THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN THE KAZAKH STEPPES

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ABSTRACT

THE RUSSIAN POPULATION IN THE KAZAKH STEPPES

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This thesis aims to understand the formation of Russian identity in the Kazakh Steppes by examining the migratory flows of Russians and the affects of state policies and patterns of inter-ethnic relations between the Russians and the Kazakhs during different historical periods. Constructionist theory has guided the analysis of the research. The Russian identity formation in the Kazakh Steppes is examined within the context of three consecutive historical periods that correspond to fundamental social, political and administrative re-structuring. First is the period of the Russian Empire, during which the resettlement policy of the Empire shattered the traditional social structures of the native Kazakhs and entailed extensive inter-ethnic contact between the Russians and the Kazakhs. Second period corresponds to the period of the Soviet Union, which experienced the intensification of Russian settlements in the Kazakh Steppes. The Soviet policy, while encouraging Russianness as a component of Soviet identity, at the same time, granted autonomy to diverse ethnic entities. The third period, which corresponds to the current era starting with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, witnessed the emergence of Kazakh State. A large potion of the Russian population in the Kazakh Steppes remained in the independent Republic of Kazakhstan and face new challenges in terms of identity formation due to the Kazakh nation building policies.

Key words: Russian, Kazakh, State Building, Soviet Nationalities Policy, Ethnic Relations, Identity Construction.

ÖZ

KAZAK STEPLERİNDE RUS NÜFUSU

Mustafa Can Teziç

Yüksek Lisans, Avrasya Çalışmaları

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Bu tez Kazak Steplerindeki Rus kimliğinin oluşumunu Rusların göç dalgaları ve devlet politikalarının ve çeşitli dönemlerdeki Rus ve Kazak gruplar arasındaki ilişki örüntülerinin etkilerini inceleyerek anlamayı amaçlar. Yapısalcı teori bu çalışmanın analizinde rehber olmuştur. Kazak Steplerindeki Rus kimlik oluşumu, temel sosyal, politik ve idari yeniden yapılanmaya paralel olarak gelişen ve bir birini takip eden üç tarihi dönem kapsamında incelendi. Birinci dönem Rus İmparatorluğu dönemidir. Bu dönemde Rus İmparatorluğunun yerleştirme politikaları bölgedeki Kazakların geleneksel toplum yapısını dönüştürerek Kazaklarla Ruslar arasında yoğun etnik temaslara yol açtı. İkinci dönem Rus yerleşiminin yoğun olarak yaşandığı Sovyetler Birliği dönemidir. Sovyet politikaları, Rusluk olgusunu Sovyet kimliğinin bir parçası olarak kuvvetlendirirken, aynı zamanda, çeşitli etnik guruplara özerklik tanımıştır. Üçüncü dönem Sovyetler Birliğinin dağılmasıyla başlayıp günümüze kadar gelen dönemdir. Bu dönemde yeni Kazak devleti kuruldu ve Kazak Steplerindeki Rus nüfusunun büyük bir kısmı bugünkü bağımsız Kazak Cumhuriyeti sınırları içerisinde kaldı. Bugün bölgedeki Rus nüfusu Kazak ulusu yaratma politikaları karşısınds yeni kimlik sorunları ile karşılaşmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Rus, Kazak, Ulus Oluşumu, Sovyet Milletler Politikası, Etnik İlişkiler, Kimlik Oluşumu.

To My Parents

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), fifteen republics, which had had formerly functioned as administrative units of the USSR, became independent states. Kazakhstan is one of these states. The difference between Kazakhstan and the other former Soviet Republics is that Kazakhstan housed a relatively high number of non-titular ethnic groups in itself. Today, after 15 years of independence, the non-titular ethnic groups still make up almost half of Kazakhstan's population.

While the small non-titular groups such as Uzbeks, Uygurs, Kyrgyz, Karakalpaks were historically part of the Kazakh Steppes, the majority of the non-titular population was composed of groups, which were not inherently linked to the native population of the region. Russians, who were the biggest group of the USSR, still make up nearly 35% of the total population of Kazakhstan, thus comprising the largest non-titular ethnic group in the country. This demographic structure and the changing ethnic hierarchy in post-Soviet Kazakhstan entail problems for the nation building process and ethnic identity formation.

The Russian interest in the Kazakh Steppes began in the late 16th century with the Russian eastward expansion. This interest was based on the Russian intention to control its eastward caravan roots, which passed through the Kazakh Steppes and

bound the Russian Empire to the rich Central Asian market the Kazakh Steppes. Therefore, concern to safeguard the caravan routes shaped the earlier stages of the Kazakh and Russian relations. Under these circumstances, the Kazakhs had to make alliances with the Russian Empire. During this period, instead of encouraging a large scale population influx into the region, the Russians adopted policies that focused on the manipulation of the already fragile Kazakh socio-political structure and the exploitation of the existing internal antagonisms in accordance with Russian interests.

The Russian policy with respect to the Kazakh Steppes changed after 1860 in connection with the changing internal dynamics of the Russian Empire. Until 1860, the Russian peasantry lived under serfdom. They were strictly bound to the landlord's authority and territory of their estate as well as that of the state. The backward situation of the peasantry and the population increase in rural Russia put pressure on the relations of peasantry and the state. From 1860 onwards, the stressful situation of the peasantry led the Russian decision makers to re-evaluate the situation and abolish serfdom in the Russian Empire. Although the peasants had officially gained their independence, the rights to travel within the country was forbidden for a period of time. At the end of the 1880s, the official outlook, which foresaw the peasantry as a communal entity confined to a given territory, was changed. After that, the Kazakh Steppes became perceived as a solution to the over population problem in rural Russia, which was potentially inherent with revolutionary tendencies that threatened the Russian Empire. The new policy with respect to the Steppes stimulated large scale population exodus from the Empire

towards the Kazakh Steppes. As a result, the Russian population rapidly increased in the steppes and the administrative structure of the region was re-arranged according to the new settlers needs. These changes stimulated by the Russian migration and settlement in the region dramatically transformed the lives of the native Kazakhs. From that point on, the Kazakhs had to give up their traditional way of life and adapt themselves to the new conditions.

After the establishment of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh Steppes did not lose their strategic value. The valuable natural resources in the region facilitated the building of industries in the Kazakh Steppes. Within a short time, these newly constructed industrial sites became an integral part of the Soviet economic system and a continuing attraction for Russian influx. Many Russians came to the region in order to meet the workforce deficiency. Another Russian influx to the region occurred during the "virgin lands project". With this project, a large agricultural area was opened for cultivation in Northern Kazakhstan and the necessary workforce was met by the Russian peasants. During the Second World War, due to the collectivization and deportation policies,, the Kazakh population in the Steppes decreased while the Russian population increased. This situation continued until the end of the 1970s.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan became an independent state. This period could be defined as the period of nation state building for the former Soviet republics. During the Soviet Period, like the other Soviet republics, the Kazak Republic had an autonomous status but was not independent in its

economic and political matters; it functioned as one of the administrative units of the Soviet Union. Hence, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in order to gain full territorial sovereignty over economic and political decision making, each former Soviet Republic formulated and initiated its state building strategy. In this context, the demographic structure of Kazakhstan posed a serious challenge to its state building endeavor.

The Russian influx into the Kazakh Steppes was not an accidental and sporadic or random process. Rather the process was associated with the internal dynamics of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. In both periods distinct internal dynamics influenced the state decisions that led to an influx of the Russian population into the region. Furthermore, all these state initiatives created the ground for the conditions that later challenged the identity of Russian migrants.

1.1   Research Problem and Thesis

The purpose of this study is to examine the settlement of the Russian population in the Kazakh Steppes in three different periods. The first phase is the period of the Russian Empire; the second phase is the period of the Soviet Union; the third phase is the Post- Soviet Period.

Furthermore, issues related to the role of Russians in the restructuring process of the Kazak Steppes, the changing nature of the Russian policy in relation to the internal conditions of the Russian Empire towards the Kazakh Steppes, the military annexation of the region and colonization, the role of the Russian population during

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the Soviet rule in Kazakh SSR are examined. The situation of the Russian population in independent Kazakhstan and the perception, of both Russians and Kazakhs, of the policy of the new Kazakh State by the Russian population is examined within the context of the nationalizing regime of Kazakhstan. The state building ideology of the new regime led to the (re-evaluation / re-definition or re-construction may be better words) of the Russian identity in Kazakhstan. The Russian community lost their previous status and found themselves in a position of a minority forced to defend their rights and re-examine their self-identity for the first time in history.

This thesis argues that inter-ethnic relations and state policies play an important role in shaping ethnic identities as stressed by the constructivist approach (Bart 1969). Accordingly, it is argued that the settlement of Russians in the Kazakh Steppes as a result of the policies of the Russian Empire, which entailed an important inter-ethnic contact and interaction; and the continuation of the settlement of Russians during the Soviet Period, followed by the growing power and status of Russians in the Kazakh socio-political structure, thus Russianization of Soviet Identity, contributed to the formation and strengthening of ethnic identities of both the Russians and the Kazakhs identities. It also shaped the perception of Russian identity in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan. It can be said that under changing conditions in Post-Soviet Kazakhstan the Russian Identity will be re-constructed in accordance with the ethnic relations and the state policies of independent Kazakhstan.

1.2   Research Procedure

The research method used in this thesis can be described as a critical review of the available literature and other secondary material, including relevant documents. In this context, publications and other written material in English, Russian and Turkish, such as books, journals, daily reports and the Constitution of Kazakhstan were examined. Particular attention was paid to ensuring that contrasting and alternative views as well as debates are reflected in the review of the available material. In addition to the analysis of secondary material, although limited in number, interviews were conducted during my eight month study visit in Lipetsk in the Russian Federation between October 2004 and June 2005. I had the opportunity to conduct ten in-depth interviews with Kazakhs, who had lived in Mongolia, as well as Russians, who had migrated to the Russian Federation from Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Latvia. The interviews focused mainly on the issues concerning the disintegration of the Soviet Union and identity formation.

Furthermore, my visit to *Yaygara,* a Moldovan village, in the summer of 2005 provided me with a rich array of observations on the post-Soviet environment and relationships among people of diverse backgrounds particularly those in the Soviet periphery. I believe that my experiences during these visits made an invaluable contribution to my understanding of the Soviet and Post-Soviet mentality.

However, the fact that I didn't have an opportunity to carry out a comprehensive fieldwork in Kazakhstan is a shortcoming of the research. For this reason, I tried to cover as much of the existing literature on this subject that I could access. Thus, in

order to avoid being biased by the view point of a select group of authors, I tried to cover a wide range of sources that contain alternative and sometimes conflicting views. A deeper understanding of the issues addressed in this thesis, would no doubt, benefit from a first hand experience obtained by living for a while in different regions of Kazakhstan. This would provide an opportunity to observe the regional differences, the relations between the Kazakh State and the various ethnic groups and the interaction between different ethnic groups. I believe that this kind of field research would provide a liberated outlook to the region. However, I tried to compensate for this gap by cross checking information from documented material with my limited interviews and observations.

1.3   Organization of the Chapters

Chapter two presents the theoretical framework related to my research. In other words, it focuses on the theories of ethnicity and their relations with the nation state building process.

The third chapter is about the Kazakh Steppes during the period of Russian Empire, which begins with a discussion of the socio-political structure of the Kazakh society prior to the Russian penetration. It continues with an analysis of the socio-political dynamics of the Russian Empire, the annexation of the Kazakh Steppes and the social and economic consequences of the Russian expansion on the Kazakh Steppes. The main objective of this initiative is to understand the dynamics of the settlement of Russians in Kazakh Steppes in order to provide the basis for a better understanding of the identity formation of Russians in Kazakhstan.

The fourth chapter is about the impact of Soviet policies on the Kazak Soviet Socialist Republic. In this chapter, the change in the Soviet Nationality Policy, the growing role of Russians in Soviet Kazakhstan and the formation of Soviet Identity and the Russification of that identity are discussed.

The fifth chapter covers the post-soviet period. In this chapter, the changing ethnic hierarchy is examined together with the state building policies of independent Kazakhstan with respect to ethnic issues and cultural revival during the nation/ state building process. Furthermore, the perception of Russians about the Kazakhization process is analyzed in the context of the reconstruction of Russian identity.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union the administrative and political bounds among Russians living in the former Soviet republics were cut off from the Russian Federation. As articulated by Kolsto there are two contrasting views regarding the current identity formation of Russians living in the former Soviet republics? According to the first view, due to the geographic distance between the Russian Federation and the newly independent Republics, the identity of the Russian populations living in the latter will be shaped according to the prevailing conditions in the place of residence. On the other hand, the second view defends the argument that the Russian communities, living in close proximity with other ethnic / national groups will develop strong sense of Russian national identity (Kolsto, 1996: 609-639).

While there are diverse theoretical discussions that are relevant in shedding light to the theme of this thesis, I have chosen to focus, in his chapter, on ethnicity theories in order to better understand ethnic identity construction and alteration under changing conditions. To date various theoretical positions have been advanced in the field of ethnicity and each of these positions provides a different perspective with respect to the issue of ethnicity. Three main approaches to ethnicity are critically reviewed here: (i) Primordialist (Geertz 1963; Van Den Berghe, 1996) approach gives an inflexible and rigid character to the concept of ethnicity. (ii)

Circumstantialist (Glazer and Moynihan, 1996) approach emphasizes the fundamental role of the "interest" factor while retaining the role of cultural factors constant. This school of thought argues that ethnic identities become functional, when the various groups are competing for the scarce resources or political power. People create coherent group boundaries by using ethnicity in order to acquire political power or scarce resources. (iii) Constructivist (Barth, 1969) approach underlines the flexible and subjective nature of ethnicity. According to this theoretical position ethnic identity could be constructed, reconstructed and dismantled according to the changing circumstances.

The case of identity formation of Russians, within the context of socio-political restructuring and the resulting spatial movements of people, could best be examined with the constructivist approach. This approach, on the one hand, accepts the validity of circumstantialism, which contains some of the insights of primordialism (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 72) and on the other hand, constructivism pays attention to the dynamics of interaction between internal and external factors (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 80). That is why, it is argued here that, the constructivist approach provides a suitable framework in understanding the patterns of ethnic identity formation of the Russian population in Kazakhstan, who in the process of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the nationalizing regime of independent Kazakhstan, are confronted with the need to adapt to a new socio-political environment. Hence, this process compelled the Russian population in Kazakhstan to reassess their perceptions of identity and rethink their self-identification.

2.1 Primordialism

Primordialism is based on the assumption that ethnicity is given, fixed and unchanging. Each social group has its own values, norms and customs within which the socialization of the individual occurs. The individual, in order to express himself/herself, speaks the language of the group of his/her affiliation and utilizes the cultural patterns and collective memory of the past in developing a self-image and identity. Kinship relations are curial for the formation of individual and group identity. Horowitz also emphasizes the significance of kinship and says that the language of ethnicity is the language of kinship. He in an away equates kinship with ethnicity. He clearly stress that ethnic membership is not chosen but given that it is obtained by birth (1985: 56-57).

Clifford Geertz studied the contradicting attributes of modern society: material progress, social reforms, civil culture flexibility of primordial bounds, blood ties, race, language, region, religion and custom (cf. Jaffrelot, 1998, 54). Geertz stated that primordial attachments stemmed from the notion of "givenness". He interprets culture as a fact, in which individuals are born; receive a sense of givenness and social existence (1963: 108-113). Geertz emphasized the significance of culture givens in religion, language, race, customs to which people accord a primordial character (cf Hutchinson and Smith, 1996: 32).

Pierre Van Den Berghe is an eminent socio-biologist, who also contributed to the primordial thought. According to him, nepotic behaviors are centered on kinship ties, which provide a mutual trust and powerful group solidarity against the outside

threat. Since the blood relations provided its members with ultimate faith, nepotistic kinship solidarity ties become powerful sentiments of ethnocentrism and nationalism. Hence, ethnic groups may be perceived as an extension of ones own family, which tends to improve group and individual capacity. For Van Den Berghe there are two types of societies. In type I, the relations are based on endogamy and the ideal of a common descent is the main amalgamation of group unity. In type II, mutual benefit takes the role of endogamy and the culture took the function of unilateral descent and lineage exogamy, through which tens of thousands of people could organize according to primordial model of social organization (Van Den Berghe, 1996: 96-103). It is important to stress that primordialist approach, both in its socio-cultural (Geertz) and the socio-biological (Van Den Berghe) interpretations are weak in accounting for change and identity shifts that may emerge as a result of change.

2.2 Circumstantialism

Advocates of circumstantialists approach claim that attachments to ethnic and racial identities are not deep rooted. What is essential for them is the practical use of such identities. For this reason the idea that "shared culture is the primary element of group identity" was challenged by the prominent supporters of circumstantialism. According to Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (1996: 56-58), although shared cultural practices have the function of keeping group boundaries distinct, affiliations based on interest bounds the members of an ethnic group to each other. Accordingly, common interest among individuals play a more prominent role in

binding people and in the demarcation of ethnic and racial boundaries compared to common culture.

For Abner Cohen, ethnicity is the consequence of the intensive struggle for power and position among various groups. He perceives ethnicity as a political phenomenon and also as an interest group. In other words, when the circumstances make it advantageousness to stress the ethnic and racial identities, these identities are emphasized by the individuals and different groups. People set certain group boundaries by stressing the racial and ethnic patterns in order to set themselves apart from other groups or people. In this way the group may secure strategic positions in the state organs. Hence, through setting its members in strategic institutions, the group may affect education policies or the diversion of public funds to their members. Hence, traditional culture provides the people with an effective instrument to transform group energy into political action, through which the group is able to conduct an effective struggle with other competing groups, who are also trying to acquire the same positions and opportunities in the state. In this process, Cohen asserts, that traditional attributes are used for political alliances and ethnicity becomes an essential political instrument (1996: 83-84). This way, the members of other groups are denied access to the scarce resources and political positions by the dominant ethnic group. The ideas of utility and common interests draw people together around the ethnic label. Hence, the interest ties emerge in the process of competition among various groups for critical resources in the economic, political or social spheres. This contributes to the crystallization and strengthening of the ethnic and racial identities.

The domination of certain ethnic and racial groups over other groups is sustained in the modern capitalist society. There are various useful theoretical approaches in analyzing the ethnic competition and hegemony among diverse ethnic groups in the circumstantialist school of thought. "Internal colonialism" is one of the approaches, which focuses on inter-ethnic competition. According to the internal colonialism theory, ethnicity is strengthened through the subordination of the peripheral groups by the more affluent, resourceful and culturally dominant groups. When ethnic hierarchies intersect with class inequality, differences based on economic and cultural/ethnic status converge, thus creating multiple layers of oppression.

Another approach advanced by the circumstantialists is called the "split labor market theory". This approach emphasizes the situations in which the higher-cost dominant labor group loses its position in the labor market due to the incoming cheaper immigrant labor. Under such threat, the members of the former group engage in group formation by emphasizing ethnic or racial boundaries, so as to exclude the lower-cost immigrant workers from the sector.

Finally, in the third approach, which is referred to as the "middleman/ enclave theory, the focus is on the competition between various ethnic groups that are struggling to seize a share of the market. Various ethnic groups, by specializing in a specific area of the economy, try to occupy different business niches (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 62-63).

Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan did a study among the immigrant groups in New York, which revealed that although the second and the third generation of immigrants were not fully assimilated into the American society, they had lost the usage of the language of their parents and grand parents and most of the cultural attributes. The only important characteristic they retained was the name of their ethnic origins. In the course of time new generations developed new attributes that their forefathers would never have recognized. Nevertheless, the individual remained connected to his group through interest ties. In this case, ethnic origin was an intervening variable, which served to connect the people in their survival under the new conditions (Glazer and Moynihan, 1996: 135-138). Glazer and Moynihan's study clearly illustrates the weakness of cultural attributes in group formation. In this case it is seen that even if the migrants lose their cultural attributes, the competition among groups is one of the most important aspect, which contributes to the maintenance of group coherence. For example, immigrants in the USA, who have become Americanized, continue to maintain a consciousness with respect to their roots. This provides them with a framework for group affiliation and solidarity, which are effective and invaluable resources for developing survival strategies. Circumstantialism claims that in case of structural change, the ethnic and racial identities become nonfunctional and no longer provide advantages to the group members. In such situations, the ethnic and racial identities are expected to disappear.

Consequently, circumstantialism sees the ethnic and racial identities as fluid and contingent and the formation of group boundary and group dynamics closely related

to the economic and political circumstances. The notion of ethnic identity serves to mobilize group energy when the group finds itself in competition with other groups for the acquisition of the scarce resources or political power (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 55-67; Somersan, 2004: 29). The above mentioned approaches or models explain only certain aspects of ethnic affiliations and they do not explain cases in which ethnicity is not only based on interest.

2.3 Constructivism

The constructivist approach argues that subjectivity is essential in understanding ethnic identity. For constructivists, ethnicity is a situational and fluid concept rather than fixed unaffected phenomenon. Ethnic groups do not have fixed boundaries. According to the changing circumstances the boundaries of ethnic groups also change (LIobera; 1999). Ethnic identities are constructed through social interaction of group members and the outsiders. Within this context, the designation of others is as important as the self evaluations of the group members. In other words, "what do I think" versus "what do they think" paradigm is one of the important factors in the construction of ethnic groups (Nagel, 1994: 152). Unlike circumstantialism, constructivism sees ethnic identities as reciprocal. "Reciprocity" is the missing element in the circumstantialist approach. For circumstantialism ethnic and racial identities are used by the group members as an instrument for the realization of group interests. However, they provide little insight for the reshaping, reinforcement or transformation of identities.

In the constructivist school of thought, critical notions like "self-ascription" and "assertion" by others are key factors in developing ethnicity. Through interaction groups begin to create assertion and self-assignments. In other words, ethnic identity is a marker forced upon the group by other groups, and group members may respond to these externally imposed markers by the out group. Groups may re-identify themselves accordance with how they are perceived by others. This process could happen by rejecting, accepting or adopting the external labels. The process of constructing ethnic and racial identities, therefore, has an interactive character. Ethnic and racial identities are aroused from the interaction of human assignments and assertion. Thus, it could be said that outside assertion and the group's self-ascription construct the group identity. Group interaction is continuous and dynamic, for this reason ethnic identity can be modified and transformed several times but it can never be finalized (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 74-80).

Barth (1969) challenged the long standing anthropological definition of ethnicity that placed culture in the centre of the concept of ethnicity. In this regard, while for anthropologists the explanation of ethnicity was based on cultural differences among the groups (cf. Jenkins; 1997: 13-14), for the subjective nature of the construction of ethnicity was central. As pointed out by Jenkins, Barth's emphasis was not limited to the content of ethnicity, what he calls "the cultural stuff", but it also included the social processes, which reproduce the boundaries of identification and differentiation between ethnic collectivities. Barth contended that culture in itself does not determine ethnic boundaries; he stated that cultural patterns may be utilized as a signal and an emblem (Barth, 1969: 1-17).

