

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE INTERCULTURAL
DIALOGUE

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ABSTRACT

EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP AND THE INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

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The aim of this thesis is to examine, analyse and discuss the ways in which the European Union is structuring its relations with its neighbours in the Mediterranean region, in regards of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, its Third Basket which is dealing with the socio-cultural cooperation and human affairs, and the initiative of the intercultural dialogue.

In this thesis, it is shown that the human dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has experienced an increase in related debates, activities and initiatives within the post-9/11 world order. To organise the intercultural relations and the civil society input in the process, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures was established in 2005.

It is observed that within the framework of this renewed significance of the Third Basket and the notion of intercultural dialogue, there exist clear problems regarding the issues of the politicisation and securitisation of the process, the representation of cultural entities and the participation of civil society organisations.

To conclude, it is suggested that the independence of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation regarding the issues of funding and civil society participation need to be enhanced extensively as within the current situation the political actors and the governments of the partner countries have strict control over the functioning of the intercultural dialogue which is initiated as a solely non-governmental institution that would regulate the cultural relations in the region.

Keywords: European Union, Mediterranean, Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, Barcelona Process, Intercultural Dialogue, Civil Society, Cultural Cooperation

ÖZ

AVRUPA-AKDENİZ ORTAKLIĞI VE KÜLTÜRLERARASI DİYALOG

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Bu tezin amacı Avrupa Birliği'nin Akdeniz bölgesindeki komşuları ile olan ilişkilerini; Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı, bu ortaklığın sosyo-kültürel işbirliği ve insani boyutu ile ilgilenen Üçüncü Sepeti ve Kültürlerarası Diyalog olguları çerçevesinde incelemek, analiz etmek ve tartışmaktır.

Bu tezde, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığının insani boyutunun 11 Eylül sonrası dünya düzeni çerçevesinde, tartışmalar, aktiviteler ve girişimler bazında ciddi bir artışa tanık olduğu ortaya konmuştur. Kültürlerarası ilişkileri ve bu süreçte yer alacak sivil toplum katkısını düzenlemek amacıyla 2005 yılında Anna Lindh Avrupa-Akdeniz Kültürlerarası Diyalog Vakfı kurulmuştur.

Üçüncü Sepet ve Kültürlerarası Diyalog olgusuna yönelik bu yenilenen önem duygusu çerçevesinde özellikle sürecin siyasallaştırılması ve güvenlik bakış açısının yerleştirilmesi, kültürel grupların temsiliyeti ve sivil toplum kuruluşlarının katılımı konularında ciddi problemler gözlemlenmiştir.

Sonuç olarak, Avrupa-Akdeniz Vakfı'nın, özellikle maddi kaynaklar ve sivil toplum katılımı konularındaki bağımsızlığının ciddi boyutta geliştirilmesi önerilmiştir çünkü mevcut düzen içerisinde ortak ülkelerdeki siyasi aktörler ve hükümetler, bölgedeki kültürel ilişkilerin düzenlenmesi için tamamen sivil bir kurum tarafından yürütülen Kültürlerarası Diyalogun işlevselliği üzerinde sıkı bir kontrole sahiplerdir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Akdeniz, Avrupa-Akdeniz Ortaklığı, Barselona Süreci, Kültürlerarası Diyalog, Sivil Toplum, Kültürel İşbirliği

To all who identify themselves as Mediterranean

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	viii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS	x
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTERS	
1. EURO-MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVES IN THE POST-WAR ERA	14
1.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Relations before the Barcelona Process	16
1.2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership	22
1.2.1 Origins of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership	23
1.2.2 The Barcelona Process	25
a) The Political and Security Partnership	27
b) The Economic and Financial Partnership	29
c) Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs	31
1.2.3 Ministerial Meetings – The Third Chapter and the Concept of Intercultural Dialogue	34
2. THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN FOUNDATION AND THE CONCEPT OF ‘INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE’	56

2.1 The Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures	57
2.1.1 The Mission and Objectives	57
2.1.2 The Network of the Foundation	58
2.1.3 The Events and the Activities	61
2.2 The concept of ‘Dialogue between Cultures	66
2.2.1 Report of the High Level Advisory Group	66
2.2.2 The Rabat Commitment	72
2.2.3 Analysis from Within	75
3. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM REGARDING ‘INTERCULTURAL	
DIALOGUE’ WITHIN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP	81
3.1 The meaning of ‘dialogue’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’ and its manifestation within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership	83
3.2 The issue of representation and agenda-setting regarding intercultural dialogue	92
3.3 The question of Civil Society participation	97
3.4 The Role of the Media.....	101
3.5 Securitisation of the Dialogue between Cultures	107
CONCLUSION	118
BIBLIOGRAPHY	128

INTRODUCTION

*“In its broad outline, the destiny of Rome is devastatingly simple.
Viewed from close up, people, events and details complicate the story”*

Fernand Braudel

These words that belong to the famous scholar of the Mediterranean, Fernand Braudel, which appear at the beginning of his depiction of Roman history, can easily be applied to contemporary Mediterranean region. In a broad definition, Mediterranean life can be summarised in various ways which can be applied to all inhabitants accommodating around what may be the most historically significant of all seas. Laid back life style, love of music, food and entertainment... all of these are factors that could draw a singular picture of the Mediterranean. However, far from these connotations of comfort and positivism, the Mediterranean is actually the world's most volatile region. This hot corner of the world is where southern Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East come together, alongside the cultural rifts between the West and Islam and the economic gap between the North and the South.

The Mediterranean region is made up of the countries bordering the Mediterranean Sea – including Portugal – between about 27° to 47°N and 10°W to 37°E. The Mediterranean, offers favourable environmental conditions, such as climate, biological diversity and natural resources as for centuries and even millennia, different people from faraway lands have chosen its shores to settle and it is the birthplace of

some of the oldest cultures and civilisations in the world, and of the three monotheistic and the most influential global religions, namely Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

The Mediterranean Sea is the largest of the semi-enclosed European seas. It is surrounded by 18 countries and has shores on three continents, namely Europe, Africa and Asia. It has a combined population of 129 million people and has a coastline of 46000 km. The Mediterranean Sea has an average depth of 1.5 km though more than 20 per cent of the total area is covered by water less than 200 m deep. The sea consists of two major basins, the eastern and the western. There are also smaller regional seas within the Mediterranean: the Ligurian, Tyrrhenian, Adriatic and Aegean seas. It is linked to the Atlantic by the Strait of Gibraltar, with the Black Sea and Sea of Azov by the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus, and with the Red Sea by the Suez Canal.

The Mediterranean is also a sea of communication and trade, as well as cradle of democracy, the welfare state and the most important periods of freedom that humanity has ever enjoyed. The region includes the Northern countries such as: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Serbia-Montenegro, Slovenia, Spain; and the South-Eastern Countries such as: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Libya, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. The northern countries are primarily Christian, whereas the countries in the south are Islamic. Israel is the only Jewish country in the Mediterranean region and in the world. The countries of the Mediterranean region cover 8,759 million km² and presently hold

578 million people. Today there is a significant difference between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries and this difference has its roots in history. It is this same history that led to the description of the Mediterranean as a *melting pot* of cultures and civilisations.

The Mediterranean has always been a region of great significance and importance throughout the history. It is an area where many different political, societal and cultural entities stay in touch with each other. Because of environmental, pre modern and sub cultural similarities it can be regarded as a region in itself. However in general it is hardly a region due to the lack of inner coherence and it is rather an area with an interregional character.

In this study, the contemporary relations of Europe with its neighbours in the Mediterranean basin which is organised under the umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) are to be discussed and analysed. In recent years, the European Union (EU) has attempted to build a 'Mediterranean regional identity' through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which will decrease the division existent in the Mediterranean area, and diminish the threats that are generated by it. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is built up on three main pillars, namely the political/security, financial/economic and the socio-cultural baskets. When we look at the functioning of this process we see that at the current situation the EMP is far from achieving its goals. There has been some development in the Second Basket which is dealing with the economic aspect of the partnership as such cooperation is much easier

since it depends mainly on financial aids and trade agreements. Such a relationship was already existent to an extent even before the Barcelona Process. The First Basket, which deals with politics, seems to be bound to under-perform since the Arab-Israeli conflict and the collapse of the Middle East Peace Process limits the space of action to a great extent. The Third Basket, which deals with the Socio-cultural cooperation, is designed to complement the First Basket of the Partnership but unfortunately is the least functioning of all three baskets. However, in the post-9/11 period there is a clear improvement in the attitudes and approaches of the Mediterranean partners towards the functioning and achievements of the Third Basket. The integral part of this new approach is the intercultural dialogue.

The main aim of this thesis will be to analyse the Euro-Mediterranean relations within the framework of the Third Basket and the intercultural dialogue. I will address the issue firstly, by explaining how the relations in the Mediterranean region were shaped in the post-WW2 era, focusing mainly on how the idea of European integration was reflected on the process in which the European states tried to reshape their relations with their ex-colonial neighbours on the Southern shores of the Mediterranean and how these relations developed and manifested themselves in policy-making and projects of cooperation, the most significant of which being the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Then, I will establish a timeline of how the Third Basket has evolved throughout the 10 years of the Barcelona Process by focusing on the Ministerial Meetings that took place within this framework and establish how the idea of intercultural dialogue and the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation that will

coordinate it, has developed. Following this, I will outline the structure, organisation and the objectives of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures and then establish the main themes, concepts and issues that are to be handled within this process. Finally, I will try to analyse and discuss the functioning of the intercultural dialogue through various academic analysis and critiques which mainly focus on the structure and the functioning of the dialogue itself. I would argue that the issue of politicisation/securitisation of the dialogue and the problem of representation, accessibility and participation are the two main aspects of the intercultural dialogue that are receiving increasing commentary and critique both in the political and academic circles. The concept of Civil Society involvement which is regarded as the most essential aspect of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Third Basket in particular will also be a topic of concern as there seems significant uncertainty regarding the definition of what constitutes the Civil Society.

In order to achieve this, I will first try to establish the background on which these relations are taking place, by presenting a brief history of the Mediterranean as I believe it would be instrumental to lay out the foundation on which the contemporary Euro-Mediterranean relations are being built upon. It is important to examine how this geography has helped certain societies, states and empires to flourish and make a contribution to humanity in the course of history and how unity and separation has manifested itself up until to the modern times in which we are observing a highly heterogeneous and conflictive social and political structure. I believe it is essential to understand how the remains of these periods of unity and separation have survived

within the psyche of the Mediterranean society in order to have a clear perspective on the issues and concepts shaping up the contemporary relations in the region.

As mentioned, the social and political structure of contemporary Mediterranean is highly heterogeneous and diverse. However, in ancient history there was not much diversity in the cultural and political sense as until the rise of Islam and its expansion towards the north and the west of the Arabian Peninsula, the Mediterranean has been a locus of diverse yet compatible civilisations with high levels of interaction and similar cultural traditions – such as the Egyptian, Greek and the Roman civilisations. Although the initial focus was on the Eastern part of the region, with the beginning of Greek colonisation, the rest of the Mediterranean entered into the picture. In the words of Fernand Braudel, “Greece was a pattern of islands, whether real islands on the sea or ‘islands on dry land’. Each of the Greek city-states occupied a limited terrain (...)”¹ According to Braudel the Hellenic era has produced the first *lingua franca* – a common language spoken by a majority of people – of the Mediterranean region:

Greek thought had, however, to confront the native culture of these colonised regions, which remained foreign to it. It was caught up in an imperial mission which obliged it to assert its unity in the face of the other. Thus a common language, a *lingua franca* or *koine*, tended to replace the dialects.²

However, a unity in all sorts has appeared with the rise of the Roman power throughout the region. The gap between the establishment of Rome's first province

¹ Fernand Braudel, *The Mediterranean In The Ancient World*, p.260

² Ibid., p. 303

outside mainland Italy and Roman control of the entire Mediterranean is little more than two centuries. With the annexation of Egypt in 30 BC, the Mediterranean became a single political unit for the first time - a large lake within a single empire. At the height of the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean was a completely inhabited and integrated region with Rome being the sole power, hence the name *Mare Nostrum* (Our Sea). Throughout this process of unification, the Mediterranean operated as a mechanism bringing together the scattered countries surrounding it, and enhancing the circulation of cultural goods, ideas, beliefs and thus brought about uniformity in material civilisation, the remains of which we can still come across in the Mediterranean and beyond. As pointed by Braudel,

with Rome victorious, the Mediterranean continued to be true to its own identity. That means diversity over time and place, and a wealth of different colours, for in this sea of age-old riches, nothing ever disappeared without trace: sooner or later everything surfaced once more. But at the same time, the *Mare nostrum*, as centuries of Pax Romana encouraged trade between regions, also displayed a certain unity in style and life. This civilisation, as it became established, would become one of the most outstanding in human history.³

This state of unity lasted for four centuries, until the Germanic tribes moved round the western Mediterranean in the 5th century AD. Tribal pressure from the north had been gradually building up throughout the heyday of Rome. As a result the Empire turned its face towards the East, establishing a new centre in Byzantium, renamed Constantinople after its founder. The emergence and development of a monotheistic religion on the Eastern shores of the Mediterranean, made a great impact on the future

³ Ibid., p.335

of the Roman Empire as the rapid change in the structure and character of the Empire was echoed with the adoption of a new religion which despite its spiritual attractiveness, actually served as a factor strengthening the influence of Eastern Rome on its territories in the East.

The Christian religion did not become the state religion without coming to some arrangement with the politics, society and even the civilisation of Rome. The civilisation of the Roman Mediterranean was taken over by the young forces of Christianity. As a result, it had to accept many compromises, fundamental and structural ones. And it is in this shape, and carrying this mixed message, that the civilisation of antiquity has come down to us.⁴

However with the rise of Islam and the expansionist movements of the Arabs, the Mediterranean entered into an irreversible process of change and division. The Arab existence in Sicily and the Iberian Peninsula alongside the whole of North Africa led the Christian world to mobilize against this threat from the East and the fruits of this mobilisation were the long lasting Crusades with the motive of liberating the Holy Lands from the Arabs. The idea of a Crusade was initiated by the Byzantines who were struggling to cope with the Turkish threat from the East while trying to defend their territories in the West against the raids of the Normans and the barbarian invaders. As they saw that the possibility of signing a treaty with the Turks was not high, they turned to the Normans and the Western Church to join forces against a common enemy of Christendom. The Crusades can be regarded as the utmost divisive and destructive aspect of the uneasy relationship still existent between the two shores

⁴ Ibid., p.355

of the Mediterranean. However, this period continued the cross-fertilisation taking place in the region following the immense advance of the Arabs, penetrating way into the heartland of Europe through the Iberian Peninsula. As Ernle Bradford underlines,

it was from their hated enemies that the Crusaders first began to learn the refinements of silk hangings, the use of ornaments, and improvements in the techniques of metalcraft. All of this was inevitably reflected by the furnituremaker, and upholstery and cushions returned to Europe from which they had almost been exiled since the collapse of the Roman Empire.⁵

Another outcome of the crusades was the rapid enlargement of the Italian marine trade, together with the amount of pilgrims travelling to the Holy shrines in the East. “The old shipping routes, which had been disrupted for centuries, resumed something like their ancient vigour.”⁶ A disastrous outcome of the Crusades regarding the western world was embedded in the notorious Latin invasion of Constantinople, which served not only to strengthen the antagonism between the Catholic and the Orthodox churches but also weaken the Byzantine Empire which, for centuries, kept Europe away from all threats from the East and indirectly contributed to its demise at the hands of the Turks in Anatolia.

The rise of the Ottoman power in Anatolia and its expansion towards the Balkans marked the beginning of yet another conflictive relationship between the two parties, reaching its peak with the conquest of Constantinople and the fall the last Christian Empire in the East. From this point the object of otherisation became the Turks,

⁵ Ernle Bradford, *Mediterranean: Portrait of a Sea*, p.350

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.351

replacing the Arabs and establishing themselves as the sole symbol of Islam and the East in the psyche of Christian Europe. The continuing Ottoman movement towards Europe and also towards the rest of the Mediterranean further established the division in the region and brought the conflict situation to a closure throughout a period where the majority of the clashes took place along the borders in the Balkans with not much impact on the status quo. The Ottomans, gaining control over the majority of the Mediterranean region, emerged as a significant maritime power controlling much of the trade taking place within the shores of the Mediterranean.

The balance started to change on behalf of Christian Europe with the positive and liberating effects of Renaissance (through which the heritage of the antiquity was re-discovered), Reformation (through which the hegemony and the oppressive character of religion was questioned and re-evaluated) and Enlightenment (through which positive science replaced the traditional, dogmatic and ignorant religious mentality). With the age of Discovery and the colonisation of the New World and other overseas regions, the significance of the Mediterranean started to deteriorate, leading to a decrease in trade revenues of trading powers of Eastern Mediterranean, namely the Ottomans and the Italian city states while for the Atlantic states of Europe, a period of prosperity and development began. Not being able to close the widening gap between itself and the European powers, the Ottoman Empire entered into a period of decline. With this decline of Ottoman power in the Mediterranean, parts of the region such as North Africa and the Levant started to attract colonising imperial powers. The essence of the colonial activities in the Mediterranean were ultimately economic, as the main

concern of the colonising powers was to create a stable and secure Eastern Mediterranean region in order to maintain the high level of commercial activities taking place on the Eastern trade routes, of which the Suez Canal is an integral part. The most significant factor of colonialism in light of the current debates regarding the contemporary relations between the ex-colonisers and the colonised is that the colonialist activities were legitimised by the Europeans as efforts in bringing progress, modernity and civilisation to the deprived subject peoples. Consequently, towards the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, all the territories alongside the Mediterranean (except the Anatolian homeland) were under the rule of Western powers, such as France, Britain and Italy.

Looking back at the period where the Turkish presence in Europe was at its height, we see the beginning of the self identification of Europe through the identification of the non-European (Russia and the Ottoman Turkey). The religious incompatibility of the Turks made them a far more significant other in the eyes of the Europeans. European Powers who were usually in unfriendly terms were all successfully united against the common threat from the East with its alien religion and culture. With the rise of the European hegemony over the Mediterranean area a trend of portraying and depicting the alien East began and this trend was duly named Orientalism. However the method of portrayal was far from realistic and objective, with the main focus – especially in art and literature - on the relaxed, carefree, exotic and degenerate atmosphere of the Orient. This process deepened the object/subject relationship of Europe and the Mediterranean Orient.

Starting from this point, this pattern of relationship continued to evolve and establish itself in the bilateral political, economic, and socio-cultural relations. Today when we look at the approach and the policies of the EU towards the non-member countries of the Mediterranean we see a similar pattern which is indicative of the foundational and the hard-to-change character of the object/subject relationship.

The long-term historical processes that I briefly tried to touch upon are significant in terms of letting us understand the ways in which national identities, states and boundaries – physical and social – were created. That is, analysing current politics in an environment of complex shifts within the social life – characterised by cultural, ethnic and religious heterogeneity – and within the political arena – characterised by the ambition to establish sovereign, economically self-sufficient and culturally homogenous nation-states. Within the Mediterranean context, these shifts took place following two long-term historical processes, first of which is the collapse of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires, and the second one being the intervention of European powers through colonisation, economic dependence and cultural influences.

