

TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING:  
PEACEBUILDING, INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND LIBERAL  
RESTRUCTURING

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## ABSTRACT

### TRACING THE EVOLUTION OF UN PEACEKEEPING: PEACEBUILDING, INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND LIBERAL RESTRUCTURING

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Peacekeeping, which was born as an innovation of the United Nations system in an ad hoc way, has transformed in the post-Cold War. In the post-Cold War era, the number of peacekeeping operations increased, new tasks were introduced and the end goal of the operations has changed. Besides, the prevailing understanding of UN peacekeeping has transformed thereby leading us to use the terms peacebuilding and peace operations rather than mere peacekeeping. While during the Cold War era, peacekeeping meant to supervise the ceasefire after interstate conflicts, in the post-Cold War era, peace operations have been mostly utilised in internal conflicts with a view to bring sustainable peace in the lands of internal conflicts. Furthermore, while during the Cold War era, peacekeeping mainly concerned peace/security and sovereignty upon the conflicts; human security and socio-economic development have been embedded into the agenda of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. This thesis offers two dynamics based on a normative change as the underlying cause behind this transformation. In the post-Cold War era, international norms have changed and brought a new parameter: internal conflicts are to be responded. Based on this normative change, the first dynamic is related with the challenge, which internal conflicts pose for peace operations, and the second dynamic is the rise of liberal internationalism, which tends to organise domestic realms of the states.

Key Words: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding, Internal Conflicts, Liberal Restructuring, Positive/Negative Peace

# ÖZ

## BM BARIŞI KORUMA OPERASYONLARININ EVRİMİNİ İZLEMEK: BARIŞI TESİS ETME, İÇ SAVAŞLAR VE LİBERAL YAPILANDIRMA

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Birleşmiş Milletler sisteminin bir yeniliği olarak Soğuk Savaş döneminde ortaya çıkmış olan Barışı Koruma Operasyonları, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde değişime uğramıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde söz konusu operasyonların sayısı artmış, yeni görevler belirlenmiş ve operasyonların arzu edilen hedefi değişmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra, Birleşmiş Milletler Barışı Koruma Operasyonları'na hâkim olan anlayış da değişmiş ve Barışı Kurma ve Barış Operasyonları kavramlarını da kullanma zorunluluğu doğmuştur. Soğuk Savaş döneminde barışı koruma operasyonlarının fonksiyonu devletlerarası savaşımlardan sonra ateşkesi denetlemek iken, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde barış operasyonları iç savaş yaşanan ülkelerde kalıcı barış temin etmek amacıyla çoğunlukla iç savaşımlara yönelik olarak kullanılmıştır. Ayrıca, Soğuk Savaş döneminde barışı koruma operasyonları, çatışmalara barış/güvenlik ile egemenlik kavramları çerçevesinde yaklaşırken, Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde insan güvenliği ve sosyo-ekonomik kalkınma barış operasyonlarının gündemine girmiştir. Söz konusu değişimi açıklamak için, tez normatif bir değişikliğe bağlı olarak iki dinamiği sebep olarak önermektedir. Soğuk Savaş sonrası dönemde uluslararası normlar değişmiş ve iç savaşlar ile ilgilenilmesi gerektiğine dair yeni bir parametre doğurmuştur. Bu normatif değişikliğe bağlı olarak; iç savaşların barış operasyonları için yarattığı güçlükler ilk dinamik; devletlerin iç yapılarını organize etmeye eğilimli olan liberal uluslararasılığın yükselmesi de ikinci dinamik olarak önerilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Barışı Koruma, Barışı Tesis Etme, İç Savaşlar, Liberal Yapılandırma, Pozitif/Negatif Barış

To My Family

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ARENA	Nationalist Republican Alliance
DOMREP	Mission of Representative of Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FMLN	Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
FRELIMO	Mozambique Liberation Front
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IPKF	Indian Peacekeeping Force
MINUGUA	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCA	United Nations Mission in The Central African Republic
MINURSO	United Nations Mission For the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MONUA	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC	United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of The Congo
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ONUB	United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC	United Nations Operation in The Congo
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America

ONUMOZ	United Nations Operations in Mozambique
ONUSAL	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
RENAMO	Mozambican National Resistance
SC	Security Council
SWAPO	South West Africa People's Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNAMIC	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNASOG	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNAVEM III	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Organisation in Croatia
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
UNEF I	United Nations Emergency Force I
UNEF II	United Nations Emergency Force II
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNIPOM	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission

UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia And Eritrea
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMISSET	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India And Pakistan
UNMOP	United Nations Mission Of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT	United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire
UNOGIL	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOMUR	United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda
UNOSOM I	United Nations Operation in Somalia I
UNOSOM II	United Nations Operation in Somalia II
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia
UNPSG	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group
UNTMIH	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
US	United States
UNSF	United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Iranian)

UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES	United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
UNYOM	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

*Porphrius:*

"... In the article under discussion, men are divided into ordinary and extraordinary men. The former must live in a state of obedience, and have no right to break the law, inasmuch as they are nothing more than ordinary men; the latter have a right to commit every kind of crime and to break law, from the very fact that they are extraordinary men. I think that is what you mean, unless I am mistaken?"

*Raskolnikoff:*

"... I did not say, however, as you make me do, that extraordinary men are absolutely bound to be always committing all kinds of criminal acts. I even believe that the censor would not have permitted the publication of an article conceived in that sense. This is really what I maintained: *An extraordinary man has a right - not officially, be it understood, but from and by his very individuality- to permit his conscience to overstep certain bounds, only so far as the realisation of one of his ideas may require it...*" (italics added)

Dostoyevsky, 'Crime and Punishment'

### 1.1. The Subject of the Thesis

The United Nations (UN) charter enshrined collective security to maintain international peace and security. Collective security is based on the 'crime and punishment duality'. Accordingly, it necessitates clear definition of aggression (crime) and aggressor (criminal) and then collective enforcement (penal system). However, collective security was hindered by the Cold War conditions states (*extraordinary men who 'permit his conscience to overstep certain bounds'*) system. In fact, the very idea of states' existence is in contradiction with the crime and punishment duality. In such an environment peacekeeping has come into existence. Peacekeeping is meant not to punish but to control the crime.

UN Peacekeepers were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 1988 for their contribution to the peace in the world. Alfred Nobel would hardly imagine honouring soldiers with the prize dedicated to the peace (Weiss et al. 2001:54). Peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter; it is an innovation of the Cold War years. Yet, peacekeeping has become one of the most important and also popular functions of the United Nations in the international peace and security.

The Cold War politics has determined the scope of peacekeeping just like other instruments of international action. When the Cold War ended or when the initial signs for that appeared in late 1980s, euphoria dominated the international atmosphere about the role of the UN in general and peacekeeping in particular in international peace and security. Just 1988 and 1989 witnessed the birth of five new peacekeeping operations in different parts of the globe as will be discussed later on. However, this optimism was shattered in the early 1990s and in the new decade peacekeeping was mostly pronounced with its inactivity or passivity or debacles due to the happenings in Somalia, Rwanda and Bosnia. A recent motion picture titled “*No Man’s Land*”<sup>1</sup> and an older one “*Underground*”<sup>2</sup> include elegant critiques of international presence and peacekeeping characterised by inactivity and incompetence during the conflicts of disintegration of former Yugoslavia.

The decade of the 1990s experienced many operations dispersed to the world from West Africa to South-east Asia, from Europe to Latin America, from Middle East to the Balkans, from Central Asia to Indochina. While UN peacekeepers supervised the ceasefires between Eritrea and Ethiopia, they verified the elections in Cambodia. The UN peacekeepers are not only soldiers any more rather human rights officers, election observers, judicial experts and humanitarian aid personnel also take part in the missions. Hence, the term ‘peacebuilding’ has come to the fore as the instrument of international society to respond internal conflicts. This development refers to the simultaneous shifts from peacekeeping to peacebuilding and from involvement in interstate conflicts to internal conflicts, which is the central focus of this thesis.

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<sup>1</sup> *No Man’s Land*, 2001, Danis Tanovic, Belgium/Bosnia-Herzegovina/France

<sup>2</sup> *Underground*, 1995, Emir Kusturica, France/Yugoslavia/Germany/Hungary



In sum, the Blue Helmets play very crucial roles in international peace and security. This is not gone unnoticed by the media, which have increasingly reserved significant places for peacekeeping operations and the Blue Helmets in coverage. The broadcasting of the scenes showing dead UN marines dragged by the Somalian insurgents on the streets of Mogadishu is a typical example in this respect.

Peacekeeping is at the intersection of very important issues of international politics such as ‘conflict resolution and prevention’, ‘international intervention’, ‘the United Nations system’, ‘interstate and internal conflicts’, ‘peace settlements’, ‘human rights’, ‘refugees’ and ‘international protectorates’. It is possible to consider peacekeeping as conflict resolution in terms of resolving a conflict and conflict prevention in terms of preventing the recurrence of a conflict once it is controlled. The nature of peacekeeping as third party involvement in conflicts makes it very central to the international involvement in conflicts; be it interstate or intrastate. Furthermore, as the product and a strategy of the UN system, peacekeeping constitutes one of the primary tools of the UN in international peace and security. It is possible to enlarge the scope of the international issues that peacekeeping conveys. The fact that analysing peacekeeping will give us the opportunity to get familiar with one of the main instruments of the international society to respond the conflicts seems to be sufficient to justify the selection of this topic.

## **1.2. The Purpose and the Problem of the Thesis**

The thesis relies on the basic assumption that the understanding of UN peacekeeping operations has transformed in the end of the Cold War thereby forcing us to use the term peace operations rather than peacekeeping. The overall objective of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive understanding of UN peace operations as an instrument to maintain international peace and security. Specifically, the purpose of this study will be to answer the following question:

*How can the transformation in the understanding of peacekeeping operations that took place in the post-Cold War era be explained?*

This thesis will hold the view that there are two dynamics underneath this transformation; two important developments have overlapped in the post-Cold War era. The first one is the fact that UN Peace Operations are mostly established upon the internal (substate) conflicts, whose nature and dynamics pose more complicated challenge than interstate conflicts. The second one is the global process that the post-Cold War era has marked the rise of liberal internationalism, which has brought a tendency to organise not only the external actions of states but also their domestic realms. The convergence of these two developments has been influential in the rise of peacebuilding dimension in UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era.

### **1.3. The Plan of the Thesis**

In order to realise the purpose, the thesis is split up into seven chapters:

*Chapter 1* is the introduction of the thesis. *Chapter 2* will discuss the birth and the nature of peacekeeping operations as part of the UN system during the Cold War. *Chapter 3* will try to show changes inflicted upon the understanding of peace operations in the post-Cold War era. *Chapter 4* is devoted to the study of theoretical and conceptual perspectives to explain the changes in the understanding of peace operations. *Chapter 5* will discuss the nature of internal conflicts and the challenges they pose for UN peace operation. *Chapter 6* is composed of analyses on the interaction between internal conflicts and UN peace operations. *Chapter 7* will summarize the conclusions of the thesis.

### **1.4. Methodological Aspects of the Thesis**

Peace operations might be analysed on three levels. Firstly, it is possible to discuss peacekeeping on operational level through a case by case study. Secondly, peacekeeping might be situated into broader conflict research thereby engaging other

issue areas of conflict research such as conflict resolution, conflict prevention, peacemaking or conflict phases. Lastly, the broader dynamics of international politics might be used in peacekeeping discussions. This thesis will borrow certain assumptions of each level in order to acquire more explanatory power.

As for the empirical material, the record of the UN peacekeeping operations both during the Cold War and post-Cold War era, mandate of the operations, descriptive analyses of the internal conflicts, and official elaboration of the issues will be used. Regarding the peacekeeping operations, the official web-site of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations provides sufficient information. On the other hand, online conflict databases such as Uppsala Conflict Database and Armed Conflict Database are appealed so as to obtain information about conflicts.

The subject under the discussion will be narrowed down to the period between the end of the Cold War and September 11, 2001 attacks. The latter has opened a new era for all the items of international politics. That is why post- September 11 era will be left out in the thesis. Another limitation on the subject concerns the analysis of the each internal conflict and peace operations. Rather than having a detailed and analytical discussion, a descriptive approach will be adopted.

## CHAPTER 2

### PEACE OPERATIONS WITHIN UN SYSTEM AND THE COLD WAR

In this part, the birth of peace operations will be situated into the general UN system. The main argument of this chapter will be that collective security is enshrined in the UN Charter but not put in practice due to the Cold War conditions. Peace operations understanding was shaped by this negativity and peacekeeping was born as an innovation of the UN system as the collective security was paralysed. Moreover, in order to have a more explanatory power, the several assumptions of the 'International Society' approach will be appealed in this chapter (Bull 1977).

#### 2.1. The UN System, Collective Security and Peacekeeping

The rationale behind the establishment of both the League of Nations and the United Nations is the purpose to prevent war. Article 1(1) of the UN Charter states that one of the main purposes of the UN is 'to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threat to the peace'. In order to maintain peace and security, certain means are available to the UN in case of disputes. According to *Bennett*, six types of method to settle international disputes might be suggested. *First* one is no action by the parties leaving the dispute unsettled. *Second* one is settlement through negotiation or other sort of peaceful means by the parties' own deliberations. *Third* method is the intervention of international agency aiming to facilitate peaceful settlement. These three methods seem to be relevant for disputes which have not yet turned out to violence. *Last three* methods in Bennet's list refer to disputes, which are not settled through peaceful means.

*First* one is collective action by international agency to restore order after the dispute results in violence. *Secondly*, parties may pursue their interests at the expense of the peace i.e. war. *Last method* of dispute settlement is the intervention by other states behaving in accordance with their interests. (Bennet 2002:143)

Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter describe the UN's methods to deal with the challenges to international peace and security. Chapter VI (articles 33-38) is entitled as 'Peaceful Settlement of Disputes'. This Chapter and its articles contain pacific measures, which can be taken by the consent of the disputing parties. Article 33(1) sets out these measures: negotiation, good offices, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, adjudication or judicial settlement and resort to regional agencies or arrangements.

Chapter VII (articles 39-51) is entitled as the '*Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression*'. In other words, this chapter concerns disputes which denies peaceful settlement and which are considered as threats to peace, breaches of peace or acts of aggression. Chapter VII of the UN Charter enshrines collective enforcement principle to maintain peace and security thereby preventing war. Covenant of the League of Nations was also based on collective security. Yet, it failed to bring peace. In theory of collective security, all states are meant to consider any attack to be an attack on each and to prevent aggression. International society is attributed the right to maintain peace and security by jointly preventing war.

*Article 25* states that member states 'agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council'. Security Council is empowered to decide upon the issues concerning international peace and security. Furthermore, Chapter VII of UN Charter provided Security Council with required authorisation to deal with threats to peace, breaches of peace and acts of aggression, which reflected collective security theory on articles and paragraphs. *Article 39* gives the Security Council deliberation to determine 'the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression'. Furthermore, according to the same article, Security Council is to 'make

recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with *Article 41* and *42* to maintain or restore international peace and security'. *Article 40* permits Security Council to take provisional measures. *Article 41* mentions the sanctions, which Security Council may decide upon in order to make its decision effective. These sanctions may be 'complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.' Sanctions do not include use of force under *Article 41*. Use of force is invoked in *Article 42*, which authorises Security Council to consider that measures stated in *Article 41* are inadequate and use of force is necessary. According to *Article 43*, member states accept to 'to undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage'. In other words, member states are supposed to provide armed forces, assistance and facilities to the Security Council. Furthermore, *Article 47* envisages the establishment of a Military Staff Committee, which was to advise and assist the Security Council. This Committee was to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council. The Secretary-General is also empowered to bring matters related to international peace and security to the attention of the Security Council under *Article 99*.

In order to realise those, collective security presumes clear definition of aggression and aggressor. In case of a breach of peace, the aggressor would be faced by the all states. "The theory of collective security assumes that a situation can be agreed upon demanding collective action and that an aggressor can be identified." (Bennet 2002:148)

In sum, the underlying theme of collective security is the assumption that all states have an interest in maintaining peace and preventing war. All states *a priori* agree on the reaction against threats to peace, which would bring collective response without any reservation concerning situations in which the aggressor is a friend. According to collective security theory, once aggressor is identified, collective enforcement is to restore peace. It seems plausible to state that self-defence right of individual states expanded to international society's right to prevent war. (Weiss et al. 2001: 25)

Collective security was paralysed under the Cold War conditions, which precluded the possibility of defining aggression/aggressor and collective enforcement mechanisms. The Cold War rivalry between superpowers ended up with stalemate in the Security Council. The power of vetoes was frequently used by the respective sides.

**TABLE 1: Number of Vetoes during the Cold War**

	<b>Veto (until January 1990)</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>236</b>
<b>China</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>France</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>Soviet Union</b>	<b>117</b>
<b>United Kingdom</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>United States</b>	<b>69</b>

Source: Global Policy Forum<sup>3</sup>

In order to carry out the enforcement measures, Security Council is required to identify the threat to international peace and security and then 'an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members' is needed as pointed out in Article 27(3). As seen in the table, veto has been invoked in the Security Council 236 times until January 1990 by permanent members: 3 times by China, 18 times by France, 29 times by the United Kingdom, 117 times by the Soviet Union and 69 times by the United States.

