

**CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE ARGENTINEAN
DEMOCRATIZATION (1983–1995)**

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ABSTRACT

CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE ARGENTINEAN DEMOCRATIZATION (1983–1995)

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This thesis analyzes the process of democratization in Argentina after 1983 by tracing the developments which led to the establishment of civilian control over the military during the periods of President Alfonsín and President Menem. The study first reviewed the political and historical background of Argentina with specific reference to the military interventions. Then, the new democratic order, its economic structure and the position of the military and the civilians after transition to democracy are analyzed. The thesis identified the nature of the transition, the economic reform process, the new elite consensus, the psychology of the military and the international atmosphere as the most important factors which shaped the process of ensuring civilian control over the military.

Keywords: Democratization, Civilian Control over the Military, Coup D'état, transition

ÖZ

ARJANTİN DEMOKRATİKLEŞMESİNDE SİVİL-ASKER İLİŞKİLERİ (1983–1995)

Akdağ, İnan

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu çalışma Başkan Alfonsin ve Başkan Menem dönemleri boyunca ordu üzerinde sivil kontrol kurulmasına neden olan gelişmeleri bularak 1983 sonrası Arjantin’ de demokratikleşme sürecini incelemiştir. Çalışma ilk, askeri müdahalelere özel referansla Arjantin ‘in siyasi ve tarihi arka planını gözden geçirir. Sonra, demokrasiye geçişten sonra, yeni demokratik düzen, bunun ekonomik yapısı ve asker ve sivillerin pozisyonları incelenir. Çalışma, geçişin doğasını, ekonomik reform süreci, yeni elit uzlaşması, ordunun psikolojik durumu ve uluslararası atmosferi ordu üzerinde sivil otoritenin kurulması sürecini şekillendiren en önemli faktörler olarak belirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Demokratikleşme, Ordu Üzerinde Sivil Kontrol, Darbe, Geçiş

To My Parents

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
ÖZ.....	v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	viii
LIST OF TABLES.....	xi
INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER	
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION THEORIES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS FOR LATIN AMERICA.....	12
I.1 Perspectives on Democratization Process and Democracy.....	12
I.2 The Democratization Theories on Latin America.....	17
I.2.1 Transition and Consolidation Processes.....	20
I.2.2 Civilian-Military Relations and the Control of Militaries in the Context of Democratization.....	27
I.2.3 The Case of Argentinean Democratization.....	38
II. MILITARY REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA AND ARGENTINA.....	42
II.1 An Overview of the Military Regimes in Latin America.....	42
II.2 The Argentinean Politics Until 1983.....	47
II.3 The Military and Military Regimes in Argentina.....	54
II.3.1 The First Military Coup (1930).....	55
II.3.2 The Coup d’etat of 1955 “Revolucion Libertadora”.....	58
II.3.3 The Coup d’etat of 1966 “Revolucion Argentina”.....	59

II.3.4 The Coup D’etat of 1976 “Proceso Reorganizacion Nacional” and Transition Process.....	62
III. ARGENTINEAN DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY AFTER 1983.....	70
III.1 The Political Situation After the Transition.....	72
III.1.1 The Radicals in Power (1983-1989) as the Military Goes Back to Barracks.....	72
III.1.2 The Presidency of Menem (1989-1995); a Peronist President without Peron’s Ideas.....	76
III.2 Economic Situation after the Transition and Its Impact on Civilian-Military Relations.....	79
III.3 The Civilian-Military Relations.....	84
III.3.1 The Attitude of the Civilian Leaders against the Past Military Junta and Human Right Abuses.....	86
III.3.2 The Military Budget.....	88
III.3.3 The National Security Doctrine.....	90
III.3.4 Institutional Position of the Military in the State Organization.....	94
III.4 The Factors that Led to the Civilian Control Over the Military.....	96
III.4.1 The Transition Process.....	97
III.4.2 Social Classes’ Position and the New Elite Consensus.....	99
III.4.3 The Economic Structure.....	102
III.4.4 International Conjuncture and the End of the Cold War.....	103
III.4.5 The Psychological Situation of the Argentinean Military.....	106
CONCLUSION.....	108
REFERENCES.....	117
APPENDICES.....	123
A. THE ROLES OF ARMED FORCES IN THE 1990s.....	123

B. ECONOMIC GROWTH OF ARGENTINA (1990-1929).....	124
C. GROWTH RATE OF GDP, INFLATION RATES, AND FOREIGN- EXCHANGE RESERVE (1946–1955).....	125
D. INDICATORS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PROTEST (1956–1966).....	126
E ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN DEBT (1962-1983).....	127
F. SELECTED INDICATORS OF ARGENTINA’S FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN (1983 – 1988).....	128
G. INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE.....	129

LIST OF TABLES

TABLES

Table 1 The Tactical Positions of Political Actors.....	24
Table 2 Casualties of the Argentinean “Dirty War” 1969 – 1983.....	65
Table 3 Argentinean Army, 1983 – 1990.....	84
Table 4 Military Expenditures of Argentina, 1972 – 1989.....	90
Table 5 Authoritarian Regimes and Liberalization / Democratization Processes, Regimes.....	99
Table 6 Support for “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”...101	
Table 7 Support for “In Certain Circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one”.....	102

INTRODUCTION

I. The Significance of the Research Topic

This thesis study looks at the process of democratization in Argentina from the perspective of civilian-military relations; in particular, it analyzes and describes the dynamics and the consequences of the process of establishing civilian control over the military during the periods of the President Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989) and President Carlos Menem (1989-1995).

In the 20th century, many developing countries from Africa, Asia, Europe and South America confronted acute power struggles bringing about revolutions, coups d'etat, rebellion, civil wars etc. to capture state power from many different political, social and economic actors. These struggles involved various power coalitions, which led to political long-term instability. Argentinean politics is a case in point; it experienced military regimes which deeply affected its political and civil society.

Some scholars tend to accept a broad definition of the term “democracy” while others find useful to use narrower meaning of the term especially when analyzing developing countries. In the context of Argentina and Latin America employing “minimalist” conceptualization of the term “democracy” seems meaningful because conceptualizing new democracies of the countries of the continent in the light of Western types would be inappropriate for analysis. Therefore, procedural democracy or minimalist democracy concepts has gained particular significance in the case of Argentina and other cases of Latin America. The theory of the procedural or minimalist democracy is based on Robert Dahl’s concept of “polyarchy”. The main principles of the theory are freedom of expression, freedom to form and join organization, the right to vote, eligibility for public office, the right of political leaders to compete for support and votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections and finally, institutions for making government policies depending on

votes and other expression of preference (Dahl, 1959). This concept of democracy has found many supporters from the students of Latin American politics. Among them, Huntington (1991b), O'Donnell (1992), Przeworski (1992), Hunter (1997a) and Karl (1990) can be counted. They have also improved the theory of Dahl. More importantly, these theories stressed that the civilian control over military was a prerequisite for democratization after transitions from authoritarianism.

The military has been an important political actor in the power struggles in developing world. The sides of the struggles sometimes needed military to protect the status quo as in the case of Latin American states during the “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian” regimes after the 1960s. In a country, the power and the importance of the military firstly comes from its monopoly over the armed forces, which has been a characteristic of modern state distinguishing from traditional state structures. In the process of capturing resources in order to gain state power, all actors firstly sought a coalition with military. Therefore, the military came to have an important position in politics. Moreover, in the process of re-establishing political order and stability, the issue of civilian control over the military and its relationship with the democratization process are raised as important problems.

As a result, many social inquires have focused and still focus on this important actor. Various approaches for analyzing militaries and their positions exist. They seek answers to questions such as what are the structures of militaries, why do militaries intervene in politics, what are the characteristics of military regimes, what are the interests of civilians against militaries, what are and what should be the missions of militaries, how can elected civilian actors establish control over militaries, and what factors are significant in the process of civilian control over military?

In this context, Latin American political systems may be counted as a significant case for military's strong and autonomous position in politics. Almost all countries of Latin America including Argentina, the case study of this thesis, could not ensure the stability of political order in the 20th century. After the 1960s with the new concept of the “*National Security Doctrine*” (NSD), the wave of military-sponsored regimes,

called the “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian” regimes covered all Latin America. The NSD was used as an ideological tool by the military in order to prevent the threat against the political elites from below, including the activated working class and leftist groups (Garretton, 1989). The main difference between these new military regimes and their ancestors was observed in the level of state-coercion, in the nature of economic policies and in the expansion of the roles and positions of the armies. Nevertheless, these regimes started to withdraw from power with the “third wave of democratization”, which started in Portugal in 1974 and which was conceptualized by Huntington (1991a) to define the transitions from authoritarian regimes. The costs of the legacy of the militaries were very high for their societies with destroyed democratic institutions, dramatic human right abuses, and sharpening income inequalities through the economic policies of military regimes. Furthermore, in many cases, militaries still protected their prerogatives in the new democracies after the transition process. Therefore, Latin American studies, which have tried to understand the continent’s political reality in the 20th century, have had to focus on militaries, civilian actors, authoritarian regimes, democracies and the transition processes.

Argentina, the subject of this thesis, similar to the other cases of the continent, has been a chronically instable country which experienced hundreds of attempted coups and six important coups in 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962, 1966 and 1976. The most violent of them came in 1976. This last military coup, called “Proceso Reorganizacion Nacional” or the “Process of National Reorganization” was particularly violent because it aimed not only to provide stability in politics but also to reorganize the whole society in terms of political, social and economic conditions. The “Proceso” started in 1976 and ended in 1983, when the period of the transition to democracy was initiated in Argentina. Today this bloody period and its heritage are still being debated in Argentina.

One of the main reasons of this praetorianism and the struggles to capture state power in Argentina was related to the irreconcilable economical interests of the social classes, one of which was the agro-export oriented sectors or the traditional oligarchy, called (the “Pampean” bourgeoisie) and the other of which was the

popular or the urbanized sectors including working class, industrial bourgeoisie and some parts of the middle class whose interests were based on the national market in Argentina. Historically, the first phase of Argentina's economy from the second half of the 19th century when the state was established to 1930 (when the "Great Depression" hit the world markets) was called the "Golden Age". In this period, there appeared impressive growth rates in Argentina. Their main basis was agro-export sector led by the traditional oligarchy ranging from agricultural bourgeoisie to commercial bourgeoisie and which politically dominated all over the history of Argentina. These classes had outward and free market economy tendencies they wanted to export easily their agricultural productions to the world market. Meanwhile, with the growing economy, new urbanized sectors including the middle class, working class and industrial bourgeoisie in Argentina started to gain power. The first struggle area for power among these sectors was related to the right of representation for the newly emerging classes. After gaining this right, urbanized sectors including the working class, industrial bourgeoisie and some sections of middle class formally and directly obtained state power. However, traditional oligarchy did not have an intention to leave state power; hence, it established alliances with the army, which led to the notorious military coups of the country.

Politically, Argentina has been governed under the presidential system since the establishment of the state. The Conservative Party, which represented the traditional oligarchy's interests, directly governed Argentina on its own until 1916 (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 78). In this period, the new classes were represented by the Radical Party, which headed some uprisings in order to gain the right to be represented in the Parliament. As a result, in 1912, the universal suffrage for all males was granted by the traditional oligarchy. After 1916, with the end of the election, the Radicals gained power. A dual party system emerged in Argentina. After 1943, with the rise of Juan Peron, the new political party, Partida Justicialista or Peronistas, emerged in politics. During the 20th century, these three political parties, the Conservatives, the Radicals and the Peronistas, dominated political structures. For many times, the power of the Radicals and the Peronistas was interrupted by military coups. In 1930, the Radical president was overthrown by a coup. In 1955, the rule of the Peronistas was ended by

the military. And in 1976, the Peronistas again were ousted by the army. Hence, a democratic structure in Argentina did not emerge.

In this context, the military gained significant characteristics for expanded political autonomy which enabled it to capture power or continue it. The Argentinean state was established after an independence war against the Spanish forces. As a result, because of the army's founder position during the establishment of the state, both the agro-export oriented sectors and the popular or the urbanized sectors, desired to establish a coalition with the military or wanted to control it. In order to understand this tie, firstly, it is necessary to analyze the nature of the coups d'état in terms of what side benefited from them. The coup of 1930 overthrew the leader of the Radical Party who represented the urbanized middle class. The coup of 1955 terminated Peron's presidency which represented urbanized working class. The coups of 1966 and 1976 again put an end to the presidencies of Radicals and Peron. Secondly, the economic policies pursued by the military regimes can also explain the nature of the civilian coalition with army. After 1930, "Import Substitute Industrialization" (ISI) politics was imposed in Argentina because of the world economic depression. However, the other military regimes established in 1955, 1966 and 1976, implemented or tried to implement liberal economic policies which were compatible with the interests of traditional oligarchy. Consequently, in every coup, a shadow of the traditional oligarchy appeared.

In other Latin American countries (such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay) military regimes set up highly institutionalized regimes and provided relatively stable economic structures. They established political parties in their countries, and the process of the transition to democracy was initiated and continued under the control of militaries with new constitutions. These constitutions provided significant guarantees for militaries against new civilian authorities in return for withdrawal from political power.

In comparison, in Argentina, the "Proceso" was weakly institutionalized. The military administration did not set up a specific party and it could not draw up a

constitution to exit from government mainly because of the discredited position of the junta due to its poor political and economic performance. Firstly, it applied repressive tactics in order to demobilize masses for restructuring the society. Many people were killed and many were subject to tortures. According to the sources of human rights organizations, approximately 30,000 people disappeared in those years¹. Secondly, in the context of economics, the junta tried to erode the legacy of Juan Peron, the former President from Partida Justicialista, who had pursued statist and nationalist policies through a populist ideology. The “Proceso” implemented liberal orthodox economic policy to adjust economic structure in the direction of the new economic order of the world. However, it failed to stabilize the economy. Many sectors ranging from industrial capitalists and middle classes to working classes suffered from the collapse of this economic policy. Finally, in order to be able to continue its rule, the junta declared a war, called “Malvinas War” against Britain and with the end of the defeat of the army of Argentina, authoritarian military regime demised.² The first competitive elections after the “Proceso” years were held in 1983, the result of which led to the Presidency of Alfonsin, the leader of Radicals. Henceforth, the transition from authoritarian government to democratic one started.

One of the major questions to be raised in relation to the analysis of civilian-military relationship is, “has civilian control over the military been ensured?” In order to grasp the democratization process, consisting of the transition from authoritarian regime and the consolidation of new democratic regime, the extent of civilian control over the military is a crucial dimension. Simply the withdrawal of army from political power does not mean ensuring completely civilian control. The most important characteristic of civilian control can be found in the process of transition from authoritarian regime because the nature of the transition is likely to determine

¹ Two important quotations can explain the dimension of violence of military administration, one of which was “first we’ll kill the subversives, then their collaborators, then ... their sympathizers, then ...those who remain indifferent” uttered by General Iberico St. Jean and another of which was “we are going to have to kill 50,000 people; 25,000 subversives, 20,000 sympathizers, and we will make 5000 mistakes.” by General Luciano Menendez (Stepan and Linz, 1996: 190).

² Malvina or Falkland is an island and its status is very debatable between Argentina and Britain. In 1982, Argentinean military invaded these islands and this led to a war between Argentina and Britain. Only in two months, Argentinean army was defeated by the British forces (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 83).

the characteristics of the new democratic regime. In general, the position and attitudes of political actors define the structure of the new political regime during the transition process. Moreover, military regimes usually demand specific guarantees, called “exit guarantees” in return for their withdrawal from power. Therefore, the boundaries of such guarantees can determine and compromise the civilian control over military. At this point, three specific demands for the military are important to leave from power; tutelary powers, reserve domains and the manipulation of the electoral process. Some scholars add other guarantees; such as amnesty laws (Valenzuela, 1992: 62-67). Within this framework, Argentina’s last military junta was quite different from other military regimes of the continent. The discredited image of the junta among the public brought about very weak bargaining power for the military to leave power. With the new democratic regime in Argentina, limited scope of the exit guarantees of the military facilitated the civilian control. Firstly, the tutelary power of military was restricted. Secondly, reserved domains were narrowed by the new civilian leaders. Thirdly, the electoral process was an important issue for the new democratic regime because this process could not be manipulated. In the case of Argentina, free elections were held after the transition. In 1983, Radicals gained power at the end of the election against the Justicialista Party or Peronistas. With the election of 1989, with the transfer of power to Peronistas, through free elections, power changed hands without any interventions. Fourthly, amnesty law always became important subject for members of military junta. Argentina was different from other cases of Latin America on this issue too. The leaders of the new democratic regime were very determined about this subject because a common demand on this issue had existed among masses which had suffered from the “Proceso”. No later after he took power, Alfonsín sent the junta leaders to trials in order to respond this demand of the society.

The military did not obtain serious guarantees in return for the withdrawal from power in Argentina. The leading members of the last junta were tried and they were punished. The military as an institution was excluded from the state apparatus and the process of decision making. Moreover, there appeared important cuts in military budgets. Consequently, civilian authority seized important power over the military.

It can be argued that this process of civilian control over the military was related with the characteristic of the transition in Argentina as an example of “reform through rupture”, unlike other countries of the continent such as Brazil and Chile whose transition process was started directly by militaries. For example, Chile was a case of “reform from below”, and Brazil was a case of “reform through transaction” (Munck and Leff, 1997). In Chile, the demand for change came from the groups which had been excluded from politics by General Pinochet. However, the old elite did not cease to be a viable political force. As a result, this elite controlled the transition process. Significant exit guarantees were inserted into the Constitution of 1980 by the leader of the military regime, General Pinochet. According to the Constitution, General Pinochet obtained the right to stay at the Head of the army and be the senator for life. The army protected its strong position in the National Security Council and the electoral law was manipulated by the military in favor of the right-wing parties. The strong position of the military came from its relatively successful economic policies. In 1989, the elections were held but many key offices were defined through appointments by the army. As a result, in Chile, a limited democracy emerged.

In Brazil, the incumbent civilian-military elite remained a very forceful political actor, which defined the transition process. The elite did not oppose to the democratic change but it firmly controlled the transition process. There had emerged considerable factions among the elite in order to maintain the authoritarian rule. However, like Chile, the government provided significant economic success and the authoritarian elite had strong position during the transition. The electoral process was thus easily manipulated. Finally, in the 1988 Constitution, some prerogatives for the military were introduced. The fragmentation of political parties followed, and in the 1990 election, nineteen political parties were represented in the chamber of deputies. As a result, in the new system as a presidential and multiparty system, civilian leaders did not gain domination vis-à-vis the army.

Therefore, the case of Argentina unlike the cases of Chile and Brazil has had some particular aspects in order to investigate and understand the case of successful

civilian control in Latin America. Civilian leaders held stronger position vis-à-vis the army during the transition process and this was reflected in the democratic emergent regime.

In the light of the democratization process of Argentina, this portrait raises another major question to be answered in this thesis; what factors influenced the process of establishing civilian control over military in Argentina after the transition to democracy? In order to analyze this issue, the type of the transition, new economic order, the classes' position or new elite consensus, the effects of new international conjecture and finally, the physiological situation of military members in the case of Argentina should be analyzed.

External factors naturally were significant to explain the democratization processes. After the Nicaraguan Revolution in 1979 and the Iran Islamic Revolution in 1979, the change in the U.S.A. policy naturally affected the transitions to democracy. The U.S.A started to support democratic regimes after these two events. (Frank, Amin, Chomsky, 1994) However, in order to analyze the nature of the democratization process, throughout this thesis, the internal factors such as elite situation are analyzed.

II. The Research Procedure

In order to pursue the subject of analysis in this thesis, there are also some minor questions besides its major research question, which need to be answered such as, what was the characteristic of transition which appeared in Argentina?; what were the successes and the failures of civil control over military in Argentina?; what was the relationship between the military and civil authorities in Argentina?; what was the position of military before, during and after the transition? Obviously, analyzing the process of democratization with specific reference to civilian-military relations by asking these questions involves at the same time a survey of the socio-political developments. In this study, the period to be investigated mainly covers the time from 1983, when the first democratic election was held and when Alfonsín's

Presidency started, to 1995 with the end of Menem's rule. This is the period during which the most significant changes in the civilian-military relationship took place. Furthermore, Alfonsín and Menem were the leaders of the rival political parties, the Radical Party and the Justicialista Party. As a result, in order to grasp the new axis of civilian-military relationship after the transition process in Argentina, this period is very important since the attitudes of two different civilian leaders and their different social bases should also be taken into consideration.

This case study is based on the interpretation of the secondary sources to produce a largely exploratory study to analyze the dynamics of civilian-military relations in the Argentinean transition. In this thesis, "deductive approach" is followed, which first laid out a general principle and expectation based on the literature of transition and democratization to understand the Argentinean case. Moreover, throughout the research, an interdisciplinary method involving the use of historical, economic, sociological and political science data is adopted.

III. The Organization of the Thesis

This thesis consists of three chapters. In the first chapter, a theoretic framework of democratization process (both macro democracy theories and minimalist sense of democracy) is to be introduced as the framework of analysis of Latin American countries in the context of civilian-military relations. This chapter also identifies and describes the processes of transition and consolidation, which are the analytically distinct stages of the process of democratization. Moreover, the main characteristics of the democratization process, civilian-military relations and civilian control over military, are to be defined in the context of Latin America. Finally, the case of the Argentinean democratization, the research topic of this thesis, is to be introduced.

The second chapter involves an overview of the military regimes in Latin America. Furthermore, the Argentinean politics until 1983, when the transition to democracy started, is surveyed through a historical perspective. Finally, the military regimes in Argentina until the transition are analyzed.

In the third chapter, the Argentinean democratization, along with the question of the civilian control over the military and the factors which influenced over this process are analyzed overall. In particular, in this chapter, Raul Alfonsin and Carlos Menem periods from 1983 to 1995, the first two civilian leaders after the transition to democracy, are analyzed in the context of their relations with the military in Argentina.

In the conclusion, a restatement of the objectives and a summary of the study are provided by stressing the current situation of the civilian control over the military in Argentina.

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEMOCRATIZATION THEORIES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS FOR LATIN AMERICA

Democratization is a complex process that includes transition and consolidation processes, therefore in order to understand the Argentinean democratization, a look at the democracy theories and the processes of democratization is necessary to define a theoretic framework. Furthermore, civilian-military relations in the context of democratization are also significant for analysis of the Argentinean democratization.

I.1. Perspectives on the Democratization Process and Democracy

The most common macro-democracy theories which offer broader approaches to democratization come from the modernization thesis. According to these approaches, democracy is directly connected with economic development (Karl, 1990: 3). With a certain degree of capitalist development, higher level of education and urbanization democracy would appear and political conflict would be moderated. Another approach to democracy comes from a cultural analysis. According to this approach, the values and beliefs are an arena that shape politics; therefore, common consensus in the society for democracy should be necessary. The third perspective on democratization deals with specific historical conditions. It argues that democratic regimes would be easily settled if the national identity question was resolved before the establishment of central governments. The fourth is the historically grounded vein of democracy. This approach is based on Barrington Moore's study (1966), according to which democracy would be emerged when the power of landed aristocracy weakened while that of bourgeoisie increased, and at the same time laboring class should not become dominant mode of production in a country. The fifth precondition of democracy is related with external factors. Especially followers

of dependency school tried to explain democratization process by external factors. In this perspective, in order to protect their competitive position in international market, professional militaries, technocrats and state managers come to the forefront of decision-making process in developing countries.³

There are also other theoretical explanations of the new democracies at a micro-level. For Latin America, Marxist authors generally assert that new democracies are the continuation of bureaucratic-authoritarian states. They reach this conclusion by analyzing the economic policy starting at the period of military regimes and continuing under that of elected presidents. For example, Timothy Harding and James Petras (1988) claim that “democratization is a result of the military’s inability to deal with the growing economic crisis, its loss of the support of the ruling groups, and the ruling class fractions’ desire to reopen a debate over alternatives, combined with mass organization taking advantage of this situation”. In another study, Carranza (1997) criticizes the explanations of liberal authors for ignoring the impact of globalization on newly democracies. According to him, the democratization of 1970s and 1980s did not bring democratic states. They brought only electoral regimes. Another important study theorized by Andre Gunder Frank, Samir Amin and Noam Chomsky is “low intensity democracy” (1994) to explain newly democratic regimes appeared in the 1970s in developing countries. According to them, in periphery or developing countries, conservative government, bourgeoisie and military together form a hegemonic bloc. Periodically, the leader of this coalition can change. The differences between new democracies and dictatorships lie on the relationship among these three cliques. In the former authoritarian regimes, militaries undertook this role. In democracies, conservative leaders with the support of middle class seized this role from militaries. One of the reasons of democratization is the changing composition of power among elites. Therefore, in their thesis, civilian-military relationship is shaped, especially by external factors, and periodically the leader clique changes. As a result, the world system always reproduces itself in

³ Huntington (1991a: 24) offers a different point of view although he also emphasizes external factors, by attributing the expansion of authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and the 1970s to the decrease of the U.S influence. Hence, after the 1980s, the U.S influence over the continent increased during Reagan’s administration and therefore democratization processes started.

periods and the popularities of authoritarian or democratic regimes observed in periphery source from the reproduction of the world system. In this type of democracy, elite democracy can live with veiled military dictatorships in developing countries. The problems of human rights are still being observed and when a crisis appears in periphery country, the military can seize power.