The nation-state gradually came to dominate the Mediterranean world in the 19th and 20th centuries. Pre-existing political arrangements built around empires, dynastic states and independent cities were undermined. By the mid-19th century, the nation-state was gaining the upper hand in the Mediterranean, especially following the unification of Italy as well as Spain's gradual loss of its overseas possessions. The

decline of the Ottoman Empire as well as its rapid opening to Western economic and cultural influences during the Tanzimat period boosted national movements in the Balkans, leading Greece, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania to gain independence and take on projects of state and nation building in line with the models presented to them by the Western European powers. Following the 1st World War, the Turkish Republic was created from the remains of the Ottoman Empire, inspired by the notions of Westernisation and Nationalism which broadly shaped the destiny of the Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries. What followed this was the emergence of Arab nationalism and all the former colonies and mandate territories of the European powers had been transformed into sovereign states, developing their national identities by the 1950s.

Consequently the newly established nation-states found themselves in a situation in which strategically drawn borders brought together groups of people who could not get the chance define their political status. As a result, the issues of territory, identity and sovereignty have been the source of many conflicts in the region, involving states, governments, ethnic groups and national movements, for the last two centuries.

Millions of people of various ethnicities or creeds were uprooted or perished when finding themselves on the wrong side of a given fault-line. Whole communities suffered discrimination and exclusion because they did not fit the constructs of identity espoused and promoted by the state. For their part, national self-images and narratives centred on powerful historical myths of primordial opposition to threatening ‘others’ have legitimised border drawing, separation and conflict. In sum, conflict has been an essential element in the formation of territorial orders and the growth of the national idea.⁷

⁷ RAMSES Work package on Borders and Conflicts in the Mediterranean: Concept Paper, p.2

CHAPTER 1
EURO-MEDITERRANEAN INITIATIVES IN THE
POST-WAR ERA

The most ambitious and developed Mediterranean initiative, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was the culmination of a decades-long series of European efforts to deepen cooperation with the countries of the Southern Mediterranean seaboard. Thus, it is instrumental to examine how these efforts have been shaped up and operated. In this part of the study, the Mediterranean initiatives of the European states will be the main topic of interest, with particular emphasis on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership set up in 1995 and its Third Basket which organises the socio-cultural cooperation across the region. As the Third Basket and the concept of intercultural dialogue has experienced an increase in their significance and necessity in the 21st century, it is important to examine how these aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has developed within the first ten years of the process. Thus, in the second part of this chapter, the development of the Third Basket and idea of intercultural dialogue, and the shifts and changes occurring in the approaches of the partners, preceding and following the events of September 11 will be examined.

The initial contacts between the then European Economic Community (EEC) and the non-EEC Mediterranean countries began in the 1960s and were mainly limited to trade relations. The links between the parties were extended in the 1980s, taking the

form of association and cooperation agreements signed with various Mediterranean states. The trade relations within the Euro-Mediterranean region experienced a decline first in the 1970s, as a result of the oil crisis, and then in the 1980s with the accession of Portugal and Spain to the EEC, which led the Community to implement various protectionist measures regarding agricultural products in particular. With the end of the Cold War, a new environment has emerged enabling the development of more comprehensive programs. The Euro-Mediterranean policy was introduced in 1990. However this new initiative did not survive for long, mainly due to the existing and continuing trade restrictions in the economic sphere, the failure of the Arab-Maghreb Union and the ever-present nature of the Arab-Israeli tensions in the political sphere. However as most analysts point out, the main reason for the failure of this pre-Barcelona initiative was “the lack of a strategic vision of the Mediterranean as a single geopolitical entity (...) up until the early 1990s, the European Community (EC) was crafting distinct approaches for the Maghreb, Mashreq and Israel”.⁸ As a result, this led the EU to begin planning a major reconstruction of its Mediterranean policy which reached its conclusion with the famous Barcelona Conference of 1995.

A prosperous, democratic, stable and secure Mediterranean region is in the best interest of the EU and Europe as a whole. But as stated by the European Parliament, the spread of Islamic fundamentalism, the continuing endemic nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the spread of conflict between different nationalities and groupings, and the aggregate effects of growing ecological problems, economic dependence, debt,

⁸ Rand Monograph Report, *'NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas'*

the continued existence of regimes of various political shades unsympathetic to the developments of democracy and human rights, unemployment, the population explosion and increasing migration have greatly exacerbated the political and social destabilisation of the whole southern and south-eastern Mediterranean.⁹

The challenges faced and even presented by the southern states may not be military in nature, but the force of the non-military threats to their security and internal stability carry both immediate and long-term implications for their European neighbours. Hence the EU launched the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – the Barcelona Process – in 1995 to bring its 15 member states and 12 Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Cyprus, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the Palestinian Authority) together.

1.1 The Euro-Mediterranean Relations before the Barcelona Process

Majority of the states in the southern and eastern part of the Mediterranean basin used to be the colonies of the European states, particularly of Britain, France and Italy. Following their independences in the 1950s and in 1960s, these states could not give up their relations with the former colonial powers, however nationalist they may be.

⁹ *'Resolution on the role of Europe in Relation to Security in the Mediterranean'*, European Parliament, A3-0076/1991

From the late 1950s on, the EEC and several Mediterranean countries began dialogue in order to formalise the trade relations between the two shores. Bilateral trade agreements were signed with Greece, Turkey, Israel, Morocco, Tunisia, Spain, Malta, Egypt, Lebanon and Cyprus between 1960 and 1972.¹⁰ The agreements signed with Greece and Turkey differed from the others, as they offered eventual membership to the Community. The other agreements remained relatively limited in nature.

These early agreements were in general a series of responses to the suggestions made by the Mediterranean states. Accordingly, these states were granted significant tariff concessions and quota increases. Most of the privileges granted to the Mediterranean countries involved industrial products, however the Mediterranean countries did not have the technological means to manufacture industrial goods that could be exported to the EEC. As a result, the bilateral agreements did not have much positive effect over the region.

In light of the apparent deficiencies of the early agreements, the EEC decided to establish a region wide approach. Especially France and Italy, who are the main producers of the agricultural goods in the Community, took the lead in this process. As a result, the Commission proposed the establishment of the Global Mediterranean Policy in September 1972. In October 1972, the leaders of the Member States issued a communiqué that outlined the goals of the new policy. This policy was officially adopted by the Council of Ministers in November 1972.

¹⁰ S. Abrams, F. Pierros, J. Meunier (ed), *Bridges and Barriers: The European Union's Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1999*, p.49

The Global Mediterranean Policy was the first policy designed specifically for the Mediterranean region and it included four main objectives, which are, free trade in industrial goods between the EEC and the Mediterranean countries; limited concessions in agricultural goods; cooperation in the technical and financial areas and financial aid to the developing countries.¹¹ At first the proposal envisioned free trade in all kinds of industrial products by July 1977, between the EEC and the more developed Mediterranean countries such as Spain, Israel, Malta and Cyprus. Tariff schedules for the less developed Mediterranean countries, were to be reduced over a period of 12 to 17 years.¹² In contrast to the trade agreements of the 1960s, the Global Mediterranean Policy regarded development as one of its main goals.¹³ Accordingly, the initial proposals of cooperation and aid appeared highly ambitious.

The EEC hoped to implement the GMP by December 1973. However the break of the Arab-Israeli War in October 1973, led to an oil embargo against several countries in the West. The economies of the countries which are not oil-producing were highly affected and as a result, the unemployment rate in these countries experienced a rapid increase. By December 1973, the goal of a region-wide negotiation was abandoned by the Council of Ministers. This marked the first retreat from the Global Mediterranean Policy and rather than signing a single, consistent agreement with the Mediterranean states as a whole, a series of individual agreements were

¹¹ Ibid. , p.86

¹² Ibid.

¹³ European Commission, *Report on the Community's Mediterranean Policy (1975-1988)*, p.1

negotiated. A ban on immigration and a decrease in financial aid followed the recession and the increasing unemployment rates.¹⁴

Southern enlargement of the Community, namely Greece in 1981, Portugal and Spain in 1986, was another unfavourable factor for the Global Mediterranean Policy. As the new members produced many of the goods that the Mediterranean neighbours are producing, the products of the new member states were to be favoured at the expense of the others.

Thus, by 1989 there was a general agreement that the Community efforts to assist the non-member Mediterranean countries proceeded too slowly and had lacked a coherent plan. The Commission admitted that the policies of the Global Mediterranean Policy had not been successful and that the policy of regional cooperation would have to be redefined.¹⁵

With its increasing population, poverty and political unrest, it became harder for Europe to ignore the Mediterranean.¹⁶ Thus, the Community decided to evaluate its Mediterranean policy and accepted the Redirected Mediterranean Policy in December 1990.

¹⁴ Ibid. , p.97

¹⁵ European Commission, *'The Exploratory Talks with the Mediterranean Countries and the Applicant Countries and the Commission Proposal Concerning the Implementation of a Mediterranean Policy for the Enlarged Community'*, report from the Commission to the Council, COM(84)107 final, p.3

¹⁶ S. Abrams, F. Pierros, J. Meunier (ed), *'Bridges and Barriers: The European Union's Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1999'*, p.86-87

The new policy aimed to support the economic reforms, which were already being carried out. It underlined once again that the Mediterranean states should be given better access to European markets. The new policy emphasised that the Mediterranean countries should have a more direct involvement in Community programmes such as agriculture, energy, taxation, business, transport, macro-economic policies, emigration, population and the environment. Horizontal cooperation programs introduced under the Redirected Mediterranean Policy were innovative. In this regard some decentralised cooperation schemes called ‘Med-Programs’ were launched. ‘Med-Urbs’ aimed to form networks between municipalities and local authorities in Europe and the Mediterranean countries while ‘Med-Campus’ was designed to strengthen cooperation between universities and other institutions of higher education. ‘Med-Invest’ targeted small and medium sized enterprises in the Mediterranean and ‘Med-Media’ was aimed at filmmakers, television, radio and newspaper journalists, promoting co-productions, training, program exchanges, seminars and workshops to improve the quality of the media across the region. Finally ‘Med-Migration’ was designed to promote cooperation between local communities in Europe and the Mediterranean countries regarding the migration issue.¹⁷ The main aim of these programmes was to mobilise the civil societies – local authorities, universities, business and the media – and to encourage cooperation between these actors.¹⁸

¹⁷ S. Abrams, F. Pierros, J. Meunier (ed), *Bridges and Barriers: The European Union’s Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1999*, p.133-134

¹⁸ Ibid., p.133

The Redirected Mediterranean Policy fell short of expectations. The main reason for the failure was the recurring free trade dispute between the northern and southern member states of the EC. Britain, Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, favoured open markets, while France, Spain, Greece and Portugal emphasised financial support and cooperation.¹⁹

The end of the Cold War had mainly negative effects over the prospects of the non-member Mediterranean states. With the fall of the Berlin Wall, all funds flowed eastwards from the member states, as investors discovered a vast source of skilled, low-wage workers who are culturally and geographically closer to Europe than the inhabitants of the Mediterranean. As a result, the Mediterranean countries had to compete with the Central and Eastern European Countries.²⁰

The emergence of single market in Europe in 1993 also had a negative effect on the non-member Mediterranean countries as the removal of internal barriers resulted in price and cost savings for European producers and lower priced European goods became more competitive against Mediterranean imports. The Redirected Mediterranean Policy did not have a significant positive effect over the region. The economies of many non-member states faltered, the economic gap between the north

¹⁹ Ibid., p.140-141

²⁰ Ibid. , p.147-148

and the south of the Mediterranean increased and immigration pressures continued to build up.²¹

1.2 The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The new Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which owes its establishment mainly to the efforts of France, Italy and Spain during the Corfu and Essen summits of the European Council in 1994, called for a multilateral political, economic, and social dialogue between the EU and its 12 Mediterranean partners; strengthened cooperation between the civil societies of the participating countries; and a series of association agreements.²²

Since the signing of the Barcelona Treaty in 1995 – between the EU and the ten Mediterranean countries of Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Palestinian Authority, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey and Israel – the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has evolved into a political ground on which a unique intergovernmental cooperation and partnership has been set against a background of deeply rooted issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict which seems to remain ever present, the recent terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, Istanbul and London and the war in Iraq.²³ However, the EMP was launched in an environment in which the future of southern Mediterranean was

²¹ Ibid. , p.164

²² Rand Monograph Report, '*NATO's Mediterranean Initiative: Policy Issues and Dilemmas*', p.26

²³ Alexandre Zafiriou '*The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in the run-up to the 10th anniversary of the Barcelona Declaration*' in Swiss DFA Politorbis No 38 (2/2005), p.1

regarded with considerable optimism. This owed to the positive developments in the Arab-Israeli issue through the emergence of a new dynamic with the Oslo Accords between Israel and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), with further negotiations between Israel and several Arab states creating a promising setting for the discussions over developing a Euro-Mediterranean zone of peace, stability and security.²⁴

1.2.1 Origins of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

The Redirected Mediterranean Policy was increasingly criticised by the Mediterranean partner countries with claims over its dysfunctional nature. Thus, in June 1992, in Lisbon, the European Council called for an improvement of relations with Europe's neighbours, especially with those in the Maghreb, in line with the interests of the two most influential European countries regarding the Mediterranean policies of the EU, namely Spain and France. It was emphasised particularly that a Euro-Maghreb partnership should be established, encompassing political and security dialogue, cooperation in social and cultural fields, increased financial and technical cooperation and a free trade area.²⁵ The Maghreb countries welcomed the Community's proposal for a partnership and freer markets. But this was criticised by other Mediterranean states as the idea seemed rather exclusive. However, ongoing problems with Libya and the worsening crisis in Algeria appeared as serious obstacles facing the achievement of an exclusive EU-Maghreb project.

²⁴ H. A. Fernández & R. Youngs *The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Assessing the First Decade*, p.15

²⁵ European Council, *Conclusions of the Sessions of the European Council in Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992*

In order to capitalise the progress in the Middle East peace process and reinstate Europe as an influential actor in the region, the Commission issued a communication in September 1993. In this paper it was underlined that the development of the regional economic cooperation could be a powerful tool in reducing the level of conflict. In light of this suggestion, the Commission proposed a 'free trade area' among the EU, Israel, and the Mashreq countries. The benefits of cooperation in scientific and cultural fields were also highlighted. The communication proposed a Euro-Mashreq Partnership involving Israel and the Mashreq countries, similar to the Euro-Maghreb project.²⁶ However, both of these ideas were abandoned soon, in favour of a generalised policy encompassing the whole of the Mediterranean basin.²⁷

At the European Council in Corfu in June 1994, the Commission was asked to prepare a renewed and more comprehensive European strategy towards the Mediterranean region. Consequently, the Commission released a communication in October 1994 and proposed that rather than sub-regional cooperation projects, a Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should be encouraged. The communication put forward an approach built on three pillars. First, a political and security partnership called upon the Mediterranean partner countries to encourage human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Secondly, an economic and financial partnership aiming for a process of progressive establishment of free trade supported by financial aid and thirdly, a social,

²⁶ European Commission, *Future Relations and Cooperation between the Community and the Middle East, Communication from the Commission*, COM (93)375 final

²⁷ S. Abrams, F. Pierros, J. Meunier (ed), *Bridges and Barriers: The European Union's Mediterranean Policy, 1961-1999*, p.139-140

cultural and humanitarian partnership was proposed. Finally the Commission called for a ministerial conference in 1995 between the EU member states and the Mediterranean neighbours to establish guidelines for further cooperation measures.²⁸

The European Council in Essen, in December 1994, approved the Commission's proposals and decided to hold a conference in Barcelona to discuss political, economic, financial, human, and societal and security issues related to the Mediterranean.²⁹

1.2.2 The Barcelona Process

The fifteen members of the Union came together with the twelve non-member Mediterranean countries at a conference organized by the Spanish presidency of EU in Barcelona in November 1995. The Barcelona Declaration issued at the end of the conference announced that the objective is to turn the Mediterranean region into “an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity.”³⁰ The declaration called for an establishment of a comprehensive partnership among the participants in three different baskets, the political and security partnership; the economic and financial partnership and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs.

²⁸ European Commission, *Strengthening the Mediterranean Policy of the European Union: Establishing a Euro-Mediterranean, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament*, COM(94)427 final

²⁹ European Council, *Conclusions of the Session of the European Council of Essen*, 9-10 December 1994.

³⁰ *Barcelona Declaration*, note 3

The EMP appeared as the most ambitious and comprehensive cooperation framework in the region so far. By combining all three chapters into one comprehensive policy, it acknowledged that financial, economic, cultural and security issues are inseparable and interdependent and underlined that there cannot be progress in one of these aspects that is not based on progress in the others. It was strongly emphasised that economic and social development is closely linked to the stability of the Mediterranean region.³¹

A Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership consisting of officials from the EU troika and from all twelve southern Mediterranean countries was established. It was decided that the committee should meet every three months and report to the foreign ministers. It was also decided that the foreign ministers of all partner countries would meet periodically to review the progress. Informal gatherings of Non-governmental and civil society organisations were encouraged. The European Parliament also initiated contacts with the deputies of Mediterranean-partner parliaments and in so doing launched inter-parliamentary dialogue.³²

³¹ European Commission, *The Barcelona Process: Five Years on 1995-2000*, p.8

³² D. K. Xenakis, 'Order and Change in the Euro-Mediterranean System' in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.11, No.1, Winter 2000, p.86

a) The Political and Security Partnership

The first chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative is titled, the ‘Political and Security Partnership: Establishing an area of Peace and Stability’ and it points out that the parties are to

- act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems;
- promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia;
- respect the equal rights of people and their right to self-determination;
- respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners;
- respect their sovereign equality;
- refrain from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another party;
- settle their disputes by peaceful means;
- refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements;
- promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT;
- promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation;
- strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism;
- fight against the expansion and the diversification of organised crime and combat the drug problems;

- consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an “area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean”, including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end. ³³

There appeared significant disagreements over the issues included in the security chapter. Thus the terms used seem generally vague. On one hand, the Europeans were criticised by the Mediterranean partners that they were imposing their values on the Arab countries. The southern Mediterranean regimes tend to consider the EU insistence on the issues of political reforms, human rights and the rule of law as interference to their domestic affairs. ³⁴ The Arab states remain fundamentally suspicious of and even hostile to any form of Western intervention, especially when it occurs in the name of international law or the right of intervention. The West is accused of creating ways to renew its hegemony while trying to hide behind the ideas of democratic principles and their alleged universality. The ruling elites in the Mediterranean partner countries believe that democracy, as a western model is not suitable for other societies. ³⁵

On the other hand, the Europeans underlined the importance of the interdependence between security and democracy, and in light of their own

³³ *Barcelona Declaration*, note 3

³⁴ R. Albioni & A. Monem Said Aly, '*Challenges and Prospects*' in *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.213

³⁵ M. Chartouni Dubarry, '*Political Transition in the Middle East*' in *The Barcelona Process: Building a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Community*, p.59

experiences in the post-war period; they believed that democratic states achieve peaceful and neighbourly relations.

b) The Economic and Financial Partnership

The political, social and cultural objectives of the EU, designed to achieve political stability, are not only sought through political dialogue but also through economic growth, which is to be generated through policies of free trade and economic liberalisation. Thus, the second chapter of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which is entitled 'Economic and Financial Partnership' is regarded as the engine of the process.