Under the Cold War conditions which paralysed collective security, there came innovations within the UN system regarding responses to international disputes. First one is the '*Uniting for Peace Resolution*' which was adopted on 3 November 1950 when the Security Council was unable to move.

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<sup>3</sup> <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/membership/veto/vetosubj.htm>, Accessed on 10 July 2006.

The resolution was originally passed against the Soviet threats to veto further resolutions to be taken in the Security Council for the Korean War. The Uniting for Peace Resolution was adopted by General Assembly and it allowed General Assembly to have emergency session within twenty-four hours whenever Security Council is deadlocked and unable to exercise its primary responsibility concerning cases under the Chapter VII realm. In accordance with this Resolution, member states are supposed to provide armed forces available upon the request of Security Council or General Assembly. (Weiss et al. 2001: 30-1, Bennet 2002:149-152) General Assembly Resolution 377 V, A1:

If the Security Council, because of the lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or acts of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time, the General Assembly may meet in emergency special session within twenty-four hours of the request therefore. Such emergency special session may be called if requested by the Security Council on the vote of any seven members, or by a majority of the Members of the United Nations.

Second innovation within the United Nations system is *peacekeeping*.

## **2.2. Birth of Peacekeeping**

UN Charter does not specifically mention peacekeeping in any chapter, article or paragraph. The term 'peacekeeping' was invented in the 1950s. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:1) Peacekeeping is the innovation of UN system during the Cold War politics. Since peacekeeping did not mean enforcement but rather controlling the violence in order to facilitate peacemaking, it was not used under Chapter VII in principle, but under Chapter VI. Peacekeeping operations were mostly authorised under Chapter VI. However as peacekeeping included deployment of military forces, this situation



led Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld to call peacekeeping as '*Chapter Six and a Half*', thereby situating peacekeeping between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully (Chapter VI) and forceful action (Chapter VII) (Weiss et al. 2001, Malone and Wermester 2000:38).

Birth of peacekeeping is dated to Suez Channel Crisis and the subsequent war in Middle East in 1956. UNEF I (United Nations Emergency Force I) is considered as the first formal UN peacekeeping mission which was deployed to help mitigate Suez Crisis. After the war broke out, *Lester Pearson*, Foreign Minister of Canada, suggested Secretary-General *Dag Hammarskjöld* to form a UN force that is to be deployed for securing and supervising ceasefire between Egyptian and Israeli armies. (Weiss et al. 2001:53-6, Ratner 1995: 9-14) General Assembly invited Hammarskjöld to submit a report on the feasibility of establishing a UN force large enough to keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out. Political considerations and technical considerations both played constitutive roles in the potential nature of UN force. Hammarskjöld's belief that UN was to be pragmatic rather than idealistic in approach contributed to crucial idea that "peacekeeping was an ad hoc response to particular problems rather than being guided by a rigid blueprint for international action". (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:99-100)

The report of Secretary-General paved the way for the establishment of UNEF I on November 1956 under General Assembly Resolution 1000. UNEF I was mandated to secure and supervise a ceasefire by the formation of a buffer zone between British, French and Israeli forces and their Egyptian counterparts (in accordance with Resolution 997); to supervise the withdrawal of foreign forces from Egyptian territory; to supervise canal clearing operations; to patrol border areas and deterring incursions; to secure adherence to the provision of the Egypt-Israel Armistice provisions. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:105)

Secretary-General's second report laid the foundations for an entirely new kind of international activity and set out principles that were to become the basis for future UN peacekeeping operations. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:100-1) Peacekeeping is mainly characterized by the initial guiding principles of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF),

which were designed by Secretary-General *Dag Hammarskjöld*. (Ratner 1995: 9) These principles are consent of the parties to the conflicts, impartiality and the use of force as the last resort (holt trinity) together with troops provided by the members, UN command and collective financing (Sitkowski 2001, Malone and Wermester 2000, Donald 2002).

The core distinction between collective security and peacekeeping regards the use of force and the consent. While the former is characterized by the collective enforcement including use of force, the latter by the consent of the parties to the conflict and the non-use of force except self-defence. Although UNEF I contributed to these principles, it seems difficult to assert that the mission had set a formal precedent since UNEF I was considered as responding to the extraordinary problems emerged in the Middle East the Suez Crisis. (Bellamy et al. 2004:71) Yet, the impetus for the codification of the UN's approach to peacekeeping over the years was supplied by UNEF I, which also generated several outcomes still valid:

- The collective security role which is enshrined in the UN Charter is paralyzed due to the intensification of the Cold War;
- Alternative methods have come to agenda for maintaining international peace and security and UN had the opportunity to display that it had a crucial role to play in international conflicts;
- The complexity of UNEF I required a conceptual clarification of the parameters of peacekeeping;
- UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester B. Pearson, highly influential figures of the time, aimed to define a particular role for UN in international resolution. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:98-99)

Dag Hammarskjöld developed a concept of 'preventive diplomacy' by which he meant preventing direct superpower confrontation, rather than prevention of violent conflicts. Through UN's image as the neutral third party in the role of preventing conflict escalation, Hammarskjöld's conception of preventive diplomacy had drawn the boundaries and parameters of UN action in the atmosphere of superpower rivalry of the Cold War. Peacekeeping has been situated at the core of preventive diplomacy. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:99)

Former Undersecretary-General for UN Peace operations Marrack Goulding gives us a definition of peacekeeping, clearly indicating the guiding principles of peacekeeping operations:

Field operations established by the United Nations, with the consent of the parties concerned, to help control and resolve conflicts between them, under United Nations command and control, at the expense collectively of the member states, and with military and other personnel and equipment provided voluntarily between the parties and using force to the minimum extent necessary. (Goulding 1993: 455)

According to Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, the principles of UN peacekeeping are as follows:

The consent of the parties; troops provided by member states serving under the command of the secretary general; minimum use of force, collective financing. It was also learned, often the hard way, that peacekeeping success requires the cooperation of the parties, a clear and practicable mandate, the continuing support of the Security Council and adequate financial arrangements. (Boutros-Ghali 1992)

In sum, UNEF I played a constitutive role about the perceptions on UN peacekeeping and the understanding and the guiding principles, which are already mentioned above, continued to shape UN peacekeeping operations over the years. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:101)

### **2.3. International Society and Peacekeeping**

Peacekeeping might be situated within the '*International Society*' approach of the English School of International Relations. This approach<sup>4</sup> conveys that states are the main actors of the international politics and their interaction is governed by common norms and values, which in turn adhere responsibilities to the states in their pursuit of interests. Hence, states are supposed to strike a balance between their interests and the impact of their pursuit of interests upon the others. International Society has

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<sup>4</sup> Prominent scholars of this approach are Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Hedley Bull, Adam Watson, R.J. Vincent, Alan James, Robert Jackson, Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler.

authoritative practices, which have developed out of common interests, and common norms, which members do share. International Society approach has merits in its explanatory power particularly with its state-centric assumptions.

The distinction put forward by *Hedley Bull* (1977) between '*system of states*' and '*society of states*' is seminal for this approach. He argues that "a system of states is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave - at least in some measure- as parts of a whole." (Bull 1997:9) Existence of two or more states is not a sufficient base for the emergence of a system for *Bull*. Rather there must be "regular contact" between them which forces the parties to take into account the others. In other words, "interaction" is a *sine qua non* for a system. The nature of the interaction does not matter in the context i.e. it may be cooperative or conflictual or based on neutrality. (Bull 1997:10) For *Bull*, "when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions". In order to form a society, states are supposed to consciously recognise certain common interests and, may be, common values to see themselves as bound by certain rules in their relations, and also to cooperate in working of certain institutions such as international law and diplomacy. (Bull 1997:13)

According to Bull's formulation, 'order' in international society is to be seen as the pattern or regularity which leads a particular result, an arrangement that it promotes certain goals or values. Order is maintained by a sense of common interests in these goals, by rules, which prescribe the pattern of behaviour that sustains them, and by institutions, which make these rules effective. In *Bull's* account, the formula for order in international society comprises the consciousness of states for common interests and values, which are regulated by rules and institutions, which, in turn, make these rules effective. (Bull 1997:51) *Bull* points out four goals in international society. First one is the preservation of the system and society of states itself. Second goal is to maintain the independence or external sovereignty of individual states.

Third one is the goal of peace, but not in the sense of universal and permanent peace. Rather the absence of war among members. Actually, the goal of peace is subordinated to the first one, the preservation of society. Lastly, the goals of social life themselves; the life, truth and possession. (Bull 1997:16-19)

In order to achieve these goals, International Society supervises in an *authoritative* manner the behaviour of the members in accordance with the common norms and rules through institutions, main ones being International law and diplomacy. These institutions reflect the dominant norms of the international society like states being the primary units of the system, non-interference in the domestic realms of states and sovereignty of states.

In this context, peacekeeping operations might be considered as a *sub-institution* within international law and diplomacy at the use of International Society to guide the behaviour of member states with a view to prevent superpower confrontation. In this respect, it seems reasonable to assert that the nature of peacekeeping is defined by the norms of the international society.

#### **2.4. Evaluating UN peacekeeping in the Cold War**

As stated above, peacekeeping during the Cold War might be framed as a tool at the use of international society to *authoritatively* guide the behaviour of the states. In this respect, the parameters of the international politics determined the nature of peacekeeping and so the main rationale behind peacekeeping during the Cold War was to prevent proxy wars from escalating into superpower conflicts. The nature of peacekeeping is determined by the Westphalian principles leaving domestic realms of the states outside the international reach. Peacekeeping was bound by the norms of the international system like non-interference in the internal affairs of the states, which is enshrined in the UN Charter by the article 2(7).

UN peacekeeping operations were to take place only after the aggression occurred, and after the parties to the dispute agreed on ceasefire, and after they consented to

deployment of impartial UN military force to observe the ceasefire. In other words, it was aimed to control violence and then status quo ante would be restored.

Peacekeeping operations functioned to observe the peace (monitoring and reporting on the maintenance of ceasefires) and to keep the peace (providing a buffer zone between parties). Peacekeeping defended status quo, which was supposed to create condition for peace negotiations and settlements. (*Weiss et al.* 2001:54-5)

Although birth of peacekeeping is dated to UNEF I (1956), two previous UN operations might be also categorised as peacekeeping: UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation) and UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan). This might be explained by the fact that Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld is identified with the emergence of peacekeeping as he developed and formulated peacekeeping as a distinct element of UN system. (Bennet 2002:156-163)

**TABLE 2: Completed / Ongoing Peacekeeping Operations of the Cold War Era**

	<b>Cold War 1948 – 1988</b>
<b>Total Peacekeeping</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Completed</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Ongoing</b>	<b>5</b>

Compiled by the author, Source: UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations webpage.

During the Cold War (1948-1988) 15 peacekeeping missions were established. While 10 of them are completed, five is still active: UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation), UNMOGIP (United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan), UNDOF (United Nations Disengagement Observer Force), UNFIYCP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) and UNIFIL (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon). Last two peacekeeping operations, UNGOMAP and UNIIMOG, were launched in 1988 when the Cold War was ended in the Security Council due to Gorbachev’ s ‘new thinking (*Weiss* 2001: 65) Hence, these two operations might be also counted as post-Cold War operations.

The table below gives the specific mandate of each peacekeeping operation, which will enable us to see what peacekeeping was meant in practice during the Cold War.

**TABLE 3: Peacekeeping Missions during the Cold War**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO)</b>  <u>Duration</u> : June 1948 – Ongoing  <u>Mandate</u> : to supervise the observance of truce in Palestine i.e. Arab-Israeli truce.</li> <li>• <b>United Nations Military Observer Group in India And Pakistan (UNMOGIP)</b>            Established by Security Council Resolution 91 (1949)  <u>Duration</u> : January 1949 – Ongoing  <u>Mandate</u>: to supervise the truce between India and Pakistan in Jammu-Kashmir.</li> <li>• <b>United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I)</b>            Established by First Emergency Session of General Assembly, Resolution 1000  <u>Duration</u> : November 1956 - June 1967  <u>Mandate</u> : to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire’.</li> <li>• <b>United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)</b>            Established by Security Council Resolution 128 (1958)  <u>Duration</u> : 11 June 1958 – 9 December 1958  <u>Mandate</u>: to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other material across the Lebanese border. In this context, the function of UNOGIL was restricted to observation. Hence the operation was not involved in mediation, arbitration or forcefully prevention of illegal infiltration.</li> <li>• <b>United Nations Operation in The Congo (ONUC)</b>            Established by Security Council Resolution 143 (1960)  <u>Duration</u> : July 1960 – June 1964  <u>Mandate</u>: to provide the Government of the Congo with military assistance, to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide technical assistance. Yet the role of ONUC was changed over the time and new tasks were added: maintaining the territorial integrity and ending secession and maintaining political independence, securing the withdrawal of foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel, which were not under UN command.</li> <li>• <b>United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (West Iranian) (UNSF)</b>  <u>Duration</u> : 3 October 1962 – 30 April 1963  <u>Mandated</u>: to monitor the truce and to maintain law and order in West New Guinea which was under the UN Temporary Executive Authority as envisaged in the agreement between Netherlands and Indonesia for the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia.</li> <li>• <b>United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)</b>            Established by Security Council Resolution 179 (1963)  <u>Duration</u> : 11 June 1963 – 4 September 1964  <u>Mandate</u>: to observe and certify the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic and Yemen.</li> </ul>
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**TABLE 3 (Cont'd)**

<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)</b> Established by Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) <u>Duration</u> : 4 March 1964 – Ongoing <u>Mandate</u>: to prevent a relapse into violence between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriot, and also to contribute to the restoration of law and order.</li><li>• <b>Mission of Representative of Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)</b> Established by Security Council Resolution 203 (1965) <u>Duration</u> : 14 May 1965 – October 1966 <u>Mandate</u>: to observe the situation and to report the breaches of the truce between the de facto authorities in the Dominican Republic.</li><li>• <b>United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)</b> Established by Security Council Resolution 211 (1965) <u>Duration</u> : 20 September 1965 – March 1966 <u>Mandate</u>: to monitor and supervise the truce along the India-Pakistan border except Jammu-Kashmir where UNMOGIP functioned.</li><li>• <b>United Nations Emergency Force II (UNEF II)</b> Established by : Security Council Resolution 340 (1973) <u>Duration</u> : 25 October 1973 – 24 July 1979 <u>Mandate</u>: to observe the truce between Egypt and Israeli forces.</li><li>• <b>United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)</b> Established by : Security Council Resolution 350 (1974) <u>Duration</u> : 31 May 1974 – Ongoing Mandate: to maintain the truce between Israel and Syria, to supervise the disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces, and to supervise the areas of separation and limitation, in accordance with the Agreement on Disengagement.</li><li>• <b>United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)</b> Established by Security Council Resolutions 424 and 428 (1978) <u>Duration</u> : 19 March 1978 – Ongoing <u>Mandate</u>: to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli force from Southern Lebanon, to restore international peace and security, to assist the Government of Lebanon in ensuring the return of its effective authority in the area.</li><li>• <b>United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)</b> <u>Duration</u> : 15 May 1988 – 15 March 1990 <u>Mandate</u>: to assist the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General to lend his good offices to the parties in ensuring the implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (the Geneva Accords). UNGOMAP was mandated to investigate and report possible violations of any of the provisions of the Agreements, which authorised UNGOMAP to monitor the non-interference and non-intervention, by the parties in each other's affairs, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the voluntary return of refugees.</li><li>• <b>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)</b> Established by : Security Council Resolution 619 (1988) <u>Duration</u> : 9 August 1988 – 28 February 1991 Mandate: to verify, confirm and supervise the truce and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries, pending a comprehensive settlement.</li></ul>
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Compiled by the author, Source: UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations webpage.



It is also possible to analyse peacekeeping operations during the Cold War through periodic conceptualisation. According to *Jett* (1999: 21-34), peacekeeping might be discussed by categorising the operations into periods:

- ***Nascent Period***, 1946-1956: During the first decade of the UN, two operations (UNTSO and UNMOGIP) were launched which were truly peacekeeping in nature but not labelled as peacekeeping as the term was introduced later on.
- ***Assertive Period***, 1956-1967: During this period, peacekeeping principles were drafted. Most of the operations were concerned about Middle East and decolonization (UNYOM, DOMREP, UNOGIL, UNEF, UNSF, UNFIYCP, and UNIPOM). On the other hand, UN intervened in a civil war where classical principles of peacekeeping were ignored like consent of the parties, non-use of force and impartiality (ONUC).
- ***Dormant Period***, 1967-1973: During this period no peacekeeping operations were launched which might be explained by the deadlock in the Security Council.
- ***Resurgent Period***, 1973-1978: During this period, the conflicts in Middle East were renewed and three peacekeeping operations were conducted in Middle East: UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL.
- ***Maintenance Period***, 1978-1988: No peacekeeping operations were launched in this period; only already existing ones were maintained. The rise of tension in the Cold War is considered as the reason behind. According to *Malone and Wermester*, UN peace operations seemed to be suspended in this period due to the lack of political will in the Security Council. This state of affairs stemmed from various factors such as ongoing tension between East and West, conjunctural economic recession and the perception in US that UN had been dominated by the 'Third World agitation' which was exemplified by the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and resolution of General Assembly in 1975 equating Zionism with racism. (2000:38-9)

- **Expansion Period**, 1988-1993: Five new operations were set up just in 1988 and 1989: UNGOMAP (UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1988), UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, 1988), UNAVEM (UN Angola Verification Group, 1989), UNTAG (UN Technical Assistance Group in Namibia, 1989), ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America, 1989). As will be discussed later on, the number of peacekeeping launched in this period outnumbered the Cold War period.