In the late 1970s, the process of democratization started in Portugal, and elected rulers began to come to power by replacing military-authoritarian rulers owing to various factors ranging from the new economic order to international conditions. This process was characterized as the “third wave democratization” in the literature (Huntington, 1991a). However, with the new regimes, another debate among scholars began; what type of political regime could be identified in the analyses of these regimes. Hence, the debates on democracy and its definitions again became intensified.

However, the historical, economic and sociological conditions for democracy coming from the macro democracy theories do not seem to be compatible with the political regimes which appeared after the 1980s with the demise of authoritarian regimes. Karl (1990: 6) emphasized the various routes to democratization in Latin American countries after the 1980s. According to her, the postulates of the modernization thesis, which claimed that the democratic process could appear with economic or capitalist development, may explain the transition to democracy in Brazil, which was triggered by economic boom, but it can not explain the transition in Peru, whose transition started with stagnant growth rates, extreme foreign debt and persistent balance of payments problems. Moreover, this approach does not explain the transition in Argentina, where the authoritarian rule appeared at the same time with relatively high levels of per capita GDP. She also rejected the explanations based on political culture analyses. She asked that if the political culture of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay embody tolerance to military rule generating violation of human rights and waves of state terror, how they could suddenly become sufficiently civic and tolerant enough to extend support for democratization. She claimed that there is no single precondition to explain democratization in Latin America; the economic,

cultural, social and international factors on their own do not constitute a general law of democratization in the region. Secondly, the results of past studies on democracy showed that, regarding economic development, more equitable income distribution, higher levels of literacy as prerequisites of democracy is flawed because these have indeed become the outcomes of democracy today. Likewise, the feature of tolerance of political culture also seems the result of democratization. Most of the Latin American democracies emerged at the end of severe struggles. Therefore, it is claimed that independent variables of democratization formulated in the past became dependent variables of democracies today (Karl, 1991: 7).

Generally, Schumpeter's theory is commonly used in comparative politics to analyze Western democracies. According to Schumpeter, democracy is a polity that permits a choice among elites by citizens voting in regular and competitive elections (Karl, 1990: 1). In the literature, the followers of Schumpeter set up the theory of procedural or minimalist democracy (Huntington, 1991a: 7). Schumpeter's theory has two major dimensions: "existence of institutions" and "regular" elections. His followers modified his theoretical framework of democracy by adding some new characteristics such as lack of restrictions on citizen expression, the absence of discrimination against particular political parties, the freedom of association for all interests and civilian control over military (Karl, 1990: 3). As opposed to procedural democracy, the definition of "substantive democracy" is also significant as it further extends the borders of Schumpeter's definition. The prerequisites of "substantive democracy" is the predominance of institutions that translate individual preferences into public policy through majoritarian rule, the incorporation of an ever-increasing proportion of the population into the process of decision making and the continuous improvement of economic equity through the actions of governing institutions (Karl, 1990: 2).

However, in order to identify the new democracies, "procedural democracy" or "minimalist democracy" conceptualization gained popularity among liberal authors working on the new democracies including Huntington, O'Donnell, Przeworski, Karl and Hunter, all of whom stressed the benefit of using the theory of procedural or

minimalist democracy (Huntington, 1991a, O'Donnell, 1992, Przeworski, 1992, Hunter, 1997, Karl, 1990). According to O'Donnell (1999: 160), the differences in political, economical and social conditions between developed countries and developing ones brought about a new definition of democracy for developing countries instead of representative democracy of developed ones. Huntington argued that in the 20th century, the approaches for defining democracy tried to conceptualize democracy in terms of sources of authority for government, purposes served by government and procedures for constituting government. He emphasized the central concern of procedural democracy as "the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern" (Huntington, 1991a: 6). These authors built their "procedural" or "minimalist" democracy concept on Robert Dahl's definition "polyarchy" by adding other specific characteristics. According to Dahl (1956: 21), the decision process, main basis of polyarchy, was divided into two stages, one of which is the election stage and another of which is the interelection stage. The election stage consisted of three periods, namely, the voting period, the prevoting period and the postvoting period. Briefly, Dahl's concept of democracy, called "Polyarchy" involved seven attributes: (1) elected officials; (2) free and fair elections; (3) inclusive suffrage; (4) the right to run for office; (5) freedom of expression; (6) alternative information; and (7) associational autonomy (O'Donnell, 1999: 176).

The second period for intensified debates on democracy, after the 1970s, emerged in the 1990s because of the end of the Cold War. Its main reason was the effort to identify the situation and the adaptation of newly democratic countries which emerged as independent after the demise of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R) and of communism. Naturally, these studies set out not only to analyze the Eastern European countries but also to analyze the nature of newly democratic states which had been subject to pressures under bureaucratic-authoritarian governments for a long time.

I.2. The Democratization Theories on Latin America

As explained, the macro democracy theories were not sufficient to explain the new democracies. Latin American countries also experienced democratic regimes with the end of the “third wave democratization”. In this section, a framework of democracy for new democratic regimes of Latin America is to be defined.

As the literature on comparative politics has emphasized the process of democratization is very complex, and it does not follow a uniform line. It proceeds in several stages. The first stage is the breakdown or the dissolution of old regime followed by a transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic ones. The second stage is consolidation of democracy (O’Donnell, 1992: 18). In the literature, analyses of consolidation of democracy have looked at its prerequisites and the kind democracies that have emerged at the end. According to Karl (1990: 11), scholars should concentrate on the mode of regime transition, the relationship among political actors in this process and finally, on what type of democracy emerges at the end of the transition process in studying process of democratization in Latin America.

As explained in the previous section, with the new developments and the new world order which was observed after the “third wave democratization”, the scholars who accepted Dahl’s theory as basis for analysis of the case studies tried to develop his framework in the light of rapid changes in the world. As a result, new derivatives of “polyarchy” emerged. Among them, O’Donnell accepted Robert Dahl’s “polyarchy” in the analysis of new democracies in Latin American countries. However, he added four criteria to Dahl’s democracy concept, “polyarchy” or “procedural” democracy. The first is that elected officials should not be forced to withdraw from power before the end of their legal power periods. Secondly, elected authorities should not be forced by vetoes or restrictions from nonelected actors, especially armed forces. Thirdly, there should be an uncontested national territory that obviously determines the voting population. Finally, there should be a generalized expectation that a fair

electoral process and its surrounding freedoms will continue in future (O'Donnell, 1999: 176-177).⁴

O'Donnell stressed the benefits of using procedural or minimalist democracy. In his approach, a political democracy or polyarchy involves certain prerequisites such as secret ballot, universal adult suffrage, regular elections, partisan competition, associational recognition and access, and executive accountability. To him, some institutions of democracy such as administrative accountability, judicial review, public financing for parties, unrestricted access to information, and limitations on successive terms in office, provisions for permanent voter registration, and absentee balloting, compulsory voting are not necessary for accepting a regime as a democracy (O'Donnell, 1999: 184). Essentially, for O'Donnell, it is not necessary for a democracy to become consolidated. "Endurance" instead of "consolidation" is sufficient to analyze new democratic regimes of Latin America or other developing countries (O'Donnell, 1999: 160).

Finally, O'Donnell also characterized the new democracies or polyarchies of Latin America as "delegative democracies" (DDs). However, these new democracies do not follow the path toward representative ones. In a DD, Presidency can be constrained only by the hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office. Winning presidential candidates in a DD present themselves as above both political parties and organized interests. Other institutions such as courts and legislatures constitute problems for a democratically elected president in terms of domestic and international advantages. Accountability to such institutions is an obstacle for the full authority of president. The DD is majoritarian and also personalistic in the sense that after the election, voters should become a passive audience of the President. Technocrats are promoted by the President in the decision-making process of economic policy against the resistance of

⁴ According to O'Donnell (1999: 177), in the light of these eleven criteria, seven of which had been theorized by Dahl and four of which were added by him, the new democracies in Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela, whose democracy had appeared before the third wave of democratization and Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, Chile and Peru could be accepted as democracies.

society; Congress, political parties, interest groups or crowds. Finally, the DD unlike representative democracy implies weak institutionalization (O'Donnell, 1999: 164-168).⁵

Other scholars were not content with the narrow framework of definition of democracy such as “minimalist” approach for new democracies. They sought a moderate explanation by considering the differences of the new democracies from established democracies. For example, in Karl's definition, democracy means “a set of institutions that permits the entire adult population to act as citizens by choosing their leading decision makers in competitive, fair, and regularly scheduled elections which are held in the context of the rule of law, guarantees for political freedom, and *limited military prerogatives*” (Karl, 1990: 2, emphasis mine). The components of this definition of democracy are political competition for power, participation of citizens through varied forms of collective action, accountability of rulers to citizens via the rule of law and *the mechanisms of representation and civilian control over military*. Thus, in the light of Latin American countries, Karl stresses civilian control over military for labeling a regime as democratic.

The process of democratization consists of the termination of a nondemocratic regime, the beginning of the democratic regime and finally the consolidation of a democratic system. (Huntington (1991b: 9) Liberalization refers to the opening of an authoritarian regime. However, liberalization may not bring about full-scale democratization. A liberalized authoritarian regime may provide some democratic rights for citizens, but this appears without submitting top decision makers to the electoral test. According to O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 7-9), liberalization is the process of redefining and extending rights. Democratization includes liberalization but it is a wider political concept. It requires an open competition to gain power and free competitive elections to determine who governs the state. Therefore,

⁵ This type of democracy as opposed to representative democracy can be used to define the present state of democracies of Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Philippines, Korea and of many postcommunist countries (O'Donnell, 1999: 160). Argentina, the main subject of this thesis, was an important example of the DD after the transition. For example, the President Raul Alfonsin and the President Carlos Menem implemented their policies through executive order or enactment of decree instead of passing law from the Congress (Wiarda and Kline, 1996).

liberalization can appear and proceed without democratization (Stepan and Linz, 1996: 3).

When the historical and chronic interventionism of military in politics in the continent are considered, Karl's definition for Latin American countries is appropriate to define a regime as democratic. As it is emphasized in the following section on civilian-military relations, civilian control over militaries gains more significance for the new democracies. Today in Latin America, procedural democratic regimes reign. For example, electoral leaders freely continue their legal period and transfer power to another one in the end of election. However, direct or indirect influences of military in politics were observed in the continent after the transition. For example, several military uprisings emerged in Argentina and Venezuela in spite of their failures after the transition to democracy. Theoretically, a threat of reversal to authoritarian regime or threat of a military coup may bring about confined civilian authorities, and the regime could not work in accordance with democratic structure.

I.2.1 Transition and Consolidation Processes

After defining a democracy theory for the new democratic regimes of Latin America, it is necessary to understand the processes of democratization. Following the demise or surrender of a military-authoritarian regime, the process of the transition to democracy from authoritarian regimes is significant for analyzing the nature of new democracies. Karl (1990: 10) claimed that "the arrangements made by key political actors during a regime transition establish new rules, roles, and behavioral patterns which may or may not represent an important rupture with the past".

According to Stepan and Linz (1996: 3), the transition process can be realized under some conditions. Firstly, there should be common agreement about political procedures to lead to an elected government. Secondly, there should be a government as the result of a free and popular vote. Thirdly, a government having an authority to

apply new policies should emerge. Finally, the executive, legislative and judicial powers formed by the new democracy should not share power with other bodies.

According to O'Donnell (1992: 6), the boundary of the transition starts from the dissolution of an authoritarian regime and extends to the installation of some form of democracy. During the process of the transition, the rules of political game are not defined. He identified the appearance of more secure guarantees for the rights of individuals and groups provided by the authoritarian rulers by modifying their own rules as the important sign of the beginning of the transition. Therefore, the transition starts when the liberalization appears in the authoritarian regime.

According to Karl (1990: 11), there are four "ideal types of transition"; reform, revolution, imposition and pacted transitions, all of which were observed in Latin America. The type "Reform" from below was always prevented by unsuppressed traditional elites. Therefore, transition, through "reform" in Latin America which was realized by mass actors from below did not produce stable democracy.⁶ "Revolution" generally brings stable forms of governance, but this type has not turned into democratic patterns of fair competition, unrestricted contestation, rotation in power and free associability. The most common forms of transition in Latin America have been transition from above or an elite-based approach. In this pattern, traditional rulers do not lose their dominant position in spite of pressures from below, and they employ strategies of either compromise or force.⁷

Huntington (1991a: 124) categorized the types of transition under three titles. The first was "transformation", in which rulers of the existing regime played central role to end the authoritarian regime and to change it into a democratic one. This type emerged in well established military regimes which successfully controlled

⁶ Argentina (1946-1951), Guatemala (1946-1954) and Chile (1970-1973) were examples for this situation according to Karl (1990: 11).

⁷ At this point, foundational pacts are identified as quite significant in the context of Latin America (Karl, 1990: 10). Venezuela is the typical sample of this pact. In this case, a series of agreements negotiated by the military, economic, and party leaders were provided on explicit institutional arrangements.

opposition as well as economic situation. The main characteristic of transformation, the opposition, at least at the beginning, was weaker than the government.⁸

The second type was “replacement” different from “transformation” (Huntington, 1991a: 142). In this type, reformers of the authoritarian regime were very weak and the dominant faction was standpatters which resisted to the change. Democratization occurred as a result of opposition gaining strength until the government collapsed. The opposition came to power and the conflict turned into a new phase in new government. Briefly, replacement consists of three phases; the struggle to produce the fall, the fall and the struggle after the fall. The transition through “replacement” has been very rare in transition from one-party person and military regimes.

The third type was “transplacement” in which democratization came from the combined actions of government and opposition (Huntington, 1991a: 151). In the government, there was a balance between reformers and standpatters, and they accepted to negotiate a change of reform. They started formal or informal negotiations with the opposition. In the side of the opposition, moderates are stronger than radicals but their power was not enough to overthrow the government. Therefore, they also sought a negotiation with the government.⁹

The process of the transition is very significant to define the future of new democratic regime. The first characteristic is whether its outcome is based on force or compromise (Karl, 1990: 10). The second characteristic is based on the position of authoritarian rulers which still protect ascendant on mass actors and mass actors which gain the upper hand over authoritarian elite. According to Karl, during regime transitions, all political calculations and interactions are very indefinite because actors do not decide what their interest are, who their supporters will be, and which

⁸ Huntington (1991a: 124) argued that the cases of Spain, Brazil, Mexico, Taiwan and Hungary among communist countries were the examples of “transformation”. In Brazil for example, President Geisel declared that political change was to be gradual, slow and sure. The transition process started in 1973 and proceeded with the appearance of the new civilian president in 1985 and with the new constitution in 1988 and the popular election in 1989. Therefore, it was a sixteen-year process.

⁹ According to Huntington (1991a: 151), during the “Third Wave”, this type of transition “transplacement” took place in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Uruguay and Korea, and to some degree in Bolivia, Honduras, El Salvador and Nicaragua.

groups will be their allies or opponents. The dynamics of the transition revolve around strategic interactions and tentative arrangements between actors with uncertain power resources.¹⁰

The “Third Wave” transitions evolved through five major phases (Huntington, 1991a: 127). The first phase is the emergence of reformers in the authoritarian government. The second is that in some cases, reformers desire to decrease the risks at the end if they continue their power. It appears especially when the opposition gains greater capacity. The third is that in some cases, leaders believe that in the democratic system, they will not lose their position in politics. The fourth is that reformers believe that the democratic system is beneficial for their country by promoting international legitimacy of their countries. Finally, in some cases, reformers believe that democracy is the most appropriate government and their countries have also to reach the level of developed and respected countries.

According to Huntington, the important political actors during the transition period in the third wave were “standpatters”, “liberal reformers”, and “democratic reformers” in the governing coalition, and “democratic moderates” and “revolutionary extremists” in the opposition (Huntington, 1991a: 121). In authoritarian regimes, the standpatters were normally right wing, fascist and nationalist. The opponents of democratization in the opposition were normally left wing actors, revolutionary, and Marxist-Leninist. During the period of transition, all groups which participated in democratization had common objectives, and at the same time serious conflicts could arise among them.

Przeworski (1992: 117) also identified the political actors related with the transition process. According to him, there are four important actors, and the relationships among them are significant for the transition. In the authoritarian bloc, “Hard-liners” and “Reformers” appear and in the opposition bloc, “Moderates” and “Radicals” are observed. “Hard-liners” want to be in the repressive cores of the authoritarian bloc;

¹⁰ O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) also introduced an actor-oriented approach. As will be explained in the following section, they emphasized the significance of political actors and the relationship among them in the process.

police, the legal bureaucracy, some journalists etc. “Reformers” want to take place among politicians of the regime and some groups outside the state apparatus; sectors of the bourgeoisie under capitalism. “Moderates” and “Radicals” may or may not share same interests. Main difference between them is risk aversion.

According to Przeworski, all transitions to democracy emerge at the end of negotiation among some of representatives of old regime and some of democratic forces. Negotiations are important not only for the extraction of the society from the authoritarian regime but also to constitute democratic institutions. Democracy appears from bargaining not from dictation (Peeler, 2004: 78). What Przeworski (1992: 119) called “extrication” transition was a situation resulting from an agreement between “Reformers” and “Moderates”; extrication appears under three different conditions. Firstly, “Reformers” and “Moderators” reach an agreement to set up institutions under which social forces are represented. Second, “Reformers” can reach an agreement with “Hard-liners” or neutralize them and thirdly, “Moderates” can control “Radicals”. Przeworski, thus, illustrates the relationship between political actors and the resulting situation in the following table;

Table 1 The Tactical Positions of Political Actors¹¹

		Moderates Ally with	
	Radicals	Authoritarian regime survives in old form	Reformers Authoritarian regime holds with concession
Hard Liners			
Reformers Ally with	Moderates	Democracy without guarantees	Democracy with guarantees

¹¹ Przeworski (1992: 120)

O'Donnell (1992: 18) asserted that in Latin American countries, which completed the first transition period, the second transition was so complex and difficult that the continent was still vulnerable to authoritarian reversal. According to him, transition to democracy in Latin America can be interrupted by a classic military coup, called "sudden death" and by a decrease of existing spaces for civilian power and the guarantees of liberal constitutionalism, called "slow death". The factors which may bring about a reversal to authoritarianism are various; the existence of determined authoritarian actors who control important resources of power, neutral position of major actors to political regime, significant authoritarian patterns of domination in social sphere, the outcomes of deep economic crisis and social inequalities (O'Donnell, 1992: 19).

O'Donnell also analyzed the newly democratic regimes which emerged with the demise of the authoritarian regimes in the 1970s, and he claimed that there are two categories of the cases of transition (O'Donnell, 1992: 24). In the first type, there was bureaucratic-authoritarian family which was economically destructive and politically highly repressive. These regimes collapsed due to internal conflict and in some cases, they vanished due to both internal conflict and its reflection to the international arena like a war.¹² Therefore, the collapse starts the transition period. This type of transition leads the country to confront a wrecked economy and very deep political and psychosocial problems. The supporters and actors of authoritarian regime lose their prestige because of economic situation and defeat in wars. Therefore, there appears a demilitarized country under new democratic regime. Military loses their veto policies, and participate only in few institutions of new regime. This condition provides the new government with freedom to act. However, in addition to advantages, the leaders of new regime have a limited arena to define economic and social policies because of the poor condition of the economy. Moreover, because of wider freedom, military can become enemy of the new regime, and this new regime is under danger of a "sudden death" by a military coup.

¹² Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay and Greece were the examples of this type according to O'Donnell.

In the second type of transition to democracy, authoritarian regimes were relatively successful in economics, and their repression was less extensive (O'Donnell, 1992: 25). Economic growth benefited important sectors of the middle classes and the entrepreneurs. O'Donnell accepted that these classes became an opposition to authoritarian regimes, but after the transition they still carry some positive memories for the authoritarian regimes. Moreover, contrary to the first category of cases, these regimes held less prestige. The transition does not appear after the collapse of authoritarian regime. The process worked with pacts and accords. The bureaucrats of the authoritarian regime shaped the rhythm and agenda of transition, because they were less repressive and economically successful.¹³ According to O'Donnell, this second group of transition is convenient for successful consolidation, because in the first type, the inheritance of a ruined economy and armed forces that are politically defeated in a transition via collapse are likely to be the enemy of new regime. In the second type, economic success, relatively low repression and negotiated transition are likely to facilitate new democracy because the economic success under authoritarian regime creates strong economic classes. Moreover, with a negotiated transition armed forces do not leave from power in the new regime (O'Donnell, 1992: 26).

Stepan and Linz (1996: 5) put forward the characteristics of the consolidation of democracy by defining it as “a political situation in which, in a phrase, democracy has become the only game in town”. In this town, there are not any social, economic, political and national actors which try to overthrow the democratic regime. Moreover, even under severe economic crises, the majority of the people seek to solve problems within the democratic paradigm. Finally, all political actors reach an agreement that search the solution of political conflicts in accordance with the rules of the established constitution.

¹³ To O'Donnell, the cases of Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Spain displayed the characteristics of this type.

According to Karl (1990: 6), consolidation appears “when contending social classes and political groups come to accept some set of formal rules or informal understandings that determine ‘who gets what, where, when and how’ from politics”. Przeworski (1992: 106) characterized the consolidation of democracy along four important dimensions. Firstly, an institutional framework for contestation must be constructed, in terms of Dahl’s concept, secondly, a competitive representative regime must be established, thirdly, economic conflicts must be channeled into the democratic institutions and fourthly, the military must be taken under civilian control. Valenzuela, like O’Donnell, accepted the minimalist approach as a framework of democratization. Moreover, he stressed O’Donnell’s “two transition perspective”. According to him, a consolidated democracy includes strengthening of certain institutions, for example the electoral system, revitalized or newly created parties, judicial independence and respect for human rights. This process requires redefinitions of the regime’s institutions and that of relations among political actors.

I.2.2. Civilian-Military Relations and the Control of Militaries in the Context of Democratization

In the analysis of civilian-military relations, there are two important issues, one of which relates to factors facilitating military’s intervention into politics, and another of which is civilian control over military. These issues can raise some points related to the main aim of this thesis. The first issue can explain the nature of the new democracies, for example if we ask the question of, is there any threat of military’s intervention? The latter is also related with the acceptance of a democracy conceptualization whether it includes civilian control or not.

Although Huntington tried to answer the question of why militaries intervened in politics, he also introduced a framework of civilian control over military. Firstly, he approached civilian-military relationship as a system of a complex balance between, on the one hand, military with its authority, influence and ideology and, on the other hand, civilian groups with their authority, influence and ideology (Huntington, 2004: xv). Moreover, he claimed that civilian-military relationship is part of national security politics. National security politics consists of three parts. Firstly, “military

security politics” includes the struggle against external threats from other countries. Secondly, “interior security politics” is the struggle against internal threats such as guerilla movements. Finally, “situational security politics” is related with the threat of erosion of state power which reveal from social, economical and demographical conditions (Huntington, 2004: 3). Militaries had a classical structure until the 19th century. After this period, there appeared a new concept; “professionalism” with the rise of officer staff as a profession. This change called for a new definition for civilian-military relations (Huntington, 2004: 25). After the rise of the officer profession in the 20th century, the most important focus of civilian-military relationship was the relationship between officer staff and state. According to Huntington, the officer is an active administrator element of the structure of military and state is that of society as it is responsible for resources including military security. Therefore, social and economic relationships between military and society reflect political relationship between officer staff and state (Huntington, 2004: 6).

