

AN ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENTAL GOVERNMENTALITY
IN THE COLD WAR PERIOD

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Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Assoc.Prof. Dr. Sibel Kalaycıođlu
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeđenođlu-Mutman
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Assoc.Prof. Dr. Ayşe Gündüz Hoşgör (METU, SOC) _____
Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeđenođlu-Mutman (METU, SOC) _____
Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip Yalman (METU, ADM) _____

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last name: Bařaran Bilgin

Signature:

ABSTRACT

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Bilgin, Başaran

M.S., Department of Sociology

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meyda Yeğenoğlu-Mutman

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This thesis tries to provide a modest contribution to the critical studies on the history of development by exploring Cold War development practices. It questions the role of these practices in constructing a new regime that was conducive to govern the relationship between the West and the Third World after the Second World War. It suggests that development practices were composed of techniques and rationalities that were designed to solve the urgent problem of governing populations without using sheer force and sovereign power tools where these methods were not practical in the context of decolonization and Cold War. For this kind of inquiry, this thesis takes into account power relations embedded in the development practices and, by utilizing Michel Foucault's theories, perceives these practices as an essential way of disseminating biopolitical methods to the Third World. Role of the development discourse in governing populations is analyzed with relation to the notion of governmentality, which refers to modes of thought and the techniques of accomplishing rule in a discourse. In line with this theoretical framework, the first part of this thesis explores three schools of thought -modernization, dependency and world system- in order to explain the ways of producing thought and knowledge

pertaining to development and the involvement of power relations in this process. Additionally, analyzing development aid and development planning which were the techniques to institutionalize development practices in the Third World countries and to render them technical that were managed only by experts without muddling with politics constitute the second part of this thesis .

Keywords: Development, biopower, governmentality, modernization school development aid, development planning

ÖZ

SOĞUK SAVAŞ DÖNEMİNDEKİ KALKINMACI YÖNETSELLİĞİN BİR ANALİZİ

Bilgin, Başaran

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Bu tez Soğuk Savaş döneminki kalkınma pratiklerini inceleyerek, kalkınma tarihine eleştirel yaklaşan çalışmalara iddiasız bir katkıda bulunmaya çalışır. Bu pratiklerin, İkinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında Batı ile Üçüncü Dünya arasındaki ilişkileri yönetmeye yardımcı olan yeni bir rejimin kurulmasındaki rolünü sorgular. Kolonilerin özgürlüğü ve Soğuk Savaş bağlamında, kalkınma pratiklerinin nüfusu kaba kuvvet ve egemen iktidar araçlarını kullanmadan yönetme sorununu çözmek için tasarlanmış teknikler ve rasyonellikler tarafından oluşturulduğunu öne sürer. Bu tarz bir soruşturma için, bu tez, kalkınma pratiklerine gömülmüş iktidar ilişkilerini dikkate alır ve Michel Foucault'nun kuramlarını kullanarak bu pratikleri biyo-politik yöntemlerin Üçüncü Dünyaya yayılmasının temel yolu olarak algılar. Kalkınma söyleminin nüfusun yönetimindeki rolü bir söylemde yönetimin başarılması için gerekli tekniklere ve düşünme tarzlarına gönderme yapan yönetsellik kavramıyla ilişki içinde anlatılır. Bu kuramsal çerçeveye uyararak, tezin birinci bölümü kalkınmaya dair düşüncelerin ve bilgilerin üretilme şekillerini ve bunların iktidar ilişkilerine bağlılığını açıklamak için üç düşünce okulunu - modernleşme, bağımlılık ve dünya sistemi – inceler. Ayrıca, kalkınma pratiklerini Üçüncü Dünya ülkelerinde

kurumsallařtıran ve bu pratikleri politikaya bulařmadan uzmanlar tarafından gerekleřtirilen teknik bir iře dnüştüren kalkınma yardımı ve kalkınma planlamasının analizi tezin ikinci bölümünü oluşturur.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Kalkınma, biyoiktidar, yönetsellik, modernleşme okulu, kalkınma yardımı, kalkınma planlaması

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Debates over the meaning of some words have never ceased. One of the terms, over the meaning of which there is tremendous amount of confusion is development. In what senses do we use this term? Does it refer to a measure of a desirable state of being for an organism or a society? Maybe it refers to a historical process of social change in which societies are transformed over a long period. Or, development simply means the realization of an inner potential in the course of time. Moreover, it may refer to deliberate efforts which aim to improve lives, societies, countries or individuals.

Whatever its meaning is, it is a fact that these debates over the meaning of development stem from the practices it refers. In different times and places, different sets of social, economic and political practices are defined as development. As long as these practices have a direct impact on individuals, debates and political conflicts about their content prevail, which is then reflected to the debates on the meaning of development. In other words, if the meaning of a word is shaped through a struggle, which tries to shape the social practices referred by this word, the debates on the meaning of development would never cease since development practices have been one of the most important phenomena which influenced individuals and societies in an extensive way throughout the 20th century.

The main reason behind the extensive influence of development practices is that it is not possible to find any nation-state, which does not have any ministry, department or non-governmental organization dealing with the issues of development. Especially after the Second World War, development became the main pursuit for the Third World countries in which billions are spent each year to realize the development

targets. Additionally, international institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank deal with the issue of development at the international level and promote countries' development policies. Why does development gain this popularity? How does it become a miraculous recipe that is believed to solve all problems of the Third World countries? If we define being a developed society as achieving high levels of industrialization, urbanization, material production and living standards, the answer to the first question is straightforward. It seems that nobody can easily refuse to embrace these benefits of development, and demanding it, at first glance, seems 'normal'. However, any inquiry which claims to be sociological should commence with questioning this status of being 'normal'. This thesis is based on this kind of inquiry that interrogates the 'normal' status attributed to development. In other words, in explaining certain aspects of development from a specific perspective, which is defined below, this thesis tries to 'stand detached from [development], bracketing its familiarity, in order to analyze the theoretical and practical context with which it has been associated.¹ This kind of inquiry requires taking into account the fact that development practices are the result of the specific historical conjuncture shaped after the Second World War. The division of world political sphere into three parts and the emergence of new, independent nation-states, which were formed as a result of the colonial independence movements, were two events that determined this conjuncture.

In addition to historical specificity of development practices, this thesis is based on one more assumption: development practices were part of the power relations between the countries and within each country in the Cold War period. Acknowledging power aspect in development does not mean to perceive it as a tool for realizing concealed aims of the hegemonic powers; or to ignore the 'benefits' of development policies. But rather, it is an attempt to explain the fact that because development mainly means the practice of transforming societies by subverting and reconstituting their certain features, it necessarily contains exercise of power. Incorporating power relations into the perspective of this thesis enables us to understand that problematization of particular aspect of human life in development policies is not a natural and inevitable, but contingent to power relations.

¹ Michel Foucault, *Use of Pleasures* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 3.

These two assumptions, the historical specificity of development practices and the embeddedness of them in power relations, culminate in the main idea of this thesis. In the Cold War period, development policies constitute a new regime, where existing ways of constructing and preserving hegemonic relations between the imperialist countries and the colonial ones were not feasible. I use the term ‘regime’ as a system of control that is constituted not only formal and informal rules, but also practices that regulate governance of the Third World and populations in the Cold War period. In the colonial period, the relationship between the colonizer and the colonized was shaped by the use of brutal force and other coercive measures to control and manage colonial subjects. In this imperialist regime, colonies were assumed to be the property of the imperialist monarch. In colonial territories, power was utilized to extract wealth, surplus and labor in order to increase the welfare of the colonizing country. This mechanism became obsolete after the Second World War, since there were no more colonial territories, but independent nation-states, the existence of which were based on the notion of ‘self determination’. In defining their policies, the imperialist countries had to recognize the sovereignty of each nation-state. In other words, the urgent problem to which new regime had to handle in the Cold War period was the following. There were forty new nation-states after the independence movements, and a new regime could endow the Western countries with the tools to manage and control this multiplicity in this historical conjuncture.

The second aspect of this period was the struggle between the capitalist and communist sides of the world, which prevented the construction of an international regime that emphasized coercive ways of managing countries. For example, direct intervention to a country was not a viable option to impose hegemony since this would lead to a nuclear war between two superpowers- United States of America and the Soviet Union. In this context, armament, developing diplomatic relations through international organizations such as United Nations and constructing military political or economic pacts such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Warsaw Pact were means to construct a post-war regime. However, because of the above mentioned reasons, this regime also needed other mechanisms which were more

subtle and productive, rather than subversive, in managing relations between hegemonic powers and the Third World countries.

This thesis suggests that development practices endowed Western countries with the tools to construct a Cold War regime. The basic characteristic of this regime was that it did not openly force Third World countries to pursue national and international policies in accordance with the demands of hegemonic powers. Rather, this regime fostered Third World countries, increased their capacities and demanded their complicity. For Western countries, development practices opened new ways of intervening to the Third World countries. As the manager of development practices, these countries defined the targets and ways of development, and imposed them on the Third World. However, this imposition was not in the form of coercive policies, rather, Third World countries demanded these development strategies. They wanted to be developed. What were in operation in this regime, were not guns and soldiers, but ‘scientific statements’, development aid, statistics, economic indicators, planning institutions and experts.

What would be the suitable theoretical approach to analyze this kind of development regime that was based on a different understanding of power? Any theoretical framework should avoid doing two basic mistakes. Firstly, seeing development practices as the continuation of colonial rule and perceiving Third World’s indigenous people as the ‘victims’ of development would make any explanation wrong. The second theoretical mistake may arise from looking for a ‘subject’ behind all these practices. By asking the ‘real meaning’ or ‘real beneficiary’ of development practices, one can easily figure out the U.S., the World Bank or the leaders of Third World countries as the subjects who designed and implemented this ‘evil’ project of development.

In order to avoid these theoretical shortcomings this thesis draws on Michel Foucault’s theoretical framework. In line with above-mentioned arguments, it is possible to suggest that during the Cold War period, development practices constituted a discourse, which referred to role of knowledge, power and subjectivity in the development practices. Through the development discourse the forms of

knowledge concerning the facts on the Third World were produced and utilized in shaping power relations. However, this thesis aims to go beyond the implications of discourse analysis by applying Foucault's later ideas to explaining development regime. In this sense, Foucauldian notions of power-knowledge, biopower, governmentality and *dispositif* are the key theoretical tools of exploring the development discourse.

In terms of the key arguments of this thesis, the notion of governmentality has great significance. Governmentality is defined as the conduct of the conduct, which refers to calculated and rational activities that seek to shape the conducts of people. In line with this idea, this thesis suggests that post-war era was managed by *developmental governmentality*. Development discourse provided rationality, techniques and scientific knowledge for conducting the conducts of Third World people in order to achieve certain ends. It constructed field of actions in which certain conducts of Third World people were fostered and promoted, while certain actions were rendered impractical and invaluable. Rather than imposing open power on individuals, authorities managed people's conducts in an indirect way by using development discourse.

In the literature on the notion of governmentality, the latter is defined with reference to two components. The first one refers to the *mentalité* of the government, that is, the rationalities, ideas, principles and ideals that construct certain governmentality. They rendered specific objects as thinkable in a certain way. They produced knowledge concerning the nature of the object governed; hence opened new ways of problematizing it. The second aspect of governmentality contains the techniques that are deployed to realize any governmental regime. Techniques of notation, computation and calculation, procedures of examination and assessment, surveys and inauguration of professional specialism are the ways of disseminating any governmental regime. In line with this notion, the core of this thesis is devoted to explore two sides of developmental governmentality. One of the chapters explores the system of thought that makes development thinkable. For this aim, three different schools of thought are analyzed. Modernization school, dependency school and world-system theory are examined in the light of the relationship between power and

knowledge. In another chapter, the systems of action in the developmental governmentality are explored. Two sets of action are the topics of this chapter: development aid and development planning.

In line with this theoretical background the content of this thesis is as follows. The second chapter is designed to constitute a foundation for the analysis of development practices that took place in the Cold War period. Although the elaboration and diffusion of development practices culminated in the construction of a development regime only after the Second World War, the idea of development and its practices have been in circulation for two centuries. The starting section of this chapter focuses on the history of the idea of development and explores the role of Enlightenment thinking, social evolutionism and Marxism in shaping the idea of development. Especially, emphasis on the linear and limitless progress was always conducive to construct an imaginary scale of development in which the Western countries were situated at the top of it, whereas Third World countries were positioned at the lower levels of the scale.

The first section also aims to explain the emergence of the idea of ‘intentional development’ in relation to the expansion of capitalism in Europe, in the 19th century. This way of utilization perceived development as a set of activities that were conducted to transform societies. Apart from Europe, colonialism was another context where development was in practice as a set of intended activities to transform colonial territories. These practices were initiated by the imperialist states in order to cope with social problems. The general idea behind this section is to underline the fact that colonial development practices were rehearsals for the future construction of development regime in the Cold War period.

The second section explores the development practices of the Cold War period. The main purpose of this section is to show that this thesis does not perceive development discourse as a monolithic apparatus, which was free from any inner debates and transformation. The final section of the second chapter tries to give answer to the following question: if development discourse was contingent to historical conjuncture, what were the post-war context and its role in shaping development

discourse? To give answer to his question historical specificities of Cold War period are defined.

The second chapter discusses theoretical insights for analyzing development discourse. My main concern here is to present Foucault's ideas to explore development discourse. In that sense, first section of this chapter starts with the examination of post-development school which utilizes Foucauldian framework in discussing development discourse. However, the aim of this thesis is to go beyond the ideas of this school since it contains theoretical shortcomings. In the following sections of the second chapter, Foucault's basic ideas are explored, and the relationship between them and development discourse are analyzed in a detailed way. Especially, power-knowledge dyad is instrumental in understanding the hegemonic power of modernization school in constructing rationalities of development discourse. Additionally, the notion of biopower is illustrative to depict the differences between the power understandings of colonialism and post-war development practices. Another highly useful Foucauldian notion is *dispositif*, which underlines that development discourse was an answer to the urgent problems of Cold War conjuncture and as this conjuncture changed development discourse underwent transformation. Finally, this thesis is based on the notion of governmentality. Two aspects of this mode of government are defined to form theoretical framework for the following chapters.

In the third chapter, the first component of developmental governmentality is analyzed: the ways of thinking and producing truth in development discourse. It examines construction of the 'modes of thought' in the development discourse. Reports of development institutions, government documents, agreements between countries and institutions on development aid would be fruitful sources to disclose developmental rationalities. However, this chapter takes 'scientific statements' as the object of its analysis because the science and technology are perceived as the main tools for achieving development. Additionally, their roles in power relations and in justifying certain political concerns are always obscured by the notions of objectivity and impartiality. In order to unveil the impact of power-knowledge dyad on constructing development discourse, three schools of thought are explored in this

chapter. The first one is the modernization school which defined the basic characteristics of development policies in the Cold War period. By interrogating ways of producing knowledge within the theoretical framework of modernization school, this section discloses the ways of constructing and preserving superiority of the West. This school of thought exemplifies the scientific ways of incorporating ideas into the development discourse, which are strategic in perpetuating hegemonic relationship between the West and the Third World. Moreover, the ways of constructing knowledge in the modernization school is examined in relation to its problematization of certain features of Third World. Scientific ways of constructing the notion of Third World, underdevelopment, poverty and subjectivities are explored to reveal the role of scientific problematization in power relations.

‘Modes of thought’ in the development discourse also contains different ways of thinking, which are critical to modernization school. Dependency school and world-system theory exemplify scientific ways of resisting hegemonic side of development discourse. These schools try to refute the knowledge produced by the modernization school. This section of the chapter aims to show that although these schools have an immense role in constructing counter-hegemonic block within the development discourse, they cannot manage to interrogate implicit assumptions in the idea of development. Additionally, the differences between the critiques of these two schools and the ones which apply Foucauldian framework are explained.

In the chapter five, the second component of developmental governmentality is examined: technologies of government. This aspect of governmentality focuses on the means, mechanisms, techniques and technologies through which development discourse is diffused to the world and used to govern populations. These technologies are the means to intervene, act upon the objects of government. They contain surveys, presentational forms such as tables, statistics, techniques of notation and architectural forms. Developmental governmentality utilized statistics, accounting techniques, aid initiatives, planning, and economic indicators as the means of constructing its rule. This chapter dwells on only two of these mechanisms: aid and planning. As a governmental tactic development aid was employed in the international relations during the Cold War period. In a bilateral form, aid was used

by the U.S. to foster Third World countries against any communist influence. Rather than exerting open military force to Third World countries it encouraged capitalist development through aid. Capitalist development, supported by the U.S. aid, turned into a mechanism for expanding American way of life to the Third World. The first section of this chapter focuses on the U.S. aid and unveils the political concerns behind the aid practices. However, in terms of the analysis of governmentality, what is at stake is not to disclose political aims in the aid practices, but rather to define ways of achieving these aims. In that sense, it will discuss how the U.S. utilized development aid with two different ways: as a tool of sovereign power and as a governmental tool. The second part of this chapter examines other technique of developmental governmentality: development planning. This mechanism became a basic tool for predicting and managing social, political and economic transformation in the Third World countries. It renders development process a technical and scientific practice which can be handled only by the experts and professionals. Additionally, it is deployed to define and implement development process as a domain outside the politics, hence a top-down process controlled by the bureaucrats. These features of the development planning will be explored by giving examples from India and Turkey. Finally, in the conclusion chapter, I will briefly make generally assessment about the role of developmental governmentality in governing Third World and populations in the Cold War period.

Before starting to the exploration of development discourse, one final remark must be mentioned. This thesis interrogates the ways of constructing Third World in the development discourse and tries to explain that this specific way also opens paths to govern Third World. In other words, the starting point of this thesis is the critical inquiry upon the very idea of Third World. However, throughout the thesis, I use the same term. My aim behind this attitude is not to reproduce the meaning and connotations of this term as it is produced in the development discourse; rather, by explaining its ways of construction, I try to show the possibility of using this term with different connotations.

CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND PRACTICES OF DEVELOPMENT

2.1. The History of the Idea of Development

2.1.1. The Idea of Progress and Evolutionism

In the emergence of the idea of development, Enlightenment ideas and the notion of infinite progress were crucial steps. Antic philosophy and the medieval Christian thinking perceived life from the perspective of cycle and necessity. As an analogy to nature, societies or cities were thought to have cycles of growth and decay that stem from the necessities of life. During the enlightenment period, philosophers relinquished comparing history of mankind to individual human experience. Increased faith in knowledge, science and reason fostered them to draw a linear view of history. This understanding was the logical result of the belief that ‘the knowledge of the people living today will be added to that of their predecessor, and that decline of science can be excluded’.² In other words, enlightenment ideology preserved the principle of growth by replacing the idea of limit and decay with the idea of linear progress.

Thanks to the liberal economics, elaborated by Adam Smith and David Ricardo, the conception of human history as the unlimited linear progress had lasting effects on the development practices. For Adam Smith, material improvement was endless as long as individuals could enter into the market in order to exchange; and the state could remove obstacles in the proper functioning of the market. As a natural instinct, exchange can increase the benefits of both sides; hence it can forestall the possible

² Gilbert Rist, *The History of Development* (London: Zed Books, 1997), 36.

economic decay. Later, Ricardo applied this logic to the nation-states in order to show that international trade is not a zero-sum game. He perceived the possibilities of development both for poor and rich countries which can only be accomplished through free foreign trade.³ Through economics, the myth of ‘limitless progress’ was incorporated into the daily lives of people and governments.

Another sphere where we can find the appropriation of enlightenment thinking entailing the idea of linear development was social evolutionism. It transferred philosophical ideas of the Enlightenment to the analysis of society whereby it managed to root teleological understanding of development in popular imagination. Gilbert Rist defines three basic characteristics of social evolutionism: progress has the same substance as history; all nations travel the same evolutionary road; and all do not advance at the same speed as Western societies.⁴ The source of this superiority was sought in the production capacity of the West and in its development in terms of science and technology. Herbert Spencer, for example, explained this ‘development’ in a teleological manner. He thought that Western societies were experiencing a higher stage of complexity whereas other societies were at the basic layers of evolutionary scheme.⁵

With the social evolutionism, the ideas of development and progress were incorporated into the political level. As Western people reached to the other geographies of the world, they encountered with the ‘savage’ and ‘barbarian’ people; and social evolutionist ideas were shaped in this context. Social evolutionism perceived savages as the ancestors of Western people. In other words, there was only one human race, but there were multiplicity of societies; each of them was at a different level of development. Because of their industrial development, complexity and civilization, Western societies sat at the top of the development ladder. This understanding legitimized new ways of colonization in 19th century. It presented colonial undertaking as a generosity that aimed to help ‘backward’ societies along the road to civilization.

³ Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (London: Routledge, 1996). 15-18.

⁴ Rist, *The History of Development*, 40.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 42.

The best way of understanding the role of the notion of development and its evolutionist thinking in shaping colonial framework is to examine the theoretical foundations of anthropology. Development was used to tell a single, unified story of ‘mankind’ and was assumed to be the driving motive of human history that enabled certain societies to reach new and higher stages of human society from older and simple ones. Those societies which were still far away from this advanced state ‘lacked’ inner dynamics or the potential for development. James Ferguson mentions that anthropology saw them as societies that not only left behind in the race of progress, but also ‘remained at one of the prior developmental levels through which the West had already passed.’⁶ This kind of anthropological thinking constructed dichotomies as savage/civilized, child/mature that played a key role in the ideologies of colonialism.

Where was the place of Marxism in this evolutionist understanding of development? As an answer, we can quote Karl Marx. In the first volume of *Capital* he says that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to less developed, the image of its own future”.⁷ Most of the time he considered those countries that experienced ‘Asiatic mode of production’ as primitive and incapable of initiating a process of development by themselves. Therefore, he reached the conclusion that European colonial expansion was a brutal but a necessary step for dissolving feudal modes of production and introducing capitalism which, then, will dialectically turn into communism.⁸ It is clear that Marx conceived history in the same manner as social evolutionists did. For him, there was only one linear historical trajectory where the West exemplified the most developed stage. Moreover, other societies should pass from the same stages that the West had already passed.

⁶ James Ferguson, “Anthropology and its Evil Twin: ‘Development’ in the Constitution of a Discipline,” in *International Development and Social Sciences*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (California: California University Press, 1997), 154.

⁷ Karl Marx, *Capital Volume 1* (Harmondsworth: Pelican/New Left Review, 1976), p.91, quoted in Rist, *The History of Development*, 42-43.

⁸ Magnus Blomström and Björn Hettne, *The Emergence of Modern Development Theory* (New Jersey: Zed Books, 1984), 10.

Marx used the notion of development as an intransitive verb, that is, development was a historical process that happened without being willed by anyone.⁹ He believed that historical development had natural laws, and tried to examine these laws through the analysis of economic development. In fact, it is possible to call him as the first initiator of a tradition, which overemphasized the role of economic development in the transformation of societies. According to his approach, the analysis of the development of a society must begin from the process of production, which contains two spheres: the forces of production and relations of production. The harmony between two spheres brings development, whereas conflict hampers the development and only structural change, or in Marxist notion, revolution can restore the development. Detailed examination of Marx's ideas is beyond the scope of this thesis. In terms of my concerns, here, what is important is the fact that Marx harmonized the Enlightenment concept of history with social evolutionism. Therefore, he perceived development as the unfolding of the historical process that was subject to natural laws.

The above-mentioned ideas on development had common points: they all conceived development as a process that took place without any external factor. In this understanding, development was seen as the realization of inner potential and it does not require any agent whose wills and desires are regarded as the midwife of development. The teleological unfolding of the history, with internal laws, brought development.

2.1.2. Intention to Development

In their book *Doctrines of Development*, Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton argue that there has been another approach to the idea of development. They call this alternative approach 'intention to development', since it emerged as a response to undesirable consequences of capitalism. They put it as follows:

It was the apprehension of the destructive dimension of a process of development which... was the starting point for the modern intention to develop. Intention, here, was to give order to particular process of development, the development of capitalism...

⁹ Heinz W. Arndt, "Economic Development: A Semantic History," *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 29, no.4 (1981), 460.

whose destructive dimensions was poverty and unemployment of potential of productive power.¹⁰

For them development and underdevelopment were not invented in the post-war period and neither were they constructed as a result of imperialist projects that designed to be implemented in colonial countries or later in postcolonial ones. Development is necessarily Eurocentric because it was invented in amid of the early industrial capitalism in Europe. The intent to development was a Hobbesian response to the consequences of capitalism; it was constructed to provide means to restore ‘order’ in the social turmoil of the early 19th century.¹¹ The period of profound change, caused by the emergence of the industrial capitalism and its basic contradictions -such as increasing poverty, inequality, unemployment and its implications for social order- stimulated the invention of the idea of development as a process requiring intention and design. Hence, the content and purpose of development was to reconcile order and progress, and to manage the potential social disorder of the dynamics of immanent capitalist development.

The best example of this approach was the Saint-Simonian and Comtian positivist understanding of development. In this understanding, ‘progress’ was conceptualized very differently: it did not refer to a point which was better than past; today did not refer to a point where unfolding of the history arrived at. Progress and development were different things; not every progress brought happiness and well-being. For Saint-Simon, development was the tool that could be a remedy to the industrial chaos of the early 19th century. Moreover, for Auguste Comte, the basic aim had to be maintenance of progress with order. This goal could be achieved only by grasping the laws of nature, hence the laws of human social evolution. Then, the necessary tool to bring progress with order was development. In doing so, they conferred agency upon development and gave it a constructivist purpose. Development turned into totality of activities “whereby an epoch of the present was to be transformed into

¹⁰ Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, ix.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 5, 13.

another through the active purpose of those who were *entrusted* with the future of society”.¹²

For the Saint-Simonians, the progress with order could only be accomplished if property was placed in the hands of ‘trustees’, who had the capacity to utilize it in the interest of society. They thought that these trustees would be banks and bankers, since well reformed banking system and the personal morality of the banker could tame the negative effects of capitalist progress.¹³ These Saint-Simonian ideas on the role of the banks in the development process had undergone transformation and this positivist approach had never been realized. However, the idea of trusteeship, which was based on the assumption that those who take themselves to be developed can act to determine the process of development for those who are deemed to be less-developed, has always remained at the center of development thought. In the colonial context, trusteeship was claimed by the imperialist countries, which aimed to ‘civilize’ the ‘savages’. After the Second World War, trusteeship in the development discourse was vested in the states. The latter, became an agent of development, who determined the process of development on behalf of people.

2.2. Colonial Development

In Europe, development always referred to a historical process that took place without any intention, whereas in colonial territories development was perceived as an activity, especially of government. Development as a natural process has undergone semantic transformation and turned into a tool that legitimized colonial activities. In Europe “it is the society or an economy that ‘develops’ whereas in colonies it is natural resources that are ‘developed’”.¹⁴ As Cowen and Shenton mention, development was applied preemptively in the colonies; it was utilized to engineer progress without disrupting order and to anticipate class contradictions of capitalist development experienced in Europe. Therefore, development initiatives

¹² Ibid., 25.

¹³ Ibid., 25-27.

¹⁴ Arndt, “Economic Development: A Semantic History”, 460.

and practices of trusteeship inhibited fuller development of the social conditions of the capitalist production.

Hans Arndt argues that, in this period, the term development was used as a transitive verb referring to intended practices of developing resources in the colonies where white European settlers could manage to assimilate indigenous populations, as in the cases of Canada and Australia. Because of the elimination of indigenous people, the basic problem of these colonies was the lack of population. In Australia, for example, it was believed that the resources of this country could only be developed by a constant increase in its population. In that sense, development was envisaged as an indented activity that necessitated the agency of government to attract new settlers. It was assumed that as long as government constructed railways and made settlement possible through irrigation, population could flow to Australia.¹⁵ However, Cowen and Shenton do not think that these development practices took place in order to attract new settler. Contrary to Arndt, they think that in the colonial cases of Canada and Australia, development as the ‘intention to develop resources’ emerged when “both colonies faced the experience of mass unemployment”.¹⁶ Development, in other words, was formed in order to handle the problem of surplus population. A half century later, in the late 19th century, the doctrine of development came to Britain. The reason for the emergence of the ‘intention to develop’ was the same: to solve the surplus population problem that emerged as a result of massive unemployment and to suppress increasing unrest in colonial territories.

