

**“DECIDING WHICH PARTY TO VOTE FOR”
IN 3 NOVEMBER 2002 ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF TİRE, TURKEY**

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ABSTRACT

“DECIDING WHICH PARTY TO VOTE FOR” IN 3 NOVEMBER 2002 ELECTIONS: THE CASE OF TIRE, TURKEY

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The aim of this thesis is to analyze the political behavior and party preferences of the voters at the 3 November 2002 elections in terms of the concept “New Political Behavior”. The structure of this thesis is as follows: In the first chapter, the basic theoretical framework of the concept political behavior is examined. In this chapter, the concept “new political behavior” is discussed in detail. In the second chapter, the political environment, institutions, traditions and transformation of the Turkish political system are analyzed. The empirical part of this thesis has examined the applicability of the concept “new political behavior” on 3 November 2002 with an analysis of the interviews which are made in Tire. The main conclusion of this study is that, the traditional approaches remained limited in explaining the picture that has emerged after 3 November 2002 elections, and the consequences of 3 November 2002 elections can be evaluated as evidence of a just occurring phenomena “new political behavior concept”, by emphasizing the similarities rather than differences between the findings and the concept.

Key Words: Political Behavior, New Political Behavior, Party Preferences, Elections in Turkey, Voting Behavior

ÖZ

“HANGİ PARTİYE OY VERMELİ?": 3 KASIM 2002 SEÇİMLERİ, TİRE ÖRNEK OLAYI

Gölgeliöđlu, Özlem

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu tez, 3 Kasım 2002 seçimlerinde seçmen davranışındaki ve politik davranıştaki değişimi yeni seçmen davranışı konseptini kullanarak incelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Tezin içeriđi şu şekilde özetlenebilir : Birinci bölümde politik davranış terimiyle ilgili temel literatür incelenmektedir. Bu bölümde ayrıca, yeni seçmen davranışı kapsamlı bir şekilde tartışılmıştır. İkinci bölümde Türk politik sisteminin temel kurumları ve geçirdiđi değişim analiz edilmiştir. Bu tezin alan çalışmasında ise Tire’de yapılan mülakatlar aracılıđı ile yeni politik davranış kavramının 3 Kasım 2002 seçim sonuçlarının değerlendirilmesinde uygulanabilirliđi tartışılmıştır. Alan bulguları ile yeni politik davranış kavramının arasındaki farklılıklardan çok benzerliklerin vurgulanması ile yeni politik davranış terimi 3 Kasım 2002 seçimlerinin değerlendirilmesinde klasik politik davranış literatürünün yerine uygun bir araç olarak düşünülebilir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Politik Davranış, Yeni Politik Davranış, Parti Tercihleri, Türkiye’de Seçimler, Seçmen Davranışı

To My Family

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 3 November 2002 elections have been given various names in the existing literature as “critical elections”, “democratic revolution” and “the elections of a sociological and political break”. These attempts for evaluation refer to some critical features of this election. We have seen that the traditional vote structure in Turkey is seriously shaken by November 2002 elections. Since 1950’s, the centre-right parties could compose the majority that helps them for governmental power, but in this election the sum of centre right votes have remained at 10-12 percent. The three coalition members, which composed 57.government, have lost 68 percent of their votes. Beside the political consequences, the 3 November 2002 elections have witnessed the lowest participation since the 6th November 1983 elections.

The Justice and Development Party (AKP) gained the majority of the parliamentary seats by receiving the majority of the votes after just 15 months of its establishment. On the election of 3 November 2002, the significance not only rests on the failure of the major parties of the center right and center left parties-except Republican People’s Party (CHP) - to pass the 10% electoral threshold, and an important change in the name of the structure of the parliament that emerged as a two-party legislature for the first time since the 1957 elections, but on the perception of the AKP as a pro-Islamist political party.

In such a context, the discussions in the literature are mainly concentrated on the AKP’s ideological aspects. According to many students of Turkish politics, AKP has represented a synthesis of a democratic, conservative, reformist and modern position at least aspiring to a centrist location in the political spectrum, which is related to the self-definition of the party, although there has been a suspicion on

the part of the military and secularist groups.¹ Some of the academic literature emphasized the similarity between AKP and ANAP as a non-ideological movement in a technical manner.²

But while trying to understand this major shift, a deeper analysis is necessary not only in terms of the political position of the AKP but also in terms of voting behavior and party choice in general. In this context, the academic literature mainly focuses on the support base of the AKP with the help of the previously used patterns of investigation such as geographical perspective³, the pattern of economic voting behavior⁴, and the micro and macro sociological approaches⁵. However, besides constructing a general understanding about the support base of the AKP, I find it quite important to have a comprehensive analysis about the change or continuity in the substance and direction of the party identifications of the voters and the main cleavages that the voting behavior is based on.

At this point, a new concept, called New Political Behavior which is based on the new post-material politics makes it possible to analyze the changes in the election outcomes of the especially advanced industrial democracies. This new concept has typically focused on three main facts that emerged especially after the 1990's. One of these facts is the declining of the long term predispositions such as party identification, which is called as individualization of politics that beside the more

¹ Coşar, Simten and Aylin Özman. (2004). "Center Right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 General Elections.Neo-Liberalism with a Muslim Face",*Contemporary Politics*, Volume 10, Number 1, pp. 55-74.

² Bora, Taml.(2002). " 2002 Seçimi ve Siyasi Güzergâh Problemleri", *Birikim*, Sayı:163/164, Kasım-Aralık, pp. 29-35

³ Çarkoğlu, Ali. (2003). "The Rise of the New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol 7, No 3, Frank Cass, London, pp.123-156

⁴ Başlevent, Cem. , Kirmanoğlu, Hasan and Burhan Şenatalar.(2005) "Empirical Investigation of Party Preferences and Economic Voting", *European Journal of Political Research*, 44, pp.547-562.

⁵ Tosun, Tanju.(2003). *Siyasette Yeniden Mevzilenmeler: Liberal Sosyal Sentez, Muhafazakâr Demokrat Sentez Ekseninde 3 Kasım 2002 Seçimleri*, BÜKE Kitapları, Ankara.

individualized and inwardly oriented style of political choice, more citizens now deal with the complexities of politics instead of depending on party elites.⁶ This is of course bounded with the shift from cleavage based voting to issue and candidate based voting⁷. According to this concept, there has been erosion in the ability of social cleavages to explain electoral choice considering the weakening of class and religious alignments has been accompanied by an appearing erosion in long term partisan commitments and enduring feelings of party identification⁸. On the other hand, as the concept “new political behavior” indicates a new set of post material issues such as environmental protection, women rights, identity politics and quality of life issues are the new points of this new post material agenda⁹.

In this respect, analyzing the shift on the party preferences, through the concept of new political behavior, makes it easy to evaluate the election outcomes of 3 November 2002 elections, whether as an emergence of new political behavior or not. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to analyze the political behavior and the voting preferences of the voters at the 3 November 2002 elections in terms of the new political behavior. Beside the theoretical discussions, the existing literature in Turkey lacks the field work about the subject electoral behaviour and party choice. This analysis is composed of two interrelated parts, one is theoretical and the other is empirical. In the empirical part of the study, I have done face-to-face interviews with nearly 40 people who have different identity affiliations as age, gender, education and income in city of Tire which is a district of İzmir.

⁶ Dalton, Russell J.(2000). “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol 33, No6/7, August September, p 919

⁷Dalton, Russell J. (2002). “The Decline of Party Identifications” in *Parties without Partisans*, ed.by Russell Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.22

⁸ Dalton, Russell. (1996) *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 2nd ed., New Jersey: Chatham House. Also see Schmitt, Hermann and Sören Holmberg. (1995). “Political Parties in Decline” in *Citizens and the State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

⁹ Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg. (2000). “Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and Post Honeymoon Trend Decline”, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Institute for Social Research: University of Michigan.

Besides the nearness and facilities of research, Tire is chosen because of the particular striking features of results of the 2002 and 2004 elections in terms of shifts in political party affiliation. Tire witnessed DP and DYP domination since the multiparty era, and 2002 elections are resulted with the triumph of the AKP.

The first chapter is dedicated to an attempt to draw the basic theoretical framework of political behavior with a particular emphasis given on the concept of new political behavior and its basic components that this concept introduces. The construction of theoretical framework on political behavior with the concepts of political culture and political socialization will be supported by the intellectual climate of the period during which behavioral sciences developed. In the first chapter, the post material turn in the behavioral sciences will be discussed in detail. By doing this, the works of Russell Dalton who carries the theoretical assumptions of new political behavior will be analyzed.

In Chapter 2, the Turkish Political system and the elections from multi party era will be discussed. Here, it will be attempted to sketch a picture of political environment, institutions, traditions and transformation of the system. After a brief analysis of the origins of the Turkish party system, the Turkish political system and elections will be discussed under the main periods of 1960-1980; 1980-1990 and 1990's. This categorization is shaped by the diverse features of these periods in the means of change and continuity in the vote structures. The last part of this chapter is the analysis of the 3 November 2002 elections, with its specific characteristics and the analytical discussion about the consequences of these elections.

The empirical part of this thesis is planned to be an application of the conceptual framework of new political behavior, discussed in the first chapter. In this sense, with a brief discussion of the concept, this chapter is devoted to a receptive analysis of the interviews which are made in Tire. This analysis will carry the concept of new political behavior on the 3 November 2002 elections. The interviews will be discussed under the categorization as political participation,

voting behavior, party identification and cleavages which are the specific points of the new political behavior concept. It is hoped that we will discover, through the interviews in Tire, if we can evaluate the consequences of the 3 November 2002 elections as evidence the of new political behavior concept, and if so, by which motivations does the voters decide the direction of their votes?

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND VOTING BEHAVIOR

2.1 Political Culture as a National Character

Political culture, as a potentially unifying concept of political science, aims to explain the effects of individuals on the political system and vice-versa in a cross-culturally valid way.¹⁰ It was first proposed by Gabriel Almond¹¹ and subsequently employed in the *Civic Culture*.¹²

The early studies of political culture proposed a unique character of political behavior within a given state. They are called as “national character studies” by the students of political culture.¹³ The characteristics of nations are identified as to the extent of fostering democratic performance. Paying special attention to the contrast between participant and subject cultures, Verba and Almond argue that “democratic outcomes are more likely where participatory norms are widespread and less likely where values take a predominantly passive, subject form.”¹⁴ Almond and Verba employed a number of concepts and classifications in their comparison of the political cultures of five contemporary democracies according to their members’ orientations to political roles and their expectations from the political system. Parochial political culture is defined by their members’ unspecialized political roles. For them the political orientations are not separated

¹⁰ Chilton, Stephen. (1988) “Defining Political Culture” *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol 41, No 3, Sep, p. 419.

¹¹ Almond, Gabriel. (1956). “Comparative Political Systems”, *Journal of Politics*, XVIII, pp. 319-409 paraphrased in Chilton, 1988, p.419

¹² Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. (1963). *The Civic Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

¹³ Gendzel, Glen. (1997) “Political Culture: Genealogy of a Concept” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol 28, No 2, Autumn, pp. 225-250 and see also Jackman, Robert W. and Ross Miller.(1996) “A Renaissance of Political Culture” *American Journal of Political Science Review*, Vol 40, Iss:3, Aug , p. 632

¹⁴ Almond and Verba, 1963 quoted in Jackman and Miller, 1996, p. 88.

from their religious and social orientations, and they have no expectations of change initiated by the political system like African loyal tribes and Ottoman Empire.¹⁵ The second major type of political culture is the subject system in which, besides the awareness of specialized governmental authority, the relationship toward the system on the general is essentially a passive relationship.¹⁶ The third type of political culture is the participant political culture, in which the members of the society tend to be explicitly oriented to the system as a whole and they tend to be activists in the polity with a role varying from acceptance to rejection of the political objects.¹⁷ The participant and parochial political culture forms are also used by Almond, Dalton and Strom in an individualistic manner, which analyses citizen's role in the policy-making process. Participants, as actual or potential, are informed about politics and make demands on the polity, granting their support to their leaders on their performances. The subjects just obey the rules but are not involved in politics. The parochial are hardly aware of government and politics¹⁸. Besides the political system and policy-making process, the policy outputs are highly related with the political cultures of the countries. About the expectations associated with functioning of the government, some cultures put more weight on the policy of outputs of government, such as providing welfare and security; but on the other hand, other cultures can emphasize how the process functions, which involves values such as the rule of law and procedural justice.¹⁹

Besides this categorization that directs us to the relation of political culture with the democratic performance of nations, political culture is also a headline for such terms as attitudes, values, orientations, ideology and socialization. Defining

¹⁵ Almond and Verba, 1963, pp. 17-18

¹⁶ Almond and Verba, 1963, p. 19

¹⁷ Almond and Verba, 1963, p.20

¹⁸ Almond, Gabriel., Powell, Bingham., Strom, Kare and Russell J.Dalton. (2004) *Comparative Politics Today: A World View*, Pearson: Longman, pp. 49-50.

¹⁹ Almond et.al., 2004, pp:49-50

political culture as a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values in which political action takes place, is a common tendency in political culture literature.²⁰ According to Dreyer and Rosenbaum, political culture refers to the aspects of the culture which incorporates the political ideals, attitudes and arranging the norms of the groups.²¹

With the prevalence of such value clusters, the cultural patterns reflect the attitudes of the individuals, and the concept of political culture assumes that these patterns are widely shared across individuals. Specifically, cultural arguments are concentrated on the aggregate properties of the societies.²² In this sense, Gendzel argues that, despite the argument of Almond and Verba in *Civic Culture* which aimed to develop a scientific theory of democracy by codifying the operating characteristics of the democracy policy itself, they simply measured attitudes toward the political system in various places and called the result as political culture, moving from the acceptance of political culture as a property of collectivity²³ :“Individuals have beliefs, attitudes and values but they do not have cultures.”²⁴

The critics toward the definition of the concept are directing the students of political culture to a more detailed and inclusive definition. Verba redefined political culture as “beliefs, symbols and values that required interpretation as well as measurement”.²⁵ He was more specific about what aspects of political culture are, and what phenomena repositioned the link between the events of politics and the behavior of individuals, and also emphasized the subcultures

²⁰ Dreyer, Edward and Walter A. Rosenbaum. (1970). *Political Opinion and Behavior: Essays and Studies. 2. Edition*, Wadsworth Publishing Company Inc, Belmont: California.

²¹ Dreyer and Rosenbaum, 1970, p. 69.

²² Jackman and Miller, 1996, p. 2.

²³ Gendzel, 1997, p. 229.

²⁴ Almond and Verba, 1963 quoted in Gendzel, 1997, p.229.

²⁵ Gendzel, 1997, p.394

within a society.²⁶ The description of political culture is challenged by Power, Strom and Dalton in the term “subcultures in a nation.”²⁷ By distinguishing political cultures as consensual and conflictual, they emphasized that in a consensual political culture, citizens tend to agree on the appropriate meanings of making political decisions, and to agree on the major problems facing the society but in a conflictual political culture, the citizens are sharply divided, often on both the legitimacy of the regime and solutions to major problems²⁸.

The political culture account identifies distinctive clusters of attitudes that are widely held across individuals. These clusters are durable: “These durable clusters form subjective world orientations that are highly resistant to change and are seen as the fundamental generator of economic and political performance.”²⁹ In that sense, the most telling criticism of the political culture theory is that it has inadequately coped with political change. Eckstein explained the reason as “the assumptions of political culture approach in fact lead to the expectation of the continuity, but continuity can be reconciled with changes, though only changes of particular kinds.”³⁰

Besides the emphasis on attitudes, the touchstone of the culturalist theory is the postulate of oriented action. Eckstein stated that actors do not directly respond to situations but respond to them through mediating orientations.³¹ Orientations differentiated from the attitudes as being more general dispositions. The cultural themes are occurred through the collective orientations. Eckstein regard these orientations as having three components, “cognitive elements that decode

²⁶ Gendzel, 1997, p. 230.

²⁷ Almond et. al., 2004, p. 52.

²⁸ Almond et.al., 2004, p. 52.

²⁹ Jackman and Miller, 1996, p. 3.

³⁰ Eckstein, Harry. (1988). “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change” *The American Political Science Review*, Vol 82, No 3, Sep, p. 801.

³¹ Eckstein, 1988, p. 791.

experience, affective elements that invest cognition with feelings that move actors to act, evaluative elements that provide goals toward which actors are moved to act.”³² Also, Patterson emphasized the importance of orientations in the political culture theory. Patterson indicates that political culture is open-ended in the sense that it includes a wide variety of cognitions and values, multi-faced in the sense that it consists of several inter-related concepts and sensitizing concept that it directs attention to potential or largely unexploited data for the purpose of enhancing knowledge about subjective orientations to politics by focusing on the symbolic, evaluative and cognitive responses of the people.³³

These orientations are not learned in some automatic way. The term political socialization refers to the way in which political values are formed and transmitted from one generation to the next. In this sense, political socialization is an important process even in the name of political culture discussions.

2.2. The Concept of Political Socialization

The creation of political culture is a long process, considering the new born totally uninformed individuals without the expectations and opinions about civic life which make it possible for them to participate in political life. Dreyer and Rosenbaum defined the political socialization as the complex and long-learning process by which the individual comes to share the political community’s way of thinking and acting about politics.³⁴ This long-learning process is resulted by the public attitudes toward politics and their role within the political system which is called political culture: “How individuals form their political attitudes and thus, collectively how citizens form their political culture.”³⁵

³² Eckstein, 1988, p.791.

³³ Patterson, Samuel. (1970). “The Political Cultures of the American States.” In *Political Opinion and Behavior: Essays and Studies*, ed.by. E.Dreyer and W.Rosenbaum, California: Wadsworth Pub.Inc, p.106.

³⁴ Dreyer and Rosenbaum, 1970, p.70.

³⁵ Almond et. al, 2004, p. 46.

Dowson and Prewitt suggest that the process of political socialization operates at two levels:

At the community level, political socialization occurs by the transmission from one generation to another of a nation's dominant political standards and creates a basis for political continuity on the other hand, at the individual level, political socialization is a more complex and continuous process through which individual acquires a political self³⁶.

The knowledge of an obligation of obeying the rules, laws, rights and duties, the identifying and differentiating among political objects, and the internalizing the norms of appropriate citizen behavior occurs quite early in life.³⁷ The importance of early socialization is emphasized by the students of political socialization. By the acceptance of "system awareness as a pre-condition of political culture"³⁸, Bowman and Boynton argue that children develop attitudes about the system and the roles of the different participants by differentiating politics as a separate part of the world.³⁹ In a similar manner, Hess suggests that children's first contact with the political system is their awareness of the foremost political figure in that system.⁴⁰ He found that most children by the ages of seven, eight or nine could correctly identify the foremost political figure in five different countries. As emphasizing the importance of early socialization, Hess and Torney suggest that "a child who develops expectations of his own competence and of the responsiveness of the system to citizen influence, will be likely as an adult to

³⁶ Dowson, Richard E and Kenneth Prewitt. (1969). *Political Socialization*, Boston: Little Brown Company.

³⁷ Dreyer and Rosenbaum, 1970, p. 70.

³⁸ Bowman, Lewis and G.R. Boynton (1974). *Political Behavior and Public Opinion: Comparative Analyses*, New Jersey: Pentice Hall. , p.5.

³⁹ Bowman and Boynton, 1974, p.5.

⁴⁰ Hess, Robert. (1974). "Cross-Cultural Comparisons of the socialization of Attitudes toward Political Authority" In *Political Behavior and Public Opinion: Comparative Analyses* ed. by Bowman and Boynton, Pentice Hall: New Jersey, pp. 13-32.

attempt to influence the government when an issue arises which is of concern to him.”⁴¹

2.2.1. The Agents of Political Socialization

Many institutions and individuals play a part in political socialization. The family appears to play an important role in transmitting political values and forming stable partisan loyalties. The influences of the family - whether direct or not- is powerful and lasting. The attitudes toward authority are affected by the family’s tendency in the process of education by increasing participation in family decision making or predisposing child as a political object.⁴² The influences of the family continue in the adult years of the individual and earlier perspectives are hardly displaced by counter influences if there may be any.⁴³ Evans also notes that parental socialization influences are playing a role in determining the vote despite the cross pressures.⁴⁴

Formal education has been a main contributor in producing a commitment to democratic values and practices. By providing children with knowledge about the political world, more concrete information is given on political institutions and relationships and their role in it; schools also transmit the rules of the political game by introducing terms such as citizenship and public duty.⁴⁵

Political parties, mass media, and electoral campaigns are additional socializing agents. They affect evaluative orientations at later stages of the life cycle than

⁴¹ Hess, Robert and Judith V.Torney. (1968) *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, Garden City N.Y: Doubleday&Company Inc, Anchor Book Edition. paraphrased in Hess, 1974, p. 14.

⁴² Almond et al. 2004, p.54.

⁴³ Evans, A.J. (2004) “Social Structural Theories of Voting.” In *Voters and Voting: Introduction*, Sage Publications, p. 46.

⁴⁴ Evans, 2004, p.46.

⁴⁵ Almond et al, 2004, p. 54.

those institutions and experiences encountered relatively in early life⁴⁶. Among these agents, political parties play an important role in the political socialization process. With a steady flow of information, by contacting voters and party activists, and molding issue preferences, political parties mobilize individuals and provide proper information about the system and the rules of the game.⁴⁷

Socialization, beginning from the early years, continues throughout the individuals' whole life. Almond et al., state these life experiences, such as becoming involved in new social groups and roles, moving from one part of the country to another, becoming a parent, or finding or losing a job, can change one's political experiences and attitudes.⁴⁸ Despite the unifying characteristics of political socialization as mentioned already above, it may be divisive also. Some events, however, such as international conflicts or loss of a popular figure that can affect the whole nation, subcultures in a society also can have their own distinctive patterns of socialization that prevent the establishment of a common national set of values.⁴⁹

2.3. The Concept of Political Behavior: A Protest Movement

Political behavior school started in 1920's.⁵⁰ Dahl associated the rapid flowing of the behavioral approach with some factors: One of them is the existence of some key attitudes and predispositions generated in the American Culture, such as pragmatism, fact mindedness and confidence in science.⁵¹ According to Dahl, the second force which resulted in the development of the political behavior approach

⁴⁶ Dreyer and Rosenbaum, 1970, pp. 71-72.

⁴⁷ Almond et al. 2004, p. 54.

⁴⁸ Almond et al., 2004, p. 52.

⁴⁹ Almond et.al., 2004, pp: 52-53.

⁵⁰ Dahl, Robert. (1961b) "The Behavioral approach in Political Science: Epitaph for a Monument to a successful Protest", *The American Science Review*, Vol 55, No 4, Dec, pp. 763-772.

⁵¹ For a detailed analysis see Dahl, Robert, 1961b, pp. 763-772.

was the arrival of European Scholars who brought a sociological approach that reflected the specific influence of Max Weber, and the general influence of European Sociology with them.⁵² The rapid growth of the survey methods, such as aggregate voting statistics, provided a direct access to the characteristics and behaviors of individuals.⁵³

Besides being a school, political behavior can also be evaluated as a set of methods. Against some of the features of political science in the interwar years, such as the strong concentration on formal institutions, with the neglect of actual political behavior, behavioralism represents a critical reaction.⁵⁴ In this context, the behavioral approach came to be associated with many scientists who are in dissatisfaction through historical, political and institutional approaches as a protest movement.⁵⁵

2.3.1. Political Participation and the Modern State

Political participation became a distinguishing mark of the modern state in much of the research in comparative politics. According to Huntington, one of the important differences among traditional and modern societies is the participation of the people in politics in modern societies, and in a similar manner, political modernization can be observed by the participation of the social groups in politics through the modern political institutions besides village or town level: “Modern society is a participant society whereas traditional society is nonparticipant.”⁵⁶

⁵² Dahl, 1961, p. 767.

⁵³ Dahl, 1961, pp: 763-772.

⁵⁴ Dreyer and Rosenbaum, 1974, pp. 38-39.

⁵⁵ Dahl, 1961, p. 766.

⁵⁶ Huntington, Samuel P. (1963). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, p. 36.

The relation between participatory behavior and the modern state is based on the concept of participant citizenship. The concept of participant citizenship or democratic citizenship is developed by Almond and Verba, which is defined as “to take an interest in politics, engage in political discussions, participate by voting and other actions, have knowledge of politics and express a general sense of competence to influence the government, in sum activity, rationality and involvement.”⁵⁷ Beyond the traditional and primordial ties, identification with leaders and modern organizations, interest in public affairs and recognition of regulations compose the rules of the game⁵⁸.

In a similar manner, Inkeles explains the process of being a citizen of a nation, and puts the differences between the traditional societies and the modern ones. He argues the individual is a member of a family or a tribe before the advent of the modern state.⁵⁹ In such a setting, he is not aware of the influences that he can create on the policies, or he has not opportunities to create an influence on the state; but in a modern state, with its modern institutions, he gains a new awareness of his influences which requires communication between the government and citizen and he is expected to take an active interest in public affairs.⁶⁰

One of the scholars of the Political Participation, Palma, also establishes a clear link between politically and socially developed countries, so called modernized countries and political participation. He specifically focuses on the urbanization that resulted with the spreading of literacy, social and physis mobility; and beside the consequences of the urbanization, he also emphasizes an increase in capacities of the political system that produces more, in a greater number of areas, and more

⁵⁷ Almond and Verba, 1963 quoted in Bowman and Boynton, 1974, p. 218.

⁴⁹ Bowman and Boynton, 1974, p. 218.

⁵⁹ Inkeles, Alex. (1974) “Participant Citizenship in Six Developing Countries” In *Political Behavior and Public Opinion: Comparative Analyses*, Pentice Hall: New Jersey ed.by. Lewis Bowman and G.R. Boynton, p. 217.

⁶⁰ Inkeles, 1974, p. 217.

effectively than previously.⁶¹ The institutions that provide the citizens to participate in politics, regardless of social standing with the equal legal and political rights, emerged as a main difference between traditional and modern states. According to Palma, in a traditionalist society, there are not many political and social networks that offer opportunities for such a participation, and in these societies, the differences between individuals in the means of social status to provide the participation channels to the politics.⁶²

Besides these discussions about the relationship between modern state and participatory behavior, Özbudun focuses on the socio-economic change in a modern society that foster participatory behavior and the amount of political participation.⁶³ He argues that the modernization process is closely linked with the nature and motives of political participation:

The cluster of certain major processes of socio economic change, cumulatively referred to as social mobilization, brings with it “an expansion of the politically relevant strata” of the population, and increases demands for a wider range of governmental services. In turn this fact translates itself as the increased political participation.⁶⁴

Salisbury, in his work, distinguishes three intellectual usage of political participation in the democracy perspective and the modernization process: Political participation as a legitimizing act, provide a legitimacy for the system through voting and other means of participatory ways; political participation as an instrument, is seen as a necessary means of obtaining political power, and political participation can be interpreted as a solvent of social conflicts that citizen would come to share a common conception about the general good.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Palma, Giuseppe. (1970). *Apathy and Participation*. The Free Press: New York, pp. 4-5.

⁶² Palma, 1970, pp. 4- 5.

⁶³ Özbudun, Ergun. (1976) *Social Change and Political Participation in Turkey*. Princeton University Press: Princeton, p. 10.

⁶⁴ Özbudun, 1976, p. 10.

⁶⁵ Salisbury, Robert H. (1975) “Research on Political Participation.” *American Journal of Social Science*, Vol 19, No 2, May, p. 327.

2.3.2. The Modes of Political Participation: Conventional/ Unconventional

The modes of political participation are characterized in many different ways by the students of political participation. Verba and Nie⁶⁶, in their earlier study, employ such a definition of political participation that refers to activities that are more directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental personal or/and the actions they take. Indirect influencing process such as ceremonial support, the actions that are not aimed at effecting the government, and extraordinary modes of action such as protests, are excluded from Verba and Nie's definition of political participation. Dalton and Salisbury classified the differences between the modes of participation in terms of several criteria such as,

Whether the act conveys information about the individuals' political preferences and/or applies pressure for compliance, whether the act is directed toward a broad social outcome or a particular interest, the potential degree of conflict involved in the activity, the amount of effort required and the amount of cooperation with others required by the act.⁶⁷

Verba, Nie and Kim explored different forms of conventional political action that citizens might use: voting, campaign activity, communal activity and contracting officials on personal matters.⁶⁸

Salisbury states that these differentiations among modes of political participation such as conventional and unconventional have been heavily laden with ideological

⁶⁶ Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie. (1973) *Political Participation: Political Democracy and Social Equality*. New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p 2 paraphrased in Salisbury, Robert H, 1975, p. 327.

⁶⁷ Dalton, Russell. (1996). *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, Chantam House Publishers of Seven Bridges Press, LLC, p 34 and also see Salisbury, Robert, 1975, p. 331.

⁶⁸ Verba, Sidney., Nie, Norman and J.O. Kim. (1971). "The Modes of Political Participation", *Comparative Politics* Beverly Hills, California: Professional Papers, paraphrased in Salisbury, Robert, 1975, p. 327.

meaning.⁶⁹ According to him, the protest marches, and other forms of demonstrations have been recognized alongside the more customary forms of political participation and the focus of the many public policies is on controlling or moderating the amount or style of many participatory acts:

Much participation has political potential. Whether it will be realized is problematic and depends upon circumstances that may arise after the initial participatory act rather than following from the intentions held at the time. Similarly, the exclusion of support behavior such as marching in parades or joining government sponsored group, requires us to assume, unrealistically that we can tell whether influence is flowing from governments rather than the other way and that what is true today will continue to be so next week.⁷⁰

Bowman and Boynton have preferred another type of categorization that can be characterized as high involvement in political decisions or low involvement in political decisions which is based upon real or the perceived economic, physical or psychological cost or effort to the individual: Low involvement types of participation would be obeying the laws, being moral, defending the country and voting, on the other hand, the high involvement types of participation would be campaigning, writing letters and getting involved in political demonstrations.⁷¹

Millbrath presents two different formulations in the means of categorization of the participatory acts: One of them distinguishes spectator, transitional and gladiatorial activities according to the presumed difficulties or costs involved in the undertaking, while the other distinguishes between active and passive participation whereby the latter involves diffused support and compliance actions.⁷² Millbrath's categorization is a bit confusing as it considers some acts

⁶⁹ Salisbury, 1975, p. 324.