The main objective of the economic and financial chapter is the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone by 2010. It is expected that through a progressive dismantlement of tariffs, the economic and social development is to be achieved in the southern Mediterranean and an area of shared prosperity is to be created, bringing peace, stability and security to the whole region. It is expected that the announcement of the objective of a Free Trade Zone, would encourage foreign investment in the region which would generate a new source of prosperity and in turn lead to the reinforcement of the countries involved. This stability and prosperity could

make political liberalisation and transition to democracy much more possible, and this would eventually contribute to the stability of the EU.³⁶

These objectives are to be achieved through the signing of Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements between the EU and the Mediterranean Partners. Although these agreements that shape the bilateral relations vary from one Mediterranean partner to the other, there are some certain aspects which are common to all:

- the establishment of free trade area over a transitional period, which may last up to 12 years from the date of the entry into force of the agreement;
- custom duties on EU exports of industrial products to the partner are to be eliminated gradually during the transitional period, partners' exports of these products already have duty free access to the EU;
- economic cooperation in a wide range of sectors;
- the adjustment provisions relating to competition, state aids and monopolies;
- the gradual liberalisation of arrangements on public procurement;
- the gradual liberalisation of trade in services;
- the maintenance of high level of protection of intellectual property rights;
- political dialogue;
- respect for human rights and democracy;
- cooperation related to social affairs and migration;
- cultural cooperation³⁷

³⁶ The European Commission, External Relations, *'The Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area'*

³⁷ The European Commission, External Relations, *'The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements'*

Regarding the financial aspect of the Partnership, it is evident that the goal of achieving a customs union requires significant reform on the fiscal, economic and industrial sectors and thus the EU aims to support these reforms through the MEDA program which is the main financial instrument of the EU within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.³⁸

c) Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human Affairs

The third chapter, as mentioned before, complements the first chapter, underlining the idea that the countries taking part in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership should encourage the participation of civil society within the process, involving joint efforts in education and training; social development; policies designed to reduce migratory pressures; the fight against drug trafficking, terrorism and international crime; judicial cooperation; the fight against racism and xenophobia; and a campaign against corruption.³⁹

Joint efforts with regard to culture, media, health policy and the promotion of exchanges and development of contact among young people in the framework of decentralised cooperation programs were also put forward. The dialogue between cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological levels, are regarded as

³⁸ European Commission, *'Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process'*, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, COM(00)497 Final

³⁹ S. C. Calleya, *'Crosscultural Currents in the Mediterranean: What Prospects?'* in *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol.9, No.3, Summer 1998, p.56

important factors bringing people closer and promoting understanding between them as well as improving their mutual perception.⁴⁰

Within this conceptual framework, initiatives called ‘Med-Programs’ were launched. The Euromed Heritage Program, being the most active and influential among all the programmes, aims the preservation and the development of the Euro-Mediterranean cultural heritage.⁴¹ The Euromed Audiovisual Program brings together European and Mediterranean operators in the audiovisual sector, aiming to contribute to the audiovisual projects in the region, mainly focusing on the preservation of archives, production and co-production support, support to broadcasting-distribution and circulation of audiovisual products.⁴² The Euromed Youth programme aims to improve mutual comprehension and cohesion between young people establishing mutual respect, tolerance and dialogue between the various cultures as the basis of action, as well as aiming to increase the importance of youth organisations and promoting the exchange of information, experience and expertise between these organisations.⁴³

Another focus of attention regarding the EU has been the promotion of human rights and democracy in the Mediterranean partners. The MEDA Democracy program

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ *Information Notes on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership*, European Commission External Directorate-General, January 2001, p.81

⁴² Ibid, p.83

⁴³ Ibid. , p.92

launched in 1996, intends to promote human rights in the Mediterranean partner countries through projects aiming the promotion of democracy, the rule of law, freedom of expression and the protection of women and youth.⁴⁴

The essence of the third chapter lies at the consideration of the civil society as an essential element of democratic reforms. The abovementioned programmes are launched in order to support civil society institutions and generate cooperation among them. This, in turn, is expected to encourage democratisation and confidence building in the Mediterranean partner countries. As we will discuss in the third chapter, there exists several question marks regarding the definition of the Mediterranean Civil Society, the problematic relations of the civil society institutions with their respective governments in the Mediterranean partner countries and the EU's approach towards these institutions taking part in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the intercultural dialogue. Amid these question marks, the issue of civil society participation within the Third Basket of the Partnership remains a critical and important topic of discussion.⁴⁵

However there are some positive and influential developments within the third basket and perhaps the most significant of those developments is the establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures.

⁴⁴ Ibid. , p.28

⁴⁵ M. Giammusso, '*Civil Society Initiatives and Prospects of Economic Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Decentralized Co-operation Networks*' in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.4, No.1, Spring 1999, p.30

The Foundation, which is situated in Alexandria, Egypt, is a major common instrument of the Barcelona Process for developing partnership in social, cultural and human affairs, in particular for developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.⁴⁶

1.2.3 Ministerial Meetings – The Third Chapter and the Concept of Intercultural Dialogue

Establishing the progress of Euro-Mediterranean relations by outlining the various initiatives from the past to the present, I will now try to examine how the Third Chapter, dealing with the social, cultural and human affairs, has developed throughout the first decade of the Barcelona Process, through the official documents, mainly the presidential conclusions of the Ministerial Meetings that took place within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

In order to review the achievements following the initiation of the Barcelona Process, the second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference took place in Malta in April 1997. During the conference, regarding our subject matter, the Third Chapter, it was underlined that there is a need for further efforts to achieve the objectives of the chapter, in accordance with the key document, Barcelona Declaration and the accompanying Work Programme. Regarding this, it was agreed to pursue the dialogue between cultures and civilisations in a more active manner, with the aim of improving

⁴⁶ Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, *Three Years Programme 1.8. 2005 – 31.7. 2008*, p.1

mutual understanding and bringing the peoples of the Mediterranean area closer. It was also agreed to reinforce the dialogue between civil societies through the Civil Forum. The Ministers underlined their wish for the re-launching of the decentralised cooperation programmes of the EU, such as the Med-Campus, Med-Media and Med-Urbs, as soon as possible, with an adequate management system set up. They also encouraged the development of direct involvement of the civil societies within the framework of national legislation through establishing networks between the NGOs. The desire for the prevention of and the fight against terrorism, the continuation and development of education and training activities, a determined campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and an intensified dialogue for cooperation on the issues of migration, human exchanges, illegal immigration, governance, organised crime and illicit drugs trade were expressed.⁴⁷

Regarding the institutional side of the Partnership, the Ministers reaffirmed the role of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee as a central forum for providing incentives, monitoring and following up actions and initiatives within the framework of the Barcelona Process. They also underlined the need to increase the visibility of the achievements of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and decided to act towards making general information regarding the Partnership more available. In the third annex to the presidential conclusions, the list of workshops and conferences that took place focusing on the dialogue among cultures and civilisations – most notably the Ministerial Conference on Cultural Heritage held in Bologna in April 1996 – social

⁴⁷ *Presidency Conclusions*, Second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference - Malta, 15 and 16 April 1997

development, dialogue on Human Rights and the fight against drug and organised crime was outlined.⁴⁸ The Meeting of Ministers for Culture in Bologna in April 1996, held the aim of specifying the factors for reconciliation and mutual understanding between the peoples on either side of the Mediterranean representing the traditions of culture and civilisations existent in this region. The discussions harboured the desire for cultural exchanges and cooperation, respecting the identity of each partner. The participants approved the proposals for enhancing and conserving the Mediterranean cultural heritage by establishing networks between museums and cultural institutions, promoting high-quality cultural tourism, protection and movement of cultural assets and transfer of know-how, and agreed on a regional programme executing all these proposed actions within a single framework, namely the Euromed Heritage.

The next ministerial meeting took place in Palermo in June 1998. This meeting was an additional, ad hoc event, which was held outside the regular schedule of the Ministerial Conferences in order to review the progress made in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership at its third year. Within the discussions, the potential of making the Euro-Mediterranean process more accessible to the peoples of the partner countries is underlined. A recent workshop on Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations held in Stockholm in April 1998 revealed some positive outcomes providing general guidelines and principles for the Dialogue between cultures and

⁴⁸ Ibid.

civilisations. Out of the Stockholm workshop came the five point programme which defined the priorities of action as

interaction between cultures and civilisations through research programmes in different cultural areas, co-operation in the fields of education and youth, media co-operation in audio-visual broadcasting and publishing fields, co-operation at civil society and government levels on the human dimension and cultural exchanges and co-operation⁴⁹

and the conclusions of the workshop formed part of the preparatory work for the second Ministerial Meeting on Culture in Rhodes. Finally, in the Palermo meeting, it was agreed to hold a meeting of experts regarding the issues of migration and human exchanges in order to develop the dialogue on this very sensitive subject.⁵⁰

The next meeting of such calibre – the Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers – took place in Stuttgart in April 1999, at which the importance of the cultural, social and human dimension and its potential to realise the overall goals of the Partnership was underlined once again. European Parliament's contribution to develop the parliamentary aspect of the Partnership and the inaugural meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Forum in Brussels in October 1998, were particularly held as positive developments. The second Ministerial Meeting on Culture that took place in Rhodes in September 1998, which outlined the progress made in Euro-Med Heritage programme, was highly praised. Another positive achievement was the launch of the Euro-Med Audio-visual programme with its ready-to-select

⁴⁹ *Conclusions*, Second Conference of the Ministers of Culture - Rhodes, 25 and 26 September 1998

⁵⁰ *The Concluding Statement by Robin Cook, UK Presidency*, Euromed ad hoc Ministerial Meeting - Palermo, 3 and 4 June 1998

projects for the forthcoming year.⁵¹ The Second Meeting of Ministers for Culture emphasised the importance of the first meeting in Bologna two years earlier, which gave broad guidelines for the Euromed Heritage regional programme, producing the first concrete action towards the implementation of the aims in the cultural field of the Barcelona Process. Acknowledging the progress achieved through the first regional programme, the participants expressed their desire to proceed with the second phase of Euromed Heritage, underlining its significance in bringing together both material and non-material heritage and thus becoming an important factor in the economic and social development of the Euro-Mediterranean partner countries.

The Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers took place in Marseilles in November 2000. The Ministers were highly interested in the Commission's proposals for revitalising the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, put forward in the communication "Reinvigorating the Barcelona Process" and the proposals of the Mediterranean partners. Through the above-mentioned communication it was clear that the EU was confirming its willingness to strengthen its external relations, particularly with the Mediterranean region.⁵²

Regarding the situation of the Third Chapter it was noted that unfortunately not all the potential of the chapter had been fully materialised, particularly regarding the

⁵¹ *Presidency Conclusions*, Third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers - Stuttgart, 15 and 16 April 1999

⁵² *Presidency's Formal Conclusions*, Fourth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers - Marseilles, 15 and 16 November 2000, p.1

social aspects, civil society and the human dimensions. In order to awaken the unexploited potential of the Third Chapter, the Ministers agreed to put more emphasis on the social effects of economic transition in the Mediterranean partners through training, employment, professional re-qualification and the reform of education systems.

From this point on, right in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, it is interesting to see how the course of the discussions and activities regarding the Third Basket and cultural cooperation takes on a much more emphasised character. It is possible to observe how concerns over security have manipulated the framework in which cultural cooperation and dialogue has been shaped.

A mid-term Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs took place in Brussels in October 2001. In this regard

the Ministers reiterated their utter condemnation of the terrorist attacks committed in the United States on 11 September 2001. In this connection they expressed their total condemnation of terrorism everywhere in the world and their solidarity with the peoples who are the victims thereof. They regard these acts as an attack against the entire international community, against all its members, all religions and all cultures together. The Ministers formally rejected as both dangerous and unfounded any equating of terrorism with the Arab and Muslim world. In this connection the importance of the Barcelona Process as a relevant and recognised instrument for promoting a dialogue of equals between cultures and civilisations was emphasised by all. The Ministers agreed to work on deepening the existing

dialogue between cultures and civilisations, focusing on youth, education and the media.⁵³

The Ministers reviewed the second phase of the Euromed Heritage programme launched at the beginning of 2001, together with the progress made in the previous programmes. The Euromed Youth programme was underlined due to its potential for combating prejudices and stereotypes among the young people of the Mediterranean area and an agreement was reached for its continuation for further three years.

The fifth regular meeting of the Foreign Ministers took place this time in Valencia in April 2002 with notable developments regarding the Barcelona Process in general and the Third Basket in particular. The main achievement of the meeting was the endorsement of the Valencia Action Plan which was regarded as an instrument to reinforce political dialogue, further develop the economic, commercial and financial cooperation and renew emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension.⁵⁴

Within the Action Plan, regarding the Third Basket, the Euromed Committee was urged to study ways to develop the contents of the chapter. Regarding the dialogues between cultures and civilisations, the importance of cooperation on culture, enhancing mutual understanding and fighting against misconceptions and stereotypes among the

⁵³ *Presidency conclusions*, Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs - Brussels, 5 and 6 October 2001

⁵⁴ *Valencia Action Plan*, Fifth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs - Valencia, 22 and 23 April 2002, p.1

general population were noted. With a decision which eventually became one of the most successful and tangible achievements of the Third Chapter, the ministers lay the foundation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the dialogue of cultures and civilisations, based on the principle of co-ownership, by agreeing to it as a principle and decided to act towards increasing the visibility of the Barcelona Process through intellectual, cultural and civil society exchanges.⁵⁵

The participants of the Conference endorsed an Action Programme on intercultural dialogue aiming the youth through education and the media, and welcomed several proposals to extend the Tempus Programme of higher education to the non-candidate Mediterranean partners together with the Netd@ys and e-Schola activities, namely school twinning, joint school projects and teacher exchanges. The Euromed-Youth Programme was to be streamlined in order to make it more efficient. Following the decision taken at the previous meeting of the Ministers, the Action Plan included an agreement to launch a Programme on Information and Communication for the improvement of the visibility of the Partnership and the Commission was asked to examine the ways of supplying support to the media in the Euro-Mediterranean region to foster cooperation and contribute to an increased awareness.⁵⁶

The most significant meeting regarding the Third Basket was the Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which took place in Crete in

⁵⁵ Ibid., p.10

⁵⁶ Ibid.

May 2003, where the main outlines of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations was set up to a great extent. The main purpose of the meeting was to summarise the progress made, especially following the implementation of the Valencia Action plan, as well as to discuss the future of the Partnership, within the perspective of the future enlargement of the EU.⁵⁷

In line with the Action programme of Valencia, the importance of younger generations as targets to be taken into consideration regarding the future of the region was underlined. The ongoing programmes of cultural heritage, audio-visual cooperation and youth exchanges were praised and following the opening of the TEMPUS programme to the Mediterranean Partners it was agreed that cooperation projects between universities and grants for mobility for teachers and staff are to be financed from the 2003 academic year onwards.⁵⁸

In line with the due enlargement of the EU, the Ministers took note of the proposed New Neighbourhood Policy as an instrument to reinforce the Barcelona Process and to develop a closer cooperation among the partners, and invited the Commission to examine the ways in which the Mediterranean partners could get involved in the EU programmes within the existing MEDA framework.⁵⁹

As mentioned before, the issue of the dialogue of cultures and civilisations has gained great momentum, particularly following the changing political and social

⁵⁷ *Presidency Conclusions*, The Euro-Mediterranean Mid-Term Meeting of Foreign Ministers - Crete, 26 and 27 May 2003

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

structure of the world in the post-9/11 era. In line with this fact, the initiative for dialogue within the Barcelona Process is regarded as one of the most important aspects of the process, which has the potential to bring the peoples of the region closer and promotes mutual understanding. Within this perspective, in order to make a healthy and efficient dialogue possible, several guiding principles for the dialogue between cultures and civilisations were pointed out in an annex to the Presidency Conclusions. The guidelines pointed out that the Ministers,

- underlining the importance of the Dialogue between cultures and civilisations, as well as its role as an instrument to promote a culture of peace and to achieve mutual understanding, bring peoples closer, remove the threats to peace and strengthen exchanges among civilisations;

(...)

- reaffirming the principles that should govern the dialogue as contained in the Action Programme for the Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations, adopted in Valencia:
 - respect for pluralism, diversity and cultural specificities;
 - equality and mutual respect;
 - avoidance and reduction of prejudices and stereotypes ;
 - the Dialogue should aim to achieve, not only a better understanding of "the other", but also solutions for persistent problems;
 - the ultimate goal of Dialogue, should not be to change "the other" but, rather, to live peacefully with "the other";

- taking into consideration and acting at all times in accordance with:

(...)

- the UN resolution entitled "United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilisations", and the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (November 2001) as well as the guidelines on the cultural and historical heritage as defined by the Bologna conference in April 1996;
 - the conclusions of the Second Euro-Mediterranean Conference of the Ministers of Culture, held in Rhodes on 25-26 September 1998, which endorsed the conclusions of the 1998 Stockholm workshop, providing general guidelines and principles for the Dialogue between cultures and civilisations;
- acknowledging the contribution of the regional programmes (Euro-med Heritage, Euro-med Audio-visual, Euro-med Youth, Euro-med Tempus) to the Dialogue between cultures and civilisations ⁶⁰

declared that the Dialogue between cultures and civilisations is regarded as a useful instrument that may construct interaction and cooperation among the nations of the region, contributing to mutual understanding with the active involvement of the civil society in the forms of institutions and individuals. The Dialogue is to be seen as an instrument to fight extremism, racism and xenophobia, establishing itself deeply in people's daily lives through assisting the formation of an understanding of the common Mediterranean history. ⁶¹

Within this framework "the Ministers agreed to

- To promote knowledge, recognition and mutual respect between the cultures, traditions and values which prevail in the partners.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

- To help create, in their respective countries, the respect for each other in a world based on tolerance and acceptance of differences.
- To encourage, in their respective countries, all relevant institutions to contribute to the Dialogue between cultures and civilisations and in particular to support cooperation, inter alia, in the field of Youth, Education and the Media.
- To encourage initiatives which aim at promoting dialogue between religions in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
- To promote at the same time the human dimension of the partnership as well as the consolidation of the rule of law and of basic freedoms in accordance with the guidelines of the regional cooperation programme which was also adopted in this field by the Valencia Conference (April 2002).
- To underline the decisive role in the implementation of the above mentioned actions of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue of Cultures and Civilisations, the principle of which was agreed in Valencia and whose goals, objectives, and fields of activity were adopted in Crete, while the modalities of its establishment will be submitted at the next Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Naples in December 2003 (Barcelona VI).
- To underline the vital importance of ensuring that all partners encourage the development and deepening of the cultural and human dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership in all its aspects and its various components at bilateral or multilateral level.’’⁶²

Making progress towards an agreement over the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the dialogue of cultures and civilisations, the Ministers pointed out a list regarding its structure, goals, objectives and activities in a further annex to the main document. The Ministers point that,

- The establishment of this new intergovernmental instrument within the framework of the Barcelona Process is a priority, for the following reasons:

⁶² Ibid.