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Parallel to this position, Cornell and Hartmann, emphasize the formation of the three conditions related to ethnic identity construction, which are: "ethnic boundary"; "perceived position" (social interaction); and "meaning". Ethnic boundary is a set of criteria, which distinguishes the group members from other groups. The criteria could be cultural patterns, physical ascriptions or could be another marker, which grants the group uniqueness. Thus, group members and outsiders are distinguished according to the marker of ethnic boundary. Through ethnic boundaries, in the course of encounter among different groups, members are able to recognize the difference between the in-group and the out-group. Consequently, the "*we*" and "*they*" dichotomy emerges. Perceived positions of difference within the dynamics of social interaction unfold into the demarcation of distinct ethnic and racial identities. In addition to this, interactions of distinct groups create a sense of self-assertion. While the group is defined by the neighbors, the group defines itself by comparing itself with the neighbors. Hence, this interaction may create a sense of stratification or status of power. As a consequence of the interaction between groups, groups assign each other certain meanings. Such as "*we are good and superior*" and "*they are bad, evil…*" This restores the group feeling of superiority or supremacy over other groups (Cornell and Hartmann, 1998: 81).

Economic, social and political factors play a role in the formation of ethnic identity. Group boundary is arranged on the principle of collective entities. Hence, state apparatuses and mechanisms (legal frameworks, specific policies, "use of force", education, and media) effect, manipulate and control ethnic groups. This can lead to

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the creation of stereotypes about certain groups (LIobera, 1999). On the other hand, a change in the circumstances that sustain boundary formation will destabilize the borders and make them nonfunctional, eventually leading to the formation of other group boundaries. Other prominent scholars such as Max Weber have pointed out the subjective nature of ethnicity much earlier than the constructivist paradigm. For Weber, "ethnic membership does not constitute a group; it only facilitates group formation of any kind, particularly in the political sphere. On the other hand, it is primarily the political community, no mater how artificially organized, which inspires the belief in common ethnicity" (Weber, 1978: 389). What is essential for Weber is the belief of human groups in their common descent and not an objective blood relationship.

As pointed out by Smith (1991) and as explained in this chapter the concept of ethnicity, which received attention in recent years, has a primordial quality for some scholars and it is situational for some others. However, between these two extreme approaches Smith focuses on historical and symbolic-cultural elements of ethnic identity through emphasizing the role of myths of decent, historical memories and cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions. He also stresses that historical memories are essential for the continuation of an ethnic group, which is the product of specific historical forces (1991: 20). The Russian population, living in Kazakhstan, started to settle into the region in the 17th century. Since that time, they gradually developed an identity which eventually bound them to the Kazakh Steppes. Both during the Russian Empire and the Soviet Period, the state gave them a prestigious position in that society, which strengthened their ethnic

consciousness and institutionalized their privileged socio-economic status. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Russian population in Kazakhstan entered a new era, in which they became a minority in the sociological sense. Therefore, the dynamics of ethnic identification of Russians in the Post-Soviet era can best be understood in the light of the constructivist approach, which allows us the opportunity to consider the new ethnic hierarchy and relations and the policies of independent Kazakh State. In this regard, a brief analysis of the nation and state building policies of Kazakhstan will shed light on the shifts in the perceptions of Russianness among the Russians in Kazakhstan.

2.4 Nation and State Building

As discussed above, the notion of identity is a multi layered concept. It may range from individual identities to collective identities such as ethnic identities or national identity. National and ethnic identities are socially constructed and closely linked to each other. It is important to note that there are contradicting views about the link between ethnicity and nationalism. While some scholars view nationalism as a modern phenomenon (Gellner, 1983), others see continuity between ethnicity and nationalism (Smith, 1991). Considering the institutionalization of ethnicity in the Soviet context, the policies of the Soviet regime and the development of nationalism in the post-Soviet Republics including Kazakhstan, it is possible to argue that the link between ethnicity and nationalism is quite strong. Especially keeping in mind that nationalism in both the Soviet and post-Soviet contexts is understood within an ethno-national framework.

In order to better understand the specific case of Kazakhstan it may be fruitful to focus briefly on Lenin's views regarding nationalism and the Soviet approach. Marxism sees nationalism as transitory phenomenon, which would disappear with the overthrow of the bourgeoisie (Jaffrelot, 1998: 55). Within this understanding, Lenin distinguished two different types of nationalism: nationalism of oppressed nations and nationalism of oppressor nations and maintained that the attitudes inherent in the nationalism of the oppressed nations towards the hegemonic nations should be tolerated (Lenin, 1998: 217-218). It is within this understanding that Lenin supported the ideals of self-determination and the policy of nativization (*Korenizatsiia)* during the early years of the Soviet regime, thus offering the previously oppressed nations or ethnic groups the possibility to develop their cultures within a recognized autonomous national territory. During the *Korenizatsiia* period the major aim of the Soviet regime was to create a Soviet society that is national in form and socialist in content. Thus, politico-autonomous administrative units based on national or ethnic identity was created, but the cultural content of these entities were expected to internalize a socialist discourse. In other words, a homogeneous culture based on socialist ideals was to be created (Tishkov, 1997: 30-33). At this point we can underline the similarities with the views of Gellner about homogenization. For example, according to Gellner, education plays an important role in the process of the homogenization of the society (1983: 36). Through state managed widespread education and curriculum, citizens could be socialized in the direction determined by the state elite. Before the emergence of modern education methods and curriculum, the connection of the central state

ideology and the regional periphery was weak. For this reason communication between the periphery and the center was often limited and difficult (Gellner, 1983: 38). Aside from the role of education as an ideological apparatus in the hands of the state, Anderson draws attention to the vital role of the printing press and language in the nation building process. The adoption of a common state language, which would be the language of every citizen, can potentially eliminate regional and local differences that may obstruct nation building. Parallel to this, with the support of technological developments, central state ideology can easily be extended to the periphery via printed material, particularly daily newspapers. Through, monopoly over the production of ideas and their dissemination becomes possible and the news from the center could easily penetrate the periphery, enabling these them to gradually acquire the norms of the center (Anderson, 1998: 42-44).

This has also been the case in the Soviet context. The Soviet regime used education as the main instrument for creating a common socialist culture. However, it is important to mention that with Stalin the policy of *Korenizatsiia* came to an end as Russian identity replaced socialism as a tool of indoctrination**.** As a result, despite the efforts of creating a Soviet identity, the nationalities policy, which granted autonomy to officially recognized ethnic groups living in the Soviet Union, strengthened ethnic identities. This strengthening was further supported by the discriminatory policies of the Soviet State such as deportation, of unequal treatments of ethnic groups including quota policies. In addition, close encounter among ethnic groups pushed them to maintain their identities since they felt that their ethnic relations to be threatened.

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It can also be argued that the preservation of ethnic identities facilitated the formation of independent states following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as in the case of Kazakhstan. Thus, nation and state building process in Kazakhstan cannot be understood without considering the Russian Empire and Soviet heritage. The views of Hobsbawm can shed a light at this point. Hobsbawm states that not only nations but also nationalism is the product of the social engineering. For Hobsbawm, historically mankind had to reorganize its political structure in order to ensure a more efficient production system. This new political structure was established as "nation state" and nationalism was the legitimate ideology of this political structure. Within this perspective, in order to establish the idea of nationalism in the minds of people, a set of practices and traditions were designed and continuously and explicitly repeated in the public sphere. Rituals, symbols were created to bind the people of the state through the assumption of common origin. In other words, a specific interpretation of history was used to legitimize the group consciousness and cement the group together (1983: 1-12). Establishing a new tradition and culture in the society can be done in two different ways: the first is adapting old traditions and customs to current conditions, the second is to invent new traditions and customs (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983: 7).

In conclusion, in view of the critical overview of the literature above, it seems clear that the constructivist paradigm provides a viable framework for understanding the situation of Russians living in the Kazakhstan. According to this approach ethic identity is contextual and fluid and constructed according to the circumstances.

Therefore, when the circumstances change, the identities are adjusted accordingly. This shows the flexible and subjective nature of ethnic and national identities. The national identities are political and they emerge as a result of the dynamics of interaction among different ethnic or national groups and they are shaped by state policies. The Soviet ethnic understanding and state practices created an ethnic hierarchy in the Soviet Union. During the Soviet Union, the Russians were considered to be the first among equals and they were seen at the top of the ethnic hierarchy. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, however, the Soviet ethnic hierarchy was challenged in Kazakhstan as in other emerging independent republics. From the disintegration onwards, the Kazakhs were placed at the top of the ethnic hierarchy. Considering the dilemma between ethnic and civic agendas in Kazakh nation and state-building process, it could be said that the situation of the Russians in Kazakhstan should be evaluated through the new state policies and ethnic relations. State policies deeply effect the positions of the Russian population in Kazakhstan and their ethnic identification.

Under the current circumstances, there a number of possible outcomes in the transformation of the identity formation of the Russian population in Kazakhstan: They may preserve a strong Russian identity by establishing close contact with the Russian federation; they may develop close ties with non-Kazakh Russian speaking minorities of Kazakhstan to challenge the Kazakh State; they may form alliances with other Russian speaking groups against the Kazakh State; or they may integrate into the Kazakh society and acquire Kazakh identity. It will not be wrong to argue that, the specific profile of the identity (and/or identities) that will develop among

the Russian population in Kazakhstan, will to a large extent be dependent on whether the Kazakh State pursues inclusive or exclusive policies and attitudes of the titular nationality members.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF RUSSIAN EMPIRE AND THE SETTLEMENT OF

RUSSIANS IN THE KAZAKH STEPPES

The policies of Tsarist Russia and the socio-political nature of the Kazakhs Steppes prior to the colonization, period prepared a base for the identity formation of the Russians in the steppes. Furthermore, the pastoral nomadic way of life and the political organization based on tribal confederation of the vast Kazakh Steppes enabled the Russian Empire to easily penetrate into the region and to put their own administrative, economic and political policies into practice without encountering any difficulty. After the abolition of serfdom in the European part of the Russia Empire the Russian peasants, who had settled into the Kazakh Steppes, considered this region their own territory because they had encountered relatively weak resistance as they transferred the steppes according to their way of life. The social organization of the peasantry based on *mir* was also installed in these newly settled lands. These historical conditions prepared the bases of Russian identity in the region.

3.1 Turco-Mongolian Socio-Political Structure

In 1206 the great Mongol leader Chengiz Khan was successful in uniting first all the Mongolian leaders and later on all the tribes of Eurasia and thus enlarging his Confederal Empire from the Caspian Sea to Pacific Ocean. Before his death Chengiz Khan divided his empire among his sons. Within this context the territories

located in the western part of the Balkash Lake and Seyhun River was given to his son Cuci. In 1230, Cuci' son, Khan Batu, invaded today's Russia and in 1294 the Mongol rule reached the eastern part of Europe. Hence, in the year 1242 *Altın Orda* (Golden Horde) was established under the rule of Khan Batu. After the death of Khan Batu his son Berke became the Khan of *Altın Orda*. Under his rule the territories of the *Altın Orda* reached its peak. Following the rule of Toktamış Khan in 1380, the *Altın Orda* Empire entered into recession and disintegrated into four Khanetes: Kazan Khanet, Sibir Khanet, Nogay Khanet and Kırım Khanetes. In 1502 the Empire of *Altın Orda* completely collapsed due to internal confilict. With this disintegration Khan Ebulhayır gained autonomy under the title of Uzbek and settled into Turkistan. The Shibanid rule became hegemon in the region between 1500 and 1510. As understood from the historical background the political formations in the region were large confederations around a Khan. Due to domestic conflicts these confederal structures dissolved and were re-established under the rule of a new Khan. Understanding the Turco-Mongolian socio-political structure is essential to recognize the relatively easy penetration of the Russians into the Kazakh Steppes and the way they perceived the local peoples while constructing their ethnic identity in the new environment.

For Barfield a similar principle of political organization was shared throughout Central Eurasia. In this system the household was the minimal social, political and economic unit called *aul*. Barfield mentions that the term *aul* could be used to define not only a small camp composed of a number of tents but also a campsite with hundreds of tents. The camping groups were formed according to the principle

of patrilineal kinship organization, descendants tracing the male line (Barfield, 1989:145). According to Barfield, the sociopolitical organization in the Eurasian Steppes was based on the model of nested kinship groups or "conical clan". Barfield and Golden defined conical-clan as an extensive patrilineal kinship organization, in which members of common descent groups were ranked and segmented according to the seniority principle (Barfield, 1990:164; Golden, 1998:9). In addition to this, Barfield emphasized the importance of kinship terms, for example elder or younger, junior or senior stressed the hierarchy among the units. Hence, the segmentary lineage structure is hierarchically ranked along these terms (Barfield, 1989:148; Barfield, 1990: 164).

Krader's study also accepted the hierarchical structure based on common ancestry. Krader reached the conclusion, in his study conducted among Kazakhs that the various genealogically binding clans were made up of each of the thress hordes (Krader, 1963: 195). Krader put concepts such as partrilineal-agnaticism, consanguinity and neighborhood at the center of the Eurasian nomadic socio-political structure. For Krader the closest neighbor of the pastoralist was his closest kinsman. The kinsmen dwelling formed nomadic consanguineal villages in which the members of the dwellings were bond to each other through kinship ties. Thus dwellings supported each other by performing basic tasks such as herd caring, and providing protection against outsiders. Krader's definition continued by stating that

> …beyond this core structure the society was organized in a series of widening concentric circles. All steppe families gathered and formed a village and villages combining to form a patrilineage and patrilinages combining to form a clan and clans combing to form clan federations… (Krader, 1963: 368-369).

Additionally, Khazanov provided a perspective which emphasized the role of the economic environment. For Khazanov, the lack of territorial links within the nomadic pastoral way of life, based on mobility, made it essential to put the kinship idea in the center of social expression (Khazanov, 1994: 139). The centre of the nomadic way of production was the family, which was forced to breakup into smaller units in later generations when the already existing pasture lands were not able to subsidize the growing size of the family. The ecological conditions could not accommodate larger families, for this reason each family was forced to break up into smaller units in order to support itself (Golden, 1998:9). Each sibling received his share and left the group and formed his own unit within his father's the territory. Only the youngest sibling stayed with the family (Barfield, 1989: 148).

Accordingly, even though Khazanov pointed out that the ecological conditions force the inhabitants to form smaller units, the political order bound distinct tribes to form greater confederations in order to reach a political goal. In the history of the region, large scale political organizations in the form of *imperial confederac*ies were formed in order to deal with the outside world. For Barfield, imperial state confederacy was maintained through three basic layers. First an imperial confederacy was formed by the ruling lineage. At the second layer were the governors, whose functions were to coordinate communication between the imperial leadership and each indigenous tribe. The third layer was made up of local tribal leaders. The pastoral economy was limited in generating forms of surplus production, which enabled the development of complex structures of labor division and the emergence of social differentiation. This meant that without any other

alternative source of wealth the pastoral nomadic societies were unable to develop any form of separate social structures let alone sophisticated political structures. Therefore, the eradication of huge political structures was common in the history of pastoral nomadism. The societies of Eurasia contributed to the extraction of wealth from other neighboring agrarian based societies in two ways by conflict or control of the trade in order to extract revenues to keep large military units. The wealth taken from neighboring settled societies was distributed equally among the tribe members in order to preserve group unity. The confederacy would not survive without the allocation of loot among the tribes (Barfield, 1989: 14-16).

The main institution of the Turco-Mongol political structure was based on a common descent or kinship relations, which could be fictive or socially constructed according to the changing conditions (Khazanov, 1994: 142; Golden, 1998: 9; Baştuğ, 1999: 84). Under these circumstances, the identity formation was conditional. This meant that each unit established its position according to its place among the other groups, which occupied an equal standing in the overall structure of the opposition. This situation was prevalent in pastoral-nomadic tribal societies (at least in Central Asia). When the structural conditions changed the identity perception was also affected and this resulted in the transformation of identities. Thus, when the structural factors no longer held the groups together, the unity of the groups tended to wane. Along with the transformation of the structure of alliances, the genealogy counting, which was the basic inspiration of group boundary, was recited, when necessary, in order to legalize the new boundaries of identification enforced by the new political alliances. The bases of group identity offer flexible

matrixes upon which forms of alliances can easily be established. Subsequently, a new form of alliance, which may eventually lead to the composition of a higher level of organization such as tribal confederations or states, could be setup (Baştuğ, 1999: 85). Krader's findings, in his study among the Kazakhs, demonstrated that the reorganization of Kazakh clans, even merging with non-Kazakh groups, was possible and showed how genealogy counting could be fictive and be socially constructed according to the changing circumstances (Krader, 1963: 193).[1]

After this brief analysis of Turco-Mongol socio-political formation it is necessary to focus specifically on the Kazakh socio-political structure. "The Kazakh" was one of the steppe confederations, which shared the same environment with other steppe peoples. Their formation traced back to the 16th century. Until the 16th century the region was a mixture of various nomadic tribes which came mainly from Turkic, Mongolic and Hunic ethnic origins[2] (Bennigsen and Wimbush, 1985: 68; Lattimore, 1994: 244). Within this diverse environment, the two Khans from the south, Girey Khan and Janibek Khan, separated from the Shibanid rule and settled in the northern region. Their arrival to the region led to a formation of a new ethno political union called "Kazakh Confederation" (Esenova, 2002: 14; Schatz, 2004: 31). However, the Kazakh confederation was not able to achieve its internal cohesion. Between 17th and 18th centuries the Kazakh *Khan*s and *Sultan*s found

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[1] Soon after the Kereit clan of Great Horde joined the Uzbeks a part of the Kereit clan joined Kishi Chuz. In order to legitimize this unification Kazakhs recited genealogy back to the eponymous founder of the Karakat clan of the Kishi Chuz. Another interesting example is when one of the Kyrgyz clans, Alygai, joined Orta Chuz. They had recited 12 generations back to establish a connection with Orta Chuz. (Krader, 1963: 193).

[2] The references use the term "ethnicity" to denote the various groups but these groups were tribal confederations in the region.

themselves in competition with each other (Bergholz, 1993: 353). Generally speaking the geographic conditions in the steppes led to the emergence of three distinct political entities. In connection with this division, three loosely connected confederations, composed of tribal alliances, were formed: "*Ulu Chuz, Orta Chuz* and *Kishi Chuz*" (Zenkovsky, 1960: 55). *Ulu Chuz* was located in the Semireche region along the rivers *Chu, Talas* and *Ili*. In the summer nomads migrated to the *Ala Tau* mountains. *Orta Chuz* settled in the Syr Darya region and in the summer migrated to the rivers of *Sarysu, Tobol* and *Ishm*. Lastly, *Kishi Chuz* inhabited the region between the Syr Darya and the Ural Rivers and the region between *Irgiz* and *Turgai* mountains. During the summer time people migrated to *Ural, Tobol, Irgiz* and the *Mugodzhan* hills (Olcott, 1987: 11). Each *Chuz* was composed of various subgroups[3], for example *Ulu Chuz* was composed of 12 tribes, which were *Kangly, Sary Usun, Shanshkyly, Ysty, Dulat, Jalair, Alban, Suan, Bes-Tangbaly, Oshakty, Sizgeli and Shaprashy. Orta Chuz* consisted of 5 different sub-groups, which were *Argyn, Nayman, Kypchag, Kungrat and Kerey*.[4] The *Kishi Chuz* was made up of 3 sub-groups, which were *Bay Uly, Zhet Ru, Alim Uly* (Beningsen and Wimbush, 1985: 69).At this point it is necessary to refer to   Hudson, who in his study on Kazakh social structure, emphasized the inefficiency of western terms used to define the Kazakh social structure through giving reference to Czaplicka

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[3] The same tribe names could be found in other tribal confederations as well.

[4] According to one of my interviewees, although she belonged to the *Naiman* clan, she insisted that she was from the *Ulu Chuz*.

> … it is very difficult to define what should be called a clan among the Turks of Central Asia. There seems to be a conception of political groups called, among both Kirgiz and Kazakhs *Uruk* or *Ru*… possibly a confederation of such clans was once called el, while a family affiliated is called by the Kazakh *Taypas* or *Tayfa*… An amalgamation of several sub-clans forms a *Sök*…(cf. Hudson, 1964: 18-19)

As mentioned by Hudson, while some scholars (ie. Samoilovich) used the terms *Sök* and *Byr* in order to designate social groups and blood relationship, others (i.e. Asfendiarov) used the term *Uru*, which covers all divisions of tribes and their sub-divisions. For Asfendiarov the term *Uru* could be used for both a small number and / or thousands of relatives (Hudson, 1964: 18-19).

The studies of Hudson (1964: 19), Kharuzin, Grodekiv and Chuloshnikov demonstrated that although among the Kazakhs a genealogical seniority between the hordes and their subdivision exist, in practice they were not significant (cf. Khazanov, 1994: 174). On the other hand, Klashtorny and Sultanov strongly emphasized the important role of the seniority principle in the Kazakh society. For them social and political privileges in the society were arranged according to the segmentation of each *Chuz* and their sub divisions from above. (Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2003: 353)[5]. In addition to this, we can observe these clans in different confederations. For example the *Naiman* clan could be observed among the Kirgiz and the Kazakh, the *Qangly* Clan could be observed among the Uzbek and the Kazakh and the *Arghyns* could be observed among the Turkmen and the Kazakhs (Schatz, 2004: 32).

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[5] For Klyashtorny and Sultanov the right of seniority was inherited and strictly determined the social hierarchy. According to him the lowest sub-group of the *Ulu Chuz* had a higher position in the social ranking than the highest sub-group of *Orta Chuz*. Sultanov continued his argument and gave some examples: the role in war, the allocation of loot, the order in meetings and the quality of food disturbed during the ceremonies and meeting were determined according to the seniority of each chuz and their sub-units (Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2003: 353).

When we look at the administrative structure of the Kazakh Society, we see that each *chuz* was governed by a *khan* (Wheeler, 1964: 32). The *khan* was elected by the *sultans, bii*s and *aksaqals* (Olcott,1987: 13). Every year *sultan*s, *bii*s and *aksaqals* gathered in the *kurulta*y under the authority of the *khan*. In these meetings the migration was planned and winter pastures were allocated among the groups. *Sultan*s ruled their tribes (*ulus)* and had a certain control over their population. However, the *sultans* knew that they received their power through the groups they ruled (Klyashtorny and Sultanov, 2003: 351). At the lower rank of the Kazakh administrative structure, we could observe *auls* (Bacon, 1980 :35). *Auls* were governed by a*ksaqals* and *bii*s and the internal disputes among other *aul*s and migration were negotiated among them (Olcott, 1987:13). However, the interests of khans and sultans and lower units conflicted most of the time. Although the lower groups accepted the nominal authority of the Khans and the Sultans, they were quite autonomous units and this structure always produced changing temporal alliances in the political structure. Hudson refers to Meyendorff, who emphasized the fact that there was no one khan, which ruled the Ulu Chuz in the 19th century (Hudson, 1964: 63). After the 16th century various tribes were gathered under the rule of Kazakh confederation. However, they could easily separate themselves and join neighboring confederations or vice versa. It is important to mention that this flexible tribal structure, which allowed instrumental confederative alliances, gave room to alliances with the Russians. This political alliance made with the modern power, brought and an end to Kazakh independence.