⁷⁰ Salisbury, 1975, p. 325.

⁷¹ Bowman and Boynton, 1974, p. 206.

⁷² Millbrath, Lester. (1965) *Political Participation: Why and how do People Get Involved in Politics*, Chicago: Rand Mc Nally, pp: 57-60.

like paying taxes and obeying laws sometimes as participatory acts and sometimes not.

2.3.3 The Determinants of Political Participation

Verba, Scholzman and Brady introduce a civic voluntarism model. It includes three types of influences on political participation such as, personal characteristics, group affects and political attitudes.⁷³ In a similar manner, Krishna differentiates three sets of factors that have been identified as micro, macro, meso-level interactions: Wealth, status and education can be stressed as micro-level interactions, design of state and the political system can be identified as macro-level interactions, and as meso-level interactions, groups and social networks have been stressed.⁷⁴ Using Krishna's categorization, I prefer to evaluate political attitudes that are mainly discussed in the literature under the line of personal factors.

2.3.3.1. Personal Factors as the Determinants of the Political Participation

As personal factors, social status (education and income) is mostly strongly emphasized that related to political participation by the scientists. Higher status individuals become more politically involved. It is not the social status per se, that motivates participation, but social status is related to skills and orientations that directly influence participation.⁷⁵ High social status people more likely have the time, money, knowledge and ability to become politically involved. It is so

⁷³ Verba, Sidney., Scholzman, Kay and Henry Brady. (1995) *Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics*. Cambridge, Massasuchests: Harvard University Press. paraphrased in Krishna, Anirudh. (2002) "Enhancing Political Participation in Democracies", *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol 35, No 4, p. 439.

⁷⁴ Krishna, 2002, p. 439.

⁷⁵ Verba et.al., 1995. paraphrased in Krishna, 2002, p. 439.

widespread the usage of social status that it is described as the standard model of political participation.⁷⁶

Education is the most emphasized social status factor in the means of effecting political participation. Knowledge and skill are the most important resources that directly associated with political participation. On the one hand, education is the main provider of the knowledge and skills, on the other hand, education, is a strong force in developing a feeling of moral responsibility to take part. It must be noted that there is a strong relation between a sense of citizen duty measured by a serious of poll questions and voting.⁷⁷ The feeling of citizen duty is the main motivator of the participatory acts. Palma supported this view with the evidence in United States:

(...) feelings of personal competence, feelings of civic responsibility and feelings of trust and identification with politics and its institutions favor participation, whereas political cynicism and suspiciousness, feelings that politics are remote, threatening, corrupt ,or ineffective lead to political apathy.⁷⁸

In a similar manner, according to Özbudun, four kinds of motives seem to lead people take part in politics: in the deferential participation, citizen is mostly influenced by deep respect to and strong identification with the influencer, but in solidarity participation, citizen is motivated by a desire to affirm one's loyalty to his larger group⁷⁹. Beside these motives, instrumental participation occurs under the anticipation of some kind of material gain. Civic participation is based on a sense of moral duty to participate, and this kind of participation is positively associated with modernization and democracy.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Verba, Sidney and Norman Nie.(1972). *Participation in America*, New York: Harper and Row. paraphrased in Dalton, Russell, 2002, p. 47.

⁷⁷ Barber, David. (1969). *Citizen Politics: An Introduction to Political Behavior*. Chicago: Markham Pub. Co, p. 19.

⁷⁸ Palma, 1975, p. 3.

⁷⁹ Özbudun, 1976, pp: 6-8.

⁸⁰ Özbudun, 1976, pp. 6-8.

Some studies argue that there is a direct relationship between income and political participation because of the increasing possibilities of having political knowledge.⁸¹ But the studies in Turkey from the 1960's indicate that it is not correct to state a direct relation between income and political participation.⁸² Education and occupation must be evaluated together with the income variation.

Age also emphasized by the students of political participation as a determinant of political participation. "As individuals age, however, they take on social responsibilities that increase their motivations to follow politics."⁸³ But Sistembölükbaşı emphasize the term "generation", considering the effects of age as a determinant of political participation. The fact that the older people are more conservative than younger people can be explained by the conditions of older people's education generation.⁸⁴

Gender is another factor that might affect political activism. Men are often more politically active than women in democracies.⁸⁵ The dynamics of gender is not adequate to explain this situation. Differences in political resources, such as educational level and income and employment patterns, explain a large part of this

⁸¹ Kourvetaris, Andrew. (1997). *Political Sociology*. Needham Heights: Allyn and Bacon. And see also Turan, İlter. (1977). *Siyasal Sistem ve Siyasal Davranış*. İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi Yayınları.

⁸² Abadan, Nermin and Ahmet Yücekök. (1966) "1961-1965 Yıllarında Büyük Şehirlerde Gelir Durumuna Göre Oy Verme Davranışı." *Sbfd*, No: 4. Özbudun, Ergun and Frank Tachau. (1975) "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a Critical Realignment" *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol 6, No 4. Sistembölükbaşı, Şaban. (2001) *Parti Seçmenlerinin Siyasal Yönelimine Etki Eden Sosyo-ekonomik Faktörler-Isparta Örnek Olay Araştırması., 1995-1999*, Ankara: Nobel Yayın Dağıtım. Çaha, Ömer., Toprak, Metin and İbrahim Dalmış. (1996) "Siyasal Parti Üyelerinde Siyasal Katılım Örneği: Kırıkkale Örneği" *Yeni Türkiye*, Vol. 9.

⁸³ Dalton, Russell, Mc Allister, Ian and Martin P.Wattenberg. (2002), "The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment" in *Parties Without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* ed. By Dalton and Wattenberg, Oxford:Oxford University Press, p. 47.

⁸⁴ Sistembölükbaşı, 2001, p. 12.

⁸⁵ Kourvetaris, 1997, p. 74.

gap.⁸⁶ Because of the gender roles in society that define women in only the private sphere rather than public sphere, a gap is created between socio-economic status of men and women.

The sociological explanations seem to dominate the political participation literature. Palma emphasize that the evidence about the United States reveals that participation is greater among the better educated, those with higher incomes or occupations, the members of dominant ethnic groups, urban residents, men, and people who within other criteria occupy a relatively high status in society.⁸⁷ Almond and Verba used a concept of “citizen competence” in their massive survey as a variant of political efficacy. Almond and Verba suggest:

Whether or not one believes himself capable of influencing a local or national regulation depends a lot on who he is within his own country. If he has more education, higher status, or is male, he is clearly more likely to consider himself competent. One’s self perceptions of his role as a citizen vary greatly within one’s social position within a nation.⁸⁸

Personal reasons such as psychological factors can be important for being active in politics: “Individual psychology can be useful in understanding such themes: by exploring, how the alienated, the outcast, the politically disposed or the hyperactive, the power seekers, the super participants got that way.”⁸⁹ Beside these psychological factors, individual orientations toward politics are also an important determinant of political participation. Ealau defined the person’s integration into the system of social and political relations with a phrase of “politics of happiness, in words, one can say that those who participate in politics are more able or willing to work within its present frame, to accept its basic rules,

⁸⁶ Scholzman, Kay., Burns, Nancy and Sidney Verba. (1994) “Gender and the Pathways to Participation.” *Journal of Politics*, 56, pp: 963-990.

⁸⁷ Palma, 1970, p. 3.

⁸⁸ Almond and Verba, 1963 quoted in Barber, 1969, p. 23.

⁸⁹ Barber, 1969, p. 21.

and to be interested in its outputs than those who do not participate.”⁹⁰ Dalton also underlines the importance of beliefs about the citizen’s role and the nature of the political action in the process of political participation. With the feeling that one’s political action can affect the political process; a sense of political efficacy can also stimulate individuals to participate.⁹¹

2.3.3.2. Group Affects as the Determinant of Political Behavior

A second group of predictors are group-based forces. Attachments like political party membership, participation in social and voluntary groups can stimulate individuals to act by the experiences in the decision-making processes of social and voluntary groups, which can provide skills and opportunities that can motivate individuals to participate in politics.⁹² According to Rosenstone and Hansten, groups and social networks play a crucial role in the members of these organizations, and they provide them identification with group expectations, with those who participate in politics or not.⁹³ These variables are undertaken within the rubric of social capital. Social capital has been defined by Putnam as “features of social organization such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit.”⁹⁴ In a similar manner, he states that the high social capital community makes the collective action possible and directs this collective action to the participation of democracy.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Ealau, Heinz. (1956). “The Politics of Happiness: A Prefatory Note to Political Perspectives”, *Antioch Review*, 16, pp.259-264. quoted in Palma, 1970, p. 4.

⁹¹ Dalton, Mc Allister and Wattenberg, 2002, p. 48.

⁹² Putnam, Robert. (1995). “Bowling Alone”, *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 6: 65- 78. paraphrased in Dalton, 2002, p.48

⁹³ Rosenstone, S.J and J.M, Hansen. (1993). *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan pub.co: Canada, p. 24.

⁹⁴ Putnam, 1995, p.67. quoted in Krishna, 2002, p.446.

⁹⁵ Krishna, 2002, p. 446

In a parallel manner, focusing on the experiments in the organizations, Çukurçayır argues that the membership of an organization is a key status in the means of political participation that encourages them to take responsibility in political organizations.⁹⁶ According to Çukurçayır, to be a member in an organization specifies the individual's interest sphere and is an indicator of the acceptance of a life style, and with the sanctions that an organization applies, the individual is encouraged to obey the rules and it carries to the political arena.⁹⁷

According to Nie et.al., there was one significant difference between participation based on a high socio economic status, and participation based on organizational membership:

While high social status affects the likelihood of political participation through the intervening attitudinal variables, such as political information, political attentiveness, sense of political efficacy and of citizen duty- participation through organizational involvement seems to occur without an intervening state of change in attitudes.⁹⁸

2.3.3.3 Political System as the Determinant of Political Participation

Political setting is defined by Milbrath as the rules of the game, political institutions, especially party systems, and the special characteristics of a given campaign such as the rules of the game, universal suffrage, secret ballot and compulsory voting are seen as the main determinations of the increased turn out rates.⁹⁹

⁹⁶ Çukurçayır, M. Akif. (2002) *Siyasal Katılma ve Yerel Demokrasi, Küreselleşme Sürecinde Yurtaş, Yönetim, Siyaset*. Çizgi Kitabevi Yayınları: İstanbul, p. 88.

⁹⁷ Çukurçayır, 2002, p. 88.

⁹⁸ Nie, Norman H., Powell, G. Bingham and Kenneth Prewitt. (1969). "Social Structure and political Participation: Developmental Relationships", *American Political Science Review*, September, pp: 808-832.

⁹⁹ Milbrath, 1965, p 90.

The most important factor that directly related with the voting participation is the party system format. In proportional system, voters are more likely to vote for their true party but in proportional system with its barriers, voters can feel that their vote is invaluable:

Where voters can vote expressively for their true party where their vote is more likely to be valuable and instrumental in electing a representative rather than being thrown away in a majoritarian system, voters are seen as more likely to turn out¹⁰⁰.

Party competition and the characteristics of the election also affect participation. According to Millbrath's categorization, in a high-stimulus elections, there is a perception that the vote rates of the parties will be close, and the citizens think that the vote will be valuable in affecting the outcome of the election; but in low stimulus elections, it is perceived that the result is so apparent that citizens efforts will not affect the election's outcome and they can choose to stay at home rather than go to the polls.¹⁰¹

2.4. Voting Behavior: How Does The Voter Decide?

Voting occupies a central place in democratic politics, so that many studies analyzed the sources of partisan support and voting among different individuals and across nations. Parallel with the political participation studies, voting behavior studies started to dominate the political studies area.

¹⁰⁰ Evans, 2004, p.150.

¹⁰¹ Milbrath, 1965, p. 96.

2.4.1. Micro - Sociological Model of Voting Behavior

The Columbia researchers explained the 1940 election with a sociological model. They found that a person's socioeconomic status education, income and place of residence (urban or rural) were strongly related to the person's vote.¹⁰² They combined these into an index of predisposition.

The relationship between age and vote has been hypothesized by many students of political participation. Age has been shown to be one of the leading predictors of turnout. In general, older citizens are more likely to vote than young citizens, but it has been often argued that relationship is curvilinear, with the likelihood of voting increasing through late middle age but declining thereafter.¹⁰³ Evans explains the lower turnout amongst the young as their less implantation in the political system and their less integration into society.¹⁰⁴

Citizens with low levels of income have been cited as less likely to vote because of their immediate concerns rather than the political. Evans argues that this situation is related with the non-functioning of democracy if low income groups are disproportionately abstaining.¹⁰⁵ Also, we should remember that the effects of education and income are closely linked, but in research political effectiveness and cognitive mobilization are more emphasized than material wealth.

There has been a historical phenomenon that women have been cited as turning out to vote less than men because of their lesser habit of political participation. Lipset indicates that women have been influenced by cross-cultural pressures like

¹⁰² Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert Weisberg. (1984). *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc, p. 9.

¹⁰³ Sigelman, Lee., Robert, Philip., Jewell, Malcolm E and Michael A. Baer.(1985) "Voting and Non voting: A Multi-Election Perspective", *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol 29, No4, Nov ,pp 749-765, p. 753.

¹⁰⁴ Evans, 2004, p. 153.

¹⁰⁵ Evans, 2004, p.154.

pressures by their husbands.¹⁰⁶ The many explanations concentrate on the very traditional conservative view as women as conservative voters, but most contemporary findings fail to find evidence that support this view.¹⁰⁷ The term traditional gender gap in the early classics in 1970's and 1960's is explained as the tendency of women to support center right parties in Western Europe. This conventional wisdom was summarized in the *Civic Culture* as: "Wherever the consequences of women's suffrage have been studied, it would appear that women differ from men in their political behavior only in being somewhat more frequently apathetic, parochial and conservative."¹⁰⁸

Higher education is linked to increased turnout firstly, because of the possibility of cognitive mobilization and capability of engaging with political discourse, and secondly, educated voters are more likely to have been socialized into the mentality that voting is a civic duty.¹⁰⁹ Education also provides attitudes such as tolerance, open minded ness, and civic-mind ness: "Overall, education has found to be the major individual predictor of turnout."¹¹⁰

The election turnout rates are differentiated among urban and rural areas. Many students of political participation explain this asymmetric consequence by the terms of mobilized or conformity voting and the high turnout rate among rural voters results from mobilized voting.¹¹¹ Mobilized voting is defined as voting

¹⁰⁶ Lipset, S.M. (1983) *Political Man: The Social Bases of Voting*. London.Heimann, 1983 edition, p.217. paraphrased in Evans, 2004, p.153.

¹⁰⁷ Wolfinger, R. and S.Rosenstone. (1980) *Who Votes?* New Heaven: Yale University Press, p.41 paraphrased in Evans, 2004, p.153.

¹⁰⁸ Almond and Verba, 1963, p.325 paraphrased in Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. (2000). "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective", *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 21, No 4, pp: 441- 463, p 443.

¹⁰⁹ Evans, 2004, p. 154.

¹¹⁰ Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980, p.53 paraphrased in Evans, 2004, p. 154.

¹¹¹ Mo, Jongryn., Brady, David and Jaehunn Ro. (1991). "Urbanization and Voter Turnout in Korea: An Update" *Political Behavior*, Vol.13, No 1, p. 3.

under the outside pressures such as coercion.¹¹² Because of the existence of traditionalist strong links in the rural areas and the limited possibilities that provide knowledge about the political system, can be the main reasons of the mobilized voting.

2.4.2 Macro-Sociological Approach

The first comparative analysis that adopted a macro-sociological approach to the voting behavior, instead of taking a micro sociological approach, is Lipset and Rokkan's work. The analysis is based on nation-building and the democratization process in which voting patterns could be identified by the challenges and cleavages of different groups' relations to each other¹¹³.

In the democratization process, competition emerges between the national polity and old groupings. A center-periphery cleavage emerged between the elite, who can be characterized as greater urban development and secularization, and the periphery that can be characterized as especially rural and more conservative aspects.¹¹⁴ National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution are two important critical points. With the formation of the state, it promoted some channels that helped to resolve differences peacefully and allowed individuals to access economic and social resources such as political parties.¹¹⁵ After the Industrial Revolution, according to Lipset and Rokkan, two social cleavages became apparent: a primary/secondary sector division between the agricultural and industrial sectors; and the workers/employers division, class cleavage.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Jongryn et.al. , 1991, p.3.

¹¹³ Lipset S.M and S.Rokkan (eds). (1967) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives*, New York: The Free Press.

¹¹⁴ Rokkan, S. (1967) "Geography, Religion and Social Class: Cross Cutting Cleavages in Norwegian politics" In Lipset and Rokkan, 1967, pp 369-371.

¹¹⁵ Evans, 2004, p. 50.

¹¹⁶ Evans, 2004, p. 50.

Lipset categorized four social cleavages that emerged after these two critical junctures:

The Political Revolution resulted in a center-periphery conflict between the national system and assorted subordinate ones, for example, ethnic, linguistic or religious groups, often located in the peripheries, the outlying regions, and a state-church tension between the growing state, which sought to dominate, and the church, which tried to maintain its historic cooperate rights. The economic revolution gave rise two conflicts: a land-industry fight between the landed elite and the growing bourgeois class, followed by the cleavage, Marx focused on, between capitalist and workers.¹¹⁷

This center-periphery framework is first used by Mardin for developing a comprehensive understanding about the cleavages in Ottoman and Turkish political life. Mardin applied this paradigm to Turkey's political system as CHP, the representative of center, and the DP (Democrat Party) as the representative of the reaction of the periphery.¹¹⁸ This social cleavage related with the cultural, economic and political divide between the ruling elites and the subject masses had a major impact in shaping partisan attachments.

Also, social scientists have paid more attention to the class cleavage than to any other cleavages. The class cleavage is closely related with the most basic issues about economy, power and capitalism: "Empirically, the class cleavage represents the economic and material problems of problems of industrial societies: providing for the economic security of all citizens and ensuring a just distribution of economic rewards."¹¹⁹ The reflection of the class cleavages to the political arena is explained by Lipset. According to Lipset, the leftist parties, representing themselves as instruments of equality, and the lower income groups support them

¹¹⁷ Lipset, S.M. (2002). *Cleavages, Parties and Democracy in Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited* ed.by. Lauri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle, Routledge: Taylor and Francis group, p. 6. quoted in Evans, 2004, p. 50.

¹¹⁸ Mardin, Şerif. (1973). "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Daedalus*, 102:1, pp: 169-190.

¹¹⁹ Dalton, Russell. (2004) "Political Cleavages, Issues and Electoral Change in Comparing Democracies" in *New Challenges in the Study of Elections and Voting* ed. by. Le Duc, Niemi and Norris. Sage Publications: London, p. 191.

because of their economically worse conditions, and higher income groups will oppose them in order to maintain their economic advantages¹²⁰.

In the Michigan school in the *American Voter*, class origins and occupation are evaluated as a first reference in the means of determining party preferences, and awareness of a class location is significant in the means of casting a vote consistent with their class.¹²¹

Achterberg and Houtman show that many evidences from many researches put a different picture in the means of class and voting relations.¹²² Many attempts are concentrated toward the explanation of the phenomenon of “working class conservatism.” Economic motives are used in understanding right-wing voting of the working class. Some argue that economic motives are important in understanding a right-wing vote by a member of the working class, such as workers vote for right wing because of its anti-immigrant policies which can provide a large proportion of working options without immigrants with whom they compete and another economic-based explanation that is analyzed below suggests that overall economic growth is much more important for workers¹²³.

According to Achterberg and Houtman, these explanations put a fixation on economic interests and economic voting:

When workers are voting for leftist parties and members of the middle class are voting for rightist parties, it is because they pursue economic

¹²⁰ Lipset, S.M., Lazarsfeld P.F., Barton, A.H., J Linz. (eds) (1954). *The Psychology of Voting: an Analysis of Political Behavior in Handbook of Political Psychology*, Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, p.1136. quoted in Manza, Jeff., Hout, Michael and Clem Brooks. (1995) “Class Voting in Capitalist Democracies since World War II: Dealignment, Realignment, or Trend less Fluctuation”, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol 21, pp. 137-162, p.140.

¹²¹ Manza et.al. , 1995, p. 141.

¹²² Achterberg, Peter and Dick Houtman. (2006). “Why Do So Many People Vote Unnaturally? A Cultural Explanation for Voting Behavior”, *European Journal of Political Research*, 45:75-92, p. 76.

¹²³ Achterberg and Houtman, 2006, p. 76.

class interests; when they are, respectively, voting for rightist and leftist parties, it is also because they pursue economic class interests¹²⁴.

They argue that cultural rather than economic interest will be decisive in explaining unnatural voting behavior by emphasizing the importance of cultural capital.¹²⁵ They expect therefore, that the members of the working class having a small amount of cultural capital adhere to culturally conservative values that lead them to cast rightist votes; and for members of the middle class, with their large amount of cultural capital, are expected to adhere predominantly to culturally progressive values that lead them to vote for leftist parties.¹²⁶

In all these respects, social and political attitudes that dominate Western Democracies can be evaluated along two dimensions: left-right attitudes and liberal-conservative values. Considering the state's role in the economy, the left is identified with the more favorable towards government identification, social spending and redistribution policies, and the right is identified with the free market economy.¹²⁷ Liberal-conservative issues are related with the personal freedom of thought, the association and life styles that liberals who are tolerant of alternative life styles, and conservatives who favor more traditional life styles.¹²⁸ The left-right dimension is closely linked with the social class; however, the liberal-conservative dimension is closely related with the religion and education.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Achterberg and Houtman, 2006, p.77.

¹²⁵ Achterberg and Houtman developed their work on the term of true class interest that is emphasized by Lipset. Lipset emphasizes true class interest as owing to their poor economic condition, the working class is held to favor economic redistribution and vote for their leftist parties.

¹²⁶ Achterberg and Houtman, 2006, p.77.

¹²⁷ Anderson, Robert and Anthony Heath. (2003). "Social Identities and Political Cleavages: the Role of the Political Context", *Royal Statistical Society*, 166, part 3, pp 301-327, p.303.

¹²⁸ Anderson and Heath, 2003, p. 303.

¹²⁹ Anderson and Heath, 2003, p. 303.

The relation between education and the liberal-conservative dimension is emphasized in the voting behavior literature. The culturally tolerant values are mainly shaped much more on education rather than class position. People of higher educational levels are more often address social issues in a more egalitarian and liberal way and more often members of socially responsible organizations.¹³⁰

2.4.3. Rational Voter Model of Voting Behavior

The other model of voting that has become popular is the rational voter model.¹³¹ According to this model, voters decide whether to vote or not to vote, and for which candidate to vote for on some rational basis - usually on the basis of which action gives them greater expected benefits-.

Rational voter model is developed from a combination of theories such as economic theories of social action and economic theories of rationality. Evans explained this theory as:

(...) rational choice theory essentially ascribes the motivations of individuals on whether to vote and how to vote to a calculation of the likely benefit to be derived from the preferred decision. In other words, voters decide upon their course of electoral action on the basis of what they expect to get from it. Each potential outcome has a benefit or a cost, and the voter will choose the one which benefits them most or costs them least.¹³²

One of the major works from which most of the rational choice theory is derived from is Down's "An Economic Theory of Democracy".¹³³ Rationality is the focus

¹³⁰ Werhorst, Herman., Van, G. and Nan Dirk De Graaf. (2004) "The Sources of Political Orientations in Post Industrial Society: Social Class and Education Revisited." *The British Journal of Sociology*, Volume 55, Issue 2. p.228.

¹³¹ Niemi and Weisberg, 1984, p. 14.

¹³² Evans, 2004, p. 70.

¹³³ Downs, A. (1957) *An Economic Theory of Voting*, New York: Harper and Row.

of this theory and is defined as achieving the goals by using the most possible way and the least possible input of resource per unit of valued output, by choosing the most cost-effective means of maximizing his gains by taking the decision which maximizes his gain.¹³⁴

The rational vote relates to the parties from the economic supply and demand perspective. According to Downs, rational voters, first of all, calculate what the government will provide to them and what the opposition offers them; if there is no difference between the two, the voter does not participate to the elections.¹³⁵ Voters also do not participate in the elections if going to the polls costs time and there is no difference between parties on what they offer to the voter.

Besides the major theoretical approach of Downs, another explanation of voting behavior based on economy-voting relationship is called “collective economic grievances”. In this model voters evaluate the state of the national economy and the parties’ success in managing the national economy rather than their own economic circumstances¹³⁶: “The issue then is not that the economic well being is unimportant but the personal economic well being is politically unimportant.”¹³⁷ This is related with the economic individualism, which is closely linked with the American Culture, and its liberal nature consequent with the disconnection between personal economic grievances and voting because of the American’s belief about economic mobility’s relation with the personal initiative.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Downs, 1957 paraphrased in Evans, 2004, p. 70.

¹³⁵ Downs, 1957, 28 paraphrased in Evans, 2004, p. 72.

¹³⁶ Kinder, Donald R and Roderick Kiewit. (1979) Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting”, *American Journal of Political Science*, 23:495-527 quoted in Feldman, Stanley. (1982). “Economic Self Interest and Political Behavior”, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol 26, No 3, Aug , pp 446-466, p 447

¹³⁷ Feldman, 1982, p. 448.

¹³⁸ Feldman, 1982, p. 464.

2.4.4 Party Identification

In the *American Voter*, Miller, Campell, Converse and Stokes argued that a sense of belonging to a particular party, predispose them to vote for it at election times. They differentiated party identification from the current preferences from many points. Party identification is unobservable and endures beyond a specific election. Empirically it is different, because some people deny allegiances to all and describe themselves as independents and although some people switch their votes, they preserve their prior party identifications.¹³⁹

The concept of party identification has reached an important position, because they are seen as key determinants of voting behavior. The importance of party identification is emphasized by Campell as:

The present analysis of party identification is based on the assumption that...parties serve as standard setting groups for a significant proportion of the people in this country. In other words, it is assumed that many people associate themselves psychologically with one or the other of the parties, and that this identification has predictable relationships with their perceptions, evaluations and actions.¹⁴⁰

Dalton briefly summarizes the functions of party attachments: Party attachments provide an organizing device for the voters' evaluations and judgments in politics, and also is a valuable cue in developing a political attitude towards a new issue. Because of the reason that issues and events on the political arena presented in political arena in partisan terms, the party attachments have a strong function in evaluating these issues. In terms of mobilizing, partisan ties motivate citizens turning out to the polls and support their parties. By this way, partisan attachments

¹³⁹ Campell, Angus., Converse, Philip., Miller, Warren and Donald Stokes. (1960) *The American Voter*, New York: Wiley. paraphrased in Dalton, R.J.(2002) "The Decline of Party Identification" in *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* ed.by Russell J Dalton and Martin Wattenberg, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 20.

¹⁴⁰ Campell et. al., 1960, p. 90. quoted in Dalton, R.J, 2002, p. 20.

tie individuals to the democratic system and help to orient them to the complexities of politics.¹⁴¹

Campbell et al. argue that a person's identification with a party is the core of the model in terms of a "funnel of causality": Voting as a tip of the tunnel, at the mouth of the funnel, there are sociological background characteristics (ethnicity, race, religion, region and the like), social status characteristics (education, occupation, class) and characteristics as class and partisanship. And then party identification that influences the person's evaluation as the candidates come. The next part is the campaign and media and the conversations with family and friends about the election. Then there is a decision on the vote itself¹⁴².

2.5 New Political Behavior

The behavioral sciences encounter with a new concept called "*new political behavior*" when analyzing the findings that the recent survey introduces. This new concept has many diverse characteristics from traditional approaches.

2.5.1 The Contagion Thesis

One immediate implication of the concept "new political behavior" is the decline of long-term predispositions. Evidences in advanced industrial democracies indicate a declining role for political parties which have witnessed their membership rolls wane, and citizens are increasingly skeptical about partisan politics with the party scandals and partisan corruptions.¹⁴³ Dissatisfaction towards the institutions of democratic governance is a widespread phenomenon today and these party scandals and partisan corruptions resulted with the skeptical attitudes about the national government's capacity to do what is right and the

¹⁴¹ Dalton, 2002, p. 20-21.

¹⁴² Campbell et.al., 1960 paraphrased in Niemi and Weisberg, 1984, p. 13.

