism, its roots lie also within the Realist tradition (Williams, 2003, 511). Conceptual innovation from the Copenhagen school—one associated in particular with Ole Waever—is the notion of securitization (1995). This concept has been presented as the solution to the problems involved in broadening the definition of security without thereby robbing it of its analytical utility. Waever and his colleagues start from the assumption that security is not a concept with a fixed meaning or a determinate social condition. Security, in other words, cannot be objectively

defined. Rather, they argue that it constitutes a distinctive form of politics. To securitize an issue means to take it out of the normal realm of political discourse and to signal a need for it to be addressed urgently and with exceptional means. Moreover, security is not just any threat or problem. Rather, security issues are 'existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond rules that would otherwise bind' (Buzan et.al, 1998). On the positive side, it draws attention to the way in which security agendas are constructed by politicians and other political actors of states. It also indicates the utility of discourse analysis as an additional tool of analysis for security studies.

In short, in today's world, one can argue that any phenomenon can become an issue of security when they are "securitised". Securitisation, in the words of Buzan (Buzan et al 1998), means a process by which " the issue in question is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bonds of political procedure". Thus, it is evident that the meaning of a concept lies in its usage and is not something, which can be defined analytically or philosophically.

C. RELEVANCE OF CONSTRUCTIVISM IN SECURITY STUDIES

Security has long been an essentially contested concept. There is no indication that its contested nature is likely to change in the foreseeable future; indeed, over the last two decades it has become ever more subject to contestation (Krause, 1998).

At the same time, security studies remains at the heart of contemporary international relations. Whereas in the past international relations as a discipline developed from a study of the core concerns of what has become security studies—that is, the causes of war and the conditions of peace—today security studies needs to renew and retool itself by feeding off broader debates, not just in international relations but in the wider social sciences and humanities (Hyde-Price, 2001).

The traditional focus on power and politics in security studies has been challenged robustly this decade by the development of ideational approaches to the subject (Farrel, 2002). Among these ideational approaches comes constructivism to the fore (Hyde-Price, 2001) . In recent years, a rapidly expanding body of work identified as 'constructivist' (either by the scholars themselves or by their IR audience) has become quite visible in various subfields within the discipline of IR. The field of security studies is no exception.

Security studies has been slow to accept critical challenges such as constructivism. It is generally observed that under the mainstream approaches it continues to be treated as " the theoretically improvised cousin to the sturdy children of international relations" (Krause, 1998, 330).

A comparison of constructivism with mainstream scholarship is needed to understand how they see security studies. In this attempt, Krause (1998) offers a workable methodology. According to this, threat *perception* as the primary variable in understanding the concept of security should be put under focus. In doing so, emphasis is to be on how the critical approaches, i.e. constructivism, correspond to the central claims of the security studies agenda of the mainstream approaches, which are as follows: Threats arise naturally from the material capabilities of possible opponents in a self-help world of sovereign states; the object of security is the state and the security dilemma can be ameliorated but not transcended.

To assess these central claims in relation to the constructivist approach, the construction of threats and appropriate responses to these threats, construction of object(s) of security and the evaluation of the possibility for transformation of security dilemma are focused on.

The recent constructivist turn in security studies has been largely responsible for opening up an analytical space by focusing on questions of identity, such as what national security means, how those meanings have come about, the nature of the subject

(the nation-state) that needs to be secured and the kind of threats it needs securing from. By focusing on these questions, constructivists have argued convincingly for the need to understand state interests and identities – and consequently, security practices – as 'socially constructed' (Varadarajan, 2004,320).

The relationship between identity and interests is particularly important. As Ted Hopf (1989, 175) points out: "In telling you who you are, identities strongly imply a particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors." This realization leads constructivists to problematize such issues, which realists and neoliberals take for granted, as identities and interests. As Paul Kowert (1998/99, 2) notes: "Rationalist theories explain how states should choose or how they should bargain. They offer answers to some important questions about when states should cooperate and when they might be expected to fight. Yet they say nothing about who the actors are or how their interests were constituted." In essence, the constructivist "critique of neorealists and neoliberals concerns not what these scholars do and say but what they ignore: the content and source of state interests and social fabric of world politics" (Checkel, 1998, 324).

The neglect of, or simply the resistance to, identity questions within the realist research program leads one to think there is no value to identity in explaining national security issues and policies. The call for identity and culture in realist and neorealist agenda of security is a clear indication of such image (Küçük, 1999).

As argued (Chafetz, Spirtas and Franklin 1998/99), national security depends on national identity. Two claims are often advanced in support of this simple proposition. One, is that internal cohesion facilitates orderly and efficient responses to external threats. This form of identity might be called patriotism or a sense of national purpose, yet efforts to promote national cohesion have also produced much insecurity, leading to violence deployed along ethnic, religious, linguistic and a variety of other fault lines. When national identity breaks down, this too has implications for international relations: civil wars, spin-off crises, changing alliance patterns, the

dissolution of existing states, and the constitution of new ones. It is easy to recognize the importance of such identity politics in international relations.

Identity is also said to be important for a second reason: a state must distinguish its friends from its "enemies." Structural realists maintain, other states are always (at least potentially) enemies,. Neo-liberals, on the other hand, find greater merit in distinguishing among states. Democracies, they expect, will behave differently than other states, and free-riders differently than the "good citizens" of a nascent international community. Such distinctions, while clearly not eternal, are presumed by many neoliberals to have enough stability to guide foreign policy (and scholarship).

The "constructivist turn in international relations theory" brings this debate into sharper relief by challenging the rationalist individualism on which neo-realists and neo-liberals alike have relied. Constructivism assumes that the world is constituted in part through the meaningful practices of social subjects, and that people act on the basis of the meanings that things have for them. These meanings are fundamentally cultural: they are made possible by particular discourses or codes of intelligibility that provide the categories through which the world is understood. Meaning is thus a social rather than an individual or collective phenomenon: it is not that everyone has the same "ideas" inside their heads, but rather that meaning stays in the practices and categories through which people engage with each other and with the natural world. Such codes of inelligibility constitute the world as we know it and function in it.

Weldes and Laffey (1999) assert that identities and insecurities, rather than being given, emerge out of a process of representation through which individuals describe to themselves and others the world in which they live. These representations – narratives, collective memories, and the imageries that make them possible- define and so constitute the world. They populate it with objects and subjects, endow those subjects with interests, and define the relations among those objects and subjects. In so doing,

they create insecurities, which are threats to the identities, and thus to the interests, of these socially constructed subjects.

The conceptualization of security therefore differs because the prevailing self-help security system is a social construction involving mutual-exclusionary identity and interest formation and security (threat) construction that would otherwise be constructed. Alexander Wendt (1992, 399-400) notes that self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity and interest that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity formation under anarchy are concerned first and foremost with preservation or 'security' of the self. Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and the manner in which the self is identified cognitively with the other.

As to the importance of culture in this process, Keith Krause (1998, 310) considers that "strategic culture has both a societal or domestic and an international or externally oriented dimension," while a security culture—as opposed to a political or diplomatic culture—entails those "enduring and widely shared beliefs and traditions, attitudes and symbols that inform the way in which a state's . . . interests . . . with respect to security (which involves non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament) . . . are perceived." On the one hand this is little more than saying that historically contingent traditions shape understandings of both strategy and security. On the other, Krause also wants to maintain more generally that culture "however defined, plays an important role in shaping international political behaviour."

A similar elusiveness rests with strategic culture. Scholars (Jones & Smith, 2001) recognize the considerable difficulty involved with the definition of strategic culture: its endless divisibility, the problem of whose culture in any particular society to examine (the outlook of the political elite for example may be very different from that of society at large) and which cultural beliefs to select and accentuate as the most important.

Beliefs and values embedded in bureaucracies and military can shape what the national interests would be. Organizational predilection does so through two processes. First, organizational culture influences bureaucratic orientation and second, bureaucratic priorities shape national preferences and policies. The influence of any institution, however, in preference formation is dependent on the organization's salience determined by the monopoly power on expertise, the complexity of the issue under consideration, and the time limit available for action.

Therefore, domestic structure and the distribution of power domestically are important for the degree of any institution's influence in preference formation. Organizational culture is defined by Kier (1995: 69-70) as "the set of basic assumptions and values that shape shared understandings, and the forms or practices whereby these meanings are expressed, affirmed, and communicated to the members of an organization." Then, Kier (1996: 202-03) defines the culture of military organization "as the collection of ideas and beliefs about armed forces—both its conduct and its relationship to the wider society." This is quite constructivist in the sense that it emphasizes the shared understandings; that is, intersubjective structures at the level of military institution. In terms of relationship between military organizational culture and domestic politico-military subculture on the formation of military doctrine, Kier (1995) argues that the domestic distribution of power and civilian policy makers' beliefs about military force and its role can affect and shape the organizational culture of the military. This organizational culture in turn shapes the choice of either offensive or defensive military strategy.

To sum up the role of domestic culture and norms in national security matters, two effects are then noted (Jepperson et al., 1996, 52-60). First, cultural, institutional and normative environments of states shape the national interests and security policies of them. Second, cultural and institutional structures shape the identities of the actors (here states). In what follows, the nature and social structure of security relations between states is constructed by having recourse to both identity and interest formation through interstate practices and domestic narratives, strategic culture of security.

Therefore, it is clear that the relationship between identity/ interest formation and security relations/system, however, is not just a function of interstate interaction but also domestic strategic culture in which how threats, security are constructed and thus national interests, preferences for state actions are decided.

Constructivist approaches to security studies question traditional realist assumptions about the materially given and endogenously derived character of interests. They stress that security cannot be objectively defined without reference to intersubjective perceptions any more than can individual or state interests. Perceptions of security and insecurity cannot be divorced from the values, beliefs, and identity of the person "or thing concerned. At the same time, however, security is not simply subjectively defined; it is not simply "all in the mind." The task for security studies is thus to combine analysis of material structures with investigation of the perceptions and assumptions of the relevant actors.

Thus, for example, Poland's sense of insecurity in the face of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s cannot be analyzed simply at the level of discourse. Hitler's demonization of Poland and the Polish people is only one aspect of a security analysis of interwar Poland; another important factor to consider must be the operational capabilities of the Wehrmacht, particularly the potency of its Panzer divisions and the doctrine of blitzkrieg (Hyde-Price, 2001, 48).

The preceding comparison reveals important differences between constructivism and mainstream approaches. First, whereas threats to security are taken for granted; in other words, they are considered "given ones" by mainstream scholars, the constructivist approach assumes that threats are constructed in light of many factors involving history, culture, ideologies, communication etc. By this distinction, we see here a theoretical clash between the two scholarships, while mainstream approaches work on the assumption that there is one objective and knowable world, constructivist

scholars pay more attention to epistemology and focus on how things in world affairs are constructed since the world is not of objectively knowable.

Second, as regards the object of security, the constructivist approach questions how the object of security is constructed according to threat perceptions, in contrast to the basic assumption of mainstream approaches that the object is primarily state. Here, the argument that discourses of threat are constitutive of the object to be secured relates to the question of how such threats are identified.

For both scholarships, national interests, threat perceptions, power etc are important determining factors for states' foreign and thus security policies. However, constructivism additionally shows that they are socially constructed with a view to identity and culture.

Security must therefore be seen in terms of a reflexive interaction between subjective perceptions and material structures, between what is observed and what is imagined (Hyde-price, 2001, 48). Security is not a given any more than a state's interests or national identity. Security, like interests and identities, is constructed. Facts do not simply speak for themselves. They require evaluation and analysis. In this sense, they are socially constructed. An operational concept of security must acknowledge the constructed nature of social reality.

However, this does not mean that security studies must reject a materialist ontology as some critical theorists and most post-positivists do. Rather, it involves recognizing that the material is mediated through human subjectivity. Interests—including security interests—are not exogenously given by the nature of the international system or the mode of production but are intersubjectively constituted through a process of reciprocal interaction.

Constructivist's focus on identity and culture as well as interests as variables of security enables scholars to better account for how the security of a state is constructed in the formulation and the conduct of its foreign policy in IR.

Added value of constructivism in security studies is also related to its emphasis on ideational factors in determining the threats perception and thus the security of the state . The importance of ideational factors in security studies can be better understood as follows: international patterns of amity and enmity have important cultural dimensions. As argued by Katzenstein (1996) in terms of material power, Canada and Cuba stand in roughly comparable positions relative to the United States. But while one is a threat, the other is an ally, a result of ideational factors operating at the international level. In each case although realists would try to reduce cultural (ideational) effects to epiphenomena of the distribution of power; it is obvious that these effects have greater autonomy.

In view of the foregoing one can rightly argue that material factors, such as the existence of weapons however dreadful are, do not suffice to account for the security of a given state. What is more important is how and whether the state perceives such material factors as a security threat to itself, than whether such weapons are really (materially) dangerous for others. In other words, it is ideational factors that shape the perception of the state vis-à-vis such material dangers. Only when it is perceived and thus constructed as a security threat, such material factor can be called a threat. In other words, not until material factors like weapons are securitized by a state, do they become relevant for the security of this state. This is thanks to constructivism. In this regard, the concept of securitization is thus another important aspect of the constructivist understanding of security. As explained earlier, for this concept the constructivists are indebted to the Copenhagen school that is the inventor of this concept.

In short, for constructivists, security cannot be objectively defined without reference to intersubjective perceptions any more than can state interests. Perceptions of security and insecurity cannot be divorced from the values, beliefs and identity of the

state. Security must be seen in terms of a reflexive interaction between subjective perceptions and material structures, i.e. between what is observed and what is imagined.

Constructivism in short does not reject materialist ontology, but accepts that material is mediated through human subjectivity. Security interests are not exogenously given by the nature of the international system or the mode of production, but are intersubjectively constituted through a process of reciprocal interaction.

Between positivist approaches attaching ontological priority to material factors and post-positivist ones privileging ideational factors, as suggested by Hyde-price (2001) constructivism stands as the 3rd way. It is argued that it consists of the important assets of all other approaches. It relates to societal security as it does not ignore domestic factors. It also consists of securitization in the sense that everything that is constructed by actors as a source of security concern becomes securitized.

To sum up, constructivism accept that national interests, threat perceptions, security dilemmas are important determining factors for state foreign and security policies. However, it contends that they are socially constructed with a view to identity and culture. That is, they are not defined through distribution of power, but distribution of knowledge. The processes of interest formation and threat construction are not independent of identity formation and cultural factors. At a deeper level of foreign and security preferences and actions lie ideational factors. Therefore, it is meaningless to portray a foreign policy outcome developed out of a peculiar identity and culture of an actor as the one against the national interests. Constructivism holds that both *realpolitik* and *idealpolitik* can be social constructions upon certain structures of identities and cultures. It does not necessarily challenge realism or idealism, but rather complements such mainstream scholarship.

D. UTILIY OF CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS FOR COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

History shows that "security, whether defined narrowly or widely, is a scarce commodity" (Garnett, 1996, 10). Therefore, it is generally observed that in face of security threat perceptions, states feel necessity to combine their efforts to strengthen their own security acting together. This brings us to the concept of collective security, which has been widely debated in the literature of international relations both in practice and in theory, during which scholars have attempted to provide several formulations to ensure collective security, in the context of international relations theory.

Here, similar to the conceptual problematic in defining security, a precise definition of collective security remains elusive. Not only do definitions differ that is bound to happen in public debate and scholarly discourse, but also some directly contradict each other (Downs, 1994) .

The term has been used to describe everything from loose alliance systems to any period of history in which wars do not take place. This wide spectrum is also due to the nature of security threats. States ally to increase their security against perceived threats.

In simple terms, collective security arrangements [5] are related to efforts of a group of states to act together in order to better preserve their own security.   The underlying logic of collective security arrangements is two-fold. As emphasized by Kupchan (1991),   first, the balancing mechanisms that operate under collective security should prevent war and stop aggression far more effectively than the balancing mechanisms that operate in an anarchic setting: At least in theory, collective security efforts make for more robust deterrence by ensuring that aggressors will be met with an opposing coalition that has preponderant rather than merely equivalent power. Second, a collective security organization, by institutionalizing the notion of all against one, contributes to the creation of an international setting in which stability emerges through cooperation rather than through competition. Because states believe that they will be met with

overwhelming force if they show aggression, and because they believe that other states will cooperate with them in resisting aggression, collective security mitigates the rivalry and hostility of a self-help world. Collective security in this sense   is of a struggle to avoid or minimize two important paradoxes that are inherent in the concept. These are "security dilemma"[6] and " free rider"[7] phenomena.

In the light of the transboundary effects of globalisation that make things heavily interdependent, sufficiency of natural security in tackling such security risks and threats of global character is also questioned. It is argued that conceptions of global peace and security based primarily on national security are no longer sufficient.   Katzenstein (1996) recognises that with the end of the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Given these arguments, one can rightly assert that national security and collective security are interrelated. Thus, under the conditions of the globalised world, in order to manage the security risks at present, national security needs strongly complemented with collective security efforts.

In any particular balance of power system, there are usually groups of states that share to some extent an assessment of threats. States face two kinds of threats in general (Kupchan, 1995).   The first is usually the reason for which states join their forces in the first place, i.e. an external threat from a potential aggressor who is not part of the group. The second threat is of more insidious but often just as dangerous nature, namely, an internal threat from a member of the group itself which betrays its friends and use force against them. The former form of collective security is best illustrated by the alliance system. An alliance functions as a collective body to defend its members from security threats directed from outside. Thus, it consists of the concept of collective defence as well.   Moreover, although an alliance is focused on external threats, the security is collective for its members.

On the other hand, the best illustration of security arrangements countering internal threats coming from members of a collective security body is the 'security community'.

Karl Deutch elaborated this concept that was first introduced by Van Wagenen, in 1957.[8] The goals of a security community are different and in some sense broader. States in a security community engage each other in high levels of economic, social and political interdependence. Their willingness to do so rests on a set of promises not to use force among themselves. This willingness is expressed either by the merger of states into a common body (amalgamated security community) or by the co-operation among states without any formal institutionalization (pluralistic security community).   Later, the concept of security community has been developed by Adler, adding common values as the foundation of such a community. For Adler (1992, 294):

> security community is formed by a group of democratic sovereign states that, agreeing on the unbearable destructiveness of modern war and on political, economic, social and moral values consistent with democracy, the rule of law and economic reform, have transferred their domestic practices to the international arena and allowed their civil societies as well as their institutions to become integrated to the point that the idea of using force loses any practical meaning and even becomes unthinkable.

While the term has been used to describe everything from loose alliance systems to any period of history in which wars do not take place, the *sine qua non* of collective security formations is collective self-regulation: a group of states attempts to reduce security threats by agreeing to collectively punish any member state that violates the system's norms. This internal focus distinguishes it from a typical alliance system, which has a goal of collectively reducing threats that originate outside its membership. In other words, collective security differs from collective defence. In the former lies the notion of punishment of aggression from within, whereas in the latter there is the punishment of aggression from outside. The security may be collective for the members of the alliance, but it is focused on a well-defined external threat. In this sense, collective security is the opposite of autonomous self-defence (Adler, 1997b, Adler & Barnett, 1998) .

In view of the foregoing, the concept of collective security can be defined in general as possessing the following particularities (Downs & Arbor, 1994):

1.   Collective security requires a substantial diffusion of power.

2.   Variation in assessment of threats dramatically limits the range and efficacy of collective security.

3.   The free-rider problem jeopardizes any collective security arrangement.

4.   Collective security cannot survive in the absence of an outside threat.

5.   Collective security requires states to commit themselves to an inflexible course of action that is insensitive to context and self-interest.

6.   The logic of collective security is circular in the sense that its establishment requires that its consequences already exit.

Collective security rests on the notion of *one for all and all for one*. While states retain considerable autonomy over the conduct of their foreign policy, participation in a collective security organisation entails a commitment by each member to join a coalition to confront any aggressor with opposing preponderant strength.

Collective security arrangements are thus by nature a result of attempts to preserve the security of each and every state, which unites against a common enemy/adversary. For they share same threat perceptions against which they think they will be better-off if they act together. What constitutes the basis for collective security arrangements is therefore the mutual responsiveness developed out of answers to the questions of "who I am" and "who the other is". In other words, it is the collective identity, which lays the ground for a sound collective security formation. In this regard, it is important to know how the object of security is constructed according to threat perceptions. Here, the argument that discourses of threat are constitutive of the object to be secured relates to the question of how such threats are identified.

As mentioned above, what constitutes the basis for collective security arrangements is the collective identity, i.e. the formation of *self* against a commonly defined *other*, which lays the ground for a sound collective security regime.

The importance of identities can be summarized as follows: common identities help strengthen collective security arrangements, whose members share common

identities. The issue of identification is best explained by the *self/other dichotomy*. The *self* is identified in relation to its position vis-à-vis the *other*. In other words, all identities exist only with their otherness. "Without the *other*, the *self* actually cannot know either itself or the world because meaning is created in discourse where consciousness meets" (Neuman, 1998, 13). The notion of the other is an epistemological necessity of the self. The very capacity to experience a self is contingent upon otherness. It is in dialogue with others that the self is shaped.

In view of the foregoing, one can easily understand that collective identities and shared values as well as shared understandings as regards threat perceptions are of significant importance for the creation of a workable collective security arrangement.

In this regard, constructivism has defined itself in opposition to the rationalist approaches in the discipline. Constructivism effectively challenged the assumption that the ultimate unit of identity in international relations is the territorial state by making a convincing case for the possibility of collective identity among states.

Constructivism with its focus on constitutive norms and identities in shaping state interests and policies, allows for the possibility that under the proper conditions actors can generate shared identities and norms that are tied to a stable peace.

Similarly, as regards the object of security, the constructivist approach questions how the object of security is constructed according to threat perceptions. Here, the argument that discourses of threat are constitutive of the object to be secured relates to the question of how such threats are identified.

The balance of threat approach to collective security formation and the deterrence theory approach to the security dilemma can be fruitful if they are reconceptualized through constructivist assumptions. Threats are socially constructed and identities are the basis of interests. In contrast to realism, constructivism assumes that threats are not derivative of the distribution of capabilities, but derivative of the

distribution of knowledge. Threats are social constructions. As Keith Krause (1998, 306, 309) notes, „ "the world of threats and intentions is supremely a constructed one, involving ", " history, culture, communication ideologies and related factors" and so "the question -of how the object of security itself is constructed is inextricable from the discourse of threats." It is these socially constructed threats that are for the most part constitutive of the interests to be secured or pursued.

Moreover, the constructivist perspective argues that state identity offers valuable insights for the study of state alliances. Identity politics which determine which states pose a threat or not, shape the choices of possible alliance partners. It is in fact the shared identity that makes some partners for alliance more attractive and possible than others. From this perspective, the bases of collective security regimes are the mutual identification and cognitive affinity that is promoted by collective identity. The collective security formation here takes some form of community rather than a contractual type, the basis of which is composed of mutual promises. Therefore, collective security regimes survive as long as the collective identity remains as it is and the actors act in accordance with the normative structure the mutual interaction produced. In fact, the nature and the degree of cohesiveness of alliances are measured against the yardstick of identity—how much the actors in question mutually identify themselves with each other—which determines the maintenance of alliance. In this sense, such collective security regimes cease when the parties undergo serious identity crises, or role conflicts or are in a position of responding to competing identities.

As to the security dilemmas, worst-case scenarios, which are the sources of threat perceptions leading to deterrent practices, are not the result of anarchy, but of a competitive security environment, which is socially constructed. State behavior is determined by actors' conceptions of their identities, which are relationally constructed with a view to others' identity conceptions. As Wendt (1992, 397) puts it, "States act differently towards enemies than they do friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not." State behavior is the product of interstate interactions. In fact, "History

matters. Security dilemmas are not the acts of God. They are effects of practice" (Wendt, 1995,77).

States as coercion-wielding units are in dire need of security which also necessitate collective security arrangements for better preservation of their own security, and collective security arrangements can be better utilized in face of an identified common enemy/adversary.

As the foregoing shows, in threat perceptions, the formation of a state's identity against other identities that can be named as "other" plays an important role. The main argument is that the identity of each unit, i.e. state, is shaped in relation to its opposition vis-à-vis those of others. In other words, the dichotomy of the self/other is relevant in the identification process as all identities exist only with their otherness. In view of this understanding, it is argued that collective security is based on the formation of a common identity of likeminded units (selves) in opposition of a commonly perceived "other".

Identity refers to the images of "self" that actors construct and project, in and through their interactions with "others". There is a construction and projection of a collective identity both at the levels of the nation (nationalism) and state (enactment of state sovereignty). This collective identity becomes an important element that links the cultural-institutional context to the question of national interest (Varadaradjan, 2004, 323).

Collective identity formation produces a sense of difference with outsider states. Production of difference does not mean the fabrication of difference but rather the discursive practice of naming, marking, and articulating of another as different. "Collective identity is a relation between two human collectives, that is, it always resides in the nexus between the collective self and its others, and not in the self seen in isolation" (Neumann, 1998, 399).

Acknowledging that collective identity is primarily a cognitive and discursive phenomenon, constructivists have studied community formation mostly through representations of self and other. While emphasizing the importance of identity dynamics in community formation, constructivists have also been careful to distinguish themselves from the cultural-essentialist approach of Huntington. Drawing on various approaches in social theory on identity formation, constructivism has emphasized the situational and fluid nature of collective identification. The constructivist notion of collective identity formation is rather an open-ended process that is shaped by the meanings that state actors hold about each other and about their interaction(s). While not denying the possibility that communities may form around the religious/civilizational lines drawn by Huntington, constructivists have criticized Huntington for assuming stable cultural divisions, without looking into the meanings and understandings that produce and sustain these divisions, or alternatively, can possibly challenge them (Rumelili, 2002).

As it can be recalled, Alexander Wendt, the most well-known constructivist, keeping the state as the principal unit of analysis, sets the two basic principles of constructivism as: "structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces and the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature" (Wendt, 1999) Based on these two principles, he claims that the interests of a state are dependent on its identity formed while interacting with other states. As a result of these interactions, Wendt (1995) argues, states convey two major identities to the outside world. They signal either a cooperative or a conflictual image and thus establish enemy, friend or a rival identity. According to Wendt, it is these identities at the international level that determine states' ability to find collective solutions to their collective problems. It is this identity (foe, friend, or rival) that becomes the means that let the states convert their intersubjective knowledge about sharedness, resemblances and dissimilarity into material interests in their international relations.

Identity creation, argues Wendt (1994, 391), takes place at both the behavioral and rhetorical levels. While behaviorally a state can act friendly or unwelcoming, at the rhetorical level it can use various modes of "consciousness raising, dialogue, discussion, persuasion, education, ideological labor, political argument, symbolic action etc.," All these rhetorical and behavioral instruments aim at creating a collective identity that eventually could solve collective action problems.

Contending that state identities and interests are constructed by the intersubjective understandings that exist among states and not dictated by the logic of anarchy, Wendt (1994, 1999) has argued that states can positively identify with each other, such that they see each other as 'part of self rather than as 'other.'

Similarly, Ted Hopf (1998) argues that constructivism provides powerful explanations for two puzzles of world politics highlighted by realism. The first puzzle is the balance of power. Realism traditionally predicts states balancing against power, but Stephen Walt (1991) persuasively demonstrates that in fact states ally against threats; in other words, states balance against threatening power. Realism shows how states can estimate the power of opponents, but missing is a theory of how states perceive hostile versus friendly intent. Hopf points out that a constructivist account of identity offers superior leverage in explaining how threats are formed and alliances forged

The second puzzle is the security dilemma that is created by the uncertainty states face in assessing the intentions of others. Hopf points out that while the security dilemma is an important dynamic in conflictual interstate relationships, it is irrelevant for many pairs and groups of states that enjoy non-conflictual relations. He notes that norms can explain why most interstate relations are not subject to security dilemmas: "By providing meaning, identities reduce uncertainty" (Hopf, 1998, 188) .   For this reason, Britain does not fear French nuclear weapons. Hopf recognizes that certainty does not always bring security. By enabling a state to recognize its enemy, identity can replace uncertainty with certain insecurity. Uncertainty is not a constant that can be

assumed (as it is by realists); rather it is a variable whose origins and effects constructivists seek to explain.

In view of the foregoing, as Farrell (2002) notes, one can see that constructivism helps better to explain collective security formations that are constitutive of collective identities. Thus, sound collective security arrangements are forms of collective identity that exclude each other on the basis of their distinctiveness.

i. COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN HISTORY

The idea of collective security is argued[9] to be as old as the Amphictyonic League, by which Greek city-states assumed the obligation not to destroy any city of the Amphictyons nor cut off their streams, in war or peace and if in case of such aggression, they would march against the aggressor. While the emphasis in this system was on protecting a common religious area bordered by all, the core of the plan required that a group of states punish collectively any member that violated an important security norm. This collective commitment of a group to hold members accountable for the maintenance of an internal security norm is seen as the essence of collective security.

Since the aforementioned early example of collective security arrangements, for more than three thousand years there have been countless proposals for collective security systems and dozens of attempts to put specific plans into effect. In this regard, it is mentioned that the power and philosophy of the Catholic Church made the Middle Ages a particularly fertile period for both. In Germany and especially France, religious councils passed laws obligating princes and clerics to oppose war by means of force.

Later, in the Era of Enlightenment numerous secular collective security plans were put forward which called for that the great powers should enforce a peace in Europe by assisting the weak and oppressed. The treaties ending the Thirty Years War obligated the signatories to defend and protect each other as well as the laws or conditions of peace. In 1693 William Penn outlined a peace plan for Europe that was

based on an international tribunal and Diet of European sovereigns whose decisions would be enforced collectively.

In this period, later the Abbe de Saint-Pierre published his Project for Perpetual Peace, which called for a Union of States that would work along the same lines. Any state that attempted to use force outside the union or refused to execute a regulation of the council would be declared an enemy until it either disarmed or complied.

In this context, the evaluation of Jean Jacques Rousseau on Saint-Pierre's Project for Perpetual Peace is held as note-worthy as it anticipated many of the critiques of collective security that would be raised over the course of the next three centuries. While acknowledging that Saint-Pierre's project would benefit the people of Europe, he argued that "their desires were basically irrelevant. Monarchs were interested in extending their power, not in providing what would now be called public goods or collective benefits."

Later, throughout history, powerful countries of their time have constructed three versions of collective security mechanisms. All these reject the unrestrained power balancing through competitive alliances that characterize laissez-faire approaches to security (Bennet and Lepgold, 1999).

The first attempt at collective security was the Concert of Europe, which helped prevent great-power war from 1815 to 1853. Although enforcement was decentralized, its members supported Europe's great-power equilibrium, shared a strong distaste for war after the costly Napoleonic Wars, and agreed to consult and take joint action in response to threats to peace. From 1815 through 1822 and to a lesser extent until 1854, they also shared a longer and broader conception of self-interest than is usual in international relations, although the shared stakes did not extend beyond the inner club of great powers. These commitments weakened when the more liberal British and French regimes opposed domestic interventions favoured by Austria and Russia.

Like the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations that was founded at the end of World War I assumed great-power cooperation. Its founders drew on numerous experiences in addition to the European Concert, including the Hague Conferences and interallied planning during World War I, but it could not overcome identification with the Versailles Treaty's punitive settlement of the war. It lacked a concert of interests, as Germany, Japan, and Italy opposed the post-war status quo. It even lacked a quorum of great powers, since the Soviets joined only in 1934 and were expelled five years later for attacking Finland, while the United States stayed out from the start. The democracies supported the status quo, but would not take responsibility for enforcing it. Britain and France could not isolate Italy after its invasion of Ethiopia for fear of pushing it toward Germany, and they then failed to resist Germany's aggression against Austria and Czechoslovakia.

In view of the above , it is clear that the history of these efforts was not happy one. In the third attempt, after the end of World War II the great-power victors of the war centralized enforcement of collective security in their own hands on the United Nations Security Council (SC) in the belief that post-war peace required continuation of the wartime concert. But with the former common enemy Germany weak and partitioned, Soviet-American cooperation broke down over conflicting ideologies and security concerns, and the resultant bipolar bloc system undermined the entire mechanism.

The disappointment after the founding of the United Nations, was even higher. Rival blocs arose swiftly in the late 1940s, less than four years after the signing of the UN Charter. As a result, the new UN soon became another forum for factional struggle and not a vehicle to transcend it. The fundamental opposition of the United States and Soviet Union, and the ability of either to veto Security Council resolutions, made the UN irrelevant to important decisions. Unlike the 1930s, however, this competition between great powers produced a "long peace," which became increasingly stable and robust after the mid-1960s.

Collective security regimes in history, i.e. the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations and the United Nations, have all failed to provide for an efficient collective security arrangement to diffuse wars and hot conflicts, and therefore were not security communities in the global sense.

Collective security has always been an issue heavily exposed to criticisms of lacking efficiency. It is argued (Kolodzej, 1992, and Negrotto, 1993) that collective security is feasible only when it is unnecessary. Similarly, critics say it works when it is not needed (Kupchan, 1999). Realists even argue that the whole concept of collective security is crippled by a fundamental paradox: "a collective security system can only be successful in a world that is already so peaceful if does not need one" (Downs & Arbor, 1994, 32).

Although in the case of the UN, one can argue that it may have helped world wars since the second World War, the reason for the absence of such a global war is in fact not the UN but the balance of terror between the two opposing military blocs based on mutual nuclear deterrence. Why did then they fail to form a security community at the global level? This can be explained with reference to identity issues in view of the previous discussions on the importance of identity-building for the creation of such communities. Here, it can be argued that those security regimes could not establish a collective identity against a common threat. In other words, the selves in these organizations did not come together against a common "other".

The Cold War was of a relationship between two opposing military blocs based on ideological confrontation working on a balance of mutual deterrence in the two-polar system. A clash – at least potentially- between these blocs was evident throughout the Cold War era. In fact, the two ideological blocs, the West and the East, had long identified themselves against each other. For the West, the "other" was the East representing "the anti-democratic, tyrannical Communist expansionism", whereas for the latter, the West was the "other" representing "the capitalist imperialism".

They failed in forming a sound collective security system at the global level. It is because they could not manage to create a collective identity and common other. Instead both sides of the bipolar world, NATO and the Warsaw pact successfully created their own collective identity among its allies against each other by constructing each other the *other* of the *self.*

ii. CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY EFFORTS IN POST-COLD WAR

a. Developments in the Aftermath of the Cold War Era

The end of the Cold War, which had long been the symbol of division in Europe for almost half a century, was marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall on 3 October 1989. The fall of the Berlin wall meant also the collapse of the ideological walls dividing Europe for so many years[10].

The end of the Cold war was in fact not of a static nature but the result of a process that can be traced back to the coming power of Mikail Gorbacev as the last president of the USSR in 1985. The historic policies of Gorbacev as the 'Prestrokia and ' Glasnost', as argued, propelled the USSR into a 'deconstructivist' overhaul of its social, political and economic system, allowing it to eliminate the bureaucratic, oppressive and immobilising forces of the Stalinist past. His aim was, most likely, to relocate resources to the welfare of the population from the defence expenditures with a view to strengthening the loyalty of the peoples in the republics forming the USSR and thus preventing the disintegration. Yet, arms cuts and even unilateral arms reduction initiated by the Gorbacev leadership was perceived outside as the weakening of the state. This was enough to flare up the popular movements in the satellite states against the Soviet regime that turned out to be irreversible. Furthermore, the Gulf war showed clearly the might of the other Super Power, the USA.   Thus, by 1989 for the USSR it was already impossible to alter the current of the historical changes.

Within a short span of time in the aftermath of the fall of the Berlin Wall, one-party Communist states disappeared throughout Central and Eastern Europe, new independent states were established in the break-up republics of the former Soviet Union. In Paris in November 1990 NATO and the Warsaw Pact formally declared that they did not threaten each other and effectively brought the Cold War to an end. This was quickly followed in 1991 by the dissolution of the military structure of the Warsaw Pact in March and then by the organisation itself in July. This was followed in December 1991 by the dissolution of the Soviet Union itself. The end of the Cold War marked the end of bipolarity. Gorbacev nevertheless managed to secure his new country, the Russian Federation, through a series of bargaining and multilateral instruments signed in the course of this historical transformation, regarding mainly arms control and reduction both conventional and nuclear.

By the end of 1991 it was clear that coupled with all these historic changes, the demise of the ideological divide yielded an unprecedented transformation in the strategic security environment not only in Europe, but also in the whole Euro-Atlantic region. That would be named as 'the post-Cold War'.

Against this background, the end of the Cold War led indeed to a moment of uncertainty when the East became extinct in a very short span of time. This seemed to have created a vacuum in international relations not only for states and politics, but also for academics and theoretical discussions. It was the years where the end of the Cold War would mean the end of everything regarding the past. This hysteria even led to the discussions on the end of history[11].

However, time attested to the contrary, with the rise of non-conventional and asymmetric security threats. In this regard, it is argued that the end of the Cold War has put new security issues beside the long-standing fear of a nuclear war between the two superpowers and their preparations for large-scale conventional wars. These consist of a wide range of risks varying from ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism and

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international terrorism through organized crime, drug trafficking, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to mass migrations, environmental disasters, poverty etc.

These threats to international security are not purely new phenomena. However, what is new in this sense is the effect of globalization on these threats. Today, in a world where things have increasingly become more transboundary and interdependent, owing to the effects of globalization, as in the domino theory, any incidents in a country or in region, be it a terrorist act or an ethnic conflict, pose threats on other areas. Corollary to this, such threats that transcend borders happen to affect security more rapidly, more severely in an ever-expanding magnitude with spillover effects. These threats inevitably necessitate collective responds as they affect almost all states in one way or another.

In addition to the re-mapping of the Euro-Atlantic area, the new security environment has also been increasingly exposed to the emergence of such security risks and threats : to cite examples, ethnic conflicts leading to civil wars that expose civilian populations to large-scale state violence; an increasing relevance of economic competitiveness and, relatedly, of the "spin-on" of civilian high technology for possible military use; increasing numbers of migrants and refugees testing the political capacities of states; threats of environmental degradation affecting national well-being; and perceived increases in the relevance of issues of cultural identity in international politics, including human rights and religion[12].

In such an environment, Europe in particular and the world in general have witnessed several hot conflicts and wars in just one decade in the post-Cold War era, which totaled more than seen in the whole course of the Cold War years. The European continent, which had been free from wars since the end of World War II, once again became a continent of fights and deaths with the wars that erupted in its midst, like in the territories of former Yugoslavia or its vicinity, like the Caucasus or in the Middle East .

In view of these, one can argue that the basic premises of the mainstream scholarship, such as anarchical setting, power politics based on national interests, etc., are still present in the world affairs. True, mainstream scholarship has failed to anticipate the end of the Cold War. But, the world order, which has replaced the Cold War era, still proves the validity of the mainstream scholarship. States act in pursuit of preservation of their interests and of protection of their security in the face of both conventional and non-conventional security threats. However, the main question is here how they gather support from other states for such policies and how legitimacy is attained for them. In fact, transboundary effects of such security threats help states to gather supports of like-minded states and act in the form of collectivity security against such threats.

The end of the Cold War that was brought about by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the dissolution of the USSR also even raised questions on the necessity of NATO as military alliances normally dissolve once their common enemy has been defeated [13].

On the fourth of April 1989, the Alliance had celebrated the fortieth anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. This event coincided with the beginning of a period of profound change in the course of East-West relations and with a far-reaching transformation of the security environment. The transformation of the security environment has also had a profound impact on NATO itself. It has enabled the Alliance to initiate its own process of adaptation, both internally and externally, while continuing to fulfill its core function of ensuring the security of its member states.

The Alliance saw the social and environmental issues, through political means, for the greater security and stability of Europe. It was therefore decided to extend a hand of friendship to the then Soviet Union and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe by inviting the governments of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This was later developed and in November 1990 these governments signed an agreement stating that they no longer regarded each other as adversaries.

Under this process of transformation came the concept of security partnership into being in NATO that symbolised the external adaptation of the Alliance to the strategic changes in the Euro-Atlantic region. This was molded with the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance. This concept adopted at the Rome Summit of 1991, bore little relation to previous concepts, but emphasized cooperation with former adversaries as opposed to confrontation. While maintaining the security of the allies as NATO's fundamental purpose, it also combined this with the specific obligation to work towards improved and expanded security for Europe as a whole.

As to the possible reasons for this inclusive approach of the Alliance towards its former adversaries, two main motives can be mentioned. The first is to avoid the risk that these newly democratic countries might pose security threats to NATO, if they were left alone. The second is to expand the security zone that surrounds the Alliance. Thus, it can be argued that it was to the benefit of the Alliance to work for the integration of these countries under a common security umbrella to enhance its strength and survival. This umbrella was the policy of partnership that marked the beginning of the external adaptation of the Alliance to the new security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. These can be considered as parts of the quest for collective identity building for their security in this newly emerged security climate.

The end of the Cold War has also revived interest in the concept of collective security [14]. This is not surprising taking into account the fact that the end of earlier international rivalries, such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and Word War II, witnessed similar efforts to devise institutional barriers to war, be it actual or potential, through measures of collective security.

The end of the Cold War, furthermore, unavoidably triggered a relevant question of whether the post-Cold War world could meet these requirements of collective security more fully than in 1815, 1919, or 1945. In this regard, the break-up of the Soviet Union and changes in the international distribution of power are especially important. Soviet

internal political changes have had the most for-reaching effects. The break-up of the old union and the preoccupation of its successor states with internal reform and economic stability have made possible a liberal concert that includes Eurasian powers, Japan, and the United States. In addition, power has diffused significantly among the top states, although a large gap continues to separate them from the rest of the world.

Beside these searches for a new other that would also justify collective security arrangements, the world has also witnessed an increasing number of military operations in the name of collective security and peace in the world[15].

Collective security arrangements have been seriously proposed after a system-wide war of its   time such as the Napoleonic Wars, World War I, and World War II. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, collective security arrangements have been considered once again. In this regard,   naturally the UN being the only global organization for collective security has been put into action on several occasions. The UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions that amount to the Security Council availing itself of a right of humanitarian intervention.

The following examples of UN resolutions and stances can show this gradual progress that was achieved though with much difficulty:

 UN Resolution 688 on Iraq adopted during the Gulf War of 1991 marked the first time that the Security Council authorised a humanitarian relief operation by invoking a threat to peace and international security under Chapter VII. The resolution, however, remained ambiguous as to whether the threat to peace stemmed from the domestic situation itself or from the consequences on neighbouring countries of massive flows of refugees. In addition, Resolution 688 did not authorise coercive measures. Nevertheless, it was used by the Western allies to declare humanitarian enclaves off-limits to Baghdad, and to launch Provide Comfort, a humanitarian relief operation to benefit the Kurds in northern Iraq, not to mention the military operation led by the US and its coalition partners to end the Iraqi occupation in Kuwait. Once established,

however, the humanitarian enclaves were transferred to the management of the UN, demonstrating thereby the uneasiness of the Gulf War allies regarding their legal grounds.

Later with UN Resolution 770 of 1992 on Bosnia-Herzegovina the UN went further in two ways. First, the Security Council was clear in its qualification of the internal situation in Bosnia as a threat to peace and international security. Second, the resolution seemed to suggest that force could be used to facilitate the provision of humanitarian relief to embattled Bosnians. However, the phrase "all measures necessary" contained in paragraph 2 was not interpreted by states as authorising the use of force in this case.

However, in the same year with Resolution 794 on Somalia the UN laid out the Security Council's clear right to intervene in support of humanitarian objectives. First, it confirmed that the domestic situation in Somalia could be considered a threat to peace and international security . Second, it resolved to authorise member state to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, leading to operation Restore Hope, conducted by the US.

Nevertheless, despite this gradual progress in fulfilling its task of collective security, the UN faced a deadlock during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Due to Russia and China's objection for a military operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the UN could not take a decision to authorise a formation of military force with the Security Council mandate and implicitly led the way to NATO to take the responsibility.

The Kosovo operation underpinned the fact that NATO can, albeit as a last resort, have recourse to military options in face of such security risks threatening peace and stability in its surrounding.

This operation was conducted without a UN Security Council (UNSC) decision authorizing the use of force. The then Secretary General of NATO said nevertheless

after the launch of this air campaign that the use of force was the only way to prevent more human sufferings and more repression and violence against civilians. This operation invoked, among others, also a great deal of controversy as to the necessity of having a UN approval in such cases[16] .

In this context, it was noteworthy that the UN Secretary General stated in the early days of the Kosovo operation "the UN charter should never be the source of comfort or justification for those guilty of gross and shocking violations of human rights" (Ove, 1999, 25).

Notwithstanding   their cause, these military operations have   led to several implications for the international order in the post-Cold war era.

Consequence I :

The first one is related to the changing nature of peace keeping operations[17].   The international community in the last decade repeatedly made a mess of handling the many demands that were made for "humanitarian intervention": coercive action against a state to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harm. There were no agreed rules for handling cases such as Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo at the start of the 1990s, and there hardly remains any today. Disagreement continues about whether there is a right of intervention, how and when it should be exercised, and under whose authority (Evans and Sahnoun, 2002).

The debate about intervention for human protection purposes has not gone away. And it will not go away so long as human nature remains as fallible as it is and internal conflict and state failures stay as prevalent as they are. The debate was certainly a lively one throughout the 1990s. Controversy may have been muted in the case of the interventions, by varying casts of actors, in Liberia in 1990, northern Iraq in 1991, Haiti in 1994, Sierra Leone in 1997, and East Timor in 1999. But in Somalia in 1993, Rwanda in 1994, and Bosnia in 1995, the UN action taken (if taken at all) was widely perceived as too little too late, misconceived, poorly resourced, poorly executed, or all of the above.

During NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo, Security Council members were sharply divided; the legal justification for action without UN authority was asserted but largely not argued; and great misgivings surrounded the means by which the allies waged the war.

The basic feature of peace operations, as they have evolved throughout the 1990s, is their being multidimensional and multi-functional. That is to say, the coming together of a wide array of actors in one framework operation in order to perform several tasks in the societies arising from violent conflict. The ultimate purpose of peace operations is " to contain conflicts, resolve the international crises and help establish conditions conducive to long- term peace-building and conflict prevention initiatives , as one UN study describes, in order to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war" (Kardaş, 2003) .

One could in this context discuss the trend towards regionalization or subcontracting in peacekeeping operations. Subcontracting might be broadly defined as delegating the implementation of the UN decisions on the initiation of peace operations to the UN member states. It is a system in which the U.N. gives authorization to military actions, which are then carried out by a state or a group of states. This process gained momentum in the 1990s, and it was welcomed by many as a promising solution to the lack of available military capability at the disposal of the UN and the UN's operational and financial crises. Regional or sub-regional organizations (ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau, NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo), ad hoc coalitions of the willing (UNITAF in Somalia, Operation ALBA in Albania, ISAF in Afghanistan, etc.), and states acting on their own capability (partly French intervention in Rwanda) have increasingly assumed a role in the process toward subcontracting (Kardaş, 2003).

All these developments as called by some the "armed humanitarianism" were partly driven by "revolution in military affairs" (Kardaş, 2003, 5) . Today, notwithstanding the argument whether or not such military action without UNSC approval is legal according to the international law, there already exists an example, if

not a precedent, which a regional organization as stated in the UN Charter, can resort to military action, in the form of a peace support operation, against a sovereign country without UNSC's approval. However, it seems that such an operation can only be invoked under the following conditions:

-       Inaction of the UNSC due to the practice of veto power.
-       Failure of all peaceful and diplomatic measures to stop these violations.
-       Gross and massive human rights violations leading to killing of non-combatants in the country in question, which create a situation that would endanger international peace and security if not intervened (Ove, 1999).

In fact, in view of Kosovo experience, having decided that a reform of UN peacekeeping was imperative, Secretary-General Kofi Annan undertook in 1999 a comprehensive assessment of events leading to the fall of Srebrenica and also commissioned an independent inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the Rwanda genocide of 1994. These assessments highlighted the need to improve the capacity of the UN to conduct peacekeeping operations and in particular to ensure rapid deployment and mandates that met the needs on the ground. UN peacekeeping operations needed clear rules of engagement; better coordination between the UN Secretariat in New York and UN agencies in the planning and deployment of peacekeeping operations; and improved cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. The UN also needed to bolster efforts to protect civilians in conflicts (see Peace Keeping, UN Web site, www.un.org).

In March 2000, the Secretary-General asked a panel of international experts led by his long-time adviser Lakhdar Brahimi (a former Algerian foreign minister) to examine UN peace operations and identify where and when UN peacekeeping could be most effective and how it could be improved. The Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations—known as the Brahimi report—offered clear advice about minimum requirements for a successful UN peacekeeping mission. These included a clear and

specific mandate, consent to the operation by the parties in conflict and adequate resources (UN Web site, Peace Keeping).

Consequence II:

In this context, what seems more note worthy as another consequence of such collective security operations is that the NATO's role as a military organization in the preservation of collective security has been clearly manifested with the Kosovo operation, despite the paradox of legality versus legitimacy in NATO's actions therein[18]. With the Kosovo operation, questions have arisen whether these kinds of peace support operations in the name of collective security are within the remit of NATO. However, as noted by some scholars (Aybet, 1999) , this question appears to be too late to be raised, since NATO has really been doing this sort of thing since the Bosnian war. In fact, during that war, NATO-led air forces launched attacks on Serbian military units in 1994 and 1995.

The only deviation of the Kosovo operation was the fact that NATO acted in this case without a clear UNSC mandate for the use of force (Aybet, 1999). In the post-Cold War era, NATO has deployed forces for peace support operations under UN mandates in accordance with the sprit of Article 52 of the UN Charter which tasks regional arrangements to take appropriate actions, including military ones, for collective security.

The discussions in the earlier chapters reveal that the end of the Cold War have two main impacts on the security environment of the Euro-Atlantic region. First, as recognized even by NATO, risks of large-scale conventional aggression have diminished, albeit not totally eliminated. Second, the Euro-Atlantic region has however faced the eruption of several non-conventional security threats which are multi-faceted as well as difficult to predict. In a heavily globalised world, such threats have become increasingly transboundary affecting many states at the same time. These have led to the ever-increasing need of collective security efforts for national security. Under such circumstances, joint actions and cooperation, which are argued earlier as the main

components of security partnership, emerge as the most convenient instruments to tackle the challenges of this evolving security environment.

With its characteristics, such as flexibility, non-fixed commitment to collective defence, a model of security partnership as applied by NATO is argued to be more pragmatic and practical as it better enables states (partners) to adapt themselves to the multi-complexity of non-conventional security threats as they occur or are perceived by partners.

The evolving Euro-Atlantic Security environment with the emergence of new states as well as non-conventional security threats, has also underlined the necessity of joint actions and cooperation to face these challenges. Thus in relation to the growing need of collective security, joint actions and cooperation on security matters including that of military nature emerge as valuable methods for tackling security risks.

This is the environment, which brings us to the concept of security partnership as a model for collective security. Security partnership in this sense can be defined as a policy of security cooperation among like-minded countries that also includes military dimension and practice to better tackle commonly perceived security threats. Partnership policies are in line with the philosophy that security is indivisible. In this regard, joint actions and cooperation are the main components of a security partnership policy . The key word which characterizes a security partnership policy is the term "interoperability". This term means making countries work together with a common understanding. Thus, it foresees a process in which partner countries become interoperable not only in practice, but also in minds towards to security environment outside.

Security partnership is different from both hard and soft security arrangements. In this sense, it differs from a military alliance, which is a hard security arrangement, on two grounds. First, unlike an alliance, security partnership does not necessarily consist

of a fixed commitment to collective defence. In other words, it does not require partner countries to commit themselves to take military actions in case one of them is attacked.

Second, whereas alliances are formed for protection against a "common enemy", i.e. a state or a group of states, security partnership is rather directed against commonly perceived security threats of various nature including military ones. This gives partner countries and the partnership structure enough flexibility for adaptation to the changing security environment as it is not wholly devoted to a certain task, such as collective defence.

Although it is not regarded as a hard security arrangement in view of the above, security partnership policy is also different from soft security arrangements that mainly concentrate on conflict prevention. The distinction between these two originates from the fact that a security partnership policy consists of, inter alia, practical military dimension and military preparedness for collective security.

NATO and the USA have been the main beneficiary of this transformation. In a way such operations became the *reason d'etre* of the Alliance. This has also pawed the way for the efforts in the EU in forming its defence and military posture of its own that have ended up with the formation of ESDP, which will be looked upon in the following chapter in detail.

Consequence III:

The new understanding of collective security towards states and their governments posing threats not only to their neighbours but also to their own citizens and peoples has also had impacts on the notion of sovereignty for such states.

The Westphalia Peace Treaty in the 17th century ending 30 years wars and the Holy Roman empire, provided the legal basis for state system. This underlined the principle of sovereignty that moved from that of divine to a national basis.

The term "sovereignty" was first mentioned by Jean Bodin in 1576 to mean "state's supreme authority over its citizens and subjects" (Gow, 2000). Till the end of 20th century, sovereignty was not altered in the sense that state was free to take decisions within its domestic jurisdiction and crucially was entitled to be free from external interference. Later, domestic jurisdiction and non-interference became conditional as the UN Charter stipulates that the sovereignty of states should not cause disturbance in international peace and security (Kuah, 2003).

In the 1990s, the traditional conceptualization of sovereignty has been further conditioned in the sense that it derived from equilibrium in international order as termed by James Gow (2000) " equilibrant sovereignty". In view of the military operations in the form of humanitarian intervention/peace keeping/enforcement operations, one can even argue that there is a transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national/international accountability.