After the new structure of civilian-military relationship, Huntington classified the types of civilian control; subjective civilian control and objective civilian control (Huntington, 2004: 112). In subjective civilian control, civil power is pulled to maximum level. However, it is very difficult to form a holistic civilian authority against military because civil groups are very numerous, they are variable and their interests are very opposite. Therefore, maximization of civilian power always means that of specific civilian group or groups’ power. As a result, subjective civilian control is related with power relationship among civil groups.¹⁴

¹⁴ Huntington historically defined kinds of subjective civilian control (Huntington, 2004: 113). First type is civilian control of state institutions. In the 17th and 18th centuries, militaries depended on throne in England and the U.S.A; hence, civilian control was used as a tool by parliamentary groups in order to increase their power against throne. However, the King was also civilian authority and, therefore parliamentary control was used to decrease the power of the King, not to reduce the power of military. The second type is civilian control of social classes (Huntington, 2004: 114). In the 18th and the 19th centuries, aristocracy and bourgeoisie began to compete to gain control over military. Both two classes equated civilian control with their interests. The third type is civilian control of political regime. Civilian control is equated with democracy and military control is equated with authoritarian or totalitarian administration. The military, in a democratic country, can weaken civilian control, and it can gain serious political power through the institutions of democracy. On the contrary, in a totalitarian regime, because of struggle among groups within military, military’s political power can decrease. Therefore, subjective civilian control does not necessarily belong to a specific political regime.

It is asserted that with the onset of professionalism of the military, struggle for control over the militaries did not continue among civilian groups any more. The military emerged as an actor with which civilian groups has also to struggle. Therefore, this new situation required the new definition of civilian control, called objective civilian control (Huntington, 2004: 117). In this type, military professionalism is pulled to maximum level. Objective civilian control is the distribution of power between military and civilian groups, which leads to reveal professional attitude from officer staff. It aims at the civilized military because the thesis of this control is that while military gradually participates in politics about the issues of institutions, class and regime, civilian control reduces. Therefore, the military must be excluded from politics and an independent area should be formed for it according to the thesis of objective civilian control. On the other hand, subjective civilian control claims that an independent field and the exclusion of military from politics are not possible.

It is also important to note that the nature of the prerogatives of the military fall under two spheres: institutional autonomy and political autonomy (Cizre, 1997: 152). The former is related with the structural properties of the military. Typically, the military excludes civilians to protect its integrity, modernity and unity. The arenas of institutional autonomy are firstly, promotions, appointments, and punishments of junior personnel; secondly, levels in the armed forces, thirdly, military education and doctrine, fourthly, military reform and modernization. In the Middle East and Latin America, increasing professional skills of militaries under the impact of the Cold War led to an increase in the military's influence in political as well as purely defense issues. The problem arises when professionalism turns into a limitation of civilian government's ability in politics. Political autonomy is related with political goals and influences. It is the ability of the military to raise its position over the constitutional authority of democratically elected governments. This ability has direct and indirect influences on the government. As a result, in order to understand military position in new democratic regimes, it is necessary to analyze these two spheres of military prerogatives.

After a general analysis of the civilian-military relationship, it is necessary to identify a model of this relationship which is valid for Latin American cases. In the process of transition to democracy, authoritarian regime rulers may demand impunity in return for withdrawal from power. In the cases of military regimes, there are two reasons of this demand, one of which is to prevent the officers of the military regime from being prosecuted for their actions and human rights abuses, and another of which is the concern for maintaining the unity of the army as an institution. Naturally, strength or boundaries of this protection depends on the relative position of the army whether it is strong or weak vis-à-vis the civilians. Valenzuela (1992: 62-67) defined this preservation under three areas of exit guarantees: tutelary powers, reserved domains and manipulation of the electoral process.

It should be underlined at this point that rather than focusing on the institutionalization of democracies, it seems more important to identify the factors that undermine its operation (Valenzuela, 1992: 62). It should not be forgotten that no consolidated democracy is immune to the breakdown. Valenzuela identified “perverse institutionalization”, which include the exit guarantees of militaries during transitions and the militaries’ specific demands in return for abandoning power. The importance of these guarantees is that they shape and condition the nature of existing democracy, the position of militaries in politics after the transition and the situation of institutions to be necessary for a democracy.

According to Valenzuela (1992: 62), there are four basic perverse elements; firstly, the essence of tutelary power generated nondemocratically. A regime is not accepted as consolidated democracy if those who win government at the end of election remain in power, but the process of policy-making is carried out by nonelected elites. They demand the right to intervene in politics in order to protect the interests of nation. After the recent transitions to democracy, in some cases, militaries have undertaken a tutelary role, which appears through the creation of formal institutions such as the military dominated Council of the Revolution in Portugal with the 1974 Constitution and the National Security Council in Turkey, through ambiguous constitutional references to the role of the armed forces as guarantors of the constitution, and informally through the perception of armies as the permanent

institution of the state that can protect the interest of nation. Tutelary powers enable the military to maintain its influence on the civilian government in the policy process (Valenzuela, 1992: 62). The first mechanism to establish tutelary powers is to include specific terms such as “national sovereignty, territorial integrity of state, law and order” in the constitution. The 1976 Constitution of Portugal was an example of this power, according to which the armed forces were the guarantor of the process of revolution. The other way is to create new constitutional institutions established by the military and charged with protecting values of the nation. Portugal Revolution Council established with the 1976 Constitution was an appropriate example for these institutions. The majority of the Council was derived from the armed forces. Likewise, with the 1980 Constitution, a National Security Council was established. In Turkey, the National Security Council was re-constituted with the 1982 constitution by expanding the weight of the military in national security issues. The final mechanism of tutelary power is to insert articles directly which define the military as guarantor of the constitution. The 1980 Constitution of Chile and the 1988 Constitution of Brazil included provisions to that effect.

The other exit guarantee is reserved domains. According to Valenzuela (1992: 64), reserved domains unlike tutelary powers provide specific power areas for the nonelected elites. They lead to specific areas not to be regulated by elected officials. Indeed, these areas can be observed even in developed countries. Such areas come from informal agreements or formal pacts and they are protected in constitutions as autonomous state agencies. However, in newly democratic regimes, these areas are used by nonelected political actors, mostly by militaries in order to maintain their political autonomy. Indeed, this power should belong to freely elected civilians in a democratic regime. With reserved domains, militaries expand their autonomy in the regime. The 1976 Constitution of Portugal reflected this guarantee (Yazıcı, 1997: 32). The 1980 Constitution of Chile accepted some policies which were defined by military; for example, military could obtain weapon and could use its budget without the permission of the civilian authorities.

The third perverse element is major discriminations in and manipulation of the electoral process. To some degree, discrimination against minor parties can be

tolerated due to the concerns about the stability of government. However, in transitions, the actors who hold power during the first transition can deliberately determine the electoral rules in order to exclude significant sectors of opinion, while others are provided overrepresentation. Such initiatives are generally confined to the first election after the transition, but sometimes it can gain permanent character (Yazıcı, 1997: 34). This can occur through the vote counting procedures or through an electoral apportionment that creates inequities in the weight of individual votes. The manipulation occurs through the election laws and the constitution. The most convenient way for such manipulation is to make the leader of last military regime elected as the president of the new democratic regime. In 1976 in Portugal, General Eanes and in 1980 in Turkey General Kenan Evren were elected Presidents in this way. Moreover, in the case of Argentina, the leaders of the “Proceso”, the last military regime between 1976 and 1983, tried to be elected president after the transition but all of them failed (Pion-Berlin, 1985). The other way is to limit the authorization of legislation in constituting government.

Valenzuela thus defined a political system as “nonconsolidated democracy”, if periodic elections with universal suffrage, freedoms of expression and organization exist as the formalities of a democracy, but, meanwhile, the electoral process is not accepted as the only means to create governments, and/or tutelary powers, electoral discriminations and/or important “reserved domains” of policy making continue to exist.

The irreversibility of the actions of the military regime is another way for militaries to maintain their autonomous position in democratic regime. Militaries try to prevent new civilian initiatives to undo the policies of the military regime (Yazıcı, 1997: 37). For example, with the 1976 Constitution of Portugal banned all constitutional changes during the first legislation period after the transition. The 1982 Constitution of Turkey included some provisional articles to prevent civilian initiatives against the actions of the military regime.

Amnesty laws are also exit guarantees for militaries. Naturally, all militaries and their top members demand protection from trial in return for withdrawal from power. In fact, the main agenda for the new democratic regimes in Latin America after the transition was the question of human right abuses by the military rulers. Militaries of several Latin American countries such as Chile, Brazil and Uruguay gained immunities from such trials (Yazıcı, 1997: 39). As will be explained in Chapter III, Argentina was an interesting example for this area.

In the axis of the civilian-military relationship in Latin America, it is necessary to look at the political traditions of military. Latin America remained under the control of Spain and Portugal for a long time. The independence from the colonizers were gained by wars through militaries. Therefore, the self perception of the militaries has been the founder and guardian of nations. This is very important because unlike other institutions of the developed countries, the military often intervened for internal security instead of its main role as the defender of external threats. With the increasing leftist movements in the 1960s as a result of Algerian and Cuban revolutions, the military strengthened its legitimacy in politics in Latin America. This was a turning point for the continent. The crisis of the regimes of the continent, because of expanded political participation and economic restructuring, brought about a confrontation of dominant classes and popular sectors and a wave of military sponsored Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes (O'Donnell, 1999; Garreton, 1989).

Finally, on the issue of the new pattern of civilian-military relationship, some scholars held a pessimist attitude for civilian control. According to Ruhl (1998: 259), after the transition to democracy in Latin America, the military is still a powerful and autonomous political actor and civil authority has not completely placed the military under its control. However, because of the new international order after the end of Cold War and new economic structure, some asserted that the new world structure would not easily accept military coups or open military intervention to democracy. The costs of military coups, not only economic but also political and social, are not tolerated by international power centers. Brian Loveman, Thomas Davies and Bruce Farcau claimed that militaries still cover their center of gravity in the political life. Loveman claimed that the military still has anti-political attitudes and Latin

American countries are still “protected democracies” under the control of armed forces (Ruhl, 1998: 260). Like Loveman, Farcau asserted that although the civilian governments appeared in Latin America, the military is still a dominant political actor in the continent (Ruhl, 1998: 262).

On the other side, there are optimistic scholars such as Hunter, Pion-Berlin and Zagorski analyzing this changing pattern of the relationship under a more positive light for democracy. They asserted that Latin American militaries lost their relative weight in political life today (Ruhl, 1998: 158). For example, according to Hunter, the new world order after the Cold War has been hostile to military coups and militaries have lost dominant character in political life in Latin America (Ruhl, 1998: 263). However, as cited above, in spite of their optimistic analyzes, these researchers still recognize the fragile structure of existing democracies in Latin America and they warn about an authoritarian danger in the region. In fact, the reason why they are accepted as optimistic rests on their democracy framework. Their democracy understanding is based on a narrow sense, and they sought endurance for democracy among political actors instead of consolidation.

Despite a general optimism about civilian-military relation in the continent, Hunter (1997a) claimed that this relationship has not completely arrived at democratic control in the Brazilian case. Identifying the factors that lead to this situation such as the economic success of Brazilian’s military government, the relatively low incidence of human rights violations and the impressive degree of public support for democracy, Hunter looked at the officers who still saw themselves as the guardians of nations, and pointed to the defense policy defined exclusively by the military, and she studied the autonomy of the Brazilian military in several areas (Hunter, 1997a: 2). However, she asserted that while the conflict between civilians and militaries was intensified, it did not turn into a breakdown of the new democratic regimes; after the transition, democracy survived with a history of interventionism of the armed forces (Hunter, 1998: 295). On the new balance of civilian-military relations after the transition, Hunter noted that “civilian governments want to enhance their influence by challenging some of the privileges and prerogatives that the armed forces acquired under the dictatorship; the military in turn, wants to defend the status quo

that prevailed at the end of authoritarian rule” (Hunter, 1998: 297). As a result, military’s influence decreased and its role was turned into “defensive position” since then.

Hunter also analyzed the general interests and preferences of most Latin American militaries emerging from authoritarian rule. Firstly, militaries sought to protect the status quo instead of expanding their influence in politics. More specifically, their first priority was to stop trials of officers for human rights abuses committed in the authoritarian period. Secondly, they also sought to protect their budgetary appropriations and to preserve decision making autonomy over military matters like force structure and weapons acquisition. Finally, in some Latin American cases, militaries also tried to retain institutional prerogatives over broad political matters (Hunter, 1998: 297).

In the light of this new structure of the relationship, what courses of action could the Latin American militaries take to defend their interest? As Hunter elaborated, firstly, in the process of democratization and after the Cold War era, militaries did not hold as much bargaining power as initial appearances might suggest. Secondly, the costs of coercive tactics have risen. Most officers are acutely aware that authoritarian solutions – such as military coups – would now face with wide-ranging sectors of society as well as the international community. Thirdly, they recognize their own limitations in governing and avoid a return to the institutional strains that resulted from military rule, including internal factionalism, politicization, and corruption (Hunter, 1998: 298). Therefore, Hunter argued that today in the new democracies of Latin America, officers faced two options, one of which is to accept civilian demands or to refuse them. Refusal is very costly to the military. If the armed forces choose conflict, it can result in confrontation with broad opposition from civil and political society, and it can lead politicians to reduce their force levels further in budgetary and other privileges. As a result, militaries can be a threat to democratic regime only in extreme situations (Hunter, 1998: 298).

The other optimistic author on the issue of the new democratic regime is David Pion-Berlin (1997: 2), who argued that it was not necessary to completely exclude

militaries from all spheres of politics. As he puts it, “central decision makers are free to propose and armies are (within limits) free to oppose”. Naturally, there are areas of discord between civilians and soldiers, especially in the military-defense issues. Nonetheless, the important point is that both opposition and proposition should emerge in the borders of institutional arrangements. These arrangements through mediating and arbitrating the conflicts limit free demands of actors. As a result, the respect of actors for the institutions is a necessary condition for the rules of the game in democracies. The significant point for this institutional approach is the institutionalization of the relationship between civilians and soldiers. “The relation was guided and transformed by a shared recognition that there are boundaries to permissible action, norms of conduct, and official channels of influence that neither side can easily transgress” (Pion-Berlin, 1997: 19).

The institutionalized relationship emphasized by Pion-Berlin brings about stability. This stability has two dimensions, one of which is formal and the other is behavioral. Constitutions, statutes, codes, regulations and other legal instruments constitute the formal dimension and all of which can be observed in the Latin American countries and most lawful states. The fragile democracy means that the rules are often in the breach. The behavioral dimension is more important, i.e., adherence to conventions among any political actors must become a behavioral adaptation. For example, the civilians’ contacts between military commanders must occur within governmental agencies. These agencies are institutions. The regulation of interaction between soldiers and civilians is important (Pion-Berlin, 1997: 20). The institutional approach emphasizes the importance of policies. Institutional designs may either facilitate or inhibit military attempts to influence policy processes. While institutional norms set the procedural ground rules for interaction, they do not guarantee substantive gains or losses for either side.

According to Pion-Berlin, coups emerge only under some specific conditions; if militaries have the motivation and the support of some social and economic forces. As a result, with respect for institutions, this option is to be excluded for new democracies (Pion-Berlin, 1997: 3). If the institutional design is changed, this means a change in the equilibrium between civilian-military relations.

In the light of the significance of institutionalized relations, Pion-Berlin (1997: 4) portrayed a democratic state. The democratic state is a multiheaded entity and because of this feature, it is not necessary that all institutions of the state are the same and they operate in harmony with another. All institutions have different structures, norms and rules of procedure. The important point is that in the situation of clash of interests, can civilian leaders provide control over military? As a result, the design of institutions is significant to define a regime as democratic.

Within this framework, the degree of autonomy of institutions is significant. There are two conditions, one of which is highly autonomous institution that emerge when “an agency may restrict points of entry for outsiders and reduce the occasions upon which government officials may be subject to duress from those who oppose their programs”, and another of which is low levels of autonomy that occur “when those institutions with fewer bureaucratic or procedural obstructions may be more permeable to outside influence; low levels of autonomy; central decision makers who devise programs objectionable to the armed forces” (Pion-Berlin, 1997: 5). The second important point is related to the situation of authority over military issues. According to Pion-Berlin (1997: 5), the divided authority over military issues among numerous institutions brings about advantages for military.

Finally, after the transitions to democracy in Latin America, which started in the 1970s, one of the main problems was related to the new missions to be fulfilled by militaries. Militaries should undertake new roles, because after the 1960s with the new doctrine of National Security, militaries had increased their influence over all spheres of politics. Then one of the major issues of political agendas was to find new missions for Latin American militaries in order to limit their political influence.

15

¹⁵ See table for “The Roles of Armed Forces in the 1990s” in Appendix A in page 113

I.2.3. The Case of Argentinean Democratization

The intensified struggle among civilian groups and interventions of the military as a side in politics shaped Argentina's political history during the 20th century. In this period until the transition to democracy in 1983, 26 successful military coups occurred, and hundreds of attempted coups were seen (Smith, 1991: 266). The last one, called the "Proceso", emerged in 1976 and the authoritarian regime continued for eight years. It is estimated that thirty thousand people were killed by junta (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 83). Moreover, in the area of economics, in this period, military implemented neo-liberal programs. Income distribution worsened, and inequality and poverty increased. Finally, like Portugal and Greece, military started an adventure by declaring a war to the British army for the Falkland Islands, whose political situation was debatable between these two countries. At the end, Argentinean military lost this war and its credibility was exhausted in its own country; this development opened the way the transition period.

The reasons of the dissolution of authoritarian regime were various. The armed forces in Argentina were left in a weak bargaining position at the beginning of the new democracy because of the poor economic performance, serious infringement of human rights and the defeat in the Malvinas / Falkland War (Hunter, 1997: 463). According to Berlin (1997: 5), the political and economic failures of the military regime combined with the cataclysmic effects of the Malvinas War, destroyed the military's historic role as political power broker. A loss of faith in programmatic objectives and the reemergence of personal and ideological cleavages within the ranks of the military contributed significantly to the regime's dissolution. Therefore, as the opposition to the military regime expanded, the military's standing among the public across classes was seriously harmed by the economic program and human right abuses.

Theoretically, according to Karl's analyses of the transition, it can be stated that the Argentinean transition was based on compromise, but the military was in a relatively weaker position, and the traditional elites protected their position.

Hence, the Argentinean transition corresponded to Karl's "transition from above" representing an elite-based approach. Traditional rulers, the "Pampean" bourgeoisie or agricultural sectors in the case of Argentina, had not lost their dominant position in spite of the pressure coming from below involving some part of the middle class and working class and strategies used for compromise.

In the Argentinean transition, according to the tactical positions of political actors, moderates of opposition allied with reformers of governing coalition. Its main reason was that hardliners were in a very weak position because of economic failures and the defeat of Malvinas War. In opposition bloc, the pressure over it during the "Proceso" provided demobilization, and radicals became the minority. Moreover, because of the weak position of military, it did not completely gain exit guarantees. As a result, unlike other Latin American cases such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay where the military had provided relatively economical successes and strong position of authoritarian bloc, in Argentina, it seems that democracy with guarantees could emerge.

In light of Stepan and Linz's (1996:3) account of the transition process, Argentina completed its transition period with agreement about the political procedures to lead to an elected government, which ultimately led to a government as the result of a free and popular vote. This government then held authority to implement new policies emerged in Argentina.

Briefly, unlike other cases of Latin America, in accordance with the narrow definition of procedural democracy, civilian control emerged in Argentina (Pion-Berlin, 1997: 16). Military's autonomy both in political and institutional term seem to be limited. In Argentina, the armed forces did not attempt to overthrow the constitution. Its reasons were; firstly, there were not any objective conditions for a coup because of international climate. Secondly, domestically, for a coup, there was not enough support or acquiescence from civil society. Thirdly, the authoritarian legacy was still held in disdain not only in society but also among the majority of the

members of army. Finally, there appears aversion against authoritarianism within the military itself.

Finally, the differences between the transitions of two countries of Latin America can display the position of the armies. Carranza (1997: 11) studied the differences between Brazilian and Argentinean transitions. The Brazilian military remained an important actor during the transition, and protected its traditional role and its control over the national security policy (e.g. military budgetary allocations, the autonomy of the intelligence forces and secret parallel nuclear program) because of the capacity of the Brazilian dominant classes for accommodation and negotiation. Conversely, during the transition in Argentina, the military did not maintain its active position because its credibility had ended due to the failure of economic policy and the defeat of Malvinas War by the British forces. Therefore, the Argentinean military was later on deprived of many prerogatives by the civilian Alfonsín Government; fifty generals were forced to retirement, civilian authorities took the administration of the National Atomic Energy Commission from the military, and its expenditures and force levels were sharply decreased. Secondly, in Brazil, the military provided security for itself through the Constitution of 1988. However, the Argentinean military, due to factors to be analyzed in the following chapters, could not retain institutional prerogatives. Carranza, thus, argued that the subordination of military to civilian government was secured in Argentina. Finally, the Brazilian military protected its technical power because of the nuclear capacity of the country whereas in Argentina, this capacity was limited because of the neoliberal economic policy, and the U.S. pressure to end the program of condor missiles. As a result, unlike the cases of Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, civilian leaders have been in a stronger position against the military, and they had a chance to freely act in the process of decision making.

Based on the above overview of the Argentinean state of civilian-military relations and in accordance with the objectives of this thesis, the following chapters look in more detail at how civilian-military relations in Argentina has reached the civilian

control noted in the literature, together with an account of the past history of military involvement in politics.

CHAPTER II

MILITARY REGIMES IN LATIN AMERICA AND ARGENTINA

As underlined in the foregoing chapters of this thesis, Latin America was in a state of political turmoil in the 20th century. Its political history consisted of colonization, independence wars, internal wars, coups d'etat, and revolutions, all of which belonged to unstable forms of political order. The countries of the continent shared almost common fate. Therefore, in this chapter, military regimes in Latin America and the historical background of Argentina's politics are to be analyzed.

II. 1. An Overview of the Military Regimes in Latin America

Until the 1960s, many authoritarian regimes ruled in Latin America. According to Loveman (1997: 3), throughout the 19th century, politics meant the conflict among personalist factions and later, among political parties in Latin America. As a result, at the beginning of the 20th century, military tried to end the chaos and to impose stability and order. However, after the 1960s, the new type authoritarian regimes spread throughout the continent. Two new concepts, the "National Security Doctrine" and the "New Professionalism", were the ideological bases of these new authoritarian regimes; the nature of military interventions changed.

Within this framework, the first military coup occurred in 1964 in Brazil and it spread throughout the continent. Peru in 1968, Uruguay in 1973 and Chile in 1973 were confronted with military regimes. In Argentina, military regimes emerged in 1966 and in 1976. This new period was significantly different in terms of the nature of the military regimes. O'Donnell (1979) and Garreton (1989) defined this new type of regimes as the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes (BA). The BA period which started in 1964 ended in 1980 in Peru, in 1983 Argentina, in 1985 Uruguay and in

1985 Brazil with the installation of democratic regimes.¹⁶ Hence, in order to understand the nature of the transition to democracy in Argentina, it is necessary to grasp the theoretical framework of BA regimes.

The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regime was a type of authoritarian state. O'Donnell (1999: 110) argued that in Latin America, "the emergence of the BA is an expression of the fear of the dominant classes and various segments of the middle class regarding what they perceive as a high degree of threat posed by a politically activated popular sector (including a working class)". BAs furthered the interests of dominant class and specific segments of middle class. As a result, in the process of the transition to democracy, the positions or the attitudes of these classes were important.

To start with, according to O'Donnell (1999: 38), the main characteristics of the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian regimes were its main social base and the upper bourgeoisie which was highly "oligopolized" and "transnationalized".¹⁷ Secondly, institutionally, BA regimes involved organizations such as technocratic institutions, and their aims were to achieve normalization of the economy through orthodox neo-liberal policies.¹⁸ The restoration of order called for the political deactivation of the popular sector and the normalization of the economy. Thirdly, the regime excluded previously activated popular sectors by strictly controlling their activation in political arena. The BA reached this aim by destroying or capturing the resources supporting the activation of the popular sector. Moreover, it imposed a repressive order on society. Fourthly, this exclusion included the suppression of citizenship. Fifthly, the BA led to an increase in the preexisting inequities in the distribution of societal resources. Sixthly, it tried to depoliticize activated sectors. Finally, the BA involved

¹⁶ Here, the new regimes after the 1980s are labeled as democratic regimes. However, it is still debatable subject whether they are democratic or not. Nevertheless, in the procedural sense, based on free election etc., these new regimes are accepted as democratic regimes.

¹⁷ In the context of Argentina, this class was the Pampean bourgeoisie and its allies such as the commercial class. Moreover, some of the upper middle classes also participated in this bloc.

