ETHICO-POLITICAL ACTS OF DESIRE

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ABSTRACT

ETHICO-POLITICAL ACTS OF DESIRE

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The concept of desire has been central to most recent philosophical debates, in various forms and styles. I have argued in the present study that, one of the main motivations for this apparent interest in the concept of desire is the result of the increasing awareness of the shortcomings of those presuppositions revolving around an "autonomous subject", "transcendence", "representation", and "moral subjectivity". Desire, in this vein, is conceived and put into practice by the traditional philosophy as one among the other attributes that cannot be considered without reference to man. Desire as such is conceived as something that is necessarily controlled and managed by reason. Ethics and politics, in terms of these ill-conceived presuppositions, are narratives erected upon this tension that necessarily refers to a self-conscious subject and her subversive desires.

I argue, in this study, for the possibility of imagining other variants of desire, i.e., something other than traditionally established debates, where desire is no longer conceived in strict reference to human beings. These novel accounts, which I will attempt to uncover, hope, will help us see in what ways desire can be considered within the concept of pure immanence and the realm post-humanist ethico-politics. Spinoza, Nietzsche and certainly Deleuze and Guattari are on this side. Desire, according to this non-tradition, belongs to immanence.

In arguing for the legitimacy of two affirmative notions of desire, namely, that of immanent desire and embodied desire, I tried to establish a continuity between immanence (totality of bodies and constant differing) and embodied desire (singular intensities), and by means of which I have drawn attention to the importance of a new vision of ethics and politics that might work, not through the already established form of subjectivities, but through new forms of individuation and flow-like encounters of bodies.

Keywords: Desire, immanence, embodiment, the subject, representation, ethics, politics, difference.

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ARZUNUN ETİK VE POLİTİK EDİMLERİ
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Arzu kavramı pek çok güncel felsefe çalışmasında, farklı biçim ve biçemlerde, merkezi bir önemde ortaya çıkıyor. Bu çalışmada, sözü edilen bu belirgin yönelişin "özerk özne", "aşkınlık", "temsil" ve "ahlaki öznellik" gibi yaygın önkabullerin giderek yetersizliklerinin ortaya çıkışıyla ilgili olduğu savunuluyor. Arzu, geleneksel felsefede, insana referans gösterilmeden düşünülemez diğer unsurlar arasında bir unsur olarak kavranmaktadır. Bu kavranışıyla arzunun us tarafından denetim ve yönetimi zorunlu görülmektedir. Bu varsayımlara yaslanan etik ve politika ise, bilinçli özne ile onun yoldan çıkarıcı arzuları arasındaki gerilimde açığa çıkan bir anlatıya dönüşmektedir.

Ben bu çalışmada arzunun başka varyantlarını imgelemenin olanaklı olduğunu savunuyorum: Uzun zaman once şekillenmiş bu varsayımlardan farklı olarak arzunun zorunlu olarak insana referansla düşünülmediği bir kavrayış… Açığa çıkarmaya çalıştığım bu yeni bakış açıları, arzuyu salt içkinlik içinde ve post-hümanist bir etik ve politik çerçevede nasıl düşünebileceğimizi göstermeyi amaçlıyorlar. Spinoza, Nietzsche ve elbette Deleuze-Guattari bu tarafta yer alanlar arasında. Bu gelenek-dışı gelenekte arzu düşüncesi içkinlik düzlemine aittir.

Bu çerçeve içinde iki farklı olumlayıcı arzu nosyonunun (içkin arzu ve bedenli arzu) meşruiyetini savunurken, bedenlerin bir aradalığı ve sürekli farklılaşma anlamında içkinlik ile tekil yoğunlukların devinimi anlamında bedenli arzu arasında bir sürekliliğin bulunduğunu temellendirmeye çalıştım. Böylece, bu kavrayıştan esinlenecek ve hazır verili sözde öznelliklere değil, yoğunluklar, bireyleşegelme ve bedenlerin akışvari karşılaşmalarına yaslanan yeni bir etik ve politikanın önemini vurgulmayı amaçladım.

Anahtar Sözcükler: Arzu, içkinlik, özne, temsil, etik, politik, farklılık.

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I. INTRODUCTION

1.1. Scope of the Problem

Desire, as a general notion, has been considered in a close relationship with ethics and politics. However, the place that is given to desire in the talk of philosophical imagination is mostly secondary if not insignificant. Or, in many cases, desire might be seen even as a subversive influence on or parasitic to what human beings would otherwise be capable of in terms of ethical and political offspring. Despite this hesitation that revolves around the concept of desire, yet there is an increasing philosophical interest in thinking and writing about desire. From one point of view, in most of the Western metaphysics what we see in terms of desire is a restricted perspective, and that this restricted and reduced accounts of desire has been stimulating for the contemporary reconsideration of the concept. The commonplace thinking of desire, in this sense, sees a necessary tie between human beings and ethics and conceives desire as no less than interference in most of the cases in which ethics and politics are relevant. Desire, accordingly, turns to be a source of tension and subversion, from which our ethical and political lives are to be protected.

From another point of view, however, there might be other ways of thinking human beings, ethics and politics as well as desire, and in such a conception we no longer need to conceive ethics necessarily in terms of human morality, and politics in terms of contractual representation. This is a challenge, in fact, to canonical voice of a long established philosophical tradition if not an invitation to think and imagine ethics and politics without strict reference to autonomous human subjectivity, or a transcendental force. The concept of immanence has a critical importance here. A non-hierarchical plenitude of bodies is suggested to think of desire, which is basically an immanent force of differentiating, or what lies beneath difference-in-itself. Desire in this sense is no longer humanistic, but other way round, human beings and their subjectivities are byproducts or modifications of this single plenitude or desire-like flow of difference. And, in a similar way, neither ethics nor politics are to be thought in terms of a Supreme Being or transcendent subject, but rather both practices are taking place within the same plane of immanence and are under the influence of immanent desire.

Thus, if the narrower scope of the discussion is centered on the discussion of "autonomous subject" *versus* "causally determined bodies", a wider scope must be envisaged in terms of "transcendence" *versus* "immanence". Because, as we will see in the following chapters, there are such philosophers as Levinas, Lacan or

Derrida, who are arguably within the tradition of ethical transcendence or quasi-transcendence, yet do not in any sense endorse stability, presence or coherence of the subject. Nor do they think of desire as something that can be manipulated by autonomous faculties of the subject. Yet, I will argue that, their thinking of ethics and desire still remains in strict reference to human beings and this commitment attaches them necessarily to the notion of "desire as lack" or "desire for…", or "desire to do…" something.

1.2. Two Lines of Philosophy

Then, it can be argued that there are two rival and separate lines of thought in Western ethical thinking.[*] One of these lines appears more like a main tradition in the sense that either autonomous self or ethical transcendence is seen as the essential source of ethics and ethical action. If, within this main line, pre-Hegelian philosophical positions are come to be thought as obsessed with the centrality of the so-called autonomous subject, those post-Hegelian philosophers of subjectivity might be suggested as the proponents

[*] Alesdair McIntire has also argued in *After Virtue* that ethics, after failure of the enlightenment in modern society, has only two alternatives. We will either fall into the Nietzschean nihilism or reconsider our virtues within public practices. The distinction I try to draw here is different from one that is discussed in After Virtue.

of a neo-transcendence tradition, in which sovereignty of the subject is no longer at peace yet both ethics and politics are still to be thought in terms of human subjectivity.

The earlier account of philosophical transcendence then is characterized by the overwhelming importance attached to "Reason", and the tension between reason and desires is both originated and supported by this tradition. From Aristotle to Kant and Mill almost all great philosophers of ethics can be included within this line of thought. Good, according to this account, is necessarily defined in terms of how much one's judgments and actions are taking the other (in the sense of other people and society) into consideration. Basic motivation for our ethical actions does or should come from our notion of "good" which is somehow "altruistic" in nature.

The later account of philosophical transcendence, on the other hand, follows different strategies to question unity of the subject. Between these two variants of the tradition of transcendence one finds Hegel, after whom the integrity of the subject is necessarily to be questioned and challenged from standpoint of the Other or other subjects. Desire, within this later tradition of transcendence, is no longer imprisoned within the subject or ego, it rather disseminates in or flashes back from the Other.

The other line, namely the tradition of immanence, is really "the Other" and is much like a step-child in the entire discourse of Western philosophical tradition. In this line ethics in fact has nothing to do with the so-called autonomous agent. Therefore, there is no such thing as a controversial situation in which an autonomous agent suffers from the tension between what reason (either in the sense of Aristotle's virtues or in Kantian sense of duty) dictates versus what our desires lead us to. Nor is there such a position that is transcendent to what is given in pure immanence. The subject has no longer a sovereign place higher than or beyond plenitude of intensities, couplings of bodies or modifications of one single substance. Rather, the life is completely coming into life out of a differentiating desire. The very concept of desire itself intends what is sustainable for the bodies. The desire intends and aims for what is good to survival for the bodies in the sense of Spinoza's conatus, though this does not mean of course it always guarantees self-preservation.

Then what good and bad mean in this line of thought is that anything is good for the agent if it increases the agent's power of acting and it is bad if it decomposes the agent's integrity. The real ethical task here is to increase our understanding of causes to see what encounters cause what effects in terms of our conatus. From one point of view Spinoza, (perhaps Hume), Nietzsche, and Deleuze can be listed within this non-tradition.

In our modern democratic societies, the first line of thought (earlier and later forms of transcendence) is dominant at least in an idealistic sense. Despite this dominance, it is not in any sense unrivalled. I will argue that the opposition and distance between these two lines is the result of a failure to recognize the differences that arise from various readings of desire. This is to say that there are two distinct conceptions of desire and only one of these conceptions has been endorsed by mainstream philosophers. This account takes desire as a possible source of action to be controlled and represented by reason. In this usage, desire is nearly synonymous with appetite or want, and it can be stabilized or canalized by all encompassing representational language. In most powerful writings of mainstream philosophers from Plato to Mill, we see "desire" in this representational sense (that I will hereafter call "subjective desire"), and their moral thinking is best differentiated in terms of the distance they put between "reason" and "desire".

The other conception of desire, which is exclusive of the concept of desire in the first sense, however, denotes a sort of "destabilizing" or "de-centering" force leading things to differentiate and connect with each other in an endless manner. This very motion is not representational at all. It experiments. Heraclitus' philosophy of "panta rei" or Spinoza's "conatus" might perhaps be attached to this usage that I will hereafter call "immanent desire". Immanent desire

is precognitive, non-representational and indifferent to subjective intentionality.

My focus in the present study will be to defend the following positions:

1. “The moral good”, in the sense of balance between what reason dictates and what subjective desire intends to do, has been kept alive and dominant in our modern ethico-political discourse, yet this does not mean that "immanent desire” is inert or far from driving our ethical and political life. On the contrary, although the role that immanent desire plays in our lives has been ignored and the altruistic moral fiction has been overvalued, the “other discourse of desire” is constantly evolving and establishing itself in the contemporary philosophy of ethico-politics.
2. Although transcendent or quasi-transcendent strategies of some of the post-Hegelian philosophers have really come a long way as regards questioning the integrity of the subject and the coherence of her moral practices, they have still been taking the side of transcendence and attempt to derive all ethical motives from that of the transcendence of the Other. This strategy, from standpoint of the tradition of immanence, makes these accounts castrated or powerless, and turns the entire regime of the multiplicity of temporal bodies to a moral

coercion of hesitation. The concept of desire, which has been put in use in terms of this impotent moral demand, looses its affirmative power and comes to make sense only in terms of an infinite lack.

3. Thinking of ethics and politics with strict reference to human subjectivity, be so-called autonomous subject or transcendence of the subject, is not necessary but result of a contingent emergence of all those ill-conceived notions including the notion of desire. The ignored tradition of immanence, one that reads from Spinoza to Nietzsche and Deleuze, provides with a vast amount of inspiration and encouragement in imagining new forms of life. This possibility has recently been central to many contemporary debates revolving mostly around Spinoza's Ethics. Thus, a Deleuze-informed Spinoza can be re-read and out of such a reading two interrelated notions of desire, that of immanent and embodied desire might flourish. A post-humanist ethico-politics will hopefully emerge from this thought experiment, and a search for this compatibility between the two modes of desire will be one of the guiding motives in contemporary debates.

1.3. Plan of the Study

Chapter two begins by laying out the historical conditions of the idea of autonomous self and its relation to ethics. The underlying purpose here is to show that the autonomy in the modern sense is absent in pre-Socratic societies, yet it emerges slightly in Greek period and is increasingly brought into center in modern times. The historical emergence of the concept of autonomy and its later coupling with ethics denotes that the Western philosophy has taken a humanistic side and preferred philosophizing within the terms of an anthropomorphic ontology and ethics. Out of this tendency comes a necessary tension between reason and desire, and ethics turns to be a moral dilemma between being good and living well.

Chapter three focuses on the shift from a strong emphasis on the centrality and coherence of the subject to a weaker position in which the subject has now come to be questioned from the Other's perspective. As Hegel plays a crucial role at this transition the chapter begins by Hegelian treatment of self-consciousness and proceeds with the two post-Kantian philosophers of ethics, Levinas and Derrida, who are important to show in what sense different forms of the transcendence have pursued a non-affirmative ethics.

I will argue in the fourth chapter against Psychoanalytic reception of desire, and that in both Freudian and Lacanian versions desire is

treated basically in terms of lack. The main motivation here is to demonstrate that Freudian strategy to read desire as a necessary outlet of libidinal repression brings at the outset a passive and reactive sense of ego, which is to be cured and reclaimed under the terms of a sick unconscious. I will also argue that although Lacanian re-consideration of psychoanalysis drops most of the problematic presuppositions of classical Psychoanalysis, it still falls within the realm of the idea of impossibility and necessary lack. Lacan, accordingly, is important here to help us see that the unity of ego is a mere fiction, and therefore the subject cannot be a starting point for a coherent ethical or political program in which desire leads subjectivities at best to a desperate and infinite search for identity. Yet, Lacan cannot be celebrated from the standpoint of immanence exactly for the same sort of reasons, for it fails to conceive possibility of a non-humanistic ontology of desire, its productivity and affirmation.

The fifth chapter will engage in an important shift from both autonomy and transcendence (or quasi-transcendence) driven accounts of ethics and politics to the nearly forgotten tradition of immanence. Thus, the chapter begins by fairly a detailed treatment of the concept of immanence in Spinoza, its ontology and implications for ethics. The basic argument here is that Spinoza's notion of immanence is rich enough to derive a monistic plane in which multitude of bodies do not only exist but also exist, act and

connect to each other necessarily, and that ethics is nothing but coherence of and continuity between *Natura Naturans* and *Natura Naturata*. The driving force in the former can be read as immanent desire (expressive power), while in the latter as embodied desire (conatus). Based on this conviction, I will try to defend in this part the possibility and legitimacy of drawing a distinction between "immanent desire" and the other two notions of desire, namely "embodied desire" and "subjective desire". This distinction is important, I will argue, because relying only on the possibility of the last one and being reluctant to the first two is responsible for what I call ill-conceived tension between reason and desire.

The last chapter is reserved to be a complimentary to the preceding one. The chief purpose in this part is to enrich Spinozistic notion of immanent desire with that of the Deleuzian reading of expression, power and difference in itself, and of embodied desire with other Deleuzian notions such as machine, synthesis, or individuation. I will attempt to establish in this part the significance of getting in tune with immanent desire and becoming accordingly by-products of our embodied desire, and that in what ways avoidance from representation is both possible and necessary. Against all those previously rejected notions of subjective desire, I will argue in this last part for the possibility of a post-humanist multitude of ethico-political bodies which are no more than temporal intensities of a non-subjective desiring.

II. THE CONCEPT OF DESIRE

In the opening section of *Philosophy and Desire* Hugh Silverman, the editor, shows very successfully how the concept of desire has constantly been reiterated throughout the history of philosophy. {Silverman 2000:1-15}He argues that desire, particularly in the twentieth century, has been discussed and presented as the "binary pair" of "desire as sex" or "desire as power". According to Silverman, both conceptions have sufficient theoretical background in the text of Western metaphysics. Plato, for instance, provides in Symposium various instances of desire including both "object oriented desire" (desire for another human being, Eros) and other types such as desire for friendship (philia), desire for intellectual companionship (nomos), desire for unity with the world of ideas (theoria). {Ibid:2}

Silverman draws attention to the similarity between Plato and Freud suggesting that in the former the three parts of the soul namely, "appetitive", "spiritual" and "rational" resemble the latter's tripartite structure of the id, the ego and the superego. Taking a different route from Plato, Aristotle also considers the Psychological understanding of desire. He places desire, Silverman writes, between knowledge and action and gives man the responsibility of

choosing the right course of action in the presence of contrary desires. With Aristotle we are for the first time introduced to the Christian notion of "self control": "Desires are now turned into something to be worried about." {Ibid:4} Under the influence of Aristotle, both Augustine and Aquinas recommended at different levels that bodily desires be approached with caution.