In the post-Cold War era, thus questions and debates remain on such vital issues as the use of military force for political purposes in the context of a transformed security agenda and an increasingly complex international society. In particular, the issue of humanitarian intervention: Is there a right to humanitarian intervention?

Consequence IV:

In this atmosphere, looking from the constructivist point of view, one can also clearly attest to academic as well as political debates in the pursuit of creating a new other as the East and the West ceased to exist as others for each other with the end of the bipolar world. Such debates were driven by certain motives, be they negative or positive. Some believed that with the end of East-West confrontation there was a real

change for creating a common self encompassing both sides for the first time. Others sought to create a common other where the democratic world now encompassing the both sides of the old world can counter.

The first attempt can be argued as the conceptualization of *rough/failed* states that use asymmetric warfare against the "democratic world". This ideological construction sought to find a new common other.

Particularly, in this respect, the outbreak of ethnic wars had two important implications for political science literature (Yanık, 2002). First, scholars started to examine the implications of identity, culture and ethnicity not only at the domestic level but also at the international level. Yet this change of focus in the levels of analysis led the scholars to concentrate mostly on the manipulative capacity of culture and identity in the hands of the political elites.

In this 'conflict' context, ethnicity was found to be the culprit for the bloody ethnic wars in two different ways (Yanık, 2002). First, according to one group of scholars, ethnic conflicts were the consequences of ruthless elites instrumentalizing ethnicity for their own political ends, especially during periods of uncertainty caused by regime changes. Second, there were also a group of scholars who argued that hatred was embedded in the primordial loyalties of the warring ethnic groups, and consequently, there was almost no way of stopping the conflict. This second line of thought came to be known as the "ancient hatred thesis."

In this context, ethnic and religious conflicts, which led to violent ultra nationalism, as witnessed in the disintegration of the Former Yugoslavia, can be argued as a testimony to the fact that ethnic divergences that are suppressed in the name of ideological unity can easily unfold once this ideological dictum is dissolved. Similarly, international terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, drug trafficking can be attributed to the fact that those pariah states as well as armed groups, which were heavily sponsored by the superpowers during the Cold War as pawns in their power politics, found

themselves totally cut off from their vital sources at the end of the ideological divide. Thus, they had no chance but to resort to such ways as stated above, simply for the survival of their regimes.

Yet, attempts to create a new other labeled as rough states have increasingly and unavoidably come across criticism as well. In this respect, Krause and Latham (1999) argue that, unable to curb its penchant for defining an alien "other," the West now constructed a new "threat" in the shape of Third World rogue states that had to be subjected to the norms of nonproliferation, arms control, and disarmament. For Krause and Latham, drawing on Edward Said's ideas of culture and imperialism, the new Western image of "immoral" and "dangerous" rogue states constitutes a "strategic orientalism." "In short rogue states are represented as posing a 'clear and present danger' to the western allies, filling the gap left by the demise of the Soviet Union."As a consequence, "essentially contestable interpretations of danger," in the Arab world for instance, have been translated into threats.

The second move was more philosophical based on the notion of "clashes of civilizations" as developed by Huntington. Yet, implicitly this was also related to the former one as such rough states were always found in other civilizations rather than in the Western world.

Under the circumstances of the end of the Cold War era in 1993, came the famous article of Samuel P. Huntington " The Clash of Civilisations?" (1993) in the renowned periodical *Foreign Affairs.* Although the title was ending with a question mark, the main presupposition of Huntington was on a clash that would occur this time not among ideological blocs but among 'civilisations'.   The main thrust of that argument, which was later more elaborated by him in the book on the same subject published in 1996, was that clashes would continue to be witnessed in world affairs, but this time among the "civilisations". The inter-civilizational clash would be more likely between the 'Western' and the ' Islamic' ones. Since then, this has created an arduous and never-ending debate both in political and in academic circles.

This discussion has later particularly turned out to be an issue of clashes between the "Christian" world represented by, and attributed to, the western countries and the "Muslim" world mainly attributed to all other countries whose populations were predominantly of the Islamic faith, mostly associated with "rouge states". Naturally, in this process, the mindset of populations in the countries of both worlds that had been shaped throughout history became determinant. For, in the minds of Muslims, socio-cultural traces of Christian crusades have always been alive whereas similar traces of first Arabs' and then Ottomans' dominance in the European continent have also been always kept alive. These elements have always been influential in the formation of their identities in both camps of the world that were constructed on the basis of socio-cultural historical background. Identities are particularly important because they function as the lenses, through which peoples see and perceive the outside (material) world.

Beside these prevailing mindsets of the peoples in both camps, the local wars that erupted immediately after the demise of the Cold War in the Balkans and the Caucasus gave strong indications to the argument that they were products of not only ethnic and national conflicts but also of religious ones. In other words, these wars had also a religious dimension beside their ethno-nationalistic dimensions. In fact, religion has always been an indispensable part in the formation of these ethnicities that are indeed collective identities composed of common ties, i.e. *primordial ties* (Smith, 1986, 143), in terms of religion, language, race etc. among certain groups of people called "*ethnie*". In this respect, the war in Bosnia between three ethnic groups of three different religious faiths, i.e. Catholic Croats, Orthodox Serbs and Muslim Bosniacs, and the war over Nagorno Karabagh between the Christian Armenians and the Muslim Azeris can be seen as clear manifestations of this phenomenon.

Despite these indications, in a clear political stance against the notion of clashes of civilisations, governments have joined each other in rejecting such clashes, at least in their official rhetoric. Even, the year 2001 was declared by the United Nations (UN) "the Year of Dialogue and Tolerance among Civilisations" .

In view of the foregoing, the following can be said: the 1990's of the post-Cold War era could not create a collective identity in the sense of self among the majority of states in the international community. In the Cold War era, the East and the West managed to create their own self constructing each other "the other" in the field of security. Yet, with the end of this confrontation at the end of the Cold War, a new self to bring the states in a larger fora like the UN was not possible. Thus, the UN could not fulfill its role for collective security. This role was mostly carried out by regional security and deference organizations like NATO and the OSCE . In this process, constructing the collective identity on the basis of the notion of civilisationary clashes or against "the rough states" seems to have not led to a success. To the contrary, these have aggravated fault lines between countries and regions as well as religions, let alone reinforcing a collective identity at the global level.

b. September 11 and Its Consequences

The world that embarked on a new millennium with these important shifts in international affairs in general and in the collective security field in particular, could not escape September 11. There is no doubt that September 11, 2001 was a day to remember in the years ahead in many aspects. That date the US was exposed to very severe, if not the most, terrorist attacks not only in its history but also in that of the entire world. Terrorists hit the Pentagon and the twin towers of the Word Trade Centre with hijacked civilian passenger airliners.

In the wake of these terrorist attacks, NATO allies lined up behind the US and in an unprecedented display of support and solidarity they invoked, on 12 September 2001, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of the Alliance, the core clause of collective defence, which states that an armed attack against an ally shall be considered an attack against all allies and thus the Alliance itself, while providing for measures to counter such an attack (see NATO Press release, NATO web site, 12.9.2001).

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In the course, once it was determined that these attacks were initiated by the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, the US government notified the UN Security Council by sending a letter on its decision to recourse military action in the exercise of self – defence as enshrined in Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In the following course, a considerable number of forces from many NATO member countries took part in two concurrent operations: "Enduring Freedom", the US-led military operation in Afghanistan, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), deployed in and around Kabul to help stabilize the country and create the conditions for self-sustaining peace. The latter has later turned into a UN -mandated multinational force. Formally speaking, in the words of the UN, "In Afghanistan, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force works closely with the UN political support mission" (see UN web site, Terrorism,).

Quite ironically, the year that the September 11 terror attacks hit the USA,   had in fact been earlier declared by the United Nations (UN) "the Year of Dialogue and Tolerance among Civilisations" . The fact that those responsible of these attacks directed against this leading country of the "Western civilisation" were held as the al-Qaida network led by an Islamic fundamentalist Usame bin Laden and its sanctuary, the Taleban regime,   flared up again discussions on the 'clash of civilisations'.

Usame bin Laden in an interview televised worldwide claimed that this was a war between Islam and the West. This led to further degrading of Islam as an enemy in the eyes of the West. On the other hand, Muslims were not helping their case. There were jubilations in parts of the Muslim world where people even distributed sweets in celebration of the terrorist attacks and chanted slogans against the USA . Yet, after this period of emotional hysteria, during which the world witnessed a sort of clash of civilisations at least in words between the Muslim and the Christian worlds, common sense seemed to have prevailed. Islamic countries   reacting the argument of Usame bin Laden that the attacks were made in the name of Islam, earnestly denied any complicity in that horrible terrorist act, and the Christian countries refrained from identifying that action with Islam in general.

Consequences of September 11 Attacks:

General

September 11 has led to many consequences for the world in the post-Cold War era. It is even argued that if the Gulf War of 1990-91 was a 'defining moment' - one in which countries had to take sides - 11 September 2001 was a 'transforming moment': not only was there an obligation to stand up and be counted, but with the advent of hyper-terrorism, the post-Cold War era itself came to an abrupt end (Heisbourg, 2002).

Similarly, it is also argued that before of 11 September, there were numerous signs that the post-Cold War era (1990-2001) was drawing to an end. What 11 September has done is to close that epoch with a horrid bang rather than in soft and easy stages. And the very brutality of the close would make the new era rather different from what it would otherwise have been (Arquilla, 2003).

To summarize, on the eve of 11 September, the end of the post-Cold War era was manifest through the following trends: globalisation, with its empowerment of cross-border non-state actors, operating in highly interdependent and vulnerable post-industrial societies;   the multiplication both of failed states (mostly in Africa but also in Asia) and dysfunctional states (Heisbourg, 2002).

It is also the case that September11 attacks were not taken by a total surprise due to early signs heralding for such a moment. As argued, some warning signs might have alerted the world to the very high possibility that a non-state actor would soon carry out a major act of international war. One of these was the development in various parts of the world during the 1990s of what may be a type of conflict that pitted movements of economically, politically and socially marginalised peoples against their respective governments in what appeared to be hopeless armed struggles (see Arquilla, 2003 and Hoffman, 2001).

The first such sign came in the form of evidence relating to specific actions of Osama bin Laden and his followers. Quite apart from bin Laden's public calls for jihad against the United States and Americans, indications that non-state actors were trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction were rife by the mid-1990s. In the torpid jargon of the US Department of Defense, "radical Islamists" loomed as a large threat in this regard. This knowledge, however, led to no more than the perception of a somewhat vague and theoretical menace, not to the apprehension of an imminent danger. To a great extent, the reason for this complacency appears to have been an inability to believe that hostile terrorists could really commit themselves to wreaking mass destruction.

A second category of warnings –not as immediate as reports of bin Laden's Qaeda's activities– was also significant. It was composed of the works of various scholars who increasingly cautioned that a global system marked by the power of the technological and communications revolutions and international capitalism would face growing resistance from the marginalised world.

Notwithstanding whether September 11 was expected or not, it appears to have led to new realities in international politics, such as vulnerability of global powers to such asymmetric security threats, privatisation of violence and globalised insecurity particularly for the Western countries that became the main target of the anti-globalist world.

These attacks seem to have thus changed many, if not all, parameters in the world affairs, leading to important repercussions on various matters. In a way, its aftermath can also be named "post-September 11 era" as a distinct era from the post-Cold War [19]. Approach to collective security is no exception in this transformation. Here, for the sake of a better analysis, one needs to first look briefly on the changes as to terrorism in the international system.

Consequences of September 11 on terrorism in its nature and its manifestations:

Terrorism is a phenomenon threatening most of the world nations, be they developed and under developed, for different reasons and under varying assumptions, but with similar destructive methods. The systematic and indiscriminate strategy of violence against governmental structures and innocent civilians alike is targeted to foster political instability and domestic tension, as well as to psychologically sever the traditional ties of trust and protection between state and people once the government is perceived to be unable to defeat terrorism without resorting to repression.

The first and foremost difficulty in combating terrorism comes from the very fact that there is no single definition of the concept of terrorism, which is commonly recognized by the international community.

Terrorism is not a new phenomenon(Wilkinson, 1977). Acts of terrorism have been known throughout history. In this regard, terrorism can be traced back as early as in the ages before Christ. For example, it can be argued that the assassination of Julius Caesar, was an act of terrorism. Terrorism became widespread at the end of the Middle Ages, when political leaders were subject to assassination by their enemies.

However, the terms "terror" and "terrorism" were first used during the French revolution. From the fall of the Bastille on July 14, 1789 until July, 1794, thousands suspected of counter-revolutionary activity went to their deaths on the guillotine. The end of the terror was signaled by the death of its prime mover, Maximilien Robespierre, on July 28, 1794, as the result of a successful plot to end his rule. He was executed on the same guillotine to which he had sent almost 20.000 people to their deaths (Siegel, 1998, 306).

His death, in fact, reveals an universal fact about the self-inflicting nature of terrorism. In other words, terrorism ultimately brings harm to its users or supporters. It is no one's benefit in the final analysis. This very fact, in the modern times, has been the key in mobilizing international co-operation to counter terrorism. Yet, especially in

the late 1990s, defining what this term means for all has been rather difficult for many reasons, among which lies the paradox that one's terrorist can be considered by others as a freedom fighter.

On the other hand, the unprecedented terrorist attacks in New York and in Washington on September 11, 2001, did not only show the terrorists' ability and resolve to use methods of massive destruction, but also prove that the nature of terrorism is changing in terms of organisation and operational approach. Terrorists today operate through networks of a global context[20].

In fact, it is generally argued that with the end of the Cold War the nature of terrorism has also begun to change. This is mainly for the fact that with the collapse of the Communist Bloc, the weapons of mass destruction have become easily accessible for terrorists due to the weak control regimes over such weapons and their experts.

Thus, as argued, terrorism experts have been warning about a new form of terrorism and the possibility of mass destruction attacks on the US and the West in general since the early 1990s[21]. It is not surprising that in the aftermath of September 11 attacks, scholars have increasingly focused on analyzing this new terrorism in the light of these terrorist attacks. In this respect, it is generally agreed that new terrorism is focused on "spectacular acts", with maximum damage to the West.

Furthermore, it is assessed that, traditionally, terrorism has been a political tactic, used by its practitioners to bully their way to the negotiating table. It has been a low-cost, high-leverage method that has enabled small nations, sub-national groups and even individuals to circumvent the conventional projections of national power.

However, it can be judged from the recent terrorist attacks that some of today's groups, motivated by radical religious or nationalist causes, no longer seek a seat at the table, but would prefer to blow it up and build something else in its place. In this regard, the best example of this is Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaida organisation. In effect,

Bin Laden is the chief executive and chief financial officer of a loosely affiliated group of radical terrorists, who share resources, assets and expertise, and who can come together for an operation and then disperse.

Over the years, terrorists have become expert at using conventional weapons, such as explosives and firearms, to maximum effect. These have been and will continue to be their preferred weapons. They are cheap, easy to obtain and use, do not require extensive scientific capabilities to produce or employ, are "low profile" and hard to defend against. Moreover, terrorists are increasingly innovative in their methods of employing these weapons, and those methods have become more lethal.

Similarly, as stated earlier, due to the lack of control, terrorist networks have begun to focus on acquiring the NBC weapons. The nuclear balance during the Cold War era was based on the principle of mutual deterrence between USA and the then USSR. In another words, a nuclear potential and threat was limited with a few actors and to a great extent was under strict control. With the Cold War over, an increased concern has risen in the horizon over the possibility of terrorist groups' getting hold of nuclear weapons or missile materials. Yet, it is more feared that practiced in the real world though there is an increasing concern about terrorists "going nuclear" or sabotaging nuclear facilities.

Yet, it is observed that nuclear terrorism presents less potential danger than terrorists resorting to less dramatic, but no less potent, means of mass destruction, such as using chemical weapons or exploiting more sophisticated technologies. Chemical and biological terrorism is technologically more feasible than nuclear terrorism.

In this context, in the aftermath of September 11 attacks, the West has once again become terrified with the letters containing Anthrax virus. This was seen as a confirmation of the possibility that terrorists can also use NBC weapons.

All these developments have certainly contributed to the growing perception among the members of the international community that terrorism poses a security threat of an asymmetric nature to states.

Consequences of September 11 on the attitude of International Community as regards terrorism:

Thus, in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks the international community has apparently realised that terrorism, as a global phenomenon, must be combated in a spirit of solidarity. Heads of states, prime ministers and ministers at many fora, have expressed and reaffirmed their determination to play a full part in a co-ordinated manner in the coalition against terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations.

In this regard, the Security Council of the United Nations has issued three important resolutions , Resolution 1373 (2001) being the most operational, that aim at eliminating all forms of support for terrorists and to take the measures needed to implement it. At present, in line with these Resolutions the international community is elaborating the relevant global framework to combat terrorism in a wide ranging scope, including suppression of the financing of terrorism, police and intelligence co-operation.

This resolution, albeit falling short in defining terrorism, has yet brought about some significant norms in the fight against terrorism.

In this regard, as regards collective security, Resolution 1378, underlines among others that the terrorist acts committed on 11 September 2001 posed   a threat to international peace and security and in this context reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter.

The resolution is also of particular importance as it expresses the common decision of all member states to deny financial and all other forms of support and safe heaven to terrorist and those supporting terrorism.

Last but not least, with this resolution, the member states have been tasked to report regularly and systematically their measures taken in line with the resolution, to the Counter-terrorism Committee , which was established in the aftermath of September 11 terrorist attacks.

Today, given the present momentum in the field of combating terrorism at international level, one can argue that the chance to come up with a common definition over terrorism as well as with a common legally binding instrument to counter terrorism is relatively high as compared to previous times.

In this respect, given its provisions that set forth a series of specific and binding measures for combating terrorism, Resolution 1373 can be used as a basis for the compilation of an international convention on terrorism. Nevertheless, the possibility of drafting this kind of convention will no doubt be to the extent of a common understanding and need emerged among the member states in the period ahead to counter all forms of terrorism whether their causes might be[22].

Consequences of September 11 on NATO's transformation as regards terrorism:

Having mentioned these developments to combat terrorism in the UN, it is also of particular utility from the constructivist viewpoint to have a brief look on the transformation in NATO as to the fight against terrorism that is now turned to be the "other" for the "allied selves" [23].

The history of NATO's approach to combating terrorism prior to September 11 can be summarized as follows:

Table 1: Analysis of NATO Summit Declarations on terrorism

Summits	Terrorism separately mentioned	Risk /Threat	Terrorism mentioned as a security threat for territorial integrity
1991	No	Risk	No
1994	Yes	Threat	No
1997	Yes	Threat	No
1999	Yes	Threat	Yes

(Source: NATO web site, www.nato.int.)

As the table above shows, the changes of wording in referring to terrorism in the Summit documents reflect a growing understanding about this scourge as a threat that could affect the security of the allies and the Alliance itself. Yet, although it was accepted finally in Washington of 1999 as a security threat that could affect the territorial integrity of the allies, the problem of terrorism was not put into consideration as a matter to be covered under Article 5. In other words, the allies were reluctant to consider terrorism as a threat to be countered by the collective defence mechanism of the Alliance when and if necessary.

Moreover, the allies also preferred to refer to the co-operation against terrorism always among the last paragraphs of Declarations. This can be seen as a reflection of an understanding that terrorism was not a priority issue for the allies.

The fact that the allies could not move ahead with amending the Strategic Concept of 1999 as regards terrorism although they agreed that it could be a threat to their territorial integrity can also be argued as the reflection of a state of mind that NATO and the allies were living through.

Thus, prior to September 11, only the following could be said about NATO's approach to terrorism: Only in the aftermath of the Washington Summit in 1999 terrorism was recognized by the Alliance as an asymmetric security threat that can affect the territorial integrity of the allies.

Yet, with September 11, this understanding has been considerably evolved as follows:

First, since September 11 terrorist attacks, acts of terrorism against an ally can be considered as an armed attack in the sense of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.

Second, following the aforementioned understanding, acts of terrorism against an ally can require the invocation of collective defence measures under Article 5.

Third, such invocation should need a proof that terrorist acts are directed from abroad.

Thus, in the post-September 11 era, it can be asserted with confidence that acts of terrorism against an ally can be responded by the Alliance with the invocation of Article 5 as a measure of collective defence, provided that such acts are proven to be directed from abroad. In this sense, this state of affairs prevalent at present within the Alliance is a breakthrough for NATO in the fight against terrorism.

Yet, the invocation of Article 5 did not lead to a joint NATO military operation, to which all the allies contributed collectively. It was rather a military operation of the USA in the form of a coalition of the willing. This reluctant attitude of the allies in the case of responding to these terrorist attacks showed that although they all agreed that there was an armed attack against one of them, they did not consider it necessary to respond to it with a joint military operation involving all of them.

This fact has unavoidably led to severe criticisms about the importance of NATO as an alliance. After all, the invocation of Article 5 following the September 11 attacks was the first case of deploying collective defence measures in the history of the Alliance. So, if NATO is not able to respond militarily with the support of all its allies, what is the point of having a collective defence provision in the Washington Treaty? In this regard, critics has even gone further to claim that by not being able to form a NATO force in fighting al-Qaida, in fact the Alliance itself faced a defeat as an organisation. It was also argued that the invocation of Article 5, initially conceived under circumstances in which European countries were under the threat of large scale military attacks from the Warsaw Pact, is now of mainly political and symbolic significance, intended to demonstrate allied solidarity.

It is true that the alliance seems to have failed to collectively support the USA in its military operation. Instead, they have provided mostly logistic assistance. However, this is due to the nature of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This article does not require automatic military response by the allies to such armed attacks.

According to the provisions of that article, to invoke the collective defence mechanism set forth in it, consensus is required among allies. Similarly, even if such invocation is initiated, to respond to armed attacks against an ally with a military operation involving all allies, i.e. as NATO military operation, consensus is necessary too. Thus, without consensus among all the allies, in case of an armed attack against an ally the alliance can face a deadlock even in invoking Article 5, let alone deciding on measures to be deployed after the invocation. This is surely a weakness inherent in the organisational set-up of the Alliance.

In short, developments in the aftermath of September 11 indicate that there has been a considerable shift in the understanding about NATO's role in combating terrorism. Almost a year ago before September 11 in the syllabus of the NATO Defence College for the Senior Officials Course, the aim of the lecture on terrorism was still to discuss "whether NATO might have a role to play in combating terrorism". Today, with the

works already embarked on in the Alliance, it is evident that NATO already has or at least should have a role in combating terrorism.

In fact, looking from the constructivist lenses, the invocation of Article 5 after September 11 has created a precedent and thus terrorist organisations must have already begun to consider NATO as a target in their future plans of attacking allies. Thus, it is in fact a necessity from the organizational point of view for NATO to develop its role in the fight against terrorism for its own and its allies' survival in face of such conceptualization.

In other words, it can be argued that today, the question of whether NATO has a role to play in combating terrorism has become superfluous. The question pending at present is rather what sorts of role NATO can play in this regard and how it can transform itself for such a role.

In the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks, the US-led military campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaide in Afghanistan has also inevitably constituted a dramatic shift in the conceptualization of what forms hard and soft security issues. First, it was bitterly confirmed that terrorism is one of the most dangerous non-conventional security threats of asymmetric nature. Similarly, it was also confirmed that terrorists can easily use weapons of mass destructions such as biological, chemical and even nuclear ones as was seen in the threat of anthrax contamination after the terrorist attacks. Yet, fight against terrorism has always been a matter of soft security that would not need hard security measures including military ones. But, the invocation of Article 5 within NATO and the military operation directed against al-Qaida terrorist network and its sanctuary the Taleban regime through the use of the right to self defence as enshrined in the UN Charter clearly showed that such non-conventional security threats would likely require military measures.

In light of what has been acknowledged, if not recognized, by the international community and thus law as to the fight against terrorism after September 11, one can

then sum up the following: Terrorist attacks pose security threats to states and thus international peace and security. As they pose such threats, states hold the right to have recourse to military options to counter it in full exercise of self- defence in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.

Consequences of September 11 on state sovereignty and international law:

In this respect, such transformation has also led to the further erosion of state sovereignty. It is because states that support or directly conduct terrorist acts in the world, i.e. state terrorism, have become the target of military operations. In other words, sovereignty could not justify their involvement in terrorism [24].

For collective security, another important consequence of September 11 lies with its effects on international law. As terrorism was accepted as threat to international peace and the security of states that would necessitate the right of self-defence, this inevitably urged for review of the relevant international law, mainly the humanitarian law. Notably, as terrorists are combated by military means in the form of a legitimate war as enshrined in the UN Charter, this has led to the questions of whether terrorists should be considered as prisoners of war in their capture or simply treated as criminals .

Since September 11, 2001, policy attention has been captured by a different set of problems: the response to global terrorism and the case for "hot preemption" against countries believed to be irresponsibly acquiring weapons of mass destruction. These issues, however, are conceptually and practically distinct. There are indeed common questions, especially concerning the precautionary principles that should apply to any military action anywhere. But what is involved in the debates about intervention in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere is the scope and limits of countries' rights to act in self-defense -- not their right, or obligation, to intervene elsewhere to protect peoples other than their own.

Yet, all these have also become the subject of hot debates. This is mainly due to the concept of terrorism and what means terrorism and also whether all kinds of terrorism justify military recourse of the states that are victims of such acts.

Consequences of September 11 on US policies in IR:

Another interesting consequence or rather development here is the changing attitude of the USA in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks[25]. Leaving aside Pearl Harbor, the United States, for the first time in its history, has become the target of a foreign attack at home. Therefore, September 11 created a deep psychological shock in the entire American nation. Thus, the very phenomenon of globalism, by means of globalised terrorism, destroyed the sense of security hitherto enjoyed by Americans in their homeland.

Thus, among other effects, these attacks showed the vulnerability of the USA that had always been perceived as the most powerful state in the world. This was due to the construction of other states about the power of the USA. Yet, the attacks have affected this image of the US. As it can be recalled, the USSR could not manage to survive once its image as a super power diminished in the eyes of first its subject countries and peoples, due to the policies of Gorbacev. No doubt, the USA must have drawn that time the necessary lessons from this development for how the image construction (ideational factors) is important rather than its material power for the foreign policy of a state. As earlier argued, to assess the strength of a state in IR, material factors and thus power are not alone explanatory unless complemented by ideational factors in terms of perception and construction of such perceptions.

This understanding thus can perhaps be the main drive in the policy followed by the US government in the aftermath of these attacks to show that its military might was still there. In other words, these unilateral policies of aggressive nature can be seen as the attempt of the US to preserve its powerful image constructed in the eyes of the rest of the world .

As argued, since September 11 not only has this country lost its previous sense of invulnerability to the terrorist phenomenon. It has also acquired a "primary filter"— the need to deal with terrorist threats — for framing policy choices. It is argued that after a decade without such a governing mechanism, in a sense the world has experienced a return to the familiar habits of the Cold War period in which many aspects of foreign policy were 'shaped in advance' by an omnipresent strategic paradigm. The dilemma is that the threat comes from a source less susceptible to deterrence. Some argued that September 11 only reinforced these trends.

Some scholars also considered that September 11 could be viewed as a blessing in disguise for the conduct of U.S. global policies. On the one hand, terrorism is a "very narrow filter" for global policy, one that identifies what we are against rather than what we are for. Yet, Washington has outlined an ambitious and engaged vision for U.S. global leadership on multiple fronts.

As to the vulnerability, Joseph Nye (2002, 49) notes,

> American power is less effective than it might first appear. We cannot do everything. On the other hand, the United States is likely to remain the most powerful country well into the next century, and this gives us an interest in maintaining a degree of international order … To a large extent, international order is a public good - something everyone can consume without diminishing its availability to others.. .Too narrow an appeal to public goods can become a self-serving ideology for the powerful. But these caveats are a reminder to consult with others, not a reason to discard an important strategic principle that helps us set priorities and reconcile our national interests with a broader global perspective. Those are the terms of engagement that the US pursue in its war against its "enemies", i.e. "rough states".

The United States has developed a conception of its security that is both more sovereign and more comprehensive. The new National Security Strategy includes pre-emptive war among its ways of fighting terrorism and seems to favour coalitions of convenience rather than institutionalized alliances. There is no doubt that this attitude has raised questions in Europe and led to transatlantic difficulties.

The unilateral stance of the US based on pre-emptive war is also interpreted by other scholars somehow differently. For example, in the article of Keohane (2002) it is said that Alexander L. George (1994) has characterized this policy as "coercive diplomacy." Keohane notes that George defines coercive diplomacy as "the use of intimidation in order to get others to comply with one's wishes." Coercive diplomacy is similar to what Thomas Schelling characterized earlier as "compellance" (in contrast to deterrence) (Keohane, 2002) . Schelling explained that compellance "involves initiating an action (or an irrevocable commitment to an action) that can cease, or become harmless, only if the opponent responds." The behavior of the United States up to this point is consistent with the interpretation that it can best be interpreted as reflecting a strategy of multilateral preventive diplomacy, or multilateral compellance, rather than as a strategy of unilateral preventive war.

The idea of preventive war - i.e. attacking before an enemy becomes too threatening — long predates the current Bush Doctrine. Indeed, Thucydides' classic formulation that the Peloponesian war ' broke out because of 'the rising power of Athens and the fear this inspired in Sparta' is essentially a preventive rationale (Arquilla, 203, 211).

Yet, the US policy of pre-emptive or preventive war is argued to be facing a risk. Some argue that the United States is "about to poke a snake out of fear that the snake might strike sometime in the future, while virtually ignoring the danger that it may strike back when America pokes it" (Betts, 2003). True, not everyone demanding an American attack ignores the immediate threat such an attack might raise — but even this camp misreads that threat, thinking it reinforces the urgency of preventive war.

As can be clearly seen in Bismarck's characterization,   preventive war is a "suicide from fear of death" (Betts, 2003).

On the other hand, it is also argued (Brooks and Wohlfort (2002) that U.S. military and economic dominance, finally, is rooted in the country's position as the world's

leading technological power. Measuring the degree of American dominance in each category (military, economy and technology) begins to place things in perspective. But what truly distinguishes the current international system is American dominance in all of them simultaneously. Previous leading states in the modern era were either great commercial and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold War, for example, each shared the world with other powers that matched or exceeded them in some areas. Following the Napoleonic Wars, the United Kingdom was clearly the world's leading commercial and naval power. But even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both France and Russia. And its 24 percent share of GDP among the six leading powers in the early 1870s was matched by the United States, with Russia and Germany following close behind. Similarly, at the dawn of the Cold War the United States was clearly dominant economically as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia.

Many who acknowledge the extent of American power, however, regard it as necessarily self-negating. Brooks & Wohlfort (2002) criticizes this as follows:

> the history books say that Mr. Big always invites his own demise. Nos. 2, 3, 4 will gang up on him, form countervailing alliances and plot his downfall. That happened to Napoleon, as it happened to Louis XIV and the mighty Habsburgs, to Hitler and to Stalin. Power begets superior counter-power; it's the oldest rule of world politics.

Consequences of September 11 on Collective Security in general:

In addition to the foregoing consequences of September 11 attacks, they have also direct impacts on collective security in IR in terms of constructivist understanding.

The invocation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty of NATO, i.e. the clause for collective defence,   the military operation directed against al-Qaida terrorist network and its sanctuary the Taleban regime and the legitimatising of this military operation under the clause of self-defence by the UN following the notification of the US government to this effect,   showed that terrorism is acknowledged as a collective threat, "the other", that can be responded by military measures.

In this context, one can argue that the September 11 terrorist attacks have provided a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a new "other", i.e. common enemy. This was "terrorism"[26].   In the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks the international community has apparently realised that terrorism, as a global phenomenon, must be combated in a spirit of solidarity. Heads of states, prime ministers and ministers in many fora, have expressed and reaffirmed their determination to play a full part in a co-ordinated manner in the coalition against terrorism under the aegis of the United Nations. Thus, in the post-September 11 era, almost all states seem to have found a new '"other", terrorism, against which they are still identifying themselves.

Particularly, at the summit meetings that took place in 2002 between the Russian Federation and the USA, NATO, and the EU respectively, this new approach has been clearly underlined by stating that terrorism is the common enemy for them.

In fact,   September 11 terrorist attacks were followed by another shift in the parameters of the post-Cold War era. This was the close co-operation of the Russian Federation with the USA as well as with the Allies in the fight against terrorism. Although the relations between Russia and the Alliance were formalised in 1997 with the signing of the Founding Act that was the confirmation of the end of the Cold War transforming the former adversaries to the partners for common security. However, relations had remained always problematic due the residual feelings of mutual mistrust between the parties. September 11 in this regard has provided for both sides to turn the relations into a new quality in the fight against commonly perceived threat of terrorism.

This momentum was culminated with the signature of a new institutional mechanism, the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), on 28 May 2002 in Rome.

This agreement coupled with the new institutional mechanism between NATO and Russia seem no doubt to further facilitate the overcoming of the residual signs of the former Cold War adversaries and thus concentrate on new security threats of asymmetric nature such as terrorism.

It can, therefore, be argued that states at present gradually come together and develop a common collective identity in opposition to a commonly perceived security threat, the "other". This is terrorism in particular and other non-conventional security threats of asymmetric nature such as WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, which are either the cause or the means of terrorism. The presence of such a "common enemy" that has been already condemned by almost all states, being members of the UN, no doubt constitutes an important opportunity to facilitate the creation of a workable collective security arrangement at the global level in the future. In this regard, the momentum gained in the UN in the aftermath of September 11 seems noteworthy. Continuing works within the UN framework, which were launched with UNSC resolution 1378 that underlines among others that the terrorist acts committed on 11 September 2001 posed a threat to international peace and security and in this context reaffirms the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the UN Charter, albeit falling short in defining terrorism, have brought about significant norms in the fight against terrorism.

In view of the aforementioned review, to sum up the Post-Cold War era with special emphasis on collective security by the lenses of constructivism, the following can be underlined:

The post-Cold War era is generally compared with that of Cold War in two contrast ways. One view is that the Cold war was terrible and dangerous period in

European history, and that ending it has enormously improved the prospects for European security. The second view, equally crude but at the opposite end of the spectrum, is that the Cold War was good for European security and that ending it has opened the Pandora's box of new dangers (Garnett, 1996,18). In view of the aforementioned discussions in the preceding chapters, both arguments seem to be relevant today.

The likelihood of large-scale war in Europe is now less than ever before in history, and there are now few direct military threats to European security. Yet new nonmilitary risks and challenges have proliferated. In the words of one commentator, "The dragon is dead, but the woods are still full of dangerous snakes" (Hyde-Price, 2001, 46)

As proposed in the aftermath of every big war ending an era in IR, collective security has become the focal point also in this era. However, just like the previous cases, collective security efforts could not lead to a success. In the Cold War era, the 'other' was the East for the West and vice versa, although members of both Blocs remained in the same global security regime, the UN. Therefore, their stay in the UN was not due to the creation of a common identity but of a necessity. In the post-Cold War era, although one of the Blocs disappeared, it was evident that at least the old leader of the East , i.e. Russia, and the USA together with the rest of the Western Bloc continued to regard each other as "other". This was because they could not create a collective identity (self), as they could not define a common threat (other) either. Constructivist lenses indeed help scholars better account for this failure that was driven by the lack of such collective identity as the self due to the absence of a common other.

What is more, in the post-Cold War era the world and Europe in general have witnessed unprecedented hot conflicts and wars driven by various reasons ranging from ethnic nationalism to religious and other causes. In fact, in view of this, security studies needs to address the implications of the changing character of war and the proliferation of new actors. As K. J. Holsti (see Hyde-Price, 2001, 46) argued, war has not declined

in our time, but its locus has changed. Most wars today are civil wars, fought using guerrilla tactics and terrorism, and generating enormous civilian causalities. Whereas many conflicts in the pre-1945 period were fought by territorially defined nation-states numbering millions of civilians, future conflicts are more likely to be conducted by smaller, less cohesive, and less powerful political entities—similar in many respects to the character of warfare prior to the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. Holsti therefore speaks of the emergence of "wars of the third kind." In the post-Cold War era, most violent conflict can be characterized as internal wars fought with conventional weapons, with far greater casualties among civilians than soldiers. The transformation of warfare at the end of the twentieth century thus constitutes a third key area of research for contemporary strategic studies (Hyde-Price, 2001, 47) .

In this period, the world has also witnessed an unprecedented number of collective security operations of military nature. Yet, as it was not possible to define a common other, all these operations have created further ambiguity alluding that such operations were in fact acts of hegemony of the global powers, let alone facilitating a sprit of collective identity at the global level to reinforce collective security regimes in the UN as the only global institution with such mandates.

As once comprehensively analyzed by Tilly, states are coercion-wielding units. As they are the product of coercion employed by rulers to gain territory and population that inevitably proves to the detriment of others due to the scarcity of sources, states have always lived in insecurity being prone to wars against their survival. This is indeed a confirmation of the fact that as long as coercion remains the basis of state formation and preservation, security needs of states would continue although their threat perceptions might change as is the case at present. Thus, collective security remains as important as before.

In this context, one can argue that the September 11 terrorist attacks have provided a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a new "other", i.e. common enemy. September 11 has led to a paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization of what terrorism

means for state's security. The use of military means in the fight against terrorism has been legitimated at least in NATO . Similarly, the US recourse to military action against another country as its right of self-defence, that was in fact notified to the UN security council through a letter sent by the US government, showed that such military operations are now regarded as legitimate recourses by virtue of self defence principle enshrined in the UN Charter.

Another interesting point to be made in this regard to show the importance of identity in understanding September 11 is the fact that the targets that were hit by terrorists were not randomly chosen but the symbols of the "US hegemony" in coercion (pentagon) and capital (twin towers) . As already mentioned in the previous chapters, these two components, i.e. coercion and capital, are the basics of western state formation. This might be alluding to the reasons why these buildings were chosen by terrorists. In fact, looking from this angle, September 11 attacks can be seen as the attacks of one self that has developed its common identity in contrast to its otherness, " Western World".

In short, these all led to a conceptual shift in the minds of states regarding their own and world security in general. These were such developments that can be seen as breakthroughs in IR and suggest to which direction the world would go in the aftermath of September 11.

Terrorism is thus today increasingly used as a legitimating factor in the eyes of the international society and of domestic public opinions as well as in international law for military operations against a non-state group or a state. For instance, even in pursuance of their policies for toppling the Saddam regime, the US administration, for a long time, first tried on a campaign which aimed to demonstrate that Iraq not only possessed WMD but more importantly provided them for international terrorism. It is because terrorism is condemned by all as the *other*. This is terrorism in particular and other non-conventional security threats of asymmetric nature such as WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, which are either

the cause or the means of terrorism. The presence of such a "common enemy" that has been already condemned by almost all states under the UN umbrella, at least in rhetoric, no doubt constitutes an important opportunity to facilitate the creation of a workable collective security arrangement at the global level in the future.

All this argumentation clearly reflects the relevance of constructivism in understanding the developments towards a new collective identity of states to better provide collective security. The central issue in the post-Cold War era is how different groups conceive their identities and interests. In the absence of constructivist explanation of identity-formation, it would be hard to contemplate on both the present issues in the field of security studies and the viability of a sound collective security regime.   Although power is not irrelevant, constructivism emphasizes how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve and how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situation. As argued (Walt, 1998, 10), the fragmentation and pluralism are the essential characteristics of the theoretical enterprise today. Compared to just twenty years ago, three is a greatly expanded menu of theoretical offerings.

Thus, one can conclude that in the present world order, in which the basic premises of the mainstream scholarship are still present, constructivism complements them, with its emphasis on the importance of collective identities and ideational factors in collective security attempts in general and in the creation of security communities in particular.

In this process, as to collective security efforts , as argued, the pending question is   whether the present IR system will be a "Hobbesian one in which the sovereigns are above the laws they pass, or a Lockeian one where they themselves are also bound by them" (see Hassner, 2002).

NOTES

[1] Security dilemma refers to the notion that a state's efforts to increase its security by threatening another state, which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state's security. See KUPCHAN, C.A. (1994), "The Case for Collective Security", in Downs, G.W. (ed), *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, USA: University of Michigan Press.

[2] On the definition see for example LIPSCHUTZ, Ronnie D. (1998), *On Security*, New York: Columbia University Press.

[3] Generally speaking, security issues requiring military options and relating to defence are considered 'hard' ones whereas others that require non-military measures such as conflict prevention are regarded as 'soft'. But this distinction today appears to be less relevant in view of events and experience in world affairs. See for details KLARE, M.T. and THOMAS, D.C. (ed) (1991), *World Security*, New York: St. Martin's Press.

[4] For an extensive review of critical theory on security studies see for example JONES, Richard Wyn (1999), *Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory*, Lynne Rienner Publishers and KRAUSE, Kenneth (1998), "Critical Theory and Security Studies", *Cooperation and Conflict*, 33(3).

[5] See for a summary of literature on collective security studies, ULUSOY, H. (2003), " Collective Security in Europe*", Perceptions*, 7(4): 156-195.

[6] The Security dilemma refers to the notion that a state's efforts to increase its security by threatening another state, which then responds with steps to increase its own security, paradoxically erodes the first state's security. See KUPCHAN, C.A. (1994), "The Case for Collective Security", in Downs, G.W. (ed), *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, USA: University of Michigan Press.

[7] The free-rider problem refers to the temptation of states to let other states assume the costs of eliminating a threat while they share in the greater security – a public good from which they cannot easily be excluded- that results. In its most simplified form, this can be formalized as an N-person Prisoners' Dilemma where each state is left with a dominant strategy of not cooperating in the security system. If other states choose to act, the free-riding state gains all of the benefits that the others do and pays none of the cost; if other states hang back, it avoids the costs of being exploited". See DOWNS, G.W. and LIDA, K. (1994), " Assessing the Theoretical Case against Collective Security" in Downs, G.W. (ed), *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, USA: University of Michigan Press, 17-41.

[8] For the views of Deutch on Security Communities , see particularly ADLER, E. (1997), "Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations", *Millennium: Journal of International Relations*, Vol.26(2) and ADLER, E. and BARNETT, M (ed) (1998), *Security Communities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also ULUSOY, H. (2003), "revisiting Security Communities, after the Cold War: The Constructivist Perspective", *Perceptions*, 8(3), September-November: 161-197.

[9] See for a good summary of collective security arrangements in history, DOWNS, G.W. and ARBOR, Ann (eds)(1994), *Collective Security beyond the Cold War*, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

[10] See for an extensive summary of developments as regards collective security in the period from the end of the World War II to the end of the Cold War, AYBET, G. (1997), *The Dynamics of the European Security Co-operation; 1945-1991*, London: Macmillan.

[11] See F. Fukuyama, 1992, *The End of History and the Last Man*, (USA: Free Press. Fukuyama's thesis is that liberal democracy has finally overcome all other ideologies, literally putting an end to history seen as a series of confrontations between ideologies. This does not mean, however, that Fukuyama welcomes without qualification the West's victory in the Cold War. He is not so optimistic about the world that will come after the "end of history," as indicated by his use in the title of the expression "the Last Man. Fukuyama's proposition is that liberal democracy, which first developed in the cradle of Western civilization, is a universally acceptable concept, and that the world is now moving in a fundamental way toward embracing it.

[12] For detailed reviews of the security environment in the post-Cold War with the emergence of new security threats see for example DAVIS, M.J., (ed), (1996), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War*, UK:Edward Elgar Pub.Ltd ; Gartner, Heinz, HYDE-PRICE Adrian and REITER, Erich (eds) (2001), *Europe's New Security Challenges*, London: Lynne Rienner.; GOETSCHEL, Laurent (2000), "Globalisation and Security: The Challenge of Collective Action in a Politically Fragmented World", *Global Society*, 14(2): 259-277; JACOBSON, David (ed) (1994), *Old Nations, New World, Conceptions of World Order,* Oxford: Westview Press.

[13] For the comments on the relevance of NATO for the security environment in the post-Cold War see for example RUHLE, M. (1998), "Taking another look at NATO's role in European Security", *NATO Review*, 4 winter; RUHLE, M. and WILLIAMS; N. (1996) , "The PfP after NATO Enlargement", *European Studies* , 5(4) winter; SCHIMMELFENNIG, Frank (1998/99), "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation", *Security Studies*, 8 ; WEBER, S. (1992) , " Does NATO have a future ?", in Crawford, B. (ed), *The Future of European Security*, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley; YOST, David S. 1998, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, 40(2): 135-151.

[14] For detailed studies on this see for example BENNET, A. and LEPGOLD, J. (1993), "Reinventing Collective Security After the Cold War", *Political Science Quarterly*, 18(2); DAVIS, M.J., (ed), (1996), *Security Issues in the Post-Cold War*, UK:Edward Elgar Pub.Ltd ; MILLER, Lynn H. (1999), " The idea and the reality of collective security", Global Governance , 5(3): 303-332; WEISS, T.G. (1993), *Collective Security in a Changing World*, Colombia: Lynee Rienner Pub.

[15] For a summary of developments in the post-Cold war era for collective security operations, ULUSOY, H. (2003) , " Collective Security in Europe*", Perceptions*, 7(4): 156-195.

[16] See for example MøLLER, Bjørn (1999), "The UN, the USA and NATO: Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Kosovo", *Copenhagen Peace Research Institute Working Paper* September 1999.

[17] For useful and sometimes controversial studies on humanitarian operations see for example EVANS, Gareth and SAHNOUN, Mohammed (2002) "The responsibility to protect", *Foreign Affairs*, November-December, accessed at http: //www.foreignaffairs.org. ; GUICHERD, C. (1999), " International Law and the War in Kosovo", *Survival* , 41(2) Summer; HAINES, Steven (2000), "Military Intervention and International Law" in Trever C. Salmon (ed) *Issues in International Relations,* London: Routledge: 101-131; KLEIN, Jacques Paul (2004), "Challenges of Change: The Nature of Peace Operations in the 21st Century and Continuing Need for Reform", *Perceptions*, Special Issues on Peace Operations, December 2003-2004: MALONE, David M. (1999), "Cooperation between the UN and NATO: Quo Vadis?", IPA Seminar on UN/NATO Relationship June 1999, International Peace Academy, MøLLER, Bjørn (1999), "The UN, the USA and NATO: Humanitarian Intervention in the Light of Kosovo", *Copenhagen Peace*

Research Institute Working Paper September 1999; SHERMAN, Jake (2000), *Humanitarian Action: A Symposium Summary*, International Peace Academy Working Papres, November, accessed at http://www.ciaonet.com.

[18] For discussions on NATO's role in humanitarian interventions see for example: MALONE, David M. (1999), "Cooperation between the UN and NATO: Quo Vadis?", IPA Seminar on UN/NATO Relationship June 1999, International Peace Academy; OVE, B. (1999), "Should NATO take the lead in formulating a doctrine on humanitarian intervention?", *NATO Review* , 3, fall; WEBER, S. (1992) , " Does NATO have a future ?", in Crawford, B. (ed), *The Future of European Security*, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley; YOST, David S. 1998, "The New NATO and Collective Security", *Survival*, 40(2): 135-151

[19] For comments on the post-September 11 era see for example: ARQUILLA, J. (2003), "Thinking About New Security Paradigms", *Contemporary Security Policy*, 24 (1): 209-223; FROST, Paul G. (2002), *Surprises, Challenges and Opportunities Since September 11,* Schlesinger working group report spring 2002, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University; HALL, Rodney Bruce, and CARL F. (2002), "Rethinking Security", *NATO Review*, Winter 2001/2002; HOFFMAN, B.(2001), "Reorganise to Meet Today's Threats", *Full Alert,* Rand Review, Fall, accessed at http: // www.rand.org/publications/rand review. ; IFANTIS, Kostas (1998), "Understanding international politics after the 11 September terrorist attacks: a note on the new security paradigm", *ARENA Working Papers*, WP 98/16.

[20] For studies on combating international terrorism after September 11 see for example CILLUFFO, F.J. and RANKIN, D. (2002), "Fighting Terrorism", *NATO Review*, Winter 2001/2002; CRONIN, Audrey K. (2003), "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism", *International Security ,* 27(3): 30-59; DELPECH, Thérèse (2002), "International terrorism and Europe", *Chaillot Papers n°56 December.* ROTH, Kenneth (2004), "The Law of War in the War on Terror", *Foreign Affairs*, January; TSCHIRGI, Dan (2002), "The War On Terror: Marginalised Conflict As A Challenge To The International System", *Perceptions*, 7(3);TURNER, Robert F. (2003), "State Responsibility and the War on Terror: The legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates", *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 4(1) Spring: 121-.

[21] See for example LAOS, N.K. (1999), "International Security In The Post-Cold War Era", *Perceptions*, 4(4) December 1999-February 2000 and LAOS (2000), "Fighting Terrorism: What can international law do?" *Perceptions*, 5(1) March-May; LESSER, Ian O. (et al) (1999a), *Countering the New Terrorism*, Rand Documents, MR-989-AC, accessed at http:// www.rand.org/hot/newslinks/terrorism.htm.

[22] For a detailed analysis of the role of the UN to fight international terrorism, see for example *Responding to terrorism: What Role for the UN?,* Conference of International Peace Academy on 25-26 October 2002, New York accessed at http.//www.ciaonet.org.

[23] For a detailed review of NATO's polices as regards fight against terrorism until 2002, see ULUSOY, H. (2002), "NATO's role in the fight against terrorism", Term paper for IR505- Problems in International Security, METU, Department of International Relations, Spring semester. See also NATO web site http://www.nato.int.

[24] For discussions on the legal dimension of fighting international terrorism by military means see for example CHARNEY, Jonathan I. (2001), "The Use of Force against Terrorism and International Law", *American Journal of International Law,* 95(4): 835-839, ROTH, Kenneth (2004), "The Law of War in the War on Terror", *Foreign Affairs*, January; TURNER, Robert F. (2003), "State Responsibility and the War on Terror: The legacy of Thomas Jefferson and the Barbary Pirates", *Chicago Journal of International Law*, 4(1) Spring: 121-.

[25] For studies on US policies after September 11 see for example BROOKS, Stephen G. and WOHLFORTH, William C. (2002), "American Primacy in Perspective", *Foreign Affairs*, July-August , accessed at http://www.ciaonet.org. ; HASSNER, Pierre (2002), *"The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire?",* Chaillot papers N.54; KAGAN, Robert (2003), *Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order,* London: Atlantic Books; NYE, Joseph S. (2002), *The Paradox of American Power*, Oxford: Oxford Un. Press; SCHONBERG, Karl K. (2001), "Paradigm Regained: The New Consensus in US Foreign Policy", *Security Dialogue*, 32(4): 439-452.

[26] Although there is no one common definition about terrorism and its forms, at least as a phenomenon it is condemned by all states. The nature and content of terrorism indeed is subject to a separate study which falls beyond the scope of this thesis.

CHAPTER 4

CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

A. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Turkey' s policies followed in the security field are directly related to the national security and thus foreign policy in general. As analysed in the previous chapters, national security is an indispensable part of collective security and foreign policy consists of policies primarily on the two former areas. Therefore, it goes without saying that one needs to analyse the patterns of the Turkish foreign policy for a fuller understanding of the polices followed by Turkey concerning its security in general and collective security efforts in particular.

In such analysis, along with the policy of general patterns of foreign policy , the national security policy of Turkey in the broadest sense including defence and military aspects needs to be looked at. Therein,   constructivism is argued to be the right theoretical tool to apply, at least, for the following reasons:

As to the state, Turkey's case represents a 'strong state' (Çalış, 1996) from its inception with a longer background of modernization or westernization history (Karaosmanoğlu, 2000). The civilian and military wings of the state that fought in arms for the liberation of the Turkish people and the creation of the Republic have been both the object and the subject of modernization, which in general foresees the top-down transformation of society in the western mould. Thus, not only the civilian state apparatus but also the military were always at the centre of domestic, as well as external politics.   In such an organizational culture, Turkish foreign policy, as it can be argued, has been reflective of *realpolitik* in a world that is also run by realist parameters.

As might be recalled following the discussions in the previous chapters, in the analysis of state policies in foreign affairs , it is of particular importance to examine both domestic and international aspects and their implications on the state's foreign policy and thus national security that shapes the patterns of collective security policy of the state.

Ian O. Lesser (2000) assesses the importance of domestic politics in the formulation of foreign policy of Turkey. For Lesser, much Western scholarship in Turkey has tended to view Turkish foreign and security policy from one of two perspectives: inside out and outside in. The former methodology considers the nature of Turkish society, and its internal organizational and bureaucratic developments, and draws conclusions about their implications for Turkish foreign policy. The latter tradition focuses on geo-politics as the prime motivator for the internal policies of Turkey and other states in its security complex.

Yet, as one can suggest, the distinctions these two traditions make is somewhat artificial. Turkey's internal affairs clearly have a profound influence on the nature and direction of the country's foreign policy, and international developments in the strategic environment affect the evolution of Turkish society and politics.

In other words, both the domestic structure, particularly the identity politics, and international developments in security environment of Turkey have impacts in foreign policy decisions.

As argued, domestic political-military culture matters in foreign and security policies. One can define domestic political culture as "the cultural beliefs and values that shape a given society's orientations toward politics. Political-military culture in turn refers to the subset of the larger political culture that influences how members of a given society view national security, the military as an institution, and the use of force in international relations" (see Küçük, 1999).