¹⁸ As analyzed before, the "Pampean" and its alliances always aimed at free trade and liberal economic policies because of their export orientation.

closing the democratic channels of access to the government and access for the representation of popular and class interests.

Garreton (1989: 50) defined the BA regimes as “the historical project”. According to him, “The emergence of an authoritarian regime seems to represent both a response to the political crisis in society and an attempt to make a historical social project materialize”. These two features are interrelated. “When the established order or the hegemony of dominant classes confronted with a threat from popular mobilization; growing radicalization, polarization and sometimes crisis, what these tendencies seek is to impose order, to demobilize, to ‘normalize’, and to ‘pacify’” (Garreton, 1989: 48).

Before analyzing the military regimes in Argentina, it is necessary to analyze the concepts of the National Security Doctrine (NSD), which enlarged the role of the army in politics in Argentina and the “New Professionalism” of Latin American armies. According to Garreton (1989: 68), “National Security was the principle invoked by military regimes at the moment of the rupture with the prevailing political system”. The NSD involved three major components. Firstly, it was made up of a series of abstract concepts. The main characteristics were the nation, the state and national unity. The nation and the state were considered as living organisms. They were interchangeable concepts. They were used as entities larger than individuals. Citizens were seen as subordinate subjects. The state was not accepted as an institution expressing and resolving diverse interests and conflicts. It was defined as the spirit of the nation, and it was above particular interests and possible conflicts. National unity was another abstract concept of the NSD. According to Garreton (1989: 70), “National unity was viewed not as the historical product of social consensus but as a fact that was ‘natural’ and metasocial, one derived from an ‘essence’ a ‘national soul’ or a tradition”. As a result, armed forces as the guarantor of the nation moved to restore order and to reestablish national unity. In the concept of national unity, there was no room for structural conflicts. Conflicts among groups, interests and institutions were rejected by this concept. As a result, this concept

perceived democracy as a danger because this system involved conflicts among interest, groups and institutions.

The second major component of the NSD was related to geopolitical options (Garreton, 1989: 71). Geopolitics was the core of the NSD in the sense that the place of the nation involved two antagonisms. The first was the antagonism between the two super powers. The second was that of between developed and developing nations. According to Garreton (1989: 71), in most military regimes, the East-West conflict was the central role. Marxism or communism was the main reflection of this conflict. This confrontation with Marxist movements was seen within the nation as the war against communist subversion. With this enemy, there was no dialogue or compromise. Here, democracy was seen as weak system in order to deal with this enemy.

The third major component of the NSD was a political mechanism that shaped the destiny of the nation (Garreton, 1989: 72). The national project was the way of the regime's official doctrine and it was made known with a declaration. Through political mechanisms, nation, state and government were identified as one and same concepts. Conflict over interests was regarded illegal because it undermined the principles of the NSD.

Historically, the NSD did not originate in Latin America. It was created in the U.S.A., and then it was transmitted to South America. The transmission occurred through the training of the officer of the militaries of Latin America in the U.S.A. As a result, this doctrine took place in the context of two-super-power structure of the Cold War. Moreover, the problems of the sovereignty of nation-states did not have to exclude the military from the NSD. The NSD reached its highest point with the appearance of military regimes (Garreton, 1989: 73).

Briefly, according to Garreton (1989: 75), the NSD led to the rise of perception of military as the ultimate trustees of the destiny of the nation, the supreme guarantors of the threatened national unity, and the bastion that stands above divisions among

groups in civil society. Moreover, the military gained the ability to govern the nation via the NSD.

Another concept associated with the NSD was the new professionalism of the military. According to Loveman (1997: 3), in the 1960s and 1970s, the professional military officers decided that civilian politics ended because of the inability of civilian leaders to solve the nation's problems. They accepted that only military regimes could provide the basis for the modernization, economic development and political stability. As a result, with the first case of 1964 in Brazil, the second wave of military regimes in the continent started.

In fact, the European training missions had led to the professionalization of Latin American militaries firstly in the late 19th century (Loveman, 1997: 4). Then, the officers ran into conflict with the civilian leaders because they criticized the latter's inability for national development. Another important dimension of the increasing power of militaries lied on their successful position during the anticolonial war against Spanish forces in the early 19th century. Thus, professionalism in the Argentinean military was notable in the 1920s. For example, the officers of military established a secret society, called "Logia", against the civilian government of Yrigoyen. The Logia opposed to Yrigoyen's policies because the members saw these policies disturbing the unity of the military (Loveman, 1997: 64). Moreover, the army defined many social areas as the part of the concept of national defense.¹⁹ As a result, the prototype of professionalism in the Argentinean military started in the 1920s.

However, the turning point for the new professionalism of militaries in the continent came with the 1960s after the Cuban Revolution. The National Security Doctrine contributed to this process. The U.S.A also affected this process in order to prevent the expansion of communist regimes which could be triggered by the acceleration of

¹⁹ For example, in 1926, Colonel Luis Vica told his colleagues that "the real meaning of national defense is vast and complex; it can be defined by saying that it includes all those activities and security measures necessary to assure the tranquility, prosperity and independence of a nation, as well as rapid victory in case of conflict" (Loveman, 1997: 8).

Cuban Revolution.²⁰ This process brought about the new professionalism of Latin American militaries. Military officers felt that the interventions in politics were necessary. According to Loveman (1997: 11), all military regimes aimed at “demobilizing social and political groups and limiting political participation to encourage modernization through regressive income distribution and capital accumulation”. War schools established and administrated by the militaries in the Latin American countries produced the ideological basis of the new professionalism. Loveman (1997: 13) defined the consequences of the new professionalism or antipolitics of Latin American countries during military governments as military leadership, a linkage between the state and coercion, an insistent demand for order and respect for hierarchy, and a less tolerant attitude toward opposition.

II. 2. The Argentinean Politics Until 1983

Argentina was invaded by Spain in 1580. Spanish forces during their invasion of the continent declared “Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata” or the “Viceroyalty of the River of Silver” as a political region consisting of today’s Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia in 1776. At the early 1800s, the liberal ideas brought by American and French Revolutions led to demands for independence in the countries of this region. In 1816, Buenos Aires declared its independency from Spain (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 75). The first world power to recognize the Argentina’s independence was England. Therefore, England historically had considerable influence over Argentina not only in the 19th century but also in the 20th century. In this period, federalist Juan Manuel de Rosas, a tyrant, governed Buenos Aires. In 1852, his tyranny collapsed, and the modern Argentinean state emerged. According to Smith (1991: 23), this state was the most modern one among other Latin American countries.²¹ A strong and centralist bureaucracy, however, was observed in all Latin

²⁰ The U.S. Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara declared that “The specific objectives of military assistance are the development of Latin American forces capable of maintaining internal security against threats of violence and subversion” (Loveman, 1997: 9).

²¹ Geographically, Latin America consists of 18 Spanish American countries and Brazil, a former Portuguese colony and Haiti, a former French colony. Some of these countries accept themselves as white and European (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay) and some of them think themselves as mestizo, a mix of European and Indian (Bolivia, Paraguay, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela

American countries including Argentina, which was the heritage of long Spanish and Portugal colonization. The “Pampean” bourgeoisie dominated political arena during the 19th century. At the beginning, with the growing economy of Argentina, based on the export of agricultural production, there was a relatively stable politic atmosphere, but in the 1890s with the economic crisis, some uprisings against traditional oligarchy broke out. Finally, in 1912, with the “Law of Saenz Pena”, universal, secret and obligatory suffrage for males at 18 years of age was introduced (Alexander, 1969: 24).

In 1916 with the result of the election, “Union Civica Radical” or the “Radical Civic Union”, which had pioneered uprisings in the 1890s against the traditional oligarchy gained power. Hipolito Yrigoyen, the leader of the Radicals, became the President. It is important to note that until this time traditional oligarchy through the Conservative Party had dominated in the political structure; yet, in 1916 it lost direct government of Argentina for the first time. However, the “Pampean” or traditional oligarchy’s domination still continued even after this period. As a matter of fact that, throughout the history of Argentina, major political conflict emerged between the traditional oligarchy and urbanized middle sectors. Politics remained as a struggle among political classes. After 1916 when Yrigoyen, the leader of Radicals, was elected, the traditional oligarchy continued to control significant resources: social prestige, economic power, influence on the army, control of the press and the university, and it periodically directly or indirectly shared political power (O’Donnell, 1979: 125). In 1930, the first military coup overthrew Yrigoyen’s government. It was the first military intervention in civilian politics, and it opened an instable period for Argentinean politics during the 20th century, the details of which are to be analyzed in following sections (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 78).

The 1930s passed under military-led and Conservatives governments during which the economy was in crisis. In 1943, the military again overthrew the government. In the new military regime, a new political figure rose to significance, Colonel Juan

and the Central American countries). The others think themselves as still black (Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Panama) (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 5).

Domingo Peron. He and his ideas, Peronism, deeply affected the Argentinean politics during the 20th century. Peron was appointed by the junta as the “Secretary of Labor” and the “Minister of War” (Smith, 1991: 27). These missions provided him with an opportunity to set up close relationship with the working class leaders. However, this strategy created a perception of threat from some factions of army. After a while, Peron was arrested with the initiative of some generals. This development led to mass demonstrations of laboring classes in the newly increasing urbanized sectors. At the end of demonstrations, Peron was released and the new election decision was taken. In 1946, at the end of the election, Peron became the President of Argentina. Peron was a corporatist and populist leader whose main social base was the organized labor. Peronism was neither a fascist nor a socialist ideology. Instead, it sought a third way to adapt the newly increased classes into the system by using two elements; clientelism and charismatic leadership. According to his strategy, only specific institutions such as trade unions were permitted by the state to influence the government. During his presidency, Peron tried to destroy the influence of old traditional oligarchy but he did not succeed. He also aimed at neutralizing the class conflict. He thought a larger system through which the working class, the industrial class, the church and the army and all of which could not dominate over each other. The main emphasis in his political rhetoric was social justice. His wife, Eva Peron, also assisted him to develop his links with the working class. It was in his period that the legislation, which gave the right of vote to the women of Argentina, was passed (Alexander, 1969: 25).

In 1955, Peron was overthrown by a military coup and was forced to go to exile to Spain. During his exile, Peron maintained his support and influence among the masses in Argentina. In 1973, Peronist candidate Hector Campora, the leader of Partida Justicialista, became President. Then Peron returned to Argentina. He became President in October 1973 at the end of the election, but in July 1974, he died. His wife, Isabel Peron, replaced him.²² Traditionally, Peronism consisted of very different factions, left wing, right wing etc. Peron in his period tried to keep his distance to the factions. However, his wife, Isabel Peron, during her power supported

²² Juan Peron got married two times. The first wife was Eva Peron and Other Wife was Isabel Peron.

the right wing Peronistas and this faction systematically continued assaults to left wing faction. Many anarchic actions were observed; the leftist armed movements sharply increased their actions after the 1970s. According to Wiarda and Kline (1996: 100), the first guerilla movements were observed in the early 1960s. However, their activities sharply reached a peak at the beginning of the 1970s. Under this political atmosphere in 1976 Isabel Peron was overthrown by military coup, and a military regime was established, which was the most repressive and violent during its government in Argentina's history (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 83).

Economically, Argentina was one of the wealthiest countries not only in Latin America but also in all over the world at the beginning of the 20th century. In the 1930s, Argentina was ranked among the world's top five richest countries in per capita terms (Pang, 2002: 26). It was ahead of many of today's developed countries in terms of some economic indicators such as growth rate and per capita income. However, it could not maintain its stable economic structure during the 20th century as Argentinean economy gradually worsened through economic crises. This brought about political instability, which was the one of the reasons of the coups.

In the last quarter of the 19th century, Europe, especially England, was the important buyer of Argentinean goods. Therefore, in this period, the source of development was agro-export sector. This economic model is called "outward oriented growth model" in the literature of economics, which provided serious growth rate for the countries of the continent in that period (Pang, 2002: 28). The process of the expansion of the Argentinean economy continued until 1930. This period was known as the "Golden Age" of Argentina. In this period from 1900 to 1930, Argentina's average growth rate (4.6 percent) was higher than the U.S.A. (2.9 percent), Canada (3.4 percent) and Brazil (3.3 percent) (Smith, 1991: 21).²³ Firstly, after this period, state corporatism started in Argentina which dominated its history throughout the 20th century under the model of "Import Substitute Industrialization" (ISI).²⁴ As

²³ See table for "Argentinean Economic Growth (1900–1930)" in Appendix B in page 114

²⁴ ISI policy emerged after 1930s after the "Great Depression". In this model, the state prevented national production through putting high tariff on foreign goods. Due to high prices of foreign goods,

Schmitter defined, corporatism was “a particular model or ideal-typical arrangement for linking the associational organized interests of civil society with the decisional structures of the state” (Oxhorn, 1998: 195). The main reason of this model was to solve developmental problems of the periphery countries against the core states because of their unequal position in the world market. This model was considered necessary because of the weakness of the national bourgeoisie (Pang, 2002: 29).

Another important aspect of Argentinean politics which also covered the whole continent in the 20th century after the 1930s was populism. It was not only employed by civil governments but also by military regimes. For developing countries, industrialization required strong and autonomous state. During the capital accumulation period, the state emerged as an important economic actor. In the period of capital accumulation in developing countries, liberalism remained only a utopia because there was not a strong industrial bourgeoisie and state had to distribute resources in the direction of an economic policy. Thus, populism was a reactionary anticapitalist response from the 1880s to the early 1980s. In Argentina from 1913 to 1989, populism did not possess unique characteristic. It was observed in very different forms in different periods (Pang, 2002: 75).

According to O’Donnell (1979: 54), the 1930s with the Great Depression led to the rise of domestic industry and the working class in both countries. Increased urbanization and industrialization led to change in the distribution of political power and facilitated a broad populist coalition. The new sectors dominated the “populist coalition”. It was against the old oligarchies and their free trade policies. Briefly, the new coalition’s policies were firstly industrialization and secondly domestic market, which were compatible with the situation of the world crisis. Ideologically, industrialization was combined with nationalism. Thus, Argentina and Brazil issued some restrictions over import and exchange. Therefore, consumers were left to remain to consume the goods of domestic market. Overall, the state had a new role as the employer for the middle class.

the national producers gain competitive ability. Moreover, National economy gains immunity to foreign crisis.

Obviously, the enemy for the new coalition was the traditional oligarchy, the supporter of free trade (O'Donnell, 1979: 55). Therefore, the new coalition reduced this sector's income and transferred this income to the domestic industry. However, although this sector's power economically weakened because of international partners, it still maintained its political power. The populist coalition leaders, Peron in Argentina and Vargas in Brazil, established contacts with the export-oriented sectors because international economic powers were necessary to expand the domestic market.

In the new populist coalition, populist leaders provided jobs for the middle class as they supported industrialization. Moreover, for this aim, they enlarged the working class in considerable numbers. However, the working class was represented under some unions because populist leaders had to control this group. Therefore, corporatism was combined with populism in order to continue the reproduction of the new coalition. Naturally, when the populist coalition lost its dynamism, the working class emerged as a highly organized force. The participants of the new coalition received necessary income during the period of populism a situation which prevented fundamental conflict.

However, the ISI policies, necessary for the populist coalition, were stopped up at the end.²⁵ According to O'Donnell (1979: 58), the populist coalition's ISI policies had to go bankrupt. The populist coalition could not reach its main aim, which was to expand domestic industry because international prices for export were not convenient, and naturally, in order to be able to continue the expansion of domestic industry, it was necessary to import capital goods, raw materials and some intermediate materials from the world market. However, there was a shortage of foreign capital. As a result, the populist coalition was in crisis. The income distribution worsened. This period started with the 1960s. Basically, the foreign capital shortage with the increasing consumption demand from all sectors was not continued any more.²⁶ The inflation rate was very high, which led to an economic

²⁵ See Table on "Growth Rate of GDP, Inflation Rates, and Foreign-Exchange Reserves (1946–1955) in Appendix C in page 115

crisis in Argentinean and in other Latin American populist countries. This situation brought about new regimes to the continent, the “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian” regimes.

Traditionally, in the Argentinean politics, three important parties, namely, the Conservative Party, the Radical Party and the Peronist Party emerged in Argentina (Alexander, 1969: 92). In addition to them, there were the Christian Democratic Party, which represented the Catholic Church and the Socialist Party, whose main ideas were based on Marxist ideology, none of which did become important actors in politics.

The Conservative Party was the representative of the traditional oligarchy. It dominated governments directly until 1916, when Hipolito Yrigoyen, the leader of the Radicals, gained power after the traditional oligarchy accepted the right of all adult males to vote (Alexander, 1969: 93). However, the Conservative Party did not represent simply the interest of rural landowners; the main aim of this party was to Europeanize Argentina (Alexander, 1969: 93). To this end, the interests of rural groups had to be reconciled because at the establishment of Argentina, rural groups of twenty three districts had specific interests. As a result, the Conservative Party played an important role in maintaining stability during the establishment of the state.

“Radical Civic Union” or the “Union Civica Radical” (The Radicals) was another important party in Argentina (Alexander, 1969: 94). They came to power for the first time in 1916. Until the 1943 coup, when Peron rose in politics, this party continued the principle opposition to the Conservatives. The main support of the Radicals came from the middle class such as teachers, lawyers and merchants. Until Peron, it gained important support from the working class as well. This party represented Argentinean nationalism against the European orientation of the Conservatives (Alexander, 1969: 94).

²⁶ See Table on “Argentina’s Foreign Debt (1962–1983)” in Appendix E in page 117

The third important party which emerged after the 1943 coup was “Partida Justicialista” or the “Justicialist Party” (Peronistas), led by Juan Peron (Alexander, 1969: 96). Peron was the colonel of the 1943 coup. During his missions, before his Presidency, he had established good contact with the working class, the main basis of the Peronist party. He supported the trade union movement with the corporatist policy. Peron supported only friendly trade unions by providing them with facilities. For example Textile Workers’ Union increased their members from 2000 in 1943, when Juan Peron was the secretary of labor, to 84,000 in 1946, when he became the President of Argentina (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 80). He developed the social security policies such as fringe benefits or free health insurance. Moreover, he supported the industrial class and gained its support with nationalistic ideas. His ideas were corporatist and as a result of this, he only accepted organized groups to play a role in policies. For example, working class was organized in a confederation, called “Confederacion General del Trabajo” or the “General Confederation of Labor”. However, polarization among society - the supporters of Peron and opponents of him - increased under his leadership. This polarization not only led to the fragmentation in society but also to factionalism in his party. The party was divided mainly into three factions; right wing, neutral and left wing. The right and the left wings implemented violent tactics such as assassinations and terror actions towards each other in order to increase their influence among the public.

II. 3 The Military and Military Regimes in Argentina

The reasons of the interventionist tradition of Argentina’s military can be found firstly in the process of the establishment of Argentina’s state. The Argentinean military’s founding role had essentially three phases. The first was the formation of the Buenos Aires militias during 1806-07. The second phase was the revolution of 1810. Finally, the third phase was when the military assumed the task of achieving real control of the formally delineated territory of the newly constituted Argentinean Republic. Therefore, in this process, the role of the army was important and naturally

it thought itself as both the founder and the guardian of the state²⁷ (Norden, 1996: 159). Secondly, as analyzed in previous sections, groups with different and uncompromising interests could not reach a consensus. Especially, the elites did not agree on how to absorb the expansion of participation which became a problem at the beginning of the 20th century. Finally, during the endless struggle, different groups called the military to be their ally and the military many times tended to respond these calls (Norden; 1996: 18). Even when army did not come to power, civilian leaders could move in political life under the shadow of a coup.

II.3.1 The First Military Coup (1930)

As mentioned above, in 1912, the right to general and secret vote for all males was accepted by the traditional oligarchy (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 72). With the result of the election of 1916, the traditional oligarchy perceived that its domination in politics was undermined. The number of voter sharply increased. For example, in 1910, there were 190,000 voters while in 1912, the number reached to 640,000 and in 1928, 1,460,000 voters elected the government (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 78). Hence, the Radicals started to be a real threat to the preexisting position of the traditional oligarchy. Hence, Yrigoyen started reforms in the oligarchic political structure. With populist ideas, he tried to expand the urbanized sectors, the middle and working classes as a respond for support of popular sectors. As a result, polarization rose in the Argentinean politics.

Secondly, the growing economy of the second half of the 19th century turned into worsening economic situation. Undoubtedly, Yrigoyen's populist policies contributed to this development. However, with the Great Depression of the world market in 1929, this structure could not be maintained. The international trade sharply diminished. Naturally, the first damage was observed in the interests of

²⁷ An Argentinean General commented that "On the army crest, it says that the army was born with the country. I believe that is not exactly so, but that the army existed before the country. It existed before the Argentina state . . . Argentina is the 'daughter of the sword' at the service of a great political (design) – national emancipation and national organization and, following peace and order, a life of democracy. This is the tradition of our army" (Norden, 1996: 159).

traditional oligarchy whose surplus was based on agro-export activities (Pang, 2002: 29).

Another significant dimension was the factionalism of the Argentinean military before 1930. According to Loveman (1997: 61), in the 1920s, with the rise of Hipolito Yrigoyen, the leader of Radicals, the unity of the army shattered with the emergence of factions. Officers of the army had participated in several uprisings against the traditional oligarchy headed by the Radicals to pressure the traditional oligarchy into electoral reforms at the beginning of the 20th century. These officers of the army were either retired or punished for their actions. Yet, with Yrigoyen's Presidency, the government issued a declaration in 1921 to restore these officers' rights because their participation in uprisings was seen a service for nation. Yrigoyen's aim was to weaken the sense of unity among the officers in order to maintain his power.

As was mentioned earlier, in this period, among the officers, a secret society, called "Logia", was established. They opposed firstly, the policies of Yrigoyen and his Minister of War for their toleration for the officers who supported Yrigoyen; secondly, favoritism and arbitrariness in the promotions, thirdly, the inability of the government to meet the army's demands such as equipments and arms and finally, the general deterioration of discipline within the army (Loveman, 1997: 63). As a result, this group took the lead in organizing the coup against Yrigoyen's presidency.

Under these conditions, in 1930, Yrigoyen was overthrown by the military. As Smith (1991: 21) pointed out with the coup of 1930, conditions turned back to the pre-1912 period. Until 1940, the traditional oligarchy through the Conservative Party had dominated the Congress (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 79). In the 1930 coup, the traditional oligarchy and the military became allies, and they moved together against the increasing power of the urbanized sectors. Briefly, the position of political actors in the 1930 coup can be summed up in the following way; *there was a coup coalition between the military and traditional oligarchy against the Radicals and the urbanized sectors, led by the middle class.*

After the coup, firstly, the right-wing Catholic nationalist faction of army gained power. This faction tried to reorganize society in the direction of quasi-fascist corporatist model (Smith, 1991: 22). However, due to economic conditions, this section of the army could not maintain its power. At the end of rigged elections in 1932, the government was replaced by General Augustin P. Justo. General Justo allied with the Conservatives, anti-Yrigoyen Radicals and technocrats (Smith, 1991: 23). Thus, until 1943, the army and the Conservative Party together governed Argentina. Nonetheless, in this period, military governments did not become successful in economic and political matters. In the literature of social science and political history, these years were called “Decada Infame” or the “Infamous Decade” (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 8).

In the area of economics, the new economic strategy was introduced by technocrats, called the “Plan for Economic Restructuring” (Smith, 1991: 23). Its main objective was to provide immunity for the industry from external economic crisis. Many developing countries adopted this strategy in order to protect themselves from the effects of the world market and to recover their economic structure which had been harmed during the “Great Depression”.

In this context, Argentina firstly experienced the ISI politics or its prototype after the 1930 coup. As explained, this strategy was to provide economic protection from external events and to promote national industry, and it achieved its aims in this period. In the early 1930s, total national product covered 40-50 percent of total consumption of manufactured good while this rate reached over 80 percent of total consumption in the early 1940s (Smith, 1991: 23). In this period, industrialization increased, and relative economic stability emerged. Moreover, several economic agreements with foreign countries (e.g. with England) were signed.

However, in the early 1940s, economic conditions changed. International trade was no longer safe during the Second World War²⁸, therefore, burdened balance of

²⁸ In this period, there appeared ISI politics in Argentina so under this policy, international trade was not important factor for the Pampean bourgeoisie. However, as cited in previous sections, some trade

payments led to a recession.²⁹ Serious economic problems emerged in Argentina, and the existing government was not able to solve them. This atmosphere brought about political turmoil because the interests of many groups were damaged by economic problems. Moreover, the new urbanized sectors could not improve their interests in the nation's representative political institutions (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 79). Finally, in 1943, another military coup came in which Juan Peron participated as an officer of the military.

