

THE COHESIVENESS AND VOTING ALLIANCES OF THE POLITICAL  
GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON TURKEY: 1980-1996

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## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE COHESIVENESS AND VOTING ALLIANCES OF THE POLITICAL GROUPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ON TURKEY: 1980-1996**

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This thesis analyzes the cohesiveness, and voting likeliness of the political groups in the European Parliament on Turkey between 1980-1996. The thesis consists of two main parts: in the first part the structure, and historical evolution of the European Parliament has been analyzed. In the second part, the changes in Turkish politics between 1980-96, and the cohesiveness, and voting alliances of the political groups have been analyzed by using roll call vote data.

**Keywords:** The European Parliament, Cohesiveness, Political Groups, Voting Alliance

## ÖZ

### AVRUPA PARLAMENTOSU'NDA YER ALAN SİYASİ GRUPLARIN TÜRKİYE'YE İLİŞKİN OLARAK ALDIKLARI KARARLARDA GRUPİÇİ MUTABAKAT VE GRUPLARARASI İTTİFAKLAR: 1980-1996

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Bu çalışma, Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda yer alan siyasi grupların, 1980-1996 yılları arasında Türkiye hakkında alınan kararlarda grupî mutabakat ve gruplararası ittifakları incelemiştir. İki bölümden oluşan tezin ilk bölümünde, Avrupa Parlamentosu'nun yapısı ve tarihsel gelişimi, teorik çerçeveye referans yapılarak irdelenmiştir. Tezin ikinci bölümünde, 1980 – 1996 yılları arasında Türk siyasi hayatında yaşanan değişim ve bu değişime Avrupa Parlamentosu'nda yer alan siyasi grupların tepkileri üç alt bölümde incelenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Parlamentosu, Siyasi Grup, Grupî Mutabakat, Gruplararası İttifak

to Çağla

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## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE AND THE MEANING**

The aim of the thesis is to analyze the attitude of the political groups of the European Parliament (EP) towards Turkey between 1980-96 by studying the cohesion within, and coalition formation among political groups. The cleavage lines e.g. left wing vs. right wing, south vs. north, and predominance of the nationality, or ideology in determining cohesion, and coalition formation in the EP in Turkey-related questions will be studied.

The EP is unique in her features. National parties determine the nominees, and then the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) present their allegiances to the political groups within the EP. The political groups maintain internal discipline through the allocation of committee positions, finances, speaking time and the space on the legislative agenda. The leadership of each European party group also controls the allocation of committee positions. These transnational parties represent the policy positions of the European families: Christian Democrats, Liberals, Socialists, and the Greens since late 1980s. As none of the groups has ever assumed the majority within the EP, group cohesion, and coalition formation are important topics to be studied.

The discipline, and cohesion within the political groups in the EP is lesser than the political groups in the national parliaments. The reasons of that can be summarized as follows: no executive body emerging from the EP asking for the systematic support of the majority of her members, the availability of lesser sanctions towards the “rebellious” members of the groups, and the availability of different national, regional, and sectoral interests within the EP. Roll-call vote is one of the few means of the political groups to keep the internal discipline.

If a roll-call vote is requested, the result of each member's vote is formally recorded, first in a special annex to the minutes, which appears the next day, and later in the translated minutes which come out in the Official Journal about three months later (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 p.168)

The roll-call votes provide also an important tool to assess the cohesion within the political groups, as well as coalition formation between themselves. According to Raunio, "roll-call analysis needs to be supplemented by other information before having a comprehensive picture of the political groups; however, he has argued that roll-call analysis is worthwhile exercise in the context of the EP, as extensive negotiations take place within and between groups, and lack of unitary voting by any group would mean failure to reach a conclusion within the group" (Raunio: 80-1) For that reason the analysis during the following pages will be build both on roll-call analysis, and debates within the EP.

Turkey has been struggling for full membership to the EU for over two decades. The EP's consent is necessary for Turkish accession for two reasons: The EP, as an effective forum has an "informal" power over other institutions, and over the public opinion. Moreover, because of the Single European Act, the EP has assumed the power to ratify the international treaties, association, and accession agreements with third countries. Because of such arms the EP deserves specific attention to her formal procedures.

The ruling elite of Turkish Republic has preferred to explain the behavior of the political groups within the EP by using the dichotomy of "enemies of Turkey" versus "friends of Turkey" during the 1980s, and the early 1990s. As the EP has a complicated and dynamic structure, the antagonistic approach to the subject will be fruitless. The cohesiveness, and voting likelihood of the political groups deserves specific attention to be studied in order to determine the availability of a consistent policy of each political group towards Turkey.

The cohesiveness, and voting likeliness of the political groups cannot be isolated neither from international dynamics and institutional changes of the European Communities, nor Turkish politics. The thesis consists of two main parts: in the first part the history, the theoretical background, and the institutional structure of the European Communities with specific reference to the EP, and the powers of the EP will be analyzed.

In the second part of the thesis, the cohesiveness, and voting likeliness of the political groups between 1980-1996 will be studied with reference to the political developments in the international politics, and Turkish politics. The period between 1980-96 is going to be classified into three episodes with different characteristics: the first episode covers the years between 1980, when the military junta assumed power, and 1987, when the dominance of the Military in Turkish politics relatively lifted, and former political leaders could run in the elections freely. The episode covers the year between 1987, and 1991, when the Cold War came to an end, and Turkey began to search a new identity internationally. The third episode starts in 1991, following the formation of True Path Party "*DYP*" and Social Democratic People's Party "*SHP*" coalition, and ends with the EP's assent to Turkey to enter the Customs Union in 1996.

## **PART I**

### **THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

The aim of Part I is to analyze the integration process of the European Communities with reference to the institutional evaluation of the EP, and the internal structure of the EP. The devastation of the continent because of the World War II, and the ongoing Franco-German hostility led not only theoreticians, but also the politicians, and the bureaucrats to reconsider the future of the Europe. The European Steel and Coal Community (ECSC) of the 1950s with six founding member states has evolved into a complicated network of institutions with twenty-five member states in the mid 2000s.

The Institutions, which are formally apolitical, develop their own interests, and prepare their own agendas. The early EP, the Common Assembly (CA) of early 1950s, armed only with consultative power, has evolved into a multi-national assembly organized along the ideological lines, and gained legislative arms, became unique in her substance in modern history. The EP, as an institution deserves specific attention because of her uniqueness in modern history, her supervisory, legislative, and budgetary powers within the European Communities, and her internal structure, and her agenda setting power.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH: THE FORMATION OF THE IDEA OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION**

#### **2.1. Introduction**

In the aftermath of the World War II, scholars, and politicians sought to elaborate a new political system that would assure cooperation between nation states, and permanent peace internationally. These two aims constitute the starting point of European integration process. The European integration process has implied a shift of competencies from national institutions to European level institutions. The aim of this chapter is to present the history of the European Communities with respect to EP. The chapter portrays a historical evaluation of the European Communities, and the reasons behind her uniqueness.

#### **2. 2. The Post-War Environment**

The history of the European Parliament can be studied within the context of political environment of Post-World War II period that led to the initial creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), and later the European Economic Community (EEC)

The outcome of the Versailles Treaty was a disaster for Europe. The age-old Franco-German hostility could not be prevented, moreover a devastating war machine backed by totalitarian thoughts brought the continent into an economic, and moral exhaustion. The search for self-sufficiency of nations has led to economic malaise, and consequently to political antagonism. Many people from anti-fascist resistance movement have pointed towards the limitation of national sovereignty. Such ideas



have evoked echo from the leading politicians of Europe just after the World War II.

It (the remedy) is to recreate the European fabric, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, safety and freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe. In this way only will hundreds of millions of toilers be able to regain the simple joys and hopes, which make life worth living (...) The first step in the re-creation of the European family must be a partnership between France and Germany. In this way only can France recover the moral and cultural leadership of Europe? There can be no revival of Europe without a spiritually great France and a spiritually great Germany. (Churchill, W: The Zurich Speech September 19, 1946.)

The conflict over Saar and Ruhr regions had been intensifying between German Federal Republic, and France since 1945. The effective control of coal and steel could enable one to build a war machinery- had she adequate know-how in those years. Jean Monnet, Commissioner for the first French National Plan had viewed that the tension between France and Germany over coal and steel production is detrimental to peace, economical and social well - being. So he suggested an independent authority to manage coal and steel production. The Plan was presented to German and French Foreign Ministers on May 3, 1950. The supranational dimension of the plan prevented UK to join it; however, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg were also included, and the European Coal and Steel Community was ratified in April 1951, and became effective as of August 1952.

### **2.3. A Revolutionary Invention: the ECSC**

The institutional structure of the ECSC was revolutionary in the 1950s because of her supranational order. The High Authority with her significant control over production was truly supranational. To counterbalance the extensive authority, the Council of Ministers, and the High Court were

created. A Parliamentary Assembly was also devised primarily because the Council of Europe had a Consultative Assembly, and moreover Monnet felt that the existence of a similar institution in the new ECSC would be a must for public acceptance of the new Community. The Assembly has only supervisory power at the time of her inception.

The Assembly, which shall consist of representatives of the peoples of the states brought together in the Community, shall exercise the supervisory power which are conferred upon it by this Treaty (Art. 20, ECSC Treaty)

Two crucial events that have dramatically changed the nature of the CA and the path of its institutional development that occurred in the following stages: the creation of political party groups and the eventual acquisition of legislative authority. The CA was an appointed body consisting of representatives from national parliaments of the member states; so All MEPs had dual mandate.

The Assembly shall consists of delegates who shall be designated by the respective parliaments from among their members in accordance with the procedure laid down by each member state. (Art. 21.1, ECSC Treaty)

The CA had no direct legislative authority. The overall weakness of the CA was partially mitigated by the close ties that it developed with other “supranational” institution. “High Authority as both were and generally favorable toward increased integration between the Member States” (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 p.197) The CA was also the first institution to organize itself on the basis of ideological affinity, rather than national identity. The election of the CA’s first president in 1953 was decided along ideological and not national lines. By the end of its first year the CA had already three organized supranational political groups, namely, Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals. The CA had an internal organizational structure that included a preliminary set of Rules of

Procedure, a Bureau, and six committees. (Kreppel: 2001 p.56.) The full potential of the CA would never be known because she existed for only five years before she was supplanted by the European Parliamentary Assembly of the newly formed European Economic Community and EURATOM.

#### **2.4. The Two Treaties of Rome**

The Korean War, the coup in the People's Republic of Czechoslovakia, and the Berlin blockade increased USA sponsored initiatives to form a European-wide security, and defense organization in Europe. The main concern of France was the revival the military capability of German Federal Republic. The answer to the issue of defense was again same as steel production: to pool the resources in an organization: European Defense Organization. As Jean Monnet has put it " the project has touched on the core of national sovereignty", and the treaty was not ratified at the Assemblée National by both Orthodox Communists of French Communist Party, and Gaullists in 1954. So the project has failed, and the European integration had a stagnation period for a year (Pinder: 1998 pp.8-9)

Despite the adverse effects of the failure of the EDC, a new initiative was on its way, as dictated by economies of scale. The new federalist initiative, forwarded by Benelux countries, has appealed the business interest especially from Germany. By the Benelux Memorandum of May 18, 1955, the further integration of Europe was successfully encouraged. Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak drafted the Memorandum.

The Governments of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands at the proper time believe to reach a new stage in the way of European integration. They think that this one must be carried out first of all in the economic field. They estimate that it is necessary to continue the establishment of Europe linked by the development of common institutions, the progressive fusion of the national economies, the creation of a large Common Market and the progressive harmonization of their social policy (Benelux Memorandum: May 18, 1955)

By June 1955 the foreign ministers of all six Member States were able to adopt a resolution calling for the further integration of Europe. The resolution asked for the six Member States of the ECSC to meet and draft a new treaty with the goal of broad European cooperation in the economic, atomic, and social fields. The intergovernmental discussions were led by Spaak and eventually resulted in the adoption of two separate treaties. One treaty dealt with increased economic integration between the Member States and the creation of a free market, the EEC Treaty, and the other focused on atomic energy and its development and peaceful usage within Europe: EURATOM.

The decision to create two distinct organizations arose out of the competing claims of France, who had preferred cooperation in the field of atomic energy, and German Federal Republic has preferred cooperation in the economic field. In the end a compromise was reached. On March 25, 1957, the six Member States signed the final Treaties establishing the European Economic Community and EURATOM. These two new communities joined the previous Coal and Steel Community to form the European Communities, although their institutional organization was significantly different from that of their predecessor. Much care was taken during the creation of the two new communities to reverse the balance of power. While the High Authority officially remained within the structure of the Coal and Steel Community, a new Commission was created for each of the new Communities. The Commissions, while still supranational, were less autonomous than the High Authority, with the intergovernmental Councils holding more power. Until Merger Treaty of 1967 there were, in fact, three separate Councils and Commissions, one for each community. When the new communities were added it was decided to create a single Assembly and a single European Court of Justice (ECJ) for all three communities

The successor institution held its first meeting on March 19, 1958. Approximately 35% of the members had also been the members of the

Common Assembly. New Assembly was significantly different from the predecessor institution. These differences can be summarized as follows:

While Members of the Common Assembly could be elected directly as an option, the new Treaties required that the Members of the Common Assembly to be elected directly - The new Treaty called on the CA to draft a plan for universal direct elections by EEC Treaty Article 138(3) and EURATOM Treaty Article 108(3). An additional increase in the political authority of the newly established EP was that her power of censure over the Commission was no longer limited to the annual report.

The EP could now move to censure the executive at any time, over any issue, although the previous voting requirements were still in force (Neither the European Parliament nor the previous CA has ever successfully called for the censure of the Commission, although several attempts have been made (Kreppel: 2001 p.58-9) The new treaties also formally included the new Parliament in the legislative process, by a consultation procedure in several policy areas. For legislation falling under a few specific articles the Council was required by the Treaties to consult the Parliament and get her opinion. However, there was no requirement that the Council act on the CA's suggestions, and in most cases the consultation process was a symbolic power. De Gaulle's return to power in 1958 has shaped the European politics. He has strongly opposed to the supranational EC, has competed with pro-federalist president of the Commission, Walter Hallstein. De Gaulle has successfully prevented the application of the Rome Treaty.

The ten years following the Rome Treaty was difficult for EC in general. The first goal of the CA was to achieve direct elections. To this end, Dehousse Report was drafted in May 1961; however, this report has not echoed in the capitals of member states. Thereupon the CA has attempted to improve their institutional position through increased internal organization, and informal agreements. It incorporated the party groups

formally into the rules and began to use the groups as a basis of internal organization (Pinder: 1998 pp. 61-5)

In March 1962, the Parliament passed a resolution to formally rename the “Assembly” of the Treaties as the “European Parliament.” Although the resolution passed with a large majority within the Parliament itself, the other institutions of the European Communities largely ignored the name change. Within the media the name change was more successful and in time the Assembly came to be referred to as the European Parliament in all but the most official documents.

It was not until the Single European Act, nearly twenty-five years later, that the Council officially recognized the Parliament’s name change. (Kreppel: 2001 p.62) Since the Treaties allowed the Commission to incorporate the Parliament’s suggestions into its proposals, the EP began in the early 1960s to request that the Commission do so on a regular basis.

The legacy of General de Gaulle is quite noticeable in the history of Europe. Until 1962 he had been preoccupied with Algerian War. Then he has concentrated on the competition with federalists in the EC, and with the Anglo-Saxons outside the EC. In 1963, General de Gaulle vetoed the accession of UK. The agriculture policy of the community was very much dependent on the contributions of the member states. The Commission, and the Dutch government have argued that if the national contributions would be automatically injected to the treasury of the EC each year without having the approval of national parliaments, then the counterpart institution: the EP should have the power to adopt the budget. Thus it was too much for de Gaulle, and he withdrew his ministers from the EC Council: the infamous empty chair policy. The question was resolved in the next year, and the issue of the EP’s budgetary power was shelved for some years.

## **2.5. Europe without de Gaulle: The Road to Direct Elections**

The end of de Gaulle's political life from the political scene in 1969 led the enlargement of the Community and the completion of its institutions as foreseen by the Rome Treaties. De Gaulle's successor, Georges Pompidou, has called the national leaders of the Member States to consider the future of Europe for a summit.

The new French President Pompidou has called for "deepening, widening, and completion" of the European Community. This speech has dual meaning: the introduction of majority voting in the Council, but also the eventual introduction of direct elections for the EP. Despite the economic recession of the 1970s, the EP has succeeded to have partial control over the budgetary process, and to have its first direct election in 1979.

The new political maneuver of France could be attributed to increasing fear from Germany's economic hegemony. In 1971 three new members: UK, Denmark, and Ireland joined the EC. Enlargement means an increase in the number of seats of the EP. Moreover; British entry meant the incorporation of a very distinct parliamentary tradition into the general *mélange* of continental parliamentary experience. Almost immediately the British contingent made itself felt through the addition of a formal "question time" and informal whipping procedures within the party groups. The new Conservative British members formed their own political group and demonstrated a level of internal organization not previously known within the Parliament (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 pp. 78-9)

With direct elections the total membership of the EP more than doubled, growing from 198 to 410. One of the first tasks facing the new EP was her own internal reorganization. The numerical requirements and organizational structure of the previously appointed Parliament could not be maintained given this increase in the membership. Several attempts by the previously

appointed EP to revise its Rules of Procedure in accordance with the imminent changes failed, leaving the task to the newly elected members. A far more contentious process than originally expected, an entirely new and reorganized set of Rules of Procedure was finally adopted only in 1981.

The European Court of Justice recognized this unique aspect of the European Parliament in an extremely important ruling in 1980. Just after the first direct elections the Council passed a final directive without waiting for the opinion of the EP, even though the treaties required the Council to solicit the EP's opinion, which is known as the consultation procedure. The EP took the Council to Court, declaring that it had ignored the treaty and its provisions. The European Court of Justice (ECJ), in the landmark "Isoglucose" case agreed with the Parliament and declared the legislation invalid, forcing the Commission and Council to start the procedure.

The ECJ held that Council had not exhausted all the possibilities of obtaining the preliminary opinion of the EP. Council did not request the application of the emergency procedure provided for by the internal regulation of the EP although in other sectors and as regards other draft regulations it availed itself of that power at the same time. Council could have asked for an extraordinary session of the Assembly especially as the bureau of the Parliament drew its attention to that possibility. So the regulation was declared as void (SA Roquette Frères v. Council of the European Communities – 138/79)

## **2.6. The Single European Act: In Progress**

The Members of the EP were not alone in feeling that the EP's powers should be increased. In 1981, the Genscher– Colombo Plan, sponsored by two members of the Council, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, then German Foreign Minister, and Italian Foreign Minister Emilio Colombo presented to the Council a program for further Community development. The plan not only advocated "more effective decision-making structures" and greater Community involvement in external affairs, but also an increased role for



the EP. The Genscher– Colombo Plan was submitted to the Member States in November 1981 and ultimately ended in the Stuttgart Solemn Declaration signed on June 19, 1983, whereby the Council agreed that the EP should be consulted on all significant international agreements before their conclusion, as well as accession treaties (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 pp.226-7)

One of the strongest proponents of institutional reform was the Italian Altiero Spinelli. A long-time federalist, Spinelli began to organize meetings with others within the Parliament who shared his views. This eventually came to be known as the “Crocodile Club,” after the name of the restaurant in Strasbourg where the group generally met during the Parliament’s week-long plenary sessions. The Crocodile Club was eventually institutionalized within the EP through the creation of a Committee on Institutional Affairs, with Spinelli as the chairman, in July 1981. On September 14, 1983.

The European Parliament entrusted the Committee on Institutional Affairs with the task of drawing up a draft treaty after it had considered the Spinelli report on the substance of the preliminary draft. The draft Treaty on European Union was adopted by the Parliament on February 14, 1984 by a large majority being laid down, as its ultimate goal, the creation of a federal European Union. (Kreppel 2001 p.70) In legislative terms, it assigned to the principle of subsidiarity<sup>1</sup> a decisive role and made simple majority voting in

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<sup>1</sup> The source of the idea of the subsidiarity is theology and natural law. It was inserted to EC Law by Maastricht Treaty, and further developed in the Treaty of Amsterdam. By a protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam, more guidance is provided on the application of the subsidiarity principle: 1. Transnational issue cannot be regulated by a member state alone 2.Actions of member states would contradict with the *acquis* 3. Clear benefits – if applied at the EU level upon the decision the Council (Kent: 2001, p.51)

In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states, and can therefore by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Article 5 (ex 3b9 of the EC Treaty)

Council the rule, with vital national interests being invoked only in exceptional circumstances. The Spinelli Plan has advocated the rapid completion of the single, internal market and the participation of all the Member States in the European Monetary System (EMS). The Commission retained its role as the executive body, while the European Council was, in particular, made responsible for laying down the new powers and responsibilities of the Union and for ensuring cooperation at political level as well as in foreign affairs. Except for the Italian Parliament, no national parliament debated the draft Treaty, despite considerable support of some of the members of the Socialist and Christian Democratic Parties in Germany, Spain, and Italy. However, the draft eventually served as a draft for the Single European Act. (Pinder: 1998, p.50-3)

One of the important developments of the 1980s was the southern enlargement of the community. Greece, Spain, and Portugal got rid of their dictators in 1970s, and they preferred to anchor themselves to democracy, rule of law, and economic development by EC membership. Greece acceded to membership on January 1, 1981. Greece had 24 seats at the EP. Both Spain (60 seats at the EP), and Portugal (24 seats) have acceded as of January 1, 1986 (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 pp.70-5) The Franco-German rapprochement has always accelerated European integration. Mitterand, and Kohl has assured the continuity of Franco-German axis, and new steps in European integration. A compensation and reimbursement mechanism was adopted, as was the principle of greater budgetary and financial discipline. On June 25-26, 1984 at the Fontainebleau European Council, a means to end the Community's financial deadlock and to have a package of measures adopted. On the way to the Single European Act (SEA), the preparatory work carried out by the Dooge Committee in 1984-85 and, more particularly, the White Paper on the completion of the internal market, presented in June 1985 by the Commission under its President, Jacques Delors, whereby a detailed

timetable was set out to remove nearly three hundred barriers by the end of 1992 (Pinder: 1998, p.83)

The SEA can be regarded as the first major revision to the Community Treaties. SEA has defined community competence in new areas such as environment, technology, and foreign policy coordination. Monetary System was set as the Community objective. Majority voting scheme was extended within the Council. The legislative scope of the EP has been extended: co-operation procedure, and assent procedure were introduced; however, she was still far from a co-legislator position.

### **2.7. The New World Order and Two Wave of Enlargement**

The collapse of Soviet hegemony in the Eastern Europe, and dissolution of Soviet Union in 1991 led to important changes in Europe. In October 1990, East and West Germany unified. France, and Germany once again cooperated in order to anchor Germany to the Community, and it was decided to hold parallel Intergovernmental Conferences (IGC) for political and economic union in the European Council of 1990,. The result was Treaty of Maastricht, which came into force on November 1, 1993. The IGC on economic and monetary union has produced the skeleton of the single currency, and a central bank. The consequences of the IGC on political union were less coherent. The EP in particular gained some powers: the right to approve/ or not to approve the appointment of the Commission- It should be noted that the right cannot be used for Commission members, but for the Commission as a whole. The scope of assent was extended to international treaties, and moreover the co-decision with the Council was introduced.