There is a common understanding that Plato, Aristotle and Stoics are pieces of the same puzzle and they only make sense when heard in a coherent narrative. It is widely held particularly for the latter two philosophic systems that they both begin with "human nature" and are naturalistic in this sense. Yet all this similarity in outlook is dissolved when it comes to their understanding of "good action".

Brad Inwood argues in *Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism* that "pure contemplation" has never been valued in Stoic tradition as a necessary part of "good life". What we see in Stoics is rather contemplation "to facilitate the living of life according to nature" {Inwood 1985}. He writes:

> It should at least be uncontroversial to claim that the Stoics were frequently inclined to de-emphasize the value of purely theoretical knowledge in a way that Plato and Aristotle were not. In pursuing the question of the Stoic analysis of rational action by means of an investigation into horme (impulse) we are on the trail of

> something central to their notion of what it means to be human. {Ibid:4-5}

The difference between Aristotle and Stoics regarding the weight they give to the role of contemplation in good life, according to Inwood, emerges from their understanding of "action". Aristotle, like Stoics, studied the difference between human and animal actions. However, "reason" appeared in Aristotle as the essence of man and is necessarily opposed to his "animal self". In similar ways, Inwood discusses, Stoics also tried to examine similarities and differences between human and animal actions. And they too identified reason as an important ingredient of action. Yet the role they assigned to the reason was significantly different from that of Aristotle:

> The Stoics, I shall argue, faced many of the same questions when they came to consider the similarities between human and animal action. And they too added reason to the psychic capacities which operate in animal actions of the simple primary sort. But in adding reason they did not allow it to oppose and struggle with the lower animal soul. They found a way to introduce reason into the functioning of the animal soul without introducing the kind of psychological dualism Aristotle seems to need and want in his theory. There is no trace of a 'divided self' in Stoic psychology. When the rational soul functioned in producing an action, it functioned as a unity. {Ibid:6}

The tension between "reason" and "desire" denotes another fundamental dimension of ongoing discussions in the history of philosophy. This tension, which might be appearing in novel forms other than simple binary positions, is not new to philosophy. The debate between Kant and Hume on the source of moral action is perhaps the most popular one that brings "reason" and "desire" into an "either/or" agenda. According to Kant, moral action is only possible if it is associated with the maxim that is represented by the universal law. The dictum is well known: Do act in such a way that the maxim of your action may become a universal law. For Kant, as it is phrased in this brief expression of duty, moral action should rely on reason alone. He reads will as a fully autonomous and capable source of action, and therefore disregards any other source of motivation such as desire.

Kant's thinking is simply a mirror reverse of Hume's. According to Hume, reason alone cannot by any means be the source of any action. Reason alone is and ought to be responsible only for reflection if any possible action is to be judged moral or not. The fact that our reason makes judgment, Hume argues, does not mean that we will act upon this judgment. On the contrary, desire or feeling is what lies behind any course of action.

"Desire to know", Silverman suggests, gained the highest priority in the Renaissance. After this cognitive turn, those notions of bodily

desires which are best illustrated in the phrase "desire as sex" began to be replaced by "desire to control", which is best articulated by "desire as power". According to Silverman, the remainder of the Renaissance philosophical stage is filled with various readings of desire, in which power is given a distinguished place. Yet in this stage, Freud and Hegel are the most important figures as they represent the opposing sides of the binary pair.

In all the above, except Hegel to some extent, we find that desire is considered with a necessary reference to an autonomous subject. The Hegelian notion of desire seems significantly different from all those mainstream philosophers who have reflected upon desire. Desire in Phenomenology of Spirit has a privileged status –perhaps for the first time after Spinoza. Hegel's conception of desire, I want to suggest, is not so narrow to call "subjective", yet is not comprehensive enough to call "immanent". Desire, in Hegel, is born out of and after the formation of selfhood. A human self in other words is only necessary if we are to talk about desire.

As a proposed remedy to this problem, it can be argued that a kind of "reasonable desire" has always been a valid way of phrasing the formula for many philosophers from Aristotle to Kant. The formula, however, has recently come to be seen as misleading as the "reasonable" itself is far from providing a rational ground to include what remains "absent" in such a so-called holistic discourse. Rather,

perhaps more proactively, "desire" is just being released out of the discourse and a new voice is being established.

The way that desire releases itself from the boundaries of the so-called reasonable discourse of rationality reminds us of what Freud was arguing in the context of repression. For Freud there is a close tie between expressions of "what is not" – that is negative - and repression. He writes:

> Thus the content of a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated. Negation is a way of taking cognizance of what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting of the repression, though not, of course, an acceptance of what is repressed.
> {Freud 1987:437-438}

All these different accounts of and approaches to desire have one assumption in common in their very construction: Desire belongs to the subject! This anthropologism leaves no room for primordial forms of desire.

In a more comprehensive account of desire, one that can be found in Spinoza's *Ethics*, we find the concept of 'conatus' that in the broadest sense needs to be understood in terms of Stoic physics. Stoic monism and materialism are in agreement with Spinoza's metaphysics. The Stoic attempt to unify Nature and God is fully

endorsed by Spinoza. The way that Stoics embedded reason into Nature is also celebrated by Spinoza. The famous Stoic dictum "Live according to Nature" can be read, in this sense, as an invitation to an affirmative life in which desire is the essential motive. However, the Stoics' understanding of life in accordance with nature is not sympathetic to desire:

> … the Stoics looked upon the passions as essentially irrational, and demanded their complete extirpation. They envisaged life as a battle against the passions, in which the latter had to be completely annihilated. Hence their ethical views end in a rigorous and unbalanced asceticism. {Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}

Spinoza's concept of "act" (*natura naturans*), on the other hand, gives us the widest sense of desire, which I call "immanent desire". I will explore this concept after the following chapter.

III. THE IDEA OF AUTONOMOUS SELF AS THE ESSENTIAL SOURCE OF ETHICS

3.1. Ancient background

The situation of "the subject" remains central in most studies on the nature and condition of morality. It is central in the sense that the possibility of an "ethics" that is indifferent to "human subjects" and their "freedom to choose" has been widely ignored in the discussion of ethics. Descartes has been considered a cult figure in encouraging debate about the self and the nature of subjectivity at the center of modern Western philosophy {Carr D. 1999:3} Yet, there are still enough reasons to argue that the idea of a responsible subjectivity embracing a notion of a free subject who is supposed to judge between rival sides and take either the right or the wrong course of action can be traced back to the Greeks. Before the classical era it is better, perhaps, to start with the Homeric poems since, as MacIntyre rightly points out, they constitute a great part in what we call the moral story of the classical society {MacIntyre A. 1985:121}.

According to MacIntyre, in almost all cultures, whether Greek, medieval or Renaissance, transmission of the moral values means

story-telling. Stories in this sense serve as the basic means of educational activity and upbringing. The Homeric poems, MacIntyre maintains, were regarded in this sense as a public ceremony in the sixth-century. The messages revealed by these poems however denoted very much earlier times, and functioned as a link between the very distant past and the present. MacIntyre puts a considerable emphasis on this narrative link. He writes:

> … such narratives did provide the historical memory, adequate or inadequate, of the societies in which they were finally written down. More than that they provided a moral background to contemporary debate in classical societies, an account of a now-transcended partly-transcended moral order whose beliefs and concepts we still find(?) partially influential. The understanding of heroic society –whether it ever existed or not- is thus a necessary part of the understanding of classical society and of its successors. {ibid:121}

In laying down the key features particularly of Homeric society, MacIntyre demonstrates that an individual in this culture and perhaps in other heroic cultures as well, cannot be considered independent from his/her role given by the society as a determinate entailment of the internal rules and conventions of the society itself. Basic structures shaping these rules and conventions, he reminds, are that of kinship and household. MacIntyre adds that "In such a society a man knows who he is by knowing his role in these

structures, and knowing this he knows also what he owes and what is owed to him by the occupant of every other role and status" {ibid:122}. To support his claim, he also reminds us that Greek "*dein*" and Anglo-Saxon "*ahde*" are of similar kind, and that there is in fact no real distinction between "ought" and "owe".

According to MacIntyre, this etymological connection is important to show that the ethical "ought" in the sense of what society expects Homeric man to perform and what role this society assigns this particular man are one and the same thing. In other words, society determines what virtue and vices will mean by combining "ought" with a "particular role" to be assigned to a particular member of the community. MacIntyre writes:

> By performing actions of a particular kind in a particular situation a man gives warrant for judgment upon his virtues and vices; for the virtues just are those qualities which sustain a free man in his role and which manifest themselves in those actions which his role requires. {ibid:122}

MacIntyre rightly reminds that the modern word "virtue" is just a late translation of the ancient word "*areté*". The latter meant in Homeric poems "excellence of any kind", that is, in MacIntyre's sense, we can talk of anyone as "virtuous" if he excels in doing whatever he is supposed to do. A fast runner, as MacIntyre suggests, displays in this sense the "*areté*" of his feet {ibid:122}. A general identifier for a conduct which is "virtuous" can therefore be

translated as "one who excels in acting in accord with what his predetermined role requires". Put in other words, morality and social structure are not different from each other, rather they mean one and the same thing. As MacIntyre maintains, "Morality (in Homeric poems) as something distinct does not yet exist. Evaluative questions *are* questions of social fact" {ibid:123}.

All this shows that free-will in our post-Cartesian sense is absent in Homeric-heroic cultures. This does not mean of course that one is not free either to act or not in accord with his predetermined role, but rather that one's action in these cultures cannot be understood in terms of a sense of free-will or freedom to choose. As MacIntyre writes, "… there are powers in the world which no one can control" {ibid:124}. This may seem to be an oversimplified identification of ethical volition with a determination that seems no more complex than a belief in fate. Yet, there is still room for individual differences in terms of ethics though this possibility cannot be derived from free-will in any sense. The individual difference that occurs in "doing" what one is supposed to do is not a source of ethical evaluation; it is rather a descriptive evaluation. Two men might be rated significantly different in terms of how they are worthy, but their difference does not originate in their subjective moral judgment. Honor is everything and a man cannot be considered without honor, and it is not a secret nor is it a puzzling question where a man can get honor from. All members in heroic society are

well-informed or, better to say, born-into-story allowing them to see clearly what their roles in society are and what levels of excellence in undertaking these roles will bring honor. The rest of the story is "excellence".

MacIntyre helps us see the descriptive source of evaluation here by depicting an analogy:

> It is a question of fact whether a man is good chess player, whether he is good at devising end game strategies, whether a move is the right move to make in a particular situation. The game of chess presupposes, indeed is partially constituted by, agreement on how to play chess. Within the vocabulary of chess it makes no sense to say 'That was the one and only move which would achieve checkmate, but was it the right move to make?'. {ibid:125}

There is something important here between what heroic cultures lack, that is "freedom of choice of values" and what they still accomplish in remaining morally coherent, perhaps more than societies of modernity. Excellence, in this heroic sense, plays almost the same role in a far more naturalist or realist sense that 'good' has always played in the talk of morality in the entire post-Platonic philosophy. If one knows from the very beginning what one owes to society and therefore what he ought to do (or what he will do), then there is only one question left that needs to be answered: To what extent is one virtuous in pursuing to achieve his role?

Courage, strength or intelligence are the concepts that directly link the question of "worth" to the matter of "excellence". By this way, ethics or morality does not only survive without free-will or subjectivity; it also flourishes in a completely different manner. Perhaps "power" enters in the moral scene for the first time here in a positive sense, by means of the naturalism and realism these Heroic cultures represented. Prosperity is, MacIntyre reminds, "… a by-product of achievement in war…" {ibid:127}.

A particular version of subjectivity, which has been influential from the late classical era to the present, however, is responsible for two important failures: First, the failure in imagining in what ways the idea of ethics can still be in charge where there is no reflective self, and second, the failure in preserving the proper place of the concept of power in the course of ethical study. These two failures, which I want to argue against, originated in the Cartesian period and have survived in almost all post-Cartesian accounts. Yet before proceeding, it is worth dwelling on the ancient influence that led the Cartesian mindset to detach itself from all kinds of Homeric moral conviction.

The idea of self consciousness in Greek thought emerged first in the philosophy of Protogoras and Georgias. The dictum "Man is the measure of all things" illuminated the shift in Protogoras' focus from the natural affinities of man with the rest of the planet to the

peculiarities of the humankind. Matter, in this respect, was no longer represented as the determining force from which everything originated. Rather the Sophists placed man at the very center and the physical world in the background. According to Barker, the dictum "Man is the measure of all things" should not be read as a denial of the possibility of objective reality nor knowledge {Barker:32}. This was not simply a strong declaration of man's subjectivity. "It was intended on the contrary to widen the province of knowledge… " {ibid, 32}.

Barker argues that the Sophists' thought was perhaps not free from discrepancies, but their basic agreement was about the centrality of man against the physical world. Barker writes:

> Whatever the divergences of view among the Sophists, they were all at one in turning from Nature to man. Protagoras and Georgias, … made the transition easy, the one by showing the impossibility of the old physical conceptions, the other by emphasizing the part which man plays in constituting the world; and following their steps, many Sophists had pursued the study of man in all the manifestations of his activity – in his politics, in his law, in his language." {ibid, 41}

The Greek society inherited from the heroic societies, as we have seen above, a mostly closed system of custom, which is productive of clear norms, to be followed strictly by every member of the

community without seeking any further justification or reflection. In this sense, Homeric inheritance did not inspire a "thinking man" either as the foundation of a moral order or as a center of the world. It rather inspired a sense of community (state) that could only be sustained by means of certain norms, no origin for which can be given, nor is it permissible at all to question.

Yet, against this background, Greek thought experienced a great shift as a direct result of the testimonies of and information collected by travelers. This shift, according to Barker, should be referred to as the anthropology that led Greek people to know of the customs of different people and tribes. Anthropology sparked in this sense the idea that there were many savage tribes scattered around the world and that these tribes had their own distinctive normative structures. This meant for Greek thinkers an absence of natural or universal law:

> The laws of Nature are the same today and yesterday, in country Greece and in Persia: fire burns everywhere, and at all times. But here were ten or a hundred different customs of marriage, or burial; nor was there any one thing, it might well be thought, which was "common and identical" everywhere. There could be nothing here which was the product of Nature: it must all be the product of man. Law was a convention: the State itself was based on a contract. {ibid, 29}

As Barker points out, the shift in Greek culture was also from Physics to Anthropology; that is, against the conventional emphasis for one single essence as the source of all materiality, they came now to realize that human-constructed institutions were simply many and as diverse as stars. They in fact kept their conviction that nature could be governed by one single law, yet human beings were obviously following more than one law that might be different here and there, now and later. Greeks in this sense replaced somehow *a*historical physics with historical human science and put the study of man at the center. Perhaps it is also legitimate to argue that one of the implications of this overt interest in the human-made world as something both different from and against the nature-made world was an overvaluation of the creative powers of human beings. Individual self-consciousness in this sense must be seen as a natural result of introspective reflection and can be considered as an early indication of the modern conception of self-consciousness. This interest undoubtedly brought various challenges and many legitimate intellectual offspring. For instance the Sophists asked, according to Barker, the fundamental question: "Is it (language) of human creation, or a natural thing?" {Ibid:30}. Nevertheless, the same interest, one can argue, is also responsible for at least the first failure I have cited above. Western metaphysics has gradually given up the idea of seeing the individual in his wider connectedness and confined itself to "individual autonomy" or "free-will".