¹⁴³.Dalton, Russell J, 2002, p.22.

public officials' moral and ethical behaviors. The most significant result of this distrust is a general dissatisfaction not only with the daily government but also with the political system itself.¹⁴⁴ With this general dissatisfaction towards the political system, Dalton claimed that the declining strength of party identification across most Western democracies is a reflection of both a weakening of the parties in democratic politics, and a nonattachment of voters to politics itself.¹⁴⁵ Dalton concludes:

If party attachments reflect citizen support for the system of party based representative government, then the simultaneous decline in party attachments in nearly all advanced industrial democracies offers a first sign of the public's affective disengagement from politics.¹⁴⁶

Considering that in a democratic political system that is running in good health, it is necessary for parties having a rather strong support from citizens; Holmberg called this situation as a "contagion thesis", that one of the most important results of declining party identification will be a declining support for party based democracy.¹⁴⁷ However, Holmberg claims that dissatisfaction from political system can be a motivating factor for some new party alternatives as attracting some people and drawing them away from traditional old line parties.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Belanger, Eric and Richard Nadeau. (2005). "Political Trust and the Vote in Multiparty Elections: The Canadian Case", *European Journal of Political Research*, 44: 121-146, p. 127.

¹⁴⁵ Dalton, Russell J.(1999) Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies in *Critical Citizens*, Oxford University Pres: Oxford, p. 66 paraphrased in Holmberg, Sören. (2003) Are Political Parties Necessary? , *Electoral Studies*, Vol. 22, pp: 287-299, p. 289.

¹⁴⁶ Dalton, 1999, p.66. quoted in Holmberg, 2003, p. 289.

¹⁴⁷ Holmberg, 2003, p. 289.

¹⁴⁸ Holmberg, 2003, p. 127.

2.5.2 Weakening of the Social Cleavages

Besides the general dissatisfaction towards the political system, one of the reasons of the diminishing of the party attachments is the weakening of class and religion cleavages.¹⁴⁹ Many researches conclude with the new conventional wisdom of comparative electoral research: “One thing that has by now become quite apparent is that almost all the countries we have studied show a decline in the ability of social cleavages to structure individual voting choice.”¹⁵⁰ Focusing especially on the diminishing of the class cleavages, explanations are concentrated on specific points: One of the related arguments focus on the working class embourgeoisement and social mobility explanations. Occupational and social mobility are emphasized in the issue of declining class voting that creates a difference between the workers’ class of origin and class of destination.¹⁵¹ Universal growth of professional and managerial employment, thanks to the greater levels of class mobility in the post war period, is emphasized as one of the factors of the diminishing of the class voting.¹⁵²

2.5.3. Post Materialist Agenda

Another set of explanations are closely linked with the diminishing of the old cleavages and the emergence of new social divisions. The increasing importance of identity struggles of social groups, such as movements of gays and lesbians, regional movements that are based on ascribed characteristics such as gender, race, ethnicity or linguistic differences are emphasized in the term of new social

¹⁴⁹ Dalton, R. (1996) *Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies*, 2nd ed., New Jersey: Chatham House and see also Schmitt, Hermann and Sören Holmberg. (1995). “Political Parties in Decline” in *Citizens and the State*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

¹⁵⁰ Dalton, Mc Allister and Wattenberg, 2002, p. 55.

¹⁵¹ Manza et.al., 1995, p. 143.

¹⁵² Manza et.al., 1995, p. 144.

divisions.¹⁵³ These identity struggles are defined by Hunter under the term of cultural conflict as:

Political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding. They are not merely attitudes that can change on a whim, but basic commitments and beliefs that provide a source of identity, purpose and togetherness for people who live by them.¹⁵⁴

With these identity politics, a new post material agenda such as environmental protection and quality of life issues have broadened the repertoire of contemporary politics.

Kauffman argues that these components of the post-material agenda such as reproductive rights, female equality and legal protections for homosexuals affect mostly women rather than men.¹⁵⁵ In a similar vein, Inglehart and Norris examine the explanatory power of the traditional gender gap in the 1990's with the rising importance of value change and the new attitudinal cleavages.¹⁵⁶ By the transformation of the sex roles, introduction of women into paid labor force, increased levels of education and the changing structure of the family, the modern gender gap is formed as women were moving towards the left in advanced industrial democracies.¹⁵⁷ The evidences in post-industrial societies in the mid 90's show that women are no longer more conservative than men is a product of cultural differences between women and men in their value orientations, especially towards post materialism and the women's movement.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ Manza et.al., 1995, p.144.

¹⁵⁴ Hunter, James Davison. (1991) *Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America*, New York: Basic Books, p.41 quoted in Kaufmann, Karen. (2002) "Culture Wars, Secular Realignment and the Gender Gap in Party Identification", *Political Behavior*, Vol 24, No 3, September, p. 287.

¹⁵⁵ Kauffman, 2002, p. 288.

¹⁵⁶ Inglehart, Ronald and Pippa Norris. (2000). "The Developmental Theory of the Gender Gap: Women's and Men's Voting Behavior in Global Perspective", *International Political Science Review*, Vol 21, No 4: pp: 441-463.

¹⁵⁷ Inglehart and Norris, 2000, p. 447.

¹⁵⁸ Inglehart and Norris, 2000, p. 459.

2.5.4 Voter Rationality: Individualization of Politics

The other set of explanations are based on the increased capacity of the better-educated citizenry to make political decisions independent from the traditional loyalties. Dalton explained this new pattern as the individualization of politics with a more individualized and inwardly oriented style of political choice, where many people now have more capacity in dealing with the complexities of politics instead of depending on traditional loyalties.¹⁵⁹ This kind of political pattern also reflects upon political participation. The methods of direct democracy - from community groups to social movements - are mainly preferred by citizens rather than structured methods of political participation like being a member of a party or voting.¹⁶⁰: “Rather than socially structured and relatively homogeneous personal networks, contemporary publics are more likely to base their decisions on policy preferences, performance, judgments, or candidate images.”¹⁶¹

The rise of unconventional political participation is emphasized by many students of political participation. Barnes (et al), predicted the spread of unconventional forms of political participation such as demonstrations, boycotts and occupation of buildings, and stated that this rise is strongly correlated with the post-materialist values which are widespread among young birth cohorts than among the old.¹⁶² Using the World Values Surveys, Inglehart and Catterberg also emphasized the increasing disengagement with the elite-dominated movements.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁹ Dalton, Russell J. (2000). “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol 33, No6/7, August, September, p. 919.

¹⁶⁰ Dalton, 2000, p. 919.

¹⁶¹ Dalton, 2000, p. 920.

¹⁶² Barnes, Samuel and Max Kase (eds).(1979). *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Societies*, California: Sage paraphrased in Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg. (2000). “Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post Honeymoon Decline”, *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Institute for Social Research: University of Michigan, p. 7.

¹⁶³ Inglehart and Catterberg, 2000, p. 7.

On the other hand, they found that in most new democracies, there is a decline in the levels of mass participation, which they called a post honeymoon effect, which is explained by increasing discrepancy between high expectations and reality that made the people see them as inefficient in the means of participating and affecting the democratic system.¹⁶⁴

The most important result of this increased voter rationality is the shift of the basis of electoral behavior to short term factors, such as candidate image and issue opinions.¹⁶⁵ Rather than the parties itself, the candidates, leaders and issues gained importance in determining the direction of the vote. The shift to issue and candidate voting is likely to increase the evaluative content of elections so that parties are judged by their leadership and the policies they advocate. This can be accepted as a welcome trend because of the suggestion of an increase in democratic responsiveness or a more rational democratic choice, but on the other hand, it can not be argued that the choice is always rational in the era of superficial media campaigns and oversimplified electioneering.¹⁶⁶ Mobilization on the basis of candidate images or issue appeals result in the more free floating voters. With greater fluidity in the voting process and greater volatility in electoral outcomes, a growing number turnover in both the number and types of parties being represented are the main characteristics for contemporary electoral politics.¹⁶⁷

2.5.5 The New Middle Class

Most of these explanations emphasized the emergence of a different left-right spectrum in restructuring the political system. It is argued that the left parties shift their electoral base to the previously ignored groups such as women, gays and

¹⁶⁴ Inglehart and Catterberg, 2000, p. 10.

¹⁶⁵ Dalton, 2000c, p. 22.

¹⁶⁶ Dalton, 1996, p. 340.

¹⁶⁷ Dalton, 1996, p. 340.

lesbians by altering their appeals from material issues to the new issues such as environmentalism, peace and civil rights and the links between workers and the left parties diminished.¹⁶⁸ The emergence of a new middle class is emphasized in the voting behavior literature by the separation of the middle class into two factions: “an old faction consisting of managers and technocrats, and a new middle class consisting of knowledge workers.”¹⁶⁹ The rising of a new class is directly related to the rising of the services such as human service and social cultural professionals, and to the decline of industrial societies.¹⁷⁰ This new middle class as the young, better educated and non religious are attracted by left parties who are appealing these post-materialist issues in which individual freedom is stressed. There is a consensus on the relation between the voting preferences of the new middle class and education in the literature. The liberal mind of the new middle class is explained by their autonomy by Lamont as:

The common interests of relatively autonomous cultural capital workers are to maintain and increase their autonomy and to expand the non-profit realm by encouraging the development of public sector, promoting policies to increase business taxation, and supporting values and political ideologies that favor non-economic aspects of social life, such as post-materialist values, environmentalism or New Left politics.¹⁷¹

According to Franklin, the resolving of the social cleavages that are reflections of longstanding social and economic divisions in advanced industrial democracies is a main reason of the diminishing of party attachments and the declining role of the social cleavages.¹⁷² But Dalton argues that the cleavages are still affective in

¹⁶⁸ Manza et.al., 1995, p. 145.

¹⁶⁹ Werfhorst and Graaf, 2004, p. 212.

¹⁷⁰ Werfhorst and Graaf, 2004, p. 213.

¹⁷¹ Lamont, M. (1987). “Cultural Capital and the Liberal Political Attitudes of Professionals: Comment on Brint”, *American Journal of Sociology*, 92(6), p. 1504 quoted in Werfhorst and Graaf, 2004, p. 213.

¹⁷² Franklin, Mark N. (2004). “The Dynamics of Electoral Participation” in *Comparing Democracies 2*, ed.by.Lawrence Le Duc, Richard G.Niemi and Pippa Norris, London: Sage Publications, pp: 148-169.

shaping the partisan loyalties of many voters. Although the social bases of the political cleavages have diminished in influencing the voter preferences, new issues were derived from these cleavages.¹⁷³ As Dalton states, empirical research suggests that non-economic and quality of life issues have not replaced traditional economic issues but they have been added to the old framework of politics.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³ Dalton, 1996, p.337.

¹⁷⁴ Dalton, 1996, p. 335.

CHAPTER 3

THE TURKISH POLITICAL SYSTEM AND ELECTIONS

This chapter covers the historical evolution of the Turkish political system to the 3 November 2002 elections. This categorization, which is shaped by the diverse features of these periods in the means of change and continuity in the vote structures, aims to explain the 2002 elections by making a selective analysis on Turkish politics and electoral behavior.

3.1 The Socio-Political Sources of the Turkish Party System

The term, political culture, summarizes a complex and varied portion of social reality. As Almond pointed out, “every political system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political actions.”¹⁷⁵ This particular pattern of orientations is defined by Dawson and Prewitt as political traditions, political institutions, goals articulated by the political ideology, and both formal and informal rules of the political game.¹⁷⁶ To develop a comprehensive understanding of the Turkish political system, it is necessary to sketch a picture of political environment, institutions and traditions of the system.

The nature of the Ottoman-Turkish state has been one of the most important reference points for many students of Turkish politics. The unique characteristics of Turkish political history are defined as the polarization between coherent and organized state elites and culturally heterogeneous and complex masses¹⁷⁷,

¹⁷⁵ Almond, Gabriel A. (1956). “Comparative Political Systems”, *Journal of Politics*, XVIII, p.396

¹⁷⁶ Dawson, Richard E and Kenneth Prewitt. (1969). *Political Socialization*, Boston:Little Brown Co. p26

¹⁷⁷ Mardin, Şerif. (1973). “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Understand Turkish Politics, *Daedalus*, Winter; see also, Yalman, N. (1973) Some Observations on Secularism in Islam: The Cultural Revolution In Turkey. *Daedalus*, 102; Ergüder, Ü. (1995). “Türkiye’de Değişen Seçmen Davranışı Örüntüleri”. In *Türkiye’de Siyaset, Süreklilik Ve Değişim*. ed.by E. Kalaycıoğlu and A.Y Sarıbay, İstanbul:Der Yayınları ,pp 361-385; Özbudun, E. (1981) “The Turkish Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization and Fragmentation”, *Middle Eastern Studies*, 17, pp 228-240.

military's strong role in the process of democracy¹⁷⁸, the absence of civil society in Turkish politics,¹⁷⁹ the salience of political patronage and clientelism¹⁸⁰, and politics revolving around high politics.¹⁸¹

As a "Historical Bureaucratic Empire",¹⁸² the state has always been an important dimension of the Ottoman political culture. During the long centuries of Ottoman-Turkish political development, policy is dominated by what the bureaucracy had developed. Having a centralized and highly bureaucratized state tradition, and suffering the lack of institutions as self governing cities, independent merchant class, and church hierarchy, the Ottoman Empire can be seen as a representative of Oriental Despotism.¹⁸³ In this manner, power was centralized in the hands of the Sultan and a small clique loyal to him: "Consequently, the social and economic structure tended to remain essentially stable and stagnant, since no

¹⁷⁸ Vaner, Semih. (1987). "The army", *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* ed.by C.Shick, T.Lonak, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 236-265 see also Sakallıoğlu, Ü.C. (1997). "The Anatomy of Turkish Military's Political Autonomy", *Comparative Politics*, Vol 29, No:4, pp 151-165, Karpas, Kemal H. (1988) "Military Interventions: Army-Civilian Relations in Turkey Before and after 1980 in State, Democracy and Military Through the 1980's, ed by M.Heper, A.Evin Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter.

¹⁷⁹ Mardin, Şerif. (1969). "Power, Civil Society and Culture in the Ottoman Empire", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, no: 11 see also Heper, Metin.(1991) "The State, Religion and Pluralism: The Turkish Case in Comparative Perspective", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol 18, No 1, pp 38-51.

¹⁸⁰ Heper, Metin.(2002). "The Consolidation of Democracy in Turkey", in *Political Parties in Turkey*, ed.by Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, Frank Cass&Co Ltd: London, Portland; see also Sunar, İlkay. (1986). "Demokrat Parti ve Populizm", in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, İletişim Yayınları: İstanbul, Vol. 8, pp. 2076-86.

¹⁸¹ Heper, 2002, p.141.

¹⁸² Heper, Metin.(1976) "Political Modernization as Reflected in Bureaucratic Change: The Turkish Bureaucracy and a Historical Bureaucratic Empire", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol 7, No 4, Oct, pp.507-521.

¹⁸³ For the further discussions on this term see Özbudun, Ergun.(1988). "Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations", in *Perspectives on Democracy in Turkey*, ed.by. E.Özbudun, Ankara; Mardin Şerif. (2004a) "Türk Toplumunu inceleme aracı olarak sivil toplum" in *Şerif Mardin Bütün Eserleri 6, Türkiye'de toplum ve siyaset* ed.by Mümtaz'er Türköne and Tuncay Önder, İstanbul: İletişim.

sector of the economy-agrarian, commercial or industrial was permitted to become dominant and upset the balance.”¹⁸⁴

The source of bureaucratization in the state system can be stated as the Ottoman recruitment (devşirme) system. This system reduced the male Christian subjects to the status of slaves and trained them for service to the state:

Through the recruitment system that aimed at eliminating the ties between the bureaucracy and the social groups, and through an educational system designed by the state at the apex of which stood the palace school called Enderun, an appropriate political orientation was systemically inculcated into the “Ruling Institution”¹⁸⁵.

In a similar pattern, according to Özbudun, the slaves have no chance to challenge the authority of the Sultan: “Their removal from their social environments prevented the development of locally entrenched, semiautonomous elements in the provinces.”¹⁸⁶ Through a unique educational system, the unity of culture dedicated homogeneity of the ruling class. But periphery developed a heterogeneous structure comparing with the homogeneity of the Ruling class because of the variety of educational channels. In the Ottoman Empire there emerged a center-periphery division along cultural lines: the great Culture of the elites versus the little Culture of the people.¹⁸⁷ The gap between center and periphery did not create a conflict because it did not contradict the *raison d’être* of the empire.¹⁸⁸ The modernization process deepened the differentiations between centre and periphery.

¹⁸⁴ Ahmad, Feroz.(1993) *The Making of Modern Turkey*, ,Routledge: London, p.21.

¹⁸⁵ Heper, Metin, 1976, pp. 507-521.

¹⁸⁶ Özbudun, Ergun. (1988). “ Development of Democratic Government in Turkey: Crises, Interruptions and Reequilibrations” in *Politics in the Developing Countries*, ed.by. L.Daimond, H.J Linz and S.M. Lipset, Lynne Rienner Pub: London, p. 3.

¹⁸⁷ Mardin, Şerif.(2004) “Türk Siyasetini Açıklayacak Bir Anahtar: Merkez-Çevre İlişkileri”,in *Şerif Mardin Bütün Eserleri 6, Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset* ed.by Mümtaz’er Türköne and Tuncay Önder, İstanbul: İletişim, p.44.

¹⁸⁸ Ayata, Ayşe.(1994). “Roots and Trends of Clientelism in Turkey” in *Democracy, Clientelism and Civil Society* ed.by Luis Roniger and Ayşe Ayata, Lynne Rienner Publisher: London, 1994, p.49.

First of all, most of the significant outcome of the modernization process was the creation of a new bureaucratic class. As Ahmad puts:

This class, though loyal to the sultan and the Ottoman dynasty, possessed a higher sense of loyalty to the state which its members no longer saw as being manifested only in the person of the Sultan. These new officials, who launched new programme of reform and reorganization known in Turkish as the Tanzimat, were steeped in Western ideas and looked to Europe as their model and inspiration¹⁸⁹.

In a similar manner, owing to the specific pattern of modernization, Heper argues that in the mid-nineteenth century, the civil bureaucracy moved into the position of power and was fully politicized.¹⁹⁰ Within the framework in which the center and periphery clash on secular and Islamic formulas, the civil bureaucracy became the defender of the secular formulas pertaining to some superstructure institutions¹⁹¹.

On the other side, the military composed another important device during the modernization process. The unionization of the army was the major event in the modernization process. As Rustow briefly puts:

The political modernization of Turkey occurred for the most part under the military aegis. New Order proclaimed by Sultan Selim III when he first undertook a program of Westernization consisted in the creation of a new army. The final victory of constitutional and representative principles came in 1908, as a result of threatened military rebellion. A decade later, Atatürk and other generals transformed the Ottoman state into a modern nation state. Thus, for nearly two hundred years, the soldier has been Turkey's foremost modernizer.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ Feroz Ahmad, 1993, p.27.

¹⁹⁰ According to Heper, this pattern of modernization with an emphasis on selected institutions, reformism soon came to mean preserving and safeguarding whatever institutional transformations were then achieved in the social and political structure. Heper, 1976, p. 510

¹⁹¹ Heper, 1976, p. 511.

¹⁹² Rustow, D.A. (1964). "The Military: Turkey" in *Political Modernization in Turkey and Japan* ed. by Rustow and Ward, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p.352 quoted in Tachau, Frank

Meeting around a same modernization programme of bureaucrats, government and army can be emerged by the neutralization of the old regime politically, and removing the contradictions between the army and the government. According to Ahmad, both institutions passed into the hands of the lower class, the Turkish lower middle class, and therefore both were able to support the same programme of reform.¹⁹³ With the cooperation and unionization of these institutes, the new modernizing center occurred with its components as the military, bureaucracy and government.

The Republican People's Party (CHP) was founded around this coalition which aimed to establish a national-territorial Turkish state. According to Karpaz, CHP maintained a certain loyalty to the old elites' historical concept of leadership and, on the other hand, the CHP aimed to create a modern party organization within the framework of the old elitist philosophy.¹⁹⁴ In the similar manner, Keyder argues: "the constitution of the Turkish Republic adopted in 1924 was unmistakably in the tradition of the nineteenth century liberal constitutions and thus crystallizing the intentions of the modernizing elite."¹⁹⁵ According to Sunar, bureaucratic elites achieved to establish a strong mechanism of state rather than to establish social organizations.¹⁹⁶

To found a link between the state and the public, the local notables are used as both the representatives of the CHP and agents of the state. As Ahmed mentioned, beside the alliance with military-civil elites, the Kemalists were obliged to reach

and Metin Heper. (1983). "The State Politics and Military in Turkey", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 16, No 1, Oct. , p.19.

¹⁹³ Ahmad, 1993, p.7.

¹⁹⁴ Karpaz, Kemal. (1991). "The Republican People's Party 1923- 1945", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* ed. by Heper and Landau, Great Britain: Tauris, pp.42- 43.

¹⁹⁵ Keyder. Çağlar. (1987a). "The Political Economy of Turkish Democracy" in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* ed. by Irvin C. Shick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.34.

¹⁹⁶ Sunar, 1986, p.2078.

the peasants through the agency of their traditional leaders, the local notables and the men of religion.¹⁹⁷ “The price of the collaboration between the Kemalists and the notables was the tacit agreement to maintain the status quo in the countryside.”¹⁹⁸ By this way, the local notables established a link between center and periphery. As Ayata puts it:

The peasants lived in a world where a primary, *gemeinschaft* type of relationship was dominant. The local notable, although, hierarchically superior and powerful, was seen as an extension of such relations. He was a part of private life as opposed to the cold and distant public face of the bureaucracy; however powerful sometimes even brutal; he was at least accessible and accepted.¹⁹⁹

The year 1946 was a turning point in the political history of modern Turkey. At this time the country was moving through the competitive party system. Beside the external factors²⁰⁰, the internal factors which resulted from the erosion of the political alliance between the bureaucracy-military elite, the landlords and the bourgeoisie, and made impossible to sustain the status quo.

In the relatively political calm and stability years, a new middle class of professions and commercial elements occurred. Petty producers experienced the beginning of economic development and personal enrichment during the 1940's. One of the pillars of the opposition was economics against the bureaucratic control over economy. The United States, the hegemonic power of the post-War era, envisaged peripheral countries ideologically and economically prepared to support the principles of an open economy, and by this agenda, the Turkish

¹⁹⁷ Ahmad, 1993, p.76.

¹⁹⁸ Ahmad, 1993, p.76.

¹⁹⁹ Ayata, 1994, p.51.

²⁰⁰ For a further analysis of external factors see Eroğul, Cem.(1987). “The Establishment of Multi Party Rule 1945-1971” in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed. by I.C Shick and E.A Tonak, Oxford: Oxford Uni. Pres, pp.102- 103.

economy had to live without protectionism and to specialize within the world market.²⁰¹ As Keyder argues:

The sudden discovery of the market is, of course, primarily due to the bureaucratic disenchantment with bureaucratic control over economy. Have gained sufficient strength through politically mediated accumulation, and having reinforced its ranks through profiteering under war time policies, the bourgeoisie could now differentiate itself from the bureaucracy at a level of ideology.²⁰²

The second pillar of the opposition was religion. The creation of a modern society according to western forms had been a target since the nineteenth century. Creating a new secularist culture to take the place of the old Islam-oriented one was a task on the political agenda. Defining the cause of the decline as “too much tradition and not enough modernity”²⁰³, military bureaucratic elite engaged in secularization as a part of modernization effort.²⁰⁴ Secularism became entangled with the nation state definition as “a homogeneous, uni-ethnic (Turkish), uni-linguistic (Turkish) and uni-Sectarian (Sunni) entity.”²⁰⁵ In this sense, the goal was the eradication of parochial and particularistic allegiances in favor to consolidate rational individuals. Rather than being expected, “Islam came to rest at the center stage of politics, and secularism became a politically charged concept.”²⁰⁶ All of the oppositional movements are benefited from the relationship between religion and state with the claim to restore the situation of Islam in the society.

²⁰¹ Keyder, 1987a, p.38.

²⁰² Keyder, Çağlar.(1987c). “Populism and Democracy in State and Class in Turkey”, in *A Study in Capitalist Movement* ed. by Çağlar Keyder, Verso: London, p.118.

²⁰³ Turan, İltar. (1991). “Religion and Political Culture in Turkey”, in *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*, ed. by Richard Tapper, I.B Tauris &Co ltd Publishers: London &New York, p.43.

²⁰⁴ Turan, 1991, p.43.

²⁰⁵ Sakallıoğlu, Ümit Cizre. (1996). “Parameters and Strategies of Islam-State Interaction in Republican Turkey”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 28, No 2, May, p.234.

²⁰⁶ Sakallıoğlu, 1996, p.236.

The critics on the Land Reform Bill²⁰⁷ created the first major split within the Republican People's Party. The Demokrat Party (Democrat Party-DP) was established with the resignations from the CHP. The DP came to power in the 1950 elections with an overwhelming majority until 1960. The DP was supported by the innovative modern entrepreneurs, middle class artisans, small merchants and new urban populations which had been developed by the economic conditions mentioned above.

The 1950 elections are defined as the “ruralizing elections²⁰⁸” or as the “Green Uprising”²⁰⁹ in the literature. The critical stage in the process of political modernization is defined as an introduction of rural masses into the political system. Such an introduction means the end of traditional political system. The “Green Uprising”, as Huntington argues:

(...) often takes the form of one segment of the urban developing an appeal to or making an alliance with the crucial rural voters and mobilizing them into politics as to overwhelm at the polls more narrowly urban based parties²¹⁰.

In a similar manner, Tachau and Good argues that the new ruralized regime coincided a shift in the composition of parliament from persons with military and official backgrounds, to persons with professional and commercial backgrounds and another consequence of 1950 elections was a rise in the representation of local and provincial elites as opposed to national elites based in Istanbul and Ankara.²¹¹

²⁰⁷ According to the Land reform bill, state owned lands and properties cultivated through sharecropping would be shared by poor peasants. According to the opponents, the Land reform would lead to a decline in production which would have all sorts of adverse consequences; the principle of private property guaranteed by the constitution was also being violated (Ahmad, 1973, p.103).

²⁰⁸ Tachau, Frank and Mary, Jo. D. Good. (1973). “The Anatomy of Political and Social Change: Turkish Parties, Parliaments and Elections”, *Comparative Politics*, University of New York, pp.551-573.

²⁰⁹ Tachau and Good, 1973, p.551.

²¹⁰ Tachau and Good, 1973, p.551.

²¹¹ Tachau and Good, 1973, p.552.

The 1950 elections are also signaled to an important feature in the sense of the voting structure. The election of 1950 was resulted with the victory of DP. It can be commented like the RPP's strong advocacy of reform and secularism can not be appealed to the less educated peasant voters who had been successfully motivated by the DP. According to Tachau, if this interpretation is true, then the party should have been the weakest in less developed constituencies dominated by the masses of poor, parochial peasants, and strongest in more developed provinces in which these elements are less important.²¹² But the distribution of the votes across the country indicates an opposite pattern. Özbudun's pattern of autonomous-mobilized voting behavior pattern can explain the whole picture. According to this pattern, in urban centers, voting is largely an autonomous act, but in the undeveloped urban areas, peasants may be mobilized or induced by their traditional leaders.²¹³ This theory can explain the election results of 1950's beside the low voting participation in the urban centers. The old relation pattern between CHP elites and local - traditional leaders seems to affect the election results of the 1950's. Considering the social base of the CHP and the social base that motivated by the DP, the 1950 elections indicated the dual structure of Turkish electorate and the periphery's attempt to gain power.

The polarization between the government and the opposition did not stem from ideological conflicts between left and right. Stemming from the same tradition, they were both close to the center. Heper introduced the wings of the opposition as state elites (politicians, bureaucrats and officers) and political elites that represented socio-economic groups.²¹⁴ Considering the state elites tension to remain basically the guardian of the long-term interests of the country, "politics in

²¹² Tachau, Frank. (1991). "The Republican People's Party, 1945-1980" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by Metin Heper and M. Landau, I.B. Tauris and Co ltd, London, pp.107- 105.

²¹³ Özbudun, Ergun and Frank Tachau. (1975). "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a critical Realignment", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Oct., p.470.

²¹⁴ Heper, 2002, p.140.

Turkey tended to revolve around high politics rather than the day-one-day needs of the country and its people.”²¹⁵

The second consequence of the split between political elites and state elites is the salience of political patronage and clientelism in Turkish politics. As Heper argues,

Political elites who are the defenders of only particularistic interests seem to have created a tendency to attend the specific needs of the people at the expense of the wellbeing of the economy as a whole. Political elites could only survive in politics if they managed to satisfy their constituencies by fulfilling some services in the absence of the opportunity to contribute to policy making. On the other side, the vote gave the masses an important chance to bargain services to be rendered.²¹⁶

According to Sayarı, the practice of rendering services is resulted by the reinforcing image of elected representatives as direct personal representatives of the voters, and second, it led to the beginning of direct bargaining with the candidates about the services to be exchanged for the votes.²¹⁷

The third implication of the rift between state elites and political elites is put by Heper as the role of the military as a final arbiter. Because of the perception of democracy as an end –what was the best for the country-, not as the means- of promoting the interests of social groups- by the state elites, democracy was seen as the only rule of the game but this democracy did not resemble a liberal democracy.²¹⁸ In this case, the military interventions are perceived as a necessary tool to guard democracy like on the 1960 coup.

²¹⁵ Heper, 2002, p.140.

²¹⁶ Heper, 2002, p.140.

²¹⁷ Ayata, 1994, p.53.

²¹⁸ Heper, 2002, p.142.

3.2. Ideological Fragmentation: 1960–1980

The regime breakdown in 1960 introduced a new phase in the evolution of the Turkish party system and the system's voting structure. Growing ideological polarization, the coalition governments that Turkey had first experienced, a shift in the vote structure from cultural cleavages to a functional one, and the formation of the new parties and their entries to the parliament are the key concepts that facilitate the understanding of the 1960-1980 period of Turkish political system.