In January 1995, the number of members of the EU increased to fifteen, with the accession of Sweden, Austria, and Finland. Following the

application of former Warsaw Pact members to the EU membership, the current institutional architecture of the EU was revised by the Amsterdam Treaty in June 1997 to enable the community to function efficiently, and democratically: The scope of majority voting at the Council was extended, cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs was introduced (Pinder: 1998 pp.20-6)

By Amsterdam Treaty co-decision procedure started to cover 32 legal bases: These include a number of new areas such as transportation, the fight against fraud, development cooperation, environment policy, customs cooperation, non-discrimination, and some social policy and employment measures. In 2004, the EU has accomplished her last wave of expansion, and welcomed ten new members. Finally the Treaty of Nice has extended the scope of co-decision to cover –support of anti-discrimination, issuing visas, certain refugee matters, judicial cooperation, social- economic cohesion, regulations governing transnational political parties at the European Level. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton: 2005 pp. 209-11)

## **2.8. Conclusion**

The European integration owes her very existence to the devastating results of the World War II. The belligerents became the architects of Europe, after the War. The driving force of the European integration was the tension between the interests of nation-state, and the collective interests of the members. It becomes a new, and unique political experiment in modern history. The history of the EP cannot be isolated from the history of the community, and which reflects the competing interests within the Community from her inception.

## CHAPTER 3

### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

#### 3.1. Introduction

There has been a long tradition among European intellectuals to devise institutional settings to lessen the possibility of war since the late 19th century. German unification, following Franco-Prussian War in 1871, and World War I have convinced intellectuals with state-centric or liberal views that reordering of European State System was a necessity. These intellectual efforts have emerged from the World War II with an enhanced legitimacy. European integration, being multidimensional in her substance attracts different scholars, who have been contributing to the IR, and Integration Theories. As Laura Cram put it

Some theorists focused on the desirable end product of this cooperation (for example federalism, and functionalism), while others focused on background conditions, which would be required for the establishment of a new transnational political community (for example, the transactionalist /communications school) Each in their own way, contributed to the elaboration of later neo-functional attempts to explain the emerging process of European Integration. (Cram,1996: 41)

#### 3.2. Federalism

Federalism, and federation are two concepts that are used interchangeably even by scholars. Before studying federalism within the European context, these two concepts have to be differentiated. Federation is a specific organizational form, which includes structures, institutions, procedures, and techniques It can be distinguished from other forms of state relatively clearly. The genius of federation is its infinite capacity to accommodate and reconcile the competing and sometimes conflicting array of diversities having political salience within a state.

Federalism informs federation, and vice versa. It is essentially a symbiotic relationship. Federalism can be taken to mean ideological positions, philosophical statement, and empirical fact(...) It is ideological in the sense that it can take the form of an overtly prescriptive guide to action. (Burgess: 2001 pp 26-27)

The desired result of federalism within the European context is to transfer sovereignty from Member States to the European government in significant political areas. The federalist ideas based on two pillars within the European context: to maintain peace and rule of law at the European level, and to run common policies effectively.

Federalists have focused on the result, rather than the process of integration itself. The federalist approach has a keen interest towards the European Integration. The root of "current" Federalism within European context can be traced back to the Anti-Fascist resistance movement of the World War II. After the War, several major countries set up constituent assemblies to redraft their own constitutions. It is very difficult to find a single, and coherent body of European Federalism. According to Corbett, there are two competing federalist claims;

- i. Constituent Assembly Model: Federalists have emphasized the role of constituent assembly, which could provide a source of democratic legitimacy, independently from national governments.
- ii. Gradualist Federalism: It was envisaged that might envisage the drafting of a constitution, as a key step in the integration process, but such a constitution is seen by them as more likely to emerge by negotiations among governments. It would be a step that would crown the integration process, consolidating years of achievement, rather than the crucial first step to enable integration to take place, as perceived by many 'constituent assembly federalists', at least in the early years. (Corbett: 2002,

p.66) Jean Monnet, and Altiero Spinelli were the leading, and also competing figures in their journeys towards a closer union.

Their basic views about history, dangers of nationalism, prevention of war, nature of nation-state, the role of the institutions, and even their ultimate goal was the same: European Federation. Altiero Spinelli, then member of EP, and European Commission has stated his ultimate goals in his Ventotene Manifesto, in 1941 as follows;

The new organism which will be the grandest creation, and the newest, that has occurred in Europe for centuries; in order to constitute a steady federal State, that will have at its disposal a European armed service instead of national armies; that will break decisively economic autarkies, the backbone of totalitarian regimes; that will have sufficient means to see that its deliberations for the maintenance of common order are executed in the individual federal states, while each State will retain the autonomy it needs for a plastic articulation and development of political life according to the particular characteristics of the various peoples (...)The road to pursue is neither easy nor certain. But it must be followed and it will be!

Spinelli was the founder of “Movimento Federalista Europe” (MFE). The political thesis of this movement was “ if a postwar order is established in which each State retains its complete national sovereignty, the basis for a Third World War would still exist even after the unconditional surrender of German Reich.

The “gradualist federalist” Monnet can be regarded, as a federalist, as a functionalist, or a hybrid of those two (Burgess:2000); however, his final objective makes him a federalist The fundamental problem for Monnet always remained the same: “How can people be persuaded to approach the problem in the same way, and to see that their interests are the same, when men, and nations are divided?” According to Monnet, Problems will change –if the context is changed. (Burgess:2000)

The new form of sectoral “supranational organization would be the foundation of the European Federation, which would evolve only slowly to engage national elites in a process of mutual economic interest. Monnet has predicted a shift within the union from quantity to quality, which did not occur because of his excessive reliance on his functionalist logic. The sectoral, and step-by-step approaches to integration were strongly advocated by neo/functionalist. In fact, many ‘functionalists’, not least Jean Monnet himself, were declared federalists in terms of their final objective. Monnet indeed never used the term ‘functionalist’ or ‘neo-functional’, but did use the word ‘federal’ to characterize the ECSC and frequently referred to the objective of a ‘United States of Europe’. Having lived and worked in America, he was well acquainted with the US federal system (Corbett:2002. p 382) Federalist scholars criticized Monnet for subordinating politics into economics. His methodology was regarded as determinist. According to Spinelli, Monnet has also underestimated the institutional structure, and power of the EC.

The Community would require key changes to bring itself close to an existing and functioning federal system. It lacked responsibilities in key areas traditionally considered as being appropriate for the central government in a federal system, notably foreign policy and armed forces. These fields have been kept in a separate largely intergovernmental framework.

Although other schools of thoughts gives far less importance to the role of Parliament in the integration process, Federalists have emphasized the role of parliament as a source of legitimacy in varying degrees. According to Spinelli, the EP, which represents the focal point for the integration process for its ability of promotes the European idea and offers a platform for discussion. According to Federalists, EP embodies the Lower House of the European federation, comparable to the US House of Representatives or the German Bundestag (Rosamond: 2000 p.30).



Federalists demand the expansion of direct and indirect democratic controls over the execution of foreign policy and the realization of the democratic system of 'check and balance' in the form of greater parliamentary powers at European, national and regional levels. The establishment of central institutions, endowed with certain autonomous powers, an effective decision-making process and democratic control, which would lead to the formation of genuine European political parties, is necessary for the fostering of the integration process.

### **3.3. Transactionalism / Communication School**

Karl Deutsch is the prominent figure of the Communication School. The Transactionalism / Communication School tradition studies the necessary conditions for political integration to occur. Karl Deutsch has identified four background conditions, which determines the success of political integration process (Deutsch:1978: p153)

- i. Mutual relevance of the units to one another: trade, telecommunications
- ii. Compatibility of values and some actual joint rewards.
- iii. Mutual responsiveness: necessary to complete the missing dimensions
- iv. Generalized loyalty, or identity.

Deutsch was highly criticized for his methodological focus on transaction flows, which did not provide an adequate picture of multi-faceted integration process. What makes Deutsch as a prominent scholar is his contribution to the forthcoming "Neo-Functionalist School"

### **3.4. Functionalism**

Functionalist approach is central to the study of both integration, and International Relations in general. The roots of functionalism can be traced back liberal-idealist tradition. "The foundations of functionalism tend to

reside in a positive view of human nature. Rational, peaceful progress is possible; conflict and disharmony are not endemic to the human condition.” Functionalism -in its classical form, was constructed by David Mitrany. He has foreseen the gradual establishment of functionally specific organizations aimed problem solving in a technocratic manner, without reference to any ideology, political thought. According to Mitrany, only cooperation, and problem solving capacity of these mechanisms could refocus the loyalty of the citizens to supranational entities. Mitrany’ s functionalism offers a largely technocratic vision of human governance. The central tenet of Mitrany’ s work was his opposition to nationalism, and the territorial organization of power, which is the primary threat to the world peace. Mitrany’ s functionalist vision can be understood by looking at his dichotomy on cooperation: political/constitutional or technical/functional in his advocacy of a new international society. According to Mitrany, political route has clearly failed because of catastrophic results of peace pacts, and international treaties especially during the Inter-War period. He proposes the development of technical international organizations, structured on the basis of functionalist principles.

Mitrany’ s functionalist methodology is quite important within the context of the European integration, as it provides the method that was conducted during the inception of the ECSC. Both Monnet, and Schuman were influenced by Mitrany’ s focus on technical-sector based approach, and his emphasis on avoiding political debates about the surrender of national sovereignty. According to Mitrany, transnational institutions can provide services better than the territorially organized entities. One of the

interesting dimensions of Mitrany’ s work is his denial of regional integration. The functionalist argument openly objects to territorial closure implicit in schemes of regional integration.

### 3.5. Neo-Functionalism

Federalism, and Functionalism owe their very existence to the political considerations of elites after the World War II. Similarly the Neo-Functionalism reflects the Behavioral School in USA in early 1950s. The Behavioral School has focused on the political processes, rather than institutional, and constitutional dimensions of politics.

In Neo-Functionalist model, two automatic processes are defined -if two units decide to be integrated. First, economic integration automatically generates extra transactions between actors, and second mainly because of the essential group characteristics, there is a tendency for the formation of new interest groups, especially among producer groups. The facilitator of the process for further integration is the executive body created jointly. According to the Neo- Functionalists, the fundamental feature of pluralistic, and industrialized societies in Europe is the interplay of competing interests in the political system. Haas, as the prominent figure of Neo-Functionalism has defined the integration as "the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas, 1958, p.16). As stated above, the Neo-Functionalists study the positions of the actors. So Neo-Functionalists analyze, how these processes impact upon member polities. As long as the benefits of the integration become evident, the interest groups start lobbying on their governments, and bureaucrats to cede the proper authority to the supranational apparatus.

Neo-functionalism displays a clear link with both the functionalist, and the Communication Schools. Not only the attitudes of national elites, but also the attitudes of supranational elites determine the process. According to

Haas, belief, and aspirations were transformed, through the interaction of supranational, and national belief systems, and loyalties would shift to a new authority.

Any shift in loyalties should not be absolute, or permanent. Multiple loyalties may exist. The formation of a new community by shifting expectations, and loyalties from one level to another is regarded as political spillover. Spillover represents the most significant advance upon functionalism. Political spill-over is consists of convergence of the expectations, and interests of national elites in response to the activities of the supranational institutions. It brings the transfer of loyalties in favor of, or as opposed to new supranational authorities. In neo-functionalist terms, the process of functional or sectoral spill-over referred to the situation in which the attempt to achieve a goal agreed upon at the outset of co-operation can be possible only if other co-operative activities are carried out. Haas, also conducted the spill-over term to geography.

Neo-Functionalists attribute great importance to élite interaction via formalized system-wide institutions. The interest groups, as rational decision makers, support integration on the basis of the perceived advantages. The member states may have competing claims that are contrary to the general interest of the Community as a whole. According to Neo-Functionalists, any institution with supranational characteristics would represent the general interest of the Community vis-à-vis nation states by enhancing its own power base.

Parliamentarians (..) are part of the institutions which shape the emerging European political community (..) [they] are crucial actors on the stage of integration (..) (Haas, 1958, 390).

The EP's acquisition of formal powers is advocated and seen as a form of progress towards further integration. Its committee structure, where MEPs and officials who are experts in their various sectors work together, makes the EP the ideal mix of a politics and technical institution. Early Neo-

Functionalists attached particular importance to the role of political parties in the European integration process as "carriers of values and ideologies whose opposition identity or convergence determines the success or failure of a transnational ideology" (Haas, 1958, 5).

Their creation and development within the European Parliament may be seen as a way to legitimize the integration process. For Neo-Functionalists, passionate politics and ideological clashes were to be replaced with a problem-solving strategy, which was used effectively by the two main groups within the European Parliament, the Socialists and the Christian Democrats as the only way to be able to make an impact on the other EC institutions and on decision-making (Viola: 2000 p.8) De Gaulle's veto on UK's membership, the forthcoming "empty-chair" policy brought political spillover to an end for decades. The oil crisis and forthcoming recession of 1970s has stopped the sectoral spillover for nearly two decades.

### **3.6. Inter-Governmentalism**

The Realist School has dominated the academia for over fifty years. It was presented as a panacea to the defects of Idealism of the Inter-War period. The core of the Realist thought is anarchic nature of the international order. The anarchic nature led nations, as rational players to search for survival. The Neo-Realist approach has brought a new level of analysis: the analysis of international system. It is often argued that both Realists, and Neo-Realists have not focused on European Integration. They advocate a state-centric view of International Relations and regard nation states and as the only "durable units" in society and the real motors of change. Even the European Integration has unique dimension, the governments of the member states keep high politics in their hands, as it can be seen in the dominance of the Council. "Luxembourg Compromise" shows the ability of the state apparatus to manage the crisis

in line with her interest. The Commission is viewed mainly as a secretariat. De Gaulle's view was that 'there is and can be no Europe other than a Europe of the States. (Ben Rosamond:130-2) Resistance to majority voting in Council, to the introduction of direct elections to the EP and even to direct contacts between sub-national authorities and the Commission were all outcomes of "Realism". Inter-Governmentalism also serves as a reminder of the fragility of the system.

Member States are the subjects of international law and can undo by a treaty all that they have done by a previous treaty. The break-up of existing federations in Eastern Europe shows that that break up of federal entities can even be done without agreement by units that are not subjects of international law and that were in situations of considerable interdependence and longstanding integration. Realists have tended to downplay the role of state-society relations within the context of the European Integration. Realists argue that Foreign Policy making is exclusively in the hands of the executives. Realist tradition emphasizes the role of the state itself in international politics, while Liberal traditions emphasize the formation of the state preferences.

Moravcsik, with his "Liberal Inter-Governmentalist" views criticized the realist approach. He has stressed that the Liberal theory focuses on state-society relations. European Integration was a series of rational adaptations by national leaders: constraints, and opportunities stemming from the evolution of an interdependent world economy, the relative power of states in international system, and the potential for international institutions to bolster the credibility of interstate commitments (Moravcsik: 1998 p.472)

Realism is hardly favorable with the supranational development of the European integration and regarded it as an anathema because it leads to an artificial system. The Realist thesis reaffirms the primacy of member states' governments and excludes any significant functions for

supranational organs including the EP. General state of anarchy that characterizes the EP as a multinational platform for discussion does not make it a suitable and efficient decision-making institution, especially when dealing with foreign policy issues. With regard to the European Parliament's political groups, their interactions are regarded by realists as a 'zero-sum game', where the extent of the gain for one side corresponds to the loss for the other. The capacity of political groups to inspire and define parliamentary policies can be assessed through the concept of power and compromise in the light of 'game' and 'cooperative' theories.

Moravcsik recognizes the fundamental role of the European Parliament in fostering the process of EU integration and pressing for further reforms by "acting above the nation-state". Yet he rejects supranational institutionalism as a variant of Neo-Functionalism along with the assumption that international institutions and transnational interest groups play a major part in the integration process, independently from the member states

### **3.7. Conclusion**

The economic integration of Europe after the World War II has provided a fertile ground to apply the existing theories, and to develop new theories. The Westphalian nation-state, and the existing inter-state system were all at stake. The departure point of early students of European Integration was an old question: how to avoid war? These have been regarded as early attempts to transcend the realist form of International Relations. Despite the federalist, and the functionalist have been regarded conceptually naïve, and normative, the questions raised by those scholars e.g. the relations between state and non-state actors, processes of economic change are substantial for the development of an integration theory (Rosamond: 2000, p.49)

Neofunctionalists build their idea around a core procedural consensus which resemble domestic, rather than international politics. Neofunctionalists have replaced power politics with supranational consensus system. They could explain the political integration of Western Europe, which is almost impossible to describe by using Orthodox International Relations perspectives (Rosamond: 2000, p.73)

Realism and its successors have been dominating the study of International Relations since the beginning of the Cold War. The nation states are at the core of the realist analysis as self-interested actors acting in an anarchic environment. From realist/neo-realist perspective the EU is viewed as a mechanism for inter-state cooperation within the context of emerging bi-polar order (Rosamond: 2000, p.133) Moravcsik' s liberal intergovernmentalism deserves specific attention because of his emphasis on strategic bargaining between states, and national preferences, whereby he stresses the role of state-society relations from a liberal perspective, and the role of institutions (Moravcsik:1998 p.472)

The modern international system contains Hobbesian, Kantian, and Grotian traditions. In different historical phases of the states system, in different geographical theatres of its operation, and in the policies of different states and statesmen, one of these three elements may predominate over the others (Bull, 1977, 1995, 39) As a result, both the theories of International Relations, and the theories of Integration can be misleading if applied exclusively. The meaning of the EP is changing depending on the theory applied, despite functionalists and federalists have a lot of common premises on the EP; the realist premises differ from them to a great extend. There is a growing literature to examine the function of the European Union as a system of governance, by using the methodologies of political science. Rather than studying the process of institutional change, day to day functioning of the EU as a polity is also possible.



The political questions in the EC systems are no longer simply issues of faster or slower, or more or less, "integration". The launch of the Single Market program inherently introduced an internal arena of conflict in the community. The *acquis communautaire* now involves a decision making on questions of domestic rather than "international" politics; such as the regulation of the market place, the implementation of environment, and industrial policies, and the reallocation of substantial economic resources under the regional, and social funds. (Hix: 2001p.96)

The recent studies on the European integration are concentrating on the interest groups, institutions, and decision-making processes. The behavior of the MEPs within the political groups depends on the structure of the institution, the distribution of power, and internal cohesion of the groups concerned. The interaction of the MEPs, and the political groups has been neglected for a long time in the literature; despite they provide valuable information on integration.

## CHAPTER 4

### THE POWERS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

#### 4.1. Introduction

According to Montesquieu, there are three types of administrative powers: legislative, executive, and judiciary. The modern state organization relies on check and balance system that is built on the separation of these three powers. Today, the structure of the institutions of the European Communities does not fit into the separation of powers. The parliamentary bodies have legislative, and budgetary powers in modern states. Traditionally, in modern states, the executive bodies emerge from the parliamentary bodies, and require the systematic support of the majority of the members of the parliament. So it enables the parliamentary bodies to maintain control over executive, which also ensure the democratic accountability.

There are important differences between conventional parliamentary structures available in modern nation states, and the EP in terms of EP's power. The EP has a limited legislative role, which has been enhanced since the SEA. The second traditional power of the parliamentary bodies is to retain the absolute control over budgetary issues. Since late 1970s, the EP has been exerting budgetary powers. The control over executive remains rather vague, as there is no executive authority emerging directly from the EP. The right to censure is one of the oldest parliamentary powers traditionally. The same right is also conferred to the EP by founding treaties, and only the EP can force a Commission as a college to resign. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the legislative, budgetary powers of the EP, and to focus on her agenda setting roles.

## **4.2. Legislative Powers of the European Parliament**

### **4.2.1. Introduction**

In federal states, usually, bicameral parliaments have the legislative power, whereby upper house represents federal level, and lower house represents the constituent entities. Traditionally, the lower house has more power in legislative process than the upper house. The Common Assembly-predecessor of the EP, had not legislative, but consultative power. The vision of the CA was far beyond the consultative rights conferred. Mainly because of the federalist sentiment in the aftermath of the World War II, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, in his first address to the Common Assembly in 1952, presented a vision that Council and Parliament are the two chambers of a bicameral parliament. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2005: p.197) Today, the successor of the Common Assembly, the EP has gained power through successive reforms. Interestingly, Simon Hix, in his "The Political System of the European Union" acknowledged the progress in line with the Federalist vision.

The EU has a classic two-chamber legislature: in which the council represents states, and the EP represents the citizens. In contrast to many other legislatures, however, the Council is more powerful than the EP. (Hix: 2001, p.56)

### **4.2.2. Consultation Procedure**

Under the ECSC Treaty, CA has exercised a power of control over the High Authority, but the EP did not join the legislative process. The EEC laid down 22 articles, and the EURATOM Treaty laid down 11 articles related to "consultation procedure. It has provided the EP, a non-binding role in legislative process. There is also no legislative role was defined for the Parliament in the "two treaties of Rome".

The Commission enjoys a considerable liberty for initiation both in the early treaties, and in the current treaties. The consultation procedure begins with a proposal from the Commission. The Commission, first forward its proposal to the EP for her opinion. The Commission may incorporate the requests of the EP, and sends it to the Council. The Council can modify these requests only by unanimity. The EP has the opportunity to present its views on issues stated in the Treaties. (Kent: 2001 p.53) The EP has pressed hard to extend her power. In May 1960, the Council undertook to extend consultation procedure to important problems, even where the treaties did not specifically require the consultation of the EP. These are known as *voluntary consultations*. In November 1968 the Council also undertook to consult EP on non-legislative texts, i.e. Commission memoranda, Council resolution. Paris Summit of Heads of Governments and States in 1973 has invited both the Council and the Commission “ to put into effect without delay practical measures designated to improve the relations between the Council, the Commission, and the EP.

These developments gave the MEPs the opportunity of being involved in all discussions on Community legislation and policy-making. However, until direct elections and the arrival of full-time MEPs in 1979, the practical use made of that power was limited. In any case, no matter how extensive the possibilities for parliamentary involvement, the bottom line of being able to block proposals or oblige the other institutions to accept the changes was lacking. The EP could make its opinion known at all stages, but it had no bargaining power if the other institutions failed to respond to its views. This situation first began to change following a major ruling of the ECJ in 1980 (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2005: p.198) The Court of Justice annulled the Community regulation establishing production quotas for Isoglucose on the grounds that the Council had not wait for the EP to deliver its opinion as required by the provisions of Art. 37.

The consultation provided for in Article 43 is the means, which allows the EP to play an actual part in the legislative process of the Community; such power represents an essential factor in the institutional balance intended by the Treaty. Although limited, it reflects at the Community level the fundamental democratic principle that the peoples should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a representative assembly. Due consultation of the Parliament in the cases provided for by the Treaty therefore constitutes an essential formality disregard of which means that the measure concerned is void (Case 138/79 SA Roquette Frères v. Council of the European Communities)

In addition to annulling the regulation in question, the ruling also obliged the Council to wait for the EP's opinion. In particular, EP has adopted new rules, whereby it can decide on a proposal from the chair or rapporteur of the committee responsible from postponing the vote on commission' s proposal, until the Commission has taken a position on EP' s amendments.