The foregoing does not constitute a denial of either external or domestic forces. But it does suggest, for example, that external forces are not really as important as contemporary realist and neo-realist models in international relations would claim, and that in foreign policy analysis domestic aspects need also to be looked upon.

Secondly, another reason for the utility of constructivism is the fact that Turkish foreign policy has been increasingly exposed to criticism of identity clashes and/or crises in the post Cold War era. For example, given domestic developments on the one hand that have shaped the identity discussions in Turkey and its geographical location as well as regional and structural changes on the other, Bozdağlıoğlu (2003), in one of the rare studies of Turkish foreign policy based on constructivist analysis, argues that Turkish foreign policy has suffered identity crises at certain time periods.

Similarly, in order to establish a case for an identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy, some critics generally suggest that Turkey has recently been replacing its renowned western oriented foreign policy (old identity) with a more Islamic, Ottomanist and Turkist, or more regional one (new identity). However, as a closer look at the development of modern Turkey's foreign affairs also reveals, the foundations of this foreign policy established by the founders of the Republic led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk have since remained consistent.

In view of the foregoing, it suffices to show the importance of a constructive analysis in order to reach a fuller understanding of the security policy of Turkey and of its foreign policy in general in the post-Cold War era. It is mainly because constructivism serves as a useful theoretical tool to analyse not only the effects of international politics but also of domestic factors on foreign policy, and it is moreover the only framework to examine the issues related to identity of a state .

Against this background, it is evident that the major texts on foreign and security affairs in Turkey have mostly *realpolitik* perspectives and are state-centric . According to such realist analyses, state security has priority over all other concerns. Consequently, policy-makers adopt realist security axioms. The Turkish state and

military elite puts much emphasis on balance of power considerations and geopolitical calculations.

Similarly, in search for explaining continuity in modern Turkey's foreign affairs since the time of Atatürk, scholars of realist understanding have ascribed this continuity to such factors as the pragmatist nature of Kemalist ideology, nationalism, national interest, the rationalist approaches of Turkish decision makers or Turkey's historical past and geopolitical position. Nevertheless, they have either ignored or underestimated the notion of the state's identity in their analyses.

Additionally, the literature about Turkey's foreign policy has mostly concentrated on Turkey's interests in the countries with which Turkey have such relations. Thus, there overall has been a general lack of scholarly literature about the ideational aspect of these relations and the ways in which identity is included in foreign policy making in Turkey.

All this clearly reveals the insufficient nature of the realist school in fully analysing the foreign policy of a country. Thus, this requires a fuller approach to complement the mainstream scholarship in this respect. That is constructivism as explained in the previous chapters in detail. Therefore, the study as it unfolds in the following pages will attempt to employ constructivist tools in examining Turkish foreign and security in general and its collectives security policy in particular in the Post-Cold War era in view of developments in the preceding periods.

B. REVIEW OF NATIONAL AND STATE IDENTITY

As in the preceding chapters the constructivist literature clearly underlines, foreign policy is the reflection of the state identity. Constructivists argue that national interest and foreign policy strategies that states adopt are to a significant degree a function of state identity.

How does state identity then shape state action? A constructivist approach to this causal nexus involves two distinct analytical steps: the demonstration of the constitution of interests through identity; and the demonstration of the effects of both

identity and interests on state action. From a constructivist perspective, the articulation of identity serves to specify state interests: the collective view of a state's place in the world informs particular conceptions of the proper ends and means of its foreign policy. Once links between identity and interest have been demonstrated at the level of discourse, one can go on to explore their effects on action. For constructivists, the articulation of state identity and state interests shape policies by making some actions justifiable and others unjustifiable in the domestic and international political realms. Thus, if identity shapes the content of state interests, one should expect state action to be compatible with both interests and identity.

The specification of state identity in any particular case involves a series of interrelated analytical tasks. First, one must delineate the policy area in question. Because states interact with many other states and participate in more than one international institution, they can have multiple, overlapping identities at any point in time. In order to define state identity with any accuracy, then, one therefore first has to delineate a particular policy context - the background against which identity is defined. This first analytical step does not eliminate the problem of multiple identities. Nor does it determine the content of a particular identity in question. A particular set of set of institutions and actors in a given policy context often will allow for different kinds of state identity.

Moreover, for states, identity has also both an internal and an external dimension (Smith, 2001): it is what binds the group together and what situates it with respect to others. In the state context, the internal dimension is often labelled "national identity," the set of shared norms and narratives that sustain "we-ness" through time. The other term, "state identity", refers then to the external dimension of national identity, the self-placement of the national political community relative to other states and international institutions.

In view of the foregoing, one can see that state identity is indispensably attached to the national identity of the state. National identity is of significance as it embodies the self of the state . The formation of the self is important in order that the state forms its foreign policy that is formulated through the state identity based on

the construction of the "other" of the state. Thus, a strong dialectical relationship exists between the definition of national identity and the formulation of foreign policy. Since the mind set of the actors and their identity is formed within these broader discourses it is necessary in the first hand to understand the dominant discourses in defining national identity.

Turkish National Identity:

Ottoman Era

Tracing and explaining the steps in the creation and the evolution of Turkish national identity is important for several reasons. Overall, Turkish national identity represents a very typical example of a national identity "created" (Yanık, 2002).

As dominantly agreed by historians, the origin of the Ottomans goes back to Turkish origin ancestors which emigrated from Central Asia to Anatolia. Having gradually turned into a multi-ethnic state and then an empire in the following centuries, the composition of the state and its populace changed inevitably even though the ruling class remained predominantly heir to its Turkish origin (see Langer and Blake (1932).

However, foreign (mainly European) sources generally argue that as late as the 19 Century in the Ottoman state, the word "Turk" continued to mean "peasant, rustic and yokel", in a derogatory form [1].

For example, in 1897, Sir Walter Ramsey, a British traveller, was surprised to find out that the term Turk in the Ottoman Empire meant generally an insult. In his book "Impressions of Turkey", he noted that:

> At the present day the name 'Turk' is rarely used, and I have heard it employed only in two ways, either as a distinguishing term of race (for example, you ask whether a village is 'Turk' or 'Turkmen'), and as a term of contempt (for example, you mutter 'Turk Kafa,' where in English you would say 'Blockhead') [2].

Likewise, Arminius Vambery, one of the distinguished Turcologists of all times, in his book *La Turquie d 'aujourd 'hui et d 'avant quarante ans* came to the same conclusion as Ramsey about the meaning of 'Turk":

> Forty years ago, Turkishness, or the word Turk, in literature, was used as an insult that meant vulgar and boorish. I remember one incident: One day, when I was conversing with educated people, I mentioned them about the ethnographic characteristics of the Turkish nation, the fact that branches of this nation extended from the shores of Lena to Asia and to Adriatic on the other side, and that among all of the nations of the earth was the nation that had the most possibility of extension. Upon saying this, the answer that they gave me was 'are you sure that you have not confused us with the Kyrgyz or those boorish nomadic Tatars?' Even in those days I had devoted myself to the study of dialects in Eastern Turkey. But with the exception of several gentlemen who knew our culture, my endeavors were found ridiculous. In Istanbul, I have not found anyone who seriously dealt neither with the problems of Turkish nationalism nor with Turkish languages[3].

Similarly, Bernard Lewis (1961) in his *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* argued that well into the nineteenth century the concept of nationality did not exist among the people of the Ottoman Empire. Rather, the Turks of the Ottoman Empire were loyal not to their nation, but to their religion; to the Ottoman dynasty, and the Ottoman state. The term Turk, as he noted as well, was a mere insult.

All these examples do, of course, by no means imply the non-existence of a populace of Turkish origin in the Empire. Rather they suggest that there was not yet a consciousness about their national identity among these people at least till the last century of the Ottoman empire.

Yet, even this did not prevent other European states from identifying the Ottoman State as the Turkish Empire. It was European writers who were endowing the Ottoman State with a noble past and far from rustic splendours. In other words, it was the rest of Europe that shaped their "European" identity in contrast to the Ottomans which they perceived as the empire of Turks [4].

Corollary to this, as this chapter will describe, within in a very short span of time, the name "Turk" took on a life of its own, lost its derogatory meaning, and eventually came to denote a nation and a nationality, thanks to the identity building process in these years[5].

As to the lack of national identity consciousness among those of Turkish origin, the great majority of the Ottoman populace, one can mention the following: In the Ottoman empire, ethnic groups were compartmentalized in terms of their religions. In this system, non-Muslim *ethnies* were provided with a kind of cultural autonomy, within which these groups maintained their religious as well as worldly affairs separately from the Ottoman rules, while in return they all remained subjects to the Ottoman Sultan and obliged to pay their levies to the empire. On the other hand, all Muslim subjects were treated alike regardless of their ethnic origins.

Under such circumstances, if one is to trace the origins of Turkish nationalism as well as Turkish national identity, there is no better place to start than the last century of the Ottoman Empire. The rise of national consciousness in the Ottoman Empire was the result of a mixture of internal and external factors, as well as cultural and political events that combined the unique historical, political and social nature of the Empire.

With the advent of the 19th century, "Age of Nationalism", the state could not prevent nationalist separatist movements among the non-Muslim subjects in the course of the weakening of the empire.

Under the above outlined circumstances, the nineteenth century also witnessed many debates among the Ottoman intelligentsia searching for a new basis of identity. These debates, which still have an impact in modern Turkish politics, revolved around four political currents, namely Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Westernism.

In an attempt to prevent the disintegration of the state, the rulers adopted the policy of "Osmanlıcılık" (Ottomanism). This policy was in fact searching to create an upper/supreme identity among the ethnic groups of the state, on the basis of a

territorial approach. However, time attested to the fact that this policy was belated and thus had no change to secure the Ottoman lands from secession where non-Muslims lived.

In the face of this eventuality, the state then attempted to, at least, secure its lands where Muslim subjects lived. This was manifested with the policy of "İslamcılık" (Islamism) aiming to bring all Muslim subjects under the unity of the Caliph who was the Ottoman Sultan. Nevertheless, nor did this prevent Arab Muslim subjects from collaborating with the Christian European powers against the Ottomans for independence during the First World War. On the other hand, the ideal of the westernists that was to combine a civic national identity with ethnic ingredients, remained only limited to certain groups.

In these years, the Ottoman state also witnessed the surge of a kind of Turkish nationalism that was initiated and developed by the ruling party "İttihat ve Terakki". This policy aimed at creating a sense of unity among the core subjects of the state, i.e. those of Turkish origin.

First started as a by-product of the interest in the study of the origins of the Turks both in Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, Turkish nationalism became a concrete ideology with the help of ideologues, like İsmail Gaspıralı, Ziya Gökalp and Yusuf Akcura. During the final years of the Empire, this nationalist ideology became a policy when the ruling elite of the Ottoman Empire realized that other ideologies like pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism could not to ensure the survival and the continuity of the Empire.

This form of nationalism was heavily motivated by romantic and ethnic nationalism. The connection that was established in this policy with the mythological ancestors in Central Asia was even manifested at its extreme in a policy of pan-Turkism as well.

To sum up, the emergence of Turkish nationalism coincided with the final years of the Ottoman Empire. It can be argued that in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the growing interest in the history of the Turks both in

Europe and in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman intellectuals for the first time started to ponder on their origins. Interestingly, they also started to cherish their Central Asian connection, inserting the Central Asia link into the Ottoman political and national discourse. This process was not truly scientific, but it nevertheless helped to put down the foundations for the creation of the Turkish national consciousness.

In this context, one can rightly ask a relevant question : why in a multi-ethnic society like the Ottoman empire, were the rulers pursuing a policy of nationhood based on ethnical roots? A possible answer to this lies with the fact that in their awareness of a state falling apart due to nationalist secession of all other ethnic groups, the *İttihat ve Terakki* tried at least to preserve the main core of the society, i.e. those of Turkish origin, in an attempt to preserve the state, if not the whole empire.

Republican Era

So, last years of the Ottoman State passed in the confusing combination of all these nationhood policies that were contradictory to one another in essence. Yet, it seems evident that thanks to the national consciousness, which was created through this Turkish nationalism, the Turkish people in Anatolia played a considerable role during the war of independence against the occupying states. Thus, it can be argued that among the majority of this people, who later became citizens of the Turkish Republic, there were already strong ties, what Smith (1991) calls "primordial ties" , such as common language, religion, race and ethnicity.

Moulded in such composition, this people successfully, though painfully, managed to establish its state in 1923 after a long war of independence against the Western occupiers. When founded, the society of the Turkish republic itself represented a multi-ethnic social fabric as the republic was established on the multi-ethnic Ottoman soil. Regarding the ethnic mosaic of modern Turkey, some scholars even claim the existence of 47 different ethnic groups, on the basis of the divergence of language, culture, religion and ethnicity[6]. However, some others find this number exaggerated and criticise the criteria used for categorisation of these groups, questioning the factual errors and insufficient statistical data in these studies[7]. Yet,

despite the fact that there seems to be no reliable data about the exact number of the ethnic groups in Turkey, it can be argued at least that in the aftermath of the proclamation of the republic, the state faced a rather heterogen cultural structure composed of ethnic diversity, although the predominant majority was of Turkish origin.

It was under these circumstances that modern Turkey was founded in the form of a unitary nation-state. The following factors can be attributed to this policy choice. Nationalism is the process of integration of the masses of a people into a common political form. Similarly, creating a sense of nationhood among its ethnic groups that would ensure their loyalty to the state was imperative for the Turkish Republic.

After the War of Independence, the new Turkish regime under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk faced not only the task of state building out of the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, but the task of building a nation as well. In terms of nation building, the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 was a major milestone in transforming the word 'Turk' from a term that was used as an insult into a term that connoted a nation.

This was firstly due to the need to form homogeneity in the society to the fullest possible extent, out of this fragmented ethnic structure as this would strengthen the domestic and thus national stability. Secondly, the creation of a common national identity was necessary to strengthen the unity of the people, and to forge the independence and the sovereignty of the state in the international arena, the main powers of which were those, against which Turkey won its independence. Last but not least, the state elite adopted a unitary nation-state policy in the state-building process, for this was the dominant model in the world of its time.

It is commonly argued that national identities have not evolved naturally and spontaneously, and that the state has a determining role in shaping the national identity. A good example of this fact is the words attributed to Italian statesmen Massimo d'Azeglio "Now that we have established Italy, we need to create the Italians" (see Yanık, 2002).

Turkey, too, sought to create a national identity that is supreme and superior to the existing ethnic (non-national) identities, with a view to strengthening its independence and sovereignty, preserving its territorial integrity,. The purpose of such nation-building was precisely to transfer loyalties from peripheral areas and traditional authorities to the centre.

In this process, the Turkish state adopted the civic territorial nationalism. This model's main characteristics, as Smith (1991) indicates, are as follows: a concept of territory with permanent borders, application of common laws to all citizens without discrimination, the concept of citizenship that enables the individuals of the state to participate in state affairs through various political, economic and socio-cultural rights; and, finally, the creation of a common culture leading to a common language for official communication. In other words, this strategy, known also as the *constitutional nationalism*, seeks to establish a nation based on citizenship within a people, regardless of differences of its members in terms of ethnicity, religion, language etc.

It is argued that modernisation of the Turkish state followed the lines that are stated at the motto of the French revolution: Equality (of all ethnic groups under the neutralised rubric of Turkish national citizenship), Fraternity (of all ethnic groups following the promise of Turkish nationalism within the sanctified borders of modern Turkey), and Liberty (from imperial invaders) (Canefe, 1998).

This policy was later exposed to some ambiguity due to the symbols of nationhood used by the state, based on the concept of "Türklük" (Turkishness). The term "Türk" had also been used in the previous policy of Turkish nationalism by the *İttihak ve Terakki* under the Ottoman regime. And, in this usage it was related to an ethnic group whose origin was traced back to the Central Asia. The policy of the *İttihak ve Terakki* had an ethnic attribution and connotation. However, despite these similarities of symbols, the nation policy of modern Turkey was not based on ethnic nationalism, but territorial one.

Even Ziya Gokalp, known generally as pan-Turkist, in *The Principles of Turkism*, insisting on the creation of a nation, had acknowledged the ethnic diversity of Turkey. "There are fellow citizens in our country whose ancestors came from Albania or Anatolia sometime in the past. If they have been educated as Turks and have become used to working for the Turkish ideal, we must not set them apart from other citizens," he argued. For him, a Turk was a person who said," I am a Turk." (See Yanık, 2002, 57). He, in other words, rejected all the definitions of nation based on race, ethnicity or religion. The traces of his thinking were later seen in the famous slogan of the modern Turkey: "*ne mutlu Türküm diyene* " (How happy is the person who calls himself Turk) (Yanık, 2002).

In this period, such Turkish nationalism based on descent from the Oguz Turkish tribe and pre-Ottoman history, on language and culture, was promoted and eventually written into the 1937 Constitution as one of the six foundational principles of the Republic. This is asserted by Khosla (2001, 9) as follows:

> the Turks were the direct descendants of the world's greatest conquering race, that they had played a leading role in the origins and development of world civilisation, and that it was the Turks who had contributed most to what had been great in the Ottoman Empire.

The ideological basis written into the 1937 Constitution was sought to be spread and consolidated by cutting off, from historiography, the Ottoman Empire. Revival of Turkish identity and self-esteem, a necessary antidote to the recent setbacks, was founded on a portrayal of Turkey's past which started with an epic history based on the geographic spread of the Turkish people from the Pacific to the Aegean; and took in the archaeological evidence from Anatolia. Thereafter, Anatolia became the heartland, the source of the tradition and culture of a Turkey which would confine its ambitions to its modern borders (see Yanık, 2002).

Additionally, such attempts in the early years of the republic as the sun-language theory was utilised in the Turkish nation-policy. Regarding this theory, it is argued that being Turk was an enigmatic formulation since it was built upon mythical foundations that constructed a mixed lineage. The Sun-language theory linked Turkish to so many civilisations. The difficulty in this theory as regards the Turkish nation-policy seems that while the citizenship is asserted as the only link

among the Turkish people regardless of their ethnic background, such theories attempted to formulate a common origin for all these Turkish citizens of different ethnic origins.

These linguistic and semantic peculiarities in these policies can be better understood under the circumstances of the time they were created. They were due to the fact that like in every nation-state, in modern Turkey, too, the state was seeking for a reference to a glorious common past that was necessary to strengthen the unity of Turkish citizens in the early years of the republic. In other words, it was a policy of creating an upper identity among its people possessing different non-national identities, on the basis of a common history and memory.

Turkey, while applying territorial nationalism, adopted a set of symbols that seems similar to the French model, another example of territorial nationalism, in which national terms, i.e. French and France, are directly related to the main ethnic group of the country, i.e. Francs.

Other countries in Europe that also long adopted territorial nationalism, on the other hand, preferred to use symbols and terms that referred to the land of the state as in the case of Spain and Britain. The terms like Spain and Spanish, originate from the land where all citizens of Spain live, not from the Kastilian majority ruling the country. Similarly, terms like British and Britons refer to the land of Britain, rather than to the dominant English ethnic group.

This eclectic structure of Turkish nation-building later gave nevertheless rise to arguments that the Turkish nation-formation policy was moulded according to ethnic nationalism, similar to the German romantic nationalism, and that Kemalist ideology created and elevated the myth of "peoplehood" not as a civil/secular construct, but as a peculiar combination of elements that pertain to motherland, blood and religion.

Nevertheless, the state was also aware of this ambivalence and tried to overcome at least the linguistic ambiguity. In this regard, one of the dictum that was used by the founder of Turkey, Atatürk, for the promotion of the nationhood, "*Ne*

mutlu Türküm diyene" (How happy is the person who calls himself   Turk) was a good of example to circumvent   such ambiguity. To avoid any misunderstanding, which might derive from the ethnic connotation of the term "Turk" in this motto, the state felt the need to clarify that the term "Turk" in such mottos   was used to refer to all Turkish citizens, irrespective of their ethnic origins. Furthermore, later in the course of the following years, the state also developed new slogans to this end. The dictum "*Kendini Türkiye Cumhuriyetine bağlı gören herkes Türktür*" (everyone who feels loyal to the Turkish republic is called Turk) is a good example of this kind.

In short, while the founders of the Republic were determined to carry Turkey to the level of the 'civilized nations' by eradicating the regressive effects of the past state system from the public life, they were also set to form a homogenous 'nation' from the remnants of Ottoman Empire.

Philip Robins (1991, 67) claims that " the creation of a subjective Turkish identity to be the primary focus of loyalty to the new state was an invention both of necessity and of its day. It reflected the need to bind together a number of disparate peoples thrown together in the chaotic aftermath of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire."

The idea of the Turkish nation in this sense was in fact a design of those founding fathers of the Republic. They first established the state with a certain identity with the hope that it would in return create a Turkish nation, a nation that would be modern/European/civilised.

In this sense, as argued (see Çalış 1996, and others) modern Turkish history is the most illuminating example of the transformation of a multi-religious/traditional empire into a secular/modern state.

State Identity of the Republic:

As generally argued (Aydın, 1999; Çalış, 1996 and Oran, 2001 etc.) , the Turkish national identity as explained above has been further moulded by the

following two concepts: Secularism and Westernism. This national identity embodied by them form altogether the state identity of modern Turkey.

The former concept, *secularism*, can be attributed to two main concerns. The first is related to the religious nature of the Ottoman state. It is hard to argue that the Ottoman state was governed by solely religious understanding and the foreign policy of the state was based on religion. Yet, notwithstanding the importance of secularism for the reconstruction of the society in the domestic life, the secularist approach was also considered by the founders of the modern Turkey as a necessity for state and foreign policy that must be governed on the basis of rationalist and pragmatic understanding. Secularism did in this sense enabled the state to free itself from policy constraints due to such reasons as religious affiliation[8].

It is argued that Ataturk's success in imposing secular reforms was in part due to the strong leadership he exhibited in the war of liberation, but it was also due to the fact that a significant portion of the population of the new republic wanted to be part of western civilization (see Ryan, 2003) . This was demonstrated by writings of a leading Turkish social theorist of the period of the day, Ziya Gokalp, who claimed that Turkish culture was influenced by European civilization as much as it was by Islamic civilization (see Yanık, 2002).

As to the latter characteristic of the state identity, W*esternism* had already been influential even in the Ottoman time. It was also followed by the modern Turkey both in domestic and foreign policy of the state.

As generally suggested, the main objective of Turkish foreign policy since the establishment of the state has been very clear: to be accepted as part of the Western community of nations through taking part in their organisations. Yet, such consistency in foreign policy direction has become possible thanks to the fact that since 1923 Turkey has developed a powerful state structure which does not allow internal and external changes to alter drastically the traditional course of foreign policy. Indeed, what lies behind the continuity of modern Turkish foreign policy is that state's identification with the ideas, ideals and norms of the Western world.

Thanks to the Kemalist modernisation movement, modern Turkey as a state began to identify itself with the norms of the Western world and then attempted to redefine the basis of national identity with the standards of Western civilisation. By this reformation, "instead of standing as the representative of the East, facing and challenging the West, the Turks deliberately turned over to the other side." The West was then meant to be Europe (Çalış, 1996).

The Republican state perceived Europe mainly from a security perspective that is highly embedded within an ideational logic. More specifically, the Turkish elites were of the view that in order for Turkey to preserve its territorial integrity and external sovereignty, interstate relations between the new-born Republic and the major European powers needed to be friendly. It was clear to them that it was needed if they did not want to see the destiny of the Ottomans.

It is generally argued (Aydın, 1999; Çalış, 1996; Oğuzlu, 2003) that only after the decline of the state, the Ottomans began searching the meaning of being European and in Europe. When this coincided with the pressure of imperialism, the Ottomans had to think twice about their position *vis-a vis* other countries in Europe. The basic question was what should be done in order to save the state.

In this regard, realists can argue the policy of Westernism/ Europeanism in the early years of the Republic as a necessity for the state to preserve its existence in the world dominated by western powers against which they fought a war of liberation.

Yet, constructivist approach can provide further explanations to this policy. Westernism in this sense can be seen as an effort of the state to see the world through the lens of the western states and thus form a common *self* with them, many of which Turks fought.

In this regard, Ataturk can even be considered to be the first constructivist in the world or at least in the modern Turkey even long before the birth of constructivist understanding . For through his policy of westernism he skilfully tailored a common self with the western countries, in terms of state and also national identity of

Turkey. This attempt was not solely to identify the Turkish republic with the values of western world under a common self. But, this was rather an attempt to be part of the *self* of modernism, as manifested in his famous words: *our goal is to reach the level of modern civilisations*. At the time of this goal, as the western world was the sole representative of the modern civilisation., this policy was shaped as *westernism* rather than *modernism* although the former meant the latter in its substance.

As argued (Khosla, 2001) , the policies of Kemalist Turkey are to be regarded, then, as striving to be modernised and civilised, not Westernised. Kemalist Turkey sought to learn modernisation from wherever it could.

In plain terms, as argued (Stone, 2001), Atatürk wanted to raise the new Republic to the status of a 'contemporary civilisation' (Western) by establishing a nation-state of a nineteenth century and evolving twentieth-century European model: a European state, with its own traditions, trying to create a space for itself, and with a favourable position in the international society of states. A European state, most notably, shorn of any imperialistic leanings, particularly of the kind that Atatürk struggled against.

Concentrating rather on domestic socio-economic reform, Atatürk's statesmanship gave the new Republic a breathing space within the international arena, which was all the better for the internal reconstruction of the country and indeed for peace and prosperity. Domestic reforms, of course, brought Turkey closer to Europe, particularly the secularisation of all levels of administration, judicial reforms, the adoption of the Western calendar and the adoption of the Latin alphabet, in which Atatürk himself invested a great deal of intellectual energy. He led and initiated the reforms that transferred this cultural space into a modernised European state.

Its foreign policy is a natural corollary to this transformation. Atatürk was unequivocal in the direction that the new Republic should take: "Turks have always gone towards the West. We want a European Turkey, in other words a Turkish country that looks towards the West. We want to modernise our country. All our efforts are aimed at founding modern Westernised government" (Stone, 2001, 3).

This clearly shows that Europe and West all meant for Turkey one thing, i.e. "modernism", where the contemporary civilisation stood in these years.

In this sense, one can also argue that the former characteristic of the state identity, secularism, was also the product of the motive to create its *self* with the world of modernity and modern civilisation.

C. REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURTY POLICY

Modern Turkish foreign policy has been a reflection of the identity of the modern Turkish state in international relations (Calış, 1996) . To put it more precisely, the state identity that is shaped by secularism and westernism in the sense of modernism on the foundations of the national identity, has been the main factor in shaping the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic as postulated by the theoretical discussion in the previous chapters.

Once the process of such a state identification was completed, the state identity of modern Turkey gave way to the birth of a new foreign policy understanding too. As argued (Çalış, 1996) , therefore, in the development of modern Turkish foreign policy, the identity of the Turkish state has become a key factor in determining foreign policy as in all other policies of the state, like the domestic structure of the country.

Nevertheless, beside the state identity as the main pillar, there are a number of determinants that have inevitably been influential in the formation of this form of foreign policy[9].

As Aydın (1999) suggests, while looking at the elements that shape the foreign policy of any country, one can see, with some degree of over-simplification, the interplay of two kinds of determinants. The first one, called *structural*, are continuous, and rather static. The second, termed *conjunctural*, are dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and foreign developments.

Such structural determinants are not directly related to the international political medium and the daily happenings of foreign politics. They can exert a long-term influence over the determination of foreign policy goals. Geographical position, historical experiences and cultural background, together with national symbols and images of other nations, and long-term economic necessities fall into the category of these 'structural determinants'.

Conjunctural determinants, on the other hand, are made up of a web of interrelated developments in domestic politics and international relations. Although not displaying any long-term continuity like the structural static-factors, these conjunctural dynamic factors do exert temporary influence on a country's foreign policy and especially on its daily implementation. Conjunctural changes in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, shifts in the world's present balance of power, domestic political changes, daily scarcities of economic factors and the personalities of specific decision-makers, fall into this category.

Since its establishment on 29 October 1923, Turkey's security has always been shaped by two structural determinants, i.e., its geography and its historical background mainly with countries in its surrounding (See MFA web site, Foreign Policy) .

As to *geography,* Turkey's perceived geographical location is one of the constitutive elements of its security culture (see Bilgin, 2004; Aydın, 1999 etc.). Some important foreign policy inputs of Turkey grew out of the country's geopolitical reality. As Rosenau puts it:

> The configuration of the land, its fertility and climate, and its location relative to other land masses and to waterways ... all contribute both to the psychological environment through which officials and publics define their links to the external world and the operational environment out of which their dependence on other countries fashioned (see Aydın, 1999, 155).

A state's borders remain highly significant in shaping its foreign policy. Turkey is no exception in this regard. In the early days of the Republic, Turkey

bordered with seven countries, four of which were major powers - Britain (mandate in Iraq), France (mandate in Syria), Italy (the Dodecanese), the Soviet Union - and the remaining three were with Bulgaria, Greece and Iran. After the Second World War, Turkey's neighbours decreased to six - Bulgaria, Greece, Iran, Iraq, the Soviet Union and Syria (Stone, 2001).

In such geography, Turkey's important and sensitive geo-strategic position has meant that national security concerns have always been paramount in foreign policy considerations. A critical element in these concerns was long Turkey's proximity to and traditional distrust of the former Soviet Union. Moreover, the fact that Turkey has borders with the Balkans and the Middle East, areas of traditional conflict, also made Turkey very sensitive to changes in both the international and regional political balance.

As to the *historical background and experiences*, i.e. second structural determinant, it is obvious that the new Turkey could not totally dissociate itself from its Ottoman heritage (see Aydın(1999); Bilgin(2004); Davutoğlu (2002); Karaosmanoğlu (2000) and (2004). Today, the Turkish nation carries the deep impressions of the historical experiences of being reduced from a vast empire to extinction, and then having to struggle back to save the national homeland and its independence. The struggle for survival and the play of *realpolitik* in the international arena, together with an imperial past and a huge cultural heritage left strong imprints on the national philosophy of Turkey and the character of its people.

Furthermore, historical experiences cannot be separated from the present day life of a nation. Like individuals, nations react to both internal and external forces within the international political arena, on the basis of their historical impressions, prejudices and national image of themselves and other nations. In short, historical experiences, by contributing to its identity, colour a nation's reaction to events and forces in the political system. They limit the foreign policy options of the political leadership and are filters for viewing international reality.

Turkey's security thinking is also coloured by the historical experiences of foreign intervention and economic dependency. As a result, the foreign relations of

Turkey, since Atatürk's time, have been dominated by concerns for genuine independence and sovereignty. In this sense, it is argued that although the Soviet threat after the Second World War persuaded Turkey to move away from its uncommitted posture to seek politico-military alliances, it was still sensitive to any real or implied infringements on its sovereignty.

In this historical background, one can trace the strong impacts of territorial loses and independence that led to the demise of the Ottoman empire. Although the Ottomans had been losing wars and territory to the Christian powers since 1699, the 1877-1878 Russo-Ottoman war over emerging Balkan nationalism, which Russia wanted to patronize, became another turning point in the evolution of Turkish security culture.

In this context, it is therefore obvious that the tradition of *realpolitik* was inherited from the Ottoman Empire. Karaosmanoglu (2000) notes that Turkey's security culture is characterised by a "defensive realpolitik"—that has emphasised balance of power diplomacy—as opposed to "offensive realpolitik"—which prevailed until the end of the 17th century and put stress on the maximisation of power through conquest. In this sense, "defensive realpolitik" is related to the fear of losing territories and thus independence. Some even argue this as "Sevres syndrome" (see Aydın, 1999, 2000, Bilgin, 2004 etc.).

From the establishment of the Republic until 1952 when the Republic joined NATO, military and diplomatic isolation of the state with two exceptions of short-lived alignments in 1914 and 1939 respectively meant being exposed to interest politics of Great Powers of the time due to its geo-strategic location. In this sense, the fear of abandonment and fear of loss of territory that became a major aspect of Turkish security culture in the Empire were inherited by the Republic. This is normal because although the state was changed, its geography and thus its geo-strategic standing did not change. Nor did the policies of other states over this geography and its surrounding.

With these structural determinants and their strong influence upon Turkey, it has been able to display a remarkable degree of continuity in its foreign policy, in

contrast to frequent internal changes. It is, to a large extent, due to these factors that Turkish foreign policy has been praised for its high degree of rationality, sense of responsibility, long term perspective, and realism found in few developing nations and far from universal even among the democracies of the West (see Aydın, 1999) .

Under the direct influence of these determinants, Turkish foreign policy in general and in security matters in particular seems to have shown two main characteristics in the phase of implementation, not to mention its westernist approach that is also part of the state identity.

The first is generally named as "internationalism" (see Çalış, 1996) . This term mainly refers to a policy of the state to act together with the international community, to seek the support and consent of the international community for its polices and to associate its polices in line with the internationally accepted principles of the international community. The reason for this policy can be argued by realists as the need to ensure the support of other, mainly powerful, states in the pursuit of its own policies and legitimating its polices with such support. However, constructivist can also consider this as the reflection of associating itself with the self, i.e. "international community", in the world, giving much emphasis on the value of cooperation in this regard.

Given its internationalist posture in foreign affairs, for example, Turkey did not only participate in international organisations such as the League of Nations and the UN, but also remained loyal to the decisions of the organisations and actively supported their efforts to achieve peace and cooperation in the World. Of course such an approach has required a non-revisionist and pro-status quo power, which has shaped Turkey's foreign policy. After the war of national independence, Turkey did try to solve its problems by peaceful means through international conferences within the framework of international organisations.

The second characteristic is the fact that in matters that are constructed by the state as dear to its survival such as territorial integrity, national security etc, it did not hesitate to act alone even without the support of the international community. The examples of such polices will be mentioned in the following chapters.

To sum up, Turkey's foreign policy was constructed on the maxim of Ataturk "peace at home, peace in the world". This led to a cautious foreign policy orientation (Mufti, 1998). However, this phrase should not be thought that peace oriented policy is necessarily to be altruistic and always passive. For the state, peace comes with deterrence and balance. Military strength was therefore at the core Turkey's quest for peace and stability. Consequently, the Turkish state presupposes that the peace and security is best served with Turkey's deterrence ability and its credible demonstration of force.

In this context, located in the epicentre of the most volatile regions of the world, i.e. the triangle of the Balkans, Caucasus and the Middle East, co-operation and joint actions that are the main components of partnership policies, have been the driving instruments for the Turkish foreign and security policies (see MFA web site, Foreign policy) .

This approach is the outcome of an understanding that Turkey's security in such conflict-ridden regions can be better preserved with promoting cooperation and joint action, be it bilateral or multilateral. In pursuance of these objectives, relations of good neighbourliness, non-expansionism, respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and reciprocity have become the guiding principles that help consolidate Turkey's security (see MFA web site, Foreign policy) .

i. INTER-WAR ERA

Turkish foreign policy in the 1920s and the 1930s can be summarised as follows: (1) Turkey refused to enter into any international alliances or to attend any international conferences on the basis of common religion due to the secular identity of the Turkish state. (2) Turkey repudiated all adventurist, imperial and irredentist policies. (3) Turkish decision makers put an end to historical enmity towards the West and tried to establish strong ties and friendship with the Western world. (4) They favoured the preservation of status quo in international relations and supported

all initiatives and efforts as much as possible, aiming to achieve regional and international cooperation (Çalış, 1996) .

In view of the foregoing, this era is generally argued to be the reflection of a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. It was true that Turkey followed a policy of neutrality till the end of World War II. However, the state did also attempt to form pacts with other states in its adjacent regions.

Pre-War Period:

From 1934 onwards Turkey had been convinced that the world had entered a pre-war period. In Turkey, the years between the Mousul crisis and 1934 were a period of introspection during which foreign policy had little relevance. Turkey was fully occupied in defining its national identity and had little time for outside distractions. The most efficient insulation was the best foreign policy. Turkey's policy, therefore, was defensive and sought to ensure Turkish security by avoiding foreign entanglements and by achieving workable agreements with neighbours in matters of local concern. Pact piled on pact, treaty of friendship on treaty of friendship, but these were little more than agreements that each would leave the other free to settle internal problems without disturbance.

By 1934, however, Turkey was beginning to follow a more active policy (see Brock, 1995). There is little doubt that this resulted from a quickening appreciation of external threats, and the appellation 'enemy' was applied to those nations considered a threat to Turkish security--and 'enemy' not in any abstract sense but as applied within the context of an international situation readily and universally identified as pre-war.

In this process Turkey promoted security cooperation with its neighbours and other friendly countries in the pre-war period between 1923-1939. Similarly, it also contributed to regional security cooperation at multilateral level. In this regard, Turkey initiated the establishment of the *Balkan Entente* which was signed in Athens on 9 February 1934. With this Agreement Turkey came together with Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia.   Similarly,   the *Saadabad Pact*, which was signed in Teheran, Iran on 8 July 1937 by Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan, was

spearheaded by Turkey. Both were aiming at cooperation and joint actions as appropriate to counter common security threats and at demonstrating the existence of solidarity among their members to deter such threats. Thus, they were the outcome of a need to enhance national security through collective security. The Balkan Entente was a response to security threats in the region deriving from the policies of revisionist states, particularly Albania and Bulgaria. The Saadabad Pact also was a product of similar threat perceptions in the region that derived from the revisionist policy of Italy.

These pacts can be interpreted by realists as the attempts of balance of power of Turkey in face of other states, by which Turkey felt threatened.

Constructivists, however, adds to this the need and search of creating a collective identity between Turkey and the likeminded countries around it. In this sense, these pacts should be seen as the first examples of collective security policy by the modern Turkey to create a self among its friends for their common security against the commonly defined other.

On the other hand, its internationalist posture also remained in tact in the foreign policy formulation of the state. During Turkey's war of liberation the League of Nations had the goal of destroying Ataturk's rebellion and dividing Turkish territory among the Western powers. However, once the Turks won the war they quickly forgave and spent the majority of the 1920's attempting to become a member of the League. This was in spite of the fact that in 1926 the League decided in favour of Iraq in a border dispute between Turkey and the British dominion of Iraq. The fact that the Turks coveted League membership after these two instances of opposition seems to confirm that it wanted to gain identification with the West by becoming a member of the League. This was summed up by a member of the Turkish assembly, who stated concerning Turkey's admission to the League, (see Stone, 2001) "The idea of the League of Nations is one which is held in great esteem by the Turkish Revolution and the Turkish Republic. We might almost say that it is one of our own ideas." (Speech by Tevfik Rustu Aras, 15 July 1931, in the Grand National Assembly).

In fact, the aforementioned policy behaviours, internationalism and forming pacts, were formulated as part of a common whole by the state. To cite an example, the programme of the government led by İnönü between 1935-37 referred to the Balkan Pact as an attempt for international peace on the one hand, reflecting the internationalist behaviour. It went on also stating that allies considered the security of each other as their own security, reflecting the importance of a common identity for collective security (see Girgin, 1998).

In this era, one can also trace the manifestation of the above fact that the state did not hesitate to act alone whenever considered necessary. This was the incorporation of Hatay into the republic through a plebiscite. Here, what is worth noting was that even in such issues considered dear to its territorial integrity and survival, Turkey acted alone but always in line with the principles of international law of the time, without resorting to war.

In plain terms, as argued (Stone, 2001), Atatürk wanted to raise the new Republic to the status of a 'contemporary civilisation' (Western) by establishing a nation-state of a nineteenth century and evolving twentieth-century European model: a European state, with its own traditions, trying to create a space for itself, and with a favourable position in the international society of states. A European state, most notably, shorn of any imperialistic leanings, particularly of the kind that Atatürk struggled against. A Turkish state no less, but shorn of any pan-Turkist or pan-Islamist leanings. Atatürk's nationalism was not expansive. On no occasion, after the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, not only did he insist on justified claims in Thrace and but he also refrained from laying claim to Arab countries. Neither did he settle remaining difficulties by force or *fait accompli*, (e.g. as in the case of the Straits or the Sanjak of Hatay), choosing instead a pragmatic attitude: negotiate later. This last point is significant to show the adherence to legality was one of the basic principles of Turkey's foreign policy.

In this period, one should also mention some acts of Atatürk in security matters that in fact reflect the utility of constructivist understanding to better account for the value of symbolism and speech acts in the security policy of Turkey that time. To cite examples, in these years awaiting the world war, one of historic

objectives of Mussolini's Italy was Antalya, a province on the Anatolian seaboard and so Turkey had cause for concern. To deter such plans of annexation in case of a war, Ataturk replied to Mussolini's speeches of threats   by making a tour of Turkey's Mediterranean coast on a destroyer with a military torpedo boat escort.

On another occasion, when Mussolini's ambassador mentioned Italy's claim to Antalya, Ataturk rose, excused himself, left the room and returned shortly thereafter in the uniform of a Turkish marshal. 'Now please continue', he invited the startled ambassador. Later he was to react to Italian claims with even less tact. 'Antalya is not in the pocket of your Ambassador in Italy', he scolded the Italian Ambassador. 'It is right here. Why don't you try to come and get it? I have a proposition to make to His Excellency and the Duce. We'll allow him to land Italian soldiers in Antalya. When the landing is complete, we'll have a battle, and the side who wins will have Antalya.' There was nothing for the frightened Italian to do but ask if he was to understand that this was a declaration of war (see Brock, 1995 for anecdotes) . Another story that is also attributed to Ataturk   in this regard is that one day as he received the Italian ambassador again, he pointed the map of Italy resembling a long boot, and hauled   "do not force me to put this boot on my feet".

All these clearly manifest that Ataturk was a man of great calibre who masterfully utilised symbolism and speech acts that strengthened the image and perception of Turkey as powerful and determined state in the eyes of the Mussolini's Italy. Yet, this great statesman could not win his last battle against illness in 1938. But his policy remained consistent as Turkey approached the world war.

World War II Period:

During World War II, Turkey followed its policy of neutrality absenting from the war. Here, the revisionist school yet portrays Turkish foreign policy as determined upon neutrality and the opportunist extraction of maximum material and economic benefit from whichever of the potential rivals seemed to be most susceptible to demands (Brock, 1995) .

This period is also named as "active neutrality" (see Bağcı, 2001a) . It is argued that given the strategic position of Turkey the government could not afford a simple neutrality as both sides of the war exerted heavy pressure on it to drag Turkey in to the war on their side. This policy of active neutrality was based on a balance policy in the sense that when one side of the war put too much pressure on Turkey this pressure was balanced by Turkey by strengthening its dialogue with the other side. This policy helped save the country from being pushed into the war, at the end of which Turkey nevertheless declared war against Third Reich and Japan for joining the United Nations.

ii. COLD WAR ERA

The aftermath of the end of World War II opened up a new era for Turkey of significant importance for its security and foreign policy.

Soviet Threat and Joining NATO:

As Bağcı (2001a) rightly notes, Turkey could manage to sustain its neutral position until the end of World War II. However, in the post-war period as a result of growing Soviet threat, providing security became the main concern of decision makers. This situation resulted in abolishing non-alignment policy inherited from Atatürk. Between 1947 and 1952, Turkey sent a brigade of the Turkish army to fight in the Korean War, joined the Council of Europe, and was included in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. In February 1952, Turkey became a full member of NATO, and in 1963, an associate member of the European Economic Community. Among all those developments membership to NATO made a profound change and has been a crucial factor in Turkish foreign policy even long after the end of Cold War .

In this era, the period till the 1960s, was particularly important for the security of Turkey. At the end of the War, Turkey once again underlined its attachment to internationalism and international peace. The programme of Saka government between 1947-48 stated the determination of the Turkish government to

work together with states of good intention in the UN in the pursuit of world peace and security (Girgin, 1998) .

In this period, the Soviet expansionism was increasingly securitized by Turkey just like other European states. In early 1945, the Soviet Union abrogated a friendship pact of 1925 with Turkey, demanded the return of the north-eastern districts of Kars and Ardahan, and that the straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles) should be jointly patrolled, meaning in effect the establishment of a Soviet naval base there. Turkey refused these demands, and President Ismet Inonu said, "We shall live with honour and die with honour" (Stone, 2001). At that time, the Kemalist tradition was strong; there was little hope that Turkey would accept the supplicant's terms. So Soviet pressure continued, and the West gave no hope of aid. Both sides wanted Turkey in the Western camp, but on the right terms. It was not till two years later, in March 1947, that the Truman Doctrine was announced, directed at Greece but with a supplement that the future independence of Turkey "is clearly no less important to the freedom-loving peoples of the world than the future of Greece" (Stone, 2001).

Under such conditions, Turkey sought the membership of the organisation set up by democratic European countries and the USA such as NATO.

In the aftermath of the Second World War, Turkey made its historic choice to be part of the free world in the face of Soviet expansionism. This was manifested with its membership in NATO in 18 February 1952. Since then, NATO has continued to be the cornerstone of Turkey's defence and security policy.

Even in the chilliest days of the Cold War Turkey always remained a staunch ally of NATO in a very volatile juncture facing directly the Eastern Block. In this period onwards, Turkey contributed significantly to the security of the Alliance and the Western Europe at the expense of great sacrifices. As the Alliance did, Turkey too endeavoured to help alleviate the tensions of East-West confrontation. While acting so, it remained firmly committed to the collective defence of the Alliance. Sharing the longest border with the former Soviet Union, throughout the Cold War

era Turkey was responsible for defending one-third of the Alliance's land frontiers against the Warsaw Pact.

However joining the Alliance was not easy (see Bağcı, 2001a, and Saray, 2000). The initiation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949 represented an opportunity for the Turks to become more closely identified with the West. It was clear that the Turks saw NATO membership as a symbol of membership in the Western community. After Turkey was denied full membership in its initial bid for entry there was considerable disappointment reflecting Turkish concerns about its standing in the West.

As discussed by Bagcı (2001a) in his book, when it was not invited to join NATO at its inception that was a shock for Turkey, the Turkish government sought alternatives to ensure its security at the regional level through collective security initiatives. The idea of a Mediterranean pact was the product of such a conjuncture. Similarly, this approach found its reflection on the government programmes. In the first Menderes government programme, there were mentions of new opening of the Turkish foreign policy like Mediterranean and the near East (Girgin, 1998).

Naturally, these attempts can be considered to be motivated by realist concerns such as demonstrating the value of Turkey for the common security of the Western world in its adjacent regions and thus increasing its visibility in the eyes of its Westerns friends, most particularly that of the US government. Yet, apart from this instrumental motives, such initiatives can also be seen as part of the searches for common identity in collective security in the light of the constructivist understanding.

With the advent of the Korean War the Turks were again given an opportunity to prove their value to an international organization, the UN. The Turkish government's decision to join the American led UN effort to turn back Communist aggression in Korea has widely been understood as being motivated by the Turkish presumption that Turkish participation would enhance Turkey's bid for NATO membership. For example, Prime Minister Menderes immediately sent troops

to participate in the UN forces, finding a way to circumvent the normally slow parliamentary procedures necessary to mobilize military forces.

Notwithstanding its "real" intention, Turkey's participation in the UN military force to fight in the Korean war changed the course of the events in this regard. Sending Turkish troops to Korea is note worthy in many aspects as follows:

First, it was the first time that Turkey deployed its troops outside its borders.

Second, notwithstanding the realist motives behind such a decision, this deployment was also important in the sense that it was the first example of contributing to the creation of a *self* by military means for collective security against a commonly constructed other.

Third, it also reflected the internationalist approach of Turkey. It is because the deployment was carried put in response to the call of the UN Security Council to help the South Korean republic.

Last but not least, following the success of Turkey in this collective security engagement, it was invited to NATO. Notwithstanding the argument whether the sending its soldiers to Korea was a precondition to join NATO or the Turkish government sent troops to convince the members of NATO of its value for collective security, in the aftermath of the Korean war, Turkey became the member of NATO in 1952.

As mentioned above, this period was of great significance for Turkey's collective security policies in history. In fact, the term "collective security" was for the first time used in the government's programme (II. Menderes government between 1951 and 1954) with the Korean war and then continued with the membership of NATO till the present time (Girgin, 1998).

The period ahead after joining NATO witnessed an intensive process of collective identity formation of Turkey with its allies in the face of their common other, the Soviet Bloc.

This period also attested to the collective security policies of Turkey at the regional level (Bağcı, 2001a; Hale, 2000, Oran, 2001 etc.). In parallel to its membership in the Alliance, Turkey also continued its traditional security policies based on the promotion of cooperation and joint action in its adjacent regions. In this context, Turkey initiated security cooperation both in the Balkans and the Middle East. The Balkan Pact of 1954 with again Greece and Yugoslavia and the Baghdad Pact [later known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO)], of 1955 with Britain, Iran, Iraq and Pakistan were the concrete results of these initiatives aimed at the consolidation of security in these regions. The Balkan Pact and the Baghdad Pact, which were established respectively in Yugoslavia on 9 August 1954, and in Baghdad on 4 February 1955, were the results of the efforts by Turkey to reinvigorate security partnership in these region to counter commonly perceived security threats. However, this time the threat was coming from the Soviet expansionism.

Even if these pacts were formed outside NATO, Turkey always underlined the importance of these pacts for collective security for its allies in NATO. As argued, these pacts were aimed also to form a chain of security together with NATO to contain the common other of the time, i.e. the Soviet Bloc (see Bağcı, 2001a) .

Similar policies of creating or initiating such organisations in its adjacent regions with a view to articulating them to western organizations such NATO or EU have also been witnessed in the Post-Cold War era. Thus, this shows the permanent posture of the Turkish foreign policy in this regard.

Johnson Letter and its aftermath:

However, with the emergence of the Cyprus problem, from the 19502 onwards it became obvious that Turkey's interests were not always necessarily identical to those of the Western countries. Parallel with the development of the detente process between East and West, Turkey also began to feel itself isolated in international politics. This feeling was exacerbated when Greece succeeded in the internationalisation of the Cyprus problem in the 1960s. Turkey seemed to enter a

period of being alienated from the West. Indeed, Turkey experienced a very difficult period between 1960-1980 during which such issues appeared as the 1964 Cyprus crisis, the Johnson letter, the opium ban, the 1974 Cyprus intervention and the American Embargo imposed after the said intervention. During the same period, Turkey's bilateral problems with the US and Greece in particular worsened considerably. On the other hand, Turkey established more balanced relations with the Muslim countries, the Third World and the Soviet Union.

Frustrated by America's and NATO's neutrality on Cyprus; faced with public outcry at home; and fuelled by the Cypriot parliament decision of June 1964 to establish general conscription for the Greek Cypriot defence forces, Inönü's government informed its allies that Turkey had decided on unilateral intervention. The American response was the now infamous Johnson letter of 1964, which was described by İnönü in his reply as 'disappointing' both in wording and content' [10].

The contents of the letter, which was not made public until 1966 but nevertheless partially leaked to the press, was shocking for many Turks who then came to the conclusion that Turkey could not rely on its allies unconditionally. In the letter Johnson warned Turkey that its 'NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO Allies'. He further reminded that 'the United States can not agree to the use of any US supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances' (see Aydın, 2000).

The second part of the letter, which was to play a most important role nearly ten years later, passed more or less unnoticed. The questioning of NATO support, however, as İnönü's reply reflected, created great concern among Turks and forced them to rethink the reliability and trustworthiness of the alliance with the West. They realized, as İnönü put in his reply to Johnson, that 'there are ... wide divergence of views' between Turkey and the United States as to the nature and basic principles of the North Atlantic Alliance'. In Turkish understanding, the NATO Treaty 'imposes upon all member states the obligation to come forthwith to the assistance of any member victim of an aggression' unconditionally, and to debate the issue of 'whether

aggression was provoked' and 'whether they have an obligation to assist' would jeopardize 'the very foundation of the Alliance ... and it would lose its meaning'. They further realized that the national interests of Turkey were no longer identical with those of the United States or the Western alliance.

This letter that was even criticized by the then US Deputy State Secretary George Bal as " the most rude diplomatic text he has ever seen" (see Çalış, 1996) , later coupled with the changing strategy of NATO from massive retaliation to flexible response, contributed to the construction of a further insecurity of Turkey bordering the common other.

Soviet development of thermo-nuclear weapons in the 1960s had necessitated a rethinking of the concept of 'massive retaliation', whereby an attack on an American ally would elicit an automatic nuclear strike against the aggressor. The United States thus opted for a strategy of 'flexible response' which did not entail an automatic nuclear response. In light of previous American actions surrounding Cuba and Cyprus, this new strategy doubtfully created great concern in Turkey.

This has led to several ramifications on Turkey's foreign and security policy:

One of the major changes in Turkish foreign policy in the late 1960s was the rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Although there had been a movement towards rapprochement with the Soviets as early as 1959 because of economic needs, as generally argued, the real thaw in Turkish-Soviet relations started after 1964 and was undoubtedly influenced by American actions during the Cyprus crisis.

Moreover, in an attempt to seek new partners and areas in line with balance of power motives, Turkey adopted a multi-dimensional foreign policy, through which its relations were enhanced with countries other than its western allies, including the USSR. Although such regions as Africa, Far-East and Latin America that were always paid less or no attention till then were first mentioned in the government's programme in 1960, such references were always kept in all governments programmes since the Johnson letter (Girgin, 1998) .

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Nevertheless, given the harsh realities of the Cold War and the balance of terror, these policies of Turkey did not lead to a change of strategy but worked only for tactical purposes. Its westernist attitude was always preserved with such additional openings paving the way for forming new identities regarding new areas.