According to Eldersveld's model, systemic developments characterized by social, cultural and economic changes in the country affected mass political behavior and party adaptation.²¹⁹ Changes in the political system refer to socio-economic development. Considering this model, an analysis of this period requires a particular examination of the main features of social, economic and institutional developments of this period.

The 1961 constitution included the lift of legal restrictions on the formation of religious, sectarian and radical leftist and rightist parties. Besides the lift of legal restrictions, the shift from a plurality to the proportional system of elections in 1961 proved to be important in the rise of new parties and their entry into parliament.²²⁰ As Ahmad puts it briefly:

This constitution radicalized politics and held forth the promise of a liberal and democratic Turkey if it was faithfully implemented. (...) The constitution did permit groups who had been tightly controlled before 1960 – the workers and radical intelligentsia - to wage apolitical structure against the entrenched forces.²²¹

²¹⁹ Eldersveld, Samuel. (1998). "Party Change and Continuity in Amsterdam", *Party Politics*, 4:3, pp.319-347, p 323. paraphrased in Yeşilada, Birol.(2002b) "Realignment and Party Adaptation: The Case of the Refah and Fazilet Parties" in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* ed.by Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Pub, London, p:158.

²²⁰ Sayarı.,Sabri. (2002) "The Changing Party System" in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey* ed.by Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Pub, London, p:13.

²²¹ Ahmad,Feroz (1977). "The Failure of Tutelary Democracy" in *The Turkish Experiment in Democracies 1950-1985*, C.Hurst Company,London.

The Marxist Türkiye İşçi Party (TİP-Turkish Workers Party), the extreme right-wing Milliyetçi Hareket Party (Nationalist Action Party -MHP), the Islamist Milli Nizam Party (National Order Party- MNP), and its successor, Milli Selamet Party (National Salvation Party MSP) and the Alevi based Birlik Party (Unity Party BP) were formed during the 1960's and 1970's. Thanks to the guarantees provided by the constitution, intellectual societies with radical, leftist tendencies were organized in the universities to debate and publicize Turkey's problems.

With the coup d'etat of 1961, the DP was no longer on the political scene. The ban on the DP, called for the new party establishments that aim to motivate DP's social base. This social base was formed with the coalition of commerce bourgeoisie, big land owners and petty producers that had a relatively economic welfare during the 1950-1960 process.²²² The issue of "the DP's legacy" remained a source for new party formations, but AP clearly had established itself as the DP's true successor with its election propandas and organizational structure.²²³ AP wished to protect the DP leaders, especially Menderes, from too harsh a punishment. Their main concern was to get a general amnesty for the convicted DP leaders. Amnesty was a key word for AP's 1961 election propaganda programme. "Look in our eyes, and then you will understand." (*Gözlerimize bakarsanız anlarsınız*) is emphasized the sorrow because of the execution of the Menderes, Zorlu, Polatkan.²²⁴ Behind this propaganda method, the strong organizational structure of AP is accepted as a proof of the continuation between DP and AP by the students of Turkish Politics.²²⁵ The organization of the AP was the strongest of all Turkish politics in the 1960's and 1970's. Although the AP

²²² Çavdar, Tefik (1985) ."Adalet Partisi", *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, İletişim Yayınları, p.2096.

²²³ Çavdar, 1985, p.2096.

²²⁴ Çavdar, 1985, p.2090.

²²⁵ Sayarı, Sabri. (1976) "Aspects of Party Organization in Turkey", *The Middle East Journal*, 30, p.195-196. also see Sherwood, W.B.(1968) "The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey, *World Politics*, 20, p.54-65. , Levi., Arner. (1991). "The Justice Party 1961-1980", in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed.by M.Heper and M. Landau, I.B Tauris and Co. Ltd: London.

was formed by different groups, the strongest group that backed the idea of establishing the AP was the former DP members or supporters²²⁶.

In the means of change and continuity in Turkish political life, the case of Justice Party (AP), can be studied within a frame work of centre-periphery relations. As Levi states:

The division between the centre and the periphery often implies a structural dimension. Nevertheless neither the centre, nor the periphery is static, frozen bodies. On the contrary, they are dynamic, basically, because they are subject to internal conflicts. In Turkey, for instance, all the major opposition parties to the RPP were founded by dissident members of the centre. In the case of the JP, not merely a few individuals but a large body of former officers became actively involved in its foundation²²⁷.

Demirel often repeated in his speeches that the AP was a mass party which represented the interests of all classes-city dwellers and villagers, workers and employers.²²⁸ It seems a coalition of periphery that evokes DP's support base in 1950's. But this coalition was diminished by the rapid social and economic change in the 1960's and 1970's.

In the aftermath of the 1960 coup, Turkey entered an era of planned economic development. Planners preserved the mixed economy, but also gave importance to the liberalizing the labor market. The share of industry increased remarkably.²²⁹ The share of agriculture in domestic production reduced. On the other side, by the increase in labor demand, between 1950 and 1970, Turkey experienced rural to

²²⁶ For a further discussion see Levi, 1991, p.137. also see Çavdar, 1985, p.2096.

²²⁷ Levi, 1991, p.136.

²²⁸ Levi, 1991, p.137.

²²⁹ for the further discussions see Utkulu, Utku.(2001). "The Turkish Economy :Past and Present" , in *Turkey since 1970:Politics, Economies and Society* ed.by Debbie Lovatt, Palgrave, London..., Köksal, Mehmet Haluk.(2001) "Sectoral analysis of the Turkish Economy" in *Turkey since 1970:Politics, Economies and Society* ed.by Debbie Lovatt, Palgrave, London., Keyder, Çağlar. (1987b). "Economic Developments and Crisis.1950-1980", in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* ed.by. I.C. Shick and E.A.Tonak, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

urban migration on an unparalleled scale.²³⁰ Urban and rural traditional petty producers and self-employed small businessmen were becoming dissatisfied. But after all, the AP's economic programme especially 1970 economic decisions, maintained to consider AP as a party of big bourgeoisie.²³¹ The coalition that formed the AP was interrupted as a consequence of social change. Behind this social change, Turkey's party politics has also experienced growing ideological polarization between left and right during the 1960's and 1970's. With the cold war tensions between the U.S.A and S.S.C.B, the liberal constitution of 1961 as mentioned above resulted with the appeal of Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party- MNP)²³² ,Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party -CMKP)²³³ , and the Marxsist Türkiye İşçi Partisi(Turkish Worker's Party-TİP).

The MSP appeared on the Turkish Political Scene as a neo-Islamist party. It emphasized the retraditionalization in socio-economic life along Islamic principles.²³⁴ With the claim of being a representative of small bourgeoisie, the MSP attempted to establish a symbiosis between the industrialization and the culture of Islam. As Toprak argues:

²³⁰ For the demographic changes between 1950-1970 see Sevkal,Naci.(2001) "An Overview of Turkey's Urbanization" in *Turkey since 1970:Politics, Economies and Society* ed.by Debbie Lovatt, Palgrave,London.

²³¹ Çavdar, 1985, p.2094.

²³² After the military intervention of 1971, MNP was closed by the constitutional court .Erbakan left to Switzerland, began publishing the Tek Nizam(Sole Order) newspaper and established Milli Görüş(National View) organization. After his return, the Milli Selamet Partisi(National Salvation Party-MSP) was established. For a further discussion see Yeşilada ,Biol. (2002a). "The Virtue Party" in *Turkish Studies: Special Issue Political Parties in Turkey*, ed.by Barry Rubin, Metin Heper, Volume 3, Number 1, Spring, A Frank Cass Journal. London.

²³³ After the election of Türkeş as a Party chair, the Party was renamed as Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi(Nationalist Movement Party-MHP) in congress meeting on 1969. For a further discussion see Çınar ,Alev and Burak Arıkan.(2002). "The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists" in *Turkish Studies :Special Issue Political Parties in Turkey*, ed.by Barry Rubin, Metin Heper, Volume 3, Number 1, Spring ,A Frank Cass Journal,. London.

²³⁴ Toprak, Binnaz.(1987) "The Religious Right" in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed.by I.C.Shick and E.A.Tonak, Oxford University Press :Oxford, p.228.

The MSP argued that Turkey would accomplish industrial growth without, however, passing through the traumas brought about by the capitalist model, with its inherent materialism. The Islamic emphasis on a close community based on brotherhood and mutual help would eliminate the atomized individuals of mass industrial society. (...) The party propagandists repeatedly emphasized the economic difficulties of underprivileged groups within the framework of a poorly operationalized concern for social justice.²³⁵

The other party organization that established its support on the components of the periphery is Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist movement party-MHP). Remaining a relatively unpopular party without any significant occurrence in political area until the 1960's -under the name of Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant Nation Party)- and it had a significant change under the leadership of Türkeş²³⁶. In the means of ideology, MHP had a contradictory ideology. As Ağaoğulları mentions:

Using both anti-capitalist and anti-communist discourse, the MHP ideology set out to articulate the aspirations of the middle classes. On the one hand, these favored change in the hope of acceding power and becoming big capitalists; on the other, they opposed change and stood ready to collaborate with the forces of the status quo, fearing both proletarianization through the development of capitalism, and a takeover by the working class.²³⁷

Helped by the ideological fragmentation, the MHP occupied with terror and also made it a basis of its ideology.²³⁸

²³⁵ Toprak, 1987,p.229.

²³⁶ Çınar and Arıkan , 2002,p.26-27.

²³⁷ Ağaoğulları, Mehmet Ali. (1987). "The Ultrationalist Right" in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives*, ed.by. I.C. Shick and E.A.Tonak, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.196-197.

²³⁸ Ağaoğulları, 1987, p.198.

Islam is referred by the MHP as a crucial part of Turkish culture that was also a political strategy to mobilize the conservative-religious voters of Central Anatolia.²³⁹ Beside this political strategy, the MHP activated the Associations of Hearts of Ideal (Ülkü Ocakları Derneği) in universities and the Organization of Young Idealists (Genç Ülkücüler Teşkilatı) in high schools, while also establishing paramilitary preparation grounds known as commando camps (komando kampları) in 1968 and after the 1971 coup, while the camps are shut down, the use of militants continued with the rise in terror.²⁴⁰

While it is forbidden to establish a Communist party, the new constitution specifically allowed for a socialist party. And on the other side, because of the increased urbanization and industrialization and obtaining the rights to strike and collective bargaining, the relations between employers and employees have taken on an organized pattern. The Trade Union Confederation and Revolutionary Trade Unions are the organizations that reflected this pattern. The Worker's Party of Turkey (Türkiye İşçi Partisi-TİP) was organized by a group of trade union leaders that broken away from the TÜRK-İŞ.²⁴¹ While the JP aimed to represent the interests of both employers and employees; the relations between AP and trade unions cooled down after the establishment of the New Revolutionary Trade Unions (DİSK).²⁴² DİSK, on the contrary to the Trade Union Confederation (TÜRK-İŞ), had a political attitude towards the Turkish Workers' Party policies. In 1969 and 1970, the JP introduced important changes in the Trade Unions Law, which were intended to strengthen TÜRK-İŞ against DİSK.²⁴³ On June 15-16 1970, a protest was organized against these limitations. With a huge participation,

²³⁹ This new combination was known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Türkeş articulated this synthesis in the following words: "We are as Turkish as the Tengri Mountain (located in Central Asia, the place where the MHP believes the Turks' ancestors migrated from) and as Muslim as Hira mountain which is located in the Muslim Holy lands in Saudi Arabia). Both philosophies are our principles." Çınar and Arıkan, 2002, p.27.

²⁴⁰ Ağaogulları, 1987, p.199.

²⁴¹ Samim, Ahmet. (1987) "The Left" in *Turkey in Transition: New Perspectives* ed. by. I.C.Shick and E.A.Tonak, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p.154.

²⁴² Levi, 1991, p.137.

²⁴³ Levi, 1991, p.137.

this protest meeting was interpreted by the leftist groups as an invitation for the beginning of an armed struggle.²⁴⁴

The party of center, Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi-CHP) also has experienced an ideological shift as a result of socio-economic change in the 1950's and 1960's. Ideological rhetoric had entered the political arena in a major way, with the succession of Demirel to the leadership of the AP. He emphasized leftism as a main target. The CHP had faced a necessity to distinguish itself from the conservative AP, and at the same time, to compete with the TIP to its left, and because of this necessity, İnönü has declared the CHP on the "left of center" in the 1965 elections.²⁴⁵ The discussions about this slogan reflected the main debates about the party's ideology. According to Ahmad:

The RPP was unlikely to win the election in 1965. In spite of its political record, the supporters of the status quo considered it too progressive, and the radicals were disillusioned with it for being progressive in words, conservative in action. The decision to introduce the slogan was regarded as an investment that would pay off, not in 1965, but in 1969 or even 1973. For the moment, it was a question of defeating the conservatives in the party and establishing a consensus around the new orientation.²⁴⁶

In 1972, these discussions were resulted with the Ecevit's (the figure in the left of center movement) election as a party chair.²⁴⁷ The leftward shift of the party continued during the leadership of the Ecevit. A new interpretation of populism highlighted the 1970's. The party had established itself as a social democratic

²⁴⁴ These groups were the people's liberation army(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu) led by Deniz Gezmiş and People's liberation party-Front of Turkey(Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi) led by Mahir Çayan in Samim,Ahmet.,1987, p.169. For a further discussion about left on 1960-1970 see Erdoğan,Necmi. (1998). "Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol'a:1970'lerde sol populizm üzerine notlar", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Güz, , p.22-37.

²⁴⁵ Tachau, Frank.(1991) "The Republican People's Party 1945-1980" in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey*, ed. by Metin Heper and M.Landau, I.B.Tauris and Co ltd, London, p.107.

²⁴⁶ Ahmad, 1991,108

²⁴⁷ Ayata,Ayşe. (2002b). "The Republican People's Party" in *Turkish Studies: Special Issue Political Parties in Turkey*, ed.by Barry Rubin, Metin Heper, Volume 3, Number 1, Spring , A Frank Cass Journal. London, p.104.

party committed to a welfare economy and society.²⁴⁸ According to Belge, Ecevit failed to consolidate his popular base. Instead of calling upon the working class to support him against the fascism, Ecevit presented himself as the personification of the state by the help of the CHP's Atatürkist origins and tradition of etatism.²⁴⁹ In an opposite pattern, Heper argues that the CHP seemed to move further from its traditional role as guardian of the state that resulted with a distance between CHP and the military.²⁵⁰ According to Heper, the anti-statist stance of the CHP reinforced the military to the notion of themselves as the prime guardian of the Atatürkist state that opened the coup that occurred on 1980.²⁵¹

1960s and 1970s introduced major changes in the Turkish political system. Despite the control of the AP the majority of the parliament from 1965 to 1971; in 1970's the case was changed and CHP has emerged as a strongest party. Against the management of the RPP and the JP to control 80 percent of parliament seats, minor parties expanded their support.²⁵² With this expanded support, Turkey had their first experience with coalition governments' between 1974 and 1978 and with a minority government in 1979-1980.

The two-party system had been weakened considering the decline of average vote share of the two major parties. But more importantly, the vote patterns of the CHP and AP had shifted dramatically from the patterns that existed during the 1950's: "The most highly developed provinces, in which the CHP had been weakest, were now the areas of its greatest strength, while conversely, its support in the least

²⁴⁸ Ayata, 2002b, p.103.

²⁴⁹ Belge ,Murat. (1990) "Sol" in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye* ed.by. I.C Shick ve E.A.Tonak,Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, p.160. paraphrased in Erdoğan, Necmi. (1998). "Demokratik Soldan Devrimci Yol'a:1970'lerde Sol Populizm Üzerine Notlar", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Güz, p.37.

²⁵⁰ Tachau, 1991, p.112.

²⁵¹ Tachau, 1991, p.112.

²⁵² Sayarı, Sabri.(2002). "The Changing Party System" in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed.by Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Pub, London,, p.13.

developed provinces, which had been its bastions dropped sharply.”²⁵³ According to Ayata, in major cities these shifts mainly originated in the squatter settlement area where the working classes lived, and the working class, the poor living on the periphery of cities, and young urban professional middle classes composed of the voter support of the CHP.²⁵⁴ In a similar pattern, as Tachau mentioned, it appears that the enhanced performance of the CHP in urban areas was due in large part to electoral shifts among the lower classes, and these shifts apparently involved direct switches from support of the AP to the CHP.²⁵⁵

The case seems a bit surprising on the TİP vote supports. After the triumph of TİP on the 1965 elections, the votes showed that the Worker’s party had not become a worker’s party. The TİP obtained nearly a third of its votes and its support seemed to have come predominantly from middle class progressives rather than from the poorer, workers’ quarters and in the countryside, TİP support came overwhelmingly from Kurds and Alevis.²⁵⁶

An analysis on the elections of 1977 and 1973 can help to make definite statements about the characteristics of the voting structure of MSP and MHP. The highest percentage of MSP votes were received in the least developed or the most rapidly developing areas of the country.²⁵⁷

In the former, individuals who voted for the MSP likely did so as a result of the party’s appeal to traditional-Islamic sentiments; in the latter, however, the MSP vote probably represented some form of protest by marginal individuals who had lost their former place within the economy-small traders, artisans, small shopkeepers and the like.²⁵⁸

²⁵³ Tachau, 1991, p:109.

²⁵⁴ Ayata, 2002b , p 104.

²⁵⁵ Tachau,1991 ,p:109.

²⁵⁶ Samim, 1987, p:156.

²⁵⁷ Toprak, 1987, p:229.

²⁵⁸ Toprak, 1987, p.229.

At the elections of 1977, on the regions of central Anatolia, in Western parts of Eastern Anatolia and north of Çukurova, the MHP's vote rates exceeded 10 percent. The provinces which MHP gained success are in the Western parts of Eastern Anatolia and some cities of Central Anatolia, like Yozgat and Çorum, where different ethnic and religious communities live together.²⁵⁹: "The factor of religion is more significant in regions where different sects coexist explains the success of the aggressive Turkish-Islamist MSP ideology directed against minorities."²⁶⁰ Ağaoğulları also explains the victory of MHP in the provinces of central Anatolia with the conservative religious ideology because of the feature of the rural social structure living there - particularly peasantry and receptive to conservative religious ideology.²⁶¹

Özbudun states that this table refers to a significant realignment of Turkish parties that had occurred during the 1960's and 1970's, and shows a trend from cultural cleavages to functional cleavages.²⁶² The functional cleavages are reinforced by the rapid socio-economic development. As Özbudun and Tachau argues:

Socio-economic development increases people's capacity to protect and further their class or group interest by way of collective action, especially by forming or joining their class or group organizations.(...) With increasing socio-economic development, politics tends to become less personalistic and more issue-oriented, with economic issues presumably playing a dominant role.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ Ağaoğulları, 1987, p.202.

²⁶⁰ Ağaoğulları, 1987, p. 202.

²⁶¹ Ağaoğulları, 1987, p.203.

²⁶² Özbudun, Ergun and Frank Tachau. (1975) "Social Change and Electoral Behavior in Turkey: Toward a Critical Realignment", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 6, No 4, Oct, pp.460-480.

²⁶³ Özbudun and Tachau, 1975, p.472.

3.3 The Restructuring of the Party System: 1980-1990

After the 1980 coup, Turkey has experienced military rule until the 1983 elections. The coup d'état of 1980 opened a new era in Turkish politics which is called by many students of Turkish politics as “the restructuring of the party system.”²⁶⁴ Not only a change in the political regime, but the coup of the 1980 signified also a change in the form of the state.

To analyze this major change in the Turkish party system, it is important to understand the motivations from global transformations. Beginning with the crises of world capitalism, the New Right dominated the 1980's with the synthesis of liberalism and conservatism on the contrary to the synthesis of liberalism and democracy.²⁶⁵ In the 1980's the global agenda of marketization remote the borders between old ideological positions; helped by social change, traditional ties were eroded and social class became an unclear motive in organizing political life.²⁶⁶

In line with this New Right hegemony, a turning point of Turkish economic policy came in 24 January 1980 when the government announced an economic reform programme. After several failed IMF programmes, the 1980 reform programme reflects a change experience from an inward looking economy to an outward and more market-based one.²⁶⁷ With the aim to avoid destructive instability and confrontations of the past, as generals believed, the shift to economic liberalism was resulted with the 1980 coup. Economic liberalism was promoted through

²⁶⁴ Sayari, 2002, p.15., also see Sakallioğlu, Umit Cizre (1997) “The Anatomy of the Turkish Military's Political Autonomy” in *Comparative Politics*, vol 29, No:4. Tosun Tanju “Turk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Sol'da parçalanma”, Boyut Matbaacılık, İstanbul, p.143-197., Yalman Galip. (2002). ‘The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective: A Relativist Paradigm or A Panoply of Hegemonic Strategies?’, *The Politics of Permanent Crisis: Class, Ideology and the State in Turkey*, (2002), p.21-54.

²⁶⁵ Ozkazanc Alev. (1995) “Türkiye’de Yeni Sağ”, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, 15.cilt, p.1218.

²⁶⁶ Sakallioğlu, Umit Cizre. (2002).” From Ruler To Pariah: The Life and Times of the True Path Party” in *Turkish Studies*, ed.by Metin Heper , Barry Rubin, Volume 3, Number 1, p.83.

²⁶⁷ For the content of 1980 reform programme see Utkulu, 2001, p.21.

conservative and authoritarian agenda, because economic liberalism was predicated on the creation of socially disciplined and depoliticized society.²⁶⁸

In this line contrary to the previous constitution of 1961, the 1982 constitution was designed with the conservative understanding of transition. It restructured the Turkish politics by narrowing the bases of political participation and strengthening state institutions.²⁶⁹ Recalling Heper's statement about the anti-statist stance of CHP, according to Vaner:

The state is the target of the army's militarist usurpation being always infact a metonym, the part (the military) thinking of itself as the whole (the state). By this we only mean to say that the military intervention and martial domination in general aim at or at least have as a consequence the deliverance of the state from the participation of certain actors.²⁷⁰

The 1982 constitution inverted many of the liberal measures introduced by the 1962 constitution in this authoritarian manner. This arrangement also brought many changes to the Turkish party system. First all preexisting political parties were broken up and forbidden to reorganize with the ban on the political leaders from political activities for periods of five or ten years.²⁷¹ Second a national threshold of 10 percent of the vote was imposed that parties were required to overcome before they could claim parliamentary seats and political parties are prohibited from maintaining ties of any sort with associations, unions, foundations, cooperatives and professional organizations.²⁷²

In the 1983 elections; the Junta exercised the power of rejecting or vetoing parties freely. The three parties were allowed to participate in elections: The Milliyetçi

²⁶⁸ Sakallioğlu, 2002, p.84.

²⁶⁹ Sakallioğlu, 1997, p.157.

²⁷⁰ Vaner, 1987, p.257.

²⁷¹ Sayarı,2002, p.16.

²⁷² Sayarı, 2002, p.16.

Demokrasi Partisi (Nationalist Democracy Party-MDP), The Halkci Parti (Populist Party-HP) and the Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party-ANAP). In this election, the new electoral rules incorporated a national quota of 10 percent which the party lists needed to gain representation in the parliament. The seats were distributed according the classical formula of d'hondt.²⁷³ According to Tachau, “the Junta’s plan envisioned an antiseptic type of politics that ideally would resemble a gentlemanly sporting contest in which two teams compete with one another and in which only one can win while the other loses.”²⁷⁴

Contrary to Junta’s plan, the ANAP won close to half the popular vote and a majority of the seats in the new Grand National Assembly. Since then, the ANAP has dominated the Turkish political arena. Özal, as the founding leader of ANAP, often argued that ANAP was established to represent a new beginning in Turkish politics: “In this sense, ANAP had no antecedents and definitely no roots that extended into the struggles of Turkish politics.”²⁷⁵ But according to Gole, the ANAP was both a continuation of the Democratic Party tradition of the 1950’s regeneration of the conservative liberal legacy, and attempting to combine market modernism and conservatism.²⁷⁶

By hosting four ideological strands of conservatism, nationalism, economic liberalism and social democracy within its rank, according to Kalaycıoğlu, ANAP’s main goal has always been to dominate the center of Turkish Politics.²⁷⁷

²⁷³ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. (2002b). “Elections and Governance” in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed by Sabri Sayari and Yılmaz Esmer’ Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.61.

²⁷⁴ Tachau, 2002, p.36.

²⁷⁵ Erguder, Ustun. (1991). “The Motherland Party 1983-1989” in *Political Parties and Democracy in Turkey* ed.by Metin Heper and M. Landau, I.B Tauris and Co.ltd:London, p.153. quoted in Kalaycıoğlu, 2002, p.45.

²⁷⁶ Gole, Nilufer. (1996). “Authoritarian Secularism and Islamist Politics: The Case of Turkey” in *Civil Society in the Middle East* ed.by Richard Norton, New York: E.J.Brill, Vol. 2, p.30.

²⁷⁷ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. (2002a). “The Motherland Party: The Change of Institutionalization in a Charismatic Leader Party” in *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 3, No 1, Spring, p.46.

This combination, which can be called an “engineering pragmatism with a cultural conservatism”²⁷⁸, seemed to argue for a traditional society, a social structure that will be dependent on moral-religious values of the past, while offering changes to the economy and to the wealth of the country. According to Tümay, in line with the global agenda that declared the hegemony of the New Right, ANAP tried to shape a new ideological system by harmonizing all the contradictory elements of the traditional ideologies and strove for the formation of an organic ideology which would be at the heart of the constitution.²⁷⁹ “This ideology was called as a conservative nationalism and it was more redefined and much more enriched form of the limited-appeal nationalism of the 1970’s.”²⁸⁰

Putting an end to the class-based politics²⁸¹, under ANAP, Ozal had emulated the global trend of shifting emphasis from competition and interest articulation to effective governance. The shift in the political competition style, which can be called as “Americanization of Political Competition”²⁸², resulted with the politicization of day to day life issues. Apart from the previous governments’, the language of public debate moved from an abstract vocabulary to an issue-based one.²⁸³

With this more technical manner, the economic policy of ANAP did not conduct with welfarism, egalitarian income distribution political considerations, and this style of policy marked a change in the attitude of Turkish right, which in the past had always stressed the primacy of political, cultural and moral factors over economic matters.²⁸⁴

²⁷⁸ Göle, 1996, p. 30.

²⁷⁹ Tümay, Muharrem.(1993). “The Turkish New Right’s Attempt at Hegemony” in the *Political, Socio Economic Transformation of Turkey* ed.by A.Eralp, M.Tunay, B.Yeşilada, Praeger:Westport, p.21.

²⁸⁰ Tümay, 1993, p.21.

²⁸¹ Yalman, 2002, p.41.

²⁸² Sakallıoğlu, 2002, p.83.

²⁸³ Sakallıoğlu, 2002, p.84.

²⁸⁴ Tümay, 1993, p.21.

However, by 1987, it had been difficult to successfully project such an identity. The political ban imposed upon the political leaders of the pre-1980 era was lifted by means of referendum. Despite the lower vote rate of ANAP (%36), it managed to obtain a higher percentage of seats thanks to the new electoral arrangements²⁸⁵. In the 1987 elections, beside the national threshold, a district level quota was introduced.²⁸⁶ According to Kalaycıoğlu, “the 1987 elections constituted one of the least representative elections in the Turkish history.”²⁸⁷ The 1989 elections reinforced the downward trend of the ANAP at the polls. A major reason of the loss of popular support was re-entry onto the political stage of Süleyman Demirel, the leader of the banned Justice Party, now at the head of the new Doğru Yol Party (True Path Party-DYP). The True Path party now stresses its continuity in the tradition of the Democrat and Justice party as representing the periphery against the state elites.

The results of the 1987 and 1989 elections indicate that the DYP has not been markedly successful in large towns like its predecessors.²⁸⁸ Beside the DYP, the newly emerging parties of the left and the right challenged the ANAP. The Sosyal Demokrat Halkçı Party (Social Democratic Populist Party SHP) is the heir of the CHP. After the leadership of Erdal İnönü, Dodd argues that the party is more acceptable than its predecessor was under Ecevit, because of both the personality of İnönü and its attitude which is not openly hostile to the military.²⁸⁹ By emphasizing planning, defending the State Economic Enterprises, urging economic growth, and calling for social justice, it is a social democrat party like its western counterparts.²⁹⁰ According to Kalaycıoğlu, “ANAP could no longer

²⁸⁵ Kalaycıoğlu, 2002a, p.49.

²⁸⁶ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. (2002b). “Elections and Governance” in *Politics ,Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed. by Sabri Sayari, Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Pub, London, p.61.

²⁸⁷ Kalaycıoğlu, 2002b, p.61.

²⁸⁸ Dodd, C.H. (1990). *The Crisis of Turkish Democracy*, Eothen Press, p.116.

²⁸⁹ Dodd, 1990, p.116.

²⁹⁰ Dodd, 1990, p.116.

claim to be the power occupying the center that extended from moderate left to the moderate right.”²⁹¹

3.4 The Party System in the 1990's

On the contrary of the military's intention, which aimed to make a new beginning to establish a stable political order, the political context of 1990's can be characterized by mainly increased political fragmentation and voter volatility, the declining strength of center right parties, the decreasing saliency of ideological differences between left and right, and the growing regionalization of political party support.

The most important trend in the party system was the return of fragmentation after it was contained by the military regime in the early 1980's. In the 1991, 1995 and 1999 elections, despite the use of a 10 percent national threshold for representation in the parliament, five parties managed to gain parliamentary seats in all three elections. Not only by elections, but also by forming sectional splits and through party switches by parliaments, the number of parties represented in the parliament increased.²⁹² Also, according to Tosun, divisions in the center right and center left spectrum was one of the causes of fragmentation.²⁹³ In short, “despite the best intension of the military junta, fragmentation has not only returned but also is now worse than ever.”²⁹⁴

The system's two centrist parties - the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party- were banned by the military on the 1980 intervention. Unlike the 1970's, where the source of conflict was between different ideological concepts, in the

²⁹¹ Kalaycıoğlu, 2002a, p.49.