1. Where the Commission proposal as a whole is approved, but on the basis of amendments which have also been adopted, the vote on the draft legislative resolution shall be postponed until the Commission has stated its position on each of Parliament's amendments. If the Commission is not in a position to make such a statement at the end of Parliament's vote on its proposal, it shall inform the President or the committee responsible as to when it will be in a position to do so; the proposal shall then be placed on the draft agenda of the first part-session thereafter.
2. Where the Commission announces that it does not intend to adopt all Parliament' s amendments, the rapporteur of the committee responsible or, failing him, the chairman of that committee shall make a formal proposal to Parliament as to whether the vote on the draft legislative resolution should proceed. Before submitting this proposal, the rapporteur or chairman of the committee responsible may request the President to suspend consideration of the item.

Should Parliament decide to postpone the vote, the matter shall be deemed to be referred back to the committee responsible for reconsideration. In this case, the committee responsible shall, orally or in writing, report back to Parliament within a period decided

by Parliament, which may not exceed two month (Rule 53: Rules of Procedure, 16th edition)

The Isoglucose ruling has dramatically increased the bargaining power of the EP. In 1995, the Court ruling placed limits on the EP's power of delay, which has to be well founded, and related to the contents of the legislation in question. Consecutive reforms have introduced new legislative procedures; however, consultation procedure has remained in place for a wide range of areas including: taxation, state aids, competition, citizenship, visa, asylum, immigration, local elections, and European elections. The EP has made lobbying activities to secure more legislative powers; there had been always one or more than one member states to refuse to extend the power of the EP (Pollack, 2003: pp.219-21)

#### **4.2.3. Cooperation Procedure**

Cooperation procedure was introduced by the Single European Act in 1987, and played an important role in the development of power. The aim was to adopt internal market measures by the participation of the EP. Measures previously adopted under co-operation procedure are now covered by the co-decision procedure.

The central feature of the cooperation procedure is that it provides for two readings for the EP, rather than one. Under consultation procedure, the Council's decision following the decision of the EP, is binding, and final. In cooperation procedure, the Council transmits its common position for a second reading. Then the EP has three options; approval of the text, rejection of the text, and amending the text. If the EP rejects the text, then the Council could overrule the EP by unanimity, and securing the support of the Commission. The Council, only by unanimity, can modify the proposed amendments coming from the EP.

According to Tsebelis, the right to propose amendments in the second reading was provided an agenda setting power to the EP over the Council (Tsebelis 1994, 131, in Pollack, p.222); however it should be noted that the Commission's consent had to be assured. In any case the second reading gave the EP a chance to react to Council's position, and to respond to the opinion expressed outside the institutions. As a result, the habit of two readings gave the impression of a classical bicameral legislative procedure at European level, and helped pave the way towards full co-decision. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton: 2005 p.206)

#### **4.2.4. Co-decision Procedure**

The co-decision procedure was first introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, and simplified by the Amsterdam Treaty. The co-decision procedure is identical to the cooperation procedure until the second reading by the EP. In the second reading, the EP has three options:

- The EP can approve the common position: It is accepted, and no further procedure is required.
- The EP can reject the common position: The legislation falls.
- The EP can amend the common position: If the Council accepts all the amendments made by the EP, then the text is regarded as adopted. If the Council accepts these amendments partially, then the matter is referred to the "Conciliation Committee" to reach a compromise text in six to eight weeks. If the conciliation committee fails to reach a compromise, then the text falls.

The co-decision procedure is an important step forward as it provides a comfortable bargaining power for the EP. A new development introduced by Amsterdam Treaty aims to reach in the first reading, without having a "common position". The sheer volume of co-decision procedures after

Amsterdam means that both institutions have an important interest in not allowing all disagreements to spill over into the conciliation process.

This realization has led to much more intensive contact between the institutions earlier in the procedure. Between 1999 and 2004, 115 or 28% of all co-decision procedures were concluded at first reading, and by no means. All of them were uncontroversial proposals. Even more (200 or 50%) were agreed at second reading, leaving 84 or 22% to be negotiated to a conclusion in conciliation. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2005: p.206) The co-decision procedure originally has applied to five areas in Maastricht Treaty. Both Amsterdam, and Nice Treaty has extended the scope of the co-decision procedure.

#### **4.2.5. Assent Procedure**

The Assent Procedure was first introduced by the SEA, and extended by TEU. It requires the approval of the Council, and the EP for adoption. The SEA has introduced the assent procedure on “association agreements”, and “accession”. There are important examples how effectively the EP could utilize the assent procedure. One of the examples of the application of the Assent Procedure is Turkey's accession to the Customs Union, which will be analyzed in depth the coming chapters.

### **4.3. Budgetary Power of the European Union**

#### **4.3.1. Introduction**

Budgetary politics, and the democratic control over the budget have been an integral part of the evolution of the modern state. The politics of making and managing budget has been a central question to the Community, as the availability of an autonomous source is critical for a community that went beyond traditional international organizations.



The budget has been at the center of conflicts that have accompanied the development of the Community for two highly political reasons. First, The budget has been an arena for struggles about the distribution of gains from integration (...) Secondly, the budget has been a focus for conflict over the powers of the different institutions: over who controls the size, pattern, and management of the expenditure. (...) “nationalist approach” have wanted to keep power in the hands of the governments. Others preferring the federalist approach have held rather that (...) the role of the EP against that of the Council should therefore be enhanced.” (Pinder, 1998: p.181)

Budgetary issues are also the part of institutional bargaining process. And there are controversial views on the role of the EP “the EP has exploited its role in the budget to lever more influence for itself within the EU” (Wallece & Wallece,2000 :p.148 )

#### **4.3.2. Historical Background**

The ECSC Treaty has created an autonomous budget, independent from national governments for the exclusive use of the ECSC. It has also stipulated an administrative mechanism indifferent to governmental intervention. The EEC Treaty of 1957 has conferred the right to execute the budget to the Commission, whereby only consultative rights have been conferred to the Common Assembly. Adoption of the budget was in the hands of the Council, where the representatives of the member states were present.

In 1967, the Commission has proposed that the EP had to exert a democratic control over the budget, which would be composed of customs duties, and agricultural import levies. This has led to the infamous Empty Chair Policy of De Gaulle. Following his resignation in 1969, the Commission has revived its original proposal. In Hague Summit, December 1969, The new French President Georges Pompidou, along with other leaders of the Community has agreed to endow the Community with

genuine fiscal powers and confer definitive financial independence from the Member States and their parliaments.

The new financial resources consisted of agricultural levies, customs duties on imported goods and value added tax (VAT) limited to 1 % of the total VAT collected by the Member States. By 1975 Treaty, the following rights have been conferred to the EP.

- The right to increase, and decrease the expenditure of the EC – without having the approval of the Council.
- The right to redistribute spending without an increase/reduction from one sector to another.
- The right to reject the whole budget.
- The exclusive right to grant a discharge to the Commission in respect of the implementation of the budget. (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton, 2005: p.240)

The 1975 Treaty has provided for the creation of the Court of Auditors to enhance the accountability in the budgetary process. Most of the new resources of the European Economic Community (EEC) went towards the financing of the common agricultural policy (CAP).

#### **4.3.3. Procedure**

According to article 272 of the TOA, the financial year runs from January 1 to December 31. The Treaty has endowed the Commission by consolidating expenditure and revenue expectations, to prepare a draft budget. On EP side, the preparations for the coming year's budget start with nominating two rapporteurs from the Budgets Committee. One focuses on administrative, and operational budgets of the Community as a whole, and the other rapporteur focuses on the budgets of the Community Institutions.

In February, the Commission prepares the Annual Policy Strategy, whereby the political priorities of the Commission on the budget are stated. "Unlike

the legislative procedure, where it is the EP that responds first to Commission's proposal, in the budgetary procedure, it is the Council that is called upon to make the first formal response to the Commission's preparations in mid-July, well in advance of the date of October 5. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton: 2005 p.244)

(...)The Commission shall place the preliminary draft budget before the Council not later than 1 September of the year preceding that in which the budget is to be implemented.

The Council shall consult the Commission and, where appropriate, the other institutions concerned whenever it intends to depart from the preliminary draft budget.

The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall establish the draft budget and forward it to the European Parliament.

The draft budget shall be placed before the European Parliament not later than 5 October of the year preceding that in which the budget is to be implemented. (Art. 272 Treaty of Amsterdam)

According to Article 272, the EP has 45 days to respond to the first reading of the Council. The mediation task is carried out by Budgets Committee. The Article makes a distinction between compulsory (modification), and non-compulsory expenditure. Moreover different voting procedures are defined. The reason to differentiate these two expenditure types is to limit the power of EP on agriculture.

The EP has the right to allocate, and increase non-compulsory expenditure within limits; however, the EP has no autonomy regarding compulsory expenditure, following the modifications by the EP, the Council has absolute say on it. So coalition between PES and EPP-ED is necessary to ensure absolute majority during the first reading procedure at the EP, especially great care is taken for non-compulsory expenditure.

(...)The European Parliament shall have the right to amend the draft budget, acting by a majority of its Members, and to propose to the Council, acting by an absolute majority of the votes cast,

modifications to the draft budget relating to expenditure necessarily resulting from this Treaty or from acts adopted in accordance therewith

Following the first reading at the EP, a new trilogue is held among the EP, the Commission, and the Council representatives. And a conciliation meeting is held the day before the Council's second reading. The Council has the following options:

(...)the Council shall act under the following conditions: (a) the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, modify any of the amendments adopted by the European Parliament; (b) with regard to the proposed modifications:

- where a modification proposed by the European Parliament does not have the effect of increasing the total amount of the expenditure of an institution, owing in particular to the fact that the increase in expenditure which it would involve would be expressly compensated by one or more proposed modifications correspondingly reducing expenditure, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, reject the proposed modification. In the absence of a decision to reject it, the proposed modification shall stand as accepted;

- where a modification proposed by the European Parliament has the effect of increasing the total amount of the expenditure of an institution, the Council may, acting by a qualified majority, accept this proposed modification. In the absence of a decision to accept it, the proposed modification shall stand as rejected;

- where, in pursuance of one of the two preceding subparagraphs, the Council has rejected a proposed modification, it may, acting by a qualified majority, either retain the amount shown in the draft budget or fix another amount.

Following the second reading by the Council, the draft budget returns to the EP. She has fifteen days to make modifications on “non-compulsory expenditure” with a higher majority than the first reading. The EP has the right to reject the budget with two-thirds of her members.

(...)6. within 15 days of the draft budget being placed before it, the European Parliament, which shall have been notified of the action taken on its proposed modifications, may, acting by a majority of its Members and three-fifths of the votes cast, amend or reject the

modifications to its amendments made by the Council and shall adopt the budget accordingly. If within this period the European Parliament has not acted, the budget shall be deemed to be finally adopted.

7. When the procedure provided for in this Article has been completed, the President of the European Parliament shall declare that the budget has been finally adopted.

8. However, the European Parliament, acting by a majority of its Members and two-thirds of the votes cast, may, if there are important reasons, reject the draft budget and ask for a new draft to be submitted to it (...)

The EP has exercised her rejection rights for three times: in 1979, in 1982, and 1984. In such case, complex arrangements come automatically into force in order to make the Community able to maintain her functioning.

#### **4.4. Political Forum and Channel for Communication**

The EP, with her high level of autonomy serves as a political forum, and also provides a channel for communication. According to Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, these functions can be carried out by broadening the agenda of political discussions, by enhancing the network of contacts with other institutions, and by ensuring high level of openness in its works. The public forum role is seen in her public debates, where following the speech, a lively debate is to be maintained. Similarly *own-initiative reports* prepared by committees are useful tools to influence the public opinion on a specific subject. By *Motions for Resolutions*, which are tabled by individual members, the MEPs could increase their voice on specific subjects. The *Written Declarations*- if signed by the majority of the MEPs, they are forwarded to related institutions. *Hearings* within the EP are valuable as contact with related parties can be formed. The EP has paid special attention to the human rights issue. The role of the EP on human rights has been regarded informal for years. Today it is not the case, and there is a solid *acquis* in this field. The EP's rule of procedure also provides set of

rules to be followed the procedure to be followed concerning the breach of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Today, the EP takes into account the human rights record of the counter parties in International Relations. The EP has created Sakharov Prize in the year 1988 to be awarded to those who have struggled for fundamental freedoms, human rights, minority rights, and respect for international law.

(...) A committee, an interparliamentary delegation, a political group or at least thirty-seven Members may ask the President in writing for a debate to be held on an urgent case of a breach of human rights, democracy and the rule of law (...) If two or more motions for resolutions are tabled on the same subject, the procedure set out in Rule 103(4) shall apply. The President and political group chairmen may decide that a motion for a resolution shall be put to the vote without debate. Such a decision shall require the unanimous assent of all the political group chairmen (...) (Rule 115: Rule of Procedures)

The EP maintains contacts with other EU institutions formally: the president of the EP attends the meetings of the European Council of the Heads of State and Government. The Presidents of the Council, the Commission, and the EP meet together monthly in Strasbourg. The committee chairs maintain formal relations with commissioners. Moreover the political leaders of the EP maintain contacts with national political leaders. Contacts with national parliaments are maintained via committees, and COSAC, Conference of European Affairs Committees. Relations with media, lobbyists, and visitors are significant as well.

#### **4.5. The Right of Censure and Control of the Executive**

The EP is enabled to dismiss the Commission as a college, which is regarded as the application of the doctrine of *“collective responsibility”*. A two-thirds majority of the EP is required to force the Commission to resign. The EP could force any of the commission members to resign individually, by implying if s/he does not resign, then a motion for censure against the

Commission would be prepared. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2005: p.197)

The control of the executive body has always been regarded as a traditional power of the parliamentary bodies, especially after the administrative networks have been more diversified after 1950s. Similarly the growth of the executive power of the European Communities led the EP to expand her supervisory role. Today the EP maintains her control function by framework agreements with the Commission. The commissioners present before the EP at the plenary, answer parliamentary questions, and submit annual reports. The Council Presidency participates the similar activities. So that the democratic accountability of the institutions mentioned could be maintained. (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, 2005: pp.276-82)

#### **4.6. Conclusion**

The predecessor of the EP, the CA had only consultative power in the early years of the Community. During 1970s, the EP gained important powers in the budgetary fields, and then the role of the EP has been transformed, as it has acquired legislative powers during 1980s, and 1990s through successive reforms. The EP's control power has been developed by mutual agreements with other institutions, and the EP succeeded to have control power similar to those of the national parliaments. The EP is also an effective political forum, and a channel for communication with community/national institutions.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **THE STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT**

#### **5.1. Introduction**

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the structure of the EP in depth. As mentioned earlier in the previous chapters, there is no executive body emerging from the EP, none of the political groups have ever reached majority within the EP, and national political parties are determining the nomination procedure rather than European wide political parties. These characteristics contribute to the structure of the EP. The daily work of the EP is carried out at the Parliamentary Committees, whose members are determined by the political groups. In this chapter, both the committees, and political groups will be analyzed.

#### **5.2. Parliamentary Committees**

Committees are the central part of the EP's work where detailed studies are carried out from the inception of the Common Assembly within the ECSC. The number and responsibilities, and the size of committees are decided during the July session of the newly elected Parliament. There are three types of committees, which differ in composition, and function.

##### **5.2.1. Types of Parliamentary Committees**

There are three main types of committees available in the EP according to functions and power.

- i. Standing Committees: After the direct elections in 1979, the number of the standing committees was 16, and then it was increased to 20 in 2004. During the years between 1979 and 2004, the number of standing committees has been revised according to



the legislative amendments, requirements, and finally as a result of enlargement.

On a proposal from the Conference of Presidents, Parliament shall set up standing committees. (...) Their members shall be elected during the first part-session following the re-election of Parliament and again two and a half years thereafter. The powers of standing committees can be determined at a time other than that at which the committee is set up" (Rule 174)

ii. Temporary Committees: Temporary committees are set up for 12 months, and the period can be prolonged. There have been 12 temporary committees since 1979. On a proposal from the Conference of Presidents, Parliament may at any time set up temporary committees, whose powers, composition and term of office shall be defined at the same time as the decision to set them up is taken; their term of office may not exceed twelve months, except where Parliament extends that term on its expiry.

iii. Inquiry Committees: At a request of one-quarter of its component members, EP may set up a committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions of Community law and maladministration (Rule 176)

### **5.2.2. Main Characteristics of the Committees**

Similar to size and responsibility, the prestige of committees do vary widely. Foreign Affairs Committee- although the EP has little power in foreign policy making, and the Budgets Committee- because of the EP's role in budgetary affairs have higher profile rather than other committees. Even though the political groups have tutelage over committees they have successfully developed corporate identities. Because of their corporate identities, and field of interest, some national/political groups focus their attention on some specific committees.

Small technical committees are informally called as “neutralized” committees where expertise prevails over national /ideological interests such as “Budgetary Control Committee”. Perceived constituency advantage, personal interests, and expertise play an important role in members’ preference for individual committees. The political groups cannot fulfill these requests, as some of the committees are oversubscribed. For that reason, substitute membership can be regarded as a safety mechanism.

### **5.2.3.The Administrative Structure of the Committees**

The formal office holders within each committee consist of four persons normally: one chair, and one to three vice chairs. All these positions are shared among political groups on the basis of the number of members within each group. Groups choose posts in accordance with their size. Once a chair has been allocated to a particular group, the choice of a specific candidate depends on the following factors: size of the national groups, experience of the individual candidates. Following the bargaining and preparation stages, election of the office-holders is a mere formality. The election takes place normally during the July plenary of the new Parliament. The chairs and vice chairs are elected for a period of two and a half year. The whole process is repeated by the end of the period. As the EP is elected for a period of five years, there would be a few numerical changes in the balance among political groups in two and a half year. Any change in the balance among political groups, or competing claims of the national groups would be reflected.

The chairs preside the committee meetings, represent the committee at the plenary, and regular meetings of the committee chairs. Apart from the office holders, group coordinators play an important role in the daily business of the committees. Each political group- usually elected by the committee members of the political group, determines a group coordinator. The group

coordinators from different political groups meet and share rapporteurships, and determine the agenda of the committee. The group coordinators can be regarded as the whips of the political groups within the committees. The Committee staff is organized under a unit head: the number of administrators may vary between two to eight administrators. They are supported by at most two support assistants. The Committee Staff provides information to the committee members on past activities, common positions. The Legal Service of the EP, personnel assistants of the MEPs, Directorate-General for Information, and the staff of political groups do attend the meetings of the committees.

#### **5.2.4. Committee Business**

When the Commission or the Council submits a formal proposal to the EP, it is referred to the “committee responsible” and often to some other committees for their opinion. The President refers the proposal to the “committee responsible” for consideration. If there is a doubt considering which committee is “committee responsible”, then Rule 179 (2) is applied;

Should a standing committee declare itself not competent to consider a question, or should a conflict arise over the competence of two or more standing committees, the question of competence shall be referred to the Conference of Presidents within four working weeks of the announcement in Parliament of referral to committee. The Conference of Committee Chairmen shall be notified and may make a recommendation to the Conference of Presidents. The Conference of Presidents shall take a decision within six working weeks of the referral of the question of competence. Otherwise the question shall be included for a decision on the agenda for the subsequent part-session. (Rule 179.2)

If the committee is “committee responsible” then it appoints a rapporteur. If the opinion of the committee is asked, then it appoints a draftsman. Only in simplified procedure defined in Rule 43, there is no need to appoint a draftsman. Following a first discussion of a legislative proposal, the chairman may propose that it could be approved without amendment.

Unless at least one-tenth of the members of the committee object, the chairman shall present to Parliament a report approving the proposal (Rule 43.1) The job of the rapporteurs is to prepare initial discussion on the subject within the committee, to present a draft text, and to revise the text in accordance with the views of the committee. Once the report is adopted by committee the rapporteur present it to the plenary, and asked to give opinion on any requested amendment by the EP. There are four types of procedures related to reporting are available in the committee procedures. These are “Legislative Reports”, “Simplified Reports”, and “Own initiative Reports”.

### **5.3. Political Groups within the European Parliament**

#### **5.3.1. Introduction**

There are two different organizational structures at the European Level: first, the parliamentary groups within the EP, and second the transnational political parties in Europe. As the subject of this paper is the parliamentary groups, the second type of the organizations will not be mentioned.

The political groups were formally established in 1953 by the Common Assembly of the ECSC. The minimum requirement was nine. In June 1953, only six months after its inception, the Members of the new Common Assembly agreed to sit according to their ideological affinity rather than alphabetically or by national identity. The Belgian Socialist, Paul-Henri Spaak, declared that he would not run against the German Christian Democrat von Bretano unless all Socialist Members agreed to support his candidacy. In the end he won with the support of all of the Socialists, including the Germans, who were forced to vote against the German candidate. A parliamentary party group is defined as an organized group of members of a representative body who were elected either under the same party label, or under the label of different parties that do not compete

against each other in elections, and who do not create a group for technical reasons. (Tapio, 2002: 263) Parliamentary groups are important players in national legislatures. They are accountable to party executives to some degree, but they enjoy a changing degree of independence from extra party activities. The parliamentary democracies, coupled with “party discipline” led weakness of the political parties vis-à-vis the executives; however the parliamentary groups have two important weapons: control of parliamentary agenda, and determination of the composition of the commissions, where parliamentary business is maintained. The Rules of Procedure of the EP in Rule 29 has stipulated the formation of the political groups as follows;

1. Members may form themselves into groups according to their political affinities. Parliament need not normally evaluate the political affinity of members of a group. In forming a group together under this Rule, Members concerned accept by definition that they have political affinity. Only when this is denied by the Members concerned is it necessary for Parliament to evaluate whether the group has been constituted in conformity with the Rules.
2. A political group shall comprise Members elected in at least one-fifth of the Member States. The minimum number of Members required to form a political group shall be nineteen.
3. A Member may not belong to more than one political group (..)

There are two sensitive issues to be mentioned. Before 1999, it had been possible to form a group with 29 members from one member state, e.g. Forza Europa. As of 1999, mono-national groups are not allowed within the EP. The political groups have assumed important power over the years.

They have the power to distribute the important posts, such as presidency, vice-presidency, and chairmanships within EP. Moreover they set the parliamentary agenda. The groups have their own agenda and staff, and through formal and informal meetings the groups can influence top officials of the Community.

The second European level structure is “transnational party federations”. They are formed during mid-1970s with the expectation that elections could be fought by European – wide programs by the leading political mainstream parties of these days: Christian Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals; however, these transnational federations could not go beyond loose organizations. The article 191 (ex Article 138a) of Maastricht Treaty enabled the leading political traditions have revived their extra-parliamentary political structures.

Political parties at European level are important as a factor for integration within the Union. They contribute to forming a European awareness and to expressing the political will of the citizens of the Union. Article 191 (ex Article 138a)

### **5.3.2. The Administrative and Executive Structure of the European Parliament**

The political groups are the backbone of the EP’ s internal structure. Functional efficiency of the EP is tied to the effective works of the EP. Political groups maintain their internal order by their internal structures. The internal structure of the political group depends on its size. The structure can be divided into two main groups: the bureau- including the leadership, and the ordinary members (backbenchers). The Bureau, where political discussions are prepared, and the positions of the group is determined, is composed of chairpersons, treasurer, and some ordinary MEPs. As the group size increases, the demarcation line between the group, and the bureau becomes more visible. For example only 17.7% of the Socialist Group were bureau member during 1989-94 term (Raunio, 2002:p.47) Group chairs provide political leadership to the group. The group members choose group chairs for a specific time period.