Jett (1999) further adds ‘*Contraction period*’ or ‘*Retrenchment period*’ when number of peacekeeping operations decreased as the optimism between 1988 and 1993 was shattered in the debacles like Somalia.

As seen in the table below, during the Cold War, all the operations but four (UNFICYP, UNSF, ONUC and DOMREP) were conducted after an interstate conflict. These four operations were conducted into a state without an interstate conflict.

**TABLE 4: Peacekeeping Operations and Type of Conflicts during the Cold War**

	<b>Cold War 1948 – 1988</b>
<b>Peacekeeping</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Interstate Conflicts</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Internal Conflicts</b>	<b>4</b>

Compiled by the author, Source: UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations webpage.

Yet, just two of them had displayed different characteristics than conventional understanding of peacekeeping during the Cold War, namely: ONUC and UNSF.

**TABLE 5: Types of Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War**

	<b>Cold War 1948 – 1988</b>
<b>Peace Operations</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Conventional</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Beyond Conventional</b>	<b>2</b>

Compiled by the author, Source: UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations webpage.

The mandates of all operations but two (ONUC and UNSF) were restricted to monitoring, observing and supervising truces. These two operations were involved in domestic governance issues. ONUC performed different tasks like assistance to government in maintaining the territorial integrity and ending secession and maintaining political independence, preventing a relapse into civil war etc. which amounted nation-building tasks. UNSF was mandated to monitor the truce and to maintain law and order in West New Guinea, which was under the UN Temporary Executive Authority as envisaged in the agreement between Netherlands and Indonesia for the transfer of West New Guinea to Indonesia.

The main rationale behind peacekeeping during the Cold War was to prevent proxy wars from escalating into superpower conflicts. (Weiss et al. 2001, Ratner 1995) Yet, peacekeeping during the Cold War reflected a commitment to liberal peace. Peacekeeping served the liberal peace between states through creating institutions and spaces for peaceful settlement of disputes on the way to achieve stable peace.

The record of UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War shows us that international politics determined both the nature of the peacekeeping and also the establishment of the operations. Article 2(7) of UN Charter leaves the domestic realms of state outside the UN jurisdiction. During the Cold War peace operations reflected this principle as peace operations were limited to observing, supervising and monitoring (except ONUC and UNSF) and creating institutions and spaces for peaceful settlement of disputes in order to bring liberal peace between states.

Peacekeeping during the Cold War might be regarded as a tool which international community was to utilise to *authoritatively* guide the behaviour of the states. In this respect, the parameters of the international politics determined the nature of peacekeeping and so the main rationale behind peacekeeping during the Cold War was to prevent proxy wars from escalating into superpower conflicts. The nature of peacekeeping is determined by the Westphalian principles leaving domestic realms of the states outside the international reach. Peacekeeping was bound by the norms of the international system like non-interference in the internal affairs of the states, which is enshrined in the UN Charter by the article 2(7).




Figure 1: Westphalian Understanding of Peace

## CHAPTER 3

### POST-COLD WAR UN PEACE OPERATIONS: WHAT HAS CHANGED?

In the post-Cold War era, significant changes upon UN peacekeeping took place. To understand the extent and nature of these changes is among the tasks of this thesis. In this sense, although the quotation above tells us about, '*What has changed?*' is a very legitimate question to start with.

According to *Bertram* (1995:338), the post-Cold War peace operations displayed two departures from the original concept of peacekeeping. First one is the move towards greater UN military involvement with the aim of enforcing the peace i.e. peace enforcement. Second departure is the move towards a role for the UN as an agent of democratic transitions. This move aims to address the root causes of conflict and it involves building political conditions for a sustainable, democratic peace rather than keeping or enforcing peace between hostile states or armies. Although both of these two changes are very important in order to understand the record of UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era, this thesis leaves out peace enforcement. Otherwise, it would have been mission impossible to cover all the relevant issues. Hence, the second departure which *Bertram* (1995) discusses will be the central theme of the following paragraphs.

It is possible to sort out a triple transformation with the end of the Cold War with regard to peacekeeping. (*Bellamy et al.* 2004:75) First transformation concerns the number of peacekeeping operations. Secondly, a qualitative transformation has occurred. Accordingly, UN peacekeeping operations displayed characteristics of complex missions, whose precedent was ONUC in the Congo in the first half of the 1950s. Yet, the post-Cold War era witnessed a regular establishment of such

operations, which were much larger and more expensive than all other operations with the single exception of ONUC. As Bellamy *et al.* (2004:1) points out peacekeeping operations merged with 'the delivery of humanitarian aid, state-building programmes, local peacemaking and elements of peace enforcement'.(p.74) According to Bellamy *et al.* (2004), the third transformation is a normative transformation catalysed by the belief that peacekeeping should serve the post-Westphalian liberal democratic peace. This last issue will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.

**TABLE 6: The Post-Cold War UN Peace Operations**

<b>United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan And Pakistan (UNGOMAP)</b> Duration : 15 May 1988 - 15 March 1990
<b>United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)</b> Duration : 9 August 1988 - 28 February 1991
<b>United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG)</b> Duration : 16 February 1989 - March 1990
<b>United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)</b> Duration : 7 November 1989 - January 1992
<b>United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I)</b> Duration : 20 December 1989 - 25 May 1991
<b>United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)</b> Duration : 9 April 1991- 6 October 2003
<b>United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)</b> Duration : 30 May 1991 - February 1995
<b>United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)</b> Duration : 20 May 1991 - 30 April 1995
<b>United Nations Mission For the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)</b> Duration : 29 May 1991 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)</b> Duration : 16 October 1991 - March 1992
<b>United Nations Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)</b> Duration : 21 February 1992 - 31 March 1995
<b>United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)</b> Duration : 28 February 1992 - September 1993
<b>United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)</b> Duration : 24 April 1992 - March 1993
<b>United Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)</b> Duration : 16 December 1992 - 9 December 1994
<b>United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)</b> Duration : 26 March 1993 - March 1995
<b>United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR)</b> Duration : 22 June 1993 - 21 September 1994
<b>United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)</b> Duration : 24 August 1993 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)</b> Duration : 23 September 1993 - 30 June 1996

**TABLE 6 (Cont'd)**

<b>United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)</b> Duration : September 1993 - 30 September 1997
<b>United Nations Assistance Mission For Rwanda (UNAMIR)</b> Duration : 5 October 1993 - 8 March 1996
<b>United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG)</b> Duration : 4 May 1994 - June 1994
<b>United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT)</b> Duration : 16 December 1994 - 15 May 2000
<b>United Nations Confidence Restoration Organisation in Croatia (UNCRO)</b> Duration : 31 March 1995 - 15 January 1996
<b>United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)</b> Duration : 8 February 1995 - 30 June 1997
<b>United Nations Preventive Deployment Force in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP)</b> Duration : 31 March 1995 - 28 February 1999
<b>United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)</b> Duration : 21 December 1995 - 31 December 2002
<b>United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja And Western Sirmium (UNTAES)</b> Duration : 15 January 1996 - 15 January 1998
<b>United Nations Mission Of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)</b> Duration : 1 February 1996 - 15 December 2002
<b>United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)</b> Duration : 28 June 1996 - 31 July 1997
<b>United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)</b> Duration : 20 January 1997 - May 1997
<b>United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)</b> Duration : 30 June 1997 - February 1999
<b>United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)</b> Duration : 30 July 1997 - 30 November 1997
<b>United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)</b> Duration : 28 November 1997 - 15 March 2000
<b>United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNPSG)</b> Duration : 19 December 1997 - 15 October 1998
<b>United Nations Mission in The Central African Republic (MINURCA)</b> Duration : 27 March 1998 - 20 February 2000
<b>United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)</b> Duration : 13 July 1998 - 22 October 1999
<b>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)</b> Duration : 10 June 1999 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)</b> Duration : 25 October 1999 - 20 May 2002
<b>United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)</b> Duration : 22 October 1999 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of The Congo (MONUC)</b> Duration : 30 November 1999 - Ongoing

**TABLE 6 (Cont'd)**

<b>United Nations Mission in Ethiopia And Eritrea (UNMEE)</b> Duration : 15 September 2000 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)</b> Duration : 17 May 2002 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)</b> Duration : 19 September 2003 – Ongoing
<b>United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)</b> Duration : April 2004 – Ongoing
<b>United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)</b> Duration : June 2004 - Ongoing
<b>United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)</b> Duration : June 2004 – Ongoing
<b>United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS)</b> Duration : June 2004 - Ongoing

### **3.1. Change in the number of UN Peace Operations**

When we look at the above table, it seems reasonable to concur that the number of peace operations established in the post-Cold War era is a lot more than that of the Cold War. In other words, the number of UN peace operations increased dramatically after 1988. *Jett* (1999) labels the period between 1988 and 1993 as the 'expansion period' for UN peacekeeping. To illustrate, only in 1988 and 1989 five new operations were launched compared to the absence of new peacekeeping operations in the previous decade: UNGOMAP (UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 1988), UNIIMOG (UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group, 1988), UNAVEM (UN Angola Verification Group, 1989), UNTAG (UN Technical Assistance Group in Namibia, 1989), ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America, 1989).



**TABLE 7: Ongoing and Completed Peacekeeping Operations**

	<b>Total 1948 – 2004</b>	<b>Cold War 1948 – 1988</b>	<b>Post-Cold War 1988 - 2004</b>
<b>UN Peacekeeping Operations</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Completed</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Ongoing</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>

Compiled by the author, Source UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations Webpage

While during the Cold War, approximately 40 years, 15 peacekeeping operations were established, in the post-Cold War era, approximately 15 years, 41 peacekeeping operations were established.

### **3.2. More and More into the Internal Conflicts**

The target of the peace operations represents an important departure from the Cold War practices. In the post-Cold War era, UN peace operations were predominantly mandated upon the internal conflicts. It would be misleading to say that the number of internal conflict increased in the post-Cold War era. However, this type of conflict has become the most common one due to the decline of interstate conflicts. Although the number of internal conflicts did not increase dramatically in the post-Cold War era, this type of conflict has become the most common one due to the decline of interstate wars. This can be observed in the Table 8:

**TABLE 8: Interstate and Internal Conflicts in Numbers**

<b>Decade</b>	<b>Interstate Conflict</b>	<b>Internal Conflict</b>
<b>1950 – 1959</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>1960 – 1969</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>1970 – 1979</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>26</b>
<b>1980 – 1989</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>1990 – 1997*</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>24</b>

Source: Meredith, Reid Sarkees et al. (2003)

On the other hand, UN peace operations were mainly deployed in internal conflicts in the post-Cold War era.

**TABLE 9: Peace Operations and Types of Conflicts**

	<b>Cold War 1948 – 1988</b>	<b>Post-Cold War 1988 - 2004</b>
<b>Peace Operations</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>45</b>
<b>Interstate Conflicts</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Internal Conflicts</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>38</b>

Compiled by the author, Source UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations Webpage

These figures show that the number of conflicts (be it interstate or internal) did not increase dramatically. During 1970s, 36 conflicts did occur and in this period, just three peacekeeping operations were established: UNEF II, UNDOF, and UNIFIL. On the other hand, between 1990 and 1997, when the number of conflicts almost reaches that of 1970s, 29 new peacekeeping operations were set up.

### **3.3. Change in the Tasks of Peace Operations**

As discussed in the previous chapter, during the Cold War era, UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to the field between the warring parties in order to secure the (negative) peace through supervision, observance and monitoring the truces and withdrawals: UNTSO (Arab-Israeli truce), UNMOGIP (India-Pakistani truce), UNEF I (Egypt-Israeli truce), UNOGIL (observing Lebanese border against illegal infiltration of arms and personnel from outside), UNSF (truce in West New Guinea during the transition from Netherlands to Indonesia), UNYOM (disengagement between Saudi Arabia, United Arab Republic and Yemen), UNFICYP (preventing a relapse into violence and supervising the truce between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots), DOMREP (truce between the de facto authorities in the Dominican Republic), UNIPOM (truce between India and Pakistan), UNEF II (Egypt-Israeli truce), UNDOF (Israel-Syria truce), UNIFIL (withdrawal of Israeli force).

The record of UN peace operations has displayed a different picture in the post-Cold War era. In the lands of conflicts such as Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leona, East Timor, UN peace operations included radically different tasks. The mandate of the UN Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA) exemplifies this argument: "...to assist the Angolan parties in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, democratic development and rehabilitation of the country"<sup>5</sup>

The new peace operations tasks include supervising, verifying and monitoring free and fair elections, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, creation and training armed forces, reforming judicial and electoral systems, promoting civil law and order, promoting human rights, mine clearance, disarmament and demobilization, performing immigration and customs functions, humanitarian supplies, national reconciliation, confidence-building, democratic development, rehabilitation of countries, civil administration, promoting self-governance, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions and political participation, meeting human needs, promotion of rule of law and strengthening civil society, technical assistance for economic development etc., should be evaluated with respect to these short, medium and long-term measures in order to make up the deficiencies of the war-shattered states.

This qualitative transformation of UN peacekeeping is widely discussed in the literature trying to trace the 'evolution' of peacekeeping, which accordingly approached to peace operations through categorisation on the basis of their functions. The terms '*new peacekeeping*', '*second-generation peacekeeping*' or '*multidimensional peacekeeping*' are utilised to illustrate this evolution. (Thakur and Schnabel 2001, Ratner 1995, Weiss at al. 2001, Goulding 1993).

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<sup>5</sup> MONUA Webpage, [http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/monua\\_p.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/monua_p.htm), Accessed on 10 July 2006.

*Goulding* points out six types of peacekeeping. The first type is '**preventive deployment**', which refers to the deployment of UN troops before a conflict break out upon the request of one of the parties and on its territory only. Second type is '**traditional peacekeeping**', which refers to deployment of UN troops in order to support peacemaking by creating conditions in which political negotiations can be held. UNFYCIP might be given a good example for this type. Third type refers to the operations that are established to assist in the '**implementation of a comprehensive peace settlement**'. Operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone are of this sort. The fourth type refers to the operations, which are established '**to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief supplies**' during the conflict. In Somalia and Bosnia, this type of operation was set up. The fifth type is what Boutros-Ghali calls '**post-conflict peacebuilding**', which refers to the deployment of a UN force in a country where the institutions of a state have largely collapsed. The examples to the type three fit the type five as well. The last type peacekeeping according to *Goulding* is '**ceasefire enforcement**'. The difference between traditional peacekeeping and ceasefire enforcement is that the use of force is extended beyond the self-defence in the latter. (*Goulding* 1993: 456-460).

*Thakur and Schnabel* (2001) identify six types of peace operations under different rubrics. **First Generation of peacekeeping** is traditional peacekeeping whose distinguishing characteristics are consent and cooperation of parties to the conflict; international backing, especially in the UN Security Council; UN command and control; multinational composition; no use of force; military neutrality between the rival armies and political impartiality between the rival countries.

**Second generation** refers to non-UN peacekeeping, which is established outside the UN system such as the Commonwealth peacekeeping operation in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe or the Indian peacekeeping force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka. **Third Generation** refers to expanded peacekeeping and peace reinforcement which are part of package deals of peace agreements set up to implement the agreements such as UN peacekeeping operations Namibia and Cambodia etc. Peacekeeping operations of this generation perform tasks like military disengagement, demobilisation and cantonment; policing; human rights monitoring and enforcement; information

dissemination; observation, organisation and conduct of elections; rehabilitation; repatriation; administration; working with or overseeing the operations of regional or non-UN peacekeeping operations. **Fourth generation** refers to peace enforcement such as UN operations in Somalia. **Fifth generation** refers to peace restoration by partnership. This type of operations are undertaken by a single power or ad hoc multilateral coalitions authorised by UN Security Council such as United Task Force led by US in Somalia, US led Haiti operation, French led operation in Rwanda, NATO operation in Bosnia etc. **The last generation** refers to multinational peace restoration-UN state creation. An example of such operations is UN operation in East Timor.