3.2. Modern outlook

It has been widely accepted that most of what has been written in modern times in a critical manner against the anthropomorphic perception of the universe is located in the Cartesian subject-oriented philosophy. Descartes' explicitly rationalist account of reason and thinking inherited from the post-Homeric Greek sources the idea of "thinking man" and took it to the most distant logically possible conclusion. According to Kiros, the only foundation Descartes believed for human beings to rely on is that of their faculty of reasoning {Kiros T. 1998: x}. For Descartes, thinking is not solely a distinctive faculty to be realized or not, or for some people but not for others. Rather thinking is the very possibility for man to exist at all. Kiros speculates on this overt Cartesian emphasis on thinking:

> Humankind exists only to the extent that he/she thinks, and it is only as a thinking being that humankind can assure himself/herself that he/she exists. Except for thinking, everything is subject to doubt. For Descartes, existence is anchored on thought. Thought itself is articulated by autonomous reason. {ibid: x}

Thus the autonomous self is, in a Cartesian sense, nothing but "autonomous reason". It is important therefore to understand here what we mean by and how we distinguish the words "subject" and "self". As Mansfield states, "Although the two are sometimes used

interchangeably, the word ‘self’ does not capture the sense of social and cultural entanglement that is implicit in the word ‘subject” {Mansfield 2000:2}. In this respect, Mansfield argues that the “I” that is central in the dictum “I think therefore I am” does not simply refer to Descartes himself. It, though inclusive of the Descartes’ selfhood as well, also covers the presence of other thinking selves, and makes sense only with this interrelation. “Cogito” here suggests a sense of reflection that goes beyond the mere interiority of the thinking man:

> 'Subjectivity' refers, therefore, to an abstract or general principle that defies our separation into distinct selves and that encourages us to imagine that, or simply helps us to understand why, our interior lives inevitably seem to involve other people, either as objects of need, desire and interest or as necessary sharers of common experience. In this way, the subject is always linked to something outside of it—an idea or principle or the society of other subjects. It is this linkage that the word 'subject' insists upon. {ibid:3}

It is also this very entanglement and richness, however, that makes the concept of “subject” and “subjectivity” an exclusively dominant source of ethics as well as politics. As Mansfield writes, “Etymologically, to be subject means to be 'placed (or even thrown) under'. One is always subject to or of something.” {ibid:3}

What we today call the “transcendental account” in the continental philosophy of subjectivity is from one respect a Cartesian invention. For Descartes, the essence of man that discloses itself in the form of thinking and doubting gives the sense of “apartness”, by means of which the transcendental dominion of human subjectivity is enhanced. This was obviously a revolutionary invention which not only placed critical thinking and doubting rather than faith at the very center of being human but also announced the new elevated status of the human subject even higher than and distant from the idea of God. As such, it was considered at the time as a clear violation of the dominant religious law. This groundbreaking invention was so powerful that even Descartes’ “sketchy and tortured reasoning to prove God’s existence in his Meditations” {Hall, D.E. 2004:20} did not count as a good substitute for this non-authoritarian attempt. For the sake of our present purpose, however, his conception of the “subjective” is much more important in terms of its outcomes than his non-religious underpinnings. Descartes’ new notion of the “subjective” originated the idea of a free and autonomous subject which does not happen to move out of necessity or causal relations, rather of a certain kind of self-sustained reflection. Hall cites Lavine to show in what ways this Cartesian invention is important:

> Z. Lavine argues that by introducing the category of the subjective into philosophical understanding, Descartes opens up an almost irreparable "chasm [between his] own

> mind and its thoughts" and the "existence of anything else," because "subjective consciousness and its contents are separated from the physical world of nature and from the social world of human beings {Ibid:20}.

Hall cites from Taylor in various sources that Descartes' philosophy has clear implications for ethical inquiry and for its relation to subjective responsibility. According to Taylor, Hall writes, the sovereign place that Descartes has given to the thinking subject is also important, for the subject is from now on both capable of and responsible for making of herself. This means that the thinking "I" can and should put distance between itself and all the rest including its own "properties, desires, inclinations, tendencies, habits of thought and feeling, so that they can be worked on". The possibility of the existence of a subject of this kind and the distance I have just referred to, are just a few of the implications of Descartes' philosophy for ethics. Many of these implications, in fact, remain valid today in discussion of free-will and responsibility. This is why Hall emphasizes in her book the difference between Antigone's choice and that of Hamlet in terms of "subjective responsibility".

The Cartesian notion of subjectivity is fully endorsed by most post-Cartesian thinkers including Kant. Despite the fact that Kantian critiques famously set-forth the limitations of the idea of "reason" as a perfectly guiding faculty, Kant is in agreement with Descartes in terms of the priority of reason and reflection in most affairs of life.

Thus one can argue that Kant followed Descartes very strictly in the sense that "the subject is located at the center of truth, morality and meaning" {Mansfield 2000:4}. However, Kant in a sense corrected Cartesian ideas of the "thinking self" which otherwise inevitably leads to a dualism, or better "Cartesian dualism", between the thinking mind and the extending body. Kant in fact agreed with Descartes that the existence of subjects of *the cogito* can be inferred from experience. Here experience represents for Kant a necessary precondition for the emergence of the thinking subject. However, he argued in *Critique of Pure Reason* that the "thinking I", which is settled as a possibility in the subject, is not an object of experience. It is rather embedded in what is given to the subject. He writes:

> …How, then, can the mind have an outer intuition which precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of these objects can be determined a priori? Obviously, this can be so only insofar as this intuition resides merely in the subject, as the subject's formal character of being affected by objects… {Kant, I. 1996:80}

What follows from this is a set of controversial issues for many of the Kantian commentators concerning particularly the meaning and status of the two different selves, "transcendental self" and "empirical self". Carr, for instance, asks a very legitimate question of this kind:

> Granted that these two descriptions are very different from each other, are we entitled to speak of two different selves, a "transcendental" and an "empirical" self? Kant himself says they are "the same subject" … but admits to great difficulty in reconciling the two descriptions. The real question is not whether there are two descriptions, of course, but whether they are incompatible descriptions. Only this would threaten or call into question the identity of the subject(s) being described. Are the two descriptions incompatible? {Carr D. 1999:44}

Carr argues that there are good reasons to claim that this dual aspect exists in a Kantian undertaking of the subject. Transcendental self-consciousness is a certain kind of relation of one to herself in which one is engaged in a spontaneous activity of thinking (ibid, 44.). In this relation, one's engagement in a spontaneous activity of thinking is not subjected to the causal laws; it is independent from and beyond causal determination. No natural object, Carr maintains, can have spontaneity in this sense. If anything is given in intuition then it belongs to the world of causality and can be grasped by empirical apperception. Therefore, "In empirical self-consciousness, even if I represent myself as having thoughts as well as sensations and perhaps other mental properties, I can have no intuition, Kant says, of the spontaneity itself" (ibid, 44.).

Thus, transcendental self-consciousness becomes for Kant a necessary precondition of experience. In transcendental self-consciousness, as Carr suggests, my sense of myself is totally different from my sense of myself as it is in empirical self-consciousness. In the former, I do not relate myself to the natural world, nor can I think of myself as part of the sensible world. I rather represent myself "as a self of a certain sort, namely, as spontaneous, as intelligence, as intentional, as legislating to nature…" When it comes to registering for a proper name in the empirical world and describing myself in terms of personal or cultural aspects, however, I can enjoy my inner sense.

Carr's earlier point is important also for our present enquiry: In what sense is a subject free as a moral agent if its existence can be deduced from experience but its spontaneity transcends its empirical self-consciousness? Let me explicate this difficulty also in Carr's words:

> Kant is here linking the freedom of the moral agent with the spontaneity of the subject of empirical knowledge. Whether moral freedom and epistemological spontaneity can be equated in this sense or not, we have established at least that the transcendental self is free in the sense of being not subject to, but subject of, worldly causality. {Ibid:57}

Kant's insistence on the necessity of certain *a priori* categories for possibility of experience was obviously an attempt to overcome the old tension between rationalist and empiricist accounts of knowing. Thus, he in fact followed a couple of compatible strategies to overcome this difficulty: He first took the possibility of *synthetic a priori* knowledge for granted, and then he established the necessity of mutually referential aspects of the subject, namely transcendental self and empirical self. It is not within the scope of this study however to show if Kant really succeeded in overcoming this difficulty, nor is it necessary at the moment to show if his two-sided strategy is reasonable. My purpose in citing Kant is to indicate the Kantian subject as an important milestone in the history of morality. In one sense, this subject is "morally responsible" and what this responsibility demands is *already* given in his sense of transcendental self-consciousness and it is being disclosed as a categorical imperative. In the other sense, however, the Kantian subject, whereat this transcendental self is located, is both inferred from and subject to causal determination of the natural world.

IV. DESIRE AND QUESTIONING OF THE SUBJECT

4.1. Hegelian desire introducing the Other

It would not be fair to read Hegel simply as what comes after Kant with respect to the problem of the subject or subjectivity. Nor would it be fair to place him within the familiar bundle of the trajectory of transcendence in terms of the place he assigned to the notion of desire in his thinking. It may be better to take the risk of making a mistake of another kind, that is, taking the risk of overestimating his purpose and argue that Hegel is crucial in the talk of subjectivity and desire for at least two different and crucial reasons: First, Hegel introduces what we have come to think of as self-consciousness in terms of and in the very presence of the other self-consciousness. This is no less than a rupture in the late metaphysics in the sense that the integrity and the stability of the subject does not only appeal to other subjects but are also challenged by them. And second, it is again for the first time through Hegel that we are introduced to the idea that 'desire' is self-consciousness and it coexists with and for self-consciousness. These two interrelated accounts of significance need to be discussed further.

Hegel's philosophy in general and the fourth chapter in t*he Phenomenology* in particular, present us with a psycho-social tension through which history unfolds itself. This is to say that although Hegel has his own distinct ontology and philosophy of nature, his broader philosophical emphasis comes with the idea that history begins with the two self-consciousness meeting each other and this meeting gives way to the entire historical combat. This tension is created in *the Phenomenology* by depicting different forms of consciousness. One of the earlier forms of consciousness is that of "sense certainty" in which consciousness gets in touch with the objects in the state of nature and thinks that they are immediately given to it. The most important thing here is that all knowledge for Hegel is the knowledge obtained through concepts. At the level of sense-certainty, however, consciousness lacks concepts. In such a state of absence of concepts of any kind, according to Hegel, any claim to truth or knowledge is impossible. For if consciousness is simply put before objects of nature without any mediation of concepts, it cannot go further than simply pointing at the object. Hegel writes: "We have, in dealing with it, to proceed, too, in an immediate way, to accept what is given, not altering anything in it as it is presented before us, and keeping mere apprehension (*Auffassen*) free from conceptual comprehension (*Begreifen*)" {Hegel 1967:149}. And this non-conceptual pointing cannot become knowledge simply because it cannot give us any possibility of expressing and exchanging what it seeks to grasp. Hegel admits

that this state of getting in touch with the object, as it is, is driven precisely by the effect of the object affecting our senses and would "appear to be the richest kind of knowledge". Yet, according to Hegel, "This bare fact of *certainty*, however, is really and admittedly the abstractness and the poorest kind of *truth*" {Ibid:149}.

The second form of consciousness, "perception", is also a result of seeking remedy for these underdeveloped attempts to grasp knowledge. Here, according to Hegel, consciousness approaches the object through its properties. Contrary to earlier attempts, which are inevitably far from having the truth since the truth of an object appeals universal in the form of perception, however, properties of objects are universals of a kind and therefore they suggest a certain level of stability before consciousness. Yet, at this stage as well, consciousness does not live up to its target because it is unable to identify the object's singularity within the connections it bears to the universals.

> This object we have now to determine more precisely and to develop this determinate character from the result arrived at: the more detailed development does not fall in place here. Since its principle, the universal, is in its simplicity a mediated principle, the object must express this explicitly as its own inherent nature. The object shows itself by so doing to be the *thing with many properties*.{Ibid:163}

Hegel, I think, makes an important move here: The object is from now on to be thought through its properties, and the properties through their relations, relations both between the individual object (thing) and its sensual properties, and between the properties and their generality. And, more important is that 'a mediated principle' will thereafter accompany the appearance of the object before consciousness. In the Outline {Hegel 1840:14}, Hegel makes this point explicit:

> "The object of this Consciousness is, therefore, the Thing with its Properties. The sensuous properties are **(a)** *for themselves* immediately in sensation, and likewise determined and mediated through the relation to others; **(b)** they belong to a thing, and are in this respect, on the one hand, embraced in the individuality of the same; on the other hand, they have generality, according to which they *transcend* this individual thing, and are at the same time independent of each other." {Ibid:14, italics mine}

Out of this point comes what has been in the center of much post-Hegelian discussion concerning "difference" and the "transcendent impossibility" to comprehend this essentiality of difference. For Hegel, this impossibility is no less than a powerful motive to lead consciousness to a higher degree of tackling both the sensibility and super sensibility of the world. In his explanatory remarks in the beginning of the second chapter in *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Baille denotes this motivating force:

> … problem for further analysis is to find the form which the universal here assumes and to determine the way in which the unity of the object (the "thing") holds together its essential differences. The result shows that the unity of the thing *qua* unity is only admissible as an unqualified or non-sensuous unity. It is a universal, but as such, not conditioned by sense; it is a pure or "unconditioned" universal-a thought proper. Being undetermined by sense, it transcends sense-apprehension, and so transcends perception proper, and compels the mind to adopt another cognitive attitude in order to apprehend it. {Hegel 1967:161}

As Baille also points out, this other cognitive attitude is the Understanding, which occupies the third stage in Hegel's Phenomenology. It is important here to note that these three succeeding analyses of consciousness, according to some commentators, are in fact direct responses to three important accounts in the philosophical traditions. According to Rauch, "The first three chapters of the Phenomenology, which crudely correspond to certain versions of empiricism, rationalism, and Kant's so-called "Critical Philosophy" are characterized by Hegel as "Sense-Certainty", "Perception" and "Force and the Understanding" respectively" {Rauch and Sherman 1999:4}. Neither Kant nor Fichte or Schelling is referred to in the subsection III, but it is evident that Hegel implicitly raises objections against these names and

distinguishes his own way clearly.[1] Moreover, Rauch argues that Hegel sets the stage in this section for the necessity of a "two one-sided" approach to truth after he clearly demonstrates that "… the one-sided supersensible conceptual approach to the object is no more able to grasp the object in its particularity than the one-sided sensible approach" {Ibid:5}.

The term "phenomenology" symbolizes for Hegel a certain kind of study, a study of the experience of consciousness. This study, according to Hegel, appears to consciousness as the result of a dilemma of a very special kind. The dilemma is related to the appearance of the condition of self-consciousness in which consciousness is drawn into a puzzle. The puzzling experience begins for consciousness with the shift of its object. Hegel refers to this puzzling experience in the initial sentences of the first and second paragraph in Chapter Four. The first sentence reminds us of where consciousness has so far reached: "In the modes of certainty

[1] According to Rauch, and as we have discussed in the preceding section, Kant's unconditioned categories served as a foundation upon which all human experience is erected. By suggesting such a foundation Kant in fact followed the rationalized track, an empiricist-informed route. The faculty of "the Understanding" has now turned to be a reliable filtering through which we can act upon our sense-data, because the very objects of our senses are constituted and synthesized already by the Understanding. Yet these ideas also brought about what Rauch calls "the shortcoming of Kant's 'Copernican Revolution', which", "… epistemologically, shifts the emphasis from the object to the subject, in that it maintains that there is some way that the object actually is independent of our possible knowledge of it." (Rauch, 5) Rauch argues that Hegelian reaction against this Kantian program is raised exactly on these points. This program is required to think that "world-in-itself" exists beyond appearances, knowledge of which is impossible.

considered so far, what is true for consciousness is something other than consciousness itself" {Ibid:1}. And the second sentence tells us what consciousness is confronted with: "Now, however, something arises that was not there in the previous relationships, namely a certainty that is identical to its truth –since the certainty is (now) its own object, and consciousness is the truth for itself" {Ibid:1}.

Thus, Hegel's point at this stage of consciousness is that when it comes to self-consciousness the referent "I" is no longer functional as other referents such as "this", "here" or "that". Consciousness has still an object on the one hand, but its object is now itself, as an immediate and unmediated appearance of the concept of "I". This paradox, or tension, leads consciousness to attempt to grasp its own presence as a stable and object-like thing, but it necessarily fails. Consciousness itself is what is at work in experiencing, and what it attempts to experience is constantly changing.