The best way to demonstrate how colonial development practices were exercised in the colonies of British Empire is to examine Joseph Chamberlain’s ideas on development. He was the colonial secretary of British Empire through the 1890s. He saw Britain as the landlord of estates that were still almost unexplored and underdeveloped. To improve British property, he proposed ‘state-sponsored economic development’ by which state undertook developmental practices like railway construction, improvement of irrigation systems and harbor works. After these developmental practices were accomplished, they helped to provide outlets for

¹⁵ Ibid., 461-462.

¹⁶ Cowen and Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, 173-174.

British investment and industrial products.¹⁷ Therefore, colonial development practices did not aim at increasing or enhancing colonial conditions, but rather they focused on the exploitation of colonial resources for the Empire.

In the late 1920s, a shift occurred in development practices and colonial policies. The British Empire endorsed ‘Colonial Development Act’, and ten years later, in 1939, it was replaced by the ‘Colonial Development and Welfare Act’. In addition to the principle of developing natural resources and productive capacities, these acts brought the concerns about the well-being of the colonial people who were started to be perceived as members of humanity. British Empire fostered colonial governments by giving loans or grants which were in turn utilized to develop agriculture and industry. Concerns about the well-being of colonial people were uttered within the notion of ‘trusteeship’.¹⁸ This idea referred responsibility of the colonizer to the native’s mental and physical well-being.

According to Deborah Johnston, concerns with the welfare of the colonial people were not an indication of humanitarian progress in development policies.¹⁹ In reality, what took place was the creation of humanitarian discourse that aimed to control populations. Through certain measurements like prohibiting slave trade, they intended to create a developed individual from the underdeveloped one, who was to be moral, honorable, free and also physically strong. Moreover, all improvements were oriented to working conditions; humanitarian approaches were applied not to people’s living conditions in general, but to labor’s working conditions. Whatever the repercussions of these policy changes were, one point was very clear: the colonial rule was being dismantled day by day, and the changing social, economic and political factors rendered old power relations obsolete and necessitated new ones. After the Second World War and the end of the colonial period, development practices did not end, rather they were dispersed all over the world. In the following

¹⁷ Ibid., 273-275.

¹⁸ Arndt, “Economic Development: A Semantic History”, 493.

¹⁹ Deborah S. Johnston, “Constructing the Periphery in Modern Global Politics,” in *The New International Political Economy*, eds. C. N. Murphy and R. Tooze (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1991), 158.

part, I will briefly explore the development practices that took place in the Cold War period.

2.3. Overview of Cold War Development Practices

As I showed in the preceding section, the idea of development has been in circulation for almost two centuries. Firstly, it emerged as a concept that referred to the realization of the potentials of things, later to the indented human actions to prevent negative impacts of capitalism and industrialization and finally, these ideas and practices were transferred to the colonial territories in order to strengthen the deteriorating position of the imperialist countries. However, only after the Second World War, development was institutionalized and became a main concern for the nation-states. It played a crucial role both in the construction process of new nation-states after colonialism and in the international power relations that were shaped by the rivalry between the Unites States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War period. Before presenting a detailed explanation of the development practices from a critical perspective, that is, revealing the role of the development discourse in recasting hegemonic relationship between the West and the Third World in the Cold War period, it would be suitable to present a brief account of the development practices that took place in the Cold War period.

After the Second World War, there were two kinds of institutions that fostered the construction of development discourse: Western countries, especially the U.S. and the international organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The last two institutions were created through the Bretton Woods system and they deserve special emphasis. By the end of the Second World War, the world economy was in stagnation, caused first by the economic crisis of the 1930s and then by the war. As a result of the increasing unemployment and protectionism, the volume of the world trade deteriorated in a drastic way and primary commodity prices sharply decreased, which meant income loss for developing countries. To solve these problems, members from 44 nations gathered in July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, USA. The conference was dominated by the U.S and Britain, while most of the developing countries present were from Latin America. In

that sense, it was far from being representative. However, the Bretton Woods agreements are important because they stayed intact as an international system until 1973 and the major institutions they initiated still have influence in international politics and economy.

The first institution envisaged in the Bretton Woods agreements was the United Nations (UN). It was to be the forum through which international decisions would be taken and an organ to maintain international political and military stability. At that time, it was visualized that other Bretton Woods institutions would be an integral part of the United Nations system.²⁰ However, this aim has never been realized. In addition to political concerns, UN also took place in the development initiatives with its two institutions, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Food Program. The aid program within the UN was based on grants or concessional aid. In terms of the development policies, UN was not endowed with the ‘hard’ instruments of development, like finance or macroeconomic policy making; rather it had ‘soft’ instruments, such as food aid, technical assistance, children, women and social policy. In that sense, the role of the UN in the development practices was partial compared to other Bretton Woods institutions.

Another Bretton Woods institution that had direct impact on the Cold War development practices was the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Fund was formed with the aim of accomplishing global macroeconomic monetary and financial management. It was envisaged as a source of short-term finance to offset balance of payment deficits and exchange rate fluctuations. In other words, the function of IMF was not to initiate development projects in the Third World countries, but to help them when they had an economic crisis. Therefore, until the late 1970s, the influence of IMF in the development practices was limited. When the negative impacts of the failure of development policies began to be experienced and the Third World countries could not pay their debts in the 1980s, the IMF increased its role in determining development policies.

²⁰ Kunibert Raffer and Hans W. Singer, *The Economic North-South Divide: Six Decades of Unequal Development* (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar, 2001), 6.

In terms of the development practices, the most influential Bretton Woods Institution was the World Bank (WB). Its name was initially International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), but after the formation International Development Association (IDA) and International Finance Corporation in the 1960s, the Bank became the World Bank Group. The aim behind the formation of the Bank was to provide long-term finance to development projects. As its name indicates, it is a bank that functions as a mediator between those who have money to borrow and those who needs money for investment. In other words, the money given by the Bank is not grant but loan. However, because it does not pursue profit, it can lend money below the market interest rate. Therefore, a developing country would have a chance to finance its development investment with lower interest rates.

The most important component of the Bank's development philosophy is its firm bias in favor of the market economy and private ownership. Concomitant with this principle, the Bank gives loans to a country only if the latter cannot borrow money from private markets. Additionally, the Bank loans can be made for specific investment projects which would not hamper private ownership. In this understanding the task of the governments in development process is to create suitable institutional framework for the effective functioning of the private enterprises.²¹ Because this aim was to be accomplished by an adequate provision of infrastructure, the Bank gave loans for big infrastructure projects during the 1950s. It financed transportation, electricity and irrigation projects in the developing countries.

The development philosophy and the lending principles of the Bank have never been intact. Changing economic situation of the developing countries and the shift in the dominant development theories transformed World Bank policies. In the early 1960s, recognizing the fact that the poorest countries could not borrow from the Bank and that the recourses which it could mobilize to finance development were too small, the World Bank doubled its subscribed capital and established IDA. The latter started to give loans to poor countries without charging any interest rate. In line with these

²¹ John. H. Alder, "The World Bank's Concept of Development: An In-House *Dogmengeschichte*," in *Development and Planning*, eds. J. Bhagwati and R. Eckaus (London: George Allen, 1972), 36.

measures, the Bank shifted its lending from infrastructure projects to agriculture and industry investments.

The profound transformation of the World Bank policies took place during the 1970s under the presidency of Robert S. McNamara. He put poverty issue on the agenda of the Bank and emphasized the crucial role of the Bank lending not only in increasing GNP per capita, but also in improving living conditions of poor people. The Bank, in this period, started to take into account issues about education, basic nutritional requirements of individuals and lending for the benefit of peasant farmers. These considerations culminated in the preparation of rural development projects and aid initiatives for small subsistence farmers. McNamara's attempts to transform the policies of the Bank had direct impact on the existing development discourse. The social aspects of the development process were incorporated into existing policies. Moreover, the meaning of 'developed' transformed and it started to mean guaranteeing a certain level of welfare to population. In fact, what caused these transformations was the institutionalization of poverty as a concern in the World Bank. In doing this, contrary to preceding conceptualizations, 'the poor' was mentioned as individual human beings rather as countries. Ceasing to classify entire countries as poor, the Bank emphasized the poor segments *within* societies.²² Development agencies targeted poor populations within the states and forced developing countries to take into account distributional issues. In that sense, as the result of the World Bank's efforts, poverty alleviation became a part of the international development practices.

Although this thesis contains the development practices of the Cold War period, World Bank's policies in the 1980s and 1990s deserve attention. As a result of the debt crisis, increasing neo-liberalism and the failure of development policies, development philosophy of the Bank has undergone drastic transformation. New policy objective of the Bank became structural adjustment with growth. In line with the imperatives of Washington Consensus the Bank initiated policy-based lending that aimed to transform political and economic structures of the Third World

²² Martha Finnemore, "Redefining Development at the World Bank," in *International Development and Social Sciences*, eds. F. Cooper and R. Packard (California: California University Press, 1997), 212.

countries. In order to give structural adjustment loans the Bank demanded from borrower countries to pursue specific policies that guarantee the free play of the market forces and the retreat of state from economic issues. In other words, the Bank's loans were the main vehicle for the expansion of neo-liberal policies to the Third World countries. However, World Bank has never been monolithic. Those who were against the neo-liberal policies in the Bank managed to reorganize it in 1987. The new issues on the agenda of the Bank during the 1990s were poverty, environment, gender and governance. In this period, adjustment lending was replaced by poverty-focused lending.

As I mentioned above, apart from these Bretton Woods institutions, there was one other element, which fostered the development practices all over the world: the United States of America. As the protector of capitalism and 'democracy' against communism, the U.S. started to tackle the issue of development after the World War II. In defining post-war policies of the U.S., Harry S. Truman said that:

More than half of the people of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. Their food is inadequate; they are victims of disease... Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous areas. .. I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their aspirations for a better life... What we envisage is a program of development based on the concept of democratic fair dealing... Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more rigorous application of modern scientific and technical knowledge.²³

In line with these considerations, the U.S. initiated the first development practice in Western Europe to reconstruct these countries. With the help of the Marshall Plan and Keynesian policies, based on full employment and low inflation, Western Europe experienced an economic boom in the 1950s. Relative success of development policies in these countries created a considerable optimism, and many developing countries were convinced to pursue the same path of development process. However, for developing countries the process of development consisted of moving from *traditional* society to *modernity*, that is, approximately the United States of the 1950s. According to the dominant development paradigms the only means to achieve 'modernity' was economic growth. It was believed that once an economy achieved a certain critical level of growth, the rest would all follow. Savings, investment and

²³ Harry S. Truman, *Inaugural Speech on January 20, 1949*, Washington, DC. Available online at <http://som.fio.ru/RESOURCES/FILIPPOVMA/2003/ENGLISH/12/truman/truman.htm>.

technology transfer were perceived as main tools for achieving desired growth. During the 1950s, development policies were shaped under the shadow of capital accumulation, the primacy of investment and GDP growth rates. All these development practices were founded on modernization theories. Leaving aside the detailed explanation of this approach to other chapters, it would be suitable to underline the fact that in the 1950s development was perceived as economic growth.

The 1950s and 1960s was a period of rapid industrialization for many developing countries. The most common strategy pursued by these countries was ‘import-substituted industrialization’ (ISI). It was an inward-looking strategy that aimed to produce goods which were imported. These policies involved high import tariffs, quota restrictions on imports and controlled access to foreign exchange. These protectionist measures tried to favor infant industries in the developing countries. Any country which pursued ISI started with the production of consumer goods and moved to intermediate goods, and then to capital goods. However, this strategy contained many drawbacks: internal markets in the Third World countries were not big enough to consume the produced goods and for domestic production, these countries needed machines which could only be exported from developed countries. As a result, ISI strategy necessitated large foreign exchange reserves and ISI pursuing countries experienced balance of payment difficulties through the end of the 1960s.

Although rapid industrialization took place in this period, its pace was quite different in different regions. In Latin America, industrialization efforts had already started in the 1930s and by the 1960s, they had a substantial industrial basis. Most of the Latin American countries chose ISI along with high capital flows from investments of transnational corporations. In contrast, the East Asian industrializing countries (South Korea, Taiwan Singapore) pursued an industrialization strategy based on exporting consumer goods. In the India case, on the other hand, industrialization was accomplished through high protectionism and with little direct foreign investment.²⁴

²⁴ Tom Hewit, “Half a Century of Development,” in *Poverty and Development in the 21st Century*, eds. T. Allen and A. Thomas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 295.

Towards the end of the 1960s, it became apparent that by no means all countries managed to be developed. It was understood that growth was not adequate to bring prosperity to people. On the contrary, the rapid growth had been accompanied by increasing inequalities. Additionally, rapid urbanization, transformation of rural areas, neglect of agricultural production culminated in huge social and economic problems. The disillusionment with the theories of modernization school opened the paths to search for alternative development approaches. The most crucial of them was the dependency school that linked underdeveloped condition of the Third World countries to their dependent relations with the First World, whose origins can be traced back to colonialism. The clear benefit of these interrogations was a general revolt against straitjacket of economic definitions of development. Even the orthodox economists accepted the fact that development and its goals could not be reduced to quantitative indicators. Hence, official bodies of development practices were more inclined to acknowledge social aspects of development process.

By the 1970s, development as an ideal and economic fact had become severely undermined. During the 1970s two phenomena appeared concerning the development practices: first, increasing emphasis on employment and distribution with growth and second, increase in the debts of developing countries.

In 1970, the first attempt to take into account the social aspect of development was a UN resolution establishing a project defined as *unified approach to development and planning*. It aimed to integrate economic and social components in the formulation of development policies and programs. According to resolution, any development policy should not leave any sector of the population outside the scope of development, activate all sectors of the population to participate in the development process, aim at social equity and give priority to the development of human potentials.²⁵ Although the result of the attempt was frustrating, it managed to animate the development debate during the years that followed.

²⁵ Wolfgang Sachs, "Introduction," in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, ed. W. Sachs (London: Zed Books, 1992), 14.

These ideas were elaborated in the proposals of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation, which suggested *another development* and *human-centered development*, which aimed at development of people, not things. Finally, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) focused on *integrated development*: “a total, multi-relational process that includes all aspects of the life of a collectivity, of its relations with the outside world”.²⁶ In a conference, organized by International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1976, a new conceptualization came into being: *Basic Needs Approach*, which aimed to achieve certain specific minimum standards of living for the Third World people. This approach became popular within two or three years. Especially the World Bank found it viable, since it based its development strategy on the rural poor and small farmers. Finally, the search for going beyond the orthodox approaches of development in the 1970s culminated in the concept of *endogenous development*. This idea, developed by the experts of UNESCO, underlined the necessity of taking into account the particularities of each nation. As Wolfgang Sachs clearly indicates, this approach led to a dead-end in theory and practices of development, since it showed the impossibility of imposing a single cultural model for development on the whole world. Because we do not have any basis to measure or define development, we are left with different systems of values and diverse cultures.²⁷

The second phenomenon in the development practices of the 1970s was the debts of developing countries. After the suspension of the free convertibility of the U.S. dollar to gold at fixed exchange rate in 1971 and the first oil crisis in 1973, the developing countries started to experience deficit in their balance of payments. Existing savings in these countries were spent to offset this deficit, which in turn diminished financial sources for development investment. On the other hand, increasing oil prices meant increasing surpluses for OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) countries. These countries, in turn, deposited their earnings in the private European banks. Therefore, after 1974, recycled OPEC dollars were ‘cheap money’ (at low interest rates) which was hard for many developing countries (demanding new

²⁶ Ibid., 15.

²⁷ Ibid., 16.

financial sources for their development projects) to resist. Then, the result was ‘debt trap’: increased borrowing raised interest rates, which had serious consequences for debt repayment. As a result, by the end of the 1970s, many Third World countries were unable to repay their debt burden. Economic resources that had been allocated to development investment were started to be used in debt service payments. In that sense, with the contribution of other factors, the 1980s was the ‘lost decade’ for developing countries.

This brief account of the development practices of the Cold War period may lead one to conclude that the development initiatives were free from any power relations. On the contrary, this thesis is based on the idea that these practices were tools for constructing hegemony in the Cold War period. They stemmed from a specific social and political context and were answers to urgent needs shaped by the Cold War concerns. In this sense, the next section will explain the social, political and economic conditions in the post-war period. It will depict the conditions of the Western countries and other parts of the world in order to link the Cold War context to development practices.

2.4. Post-war Context

Development practices were historically and culturally contingent; they can only be understood in the context of power relations at the time of their formation. In that sense, exploring political and economic context of post-Second World War period is helpful in analysing development practices. Main spheres of change were independence movements in colonial countries, restructuring of Europe after war, emergence of Cold War along with the fear of communism, the need to find new markets for the booming production of the U.S., increasing Keynesian politics, and finally, belief in the applicability of pure science and technology in solving macro problems.²⁸

²⁸ Arturo Escobar, *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), 31-38. (hereafter cited as *Encountering Development*)

Post-war period of the 1940s and 1950s witnessed drastic changes in the hegemony structure of world politics. Nationalism became the leading ideology in colonial countries. They initiated military struggles against colonialist countries to gain their independence. In this period, sustaining old methods of colonialism, which was mainly based on physical coercion of indigenous people, was impossible and most of the colonial countries gained their independence. After this process, elites of these countries started to construct a unified nation which was mainly based on Western type of political and economic institutions, while at the same time they tried to articulate their countries to world politics with equal rights. At this stage, developmental state came into being; development process, with the agency of state, was defined as the prime contributor of economic and political independence in the postcolonial countries.

Another factor that shaped the post-war period was the restructuring of Europe. In terms of politics, post-war period experienced shift in the hegemony of world politics; European countries, especially the main colonial forces of the 20th century- for example United Kingdom- lost their political power and the U.S. turned into the hegemonic power of the post-war period. However, without the help of Europe, this power was far away from being sustainable, that is to say, the U.S.'s first task after war was the revitalization of the European economy in order to find new allies in the Cold War period. Additionally, during the war the U.S. economy had experienced huge amount of growth, especially in industrial output which in turn created oversupply for domestic market. The U.S. had to find foreign markets to melt down its increasing inventories. In that sense, it initiated economic aid to Western Europe which was formulated under the name of Marshall Plan. Later, this aid mechanism was transferred to U.S.'s relations with Third World countries: proposed development plans and direct aids to Third World countries were aimed to create Western lifestyles so that the U.S. products could be demanded.

Another historical condition that made the creation of development discourse possible was the Cold War and fear of communism. Post-war period witnessed the division of the world into three political spheres: First World countries which included the U.S. and Western European countries; Second World countries which

consisted of the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries; and Third World countries which included the ex-colonial countries and those that did not belong to First and Second World countries. The real battleground of Cold War between the West and East was Third World countries. Each part endeavoured to increase its control over the Third World countries. The idea of development and ways of realizing it were basic means of this battle. Proposed development policies, proposed by the U.S. and the other Western countries, were the blueprints of the capitalist development in Western societies. They assumed that the only possible way of development for Third World countries was to follow paths of capitalist development: increase in accumulation of capital, commodification of life, institutionalization of market economy and industrialization. In that sense, development policies and practices reflected the faith in capitalism. Additionally, the capitalist side of the world thought that poverty made people susceptible to communist ideas; therefore, poor countries had to be rescued from their poverty, if not they would slip into communism.

Another issue that marked post-war period politics was the increase in the widespread application of Keynesian politics. Great Depression of the 1930s and the Second World War collapsed laissez-fair approach in economy. These developments reshaped the relationship between the state and society in the Western countries. Governance, in these societies, became an activity undertaken by the national welfare state acting as a unified body and in defense of society. The aim of the welfare state was to frame society with mechanisms of security through which it could care the welfare of its citizens throughout their lives. Role of the techniques of the Keynesian intervention, such as adjustment to fiscal and monetary policy or direct state investment, was to create a form of direct security in which the health of society and the health of the economy became mutually reinforcing.²⁹ It is possible to suggest that development apparatus was the best way to transfer this welfare state to Third World countries. Applying these Keynesian policies within the framework of development necessitated developmental states in the Third World countries. The state in these countries was seen as the prime agent of development since these

²⁹ Michell Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in the Modern Society* (London: Sage Publications, 1999), 15.

countries were deprived of private entrepreneurship and capital accumulation which were exalted as the main contributors of industrialization.

Finally, blind faith in technology and science were the other contributors to the formation of development discourse. The Second World War took place not only in battlegrounds but also in research centres and laboratories. Military power of both sides was based on scientific and technological innovations. It is believed that the triumph of the U.S. and its allies was based on their superiority in technology. Application of this technology in the Second World War was later transferred to the war against underdevelopment. Scientific research was conceived as the main contributor of Third World development. In that sense, transfer of technology to the Third World became the main component of development projects.

If we see development practices as a certain way of problematization of a particular aspect of human life, it can be said that this process is not natural or inevitable, but historically contingent and dependent on power relations. In this sense, development practices reflect the social, political and economic conditions from which they arise.

In the Enlightenment period, the idea of development intermingled with the notion of infinite and linear progress; later, it was shaped by the social evolutionism to analyze societies. In the 19th century, it was conceived as the totality of intended human actions to prevent social disorder caused by capitalism. At the same time, development was utilized in colonial territories to retard possible independence of subjugated people. However, in all these contexts, development played a partial role in shaping lives of individuals. Only after the World War II, as result of the changing conditions mentioned above, development became a profound mechanism in constructing relations between the West and the Third World. If development practices had a central role in the issues of development and domination, what theoretical approaches should be applicable to interrogate this dark side of the development practices? In the following chapter, I will draw on the ideas of Michel Foucault, whose insightful articulation of an intrinsic and irreversible relationship between power and knowledge is of immense value to the analysis of development discourse. To realize this aim, the next chapter will start with exploration of post-

development school, which perceives development practices as a discourse and applies Foucauldian theoretical framework to critically engage with it.

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1. Post-development

In the 1980s, development projects came to a halt. It was understood that ‘catching up’ developed countries as the main aim of development discourse did not become successful. Countless projects, which were initiated to bring prosperity to underdeveloped countries failed. Only very few countries managed to break the vicious circle of poverty. Most of the development projects exacerbated problems in the Third World. They destroyed indigenous ways of life and economy, and deepened cultural alienation. They created huge differences between the poor and rich, urban and rural. At the global level, development discourse brought further inequality between the North and the South. Even in newly industrialized countries where sound economic growth was experienced, democratization and social improvement did not follow achieved growth. It has been demonstrated that “democracy is not an inevitable product of the factory”.³⁰ Economic growth without distribution concerns did not bring welfare, but rather culminated in increased inequality and social problems.

Debt crisis in the 1980s marked the transformation of development discourse. As it is described in the previous chapter, Third World countries could borrow money with low interest rates from European private banks in the late 1970s. However, they did not manage to invest these loans in efficient development projects. Finally, after the 1970s, they could not afford to pay their loans back and debt crises have emerged. From that time on, they had to negotiate with IMF to sustain their debt service. In

³⁰ Thierry. G. Verhest, *No Life Without Roots: Culture and Development* (London: Zed Books, 1990), 12.

that sense, the World Bank as the dominant agent of development projects was substituted by the IMF who demanded tight fiscal policies and 'structural adjustment' programs from the Third World governments. The IMF focuses on neoclassical economic policies and integration of Third World countries to financial capital markets rather than development projects. Therefore, shift from the World Bank to the IMF in the role of policy making in international level is a sign of the transformation in the development discourse.

Failure in development projects culminated in the proliferation of critiques concerning development and its repercussions. It is possible to divide these critiques into two groups. First group, named as 'alternative development', contains those who try to overcome development impasse by proposing new approaches within the already existing development discourse. They criticize mainstream development understanding, but still believe in and redefine development. They put emphasis on the decreasing role of centralized governments in development projects, on indigenous knowledge and participatory development, and on the social capital.³¹ The World Bank's 1990 report on 'poverty' and 1997 report titled as 'The State in a Changing World' exemplify 'alternative development' approach.

Second group, which criticizes development, can be named as 'alternatives to development'. This group favors going beyond the development paradigm. For example, Wolfgang Sachs thinks that "the idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape. Delusions and disappointments, failures and crimes have been the steady companions of development and they tell a common story: it did not work".³² Because those who belong to this group totally reject the idea of development, they are called as post-development theorists in the literature. Most crucial proponents of post-development school are Arturo Escobar (1995), Gustavo Esteva (1992), Wolfgang Sachs (1992), John Crush (1996) and Sergey Latouche (1993).³³ What makes the analysis of post-development approach special and

³¹ Giles Mohan and Kristian Stoke, "Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 2 (2000), 247.

³² Sachs, "Introduction", 1.

elaborative is not only their rejection of development, but also their post-structuralist methodology and the Foucauldian perspective. They deploy an approach that conceives development paradigm as a *discourse* which creates relationship between knowledge, power and subjectivity. Arturo Escobar, for example, pursues a Foucauldian analysis of development discourse and defines it as follows:

[D]evelopment can be described as an apparatus that links forms of knowledge about Third World with the deployment of forms of power and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies. Development constructs the contemporary Third World, silently, without our noticing it. By means of this discourse, individuals, governments and communities are seen as ‘underdeveloped’ and treated as such.³⁴

By taking development as a discourse, post-development school deconstructs *naturalization* process of development paradigm through which its practices are perceived as scientific, and hence, free of any power relations. The Foucauldian analysis considers development as a culturally and historically contingent discourse which is shaped by power and domination relations. It problematizes formation of spaces of truth within the development discourse; the latter enables certain representations while it annihilates other forms. Furthermore, post-development questions the role of knowledge and power in subject formation, and shifts focus from ‘what is’ to *how* subjects are formed within this discourse as developed and underdeveloped.³⁵

According to Escobar, there are three elements that constitute development discourse: material and economic factors such as capital formation, technology, industrialization, agricultural development; cultural elements such as education and modern cultural values; and finally institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and

³³ Escobar, *Encountering Development*; Gustavo Esteva, “Development,” in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, ed. W. Sachs (London: Zed Books, 1992); Jonathan Crush, “Introduction: Imagining Development,” in *Power of Development*, ed. J. Crush (London and New York: Routledge, 1995); Serge Latouche, *In the Wake of Affluent Societies: An Exploration of Post-development* (London: Zed Books, 1993).

³⁴ Arturo Escobar, “Imagining a Post-development Era,” in *Power of Development*, ed. J. Crush (London and New York: Routledge, 1995), 213.

³⁵ Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London and New York: Zed Books, 2000), 14.

national planning agencies.³⁶ However, development discourse is not the combination of these elements, but also it is the “establishment of a set of relations among these elements” and systemization of them.³⁷ This discourse forms and arranges certain objects according to specific rules of its formation. Through its practice it constructs, by making some objects ‘visible’, namely the Third World. Development discourse sets rules of the game in which Third World can be problematized, mentioned, and managed in a certain manner that sustains hegemony of the West in postcolonial period.

Exploring the exercise of power and knowledge in development discourse reveals two mechanisms that construct this discourse. The first one is the *professionalization of development*. It defines the processes through which certain space of truth about the Third World is created and fostered. This process contains techniques and disciplinary practices by which knowledge is organized and disseminated.³⁸ Through this process, everything concerning the Third World is turned into objects of scientific analysis. New disciplines such as development economics, development studies and area studies are established in the Western universities. Local experts are trained in line with the scientific norms that are produced in the Western institutions. Professional discourse of development succeeds through abstractions; it separates concrete experiences of Third World people from the context and turns them into mere ‘cases’ or data.³⁹ This kind of process normalizes and categorizes Third World reality according to the rules of science, which are not free from any political and cultural biases. In other words, the knowledge produced by professionals of development takes, processes and represents facts of the Third World to produce a certain regime of truth, which in turn is utilized to construct and manage the Third World.

³⁶ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 40.

³⁷ Arturo Escobar, “Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World,” *Cultural Anthropology* 3, no.4 (1988), 430.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 110-111.

The other mechanism, which has a role in the construction of development discourse, is the *institutionalization of development*. It designates established institutional field in which development discourse is produced, modified, recorded and exercised.⁴⁰ This structure contains international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF and national, local agencies such as the State Planning Agency. They utilize knowledge, which is produced by professionals of development discourse; and by doing this, they make the exercise of power possible.

3.1.1. Shortcomings of Post-development School

Most frequently expressed critique concerning the post-development school is its problematization of development as a monolithic discourse. In the course of its application, theories and policies of development discourse have undergone many changes, like the emergence of alternative approaches in the 1960s and 1970s. However, it is asserted that, rhetorical language of post-development conceals these differences within the development discourse.⁴¹ It presents development as the devil that creates all problems in the Third World. It seems that these critiques reflect inadequate understanding of basic Foucauldian theory. Escobar also mentions changing strategies and theories within the development discourse. But these changes do not form a new discourse because latter is not the simple combination of theories, strategies and institutions it is the rules of formations that construct relationships between these elements.