3.2 Russian Frontier Expansion and Growing Role of the Russians in the Kazakh Steppes

The Russian penetration into the Kazakh Steppes began with the establishment of fortresses, which was followed by the settlement of Cossacks. As a result of the settlement of Russians via creating alliances with the Kazakh Chuzes, the Russians started to transform the socio-political structure of the Kazakh Steppes. Russian frontier expansion started after the fall of Khazan in 1552[6]. When we look at the nature of the Russian eastward advance we clearly see that the gradual Russian penetration started with the establishment of self sufficient fortress lines and the employment of Cossacks in these fortresses (Khodarkovsky, 2002: 132). The Cossack army served the Russian Empire in return for their self-autonomy. They not only protected the lines against nomadic incursions to the Russian territory but also provided a safe haven for colonization within the borders of the newly established fortresses (Donnelly, 1998: 191; Kappeler, 2001: 49). In other words, in the peripheries of the Russian territory, the Imperial state transferred its authority to Cossack groups in return for their loyalty to the Tsar. These semi-autonomous military organizations were not only responsible for the security of colonies but they were also engaged in farming (Donnelly, 1998: 193). Hence, by establishing new fortresses, the Russian state created a periphery, which was later incorporated to the Russian territory. Since 16th century Cossack units settled into the Don,

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[6]Thompson and Lamer defined the frontier as: "…not a boundary or a line, but as a territory between two previously distinct societies. Usually, one of the societies is indigenous to the region, or at least has occupied it for many generations; the other is intrusive. The frontier "opens" in a given zone when the first representatives of the intrusive society arrive; it "closes" when a single political authority has established hegemony over the zone…" (c.f. Clem and Ralph 1981:7).

Volga, Ural (*Yaik*) regions (Kapeller, 2001: 49). The Ural Cossacks built two strategically important fortresses called *Gurev* and *Yaki*. When the Kazakh intrusion started, these fortresses would play an important role in the incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes. Russian and Kazakh relations had started before the 18th century. However, these relations which primarily arouse from the need of the Kazakh Khans to form alliances with Russia against their own opponents and for this reason were not long-lived (Bergholz, 1993: 363; Olcott, 1987: 28, Sabol, 2003: 27). True relations started when the Russian Empire began to seek safe caravan routes, which would bind Russia to rich markets (such as Bukhara and Khiva) located in the south of Syr Derya River.

In the middle of the 19th century the development of industry in Russia necessitated new markets for Russian manufactured goods. At the same time, the industrial growth in Russia also required raw material resources in order to supply industrial production (Demko, 1969: 35). Central Asian, Chinese, Persian and Indian markets would supply the Russian industry, given that Russia was able to expand to those regions. The Russian industry would not only find the necessary market place for its manufactured goods but also control the rich raw material resources of Central Asia. In order to realize this, Russia had to establish first the safety of the routes along the Volga and across the Caspian Sea and then penetrate into the Kazakh Steppes to bind Russia to Central Asia, China, Persia and India (Bergholz, 1993: 362; Becker, 1994: 23; Donnelly, 1998: 203).

Within this perspective, in 1722, Peter the Great decided to take control of the Kazakh Steppes. By doing so the security of Russian trade would be ensured (Wendelken, 2000: 74). Peter the Great did not intend to occupy the Kazakh Steppes, instead he built fortification lines in order to regulate and defend the trade and communication throughout the caravan routes (Wheeler, 1964: 36). Within this context, the Russian government organized several expeditions to the region in order to find the best caravan route, which would enable Russian goods to reach southern markets with maximum security. At the end of the expeditions, the route, which passed through Eastern Turkistan along the Irtish River was selected the best route (Sabol, 2003: l27; Olcott, 1987: 30). Following this decision the Irtish fortress line, which ran across the Irtish river and along the northern steppe region, was built to support the Russian trade. The fortresses were built in the following order Omsk (1716), Semipalatinsk (1718), Ust-Kamenogorsk (1720), Pavlodar (1720), Orsk (1735), Orenburg (1737) and Petropvlovks (1752) (Wendelken, 2000: 74; Demko, 1969: 37; Sabol, 2003: 27; Donnelly, 1998: 204). The fortification line extended along the northern end of the Caspian Sea and along the northern borders of Kazakhstan and reached Omsk. Later this line was extended as far south as *Vernyi* in Semireche Oblast (Bacon, 1980: 92). In addition to the expansion of the fortification line, the colonization of the Kazakh Steppes started with the arrival of the Cossacks in the region[7] (Donnelly, 1998: 200). Hence, three distinct Cossack army units *vosika* were stationed throughout the region. The first group of army units was called Orenburg *vosika*, formed in 1774, and stationed in the region

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[7] The frontier administration did not inquire about the origins of the new comers. Although there were strict regulations to turn away runaways, these regulations were not applied and runaways were secretly allowed into the region (Donnelly, 1998: 2000).

extending from the city of Uralsk to Orenburg. The second group of units was called Siberian Cossack *vosika*, which was established between the years 1730 and 1740. The Siberian *vosika* was stationed along two separate lines: The first line was the *Novaya Ishim* line, extending from Orenburg to Omsk and the second line was called the *Irtysh* line, which stretched along the *Irtysh* River to Semipalatinsk and Ust-Kamenogorsk. The last group of units, Semireche *Vosika*, was formed in 1867 in connection to the expansion of military penetration to the southern part of the steppes (Demko, 1969: 40-42).

After achieving the control of the northern belt of the Kazakh Steppes, the Russian forces focused on penetrating into the Kazakh Steppes, which would later on provide the Russian Empire a logistic base for the annexation of Turkistan. For a successful military operation against the Central Asian Khanates, the Russian Empire needed additional military fortresses deep in the Kazakh Steppes. As a result, four fortresses were built along the *Ema* and *Uir* rivers (in 1820 Kokchetav, in 1826 Baia-Aul, in 1834 Manyghalk). In addition to these fortresses new military outposts were also positioned. From 1845 to 1847 the Turgai (Amengel'dy), Irgiz, Atbasan and the *Novo Aleksandrovsk* line, which stretched from the north western corner of the Aral Sea to southward Semipalatinsk along the Syr Darya River, was built (Donnelly, 1998: 205).

On the other hand, from the perspectives of the Kazakhs we can see that there were several factors, which forced them to enter Russian rule. When the political conditions of the Kazakhs in the early 1770s are examined, it can be said that the

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Kazakhs lost their southern cities of Tashkent, Turkistan and Saray due to the Jungar pressure from the south in the early 1600s. The Kazakhs were forced to move into the new pasture lands located near the *Emba* and *Yaki* Rivers, which were shared between the Bashkirs, Kalmuks and Cossacks. The Jungar in the south forced the Kazakh tribes further north. The Kazakhs sought new territories, which could provide them a safe haven and adequate fresh fodder for their herds. Within this context, the Kazakh clans tried to enter the Russian occupied pasture lands. There were incidents which illustrated the disorder in the region. For example Khan Bukei, who belonged to the nobility of the *Kishi Chuz*, signed an agreement with the Russian Empire, which allowed Khan Bukei and 5000 families to cross the Ural river and reach safe pasture lands. This group later lost their ties with the *Kishi Chuz* and became known *as Bukei Chuz* (Krader, 1963: 253; Alexandrow, 1996). The presence of Kazakhs in the new pasture lands created a discontent among the local population (Bashkirs, Cossacks and Kalmuks) (Khodarkovsky, 2002: 50). Hence, under these circumstances, the Khan Abu'l Khayr recognized the Russian authority and granted Russian caravans safe passage. Furthermore, agreed to the construction of new fortresses in the Kazakh territory. Thus, the Russian protection made possible for Abu'l Khayr to share the same grazing land with Bashkirs and Kalmuks in peace (Sabol, 2003: 29). However, afterwards in many occasions Abu'l Khayr Khan used the Russian card against other Kazakh Sultans. For example Abu'l Khayr Khan asked the Tsar for extra troops and insisted on the construction of new fortresses in the Syr-Darya region, in order to strengthen his authority over the Kazakh Sultans and control Khiva (Khodarkovsky, 2002: 159). We can also

observe similar political maneuvers of Kazakh Khans and *Sultans* of other chuzes[8].

Hence between 1732 and 1742 *Orta* and *Kishi Chuze*s entered into Russian Rule. In 1867, after the annexation of the Central Asian Khanates, *Ulu Chuz* also entered into Russian Rule. Consequently, as long as the tribal chiefs made alliance with Russia and received Russian assistance for their internal and external problems, the Russian Empire gradually extended its permanent fortifications lines into the territories of each Kazakh *chuz*.

As explained above, in this period, the Kazakh Confederation lost its territory in the south and was pushed into northern territories of the region in order to use rich pasture lands, where Russian control was gradually established. The dual interests of the two actors made the relations easy. In the long run the temporary alliances between various Kazakh Sultans and the Russian Empire forced the Kazakhs to live under the rule of the Russian Empire[9].

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[8] For detailed information, see "The Kazakhs" by Martha Brill Olcott (1987: 37-40)

[9] Nowadays, the dynamics of the incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes by the Russian Empire is an important debate among historians and politicians. The annexation and the opening of the region to Russian settlement play a crucial role in legitimatizing the existence of the Russian population during both the Soviet and post Soviet periods. The Russian incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes started with the Kishi Chuz then spread to Orta Chuz and concluded with the annexation of the territories of the Ulu Chuz. However, the incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes has been quite a controversial issue not only during the Soviet period but also today. During Soviet times, there were two distinct historical explanations written on Russian incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes. The first version (1940s) argued that the incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes into the Russian Empire was not voluntary and for this reason, the Kazakh people lost their independence and became Russian subjects. The second version (late 1950s) interpreted the Kazakh incorporation as a progressive and continuous occurrence. After the Abu'l Khayr Khan had recognized Russian authority the ordinary Kazakh people followed Abu'l Khayr Khan's example and voluntarily accepted Russian rule. In addition to this, the 1957 version of historical explanation stressed that people of Kazakhstan voluntarily joined the Russian Empire in order to escape the oppression of native rulers and colonist absorption by British imperialist advancement (Wheeler, 1964: 37-52). This issue is still controversial for several groups. While nationalist Russians and Cossacks defended the thesis of voluntary incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes, the latest version of Kazakh history written after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, strongly stressed the involuntary occupation of Kazakh Steppes. In her article Carolyn Kissane stated that

After the military organization of the Kazakh Steppes was completed, the Russian Empire directed its attention to the south. Three Central Asian Khanates (Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand) were located in the south of Syr Darya River. The annexation of these Khanates had become a very important task for the Russian Empire for a number of reasons. First, they were valuable locations for trade and raw material and by occupying this region Russia would obtain the control of much needed resources for Russian industry. Second, the Kazakh resistance in the steppes found support from these Khanates especially from the Khiva Khanate, which followed an expansionist policy into the Syr Darya and Aral regions, infringing upon Russian interests in the area. Thirdly, the occupation of the region provided the Russians with a strong hold to retaliate against the British advancement in Afghanistan and India. (Olcott, 1987: 72-73; Donnelly, 1998: 205). This annexation pushed the

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the new text books written after the disintegration of the Soviet Union strongly emphasized terms "colonization", "colony", "colonized" and "Russifed" replace the previously used terms such as "voluntary joined Russia" or "progressive annexation" (Kissane, 2005: 56). In addition to this, the terms such as "genocide", "demographic catastrophe" and "ecological crises" were used in relation to the Russian infiltration to the Kazakh steppes. In conclusion, the current interpretation of the process of Russian advancement to the region is that the people of Kazakhstan were "forced", "coerced" and "manipulated" to become subjects of the Russian Empire. Despite their struggle against Russian aggression, in the end the Kazakhs lost their traditions, nomadic way of life and their culture (Kissane, 2005: 57-58). It is possible to argue that, as mentioned previously, the socio political structure molded by the pastoral nomadic life, forced various nomadic groups to form temporal alliances against each other. These kinds of temporary alliances were quite normal for the groups whose socio-political setting was determined by the pastoral nomadic way of production. The expansionist Russia was aware that the alliances with tribal leaders were not permanent. In fact, they were quite fragile and each leader would easily turn against the Russian Empire when the political circumstances changed against Kazakh interest. However, Russia cleverly manipulated the already existing structure and strengthened its position by making alliance with every local leader. These alliances served the short term interests of local leaders and made it possible for the Russian Empire to permanently anchor into the region. Before the Kazakhs, there were many other local groups. The Russian Empire dealt with these groups in the same way. For example: the Kalmuks sought alliance with Moscow against their Nogai neighbors. In another instance, various Kalmuk lords encouraged Moscow to built fortresses on the *Yaki* River against alien Kalmuk groups, which were coming from Jungaria (Sunderland, 2004: 27). From the point of view of tribes, however, the results of building voluntary alliances with Russia was disastrous. In the end Russia invaded the territories of the tribes.

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Russian frontier further south and made the Kazakh Steppes an internal component of the Russian Empire.

The incorporation of the Kazakh Steppes did not only consist of military advancement and construction of fortification lines. The military advancement necessitated an advanced bureaucratic organization, through which the Russian Empire was able to keep order in the newly acquired lands. Without such bureaucratic administration the Russian Empire could not directly be involved in the rule of the Steppes. In other words, without a bureaucratic administration, the Russian presence in the region could only be through the local leaders. Since Russians did not trust the local chiefs, they built the necessary bureaucratic structure, which best served the interests of the Russian Empire in the region.

In this regard, in 1822, the Speransky Reforms were introduced to the region. Through these reforms the Empire gradually aimed to transform the nomadic culture in the direction of the imperial culture and create an administrative apparatus. In other words, by implementing the Speransky Reforms in the region, the government set out to create a high culture, based on the Russian population and Russian imperial moral values. In this way, Speransky aimed at to create an imperial subject, who would be integrated into the European part of the Empire. However, the reforms did not directly attack the values of the native people; instead, a smooth transformation was planned. In this way, any possible resistance against Russian Imperial administration would be prevented. The reforms could be divided into three categories. First, the reforms aimed to draft legislations which

would soften the cultural customs. In this way, the reforms would be legitimate in the eyes of the native people. Secondly, by implementing cultural policies the government targeted to integrate the people of the region to the rest of the Empire. Third, new administrative units were created in the region. By creating an advanced administrative organ, the Russian rule not only made the previous socio-political organization ineffective, but it also created a regime in which people could be easily controlled (Martin, 2001: 36). The Russian rule classified the native population within the ranks of the Russian Empire. This classification served as a guide to Russia in her dealings with the people living in the Kazakh Steppes. In this context, the concept of *inorodtsy* (non-Russian subjects) was used for the non-Russian subjects of the Empire (Wendelken, 2000: 75). Thus, people living in the newly occupied lands were recognized as subjects by the Empire. In other words, the inhabitants of the newly occupied lands received a status in the Russian administration. With *inorodtsy* people gained certain legal rights. For example, they were exempted from military service and their self administration was recognized by the Empire[10] (Kapeller, 2001: 188). Furthermore, the new administrative apparatus needed a new law in order to regulate order in the region. The local customary law of Kazakhs, called *adat* needed to be codified. The officials collected full details and information on the local laws. The harsh and contradicting sections, which opposed the Russian Imperial norms and regulations, were softened (Martin, 2001: 43). In the late 1800s the dual court system was introduced to the region. Civil cases involving local Kazakhs were trialed in the native courts. In

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[10] For detailed information see Speransky's code of indigenous administration (Williams, 2000: 179-182).

these courts, the rules and regulations of the *adat* were applied. On the other hand, at the *volost* and *uiezd* level the Russian courts dealt with the criminal cases (Wendelken, 2000: 77). Consequently, all these modifications in the fields of law, education, administration, culture, economy aimed to complete the integration of this region to the Russian Empire. It could be said that with these adjustments life in the region was restructured according to Russian rationale.

In cultural and economic spheres the Russian Empire used the Kazan Tatars to "civilize" the Kazakhs. By using Tatar merchants a market for Russian goods was created in the region. The Kazakhs soon became good customers of Russian commodities. In 1789 and 1791, under the rule of Catherine II, the Tatar mullahs worked to strengthen Islam in the region with the intension of altering the animistic beliefs of the Kazakhs (Zenkovsky, 1960: 58-59). However, later on it was seen that Islam played a political role serving to unify the Kazakhs with other Muslim groups against the Christian Russian Empire. In other words, Catherine II's policy backfired and united, to a certain extent, all the Muslim groups living in the Russian Empire against Christianity (Benningsen and Wimbush, 1985: 175).

The Russian authorities were disturbed by the spread of the pan Islamic and later on pan Turkic ideas among the Kazakhs. For this reason bilingual Russo-Kazakh Schools, which gave education in both the Kazakh and Russian languages were opened in the Steppes in the middle of 1800s (Carrére d'Encausse, 1967: 174-175). In this framework, Nikolai Ostrovmov, a student of the linguist Ilminskii, did research in the area and made contributions to the education in the Kazakh

language[11] (Brower, 2003: 66). Within a short period of time, the necessary preparations were completed and schools, which gave education in both Russian and Kazakh Languages were opened (Sabol, 2003: 159). This education policy aimed to create a culturally homogeneous society. In other words, this policy aimed to create individuals, who spoke Russian and easily adapted to a European way of life. Thus, it would be possible to create *grazhdanstvennost* (civic russianization), who could be employed in the administrative structure[12] (Brower, 2003: 65-68). Besides education the Russian Empire utilized health services in the peripheries to promote the idea of "advanced Russian", "superior" people, who implement modern and advanced methods in science and education. However, all these policies contributed to the formation of Kazakh nationalism, which later on turned against the Russian presence in the region.

After 1868, the Kazakh Steppes were formally annexed by the Russian Empire and became an integral part of it. For this reason, the introduction of a Western type administrative system was perceived essential by the Emperial governors. With this new administrative structure the Russian Empire aimed to rule over the region more effectively. The region was divided into six oblasts under three separate jurisdictions: Syr Darya and the Semireche oblasts were reorganized under the jurisdiction of the Governor General of Turkistan. The Uralsk and the Turgai

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[11] N. I. Ilminskii emphasized the role of education in vernacular languages in the process of Russianization of the native people of the Russian Empire and claimed that these schools should be based on Russian politics. In this way not only the Russian language and culture could be spread into the peripheries of the Russian Empire but also pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic movements would lose support (Zenkovsky, 1960: 29; Azade-Rolich, 2000: 101-104).

[12] Zenkovsky claimed that the Soviet regime used similar bi-lingual schools to spread the Russian language and culture (Zenkovsky, 1960: 29).

oblasts were included under the jurisdiction of the Orenburg Governor General of Turkistan and Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts were rearranged under the jurisdiction of the Governor General of Western Siberia (Kapeller, 2001: 188; Bacon, 1980: 94). In 1891 the four northern oblasts, Turgai, Uralsk, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk were united under the new Governor Generalship of the Steppe (Wendelken, 2000: 76). In addition to this, each oblast was divided into subdivisions. The lowest administrative unit was called a*ul uzed rodovaia uprava*, which consisted of 50-70 charts (approximately 15 families) and was governed by an elder *or aksaqal*, who was chosen by the group. The *aksaqal* did not receive a salary from the Empire. The *Aksaqal* performed his duty based on customary law and one of his duties was to collect taxes from the *aul* members. The *volost inorodnaia uprava* was the second layer of the new administration. A *volost* consisted of 10-12 *aul*s and was administered by a Sultan or a member of the aristocracy elected by the elders. *Okrug* was at the top of the new administrative structure, it was governed by *prikaz* and the administrative chair, which consisted of two Russians appointed by the Orenburg, the elders, the *sultan* and two elected Kazakh representatives (Sabol, 2003: 32-33; Olcott, 1987: 58-59; Martin, 2001: 39). Furthermore, the new administrative system in the region, assigned the authority of the Khan to the Sultans. Through anti colonial activities status of the white bone *sultans* was defunct and the black bone elite gained status in the ranks of the administrative apparatus.

In addition to this, the new regulation prohibited free migration out of the *okrug* territory. Special permission was required to cross the *okrug* borders. Hence,

territorial delimitation not only restricted the nomadic movements and distorted the main way of production but also the new administrative regulations and restrictions on cross border migrations between the administrative units also disrupted the traditional socio-political formation and the traditional sociopolitical identities (Martin, 2001: 39, Sabol, 2003: 32). The effective implementation of the regulations divided the region into administrative units, which was hitherto conceived by the nomad as a smooth space. Imposing strict boundaries and enforcing the settlement of nomadic groups brought about the eradication of identities, constructed along segmentery lineages.

3.3 Formation of the Resettlement Policy

By 1867, the Cossack armies had already setup 14 settlements in the region. Each army was ruled by a Hetman, appointed by the Tsar. The Cossack armies were divided into settlements and each settlement was composed of 1 to 4 villages. Each settlement was ruled by the Ataman, who was elected by the adult members of the group (Demko, 1969: 42-45). The duties of the Cossack units were not only to protect the region, but also to engage in agricultural production, fishing and small scale trade. In addition to this, the Cossacks controlled vast lands, which were gradually rented out to the peasants or to native Kazakhs (Wendelken, 2000: 74; Denko, 1969: 37). Another important effect of Cossack fortification lines in the region was that they divided the land into smaller sections and administrative units (Wendelken, 2000: 75). However, after the 1860s, the Russian frontier expanded further south and the security concerns of the Kazakh Steppes left its place to the organization and the Russification of the region. Hence, in time Cossack divisions

gradually lost their significance and became obsolete in the eyes of the government officials. A. Koppakovskii, the first military governor of Semireche, complained about the inefficiency of the Cossack divisions. For Koppakovskii, the Cossack units were not able to till the land as efficiently as peasants, the arable lands under Cossack control sooner or later was left in ruins. The Cossack units exploited massive shares of land causing deforestation, which put a heavy burden on the government budget. In other words, Cossack lands were not efficiently used. Lastly, Cossack divisions became a kind of parasitic military estate on the peripheries of the Russian Empire. Because of all these reasons, in 1867, with the advice of Koppakovskii the region was colonized by peasants instead of Cossack military units (Shigabdinov and Nikitenko, 2000: 95; Katsunori and Nishiyama, 2000: 67). However, peasant emigration into the region should be held apart from the Cossack colonization. The Russian government opened Siberia to migration much earlier than the peasant unrest in European Russia in the 1880s and 1890s. The issue of migration was brought to attention in 1821 by Speransky. For him, the migration from European Russia to Siberia had two advantages; the first advantage was to direct population from over populated areas to under populate lands, and the second advantage of the migration to Siberia was to provide extra land for the land hungry peasants, who were trapped in European Russia. Within this framework, the emigration of state peasants to Siberia was accepted. After Speransky, in 1837, the new Minister of State P.D. Kiselev carried on with the existing regulation and in 1843 he provided each state peasant with 15 desiatinas land[13] and encouraged the migration to Siberia. With this policy, approximately 350.000 state peasants were

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[13] 1 desiatina is approximatly 1.1 hectares or 2.75 acres.

resettled in Siberia. Kiselev played an important role to ease the growing tension in European Rural Russia by the end of the 1850s (Treadgold, 1957: 27-29). However, these policies did not entirely solve the problems of the peasantry. The peasant unrest in the European part of the Empire forced the Russian government to recognize the rural problem in European Russia. Despite the potential discontent of the landlords, the Russian government decided to further encourage the migration of peasants to Siberia. In order to realize this in 1881, the government enacted the first legislations on the issue of migration. With the new law entitled *The Temporal Rules For Resettlement*, some of the former legal barriers in front of migration were abandoned. From this date on, the government setup new stations in order to facilitate the migration (Demko, 1969: 58). The next step was taken by the Government and *The Steppe Status of 1891*, which enabled Russian control over the Kazakh Steppes was legislated (Olcott, 1987: 87). Thus, the territories of Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semireche, Turgai and Uralsk were seized by the Russian state (Wendelken, 2000: 79). Article 120 was the most striking item of the 1891 Steppe Law, which stated that "the land excess of Kazakh needs" was to be given to the Public Fund controlled by the Minister of State Property. Since 15 desiatinas land was allocated to each household, households which had more than 15 desiatinas land was considered to own "excess land". In this way, land was reclaimed under article 120 of Steppe Law and the Russian government was able to create large agricultural settlements in the region.