Groups issue voting instructions to their members. Group whipping systems are less strict than national systems. According to Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton, the degree of cohesiveness is proportional to the diversity of regional, political, and sectoral interests, nonexistence of a European level government depending on the support of the majority of the MEPs, and nonexistence of sanctions against the dissident MEPs. Group members from the same nationality constitute national delegations. They are important link to national parties. The national delegations meet to determine their position vis-à-vis group position. The cohesiveness of the groups is determined at these meetings.

The EP budget allocates certain appropriations directly to the political groups. It was € 45.9 in 2005 (Corbett, Jacobs, and Shackleton p. 95). The Political Groups also employ officials. The number of officials depends on the number of official languages spoken within the groups, and the size of the groups.

### **5.3.3. Cohesiveness within the Political Groups**

According to Özbudun, the party cohesion can be defined as “The extent to which, in a given situation, the group members can be observed to work together for the group’s goals in one and the same way.” Political cohesion is important in the sense that it provides stability, and reflects homogeneity within the parliaments. (Özbudun in Raunio 1994:p.245) Despite the erosion of the traditional class allegiances, and new political issues, EP party system is working on the basis of left - right divide. As Raunio put it,

The shape of the EP Party system depends on developments in the national politics of the EU member states. Particularly the electoral volatility and high degree of party system fragmentation in France and Italy have destabilized the group structure. (Raunio, 2002: p.259)

The electoral differences between member states applied in the EP elections denotes the dependency of EP to the national legislations. As majority system is preferred in UK, Liberal Party was underrepresented for decades in EP. The political groups of the EP have some distinct characteristics when compared with parliamentary political groups at national level. The most distinct feature is that there is no European-level government accountable to the EP. As mentioned above, there are no “political parties” organized at European level - when we leave loose transnational gatherings apart, so it is not possible to maintain a party discipline over the MEPs. Moreover national parties determine the nomination procedure. The recent studies has shown that the party groups within the EP has shown increasing degree of cohesiveness as the party groups have the capacity to control the nomination of the key offices of the parliament. This trend was accompanied by the accession of smaller groups to join the major political groups. (Hix: 2001p.176)

#### **5.3.4. Coalition Formation**

The left wing vs. right wing power balance within the EP is less salient than the national parliaments. As there is no executive body in search of parliamentary support like national political systems, moreover political groups are more heterogeneous than their national counterparts. There are also new cleavage lines that vertically cut the political spectrum such as Euro-skepticism vs. Federalism.

The two leading political groups within the EP are the Socialists, and the Christian Democrats. Both of them have failed to secure a majority in the history of the EP. So a compromise solution is a necessity in conduct of politics within the EP. If center left and center right groups fail to reach a consensus, both of them focus their attention to their ideological sisters. As it is far more difficult to reconcile a liberal, and an extreme rightist on one



hand, and orthodox communists and greens on the other hand, the leading groups usually try to reach a compromise solutions.

## CHAPTER 6

### THE ELECTION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

#### 6.1. Introduction

The members of the international parliamentary assemblies are mainly appointed by the member states. Despite the provisions in her founding treaties, the EP was no exception until 1979. It was stated in the treaties that a uniform procedure in the election process should be applied. The progress on devising a uniform procedure was slow, and finally in 1976 the Council agreed to hold the direct elections in 1979. It can be regarded as a turning point in the history of the EP. There are competing views on the nature of the EP elections in academia as well. The aim of this chapter is to analyze the electoral process, and the competing views on the EP.

#### 6.2. General Rules

Despite it was stated in the founding treaties, the EP has been a body composed of appointed persons from member states until 1979.

The Paris Summit of Heads of Governments decided to institutionalize their meetings in the form of the European Council, and to meet three times per year. To balance this reinforcement of the intergovernmental side of the Community, they also agreed that direct elections to the EP (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 p.12)

The EP has prepared its early draft in 1976, and The Council approved “Act concerning the election of the representatives of the assembly by direct universal suffrage “ in the same year.

(...) Representatives shall be elected for a term of five years. This five-year period shall begin at the opening of the first session following each election (...) Representatives shall vote on an individual and personal basis. They shall not be bound by any

instructions and shall not receive a binding mandate (...) Pursuant to Article 21 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Article 138 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community and 108 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, the Assembly shall draw up a proposal for a uniform electoral procedure. (Act concerning the election of the representatives of the Assembly by direct universal suffrage OJ 278, 8.10.1976)

Following the Council' s decision, the main issue within the EP was the uniformity in the electoral procedure. Despite minor differences, proportional representation system is in use. The major exception was UK, where the majority system has been in use even in the EP elections until 1999. That has altered political balance within the EP was altered in many instances.

The other problematic area is the size of the constituencies. There is a trade off between the number of the constituency, and the proportionality of the results. In many countries, the whole nation is regarded as one constituency. The prerequisite of the pure proportional system is to see the entire country as one electoral area, but it prevents the MEPs to form strong links with the citizens, as all of the MEPs were chosen from the same constituency. In order to reconcile the link between the citizens, and the proportional representation, some hybrid models are proposed, which are already in use in national elections.

Some member states prefer minimum thresholds in order to prevent fragmentation -or to suppress the representation of some minor political groups. Whatever the reason is the member states are allowed to set minimum thresholds not exceeding 5%. There is no uniformity on preferential voting system in member states applying it. The minimum age to vote is uniformly 18, and voting is compulsory in a few member states. According to the Maastricht Treaty, any EU citizen could vote and can stand as candidate in his or her own country of residence as long as he or she resides in a EU member state.

### **6.3. The Distribution of the Seats at the European Parliament**

The number of seats has steadily increased as the numbers of member states have increased. Total number of members was only 198 before the direct elections, and now, after the last wave of enlargement, it is 732. The main dilemma of the EP is to give adequate representation to small countries e.g. Malta, Luxembourg, and on the other hand to attain a proportionality in representation i.e. to reach equality in number of citizens per MEP in each and every member state. No such proportionality is attained in the history of the EP; however a balance between the leading four members: Germany, UK, France, and Italy has been kept.

### **6.4. The European Elections: The Meaning**

The European Elections have been held for six times since 1979 in every five years with declining turnovers. Simon Hix has observed two competing views on European elections:

- i. Classical View: According to classical view, the EP elections are second order elections to national contents. The logic behind classical view is based on two premises: the elections are national contests, rather than international, and the EP elections are less important than national elections as national elections determine the substance of executive body, and policy guidelines of the EU is determined by the national governments.
- ii. Alternative View: According to Simon Hix, rather anecdotal evidences, declining turnover goes hand in hand with declining support to the European integration. Green parties also get better results than the national elections.

(...)voters could also use them to punish 'their' (opposition) parties, or even to indulge in the luxury of supporting smaller parties that might seem irrelevant in a general election where government formation was a salient issue. (...) Broadly speaking, our results seem to point to 'punishment' rather than 'protest' being a primary force in making European Parliament elections different for general elections (Simon & Michael, 1995: 7)




FIGURE 1: THE AVERAGE TURNOUT IN THE EP ELECTIONS (CORBETT, JACOBS, AND SHACKLETON: 2005 P.28)

## PART II

### THE ATTITUDE OF POLITICAL GROUPS OF THE EP TOWARDS TURKISH POLITICAL EVENTS: 1980-96

The aim of the second part of the thesis is to analyze the cohesion, and voting likelihood of the political groups in the EP concerning the decisions on Turkey between 1980 and 1996. The cohesion and voting likelihood of the political groups of the EP is going to be studied by analyzing the roll-call vote data. As mentioned in Chapter 1, roll-call vote of the MEPs is recorded, and published in the Official Journal along with the information of his/her own nationality, and political group.

If a roll-call vote is requested, the result of each member's vote is formally recorded, first in a special annex to the minutes, which appears the next day, and later in the translated minutes which come out in the Official Journal about three months later (Corbett, Jacobs, Shackleton: 2005 p.168)

The roll-call votes provides an important tool to assess the cohesion within the political groups, as well as coalition formation between themselves, and it needs to be supplemented with other information.

An index of agreement (IA) is used to measure the cohesion of the political groups. The index is a measure of relation that exists between the three modalities of votes-in favour, against, and abstention- cast by the members of a group; more exactly, it is the percentage measure of relation between (a) the difference between the highest numbering modality, and the sum of other two modalities in a vote by the MEPs of a group, and (b) the total number of votes cast by the group;  
$$IA = [(highest\ modality - sum\ of\ other\ two\ modalities) \times 100] / total\ number\ of\ votes$$

The index is equal to 1.00 when all the deputies belonging to a group vote in the same way. Between 0.999 and 0.001 agreement decreases, but more than half of the voters express the same voting modality. (Attina 1990: 564 in Raunio p.94)

By using the roll-call vote data in the index of agreement, the cohesiveness, and the voting likeliness of the political groups will be analyzed between 1980 and 1996.<sup>2</sup> As mentioned in the previous chapters, the national delegations are the nucleus of the political groups. The chairs of the political groups have to consider the presence of their power over its members in decision-making process. The national delegations may choose not to act in line with their party groups, and which is not a rare case. The predominance of the national interests over ideology will be analyzed with regard to problematic Turco-Greek relations.

Greece acceded to the EC in January 1981, and twenty-four seats allocated to Greece at the EP. It is a wide spread argument that despite their ideological differences, the Greek MEPs have been voting in similar fashion concerning Turkey. The voting behaviors of Greek MEPs on Turkey deserve specific attention. The cohesiveness of the Greek MEPs with their groups will also be studied in the coming pages.

In September 12, 1980, the military assumed power, and attempted to reengineer political system of Turkey by drafting a new constitution, closing political parties, and prohibiting former politicians to run in the elections. The repercussions of the military junta were felt more than two decades in Turkish politics. Recovery of Turkish political system, and search for closer integration with the EC has gone hand in hand. In the late 1980s the EC has moved to a closer union. In the early 1990s Cold War came to an end, and Warsaw Pact ceased to exist in 1991. In the same year a new coalition government was formed in Turkey with an ambitious plan to remove the remnants of Military Junta in Turkish politics. The new government was welcomed from the EP. Despite tensions in the relations, the coalition government succeeded to secure the assent of the EP in December 1995

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<sup>2</sup> Visit <http://personal.lse.ac.uk/hix/HixNouryRolandEPdata.HTM> as part of Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gerard Roland (2005) 'Power to the Parties: Cohesion and Competition in the European Parliament, 1979-2001', *British Journal of Political Science* 35(2) 209-234.

for Turkey's accession to the Customs Union. The cohesiveness and voting likeliness of the political groups within the EP were studied in three periods in order to depict the *zeitgeist*, and the changing priorities of the EP, and Turkish ruling elites.

The first period studied extended from 1980 to 1987. Following the coup d'état in 1980, the EC Institutions had a tolerant stance towards Turkey. Mainly because of the prospect for restoration of the democratic order that would be accomplished in a short period of time; however, the expectations have not been met. The first general election was held almost three years after the coup, and the military junta effectively used its veto power against the leading politicians to bar them from politics. The two major political traditions that have shaped Turkish politics since the inception of the Turkish Republic, were not allowed to run in the 1983 elections. So the MEPs have concluded that Turkish democracy was not restored by 1983 elections, and they did not resume relations with Turkey until the 1987 elections.

The second period studied was between the years 1987 and 1991. In 1987, just before the general elections, the ruling Motherland Party "ANAP" applied for full membership to the EC despite the attempt was not welcomed by the leading EC members. During the second term, the relations between EC, and Turkey was stabilized. The period could be regarded as transition period. In these years, Cold War came to an end, and EC members boost their attempts for a closer union.

The third period studied was between the years 1991 and 1996. Following the 1991 elections, Motherland Party "ANAP" lost her majority, and True Path Party "DYP" on the center-right and Social Democratic People's Party "SHP" on the center left have formed a coalition government, which aimed to carry out an ambitious political reform program. The new government was welcomed by the European Parliament as well; however, the reform



program failed for domestic reasons. The important development in the same period was Turkey's attempt to accede to the Customs Union. Because of the newly defined "assent procedure" the EP's influence over Turkey has increased enormously.

## CHAPTER 7

### THE DILEMMA OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT: REALPOLITIK OR PLURALISTIC DEMOCRATIC ORDER BETWEEN 1980-7

#### 7.1. Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to analyze the attitude of the political groups in the EP towards Turkey from the military coup of September 12, 1980 to the 1987 General Election. The international, and domestic political developments will be studied by analyzing the roll-cast votes cast by the MEPs. The main characteristics of the period analyzed is the ongoing dominant role of the military forces even after the General Elections of 1983.

The EP, after first direct elections in 1979, faced two important military coups on the continent: first in Turkey in 1980, and then in Poland in 1981. Despite the expectation of restoration of the democratic order in a short time period, the military junta has remained in power nearly three years in Turkey. The EP has closely observed Turkish politics, and did not hesitate to suspend relations-if deemed necessary.

#### 7.2. International Setting: Second Cold War and Search for Turkish Leviathan

The coup in Kabul, and the following military intervention in Afghanistan by Soviet Union have brought the superpower relations to a new phase: "The Second Cold War". The President of the US has denounced the Soviet Union as "the Evil Empire", and started to maintain a "full fledged" cold war rhetoric in all fronts. These policies resulted in a mushrooming budget deficit; a powerful, and at times anti-US, peace movement in Western Europe; strains within the NATO alliance; and a heightening of Cold War tensions (Painter, 1999: 95)

Turkey has experienced a political instability during the late 1970s. The leading parties- i.e. center-right Justice Party “*AP*”, and center-left Republican People’s Party “*CHP*” have been unable to form neither a majority government, nor a coalition government between themselves. Two National Front governments- including ultra nationalist elements was formed under the leadership of Justice Party that has escalated the confrontation, and brought the country to the brink of a civil war. The Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA) had been unable to elect a successor to President Korutürk just before the coup, even after countless, long sessions.

Turkey, as a member of NATO is strategically located in the Eastern Mediterranean, and was viewed as a major ally of the US, particularly with the fall of the Shah in the nearby Iran. For months the Carter Administration has been deeply concerned about the situation there, fearful about terrorism, which has claimed more than 2,000 lives in the past, and the apparent inability of the political system to function effectively.

On September 12, 1980 at 4:30 A.M, It was declared via a radio broadcast that the Military resumed the political power. Almost an hour before the announcement, Military Assistance and Training Department of the US Defense Ministry was officially informed. Despite its commitment to Helsinki Accord, Carter Administration welcomed the Coup D’état. The hierarchical order of the military intervention, and the appointment of General Haydar Saltık - who has served to NATO, as the Secretary General of National Security Council have convinced the US to take a tolerant approach towards Turkey. The European Allies of the US had a dual approach to the question: on one hand NATO membership welcomes the takeover, as it has prevented a radical bias, on the other hand EC membership accuses the breach of democratic principles, and rule of law.

I know that we could not say such things following the Greek accession; however, it is obvious that Turkish Military has

intervened to save the democracy. Turkey is the only country, where military interventions cannot be regarded as the end of democracy. For that reason, Turkish Military should be supported during the transition period (Hans Dietrich Genscher, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, German Federal Republic in Birand, 2005: 296)

### 7.3. The European Parliament: In the Aftermath of the Coup

The EP held her first direct general elections in the year 1979. The Socialist Group was the leading group, and the European People's Party was the second largest group in the EP after the elections. Liberals, Conservatives, and Communist Groups were the other leading group in the EP.




FIGURE 2: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEATS IN THE EP BETWEEN 1979-84 (RAUNIO, 2002:P.63)

The EP discussed the coup in Turkey on September 18, 1980, less than a week after the coup d'état in Turkey. There have been two motions for resolution: The first one prepared by the Communists under the name of "on the Coup d'Etat in Turkey". The second one was a joint proposal,

prepared by the Socialist, Liberal, and Christian Democratic Groups under the name of “on the Events in Turkey”.

The Communist Group has argued that worsening of terrorist activities, and economic bankruptcy could not justify the coup d'état. On the other hand, the remaining groups from Socialists on the left to Conservatives on the right have argued that violation of human rights, and murders have been daily event in Turkey, and the inability of the Turkish Parliament's to elect the new President has been another cause of concern. So It was argued that in line with the Council, and the Commission, cooperation with Turkey will be maintained, and daily developments in Turkey will be closely observed. It is also important to note that Mr. Gerd Lemmer from the Christian Democratic Group has argued that it is the constitutional right of the Military to assume power –if it is deemed necessary, as the guardian of Turkish Republic. At the end of the meeting, the proposal of the Communist Group was not accepted. The accepted resolution- proposed by Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats, was as follows:

The EP, (...) urgently requests that steps be taken immediately towards guaranteeing for the Turkish people the enjoyment of political and trade union freedoms within a democratic and institutional framework. Stresses the importance of ensuring in the immediate term the physical safety of those persons who have been detained (...) Considers that the prolongation of non democratic measures would place Turkey in flagrant violation of several explicit undertakings. Reaffirms that the respect for internationally recognized human rights (...) is an essential condition for dialogue (...) Calls on the foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to report to the component communities of the EP (...) (Resolution: September 18, 1980)

According to M. Ali Birand, the duration of the EP's *credit* was unknown (Birand, 2005: 499) The left wing newspaper Cumhuriyet has also mentioned that EP did not suspend relations with Turkey, and the EP has a tolerant stance to Turkey. It was asked the junta members to utilize this opportunity properly (Selçuk: 20.09.1980)

On January 1, 1981 Greece acceded to the EEC. Greek Membership was a regarded as a trauma for Turkey. One of the important determinants of Turkish foreign policy was to take Greco-Atlantic relations into consideration, and to follow Greek suit as much as possible (Birand, 2005:51-7) Moreover, Turco-Greek disputes could be discussed in a new platform, where Turkey is not a player. These concerns led the Military regime to discuss a new strategy for Turkish accession to the EC. Twenty-four seats were allocated to Greece at the EP. The Greek Parliamentarians have been actively involved into the sessions of the EP on Turkey. National Security Council has invited three of its ambassadors to Ankara to discuss the conduct of Foreign Affairs in March 1981. Ambassador Cenap Keskin-Permanent Representative to the EP has stated that the relations would be deteriorated day by day – if Turkey would not attempt to restore democratic order (Birand, 2005: 301)

#### **7.4. The Lessening Credibility of the National Security Council and the Greek Accession to the European Union**

The credibility of the military régime in the eyes of the EP did not last long. The arrest of 223 DİSK- left wing trade union members, the widespread allegations on torture, and breach of human rights have turned the attention of the EP to Turkey, and it was decided to discuss the developments in Turkey on April 10, 1981. There have been four competing proposals on Turkey from the Communist, Radical, Socialist, and Liberal Groups separately within the EP. The question was centered on sending an inquiry committee to Turkey. Gauthier on behalf of the Communist Group has stated that

(...) more than one hundred death sentences have been pronounced in Turkey, and this by no means all (...) some members have asserted that the visit of our delegation to Turkey would constitute a restraint on military, and It has been said that this military dictatorship would have only temporary effects (...) Today it is evident that these efforts have been ended in failure (...) The

Turkish military régime openly asserts that the period of dictatorship would be along one (...) Under these circumstances a visit by a Parliamentary delegation would be a serious concession to this dictatorship. (Debate of the EP, April 1981: 264-7)

Pannella on behalf of twenty-six MEPs- mainly from Radical Group, has drawn a parallelism between Greece and Turkey. He argued that the EP had made a decision in line with Christian Democrat Group's proposal, sixty days after the coup d'état in Greece, and resumed her relations with Greece; however, in Turkish case, he argued that realpolitik suppress norms and values. So realpolitik determines the pace of politics. Pannella stated "We are simply asking that this weapon again be used to bring the generals to reason." Glinne from Socialist Group mentioned Socialist Group's two concerns not to participate to the visit of the "will be formed" Parliamentary Delegation to Turkey: first no reliable assurance has been given regarding the possibility of meeting certain political detainees and second because of the lobbying activities conducted by Turkey political views would be excluded from the EP Delegation.

We therefore condemn the prolonged suspension of the democratic institutions in Turkey, and call on the Commission, the Council, and the member states to address a precisely worded message to the present Turkish authorities. They must insist on Turkish military régime to forward a list of measures permitting the exercise of democratic freedoms, and containing time limits for their implementation (...) We would like to make known to the Turkish military régime that the Association Agreement between Turkey and EC may be suspended if democratic institutions, and practices are not restored very soon (Debate of the EP, April 1981: 264-7)

Habsburg from European People's Party in his short speech has argued that it is necessary to send an inquiry committee to Turkey to gather information on the current situation. Both Conservative, and De Gaullist Groups have declared their support for Mr. Bangemann's resolution – from Liberal Group. The Greek members of the EP have actively participated to the discussions. The arguments of the Greek members were based on

similarities of the sufferings of the Greek and Turkish People under military régime. References to Cyprus and Aegean disputes have been made.

Non-Attached Greek member of the EP, Ioannis Zighdis, in his long speech asked the EP to take the necessary measures to overcome Turkish People's hardship. "Otherwise, and I stress this point to you, the Turkish people will reach the conclusion Evren's successor will have to be, as I said earlier, another Mengistu, or another Khomeini." Nikolau Kalliopi from Socialist Group stated "in an age where we have mass media and world-wide communications, it is hypocritical to pretend that we do not know what is going on at the moment in a neighboring country". Efstratios Papaefstratiou from European People's Party, and Konstantinos Kappos from the Communist Group have together condemned the military régime in Turkey (Debate of the EP, April 1981: 264-7) Because of the absence of Mr. Bangemann at the plenary, the Liberal Group was forced to withdraw its proposal, and roll-call vote was requested from Socialist Group. The Socialist Group sponsored "*Resolution on the Military Junta in Turkey*" was accepted on April 10, 1981 with a narrow margin.

The EP(...) considering that there has been no move towards the restoration of democracy in Turkey, since the military régime was established despite the assurances to the contrary given by the military authorities to European countries, and to the institutions of the EEC (...)Condemns the prolonged suspension of the democratic institutions of Turkey urging the Turkish Military régime to present without delay a list of measures to introduce democratic liberties, giving specific deadlines for their implementation(...)Drawing the attention of the Turkish Military régime to the fact that the association between Turkey and the European Community will be suspected with immediate effect unless democratic institutions and practices are reinstated within two months(...) ( Resolution, April 1981)

There was a low turnout. Only 105 out of 434 MEPs voted for the resolution (52 for, 45 against, and 8 abstain). 5 out of 24 Greek members have cast their votes for the resolution regardless of their political affiliation (Hix, Noury, Roland, 2001:209-34) The Socialist Group, in line with her



ideological sister Communist Group voted for the resolution. The ideological polarization within the EP reflects the disappointment of the Socialists with the military junta.<sup>3</sup>

TABLE 1: VOTES CAST ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL GROUPS: ROLL-CALL VOTE: APRIL 10, 1981

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
<b>votes cast</b>	30	26	4	26	12	7
<b>for</b>	30	6	0	1	9	6
<b>against</b>	0	19	3	23	0	0
<b>abstain</b>	0	1	1	2	3	1
<b>cohesiveness</b>	100%	46%	50%	77%	50%	

(Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland: 35/2 209-234)

There were two important achievements to be noted in the European Parliament: The Greek Accession to the EC has been regarded as the source of concern among Foreign Affairs circles in Turkey. As it has been expected, the Greek members of the European Parliament have been participating discussions on Turkey aggressively, and rather than agreed upon group positions, and ideological considerations, national preferences have dominated decision making processes.