Another critique of post-development emphasizes its essentializations. Post-development approach is operationalized through binary distinctions such as the West and the non-West. While the West is essentialized as inauthentic, urban, consumerist, monstrous and utilitarian, the non-West is coded as authentic, rural,

⁴⁰ Escobar, "Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third World", 431.

⁴¹ Jan Nederveen Pieterse, "My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-development, Reflexive Development," *Development and Change* 29 (1998), 363.

productive, content and in harmony with nature.⁴² Similarly, Maria Baaz thinks that post-development constructs mirror image of Eurocentrism located in development discourse: it changes negative image of the Third World with a positive one. Post-development conceives the West as the source of problems and the Third World as the host of virtues. Hence, essentialization culminates in normative figures such as the ‘Noble Third World’ and the ‘Ignoble West’.⁴³

Rejection of modernity and development by post-development school is also criticized by some authors. Jan Pieterse, for example, asserts that post-development theory exhibits a paradox. Against the negative impact of development it proposes democratization of this process, and the politics of difference which arise out of modernity itself.⁴⁴ In other words, the tools that are used by post-development to fight against modernity are already products of modernity. Additionally, Stuart Corbridge criticizes post-development for its equalization of modernity with universal science, bureaucracy and even oppression. However, he thinks that development practices which utilize science have considerable beneficial effects such as achievements of modern medicine in lowering child mortality.⁴⁵ These critiques are really weak and even in some aspects deceptive. Post-development debate is beyond the mere acceptance or rejection of modernity. It ‘problematizes’ modernity that is to say, it interrogates role of it in power relations and discloses embedded Eurocentrism in the development discourse. Furthermore, Escobar always avoids essentializing the ‘traditional’ and the ‘modern’. He encourages hybrid cultures which exhibit openness toward modernity and he continues by warning us:

If we continue to speak of tradition and modernity, it is because we continually fall into the trap of not saying anything new because the language does not permit it. The concept of hybrid cultures provides an opening toward the invention of new languages.⁴⁶

⁴² Stuart Corbridge, “Beneath the Pavement Only Soil: The Poverty of Post-Development,” *Journal of Development Studies* 34, no.6 (1998), 144.

⁴³ Maria Eriksson Baaz, “Culture and Eurocentrism of Development: The Noble Third World versus the Ignoble West and Beyond,” *Journal of International Relations and Development* 2, no.4 (1999), 212.

⁴⁴ Pieterse, “My Paradigm or Yours? Alternative Development, Post-development, Reflexive Development”, 365.

⁴⁵ Corbridge, “Beneath the Pavement Only Soil: The Poverty of Post-Development”, 144.

Post-development school is mainly criticized about its overemphasis on local communities and cultural traditions. It is thought that post-development envisages local as the discrete places that host relatively homogenous communities and constitutes these places as the centers for new social movements and resistances to development discourse.⁴⁷ It reifies culture and locality by depicting them victims of development discourse, which do not have any active agency. This kind of conceptualization leads to the ignorance of power relations that take place at the local and nation-state levels. By referring to Meera Nanda, Aram Ziai suggests that the idea of ‘cultural authenticity’ ignores domination within a culture; and in India, for example, post-development serves as a mobilizing ideology for the rural beneficiaries of development. Deconstructing modern science and modernization encourages neo-populist movements that defend anti-modernist and patriarchal values of traditional elites.⁴⁸ But accusing post-development for romanticizing local communities is one way of perverting ideas of post-development school. Even the most romantics in this school acknowledge the existence of deprivation, domination and violence in local communities. Likewise, Escobar sees necessity of avoiding extreme approaches which are inclined “to embrace [local culture] uncritically as alternative; or to dismiss them as a romantic exposition”.⁴⁹

Another group of critique focuses on the application of Foucault’s ideas in the post-development school. Aram Ziai claims that, the language of post-development reflects the rhetoric of conspiracy theory. Assertions such as unmasking development’s promises as mirage and revealing ‘reality’ and ‘secrets’ of development are reminiscent of “traditional objectivist critique of ideology”.⁵⁰ Additionally, he thinks that post-development analyzes power relations at macro

⁴⁶ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 219.

⁴⁷ Mohan and Stoke, “Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism”, 264.

⁴⁸ Aram Ziai, “The Ambivalence of Post-Development: Between Reactionary Populism and Radical Democracy,” *Third World Quarterly* 25, no.6 (2004), 1055-1056.

⁴⁹ Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 170.

⁵⁰ Ziai, “The Ambivalence of Post-Development: Between Reactionary Populism and Radical Democracy”, 1047.

level. It signs international institutions and state as the centers from which power emanates and conceives local communities as terrains that are free of any domination and conflict.

The final critique related to the conceptualization of power in the post-development approach is the repressivity hypothesis. After underlining Foucault's distinction between sovereign power and biopower, Morgan Brigg asserts that post-development remains captured within a repressive understanding of power. Usage of colonization metaphor like 'colonizing mechanisms of power' or 'colonization of reality' reveals that post-development sees development as a mere imposition of the West, which is introduced by using repressive power in the Third World context. However, rather than being repressive and deductive power, biopower is productive, in the sense that, it creates interests and aspirations of Third World subject that enhances not submissiveness of the individual, but rather potentials and practices of him or her. A related problem in the post-development school is the usage of power with connotations of intentionality.⁵¹ By emphasizing imposition, post-development creates an image of the singular intentional force such as the 'West' or the 'U.S.'. They appear as the subjects of development who can take decisions and implement them with full of intentions and without any resistance. This leads to the underestimation of multidimensionality in social relations and their contingent character.

This thesis aims to pursue Foucault's theoretical framework for analyzing the scientific theories of development and two basic tools of disseminating development discourse, namely aid and planning. For this aim, post-development approach is a fruitful starting point, since the way they apply Foucauldian theories opens new paths in this literature. However, as it is explained above, this approach is not free from flaws. Although most of the criticisms are based on exaggerated and distorted versions of the ideas of post-development school, it is true that this school is inclined to define development discourse as an imposition of the West, which is managed by the U.S. or the World Bank. How can one escape from these theoretical

⁵¹ Morgan Brigg, "Post-Development, Foucault and the Colonization Metaphor," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no.3 (2002), 424.

shortcomings? Rather than leaving aside the Foucauldian framework as a tool for analyzing development practices of the post-war period, I will focus on Foucault's later studies, the ones that are written in the late 1970s and the early 1980s. Regarding the fact that Foucault himself was always critical to his own works and tried to overcome dilemmas of his studies, his later ideas can give insights to avoid the above mentioned theoretical flaws. In line with this idea, I will dwell on four Foucauldian notions, which can be regarded as the main components of my theoretical toolbox in analyzing development practices of post-war period: *power-knowledge*, *biopower*, *governmentality* and *dispositif*.

3.2. Power-Knowledge

One of the aims of this thesis is to reveal the role of the modernization theory in shaping development discourse. It tries to explain that the assumptions, the 'scientific' methods, knowledge and the truth that the modernization school produced in the Cold War period should not be evaluated as 'objective' or 'impartial'. All the theories of modernization school were inevitably affected from power relations. If it is remembered that modernization school flourished after the Second World War in the U.S., it will be easier to grasp the effectiveness of this school in fighting against communism, perpetuating dominant position of the First World vis-à-vis the Third World and deploying tools for managing international power struggle. In order to explain this side of the modernization school, first, the relationship between knowledge and power must be analyzed. This kind of theoretical inquiry is the aim of this section.

The relationship between power and development is analyzed in a detailed way by Foucault. He thinks that power produces knowledge, and it is impossible to understand power without analyzing knowledge and vice versa. While the typical understanding of knowledge perceives it as the tool for those in power, which is mainly used to legitimize existing hegemonic relations; for Foucault, the acquisition of knowledge inevitably contains power relations. In this sense, he bonds these two concepts together in a single entity: power-knowledge. They form an entity because

exercising power always creates new objects of understanding or rational inquiry; in return, knowledge presupposes and constitutes power relations.⁵²

Power-knowledge dyad also refers to the reciprocity between power and truth, since in producing knowledge, power also produces truth. In other words, truth isn't outside the power; it induces regular effects of power. It is not simply the representation of the way things are, such as two times two equals four; rather, it refers to "system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements".⁵³ Truth is in relation with the systems of power which produce and sustain a 'regime of truth':

That is, the types of discourse which [each society] accepts and makes function as true; the mechanism and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true.⁵⁴

The best illustration of this 'regime of truth' is the very idea of 'science', which has great importance in the contemporary Western society. The scientific method is the legitimate way of distinguishing true and false statements. The statements derived only by the techniques and procedures which are defined as 'scientific' have the status of being 'true'. Additionally, those who have the authority to say what counts as true are not determined in a random way. There is an institutional edifice in which one can claim authority about scientific truth. Universities and research centers, as the embodiments of science, have the right to give diplomas and certificates, which make persons 'scientists'. In other words, the idea of 'science' creates such a 'regime of truth' through which what is 'scientific' automatically becomes what is 'true'. If any statement is derived from the 'scientific' assumptions and by the 'scientific' methods, it directly has the status of being true. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that modernization theorists blamed dependency school's critics as unscientific and ideological because determining whether a statement is scientific or

⁵² Michel Foucault, *Power-Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, ed. Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 131.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 133.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 131.

not always contains power struggle, since being scientific directly means being 'true'.

In the development discourse, institutions and community of social scientists are central in the dissemination of existing truth discourses. When these discourses conform to the regime of truth, then certain discourses or bodies of knowledge are admitted into the category of 'true knowledge'. In this process, a whole set of knowledge is rendered "suspect, discredited, excluded and disqualified, while another becomes the basis of policy formation".⁵⁵ In most of the time, this mechanism in the development discourse operates to exclude indigenous and popular knowledge by defining them 'unscientific' or 'irrational'. The constructed truth regime allows the discourse of the development expert to take precedence over the discourse of local farmer in the Third World country.⁵⁶

The following chapter will explain the power-knowledge relationship at the level of knowledge production. By analyzing three important schools that had direct impact on the formation of development discourse in the Cold War period, it will show the role of social theories in constructing hegemonic development discourse and also in facilitating resistances against it. Power-knowledge dyad can be observed not only in the scientific theories, but also in the development practices. Recalling the fact that Foucault uses the notion of 'biopower' to define the set of strategies of power-knowledge in the modern Western societies, focusing on the theoretical repercussions of 'biopower' would be illuminating to analyze power-knowledge in the development practices. Therefore, the main theme of the next section will be the 'biopower'.

⁵⁵ Marc DuBois, "The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development," *Alternatives* 16 (1991), 7.

⁵⁶ It would be illuminating to note the fact that, after the 1980s, orthodox development approaches try to incorporate indigenous knowledge into development discourse. However, taking into account indigenous knowledge does not mean that development discourse is now free from any power relations. What is at stake are the ways of utilizing this local knowledge.

3.3. Biopower

Foucault's definition of power was quite different from the general understanding of power. The latter sees power as a repressive and negative force that limits, controls, forbids and excludes. In contrast, Foucault thinks that power is primarily positive, rather than negative, and productive rather than restrictive.⁵⁷ Moreover, he rejects the juridical understanding of power which conceives it as a top to down operation and the thing that can be transferred from one person to other. For him, power is mainly relational; it comes into being through tactics and practices.

Analyzing power relations at micro level stems mainly from the idea that starting from the 17th century, power mechanisms in Europe had undergone transformation. The determining factor in this transformation was the change in the application of the sovereign power. In his book devoted to explaining history of sexuality in Europe, Foucault gives an account of this transformation in a chapter entitled 'Right of death and power over life'.⁵⁸ Classical deductive power that was in practice through medieval era was sovereignty. It was mainly conceived as the transcendent form of authority exercised over subjects within a definite territory, and its principle instruments were laws, degrees and regulations.⁵⁹ The exercise of sovereignty is practiced through right to kill or let live and had the sword as its symbol. As a specific form of rule over things, sovereignty subtracted products, money, wealth, labour, service, and blood. But, Foucault argues that, starting from classical period, we can observe the proliferation of other ways of exercising power in addition to this deductive power. These new mechanisms seek to reinforce, proliferate, incite, control, and optimize forces rather than subjugating, annihilating or limiting them. From that moment, right to death shifted to considering necessities of life. This understanding tries to foster life, increases the means of subsistence and cares the

⁵⁷ Marc Dubois, "The Governance of the Third World: A Foucauldian Perspective on Power Relations in Development", 5.

⁵⁸ Michel Foucault *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction* (London: Allen Lane, 1979)

⁵⁹ Dean, *Governmentality: Power and the Rule in Modern Society*, 105.

happiness and prosperity of its inhabitants. Foucault calls this new power mechanism *biopower* and defines it as

a power whose task is to take charge of life needs continuous regulatory and corrective mechanisms. It is no longer a matter of bringing death into play in the field of sovereignty, but of distributing the living in the domain of value and utility. Such a power has to qualify, measure, appraise and hierarchize.⁶⁰

For Foucault, there are two components of biopower, functioning at different levels of the same basic target: first, *disciplinary power* that focuses on individual human body, and second, *regulation of populations*, aimed at ‘species-body’. As an ‘anatomy-politics,’ first one demands “the optimization of capacities of human body, the exertion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility”, while the second one, ‘bio-politics’, targets biological processes such as “propagation, births, and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity”.⁶¹

Rendering human bodies at once docile and useful was first exercised in the military barracks of the 19th century Europe. Later, similar techniques were emulated in the other institutions such as schools, factories, hospitals, families and bureaucracies. The most crucial instruments of disciplinary power were hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. The first technique entails the panopticon architecture which aims to “act on those it shelters, to provide a hold on their conduct, to carry the effects of power right to them, to make it possible to know them, to alter them”.⁶² Normalizing techniques, on the other hand, define averages, limits and optimums by which they differentiate individual actions and compare them to one another. Moreover, these techniques measure human action in quantitative terms, and rank them to pinpoint those who are at the margins. By excluding them, they aim to achieve certain homogeneity. The final technique, examination, combines observation and normalizing techniques; by doing this, it

⁶⁰ Foucault, *History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, An Introduction*, 144.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 139.

⁶² Jhonston, “Constructing the Periphery in Modern Global Politics”, 161.

enables documentation. Each individual becomes a ‘case’ within the power structure of the system of knowledge.

Biopolitics on the other hand, concerns the administration of life at the level of population. It is the “endeavor, begun in the eighteenth century, to realize problems presented to governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a group of living human beings constituted as a population: health, sanitation, birth rate, long, race”.⁶³ In other words, life with all its complexity becomes the object of bio-political power. It concerns all aspects of life: social, cultural, environmental, economic and geographic. However, Foucault warns us to analyze biopolitical power in relation to liberalism. The exercise of biopolitics is shaped by this question: how is it possible to deal with the ‘population’ where law and freedom of people are the main pillars of social, economic and political system?⁶⁴

Liberalism has emerged as a critique of the potential and existing forms of biopolitics; it was always in an alert position to detect excessive intervention of biopolitical government. This liberal understanding was based on the idea that population, society and economy are semi-autonomous spheres, and they can be influenced not through the individual and intense technologies of discipline, but by the control of processes which are social and economic. This liberal interrogation marks the transformation of biopower from ‘disposition of things’ to ‘frugal government’. First method, as in the emergence of *Polizetwissenschaft*, exercised through the disposition of people and things in order to increase and strengthen the state power or king, whereas liberal ‘frugal government’ understanding seeks to exercise influence by the distant and calculative means of governmentality.⁶⁵ In order to explain this level of biopower, I will dwell on *governmentality* and *the governmentalization of state* in the next part. But before doing that, I will try to unpack the relationship between biopower and development.

⁶³ Michel Foucault, *The Essential Works 1954-1984, Vol.1 Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth*, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 73, quoted in Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 99.

⁶⁴ Michel Foucault, *Ders Özetleri* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2001), 109.

⁶⁵ Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 50.

3.3.1. Biopower and Development

The shift from colonial period to postcolonial period in the 20th century also marks the transformation of sovereign power into biopower in power relations. Colonial rule was based on sovereign power in which colonies were assumed to be the property of the monarch. Coercive power was utilized to extract wealth, surplus and labor from colonies. However, independence of colonies brought sovereign power into a halt in the 1950s. As in the case of Europe, biopower substituted sovereign power in regulating relations between the West and Third World countries in the post-war era.⁶⁶ Development discourse is the tool through which this transformation takes place.

As in the case of disciplinary power in which institutions such as schools, factories and army barracks are the necessary places to train, and render bodies productive and docile, in the post-war period, same function was also exercised by development institutions. State agencies, international development organizations and universities are the institutions through which disciplinary power of development is operationalized. The first function of these institutions is the hierarchical observation by which they render the Third World to be known to the Western world. World Bank experts, IMF officials, state planning agents produce statistics about the birth rates, death rates, GNPs, urban populations, energy consumption rates- all sort of statistics on the Third World. Combined with other knowledge production techniques, they are utilized to objectify and subjectify the Third World.⁶⁷

Secondly, the knowledge about the Third World is utilized to compare 'underdeveloped' countries. By defining the basic social, economic and political characteristics of Western countries as the 'normal', statistics turns into a vehicle of comparing countries in terms of the 'normal'. Those countries which deviate from the 'norm'- this can be in terms of the volume of capital accumulation, GNP, urban

⁶⁶ Brigg, "Post-Development, Foucault and the Colonization Metaphor", 223-224.

⁶⁷ Johnston, "Constructing the Periphery in Modern Global Politics", 165.

population, capacity of industrial production - are isolated and turned into receivers of reforms and rehabilitations programs, designed according to developmental rationality. As in the case of disciplinary power, the aim of development is the same: to normalize behavior. This time the target is not only the docile and productive body of the individual, but also the modern developed nation-state.⁶⁸ Working through modernization theory, development seeks to normalize the one that deviates from the norm.

What could be the role of biopolitics in the development discourse? To give answer to this question, first we should explore an urgent problem in the 19th century Europe that caused the emergence of biopolitics. As Partha Chatterjee mentions, in the twentieth century, the emergence of mass democracy in Western societies created the distinction between citizens and populations.⁶⁹ At the theoretical level, each individual was perceived as a citizen who bears civic rights, such as universal suffrage. This assumption produced the homogeneous construct of the nation, whose interests were connected to nation-state through the idea of popular sovereignty. However, in reality, things worked quite differently; in practice, instead of a homogenous nation, there was a population that consists of individuals with different interests. This dilemma was surpassed by the exercise of biopolitics, which aimed to concern the well-being of the population. Through developing policies that increase welfare of the citizens, authorities managed to secure regimes in Western societies.

This dilemma was not experienced in the colonial territories since the distance between the imperialist state and the subjugated populations was defended by the coercive methods. There were few cases, in which biopolitical policies were applied; however, as it is defined in the preceding chapter, these policies aimed to develop working conditions of the populations not their welfare. The same dilemma occurred in Third World countries after the independence because these countries have copied the Western type of political and social institutions.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Partha Chatterjee, *Politics of the Governed: Reflections of Popular Politics in Most of the World* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 34.

In order to be clear, I want to give an example from India by drawing Partha Chatterjee's work. In his article focusing on the role of civil and political societies in postcolonial India, Chatterjee argues that modernized civil society was inadequate to link populations to the state.⁷⁰ First, understanding of civil society that was theoretically grounded on the concept of right bearing citizens was in contradiction to the realities of population since larger part of the latter did not have capacities to use their civil rights. Second, since civil society was composed of the Indian elites who endorsed 'modern' ideas of civil society, it was too small and left out populations. Therefore, the Indian authorities had to develop suitable ways for constructing mediation between populations and the state. In the post-war context, the answer to this problem was the "developmental state, which seeks to relate to different sections of the population through the governmental function of *welfare*".⁷¹ Biopolitics in the postcolonial states enabled the authorities to articulate populations to the state through development practices in which well-being of the populations was targeted. In other words, development discourse has transformed biopolitics, which were invented in Western societies throughout the 19th century, to the postcolonial countries in order to manage populations.

In the development context, biopolitics is also related to the concerns of population through the Malthusian approach. One of the arguments of modernization theory is that, in the Third World countries, there is a huge discrepancy between scarce resources and excessive population, and this fact is regarded as the main cause of underdevelopment. As a remedy, development projects and plans attempted to contain population growth rates, fertility rates, and birth control policies. In addition to concerns about the number of inhabitants, national development projects aim to increase the health of the population by immunization campaigns and nutritional education programs. There are two aims behind this project is: first, by increasing health standards, it aims to contribute to the accumulation of working force, which in

⁷⁰ Partha Chatterjee, "Two Poets and Death: On Civil and Political Society in the Non-Christian World," in *Questions of Modernity*, ed. T. Mitchell (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 46.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 35.

turn increases accumulation of national wealth; second, increased life standards of populations led them to articulate state policies.

Moreover, development projects that focus on population control problematize all aspects of life; hence turn these spheres into objects of biopolitical intervention. For example, rural development and health programs of the 1970s and 1980s exemplify application of biopolitics in the Third World countries. Throughout these programs, many aspects of the Third World societies such as health, nutrition, and education are regulated according to the rules of development discourse. These programs turn social life into an object of different disciplinary mechanisms, by which “biopolitics of development continues the deployment of modernity and the governmentalization of social life in the Third World”.⁷²

3.4. Governmentality

Foucault suggests that power does not simply refer to the relationships between individuals or collective, but it is a way in which certain actions modify others. Power can only exist when it is put into action; without action there is no a priori, universal thing from which power emanates. This action, however, is not a direct and immediate action on the other. Instead, it is an action upon another action that defines power. Therefore, the exercise of power is neither violence nor consent; but “it is a total structure of actions brought to bear upon possible actions; it incites, induces, seduces, makes easier or more difficult”; and it is always exercised on acting subjects “by virtue of their acting or being capable of action”.⁷³ In other words, operation of power is always based on the assumption that individuals have certain capabilities to choose their own actions.

This point leads us to the role of freedom in power relations. Contrary to general understanding of power which perceives it as the renunciation of freedom, Foucault’s

⁷² Escobar, *Encountering Development*, 143.

⁷³ Michel Foucault, “Subject and Power,” in *Michel Foucault: Beyond Hermeneutics and Structuralism*, aut. P. Rabinow and L. Dreyfus (New York: Harvester Press, 1982), 220.

definition accepts freedom as the main condition for the exercise of power. A slave with a chain does not exemplify power relation but only a “physical relationship of constrain”.⁷⁴ Only free individuals, who have capacity to act and think, can be seduced, and induced within power relations. This remark creates further questions: concerning the myriad number of actions that can be done by free subjects, how can the exercise of power shape the possibility of conduct and intervene to possible outcomes? Foucault answers this question by analyzing formation and transformation of problematic of government in Europe since the 16th century.

In his seminal paper on governmentality, Foucault defines two processes which led to the emergence of the problematic of government in the 16th century Europe: first, the disintegration of feudalism and the formation of great territorial administrative colonial states; second, as a repercussion of Reformation and Counter Reformation, questioning the manner in which one is to be spiritually ruled on this world.⁷⁵ As feudalism scatters and the role of religion in individuals’ life diminishes, European people become more free, which in turn creates the issue of governing this freedom both at the state and individual levels. Therefore, a problematic of government is shaped around the questions of ‘how to be governed’, ‘by whom’, ‘to what extent’, and ‘with what methods’.

In this framework, ‘government’ is not limited to political structures or to the management of states. It consists of the government of children, of souls, of communications, of families, of the sick and, may be more importantly, of the self. Concerning the multitude of the issues that are entailed by the problematic of government, the latter can only be exercised by immanent techniques which are specific to certain conditions. Government ‘as a conduct of conduct’ can be realized by structuring the possible field of action of individuals. Mitchell Dean extends this definition:

Government is any more or less calculated and rational activity, under taken by multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through our desires, aspirations,

⁷⁴ Ibid., 221.

⁷⁵ Michel Foucault, “Governmentality,” *Ideology and Consciousness*, no.6 (1979), 5-6.

interests and beliefs, for definite and shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes.⁷⁶

Knowledge is central for the possibility of governance; every authority renders certain objects visible according to a specific logic, calculation, experimentation and evaluation. This knowledge is embodied by experts; they are the link between socio-political objectives and daily existence at home, in school or factory.⁷⁷ Because of this strategic function, they can both produce knowledge and return them back to daily life as programs, projects that are shaped according to what is good, healthy, legal, medical, normal and technical. Combination of expertise and knowledge creates an indisputable territory of truth where government practices can easily gain legitimacy.

In order to delineate the relationship between government and knowledge, Foucault uses the term ‘governmentality’, which is the combination of the words ‘governing’ (gouverner) and ‘modes of thought’ (mentalité). Governmentality designates two aspects of the ‘art of government’: political rationalities that underpin programs of government, and secondly technologies, tactics and assemblages that put rationalities into practice.

First aspect is the discursive sphere in which the exercising of power is ‘rationalized’. It offers certain means to render the real thinkable, calculable and improvable. Certain political rationalities enable the problem to be addressed and it offers strategies for solving the problem.⁷⁸ Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller present three basic characteristics of political rationalities.⁷⁹ First, political rationalities have a *moral* form; they define the ideals and principles to which government should consider -freedom, citizenship, economic efficiency, solidarity, growth and the like. Second, there is a certain *epistemology* that fosters every governmental practice. This

⁷⁶ Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 11.

⁷⁷ Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller, “Political Power Beyond State: Problematics of Government,” *British Journal of Sociology* 43, no.2 (1992), 188.

⁷⁸ Thomas Lemke, “‘The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality,” *Economy and Society* 30, no. 2 (2001), 191.

⁷⁹ Rose and Miller, “Political Power Beyond State: Problematic of Government”, 78-179.

epistemology gives knowledge and information about the nature of the objects governed. For example, liberal rationality conceives economy as an autonomous sphere in which interest driven exchanges of individuals maximize the total welfare of society. Third, political rationalities are formulized in a specific *idiom*. Certain language, for example the vocabulary of ‘economy’, renders certain reality thinkable in a certain way.

The second aspect of governmentality is the material sphere where certain governmental programs, projects and aims are based on particular technologies. They enable intervention, and consist of techniques of notation, computation and calculation, procedures of examination and evaluation, devices such as surveys and tables, architectural designs and like that.

Foucault thinks that we live in an era of ‘governmentality’, which is discovered in the 18th century.⁸⁰ He called this transformation the ‘governmentalization of state’ whereby the art of government separated from the practices of sovereignty; and more complicated and dispersed techniques were articulated to the art of government. Foucault tries to reveal this transformation by focusing on the relationship between sovereignty, discipline and government. But rather than perceiving them as three successive types of society, he thinks that they shape a triangle: “sovereignty-discipline-government, which has as its primary target the population and as its essential mechanism of security”.⁸¹

3.4.1. Governmentality and Development

After presenting basic points about the notion of governmentality, I want to dwell briefly on the analytical power of ‘governmentality’ in analyzing the development discourses. I suggest that post-war era was managed by the developmental governmentality. Development projects provided rationality, techniques, and scientific knowledge for conducting conducts of the Third World people in order to achieve certain ends. It constructed a field of actions in which certain conducts of the

⁸⁰ Foucault, “Governmentality”, 20.

⁸¹ Ibid., 19.

Third World people were fostered and promoted, while certain actions are rendered impractical or invaluable. Rather than imposing sheer repression on individuals, authorities managed people's conduct in an indirect way by using development discourse.

As mentioned above, the problems of 'how to govern, by whom, and to what extent' emerged in the 16th century, where old feudal structures and religious beliefs shattered. Same kind of problems became apparent in the second half of the 20th century when colonial countries gained independence and Second World War recast international power relations. In this conjuncture, it became impossible to exercise colonial rule, which was based on sovereign power in which colonies were assumed to be the property of monarch. During the colonial regime this power was utilized to extract wealth, surplus and labor from the colonies. But, after the independence of colonial countries, the inhabitants of these geographies were no longer the subjects of the king. They were now free and autonomous individuals, not savages or barbarians who needed patriarchal intervention of the 'West', which would turn them into civilized persons. In other words, the same kind of transformation, which was experienced in Europe between 16th and 19th centuries in Europe, pertaining to the relationship between the sovereign and his subjects took place between the colonial subject and the 'Western' colonizer in the 20th century. Ex-colonial people were now free, and they could only be governed by accepting this fact, by forming the exercise of power on this structure, as in the case of governmentality. Therefore, as a result of historical specifications, development governmentality emerged to provide rationality and techniques for governing formerly colonized populations, who became free and autonomous.