²⁹² Sayarı, 2002, p.19.

²⁹³ Tosun ,Tanju. (1999). *Merkez Sağ ve Solda Parçalanma*, Boyut Kitapları, Ankara, p.197.

²⁹⁴ Tachau.Frank. (2002). “An Overview of Electoral Behavior: Toward Protest or Consolidation” in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed.by. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p.140.

1990's, the major conflict in politics occurred in similar ideological orientation.²⁹⁵

As Ayatas mentioned:

The reason of the narrow left-right ideological divide in Turkey's politics was the increasing similarity in their programs and economic policy orientations together with their growing dialogue and orientation. In addition to the close positions on socio economic issues, their social base was, broadly, the same position on the political spectrum.²⁹⁶

In a similar manner, as Kalaycıoğlu states:” The ANAP and DYP competed to control the same electoral turf, and thus they were no longer just opponents but also competitors.”²⁹⁷ Because of their antagonism which remained during the 1991-1999 period, an ANAP-DYP coalition seemed impossible.²⁹⁸ The adoption of neoliberal economic policies that de-emphasizes social-welfare spending had distanced the centrist parties, especially those on the center right from large numbers of voters who have faced growing economic problems

Another important reason for the increase of fragmentation was the weakening of electoral support for the centrist parties. The four center right and centre left parties collectively received %82.7 percent of votes in 1991. In the 1999 elections this was down to %56.1 percent. The most important share of this decline is in the center right parties. The total ratio of center right votes had declined from 55 percent in 1991, to 38.8 percent in 1995, and this trend was further continued in 1999 to 25.5 percent. Unlike the other periods of the Turkish system, they were no longer the dominant forces in the party system, although the center-right parties shared political power in all of the coalitions. The decline of the centre-right

²⁹⁵ Sayarı, ,2002, 19

²⁹⁶ Ayata, Ayşe and Sencer Ayata. (2000). “Turkey's Mainstream Political Parties on the Centre-Right and Center-Left in Turkey Since 1970”, in *Politics, Economics and Society* ed.by Debbie Lovatt, Palgrave, New York, p.103.

²⁹⁷ Kalaycıoğlu, 2002a, p.53.

²⁹⁸ Aleskerov,Fuad .,Ersel, Hasan and Yavuz Sabuncu. (2000). “Power and Coalitional Stability in the Turkish Parliament,1991-1999” in *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1,No 2, Autumn, Frank Cass, London, p.53.

parties has attracted many students of Turkish politics. According to Sayarı , their failure to deal effectively with pressing social and economic problems, especially with inflation, incessant fighting among their leaders, and their involvement in publicized incidents of corruption and growth are the causes of the decline of center right.²⁹⁹ The changing position of the state reinforced the incidents of corruption, as Öniş states briefly:

The increasing politicization of the state meant that direct contact with politicians became increasingly important for businessmen or private firms to achieve greater and preferential access to state resource. Associated with this process, there was a relaxed attitude towards disciplining economic crimes in a period associated with rising instances of bribery, corruption and embezzlement, of which the scandal involving "fictitious exports" during the late 1980's.³⁰⁰

This politicization of the economic rent distribution in the 1990's had led to an inequality and exclusion among diverse groups in society. Beside the changing structure of the state, the liberalization policies of the 1980 have resulted with the income gap between the rich and the poor. During this time the middle class eroded in the Turkish society and wage earners saw their share in national income fall to about 20 percent, and in contrast, the national factor income share for individuals and firms earning rent, interest and profit increased from 40 percent to 60 percent.³⁰¹ Adopting neo-liberal policies that de-emphasize social welfare, it had been inevitable to lose the support of middle classes. Beside the lose of support among the middle classes, the new formed migrant population also was alienated from centre-right parties because of their failure to address problems such as poverty, unemployment and absence of social security.³⁰²

²⁹⁹ Sayarı, 2002, p.19.

³⁰⁰ Öniş, Ziya. (1997). "The Political Economy of Islamic Resurgence in Turkey: The Rise of the Welfare Party in Perspective", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol 18, No 4, p.752.

³⁰¹ Yeşilada, Birol .(1999). "The Refah Party Phenomenon in Turkey in Comparative Political Parties and Party Elites ed.by Yeşilada, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, p.164.

³⁰² Ayata and Ayata, 2000, p.97.

There are also new emerged groups as Western educated bourgeoisie who demand anti populist values such as a smaller state, privatization and reduced spending on agricultural subsidies and welfare benefits.³⁰³ For the center right parties, it was very difficult to balance the interests of the big bourgeoisie and majority population. By the tendency to favor the interests of the older and new established business groups, beside the middle classes and the urban poor, the center right also lost the support of the new small and medium-scale entrepreneurs, the so called Anatolian Capital.³⁰⁴ The opposition to the neo-liberal restructuring policies, which was took a place on the centre-left political agenda, could not direct the votes of the groups above to the center-left parties. Mainly for the SHP/CHP political issues such as constitutional reform, the rights of individuals, civil liberties, secularism and democratization have always occupied a central place in ideology and propaganda rather than economic issues.³⁰⁵

The main beneficiaries of the weakening of the political center were the extremist parties that once had controlled only a small segment of the electoral space but became the key players in party politics during the 1990's. Besides the weakening of the political center, it is important to emphasize the process of postmodernism that seems to be occurring in the cultural realm. As Önis argues:

The process of globalization associated with postmodernism occurring simultaneously in the economic and cultural spheres has been interacting and producing powerful impulses leading to the rise of identity politics as the primary form of political discourse or conflict in the current historical context. (...) The issues of identity politics are as diverse as regional interaction and loss of sovereignty, religion and secularist, linguistic and racial minority rights, and the environment.³⁰⁶

³⁰³ Ayata and Ayata, 2000, p.97.

³⁰⁴ Öniş, 1997, p.755.

³⁰⁵ Kınıklioğlu, Suat .(2002). "The Democratic Left Party" in *Turkish Studies: Political Parties in Turkey*, ed.by Barry Rubin and Metin Heper Volume 3, Number 1, Spring ,A Frank Cass Journal, England.

³⁰⁶ Önis, 1997, p.757.

Islamism and Turkish nationalism is used by the military elites of 1980's to promote a state-centered Turkish-Islamic consciousness. As Birtek and Toprak argue, "The Islamic umma, a community of believers who are united by the same faith, seems to have set the model for a new sense of community which can consolidate social unity and solidarity and thereby eliminate the conflicts of opposing ideologies."³⁰⁷ Beside this official reinforcement of Islamism and Nationalism, the reflections of identity politics sounded in society in the 1990's. Starting with the 1991 national elections, the RP (Welfare Party) and Erbakan had entered the parliament, also as a coalition partner after the 1995 national elections

The RP is based on the four segments of the population: The Islamic intellectuals, who demand free expression in the public sphere, the Sunni Kurds, who seek either autonomy or reorganization of the Turkish nation state to allow them to be recognized as a separate ethnic group, the squaler dwellers, who demand social justice and the new members of the new bourgeoisie, who want less state intervention more liberalization and the eradication of the state subsidies for the big corporations.³⁰⁸ The RP's strategies attracted all these groups with different policy formulations. Islamic intellectuals and Islamic elites rose to power in the ranks of the Motherland Party, veiled women became visible on modern university campuses and Islamist periodicals, newspapers and books shifted the intellectual debate in Turkey away from the dominance of leftist intellectuals to that of the Islamists.³⁰⁹ As Göle argues:

As these new agents of Islamism began to obtain the same cultural capital as the Republican elites, share the same university classes, occupy the ranks of parliament, and participate in public debates on television, they started to gain public visibility, social recognition,

³⁰⁷ Birtek, Faruk and Binnaz Toprak. (1993). "The Conflictual Agendas of Neo-Liberal Reconstruction and the Rise of Islamic Politics in Turkey: The Hazards of Rewriting Modernity", *Praxis International*, 13, July, p.195.

³⁰⁸ Yavuz, Hakan. (1997). "Political Islam and Welfare Party in Turkey", *Comparative Politics*, Vol 30, No 1, Oct, p.79.

³⁰⁹ Göle, Nilüfer. (1997). "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter Elites", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 51, No 1, winter, p.54.

legitimacy, and prestige.³¹⁰

The RP became the main instrument that gave access to this new group in the parliament as a bloc. The RP seems attractive for Sunni Kurds for having a common identity called Islam: “RP emphasized Islam as a total and complete ideology that was a clear alternative to Western orientation, called for collectivism and collective action, rejected nationalism.”³¹¹ On the other side, by the help of the most appealing program called Just Order (Adil Düzen), the RP could supply support from the poor and newly urbanized masses whose request is equal distribution for economic goods and for economic expansion.³¹² Beside the poor and newly urbanized masses, rising Islamic capital is one of the partners of this cross-class coalition. As we mentioned above, the center-right's tendency towards big capital, Anatolian capital is represented in the ranks of the RP.

With the increasing support of the RP, the polarization based on rival political ideologies on the left and right has substantially diminished. Unlike the 1970's, several coalition governments are formed between left and right parties, like DYP/SHP coalition from 1991-1995 and DSP-MHP-ANAP coalition after 1999 elections. Conflicts between the secularists and Islamists have become a principal source of polarization. It can be clearly seen from the situation of RP after the 1995 elections. Except the short lived experience of the DYP-RP coalition, the RP failed to enter into alliances with other parties and participate in coalition governments like the CHP's situation in the 1970's. Despite the Islamist parties electoral strength in the elections, they were excluded from the coalition governments because of its perceived image as an anti-system party.³¹³ Despite this image of RP, center right parties developed more conservative policies competed with the RP for the Islamic vote. In this manner, according to Yavuz,

³¹⁰ Göle, 1997,p.54.

³¹¹ Yeşilada, 2002, p.172.

³¹² Yavuz, 1997, p.70.

³¹³ Sayarı, 2002, p.21.

"Although Islam has not become the language of modern Turkish politics, Turkey's political language has been islamized."³¹⁴

The MHP also benefited from the slump of center-right parties and identity politics that dominated the global agenda. During the 1990's, the rising tide of nationalism reflected in the elections. Beside the ethno-religious conflicts in the Balkans and the Caucus that involved Turkic and Muslim communities, Turkey's relations with Europe over Turkey's efforts to become a full member of the European Union reinforced Turkish nationalism.³¹⁵ But the most important factor was the rise of radical Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, the campaign of political violence and terrorism conducted by the ethnic Kurdish terrorist organization, and the separatist group Kurdistan Turkish Workers also contributed significantly to the upsurge in the MHP's votes.³¹⁶ In the 1999 elections, the electorate had become sensitive on issues of patriotism and nationalism in the face of PKK terrorism and the capturing of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. This conjuncture allowed the MHP to represent itself as the only truly patriotic party owing to its nationalism.³¹⁷ On the other side of the nationalist spectrum, the pro Kurdish People's Democracy party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi-HADEP) received an average of 4.5 percent of national vote in the 1995 and 1999 elections. Although it can not gain any seats in the parliament because of the national threshold, it managed to become the first party in a number of eastern and southeastern provinces heavily populated by Kurdish voters.³¹⁸ Despite all the claims of the HADEP for being a leftist mass party, it is seen as a Kurdish party and also an anti-system party by the other members of parliament.³¹⁹

³¹⁴ Yavuz, 1997, p.73.

³¹⁵ Sayarı, 2002, p.22.

³¹⁶ Sayarı, 2002, p.19.

³¹⁷ Çınar and Arkan, 2002, p.36.

³¹⁸ Sayarı, 2002,p.20.

³¹⁹ Watts, Nicole F. (1999). "Allies and Enemies: Pro Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990-1994", *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol 31, No 4, Nov., pp.631-656.

The electoral trends of the 1990's have been studied by many students of Turkish politics on the basis of voting behavior. Voting analysis focusing on this recent electoral experience diagnose demographic, socio economic, cultural and ethnic bases of political support. One major explanation focuses on the center-periphery cleavage that Turkey had inherited from Ottoman Empire. Kalaycıoğlu, in his survey, argues that a major determinant of party preferences is commitments to the values of the center and periphery³²⁰. And also Çarkoğlu and Hinich argue that religiosity is a major factor in determining the party preferences of Turkish voters.³²¹ According to Kalaycıoğlu, values of the center and values of the periphery still clash, and their conflicts continue to influence political attitudes in Turkey."³²² In another survey, conducted by Kalaycıoğlu in 1999, resulted with the similar conclusions when compared with the earlier findings.³²³ According to Kalaycıoğlu, the shift of voter allegiance to the extreme right appears to be motivated more by deepening cultural and ideological differences than by socio-economic factors, but between these factors the relative weight of cultural factors increase³²⁴. Another survey which mentioned the importance of center-periphery cleavage is the survey of Çarkoğlu and Avcı.³²⁵ By concentrating on the April 1999 elections, their analysis reveals considerable support for the center-periphery paradigm. They emphasize the different motivations of the periphery from the past decade and the periphery's more centrist DP tradition is displayed by the pro-

³²⁰ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin . (1994). "Elections and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in The 1990's", *Comparative Political Studies*, vol.27, No 3, October, pp.402-424.

³²¹ Çarkoğlu, Ali and Melvin J.Hinich. "An Analysis of the Ideological Space Underlying Turkish Party Preferences", *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Volume 1, Number 1, pp.90-99.

³²² Kalaycıoğlu, 1994, p.422.

³²³ Kalaycıoğlu, Ersin. (1999). "The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey: Coping with the Post-Cold Era", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, Spring , p.20, pp. 47-76.

³²⁴ Kalaycıoğlu, 1999, p.72.

³²⁵ Çarkoğlu ,Ali and Gamze Avcı.(2002). "An Analysis of the Electorate from a Geographical Perspective", in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed.by. Yılmaz Esmer and Sabri Sayari, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London.

Islamist and nationalist tendencies.³²⁶

The regional patterns of elections are also investigated by many works in the literature. The above-mentioned survey, which is conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu, indicates the overlap between the development patterns of the provinces and their nationalist and religious tendencies.³²⁷ The regions where nationalist and religious support occurs are also the provinces in which development problems and disparities continue. As Çarkoğlu mentions:

What is perhaps more significant is that the most developed provinces are dominated by the center-left and center-right and the least developed provinces have supported the anti-systemic parties of a pro-Islamist and separatist Kurdish cause. Their impact on the whole Turkish political system is limited primarily because the region is deeply fragmented politically.³²⁸

Another work which mentioned the overlap between of religious votes with class as well as ethnic and regional motives and identities is Ayatas'.³²⁹ Ayatas argue that the identities based on religion, ethnicity and class tend to cut each other. As they briefly state:

Ethnic and Religious parties have found a large electoral base among the urban poor in large cities, the rural masses and inhabitants of the Anatolian towns that have not received the benefits of economic development in recent decades. (...) Islamist parties that emphasize an Islamic identity above ethnicity, tribe and nation often find themselves challenged by the pro-Kurdish and Turkish nationalist parties. The less Alevi support for the Islamists made these parties as an exclusive Sunni Party.³³⁰

³²⁶ Çarkoğlu and Avcı, 2002, p.121.

³²⁷ Çarkoğlu, Ali. (2000). "The Geography of the April 1999 Turkish Elections", *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.1, Spring ,pp 149-171.

³²⁸ Çarkoğlu, 2000, p.166.

³²⁹ Ayata ,Ayşe and Sencer Ayata.(2002). "Ethnic and Religious Bases of Voting", in *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed.by. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, pp.137-157.

³³⁰ Ayata and Ayata, 2002, p.155.

Another study by Çarkoğlu, which aims to develop an aggregate model to account for variations in electoral support for the incumbents in 21 elections during the 1950-1995 period assessing the role played by macro economic conditions³³¹. The analysis suggests a significant impact of economic conditions on electoral support for incumbents in Turkey. The results show that governments are rewarded or punished for their economic performance. Protest voting hypothesis also constitutes an explanation of voting behavior. As Tachau discussed, political choice largely occurs through the social and economic disparities to express their dissatisfaction from the conditions³³². It is largely used to explain the rise of Islamist and nationalist parties and the weak centre parties. The rise of Islamist and nationalist votes are largely explained by the protest of urban poor.

On the contrary of these analyses, Esmer, in his survey, which is based on a survey of 1.741 voters after the April 1999 elections, indicates that the most important predictor of voting behavior was left-right ideology.³³³ Esmer argues that the large number of indicators such as relative deprivation, subjective class, efficacy and economic well being are far away from producing any tangible effects on either the FP or the MHP³³⁴.

These electoral trends increased political fragmentation and voter volatility, the declining strength of center right parties, the decreasing saliency of ideological differences between left and right, the growing regionalization of political party support, and the politics of identities reached a peak with the elections of

³³¹ Çarkoğlu, Ali .(1997) “Macro-Economic Determinants of Electoral Support for the Incumbents in Turkey, 1950-1955, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 17:75-96

³³² Tachau , 2002, pp 33-55.

³³³ Esmer, Yılmaz. (2000) “At The Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior”, *Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey*, ed.by Sabri Sayarı, Yılmaz Esmer, Lynne Rienner Publishers: London, p.95.

³³⁴ Esmer, 2000, p.112.

November 2002.

3.5 The November 2002 Elections

The November 2002 elections indicate several important trends. First of all, the elections have resulted with the victory of a pro-Islamist party, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party-AKP). Thanks to the electoral system, the AKP had an overwhelming majority in the parliament with the vote rate %34.28 and gained 363 seats. The CHP is the only other party that was able to pass the 10% threshold with a 19% vote rate and 178 seats. The coalition partners together lost 39% percentage points of electoral support.³³⁵

It seems necessary to sketch a picture of the post-election era in order to understand the continuity and change in Turkish politics. The political arena has witnessed an important change in the name of the structure of parliament. For the first time since the 1954 elections, Turkey has gotten a two-party parliament. As Cagaptay briefly puts:

So far, Turkish politics has been marked by constant bargaining between the many parties represented in the parliament and this has become such an integral part of the country's life that the Turks have no memory of politics in a two-party legislature.³³⁶

According to Sakallıoğlu, this two-party system can be taken as an opening for the transformation of center politics initiated in the aftermath of the 12 September 1980 military intervention³³⁷. A second change in Turkish politics is the majority

³³⁵ The vote rates of the parties: DYP %9.54, MHP 8.36%, DEHAP 6.22%, ANAP5.13, DSP 1.22% and a populist new comer to the Turkish electoral scene Genç Parti(Young Party GP) 7.25%

³³⁶ Cagaptay, Soner. (2002). "The November 2002 Elections and Turkey's new political Era", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6, No 4, December, p.43.

³³⁷ Coşar, Simten and Aylin Özman. (2004). "Center-right Politics in Turkey after the November 2002 general Elections: Neo-liberalism with a Muslim Face", *Contemporary Politics*, Volume 10, Number 1, March, p.57.

government that Turkey gets with the November 2002 elections after the coalition governments of the 1990's.

The 2002 elections also represent a continuity of party-system characteristics that effect the political era in the 1990's. As I have discussed, the election outcomes are very volatile in the post-1990 Turkish party system. There is a higher level of volatility compared with 1999 elections on November 2002. Twenty per cent of voters have switched their votes from one group to another between 1999 and 2002.³³⁸ The striking example of this trend can be observed on the vote rates of DSP (Democratic Left Party).³³⁹ The rise of pro-nationalist and pro-Islamists group of parties peaked, reaching nearly 53%, an all time high in Turkish politics. This group is 3.3 times larger than the center right parties and about 2.5 times larger than the center-left parties.³⁴⁰

About the electoral support in the post-1990 period, the Turkish party system is also very fragmented. Compared to 1995 and 1999, the party system is less fragmented but more fragmented than 1991.³⁴¹ The fragmentation, which is a main factor in the party system in the 90's, reflected to the parliamentary by the voters' perceptions rather than election system. According to Çarkoğlu, the position of local component, which dominates election results, continued in 3 November 2002.³⁴² But also 2002 elections have also witnessed a significant rise of the national component in the case of AKP.³⁴³

³³⁸Çarkoğlu, Ali. (2002). "Turkey's November 2002 elections: A new Beginning?", *Middle East Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 6,No4, December, p.31.

³³⁹ 22.2% vote rate on 1999 elections, 1.22 vote rate on 2002 elections.

³⁴⁰ Çarkoğlu, 2002a, p.32.

³⁴¹ Çarkoğlu, Ali. (2003). "The New Generation Pro-Islamists in Turkey", *South European Society and Politics*, Vol.7, No 3, Winter, Frank Cass, London, p.138.

³⁴² Çarkoğlu, 2002, p.33.

³⁴³ Çarkoğlu, 2002, p.33.

The winner of the 2002 elections, AKP, was formed in August 2001 by the Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party FP)'s reformist wing.³⁴⁴ Two separate generations with divergent agendas began to emerge over the leadership issue within the Welfare party: the younger "reformists" who pushed for greater internal democracy within the new party, while Erbakan pressed for the party to be run by his personal loyal followers.³⁴⁵ According to Yıldız, the FP acted more as a "party of transition" and after the closure of the party, two strands were organized in different parties.³⁴⁶ While the traditionalists formed the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party-SP), the reformists formed the AKP.³⁴⁷ The differences between the two wings were more strongly emphasized after the formation of two different parties with an AKP's emphasis on the democratic credentials both in party structure and in the approach to redefinition of politics.³⁴⁸ Although AKP has been presented as a political party at least aspiring to a centrist location in the political spectrum,³⁴⁹ there has been a suspicion on the part of the military and secularist groups that the party was engaged in dissimulation (Takiyye) and it would sooner or later try to bring back in Turkey a state based on Islam.³⁵⁰

The term of "conservative democracy" is a label that the party represents itself to the political arena. It can be described as a synthesis tendency which is related to the self-definition of the party as "democratic, conservative, reformist and modern." Integration with Europe is used as a useful instrument that embodies the

³⁴⁴ The virtue party was founded in December 1997 before the closure of Welfare Party to compose a base for Islamists in order to establish a new party.

³⁴⁵ Mecham, Quinn. (2004). "From the Ashes of Virtue; a Promise of Light: the Transformation of Political Islam in Turkey", *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 25, No 2, pp. 339-358, p.345.

³⁴⁶ Yıldız, Ahmet. (2002). "Politico-Religious Discourse of Political Islam in Turkey: The Parties of National Outlook", *The Muslim World*, Vol. 93, April, p.53.

³⁴⁷ Yıldız, 2002, p.53.

³⁴⁸ Coşar and Özman, 2004, p.62.

³⁴⁹ Coşar and Özman, 2004, p.62.

³⁵⁰ Heper, Metin. (2005) "The Justice and Development Party Government and the Military in Turkey", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No 2, Routledge, June, p.215.

democratic, reformist and modern aspects of the AKP's identity.³⁵¹ Mecham evaluates this strategy as a consequence of the political learning process from the cases of the Welfare and Virtue Party.³⁵² The creation of a new democratic rhetoric and a formulation of policies to expand democracy is a consequence of institutional constraints on the Islamic movement. As Mecham states briefly:

The 1998 National Security Council demands on Erbakan which led to dissolution of Welfare and formation of Virtue provided an imposing reference for Virtue leaders in their attempts to reframe the movement as one within the acceptable boundaries of the political system. Three political constraints helped Virtue's political position: the possibility of military intervention, a fear of legal closure by the courts and the need to maintain and expand their electoral constituency³⁵³.

Judicial and military constraints on the Virtue Party led to two different strategies which were embodied in two parties. The constitutional constraints provided the incentives for the reformists to make the split from the traditional leadership and on the other hand, Justice and Development Party's agenda moved to a more democratic agenda in the consciousness of not being anti-systemic³⁵⁴. As William Hale states: "(...) has to compete in the political market place with other, secularist parties and to play the game according to the rules of secular democracy, rather than a millenarian revolutionary vision."³⁵⁵

Coşar and Özman emphasize that in its political posture, the AKP represents an attempt at a synthesis between the neo-liberal context, which has already been shaped by the center right politics of the ANAP, and traditional-conservative votes.³⁵⁶ The difference between center right parties and AKP was the form of

³⁵¹ Coşar and Özman, 2004, p.63.

³⁵² Mecham, 2004, p.349.

³⁵³ Mecham, 2004, p.350

³⁵⁴ Mecham, 2004, p.351.

³⁵⁵ Hale, William. (1999) "Foreword" in *Turkey, identity, politics, Democracy* ed. by Sylvia Kedaurie, London, Frank Cass, pp.VII-VIII.

³⁵⁶ Coşar and Özman.2004, p.67.

AKP's policy which acquires a liberal-conservative identity: "This third way should not recall the synthesis between neo-liberal and social democratic politics that it did in the homeland of the term, but between neo-liberal and religio-conservative values."³⁵⁷

According to Tanıl Bora, it is possible to observe a parallelism between the elections of 1983 and 2002 on the points of having a power on the contrary to military's desire and the program of AKP such as development, richness and freedom.³⁵⁸ Bora defines AKP as a non-ideological movement with leaders who declared their Muslim identity on a basis of democracy respect platform.³⁵⁹

Making it briefer, it is necessary to analyze the support base of the Justice and Development Party and main motivates of the voters in the 2002 elections. Çarkoğlu argues that a pro-Islamist, conservative and potentially anti-system electoral constituency is growing at the center of the Anatolian peninsula.³⁶⁰ With the help of the previously used patterns of investigation, Çarkoğlu finds clear overlaps between provincial levels of socio-economic development as well as party system characteristics. The first result is the remaining of the Kurdish electoral base intact if not expanded in the east and southeastern provinces compared with the 1999 elections.³⁶¹ The coastal provinces of the Mediterranean and Aegean regions, as well as the border provinces of Marmara, remained the heart of the centrist electoral base despite a shrinking of considerable size. AKP is effective on all regions which the FP gained an important support but the Anatolian peninsula remained on the highest level by the 44.26% of AKP's support among the regions.

³⁵⁷ Coşar and Özman, 2004, p.67.

³⁵⁸ Bora, Tanıl.(2002). "2002 seçimi ve siyasal güzergah problemleri", *Birikim*, sayı 163/164, p.29.

³⁵⁹ Bora, 2002,p.32.

³⁶⁰ Çarkoğlu, 2002b, p.136.

³⁶¹ Çarkoğlu, 2002b, p.146.

To examine the pattern of economic voting behavior that determines the party preferences, Başlevent, Kirmanoğlu and Şenatalar find evidence that economic evaluations play a significant role in party choice. In this study, there is evidence that voters who state that their household's economic situation has worsened over the past year are more likely to vote for the AKP than the two center-right parties (ANAP and DYP).³⁶² The evidence also shows that people who expect to get worse off economically during the next year are more likely to vote for AKP.³⁶³ According to Tosun, there is no correlation between the socio-economic development indicators of urban residents and AKP's votes. Tosun indicates that it is an evidence of economic voting behavior that determines the party preferences in the sense that all the parts of society are affected by the economic crisis.³⁶⁴

The socio-economic status of the support base of AKP was examined by many surveys³⁶⁵ just before and after the 2002 elections. All these different works refers to similar consequences on the platform of socio-economic variables: On the one hand AKP, DYP, DEHAP and SP are supported by the lower socio-economic groups, on the other hand, YTP, CHP and DSP are supported by the higher income groups. AKP's support base seems to be less educated, but on the other hand, CHP was seen to be supported by more educated groups.

³⁶² Başlevent, Cem., Kirmanoğlu, Hasan and Burhan Şenatalar.(2005) "Empirical Investigation of Party Preferences and Economic Voting", *European Journal of Political Research* ,44, pp.547-562.

³⁶³ Başlevent et.al., 2005, pp.547-562.

³⁶⁴ Tosun.,Tanju. (2003) *Siyasette Yeniden Mevzilenmeler:Liberal Sosyal Sentez,Muhafazakar Demokrat Sentez ekseninde 3 Kasım 2002 seçimleri*, Buke Kitapları,Ankara,p.300.

³⁶⁵ Esmer, Yılmaz."Seçmen Davranışları açısından 3 Kasım Seçimleri, Milliyet, 7 Kasım 2002;for the survey of SAM see Radikal, 8 Ekim 2002; Akyol, Taha. AKP'nin arkasında ne var ?Milliyet, 17-21 Ekim 2003

In the means of ethnic and religious divisions reflected on the voting behavior, there appeared important consequences from the surveys. Both Erder and Çarkoğlu report similar results in their surveys:³⁶⁶

The tendency to vote for the AKP drops substantially as the sign of Alevi orientation increases; that is as the likelihood of being an Alevi increases the tendency to vote for AKP drops to a large extent.(...)As a reverse image, as confidence in a respondent's Alevi orientation increases, that respondent's likelihood to vote for CHP increases.³⁶⁷

On the other hand, Şenatalar emphasizes that Kurds vote extremely for HADEP rather than AKP or other parties. But also, according to this survey, the two pro-Islamist parties are relatively popular among Kurds, as they have traditionally emphasized the notion of the "brotherhood of Islam" as a basis of unity rather than the Turkish identity.³⁶⁸ Results of Esmer's survey indicate that the index of religiosity is high among the voters of AKP. On the other hand, this index is relatively very low among supporters of CHP. But the AKP's base seems to be far away from supporting a Sheria regime compared to SP's base.³⁶⁹

Şirin Tekeli mentions three main cultural groups, where each one reflects a particular socio-economic background: the traditional rural cultures which the remnants of a feudal world-view are still present the urban-industrialized segments of society which have more or less internalized modern-Western rules, and the new urban cultural group, which occurs at the intersection of two other groups.³⁷⁰ Sefa Şimşek mentions that the Islamic movements in 1980's are supported by this new urban group. In a similar manner, Çarkoğlu's and

³⁶⁶Çarkoğlu, Ali. (2005) "Political preferences of the Turkish Electorate: Reflections of an Alevi-Sunni Cleavage", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 6, No 2, pp.273-292.June. also see Erder, Necat. (2002) *Türkiye'de Siyasi Partilerin Yandaş-Seçmen Profili, 1994-2002*, İstanbul, TÜSES Publications.