Another impact of the frustration due to the Johnson letter can be argued as the understanding mainly in the Turkish military to focus on national sources to develop more independent military structure and capability. This new orientation in fact helped Turkey to render it possible to carry out the peace operation in Cyprus as the guarantor power in 1974. This military operation shows also another manifestation of the fact that Turkey does not hesitate to act alone in matters directly related to its own security and survival at the expense of its internationalist policy. Yet, like in the interwar era, by using its rights as guarantor power as stated in the Treaty of Guarantee, Turkey acted alone but in conformity of international law.

The 1974 operation was also significant in the following constructivist aspect. Although Cyprus was important for the security of Turkey for strategic reasons, it was also valued for such factors as a national and linguistic and even religious affinity between the motherland Turkey and the Cypriot Turks. In other words, it showed the importance of such ideational factors as those aforementioned in the identity of the foreign and security policy (Adamson, 2001).

The period that followed the peace operation was not easy for Turkey, with arms embargoes on the one hand, international conflicts exacerbated by terrorism and the domestic difficulties on the other hand. Later, this difficulty was even coupled with the negative avis of the EC commission for the membership of Turkey albeit acknowledging its eligibility for such membership. Under the ordeals of this period, scholars even argued that all these developments led to the first identity crisis of important size as the world came to the end of the Cold War.

In light of the review of this era as discussed above, the following can generally be said about the state in the Cold War:

The strategic culture of Turkey has been "defensive realpolitik". In other words, Turkey's defence policy is oriented to "defensive realpolitik" and it has been identified with the aim of maintaining and preserving the country's independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and its vital interests. This strategic culture is also related with its identity defined in terms of territoriality and constitutional rights. Thus, Turkey has special importance to protect its territories and constitutional order against internal and external threats. Turkey's domestic institutional structure and political culture makes the civilian and military wings of the state as the most determining forces in foreign and security policies, the organizational culture of these bureaucracies shape the strategic culture. Given the past experiences and present realities they think in terms of geopolitics.

Out of such a portrayal, it can also be argued that Turkish strategic culture falls into the mixture of accommodationist and defensive grand strategies arising out of its political goal of status quo. Alastair Iain Johnston (see Çalış, 1996) proposes three ideal types of grand strategies: *Accommodationist, defensive* and *offensive/expansionist*. Accommodationist strategy relies primarily on diplomacy, political trading, economic incentives, bandwagoning, and balancing alliance behavior, among other low-coercion policies. Security is achieved primarily through informal and formal alliance building, or uni-, bi-, or multilateral concessions. Accommodationist strategies imply that the ends of policy, while not necessarily well defined, exclude the physical and political elimination of the adversary and the annexation of its territory. Defensive strategy is more coercive in nature than an accommodationist strategy. It relies primarily on static defence along an external boundary. The use of force is not designed to annex territory or to destroy the political leadership or structures of the enemy state. Security is supplied primarily through the internal mobilization of resources for military purposes rather than through alliance building. Defensive grand strategies imply that the ends of policy are not, at that moment, expansionist or annexationist. This category captures the notion of deterrence through denial or limited punishment.

Having mentioned the strategic culture of Turkey shaping its foreign and security policy, the general characteristics of the Turkish foreign and security policy as witnessed in this era can be summarized as follows:

During some 50 years of the existence of the Republic of Turkey from 1923 to the late 1980s, one can distinguish at least three different periods which could be identified with their distinct patterns in the country's foreign policy attitudes. The inter-war period under the leadership of Atatürk and İnönü was westernist in its inclination but strongly guarding against any intimation that its independence, either economically or militarily, might be jeopardized. The second period from 1945 to the late 1960s, during which Turkey's westernist policy was never questioned, was followed by a period of disillusionment with the West, late detente with the Soviet bloc and rapprochement efforts with the Third World (1960-70). The 1970s, in addition, saw a pattern of alienation from the West aggravated by the Cyprus crisis of 1974, which in turn showed Turkey the cumulative result of the foreign policy it had been following since the end of the Second World War: loneliness in the international arena. Hence, the 1970s witnessed Turkey's efforts to come back to the international arena through a multi-dimensional foreign policy to the possible extent under the constraints of the bipolar world.

As argued, the Cold War was an era of "survival". The Cold War also meant to be an era of alliances and the end of neutrality for Turkey.

Under these necessities of the bipolar world run by the balance of terror due the proliferation nuclear weapons, the state had no other alternative but to follow a realist policy. Even the governments' programmes confirmed this realist policy . In this regard, as early as in 1971, in the I. Erim government, the Turkish Foreign policy was named overtly as "realist" (see Girgin, 1998). This reference was repeated in the programme of II. Demirel government in 1979-80. The realist posture of the Turkish foreign policy was even evident at the end of the Cold War era. The words of the then Foreign Minister of Turkey in December 1990 attests to this fact: "Realism is a must in foreign policy. One of the main pillars of Turkish foreign policy is realism. It is a lesson of history that those states distancing themselves from realism always faced sorrow and disappointment in the end" (see Girgin, 1998).

Despite all these difficulties mentioned above with its allies, Turkey's foreign policy was able to remain western oriented in essence, because the state successfully uncoupled its bilateral problems from its position in the Western world. For example, despite its bilateral problems with the US, Turkey never thought of protesting against NATO's operations, or leaving NATO's military wing, let alone withdrawing from this organisation as a whole. In a similar way, although Turkey developed closer relations with the Muslim World, Ankara yet always paid special attention to secularism, and never considered the establishment of an Islamic pact. Despite the Soviet Union's tremendous efforts and economic supports, Turkey did not give any political concession either.

Thus, this era witnessed the continuation of its Westernist policy. It is true that Turkey's attempts to align itself with the West did not start with the Cold War. In this era, alignment with the Western world was not only due to Turkey's quest for modernisation. It was also necessitated by security concerns deriving from the conditions of the Cold War. In other words, in this westernist policy not only ideational but also material factors were influential. In fact, it is obvious that as a global factor the Cold War in particular both urged and facilitated its integration with the Western world. The Cold War urged the integration, because Turkey had to find a place, in order to protect itself from the Soviet threat. The Cold War facilitated Turkey's integration with the West, because the global confrontation unprecedentedly increased Turkey's geopolitical importance. In this process, the Soviet threat was important for Turkey to seek solidarity with European countries and those western organisations that were established after World War II.

Realists can argue this as a rational policy for Turkey as it had not so much options in this era due to severe security concerns of the bipolar world. Yet, constructivist explanation can add that Turkey's policy not to question its Western allies was also motivated by its Western identity. In this regard, as argued, throughout the Cold War, NATO was represented as the bastion of 'Western' identity in Turkey (Bilgin, 2003).

Nevertheless, on the other hand, there are also arguments that Cold War participation served no Turkish interest. It jeopardised security since Turkey was the

NATO member with the longest common frontier with the Soviet Union; and this led, at a later stage, to suspicion among its non-aligned Arab neighbours (Khosla, 2001).

Moreover, Turkey's western stance was even criticized as its denying of its origins. In the Ottoman period, the Turks were the representatives of the Eastern world (Islam) in the West. But since the establishment of the Republic, according to these critics, the Turks have been trying to be the representative of the West, in other words, the representatives of the Western values in the East. As a result of such a westernist understanding, Turkey joined the creation of Baghdad Pact in the 1950s, abstained in voting for the independence of Algeria and Tunisia in the 1960s, behaved together with the Western world in the works of the UN, defended the Western Block in the Bandung Conference and rejected the idea of Third worldism (Çalış, 1996).

To these critics, two response can be given. First, as explained above, Turkey had to act with not much policy options under the constraints of the bi-polar world where the balance of terror ruled due the fear of nuclear wars.

Second, all these that were portrayed as clashes with its historical identity of Turkey as argued above, can be seen on the contrary as siding with the international community as part of its traditional internationalist posture. This internationalism continued despite the fact that for reasons of its security and also ideational affinity, in certain cases Turkey did not hesitate to act alone albeit always in line with international law.

As in the case of the Cyprus problem, when the Turkish state felt that Turkey's security was in danger, it even acted against the Western countries' will. Despite the pressure of many western countries and organisations, Turkey did not give up its own plans about Cyprus. Indeed, westernism has not meant to be a total submission to the West in the case of modern Turkish foreign policy (Çalış, 1996). To the extent Turkey became disillusioned over its Western allies, it has diversified and opened up foreign policy options to new regions and states, yet under the

constraints of the bipolar world. This growing multi-dimensional foreign policy in fact   contributed to the formation of new identities in foreign policy.

In this period, the identity of foreign and security policy was heavily dominated by material factors (existence of military threats and nuclear weapons) and realist concerns(survival, territorial integrity)   rather than ideational ones (common ties based on ethnicity, language or religion).

In this context, one can see a gradual increase in its insecurity perception as constructed by the state. In addition to the Soviet threat, the attitudes of its allies as manifested in the Johnson   letter and the change of the NATO strategy to flexible response, coupled with internal terrorism   further aggravated the construction of insecurity of the state.

All these security concerns found their reflection in state's discourses. For example, as to terrorism, for the first time in 1972 in the Melen government (see Girgin, 1998), foreign countries were warned not to intervene the internal affairs of Turkey through subversive acts of terrorism.

To cite another important development in this regard,   as the world was approaching the end of the Cold War, the Ministry of National Defence together with the Turkish General Staff issued an official book in 1987 in the format of "White Paper" for the first time in the history of Turkey . This document seems to be of particular importance for the following aspects:

The book stressed that "in the world being transformed, security concerns gain priority for states" (White Paper 1987).   This shows the existence of the consciousness in the state about the changing conditions of the world on the eve of a new era. In fact, the book can be seen as the product of a need perceived by the military to respond to the changes and challenges in that period that would soon lead to the end of the Cold War.

Despite this perception, as the book shows, there was no mention of a national security policy formulated therein. The priority was still on defence rather

than security in general. Thus, the book only mentions of the defence policy of Turkey. Corollary to this understanding, NATO was underlined as the main pillar of the Turkish defence policy.

Another interesting reference in the book was terrorism. This scourge was mentioned as a threat to general peace in the world. By this one can see that Turkey was embarking on its struggle to convince its allies for cooperation against terrorism that its was fighting so long. In fact, these two references, NATO and cooperation against terrorism, would have then remained in tact in the following up-dates of this book in the post-Cold War era (Bilgin, 2004) .

During the Cold War all these discussed above helped constitute a security culture that is realist. Realist assumptions have shown the representations of Turkey as a 'country besieged by internal and external enemies' and provided justification for the 'security rationale' used by the state to shape foreign policies in the post-Cold War era.

In this period, this particular reading of Cold War history considers Turkey's military capability and geopolitical location (i.e. the 'military/ security card') as the most significant assets that helped the country join NATO and establish its 'Western' credentials. It is argued that the 'military/security card' has reaffirmed the country's Western identity. To cite an example, indeed, this card is considered to have played a major part in convincing the otherwise reluctant founders of NATO to admit Turkey into the organization in 1952. Turkey's enthusiastic participation in the Korean intervention was intended to present Turkey as a 'dependable' ally and a crucial part of the US-led collective security effort, thereby strengthening Turkey's chances of being accepted as a NATO member (Bilgin, 2003, 347)

On the other hand, from a different angle one can also argue that Turkey's contribution to security in Europe helped to secure the Western identity through its security policies during the Cold War. Thus its contribution to security was not limited to its military capability and geographical location. In this sense, to give the same example, Turkey's participation in the Korean War was instrumental in its joining NATO not only because of Turkish military contributions to the war effort

but also because Turkey helped to constitute the West and strengthen Western solidarity at a time when these were rather fragile. (Bilgin, 2003, 348)

To sum up, then, perhaps the best summary that can explain the perceptions of the state about the international developments in the Cold War era, and thus the construction of foreign and security policy of Turkey under such perceptions is the following words: "Cold War was a peace based on fear and insecurity". This was said by the then Foreign Minister of Turkey, H.E. Hikmet Çetin, who presented the budget of his Ministry to the Parliament in 1992 (MFA Budget speech 1992). Thus, it was under such perception and construction of the world that Turkey entered into a new era as the Cold War came to an end in 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell down.

NOTES

[1] See for example KEDEOUIRE, E. (1970) ed., *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, Frank Cass and Comp.Ltd, 49; See also SMITH, A.D. (1986), *The Ethnic Origins of Nations,* Oxford: Blackwell, 143. Similarly, see quotation from the book "Impressions of Turkey (London: n.p., 1897) by Walter M.Ramsay, in LEWIS, Bernard (1961), *The Emergence of Modern Turkey,* London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, .327 and the quotation from the book "LaTurquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant quarante ans", Paris: n.p., 1898 by Arminius Vambery, in GEORGEON, François (1999), *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, trans. Alev Er Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı YurtYayınları, 10. *Both are quoted from* YANIK, Lerna K. (2002), Brothers Apart? The Role Of Ethnic Affiliation In The Making Of Turkish Foreign Relations, PhD Thesis, Georgetown University, December 4,2002.

[2] Sir Walter M. Ramsay, Impressions of Turkey (London: n.p., 1897), 99 quoted in Bernard Lewis*, The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1961), 327.

[3] "LaTurquie d'aujourd'hui et d'avant quarante ans", Paris: n.p., 1898 by Arminius Vambery, in GEORGEON, François (1999), *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri: Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, trans. Alev Er Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı YurtYayınları, .10. *Both are quoted from* YANIK, Lerna K. (2002), Brothers Apart? The Role Of Ethnic Affiliation In The Making Of Turkish Foreign Relations, unpublished PhD Thesis, Georgetown University, December 4,2002. See also ÖKE, Mim Kemal (1983*), İngiliz Casusu Prof. Arminius Vambery'nin gizli raporlarında II. Abdulhamit ve Dönemi*, İstanbul: Üçdal Neşriyat.,

[4] See, for an extensive summary of such literature, YURDUSEV, A. N. (1997), "Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği", in A. Eralp ed. *Türkiye ve Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi and also DELANTY, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, reality,* Basingstoke: Mac Millan, 1995.

[5] See for good summaries on the emergence of Turkish national identity in the Ottoman empire onwards, CALIS, Şaban (1996), The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham; YANIK, Lerna K. (2002), Brothers Apart? The Role Of Ethnic Affiliation In The Making Of Turkish Foreign Relations, unpublished PhD Thesis, Georgetown University, December 4,2002 and also ULUSOY, H. (2001), *Co-Habitation Of Non-National Identities With The National Identity In A Democratic Unitary State: Turkish Case*, (unpublished article).

[6] See for example ANDREWS, P.A. (1992), *Türkiye'de Etnik Gruplar* (translated from "Ethnic Groups in the Republic of Turkey"), Istanbul: Ant Yayınları and YALÇIN-HECKMAN, L. , "Türkiye'de Etnik Gruplar" in Hürriyet (Turkish Daily Newspaper), 6/5/1991.

[7] See for example ONDER, D.T.(1999), *Türkiye'nin Etnik Yapısı,* Ankara: Bilim ve Sanat Dağıtım.

[8] For the importance of secularism and the religion on the foreign policy of Turkey see for example DAGI, I. (2003), "Islamic Political Identity in Turkey: Rethinking the West and Westernization", http://www.policy.hu/dagi/project.htm ; HOWE, Marvine (1998), " TALKING TURKEY: The Islamist Agenda in Turkey; Democracy", The Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, Washington: Nov 30, 1998, 17(7) : 18 ; NARLI, Nilufer (1999), "The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey", Middle East Review of International Affairs, 3(3): 38-48; ROBINS, P. (1997), " Turkish foreign policy under Erbakan", *Survival*, 39(2) Summer: 82-100.

[9] For useful reviews see for example AYDIN, Mustafa (1999), "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: Historical framework and traditional inputs", Middle Eastern Studies, 35(4): 152-186; BILGIN, P. (2004), "Clash of Culture? Differences Between Turkey and the European Union on Security", in A. Karaosmanoğlu and S. Taşhan (ed) The Europeanization of Turkish Foreign policy: Prospects and Pitfalls, Ankara, Foreign Policy Institute:25-46; CALIS, Şaban (1996), The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham; KHOSLA ,I. P. (2001), " Turkey: The Search for a Role", Strategic Analysis, 15(3) June and STONE, Leonard . (2001), "Turkish Foreign Policy. Four Pillars of Tradition", Perceptions, 6(2) June-July:

[10] For the review of developments in this period of Cold War see for example ADAMSON, Fiona B. (2001), "Democratisation and the Domestic Sources of Foreign policy: Turkey in the 1874 Cyprus Crisis", Political Science Quarterly, 116(2) Summer: 227-.; AYDIN, M. (2000), "Determinants of Turkish foreign policy: Changing patterns and conjunctures during the Cold War", Middle Eastern Studies, 36(1): 103-139; CALIS, Şaban (1996), The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy, unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham; HALE, William (2000) Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000, London: Frank Cass Publishers and ORAN, Baskın (ed) (2001), Türk Dış Politikası I&II, İstanbul: İletişim.

CHAPTER 5

EXAMINATION OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA IN TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

A. CONSTRUCTIVIST ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN TURKISH FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

i. CONSEQUENCES OF THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War has inevitably had ramifications on Turkey and its foreign and security policy. Given the fact that,   in less than 15 years, the post-Cold War period has witnessed many developments not only in the world affairs, but also, corollary to this, in the Turkish foreign and security policy,   the focus here will be only on those   that are considered to be particularly relevant   for the constructivist analysis of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

Apart from structural determinants,   which are mentioned in the preceding chapter to have shaped the Turkish foreign and security policy,   conjunctural factors, i.e. the results of international and domestic changes over the years, have also helped to shape Turkey's contemporary foreign policy. Due to their dynamic and changeable character, however, they exerted a temporary influence on the country's foreign policy, especially on its implementation. But due to these factors, Turkey's foreign policy has undergone some rapid changes in its implementation, even if no major deviations have occurred in the ultimate national goals. These factors have modified the foreign policy of Turkey through the years to establish a better defined and more relevant foreign policy to meet the requirements of the contemporary world.

Among them is the Cold War's end, stated by Aydın (2000), as the most important development in Turkish foreign policy.

The Berlin wall fell down in October 1989. And a year later the Cold war came to an end formally as NATO and Warsaw pact countries declared that they did not see one another as adversaries any longer by signing the Paris Charter. Yet, as conventional security threats seemed to be fading away thanks to the collapse of the Warsaw pact and the Soviet Bloc, a couple of months later the Gulf war erupted following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq by leading to a new era of insecurity and threats. These tremendous and fast changes in the world order were difficult to cope with for any state by any standard.

Need for regaining visibility

Although having been long regarded as the last frontier of the Western alliance against the common other the Soviet Bloc, for Turkey the end of the bipolar world with the disintegration of the USSR and the collapse of the Warsaw pact led to conclusions that its importance and strategic value for the Western world in particular faded away to a great extent.

In this context, for example, the European Community's negative reply in 1989 to the full membership application of Turkey was even argued to be the signal of such diminishing importance of Turkey (Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003).

When this picture was captured by some analysts who took into account the sentimental declarations of Turkish politicians concerning Turkey's potential estrangement from the West, a quick diagnosis was made: Turkey is in an identity crisis. In May 1990, The Economist for example wrote "downgraded in one western club [NATO], excluded from another [EC]: no wonder many Turks feel affronted; and are wondering where they really belong" (Çalış, 1996).

According to Bozdaglioglu (2003,19), the end of the Cold War resulted in an identity crisis in Turkey that the country did not have a clearly defined role anymore. Yet, on the other hand, after defining its role as a country on the western camp to contain Soviet expansion for almost half a century, the end of Cold War, reducing geopolitical importance of Turkey, created also a search for a new role in foreign policy (Aybet, 1994,15).

In this context, it is argued that

> the drastic changes involved implied the downgrading of the geo-strategic importance that Turkey had enjoyed during the Cold War as an integral component of the NATO alliance, with a corresponding decline in the likelihood of its becoming a full member of the European Union. The immediate implications seemed to be increased isolation and insecurity (Khosla, 2001).

This naturally brought up an increasingly felt need for visibility by Turkey in the world affairs. The concern for such visibility is of particular importance for states as it always helps shape the image of one state in the eyes of other states. In other words, according to the constructivist understanding the construction of Turkey's image in the eyes of other states was heavily subjected to the visibility of Turkey.

New Horizons

Beside this negative effect of the end of the Cold War, it did also nevertheless open up new horizons for countries including Turkey in the field of international politics and economics. In other words, as the constraints of the bipolar world stemming from the fear of nuclear war diminished considerably, policy options ostensibly increased with the emergence of newly independent countries in the regions adjacent to Turkey in the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Central Asia.

Within this short span of time, the formulations of the state in its foreign policy as a reaction to these drastic changes in the world order seem in fact to have corresponded to these two needs of Turkey, i. e. the need for the maintenance and even

increase of its visibility in the world scene and the need for opening up to the new world.

To cite an example, the budget speech of Turkish Foreign Minister Mesut Yılmaz   for the year 1990 (MFA Budget Speech, 1989) that was delivered in March 1989 at the Parliament, sought to underline the continuing importance of the state at the time, with the following words: " Turkey's strategic importance and value have not diminished… Its geo-strategic importance continues to be intact thanks to   its geographical position…". He also alluded to a formulation of new policy that "Turkey will play roles in the transformation in the region… the era of normalisation enables NATO allies with more freedom of manoeuvre in this regard." He further stressed that " Turkish foreign policy has managed since 1983 to develop a multi dimensional network of relations not only with the West, but also the East and the Middle East and contributed to peace, security and cooperation…" Similar wordings were used in the following year's budget speech as well. All these clearly show that the Turkish state was aware of the conditions prevalent as the Cold War came to an end.

Emergence of new security threats

Similarly, the emergence of new security threats and risks of mainly asymmetric nature directly affected Turkey in many aspects. These threats causing instability not only in Europe but also in the surrounding regions of Turkey aggravated the security concerns of the country.

In fact, already on the eve of the demise of the Cold War, Turkey was aware of the security implications of the coming era thanks to the foresight of the institutions such as the Foreign Ministry and the General Staff. The government programme for the period of 1989-1991 attests to this fact . In the programme, the Turkish government underlined its determination to establish a new belt of peace and cooperation in the surrounding of the state starting from its neighbours. As early as 1991, Turkish Foreign Minister Sefa Giray acknowledged that " Turkey needs to make a new threat evaluation

under the present circumstances" (MFA Yearbook 1991). He also for the first time mentioned of "new risks" in MFA discourses referring to the Gulf crisis at his speech before the UN General assembly in September 1991 (MFA Yearbook 1991).

All these developments seem to have led to two basic outcomes in the formulation of the foreign and security policy in Turkey. They can be classified as follows[1]:

a) Growing perception of insecurity and securitization of issues in the foreign and security policy.

b)Transformation of the foreign policy from defensive reflexes to an active politics.

The government programmes in the early period of the post-Cold War era do clearly reflect these points. As early as in 1991 the Turkish government pronounced its priority to follow an active policy in all fields particularly for security. The government programme for 1991-93 furthermore spelt out for the first time "new threats" and "insecurity". Similarly, the term " internal security" and its relevance for foreign and security policy were also mentioned for the first time in the same government's programme (Girgin, 1998).

The world order at the end of the Cold War and how it was perceived by Turkey as already mentioned is described in the MFA web site as follows:

> The dramatic changes that occurred in Europe in the late 1980's and early 1990's, that is the collapse of totalitarian regimes, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the emergence of new independent states, the reunification of Germany, and the spread of pluralist democracy and free market economies, brought the East-West rivalry and the bipolar system to an end. At the same time, the world witnessed the emergence of new threats to security, such as ethnic nationalism, xenophobia, irredentism, religious fundamentalism and international terrorism, giving rise to regional instability and conflicts, and casting a shadow over the initial optimism engendered by the prospects for a new peaceful era (MFA Web site, Foreign Policy synopsis, 2005).

This clearly reflects the mindset of the state as to the general situation prevalent in that period.

a. Gulf War: Insecurity and Securitization

As to the growing perception of insecurity and thus securitization of issues by the state, in this period, the Gulf war that erupted in 1991 is of particular importance for the thesis as it has led to several implications for the collective security policy of Turkey in particular and the foreign and security policy in general[2].

In the Cold War, Turkey's policy toward the Middle East was characterized by non-interference and a certain lack of interest. Together with the European allies Ankara opposed the American idea of extending NATO's area of responsibility to the Middle East and Persian Gulf region (Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, 17).

Although it was generally argued as the first manifestation of an active policy even leading to adventurism, the policy of Turkey in the Gulf War was in fact in line with its internationalist approach. It was because only after the resolution of the UN Security Council in this regard, Turkey joined the sanctions against the Saddam regime in Iraq in the face of its occupation of Kuwait. To cite an example in this regard, the Turkish Foreign Minister on the eve of the military operation against Iraq   underlined at his speech before the UN General Assembly in September 1990 that "Turkey attached utmost importance to the decisions of the   UN Security Council on Iraq"   (MFA Yearbook 1990).

Turkey's policy in this period was criticized as adventurist. Yet, as can be seen above, Turkey indeed acted in line with the UN Security Council decisions and thus international community. It is obvious that after the war Turkey had to bear bigger problems in terms of its security and economy due to the consequences of the war. Nevertheless, as argued by Gözen (2004) and others, it was unlikely to expect that a policy of neutrality would be possible for Turkey or that such policy would cause less

damages to Turkey. Thus, the policy followed by Turkey was with no alternative under the prevailing realities and conditions.

Yet, this policy did not go far to send Turkish troops to outside its borders. Following the mandate obtained from the Parliament the Government announced that "Turkish armed forces would not undertake any operations against Iraq unless attacked by the country" (MFA Yearbook 1991) This was the clause of self-defence. Yet, Turkey opened otherwise its bases to its allies undertaking military operation in Iraq. Moreover, the allied mobile force (AMF) of NATO and patriots anti-missiles were deployed upon the invitation of the Government along its border with Iraq to deter any aggression from the Saddam's regime during the war. Such deployment marked a new development in the security and foreign policy and the implementation of Turkey's security polices in the era.

Nevertheless, the Gulf war and its aftermath have seemingly contributed to the new thinking of strategy in the Turkish military towards such collective security operations (Güvenç, 1998, 142). For example, from 1991 to 1993 the Turkish army was restructured   towards a more mobile and flexible units for the purposes of rapid deployments outside the borders.

As generally argued the most important implication of the war for Turkey's security policy in particular was the securitization of the Middle East for Turkey's security perceptions as threat number one in the years that followed.   This was also note worthy for the constructivist analysis of Turkey's foreign and security policy.

Moreover, despite contrary arguments, it is accepted that this policy of Turkey was in fact inevitable and inescapable under the prevailing circumstances for a country like Turkey that always act in line with its realist tradition and rational understanding.

Turkey's relations with the Middle East have been heavily influenced by the historical experiences, geopolitical considerations and ideological factors. Most of what

is the Middle East today was part of the Ottoman Empire. It is argued that located at the crossroads of two continents and as a Mediterranean power Turkey, like its predecessors, has been interested in the region for its security concerns. While the persistent instability in the Middle East increased Turkey's strategic value for the Western alliance, it also led to Turkey's reluctance to get involved in the region. The combined impact of those two forces affected Turkey's relations with the area. Finally, Turkey's membership in the Western camp and its project of Westernization led to a polarization between Turkey and the Middle East. At the same time Turkey's European vocation rendered the Middle East into a less important regional identity for Turkey (Altunışık, 2004).

The developments in the Middle-East since the end of the Cold War exacerbated Turkey's security concerns. As a result of this increased sense of threat from the Middle East, early 1990s witnessed the "securitization" of Turkey's foreign policy towards the region. This general sense of insecurity in the 1990s was increasingly reflected in Turkey's policy towards the Middle East since this region was seen as a major source of threats to Turkey. Particularly, the disillusionment with post-Gulf War developments led to a strategic shift in Ankara. The new strategy identified the Middle East as the number one source of threat to Turkey (Altunışık, 2004).

The threat construction from Middle East has become so immense that Turkey had to give up its traditional non-or minimum involvement in the Middle Eastern politics for its own sake (Makovsky, 1999; Altunısık, 2004; Sayari, 1997). For Turkey's part, the main threatening environment was not the Gulf crisis itself but the environment of instability and uncertainty that it left afterwards. These became the major security concerns and constituted the threat constructions of the state and military. For example, the power vacuum created in Northern Iraq where the majority of the population is of Kurdish origin constituted a great threat for Turkey (Kirisçi, 1996). The Turkish military broke its traditional approach of caution, and crossed the Iraqi border for border-beyond operations against the PKK to make the region safe from terrorist shelter (Guvenc, 1998). In this period, the Turkish state saw an internal fundamentalist movement and a

Kurdish ethnic uprising engendered by some Middle Eastern neighbouring states. It is argued that as Turkey became more active in regional politics, "it brought various tendencies in Turkey out of closet, thereby threatening the officially defined identity of the Turkish state" (Muftuler-Bac, 1996, 265).

All of these have contributed to the feeling of insecurity deriving from the region and thus securitization of such issues in the policies of Turkey.

b. Activism and Growing Multi- dimensionalism

Following the Gulf War Turkey has increasingly adjusted itself to the patterns of an active policy through several regional initiatives for expanding its polices in political, economic and security fields[3]. As argued by Kut (1998), the developments in the aftermath of the Cold War era led to a situation that not only necessitated Turkey to follow an active foreign policy but also provided it with opportunities to do so.

This active policy has found its particular reflection on the policies of the state directed at the newly independent countries of the former USSR, mainly in the Central Asia and the Caucasus[4].   As early as in 1991 the Turkish government spelt out its intentions to act as a model for these countries where the modern Turkey had long primordial ties in terms of language, ethnicity and religion.

In 1991 the Turkish Foreign Ministry (MFA) announced an opening up to these countries. The basic principles of this policy were also clearly defined at the very beginning. The 1992 budget speech of the Foreign Minister listed them as follows: "Turkey's polices in this region are not pan-Turkist",   "Turkey is cooperating with the Russian Federation in this region". However, there was no mention of the term "Eurasia" yet that would be later developed by the state for its policy construction in this region (MFA Budget Speech 1992).

The term "Eurasia" was revitalized   by the Turkish foreign policy makers thanks mostly to Foreign Ministry officials. This geopolitical term that was first used in the government programme of 1993-95 was an attempt to bring those friendly and brotherly countries of Turkey in the Central Asia under the same roof of its western allies and European family. In fact, this new concept was in line with the emerging understanding in Europe as later those countries one by one joined either as full member or partner into several European organisations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe and NATO (Girgin, 1998).

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the relative relaxation of the Russian hegemony in Eurasia, the Turkish state started to highlight its common ethnic bonds with the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union. In other words, by using cultural elements and identity, Turkey employed ethnic affiliation as part of its foreign policy. In the early 1990s, Turkey's engagement with the Turkic republics was, as one minister described later, in the spirit of "fanatic love," and consequently very romantic and optimistic (Yanık, 2002).

On the other hand, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the independent states in the region have had implications not only for Turkish foreign policy, but also for the Western countries, because of their geographic size, natural resources, economic potential and strategic location. Although the total population of the Republics is more or less the same as Turkey, their territories comprise about five times that of Turkey, which is about 800.000 sq. km, making them more than 4 million sq.km. According to estimations, four of them have substantial hydrocarbon deposits; particularly Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have extensive oil and natural gas reserves to be explored. The Caspian Sea, which is shared by the four republics including Iran and Russia, is estimated be one of the richest oil reserves in the World, and can be compared with that of the Persian Gulf region (Çalış, 1996).

Because of this simultaneous presence identity and interest in Turkey's engagement with the Turkic republics, Turkish foreign policy towards these countries

has been frequently claimed to be instrumental. In other words, it was argued that Turkey's highlighting of its common culture with the Turkic Republics was due to the presence of its material and strategic interests in these countries (Yanık, 2002).

Turkish foreign policy towards the Turkic Republics should also be analyzed from a perspective that includes both interest and identity as motivating forces (Yanık, 2002). This attempted collective identity creation was not pan-Turkist *per se.* Pan-Turkism, as the following chapter explains, includes irredentist claims. Although there were some nationalist organizations in Turkey that advocated the idea of Turkic Union such claims were never taken seriously by the foreign policy bureaucracy. Thus, the collective identity that Turkey tried to create was rather Turkic and cultural, but not as political and as irredentist as pan-Turkism (Yanık, 2002).

This active policy towards a multi-dimensional posture has inevitably been further stimulated when the EU once again decided not to confer Turkey with the candidate status at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. There it was decided that negotiations for full membership would be opened with Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia, with Cyprus in the wings or to be taken up soon. A second group of East Europeans was listed for later membership negotiations. Turkey was on neither list, and the summit specified a number of criteria before it could be put on such a list, including further progress towards democratisation and respecting human rights (khosla, 2001).

As argued by Bagcı (1998a), as the changing foreign policy and security paradigms were cleared and under the new geopolitical and economic realities there was an immediate need for a new concept of overall strategy for Turkey. Similar to what happened in the aftermath of 1964 events following the Johnson letter, Turkey has devoted its efforts both institutionally and conceptually to the strengthening its ties and polices in the greater Eurasia as a pivotal country that stood in its epicentre.

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In this period Turkey welcomed new concepts such as " historical geography" in the sense that Turkeys geography is not limited to its physical borders but expands to where its history lies. Similarly, for the first time the term "communities of kinship " was used referring to the countries where Turkish people share the aforementioned primordial ties. What is more, Turkey was increasingly called a global state alluding to its determination to expand its relations with the whole world instead of limiting itself to the EU membership.

Following the Luxembourg, the works on the formulation of the multi-dimensional policy were ever intensified. For example, in 1998 the "Plan for Turkey 2010-2020" was presented by the Foreign Ministry. In this plan, the term " Eurasia" was for the first time formally defined as follows: the geography stretching from the Western Europe to the Western China". The plan asserted that "Turkey is the pioneer of Eurasia in politics and economics". Another importance for constructivist understanding as to the wording of this plan was that it also stressed openly the value of such ideational factors as history, geography, culture in the conduct of foreign policy along with traditional material factors (MFA Yearbook 1998).

On the other hand, the Plan underlined that " Turkey wishes to join the EU but its vision is broader than this". Nevertheless, later Turkey stressed that " the relations with the EU will depend on how the EU would fulfil its commitments to Turkey", while underlying " the determination to join the EU will remain despite the Luxembourg decision"(MFA Yearbook 1998).

Turkey's consistent policy of "political non-dialogue" with the EU in the aftermath of the Luxembourg Summit, as argued by Bagcı (2004a, 913), forced the EU side to reconsider its position and to extend to Turkey its long-waited candidate status at the Helsinki summit of 1999. This alteration can be attributed to the changes of the perception of Turkey in the eyes of the EU counties as "global player" or "pivotal state". Helsinki summit in fact shows that the Turkey's formulation of multidimensional policy as a global state was rightly perceived by the outsiders.

The perception of the EU countries about Turkey in this period that led to the Helsinki decision is elaborated in detail by Eralp (2000) as follows:

> the change in the relationship between the European Union and Turkey as manifested in the Helsinki Summit mainly emanated from the EU rather than from Turkey. In the aftermath of the Luxembourg Summit, there were increasing criticisms of the Luxembourg framework on enlargement within the EU – that it has provided a narrow and a discriminatory vision on enlargement and resulted in the creation of borders based on geographical and religious-cultural values.

Naturally, one can also argue that on the road to Helsinki Turkey was helped by the conjuntural developments in international relations such as the capture of PKK chieftain Ocalan and disclosure of the facts of how some EU member countries provided sanctuary to this terrorist organisation mainly Greece and Germany.

All these continued to reinforce the multi-dimensional foreign policy. Multi-dimensionalism translated into two things: a bridge or cross-roads, and a model.

A typical official elaboration of the 'bridge' idea is the following: "Turkey is capable of acting as a bridge between the European Union and the Islamic world" (Çiller, 1996,11); or, in greater elaboration, this:

> Turkey is located at a point where Europe and Asia meet. Indeed, it is often regarded as a bridge between the East and the West. Such a unique geographical position gives Turkey European, Balkan, Middle Eastern, Caucasian, Mediterranean and Black Sea identities" and explain its "multi-dimensional foreign policy (MFA Yearbook 1998).

For the 'cross-roads' idea, One of the Turkish Foreign Minister can be quoted as follows:

> as a country and people, we have been situated at the cross-roads of civilisations, religions and trade. History gave Turkey the opportunity to live in "a very large geography which provided for the main trade routes and for the dissemination of ideas and religions...Turkey thus provides a political and economic centre for the emerging Eurasian reality and constitutes western Europe's major historical, cultural and economic opening to Eastern horizons (Cem, 1999).

Former US President Clinton   endorsed this, saying that if the multiple regions in which Turkey is located are to see a brighter future, of rising prosperity and declining conflict, that "requires a strong Turkey playing its rightful role at the cross-roads of the world, at the meeting place of three great faiths" (Khosla, 2001).

While it may be thought that by the end of the 1990s much of the euphoria had evaporated, the Economist could still say in its January 15, 2000 issue, "Turkey's value as a strategic pivot in a most dangerous part of the world has rarely been as high as it is today. It is a valued member of NATO. It is a source of common sense in the combustible Caucasus. It is respected by Russia, still a force for mischief in the area..." (khosla, 2001).

As to the "model" idea, President Suleyman Demirel wrote in 1999:

> Turkey's strategic relevance in the post-Cold War era lies in her very ability to look both to the West and the East; to remain firmly committed to her western orientation while simultaneously recognising the complexities of her geography as well as the harsh realities of her immediate neighbourhood. By her very existence, Turkey can be a model for her neighbours to plant the seeds of secular democracy. Through her actions fostering economic and political interdependence and cooperation, Turkey will not only remain central to the security and prosperity of the West, but will also be the key state in the containment and resolution of a host of problems of our era (Demirel, 1999).

In realist understanding,   these policies and innovations   can naturally be considered as tactics of the state to increase its visibility, strategic value in the eyes of the EU members and of the US as well. Similarly, they can be argued to be motivated by such motives as creating areas of influences in these countries of the Central Asia and the Caucasus by means of ideational factors or as using them for policy of balance of power.

However, looking from the constructivist lenses , one can also see an enormous effort dedicated for the formation of a collective identity between Turkey and in the regions where those countries lie. Notwithstanding the strategic motives behind this

policy, for constructivists, this active policy has served as an useful tool to analyse the lenses of identity through which the Turkish state has perceived the world in this period.

ii. DEVELOPMENTS AS REGARDS TURKEY'S SECURITY

While the active and multi-dimensional posture of Turkey in its foreign policy has led to the aforementioned discussions and implications , the post-Cold war has also brought up several important developments in the foreign and security policy of Turkey in general and its collective security efforts in particular.

In Cold war, Turkey had contributed to helping to bring the East-West confrontation to a peaceful end. The collapse of the Eastern Bloc brought out hopes for a more secure environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. However, time attested to the contrary with the emergence of ever-increasing and inter-twined security threats such as ultra-nationalism, ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism, terrorism, mass migration, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

While historic changes were taking shape, the post-Cold War era also began to witness a multitude of non-conventional security threats. These threats, or to put it more mildly, these risks, range from ethnic conflicts to terrorism to environmental disasters. This fact, coupled with transboundary implications of the heavily globalised world, attests to the importance of co-operation and joint action in tackling these threats more efficiently. With all these, one can easily see that co-operation and joint action stand as valuable instruments for security and thus defence from both a political and a practical perspective.

National security is defined in the Act on the 'National Security Council and National Security Council General Secretariat' dated December 9th 1983 No. 2945 as "the protection and maintenance of the state's constitutional order, national presence, integrity, all political, social, cultural and economic interests on an international level, and contractual law against any kind of internal and foreign threat" (White paper, 1998,

12). The spectrum of national security is wide-ranging and includes many sectors of security. It has both external and internal aspects. Territorial integrity, non-interference in domestic affairs, and indivisibility of the country are some of the most important preferences of external security (Küçük,1999).

In parallel to the foregoing, Turkey's military strategy consists of four dimensions (White Paper, 1998, 15):

1.   Deterrence: Turkey relies on its military power to forestall potential aggressors from taking offensive measures against itself and to prevent possible threats.

2.   Collective Security and Alliance Politics: Turkey actively involves itself in bilateral and multilateral alliances and gives special importance to regional and international institutions of which it is a part. For instance, NATO is the backbone of Turkey's security strategies and policies; the. special bilateral relation with the US also constitutes an important part of Turkey's strategic planning.

3. Forward defence: it is to identify the potential conflicts and threats and to take pre-emptive measures to forestall or to eliminate them without resulting in actual armed clashes.

4. Military contribution to the crisis management and intervention during crises: Turkey never rules out the option of threatening to use force to ease the tensions and to resolve stalemates in favour of itself. For this reason, Turkey always keeps its armed forces ready, well-trained, and modernized to deploy or mobilize whenever necessary.

As earlier mentioned , with a brief glance on the texts of the respective government programmes and the MFA releases and budget speeches, one can find the reflections of these changes taking place in the world affairs and the security environment on the construction of the identity shaping the Turkish foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era. In this context, it seems also useful to have a look at

the gradual transformation that appeared in the texts of the White Papers of the Turkish military.

This document was a product of the need felt by the state in general and the military in particular as the Cold war was about to end. First published in 1987, the White Paper needed to be updated in 1990. Yet, these two versions became soon outdated as the Eastern Bloc ceased to exit in 1991 with the dissolution of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.

The paper was then updated in 1993. This version contained some new chapters and thus is more indicative about the perception of the security environment as seen by the state. New security risks were spelt out for the first time. Turkey's geographical location was explained in terms of insecurity sources. In this regard, Turkey was underlined as the source of stability in an environment of insecurity. Furthermore, again for the first time, the parameters of the defence policy of Turkey were listed. Yet, Despite the stress on the widening security concerns, the Paper did not contain any chapter on security or security policy. Instead the book was prepared as a reference text to the defence of Turkey in the conventional way.

The version of 1995 came with several additions: an in-depth review of post-Cold War security environment was inserted. Similarly, it mentioned of Turkey's security policy that was declared as "defensive". By stating " Turkey has now become a front country as it was a flank country in the past", it also stressed the changing position of Turkey in the actual security environment. Furthermore given the developments in the years passed since the end of the Cold War, the Paper inserted separate chapters on Turkey's contribution to peace keeping, the situation in Northern Iraq and combating terrorism , the two latter being referred to as security concerns of Turkey.

The following update came in 1998. In addition to the insertions of 1995, one can see an increased emphasis on security issues rather than pure defence matters, with a

special chapter on "national security policy" .   Similarly, a special section was devoted to "internal security" and the use of military for such security.

Moreover, in this version one can see the discourses in parallel to those developed by the state about the Turkish foreign policy standing regarding the multidimensional politics and security environment, such as "Turkey is a country of not only Europe but also Asia, Balkans and Caucasus ", "Turkey is a security producing country", as well as references to "linguistic, historical, cultural ties, moral obligations in the Balkans and the Caucasus" (White Paper, 1998). The last insertion is particularly important as they show the reflection of the ideational factors in the security policy of the state. The same version was preserved in its content and structure in the update of 2000. The only difference important for the constructivist understanding is that the term "defence" was finally removed from the title of the document (White Paper, 2000).

Thus, to sum up, one can argue that these white papers are truly reflective of the changes of the mindset of the state and the military that shows a transformation from purely defence oriented polices to security-based ones in a wider spectrum of threat perceptions.

In this context, it is also evident that in all these versions the references to NATO has always remained intact as the main pillar of "Turkey's defence and security" (White Paper, 2000).

a. Relevance of NATO

Just like the Cold War era, NATO has continued to preserve its vital relevance for Turkey's security and defence (see Bağcı, 1998a, 2001a, 2004a, Eralp 1997b, Karaosmanoğlu 1995, 2004). As the Cold War officially came to an end in 1990, it was NATO that was praised and considered by the Turkish state as "vital more than ever to transform these changes into a security structure"(MFA Budget Speech, 1990).

During the Gulf war, NATO became even more important for Turkey. On the eve of the military operation against Iraq, NATO sent its contingency troops to protect the Turkish border. The following words of the then foreign Minister are testimony to this: "Turkey invited the allied mobile force to show Iraq that NATO backs Turkey in case of any aggression" (MFA Yearbook, 1990).

In the post-Cold War, Turkey, being at the epicentre of the Euro-Atlantic region, actively supports and participates in the partnership policy of the Alliance, provided that the core function of NATO remains collective defence (MFA web site). In the regions, to which Turkey is linked either by its geography or by its history, almost 20 partner countries are located. This has facilitated Turkey's close co-operation with those countries. Turkey has   signed bilateral co-operation agreements   with 20 partner countries in the military field. Given its historical ties with them, Turkey's emphasis on this policy has been mainly on the Central Asian countries and Azerbaijan. Similarly, Turkey has also given priority to partner countries in its neighbourhood with a view to enhancing security surrounding its territory.

Turkey, in line with its active support to the NATO's partnership policy, established a PfP Training Centre (BİOEM) in Ankara in 1998 to contribute to the improvement of relations between NATO and PfP nations and to help create a more secure and peaceful environment (PFP Training Center Course Guide 2000-2001). The PfP Training Centre is open to all partner countries. The principal objective of the Centre is to provide strategic and tactical training and education with a view to supporting partners' military and civilian personnel in accordance with NATO/PfP overall concepts, general principles and interoperability objectives (Karaosmanoğlu, 2004).   Beside its active participation in the Alliance's partnership programmes, one can also underline some initiatives of Turkey outside NATO that conforms with the characteristics of security partnership.

As generally argued,   out of the 19 potential conflict scenarios that NATO military authorities have identified for planning purposes, 18 would require Turkey's

involvement one way or another. Two of our neighbours being depicted as part of an "evil triangle" and a third remaining on the US list of countries sponsoring terrorism, is not a situation Turkey can take comfort in (Moralı, 2004). This prompts arguments that Turkey needs strong military forces for its defence and security as well as for the peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic region as an ally to NATO (White paper 2000). Today, Turkey has the largest armed forces in Europe among the European allies and comes second after the USA in the whole Alliance, as the below table indicates:

Table 2: Place of Turkey Among NATO allies in terms of armed forces

(source: NATO web site: www.nato.int)

As peace and stability is confidently achieved in its adjacent regions and particularly as relations with its neighbours further improve, one can argue that Turkey's defence spending may likely be reduced. In fact, according to the White Paper of 2000, it is foreseen for the future, to gradually move forward to further modernised and more professional armed forces with a smaller size but of higher mobility and firepower (White Paper, 2000).

Yet, given the actual threats and perceptions of insecurity as well as the increasing number of issues securitized as a corollary, Turkey has felt a strong need to spend relatively higher for its defence and security than most of its allies although its per capita expenditure still remains low as compared to some of its allies' position including Greece. Tables below show this situation clearly:

Table 3: Place of Turkey among NATO allies in terms of the percentage of defence expenditure in GDP

(source: NATO web site: www.nato.int)

Table 4: Place of Turkey Among NATO allies in terms of defence expenditure per capita in US Dollars (based on 1995 prices)

(source: NATO web site: www.nato.int)

b. Regional Initiatives

In parallel to its NATO membership, Turkey has also taken the necessary steps for the promotion of co-operation and joint actions for collective security and partnership through either bilateral or regional initiatives. This is because through co-operation and joint actions one can better develop common understanding. And, as the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, said, "It is common understanding rather than treaties that makes peoples united" (Ulusoy, 2002). In fact, surrounded by the famous triangle of conflicts, i.e. the Balkans, the Middle East and the Caucasus, the promotion of regional co-operation has always been considered valuable for Turkey's security. As earlier emphasized, it is mainly because this policy contributes to regional peace and stability enhancing Turkey's security.

At bilateral level, Turkey has concluded, with almost 60 countries, various agreements, of cooperation on military training, technical and scientific matters as well as defence industry. These countries, in addition to Turkey's NATO allies, include those from the Balkans, the Middle East, South Mediterranean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, Far East Asia and even South America. These agreements are not directed against third countries but aim at security cooperation with a view to interoperability.

At multilateral level, Turkey has also launched a number of initiatives to create a web of regional cooperation mechanisms (Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, 17). Some of its major initiatives are as follows (see MFA website, NATO):

South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP):

In the Balkans, Turkey with other Balkan nations started up a process called the South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECP). This brings Turkey together with Albania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Romania, FRY and Greece as well as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

In this Process, Turkey drafted the Charter on Good Neighbourly Relations, Stability, Security and Cooperation in South-East Europe that was signed in February 2000. This Charter is the first instrument signed among the countries of the region in this conflict-ridden juncture since the Balkan Entente of 1934 and it aims at contributing to peace and stability in the region in close cooperation with other existing bodies therein.

Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE):

Another initiative of Turkey in the Balkans is the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe (MPFSEE). Originated from a proposal made by Turkey in 1997 this body was brought into life by the inauguration of its headquarters in September 1999 in Plovdiv/Bulgaria. It can be argued as an important landmark in the history of the Balkan region. It brought former adversaries of the Cold war together for collective security in a military structure.

This Force, in addition to Turkey, consists of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Italy, Macedonia, and Romania. USA and Slovenia participate in MPFSEE as observers. The first Commander of the MPFSEE is a Brigadier-General from the Turkish Army.

Under this force operates a brigade (SEEBRIG) composed of forces on call that are contributed by participant countries.

The main objective of the MPFSEE is to contribute to security in the Euro-Atlantic area and foster good neighbourly relations and cooperation as well as interoperability among the countries of the region.

The Force, in principle and contingent upon case-by-case decisions by the participating nations, is assigned for NATO-led conflict prevention and other peace support operations that can be conducted through a mandate to be provided by the UN

and the OSCE. The Force can also be called on to participate in "coalition of willing" type international initiatives of a similar kind.

Black Sea Naval Cooperation Task Force (BLACKSEAFOR)[5]:

The latest Turkish initiative among its regional collective security policy is the creation of a naval task force in the Black Sea called BLACKSEAFOR with the participation of the littoral countries' naval forces.BLACKSEAFOR is a tangible outcome of Turkey's vision of bringing together the naval forces of the littoral states for the realisation of certain tasks at sea.

This initiative, which the Turkish side tabled in the first half of 1998, was wholeheartedly welcomed and endorsed by the other littoral states. Its charter was signed in 2001 following the long process of negotiations.

BLACKSEAFOR is a regional and stand-alone formation, as well as a transparent initiative in the Black Sea. As its charter indicates, the aim of this initiative is to contribute to further strengthening of friendship, good relations and mutual understanding in the Black Sea through enhancement of cooperation and interoperability among the naval forces of the littoral countries. It enables the participating countries to call their naval elements to come together in order to perform such tasks as search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and environmental protection operations, as well as mine counter measures. According to the charter, when decided by the parties, BLACKSEAFOR can be assigned for other purposes, such as countering terrorism (MFA website).

One can rightly argue that the formation of the BLACKSEAFOR is unprecedented in the Black Sea region, from both political and military perspectives. It constitutes the first of such political significance in the Black Sea as all the littoral states were once in the opposite military alliances during the Cold War era. For the first time in history, former adversaries have joined theirs naval forces to carry out their

common tasks in the region. The Black Sea is a common heritage among these states. Throughout history, it has linked them to each other. However, in the past, it was mainly associated with potential conflict rather than co-operation among these countries. In this regard, the post-Cold War era has contributed to furthering co-operation and friendship in this region.

These aforementioned endeavours, be they bilateral or multilateral, help promoting further interoperability in minds as well as in practice between Turkey and the countries in its surrounding regions. In this regard, interoperability achieved among the military forces of the member countries in the SEEBRIG and BLACKSEAFOR seems to be noteworthy. As these countries are also the partner countries of NATO, this interoperability complements the NATO's partnership policy as well.

Moreover, they no doubt help serving the facilitation of collective identity among these states including Turkey in security and foreign policy related matters. This makes them particularly important for the constructivist understanding.

c. Peace keeping operations

After the Cold War, Turkey began to pay particular attention to regional cooperative security and peace support operations, including diverse missions ranging from peacekeeping to peace enforcement Turkey actively participated in peace support operations in many countries not only in Europe and adjacent regions but also in Africa like the Somalia operation or in Afghanistan. It has also contributed to various peace observation missions.

As the MFA web site indicates,

> in the post-Cold War era, international peacekeeping has gained new significance and Turkey has participated in many peace-keeping and peace enforcement operations. Turkey's commitment to peace keeping across the globe continues through its participation in and support for various UN, NATO and EU led missions" (MFA website, Foreign Policy synopsis, 2005) .

The MFA web site also draws attention to the fact "to date, Turkish troops have the unfortunate distinction of ranking second in terms of the number of casualties suffered in the service of world peace under the UN flag" (MFA website, Foreign Policy synopsis, 2005) .

The policy of Turkey regarding the contribution to such collective security operations will be discussed in detail in the following sections in view of constructivist understanding.

d. Internal security

The post-Cold War era has also witnessed the growing importance of internal security in the Turkish foreign and security policy due to the separatist terrorism deriving from ethnic tensions in the country [6] that was also heavily supported from abroad.

The separatist terrorism[7] became a source of concern for Turkey not only for its internal order but also for it foreign and security policy in the post—Cold War era. As the Cold War was coming to a close, Turkey was using every opportunity to mention this scourge among its security concerns.