Concerning the fact that governmentality contains two sides, political rationalities and material sphere, it is possible to define two spheres in which developmental governmentality is functioned. The first stage, which would be defined as the 'mode of thought', mainly dominated by the 'scientific' theories concerning development. The next chapter will analyze this sphere through the detailed account of modernization theory, dependency school and world system approach. In advance, it is possible to say that modernization school exemplifies the hegemonic modes of

thinking in the developmental governmentality. It has the moral form that puts emphasis on growth and economic efficiency; it has the epistemology in which it produces knowledge pertaining to the Third World; and it has a certain idiom that enables it to present issues of development within the framework of economy.

The second sphere of developmental governmentality, which would be defined as the ‘*techne of government*’, contains means to intervene, act upon the objects of government. Within the development context, the most important two means for realizing this function are development aid and planning. The first technique helps Western countries to construct relations with Third World countries, which is based on governmental way of using power, rather than sovereign ways of using it. In other words, development aid is the way of intervening Third World countries by fostering them to be in the development process. Additionally, development planning is mainly utilized by the authorities of nation-states to manage and control populations. It is a tool to turn development process into a technical and scientific task that excludes politics. These two mechanisms will be the main subject of chapter five.

By focusing on the two spheres of governmentality, one should not conclude that developmental governmentality contains duality between material and mental spheres. Each development practice is the realization and reproduction of certain political rationality, while at the same time it is a tool of the intervention to the object of government. In order to be clear, we need another Foucauldian notion, *dispositif*.

3.5. Dispositif

By comparing *dispositif* with *episteme*, one can easily understand the role of the former in Foucault’s later ideas. ‘*Episteme*’ is the central notion of his books *Order of Things* and *Archeology of Knowledge*. Foucault defines it as “the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences and possibly formalized systems”.⁸² Foucault’s main point was to analyze discursive practices and their rules of formation without any concern about their relation with social practices. The latter with their impact on

⁸² Michel Foucault, *Archeology of Knowledge* (New York: Tavistock Publication, 1972), 19.

power relations were not the focus of his analysis. He tried to construct a theory that repudiates anthropomorphic thinking. In that sense, by delineating discursive formations, he aimed to announce the death of the author in order to replace the question: who is speaking?

The term *dispositif* came to surface when Foucault's attention shifted to the problem of power. Like the notion of *episteme*, *dispositif* is used to repudiate certain kind of questions such as 'who has the power' and 'what does he have in mind'. It replaced these questions with "how is power exercised"?⁸³ However, this time his object of analysis was not autonomous discursive practices, but rather social practices within the certain power apparatus. In that sense, *episteme* is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas "the apparatus [*dispositif*]"⁸⁴ in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive".⁸⁵ Furthermore, he defines *dispositif* as:

a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions... The apparatus itself is the system of regulations that can be established between these elements.⁸⁶

Two characteristics related to *dispositif* are crucial in terms of studying development practices. Firstly, the nature of connection between the elements of disposition is not fixed. There are constant modifications and interplay of positions; one particular discourse can be programmed by an institution, while later it can be used by another element of apparatus to scientifically legitimize its practice. Moreover, *dispositif* can produce unforeseen effects, but through strategic elaborations these negative effects are reutilized within a new strategy. In other words, *dispositif* is not monolithic; its one element can enter into contradiction with another and necessitates reconfiguration of heterogeneous elements of *dispositif*.

⁸³ Neil Brenner, "Foucault's new Functionalism," *Theory and Society* 23 (1994), 684.

⁸⁴ In some of the English translations of Foucault's work 'dispositif' is translated as 'apparatus'.

⁸⁵ Foucault, *Power-Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings*, 197.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 194.

Secondly, every *dispositif* has a dominant strategic function that stems from its being response to a certain urgent need. For example, Foucault mentions “the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for an essentially mercantilist economy” as strategic imperative that shapes *dispositif* on madness and mental illness.⁸⁷ Each *dispositif* is operationalized through these targets and tactics. *Dispositif* is shaped within a social context and as this context changes, the *dispositif* undergoes certain transformations.

Understanding *dispositif* as immanent to specific social and historical context and analyzing it in terms of the targets and tactics bring us to the notion of power. To put it simply, the *dispositif* is inscribed into a play of power relations; and its essence is the manipulation of relations. For example, the disciplinary *dispositif* emerges when certain tactics, which are institutionalized in schools, factories or prisons to manipulate the relations between the individual and the authority, aim towards the same set of targets which renders the individual body both productive and docile. Now, I want to put emphasis on the fruitfulness of the concept of *dispositif* in analyzing development practices.

3.5.1. Dispositif and Development

Concerning the above mentioned definition of *dispositif*, it is possible to study development practices of the post-war period under the rubric of *developmental dispositif*. In this period, discourse on underdevelopment and poverty; establishment of international and national development institutions such as World Bank or National Planning Institute; development programmers on health, nutrition, rural poverty; formation of scientific disciplines such as development economics, regional studies which produce ‘truth’ and ‘information’ concerning the development and finally philanthropic ideas on international aid and poverty alleviation enter into a relationship that culminates in creation of a specific *dispositif*. As Gilles Deleuze mentions, relations of knowledge, power and subjectivity are the underpinning

⁸⁷ Ibid., 195

dimensions that give certain level of coherence and density to these elements.⁸⁸ However, contrary to some post-development scholars' assumptions, the systems of relations between these heterogeneous elements were not fixed and monolithic. Dispositif has gone certain transformations as unforeseen effects of development practices had emerged. For example, over the decades from the 1950s to the 1970s, the dominance of economic and urban concerns in development dispositif shifted to the social, rural and human centered discourses, which was discussed in the chapter two.

The analytical power of using the term dispositif in studying development practices becomes apparent when we ask the following question: what could be the urgent need that development dispositif answers? Like the emergence of dispositif of madness, which gives practical solution to regulation of floating mass in mercantilist era; the development dispositif functions as the regulation of multiplicity of newly emerged postcolonial states in the post-war period. As Michael Latham mentions by 1960, there were approximately forty newly independent states with a population of about 800 million.⁸⁹ The urgent need was to manage and regulate this multiplicity where old colonial methods of regulation were no more viable. In the post-war period, development dispositif functions as a power apparatus that shapes this multiplicity at the two levels. One was at the international level in which development discourse conducted the 'conducts of the nation-states', not of individuals. Second one was at the national level, where development dispositif was utilized to create a nation-state and to govern populations, especially those who resist the existing regime. It was a tool through which "a set of managerial strategies and techniques invented to cope with the social disorder in Europe were then exported to the rest of the world".⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Gilles Deleuze, "What is dispositif," in *Michel Foucault: Philosopher*, ed. Timothy J. Armstrong (London: Harvester, 1991), 159.

⁸⁹ Michael Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and "Nation Building" in the Kennedy Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 2.

⁹⁰ William Walters and Wendy Lerner, "The Political Regionality of 'New Regionalism': Toward a Genealogy of the Region," *Theory and Society* 31 (2002), 401.

After the incorporation of the Foucauldian notions into the analysis of this thesis, it is possible to say that Cold War development practices were constitutive of power and knowledge relations, which itself constructed by these relations; they were the means to export biopower to the postcolonial territories in the Cold War period; and they functioned as a governmental machine that intervene and control the conducts of its objects by fostering them rather than subjugating them. Finally, development practices constitute a *dispositif*, which is a system of regulations establishing links between institutions, scientific ‘truths’, moralities, plans and schemas pertaining to development.

In the following chapter, I will explore the ‘modes of thought’ in the development discourse and its construction via power-knowledge. For this aim, I choose scientific theories about development. Modernization theory, Dependency school and world-system approach will be objects of my inquiry in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 4

POWER-KNOWLEDGE IN THE DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

4.1. Introduction

In the preceding chapter I defined development as a governmental tool that is composed of two parts. The first part consists of ‘modes of thoughts’, while the second one refers to governmental technologies that bring together different aspects of government and make political rationalities deployable. This chapter focuses on the first aspect of developmental governmentality; it examines construction of ‘modes of thought’ in the development discourse. Recalling the fact that there is a clear relationship between the ways of thinking and power relations, it is possible to define this sphere of governmentality as the terrain of political rationalities, that is, “a domain for the formulation and justification of idealized schemata for representing reality, analyzing it and rectifying it”.⁹¹ From this perspective, there would be many items as the objects of my analysis in explaining political rationalities of post-war development practices. Reports of development institutions, government documents on development issues, agreements between countries and institutions on development aid would be fruitful sources to explore developmental rationalities. However, this chapter takes ‘scientific statements’ as the object of its analysis because the science and technology are perceived as the main tools for accomplishing development. Their role in power relations and justification of certain policies is not taken into account. In that sense, any scientific statement on development is marked as ‘objective’, ‘impartial’ and ‘true’ without concerning its role in shaping power relations between the West and the Third World in the Cold War period.

⁹¹ Rose and Miller, “Political Power Beyond State: Problematics of Government”, 178.

In line with these considerations, this part will explore three different ways of producing ‘scientific statements’ about development, which have crucial influence on determining the ways of producing truth and ‘scientific’ knowledge in the development discourse. Although proponents of these schools were mainly from academic circles, their ideas became hegemonic among development institutions and professionals in the Cold War period. Especially the first one, modernization school, became mainstream approach in the development practices throughout the 1950s and 1960s. It dominated the ways of thinking and producing truth about development. Dependency theory, on the other hand, emerged in the 1960s as the critique of modernization school; it refused the relationship between capitalism and development that was defined by the modernization theory. It saw expansion of Western capitalism as the main reason of the underdevelopment of Latin America. The ideas of dependency school shaped Third Worldist development practices. Finally, world system theory explores development with relation to expansion of capitalism in the world; hence it focuses on the link between capitalism and the development.

4.2. Modernization School

We can define three basic events that shape the modernization theory in the post-war period. First one was the emergence of the U.S. as the super power who could manage world affairs, starting from the reconstruction efforts of Western Europe through Marshall Plan. Second, there was a serious fear of communism as the Soviet Union had become another super power. Finally, there was an ongoing process of the disintegration of the European colonial empires and the emergence of new nation-states who aspire to be developed and independent. Under these circumstances, old ways of constructing hegemony in world political affairs had also undergone a drastic change. In the Cold War period, ‘civilizing mission’ as the legitimizing tool for the European colonizing efforts in the 19th century was not viable. Instead of it, what the U.S. social scientists and policy makers developed was the ‘modernization mission’.

Although these two missions were both employed for legitimizing existing power relations around the world, they represented different mentalities. Colonial civilizing

mission was based on the ‘civilized’ and ‘savage’ dichotomy. It put emphasis not only on the European material culture as the reference point for claiming superiority, but also on more abstract values such as freedom, human dignity and individuality. Hence the ‘civilizing mission’ also contained items of European cultural and intellectual profundity. But, the U.S. was founded by the immigrants who were stripped off all the cultural depth of European people; and when hegemonic power shifted to the U.S. in the post-war period, the meaning of ‘civilization’ was reduced to material, visible objects and machines. Under the name of modernization, Americans coded ‘civilizing mission’ as the spread of machines, technology, science and American material culture.⁹² In that sense, modernization theory was the materialization of the blind faith in American way of life in the social sciences. It was the endeavour to legitimize American values with scientific truths, and transfer them to the Third World countries.

As Michael Latham mentions, modernization theory was not simply a social scientific formulation. It was an apparatus that “articulated a common collection of assumptions about the nature of American society” and “a worldview through which America’s strategic needs and political options were articulated, evaluated and understood”.⁹³ Maybe, it was the first time in history that science was utilized in such an obvious way to govern people and nations. The ‘truths’ pertaining to developing countries in the modernization theory were more than intellectual products; they were weapons for winning the Cold War. At this point, one may ask the question that how social scientists had gained such an influence in exercising American power.

During the World War Two, American scientists and the U.S. government cooperated in many projects. After the war, the increasing threat of communism and the need for finding new ways of managing global affairs pushed the U.S. officers to

⁹² Michael Adas, “Modernization Theory and the American Revival of the Scientific and Technological Standards of Social Achievement and Human Worth,” in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, eds. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, Michael E. Latham (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2003), 29.

⁹³ Latham, *Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and “Nation Building” in the Kennedy Era*, 5, 8.

extend this partnership. The academia was asked to deliver useful knowledge about the world, which could enable the U.S. to promote and manage social change in the Cold War context. The governments increasingly funded academic researches, and, in turn, to benefit from more these funds scientists became more and more policy-oriented and bounded with political concerns. Additionally, especially during the Kennedy Administration, academics directly joined to the policymaking process. For example, famous development economist Walt W. Rostow left Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and became a White House national security adviser, and later chairman of the State Department's Policy Planning Council. Harvard University economist Lincoln Gordon joined Kennedy's Latin American Task Force and became the U.S. ambassador to Brazil.⁹⁴ Close partnership with social scientists was not limited to the U.S. governments: multilateral organizations such as World Bank, IMF and UN also recruited academics for developing policies and their implementation.

As a result of this collaboration between academy, governments and international institutions, modernization school gained hegemonic position for the production of knowledge in the development discourse. In that sense, we cannot regard modernization theory as a simple scientific inquiry; its impact was beyond the boundaries of academy. Especially in the 1950s and 1960s, almost all development policies and practices were inspired by modernization theory.

4.2.1. Classical Studies in the Modernization School

This section tries to expound two classical studies in the Modernization School. In realizing this aim, it explains the basic assumptions of modernization school, its ways of legitimizing Western ways of development process and presenting them as the solutions to the 'underdevelopment' problem. The first one represents the mainstream economic approach in the modernization school, and is written by Walt W. Rostow. The second one reflects another side in the same school, which puts emphasis on social, political aspects of development rather than economic aspects. Daniel Lerner's study, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, is a famous example of

⁹⁴Ibid., 7.

modernization study that exhibits the basic assumptions and epistemology of modernization school.

Rostow's seminal work was published in 1960 under the title *The Stages of Economic Growth: A non-Communist Manifesto*.⁹⁵ As its name clearly indicates, Rostow's book reflects the impact of Cold War situation on academic works. His book combines the political concerns with scientific research and 'proves' the 'veracity' of Western model of modernization. In fact, his aim is twofold: first, with reference to European history, he tries to show that recently decolonized countries can achieve high level of development; second, he aims to explain why communism, which is an alternative model for development, is a 'deviant' way of modernization.

In his evolutionist model, Rostow envisages modernization as a staged process that starts from traditional society and ends with industrialized one. He describes traditional society as characterized by low level of productivity and as a struggle against scarcity, whereas modern society is the society of high-mass consumption. Road from traditional society to modern society passes through five staged economic processes which are derived by comparing historical evolution of industrial societies in Europe, North America, India and China. These five stages are the traditional society, the preconditions for take-off, the take off, the drive to maturity and the age of high mass consumption. This model of transition was mainly the one which had been experienced in the industrialized Western countries. Rostow turns this historical process into a universal law; hence, specific European experience becomes a scientific fact that is utilized to determine 'veracity' of any development process in the Third World.

According to Rostow, in traditional societies, productivity is very low because of limited science and technology. Society experiences the level of satiety in which the social and economic conditions for fostering change do not exist. At the second stage, the preconditions for the take-off begin to emerge and economic progress is perceived as the necessary condition to achieve a specific goal, whether it is the faith

⁹⁵ Walt Whitman Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

of nation, general welfare or private property. The rise of new entrepreneurs triggers the investments especially in transport, communication and raw materials. This change, in turn, culminates in the expansion of the market and the development of modern manufacturing. However, this stage is not sustainable, because there is still the traditional economy persisting side by side with modern economic activities. In addition to this dualistic structure, large population also curtails the streaming of economic surplus to the productive investment. For Rostow, “external intrusion by more advanced societies” is the main reason for the rise of these preconditions in the traditional societies.⁹⁶ Contrary to the history of England in which industrialization is an endogenous process taking place naturally, traditional countries need exogenous forces, because they do not have the internal dynamics for initiating change.

In this reasoning, we find the scientific ways of constructing development discourse as a tool for intervention. First, in a scientific way, modernization theory defines basic features of Western societies as the ideals to which all societies should reach. Economic efficiency, productivity, growth and material abundance become the objectives of any development process. In that sense, modernization school offers a definition of basic scientific ‘truths’ to be applied. Second, at the epistemological level, it produces some ‘facts’ about the nature of the objects governed; in this case the governed objects are underdeveloped countries. In its account of the ‘underdeveloped’, modernization theory defines the latter in a situation of impotence, which cannot initiate its own development process. Finally, after defining the problem, modernization school presents the scientific solution: necessity of the help of developed countries. Whether in the form of development aid, private capital or technology transfer, developed countries should help underdeveloped ones in their development process. Specific ways of producing knowledge about the underdeveloped countries determine the content of the problem and the remedies for it. They, in turn, open the paths for intervening and managing Third World through development discourse. Additionally, Rostow’s reasoning also legitimizes colonialism, since he claims:

⁹⁶ Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, 6.

Colonies were often established initially not to execute a major objective of national policy, nor even to exclude a rival economic power, but to fill a vacuum; that is to organize a traditional society incapable of self-organization (or unwilling to organize itself) for modern import and export activity, including production for export.⁹⁷

Apart from exemplifying the ways of justifying colonialism, this example also shows that development discourse perpetuated the control and management of ex-colonial countries with new methods in the Cold War period. The legitimizing tool for governing these countries was not the ‘civilizing mission’, but the ‘development mission’ in which technology transfer, aid, capital movement and development experts were the strategic means for intervening the Third World.

According to Rostow’s model, at the take-off stage, dualistic economy is erased in favor of the modern economy. Whether it is a political revolution, initiation of new technology or a favorable international environment, any stimulus is needed to push a Third World country from preconditions stage to take-off stage. At this stage, agriculture is commercialized with increasing productivity, new industries appear and they deploy new technologies. In order to catch self-sustained take-off stage, country must invest 10 % of its GNP for production.

At the drive to maturity stage, investment increases to a number between 10 to 20 per cent of GNP. Additionally, changes in the economy are accompanied by the erasure of the values and institutions of traditional society. As technology becomes more complex, “what is produced is now less a matter of economic necessity, more a question of choice”.⁹⁸ Finally, at the high mass-consumption stage, dominant manufacturing activity is the production of durable consumer goods and services. As in the case of America, welfare state is operationalized to distribute productivity gains to the workers, which in turn increases consumption.

Rostow’s study embodies the theoretical assumptions and flaws of modernization theory. Five staged model is basically evolutionist because it envisages a development process of a society from primitive conditions to complex and

⁹⁷Ibid., 24, quoted in Rist, *The History of Development*, 96-97.

⁹⁸ David Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernization and Development* (London; Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 27.

integrated one; and every stage in this process is better than the preceding one. Like the 19th century evolutionists, he uses the terms such as ‘stages’ or ‘maturity’ that are influenced by organicist thinking. Additionally, he thinks that modernization process is irresistible and irreversible and that Western technology, its living standards and institutions will inevitably diffuse to other parts of the world. As this strict model implies, this diffusion is a homogenizing process rendering modernized societies more alike. To map out such a wide range of issues and geographies, Rostow uses over-generalization, and works with ideal typical cases.

His argumentation progresses at the very general level that tries to apply small number of laws to all societies. This leads to serious problems, because his work “ignores the historical and structural reality of the under-developed countries”.⁹⁹ But his is not a simple theoretical flaw; it also has political consequences, because at the scientific level it helps to cover the fact that the desperate condition of the Third World countries is closely associated with their colonial history. On the one hand, through abstractions, ideal types and homogenization, Rostow’s work implicitly erases the colonial history and the unequal relationship with the West and the rest of the world. On the other hand, by theorizing ‘modernization mission’ at the scientific level, he helps the formation of new ways of managing the Third World countries in the post-war period.

Most of the studies within the modernization theory were carried out to counter effect the dominance of economic perspectives in this school. Especially those who were committed to political and sociological studies try to show that modernization process is also about the transformation of social structures, political institutions, values, attitudes and personalities.

In line with these concerns, Daniel Lerner published his book, *The Passing of Traditional Society*, in 1958. The book was a result of an empirical study that examined the modernization process in Middle Eastern countries. By conducting sample surveys, Lerner asserts that modernization is a global process that takes place

⁹⁹ Andre Gunter Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution; Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy* (New York: Review Press, 1969), 47.

in the same manner all over the world. For him, modernization is the expansion of 'rationalist and positivist' spirit that transforms not only institutions, but also the mentality of individuals. In that sense, the main aspect of modernization is the development of 'mobile persons' who are characterized by rationality and empathy. The latter attribute "enables mobile persons to *operate efficiently* in a changing world".¹⁰⁰ Lerner puts emphasis on the mass media as the main instrument of change in the Middle East countries. He thinks that contrary to the early 20th century, where Europeanization had only impact on upper classes of Islamic countries, modernization, now, "diffuses among a wider population and touches public institutions" due to expansion of mass media of tabloids, radio and movies.¹⁰¹

Although Lerner's study is based on the dualistic thinking, he tries to go beyond this dichotomy and categorizes respondents of his survey as modern, traditional and transitional. To some extent, the latter category brings flexibility to his study and enables him to notice that especially in this phase of modernization, transformation can be painful, which creates problems of social control and loss of identity for individuals.¹⁰²

Lerner's emphasis on transitional category and his mentioning of drawbacks of modernization process differentiates his work from mainstream modernization literature. However, he still writes within the boundaries of modernization theory and shares common themes with other modernists. David Harrison defines these similarities as the classification of societies as traditional or modern, despite an emphasis on intermediate category; valuing certain personality types as the examples of modernization; reducing modernization to certain phenomena like urbanization, literacy, emergence of mass- media; finally perceiving modernization as the infusion of 'rationalist and positivist spirit'.¹⁰³ Moreover, with all its empirically fostered

¹⁰⁰ Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (New York: Free Press, 1958), 49-50.

¹⁰¹ Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, 45.

¹⁰² Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernization and Development*, 17-18.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 18.

facts on Middle East countries, Lerner's study reveals the basic feature of modernization theory: the studies in this school not only combine theoretical debates on Third World, but also they actively produce facts, information and statistical knowledge about Third World by rendering the latter as the object of their 'scientific' inquiry.

These two scholars represent the mainstream approach in development discourse. However, modernization school was not monolithic and it had gone certain transformation. Till the end of the 1960s, modernization school received many criticism; especially Reinhard Bendix (1967), Samuel Eisenstadt (1974), Samuel Huntington (1968), Barrington Moore (1967) and Guillermo O'Donnell (1978) are critical about the evolutionist and functionalist tendencies in the modernization school.¹⁰⁴

Among these scholars Huntington had been very influential. Especially his ideas on democracies in the developing countries received attention. He argues that development is not always a progressive force and economic wealth is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the democracy in the Third World countries. According to his conceptualization of the 'zone of transformation', in the course of development process, countries enter into a period in which traditional political institutions start to crumble. At this stage, development is not the only factor in determining what political system will replace those institutions. There are many alternative paths to choose, and the historical choices made by the political elites of the developing countries determine the new institutional forms. In other words, there is no linear development path which would reach Western-style democracy. A Third World country with certain level of development may have authoritarian political structure. For Huntington, in order to have Western-style of democracy, there must be other elements along with the economic prosperity. He emphasizes the role of the

¹⁰⁴ Reinhard Bendix, "Tradition and Modernity Reconsidered," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* IX no.3 (1967), 292-346; Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, "Studies of Modernization and Sociological Theory," *History and Theory* 13 (1974), 225-252; Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in the Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).

autonomous bourgeois class and the existence of free market economies in attaining democracy.¹⁰⁵ Without the first element, there would be no mechanism to check state power, and the society will be dominated by authoritarian institutions. Lack of second element, on the other hand, will cause centralization of economic power in the hands of the few and deteriorate equitable distribution of incomes, which are both conducive to development of authoritarian state. In line with these arguments, it is possible to say that Huntington represents the conservative side of the new modernization school. He puts emphasis on order and on the drawbacks of social transformation. Additionally, his ideas bear certain Eurocentric biases, since he reduces the possibility of democracy to the existence of social structure that has flourished only in the Western countries.

Nevertheless, as Alvin So mentions, these studies are still part of the modernist school because they share most of the assumptions and methodologies of this school. Like classical studies, their works still focus on Third World development; their unit of analysis is the nation-state; they still assume traditional and modern duality; and they still have deep faith in the benefits of modernization. However, they underline the possibility of different paths of development; put emphasis on the impact of external and international factors in the development process.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, they try to show that modernization process is not free from any social or political problem.

As a part of the developmental governmentality that is operationalized at the scientific level, modernization school is intellectual machinery for rendering Third World thinkable in such a way that it is amenable to political deliberations. In realizing this aim, modernization school produces *ways of seeing and perceiving*: its theories construct a certain field of visibility. It has certain ways of structuring light, a certain rationality that disperses the visible and invisible. It sheds light on certain things and makes them exist while causing others to disappear.¹⁰⁷ However, it is not

¹⁰⁵ Alvin So, *Social Change and Development: Modernization, Dependency, and World-System Theories* (Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications, 1990), 80-81. (hereafter cited as *Social Change and Development*).

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 62.

¹⁰⁷ Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 30.

the invention of new objects or the renaming of things when we talk about making objects exist or nonexistent; it is the *problematization* that creates certain ways of seeing and perceiving. This Foucauldian notion delineates the practices that facilitate incorporating something into the truth game and constructing it as an object of thinking.¹⁰⁸ In other words, with the notion of *problematization*, examination of the ways of seeing and perceiving enables us to disclose role of power-knowledge dyad in the development discourse. In line with these theoretical insights, how can we examine the ways of problematization in modernization school? Concerning the post-war practices, it is possible to underline three basic notions that were rendered visible in the modernization school, hence in the development discourse. The first one was the construction of the nation-states and the Third World as a unit of analysis in the development studies; the second one was the problematization of ‘poverty’ and ‘underdevelopment’ as the basic features of Third World. The final one was the attribution of certain subjectivity to underdeveloped people. In relation to modernization school, the following three sections will explore construction of these three notions in the development discourse.

4.2.2. The Nation-State and the Third World

The nation-state as a political idea and its realization was not unique to Cold War period. It is possible to read the history of the 19th century Europe as the history of struggle to form nation-states. But, although many institutions of the nation-state were exported to other geographies during the colonial period; the nation-state formation was never accomplished in colonial territories. Since the idea of popular sovereignty was not the part of colonial regime, populations could not be articulated to the existing institutions of the nation-state. Only the independence of colonial countries rendered the formation of nation-states possible, which was believed to materialize national autonomy and popular sovereignty. In that sense, the independence movements were followed by the practices of nation-state building in the old colonial territories. What concerns us here is the role of development practices and modernization school in mapping diverse geographies as composed of nation-states, which are homogenous and bounded by certain territories.

¹⁰⁸ Ferda Keskin, “Foucault’da Öznellik,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 73 (1997), 42.

Additionally, another concern of this section is to examine the construction of the ‘Third World’ as a generic category that homogenizes these different nation-states.

At the political sphere, between the two world wars, the underlining notion of self determination of people that fosters the independence struggle of colonial people has been transformed into the notion of ‘self determination of nations’, which was believed to be realized only by the sovereign state system. In the Cold War period, this understanding was empowered by the liberal understanding of sovereignty. The latter was based on the mutual recognition of sovereignties of each nation-state with the idea of nonintervention by which territorial integrity of each nation-state is maintained.¹⁰⁹ Development discourse was based on these understandings and made them applicable in the Cold War context. It provided technical and intellectual tools to create measuring standards and to compare national features. Each nation with specific territorial unity was rendered visible through the development figures which were constructed by statistical methods. By representing them through indicators such as living standards index, national income or growth rates, development discourse made certain populations and geographies visible and manageable.