- in the first place, on account of the need, in this essential sphere, for a dynamic structure, which should contribute decisively to the development of a true sense of joint ownership of the Barcelona Process by its members.
- the importance of having an instrument that would disseminate the goals of the Barcelona Process and its development amongst the European and Mediterranean societies. Therefore, the implementation of Chapter III of the Barcelona Process requires actions whose objective is to reach the greatest possible number of citizens, while aspiring to overcome barriers in the way of access to information and to achieve a greater level of mutual knowledge between them;
- the need to set up an institution that, in the cultural field, is able to promote the coherent identification and execution of projects that are relevant to the dialogue of cultures and increased cultural co-operation;
- the need to set up an institution that catalyses and provides an inventory of co-operation between the existing networks of foundations, NGOs and other institutions of civil society, whether public or private, national or international, which operate in the Euro-Mediterranean area.⁶³

Having set the grounds on which the Foundation is to be founded, the Ministers pointed out the main objectives as,

- to identify, develop and promote areas of cultural convergence between the countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, with the aim in particular of avoiding stereotypes,
- to hold a close and regular dialogue between cultural circles often kept outside the main diplomatic and cultural exchanges,
- to serve as a catalyst for promoting exchanges, co-operation and mobility between people at all levels, targeting in particular the young and activities relevant to young people.⁶⁴

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

Additionally it was underlined that the activities of the Foundation should be prepared in close cooperation with other initiatives in the region to avoid any duplication and that they should echo the non-governmental character of the Foundation itself. The possible list of activities were pointed as,

- exchanges between cultural and intellectual circles in the wider sense,
- promoting a continuous cultural debate using in particular multi-media techniques (television, radio, periodical magazine, Internet) in co-operation with important existing media and with the participation of people from both shores including journalists and the young ,
- patronage of important events which symbolise mutual understanding (for example, a limited number of concerts, exhibitions, etc on relevant themes), co-financed by large media groups and/or festivals and institutions already active in these areas,
- promoting the activities of the Barcelona Process including through means of the Foundation itself (periodical magazine, Internet site).⁶⁵

Regarding the structure of the Foundation, it was recommended that the Foundation should be established in one step at a time in the initial stage, functioning as a network of networks with a loose independent administrative structure coordinating the national networks. Each partner country is to determine a list of national institutions working towards and contributing to the development of a dialogue between cultures and civilisations and select one organisation to act as the head of each national network. The Foundation is to provide a coordinating role among the already existing networks dealing with the issue of intercultural dialogue within the EU and its Mediterranean partners. However it is underlined that the Foundation should be linked

⁶⁵ Ibid.

essentially to the Barcelona Process, by setting the Euromed Committee as the Board of Governors, consulted by qualified personalities in the decision making process, in the initial stages, with the Director of the Foundation reporting to the Euromed Committee on a regular basis.⁶⁶

Looking back to the issue of the activities of the Foundation, the Ministers set out an indicative list of possible activities as a further annex within the second annex, which set out the principles of the Foundation. Taking into account the highly influential report of the High Level Advisory Group set up by the Commission President, Romano Prodi⁶⁷, the indicative list of activities were set out under three main categories, namely the intellectual exchanges, cultural and artistic exchanges and the visibility of the Barcelona Process.

Six months after the mid-term meeting in Crete, the sixth regular conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers took place in Naples in December 2003. It was advised in the Presidency Conclusions that in order to enhance the achievements of the Partnership related to the intercultural dialogue, the present instruments of cooperation and regional programmes should be strengthened and accompanied by new

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ The High Level Advisory Group (also known as Groups des Sages) was set up by the Commission President Romano Prodi examined the idea of a dialogue between peoples and cultures in a broader sense, taking into account the economic globalization, enlargement of the EU, presence of immigrant communities and the question marks over identity affected by the undeniable changes occurring on both sides of the Mediterranean. The aim of the Group is to specify the factors for the creation of the conditions favourable to a combination of cultural and religious diversity, freedom of conscience and the neutrality of the public realm. The High Level Advisory Group therefore stated that they have identified a number of founding principles in order to give the new Neighbourhood Policy a human dimension and assist the process of the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation.

instruments, namely the Euromed Foundation, and thus the visibility of the Partnership should be increased.⁶⁸

Regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, following the agreement over the modalities of the Foundation, contained in the Doc. De Séance No 57/03 Rev. 2, the Ministers decided the setting up the Foundation and took note of several proposals from the Mediterranean partners on the geographical base of the headquarters of the Foundation, which the Euromed Committee was assigned to evaluate and reach a decision as soon as possible. The Ministers also underlined the significance of the report of the High Level Advisory Group set up by Romano Prodi and presented in Alexandria in October, as it helps defining the main principles for the intercultural dialogue and contributes to the functioning of the Foundation.⁶⁹

In line with the changing outlook of the EU due to the biggest ever enlargement of the Union in May 2004, the Dublin meeting which was the scene for the memorable acceptance ceremony of the new members, was taken as an opportunity to reinstate the Union's dedication to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership by convening the Mediterranean Partners for a mid-term Foreign Ministers Conference, on the 5th and 6th of May 2004. Firstly, the setting up of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly in Athens in March 2004 was praised as an influential instrument serving for the improvement of cooperation and democratisation in the region. The Ministers

⁶⁸ *Presidency Conclusions*, Sixth Conference of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers - Naples, 2 and 3 December 2003

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p.12

agreed that the views of the Assembly related to the issues of the partnership would be welcome at all times.⁷⁰

Regarding the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, the Ministers reached an agreement on the name of the institution. The Foundation is to be known as “The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures” and is to be situated in Alexandria, thanks to an offer by Egypt and Sweden to have the new institution based in the Alexandria Library together with the Swedish Institute. Regarding the financing of the Foundation, the Ministers underlined the importance of each partner’s financial contribution to the establishment costs and stressed that these contributions would be an indication of each member state’s political commitment and emphasise the common ownership.⁷¹

Placing great emphasis on the contribution of the civil society in the activities of the Partnership, the Ministers, in order to guarantee the continuity of the civil forums, agreed on the launching of the Euromed Civil Forum Platform which would bring together the organisers of the previous and upcoming civil forums and act as a permanent structure representing the partnership, as well as taking up the responsibility of organising the future civil forums.⁷² Finally the ministers expressed their growing concern over the information deficit regarding the Barcelona Process

⁷⁰ *Presidency Conclusions*, Euro-Mediterranean Mid-term Foreign Ministers Conference - Dublin, 5 and 6 May 2004, p.1

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p.13

⁷² *Ibid.*, p.15

and showed their support to the recently launched programme of Information and Communication.⁷³

As the 10th anniversary of the signing of the Barcelona Declaration was approaching, the Ministers came together in The Hague in November 2004, in order to discuss the preparation for this historic point in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The main message is that, enhanced by the European Neighbourhood Policy; The Barcelona Process keeps its firm position as the main initiative bringing together the EU and the Mediterranean partners.⁷⁴

Pointing out the increased number of international initiatives aimed at developing and strengthening the processes of political, economic and social reform in the Mediterranean region within the year 2004 – such as the Arab League Tunis Declaration on reform and modernisation and the G8 Sea Island Declaration – the Ministers underlined the undeniable significance of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership due to its developing institutional structure for dialogue and reaffirmed the launching of the Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures for 2005 and noted the fact that its headquarters being in Egypt, a Mediterranean partner country, carries a great amount of symbolic value. They also welcomed the adoption of the Statute of the Foundation and the meeting of the representatives of the national networks, held in Brussels, prior to the official launching of Foundation the following

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ *Presidency Conclusions*, Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers meet to prepare 10th Anniversary of their partnership - The Hague, 29 and 30 November 2004, p.1

year. The importance of the Dialogue between Cultures as an instrument of promoting a higher level of understanding among the people on both shores of the Mediterranean, acting towards the prevention of all extreme and radical elements that might emerge within these societies is emphasised.⁷⁵ Regarding the need for visibility of the increasing amount of cooperation, activities and achievements in this field, the Ministers decided to declare 2005, the Year of the Mediterranean, and put more emphasis on the functioning of the Euromed Dialogue programme.⁷⁶

The seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers took place in Luxembourg in May 2005. Preparing for the second decade of the Barcelona Process, the Ministers, regarding the Third Basket issues, praised the success of the Luxembourg Civil Forum and its contribution to establish a platform bringing together the actors of the civil society. Noting the recommendations of the Civil Forum, outlined in its Final Declaration, the Ministers agreed to work on mechanisms to strengthen the presence of the Forum within the Partnership and underlined the role of the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures in promoting the input of the civil society.⁷⁷ Stressing the importance of communication in transporting the messages of the Partnership to the general public, the Partners agreed on the launch of the Euromed Dialogue programme covering the whole region, to raise the public awareness of the EU and Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and increase the feeling of joint ownership.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p.12

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.41

⁷⁷ *Presidency Conclusions*, Seventh Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs - Luxembourg, 30 and 31 May 2005, p.12

The adoption of the Euromed logo was praised and its use in the forthcoming activities as a label of the Partnership was encouraged.⁷⁸

The final meeting of the Partners to date took place in Barcelona in November 2005.⁷⁹ Commemorating the 10th Anniversary of the Barcelona Process, the countries belonging to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership met at the summit level, which is the level of Heads of State and of Government, for the first time. The leaders of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership demonstrated their continuing commitment to the main objective of the Barcelona Declaration, achieving a common area of peace, stability and prosperity in the Mediterranean region through dialogue, exchange and cooperation. They underlined the dependence of this process on an enhanced security, resolved regional conflicts, strengthened democracy, firmly established rule of law and human rights, balanced economic and social development and a greater understanding between cultures and peoples.⁸⁰

Regarding the Third Chapter, the leaders stated their commitment towards strengthening the management of migratory flows, in a manner that respects the rights of the migrants, and towards intensifying the cooperation on the countering of illegal immigration. They also expressed their will to act jointly against all forms of racism,

⁷⁸ Ibid., p.12,13

⁷⁹ During the process of finalizing this study, a Ministerial Meeting of Foreign Ministers took place in Tampere, Finland on the 27th and the 28th of November, 2006. Apart from reaffirming the willingness of the partners in the process, the Anna Lindh Foundation was invited to contribute in the preparations of the '2008 EU Year of Intercultural Dialogue'. Ministers invited Euromed Ministers of Culture to hold a meeting in Greece, to discuss the Barcelona Process intercultural agenda and to examine the results of the first 3 years of the Anna Lindh Foundation.

⁸⁰ *Chairman's Statement*, Euro-Mediterranean Summit 2005 - Barcelona, 27 and 28 November 2005, p.1

xenophobia and intolerance, rejecting extremist views by promoting common understanding among the peoples of the region. They stressed the importance of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures in terms of improving the intercultural dialogue, in cooperation with the UN Alliance of Civilisations.⁸¹

This summit bringing together the Heads of State and of Governments produced a Five Year Work Programme, designed to provide the basis for cooperation for the next five years, aiming to deliver results with a positive impact for the peoples of the region and increasing the visibility of the Process. For the Third Chapter issues, the Work Programme underlines the importance of education regarding all aspects of the socio-cultural cooperation and points out that the Partners have agreed to increase funding, school enrolment rates; expand and improve illiteracy eradication and adult education, enhance the capabilities of universities and higher learning institutions; support the work of the Anna Lindh Foundation; strengthen youth dialogue; cooperate to combat discrimination, racism and xenophobia and enhance the role of the media for the development of intercultural dialogue.⁸²

The examination of the conclusions of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meetings has shown us the significant shift that took place on the discussions and approaches regarding the functioning of the Third Basket and the increasing number of

⁸¹ Ibid., p.3

⁸² *Five Year Work Programme*, Euro-Mediterranean Summit 2005 - Barcelona, 27 and 28 November 2005, p.5,6

initiatives and activities that has emerged following the terrorist attacks of September 11, and the environment of anxiety and urgency it has generated. There is a clear change in the amount of discussions held in the second half of the 10 years of Barcelona Process related to the Third Basket, with high emphasis put on the avoidance of a clash of societies, cultures or civilisations that has been increasingly speculated. It seems that preceding the events of September 11, the main problem regarding this issue has been the lack of political will, interest and initiative, with the Third Basket being overshadowed by the First and the Second Baskets of the Partnership. This situation can be examined in the vagueness and the superficiality of the language being used while underlining the importance of the Third Basket and outlining the concepts and issues and how they need to be handled. Although in the period following September 11 there emerged an increased discussion over the future and the potential of the Third Basket, one can sense that this emerging political and social will towards the issue of intercultural dialogue has been motivated by the feeling of mistrust and fear which began to be emphasised ever-more frequently in the region. As we will discuss in the third chapter, this situation highlights the discussions over the politicisation and securitisation of the intercultural dialogue.

CHAPTER 2

THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN FOUNDATION AND THE CONCEPT OF 'INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE'

As we have seen in the previous chapter, in line with the increasing activity within the Third Basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and as a response to the need for an institutional framework organising these activities, a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures has been established.

In this chapter I will be examining the objectives, the structure and the activities of the Foundation, with particular focus on the report of the High Level Advisory Group set up by the former President of the Commission, Mr. Romano Prodi, which emerges as the main document establishing the basis for the Foundation and how intercultural dialogue has to be operated within this framework. I will then have a brief focus on the Rabat Commitment which is significant as it reflects the approaches outside the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, regarding intercultural dialogue. Finally I will be referring to the observations and recommendations of Dr. Traugott Schoefthaler, the President of the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures to set the basis for the discussions and criticism that will be analysed in the following chapter.

2.1 The Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures

2.1.1 The Mission and Objectives

The Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, as frequently mentioned before, is the first common institution jointly established and financed by all 35 members of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership countries. Situated in Alexandria, the Anna Lindh Foundation is also the first institution of its kind to be established outside the EU. This reflects the commitment of all parties to respect and fulfil the legacy of Anna Lindh, the late foreign minister of Sweden. It was her who advocated mutual comprehension between people and among peoples of different traditions, cultures and religions. Set as an intercultural cooperation tool between the EU and its partners in the southern Mediterranean region, it is aiming to become the most effective and visible instrument to fulfil the mission of the Barcelona Process on human and cultural cooperation.

The mission and objectives of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, as pointed out in the statute of the Foundation in the previous chapter, are to identify, develop and promote areas of cultural convergence between the countries and peoples of the Mediterranean, particularly with the aim of avoiding stereotypes, as well as holding a close and regular dialogue between the cultural circles often neglected by all exchanges within the diplomatic and cultural spheres. The Foundation is also to serve as a catalyst for promoting exchanges,

cooperation and mobility between people, with a particular focus on the youth and activities targeted for them.⁸³

2.1.2 The Network of the Foundation

As agreed, all this work aimed towards the achievement of these objectives is to be executed through a ‘network of networks’, which may be regarded as a group of organizations enshrined in civil societies of the countries of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, committed to make mutual respect and understanding in the Mediterranean region a reality. The National Networks aim to reflect the diversity of their own civil societies and are invited to associate partners involved in the thematic fields of the Anna Lindh Foundation such as international/cultural relations, heritage, religion, human rights, democracy and community development, arts, youth and education, gender, environment and sustainable development, and the media. Each government of the 35 member states of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has appointed an organization or institution working at the national level to head the National Network.

The Turkish network is headed the by the ‘Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (Istanbul Kültür Sanat Vakfi - IKSIV)’, which is a non-governmental organisation focusing on arts, heritage and international cultural relations through famous organisations and events such as the International Istanbul Film Festival, the

⁸³ *Euro-Mediterranean Foundation For A Dialogue Of Cultures*, Partneriat Euromed, Doc. De Séance No: 57/03 Rev2, 12.11.2003

International Istanbul Music and Jazz Festivals alongside the internationally acclaimed Istanbul Biennial held once every two years. Apart from the IFCA, the Turkish network consists of 10 non-governmental or private non-profit foundations and institutions. The ‘AFS Intercultural Programs (Türk Kültür Vakfı)’ provides intercultural learning opportunities, helping people to develop the knowledge, skills and understanding needed to create a more just and peaceful world. ‘Akbank Sanat’ has a great variety of cultural activities including Jazz Festival and Chamber Orchestra Concerts. ‘Borusan Culture and Art (Borusan Kültür Sanat)’ aims to contribute to ensuring that music, particularly polyphonic music, is appreciated by wider audiences in Turkey and to raise cultural awareness, supporting young Turkish artists. ‘The Cultural Awareness Foundation (Kültür Bilincini Geliştirme Vakfı)’ works to promote social awareness and sensitivity for protection and preservation of historical, cultural and natural heritage and assets of Turkey, and to help younger generations understand and assimilate such heritage. Its main areas of interest are history, archaeology, fine arts, and travel culture. ‘The Open Society Institute (Açık Toplum Enstitüsü)’ supports the Turkish society, academics and NGOs in their efforts towards achieving a democratic and an open society in Turkey. ‘The Platform Garanti Contemporary Art Centre (Platform Garanti Güncel Sanat Merkezi)’ acts as a dynamic catalyst for the dissemination, research and practice of contemporary art in Istanbul, Turkey and the region. It is a meeting point for exchange between contemporary artists, curators and critics. Sabancı University Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences and the Sabancı University Performing Arts Centre aim to organize activities through which art appreciators of all ages and from all walks of life can interact with the arts, as well as

to become a prestigious performing arts centre renown for the quality of its national and international performing artists and groups. ‘The Santral Istanbul – Museum of Contemporary Arts and Culture Centre’ is a part of the Istanbul Bilgi University and aims to create international public arts, cultural and educational facilities, to attract the diverse and multifaceted artistic and cultural energies, ideas and work from regions such as the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia and to network these artistic energies across the globe. Finally the ‘Third Sector Foundation of Turkey (TUSEV – Türkiye Üçüncü Sektör Vakfı)’ works to develop the human, financial and technical capacity and promote a legally and fiscally enabling environment for non-profit organisations.⁸⁴

The role of these heads of Networks is significant as they are to gather organizations or institutions actively interested in promoting dialogue between Euro-Mediterranean cultures as parts of the Anna Lindh Foundation. In this way, the Heads of Networks give the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership a more visual presence at both the national and international levels. Through coordination of the Heads, members of the National Networks are invited to contribute to the identification and implementation of the activities of the Anna Lindh Foundation. The members also enable the circulation of information and knowledge within networks. By this, cooperation on concrete programmes and projects among people across frontiers is encouraged through the creation of strong linkages among civil society organizations all over the Euro-Mediterranean Partner countries. As noted by Dr. Muhyiedden Touq,

⁸⁴ *Official website of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures – <http://www.euromedalex.org>*

the President of the Anna Lindh Foundation Board of Governors, 34 out of 35 countries have set up a National Network with at least 5 members and as of today, the Anna Lindh Foundation National Networks have 997 members.⁸⁵

2.1.3 The Events and the Activities

Acting in accordance with the international consensus on cultural diversity being as essential for humankind as is bio-diversity for nature, the Foundation aims to mould this approach into proposals for Euro-Mediterranean co-operation, aiming at ensuring respect for diversity and pluralism and promoting tolerance between different groups in society.