Consciousness, according to Hegel, goes through several successive forms of struggle with itself in its attempts to overcome the aforementioned tension and accomplish self-consciousness. The first form of the struggle takes place when it desires to negate the otherness of its object, but in this case it is itself. He writes: "Negation, or otherness, presents itself to the consciousness as an external thing different from it, which however is determined

through the self-consciousness **(1)** as a somewhat suited to gratify the appetency, and **(2)** as a somewhat in itself negative whose subsistence is to be cancelled by the Self and posited in identity with it (i.e. made identical, or assimilated)" {Hegel 1840:26}.

The second form is perhaps the most crucial one: With this necessary and stressful experience of the impossible impulse to negate its self-otherness, consciousness appeals to other means for getting out of the conflict. Self-consciousness, in this sense, "is the basis of selfhood; it is where selfhood is registered" {Rauch and Sherman 1999:56}. And at this critical instance in advancing out of the conflicting experience, the self-conscious yet immature self turns to the other self. Rauch regards this transition as entirely phenomenological:

> Self-conscious selfhood begins to see itself as the basis of its life. Since its experience is fluid, it tries to see itself as the stable center of life: i.e., that center as the self-conscious subject itself. But the self has not yet found its security in this. Its self-questioning is very disturbing. I therefore turn to another individual for aid and comfort, so that the "other" (as the ordinary object of the knowing subject) now becomes an "Other" (as rival consciousness, another self having its *own* sense of being the center of its experience.) Yet there cannot be two selves *each* of whom is the center of the

> experienced world. I therefore deny *you* the place of subjective centrality of *my* world. {Ibid:57}

The idea of negativity, which is at the heart of Hegel's philosophy, is no less than a genesis out of which the whole history is shaped. Self-conscious yet immature self goes through an experience of double confrontation: I am first confronted with the fact that "I" is to be an object appearing in other self-consciousness, and then I am also confronted with the mood that this "I" cannot be real. Hegel writes: "… *first* it (self-consciousness) has lost itself, since it finds itself to be an *other* entity; *second*, it has thereby negated the other, since it does not see the other as essential, but rather sees *itself* in the *other*" {Ibid:14}. The stage is set here: "My" appeal to recognition from "you" is no less than a struggle to death. I can affirm my centrality only through your unconditioned recognition. The certainty of self-consciousness and the maturity of the "I" are possible only when "you" turn to be a slave. That is why the dialectic of master versus slave is a phenomenological necessity, as well as a historical motive.

However, Hegel's influence on the later accounts of transcendent or quasi-transcendent philosophies can best be understood as provocation, rather than celebration. This is to say that, in various post-Hegelian philosophies, one can trace the influence of Hegel in what these philosophies seek in fact to avoid the mutuality of Hegelian subjects in their struggle for recognition. The symmetry

that Hegel posits between the two self-consciousnesses is challenged both by Levinas and Derrida in different ways. The ethical demand of the Other in Levinas and the ethical implications of Derrida's deconstruction are both settled against this Hegelian symmetry. However, as I will attempt to show in what follows, Levinas favored asymmetry in the name of the Other-than-being, and secured the face of the Other from any kind of capture. Derrida, on the other hand, utilized deconstruction to show that deferral of meaning, judgment or decision should not necessarily be mystified. Rather, absence transcends presence necessarily, and deconstruction is the least impossible medium through which one might have but partial access to this quasi-transcendent other, what is not present or what is simply not said.

4.2. Two Post-Kantian Variants In Transcendence

In a recently published essay on transcendence versus immanence, Smith argues that the discussion of the theme revolves particularly around a sub-theme namely "subjectivity", as well as other sub-themes such as ontology and epistemology {Smith 2003:47}. He offers a general working definition:

> For any philosophy that begins with the subject –that is, much of post-Cartesian philosophy- the concept of immanence refers to the sphere of the subject, while

> transcendence refers what lies outside the subject, such as the "external world" or the "other". In this tradition, the term "transcendence" refers to that which transcends the field of consciousness immanent to the subject. {Ibid:47}

Smith, based on a Deleuzian reading of the history, however, suggests that transcendence has been brought into philosophical discussion through three milestones. These are Platonism and its followers (the idea of Idea), Descartes and Kant (the transcendence of the Subject) and finally phenomenology including both Levinas and Derrida {Smith 2003:52}. However, although there is an explicit thematic continuity from Plato to Kant concerning "the status of human subjects" in terms of the "idea of transcendence", an important disjunction has emerged with the arrival of post-phenomenologist voices of Levinas and Derrida. This is because, as Smith rightly emphasizes, "… there are two general means by which one can call into question the status of the transcendental subject (the well-known theme of the 'death of the subject'): by appealing either to *the transcendence of the other* or to *the immanent flux of experience itself*" {Ibid:47}. Smith suggests that Derrida simply took the first path, and I want to argue that Levinas did the same. For being critical of the conventional notions of subjectivity, yet still belonging to the side of transcendence, these two philosophers deserve a longer analysis.

4.2.1. Levinas' elusive 'the Other'.

The notion of "the Other" remains elusive in the entire course of Levinas' work, even if it is at the very center and attempts are made to make it clear. From one point of view, it could be argued that the Talmudic and esoteric tone, which is embedded in Levinas's grammar in general, is responsible for this inaccessibility. "The Other", from this point of view, is not more unobtainable than any other of the Levinasian notions such as "justice", "face" or in general "ethics". Yet from another point of view, Levinas' grammatical strategy to blur, or his non-strategy simply to not make "the other" easy to grasp, does not reflect a generic feature of the philosopher. Rather "The Other" must be elusive, not only as a concept or non-concept, but also *qua* "the Other". It must stay outside the realm of the ontology and of the language this ontology implies as a necessary feature of "ethical transcendence".

The elusiveness of the Other, as such, is a *transcendental* possibility for that which cannot be represented, that which cannot be thought and that which hesitates "the being" from "not yet" by necessary dissemination of the infinite into the finite. This contamination precedes philosophy, and the spontaneous interruption of the finite makes ethics the first philosophy. In other words, what cannot be represented makes ethics possible to the extent that "the Other" remains elusive and transcendent.

One of the repeating points that Levinas makes in *Totality and Infinity* is that of the non-symmetrical development of the otherness, much like an immediate transition from the very reception of the "I" to the responsibility for "the Other". This non-symmetry, which begins with the questioning of an individual's right-to-be, places "the Other" at the very center of Levinas's philosophy. "The Other", in this sense, is not only at the center, but is also prior to ontology. For Levinas, in the dynamic process of being or the adventure of "*etre*" to preserve its existence lies awareness of ethical problems and questioning as well as acts of "conatus essendi" in Spinoza's sense. Denise writes: "But 'being-there' may also mean occupying, usurping someone else's place in the world. This is where 'the *Da* of Da-sein is already an ethical problem for Levinas" {Denise 2003:174}.

Emergence of the Other, according to Levinas, is as old as the Cartesian-Kantian sense of "I", if not older. And the Other, which is born out of a desire, a desire that a being has toward an other (Autrui), cannot be understood by examining all other needs or *desires* of the being because "the desire for the Other" exists where the being lacks nothing. "The desire for the Other (Autrui), sociality is born in a being that lacks nothing or, more exactly, it is born over and beyond that can be lacking or that can satisfy" {Levinas 1996:51}.

Then how can we understand what "the Other" means? The project of understanding the Other seems problematic, if not tricky, because of two different but interrelated reasons: First, the notion of the Other in Levinas is neither coherently presented, nor is it consistently developed in any work written by the philosopher. One simple reason for why Levinas fails to make the notion of the Other clear is related to his double preference of two words while speaking about the Other: '*Autre*', in the sense of the other with no particular reference to anything, the non-personal other, and *'Autrui'*, in the sense of 'other person' with capital 'O'. These two words are used at most places interchangeably. [2]Moran criticizes Levinas for writing too shadowy:

> In the French text, sometimes these terms (l'Autre and l'Autrui) are capitalized, sometimes not. As Levinas puts it in typically ambiguous manner: 'The other qua other is the other'. As in all other matters, Levinas is not consistent, sometimes capitalizing 'l'Autre' without clearly signaling what he means. {Moran 2000:337}

Second, the Other is in itself elusive independently of how Levinas presents it. In other words, the difficulty of understanding the Other is clearly a difficulty for Levinas as well. Levinas in this sense is in a situation where he cannot help attempting to clarify what the Other

[2] Erdem Ciftci suggests that Levinas uses both *autrui* and *autre* for other. He writes: "In French, *autrui* means the personal other, and *autre* means otherness in general, alterity." Yet, he also admits that "Despite this difference, Levinas is not consistent in using them". {Ciftci 2005:1}

means, knowing at the outset that he will fail. He writes: "The Other comes to us not only out of context but also without mediation; he signifies by himself" {Levinas 1996:53}.

His attempts to help readers clarify, at least to some extent, what the Other looks like inevitably fall in either one of the two poles. At the one pole, the Other is nothing more than a "transcendental trace" given to a being primordially though its power can only be activated by encounter. The Other, in this sense, reminds us of Sartre's position: "... the other is a pure hole in the world" {Ibid:60}. There are many places in Levinas's works in which supporting ideas for this point can be found. The Other, Levinas writes, "is an abstraction for the I, for the Same" {Ibid:28}. In a similar sense, he emphasizes elsewhere that "the Other sees but remains invisible, thus absolving himself from the relation that he enters and remaining absolute" {Ibid:17}. What makes the Other disembodied trace is that of its absence, i.e. its presence in its absence. According to Paperzak, the Other in Levinas's thought is neither a phenomenon nor a being within the totality of beings {Paperzak 1996:xi} The Other is simply a disappearance within the world, and by its disappearance it interrupts the world.[3]

[3] Remember Derrida's reading of Hamlet in *Specters of Marx* (Derrida, 1994). The King who is already dead haunts the world of Hamlet and others. He is dead now, but in his absence he becomes more present and powerful. He sees but remains invisible.

Nevertheless, confirming that Levinas provides many supports towards understanding the Other as a disembodied trace does not help us overcome the entire difficulty. Levinas, though it may seem contradictory in itself, also suggests that the Other is first and foremost to be envisaged as the other embodied human being I encounter. He writes, "The absolutely other is the human other (*Autrui*) {Levinas 1996:17}.

In fact, Levinas is quite generous in providing clues about manifestations of the Other. Among attributes of the Other, Levinas frequently articulates, "the face" is perhaps the most discussed and yet the least clarified one. He suggests that "the Other presents itself (interrupts the same) as a face, not a theme" {Ibid:17}. He writes at various places that his notion of face is to be understood as the human face. Ethical dimension of the human relationship begins with face-to-face encounter, and responsibility emerges out of this encounter. However, the importance Levinas attaches to "face" brings further questions and difficulties regarding the attributes of or criteria for "facehood of a face". Moran asks all the relevant questions: "Levinas agrees that we cannot actually refuse to acknowledge the faces of animals; nevertheless, at the same time, he has no adequate discussion concerning the attributes of faces, no criterion for "facehood" as it were" {Moran 2000:350}.

As Moran points out, Levinas himself admits that he is far from providing a clear account for manifestations of face: "I cannot say at what moment you have the right to be called 'face' {Ibid:350}. According to Moran, Levinas's admission of his failure to provide any clarification for what makes a face a "face" denotes a serious controversy, as he puts so much weight on the ethical importance of face. "If I don't see something as having a face, it has no call on me and I have no responsibility towards it. Then, surely, how one accords face is crucial" {Ibid:350}.

It is necessary, I think, to expand this discussion a little further in order to explicate how the Other and her face are both elusive. In a recent essay called "The Pact", Levinas argues against contemporary forms of human connectedness that utilize technological means. He writes:

> ... a society in which, due to the ease of modern communications and transport, and the worldwide scale of its industrial economy, each person feels simultaneously that he is related to humanity as a whole, and equally that he is alone and lost... One understands that the very progress of technology –and here I am taking up a commonplace- which relates everyone in the world to everyone else, is inseparable from a necessity which leaves all men anonymous. Impersonal forms of relation come to replace the more direct forms, the 'short connections' as Ricoeur calls them, in an excessively programmed world. {Levinas in Hand 1989:212}

It is clear from these words that Levinas accepts no substitution for face-to-face relation in the real sense. But why should I restrict my ethical relation with the Other to the real-physical encounter with her face? I know that – according to Levinas - it is not "any" face, nor is it "any human face" that will necessarily confront me with questioning my spontaneity. The face for Levinas is not something we meet in everyday practices. And it is understood, on the other hand, that one is not supposed to see someone necessarily in a physical sense to welcome the ethical demand of her "face". Take, for instance, the Internet, on which people may interact with each other without seeing each other's face or even without knowing each other's identity. Can we say that such a relation on the Internet is not face-to-face and therefore it does not count as an ethical encounter? I might still be responsive, one may reply, to the demand of "the Other" though I am not facing with her face in the first sense. In the second sense, however, I am completely aware that there stands a human being (the Other) who might be in ethical relation with me. Her voice (text, trace, etc.) might still put my existence into question.

Then what is the status of "face" in an ethical encounter with the Other? This question takes us back to the difficulty that arises from double affirmation of Levinas concerning nature of the Other. Does the Other really exist and demand recognition from me or is it a

transcendental –or semi-transcendental- trace bearing the effects of the Other?

All this shows that "the Other" remains elusive both at the hands of Levinas and in itself as a double affirmation of the otherness: the Other as an abstraction and the Other as the human other. I shall argue in the next section that this elusiveness of the Other is not only "necessary" for Levinas's ethical thought, but is also inevitable for "ethical infinity" to transcend the realm of totalizing the present.

The Translator's Introduction in Ethics and Infinity presents a clear discussion of the fallacy of asking "what" questions. Cohen argues in reference to Heidegger that the history of the Western thought and culture since its Greek beginnings has been an "onto-theology: theology in the guise of ontology" {Cohen 1982:1}. Onto-theology of this kind, according to Cohen, assumes a double representation, in which the God or substance is represented as "the world" and the world itself is represented by philosophy. "The world then is already a secondary text, and philosophy is a commentary on commentary" {Ibid:2}.

Heidegger was in a sense one of the pioneers disregarding this picture. But he, Cohen argues, did not go any further than telling us that representation and the language it entails must be dropped. While telling this, however, popular Heideggerian questions such as

"what is thinking?", or "what is technology?" helped ontological thinking reproduce itself in entirely different way. Levinas, on the other hand, is completely aware of those ill conceptions reproduced constantly in every "what is?" question. Rather than taking the legacy of asking "what is?" questions for granted, he finds the legitimacy of this question problematic. Hence he takes another route, a route in which the question "what is ethics?" is replaced by "is ethics better than being?".

Then we are not to ask what ethics or the Other *is*. All these ontological questions erode and diminish the power of the ethical. This is to say that ethics is prior to ontology or questions of essence, i.e. "better" comes much before "knowing what is": "One does the good before knowing it – ethics lies in this 'before', eternally scandalous to thought" {Levinas 1982:11}.

Both ethics and the Other as such resist objectification that comes with false questioning. The ethical demand made by the Other by-passes all aspects of knowledge because according to Levinas, "Knowledge has always been interpreted as assimilation" {Ibid:60}. Knowledge of this kind refers, for Levinas, to the history of philosophy. This history, writes Levinas, "can be interpreted as an attempt at universal synthesis, a reduction of all experience, of all that is reasonable, to a totality wherein consciousness embraces the

world, leaves nothing other outside of itself, and thus becomes absolute thought" {Ibid:75}.

Experience of totality in this sense is responsible for being blind to or the reducing of "otherness" to an interior realm of the so-called knowledge that always operates in terms of "equality" and "sameness". Beaver's points are illuminating:

> Thus, ideas, which were formerly thought to be representations of an 'other' reality or domain of existence, turn out to be created by human cognition in the act of understanding. They get their truth value by how well they can be situated within an already familiar system of references... Knowledge is a denial of difference. {Beavers 2003:2}

Against totality, Levinas argues for the vitality of the outside, which is other than interiority, rather a pure exteriority which reads as infinity. Levinas reads "infinite" as anything that exceeds our comprehension. Accordingly, infinity will always remain as exteriority and will not be grasped by means of conceptual instruments of consciousness. What follows from this is that "infinite" unfolds itself in the Other. "In the access to the face there is certainly also an access to the idea of God" {Levinas 1982:92}.