For the account of development practices in relation to constructing the nation-state system in Cold War period, the examination of the incorporation of Keynesian ideas into the development understanding is insightful. Between the two world wars, in 1936, John Maynard Keynes published his now famous book, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*. Contrary to pre-Keynesians who focused on the market as the sphere of economic activities, Keynes came up with a macroeconomic view that perceives economic system as a whole, whose limits corresponds to geographical boundaries of the nation-states. As ideas in the *General Theory* penetrated into the mainstream understanding of economics, Keynesian theory provided new ways for the nation-state to represent itself. Each nation-state with its own geographic space was considered as a self-closed entity, which could be represented in terms of aggregates pertaining to production, employment, investment and averages. Gross national product, employment rates, consumption figures

¹⁰⁹ Mark T. Berger and Heloise Weber, “Beyond State-Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-State System,” *Third World Quarterly* 27 no.1 (2004), 204.

rendered the specific geographical space imaginable as a nation-state with special measurable features. As Timothy Mitchell mentions, all these figures constructed a national economy that was measurable and bounded with certain geography.¹¹⁰ Additionally, contrary to laissez-faire liberalism of the 19th century, which had perceived the state as an external sphere to economy, Keynesian understanding constituted the nation-state as the prime mover of the economy.

Development discourse inherited this understanding and envisaged the world according to the nation-state system in which each nation state is represented by the economic indicators. Within the development discourse, these indicators not only rendered each nation-state visible, but also provided basis for the homogenization and comparison of them. By representing a nation-state with these numbers, development discourse erased other unique characteristics of each country and made them imaginable only with certain attributes. In other words, it brought homogenization to the nation-state system by referring only to certain measurable features. Moreover, this kind of standardization in envisioning nation-states also fostered the comparison of them with each other. It was possible to rank and group nation-states in terms of their national income, production level and other development indicators. Hence, development discourse presented a new way of looking to the world, a new world map which is composed of two dimensions. At the first layer, the world was divided into many nation-states with specific and measurable features; and at the second level, these nation-states were grouped under the two categories: the developed and the underdeveloped.

Another result that was caused by ranking and comparing nation-states through development indicators was the creation of a new notion called 'Third World'. Emergence and widespread utilization of this term is a good example for understanding the relationship between development discourse and political situation in the Cold War period. In addition to the notion of underdevelopment, the very idea of Third World implicitly refers to First and the Second World. In other words, the term Third World refers not only the division of world into the developed and

¹¹⁰ Timothy Mitchell, "Fixing the Economy," *Cultural Studies* 12 no.1 (1998), 89.

underdeveloped parts, but also the political struggle between communist and capitalist sides of the world. There was a very abstract and binary thinking behind the idea of Third World. First, the world was divided into its 'traditional' and 'modern' parts; then, the modern part was divided into its 'communist' and 'capitalist' parts.¹¹¹ And, the meaning of each term was derived from mutual opposition of them, rather than the things they described. Carl Pletsch defines the underlying meanings of these three terms in a comprehensive way:

The Third World is the world of tradition, culture, religion, irrationality, underdevelopment, overpopulation, political chaos, and so on. The second world is modern, technologically sophisticated, rational to a degree, but authoritarian and repressive... The First World is purely modern, a haven of science and utilitarian decision making, technological, efficient, democratic, free- in short, natural society unfettered by religion or ideology.¹¹²

In the development literature, Third World referred to a territory where the excess and lack were always dominant: excessive populations, lack of political stability, lack of agricultural productivity, low income per capita were always the main characteristics of Third World countries. For example, like many social scientists, Paul Bairoch sees low agricultural productivity as the main problem of the Third World countries and attributes this problem to the population explosion in Third World.¹¹³ In the same manner, development economics always takes the overpopulation problem in the Third World as the given and tries to explain the impact of it on the development process.¹¹⁴

The problem of democracy in the Third World is also perceived from the same logic.¹¹⁵ Democracy is perceived as the natural consequence of Western institutions, and the lack of these institutions in the Third World means the lack of democracy.

¹¹¹ Carl E. Pletsch, "Three Worlds, or the Division of Social Scientific Labor, Circa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 23 no. 4 (1981), 573.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 574.

¹¹³ Paul Bairoch, *The Economic Development of the Third World Since 1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 38.

¹¹⁴ See Michael P. Todaro, *Economic Development in the Third World* (New York: Longman, 1977)

¹¹⁵ See Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," *American Political Science Review* 53 no.1 (1959), 69-105; Samuel Huntington, "Will More Countries Become Democratic?," *Political Science Quarterly* 99 no.2 (1984), 193-218.

On the one hand, Western political, social and economic institutions are envisaged as the natural outcomes of a historical process that leads to democracy and economic wealth. On the other hand, Third World is defined as a terrain of abnormalities where the cause of one deviation from the 'normal' or 'standard' is another lack; that is, lack of democracy is caused by the lack of economic development. The only remedy for this lack is the adaptation of Western institutions through the development process.

Yet, one must be cautious about the idea of the Third World and its usage in development discourse. This term did not emerge as the inculcation of Third World people by the Western social scientists who engage with the issue of development at the practical or theoretical level. At the international politics, the idea of Third Worldism was initiated by the nation-states, which were reluctant to take side in the Cold War. In 1955, delegations from 29 nation-states attended to Bandung Conference, aiming to generate unity and support among newly emerged nation-states of Africa and Asia. This movement, which was called Third Worldism, was inspired by the anti-colonialist and nationalist ideas. In the declaration of the Bandung Conference, attendants condemned all manifestations of colonialism whether in the form of Western European imperialism, Soviet occupation or neo-colonialism of the United States. Additionally, final declaration demands sustained co-operation between the governments of Third World countries; "the establishment of an economic development fund to be operated by the United Nations; increased support for the human rights and the self determination of people and nations".¹¹⁶

Key figures of the idea of Third Worldism were Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India; Sukarno, President of Indonesia; Jamal Abdel Nasser, President of Egypt; and Fidel Castro, President of Cuba. The main concern of these leaders was the national liberation; and for them, this aim could only be achieved by the development process. For example, Nasser, in Egypt, initiated a state-led development project that set industrialization as the main target. Likewise, Sukarno nationalized Dutch owned properties and fostered state intervention for the economic development through

¹¹⁶ Mark T. Berger, "After the Third World? History, Destiny and the Fate of Third Worldism," *Third World Quarterly* 25 no.1 (2004), 12.

increased role of Indonesian army in political and economic spheres.¹¹⁷ Later, from the mid-1960s to the 1970s, Third Worldism radicalized its view and put more emphasis on the Marxist theories of development and dependency theory. The movement managed to gain support in United Nations and endorsed the UN Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which demanded restructuring of world economy in favor of nation-states of the Third World. However, this declaration was never realized or managed to change economic structure in the 1970s.

Briefly, development discourse in the Cold War period fostered the mapping of the world as consisting of nation-states. Additionally, by using certain measurable indicators, it grouped certain nations-states under the rubric of Third World. In attributing certain features to these countries, development scholars used Western institutions as the standards to define a development norm. Consequently, the characteristics of these nation-states were determined according to the logic of lack or excessive. On the other hand, even the authorities in the Third World countries accepted this term, because the struggle between communism and capitalism forced them to form alliances between the ‘neutrals’ under the ideology of Third Worldism.

4.2.3. Underdevelopment and Poverty

Although the notion of development has been used within the socio-economic context since the 1900s, the notion of underdevelopment has been in circulation only since the 1940s. ‘Underdevelopment’, as a term, was first used by an International Labour Organization (ILO) functionary, William Benson, in his article entitled ‘The Economic Advancement of Underdeveloped Areas’.¹¹⁸ Later, Rosenstein-Rodan used the notion of ‘economically backward areas’ as a synonym for ‘underdevelopment’ in his article ‘The International Development of Economically Backward Areas’.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Ibid., 16.

¹¹⁸ William Benson, “The Economic Advancement of Underdeveloped Areas,” in *The Economic Basis of Peace* (London: National Peace Council, 1942), cited in Rist, *The History of Development*, 73.

¹¹⁹ Paul N. Rosenstein-Rodan, “The International Development of Economically Backward Areas,” *International Affairs* 20 no.2 (1944), 157-165.

Finally, in 1948 UN General Assembly adopted two resolutions concerning development, and Harry S. Truman, in his inaugural speech that defined four basic issues for the U.S. government in the Cold War period, mentioned underdeveloped areas and the will of the U.S. to bring prosperity to these regions of the world. It was the emergence of the term ‘underdeveloped’ in the politics and academics that rendered certain regions of the world visible. And, in the development discourse, this visibility was also a work of *problematization* that produced specific problems and solutions for these regions of the world.

Analyzing one of the studies of modernization school would be very useful to gain insights about the role of the term ‘underdevelopment’ in assigning certain features to Third World. In his article on the international development, Rosenstein-Rodan prefers to use the term ‘economically backward’ or ‘depressed’, instead of ‘underdeveloped’, to define certain parts of the world. He starts his article with the assumption that the benefits of industrial revolution and technical progress have not been distributed equally among different nations. For him, many people are experiencing depressing living conditions because they “missed the industrialization ‘bus’ in the nineteenth century”.¹²⁰ Here, we find the basic tenant of development discourse: underdevelopment is due to lack of industrialization. Moreover, the main reason of this fact should be searched in the structural deficiencies of each country; it has nothing to do with the expansion of capitalism or the unequal relationship between these countries and the Western ones. Underdevelopment is something that can only be understood with reference to ahistorical characteristics of each country.

Additionally, Rosenstein-Rodan’s article gives us some clues about the necessity of taking into account the underdevelopment issue in the post-war period. For him, dealing with underdevelopment is indispensable because it destroys peace and stability. Because people always “prefer to die fighting rather than to see no prospect of a better life”, underdevelopment is the main enemy of world peace. We can find this reasoning in the U.S. Governments of the Cold War period, who believe that poverty and underdevelopment are the main sources of communism; or in the

¹²⁰ Ibid., 159.

language of the World Bank. But what makes Rosenstein-Rodan's argument valuable for analyzing development discourse is his reasoning that sees economy as the main contributor of world peace. It is one of the first examples of the thinking which perceives economic development as the remedy for all social and political problems:

the optimism of the nineteenth century centered in the conviction that all economic problems would be settled automatically provided political problems would be solved. Nowadays, we almost tend to think that most political problems would be solved if the economic problems could be settled.¹²¹

First, he defines the problem of underdevelopment within the language of economics. For him, all underdeveloped areas are "agrarian, engaged in primary production with great density of population per acre of cultivable land", they have 'disguised unemployment' with low level of productivity; and finally, they have low income per capita and capital, which are both necessary for industrialization.¹²² Later, the remedy for this underdeveloped situation is again presented from the perspective of economics. Since industrialization is the main target that dissolves underdevelopment, international capital must be made available for poorer countries, which in turn increase mechanization and technology, hence the level of productivity.

One would argue that this reasoning is limited to a small cadre of academics that consists of economists; however, economic perspective that renders underdevelopment visible within this framework has always been dominant in development discourse. Until the 1970s, the problem of development was defined within the language of economy. Applying theories of development economics in the management of life was seen to be sufficient to dissolve backward conditions of life in underdeveloped countries. In line with the idea of development, many critical issues that needed political struggle at the international or nation-state level, rendered issues of bureaucratic or technical intervention. Development discourse, in this sense, has emerged as a result of a struggle that tries to realize an ideal: without

¹²¹Ibid., 157.

¹²² Ibid., 159.

facing any political resistance, perceiving and managing life through the tools of economy.

In fact, the semantic shift, which took place in the meaning of development after the emergence of the term underdevelopment, revealed interventionist ideals behind the development discourse. According to Gilbert Rist, before the post-war period, the notion of development was used as an intransitive phenomenon. In Marx or Schumpeter, development was used as a thing that “simply happens and nothing can be done to change it”.¹²³ However, after the wide circulation of the notion of underdevelopment after the Second World War, the meaning of development has undergone transformation. In the Cold War Period, what was used as a intransitive verb, and assumed to be taking place by itself was not ‘development’ but ‘underdevelopment’. As Rosenstein-Rodan’s article exemplifies, the meaning of ‘underdevelopment’ referred to a naturally occurring state of things; underdevelopment was started to be perceived as a natural phenomenon. Development, on the other hand, referred to a conscious act of choosing actions to bring about a goal that was defined before. In that sense, after a semantic shift, it was possible to ‘develop’ a thing, country, or a region by practicing true policies. After the initiation of the term ‘underdevelopment’ as an intransitive phenomenon, development referred to a bunch of techniques, theories, actions that were used to manage social phenomenon in order to bring about predetermined consequences.

The emergence of the notion of ‘underdevelopment’ enabled this kind of a semantic shift in the meaning of development, because the former did not refer to the opposite meaning of development; it only delineated incomplete or ‘embryonic’ form of it.¹²⁴ The gap between developed and underdeveloped was defined in quantitative terms such as the GDP per capita, population or volume of capital. By doing this, it was possible to depict the developed and the underdeveloped within the same picture, hence to create a relationship between them. In other words, the development/underdevelopment contrast introduced ways of differentiating Western

¹²³ Rist, *The History of Development*, 73.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 74.

societies from Third World countries, while at the same time connected them in a new hierarchical way. This gap inculcated development as the only target for the Third World countries, which could be achieved only by pursuing the same trajectory of development, through which Western societies had already passed.

Another problematization pertaining to Third World countries was the notion of poverty. As in the case of the term ‘underdevelopment’, problem of poverty was first given attention by the U.S. President Harry S. Truman. In his inaugural speech, he says that, “the economic [life of the poor] is primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and more prosperous areas”.¹²⁵ Just one year before President Truman’s speech, the World Bank Development Report on Chile related poverty to countries’ gross national product. Report defined countries with an average per capita income less than \$100 as poor and underdeveloped. According to Majid Rahnema, initiation of the notion of poverty in development discourse in this way indicates two basic points. First, in history, for the first time, nations and continents, rather than individuals or communities, were led to believe that they were poor and in need of assistance. Second, national income was presented as the basic tool for measuring poverty; and hence, increasing it through economic development was given as the main solution to poverty. Problematizing poverty in this way turned it into a universal phenomenon that did not contain any culturally specific features. The programs committed to erase this problem, therefore, represented “universalist, one-track, income-based acultural” recipes that were composed of “mix technicalities and economic referents that can only be practiced by experts and development professionals”.¹²⁶

Although widespread poverty was mentioned as the main reason for demanding development, especially in the first decades of post-war period, poverty reduction was not a primary item in development agenda. Joe Remenyi thinks that dominance of modernization ideas in the development discourse caused the ignorance of

¹²⁵ Truman, *Inaugural Speech on January 20, 1949*, Washington, DC. Available online at <http://som.fio.ru/RESOURCES/FILIPPOVMA/2003/ENGLISH/12/truman/truman.htm>.

¹²⁶ Majid Rahnema, “Poverty,” in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, ed. W. Sachs (London: Zed Books, 1992), 162.

poverty reduction policies. Because modernization theory demanded the diversion of national production from consumption to investment, development was believed to require austerity and deprivation.¹²⁷ The accumulation of wealth in the hands of limited number of people was preferable, since, in this way, large amount of capital could be drained into investment to lead technological productivity and economic growth. Hence, most of the development plans perceived increasing poverty in the first decades of development as the natural outcome of development process.

Later, during the 1970s, as the desperate outcomes of development policies had emerged in the form of increased unemployment, income inequality and famine; the World Bank and other institutions rediscovered the importance of poverty reduction. In line with this agenda, Robert S. McNamara, president of the World Bank between 1968 and 1981, announced the ‘basic needs approach’ in his 1973 Nairobi Speech. The idea behind this approach was simple: poverty created traps that keep poor people poor; and, government intervention and development policies should secure access to basic needs of poor to breach vicious cycle of poverty. However, Remenyi notes that, these good intentions were evolved into paternalist and elitist attitudes which gave no credit to the knowledge of the poor people. Development professionals “confused charity with development assistance, education with knowledge, and poverty with ignorance”.¹²⁸ Defining basic needs to struggle against poverty was not unique to the World Bank; other institutions also had their poverty alleviation programs based on evaluating needs. For example, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) examined the percentage of books, radios, newspapers or the illiterates, whereas in Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) needs were evaluated in terms of per capita calorie. Rahnema thinks that whatever the criteria for evaluating basic needs were, the main understanding behind these policies was same: in all these cases “needs were perceived as figures or a combination of elements disembedded” from specific

¹²⁷ Joe Remenyi, “Poverty and Development,” in *Key Issues in Development*, ed. Damien Kingsbury, Joe Remenyi, John Mckay, Janet Hunt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 197-198.

¹²⁸ Joe Remenyi, “What is Development,” in *Key Issues in Development*, ed. Damien Kingsbury, Joe Remenyi, John Mckay, Janet Hunt (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 33.

cultural setting of indigenous societies.¹²⁹ They were the needs of a certain ‘economy’ and specific idea of poverty, which had nothing to do with cultural and social life of the Third World people.

In terms of our main concern, what can be said about the role of problematizing poverty in governing people and nation-states during the post-war period? It is possible to say that rendering poverty visible in this way enabled authorities to legitimize their interventionist practices. Rahnema asserts three aspects of this legitimizing process. First, poverty was coded as a sensitive and technical matter that could only be handled by professionals and institutions. Second, problem of poverty and the programs for alleviating it were always defined in terms of economic resources and needs. Finally, mapping the problem in this way always legitimized governments and institutions as the authorities who are in charge of defining needs and required solutions.¹³⁰

4.2.4. Subjectivities

Development discourse and its practices were based on assumptions about the subjectivities and the identities of Third World people. After the independence movements colonial people were not the subjects of colonial Empires, rather as the citizens of independent Third World countries they were free subjects. These subjects could not be managed with the colonial techniques, and new tactics and strategies, which were less coercive and suppressive than the colonial ones, needed to be developed in the post-war period. Development practices provided authorities tools for achieving this aim. The construction and implementation of development practices always took place in line with certain assumptions pertaining to subjects. Development regime with its governmental strategies attributed certain capacities and potentials to those who exercised power and to those who were governed. In this part, I will explore the subjectivities that were constructed by the modernization school.

¹²⁹ Rahnema, “Poverty”, 164.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

There were two different subjectivities operationalized within the development discourse: underdeveloped and developed subjects. The basic characteristics of the former were defined under the rubric of ‘traditional’, whereas the latter was embodied in the attributes of ‘modern man’. In this dualistic structure development was envisaged as the struggle to transform traditional subjects to the modern ones.

Examining studies conducted by the modernization school give us clues about the ways of constructing underdeveloped subject and linking him/her to traditional man. Especially those scholars who conceived development as the internalization of modern values and attributes had constructed the very idea of traditional man. For example, Alex Inkeles and David Smith’s study was based on the empirical research that was accomplished by conducting interview with six thousand men from Third World countries. They defined Ahmaddullah, the traditional man, as “relatively passive, even fatalistic, and very much dependent on outside forces, above all on the intervention of God.”¹³¹ Traditional man, in this sense, was not free and autonomous; he did not use his own rationality since he was under the control of religious or paternalistic ideas.

Defining basic characteristic of traditional man was done through comparing Third World people with the Western-modern man. The attributes of the latter was defined as the ideal that should be reached. Then, the logic of *lack* determined the basic features of the traditional subject. For example, modern man was the one who was open to new ideas whereas the traditional man was the one who lack this characteristic; hence he was not receptive to new ideas. Through this dualism, Inkeles and Smith defined basic features of traditional man: rooted in tradition, denial of different opinions, oriented toward past, particularistic, fatalistic, high value placed on religion and the sacred.¹³²

¹³¹ Alex Inkeles and David H. Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p.74, quoted in Catherine V. Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory* (Boulder: L. Rienner Publishers, 1995), 28.

¹³² Inkeles and Smith, *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries*, 19.

Gender was situated in a very critical position in these attempts for constructing traditional subjectivity by developing the antinomy of tradition and modernity.¹³³ According to Catherine Scott, as in the discourse of biomedical sciences in the seventeenth century, the struggle between the forces of tradition and modernity was associated with the struggle between the sexes in the development discourse. According to development theorists, modernization can be reached by the “autonomy and the separation of men from the household and the feminine traits associated with it”.¹³⁴ For development discourse, woman was the main victim of paternalism that caused by underdevelopment; however, this victimhood also brought her a subjectivity that embodied all the traditional attributes. Third World woman with her subjectivity was perceived as the locus of traditional values. Development studies used woman as a test for determining the degree of ‘backwardness’ of a particular Third World. This attitude can be observed in David McClelland’s studies, he suggested that:

A crucial way to break with traditional and introduce new norms is via the emancipation of women.... The most general explanation lies in the fact that women are the most conservative members of a culture. They are less subject to influences outside the home than the men and yet they are the ones who rear the next generation and give it the traditional values of the culture.¹³⁵

The dualism between the modern and the traditional seems like the dualism of colonial times, savage and the civilized. In this latter form, again, being civilized referred to the Enlightenment concepts of autonomy, rationality and freedom while being savage meant lack of these attributes. If this is the case, is it possible to say that colonial discourse was inherited by the development discourse in the Cold War period? In terms of the way of constructing dual subjectivities it is possible to say yes. Both oppositions were formed by a modernist procedure to which Jacques

¹³³ In the 1950s and 1960s women were invisible in development studies and practices. Starting from the 1970s, Women in Development (WID) program and Gender and Development (GAD) strategies have tried to integrate ‘women’ into development. The critics of these attempts and gendered biases of the development discourse have constituted vast amount of literature. These concerns are beyond general aim of this chapter.

¹³⁴ Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory*, 23.

¹³⁵ David McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (New York: Irvington, 1976), 399-400, quoted in Scott, *Gender and Development: Rethinking Modernization and Dependency Theory*, 26.

Derrida has given the name *logocentrism*.¹³⁶ This term delineates an attitude that conceives the ‘other’ with the dichotomies and imposes hierarchy to this dualistic relation. The first term of the dichotomies like West and East, developed and underdeveloped is conceived as a higher reality pertaining to the realm of logos or invariable presence that needs no explanation. The second term is defined in relation to first, and it is always inferior or derivative form of the first one. Both civilized savage and the developed–underdeveloped oppositions are constructed through this logocentrism.

Although logocentrism marked the continuity of some colonial practices within the development discourse, there was one point that underlines the difference between these two practices. As Ivan Karp underlines, colonialism excluded or marginalized savage people from the universal rules that govern the evolution of human societies. Because of the racial inferiority savage was not part of the universal human history, he could not catch up the Western man. However, development discourse did not exclude or marginalize underdeveloped subjects; instead “it defined the subjects of development as exceptions whose exceptional nature was the problem that development seeks to transform”.¹³⁷

In development discourse, traditional man was part of the universal history, but still he was different, he was an exceptional form of the evolution of the Western man. Contrary to colonialism, which attributed this difference to racial inferiority, development discourse perceived this exception as a result of cultural factors. In other words, there was a shift from emphasis on race to culture. Frederic Cooper observes this transformation and mentions that during the 1940s discussions of racial superiority was banned from colonial vocabularies and arguments about culture emerged with the same form. The difference was that “cultural change seemed open to the individual, but Africans who chose not to make the transition were seen as

¹³⁶ Jacques Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978).

¹³⁷ Ivan Karp, “Development and Personhood: Tracing the Contours of a Moral Discourse,” in *Critically Modern: Alternatives, Alterities, Anthropologies*, ed. Bruce Knauft (Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press, 2002), 97.

willfully obstructionist rather than quaintly backward”.¹³⁸ Consequently by emphasizing on cultural, rather than the racial differences, development discourse attributed potential and capacity to the underdeveloped subjects. Now, traditional people had potential to be developed; what he had to do was to desire development and faced the cost of this transformation. As a governmental strategy development discourse assumed certain capacities of the people whom they aimed to govern, it fostered these capacities in order to transform them into modern-developed subjects.

Nevertheless, the potentials of the subject of development should not be left to his own recourse. Development practices aimed to manage these potentials and articulated subject to the more universal institutions. Maria J. Saldana describes this transformation:

The subject must be transformed into the ideological space of citizen through individuation into ‘productive forces’. ‘Previous’ communities must be transcended in order that nature and the subject may contribute to the larger national community. In short, the particularism of the ‘folkloric’ must be transformed/transcended by the universalism of the nation-state and democratic capitalism.¹³⁹

In other words, development increased the capacities of Third World people, it changed their values and conducts, but this did not mean that it rendered them free, autonomous subjects. Development was the name of the totality of the processes that link Third World people to macro institutions such as the nation-state or the market. As they became subjects of these institutions traditional man even lost control of his daily practices. His conduct became subject to forces in which he did not have any power to manage. The rights and the obligations of being citizen of a nation-state, the rules of the capitalist production and the market determined his daily life. Hence, rather than exerting restricting actions on individuals, development discourse empowered them in orienting their conducts to the rules of these institutions.

¹³⁸ Frederic Cooper, “Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans and the Development Concept,” in *International Development and Social Sciences*, ed. Frederick Cooper and Randall Packard (California: California University Press, 1997), 87.

¹³⁹ Maria Josefina Saldana, “The Discourse of Development and the Narratives of Resistance” (PhD dissertation, Stanford University, n.d.), 20.

According to Saldana the subject that was envisaged by the development discourse was an ethical subject.¹⁴⁰ Development constructed ‘progress’ as a matter of choice that was free from any economic, political or historical constraints: the choice of adapting technology, the choice between export-led growth and import substitution. Ethical subject must make the right choices, and pursue right policies in order to develop. In doing this subjects must constitute themselves as subjects of moral conduct and develop “relationship with the self, for self-reflection, self-knowledge, self examination, for the transformations that one seeks to accomplish with oneself as object”.¹⁴¹ Consequently, development discourse presented to the traditional man a moral modality through which he could reconstruct the relationship with himself and make right choices. From this perspective development had partial relationship with the economic growth, high GNP per capita or mass consumption. It was the transformation of attitudes, an acceptance of the enlightenment notions of self-consciousness, rationalization, productivity and free will.

At one level, the ethical subject worked with the individuals, but at another level it is also associated with the nation or society. Development discourse demanded right choices not only from individuals but also from nations and societies. In Rostow’s arguments this understanding can be observed clearly:

In surveying now the broad contours of each stage-of-growth, we are examining, then, not merely the sectoral structure of economies.... We are also examining a succession of *strategic choices made by various societies* concerning the disposition of their resources.¹⁴²[emphasis added]

Here, rather than the individual, society was perceived as the autonomous, self conscious and self controlling subject who could make correct choices. Without any internal conflict, nation had to make right choices and face the all costs of development process in order to be the part of modern world.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 22.

¹⁴¹ Michel Foucault, *Use of Pleasures* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986), 24.

¹⁴² Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, p.16, cited in Saldana, *The Discourse of Development and the Narratives of Resistance*, 16-17.

4.2.5. Critique of Modernization School

In terms of its assumptions and methodology, modernization school can be criticized from different points. First objection that can be raised to this school is its assumption about the dichotomy between traditional and modern. Modernization theory perceives traditional as the residual category that can be defined according to Western societies. In this literature, tradition always contains negativity in relation to the modern; and these negative values are always associated with the basic features of the Third World societies. While modernization school codes basic characteristics of Third World countries as traditional, it perceives them as the basic obstacles for development. In other words, modernization process is defined as the annihilation of social, political and economic structures that do not resemble Western ones.

Secondly, this approach also brings the problem of ethnocentrism into picture. In modernization theory, 19th century Western experience of industrialization is abstracted and universalized. The Western social, economic and political systems that came into being through specific historical process are envisaged as the model of modern society. The belief that industrialization and capitalism are the main causes of 'advancement' in Western societies is turned into a universal and scientific truth and become general pattern for modernization. All these ethnocentric assumptions are projected to the modernization discourse as the language of abnormalities. Because Western type of modernization is raised to the 'norm' status, every phenomenon that differs from the assumptions of modernization theory is categorized as 'abnormal', 'deviant' or 'transitional'.¹⁴³ For example, Rostow defines Communism as a 'disease of the transition', while Lerner interpreted contradictory evidences as transitory.

Thirdly, serious contradictions between empirical facts and the theories of modernization do not only stem from Eurocentric assumptions. The functionalist methodology that dominates modernization studies is another reason of flaws in this school. By using functionalist approach, members of this school perceived

¹⁴³ Henry Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development," *Journal of Development Studies* 7 no.2 (1971), 147.

modernization as a 'comprehensive process' in which change in one part of the social structures necessitates the change in other parts in order to provide integrity of the system. In the Parsonian sense, modernization is the differentiation, adaptive upgrading, inclusion of new units and structures in the normative order, and the generalization of values.¹⁴⁴ Only as a result of these total changes in the whole social system can modernization be achieved. However, Henry Bernstein thinks that this functionalist approach creates serious problems because "the substantive referents of modernization theory are tied in at the level of theory-formation with the 'pure' requirements of systemic interdependence or functional reciprocity".¹⁴⁵ The result is the highly abstract and deductive theory that lost its relation with empirical facts. In other words, the functionalist theory enables the modernization school to ignore the specificities of Third World countries and homogenize them under the rubric of underdeveloped, in order to impose on them Western type of modernization as the universal receipt for development and general affluence.