The National Security Council was quick to response to the EP's resolution. The Office of Prime Minister has declared that Turkey will follow her suite in democratization process. The Head of State General Evren has also accused the EP, and the left-wing political groups in Turkey. There have been number of articles published in Turkish media regarding the difference between the EP and the Council of Europe, and the EP has been accused for her limited scope (Öymen: April 14, 1981) Despite ongoing censor, critical articles on Turkish democracy, and human rights records have appeared on the media (Altan, April 17, 1981 and İlhan April 14, 1981)

<sup>3</sup> Among the five Greek MEPs two of them were from Socialist Group, one of them was from Communist Group, and the remaining two were Christian Democratic Group.

Despite the resolution dated April 10, 1981, it was decided to send a Parliamentary Delegation to Turkey at the Enlarged Bureau meeting. The Socialist Group has withdrawn from the Parliamentary Delegation due to the lobbying activities from right-wing governments. The Delegation of the EP has paid its visit from September 30 to October 1, 1981.

### **7.5. Suspension of the Activities of the EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee**

The National Security Council has suspended the activities of the political parties first, and then on October 16, 1981, all political parties were suspended. The generals in their zeal to enforce a radical break with the past, they even tried to destroy the past itself: the archives of the parties, including those of the Republican People's Party of the last 30 years disappeared and were probably destroyed (Zürcher: 1998: p.298)

On October 23, 1981 the Consultative Assembly "*Danışma Meclisi*" was convened. The Assembly consists of 160 members – 40 of them had been appointed by the National Security Council, and the remaining 120 members had been appointed by the provincial governors- appointed by the generals. The EP has shown her discontent by suspending the 4<sup>th</sup> Financial Protocol on November 4, 1981. Indeed suspension of the protocol was no more than a symbolic gesture, as it requires the approval of the Council.

On January 21, 1982 a joint debate was held on the situation of Poland and Turkey, under the Presidency of Belgium. Communists, and Radicals have asked to discuss Turkey, and Socialists, and Christian Democrats have asked for a discussion on Poland. (Debates of the EP, January 1982: pp.21-60)

Panella from the Radical Group has stated "For the Munich Policy of appeasement, whether from the right or from the left may come once more to the fore in 1980s. We must fight vigorously against the spirit of anti-legal violence, against the structures of violence, and dictatorships of 1980s." He has accused the European politicians, who took hard line on Poland, but a tolerant approach to Turkey. Eva Gredal from the Socialist Group has stated, "Our great sympathy with the situation in Poland should make us forget that there are other places in the world, where people are suffering injustice, and I should like to deal specifically with Turkey here today". And she added that Socialist Group would not participate Joint Parliamentary Committee of the EEC-Turkey Association Council – if Joint Parliamentary Committee meetings were not suspended Von Hassel from EPP has stated that (...) before we discontinue and cut off everything we should wait and consider helping Turkey to return to democracy- and we cannot achieve this by condemning the Turks, but by helping and cooperating with them." (Debates of the EP, January 1982: pp.21-60) In the following day again Turkey was on the agenda. The Resolution on the death sentence imposed on 52 Turkish Trade Union Leaders was accepted on January 22, 1982, whereby the mandate of MEPs in the EEC-Turkey Parliamentary Association was not renewed. Total number of votes cast was 118, and the resolution accepted was in line with Socialist Group's expectations.

Deeply disturbed by the news that death sentence has been requested for 52 leaders of the DİSK trade union in Turkey (...) whereas after the coup d'état of September 12, 1980 the Turkish military régime has shown no serious desire to restore civil and democratic freedom.(...) requests its President and the President of the Council to take action to help the 52 trade union leaders whose life is in danger and to seek their release (...) decides not to renew the mandate of the EEC-Turkey Association until such time as the Turkish Grand National Assembly has been freely elected in a secret ballot by direct universal suffrage, and has taken office. (...) calls on the commission to recommend that the council adopt the fourth EEC-Turkey Financial Protocol as soon as the various stages of the returns to democracy have been finally completed ( Resolution: January 22, 1982)

It is important to note that only 111 members of the European Parliament participated the session. The indifference of Christian Democrats, and Liberals to the debates on Turkey was noticeable. A loose alliance of left wing parties, and Greek Members of the EP proved to be enough to disapprove the military régime in Turkey. Conservative Group has tried to justify the military regime in Turkey. This could be attributed not only to the “realpolitik” but also to the cordial relations between Turkey and UK.

Table 2: Votes cast on the basis of political groups: Roll-Call Vote: January 22, 1982

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
votes cast	42	24	11	30	7	4
for	42	3	1	0	7	3
against	0	21	2	30	0	0
abstain	0	0	8	0	0	1
cohesiveness	100%	75%	45%	100%	100%	

(Hix, Simon, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland: 35(2) 209-234)

The Communist and Allies Group, which was a loose alliance between liberal minded Euro Communists of Italy, and Orthodox Marxists of French Communist Party has argued against the Military Junta both in Turkey, and in Poland. The Socialist Group has shown a great cohesiveness in the voting procedure. And again the Greek members have acted in line with their national interest, rather than ideological considerations.<sup>4</sup>

### 7.6. The Detention of Former Prime Minister of Bülent Ecevit and the Reaction of the Socialist Group

The former Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit has resigned from his People’s Republican Party “CHP” in October 30, 1980, and then he has started to

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<sup>4</sup> Nine Greek MEPs supported the resolution: three Christian Democrats, four Socialists, one Communist, and one independent. The right wing MEPs have voted in line with Left Wing Groups.

publish a Magazine called “*Arayış*”. Because of his speeches to the foreign press, and of his critical remarks on the military junta, he was detained. It was not acceptable to the Socialist Group of the EP. The legendary leader of the Socialist International, Willy Brandt made a speech at the plenary, and asked the MEPs not to vote for Uwe von Hassler’s report on Turkey, which was prepared in the absence of Socialists. The report asked a tolerant stance towards Turkey from EC members. Despite Brandt’s attempts, the resolution was accepted by a slim majority -105 vs.100, and 9 abstentions

The European Parliament, aware that (...) Turkey’s geographical position and the state of its economic development make it vulnerable to numerous attempts to destabilize it (...) noting the improved internal security of Turkey and that the slowing rate of inflation has stabilized the country’s purchasing power, and noting that the Turkish authorities have published a timetable for a procedure which will lead to free legislative elections to be held by secret ballot in the autumn of 1983 or the spring of 1984 at the latest.(...)Proposed to send a delegation representing all shades of political opinion in the Assembly to act as observers during the campaign preceding the constitutional referendum planned for the autumn of 1982 as it has already done in associated or friendly countries(...) Believes that Turkey, in this extremely critical period of history should receive understanding from the Member States of the EC(..) Expresses the conviction that a just solution of the Cyprus Problem based on the restitution of the Republic of Cyprus’ s sovereignty, leading to withdrawal of foreign troops from the Republic’s territory in line with Nicosia Agreements, and the resolutions of the UN (...) would lead to a significant improvement in the EC’s relations with Turkey ( Resolution: July 8, 1982)

The participation to session was relatively high. Again there was a split between ideological lines, rather than a Grand Coalition of Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats. Both the Socialist Group, and the Communist Group were highly cohesive in their decisions. On the other hand, Christian Democratic Group was less cohesive because Greek

members of the Christian Democratic Group, who preferred to vote alongside with their nationals on the left wing.<sup>5</sup>

TABLE 3: VOTES CAST ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL GROUPS: ROLL-CALL VOTE: JULY 8, 1982

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
votes cast	64	67	10	35	23	15
for	0	60	9	32	0	5
against	63	6	0	1	23	10
abstain	1	1	1	2	0	
cohesiveness	97%	79%	80%	83%	100%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35(2) 209-234)

### 7.7. Transition to Democracy Under Military Tutelage

The new constitution was subject to a referendum on November 7, 1982. Approval or rejection was directly linked to the figure of General Evren (...). Voting was made compulsory, and anyone who chose not to-or neglected to- vote, not only had to pay a fine, but also lost his or her right to vote for five year. Furthermore a decree of October 20 banned all criticism of the Constitution, its temporary articles, or of the speeches General Evren made in favor of a yes vote. Thus prepared, the referendum yielded the expected result a yes vote of 91,4%. Only in the Kurdish south-east were relatively high percentages of no votes were recorded. (Zürcher, 1998: 295-6)

As of April 25, 1983, the ban on political activities have been “partially” lifted. Right wing True Path Party “DYP” of Süleyman Demirel, and left wing Social Democracy Party “SODEP” of Erdal İnönü were not allowed to run in the general elections of 1983 Only three political parties have been allowed to run in the first general elections on November 6, 1983 after the coup. These parties were Nationalist Democracy Party “MDP” of General Sunalp, Motherland Party “ANAP” of Turgut Özal, and People’ s Party “HP” of Necdet Calp. The National Security Council have openly supported General (ret.) Sunalp’ s MDP (Birand:1998: 226) The EP condemned Turkey for the

<sup>5</sup> Five Greek MEPs, two of them were from right wing groups, voted in favor of the resolution in line with left wing groups

breaches of human rights, for the military tutelage over democracy, as some political parties were not qualified to run in the elections on September 13, 1983. Particularly after the second half of the year 1981, there has been an ideological polarization on Turkey related matters in the EP. The EP' s last resolution on Turkey, almost a month before the general elections in Turkey was approved by different political groups: communists on the left, and even some conservatives on the right. This could be attributed to the prolonged period of transition to democracy, and to the tutelage of the generals over Turkish democracy by the veto power in their hands. <sup>6</sup>

TABLE 4: VOTES CAST ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL GROUPS: ROLL-CALL VOTE: SEPTEMBER 13,1983

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
votes cast	59	36	6	12	22	5
for	59	33	6	3	19	5
against	0	0	0	4	0	0
abstain	0	3	0	5	3	0
cohesiveness	100%	83%	100%	17%	50%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35(2) 209-234)

## 7.8. The General Elections and “Motherland” Government in Power

### 7.8.1. Political Developments

The result of the elections was shocking for the military. Motherland Party got 45% of the votes alone, and established a single party government.

The priority of Motherland Governments was the normalization of the relations between Turkey, and EC. Following the EC' s moderate stance to the military junta first, the EC, (*especially the*

<sup>6</sup> 18 Greek MEPs voted in line with the resolution. Six of them were from right wing political parties.

*EP*) has revised her stance towards Turkey in the mid- 1981. There has been a long political tension in the following years. The EP has become the major political institution in Turkey – EEC relations in those years (Çayhan, 1997:256)




FIGURE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEATS AT THE TGNA  
(TEKELI, İLKIN, 2000: 40)

### 7.8.2. 1983 General Election and the European Parliament

The first discussion on Turkey was held- after the general elections, on May 24, 1984. There were two different motions for resolution prepared by the Communists, and Socialists. Jacques Dennis from the Communist and Allies Group has asked for a resolution on Turkey called “on persistent violations of human rights in Turkey”. The motion was accepted by the EP. At the resolution references were made to the NGOs observations in Turkey, and urgent desire of the EP to see an end to the torture was stressed (The Debate of the EP, May 1984:pp.255-7)



The European Parliament, (...) recalling that on April 26, 1984, its political affairs committee held a hearing on the violations of human rights in Turkey (...) mindful of the information given at this hearing by representatives of Amnesty International, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, The World Confederation of Labor, the International Press Institute, the Minority Rights Group, and the Peace Movement in Turkey (...) noting that the information given by these organizations show that in the period following the elections, torture, the imprisonment of people for political reasons, violations of the freedom of press(...) continued owing to the existence of martial law(...) noting that the hunger strikes held in prisons since September 1983(...) express its concern for respect for the freedoms(...) reiterates its urgent desire to see an end to torture in that country.

The second motion for resolution- prepared by the Socialist Group was modified by the request of Uwe von Hassel from Christian Democratic Group and a phrase on the attempts for the re-establishment of democracy was inserted to the text. Marco Pannella from the Radical Group criticized the moderate stance of the EP towards Turkey by saying "it is shameful fact that if Sakharov was a Turk, this parliament would probably expressing solidarity with his torturers." (The Debate of the EP, May 1984:pp.255-7)

The EP(..)Notes that by virtue of the election of the Turkish Grand National Assembly and the recently held local elections, Turkey has taken its first step towards the re-establishment of pluralistic democracy, although in view of the de facto martial law at the present prevailing in Turkey, these elections are of only limited significance (...) protests in the light of the results of the aforementioned hearing held by the Political Affairs Committee against: the use of torture, and intimidation, and the protracted nature of criminal trials held before military courts, the imposition of death penalty in numerous cases, and the demand for this penalty by the military prosecuting authorities (...) urges the government and Parliament of Turkey ( as well as military authorities in the provinces under martial law) to put an end to this deplorable state of affairs and to guarantee full respect for human rights. (Resolution: May 24, 1984)

### 7.8.3. EP Elections: Second Term 1984-9

In June 1984, the EC members chose their representatives in the EP for the second time.




FIGURE 4 : THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEATS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTS AMONG POLITICAL GROUPS: 1984-9 (RAUNIO, 2002:P.63)

As stated in the previous pages, the EP has suspended the functioning of the EEC-Turkish Joint Parliamentary Committee in the year 1981. Following the 1984 elections, the EP President's Office has assigned the task of determining the members of the delegation to the EEC-Turkish Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC). There were two competing views on the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The first motion for resolution has asked the resumption of the JPC, until when Turkey fully adopt the democratic principles. The second motion for resolution has asked for the formation of the 13-member parliamentary committee, which will be operative only after the two conditions are going to be met:

the Association Council would be operative, and the EP would give her consent for the resumption of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The Assembly accepted the second option: 148 vs. 66, and 21 abstain.

TABLE 5: VOTES CAST BY MEPs FOR THE ROLL-CALL VOTE ON OCTOBER 11, 1984

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
<b>votes cast</b>	76	78	13	27	8	25
<b>for</b>	5	73	12	27	5	18
<b>against</b>	58	4	0	0	2	2
<b>abstain</b>	13	1	1	0	1	5
<b>cohesiveness</b>	53%	87%	85%	100%	25%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35(2) 209-234)

A right-wing coalition has determined the outcome at the plenary. Despite both the Socialist Group and the Communist Group had a low cohesiveness, majority of their members voted against the resolution. Conservatives maintain their support to Turkish government in power at the plenary. The Christian Democrats also had a high cohesiveness, despite some of the Greek members- belonging to the Christian Democratic Group, have voted against the resolution. Considering two other resolutions on Turkey – accepted at the plenary on the same day, It can be argued that both the Communists and Socialists accuse Turkey for her human rights, and democratization records, and had a stance against Turkey. On the other hand, the right wing political groups had a more pragmatic approach towards Turkey.

Mr.Jannis Sakellariou from Socialist Group has stated that on October 7, 1984 the first death sentence was carried out after the elections of November 6, 1983. He has called the death sentence as state-organized murder. The resolution, accepted in line with his proposal (The Debate of the EP: October 1984: 142-52)

The European Parliament deeply dismayed at the execution of İlyas Hağ, the first death sentence to be carried out since the elections in November 1983(...) whereas the Turkish Military courts are passing death sentences on opponents of the régime in a 'conveyor belt' procedure(...) Calls on the Turkish Authorities to suspend carrying out of any further death sentences with immediate effect. (Resolution: October 1984)

In the following days, former Ambassador Mahmut Dikerdem' s arrest because of his membership to Peace Association was brought to the plenary. Vassilis Ephremidis from Communists and Allies Group has stated, "Our own motion for a resolution refers specifically to the case of Mahmut Dikerdem. This man is well known in the countries of the Community because for 30 years he served democratically elected Turkish government as a diplomat. He has been arrested, is being held in medieval conditions, he has been charged because he has supported the democratic rights of the Turkish People (..) He is suffering from cancer, and is expected to die from this horrible affliction at any time (...) enable him to live his remaining life in peace and tranquility." (The Debate of the EP: October 1984: 142-52)

The European Parliament, whereas the Turkish diplomat Mahmut Dikerdem, President of the Turkish Peace Committee (...) is still being held in Turkish prisons despite international protests (...) calls on Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation to make representations to the Turkish Government for the immediate release of Mr. Mahmut Dikerdem. (Resolution: October 11, 1984)

On February 13, 1985, some fifty members of the European Parliament, mainly from right wing political parties, convened in Strasbourg under the presidency of West German Christian Democrat Ludwig Lemmer and called them "Friends of Turkey"; however, such initiatives proved to be fruitless.

On March 20, 1985 Pieter Dankert, the former President of the EP from Socialist Group - paid a ten-day visit to Turkey - to Ankara, Diyarbakir, and Istanbul. The resolution dated April 18, 1985 was called as "Resolution on the ruthless violation of human rights, and the bloody reign in Turkey was accepted by the EP. Turkey was accused launching *a systemic campaign*

*of genocide* against Kurdish minority, and it was stated that Turkish authorities have requested death sentences for two detainees under the age of sixteen.

#### **7.8.4. Balfe Report**

Richard Balfe from the Socialist Group prepared a report on Turkey, on behalf of Political Affairs Committee after his visit to Turkey. Balfe, during his stay in Turkey met with the leaders and representatives of political parties, diplomats, and the Chairman of the Prisoners' Committee. At the plenary, Balfe made a speech about his report. He argued that political conditions have improved since 1983; however, widespread and systematic torture, and ill treatment of political prisoners, and use of death penalty are still common in Turkey. Balfe made references to the findings of Amnesty International in Turkey. Balfe has stated "The exclusion of SODEP and DYP from the political arena cannot leave us in any doubt that full parliamentary democracy does not exist, and will not exist until those two parties have been able to contest an election, and take their seats in the Parliament" (The debates of the EP: October 1985). Dankert from Socialist Group has put forward that

Turkey is not a democracy by Western European standards. There is an Association Agreement between Turkey and the EEC(...) Association has to be seen as in a double context. In the first place in the context of the European Human Rights Convention, whose values we all claim to share. In the second place, Turkey is striving towards closer association with the EEC. I think we should judge the Turkish situation by our western standards. I think at this moment it is too early for this Parliament to resume formal relations with the Turkish Parliament in the joint committee. We should try to keep the pressure on. The past two years have shown that pressure works.

Gerd Lemmer from EPP mentioned his visit to Turkey together with Spicer from Conservative Group, and Pintat from Liberal Group. He argued that there was probably no alternative to a military takeover in Turkey in 1980.

The EP has put higher standards to assess Turkey. "We deplore that not all parties were allowed to put up candidates. But this guarantee is required practically only by Western Europe or the USA. We are less fussy about other countries in which we maintain delegations". The British Conservative Derek Prag has also asked for the resumption of dialogue with Turkey. Francis Wurtz from the Communists and Allies Group has point out the Kurdish Question, by accusing Turkey for maintaining a conscious policy of genocide.

Francis Wurtz' s speech can be regarded as a turning point on the EP' s assessment of Kurdish Question. The problems related to the rights of Kurdish People living in Turkey have been assessed as a part of human rights questions. Francis Wurtz, despite his radical stance, put the rights of Kurds as a separate subject. By the end of the debate, Balfe Report was accepted by the Assembly, and Turkey was reminded that human rights records should be improved.

The European Parliament (...) Recalling no fewer than 11 resolutions expressing concern about the human rights situation in Turkey have been passed by the Parliament since the coup d'état in September 1980 (...) welcoming the rapporteur' s findings that some progress have been made towards the restoration of human rights in Turkey (...) deploring in this connection, the continuance and the protracted procedures of the mass trials of various bodies such as the Turkish Peace Association, and the trade union confederation of DİSK, and its affiliated unions, and of various groups of academics, and intellectuals(...) recognizing nevertheless that political democracy cannot yet be considered to exist in Turkey, while major political parties, particularly the Social Democratic Party on the left, and the True Path Party on the right remain unrepresented in the country's parliament, while leading political figures such as Mr. Demirel, and Mr. Ecevit remain excluded from active political life(...) noting that martial law still remains in force (...) calls on the Turkish Government to move rapidly towards a restoration of human rights observance in Turkey(...) While fully recognizing the difficult political, and economic circumstances faced by Turkey is of the opinion that the human rights situation does not justify a reversal of the previous decision referred to in recital B of their resolution and the appointment of the European Parliament

delegation to the EEC-Turkey Joint Committee should remain in abeyance (Resolution October 23, 1985)

TABLE 6: VOTES CAST BY MEPS FOR THE ROLL-CALL VOTE ON OCTOBER 23, 1985

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
votes cast	98	81	20	37	28	11
for	98	15	1	4	28	10
against	0	60	18	31	0	5
abstain	0	6	1	2	0	0
cohesiveness	100%	48%	80%	68%	100%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35(2) 209-234)

Balfe Report was accepted at the plenary by a left wing coalition, and also some right wing politicians voted for the resolution. Cohesiveness within the Communists and Allies Group, and Socialist Group has led the approval of the report. The weak cohesiveness of the Christian Democratic Group has also contributed to the outcome Greek and some Italian Christian Democratic parliamentarians' support for the report. Even the most cohesive group of the EP, the Conservative Group was divided over the issue, and six of her members have voted contrary to the majority of the group. So it could be argued that dissatisfaction of the left wing groups over Turkey's record on human rights, and her concerns over Turkish democracy was shared by some right wing politicians as well.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> 20 Greek MEPs voted for the resolution. Nine of them were from right wing political groups, but preferred to vote in line with Socialists, and Communists.

### **7.8.5. Turkey' s Attempt for Full Membership to the European Community**

Turkey established formal relations with the EEC by Ankara Agreement signed in 1963. Turkey's full membership to the EC was on the agenda, even just after the coup d'état in Turkey. National Security Council was convened on March 25, 1981, and the followings were invited to the meeting: Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Finance, Permanent Representative to Brussels, Prime Minister, Undersecretary of Prime Minister's Office, coordinator of the State Planning Organization. During the meeting, Turkey's full membership to the EC was discussed. With the exception of State Planning Organization, all agreed. Turgut Özal did not argue against the membership, as expected. General Evren has stated that *we lost 18 years (after Ankara Agreement) an organization should be set up to manage membership process*. It was agreed to apply for full membership, following the transition to democratic order. The decision of the National Security Council was not echoed at the EC. Following the general elections, the new Prime Minister Özal has mainly revised his anti-integrationist views. He sent a message to the meeting of Economic Development Foundation "İKV", whereby he stated that the aim of Turkey was full membership. "We are determined to apply for full membership, and application will be made at the appropriate time, but we are not ready yet" (Tekeli, İlkin, 2000: 72)

Association Council meeting was set to meet on September 16, 1986- after a six year interval. Prime Minister Özal has set the target as full membership, and he has stated that Customs Union without full membership would bring nothing, but current account deficit. (Birand, 2005: 323) Özal has appointed Ali Bozer – dissolved Nationalist Democracy Party "MDP" member, as Deputy Prime Minister in October 1986, and asked his advisor Adnan Kahveci to study formalities of application. Despite Ankara's



attempts, the full membership application of Turkey was not welcomed in Europe.

The EP has discussed Turkey's membership on December 11, 1986. The Socialist Group's motion was accepted on the same day.