The idea of Infinite, for Levinas, denotes *transcendence* which has always been present in the interiority of thinking. It is "like a thought which thinks more than it thinks". The idea of infinite, in

this sense, is necessarily a transgressive desire, and it presents itself to thought as a seductive call which cannot be welcomed within the limits of the same.

We have discussed so far that the ungraspable otherness as such resists the same by staying outside the knowledge, and by this mean it links the same to the possibility of ethics. This link is language by which the other presents (or does not present) itself to me. While presenting, however, it does not lose its otherness, its absolute and transcendent otherness persists during and after communication.

4.2.2. Derrida's deconstruction

One might argue that a similar kind of slippery discourse – that we have seen above in Levinas' case - is valid also in Derrida. It is hardly possible if not impossible at all, to derive clear ethical or political instructions from Derridean deconstruction. This is so not only because Derrida is one of the most obscure thinkers of our time, but because the very idea of deconstruction does not lend itself to any kind of moral-ethical guidelines or principles that we are even partially familiar with from Utilitarian and Kantian schools. This is because, apart from other reasons, these schools are methodologically systematic in their search for ethical principles and

they tend to presuppose that this methodology might secure reason (or rationality) from interferences of desire. Deconstruction does not aim at this kind of sterilized rationality. Nor does it believe that this is ever possible. What we find in deconstruction, I will suggest, is a kind of interplay between unstable subjectivity and experience, both of which are derivative of a desire-like flow (dissemination) in meaning. This brings out, I want to argue, but in a quasi-transcendental way further possibilities of conceiving deconstruction in which many indirect ethical implications can be revealed. However, I also want to show that all these implications reflect a characteristic of transcendent tradition, one which appeals to sliding into "beyond" or what is not there, or into other than itself. In Derrida's case, deconstruction resists as much as it can to the simplification of the idea of transcendence. Thus, those indirect ethical and political implications I have just mentioned might in the end require a messianic trace, but none of them requires simply a transcendental reference.

One of these possible understandings, I am inclined to argue, is to conceive deconstruction as a special type of engaging in texts, which leads one to create a temporary background against which dominant voice(s) in the text are weakened. This "power diminishing effect of deconstruction", in my terms, comes with the experience *of* deconstructive reading or deconstructive reading *as* an experience. Conceived in this way, deconstruction turns to be an effect of

subversive desire, that is, a very act of reading *desires* to proceed in such a way in which the integrity of the subject is not reserved in any sense and sovereignty of the subject over meaning is undermined.

Gall's conception of "comic" and its relation to deconstruction is relevant here. He argues that "writing" in a Derridean sense has a "frivolous and joking character" {Gall 2004:12}. This de-centering character of writing, he argues, emerges from the contradictory act of desiring in text. He writes:

"Freed from constraint, deconstruction affirms the irony and play that is always already there, scattering meaning to the winds in an infinitely repeatable dissemination of significance… On the one hand, there is the apparent duty and desire to be significant, to matter, to be relevant, to be useful, to impart a secret knowledge, … On the other hand, there is a desire for freedom, bound not to be bound by the past, or even the desire for significance." {Ibid:13}

Once we conceive deconstruction as experience and become aware of textual desiring embedded in the territory of writing, the ethical promises of deconstruction become apparent. According to Derrida "…writing cannot be thought outside of the horizon of inter subjective violence…" Deconstruction in this sense is both self-protecting and ethical way of reading as it is helping reader see how violence is constituted in the text, while allowing one at the same

time to communicate with the "other(s)" of the text. This becomes possible only when we come to see that deconstruction is to be understood as "experience of desire".

Though Derrida himself always seems to object to such labeling attempts as "deconstruction is a method", or "… is a technique", there is an obvious inclination in philosophical literature to read deconstruction as a skill-generating activity designed specifically to apply in philosophical works. Understood in this way, deconstruction turns to be a specific set of skills *one* can practice and master over time. Although deconstruction might also inspire such uses to a certain extent, reducing deconstruction simply to learning a skill would be to ignore the effects of subversive desire taking place in textual territory. Derrida writes:

> What I consider as deconstruction, can produce rules, procedures, techniques, but finally it is no method and no scientific critique, because a method is a technique of questioning or of interpretation, which should be repeatable in other contexts also, without consideration of the idiomatical characters. The deconstruction is not a technique. It deals with texts, with special situations, with signatures and with the whole history of philosophy where the concept of method would be constituted. {Derrida 1987:70}

Despite all this difficulty in conceiving what deconstruction precisely is, one's experience of deconstructive engagement in text(s) can be thought, and thinking of this can bring further possibilities. As Derrida points out, when asked in an interview whether there is anything normative in deconstruction, we, like him, "should prefer to speak *of experience*" too. He says that experience "... means all at once crossing, journey, ordeal, at the same time *mediatized* (culture, reading, interpretation, work, generalities, rules, and concepts) and *singular*--I do not say immediate." The Derridean dictum "there is nothing outside text" becomes more powerful when it is understood as a call for awareness of what has always already been *there* in the text.

However, this sense of awareness does not happen to one just because one is simply reading a text. It is true, as Johnson writes in her introduction to *Dissemination*, that Derrida is, first and foremost, a reader, a reader who constantly reflects on and transforms the very nature of the act of reading {Johnson 1981:x}. And it is also true that "deconstruction as experience" presupposes a deliberate reading. All this, yet, does not mean that reading, whether deliberate or not, is sufficient condition of "experience", even if it has always been necessary condition of "deconstruction as experience".

No doubt, "reading", as a necessary condition, must take place if "experience" is to be experienced. In a Derridean sense – or better to say after a Derridean insight - reading is first of all a "juxtaposition" of different texts in different contexts and for different purposes. This type of reading begins where the so-called philosophical analysis ends. Pre-Derridean philosophy and its methods expected "reading" to bring clarification, disclosure of essential meaning and dissolution of ambiguities in the text. With Derrida, on the other hand, reading can in no sense be unifying. It rather disrupts the assumed thesis, arguments or messages that the text is supposed to convey. This is not something that particularly requires an educated reader. Perhaps it is not related to the status of reader at all. It refers to a general problem (or promise) of signs and writing that Derrida calls "non-concept" or "différance". Before referring Derrida, it is worth quoting Moran on difference:

> All signs, by pointing away from themselves, involve a deferral of meaning, while at the same time creating the illusion that the meaning is present. The sign stands for the absent and represents the presence in its absence. {Moran 2000:466}

Derrida's insistence on the "retrospective" nature and, at the same time, the "provisional" function of "preface" can be linked to his reflection on différance. This is important, as Spivak writes in his preface to *Of Grammatology,* because this shows how "difference" is

created and what is "dislocated" in the text and the very act of différance becomes visible. "Preface" denotes something that is "pre" or "before" something *else*, but at the same time it is constituted in this *something else*, or out of it in the end. Derrida's treatment of prefaces is, according to Spivak, akin to Hegel's discussion of "familiar": "What is 'familiarly known' is not properly known, just for the reason that it is 'familiar" {Derrida 1976:xiii}.

According to Spivak, " … a certain view of the world, of consciousness, and of language has been accepted as the correct one, and, if the minute particulars of that view are examined, a rather different picture (that is also a non-picture) emerges" {Ibid:xiii}. This passage summarizes, in a sense, what Derrida reminds us of: different moments of speech are accessible only in "writing", though they are still never stable and inert even as graphic structures. Derrida relates his understanding of language of this kind to that of Saussure, who pointed out that language is a system of differences rather than a collection of independently meaningful units {Johnson 1981:ix}. Language never constitutes itself by aggregating numerous labels for things. It rather operates on the "distances" and "differences", and is shaped by "is not" rather than "is".

An understanding of language as such brings awareness of "différance" in both senses as "to differ" and "to defer". Derrida's

attempt to read the entire tradition of Western metaphysics as an unfolding of numerous "différance" situations lies in this account of language. Such "familiar" and therefore dominant conceptions as "preface", "speech" or "immediacy" are reconciled with their "others" in such a way in which "others" are no longer oppositions. Preface, for instance, from the standpoint of "différance" is both 'different' and -in a disguised form- geographically distant from it. Yet, preface is neither identical to itself nor perfectly different from the book (text). Preface and the text become, by virtue of différance, "thing" and "thing", i.e. two things that are never separate but not "one" either.

> The pre of the preface makes the future present, represents it, draws it closer, breathes it in, and in going ahead of it puts it ahead. The pre reduces the future to the form of manifest presence. … But does a preface exist?" {Derrida 1981:7-9}

Likewise, the "movement of différance" creates an "order" in which we are asked to become aware that "speech" and "writing" are in no sense in relation with each other as either "essence" or "supplement". According to Derrida, différance blurs any so-called relationship of privilege between speech and writing in which the former is favored.

> Here, ... we must let ourselves refer to an order that resists the opposition, one of the founding oppositions of philosophy, between the sensible and the intelligible.

> The order which resists this opposition, and resists it because it transports it, is announced in a movement of différance between two differences or two letters, a différance which belongs neither to the voice nor to writing in the usual sense, and which is located, as the strange space ... between speech and writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity which links us to one and the other, occasionally reassuring us in our illusion that they are two. {Derrida 1982:12}

Deconstructive reading[4], which refers to and is constantly informed by "différance", turns particularly in ethical context into an "experience". This turn is apparent especially in recent writings of Derrida. In *Before the Law*, *Force of Law* and *Specters of Marx* one can trace, in order, a possibility of hope *for* and suspension *of* justice, deconstruction *as* and *on behalf of* justice, and finally responsibility as never ending opportunity to be just (less unjust) under the conditions of "spectrality".

Before the Law is first and foremost a prologue for the possibility of hope for the future in the darkness of the present. Derrida argues in this paper, in the form of an interplay-reading at the margins of philosophy and literature, that "... it (justice) is possible but not

[4] In writing "deconstructive reading" I do not mean to take sides in the ongoing debate as to whether deconstruction has a telos. My conviction is that every deconstructive reading might be purposeful in its own way. This is to say that "plurality of telos" is possible, though "deconstruction" as a non-concept might not have one ultimate purpose.

now"[5] {Derrida 1985:196}. According to Beardsworth, in *Before the Law* three aspects need to be emphasized concerning the relationship between Law and literature. He writes: "The first aspect of their relation is to be located, for Derrida, in the fact that law and literature share the same conditions of possibility: the origin of law (in the phenomenal sense of a positive law) is also that of literature" {Beardsworth 1996:25}. The second aspect is related to the general failure of Law, a failure that arises from the "undecidable relation between the general and the singular".{Ibid:25}. Beardsworth's point is helpful: "No law can be general enough not to be violent, not to engender exceptions or instances of counter-violence which... are appropriately thought of as 'singular'" {Ibid:25}. The third aspect concerns the possibility of literary influence on the undecidable or indeterminable situation in Law.

Undecidability plays a key role in Derrida's philosophizing of justice. As one of the several aporias that Derrida employs throughout his treatment of law, justice and decision, "undecidable" marks perhaps the most difficult aporetic relationship between "necessity" and the "necessary failure" of judgment. Remember the tale: "No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made only for you.

[5] In *Before the Law* Derrida does not make any mention of neither justice, nor he makes a distinction between "Law" and "justice". Law as prohibition is constituted here as an original source of violence. Considered later uses, it might be thought that Derrida want to bring in focus not justice but 'right to ask for judgment' and how this right is always delayed, delayed in the sense of différance and impossibility of decision. Nevertheless, here I want to keep it as 'justice' as it makes better sense in a wider context.

I am now going to shut it". Beardsworth's question denotes the aporetic situation: "How can a law to which a particular individual has no access be a law only for this individual above?" {Ibid:41}. Derrida leaves us without an answer in Before the Law, yet with a sense of "hope" for possibility of "decision" through undecidability. A relatively clearer answer (say 'no answer') comes in *Force of Law*, the answer in which the term "experience" appears for the first time:

> The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the *experience* of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged – it is this obligation that we must speak – to give itself to the impossible decision, while taking account of laws and rules. *A decision that did not go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision*... {Derrida 1992 b:24}

Suspension of rules and re-accordability of law (iteration) under the general law of différance makes the task of decision making "an ordeal-like experience". Besides this very experience of the ordeal of undecidability, Derrida cites the third aporia: "But justice, however unpresentable it may be, doesn't wait" {Ibid:26}. Then how is justice to be achieved, if ever possible? What is justice after all?

Derrida's answer is that "Deconstruction is justice" {Ibid:15}. Going through the experience of deconstruction is the only condition for "fresh judgment". Derrida's conception of fresh judgment requires what I call "deconstruction as experience" as he writes:

> This 'fresh judgment' can very well –must very well- conform to a preexisting law, but the reinstituting, reinventive and freely decisive interpretation, the responsible interpretation of the judge requires that his 'justice' not just consist in conformity, in the conservative and reproductive activity of judgment. {Ibid:23}

Aichele argues in *Reading Beyond Meaning* that "Reading is an endless and violent playing with the text, and the reader is in a perpetual struggle with the law of the text." {Aichele 1993:11} His reference to Italo Calvino's postmodern novel, *If On a Winter's Night a Traveler*, presents an ironic picture of how madly one would want to avoid the violence of a text. Aichele summarizes what the tale tells:

> ... there is a character named Irnerio. Irnerio is a "non-reader"--a person who has taught himself how not to read. He is not illiterate, not even "functionally illiterate." Irnerio refuses to read. Yet Irnerio does not refuse to look at written words. Rather, he has learned how to see strange and

> meaningless ink marks on pages where others see words. Irnerio is beyond reading; for him the books, pages, and words are no longer the transparent vehicles for immaterial ideas, but they are solid, opaque objects. {Ibid:12}

Irnerio's caution to violence of text (reading) is undoubtedly thought stimulating. However, it is not realistic at all. As Aichele points out "... no one can actually learn not to read ... for the unconscious habits of reading cannot be entirely unlearned" {Ibid:17}. Yet, a question arises: What is there in a text that one is supposed to face with caution? "Force of Law" presents some of the answers. According to Baker, it offers some fundamental ways of understanding the question of violence in its social context. In *Force of Law*, Baker argues, Derrida's reflection on the relationship between "violence" and "force as legitimate power" led him to offer that violence is necessarily social in character, and violence and law never come apart. {Baker 2002:35} Derrida reads "force as legitimate power" as the force that derives its "enforceability" from the very nature of différance. He writes:

> For me, it is always a question of differential character of force, of force as différance (différance is a force différée-différante), of the relation between force of form, between force and signification, performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary force, of persuasive and rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature, but also and especially of all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest force and the greatest weakness strangely

> enough exchange places. And that is the whole history. {Derrida 1992 b:7}

As it is obvious from the above passage, "force as différance" means the textual possibilities of contradictory "actions". Because, the Wittgensteinian question of "how do we play language games?" changed to Austin's popular phrase "how to do things with words?", and was finally transformed by Derrida to "how to do things (*just* or *unjust*) with (con)texts? This is différance (in the negative sense, in the sense of iterability) and this gives law (power) the possibility of 'force'.

Fortunately, the possibility of deconstruction as justice appears at the same point where deconstructive analysis leaves us pessimistic with the iterability of law and the force of law against the singularity of the individual. Because, as Derrida argues in "The Violence of Letter" in *Of Grammatology*, the structure of violence is matched with the very structure of the trace or writing. Then, if a non-violent deal with violence is to be reached, one must search for it in writing (text). This is to say that deconstruction must subject "writing" to deconstructive reading, in the end of which the constitution of violence that is in the form of "dominance" (dominant voice, judgement or value) is to be de-constituted. However, deconstruction as such neither requires nor allows one to step outside the power struggle. Deconstruction, in contrast, asks one to stay inside and experience a juxtaposition of different texts and

contexts to let binary oppositions reveal and to make the spectral movement of signs (in the sense of différance) possible. This point is elaborated very well by Grosz:

> ... Derrida suggests that this question of violence and its relation to the law inheres in, is, the very project of deconstruction. It is not a peripheral concern, something that deconstruction could choose to interrogate or not, but is the heart of a deconstructive endeavor: the violence of writing, ..., of judging or knowing is a violence that both manifests and dissimulates itself, a space of necessary equivocation. The spaces between this manifestation and dissimulation are the very spaces that make deconstruction both possible and necessary and impossible and fraught; the spaces that deconstruction must utilize, not to move outside the law or outside violence, but to locate its own investments in both law and violence. {Grosz 1999:8-11}

This space is the space for experience. Through experience one may become aware of what is inside text. And, in a similar way, through experience one may become aware of the possibility of displacement almost in any text, of binary constructs and possibility of différance.