The main concern during the programming of the activities is the need to avoid the duplication of efforts, as well as acting in close cooperation and enhancing the capacities and potentials of existing activities. All the activities that are to take place under the umbrella of the Anna Lindh Foundation have to involve at least two EU and two Euro-Med partner countries. Education, culture, science and communication, human rights, sustainable development, gender and youth are the main fields of action. The most important means to reach to the civil societies and the youth in particular are education and use of IT and other media.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Dr. Muhyiedden Touq, *'Intercultural Dialogue across the Mediterranean – The Role of the Anna Lindh Foundation and its Networks'*, p.1,2

⁸⁶ Dr. Traugott Schoefthaler, *'The First Steps of Establishing the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures'*, p.4

The three years work programme of the Foundation covering the period 2005 - 2007 has listed out six programmes to receive specific focus. The first one of these programmes is titled “Our Common Future” and it aims at reaching out to the largest possible number of young people, inviting them to share experiences and work together without frontiers. The flagship project of this programme is the ‘*Euro-Mediterranean Popular Music Project (“Discotheque Project”)*’ which is to bring together via national surveys of workshops, a collection of popular music selected by the youth and work towards making the acquisition of these products easier through various means. The second project of the programme is the ‘*Euro-Mediterranean school magazines project*’, focusing on the twinning of schools having school magazines or yearbooks, co-production of articles on selected themes such as sustainable development and cultural diversity/heritage, capacity-building for secondary school student journalists and teachers. The third project is the ‘*Euro-Mediterranean schools network*’ which is to exist as an inter-regional structure within existing international school networks such as UNESCO Associated Schools and Global Environmental Youth Initiative. Projects such as Mondialogo, Join Multimedia, NetD@ys, e-schola are invited to participate in this project. The fourth and the final project of the programme is the ‘*Euro-Mediterranean Teacher-Training Programme*’, which will operate in cooperation with the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization and the Council of Europe.⁸⁷

⁸⁷ ‘*Three Years Programme of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue Between Cultures 2005-2007*’, Partneriat Euromed, Doc. De Séance No: 137/04, p.4,5

The second programme listed in the three years programme is titled “Opportunities for Multiperspectivity” and it is to provide educational content to promote a lifetime of learning among the young people by translating universal values such as non-discrimination, justice and tolerance into a more accessible language within more attractive learning and teaching resources. The flagship project of this programme aims to establish a *‘Multilingual Education Server’* providing knowledge – in the languages of English, French and Arabic – related to the issues of human rights, democratic citizenship and sustainable development, in co-operation with existing projects. The second project is the *‘Euro-Mediterranean programme for comparative research on school text-books and curricula’* which is to take place via workshops, aiming at elaboration of proposals for educational planners, teachers and textbook authors as well as a compilation of good practice teaching and learning materials. The third and the last project of the Multiperspectivity programme is the *‘Culture of Religions programme’* which is intended to be a survey of existing curricula and textbooks on education about religious pluralism, and publication of a good practice manual.⁸⁸

“Our Creative Diversity” is the third title bringing together projects inspired by Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development chaired by former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (1995) and the UNDP 2004 Human Development Report. The flagship project of the Diversity Programme is *‘Contemporary Creation’*, introducing a Euro-Mediterranean component in workshops

⁸⁸ Ibid, p.5,6

on artistic creation in fields such as theatre, music, modern dance and arts. It will also work towards enabling mobility schemes and travel grants for young performing artists and creators. Another component of the Diversity Programme is titled '*EuroMed Heritage in Young Hands*'. It will prepare educational materials related to the Euromed Heritage programme in order to make the work of the programme more accessible to formal and out-of school education. While the '*Dialogue between Cultures in the Classroom*' programme will deal with the preparation of educational tools on cultural diversity, the '*Euro-Mediterranean Interdisciplinary Cultural Diversity Programme*' will be working towards establishing a Euro-Mediterranean component into ongoing cultural research projects that are aiming to introduce the cultural diversity of a certain Euromed partner to other countries or regions. The programme is also granted the sponsorship of the Foundation to certain workshops and events promoting cooperation between Euro-Mediterranean networks and those working in cultural diversity projects.⁸⁹

The fourth title of the three year work programme is The Science without Frontiers Programme, giving particular attention to enhancing the use of existing digital networks such as GEANT broadband communication network to involve the Southern Mediterranean partners as well. The flagship project for achieving this goal is the launching of the '*Braudel-Ibn Khaldoun Higher Education Network*' in accordance with the proposal of the High Level Advisory Group in December 2003. There will also be work towards providing travel grants for students and scientists from the Euro-

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.6

Med developing countries, promoting the multiplication of cooperative trans-border research groups in the Euro-Mediterranean region and contributing to the debate on the future of the European Commission Framework Programme. Another programme integral to the Science without Frontiers Programme is the '*EuroMed Model University Programme*' which was launched with the World University Service involving simulations of Euro-Med Foreign Ministers Conferences by university students and various forums organized by humanities students related to the dialogue between cultures.⁹⁰

The fifth programme listed is titled the "Euro-Mediterranean Information Society", through which the Foundation is to co-organize or grant sponsorships to workshops on civil society participation in the modernisation of educational, cultural, science and information policies. The '*Educational and Cultural Journalism Programme*' is aiming to link the Euro-Mediterranean school magazines network with media partners and journalist schools. There will also be the Anna Lindh Award for educational and cultural journalism established in cooperation with the media partners. A Euro-Mediterranean training programme for young journalists will be incorporated to the existing journalism schools together with the information and communication programme of the European Commission.⁹¹

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.6,7

⁹¹ Ibid., p.7

The sixth and the final component of the three year programme of the Foundation is titled the “Empowerment of Women” and it will be working in cooperation with international women networks and women universities or relevant university programmes existing in the Euro-Mediterranean area.⁹²

2.2 The concept of ‘Dialogue between Cultures

2.2.1 Report of the High Level Advisory Group

As mentioned in the previous chapter, The High Level Advisory Group (also known as Groups des Sages) was set up by the Commission President Romano Prodi who was convinced by the fact that despite its inevitability, conflict is not the predestined fate of the Euro-Mediterranean world. The group examined the idea of a dialogue between peoples and cultures in a broader sense, taking into account the economic globalization, enlargement of the EU, presence of immigrant communities and the question marks over identity affected by the undeniable changes occurring on both sides of the Mediterranean. The group declared that their work is not influenced by a desire to prevent a hypothetical clash of civilisations, but instead, by the fact that the complementary aspects of the two sides of the Mediterranean will be integrated into each other’s daily lives within the next 50 years. The aim of the Group is to specify the factors for the creation of the conditions favourable to a combination of

⁹² Ibid., p.8

cultural and religious diversity, freedom of conscience and the neutrality of the public realm.

Regarding the ways to forge an intercultural dialogue, the report states its concern to develop the perception and the feeling itself of a shared destiny between the North and the South of the Mediterranean, in order to make a Euro-Mediterranean area holding together and making sense a reality. It is also noted that mutual awareness and understanding should become also become a reality among the societies and people alongside the states and institutions.⁹³ If not, the already active forces in the region – mutual perceptions and memories used for dominating one other, generating feelings of vengeance or introversion; globalisation weakening the identities, especially in poor countries; increasing migration creating burden on host societies, impact of unresolved conflicts; impact of the ageing population and the eastward enlargement on Europe; differences between the North and the South in terms of development, power, status of individuals and civil rights – will continue to combine ever-more effectively in a negative manner.⁹⁴ Instead, since the main aim of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to create an inter-regional community embracing differences and respecting origins, expressing a will to live together, the intercultural dialogue must be given an enhanced status and role within the Partnership and the Neighbourhood Policy.

⁹³ Report of the High Level Advisory Group, p.20

⁹⁴ Ibid., p.20,21

The Third Chapter and the intercultural dialogue in particular ‘can no longer be a secondary element’ of the Barcelona Process and that in a process in which the relations are reshaped, a true Euro-Mediterranean Parliament with real powers of initiative and oversight is mandatory. In order to achieve that, a set of fundamental principles is offered, beginning with ‘respect for the Other’ as a must for any type of cultural interchange, ‘equality at all levels’ from states to the individuals, ‘solidarity’ and finally ‘knowledge’ as the engine for dialogue and curiosity about the Other.⁹⁵ After establishing the main principles, the report underlines the importance of five further principles for action towards change. Noting that a dialogue between ‘civilisations’ is usually an unequal one, the principle of ‘equity’ developing and interpreting the shared values of civilisations is regarded vital. Principles of ‘co-ownership’, ‘transversality’, ‘cross-fertilisation’ and ‘cooperation’ are the other conditions named valuable in the report.⁹⁶

The report refers to successful functioning of the triangular structure of the EU and suggests that a similar institutional structure could be adapted to the Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations in order for it to gain more strength and prominence within the Barcelona Process: a Euro-Med Council for culture and education a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly with a Committee on intercultural dialogue and thirdly the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, working together with the Assembly

⁹⁵ Ibid., p.22

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.23

on bringing the violations of the fundamental principles to attention, and with the Council on drawing up a programme of priorities and assessing cultural programmes.⁹⁷

In line with the immediate need to engage in renewed dialogue, an effective dialogue must “constitute a model capable of performing convincingly and delivering results that, if not measurable in the short term, are at least apparent in the long run.”⁹⁸ It is important that the contribution of the dialogue has a lasting nature and the success of this contribution, according to the report, depends on establishing the conditions for dialogue – for which education is the most important tool, the daily operation of the dialogue – practiced as a genuine exchange between people and the projects, and consolidating, supporting and publicising the process – in which the media plays an important role. All these factors are to be supported by a functional decision-making framework, in which the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation has an important role in acting as driving force in issues out of the responsibility of public authorities.⁹⁹

The importance of education as a pivotal instrument of the intercultural dialogue is underlined, by stating that limited education would eventually lead to a lack of participants who are incapable of receiving or transmitting the dialogue, and to limited dialogue between members of closed elite and numerous advisory groups producing no real impact. Education is regarded crucial also in the religious aspect of the dialogue as

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.24

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.27

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.27,28

a proper understanding of a religion requires mutual knowledge and empathy. Underlining the start of the revelation of the Holy Qura'n with the command 'Learn'; "within the inter-faith context, the north is requested to learn more about Islam and to reshape its attitudes accordingly" and "the Muslims are requested to have their spirituality, their tolerance and other values of their faith get manifested more clearly."¹⁰⁰ The key areas of action within the field of education are 'teacher training', 'language learning', 'movement and communication' and 'common knowledge' and as we could see in the earlier parts of this chapter, the programmes in Three Year Programme of the Anna Lindh Foundation reflects the importance of education and the fields of action required to enhance its effect suggested and proposed in the High Level Advisory Report.¹⁰¹

Another key factor of the intercultural dialogue for it to have a lasting nature, as mentioned before, is the vital role of the media. In the report, to define this vital role, it is noted that the content of the "information, its accuracy and the relative weight given to different aspects of the news shape public opinion and will, to a large extent, determine the success or failure of a venture as ambitious as the cultural dialogue."¹⁰² The not only crucial but also difficult role of the media requires the support of the public authorities in providing enhanced input to the future of the media by encouraging schools of journalism, film academies and colleges in developing special

¹⁰⁰ *Intercultural Dialogue across the Mediterranean* – Speech of Ms. Salwa Saniora Baassiri, Lebanese National Commission for UNESCO', p.2

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.28-31

¹⁰² Ibid., p.34

courses on cultural diversity, preparing the public for the dialogue and strengthening critical thought and critical examination. Another requirement is the establishment of support programmes targeted for the publishing, film, and television sectors specializing in popularising science, both socially and academically. The fulfilment of the responsibilities of the television stations in providing education and popularising science through documentaries is also encouraged. The ongoing Euromed Audiovisual Programme already deals with such issues and the proposed support programmes could be incorporated in it. It is also proposed in the report that the Commission should provide support the local channels in the South and encourage the creation of ‘neighbourhood channels’ through the Euromed Audiovisual Programme.¹⁰³

Admitting that the proposals put forward are more or less ambitious, the report underlines their realistic nature and points that they require, targeted and limited action as this would improve the effectiveness of the dialogue, in the light of the fact that quantity act against quality. When the point at which the projects have been launched, fine-tuned and completed in the medium to long term is reached, the matter of evaluating the results arises and underlining the difficulties of measuring something like the impact of a dialogue, the report proposes an ‘Euro-Mediterranean cultural barometer’, which in the form of an opinion poll carried out once every two years, measures the collective mutual perceptions in four European countries – one in Northern Europe, one with a large immigrant population, one bordering the Mediterranean and one new EU Member State – and several countries from the

¹⁰³ Ibid., p.36

southern and eastern Mediterranean. It is suggested that the results of these polls could be used by the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation as a tool for producing a “social survey based on a detailed analysis of values and attitudes.”¹⁰⁴

2.2.2 The Rabat Commitment

An event titled “Conference on Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and Civilisations through Concrete and Sustained Initiatives” brought together experts in various fields in Rabat, Morocco in June 2005. Organised under the patronage of the King of Morocco, the significance of the event was that it was co-sponsored by six organisations, namely UNESCO, Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (ISESCO), Arab League Education, Culture and Scientific Organization (ALESCO), the Danish Centre for Culture and Development and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures, with the Council of Europe participating as an observer.

The representatives of all these organizations have underlined their commitment to the success of the intercultural dialogue by reporting their individual and joint initiatives. The ISESCO pointed the need that intercultural dialogue should serve and be integrated to the process of sustainable development and stated that a profound knowledge of history and mutual values would in turn form the basis of mutual respect and recognition of cultural and civilisational diversity, bearing in mind that “inter-

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.40

civilisational dialogue should not be the monopoly of a single organization nor of an academic; cultural or political institution.”¹⁰⁵ The ALESCO underlined the importance of intercultural dialogue at undermining the clash of civilisations theory. It was stated that the role of education in teaching co-existence through textbooks, curricula and the teaching of foreign languages is highly important. UNESCO representative expressed the need to bridge theoretical approaches to dialogue; with the involvement of a broader range of participants, beyond the political and administrative representations, pointing that refined approaches to the issue will lead to a more direct dialogue between peoples of the region. The main concern of the OIC is the rising danger of Islamophobia and the representative noted the set up of an observatory, monitoring and documenting cases related to this important cause of concern. The Danish Centre for Culture and Development called for a more concrete and sustained action in the fields of media, culture and education, pointing that the recent initiatives unfortunately keep the issue at more philosophical levels. Finally the speaking for the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Executive Director Dr. Traugott Shoefthaler called for “engaging youth, for a dynamic understanding of universal values in the spirit of common standards to be achieved and for a particular focus on education.”¹⁰⁶

Conducting work on three separate workshops related to the improvement of the intercultural dialogue, firstly the Conference pointed out its recommendations in the field of education. Calling for curriculum renewal and improvements in the content,

¹⁰⁵ *‘Conclusions and Recommendations of the Rabat Conference’*, p.1

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p.1,2

methodology, teacher education and learning processes, as well as a textbook revision and a production of new educational materials, the participants underlined the importance of avoiding oversimplifications and increasing the awareness on cultural diversity. Integration of intercultural learning in pre-school education, preliminary education, informal education and extra-curricular activities is also recommended. Regarding religion, it was underlined that respect for differences and highlighting of shared religious values ethical concerns is essential. Regarding culture, it was noted that key concepts need to be revisited by competent organisations and academic scholars in order arrive at definitions that can genuinely form a basis to further the dialogue. The reducing of cultural handicaps between teachers and students was regarded vital in order to provide an environment suitable for the elimination of ignorance, stereotypes and rejection of the Other. The final workshop on communication brought out the recognition of the fact that “education requires communication, and communication always contains educative elements.” The need for media projects focusing on combating ignorance between the West and the Islamic world and creating mutual confidence and trust through dialogue was expressed. Alongside underlining the importance of the full exploit of the potential of Internet, it was pointed that the Arab media should be encouraged to reflect its regional diversities and to serve all segments of its community.¹⁰⁷

Although the messages and the recommendations generated in the Rabat Conference echoes the recommendations of the High Level Advisory Group, it seems

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., p.3-7

that nothing new and original has been said in terms of producing a significant contribution to the intercultural dialogue. One might also notice that, the use of the term ‘inter-civilisational dialogue’, especially by the participants of the Islamic world, does not comply with the avoidance of the usage of this term within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and it suggests an approach in line with Huntington’s ‘civilisational logic’, which we will focus on further within this chapter.

2.2.3 Analysis from Within

The Executive Director of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures, Dr. Traugott Schoefthaler outlined the shortcomings of the dialogue between cultures, presenting an analysis of the situation following the Danish cartoon crisis and expressed his views on the future of the project in his speech at a forum in Finland in April 2004.¹⁰⁸

Referring to the last two decades in which the dialogue between cultures and civilisations has increased in terms of events and initiatives, as lost decades, he stated that the majority of the efforts were examples of a somewhat limited dialogue, remaining within the civilisations logic of Huntington. Speaking in the light of the then recent cultural crisis related to the cartoon issue, Dr. Schoefthaler pointed out that the reference of many Western leaders to human rights and the freedom of expression and highlighting them as “Western/European values” has been unfortunate as these

¹⁰⁸ Dr. Traugott Schoefthaler, *What Went Wrong With the Dialogue Between Cultures?*, Partneriat Euromed, Doc. De Séance No: 67/06

statements fell short of the consensus reached at the United Nations Conference in Vienna in 1993 – regarding all human rights as forming an indivisible whole – and appeared as a selective use of human rights as a political instrument which is reminiscent of the rhetoric Cold War era. He points out that Europe should refrain from referring to “European values” while trying to communicate with other regions, and that the long established notion of human rights has not yet become an integral part of intercultural relations. Underlining the need to develop a ‘rights-based understanding of culture’, the Executive director calls for a similar understanding evident in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in which there is no reference to any cultural or religious tradition – and thus establishing a common language for common or universal values. From this point Dr. Schoefthaler argues that there is now a need for a common language regarding cultural differences. He points out that a “culturally sensitive language needs to avoid schematic concepts such as the popular distinction between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’” and calls for an end to the use of the term ‘The Other’ as it gives way and prepares implications to a mentality of collective identities on individuals.¹⁰⁹ The executive director presents a list of the elements of common language developed in the past decade of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and underlines five points as particularly crucial:

- (1) Cultural diversity between as well as within countries is as essential for humankind as biodiversity is for nature. Cultural differences are not a threat but a key factor of quality of life.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.6

- (2) The right to be different is a core element of a rights-based understanding of culture. The individual human being, as cultural actor, as learner, as communicator, as bearer of cultural diversity, is at the centre of better understanding of culture.
- (3) Overlap between cognitive and emotional elements of intercultural relations is the rule and not the exception. Historical and biographic, individual and collective processes of attaching value judgements to cultural differences need to be addressed.
- (4) Deconstructing self-referential systems of belief and knowledge is essential. Religious truth that is believed eternal can only be compromised by an attempt to make it more convincing with evidence from scientific truth that is changing every day with more knowledge.
- (5) Freedom of opinion or any other belief is not only a basic human right; it is intrinsic to any human understanding of religion. Enforcing belief would be a contradiction itself, as much as imposing values “comes down in the end to negating them.”¹¹⁰

Dr. Schoefthaler says that it is more than evident that the two decades of intercultural dialogue has not only failed to prevent a cultural crisis, but also has been unable to figure out how cope with such a situation.¹¹¹ He points that the recent “crisis is rooted in accumulated frustration which is specific to the Muslim world.”¹¹² What he means is that the 1.2 billion Muslims around the world believe that the Islam is less respected and protected than other religions.

Dr. Schoefthaler also refers to the new initiatives, dealing with intercultural relations. The “Alliance of Civilisations” proposed in the UN by Spain and Turkey is

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.7,8

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.2,3

¹¹² Ibid., p.4

to include a specific feature on Islam. The Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisations of the Arab League and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference, the ALESCO and the ISESCO, have initiated an elaboration of the establishment of principles towards a balanced dialogue, based on rational, scientific and self-critical methods. The strategy on democratic management of diversity, a programme of cooperation approved by the Council of Europe, and most importantly, the works of the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures for a re-launch of the intercultural dialogue are underlined in the speech.¹¹³ Within the context of cooperation with other ongoing and new initiatives, in the draft strategy and action plan for re-launching the Dialogue between Cultures, it is underlined that the events held under the umbrella of intercultural dialogue should no more be representative events and instead become “inter-institutional, with the objective of creating synergies and common platforms of action”¹¹⁴ following the example of the Rabat Commitment, which we talked about previously, bringing together the ALESCO, ISESCO, OIC, UNESCO, Council of Europe, DCCD and the Anna Lindh Foundation.