The European Parliament (...) noting the progress which has taken place since the then towards the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Turkey (...) noting however that though the Turkish Grand National Assembly is now more widely representative of the political spectrum (...) concerned at the continued occupation in Turkey of a full 36% of the national territory of the Republic of Cyprus, a country associated to the European Communities (...) Expects Turkey to pursue a good neighbor policy towards Greece and actively contribute to an actively liable solution of the Cyprus conflict in the framework of the UN(...) Feels that the European Community is not yet justified in fully normalizing its relations with Turkey, and that holding a meeting of the Association Council was liable to give false impression of a complete EC endorsement of the political and human rights situation in Turkey (...) Accepts nevertheless that a dialogue is needed between the EEC and Turkey to settle certain contentious issues within the framework of the Association Agreement (...) Understands that in a situation of massive unemployment within the EEC and at a time when Greek workers do not yet have full free movement within the Community, and Portuguese and Spanish workers will not until 1993, it was impossible for the Council of Ministers to make a more generous offer on the question of free movement of Turkish workers within the EEC. Stress, however, that the Community and its members should do everything to improve social and legal situation of Turkish workers already in regular work within the Community (...)

Apart from concerns on Turkish economy, and democracy, the EC was not ready to absorb Turkey, as memberships of Spain, and Portugal were not finalized yet. The EP has sent Richard Balfe to Turkey. He has asked to postpone application after the coming elections, but it was not accepted. Turkey made official application on April 14, 1987.

On September 6, 1987 Political ban on leading political figures, including Demirel, Ecevit, Erbakan, and Türkeş was lifted after a referendum by a

slim margin and early general elections was scheduled for November 29, 1987. These moves enable Ali Bozer to pay a visit to the EP, after seven-year isolation of Turkey.

#### **7.8.6. Armenian Question**

The question was referred to Political Affairs Committee by the Assembly on October 23, 1984 upon the motion for resolution by Saby and later by Kolokotronis. The draft report was accepted on February 25, 1987, and brought before the Assembly on June 18, 1987.

The French Socialist Henri Saby has argued that Turkey could only join the Community when she has achieved democracy, ethnic and cultural diversity. Gerd Lemmer from Christian Democratic Party of Germany has stated that historical truth could not be determined by Parliamentary majority. His view could be regarded as identical to Turkish stance. (Debates of EP, 2-353, p.246-63)

The investigation, revelation, and assessment of events long ago is a job for historians, who should research it, and explain it without political emotion, and political bias.

Like EPP, the Conservatives took similar line, and argued, "It was not the task of the EP to assign responsibility for tragic events that took place many year ago, long before the signature of the Treaty of Rome." On the other hand the Communist Group had a tougher stance vis-à-vis Turkish arguments. French Communist René Piquet argued, "*As regards to Turkey, we are not seeking to foster* some kind of anti-Turkish attitude. We just want the present Turkish Government to recognize the past" (Debates of EP, 2-353, p.246-63).

Coste Floret of Gaullists argued "The German government of 1952, which certainly was not responsible for the holocaust against the Jewish people,

did this when it acknowledged its past and signed a treaty of moral reparation with state of Israel". By the end of the discussion, the following resolution was accepted.

The European Parliament, having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Saby and others on behalf of the Socialist Group on a political solution to the Armenian Question. Having regard to the motion for a resolution tabled by Mr. Kolokotronis on the Armenian Question and the declaration of April 24, as Armenian Genocide Day (..) whereas the Armenian side regards these events as planned genocide within the meaning of 1948 UN Charter. Whereas the Turkish State rejects the charge of genocide as unfounded (...) whereas the recognition of Armenian genocide by Turkey must therefore be viewed as a profoundly human act of moral rehabilitation towards the Armenians, which can only bring honor to the Turkish Government (...) profoundly regretting and condemning the mindless terrorism by groups of Armenians who were responsible between 1973 and 1986 for several attacks causing death or injury to innocent victims and deplored by an overwhelming majority of the Armenian People (...) Believes that the tragic events in 1915-17 involving the Armenians living in the territory of the Ottoman Empire constitute a genocide within the meaning of the convention on the prevention, and the punishment of the crime of the genocide adopted by the UN General Assembly December 9, 1948. (Resolution June 18, 1987)

#### **7.8.7. The United Turkish Communist Party and the EP**

Before the general elections, on November 19, 1987 the leaders of newly founded *United Communist Party of Turkey*, TBKP have returned to Turkey after long exile periods. Seven members of the European Parliament have accompanied them during their trip. Both of the leaders have been detained, when they have arrived to Turkey. Their arrest was debated at the EP, and on November 19, 1987 the EP accepted below stated resolution;

The European Parliament express its concern at the fact that Mr. Nihat Sargin and Mr. Haydar Kutlu were arrested on arrival in Ankara, abruptly separated from the parliamentarians accompanying them and placed in solitary confinement in the city's central commissariat. Demand immediate release of these people

and call for guarantees that in the future they will enjoy the freedom of political activity in Turkey with a view to contributing to the establishment of democracy in that country. (Resolution: November 19, 1987)

TABLE 7 VOTES CAST BY MEPS FOR THE ROLL-CALL VOTE ON NOVEMBER 19, 1987

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Communists	OTHER
<b>votes cast</b>	70	36	3	43	28	23
<b>for</b>	70	3	0	0	28	22
<b>against</b>	0	31	2	43	0	0
<b>abstain</b>	0	2	1	0	0	1
<b>cohesiveness</b>	100%	72%	33%	100%	100%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35(2) 209-234)

203 parliamentarians have voted. The resolution was accepted by a coalition of Left Wing political groups – Socialists, Communists, and Radicals. The Greek members of the EP have supported the resolution regardless of their ideological affiliation- e.g. the only three “yes” votes within the Christian Democrats comes from the Greek members of the mentioned group.

A similar resolution was accepted by the EP on May 19, 1988 following the joint initiative by the Socialist and Communist Groups as a reaction to suppression of May Day by police forces, and ongoing arrests of Kutlu, and Sargin. A third resolution was accepted on July 7, 1988 on the ongoing arrest of Kutlu and Sargin.

The European Parliament, (...) expresses its concern at the fact that Mr. Nihat Sargin and Mr. Haydar Kutlu were arrested on arrival in Ankara, abruptly separated from parliamentarians accompanying them and placed in solitary confinement in the city’s central commissariat. Demands the immediate release of these people and calls for guarantees that in the future they will enjoy freedom of political activity in Turkey with a view of contributing to the establishment of democracy in that country.

## **7.9. Conclusion**

The political groups of the EP had a tolerant stance towards Turkey after the coup d'état in September 12, 1980. The EP has discussed the military régime in Turkey only six days after the coup. Despite the objections of the Communists, the EP confirmed her tolerant stance towards Turkey by the votes of Socialists, Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Conservatives. The voting likeliness of the groups from a wide spectrum denotes that the EP could keep her tolerant stance towards Turkey, only if it could restore democracy in the country as early as possible, and respect fundamental human rights in the transition period. The tolerant stance of the EP to Turkey could be attributed to the ongoing Cold War, and Turkish armed forces' previous examples of transferring the political power to the civilian authorities following a short transition period.

The tolerant stance towards Turkey did not last long. The breach of fundamental rights, and widespread allegations of torture led to the resolution dated April 10, 1981. The significant development was the cooperation between the Socialists, and the Communists. The shift of the Socialists from a coalition with the right wing parties to a coalition with left wing parties denotes the disappointment of the Socialists with the Military Junta in Turkey. On January 22, 1982 the EP did not renew the mandate of the MEPs, who are the members of EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. Again both the Communists, and the Socialists have voted in the same direction, and their argument was accepted. Following the veto on the two leading political parties by military junta before the general elections set to be held on November 1983, the Christian Democrats, the Liberals, the Socialists, and the Communists voted in an alliance, and accused Military Junta.

After the general election in November 6, 1983, the EP has discussed the resumption of EEC-Turkey Parliamentary Assembly. The possibility of

resumption was endorsed by a right wing alliance, and by the abstention of some of the Socialist MEPs. The Balfe report, which was highly critical on Turkey was approved by the Communists, and the Socialists. Both of the groups had a cohesiveness of 100%.

The right wing political parties were supportive to the policies of the military junta, within their limits. The main argument of the right wing parties was that the Turkish Armed Forces would restore democratic order in Turkey in the short-run. Upon the veto on right wing True Path Party, "*DYP*", and left wing Social Democratic Party "*SODEP*", both Christian Democrats, and Liberals were quick to accuse military junta in Turkey.

The Conservative Group, which was composed of mainly British Conservative Party had an unconditional support to the Military Junta in power. The Conservative Group, known with their group discipline has maintained their support with high cohesiveness. The support could be attributed to Thatcher government's interest to Turkey.

The ally of the Socialists, the Communist Group was an amorphous body, where Euro-Communists of Italy, and Orthodox Communists of France were sitting together. For French Communists, Turkey has provided an ideological panacea that could be used as a counter argument against the condemnations because of the coup d'état in People's Republic of Poland organized by General Jaruzelski. The Italian Communists, who had already alienated themselves from the Soviet type socialism, did not miss the change to accuse both Poland, and Turkey. It should be noted that following the Greek accession to the EC, the Greek MEPs have acted together in any issue concerning Turkey regardless of their ideological affiliation. So especially the Greek MEPs from Christian Democratic Group has decreased their group's cohesiveness by acting in line with the Communist, and Socialist MEPs.

## CHAPTER 8

### THE END OF THE COLD WAR: ETHICS OVERRULES REALPOLITIK

#### 8.1. Introduction

Late 1980s has witnessed an important transformation in modern history. Following the Glasnost, and Perestroika policies of Gorbachev, the “relatively” young and reformist Secretary-General of the Communist Party, a rapprochement period between super powers ended with the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989, unification of Germany in 1990, and dissolution of Soviet Union, and Warsaw Pact in 1991. Despite the devastating economic cost of German unification, the EC has deepened the integration among her members by the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The transformation of the East European states, and their integration to Western European political, and security architecture have assumed priority in the eyes of EC members. Turkey found herself in an identity crisis.

(...) Özal realized that Turkey had lost most of its strategic significance as a bastion against Soviet Union, which had been its most important bargaining chip against in seeking membership of the EC, and generally securing Western support. He saw Turkish participation in the coalition as a way to emphasize Turkey's status as a Western stronghold in the Middle East, and even to force Turkish entry into the EC...(Zürcher, 1998: 333)

#### 8.2. ANAP's Second Term

The second general elections, after the coup d'état in 1980 was held in November 29, 1987. The EP has sent ten observers to Turkey to monitor electoral process. ANAP has secured a comfortable majority- mainly because of the electoral system, at the Turkish Grand National Assembly, despite her shrinking votes.

Just after the general elections in December 19, 1987 the EP has rejected Turkey' s Harmonization Agreement with two of her new member states, Portugal, and Spain. The agreements were approved a month later, on January 20, 1988. Despite its technical nature, its rejection was gesture of dissatisfaction with Turkey as Socialist Richard Balfe has put it.




FIGURE 5 : POLITICAL PARTIES AND VOTES AFTER 1987 GENERAL ELECTIONS (TEKELI, İLKIN, 2000: 2003)

### 8.3. The Cyprus Question and the European Parliament

The Greek membership to the EC has strengthened Greece's bargaining position vis-à-vis Turkey on Turco-Greek dispute. According to some Turkish scholars, Aegean, and Cyprus questions were seen within the realm of Greek MEPs for years in the EP (İlkin & Tekeli, Birand) There have been eleven resolutions on Cyprus, and Aegean related questions between 1985 and 1996, where the Greek MEPs have played leading roles. The inferior role of the EC in Cyprus question was always a cause of concern for the EP.



On May 20, 1988 French MEP Coste-Florent' s Cyprus report was accepted: Floret was from Gaullist Group. He argued that the EC had to involve the question, as UK and Greece are full members, and Republic of Cyprus and Turkey have already signed the Association Agreement with the EC. Floret stated that he tried to make a synthesis of Turkish and Greek arguments in order to reach a balanced and acceptable proposal (The Debates of the EP: May 19, 1988 No: 2-365)

On a number of important points I have adopted the Turkish point of view. Firstly as regards the division of responsibilities, and secondly as regards the means needed to reach an agreement. Because it seemed to me unrealistic, I rejected the Greek proposal for an international conference in favor of the Turkish idea that there should be a resumption of negotiations between the two communities under the auspices of the UN. Finally regarding the structure of the federal state, I agree that both communities should have a veto in matters of vital interests. On the other points, I took the Greek point of view. Firstly, regarding the unlawful nature, which seems to me obvious, of the unilateral proclamation of the Republic of the Northern Cyprus. Secondly, regarding the need to bipartite properly structured federal state. And lastly the departure of Turkish troops. (The Debates of the EP: May 19, 1988 No: 2-365)

The leading Socialist, and Christian Democratic Groups declared their support for the resolution. Greek MEPs from different political groups – Tzounis from Christian Democrats, Ephremidis from the Communists and Allies Group, Plaskovitis from Socialist Group, have declared their similar opinion on Cyprus question, and welcomed the resolution. Independent MEP Taylor from UK has pointed out foreign residents problem in Cyprus, and stated that Southern government has expelled seventy-three foreign residents from the island. At the end of the debate, “resolution on the situation in Cyprus” was accepted. The United Nations initiative was welcomed, and the evacuation of foreign troops on the island. It was asked that movement, establishment, and property rights of the Cypriots should be assured (The Debates of the EP: May 19, 1988 No: 2-365)

The European Parliament, (...) asks the Foreign Ministers meeting in European Political Cooperation to consider the ways and means whereby a state of law might be re-established in Cyprus, and to devote particular attention to the possibility of a resumption of negotiations between the communities under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General, with the aim of conferring on the Republic of Cyprus the status of a federation, the constituent part of which would be in proportion to the composition of the population, which would guarantee the rights of the two communities, free the island from the precedence of all foreign troops and guarantee freedom of movement, freedom of establishment, and the property rights of members of both communities, and ensure the security of both Greek and Turkish communities, and to keep EP informed. (...) Expects the Foreign Ministers meeting in the European Political Cooperation simultaneously to put pressure on the Turkish Government, which is linked to the EEC by an association agreement and is an applicant for membership to draw up a precise timetable for the withdrawal of its troops (...) and giving refugees from Famagusta the opportunity to return and to settle freely in their homes (...) (Resolution on the situation in Cyprus May 20, 1988)

#### **8.4. Gerd Walter's Report and Resumption of the EC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee**

The European Parliament has discussed Gerd Walter's report on September 15, 1988. Despite its critical tone, the report has endorsed the convention of the EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. The endorsement is attributed to two factors: the commissioner Claude Cheysson's positive assessment on Turkey, and opposition leader Erdal İnönü's lobbying activities on behalf of the Socialist International, and Socialist Group.

Following the military coup in September 12, 1980, the EP has broke off its official relations with Turkish Grand National. The European Parliament did not credit the Turkish Grand National Assembly formed after the 1983 elections, which has been formed under the tutelage of the Military Junta. By British Socialist Gerd Walter's report, the EP discussed "whether recent domestic developments in Turkey justify the reinstatement of Joint

Parliamentary Committee” as Mr. Walter put it. The Socialist Commissioner Edith Cheysson- former Foreign Minister of France supported Mr. Walter’ s arguments. Fellermaier from the Socialist Group exemplified the undemocratic nature of administrative apparatus in Turkey like torture, outlawed trade unions, prisoners of conscious; however he put forward that “we view this body as a means of supporting the free and democratic forces in Turkey, which fight for respect for human rights, freedom of the trade unions, freedom of press, penal reform, and for a complete return to democracy.” So The Socialist Group has openly supported the resolution. A Greek MEP, Tzounis from PPE has pointed out the undemocratic measures that have been stipulated in Mr. Walter’s report, stated that “the reactivation of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on the basis that doing so will make it easier to influence the situation for the better, and to speed up the process of real democratization in Turkey.” (Debate of the EP: September 15, 1988)

The European Parliament, having regard to the role in European history played by Turkey over the last 600 years, having regard to the political, strategic, economic, and treaty ties which exists between the Turkish Republic and the European Community, having regard to the problems in the Aegean and partial occupation of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkish troops, which are jeopardizing the political stability of this region, and are detrimental to political relations between EEC and Turkey (...) Takes the view that in the wake of the Turkish elections in November 1987, the Association bodies are appropriate framework for promoting the dialogue between the EEC, and Turkey on continuing these developments, wishes therefore that the Association be resumed and the EEC/Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee can be reconvened (Resolution: September 15, 1988)

The first meeting of the EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary meeting was held on January 17-19, 1989 in Strasbourg. The members from the opposition parties of the Turkish delegation have openly criticized ruling ANAP’ s policies. As different voices within a Turkish delegation have been a rare exception, there has been sympathy towards the Turkish Delegation. Especially the poor human rights record of Turkey was criticized both by EP

members, and by the opposition members within the Turkish delegation. İbrahim Aksoy, member of Social Democratic People's Party "*SHP*", has asked for cultural autonomy for Kurdish people. He was forced to leave his party, after his return to Turkey.

### 8.5. The European Parliament Elections: 1989

During June 1989, the third general election of the EP has been held. The Socialist Group was the main beneficiary of the elections. The rise of Green politics was reflected to the European Parliament. The Greens, who have been part of some groups, succeeded to form their own group. The amalgamated Communist Group split into two subgroups. Leyla Onur, a German citizen with Turkish origin, has succeeded to become MEP from German Social Democratic Party: SPD. The political elites, and media did not welcome the election results, as the leading Socialists have been labeled as anti-Turkish especially on human rights issue




FIGURE 6: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEATS AT THE EP AFTER THE 1989 ELECTIONS (RAUNIO, 2002:P.63)

## **8. 6. Minority Questions and the European Parliament: Turks in Bulgaria, Kurds in Iraq, Kurds in Turkey**

As the successor of the Ottoman Empire, the minority issue has always been a cause of concern for the young Turkish Republic. The ruling elite of the Turkish Republic has tried to delimit the scope of the minority to the Sevres Agreement of 1923. On the other hand, under the shadow of the ethnic cleavages in former-Yugoslavia, the EU, and especially the EP has concerned the redefinition of the minority concept, and its rights, and its integration to the society. So the different perceptions on the definition of minority question became one of the problematic dimensions of Turkish Foreign Policy (Oran, 2005: 190-6) There are three different groups of resolutions, which are directly related to Turkey: resolution on Turks living in Bulgaria, resolution on Kurds living in Iraq, and resolution(s) on Kurds living in Turkey.

### **8.6.1. Turks in Bulgaria**

When the Communist Bulgarian government stepped up its policies of forced assimilation of Turkish-Muslim minority, a crisis with Bulgaria suddenly developed. And 344,000 Bulgarian Turks fled across the border into Turkey in September 1989. This caused a tremendous upsurge in nationalist fervor in Turkey, but the country was hardly in a position to accommodate so many refugees (Zürcher, 1988: 333)

The EP has passed a resolution called “Resolution on the situation of Bulgarians of Turkish Origin” on September 14, 1989, whereby the rights of minority groups were pointed out, and it was asked the Bulgarian authorities to halt the unsatisfactory treatment to the Bulgarians of Turkish origin. (Resolution: September 14, 1989)

### 8.6.2. Kurds in Iraq

Its (Turkey's) real problems started when the war was virtually over. During the war, US President Bush had encouraged the Kurdish leaders in Iraq to revolt against Saddam Hussein's regime in Baghdad. When the allied forces had crushed the Iraqi army in the south, the Kurds did as they were asked and Barzani and Talabani together launched an insurrection in the north. At the insistence of its Middle Eastern allies (including Turkey), however, who did not want to see Iraq dismembered, and a Kurdish state established, the Americans halted their offensive, and leaving Saddam Hussein's regime in place. This enabled him to suppress the Kurdish rebellion with his remaining troops. The result was that huge numbers of Kurds fled across the border into Iran, and tried to flee across the northern border into Turkey. This Turkey did not want. It already had a serious problem with its own Kurdish community (...) Instead of opening the border, Turkey's president launched a plan to establish a security zone in Northern Iraq, where the Kurds would be protected and Iraqi air force would not be allowed to fly (Zürcher, 1998: 334-5 and Oran, 1996: 158-61)

The first wave of Iraqi offense to the Kurdish population by using chemical weapons was in 1988. The EP, in its "Resolution on the Massacre of the Kurds" welcomed Turkish Government's attempt to help the refugees, and calls the community to provide necessary aid to Turkey. The second wave of the Kurdish insurrection, and following operations of the Iraqi army was discussed at the EP and a resolution called "Resolution on the situation of the Kurds" was passed on March 14, 1991, whereby Turkey is accused for persecutions against the Kurdish population. In the following month a third resolution was passed: "Resolution on the Situation of the Kurds", whereby Turkey is asked to open its borders. In the same resolution, convention of an international conference to discuss Kurdish question, and Kurdish autonomy is asked on April 18, 1991. Such moves were incompatible with Turkish interest.

### **8.6.3. Kurds in Turkey**

The Kurdish Question can be regarded as one of the biggest problem of the Turkish Republic after 1980. The Kurdish problem was not on the forefront between 1980-7; however, following the transition from a military rule to democracy, the Kurdish Question would be discussed in depth in the EP. The strengthening of Left-Wing political groups, and the presence of Kurdish Diaspora in Europe has contributed to the debate. On January 21, 1988 the EP passed a resolution on human rights in Turkey, whereby the ongoing detention of Mehdi Zana, the former Mayor of Diyarbakir was accused. By "the Resolution on the Resumption of the EEC-Turkey Association" dated September 15, 1988 the EP has called Kurds living in Turkey as minority, and asked the Turkish Government to provide the basic human rights to the Kurds. In January 1989, at the resolution on human rights in the world: community policy on human rights for the year 1987-8, the Kurdish problem in Turkey was specified as intensified inter-communal conflict. On May 25, 1989 the imprisonment of a 17-year girl for separatist propaganda was condemned by the EP. (Resolution: May 25, 1989)

### **8.7. The Opinion of the Commission**

The European Commission has declared its opinion on December 20, 1989 concerning Turkish application for full membership on April 14, 1987. The Commission has stated that "(...)the Commission is of the opinion that it would be inappropriate for the Community. Furthermore, the political and economic situation in Turkey leads the Commission to believe that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away" It was also stated that the Community has fundamental interests to intensify its relations with Turkey. The Community proposed the completion of the Customs Union as stated in the opinion

The completion in 1995 of the customs union, in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, would require the Community to review the arrangements for trade in Turkish textiles and agricultural products. It will have to involve the adoption by Turkey of the common policies essential for the proper operation of the customs union. Progressive completion of the Customs union will give the Community the opportunity to associate Turkey more closely with the operation of the single market, while taking into account the constraints imposed by the economic disparities between Turkey and the Community. This requires a strengthening of the machinery for agreeing concerted economic and social policies between the Turkish Government and the Community institutions. (Commission opinion: December 20,1989)

According to Mehmet Ali Birand, former Prime Minister of France, Raymond Barre during his visit to Turkey in 1988, convinced his counterpart Turgut Özal to accede to Customs Union first. According to Barre, Greek veto would not be applicable, as Customs Union was foreseen in Ankara Agreement, and the Community could not denounce full membership right to Turkey- if she had already acceded to Customs Union (Birand, 2005:306) In February 1990 the Council adopted the general content of the Commission's opinion and asked it to make detailed proposals for strengthening the ties between Turkey and EU. Already in June 1990 the so-called 'Matutes package' was adopted by the Commission. This set of proposals included the completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties. However, the Council did not adopt the package.