In the budgetary speeches as early as 1989 and onwards, the neighbours became increasingly warned not to provide sanctuary to PKK terrorists. Interestingly, these warning were spelled out by Turkey at international fora like the UN General assembly as calls for solidarity and cooperation against terrorism in general in a softer mode.

The government programme for 1991-93 mentioned for the first time the term "internal security" and its relevance for foreign and security policy (Girgin, 1998).

As emphasized by Ambassador Moralı in his article (2004), separatist PKK terrorism benefited from financial support from expatriates in Western Europe as well as political, logistic and even operational support from some of Turkey's neighbours. "It entered into an unholy alliance with Greek Cypriots and the Armenian Diaspora. Sanctuary was provided in neighbouring territories from which PKK could launch cross-border incursions". The vacuum of central authority in Northern Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War contributed to this situation. Attitude of certain Western European countries and human rights groups that preferred to perceive PKK not as "professional" separatist terrorists but as freedom fighters, encouraged more radicalism. PKK started attributing itself the clout of a winner and expected to bring about nationwide ethnic confrontation and polarisation. This overlooked the fact that integration of Kurds into the Turkish society had made irreversible headway. It also miscalculated the power and determination of forces dedicated to the Republic. Nonetheless, "PKK was able to become a formidable security challenge draining Turkey's resources and causing immense human suffering, but most importantly, retarding democratisation and human rights reforms" (Moralı, 2004).

Separatist terrorism, on the one hand, has inevitably affected Turkey's relations with its European partners and allies even in NATO. In this process, the following are the common problems that persisted between Turkey and its allies:

- The lack of common understanding about terrorism between Turkey and its allies, as the terrorist of one was seen as the freedom fighter by others.

- the double standards used by its allies towards Turkey in its fight against terrorism even leading to the suspension of arms exportations to Turkey by its allies.

- The sanctuary both in political and military terms provided by some allies of Turkey to the separatist terrorists

These have unfortunately served nothing than the growing mistrust between Turkey and mainly its European allies. In this context, to better understand the feelings in these years, the words of former President Demirel are quite helpful:

> They told me that " there live 25 million people (Kurds). Iraq, Iran and Turkey should give up some territory so that this people set up its own state. In reply, I simply said that if you take care so much about them, why do not you give them lands from your territory. Your lands are more prosperous. So they will be happier!" (Interview with Former President Demirel).

On the other hand, in face of such a devastating terrorist threat that was stationed outside the country mostly along the south and south-eastern border of Turkey, the state had to take trans border military operations in the Northern Iraq that became a power vacuum where no Iraqi control was available due to the sanctions . These operations were carried out in conformity with the right of hot pursuit according to the international law. Yet this policy was exposed to heavy criticism mainly from its allies not to mention its neighbours .

As the situation in Northern Iraq was increasingly perceived as a security matter for the state, it was duly securitized. For example, since the 1993 version of the White Paper there has been always a special section on the situation in Northern Iraq as a security matter.

The operations in this region underline in this sense the continuation of the permanent element of Turkish foreign and security policy. That is to say that despite its internationalism and its refrainment from unilateral military actions in collective security operations, Turkey has not hesitated to take necessary military actions in cases where its survival and territorial integrity and national unity were considered as threatened .

All of these developments have also found reflection in the official discourses of the state organs. For instance, starting form 1995, in the governments' programmes, terrorism was mentioned among security threats to Turkey in the context of foreign and

security relations. Similarly, as of the White Paper of 1995 a special section was placed on combating terrorism in the context of internal security. To sum up, separatist terrorism was in this sense securitized as a security threat to Turkey.

The general review of the foregoing policies in the field of collective security and also national security that are in fact inseparable, indicate the importance of a search for a common identity in these fields. In this process, thanks to its location, its multidimensional policies and close links with many countries that emerged from the end of the Cold War in and around Europe, Turkey has increasingly sought to emphasize its potential as security provider in this vast geography, be it called "Euro-Atlantic area" or "Eurasia".

As stated by Bağcı (Bağcı & Kardaş 2003), Turkey's military strength is an important source of its security producer role. Turkey is the second largest military force in NATO after the US and takes active part in NATO and UN mandated operations.

Ambassador Moralı (2004, 8) emphasizes Turkey's role in this regard as follows:

> As a NATO member, Turkey has never been at the receiving end only. We have contributed to collective defence as a staunch ally, providing and hosting military capabilities, including nuclear deployments, in connection with possible roles under Article V of the Alliance treaty. Today, in response to the requirements of the new security environment, Turkey is a net contributor to the maintenance international peace and stability, a contribution that has increased in direct proportion to Turkey's military and political "clout".

The above statement is the clear reflection of the perception of the state in this context. While Turkey through these policies was seeking to formulate a common identity encompassing its old allies and the countries in its surrounding regions , quite paradoxically, its policies in these regions as well as its location in the epicentre of the conflict triangle and its closeness to new threat areas were also seen and perceived by its allies, mainly the EU members as sources of instability and insecurity. Furthermore, Turkey's rigid stance with regard to the development of the ESDP by the EU to the detriment of the former's security needs and concerns exacerbated the tension and the

disagreement between the two sides. Thus, increasingly , the EU has considered Turkey as a security consumer rather than security provider.

As mentioned by Bagcı (1998a,b), Turkey was then considered as a country causing instability, in the eyes of EU countries. To understand the state of minds of the EU countries in this period, the following words are quite relevant:

> Turkey is considered by many countries, at the present time, as a country which is producing instability, threat and a lot of troubles. It is exactly the way of behaviour why the European Union at the present time is not having any interest of including Turkey into it. Because Europe hates the word instability. The European Union is a stable institution and if Turkey becomes full member of it in a couple of years, the European Union will have its borders starting from Iran, Iraq and Syria, the most reluctant and trouble maker countries for the Turkish security perceptions. Because Turkey is not producing the security, but rather consuming security and producing insecurity (Bagcı, 1998b, 81).

This reflects the general situation prevailing in the post-Cold War era. Under such circumstances came the September 11.

iii . SEPTEMBER 11 AND ITS IMPLICATIONS ON TURKEY

As emphasized by Bagcı (2004a, 911), the September 11 terrorist attacks have been a milestone not only for the USA, but also all other countries including Turkey as well as the discipline of international relations. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the September 11 terrorist attacks seem to have paved the way at least for facilitating the emergence of a collective identity among the Western countries against terrorism defined as the common other.

In this context, one can argue that Turkey's importance has also shown a particular increase in the eyes of these countries mainly the USA and the major EU members (see Bağcı and Kardaş, 2003, Fuller, 2004, Larrabee, 2003).

Following the September 11 attacks and the decision to invoke article V of the NATO treaty for collective defence, The Turkish government contributed to the campaign by sending a unit of special forces to work with US troops in humanitarian operations and train Northern Alliance fighters. Turkey also offered its experience in guerrilla warfare available and help carve out a coalition between various Afghan factions against the Taliban. Additionally, the US benefited from Turkish airspace, used Incirlik airbase as a transport hub for the campaign.

Later, following the defeat of the Taliban regime, Turkey actively participated in the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF), charged with assisting the newly formed interim Afghan authority and with providing order and stability in the capital, Kabul. Within the framework of the ISAF, Turkey contributed to the training of a national Afghan police and military force, provided military aid and equipment, and patrolled Kabul and its environs. Moreover, in June 2002, Turkey assumed the lead-nation role and took over the command of the International Security and Assistance Force (Bagcı and Kardaş 2003, 35).

The active participation in ISAF was in line with Turkey's policy on peace operations, as it had evolved in the post-Cold War era. As argued, "this time, through participating actively in the ISAF and commanding a multinational force, it could show its military capabilities and ability to project power abroad, thus expanding the Turkish sphere of influence" (Bagcı & Kardaş, 2003, 35).

Yet, based on these developments, it was claimed by most analysts that Turkey was going to become a more assertive power, not only in its immediate neighbourhood, but also 'out of area'. In Turkish reasoning, its active support for the US military campaign was a logical corollary of its position on fighting international terrorism. Yet, this policy was also interpreted as follows: "by taking strategic decisions and an active part in the military realm, Turkey sought to have a say in the future political landscape of not only Afghanistan, but in Central Asia overall" (Bagcı and Kardaş, 2003, 35) .

There seem to be several effects of the September 11 attacks on Turkey and its perceptions by the outside world:

In this context, "the first effect that contributed to Turkey's current position was the growing acceptance of the Turkish approach to the fight against terrorism in international relations. Turkey itself had long struggled against separatist terror and political Islam in a domestic context" (Bagcı and Kardaş, 2003, 19). Yet, even in the post-September 11 era, developments show that old habits die hard. For example, the EU long tried not to put terrorist organisations, which Turkey has fought for years, in its list of terrorist groups that was prepared in the aftermath of September 11.

The second development regarding Turkey's growing strategic importance is the increasing reference to Turkey as a model for the Islamic world. The war against the Taliban and the al- Qaeda was, in a political and intellectual sense, also a war against a militant, reactive, anti- Western (or anti-American) interpretation of Islam (Bagcı & Kardaş, 2003, 25)

In this regard, Turkey, too, acted in a responsible manner in rejecting such prayers of civilizational clashes between the "Western" and "Muslim" worlds. Representing a country that is an indispensable part of this Western world with its population of predominantly Islamic faith, took the initiative to organize the OIC-EU Joint Forum "Civilisation and Harmony: the Political Dimension" in February 2002 in Istanbul between the countries of the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC) and the European Union (EU) at the level of Foreign Ministers . At the forum that provided an important opportunity to express their rejection of the argument on the 'clash of civilisations' in the post-September 11 era, the Ministers all underlined that Islam could not be associated with terrorism, and the EU Ministers additionally expressed that the West did not oppose Islam. At the end, all the Ministers called for dialogue among civilisations (MFA Web site) .

Turkey's support for the military coalition was instrumental in defusing the charge that the war in Afghanistan   was a Muslim-Christian confrontation (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001). The then Foreign Minister Cem expressed this point was very well when he said,

> This is the fight between democracy and terrorism and the struggle between the wise and fanatic. We believe that this fight will be won by our side. Turkey will be the biggest obstacle before those who want to divert this [fight] to a wrong path such as a fight between the religions (see Bagcı & Kardaş 2003, 29).

Furthermore,   the Turkish model was offered as an alternative to a Taliban version of Islam. This means that Islam and modern values are compatible with each other and it is possible to reconcile Islam within a modern, Western-style, democratic and secular system. In the words of Dale F. Eickelman (2002) (see Bagcı and Kardaş 2003) : "Turkey can only offer the world an example of a nation in which Western democratic values and Islam converge in an increasingly strengthened civil society, in which the state and religion are not seen as adversaries. 'Western' societies, like Islamic ones, have no place for either militant secular extremism or militant religious extremism".

Similarly, the then US Deputy Secretary of State Marc Grossman also underlined after 11 September:

> Turkey is once again highlighted as a model for those countries with an Islamic heritage who choose to be – and work to be – modern, secular, democratic, and true to their faith simultaneously. Those of us who have admired Turkey for this vision for years now find we are not so alone in wishing that your great endeavour succeeds (see Bagcı and Kardaş 2003) .

As argued by Bagcı in detail (Bagcı and Kardaş 2003), September 11 has overall contributed to the strategic importance of Turkey in the eyes of its Western allies. In other words, Turkey's unique position both in the West and in the Muslim world given its history, geography and religion, not to mention its military expertise and experience in the fight against terrorism, seems to have positively affected the lenses through which the West sees Turkey in the face of the new terrorist phenomenon labelled as Islamist fundamentalism.

For the state, "September 11 constituted the second fault line of the world order since the dissolution of the Warsaw pact and the disintegration of the Soviet Union" (MFA Budget speech 2003, 1). As the interviews conducted with state dignitaries suggest, the general perception persistent in the state   in the aftermath of September 11 attacks confirm that Turkey needed to follow proactive initiatives in the foreign and security policies in the world.

As stated by former President Demirel, in the aftermath of September 11, there was a new enemy found. It was terrorism, whose source is considered to be radical Islam. "In such environment, Turkey needs to follow policies and present solutions through proactive initiatives" (Interview with H.E. Demirel).

Similarly, the MFA budget speech of 2002 that was delivered by the Foreign Minister in 2001 right after the September 11 attacks is in many ways reflective of the perception of the state in the post-September 11 era. It underlined that "developments around us (Turkey) have brought to the fore the regional importance of the country". The speech emphasized the role of Turkey between the western world and the Muslim world in the sense that "Turkey plays a bridge role in developing a common understanding between the Muslim and Western world in the fight against terrorism" (MFA Budget Speech 2002).

The speech also sent messages to the western allies : "terrorism is nothing new for us". " terrorism has no religion or geography". " It is yet promising for the future of the civilised world to see the countries that could not or did not want to understand the importance of cooperation against terrorism, among the members of the coalition formed against terrorism" (MFA Budget Speech 2002).   These words in fact stand as a response of the state to the construction formed by its allies and EU countries about Turkey's standing in the post-September 11 era. It also shows the reaction of Turkey to these countries concerning its fight against terrorism., in the sense that " See, we were right!" (See Bağcı & Kardaş, 2003).

Thus, to sum up the developments in the aftermath of September 11 as regards Turkey's position in international arena the following can be said:

Being a country with a population of predominantly Muslim faith, yet governed by secularism and pluralistic democracy that is seen as an anti-thesis to Islamist fundamentalism, Turkey has been perceived as a model for the rest of the Islamic world to cohabit with the Western world in a peaceful coexistence.

Similarly, thanks to its geographical location adjacent to the regions dominated by other Muslim countries of mostly undemocratic regimes and to its historical and cultural ties with them emanating from the Ottoman legacy, Turkey's role in the fight against such form of terrorism seems to have increased in the eyes of the Western countries.

On the other hand, Turkey's long experience in the fight against terrorism has now been recognised even by the EU countries, although the political disagreement continued as to the definition of who is terrorist and who is not.

These two appear to be added values in Turkey's role in the global security environment in the post-September 11 era.

In this context, it is also argued that Turkey's international standing that has been visibly enhanced, a more cautious approach is needed to assess the post-11 September developments on Turkish foreign policy. But, even in this cautious approach, as argued (Bagcı & Kardaş,   2003), post-September era confirms Turkey's role that it plays   mainly as a pivotal power.

Here, one should also refer to the implications of September 11 on collective identity building between Turkey and its friendly countries and allies (see Oğuzlu, 2004). In the literature, Turkey is often praised for having produced "security" during

the Cold War by constituting a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet military power. Thus, viewed from a traditional lens rooted in a narrow conception of security and security policy, Turkey was seen 'dispensable' for post-Cold War security environment where no Soviet threat exists as earlier mentioned in reference to the events in the post-Cold war era (Bilgin, 2004).

Yet, adopting a constructivist perspective that conceives security in broader terms and takes into account the mutually constitutive relationship between security, identity and interests, suggests a different picture in which a whole new dimension to Turkey's past (and future) contribution to security building in "Europe' becomes visible.

During the Cold War, Turkey helped produce and secure the collective identity of the West as a "security community". As argued by Bilgin (2004), in post-September 11 world politics, as ever, the West' needs countries such as Turkey to help produce and secure a Western' identity that is not perceived to be anti-Muslim. What is significant to note here is that such arguments could only be generated within an alternative approach that does not take security as given but reflects upon the processes through which identities, interests and insecurities are constituted.

Furthermore, Turkey's policies based on cooperative security in its adjacent regions particularly in the Balkans, the Black Sea and the Caucasus as mentioned earlier have provided an useful tool for the West to fight against such security threats of asymmetric nature.

In fact, Turkey's contribution to the US-led military campaign under NATO and then UN umbrella in Afghanistan and later its active military participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan leading to its command of the ISAF can clearly suggest how Turkey has then been seen and perceived by its Western allies.

Similarly, Turkey's initiative to hold the OIC-EU joint forum to underline the objection of the global world against such arguments of the clash of civilisations was a

reflection of a proactive policy to stress the importance in bridging the two worlds in a similar fashion that the West wanted to see Turkey in this regard. These clearly show in factual terms what Turkey had in its hand as assets to be utilised in the post-September 11 era and how it has done so.

In short, one can argue that the September 11 attacks have no doubt aggravated the global insecurity mainly for the Western states including Turkey. Yet, on the other hand, the post-September11 era seems to have served the strengthening   of collective identity of Turkey with its Western allies in opposition to the common other "terrorism", by improving its perception by those countries in strategic and security terms.

iv. GENERAL APPRAISAL OF THE POST- COLD WAR ERA FOR TURKEY'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The post-Cold War era is generally compared with that of Cold War in two contrast ways. One view is that the Cold war was terrible and dangerous period in European history, and that ending it has enormously improved the prospects for European security. The second view, equally crude but at the opposite end of the spectrum, is that the Cold War was good for European security and that ending it has opened the Pandora's box of new dangers. In view of the aforementioned discussions in the preceding chapters, both arguments seem to be relevant today.

In this era, as discussed in detail in the preceding sections, Turkish foreign and security policy has followed the aforementioned patterns. The section below will then focus on the identity-related discussions on Turkish foreign and security policy in view of the polices followed by Turkey in the post-Cold War era.

a. Identity crisis in Turkish foreign and security policy?

The events in the post-Cold War and the polices followed by Turkey in its foreign and security policy have not been excluded from the discussions of identity crisis

or clashes of identity in the foreign policy. As Kushner (1997, 223) correctly puts it '..everyday problems and crises on both the internal and external level … tend to bring to the fore time and again these tormenting questions of identity [in Turkey].'

Turkey's opening to the central Asia to the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East were mostly argued to be deriving from a new adventurism based on affinities in terms of religion, language and ethnicity.

Huntington (1993,42) asserted that "the end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilisation involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China." According to another famous analyst, Andre Gunder Frank (see Çalış, 1996), "ever since Ataturk, Turkey itself seems to prefer becoming the last wagon on the European Train. But if Europe now closes off that option, perhaps Turkey will opt for becoming the locomotive on a Pan-Turkish-Asian train instead."

Yet, as the MFA web site emphasizes, according to the Turkish state:

> As a cosmopolitan state in a multi-cultural global community, Turkey employs a multi-dimensional foreign policy that reconciles the West with the East and the North with the South and is active in all continents. She serves by way of her geographic disposition and close historical and cultural ties across a vast landscape as a crucial bridge for dialogue and interaction between civilizations at the heart of Eurasia.

> Turkey aims to proactively pursue the goal of helping to create an environment of security, stability, prosperity, friendship and cooperation all around herself at the natural convergence point of Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Central Asia, all of which figure prominently on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Turkey is active in its foreign relations in all regions, including Asia and the Pacific. The adoption of the "Action Plan for Latin America" and the "Action Plan for Africa" in 1998 is a clear reflection of Turkey's will and desire to further develop its relations and cooperation with the countries of these two continents (MFA Website, Foreign Policy synopsis, 2005).

Multi-dimensionalism is perhaps best reflected in the words of former Prime Minister Ecevit: "The Turks have been Europeans for 600 years. But the Turks are not only Europeans. They are also Asian, Caucasian and Middle Eastern" (Khosla, 2001).

Since the end of the Cold War, Turkey has found itself at the crossroads of multiple regional systems, which appear to have developed according to historical and cultural lines, This has renewed the debate on the identity of Turkey, dealing with its historical roots, new geopolitical imperatives and domestic pressures'. Concerned with Turkey's future role in international relations, many have begun asking whether Ankara has been abandoning its traditional aloofness towards developments taking place in its region at the expense of its contacts with the West (Çalış, 1996, 3). On this subject, one observer claimed that

> the Moslem world's only NATO member is today groping for a new identity... [F]or the first time since the birth of the republic in the 1920s Turkey is starting to play a decisive, if somewhat reluctant, role in its immediate neighbourhood in the Balkans, in the conflict in the Caucasus and not least in north Iraq" (see Çalış 1996).

Nevertheless, the multidimensional and active foreign policy of Turkey that was followed in the aftermath of the Cold War could not escape from the arguments of identity crisis, accusing Turkey of following inconsistent foreign policy. Turkey's active foreign policy and multi-dimensional approaches have been considered as clashes of identities and/or identity crisis in the foreign policy[8]. In this context, policies directed to regions such as the Central Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle east where historical, linguistic or religious affinities exist between Turkey and those countries in these regions have been criticized as "neo-ottomanism" alluding to a policy of expansionism.

Similarly, the period of frustration and disappointment with the EU following the Luxembourg summit of the Union has been regarded as an identity crisis for Turkey given its Westernist posture of the foreign policy. Furthermore, while relations with the Muslim world were fostered on the one hand, , on the other, its growing relations with Israel were also interpreted as identity clashes.

Circles began to discuss the meaning of being the remnants of the Ottoman Empire. Some of them regarded Turkey's Ottoman past with pride and as a possible alternative model to the foreign policy of the Republic . When this renewed interest in the Ottomans coincided with the emergence of a new area in the Balkans and the Caucasus which the Ottoman Empire had influenced and ruled for centuries, many analysts began to argue about the emergence of a neo-Ottomanism in the region (Çalış, 1996, 373).

Several scholars have commented on modern Turkey's identity problems, and they generally agree that these problems have developed because of the confusion in Turkish society concerning whether Turkey should be identified with Europe or with the Islamic world. They argue that aspects of this problem include the ambiguous nature of Turkey's geographical position, value conflicts within Turkey between groups that lean toward the West and those that strongly identify with the Islamic world, and the rapidly implemented policies of modernization and secularization introduced by Ataturk, modern Turkey's quest to understand its own identity has even been described as "schizophrenic" (see Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003).

Arguments continued in this regard as follows: Modern Turkish foreign policy's conventional foundations, based on Kemalist principles, have been shaken to their roots: new factors have forced decision makers to consider a more active and distinct foreign policy than hitherto followed[9]. In addition, it has also been suggested that in Turkey pan-Islamist, pan-Turkist and even Ottomanist aspirations are on the march, in the face of Turkey's growing interest in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.[10]

In short, it is maintained that Turkish foreign policy has been in a deep crisis of identity, because all traditional, religious, cultural and political elements creating national identity have been faced with a new evaluation/interpretation in Turkey. Many analysts have jumped to the conclusion that modern Turkish foreign policy is now in an identity crisis. Accordingly, the multi-dimensional and active politics was seen deviation

from the established identity of the Turkish foreign policy. Then the same label was ready: Turkey was in identity crisis.

However, as already mentioned in the afore mentioned sections, these policies were not in deviation of the identity of the Turkish foreign and security policy. Yet, what was the case that Turkey could expand its relations to these areas without changing the characteristics of its foreign policy. It was because the structural determinants of the foreign policy have remained the same .Only the options that form the conjunctural determinants were expanded.

As argued (Çalış, 1996), the assertions of the so-called identity crisis do not reflect the real situation of modern Turkish foreign policy either in the 1990s or in the past. This foreign policy displays an unbroken continuity in its conventional understanding which has been developed and applied since the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Above all, as all the previous discussions also imply, this foreign policy has had very tangible and understandable objectives related with the country's modernisation/westernisation movement, and principles based on a strong institutional and constitutional framework. There has not been a permanent situation of inconsistency in decisions and the lack of confidence in application either. Turkey's new role in international politics has also been fully compatible with its conventional understanding of foreign policy. To be more clear, there has been no conflict between Turkey's old and new identity in international relations. Certainly, global, regional and domestic changes have brought about some problems which need to be addressed, but they have not yet caused an identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy. It seems fair to conclude that because it has not shown the symptoms of an identity crisis, Turkish foreign policy has not been suffering from such a crisis.

Constructivist studies conducted about the Turkish foreign policy generally argue for identity crisis or clashes of identity. For example, Bozdalıoğlu's study (2003) on Turkish foreign policy in light of constructivism analyse in depth these developments

in the post-Cold War era and suggest that the Turkish foreign policy has been in an identity crisis in this period.

Yet, here the same constructivist approach in fact seems to provide a deeper analysis in this regard also accounting for the stability and consistency of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

In order to establish a case for an identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy the critics mentioned in the previous pages generally suggest that Turkey has recently been replacing its renowned western oriented foreign policy (old identity) with a more Islamic, Ottomanist and Turkist, or more regional one (new identity). However, as a closer look at the development of modern Turkey's foreign affairs also reveals, the foundations of this foreign policy established by Mustafa Kemal have since remained (Çalış, 1996).

As argued, perhaps some external developments such as the Cyprus problem, the emergence of Central Asia and internal factors such as the rise of some Islamist, Turkist and Socialist opposition groups have affected the content and the style of conducting Turkish foreign policy, but its substance has remained the same. This is mainly because there has been a strong correlation between the Turkish state's identity and the identity governing the conduct of the modern Turkish foreign policy (Çalış, 1996).

For example, when the post-Cold War politics awakened religious coloured wars in the region surrounding Turkey and when some speculators began to argue about the possibility of cultural and religious conflict between nations, Turkish decision makers began to deny such a possibility and tried to keep away from making any policy statement that would remind them of Christian-Muslim conflict in the World. Turkey's Balkan and Azerbaijan policies and its approach to the wars between Muslim Bosnians and Christian Serbs on the one hand and Muslim Azeris and Christian Armenians on the other are a testimony to its long established secular understanding of foreign policy. Despite the fact that there has been a growing opposition in domestic politics that have

always criticised Turkey's secular stand in international politics, Turkish foreign policy has been able to preserve its secular character.

Similarly, Turkey's relations and active policy in the OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference) have also been interpreted as a deviation from its secular stance of the foreign policy. It is true that Turkey has utilised the OIC channels in the post-Cold Ware era for certain aspects. These relations were mainly driven from its concerns such as the increasing insecurity after the Gulf war in the region in particular or its general policy to foster international cooperation in all possible fora. However, these polices have not led to any deviation in the general patterns of Turkish foreign policy mainly the secular pattern. To cite an example, Turkey has not formally joined the OIC as it has not ratified its Charter. What is more, it has submitted a formal declaration to the effect that it will comply with decisions of the OIC to the extent they are consistent with its constitution and state system. These clearly show developing relations with the Muslim world and the OIC has not meant to be an alteration to its general patters of the foreign policy but a contribution to its multidimensional policy in this regard.

As Aybet (1994) puts it,

> despite the changing status quo in neighbouring regions since the end of the Cold War, Turkey continues to apply [its conventional principles] in its relations with old and new states from the Balkans to Central Asia, conducting its traditional foreign policy whilst evaluating new opportunities and new threats to its security.

Not only in the security issues but as a whole, Turkey's foreign policy in the 1990s shows an unbroken continuity in essence and a visible compatibility with its conventional foreign policy understanding. Indeed, there is no convincing evidence proving that Turkish authorities have tried to change the basic tenets of modern Turkish foreign policy rather than responding to changes within the traditional framework. As one of the Turkish analysts put it, Ankara's post-Cold War foreign policy has hitherto been determined by a "two-pronged strategy" of preserving and reinforcing its old relationships accumulated from the previous period, whilst cultivating multilateral ties

with the newly independent countries in its neighbouring regions (Sezer, 1993, 82). But even this cultivation has been kept within the limits of the traditional framework.

In the light of Turkey's response to the regional and global changes in world politics, it is possible to conclude that Turkey's foreign policy direction in the 1990s has so far remained the same as in the previous periods. Turkish decision makers have conducted Turkey's foreign relations in accordance with the conventional principles of Turkish foreign policy which have been developed for seventy years.

Nor have these global changes diminished Turkey's importance in international relations. On the contrary, Turkey has begun to play a more important role in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. While playing its role, Turkey has been able to resist all tempting factors that would undermine its westernisation efforts, its secular identity, its attempts to integrate with the Western world in general and the EU in particular (Çalış, 1996).

In view of the foregoing regarding the unbroken continuity of the foreign and security policy, one can then rightly ask how the Turkish foreign policy has remained consistent despite all these seemingly divergent policies.

In this respect, first, some factual characteristics can be mentioned. Among them is the sterile character of foreign policy from the domestic politics and concerns (Aydın, 1999). To cite an example, one scholar states that " even when the Islamists in power, the deepening of relations did not alter as reflected with the signing of further military co-operation agreement between the parties [Turkey and Israel] on 29 August 1996" (see Bozdağlıoğlu, 2003).

Similarly, as to the effects of domestic forces, for example, shouting in the streets for a change may provide a stimulus for decision makers, but in foreign policy, a field in which the institutions are a dominant factor, reasons other than popular demonstrations would be needed in order to bring about a change (Çalış, 1996).

Another reason for the continuity is that, as argued, Turkish foreign policy has strong institutional and legal/constitutional foundations. The role of leadership is not an independent factor. Despite many changes in the governments and ministries and despite great social fluctuations, the conventional principles of this policy have remained unchanged in the 1980s (Çalış, 1996).

As stated by scholars, Turkish foreign policy has not depended on individuals, groups, parties or even type of regime (Çalış, 1996). The process of Turkey's alignment with Britain and France was started by Ataturk and completed by Inonu with the Tripartite Agreement of 1939. The first Turkish application for NATO membership was made by the Republican People's Party and obtained by the Democrat Party . In 1959, the Democrats applied to the EC for an association agreement, negotiations were conducted by the military regime, and the Ankara Agreement was undersigned by the Republicans. In 1981, the military regime decided to make Turkey's full EC membership application and Ozal put it into practice in 1987. Ozal's Motherland Party started the process of customs union agreement, Demirel-Inonu coalition continued negotiations and Tansu Ciller concluded this process with the signature of the agreement in 1995.

All these clearly suggest that the Turkish foreign policy has not been altered preserving its determinants since the early days of the Republic. Yet, given its multidimensional and active policy, Turkey has followed different policies according to different areas and issues. In fact, policy diversification was present in Turkish foreign policy conduct in the Cold War era as well. But, as the ideological divide became extinct and the constraints of the Cold War were lifted, Turkey could have more policy options with the emergence of new areas.

Thus, one can argue that the determinants of Turkish foreign policy have not been challenged despite all these policies and these policies were the product of the changing conditions in the world affairs.

As mentioned by Kut (1998), the basic principles of Turkish foreign policy have not changed. The new policies of Turkey have not been driven by a renewal of the Turkish foreign policy but by the new international environment and the emergence of new problems and opportunities in the new world order.

To better understand the rationality behind the multi-dimensional posture, the following words of former President Demirel are quite indicative:

> Kosovo, Palestine, Israel, Iraq, they were all in the Ottoman land. Had the empire not collapsed , perhaps we would not have faced problems in these areas today. As they were once the Ottoman soil and part of our people, what happens there is direct concern to us" (Interview with H.E. Demirel) .

As in these regions Turkey had historically cultural, linguistic or religious affinities, the policies of Turkey have been shaped increasingly by such ideational factors. In this sense, constructivist analysis help to argue that such policies directed to these regions and countries were not driven by neo-Ottomanism, but, on the contrary, that they have contributed to the formation of collective identities with these countries in a process of collective recalling.

Mentioning of identities, in fact, behind the continuity in the foreign policy understanding of Turkey,   lies always the unchanged state identity. In this regard, the question of how the state identity governing the Turkish foreign policy has remained consistent despite all these seemingly divergent policies can be offered to two different explanations on the basis of identity analysis of the Turkish foreign policy.

One explanation as offered by Çalış (1996) in his Ph.D thesis, which clearly shows the consistency and unbroken continuity of the foreign policy, suggests that the state identity of Turkey which shaped the determinants of the foreign policy is immune from all these ideational factors in the state's policies directed to these regions. Corollary to this, all these polices followed by the state in regard to these countries and regions are regarded as nothing more than realist-driven manoeuvres. This approach

does not support the existence of multiple identities governing the Turkish foreign policy.

In contrast to the former, this thesis offers an alternative explanation on the basis of the presence of multiple identities in the Turkish foreign policy contributing to the consistency of this policy.

As earlier mentioned, the determinants of the Turkish foreign policy coupled with those of the state identity form the upper (superior) identity governing the foreign policy. Yet, this is not to ignore the facts that each policy directed to different regions such as the Central Asia or the Middle East or to the Muslim world in general, has led to the construction of a special identity on its special case.

Modern Turkey, thanks to its geo-strategic location with borders on Europe, the Middle East, and the new republics of the former Soviet Union, has been able to play a role in world politics far greater than its population and economic strength would indicate. Historically, Turkey is located on one of the most, if not the most, strategic and traditionally most coveted pieces of territory. It controls the historic invasion routes from the Balkans and the Caucasus mountains onto the high Anatolian plateau, which in turn commands the entire Fertile Crescent down to the oil-rich Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. Turkey is also at the crossroads of major air, land, and sea routes of modern times, joining the industrially advanced lands of Europe with the petroleum-rich lands of the Middle East. Furthermore, the country possesses the sources for most of the water irrigating lands as far as the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, during the Cold War Turkey was also on the line of conflict between the ones of two military superpowers and their respective alliances. And from the north to the south, it was in a rather sensitive part of the Mediterranean, where both superpowers tried to expand their spheres of influence and counterbalance each other.

This particular geographical position makes Turkey a Balkan, Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern country at the same time. It also makes Turkey doubly susceptible

to international developments near and far and, thus, greatly sensitive to the changes in the international political balance as well as the regional one (Aydın, 1999).

In this process, ideational factors help to shape the identities constructed *vis a vis* these regions. These identities are developed in a process of collective recalling on the basis of cultural, historical, linguistic and religious affinities. In other words, all these identities do not clash with the upper identity that governs the foreign policy. It is because each of these identities do contain the determinants that shape the foreign policy in addition to their ideational factors that make them differ from each other. In other words, these identities cohabit as sub-identities with the state identity that shape the foreign policy as the upper identity.

As discussed in earlier chapters, states can possess multiple identities. As long as they are in harmony in the sense that they cohabit as sub-identities under one superior identity, identity clashes can be avoided.

The specification of state identity in any particular case involves a series of interrelated analytical tasks. First, one must delineate the policy area in question. Because states interact with many other states and participate in more than one international institution, they can have multiple, overlapping identities at any point in time. In order to define state identity with any accuracy, then, one therefore first has to delineate a particular policy context - the background against which identity is defined. This first analytical step does not eliminate the problem of multiple identities. Nor does it determine the content of a particular identity in question. A particular set of institutions and actors in a given policy context often will allow for different kinds of state identity.

In this sense, this thesis argues that different identities constructed by Turkey in the conduct of foreign and security policy in the post-Cold war era, do not clash with each other as they are the part of the superior identity, i.e. the identity of the Turkish foreign policy. But, what is more, multiple identities are in fact the product of the multi-dimensional policy of Turkey in this era.

The multi-dimensional character of the Turkish foreign policy has gained its momentum gradually from the beginning of the Post-Cold War era and ideologically formulated and institutionalised in the period following the EU Luxembourg summit denying to Turkey its long-waited status as candidate for EU membership.

This policy is in fact seen a the necessity due to the historical, geographical and economic potentials of the state (MFA budget speech, 2000) . This clearly reflects the importance of both material (economic and geography) and ideational(history/affinities) factors in the formulation of the foreign policy of the state.

In this multidimensional policy, Turkey's reach to its adjacent regions were stressed with such discourses as historical geography, cultural and historical affinities and Turkey was stressed as a "global state". They clearly show the increasing use and role of ideational factors in the construction of the identity governing   such multi-dimensional policy.   All state dignitaries interviewed in fact acknowledged the role of such ideational factors in the polices followed by Turkey. Yet, they all underlined that rationalism and realism have always prevailed over such ideational concerns. Similarly, as stated by Ambassador Ziyal, former undersecretary of the MFA, "in the conduct of foreign and security   policy realism overrides ; yet, socio-psychological (ideational) factors enrich these polices" (Interview with H.E. Ziyal).

As can be seen in the above statements of those dignitaries,   such ideational factors are generally serving as variables in sub-identities. In fact, the upper identity that governs the Turkish foreign policy is formed mainly by material factors driven by realist concerns, such as concerns for survival, territorial integrity and borders, independence, security from military and other attacks etc. These constants are also prevalent in all other sub-identities forming the backbone of them. Yet, what differs from each other is the combination of variables as mentioned above that are mostly of ideational nature in the sub-identites.

In this context, one should also underline the following : In contrast to the high level of use of material factors and realist aspects in the conduct of Turkish foreign and security policy by the state organs such as Government, Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, the ideational factors seem to have found their reflections mostly in the debates of the Turkish parliament. The analysis of the debates that took place at the parliament on the issues of state security matters clearly shows that parliamentarians spell out more ideational aspects of any security issue under discussion than realist (material) aspects of such issue (see the TGNA official gazette of session records and Yenigün, 2004).

Having said that, one can illustrate the role of these material and ideational factors in the upper and sub-identities in the figure as follows:


Figure 2: Spectrum of material and ideational factors in the formation of identities

As one can see, the weight of the material factors and realist concerns becomes high in the upper (superior) identity whereas ideational factors matter more in sub-identities. This perfectly reflects the Turkish foreign policy posture in the context of constructivist analysis.

b. Security identity of Turkey

Having mentioned the state identity governing the Turkish foreign policy in general, one should also dwell upon the security identity of the state in the post-Cold War era as it has also shaped the policies followed by Turkey particularly in the field of collective security in this era.

As mentioned by Bagcı (2004a, 941), Turkey's national security policy can be better understood by two principles: protection of territory and national unity; defending legitimate rights and freedoms.

Most studies on Turkish foreign and security policies in the post-Cold War era emphasize the impact of the changing international structure. The disappearance of the Soviet and/or Communist menace for Turkey's territorial integrity and Western, democratic, liberal identity has absolutely significant implications for Turkish national security and strategy. However, new threat perceptions have ascended as the Cold War's stability and certainty gave way to uncertainty and instability. The Gulf-War of 1990-91, the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Chechen-Russian conflict, and the Bosnian crisis among others, have all, one way or another, had negative effects on Turkey's security. The immediate aftermath of the Cold War presented uncertainty, instability and fluidity that Turkey had to respond to effectively and to eliminate. In short, the Soviet threat has waned but new threats emerged in Turkey's near environment in which Greece, Syria and Iraq appeared as the most threatening states for Turkey's national security (see Çalış, 1996).

The Turkish case explained demonstrates how countries update the practice of their cultural values and understandings of their place in the world according to changes in the international system. Ideational essence survives through the process of evolution of identity, and this evolution is a process that is punctuated by shifts in the international social system. When events trigger a radical change in the international system, states

react by applying traditional perspectives to new circumstances. What emerges is a different form of foreign policy practice, but one that is still based on certain constant ideas that reflect the identity shaping states' international role (Ryan, 2002).

As already mentioned in the theoretical discussions of constructivism in the previous chapters, the main determinant to shape the security identity is related to the perception of insecurity of the state . This perception leads states to securitize issues and thus serve to construct their security identity.

In this regard, some scholars like Bilgin use critical constructivist explanations to analyse the security identity of Turkey. Bilgin's works (2002,2003 and 2004) and others such as the work of Kösebalaban (2004) argue that Turkey's security culture and thus identity are primarily affected by the fear of loss of territory, division of the country and distrust of foreign nations. This posture of insecurity is generally called " Sevres syndrome" in a negative manner to mostly criticize the state elites' over caution and scepticism in this regard.

These arguments are relevant in understanding the sources of insecurity in the formation of the security identity in Turkey. Yet, what lacks in this context is that these works do consider this insecurity feeling and perceptions of the state as simply ideational or ideological. They do not attempt to find other concerns that are driven by the realist parameters of the world. This is in a way normal because such scholar do not adopt conventional constructivism but follow mainly critical version of constructivism disregarding the importance of realism in world politics. However, once one applies conventional constructivism, i.e. taking into account the realist world outside and its effects on the construction of such identities, one can easily see that such syndromes are in fact the product of past experiences of a country that has won its independence against other countries and whose land has always been the focus of interest of big powers for their own policies in and around the country.

In other words, Bilgin and others in their useful arguments prefer to explain the insecurity as an ideational factor with only ideational factors whereas this thesis enriches this explanation with the help of material factors of the realist world as it does not deny the existence of outside world functioning in realist terms.

In fact, the realities in the world both in the past and at present shape states' perceptions. As to the past experiences of the Turkish state , it is argued that the state learned, as a result of centuries-long hostilities with their neighbours, not to trust any state, to rest on nothing but their own strength, and to be ready to fight at any given time. This is indeed reflected in the proverb common in Turkey: "water sleeps, but never does enemy".

Consequently, it is also argued that Turkish diplomats are famous, among other things, for being sceptical and cautious. The Foreign Ministry always takes its time in answering any given foreign statement or memorandum as if searching for the real intentions behind the lines (Aydın, 1999,162). There is also a sense of insecurity in Turkey, a direct legacy of the Ottoman Empire, reflected even today in statements.

Those concerns and perceptions of insecurity are the product of historical experiences of the state. Thus, history matters in the formation of such insecurities and duly the securitization of certain issues. As in the words of former President Demirel, "…in forming and conducting the security policy of Turkey, the collapse of a world empire and various implications on the Republic need to be assessed as well." (Interview with H.E. Demirel). The importance of history is also emphasized by Ambassador Ziyal as " in the lens that is the security identity of the state, the tint is history" (Interview with H.E. Ziyal).

In addition to the insecurity perceptions driven mainly by the realities of the world in history and at present, the security identity of Turkey has also been shaped by its geography. Located in a region where it has always been surrounded by volatile and instable sub-regions and countries, Turkey's perception of insecurity and thus the

security identity has been inevitably affected by such geography.   Here, one should note that it is not geography alone to shape the security identity of the state but the existence of threat and insecurity perceptions of the state in regard to other states in this geography. In other words, material factors like geography can affect the security identity only coupled with such ideational factors as perception of insecurity deriving from this geography.

In this regard, in the perceptions of insecurity and securitization, not only the countries in the surrounding regions of Turkey and their policies do play a role, but also the other countries' perceptions on Turkey in terms of its geographical location and strategic importance are determinant in this process. For example, as noted by one analyst,

> Turkey is situated in a critical geographic position on and around which continuous and multidimensional power struggles with a potential to affect the balance of power at world scale take place. The arcs that could be used by world powers in all sorts of conflicts pass through Turkey. Turkish territory, airspace and seas are not only a necessary element to any force projection in the regions stretching from Europe and Asia to the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Africa, but also make it possible to control its neighbourhood...All these features make Turkey a centre that must be controlled and acquired by those aspiring to be world powers (See Bağcı and Kardaş, 2003, 29).

Affected by these sources of insecurity, in the post-Cold War, such issues as the power vacuum in Northern Iraq, separatist terrorism, fundamentalist Islam, along with other manifestations of asymmetric security threats,   have been gradually securitized adding to the security identity of the state along with other conventional sources of insecurity descent from the previous era.

In this regard, it is also important to mention that Turkey's internationalist posture in foreign policy has been further developed to extend it to joining military campaigns in the format of peace keeping or enforcement under the mandates of international organisations. Turkey's active participation in the collective security operations are clear testimony to this development of the internationalist posture of the state.

Mentioning of the internationalist posture, one can also see as regards the security identity, the continuation of the policy of the state to act alone without seeking the support of the international community in matters directly affecting its security, albeit always in line with international law and norms.

In this regard, the Kardak crisis stands as a good example. This crisis that erupted over a non-habited rocky islet in the Aegean is of significant value for constructivist understanding in many aspects. In December 1995 one Turkish vessel run grounded on this islet. When Turkish authorities sent rescue to it, Greece declared that it was a Greek territory. In the aftermath, first a Greek pastor hoisted a Greek flag on the islet that followed Turkish people to replace the flag with the Turkish one. This led the Greek army to send troops to the islet and responded by Turkey in the same manner (MFA Yearbook,1995). This strange story not only attested to the continuation of Turkey's traditional policy to act alone in such issues of security without hesitation despite its internationalist posture, but also clearly illustrates the importance of symbolism in the national identity and also the conduct of foreign policy in both countries at the expense of rationality as they were allies in NATO. It in this sense also shows the fact how both sides regarded each other as "other".

Another case is in this regard was the crisis with Syria. In October 1998 Turkey and Syria almost went to war. The long-running dispute between the two countries flared up when several Turkish officials, civilian and military, in response to Syria's sanctuary provided for many years to PKK terrorist chieftain Ocalan, started to talk about an "undeclared war Syria had been waging against Turkey" and "Ankara's right to respond" (Altunışık, 2004, 213), which indeed forced Syria to expel Ocalan out of the country.

Both clearly show that Turkey acted decisively without seeking the support of the international community but always in line with international law and norms on matters that are perceived as a security threat and thus securitized by the state.

v. CLOSING REMARKS

To summarize the whole episode of the post-Cold War era as regards the Turkish foreign and security policy, the following can be emphasized:

Turkey emerged from the Cold War with multiple threats to its security. However, new emphasis on threats, together with opportunities, eventually also led to activism in the foreign and security policy.

In the meantime the post-Cold War international system also paved the way for regional powers like Turkey to tackle their own security problems independently.

Another important factor through which Turkey's foreign policy should be seen is the legality of its actions in the international arena. In Turkey it is honourable to comply with international commitments. Although its inflexible policies, which have often resulted from an all too legalistic approach toward international questions, would delay and sometimes prevent possible solutions, Turkey still insists on abiding by rigid legality. This is argued as " a direct result of the memories of the last years of the Ottoman Empire when the only way to preserve its existence and independence as the reliance on international agreements" (see Aydın, 1999). It may also be argued that this attitude is simply a continuation of a tradition established and carefully followed by Ataturk in the early days of the Turkish republic.

Turkey is not offensive or expansionist in its relations. It exploits all diplomatic channels and means but still thinks of the use of force as the last resort of diplomacy. It increases its military hardware for defensive and deterrence purposes but when necessary it does not eschew from making use of them, however rare is it—a case of Cyprus in 1974 and Northern Iraq operations in the post-Gulf War period. Both territorial integrity and national sovereignty which is the sine qua non for its national

identity are vital to be secured against not only external but also internal threats (Küçük, 1999).

As argued, other   factor which should be kept in mind when evaluating Turkish foreign policy is Turkey's desire to improve its image among the international community. Although Turkish politicians and diplomats usually argue otherwise, contemporary Turkey cares for 'international public opinion' and responds to pressures from the international arena (Aydın, 1999).

The aforementioned combination of the Turkish foreign and security policy posture can be perhaps best explained by the policies directed at the Middle East. As argued, the policies directed at the Middle East   can probably be partially explained by Turkey's general foreign policy activism after the end of the Cold War. The first substantial change occurred as a result of President Ozal's decision to join the first Gulf War coalition against Iraq. This was a multilateralist move which continued with the operations "Provide Comfort" and "Northern Watch". The most significant reason for the change, however, was the terrorist activities of the PKK, combined with the lack of international anti-terrorist cooperation, 'which urged Turkey to take actions unilaterally (Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, 18).

Turkey is influenced by two trends that characterize the present globalizing international system. While its EU candidacy, NATO membership, its active performance in the PfP and participation in peace operations are inspiring internationalization, multilateralism, cooperative security, its regional environment is suggesting security through power politics and the sustained primacy of the nation-state (Karaosmanoğlu, 2004, 19).

Considering the transformation in international politics since the 1980s as a whole, it is possible to identify some important developments which have given Turkey substantial opportunities to play a more influential role on the world stage as well as some constraints, without abandoning its traditional foreign policy understanding.

Although it is true that the disappearance of the already established security system first undermined Turkey's importance, the emergence of the other factors have restored Ankara's key role in the Western system of states.

Indeed, contrary to the expectations, the end of the Cold War has so far neither diminished Turkey's position in international politics nor adversely affected its western oriented foreign policy. Instead, Turkey's relations with the West in general and the EU in particular have improved and entered a period of rapprochement which has culminated with the EU's acceptance to start the process of membership with Turkey.

As once argued by the security affairs advisor of the President, Turkey's role became a frontline state in the intersection of conflicting regions of the Middle East, the Balkans, and the Trans-Caucasus instead of a flank country of NATO during the Cold War (Cakar, 1996, 20). Despite all these changes, Turkey's security objectives remain significantly the same: to protect the independence, freedom and integrity of the country, maintain the constitutional order and its principles, promote the economy and welfare of the nation, develop friendly relations with other countries and create an environment of peace and stability around Turkey (see MFA web site).

There are many attempts to explain continuity in modern Turkey's foreign affairs since the time of Ataturk. But they have ascribed this continuity to such factors as the pragmatist nature of Kemalist ideology, nationalism, national interest, the rationalist approaches of Turkish decision makers or Turkey's historical past and geopolitical position. They have either ignored or underestimated the notion of the state's identity. However, as this thesis has attempted to argue, neither identity nor interest alone can truly explain Turkish foreign policy between 1991-2001. On the contrary both are necessary to account for it as they act in relation to each other, the former shaping the latter, and these notions have played a central role not only in forming the Turkish foreign policy but also in the continuation of this policy understanding in the post-Cold war era through an increasing posture of multi-dimensionalism supported by multiple

sub-identities that cohabit with the upper identity of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

B. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RELEVANT FOR TURKEY'S SECURITY IDENTITY

In the post-Cold War era, given the transboundary effects of globalisation that make things heavily interdependent, sufficiency of natural security in tackling such security risks and threats of global character has been questioned. In this regard, it is argued that conceptions of global peace and security based primarily on national security are no longer sufficient. In this context, Katzenstein (1996)   recognises that with the end of the Cold War, the mix of factors affecting national security is changing. Given these arguments, one can rightly assert that national security and collective security are interrelated. Thus, it has become clear that under the conditions of the globalised world, in order to manage the security risks at present, national security needs strongly complemented with collective security efforts..

In view of the foregoing, this section concentrates on Turkey's relations with NATO and the EU as well as its contributions to collective security operations in the post-Cold War era in respect to the security identity of the state and the effects of the developments on this identity in these areas. Therefore, as to these relations, each of which has in fact several aspects and dimensions,   only the events and developments that are considered to be relevant for the analysis of security analysis of the state in view of the constructivist understanding will be focused on.

In this context, Turkey's relations with NATO will be viewed in its contribution to the collective identity in terms of security between Turkey and the Alliance together with its members. On the other hand, Turkey's relations with EU in the field of security will be assessed as to the absence of such collective identity between the two sides. Finally, Turkey's contributions to and policies on the collective security operations in the pos-Cold War era will be emphasized in respect to the role of ideational factors in

these policies and thus in the security identity constructed by the state as to collective security.

i.   CONSTRUCTIVIST APPRAISAL OF NATO-TURKEY RELATIONS

As mentioned in the preceding sections, NATO has always been considered indispensable for Turkey not only for its national security and defence but also for its collective security policies (MFA Web site and see also Eralp, 1997b).   As noted by Bagcı (2001a), it is despite the fact that admission to the Alliance was not an easy process for Turkey and to convince NATO about its strategic value in the defence and security of the Alliance and its allies,   the state had to bear enormous challenges, among which was the deployment of Turkish troops to the Korean war, on the way to its joining the Alliance.

Joining NATO can be seen, on the one hand, as motivated by realist concerns to strengthen the security of the state in face of the Soviet threat and expansionism in the aftermath of Cold War II.

Yet, on the other hand, given the constructivist explanation, NATO membership can also be seen as stimulated by a quest of   the state for building a collective identity with its Western allies in NATO in face of its increasingly perceived insecurity as to the same Soviet threat. Whatever the reason might be, the end result was the same, i.e. to strengthen the security of Turkey thanks to NATO.

A collective identity constituted at a higher level of aggregation than the state - such as an international or regional institution- has a constitutive effect in constructing identities of its constituting members. Schimmelfennig (1998/99) notes that NATO represents an institutionalized identity of democratic allies culminating in a pluralistic security community in which a security of each is considered the responsibility of all. National interests become the interests of NATO. Because collective identity formation is a process of defining who 'we' are, at the same time it

delineates the boundaries with and against the 'other.' This collective identity then prescribes the norms of rules and roles members are to take towards those perceived as 'us' and those perceived as the "other".

NATO has been a peculiar mixture of an alliance and security community. In this context, as a collective defence organisation it has provided security for its members against the outside threat, the Soviet expansion, with its collective defence mechanism. Thus, one can argue that throughout the Cold War era NATO contributed to Turkey's defence and security, in addition to its own national security capability against the Soviet Bloc, i.e. the Warsaw pact, that was the "other" of the Western world.

On the other hand, the Alliance has also acted as a security community among its members while also deterring and countering security threats coming from outside as well. In this regard, NATO, as a security community, helped easing the tensions between Turkey and Greece to date.

In this regard, one can suggest that particularly the national identity of Greece and that of Turkey to some extent are constructed in contrast to each other. In fact, it is argued that "the conflicting identities of Turks and Greeks are their mutually exclusive construction of national identities" (Millas, 1995, 23-31). Furthermore, even one Greek scholar notes that

> Hellenism as an identity of Modern Greece was defined and imposed on Greeks by Europeans in return for help in their independence movement. Greeks, thus, embraced an anti-Turkish construction of Hellenic identity, which idealizes the Greek civilization as the source of western civilization and defines Turks as barbaric and uncivilized (Yerasimos, 1988, 40).

Based on this self/other dichotomy, Turkish-Greek relations since the 1960s seem to have operated on the structure of a security dilemma. In a standard security dilemma, each state wants to ensure its defense and to diminish its threat perceptions by increasing its armament. However, as the two parties rely on their national strength and increase their capabilities for this reason, those capabilities are perceived as offensive

rather than defensive because the social structure between the sides is conflictual. In this situation, weapons, for instance, have no intrinsic quality, rather they are socially/intersubjectively defined as ideational factors shaping the identities of the states.