Dr Schoefthaler’s speech was well received by the Euro-Med Non-governmental Platform too. In their contribution on the Dialogue Strategy, it can be noted that they share his criticisms regarding previous attempts of dialogue based on collective identities and agree that core values of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be stressed within the intercultural dialogue. The participants of the platform

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ ‘Draft strategy and action plan for re-launching the Dialogue between Cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Region’, Partneriat Euromed, Doc. De Séance No: 22/06, p.2

underline the necessity of mutual respect as a basis for all kinds of dialogue, stressing however that there is clearly a lack of respect between the communities which became evident following the so called ‘Cartoon Crisis’. The reaction Islamic world gave to the cartoons published in a Danish newspaper and depicted Prophet Mohammed in inappropriate personifications, manifested itself as intense and at times violent protests. The concerns of the Islamic community regarding the European lack of respect to a religion and a culture lie at the heart of this call for mutual respect. However, the statements made by some European leaders which regarded the matter as an issue of human rights and freedom of speech seemed to serve to the politicization of the whole issue. The members of the non-governmental platform raise their concerns on this matter by stating that the crisis faced is not a cultural but

an in depth political crisis which marginalises the democrats or tries to control them and enclose them within well-stereotyped frames of what democracy should be or should not be, which marginalises and threatens freedom of thought, of consciousness, of expression and creation (...) an in depth crisis where traditional schemes are being attacked/deconstructed through symbolic violence, and this has consequences on social links.¹¹⁵

Having set out the structure, the functions and the projects of the Anna Lindh Foundation set out in its Three Years Programme, in this chapter, I have focused on the report of the High Level Advisory Group, in terms of its content related to intercultural dialogue, and the recommendations of the Rabat Commitment – significant as it brought the main international and regional organisations and institutions both within and outside the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership together – in

¹¹⁵ G. G. Deschaumes, ‘*Contribution by the EuroMed Non-governmental Platform to the Debate on the Dialogue Strategy*’

order to set the background to the comments made by those who are working within this field concerning the past, the present and the future of the dialogue. Then, I outlined the views, discussions and analyses taking place within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, focusing particularly on the self-critical and advisory approaches put forward by the members of the Foundation and other platforms within the Third Basket of the Partnership in order to set the grounds for the academic commentary and criticism regarding intercultural dialogue, which I will be presenting in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

**ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM REGARDING ‘INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE’
WITHIN THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN PARTNERSHIP**

In this part of the study, I will be pointing out the main arguments dealing with the structure and the operation of the activities within the Third Basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the intercultural dialogue. The main issues I will be dealing with are the concerns over the possible securitisation of the dialogue through increased political aspects injected into the framework of the intercultural dialogue, as well as the problem of cultural representation which can be linked to the politicisation of the process and the questions over the Civil Society participation. I will also be focusing on the definition of dialogue and how it has been manifesting itself within the Euro-Mediterranean relations and the role of the Media within this framework.

As it is a significant part of many discussions, analysis and criticisms regarding the intercultural dialogue taking place underneath the umbrella of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it will be suitable at this point to outline how the infamous theory of Samuel Huntington and his ‘civilisations logic’ manifests itself within the process. Regarding civilisations as the largest grouping underneath the broad grouping of the human race he describes civilisation as “the values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached

primary importance”¹¹⁶ and sees religion as the defining factor to for a given society to belong in a certain civilisation. As civilisations are cultural in nature, they do not have any clearly defined boundaries and are dynamic and continuous. Huntington divides the world today into eight distinct civilisations, namely the Western, the Islamic, the Orthodox, the Sinic, the Japanese, the African, the Hindu, the Buddhist and the Latin American. Civilisational groupings along these lines are believed to determine most of the world’s international politics in the future. It is argued that the most serious conflicts in the world will be those that take place along the borders of civilisations and these conflicts will be the ones that are likely to evolve into a global war. According to Huntington, the most common are for a civilisational war is the Islamic realm, as he argues that there already many wars taking place between the Muslims and their neighbours. The fact that Islamic civilisation is lacking a core, dominating state, makes it vulnerable to the risk and possible spreading of potential conflicts. Huntington argues that the trends of global conflict after the end of the Cold War are mainly surfacing along these civilisational lines and sites the wars that took place following the break up of Yugoslavia, the military conflict in Chechnya, India and Pakistan as evidences of inter-civilisational conflicts. The perception of the West that the Western civilisation is universal in its ideals and values is criticised as the insistence on democratisation and the universal norms in accordance with the self-perceived superiority and universality will only serve as an offensive attitude within the perspective of other civilisations.

¹¹⁶ S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 1996

3.1 The meaning of ‘dialogue’ and ‘intercultural dialogue’ and its manifestation within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

It is evident that the ‘civilisations logic’ has now been embedded within the mentalities of the people. As Del Sarto notes, “in public debates and in the media, the term ‘Islamic world’ is often used as an obvious, and unquestioned, concept generally expressing difference to an equally unchallenged image of ‘the West’”.¹¹⁷ The way intercultural dialogue is conceptualised is built upon what could be named as the ‘civilisations paradigm’.

The new trend in international relations, dealing with the organisation of public events focusing on intercultural and inter-civilisational dialogue can be regarded as a phenomenon gaining prominence following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and implicitly suggests an interpretation of international politics along lines of two potentially conflicting and different civilisations among politicians, academicians and the media. This approach also puts civilisations as the main agents in international politics and implies that cultures and civilisations are capable of engaging in a dialogue – in the sense of a conversation – as entities. Although Huntington asserts in his writings that states are still the most important actors in world politics, his prophecies regarding a major clash and even a war to take place in the future to involve civilisations rather than states holds a certain amount of contradiction within itself. This civilisational

¹¹⁷ R. A. Del Sarto, ‘*Setting the (Cultural) Agenda: Concepts, Communities and Representation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations*’ in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.316

approach evident in most of the political and public debates underlines a departure from the state centred conceptualisation of international politics.¹¹⁸

One of the most significant discussions taking place around the idea of Intercultural dialogue is about the notion of dialogue itself. In her article related to this issue, Michelle Pace takes two important thinkers and theorists, namely Mikhail Bakhtin and Bruce Tuckman and argues for the significance of dialogue for Euro-Mediterranean relations through the works of these two scholars.

Pace points out that there are three conditions towards an effective use of the term dialogue. Firstly, a formal decision of the Committee and/or ministers to engage in a 'dialogue'; then a formal agreement with the partners concerned; and finally in addition to normal diplomatic relations, regular political contacts are required.¹¹⁹ In the Euro-Mediterranean context the main instrument for the governing of the relations is the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which achieves this through the respective Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements. The Partnership organises the Euro-Mediterranean relations through the frequently mentioned tri-pillar system, offering different forms of dialogue with political/security, financial and socio-cultural sections. In accordance with the 2004 Enlargement of the EU and the establishment of the new Neighbourhood Policy, the Barcelona Process has achieved a more intensive political dialogue enhanced through the Action Plans.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.316-318

¹¹⁹ M. Pace, *Imagining Co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Role of Dialogue*, in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.293

However, for a more theoretical and critical approach towards the dialogic relations in the Euro-Mediterranean region, Pace first of all focuses on the work Mikhail Bakhtin. The main focus of Bakhtin's theories is the concept of dialogue and that language expressing any form of speech or text always constitutes a dialogue. He regards dialogue as a human condition, an ethical imperative and as prerequisite for thinking. He focuses mainly on the social nature of dialogue, pointing at three elementary elements for a dialogue, namely a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a relation between the two.¹²⁰ The notion of dialogue, according to Bakhtin, is contrasted with the idea of monologue, an expression conducted by a single person or entity, producing unique meaning in its own speech; its speech coming from itself alone. Bakhtin points out two factors on which this way of thinking related to language is standing upon, namely the language as a system, and the individual who speaks it. According to Bakhtin, both factors lead to a monologic language, generated by a single, unified source.¹²¹ There are two main forces that operate when this language is used and in Bakhtinian terms they are the centripetal and the centrifugal forces. While the centripetal force is pushing things towards a central point, the centrifugal force pushes things away from a central point in all directions.

Within this logic, the monologic language, referred to as monologia, operates according to centripetal forces in which the speaker is pushing the elements of language and all the ways it is manifesting itself – such as journalistic, religious, political, economic, academic or personal – into a single form and thus converging into

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.294

¹²¹ Ibid.

a central point. Accordingly, “monologia is a system of norms, of one standard language, or an ‘official’ language, a standard language that everyone would have to speak.”

The alternative to monologia is heteroglossia, which implies a multiplicity of languages, different ways of expression, rhetoric and vocabulary. In the case of heteroglossia, instead of racing towards consensus, there takes place a pause for thinking and analysing of the meanings put forwards by the Other.¹²² According to Bakhtin in all dialogic interactions, both monologia and heteroglossia are taking effect and language transcends all individuals but at the same time it is shaped by the specific contents expressed by specific individuals, thus it is both anonymous and social at the same time. When a discussion of the Self and the Other is to take place in a dialogic fashion, the dialogue in question is executed in two separate levels:

The first degree of dialogue requires the unity of the Self. The dialogic process thus requires reconciliation with the Self before interaction with an Other. At the second level of dialogue, an acceptance of the Other in dialogue has to be in place.¹²³

As Pace puts it, while the colonizer is defining the colonized, the colonized is defining the colonizer as well. Regarding the Other as a mirror-image of the Self, shapes the societal codes that conducts the respective images and perceptions and the ways in

¹²² Ibid., p.295

¹²³ Ibid., p.296

which they are reshaped and put into practice.¹²⁴ Within the Euro-Mediterranean context, a good heteroglossic dialogue could be achieved through a language of democracy, which could be expressed in various lines of discussion and which would probably be regarded as a universal topic relating not only to the European but also to the Mediterranean partners to a great extent. A major role falls to Europe as it is obliged to combine the best of Europe with the best of the Mediterranean if it is seeking to use the influence of its colonial past on the proper functioning of the dialogue. As Pace points out, “a dialogic dialogue requires enlightenment beyond preconceived ideas of the Other. Different and mutually exclusive universalisms have to be reconciled in order to enter into a dialogue.”¹²⁵

The second theorist Pace refers to in her analysis is Bruce Tuckman and his forming, storming, norming and performing group development model. Tuckman points out four stages of group development. First of all, the ‘forming stage’ comprises of orientation, testing and dependence between the groups involved in interaction. At this initial stage the groups identify and test their boundaries and establish a dependency relationship with other members of the group. Pace links this to Bakhtin’s inter-action stage. Secondly, there appears a conflict and a phase of polarisation in which the parties behave in way that resists the group influence and task requirements and this is constitutes the ‘storming stage’. Then comes the ‘norming stage’ in which group cohesion takes place, overcoming the resistance. At this stage the groups feel

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.298

more comfortable in expressing their opinions, embodying the ability to grasp the importance of mutual understanding and empathy. Pace links this stage to Bakhtin's heteroglossia as group cohesion is achieved through a diversity of voices. Finally at the 'performing stage', the groups establish functional and flexible roles and are able to achieve a collective focus towards targeted tasks and work to fulfil them. The group structure is now firmly rooted and supports the group's performance. It is in this stage that, in Bakhtinian terms a 'fusion of horizons' is established through a mature level of interaction.¹²⁶

Within the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, the beginning of the forming phase can be regarded as the Treaty of Rome in 1957, in which a series of initiatives were designed to organise Europe's relations with its neighbours in the South. An important factor within this relationship is the colonial past of the region which created competitive cultures, inequality and subjugation of those outside Europe. A truly dialogic relationship within the region can only be achieved through a serious and critical confrontation with the role of colonialism, the responses of the colonised, neo-colonialism and its legacies. It can be argued that the EU and its Mediterranean partners share a common or interrelated history, which is one of the Bakhtinian conditions for a dialogic dialogue, however in terms of economy and social development, the Mediterranean partners and the Arab countries in particular are far from constituting a homogenous group. It can also be noted that the forming phase of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue is a process in which the partners test each other and

¹²⁶ Ibid., p.298-300

their boundaries through a dialogic interaction.¹²⁷ The storming phase, in which Bakhtin's centripetal forces emerge, is the phase in which differences and conflicts arise. Pace notes that, the civil society in the Mediterranean partner countries is underdeveloped and that the Arab organisations representing the civil societies within these countries have failed to play a significant role in the implementation of the Third Basket. Several programmes launched with the intention of fulfilling the high expectations of creating closer social, cultural and human links between peoples of the region have not led to any significant enhancement regarding human mobility in the South to North direction, and this is causing great discontent on the Mediterranean partners' side. Mobility is regarded as the key factor and a requirement to achieve a healthy and dynamic cultural relationship between two communities. Apart from the strict and discouraging visa regulations, the regular Western media references to undemocratic regimes, bad human rights records, interregional conflicts and violence and the unresolved economic challenges in Mediterranean countries are also matters of fierce discussion among the Euro-Mediterranean partners. Alongside these factors making up the centripetal forces in the relationship, interchanges taking place between the groups may lead to centrifugal forces to appear as well. References of Europe to democracy, free trade areas and closer ties between the peoples of the region – namely the three baskets of the Barcelona Process – are acting as catalysts to the whole regional interaction but at the same time, the Mediterranean partners are trying to have their own voices heard within the Partnership by making references to their diverse political systems, economic problems, barriers to mobility and increasing population

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.301

rates to justify a certain degree of difficulty in complying with the goals of the Partnership. As Pace puts it, the Bakhtinian style of Euro-Mediterranean dialogue “should aim for an orientation toward the interaction between the various languages of a speaker and the languages of a listener which may bring partners to the norming phase in their dialogic encounters.”¹²⁸ The norming phase in which group cohesion is established through a multiplicity of languages is manifested within the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue in the evaluations and recommendations put forward in the 2003 Arab Human Development Report of the UNDP and the 2004 Tunis Declaration of the Arab League. These two documents portrayed a self-critical and productive approach by the Arab community, in political and academic levels. It is underlined within these two documents that an improved economic development can be achieved in an educated Arab society through training of the young and large labour community. This is significant in the sense that the language used by the Arab counterparts are coinciding with the language Europe has been using to define the goals of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the intercultural dialogue in particular. This cohesion in languages and rhetoric, the firm stand of the partners in the joint ownership of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership process and the joint operations of the ministerial meetings together with the cooperation in the development of the Neighbourhood Policy are all factors identifying a norming phase which could be observed within the Euro-Mediterranean relations. Further evidence serving the norming phase can be put forward in the setting up of the Anna Lindh Foundation, which is in a significant way, the first common institution that flourished within the

¹²⁸ Ibid. p.305

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the setting up of the Euro-Mediterranean Civil Forum and the Euro-Mediterranean Non-governmental Platform. As Pace underlines,

the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly and the Anna Lindh Foundation, are newly created sites building on already existing signs for dialogue. They are workable instruments which have the potential for dialogic encounters between European and Mediterranean partners to flourish through equal participation under conditions of mutual recognition. Such initiatives offer the groundwork for (...) the implementation of the objectives of the EMP, that is, the performing phase.¹²⁹

The performing phase in which a fusion of horizons, in Bakhtinian terms, takes place could be achieved only if the EU moves away from monologia, that is if they refrain from continuously reflecting their own rhetoric regarding the partnership, and starts integrating the concerns of its Mediterranean partners to the shaping and execution of the dialogic relationship. Within this phase, the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly would act as instruments serving for an enhanced cross-cultural knowledge and mutual understanding, and thus achieve a heteroglossic dialogue. Through this dialogue, both Europe and its Mediterranean partners could express their concerns and messages in a way much more understandable by the Other. The diversity of voices in a truly dialogic relationship is the fundamental characteristic of heteroglossia. The recent Euro-Mediterranean initiatives have the potential to fulfil this imagined co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean dialogic relations.¹³⁰

¹²⁹ Ibid., p.307

¹³⁰ Ibid., p.308

Consequently, observing the development of the Euro-Mediterranean relations in a categorical way, we can say that although there has been quite a lot positive achievements regarding the Third Basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the collective desire to facilitate a true and effective intercultural dialogue, the relations between the EU and its Mediterranean partners seem to be revolving around the storming phase.

3.2 The issue of representation and agenda-setting regarding intercultural dialogue

As mentioned before, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 made a tremendous effect on all aspects of human life at a global scale, and the Euro-Mediterranean relations had its share of adjustments to do as well. The rise of the importance attributed to the issue of intercultural dialogue was also in line with the clash of civilisations discourse that gained huge prominence in the post-9/11, as dialogue was regarded as the most important tool to counter any such discourse. However, problems lie at the core of this approach too as trying to counter the ‘clash of civilisations’ discourse, there lies a significant risk of reproducing the same set of assumptions that characterise a civilisational conflict. As we have seen before, Huntington’s theory harbours the belief that there exists clear and distinct groups of cultures who are capable of interacting with each other in international issues and this is what the idea of intercultural dialogue essentially supports.

The problem that accompanies the idea of intercultural dialogue, according to Del Sarto, faces the same conceptual problems as Huntington's thesis. They both assume that cultural entities can be identified.¹³¹ Looking at the various initiatives that are underway in other organisations, we see that within the intercultural dialogue programme of UNESCO there are many meetings and conferences covering series of separate issues and bringing together several regions are being organised. As an organisation with a global character, the number regions and cultures it allows it interact with each other is quite significant. Council of Europe on the other hand, is concentrating mainly in cultural cooperation and promotes an understanding of intercultural dialogue which precedes the notions of state and religion. However, within the Euro-Mediterranean context, the categories of intercultural dialogue either tend to draw a boundary between the North and South, particularly between Europe and the Arab world or focus on a dialogue which is more inter-faith based attributing religion a great deal of significance and value.

If we have a closer look at what these different entities are composed of, we see that Europe and the West in general consists of very different political entities, in terms of administration, regime, regions and so on. The societies are also made up of many different cultures and sub-cultures. The same can be applied to the Arab world, although the existence of a common language makes it seem quite homogenous from outside. On the contrary, the content of the Arab world is quite heterogeneous, with

¹³¹ R. A. Del Sarto, *'Setting the (Cultural) Agenda: Concepts, Communities and Representation in Euro-Mediterranean Relations'* in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.318

multiplicity of Arab states rivalling each other. The seemingly unifying concept of religion is also evidently divisive with the existence of many different sects and practices of Islam and the ongoing struggle taking place between the supporters of fundamentalist, conservative and liberal lines of Islam.¹³²

It is evident that there are many different ways of interpreting the boundaries that are drawn between different cultural groups and the definitions of their similarities and differences. If want to divide the Euro-Mediterranean region into different cultures we are faced with a multiplicity of fractions. In terms of religion, we can identify three different cultures representing Christianity, Judaism and Islam. If we are to define culture in lines of secularism, this time we are faced with different groupings of states bringing the supporters of the secularist culture in France, Turkey, Morocco and Italy together. We might also draw a line between cultures of patriarchy and egalitarianism, not to mention the conservative, reactionary and progressive cultures. As a result, we see that “alternative definitions of ‘culture’ produce coalitions and alignments that cut across the easily assumed divide between ‘Islam’ and the ‘West’, as well as the ‘North-South’ dichotomy.”¹³³

This dichotomy becomes even more confusing when the issue of who shall represent which culture comes into question. Considering that each culture is to be represented by specific individuals, the definition of these cultures including the

¹³² Ibid., p.320

¹³³ Ibid.

features and the boundaries that define them also has to apply for those who are designated to speak on behalf of them. As noted the majority of the interaction within the intercultural dialogue takes place within the realm of politicians and religious leaders and this in turn further emphasises the West/Islam and Europe/Arab world dichotomy. It should be noted that a head of state or a government official would be unable to represent a culture, taking into account the situation of any given authoritarian state in which the voice of the state, in many cases, is completely different than the voice of its citizens. A political representation of a culture would also allow the governments to further define the meaning of culture according to their own values and interests. Articulated by concerns over internal politics and state policies, a governmental representation is inclined to speak for its own interests rather than representing its culture in a collective sense. It can also be argued that

in combination with the ‘civilisations paradigm’, the representation of ‘cultures’ by political actors within any intercultural dialogue also implies that states position themselves within a broader and culturally defined community of states, in defiance of both intra-state and inter-state divergences and differences¹³⁴

Within this framework, the representation of cultures by religious leaders also involves some difficulties as such representation turns a blind eye to the different sects and lines existing within each religion. Also, religious representation can be questioned on how reflective they are of the debates over the role of religion in public life in many countries in the Middle East but also in Europe too, and also on the role of the

¹³⁴ Ibid., p.321

secularist culture within the society. The final aspect of the issue of cultural representation relates to those groups that stand in between the above mentioned groups. As argued by Del Sarto, in “the context of the generally assumed cultural difference between the ‘West’ and ‘Islam’, which ‘culture’ would a Turkish head of state represent, for instance? And who would represent the millions of Muslim citizens of Europe?”¹³⁵ The significance of this issue of representation is that within the structure and functioning of the Euro-Mediterranean intercultural dialogue, agenda-setting is very much related to the definition of culture and its representatives and accordingly, political and religious representatives would have quite a different priority of issues to be handled and discussed.