Critchley argues that Derridean deconstruction can and should be read as a quasi-transcendental ethical demand if ethics is to be taken in the novel sense as it is presented in Levinas {See Critchley 1992}. For Critchley, Derrida's emphasis on 'the unconditional

affirmation' reveals that the logic of deconstruction implies an imperative-like interruption of what belongs neither to inside (the closure of a determinate context) nor outside, that the 'text is blind'. Critchley defines 'closure' as "the double refusal both of remaining within the limits of the tradition and of the possibility of transgressing that limit" {Ibid:20}, and 'clotural reading' as "reading" as "reading of a text (that) would consist, first, of patient and scholarly commentary following the main lines of the text's dominant interpretation where reading discovers insights within a text to which that text is blind" {Ibid:30}.

Between these two readings (manifest modes of clotural reading), ethical emergence of 'the other' presents itself – in Levinasian sense - as an invitation to include what otherwise text cannot comprehend. This invitation to, or interruption of *the other,* is not contingent. It is a necessity to which Derrida repeatedly denotes by the thought of differánce.

Differánce for Derrida is the notion that articulates impossibility, the impossibility of fixing meaning inside a self-sufficient and self-identical axiology. Derrida, in discussion with Saussure, argues that in language there are only differences {See Derrida 1982:1-28}. What follows from this, for Derrida, is that for something to be "the present" it must have been constituted "by means of this very relation to what it is not" {Ibid:13}. Biesta elaborates on this:

> This contamination is a necessary contamination: For the present to be itself, it already has to be other than itself. This puts the non-present in a double position, because it is the non-present which makes the presence of the present possible, and yet, it can only make this presence possibly by means of its exclusion… {Biesta 1998:5}

However, as Biesta discusses, the play of difference is not where Derrida takes us to and then leaves. By introducing difference, Derrida warns us against the fallacy of thinking the play of difference as the ultimate condition of all conceptuality, which would again be falling in the realm of metaphysics of presence. Differánce, on the other hand, neither requires nor allows an Archimedean point within 'the system' (read as totality). Derridean shift from 'the play of difference' to 'differánce' is important for Biesta as it "tries to open up the system in the name of that which cannot be thought of in terms of the system and yet makes the system possible" {Biesta 1998:6}. Biesta writes:

> This reveals that the deconstructive affirmation is not simply an affirmation of what is known to be excluded by the system. Deconstruction is an affirmation of what is wholly other (tout autre), of what is unforeseeable from the present. It is an affirmation of otherness that is always to come, as an event which 'as event, *exceeds* calculation, rules, programs, anticipations'. {Ibid:6}

Thus, difference behaves in the context of clotural reading as the necessary medium of unconditional affirmation. Critchley emphasizes that Derridean understanding of the closure of a determinate context, and its interruption by 'wholly other' by the very act of difference, does not assume a dominant referent (such as God,). Rather, Critchley writes: "… the context itself contains a clause of non-closure" {Critchley 1992:32}.

It is obvious from Critchley's earlier point of view that Levinas's approach to ethics finds its textual echo in Derrida, and for both thinkers "ethical transcendence" requires no longer a transcendental point of reference other than what is immanently given in the very experience of transcendence. However, it is impossible to neglect the ongoing multifaceted discussion concerning Derrida's reliance on the Levinasian concept of the experience of transcendence. Derrida's departure from Levinas' thinking is most evident, for some writers, when he talks about "eschatology of messianic peace" {Direk 1998:186}, and for others when he suggests that Levinas privileges the spoken discourse {Rauch and Sherman 1999:193}, while for some others when Levinas reserves an important place for the "transcendental signified". It should be noted that Critchley himself later declared in his more recent book on deconstruction that he has also come to deal with the possibility of this Levinas-free version of deconstruction. Therefore, it perhaps deserves, though not within the scope of this research, a further elaboration on the sense in

which Derrida's project might offer a different promise for ethico-politics that remains within the realm of the quasi-transcendent, yet outside a Levinasian deity.

In his newer tackling of the issues of subjectivity, ethics and politics, Critchley asks the crucial question in the seventh chapter:

> Might not the 'quasi-atheist' messianism of Specters of Marx be linked with the *es spukt* and the *il y a*, not as a religious messianism, but precisely as an experience of atheist transcendence? Does the impossible experience of the *es spukt*, the spectrality of the messianic, look upwards to a divinity, divine justice, or even the starry heaven that frames the Moral Law; or, rather, does it not look into the radically atheist transcendence of the *il y a*, the absence, disaster and pure energy of the night that is beyond law?" {Critchley 1999:161}

In pursuing this and arguing for the possibility of a positive answer, Critchley first revisits the pre and post Heideggerian status of the subject in Western metaphysics. According to him, Levinas actually emerges where there is no more hope for a subject, i.e. in an era of post-Heidegger. {Ibid:62} For Critchley, Levinas presents us in this respect "with the possibility" for a novel conception of subjectivity, one which consists of a minimal, non-identical and pre-conscious subject. But it is important to note that this is merely "a possibility for beginning to think" a subject of this kind. But immediately after, he adds that this subjectivity is to be called as "post-deconstructive":

> Levinas, I believe, presents us with the possibility for beginning to think a post-Heideggerian conception of the subject that will hopefully not be metaphysically or naively pre-Heideggerian, a conception that I shall eventually describe as 'post-deconstructive. {Ibid:62}

Here is the turning point for Derrida, as well as Critchley. Critchley reminds us of the importance of *Zusage* (promise) for Derrida, and it is this thought which sets Derrida apart from Levinas. Levinas' notions such as "to question", "to call", or "to respond" are not prior to language, quite the opposite, "all forms of questioning are always already pledged to respond to a prior grant of language… One might say that the 'origin' of language is responsibility" {Ibid:71}. Following this insight, Derrida further attempts to show that "trace" is not to be sought beyond or outside the determination of what is given in and only through language. Rather, "The subject, if subject there must be, is to come *after* this." {Ibid:71}

In his later treatment of the subject, Critchley keeps on alerting the allusions to Levinas but he nonetheless continues his reading of Derrida being faithful enough to his idiosyncrasies. One of the idiosyncrasies of this kind is that of "hantologie" that Derrida introduces in Specters of Marx. Hantologie, according to Critchley, plays almost the same role that ontology has played so far in metaphysics. The Derridean non-concept "differance" is in this sense attached to the recent notion "democracy to come".

As a result of this long exposition, it can be argued that the elusive call of ethics and/or infinity masked in the face of "the Other" in Levinas functions as the trace of that which transcends what is given or immanent in-the-world.

In the case of Derrida, however, although there is still thought of "impossibility" and "beyond", the ordeal-like experience of deconstruction - masked in the suspension of "justice" - remains still worldly. That is why, one can argue, ethical priority of the Other for Levinas and the aporetic appearance of the relationship between necessity and necessary deferral and failure of judgment for Derrida are always almost impossible to turn into an explicit possibility.

This result is not "ethically" acceptable from the standpoint of the tradition of immanence. This is because, ethics, in the tradition of transcendence, does not only presuppose a "free and autonomous subject" as the only accountable agent of ethics (as in Descartes), it elevates this subject to a transcendental status (as in Kant), and finally subjects the subject to the what is not present, otherwise than himself or so-called thinking-of-the-Other (as in Levinas).

As we have seen above, Derrida presents an exception to an important degree in his emphasis on the importance, priority and religiously-neutral effect of language in its suspended yet sustained promise for democracy. Many of Derrida's notions including

particularly "undecidability", "aphoria", "double-bind" and mostly "deconstruction" are claimed to be ethically promising and politically non-neutral. However, quite surprisingly, what Critchley thinks of as one of the most important shortcomings of deconstruction is related to its mistaking of "hegemony" {Ibid:283}. There is obviously a "power diminishing" effect of deconstruction as I have discussed earlier in this chapter. Yet, there is not reference in it to lines of resistance or of struggle against hegemony. Ethics, and for the same reason politics too, remains at best at the level of demanding, that is, the Other or the spectrality of the unpresentable appears as a pure passive demand, rather than empowered source of active demanding.

From the viewpoint of immanence, writes Smith, "transcendence represents my slavery and impotence reduced to its lowest point: the absolute demand to the absolutely impossible is nothing other than the concept of impotence raised to infinity" {Smith 2003:63}. I will argue later in this study that a completely different strategy to question the unity and integrity of the subject and an ethics of a different kind which appeals neither to an autonomous subject nor to any transcendent point of reference can be justified. However, before pursuing this, the following chapter will first analyze the notions of subjectivity and desire in two different psychoanalytic schools. In an initial and brief presentation of the Freudian

approach, I would like to begin with setting the background, against which particularly Lacan attempted to established his own voice.

V. PSYCHOANALYTIC CONFIGURATION OF DESIRE

(What is wrong with it?)

5.1. Freudian background

It is in generally accepted that Freud was the first to attempt to question the humanist narrative of a "conscious self". The conscious self against which Freud raised his own split-self was in fact a Hegelian ideal of the self. This humanist ideal presupposed and constructed successive appearances of a conscious self that denotes consciousness and self-consciousness. The boomerang-like movement of consciousness in a Hegelian sense places "desire" within the "conscious self" as the unique source of motivation. Desire in this sense is almost one and the same with self-consciousness.

For Freud, on the other hand, the humanist ideal of the self is an impossible project as there is no such thing as unified consciousness that can evolve and come back as self-consciousness. Discovery of the unconscious, therefore, displaced and destabilized Hegelian desire. This attempt was quite revolutionary as it challenged thus far unified understanding/acceptance of consciousness, but Freud, with

his conviction that the unconscious is to be brought into the consciousness eventually gave rise to the emergence of various post-Hegelian successors, some of whom have expressed serious antipathy to this conviction.

The Freudian shift from self-consciousness to unconscious aspects of the self is crucial to understand how psychoanalysis has configured desire. It is common to accept that the notion of unconscious was at least imagined by several other philosophers before Freud named it. Spinoza, for instance, thought that consciousness is vulnerable to illusions that blur or distort the way one perceives the reality. It is surprising to see that a "lousy" notion of unconscious is first introduced by Spinoza in the third chapter of *Ethica* {Spinoza E-Boyle:87}.

This passage and many others show, according to Sunat, that Spinoza's *Ethica* is obviously one of the most influential sources of inspiration for Freudian psychoanalysis {Sunat 2002}. Similarly, Nietzsche can also be seen as one of the predecessors of Freudian idea of unconscious. Nietzsche's idea of "will-to-power" could be read as a result of his discomfort with the idea of the conscious self and the so-called noble actions that follow from it. Hegel, in a rather different sense, gave in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* a quite detailed account of "abyss" that can be proposed as an initial

conceptualization of the contemporary unconscious. {Mills 2004:159-183}

Yet it is still more reasonable, I believe, to argue that Freud is unique in his intellectual investment in the implications of the idea of the unconscious. Desire, in Freudian anthropology, is the sum of what has always been repressed in a human being from birth to death. Repressed desire or libido forms the unconscious and seeks to survive in it. In its survival, Freud argues, desire constantly reorients itself symbolically and shows up in different occasions in disguised forms. Dreams in this sense are signs of repressed desire, and therefore tell us about what is stored in the unconscious.

In a case study, Freud read his patient's obsession with wolves as a sign of repressed childhood desire. Colebrook shows how Freud connects a singular figure to an earlier "parental phantasy":

> By a series of associations Freud argues that the memories lead back to a "primal scene" where the parent, as a child, had witnessed his parents having sexual intercourse with his father "mounting" his mother from behind. The child therefore represents his father with a wolf figure. Freud traces all connections back to this childhood trauma; he even interprets the "W" of "wolf" as a sign of the bent over servant girl who, in turn, symbolizes the sexual position of his mother. {Colebrook 2002:34}

In the Freudian account of desire, desire is conceived as a general drive and is always coupled with an object. Objects of desire, in classical psychoanalysis, might be anything that is capable to gratify the immediate instincts occurring in the form of desire. The object, however, is not always present when it is in the focus of desire. The absence of objects results in delay and modification of desire, and both its quality and direction may change irreversibly: "It is also possible for the object of gratification of the instinct to be changed or displaced from the original object to another object. Thus, the love of one's mother may be displaced to the wife, kids, or dog" {Pervin 1989:91}.

It is important to note that Freud's theory is basically libido driven and it is in this sense rooted in origin in Biology. This heavy reliance on biology – though more severe in his early writings - marks the point where Lacan drops some aspects of Freudian psychoanalysis and takes his own route. It is, I think, for this reason that Lacan revisits Hegel after Freud, that is, to construct a rather hermeneutical program.[6] Within this program, however, Lacan does not only leave what I have called above the Freudian optimistic expectation from the notion of unconscious, but also the Hegelian hope for Absolute Knowledge. If the former is driven by Lacan

[6] Without doubt, Freud is also generous in providing narrative and hermeneutical aspects in explicating his theory. Yet, the point here is that in Freud's hands libido keeps its biological character even in later stages of ego development. In Lacan's case, however, libidinal force is a mere initiator and it plays but less than secondary role in the entire paradigm of the theory.

himself, the latter is no doubt a result of Kojeve's lectures, which Lacan also attended.

5.2. Lacan: The desire to death

Lacan, in fact, follows Freud as much as possible in his own program. The Freudian emphasis on "early years" finds its strong echo also in Lacan, and the famous Lacanian parable[7] "mirror stage" resonates with Freud's developmental stages of oral, anal and phallic. The child's early encounter with the mirror, for Lacan, represents what the child will then be in an endless and desperate search for. It is the image in the mirror that appears to the child to be coherent, complete and whole. Lacan presents this scene as follows:

> The mirror stage is a drama whose internal thrust is precipitated from insufficiency to anticipation and which manufactures for the subject, caught up in the lure of spatial identification, the succession of phantasies that extends from a fragmented body image to a form of its totality that I shall call orthopaedic- and lastly, to the assumption of the armour of an alienating identity, which will mark with its rigid structure the subject's entire mental development. {Lacan 1977:4}

[7] According to Kirshner, " the mirror phase could be regarded, in Kleinian terminology, as a "position," rather than a discrete chronological event." {Kirshner 1998:407}

It is exactly in this sense that Lacan does not follow Freudian optimism: Although Freud too admits that "development" is always traumatic and "developing self" inevitably confronts with the coercion for the replacement of "pleasure principle" with that of the "reality principle", it nevertheless might at least be resolved within the course of therapeutic relation, if not in natural ego formation. For Lacan, on the contrary, the illusion of complete self or ego that emerged in the mirror stage is at work forever. Ego, in this sense, in fact never emerges in Lacan, nor is it something that has any "real" regulatory role between unconscious motives and the conscious requirements of the so-called reality. The pessimism that deeply sounds in this theory exceeds even that of Hegelian narration, by means of which Hegel attempts to establish his own notion of selfhood in the form of self-consciousness. While, however, Hegel's Phenomenology is promising for the "Absolute" enlightenment, Lacan follows Kojeve's Hegel and ends up with a desperate longing for this ever non-exist and always missing ego.

Lacan's departure from Freud – and from Hegel as well - is most apparent in linguistically driven and more mature levels of his theory. Here, drawing heavily on Saussure's linguistic and Levi-Strauss' structuralist anthropology, he arrives at the investigation of what he calls the "symbolic" realm. It is also at this level where Lacan most strongly relies on the primary constitutive role of the linguistic, and most obviously drops the classical psychoanalytic

view that symptomatic language is an effect of unconsciousness. Rather, for Lacan, the unconsciousness is akin to language, and therefore any symptom, i.e. any object of Psychoanalysis itself, is originated in this language-like unconscious and a logical resolution for which is to be sought again in and through language. Language as a structure creates and shapes and re-shapes man, and psychoanalytic reverse engineering may at best function by confirming this.