Despite these ideational impediments, one can argue that although both countries have seen each other "its other", NATO membership helped avoiding undesirable consequences in the relations between the two countries, by bringing them together under a collective identity constructed in NATO throughout the Cold War years .

What is more, as already argued in the preceding sections, Turkey's Western identity was also represented mostly by its membership in NATO in the Cold War. Indeed, "throughout the Cold War, NATO was represented as the bastion of 'Western' identity" (Bilgin, 2003, 345). Similarly, Turkey has also defended the Western identity since its admission in the Alliance.

Nevertheless, Turkey-NATO relations have also had to pass serious ordeals throughout these years. As earlier discussed in detail, the Johnson letter of 1964 and the changes of NATO strategy from the "massive retaliation" to "flexible response" in the same decade were serious blows for Turkey as to its perception of the Alliance for its security and defence. Yet, as emphasized again in the earlier sections, these developments did not cause any change in the policy of Turkey and its collective identity with the Alliance, but they simply led to a more balanced and multi-dimensional foreign and security policy to the extent possible under the constraints of the Cold War era given the fear of nuclear war. Another impact of the frustration due to the Johnson letter can be argued as the changed understanding mainly in the Turkish military to focus on national sources to develop more independent military structure and capability. This new orientation in fact helped to render it possible to carry out the peace operation in Cyprus as the guarantor power in 1974.

The second test came right after the end of the Cold War as the Gulf crisis erupted. During the Gulf war, NATO became even more important for Turkey. On the eve of the military operation against Iraq, NATO sent its contingency troops to protect the Turkish border. The following words of the then Turkish foreign Minister are testimony to this: "Turkey invited the allied mobile force to show Iraq that NATO backs Turkey in case of any aggression" (MFA Yearbook, 1990).

The allied mobile force (AMF) of NATO and patriot anti-missiles were deployed upon the invitation of the Turkish Government along its border with Iraq to deter any aggression from during the war. However, the reluctant attitude of some allies sending troops in this force were met by Turkey with disappointment. For example, Germany and Belgium had stated that they would withdraw their forces in case the war broke up (MFA yearbook 1991) . But they did not. In these context, the following anecdote is quite indicative about the situation between Turkey and Germany at that time:

> In face of Germany's reluctance to send troops to Turkey, (president) Özal argued in a German news programme … that Germany was responsible for Saddam's ability to threaten the use of biological and chemical weapons. Therefore the Germans should accept their responsibility and help the Turks. Kohl phoned Özal immediately to assure him that the FRG would lend military assistance in the event of an Iraqi attack on Turkey (Zehfuss, 2002, 65) .

Another test came with the enlargement process of the Alliance. In this context, it seems that realist concerns and rationalism has prevailed (see Karaosmanoğlu, 1995). Cognizant of the conditions of the post-Cold war security environment, Turkey did not oppose to the enlargement. Instead, it has sought to avoid any security weakness or economic damage that might be incurred from the enlargement of the Alliance. In fact, from the very beginning the state has naturally sought to benefit from the enlargement by supporting the accession of the countries of the Balkans as their admission was perceived by the state as being important to bridge over the security gap prevailing due to the geographical distance between Turkey and the rest of the allies. Thus, Turkey has defended the accession of the Balkan countries as they would enrich the Alliance with a "strategic depth" (MFA website, Foreign policy, 2005).

Yet, despite this *rationale,* it is also a fact that at the EU December 1996 Summit, (Prime Minister) Erbakan implied that Turkey would veto the enlargement of NATO if Turkey was not clearly named to be a candidate of the EU (Rumelili, 2002, 193). Nevertheless, this policy did not materialize as the realist posture of the Turkish foreign and security policy prevailed at the end.

The last ordeal stemmed from the divergent understandings between Turkey and its allies about terrorism in general and the fight of Turkey against the PKK separatist terrorism in particular in the post-Cold War era. Turkey always sought to raise awareness among its allies about the danger of terrorism and raised this issue in the framework of NATO. As Bagcı notes (2003, 20), Turkish governments endeavoured to generate international concern about terrorism in general. They worked hard to convince European countries to limit the activities of various separatist, leftist and Islamic organisations. As part of its activities, Turkey even tried on some occasions to bring the terror issue onto NATO's agenda.

But, as mentioned in chapter IV, the allies did not pay enough attention to this scourge and Turkey's appeals in this regard,   even if terrorism was gradually listed among asymmetric security threats in NATO declarations due mainly to Turkey's efforts.

This attitude can be attributed to some reasons that are summed up as follows:

First, the allies were most probably concerned with the fact that Turkey was heavily engaged in the fight against separatist PKK terrorism threatening its territorial integrity. Thus, accepting terrorism as security threat for which Article V can be invoked, would force them to decide whether to help Turkey or not, in its fight against terrorism. In both cases serious controversy would likely emerge given the attitude of some allies condoning PKK terrorism.

Secondly, some allies of Turkey regarded PKK separatist terrorists implicitly or sometimes explicitly as guerrillas and even freedom fighters. This was another fact that could have prevented the alliance from coming up with a common understanding about the nature of terrorism as a security threat against the alliance.

Separatist terrorism has inevitably affected Turkey's relations with its European partners and allies even in NATO. In this process, the following are the common problems that persisted between Turkey and its allies:

- The lack of common understanding about terrorism between Turkey and its allies, as the terrorist of one was seen as the freedom fighter by others.

- the double standards used by its allies towards Turkey in its fight against terrorism even leading to the suspension of arms exportations to Turkey by its allies

- The sanctuary both in political and military terms provided by some allies of Turkey to the separatist terrorists.

Yet, the September 11 terrorist attacks seem to have changed this indifferent attitude of its allies towards terrorism and the importance of international cooperation to counter it.

In this sense, NATO's decision to invoke Article 5 was a welcome development for Turkey, as expressed by Ambassador Onur Öymen, Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO during that time:

> We have always called for terrorist activities to be included within the Article 5...We have always stated that an attack does not only mean a country's intrusion into another country's territory but it also covers terrorist attacks which [are] an international problem. That's why NATO's invocation of Article 5 is very important for us (see Bagcı & Kardaş, 2003, 22).

In this regard, September 11 has overall contributed to the strategic importance of Turkey in the eyes of its Western allies. In other words, Turkey's unique position both in the West and in the Muslim world given its history, geography and religion, not to mention its military expertise and experience in the fight against terrorism, seems to have positively affected the lenses through which the West sees Turkey in the face of the new terrorist phenomenon labelled as Islamist fundamentalism. In addition to these, as NATO invoked Article V of the Washington Treaty and accepted the use of military to counter this terrorism as was the case in the military campaign in Afghanistan, this in a sense also help to justify Turkey's fight against the PKK terrorism by military means.

In this regard, the decision of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (Declaration on the Fight against terrorism adopted by the NATO Parliamentary Assembly at the 2001 Ottowa Plenary Session) after the September 11 attacks to urge "the allies to take the necessary step, either through a declaration by the NAC or in a formal revision of the Strategic Concept, to state explicitly that *military action is a legitimate response to acts of international terrorism if it is agreed that these acts fall under article 5"* can be seen as testimony to this mentality change among the European parliamentarians. This is interesting because these parliamentarians who are also the national deputies of their countries, were mostly critical in the past about the use of military measures by Turkey, to counter terrorist military attacks on its own territory.

In this process, it is evident that the higher the understanding among allies is about the fact that nothing can justify terrorism, the more likely it becomes to overcome the paradoxes surrounding the issue. As the perceived leading beneficiaries of today's globalised world order, the West has become a prime target of terrorists as witnessed in September 11. This fact can be a stimulating factor in changing the paradoxical attitude of the western allies.

To sum up, as all these cases above clearly show, the difficulties that arose in Turkey's relations with NATO were mainly due to the attitudes of its allies rather than the Alliance itself. One can argue that these problems were mainly because of the

uncertainty about the strategic importance of Turkey for these allies as the "other", the Soviet Bloc, that brought these allies in NATO together, became extinct at the end of the Cold War. These attitudes inevitably led to a growing perception of insecurity in Turkey towards its allies, which are mainly the EU members.

Bilgin (2003, 348) criticizes these attitudes as follows:

> Turkey's contribution to security in Europe was not limited to its military capability and geographical location. More specifically, Turkey's participation in the Korean War was instrumental in its joining NATO not only because of Turkish military contributions to the war effort but also because Turkey helped to constitute the West and strengthen Western solidarity at a time when these were rather fragile. Thus, a different lesson that could be drawn from the past is that Turkey helped to secure the Western identity through its security policies during the Cold War.

However, these difficulties seem not to have gone far to lead Turkey to question the importance of the Alliance as a whole (see Eralp, 1997b) . This can be attributed to the continuation of realist concerns such as the importance of NATO for Turkey's security and defence as well as Turkey's reliance on such a military alliance for its foreign and security policy.

Yet, from the constructivist perspective, this is also thanks to the collective identity that Turkey has developed with the Alliance. As one recent survey indicates (Dağı, 2004), the importance of NATO has never been questioned in Turkey. In the post-Cold War era, the Turkish public still consider NATO as necessary for Turkey's security.

Having said that, despite the continuing support for NATO both in state and in public, concerns about the future of this alliance have unavoidably arisen in the recent years. One of the concerns in this regard is related to the attitude of the US administration as observed in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

Initially, US acted almost unilaterally in Afghanistan; others followed from behind. In this regard, the words expressed in the MFA budget Speech of 2003 are quite

indicative about the perceptions of the Turkish state concerning the US policy in the post-September 11 era: "The USA has become only polar in political and military terms in the world. At the same time, with the strong effects of the traumas it underwent, the USA has tended to pursue its truths and interests assertively in the aftermath of September 11". Here, what is more interesting is that one year earlier there was only mention of words for praises to the US administration as regards its polices in Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11 Attacks (MFA Budget Speech 2002). NATO's relevance has since been widely debated not only in Turkey but also in all other fora in general. Was Washington circumventing the Alliance? Had NATO lost its utility for USA? As earlier discussed in Chapter 3, the US military strategy based on acting with coalition partners while using the military capabilities of NATO naturally raised questions about the US commitment to the core of the Alliance rather than using it as a logistic support for its military campaigns .

In this regard, as mentioned by Ambassador Moralı (2004), at the Prague summit that was named the "transformation summit", NATO has embarked on creating the force, command structures and military capabilities that will enable swift, effective and sustainable responses to security challenges wherever and whenever necessary. Areas of shortcoming have been identified and allies have been asked to enter into concrete commitments to rectify them, in response to the requirements of a security environment dominated by anxieties about renegade forces with capacity to inflict heavy unconventional damage. Naturally, time will show whether this process of transformation since Prague would preserve and strengthen the relevance and importance of the Alliance for its allies.

The other concern of Turkey is related to the growing military posture of the EU within the framework of the ESDP and its possible implications on the relevance of NATO for these countries. This in fact forms the one of the main core issues between Turkey and the EU in recent years that will be discussed in the following section.

ii. CONSTRUCTIVIST APPRAISAL OF EU- TURKEY RELATIONS

Turkey's relations with the European Union (EU) have a long and old history dating back to 1950s. This is reflected by the Turkish Foreign Ministry as follows:

> The first goal [that drives Turkey's foreign policy vision for the future] is to make Turkey an integral part of the European Union. Historically, geographically and economically, Turkey is a European country. It is therefore quite natural that she should become a full member of the EU, sooner rather than later. The December 2004 decision by the EU to initiate accession negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005, is an important step towards the attainment of this strategic objective. Turkey brings the contemporary standards of democracy, secularism, free market economy, good governance and habitual regional cooperation to the threshold of the Middle East and Eurasia (MFA website, Foreign policy synopsis, 2005).

One can put forward several arguments that might account for the essence of this relationship. Yet, to be consistent with the theoretical framework of the thesis, from the constructivist perspective, one should note that the EU membership has also meant to Turkey for the culmination of its European identity through a historical process stemming from the Ottoman time to date.

Naturally, the relations between Turkey and the EU have evolved through a process of ebbs and flows facing several ordeals due to a great variety of problems descent from both sides. Developments in the post-Cold War era, have added to this complex relationship a security dimension.

In fact, as one can rightly argue, "the story of European integration began with defence" (Howorth, 2000, 1). The European integration process can be defined with the following formula: integration because of security needs and security through integration[11].

The Post-war era for the Western Europeans was initially shaped by two important concerns that arose at the end of the war: how to prevent Germany's revival as a war machine as it did after the first World War and how to resist the Soviet threat and

expansion. Western Europeans became faced with two big challenges for their security. These two security concerns seem to have played an important role in the integration process among Western Europeans for the first time in the history of the continent.

Following the failure of the supranational project of the European Defence Community, the Western Europeans took the functionalist path to start the integration through their economies. Their concerns about security and defence were taken care of in NATO. It was clear that Western Europeans took collective security matters outside the European integration, as NATO was the perfect choice that time with the strong presence and commitment of one of the Super Powers, the USA. The conjuncture was also not helping for otherwise. The various international crises which sporadically erupted in East-West relations raised the spectre of transforming the Cold war even into a 'hot' war. The building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the invasion of Hungary in 1956, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and the Czechoslovakia crisis of 1968 were all spectacular developments in which the West had no other alternative but NATO for their own security and defence (Aybet, 1997, 58) .

The 1970s and the 1980s witnessed the dichotomy of "entrapment/abandonment" between the European allies, most of which were also the EC members and the US, mainly due to the issues such as "burden sharing" and "fear of decoupling". Under such circumstances came the first major revision of the Community Treaties with the signature of the Single European Act (SEA) in 1985. This Act was a breakthrough for the EC members in many aspects.

The SEA also gave the European Political Co-operation (EPC), EU's intergovernmental side, a mandate in political and economic aspects of security. As argued, "ever since the EC began to discuss security and foreign policy objectives" (Schultze, 1992, 327) .

The EU (then EC) has become a security community in the sense of preventing security threats coming from its own members. The interlocking values and interests that have emerged among the EU members in the European integration process have indeed contributed to this end. Western Europeans being yet vulnerable to outside threats of the common other, the Soviet Bloc, NATO still functioned as the bedrock of European security and defence. As the Cold War ended with the collapse of this other, the EC countries felt relieved enormously that facilitated the opening of new horizons in their polices including security and defence matters.

In the transformed security environment of the post-Cold War era, the Turkish-EU relations seem to have faced an increasing number of severe issues concerning security that have also risked casting a dense shadow on Turkey's march onto membership. In this regard, arguments have been elaborated in the literature. These can be summarized as follows:

The one side of this problematic period is related to Turkey's polices and geographical location as well as their perception by the EU as to its security[12].

In the literature, Turkey is often praised for having produced 'security' during the Cold War by constituting a "bulwark against the expansion of Soviet military power" (Larrabee, 1997, 14). Thus, in view of such arguments Turkey was seen "dispensable" for post-Cold War security environment where no Soviet threat existed (Bilgin, 2004, 27) . Accordingly, traditional approaches considered Turkey's contribution as limited to its geographical location—a base for military force projection. In other words, from such traditionalist perspective, "Turkey could only be represented as a rather typical developing country that has lost some of its significance for its European allies now that the Cold War has ended" (Bilgin, 2004, 45).

Moreover, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey's multi-faceted policies in its adjacent regions were mostly interpreted as adventurist and even labelled by the EU as "neo-Ottamanism", as previously argued. No doubt, this criticism was most likely due

the fact that these polices were not also perceived by EU members as being in line with their interests in these regions.

In addition to Turkey's assertiveness as perceived by the EU in the former's polices, the geographical location of the country was considered to be the *conflict triangle* due to the tensions and hot conflicts as well as wars in the regions of the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East that were also posing security threats to the EU owing to the transboundary effects of the globalised world. Besides, Turkey's tensed relations with one of the EU member, Greece, and with the Greek Cypriot administration were also not seen as helpful to overcome the growing negative perception of the EU and its members about Turkey and this country's effects on their security. The result was, as emphasized in the previous section, that Turkey was labelled as a country not producing security, but rather consuming security and causing insecurity to the EU.

Turkey's fight against separatist PKK terrorism further exacerbated this perception. Along with the EU's criticism towards Turkey on the basis of human rights and democratisation as regards the latter's polices conducted to eradicate the separatist terrorism, the military measures of Turkey to combat this form of terrorism was further seen by the EU as causing tensions with Turkey's   neighbours in the region, thus aggravating the insecurity deriving from Turkey for the Union.

On the other hand, Turkey, too, increasingly felt a similar perception of insecurity in this period due to the polices of EU members as to the PKK as earlier mentioned in the pervious section. The following were the reasons for such insecurity: the double standards used by the EU states towards Turkey in its fight against terrorism even leading to the suspension of arms exportations to Turkey by them; the sanctuary both in political and military terms provided by some EU members of Turkey to the separatist terrorists; the lack of common understanding about terrorism between Turkey and the EU, as the terrorist of one was seen as the freedom fighter by others.

As earlier mentioned in the previous section, all these have increasingly exacerbated the perception of the EU about Turkey as a security consumer rather than security provider as in the case in the Cold War era (Jung, 2001),

The state of affairs in this period is perhaps summarized by the following words of Karaosmanoğlu (2001a, 69): " Turkey hopes for the widening of the geopolitical horizon of Europeans; Europe expects Turkey to expand its democratic horizon".

In this process, the other side of the coin is the growing security and military posture of the EU and the perception of this by Turkey as to its security.

This is in other words the gradual process of the development of an European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).[13]

It is evident that in the course of the rapidly transforming security environment that has evolved in the first half of the 1990s the Western Europe and the EU countries in particular found a conducive atmosphere for concentrating further on collective security.

The possibility of massive military conflicts as perceived during the years of the Cold War diminished to a considerable extent with the collapse of the rival bloc and the consequent integration efforts of these post-communist states in the Euro-Atlantic security structures. In other words, the Europeans felt more comfortable to talk security and defence issues outside the Alliance. Furthermore, the emergence of non-conventional security risks and threats have further made them focus on security issues to tackle them.

In fact, this "motivation" was even encouraged by the US as a promising step for better burden sharing for the security of the Continent (Aybet, 2000). What came out of

this was the European Security and Defence Initiative (ESDI) that was formulated within NATO in 1994.

As earlier mentioned, the relationship between the Americans and the Europeans for the security of the Continent, be it in the NATO or in other fora, was not an easy one. Yet, even in the years passed under the entrapment-abandonment dichotomy, a common understanding prevailed that the European allies should do more for their own security and defence in Europe. In other words, it was evident that Europeans should form together the European pillar of the Alliance. In this context, the ESDI was in fact the result of such efforts for a better balance of burden sharing in the security of Europe.

In this process the WEU was entrusted with the task of the ESDI, thereby forming the European pillar of the Alliance. And, as the non-EU allies of NATO such as Turkey were already granted equal status in the WEU, albeit not a full member, this organisation that was generally seen as a body playing second fiddle to NATO, seemed to be the perfect choice at that time. It was also in line with the continuing understanding of the EU as to its reserve position to handling such hard security issues as defence outside the Union albeit in close coordination with it (Howorth, 2000).

However, the external and internal dynamics that have emerged in the aftermath of this initiation seem to have changed the course of developments. The first was the inefficient cooperation and solidarity in the WEU in responding to the local conflicts particularly in the Former Yugoslavia. It was obvious in the eyes of the EU countries that even the WEU did not help balance the US dominance in the Alliance and that when the US was not willing it was impossible to take actions in the Alliance to intervene such conflicts affecting the European security as was the case during the Albanian crisis in 1997. Thus, there was growing understanding to incorporate the WEU in the EU structures and thus assuming the hard-core security roles like military tasks within the Union.

The Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 provided the basis of a security and defense policy for the EU. This Treaty was the first sign in this regard but could not yet solve the problematic of whether the EU institutionally should also deal with hard security issues as defence and how this would pose ramifications on the European integration process. Yet, this dilemma later was overcome by the Franco-British Summit in St. Malo in December 1998. It was a breakthrough in the sense that these two countries representing the two opposing sides of the above problematic came to an understanding to form a common security and defence policy (CESDP) inside the EU. This policy would be carried out for primarily fulfilling the Petersberg tasks of the Union (Bagcı, 2004).

This process further gained momentum at the EU Helsinki Summit in 1999 where the EU members took the decision to incorporate the WEU in the Union thereby assuming the tasks of the said organisation. The Summit set a 'headline goal' to form a EU brigade. It was envisaged to be deployed for Petersberg tasks. In other words, the first steps of setting up a joint European army were taken.

In view of this transformation, one can argue that member state governments have unsystematically securitised the EU through the evolution of security policy from Maastricht (the first introduction of the word 'security') to Cologne and Helsinki (agreement on goals and timetable for security capabilities). In some respects this securitisation was unintentional as the aim of acquiring military capabilities was to facilitate the Petersberg Tasks incorporated into article 17 of the Amsterdam Treaty. The first half of the Petersberg tasks are quite innocuous and reinforce the humanitarian character of the Union: by referring to 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks etc., but it is the second half which causes greater concern by including 'tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking (see Howorth, 2000). Here, it is argued that " this securitisation is quite intentional – the more federally minded, and anti-American forces, within the Union were keen to create room for autonomous 'peacemaking' capabilities when the US was unable or unwilling to act" (Manners, 2001, 4)

On the other hand, the decision of incorporation of the WEU in the Union also meant that the role of European pillar of the WEU would be carried out by the EU in the Alliance. Inevitably this required close coordination between the ESDI of the Alliance and the ESDP of the Union. The issue became even more problematic when the EU expressed its desire to use NATO assets and capabilities for its operations within the framework of the ESDP. Yet, this amalgamation of the WEU into the Union and the relations between the ESDI and the ESDP created many crucial problems in the relations with the Alliance. In this context, how the vested rights of the non-EU allies in the WEU would be preserved in the ESDP was the most painstaking. Naturally, these allies particularly Turkey were not willing to share NATO assets and capabilities with the EU for ESDP purposes unless given appropriate status by the EU in commensurate with their right in the WEU.

Turkey's attitude towards the development of a security and military posture within the EU in connection to NATO capabilities and assets was always critical from the very beginning[14]. In fact, as Bagcı emphasizes,

> Turkey's participation in the institutional and operational dimensions of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of the European Union (EU) has been one of the most contentious issues of the Turkish foreign and security policy during the late 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century (Bagcı & Yıldız , 2004, 79).

As early as 1991, the Turkish Foreign Minister (MFA Yearbook 1991) felt the need to warn the EU in the following lines:

> We note with understanding the EU's movement onto security dimension. But this should be in conformity with the contribution of NATO to the European architecture and not harm the present balance among the states that assumed roles in the security and defence of Europe". He continued to stress that " this issue (ESDP) is closely related to Turkey's foreign policy priorities and its security and defence polices.

Similarly, the issue of developing a European security and defence identity within NATO by the WEU as the European Pillar, and later by the EU itself

autonomously as ESDP found its reflections in the White paper. As the issue of such policy became shifted to the hands of the EU as its own security and defence posture, the concerns of the Turkish state and its army were raised in the White paper of 1998 for the first time.

While the WEU was trusted to develop the European security and defence identity of NATO as its European pillar, Turkey sought to join the WEU as a full member. Once it was understood that it was not possible to become a full member due to legal impediments (only EU members could become full member of the WEU), Turkey then directed its efforts to join the decision-making process of the WEU to the fullest possible extend as an associate member.

Yet, when the EU itself absorbed the WEU and began to develop its European security and defence policy (ESDP) supplanting the ESDI in practice, Turkey's concerns became even more severe.

According to Ambassador Onur Öymen (2001a,b), who was Turkey's Permanent Representative to NATO during the heydays of this conflict, Turkey's concerns about the ESDP could be classified into four categories: 1. Institutional concerns, with respect to preserving the integrity of NATO; 2. concerns on how best to strengthen European security; 3. a matter of principle to respect agreements reached at the level of Heads of State and Government and 4. national concerns with respect to protecting national interests. In this context, one should add to them that Turkey's concern about the ESDP was in fact closely related to the general attitude of the EU towards Turkey.

As mentioned above, one concern was the dilution of the relevance of NATO due to the ESDP. Therefore, the state strongly underlined the importance of indivisibility of security and urged the EU as follows:

> Turkey welcomed the decision to establish a strategic partnership between the two organisations on European security and defence. Such a strategic partnership, based on the principle of the indivisibility of security, will enable

the common struggle against current risks and threats to be carried forward in a more effective manner… The development in the ESDP should not compromise NATO's role as the primary security organization for the Euro-Atlantic region (MFA website, Foreign Policy, 2005)

Naturally, as to ESDP and its participation in its institutional and operational dimensions Turkey had several demands from the EU deriving from the founded expectation to be granted with the same rights by the EU in the ESDP as its rights in the WEU once as the EU took the role of the WEU as the European pillar[15].

The expectations of Turkey in this context are summarized by Bagcı (Bagcı and Yıldız 2004, 85) as follows:

a. the participation, on a regular basis, in day-to-day planning and consultations on matters related to European security as is the case within WEU.

b. full and equal participation in the process leading to decision-making on all EU-led operations drawing on collective assets and capabilities of NATO and their implementation.

c. participation in the decision shaping and subsequent preparation, planning and conduct of EU operations not drawing on NATO assets and capabilities.

Besides, it is generally argued that the main controversy surrounding the issue of the ESDP was due to the divergence of threat perceptions between Turkey and the EU states (Bagcı (2004); Karaosmanoğlu (2004) and (Bilgin(2004).

Indeed, in practical terms, the main core of the concerns of Turkey as to the ESDP was related to the state's security perceptions *vis a vis* the ESDP. Turkey was mostly concerned by possibilities such as the participation of the Greek Cypriot administration in the ESDP in case of its EU membership or Turkey's non-involvement in the operations of the EU that might take place in the near vicinity of the state.

The difficult times witnessed as regards the relations between Turkey and the EU in the field of security in the 1990s due to polices of both sides and their perceptions

by each other as underlined above have as a whole both affected the overall Turkish- EU relationship and also been affected by other developments in this relationship.

In this context, one can argue nevertheless that the September 11 attacks have changed the course of the current or at least slowed it down. As mentioned in previous section, September 11 has overall contributed to the strategic importance of Turkey in the eyes of its Western allies. In other words, Turkey's unique position both in the West and in the Muslim world given its history, geography and religion, not to mention its military expertise and experience in the fight against terrorism, seems to have positively affected the lenses through which the West sees Turkey in the face of the new terrorist phenomenon labelled as Islamist fundamentalism.

The September 11 terrorist attacks seem also to have changed the indifferent attitude of the EU members towards terrorism and the importance of international cooperation to counter it. Although old habits die hard, the EU finally came to an understanding with Turkey over the incorporation of the PKK and other extreme leftist groups into its list of terrorist organizations.

Moreover, Turkey and the EU reached a compromise solution in 2001 with the "Ankara Document" to end their conflict over the issue of the ESDP. No doubt that in reaching such a compromise the assurances given to Turkey for its ultimate EU membership by the EU side seem to have been crucial.

Though the Greek government vetoed the so- called 'Ankara Document' during the EU's Laeken Summit in December 2001 (Missiroli, 2002), the sides were finally able to resolve the main frictions a year later. According to the compromise, Cyprus would remain outside the area of responsibility of the EU's Rapid Reaction Forces, while Turkey would lift its veto on the EU's assured access to NATO's assets (Oguzlu, 2003, 296).   Turkey was given guarantees by the US and the UK that the European crisis management missions would not be used in contingencies involving the Aegean as well as the eastern Mediterranean. Furthermore, bilateral issues between NATO allies

would not be a legitimate concern of ESDP i.e. EU would not intervene in problems between Turkey and Greece, both in the Aegean and in Cyprus. Ankara Document was considered as a satisfactory outcome by both Turkey and the EU (Bağcı and Yıldız, 2004,93).

The following reflects the official discourse as to the ESDP issue and its solution based on the above mentioned compromise:

> The Turkey, as a European Ally that contributed to the preservation of peace and stability in Europe during the Cold War years, has supported the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) within the EU, with the understanding that this would also strengthen the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Alliance. In line with its accession process to the European Union, Turkey continues to support the development of the ESDP in a coherent and inclusive manner. Turkey's efforts to render ESDP more inclusive has contributed to the effective development of the project from its very beginning. These efforts were based on the vested rights and status that Turkey has enjoyed in the Western European Union (WEU). Efforts have borne fruit in December 2001 with the finalization of the so-called Ankara Document. The Document was finally endorsed by the EU Heads of State and Government during the Brussels European Summit of 24-25 October 2002, with minor changes (MFA website, foreign policy, 2005).

In light of the developments in the post-September 11 era, one can argue that the EU has finally understood the importance of Turkey in strategic and military terms for common security threats of asymmetric nature. In other words, the military card that was played in the Cold War has again proved its value in the post-September era.

In this regard, as   emphasized in 2000, "leaving Turkey outside the EU and treating it as a barrier against soft (more dangerous) and hard (less dangerous) security threats will not operate in today's environment because of the globalized and trans-regionalized nature of security issues in this special part of the world" (Eralp, 2000).

It is also argued that a European Union that is interested in developing its own (military) crisis-management capability would need Turkey because Turkey has a large,

effective and modern military power, both in its own region and in NATO. Furthermore, it has a well-trained army experienced in low-intensity warfare. This factor is particularly important for contributing to Petersberg-type operations. Turkey's geographical location is adjacent to regions of critical importance to the EU's interests. Turkey's location, NATO-class military infrastructure and logistical means constitute an indispensable environment for EU military power projection (Karaosmanoğlu, 2001a,b).

Yet, although they are all relevant, this form of realist-oriented arguments need to be complemented by constructivist explanations based on identity-related issues that seem to be the main core of the difficulty surrounding these relations.

In this respect, it is argued that the attempt to take a shortcut to EU membership by relying on the 'military/security card' is unlikely to be to the country's benefit in the long term, as this policy only emphasizes the military dimension. But the project of European integration has emphasized non-military aspects of security. What is more, the context in which Turkey joined NATO is significantly different from the environment in which Turkey finds itself today. (Bilgin, 2003, 348)

One can argue that the process shaping the security and military posture of the EU began with the Single European Act in 1985 and culminated with the insertion of the security and defence competences of the Union in the European Constitution in 2004. The evolution of the European Union in the fifty or so years since the onset of Cold War era has resulted in a distinctive security culture in Europe (Wæver, 1995).

Thus, the differences in security culture are of particular significance for better analysing of the security relations between Turkey and the EU.

In the main core of these problems as mentioned above lies a mutual mistrust, or to put it mildly, a lack of confidence between the two sides. This perception seems not to be only a matter of feeling. In its roots lie a set of experiences borne by both sides in history.

Here, the relevant question is why it is then so. In this regard, in view of the constructivist understanding, with special emphasis on identity, one can underline the role of identity processes that have been determinant in history both in Turkey and the rest of Europe, most of which are the members of the EU at present.

Based on the self/other dichotomy, one can argue that the "European" identity was constructed *inter alia* in its otherness to the Turks. In fact, as argued, "the Ottoman Empire, no less, was a European state… given Ottoman rule of over one-third of Europe for four hundred years,… European history cannot be understood without examining the role of the Ottoman Empire within its structural process" (Stone, 2001 ,)

Yet, in the formation of "European identity" among the peoples of this old continent, the presence of the Ottoman Turks representing a different religion and culture strange to the rest of Europe in history was also determinant. The related literature clearly supports this .[16] European states long identified the Ottoman State as a Turkish Empire of Muslim denomination. It was European writers who were endowing the Ottoman State with a noble past and far from rustic splendours. In other words, it was the rest of Europe that shaped their "European" identity in contrast to the Ottomans, which they perceived as the empire of Turks. They also mostly considered the Turks as not being European, but rather   in Europe (Noff, 1984).   In other words, it was the " Muslim Turks" in their minds considered as "the other", against which the rest of Europe of predominantly Christian faith constructed their "European" identity as being "the self".

The role of the Ottoman Turks in the formation of the common self among the countries of the continent is mentioned by one scholar even as follows: "Non-European (Ottomans) invaders set up military rulers and system of tributes that produced important revenues. However, they did not intervene decisively in local social arrangements . Within their own space, Europeans formed , manufactured , traded and especially fought each other . Almost inadvertently, they thereby created national states (Tilly, 1990, 51). The importance of this observation is that it shows, albeit negatively,

the role of the Ottoman Turks not only in the formation of the self among the states of the continent but also the emergence of nation states there.

The natural ramification of this perception of otherness was the differentiation in terms of civilisations that the Turks and the rest of Europe had possessed. The discussions of civilisational clashes even became more attractive in the post-Cold War era. Huntington (1993, 30) asserted that Turkey was considered to be fitting in none of the "civilisations", and that in a sense it lacked civilisational qualities and suffered identity problems. He claimed that "historically Turkey has been the most profoundly torn country". This argumentation has been strongly criticized by both academic and political circles in Turkey.

Yet, what Huntington said was nothing new, given the mindset of the western people even including scholars and academics towards Turks and Turkey. He in fact seemed to follow the lines of conceptualisation developed much earlier by European historians of the study of civilisations, such as Spengler and Toynbee. The former regarded Turks as one of the "non-cultured" peoples. The latter did not even mention the word of Turks in his list of civilisations but only referred to the Ottomans as one of "the arrested civilisations" (see Yurdusev, 1995). So, it was obvious that Huntington's understanding of Turkey was a product of mindset filled with prejudices prevalent in Europe that has been developed throughout history.

Similarly, it appears that the process of Turkish membership in the European Union could not escape the effects of such arguments on the clash of civilisations. Mainly Christian Democrat circles continue to oppose the eligibility of Turkey for EU membership questioning the European identity of Turkey on the grounds that "Turkey is a Muslim country". Naturally, this has led to Turkish politicians to react to such rhetoric with counter-arguments that the EU should accept Turkey if it is not a "Christian club" or if it really wants to deny the clash of civilisation.

It is also a fact that the legacy of this perception of the European peoples seeing Turkey as other representing a different civilisation was further shaped by the wars and

hostilities in the history. As argued, until the end of the Ottoman Empire, Europe and Turkey had perceived each other mainly as enemies and rivals (Neumann, 1999).

The following selection of historical data (see Lewis, 1993) clearly reflects the prevalent perception among European peoples in history towards the Turks:

Generalle Historie of the Turkes (the first book published in England about Turks in 1603) stated that   the threat perceptions of the Europeans were two-fold: a challenge to Christendom from the rival Muslim faith, and a menace to Europe of conquest and incorporation into "the glorious Empire of the Turks, the present terror of the world" (see Lewis, 1993, 72).

This perceptions were not prevalent only in the continent.   Even in Iceland, there were texts   against the Turks as early as the 17th century. A Lutheran prayer book included a prayer beseeching God to "save us from the evil of the Pope and the terror of the Turks" (see Lewis, 1993, 74).

What is more interesting, it was the papacy that called on the Christian European states to impose perhaps the first arms embargo of history on the Turkish Ottomans. A Papal bull issued by Clement VII in 1527 pronounced excommunication and anathema on " all those who took to the Saracens, Turks, and other enemies of the Christian name, horses, weapons , iron, iron wire, tin, copper, brass, sulphur, saltpetre, and all else suitable for the making of the artillery and instruments, arms and machines for offence, with which they fight against the Christians , also ropes and timber and other nautical supplies and other prohibited wares"."A century later Pope Urban VIII issued a similar bull, this one with a slightly longer list of prohibited war materials, excommunicating and anathema zing those who directly or indirectly gave aid , comfort or information to the Turks and other enemies of Christianity" (see Lewis, 1993, 75).

Even one can trace the signs of defamations against the Turks in works of Shakespeare's. "When Othello spoke of " a malignant and a turbaned Turk", he was expressing the common idea of an evil and alien invader" (see Lewis, 1993, 79).

The above-mentioned historical legacy, coupled with the traumas of the first Wold War, i.e. the invasion of the Ottoman land by the western European states, has been inevitably crucial in the establishment of the Turkish republic and the state's perceptions about the "Europeans".

As stated while discussing the policy of westernization followed by Turkey in the preceding sections, the Turkish state, despite this historical legacy, chose to be part of this world. The reasons for this choice were discussed at length in the afore mentioned section. Yet, one should here once again underline that this policy was an attempt of a "constructivist" nature to adopt the lenses of the western Europeans representing the modern civilisation at the time so that the Turkish state and the rest of these states could manage to see the world in parallel.

Naturally, this policy was driven mainly by security concerns. As mentioned by an analyst, the Republic perceived Europe mainly from a security perspective that is highly embedded within an ideational logic. It was clear that if they did not want to see the destiny of the Ottoman Empire repeated, the enmity- and rivalry-based Europe–Turkey interaction process needed to be replaced with a friendship-based one. "Their hope was that if the European states perceived Turkey as European, they would not have to construct their relations with Turkey on the basis of a self–other dichotomy" (Oguzlu, 2003, 290).

As to the perception of Turkey as the other of the EU states, studies show that there can be two forms of being other. One is "absolute", the second is " liminal". The liminal position is explained by one scholar as follows:

> Either the outside state resists the construction of its identity as different or the community-building institution somehow fails to maintain the

appropriate degree of social distance with the outside state. As a result, the outside state comes to occupy an ambiguous position with respect to the collective identity. Not part of the community and neither a 'precarious self nor an 'absolute other,' the outside state occupies a liminal position (Norton, 1988).

The concept of liminality is very prominent in anthropology and cultural studies. Turner (1995, 95) defined liminals as "entities that are neither here nor there; they are betwixt and between the positions assigned and arranged by law, custom, convention, and ceremonial."

It is argued that because of the ambiguity of their identities, liminal states make the community identity more insecure, and are perceived, represented, and acted toward as identity threats. The identities of these states defy easy classification, and often invite opposing assessments. In some respects, the community discourse represents them as inherently different from the community; although in other respects, their differences are regarded to be based on acquired characteristics. As a result, the social distance between the community and these states remains ambiguous, fluctuating between inclusion and exclusion (Rumelili, 2002) .

In fact, the *liminal* position of Turkey is stressed by some analysts in view of the relationship between Turkey and the EU members in the Cold War. This is based on the argument that the EU(then EC) did not treat Turkey during the Cold War as its other.

According to this argument (Rumelili, 2002), Turkey came to be situated in a liminal position as a result of a change in the discourse of European collective identity promoted by the EU. This discursive change entailed different aspects of European identity being emphasized at the expense of others. During the Cold War, the EU's community-building discourse emphasized capitalism and alliance with the Western bloc as the main constitutive elements of the European collective identity. The idea of a common European cultural heritage, geographical boundedness of Europe, democracy, and political and economic development remained as elements of European identity, but

they were de-emphasized. In relation to this discourse on European identity, Turkey was constituted as a precarious self.

Therefore, the Turkish application was that time not perceived and represented as threatening to community identity. In a bipolar world, Turkey, as a member of the Atlantic alliance, was unambiguously identified as a capitalist state. In the Cold War discourse on European identity, the differences in geographical location, culture, and the level of political and economic development were domesticated, while differences in economic systems and alliance affiliations were absolutized.

In the late 1980s, there was an important change in the social/ideational context within which the European collective identity is conceived. With the end of the Cold War, the discourse on European identity came under heavy challenge, as capitalism and belonging to the Western bloc lost their significance in demarcating *self* from *other*. In the newly emerging discourse on European identity, the common European cultural heritage, geographical boundedness of Europe, and democracy and human rights came to be re-emphasized as constitutive elements of the European self. This new discourse on European identity constructed East and West, Europe and Asia as incompatible and mutually exclusive identities and thus situated Turkey in a liminal position with respect to Europe.

In contrast to the first encounter, Turkey's advance towards the EU was not then constructed to be securing of European identity. A change had begun to occur in the dominant discourse on European identity, where certain aspects of European identity that were previously de-emphasized, such as democracy and human rights, European culture, history, and geography, began to be (re)emphasized. On these issues, Turkey's differences from Europe became absolutized, paving the way for the perception and representation of Turkey as threatening to European identity. As Huntington (1993, 42) puts it, "while the elite of Turkey has defined Turkey as a Western society, the elite of the West refuses to accept Turkey as such".

Yet, on the other hand, the integration process with Turkey has continued. In 1996 the customs union between the two sides was set up. In 1999 Turkey's candidate status was confirmed and in 2004 the date for opening the membership negations although with several caveats was declared.

In view of this, it is then argued that Turkey fits in to the position of being a *liminal other* of the EU. Naturally, in view of realist interpretation, the policies of the EU during the Cold War can be seen as driven by the necessities of the time that required a close ally like Turkey to counter the Soviet threat that was the common other of the western world. In other words, the polices of the EU to develop its relations with Turkey as its self might have been for tactical reasons for the above mentioned concerns of the *realpolitik* in the cold Ware era. The same argument can be raised for the policies of the EU in the post-Cold War particularly on the march of Turkey towards full membership.

Yet, irrespective of whether Turkey is *absolute* or *liminal other* or once was the *self* of the EU, the aforementioned discussion strongly suggests that there exists a problem of identity observed in the Turkish-EU relations. This has inevitably affected the formation of collective identity between Turkey and the EU states in the security field not to mention the other fields of the relationship. As explained in the previous part, NATO has helped to ease this problem in the security realm by facilitating the emergence of collective identity to some extent between Turkey and the EU states that are also members of the alliance.

In this context, by adopting a constructivist perspective that conceives security in broader terms and takes into account the mutually constitutive relationship between security, identity and interests, one can draw a different picture of Turkey-EU security relationship, in which a new dimension of Turkey's contribution to security building in Europe becomes visible (Bilgin, 2004).

Looking from the constructivist lens that does not take security as given but reflects upon the processes through which identities, interests and insecurities are constituted, one can argue that

> Turkey helped to secure the collective identity of the West' as a 'security community' and to attract other developing countries to join the free world as a Western-led alliance system. In post-September 11 world politics, the West in general and the United States in particular, need Turkey perhaps more than ever (Bilgin, 2004, 45).

In this regard, as to the problem of identity, one should note that in the post-Cold War period, joining the European Union has come to symbolize being a part of 'the West'. This is partly the reason why the issue of EU membership is held in such reverence in Turkish politics. Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the EU's Helsinki summit in 1999, Turkish dailies declared that Turkey was in Europe. In Turkey, then, becoming an EU member is viewed not only as joining another European institution, but also as bolstering Turkey's Western identity (Bilgin, 2003, 345)

Similarly, as a survey conducted in 2004 (Dağı, 2004) reveals, the Turkish people support the EU membership by 73 percent . The majority of them also consider Turkey to be part of the Western civilisations symbolized by the EU mostly. Furthermore, the absolute majority of the people prefer the EU to the USA as the side that Turkey should be close to. These can be interpreted in a way to suggest that the Turkish people is more inclined to construct such a collective identity with the EU side at least at the grassroots level.

Having said the above, one should also duly note that the improvement in the Turkish-EU relations resulting in the decision to launch the process of membership negotiations is a promising step supporting Turkey's *liminal* position. Yet, in view of the aforementioned dichotomy of self/other, it is still clear that at the bottom of the Turkish-EU relations lies the need of constructing a collective identity.

iii. CONSTRUCTIVIST APPRAISAL OF TURKEY'S PARTICIPATION IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY OPERATIONS

Turkey's participation in the collective security operations mainly in the format of peace keeping has considerably increased in the post-Cold war era in comparison to the situation in the Cold War years. As briefly mentioned in the preceding sections, throughout the Cold War only in the case of Korea did Turkey send its troops to join a military campaign outside it borders. Yet, in the Post-Cold War era the number of such operations has increased enormously. Since 1988 Turkish troops have been assigned for such campaigns for 8 times in different countries not only in Europe but also in other regions like in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, along with participations in the military observer missions in 6 cases.[17]

As can be argued, the Turkish state was not enthusiastic for such collective security operations by tradition. Karaosmanoğlu (2004, 17-18) notes:

> In the 19th century, multilateral military interventions, despite their declaratory aims, were mainly strategic and motivated by balance-of-power policies. The Ottoman State was the major target of such interventions by the European Powers. In the Cold War, the fundamental purpose of United Nations peacekeeping operations was the prevention of the escalation of local conflicts to a dangerous confrontation between the two blocs.

In other words, the objective was to contribute to a smooth functioning of the bipolar balance of power system. This in fact had served the cautious stance of the Turkish state towards such operations in the Cold War.

Thus, the post-Cold War clearly shows that given the changing conditions of the world Turkey's approach to collective security operations outside its borders has also been transformed. In this regard, Turkey's security policy in this regard has showed, in a considerable degree, an evolution in the post-Cold War era. As mentioned in the section on the Gulf war, in the beginning of this transformation, Turkey did not go far to send military troops to outside its borders but opened its bases for the coalition forces

and later accepted the NATO contingency force called the Allied Mobile Force (AMF) . After the Gulf war, this policy further followed the stationing of the allied forces on the Turkish-Iraqi border under Provide Comfort Operation that was started in 1991 and replaced by the Northern Watch in 1997. [18]

On the other hand, the state also gradually took decisions to militarily participate in such collective security operations, first with its air and navy components and then with its ground forces as well. Furthermore, as in the cases of Somalia and Afghanistan, Turkey assumed the command of the peace keeping operations and the forces assigned to these operations:

In parallel to this transformation in practice, the official discourses did also evolve. For example, the White Paper of the Turkish armed forces reserved a special chapter for collective security operations under the heading of "peace keeping" for the first time in 1995 following the contribution of Turkey in such operations in Bosnia and Somalia. Similarly, collective security was inserted among the military strategy pillars of the state and this found its reflection in the 1998 version of the said White Paper. This clearly reflects the change of mentality of the state towards such collective security operations on the basis of the changing perception of the state about the security environment in the post –Cold War.

What is more, the active participation in such security operations has also found its implications on the Turkish armed forces itself. As stated in the White Paper (1995), "participation in such operations has directly contributed to training and operational readiness levels of the Turkish armed forces".

As argued, one of the motives for contributing to multinational military operations was the growing ability of the Turkish army to carry out military operations beyond the borders of the country and under high threat conditions (Güvenç, 1998) .

Karaosmanoğlu (2004, 16) notes the adaptation process of the Turkish armed forces as follows:

> Peace Support Operations are usually manpower-intensive operations which require diverse skills and special military training for units and individual soldiers. Since the Turkish armed forces (TAF) are formed mainly by conscripts who serve for only eighteen months, troops assigned to peace support operations are trained specifically for that purpose… For the purpose of facilitating its adaptation and contribution to peace support operations, the TAF created new institutions in its own organization. First, the peace missions were assigned to the 3rd Corps and the 28th Mechanized Brigade. Secondly, the TGS (Turkish General Staff) and the each of the three services (land, navy, and air) established "Peacekeeping Departments".

Given this change of mentality in respect of contribution to such military operations, one can rightly question the reasons for such a transformation. In this regard, the possible answer can be the changing conditions of the post-Cold War era, particularly in the security environment.

Just like any other state, Turkey, too, has encountered with the increasing number of new security threats and risks in the post-Cold War. They are of transboundary nature due to the effects of globalisation. Like in the domino theory, a crisis of any sort in one state or a region could easily risk spreading to other areas through a spill-over affect. This asymmetric warfare has clearly showed the fact that the state cannot take comfort in waiting for these effects of security threats to come to its borders before taking action. Thus, the narrow understanding of defence needed to be replaced by a wider concept of security and this led states to actively take part in collective security measures in both global and regional fora.

In addition to this new understanding prevalent in the world order, the end of the bipolar order has offered to states like Turkey more space and options in its policies as the constraints of the old order stemming from the fear of nuclear retaliation gradually faded away.

The following words reflect the transformed state of mind of the Turkish state towards its security and defence in face of the conditions of the post-Cold War era: " National security and collective security are the two main interrelated pillars of the general concept of security. In an era defined by globalization, the current security environment has further strengthened this linkage and confirmed that security is truly indivisible" (MFA website, Foreign policy section, 2005). While national security and collective security are seen as inseparable, the state considers its security in such a wide perspective:

> The following factors need to be taken into account in today's concept of security: safeguarding territorial integrity; maintaining peace and stability; contributing to collective defence and crisis management operations (such as peacekeeping, humanitarian operations and police missions); containing ethnic and religious conflicts; preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means; supporting disarmament; combating asymmetric threats, such as terrorism, sabotage, organised crime, disruption of the flow of vital resources, uncontrolled mass movement of people as a consequence of armed conflicts, and cyber war risks, as well as combating the spread of infectious diseases; poverty and alleviating socio-economic disparities. These threats are not necessarily of military nature and therefore, security can no longer be achieved solely through military means and policies. Since the definition of security has broadened, so should our approach in dealing with these threats. We need to be able to employ a broader mix of military, economic, social and political policies in confronting contemporary challenges. This is the only way to achieve sustainable peace and stability on a global scale (MFA website, foreign policy, 2005).

The foregoing clearly indicates that in the evolution of the security policy of the state the aforementioned changes in its perception about the general security environment that were triggered off by the changing conditions of the post-Cold War era became decisive. In other words, it is the construction of insecurities by the state that shaped the polices in the field of collective security operations. Material factors such as the presence of material dangers of asymmetric warfare affected the perception of the state leading to new formulation of insecurity, and, as a result, as the collective security operations were securitized by Turkey it led the state to take part in these operations. Naturally, to this constructivist explanation can be added by realist interpretations that

Turkey's participation in such collective security operations are motivated not only by security concerns but also by realist motives such as seeking influence and interests in these areas where operations were directed.

Yet, whatever the real motive, all these concerns whether ideational or realist have altogether unavoidably contributed to the security identity of the state. And, it is in fact this identity that shapes the policies of the state in the field.

One can argue that in the post-Cold War era, this identity has helped the formation of collective identity between Turkey and its like-minded countries in the international community through these collective security operations. In fact, as a closer look can show, in all these collective security operations since the Gulf war Turkey has carefully acted with the international community.

The overall review of these military operations seems to reflect the internationalist behaviour of Turkey in it foreign and security policy. Turkey, despite all these pressing issues and political pressures deriving from its domestic politics due to its affinity with the peoples in the areas where the war was , has always acted in line with the international community's decisions and refrained from unilateral interventions.

In this regard, it is also important to mention that Turkey's internationalist posture in foreign policy has been further developed to extend it to joining military campaigns in the format of peace keeping or enforcement under the mandates of international organisations. Turkey's active participation in the collective security operations are clear testimony to this development of the internationalist posture of the state.

In this sense one can argue that by participating in these military operations, Turkey has added a military dimension to its internationalist posture in its foreign and security policy.

However, it is obvious that despite acting in conformity with the decisions of international community Turkey has not participated in all collective security operations

even under the legitimate mandates of the UN, OSCE or NATO. As stated by Deputy and former Ambassador Öymen, in reply to the question of why Turkey did not participate all such operations but acted in a selective manner, "Turkey is not the legionary of the world" (Interview with H.E. Öymen).

This is an interesting point to be discussed further. In the selective attitude of the Turkish state, as one can naturally argue, the threat perception of the state for its national security as regards the operation and its location can be a possible answer. Furthermore, as the thesis argues, ideational factors towards the state or region where such operations were directed seem to have also been crucial in this context.

In this context, many analysts sought to argue the importance of such ideational factors in the conduct of Turkey's foreign policy in general and its approach to collective security operations in particular. For example, one argued that the ideological basis for a Turkish role in Bosnia, Albania and Macedonia cannot be rationalised by secularism, "since religion, not ethnicity, is the common denominator among these entities" (see Çalış 1996). In this context, Turkey's involvement in the Balkan crisis and its military contribution to the UN peace keeping forces have been regarded as very significant developments displaying a fact that Turkey has been abandoning its traditional foreign policy understanding in favour of becoming a regional power (Çalış, 1996).

There are indeed many factors which may support at the first sight these arguments when one looks at Turkey's ethnic composition, religious affiliation, historical role and its location in the region. Above all, Turkey is a Muslim-populated country and a remnant of the Ottoman Empire. In this regard, as argued,

> the indigenous and Turkic Muslim population of the region is a cultural and historical legacy of the same empire. This population perceives Turkey as a natural ally and seeks support from it in time of need. In addition, despite Turkey's official negative stance against the Ottoman legacy, the Ottoman Empire has never lost its value as a reference point in the political discourses of Islamists and Turkists in particular (Fuller, 1993).

Furthermore, the following discourse of the state also strongly supports the importance of ideational factors in Turkey's participation in collective security operations. For example, Turkish Foreign Minister Cem stated in 1998 on the Kosovo crisis that " on Kosovo, Turkey has brought its contribution and support to the Balkans in conformity with its history, identity and interests" (MFA budget speech of 1998). This shows the role of such ideational factors as history, identity, along with the presence of material factors like interests in the rationale behind the understanding that later led Turkey to join the military campaign in Kosovo. Similarly, a year later on the eve of the Kosovo operation, the Foreign Minister stated that " Cognizant of the responsibility stemmed from history, we have taken a lead role in the international efforts aiming to stop the sufferings of the innocent Kosovar people among whom exist our kinsmen of 60.000" (MFA Budget speech of 1999). Again history as a structural determinant of the Turkish foreign policy, along with such primordial ties as ethnic affinity, were mentioned indicating the role of ideational factors in such polices. Similarly, in reply to a question of whether ideational factors such as feelings of affinity, of moral obligations etc, play roles in the polices of the state therein, Former President Demirel mentioned :

> Kosovo, Palestine, Israel, Iraq, they were all in the Ottoman land. Had the empire not collapsed, perhaps we would not have faced problems in these areas today. As they were once the Ottoman soil and part of our people, what happens there is direct concern to us" (Interview with H.E. Demirel) .