A positive aspect within the context of agenda-setting lies in the recommendations of the High Level Advisory Group. The report, as covered earlier, departs from the political and religious oriented approach towards which issues are to be included in the process and adopts a broader concept of culture, embracing all the aspects existent within the daily lives of the people. The prioritising of education, mobility, youth and the media is therefore in line with this change in approach. Established mainly upon the principles and recommendations of the High Level Advisory Group, the Anna Lindh Foundation prioritizes these issues in line with an understanding of culture that embraces all aspects of human life, enabling an enhanced participation of civil society organisations as representatives and encouraging them to take part major roles in the intercultural dialogue. Through this, the Foundation draws

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.322

attention to issues much more relevant than the ones that had been tackled in the previous initiatives of intercultural dialogue. However, the recent structure of the foundation and the organisation of its activities does not fully enable it achieve a true and sincere ‘cultural’ dialogue as the main role of Foundation, at least in the initial stages, is co-ordinating the activities of the national networks rather than funding its own activities and events. As pointed out before, unfortunately the national networks are heavily influenced by the ministries they operate under, and the governments are able to select or filter which civil society and cultural institutions and organisations are to be included in the network, to a great extent. This carries the risk of politicisation of culture and makes it possible that the “government interests and hegemonic visions of ‘culture’, ‘cultures’, and their representatives, are likely to enter the EMP’s intercultural dialogue through the back-door.”¹³⁶

3.3 The question of Civil Society participation

As mentioned in the second chapter, there exists a significant amount of question marks regarding the definition of the Civil Society in the Mediterranean region and the frequently underlined importance of its participation within the process remains a blurred subject amid many discussions regarding the character of the civil society institutions, particularly of those functioning in the Mediterranean partner countries.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.325

Regarding what constitutes a civil society organisation participating in the political and social development of a country, we can say that any such organisation has to advocate tolerance and a rejection of violence as well as supporting democratic internal structures. There exists two approaches regarding the character of civil society, namely the 'dichotomous' and the 'integrative'. The dichotomous view of civil society suggests organisations that are completely independent of state with whom they engage in a conflictive relationship with their main concern being the undermining of the authoritarian regimes. The integrative view of civil society, on the other hand, suggests organisations which are part of the political system with a mission of both controlling the state and increasing the legitimacy of the regime through civic participation.¹³⁷

Within the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, it can be observed that the EU has not favoured engaging in relations with representatives of the dichotomous view of civil society that would potentially generate conflict between the EU and its Mediterranean partners. Thus, the main focus of attention has been the representatives of the integrative view. This is in line with the EU characteristic of supporting carefully controlled gradual political reform processes. It is known that non-governmental human rights organisations in the Mediterranean have experienced a dichotomous relationship with their respective regimes, in which they function as both

¹³⁷ A. Jünemann, 'From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership' in *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No.1, Spring 2002, p. 90

critical watchdogs and integrative mediators and thus, “using a mixed strategy of political pressure and professional consultancy.”¹³⁸

Although there seems to be a consensus over the importance of the civil society within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, there is a significant amount of reservation among the Mediterranean partner states that seem to have accepted the civil society dimension of the Partnership only because it was imposed upon by their European partners who promised them enhanced economic and financial cooperation. In line with the regime problem of the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, some governments insisted that a clause underlining that the civil society projects must be within the framework of national law must be included in the Barcelona Declaration. Also the regimes are suspicious of the cultural and social basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, because this encourages direct contacts with independent groups and non-governmental organisations between the two shores of the Mediterranean. Governments find it difficult to control and fear that flow of information will presage a wave of disaffection and potential dissidence.¹³⁹

Differences regarding the definition of civil society can be observed in the Mediterranean partner countries. Radical Islamic movements regard civil society initiatives as part of western civilisation and intrinsically corrupt, consequently leading to ‘westernisation’. Islamist thinkers in particular, tend to define the concept as a

¹³⁸ Ibid., p.91

¹³⁹ M. Giammusso, 'Civil Society Initiatives and Prospects of Economic Development: The Euro-Mediterranean Decentralized Co-operation Networks' in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.4, No.1, Spring 1999, p.47

‘citizen society’ which is based on primordial structures of society such as family or religion, however, the secular/intellectual communities in Europe and the Arab world refuse such a distinction between civil society and citizen society, as the primordial institutions are not based on the free and rational will of the participants. Thus the question of whether organisations with Islamist characters actually meet the theoretical categories used to define the civil society. In this line of thought, the EU has opted for not including primordial associations in its projects in order to avoid any potential conflicts with the secular civil society organisations and the partner governments such as Tunisia, Algeria and Turkey. The EU has also reduced the amount of inter-religious dialogue projects to a minimum as the secular governments in the partner countries expressed their concern over the possible legitimisation of Islamist groups who are persecuted in their home countries through EU-supported international dialogue projects. Thus, a majority of the participants in the programmes involving the civil society institutions tend to come from the secular sections of the societies.¹⁴⁰

The main institution of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, regarding the participation of the civil society is the Euromed Civil Forum which is a non-institutional initiative for coordination and debate among the civil society organisations of the region. The Civil Forums have been organised nearby the Euro-Mediterranean Meetings of Foreign Affairs Ministers and have provided the civil society of the region with an opportunity to meet and agree on recommendations to the

¹⁴⁰ A. Jünemann, *‘From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’* in *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No.1, Spring 2002, p. 92,93

governments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. However, so far the Forums have been too far away from the decision-making process to be effective in influencing policies and also been but too exposed to the political influence of the member states hosting its meetings to fulfil a critical and influential function. Another set back of the Civil Forum, and the role of the Civil Society in the Euro-Mediterranean space is the existence of the “North African ‘GONGOs’, organizations parading as NGOs but in reality linked to and controlled by governments” which undermines the essential aspect of independence of the Civil Society.¹⁴¹

3.4 The Role of the Media

The role of the media and the pivotal role it plays in communicating and promoting intercultural dialogue to the masses are deeply highlighted in the report of the High Level Advisory Group. As mentioned before the media is regarded extremely influential in the building of the necessary, urgent and unavoidable intercultural dialogue. The recent situation in the Euro-Mediterranean relations suggest that a cultural understanding is more needed than the economic and financial relations – at least in the initial stage – for the narrowing of the gap between the partners in the North and in the South. It is essential to point out at this stage that the level of communication has never in the course of history, been such close in all senses – verbally, visually or textually – and in the physical sense, the proximity of people to

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p.96

each other and the level of global movement has brought communication and interaction to a never-seen-before scale. Within the Euro-Mediterranean framework, regarding international movement and proximity, the issue of migration comes in to the picture in an ever so crucial manner. One of the main obstacles facing the intercultural dialogue is the existence of a large number of immigrants in Europe, coming from Muslim countries. Although the level of communication is at its highest level in recent years, it is an interesting fact that a majority of the communication existent in the Euro-Mediterranean region is rooted with “stereotypes, manipulated data and facts, lack of mutual trust, fear and hate, social isolation and exclusion, and pure ignorance of the other.”¹⁴²

When trying to evaluate the state and the role of the media in intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean region, it is essential to include not only Europe and the Southern Mediterranean partners but also the United States in our scope as it has an unique status thanks to its information and political sources, the more than significant presence in the region and the power of its media industry. The United States is the origin of the communicational conflict in the region to an extent, so if reparation of media relations is considered the United States should also be an integral part of the process.

The news images in the South are perceived as ‘Western’ in general, rather than ‘European’ as Western television monitored in the South is largely identified with the

¹⁴² J. Roy, *The role of the media in the north-south intercultural dialogue* in ‘Dialogue between peoples and cultures: actors in the dialogue’, p.109

United States. Although the values and messages broadcasted claim to have universal substance, they are mainly attributed to the United States, as the American networks such as CNN have become reference points not only in the Mediterranean region but in a global sense too. Such format of news broadcasting has become so popular that most national networks try to replicate the American model.

The independence of media and the quality of its content depends largely on budgetary concerns. The fact that American news sources have the budgetary resources to send specialised correspondents to conflict zones leads to many independent, small or medium-sized European newspapers to use the informative, analytical and opinion products offered by these sources.¹⁴³ In this sense one might say that the majority of the news content existent in the Euro-Mediterranean region is US-influences or originated. “Europe’s television message in Arab countries is non-existing, diffused, or partially identified with certain countries”¹⁴⁴ as in the case of BBC with its relatively higher level of achievement compared to other European news sources. Projects such as the Euronews, with its audience-friendly commentary in various languages and its mission of informing the public about the developments in the EU, has a limited effect as a possible lack of funding or political will might undermine its practicability. Establishing that the US-originated media plays an important role in the daily lives of the people in the Southern Mediterranean, it is important to point that the policies of the Bush administration, particularly the war in

¹⁴³ Ibid., p.112

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., p.116

Iraq and its reflections in the international – mainly US – media has caused a great deal of damage on the credibility of these news sources. News channels such as the Fox News, with its pro-Bush approach have led to perceptions of the media in the US not being so independent after all. This concerns not only the US but also organisations in Europe who are known for their legacy of independence, such as the BBC, due to the involvement of its administration in the war in Iraq and the fact that it is a State-owned enterprise.¹⁴⁵ Another factor related to the issue of the independence of the press is the apparent increase of op-ed pieces and analysis features which are written by outside sources that actually pay to be published. Exploiting the budgetary needs – due to a lack of readership and what one may call ‘ratings’ – of the newspapers, these outside sources that are mainly connected to private syndicates or to political administrations, usually have the freedom to present and promote the policies and the messages of the institutions they belong to and thus are able to manipulate public opinion at the expense of the independence of the media.

As the media which is regarded as an integral part of delivering the constructive messages of the intercultural dialogue can be challenged so easily in terms of its independence, it might be appropriate to say that European media either has to distance itself from the US-led media and create its own language and mode of communication or has to act in cooperation with the dominant source of global information in the southern Mediterranean. As the state of the American media can only be sorted by the US itself, Europe seems to be reliant on its own media resources, firstly to rid itself

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

from the negative perceptions the US-led media has attributed to them under the broader term of ‘Western’ media, and secondly to deliver its messages and generate the positive informative and communicative environment it seeks to achieve throughout the Mediterranean region.

Roy points that the message Europe has to give to the South needs to reflect the past mistakes that led Europe to an almost self-destructive situation. The success of the European integration project which put an end to centuries of conflict, war and extreme ideologies such as racism, totalitarianism, nationalism and intolerance should be the main export of Europe to its partners in the Mediterranean. Referring to the use of ‘soft power’ by the US in exporting its values through film, music, sports and consumer goods, Roy argues that in an environment in which US is no longer to succeed in using the soft power that contributed to the universalisation of its values, Europe is in a position to step in and exploit the use of soft power to capture the minds of the people in the South in an enriching way.¹⁴⁶

In a set of recommendations Roy points that Western media, and in particular the media in Europe, should distribute more materials produced by Western authors dealing with the southern Mediterranean, the broader Middle East and the intercultural dialogue in general, as well as accepting contributions made by the authors in the South, especially the ones that reflect a realistic view of the issues through a perspective of the South. Accordingly the media in the south should be willing to

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p.120

distribute to its audience a better and more accurate view of the north and the inter-regional relationship. In line with the proposal of the High Level Advisory group on using the Euromed Audiovisual Programme as a tool for supplying funding for the small and medium sized media sources, it is also pointed by Roy that any government programme of assistance should include a democratic clause, safeguarding the independence of the source and the content that is delivered.¹⁴⁷

As the High Level Report underlines, the media is under enormous market pressure and tend to act towards the achievement of instant profitability. This pressure might lead the media sources to neglect their vital role of educating the uneducated through the stimulation of critical thought and examination. Critical examination is favoured as “reading an image is something that has to be learned, just like reading a book. The language of image, which is so powerful nowadays, should be taught at all levels and to all age groups.”¹⁴⁸ Accordingly Roy points out that state controlled television networks should incorporate more air time dedicated to news, analysis and documentaries originating from the southern Mediterranean neighbours, provided that they are produced locally and free from government intervention.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p.123

¹⁴⁸ Report of the High Level Advisory Group, p.35

¹⁴⁹ Roy, p.123

3.5 Securitisation of the Dialogue between Cultures

Apart from the conceptual approaches to the notion of dialogue and the representational arguments, what may be regarded as the main critical issue within the intercultural dialogue is the concept of securitisation. One of the main reasons of the renewed interest in the Third Basket of the Barcelona Process is the EU's desire to seek alternative ways to deal with radical and extremist tendencies and the increasing mistrust which manifests itself in a mutual manner across the Mediterranean region, of course refraining from any expression that might serve to the clash of civilisations theory. The main catalyst of this renewed approach to maintain a firm stand in a changing security environment is highly connected to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the so-called war on terror that followed it. Within this framework some may interpret the new initiatives of intercultural dialogue as an instrument of security.

As Malmvig points out, although the Dialogue between Cultures is highly inspired by Habermasian ideals of dialogue, in practice, the ideals put forward are quite difficult to apply as long as the context of security maintains its hold in the mindsets of the interlocutors. He argues that

the securitization of the 'Dialogue' has paradoxically served to provide it with extraordinary legitimacy and urgency, while at the same time compromising the very conditions of possibility for a dialogue along Habermasian lines.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰ H. Malmvig, 'Security through Intercultural Dialogue: Implications of the Securitization of Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures' in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.350

Habermasian dialogue is characterised by mutual understanding through intersubjective dialogue, a dialogue in which no relations of power and exclusion exist. Described by Habermas as the ‘ideal speech situation’, this type of dialogue requires the participants to share a ‘common lifeworld’ – common language, culture or history – and to be prepared to experience a change or a shift in the ways they perceive the world and their identities, through an empathic approach, being open to the idea of seeing things from the perspectives of the other. What is required to follow is a consensus of views and a new common ground. As Malmvig points, these conditions for an ‘ideal speech situation’ is highly reflected in the documents related to the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue, the Report of the High Level Advisory Group being the most significant example.¹⁵¹

The main concern expressed towards the functioning of a truly Habermasian dialogue are the presumptive nature of the whole idea, which appears optimistic of the possibility of a dialogue free from power politics and assumes that the actors participating in this type of dialogue are totally ready and willing to take part. It is evident that in the international political scene power politics is rarely out of the picture and the participants are rarely considered as equals, not to mention the almost impossible situation in which the participants would appear free from self-interest and engage in a dialogue which might challenge the ways they perceive the world and their identities. However, the need to formulate an alternative to a much refrained clash of civilisations and the state of emergency and urgency apparent in many parts of the

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p.352

world, following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and those that took place in other part of the World can be underlined as the two main reasons that set the background to a collective interest in undertaking an initiative such as the Dialogue between Culture, however unwilling the parties taking part in the Dialogue may seem in adopting the Habermasian ideals within the process. Within this background the Dialogue is seen capable of changing the political opinions and strengthen the moderate fractions. Not responding to the calls for a dialogue, however, is regarded as a situation which would strengthen the radicals and their extremist perceptions of the world and would serve to a clash of civilisation that all parties are eager to avoid. However this mentality harbours, as we pointed before, the issue of security as a catalyst of dialogue and eventually securitises the whole process.

Malmvig outlines three conditions that indicate the securitisation of the intercultural dialogue is taking place. Firstly, “the articulation of an alternative analysis of the root causes of conflict between cultures, constructed in stark opposition to Huntington’s analysis of a clash of civilisations” is apparent in line with the anti-Huntington language of the High Level Advisory Report, reflecting an unconscious reproduction of the Huntington theory. Several changes that took place in the wording of the title of the Dialogue – ‘Dialogue between Cultures and Civilisations’ in Valencia and Crete; ‘Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures’ and finally the ‘Dialogue between Cultures’ – indicates the desire of the Euro-Mediterranean partners in avoiding the usage of a civilisational logic, however it can also be observed in the High Level Report that the term ‘clash’ is nevertheless suggested, but instead of a

clash of civilisations, a clash of ignorance is underlined as an unwanted situation. The second condition pointed by Malmvig is “the articulation of dialogue as an urgent necessity.” Such urgency declared in the official rhetoric of the advisors and the interlocutors of the dialogue creates a situation in which it seems that if the peoples of the region do not act accordingly it will be too late to achieve a constructive solution. Instead of a long-term process, with this referral to the urgency of the matter, an immediate future with connotation of devastation is highly suggested. The third and final indication put forward by Malmvig is “the articulation of a threatening future in the absence of dialogue” suggesting that if the dialogue does not take place wrong perceptions and stereotypes are to overcome and encourage violence and extremism. As argued in the High Level Report a closed mentality fuelled by political and religious certainties could lead to terrifying examples of deviancy.¹⁵²

Malmvig also points to the High Level Report’s perception of the dialogue as a weapon used in order to anticipate, defuse, avert and resolve conflicts.