In 1892 the Siberian Rail Road Committee started research expeditions so as to extent the railway line. The research team determined the best places for agriculture

and the railway line project was planed to pass through these regions. At the first stage, from 1894 to1900, the length of the railway was extended from Chelyabinsk to Omsk and from Omsk the railway reached the Ob River. At the second stage, the railway line reached Lake Baikal and eastern Siberia. With this project, the railway committee offered incentives, such as reduction in transportation costs to people who wanted to migrate (Becker, 1994: 31; Demko, 1969: 59-96). The census carried out in 1897 showed that the 12% of the total population of the Kazakh Steppes were Russian. However, this number increased after the 1896 Resettlement Administration, which led to intensify Russian colonization in the Kazakh Steppes (Becker, 1994: 32; Wendelken, 2000: 77).

In 1899, the Resettlement Act was initiated. Although these regulations still required permissions for migration, they provided incentives for migration (Demko, 1969: 58-59). With this new government provision, the government provided settlers with 15 to 30 desiatinas land, interest free loans and 3 years tax exemption (Becker, 1994 :31; Katsunori and Nishiyama, 2000: 68). In addition to these promotions additional interest free loans approximately 30 to 100 rubles were provided for people, who wanted to migrate (Demko, 1969: 59). Consequently the resettlement Act caused a rapid population growth in the Kazakh Steppes.

3.4 Social Organization of the Russian Peasantry

The social order of the Russian peasantry was based on collective organizations, composed of large patriarchal families (Skocpol, 2004: 252). Usually three generations lived under the same roof called *izby* (Dixar, 1999: 87-89; Pipes, 1974:

43). The family was headed by the grandfather, in case of the grandfather's death the household was headed by the oldest son or under some conditions, the family could be headed by a women. The head of the family was called *Khozaiin* or in some provinces *Bolshak* (Wallace, 1961: 256-258).

The *mir* or o*bshchina* were communal units, made up of large households (Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 9; Dixar, 1999: 89). Under this communal organization each household assumed collective responsibility for their legal obligations (Wallace, 1961: 29; Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 11). The soil was collectively tilled and the commune was collectively responsible for the produce and taxes. The *mir* was governed by the village elders, called *Storosty,* who were elected among the adults of the commune. The elected members were gathered in the assembly, called *Skhod,* and the *mir* was governed according to the customary law (Dixar, 1999: 89). The communal administration was responsible for the organization of each household collectively. The time of harvest, tax collection and in case of demand, the required number of soldiers was determined by the communal administration (Dixar, 1999: 89; Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 9). The soil was allocated among the families according to the size of each family. The larger households received larger shares than smaller households. In addition to this, the land was periodically redistributed among the households, according to changes in the household composition (Skocpol, 2004: 252).

In the Russian Empire there were two kinds of peasants. The first group was called *Gosudorsrtvennye Krestiane* or state peasants; they were bound to the land, but they

were not serfs. They answered to the Tsar and inhabited estates owned by the crown, secularized monastic or church holdings (Pipes, 1974: 144; Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 9). They had to pay tax (higher than property peasants) and fees to the state. It was strictly forbidden for the peasant to leave the village without the permission of the *mir* (Pipes, 1974:146). If the peasant desired to leave the village permanently, he had to find somebody, who would purchase his house, equipment and develop his allotment (Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 9). When a peasant wanted to leave the *mir*, he needed to find someone, who would assume this duty during his absence. After receiving approval from the authorities a passport was issued for the peasant. The second group of peasantry was called *Pomeshchc'i Krestiane* or property peasants. They were classified as serfs, strictly attached to the land under the authority of the Land Lord and they did not have the right to leave the commune (Dixar, 1999: 84-86). If a peasant run away the whole commune was held responsible for the absence (Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 9). In short, the Russian peasants were attached to the land and the only way to leave was through a satisfactory guarantee for the fulfillment of the peasants' tasks in the commune (Hugh, 1985: 271; Dunn and Dunn, 1998: 9).

3.5 Abolition of Serfdom in 1861 and Its Impact on the Kazakh Steppes

> The commune is a living principle among our peasantry …We have to recognize its existence, its salutary and powerful influence on the peasants… (Its abolition would) would give rise to true chaos…If we did not have such a communal system as now exist, we would have to create it; …With communal emancipation, the land will remain common property; consequently, there will be no difficulties with the organization of arable, pasture and other lands. (Moreover), as the population grows, the land will be repartitioned, and again all workers will receive land and landless will…remain within its present limits. Such an order is not an utopian invention, it already exists on many well-organized noble estates (cf. Macey and David, 1987: 5).

The social unrest in the society and Nikola I's oppressive regime reached its highest level during the Crimean War (Volin, 1970: 13). The Crimean defeat was a turning point in the organization of the agrarian structure in the Russian Empire. According to the officials, the main reason of the Crimean defeat was economic underdevelopment and outdated agricultural policy, based on serfdom (Emmons, 1968: 43; Volin, 1970: 40). Throughout the war peasants displayed disorder, this created obstacles for the Russian military and affected the faith of the battle[14]. Hence, the growing disorder among the majority of the population forced Tsar Alexander II to find a solution to the problem of serfdom (Hugh, 1985: 41). Alexander II immediately decided to reform the ineffective agricultural policy from above; otherwise the system would have abolished itself from below through the uprising of the peasantry (Volin, 1970: 40, Pipes, 1974: 163). In 1859, with the initiative of Alexander II the Special Editing Commission was formed and the problem of the agrarian question was brought to its attention (Macey, 1987: 6). Although the commission was in favor of the abolition of the peasantry, the main difficulty in front of the commission was the reaction of the nobles. The nobles could not survive without the exploitation of the peasantry (Korelin, 1995: 140) and the authorities believed that the immediate absolute freedom of the serf would cause mass movements, which would set off social unrest and make

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[14] Especially English and French forces manipulated twelve thousand villagers in Ekaterinoslav and Khersan near Crimea (Emmons, 1968: 49). In 1858, the population of the Russian Empire reached 68 million. 40% of the total population was composed of peasants (Carrere d'Encausse, 2003: 152). Hence the growing number of peasant population and the horrific agrarian system of the Russian Empire caused disorder in the countryside. For example between the years 1840 and 1855 the number of violent uprisings had reached 400 and the number of incidents rose from 1855 to 1860 (Hugh, 1985: 41). During the war there were several rumors about the issue of the abolition of serfdom. Many people joined the army in return for their freedom. The disorder surrounded rural Russia and approximately 144 *pomeshchik* were killed by the serfs, who refused to obey traditional obligations (Emmons, 1968: 48).

collection of taxes impossible (Pipes, 1974: 164). For these reasons, the government authorities decided to retain the commune system (Carrere d'Encausse, 2003: 152).

However, under these conditions, in 1861, the serfdom was legally abolished in the Russian Empire. With the abolition, the peasantry was freed of the landlords. The title of the allotment lands were handed over to the peasant communes instead of the individual peasants (Hugh, 1985: 43; Pipes, 1974: 165; Volin, 1970: 54). The new rule allowed the former serfs to purchase commune land from the former landlords with a government loan (Carrere d'Encausse, 2003: 152). On the other hand, the redemption payment was the collective obligation of the whole commune. For this reason individuals were not allowed to leave the commune without paying the redemption cost[15]. The peasant who wanted to leave had to first compensate his share or find someone, who would purchase his share. Furthermore, the approval of both the commune administration and the state were required. Only under these circumstances could the peasants leave the communes, which they belong to (Skocpol, 2004: 252).

In reality the abolition of serfdom did not change the commune system, which was the main source of social unrest, but tilled the seeds of further social turmoil in the society. With this new regulation the authority and status of the landlord were abolished but the notions of collective membership and collective allotment of the

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[15] 80% of the total value of the land was covered by the state, the remaining, was paid in installment, over 49 years, as redemption payment (Hugh, 1985: 43; Skocpol, 2004: 252).

commune land was seen as the fundamental nature of the peasant life in Russia (Robinson, 1967: 66-76).

However, after the abolition the situation of the peasantry became worst. The land was not distributed fairly. The former landlords kept the best land for themselves and distributed the lower quality land among the peasantry[16] (Volin, 1970: 48). Population growth was another factor, which made the already existing conditions worst in the country side. The rapid population growth, at the same time, brought the demand for additional agricultural land[17] (Hugh, 1985: 110).

Hence, peasants were left to their own recourses. While the poorest peasants were engaged in share cropping or paid laborer, peasants who relatively well-off rented additional land from the landlords were for higher prices (Skocpol, 2004: 255; Pipes, 1974: 167; Hugh, 1985: 111). But this resulted in the inflation of land and a drop in agricultural produce prices. When we look at the picture from the point of view of sharecrops, the situation was not better. The fierce competition for land

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[16] While a normal household needed approximately 8-15 desiatina, after the reform the peasantry received only 2.6 to 4.8 desiatina lands per household (Korelin, 1995: 143). The inadequate amount land per household resulted in poor cultivation and a drop in the amount of yield per acre. In addition to this, land holdings were distributed incontinently. This created an additional handicap for the agriculture. Volin, in his book, defined this problem as "mouse trap" and argued that access to the spontaneously distributed lands, which could be reached by passing through the former landlords' territory, created problems with former landlords. The lack of essential elements for effective agriculture also created obstacles for the Russian peasantry. These elements were pasturelands, forests, water sources. All these elements were easily accessible before the reform, but now these subsidiary elements were kept under the control of the former landlords and for this reason free access of these sources by the peasants were severely restricted (Volin, 1970: 48).

[17] The annual population growth in Russia was 1.8% and the total population of Russia increased from 65 million to 125 million between the years 1856 and 1889. This 50% increase was mainly observed in the European part of the Russian Empire (Pipes, 1974: 167;).

strengthened the position of the former landlord so that they were able to hire cheap labor and this enabled them to make higher profits by exploiting the labor of the peasants (Volin, 1970: 74). Consequently, heavy taxes and redemption payments (fiscal burden, social and economic disabilities and population growth) made life difficult for the peasants forcing the status of the peasants to shift into semi-serf[18] (Pipes, 1974: 167-168; Korelin, 1995: 143).

All these problems created tension in rural Russia. In order to reduce explosive tendencies, the government took preventive measures. Within this perspective a Peasants Bank was setup so that peasants could get credit to buy extra land. Peasants were encouraged to leave the commune and move to Siberia or Central Asia. In 1886, the poll tax was abolished. In 1894, the Peasant Bank reduced interests on loans. In 1896, redemption payments were postponed and land tax was reduced (Korelin, 1995: 146; Macey, 1995: 166-167). However, some reforms implemented to extinguish social unrest resulted in failure. Prior to the crop failure and big famine in 1891-1892 the agrarian problem had already become a critical issue (Macey, 1995: 167). In the early 1900s, the agricultural disturbance reached its peak and several uprisings occurred in the Russian countryside. During these riots the property of the rich land holders and former landlords were looted. These

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[18] In February 1870 only the 55% of the total peasants could pay the redemption cost and 20 years after the abolition of serfdom the 20% of the peasants were still repaying their debts to the state. The main problem of the redemption payment was that it was much higher than the actual value of the abolished land. In the northern region, the redemption price was 90% higher than the real price of the soil. On the other hand, in the southern districts of the country, the redemption price was 20% higher than the real price of the land. At the same time, the allocated lands were not feasible. Thus the peasants could not get adequate surplus yield to pay their debts (Volin, 1970: 51-52).

uprisings and uneasy atmosphere forced the government to reexamine the immigration policy. In 1902 the decision was made to allow people from overpopulated areas to migrate to less populated regions. Within this perspective, in 1904, the government passed the Resettlement Act, which legalized the peasant migration from European Russia to the Steppes (Katsunori and Nishiyama, 2000: 70-71).

After 1904, all former restrictions prohibiting migration were abolished. The new reforms proposed to break the severe peasant uprising in European Russia between the years 1905 to 1907. For administrative purposes the Eastern part of Russia was divided into 12 distinct settlements and 5 out of these 12 settlement regions were within the territories of the Kazak Steppes, and further plans were made to increase the settlements in the region (Demko, 1969: 60; Becker, 1994: 32). Finally with the Stolypin reforms in 1906, the communal organization of the peasantry was abolished and an end was brought to redemption debts and the migration problem was completely solved in the Russian Empire.

Following the incorporation of the steppes to the Russian Empire, the region was officially divided into six main regions: Uralsk, Turgay, Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Semireche and Syr Darya. In addition to these main administrative divisions, each region was also subdivided into smaller units. These administrative divisions brought new norms and regulations, which previously had not been present in the region. From then on, the organization of production and regulations in the region were rearranged according to the new principles.

As mentioned by Demko, the growth of the Russian population and the new priorities such as exploiting the economic resources of the region necessitated a new administration in the region. Between the years 1897 to 1916 the Russian population in the region increased to 56% and reached the total number of 1.250.000. In the beginning, the region was colonized by the Cossacks for security purposes, but with the changes in the Russian Imperial dynamics, the government utilized the region to accommodate peasants from the overpopulated European part of Russia. Since the migration had a rural character and the northern part of the Kazakh Steppes was the most suitable area for agriculture, the main region, which received the most settlers, was the Northern Kazakh Steppes. In time Russian peasants occupied 75% of the four northern Kazakh regions. New Russian comers found better opportunities in the region when compared to the conditions in the European part of the Russia. The regular allocation of 5 desiatinas of land in European Russia was increased to 39.9 desiatinas in the Kazakh Steppes. Through migration the Russian peasants received larger farm land; at the same time they were better equipped. For example the statistics reveal that while 29.6% of the peasants had a metal plough in European Russia, this increased to 81.7% in the Kazakh Steppes. All these improvements increased the capital and the birthrate of the Russian population in the region. Again the statistics demonstrated that the average capital rate increased from 239 to 466 ruble. At the same time, a 10% increase in the birthrate was observed. When the birth rate of the Russian population living in the Kazakhs Steppes and the Russian population living in

European Russia was compared, the birth rate had increase from 22% to 33% (Demko, 1969: 192-196).

Although, the Russian migration had a rural character, the migration of the Russian peasants in the region also affected the urbanization in the Kazakh Steppes. While the rate of urbanization in the region was 7% in 1897 this rate increased to 11% in 1916. The cities became the main trade centers in the region. The goods were exported to Moscow, St Petersburg and China from these centers and at the same time manufactured goods were imported into the cities and were redistributed to the rural areas from these centers (Becker, 1994: 32). In other words, the region became a market for Russian manufactured goods, which were sent to the rural regions in return for raw materials and semi fabricated products. Grain, cattle, and butter were the most important produces exported out of the region (Demko, 1969: 145-149).

On the other hand, with the Russian inflow to the region life was rearranged according to Russian interests. This change had a deep impact on the life styles of the native Kazakhs. With this transformation the native people were encouraged to settle in villages and chose a life style based on the new norms which were brought into the region with the Russian immigrants. The first step of the Russian administration was to change the pastoral nomadic life and force the natives to choose a settled way of life. With the newly established settlements and administrative units the Russian officials planned to include each kin group within the *volost* administration. Since bureaucratic procedures were required to travel between *volost*s each kin group was forced to move within the borders of a *volost*.

Most of the nomads settled in their winter camps and gave up pastoralism. Becker (1994: 32) states that 30% of the Kazakh chose a sedentary way of life. At the same time 33.4% of the total agricultural lands of northern oblasts were cultivated by the Kazakhs. In order to encourage the Kazakhs live in settlements, a plot of 15 desiatinas was given to each household as their private property. The size of the land given to the elders was 30 desiatina and 50 desiatina lands were given to the Sultans. Those who refused to accept the settled way of life were forced to seek alternative migration cycles, which were mainly in the southern arid regions. This situation caused the productivity of the pastoral nomadic economy to drop.

Another Russian modification was the introduction of the concept of market and various consumption goods to the region. In this context "money" was another new concept, which came in to the Steppes with the growing market and was ingrained into the mentality of the Kazakhs. The native Kazakhs, who were not familiar with these new market terms, suddenly found themselves entrapped by moneylenders who extracted 100% interests. With the new market native Kazakhs also acquired new skills, such as black smith, wood working and carpeting. On the other hand, the weakening tribal structure and deterioration of pastoral nomadic way of production gave way to the formation of new deprived and richer classes. While the person, who lost his herd, could compensate his lost by working for one of the richer associates, after the colonization the compensation of loses became impossible. The poor nomads were forced to settled down and work as a paid labor (Demko, 1969: 184-192).

All these developments changed the nature of the Kazakh Steppes permanently. From this period on, The Russian political system and population became hegemon in the Kazakh Steppes.

Consequently, when the Russian presence in the Kazakh Steppes is evaluated it is seen that the socio-political structure of the region and the Kalmuk invasion from the southern part of the Kazakh Steppes disturbed the Kazakh autonomy, making the Russian penetration relatively easily. Shortly after, political, economic and administrative organizations were implemented according to the interests of the Russian Empire. From the Russian point of view the region was civilized through the Russian settlement. The migrant peasants not only opened the region to agriculture but also under certain circumstances defended their land against Kazakh rebels. Within this context the migrant peasants developed the idea that the region belonged to the territory of the Tsar and they were the subjects of the Tsar. Hence the Kazakh presence started to be questioned by the settlers. The migrant Russians continued to live under their traditional village structure called *Mir*. The newly established villages were built in the same style as the villages in the European part of the Russia and their traditional way of decision making was preserved. The villages were named after their previous villages in European Russia (Brower, 2003: 130-134). The government initiated immigration, brought with itself a written code of law, education, administrative structure and settled way of life, enabling the Russian identity to strengthen its presence in the region. On the other hand, the territorial loss of the Kazakhs and the encounter of two alien cultures created major problems in the region. These problems lead to the formation of the idea of the

"colonizer Rus". All these developments caused both Kazakhs and Russians to define each others identities. The Kazakhs perceived the Russians as colonizers and this idea was also strengthened during the Soviet regime. This image of "colonizer Rus" also influenced the policies of the post-Soviet Kazakh nation and state building policies. However, Russians believe that they had been given the mission to develop the region and the locals, the Tsar. This perception of "civilizing mission" continued also during the Soviet period and continued to shape the identities of both groups.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOVIET PERIOD AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE RUSSIAN

PRESENCE IN KAZAKH SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

(KAZAKH SSR)

When the Soviet politics towards the Kazakh Steppes is analyzed, it is clearly seen that the Soviet regime received the legacy of Tsarist frontier expansionist policies. Although during the first years of the socialist revolution the national cultures were supported by the regime, with Stalin this support was given only to the Russian culture in the USSR. The industrial and agricultural projects brought Russian migration to the steppes and changed the demographic balance of the region in favor of the Russians. In addition to this, the new comers arrived with the mission to construct the Kazakh SSR. This enforced the notion of the "Russian elder brother". Consequently during the Soviet period, as we will see in this chapter, the Russian identity was reconstructed and strengthened in the Kazakh SSR and especially in the northern part of the country, to a large extend as a result of the policies of the regime.

4.1. Soviet Nationalities Policy and Policy Shift Under Stalin

Lenin and his comrades organized a socialist revolution in Russia in the hope of creating a socialist society in which the entire national and class differences would be liquidated. According to Lenin, the appropriate way to establish a socialist regime in Russia went through the political, economic and cultural equalization of all ethnic groups. The Leninist model was based on the principles of "flourishing"

(rastsvet) and "merging" (sblizhenie) (cf. Schroeder, 1990: 43). In other words, the socialist merging of nations could only be possible after each ethnic group reached the level of nationhood. For this reason Lenin gave importance to the concept of national self determination for all oppressed nations. Through self-determination oppressed nations could reach their national consciousness and develop their national cultures before merging in the socialist state (Kolstoe, 1995: 73).

That is why the nationalism of smaller nations was tolerated for the elimination of the Great Russian nationalism. As mentioned by Kolstoe, Lenin stated that non-Russians who were oppressed during the Tsarist Empire should be treated as a single social class (Kolstoe, 1995: 73). Under socialism, national culture should be socialist in content and national in form. This was the main objective of the Soviet regime. To accomplish this objective, masses had to be educated with the spirit of socialism and internationalism aiming at creating a Soviet identity. So without a socialist content the national form of culture is used as a mask for bourgeois nationalism. Lenin defined federalism as a "transitional" form to complete the unification of various nations. In other words, federalism was to be a preliminary regime towards centralizing state power in multi-national areas. (cf. Smith, 1990: 5) In this regard, national territories were established and nations were provided with all the facilities necessary for cultural reproduction.

The main policy adopted during the early Soviet period was *Korenizatsiia* (nativization). With *Korenizatsiia* each officially recognized nationality acquired its own national territory had the opportunity to develop its culture and language.

Beside this, officially recognized ethnic groups had certain privileges in their territories and these privileges were granted by according to quota system (Smith, 1990: 73).

However, the relatively free atmosphere of the 1920s due to the *Korenizatsiia* policy came to an end with the Stalin period. Under Stalin, the Soviet nationality policy changed and the policy of *Korenizatsiia* ended. The state became more centralized, and the republics lost most of their political autonomy. National communism was destroyed the leaders were imprisoned or executed and all forms of nationalism were punished. In March 1938, the Russian language was made compulsory along side other native languages in all non-Russian schools (Nahaylo and Swoboda, 1989: 131). Hence the Russian language became a communication and science language for the whole union. In addition to political constrains, Stalin imposed restrictions on the economic autonomy of the national units. It is possible to argue that the content of Soviet identity which had to be socialist and internationalist started to be composed of elements of Russian culture. In the late 1920s, the Supreme Council of the National Economy (VSNK) acquired more control and applied monopolization over national units and the economic autonomy of national units were curtailed. Their decision making and control over economic activities were strictly controlled (Ericson, 1992: 241-245). The vast industrial development that took place under Stalin entailed important waves of migration of Russians from RSFSR to Soviet republics and also to Kazakh SSR[19]. Under Stalin's

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[19] The Kyrgyz ASSR developed, in course time, into the Kazakh SSR. In 1920, the Kyrgyz ASSR was formed with the incorporation of the Uralsk, Turgai, Akmolinsk, and Semipalatinsk regions and the city of Orenburg was declared the capital city of this autonomous republic

directives a union wide production network was constructed. Within this network new production facilities were distributed to various parts of the Soviet Union. New factories and heavy industries were opened in the peripheries. However, because of the lack of qualified native workforce, the new industrial work places were filled by workers of Russian and Slavic origin. Accordingly, 1200 qualified miners and technicians from Donets Basin of the RSFSR were sent to coal mining districts of Kazakhstan. Beside this in 1935 170 fully trained medical doctors were sent to Kazakhstan. No one knows how many Russian left RSFSR voluntarily but their social standards were better than the native people or other diaspora groups within the Soviet Union (Simson, 1991: 117-128). The Russian immigration to the peripheries of the Soviet Union changed the demographic balance in the Kazakh Steppes.