On the other hand, as Calış (1996) emphasized, the objections of some countries such as Greece, Bulgaria and Russia to Turkey's contribution to such operations in the Balkans were also driven by such ideational factors. These countries always stated that if Turkey participated in the UN military operations, this would annoy and even provoke a counter-attack from the peoples of the region, due to Turkey's historical and cultural identity.

But Turkey's new policy formulation was in fact in conformity with its traditional foreign policy understanding, despite the change in style, a style that seemed to be a result of changing foreign policy understanding. As emphasized by Çalış (1996),

the state clearly explained that its policy was based on two important objectives: Finding a solution to the Crisis was not only Turkey's problem. It was a problem for the international community and it should be solved by international organisations as in the case of the liberation of Kuwait. As a result, despite the pressure of public opinion, Turkish authorities did not hesitate to declare that Turkey was not alone in the World, and that they had no intention of intervening unilaterally by military means unless the international community were to call upon Turkey to take part in an international operation force. When confronted with similar questions, the Turkish governments made it clear that Turkey would not take any unilateral action, but act in accordance with the UN decisions, even though they disapproved of the existing stance of the UN and NATO against the Serbians.

Therefore, as rightly noted above, despite the presence of such discourses and state of mind that were influential in these policies, the reality shows that Turkey did not attempt to any unilateral act to help these peoples in this region. Notwithstanding possible measures of assistance falling outside the scope of formal state polices, the state has instead continued to follow the decisions of the international community in line with its internationalist posture. This is indeed the reflection of the fact that realist concerns have prevailed over such ideational factors however they were pressing mainly due to the domestic concerns inside the country.

However, it is also evident that Turkey sought to mobilize all possible fora to force the international community to take decisive measures including military options to end the suffering of the peoples in these countries. To cite some examples, in the Bosnian crisis, Turkey presented to the UN Security Council an action plan including both political and military measures (MFA Yearbook 1992). Similarly, Turkey even mobilized the OIC taking an active stance by holding an extraordinary meeting of OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) Foreign Ministers in 1991 (MFA Yearbook 1991). This is particularly important as in these years Turkey's relations with the OIC were not so developed as the multi-faceted policy of the state was only in its early days.

In view of the foregoing, one can rightly argue the following: First of all, Turkey's participations in the collective security operations in the post-Cold War are also a product of its policies in the search of collective identity with the international community in general and mainly with its European and Western allies as in the cases of NATO solidarity. Secondly, in these policies, ideational factors stemming from socio-psychological and primordial bonds have also been influential although realist parameters in the superior identity governing the foreign and security policy of the state always prevail over these concerns.

NOTES

[1] For an extensive review of Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era see for example: AYBET, Gulnur (1994), Turkey's Foreign Policy and Its Implications for the West : A Turkish Perspective, London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies; ----------- (2004), *Turkish Foreign Policy: Framework and Analysis*, SAM papers No: 72004, Ankara; BAGCI, Hüseyin (1998a), "Türk Dış Politikası: Genel Bakış", in I. Dağı (ed) *Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitapevi; BAL, İdris (ed) (2004a), *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era,* Florida: Brown Walker Press.; BAL, İdris (ed) (2004b), *21.Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara: Nobel;* C CALIS, Şaban (1996*), The Role of Identity in the Making of Modern Turkish Foreign Policy,* unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Nottingham; CALIS, S. , DAGI, I.I. and GOZEN, R. (ed) (2001), *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi , Güvenlik*, Ankara:Liberte Yayınları; CELIK, Yasemin (1999), *Contemporary Turkish Foreign policy*, Westport: Praeger; DAGI, İhsan (ed), (1998), *Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim*, Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi; DAVUTOĞLU, Ahmet (2002), *Stratejik Derinlik: Türkiye'nin Uluslarası Konumu*, İstanbul: Küre yayınları; HALE, William (2000) *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000*, London: Frank Cass Publishers; KHOSLA ,I. P. (2001), " Turkey: The Search for a Role", Strategic Analysis, 15(3) June; KIRISCI, Kemal (1995), " New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behaviour," in Cigdem Bahm et al (ed) *Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s,* Leiden, New York, Köln: E. J. Brill; KUT, Şule and ÖZCAN, Gencer (eds) (1998), *En Uzun On yıl : Türkiye'nin Ulusal Güvenlik ve Dış Politika Gündeminde Doksanlı Yıllar*, İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları; LESSER, I. (1999b), " Turkey's Strategic Options", *The International Spectator* , 34(1) January-March; ------- (2000), "Turkey in a Changing Security Environment", *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1): 183-197; MARTIN, Lenore G. (ed) ( ), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Massacushets: MIT Press; MÜFTI, Malik (1998), "Daring and Caution in Turkish Policy", *Middle East Journal*, 52(1) Winter: 32-; MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ, Meltem (1996, "Turkey's predicament in the post-Cold War Era", *Futures*, 28(3): 255-258; MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ, Meltem (1996, "Turkey's predicament in the post-Cold War Era", *Futures*, 28(3): 255-258; RUBIN, Barry and KIRISCI, Kemal (eds) (2002), *Günümüzde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası,* Istanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi. ; SONMEZOGLU, Faruk (ed) (2001), *Türk Dış Politkasının Analizi,*

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[2] For the changing patterns of Turkish securitization as regards the Middle East after the Gulf war see for example : ALTUNISIK, Meliha B. (2004), "Redefinition of Turkish Security Policies in the Middle East After the Cold War", in Karaosmanoğlu and Taşhan (ed) *The Europeanization of Turkish Foreign policy: Prospects and Pitfalls*, Ankara, Foreign Policy Institute: 213-230; ARAL, Berdal (2001), "Dispensing with tradition? Turkish politics and international society during the Özal Decade 1983-1993", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37 (1): 72-88; GOZEN, R. (2004), "Türkiye'nin II. Körfez Savaşı Politikası: Aktif politika ve Sonuçları", in İ. Bal (ed) *21.Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara: Nobel* : 725-750; KIRISCI, Kemal (1997), "Post-Cold War Turkish Security and the Middle East", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2 July; -------- (2004), "Between Europe and the Middle east: The Transformation of Turkish Policy", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 8(1) March: 39-2; MANGO, Andrew (1992), 'Turkish Policy in the Middle East; Turning Danger to Profit', in Clement H. Dodd (ed.) *Turkish Foreign Policy; New Prospects*, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press; ROBINS, Philip (1991), *Turkey and the Middle East*, London: Pinter Publisher; ------- (1992), "Turkish Policy and the Gulf Crisis", in Clement H. Dodd (ed.) *Turkish Foreign Policy; New Prospects*, Cambridgeshire: The Eothen Press.

[3] For studies focusing on this new opening in Turkish foreign policy see particularly : FULLER, G.E. (1993), "Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey" in G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to the Western China,* B. S. F. and Oxford: Westview Press, 163-184.; MAKOVSKY, Alan (1999), "A New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy", *SAIS Review* , 19(l) : 92-113; MAKOVSKY, Alan and SAYARI, Sabri (2001), "Introduction," in A. Makovsky and S. Sayari (ed) Turkey's New World: Changing Dynamics in Turkish Foreign Policy, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy; MCKENZIE, Kenneth (1993), 'Turkey's Circumspect Activism," *The World Today,* 49: 25-26; SAYARI, Sabri (2000), "Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: The Challenges of Multi-Regionalism", *Journal of International Affairs*, 54(1): 169-182.

[4] See some interesting articles on this: USLU, Nasuh (2003), "The Russian, Caucasian and Central Asian aspects of Turkish Foreign policy in the Post-Cold War Period", *Alternatives*, 2(3&4): 164; WINROW, Gareth M. (1997), "Turkey and the Newly Independent States of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, 2 , accessed at http: //www.ciaonet.org. ; SASLEY, Brent (1998), "Turkey's Energy Politics in the Post-Cold War Era*", Middle East Review of International Affairs* , 2(4) December. See also J. Laber, "Balanced on the Golden Horn", The Washington Post, 9 February 1992. "Turkey Discovers a New Role in Former Soviet Central Asia", Financial Times, 11 February 1992. D. Sneider, "Turkey and Iran Play out New 'Great Game' in Asia", The Christian Science Monitor, 15-21 May 1992. A. Zaman, "Ottoman Heirs Seek New Balkans Role", Sunday Telegraph, 29 November 1992. B. Harden, "Ankara's War for Central Asia: Waged At the Heart, on TV", International Herald Tribune, 24 March 1992.

[5] See the official website of the BLACKSEAFOR at http://www.blackseafor.org . And also ULUSOY, Hasan (2002), "A New Formation in the Black Sea: BLACKSEAFOR", *Perceptions,* 6(4):97-107.

[6] The history of modern Turkey shows that the policies followed by Turkey as regards nation-building has been open to manipulation. Especially, as it was seen as a "soft belly" of modern Turkey, the ambiguities in these polices were exposed to manipulation in foreign politics as a factor for destabilising the country. In this process, the resentment of some ethnic groups other than that of Turkish origin offered a fertile ground for such a manipulation. As non-Muslim citizens of the state were granted minority rights, arguments were developed that Muslim ethnic groups should also be given the same rights, as otherwise they would be free to fight for secession. Such arguments followed that the Turkish state was assimilating

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the non-national identities within the main ethnic group of Turks. These conditions led the state to further perceive itself under a threat against its unity and territorial integrity. Consequently, under such perceptions the state acted with defensive reflexes that were naturally not conducive for the promoting of such non-national identities.

The presence of such an external manipulation, while exacerbating the state's attitude due to defensive reflexes, has also been used as an alibi by some domestic circles which find their interest better protected in suppressing non-national identities. In other words, one can argue that the more the state felt itself threatened by this, the less attention it gave to the non-national identities, for a possible fear that this would be counter-productive for its territorial integrity and national unity. In this context, furthermore, the fierce ethnic terrorism that was witnessed in the last decades of the 20th century for more than 15 years, had a strong impact on this behaviour of the state, which was already moulded with such defensive reflexes.

Such state of affairs generally leads to a vicious circle, in which non-national identities are deprived of proper preservation and promotion as this is seen as further contributing to the efforts of disintegration of the state. But in return, ethnic groups (non-national identities), deprived of their freedoms, become more easily receptive of such disintegrating efforts.

It is argued that such a vicious circle is easily aggravated once the state's policies on its integrating powers towards non-national identities lack its optimum use. To sum up, the recent history suggests that the aforementioned vicious circle, coupled with these difficulties in the optimum use of integrating powers, has resulted in negative ramifications both for the non-national identities of Turkey and for the democratic stability of the country .

This state of affairs long remained to be the case despite the efforts of the state to improve the situation within the broader context of furthering human rights and democratisation. In this direction, a number of important developments have paved the way for further improvement. The first was the success in the fight against ethnic separatist terrorism following the military defeat of the terrorists and the capture of their chieftain. This helped the state better utilise other integrating powers rather than only coercive ones. Secondly, the progress of Turkey as a candidate country on the way towards the EU membership has provided further impetus in this regard.

Given the legal reforms, one can argue that the co-habitation of non-national identities (as sub-identities) with the national identity (as the upper identity) though a system of enjoyment of ethnic identities on the basis of individual liberties rather than minority rights has become improved, albeit with still room for further improvement as no country in the world can be considered perfect in terms of human rights. Being a country that has long adopted the system of constitutional citizenship irrespective, but embracing, of various sub-identities of its citizens, be they ethnic, religious or in other forms, Turkey is an ideal case for this model. Yet, in this process, among major steps to be taken in Turkey would be the change of mentality in approaching the concept of human rights in general and individual liberties in particular. The recent reforms are testimony to such a shift.

[7] For relevant studies (mostly critical) on ethnic terrorism in Turkey see for example: ATACAN, Fulya (2001), "A Kurdish Islamist Group in Modern Turkey: Shifting Identities", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37 (3): 111-144; ATAMAN, Muhittin (2001), "The Kurdish Question and Its Implication on Turkey's Foreign Policy: From 1923 to 2000", *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, 24(2): 33-49; AYDINLI, Ersel (2002), "Between Security and Liberalization: Decoding Turkey's Struggle with the PKK", *Security Dialogue*, 33(2): 209-225; CORNEL, Svante (2001), "The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics", *Orbis*, 45 (1): 31-46; GUNTER; Michael M. (1994), "The Kurdish Factor in Turkish Foreign Policy", *Journal of Third World Studies*, 11(2) Fall: 440; HIRSCHLER, Konrad (2001), "Defining the Nation: Kurdish Historiography in Turkey in the 1990s", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 37(3):145-166; KIRISCI, K. (1998), "'Minority/ Majority Discourse; The Case of the Kurds in Turkey", in C. Gladney (ed.) *Making Majorities; Constructing the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the United States*, Stanford: Stanford University Press; KOCHER, Matthew (2002), "The Decline of PKK and

the Viability of a One-state Solution in Turkey", *International Journal on Multicultural Societies,* 4(1): 9-20; RADU, Michael (2001), "The Rise and Fall of the PKK", *Orbis*, 45(1): 47-63; YEGEN, Mesut (1999), *Devlet Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu [Kurdish question in the State Discourse]*, Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinevi.

[8] BOZDAGLIOGLU, Yücel (2003), *Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity: A Constructivist Approach,* New York: Routledge; BOZDOGAN, Sibel and KASABA, Resat (eds.) (1997), *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, University of Washington Press; FULLER, G.E. (1993), "Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey" in G. E. Fuller and I. O. Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to the Western China,* B. S. F. and Oxford: Westview Press, 163-184; KUSHNER, David (1997), 'Self-Perception and Identity in Contemporary Turkey", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 32(2): 219-233; CALIS, S. , DAGI, I.I. and GOZEN, R. (ed) (2001), *Türkiye'nin Dış Politika Gündemi: Kimlik, Demokrasi , Güvenlik*, Ankara:Liberte Yayınları; ONIS, Ziya (1995), 'Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era: In Search of Identity," *The Middle East Journal,* 49(1) :48-68; ROULEAU, Eric (1993), "The Challenges to Turkey", *Foreign Affairs*, November-December:110-.All the above noted references mention Turkey's identity crisis. But in some writings this subject made headlines. For example see: J. M. Brown, "In Search of New Identity", Financial Times, 18 November 1992. Newsweek, "Identity Crisis: Has Turkey Earned a Place in the New Europe?", 21 May 1990. Time, "Across the Great Divide", 19 October 1992.

[9] For example see: FULLER, G. E. (1993), "Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey" in G. E. Fuller and I. O.Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics: From the Balkans to the Western China*, Oxford: Westview Press, 163-184.

[10] For example see: "Turkey Discovers a New Role in Former Soviet Central Asia", Financial Times, 11 February 1992. SNEIDER, D. (1992), "Turkey and Iran Play out New 'Great Game' in Asia", *The Christian Science Monitor*, 15-21 May 1992. A. Zaman, "Ottoman Heirs Seek New Balkans Role", Sunday Telegraph, 29 November 1992. B. Harden, "Ankara's War for Central Asia: Waged At the Heart, on TV", International Herald Tribune, 24 March 1992.

[11] For reviews of European integration process and its security aspects see for example: AYBET, G., (1997), *The Dynamics of the European Security Co-operation; 1945-1991*, London: Macmillan;----------, (1999), "NATO's Developing Role in Collective Security"*, SAM Papers*, No: 4/99;------- (2000), *A European Security Architecture of the Cold War*, London: Macmillan; BRONSTONE, Adam (2000), *European Security into the 21ˢᵗ Century*, Aldershot: Ashgate Pub. ; CRAWFORD, B. (ed), (1992), *The Future of European Security*, Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley; GARTNER, , Heinz, HYDE-PRICE Adrian and REITER, Erich (eds) (2001), *Europe's New Security Challenges*, London: Lynne Rienner; HOWORTH, J.(2000), "European Integration and Defence: The Ultimate Challenge", *Chaillot Paper 43,* November 2000; KELLEHER, C. M. (1995) , *The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment*, Washington D.C: The Brooklyns Inst; KUPCHAN, C.A. (1991), "Concerts, Collective Security and the Future of Europe", *International Security*, 16(1) Summer; MANNERS, Ian (2001), *European [security] Union: from existential threat to ontological security*, The Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) for a Senior Research Fellowship; RYNNING, Sten ( ), "The European Union: Towards a Strategic Culture?", *Security Dialogue*, 34(4): 479–496. ULUSOY, H. (2003a) , " Collective Security in Europe*", Perceptions*, 7(4): 156-195

[12] Several works focused on this issue. For example see: AYBET, Gülnur and MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ, Meltem (2000), "Transformations in Security and identity After the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe", *International Journal*, Autumn; BAGCI, Hüseyin (1998a), "Türk Dış Politikası: Genel Bakış", in I. Dağı (ed) *Türk Dış Politikasında Gelenek ve Değişim*, Ankara: Siyasal

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[13] For detailed works on the ESDP development and Turkey's attitude on it, see for example: AYBET, Gülnur and MÜFTÜLER-BAÇ, Meltem (2000), "Transformations in Security and identity After the Cold War: Turkey's Problematic Relationship with Europe", *International Journal*, Autumn; BAGCI, H. (1999), "Turkish Reactions to the EU Approach" in S. Baier-Allen (ed) *Looking into the Future of Cyprus-EU relations*, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag: 39-50; ------- (2004b), "Türkiye ve AGSK: Beklentiler, Endişeler " , in İ. Bal (ed) *21.Yüzyılda Türk Dış Politikası, Ankara: Nobel.* : 939-958;
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[14] For the views reflecting the Turkish state see for example the following articles of the state officials and dignitaries: DOGAN, Esra (2003), "Turkey in the New European Security and Defence Architecture", *Perceptions*, 8(1);ERGUVENC, Şadi (1998), "Turkey's Security Perceptions", *Perceptions*, 3(2); MORALI, Turan (1996), "European Security and Defence Identity and Turkey", *Perceptions*, 1(2); ------ (2004), "Turkey's Security Perspectives and Perceptions", *Turkish Policy Quarterly;* ORHUN,   Ömür (2000), "European Security and Defence Identity-Common European Security and Defence Policy: A Turkish perspective", *Perceptions,* 5(3); OYMEN, Onur (1997) , "Turkey's European Foreign policy", *Perceptions*, 2(1); --------- (2000), *Turkish challenge: Turkey in Europe and the World towards the 21ˢᵗ Century*, Nicosia: Rüstem; ------ (2001a), "Turkey and Its Role in European Security and Defence", *Insight Turkey*, 3(1); ---- (2001b), "What is Turkey's Role in NATO-EU Cooperation", *Insight Turkey,* 3(3),: 15-21.

[15] In a survey conducted at the NATO Defence College among the participants of the Senior Course 96 in 2000, respondents, who were the officials of the NATO member and partner countries working at NATO and security related departments in their own countries, were asked whether "as ESDI in practice develops within the EU, it can be viable only if the EU gives all European members of NATO equal rights in matters relating to ESDI". 71 percent answered affirmatively. This percentage was higher (80 percent) among the Partnership respondents. See Hasan Ulusoy (2001) , "a Survey on Current Major NATO Issues", Perceptions, Vol. VI, No. 1.

[16] See, for an extensive summary of such literature, YURDUSEV; N. (1997), " Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği" in Atila Eralp ed. *Türkiye ve Avrupa*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi and also G DELANTY, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, reality,* Basingstoke: Mac Millan; NOFF, T. (1984), "The Ottoman Empire and the European States System", in H. Bull and A.Watson ed., *The Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.

[17] The collective security operations (peace support and observer missions) participated by Turkey in the post-Cold War era are as follows: UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), UN Iraq-Northern Military Observer Mission (UNIKOM), UN Georgia Observer Group (UNOMIG), UN East Timor Transitional Administration (UNTAET), Georgia OSCE Observer Mission, Temporary International Presence in El-Halil (TIPH), UN Somalia Operation(UNOSOM), UN Protection Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (UNPROFOR), NATO Protection Force in Bosnia Herzegovina (IFOR/SFOR), Sharp Guard Operation, Day Flight/Deliberate Forge/Joint Guardian Operation, Operation ALBA (Albania), Kosovo Operation (KFOR) , Provide Comfort and Northern Watch Operations in Northern Iraq, UN-NATO Operation in Afghanistan (ISAF) . See the web site of Turkish armed forces accessed at http://www.tsk.mil.tr/uluslararasi/barisidestekharekatkatki/barisdestekkatki. 27.12. 2004.

[18] The Provide Comfort Operation was the result of the fact that following the Gulf War, many people sought refugee in Turkey as a result of oppression the Iraqi government commenced against such groups which did not support the Saddam regime in 1991. Thereupon, the UN Security Council decided by its resolution 687 dated April 3, 1991 to lay economic embargo against Iraq and ensure destruction of the nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. Later, given the UN Security Council resolution 688 on April 5, 1991 to provide security, board and lodging of the regional people and ensure them to settle in their territory., the Turkish government decided on April 5, 1991 to approve the temporary presence of a multi-national force in our territory based on the Turkish grand National Assembly's Decision 126 dated January 17, 1991 in order not be permit repetition of the mass migration and ensure a long-lasting peace in the region. Thus Provide Comfort operation was started with the participation of the US, France and the UK, and Turkey as the host nation. The operation carried out for the humanitarian aid and deterrence purposes has been replaced by the Northern Watch Operation from January 1, 1997 with the participation of the US, UK, and Turkey as the host nation for ensuring surveillance and control of the region, upon the return of the refugees to their territory and termination of the humanitarian aid activities (see Turkish armed forces website, Northern Watch, accessed at http://www.tsk.mil.en/northernwatch. , 2005.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS

The post-Cold War era is generally compared with that of the Cold War in two contrast ways. One view is that the Cold War was terrible and dangerous period in European history, and that ending it has enormously improved the prospects for European security. The second view, equally crude but at the opposite end of the spectrum, is that the Cold War was good for European security and that ending it has opened the Pandora's box of new dangers.

In view of the aforementioned discussions in the preceding chapters, both arguments seem to be relevant today. It is evident that if the Cold War era was neither peace nor war, the post-Cold War has so far been both peace and war in the same time. Given the countless hot conflicts and fights in the Post-Cold war era that have stemmed from non-conventional warfare of asymmetric nature, despite the diminishing threat perception of nuclear wars on a global scale, one can rightly say: "the dragon is dead, but the woods are still full of dangerous snakes" (Hyde-Price, 2001, 46).

In this era, political realism has continued to reign while the realist (mainstream) scholarship of positivist legacy has seriously been challenged by critical approaches that work on the post-positivist understanding and constitutive theorizing. Of great importance in the constitutive mode is the understanding that human beings and thus states see the world, through their lenses that are constructed in conformity with their backgrounds shaped through cultures, values and norms, which altogether form the identity.

Explanations based primarily on interests and the material distribution of power cannot fully account for important international phenomena. The importance of a country is driven by perceptions.

In such a world, everything that led to the process, through which   this thesis has come about, began in fact at the NATO defence College with the course of Senior Officials working at NATO and security related posts that I had the change to attend in the year millennium. There, my general observation was that Turkey's multi-faceted foreign and security policy was in fact mostly interpreted by not only scholars but also course participants in terms of inconsistency and unpredictability leading to arguments of identity crisis and/or identity clashes. What is more, this set of arguments was coupled with the fact that Turkey was perceived mainly by EU countries as a country causing instability as a security consumer in the post-Cold War era. This was another important issue related to the identity question as regards Turkey and its foreign and security policy.

Were these arguments right ? It is this question that stimulated this Ph.D. study in the search for an answer.

Main argument of the Thesis and its assertions

In the literature, indeed critical   studies mostly regard the Turkish foreign policy in the post-Cold War era as inconsistent, thus bound with a identity crisis. On the other hand, realist studies consider it otherwise and the active multi-dimensionalism of Turkey in the field of foreign and security policy is explained   either as tactical policies or in terms of accidental irregularities in otherwise consistent foreign policy of the state.

The purpose of this thesis was in fact to present another argumentation to this problematic. Based on personal experience in the field as a *practioner* , it was my observation that the general patterns of the Turkish foreign and security policy have not been altered despite the growing multi-dimensionalism. It is a fact that this policy has been increasingly challenged by difficulties and constraints of both endogenous and exogenous nature. Yet, it has managed to follow an unbroken continuity and consistency. In this process Turkey has in fact contributed to the general security environment not only in Euro-Atlantic area but also on a global scale.

In this context, the thesis has sought to provide alternative explanations to this consistency and continuity with special emphasis on its security dimension, on the basis of an examination of the lenses forming the identity of the state that has governed the foreign and security policy in the post-Cold war era till the Iraqi crisis in 2002.

Turkey' s policies followed in the field of international security are directly related to the national security and thus foreign policy in general. As analysed in the previous chapters, national security is an indispensable part of collective security efforts and foreign policy consists of policies primarily on the two former areas. Therefore, it goes without saying that one needs to analyse the patterns of the Turkish foreign policy for a fuller understanding of the polices followed by Turkey concerning its security.

The main argument of the thesis, then, was that in the world which is run by political realism, Turkey has conducted a pragmatic but consistent foreign and security policy guided by rationality that functions depending of how the state has perceived the outside material world, through the lens forming its own identity.

Based on this argumentation, the assertions of the thesis were as follows: in the Turkish foreign and security policy there exists no identity crisis despite the plurality of identities stemming from the multi-dimensionalism in this policy. These identities called sub-identities may differ depending on the composition of ideational and material factors therein. Yet, they exist in harmony with each other under the guidance of the state (upper) identity. In this regard, arguments regarding Turkey as a security consumer causing instability are due to the identity problems. It is the lack of sufficient collective identity that leads to such perceptions about Turkey.

In view of the foregoing, the focus was on the identity analysis and thus the thesis has utilised the constructivist approach in its conventional form. The thesis is based on the understanding that in the world where realist parameters function, states follow rational policies according to how they see and perceive the world. Constructivism serves as the right theoretical tool in this regard.

This theoretical approach helps understand how the material world where realist parameters dominate through rationalistic behaviour of states is constructed and thus how the foreign polices of states are formulated. It focuses on the examination of the lens through which the state sees and constructs the world outside. The lens simply shapes the identity of the state in question.

It is clear that constructivism is not an alternative but complementary to the realist understanding of the world and international relations. It provides additional explanations to the world outside without rejecting this realist world. Constructivism in its conventional form thus functions on the premises of the mainstream scholarship but also complements them with societal premises stressing the importance of identity, culture and norms, in addition to interests, in shaping foreign policies of states in IR. Constructivism does indeed help contemporary IR to advance a more complete picture of 'what makes the world hang together' (Checkel, 2004, 30).

Building on this theoretical tool, the Turkish foreign and security policy has been examined with reference to identity. In this process, the study is mainly based on the discourse analysis of the official documents, debates, policy papers as well as speeches and articles of state personalities who play roles in the foreign and security policy.

Discourses are speech acts that are of particular importance in two aspects: First, they are the reflection of the identity in foreign policy. Discourses written or spoken of the state officials and institutions are the products and thus reflection of the identity of the state in foreign policy. Second, such speech acts also help understand the contents of the identity. It is because such discourses written or spoken by state officials and organs in return do directly contribute to the shaping of the identity that make them use such texts and speeches.

Given the fact that the post-Cold War era has already encompassed a multitude of developments not only in the world affairs, but also, corollary to this, in the Turkish foreign and security policy, the focus of the thesis has been on only those that are

considered to be particularly relevant   for the constructivist analysis of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

Chapters

Based on the aforementioned structure, the chapters of the thesis unfold as follows:

Chapter 1 as the introduction has set forth the general statement of the thesis with the main argumentation and assertions. Besides, the theoretical and conceptual framework has been explained along with the research design and methodology of the thesis.

Chapter 2 has focused on the analysis of the constructivist scholarship in the literature of IR theory. In this context, the insufficiency of the mainstream scholarship to fully account for the post-Cold war era and the rise of the critical scholarship that led to the emergence of constructivism have all been mentioned. Further to this, constructivism along with its roots, variants and its comparison with both mainstream and critical scholarship have been analysed. In this regard, the added value of constructivism for a better analysis of foreign polices of states in international relations has been emphasized.

Constructivism as a phenomenon has become inescapable in the post-Cold War era. It emerged as an approach to break the stalemate that the mainstream debate resulted in. The constructivist project is not to change the world, but to understand it.

As the chapter has suggested, constructivism takes into account ideas shaped by culture, history as well as experiences and make use of identity and culture in foreign policy analysis. It shows that state identities and strategic cultures are important factors to shape states' foreign and security policies.

Constructivism is welcomed in the sense that it represents a bridge between the two extremes: positivist/rationalist-based mainstream theories and interpretive critical theories of post-positivist nature. Constructivism, albeit drawing from both

positivist/rationalist based mainstream theories and radical interpretive critical theories, seizes the *middle ground* between them.

Constructivism in its conventional form complements the mainstream scholarship in giving a fuller account of world affairs that are still governed according to realist parameters. Importance of the conventional constructivism is that it does not disregard the existence of a world out there. Yet, despite its existence, constructivists argue that this world is socially constructed. In other words, conventional constructivism does not reject the positivist world but approaches it with post-positivist tools to better explain the situation.

Chapter 2 has also indicated the importance of "identities", "interest", "norms," and "culture", as well as "speech acts" in the constructivist analysis of foreign policy.

The analysis clearly shows that identity and interest are not totally different concepts and they are not independent from each other. In fact, they constantly shape each other. We cannot know what we want if we do not know who we are.

State identities have two effects therefore; one is direct—shaping the national interests—the other is indirect—affecting the nature of the security system through shaping the interstate normative structure that in turn shapes the practices of actors. Constructivists show that national interests and foreign policy strategies states adopt are to a significant degree a function of state identity.

Similarly, the effects of identity and culture go deeper. They constitute the content of 'national interest', the sources of 'threat perceptions' and the ideational bases of military strategies. Cultural environments affect not only the incentives for different kinds of state behaviour but also the basic character of states--what we call state "identity."

As to the norms, they either define ("constitute") identities in the first place or prescribe or proscribe ("regulate") behaviours for already constituted identities. Norms are collective expectations about proper behaviour for a given identity.

In sum, this chapter has illustrated with the help of a chart that I myself formulated that there is a mutually determining process of interaction in the sense that all these concepts determine each other in a circle of interaction. For example, norms as products of speech acts contribute to shape   the culture and identity. They are in return shaped by identity, culture as well as the interests. In this process speech acts function as the trajectory to carry those effects of these concepts among each other. In other words, they are not independent variables and none of them is taken as granted but open to a process of constant evolution.

Chapter 3 has followed a similar methodology by focusing on the literature of security studies with a view to underlying the importance of constructivism in the field of security studies. It has indicated that despite the neglect of, or simply the resistance to, identity questions within the realist research program which leads one to think there is no value to identity in explaining national security issues and policies, national security in fact depends on national identity.

For   both scholarships of mainstream and constructivism, national interests, threat perceptions, power, security dilemmas etc. are important determining factors for states' foreign and thus security policies. However, constructivism additionally shows that they are socially constructed with a view to identity and culture. The processes of interest formation and threat construction are not independent of identity formation and cultural factors.

Constructivist's focus on identity and culture as well as interests as variables of security   enables scholars to better account for how the security of a state is constructed in the formulation and the conduct of its foreign policy in IR.

Added value of constructivism in security studies is also related to its emphasis on ideational factors in determining the threats perception and thus the security of the state. At a deeper level of foreign and security preferences and actions lie ideational factors. It is ideational factors that shape the perception of the state vis-à-vis material dangers. Only once perceived and thus constructed as a security threat, material factors can be called a threat. For example, missiles in a country may pose a threat to some states; and not to others. They may even be regarded by some as tools of

security. In other words, the same missiles have different meanings for different actors across time and space because the meanings attached to these material factors differ depending on the nature of social structure (of enmity or amity) between the actors. This is the process of securitisation, in which insecurities that are threats to the identities, and thus to the interests, are perceived and constructed as threats.

The said chapter has also reviewed the literature as regards collective security arrangements in a comparative manner where constructivism is assessed as the best theoretical tool to account for collective security efforts particularly in the post-Cold War era. It has concentrated on this issue with special emphasis on the role of collective identity. In view of the self/other dichotomy, the importance of building a common *self* as a collective identity in contrast to a common *other* has been underlined.

The literature review has showed that collective security efforts constitute an adequate field to asses the value of constructivism with the application of the *self/other* dichotomy. It is because collective security efforts are related to forming collective identities of the *self* against a common enemy , i.e. the *other* in a world governed by realist parameters. What constitutes the basis for collective security arrangements is the collective identity, i.e. the formation of *self* against a commonly defined *other*, which lays the ground for a sound collective security.

In view of this, the importance of constructivism and the role of collective identity in the post-Cold War era have been empirically discussed in light of former collective security regimes in the world.

In this context, one can easily understand that collective identities and shared values as well as shared understandings as regards threat perceptions are of significant importance for the creation of a workable collective security regime. Thus, sound collective security arrangements are forms of collective identity.

In this regard, as the chapter indicates, collective security regimes in history failed in forming a sound collective security system at the global level. It is because they could not manage to create a collective identity and common other. In the Cold

War era, the East only and the West managed to create their own *self* constructing each other "the other" in the field of security. The post-Cold War could not either create a collective identity in the sense of self among the majority of states in the international community on a global scale. In this era, constructing a collective identity on the basis of the notion of "civilisationary clashes" or against "the rough states" seems to have not led to a success. To the contrary, these have aggravated fault lines between countries and regions as well as religions, let alone reinforcing a collective identity at the global level.

In this context, the post-September 11 era seems to have provided a conducive atmosphere for the creation of a new "other", i.e. common enemy. This is terrorism in particular and other non-conventional security threats of asymmetric nature such as WMDs (weapons of mass destruction), religious fundamentalism, extreme nationalism, which are either the cause or the means of terrorism. The presence of such a "common enemy" that has been already condemned by almost all states, being members of the UN, no doubt constitutes an important opportunity to facilitate the creation of a workable collective security arrangement at the global level in the future.

As mentioned in the chapter, one should here stress the following to illustrate the value of constructivist understanding: on September 11 the targets that were hit by terrorists seem to be not randomly chosen as they were in fact the symbols of the "US hegemony" in coercion (pentagon) and capital (twin towers). These two components, i.e. coercion and capital, are the basics of western state formation. Thus, looking from this angle, September 11 attacks can be seen as the attacks of one *self* that has developed its common identity in contrast to its *other*, " Western World".

One can conclude that in the present world order, in which the basic premises of the mainstream scholarship are still present, constructivism complements them, with its emphasis on the importance of collective identities and ideational factors in collective security.

Following the focus on the conceptual and theoretical framework of the thesis in the preceding chapters, Chapter 4 has been devoted to the analysis of Turkish

foreign and security policy with special emphasis on collective security since the establishment of the Republic till the end of Cold War.

There, first the national identity that is an indispensable part of the state identity shaping the foreign and security policy of the state has been reviewed. This review shows that national identity (the set of shared norms and narratives that sustain "we-ness" through time) is of significance as it embodies the *self* of the state. The formation of the *self* is important in order that the state forms its foreign policy that is formulated through the state identity based on the construction of the "other" of the state.

The national identity of Turkey is based on the concept of *Turkishness* . As explained in the Chapter, this term does not consist of ethnic connotations but to the contrary refers to the citizenship of the state in accordance with the philosophy of constitutional (territorial) nationalism. In this regard, the dictum of Atatürk " ne mutlu Türküm diyene" (how happy is the person who calls himself Turk) underlines the importance of national identity as this motto encourages the people of Turkey to identify themselves with this term. More importantly, one can also see the impact of a constructivist understanding in this dictum. It is because Atatürk's dictum is a call for the people of Turkey for how to perceive themselves and to construct their identity accordingly.

The Turkish national identity has been further moulded by the following two concepts: Secularism and Westernism. This national identity being embodied by them formed altogether the state identity of modern Turkey. To put it more precisely, the state identity that is shaped by secularism and westernism in the sense of modernism on the foundations of the national identity, has been the main factor in shaping the foreign policy of the Turkish Republic as in all other policies of the state, like the domestic structure of the country.

Beside the state identity as the main pillar, there are a number of determinants that have inevitably been influential in the formation of this form of foreign policy. The first named *structural*, are continuous, and rather static. The second, termed *conjunctural*, are dynamic and subject to change under the influence of domestic and

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foreign developments. Turkey's security has always been shaped by two structural determinants, i.e., its geography and its historical background mainly with countries in its surrounding.

Under the direct influence of these determinants, Turkish foreign policy in general and in security matters in particular seem to have shown two main characteristics in the phase of implementation, not to mention its westernist approach that is also part of the state identity.

The first is generally named as "internationalism" . This term mainly refers to a policy of the state to act together with the international community, to seek the support and consent of the international community for its polices and to associate its polices in line with the universally accepted principles of the international community.

The second characteristic is the fact that in matters that are constructed by the state as dear to its survival such as territorial integrity, national security etc, the state has not hesitated to act alone even without the support of the international community, though always in line with international law and customs..

The constructivist analysis in the chapter has suggested that under the constraints of the bipolar world run by the balance of terror due the proliferation nuclear weapons, the state had no other alternative but to follow a realist policy. Even the governments' programmes confirmed this realist policy .

Despite all these difficulties with its allies as mentioned in the chapter, Turkey's foreign policy was able to remain western oriented in essence. In fact, the Cold War facilitated Turkey's integration with the West, because the global confrontation unprecedentedly increased Turkey's geopolitical importance.

Yet, on the other hand, to the extent Turkey became disillusioned about its Western allies, it has diversified and opened up foreign policy options to new regions and states, albeit still under the constraints of the bipolar world. This

growing multi-dimensional foreign policy in fact   contributed to the formation of new identities in foreign policy.

In this era, alignment with the Western world was not only due to Turkey's quest for modernisation. It was also necessitated by security concerns deriving from the conditions of the Cold War. In other words, in this westernist policy not only ideational but also material factors were influential.

In this period, the identity of foreign and security policy was heavily dominated by material factors (existence of military threats and nuclear weapons) and realist concerns(survival, territorial integrity)   rather than ideational ones (common ties based on ethnicity, language or religion).

Realists can argue this as a rational policy for Turkey as it had not so much options in this era due to severe security concerns of the bipolar world. Yet, constructivist explanation can add   that Turkey's policy not to question its Western allies was also motivated by its Western identity.   In this regard, throughout the Cold War, NATO was represented as the bastion of 'Western' identity in Turkey.

In view of the foregoing, the best summary that can explain the perceptions of the state about the international developments in the Cold War era, and thus the construction of foreign and security policy of Turkey under such perceptions is the following words: "Cold War was a peace based on fear and insecurity" (MFA yearbook 1992) .

Following the general patterns of the Turkish foreign and security policy, Chapter 5 has focused on the developments in the post-Cold war era as regards this policy that has evolved in conformity with the aforementioned structure and features as discussed in the previous chapter. In this regard, the collective security policies of Turkey in the post-Cold War era has been elaborated in light of the developments in the Turkish foreign and security policy during the previous eras.

As the chapter argued, the general consequences of the end of Cold War, i.e. the demise of the bipolar world with the collapse of the Soviet Bloc, the emergence of

new security threats causing multitude of hot conflicts and even wars with the transboundary effects of globalisation, seem to have led to two basic outcomes in the formulation of the foreign and security policy in Turkey. They can be classified as follows:

a) Growing perception of insecurity and securitization of issues in the foreign and security policy.

b)Transformation of the foreign policy from defensive reflexes to an active politics of growing multi-dimensional nature.

Turkey emerged from the Cold War with multiple threats to its security. However, new emphasis on threats, together with opportunities, eventually also led to activism in the foreign and security policy.

Following the Gulf War Turkey has increasingly adjusted itself to the patterns of an active policy through several regional initiatives for expanding its polices in political, economic and security fields.

This active policy towards a multi-dimensional posture has been further stimulated when the EU once again decided not to confer Turkey with the candidate status at the Luxembourg summit of 1997. In this period Turkey welcomed new concepts such as " historical geography" in the sense that Turkey's geography is not limited to its physical borders but expands to where its history lies.

Nevertheless, the multidimensional and active foreign policy of Turkey that was followed in the aftermath of the Cold War could not escape from the arguments of identity crisis, claiming Turkey to follow inconsistent foreign policy.

Turkey's active foreign policy and multi-dimensional approaches have been considered as clashes of identities and/or identity crisis in the conduct of foreign policy. In this context, policies directed to regions such as the Central Asia, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East where historical, linguistic or religious affinities exist between Turkey and those countries in these regions have been criticized as "neo-Ottomanism" alluding to a policy of expansionism.

In addition to this, while the active and multi-dimensional posture of Turkey in its foreign policy has led to the aforementioned discussions and implications , the post-Cold War has also brought up several important developments in the foreign and security policy of Turkey in general and its collective security efforts in particular.

Constructivist analysis shows that Turkey's security culture and thus identity are primarily affected by the fear of loss of territory, division of the country and distrust of foreign nations. This posture of insecurity is generally called " Sevres syndrome" in a negative manner to mostly criticize the state elites' over caution and scepticism in this regard.

Those concerns and perceptions of insecurity are the product of historical experiences of the state. Thus, history matters in the formation of such insecurities and duly the securitization of certain issues. In addition to the insecurity perceptions driven mainly by the realities of the world in history and at present, the security identity of Turkey has also been shaped by its geography.

Affected by these sources of insecurity, in the post-Cold War, such issues as the power vacuum in Northern Iraq, separatist terrorism, fundamentalist Islam, along with other manifestations of asymmetric security threats, have been gradually securitized adding to the security identity of the state along with other conventional sources of insecurity.

In this process, in parallel to its NATO membership, Turkey has taken the necessary steps for the promotion of co-operation and joint actions for collective security and partnership through either bilateral or regional initiatives. This is because through co-operation and joint actions one can better develop common understanding.

The promotion of regional co-operation has always been valuable for Turkey's security. It is mainly because this policy contributes to regional peace and stability enhancing Turkey's security. They no doubt help also serving the facilitation of collective identity among these states including Turkey in security and foreign policy

related matters. This makes them particularly important for the constructivist understanding.

While Turkey through these policies were seeking to formulate a common identity encompassing its old allies and the countries in its surrounding regions , quite paradoxically, its policies were also seen and perceived by its allies mainly the EU members as sources of instability and insecurity. Corollary to this perception, the EU has increasingly considered Turkey as a security consumer rather than security provider.

As regards the issues surrounding collective identity building, the chapter has examined Turkey's relations with NATO in view of its contribution to the collective identity between Turkey and the Alliance and its members. On the other hand, Turkey's relations with the EU in the field of security has been assessed in view of the absence of such collective identity between the two sides. Finally, Turkey's contributions to and policies on the collective security operations in the post-Cold War era have been emphasized in respect to the role of ideational factors in these policies and thus in the security identity constructed by the state as to collective security.

As analysed in detail, Turkey's participations in the collective security operations in the post-Cold War are also a product of its policies in the search of collective identity with the international community in general and mainly with its European and Western allies as in the cases of NATO solidarity. Secondly, in these policies, ideational factors stemming from socio-psychological and primordial bonds have also been influential although realist parameters in the upper identity governing the foreign and security policy of the state always prevail over these concerns.

Testing the assertions of the Thesis

As explained in Chapter 5, the multi-dimensional and active politics was seen as a deviation from the established identity of the Turkish foreign policy. Then the label was ready: Turkey was in identity crisis.

Certainly, global, regional and domestic changes have brought about some problems which need to be addressed, but they have not yet caused an identity crisis in Turkish foreign policy. It seems fair to conclude that because it has not shown the symptoms of an identity crisis, Turkish foreign policy has not been suffering from such a crisis.

Nor have these global changes diminished Turkey's importance in international relations. On the contrary, Turkey has begun to play a more important role in the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia. While playing its role, Turkey has been able to resist all tempting factors that would undermine its westernisation efforts, its secular identity, its attempts to integrate with the Western world in general and the EU in particular.

In the light of Turkey's response to the regional and global changes in world politics, it is possible to conclude that Turkey's foreign policy direction in the 1990s has so far remained the same as in the previous periods. Turkish decision makers have conducted Turkey's foreign relations in accordance with the conventional principles of Turkish foreign policy which have been developed since the establishment of the republic.

In this context, Turkey's internationalist posture in foreign policy has further evolved to extend to joining military campaigns in the format of peace keeping or peace enforcement under the mandates of international organisations. Turkey's active participation in the collective security operations are clear testimony to this development of the internationalist posture of the state.

Mentioning of the internationalist posture, one can also see as regards the security identity, the continuation of the policy of the state to act alone without seeking the support of the international community in matters directly affecting its security, albeit always in line with international law and norms.

In view of the foregoing regarding the unbroken continuity of the foreign and security policy, one can then rightly ask how the Turkish foreign policy has

remained consistent despite all   seemingly divergent policies stemming from its multi-dimensional posture.

In this regard, in addition to the presence of strong institutional and legal/constitutional foundations in the state such as MFA and the General Staff as regards foreign and security policies and the sterile character of Turkish foreign policy from the domestic politics and concerns, as well as   the structural determinants, history and geography, behind the continuity in this foreign policy understanding lies in fact the unchanged state identity.

As emphasized   in the preceding chapters, states can possess multiple identities. As long as they are in harmony in the sense that they cohabit as sub-identities under one superior identity, identity clashes can be avoided.

In this sense, the thesis has underlined that different identities constructed by Turkey in the conduct of foreign and security policy in the post-Cold war era, do not clash with each other as they are the part of the upper(state) identity, i.e. the identity governing the Turkish foreign policy. But, what is more, multiple identities are in fact the product of the multi-dimensional policy of Turkey in this era.

In this process, ideational factors help to shape the identities constructed *vis a vis* the regions and states or group of states to which policies are formulated. These identities are developed in a process of collective recalling on the basis of cultural, historical, linguistic and religious affinities. In other words, all these identities do not clash with the upper identity that governs the foreign policy. It is because each of these identities do contain the same determinants that shape the foreign policy in addition to their ideational factors that make them differ from each other. In other words, these identities cohabit as sub-identities with the state identity that shape the foreign policy as the upper identity.   As stated by Ambassador Ziyal, former undersecretary of the MFA, "in the conduct of foreign and security policy realism overrides; yet, socio-psychological (ideational)   factors enrich these polices" (Interview with H.E. Ziyal).

Such ideational factors are generally serving as variables in sub-identities. In fact, the upper identity that governs the Turkish foreign policy is formed mainly by material factors driven by realist concerns, such as concerns for survival, territorial integrity and borders, independence, security from military and other attacks etc. These constants are also prevalent in all other sub-identities forming the backbone of them. Yet, what differs from each other is the combination of variables as mentioned above that are mostly of ideational nature.

As I formulated in a chart, the weight of the material factors and realist concerns becomes high in the upper (state) identity whereas ideational factors matter more in sub-identities. This perfectly reflects the Turkish foreign policy posture in the context of constructivist analysis.

In this context, one should also underline the following : In contrast to the high level of use of material factors and realist aspects in the conduct of Turkish foreign and security policy by the state organs such as Government, Foreign Ministry and the General Staff, the ideational factors seem to have found their reflections mostly in the debates of the Turkish parliament. The analysis of the debates that took place at the parliament on the issues of state security matters in the post-Cold War era clearly shows that parliamentarians spell out more ideational aspects of any security issue under discussion than realist (material) aspects of such issue (see the TGNA journals of session records).

The realist character of the Turkish foreign policy and the role of ideational factors in this policy along with its limits in affecting this realist policy can be perhaps explained in the best possible manner with the following anecdote: One day his friend asked Atatürk: " You went till İzmir and liberated it. But why did you not go to Selanik (his birth palace) to liberate it from the Greeks". Atatürk simply replied, "Had we tried to do so, we could then have lost even İzmir." The message was, as stated by Atatürk on another occasion, : "do not tempt your people to the interests that are not attainable" (*Halkımızı, kabil-i istifade olmayan menfaatlere, kabil-i istihsal olmayan menfaatlere yöneltmeyin*) (Interview with H.E. Demirel).

As mentioned in the analysis of the developments in the post-Cold War era, Turkey was seen as a security consumer. This has stemmed from the perception of mainly the EU counties due to the impediments hindering a solid formation of collective identity between Turkey and them.

Throughout the Cold War Turkey and the western Europeans managed to form a collective identity at least in security and defence-related areas in contrast to their common perception, the Soviet Bloc, as the "other". Yet, at the end of the Cold war, as this common "other" became   extinct, such problems were in a way expected in the absence of an "other" that had enhanced the collective identity between Turkey and the Western Europeans, many of which are EU members.

Thus, in the post-Cold War era, Turkey's multi-faceted policies in its adjacent regions were mostly interpreted as adventurist and even labelled by the EU countries as "neo-Ottamanism". In addition to Turkey's assertiveness as perceived by the EU in the former's polices, the geographical location of the country was considered to be the *conflict triangle* due to the tensions and hot conflicts as well as wars in the regions of   the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle Eats that were also posing security threats to the EU owing to the transboundary effects of the globalised world. Besides, Turkey's tensed relations with one of the EU member, Greece, and with the Greek Cypriot administration were neither helpful to overcome the growing negative perception of the EU and its members about Turkey and this country's effects on their security. Turkey's fight against separatist PKK terrorism was another reason for this perception. Furthermore, Turkey's rigid stance with regard to the development of the ESDP by the EU to the detriment of the former's security needs and concerns exacerbated the tension and the disagreement between the two sides. The result was, as emphasized in the previous section, that Turkey was labelled as a country not producing security, but rather consuming security and causing insecurity to the EU.

Despite this, these difficulties seem not to have gone far to lead Turkey to question the importance of the NATO Alliance where many EU countries are members. This can be attributed to the continuation of realist concerns such as the importance of NATO for Turkey's security and defence as well as Turkey's reliance

on such a military alliance for its foreign and security policy. Yet, this is also thanks to the collective identity that Turkey has developed with the Alliance.

In this regard, the post-September11 era seems to have served the strengthening of collective identity of Turkey with its Western allies, most of which EU members, in opposition to the newly found common other "terrorism", by improving its perception by those countries in strategic and security terms.

Testing the utility of the Thesis for the literature

The importance of identity as to foreign and security policy has gradually attracted the attention of scholars of Turkish studies in the literature. Identity- based explanations offer a better understanding of a state's preferences and interests, and consequently its foreign policy priorities.   However, these studies concentrate on identities that shape Turkish foreign and security policy taking them as given, without attempting to analyse these paradigmatic lenses as a whole through which the Turkish state sees and perceives the world.

In view of the foregoing study that is sought to be explained throughout the thesis, one can argue that this thesis has modestly contributed to the relevant literature with the following novelties:

> - Constructivist analysis of Turkey's foreign policy with special emphasis on its security dimension,
>
> - Constructivist analysis of the lenses (identity), through which Turkey perceives the outside material world,
>
> - Constructivist analysis of the existence of multiple identities functioning in harmony as lower identities with the upper (state) identity, thus avoiding identity crisis and clashes of identity in the Turkish foreign and security policy,
>
> - Constructivist analysis of the contents of these identities by focusing on the composition of   ideational and material factors and their effects in the formation of these identities(upper and lower),
>
> - Last but not least, constructivist analysis of collective identity that Turkey has developed in its collective security policies.

As regards the last point, in view of the difficulties faced by Turkey in the process of collective identity-building with the EU, the thesis wishes to forward some suggestions to find remedy to this predicament. Yet, the following proposition is not intended to supplant the other factors accounting for Turkey-EU relations. It rather supplements them in an endeavour to produce a clearer picture of this relationship.

As examined in Chapter 5, irrespective of whether Turkey is *absolute* or *liminal other* or once was the *self* of the EU, the discussion strongly suggests that there exists a problem of identity observed in the Turkish-EU relations. This has inevitably affected the formation of collective identity between Turkey and the EU states in the security field not to mention the other fields of the relationship. NATO has helped to ease this problem in the security realm by facilitating the emergence of collective identity to some extent between Turkey and the EU states that are also members of the alliance.

Given the lack of a sufficient collective identity due to the fact that the EU countries have tended to regard Turkey as its *other* throughout history and to a less extent, *vice versa*, two possible formula can be suggested in the search for a solid collective identity to avoid such identity clashes.

The first can be called *"vertical identification"* formula. In other words, given the plurality of identities, the vertical formula calls for the creation of one upper identity among different sub-identities constructed in contrast to each other. Creating such upper identity that would reconcile the differences between these cultures would better serve to alleviate clashes among themselves. This formula is already applied at the level of nation states, which are of ethnically non-homogenous and in which ethnic groups as non-national identities are embraced by an upper identity, i.e. the national identity.

In this context, another possible remedy to the clash of identities seems to lie in the creation of a "common other" among all these identities that are constructed in contrast to one another. This can be called "*horizontal identification*" formula. In other words, this assumes that different civilizations representing different identities which are historically constructed in contrast to one another, as being "the other of each other", can come together and form a common self against a new common "other".

The said two formulas seem to suggest the possible remedies to the intransigency of socio-physiological (ideational) factors in hindering the Turkey-EU relations. Naturally, in the process of Turkey's accession to the EU one can talk about some other factors that are and will likely be causing difficulties in this process. Let alone the pressure of the EU as to such sensitive issues as Cyprus, these factors include not only the political and economic criteria that Turkey is requested to meet. But also on the part of the EU, there are institutional constraints and concerns, such as how to accommodate such a big country without altering the balance in the EU that is favourable always for the big countries, not to mention political disputes among and within EU countries about their common strategic choice whether to accept Turkey or not in their club.