³⁶⁷ Çarkoğlu, 2005, p.286.

³⁶⁸ Başlevent et.al., ,2005, p.559.

³⁶⁹ Esmer,,Seçmen Davranışları Açısından..., Milliyet, 7 Kasım 2002

³⁷⁰Tekeli, Şirin. (1995). "Introduction: Women in Turkey in the 1980's" in *Women in Modern Turkish Society: A Reader* ed.by Şirin Tekeli, London and New Jersey, Zed Books Ltd, p.4.

Şenatalar’s evidence supported this idea that “AKP’s voters appear to be religious, young, shantytown dwellers who do not support EU membership.”³⁷¹

As the above mentioned surveys indicate, center-periphery cleavage seems to dominate the Turkish political arena. As Çarkoğlu emphasizes, the rise of AKP can be evaluated as a continuation of the peripheral challenge to the statist center of Turkish politics.³⁷² But it is important to analyze the mean of center and periphery today with the broad social and political changes take place. Developing a comprehensive understanding on the periphery’s new dynamics, will facilitate the broad social base of AKP, stated as “AKP now inherits the tradition not only of the pro-Islamists but also of the patronage-minded Democrat Party (DP) of the 1950’s, Justice Party(AP) of the 1960’s and 1970’s, and the recently alienated DYP and ANAP.”³⁷³

³⁷¹ Çarkoğlu, 2002b, p.151. and Başlevent et. al.,2005, p.560.

³⁷² Çarkoğlu, 2002b, p.153.

³⁷³ Çarkoğlu, 2002b, p.153.

CHAPTER 4

THE CASE OF TIRE IN THE CONTEXT OF 3 NOVEMBER 2002 ELECTIONS

In this chapter, I want to analyze the concept of new political behavior in terms of political participation, voting behavior and party preferences in Tire. Do the socio-demographic variables still have explanatory power when determining the levels and kinds of participatory acts? Does voting behavior still preserve its importance among other participatory acts? What is the main motivation of the citizens to vote? Are the short term forces influential in the terms of voting decision? Are party attachments still preserving their importance? In this respect, I shall analyze the decision on voting on the criteria of political participation, voting behavior, the party identification, issue and candidate-centered preferences and the new post materialist political agenda.

4.1 METHODOLOGY

4.1.1. The Purpose of the Study

As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this thesis is to discuss the dynamics of voting preferences and political behavior at the 3 November 2002 elections in terms of the new political behavior. Besides the theoretical analyzes, this study requires an empirical study for developing a comprehensive understanding about the dynamics of the voting behavior by learning the reflections of political system on the individual experiences. This study tries to answer whether the consequences of November 2002 elections can be evaluated in terms of the concept “new political behavior” by tracing differences and similarities between the concept of new political behavior and Turkish citizens’ voting - participating patterns.

4.1.2. Choosing the Method

My research topic is the patterns of new political behavior in the context of 3 Nov 2002 elections. This is a new issue for the students of Turkish politics so my study aims to be an exploratory study for providing insight into the concept which may suggest a new ground for the studies of elections. I seek to identify the processes and patterns involved in the phenomenon rather than reaching some statistical generalizations, therefore my study is based on qualitative data to release some basic answers to the questions of why and how in order to understand if there is any shift in the means of voting behavior, and to learn more about the reflections of politics to their daily life. This qualitative data is provided from the interviews which I have done in the city of Tire.

I have used partly structured method during my research to handle the limitations of the strict interview frames. This method gives interviewees a chance to talk about their own experiences in their political area that can be a consequence of their own socio-demographic characteristics. The questions that I have asked are decided before the interviews to preserve the focus of the material that must be touched on by all respondents.

4.1.3. A Questionnaire

The most important tool of my research is the questionnaire that was developed before the interviews. It is composed of mainly four parts. The first part was designed in order to gather information about the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents such as age, place of birth, occupation, education, income and sex to have an idea on the profile of the respondents, and to discover whether these characteristics have an explanatory power in explaining voting preferences and modes/levels of political participation.

The second part is organized to focus on political participation. It has been developed to gather information about the respondents' preferences in the modes and levels of political participation such as voting, party membership, participating in demonstrations, watching and reading news about politics and even discussing about politics. The third part focuses on voting behavior and specifically in the context of the 3 November 2002 elections. It tries to learn if there is any shift in the means of party preferences and the motivations of this shift. It also deals with the concept of party identification and tries to learn changes and continuities in the means of party preferences. The last part is developed to find out the importance of cleavages in voting behavior by specifying the issues such as Türban, the European Union and Sheria. It also asks what the respondents see as the main problems of Turkey in order to understand whether a new post material political agenda occurs or not.

4.1.4. Data Collecting

I have interviewed 40 people between September and November 2005. One of the difficulties that I have experienced during the study is to identify the sample. It was very challenging to persuade the people to do interviews especially when I put the interview's subject on politics and elections. As an optimal solution, I have benefited from some links that I have provided during the university project that is performed in the city of Tire. During this university project, I have interviewed some members of the civil organizations and party organizations. With these references, I was able to persuade some people in order to do the interviews. However, this list has provided me an improper sample with my thesis' subject that mainly focuses on "ordinary citizens", since it includes mainly activists of politics in the city of Tire like members of the parties and leaders of the party organizations. Therefore, I choose the snowball strategy as a sampling strategy. In this case, I relied on informal networks: One of a lawyer, who is very interested in my subject, referred me on to his friends, and they led me others. With these informal references, I was able to persuade people.

Besides the benefits of the snowball sampling in the means of identifying and persuading interviewees, there are also some disadvantages of the method. As I will mention below, the sample is far away from reflecting on Turkey's general characteristics as education and party preferences. However, it must be emphasized again that this study aims to understand the process and dynamics as an exploratory way rather than to reach statistical generalizations.

I had 42 contacts however; the tape recorder was used in 32 of the interviews: Eight of them refused the interview to be taped, and two of them refused to participate in the study. Also four of them denied to respond the question what party did you vote for at 3 Nov. 2002 elections. I think it is closely linked with the hesitation and cynicism toward talking about politics and this fact emphasizes the importance of the secret ballot principle once again. I have rarely faced difficulties in taping the interviews, especially with the high educated people and party activists. They were more willingly participated in the interviews, and the longest interviews were also conducted with these groups. The shortest interview lasted twenty minutes and the longest two-and -a - half hours. The workplaces, private homes and cafes are places where the interviews were conducted. Generally the workplaces were used, since many of my respondents are artisans. Also, by the help of these informal networks, I contacted interviewees without prearranged appointments.

4.1.5. General Profile of the Interviewees

Besides some common characteristics shared by the interviewees that I mentioned below, they differ in age, occupation and education.

The ages of participants ranged from 20 to 70, most of the participants are middle-aged as 11 of participants are between 30 and 40, and 11 of them are between 40 and 50. The women participants are less than men, as 8 of participants are women. Their ages are under the total average, most of them are between 30 and 40.

The sample has a highly-educated characteristic. Nearly half of the interviewees are graduated from university. Thirteen (32.5%) of respondents have lycee diploma, 4 (10%) of them graduated from primary school and 3 (7.5%) of them have secondary school diploma. Among elder interviewees, the number of graduates from university is very low. Only ¼ of elder interviewees aged between 60 and 70 have a university diploma.

The sample seems to be homogeneous considering the birth places of the respondents. Seventy five percent (30) of respondents were born in Tire. Ten of them came to Tire because of their work, and four of them were born in the other districts of İzmir. The sample seems to be proper to my study in the means of excluding the effects of migration and ethnic diversities on the voting behavior and party preferences.

Of the 40 participants, 33 participants (%82.5) are working. The other participants reported that they were retired. The majority of the participants are working in the service sector as teacher and doctor. The most important point is the high rate of university alumnae who are working independently. (8 of 20 respondents). Teachers are the second big group in the sample, as 7 of 40 respondents are working as a teacher. 25% of interviewees are working in trade sector and only 5% of the sample is working in the agriculture sector. Regardless of their occupation, more than half of the respondents seem to be working in private sector.

After presenting a profile of the interviewees, it must be mentioned that the names of the individuals are hidden in the study to protect the anonymity of them; however, the characteristics of individuals such as age, occupation and education level are not removed because of emphasize in the literature on the relation between these socio-demographic characteristics and political behavior.

4.2. ELECTIONS IN TİRE

Tire, a district in İzmir, is located southeast of İzmir. It is one of the largest districts in the area with 64 villages. According to the 2002 census, the population of the city of Tire is 42.988. The population of the Tire district, with its villages, is 78658 with an urbanization rate of 54%.

Table 1: City of Tire's Population

	Women	Men	Total
Number (n)	21975	21013	42988
Percentage (%)	51	49	100

*Source: TURKISH STATISTICAL INSTITUTE (TURKSTAT)

For developing a comprehensive understanding about the voting decision in the 3 November 2002 elections, it is necessary to sketch a picture of elections in Tire.³⁷⁴

Table 3 is designed according to the common characteristics of elections in the period of 1961 - 1977 that were mentioned in the previous chapter. The one of the important results of the elections is the AP's high and continuing support among voters in Tire. At all of the four elections, the AP's vote rates are over its rates in Turkey.³⁷⁵ It is noteworthy that the AP was the leader party even at the elections of 1973 and 1977, even though CHP reached to its most impressive vote rates in its history.³⁷⁶ The emergence of new parties was away from affecting the results

³⁷⁴ The periods 1961-1977, 1983-1987 and 1991-1999 are analyzed by the tables which figure the Tire center's election statistics with its villages as a whole. Table 6 included the election outcomes of city of Tire where this study is based on.

³⁷⁵ AP's vote rates in the election of 1961, 1965, 1969,1973,1977 as 34.79%, 52.86%, 46.55%, 29.8%, 36.89. http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=4,5,6,7

³⁷⁶ CHP have gained 33.29% and 41.39% of total votes in the elections of 1973 and 1977 http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=6,7

of the elections in the period of 1961 and 1977, therefore the competition was still between the CHP and AP.

Table 2: Patterns of Voting in 1961, 1965, 1969, 1973, 1977 General Elections (%) – TİRE

	1961	1965	1969	1973	1977
AP	59.6	65.8	56.1	41.9	52.8
CHP	37.0	28.4	33.1	36.4	40.8
CGP	-	-	6.2	2.0	1.2
CKMP	2.2	0.9	-	-	-
DP	-	-	-	1.5	1.5
MP	-	2.8	0.9	0.4	-
MHP	-	-	0.6	0.6	0.9
MSP	-	-	-	3	2.3
TBP	-	-	1	0.6	0.3
TİP	-	2.0	1.2	-	0.2
YTP	0.9	-	0.6	-	-
Independent	-	0.1	0.3	0.1	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100

*Source: TURKISH STATISTICAL INSTITUTE (TURKSTAT)

The election results of 1983 and 1987 elections in Tire indicated a different picture when compared with nationwide results. The ANAP's voter support in Tire was under its general vote rates, but on the other hand, the MDP's and the leftist HP's vote rates were higher than as they were nationwide.³⁷⁷ However, the most important point that the table shows is the DYP's high vote rates just after its establishment. This makes us think that the DYP is accepted by voters in Tire as the true heir of the AP, which has preserved its high vote rates during the period 1961-1977.

³⁷⁷ The vote rates of parties in the election of 1983: ANAP 45.14%, HP 30.46%, MDP 23.27%

Table 3: Patterns of Voting in 1983, 1987 General Elections (%) - TIRE

	1983	1987
RP	-	2.1
DYP	-	28.8
ANAP	35.9	32.1
DSP	-	5.8
SHP	-	29.8
HP	32.5	-
İDP	-	0.5
MGP	-	0.9
MDP	30.4	-
Independent	1.2	-
Total	100	100

*Source: TURKISH STATISTICAL INSTITUTE (TURKSTAT)

Table 5, indicates a fragmented party system when compared with the previous table. AP-DYP's tradition continued to dominate Tire's voter decision during the years 1991, 1995, 1999. At all of the four elections, the DYP's vote rates are over its rates in Turkey.³⁷⁸ As proper to the nationwide trend, the vote rates of centre right has declined also in Tire. At the 1999 elections, DYP has declined from 36.6 to 21.4. The second important point that the results of these elections indicates is the weak support of RP and FP even at 1995 elections. In this election, RP has gained 21.38% of total votes and came to the power by a coalition with the DYP. The MSP tradition has very limited support in Tire, and it makes us to think that the election victory of AKP must be evaluated in terms of change in voting behavior patterns rather than the rising of Islamism.

³⁷⁸ Nationwide results: 1991: 27.03%, 1995: 19.8%, 1999: 12.01% www.belgenet.net.

Table 4: Patterns of Voting in 1991, 1995, 1999 General Elections (%) – TIRE

	1991	1995	1999
RP	4.6	6.5	-
DYP	39.2	36.6	21.4
ANAP	23.2	18.8	14.3
DSP	7.1	16.2	33.5
CHP	-	9.3	5.1
HADEP	-	1.3	1.6
İP	-	0.3	0.3
MHP	-	9.8	15.9
MP	-	0.4	0.3
YD	-	0.3	-
YDP	-	0.4	0.1
YP	-	0.1	-
SHP	25.3	-	-
SP	0.6	-	-
BP	-	-	0.2
BBP	-	-	0.4
DEPAR	-	-	0.1
DP	-	-	0.5
DTP	-	-	0.7
FP	-	-	4
LDP	-	-	0.8
ÖDP	-	-	0.4
SİP	-	-	0.1
EMEP	-	-	0.2
Independent	0.1	2.2	0.1
Total	100	100	100

*Source: TURKISH STATISTICAL INSTITUTE (TURKSTAT)

At 2002 elections, in the Tire district, DYP has gained 23.4% of the votes, CHP has gained 18.1% of the votes, and AKP became the fourth party after GP with the vote rate of 16.3%. However, the city of Tire, where my sample is drawn from, presented a totally different picture. Despite the strong support base of DYP when compared with the nationwide results³⁷⁹, 2002 elections are resulted in the city of centre with the triumph of AKP. The difference between the vote rates of DYP in the city and in the rural can be an evidence of the effect of modernization on the party identification. Besides the general elections, municipality elections

³⁷⁹ At 2002 elections DYP has gained 9.54% of total votes.

indicate a similar trend as the high vote rates of DYP and AKP's victory at 2004 municipality elections.

Table 5: Patterns of Voting in 2002 General Elections (%) – CITY OF TİRE

	2002
AKP	19.1
CHP	17.2
ANAP	5.2
BBP	0.7
BTP	0.3
DEHAP	2.4
DSP	1
DYP	18.9
GP	17.6
İP	1.8
LDP	0.3
MP	0.2
MHP	12.1
ÖDP	0.2
SP	1
TKP	0.2
YP	0.7
YTP	1.1
Independent	0
Total	100

*Source: TURKISH STATISTICAL INSTITUTE (TURKSTAT)

Table 6: The Vote Rates of Parties at 1989, 1994, 1999, 2004 Municipality Elections (%) – TİRE

	1989	1994	1999	2004
DSP	1.8	-	14.2	0.2
ANAP	16	23.2	28.3	24.7
BTP	-	-	-	0.2
AKP	-	-	-	29.5
İP	-	0.4	0.2	0.2
DYP	56.7	32.2	24.1	7.2
CHP	-	3.8	2.4	27.7
GP	-	-	-	0.8
SHP	21.0	7.3	-	1.3
SP	-	-	-	0.4
MHP	0.8	28.6	24.9	7.8
IDP	0.3	-	-	-
MİP	0.8	-	-	-
MP	-	0.5	0.2	-
DTP	-	-	0.8	-
FP	-	-	4.9	-
Total	100	100	100	100

*Source: TURKISH STATISTICAL INSTITUTE (TURKSTAT)

Beside the nearness and facilities of research, the city of Tire is chosen for the empirical part of this study, because of the particular striking features of results of the 2002 and 2004 elections in terms of shifts in political party affiliation.

4.3. Findings

4.3.1 Political Participation in Tire: New Trends in Participation

As the determinants of a political behavior, it is obvious that social position is an important marker of political participation. Education, income and occupation are the main components of the socio-economic status. Among these determinants of the political behavior, interviews in Tire have showed that, education has a greater impact on political behavior than the other components of political behavior in the sense that the more educated individual has more political information, the more educated individual is more likely to follow politics, and feels free to discuss

politics. All of the interviews that were made with relatively educated people have presented such a case.

(41, pharmacist, University, M)I follow the news that I concern. You know, all newspapers have internet links; even news channels have such kind of links. I try to read and watch.

(36, Teacher, University, W)-I read Evrensel and Yeni Evrensel newspapers. I generally watch NTV, especially the news. I try to follow all

(50, Laborant, University, M)I buy two newspapers everyday. I watch only sport and discussion programmes. I watch Kurtlar Vadisi because I think it reflects Turkey's actual events. But I think this series is functioned by some other different interest, because there is a Çatli event in this country. I watch because I recognized some realities and I also have experienced them. I also watch NTV and CNN.

As the interviews emphasized, the activities which more educated individuals preferred are generally spectator activities.³⁸⁰ Half of these respondents stated that they have no an affiliation to a party or an association. But, interestingly, gladiator activities such as being a member of a party or being a candidate for office are preferred by relatively low-educated people. Half of these educated respondents stated the reason behind their passivism is their skepticism and distrust against the political parties and the party system. Political trust can be defined as a general evaluative orientation towards the government and government's operation and effectiveness that constitutes a set of attitudes that can help citizens tolerate a certain level of dysfunction.³⁸¹ In the set of interviews below, the distrust seemed to be directed towards not only to the government itself but also to the political parties and to the political system as a whole. The most important factor of the new political behavior is the observable distrust towards the political system, and the political parties in Western Democracies is easily recognized in the set of interviews which are made with the high educated strata, but after all, nearly all of

³⁸⁰ Spectator activities are watching and reading political news, participating political discussions.

³⁸¹ Belanger, Eric and Richard Nadeau. (2005). "Political Trust and the Vote in Multiparty Elections: The Canadian Case", *European Journal of Political Research*, 44: 121-146, p. 122

the interviews that were made with relatively low educated people failed to be an evidence for such kind a political distrust.

The content of this distrust is mainly concentrated on the intra-party politics and the party decision-making processes. It appears as a main reason behind the disactivism in party politics. As one of the artisan states, citizens seem to be doubtful about the process of decision making in parties, and they think that this process is away from supplying career opportunities despite the long and hard working years in the party.

(35, Artisan, Lycee, M): - *What is the intra-party democracy? To make elections-whatever it is- in the party as fairly, as rightly, as honestly. But it does not happen so; lots of tricks exist. The reason that I have left the party was the lack of promotion opportunities. You have entered the party on your elder ages, you got educate, and when it is the time that you can have any important mission, anyone who have an important name, become the candidate. This makes a person tired. It is not the intra-party democracy*

Beside the lack of career opportunities, the lack of intra-party democracy is put as a main reason of disactivism by many interviewees. One of the pharmacist and laborant emphasize authoritarianism and undemocratic processes in party politics as the reason of their disactivism towards party politics.

(41, pharmacist, University, M): *These people when they are opposed to the existing party system, it resulted in their judgment by their party organs and their exclusion from the parties. The political parties in this country are managed with an authoritarian manner. This system of delegation seems as democratic, but I think it is not. A person, who can vote even for a meal, can take a responsibility of organizing a party's important organs which can play a vital role for country's destiny. In this situation, I do not think of participating in party politics.*

(50, Laborant, University, M) *The name of the party is democratic, but the party is never democratic. You can not know who is a member of DSP. Even the membership of the leaders is suspicious. We all think that we are the members of DSP. But now I don't know. There is nothing democratic in the party. I have withdrawn from the party after elections. I am not actively involved in politics.*

According to Dalton³⁸², in most advanced industrial democracies, participation levels and various methods of political action, especially direct forms, are expanding and these new styles of participation give opportunity to the citizens in the means of controlling political activity and increasing public pressure on public elites. As I mentioned before, a decreasing of participation in the party politics can be observed especially among relatively highly educated individuals, but it is difficult to claim the emergency of a new participatory repertoire replacing party politics. The legal restrictions over the membership of officers to the political parties can be one of the reasons of this situation. But it is important to emphasize that the negative attitude toward party politics, other social networks and civil society organizations are more observable among highly-educated people who are independently occupied such as a lawyer, pharmacist or doctor.

The content of this negative attitude towards the civil society organizations is shaped by the ineffectiveness of civil organizations. One of the lawyers points out the lack of quality of these organizations as having wrong functions contrary to his expectations from a civil organization. This unfunctioned role of civil society organizations is also emphasized by one of the veterinarians. The social positions of these interviewees are remarkable.

(41, Lawyer, University, M): I think all of these organizations are sore of some kind of “management illness”. There is a society called Atatürkist Thought Association. . I am a member of this association because of the fear of being antipathic. Even the name of the society is false. Atatürk is not an opinion leader. He is an activist. You can think whether it is so important, but it shows the lack of quality. Please do something in a right way. They have said that we will finance poor children. Are you stupid? Does Atatürkist Thought Association finance poor children? They do that because of the religious communities -fethullahçılar- do. Can we compete with their financial resources? You must do something different that I do not know what. I have no magical formulas.

(52, Veterinarian, University, M), I did not think to be a member of an association and I do not think to be. All of them are backed with some another power focuses. For example, Atatürkist Thought Association or war veteran society.... All of them benefit from their rents. They do not have social aims. But if I encounter one with a really meaningful purpose, I can affiliate for example the

³⁸² .Dalton Russell J.(2000a). “Citizen Attitudes and Political Behavior”, *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol 33, No6/7, August September, p.929

society of protection of forests in Tire because I live in a forest and I work in the forest.

The efficiency feelings are also noteworthy in dominating the tendencies toward the participatory modes. Especially among highly educated people this feeling of efficiency and creating a change in the political system is emphasized as a feeling which was effective in their elder years. As Dahl has hypothesized, participation in politics and feeling of efficacy feed on each other, like a circularity of effects that people's participation increases their salience of efficacy and their sense of efficacy in turn increases their participation³⁸³. As this interview indicates, the feeling of efficiency supply the main motivation of the participation to the politics.

(50, Laborant, University, M): It was my ideal. In my education years, I struggled for a democratic university. And I am always concerned with this country's problems. I have determined the problems and have searched for solutions. But I have understood that it is impossible to do some beneficial things if you are not in power. To date, I have done nothing for this country except discussing about politics or pointing out the problems. I have affiliated with this party when it was in power. I have done many things when I was the member of the district organization of the party and I have tried to do something for this country...

Income as a component of socio-economic determinants seems to have a little explanatory power when compared with education, but after all, politics is still accepted as a work that requires money and work. The following dialogues points out the perception of politics as money and time-work by the interviewees. From these dialogues, it is apparent that party politics is accepted as a money-time load activity that is performed by always the same people who have them.

(55, Lycee, Retired officer, M) - I have resigned from True Path Party after I have worked for one year. Politics means money. We have not so high an income.

³⁸³ Dahl, Robert. (1961). *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, New Heaven: Yale University Press, p.58 paraphrased in Millbrath, 1966, p.110.

I won't be a deputy or mayor. Why should I spend my children's money for politics? Then I have resigned from the administration of the party.

(56, Accountant, University, M): There are always the same people in politics in Tire. Here, the most important factor is economic power. Also, they are from the old families of Tire. They are not tradesman as you suppose. Because if they evince their political choice, they will loose their clients. Always the same people are in politics because they have enough time and money. Time is also important

Among the socio-demographic variations, gender seems to create a difference in the participatory activities. Men are more likely to participate in politics than women, both in spectator and gladiator terms. But as expected, social and economic modernization is eroding this difference. The sex difference also disappeared in the upper-middle SES, well educated strata.

From the interviews, which are done with relatively educated women; it can be argued that education carries an important role in more active ways of political participation such as being a member of a civil society organization, following political discussions. The educated women seem to have a more positive attitude toward the civil society organizations. One of the teachers points out the opportunities that civil society organizations provide in the means of learning the rights and supplying beneficiaries from collective action.

(36, Teacher, University, W): I have been the member of Eđitim-Sen for 6 years.

Researcher: Why do you prefer to be a member of such a civil organization?

(36, Teacher, University, W): I am aware the possibilities that this organization's conditions that help me to learn my rights more clearly. And another reason is my belief about the collective action's beneficiaries rather than individual effort. I concern more about my working conditions rather than our wages. Yes we are in a disadvantaged position because we have no sanction. But it is again depends on us, whether to gain or not sanction, depends our efforts.

Another dialogue emphasizes the power of the social sensitivity in the means of providing a link between individual and civil society organizations. It appears a main motivation in reinforcing the affiliation between citizens and civil society organizations.

(31, Secretary, University, W): I am a member of the Atatürkist Thought Association. I went to their conferences and at that time, there was a campaign called “one moment of darkness for endless daylight”-sürekli aydınlık için bir dakika karanlık-. For a while I have just followed their activities. I found them very successful and I am satisfied with their activities in schools, their tours for example to Çanakkale, and the theatres about Atatürk and the independence war. And also during this time, you know, there were some attacks toward Atatürk from the Welfare party, so it reinforces sensitivity in all society. I was also affected from these discussions and I affiliated Atatürk’s idea society.

Age is also not significantly associated with higher levels of political participation. The interviews which are made with various age groups do not indicate any linear or curvilinear relation between age and political participation. Also occupation as a determinant of political participation sketches a meaningful picture only if is evaluated with the education factor.

In the means of political participation, the most important factor in determining the modes and degrees of political participation seemed to be the education factor. When compared with the low educated strata, highly educated citizens have more political information, following politics and discussing politics. However, contrary to the classic political participation literature, highly educated strata seem to be away from the most traditional and institutionalized way of participating: party politics. It seems to be proper to the new political behavior literature that states a decline in structured methods of political participation. The rising cynicism and distrust towards the political system and political actors is a main reason behind this noted passivism appropriate to the evidences in Western democracies. But after all, on the contrary to the concept of new political behavior, this highly educated stratum is still silent about turning to various methods of direct democracy ranging from community groups to social movements.

4.3.2 The Voting Behavior in Tire: Still Popular or Not?

In this section, the focus will be on the decision about participation in the elections. I will attempt to give a picture about voting behavior in the elections of 3 November 2002. Voting occupies a central place in democracy. Generally speaking, voting requires two decisions: first a decision is to engage or not, and the second decision of which candidate or party to support. The decision about whether to participate in elections or to stay at home can often determine who wins an election. Considering the lowest turnout rate -%79- in 2002 elections since 1983 elections, voting participation became an important issue to analyze

Concomitant with the theories on voting behavior, what becomes rather apparent during the interviews in Tire, is that social position is not the factor that determines the turnout. That is to say, it does not have a real influence on the participation in the elections. Interviews with people in various socio-economic statuses have showed a strong tendency to go to the polls in the election times whatever their social statuses are. The frequency and regularity of the voting behavior also do not change in different socio-economic groups.

Age is emphasized by the literature as an important variable of participation in the elections. In general, it is believed that the older population participates in the election more frequently than the younger generation.³⁸⁴ However, we do not see such a relation between age and participation in the elections. The general view that emphasizes the linear relation between age and turnout has failed in the case of Tire. The young population seems integrated into society and politics, with a high level of information about daily political discussions, and has gained a regular participatory habit to the elections

Another socio-demographic variable that is calculated as a variable of voting behavior is gender. This has been a common explanation indicating the shorter enfranchisement of women. But as I expected, this theory is away from an

³⁸⁴ Miilbrath, 1966.

explanatory power considering the interviews in Tire. The interviews with women located on different places in social strata, showed a strong tendency toward participating in the elections.

In the case of Tire, the high turnout rate in the 2002 elections deserves attention.³⁸⁵ In relation to turnout, my sample is also a representation of Tire. 3/4 of the respondents state that they cast a ballot in the 2002 November elections. In this case, it is meaningful to analyze the motivations of voting behavior. One of the important motivations that direct citizens to participating in the elections seems to be “feeling of efficacy”. In the research, ¼ of respondents are concentrated towards this kind of efficiency. Citizens evaluate voting as a valuable act in order to take responsibility in the political system.

(31, University, Secretary, W) In the previous elections I voted for the Freedom and Democracy party. I have listened to their political views, programmes and political propagandas, and I have voted for them since it would be possible for them to do good things. I have thought that it is valuable if their vote rate increases even by one person. I have said that one vote is one vote, and because of this I voted for a party that has no chance to win. Considering the possibility of giving a more qualified service, and for a more democratic and equal society, I vote regularly for the party that I believed in.

(35, Lycee, artisan, M) One may prefer not to vote or may prefer not to go to the elections. But I think this is not correct. You will have a word only if you take responsibility. You should vote. If you are a part of majority, your party will be the government.