Symbolic realm, according to Lacan, is a source of second hope for man – yet not a second chance at all - after the mirror experience in his search for the impossible integrity of being "a subject". The symbolic realm represents in this sense a totality which existed much before my sense of "self" emerged and was even born but incomplete to my bodily presence. Sherman makes this point clearer:

> The young child, therefore, would do better to seek his recognition in the symbolic realm, not the realm of images, which includes within it baneful ideas such as the unified ego structure, for symbols 'envelop the life of man in a network so total that they join together, before he comes into the world those who are going to engender him by 'flesh and blood'; so total that they bring to his birth… the shape of his destiny… {Rauch and Sherman 1999:199}

Lacan's theory, however, does not promise in any sense a complete subjectivity: The subject has never been complete and will not ever be in the realm of the symbolic either, for within this realm there is not other than *metonymy* and *metaphor*, i.e. a chain of signifiers in which signifiers signify other signifiers and this goes on infinitely. Therefore, from the standpoint of subjectivity, Lacan agrees and exceeds Freud in that the so-called conscious man is open and vulnerable to an unsteadiness of his ego, and Lacan suggests contrary to Freud that the metonymical character of the unconscious does not lend itself to full resolution even in the symbolic realm. Lacan, with this overt emphasis on the impossible integrity of the subject, is perhaps one of the most important challenges in modern times. Yet, his thinking in general and his theory of desire in particular, one might rightly argue, still falls within the tradition of transcendence.

According to Kirshner, a mythology-driven[8] discourse of "desire as lack" is evident in Freud's talk of Eros, and both Freud and Lacan employed this idea but at different weights in their own models. Kirshner writes:

> Beyond his electrostatic analogy of a libidinal energy driving man by its near-constant pressure for discharge and making demands for work upon the mental

[8] Aristophanes' myth is well known: Each person is and remains incomplete. In Plato's symposium this myth is depicted: Man's original body having been thus cut in two, each half yearned for the half from which it had been severed." (Plato, Symposium, 61)

> apparatus, Freud (1920) proposed his broader concept of Eros--a fundamental force of nature seeking unity, binding, and wholeness. He drew upon Plato's Symposium, citing Aristophanes' imaginative depiction of a bifurcated being who seeks through sexual love to regain his lost completeness. In the Symposium, Socrates extended this image by elaboration of his theory that love is a quest for what man is lacking in himself, ultimately, the eternal reality of pure forms. {Kirshner 1998:408}

Kirshner argues that Lacan welcomed this Greek influence that reached him through Freud by suggesting that "man's fundamental *manqué* or innate state of lack as essential to psychic reality" {Ibid:409}. This notion of *manqué* points to the distinction that Lacan draws between "need" and "desire". For Lacan, desire is different from need, as in the former there is always something unsettled or erratic. In *Ecrits*, Lacan accuses of classical psychoanalysis for its ignorance of this distinction. {Lacan 1977:286}The distinction is crucial for Lacan, because he connects his own notion of desire to lack over this distinction: "Desire is a relation of being to lack. This lack is the lack of being properly speaking. It isn't the lack of this or that, but lack of being whereby the being exists" {Lacan 1954:222-223}. Desire, in this sense, is "an essential negativity" and is "a turning-point (tournant)" {Lacan 1988:147} It is also the same notion of lack or absence that leads Lacan to admit that "Desire is first grasped in the other" {Ibid:147}, or that "man's desire is the desire of the other" {Ibid:177}, and that

Hegel is obviously at work here for "desire of the other" is nothing but recognition, recognition of me, my centrality, my wholeness and integrity.

I have tried so far to show that Lacan's improvement of psychoanalysis relies basically on the discovery of three distinct but interrelated ideas: First, the search for "being a subject" does not begin with a physical encounter with an object and subsequent separation from it (fort/da), but rather with the encounter, or coming into a linguistically given environment of fragmented subjectivities. The structure of primordial language precedes in this sense everything. Second, sudden and constant realization of the impossibility of integrity of the subject or ego –particularly in the realm of the symbolic- accompanies all experiences of the one, whether conscious or not. And, third, desiring what is absent and what will necessarily remain absent forms and fills in the unconscious in much the same way presence/absence relation forms and fills the very structure of language.

In these remarks, Lacan goes a long way in demonstrating that a Cartesian foundation for the so-called complete subject is neither reliable nor necessary. However, what fills in Lacan the space left behind the erased discourse of this subjectivity is also open to debate. Lacan replaces the complete subject with that of the incomplete subject, yet he preserves this but fragmented notion of

subject for his entire account of desire and life. His ambition cannot go beyond the suggestion in the long run that desire is a trace of death: "It is death that sustains existence" {Lacan 1977:300}. Desire in Lacan cannot suggest itself as an affirmation, a positivity and joy. Nor does it equip itself in this discourse with any kind of praxis, a positive politics or a way out from the depressed psycho-story.

Perhaps, Lacan is weakest when he attempts to distinguish "symbolic" from "real", and when he attempts to use this distinction, to argue against scientific discourse of a "struggle for life". Real in Lacan seems to mean what exists outside the symbolic realm; a sphere that stands outside and cannot be grasped via linguistic attempts. Real, according to Lacan, lacks nothing. There is no absence in Real. {Lacan 1954:313}. Thus, "desire is the desire of the other" is not to be considered in Real, but between imaginary and symbolic. Lacan argues that the "struggle to death" (in a Hegelian sense) has nothing to do with the Darwinian "struggle for life", for in the former we are dealing with the imaginary-symbolic affairs, while in the latter with what is supposed to take place in Real. But more than this, Lacan also claims that the "struggle for life" is a political myth {Lacan 1988:177}. He continues that "aggressivity" and "aggression" are two different things frequently mistaken for one another. He writes:

> People believe that aggressivity is aggression. It has got absolutely nothing to do with it. At the limit, virtually, aggressivity turns into aggression. But aggression has got nothing to do with the vital reality, it is an existential act linked to an imaginary relation. {Lacan 1988:177}

Lacan seems to believe that there is no organic connection between what he calls aggressivity in the Real and aggression in the human symbolic. Nor, therefore, does he think that "desire" in the sense of *conatus*, or of *struggle for life* has any contact with the desire of his own, i.e. desire as lack or desire of the other. He further clarifies himself:

> In the human subject, desire is realized in the other, by the other –*in* the other, as you put it. That is the second moment, the specular moment, the moment when the subject has integrated the form of the ego. But he is only capable of integrating it after a first swing of the see-saw when he has precisely exchanged his ego for this desire which he sees in the other. {Lacan 1988:177}

Thinking of desire as something which is necessarily linked to an idea of an object motivated the Psychoanalysis of both Freud and Lacan to agree with the mainstream approach to desire that reads it as "lack". The conceptual link between desire and absence or lack, Schrift argues, "seems natural, and we should not be surprised to find this conceptual link running throughout the history of Western

philosophical discourse" {Schrift 2000:173}. He perfectly sketches how this discourse of "desire as lack" has been established through various instances of philosophical history. Against this trend, he argues that another way of thinking is possible in which desire is no longer a desperate search after an idea of object. It rather recognizes "the productivity of desire". He writes: "Where the philosophical mainstream has focused on the desideratum, the object of desire, as lacking, this other discourse focuses on the motivational force of the desiderare, the act of desire, as productive" {Ibid:176}.

Deleuze introduces us, perhaps once again after Spinoza and Nietzsche, to the notion of productive desire. It is important here to notice that Deleuze's understanding of desire spans two dimensions; namely, "desire" and "the social": "There is only desire and the social, and nothing else". {Deleuze and Guattari 1984:29} The next to be remembered is that "… everything is production: production of productions, …" {Ibid:4}. Deleuze conceives desire as a productive, motivating, connective and differentiating "flow" which disrupts the so-called "subject-object" dichotomy. Desire, in this sense, very much resembles Spinoza's "conatus" which is to be understood in terms of "immanence" in and by which a Being expresses itself. They write:

> ... man and nature are not like two opposite terms confronting each other… rater they are one and the same essential reality, the producer-product. Production

> as process overtakes all idealistic categories and constitutes a cycle whose relationship to desire is that of immanent principle.{Ibid:4-5}

Thus, is what I have called "immanent desire" part of very infrastructure? Deleuze & Guattari's answer is affirmative in Anti Oedipus: "We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire…" {Ibid:30}. However, Deleuze's notion of desire –or immanent desire - has been criticized for being inadequately justified and *a*historically located into the center of sophisticated social criticism. Olkowski outlines the main lines of the argument, one which is developed by Butler that shapes one of the strongest objections to Deleuzian desire. According to Butler, Olkowski writes, "Deleuze makes desire 'the privileged locus of human ontology', an ontology that is not historicized… Desire is an 'ontological invariant', 'a universal ontological truth" {Olkowski 2000:187}. For Butler, Deleuzian desire is emancipatory and is like a pre-cultural eros.

There might be a mistake in this objection. It is not Deleuze, if one is to be criticized for favoring immanence while remaining indifferent to history, but rather an all encompassing obsession with representation that re-emerged in various instances of Western metaphysics. Goodchild's commentary on Deleuze-Guattari presents a strong case against Butler's argument though this is not in any sense a declared aim in the book. According to Goodchild, Deleuze

regards Spinoza's substance as power of existing. "Power of existing" for Deleuze, Goodchild writes, is an ontological desire to come into existence:

> Desire is not immanent to the plane of existence; desire is the immanent plane of existence. 'To be' is to be coming into a relation, to be a becoming, to produce a new affect, relation or modification between terms that are themselves modifications. Desire only exists when it produces an affect… Like Spinoza's substance, desire is a cause of itself; yet unlike the usual interpretation of Spinoza's substance, desire only exists in the relations and modifications it produces. {Goodchild 1996:40}

Then "immanent desire" is to be understood as a possibility, a potentia, and a ready-to-express force that waits for the call of production. Goodchild draws a very important distinction here:

> … to 'be' is to desire, to become, to relate, and to produce. .. Everything that exists is a becoming, but to comprehend a becoming one has to form a relation with it. Now, insofar as one simply perceives a becoming as an intensity, a code, or a territory, one does not allow it to affect one's own underlying mode of existence or body of affects: something fixed is extracted from the becoming… This is a modality of desire, but one that operates when desire does not have sufficient power to enter into a full relation. {Ibid:40}

Butler is right in thinking of Deleuzian desire as emancipatory for she fails to distinguish the potentiality of immanent desire from

actuality and the liberation of subjective desire. "This awareness of desire, in which desire becomes an ontological affect, or how one feels about life as a whole, is also the liberation of desire: desire is enabled to communicate and intensify itself" {Ibid: 40}.

This also shows, in a sense, what is wrong in psychoanalysis from the standpoint of the Deleuzian account of desire. Psychoanalytic fiction does not allow subjects to prompt the immanent desire to communicate, disseminate and intensify itself. Oedipus is a form of imperialism that attempts to invade the very field between immanent and subjective desire. The oedipal schema forces the desire production into the daddy-mummy-me triangle and keeps it away from real production. Desire, in this way, turns to be an enemy whose attacks from the unconscious to the outside need to be controlled and manipulated.

VI. ETHICAL ESTABLISHMENT OF IMMANENCE: The other history

6.1. The concept of immanence in Spinoza

The concept of immanence discloses itself in various places in Spinoza's works, but particularly and most systematically in the first part of *Ethics*, and perhaps more wholeheartedly in the sixth part of *A Theologico-Political Treatise*. * It is, however, I believe, neither necessary nor possible within the scope of this study to offer a sufficient exposition of these parts to clarify in what ways Spinoza brings us to see his own conception of immanence. Yet I believe that sketching these parts in terms of the idea of immanence and its implications for the rest of the Spinoza thought is both necessary and possible.

Three definitions (Def. 1, Def. 3 and Def. 6) in the first part of Ethics give us a general outline for Spinoza's idea of immanence. These definitions include three underlying conditions one needs to take

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- Please note that the following conventions will be applied for different translations (and/or editions) of *Ethics*:

E-Boyle refers to Andrew Boyle's translation of *Ethics*; E-Curley refers to Edwin Curley's translation of *Ethics*; E-Elwes refers to R.H.M. Elwes' translation of *Ethics*.

into consideration, if one is to talk about *immanence* in general, not about something which is *immanent to* some other thing. The concept of immanence, in this sense, is a full plenitude in which cause and effect are not temporally different from each other. Nor is there one particular being other than being in any kind of hierarchy. By "cause of itself" Spinoza understands, in this sense, "that whose essence involves existence" {Spinoza E-Boyle:4}. In other words, neither essence nor existence is prior to each other, but they co-exist. Their co-existence as well as concurrent emergences of its attributes take place in one and the same realm, one that Spinoza calls "substance". As Boyle rightly explained later in the *Notes on Spinoza's Ethics,* the cause and effect relationship here is simply a logical one, not in the sense that cause precedes its effect. For Spinoza, "the cause of X is the reason for X, in the sense in which a triangle's being isosceles is the reason for its base angles being equal" {Ibid:260}.

In the same way, substance for Spinoza is that which meets all the conditions of the concept of immanence. The conception of substance is fully self-referential. This self-referentiality is important in understanding Spinoza's idea of immanence. In the earlier two translations of Ethics, the substance's definitive feature of being in itself and being conceived through itself was translated with the help of the word "independence" as follows:

"that of which a conception can be formed *independently* of any other conception" {Spinoza E-Elwes:39}.

"that, the conception of which *does not depend on* the conception of another thing, from which conception it must be formed" {Spinoza E-Boyle:3}.

What we see in these two translations is that the substance's very nature of conceivability in itself has been met by the word "independence" to mean that its conception is independent from any other conception. This, I think, is a weak correspondence for Spinoza's notion of "conceivability in itself". For we can imagine at least one other thing (another reading of God), conception of which is possible independently from any other thing. For instance, one can conceive a God – a God which is indifferent to human beings' well-being or pain[9] - independently from any other given thing, yet conceiving it still *requires* the concept of the other thing or things that he created. However, in Spinoza's case, understanding substance's conceivability in itself demands a stronger emphasis.

Later, in a recent translation, Curley preferred the following reformulation:

[9] Epikurus' rejection of the concept of the gods popular in ancient Greece can be considered as an example to the belief in "indifferent God". The claim that Gods are perfect, according to Epicurus, requires that the gods be indifferent to human behavior.

"that whose concept does not *require* the concept of another thing, from which it must be formed" {Spinoza E-Curley:85}.

For Spinoza, it can be argued in light of the slight variants in the translations given above that a substance's conceivability in itself is crucial. We are asked by this emphasis to take substance as all that exists and beyond which there is nothing, nor is it necessary at all to think. The 1st, 2nd and 6th definitions taken together serve in this respect as a foundation for the rest of the construction in which the idea of immanence takes its final shape. Once Spinoza defined what being *cause of itself* means, what we are to understand from substance and from God, he goes into establishing his main propositions. He utilizes in the 6th. 7th. 14th. and 15th propositions, respectively, the idea of immanence of substance embedded in the earlier definitions as much as possible. The 6th and 7th propositions help Spinoza in two complimentary ways: First, by means of the 6th proposition he establishes, based on the first definition, the unity of substance and thereby challenges the Cartesian duality. Second, by setting the first definition almost as analytic *a priori* knowledge, he barriers the idea of transcendental reference that is beyond substance. This is because substance is regarded as the cause of itself, and therefore by definition there cannot be another substance to be the cause of each other. Arguing against this position is possible only through a bare objection: There are two substances, one of which is the cause of the other. If this is contradictory to the

definition of substance, then the definition needs to be revised. However, Spinoza writes in what he calls "Another proof" for the 6th proposition that arguing for the opposite (there are two substances, one of which produces each other) can be shown to be absurd. "For if a substance can be produced from anything else, the knowledge of it should depend on the knowledge of its cause (Axiom 4), and consequently (Definition 3) it would not be a substance" {Spinoza E-Boyle:6}. He also supports these earlier propositions with a well-considered one in the 14th, and then in the 15th proposition: In the former he discloses that God and substance are one and the same thing. He writes, "Except God no substance can exist or be conceived" {Ibid:12}. Then, he goes on to favor explicitly in the latter proposition what we call immanence instead of transcendence: "Whatever is, is in God…" {Ibid:13}.

In the later propositions and notes, Spinoza sets out to make perhaps the most important move in his system: Once he established and demonstrated that substance is the cause of itself, and that there is only one substance and except God or Nature there is no substance, and that if anything exists it necessarily exists in God, Spinoza seeks to further demonstrate that God or Nature is not a *product*, nor is it an *inert* being. God or Nature, for Spinoza, *acts*. Not, of course, it acts in the sense of thinking substance acting in a certain purposeful way. Nor does it act as an effect of something outside of itself. It is rather a pure *act* in itself, or in other words it

acts out of its very essence. This act, which is about that all exists in God or Nature, is the act within immanence or an immanent act which is not only being originated *in* God but also originates the modes of action for finite things *in* God. It is obvious from various propositions and corollaries in Ethics that God or Nature according to Spinoza is such a single subject within which a "*cause sui* act" emerges and sustains, that God itself necessarily acts being an efficient cause of everything else and that everything else thereby turns to be a cause for an effect. The last proposition of the first part is saved to make this point clear: "Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow" {Ibid:30}.