*Ratner* (1995:21-24) talks about two types of peacekeeping: **traditional** and **new**, and argues that despite similar attributes between first or traditional and second or new generations peacekeeping, there are general distinctions. First of all, second-generation operations have mandates to assist a state or a group of states in implementing a political settlement. Secondly, second-generation peacekeeping operations include also non-military mandates and components. Thirdly, second-generation peacekeeping operations have peacebuilding agendas. Fourth, new or second-generation peacekeeping operations are established to respond both interstate and internal conflicts. Fifth, various types of actors function second-generation peacekeeping operations beside UN peacekeepers. Lastly, new peacekeeping operations' mandate may be changed in accordance with the situation in the field.

### **3.4. Transformation in the Understanding of Peace Operations**

To analyze the mandates of peace operations, which were established in the post-Cold War era, enables us trace the changes in the tasks of peace operations. Yet, the categorization of peacekeeping operations based on their tasks was already discussed in the previous section. It was also argued that such categorizations seem not to give fruitful outcomes for understanding general evolution of UN peacekeeping. What is needed to understand the evolution of UN peacekeeping is to sort out the distinct

characteristics of peacekeeping understandings over the time. In this line, *Banerjee* (2005) argues that UN peacekeeping has passed through four distinct phases since beginning. Accordingly, the phase that is called traditional peacekeeping refers to first stage. The second stage is second-generation peacekeeping, which are complex operations after the end of the Cold War. According to Banerjee, the period, which came after the Srebrenica in 1995 resulting in shrinking of peacekeeping and growing regionalisation, is the third stage. The last stage is the period of resurgence of peacekeeping in failing and failed states such as Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Democratic Republic of Congo with growing humanitarian considerations. (Banerjee 2005:1-14)

In the same vein, *Woodhouse and Ramsbotham* (2005) put forward that UN peacekeeping has been through three major phases of development. Accordingly, the first phase refers to classical or traditional phase, second one is multidimensional phase and the third one is mid and late 1990s when peace support operations emerged. For them, the UN peacekeeping is currently at the third phase and it is currently moving to another period of transition. (Woodhouse and Ramsbotham 2005:139-156)

These classifications offered by *Banerjee* (2005) and *Woodhouse and Ramsbotham* (2005) seem to be helpful for our purposes. Particularly, the current phase i.e. resurgence of UN peacekeeping in failing and failed states with growing humanitarian consideration will be the focus of the next sections of the thesis as in this current phase, the objectives of traditional UN peacekeeping operations i.e. maintaining peace and security and state sovereignty seem to be combined with human rights and socio-economic development. (Aksu 2003:28-29)

Based on the starting point of the thesis that the understanding of peace operations have changed in the post-Cold War era, it will be argued that a transformation took place through two interrelated aspects of peace operations in the current phase of UN peacekeeping. Those are namely growing integration of peacebuilding into the peacekeeping operations and change of the end-goal of peace operations.

### 3.4.1. *Peacebuilding Rising*

The first aspect of transformation in the understanding of peace operations is the integration of peacebuilding into the peace operations. It is the stance of this thesis that peacebuilding instrument has been increasingly utilised in the post-Cold War era. Before proceeding further, it seems necessary to make a conceptual clarification on peacebuilding.

*Johan Galtung*<sup>6</sup> identified three methods of international action to peace: peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding. Accordingly, *peacekeeping* aims to ‘halt and reduce the manifest violence of the conflict through the intervention of military forces in an interpository role. *Peacemaking* refers to actions ‘directed at reconciling political and strategical attitudes through mediation, negotiation, arbitration and conciliation’. *Peacebuilding* means addressing ‘the practical implementation of peaceful social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development’.

Former Secretary General *Boutros-Ghali* (1992:10-3) identified four types of international actions to peace:

*Preventive Diplomacy* aims ‘to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts, and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’.

*Peacemaking* aims ‘to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the UN Charter’.

*Peacekeeping* refers to ‘the deployment of a UN presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all parties concerned, normally involving UN military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well’.

*Peacebuilding* is an international action ‘to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’.

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<sup>6</sup> Johan Galtung (1976) (ed.): *Peace, War, and Defence: Essays in Peace Research. Volume II*. Copenhagen: Christian Ejlertsen, cited in Oliver Ramsbotham (2000 : 170)

According to *Bertram* (1995:388), peacebuilding missions tend to have following characteristics: they deal with conflicts within rather than between states; the host government is one of the parties to the conflict; their aim is to develop and/or implement a political transition following or accompanying an end to military hostilities; and a central component is the reform or establishment of basic state institutions.

It is possible to situate these strategies of international involvement into conflict phases to grasp a better picture. According to *Ryan* (2000:34), the main stages of conflict might be conceptualised as follows:

Stage		Strategy
1. Pre-violence	→	Conflict Prevention
2. Escalation	→	Crisis/Humanitarian Intervention
3. Endurance	→	Peacemaking and Relief Work
4. De-escalation	→	Peacemaking and 'traditional peacekeeping'
5. Post-violence	→	Peacebuilding/transformation

During the Cold War, peace operations were used only for stage 4 (traditional peacekeeping) with the purpose to 'De-escalate' conflicts through truce supervision, observance and monitoring. Even though some of the operations were conducted inside the states only two operations moved beyond traditional peacekeeping: ONUC and UNSF. In the post-Cold War era, practices of UN peace operations have entailed the approach to combine the stages 4 and 5 (De-escalation and Post-violence) (*Ryan* 2000).

As seen above, UN peace operations acted in the post-violence stage of the conflicts with the purpose to transform the conflictual relationships into peaceful ones through peacebuilding in the lands of conflict like Namibia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Mozambique, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and East Timor etc. An important characteristics of UN peacekeeping missions having peacebuilding dimension is that peacebuilding is exclusively a '*post-conflict action*' and peacebuilding follows the political settlement i.e. peace agreements (*Ramsbotham* 2000). The missions were mandated after peace agreements were reached between the parties to the conflicts and their mandates were concerned with these peace agreements.



Regarding the peacebuilding dimensions of peace operations, Secretary General *Boutros-Ghali* identified the main tasks of peacebuilding as disarmament, repatriation of refugees, training of security personnel, monitoring elections, protecting human rights, reforming and strengthening governmental institutions and political participation etc. (1992). The *Brahimi Report* (2000), which elaborated the challenge to peace operations and made recommendations to improve peace operations upon the request of Secretary General *Kofi Annan*, added the peacebuilding roles meeting human needs, promotion of rule of law and strengthening civil society, technical assistance for economic development.

The Millennium Report reflects on the changes in peace operations regarding the tasks and types of personnel:

Peacekeeping has become more complicated because peacekeepers must now undertake a greatly expanded range of tasks. Beyond interposition forces and multidisciplinary operations to assist the parties to implement agreements, peacekeepers over the past year have assumed responsibility for interim administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, balancing the competing and sometimes contradictory tasks of governing those territories, supporting the emergence of local institutions and maintaining law and order. The assumption of these new responsibilities has required that the United Nations expand and adapt the profile of peacekeepers in the field. Over a little more than a year, reflecting in particular the deployment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor, the authorized deployment of police has jumped from approximately 2,500 to over 8,600, a more than threefold increase. In addition, these new missions have obliged the United Nations to recruit lawyers and judges; city administrators; and experts in customs, fiscal management, public utilities, health, education, sanitation and agriculture. (Millennium Report 2000:9)

On the other hand, it must be stated that UN also established peacekeeping operations with the traditional mandates of supervision, observing and monitoring ceasefires and withdrawals short of peacebuilding in the post-Cold War era. If peace operations are analyzed case by case, it would be possible to see that peace operations have developed in ad hoc way in response to specific problems and that peace operations displayed differences, which allow us to assert that not all operations during the Cold War were of traditional and not all peace operations after the Cold war were of a distinct understanding. Furthermore, chronological

categorization of peace operations and their mandates causes certain anomalies. To illustrate, ONUC denies such categorization (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:12-14). In this sense, the mandates of United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan And Pakistan (UNGOMAP), United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), United Nations Angola Verification Mission I (UNAVEM I), United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM), United Nations Observer Mission Uganda/Rwanda (UNOMUR), United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG), United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of The Congo (MONUC), United Nations Mission in Ethiopia And Eritrea (UNMEE) did not amount to peacebuilding even though they are post-Cold War era operations.

### ***3.4.2. Changing the End-Goal of Peace Operations***

The increasing use of peacebuilding i.e. international action ‘to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict’ with the words of Boutros-Ghali, has been hand in hand with the change in the end-goal of peace operations. As *Keohane* (2003:275) maintains the success of military intervention (peacekeeping) is linked to economic and political reconstruction in the post-Cold War era.

As discussed before, during the Cold War era, the normality has been the use of traditional peacekeeping which aimed to control violence in order to pave the way for restoring the status quo ante through observing the peace (monitoring and reporting on the maintenance of ceasefires) and keeping the peace (providing a buffer zone between parties). In other words, peacekeeping defended status quo, which was supposed to create condition for peace negotiations and settlements. The main rationale behind peacekeeping during the Cold War was to prevent proxy wars from escalating into superpower conflicts.

In the post-Cold War era, upon the military intervention, the goal of peace operations has turned out to be ‘to create stable forms of governance that deliver services and security to the population while respecting the rule of law’. (Ignatieff 2003:306)

According to *Bellamy et al.* (2004), peace operations might be analyzed and distinguished by the *desired ends* or *what they mean to achieve*. Five different types of operations are put forward on the ground of their desired ends, which are hoped to be achieved rather than the means, which are employed: Traditional peacekeeping operations, Managing transition operations, Wider peacekeeping operations, Peace Enforcement operations and Peace-support operations.

**Traditional peacekeeping operations** rest on three principles: consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality and the minimum use of force, also called Holy Trinity. The end goal of such operations is to bring peace between states through opening necessary political space for the parties to reach an agreement after ceasefire. (*Bellamy et al.* 2004:95) Traditional peacekeeping is discussed in Part II more in detail. UNTSO, UNEF I and II in Egypt, UNFICYP in Cyprus and UNIFIL are examples of traditional peacekeeping.

**Managing transition operations** are intended to facilitate and implement a settlement, which is agreed by the disputing parties within states, only after an agreement. Although the consent of the parties is obtained, it is towards the implementation of an agreed political settlement. (*Bellamy et al.* 2004:5) Managing transition operations follow both a ceasefire and a political settlement and peacekeepers are deployed only after the settlement is concluded which is devised and agreed by the parties to the conflict. Therefore, the role of peacekeepers is only to oversee the implementation of the settlement. UNTAG in Namibia, ONUSAL in El Salvador and UNTAC in Cambodia are cases of managing transition operations. (*Bellamy et al.* 2004:111)


**Wider peacekeeping operations** came into existence due to the environment of ongoing internal conflict. While the mandate of traditional peacekeeping was being carried out, additional tasks were introduced out of necessity in Bosnia, Rwanda and in Sierra Leone. The breaches of ceasefires and agreements, which allowed the establishment of traditional or managing transition operations, have paved the way for the development of wider peacekeeping operations. In other words, while peacekeepers carry out both traditional and non-traditional tasks such as separation

of forces, disarming the belligerents, organising and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, protecting civilian UN personnel and those from other governmental and non-governmental organisations, guaranteeing freedom of movement, host state capacity building, monitoring ceasefires and enforcing no-fly zones, they are bound with the principles of traditional peacekeeping i.e. holy trinity. Wider peacekeeping can be given example of the ad hoc nature of peacekeeping as 'it is an ad hoc response to a changing conflict environment and the addition of new tasks'. (Bellamy et al. 2004)

**Peace Enforcement operations** are those under the Chapter VII of the UN Charter, coming closer to the collective security. Chapter VII allows the Security Council to determine when a threat or breach of international peace and security takes place; to order provisional measures and to order enforcement measure. UN used Chapter VII sanctions on 24 occasions between 1946 and 1989 compared to 166 Chapter VII resolutions between 1990 and 1999. UN involvement in Korea (1950-3), in Gulf War (1990-1), in the Congo (1960-4), in Somalia (1992-5), in Haiti (1990-7) are cases of such type. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:146-7)

**Peace-support operations** are intended to help establish liberal democratic societies inside the states with robust military forces and strong civilian component: civil administration, humanitarian elements and civilian police. Peace-support operations take place when the violence is halted and a political settlement is reached. The end goal is '*to transform war-torn societies into liberal democratic societies*'. Peace support operations come before the installation of an interim UN administration aiming to establish a functioning (liberal democratic) state. The end goal of peace support operations is to establish the rule of law, democratic institutions and state capacities and when this is fulfilled, UN administration yields to democratically elected leaders. (Bellamy et al. 2004:165)

**TABLE 10: Transformation of Conflict**




Compiled by the author, Source Bellamy et al. (2004)

If we situate the types of UN peace operations as identified by Bellamy et al. (2004) and their goals, it seems reasonable to argue that while traditional peacekeeping takes place in situation 1, managing transition operations in situation 2, wider peacekeeping operations was born in situation 1.1 and 2.1. On the other hand, peace enforcement operations take place when there is 'violence', getting back to the chart above. Furthermore, peace-support operations follow situation 2 until stable peace. The formulation of *Bellamy et al.* (2004) summarized above helps us to clarify to what purposes or goals peace operations are to serve in the post-Cold War era.

If traditional peacekeeping and its traditional goal is placed on the one side of a spectrum, peace-support operations with a heavy agenda of peacebuilding constitute the other extreme.

**TABLE 11: Peacebuilding Dimension in Peace Operations**



Compiled by the author, Source: Bellamy et al. (2004)

Departing from the traditional peacekeeping, operations along this continuum contain peacebuilding dimensions i.e. international action 'to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse

into conflict'. Therefore, the transformation with regard to the end-goal of peace operations might be articulated as a transition from defending the status qua ante (traditional peacekeeping) to preventing a relapse into conflict (peacebuilding).

The issues of success in peace operations reflect both the transformation of peace operations understanding and of end goals of peace operations. *Pushkina* (2006) offers four broad criteria of success for peace operations: namely to limit violent conflict in the host state, to reduce human suffering, to prevent the spread of conflict beyond the object state's borders and finally to promote conflict resolution i.e. to create a stable environment that is capable of preventing the recurrence of hostilities after the mission leaves. (Pushkina 2006:134-5) Those criteria of success clearly display that with inclusion of peacebuilding tasks and changing end-goals, the post-Cold War peace operations have a distinct understanding than the Cold War operations.

It was already mentioned before that UN involvement in internal conflicts is not a post-Cold War era developments. Rather UN peacekeeping was utilised in internal conflicts such as ONUC, UNSF, UNFICYP and DOMREP. *Aksu* (2003) puts forward that UN involvement in internal conflicts has two periods of intensity: 1960 and 1990s. Those four UN peacekeeping operations were established between 1960 and 1965. *Aksu* (2003) argues that from 1960s to 1990s, the international normative framework behind UN peacekeeping in internal conflicts has changed. Accordingly, the 1960s witnessed the utilisation of UN peacekeeping in internal conflicts with emphasis on international dimensions of internal conflicts. These dimensions concern the two of the fundamental Charter objectives: peace and security and state sovereignty. In other words, the main objectives of ONUC, UNSF, UNFICYP and DOMREP were to maintain international peace and security and protect state sovereignty. During this period, other two fundamental Charter objectives i.e. human rights and socio-economic development were ignored. *Aksu* (2003) continues that in the 1990s human rights and socio-economic development considerations have been embedded in UN peace operations in internal conflicts and 'maintaining *international* peace and security' has lost little of its centrality. Hence, the post-Cold War UN Peace Operations have integrated the fundamental Charter Objectives,

peace and security, state sovereignty, human rights and socio-economic development, into UN's peace and security function. (Aksu 2003:210-219) Indeed, these arguments confirm the criteria for success of peace operations, which is offered by *Pushkina* (2006) and discussed above.

The next part will try to identify what 'transforming the conflict', 'preventing a relapse into conflict' or 'social change through socio-economic reconstruction and development' has referred to in international action through operations in the post-Cold War era.

## CHAPTER 4

### EXPLAINING TRANSFORMATION OF PEACEKEEPING: THEORETICAL DISCUSSION

In the previous chapter, both changes in the peace operations and the transformation in the understanding of peace operations are sorted out. According to *Cockayne and Malone* (2005), the shift from 'to buttress essentially self-enforcing cease-fires during the Cold War' to 'to build the foundations of a self-renewing peace' are the consequences of five evolutions concerning peacekeeping. Those are namely the end of the Cold War constraints, involvement in internal conflicts, increasing role for regional organisations, the impact of North-South politics and different considerations in mandate of peace operations. (Cockayne and Malone 2005:7)

Generally, the changes or transformation that took place with regard to UN peace operations have been linked to the end of the Cold War by the 'Conventional End of the Cold War Explanations'. However, such explanations fail to identify causal links between the end of the Cold War and the changes and transformation of peace operations (Jakobsen 2002).

On the other hand, according to *Aksu* (2003), the dynamics underlying the interaction between the UN peace operations, internal conflicts and relevant actors' understanding of governance is missing in the literature.

In line with the triangular interaction pointed out by *Aksu* (2003) and causal links between the end of the Cold War and transformation of peace operations emphasised by *Jakobsen* (2002), this rest of the chapter will try to discuss the transformation of peace operations understanding in the post-Cold War era.