Beside the motivation of the feeling of efficiency, in my research, many people feel a duty to vote whether or not their vote will change results of the election. The citizenship duty attitude relates to the political efficiency attitude. Feeling a duty to participate seems to carry over to political action: several studies show that persons feeling a duty to participate are more likely to participate.³⁸⁶ On the

³⁸⁵ The turnout rate of city of Tire (84.7%) is significantly higher than nationwide average which is 74.1%

³⁸⁶ Millbrath 1966, p.62.

contrary of the common belief that argues the tendency of upper socio- economic status persons, especially those with high education are more likely to develop a sense of citizen duty, in the research the explanations which include the citizen duty theme is constant among various socio-economic groups. More than half of the interviews among various socio-economic groups indicated such a case. As an important motivation factor, the citizen duty concept results with a voting behavior despite the lack of clear decision on the direction of the vote.

Researcher: Dou you vote regularly?

(42, Lycee, retired soldier, M): Yes, I have voted regularly in the last 10 years. I am a citizen. I have rights and the most important one of these rights are voting. I choose the person who rules me. I went to the poll even when I was working abroad because of my job. I can go; do I not have a right? It is necessary to vote in the elections. It is a simple citizen duty.

(41, Lawyer, University, M): I always have regrets on the decision of my vote, but as a citizen duty, are there any alternatives?

(56, Accountant, University, M): I vote in every election. It is a citizen duty.

(40, University, Teacher, W)I vote regularly. Although in the previous elections, in 99 elections, I thought not to vote. I have voted because, it is a citizen duty. Although I have not a clear decision in which way I use my vote, I voted in the previous elections.

The interviews above also emphasized the fact that despite the decision about not to vote, voters cast a ballot. The effect of the party system on the voting behavior is also accentuated in the ¼ of interviews. According to Evans, in proportional systems, voters are more likely to vote for their “true party” because this party is more likely to exist. Thus, where voters can vote for their true party, their vote will be more valuable and it encourages them to vote.³⁸⁷ But in this interview, a counter-hypothesis seems convincing. The counter-hypothesis argues that large a number of parties in the system that carried a potential to make coalitions, rather than single party government, may be less attractive to voters who prefer a clear outcome.³⁸⁸ In this sense, this interview can also be evaluated in terms of a desire for a clear winner and this desire’s incentive effect:

³⁸⁷Evans, Jocelyn A C. (2004). *Voters& Voting an Introduction*, London, Sage Publications, p.158.

³⁸⁸ Evans, 2004, p.158.

(**61, retired artisan, secondary school, M**): *Yes but in 1999 elections, I thought not to vote. But after all, I have voted because voting is a citizenship duty. I voted for a party that I have decided on.*

Researcher: Why do you think of not voting?

I believe that this country can not be governed with coalitions. This is also a characteristic of us; I mean we are not successful partnerships in our all works, not only in political area, but also in a kind of business. In this sense, we did not achieve in partnerships in previous government. So, it seems to be a coalition, and I thought not to vote.

The most interesting case that interviews direct us is the continuation of the voting behavior despite the negative image of the political system and elections.

According to Palma:

Feelings of personal politic competence, feelings of civic responsibility and feelings of trust and identification with politics and its institutions favor participation, whereas political cynicism and suspiciousness feelings that politics remote, threatening and corrupt or ineffective lead to political apathy.³⁸⁹

But in an opposite manner, more than half of the interviews reflect an enduring participation to elections, despite the distrust against the political parties and democratic elections. The following dialogue emphasizes this kind of continuity, despite the distrust against the political system. As I have touched on before, voting seems to be an important component of citizen duty and it provides “the right” to talk about country’s problems.

(**35, Lycee, artisan, M**): *I do not evaluate elections as a good process. There are some people who are passing on the red lights. These people’s votes are carrying the same value with the votes which are used in a rational manner. The people who vote in a rational manner are not a majority. So think about the government who is elected by these elections. But after all, I vote regularly. But voting is a basic citizen duty, and by voting you assume the responsibility, and at the same time, you deserve the right to talk about the country’s problems. In this sense, I vote regularly.*

³⁸⁹ Palma, Giuseppe. (1970). *Apathy and Participation*, The Free Press, New York, p.6.

One of the pharmacists states the importance of voting as a political participation type. Voting appears as a very important participation type considering the hesitation towards party politics and civil society organizations.

(41, pharmacist, University, M) My only way of intervention is my vote. I am not a member of a party. The only thing that I can do is voting. I am voting insistently. It is the only thing that I want to do. I vote regularly really even though I curse them. I got angry to the system, elections, and parties. But I vote because my only intervention is my vote. I am not a member of an association; I am not a member of a party. I participate to elections persistently. This is the only way that I want to do things in the means of participation.

In the light of these dialogues, it can be argued that citizens can be mobilized to voting even when they have no clear choice among parties and even when they are in distrust to the parties and elections. As these dialogues indicate, voting figures can rely on to provide at least a clear indication of people's a desire to participate in politics. As Evans argues:

The apparently increasing failure of many individuals to participate in the selection of the leaders and their parties leads to indignant and outraged accusations of apathy, and calls for measures to address the decline in interest in precisely the activity which allows all citizens access to the political process. From this perspective, voting is unique and paramount importance.³⁹⁰

From this perspective, another dialogue emphasizes the importance of voting behavior as a political participation type. It is a good example of regular participation, despite the distrust and political cynicism feelings. In an opposite manner, as this interview reflects, non-voting can also be evaluated as a kind of participatory movement that aims to reflect protest toward the political parties and system. This kind of behavior may importantly mean a main interest about politics.

Researcher: *You have said that there is no difference between parties and there is no party which offers a solution to the problems of the country. Do you vote regularly?*

³⁹⁰ Evans, 2004, p.1.

(50, Laborant, University, M): Of course, in every election.

Researcher: Why, I mean you vote regularly but at the same time you are in distrust to the parties.

(50, Laborant, University, M): Not voting is a special kind of activism. If you can do this in an organized manner, if you achieve to give messages then I always be in such kind of protest activity. But it has no meaning individual rejection of voting. This kind of rejection can be evaluated as a terrorist activity. But if you organize the large segments of society in the way of non-voting, then it will be a protest activity.

One of the explanations that intend to explain the main determinants of the voting turnout is focused on the costs and benefits of the voting behavior. The calculus of voting theory tries to account for the fact that millions of people vote despite the apparent irrationality, so from this theoretical perspective, the costs of voting including transformation, the cost of gathering information and making a decision might outweigh the benefits derived from it.³⁹¹ Compulsory voting can be analyzed in terms of the costs of voting behavior. It can be said that the “stick of compulsory voting and the carrots of weekend polling do lead many people to vote in the elections³⁹².” Contrary to the dominant understanding, only one interview declared the importance of compulsory voting that motivates citizens to vote.

(44, Farmer, Lycee, M): I vote regularly in every election.

Researcher: You have said that there is an authority gap in Turkey and there is no party to resolve this problem. Then why do you vote?

(44, Farmer, Lycee, M): At least if you do not go to the polls, you will be punished. You can also vote in an invalid way. I vote because it is an obligation.

Researcher: If you are not obligated.....?

(44, Farmer, Lycee, M): Of course I do not vote. Who do you vote for? They can not solve their intra- party problems, then how can you expect from them solving yours? They are not different from each other.

It can be argued that under compulsory voting, individual incentives are high about voting among voters. It can also refer to a strong awareness about the

³⁹¹ Riker, William and Peter Ordeshook. (1968) “A Theory of the Calculus Voting”, *American Political Science Review*, p.25-42.

³⁹² Evans, 2002, p.155.

existence of these rules and a greater feeling of civic duty when compared with the low-incentive voters that reject voting under the same conditions.³⁹³

After an analysis of the main motivations that directs people's voting, it is necessary to ask such a question: Why does somebody not vote? Only three interviewees stated that they do not vote in elections. Among the relatively few non-voters, the registration process is seen as a main obstacle to participate. Although in the Turkish election system, there is no complex registration process to be repeated before every election, the problems can occur in the relocations. Theoretically, since registering is seen as a separate action from the voting process, it can raise the cost of voting and it can result with low participation to the elections.³⁹⁴

(36, Teacher, University, W): I've not voted for previous two elections. Because we remove to a new place of residence and our names did not appear on the voter list. Of course we were faulty. We did not control the list.

In my research, the feelings of distrust and suspicions have rarely resulted in an abstinence behavior. Contrary to the fact, some interviewees reflected this kind of non-participant behavior which emphasized the dissatisfaction about the parties. But after all, these expressions must be appraised as a protest manner rather than as a condition of political apathy. Abstainers are integrated citizens in the political system with participating discussions, following related news and even being party members.

(65, secondary school, artisan, M): I am a member of the Republican People's Party, but after all I do not vote even for RPP. I do not vote and I will not!! Because they are all old; the formers should resign. We need young people who are not hindered. They are all the same and I don't think on voting.

³⁹³ Evans, 2002,p.152.

³⁹⁴ Niemi and Wiesberg,. (1984). "Controversies in Voting Behavior", *Congressional Quarterly Inc*, U.S.A, p.28.

Dalton argues that the participation levels and the various levels of political action are generally expanding in today's societies, even when participation in political parties and electoral politics is decreasing.³⁹⁵ Contrary to the concept of new political behavior, this research in Tire emphasizes that voting still is a popular activity among citizens. It would appear from this research that only a small fraction of Tire residents are actively participating in the other processes of democracy. Voting still remains relatively high as a single common factor.

The main motivation that directs citizens to voting is the conception of a citizenship duty. Regular elections are seen as a common and strong way of influencing the composition of government by an equal and collective participation. Casting a ballot is the most common act of citizenship. As Almond and Verba argue:

The democratic myth of citizen competence has significant consequences. For one thing, it is not pure myth: the belief in the influence potential of the average man has some truth to it and does indicate real behavioral potential. Whether true or not, the myth is believed.³⁹⁶

Also it appears that socio-demographic and socio-economic differences are away from creating an influence over the participation in elections.

In my research it will be a mistake to associate non-voting behavior as an indicator of political apathy. It appears as a signal of protest and the reflection of dissatisfaction from political parties. The differentiation between dissatisfaction and disaffection can provide an effective tool for this case. According to Palma, disaffection is an alienation of feelings and so involves remoteness and estrangement, but dissatisfaction is more generally indicates a temporary dislike

³⁹⁵ Dalton ,Russel J and Martin P.Wattenberg. (2002). "Unthinkable Democracy : Political Change in Advanced Industrial Societies" in *Parties without Partisans*, ed.by Dalton and Wattenberg, Oxford University Press, p.7.

³⁹⁶ Almond,Gabriel and Sidney Verba. (1963). *The Civic Culture*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, p.487.

for anything that falls short of one's wishes.³⁹⁷ In this means, the interviewees reflect a general dissatisfaction, and it seems to be concentrated among mainly political parties and leaders. Besides this analyze, the education factor seems to balance apathy in terms of voting behavior. Because of the high education level of my sample, it appears that education has a greater impact on the continuity of voting behavior despite the dissatisfaction from political parties.

4. 3.3. The Party Identification in Tire: Are Voters Still Loyal?

In this section, I will attempt to give a picture about the main patterns of voting, the main cleavages which the voting patterns are based on, and the process of political alignment which parties' failure seems to have directly affected. Can we evaluate this picture as evidence of the dealignment thesis and as a declining role of political parties?

One of the main arguments of this concept "new political behavior" is the diminishing role of political parties, and the party attachments in providing a reasonable electoral choice. However, the interviews in Tire provide evidence about a process in which voters are moving toward non-partisanship. Especially, among AKP voters, **all interviews** presented such a case. The most emphasized concept in interviews is the weakening of party loyalties, which is seen as a "football team advocacy".

(42, Farmer, Lycee, M) For example, I would support party A. However, when I recognize its faults, I will criticize it. As a matter of fact, one of the problems in Turkey is the strong partisanship as a football team advocacy. For example, my father supported DYP as if it is a football team. He always vote for DYP whether it gains or loses as if it is a football team. Today, I vote for AKP, and I generally admire this government. But if I see the faults of the government, I will not again vote for AKP.

(61, secondary school, retired artisan, M) I vote for who can do the job. I voted for DYP, I voted for ANAP in previous elections. But I am not a partisan. For example, I admire this government now. But if AKP does not attend successfully, I

³⁹⁷ Palma, Giuseppe Di . (1970). *Apathy and Participation*, The Free Press, New York, p.16.

will not vote for AKP. Just like a football team advocacy, I do not support a party if it does not attend successfully.

(42, high school, retired soldier, M)- *I am changing my vote in every election. It is necessary to change according to conditions. People act in a similar manner. If it is like the old football team advocacy, ANAP or DYP again can be in power. Whether they are educated or not, people change their parties' they vote for.*

Right-left cleavage and ideology seem to lose its importance in the process of deciding on which party to vote for among AKP voters. Leadership and politicians' abilities appear as important factors. The media provides a proper channel in order to give information about parties and politicians as these dialogues emphasize.

(35, Lycee, artisan, M) *There is no a strict partisanship. After 95's and 2000's, there is no such a thing as partisanship. You can not observe that people are casting votes always for the same parties, like ANAP, DYP. People are more educated and awake. In past, they were like sheep. My father always votes for DYP. I also have grown in a centre-right tradition. But I did not vote for DYP. The media affects all of us. We all watch both politicians who have logical solutions and who have totally nonsense arguments. There is no right-left cleavage in this time. In the past, they even do not give permission to their daughters marrying a man from a different ideological tradition. But now, even a politician can change his party. We are interested in politicians' abilities whether they are doing a job or not. The media supply information about all political events and parties' agendas I voted for AKP, but it does not mean that I will always vote for AKP. I am watching the political field like watching a football match. (...) If a man's arguments show his political vision is logical, I vote for him. I am interested in his government mentality of the country. People of this country are also like me.*

(40, Teacher, University, W): *I am not interested in party's ideologies. I consider the leader's personality and his team whether they are honest or not. There is not such a specific party which I can support all time. I alter my choice at times. Honesty and faithfulness are important.*

When we analyze the preferences of the AKP voters in previous elections, we can have an interesting shift: $\frac{3}{4}$ of respondents declared that their preferences in previous elections were with the Motherland Party because of Özal's leadership. It seems the main vote transfer has occurred from ANAP to AKP in November 2002 elections in Tire. AKP seems to be succeeding, attracting these voters who are on the right of the political spectrum. In a parallel manner, leadership seems to be an important factor in party preferences of AKP voters. Erdoğan's personal charisma

as a leader is indicated in the half of the interviews that are made with the AKP voters. This case also presents a picture that can be evaluated in terms of the new political behavior which argues the importance of candidates and leaders in the decision of voting.

(61, secondary school, retired artisan, M): I have voted for Demirel from the Justice Party. And then I have voted for ANAP just because of Özal's successful performance. After Özal, I did not vote for ANAP. In the last elections at 2002, I voted for AKP because of Tayyip Erdoğan.

(27, university, artisan, M): I voted for AKP in the last elections. To date, I have admired ANAP because of Turgut Özal. I think he is the greatest loss of this country. After Özal's presidency, ANAP has lost all its popularity. For 5-6 years, I have not supported a specific party. Maybe some people do not know the chief of the party in Tire, but still they support the party like a football team.

(30, lycee, laborer, M): I have voted for ANAP. I appreciated ANAP's, especially Özal's mission. In the last elections, I really appreciated our prime minister's services in Istanbul. I have believed that such a person can govern our country.

The AKP is identified by all of its supporters as a center-right party rather than an Islamist party. Apart from these respondents, the voters who declared their preferences for the True Path Party in previous election also emphasized the AKP's identification in a similar manner. The social base of Justice and Development Party in Tire seems to be more centrist rather than a marginal Islamist. AKP's victory must be evaluated as the success of AKP's emphasis on Conservative-Liberal synthesis rather than the rise of Islamist tendencies. That is to say, people who vote for AKP identified themselves as centrist in their political choice, and emphasized their distance from marginalist politics.

(27, university, artisan, M)- I voted for Erdoğan's conservative personality. I mean he is not a marginal leftist or marginal rightist as Erbakan. Honestly, I am not a leftist or rightist, I am in a middle way. In this mean, he resembles me. He is on the centre.

(61, secondary school, retired artisan, M)-I am a Muslim. I try to fulfill my duties. But I am not an extremist. This is my religiosity. I prefer everything's middle point. I can not tolerate extremities.

(42, high school, retired soldier, M)- I think the Felicity Party is distinct from AKP. Erbakan and Kutan are extremist .Anyhow they are in a similar manner, Erdoğan and his team did not found a different party.

Beside these interviews that emphasized the declining role of partisanship among AKP voters, CHP seemed as a “frozen party” in Tire. 3/4 of CHP supporters presented a continuity considering the preferences in pre-elections. However, party identification seems to play a vital role among less educated and older voters. Nearly all of these voters, with AP-CHP cleavage references, composed a kind of “guaranteed-loyal voter base” for CHP. They declared their preferences in previous elections and even in next elections as CHP.

(70, University, retired teacher, M): I had some experiences like a jungle law when I was 15-16 years old. There was a persecution of tax collection. There was discrimination between officials and people. Favoritism has experimented in the years of absence. I have participated the DP's campaigns. And I thought that DP as the poor people's party (Yalınayaklıların-baldırıçıplakların partisi). However, in 1953, I entered CHP because I thought that DP has changed its mentality. By the leadership of Kasım Gülek, the real populism has appeared in CHP. From this time, I have always voted for CHP and I have worked for CHP

(65, Secondary School, artisan, M): I always vote for CHP because of Atatürk and İnönü who are the founders of this party. The era of Atatürk and İnönü is the best era that Turkey has experienced. ...

(47, primary school, artisan, M): I vote for CHP for Atatürk and his principles. I also accentuate social justice because of this fact I vote and I will vote for CHP.

(72, primary school, farmer, M): Everybody knows that I support CHP. I have never altered my party. I admire Atatürk and I will always admire that man.

Among well-educated and young CHP supporters, it is noteworthy to state the declining role of party attachments. Nearly half of these respondents stated a degree of disappointment with CHP's performance in a multi-party setting and complaints about the corruption of politics. The unsatissfaction toward the party system and parties is more apparent among these well-educated and young CHP voters. Nearly all of these well educated and relatively young CHP supporters' preferences are concentrated among leftist parties in the previous elections.

(41, university, lawyer, M): I am not anthipathic to CHP. I have regret on my decision of my vote for CHP. In the 1999 elections, I voted for ÖDP. In the last elections, I really did not cast a ballot but I have just been married and my wife- I think with a really nonsense view- pressed me to vote for CHP because of AKP's potential victory. One vote is not so important among millions, but I vote. I have observed that all my family cast their votes for the mass parties like CHP or DSP having such a mentality.

(42, university, pharmacist, M): I have voted for CHP for years, but I do not feel comfortable. Actually, there are alternatives especially on the left of the political spectrum, and in the previous elections I have voted for them. However, CHP has a strong tradition and is the main part of the republic. CHP is integrated with the republic of Turkey. But today, AKP placed itself on where CHP would stand. We have all struggled for a democratic university for years, but today CHP is the main defender of YÖK. I think it is an interesting case.

(36, university, doctor, M) I always vote for CHP, for social democrats. But I do not feel very comfortable. In this country, Deniz Baykal had Rockefeller scholarship and his daughter became a U.S.A citizen. Baykal said that Turkey will be transformed to a person-centered state from a holy state, and Turkey became a globalize state. I am a nationalist, but after all I vote for CHP with regret.

Counter to the general expectations, DSP voter seems to preserve their political preference in the Tire case. Despite the inadequate data, two interviews show continuity between two elections on 1999 and 2002.

Among MHP and DYP supporters, party attachments seem to preserve their importance. Contrary to MHP, more than half interviews of DYP supporters indicate older and a relatively uneducated profile. Among these supporters, party identification still had an importance in the way of determining voter preferences. Emphasis on AP-CHP cleavage still is an important reference point in political identification perceptions.

(64, lycee, retired officer, M) Our ancestors are 46 democrat, we all admire Menderes. Demirel, AP, DYP are perpetuations of 46 democrats .It goes on...

(60, lycee, artisan, M) It remained from my father. My father always supported the Democrat Party. Also my grandfather was a chief of district organization of DP. I have continued like them. I do not alter my party even in doomsday. It is my rule to the day I die. I am working for this party for 40 years. I do not vote for any party except DYP.

All of the interviews made with MHP voters in Tire signify a distinct case as a relatively educated and young profile. Despite the continuity in voting patterns, a more criticized view of political parties and the system is accompanied with voting preferences. Emphasis on the deficit of the differences between political parties and distrust towards the political system made us think that partisanship is the most important clue in determining the party to vote for, among MHP voters.

(38, University, Lawyer, M) I voted for MHP because it is proper to my world view. MHP can not solve today's problems, but after all I always vote for MHP. I became a member of MHP in 1994.

(40, university, teacher, W) I did not alter my party; I voted for MHP again despite its low chance to become the government because I did not see any differences between parties. I think there is a party problem in Turkey. The solution is-I think- education.

Beside the declining role of the political parties, these interviews underlined the fact that partisan loyalty has already lost its “clue-giving” characteristic about the direction of vote in elections. If the main motivations of voters moved from partisanship that provides a “perceptual screen”, which is a valuable cue in developing one’s own position, then what determines the direction of voting?

As expected, the older and relatively less educated voters of CHP and the voters of MHP do not differentiate their preferences between local and general elections. More than half of the MHP voters and all older- less educated CHP voters emphasized the importance of local elections in the way of effecting general elections. This also can be seen as evidence of strong partisan attachments among these supporters because of the vote-splitting thesis. According to Dalton, dividing the votes between parties within the same election – vote splitting - is evidence of partisan dealignment, and in advanced industrial democracies, voters are now more likely to divide their ballots among different parties.³⁹⁸

(57, retired teacher, University, M) I always vote for my own party, even in local elections. It seems wrong, but I do not alter my vote in local elections because the results of local elections also effect nation-wide elections, and the undecided voters.

(47, primary school, artisan, M) My criteria are not differentiated. I have no other criteria. For example, one of our municipality candidates is a social democrat, but he is from ANAP. I did not vote for him .I think it is not virtuous.

(30, University, Builder, M): I have a standard criteria, I vote for my party in every election whether It is local or nation-wide. Some pay attention to the candidate in local elections. But I think it is a wrong mentality which some parties that people-liked candidates have applied. But the local elections had a

³⁹⁸ Dalton,Russell J; Mc Allister, Ian and Martin Wattenberg. (2002). “The Consequences of Partisan Dealignment” in *Parties without Partisans* ed.by. Dalton and Wattenberg, Oxford University Press:Oxford,p..37-64

significant place in Turkey's election map. For example, Schröder resigned from duty because of his failure in local elections.

On the contrary, three quarters of interviews have emphasized the importance of the candidate in local elections. The role of politicians themselves in affecting electoral outcomes in local elections is a factor that has drawn considerably attention. According to Dalton, as partisanship in the electorate has weakened, it stands to reason that voters would have to substitute other factors in their decision making process.³⁹⁹ In Tire, especially in local elections, “candidate-centered preferences” is an important factor that affects the election outcome. Not just having a similar ideological stand but also the personality of a candidate is an important determinant in one's decision about the direction of the vote. It should be added that the possibilities of having direct information about a candidate is much more simple in small districts like Tire, compared with cities. A candidate-centered voting decision in local elections is much more accentuated among more than half of the relatively young and especially highly educated respondents.

(39, Teacher, University, W): I decide the direction of my vote according to the candidate's personality in local elections. The ideological background of the candidate is not so important. If he is trustworthy, I vote for him. I am against the ideological preferences in local elections.

(44, Lycee, Farmer, M) In local elections, I decided the direction of vote considering the personality and the possible performance of the candidate. Here, everybody knows each other. One votes for a person who is reliable in local elections

(40, University, pharmacist, M): Local elections can be different. As a district, we all know each other, all candidates in the list. So, you can decide according to candidate's vision. For example, in previous local elections, I have voted for a candidate whose party is not very proper to me. I think it is an advantage.

(56, University, accountant, M) Local elections are different. We all know each other here. Whatever his party, I decided according to their personality.

It is noteworthy that a quarter of the interviews has emphasized the importance of social networks, family tradition and personal relations that still preserve their

³⁹⁹Dalton, Russell J. (2002). “Decline of Party Identifications” in *Parties without Partisans* ed. by Dalton and Wattenberg, Oxford University Press: Oxford, p.25.

importance in determining the direction of the voting behavior. Beside the facilities of providing knowledge, and the respondents' relatively high education levels, it must be mentioned that these traditionalist voting patterns still continue among less than ¼ of voters.

(30, secretary, Lycee, W): I have voted for DYP because of my brother in law. He is interested in politics and he requested me whether I can vote for DYP or not.

(21, secretary, Lycee, W): My father is leftist and he always votes for CHP. I have never voted yet, but I think in the next elections, I will vote for CHP because of my family

(55, lycee, retired official, M) – I voted for AKP in previous elections because its candidate is my relative. In general elections, I voted for DYP, but in local I did not vote for DYP and I even did not make my relatives vote for DYP. I have 25-30 votes, my relatives do whatever I want. They always ask me about the party which they vote for. In local elections, we voted for AKP.

The picture that interviews in Tire present affirms Dalton's cognitive mobilization thesis. According to Dalton, the expansion of education and the growing availability of political information increased voter's political skills and resources.⁴⁰⁰ This has decreased the functional need for partisanship by increasing voter's political sophistication. In determining the direction of the vote, the media also functions in a vital role. The mass media are assuming many of the information functions that political parties once controlled. The mass media became the primary sources of campaign information. The interviews in Tire stated the importance of the media especially during the pre-election process in the way of gathering information about parties and party programmes.

(27, University, artisan, M) –Especially, I try to watch news about, not the classic ones like accidents, but the actual events. For example, nowadays, I try to watch events in Hakkari, news about the European Union.

(56, University, accountant, M) I read three newspapers regularly per a day. I watch Kanaltürk, Ulusalkanal and the programme called Ceviz Kabuğu. For 40 years, I have followed political publications.

(50, University, laborant, M) -In the past, parties are supported like football teams. Nearly for 10-15 years, this is not the fact. Especially in local elections, with high education and the mass media, people moved away from strong

⁴⁰⁰ Dalton , 2002, p.27.

partisanship. We are directed by mass media, and we vote for a party which the media directs us. At the Election Day, people can change their mind about their decisions.

The interviews above also underlined a “trial and error type” of voting pattern throughout the last decade. According to Açıkel, the main reason of this strategy is a degree of disappointment with parties’ performance in a multi-party setting.⁴⁰¹ The interviews also emphasized this kind of disappointment with the party system. Half of the respondents stated their disappointment about parties and clientelist networks that parties supply.

(44, Lycee, Farmer, M) - I think there is no party or leader in the political system. I expect nothing from this system. Also, Tayyip Erdoğan is not as expected.

(31, University, Secretary, W) There are no parties in the system that can solve Turkey’s problems. I voted for CHP, but I think even CHP is insufficient.

(30, Lycee, Secretary, W)-Frankly speaking, I have no positive idea about parties in the system. I distrust parties. They claim that they will solve the problems, but when they are in power, problems continue.

(65, Secondary School, artisan, M) The youths are obstructed. Why? One works for a party even if he has a benefit, for example, finding a job for his son or his relatives. They all get old but they do not give up.

(41, university, lawyer, M) I think that one lost his honesty in politics because of the aim of getting votes. Ten years ago, there was a congress ion of CHP. When I have met a deputy, there were 15-20 people in his office. Instead of talking about congress and the actual problems, there were tragic dialogues about requesting a job, etc. That politician couldn’t show them the door. What are all the deputies that we elected, doing? They endeavor in such kinds of daily problems.

As the concept of new political behavior puts, evidences in Western democracies signaled a declining role of party attachments and partisan loyalties. In the Tire case, it is important to emphasize that especially among AKP voters and relatively young high educated strata, the declining role of party attachments can be easily observed. As a consequence of diminishing party attachments, leadership and candidate-centered preferences in local elections have gained importance in determining the direction of the vote, especially among AKP voters and high educated strata proper to the concept of new political behavior. The media also

⁴⁰¹ Açıkel,2003, p.186.

plays a vital role in determining the direction of the vote. Individuals seem to gather their own information about the system and the parties by media or personal channels rather than parties.

4.3.4 The Social Cleavages in Tire: Emergence of the Post Material Agenda

TABLE 7: Party Choice in Tire

Parties	40 Interviewees
AKP	14
CHP	13
DYP	5
MHP	3
DSP	2
ANAP	1
OTHERS	2

Social cleavages, as I mentioned in the first chapter, were so powerful for determining the direction of the vote. With the low dimensional nature of ideological spaces in modern democracies⁴⁰², the first and dominant dimension is the secularist vs. pro-Islamist cleavage, which largely overlaps with the centre-periphery formations in Turkish politics. The fact that all of the CHP voters put parties with religious tendencies as those who they will never cast a vote for is so significant. These pro-secularist respondents tend to be in relatively high socio-economic groups with their educational and professional backgrounds. This fact is noteworthy in the means of analyzing overlaps with the centre-periphery formulations. AKP has seemed to be engaged in dissimulation that would bring back in Turkey to a state based on Islam.

(31, University, Secretary, W) Will never vote for parties like AKP and SP. Actually, I feel myself close to DSP. DSP is more nationalist. I am not fascist but I love my country. I do not affirm the humiliation of my country. Ecevit seems a bit more nationalist. If there will be a party that can challenge AKP, I can vote for it. I think AKP is not what it seems. They have some other aims, and it is a really risk in front of the modernization project.

⁴⁰² Çarkoğlu, Ali. (1998). "The Turkish Party System in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change", *Political Studies*, XLVI, p.544-571.