Yet, given the role of identification in the life of societies and states and thus the importance of the mindset of their populations that are of socio-physiological nature, one can also rightly argue that the ideational factors, which hinder the eventual accession of Turkey in the Union, should be tackled and remedied as a priority.

This is not an easy process. The fact that in the formation of "European identity" among the peoples of this old continent, the presence of the Ottoman Turks representing a different religion and culture strange to the rest of Europe in history was also determinant. In other words, it was the " Muslim Turks" in their minds considered as "the other", against which the rest of Europe of predominantly Christian faith constructed their "European" identity as being "the self". This was due to the socio-physiological lenses, through which they saw and perceived the

Ottoman Turks and later the modern Turkey. It is hard to deny the existence of these lenses today, too, even if such socio-physiological mindset is never spelt out vocally.

Naturally, it is politically correct to deny such a mindset. But this should not prevent EU countries and Turkey from efforts to cure it. Here comes the importance of the afore-mentioned   formulas, i.e. *vertical* and *horizontal identifications*.

Vertically, creating an upper identity to reconcile the differences between the Turkish identity and those of the other European societies would be the first remedy in this respect. In this context, a true "European identity" that can be a superior one to embrace all those national identities of the EU members as sub-identities should also include the Turkish national identity.

Horizontally, Turkey and the rest of the EU states need to form a common self, this time not against each other but against a jointly defined new other. Identifying the self against a common other would certainly facilitate bringing Turkey and the rest of the EU together in the context of peoples' mindset.

However,   the process of such collective identification either horizontally or vertically, between the people of Turkey and those of the rest of EU countries whose histories and memoirs are not immune to   tragic   events, such as wars, killings, occupation against each other, is not certainly an easy one. Yet, one can argue that the key for its success lies in creating a collective identity among such societies and peoples through a process of *collective amnesia* that would focus on getting the peoples forget collectively the centuries-old bitter memoirs. This collective identity building that can be called "palimpsest identity" has in fact worked very well among the EU members that had long been historical foes and rivals of each other, such as between France and Germany.   Thus, it would serve as a useful tool for the Turkish-EU relations in the process of creating a collective identity between both sides, be it vertically or horizontally. Naturally, in this regard,   the onus of proof certainly lies with both sides and with their determination   not only at the level of governments but also at the grassroots level.

This proposition in fact stands as an issue for further constructivist researches following the patterns of argumentation of this thesis in order to asses the value of identity-building in terms of collective identity in the relations between Turkey and the EU countries, not only in particular areas such as security , but also as a whole.

To conclude

As explained above, Turkey has pursued a rational foreign and security policy in the age of political realism, according to how it sees and perceives the material world outside. The Turkish foreign and security policy shows an unbroken continuity of a pragmatic and consistent nature as its determinants and the state identity remain intact. Even systemic changes such as the end of the Cold War could not change the substance of this policy as they are only conjunctural.

Yet, this should not lead to conclusion that Turkish foreign and security policy suffers from *neophobia*. In fact, it has become even more open to novelties in the post-Cold War era, thanks to multi-dimensionalism that are guided by different sub-identities with no detriment to the upper state identity.

In domestic life Turkey might have faced identity crises deriving from certain cultural, social and even political reasons. Yet, even in spite of these factors, the Turkish foreign policy has not encountered such identity crisis. Despite the different policies that might sometimes lead to the claim of identity crisis, the state identity that governs the foreign policy has not changed since the lenses through which policy makers of the state see the outside world remained the same. However, this does not deny the existence of plurality of identities in the conduct of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

The realist foreign policy of Turkey has mostly been subject to the analyses carried out in line with the realist understanding of foreign policy based on rationalism. However, the failure of solely realist studies in fully capturing international relations and thus foreign polices of states in this system has already been underlined in the previous chapters. In a nut shell, the main difference between the realist understanding and that of constructivism can be as follows: Realists

considers that " states do what they have the power to do" whereas constructivists hold that " states do what they think most appropriate".

Turkey therefore constitutes a good case study to asses the utility of constructivism in the sense that identities also are important in shaping strategic interests of the country that are assumed to be formed rationally according to the realist parameters. Constructivism is a set of paradigmatic lenses through which we observe all socially constructed reality. This theoretical approach stand as an useful theoretical tool for better explaining how Turkey perceives the outside material world and also the composition of ideational and material factors in the polices followed by Turkey.

In this sense, constructivism in its conventional form complements the realist scholarship to better account for the policies of Turkey. It is true that neither of these approaches seems to be sufficient enough to do this alone. For example, Turkey's polices towards the countries where Turkey has primordial ties in terms of language, ethnicity, language or religion, cannot be fully explained by only realist motives but also through constructivist lenses underlying the importance of collective identity in these polices.

The central issue in the post-Cold War era is how different states conceive their identities and interests. In the absence of constructivist explanation of identity-formation, it would be hard to contemplate on the present issues in the field of security studies. Although power is not irrelevant, constructivism emphasizes how ideas and identities are created, how they evolve and how they shape the way states understand and respond to their situation.

There are many attempts to explain continuity in modern Turkey's foreign affairs since the time of Ataturk. But they have ascribed this continuity to such factors as the pragmatist nature of Kemalist ideology, nationalism, national interest, the rationalist approaches of Turkish decision makers or Turkey's historical past and geopolitical position. They have either ignored or underestimated the notion of state identity. This thesis has sought to underline that identity does indeed matter not only in the formulation of the Turkish foreign and security policy, but also in the continuation

of this policy understanding in the post-Cold war era that has evolved through an increasing posture of multi-dimensionalism supported by multiple sub-identities that cohabit with the upper identity of the Turkish foreign and security policy.

As underlined in the introductory chapter, the thesis should not yet be seen as exhaustive in terms of the analysis of theory and literature. Rather it can be considered as thought provoking in the search for a better account of the Turkish foreign and security policy in the post-Cold War era, on the basis of identity analysis through constructivism.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

LIST OF TURKISH STATE PERSONALITIES INTERVIEWED

H.E. Süleyman Demirel, Former Prime Minister, and President, (interviewed in March 2004)

H.E. Ambassador (Rtd) Özdem Sanberk, Former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1990 and 1994, (interviewed in March 2004)

H.E. Ambassador (Rtd) and Deputy Onur Öymen, Former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 1994 and 1997 and former Permanent Representative to NATO between 1997 and 2002 , (interviewed in March 2004)

H.E. Ambassador Uğur Ziyal, Former Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2002 and 2004, (interviewed in March 2004)

H.E. Ambassador Turan Moralı, Former Director General (Head) of International Security Affairs at the Foreign Ministry and Former Deputy Permanent representative to NATO, (interviewed in March 2004)

APPENDIX B

MAIN QUESTIONS ASKED TO THE STATE PERSONALITIES
AT THE INTERVIEWS

- How do you evaluate the security concerns of Turkey in the Post-Cold War era, in comparison to those in the Cold War years? (differences, similarities).

- In your tenure, what are/were the main determining elements shaping the policies of Turkey in the field of security in general and in the field of collective security in particular?

- Beside material factors based on realist understanding, such as the protection of territorial integrity, survival, balance of power, etc., to what extent have the ideational factors, such as primordial (common language, ethnicity and religion) and historical ties become determinant in Turkey's policies towards a certain region/country?

- What are the impacts of post-September 11 era on Turkey's policies as regards its security and collective security in particular?

VITA

PERSONAL INFORMATION:

Name	: Hasan Ulusoy
Nationality	: Turkish
Date and Place of Birth	: 15 September 1966/ Görele, Turkey
Marital Status	: Married with one child
Foreign Languages	: English (professional), French (advanced), German (basic)
E-mail	: hasulu@yahoo.com
Phone	: 00 41 31 359 70 83

ACADEMIC BACKGROUND:

1990-1991	post-graduate research on minority rights / ethnic nationalism, University of Oslo, with scholarship.
1989-1990	MSc. on European Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science, with British Council scholarship, Thesis title: European Security cooperation from an Institutional Perspective.
1988-1989	Graduate research on international security, University of Oslo, with Scholarship.
1983-1987	BA on Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science of Istanbul University.

ACADEMIC AWARDS:

- BA as the third best graduate
- MSc with merit

WORK EXPERIENCE:　　　　　　Since 1991　career diplomat at the Turkish MFA

September 2002 -　　　　　　　　First Secretary, later Counsellor at the Turkish Embassy in Bern, Switzerland

August 2000 – September 2002　First Secretary at the Directorate General for International Security, MFA

February-August 2000　　　　　Training at the NATO Defence College, Rome, Senior Officials Course

July 1998-February 2000　　　　Second Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Teheran, Iran

July 1997-July 1998　　　　　　Third, later Second Secretary at the Turkish Embassy in Lagos, Nigeria

September 1994-July 1997　　　 Third Secretary at the Turkish Permanent Delegation to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, France

December 1991-September 1994　Attaché at the Directorate General for Bilateral Relations with European Countries

PUBLICATIONS:

1. Ulusoy, H.(2004) , "Importance of Identity Building in Avoiding the Clash of Civilisations in the Age of Globalisation (With some reflections on Turkey-EU relations)", *Perceptions,* 9(3), Special Issue.

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TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu tez, devletlerin nasıl görüp algıladıklarına bağlı olarak rasyonel politikalar izledikleri realist dünyada Türkiye'nin dış politikasının güvenlik boyutu bağlamında nasıl yapılandırıldığı/oluşturulduğu konusu ile ilgidir.

Tezin yazılmasına vesile olan itici güç, Roma'daki NATO Savunma Koleji Üst Düzey Görevliler kursuna iştirakim sırasında Türkiye'ye yönelik algılamalar bağlamında ortaya çıkmıştır. Anılan kolejde gerek ders veren akademisyenler, gerek diğer kursiyerler tarafından Türkiye'nin Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki çok boyutlu dış ve güvenlik politikası çoğunlukla tutarlı ve belirgin olmamakla eleştirilmekte ve bu eleştiri çerçevesinde Türk dış politikasında kimlik krizi ve/veya kimlik çatışması bulunduğu savları işlenmekteydi. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye, güvenlik alanında genelde istikrasızlığa davet çıkaran bir ülke olarak nitelendirilmekte ve "güvenlik tüketicisi" olarak tanımlanmakta idi.

Tabiatıyla, diplomasi mesleğindeki kendi tecrübe ve gözlemlerim bunun tersini destekliyordu. Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasının temeli, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde giderek artan çok boyutluluğa rağmen değişikliğe uğramamıştı. Her ne kadar, bu politika, dışsal ve içsel sıkıntı ve engellerle karşı karşıya gelmiş olsa da, kesintiye uğramayan pragmatik bir temelde devamlılık ve tutarlılık izlemekteydi. Böyle bir süreçte, Türkiye güvenlik alanında da genel güvenlik ortamına sadece Avrupa- Atlantik bölgesinde değil, aynı zamanda küresel boyutta önemli katkılar yapan bir "güvenlik üreticisi" konumunu sürdürmekteydi.

İşte, bu genel gözlemlerimi nasıl akademik olarak test edebilirim düşüncesi benim doktoraya başlamamda ve bu tezi hazırlamamda temel etken düşünce olmuştur. Bir başka deyişle, mesleki alandaki gözlemlerimi akademik alanda sınamak bu tezin itici gücünü teşkil etmiştir.

Tezin temel argümanı, Türkiye'nin, dış materyal dünyayı, kendi öz kimliğini oluşturan mercekler arkasından algıladığı şekliyle uyum içinde işlev gören bir rasyonellik ile yönlendirilen pragmatik ve tutarlı bir dış ve güvenlik politikası izlediği yönündedir.

Mercek metaforunun önemi şu şekilde özetlenebilir. Miyop bir insan, dışarıda aynı olan dünyayı, gözlüğünü taktığı zaman farklı, gözlüksüz baktığı zaman farklı algılamakta ve tanımlamaktadır. Farklılık merceğin içeriğinden kaynaklanmaktadır. Tez, devletin dış dünyaya bakarken kullandığı merceğin içini irdelemeye ve böylece dış dünyayı nasıl algıladığını tesbite yöneliktir.

Tezin hipotezleri şu şekilde sunulmaktadır: Çoğunlukla eleştirel (critical) çalışmaların aksine, Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasında, bu politikanın çok boyutlu niteliğinden kaynaklanan kimliklerin fazlalığına rağmen, kimlik krizi yaşanmamaktadır. Alt kimlikler olarak nitelendirilebilecek bu kimlikler, içlerindeki sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) ve materyal etkenlerin kompozisyonuna bağlı olarak farklılık gösterebilirler. Ancak, devletin üst kimliği altında birbirleriyle uyum içinde bulunurlar. Ayrıca, (müşterek) güvenlik bağlamında Türkiye'nin istikrasızlığa yol açan bir güvenlik tüketicisi olduğu yönündeki argümanlar da kimlik olgusu ile ilintilidir. Bu argümanlara, Türkiye hakkında böyle algılamalara neden olan müşterek kimlik yetersizliği yol açmaktadır.

Tezin odak noktası kimlik analizi olduğu cihetle, çalışma yapılandırmacı/ oluşturmacı[*] (constructivism) yaklaşımın konvansiyonel versiyonu temelinde yapılmıştır. Konvansiyonel yapılandırmacı yaklaşım, realist anlayışın egemenliğindeki standart (mainstream) okulu reddetmeksizin, siyasi realizmin hakim olduğu dünyaya alternatif değil, tamamlayıcı açıklamalar getirir. Bu yolla, konvansiyonel yapılandırmacı yaklaşım, realist parametrelerin hakim olduğu ve devletlerin rasyonellik temelinde hareket ettiği materyal dış dünyanın bu devletlerin gözünde nasıl yapılandırıldığını ve dolayısıyla devletlerin dış politikalarının nasıl

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[*] Türkçe kaynaklara bakıldığında *constructivism* teriminin Türkçe karşılığı üzerine bir uzlaşmanın henüz gerçekleşmemiş olduğu görülür. Türkçe karşılık olarak literatürde ağırlıklı olarak yapılandırmacılık veya oluşturmacılık terimleri kullanılmaktadır. Bu tezde yapılandırmacılık terimi esas alınmıştır.

oluşturulduğunu anlamaya hizmet etmektedir. Bu yaklaşım devletlerin dış dünyayı algılayıp yapılandırmasına hizmet eden merceklerin analizine dayanmaktadır. Bu mercekler devletin kimliğini biçimlendirmektedir.

Bu kuramsal yaklaşım temelinde, tez, 2002 yılındaki Irak krizine kadarki Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde Türk dış politikasındaki tutarlılık ve devamlılığa güvenlik boyutu bağlamında alternatif açıklamalar getirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tez, genel olarak devletin dış ve güvenlik politikasını biçimlendiren kimliğini oluşturan merceklerin analizini içermekte ve özellikle (müşterek) güvenlik bağlamında devletin müşterek kimlik yaratımı konusuna odaklanmaktadır.

Türkiye'nin güvenlik alanında izlediği politikaları ulusal güvenliği ve dolayısıyla dış politikasıyla doğrudan ilintilidir. Özelikle Soğuk savaş sonrası dönemde olmak üzere, ulusal güvenlik ve müşterek güvenlik kavramları yek diğerinin ayrılmaz parçası olmuştur. Dış politika da başlıca bu iki alandaki siyasalardan oluşmaktadır. Bu nedenle, tezde, Türkiye'nin genel olarak güvenlik, özel olarak ise müşterek güvenlik alanında izlediği politikalar hakkında daha tamamlayıcı bir resim elde edebilmek için, sadece bu alanlardaki politikalar değil, aynı zamanda Türk dış politikasının genel yapısı da konuyla ilgili örnekler temelinde ampirik olarak analiz edilmektedir.

Tezin metodolojisi, Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasına dair resmi belgeler, resmi görüşmeler ve siyaset belgeleri ile bu politikada rol oynayan devlet görevlilerinin konuşmaları, mülakatları ve makalelerinin analizini içermektedir. Bunun seçilmesinin nedeni, bu kaynakların hem devlet kurumlarının, hem devlet görevlilerinin (sivil, askeri bürokratlar, devlet adamları ve siyasetçiler) dış dünyayı nasıl algıladığını yansıtmasıdır. Bunlar, Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasını oluştururken dış dünyaya bakmakta kullandığı merceklerin (kimliklerin) içeriğini ortaya koymaya hizmet etmektedir.

Yukarıda belirtilen kuramsal ve metodolojik temelde tezin bölümleri aşağıdaki şekilde oluşturulmuştur.

Birinci bölüm (Giriş) , tezin temel argümanı ile tezde akademik sınamaya konu olan hipotezleri içermektedir. Buna ilave olarak, tezin kuramsal ve kavramsal çerçevesi ile araştırma şekli ve metodolojisi ortaya konmaktadır.

İkinci bölüm, uluslararası ilişkiler (Uİ) kuramı literatüründe yapılandırmacı okulun analizini içermektedir. Bu çerçevede, *mainstream* okulun Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemi tam olarak açıklamadaki yetersizliği ile yapılandırmacılığın doğuşuna yön veren eleştirel (critical) okulun yükselişi ele alınmaktadır. Buna ilave olarak, yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın kökeni ve tipleri analiz edilerek, *mainstream* ve eleştirel yaklaşımlarla karşılaştırması yapılmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, devletlerin dış politikalarının daha iyi bir analizini yapabilmek açısından yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın sağladığı katma değer vurgulanmaktadır.

Yapılandırmacı okul, dış politika ve uluslararası ilişikler analizinde sosyo-psikolojik faktörlerin önemini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu çerçevede, kimlik olgusunu analizin temel öğesi olarak ele alır. Devletin kimliğinin ve stratejik kültürünün bu devletlerin dış ve güvenlik politikalarının biçimlendirmede önemli faktörler olduğu vurgusunu yapar.

Yapılandırmacı okul, positivist / rasyonel kökenli *mainstream* kuramlar ile post-positivit yorumcu (*interpretevist)* eleştirel kuramlar arasında bir köprü işlevi gören *, via media* bir yaklaşım içermektedir. Bu yapısıyla anılan iki yaklaşım arasındaki orta yolu oluşturmaktadır.

Yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın bir versiyonu olan ve tezin temel aldığı kuramsal yaklaşımı teşkil eden *konvansiyonel yapılandırmacı* yaklaşım, realist anlayışın egemenliğindeki *mainstream* okulu reddetmeksizin, siyasi realizmin hakim olduğu dünyaya alternatif değil tamamlayıcı açıklamalar getirir. Bu yaklaşım, dış dünyadaki materyal etkenleri dışlamadan, anılan dünyanın aynı zamanda sosyal olarak yapılandırıldığı vurgusunu getirmekte ve böylece, dış dünyayı daha tamamlayıcı bir şekilde anlamaya hizmet etmektedir.

İkinci bölüm, bu çerçevede, yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın önemli olgularını oluşturan, kimlik, çıkar, norm, kültür ve diskurların (speech act) dış politika analizlerindeki işlevlerini de ayrıntılı olarak ele almaktadır.

Sözkonusu olgular birbirlerini düzenli ve sürekli olarak etkileyerek biçimlendir ve bir bütün olarak devletlerin dış politikalarının belirlenmesi sürecinde önemli rol oynarlar. Bu süreçte, kimlik bütün bu olguları içinde barındıran temel olgu olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Üçüncü bölüm, bir önceki bölümde uygulanan metodoloji çerçevesinde Uİ bünyesindeki güvenlik çalışmaları literatürünü ele almakta ve yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın güvenlik çalışmaları alanındaki kuramsal önemini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu bağlamda, ulusal güvenlik olgusunun ulusal kimlik olgusuna dayandığı vurgulanmaktadır.

Bölümde, devletlerin dış ve güvenlik politikalarını belirleyen temel olgular olan, ulusal çıkar, tehdit algılaması, güç ve güvenlik ikilemleri gibi olguların *mainstream* ve yapılandırmacı yaklaşımlar açısından karşılaştırması yapılmakta ve *mainstream* okulun bu olgulara ilişkin tesbitlerine ek olarak, yapılandırmacı okulun, bunların kimlik ve kültür temelinde sosyal olarak yapılandırıldıkları vurgusunu getirdiği ortaya konmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın, güvenlik değişkenleri olarak kimlik, kültür ve çıkarlara yaptığı vurgunun, bir devletin güvenliğinin, dış politikasının oluşturulması ve uygulanmasında nasıl yapılandırıldığını daha kapsayıcı olarak yansıttığı dile getirilmektedir.

Yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın güvenlik çalışmalarına getirdiği katma değer, devletin tehdit algılamalarını ve dolayısıyla güvenliğini belirlemede sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) etkenlere yaptığı vurguda yatmaktadır. Sosyo-psikolojik etkenler devletin materyal tehlikeler karşındaki algılamasını belirlemektedir. Materyal olgular, ancak bir güvenlik tehdidi olarak algılanıp, bu yönde yapılandırıldıkları zaman o devlet için bir tehdit olarak adlandırılırlar. Bir örnek vermek gerekirse, bir ülkenin sahip olduğu füzeler bazı devletler için tehdit olarak görülürken, bazıları için görülmezler. Bunun nedeni, füzeye sahip devlete ilişkin diğer devletlerin geliştirdiği tehdit algılamaları arasındaki farktır. Bir başka deyişle, materyal olgular

ancak sosyo-psikolojik olarak yapılandırıldığı zaman anlam kazanmaktadırlar. Yoksa tek başına bir ülkedeki füzelerin varlığı onun güvenlik açısından bir başka ülke için tehdit olarak görülmesine yol açmamaktadır.

Genel olarak güvenlik olgusunun yapılandırmacı anlayış çerçevesinde ele alındığı bu bölüm ayrıca güvenlik çalışmalarının bir alt birimini oluşturan müşterek güvenlik düzenlemeleri konusundaki literatürü ele almakta ve bu çerçevede, özellikle Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde müşterek güvenlik düzenlemelerini açıklayabilmek için yapılandırmacı okulun en uygun kuramsal yaklaşım olduğu vurgusunu yapmaktadır.

Literatür analizi, müşterek güvenlik olgusunun temelde, benlik/ötekilik (self/other) karşıtlığı anlayışı çerçevesinde müşterek kimlik yaratımı ile ilgili olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Realist parametrelerin hakim olduğu bir dünyada, müşterek güvenlik düzenlemelerinin başarılı olabilmesi için üyeleri arasında müşterek kimlik yaratılması, bir başka deyişle, ortak olarak tespit edilen bir "öteki" karşısında "benlik" oluşturulması gerektiği bu bölümde tarihteki müşterek güvenlik düzenlemelerinin genel bir değerlendirmesi ışığında ortaya konmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, BM dahil olmak üzere, geçmişteki bu gibi düzenlemelerin müşterek güvenlik alanında istenen başarıyı sağlayamamasının arkasında, bu düzenlemelerdeki üye devletler arasında müşterek kimlik yaratımında zorluk yaşanmış olduğu gerçeğinin yattığı vurgulanmaktadır.

Soğuk savaş döneminde Batı ile Doğu blokları birbirlerini "öteki" olarak tanımlamışlardır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde de uluslararası toplumun çoğunluğu arasında küresel boyutta ortak bir "öteki"ye karşı "benlik" olacak şekilde müşterek kimlik oluşturulamamıştır. Bu dönemde, eskinin ideolojik karşıtlığının yerini almaya yönelik, *medeniyetler çatışması* ve benzeri savlar temelindeki müşterek kimlik arayışları da aksi tesir yaparak, müşterek kimlik yerine devletler ve bölgeler arasındaki kırılma hatlarını daha da şiddetlendirmekten başka bir yarar sağlamamıştır.

Bu süreçte, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemin, terör olgusunun en azından söylem düzeyinde uluslararası toplumun hemen hemen tamamı tarafından "öteki" olarak tanımlanmasına hizmet etmiş olduğu düşünülmektedir. Bu çerçevede, bu ortak

düşman "öteki" temelinde küresel düzeyde müşterek güvenlik açısından müşterek kimlik yaratımı için elverişli bir döneme girildiği söylenebilir.

Bu tespitler ışığında, yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın, kimlik analizi yoluyla Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde müşterek güvenlik alanında yaşananlara daha kapsayıcı açıklamalar getirdiği bu bölümde ayrıntılı olarak dile getirilmektedir.

Bu kuramsal ve kavramsal ampirik analizleri takiben, bu analizlerin ışığında dördüncü bölüm, Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasını müşterek güvenlik alanına ağırlık verilmek suretiyle irdelemektedir. Bu bölüm, tezin ana inceleme dönemini oluşturan Soğuk Savaş sonrası döneme kadarki zamanı içermektedir.

Bu bölümde, öncelikle devletin, dış ve güvenlik politikasını biçimlendiren devlet kimliğinin ayrılmaz parçası olan ulusal kimliği, Cumhuriyet öncesi dönemden başlayarak irdelenmektedir. Türkiye'nin ulusal kimliği "Türklük" kavramı üzerine kuruludur. Bu kavram, herhangi bir etnik temele dayanmamakta, aksine, anayasal (territoryal) ulusalcılık felsefesine uygun olarak vatandaşlık bağı temelinde ulusal kimliği açıklamaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Cumhuriyetin kurucusu Atatürk'ün "ne mutlu Türküm diyene" sözü, yapılandırmacı anlayış çerçevesinde ulusal kimliğin içeriğini en iyi şekilde açıklamaktadır. Bu söz, ulusal kimliğin, Türk olmak yerine, kendini Türk olarak tanımlamak anlayışı temelinde oluşturulduğunu ve bu anlamda etnik temelden ziyade, vatandaşların kendini Türk olarak tanımlamasına yönelik bir anlayışı yansıttığını vurgulamaktadır. Bu anlamda, Atatürk, yapılandırmacı okulun doğuşundan 70 yıl kadar önce bu yaklaşımın felsefesini devlet idaresine uygulayan bir lider olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Türk ulusal kimliği, bu içeriğine ilave olarak laiklik ve modernleşme anlamında Batıcılık kavramları ile yoğrulmuştur. Bütün bunlar hep birlikte modern Türkiye'nin devlet kimliğini oluşturmaktadır. Bu haliyle devlet kimliği ülkenin iç politikalarını olduğu kadar dış politikasını da biçimlendiren temel etken olmuştur.

Tabiatıyla, devlet kimliğinin yanında, dış politikanın oluşturulmasında yapısal ve konjonktürel bir dizi belirleyici etken de bulunmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin özellikle güvenliği açısından izlenen politikalarda, coğrafi konumu ve yakın

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çevresindeki ülkeler başta olmak üzere tarihi ilişkileri iki temel yapısal belirleyici olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Bütün bu etkenlerin doğrudan etkisi altındaki Türkiye'nin dış politikası ve özellikle güvenlik alanında izlenen siyasaları, aynı zamanda devlet kimliğinin bir parçasını oluşturan Batılılık anlayışı yanında iki temel özellik içermiştir.

Bunlardan birincisi, "uluslararacılık" olarak tanımlanabilir. Bu anlayış, devletin izlediği dış politikada uluslararası toplumla birlikte hareket etmeye, politikalarında uluslararası toplumun desteğini almaya ve politikalarının bu toplumun evrensel olarak kabul görmüş ilkeleriyle uyum içinde olmasına özen göstermesini anlatmaktadır.

Buna ilave olarak ikinci özellik ise, devletin, kendi varlığının idamesi için yaşamsal olarak addettiği, toprak bütünlüğü, ulusal birlik gibi konularda gerektiğinde uluslararası toplumun desteği olmaksızın da hareket etmekten çekinmemesi, ancak, bu hareketlerinde yine de uluslararası hukuk ve teamülleri göz önüne almasıdır.

Cumhuriyetin kuruluşundan Soğuk Savaşın bitimine kadarki dönemde Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasının yapılandırmacı analizi aşağıdaki hususları öne çıkarmaktadır:

Türkiye her zaman realist bir dış ve güvenlik politikası izlemiştir. Bu dönemde Batılı müttefikleri ile olan zaman zaman sıkıntılılara rağmen, Türkiye'nin dış politikası Batılılık vokasyonunu kesintisiz sürdürmüştür. Batılılık, yapılandırmacı analizin iyi şekilde ortaya koyduğu üzere, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin kurulduğu dönemde modernleşmenin temsilcisi olarak var olan Batı devletleri ile aynı mercekten dünyaya bakma ve böylece bu devletlerle modernleşme temelinde müşterek bir kimlik oluşturma çabasının bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkmıştır.

Soğuk Savaş dönemi, Türkiye'nin Batıyla entegrasyonunu güçlendirmiştir. Diğer yandan, yaşanan sıkıntıların da etkisiyle Türkiye bu dönemde, iki kutuplu dönemin içinde barındırdığı sınırlamalar ölçüsünde giderek yeni bölge ve devletlere açılmaya dayalı çok boyutlu dış politika izlemeye başlamıştır.

Bu dönemde Türkiye'nin Batı dünyasına yönelik dış ve güvenlik politikası sadece realist dünyada güç dengesi, güvenlik kaygıları gibi materyal etkenlerden değil, aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin modernleşmenin temsilcisi olarak gördüğü bu dünya ile müşterek bir kimlik yaratma yönündeki sosyo-psikolojik etkenlerden etkilenmiştir. Tabiatıyla, iki kutuplu dünyanın dehşet dengesine dayalı güvenlik ortamı içinde Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasını biçimlendiren kimlik, yani dış dünyayı algılamada kullandığı mercek, ağırlıklı olarak materyal faktörlerden oluşmuştur.

Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasına ilişkin yapılandırmacı analiz çerçevesindeki bu genel tespitlerden sonra beşinci bölümde, bu politikanın müşterek güvenlik alanı özelinde Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemdeki yapılandırmacı analizi yapılmaktadır.

Soğuk Savaşın sona ermesinin genel sonuçları- iki kutuplu dünyanın bitişi, ancak küreselleşmenin etkisiyle sınıraşan nitelik kazanan sıcak çatışmalar ve savaşlara yol açan yeni güvenlik tehditlerinin ortaya çıkışı- Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikalarının biçimlendirilmesi açısından iki önemli gelişmeye yol açmıştır. Bunlar, bir yandan, giderek artan bir güvensizlik (insecurity) algılaması ile bağlantılı olarak yeni güvenlik sorunlarının (securitization) ortaya çıkması, diğer yandan ise, iki kutuplu dünyanın yarattığı sınırlamaların ortadan kalkmasının da etkisiyle, dış politikada savunma refleksi ile hareketten, giderek artan bir çok boyutluluk gösteren aktif politika anlayışına dönüşüm sağlanmasıdır.

Türkiye, Soğuk Savaş sonrası kendi güvenliği açısından giderek çoğalan tehditlerle yüz yüze kalmıştır. Bu tehditlere yönelik yeni yaklaşımlar ve Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemin kendi içinde sunduğu yeni fırsatlar, dış ve güvenlik politikasında aktivizme imkan sağlamıştır.

Körfez savaşını takip eden dönemde Türkiye, giderek artan bir biçimde siyasi, ekonomik ve güvenlik alanlarında açılımlara yönelik bölgesel inisiyatifler yoluyla aktif bir dış ve güvenlik politikası uygulamaya başlamıştır.

Çok boyutluluk görünümü kazanan bu aktif yaklaşım, 1997 yılındaki AB Lüksemburg zirvesinde AB tarafından Türkiye'ye adaylık statüsü verilmemesi ile daha da ivme kazanmıştır. Bunu izleyen dönemde Türkiye, bir örnek vermek

gerekirse, *tarihi coğrafya* gibi yeni kavramları dış politikasına adapte etmiştir. Bu kavram, tamamen yapılandırmacı anlayışa uygun olarak sosyo-psikolojik kimlik boyutunu öne çıkarmakta ve Türkiye'nin coğrafyasının ülkenin sınırları ile sınırlı olmadığı, bunun ötesine tarihi bağlarının olduğu yerlere kadar uzandığı vurgusunu yapmaktadır.

Ne var ki, bu çok boyutlu aktif dış politika, Türkiye'nin tutarsızlık içeren politikalar izlediğini savunan kimlik krizi ve/veya kimlik çatışması suçlamaları ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. Bu bağlamda, Türkiye'nin tarihi, dilsel veya dinsel bağlarının olduğu Orta Asya, Balkanlar, Kafkaslar ve Orta Doğuya yönelik, *Avrasya* gerçeği temelindeki politikaları devleti yayılmacılıkla suçlayan *Yeni Osmanlıcılık* politikaları olarak eleştirilmiştir.

Buna ilave olarak, Türkiye'nin dış ilişkilerindeki bu aktif ve çok boyutlu görünümü böyle tartışma ve sonuçlara yol açarken, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönem, aynı zamanda ülkenin genel olarak bütün dış ve güvenlik politikasında, özel olarak ise müşterek güvenlik alanında izlediği politikalarda birçok önemli gelişmeyi ortaya çıkarmıştır.

Yapılandırmacı analiz,Türkiye'nin güvenlik kültürünün ve dolayısıyla kimliğinin toprak kaybı, ülkenin bölünmesi gibi endişelerden ve yabancı ülkelere yönelik güvensizlik hissiyatından etkilendiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Bu hissiyat genelde ilgili literatürde devletteki elit kesimin içindeki "Sevr sendromu" olarak nitelendirilir. Ancak, bu hissiyat, bu şekilde bir anlamda devletin yönetici kesiminin sosyo-psikolojik temelli güvenlik algılamaları olarak ortaya konsa da, esasında temelinde tarihi gerçeklere dayanmaktadır. Yapılandırmacı anlayış bu bağlamda Türkiye'de devletin güvenlik kimliğini biçimlendiren bu hissiyatta tarihteki tecrübelere dayalı tehdit ve güvensizlik algılamalarının yattığını vurgulamamıza yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, devletin güvenlik kimliği, tarihinden ve coğrafi konumundan kaynaklanan tehdit ve güvensizlik algılamalarına ve buna bağlı güvenlik konseptine dayanmaktadır.

Türkiye bu kimlik çerçevesinde güvenlik alanında bir yandan müttefikleriyle oluşturduğu müşterek kimlik temelinde NATO içinde konvansiyonel güvenlik ve savunma politikalarını sürdürürken, diğer yandan bölgesinde ikili ve çok taraflı

işbirliği ve ortak hareket tarzındaki inisiyatiflerde önemli rol oynamıştır. Bunlar da, yapılandırmacı analizin ortaya koyduğu üzere, bir yandan Türkiye'nin ve bölgesinin güvenliğine katkı sağlarken, diğer yandan da Türkiye'nin müşterek kimlik yaratımı çabalarının bir yansıması olarak ele alınmalıdır.

Türkiye bu yönde politikalar izlerken, bu politikaları genelde çoğu AB üyesi olan bazı müttefikleri tarafından paradoksal bir biçimde istikrasızlık ve güvensizlik kaynakları olarak algılanmıştır. Bunun bir sonucu olarak, Türkiye bu ülkeler tarafından "güvenlik sağlayıcı" ülke yerine, "güvenlik tüketicisi" ülke olarak tanımlanmıştır.

Yukarıda dile getirilen bu eleştiri ve algılamalar (Türkiye'yi kimlik krizi, kimlik çatışması içinde görme, güvenlik tüketicisi olarak telakki etme vs.) tezde yapılandırmacı analiz temelinde yanıtlanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda tezin bu analiz temelindeki tespitleri aşağıda özetlenmektedir:

Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde doğal olarak bazı küresel, bölgesel ve iç değişimler dış politikada belli sıkıntılara yol açmıştır. Ancak bunlar son tahlilde dış politikada bir kimlik krizine veya kimlik çatışmasına neden olmamıştır.

Türkiye, küresel ve bölgesel değişimlerin etkisiyle uluslararası alanda önemini yitirmek yerine daha da önemli bir konuma yükselmiştir. Tarihi coğrafya gibi sosyo-psikolojik savlarla desteklenen çok boyutlu aktif politika, sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) bağların güçlü olduğu bölge ve ülkelerde ilişkileri güçlendirirken, Türkiye'nin dış politikasındaki temel unsurlar olan Batılılaşma, laiklik, Avrupa vokasyonu ve AB ile entegrasyon hususları önemlerini yitirmeden süregelmiştir.

Artan çok boyutlu ve aktif görünüme ve yeni politika alanlarına rağmen, Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasındaki bu devamlılık tabiatıyla, yapısal belirleyiciler olan tarih ve coğrafyanın sabitliğine, bu alandaki politikaların oluşmasına ve yürütülmesine hizmet eden devlet kurumlarındaki devamlılığa ve dış politikanın iç politikadaki tartışmalardan steril yapısına bağlıdır. Ancak bütün bunların ötesinde bu devamlılığın temelinde, devletin, dış dünyayı algılamada kullandığı merceği oluşturan değişmez kimliği (devlet kimliği) yatmaktadır.

Devletler birçok kimliği bir arada barındırabilirler. Bu durum, kimliklerin çokluğu anlayışına yer veren yapılandırmacı yaklaşımla iyi şekilde ortaya konmaktadır. Bu kimlikler alt kimlik olarak bir üst kimlik altında uyum içinde birlikte yaşatılabildikleri sürece kimlik krizleri ve çatışmaları önlenebilmektedir.

Bu anlamda, tez, Türkiye'de dış ve güvenlik politikasının yürütülmesinde yapılandırılmış olan farklı kimliklerin birer alt kimlik oluşturduklarını ve hiç birinin üst kimlik olan devlet kimliği ile çatışmadığını, bu kimliklerin içeriklerini analiz ederek savunmaktadır. Bu farklı kimlikler esasen Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasının çok boyutlu yapısının doğal bir sonucu olmaktadır.

Uygulandığı bölge veya ülkeye göre yapılandırılan alt kimliklerin temelinde içerdikleri bölge veya ülkeye yönelik sosyo-psikolojik etkenlerin payı büyüktür. Bir örnek vermek gerekirse, Orta Asya Cumhuriyetlerine yönelik Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasında egemen olan alt kimlikte bu bölge devletleriyle olan tarihi, kültürel, dilsel ve dinsel etmenlerin de belirleyici rolü olmaktadır. Ancak bütün bu alt kimlikler aynı zamanda Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasını belirleyen devlet kimliğinin içinde bulunan ve çoğu materyal (realist) etkenlerden oluşan temel belirleyicileri de (toprak bütünlüğü, ulusal birlik, uluslararacılık, güç dengesi, ittifak dayanışması vs.) içinde barındırmaktadır. Bu nedenle, alt kimlikler içerdikleri sosyo-pskolojik etkenler nedeniyle birbirinden farklılık arz etse de her birinin içeriğinde bulunan sabit belirleyiciler nedeniyle bir çatışma içinde girmemektedirler. Aksine, bu alt kimlikler Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasını zenginleştirici katkı yapmaktadırlar.

Dış ve güvenlik politikasındaki kimliklerin içindeki realist materyal etkenlerin ağırlığı üst kimliğe gidilikçe artmakta, alt kimliklerde ise sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) etkenler öne çıkmaktadır. Ancak, her zaman realist kaygılar salt sosyo-psikolojik etkenlerin önüne geçmiştir. Buna bir örnek olarak, Cumhuriyetin kurucusu Atatürk'ün, İzmir'i işgalden kurtardıktan sonra neden doğum yeri olan Selanik'e kadar gitmediği sorusuna verdiği yanıt gösterilebilir. Atatürk "buna kalkışmak halinde İzmir'i kaybetme riskine gireceklerini, bundan dolayı buna sıcak bakmadığını" belirtmiştir. Bu da, dış ve güvenlik politikasında sosyo-psikolojik

faktörlerin bir yere kadar etkili olduğunu, esas olarak materyal kaygı ve anlayışın belirleyici bulunduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Tez, kimlik çatışması ve krizi savlarına bu şekilde bir karşı açıklama getirirken, Türkiye'nin "güvenlik tüketicisi" ülke olarak görülmesi savına ise, müşterek kimlik temelinde aşağıdaki şekilde bir yapılandırmacı yanıt vermektedir.

Soğuk Savaş döneminde Türkiye ve Batı Avrupalılar ortak "öteki" Doğu Bloku karşıtlığında ortak bir "benlik" oluşturmuşladır. Soğuk Savaş sonunda, müşterek kimlik oluşturulmasına hizmet eden bu "öteki"nin ortadan kalkması Türkiye ile çoğu AB üyesi olan Batılı müttefikleri arasında müşterek kimlik sıkıntısını yaratmıştır.

Bu süreçte, Türkiye'nin AB ülkeleri tarafından "yeni Osmanlıcılık " olarak tanımlanan çok boyutlu politikaları, ülkenin bulunduğu bölgenin "çatışma üçgeni" olarak adlandırılacak şekilde her yanının sıcak sorunlarla dolu olması ve Türkiye'nin Yunanistan ile gergin ilişkileri AB tarafından Türkiye'nin kendi çıkarları için güvenlik sağlamayan bir ülke olarak algılanmasına neden olan faktörler olarak literatürde dile getirilmiştir. Bu algılamada, bir yandan Türkiye'nin bölücü terörle mücadelesi, diğer yandan ise AB tarafından geliştirilen Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Politikasına karşı çekinceleri de ilave etkide bulunmuştur. Bu süreç, 11 Eylül sonrası dönemde belli bir değişime girmiştir. Bunda, giderek artan şekilde yeni "öteki" olarak tanımlanmaya başlayan uluslararası terörizm karşısında AB üyesi müttefiklerinin Türkiye'nin konumunu ve bu "öteki" ile mücadelede oynayabileceği rolü daha iyi algılamaya başlaması etkili olmuştur.

Çoğu NATO müttefiki olan bu ülkelerin kendisine yönelik eleştirel yaklaşımına rağmen Türkiye NATO'ya her zaman özel önem vermiştir. Bunda, bir yandan bu örgütün Türkiye'nin güvenliği ve savunması için taşıdığı önemli işlev gibi realist kaygılar, diğer yandan ise yapılandırmacı analizin ortaya koyduğu üzere bu örgüt içinde Türkiye'nin bu müttefiklerle oluşturduğu müşterek kimliğin katkısı olmuştur. Ancak, AB ile ilişkilerdeki müşterek kimlik eksikliği ilişkilerin gelişiminde her zaman ilave bir sıkıntı kaynağını teşkil etmiştir.

Tezde, Türkiye'nin güvenlik alanında istikrarsızlık kaynağı olduğu ve güvenlik sağlamaktan ziyade güvenlik tüketicisi konumunda bulunduğu yönündeki savlara yanıt olarak Türkiye'nin müşterek güvenlik harekatlarına katkıları da irdelenmiştir.

Bu çerçevede, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde, Türkiye'nin artan şekilde katkıda bulunduğu barışı koruma operasyonları formatındaki müşterek güvenlik operasyonları Türkiye'nin bu alanda müşterek kimlik oluşturma sürecinin bir yansıması olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu operasyonlar aynı zamanda Türkiye'nin dış ve güvenlik politikasının temel özelliklerinden olan "uluslararacılık" öğesinin askeri boyuta uzanması olarak görülebilir. Zira bu operasyonlara katkı daima uluslararası toplumunun bu yönde aldığı kararlara katılım çerçevesinde tecelli etmiştir. Bu operasyonların ortaya koyduğu bir başka tespit de, her ne kadar sosyo-psikolojik etkenler etkili olsa da devletin katıldığı bu tarz operasyonlarda esasen üst devlet kimliği içindeki egemen unsur realist kaygı ve anlayışların belirleyici olduğudur.

Yukarıda özetlenen şekilde yapılandırmacı analize konu olan tez, Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasının irdelenmesine yeni bir bakış getirmeyi amaçlamaktatır. Bugüne kadar realist anlayışın hakim olduğu analizler, kuramsal yapıları gereği genelde kimlik, özelde ise devlet kimliği olgusunu ele almamıştır. Bununla birlikte son yıllarda kimlik analizleri Türk dış politikasına uyarlanmaya başlamıştır. Ancak bu çalışmalar da kimliği genelde *mainstream* anlayış temelinde sabit olarak ele almaktadırlar.

Oysa, kimlik her zaman devinim içinde olan devletin dış dünyayı algılamasına bağlı olarak içeriği değişebilen dinamik bir olgudur. Bu nedenle, bu kuramsal anlayışa ağılık veren yapılandırmacı analiz temelinde hazırlanan bu tez, devletin dış dünyayı algılamada kullandığı mercek olarak kimlik olgusunu, içeriğini oluşturan etkenlerin ayrıntılı analizi ile birlikte irdelemeye imkan vermesi itibariyle bir yenilik getirmektedir. Tezin bu anlamdaki bir başka yeniliği, bugüne kadar yapılan diğer yapılandırmacı analizler Türk dış politikasını kimlik krizi ve çatışması içinde olmakla değerlendirirken, bu tezin kimliklerin çokluğu ve birlikteliği anlayışı temelinde Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasındaki kimliklerin çatışmadığı ve dolayısıyla bir kimlik krizi olmadığı vurgusunu yapmasıdır.

Bu temelde, tezin aşağıda hususlarda literatüre katkı sağladığı söylenebilir:

- Türkiye'nin dış politikasının güvenlik boyutu vurgusu temelinde yapılandırmacı analizi,

- Türkiye'de devletin dış materyal dünyayı algılamada kullandığı merceğin (kimlik) yapılandırmacı analizi,

- Üst kimlik olan devlet kimliği ile alt kimliklerin uyum içinde bulunduğunu ve dolayısıyla Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasında kimlik çatışması ve kimlik krizine yol açılmadığını ortaya koyan çoklu kimlik olgusunun yapılandırmacı analizi,

- Bu kimliklerin içindeki sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) ve materyal/realist faktörlerin kompozisyonların ve bunların alt ve üst kimliklerin oluşumuna etkilerinin yapılandırmacı analizi,

- Türkiye'nin izlediği uluslararası güvenlik politikaları bağlamında oluşturduğu müşterek kimlik olgusunun yapılandırmacı analizi.

Yukarıda kayıtlı son husus bağlamında, Türkiye'nin AB ile müşterek kimlik yaratımı sürecinde karşılaştığı sıkıntıların ışığında tezde ayrıca yapılandırmacı yaklaşım temelinde bir politika önermesinde de bulunulmaktadır. Tabiatıyla bu önerme, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerini açıklamaya yarayan diğer etkenleri göz ardı etmeksizin, bunlara, yapılandırmacı yaklaşım çerçevesinde olayı daha kapsayıcı olarak görebilmeyi teminen tamamlayıcı nitelikte katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Tez, Türkiye ile AB arasında tarihten kaynaklanan bir kimlik sorunu olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. AB üyesi olan ülkelerin tarihsel olarak, bugün modern Türkiye'nin temsil ettiği Osmanlı Türklerini kendi müşterek kimliklerini oluşturdukları "öteki" olarak gördükleri olgusu ışığında bu algılamaya dayalı kimlik yapılandırmasını aşmak için, tezde Türkiye ile bu ülkeler arasında müşterek kimlik oluşturulmasına yönelik iki formül geliştirilmektedir.

Bunlardan birincisi, *dikey kimlik yaratımı formülü* olarak adlandırılabilir. Bir başka deyişle, bu formül, birbilerine karşıtlık temelinde oluşmuş bir çok alt kimliğin bir üst kimlik altında biraraya gelmesini anlatır. Böyle bir üst kimlik yaratımı, birbirlerine karşıt olarak oluşmuş alt kimliklerin arasındaki çatışmaları aşmalarına hizmet edecektir. Bu yöntem, ulus devlet ölçeğinde, farklı etnik kimlikleri (alt kimlikler) ulusal kimlik (üst kimlik) çatısı altında biraraya getirmek için uygulanmıştır.

İkinci formül ise, *yatay kimlik yaratımı formülü* olarak adlandırılabilir. Bu formül, birbilerine karşıtlık, yani birbirlerini "öteki" olarak görme temelinde oluşturulmuş farklı kimliklerin bu kez ortak bir "öteki" karşıtlığı temelinde kendi aralarında "benlik" oluşturmasına yöneliktir.

Bu iki formül, Türkiye-AB ilişkilerindeki sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) zorlukların aşılabilmesi için olası çözüm yolları sunarlar. Tabiatıyla, Türkiye'nin AB üyelik sürecinde, sorun yaratan veya yaratması muhtemel olan başka bir çok etken bulunmaktadır. Bunlar, Kıbrıs meslesi gibi hassas konularda AB tarafının baskılarının yanında, Türkiye'den uymasının talep edildiği siyasi ve ekonomik kriterleri içermektedir. Ayrıca, AB tarafına bakıldığında, Türkiye'yi Birliğe alıp almama yönünde ortak bir stratejik karar almaya ilişkin AB üyelerinin hem kendi aralarında hem de kendi ülkeleri içindeki siyasi tartışmaların yanında, AB içindeki dengeleri bozmaksızın böylesine büyük bir ülkenin nasıl hazmedilebileceği gibi kurumsal kaygı ve sorular da bulunmaktadır.

Ancak, toplumların ve dolayısıyla devletlerin yaşamlarında kimliklerin önemi ve bu bağlamda AB ülkelerinin nüfuslarının sosyo-psikolojik zihin yapıları dikkate alındığında, Türkiye'nin AB üyeliği önünde engel yaratacak nitelikteki bu sosyo-psikolojik etkenlerin ele alınmasının öncelikli bir konu oluşturduğu ortadır.

Bu kolay bir süreç içermemektedir. Zira, "Avrupa kimliğinin" oluşumunda farklı bir din ve kültürün temsilcisi olarak görülmüş olan Osmanlı Türklerinin varlığı da belirleyici olmuştur. Bir başka deyişle, tarih boyunca bu ülkelerin zihinlerindeki "Müslüman Türkler" algılaması, oluşturulan ortak benlik "Avrupa kimliğinin" "öteki"si olarak yapılandırılmıştır. Bu durum, bu halkların tarih boyunca Osmanlı

Türklerine ve daha sonra da modern Türkiye'ye bakarken kullandıkları sosyo-psikolojik merceklerin içeriğinden kaynaklanmıştır. Her ne kadar yüksek sesle dile getirilmese de, bu merceklerin varlığını bugün bile yok saymak zordur.

Tabiatıyla, siyaseten böyle bir zihniyeti kabul etmemek uygun bir yaklaşımdır. Ancak bu doğru tavır, Türkiye ve AB ülkelerini, böyle bir zihniyetin nasıl ortadan kaldırılabileceği konusunda çalışmaktan alıkoymamalıdır. Bu süreçte, yukarıda sayılan dikey ve yatay kimlik yaratımı formüllerinin önemi ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu müşterek kimlik yaratımı formülleri, Türkiye ile AB ülkelerinin dış dünyaya aynı merceğin arkasından bakıp, aynı algılamalarda bulunmasını sağlayamaya hizmet edecektir.

Dikey olarak, Türk ulusal kimliği ile diğer AB üyesi ülkelerin kendi aralarında oluşturdukları ortak kimliğin bir üst kimlikte bir araya getirilmesi önem taşımaktadır. Bu bağlamda, bütün AB üyesi ülkelerin ulusal kimliklerini, alt kimlikler olarak içinde barındıran gerçek bir "Avrupa kimliği"nin (üst kimlik) Türk ulusal kimliğini de içermesi gerekecektir.

Yatay olarak ise, birbirlerini "öteki" olarak gören Türkiye ve AB ülkeleri arasında bu kez birlikte yapılandırılacak yeni bir ortak "öteki" karşısında biraya gelerek, "benlik" oluşturmaları sözkonusu olabilecektir. Bu süreçte, mesela terörizm Türkiye ve AB ülkelerinin kimliklerini ortak bir "benlik" haline getirebilecek bir "öteki" olarak ele alınabilir.

Tabiatıyla, tarihleri ve anılarında savaşlar, işgaller gibi trajik tecrübeler bulunan Türkiye halkı ile AB ülkeleri halklarının arasında sosyo-psikolojik (ideational) temelde ister yatay, ister dikey olsun ortak kimlik yaratımı süreci kolay olamayacaktır. Bu kapsamda, bu trajik geçmişi unutmaya hizmet edecek bir *ortak unutkanlık sürecine* ihtiyaç olacaktır. Bu ortak kimlik yaratımı süreci (palimpsest identity building) geçmişte Almanya ve Fransa gibi tarihleri böyle karşılıklı trajik olaylarla dolu iki ülkeyi AB çatısı altında bir araya getirmede başarılı olmuştur. Bu nedenle, Türkiye ve AB ülkeleri arasında da böyle bir yöntem yararlı olabilecektir. Tabiatıyla, bu süreçte sağlanacak başarı, her iki tarafın sadece hükümetler düzeyinde değil, toplum düzeyinde de kararlılığı ile yakından ilintilidir.

Bu önerme, bu tezin kullandığı yapılandırmacı analiz çerçevesinde gelecekte yapılabilecek yeni çalışmalar için bir konu teşkil etmektedir.

Yukarıda özetlenen bu tez, tabiatıyla, yapılandırmacı yaklaşımın Türk dış ve güvenlik politikası bağlamında kuramsal ve literatür taraması açısından bütün unsurları içerdiği gibi bir iddiada bulunmamaktadır. Bundan ziyade, bu tez, yapılandırmacı kuramsal yaklaşım çerçevesindeki kimlik analizi temelinde Türkiye'nin müşterek güvenlik alanındaki politikalarını incelemek yoluyla Türk dış ve güvenlik politikasına daha tamamlayıcı bir açıklama sunmak doğrultusunda bir çalışma olarak değerlendirilebilir.