Two causal links between the end of Cold War and transformation of peace operations will be offered. The first one concerns the supply for peace operations (liberal internationalism) and the second one concerns the target of peace operations (lands of internal conflicts). Yet, one deeper cause will be put forward which lies behind those two causal links. This deeper cause is the transformation of international norms related to international involvement in internal conflicts.

In order to provide a satisfactory answer to the question posed in the beginning of this thesis i.e. *How can the transformation in the understanding of peacekeeping operations that took place in the post-Cold War era be explained?*, a theoretical perspective will be utilized with the help of general assumptions of International Society approach and also constructivist assumptions.

#### **4.1. International Society, Order and Peace Operations**

In section 2.3., it was proposed to situate UN peace operations within the '*International Society*' approach of Bull (1977). Mainly, the distinction between 'system of states' and 'society of states', the concept of order and the way it is maintained by the international society, goals of the international society and the way they are pursued are briefly discussed in the aforementioned section. There is some use in recalling the main goals of the international society: the preservation of the system and society of states itself, maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states, goal of peace in the sense of the absence of war among members. It was also argued that in order to realise these goals, International Society supervises in an *authoritative* manner the behaviour of the members in accordance with the common norms and rules through institutions, main ones being international law and diplomacy. Furthermore, these institutions are bound by the dominant norms of the international society like states being the primary units of the system, non-interference in the domestic realms of states and sovereignty of states. An important assumption of this thesis has been considering peace operations as a *sub-institution* and as an international instrument that International Society may employ to guide the behaviour of member states with a view to achieve the goals.

During the Cold War, as a normality, peace operations or peacekeeping were used with the goal to control violence so as to pave the way for restoring the status quo ante through observing the peace (monitoring and reporting on the maintenance of ceasefires) and keeping the peace (providing a buffer zone between parties). In other words, peacekeeping defended status quo, which was supposed to create condition for peace negotiations and settlements. The main rationale behind peacekeeping during the Cold War was to prevent proxy wars from escalating into superpower conflicts.

In this sense, it seems reasonable to assert that the understanding of peacekeeping was defined by the international society's goals, namely to preserve the system and society of states itself; to maintain the independence or external sovereignty of individual states; the goal of peace in the sense of absence of war among members. The goal of peace is subordinated to the first one, the preservation of society. These goals are to be pursued in order to maintain the order. The rules and institutions are also identified by International Society to preserve order thereby pursuing the goals mentioned above. During the Cold War, proxy wars, which were interstate wars, were the most important challenge for the International Society as they represented breaches to all the goals identified above. A proxy war was against the goal of peace i.e. absence of war among the members; a proxy war was against the goal maintaining the independence or external sovereignty of individual states and thereby against the goal of preserving the system and society of states itself. Hence, peacekeeping was born as an innovation within the UN system, which was a by-product of institutions of International Society, international law and diplomacy. Peacekeeping is to be considered as an instrument or sub-institution at the use of International Society to lead the members in an *authoritative* manner in accordance with its common norms and rules such as state sovereignty and non-intervention. Therefore, it seems logical to argue that the parameters of International Society have determined the parameters of peace operations.

In the post-Cold War, this formula has transformed. The main challenge is no longer proxy (interstate) wars but internal conflicts, which directly disturb the International Society as they mean that the building blocks of the Society itself i.e. states encounter serious problems including failure and collapse. In line with the articulation of Bull, as the parameters of International Society has transformed, so did those of peace operations: the order in the International Society and the goals now necessitates an international action '*to bring the (sovereign) state back in*' after solving its problems and therefore involving in domestic spheres of its members.

However, UN involvement in internal conflicts through peace operations should not be considered as a novelty of post-Cold War era. Congo Civil War and ONUC exemplified the involvement of the UN in internal conflicts through peace operations. The thin line is that what had been considered as '*anomaly*' during the Cold War i.e. involvement in internal conflicts has turned out to be '*normality*' in the post-Cold War: as the parameters of actions of International Society have changed enabling the UN to involve in internal conflicts. (Bellamy et al. 2004, Cockayne and Malone 2004, Aksu 2003)

In the following part, these arguments will be complemented with the some of the constructivist assumptions in order to provide a theoretical basis for the transformation of UN peace operations understanding.

#### **4.2. 'Transformation'**

First point about constructivism might be that there is no one coherent constructivism. Rather there are different constructivist approaches. Similarly, they are not exclusively applied in political science. They are mainly about how the social world is constituted. In this sense, they might be applied in other disciplines as well e.g. sociology. In this sense, constructivism might be considered a 'method' (Checkel 1998:324), 'analytical framework' (Reus-Smith 1996:222) or a 'specific position in the philosophy of the social science' (Christiansen *et al.* 1999:530).

Accordingly, it is not a ‘substantive’ or ‘grand’ theory. Connected to these arguments, this thesis holds the view that constructivism is a method of social inquiry, which has certain assumptions, and these assumptions also form the common ground among the various constructivist approaches. Yet, it is possible to develop a grand theory by developing building upon constructivist assumptions like *Wendt’s Social Constructivism* (Wendt 1992, 1999).

Constructivist approaches agree that ontologically there exists a world independent of our minds. Yet they oppose the assumption that this world is independent of our knowledge and it constitutes itself. Rather, the world independent of our minds is constructed by our interpretations, which are based on ‘a shared system of codes and symbols, of languages, life-worlds, social practices’. In other words, the knowledge of the reality independent of our minds is socially constructed (Guzzini 2000:160).

Constructivist approaches distinguish between material and social world. The social world is composed of inter-subjective structures, which give material world its meaning. In other words, material structures are interpreted in the social context of inter-subjective structures (Reus-Smith 1996:216-7, Checkel 1998:325-6, Bretherton and Vogler 1999:28). In this sense, ‘inter-subjective meanings, norms, rules, institutions, routinized practices, discourse, constitutive and/or deliberate processes, symbolic politics, imagined and/or epistemic communities, communicative action, collective identity formation’ are some of inter-subjective structures that constructivist approaches focus upon (Christiansen *et al.* 1999: 530).

Another assumption of constructivist approaches is the agency/structure interaction. The social world is pictured in “a dialectical relationship between agency and structure” (Bretherton and Vogler 1999:29). In this sense, structures provide opportunities and constraints for agents. Yet, they are shaped by the agencies. In this dialectical relationship, agencies and structures mutually constitute each other. (Checkel, 1998:325-6, Bretherton and Vogler 1999:28-29, Reus-Smit, 1996:218). This mutual constitution can be defined as “a cyclical process of social construction and reconstruction” (Bretherton and Vogler, 1999:29).

The processes of construction and reconstruction cause changes in the norms. Agents' practices can change the knowledge about the reality. This causes change in norms and inter-subjective structures. The changes in the structures in turn constraint and to some extent determine agents' practices. In sum, constructivist approaches imply that knowledge and social world are socially constructed (Guzzini 2000).

This thesis discusses a bunch of issues like the UN's role in international peace and security, peacekeeping, internal conflicts, and liberal democratic paradigm. It seems obvious that one grand theory cannot be sufficient to account for all those. In this sense, this thesis will use constructivist method and its assumptions in this thesis. In other words, the thesis will use constructivist lenses to evaluate the topics.

One of the main contributions of constructivist perspectives is 'to include the impact of norms and ideas on the construction of identities and behaviour' (Christiansen *et al.* 1999: 532). Connected to this point, the main use of constructivist methods seems to be in the ability to explain 'change' or 'transformation'. In this sense, constructivist lenses might help us explain and understand the transformation of UN peace operations.

#### ***4.2.1. Peacekeeping, Liberal Internationalism and 'Transformation'***

Through the constructivist perspective of "a dialectical relationship between agency and structure", the evolution of peace operations might be analysed. As pointed out before, the nature of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War years was shaped by the interaction between the Cold War parameters (structure) and role of UN in peace and security (agent), which (re)produced 'peacekeeping'. Peacekeeping was bound by the norms of the international system like non-interference in the internal affairs of the states, which is enshrined in the UN Charter by the article 2(7). In this context, the main rationale behind peacekeeping during the Cold War was to prevent proxy wars from escalating into superpower conflicts.

The end of the Cold War system has also brought transformation in the parameters of international politics. Accordingly, the norms of international system such as non-interference in internal affairs of states have been adjusted to the new parameters. In this context, rise of liberal democracy and the belief in spreading liberal democracy have shaped the parameters of international system in the post-Cold War era.

As proposed above the new parameter of International Society i.e. *internal conflicts are to be responded as they disturb the very society itself* is compounded with the liberal democracy understanding or what Paris (1997) calls *liberal internationalism*.

Out of interaction between these parameters and peace operations, peace operations have become an instrument that the UN utilizes in liberal restructuring of domestic realms in the lands of internal conflicts in line with the western norms like market economy, liberal democracy and human rights. (Paris 1997, 2000 and 2003, Jakobsen 2002, Rambotsam 2000) According to Paris (1997:56), the work of international agencies involved in peacebuilding seems to be guided by '*paradigm of liberal internationalism*'. Accordingly, this paradigm is based on the assumption that 'the surest foundation for peace... is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and a market-oriented economy' and building liberal democratic governance requires 'a functioning civil society, the rule of law, effective and accountable police forces, civilian control of the armed forces and an independent media'. (Bellamy et al. 2004:31)

In the post-Cold War era, which has been through the paradigm of liberal internationalism, domestic realms of states have been opened to international reach. While during the Cold War era, involvement in internal conflicts and liberal restructuring of domestic realms were seen 'anomaly', in the paradigm of liberal internationalism it has turn out to be 'normality'. According to Paris, the essence of liberalism is "the protection of individual freedom, the reduction of state power and the conviction that power is legitimate only if it is based on consent and respects basic freedoms."

Liberal internationalism refers to “an activist foreign policy that promotes liberal principles abroad, especially through multilateral cooperation and international institutions.” *Paris* continues that the Western understanding of democracy has come to be regarded as the accurate definition of democracy; and market-oriented economies as the fastest way to prosperity. (1997:59-61)

Another perspective belongs to *Bellamy et al.* (2004) who argue that the role of peacekeeping in international politics differs in Westphalian terms and post-Westphalian terms. While the former limits its role to ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes and orderly relations between states, post-Westphalian terms brings more comprehensive understanding of the liberal-democratic peace thesis. According to the Westphalian peacekeeping, ideological persuasion and political organisation of the states are not concerns of peacekeepers as long as states do not deny the Westphalian norms of sovereign autonomy and non-intervention. In the extreme, this perspective also rules out human suffering within states from as a concern as long as human suffering does not threaten order and maintenance of peace and security in the system. On the other hand, post-Westphalian understanding of peacekeeping rests on the assumption that the nature of a state's domestic society affects international behaviour hence liberal-democratic societies within states bring liberal relations among states. This perspective does not limit threats to international peace and security to acts of aggression between states but also include violent conflicts and illiberal governance within states. As a result, post-Westphalian peacekeeping is to both maintain order between states and also ensure peace and security within states. “This is to be achieved by creating liberal democratic societies and polities within states that have experienced violent conflict”. (*Bellamy et al.* 2004)

*Bellamy et al.* (2004) asserts that theory and practice of peacekeeping reflect a commitment to liberal peace. While Westphalian peacekeeping serves the liberal peace between states through creating institutions and spaces for peaceful settlement of disputes (traditional peacekeeping), the role of post-Westphalian peacekeeping is to spread democracy thus reducing the likelihood of war between and within states in accordance with the liberal peace theory.




Figure 2: Post-Westphalian Understanding of Peace

In the post-Westphalian form of peacekeeping, the principal aim is not to create institutions and spaces for states to resolve disputes but to protect and spread liberal democratic governance: in the absence of widespread liberal democracy, there will be always a tendency for non-democratic states to resort to war. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004)

Globalisation perspective is also related to this point. *Jakobsen* (2002) asserts that the ‘acceleration in the globalization of the market economy, democracy and human rights that has been triggered by the Western victory in the Cold War’ is the link between ‘the end of the Cold war and ‘the dramatic changes in the number and nature of peace operations’. In other words, the acceleration of globalisation in the post-Cold War era has resulted in the transformation of peacekeeping in nature. He identifies three developments which have caused this acceleration: (a) ‘the introduction of economic and political conditionality in Western development and assistance programmes served to generate demand for peace operations by contributing to state collapse and outbreak of armed conflicts in the Third World’; (b) ‘the change in norms that made it possible to launch peace operations in support of human rights and democracy served to increase the supply of peace operations aimed at promoting these goals; (c) ‘the intense media coverage of human rights violations and atrocities generated intervention pressures that also had the effect of



increasing the supply of peace operations aimed at promoting democracy and *humanitarian* objectives'. (Jakobsen 2003:268-9) Jakobsen continues that globalisation initially transformed the number and nature of peace operations. Then, peace operations have become agents of globalisation.

In the same vein, Bellamy *et al.* (2004:3) argues that globalisation, triggered three important developments with regard to the environment where peacekeeping operates. First, globalisation forced the UN and its members to pay greater attention to non-state actors such as humanitarian NGOs, international financial institutions (IFIs) and 'warlords' who may play important roles in either maintaining or disrupting international peace and security. Second, hegemonic role of US has had important reflection upon theory and practice of peacekeeping. Third, a distinctive form of violent conflict has been triggered by globalisation, which reflects the ongoing erosion of states monopoly on legitimate organised violence.

Paradigm of liberal internationalism has also determined the proper instrument to respond internal conflicts: peacebuilding. In this sense, peacebuilding works have been dominated by liberal internationalism and by the purpose to transform war-shattered states into market democracies in order bring sustainable peace.

*Paris* summarizes this point:

Peacebuilding is in effect an enormous experiment in social engineering - an experiment that involves transplanting Western models of social, political, and economic organisation into war-shattered states in order to control civil conflict: in other words, pacification through political and economic liberalisation. (Paris 1997:56)

Peace operations in the post-Cold War era are to address the challenge of the internal conflicts. The challenge of internal conflicts is quite different and complicated compared to interstate conflicts. During the Cold War, peacekeeping meant observing and keeping the peace by interposing between warring parties of interstate conflicts. Peacekeeping defended status quo which was supposed to provide condition for peace settlement. (*Weiss et al.* 2001: 55)

The picture is complicated in the post-Cold War when peacekeeping has been mostly utilised in internal conflicts where peace operations are supposed to do more than observing and monitoring in order to prevent violence relapsing into conflict to be successful. The risks and costs for operations in internal conflicts are much greater than for traditional peacekeeping; furthermore, the complexity of the tasks of these missions and the volatility of the situation on the ground have tendency to increase together.

Since the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping has often combined with peacebuilding in complex peace operations deployed into settings of intra-state conflict. Those conflict setting, however, both affect and are affected by outside actors: political patrons; regional powers that send their own forces into the fray; and neighbouring states that host refugees who are sometimes systematically forced to flee their homes. With such significant cross-border effects by state and non-state actors alike, these conflicts are often decidedly 'transnational' in character. (Brahimi Report 2000: 3)

In this sense, internal conflicts pose more complicated challenges to peace operations since root causes of the conflict must be addressed so as to provide a durable peace. Liberal democracy is considered as the right form of governance, which is able to address the root causes of internal conflicts. In sum, the post-Cold War parameters of International Society i.e. 'internal conflicts are to be liberally transformed' have brought an understanding that the desired end goal for peace operations has turned out to be '*bringing back the (sovereign) state in liberal democratic form*'.

#### ***4.2.2. Peace Operations, Human Security and Sovereignty***

The post-Cold era, which can be defined as the era between the fall of the Berlin Wall and the terrorist attacks to the US on 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001, contained transformation in almost all dimensions, actors and tools of the International Society. The Cold War paradigm was replaced by the 'New World Order', which was left to speculations in the absence of a clear definition. Multilateralism might be the concept that was mostly used by those who wanted to fill in the new paradigm.

At the age of multilateralism, the means of International Society were adjusted to the new security challenges. While during the Cold War era, the primary security concern was inter-state war, in the post-Cold War era this has been replaced by internal conflicts related issues. As the Millennium Report<sup>7</sup> points out:

The demands made on the United Nations reflect a shift in the nature of the threats to peace and security since the end of the Cold War: from inter-state conflict to intra-state conflict; from the violation of people to a much greater emphasis on the violation of people. Where conflicts were once driven by the ideological divisions of a bipolar world, they are now fuelled by ethnic and religious intolerance, political ambition and greed and are often exacerbated by the illicit traffic in arms, gems and drugs. (Millennium Report 2000:4)

Human security has several dimensions: Firstly, the focus is on individual not on state. In this sense, referent object of security is shifted from state to individual. It emphasizes the need to meet basic human needs, to promote justice and political participation. Another point to add, human security concerns based on human needs are generally expressed in collective terms. (Thomas 2001)

*Peou* (2005) uses the concept of ‘collaborative human security’ and defines it “as something done for a common purpose by different actors, aiming to promote the security interests of other individuals or to meet their security needs”. (Peou 2005:88) The answers of human security to the question of ‘what is being secured and against what?’ is quite different from traditional state centric and military security. In human security concept, the referent (what is being secured) is not state but societies, groups and individuals. Secondly, the threats to human security (against what?) stem from various sources such as political repression and violations of human rights, hunger, disease, illicit drugs and organized crime.