II.3.2 The Coup d'état of 1955 “Revolucion Libertadora”

The Peronist period, which started in 1946, had created considerable class polarization in Argentina. Peron's political doctrine was based on “a progressive working class orientation emerged with an emphasis on industrialization and an essentially Catholic vision of the social order” (Norden, 1996: 23). With his authoritarian policies, freedom of the press was destroyed, the universities and the opposition leaders were imprisoned or exiled. As a result, Peron had divided Argentina society into two parts; his supporters and opponents. Traditional oligarchy again felt a threat from below especially from the working class (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 80).

Consequently, Peron was overthrown by the military in 1955. General Pedro Aramburi became the President. The first thing to be done by the military was to abolish Peron's influence in Argentina. Peron was made to go to exile. All Peronist activities were banned. Many officers in military who had tolerance and sympathy to Peron were forced into retirement (Smith, 1991: 29).

Briefly, the position of political actors in the 1955 coup can be shown in the following way; *there was a coup coalition between the military and the traditional*

agreements with other countries were signed. The “Pampean” landowners had benefited from this situation. Therefore, this leader group was affected by unsafe characteristic of international trade.

²⁹ ISI at the beginning provides growth of economy. However, in time this politics leads to spoil of balance of payments resulting in economic recession.

oligarchy against Peron and the urbanized sectors whose leader was mainly the working class.

General Aramburi defended the constitutional and democratic order in Argentina, but he thought Peron as the enemy of democracy. His main aim was to diminish Peron's influence among the masses. In 1958, he decided to go to an election. However, it was necessary that the Peronistas were prevented from the elections. The Radicals won the elections of 1958, and Arturo Frondizi, the leader of the Radicals, became the President. Nonetheless, the military was still skeptical about civilian leaders, and it saw Frondizi as a communist and the cooperator of Peron. As a result, after 1958, a democratic order in Argentina did not emerge. The armed forces considered Frondizi's government as illegitimate (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 81).

According to Norden, Peron held considerable influence among the masses. The ban over him for entering the election of 1958 created serious tension in Argentina (Norden, 1996: 28). Therefore, there was an impossible game in politics, which led to another coup in 1966 only after eight years.³⁰ However, the characteristics of military regimes had now started to change.

II.3.3 The Coup d'état of 1966 “Revolucion Argentina”

Latin America entered a new period in the 1960s with the increasing impact of the leftist movements after the Cuban Revolution in 1959. In addition, these movements turned their methods into armed struggle. Consequently, the traditional elites perceived a serious threat to their domination in Latin America.

The main characteristics of BAs are mentioned in the previous sections. However, each BA regime had particular characteristics beside this general structure. O'Donnell identified the peculiarities of the Argentinean BA regime between the years 1966-1973 and compared it with the other Latin American BA regimes; the differences were

³⁰ See Table on “Indicators of Socio-Political Protest (1956–1966) in Appendix D in page 116

firstly, the smaller threat level before the implantation of the BA state, secondly, the less severe repression imposed on the popular sector and its political allies, thirdly, the greater autonomy of the popular sector (of the working class and of the trade unions) in terms of the state and the dominant class, fourthly, the moderate fall of industrial wages and the more pronounced decline in the incomes of a sizable proportion of the employed middle sectors, fifthly, the rapid formation of an alliance of the popular sector and the unions with the domestic bourgeoisie, against the new state and, particularly, against its effectiveness and internationalizing policies, sixthly, the conflict between the government and, with it, the large bourgeoisie- and the Pampean bourgeoisie, and finally, the decisive role of Peronism as the expression and mobilization channel of a heterogeneous constellation of forces in opposition to the BA state (O'Donnell, 1999: 3-4).

The first BA regime thus emerged in Argentina with the coup of 1966, led by General Juan Carlos Ongonia. As General Ongonia put forward three reasons of the coup; firstly, the lack of harmony among and in major social groups which had brought about terror and anarchy, secondly, the incapacity of civilian leaders to solve national problems, thirdly, the unrepresentativeness of the leadership of the political parties and the irresponsible behavior of political parties which had caused the polarization (O'Donnell, 1979: 116). The authoritarian administration strengthened the state repressive apparatus, the military, police, judicial system and penal institutions. However, in Argentina, there was already an organized civil society. The military had to demobilize and disorganize it. Therefore, the regime tried to disintegrate already existing institutions and political practices. To this end, Ongonia firstly removed the political appointees of the previous regime from office, ranging from many middle-upper bureaucrats to technocrats. Secondly, he limited political party activities. Thirdly, legislative and elective bodies both in the level of national and of provincial were eliminated. Fourthly, the judicial autonomy was restricted. Fifthly, censorship and pressure over the universities and press was imposed (Smith, 1991: 52).

Other policies of the regime aimed at dismantling the preexisting institutions came in two coercive decree-laws issued in 1967 (Smith, 1991: 53). The first of them was called the "Law for a Civilian Defense Service", which defined threats to national security very broadly, covering anything that affected the vital interests or the integrity of the state. The second of them was the "Law for Defense against

Communism”. Dramatic limitations over democratic institutions were set up via this new law.

The modernization and “destructuralization” of the state apparatus continued with a new plan, called the “System for National Planning and Action for Development and Security” or briefly “Systema” (Smith, 1991: 54). In this period, the military doctrine started to show different characteristics in comparison to former policies. Prior to the coup, according to new doctrine, national development and national security had been defined as very close concepts. According to “Systema”, two new institutional complexes appeared, called the “National Security Council” (CONASE) and the “National Development Council” (CONADE). As it can be understood, these institutions resulted from the new military doctrine, declared prior to coup. The main aim of CONASE was to end the military factionalism. It was to provide it by setting up an institutionalized channel and by defining conditions of chain of command. The aim of CONADE was to limit the influence of conflicting entrepreneurial interests and to bring them under state control.

Meanwhile, three different groups in the army emerged to exert influence in the economic arena; the supporters of liberals, pragmatic and business oriented moderates and technocrats (Smith, 1991: 55). Ongonia tried to find a balance among these three groups by appointing people from these groups equally in his cabinet. He excluded the extremists. Jorge Salimei, a moderate, was appointed as the Minister of Economics, and Alejandro Aguilar, an owner of a firm, was chosen for the “Secretary of Industry and Commerce”. Finally, Raggio, a respected agronomist, became The “Secretary of Agriculture”. Hence, Ongonia tried to represent both the interests of the “Pampean” and of the industrial bourgeoisie in his cabinet. Technocrats tried to balance these rival economic interests. However, soon, Ongonia turned his way into orthodox liberal program, involving devaluation of peso and the elimination of export taxes on agricultural products (Smith, 1991: 56). Ongonia’s project was based on an elite-controlled political structure. Elections would be held, only after the establishment of this new structure at national, provincial and local levels.

Another task of the junta was to extend popular legitimization for the regime. To this end, they introduced the new regime as the disinterested and impartial guardians of the state and the nation (Smith, 1991: 50). They declared that the representative democracy would be reestablished in the future, without giving a specific date. However, the military regime failed to provide stability in political and economic terms. Moreover, leftist movements' and Peronists' shadow remained as the sword of Damocles in politics.

Briefly, the position of political actors in the 1966 coup could be summed up as: *there was a coup coalition between the military and the traditional oligarchy against the Radicals, the Peronistas, the urbanized sectors led by the working class and the leftist or the communist movements.*

II.3.4 The Coup D'état of 1976 “Proceso Reorganización Nacional” and the Transition Process

According to O'Donnell (1979: 163), the demise of the 1966 military regime was related to the persistent mass repression, social disturbances and the factionalism among the military. However, unlike the Brazilian case, Argentinean military during the 1966 military regime was unwilling to use extreme levels of repression. As a result, in spite of the ban on the student organizations, the students became more radical and were engaged in violence against the regime. The labor movement could not be demobilized; it refused to accept a reduction in its living standards, which was necessary for restructuring of economic organizations for the military regime (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 82).

At the end, the army gave permission to Peron to return to Argentina in 1973 and he again became the President. After his death in 1974, Isabel Peron, his wife, became the President of Argentina. During her period, political polarization increased between Peronists and anti-Peronists. Furthermore, the leftist guerilla movements increased their activities in Argentina. The Argentinean economy entered into crisis for example inflation hit 1 percent per day (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 83).

Within this framework, in 1976, a new military sponsored coup led by General Jorge Videla emerged in Argentina, which would be the last but most violent experience for Argentina in the 20th century. As was mentioned earlier, this coup was called “Proceso Reorganizacion Nacional” or the “Process of National Reorganization” (the Proceso) and continued until 1983. The military regime aimed at restructuring political, social and economical system in compatible with the definition of O’Donnell’s BA regime. The junta declared its political, social and economical aims in “The Act of National Reorganization” on March 24, 1976 (Smith, 1991: 54).

The first mission for the military was to provide recovery in the economy. At the same time, General Videla was interested in political issues as well. The way to be followed by military in the economics was defined as liberal free market policy by appointing Martinez De Hoz, liberal economist to the Minister of Economics. The answer to the question why the military choose a liberal strategy was, according to Pion-Berlin (1985: 58), to disintegrate the Peronist legacy of populism. In fact, during the rule of Peron and his wife, Argentina had been dragged into high inflation, economic recession and the burdened balanced of payments (Smith, 1991: 49). Moreover, high foreign debts had forced Argentina to promote its ties with foreign institutions and creditors. Furthermore, the new financial elites who were in close relationships with foreign capital supported this new strategy.

Briefly, the position of political actors in the 1976 coup can be summed up as; *there was a coup coalition among the military, the traditional oligarchy, some part of the industrial bourgeoisie and international financial institutions against the Peronistas, the urbanized sectors led by the working class and the leftist or the communist movements.*

During the military regime which lasted from 1976 to 1983, the main lines of the liberal economic policy were, firstly, the control of wage increases in order to decrease demands; secondly, the liberalization of labor market; thirdly, subsidy to big corporations; fourthly, privatization; fifthly, the liberalization of finance and capital and finally, the liberalization of the control of price and foreign money

(Smith, 1991: 56). However, inflation was not initially reduced and in 1978, De Hoz declared the “Tablita Plan”, which allowed the devaluation of the Peso. Hence, the plan did not provide better conditions for the economy.

Another important policy for the military was to demobilize the popular sectors in order to suppress the actions of armed leftist faction of the Peronistas, called “Montoneros”. This was also necessary to implement orthodox liberal economic program. Therefore, a dramatic wave of state terror period started. The conjectures of the numbers of disappearances vary depending on the sources, ranging from 9,000 to 30,000 (Loveman, 1997: 231).³¹ Moreover, thousands of people were subjected to torture. Therefore, the “Proceso” gained very bad reputation among masses, and internationally the regime became infamous with the “Dirty War” of the disappearances and the killings. The Table below displays the extent of violence of the “Proceso”.

³¹ Loveman classified the victims of the junta, as the guerrillas, lower and intermediate union cadres, students, civilian politicians, professional groups (lawyers, psychiatrists, artists, social scientists, clergy etc.) (Loveman, 1997: 231).

Table 2 Casualties of the Argentinean “Dirty War” 1969 – 1983³²

Years	Deaths Caused by Guerillas	“Disappeared” and Military Presumed Responsible	Civilian deaths in Confrontations
1969	1	-	-
1970	4	-	-
1971	24	6	-
1972	26	5	-
1973	49	18	-
1974	120	46	-
1975	179	359	564
1976	293	4105	1277
1977	70	3098	555
1978	18	969	63
1979	7	181	3
1980	-	83	-
1981	-	19	-
1982	-	12	-
1983	-	9	-
Total	790	8910	2462

It should be noted that unlike the Brazilian and Chilean cases, during the “Proceso”, the military did not institutionalize the authoritarian regime. According to Stepan and Linz (1996: 190), the military regime aimed at authoritarianism instead of institutionalism. Unlike Brazil, it did not create parties and hold elections. Unlike Chile and Uruguay, it did not make a constitution and did not present it to a plebiscite. During the “Proceso”, military regime quickly repressed strikes. Moreover, the Peronistas were barred from political activity. The Radicals could maintain their activities unless they threatened the military regime (Pion-Berlin 1985: 55).

Various reasons explain the fall of the junta. The momentum of the “third wave of the democratization”, (which emerged firstly in 1974 in Portuguese), economic failure, the defeat in the Malvinas War and massive human rights abuses were commonly accepted in the literature (Hunter, 1998; Smith, 1991; Peeler, 2004; Norden, 1996). According to Pion-Berlin (1985: 60), while admitting the importance

³² Norden, D. (1996: 59)

of these factors, the turning point in the fall of the military regime was the emergence of factions within the military's hierarchical structure in 1980. As mentioned in the section on the coup of 1930 in this chapter, factionalism in the Argentinean army had emerged during all coups. Since 1930, the military has been plagued by the existence of antagonistic ideological factions (Wiarda and Harvey, 1996: 94). During the Proceso, the palace coups of 1981 against General Videla and 1982 against General Viola dramatically indicated the factions in the army.

According to Pion-Berlin (1985: 56), factional divisions which led to the demise of the military regime emerged in 1980 with the collapse of the four important national banks. Martinez de Hoz, the economic minister of General Jorge Videla, argued that this was only a local failure of economic program, and that the program was maintained. General Videla supported his minister. At this point, however; the Commander of Chief of the Navy, General Armando Lambruschini criticized the financial sector and the current liberal program. Moreover, Commander of Chief of Air Force, General Omar Rubens Graffigna also rejected the program. Videla's period ended in 1981 and General Roberto Viola became the President. Therefore, according to Pion-Berlin (1985: 64), the military could maintain its institutional unity through transferring power as scheduled. In fact, the army during the military regime of 1976 could secure its unity for a period of four years unlike the preceding interventions. However, with the loss of faith in the economic program, objections and personal and ideological cleavages within the officer ranks, the factionalism resurfaced, which then led to the transition process (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 56).

General Viola was different from General Videla in the sense that the latter was more pragmatic (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 63). He announced a plan for the gradual normalization of intermediary organizations, such as unions and political parties. He proposed to liberalize their activities which had been lost at the beginning of the "Proceso" period. Moreover, he called for an open a dialogue between the government and the opposition in order to arrive at a national consensus over the political transition. However, for the second time, different factions among military

elites again appeared. General Leopoldo Galtieri, Commander of Chief, challenged Viola by arguing that the “Proceso” period was continued. Therefore, it turned out at that moment that the second division within the military was between the “hard-liners” and the “soft-liners”.

President Viola declared in a speech that the new executive chief would be chosen by the political participation of parties, which meant that in 1984, at the end of the power of Viola, there would be free elections (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 65). The military immediately rejected Viola’s declaration. In this period, because of the divided nature of military elites, the civilian opposition activities increased, and a coalition among the factions of the civilian opposition emerged, called the “Multiparty Coalition”. Its major demands were the tariff protection for industry, lower interest rate, liberalized credit and a substantial increase in real wages. The government did not holistically reject this multiparty agenda. Viola remained neutral. The military took this as a threat to the regime. Finally, in 1982, General Galtieri overthrew Viola from the Presidency and he assumed power.

However, the overthrow of Viola did not generate the expected integration in the military (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 67). The military had been divided into, on the one hand, right-wing nationalists and economic liberals and on the other, politically moderate and economically nationalist officers. Galtieri maintained his Commander of Chief position during his Presidency, and he gathered all power within his hand. However, by now, the military had lost the common aims of the “Proceso”.

Galtieri favored a rapid transition to electoral politics because his objective was to be elected as President through elections in 1984. To achieve this, he had to gain the support of the civilian opposition. Thus, he secretly met with the Peronist leaders and proposed liberalization of trade unions in exchange for labor support. Moreover, he declared that new political parties law would be passed to restore the party system. However, his declarations and meeting with Peronistas angered the military. Moreover, his economic policy, based on the liberal model, including freeze on

public sectors and privatization of military industry complexes contradicted the interests of labor, industrial capital and the military.

It was at this point that General Galtieri invaded Falkland Islands, which were traditionally under the control of Britain. Argentina claimed that the control of islands belonged to itself. In response, Britain declared war against Argentina, thereafter known as the Malvinas or Falkland War. The U.S. and the NATO supported Britain and cut diplomatic relations with Argentina. The war lasted only two months, and the Argentinean military was defeated by the British forces. The army then established a post war government led by General Reynaldo Bignone (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 70).

The defeat of the army was crucial in terms of its consequences. This triggered the withdrawal of the Argentinean military from politics because its public standing was now totally shattered and it was internationally discredited. According to Stepan and Linz (1996: 191), this defeat and the disgrace of the Argentinean military in the Malvinas War prepared the end of the military government. Until this event, the military regime could silence the working class, and the strikes could easily be repressed (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 55). Moreover, the Peronist Party was barred from political activity, and it could not maintain a successful underground resistance. Although some civil society organizations such as “Madre de Plaza de Mayo” or the “Mothers of the May Square”, established by the mothers of the people who disappeared in 1977 were active in Argentina, they were not strong enough to make effective opposition to the regime (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 96). Nonetheless, after the defeat of the army against British forces in 1982, the estimated 250,000 people that crowded in front of the presidential palace on April, 6 protested the regime (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 71). And finally, the post-war government of the “Proceso”, headed by General Reynaldo Bignone, declared the election timetable as proposed by the opposition.

As for the political parties in Argentina, the military regime could successfully repress and exclude them until 1980 (Pion-Berlin, 1985: 65). However, with the

economic crisis, political parties appeared in the political arena. In July, 1981, the major political parties the Peronist Party and the Radical Party constituted a multiparty coalition, and created a strong opposition block against the regime. The main demand of the coalition was redemocratization and the return to a nationalist-oriented economic program involving tariff protection for industry, lower interest rates and a substantial increase in real wages. At the beginning of the birth of the coalition, the regime did not negotiate with the coalition, but after the defeat of the army in the Malvinas War, the army started to negotiate with the coalition for the withdrawal from power.

Thus, the transition process unlike Brazil, Chile or Uruguay did not proceed under the control of military in the case of Argentina. Because of the reasons mentioned above, there emerged a “rupture” from the military regime. The public and their political representatives did not negotiate the transition with the military. Naturally, this process affected the position of military after the transition. Although civilian leaders considered a negotiation with the army, there was not a holistic and united military structure. Under these conditions, the transition process gained further momentum and in very short time, free elections were held in 1983.

CHAPTER III

THE ARGENTINEAN DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE QUESTION OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

Argentina started the process of democratization with the election of 1983 as a result of the “third wave democratization”. The “third wave” is analyzed in detail in the literature in the democratization in terms of its reasons, effects and results (Huntington, 1991a). Nevertheless, the position of the militaries during and after the transition and the problem of civilian control over military has not been subject to agreement among scholars. In particular, the prerogatives of the militaries and the position of civilians have gained importance in this debate.

At the beginning of the transition, the position of the militaries and their prerogatives were very different in each case of the continent. The cases can mainly be divided into two groups (Stepan and Linz, 1996: 191). In the first group, the militaries were relatively successful during their rules. As mentioned previously, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay can be counted as the examples of this situation. In these cases the armies could hold onto some of their prerogatives under the democratic regimes. In Chile, the military wrote up a constitution in 1980, which provided serious prerogatives to the army. For example, General August Pinochet, the head of the coup of 1973, and then the President of Chile constituted a Constitutional Court, all members of which were appointed by him. The democratic governments after the transition were obstructed by this Court in significant matters. Like Chile, in Brazil, the army gained important prerogatives with the Constitution of 1988 because of its influence on the “Constituent Assembly”.

In contrast to the Chilean and Brazilian cases, the Argentinean military was in a weaker position during the transition process. As mentioned previous chapter, its

main reasons were the weight of its internal disunity and its low prestige among the masses due to the economic crisis and the defeat in the Malvinas War (Stepan and Linz, 1996: 191).

As a result, the Argentinean transition to democracy has followed a somewhat different route from its contemporaries in Latin America. This was also due to the characteristics of the latest military regime (1976-1983). According to Stepan and Linz (1996: 192), although the military held power for 16 months from 1982 after the defeat in the Malvinas War to the elections of 1983, it could not find allies from political parties and the civil society. The call for a pact by the military was refused three times by the two major political parties, the Radical Party and the Peronist Party. As a result, the military did not devise a constitution to provide for itself some prerogatives during the transition process.

As of the mid-1990s, some of the scholarly approaches put forward on the issue of civilian control over military after the transition were cautious about the extent of civilian control over militaries. For example, Stepan and Linz (1996: 4) argued that although militaries have lost political power after the transitions, they still protected their autonomous position in some arenas and prerogatives in politics. Therefore, a prospective threat of the revival of authoritarian regimes was not out of question, hence; these new democracies still came to have a fragile nature.

On the other hand, other scholars, for example O'Donnell (1992), Hunter (1997a), Przeworski (1992), Huntington (1991b) and Pion-Berlin (1991) were more optimistic than their colleagues. They characterized the new political order after the transition as a democracy because it possessed features of procedural democracy such as free election, civilian governments etc. However, in spite of their optimistic approach, they also noted some reserves for newly democratic regimes. For example, O'Donnell drew attention to a threat of reversal to military regimes. As mentioned in the first chapter, a threat of "sudden death" emerged when a direct coup interrupted the transition, or "slow death" appeared when the constitution introduced limited spaces for the civilians in the new democracies (O'Donnell, 1992). However, as

explained, in Argentina, the military was in very weak position at the end of its rule, and therefore it could not dominate the transition period. Because of its discredited position, neither a “sudden death” nor a “slow death” took place. As will be analyzed in this chapter, after the transition, the military could not even maintain autonomous areas; instead many senior members of the latest junta were sent to trials for their roles in the infamous “Dirty War”.

In this chapter, civilian-military relations in Argentina after the transition will be analyzed. And the major and minor questions of this thesis will be addressed; to what extent has civilian control over the military been secured? To what extent did the military maintain its institutional and political autonomies? And which factors have led to civilian control over the military in Argentina?

III.1. The Political Situation After the Transition

In this section, two civilian leaders’, Raul Alfonsin, the leader of the Radical Party and Carlos Menem, the leader of the Peronist Party, policies and the situation of Argentina are to be analyzed.

III.1.1. The Radicals in Power (1983-1989) as the Military Goes Back to Barracks

The transition to democracy started after the defeat of the military against the British forces in 1982. According to Tedesco and Barton (2004: 97), the process of the transition lasted for 16 months from the defeat in Malvinas War to the election held in 1983. The Radical Party, the Peronist Party, the Conservative Party, the Catholic Party and the Socialist Party competed during the campaign period. The army could not manipulate the election. Political parties and Human Right Organizations such as “Madres de Plaza de Mayo”, organized by the mothers of the disappeared people during the “Proceso” were very active in this period.

The main competition in the elections was between the Radicals and the Peronistas. The victory of Raul Alfonsin, the leader of the Radical Party, was very shocking for the Peronistas because until this time in every free election, 1946, 1952 and 1973, the Peronistas had gained the power.³³ The main reason of the victory of the Radicals was that previous Peronist governments, headed by Juan Peron and later Isabel Peron, had mismanaged the economy, and the real wages had been melted under inflationist pressure (Lewis, 1992: 479). Moreover, more importantly, Alfonsin led his election campaign in the direction of democratic consolidation. Masses had suffered from military regimes and they demanded real democracy. At that point, however, rumors emerged that Peronistas made a deal with the military junta's leaders so that if Peronistas won the presidency, legal criminal immunities would be provided for the army. Alfonsin successfully appealed to all social classes. He even gained the votes from the Peronist working class. He thus enlarged the electoral basis of the Radicals from the middle classes, their traditionally supporters, to the working classes, the traditional stronghold of Peron and the Peronistas (Lewis, 1992: 480).

The year 1983 was a very important date because in Argentina's history, at least until that year, military intervention period seemed to end and there appeared a relatively stable political structure. Until this election, as mentioned previously, Argentina's politics had been so instable and even chaotic that since 1930 the country had had 24 presidents, 16 of whom were army generals and many coups and attempted coups interrupted civilian political dynamics (Smith, 1991: 267). Therefore, free elections and civilian presidents elected through them had been a dream for Argentina until this time.