It is important to note that as Simson mentions, Stalin saw the Russians as the guarantor of the regime as opposed to Lenin; and he argued that the nationalism of small nations endanger the regime (Simson, 1991: 119). These policy changes that took place under Stalin strengthened the position of the Russians in Soviet republic. Since the population of the Russian workforce was larger than the native workforce in the non-Russian areas in the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians had a leading position. Hence, it was clear that the Stalin's new policy had an effect of

(Akiner, 1995:34). In the early 1920s the Kyrgyz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was a part of the RSFSR (Coates, 1969: 118; Caroe, 1969: 115). In may 1925, the boundaries defining the territories of the Kyrgyz ASSR was reorganized and as a result of this reorganization the territories of "Government General of Turkistan" was added to the Kirgiz ASSR and the Karakalpak region, located in the south west of the Kazakh Steppes, was left to the Uzbek SSR. In 1936, the Kazakh SSR acquired the status of Soviet Socialist Republic (Coates, 1969: 118-140; Caroe, 1969: 145).

Russification (Kolstoe, 1995:73). The status of Russian heightened into "Elder Brother". Kazakh Steppes were one of the regions where important numbers of Russians migrated. The main objective of the Soviet authorities in the Kazakh Steppes was to challenge the existing traditional structure, which was based on kin groups and perpetuated by the Muslim doctrine, and to industrialize the region and introduce the settled way of life in order to transform the social structure (Dunn and Dunn, 1967: 149; Lane, 1975: 171).

4.2 Changes in the Soviet Nationalities policy and Increasing Role of Russians in Administrative, Economic and Social Structures.

The *Korenizatsiia* period in Kazakhstan was characterized by a limited room for private ownership, a cultural development and nativization in the administrative and party structure. However, these policies were challenged in 1930s and the power of Russians and the policies of Russiafication were intensified as already mentioned. Considering the agricultural policy, it can be said that during the time of Lenin, the main philosophy of the New Economic Policy was to give some freedom to the poor strata in the society (Caroe, 1967: 175). In this context, the deprived groups were allowed limited private ownership in agriculture (Olcott, 1987: 162). They were allowed work on their lands, raise their animals and sell their produce in the market. On the other hand, the system aimed to remove wealthy landlords from society (Caroe, 1967: 175). For Soviet understanding the *biis* in the Kazakh society were the counterparts of the land rich *Kulaks* in European Russia and within this framework, the *biis* had to be eliminated like the k*ulak*s in European Russia. However, even though the *bii*s were seen as "exploiters" similar to the *kulaks*, in

fact they were more than just the owners of production in the Marxist sense; these wealthy landlords were the heads of kin groups and the traditional leaders of the Kazakh society. Moreover, they continued to retain their authority within the Kazakh society after their property had been expropriated by the state (Dunn and Dunn, 1967: 155; Olcott, 1987: 162). The Soviet state created collective farms by redistributing the expropriated land and cattle to the poor (Matley, 1967b: 302).

In late collectivization was intensified and became very harsh (Olcott, 1981: 125). The agriculture was organized under collective units[20]. The training of the farm workers, personnel's training was also an important issue for the transformation of agriculture because collectivization and mechanization of agriculture required a highly trained labor force. The native farm workers were inefficient in using new machinery and techniques (Dunn and Dunn, 1967: 149). In order to provide technological assistance and training sent to the region (Olcott, 1981: 127). In addition, the Soviet authorities sent 650 Communist Party members to the rural districts as political control agents. The role of these people was to work in MTSs[21] and to demonstrate a model of the Soviet life to the local population (Dunn and Dunn 1967: 154). Consequently, it was seen that the collectivization of agricultural units not only aimed at increasing the production but also enabling the Soviets to

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[20] The collectivization produced a strong resistance in the steppes. People preferred to slaughter their livestock and in the years 1930 and 31 around 10-15% of the Kazakh population left the country. As a result of collectivization the population of the region was divided into collective units, which were called k*olkhoz*'s (Olcott,1981:130).

[21] MTS (Mashinno- Tractornaia Stantsiia) became the tool of the Communist party, through which the rural areas were controled. During the Soviet Union peasants were not allowed access to machine stations. The machinery was in the hands of agronomists, who were sent from the center (Chizuko, 2002:117).

easily reach the rural districts. In this way party politics and propaganda could be carried out efficiently.

Related to the nativization of administrative and party structures one has to point out that in order to form a legitimate authority in the region, Bolsheviks encouraged native Kazakhs to seek employment in the government, communist party and administration. According to the Bolsheviks, each nation could govern itself. When the statistics are examined, it is clearly seen that since the 1920s the Bolsheviks drew many native members to the government. For example, in the 1925-26 elections, held in 60 *volost*s and 588 village soviets, the distribution of the voters showed that, out of 7541 deputies, 53.3% were Kazakh and 46% were non Kazakh. On the other hand, the figures from three urban soviets indicated that while 20.2% of the deputies were Kazakhs the majority 67.9% were non Kazakh members. A similar trend can also be observed in the 1927 elections too. The elections were held in 17 out of 34 *uezds* and 1631 out of 3881 village soviets. The distribution of the votes was as follows: 62.6 % Kazakhs, 11.1 Russian, 2.7% Karakalpaks and 1.1% Uzbeks (Cherot, 1955: 46). However, after 1926, when the soviet authority began to show its presence and the Russian migration started from the Russian Federation to the peripheries of the Soviet Union, the ethnic composition of the Kazakh Soviet began to change in favor of the Russians. When the results of 1927 and 1929 elections are compared the changing ethnic balance can be clearly observed. While in 1927 the Kazakhs constituted the 61.1% of all chairman in the all village soviets, in 1929 they constituted the 48.3%. On the other hand, while the 18.5% of the village soviet membership was composed Russians in 1927, their representation

increased to 21.8% in the 1929 elections. In addition to village soviets, the percentage of Russian representation on the Revision Commission of rural soviet increased from 22.3% to 29.9%. The same increase (from 18.5% to 33.6%) can be observed in the Central Executive Committee (Cherot, 1955: 48). On the other hand, when the ethnic composition of the City Soviets is examined, it is seen that the majority is composed of Russians. The reason behind this Russian domination is that Russians constituted more than 50% of the city population in Kazakhstan (Cherot, 1955: 46).

Although during the 1920s the Soviet structure of the Kazakh ASSR was relatively nativized, the native majority was not observed in government administration and the Communist Party of the Kazak ASSR. When the ethnic compositions of these two institutions are compared, it is clearly seen that the government administration and the Communist Party was dominated by the Russians. For example, while the 26.6% of the administrative body was composed of Kazakhs, the Russian were the dominant group with 70%. The same trend can also be observed in the Communist Party. A majority of 60% of the party members were composed of Russians while only 25% were Kazakh. This distribution could be explained by the low literacy rate of the Kazakhs in addition to their inefficient command of the Russian language. Since the Russians were relatively better educated than the Kazakhs, they dominated these state organs (Cherot, 1955: 49-50). According to David Lane, in 1924, 2000 members of the Kazak ASSR were illiterate and were composed of mullahs and *bii*s. Lane stated that 58% of Russian men and 34% of Russian women were literate, the literacy rate for Kazakh men was 12% and Kazakh women was

1% (Lane, 1975: 171-174). In other words, the new soviet apparatus was constructed upon the existing traditional social hierarchy. According to Matha Brill Olcott, due to the clan rivalry, the leaders of clans entered the soviet in order to gain advantage against each other (Olcott, 1987: 158-208).

At the end of the 1920s, while the administration and communist party were composed of Russians, in the majority of cities the *aul*, *volost* and *uezd* Soviets remained in control of the traditional leaders. Naturally, this situation was a serious obstacle in front of the progress of "merging" of all nations, since it prevented the awareness of class consciousness and encourage the continuation of traditional clan structure within the system (Lane, 1975: 176). The central role of the Kazakh family remained unchanged, the authority of the *aksaqal*s was strong and the elders were still in power and customary practices were as important as before. The local party structure was controlled by clan and clerical leaders (Olcott, 1987: 172).

According to the Soviets the traditional education and religious institutions perpetuated the traditional way of life. Thus, in order to establish the Soviet institutions first of all the traditional instruction and traditional schools had to be replaced by the Soviet school system (Akiner, 1995: 47; Olcott, 1987: 171)[22]. For

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[22] Before the introduction of the Soviet curriculum to the steppes, education was based on traditions. There were three types of schools in Kazakhstan. The first was Mektebs or Muslim religious schools, in these schools students received traditional and religious education. The second type of schools were Russian school for Kazakhs, the previous regime established these schools in order to educate Kazakhs for administrative careers. The third type of school was the New Method Mektebs, the difference between these schools and the traditional Mektebs was that New Method Mektebs had secular instruction and promoted cultural revival (Dunn and Dunn, 1967: 53).

Soviets the only way to introduce Soviet ideals to the native people and to construct Soviet culture and identity was through Soviet type education, which was based on the mass education of scientific atheism. Hence, the Soviets started a mass education campaign, which was expected to aid the transformation of the new life style throughout the Kazakh steppes. In 1922, in order to bring education to the rural districts *Red Yurt*s and *Red Caravan*s were formed. These units were mobile and their mission was to travel among *aul*s and lecture and edify Soviet propaganda. Besides education these units also provided technical support, medical and veterinary aid and agricultural assistance (Olcott, 1987: 171).

In addition to mobile units, an eight year compulsory education program was initiated. Higher education facilities were promoted and Kazakh State University and Kazakh Academy of Science were established. As a result of these developments the 7% literacy rate in 1927 increased to 40% in 1930's and reached 77% in 1939. In 1940, the whole society had received education and the mission was accomplished (Akiner, 1995: 41). To compensate the teacher gap in Kazakhstan, 13000 new teachers, trained according to the principles of socialism, were sent to the region half of which were Kazakh and the rest non- Kazakh (Olcott, 1981:194). In 1930, first the Latin alphabet, then in 1940 the Cyrillic alphabet was introduced to the Muslim regions of the Soviet Union. In this way the region was totally isolated from the rest of the Muslim world (Dunn and Dunn, 1967: 158).

The Soviet system also imposed changes in formal education and within the framework of indoctrination; Soviet culture and institutions were established. New

institutions such as regional branches of the Communist Party and related organs were established. Professional trade unions were opened, radio, cinema and television programs were made, museums and public libraries were extended to the districts. The names of the cities, streets, parks were changed to the names of prominent Soviet leaders and figures such as Karl Marx, Lenin, Kirov, Dzerzhinsk, Gorky, Pushkin, Lermentov. European style orchestral, choral music were formed. All the effects of the socialist system were reflected in the arts. Soviet figures were chosen in the selection of symbols, flags, national anthems of the Kazakh SSR (Akiner, 1995: 38-41). The increasing power of Russians in the Kazakh SSR during the Stalin period, which can also be defined as a modernization period, challenged the traditional structures and entailed the Russification of the Soviet identity. In other words, the socialist content, which was the ideal of the regime, was russified.

4.3 Industrialization and Increasing Migration of Russians to the Kazakh SSR

Before the Soviet period only small scale native industries, such as carpet and rug making existed in the Steppes. These industries were small, weak and managed by outdated methods (Matley, 1967a: 309). This traditional economy was challenged in the Soviet period. This was followed by a demographic change because with the industrialization of the region, Russian immigration into the steppes increased. For this reason, the development of industry and Russian immigration to Kazakhstan are examined together.

During the first years of the Soviet the existance regime valuable Kazakh non-ferrous mines and oil resources was known by the authorities. In 1924 the Emba Oil

industry, Ekibastuz and Karaganda coal mines were revitalized. However, due to lack of transportation networks between the facilities, these industries could not support each other. For this reason, in 1925, these mines were closed down (Matley, 1967a: 338-339).

With Stalin this trend changed by the initiation of the new economic policy named "all union economy". With this policy industrial development in Kazakhstan was launched. In the First Five Year Plan, the Soviet Union invested 1.599 million rubles in Kazakhstan and the 48% of this budget was allocated to industrial development (Coates, 1969: 122). As mentioned by Coates and Matley, in the Second five Year plan (1937-1942) the investment, to Kazakhstan increased to 4.000 million rubles. As a result of these investments the Kazakh SSR's industrial capacity reached 56.8%. When this growth rate is compared to the rate in 1916, it is seen that the industrial growth in Kazakhstan rose by 63%. Rich oil wells, mines and industries were intensified and before the start of World War II the Karsakpay copper plant was already put into operation at Jezkazgan and Ridder lead plant was also started. Big ore deposits were discovered and the non-ferrous metal base was initiated. (Coates, 1969:123) In addition to these developments, Karaganda coal pits (Donbas and Kuzbas) were reopened and their annual outputs gradually increased from 3.9 million ton to 6.3 million ton between (1933-1937) and 1940. The production of Emma oil was increased; in order to extract nonferrous metals at Ridder in Karsakpay new industrial plants were opened. In Ust- Kamenogorsk new plants were built in order to extract valuable zinc from the mines in the region. Between 1936 and 1937 potassium salts and borate were extracted from at the Lake

Inder on the lower Ural River in the western Kazakhstan (Coates, 1969: 123-124; Matley, 1967a: 340).

During World War II because of the German invasion to the western part of the Soviet Union, Soviet industry was evacuated to strategically safe Kazakhstan and Western Siberia. Of course this evacuation intensified the industrial development and Russian migration to Kazakhstan. In other words, during the World War II the Kazakh republic became the arsenal deposits of the Soviet Army (Coates, 1969: 124; Matley, 1967a: 303, 340). Ferro ally's plants were built in Aktyubinsk to exploit the chromium deposits. Extraction of molybdenum and tungsten mining began in Balkhash cooper site. Manganese and nickel were also minded in Central Kazakhstan. At Tekeli and Jungar Alatu, a leading zinc combine began operation and the number of Zinck plants in Ust-Kamenogorsk was increased (Matley, 1967a: 340-341). These industrial sites were connected to other industrial sites in the Soviet Union through railway networks. In this way, the raw material could be easily sent to the factories. For example Petropavlosk, Karaganda and Siberia was connected each others through the railway. Another railway line ran through Akmolinst, linking Karaganda to South of the Balkhash (in this way Karaganda coal was able to supply the Magnitogorsk iron and steel combine). A third line linked Akmolinst to Karatay region (Coates, 1969: 124-127).

Besides the increase in the extraction of natural resources the numbers of factories were also increased. The manufacturing of mining equipment, manufacturing of heavy machinery, automatic press factories were opened in Karaganda, Alma Ata

and Chimkent. In addition to these textile mills plant were opened all around the country (Matley, 1967a: 342; Coates, 1969: 30). After the World War II the capacity of hydro-electric power stations were enlarged and additional stations were constructed. For example a new station was built on the Irtish River and was put into operation in 1953. Besides this the capacity of Bukharma station on the Irtish River was also increased. A new power station was built in Shulba, supplied the mining ore processing in the Altay region, below Ust- Kamenogorsk (Matley, 1967: 342). In addition to all these developments, additional railway lines were constructed. In 1953, the Trans- Kazakh line transferred Karaganda coal to South Central Asia. Furthermore harvest machinery factories were constructed in Pavlodor, Ust-Kamenogorsk and Kustanay. Baykonour space station was established on the North of the Aral Sea and in Semipalatinst on atom bomb test field was constructed (Matley, 1967a: 343-344).

Russian immigration to Kazakhstan was accelerated with the opening of new industrial sites in Kazakhstan in relation to Stalin's initiation of All Union Economy. Because of the lack of qualified native workers, trained industrial workforce was sent to Kazakhstan from European Russia. Like other Soviet regions industrialization brought about rapid urbanization in Kazakhstan. While the cities were populated by Russian industrial workers, the rural districts were dominated by native Kazakh (Lane, 1975: 180; Coates, 1969: 163). Besides industrial workers, scientists, school instructors, were also sent to Kazakhstan to educate and train Kazakh workers and students. It could be argued that the influx of Russian workers prevented the emergence of a qualified Kazakh workforce. While qualified Russian

workers were employed in big factories and State institutions, the Kazakh workers were mostly employed in collective state farms and mines (Simson, 1991: 126-129).

Caroe's statistical study strongly supports the above argument. In his study Caroe compares the results of the 1926 and the 1936 censuses and the 1950 election results. According to his findings, in 1926 Russians made up the 35% of the population and the 85% of these Russians lived in the cities. This meant that two thirds or the 61% of the urban population was composed of Russians. When 1936 census results were compared to the 1926 census results, Caroe reported that while there was an increase of Russian population, the Kazakh population had decreased. According to these findings it was revealed that the Russian population had increased to 41% of the total population. The results of the 1950 census revealed that the Russian population living in Kazakh SSR increased to 49% (Caroe, 1967: 169-171).

It is important to note that, the Russians who were sent to the region to work and built the industrial sites, developed a sense of attachment to the steppes and while in interaction with other cultures defined themselves as people bringing "civilization" to the region and developed a sense of superiority over the local populations. The migration of Russians in to the region was further intensified with the policy of Virgin Lands. The Virgin Lands agricultural projects triggered the second largest Russian and Slavic immigration wave to the territories of Kazakhstan. 1953, the remote and sporadically populated regions were opened to agriculture (Durgin, 1962: 25; Douglas, 1961: 656; Olcott, 1987: 224). The project included the

Northern part of the Kazakhstan, Southern Siberia and some parts of the Northern Caucasus (Douglas, 1956: 3; Frank, 1962: 225; Allworth, 1967: 304) and comprised of 14 provinces in RSFSR and 8 provinces in Kazakhstan (Durgin, 1962: 256; Douglas, 1956: 7).

As a result of the opening of remote areas to agriculture, new rural settlements had to be constructed in the empty steppes but this required a new infrastructure and a new administrative organization (Durgin, 1962: 258). Hence, in connection with the expansion of grain fields in 1960, a decree of the Kazakhstan Supreme Soviet rearranged particular provinces in northern Kazakhstan including Akmolinsk, Kokchetav, Pavlodar, Northern Kazakhstan into an administrative unit known as Tseliny Krai (Virigin Land Territory) and Akmolinsk (White Grave), which was renamed Tselinigrad (Virgin land City), became the capital city of Tseliny Krai. Hence, the whole administration of the Virgin Land Territory was linked to Tselinigrad (Durgin, 1962: 263; Matley, 1967b: 305). As mentioned by Matley Tselingrad was not only an important administrative unite but it was also the location of the largest farm machinery plant in Petropavlosk Kazakhstan. Thus, Tselingrad became the administrative center of agricultural production and a necessary machinery center. In this way, the demand of agricultural machinery was supplied. Tselingrad became an economic region, causing the demographic composition of the region to shift in favor of the non-titular nations. When the demographic composition of the region is examined, it is clear that the 42% of the total population was composed of Russians. In addition to the Russian majority, there were 14% Ukrainian and 12.1% German presence in the region. On the other

hand, only the 19% of the total population was Kazakh (Matley, 1967b: 309). Besides the establishment of Tselingrad Krai, additional regions were formed in the Kazak SSR. In May 1962 a western Kazakhstan *Krai* was formed from Aktyubinsk, Guryev and Uralsk Oblast with the capital at Aktyubinsk. The southern Kazakhstan *Krai*, including Jambul, Chimkent and Qizil Orda oblasts came into existence with the capital at Chimkent (Matley, 1967b: 305-309).

Due to the insufficient number of qualified field workers, the Soviet government sent thousands of Russian and Slavic origin peasants to the region. According to the statistics, between 1945 and 1961 the total population of the Kazakhstan SSR increased by 3 million and out of this 3 million, 1.5 million immigrants were settled in rural areas. 218.000 houses were built in rural districts in order provide residence for the new comers. In addition to permanent immigrants to the region, there were 250.000 skilled personal and students sent to the region from other republics for temporary work during the harvest season (Durgin, 1962: 272-340). On the other hand, when the division of labor in the agriculture is examined, it is seen that the majority of Kazakhs were employed as unskilled labor in the pastoral productions and cotton harvest. Conversely, Russians and other ethnic groups occupied mechanized and better paid branches of agriculture. In addition to this although northern Kazakhstan was included in the Virgin Lands project, the Kazakhs were not allowed to be employed in this project (Khazanov, 1995b: 250).

With the implementation of the Virgin Lands policy, the abandoned agricultural state farms project called *Sovkhoz*, was put on the agenda of the Soviet for a second

time[23] and *Sovkhoz* occupied one third of the total farm land in the Soviet Union. More than 500 *Sovkhoz*s were opened in Kazakh SSR and this number made up three-fifths of the total number of the agricultural units in the republic. In this way, the state control over agriculture became easier. Hence the isolated rural sections of agricultural units became more manageable and controllable for the Soviet Regime (Roy, 1961: 334-335). Furthermore, with the implementation of the *Sovkhoz* system, the regime not only controlled the management of remote rural areas but also created an opportunity to give education to the rural population (Matley, 1967b: 307).

In connection with the Virgin Lands agricultural project, many high level managers were sent to the Virgin Lands region from various parts of the Soviet Union (Roy, 1962: 334; Olcott, 1987: 224). In addition to the cadre appointed from the centre, several Kazakh bureaucrats holding positions in the administration and the Communist Party were replaced by loyal Russian cadre. For example, the first and the second secretaries of the Kazakh Communist Party, Shaiakhmetov and I.I Aforow were both dismissed from their positions because they opposed this project[24]. Shortly after, P.K. Ponomarenko and L.I Brezhnev were appointed to the

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[23] *Sovkhoz*, "grain factories" proposed to organize agriculture under the direct control of the state. In these units the statuses of peasants were equivalent to the status of industrial workers in the cities. The project failed in 1934 and during the 17th party congress Stalin admitted that s*ovkhoz* was abandoned because it put great financial burden on the state budget. The required number of machinery could not be supplied. For these reasons, highly specialized these units became unmanageable and after the 17th party congress, s*ovkhoz* was split up into smaller and more diversified units. Kolkhoz remained the prime source of agriculture unit. Until that time, only smaller and more diversified s*ovkhoz* units were retained but they had served for experiments and superior socialist models of agriculture (Olcott, 1987: 225-228).

positions of the first and second secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan. In addition to this, both the local Kazakh leadership and the first secretaries of the six Virgin Land Oblasts were all replaced [25] (Olcott, 1987: 224-226). When the statistics are examined, it is clear that the 48% of the first secretaries of the district Communist Party communities and the 58% of the chairmen of the district executive community in Kazakhstan SSR were dismissed just in 1958 (Roy, 1961: 342). After the appointment of Brezhnev, the administrative structure of Kazakh SSR was reorganized. A new staff, who had a stronger commitment to the regime, was appointed to the critical positions in Kazakh SSR, at the same time the older cadre was totally isolated from the administrative structure of the country (Olcott, 1987: 227-228).

Consequently, when Kazakh and Russian participation in the lower organs of the Kazakh Communist party is examined it is seen that the Virgin Lands project had a negative effect on the Kazakh participation. While the percentage of Kazakh participation to the lower organs of the party such as *Obkom*s, *Gorkom*s and *Raikom*s were reduced, the percentage of the Russian participation in these organs dramatically increased throughout the project. The following statistics proves this argument: the 45% of the lower organs of the Kazakh Communist party and the 48% of the *Obkom* posts had been occupied by the Kazakh delegates between 1954 and 1956, this distribution changed after the appointment of Russian party members

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[24] Before being removed from his office Shaiakhmetov pointed out that the cultivation project in the Northern parts of the Kazakhstan would harm the live stock farms in the region (Olcott, 1987: 226).