(47, Secondary School, Retired Laborer, W) I will never vote for AKP and Saadet even in doom time because they are reactionaries.

(36, Lycee, Housewife, W) I never vote for Erbakan, Kutan and also Erdoğan because they are not honest in their discourse. They pretend to be democrat, but they aren't.

(56, University, Accountant, M) The people in DYP, ANAP passed to AKP in the last elections. They are all same. DYP couldn't give true messages to society. Democrat party mentality continues in AKP in Tire. It is not so interesting. It is not an Islamic mentality. ANAP is a bit different with social democrat members. But nation-wide, I think AKP is not what it seems. In this sense, I never vote for AKP.

It is noteworthy that nearly half of the CHP voters have stated AKP's ideological position as different from SP or RP as a more centrist point. It can be evidence of the AKP's success of the construction of its self-identification as conservative-democrat.

(52, University, Veterinary, M) I do not vote for Erbakan. I do not vote for a party which disposes religion as a political vehicle. I am against tarikats but they lead the country. I am a Turk and Muslim, and I live with this identity.

(35, Lycee, artisan, M) I do not like marginal people, I never vote for Felicity party. I want people to be more brilliant. I don't want people to lick Türbe's walls. I think it is not a religion, but a psychological problem. I never vote for a conservatist party for example reactionaries. Dividing the society into Muslims and others is very wrong.

The second dimension is based on nationalism cleavage which is defined largely in opposition to ethnic Kurdish identity among centre right and right voters. Contrary to expectations, those who assert that they voted for right and centre right parties as well as those who do not state centre-left parties as the parties for which they will not cast a vote. DEHAP appeared as a party for which half of those voters will never vote.

(30, University, Builder, M) AKP is more professional than RP. The first stages were achieved in RP; in FP, this stand was ripped. The people have fulfilled their education and became professionals. Their point of view is very liberal, but its establishers have an Islamic background. In mentality, nothing has changed. I think it is natural. For these people, being liberals in one night is impossible. I can vote for AKP, but never for DEHAP.

(30, lycee, laborer, M): I will never vote for DEHAP. Everybody knows that its mission is to separate the country.

(38, University, Lawyer, M) I will never vote for DEHAP, because I think their aim is to split the country.

(35, Lycee, artisan, M) I do not see DEHAP as a party. Among the other parties like ANAP, DYP, CHP, MHP, SP, there are no parties that I will not vote for.

The most striking point that deserves attention is that ¾ of AKP voters signified that they can cast a vote for any party from every point of ideological spectrum. This fact supports the dominant question in this electoral research to explain whether there is a persistence of established patterns among AKP voters. It can be an evidence of a new electoral behavior which one of the main concepts is dealignment thesis.

(60, lycee, artisan, M) There is no party that I will never vote for. I read newspapers. If I like it, I can vote for any party. I have no strict ideological point. For example, I have read in newspapers about Doğu Perinçek and I appreciated it. I can vote even for Doğu Perinçek, why not?

(27, university, artisan, M): - There is no party that I will never vote for. The importance is in my belief of the ideas. Actually, I do not think to vote for DEHAP, but if a really good one becomes a leader than I can even vote for DEHAP.

(55, secondary school, artisan, M) I do not have such an obsession for any party. Everything can change by the time. It is beneficial not having a bias.

The most important cases which reflect the main tendencies among the voters are Sheria, Türban and the European Union cases. The rising nationalist and secularist tendencies can be easily observed in these cases. With a great compromise, the question about the Sheria has been negatively responded to by all respondents. The respondents with different voting preferences have strongly rejected the idea of Sheria as a political system.

(30, University, Builder, M) What does Sheria mean? It means the Islamic law system. What does it contend? It is the system which all Muslims must obey. I do not obey; I am a sinful. But the point is, we had a state which we established in these lands and our state has a system. We must accord with this system. If we are not happy in this country, then we must go to the countries we can be happy. But I am happy in my country.

(30, lycee, laborer, M) You know, Turkey is a secular country and it is nonsense to establish a state of sheria. At least our army confronts it. All people are free for their religion, but at the same time they must obey their countries' rule.

(27, university, artisan, M): I do not think that we will be a state of sheria. I am respectful of all people's ideas, but one's freedom finishes where another's freedom starts.

(55, lycee, retired official, M)- I do not believe that Turkey can be managed by Sheria. Actually, these polemics continue even after 20 years. Maybe not this case, but surely another polemic will be discussed.

(55, secondary school, artisan, M)- I am a Muslim and I try to fulfill my duties. But Sheria means superstition. We do not read the real Kur'an, and we begin to believe superstitions. I want to give an example from Australia. Everybody can believe any religion that he wants. There must have such a freedom. There are some differences in the Kur'an, and they are kept secret from us.

(31, University, Secretary, W) Actually, I don't think that Turkey can be governed by Sheria. I think that this government is also temporary. Everything has a process; in this sense, every party shows this kind of victories and then it failures. But we must discuss, we must defend laicism because they deceived some people easily. Especially my family is religious, but not marginal. My mother wears a head scarf, but my family does not intervene on our practices.

(52, University, Veterinary, M) I do not believe anything except Kuran. Islam is what Koran defines. There is Koran, do we need anything else? If you are a Muslim, live like Koran describes. There is no need of Sheria.

(44, Lycee, Farmer, M) There is nothing to discuss. Consider Iran, and then discuss it. Say impossible and then pass it.

(39, Teacher, University, W) It is not possible. State pays all imams' payment. Everybody is free for their beliefs. Tarikats are all nonsense. To kill a man in the name of a religion is all nonsense.

Among all these cases, Türban is the most debated issue with all its concepts. This acid-test-like issue has given strict evidence about respondent's political stand. More than half of the respondents who vote for centre- right parties and AKP, have emphasized freedom in the case of Türban using liberal arguments.

(30, lycee, laborer, M)My personal opinion is that, there is discrimination about the turban issue. If a non-veiling person enters to the university, a veiled person should enter too. Since we are talking about freedom, I think the rule must be like this.

(55, secondary school, artisan, M) I am totally against discrimination. For instance, what makes me uneasy is the turban issue. There (Australia) I witnessed, in universities women wearing headscarves are free; everybody can live according to their traditions. The Australian educational system does not limit freedom of women wearing headscarves. Malaysian girls have different entrances to the school. Not for separation, for their request. While they enter into their classes, a disorder occurs and they contact each other. They said they were uncomfortable with the situation, and the school accepted. They showed another entrance and show toleration to the girls. I am uncomfortable because I do not see this toleration here (in Turkey). For example if somebody wears headscarves, it is their personal choice and she can wear it. Moreover I am against this public

sphere. Why? Why do they make such a distinction? I am against it. I think Australia is more secular than Turkey.

(42, Lycee, Retired Soldier, M). For me, it must be free. OK. I am military personnel. I am retired. Since we are talking about freedom, no body interferes – not to say bikini- but improper clothes. I am not conservative but in university there is no clothing thing is there? Here, there is a two-year academy, in which students were living marginally. Turbanist! Can wear and go. Anyway, she wears it as far as she came to the door, then wear wig. But I am against it in state offices. Tax officer or banker should not wear. I do not approve it. Students can, it is appropriate for university environment, is university not an environment for freedom?

(61, Lycee, Artisan, M) Everybody should live according to his beliefs. If we respect an atheist, we should respect people wearing a turban. In this sense, I denounce this, and also I find these discussions strange.

Some interviewees discuss the Türban issue focusing on the public issue debate. One of the artisans emphasizes the using of religion as a political issue, and states that he is against the fact that using a Türban is a political action tool.

(35, Lycee, artisan, M)- It is personal. For the Turban issue, as I said before, it is very easy to solve this problem. You should make it free everywhere, in state offices and in universities. The only thing you should prevent is this: political action, If he/she makes politics using religion, you have to prevent it. Otherwise, leave alone what she wants to wear. In Europe and in America, wearing turban is not a problem, nobody intervenes on it. When we will enter to the European Union, the turban discussions will be eliminated. This problem will be solved. At least we shall not deal with it. Leave people's clothing styles as they wish. Their personal ideas, they are conservatives and more religious, they want to dress conservatively. Let them dress how they like. Let me give another example: she is also Muslim, but she wants to wear more sportive clothes, she wants to wear skirts and does not want to veil. Let her wear what she wants. But we should notice that: we should not separate this. If state officer is veiled, let her work like that. What is important is her efficiency. If she wants to wear skirt or pants, let her work like that

(30, Lycee, Secretary, W) People should not be repressed because of the turban issue. But how can I say, while entering some places there should not be many difficulties. In universities, I think it should not be. I heard about some oppression. I do not know, because I do not face it but I think in universities there should not be headscarves, but outside people should not be oppressed. I am a more conservative person. I think public sphere should be described more narrowly and university students should wear turban.

As expected, the wearing of Türban is strongly confronted by respondents who supported centre-left parties. But the most striking point is the compromise between supporters of CHP and supporters of MHP on the statist tendencies.

Besides the laicist arguments, nationalist and especially statist jargon is commonly used by these respondents. Nearly all of these respondents stated Trban as a political symbol using by anti-system forces.

(52, Veterenian, University, M)- Now, why turban is the issue but nobody interferes people who are not wearing headscarves? I am against the turban because it is a symbol. The symbol of Turkish Republic is the flag of Turkish Republic. My mother is veiled but she does not know turban. They pull her in today if they believe in heart, she veils her face, and she cares about not showing her face. Today which one is more exaggerating the women with turban or with headscarf? Let us look materially, economically and socially: simple citizens that wear headscarves, simple people, and the people those who believe in their heart, but do not give harm to anybody. I believe that every woman wearing a turban and every man who lives behind a religious identity is harmful to Turkish Republic.

(21, University, Secretary, W) Turban, for me, is senseless. I mean, not for people who wear it – it is their choice- but I think about education. There are a lot of discussions and people think as if there is discrimination, but I do not think like that. I think everybody should obey the rules.

(30, University, Builder, M) My point of view about turban is this: First of all, I adhere democracy and freedom. When we were studying in the university, some women were wearing clothes that could attract the opposite sex. These people were never criticized, because of their clothing style; university administration never warned them or dismissed them. The same practice should be done for everyone. Everybody should be free to wear what he/she wants. But at the point these people oppose the existing state order or the unchangeable principles of the constitution, they should be prevented. Freedom... no freedom is without limits.

(72, primary school, farmer, M)- I am against the turban. They are our religious brothers, but in them there are radicals. I mean I am not with them. It is not good to be radical in every issue. State gives permission, but as our prime minister said, both women with and without turban are our citizens.

However, the Trban issue can be thought in the names of identity politics that is a main figure in post-material agenda. Considering the Islamist groups' campaigning, especially for women university students, it effectively functioned as a symbol of identity which is justified by democratic principles and human rights arguments. Concentrating on the Muslim Identity and Trban as a symbol of this identity, it can be thought that the post-material agenda began to dominate Turkish political scene in the means of identity politics.

One of the most important issues of the political agenda of the respondents is the European Union. Nearly $\frac{3}{4}$ of respondents have stated their concerns about the interventions of EU and the compensations, especially about Cyprus and Armenian genocide. It is noteworthy that the increasing nationalist tendencies can be observed once again in all interviews, from all ideological points of political spectrum. The most emphasized issue about EU discussions is the conditions that EU puts.

(30, lycee, laborer, M) If EU will be under the conditions that we want, it is good. But we all confront with the conditions that humiliated us, like a new Kurdish state, Armenian genocide etc. It is difficult to be a member of EU under these conditions. I am against being under these conditions, and I am sure many people feel like me.

(30, Lycee, Secretary, W)...- Actually, I do not think in a good manner about the EU. Under these conditions, it won't be beneficial for Turkey. If we enter, it can be good, but people are nationalist nowadays, and it can not be possible to enter under these conditions.

(31, University, Secretary, W) European Union is good, but I do not like actual the conditions. EU intervenes to lots of things from country's internal decisions to its economic structure .Of course, I do not object to the interventions to production styles or health issues. It is good for our living standards. But it makes me uncomfortable that EU intervenes into everything. But if we have the same conditions like other countries, it can be desired for Turkey.

As a part of identity politics, many responses emphasize the Islam-Christianity difference as a main obstacle in front of Turkey's membership to the EU.

(59, Primary School, Artisan, M) If this process will be under the same conditions that applied to other countries, then it can be good. But we must be careful about compromises like Kıbrıs and Armenian genocide. They treat us in a different manner, because Turkey is a Muslim country.

(60, Lycee, Retired Officer, M) - EU never adjusts our conditions. One is Muslim, and another is Christian. You must choose between Islam and EU. The authority of police and armed forces are taken from them because of this process. It creates anarchy. I do not support this process.

It is noteworthy that the increasing nationalist tendencies can be observed once again in all interviews from all ideological points of political spectrum.

(56, University, Accountant, M)- I think that nations must be fully independent. First of all, I want my country to stand on independently. It can be a good motivation for our modernization project, but why do we depend on them? Lets

make our nation independent once; adjust our social and economic life and then we will cooperate with the EU. EU must be the last point of our plans. I support full independency. It is my thought.

(70, retired teacher, university, M) I think Europe's point of view about us is negative. They try to destroy our national entity with some compromises. It is non-acceptable. I am committed to Atatürk's principles. Here, the thing that is wanted to apply is Sevr.

Considering with the negative tendencies to the DEHAP as a reflection of the Kurdish issue, the European Union case also can be evaluated as a part of identity politics by its emphasis on minorities and religion differences. Rising nationalism is also an evidence of this just occurring phenomenon.

The one more thing that must be paid attention to is the vertical understanding and perceptions of the supporters of CHP about even more local political issues. Significantly, relatively educated supporters of CHP have analyzed the issues below with more universalistic understanding and references can be evaluated as an elitist and centrist tendency of CHP's support base.

(40, University, lawyer, M): I think all of these discussions are artificial. In this period, the cashboxes of the state were robbing, and to attract the society's attendance to another way, it has shown that thirty men will change Turkey's system. I think the media behaves different; it shows what has benefits. The real events are still secret. Aczimendi, Hizbullah were exaggerated by the media. Okay, they can be dangerous, but for many days, these things have been showed to us on televisions and in newspapers and after that, all banks were made empty. We went to the theatre and the thieves robbed our house. This is the case.

(40, University, pharmacist, M)- First of all, it is necessary to discuss European civilization. Are they really civilized or not? Are they civilized to itself only or not? It is an important concept. For example, they could not approve EU's constitution. And still they could not approve their currency. A very dangerous tendency in Europe appears nowadays. Policies toward minorities... Europe is democratic to itself. They are not so civilized to countries such as us. We do have a need to depend on them. We are not successful about diplomacy. But I am not against the EU. We just need more details. EU is a good motivation for us, for human rights, social securities. But I believe that we won't be a member of the EU. They do not permit for our membership, because we have a population of 70 million and it is a huge number, considering the representation proportion of member countries. Secondly, if we enter EU, Europe will have neighbors such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. It is a really important problem. Thirdly, there are 70 million hungry people in Turkey, who are waiting for engaging to Europe.

(50, University, Labourant, M) The Turban issue brings a potential that can easily be manipulated for political reasons. If they want they can solve it. In this country what is not solved? They have the power of manipulating society by using the media. Who owns the media? They own it. The media is not my media, they own the media, and they manipulate society. One day you look and see Shock, shock, shock, what happened? Ali Kalkancı did this and that. I live in the east, and in the east in every district there is a sheikh. Aczmendis, they are living in Elaziğ, they do not work, their followers took their foods, they just pray and do nothing. They have such an order. State officers know them, they know all of them, One day, something happened and they walked to Ankara, they came to the middle of Güvenpark. After that, they came to Istanbul. We are watching TV and it looks like they are everywhere. Whereas, they are just 25 people. All of these happened before 28 February; people thought that all around the country there are these people. People got feared.

(40, University, pharmacist, M): An era came after the military coup of 12 September. Then, you know, there was the Green Belt project in the world agenda and these are the products of this Green Belt project. This is the imposing of a moderate Islam instead of a leftist point of view. Naturally, people are grown in such an atmosphere. On religion, of course I am respectful, I think. I know Islamic imperatives for veiling. OK. This is a belief, and there is such a thing. We can not deny it; there is a concept named headscarf in Islam. However, there is a democratic and secular structure. Public sphere... these concepts were created afterwards. I do not understand this. That is the point: here the good will of the people should be looked at. If people want to wear (headscarf) because of their belief, I think, they should wear it, not only in public sphere but anywhere. But if they use it as a symbol, as an ensign, moreover if they use it as a tool to shake the table –the system- it should be interfered with. Since democracies need some intervention, it must be done. If we want to live in a democratic environment, we must prevent the interventions to us, harmful interventions against democracy. This must not be reduced to religion. I think this is a massive struggle; I mean the turban issue became a massive issue in Turkey. My mother is also wearing a headscarf, but she has never got such a sentiment, I know it or her friends, sisters etc.

One of the important components of the concept “new political behavior” is the increasing effect of new issues such as gender issues, environment, etc. Such a political agenda can not be stated among voters in Tire. Gender issues and environmental politics are far way from dominating political agenda in Tire. The most important issues are declared as unemployment and economy as proper to the classical political agenda. The risk of separation is seen as a main problem of Turkey among ¼ of respondents proper to the rising nationalist tendencies.

(56, University, Accountant, M) The most important problem of Turkey is the risk of separation and ethnic discrimination. Turkey is a mosaic. There are people in

Turkey from many ethnic roots. We can not separate them. If we live in good conditions, we all do. If we develop, we all do. I care about a whole development project with all citizens.

(30, University, Builder, M) The most important problem of Turkey is the formation of a state which we never want. This problem can be prevented by only the MHP. This solution can be legal or illegal for the being of a country. If they will be caught, they must obey the laws.

(30, Lycee, Laborer, M) The most important problems of the country are unemployment and terror. Terror is associated with unemployment. When there is no investment on south east, people are forced to be in terror.

As proper to the classical political agenda, economical issues, especially unemployment and debts, are commonly emphasized by the interviewees.

(42, Lycee, Retired Soldier, M) -Unemployment is the greatest problem. Even the young people who are educated from Universities are unemployed. I went to Hilton for an exam of a firm. There were many young people, educated from a university despite the low-wage suggestion of the firm.

(35, Lycee, artisan, M) The most important problem of the country is debts. During the previous governments, the fiscal discipline couldn't be formed. This debt system created more problems. You can not form fiscal discipline. Every month you spent 800 million, although your income is 600 million. This government seems successful at least preventing graft.

To conclude, the social cleavages such as nationalist and religious cleavages rather than left/right cleavages that shape the voters' party preferences still are effective determinants of voting behavior in Tire. However, the rising of identity politics among respondents can be evaluated as an occurrence of the post material agenda as proper to the concept of new political behavior. Despite the rising of identity politics, gender and environment issues are still outside of the political agenda of the respondents. Traditional issues such as economy and unemployment are stated as a main problem of Turkey by all of the respondents.

CONCLUSION

In this study, I have attempted to evaluate the consequences of the 3 November 2002 elections in the point of the concept “new political behavior”, which includes the facts of the decreasing importance of party attachments, the rising significance of the post-material agenda, the decreasing role of the cleavages as the determination of the voting behavior, the decreasing importance of voting as a political behavior and the decreasing of the micro-sociological factors as an explanatory model for the voting behavior. This has been investigated by an empirical study with 40 voters in city of Tire, which is a district in İzmir. Here, I aim to emphasize the main findings that form the basis of this study. The table which aims to show the applicability of the concept “new political behavior” is demonstrated below.

An overall conclusion is that, although the main components of the new political behavior have become apparent among Turkish voters, it is difficult to mention a total break among Turkish voters in the sense of the voting patterns. In this respect, this study has explored that the new political behavior is a “just occurring phenomena” among Turkish voters. There are some differences between Turkey and advanced industrial democracies in which the concept of new political behavior is theorized, but the similarities are more crucial than the differences.

As I mentioned, the questions are categorized under three headings such as political behavior patterns, the determinants of voting behavior, and party identification and the cleavages that voting preferences are based on. Firstly, as a determinant of political behavior, education has a great impact on the participation in the political events, because of the facilities of having more political knowledge. All of the interviews which are made with highly educated individuals correct the pattern that the more educated individual is more likely to follow politics. The most striking pattern is the low-participation of highly educated individuals to the party politics. Participation to party politics as a “gladiator

activity” is much more preferred by relatively low educated people. The decrease of the participation to the party politics is an important fact in most advanced industrial societies, so it is in the concept of “new political behavior”. But rather than an emergence of new participatory repertoire, highly educated people seem to be staying away from every kind of participatory ways. Income as a variation of political participation has little explanatory power compared with education, but income seems to be related not with the amount of participation but with the more active participatory ways, such as party politics. Gender seems to create a difference in the participatory acts, but it is noteworthy that among the upper-middle strata, sex difference has disappeared among men and women in the means of political participation, such as following political discussions and being a member of a civil society organization because of the increasing rates of education among women. Education seems to be a main factor that affects the amount of political participation. The most ineffective factor seems to be age, whether as a linear or a U-shaped relation between age and political participation. Contrary to the “new political behavior concept”, citizens are still participating in politics by the institutionalized methods of political participation. However, among the relatively highly educated strata, the traditional ways of political participation, especially party politics, is not a popular way in the means of participating in the politics. But this stratum is not turning to the methods of direct democracy such as new political behavior agenda presumes.

Voting behavior is one of the main themes that the “new political behavior” focuses on. According to this concept, participation in political parties and electoral politics is decreasing. But the research in Türe indicates that voting is still the most important form of participation among citizens. The micro-sociological factors that are argued to effect the voting behavior seems to be ineffective in the understanding of the participation in the elections. The frequency of the voting behavior does not change in different socio-economic groups. However, the most important point that deserves attention is the continuation of voting, despite the bad image of political parties. The citizen duty is the main motivation of voting behavior in different socio-economic groups, contrary to the common belief that

emphasizes the importance of citizen duty motivation among the high socio-economic status. Non-voting, should be evaluated as a signal of protest and cynicism toward the political system, but not as an indicator of political apathy contrary to the main arguments that state non-voting is a signal of political apathy.

Thirdly, the dealignment thesis that emphasizes the declining role of the political parties in determining the direction of the vote is an important aspect of the “new political behavior.” As this study has shown, especially among AKP voters, this tendency has become apparent. Regardless of their socio-economic status, nearly all AKP supporters have declared that they do not consider partisanship as if it is the football team advocacy. The CHP voters’ main attention in terms of dealignment thesis depends much more on the socio-demographic features of the voters. The younger and well-educated strata are more likely to change their vote in every election. It is noteworthy that the role of party attachments in determining the direction of the vote is decreasing. However, among less educated and older voters, the role of party attachments still preserves its importance. The MHP and DYP voters’ main attention in terms of party attachments are more similar to those older and less educated CHP voters. The emphasis on CHP-DP cleavage is still an important reference point among older CHP and DYP voters. As the concept “new political behavior” states, as partisanship in the electorate weakened, the role of candidates and leaders increased in determining the direction of the vote. In a parallel manner, leadership is the main motivation of AKP voters in determining the direction of their vote as proper to the new political behavior agenda. They have explained the reason behind their party preference at the 2002 elections as the leadership of Erdoğan and a general trust to the management mentality, especially his practice as chair person of municipality in Istanbul. Also, among highly educated and relatively young strata, a candidate-centered voting decision in local elections is much more accentuated by providing much more direct information about the candidate. This picture affirms the term cognitive mobilization that the concept of “new political behavior” introduces. The interviews in Tire also indicate the significance of media, especially during

the pre-election period in the means of gathering information about the parties' programs.

Social cleavages are the main determinants of voting behavior in conventional behavioral approach⁴⁰³. However, one of the significant contributions of the concept of “new political behavior” is its emphasis on the declining role of the social cleavages in determining the direction of the vote. Secularist/pro Islamist cleavage has the explanatory power in the direction of the vote among CHP voters. They have grasped the fact that they will never vote for pro-Islamist parties. However, despite their strong self-identifications as secularists, AKP is not seen as a pro-Islamist party by half of the CHP supporters. Considering the AKP's identification as a center-right party rather than an Islamist party by the supporters of AKP, the AKP's emphasis on conservative-democrat synthesis seemed to have succeeded. Rather than left/right cleavage, nationalist tendencies are much stronger among the supporters of DYP and MHP. They have not stated the centre-left parties as the parties they will never vote for. However, the DEHAP appeared as a party those voters will never vote for. But the most striking point that must be considered in terms of “new political behavior” is the AKP voters' perception of social cleavages. More than half of the AKP voters have insisted that they can vote for any party from every point of the ideological spectrum. However, rather than secularist tendencies, as the study shows, the main cleavage appears on the nationalist dimension. Especially, on the EU issue, nearly all of the voters have stated their concerns about interventions of the EU. Besides, the most striking point has become apparent by a compromise between MHP and CHP voters on the issue of Türban. They have explained their opposition to the Türban on the public sphere as a “threat to the unity of Turkish Republic”, and a challenge to the “rules of the state”. This rising nationalist tendencies toward DEHAP and EU, the Türban issue as a symbol of Muslim identity can also be evaluated as evidences of the emergence of identity politics among voters, which is stated as a main component of the term “new political

⁴⁰³ Lipset, S.M. and S. Rokkan. (1967) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross National Perspectives*, New York: The Free Press, 1967

behavior”. However, the other issues of post-material agenda, such as gender and environmentalism, are far away from dominating voters’ political agenda. Conventional issues such as inflation and unemployment are still important determinants of decisions on voting.

In sum, having summarized the main aspects of the “new political behavior”, this study has indicated that the traditional approaches remained limited in explaining the picture that has emerged after the 3 November 2002 elections. Especially, the voters who supported AKP in the 2002 general elections represent the emergence of new political behavior with the declining role of the party attachments and the declining role of the cleavages in determining the direction of the vote. Moreover, as a matter of fact, evidence provided from the high socio-economic strata illustrated that party attachments no longer supply a perceptual screen contrary to what the traditional approach argues. Candidates in local elections and leadership are becoming important factors in determining decisions on voting. Media creates appropriate channels in providing information about the politics in Turkey and individuals benefited from these channels more than the case in the past. Identity politics became an important component of the political agenda and the parties’ stand on this platform has become an important variable that effects voters’ decisions on voting. To conclude, we can evaluate the consequences of the 3 November 2002 elections as evidence of just occurring phenomena of “new political behavior concept” by emphasizing the similarities rather than differences.

TABLE 8: Applicability of the Concept “New Political Behavior”

		Assumptions of New Political Behavior	Empirical Finding on Participation in Tire
Voting			
	Turnout	Low Turnout Rates	Unsustained
Factors Shaping Party Preferences			
	Media	Increasing role of media in shaping party preferences	Sustained
	Candidate	Increasing role of candidate in shaping party preferences	Partly sustained: (by AKP and high educated CHP voters)
	Leader	Increasing role of Leader in shaping party preferences	Partly sustained (by AKP voters)
Party Politics			
	Party Identification	Decreasing role of party identification	Partly sustained (by AKP and high educated CHP voters)
	Participation to the Party Politics	Decreasing participation to the party politics	Sustained
Political Agenda		Emergence of post material political agenda	Partly sustained: (Emergence of identity politics.)

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: QUESTIONS OF INTERVIEW

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DETERMINANTS

1. Date of Birth, Place of Birth?
2. If you are not from Tire when did you migrate? Why? Where did you migrate from?
3. What is your profession? What is your level of education? Did you get any religious education?
4. What is your average monthly income? (Including rental incomes, salary and interest revenues)
5. Are you satisfied with your economic resources?
6. According to some academic research, people coming from different races, nationalities and religions are living in Turkey. If someone asks you, which one of them do you come from, how would you answer?

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

7. Do you vote regularly?
8. Which political party did you vote for at the 2002 elections? Why? Did your preference change since then? Why?
9. Which political party did you vote for at the last local elections? (If some other preference) what criteria do you follow in voting at the local elections?
10. What do you think is the greatest problem of Turkey? Which political party can solve this problem?
11. What do you think is the most important threat that Turkey faces today? Which political party do you think can solve this threat?
12. Do you feel close to any particular political party today? If so which party is that? Why?

13. If this political party did not or could not attend the elections for any reason, which party would you vote for?
14. For some people, there are political parties that they could never vote for. Do you have such a party for which you say I would never vote for it?
15. Which newspaper you read regularly?
16. Which TV programmes you follow regularly? Do you follow the news about the political party that you plan to vote for?
17. Do you attend the meetings of the political party you think you will vote for or any particular political party?
18. Are you a member of a non-governmental organization? If so which one? Do you participate in its activities?
19. Are you member of a political party? If so, by whose means did you become a member? Why did you want to be a member of a political party? What is the reason that you chose that political party?
20. If the leader of your party was a member of another political party would you still support him?
21. Did your family have a rigid and stable political view?
22. Did your political view ever differentiate from it?
23. Today, in your household do votes differentiate or does the whole family vote for same political party? If there is no differentiation who determines this choice?

ACTUAL EVENTS-LEVEL OF BEING INFORMED- GENERAL TENDENCIES

24. As you know, the turban issue has for a long time been part of the Turkish agenda. What do you think about this issue?
25. Some people claim that Turkey should be ruled according to Sharia. Do you agree with this? Why?
26. Do you think you are pious? Can you fulfill your religious duties regularly?
27. What do you think about the issue of European Union?
28. According to you, what was the cause of the 1999 and 2001 economic crises? Did these crises have a direct impact on you?

30. Do you follow the discourses and deeds of the political parties concerning women? Is this important for you for your voting behavior? Does it matter to you if a political party has women candidates? (For women)