In order to understand the relationship between Alfonsin and the military after the election, it should be necessary to remember the dilemmas of the previous military regime. The "Proceso" had very badly governed Argentina. The army's credibility was exhausted because of the mismanagement economy at their hands, human right abuses, and the defeat of the Malvinas War. Therefore, unlike other Latin American

³³ Alfonsin won 52 percent of total votes while the Peronistas got 39 percent in the 1983 election (Lewis, 1992: 478).

countries such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, Alfonsín found himself in a more convenient atmosphere against the military after the election. At first sight, this was advantageous for Alfonsín as a civilian leader, but this situation carried some risks as well. On the one hand, Alfonsín had grasped an opportunity to limit the military's position in politics. On the other hand, Alfonsín's supporters had very high expectations from his governance, and in particular from his economic policies. Therefore, Alfonsín had to meet all the expectations of his supporters (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 97).

Alfonsín's background was also important to understand his attitude against the military. Alfonsín was a lawyer and a longtime the Radical Party activist. In the party, he had always worked with the leftist workers. He had won the leadership of the Radical Party after Ricardo Balbín's death in 1981, the former leader of the Radicals. As a result, with the leadership of Alfonsín the leftist faction of the Radicals gained domination within the Party (Lewis, 1990: 478).

In the first years, Alfonsín was well aware of the critical situation both in the economy and politics, and he started an ambitious program. In the realm of politics, he tried to strengthen the limits of democracy on the military, and he held uncompromised attitude against military. According to Tedesco and Barton (2004: 97), Alfonsín's policy toward to the military aimed at weakening its political power. For this aim, he proposed the isolation of all members of Junta and set up a commission in order to investigate the crimes of the "Proceso". As a result, he sent the military leaders of the "Proceso" to trial, the details of which are to be analyzed in the following sections.

At this point, the three uprisings of the military during Alfonsín period were important (Norden, 1996). In 1987, there appeared an upheaval of some officers of the military. Some soldiers, led by Colonel Aldo Rico, occupied the "Infantry School at Campo de Mayo" near Buenos Aires. The main demand was to stop trials of the crimes of the "Proceso". Two days later, they were suppressed by troops with the

command of Alfonsín. Three more uprisings in addition to this first upheaval occurred during Alfonsín's government. All of them were suppressed

The four uprisings of the junior officers of the military after the transition are important discussion points among scholars who investigate the democratization process in Argentina. The rebel's demand was that the penalties of the junta leaders should be abolished. Pessimist scholars such as Stepan (1988) claimed that these uprisings were the indicator of the failure of the civilian control over military. However, Norden's thesis (1996) seems more appropriate than this pessimist approach. Briefly, she argues that these uprisings were started by only small factions of army and they did not have a common basis in the military. All these rebellions were started by junior officers at the level of the colonels, and the military as an institution did not completely participate in them. Furthermore, all of them were suppressed by the other part of the army.

In the economic field, President Alfonsín abandoned pure liberal economic programs, and implemented a series of highly statist economic policies including moratorium for foreign debts, and increased public spending (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 99).³⁴ However, in retrospect, Alfonsín's policies were not in harmony with national and international economic conditions and they ended with frustration (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 99). In general, in the area of the economy, the government displayed poor performance. Inflation and unemployment rates drastically increased, leading to an economic crisis. For example, the annual average in real wages variation of industrial workers was 22.8 percent in 1983 and -27.9 in 1989. The inflation rate was 433.6 per cent in 1983 and 4,923.3 per cent in 1989. The external debt was 45,069 million US\$ in 1983 and 63,314 million US\$ in 1989 (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 102). As a result, Alfonsín had to reverse his politics and implemented market reforms in economic ideas. In politics, Alfonsín's policy against the military softened after the outbreak of the uprising in the military. However, the policy of curtailing the autonomy of the military did not end, but the process of

³⁴ See Table on "Selected Indicators of Argentina's Foreign Debt Burden (1983-1988)" in Appendix F in page 118

establishing civilian control was slowed down. In spite of these changes, Alfonsín could not maintain his presidency and he resigned under public pressure. He did not become a candidate in the next election. After the 1989 elections, he transferred power to Carlos Menem, the leader of the Peronistas.

III.1.2. The Presidency of Menem (1989-1995); a Peronist President without Peron's ideas

Carlos Menem's victory was important because after the transition, power was transferred to another civilian leader in the second election. As mentioned, this was the one of the major criteria of O'Donnell's consolidation of democracy (O'Donnell, 1992: 23).

Menem belonged to the genre of Peronism and its populist tradition. During his election campaign, he declared that he would pursue Peronist ideas and he would keep his distance to all leftist and rightist Peronist factions, which had led to acute polarization in Argentina in the 1970s. However, during his presidency, all policies, political, social and economic, were opposed to Peron's project for Argentina. To start with, Peron was a nationalist, but Menem was not. Peron had sought to prevent Argentina from the U.S. influence, but Menem proceeded to improve the relationships. Peron had supported national industry, but Menem opened the economy to the world market. Peron tried to improve the working class' living conditions, but their position got worse in Menem's period. Menem's economic policies were contrary to the Peronist legacy. Menem became an ardent supporter of international economics. However, the political tradition of the Peronist Party was linked to statist policies of Peron. This tradition supported internal markets and unions. In contrast, Menem openly declared his decision to ally himself with the sectors of Argentina's traditional right (Schaverzer, 1998: 62).

In his period, unlike Alfonsín's initial radical policy against the army to set up civilian control, Menem followed a different strategy towards the military. He moderated the policy of weakening the political autonomy of the military. As explained, in Alfonsín's period, there had been some uprisings of some military

officers as a reaction to the trials of the officers of the “Proceso”, and this was a test of limits of the military. President Menem grasped this situation and he sought a peace with military because his first priority was to cope with the economic crisis, which had emerged in Alfonsín’s period. Therefore, in 1989, he granted an amnesty to the some officers of the “Proceso” who had already been judged and to the leaders of uprisings during Alfonsín’s period (Hunter, 1998: 307). However, he maintained the policy of civilian control over military and as will be explained in economic and institutional realm, the military gradually lost its autonomy and prerogatives. But the trend of control of the military was continued. Indeed, due to the nature of the Argentinean transition, the military did not demand to maintain its autonomous position. In this period, it was in a defensive one and its members only want to stop the trials. Therefore, because of the military’s weak position, Menem’s period was convenient for subordinating the military as an institution to the civilian authority.

Nevertheless, although his policy against military was not as radical as Alfonsín’s policies, another uprising emerged in 1990. This was started by Colonel Mohamad Ali Seineldin and made Menem change his attitude toward military. This was the second test time of the civilian-military relations, and Menem did not accept a negotiation with rebels and he crushed them through the army forces. The rebels’ demands were to provide recovery in economic situation of the members of the military and autonomy from the civilians in the internal promotions as a reserved domain (Norden, 1996: 150). The rebels were then arrested and the uprising was ended. President Menem again gained the upper hand in his relations with the military.

Finally, in January 1991, President Carlos Menem, the second civilian president after the transition, issued pardons to imprisoned military personnel, excluding the leader of the “Proceso” (Wiarda and Kline, 1996: 107). Jorge Videla was put under house imprisonment. This decision was demanded by public in mass protests. However, Menem did not stop the process of the civilian control over the military. He simply changed radical strategy of Alfonsín because due to the economic problems, the

military's limits were tested during Alfonsín period. As a result, Menem followed a more moderate and realist strategy against the military in order to promote the civilian control over the military. The uprisings were not only to test of the limits of civilian and military actors but also demand of the military to protect status quo and it can be argued that the civilian actors could maintain the process of the subordination of the military in spite of the uprisings.

However, the importance of these events was to test the limits of the power of both sides; civilian and military. At the end, the trials were stopped, and an amnesty for most of the junior officers of the military who had participated in the "Proceso" government and who had participated in the uprisings after the transition was declared by Carlos Menem in 1989 (Norden, 1996: 140). However, it should be remembered that the leading members of the "Proceso" was still under house imprisonment. At first sight, this development may be taken as evidence to support the argument that the civilian leaders after the transition had lost their position against the military. However, the context of the process, i.e. the worsening economic conditions of Argentina was also important. Civilian presidents had to deal with economic problems of the country with priority, and so the civilian control over the military was a secondary issue for them at that point (Norden, 1996).

Briefly, during both Alfonsín and Menem's periods, civilian leaders gained significant powers over the military. As it is covered in the next section, the hitherto autonomous fields of the military were restricted and civilian control was secured in those fields. Although, in this period, four uprisings emerged, both of which were crushed. In this period, the military remained in a defensive position unlike the 1960s and 1970s. Their main demand was to stop the trials of the former junta members. To some degree, they reached their demands by the amnesty for the junior officers of the "Proceso" but the top members of the junta did not gain impunity. However, the trend of diminishing the power of the military was not reversed. In addition, in both Alfonsín and Menem's periods, Argentina reflected O'Donnell's "delegative democracy", theoretically analyzed in the first chapter. The two presidents implemented their policies through executive orders or enacting decrees. They

bypassed the Congress. For example, in March 1989, President Alfonsín enacted a decree which stressed the role of the army as external defense only (Zaverucha, 1993: 297).

III.2. Economic Situation after the Transition and Its Impact on Civilian-Military Relations

As analyzed in the previous chapter, Argentinean economy displayed a very bad performance in the 20th century. From the establishment of the modern state to the 1920s, a relatively liberal economic structure had been developed, which worked in favor of the traditional oligarchy whose interests were tied to the world market. However, in 1929 with the “Great Depression”, this open structure of economy turned into an introverted one. After this period, Argentina’s economy was characterized by “statism” and “populism”. Since 1930, both civilian and military governments did always increase the strength of the state not only in the social sphere but also in the economy through ISI policies, because they could easily reach their different aims through state power and they could manipulate other social classes. However, the cost of the successes of the ISI models (i.e. high level of industrialization and growing bourgeoisie, middle class and working class) was higher than the failures of the model; high inflation, high debts and unemployment. Therefore, with the world economic crisis of the 1970s, this model came to an end not only in Argentina but also all over the world. Consequently, this model could not be maintained after the 1980s. Argentina’s economy again reflected a crisis ridden situation (Pang, 2002: 36).

The second characteristic of the Argentinean economy was mostly the strengthened position of the state even in the relatively liberal period from the 1850s to 1930s. In this period, a model based on economic liberalism and democracy did not completely emerge. Oxhorn (1998: 16) stressed this point and he argued that “economic liberalization without political liberalization” was more common than “democracy with economic liberalism”. After 1984, a new model based on economic liberalism with democracy emerged.

At the end of the “Proceso” years, the Argentinean economy had collapsed, which was one of the main reasons of withdrawal of military from politics. At the end of the 1970s, not only in Argentina but also all over the third world, there was a debt crisis.

In 1979, Argentinean military government’s deficit reached 42.1 percent of total GDP while it increased to 49.8 percent in 1983 (Pang, 2002: 41). The economy was shrinking; in 1981 decreased 6 percent, in 1982 decreased 5 percent (Pang, 2002: 41). Consequently, it was obvious that the economic policy could not be maintained at the beginning of the 1980s. Finally, in 1983, when the military government fell and the civilian government took office, economic situation was one of the urgent problems to be solved for the new civilian leader, Alfonsin.

Before discussing the economic policies of Alfonsin and Menem after the transition, economic power centers should be elaborated in Argentina. The “Proceso” years followed liberal economic policies, although military government continued the state power in economy. In this period, naturally, agro-export sectors, the commercial classes and newly emerging financial capital gained power in the economy. Indeed, traditionally, the Pampean bourgeoisie and its partners had constituted power center since the establishment of Argentina, but a new development was the appearance of financial capital or called “financial conglomerates”³⁵. Their tendencies in economy were the firm cooperation with foreign economic powers, including IMF, World Bank, foreign banks etc. and the privatization of state enterprises. In this period, the 100 largest companies (according to sales) in 1975 fell into 77 companies in 1981 (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 94). These companies were absorbed by other 77 companies. The monopolization was very clear. According to Tedesco and Barton (2004: 94), the financial sector with the firms of the “Pampean” bourgeoisie was benefited from the economic policy of the “Proceso”.

The second important economic power was the institutions of the world market; IMF, World Bank and foreign creditors. Their intervention in the economic policies

³⁵ According to Pang, financial conglomerates began their first careers at the end of 1960s. There were 24 conglomerates ranging from banks, oil and gas, automobile, manufacturing to agriculture and pastoral activities. Together these 24 dominated Argentina’s private sector (Pang, 2002: 43).

of the civilian governments did not stem from the external debt of Argentinean economy, but came from Argentinean civilian leaders' policies to stabilize the economy. Naturally, this policy required new financial supports. At the beginning, Alfonsín did not want to develop his relations with foreign economic powers due to the populist and statist legacy of the Radicals. However, his policy ended with an economic crisis in Argentina. As a result, Menem had to re-design the economy as more liberal and more open to the world market (Pang, 2002: 46).

Initially, Alfonsín had to confront foreign creditors and financial capital as the dominant economic actors. In his first years, he did not want a stand-by agreement with IMF. He appointed Bernardo Grinspun with populist tendencies as the Minister of Economy. He promised to decrease budgetary deficit, to increase real wages, to promote exports, to modernize industry and to negotiate with foreign creditors (Pang, 2002: 41). At the first year, he rejected an IMF agreement. However, the reality of economics was not compatible with his populist ideas. Finally, in 1984, Argentina signed a 15-month stand-by agreement with IMF. However, this was not a pure neo-liberal program, and there was a free space for the government to respond the public's demands. Nonetheless, this agreement did not solve economic problems. Moreover, conglomerates were opposed to Grinspun's ministry and finally, he was removed from the Minister of Economy. This event reflected the influence of the economic actors over the government. Then Alfonsín changed traditional populist and statist policies, and the economic policies were designed in favor of the world market and its allies in Argentina.

In 1984 there was a decrease in new foreign debt. At that time, Alfonsín was trying to continue the populist ideas of the Radicals, and he did not completely set up cooperation with the "Pampean" and the institutions of the world economy. However, in 1984 the world economic institutions and their allies in Argentina showed their power over economy by sharply diminishing its foreign debt credit. Then, when Alfonsín started a closer relationship with the economic powers by appointing a liberal minister of economy, Argentina's foreign credit was raised.

Alfonsín appointed Juan Sourrouille, who did not have populist ideas, as the new Minister of Economy. In 1985, the economy was in a poor condition. The decreasing foreign debt brought about an economic crisis. Inflation hit 6,500 percent in a year, and Argentina declared a moratorium on its \$55 billion external debt (Pang, 2002: 43). And finally, the IMF-sponsored economic plan, called “Austral Plan”, was declared by Alfonsín’s government. The short-term details of the plan; firstly, a price freeze, secondly, a 15 percent devaluation in exchange rate, thirdly, a new currency; the austral (Pang, 2002: 43). The long-term aims of the “Austral Plan” were restructuring the state in the direction of free market. It was necessary to provide the liberalization of international trade, the deregulation of the domestic market, and the privatization of public-sector companies. In addition to the “Austral Plan”, Alfonsín introduced the “Austral” 2 and 3 plans. Although some economic recovery was observed, stability in economy could not be provided. At the end of 1988, Argentina entered a hyperinflation period. Since the 1970s, with the liberal economic policies, the main problem for the governments was to provide macro economical balance and the control inflation. Several economic programs were introduced in this period; Tablita Plan in the period of military regime, Austral and Australito plans in the period of Alfonsín, none of which provided solutions to the chronic problems of Argentina’s economy.

The Menem period in Argentina started under this atmosphere. Although he promised to follow Peronist strategies in the economy, he stuck to liberal market policies. Menem declared the BB plan, named after “Bunge & Born”, Argentina’s most powerful multinational corporation at the beginning of his Presidency (Smith, 1991: 300). This plan introduced market reforms but it failed to provide stability in economy. The economic powers demanded further liberalization. At the end, Menem accepted their demands and in 1991, with the “Convertibility Plan” or “Cavallo Plan”, named after Menem’s Economy Minister, Domingo Cavallo, a recovery in Argentina’s economy was observed. This was purely a liberal economic program involving the abolishment of export taxes and the deregulation of market privatization (Pang, 2002: 109). The result was a relative balance in the economy.

Generally, after the 1980s, these policies promoted the integration of Argentinean economy to the world market. However, the economy was now more vulnerable to external factors. Therefore, naturally, economy had to be redesigned in harmony with the demands of external economic actors. The key economic policies in this period were privatization, (not only with the demand of external actors but also the financial groups of the country), balance of payments and the payable external debts. The expansion of the state sector was seen as a threat to the prerequisites of the new model. Therefore, the public sector had to be curbed by the policy makers. The wave of privatization started in the period of Menem. (Schaverzer, 1998: 74) Under this wave many state enterprises including military ones were sold. The economic programs devaluated the national currency of Argentina due to the balance of payments problems. During this period, the income distribution in the country considerably worsened.

This redesign of the Argentinean economy through market reforms and stabilization plans led to serious effects over the civilian-military relations. The first effect was related to the prerequisites of the new economic model based on small state structure. The cuts in state expenditures in important quantities were an obligation. The second effect was that civilian leaders used the new economic policy to subordinate the military in the political sense.

The first change emerged with the privatization wave. Many military enterprises were sold under the rhetoric of limited state. Moreover, many military weapon programs were stopped. Therefore, the army depended more on civilian leaders to produce weapons and to use more funds, which is to be analyzed in the following sections.

The second change was observed in the size of the army. With the economic programs, the size of the armed forces was curbed. As seen in Table 3, the numbers of the soldiers were limited while the officers of army remained same.

Table 3 Argentina Army, 1983 – 1990³⁶

Year	Officers	Soldiers
1983	6,154	64,640
1984	5,891	62,902
1985	5,804	35,527
1986	5,857	24,930
1987	5,900	24,921
1988	5,895	28,343
1989	5,878	29,169
1990	6,000	16,000

The third change was observed in the living standard of the members of the army. An erosion of their situation was observed. From 1983 to 1990, the salaries of the officers relatively were eroded by 211 percent and in 1989 and 1989 there could be observed that the officers worked in second jobs (Norden, 1996: 143). However, it is important to note that there was no serious protest in army in view of these developments.

Briefly, the new economic model was designed in harmony with the liberal market conditions after the transition. The prerequisites of the model brought about serious cutting on military's expenditures, which is to be analyzed in the following section, the "Military Budget". One can conclude that this was not only a requirement of the new economic model but also a tool for the civilian leaders to limit the influence of military.

III. 3. The Civilian-Military Relations

In the previous Chapter, the reasons led that the military to become more politicized and to intervene in politics were analyzed. In the following sections, the new axis of the relationship after the transition is to be analyzed.

³⁶ Norden, D. (1996: 143)

Briefly, if one is to restate the background of civilian-military relations, traditionally, the state of Argentina was formed at the end of an independence war from colonization. Naturally, the main founder actor of the state was the military. Therefore, Argentina's military saw itself as a guardian of the nation and it accepted itself as a natural owner of country. As a result, under all political instable conditions in Argentina, the military moved with these psychological and historical impulses, and it intervened in politics.

Norden (1996: 157) emphasized the sources of chronic interventionism in a striking way by stating that "Argentina's military interventionism stems from both a civilian predilection to seek military allies and the military's tendency to respond". Under these conditions, the military by responding this call directly intervened in politics many times. Sometimes, it governed the country directly and sometimes only it changed the political structure by informally establishing a pressure over civilian leaders. Hence, the military became important political actor in Argentina and even when it did not directly intervene in politics, the fear or the prospect of a coup has always shaped the steps of civilian leaders. According to Pion-Berlin (1997: 2), the absence of the institutionalized structure led to the breach of the rules. Furthermore, "the behavioral adaptation of the military as a political actor to conventions" did not emerge in Argentina until recently.

Therefore, the new paradigm of the civilian-military relations after the 1980s was the changing roles of both sides; civilian leaders were in offensive position while military was in defensive one. Hunter (1998: 297) stresses this situation that after the transition to democracy at the result of the third wave democracy, militaries, instead of increasing their influence over politics, have sought to protect the status quo. At this point, another question can be raised; what is the civilian control? Is civilian supremacy necessary to claim civilian control? In order to understand the case of Argentina after the transition, the determinants of the "civilian control" have to be indicated. For the civilian control, the civilian leaders should confine military in barracks or they exclude it from all decision process of state policies. However, total exclusion of the army is not possible due to the defense matters. As a result, to

answer this question, it is necessary to find a middle of the road approach. In this context, Berlin offers such a perspective for the civilian-military relations in Argentina. According to him, in a democratic state, the civilian supremacy is not necessary (Berlin, 1997: 13). Instead, there should be equilibrium between civilian-military authorities. In these countries, military is benefited for advice; it can even participate in the process of decision-making about defense and security. However, there is one thing which is necessary for democracy; that is, the political authorities should determine the limits to military influence (Berlin, 1997: 14).

Consequently, in order to understand the new pattern of the civilian-military relations in Argentina after the transition, firstly, it is necessary to analyze the situation of prerogatives and autonomous spheres of the military as well as the civilian attitudes against them after the transition.

III.3.1. The Attitude of the Civilian Leaders against the Past Military Junta and Human Rights Abuses

The “Proceso” years were very traumatic years for Argentina people. This period was so violent that nearly 30,000 people disappeared and many people were subject to torture.³⁷ Therefore, the first demand for many people of Argentina was to see punishment for the junta leaders and notable officers, who were responsible for the violation of human rights. This demand was also expressed during the election campaign of 1983 and the respond of this call took Alfonsín to the Presidency.

The trials of the past military regimes were very important in the establishment of the civilian control because militaries demand some exit guarantees to leave power, which compromises the civilian control or which maintains the military influence after the transition (Yazıcı, 1997: 26). Among them, amnesty laws are important for the protection of officers. Consequently, in the case of Argentina, the attitude of

³⁷ The number of the disappearances ranging from 8,000 to 30,000 is debatable among scholars and human right organizations (Stepan and Linz, 1996; Berlin, 1985; Smith, 1991; Wiarda and Kline, 1996). However, the different numbers do not change the reality of the violence of the “Proceso”.

civilian leaders against the members of the past military regime significantly influenced the direction of the new regime over the problematic issue of impunity.

One of Alfonsín's first policies was to put military's junta leaders to trial for the disappearances and tortures, which was not only the way of the establishment the civilian control over the military but also a response to the common expectations of public. In Argentina, several human right organizations were active especially over the issue of the disappearances. One of the important human right organizations was "Madres de Plaza de Mayo" or the "The Mothers of the May Square", established in 1977 by the mothers of the disappeared people (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 96). "Familiares de Desaparecidos y Detenidos por Razones Políticas" or the "Families of Disappearances" and the "Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo" or the "Grandmothers of the May Square" were other organizations (Norden, 1996: 89). Their main demand after the transition was firstly, the return of the missing people and secondly, the trials of the junta members for the disappearances and the tortures. They had strong influence over the civilian governments and the civilian courts after the transition.

Only five days after Alfonsín took office, he established a committee, called the "National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons" (CONADEP) to investigate disappearances of the "Proceso". Moreover, on 14 February 1984, the Argentinean Congress passed a law to change the Military Code of Justice (Zaverucha, 1993: 295). According to the law, coup attempts and human rights violations would be brought to a civilian jurisdiction. This law led to allow the officers of the "Proceso" including Videla to be sent for trial in a civilian court. The members of the Argentinean military historically used to be tried in military courts according to the Military Code of Justice until this time (Norden, 1996: 87).

In April 1985, the trials of the officers involving General Jorge Videla, the head of the "Proceso", began. At the end of the trials, General Videla and Admiral Emilio Massera received life sentences for homicide, illegal detention, and other human rights violations of the junta. Moreover, General Roberto Viola was sentenced to seventeen-year imprisonment. General Leopoldo Galtieri was given twelve-year

sentence due to his role in the defeat of Malvinas War, Admiral Anaya received fourteenth-year sentence and Brigadier General Basilio Lami Dozo was sentenced to eight years (Smith, 1991: 270).

However, as analyzed before, four uprisings of officers broke out after the transition against the trails of the “Proceso”. However, these events did not stop the process of the civilian control over the military in Argentina. Today, Videla is still under house imprisonment. Other top members of the “Proceso” have been in prison for years. In the area of the military’s impunity, it can be argued that the civilian supremacy has been provided. Moreover, military as an institution did not participate in these uprising movements. Especially, the senior officers were not part of the uprisings. Finally, these were repressed by the military (Norden, 1996).

III.3.2. The Military Budget

Military budget and expenditures is the pillar on which autonomy of the military rests, because financial sources provide the power to the army. The military budget had constituted an important part of the Argentina’s GDP before the transition. In addition, military expenditures were not under control of the civilian authorities. Consequently, a financial autonomy had been obtained by the military. As a result, limiting and controlling military’s expenditures were crucial for the civilian leaders in order to provide civilian control after the transition.