Articulating intercultural dialogue in these terms of war and weapons effectively securitizes the goals and intentions of dialogue. Within this logic of securitization, intercultural dialogue, it seems, is not to be promoted in order to strengthen culture, but culture is to strengthen security.¹⁵³

However, it may also be argued that securitisation could have positive implications too, in the sense that highlighting the feelings of vulnerability and

¹⁵² Ibid., p.355-357

¹⁵³ Ibid., p.358

insecurity would encourage social and political mobilisation, underlining the presence of an issue within the security agenda with implications of danger and priority and eventually persuade people to support actions they probably would not have supported in normal conditions. On the other hand the negative implications of securitisation seem to prevail over the positive implications as it appears that securitisation is an extreme form of politicisation and some issues, especially the intercultural dialogue should not be regarded as matters of security in order to establish a true ‘cultural’ dialogue. Securitisation involves strong mechanisms of control and monitoring of the decision-making process and marginalises the non-governmental groups, keeping them away from influencing and taking part in related debates and discussions. These implications of securitisation are truly far from the ideals of openness and equality, underlined in the Habermasian type of dialogue.¹⁵⁴

Malmvig argues that all the negative implications pointed out above can be witnessed within the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue between Cultures and that the Dialogue is subject to tight government control and extreme politicisation. First and foremost, regarding the issue of the accessibility to the dialogue, it can be pointed that all the National Networks and the Heads of these Networks have been appointed or approved by the governments. Although these networks are supposed to harbour an independent character, reflecting the activities of the civil society, a considerable amount of them are either directly involved in government or even situated within the Ministries of Culture or Foreign Affairs. The Board of Governors, which is the

¹⁵⁴ Ibid.

decision-making body of the Anna Lindh Foundation, awarding grants, adapting the annual work programme and deciding the guidelines of the Foundations, is composed of the members of the Euromed Committee, which of course is under strict control of the governments. Thus the governments of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership have control over the accessibility of the Dialogue, being able to decide which organisations representing the civil society are to take place in the process. The governments have the power to exclude the groups outside of the governmental influences if they see them as controversial and oppositional, which of course contradicts with the inclusive nature of the Dialogue that used to be articulated in the past documents and declarations of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The political circles of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership also has control over which concepts, issues, themes and topics are to be debated within the framework of the Dialogue. The working programme specifying priority areas, projects and target groups have already been adopted by the Euro-Mediterranean Committee and the Foreign Ministers preceding the start of the actual dialogue. As Malmvig points out, “The thematic focus of the Dialogue has therefore been predetermined by Euro-Mediterranean governments, inhibiting civil society networks from formulating their own goals and priorities.” This implies an extremely political character of the process as the governments are free to include and exclude themes and issues according to their interests.¹⁵⁵

All these factors underlining the politicised and securitised character of the intercultural dialogue is also evident in the interfaith dialogue and the EU’s policies

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p359, 360

regarding Islam. The securitisation of this issue is mainly reflected in the internal policies of the EU, especially in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, which was renamed as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice at the end of 2004. As Silvestri underlines, “it is interesting to note how the new name emphasises the link between freedom of movement and security concerns.”¹⁵⁶ The majority of the Muslim population of the EU is made up of mainly first and second generation of immigrants. The immigration policy of the EU, which the majority of the EU governments are keen to strengthen even more, restricts the flow of immigrants to the host countries and thus creates a cultural barrier between those who reside in the EU, and thus who are Europeans, and those who are outside, and thus are the Others. This also brings to mind that one of the main reasons for the EU to formulate such an ambitious project as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is to achieve a long-lasting solution to the issue of illegal immigration. As we mentioned before, the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures is strongly affiliated to a Nordic European Country, namely Sweden, as the headquarters of the Foundation is co-hosted by the Swedish Institute in Alexandria. This illustrates the interest of a country such as Sweden – which is to be regarded far from the Mediterranean, both geographically, culturally and politically – towards the Barcelona Process. Alongside the desire of Sweden to initiate a process enhancing the soft power of culture and to refresh the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’s Third Basket through a structure outside the realm of the EU, what seems to be main reason for Sweden to have such a firm stand in this issue is highly

¹⁵⁶ Sara Silvestri, ‘*EU Relations with Islam in the Context of the EMP’s Cultural Dialogue*’ in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.387

related to the country's internal politics too, as a large part of the Swedish society is made up of immigrants coming from the MENA region and the social and cultural tensions attributed to the two sides of the Mediterranean can also be observed within the Swedish society. According to Silvestri,

this explains why, even before becoming openly committed to the cultural and social basket of the EMP, the Swedish government organised several conferences and open meetings on the impact of Islam in European society, in association with Muslim countries or with Muslim organisations. Hence, the activities of the Swedish Institute in Alexandria can be interpreted as a continuation of this 'Euro-Islam' project.¹⁵⁷

However it would be unwise to affiliate the initiation of a Foundation with such ambitious goals to a single European country. It is more than evident that within the crisis environment following the events of 9/11, the EU has become a stronger advocate of intercultural and interfaith dialogue. Initially seen as an instrument to counter the violent, radical, extremist threat and also to enhance the participation of the civil society and enable social cohesion, the instrumental character of the dialogue eventually decreased and the project gained an individual status which can at times be regarded outside the framework of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. This ambitious project centred on a sincere and transparent dialogue of cultures and communities is not free of risks though. The risk of "being hijacked by those that exploit this positive rhetoric in order to achieve visibility in the public sphere and pursue private political goals" is ever present and the fact that "none of the EU or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiatives in the field of intercultural dialogue has yet produced any

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., p.391

immediate results or clear guidelines on how to improve relations, in practical terms, with and within religious and ethnic communities in Europe and across the Mediterranean” can be seen as discouraging factors.¹⁵⁸

A true improvement in relations within communities in both parts of the Mediterranean requires the need to find the space for critical self-reflection. Establishing a move away from relations and attitudes of domination, a dialogue needs an overlap of the Self and the Others. Within this context in order to present a favourable environment to engage in dialogue, Europe has to face its own hegemonic practices while its partners in the Mediterranean have to evaluate their own actions and attitudes in a more self-critical manner. As Pace puts forward, “the recognition of one’s own participation in another’s ‘language’ can create a bridge and a common horizon for dialogic interactions”¹⁵⁹ in line with the requirement of a fusion of horizons underlined in Bakhtin’s thoughts.

As a voice more or less representing the south of the Mediterranean, Bichara Khader underlines the importance of analysing the historic construction of collective representations and the relations with the Other on both sides of the Mediterranean region, and warns us of the danger of the simplifying a true heritage. Khader points out that cultural dialogue firstly requires the work of historians to sort out the bitterness embedded in history and set out a new form of coexistence, namely the “neo-

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p.400

¹⁵⁹ M. Pace, *‘Imagining Co-presence in Euro-Mediterranean Relations: The Role of Dialogue’*, in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.309

Andalusian”¹⁶⁰ myth which implies an evocation of the Andalusian period of coexistence between the three monotheistic religions. However, the achievement of this coexistence is the responsibility not only of the Europeans but also of the Arabs, who like the Europeans, also have a deformed vision of their counterparts. The defensive position of the Arab world in the new international political environment makes it impossible for them to engage in a self-critical process of analysing their identity. According to Khader, the Arabs are not worried about identity in itself but they are more concerned about their identity related to others – namely Israel, Europe, the West, the non-Muslim world and non-Arab neighbours – which is defined by the us/them binary opposition. The Arab world has to slip out of the monopoly of victimisation embedded in their period of colonisation, which also renews itself within the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This conflict which has a much global effect than one would think,

is the source of unaccountable suffering and gross injustices, as well carrying with it a bloody trail that has spanned over six decades, and which still shapes the long term relations that Europe maintains with the Southern Mediterranean (...) any problem in the peace process and any toughening of positions block any significant step forward in Euro-Mediterranean collaboration, especially in terms of politics and culture.¹⁶¹

Finally, Khader warns us of the notions of the ‘clash of civilisations’ and of the axes of ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in terms of their role in recreating the fractures and borders between the self and the other, and advocates an adoption of a humanist approach in

¹⁶⁰ B. Khader, *Towards a New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Dialogue*, p. 3

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.6

which the creation of enemies, the demonising of societies and religions, and attribution of collective responsibilities should be ceased to exist.

As we have seen throughout the arguments, the main problem regarding the future of the Third Basket activities appears to be the increased attribution of security issues to the functioning of the Dialogue which raises questions over the independence of the Anna Lindh Foundation, the Civil Society actors taking part in its projects and the degree of the ‘cultural’ character of the Dialogue. The issue of representation emerges as a major concern as well. The political and religious character of the actors claiming to be the representatives of ‘cultures’ and ‘religions’ underline these concerns which appear parallel to the discussions of politicisation and Civil Society participation that I touched upon. To sum up the analysis and recommendations put forward in this chapter regarding the current and the future state of the Third Basket of the EMP and the intercultural dialogue in particular, in one sentence, we can state that

the North of the Mediterranean and Europe as a whole need a new approach to otherness, while the South of the Mediterranean requires a new form of managing the past, a diplomatic opening, and a new governance to tackle the challenges of the third millennium.¹⁶²

¹⁶² Ibid., p.11

CONCLUSION

The Mediterranean emerges as probably the most significant region of the world, in which extremely diverse and conflictive societies are able to relate to each other in a unique way, thanks to a centuries old common and shared heritage in which the main components of daily lives generate a certain feeling of coherence amid strongly rooted mutual suspicion and uneasy relations across the region. The fact that the Mediterranean region can present a clearly visible history of peace, unity, conflict and division to its inhabitants is one of the main sources of the contemporary psyche of the societies, shaping up the relations varying from friendly engagements to highly conflictive arguments. The causes and effects of mutual Otherisation can be observed to the highest extent in the Mediterranean region. It is this uniqueness of this area that places it in the international spotlight, in light of the war on terror following the attacks on September 11. The emerging world order of the 21st century places the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean and brings the West and Islam against each other in a fundamentally contradicting manner. It is in this fragile environment that the concept of intercultural dialogue has emerged as an instrument of normalising and developing bilateral relations and mutual perceptions. In this study, my main focus has been the development, the present state and the future prospects of this dialogue which has become one of the most integral aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which is organising the relations of the EU with its neighbours in the Mediterranean region.

As we have witnessed in throughout the chapters, within the context of the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, the Huntingtonian discourse of the ‘clash of civilisations’ has become a highly debated issue, much more than it was in the initial stages of the Partnership. The most significant reason for this increase in the amount of debate in these lines is of course the events of 9/11 and state of emergency, paranoia and crisis that took over both the political and social environments throughout the globe. When we look at the response of Europe we see that the third basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership has been the main instrument through which the EU has attempted to respond to this cultural crisis.

Thinking in line with this discourse and trying to analyse the relationship between the two sides in an unequal, object/subject type of relationship, one could interpret the civilising mission of the Europeans as an echo of the efforts of self-legitimising within the Colonial period. As mentioned in the first chapter, colonialist activities were legitimised by the Europeans as efforts in bringing fruits of progress and modernity to the subject peoples. Those peoples of course are those who are different because they were inferior and had to be made similar and equal by civilising them. Today, this idea of a civilising mission can still be observed within the EU and its policy making. Thus it can be argued by critics that the EU has represented its EMP third basket policy ambitions to its member states and the Mediterranean partners in a highly idealised fashion.

The main theme harbouring within the Third Basket of the EMP is the democratisation of culture – which is making culture accessible and attractive to the masses.¹⁶³ We see that counter to the general attitude evident in the initial stages of the Partnership; governments are thinking outside the boundaries and looking into the cultural needs of their societies against the changing background, thanks to the effects of globalisation, and the emerging lifestyles and enhancing the quality of life in accordance. Thus, democratisation of culture can be regarded as the main pillar of the Third Basket, aimed at promoting understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies and developing human resources.

The basis of the rhetoric of the Third Basket and the intercultural dialogue is that the Euro-Mediterranean cultural traditions are able to co-exist and that none of these cultures should be allowed to dominate over another. Thus, European culture is not a superior one and it should not be enforced on the peoples of the Mediterranean partners for their wellbeing. Accordingly the objectives of the Third Basket are based on measures to preserve and promote cultural activities originating from the whole of the Mediterranean. In order to make the Third Basket comprehensive, all programmes and activities must be related to the socio-economic life and the educational systems in the Southern Mediterranean. Thus, cultural democracy proposes a cultural life which is highlighted by the participation of everyone. In this sense, cultural life itself should be subject to democratic control as well. Everyone in the Euro-Mediterranean region should all be able to have a say in public cultural issues that concern them.

¹⁶³ M. Pace, 'Conclusion: Cultural Democracy in Euro-Mediterranean Relations?' in *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol.10, No.3, p.429

Another important factor regarding the better functioning of the Third Basket is of course, funding. In line with the efforts of democratization of culture, funding could be used at an optimum level through better targeting of the resources on the key policy priorities of the peoples of the region. Thus it is a good sign that social commitment and creativity, the voices of youth and women, and the role of education are specified as the three main pillars for the evolution of cultural democracy in the Euro-Mediterranean area.

Eurocentricism, as in many issues, is a negative factor also within the functioning of the Euro-Mediterranean relations. It is evident that looking at the Mediterranean solely through a European perspective has not worked so far as European solutions to the problems of the Southern Mediterranean do not serve the aspirations of its peoples. Therefore, what is necessary is to see the thousands of years old Mediterranean heritage and cultural values integrated to the political, social and economic reconstruction of the Southern Mediterranean partner countries. The general perception on the south is that Europe is willing to cooperate and offer assistance as long they follow their path, not taking the discussions within too seriously. Accordingly what seems to be problematic with the programmes and activities within the Third Basket is that they encourage the peoples of the Mediterranean to follow European values, assuming that the peoples of the Mediterranean cannot create tangible solutions to their problems. Therefore the main aim of the EU should be encouraging initiatives originating from the other side of the Mediterranean which in turn could be supported by them.

Another significant issue within the Third Basket, as we have seen in the previous chapters, is the establishment of an international system across the Mediterranean based on respect towards human rights. The new European Neighbourhood Policy certainly presents new opportunities for the promotion of human rights in the Southern Mediterranean. However, the Action Plans, which are the basis of the bilateral relations taking place within the ENP, have been negotiated with the neighbouring governments without any input from the civil society. As a result, in line with the preferred stance of the respective governments towards certain issues, some Action Plans seem to be well developed on human rights, while others are not. This represents what may be one of the most significant contradictions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The contradiction between the aim of developing and enhancing mutual knowledge among the peoples of the Mediterranean and the method taken to fulfil this aim which is characterised by the application of an intergovernmental relations without giving any say to the peoples of the region, who will be ones most effected by the outcome. Thus, action towards enhancing the involvement of the civil society in the process, which is so far mainly confined to the Third Basket, should be extended to include the First and the Second Baskets which are dealing with the economic and political issues.

The Third Basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was designed to complement the First and Second Baskets dealing with the political and economic aspects of the inter-regional relations. The general belief of the instigators the Partnership is that political and economic cooperation would not reach its optimum

effectiveness unless the peoples of the region make an effort to understand each other and establish a feeling of a shared destiny. Within the framework of the renewed significance and necessity of the Third Basket and the setting up of the intercultural dialogue as an instrument to achieve the goals of the Partnership, the possibility of a watershed of positive relations from the Third Basket to the First and Second Baskets is more evident and anticipated than it ever was throughout the first decade of the Barcelona Process. An increased social and cultural cooperation and understanding would in turn contribute to the legitimisation of the political and economic measures that are being applied in order to turn the aspirations of a democratic and stable Mediterranean region a reality.

As we have seen, the establishment of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, efforts towards enhancing the participation of the civil society institutions and measures taken to enable an efficient functioning of intercultural dialogue are all positive factors of the Third Basket and the significant importance it gained in the post-9/11 world. We are going through times in which the notions of difference and similarity across the Euro-Mediterranean area clearly need to be redefined. Thus, a true trans-cultural dialogue that is established upon the ideals of common values and interests of the peoples of the Mediterranean is more than necessary. The ambitious project of the establishing a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation designed to coordinate the efforts towards the achievement of the necessary trans-cultural dialogue is a very positive and constructive approach by the Euro-Mediterranean partners. However, there exists some clear problems regarding the organisational principles of the Anna

Lindh Foundation, as explained in the previous chapter, and at this point we will have to wait and see if the Foundation will be able to support and maintain the objectives of the Third Basket.

There is a strong emphasis on the involvement of the civil society within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership since the Barcelona Declaration of 1995. However, as we have discussed in the third chapter, the character of the Mediterranean civil society and the issue of what type of organisations and institutions in the Mediterranean partner countries are to be engaging in relations with the European civil society representatives is a highly debatable. As national civil society organisations in the partner countries are experiencing problematic relations with their respective regimes and the EU seems reluctant to define exactly what type of Islamic organisations it wishes to cooperate with, there emerges a significant imbalance regarding the input of the civil society within the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Thus, it can be suggested that the Trans-national Non-governmental Organisations would be able to offer a means of mitigating such imbalance. Trans-national NGOs are able to engage in long-term, cooperative relations, combining the potential of all their member organisations, instead of working together in temporary projects with changing partners. These types of organisations, such as the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, set up in 1997 in order to support the development of democratic institutions and the promotion of human rights and education, are able to pursue more powerful struggles against repressive regimes than individual national organisations. This way, these trans-

national organisations could become the backbone of civil society co-operation in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.¹⁶⁴

In line with the ‘civilisational logic’ of the new millennium, the Third Basket activities are overshadowed by the increasing emphasis put on terrorism, drug trafficking, organised crime and illegal immigration. Hence the concerns of the many regarding the securitisation of the Third Basket, as we have seen in the pervious chapter. It seems that as the third basket has increasingly emerged as a substitute for the first, the securitization of the Dialogue will be hard to escape. In the short-term period it is likely that the Dialogue will continue to be an object of difficult and highly politicized bargaining between the Euro-Mediterranean governments, which as a process restrains the influence of civil society groups in the process. A positive factor regarding this issue is the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly through which parliamentarians from both sides of the Mediterranean have an opportunity to establish an untied stand in promoting freedom of speech and democratic values throughout the Mediterranean region.

Finally, it is important to state the need towards further contributions of Arab scholars - which there is a clear lack of – in order to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of how intercultural dialogue really should take place in the Euro-Mediterranean area. It is important to fully comprehend the specific national issues and challenges occupying the minds of the peoples in the Southern Mediterranean in order

¹⁶⁴ A. Jünemann, *‘From the Bottom to the Top: Civil Society and Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership’* in *Democratization*, Vol. 9, No.1, Spring 2002, p. 98

to enhance the scope and the vision of the proposals and activities, and achieve “an ensemble of concepts which constitutes a moral force, a Mediterranean conscience.”¹⁶⁵

However positive the intentions are within the Euro-Mediterranean space towards the achievement of a constructive dialogue bringing peoples and cultures together, we have seen in the recent ‘cartoon crisis’ that neither the politicians nor the public has absorbed the essence of the idea of ‘dialogue’. What Europe needs to do is stop regarding every issue that they feel trapped in – especially regarding the relations with the Others within and without – through a egocentric perspective, linking every action and reaction to the notions of liberty, freedom of thought and speech underlining them as their own ideals and claiming their universality, forgetting that above all notions of liberty lies a necessity of mutual respect. Although it is evident that there is a rise in right wing nationalist rhetoric within Europe, it is also evident that the only road Europe could take in terms of dealing with their problematic issues – especially with the threat of radical Islam – is one of constructivism. However, against a collective approach in issues of international importance, stands the concerns of governments on matters of domestic politics and this has a clearly negative impact over the level constructivism reached in the end. The communities in the Southern and Eastern parts of the Mediterranean on the other hand, are essentially in need of a dialogue with Europe and the West in general. What seem to be the real problems in generating a true dialogic relationship between the two sides regarding the Mediterranean partners are education and the ignorance of the majority of the

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., p.436

populations. What reaches us on television and newspaper coverage is usually images of flag-burning people with arrogance and hatred reflecting from their faces. This shows how the easily manipulated, uneducated masses can express their anger. However on the European side we see images of people expressing their opinions with a certain level of intellectual conscience – however biased they may be. As mentioned before, true dialogue requires a common language in which the interlocutors are able to express their opinions comprehensively. To extend the usage of this language to include the societies requires better education.

As we have seen through the discussions involving the politicians and the civil society representatives, there is a constant expression that there is a definite need for dialogue across the Euro-Mediterranean area. However we can say that it is during the times in which people feel the need of a dialogue the most, that the establishment of a constructive dialogue is the hardest. Whenever, anxiety and urgency is involved, communication becomes harder and harder. As in all problems regarding the future of humanity, the most basic humane remedy offered would be ‘time’. Sands of time will define whether the sands on the shores of the Mediterranean will be washed by waves of friendship or hostility.

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