[25] Akmolinsk (Tselinograd), Karaganda, Kokchetav, Kustanai, Pavlodor and Northern Kazakhstan.

to the Virgin Lands region. From then on, the Kazakh representation at the lower party organs *Gorkom* and *Raikom* were reduced to 30% and at the *obkom* level the Kazakh representation fell to 40%. In addition to this, the foreign cadre, who were recruited from the other regions of the Soviet Union, replaced the old Kazakh cadre at the *raion* level, just because the new Russian cadre was considered more trustworthy by the center (Olcott, 1987: 241).

Martha Brill Olcott claimed that although the impact of the Virgin Lands project on the Kazakh party structure at the local level was difficult to document, the leadership structure of the six Virgin Lands *Oblasts* was all imported. Olcott continues her claim that party cells in the *Sovkho*zs were headed by the Russians or the Ukrainians. Finally, Martha Brill Olcott evaluates the outcome of the Virgin Land policy as the emergence of two distinct administrative apparatus in the Kazakhstan SSR. The first one was the Russian network, which was directly to Moscow and linked to the all-union economy. The northern part of the Kazakhstan SSR mostly hosted the economic zones (metallurgy, industry and the cereal crop produce), supplying the raw material and grain demand of the Soviet Union. For this reason, these zones were administered by ethnic Russians and they became an integral part of the all-union economy. The second administrative apparatus was the Kazak Communist Party, which was mostly dominated the southern regions of the republic. The management of the stock breeding economy, administration of the Communist Party at the *raion* level, state agencies, and only a few large rural oblasts located in southern Kazakh SSR were left in the control of the Kazakh Communist Party (Olcott, 1987: 241-242). In other words, the control of the

northern territory of the republic was seized from the Kazakh party and tied to Moscow's administration.

4.4 The Social Effects of the Economic Regionalization in the Kazakh SSR.

The industrial transformation and the implementation of Virgin Lands project at the northern part of Kazakh SSR prepared the preconditions of deep ethnic problems, which would later lead the republic into ethnic turmoil. As the northern part of the republic was linked to the all-union economy, where the ethnic Russians were the dominant actors, the region was flooded with the Slavic workers, who were sent by Moscow. This situation not only changed the demographic balance against the native Kazakhs as previously mentioned, but also caused the emergence of ethnic segregation in the sphere of professional occupations.

The ethnic Kazakhs mostly occupied the administrative positions; however, their role in the other areas was extremely weak. Although, the 51% of the employees in the administrative sector were Kazakhs, only the 3% of the skilled labor force was composed of Kazakhs and the 11.3% of the unskilled labor force in the republic were Kazakhs. On the other hand, members of the working class and the middle class (blue color workers) were composed of the Russians and other Russian speaking groups in the Kazakh SSR. When the top positions of the KGB and the Army of Kazakh SSR are examined, we noticed that similar to the industrial sector, top positions were again occupied by the ethnic Russians (Dash, 1992b: 322). Consequently, the data above clearly shows how the ethnic Kazakhs were pushed to the peripheries of the industrial sector. This situation provided the Russian

employees privileged status in society. Khazanov argued that this situation created a labor aristocracy. Khazanov also says that since the 93% of the Soviet industry was subordinated by the all-union economy, which included (defense, heavy industry, space research, military and agriculture) positions were occupied by Soviet Union workers and not by the indigenous workforce. According to Khazanov the labor aristocracy directly steamed from the Soviet economic policy. Ethnic Kazakhs were kept away from both the industrial sector and urban areas because of the labor aristocracy, which was based on ethnic stratification (Khazanov, 1995a: 160-161).

The demographic data from the 1979 census showed that the 69.1% of the rural population of the Kazakh SSR was composed of Kazakhs whereas only the 20.8% of the urban population was Kazakh. According to the 1979 census results, the number of Kazakh workers in the industrial workforce also proved how weak the role of native Kazakhs was. While the Kazakh participation to the industry was 13% in 1977, this percentage slightly increased to 21% in 1987. Among the total number of Kazakhs, employed in the industrial sector, 8.6% were in the non-ferrous metal industry, 9.2% in coal mining, 12.6% worked in the engineering and metal works industry and 15.6% worked in wood work (Khazanov, 1995a: 160). However, the Russian supremacy did not continue for long in the Kazakh SSR. With appointment of Kunaev to the office of first secretary, patron clientalism started to develop in the Kazakh SSR. Kunaev, who had close relation with Soviet Socialist First secretary L.Brejnev[26], used this political network to create a stable organization base both in

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[26] Brezhnev spent two crucial years of his carrier in Kazakh SSR. Although Brezhnev's' direct influence on the Kazakh SSR party structure was small, his continuing undirected impact was

the Kazakhstan SSR and in Moscow[27] (Olcott, 1987: 241). Consequently, Kunaev

remained in power for 25 years from 1965 to 1986. It is possible to say that during

his rule, Kunaev supported Kazakhs over Russians not only in administrative

positions but also in other key positions. However, his support was especially based

on networks. Especially the southern clans gained the power during this period. On

the other hand, other indigenous Kazakhs, who had no relations with Kunaev's

lobby, in the southern oblasts suffered from unemployment and underemployment

(Dash, 1992a: 110). The limited role of the Kazakhs in the all-union economy and

in contrast to the increasing Kazakh presence in administrative offices contributed

to the development of the Kazakh patronage system in the Kazakh SSR (Edmunds,

1998: 465). Edward Schatz also supported this argument and added that the state

controlled common economy was one of the factors, which contributed to the

formation of informal networks on the bases of *chuz* and clans. In order to gain

access the scarce goods,[28] during the shortage of supply, people used clan and *chuz*

networks[29]. Furthermore, Schatz claimed that political positions (goods) could be

achieved through informal access networks (Schatz, 2004: 86). For example from

great. He continued to cultivate the contacts made during those years and promote crade, who worked well with him (Olcott, 1987: 241).

[27] During the Brezhnev period, local elites became very powerful and corrupt. The patron client network, which started to form during the Khrushchev period had now, became an obvious. From this period on the periphery started to challenge Moscow. Brezhnev followed a policy which comprised between center and periphery. He followed a "to live and let live" policy (Khazanov: 1995: 248; Rumer, 1989: 144-159).

[28] During the Soviet period local interests were not taken into account. The 70% of the total production in the Kazakh SSR was raw material, which supplied all-union economy, and the 12% of the production was half-finished production. So, production of consumer good was very low and the 60% of the consumer goods were imported (Khazanov, 1995a: 160).

[29] By using informal network people could access power, goods and services. Edward Schatz called this network "gray market". For Schatz gray market economy was based on the informal channels, which provides people easy access to scarce goods or power channels (Schatz, 2004: 86).

1971 to 1981, although the key administrative offices were still occupied by Russians, Kazakh representation dramatically increased. The presence of Kazakhs at the ranks of state department rose from 30% to 60% and from 1964 and 1981, the Kazakh participation in the ministerial and state chair positions rose from 39% to 61%. In the early 1980s, the Kazakhs became first secretaries in 11 *obkom*. This made up the 57.9% of the total administration. In addition to this, the new Kazakh officials' career developments were quite advanced when compared to the pervious generations of the Kazakh officials. The new Kazakh officials were better educated and they were more employed in different positions (Olcott, 1987: 244-245)**.**

The demographic increase of Kazakh population in the southern regions of the Kazakh SSR led to the immigration of unemployed rural Kazakhs from rural places to urban areas. At the end of the late 1950s, the 30% of the total population was composed of Kazakhs, whereas the Russians constituted the 42% of the total population. But this trend gradually changed. The result of 1970s census revealed that the Russian population grew by 0.5% and comprised the 42.5% of the total population, whereas; the Kazakh population grew by 2.6% and constituted the 32.6% of the population. There were several factors that affected the ethnic composition of the population. The first was the higher birth rate of the Kazakhs. This was the most important factor which indirectly affected the fate of the ethnic relations in the republic. The Kazakh population rapidly increased especially in the rural areas. On the other hand, the birth rate of the Slavic population was relatively low. While the Kazakh population was becoming younger, Russian population got older. Hence, this raise not only affected the Kazakh share in the total population

from 32.6% in 1970 to 39.7% in 1980. From that date on, the Kazakhs were dominant in 11 *oblasts* out of 19[30] (Asylbekov, 1998: 175-177).

The increasing Kazakh population, especially in the southern part of the Kazakh SSR, created a population overflow and unemployment. Many unemployed Kazakhs started to migrate to the northern regions of the country in order to find better job opportunities. As a result of this population movement, the two ethnic groups, the ethnic Russians and the Kazakhs came together and interacted in the cities of northern Kazakh SSR (Khazanov, 1995a:162). This population flow directly affected the ethnic composition of the cities, where the Kazakh population increased rapidly. According to Khazanov in 1970, the 12.4% of the total population of Almaty was composed of Kazakhs. This percentage increased to 16.7% in 1979 and to 22.5% in 1989. Since the immigrant Kazakhs was mostly uneducated, they could not compete with better educated ethnic Russians. For this reason, while the new comers were employed in unskilled and low paid jobs, better educated ethnic Russians continued to occupy more prestigious jobs. The Kazakhs were the workers and the Russians were the foreman, team leader, the superior. In other words, various ethnic groups occupied specific niches. Certain group hindered the social and professional advancement of the other. As a result, labor stratification was based on ethnic difference. There were various social groups, who shared diverse incomes, values, and lifestyles. Hence this social divergence created diversity in the republic and produced the formation of distinct boundaries, which

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[30] In 1970, the Kazakh population increased to 48.1% and this trend continued during the following years. In 1979 the Kazakh population increased to 52.1% and in 1989, it increased to 63.5% (Asylbekov, 1998: 177).

prevented social mobility (Khazanov, 1995a: 163-165). As a result of this development, contrary to Soviet expectation, the multi-ethnic composition of the Kazakh SSR did not evolve into "internationalism". Ethnic tension continued to increase parallel to the increase of the Kazakh population, adding to the competition between the members of opposing ethnic groups the members of the different ethnic groups increased (Khazanov, 1995b: 248).

Moscow's anti-corruption campaigns started after the Brezhnev period. These campaigns indirectly set up the preconditions that led to the most serious Almaty events in 1986. After the Brezhnev regime, Moscow repeatedly accused the Kunaev regime in the Kazakh SSR of clan favoritism (Dash, 1992b: 323; McCauley, 1994: 94). According to Olcott, after Brezhnev, Kunaev's position was gradually undermined during the Andropov and Chernenko regimes. With Gorbachev[31] the long lasting Kunaev regime ended in Kazakh SSR. In 1986, Gorbachev dismissed the Kunaev from office so that Moscow could eradicate the corruption and the increasing patron client relations in the republic, and as a result, the function of the all-union economy would be increased. Together with the former Kazakh party secretary Kunaev, his close associates and *obkom* first secretaries were all dismissed from their positions. Gennadii Kolbin, an ethnic Russian from another region of the Soviet Union was appointed first secretary of Kazakh Communist party [32](Olcott, 1987: 245-249). As Dash argues, as a result of this appointment on 17 December

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[31]Gorbachev tried to cope with corruption in the periphery and began to replace corrupt local elite with loyal Soviet officers.

[32] Gennadii Kolbin was the second secretary of Georgian SSR and first secretary of Ulianovsk (Olcott,1987: 249).

1986, several hundred nationalist students took to the streets and mobilized their supporters to demonstrate against Kolbin. In the afternoon the demonstrations turned into violence and lasted about ten hours. The events caused irreparable loss, looting, and disobedience. The demonstrators attacked jails and freed those Kazakh prisoners and also attacked the police stations and freed arrested during the events. During the demonstrations, the following slogans were use "Kazakhstan is only for Kazakhs", "We want to join with China", "America with us and Russia against us", "Kolbin go back to Russia". Furthermore, the demonstrators demanded a separate seat for Kazakhstan in the United Nations. After the events, the British newspapers reported that the number of protestors rose to 300.000 during the peak of events. However, the critics claimed that this number was exaggerated because in 1979 census the Kazakh population in the Almaty *oblast* together with children and older people was 319.634 (Dash, 1992a: 111). On the other hand, when the Almaty riots are carefully examined it is seen that various groups manipulated the demonstrations and that the demonstrators were provoked causing the events to lead into a riot.

The December riots illustrated the enormous influence of patron client relationship in southern Kazakhstan. There was evidence, which showed that the local administration was in the riot (Edmunds, 1998: 465). The bureaucrats involved in Kunaev's patronage network were threatened by Gorbachev's replacement policy because the new Kazakh Communist Party guaranteed a fair distribution of jobs in the police department, trade unions and in the state ministries (Dash, 1992a: 110). This provoked the local administrative groups. According to Russians, the

December riots were the mark of a power struggle within the local Kazakh political elite. One of the eyewitness claimed that the December riot resulted from the demands of protestors, who were in favor of having a specific local leader appointed the office and that the rioters were supporters of the opposition, which was organized the party fraction in power. In addition to the claims of the eyewitness, Helsinki Watch received reports, which proved that the Kunaev regime played an important role in the December riots. According to this report, men, possibly members of Kunaev party fraction, were seen to organize a number of Kazakhs students. Besides this the Kazakh students forced and beat other Kazakh students, who refused to join the demonstrations. Helsinki Watch Report reported the testimony of a Kazakh sales woman: "Before the troops arrived, there were students from police academies. Most of these cadets were Kazakhs. They were ordered to stop the demonstrations but they were upset at having to follow these orders" (c.f. Helsinki Watch Report, 1990: 14). Again according to Helsinki Watch Reports, students were called upon by older men to charge into the square in the morning. They broke into the dorms and attacked the students who did not want to join. The Kazakh activist Malibayev announced that the demonstrators raised a question about the government in general; naming Nazarbaev and Alibekov as the leaders they wanted. All these informations proved that certain political groups, who were threatened by the new polices of Gorbachev, were involved in and played the major role in the December events. On the other hand, there was also some evidence, which proved that the December riots were manipulated by the Soviet regime to give the incident a radical nationalist color, which would enable the Soviet regime to legitimize their strict policies in the country. For example the

protest was labeled as "Kazakh nationalist uprising" by Mikhail Salomentsev, the politburo member and chairman of the Communist Party Committee in charge of discipline, and that night local Russians and Russian factory workers were recruited as a volunteer police force to control the demonstrations. It is also argued that the Soviet government distributed narcotics to the protestors during the events and through the radio broadcasts the tension was intensified artificially (Helsinki Watch Report, 1990: 8-25).

The Almaty events triggered ethnic tensions in other cities of the Kazakh SSR. Riots occurred in Karaganda, Tselinograd, Pavlodar, Dzezkazgan, Aktyubinsk, Mangyshlak, Eastern-Kazakhstan and Taldy-Kurgan. In the end, both the Almaty events and other incidents were suppressed within a short time but the atmosphere in the region remained tense for several months. By artificially intensifying the events in Almaty, the Soviet government seemed to have tried to set up preconditions for its strict rule. The new Communist party secretary started an extensive replacement program. Many officials were replaced especially in the fields of administration and education. The investigation commission accused top officials of corruption, nepotism, and political favoritism (Brown, 1994: 72-73). Consequently, Kunaev and most of his associates were removed from office and Kolbin came to power and his rule continued until the late 1980s and he was replaced by Nursultan Nazarbaev.

It is possible to conclude by saying that starting with the Period of Stalin the content of the Socialist identity, which had to be socialist, was Russified. Especially in areas

such as culture, education and politics the Russian influence became dominant. This also contributed to reinforce the status of the Russian identity in the Soviet Union in general and in the Kazakh SSR in specific. In addition to this, industrialization and the Virgin Lands projects in the Kazakh SSR entailed the migration of large numbers of Russians into the republic. These migration flows changed the demographic balance in the republic in favor of the Russians (Sinnott, 2003: 106). This demographic superiority, especially in the northern part of the republic, was another factor which reinforced status of the Russian identity in the region. The role of the Russian workers and specialists in the construction of industrial sites and research centers not only led the Russians to identify themselves with the lands they settled and entailed the development of a sense of the possession of the land, which led to the articulation of the phrase "we build this country". Especially with the Virgin Lands policy the territorial administration of the Kazakh SSR was reorganized according to the needs of the project and the control of Moscow increased. A politically, culturally and socially Russified environment was provided to the Russians, who developed a "superiority complex" in the region, which strengthened the Russian identity in the region.

CHAPTER V

POST-SOVIET KAZAKHSTAN AND THE IMPACT OF CHANGING

ETHNIC HIERARCHY ON THE IDENTITY OF RUSSIANS

The history of Russians in the Kazakhs Steppes and the impact of the Russian population on the Kazakh life style are studied in the previous chapters. In this chapter, I will focus on the problems which Russians have faced after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the impact of these problems on the Russian identity. Furthermore, Kazakh nation and state building policies and their impact on Russian identity would be examined.

Within the all-union structure the northern part of the Kazakh SSR functioned as the integral part of the southern industrial region of Russia. Economic arrangements, production, energy distribution networks, transportation and the appointment of the elite network were strictly carried out inside the all-union structure (Cummings, 2002). Especially, in the Baikonur space station, military industry, nuclear warhead bases, research and heavy industries large number of Russian workers were employed. In addition to this the Karaganda cooling, metallurgy and heavy industry complex close tied to its counterparts in western Siberian. As already mentioned, Martha Brill Olcott defined this situation as a two-tyred system. For Olcott, the Russian population, which was the key factor binding the all-union structure, was under the control of the Russian dominated Soviet Socialist Communist Party. For this reason the employees of the all-union structure were not affected by the decisions of the local party structures (Olcott, 2002:70).

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the all-union structure disintegrated. Hence the employees of the all-union structure, in which the workforce was mainly composed of Slavic origin workers found themselves in an insecure environment (Aasland, 1996: 486). The breaking-up of the previous ties with the West-Siberian industrial complexes and the all-union structure created de-facto autonomy in the northern part of Kazakhstan (Cumming: 2002). According to Chinn, the geographic proximity and demographic situation of northern Kazakhstan amplified the likelihood of irredentist demands in the region (Chinn, 1996: 185). After independence, the Kazakh elite quickly seized the power and occupied the important positions. Nurbulat Masanov, described the development of the Kazakh state building process as the reemergence of tribalism (cf. Nazpary, 2002: 20). Protectionism and patron-client network became important factors in government administration and business affairs. The new elite actively engaged in business and by acquiring a considerable share of state property through privatization (Sadovskaya, 1997). Through clan ties monopoly, all key posts in the state organs, security, banking and finance sectors, and large medium and large business were occupied by the ethnic Kazakhs. All these economic and political changes had an important impact on the new ethnic hierarchy of independent Kazakhstan (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002).

5.1 Constitutional Arrangements, Laws and Policies in Nationalizing Kazakhstan.

After the independence, Kazakh state builders had to face two opposing groups of people. On the one hand, the nationalists emphasized the role and importance of

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ethnic nationalism in the state building process and on the other hand, the non-Kazakh groups strongly resisted nationalist policies and sought their places in the newly established Kazakh State. According to the nationalists, the new Kazakh State had to be built upon ethnic norms. The non-Kazakh groups, however, argued that the new Kazakh State had to be built upon civic norms, in which non-Kazakh groups would easily find a place. Hence this disagreement initiated a debate between nationalist Kazakhs and non-Kazakh groups and since 1991 the nation builders in Kazakhstan are still trying to find a solution, which both parties would agree on (Kolsto, 1999: 56-59)[33].

According to Martha Brill Olcott, Nursultan Nazarbayev tried to avoid confrontation on the ethnic issues by asserting that Kazakhstan was both a multiethnic society and at the same time a homeland for the ethnic Kazakhs (Olcott, 1993: 315). We can easily observe these balanced policies in both 1993 and 1995 constitutions. The 1993 constitution carries both ethnic and civic elements. The

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[33]. In April 1994 a Kazakh professor of Law B. Abdygaliev tried to define the difference between "national" *natsional'nyi* sovereignty and "popular" *narodnyi* sovereignty. He concluded that Kazakhstan was a nation state of the Kazakh nation, but "in content" it was a democratic, law-governed state. According to the professor these two views do not contradict (Kolsto, 1999: 61). So it can be understood from the argument of the Kazakh professor that the Kazakh state builders found a unique solution, which was designed for the conditions of Kazakhstan. According to Kolsto, the concept *re-ethnification* balanced the two different arguments. This concept sought the unity of the state through recognizing the presence of each ethnic group and their rights in the country. According to this perspective, people were represented through ethnic groups. With this policy each ethnic group was allowed to develop its cultural existence (education, school curriculum) and by strengthening ethnic identities state integration would be achieved. On the other hand, the new system did not allow the formation of ethnic autonomies as in the Soviet case. B. Abdygaliev said that this model allowed the people of Kazakhstan to be both a representative of a defined ethnic group and an equal citizen of Kazakhstan. According to the state ideology of Kazakhstan, Kazakhstan was the homeland of the Kazakhs but individuals from other ethnic backgrounds were also welcome to live in Kazakhstan. In return for their loyalty the state allowed these ethnic groups, to develop their own ethnic identities (Kolsto, 1999: 167-172).

constitution opens with a civic emphasis by referring to the people (*Narod)* of Kazakhstan as the architects of the constitution. On the other hand, the very first article declares that the state of Kazakhstan is based on "the Kazakh people's statehood" (Kolsto, 1999: 129) In 1992, President Nursultan Nazarbayev linked the notion of sovereignty with the principle of "national selfdetermination" of the titular nation, describing the country as the historical land of Kazakhs. The same passage was retained in the draft version of the subsequent constitution, but eliminated in the final version of the 1995 constitution. However, a new formulation referring to Kazakhstan as the "primordial" owners of their lands were added. The preamble of the new constitution stated "We, the people of Kazakhstan, united by a common historical fate, have created a state on ancient land of ethnic Kazakhs". The Kazakh State is clearly a manipulated ethnic card.[34]

Another issue was heavily discussed found expression in the centralization of administrative structure. In the year 1995, with the new constitution, a radical program for restructuring the territorial organization was started. Under this new administrative structure the regional and ethnic autonomies, which would challenge the authority of the central power, were unified under a single central autonomy (Melvin, 2002: 174-177). In other words, with the initiation of the 1995

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[34] The Article 19 of the constitution of Kazakhstan states that "each person is permitted to define and indicate his/ her nationality or religious affiliations". However, contrary to the constitution the Kazakh government indicated ethnic origins on passports and new identification cards. The first page of the Kazakh passport is written in both Kazakh and Russian languages and on this page the nationality column prepared. The second page of the passport is in English. On this page the nationality column is omitted. In addition to passports the nationality column is also present on the new identification cards. In 1997, a Russian from Chimkent demanded to have the term "Kazakhstanian" written in his nationality column. His request was accepted only after formal inquiry. For Bhavna Dave the nationality column is used for internal consumption in Kazakhstan (Dave, 2003: 18; Bohr, 1998: 154-156).

constitution a big step was taken to centralize the Kazakh State. With the 1995

constitution not only the state was centralized but also the administrative structure

of the entire state was restructured and the president gathered power, which restored

the balance of the power mechanism in the state in favor of the president[35].