## **8.8. Conclusion**

The second general election after the 1980 coup was held in 1987. The political ban on the former political leaders was lifted by a referendum held in 1986. Following the referendum, the leading Motherland Party "ANAP" government has called for early elections. The EP has observed the election process, and declared that the general election met the democratic requirements. So that hopes were raised in Turkey for normalization of the



relations, despite Turkey' s application for full membership was not approved. During the 1987-91 period, the EC has concentrated her attention on closer integration, and rapid changes in Warsaw Pact members. In the process the EP has endorsed the resumption of EEC-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee by the support of Socialist, Liberal, Christian Democrat, and Conservative Groups. The Greek MEPs have voted against the resumption of the Joint Parliamentary Committee. The formation of a grand coalition by the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats could be regarded as a sign of increasing trust to developing democracy in Turkey. In the same period various left wing political groups brought the minority question to the agenda of the EP. Turkey did not welcome these attempts. The minority question would effect the relations in the coming years.

## CHAPTER 9

### TOWARDS CUSTOMS UNION UNDER DYP-SHP COALITION

#### 9.1. Introduction

The election was held on October 20, 1991. None of the political parties have secured enough seats to form a majority government. The center-right DYP and center-left SHP have decided to form a coalition government. As both of them have declared their reform agenda before the elections, hopes were raising for a reform program.




FIGURE 7 : THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEATS AT THE TGNA AFTER THE 1991 ELECTION (TEKELI, İLKIN, 2000: 225)

It was declared at the coalition program that accession to the EC is the primary goal of the coalition government. The program has also included important reforms on recognition of different identities, respect to human rights, and an ambitious program of democratization.

It can be compulsory to declare state of emergency even under a democratic régime. The duration of such preventive measures should be considered carefully for the sake of its effectiveness. The new government will handle these problems, after having studied official documents. New and effective political, economic, legal, social measures will be taken. The existing preventive systems will be assessed. Our citizens can be from different belief systems, language, or origin. This cannot be regarded as a weakness to the unitary structure of the republic. (DYP-SHP Coalition Programme in Çayhan 353: 1997)

## **9.2. Reform Program of the DYP-SHP Government**

### **9.2.1. Turkish Military Presence in Northern Iraq and the European Parliament**

The Reform Program increased the sympathy towards Turkey; however, the honeymoon between Turkey and the EP did not last long. The EP condemned the presence of the Turkish Armed Force in the Northern Iraq on November 24, 1991.

A few months later, during the celebration of Kurdish New Year on March 21, 1992 thirty-one persons have been killed in Turkey. These incidences have echoed in the EP. There were nine motions for resolutions raised by different political groups. A joint resolution of Socialist, Liberal, and Christian Democratic Group was accepted despite the opposition of the Greens, and Communists.

The EP, (...) deploring the violence which caused many deaths in south east Turkey following Kurdish new year celebrations (...) whereas a total curfew has been imposed in several towns, unhampered press reporting is no longer possible, and the region is, effectively in a state of war ( ...) recalling the declarations on human rights, and the rights of minorities by the Council of Europe, and the CSCE, of which Turkey is a member (...) express its sympathy with the families of the victims of this outbreak of violence, condemns (...) the Turkish armed forces in south-east Turkey, which violated basic human rights of innocent citizens (...) condemns the terrorist acts of the PKK and Dev Sol which can only damage the efforts of

the new Turkish Government to improve respect for human rights throughout Turkey. Calls on Turkey strictly to respect human rights in combating terrorism and not use military force on its own territory (...) (Resolution: April 9, 1992)

The EP was highly criticized by Turkish political establishment. According to İlkin & Tekeli The new coalition government's Pro-Europeanism in foreign politics as against Özal's Pro-Americanism was irrevocably hurt (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000:283) Italian liberal MEP Mr. Gawronski has prepared a report titled "The Rights of the Kurdish People" The report was written in a moderate mood, and Turkish government was condemned for breaching the rights of the Kurdish people, the moderate Gawronski report was accepted by the Socialists, the Liberals, and the Christian Democrats voted, despite the opposition by the Communists, and the Greens.

The European Parliament; (...) whereas over 25 million Kurds are divided among four states in the region: Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, and also in smaller numbers in some republics of the former USSR (...) disappointed that the new Turkish Government's announcements of democratization, respect for human rights and recognition of the reality of the Kurdish problem have not been put into practice and that rather than the situation improving death squads, special units, and counter-guerilla groups are murdering, and abducting and causing to disappear innocent people ; whereas violence and terror in the region are on the increase (...) condemns the attacks by Turkish armed forces on Kurdish settlements both in Anatolia, and in Iraq and PKK terrorism against both Kurds, and Turks (...) condemns the bombing by the Turkish air force of Kurdish villages in Anatolia, and Iraq on account of the danger to the civilian population (Resolution: September 17, 1992)

### **9.2.2. EC-Turkey Relations in General: The Dury Report**

On November 19, 1992 Raymond Dury' s Resolution on EC-Turkey Relations was accepted at the plenary. The report was quite comprehensive, and mentions the evaluation of Turkey-EC relations, presents new perspectives, and mentions democratization measures.

The EP, (...) notes that the general election of 20 October 1991, which testified to the multiparty nature and political maturity of the Turkish regime, marked the beginning of a new era in the country's political history, under an electoral law which continues to restrict the right of political expression, welcomes the coalition protocol between DYP and SHP and their program on government (...) welcomes the closure of Eskisehir prison, but deplores the continuing use of torture, and detention of political prisoners (...) notes that the new government, intends to respect the cultural identity of the Kurdish people as part of the process of establishing democracy and national unity. Recalls its resolution concerning, in particular the Armenian question. Notes that the statistics show a substantial increase in trade, with however, a considerable deficit on the Turkish side, and recalls that the European Community has made a significant effort to increase the export quotas of Turkish textile to the EC (...) refers to the Council declaration of 24 June 1975: "It is in the Community's interest to maintain and develop close association relations with Turkey and Greece's application for EC membership must not affect EC-Turkey relations or rights based on agreement concluded between the EC and Turkey"(...) calls on the Association Council to debate the political issues of mutual interests to the two parties, such as issues concerning Iraq, security in Mediterranean basis (...) (Resolution: November 19, 1992)

TABLE 8: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE VOTES CAST AFTER THE DEBATE ON NOVEMBER 19, 1992

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Liberals	Conservatives	Left Unity	Greens	Other
<b>votes cast</b>	93	54	11	14	5	16	21
<b>for</b>	78	48	3	14	3	0	5
<b>against</b>	4	0	0	0	0	16	15
<b>abstain</b>	11	6	8	0	2	0	1
<b>cohesiveness</b>	68%	78%	45%	100%	20%	100%	

The report was again accepted by Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals together, despite the opposition of the Greens, and some Communists. As argued, the reform process has increased the sympathy of the Socialists towards Turkey. So it could be argued that reform minded

government in Turkey has shifted the Socialists from a coalition with their ideological sisters to a grand coalition with Liberals, and Christian Democrats.

It should be noted that despite the low cohesiveness of the Communists on Turkey, Greens had 100% cohesiveness against Turkey. Most of the abstained MEPs were the Greek members of the Parliament from the Socialist, and Communist Groups, despite right wing Greek members of the EP voted for the resolution, there was a resistance towards Turkey among the Greek members. Those MEPs took the risk of acting against the majority of their political groups.

### **9.3. Revision in the DYP-SHP Coalition Government: New Generation in Power**

Following the sudden death of President Turgut Özal, Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel was elected as the ninth president of the Turkish Republic. His DYP has elected Tansu Çiller, state minister, as the party leader. In the same days Erdal İnönü, the leader of the SHP, and the deputy prime minister has resigned. The popular mayor of Ankara, Murat Karayalçın in September 1993, replaced İnönü. The deteriorating economics, Kurdish Question, and relationship with the European Union dominated Çiller - Karayalçın Government.

#### **9.3.1. Pro-Kurdish Democracy Party “DEP” and Deteriorating Relations**

The minor partner of the coalition government, Social Democratic People's Party “SHP” had formed an electoral alliance with pro-Kurdish People's Labor Party “HEP” before the general elections, and HEP members had been nominated from SHP lists in the Southeastern Turkey. Twenty-two HEP members were elected to the Grand National Assembly in

1991. The presence of the Pro-Kurdish members at the Turkish Grand National Assembly increased the political tension. Consequently, those Pro-Kurdish members left SHP, and formed a new political party: Democracy Party “DEP” The Democracy Party was disbanded on June 15, 1994 because of her alleged symbiosis with PKK, and eventually some of her members detained after their parliamentary immunity had been waived in March 1994.

The EP has monitored the legal proceedings closely. On March 10, 1994 the EP has accused Turkey for waiving the immunity of the pro-Kurdish DEP members with the following resolution, which was accepted with a comfortable margin, and the leading political groups either from the left or right wing have supported the resolution.

The European Parliament (...) Condemns the attitude of the Turkish government towards democratically elected MPs whose only crime is to have defended the interests of the Kurdish people in Turkey who are the victims of brutal military repression. Points out that politics of repression, and in particular the denial of free speech to elected representatives of people from South –East turkey will only encourage members of the Kurdish minority to support the PKK. Calls on the Turkish government finally to recognize the right of autonomy of the Kurdish people (...) (Resolution: March 10, 1994)

### **9.3.2. The European Parliament Elections: Fourth Term 1994-9**

During June 1994, the general elections for the EP was held . The election has been the fourth election since 1979. The Socialist Group increased her number of seats at the EP. The Conservatives, as a result of their poor electoral result in UK decided to merge with Christian Democrats. So the European People’s Party, the party of European Christian Democrats, changed her name to “*European People’s Party -European Democrats*” (EPP-ED) The successors of the former Communist parties have formed a new political group, which is called as United Left. Italian media mogul

Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Italia members formed their own group named "Forza Europa", as Italian Christian Democrats blocked their membership to the EPP-ED. Forza Italia maintained a pro-Turkish line until they have joined the European People's Party.




FIGURE 8: THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SEATS AT THE EP AFTER THE 1994 ELECTIONS (RAUNIO, 2002:P.63)

### 9.3.3. The Suspension of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee

The newly elected EP has held her first meeting on July 18, 1994. The political ban of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party "DEP" was discussed on September 29, 1994. The resolution on Turkey was accepted unanimously, and the EP decided to freeze the activities of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee. The decision was taken unanimously.

As stated in the previous chapters, the EP froze the activities of the Joint Parliamentary Committee first, after the coup d'état in 1980. The second suspension of the JPC can be regarded as the sign of EP's dissatisfaction with Turkey. As Turkey is proceeding towards the completion of the Customs Union with the EU, the dissatisfaction of the EP with Turkey's



human rights, and democratization records should be considered as a cause of concern because of the increasing power of the EP within the decision making architecture of the EC/EU. (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000: 373)

The European Parliament; recalling its resolution on March 9, 1994, on the arrest of Kurdish members of the Parliament in Turkey (...) denounces the whole trial against the six DEP members of the TGNA and the outlawing of the DEP Party as an attack on pluralistic democracy in this country, and requests the immediate release of these members of the Parliament. (...) Resolves to freeze the EU / Turkey joint parliamentary committee pending the outcome of the trial. (Resolution: September 28, 1994)

TABLE 9: VOTES CAST ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL GROUPS: ROLL-CALL VOTE SEPTEMBER 28, 1994

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Greens	Liberals	Left Unity	OTHER
votes cast	106	77	11	19	19	21
for	105	76	11	19	19	21
against	0	0	0	0	0	0
abstain	1	1	0	0	0	0
cohesiveness	98%	97%	100%	100%	100%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35/2 209-234)

#### 9.4. Turkey's Bid Towards Customs Union: 1991-6

Following the AVIS of the Commission, Turkey downgraded her full membership target to accession to the Customs Union as foreseen in Ankara Agreement of 1963. Demirel-İnönü Government, and then Çiller-Karayalçın Government have provided full support to the project. The main obstacle was veto power of Greece.

On December 15, 1994 despite the attempts of Christian Democrats, and Forza Europa Groups, the EP passed the following resolution (145 MEPs for the resolution, 87 against, 2 abstains). By the resolution the EP

expressed its solidarity with convicted MPs, and called the Council to suspend the negotiations, and pointed out that Customs Union Agreement with Turkey will be subject to assent procedure.

The EP, (...) expresses its solidarity with the convicted MPs (...) resolves to maintain the suspension of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee until Turkey takes note of Parliament's demand, believes, however; that unofficial contacts with Turkish Parliamentarians with democratic views should be continued (...) decides to submit to the Council a call for the immediate suspension of the links on the establishment of a customs union between Turkey and the EU, and therefore the postponement of the meeting scheduled for December 19, 1994 (...) points out that the agreement on customs union with Turkey has to be submitted to the assent procedure. (Resolution: December 15, 1994)

Regarding the necessity of the assent procedure upon the Turkish accession, two competing views arose: The Turkish academic Haluk Günuğur has argued that as stated in Article 22.1 of the Ankara Agreement, there is no need for further approval, as the Council of Association has the power to take decisions, and stages to be taken have already been foreseen. (Balkır, 1995: p.82)

In order to attain the objectives of this Agreement the Council of Association shall have the power to take decisions in the cases provided for therein. Each of the Parties shall take the measures necessary to implement the decisions taken. The Council of Association may also make appropriate recommendations (Ankara Agreement Article 22.1)

On the other hand, it was argued mainly by the EP, and the Commission that EP's assent is necessary, as the working mechanism of the EC has changed since the approval of the Ankara Agreement. The Turkey-EU Association Council convened on March 6, 1995 to conclude Turkey's the transition to the Customs Union took "decision 1/95. In the same days, a compromise has been reached to appease Greece: Greece will not use the veto power against Turkey in exchange for the commencement of the

full membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus six months after the Inter Governmental Conference in 1996.

On February 16, 1995 the EP passed a new resolution on Turkey whereby it was asked to Turkey to amend her constitution to guarantee fundamental rights. A reporting system on Turkey was asked, and both Commission, and the Council was reminded about the assent power of the EP. Following the merger of two social democratic party: ruling Social Democratic People's Party "SHP" and reopened Republican People's Party "CHP" under the roof of CHP in 1995, Mr. Erdal İnönü was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs on March 27, 1995. He was a well respected figure among the members of the Socialist Group of the EP. The political reforms requested by the EU was not carried out as nationalist faction of True Path Party – DYP, was unwilling to carry out a reform program, Motherland Party "ANAP", was hesitant to support a reform package that lead to Customs Union- since it would be regarded as Prime Minister Çiller's success, and the only Pro-Reform party Republican People's Party "CHP" was powerless to carry out reform program alone. On June 1995 the chairwomen of three left-wing groups: Pauline Green of Socialists, Catherine Lamumier of the Radicals, and Claudia Roth of Greens paid a visit to Turkey. The visit was regarded as a sign of increasing interest towards Turkey on behalf of EP, which has been regarded within the realm of Greek MEPs until that time ( İlkin & Tekeli: 2000, p.487) Despite State Minister Ayvaz Gökdemir' s impolite assessments, the outcome of the visit was quite beneficial for Turkey, as both Socialists, and Radicals have declared their support for Turkey.

Following the three chairwomen's visits, Rapporteur Carnero has paid a visit to Turkey, and criticized the Article 8 of the Penal Code, and the ongoing detention of MPs from Pro-Kurdish Democracy Party "DEP". On October 30, 1995 The Association Council declared that Turkey is technically ready to accede Customs Union, and from then on, the assent

on the EP' s assent is necessary to bring Customs Union in force. In this period two important developments took place: The EP has declared Leyla Zana as Sakharov Prize Winner. The Sakharov Prize had important repercussions in Turkey. Leyla Zana' s prize was attributed to a deal between Left Wing and Liberal groups within the EP. The liberals have supported Leyla Zana, in exchange for abstention of members of the Left Wing groups during the assent procedure (Tekeli & İlkin, 2000:p.480) The second development was aggressive lobbying activities of Turkey for the assent of the EP. Not only Turkey but also Israel, and US have involved the lobbying in favor of Turkey, which had some negative impacts on Turkey. It was also noticeable that not only business interest, but also left wing NGOs, and left wing trade union Confederation of the Revolutionary Trade Unions "DİSK" organized visits to the EP to support the Turkish cause. And finally on December 13, 1995 the EP gives her assent to Turkish accession.

#### **9.4.1. The Resolution dated February 16, 1995**

The session was opened by the President in Office of the Council Lamassoure' s speech. He has stressed the unique characteristics of Turco-European Relations. He has mentioned the history of Turkish-EEC Relations with reference to Ankara Agreement, Additional Protocol, Cyprus Question, and coup d'état in 1980. He has pointed out that today, TGNA is elected democratically, and moderate three political forces have their say on politics, namely coalition partners Justice Party - *he mentions True Path Party*, and Social Democratic People's Party, and main opposition Motherland Party. During the speech Turkey' s key role in Western security architecture, and strategic role was also mentioned. Lamassoure has identified three parallel questions related to Turkey: human rights, Cyprus, and the relations of the Community with Turkey. According to Lamassoure, these questions can be handled if talks with the EU are continued. He has concluded his speech by stating that "We hope that between now, and then

everyone will have understood his own historic responsibilities on these major issues.” (Debates of the EP: February 14, 1995) Commissioner Van der Broek has stressed the political dimension of the Customs Union, rather than economic dimensions, and he argued: “this is not just another economic agreement with just any country. The political dimensions cannot be overstated here. The aim of the agreement is to strengthen the forces of democracy in Turkey after long years of stagnation in our relations.”

Pauline Green, the chairwoman of the Socialist Group has criticized the approach of the Council to the question by stating that there is no commitment made by Turkey on human rights, Cyprus, and Kurdish Questions. According to her, EU has its own rules to conduct her relations with a third party, and Cyprus question should be considered separately. “Turkey will have had time to move forward on Cyprus, and to move forward on the question of Kurdish MPs and democratic rights. Then we shall take a decision in this Parliament as to whether to say yes to the customs union (...)”

Despite the Socialists have not supported the Council's stance; the EPP-ED group has supported the Council's stance. The Liberals had a stance similar to the Socialists. Bertens from the Liberal Group has stated, “how far we go, how much do we have to swallow in the name of real politik? How badly do human rights have to be violated in Turkey before we put our principles on human rights, the constitutional state, and democracy before its geographical importance? “The United Left Group has stated that human rights, and democratization have been underestimated by the Turkish government. The Greek member of the United Left Group has also mentioned that market size, and strategic location is important, but these are no more than mere perceptions of some Europeans.

Despite their pro-Turkish line, members of Forza-Europa also maintained a critical stance towards Turkey, “we say frankly to the Council, and the

Commission that we do not disagree with the line they have taken, but we do ask both of them to define more precisely and in greater detail with the Turkish side, the commitments, time-limits and obligations to be accepted” as Carlo Casini has stated.

The Greens had also critical stance towards Turkey. The chairwoman Roth has stated “We have been waiting since 1991 for DYP and SHP coalition agreement to be put into effect (...) the fact that Turkey has moved even further away from political solution, preferring instead military option, has led to a dramatic reversal in the democratization process”. Roth has also concerned with the power of anti-Europeans in Turkey. She has complained with reductionism maintained by the Council, whereby the customs union issue is equated to the problems between Turkey and Greece. She has stated that “It is all about democratization, respect for human rights, and putting an end to the dirty war in Turkey.” Then she stated the necessary conditions to be fulfilled by Turkey to get the assent of the Greens as follows,

- Release of the Kurdish members of parliament
- Release of Mehdi Zana
- Amnesty for those prisoners of conscious.
- Removal of all obstacles hindering the work of the human rights of organizations
- Lift of the censorship on anti-government media
- Return to ruined villages, and material compensation
- Establishment of a committee by the TGNA for the inquiry of mysterious deaths, and systematic torture
- Alignment of the constitution with International Law

The Radical Group had similar approach to the question as chairwoman Lalumière put it “I would add that I do not deny the economic advantages that the EU itself would gain from the implementation of the agreement. But obviously this desirable agreement can only be signed under several conditions and I share the reservations of my colleagues.” Following the discussions, the following resolution was passed from the EP.

The February 14, 1995 resolution is more tolerant, and constructive towards Turkey, when it is compared with the previous resolution dated December 15, 1995.

The European Parliament (...) having regard to the statements made by the Council, and the Commission on the conclusion of a Customs Union between the European Union, and Turkey (...) whereas the Turkish political parties have agreed to examine the modifications to be made to the constitution, which may affect the very provisions that led to the trial of parliamentarians (...) believes that the state of human rights in Turkey is too grave to allow for the formation of proposed Customs Union at present. Appeals to the Turkish Government, and TGNA to undertake a fundamental reform of its constitution in order to better guarantee the protection of democracy, and human rights in Turkey, as well as to contribute to a solution of Cyprus problem. Calls on the Commission to establish a system of interim reporting on the modifications currently being made to the Turkish constitution (...) (Resolution: February 16, 1995)

#### **9.4.2. The Assent Procedure and Turkey's Accession to the Customs Union: December 13, 1995**

The long awaited plenary of the EP concerning Turkey's accession to the Customs Union was opened by the speeches of the two rapporteurs: the Spanish rapporteur Carnero from the United Left Group mentioned political, economic, historical, and strategic requirements to link Turkey to the EU institutions. he pointed out Turkey's unwillingness to establish a genuine democratic order. He put forward "I shall vote no, that is to say yes to a democratic Turkey." The second rapporteur on Turkey, Konrad Schwaiger from the EPP Group has mentioned Turkey's strategic location as the provider of stability to the region, and Mediterranean basin with her population, and developed economics (The Debate of the EP: December 13, 1995) The Socialist Group, after long discussions among national delegations, decided to support Turkey's accession. The chairwoman of the Socialist Group, Pauline Green stated "no vote could only harm those very people who fight for Turkish democracy". According to Green, most of

the EP members will vote in favor of the ratification despite their unwillingness. Green condemned The Council, and the Commission for abdicating democracy, and human rights in their decision making process. This house has been subjected in recent months to a torrent of lobbying on this vote. The aggressive lobbying activities of the Turkish Government have been a cause of concern on behalf of the MEPs as Pauline Green put it “The Turkish lobby has been sometimes aggressive, and as I know to my cost, sometimes personally abusive”

The Christian Democrats have maintained their pro-Turkish stance during the session. Willfried Martens from the PPE group stated that “our group looks favorably on Turkey’ s desire for close cooperation with the EU provided she is willing to seek ways and means of becoming a part of the EU’ s community of values too.” He has mentioned Turkey’s strategic location, and emphasized the importance of anchoring Turkey to the EU. He has argued that with further dialogue, Turkey’ s democratization could be monitored.

The Liberal group took a pro-Turkish stance during the session. The Dutch Liberal de Vries asked for cooperation in the fields of education, and justice – apart from customs union. It should be noted that full membership is not mentioned during the speech. De Vries mentioned the trade volume with Turkey, and stated that democratization in Turkey should be supported wholeheartedly. Martin Schulz from Socialist Group had economic justifications not to support Turkish accession to the Customs Union. He stated that there is a danger of destabilization in the economic structure in Turkey, and moreover a significant part of the Turkish economics will be affected negatively from Customs Union. Schulz noted there was no significant progress in democratic reforms. He also accused Çiller and her government not for working on democratic reforms, but spending time abroad for lobbying activities.