At first sight, military expenditures in Argentina gradually decreased after the 1980s and this trend still continues. However, this trend was not only due to the imperatives of limiting the military’s influence in politics, but it was also related with the prerequisites of the liberal economic programs in Argentina. The new orthodox liberal economic programs required a limited state, and so the military budget had to be cut off (Norden, 1996: 93).

In 1982, military expenditures were 32.3 percent of total public expenditures while in 1990 it decreased to 18.4 percent (Hunter, 1997b: 464). Consequently, at the end of

the 1980s, military's operational and training capacity was significantly reduced. Menem also continued this trend. With the liberal economic adjustment, the force levels of the army were diminished from 95,000 in 1989 to 65,000 in 1993 (Hunter, 1997: 465). Moreover, technological research on missile and militaristic projects, the most important one being the "Condor Missile Program", was ended. In 1989, the military's budget was 2.6 percent of total GDP and in 1993, it fell to 1.7 percent (Hunter, 1997: 465). In 2000, only 1.3 rate of total budget was accepted to the military's expenditure. Hence, the military lost important economic power in comparison with the past (Pang, 2002: 170).

In addition, the military had emerged as an entrepreneur in the 1960s by establishing arm factories. After the 1980s, with the trend of the privatization, these military owned factories started to be sold. Hence, the dependency of the military to civilian leaders for economic matters increased because in order to buy arms, the army not having an arm factory had to get permission from the civilian authorities.

The table below displays the change of military expenditures from 1972 to 1989. The data shows the period before, during and after the last military junta. As it can be seen, after the last coup, expenditures sharply increased and after the transition, there emerged serious cuts in them.

Table 4 Military Expenditures of Argentina, 1972 – 1989³⁸

<u>Year</u>	<u>Million %US</u>	<u>% of Gross Domestic Product</u>
1972	965	1.85
1973	992	1.82
1974	991	1.67
1975	1,278	2.04
1976	2,293	3.79
1977	2,483	4.01
1978	2,699	4.73
1979	2,814	4.67
1980	2,561	4.20
1981	2,700	4.72
1982	2,203	4.00
1983	2,499	4.39
1984	1,980	3.23
1985	1,681	2.84
1986	1,760	2.90
1987	1,899	3.72
1988	1,832	3.36
1989	1,461	2.72

Consequently, in this area, the civilian leaders secured the control over the military. The military had to obtain civilians' permission before spending its budget. Moreover, after the transition, the military in the areas of the budget, defense production and research on the issues related to defense had to become tied to civilian Ministry of the Defense. The ministry's approval was necessary on these areas. As a result, the civilian leaders gained supremacy in this sphere (Norden, 1996: 96).

III.3.3. The National Security Doctrine

The National Security Doctrine was a significant part of the civilian-military relations in Argentina. As analyzed in the previous Chapter, it was used by the military as an ideological tool in order to strengthen their autonomy especially after the 1960s. Indeed, at those times not only in Argentina but also throughout the continent, almost all militaries developed a new concept of security. Almost all

³⁸ Norden, D. (1996: 94)

spheres of societies including economics, education, and politics were accepted as a part of National Security and naturally militaries easily interfered in these areas. Therefore, their autonomy sharply increased during this period. In this context, after the transition, a look at the developments in the doctrine and the role of the military in it are important to explain the new nature of the civilian-military relations.

According to Stepan (1988: 140), the first area to be analyzed is the system of intelligence to understand National Security Doctrine. Intelligence was such an important apparatus of the state that the military in Argentina dominated it for long years. It can be used not only to gather vital information but also to constitute pressure over the masses. In every coup in 1930, 1966 and 1976, the military tried to strengthen the state apparatus by extending its intelligence system to protect their authority. Moreover, until the transition, even under civilian governments, the military continued their domination in intelligence system. Briefly, it was used to be a repressive apparatus for military in order to demobilize society.

After the transition, Alfonsín's government noticed the importance of this area and he decided to exclude military from it. Until his power, in the "Proceso" period, there was an intelligence service, called "Secretaría de Inteligencia y Defensa del Estado" or the "Secretariat of State Intelligence" (SIDE). Alfonsín firstly tried to limit the SIDE's power by prohibiting it from interfering in the domestic civil conflicts (Smith, 1991: 270). Moreover, the performance of the SIDE did not satisfy the government. As a result, Alfonsín reestablished an old agency, called "Centar Nacional de Inteligencia" or the "National Intelligence Center" (CNI), firstly created in 1971 by the former President General Alejandro Agustín Lanusse. However, the CNI board consisted of five civilians and six military personals. Consequently, now there were two intelligence services. Peronistas and Radicals diverged on which of them would be the senior intelligence service. Some efforts for an agreement between the two parties emerged but none of them succeeded. Finally, this issue was postponed and nothing about this subject was realized in following periods. This issue has not been raised in the political agenda since then (Zaverucha, 1993: 287). Hence, the intelligence force of the military was divided into two parts since then.

It can be contended that this particular effort of Alfonsín had two aims, one of which was that the problem of the unsatisfactory performance of the SIDE would be solved and another of which was that with the two intelligence services the military influence over the system would be limited. Under Menem's period, this dual structure was maintained and the military's power has been eroded in this area.³⁹

The second area of the doctrine was the National Security Council. According to Stepan (1988: 141), the dynamics in this council was important for democratic civilian-military relations. There are two important reasons. Firstly, according to the traditional military argument, the army saw itself as the members of polity, and the military gained weight through the polity. Secondly, the involving role of the military as an advisor and implementer of policy in the National Security Council provides the expanding position for the army to be a regular institution of the state. In this council, policy making decisions are taken and after these decisions, all state apparatus start to implement them. Consequently, in a democratic structure, civilian leaders have to control the council by subordinating the army as the military possessed only advisor role in defense matters. After the transition, the efforts of the civilian leaders to change the structure of the Council followed. Alfonsín and Menem limited the participation of the military in this Council (Hunter, 1997a: 160). The "National Defense Law" passed in 1988 during Alfonsín Presidency and it denied seats for the military on "Consejo de Defensa Nacional" or the "National Defense Council" (Hunter, 1997a: 160). The "Consejo" was to consist of the President, vice-president and the National Cabinet, which was composed of the President, and two representatives of each of the Congressional Defense Committees (Norden, 1996: 98). The military Chiefs of Staff could only participate in the Council with the invitation of the Minister of Defense. Consequently, this law prevented the armed forces from having an institutionalized role in the national defense policy.

Another point that needs to be defined was the situation of the war colleges because they were very important in shaping the "National Security Doctrine" (Stepan, 1992:

³⁹ The dual structure of the intelligence system was maintained during the Menem era. The main reason is that the political parties could not agree on this matter (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 76).

143). The war colleges were financed and directed by the military. Very few civilian students and professors could be admitted to them. Therefore, the military oriented doctrine was determined by their students and academicians. According to Loveman (1997: 11), the war colleges were the institutional orientation of the new professionalism of the army. Alfonsín transferred their responsibility to the Ministry of Defense. More students and academicians started to be admitted to these colleges. As the military lost its influence over colleges its role in the process of the formulation of the Doctrine diminished. In Brazil, Chile and Argentina, national defense colleges were placed under a civilian Minister of Defense after the transition (Norden, 1996: 95). Stepan (1988: 145) emphasized that fewer military appointments into the structures of doctrine, such as National Security Council and War Colleges in the direction of civilian control, may diminish the military's sense of isolation and it could lead to more effective system of mutual exchange of information, and it could develop the capacity for democratic control.

As analyzed before, the army with the new concept of National Security Doctrine in the 1960s had expanded the scope of their missions ranging from economics to politics. Therefore, civilian leaders had to rethink the borders of the missions of the military after the transition. Within this framework, on March 1989, Alfonsín enacted a decree which declared the role of the army as external defense only (Zaverucha, 1993: 297). However, three months earlier, the military garrison "La Tablada" had been attacked by a leftist group, which led to the intervention of the army to crush illegal activities of the leftist groups. Therefore, on April 1989, the Congress approved the "National Defense Law" after long discussions (Norden, 1996: 99). This law emphasized the external defense role of the army, but under some specific conditions it allowed the army to interfere in internal conflicts. This trend was continued under the Menem administration. In 1990, Menem enacted a decree that allowed the military to intervene in internal disorder without strict civilian surveillance due to the increasing leftist movements.

As a result, in these areas, the civilian leaders tried to break off military's influence. However, in comparison to other issues, amnesty law and military budget, there was

not a clear result for total civilian control. Its main reasons were the divergence among political civilian groups about some issues and the activities of extremist organizations. However, it can be argued that unlike the past, at least, in the process and application of National Security Doctrine, civilian authorities have gained the upper hand. Military was not only the decision-maker any more.

III.3.4 Institutional Position of the Military in the State Organization

Starting in the 1960s, the military expanded its political autonomy by directing and dominating state organs such as the intelligence service and the Gendarmerie under new National Security Doctrine. Almost all state bureaucracy was under the control of the military during military regimes. Within this framework, the military maximized its influence in politics. Therefore, the new civilian leaders after the transition had to erode the institutional position of the military in order to erode the military's influence from state organization. Moreover, the military had to be controlled directly by the civilian authorities through a strong civil bureaucratic organization.

In this context, Alfonsín tried to strengthen the Ministry of Defense to expand civilian presence and authority (Zaverucha, 1993: 290). He changed the military dominated composition of the Ministry of Defense by appointing many civilian persons (Hunter, 1997a: 160). For example, at the Ministry of Defense, the top five positions were assigned to civilians (Agüero, 1992: 160). Alfonsín also abolished the Commander in Chief and created three Chiefs of Staff which would depend on the Joint Chief of Staff. The President maintained his relationship through the Minister of Defense instead of direct contact with the officers of the army. Consequently, the relations of the President with the army could be established through the Minister of Defense. The Minister of Defense gained dominant position over the military. In the past, the officers of the army thought their positions as more important than the Minister of Defense. Therefore, the military's highest officers would now be dependent on a civilian authority.

From an institutionalist viewpoint, Pion-Berlin (1997: 4) stressed the importance of the monopolized executive for facilitating control over the army. He claimed that if the authority over the army is dispersed, the military is likely to take advantage from this situation. Therefore, the stronger the position of the Minister of Defense the higher the control it would possess over the army by a re-organization in the state. This was what happened in Argentina in this period.

The other important subject was the position of the National Gendarmerie and the Naval Prefecture, called paramilitary organizations. Moreover, the police was another armed force of the state. In the past, they both depended on the military in the light of the National Security Doctrine. However, Alfonsín separated them from the military's hierarchy; the Gendarmerie and the Naval Prefecture were then tied to the Minister of Defense while the police was brought under the control of the Ministry of Interior (Zaverucha, 1993: 293).

Another important arrangement as a source of institutional autonomy was related to promotion of higher officers of the military. After the transition, because of the poor reputation of the army, authorization on this was tied both to the President's approval and the Senate's consent (Zaverucha, 1993: 294). The objective of this arrangement was that the military became tied not only to the President but also to the Senate. This was another crucial indicator of increasing civilian control over the military.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ In this context, the Turkish case of democratization also can be taken up briefly for comparative insights on civilian-military relations following transitions to democracy. The Turkish case of the civilian-military relations after the transition to democracy displays considerable differences from the Argentinean case. In Turkey, the military directly intervened in politics three times – 1960, 1971 and 1980 since the establishment of Turkish Republic in 1923. The military coup of 1980 brought three-year military regime. The Turkish military like Argentinean one withdrew from the power in 1983 with elections to install a civilian government. However, the civilian-military relations and the civilian control over the armed forces have not been secured completely. In 1983, the Turkish army decided to withdraw from power unilaterally as it set out to do at the time of the intervention. At this point, the first difference from Argentina was observed in the Turkish case. The military rulers took a decision without a pressure from civilian actors. As a result, in Turkish case, the army gained important exit guarantees in return for the withdrawal from the power because the transition unlike Argentina's rupture type was controlled by the military. The first exit guarantee for the army was the manipulation of the elections. In order to end polarization among political parties, National Security Council through which the army governed Turkey declared the election law in 1983. (Yazıcı, 1997: 156) Some political parties were banned from the election. As a result, after the 1983 election, only three parties could be represented in the Parliament. The second exit guarantee for the Turkish army was that the leader of the junta, Kenan Evren, was elected as the President of the Turkish Republic. Consequently,

III.4. The Factors that Led to the Civilian Control Over the Military

In the previous section, the eroding the military's influence vis-à-vis the civilians after the transition in Argentina has been portrayed. Autonomous areas such as impunity of the soldiers, military budget and the institutional position of the military especially in the policy-making process have been taken up by the civilians to restrict military's political autonomy after the transition in Argentina.

Briefly, the trials of the junta members, the military budget cut-offs, the limited role of the military in National Security Doctrine and in the state organization indicate that the civilian control over military has largely been provided in Argentina. In the new paradigm of the civilian-military relations, civilian leaders have been stronger as they ended up with the power to direct the relationship with the military. In comparison with the past, civil leaders were relatively free to design policies while the military were left in a defensive position.

However, as indicated the four uprisings that broke out after the transition can be taken as an indication of the limits of the civilian control over the military, if not the failure of it. Moreover, the top members of the military did not take part in these movements and the rebels only demanded that the trials of the members of the

the military could maintain its influence on the state mechanism. As it can be observed through the Presidency, the military gained important prerogatives in Turkish politics. Moreover, another significant exit guarantee was the role of National Security Council, which was an institution to define the security matters. After the transition, the Council was to maintain its position in Turkey (Yazıcı, 1997: 185). Although this structure of the Council was changed in the 1990s and in the 2000s to expand the civilian presence by the number of civilians during the transition period, the military provided majority of the Council and the Cabinet had to pay attention to the decisions of the Council about national security, limits of which were defined very extensively. Another important exit guarantee for the military was observed in the temporary article 15 of the constitution of 1982. This article provided impunity for the members and actions of the National Security Council which was used by the army to govern the military regime. According to the article, after the election, the members and the actions of the military regime could not be brought to the trials (Yazıcı, 1997: 201). In the area of the military budget, the Turkish military still maintained its prerogatives: no reduction also no control or accountability to the elected actors (Cizre, 1997: 160). According to observers, the reduction in the budget is not likely in the future. In Argentina's case, these guarantees could not be gained by the military. The difference between the Turkish and Argentina's cases only partly stemmed from the type of the transition. The Turkish military held stronger position and popularity among the public than the Argentina's army, hence, it could control the transition period, and it secured for itself important prerogatives after the transition. As a result, Turkey and Argentina are very different cases in the area of the civilian-military relations after the transition to democracy.

“Proceso” be stopped. The military did not try to gain its past prerogatives or to strengthen its position in politics. Moreover, these upheavals were suppressed by the rest of the members of military. At the end of this process, neither civilian leaders nor the military changed their strategy. The civilians continued on a gradual pathway to subordinate the military. As a result, the trend of diminishing military’s influence continued with the result that many areas of the prerogatives of the military in the past were lost and the civilian institutions replaced them.

At this point, the remaining question is “what factors specifically led to the civilian control over military?”

III.4.1. The Transition Process

The type of the transition in Argentina was very important to provide the civilian control over the military because the transition period defines the future characteristic of the new regime and the relationship among actors. Karl (1990: 8) claims that the new rules and patterns made by political actors of transition become the institutions shaping consolidation of democracy in the future. In fact, in the transition period, political actors and their positions would determine the new rules of the game. Therefore, for the case of Argentina, the last military regime, the “Proceso”, was crucial to understand the civilian-military equilibrium after 1983.

As was analyzed before, the “Proceso” years ended up being very unpopular with the public due to economic mismanagement which brought about the collapse of Argentina’s economy, violation of human rights and finally the defeat in the Malvinas War against Britain. Therefore, unlike other Latin American cases such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, the military of Argentina as a political actor was in a very weak position during transition. In Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, as mentioned in the first chapter, militaries were in a stronger position and the transition processes were under control of them. They displayed successes in economics.

At this point, in order to support argument, a comparison of the characteristics of the military regimes in three cases; Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil during the military regimes is often underlined in the literature (Stepan and Linz, 1996: 190). Thirty-two times more people disappeared in Argentina than in Uruguay and more than three hundred times more people disappeared in Argentina than in Brazil. The military in Argentina unlike Brazil did not create parties or hold elections; the military regime was much more of “naked” authoritarian situation than an institutionalized regime. It never formulated a “guided democracy” with a constitution which it submitted to a plebiscite as in Uruguay or Chile. According to Felipe Aguero (1992: 168), if the authoritarian regime is militarized, instead of institutionalized, and the transition path is likely to be military defeat and regime collapse, the relative position of the military will consequently be weaker.

Theoretically, there are various types of transition. Two of them were particularly important as categorized by Huntington and Linz, the details of which were analyzed in the second chapter. The table below displays the types of transitions appeared after the third wave of democratization.

Table 5 Authoritarian Regimes and Liberalization / Democratization Processes, 74 – 90 Regimes ⁴¹

<u>Processes</u>	<u>One Party</u>	<u>Personal</u>	<u>Military</u>	<u>Racial Oligarchy</u>
<u>Transformation</u>	Taiwan Hungary Mexico The U.S.S.R Bulgaria	Spain India China	Turkey Brazil Peru Ecuador Guatemala Nigeria Pakistan Sudan	
<u>Transplacement</u>	Poland Czechoslovakia Nicaragua Mongolia	Nepal	Uruguay Bolivia Honduras El Salvador Korea	South Africa
<u>Replacement</u>	East Germany	Portugal Philippines	Greece Argentina	

According to Munck and Leff (1997: 353), the failure of the “Proceso” weakened the old elite. This weakness brought about inability of the old elite to constrain the opposition. Therefore, unlike negotiated transition, Argentina was clear example of rupture with the past. The army could hold the power only for 16 months after the defeat in the Malvinas War until the election. In this period, as analyzed in previous chapters and sections, the opposition and the political parties did not accept a negotiation with the army. The military could not write up a constitution and it could not obtain some exit guarantees in return for withdrawal from the power. As a result, in this context, this type of transition facilitated the civilian control over the military.

III.4.2. Social Classes’ Position and the New Elite Consensus

As emphasized in the previous chapter, historically the struggle among social classes bred political instability as these struggles had ended up with military interventions

⁴¹ Huntington (1991b: 582)

in Argentina. Therefore, in Argentina, the prospect of the new pact or compromise among classes is important to understand the civilian control over military.

In the Argentinean history, as cited before, the main tension was observed between the traditional oligarchy whose activities were based on agro export sectors and the urban sectors which emerged after the 1930s. The urban sectors had gained the representation right in 1912 with the right to universal male suffrage and the struggle intensified after this period. Many times this struggle ended with a military regime. Therefore, the new alliance after the transition seems crucial for Argentina as this conditions the strength of civilian control.

According to Schvarzer (1998: 64), “the new alliance brought together traditional sectors of national economic power (in which commercial and financial interests predominate), foreign lenders (international institutions and banks that share a similar outlook), technocrats representing the new economic orthodoxy, and political leaders with populist backgrounds”. Traditional sectors and international institutions wield economic power. Technocrats use their knowledge and ability to design policies. And political leaders provide the legitimacy of new political orders. As a result, the traditional oligarchy and the some parts of the industrial capital, which had gained competitive character in the international market reached a consensus for the economic structure and this coalition through the populist leaders gained legitimacy among the masses. The populist leaders were so strong that they influenced and mobilized masses. For example, when Peron was disappointed in 1946 with the demonstrations of masses, the military had to bring him back to former missions. Moreover, when he was in exile in Spain, masses called him back to Argentina, and finally he was permitted to return to Argentina. Likewise, at the end of the 19th century, the Radicals launched a campaign for universal suffrage, which led to some uprisings. Finally, at the beginning of the 20th century, the traditional elites had to accept this right. As a result, in the light of the new elite consensus, based on the traditional oligarchy, some parts of the industrial capital, foreign economic powers, the technocrats and the populist leaders agreed on the new economic structure.

It can be said that this consensus led to an agreement on the democratic order after the transition (Schaverzer, 1998: 65).

The elite support and demand for democracy is important. Nonetheless, it should be demanded not only from the elites, but also from the masses. As cited above, the new elite consensus saw the democratic regime more preferable than the authoritarian one. The common agreement among the public for democracy was also significant because if the support for democracy only comes from the new elite consensus after the transition, this can lead to a relatively instable politics. At the end, the elite consensus might gain an authoritarian character or might prefer authoritarianism in order to maintain its domination.

The tables below display preferences of the people between democratic and authoritarian regimes in Argentina in particular and in Latin America in general.

Table 6 Support for “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government” (% in agreement)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	2000
Argentina	76	71	75	73	71
Bolivia	na	64	66	55	62
Brazil	41	50	50	48	39
Chile	52	54	61	53	57
Colombia	na	60	69	55	50
Mexico	49	53	52	51	45
Peru	52	63	60	63	64
Uruguay	80	80	86	80	84

* Not including those who answered ‘it doesn’t matter’ and ‘don’t know’

na = not available

Source: Latinobarometro, Informe de Prensa – various (Santiago, Latinobarometro, 2002) (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 67)

Table 7 Support for “In certain circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one” (% in agreement)

Country	1995	1996	1997	1998	2000
Argentina	11	15	15	16	16
Bolivia	na	17	16	22	13
Brazil	21	24	19	18	24
Chile	19	19	16	16	19
Colombia	na	20	13	17	23
Mexico	15	23	31	28	34
Peru	23	13	16	12	13
Uruguay	8	9	7	9	9

* Not including those who answered ‘it doesn’t matter’ and ‘don’t know’
na = not available
Source: Latinobarometro, Informe de Prensa – various (Santiago, Latinobarometro,2002) (Tedesco and Barton, 2004: 68)

As it can be seen in the Table 6, the highest support for democracy among the people emerged in Uruguay and Argentina. During the time period when the survey was carried out, the rate of support was over 70 percent in Argentina.

In the Table 7, the highest support for authoritarian regime in certain circumstance emerged in Brazil because of the relatively successful last military regime. In Argentina, this support slowly increased during 5 years of the survey.

As Wiarda stressed (2005:58), the support for democracy among the public after the transition stemmed from the fact that the other alternatives such as Marxism and authoritarianism had been discredited among the public, which led to acceptance of the democracy as the “only game in the town” in Argentina.

III.4.3. The Economic Structure

The “Proceso” years had led to a collapse of Argentina economy, which was analyzed in detail the previous chapter. Serious foreign debt problems and high

inflation existed at the end of this period. Moreover, the military's spending had reached in considerable share of the GDP. As indicated above, in 1983, total military expenditures had reached 4.39 percent of total GDP and the increase in public expenditures had produced the high level of inflation. Moreover, foreign debt had reached a peak.

It can be argued that the increasing military spending became an important problem for the new elite alliance around the new economic structure based on liberal market ideology. The neo-liberal program could not tolerate the increasing state expenditures. Finally, with the end of the Cold War, it was necessary to cut military expenditures. Therefore, the military budget had to be restricted and in accordance with new liberal economic program, many military enterprises were privatized. Furthermore, several military programs such as the "Condor Missile Project" were ended (Hunter, 1997a: 163). Therefore, this process has substantially reduced the financial and institutional levels of the military.

III.4.4. International Conjuncture and the End of the Cold War

The Post Cold War conditions and the new wave of economic ideology were important dimensions of the analysis of the civilian-military equilibrium after the transition period. In this section new international atmosphere and its implications for Argentina will be pointed as another factor facilitating to civilian control over military. Two specific events directly related with the international context were firstly, the defeat of the Argentinean military against the British armed forces in the Malvinas War and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the U.S.S.R) and the end of the Cold War. In this context, the military's political autonomy weakened in Argentina after the transition to democracy.

The first turning point for Argentina military was the Malvinas War. As elaborated in the previous chapter, the military junta of the "Proceso" years, especially in its last years, deepened the differences among the factions in the army. The struggle among the "hard-liners" and "soft-liners" intensified. Meanwhile, the opposition gained

strength as the economic situation got worse. In this period, the “hard-liner” officers took a strategic decision to conceal their failures in government. That was to open a war against Britain about a debatable position of a tiny island. At the end of the war, which lasted for two months, the Argentinean armed forces were defeated and this defeat started the transition. The head of the junta, General Galtieri, was forced to resign and General Bignone replaced him. Then the way for the elections was opened.