The status of state language is another controversial issue in the building of new

Kazakhstan.[36]. Following the independence, laws related to, language has been

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[35] When the new version of the constitution is compared to the previous version, it is possible to argue that the 1995 constitution was different from the 1993 constitution in three ways. First, the new constitution changed the executive structure of the state. In the 1993 constitution the presidency was the single executive system, but in the 1995 constitution the president ceased to be a part of the executive system. He stood as an independent arbiter and the guarantor of the constitution and states territorial integrity. While the 1993 constitution provided checks and balance on the powers of the president, the 1995 constitution did not restricts the power of the president in anyway. The president could appoint all the ministers with the exception of the prime-minister, the president could dissolve the parliament and hold early presidential elections; the president could employ referendum to override any parliamentary law without parliamentary approval (Bremmer and Welt, 1996: 92; Cummings, 2000: 8). Second, the new constitution abolished the Constitutional Court and formed a new institution called the Constitutional Council. The activities of the Constitutional Council were directly controlled by the president. The six members of the constitutional council were appointed by president, the senate and the assembly (Bremmer and Welt, 1996: 93). Besides this the status of the judges was not clearly defined. The Arbitration Court was abolished and the Prosecutor's Office was restructured. Some of its functions were transformed to the newly established state Investigation Committee, which was subordinated by the president (Cumming, 2000: 8). Third; the structure of the parliament was changed. A bi-cameral parliament was formed. 40 of the upper house members were elected representatives of the provinces (2 from each). Elections were held every two years. Seven members of the upper house were appointed by the president. These appointed members remained in office for the entire term of the senate (Bremmer and Welt, 1996: 93).

[36] During the Soviet Union the Russian language was officially referred to as the "language of interethnic communication" (Dave, 2004:125). The Russian language penetrated into all areas of public life from the work place to daily life. Russian became a language of interethnic communication, language of education and science. But in the year of 1989, the *Qazaq Tili* language association, which was sponsored by the government, was formed in order to develop the role and the status of the Kazakh language in Kazakhstan. The Kazakh State's primary aim was to ensure that the status of the Kazakh language was raised to state language (Cummings, 1999: 140). Within this perspective on 22 October 1989, the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan passed a new language law (Kolsto, 1999: 178). According to this new law, the Kazakh language was given the status of the state language and the Russian language renamed as the interethnic communication language. From then on proficiency of the Kazakh language was required for application to government offices and for admission to higher education and employment. Since the majority of the population was not ethnically Kazakh and the Kazakh language was not spoken even by the native Kazakhs, this new legislation created a deep resentment among some members of society. With this language law the previously privileged people became under

modified several times. 1992, when the draft version of the Language Law was written, the Kazakh language remained as the state language but the section on "Russian being the interethnic communication language" was deleted. As a result of this act, strong resentments aroused in various parts of Kazakhstan especially among Russians. For example, in December 1992, Russian medical workers in the southern city of Chimkent complained and argued that they were discriminated. Furthermore, 15.000 people gathered in northern Kazakhstan to protest against the draft version of the Language Law (Kolsto, 1995: 247-248). As a result of this strong opposition, the Kazakh government took a step back and on 28th of January 1993, the new constitution was amended and the phrase "the Russian language is an interethnic language" was re-added (Dave, 2004: 129).

In the 1995 constitution, the Kazakh Language was declared as the state language but it was also mentioned that in state bodies and bodies of local government Russian can be used officially together with the Kazakh language. With this amendment nobody suffered from discrimination. On 22 November 1996, a new draft of Language Law was written and according to this draft all ethnic Kazakhs were to learn the Kazakh language by the year 2001 and the remaining ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan were to learn the Kazakh language by the year 2006 (Edmunds,1998: 463). This draft law was one of the most heated debates in the politics of Kazakhstan. Later, on the 11th July of 1997, the new Language Law was

privileged, because they failed to master the Kazakh language. Beyond personal resentments the newly legislated Language Law deepened the gap between the Russians, the non-Kazakh ethnic groups and the ethnic Kazakhs in Kazakhstan. In addition to the population movements and the mass rejection to learning the new state language, the new Language Law triggered irredentist attitudes among Russian population (Chinn, 1996: 194-195).

passed and the main aim of this new law was to strengthen the status of the Kazakh language in the country. The new law stated that all citizens of Kazakhstan were obliged to master the Kazakh language, which is "the most important consolidating factor of the people of Kazakhstan". According to this new Language Law, the status of Russian as the "interethnic language" was protected and "the functioning of Russian on an equal basis with the state language" was reformulated. Furthermore, the new Language Law (article 8) required all non –state organizations to employ the state language and "if necessary" other languages as well.

However, it is important to note that, approximately only the 2% of the non-Kazakh population was fluent in the Kazakh language and the 10% of the non-Kazakhs claimed that they could read Kazakh with the aid of a dictionary. In addition to this, some Kazakhs, who were unable to read in their native language and it was estimated that the literacy rate of the Kazakhs was 60-75%. Especially Kazakhs living in the cities and the northern parts of Kazakhstan had poor command of the state language (Kolsto, 1997: 2). Interestingly however, these percentages show how it is difficult to apply these laws. These finding are quite controversial compared to the findings of 1999 census results. Based on the 1999 census, the government statistics illustrated that the 99.4% of the Kazakhs and 15% of the Russians were proficient in the Kazakh language and 27% of the Russians were learning the Kazakh language (Dave, 2004:122).[37]

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[37] With these census results, the Kazakh State revealed that the majority of the citizens spoke the state language at a proficient level. However, during the census the evaluation questionnaire did not include separate questions on reading, writing and speaking skills. The available categories

Research done by the sociologists of the Center of Humanitarian Research in 2001 revealed the factors that agitated the non-Kazakh groups in Kazakhstan the policies of the Language Law such as translation of office work into the state language without the Russian duplication; enforcement of the program of introduction to the state language, (it is compulsory to be proficient in the state language when applying to state offices), changing the names of administrative units, into Kazakh names; the reduction of the Russian radio and TV broadcasting time and the increase of broadcasting time in the Kazakh language; a decrease in the number of Russian language and literature lessons in schools (this decreased the chance of Russian and non-Kazakh pupils entering Russian High Schools.); most anniversaries are in the name of Kazakh heroes and non-proportional representation of ethnic groups in power bodies (Kurganskaya, http://www.assamblea.kg/em15-2_2.htm).

It is clear that, the language policy negatively affected the situation of Russians and other non-Kazakh groups living in Kazakhstan. According to respondents interviewed by the Center of Humanitarian Research, the 61.3% of Russians claimed that their rights were violated by the Language Law. In addition to this, the 24.6% of Russians and the 7.6% of Kazakhs claimed that they faced legal restrictions, when they applied for employment and the 19.4% of the Russians and the 3% of the Kazakhs complained that they had problems with legal service

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were only; know, know weakly, learning, do not know. Hence the government left the decision to the self evaluation of the respondents (Dave, 2004: 134-135). Furthermore, the government put all the Muslim ethnic groups under the same category and claimed that the 99.4% of the Kazakhs spoke the Kazakh language. But when the research was closely examined it was seen that the 70% of the speakers were the members of other Turkic language groups, such as Karakalpak, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek (Dave, 2004: 134).

because they did not speak the Kazakh language. Moreover, the 64.2% of all non-Kazakh respondents thought that there was a need for a second state language. When the attitude of the people living in the north and the south of the country were compared it was seen that the people living in the northern regions of Kazakhstan were more sensitive to the language issue than the people living in the south (Kurganskaya http://www.assamblea.kg/em15-2_2.htm). The result of this research is also supported by my interviews. During an interview I carried out in Russia a Kazakh woman, argued, "in Kazakhstan today, if you speak in Kazakh in government offices it would be very prestigious and this would provide easiness in getting your job done". In short, Kazakh state used the issue of state language as a means to homogenize the Kazakh society. However, it is perceived by non-Kazakhs as a discrimination policy.

State symbols, protected by the constitution, constitute other important elements of the Kazakh nation and state building process. After the independence the Kazakh government initiated a series of new state symbols ranging from the flag to state emblems. When the new state symbols are examined it can be argued that the Kazakh state defined itself by basing on pastoral-nomadic past and disregarded multi-ethnic composition of the country. For example the flag of Kazakhstan contained graphic elements related to the national culture of Kazakhs (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). The eagle on the blue sky background glorified the traditional Kazakh hunters, who hunted with trained eagles. The same thing can be said about the state symbols. For example the state emblem, depicting a *yurt,* which played a significant role in traditional Kazakh life together with two mythological horses

placed on both sides of the *yurt* (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). Horses were another fundamental part of the Kazakh pastoral life and they symbolized the nomadic life style. Besides the state emblems, the sculpture *Altın Adam* (Golden Man), a replica of an archeological finding, standing in the square of Almaty glorifies the Kazakh past, which symbolizes the Kazakh existence of these lands of since immemorial times. All these symbols opposed to a large extend to the values of non-Kazakh people of Kazakhstan (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). It can be argued that since all these symbols do not embrace the non-Kazakh people in Kazakhstan including the Russians, the non-titular people will have difficulties in establishing a psychological bind with the state symbols and the state of Kazakhstan.

In addition to the state symbols, Kazakhization shows itself on streets names too. Most of the names of streets, squares, cities and oblasts were changed from Russian into Kazakh. Furthermore religious holidays and traditional celebrations were declared state holidays (Bremmer and Welt, 1996: 182). For example Nawruz, which signifies renewal and the coming of spring, celebrated on the 22$^{nd \ of}$ March, became a state holiday (Kari and Chebotarev, 2002). On the other hand, the non-titular population was quite disturbed by the governments' policy on government symbols and the replacement of the names of the places. For example when the name of the *Komsomol's Kovia Street*, was changed *Tolebi Koshesi*. Laitin mention about the anger of the residents in Almaty (Laitin, 1998:156). The changing symbols and names of places and streets alienate the non-Kazakh population to their environment. For the non-Kazakh population, the results of this policy created an

environment, where they felt that they were in totally unfamiliar surroundings and that their pasts and their memories were being erased.

Besides the language law the other constitutional amendment on the double citizenship made the Russian community in Kazakhstan uneasy. It should be mentioned that according to the article 10 3 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan, foreign citizenship of a citizen of the Republic shall not be recognized. For this reason the dual citizenship demands of ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan has become one of the most debated issues in Kazakhstan, which may create serious problems. The problem stems from the demands molded by ethnic Russians to gain Russian citizenship. The ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan found the new legislations ranging from the Language Law to the new education policies, aiming at restructuring Kazakhstan, disturbing. They feel that they are discriminated against and excluded. In addition to this, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government legislated a Citizenship Law, which automatically considered permanently living within the borders of Kazakhstan as Kazakh citizens (Chinn, 1996: 94). All of these developments made the ethnic Russians feel vulnerable because the changes were perceived as threats to their interests. On the other hand, Kazakh authorities found it threatening to keep a mass of ethnic Russians, holding Russian citizenships, located near the northern border of Kazakhstan. For Kazakh authorities this would trigger de facto irredentist tendencies among the Russian population (Chinn, 1996: 94). For this reason, the Kazakh government was strongly against the dual citizenship.

5.2 Educational Reforms

Parallel to the language policy, the government of Kazakhstan went into educational reforms as well. Within the context of these reforms the numbers of Russians working in university administration and in the Ministry of Education were decreased. Between 1989 and 1992, the number of Russian executives in the Ministry of Education had declined from 43% to 14% and the number of Russian specialist, also declined from 47% to 19% (Chinn, 1996:194). On the other hand, the numbers of Kazakh language Schools increased. The Kazakh government opened new Kazakh Schools especially in the Russian dominated northern regions of Kazakhstan (Bremmer and Welt, 1996: 184). When the statistical data is examined, it is seen that there is an increase in the number of Kazakh Schools as opposed to the decrease in Russian Schools. Between 1990 and 1994, the percentage of Kazakh Schools had increased from 34% to 38.3%. During the same period the percentage of Russian schools decreased from 44.7% to 33.9%. In 1999, the total number of Russian schools decreased from 3641 to 2412. The same trend is observed when the percentages of students are examined. Between 1990 and 1994, the percentage of students in Kazakh schools increased from 32.4% to 40.1%. In the same period the percentage of students in the Russian schools decreased from 65% to 57.2% (Chinn, 1996: 193).

When the results of the State Committee of Statistics are examined, the same trend is observed in higher education. According to their data, the percentage of Kazakh students increased from 53.3% to 64.4%, while the number of Russian students decreased from 31.2% to 25.8% in higher education between the periods of 1991-

1992 and 1994-1995 (Edmunds, 1998: 464). However, although the Kazakh government had tried to increase the number of the Kazakh schools, there were not enough teachers or resources available to make advancements on a large-scale possible. During this time, the government also converted Russian schools into Kazakh schools but the Russian students did not prefer to study in Kazakh schools and because of this reason, the Russian schools became over crowded. But the study conducted in 1996 by Kolsto, demonstrated that today more Kazakhs sent their children to Kazakh schools when compared to the Soviet Period (Kolsto, 1997: 1-3).

5.3 Territorial Re-adjustment, Demographic Change, Migration and Government Migration Policies

Territorial-administrative reforms and re-adjustment plans even after the independence played a significant role in ethnic policies, which aimed to liquidate the densely Russian populated regions. Within this perspective, a decision was made to move the capital city from Almaty, to further north, to Tselinograd/ Akmola, later named as Astana. There were various explanations for the relocation of the capital. One such reason was that Almaty was located on a seismic belt. Other reasons were the old capitals geographic proximity to China and Nazarbayevs' incentive to escape from the political domination of the southern regions. However, for Karin and Chebotarev the main objective among others was the issue of coping with Russian dominated northern regions. By moving the capital city from Almaty to Astana, and the resettlement of the Kazakh elite and bureaucrats, the Kazakh population would penetrate to the predominantly Russian

and Russian speaking northern regions. The plan was to increase the Kazakh population (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). With the same objective, in 1997, the Kazakh authorities initiated the territorial-administrative reform in the context of "regional optimization". Even though the project was carried out so as to optimize regional administrative units, this structural modification only affected the northern oblasts. Within this perspective, the five regions Taldykorgan, Semipalatinsk, Zhezkazgan, Kosketau and Torgai were abolished and fused with adjoining territories. The territory of the Kazakh Oblast Torgai was shared between predominantly Russian oblasts Akmola (46% Russian) and Kostanai (43.7% Russian), The predominantly Kazakh Oblast Taldykorgan (45.3% Kazakh) was incorporated into the Russian dominating Oblast of Almaty (41.6% Russian-30.1% Kazakh), the Kazakh Semipalatinsk Oblast (50.7%) was incorporated to Russian dominated Russian oblast East-Kazakhstan (65.9% Russian) and the territories of the Kazakh oblast of Zhezkazgan (46% Kazakh) was added to the Russian dominated oblast of Karaganda (52.2%). In this way, the population size and geographic size of each district was enlarged and with the fusion of ethnically Kazakh dominated regions, an ethnic balance was obtained (Dave, 2003: 19; Cummings, 2000; Roy, 2000: 179). Russian dominated oblast centers became in a way the target of government appointments. The administrative offices of formerly Russian dominated centers were filled by Kazakh elite and bureaucrats[38]. The appointment of Kazakh elite to state offices and enterprises of the region contributed to the migration of the Kazakh population into Russian dominated

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[38] Constitutional adjustments enabled the president to control every stage of administrative positions and in case of problem an executive could easily be replaced by someone else, who was perceived to be more loyal to the central administration (Kolsto, 1999: 193).

centers and oblasts (Dave, 2003: 20; Savin, 2002: 285). The demographic change and mass government appointments in the region brought with itself patronage networks and the ethnicization of the state apparatus. Since the patronage system was based on the loyalty to the president, the voice of the non-titular opposition was automatically excluded from the government and the bureaucracy (Masanov, 2002). According to one research, conducted among Kazakh and Russian students, demonstrate that 53% of the students in Astana and the 55% students in Almaty responded by saying that ethic origin played a role in the foundation of a good career (Olcott, 2002: 182).

In addition to political initiatives, economic destruction and high unemployment rates caused serious population movements in the newly sovereign republic. In this context, people were attracted by large industrial cities, which offered relatively better employment opportunities. According to the findings of research, the 71% of the ethnic Kazakhs and the 18.2% of the ethnic Russian have moved to cities due to the economic factors (Karin and Chebotarev, 2002). In addition to this, according to the research of Olcott, the 75% of the internal flow of migration within Kazakhstan was towards the northern regions (Olcott, 2002:175).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Kazakh state granted repatriation tights to the Kazakh Diaspora as a part of the Kazakisation policy. In the 1992, a *Qurultay* (World Congress of All Kazakhs) gathered under the sponsorship of the Kazakh government. The congress appealed for the unification of all Kazakhs under the single flag of Kazakhstan within the territories of Kazakhstan (Janabel, 1996: 7).

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According to Cummings many Kazakhs from countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Mongolia, Turkey, attended this *Qurultay*. The repatriation law was officially launched in November 1992 on the premise of two interlinked policies. First, the repatriation policy was seen as a legitimate way to balance the demographic composition in Kazakhstan and a useful means to extend the recognition of Kazakh culture and use of Kazakh language. Second, through this policy an attempt would be made to correct historical injustices. The government tried especially to cover up the loss that resulted from the 1930s Soviet collectivization policy (Cummings, 1999: 140-142). The legal basis of repatriation was codified in several important laws and decrees from 1992 to 1995, but the most important legal reforms were realized in the field of Citizenship Law. The amendment to this law made it possible for diaspora Kazakhs to carry dual citizenship. The diaspora Kazakhs now preserved right to acquire the Kazakh citizenship along with their existing national status. Of course, this caused a deeper resentment among the Russian population, who want to take Russian citizenship beside their Kazakh citizenship. While the Kazakh government overlooked the Russian demands for "dual citizenship", the government granted the privilege to repatriating Kazakhs (Kolsto, 1999: 159). Furthermore the new Immigration Law (Article 17) automatically granted repatriate status to the ethnic Kazakhs and their descendents, who had fled during the collectivization campaign[39]. Changes were also made to the law regulating the requirements for citizenship and in October 1995, the five year residency period for citizenship was abandoned (Cummings, 1999: 142). Along with various material

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[39] Other ethnic groups such as the Uighurs, who had left Kazakhstan for the same reason, were not allowed to automatically return to Kazakhstan.

benefits for example accommodation, travel within Kazakhstan, college admission was free of cost to these people (Janabel, 1996: 7). Besides domestic regulations, the Kazakh government approved international agreements in order to receive more Kazakhs. For example during his visit, in 1992, Nursultan Nazarbaev made an agreement with the Iranian officials on the issue of migration. Again in November 1994, the "Voluntary Migration" agreement was signed by the two presidents, Nursultan Nazarbaev and Puntsagiyn Jasray (Cummings, 1999: 142).

The Kazakhs, who had been repatriated, were settled mostly into the Russian dominated regions of north Kazakhstan (Olcott, 2002: 176). Some of the new comers settled in to the German residences, which had been left after the emigration of ethnic Germans of Kazakhstan to Germany (Khazanov, 1995b: 256). The remaining Kazakhs were settled into the southern regions of the country, which were Uighur dominated oblasts (Cummings, 1999: 141). Consequently, even though the demographic structure changed in the region, the repatriated Kazakhs were not welcomed by the native people, because of cultural differences; neither Kazakhs nor Russians accepted the repatriated Kazakhs. In addition to this, the native Kazakhs regarded the new comers as anachronistic Muslims and Kazakh speaking traditionalists (Cummings, 1999: 144). It is possible to argue that the policies of the Kazakh State encouraging the immigration of ethnic Kazakhs have been an important pull factors. This argument was supported by the interviews carried out in Russia with Kazakhs form Mongolia, who were there for educational purposes. One of them, a 23 years old university student, said "I will go to Kazakhstan when I finished my education. My family and other relatives have already returned to

Kazakhstan from Mongolia. I believe that I will have a better future in Kazakhstan and the possibility to find a good job".

Consequently, in his article, Aleksander Aleksenko argued that the problem of emigration of the non-titular population from Kazakhstan could be clearly understood in the context of intra-republic migration. For Aleksenko, there is a close relationship with two issues which trigger one another. Historically speaking, while the Russian-speaking populations including the Russians were mainly located in cities, the rural districts were largely populated by ethnic Kazakhs. Population increase and economic crises in the rural districts of Kazakhstan led to the population flow from rural to urban areas. This population flow altered the population distribution in the cities of Kazakhstan (Aleksenko, 1997)[40]. Both Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the rural migrants started to penetrate the industrial and petroleum regions of Kazakhstan and started to compete for the jobs against the urban work force (Ayagan, 1998). In addition to this after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, repatriated Kazakhs have been settled in the northern regions by the Kazakh state. Of course, the struggle between the rural Kazakhs and urban population for employment, automatically gained an ethnic color (Aleksenko, 1997). On the other hand, Dina Eshpanova emphasized that since the new comers did not have the necessary skills to work in industrial sectors; they found themselves under privileged conditions and had to work in low paid jobs. In

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[40] Between 1970 and 1979 the percentage of Kazakhs living in cities increased to 39.5% and between the years 1979-1989 this rate increased to 56.3% (the Russian population in the same decade was-25%). According to the findings of the all-union census the percentage of net outflow of the agricultural population into the cities in Kazakhstan was 14%. Compare to the migrations rate of Belarus (17.2%) this ratio was the second highest rate in the Soviet Union (Aleksenko, 1997).

addition to the struggle for employment, for Eshpanova, the migration flow to the cities of Kazakhstan led to cultural alienation of the new comers. During the urbanization process of Kazakhstan, the rural Kazakhs had to adapt to the new conditions in the cities, change their way of life and lose their traditional values. All these factors (economic and cultural) prevented the integration of the new comers in the cities of Kazakhstan (Eshpanova, 1996: 260). Some of the new comers engaged in criminal activities causing further uneasiness in the relations between rural and urban inhabitants. The situation sometimes led to conflicts between the two communities. Besides Russians, other non-titular urban groups, and ethnic Kazakhs also had problems with the rural new comers (Nazpary, 2002: 37). Aleksenko argued that the growth of Kazakh nationalism, the loss of social status of Russians, frustration from social conditions, increasing criminal incidents, loss of hope for the future and their future of the children all created a powerful "push" factor for emigration (Aleksenko, 1997). Consequently, statistical data clearly shows that the Russian the population declined, while the population of ethnic Kazakh's increased in the Russian dominated northern regions.

5.4 The Perception of the State Policies by the Russians and Inter-ethnic Relations

Many public polls were conducted to understand the Russian reaction to the government policies. The public polls revealed that the Russian population still had strong ties with the Soviet identity and the majority of the respondents did not identify themselves with the newly independent Kazakh State. This also explains the migration of some Russian from Kazakhstan to Russian Federation. According

to the all-Russian Center for Public Opinion Research finding's among the Russian population in former Soviet Republics, the preference for the Soviet identity was higher and the 81% of the Russian population declared their country to be the Soviet Union, not the republic in which they were living in (Pilkington, 1998 :189). According the findings of another survey, conducted in 1994, the 86% of the respondents were in favor of the reconstruction of the Soviet Union (Olcott, 2002: 79). This has of course many reasons but one of these is that with the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Russians, living in Kazakhstan, lost the support given by the Soviet Union. This situation contributed to the change of ethnic hierarchy in Kazakhstan.