The co-president of the Greens, Claudia Roth has started her speech by asking, “who are the friends of Turkey?” She argued that saying yes to the customs union, and at same time not accepting Turkey ‘s full membership on the ground that of Turkey’s Muslim population constitutes an ambiguity. Roth, like Schulz added that Turkey will bear the negative consequences of the Customs Union, and the EU members will benefit mostly. Lastly she has argued that the principle of indivisibility of human rights has been breached as no progress has been reported on the fields of human rights since the cancellation of the agreement in the early 1995. Roth added that, “We the Greens call for the vote to postponed until there really is tangible progress”. By the end of the discussions, the EP gives her assent to Turkish accession to the Customs Union.

The European Parliament (...) having regard to the proposal for a Council Decision (...) gives its consent to the common position of the Community (Legislative Resolution: December, 13, 1995)

TABLE 10: VOTES CAST ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL GROUPS: ROLL-CALL VOTE DECEMBER 13, 1995

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Greens	Liberals	United Left	OTHER
<b>votes cast</b>	<b>186</b>	<b>163</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>90</b>
<b>for</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>59</b>
<b>against</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>25</b>
<b>abstain</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>cohesiveness</b>	<b>13%</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>77%</b>	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35/2 209-234)

The decision was taken by the Christian Democrat, the Liberal, and the Socialist together. The “grand coalition” of the leading political groups had different cohesion degrees. The Christian Democrats, and to some extend the Liberals had maintained a degree of cohesiveness. Despite the decision of the Bureau of the Socialist Group to support Turkey. The Socialist Group was the least cohesive group at the plenary- the second

least cohesive group was the Liberal Group. It should be noted that, Greek MEPs in these leading groups have voted against the Turkish accession to the Customs Union. On the Left- Wing of the political spectrum, both Greens, and the United Left were against the resolution with high cohesiveness degrees. On the same day, the EP passed a second resolution on Turkey called as “Resolution on the Human Rights Situation in Turkey” whereby the EP has stated;

The European Parliament (...) calls upon the European Union, its member states and Turkey to give their full backing to a continuous and broad dialogue to promote respect for human rights, and freedoms, and calls on the Turkish government and TGNA to continue the necessary reform process (...) appeals to the Turkish government, and the PKK, and other Kurdish organizations to do all in their power to find a non-violent and political solution to the Kurdish issue (...) will remain vigilant regarding developments in Turkey in order to react immediately if the Government of Turkey or TGNA were to crosstrack on moves towards strengthening democracy and guaranteeing full respect for human rights, principles which characterize western European democracy to which Turkey aspires; reminds Turkey that its assent is to be considered as an encouragement to the Turkish Government’s commitment to continue the process of democratization and improvement of the human rights situation (...) (Resolution: December 13, 1995)

TABLE 11: ROLL-CALL VOTE DECEMBER 13, 1995

	Socialist	Christian Democrats	Greens	Liberals	Left Unity	other
votes cast	183	164	23	41	23	113
for	158	151	7	38	1	39
against	1	1	0	0	1	16
abstain	24	12	16	3	21	58
cohesiveness	73%	84%	39%	85%	83%	

(HIX, SIMON, ABDUL NOURY AND GÉRARD ROLAND: 35/2 209-234)

The decision was taken again by a “grand coalition” of the Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Liberals. Greens and Left Unity remained abstained as a protest to the previous decision.

### **9.4.3. Conclusion**

Following the October 20, 1991 general elections a coalition government between center-right True Path Party “DYP” and center-left Social Democratic People’s Party “SHP”. The primary goal of the coalition government was to reform the political system, and constitution. The democratic reforms, Kurdish Question, and Human Rights have been on the agenda during 1991-96 period. Especially the Kurdish Question has strained the relations between Turkey and the EP.

Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union was asked to be subject to the assent procedure, despite Turkey’ s claims. This has increased the importance of the EP in the eyes of Ankara. Turkish government had to maintain lobbying activities in the EP. Turkey’s will to accede the Customs Union was a trump card in the hands of the EP, which has asked the fulfillment of the democratic reforms in exchange for her assent to Turkish entry.

Despite their critical tones, both “Resolution on the Situation of the Kurds”, and the “Dury Report “- both of them were in tolerant mood, were accepted by the grand coalition of the Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats- it should be noted that the abstention of the Liberals, and the Socialists were noticeable. These could be regarded as the signs of honeymoon between the EP and Turkey.

On June 1994, the EP election was held. The Conservative Group was merged with the Christian Democrats, and the name of the European People’s Party was changed as European People’s Party-European Democrats. The EP was convened after detention of the members of Pro-Kurdish Democracy Party, and decided almost unanimously to suspend the activities of the EU-Turkey Joint Parliamentary Committee on September 28, 1994. This was set back for Turkey, as the activities of the Joint

Parliamentary Committee was suspended previously when Turkey was under military rule in 1981, and moreover the EP would be hesitant to give her assent to Turkey regarding her accession to the Customs Union in the coming months.

On December 15, 1994 the EP has declared that assent procedure would be applicable to Turkey's accession to the Customs Union. The decision was taken by a Left Wing – Liberal coalition, despite the attempts of the Christian Democrats, and Silvio Berlusconi's Forza Europa. The following resolution dated February 14, 1995 reiterated the reform requests of the MEPs from different political groups- even Forza Europa Members have asked Turkey to comply with the requests of the EP. The resolution was mild-tempered. From February 1995 to December 1995, the EP became the most effective institutional arms of the EU on behalf of Turkey. While both the Commission, and the Council tried to appease Turkey, the EP enjoys her blackmail capacity over Turkey. The European politicians had a keen interest over Turkey, which has been regarded as the realm of Greek MEPs for years. The political reforms in Turkey, and campaigns organized by the Turkish NGOs, and lobbying activities led the Socialists to take a non-binding group decision.

On December 13, 1995, the right –wing groups: Christian Democrats, and Liberals have supported Turkey's accession to the Customs Union. On the other hand, the left-wing groups had different views on Turkey. The Socialists, despite the group decision was the least cohesive group even within the national delegations- i.e. the national delegations of UK, Germany, and Spain had also low cohesiveness; however, the "yes" votes within the Socialist Group has determined the outcome. It should be noted that the Socialists again shifted from a left wing coalition to grand coalition in order to maintain surveillance over Turkey, and support the reform process in the country. Both the Greens, and European Left objected

Turkey's accession on the ground that she has failed to fulfill the requests of the EP.

In the 1991-6 period, Turkey enhanced her relations with other EU institutions, especially within the accession to the Customs Union context; however, Turkey maintained tense relations with the EP, which was armed with assent procedure. As it was declared that Turkish accession requires EP's assent, the EP's power over Turkey has automatically increased, and the EP has been functioning as surveillance, and advisory body on Turkey related issues since then.

## CHAPTER 10

### GENERAL OVERVIEW ON THE POLITICAL GROUPS

#### **10.1. The European Parliament, Turkey and the Political Environment: 1980-96**

The cohesiveness and voting alliances of the political groups in the European Parliament during the debates, and roll call votes concerning Turkey between 1980-1996 was analyzed in three periods in the previous chapters. Each period was characterized by different political and economic priorities.

The first period was rather a long one, between 1980-7. The first period started with the coup d'état in September 12, 1980, and came to an end by the 1987 general elections. The period was first characterized by the Cold War: security concerns, and political polarization. Despite the ongoing Helsinki Accord, the NATO members welcomed the Turkish Generals, who have saved Turkey to fall into the hands of "Red Evil." The EP, in line with the national governments has asked The Turkish Military to restore the democratic order within a reasonable time limit, and respect fundamental freedoms in this process. According to analysts, the National Security Council (NSC) has regarded the resolution dated September 18, 1980 as an unconditional support; however, the EP was quick to respond to the delay in the transition to democracy. The shift of the Socialist Group from "Grand Coalition" to "Left Wing Coalition" is noticeable in this regard, and could be attributed to the NSC's failure to respect fundamental rights and freedoms in Turkey. The EP's stance vis-à-vis Turkey did not change even after the 1983 general election, which was regarded as anti-democratic since the leading political parties were not allowed to participate the elections. The EP was unwilling to resume her relations with Turkey by the Joint Parliamentary Committee.

Surprisingly, Turkey officially applied to the EC for full membership on April 14, 1987.

The second period was started, following the 1987 general elections. The period can be regarded as a transition period. The EP has normalized her relations with Turkey by resuming the Joint Parliamentary Committee after seven years. The important development within the context of the EP was that the Socialists have shifted from the "left wing coalition" option to the "grand coalition" option- i.e. alliance with center- right groups. The shift of the Socialists could be attributed to the improvements in Turkish democracy. In this period, mainly left wing political groups have brought human rights abuses, and minority questions to the agenda.

The third period has started with formation of the True Path Party "*DYP*", and Social Democratic People's Party "*SHP*" coalition government. The new government has proposed an ambitious reform program. In this period, Turkey has attempted to accede Customs Union with EU members on the basis of Ankara Agreement dated 1963. In this period Turkey has experienced a new deadlock in her relations with the EP, mainly because of the closure of the pro-Kurdish Democracy Party "*DEP*", and the detention of Kurdish MPs. Turkey has improved her relations with various EU institutions in this period. The only exception was the EP (İlkin & Tekeli p.286) According to Birand, the EU institutions have maintain a carrot-stick policy during Turkey' s accession to the customs union. In exchange for democratic reforms, the EP gave her assent to Turkish accession to the Customs Union. "The demanding EP was the bad cup, while the commission was the good cup in the process" (Birand, p.368)

## **10.2. The European Parliament and Political Groups**

### **10.2.1 The Communist and Allies Groups and Her Successors**

The Communists and Allies Group has been a loose alliance of European Communist Parties from Euro-Communists of Italy to Orthodox Communists of France until 1994. The Coup in Turkey gives an ideological leverage to the Communists, especially to those who have also condemned the Polish Coup in 1981. The Communists, like the Greens have closely observed human rights abuses in Turkey, and have maintained a strict policy. The Communists, like the Socialists, have maintained a high cohesiveness in the EP. After the 1989 election, following the restructuring the Italian Communist Party, and the fall of Berlin Wall, two competing successor of the Communist Group have emerged: United European Left of Italian Communists, and Left Unity of hard-liner French Communists. After the Italian Communist Party has changed her name to PDS (Democratic Party of the Left), the party members in the EP have joined to the Socialist Group. The remaining members of the United European Left have formed a new alliance with the Left Unity: Party of the European Left/Nordic Green Left.

The Communists and Allies Group, free from the similar Cold War fears of the mainstream political parties, harshly criticized military intervention in Turkey at the first meeting of the EP on September 18, 1981. Because of the numerical inferiority of the Communists, the rival motion of the Socialists, Liberals, and Christian Democrats passed. The ban of political parties, trade unions, and deteriorating human rights records of the military led a “left wing coalition” mainly between the Socialists, and the Communists.

The study of the roll-call votes denotes that following the “resolution on the military junta in Turkey” dated April 10, 1981, the left wing coalition of the



Socialists and the Communists became visible. In the following resolutions, namely, “resolution on the death sentence impose on 52 Turkish trade union leaders” dated January 22, 1980, “resolution on the political situation in Turkey” dated July 8, 1982, “on human rights conditions in Turkey” dated September 13, 1983, “resolution on the human rights conditions in Turkey” dated October 23, 1985, “resolution on the arbitrary arrests in Turkey” – one of the three resolution on the arrests of Kutlu and Sargin, dated November 16, 1987, again, there was an alliance between the Socialists, and the Communists- with a cohesiveness almost 100% in both political groups. This was an important phenomenon to be noted, as the Socialists have voted mostly in the same line with the Liberals, rather than the Communists, and the left wing political parties had ideological problems in 1980s, and 1990s between each other, and barely they formed alliances. So the reason for the Left Wing alliance in 1980s was the human rights abuses in Turkey, and the alliance gave the Communists an asymmetric power to exert on Turkey (Birand, 2005: 317)

During 1990s, the successor of the Communist Group, the European Left showed a similar voting pattern with the Greens on the issues concerning Turkey, namely, on the assent procedure regarding Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union, where both groups vote in the same direction, and the European Left had 77% cohesiveness, while the Greens had 100%.

### **10.2.2. The Greens**

As a result of the Green movement of early 1980s, the Greens succeeded to form a group within the EP in alliance with regionalist parties following 1984 elections. After the 1989 elections, the Greens succeeded to form their own political group. The Greens, like the other left wing political groups had a high cohesiveness on issues concerning Turkey. The Greens paid attention to minority rights, and human rights mainly. The first roll-call vote on the Green groups denotes that the Greens were not satisfied with

the reform program of the DYP-SHP coalition government, and voted against the Dury Report, which welcomes the reform program of the Turkish Coalition government on November 19, 1992

The Greens play an important role in Turkey's accession to the Customs Union. The chairwoman Claudia Roth paid a visit to Turkey, and argued that as long as there is no progress on human rights, the Greens would not give their assent to Turkey's accession to the Customs Union. The Greens voted against Turkish accession with 100% cohesiveness. It should be noted that, the Green leader Roth maintained in her speech on December 13, 1995 that *"saying yes to the customs union, and at same time not accepting Turkey's full membership on the ground that of Turkey's Muslim population constitutes an ambiguity"*, moreover she has added Turkey will bear the negative consequences of the Customs Union, and the EU members will benefit mostly. These arguments can be regarded as the indication of the Greens' policy towards Turkey in the coming years.

### **10.2.3. The Socialist Group**

The Socialist Group is one of the oldest three political groups within the EP. Between 1979 and 1999 the Socialists outnumbered their rival Christian Democrats in the EP, but it should be noted that none of them have never achieved majority within the EP. Despite the Socialist Group was less cohesive than her main rival: the EPP, she was highly cohesive on matters related to Turkey, as there is a consensus among national delegations on Turkey. As mentioned above, the Socialist Group voted in the same way with the Communists in the 1980s despite ideological differences. This could be attributed to the human rights records of the military régime. It should be noted that the Socialist-Communist alliance on the issues concerning Turkey is not a permanent alliance. The Socialists have voted in the same line with the Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the Conservatives, especially after the DYP-SHP coalition. The stance of the Socialist Group vis-à-vis Turkey can be best depicted as *"change through*

*rapprochement*” policy. The Socialists do not hesitate to maintain a pivotal role in debates concerning Turkey. On any important case, e.g. assent to the Customs Union, the Socialists prefer to vote in line with mainstream political traditions: The Christian Democrats, and Liberals.

#### **10.2.4. The Liberal Group**

The Liberal Group is one of the oldest three political groups within the EP. The Liberals, mainly because of their numerical inferiority did not play an important role on the issues concerning Turkey. Like mainstream political groups, the liberals declared their support to the military régime for a specific time period, the liberals mainly voted in line with Christian Democrats, and Conservatives during 1980s, 1990s. The Liberals showed their dissatisfaction with Turkey in February 1995, and they have accused Turkey to violate human rights constantly. On December 13, 1995, at the assent procedure, the Liberals had a low turnout, and low cohesiveness. This could be regarded as their indifference to Turkey related issues.

#### **10.2.5. The Christian Democratic Group**

The Christian Democratic Group, known as European People’s Party (EPP) is one of the leading two political groups in the EP. The Christian Democrats became the biggest group at the 1999 election. The Christian Democrats, like Conservatives a “pro-Turkish line” in their decisions. The MEPs from the Christian Democratic group maintained that Turkey is in a process of forming her democratic order, and the EP should maintain a milder stance vis-à-vis Turkey. The Christian Democrats had a low cohesiveness on Turkey related issues, as her Greek members preferred to vote in line with their nationals in left wing political groups. The Christian Democrats surprised Turkey for their support to suspend the JPC on September 15, 1984. The Christian Democrats, play an important role in Turkey’ s accession to the Customs Union.

### **10.2.6. The Conservative Group**

The Conservative Party members of the UK have sit together until 1994. Some Dutch, and Spanish Conservatives have joined the Conservative Group – known as European Democrats. The Conservative Group brought the British tradition to the EP: group discipline, whipping procedure. Following the coup in Turkey, the Conservative Group took a pro-Turkish line, along with some Christian Democrats. The conservative policy on Turkey could be attributed to the Cold War environment, British PM Thatcher's sympathy to Özal Administration. The Conservative Group, because of the whipping procedure, maintained a high cohesiveness on Turkey related issues: almost 100%.

## CHAPTER 11

### CONCLUSION

The perception, and the stance of political groups within the EP towards Turkey cannot be isolated from the priorities of the international politics, and internal dynamics of member states and of Turkey. Turkey's NATO membership was the most important determinant of the EC's stance vis-à-vis Turkey during the Cold War era. The dissolution of Warsaw Pact, changing economic priorities, and the stress on cultural, and religious identities rehearsed the image of Turkey in the eyes of the political groups within the EP.

The dichotomy of "*Friends of Turks*" versus "*Enemies of Turks*" proved to be fruitless to explain the coalition formation among political groups, and the changing support of the political groups towards Turkey. To overcome the immature "*friends vs. enemies*" dichotomy, a mathematical analysis was carried out with reference to international politics, and to the domestic politics of Turkey in the previous chapters. The retrospective analysis of the years between 1980-96 enables us to draw conclusions, and put forward further questions on the stance of political groups towards Turkey, and on the relations between the political parties/institutions in Turkey, and in the EU member states.

The EP's resolutions on Turkey through 1980s, and 1990s, and even the assent of the EP on the Turkey's accession to the Customs Union have been shaped by the pivotal role of the Socialist Group. Although Socialist-Christian Democratic Coalitions are formed often in order to attain majority, between 1981-1991 the Socialists preferred alliance with their ideological sisters due to poor human rights and minority rights records of Turkey. The backing of the Socialists could be assured so long as fundamental

principles of human rights are observed strictly in Turkey. It is important to note that when the True Path Party “*DYP*” and Social Democratic People’s Party “*SHP*” coalition was formed with a detailed reform program, the Socialists have maintained a tolerant stance towards Turkey that has never been seen after the year 1981 until the closure of pro-Kurdish Democracy Party “*DEP*”

The Greens, relatively a new political thought in the European politics, have maintained a coherent policy towards Turkey. They envisaged a vision for Europe, where different religions, cultures, and languages could live together peacefully. It is important to note that the Green MEPs,, despite their opposition to Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union on the basis of Turkey’s poor human rights, and minority records, blamed Christian Democratic MEPs for rejecting Turkey’s full membership on the basis of religion. The Greens show their sympathy with Turkey’s full membership in different occasions. Despite her numerical inferiority, the backing of a coherent political group in Post-September 11 era deserves specific attention.

The Liberal Group was mainly indifferent to Turkey related issues during period studied in the previous chapters. From the beginning of the year 1995, there is a tremendous increase in the Liberal Group’s interest towards Turkey. Despite her numerical inferiority- like Greens, the backing of a secular, and excessively business -minded political group in Post-September 11 era deserves attention from the elites of Turkish Foreign Policy.

There are two political groups whose backing could not be secured easily in the coming years. First the Christian Democrats supported Turkey continuously during 1980s, and 1990s; however, considering new dimensions in International Politics, and internal dynamics of member states, it would not be reasonable to expect continuous backing from the

Christian Democrats. They mainly see Turkey as privileged partner of Europe, and do not envisage full membership role for Turkey. Second the successor of Communist Group: The Party of the European Left/Nordic Green Left maintains traditionally an intolerant stance towards Turkey. Considering the group's emphasis on minority rights, it seems far more difficult to reconcile them with the decision makers of Turkey.

Considering each group's stance vis-à-vis Turkey separately, the retrospective analysis denotes three types of winning coalitions on Turkey related questions: The "*Grand Coalition*" of Socialist, Liberal, and Christian Democratic Groups. The "*Left-Wing Coalition*" of Socialist, Green, and other left wing groups, and the "*Right-Wing Coalition*" of Christian Democrats, and Liberals. It is important to note that the Socialists had always a pivotal role in the period studied. As long as they are satisfied with the reform package of the Turkish governments in power, they have opted for a tolerant stance for Turkey, and chose "*Grand Coalition*" option. Low coherence of the Socialists led the predominance of the "*Right-Wing Coalition*." The rapprochement of Liberals, and Socialists became visible in the year 1995. Considering Turkey's Muslim identity, and poor growth in European economics, it would be inescapable to monitor a solid objection from Christian Democrats to Turkey. In my opinion, it would be necessary to secure a "*Traffic Light Coalition*" of Greens, Socialists, and Liberals in the EP to get the necessary support for Turkey's full membership. As historic data denotes, only political convergence with necessary reform packages could assure the backing of Socialists, Greens, and to some extent Liberals.

The only formal link between the EP, and TGNA is the Joint Parliamentary Committee, as stated in the Ankara Agreement. The functioning of the JPC was suspended twice upon the request of the EP during the period studied. Until 1995, The EP has been regarded as a second order assembly, which has been predominated by the "enemies of the Turks." With a few

exceptions, Turkish delegation in JPC preferred to have a single voice, and stand for the “national interests”. As a result, JPC meetings are mainly confined to the limits of national interests, and failed to produce profitable outcomes. Political parties in Turkey have loose relations with their “ideological sisters” in Europe via transnational political parties/ organizations; moreover the ideological convergence between them is not clear due to different historical, political, and economic paths followed. Mainly Social Democratic People’s Party “*SHP*” and Motherland Party “*ANAP*” institutionalized their relations with Pan-European transnational party organizations in the period studied. It would be reasonable to expect that the deepening relations between Turkey, and the EC/EU would lead ideological convergence of Turkish political parties with their European counterparts, and institutionalize their relations with their “ideological sisters”.

Leaving institutionalized relations aside, especially in the mid 1990s, the NGOs from Turkey put pressure on the various political groups of the EP. The business organization TUSIAD opened an office in Brussels. The left-wing trade union “Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Trade Union” *DISK* has also maintained an effective campaign for Turkey in the year 1995. The MEPs from various political groups acknowledge the lobbying activities from either *DISK* or TUSIAD in their yes vote for Turkey’s accession to the Customs Union. In my opinion maintenance of lobbying activities on behalf of the EP through NGOs would boost the group cohesion first, and then the overall support for Turkey. It should also be noted that lobbying through non-members states would bring negative results on behalf of the EP as it was seen USA and Israel backed lobbying activities in 1995.

The EP, as the co-legislator, and the agenda setter of the EC/EU deserves special attention from the political parties and the NGOs of Turkey. Considering the political, and historical differences, the measures to



enhance the relations between Turkey, and the EP can be classified as short-term measures, and long-term measures. In the short-run, the pro-integrationist political parties in Turkey should enhance their relations with Trans-European Political Parties by organizing international offices. Formation of multilateral relations with Trans-European Political Parties on the basis of “single issues” – e.g. Turkey’s full membership, immigration problems, minority rights, would be more pragmatic considering ideological differences between political parties in Turkey, and their so-called counterparts in Europe. Multilateral exchange programs for the youth organizations of the political parties would promote mutual understanding, and would contribute to ideological convergence in the long- term. The role of the NGOs in the short-run should not be underestimated. For that reason necessary legal steps have to be taken to enable the Turkish NGOs to cooperate with their European counterparts, and to reach financial resources out of Turkey. These steps would contribute to ideological convergence of Turkish political parties with their European counterparts, and exert pressure on Turkey related matters. Similarly lobbying activities through NGOs on behalf of the EP would be an important assent for Turkey.

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