According to Peou, human security is freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want. Freedom from the fear of want has socio-economic nature and it covers poverty, unemployment, hunger, crime and environmental degradation. (Peou 2005:88- 90)

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<sup>7</sup> Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organisation, 2000, General Assembly Official Records, Fifty-fifth session Supplement No. 1(A/55/1), <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/>, Accessed on 7 July 2006.

Human security has become salient in international politics and this concept has been embedded to UN system in the post-Cold War era. It seems reasonable to argue that human security has become a priority for collective international action. (Peou 2002, Chandler 2001 and Bilgin 2003)

Although human security defines fear in humanistic terms, military methods to achieve human security are not ruled out such as humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. In this sense, when states fail to provide freedom from the fear of violent death, political subjugation and want i.e. human security, collective international action is well legitimized in human security concept. (Peou 2005:90-91)

As Tschirgi (2003) tells us, the mismatch between means of International Society that are well designed for the traditional state centric security concerns and the new security agenda with repercussions on human security concerns such as civilian deaths, widespread suffering and massive refugee and population flows at the core has resulted in the rethinking of the conventional separation between ‘security and development’ between ‘interstate and internal conflicts’, between ‘international and domestic realms’. She considers peacebuilding as bridging security and development at the international and domestic levels offering an integrated approach to deal with all kind of security concerns. (Tschirgi 2003)

Indeed, this last remark brings us to the starting point of the thesis that UN peacekeeping operations has transformed in the post-Cold War era. While traditional peacekeeping was designed to deal with *interstate security* concerns in *international* sphere, in the post-Cold War era UN peace operations have opened the *domestic* realms of countries having *internal conflicts* with *human security and socio-economic development* among the priorities through the integration of peacebuilding dimension.

The dichotomy of international and domestic brings the issue of sovereignty to the agenda. International involvement in internal conflicts has been a source of debates at the core of which lies sovereignty. Regarding the international involvement in

internal conflicts, although the issue of humanitarian intervention causes discord for classical notion of sovereignty, peace operations triggers discussion for post-intervention sovereignty. *Krasner (2004)* identifies three elements of conventional sovereignty: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty and domestic sovereignty. While international legal sovereignty refers to juridically recognition of independent territorial entities, Westphalian sovereignty refers to non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. On the other hand, domestic sovereignty refers to nature of domestic authority structures and the extent to which those structures are able to control activities within states' boundaries. According to Krasner, these three elements of sovereignty support and reinforce each other in ideal system; however, the contemporary world contains states that still preserve their legal and even Westphalian sovereignty despite poor domestic sovereignty performance. (*Krasner 2004:87-88*) In this sense, as *Jackson (2004)* points out peace operations activities might be summarised as 'responding to a sovereignty problem' and 'responding to a governance problem'. (*Jackson 2004:21-36*)

At this point, it seems reasonable to argue that human security is embedded in domestic sovereignty and the poor performance of the latter diminishes the former. While international intervention such as humanitarian intervention for human security considerations concerns Westphalian sovereignty, peace operations activities in the post-intervention era concern domestic sovereignty. In other words, the end goal of peace operations has turned out to be to establish domestic sovereignty with human security considerations at its core in the current stage of peace operations understanding.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Regarding the end goal of peace operations, there is an interesting discussion on sovereignty. *Krasner (2004)*, *Keohane (2003)* and *Ignatieff (2003)* question whether failing or failed states should be still treated in line with Westphalian sovereignty or which type of sovereignty should be re-established in those lands. *Krasner (2004)* argues that 'shared sovereignty' would be a viable option for failed states. In shared sovereignty, external actors would govern certain domestic authority structures. In the same vein, *Keohane (2003)* asserts that sovereignty needs to be 'unbundled' and domestic and legal sovereignty might be more appropriate than Westphalian sovereignty. In this sense, *Keohane* argues that restoration of classical Westphalian sovereignty should not be considered as the end goal of peace operations. Similarly, *Ignatieff (2003)* puts forward that it is not necessarily needed to increase the number of Westphalian states if the concern is to reduce chaos and to improve domestic governance.

#### ***4.2.3. Rising Supply for Peace Operations***

The implication of liberal internationalism on UN peace operations has been the rise in the supply of peace operations. This is exemplified in the willingness of western states for peace operations in internal conflicts after the Cold War. As argued in section 3.2., the Security Council has tended to be more proactive and willing to mandate more and larger operations in the post-Cold War era. (Jakobsen 2003, Bellamy et al. 2004) For example, between March 1991 and October 1993 the Security Council passed 185 resolutions and established 15 new peacekeeping operations. Similarly, only six substantive vetoes were used in the Security Council between May 1990 and June 1997(Cockayne and Malone 2005:8).

In this regard, the fall of communism is an important factor. It is argued that a sense of optimism about the international cooperation in pursuit of stable peace has become widespread after the collapse of communism i.e. primary ideological rival of liberalism in late 1980s. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:78)

According to some scholars, due to ‘CNN effect’ i.e. the transfer of human suffering into liberal societies through television images prompted the states to be more interested in participating peace operations, which led to the rise in the supply of peace operations as it has become impossible to ignore atrocities covered by the media (Cockayne and Malone 2005:15, Bellamy *et al.* 2004:78, Jakobsen 2003:275). The end of ideological rivalry caused a decline in superpower patronage for proxy as part of bipolar rivalry. Therefore, many internal conflicts provoked by the Cold War such as Namibia and Angola were concluded. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:79) However, *Jakobsen* (2003:273) maintains that the rise in the demand for peacekeeping can not be held to explain the increase in the number of peacekeeping operations. According to *Jakobsen*, the end of ideological rivalry enabled great powers to use peacekeeping operations to (a) disengage themselves from Cold War conflicts due to the end of strategic importance arguments such as UNAVEM I in Angola or UNTAC in Namibia; (b) share the burden of managing armed conflicts; (c) delegate part of this

burden to coalition of willing states and organisations like NATO's Bosnia operations; (d) obtain legitimacy for operations led by the permanent members or other regional great powers like French-led Chapter VII operations in Rwanda or Australian-led Chapter VII operation in East Timor. Furthermore *Jakobsen* continues that as the Cold War and the threat of Soviet Union over Western States ended, the West has become able to devote resource to peacekeeping. Another important argument by *Jakobsen* (2003:274) is related to the priority of democracy and human rights in the foreign policies of Western states. In case of violation of human rights or when democracy was overthrown, it became harder to resist demands for intervention for the West due to their discourse.

Certain specific factors also played important role in the transformation of UN peacekeeping. Normative ideas such as 'good international citizenship', the tendency of the Western states to see peacekeeping as a way to promote their values and the tendency to see participating peacekeeping as a way to gain international respect and legitimacy especially for the former Eastern Bloc countries and as a way to integration into important political and economic institutions, the possibility of Security Council reform to admit new member states, neighbourhood, and for poorer states reimbursement from the UN. (Bellamy *et al.* 2004:79)

## CHAPTER 5

### NATURE OF INTERNAL CONFLICTS

One major objective of this thesis has been to try to identify the causal links between the end of the Cold War and the transformation of peace operations understanding. Accordingly, the previous chapter discussed the change in the parameters of international system or society converting involvement in internal conflicts legitimate through peace operations into 'normality'. Secondly, the globalisation process is discussed in the previous chapter, which has become the paradigm defining international norms and behaviour i.e. liberal internationalism. As a result, a tendency to involve in internal conflicts with a view to organising not only the external actions of states but also their domestic realms has become dominant. In sum, the convergence of these two developments has been influential in the rise of peacebuilding dimension in UN peace operations in the post-Cold War era. Yet, there is an interrelated link between the end of the Cold War and transformation of peace operations: the nature of international conflicts, which poses much more difficult challenge to peace operations than interstate conflicts. In order to ensure sustainable peace in the land of internal conflicts, addressing the roots of internal conflicts is a prerequisite for international involvement.

Paradigm of liberal internationalism has also determined the proper instrument to respond internal conflicts: peacebuilding. In this sense, peacebuilding works have been dominated by liberal internationalism and by the purpose to transform war-shattered states into market democracies in order bring sustainable peace.

This development is closely linked to the nature and dynamics of internal conflicts, which pose much more complicated challenges than interstate conflicts. The challenge of internal conflicts is quite different and complicated compared to interstate conflicts.



During the Cold War, peacekeeping meant observing and keeping the peace by interposing between warring parties of interstate conflicts. Peacekeeping defended status quo, which was supposed to provide condition for peace settlement. (Weiss et al. 2001: 55) The picture is complicated in the post-Cold War when peacekeeping has been mostly utilised in internal conflicts where peace operations are supposed to do more than observing and monitoring in order to prevent violence relapsing into conflict to be successful.

Although the rise and fall of nation-states is not a new phenomenon, this issue has become very salient in the modern era. As states constitute the principal actors or 'building blocks' of the international system, the legitimate order of the international system and it is the very foundation are disturbed by the violent disintegration and weakness of its constituents. (Rotberg 2002:1) In order to keep the smooth functioning of the system, stability and predictability, thereby order is required. Yet, state failure disturbs the order in the system. Serious problems encountered by the building blocks of the system i.e. states disturb the order thereby leading an expected response by international system in turn. As in the modern age the norm that territory and population are to be divided into political jurisdiction, which determine the identity, order and authority within their borders, is prevalent, state failure/collapse refers to an important anomaly. (Zartman 1995:2)

International action through peacebuilding is supposed to both heal the consequences or damages generated by internal conflicts and also the root dynamics of those conflicts. While the damages or consequences are short-term goals of peacebuilding, the root causes are harder to deal with and require long-term involvement. The following sections will attempt to demonstrate how complicated to address the roots causes of internal conflicts is for liberal restructuring through peace operations.

### **5.1. Assessing the Root Causes of Internal Conflicts**

Assessing the roots of internal conflicts is one of the crucial parts of understanding international politics. Individual, societal and international dimensions like ethno-

nationalism, population growth and population movements, resource scarcity, environmental degradation, bad governance, weak state capacity are among issues related to the phenomenon of internal conflicts. The literature includes variety of approaches to identify the underlying causes of such conflicts. For instance, *Brown* (1996) offers a list of factors which might cause internal conflict: structural (strength of state, presence of minorities), political (the fairness of the political system, nature of citizenship: civic or ethnic), economic (health of economy, level of economic development), and cultural (intercultural perceptions). A complementary and triggering factor is 'bad leadership' in this reasoning.

On the other hand, neorealist analysts hold the argument that interstate conflict frameworks might be utilised for internal conflicts, as well. For instance, *Walter* and *Snyder* (1999) emphasize 'the uncertainty arising from security dilemma'. Similarly, *Jack S. Levy* (2001) asserts that the 'level of analysis framework', which was systematically put forward by Waltz, might be used to analyse intrastate conflicts with some modifications. This framework suggests that causes of wars might be analysed at the levels of individual, nation-state and international system.

*Carment* (2003) offers an analytical framework, which allows us to analyze state weakness and state failure through 'long-term fundamental dynamics relating to macro level preconditions and consequences; mid-term intermediate behavioural patterns; and immediate micro-level events such as political crises and ethnic cleansing.' In his perspective, there are three levels, which might be utilized to analyze the root causes of internal conflicts. The first one is macro level referring to long term processes that are associated with system structure transformations and the associated problems of the emergence of weak states. The second level is intermediate level whose mechanisms are associated with institutional viability and state weakness. The last level to analyze the root causes of internal conflicts is micro level, which includes short-term selection processes and mechanisms account for preferences for violence over pacific forms of strategic interactions and the subsequent escalation and/or duration of ethnic hatreds, violence, repression, and war at specific points in time.

*Macro Level* analyses refer to the long term processes, which are associated with system structure transformations and the associated problems of the emergence of weak states. As the surrounding conditions can significantly affect the essential features of state building such as development of political capacity, legitimacy and authority, state building cannot be held as a linear process. In this line, Carment (2003) proposes two ways in which the changes in system structure can reverse state building: through the creation of highly dependent weak states and through processes of economic development and the strengthening of international norms of self-determination.

There are cases of systemic transitions, which were associated with the creation of new states in hostile environments involving conflicts over territory and identity. The collapse of the Spanish Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> century caused creation of new states in such environments in South America, the collapse of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Empire after the First World War in Europe, the decolonisation process and the collapse of colonial powers in Asia and Africa after the Second World War and the collapse of Soviet Union in the late 1980s in Central Asia and Eastern Europe. In this sense, it can be argued that the abundance of state failure in the late 1980s and 1990s might be associated with the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Bloc, which caused cessation of the support that the Third World countries used to reach from super powers as proxy allies. (Carment 2003) The second way in which the changes in system structure can reverse state building refers to processes that concern the state failure indirectly: economic development and the development of international norms of self-determination. The international economic context and the subsequent rise of liberal market tendencies, which commenced to be in discord with state structures in Africa in early 1980s and internationalisation of the demands of minority groups and legitimisation of their claims through international forums are clear examples to these process. (Carment 2003:412-3) Analyses on *intermediate level* relate to the internal dynamics and pressures, which weaken the state:

The failure of prevailing societal values to legitimise existing divisions of labour and political order is the reason behind the emergence of state disorder: 'Existing ideologies fail to legitimize the positions of various actors in a hierarchical social structure' and this situation brings the breakdown of the social and political order. (Carment 2003: 413)

This level seems to focus on social contract between the state and society. Especially this level seems to offer useful insights for analyzing weakening of state structures in multiethnic communities.

Macro and Intermediate level perspectives enable us to understand and to identify the roots causes, structural and societal factors behind the state failure and collapse. Yet, in order to understand why violence do occur and in which form, *micro level* dynamic interactions between armed forces and groups and between armed factions and groups and outside forces are to be scrutinised. Only through this way, the probability of war, violence, ethnic cleansing and genocide might be accounted for. The roles played by elites in mobilisation of the groups and factions and outside forces are constitutive dynamics in the course of internal conflicts. Carment gives the example that although structural i.e. macro and intermediate level factors might have explained the mutual ethnic and religious hatred which underlined the conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda etc., the specific objectives of the belligerents i.e. micro level conditions help us understand the wars. Decisions of Serbian and Hutu leaders towards the specific objectives and the credibility of the Western threat of retaliation in Bosnian conflict had constitutive impact on the course of conflicts. Similarly, the decisions of political and military officials in UN Security Council not to establish a effective and pre-emptive peace enforcement mission is considered as the direct reason for the genocide in Rwanda (Carment 2003: 415-7)

Another approach belongs to *Azar* (1990), who uses the term '*Protracted Social Conflict*' for the conflicts 'which may remain dormant for a period of time and then suddenly break into open warfare, destroying life and property'. Azar argues that protracted social conflicts possess several characteristics. At the centre of these conflicts stands religious, cultural or ethnic communal identity, which is based on the satisfaction of basic needs like security, communal recognition and distributive justice. Azar continues that in these conflicts developmental needs are expressed in terms of cultural values, human rights and security. (Azar 1990:2-3)

In Azar's Protracted Social Conflict analysis, there are four basic set of conditions, which might cause conflictual situations: communal content, human needs, governance and the role of the state, and international linkages. (Azar 1990:7-12).

*Communal Content* is suggested to be the most important set of conditions for protracted social conflicts. Azar argues that a society having multi-communal composition is more prone to protracted social conflicts. These societies are characterised by a discord between the state and society and the state is usually dominated by one communal group or a coalition of a few. Furthermore, the ruling group or groups are 'unresponsive' to the needs of others in the society. (Azar 1990:7)

Second set of conditions is *Human Needs*. The assumption that individuals aim to meet their developmental human needs through formation of identity groups is central to this cluster. In order to secure survival and well-being, individuals seek material needs through identity communities. Azar continues that societies usually contain certain individuals or minority groups who are deprived of material needs. In the same vein, marginalised groups are not granted access to political, economic and social participation. In these cases marginalised groups, which do not acquire acceptance of communal identity, develop responses in order to address their situations. (Azar 1990:7-10)

*Governance and State's Role* is the third set of conditions is influential in emergence of conflictual relations. Azar argues that deprivation or satisfaction of human developmental needs, political, economic and social participation and acceptance of communal identity is based on social, political and economic interactions, which the state is responsible for regulating.