However, another impact of the war was the withdrawal of the support of the Western World to the military regime. At the beginning of the “Proceso”, the U.S.A. had indirectly supported the military. Henry Kissinger, the Foreign Minister of the time, had told the generals of the Junta that "if there were things that had to be done, you should do them quickly" and that "we had followed events in Argentina closely. We wish the new government well. We wish it would succeed. We would do what we could to help it succeed."⁴² However, the failures of the government and the war reversed this situation. The U.S.A. and the Western World supported Britain, and broke off their relations with the military of Argentina.

The second turning point emerged in 1989, when the Cold War period formally ended. Naturally, in addition to the changes which emerged all over the world, it also undermined the legacies of the “Bureaucratic-Authoritarian” regimes in Latin America. As mentioned in the previous chapters, the main aims of the BAs were to prevent threat from below from the working class and the urbanized middle class. Especially after 1959, with the Cuban Revolution, guerilla movements and communist threat rose throughout the continent. With the end of the Cold War and the subsiding of the communist wave in the world, the threat from below weakened, so this situation necessitated the changes in National Security Doctrine for the civilians.

At this point, Desch emphasized the effects of threats to civilian-military relations. For example, the increasing communist threat after the Cuban Revolution in the

⁴² <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB133/index.htm>

context of the Cold War dynamics led to the interventions of militaries in politics because the military saw the civilians as incapable of dealing with the threats, and the army felt itself as the savior of the state and as the guarantor of the nation. According to Desch (1998: 323), “challenging internal threat environment undermines civilian-military relations”. Desch (1998: 325) also analyzed this situation in terms of institutions. In his opinion, the intensity of threats affects both civil and military institutions. The greater the threat the more cohesive would get the military institutions. Likewise, lower threat levels would lead to less cohesive institutions. While a state might face a high external threat and no internal threat, this should lead to the best pattern of civilian-military relations. The military will be outward-oriented. If a state faces neither external nor internal threats, this should lead to be relatively stable position of civilian-military relations. The tension civilian-military relations would be very low. If a state might face no external but high internal threats, this should lead to the worst civilian-military relations. The military institution would be cohesive and inwardly-oriented.

In Argentina, after the 1950s, the threat or the perception of threat from below or popular sectors led to the interventions of military; the BA regimes in 1966 and 1976 emerged. These military regimes were different from their predecessors. In this context, the 1966 and the 1976 regimes displayed very poor civilian-military relations in Argentina due to the high internal threat levels. The military as an institution gained a very cohesive character, explaining the acute pressure over the masses and the human right abuses during the “Proceso”. However, this violence in the context of Argentina undermined the credibility of the military as well. Moreover, the impact of the end of the Cold War on the civilian-military relations can be seen from this perspective. The threat from below or from the popular sectors could be eliminated by the junta, and after the transition there did not emerge a serious threat or a perception of threat both by the traditional elite or the military elite. Moreover, the competition for the leadership of the continent between Argentina and Brazil could end with the process of economic integration. In 1978, there emerged a territorial dispute over the Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile, and they were very closed to war (Norden, 1996: 68). However, the border

disputes between Argentina and Chile were ended with the efforts of the Pope. Therefore, in this context, the military lost influence over domestic politics in Argentina by focusing on external threats.

Related to that the new internal missions of the military; drug trafficking, gang related and other criminal activities can be counted. Furthermore, specific peace-keeping operations were assigned to the military such as peace-keeping mission in Kosovo. These developments undermined the internal mission concept of the military. Finally, in the periods of Alfonsín and Menem, police and intelligence agency were separated from the military. Hence, the military were no longer responsible for internal problems (Pereira and Davis, 2000: 4).

Finally, on this issue, one should note that Pion-Berlin (1997: 16) also looked at the reasons why military officers were not in a position to upset existing equilibrium with civilian authorities after the transition. According to him, coup prone officers would find themselves internationally isolated. A military coup can not emerge without gaining some resources both internally and internationally.

III.4.5. The Psychological Situation of the Argentinean Military

The “Proceso” was very traumatic not only for civilians but also for the members of military. The failure of its economic policies, the human right abuses, and the defeat of Malvinas War brought about serious fear for officers for lost legitimacy among the people. After almost 23 years following the transition to democracy, the Argentinean military has still been in traumatic position. The Commander of the Air Forces apologized from Argentina’s public for the “Proceso” years on March 9, 2006 ⁴³ After the transition, many members of the military apologized for human right abuses of the “Proceso”.

Moreover, as indicated in the previous chapter, Argentina’s army had always been into divided into factions, much that it did not turn into an integrated body. This

⁴³ http://www.latinbilgi.net/index.php?eylem=yazi_oku&no=492 available at August, 2006

factor also developed an authoritarian aversion among the officers. Pion-Berlin (1997: 17) also underlined that the army was not devoted the doctrine of political intervention any more. The National Security Doctrine which forced the military to combat against internal political affairs was in disrepute. Overall, the diminishing influence of the Marxist movements and the absence of doctrinal coherence of the military also facilitated the civilian control by transforming the psychological condition and the mindset of the Argentinean military.

CONCLUSION

In this study, the civilian-military relations in the Argentinean democratization from 1983 to 1995 were analyzed. In this period, the civilian control over the military was secured. After very unstable politics in Argentina during the 20th century, democratic order seemed to be provided in these years.

Argentina, like other Latin American countries, has been characterized by a very unstable political history in the 20th century. This country experienced colonization period, independence war against colonizer forces, guerilla movements and many military coups. After the independence, the intensified struggle among social groups emerged over Argentina's political, social and economic organizations. On the one side there was traditional oligarchy and on the other side there were new urbanized classes ranging from the working class to the middle class. The struggle among these sides of this country did lead to very unstable political structure in the 20th century. The case of Argentina is significant for analysis especially to understand civilian-military relations in Latin America during and after the third wave of the democratization.

Scholars of democratization have rightly underlined that the Western type of democracy was not an analytically useful framework for the new democracies of the developing countries. After the unstable century of Argentina, this type of democracy involving broader institutional and socioeconomical dimensions can not be used as a background for analyzing the civilian-military relations after the transition. Instead, the "procedural democracy" perspective can help us understand relations among social and political actors in Argentina. The main characteristics of procedural democracy are; elected officials, free and fair elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, alternative information, and associational autonomy. However, democracy as such also includes civilian control over military. Democratization process includes both transition and consolidation. First, in

transition, the relationship between civilian elites and the military rulers is crucial because it shapes the transition process and also it conditions the new democratic regime to emerge. Second, in consolidation, the new axis of the civilian-military relationship either deepens or compromises the process of democratization.

The Argentinean military has always been an important political actor in Argentina's politics. Its political role was entrenched first during the war of independency at the beginning of the 19th century against Spanish forces. Consequently, the army saw itself as the founder and the guardian of the state. This role provided another specific role to the military as the guarantor of the political regime. In the 20th century, the military re-emerged in the politics in the coup of 1930, which restored the direct domination of the traditional oligarchy (The landed oligarchy). However, it did not solve the problems of the Argentinean economy. Unstable political and economical atmosphere continued and in 1943 the military again intervened in politics overthrowing the Conservatives' government. Juan Peron, the commander of the military regime, became the President in 1946 and his policies favored the working class, the industrial capital and the some parts of middle class. However, there emerged politics and economic problems in Argentina; high inflation and deep polarization, which led to another coup that overthrew Peron in 1955. Nevertheless, after 1955, neither civilian nor military leaders could solve the economic problems of the country. The next military coup came in 1966 in order to recover political and economical problems. The 1960s were an important period because the nature of military interventions and the army's ideological position was significantly transformed. The new National Security Doctrine was thus formulated, which shaped the subsequent military interventions and regimes. The new military regimes of Latin America were labeled as "Bureaucratic-Authoritarian" because the government was formed by soldiers and civilian technocrats and was managed in the direction of authoritarian policies. The major objectives and the new concept of the National Security Doctrine of these new regimes were the normalization of economy and prevention of threats from below. In fact, in the 1960s after the Cuban Revolution the continent faced a wave of leftist guerilla movements, which led to a "threat perception" by the traditional elites. In Argentina, the army always established a

coalition with the traditional elite, and naturally this threat had to be eliminated by the army due to its founder and the guard position of the state. Therefore, the new concept of the National Security Doctrine led to military's expanded position and autonomy in the politics prior to the last military regime which was installed in 1976.

The reasons of why Argentina did not experience a real democracy are important to re-state in order to understand the civilian-military relations. According to Peeler (2004: 43), Latin American democracies can be classified into two groups, one of which can be labeled as "early democracies", such as in Venezuela, Costa Rica and Colombia and another of which can be named as later democracies which emerged in Argentina, Brazil, Peru etc. The roots of this difference can be found in the elite attitudes. According to Peeler (2004: 43), in early democracies, "the competing elites agreed on modes of absorbing the expansion of political participation while establishing and maintaining liberal, competitive political systems". However, in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, this agreement among the elites was not achieved. In Argentina, the elites could not adapt peacefully to the extension of participation. The right to universal male suffrage came in 1912 and then Radicals gained power to be overthrown in 1930. In the following decades, Peron and Peronistas were overthrown in 1955 and 1976. Moreover, in 1962 and 1966, two coups emerged to prevent possible Peronist victories. Historically, the army always allied with the traditional oligarchy involving the "Pampean" bourgeoisie and the commercial bourgeoisie.

After the 1960s, the leftist movements in all of continent were seen as a threat by the traditional oligarchy. Moreover, there emerged important economic problems. In this period, Argentina experienced two military regimes; 1966 and 1976. The last military regime, called the "Proceso", was infamous with the scope of violence against civilians among all authoritarian regimes in Argentina. Its main aim was to reorganize the society by demobilizing activated sectors including the working class and the student organizations, and by adjusting economic structure in the direction of the liberal market. Serious human rights abuses were committed by the military. The numbers of disappeared people ranged from 8,000 to 30,000 people. Thousands of

people were subject to tortures. Moreover, it failed to generate relatively stable economy. Finally, a war was declared against Britain for Falkland Islands, at the end of which it was defeated. Thereafter, military regime formally collapsed due to the increasing pressure from the people and with the acute factionalism among the members of the military.

Another important aspect of the collapse of the “Proceso” was the factionalism of the army. The “hard-liners” involving General Viola (who would later be the President) ended General Videla’s power, as they wanted to maintain the military regime. Videla was the leader of the coup of 1976, but he decided to hold elections. As the “hard-liners” did not accept this decision, and as the army’s unity was shattered, these developments paved the way for the collapse of the “Proceso”.

As explained in this thesis, Argentina’s transition to democracy displayed significant differences from other transitions in Latin America. In Brazil, Chile and Uruguay, military regimes reached relatively economic successes, and the process of the transition was managed and controlled by the militaries. In Argentina, unlike other military regimes, the “Proceso” was not institutionalized. The rulers did not set up a party through which the country would be governed or did not write up a new constitution which would provide exit guarantees for the military in return for the withdrawal from power in contrast to some other cases such as Brazil, Chile and Uruguay. Because of the erosion in popularity of the military, it ended up with very weak bargaining power and, as such, it was not able to negotiate the terms of the transition with the civilian leaders. As a result, in Argentina “rupture type” of transition emerged.

As a result, after the transition, because of its weak position, the military could not maintain its political and institutional autonomy. It did not obtain exit guarantees from the civilians. It did not gain impunity after the transition. On the contrary, the new civilian President, Alfonsín, sent the members of the last military’s regime to the trials as a result of which they were punished. Moreover, another significant part of the autonomy of the military, the military budget, was also eroded. Two dimensions

were important in this matter. The first was the army's share of the budget in the public spending and its control by the civilian leaders. In Argentina, after the transition, elected governments cut off the military budget in considerable rates. In 1982, military expenditures were 32.3 percent of total public expenditures while in 1990 it decreased to 18.4 percent (Hunter, 1997b: 464). Furthermore, the civilian's scrutiny on the military expenditures raised for example the military in order to buy new arms or equipments had to get permission from the Parliament. Consequently, the armed forces were accountable to the civilian governments in these areas. Furthermore, the military's role in the national security was transformed and diminished. In the 1960s under the National Security Doctrine, the army had expanded its influence in politics. However, after the transition, with the end of the Cold War its role in the process of the National Security was minimized e.g. the army was excluded from the intelligence service (Zaverucha, 1993: 287). It was important because in the previous periods, the service was used for the repression for the activated sectors by the army. Moreover, the civilian leaders decreased the influence of the army in the National Security Council. The number of the civilian members was raised in the Council. Another point was the situation of the war colleges in which the National Security Doctrine had been defined. President Alfonsín after 1983 gave military's responsibility to the Minister of Defense. Moreover, many civilian academicians and students could be enrolled in these colleges. Therefore, there emerged a civilian majority in these colleges and the National Security Doctrine could now be formed by the civilians. Final issue for the civilians was to define the role of the military in defense matters. In March 1989, President Alfonsín enacted a decree which stressed the role of the army as external defense only (Zaverucha, 1993: 297). During President Menem's period from 1989 to 1999 the army could gain some role in internal security due to some internal guerilla activities, but it remained rather limited. In short, in the areas of impunity, the military budget and national security, the civilian leaders could establish dominance over the military. Unlike other cases, such as Chile and Brazil, the army in Argentina ended up in very weak position vis-à-vis the civilian politicians, hence, the civilian control over the military was secured, and in several important respects in the context of the new democracy emerged in Argentina.

At first sight, the four uprisings by some parts of the army which broke out after the transition can suggest significant difficulties in the process of the establishment of the civilian control. However, these uprisings did not aim at the expansion of the autonomy of the army. Firstly, only one section of the army headed by junior officers of colonel level participated in the uprisings, and their demands were only to stop the trials of the past military junta members. Furthermore, these uprisings were suppressed by the other part of the army. As a result, although at the end of these uprisings, the process of the establishment of the civilian control slowed down after the transition, as the trend of limiting military's position in politics has been maintained.

Stepan and Linz (1996: 5) stressed that the consolidation of democracy involves that democracy becomes "the only game in a town", which means that no one searches for a solution outside of the democratic regime. In Argentina, after the "Proceso", a new elite consensus emerged. The source of the consensus had appeared at the end of the 1960s with compromised economical interests between the traditional oligarchy and the industrial capital. Furthermore, the public consensus for democracy emerged after the transition due to serious violation of human rights during the "Proceso". In addition, the military's eroded popularity among masses has brought about hate for a coup among the military's members. Briefly, in the context of popular and elite attitudes, the consolidation of democracy has seemed to be provided in Argentina.

Today, twenty-three years passed after the transition to democracy in Argentina, and besides some uprisings of the military, there did not emerge a direct intervention of the military in the politics. The Argentinean military is still in a weak position vis-à-vis the civilians. Its main reasons were firstly, the last military regime and the transition process. The army badly governed the country during the "Proceso". Its heritage for Argentina was the collapsed economy, the violation of human rights and the defeat in Malvinas War against the British forces. As a result, during the transition process the military was in a very weak position, and there emerged the rupture type of the transition. Secondly, during the "Proceso" there emerged factionalism among the hard liners and soft liners. In fact, the factionalism in

Argentina's military had started after the 1920s. Thirdly, there emerged a new elite consensus on economic structure in Argentina with the end of the 1960s, the industrial bourgeoisie started to gain competitive ability in the world market and a new elite consensus among the "Pampean" bourgeoisie and industrial one was observed. Furthermore, the middle class has had a fragmented structure in Argentina. Its upper part participated in the new consensus. During the "Proceso", other urbanized sectors, the working class and the some parts of the middle class, were demobilized through coercion. Fourthly, there emerged a stable political structure in Argentina in the 1980s due to the elite consensus. Moreover, because of the extreme violation of human rights whose balance sheet displayed thousands of killing people and thousands of tortured people led to a democratic consensus among the public. The majority of the public supports the democratic regime. Fifthly, the new international conjecture after the end of the Cold War had considerable impact in the internal matters. The communist threat or the threat from below diminished and the main characteristic of the National Security Doctrine lost its effectiveness. The military started only to deal with the external problems but in the case of Argentina, there did not emerge an external threat to the country. Therefore, the military lost its dominance in defence matters. In the search of the new missions, the army has undertaken international peace keeping missions such as in Bosnia.

In Argentina, after Carlos Menem was defeated in the 1999 elections, Fernando De La Rúa, the leader of the Radicals, became the President. However, due to economic problems, in very short time, the optimism for his Presidency ended. The Economic situation worsened, and the IMF agreements were signed. The worsened economic conditions triggered social protests. In 2001, a serious economic crisis broke out in Argentina. Widespread public demonstrations and protests followed in which 27 people were killed. De La Rúa had to resign.⁴⁴ The Congress elected Eduardo Duhalde, the Peronist, as the President. However, the economic crisis continued. In the 2003 elections, Nestor Kirchner, the head of the Peronistas, won the Presidency. During his presidency, economic crisis continued and the several IMF agreements

⁴⁴ www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21113.pdf

were signed. As a result after 1995, unstable economic structure continued in Argentina.

President Kirchner moved on to dismiss these top officers who had taken part in the previous uprisings and vowed to prosecute current and retired military officials responsible for human rights violations. He strongly supported the Supreme Court's decision of June 2005 overturning of two amnesty laws from the 1980s that had blocked prosecution for killings under the military rule, which opened the door for trials of former military and police officials. In August 2006, a former federal police official was sentenced to 25 years in prison in the first trial upon the Supreme Court's action, and in September 2006, the former police commissioner of Buenos Aires, Miguel Etchecolatz, was sentenced to life imprisonment.⁴⁵ During these developments, the military remained silent and it held onto its defensive position.

Finally, in order to predict the future of the democracy in Argentina, some points which led to democratization should be highlighted. According to the survey, done in 1995, 76.6 percent of total respondents said that democracy is preferable to any other form of government in Argentina while in Chile 52.2 percent and in Brazil 41 percent approved democracy as better political system over the alternatives (Stepan and Linz, 1996: 222). Moreover, the new elite consensus can be maintained. For the near future in the light of the global market these classes' interests will be close to each other. The public consensus is likely to be maintained because the social trauma of the "Proceso" has been very deep. The military as an institution is also opposed to the intervention to the politics. It is psychologically still under the impact of the failure of the "Proceso".

However, two factors are significant which can erode the popular commitment to democracy. The first is the unstable economic conditions and socioeconomic inequalities in Argentina. According to Tedesco and Barton (2004: 82), in the 1990s, the number of poor grew drastically in Latin America. The wealthiest 1 per cent earned 237 times more than the poorest 1 per cent of the population in 1980, while in

⁴⁵ www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21113.pdf

1995 the gap increased to 417 times. As the rich are able to protect themselves from the economic crisis, the poor cannot.⁴⁶

As a result, the poverty may again breed an instable atmosphere in Argentina and there may appear a reversal to an authoritarian trend. The second thing is the wave of the new populist left in the continent. In some countries including Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia and Colombia at the end of the 1990s the populist left came to the power. Their policies such as nationalization of some sectors were opposed to the interests of the traditional oligarchy, which had turned into conglomerates at the end of the 1960s. Furthermore, their policies were opposed to the interest of the international economic and political order. However, a potential authoritarian reversal does not mean that the military would again directly intervene in politics. Instead, it may be influential in politics through increasing coercion in the political system in an atmosphere of sharpening social class conflict and civil disorder.

⁴⁶ See the Table on “The Income Distribution Between the Wealthiest and the Poorest in the Three Countries of the Continent, Argentina, Brazil and Chile in the 1990s” in Appendix G in page 119

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE ROLES OF ARMED FORCES IN THE 1990s ⁴⁷

Democratic Actors	Political Actors	Economic Actors
<u><i>Civilian Control</i></u> Costa Rica	<u><i>Moderator</i></u> Brazil Ecuador	<u><i>State Capitalists</i></u> Brazil Ecuador
<u><i>External Defense</i></u> Peru Ecuador	Bolivia Honduras	Guatemala Peru
<u><i>Institutional Pressure Groups</i></u> Mexico Dominican Republic Panama	<u><i>Roadblock</i></u> Guatemala Colombia Nicaragua	<u><i>Organized Crime</i></u> Colombia Guatemala Paraguay Haiti
<u><i>Counterinsurgency</i></u> Colombia Peru Mexico	<u><i>Revolutionary Agent</i></u> Venezuela Ecuador Bolivia	
<u><i>Counternarcotic</i></u> Colombia Peru Mexico Bolivia	<u><i>Impunity</i></u> Colombia Peru Mexico Brazil Chile Argentina El Salvador Guatemala	

⁴⁷ Peeler (2004: 99)

APPENDIX B

ECONOMIC GROWTH OF ARGENTINA (1900–1929)⁴⁸

Years	Population (Thousands)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP)	Annual Million Average of pesos (At 1950 prices)	Annual Average Growth
1900 – 04	4,797	-	10,756	-
1905 – 09	5,710	3.8 %	15,890	9.6 %
1910 – 14	7,271	5.5 %	19,896	5.0 %
1915 – 19	8,372	3.0 %	19,131	- 0,8 %
1920 – 1924	9,416	2.5 %	25,491	6.7 %
1925 – 1929	10,970	3.3 %	33,184	6.0 %

⁴⁸ Ferns H.S. (1973: 87)

APPENDIX C

GROWTH RATE OF GDP, INFLATION RATES, AND FOREIGN- EXCHANGE RESERVES (1946–1955) ⁴⁹

GDP growth rate (%)	Cost of living Index (%)	Wholesale price Index (%)	Change in foreign exchange *
1946 8.3 %	17.7 %	15.8 %	-
1947 13.8	13.5	3.5	-
1948 1.2	13.1	15.5	-
1949 - 4.6	31.1	23.0	- 269
1950 1.6	25.5	20.2	+ 166
1951 4.0	36.7	49.1	- 333
1952 - 6.3	38.7	31.2	- 173
1953 7.0	4.0	11.6	+ 279
1954 3.8	3.8	3.2	- 33
1955 6.9	12.3	8.8	- 175

* Change in net Central Bank reserves in millions of U.S. dollars

⁴⁹ Smith, W. (1991: 28)

APPENDIX D

INDICATORS OF SOCIO-POLITICAL PROTEST (1956–1966)⁵⁰

	Strikes	Political Demonstration	Revolutionary direct action *
1956	37	4	107
1957	118	10	158
1958	124	49	73
1959	206	35	347
1960	134	14	223
1961	215	21	169
1962	181	42	309
1963	143	38	87
1964	265	115	215
1965	291	109	173
1966	263	159	158

* Includes bombings, all assassination attempts (whether successful or not), kidnappings, armed propaganda and other acts

⁵⁰ Smith, W. (1991: 39)

APPENDIX E

ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN DEBT (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS) (1962-1983)⁵¹

Year	Public	Private	Total
1962	2,169	685	2,854
1963	2,327	503	2,830
1964	2,034	882	2,916
1965	1,956	684	2,650
1966	1,959	704	2,663
1967	1,999	645	2,644
1968	1,754	1,051	2,805
1969	1,996	1,234	3,230
1970	2,143	1,732	3,875
1971	2,527	1,998	4,525
1972	3,046	2,046	5,092
1973	3,316	1,670	4,986
1974	3,878	1,636	5,514
1975	4,941	3,144	8,085
1976	6,648	3,090	9,738
1977	8,127	3,634	11,761
1978	9,453	4,210	13,663
1979	9,960	9,074	19,034
1980	14,459	12,703	27,162
1981	20,024	15,647	35,671
1982	28,616	15,018	43,634
1983	32,230	14,270	46,500

⁵¹ Smith, W. (1991: 261)

APPENDIX F

SELECTED INDICATORS OF ARGENTINA'S FOREIGN DEBT BURDEN (1983 – 1988) (MILLIONS OF U.S. DOLLARS) ⁵²

	Foreign Debt New Loans	Principal repaid	Interest Repaid	
1983	\$45,925	2,833	1,364	2,417
1984	48,856	802	812	3,277
1985	49,324	3,790	1,018	4,389
1986	49,715	2,602	2,043	3,707
1987	56,813	3,116	695	3,775
1988	60,200	2,600	1,759	2,757

⁵² Smith, W. (1991: 284)

APPENDIX G

INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL AND CHILE ⁵³

		Participation in total income of			
		Poorest		Richest	
	Year	40%	30%	20%	10%
Argentina	1990	14.9	23.6	26.7	34.8
	1999	15.4	21.6	26.1	37.0
Brazil	1990	9.5	18.6	28.0	43.9
	1999	10.1	17.3	25.5	47.1
Chile	1990	13.2	20.8	25.4	40.7
	2000	13.8	20.8	25.1	40.3

⁵³ Tedesco and Barton (2004: 82)