Finally, modernization school never takes into account the unequal relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries. This attitude can be observed at two levels. At one level, they assert that, like the 19th century Europe, underdeveloped countries can be modernized through industrialization and capitalism. However, they always conceal the fact that in the 19th century, there was no great world hegemonic power that could inhibit industrialization of Europe. Whereas, now, capitalist West as the dominant power is the main factor in the development process of Third World countries, which can intervene to this process in a positive or negative way. Second, concomitant with the first argument, the underdeveloped situation of the Third World countries are explained by reference to their internal deficiencies. With few exceptions, the colonial era, which enabled Western countries to be rich at the expense of other parts of the world, has never been taken into account in the modernization school. This last objection was the departure point of dependency school as it flourished in the 1960s in Latin America.

¹⁴⁴ Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernization and Development*, 37.

¹⁴⁵ Bernstein, "Modernization Theory and the Sociological Study of Development", 150.

At the scientific level, modernization theory had a dominant position in the process of producing knowledge and ‘truth’ concerning the development practices. However, there were other theoretical approaches which challenged this hegemonic status. This section defines two different intellectual efforts to resist dominant ways of producing knowledge. Dependency school and world-system theory are the subject matters of this section. The issues of controversy between these schools and modernization theory, the extent of their success in going beyond the assumptions of hegemonic ways of thinking and their approach to the idea of development will be analyzed in a detailed way.

4.3. Dependency School

Dependency school was mainly consisted of Latin American scholars who were trying to find solutions to the crisis that Latin American countries were experiencing in the late 1950s. The dominant cause of the crisis was regarded as the failure of development policies that were proposed by the UN Economic Commission for the Latin America (ECLA). As the president of this commission, Paul Prebisch declared the ‘ECLA Manifesto’ in 1950, which criticized the existing international division of labor and the development strategy that was based on it. Prebisch thought that the existing economic order was based on free trade that functioned through the flow of raw materials and food from Latin America to industrialized countries and counter flow of industrial consumption goods from developed countries to Latin America. The gains from export of raw materials in Latin America were assumed to be the engine of development process in these countries. However, for Prebisch, this development strategy was not sustainable because of the deteriorating terms of trades of Latin America, which, in turn, curtailed capital accumulation. The strategy for solving this dilemma was the import-substituted industrialization (ISI) program, based on the idea that development could be achieved through the substitution of imports by domestic production.¹⁴⁶

Although it had a critical view, ECLA's development strategy embodied ideas of modernization theory. It had the optimism that industrialization would lead to the

¹⁴⁶ So, *Social Change and Development*, 93.

disappearance of traditional society and achievement of development. In practice, what it caused in the late 1950s is the balance of payment crises and concomitant social and political disorder in Latin American countries. The reason behind the failure of ECLA's strategy was clear: to some extent, internal production of consumption goods increased, but the domestic market was not large enough to absorb these products. Additionally, industrialization needed capital goods, but the Latin American countries did not have them and they had to import capital goods from industrialized countries. Hence, import dependency had shifted from consumption goods to capital goods. Finally, because capital goods were more expensive compared to consumption goods, Latin American countries needed more foreign exchange to purchase machines; hence their foreign currency reserves diminished day by day. All these factors led to economic depression and political stress in late the 1950s and later to the replacement of populist governments with militarist ones.

Dependency theory was first shaped as the critic of ECLA's development strategy, but the main target of its criticism was the modernization school. At the academic level, it tried to challenge the dominance of modernization school in development discourse. Here, my aim is not to give a detailed account of this school, rather I only try to show the failure of dependency school in going beyond hegemonic power of modernization theory. In other words, although dependency school was very critical of modernization school, it still embodied many assumptions of the latter. It challenged the 'truths' produced by modernization school, but it still inherited the ways of conceptualizing its problematic and producing knowledge pertaining to it. Therefore modernization and dependency schools were different sides of the same coin; they both had faith in development, industrialization and material progress.

It is possible to conceive two different academic trends in the dependency theory. The first one was shaped by Andre Gunder Frank, who was a Chicago-trained economist, a committed socialist and the main transmitter of Latin American scholars' works to the U.S. The second trend was characterized by the stress it makes on sociopolitical aspects of dependency and Fernando Cardoso was the main contributor of this understanding.

What Frank really did was to reverse the common understanding about the relationship between development and capitalism. Contrary to modernization school, which asserted the necessity of close collaboration between capitalist and Third World countries for the development of the latter, Frank thought that it was the same relationship that made Third World countries underdeveloped.¹⁴⁷ According to the idea of ‘development of underdevelopment’ the ‘underdeveloped’ situation of Third World countries could not be linked to their internal conditions, rather it was the external conditions, mainly colonialism that rendered these societies underdeveloped. Expansion of capitalism led to the development of Western economies, while it functioned through exploiting resources of colonial countries. Hence, not only modern sectors, but also traditional sectors of underdeveloped countries had always been part of an imperialist system. In fact, contrary to modernization school’s arguments, traditional sectors were those that had the closest links with the capitalist world in the colonial era. Because, colonialism drained off all their sources traditional sectors never had a change to generate economic development.

Rather than the dualism of traditional and modern sectors, Frank’s explanation provided metropolitan and satellite dichotomy to reveal the dependent relationship between developed and underdeveloped countries. Frank argued that, from the beginning of colonial era, the big cities in the colonial areas were turned into satellites of the Western metropolis, through which the economic surplus produced in these areas were expropriated. Additionally, satellite cities became colonial metropolis with respect to provincial cities that had local cities as the satellites. Therefore, through this chain-like model, metropolitan-satellite relation was extended to the inner parts of the underdeveloped countries. This dependency was still in practice even after decolonialization, and in order to be developed, Third World countries had to delink themselves from capitalist economic system. For Frank, the only way for achieving this kind of break with the capitalist system was to realize socialism.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁷ Andre Gunter Frank, *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution: Essays on the Development of Underdevelopment and the Immediate Enemy* (New York: Review Press, 1969)

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 371- 372.

While Frank's argument was basically constructing ideal types, it overlooked the national and historical differences and treated dependency as the general process that was valid for all societies. Additionally, his explanation was based on the economic understanding that reduced dependency to the flow of surplus from one country to another. He linked underdeveloped situation to external conditions while internal factors were not taken into account. Finally, development and dependency were perceived as incompatible; as long as the outflow of economic surplus continued, Third World countries could not be developed.¹⁴⁹ Frank's studies enabled dependency school's ideas to reach to other parts of the world, especially to the U.S., hence, they helped to challenge dominant ideas of modernization school, yet his approach was simplistic and excessively generalizing.

Fernando Cardoso and others¹⁵⁰ also accepted the basic idea of dependency school that underdeveloped situation of Third World countries had been affected by the expansion of capitalism. However, they hesitated to use vulgar and simplistic explanations, which saw all underdeveloped countries as essentially similar and explained social change in peripheral countries with reference to external factors. They pursued dialectical approach and saw dependency situation as a dynamic relation that changed over time. This dependent situation was open to any change, because the internal conditions of each country were not the same: dependency was not the result of the "abstract 'logic of capital accumulation' but of... particular relationships and struggles between social classes and groups at the international as well as at the local level".¹⁵¹ Taking into account internal dynamics necessitated the shift in the focus of dependency studies. Focus was now on the socio-political aspects of dependency rather than on the economic aspects. Cardoso thought that external domination was always experienced as 'internal' forces, since there were

¹⁴⁹ So, *Social Change and Development*, 104-105.

¹⁵⁰ Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969); Celso Furtado, *Economic Development of Latin America: A Survey from Colonial Times to the Cuban Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

¹⁵¹ Cardoso and Faletto, *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, p.xvii, quoted in Ilan Kapoor, "Capitalism, Culture, Agency: Dependency versus Postcolonial," *Third World Quarterly* 23 no.4 (2002), 649.

always local groups and classes who shared common interest with the external forces and struggled to realize them. Cardoso called this situation the ‘internalization of external interest’, and the analysis of this situation sought to study the conditions of the decision making in each country. For example, after the 1964 military coup in Brazil, decision making was shaped by the alliance of three main actors: state, multinational cooperations and the local bourgeoisie.

Additionally, contrary to Frank, Cardoso suggested that development and dependence were not incompatible. Given the specific situations, it was possible to have development in a dependent relation. He conceptualized ‘associated-dependent development’ referring to the new phase that enabled development. Cardoso argued that the expansion of multinational cooperations and diffusion of industrial capital into Third World made the interests of foreign cooperations compatible with the internal prosperity of the dependent countries.¹⁵² Although dependent situation continued, any Third World country could achieve a certain level of technological improvement, increase in GNP and industrialization. However, this development was far from a being self-sustained growth based on the local capital accumulation and a dynamic industrial sector.

4.3.1. Failure of Dependency Theory

Dependency school has been criticized from different directions; those who were inclined to mainstream approaches condemned dependency theory as ideological and not scientific, while Marxist ones criticized the overemphasis on the external relations and the lack of class analysis. Giving account of these critics is beyond the aim of this thesis, what I want to disclose is the position of dependency school in the development discourse and its relation to modernization school.

The challenge of analyzing dependency school is the following: dependency school harshly criticized modernization theory, which basically shaped the development discourse, however it was still part of the same discourse; therefore, how is it

¹⁵² So, *Social Change and Development*, 141.

possible to show the linkage between the dependency theory and the basic tenets of development discourse? Point of departure can be Kate Manzo's warning that

even the most radically critical discourse easily slips into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest, for it can never step completely outside of a heritage from which it must borrow its tools- its history, its language- in its attempt to destroy that heritage itself.¹⁵³

Dependency school criticized the defined relationship between development and capitalism; however it never interrogated the idea of 'development' itself. As Haldun Güralp mentions, dependency writers adopted the modernization school's idea that development was basically the progress in economy and technology.¹⁵⁴ For them, the Western type of development was still the model for being developed. The difference was that modernization school emphasized strong ties between developed and underdeveloped countries, whereas dependency school wanted to break these ties to reach development. But for both of them the main target was the same: development. Additionally, dependency theory perpetuated binary thinking; instead of traditional-modern dichotomy it constructed center-periphery and metropolis-satellite duality. However, by seeing centre as the main reason for underdevelopment, it attributed to the centre the activeness of a subject, and reduced periphery into a passive victim. Therefore, their analysis became alike with the modernization school in which "the West ends up being consolidated as sovereign subject".¹⁵⁵ What dependency theory said was that: this 'sovereign subject' blocked the 'natural' course of development in the periphery, without the West, the periphery would have followed its natural development path. Here, there was a clear sign of faith in the idea of progress which was assumed to be realized without any external intervention.

Economism is another issue that shows us the failure of dependency school scholars in their attempts to go beyond the premises of modernization theory. Cultural and social aspects received little attention in this school. As Frank's study exemplified, dependency of periphery to the core was explained in terms of economic relations; he

¹⁵³ Kate Manzo, "Modernist Discourse and the Crisis of Development Theory," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 26, no.2 (1991), 8.

¹⁵⁴ Haldun Güralp, "The Eurocentrism of Dependency Theory and the Question of 'Authenticity': A View from Turkey," *Third World Quarterly* 19, no.5 (1998), 957.

¹⁵⁵ Kapoor, "Capitalism, Culture, Agency: Dependency versus Postcolonial", 654.

never talked about the social or cultural dependency. Colin Leys thinks that in dependency studies, social classes, culture and ideology were incorporated into the analysis as derivatives of economic forces.¹⁵⁶ Even Cardoso, who was inclined to analyze socio-political aspects of dependency, explored the decision-making process in governments and politics, which, he thought, was determined by the economic interests of main power groups. In other words, dependency theory inherited the economic language of modernization school, and used it to refute and counterbalance the latter's theories.

Another issue that was common both in the dependency and modernization schools was the role of the nation-state in the development process. Like modernization theorist Latin American scholars "equated development with national autonomy and the growth".¹⁵⁷ The nation-state was the 'inside' whose well-being could be gained only by recasting or even breaking its relationship with the 'outside'. Every possibility of agency could only be realized within the boundaries of the nation-state. Concomitant with this understanding, the nation-state was perceived as the sovereign subject of development, like a rational individual who can pursue his self-interest. Therefore, the way in which the nation-state was located in the modernization theory was directly inherited by the dependency school.

To some extent, dependency school managed to criticize and challenge the hegemonic position of modernization school in the development discourse. Especially, it was successful to disclose the unequal relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries, which had been experienced since the colonial era. Contrary to modernization school's assertions that capitalism was a useful and necessary vehicle for development, dependency perspective revealed the negative impact of capitalist relations on Latin America and generally on Third World countries. However, these scholars defined a dependent relation between periphery and the centre as the economic dependency and to some extent as a political one. But, as I try to show above, there was another dependency from which

¹⁵⁶ Colin Leys, *The Rise and the Fall of Development Theory* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), 49.

¹⁵⁷ Manzo, "Modernist Discourse and the Crisis of Development Theory", 12.

even these scholars themselves could not escape from. They used the assumptions of modernization school to criticize this school, hence, at the level of thinking and producing knowledge, they did not go beyond modernization school. The account of dependency theory shows us the following: in the Cold War period, the unequal and dependent relationship between the developed and underdeveloped countries perpetuated, but this relationship was not confined to economic relations. The hegemonic relationship was extended to the cultural and especially to scientific levels. The ways of producing 'truth', thinking about the well-being and happiness of people were also shaped by dominant discourses.

This last remark gives us clues about the differences between the critics of dependency school, generally neo-Marxists, and those who apply Foucauldian ideas. Because most of the dependency school scholars were coming from Marxist background, they were inclined to think within the framework of political-economy. They disclosed the hegemonic relationship between the West and the Third World countries; however, they defined it in terms of the notions of economy. The terms they used in their analysis reflected their biases: economic exploitation, unequal exchange, terms of trade, modes of production, class struggle were the most common notions in their studies. This way of thinking ignored the fact that the founding assumptions of the idea of development inherited dark sides of the modernity, like overemphasizing material wealth, technology and the idea of progress. In other words, dependency school and neo-Marxists only focused on the 'true' ways of development, which would bring them independence and prosperity. They never interrogated the idea of development and its intrinsic link with modernity. This kind of inquiry would be possible only if the idea of development is analyzed with all its cultural, political and social connotations. One of the viable ways of accomplishing this task is to incorporate Foucauldian ideas into the critique of development. What this thesis tries to do is to show that development practices were not only tools for economic exploitation, but they constituted a discourse or *dispositif* that functioned at the cultural, scientific and political levels. Briefly, Foucauldian perspective enables scholars to explain the fact that development practices were always part of the power relations whose effects can be seen in the ways people think, scientist produce knowledge, experts act and countries give aids.

Additionally, again as a result of the Marxist background, dependency school and neo-Marxist critiques of development practices were mainly based on Marxist way of criticizing ideology. They thought that development was a ideological concept which functioned like *camera obscura*, that is, it presented reality in a upside down form; hence it distorted the reality. According to this argument, development practices and the knowledge concerning it were ideologies that conceal new imperialist ways of exploitation in the post-war era. In other words, as an ideology, development presented distorted image of the relation between the West and the Third World. On the other hand, Foucauldian perspective tries to go beyond the critic of ideology. What was taking place through development discourse was not the concealment of reality, but rather the construction of it. Development discourse produced realities concerning the Third World. In fact, the role of development discourse was same the as the role of the Orientalism defined by the Edward Said. Rita Abrahamsen mentions that when we replace Orient with the Third World and Europe with the West in the definition of Orientalism, we can reach to the definition of development discourse: “[Orientalism is a] systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage- and even produce- the Orient politically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period”.¹⁵⁸ Therefore development discourse contained techniques, knowledge to produce and manage Third World.

4.4. World-System Theory

By the mid-1970s, critical developments including the substantial development experiences in East Asia, crises in the socialist countries and oil crises with its impact on world economy crumbled the explanatory power of dependency theory. At the initiation period, by inheriting many concepts of dependency school and French Annels School of history writing, world-system theory tried to fill this intellectual vacuum. Immanuel Wallerstein with Samir Amin and Andre Gunter Frank was the dominant figure of world system approach. Here, I will not give a detailed account of

¹⁵⁸ Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa*, 15.

the world-system theory because I believe that the position of this theory in the development discourse was quite different from that of dependency and modernization schools.

World-system theory had intellectual pessimism that stem from the disillusion about the idea of delinking from world economic system and the possibility of national development. Andre Gunter Frank, for example, thought that world crisis of the 1970s erased the political propositions of structuralist dependence theories of underdevelopment, because these theories assumed the viability of an ‘independent’ alternative for the Third World. However, this alternative never existed, “because the world-system has always been single and unified whole”.¹⁵⁹ This tightly-knit world system did not allow delinking, and the only possible way for ‘real autonomous development’ was the creation of ‘global socialist society’, which could be constructed from the periphery.¹⁶⁰

World-system theory basically aimed to analyze expansion of capitalism, which started in the 15th century Europe as the production for the market and the profit. As Western nations developed trading links with non-European countries, capitalist system incorporated the rest of the world. It first incorporated ‘mini-systems’ later ‘world-empires’ and finally it became capitalist world-system, which contained even socialist countries and those without a history of direct colonialism.

In the world-system analysis, there are two issues that deserve mentioning. First one concerns the explanation of the mechanism by which the world capitalism was maintained. The surplus transformation from peripheries to core was accomplished through ‘unequal exchange’. As Arghiri Emmanuel explained, at the roots of this unequal trade relationship, there was the difference between wages in the Third World countries and in the industrialized West.¹⁶¹ This difference was reflected to

¹⁵⁹ Andre Gunder Frank, “Crisis of Ideology and Ideology of Crisis,” in *Dynamics of Global Crisis*, eds. S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A. G. Frank, I. Wallerstein (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982), 135.

¹⁶⁰ Samir Amin, “Accumulation and Development: A Theoretical Model,” *Review of African Political Economy* no.1 (1974), 9, cited in Harrison, *The Sociology of Modernization and Development*, 96.

¹⁶¹ Arghiri Emmanuel, *Unequal exchange: A study in the Imperialism of Trade* (New York London: Monthly Review Press, 1972).

the prices of products and Third World products became cheaper than those produced by the advanced capitalist countries. In other words, Third World worker had to work many hours to buy any product that was produced by an industrialized country worker in one hour.

Second issue was the rejection of the dualist model. Especially Wallerstein thought that dualist model of dependency theory was inadequate to analyze the complexities of world system. In addition to core and periphery, he envisaged semi-periphery as the combination of buffer areas, which separated two economic poles in the world system.¹⁶² Semi-periphery was exploited by the core but, in turn, it exploited the periphery. It included economically stronger Latin American countries of Brazil, Argentina; periphery of Europe: Portugal Spain, Greece and most of Eastern Europe; Asia countries such as Turkey India Iran Korea; and white Commonwealth: Canada, Australia, South Africa and other.¹⁶³ Capitalist world system needed the semi-periphery sectors for two reasons. First, as the buffer zones semi-periphery prevented the acute crises that emerged as a result of the strain between core and periphery. Second, in a situation where profit possibilities were declining in the core areas, there had to be sectors, which had potential to absorb capital transfer from the core and turn them into profitable investment.¹⁶⁴ In other words, sustainable functioning of capitalist world system needed the existence of semi-periphery sectors.

In terms of the development debate, world-system theory, especially Wallerstein's arguments, exhibited quite a different approach to development than the modernization and dependency schools did. These two schools placed the idea of 'development' at the centre of their analysis; modernization theory explored the possibilities of modernization through development process in which capitalism was a necessary contributor, while dependency school perceived capitalism as the blocker of development process. However, the idea of 'development' was not located at the

¹⁶² Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World-Economy: Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 100.

¹⁶⁴ So, *Social Change and Development*, 180-181.

centre of world-system theory; rather, it was the capitalism itself that became main object of inquiry. Wallerstein's aim was to explain capitalism as a historical system, which was reproduced by means of ongoing division of labor. It is for sure that in this theoretical framework devoted to explaining emergence, functioning and reproduction of capitalism, the issue of development was only a fringe element. Development was analyzed in relation to the transformation of whole capitalist world-system. In that sense, development as a way of bringing prosperity to a nation was not possible:

National development may be well a pernicious policy objective. This is for two reasons. For most states, it is unrealizable whatever the method adopted. And for those few states which may still realize it, that is transmuting radically the location of world-scale production and thereby their location on the interstate ordinal scale, their benefits will perforce be at the expense of some other zones.¹⁶⁵

Wallerstein had doubts not only about the national development, but also about the very idea of 'development' and 'progress'. He rejected the idea that capitalist development represented a progress over the various previous historical systems that it destroyed and transformed. Progress had nothing to do with growth of wealth; it was the "removal of realities of the exploitation of labor".¹⁶⁶ Historically, there was no specific trajectory of progress that represents linear movement from simple, primitive to complex and advanced. We could observe certain trends in line with the certain historical systems, but they were uneven or maybe indeterminate. It is for sure that world-system theory differed from modernization and dependency schools by rejecting idea of linear progress.

In terms of the position of world-system theory in the development discourse, it seems that, to some extent, this theory managed to go beyond the assumptions of modernization school at the expense of the idea of development. As I tried to show in the account of modernization and dependency schools, the scientific ways of producing knowledge about the development was bounded by the Western modes of thinking; and, the possible exodus from this trap was to interrogate the ways of doing

¹⁶⁵ Emmanuel Wallerstein, "Development: Lodestar or Illusion," *Economic and Political Weekly* 23, no.39 (1988), 2022, quoted in So, *Social Change and Development*, 192-193.

¹⁶⁶ David P. Levine, "Political Economy and the Idea of Development," *Review of Political Economy* 13, no.4 (2001), 532.

social science and the idea of development. Especially during the 1970s where national development projects turned into illusions, there emerged a suitable context to criticize the basic assumptions of development discourse. By focusing on the capitalist world system, rather than on the development, Wallerstein and others realized this situation and played a crucial role in the evolution of development discourse during the 1980s. However, when it is perceived from Foucauldian perspective, world-system theory is also susceptible to the critiques, which I do about dependency school. In world-system theory, capitalism and the history of the West became the main agents, who constructed the world history. The latter was reduced to the unfolding of capitalism; moreover, again, economic relations were taken as the determining factor of history, in which social and cultural aspects were ignored.

This chapter focuses on the first side of the developmental governmentality: modes of thought or political rationalities. By explaining the ways of producing knowledge in the modernization school this chapter discloses the dominant ways of thinking in the development discourse. The latter takes features of Western society and makes them universal laws of development, to which underdeveloped countries should reach. Additionally, through problematizing certain objects from underdeveloped countries it renders Third World visible and manageable in a certain way. Finally, this chapter also underlines the inadequacy of theoretical resistances to modernization school through exploring dependency and world-system theories.

The following chapter will explore second side of the developmental governmentality, namely, technologies of government. The specific techniques that make realization and dissemination of development ideas will be the subject matter of the next chapter. Development aid and planning, as the basic development mechanisms, will be explained in a detailed way.

CHAPTER 5

GOVERNMENTAL MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE

This chapter examines the *techne* of developmental governmentality. It starts with the following question: “by what means, mechanisms, tactics, techniques and technologies is authority constituted and rule accomplished’ in the development discourse?”¹⁶⁷ These technologies are the means to intervene, act upon the objects of government. They contain surveys, presentational forms such as tables, statistics, techniques of notation and architectural forms. Developmental governmentality utilized statistics, accounting techniques, aid initiatives, planning, and economic indicators as the means of constructing its rule. This chapter dwells on only two of these mechanisms: aid and planning. As a governmental tactic development aid was employed in the international relations during the Cold War period. In a bilateral form aid was used by the U.S. to foster Third World countries against any communist influence. Rather than exerting open military force to Third World countries it encouraged capitalist development through aid. Capitalist development, supported by the U.S. aid, turned into a mechanism for expanding American way of life to the Third World. Development planning, on the other hand, became a basic tool for predicting and managing social, political and economic transformation in Third World countries. Additionally, it was deployed to define and implement development process as a domain outside the politics.

5.1. Development Aid

Foucault constitutes the notion of governmentality to subvert the understanding which perceives power as repressive. He depicts power as the collection of mechanisms that encourage individual and ease certain actions by constructing a

¹⁶⁷ Dean, *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society*, 31.

field in which individual can form his or her subjectivity. Foucault tries to reveal influence of governmental strategies on the individual, but I aim to show that as a governmental strategy development was utilized to manage not only the conducts of the individuals, but also nation-states in the Cold War period. In other words, I substitute the nation-state for the individual; and try to show how aid fostered nation-states to pursue certain policies and specific development models.

Because Foucault explores the impact of power relations on the individual conduct, it is quite easy to show the duality between governmental power and sovereign power, as it is explained in the chapter three. However, when we replace individual with the nation-state the borders between governmental and sovereign power become blurred. In the relations between the nation-states, policies that each state pursues against the other contain both governmental and sovereign aspects of power. Even the same practice can bear the traces of these two different approaches. In the Cold War period, development aid contained the activities in which we can observe the combination of governmental and sovereign ways of utilizing power. It is for sure that bilateral aid was given by sovereign countries to realize specific national interests; however, this fact cannot reduce aid to an example of sovereign power practice. Aid was also a governmental instrument because it was given with a certain kind of development framework that should be pursued, and it needed the complicity of recipient country. Moreover, it fostered the development activities in this country.

Aid for development was also in practice before the Cold War period. For example, within the framework of 1929 Colonial Development Act, United Kingdom raised 1 million pound to develop agriculture and industry in the colonies. However, this aid was spent to expenditures of experts and technicians whose task was to diffuse Western civilization to these areas. Moreover, the basic aim of the colonial aid practices was to yield more profit for the metropolitan country by developing the productive capacity of colonial country.¹⁶⁸ In the post-war context, granting aid with the same aim was not possible. Main difference was that colonial territories were assumed to be the property of the Empire and development aid was given to develop

¹⁶⁸ Wustaff G. Zeylstra, *Aid and Development: The Relevance of Development Aid to Developing Countries* (Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1975), 50-51.

this property, without taking into account demands of colonial people; however, after the independence movements, aid relations took place between two independent countries, rather than between the colonized and the colonizer. In other words, granting aid needed free will and the consent of the two nation-states. However, this rhetoric of autonomy exists only in the official language of international relations. In reality, aid was not something that was demanded by the free will of independent country; but it was a thing that was given according to certain logic of deficit. Within the development framework, certain standards for measuring the level of development were determined; and those who are below these standards became recipients of development aid. This transformation that took place at the nation-state level was similar to Marianne Gronemeyer's observations on the transformed relationship between help and individual in modernity:

Modern help is much more often the indispensable, compulsory of a need for help that has been diagnosed from without. Whether someone needs help is no longer decided by the cry, but by some external standard of normality. The person who cries out for help is thereby robbed of his or her autonomy as a crier. Even the appropriateness of a cry for help is determined according to this standard of normality.¹⁶⁹

Another transformation that allowed the utilization of aid as a governmental strategy was its institutionalization and professionalization through long-run aid relations. Throughout the Cold War period, both multilateral and bilateral aid were tried to be formed through the long-term agreements. This kind of aid relation facilitated the intervention of donors to the political, social and economic problems of recipient countries. Especially, debates on the aim of aid and its time span during the Kennedy administration reflected the controversies about using power of aid in a governmental or sovereign way. This point will be explored in an extensive way in this section.

When we check the numbers concerning aid practices in the Cold War period, the dominance of the U.S. in this area is very clear. Between 1945 and 1964 the U.S. aid to developing countries was around \$36 billion and \$30 billion of it was given after 1950. This number did not contain the Marshall aid that was given to European countries. In the same period, non-communist countries' bilateral aid was around \$21 billion while communists block's was around \$6 billion. The World Bank, as the

¹⁶⁹ Marianne Gronemeyer, "Helping," in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power* ed. W. Sachs (London: Zed Books, 1992), 54.

main multilateral aid donor, gave only \$8,5 billion to the developing countries between 1945 and 1964. Apart from development aid, in the military aid the US was still the main donor country: in the same period the military aid that was given by the U.S. was around \$17 billion while the communist blocks' military aid was around \$3 billion.¹⁷⁰ These numbers reveal two facts: in the Cold War period the large amount of development aid was in the bilateral form, that is, there was only one donor country behind the each aid activity. Second, the U.S. was the dominant bilateral aid donor who had the power to determine the institutionalization of aid in the Cold War period. For these reasons, my main emphasis will be on the U.S. aid.