Although in theory state was supposed to be fair and neutral, most of the states which suffered protracted social conflicts tend to be 'incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian and accordingly far from providing basic human needs:

Political authority tends to be monopolized by a dominant identity group or a coalition of hegemonic groups. These groups tend to use the state as an instrument for maximizing their interests at the expense of others. In the protracted social conflict context, these groups have manifested in communal terms. The monopoly of political authority by one or more groups denies the state a capacity for fair and successful governance. As a result, the means to satisfy basic needs are unevenly shared and the potential for protracted social conflict increases. (Azar 1990 : 10)

The last set of conditions in Azar's framework is *International Linkages*. The role of state in satisfying basic human needs is also influenced by the patterns of linkage with the international system. Two types of international linkage are identified: the first one is related to economic dependency and second one is to political/military client relationship with strong states. Through such linkages, state autonomy to pursue strategies to provide basic human needs is severely limited. (Azar 1990:11-2)

Azar summarises his discussion to identify precondition for the rise of protracted social conflicts as follows:

Protracted social conflicts occur when communities are deprived of satisfaction of their basic needs on the basis of their communal identity. However, the deprivation is the result of a complex causal chain involving the role of the state and the pattern of international linkages. Furthermore, initial conditions (colonial legacy, domestic historical setting, and the multicommunal nature of the society) play important roles in the genesis of protracted social conflict. (Azar 1990:12)

According to Azar, the communal content of the state is basic to the analysis of protracted social conflicts. Closely related to this last point, another dimension of nature of the internal conflicts, failed or collapsed states concerns societal security. Societal security<sup>9</sup> is defined as "the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats". (Waever *et al.* 1993:23) Societal security is about "the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture, association, and religious and national identity and custom." (Waever *et al.* 1993:23) More precisely, societal security concerns the situations when societies perceive threat to their identities. The

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<sup>9</sup> Bary Buzan and Ole Waever are leading names of Copenhagen School, which developed societal security approach.

referent of security is not state in societal security approach, but society. In this sense, politically significant ethno-national and religious identities are the main units of analysis. (Waever *et al.* 1993:22) Societal insecurity is often an important aspect and/or result of internal conflicts as ethno-national and religious identities perceive threat to themselves i.e. their survival. Societal (in)security is among the important factors shaping the communal content.

Following this reasoning, this thesis holds the view that the discord between state and society might be sorted out as the fundamental cause of internal conflicts:

**TABLE 12: Dynamics of Internal Conflicts**

<b>Internal Conflicts</b>	<b>Dynamics</b>
Namibia	Legacy of the Mandate System (Under South Africa Mandate) Multicommunal Nature (White Minority/Black Majority) Black Nationalist Insurgency (SWAPO) against White Minority Ruling Regional Involvement (South Africa, Angola, Cuba)
El Salvador	Revolt of the coffee plantation workers against fourteen richest families who owned %90 of the land in 1930s Coffee Oligarchy and Military (Power Structure) Anti-Regime front in 1980s Regional Involvement (US, Cuba and Nicaragua) Civil War between rival organisations (leftist FMLN and rightist ARENA)
Cambodia	Colonial Legacy (Under French Ruling) Oppressive rule of Prince Sihanouk against all segments including ethnic minorities Communist opposition (Khmer Rouge) and coup against Sihanouk Misrule of Authoritarian Republic against communists, royalists and ethnic Vietnamese Khmer Rouge and 'killing fields' Regional and International Involvement (Cold War, Soviet Union, China, Vietnam and the West)

**TABLE 12 (Cont'd)**

Mozambique	Legacy of Colonialism (Portugal Colony Rule) Regional and International support to FRELIMO (Independence Movement) Regional Involvement (White Regimes in Rhodesia and South Africa) South African Support to RENAMO, rival to FRELIMO
Angola	Legacy of Colonialism (Portugal Colony Rule) Tribalism (Bakongo, Mbundu, Ovimbundu, Chokwe, Ovambo) MPLA, UNITA and FNLA against Portugal Rule but armed struggle among Ideological Rivalry Regional and International Involvement (Algeria, Congo, US, China, Soviet Union, Cuba and the West)
Liberia	Power Struggle between military dictatorship and NPFL Ethnic lines (Gigo, Mano, Krahn and Mandigo tribes)
Rwanda	Ethnic cleavages between Hutus and Tutsis Regional and International Involvement
Bosnia	Disintegration of Yugoslavia Constitutional Status of Bosnia-Herzegovina Ethnic and Religious cleavages Regional and International Involvement
Sierra Leone	Tribalism Corruption and mismanagement of Diamond sector Regional and International Involvement
Kosovo	Ethnic cleavages Constitutional Status of Kosovo Regional and International Connections
East Timor	Legacy of Portuguese Rule under Non-Self-Governing Territories Status of territory Disagreement in the population (some favouring independence some integration with Indonesia)


Compiled by the Author, Sources *Uppsala Conflict Database, Armed Conflicts Events Database*<sup>10</sup>

When we look at the dynamics of the internal conflicts given in the table above, historical settings of the countries, multicomunal nature, mismanagement of country, regional and international involvement, economic status, ideology rivalries, natural resources and power struggle seem to play crucial roles in development of conflicts. However, the main impact of all those factors concerns influencing the communal content and therefore the social contract between state and society.

<sup>10</sup> the *Uppsala Conflict Database*, <http://www.pcr.uu.se/database/>, the *Armed Conflicts Events Database*, <http://www.onwar.com/aced/>, Accessed on March 2006.



**TABLE 13: Fundamental Cause of Internal Conflicts**



Compiled by the author, Sources: Azar (1990), Carment (2003).

As seen in the table 13, the existence of different identity groups such as ethnic and religious is not necessarily the root cause of a conflict. Rather, the viability of the social contract between state and society with regard to the communal content (in Azar's terms) of groups plays a leading role. In order to get a clear grasp of this issue, the next section goes into the substance of social contract i.e. delivery of public goods.

## **5.2. Delivery of Public Goods**

The very rationale behind the existence of state is to deliver public goods to its citizens. In other words, the main occupation of the states is to answer the concerns and demands of citizens. Political goods include security, education, health services, economic opportunity, environmental surveillance, a legal framework of order and a judicial system to administer it, fundamental infrastructural requirements such as roads and communications facilities. (Rotberg 2002:87)

Delivery of public goods is the most important referent of state performance. In this sense, it would be possible to distinguish weak states, strong states, fail states and collapsed states in accordance with the level that a state delivers public goods its citizens. As *Rotberg* puts, a failed state is no longer able or willing to perform the basic functions expected from nation-states in modern world (Rotberg 2003: 2-6).


### ***5.2.1. Developmental Continuum and State performance***

The phenomenon of state failure can be well understood if it is placed along a 'developmental continuum'. Along this continuum, state failure should be approached as a 'non-linear process of relative decay', which enables us to characterize states as strong, weak, failed and collapsed. While some states survive as weak for years, some may never get strong, only moving from weak at independence to failed and to the extreme status of collapsed. (Carment 2003: 409)

In order to assess the connection between state performance and state failure, two sets of conditions might be proposed: absolute development of a state's capabilities and relative development of a state's capabilities within the system. While the former refers to states' own past, present and future performance in absolute terms, which tend to be 'unidirectional', the latter refers to assessment of state's performance in comparison with other states in international system. Relative development of a state's capabilities tends to be 'curvilinear'. Accordingly, analyzing a state's relative performance as opposed to its absolute performance shows whether a state is moving towards collapse or improvement. This perspective allows us to understand that failure is a relative term and it has meaning only with respect to the performance of a state at specific points. (Carment 2003:409-10)

In this picture, what is missing is the *referent* of the state performance both in absolute and relative terms. It seems reasonable to argue that *the delivery of positive or public goods* might be held as the referent point for state performance both in relative and absolute terms, thereby constituting the substance of social contract between state and society.

**TABLE 14: States, Public Goods and Developmental Continuum**



Compiled by the author, Sources: Rotberg (2002), Carment (2003)

Although the delivery of public goods is the referent for state performance, it would be misleading to conclude that all public goods have the same salience. Rather, a hierarchy exists among them. According to Rotberg, it is the supply of security, particularly human security ranks first among public goods and only when a reasonable extent of security is provided, the delivery of other desirable public goods becomes meaningful:

The state’s prime function is to provide that political good of security: to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their disputes with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion” (Rotberg 2003: 3)

Regarding the rationale behind the states’ existence and delivery of public goods, *Zartman* (1995) argues that states are supposed to perform three functions, which are also constitutive elements of its rationale. Firstly, a state functions as the sovereign authority i.e. it is the accepted source of identity and the arena of politics. Secondly, a state functions as an institution i.e. it refers to a tangible organisation of decision making and an intangible symbol of identity. The last function of a state concerns security dimension i.e. it is the security guarantor for a populated territory. These three functions are intermixed that states perform them together not separately. Accordingly, state collapse refers to a situation where basic functions are not performed:

*As the decision-making center of government*, the state is paralyzed and inoperative: law are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced. *As a symbol of identity*, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action. As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organisation. *As the authoritative political institution*, it has lost its legitimacy, which is therefore ups and grabs, and so it has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs. *As a system of socioeconomic organisation*, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives supports from nor exercises controls over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule. (Zartman 1995: 5, italics added)

Looking from delivery of public goods angle, Congo, Somalia, Liberia and Sierra Leone among others are cases of state failure and collapse where

The central government ceased to function, and was unable to provide for the well-being of its population or protect it from internal and external threats. States weaken and fail when they are unable to provide basic functions for their citizens. The economy weakens. Education and health care are non-existent. Physical infrastructure breaks down. Crime and violence escalate out of control. These conditions generate opposition groups, which often turn to armed uprising. More often than not, 'the weapons of choice are small arms, light weapons and explosives because they are cheap, plentiful, durable, easily transported and simple to use'. These conflicts create huge population shifts and refugee crises, long term food shortages, failing economies, and the death of large numbers of civilians from disease, starvation and direct conflict (Carment 2003:409).

Going back to *Azar's* formulation of protracted social conflicts and sets of conditions, communal content is the most important dynamic behind the social contract. If it is not provided through delivery of public goods, a discord between state and society and between communities seems to be inevitable. In a way to validate this assumption, *Rotberg* (2003) tells us that 'there is no failed state without disharmonies between communities'. Indeed, this last issue leads us to another dimension of internal conflicts: *societal collapse*. Accordingly, although society is independent and distinct from state but potentially under its control, it performs demand and support functions to influence, legitimize, and/or replace state. In this sense, 'State collapse involves the breakdown not only of the governmental superstructure but also that of the societal infrastructure'. (Zartman 1995:7)

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **INTERNAL CONFLICTS AND UN PEACE OPERATIONS: MANDATES AND CONFLICTS**

As we have seen in the previous chapter, almost all of the countries, which had conflicts, have multicommunal composition. Moreover, these countries especially Cambodia, Mozambique, Angola, El Salvador, Liberia, Rwanda, Kosovo and Sierra Leone showed a discord between state and society. Furthermore, the poor state of developmental human needs is a common factor in most of these conflicts. On the other hand, as we have also seen, almost all conflicts had international linkages. The conflicts were rooted in the global rivalry and in the regional reflections of the global Cold War politics.

This thesis from the very beginning has argued that the nature of internal conflicts and the challenge posed have been a crucial factor in the transformation in the understanding of peace operations. Chapter 5 has analyzed the nature of internal conflicts and tried to show the impacts of such conflicts on governance, societal and physical infrastructure. The challenge of internal conflicts concerns the scope of international involvement that is to be clarified in the next section.

#### **6.1. Positive/Negative Peace and Peacebuilding**

The distinction between negative and positive peace is seminal in conflict theory. Johan Galtung suggested that conflict resolution through international involvement has two dimensions in order to end 'structural violence'. (cited in Ramsbotham 2000) Responding the direct violence is not sufficient to eliminate the violence which is inherent in the structures which denies physical and socio-economical well-being to

people. In other words, the absence of conflict (*negative peace*) and sustainable peace (*positive peace*) must go together; in the lands of conflicts the absence of sustainable peace is prone to cause negative peace be undone. (Fetherston 2000: 202). The distinction between negative peace and positive peace is crucially important to explain and understand how conflicts are responded and resolved. While negative peace refers to the absence of war or violence, positive peace means sustainable peace.

Interesting discussion might be found within conflict theory concerning negative/positive peace and peacekeeping. For instance, *Fetherston* offered a theoretical framework to understand peacekeeping. In his framework, peacekeeping is a type of conflict resolution as a third party activity based on consent. Peacekeeping is utilised only after the conflict has become violent and protracted. The functions of peacekeeping must have two dimensions: peacekeeping is to firstly act 'as a means of separation, a breathing space where both sides can step back from confrontation' and secondly 'as peacebuilding - working on improving communication and on social, political and economic regeneration'. (Fetherston 2000:191-2) In this theoretical framework, the functions of peacekeeping are defined firstly as bringing negative peace and secondly as positive peace.

On the other hand *Burton* (1990) offers us an interesting perspective. He argues that the denial of the basic human needs is the underlying reason of deep-rooted conflicts, most important ones being namely identity, security and distributive justice. Based on this approach, *Burton* offers a model of peacebuilding which has two dimensions. First dimension is conflict resolution, which is the process of problem solving, and second one is what *Burton* calls '*provention*'. *Provention* does not only include explanation of conflict and its environment and the necessary structural changes to remove the conflict but also promotion of condition to provide cooperative relationship. For *Burton*, these two- dimensional framework might transform the conflictual relationships.

During the Cold War, peacekeeping operations were aimed to end and control the violence through interposing UN forces between warring parties after peacemaking achieved cessation of war and truce. The conflict stages and strategies below (Ryan 2000) also utilised in section 3.5.1, demonstrates us the cycle of international involvement in conflicts:

Stage	Strategy
Pre-violence	Conflict Prevention
Escalation	Crisis/Humanitarian Intervention
Endurance	Peacemaking and Relief Work
De-escalation	Peacemaking and 'traditional peacekeeping'
Post-violence	Peacebuilding/transformation

As argued before through this formula, during the Cold War era, peace operations were mostly used only in stage 4, De-escalation through peacemaking and peacekeeping. In other words, once the parties to the conflict agreed to cease violence (peacemaking), UN peacekeeping missions were deployed to the field between the warring parties in order to secure the (negative) peace through supervision, observance and monitoring the truces and withdrawals. As also discussed in the section 3.3, in the post-Cold War era, UN Peace operations were mandated with peacebuilding tasks (positive peace):

**Peacebuilding Tasks** (Non-Exhaustive List)

- A. supervising, verifying and monitoring free and fair elections
- B. repatriation and resettlement of refugees
- C. creation and training armed forces
- D. reforming judicial and electoral systems
- E. promoting civil law and order
- F. mine clearance
- G. disarmament and demobilization
- H. performing immigration and customs functions
- I. humanitarian supplies
- J. national reconciliation
- K. confidence-building
- L. democratic development
- M. rehabilitation of countries (Infrastructure, Health, Logistics etc.)
- N. civil administration
- O. promoting self-governance
- P. reforming and strengthening governmental institutions and political participation
- Q. monitoring human rights
- R. promotion of rule of law and strengthening civil society
- S. technical assistance for economic development

*Table 15* below shows which peace operations included which peacebuilding tasks that are listed above in their mandates:



**TABLE 15: UN Peace Operations, Mandates and Tasks**

1989- 2001	Peacebuilding Tasks enshrined in the Mandates																		
Missions	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S
UNAVEM I																			
UNTAG	X	X			X		X					X			X			X	
ONUCA							X												
UNIKOM																			
MINURSO		X					X								X				
UNAVEM II	X											X							
ONUSAL	X		X	X			X					X					X		
UNAMIC						X													
UNPROFOR							X		X										
UNTAC	X	X					X					X	X	X			X	X	
UNOSOM I									X										
ONUMOZ	X	X					X		X			X							
UNOSOM II		X		X	X	X	X			X				X		X			X
UNOMUR																			
UNOMIG							X			X									
UNOMIL	X						X		X			X					X		
UNMIH						X													
UNAMIR		X	X			X	X		X	X	X		X						
UNASOG																			
UNMOT							X		X	X									

**TABLE 15 (Cont'd)**

UNAVEM III	X					X	X		X	X		X				X			
UNCRO							X		X										X
UNPREDEP									X		X				X				
UNMIBH	X	X	X	X		X			X			X					X	X	X
UNTAES	X	X					X			X			X	X					
UNMOP							X			X	X								
UNSMIH			X							X						X			X
MINUGUA							X			X									
MONUA							X		X	X	X	X				X	X		
UNTMIH			X							X						X			X
MINOPUH			X																
MINURCA	X		X				X												
UNOMSIL			X				X					X					X		
UNMIK	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNAMSIL	X				X		X		X		X		X			X			
UNTAET					X			X	X			X	X	X	X	X			X
MONUC	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X					X		

Compiled by the author by analyzing the mandates of each operations on UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations webpage.