According to the findings of the 1998 poll, conducted by the Kazakh Presidential Information Analysis Center, around 46% of the Russians still considered the former Soviet Union, and not Kazakhstan, to be their motherland. In addition to this, the same public poll revealed that less than 15% of the Russian people believed that adapting to the life in Kazakhstan was possible (Olcott, 2002: 179). Another survey, conducted by the United State Information Agency, found that in comparison to Kazakhs, Russians were twice likely to be in favor of a close union with Russian Federation. While the 66% of the Russian respondents were in favor of entering a close union with the Russian Federation, only 35% of the Kazakhs supported the same idea (Olcott, 2002: 79). Under the directorate of the historian Murbulat Masanov, a survey was conducted in five different cities (Almaty, Petrpavlosk, Uralsk, Ust-Kamenogorsk and Chimkent) of Kazakhstan. In this survey, the relationship between multiethnic society and unitary state politics were

examined. This research demonstrated the diverse attitudes of Russians and Kazakhs on the issue of state building policies. Generally speaking, while the Kazakhs approved the state policies, the Russians emphasized the Soviet past, only few Russians in Kazakhstan internalized the new Kazakh state. While the 51% of the Kazakhs identified themselves with the Kazakh State, only the 11.9% of the Russians chose to do so. When the question was repeated a second time, the 84.3% of the Kazakhs said they identified themselves with the Kazakh State, in response to this only the 24.2% or Russians identified themselves with the Kazakh State. While the 41.8% of Russians claimed that their primary unit of allegiance was their family, only the 26.1% of Kazakhs gave the same answer. On the other hand, according to this survey, the 24.6% of Russians associated themselves with the Soviet Union; the same survey revealed that only the 5.9% of Kazakhs identified themselves with the Soviet Union. In addition to this, while the 21.6% of Russians associated themselves with their generation, the 18.9% of Kazakhs associated themselves with their generations (Masanov, 2002). In addition to these findings the research revealed that the most important ethnic polarization in northern Kazakhstan was in the city of Uralsk. In this city, while 100% of the Kazakhs considered themselves as citizens of the Kazakh State, only the 15.6% of the Russians considered themselves to be a citizen of the Kazak State. While the 71.4% of the Kazakhs argued that the Kazakhs should dominate the political institutions, only the 2.6% of Russians gave the same answer. While the 91.8% of the respondents believed that the president of Kazakhstan should be of Kazakh origin, only the 15.6% of Russians gave the same answer. Accordingly, from the findings of all these public polls we could infer that while most of the Kazakhs identified

themselves with the new Kazakh State, the Russians internalized themselves with the Soviet Union, family or their past generations.

It is also important to note that the Russians living in Northern Kazakhstan tend to identify themselves more closely with the Far East Russian Region of Siberia *Altai Krai, Tomsk* rather than the mainland Russia. Irina Erofeeva, a Russian historian strongly emphasized that the regional and local attachments of Russians to Eastern Kazakhstan overrode their sense of attachment to Kazakhstan or to the Russian Federation. She added that the Russians, who lived in the southern parts of Kazakhstan, were closer to the Kazakh culture and familiar with the Kazakh language (c.f. Dave, 2003: 12). For this reason the idea of establishing the Republic of Southern Siberia was expressed by extremist groups (Cummings, 2002). The survey, which was conducted in 1994 among the Russians in Kazakhstan, demonstrated that the 27% of the Russians support the unification of the Northern part of Kazakhstan with the Russian Federation; on the other hand, the 14% of the Russian population supported the idea of territorial autonomy. According to the research findings in the Eastern and the Northern Oblasts of Kazakhstan the 42% of the Russians maintained that the eastern oblasts of Kazakhstan belonged to the Russian Federation, the 16% of the respondents supported the idea of territorial autonomy. On the other hand, the same survey, conducted in the Northern Oblast of Kazakhstan revealed that while the 37% of the Russians held the idea of uniting with Russia, the 11% of the Russians favored territorial autonomy (Olcott, 2002: 76). Irina Erofeeva claimed that the Northern part of the Kazakh Oblasts, along the right bank of the *Irtysh*, including the city of Ust-Kamenogorsk, belonged to the

Siberian ecological landscape not to the Kazakh nomadic pastures and these lands were under autonomy of the Western Siberian government throughout the Tsarist period until the inclusion in 1920 (c.f. Dave, 2003: 19). Using the state sponsored press and academic circles the Kazakh State showed a tendency to voice such terms as diaspora, settlers, guests when referring to the non-titular ethnic groups in Kazakhstan in order to alienate them and break their territorial claims (Dave, 2003: 12). This is also a factor which will push the Russians to migrate to Russia. This is of course perceived as discrimination by the Russians and as a way for excluding them.

Bhavna Dave argued that the Russians in Kazakhstan had complex multi-layer identities, which formed a profound ethnic mix, especially in virgin lands region, where the Soviet style internationalism flourished. This can be seen Russian sayings such as (*mama Tatarka, otets Greek a ia Russkii chelovek*) meaning my mother is Tatar, my farther is Greek and I am Russian (c.f. Dave, 2003: 12). Joma Nazpary also referred to similar cases in his book; he gives the example of a family of Greek origin, who identify themselves as Russians. During my interviews, one of the interviewees, a girl from Kostanay, first introduced herself as Russian. However, later during the interview she then after sometime told me that her mother was Korean and her father Ukrainian. She said that she spoke neither Korean nor Ukrainian and that she was not familiar with their traditions. She told me that she had many Kazakh friends and she spoke with them in Russian. She asked me how I would describe her. I first answered by saying she was a Kazakh national, but my

answer did not satisfy her. Then I changed my answer and said that she was Soviet. This time she was quite satisfied.

Another interviewee, born in Kazakhstan but who emigrated with her family to one of the small cities of the Russian Federation, said: "*moy radnoy gorad Kostonay*" (my mother city is Kostanay) and she added that her father was also born in Kazakhstan and that her mother came to Kazakhstan when she was a child. When asked how she remembered Kazakhstan. She answered: "I was born in Kostanay and all of my childhood past there. Now I have relatives in Kazakhstan and it is a wonderful place and I have great memories of Kazakhstan". Furthermore, when I asked her if she want to go to Kazakhstan again, she immediately replied: "Yes, of course I want to go. I miss Kazakhstan very much and so does my mother." I asked her why she came to Russia. She said: "if we had stayed in Kazakhstan my mother could not work and I also could not study at the university because we do not speak the Kazakh Language"[41]. During the interviews, I realized that people in general miss their friends and their neighbors independently of their ethnicity. This allows us to say that usually interethnic relations are relatively peaceful and the complaints of the people are mostly about the policies of the state.

The interviews, which I had carried out, showed that Russians and non-Russian people, living in the areas of all-union economies, have internalized to a certain extent the Soviet identity. In my view, the paradoxes of the Soviet ethnic

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[41] This answer is very interesting because education language is Russian most of the universities in Kazakhstan today. This answer revealed how the state language policy effects the perception of Russians living in Kazakhstan.

engineering policy prevented in someway a complete merging of all the people under the Soviet identity, which was the main objective of the regime. The people, living in multiethnic areas, who were socialized under the Soviet High Culture and developed regional bounds. As a result, a certain degree of merging took place[42]. Furthermore, as a result of Russian eastward expansion millions of Russian migrants settled into the northern part of the Kazakh steppes, which became (*Rodina*) homeland of the Russians. In the course of time these people developed emotional attachments with these lands.

5.5 Political Organizations Among Russians

In response to the pressure of Kazakhization policies, non-titular groups, mainly Russians began to form political and cultural organizations in order to claim their rights from the Kazakh State. However, these organizations are not true political parties and they do not have a clear program. They can be defined as

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[42] I also interviewed middle-aged Russian women from Latvia in Russia. There are important similarities to those coming from Kazakhstan. She had moved to a small city in the Russian Federation: When asked about her life in Latvia she said: "I always look at my photo album, my childhood and university life passed in Latvia…I miss my life in Latvia very much… people in Russia are very rude but in Latvia people were kind… in Latvia people never throw their cigarettes out on the street, but in Lipetsk it is quite common for people to spit on the street". Another interview was a student from Moldova. He had come to Russia for his university education. He said "I preferred to come to Russia because I am not proficient in my native language". In Russia he blamed the Russians for their drinking habit and some times he talked Moldavian but when I visited him in Moldova I observed that he preferred to speak Russian. He has a Russian speaking Moldavian peer group. When asked they said that "we are Moldavian but our native language is Russian or Russian is better then our native language". They identified themselves as Moldavian but they spoke Russian. They had all graduated from Russian schools in Moldova. In some conversations in various places I understood that people, who worked together, learned about their ethnic origin for the first time. They do not care about their ethnic origins. When I asked the Moldavian interviewee about the ethnic origins of people in the village told me that he did not know they…may be Russian or may be Moldovan but they were good people.

"broad umbrella organizations", whose functions are to coordinate the political activities of the non-titular population (Melvin, 1995: 112).

The most radical settler organization was the *Russian Community*, registered in 1992. The activities of the *Russian Community* primarily found support from the Russian dominated Northern Oblasts of Kazakhstan. The agenda of the *Russian Community* was to defend human rights and collect records of human rights violations. The *Russian Community* followed a narrow ethnic line the leader of the organization was Boris Suprunik, who would later take on Russian citizenship. He was accused of encouraging ethnic hatred and was arrested in Petropavlosk. The *Russian Community* could not register in the 1994 elections because of their radical agenda. Although Boris Suprunik was a charismatic leader, the community had a weak internal organization and was divided into smaller extremist groups (Cumming, 2002; Melvin, 1995: 114).

Another Slavic movement, called *LAD*, which was formed in the city of Petrapavlovsk to coordinate the various Slavic cultural centers. *LAD* tried to gain a constituency from all the Slavic and Russian speaking population as opposed to only targeting ethnic Russians. The principle of *LAD* was to preserve the ethnic cultural sprit of the Slavs (Alexandrov, 1999: 116; Melvin, 1995: 113). *LAD* consolidated with all the Slavic organizations in Northern Oblasts and planed to work within cultural centers. The movement also found support from Kazakhs and Tatars. In the 1994 parliamentary elections, the movement became successful in a number of regions. As a result four candidates from *LAD* and eight candidates,

known to be close to *LAD* became members of the parliament (Melvin, 1995: 114).
In addition to this, there were various regional Cossack groups operating in
Kazakhstan. They were not unified under a single organization and they had
conflicting agenda[43]. While some of the group leaders employed separatist policies
other leaders preferred to seek moderate relations with the Kazakh State
(Alekseenko, 1998; Irtikeev, 1998).

Results of a research involving interviews with nationalist group leaders, Victor
Mikhailov, Chairman of the Republic Slavic Movement *LAD*, Furii Bunakov
Chairman of (*Russkaia Obshehina*) Russian Community and Boris Tsybin,
Chairman of the Russian Union (*Russkii Soiuz*), revealed that the leaders of
Russian population had common objections concerning the nationality policy of
Kazakhstan as follows; First the leaders blamed the Kazakh government for trying
to build a mono-ethnic Kazakh state and ignoring the idea of civic nation building.
The Kazakhs increased their share in the government sector and gained special
privileges within the mono-ethnic system. The government employed methods of
systematic assimilation or/and ethnic discrimination. For the interviewees, the main
problem behind the large emigration is the governments' economic and ethnic
policies. Secondly, all these leaders agreed that Russian should become the state
language, the state symbols and the names of landmarks/, streets etc… should
reflect the Kazakhstan's multiethnic character. Thirdly, in order to retain the
cultural liberty of non-titular groups territorial autonomy is necessary, in addition to

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[43] In 1999, an unsuccessful military separatist movement was initiated by one of the Cossack
groups in northern Kazakhstan (Commercio; 2004: 85-103).

this, a quota system is necessary for the employment of ethnic groups in the state organs. Finally, all of these leaders agreed that the governments' current nationalist politics intensified the inter-ethnic tension in the country[44] (Oka, 2002).

With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government initiated Kazakh state building policies. This process could be interpreted as the collapse of previous customs and the beginning of a new area in which the Russian population in the region had to face various difficulties. New constitutional amendments and administrative practices replaced the previous Soviet state understanding which provided the Russian population the opportunity to consult a strong ethnic identity. However, with the new period the Russian population lost its previous status an entered into a stage in which they had to struggle against ethnic state building policies in order to protect their rights. On the other hand, President Nursultan

[44]In opposition to Russian stance, various Kazakh organizations were formed. *Azat*, *Jeltoqsan* and *Alash* are the nationalist Kazakh organizations. These organizations develop the idea of mono-ethnic state (Svanberg, 1996: 323). Even though, all three parties have a nationalist agenda they have different tones. The *Azat* movement was organized in the summer of 1990; the party favored negotiating inter-ethnic issues to violence. The *Jeltoqsan*, officially registered on March 29th and had an anti-communist stance. The slogan of the party was "Kazakhstan for Kazakhs', Russians for Russia". The party was a highly radical organization and had a militant attitude towards issue of inter-ethnic issues. *Alash* had a radical approach towards the inter-ethnic issues; the party believed that the use of violence was the best way to achieve their objectives. *Alash* had a relatively Pan-Islamist outlook and aimed to establish an Islamic State of *Alash-Orda*, the party tried to enlarge its sphere of influence and include all the Turkic peoples living in the CIS (Janabel, 1996:16-17). Natsuko Okas' interview with the Kazakh nationalists Aldan Aimbetov editor in chief of *Kazakhskaia Pravda*, Sabetkazy Akatai chairmen of the national Party *Alash*, Khasen Kozhakhmet chairman of the civil movement *Alash*, Kaldarkhan Kambar journalist for the Kazakh language newspaper *Turkistan* revealed that the common opinion of these writers and leaders were as follows: Kazakhstan could be a multi-ethnic society but the Kazakhs had certain privileges in Kazakhstan and the policies of the government had to be in line with this fact. Another factor, which disturbed Kazakh nationalists, was the distant stance of non-Kazakhs to Kazakh culture and language. The Kazakh state should initiate such policies in order to elevate the consciousness of Kazakh people, the only state language had to be the Kazakh language, Kazakh names had to be given to streets and landmarks the government had to support Kazakh culture and tradition, the share of Kazakhs in the population should be increased. Consequently, the repatriation of diaspora Kazakhs was essential (Oka, 2002).

Nazarbaev has emphasized the significance the concept of civic nation building during last years to balance ethnic relations and due to certain practical difficulties. In other words, the reason behind this political maneuver was to calm down the inter-ethnic relations in Kazakhstan. As stressed in the theoretical chapter, the two factors, the ethnic state policies and the competition for scarce resources among ethnic groups, intensifies the tension among them. The policies, which will be adopted by Kazakhstan, will have an important impact on inter-ethnic relations. A balanced policy will diminish the problems that may arise as a result of changing ethnic hierarchy during the post-Soviet period.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Increasing security concerns and trade required the Russian Empire to conquer the Kazakh Steppes. The Russian military advance penetrated deep into the steppes and in the year of 1860 the entire region was incorporated into the territories of the Russian Empire. The Russian frontier expansion, which began at the end of the 16th century, entailed massive migration waves from the Russian Empire to the Kazakh Steppes. These developments firmly attached the Russian Empire to the region and made her a permanent actor in its affairs. This frontier expansion policy caused significant demographic change in the Kazakh Steppes, which resulted in extensive interaction between Russian migrants and the native population of the Kazakh Steppes. This interaction combined with the policies of the Russian Empire triggered changes in the identity formation of both immigrant Russians and local Kazakhs as well as in the social formations of the Steppes.

The settlement of the Russians in the Kazakh Steppes not only challenged the pastoral-nomadic way of life and the Kazakh identity but it also reshaped and strengthened the Russian identity as indicated by the constructionist approach. Both state policy (that of the Russian Empire and the Soviet State and later Independent Kazakh state) and inter-ethnic relations that took place since the settlement of Russians in the Steppes had fundamental impact on shaping the identities of both Russians and Kazakhs. The settlement of Russians transformed the socio-political structure of the pastoral nomadic way of life of the Steppe people. In addition to

this, the Russian education policy, which aimed not only to train the future cadres for the Imperial State, also divide the people of Turkistan and the Kazakh Steppes into smaller ethnic groups. The well educated Kazakh elite internalized the term *Kazakh* as an ethnic identity, the term had previously been used to denote tribal confederation. It is possible to argue that, the Kazakhs solidified their ethnic consciousness from that date on. This consciousness could be observed in the formation of Kazakh political movements, meetings and publications. Russian rule brought modernization to the region, which encompassed new ideas and a new way of life, along with the formation and strengthening of the *Kazakh* ethnic label and group.

On the other hand, when the issue is evaluated from the perspective of the Russians, it can be argued that the main drive behind their immigration was to find a suitable environment for survive. The survival needs of the peasants suited the interests of the Empire, therefore the peasants were allowed to settle in the Kazakh Steppes. Gaining the support of the Imperial State, the Russian population acquired a privileged and superior position vis-à-vis the Kazakhs and this situations prevented the integration of the Russian population with the native groups. However, with the settlement to the new lands the interaction of the Russian migrants and Kazakhs led to a development of a new sense of Russian identity, different from the one in Russia. These changes indicated a mental change among the Russian settlers. Russian migrants found better opportunities in the region and they restructured the Steppes according to their own needs. This change was the beginning of a process, which would later on make the Russians, in Kazakhstan say "This is my

Motherland" and lead them to differentiate themselves from the rest of the Russians in the European part Russia. It must be borne in mind that, at the macro level, the migration of the Russian peasants to the Kazakh Steppes for survival served the interests of the Russian Empire. For this reason the emigrants received the full support of their state and this provided them with a sense of superiority over the Kazakhs in the region. The Russians had the tended to have an ethnocentric view of the life style of the Steppe people, thus remaining distant to them. This factor contributed to the maintenance of the two ethnic groups distinct form one another.

Although the official Soviet ideology had aimed to integrate all nations of the Soviet Union, the actual policies and practices they adopted prevented the actualization of this ideal. The Soviet Nationalities Policy recognized the presence of ethnic groups and granted them with certain national territory. Hence each ethnic group was allowed to develop its own national culture and language by acquiring a sort of self autonomy. This practice deepened the differences between ethnic groups and put administrative and mental boundaries between them. During the Soviet period the Kazakh Steppes experienced important social and political changes as they gained the status of Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Thus, Kazakhness was encouraged by the state policy. Russian nationalism was strictly suppressed during the early years of the Socialist Regime, which promised equality to all the nationalities and the right of self-determination.

However, with Stalin, Russians regained their higher status. During the period of Stalin, the migration of Russians continued to the Kazakh SSR due to the

construction of industries and the opening up of agriculture in the northern part of the Kazakh SSR millions of workers of Russian and Slavic origin were sent to these new sites in the peripheries of the Soviet Union. As a result, the Russian population reached over 40% of the total population of Kazakh SSR. The migrants came to the region with the mission of establishing industry, enhancing agriculture, developing institutions in the field of education and health. Their migration was not like a migration to a foreign country but rather migration from one region to another region of the same country. Hence, they identified themselves with the place they settled in and perceived it as their homeland. They developed a certain unique way of life with the people living in the Kazakh Steppes. As a result, the Soviet way of life and modernization were transferred to the periphery of the Soviet Union via the Russian migrants. The modernization of the Soviet periphery entailed the dissemination of the idea that Russians were well educated and an advanced nation in the domain of culture, science and technology. The Russian character in Chingiz Aitmatov's novel *The Day Last More Than a Hundred Years* clearly illustrates this idea. The dialogues with the non-Russian ex-Soviet citizens reveal a general view of how the Russians were perceived by the non-Russians. The perception of Russians is a controversial issue for the non-Russian, ex-Soviet citizens. For them, while Russians were perceived as aggressors and invaders on the one hand, they were perceived as educated and civilized people on the other. Thus, understanding this dilemma is essential in understanding the inter-ethnic perceptions and identity issues.

Inter-ethnic relations in Kazakh SSR became tense starting with the Gorbachev period. The tense relationships emanate mainly form the Soviet ethnic hierarchy which resulted in the concentration of the Kazakh population in low paid jobs and unskilled positions. This ethnic stratification created negative feelings among the Kazakhs against their Russian neighbors. The relatively democratic atmosphere of the Gorbachev period, gave the Kazakhs, who were feeling discriminated against, the opportunity to express their discontent. For Kazakhs, the Kazakhs had to have preferential positions in Kazakh territory. Thus, this situation frustrated the Russian population living in Kazakh SSR.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union the Russian population in Kazakhstan lost their political and social power, which they had acquired during the time of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Kazakhstan started to experience a process of nation and state building. This process was a controversial one for the non-titular populations of Kazakhstan in general, and for Russians in particular. This situation left the Russian population in Kazakhstan defenseless before the new state building ideology. As a result, to overcome certain difficulties, aiming at protecting their identities and to deal with government policies, the Russian population formed various political organizations. While some organizations were based on Russianness, other organizations were formed on the basis of the Slavic identity or on the basis of the Russian language, spoken commonly by various ethnic groups.

Considering the policies of independent Kazakhstan, it can be argued that the relatively strong ethnic policies of the early years of independence are balanced

today with more civic policies, which attempt to embrace all the non-titular ethnic groups living in Kazakhstan. It is essential to remember that the government policies deeply affect the attitude of the Russian and non-titular groups towards the state. Through strict ethnic policies, non-titular groups may feel excluded and this would lead to new ethnic formations through time. On the other hand, civic policies may help to calm down ethnic tension in the state and prevent formation of new alignments.

It is possible to argue that institutionalized understanding of ethnicity is still   strong not only in Kazakhstan but also throughout the post-Soviet geography. This understanding is still fresh both in the traditions of governments and in the minds of the individuals living in the region, who consider the ethnic affiliations primordial. In addition to this, we have to consider the external factors such as the impact of the Russian Federation, which may play a role in shaping the identity of the Russians of Kazakhstan.

In conclusion, this thesis attempted to understand the settlement of Russians in the Kazakhs Steppes and the political processes they experienced during the Russian Empire and Soviet period. During these periods the Russian population, with a privileged status, identified themselves with the Kazakh Steppes, which gave them a unique Russian identity, distinguishing them from the local population as well as the Russians living in the European part of Russia. However, after the disintegration they lost their political and social power that was supported by the Russian Empire and the Soviet State. Furthermore, the state building policies of Kazakhstan entailed

a relative exclusion of the Russian population. Confused under new conditions, Russians continued to identify themselves with the Soviet identity since some of them felt that there was no room for them in the newly emerging Kazakh identity.

The assumptions of the constructivist school emphasized that the structural factors led to the reformation or loss of ethnic identities. Hence, today the political structure in Kazakhstan has changed against the interests of the Russian population. This structural shift changed the ethnic hierarchy in the society against the interest of the Russian population. The future of the identity of the Russian population is connected to a large extent to the policies, which will be adopted by the Kazakh state. If the Kazakh state intensifies its policy excluding the Russian population, the Russian population would develop alternative survival strategies in order to defend their rights. On the other hand, the adoption of civic nation building policies, which will include the ethnic groups living in the country, will prevent the radicalization of the Russian population and put an end to their alignment projects with other Russian speaking groups.

Furthermore, the developments in the world and particularly the developments in the Russian Federation will have direct impact on the attitude of the Russian population in Kazakhstan. If the Russian Federation finds that circumstances are profitable to intervene with Kazakh internal politics, the Russian population might find the support they need and may develop separatist movements, they did not need to exercise until now. Policies adopted will have direct impact on their identity. It can be concluded that it is too early to predict how the identity of the

Russian population in Kazakhstan will evolve since the Kazakh identity is also under construction. The development of both identities will shape each other considering the significance of interaction on ethnic identification.

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