Before giving account of the aid activities in the Cold War period, one must ponder on ambiguity of the term 'aid'. When we consider foreign aid, it is generally divided into two categories: military aid and economic aid, the latter is most of the time means development aid. Within the official language of development institutions, the division between two types of aid is clear. For example, The Development Assistance Committee- principal body through which Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) deals with development issues- clearly excludes all grants, loans, and credits for military purposes from the definition of development aid. However, in practice things work quite differently: until the 1960s, in the U.S. most of the economic aid was distributed through the Economic Support Fund (ESF), which was officially aimed to pursue U.S. military objectives.¹⁷¹ In the recipient side, the ambiguity between the military and development aid is defined by the issue of fungibility. This concept refers to the fact that if the terms of an aid agreement were not strictly defined, the recipient country can use development aid for different aims, for example financing military expenditures.¹⁷²

Additionally, even we if can differentiate military and economic aid, the content of the latter is quite complicated. The grants, loans, credits and material assistance can

¹⁷⁰ Harry J. P. Arnold, *Aid For Development: A Political and Economic Study* (London: Bodley Head, 1966), 220.

¹⁷¹ Robert E. Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 11.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*

both be considered as economic aid. The development Assistance Committee defines 'official development assistance' (ODA) as containing a grant element of at least 25 percent.¹⁷³ However, this kind of definition excludes almost all the World Bank's aid because the Bank gives money to the developing countries as a loan which has to be paid back with a certain amount of interest rate. On the other hand, within the World Bank Group, International Development Agency (IDA) provides loans with the interest rates below the market level or even with no interest rates, hence its loans, to some extent, can be considered as an aid.

Conceiving aid as a governmental tool can help us to explain the complexity and the ambiguity of aid activities in the Cold War period. The international order that was defined by the U.S.-Soviet conflict and the principles of self-determination of each country and the idea of non-interference to domestic affairs of countries curtailed the number of tools for managing international relations after the Second World War. Aid, in this context, with all its complex character, enabled countries to circumvent rigid requirements of international order. Especially in the bilateral aid agreements bargaining process between donor and recipient countries substituted formal rules of international order. Ad hoc basis of aid negotiations created room for manoeuvre and brought flexibility to relations between countries. In the programmed aid lending where donor country expected sound development policies from receiving countries, the bargaining process contained not only the economic conditions of the receiving country but also the social, political and military aspects of it. Hence, through development discourse in which development was perceived as the total transformation of all aspects of society, aid helped donor countries to intervene domestic policies of the receiving countries. This way of intervention was far from being repressive, rather it fostered nation-states; it empowered countries to pursue certain policies.

5.1.1. Truman Doctrine

After the Second World War the U.S. President Harry S. Truman requested \$400 million from Congress for economic, technical and military assistance to Greece and

¹⁷³ Ibid., 13.

Turkey. Truman's speech, which was later named as Truman doctrine, revealed the changing character of foreign aid policy of the U.S. in the Cold War period. This doctrine exemplified the conjunction of security concerns, and other American interests, with the development discourse. The explicit aim behind the aid was defined by Harry Truman as "to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures". And he added: "I believe that our help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes".¹⁷⁴ Here, "attempted subjugation by armed minorities" referred to situation in Greece where Marxist oriented minority group rebelled against government, whereas "attempted subjugation by outside pressures" referred to the situation of Turkey which was under the threat of the military expansion of Soviet Union.

It is for sure that the rationale for the Truman Doctrine was not merely humanitarianism but the national interest of the United States. The Cold War understanding of 'containment policy' determined the idea of aid to Greece and Turkey. According to this policy Soviet Union and other communist countries must be geographically quarantined by military aid to countries bordering communist countries. The main concern for us here is not the implicit interests of the U.S., but the ways in which this was realized. In the Cold War environment where sending troops to countries bordering to communist countries was not a viable solution, the very idea of development and economic aid became means of managing Cold War problems in a more effective way.

The assumption was that economic aid would strengthen the economy in the Third World countries, and the strengthened economy would yield more political stability. The latter generally meant democratically elected non-communist, pro-American governments that had political, or in some cases military power to reduce the appeals of communism. Hence, development discourse provided suitable ways to solve security problem. Without facing open war which might lead to nuclear wars

¹⁷⁴ Public Papers of the President of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1947 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing office, 1960), 178-179, quoted in Robert A. Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 26.

between super powers, security problem was envisaged within the development framework. In the Cold War situation, war against communism could only be won by fostering capitalist and Western type of political, social and economic institutions in the Third World countries; and the development activities provided a general framework to realize this aim.

5.1.2. Marshall Plan

Officially known as European Recovery Program, Marshall Plan gave over \$13 billion between 1948 and 1952 to Western European countries. Over 90 percent of this aid was in the form of grant. The reputation of Marshall Plan was due to its success in restructuring European economies which had collapsed in the Second World War. Marshall Plan gave a chance to America to prove its generosity and humanitarian motives in relationship with other countries.

In terms of the role that Marshall Plan played in development aid, its importance did not stem from the contributions it provided to European recovery, but from the construction of a framework of goals and means that shaped the development aid during the post-war period. It created a body of operating principles and procedures that became the main part of the aid regime. Additionally, it initiated large-scale economic programs in the underdeveloped countries. Through Marshall Plan and Point Four the U.S. initiated aid programs in the territories of the European colonial powers and in forty independent Third World countries. Between 1948 and 1952, one-fifth of U.S. aid went to the underdeveloped areas.¹⁷⁵ The experiences that U.S. experts achieved in the European Recovery Program were transferred to aid initiatives in the Third World countries. Hence, Marshall Plan and its success provided encourage and knowledge to construct an aid regime in the post-war period.

The Marshall Plan had the same rationale as the Truman Doctrine. It was believed that Europe with economic and political instability was susceptible to communist threat. The remedy of this situation was the economic development that was assumed to be realized by external aid. Because the solution was perceived within the

¹⁷⁵ Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy*, 65-66.

discourse of economic development, the aid instruments were almost exclusively economic: raw materials, instrumental equipment, and international liquidity. These were given to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), a planning agency which in turn reallocated the aid. Participant states received aid on roughly per capita basis. Because industrial development was assumed to be necessary contributor to European revival, industrially developed countries, United Kingdom, France and Germany received the larger amount of the aid.

In fact, the relative success of the Marshall Plan was due to appropriate conditions in Europe where technical and financial expertise, well-educated population and democratic tradition already existed. Only missing ingredient was economic; because of the world war and the independence of colonies, European countries suffered from exhausted exchange reserves. Marshall Plan provided foreign currency, mainly U.S. dollar, to import necessary goods for the reconstructing Europe. In addition to direct foreign currency funds, Marshall Plan initiated the *counterpart funds*, which later became indispensable mechanism in aid policies. These funds were created with the local currency and larger part of it was used to support private industrial investment.

Within the European context, restricting aid to economic means was quite meaningful and sufficient. However, as Robert Packenham mentions, the success of Marshall Plan was perceived as the success of the aid that was based only on economic instruments. Hence, this experience was emulated in other aid initiatives during the post-war period. Without concerning the conditions of the receiving countries, aid with economic emphasis was extended to Asian, African and Latin American countries.¹⁷⁶ Through the administrative mechanism of Economic Cooperation and Administration (ECA) Marshall Plan was first transferred to China and Korea, and later to Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. The major aim of these programs was “to develop institutions and practices which would not require prolonged American support” and the main instruments for achieving this aim were “technical assistance and relatively small quantities of material aid”.¹⁷⁷ The success

¹⁷⁶ Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences*, 35.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 38.

of the Marshall Plan created the illusion that development of Third World countries could be achieved by the short-term external aid which was based on economic instruments. However, conditions of the Third World countries were quite different from that of Europe; and bringing change in the Third World necessitated different aid paradigm that was diverged from Marshall Plan. This different aid paradigm was tried to be institutionalized during the Kennedy administration where we can trace the replacement of sovereign understanding by the governmental one in utilizing aid.

5.1.3. Aid During the ‘Development Decade’

Before giving account of the aid practices in the 1960s, it will be useful to explore aid in the 1950s during which Cold War considerations directly determined objectives of the American aid. Because of the Korea War and increasing tension between Soviet Union and the U.S., the emphasis in the U.S. government shifted from economic development to security concerns. Throughout the 1950s the quantity of military aid doubled the quantity of economic aid.¹⁷⁸ Under the Mutual Security Act of 1951 the U.S. gathered all its aid activities under one legislative authority. The main aim of the aid was to maintain security by building a strong free world alliance. Both military and economic aids were utilized to gain friendly countries and increase their defensive power without hampering their basic economy and decreasing their living standards. As Packenham mentions, in this period, relationship between mutual security aid and its goals were unclear; and short-term usage of aid to contribute defensive alliances was the dominant understanding.¹⁷⁹ However, starting from the early 1960s, this understanding in aid activities was transformed by the Kennedy administration. Kennedy’s ideas about the aid represent a new attitude which saw aid as a governmental tool for managing international relations in the 1960s.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., 49.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid., 51.

After announcing the 1960s as the ‘development decade’, President Kennedy sent his aid message to the Congress in March 1961. His suggestions reveal the changing attitude in the aid practices.¹⁸⁰

i- Kennedy proposed the establishment of a super aid agency that took control of the different aid initiatives. In 1961 this super agency came into being, Agency for International Development (AID). This agency played a crucial role in the institutionalization of aid regime. For example, in 1964, the number of experts working for AID was around three thousand. These experts produced all kinds of knowledge concerning the aid receiving countries. They helped local authorities in drafting development projects and programs, took active role in implementing these policies. In other words, its widespread branches that dispersed all over the world and web of experts in each country enabled AID to control and manage aid practices, hence the way of development that should to be achieved.

ii- Another point mentioned by the Kennedy Administration was about the objective of development. For him, the U.S. aid should put emphasis on dealing with economic problems rather than preventing communism. The latter was still a threat for the Kennedy Administration, but the ways of dealing with this problem were not restricted to military sphere. Kennedy and his advisor Rostow tried to merge the issue of security with development; that is, development as the expansion of Western way of life and its institutions into the Third World was envisaged as the main weapon in war against communism. Hence aid, without military concerns, was given with the aim of fostering development objectives in the Third World countries.

iii- Another objective that reveals Kennedy’s perception of aid as a governmental tool was the notion of self-help. In search for the criteria that determine which country or project was eligible for receiving aid, Kennedy administration came up with the idea of self-help. According to this criterion, recipient government must have commitment to development and must prove this commitment by initiating certain policies. These measures contained a broad spectrum of economic, social and

¹⁸⁰ Arnold, *Aid For Development: A Political and Economic Study*, 45-56.

political concerns such as increasing saving rates, extending educational system, improving health facilities and strengthening political representation. In addition to this vague definition of the contours of self-help, the target of the U.S. aid was not clear. The handbook *Principles of Foreign Aid Assistance*, published by the AID, states that “The United States aid may be linked to a single project, to a particular sector or to the performance of entire economy. Our strongest interest is country-wide social and political progresses”.¹⁸¹ In this context, the process of reaching decision about the recipient country’s self-help performance contained close scrutinization of every political, social and economic aspect of the country. In other words the notion of self-help with its open contours allowed donor country to turn every point into an object of its scrutinizing gaze. In the bargaining process for aid the donor country had a power to incorporate any problem of recipient country into the items of negotiation.

Additionally, in terms of the governmental strategies, self-help meant the complicity of the recipient country. With this notion aid and development ceased to be something that was imposed on a Third World country from an outside one; they became something that was desired by the Third World country itself. As Foucauldian analysis shows, individual first should have free will to be an object of governmental strategies, Third World countries should be independent states; without any imposition, they should desire to be developed like Western countries. In order to be eligible for aid, they should prove their will for development by initiating certain reforms which were in line with the dominant development paradigms. By taking the risk of overemphasizing importance of Foucauldian analysis, it is possible to say that with the notion of self-help development discourse created suitable subjectivities for the Third World states. This subjectivity was constructed through stimulating aspirations to be developed; and aid, in this situation, was not something that inhibits this desire rather it was conducive to any efforts for realizing this aspiration.

iv- As it is mentioned above, throughout the 1950s aid was given for short-terms. Kennedy administration aimed to change this short-term financing attitude in favor

¹⁸¹ Quoted in Arnold, *Aid For Development: A Political and Economic Study*, 48.

of the long-term; and they proposed for a long-term borrowing authority for the AID. From one perspective this proposal reflected the power struggle between Kennedy Administration and the Congress. Because the budget of AID should be ratified by the Congress annually, Kennedy administration was not completely free in aid policies; hence long-term aid aimed to bypass Congress' control. However, this political manoeuvre delineated much more important changes in the aid policies: shift from sovereign concerns to governmental ones.

Short-run aid was used as an instrument of response to urgent Cold War problems. Especially in the hands of the Department of State aid was a tool for achieving short-term political purposes rather than long-term economic development. Packenham mentions that short-run use of aid aimed to “win friends, punish enemies (by withdrawing aid), and maintain alliances, influence elections, and advance American security”.¹⁸² This kind of understating about aid clearly indicates the fact that it was perceived as an instrument for implementing sovereign power. Under the Cold War security concerns aid was employed to punish countries which hesitated to partake in the U.S. alliance, and to reward those countries which were in the U.S.'s side.¹⁸³ In this context, aid looked like a tool for implementing arbitrary power of the sovereign, the U.S.. It was diverged from development goals and tied to Cold War security problems. To reach a decision about giving aid to a country, the only criterion was the country's strategic position in the war against communism. Like a king's sword, aid was used to reward and punish countries by the U.S..

Long-run aid, on the other hand, tried to institutionalize perennial relationship between donor and recipient country. Aid, in this case, ceased to be a sovereign instrument and became a governmental tool that fostered recipient country's transformation. Institutionalized aid relationship between two countries devised a channel for the flow of all kind of knowledge and information that were drawn by the development experts in the recipient countries. Donor country received information

¹⁸² Packenham, *Liberal America and the Third World: Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Sciences*, 68.

¹⁸³ For example, in 1951 India demanded two million of grains to prevent a possible famine. The U.S. Congress waited four months to ratify the aid because of the concern that India demonstrated a 'neutral' position in the Cold War.

that in turn made other country visible in a certain way, and in line with this information it granted aid. The latter, along with development understanding, constructed a field where recipient country could pursue certain policies. From this perspective long-run aid functioned as a governmental tool that facilitated shaping conducts of Third World states for definite and shifting ends in the Cold War period. For example, the long-run aid necessitated the formation of long-term development planning in recipient countries. Only after seeing sound development plan the U.S. accept to grant long-term aid. Planning meant the visibility of future policies of the Third World country; hence in advance, the U.S. had a chance to foresee any conduct of a country. Any conduct that was not in line with its aims was intervened and changed under the name of development assistance.

To some extent the initiatives of Kennedy Administration to turn aid into a governmental tool was successful during the development decade. Aid with development purposes was favored at the expense of military aid and U.S. aid programs existed in ninety-one countries. However, the share of military aid in the total member of American aid was still unavoidable.¹⁸⁴ Additionally, using aid for short-term security concerns was also in practice. In other words, aid was used as a tool both for governmental and sovereign concerns. Bilateral aid regime of the U.S. in the 1960s exhibited combination of governmental and sovereign concerns. Especially in urgent cases, using aid articulated sovereign understanding of power techniques, while any attempt to institutionalize aid relationship between two countries took place inline with governmental understanding.

Before finishing this part I, briefly, want to mention the role of multilateralism in the development aid. Although bilateral aid was the dominant way of granting aid during the Cold War period, starting from the early 1970s multilateral lending has become dominant trend within the aid regime. For example, in 1970 only 37.9 percent of the total aid to developing countries was in the form of bilateral aid. The main cause of the increase in multilateralism was the expansion of the operations of multilateral

¹⁸⁴ Hollis B. Chenery, "Objectives and Criteria for Foreign Assistance," in *Why Foreign Aid*, ed. Robert A. Goldwin (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1963).

institutions. In this decade International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the United Nations provided almost all multilateral aid.¹⁸⁵

World Bank Group, consisting of International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Finance Corporation (IFC) and International Development Association (IDA), was the main contributor of multilateral aid during the 1970s. Although it is a Bretton Woods institution that was founded in 1944, the influence of the Bank has increased after the formation of IDA in 1961, which deals with lending to the poorest countries, and after the presidency of Robert S. McNamara in 1968, who initiated basic needs approach and poverty alleviation programs in the World Bank. As Robert Wood notes, during the 1970s, World Bank Group lending grew sevenfold and “the Bank moved aggressively during the decade to establish a preeminent position in terms of policy, research, aid coordination, education, and other activities.”¹⁸⁶ Without underestimating the role of World Bank in the development practices during the Cold War period, I want to relate the Bank’s increasing power during the 1970s to the changes in the development paradigm that we experienced only in the last twenty years.

The Bank’s increasing influence in the late 1970s indicated that development discourse as the main mechanism of managing the conducts of nation-states in the Cold War international relations were changing. In this period, development was generally the concern of the governments; all the processes of giving decisions about initiating a development policy, granting or receiving a development aid were taken place at the official relations between the nation-states. However, by the end of 1970s, development practices began to take place at different levels. The nation-state level turned into only one level along with the supranational and subnational levels. Concomitantly, different actors such as multilevel institutions, non-governmental organizations, activists have become influential within the development discourse. Therefore, increasing power of the Bank in the 1970s was an indicator of this new shift in the development practices. Because this thesis aims to analyze development

¹⁸⁵ Wood, *From Marshall Plan to Debt Crisis: Foreign Aid and Development Choices in the World Economy*, 72.

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 77.

practices that took place in the Cold War period, shift in the development practices after the 1980s is beyond the scope of this thesis.

5.2. Development Planning

Before World War II, development planning was in practice only in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Since 1929, when its first Five Year Plan was approved, this country continued to pursue centralized planning until its collapse in the late 1980s. Centralized planning for industrialization in the U.S.R.R. was the main reason of unprecedented economic development of this country, which transformed traditional society into an advanced and industrialized one. Because of this success, centralized planning was labeled as a ‘socialist’ way of achieving development targets. In the Cold War context, where the struggle between the capitalist and socialist sides of the world was dominant, for Western countries, pursuing this kind of centralized planning was ideologically impossible. In that sense, Western countries were always against planning for their own economies. However, it was a fact that, as aid donors, the same Western countries accepted planning in recipient countries and even insisted on the formulation of plans before giving aid to them. How can we explain this contradiction? Quoting two liberal planning specialists Keith Griffin and John Enos’s words would be a good starting point:

What is needed are *controlled changes*, i.e. planned revolutions. One object of planning in an underdeveloped country should be to implement the necessary major structural transformation of society in a conscious, explicit, orderly and rational manner.¹⁸⁷(emphasis added)

In the Cold War situation, development discourse enabled the Third World countries to be developed to a certain extent. It constructed a field in which Third World countries could increase their income and general well-being. This transformation necessitated the subversion of traditional social and political structures of these countries in favor of modern ones, which looked like a revolutionary process. This kind of revolution was demanded by the Western countries as long as this

¹⁸⁷ Keith Griffin and John Enos, *Planning Development* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 184, quoted in Alexander Robertson, *People and the State* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 221.

transformation was foreseeable and manageable. Through imposing creation of plans for receiving aid, the Western countries could have a chance to observe their development practices and intervene in them, in turn, development planning enabled elites of these countries to control the transformation of society; hence, to perpetuate their existing authority. Planning was a process through which development was not only planned, but also rendered controllable, manageable, technical and non-political.

Although development planning was a post-war phenomenon, the idea of planning had been in circulation since the 19th century. Brief account of the emergence of planning in the 19th century Europe would give us clues about its general features. According to Arturo Escobar, there were three factors that shaped the emergence of planning in the European context, in the 19th century: the development of urban planning, the rise of social planning, and the invention of the modern economy.¹⁸⁸

In the first half of the 19th century, capitalism and industrial revolution created growing problems in the industrial cities. As uprooted peasants flooded the cities and factories proliferated, European cities became more and more overcrowded, disordered and diseased. Dealing with health, traffic and accommodation problems of the cities created the foundations of urban planning. Forming suitable conditions for the circulation of traffic and the fresh air in the city required comprehensive urban planning that conceived the city as an object of scientific analysis. Planning problematized and solved these problems by reifying spaces. It did not hesitate to erode the existing spatial and social make up of the city in order to implement a certain abstract logic of urbanism. Grid plans, wide highways and straight streets enabling the movement of people, vehicles and fresh air began to represent the modern city.

The second factor that contributed to the emergence of planning was the increasing concern about the welfare of the people in the 19th century Europe. Urgent need for facing the problem of poverty in Europe culminated in the construction of

¹⁸⁸ Arturo Escobar, "Planning," in *The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power*, ed. W. Sachs (London: Zed Books, 1992), 132.

discourses dealing with the ‘social problems’. Poverty, health, education, hygiene and unemployment became subjects of scientific knowledge, through which social planning made possible the socialization and subjection of people to dominant norms. Later, after the Second World War, the idea of social planning merged with welfare state practices and it dispersed knowledge and techniques for dealing with ‘social problems’ to Third World countries through the development discourse.

Finally, the invention of the idea of the ‘economy’, which did not even exist before the late 18th century, opened the path for the idea that economic development can be planned and managed. Institutionalization of the market, utilitarian ideas and the increasing individualism in the 19th century Europe constructed ‘the economy’ as an independent domain, free from any political, moral concerns. This very idea of ‘disembeddedness’ of the economy for society, as Karl Polanyi named it, was based on the assumption that working mechanisms of the economy were quite different from that of the society. One of the spheres of the resurrection of this approach in the development discourse was the notion of development planning. With the help of the Keynesian economics, the latter contained tools for managing and controlling the mechanisms of the economy to achieve development. Development planning separated economy from the society and by focusing on the planning of the economic sphere, it reduced development to the economic development.

5.2.1. Colonial Development Planning

As it is mentioned above, before the World War II, U.S.S.R. was the only country engaged in a systematic development planning. However, especially in the colonial territories, development planning was started to be practiced in the first half of the 20th century. In India, a ten-year plan aiming at doubling India’s national income was prepared in 1933; five years later, the National Planning Committee was established by setting the same targets. The resolution setting up the committee defined the main objective as ‘catching up’ with the advanced countries through planned industrialization. During the World War II, in order to resume planning activities which were interrupted because of the war, British government appointed high level governmental planning committee in India, in 1941. Then, in 1944, Department of Planning and Development was established and it requested from

local governments to prepare development plans to be undertaken after the War.¹⁸⁹ As this account clearly indicates, institutionalization of development planning took place before the end of colonialism. Pursuing development plans for catching up with advanced countries was not a new strategy for postcolonial countries; they just perpetuated the existing policies and institutions which had been developed during the colonial period.

Another example of the pre-war practice of development planning was the Philippines, which was ruled by the U.S. between 1898 and 1946. Although the U.S. was not implementing national planning in its own country, it engaged planning activities in the Philippines. In 1935, the National Economic Council was established to prepare development plans for agriculture, fishing, trade, transportation and industry. Additionally, in Puerto Rico, the governor appointed by the U.S. administration also advocated planned development to reduce unemployment on the island by expanding production and later, in 1942, the Planning Board was established to develop plans.¹⁹⁰ After the war, these experiences achieved in the colonial territories were transferred to the Third World countries through the development discourse. In other words, the knowledge and experience for constructing and spreading post-war development discourse had already accumulated during the colonial period. For example, Arthur Lewis, who subsequently became one of the main post-war architects of national planning and development economics, was appointed by the British Government as the Secretary of the Economic Advisory Committee, which was responsible for allocating funds given by the Colonial Development and Welfare Act in West India. Likewise, in French colonies, a Colonial Development Fund was set up between 1934 and 1935 with a budget of a billion francs a year, for fifteen years. After the war, colonial planning was included within the French metropolitan plans.¹⁹¹ In the light of these examples, it is possible to suggest that development planning was a tool for imperial countries to control the independence processes took place in the colonial territories.

¹⁸⁹ Albert Waterson, "A postwar prodigy: Development Planning," *Finance and Development* 2, no.1 (1965), 1.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁹¹ Robertson, *People and the State*, 19-21.

When the independence of the colonial countries became inevitable, planning was utilized to alleviate negative impacts of this transition period.

One of the factors that contributed institutionalization of development planning in the post-war period was the ‘wartime planning’ pursued by the Western countries. During the Second World War, the United Kingdom and the U.S. adopted centralized planning that substituted market mechanism in determining the prices and quantities of goods and services bought and sold. In the United Kingdom, planning was developed to counterbalance excessive demand. Oriented by the plan, government interventions allocated basic productive resources in order to control prices. In the U.S. planning was also utilized to meet urgent war needs by substituting market mechanism. These practices gave insights to experts about what was essential for carrying out plans and about developing new planning methods, which were later adopted by the Third World countries’ development planning institutions. Additionally, these wartime plans demanded sacrifices from people to win the war, and later when these experiences were transferred to Third World countries, the notion of sacrifice was maintained. All the development plans drafted in the Third World countries underlined the fact that the nation was in war against poverty and backwardness, and demanded sacrifices from people to reach common goals.

5.2.2. Basic Features of Development Planning

After the World War II, almost every country had a national plan for economic development. From France to newly emerged Nigeria, all countries embraced planning as a miracle tool for solving their economic problems. Although there were differences, in its organization and implementation, planning had three basic features, which were valid for all development planning practices in the Cold War period. First, “planning was an attempt to reach forward and gain some kind of control over a future”.¹⁹² It was a task of subverting uncertainty by envisaging a goal and methods for achieving it. Because shaping future always needed accurate and up to date information, no amount of data was enough for planning. It always

¹⁹² Ibid., 86.

demanded more and more information which turned development planning into a process of drawing information about a country, and interpreting these data in the light of certain development paradigms, then projecting them on to future policies.

Secondly, planning contained translation of ideas into reality. Development planning defined not only targets, but also means to achieve them. Because lack of development was mainly problematized as a low level of production in the underdeveloped countries, the means of development planning proposed were mainly aimed at increasing productivity in the production process. In line with this orthodox understanding of development, planning proposed to realize this objective by investment fostered with capital accumulation and technology transfer.

Thirdly, development planning was a political process, involved an exercise of power which was mainly between the state and subject populations.¹⁹³ For its implementation, it demanded the compliance of people. Alexander Robertson remarked that planning focused on “attempts to organize the mass, to change an undifferentiated and unreliable citizenry into a structured, readily accessible public”.¹⁹⁴ In line with the imperatives of ‘modern society’, development planning contained overcoming the ‘traditions’ and ‘irrationalities’, which meant transformation of existing human and social structures and their replacement with rational ones. To gain compliance of citizens, development plans defined increasing welfare of the people as their main target. In order to realize this aim, planning adapted biopolitical strategies which had been practiced in Europe since the 19th century. For example, in the 1970s, when negative impacts of existing development strategies came into being, Basic Human Needs approach was developed to offset increasing poverty. Adoption of this strategy in development planning opened new areas of intervention. Education, health, nutrition, housing, family planning and rural development became targets of biopolitical practices. As Arturo Escobar mentions:

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Robertson, *People and the State*, 128.

Planning rendered Third World people's health, education, farming and reproduction practices the object of a vast array of programs which were introduced in the name of increasing these countries' 'human capital' and ensuring a minimum level of welfare for their people'.¹⁹⁵

Therefore, development planning was involved not only in economic resources, but also in all aspects of social life.

In order to explain political aspect of development planning I want to cover Partha Chatterjee's arguments on the development process in India.¹⁹⁶ He suggests that the technical discipline of planning became an instrument of politics, i.e. of the exercise and contestation of power in the India. As it was mentioned above, National Planning Committee in India was established in the colonial period in 1937 under the head of Jawaharlal Nehru. According to Chatterjee, there were three aspects of planning pertaining to its role in the politics of India. First, planning appeared as a form of determining state policy. Initially planning was developed to determine economic policies, but then its impact was extended to define an overall framework of a coordinated and consistent set of policies of a nation state. In other words, planning envisaged the concrete forms in which power would be exercised within a nation state. Second, planning shaped the most distinctive element of the state: "its constitution as a body of experts and its activity as one of technical evaluation of alternative policies and determination of choices on 'scientific' grounds".¹⁹⁷ In the Foucauldian sense, planning made the 'art of government' an exercise of science that needed experts who knew the rules, techniques and modalities of governing. Thanks to the incorporation of planning into the Third World, governing a country ceased to be a political issue and became a technical and scientific one which could be exercised only by professionals. This point underlines the third and the most important aspect of planning. During the Cold War period, in most of the Third World countries, planning was an exercise of political power constituted outside the immediate political process itself. It became a means for the determination of priorities on behalf of the nation by bypassing conflicts of politics.