Ramsbotham (2000) tells us that UN peace operations in the post-Cold war era had a 'standard operating procedure', which applied 'social engineering' in the lands of conflicts. Accordingly, in these operations the first task has been to prevent relapse into overt violence (*negative peace*) and second one to create a self-sustaining *peace* (*positive peace*). The standard operating procedure included military/security, political/constitutional, economic/social, psycho/social and international dimensions as short, medium and long-term measures:

- (i) Interim/short-term measures (up to the first election)
- (ii) Medium-term measures (through to the second election or to the next election where there is a peaceful change of government)
- (iii) Long-term measures (beyond (ii))

*The military/security dimension*

- (i) Disarmament/demobilisation of factions, separation of army/police
- (ii) Consolidation of new national army under civilian control.  
Steps towards creation of integrated non-politicised national police.  
Progress in protecting civilians from organised crime
- (iii) Demilitarised politics, societal security, transformation of cultures of violence

*The political/constitutional dimension*

- (i) Manage problems of transitional government/constitutional reform
- (ii) Overcome the challenge of the second election/peaceful transfer of power
- (iii) Establish tradition of good governance including respect for democracy, human rights and rule of law.  
Development of civil society within genuine political community.

*The economic/social dimension*

- (i) Humanitarian relief, essential services/communications.
- (ii) Rehabilitation of resettled population/demobilised soldiers.  
Progress in rebuilding infrastructure, reviving agriculture, and demining.
- (iii) Stable long-term macroeconomic policies and economic management.  
Locally sustainable community development/distributional justice.

*The psycho/social dimension*

- (i) Overcoming initial distrust.
- (ii) Managing conflicting priorities of peace and justice.
- (iii) Healing psychological wounds/long-term reconciliation.

*The international dimension*

- (i) Direct, culturally sensitive, support for the peace process.
- (ii) Transference to local control avoiding undue interference/neglect.
- (iii) Integration into cooperative and equitable regional and global structures.

On the other hand Richmond (2004) uses the concept of ‘peacebuilding consensus’, which refers to a discourse and practice of both means and ends, while the (peaceful) means are mediation, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, conflict resolution, prevention and transformation approaches through incorporation of multiple actors in a multidimensional process, the end is liberal democracy with socio-economic development. (Richmond 2004:131-132)

## **6.2. The Brahimi Report**<sup>11</sup>

Upon the initiative of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a high level panel was convened on 7 March 2000 ‘to undertake a thorough review of the United Nations peace and security activities, and to present a clear set of specific, concrete and practical recommendations to assist the United Nations in conducting such activities better in the future. The panel was chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of Algeria and was composed of prominent figures of peacekeeping, peacebuilding, development and humanitarian assistance. On 17<sup>th</sup> of August 2000, the so-called Brahimi Report was transmitted to the Secretary-General. The Brahimi Report approaches to the issue of peace operations in the same way this paper is trying to do. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that the Brahimi Report seems to codify the arguments discussed throughout the previous chapters.

The report argues that throughout the 1990s, the UN had failed in this respect, which led the Secretary-General to ask the High Level Panel on United Nations Peace Operations ‘*to assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change*’. The report defines three principal activities for peace operations: conflict prevention and peacemaking; peacemaking and peace-building: (Brahimi Report 2000:2-3)

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<sup>11</sup> The Brahimi Report, A/55/305-S/2000/09, [http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace\\_operations/](http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/), Accessed on 7 July 2006.

Long-term ***conflict prevention*** addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace. Where those foundations are crumbling, conflict prevention attempts to reinforce them, usually in the form of a diplomatic initiative. Such preventive action is, by definition, a low profile activity; when successful, it may even go unnoticed altogether.

***Peacemaking*** addresses conflicts in progress, attempting to bring them to a halt, using the tools of diplomacy and mediation. Peacemakers may be envoys of Governments, group of states, regional organizations or the United Nations, or they may be unofficial and non-governmental groups... Peacemaking may even be the work of a prominent personality, working independently.

***Peacekeeping*** is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and force separations after inter-state wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangers aftermath of civil wars.

***Peace-building*** is a term of more recent origin that, as used in the present report, defines activities undertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war. Thus, peace operations includes but is not limited to reintegrating former combatants into civilian society, strengthening the rule of law (for example, through training and restructuring of local police, and judicial and penal reform); improving respect for human rights through the monitoring, education and investigation of past and existing abuses; providing technical assistance for democratic development (including electoral assistance and support for free media); and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation techniques. Essential complements to effective peace-building include support for the fight against corruption, the implementation of humanitarian demining programmes, emphasis on human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) education and control, and action against other infectious diseases.

According to the Brahimi Report, one of the most important lessons learnt from the experiences is the need to complement short-term crisis related initiatives with long-term preventive strategies:

Until the end of the Cold War, United Nations peacekeeping operations mostly and traditional ceasefire-monitoring mandates and no direct peacebuilding responsibilities. The 'entry strategy' or sequence of events and decisions leading to United Nations deployment was straightforward: war, ceasefire, invitation to monitor ceasefire compliance and deployment of military observers or units to do so, while efforts continued for a

political settlement... However, traditional peacekeeping, which treats the symptoms rather than source of conflict, has no built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacemakers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan). (Brahimi Report 2000:3)

The Brahimi Report concludes that peacekeepers and peacebuilders are inseparable partners in complex operations as peacekeepers are to secure a safe local environment for peacebuilders and peacebuilders are to support the political, social and economic changes that create a secure environment that is self-sustaining: “While the peacebuilders may not be able to function without the peacekeepers’ support, the peacekeepers have no exit without the peacebuilders’ work.” (Brahimi Report 2000:5)

By using the lessons learnt from the experiences, the Brahimi Report makes a number of recommendations regarding the doctrine behind the peace operations. The essence of the recommendations is the acknowledging the importance of peacebuilding as integral to the success of peacekeeping operations. According to the report, peacebuilding should entail engagement, which is multidimensional in nature. In this sense, the Brahimi Report emphasizes on the necessity to view ‘free and fair’ elections as part of broader efforts to strengthen governance institutions. Accordingly, elections will take place in ‘an environment in which a population recovering from war comes to accept the *ballot* over the *bullet* as an appropriate and credible mechanism through which their views on government are represented’ (Brahimi Report 2000:7, italics added):

Elections need the support of a broader process of democratization and civil society building that includes effective civilian governance and a culture of respect for basic human rights, lest elections merely ratify a tyranny of the majority or be overturned by force after a peace operation leaves.

The Brahimi Report also touches upon the issues of civilian police and judicial components of peace:

In short, a doctrinal shift is required in how the Organisation conceives of and utilizes civilian police in peace operations, as well as the need for an adequately resourced team approach to upholding the rule of law and respect for human rights, through judicial, penal human rights and policing experts working together in a coordinated and collegial manner. (Brahimi Report 2000:7)

The Brahimi Report also emphasised the potential role to be played by UN human rights personnel in supporting a comprehensive program for national reconciliation by training military, police and other civilian personnel on human rights issues and on the relevant provisions of international humanitarian law (Brahimi Report 2000:7). Similarly, according to the Brahimi Report disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants are key to immediate post-conflict stability and reduced likelihood of conflict recurrence and in this field peace-building can make a direct contribution to public security and law and order. Yet, all three elements should be implemented in order to succeed. (Brahimi Report 2000:7-8)

The recommendations of the Brahimi Report regarding peacebuilding are summarized as follows:

- (a) A small percentage of a mission's first year budget should be made available to the representative or special representative of the Secretary-General leading the mission to fund quick impact projects in its area of operations, with the advice of the United Nations country team's resident coordinator.
- (b) The Panel recommends doctrinal shift in the use of civilian police, other rule of law elements and human rights experts in complex peace operations to reflect an increased focus on strengthening rule of law institutions and improving respect for human rights in post-conflict environments;
- (c) The Panel recommends the legislative bodies consider bringing demobilization and reintegration programs into the assessed budgets of complex peace operations for the first phase of an operations in order to facilitate the rapid disassembly of fighting factions and reduce the likelihood of resumed conflict;

- (d) The Panel recommends that the Executive Committee on Peace and Security discuss and recommend to the Secretary-General a plan to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programs in support of those strategies. (Brahimi Report 2000:8)<sup>12</sup>

### 6.3. Transitional Administration

It is possible to trace a trend in the UN peacekeeping operations and the functions they have undertaken. Three models are identified by *Helman and Ratner* (1992) for UN peacebuilding roles: governance assistance, delegation of governmental authority and direct UN trusteeship. While the first one would be for failing states, the last two roles for failed or collapsed states. On the other hand, Caplan (2002) puts forward that a continuum with supervision at one end and direct governance at the other. In-between lays operations with varying level of authority. For him; the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), established in 1992 is a clear example of international administration as supervision. As discussed in the previous chapters, UNTAC was established to implement Paris Peace Accords. According to Caplan, three peace operations displayed direct form of governance thereby to be situated at the other end of the spectrum.

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<sup>12</sup> Paris (2000) emphasized the lack of interaction between studies of peace operations and International Relations discipline; and called for 'broadening the study of peace operations'. Indeed, new approaches to the study of peace operations have recently joined the literature on peace operations. These approaches argue that a new thinking should prevail in the studies of peace operations. For example, Bellamy and Williams (2004), Bellamy (2004), Pugh (2003 and 2004) merge the Critical Theory assumptions with peace operations understanding. Accordingly, current approaches to peace operations are considered as 'problem-solving' approaches, which only aim at achieving smooth functioning of the system i.e. peace operations with the understanding of managing internal conflicts. On the contrary, they point out the necessity to adopt 'Critical Theory Approach', which aim to demonstrate that peace operations construct, reproduce and maintain a particular vision of order. This Critical Approach is to constitute the 'next stage' in peace operations theory. This approach to peace operations considers the Brahimi Report as the outcome of problem-solving understanding. On the other hand, Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (2005) offer the utilisation of 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping', which consists of negative and positive peace together with high conflict resolution capacity through high military (negative peace) and civilian (positive peace) capacity. For them, Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping is situated between current enhanced peace support operations (high military/low civilian capacity) and Critical Approach. This approach offers a peacekeeping understanding, which is further than the Brahimi Report proposals in practice, such as development of UN Emergency Peace Services.



Those operations are the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES), the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

*Fearon and Laitin* (2004) compare the contemporary transitional administration, which they call 'neotrusteeship' with classical imperialism of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They conclude that although there exists a valuable analogy between those, there are two important differences. First one is the multilateral character of contemporary international administration. Second one concerns the duration while classical imperialism did not foresee an exit date i.e. indefinite duration, contemporary understanding contains quick exit from administered lands. (Fearon and Laitin 2004:11-12)

An interesting matter of discussion evolving around the UN peacebuilding efforts is the idea of reviving UN trusteeship. The proposals about this idea have been repeatedly rejected in the UN circles even though this strategy would be more effective. After having put forward that peacekeeping is bound by the norms of the global cultures, *Paris* tells us that such proposals are turned down mainly on normative grounds "as a violation of state sovereignty, and an unacceptable reintroduction of colonialism". Hence, the idea of trusteeship considered to be against the principle of the UN (Paris 2003:451-463).

The more recent missions in Kosovo and East Timor clearly demonstrate that UN seems to have developed transitional civil administrations. The uniqueness of these operations is well depicted by the Brahimi Report:

No other operations must set and enforce the law, establish customs services and regulations, set and collect business and personal taxes, attract foreign investment, adjudicate property disputes and liabilities for war damage, reconstruct and operate all public utilities, create a banking system, run schools and pay teachers and collect the garbage – in a war-damaged society, using voluntary contributions... in addition to such tasks these missions must also try to rebuild civil society and promote respect for human rights, in places where grievance is widespread and grudges run deep. (Brahimi Report 2000:13)

*Caplan* (2002) argues that international administration is consistent with expansion of traditional peacekeeping operations to embrace a wide variety of peacebuilding activities ranging from human rights monitoring and electoral assistance to the protection humanitarian relief operations and the disarmament, cantonment and demobilisation of armed forces. However, *Caplan* maintains that international administration should not be seen as a mere extension of complex peacekeeping since responsibilities undertaken are unique in character: to make and enforce local laws, exercise total fiscal management of a territory, appoint and remove public officials, create a central bank, establish and maintain customs services, regulate the local media, adjudicate rival property claims, run schools regulate local business and reconstruct and operate all public utilities etc. The main argument of *Caplan* is that a transitional administration with full executive authority rather than just supervision is better equipped to meet the multitude of challenges of peace operations. In the absence of such authority, international efforts are likely to be distorted by local actors. Furthermore, *Caplan* puts forward that international administration is fundamentally political enterprise, which leads us to conclude that political outcomes do matter. (Caplan 2002:4-5)

## CHAPTER 7

### CONCLUSIONS

UN peacekeeping has been interrelated with other important issues of international politics such as the UN as an “actor”, “intervention”, “internal conflicts”, “humanitarian considerations”, “socio-economic development”, “conflict resolution” and “prevention”. There is a considerably rich and extensive literature on UN peacekeeping covering diverse issues under above-mentioned topics. As argued in the beginning, studies on UN peacekeeping can be carried out through case studies, conceptual studies and theoretical approaches. This thesis tries to use certain assumptions of each way of study in order to provide a comprehensive understanding of peacekeeping as an instrument to maintain international peace and security and its evolution in the last five decades.

The research question of the thesis “*How can the transformation in the understanding of peacekeeping operations that took place in the post-Cold War era be explained?*” has been the driving theme throughout the thesis. The first chapter, the introduction, has clarified the research concerns and methodological aspects of the thesis besides putting forward the research question.

The second chapter aimed to give a clear picture of traditional peacekeeping understanding developed in an ad hoc way during the Cold War. The third chapter tried to show the substance of the starting point of the thesis i.e. change in UN peacekeeping. In this sense, changes in the number and tasks of peace operations established by the Security Council and the increasing utilisation of peace operations into internal conflicts are pointed out. Furthermore the transformation of the peace operations understanding from ‘*peace and security*’ and ‘*state sovereignty*’ centred peacekeeping to peace operations understanding which also contains ‘*human rights*’ ad ‘*socio-economic development*’ considerations has been emphasized. Indeed,

currently this understanding governs the utilisation of peace operations in internal conflicts in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, East Timor etc. To understand the nature of UN peace operations at its current phase has been at the core of the thesis along with the analyses of the evolution of UN peacekeeping in general.

Based on the findings of Chapter 3, the main task of chapter 4 was to understand the transformation of the UN peace operations understanding with the use of several theoretical and conceptual discussions. The theoretical discussion concluded that the norms of international society has transformed to the extent that the domestic realms or domestic sovereignty of (failing, failed or collapsed) states have been opened to international involvement through (legitimate) UN peace operations with a particular vision of peace and order i.e. liberal democracy.

In chapter 5, a general discussion on internal conflicts took place with a view to display their complicated nature and the challenge they pose for peace operations. The core of the arguments in that chapter was to emphasize that generally a discord between state and society lies at the root of internal conflicts and afterwards of the conflict the task of peacebuilders is not only establish the physical infrastructure and but also societal infrastructure. The link between the theoretical discussion and internal conflict analyses is that the cure for this challenge is found to be in liberal democracy implantation by International Society through peacebuilding. As long as international involvement stays only in halting the internal conflict and reinstating the collapsed governance and not goes deeper into the underlying cause i.e. discord between society and state, the peace will not be sustainable. In this context, peacebuilding is to serve to install a liberal social contract between society and state, which would bring sustainable peace in country.

Chapter 6 attempted to show the strategy of peace operations to deal with the challenge of internal conflicts i.e. 'peacebuilding consensus'. Moreover, the Brahimi Report and the issue of transitional administration are also discussed in Chapter 6.

The focus of the discussion throughout the thesis has been on the interaction between the UN peace operations, internal conflicts and relevant actors' understanding of governance. Based on this interaction, two causal links between the end of the Cold War and transformation of peace are sorted out. The first one concerns the supply for peace operations (liberal internationalism) and the second one concerns the target of peace operations (lands of internal conflicts). In other words, coming back to the research question of this thesis, two dynamics were offered which overlapped in the post-Cold War era thereby constituting the underlying forces behind the transformation of UN peace operations.

UN Peace Operations are mostly established upon the internal conflicts, whose nature and dynamics require not only negative peace but also positive peace. Meanwhile the post-Cold War era has been dominated by the rise of liberal internationalism, which has brought a tendency to organise not only the external actions of states but also their domestic realms with strong human rights and socio-economic development considerations. The convergence of these two developments has been influential in the formation of the current nature of UN peacebuilding operations in internal, failing/failed and collapsed states with the goal of transforming the conflict, defined as UN involvement through peace operations in order to prevent relapse into violence after internal conflicts and to bring back the state, in liberal democratic form. The thesis concludes that the understanding of UN peace operations have transformed as the desired end goal for peace operations has turned out to be *'bringing back the (sovereign) state in liberal democratic form'*.

As put forward in the beginning, the overall objective of the thesis has been providing a comprehensive understanding of UN peace operations. Yet, the main themes have been the evolution of UN peacekeeping and the current understanding of UN peace operations. Therefore, many important issues are either left outside or touched briefly. As a future research topic, the issue of transitional administration and sovereignty or the sectoral analyses of peacebuilding activities such as infrastructure or institution building might be picked up.

As stated in the beginning, the scope of the thesis has been limited to the events in the post-Cold War era until September 11, 2001, since it might be argued the hard security issues seems to have dominated the agenda of the UN peace operations once again at the expense of human security consideration after 9/11. Therefore, the analyses of the impact of September 11 on peace operations might constitute another topic of future research.

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