¹⁹⁵ Escobar, "Planning", 138.

¹⁹⁶ Partha Chatterjee, "Development Planning and Indian State," in *Development: Critical Concepts in Social Sciences Vol.4*, ed. Edward Stuart (Cambridge: Routledge, 2000).

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 5.

In the context of India, the best example of constituting planning as a domain outside political conflict was the debate on industrialization that took place between Nehru and Gandhi. The dilemma that in India and in most of the colonial states experienced after the independence was the following: in order to mobilize mass movement against colonial rule, in addition to nationalist ideas, the Indian Congress had required Gandhi's ideas on the drawbacks of modernization, machinery, commercialization and centralized state power. These anti-modernist ideas had managed to articulate rural people into the war against colonial rule. However, after the independence these same 'evil' notions of the colonialism became the main goals of the postcolonial state. Against Gandhians, the spokesman of the adherents of modernization in India was Jawaharlal Nehru who said that "we are trying to catch up, as far as we can, with the Industrial Revolution that occurred long ago in Western countries".¹⁹⁸ Therefore, the political debate after the independence was whether to restrict and eliminate modern industrialization or to promote it. The idea of planning enabled Nehru and his adherents to reject Gandhian anti-modernist notions as 'visionary' and 'unscientific', which ignored the universal principles of historical process. By asserting that basic principles of planning required industrialization and the Congress should cope with this problem, Nehru managed to present a political issue as a technical and scientific one; hence, rendered Gandhian position politically unviable. In other words, defining politics and planning as two separate areas, and constructing the latter as scientific and technical domain made planning a basic tool for power struggles in the Third World countries.

This example should not lead one to conclude that above mentioned ways of exercising planning in the Cold War period was unique only to countries with colonial background. Rather, development discourse and its main instruments - such as aid and planning - constituted a Cold War regime that had an impact not only on postcolonial countries, but also on the ones without any colonial background. The best way to illustrate this argument is to present examples from planning practices of Turkey which had never been colonized.

¹⁹⁸ Quoted in Chatterjee, "Development Planning and Indian State", 6.

In order to reveal the role of planning in state apparatus and its technical and anti-political side, it would be illuminating to mention the fact that State Planning Organization (SPO) in Turkey was established after the military coup in 1960. The foundation law of the SPO was accepted on September 30, 1960, only four months after the military coup. It is a fact that preparations for establishing a planning institution commenced before the coup d'état when economic situation of the country deteriorated through the second half of the 1950s. Because of the increasing pressure from businessmen and IMF, which conditioned its aid program to the development of a plan; Democratic Party (DP) government had invited Jan Tinbergen and his assistant J. Koopman to prepare a development plan. Despite the existence of these efforts, the impatience of coup makers to establish SPO rendered them susceptible to the argument that one of the important reasons for making military coup was to establish SPO.¹⁹⁹

Giving detailed account of the political ambitions behind the military coup is beyond the aim of this section. What concerns us here is the following: when DP came into power in the 1950 it confronted a gap between the state and society. On the one hand there were ruling modernist, statist and bureaucratic elites; on the other hand there was a nonindustrial traditional society. To incorporate the 'people' into the electoral majorities without offending bureaucratic elites, DP pursued particularism, patronage and populism. The military intervention in 1960 was an attempt to change these clientist-populist policies in order to regain power of the bureaucratic and modernist elites.²⁰⁰ Planning, in this sense, was envisaged as a tool by which these elites increased the control of the state, which would determine the material allocation of productive resources within the nation.

The facts concerning the organization of SPO revealed aims of constituting planning as a domain outside the politics. The foundation law of SPO tried to guarantee the

¹⁹⁹ Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiyede Devlet ve Sınıflar* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları,1990), 122.

²⁰⁰ İlkay Sunar, "The Politics of State Interventionism in 'Populist' Egypt and Turkey," in *Developmentalism and Beyond: Society and Politics in Egypt and Turkey*, eds. A. Öncü, Ç. Keyder, S.E. İbrahim (American University in Cairo Press: Cairo, 1994), 111.

autonomous position of the Organization in the state. The law envisaged SPO as an undersecretary of prime ministry, which rendered it more autonomous. Additionally, in 1961, there were only forty-seven experts who worked as the planners in the Organization.²⁰¹ By keeping staff small in number, bureaucratic and technocratic characters were tried to be institutionalized in the SPO. Finally, one of the draft bills -Orel Draft Bill- on the establishment of SPO envisaged an Economic Council which would establish contact with the state, universities, trade unions and private enterprises. Hence, different sections of the society could attend to the planning process, which in turn rendered planning more democratic. Although National Unity Committee accepted this Orel Draft Bill, it eliminated the Economic Council on the grounds that it necessitated a different organization that was beyond the aim of planning.²⁰² This attitude closed planning process to the demands of the different sections of the society, and made it a bureaucratic, centralized task that was free from any political debate and was accomplished only by the experts. In other words, as it is demonstrated in the cases of India and Turkey, planning was a way of deciding the priorities of the nation without muddling with political process.

On the other hand, it would be a mistake to argue that the power of planning in the Third World countries was unchallenged. Its impact on politics has always been in a constant change. It has never been the only mechanism that determined the priorities of a nation on behalf of populations. In line with the mainstream theories of development, international politics and the political struggles within the nation-state, the popularity of planning as a bureaucratic, centralized state mechanism had increased or decreased. For example, when Justice Party came into power in Turkey after the 1965 elections, it developed policies to paralyze the functioning of SPO. Rather than directly dissolving the Organization, which would offend the bureaucratic, statist elites, the Justice Party tried to change the organizational structure of SPO in order to render it ineffective in the decision making process. Through recruiting new experts, SPO became over-staffed and routine meetings

²⁰¹ Gencay Şaylan, "Planlama ve Bürokrasi," *METU Studies in Development* Special Issue (1981), 189.

²⁰² Barış Alp Özden, "Turkey's Experience with the Planning in the 1960s," (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, n.d.), 47.

between SPO and government were continuously delayed. Finally, in 1967, formation of a special Incentive and Implementation Department inside the SPO altered the institutional structure of the planning agency. Through this department SPO was drawn into the everyday issues of political struggle and could no more isolate itself from the demands of interest groups.²⁰³ As a result of these policies, the autonomy of SPO diminished and governments bypassed it in shaping the economic policies through the second half of the 1960s. Although SPO is still preparing development plans, its real impact on economic policies is far from being determining.

This remark on the changing influence of SPO in Turkish politics leads us to the final and very crucial aspect of planning. If one looks at the development planning practices or the literature on planning, he/she would notice the abundance of complaints pertaining to the lack of effective implementation of a development plan or its ignorance of some aspects of the economy. In other words, complaints about the poor implementation or the narrowness of the scope of the plans have always been part of the discourse on planning in the Cold War period. For example, before the formation of SPO in Turkey, there had been many development plans and programs which had never been thoroughly implemented. In 1947, Economic Development Plan of Turkey (Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı) was prepared and it envisaged a shift from industrial-led development to agriculture-led development. However the 1947 plan remained unimplemented.²⁰⁴ Later, World Bank mission came to Turkey and prepared a development plan in 1950, titled, ‘The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for a Developed Program’. However, the end of this report was also the same; it was never thoroughly implemented. These cases were not unique to Turkey, all over the world the number of plans that remained unimplemented exceeded the number of ones that were implemented. Why does planning always contain a ‘failure’ in its formation? The answer of this question is related to the ways in which the planner produces knowledge of the

²⁰³ Ibid., 98.

²⁰⁴ İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Şavaş Sonrası Ortamında 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* (Ankara: ODTÜ Yayınları, 1974).

objects of planning. Again, Partha Chatterjee's ideas are conducive to explain this point.

Chatterjee starts his argument by explaining how mainstream development theory defined the failure of 'plan implementation'. As a representative of this literature he chooses Sukhamony Chakravarty's book *Development Planning*. In this book, Chakravarty defined three reasons for implementation failure: (a) if planning authorities are inefficient in gathering the relevant information, (b) if they take so much time to respond, so that underlying situation had by then been changed, (c) if public agencies which are responsible for implementing the plan do not have enough capacity and private agencies manage to change expectations, which had been taken by the planners as 'parametric'.²⁰⁵

According to Chatterjee, the first reason for a failure assumes the separation of planner from the objects of planning. The latter exist 'out there' and can only appear in the shape of 'information'. The 'adequacy' of this information can be sustained only if these objects have been constituted in the planner's consciousness in the same form as they exist outside it, in themselves. For Chatterjee, the point that should be criticized is not the impossibility of such a positivist project. The problem is not whether one knows what the objects of planning are, but rather, whether they have been explicitly specified as objects of planning. In other words, three situations mentioned as the reasons of failure are related to ways in which the planner produces knowledge of the objects of planning. Planner can proceed only by constituting the objects of planning as the objects of knowledge.

[He] must *know* the physical resources whose allocation is to be planned, he must *know* the economic agents who act upon these resources, *know* their needs, capacities, and properties, *know* what constitutes the signals according to which they act, *know* how they respond to those signals... This knowledge would enable him to work upon the total configuration of power itself... [He] does this by turning those subjects of power into the objects of a single body of knowledge.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Chatterjee, "Development Planning and Indian State", 10.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, 11.

This is the point where the failure of planning occurs. What the planner tries to reduce into a single body of knowledge is a site at which the subjects of power in society interact with each other in the political process. In other words, as a part of the society, the planning authorities themselves are the objects for the configuration of power in which others are subjects. The very subjects of social power which the rational consciousness of the planner tries to convert into its knowledge can turn planning authority itself into the object of their power. When we leave the domain of planning, situated outside the political process, and enter into the domain of social power the subjects and the objects are reversed. That is why planning always contains self-deception. Even the best efforts of planning to “secure adequate information leave behind an unestimated residue”, which may be called as the negative, irreducible or -as Chatterjee names- politics.²⁰⁷

Before ending this section, one final point should be mentioned. All these accounts should not lead one to conclude that development planning in the post-war period was a monolithic and unchanging mechanism. Rather, planning practices exhibited differences according to the ideological backgrounds of the countries. In the socialist countries, planning appeared to be more centralized and oriented to public sector whereas in the capitalist countries, planning became indicative which aimed to help private sector. In most of the Third World countries, where mixed economy was prevailing, development planning mainly appeared as the planning of state investment to attain necessary economic structure for development. Additionally, in the course of history, as hegemonic development paradigm underwent transformation, the planning practices were also transformed. Especially by the 1960s under the influence of modernization theory, national planning was accepted as both inevitable and necessary for attaining development. Accordingly, it became oriented to economic growth, hence highly technical and standardized. It combined bureaucratic and scientific spirits in itself, which in turn rendered planning a centralized, top-down process. Because of these qualities planning became the exercise of centralized political authority which necessitated independent powerful statehood. In the late 1960s, the failure of development projects and the decline of

²⁰⁷ Ibid., 12.

the hegemonic position of modernization school opened the paths for alternative planning approaches. Planning for 'Basic Needs' tried to incorporate rural people and social aspects into the planning process, while the idea of local planning criticized the centralized, top-down planning. The latter proposed de-centralization of the planning process and promoted the inclusion of local people into the planning process. Finally, through the 1970s and 1980s, environmental planning for 'sustainable development' and planning to 'incorporate' women gained hegemonic positions in the development discourse.

Despite all these transformations, the idea of planning retained its main assumption that social change could be engineered and directed according to scientific and rational norms. Development planning always aimed to capture social and economic transformation in the Third World countries in line with the demands of developed countries. It did not impede the development and advance of Third World people, rather it encouraged them to be developed, but by doing this, it controlled the ways of transformation. Planning presented models to be pursued in the development process. Therefore, it managed to control transformation of societies in the Cold War period.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This thesis interrogated the development discourse of the Cold War period in order to disclose its function in constructing power relations between the West and the Third World. It was the result of an endeavor that evaluated and criticized development practices by analyzing them in a historical context. It perceived development discourse contingent on social, economic and political conditions of the Cold War period. In line with this understanding, it showed that development discourse had existed as long as it endowed authorities with means to cope with the problems that stemmed from these conditions. At the international level, one of the basic problems was to construct a new regime to regulate hegemonic relationship between the West and the Third World, where old ways of sustaining this relationship had become implausible as a result of the end of colonialism and the Second World War. It was mainly the collapse of the colonial regime after the War that necessitated the construction of a new one. Colonial regime was based on the military occupation of the colonial territories, utilization of sheer force and authoritarian measures to control colonized people, and on the hegemonic ideas about the racial superiority of the Western people and the ‘civilizing mission’ of the Western occupation. However, the independence movements and concomitant with it the transformation of colonial territories into the independent nation-states, as well as the Cold War between the super powers of the world, rendered colonial regime useless in governing excolonial populations. In this context, colonial regime was replaced by the development regime which substituted military occupation and authoritarian measures with biopolitical and governmental techniques, idea of racial superiority with technical and scientific superiority, and the ideology of ‘civilizing mission’ with ‘development mission’.

In this period, development practices constituted a regime of government that involved practices for the production of truth and knowledge, put together different

forms of technical and calculative rationality, contained practices and technologies to implement these rationalities, and had capacity to undergo transformation as the existing circumstances changed. The constitutive element of the Cold War regime was development discourse because it was constructed through the practices that aimed to find solutions to the urgent needs of the period. The first need in the Cold War context was to find adequate means to govern the multiplicity of nation-states since after the end of colonialism many nation-states emerged in the old colonial territories. Although international political order was based on the recognition of the sovereignty of each nation-state and the idea of nonintervention, the Cold War between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. forced these countries to govern conducts of the nations-states. The each side tried to construct hegemony on the nation-states and aimed to govern the policies of the latter in order to strengthen the alliance against its rival. In this context, exerting sheer repression or military invention of a nation-state were not the viable ways of constructing hegemony since this kind of attitude would create a nuclear war between the two rival powers. Additionally, these methods were rendered impossible as a result of the idea of nonintervention to the affairs of nation-states. Therefore, there was an urgent need of constructing set of actions that govern multiplicity of the conducts of the nation-states. The development discourse was an answer to this urgent problem.

Both capitalist and communist sides of international politics utilized development practices for constructing hegemony in their relations to Third World countries. However, concerning the dominance and lasting effects of them, this thesis confined its scope to examine the development discourse which was constructed by the policies of Western countries. Setting development as the main target for the Third World countries and defining the content and the means of development, then providing help to these countries to achieve development helped the West to construct a regime to govern the Third World.

Emphasizing the role of development discourse in managing Third World should not lead one to conclude that the functioning of power in the development regime was a top-down operation. Power was not a repressive and negative force which was centralized in the Western states and imposed on Third World countries to limit,

control or forbid their activities at the international level. Likewise, it was not a coercive form of authority exercised by the Third World states over their citizens. Power in the development discourse did not force people to bear burdens of development process; rather it reinforced them, proliferated and optimized their forces and capacities. By using Foucauldian theoretical framework, I described the way of utilizing power in the development regime as biopolitics, which concerned the administration of life at the level of population. Basic working mechanism of development regime was composed of policies that targeted all aspects of life in order to increase well-being of the population. Birth and death rates, income, consumption rates and patterns, nutrition and education levels of populations became objects of biopolitical power. Development discourse was an apparatus to problematize and manage these aspects of life through rural development projects, poverty alleviation strategies and regional development programs.

In concerning social, biological and economic aspects of life, development discourse sought to exercise influence by the distant and calculative means of governmentality. This Foucauldian notion underlines the fact that exercise of power in development regime was not a direct and immediate action on individuals, which contained violence. Rather, power was an action upon individual's action which assumed certain capacities and free will of the individual. In other words, development discourse tries to construct a field of action for individuals in which they were incited, seduced and helped to conduct certain actions that were in line with the aims of authorities. The utilization of power in the developmental governmentality was constitutive in the sense that field of action created by development discourse was conducive to formation of subjectivities who were capable of choosing true actions to be developed. Additionally, developmental governmentality consisted of calculated and rational activities, undertaken by different authorities and agencies, utilized different techniques and forms of knowledge in order to shape the conduct of the individuals for specific ends. This thesis explored different techniques and forms of producing knowledge that are utilized in the development discourse. In this sense, I explained developmental governmentality under the two different domains: the *mentalité* and *techne* sides.

The first side of it referred to the rationalities that were conducive to the exercise of power in the development discourse. It contained the means to render the object of governing thinkable, calculable and manageable. In the development discourse ‘scientific statements’ constituted a sphere in which certain rationalities were produced to address the problems of development and to offer strategies for solving them. Three schools of thought in the development discourse exhibited basic features of constituting governmental rationalities: modernization school, dependency school and world-system theory. Especially modernization school exemplified the hegemonic modes of producing knowledge and rationalities in the development discourse, whereas dependency and world-system approaches showed the possibility and the limits of subverting hegemonic ‘modes of thought’ at the level of knowledge production.

By examining modernization school, I discussed three basic characteristics of developmental rationalities. The *moral* form of rationality presented by this school defined the ideals and principles, which should be achieved by development. Modernization school set basic characteristics of Western societies as the principles and ideals for developing countries. Rostow defined high mass-consumption stage as the final point to be achieved by the developing countries. Daniel Lerner, on the other hand, did not perceive transformation of institutions as an adequate condition for achieving development; he demanded transformation of the mentality of individuals in the Third World. The ideal to be modeled was of course the modern Western man who is mobile, rational and has capacity to develop empathy. In both cases, comparisons between Western societies and others, empirical facts from Third World countries and statistical information were presented to prove the ‘scientific’ statement that the West - with its institutions and individuals - was the model to be emulated in the development process.

Scientific facts about the issue of development were defined according to a certain *epistemology*, which produced knowledge and information about the nature of the objects to be governed through developmental governmentality. In producing knowledge, modernization school developed ways of seeing and perceiving, which rendered certain aspects of Third World visible. It produced knowledge pertaining to

the nation-state, the Third World, underdevelopment, poverty and subjectivity of people through a certain epistemology, which exemplified the utilization of knowledge in the exercise of power. This way of producing knowledge divided the world into the nation-states and envisaged each of them as a self-closed entity bounded with certain geography. It attributed certain features to each nation-state which were represented in terms of aggregates such as gross national product, employment rate, investment volume and consumption figures. Therefore it produced standardized knowledge about the Third World, which provided basis for homogenizing and comparing them. Additionally, modernization school problematized 'underdevelopment' in such a way that the latter started to be perceived as a natural phenomenon, which did not have any relationship with the negative impact of colonialism. Likewise, poverty was disembeded from its specific cultural setting and coded as a technical matter that could only be handled by professionals and development experts. Concomitant with it, this way of knowledge production about the problem of poverty rendered governments and institutions in a hegemonic position in defining needs and required solutions on behalf of people. Finally, modernization school assumed certain subjectivities pertaining to Third World people. It perceived them as traditional, oriented toward past and fatalist. However, this school attributed certain potential and capacities to them, through which these people were expected to transform themselves into modern people. The development subject that was envisaged by modernization school was an ethical subject who had to make right choices and pursue right policies in order to be developed and modernized. As these examples clearly indicate the 'scientific statements' by modernization school were not simple endeavors to describe the basic features of reality, which was 'out there'. They constructed the reality and played strategic role in power relations between the West and the Third World.

Finally, 'scientific statements' about development were formulized in a specific *idiom*. In each of the three schools of thought, scientific language was dominated by the vocabulary of 'economism'. Development was defined as the improvement of economic indicators, like GNP per capita, investment rates and the volume of capital accumulation. Although there were theoretical oppositions to the attempts of reducing development to economic indicators, and remarks that perceived economic

development as ‘necessary but not a sufficient’ condition for achieving development, economy had always been a determining factor in analyzing development process. Additionally, the scientific language of modernization school was dominated by the dualities. Dichotomies such as modern-traditional, developed-underdeveloped were constructed by comparing the West with the Third World. While the first notions of these dichotomies defined the basic features of the western societies, the second notions were the residual ones which referred to features of Third World societies. First notions contained what was positive and normal whereas the second notions defined the ‘lack’.

The hegemonic position of modernization school in producing knowledge and ‘truth’ concerning the development practices were challenged by two schools of thought: dependency school and world-system theory. To some extent, these schools managed to go beyond the dominant understanding in development discourse. They were quite successful in disclosing the relationship between the expansion of Western capitalism and the ‘development of underdevelopment’ in the Third World. In other words, dependency and world-system theories examined the notion of underdevelopment in its historical context with reference to destructive effects of capitalism and colonialism on the Third World. However, the main idea behind giving account of these two schools was to show the limited possibility of going beyond any hegemonic discourse by only criticizing it. In other words, they challenged the ‘truths’ produced by modernization school, but they still inherited the ways of conceptualizing its problematic and its methods of producing knowledge pertaining to it. Especially the failure of dependency school in this attempt was obvious. In problematizing development, like modernization school, it perpetuated faith in industrialization, material process and technological improvement. For this school Western type of development was still model for being developed. The adherents of this school interrogated the dependent relationship between the West and the Third World; however, they never questioned the idea of development and its Eurocentric connotations. Additionally, they exaggerated the role of economy in the development process. Dependency school inherited the economic language of modernization school and analyzed dependent situation of Third World with reference to economic relations; social, political and cultural sides of the dependent

relationship were never questioned. In this sense its failure in going beyond modernization school's assumptions and methods in producing knowledge revealed the fact that after the colonialism hegemonic relationship between the West and the Third World was extended to cultural and scientific levels. Not only economic conditions but also ways of thinking and producing knowledge in the Third World were dominated by the Western models.

World-system theory, to some extent, manages to go beyond the assumptions and methods of modernization school in producing knowledge pertaining to development. Especially, Wallerstein is very critical with the very idea of progress and thinks that material development does not mean the welfare of the populations. Additionally, world-system theory interrogates the ways of producing knowledge in the social sciences and search for alternative methods to surpass ideas of modernization school. However, in doing this, world-system theory perceived the issue of development as a fringe element in its analysis. Contrary to modernization and dependency schools which put the problem of development at the centre of their scientific inquiry, world-system theory questions the expansion of capitalism; development is explored in relation to functioning and reproduction of it.

In fact, if we consider dependency school and world-system theory as the neo-Marxist critiques of development discourse, above-mentioned remarks are helpful to underline differences between the neo-Marxist and Foucauldian ways of analyzing development discourse. While the former interrogated the 'true' ways of development, it never questioned the idea of development and its relationship with the dark side of modernization. Because of the Marxist background these scholars welcomed the overemphasis on progress and material advancement made by development discourse. However, Foucauldian framework enables one to see that technological and material advancement promised by development discourse did not mean the end of inequality or exploitation as long as development practices were always part of the power relations and they endowed authorities with new means to perpetuate unequal relationship between the individuals, and between the West and the Third World. Moreover, contrary to dependent theorists who were inclined to mark ideas of modernization school as the presentation of reality in a distorted

manner, Foucauldian analysis considered producing knowledge pertaining to Third World as the production of reality. Development discourse produces the Third World at the political, economic, social, scientific and imaginary levels.

If 'scientific statements' constituted the first side of the developmental governmentality, the second side of it consisted of the means and mechanisms through which authority was constituted and rule was accomplished in the development discourse. Development aid and planning were the two mechanisms which enabled the institutionalization of development practices in Third World countries. In the Cold War period, there were two basic features of development aid: until the late 1970s, development aid was in the bilateral form and the U.S. was the main donor country. Bilateral aid was given by the Western countries to realize specific national interests in the Cold War period. The main factor behind the development aid was the fear of communism. Especially Truman Doctrine exemplified the conjunction of security concerns with the development discourse. The U.S. aimed to help countries which experienced political and economic turmoil since it was believed that lack of economic stability made a country susceptible to influence of communism. Aid was given with the assumption that economic aid would strengthen the economy, and a strengthened economy would yield more political stability. Additionally, war with communism was taking place not only at the military level; fostering expansion of capitalist and Western type of political, social, cultural and economic institutions to the Third World was the basic way of curtailing the diffusion of communism. Development discourse was instrumental in this war as long as it inculcated the capitalist ways of achieving industrialization and, with its modernization approach, the institutionalization of Western values and culture. However, disclosing national interests behind the development aid would be a partial aim of this thesis; rather, the main concern was to examine how development aid was utilized within the development discourse.

In terms of power relations, there were two different ways of utilizing development aid in the Cold War period. The first one is the sovereign way of utilizing aid in which the aid was given as a response to urgent Cold War problems. Especially in its short-run use, aid was employed to reward those countries which were on the U.S.'

side. In this form, aid diverged from developmental concerns and became an instrument for implementing sovereign power. On the other hand, aid practices were also utilized with governmental concerns. Long-run aid, for example, constructed a relationship between the donor and recipient country that lasted many years. This form of aid demanded collaboration of recipient country, that is, it had to have a sound development program, policies and willingness to implement them. Development aid, along with development understanding, constructed a field where the recipient country could pursue certain policies and the donor country had a chance to scrutinize them. From this perspective, long-run aid functioned as a governmental tool that facilitated shaping the conducts of Third World states for definite and shifting ends in the Cold War period.

Planning was another important mechanism through which hegemonic power relations was accomplished in the development discourse. Although planning achieved popularity after the Second World War, it was in practice in the colonial territories during the first half of the 20th century. Imperialist countries put emphasis on planning in their colonies because they utilize it to alleviate negative impacts of independence movements. Later, after the War and end of colonialism, the experiences about the planning were transferred to the Third World through development discourse. Although Western countries, mainly the U.S., hesitated to implement planning in their countries, since planning was perceived as a socialist way of achieving growth and development, they demanded sound planning initiatives from Third World countries for giving aid. The explanation of this contradiction is the following: with aid practices, planning enabled the developed countries to control the course of development process in the Third World. By scrutinizing or actively participating preparation of development plans, developed countries had a chance to intervene to development process. In this sense, planning was the basic mechanism of realizing controlled changes in the Third World, which rendered development process foreseeable and manageable.

The best way of accomplishing controlled changes in the Third World was to render development a controlled process that required non-political and technical practices, in which scientists and experts had authority to define the goals and means of

development. As in the cases of India and Turkey, which were defined above, planning was an attempt to determine the priorities of a society without allowing them to be debated in a political arena. Any critical issues concerning the development process were debated within the boundaries of planning and presented as a technical and scientific problem which could only be solved by development professionals. In constructing such a field, planners tried to turn every aspect of a society into an object of their knowledge, through which planning rendered life manageable by the policies defined at the headquarters of development institutions. However, this attempt was also the reason of the fact that, most of the time, the implementation of the development plans in the Cold War period resulted with failure. Planners tried to reduce all aspects of a society into a single body of knowledge, but there was always an unestimated reality, a residue or an irreducible which we may call politics that lead to failure of a plan in its implementation.

Development discourse was the product of specific conjuncture of the post-war period. As this context changed, the development discourse had undergone transformation. Until the 1980s, it is possible to trace these changes under the rubric of development discourse and suggest that this discourse constituted a Cold War regime which I named developmental governmentality. However, starting from the second part of the 1970s, developments such as debt crises, the retreat of state from economic affairs, end of the Cold War period and the increasing hegemony of neo-liberal policies have transformed the ways of knowledge production, mentalities and practices in development discourse. These transformations do not mean that the influence of development discourse on power relations has vanished. Rather, there are new relationships between different elements within the development discourse. Also, the interactions of this discourse with other discourses have undergone a change. Examining these relationships and interactions requires new theoretical perspectives. For example, as a research topic open to further study, one may interrogate the transformation of developmental governmentality with relation to globalization. It would be illuminating to examine the evolution of developmental governmentality into transnational governmentality, a process which refers to outsourcing the functions of the state to NGOs and other non-state agencies that are organized at the local and/or global level. In other words, proliferation of

supranational and subnational agents and the decreased role of the state in development practices are determining factors in the development discourse after the 1980s. Taking into account these factors requires new assumptions, research questions and theoretical approaches that go beyond the scope of this thesis.

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