6.2. God's power, immanent desire and connection of things

I have ended the last section by asserting that there is a "*cause sui* act" in and through substance, by means of which God or Nature turns to be an efficient cause for everything. However, a question has remained unanswered so far: Why is there an act rather than stillness or inaction?

Spinoza does not give us a clear outline for understanding the nature, direction or non-causality of the motion embedded in the very nature of substance. Yet his deduction particularly in the first

part of Ethics contains a number of promising terms for a speculative and fruitful imagination to deal with this question.

There are a total of 36 propositions in the first part of Ethics. Within this plan Spinoza hardly talks about the nature and/or the quality of action or motion which directly and necessarily follows from God or Nature. In several places, however, he explicitly uses some particular terms or words which imply and denote a motion, in the sense that something (called substance) exists *cause sui* whose essence is both motion-originating and motion-sustaining. In the 16th proposition, for instance, Spinoza writes: "Infinite thing in infinite ways (that is, all things which can fall under an infinite intellect) must necessarily *follow*[10] from the necessity of the divine nature" {Ibid:16}. It is not clear in this proposition in what sense things follow from the divine nature. The translator offers some help in the notes explaining that in most parts in Ethics Spinoza takes causality in terms of rationalist tradition (x follows from Y only logically), but according to corollaries he clarifies that the divine nature is not just a logical cause, but that it is also the efficient cause. Likewise, Spinoza further supports this reading in the next proposition and this time explicitly articulates that God acts: "God *acts*[1] solely according to the laws of his own nature, and is compelled by no one" {Ibid:17}. By being an efficient cause Spinoza

[10] Italics belong to me.

means, according to Boyle, that A is only efficient cause of B if A produces or brings about B.

In several later propositions Spinoza also explicitly uses the terms "produce", "performing", or "power of God" allowing us to be justified in thinking that God or Nature not only *is*, but it also causes, produces, originates, creates or triggers. Yet in all these places, Spinoza's primary motivation is not to argue for the triggering or activating nature of God *per se*, but rather to demonstrate that God is the only and the immanent cause of all things, that it acts necessarily, in the sense that it does not have a free-will to let it act otherwise. Therefore, being in the limits of the first part and confining ourselves simply to those propositions in which Spinoza explicitly articulates "triggering terms", we can offer no better ground to answer the earlier question: Why is there *act* rather than stillness?

Perhaps the entire agenda of Deleuze in *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* is to explore in what ways Spinoza's single and univocal substance does trigger and persist in triggering the unity of finite things, thereby leading all things to connect to each other and disseminate in infinite ways. Deleuze undertakes in this work a quite challenging program through which Spinoza's system unfolds itself in a constantly vibrating triadic schema, substance through attributes, attributes through modes. For Deleuze, the notion of

"expression" is crucial in understanding this schema and following it up to further ethico-political implications.

Expression, for Deleuze, is no less than a synthesis of *explicare* and *involvere*. The synthesis denotes a double characteristic of the act of substance in Spinoza; it simultaneously explicates and involves. Deleuze reads this double characteristic both in terms of *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*, and moods of acting within these spheres. "God expresses himself in himself "before" expressing himself in his effects: expresses himself by in himself constituting *natura naturans*, before expressing himself *natura naturata*" {Deleuze 1990:14}. Deleuze reads this synthesis also as a manifestation of a more dynamic notion that can be translated as "to evolve" and "to implicate". These two terms equips expression in a sense with more vivid and dynamic elements. Deleuze writes: "To explicate is to evolve, to involve is to implicate. Yet the two terms are not opposites: they simply mark two aspects of expression" {Ibid:16}.

Deleuze reads the last proposition of Ethics as a manifestation of an important point, in the sense, I think, that a long expected disclosure emerges. In the proof for this proposition Spinoza writes: "Whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate manner the nature or essence of God, that is, whatever exists expresses in a certain and determinate way the power of God…" {Spinoza E-

Boyle:31}. According to Deleuze, this proof is a manifestation of the identity of power and essence. This means, for Deleuze, that "a power is always an act or, at least in action" {Deleuze 1990:93}. The idea of the identity of power and act, according to Deleuze has been endorsed by both a long theological tradition and a long materialist tradition. In all these traditions, thus, the essence of God is power, and power expresses itself in acting. God or Nature as the single substance in Spinoza means, in this sense, "power of existing and acting".

According to Goodchild, there is a close connection in Deleuze's reading of Spinoza's common substance that can be located between "power of existing" and "desire". Goodchild writes:

"Deleuze reads Spinoza's common substance as a "power of existing"; for him, the power itself does not exist in itself, but only insofar as it is realized. The dichotomy between essence and existence is removed; the "power of existing" is therefore an ontological desire to come into existence. Desire is not immanent to the plane of existence; desire is the immanent plane of existence." {Goodchild 1996:40}

Goodchild calls this immanent act of substance "ontological desire" and justifies this terminology based on some observations. According to him, "Deleuze… extracted an ontology of desire from

Spinoza: to 'be' is to desire, to become, to relate, and to produce" {ibid: 40}. The same terminological preference occurs also in another contemporary thinkers including particularly Butler {1987}. I, however, prefer using "immanent desire" instead of "ontological desire" for I am convinced that the act of Spinoza's substance can best be thought as "non-cognitive" and "non-teleological" yet "immanent" desire. This notion of desire, I believe, is not in any sense "desire *to* be". It cannot be "ontological" not only because it does not echo "*to* do something", but because it must certainly be considered away from being in any sense purposive, teleological or consciously intentional. Immanent desire exists immanent to substance simply because it exists so necessarily.

The distinction that needs to be drawn between "immanent desire" and the other two notions of desire, namely "embodied desire" and "subjective desire", is crucial here if we are to avoid what I call a long-lasting tension between "reason" and "desire", and the repressive ethico-political practices that follow from this ill-conception. In Ethics, from the standpoint of this concern, one can find sufficient imagination in Spinoza's treatment of "substance", "its acts" and "bodies". The same imagination is later significantly enriched by Nietzsche and is finally brought into the political agenda by Deleuze. Therefore it is vital to elaborate a little on how it is rational to distinguish the two senses of desire in Spinoza and to

explore what ethico-political implications follow from thinking desire based on these distinctions.

Having argued for the view that "immanent desire" is best understood at the level of substance, I now wish to consider another sense of desire, that I call "embodied desire".

The second part of Ethics begins with the nature of the existence of modes and keeps tackling with all these at chapter length. These, according to earlier definitions and propositions, are to be considered within the realm of *natura naturata*. Body, in the very first definition, is defined as a "mode" that expresses God's essence. Additionally in the first Axiom, Spinoza directly goes into describing man: The essence of man does not involve necessary existence. This axiom is later elaborated in the tenth proposition, in which Spinoza suggests that *the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man*. This is to say - and is explained later by Spinoza accordingly - that man does not exist necessarily, or, in other words, the being of substance (*natura naturans*) does not guarantee the existence of any particular man (in *natura naturata*), nor does it guarantee his survival in being. In all that follows, both in the second and the third parts, Spinoza thinks of bodies in general and of man in particular within the very plenitude of the interplay of power relations.

5.3. Ethics as conatus

Ethics, in fact, is the name of an entire study Spinoza reserved for a general account of nature, if not of the entire physical universe. Yet he entitled his book "ethics", not because of an anthropomorphic reductionism, but quite the opposite, because he wanted to depict a pre-subjective plane in which one still thinks of an order and logic of encounters and differentiation. However, this distinctive feature does not make Ethics a far distant thematic study, relevance of which to human beings is only secondary. On the contrary, Spinoza's approach to man's ethical and political struggle for the best can and should be considered within the realm of a greater plan, and as an interconnection *between* all that exists *and* any particular individual which exists as a single "mode". In this sense, we find in Ethics not a description about what is good or bad in itself, but rather in what sense any finite thing in *Nature Naturata* might come to be regarded as good or bad for any other finite thing. In this sense, human individuals have not any priority in searching for a supreme good (*sunnum bonum*), but a relative and anti-hierarchical importance in what is at stake.

It is important at the outset to list a basic set of regulations that guide the entire Spinoza ethics:

1. Human mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God.

2. Ideas are true and adequate only provided that they refer to God.
3. There is no such thing as "mind absolute" or "free will" which can be thought outside causal dependence; but the mind is determined for willing in certain ways by a certain cause, and this cause is produced by another.

The third part in *Ethics* begins accordingly with the two important propositions that set the stage for a detailed metaphysical study of a psychology of emotions. In the 6th proposition Spinoza asserts that "Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being", and in the 7th that "The endeavor (conatus) wherewith a thing endeavors to persist in its being is nothing else than the actual essence of that thing." {Spinoza E-Boyle: 89-90}. These two propositions undertake to set out that anything that exists *desires* to keep existing and this very embodied desire (conatus) is not contingent, but a *necessary* outcome of the nature of that thing. The third part is in fact nothing more than a psychological elaboration of the notion of power that unfolds in these two early propositions.

Spinoza calls this power (in the sense of conatus) *appetite* (appetitus) when it comes to human beings – mind and body together - and as *desire* (cupiditas) when it is accompanied by consciousness {Spinoza E-Boyle: Prop.9 91}. For Deleuze, Spinoza's study of emotions in Part three announces a new model in the sense

of what is described above in three basic assumptions. This new model, a model in which the two attributes of God express together a coherent and complete plane of ethics, is nothing but the body. Deleuze argues that Spinoza's invitation to take body as a new model does not lead us in any sense to a devaluation of thinking in favor of extension. It is rather at best "a devaluation of consciousness in relation to thought" (ibid: 18). Powers of the body, in this sense, are brought in to a full synchronization with powers of the mind. Deleuze writes:

> We are in a condition such that we only take in "what happens" to our body, "what happens" to our mind, that is, the effect of a body on our body, the effect of an idea on our idea. But this is only our body in its own relation, and the other bodies and other minds or ideas in their respective relations, and the rules according to which all these relations compound with and decompose one another; we know nothing of all this in the given order of our knowledge and our consciousness. {Ibid:19}

However, Deleuze reminds us that our consciousness according to Spinoza is always subject to illusions[11] {Ibid:20}. Though our consciousness is always open to what Deleuze calls "a triple illusion" and thus vulnerable, it still needs to have a cause for its operation. This cause is "appetite", the appetite that man has a consciousness

[11] Deleuze calls this as triple illusion, an exposition of which is later provided.

which is to be defined as “desire”. However, as Deleuze writes, this consciousness is not influential in any sense because, as we have discussed above, for Spinoza man does not strive for anything because he is conscious of the judgment that it is good. Rather, desiring operates the other way round: we call something good because we strive for it or desire it. It is in this sense, Deleuze suggests, that “desire” now comes for Spinoza to mean “conatus”.

Yet, this striving leads a given body to interact with the other bodies and respond to them differently in terms of the quality of the encounters it come across. Out of these encounters spring *affections*. According to Deleuze, all this shows that Ethics is an ethology and the entire story is about men and animals, and about their capacity to affect and to be affected. {Deleuze 1988:27} Deleuze’s skillfully depicted exposition of the play of emotions in Ethics can be demonstrated as follows:

	Actions		***Passions***	
	(Those *affections* which are explained by the nature of the affected individual, and which spring from the essence of an individual.)		(Those *affections* which are explained by something else, and which originate outside the individual.)	
produces	*Joy* that increases power of acting, or vice versa, *increased power of acting* that brings joy.	***produces***	*either* *Joy* that proportionally increases power of acting.	*or* *Sadness* that decreases power of acting.
	Best encounter		Moderate encounter	Worst encounter

{Portrayed from Deleuze 1988:27-29}

A given body becomes aware of these affections in such a way that its power of acting or its conatus is strengthened or weakened. The given affections that follow from these encounters turn to be a necessary cause of the consciousness of this conatus.

It is important here, as a result, to note that although there exists a desire (as a basic striving) that necessarily follows from the necessity of the nature of human being, any given human being might be an adequate or inadequate cause of his own desire. Spinoza argues that only if the individual is the adequate cause of his own desire can he rely on this desire and *only when this is the case* does it necessarily preserve his existence. Otherwise, when desire is originated in or by other things other than individual himself, which is when the individual is not the adequate cause of his desire and might then, lead him to annihilation. What is important here for our current problem is that the plane of finite modes, or the world of actualities, both bears on possibility and risk for human beings, as well as other things to preserve or destruct their existence. Ethics still occurs or is just what is given in this plane of encounters, and Spinoza establishes it based on these axiomatic themes.

It is important to emphasize once again that "we endeavor, will, seek, or desire nothing because we deem it good; but on the contrary, we deem a thing good because we endeavor, will, seek, or

desire it". {Spinoza E-Boyle:91}. What is disclosed in this idea is important for two reasons: First, what makes a thing good or bad has nothing to do with its value in itself. In fact, there is no such thing in Spinoza's ethics as something "intrinsically valuable". Things might be good or not in terms of their actual status relative to a given particular man's estimation concerning the potential effect of that thing. A thing might increase the man's power of activity, and then the man deems it good, desires it more or seeks it on purpose. The experience of such emotional changes as pleasure or pain is nothing but the effects of a transition between greater and lesser activity of power that follow from these kinds of encounters. Second, the fact that one desires a thing does not make that thing necessarily good for one (in the sense of an increaser of the power of acting), unless he himself is the adequate cause of this desire or, in other words, he is active in this encounter.

Thus, according to Spinoza, man is virtuous only in so far as he truly understands or has adequate ideas and in so far as he manages his encounters to have joyful emotions. Therefore, acting and understanding, which occur in the sphere of "embodied desire", is the basis of virtue and they define what is (actually) good for our conatus. This virtue of, or strategy for, having a greater perfection is in one sense an ethical challenge, a challenge that can be read as

an open question: *In what ways does our embodied desire get and stay in tune with the immanent desire*?

VII. ETHICAL AND POLITICAL ECHO OF IMMANENT DESIRE

7.1. Deleuze's ontology

It is perhaps one of the most powerful habits of our minds to think that "ethics" necessarily entails intentionality of a subject. Commonplace thinking tells us that subjectivity and consciousness precedes decision, and therefore "ethics of life" must be understood in connection with the subject. Deleuze succeeds in establishing a different voice against this background. For Deleuze, ethics does not start with, nor does it require, a subject. Ethics should rather be searched for within the very disposition of every existing "thing" – i.e. immanent to thing - a predisposition to keep on existing.

Deleuze has much in common with the post-structuralist thinkers of the late 20th Century, though he is quite distinct in his motivation to find a path to diversity and 'diversity of differences'. "Becoming" is key in this questioning against the unifying and totalizing posture of western tradition. Becoming, quite the opposite of 'comprehending', denotes openness, incompleteness, transition and differences.

The Deleuzian notion of becoming raises important objections against traditional understanding of the role of 'subject' in both thinking and acting. Deleuze and Guattari write in What is Philosophy? that "Thinking is neither a line drawn between subject and object nor a revolving of one around the other. Rather thinking takes place in the relationship of territory and the earth" {Deleuze and Guattari 1994}.

Subjectivity, in the sense of tendency to see the human subject as the 'measure of everything', is a notion that can be traced back to the 17th Century "cogitoism". As we have discussed in Section 2.2., Cartesian skepticism, with its explicit doubt of almost everything except the thinking subject, creates, in a sense, a new and more powerful source of transcendence. What follows from this is that there 'are' subjects that observe, react or judge as long as they exist. The subject, regardless of how it is conceived – either as transcendental or as a by-product of culture, discourse or ideology - has always been the point of departure, even in the more recent philosophical writing.

What is common to metaphysics and transcendental philosophy is, above all, this alternative which they both impose on us: either an undifferentiated ground, groundlessness, formless nonbeing, or an abyss without differences and without properties, or a supremely

individuated Being and an intensely personalized form {Deleuze 1990:106}.

This conception of "the subject" as the very foundation of everything else is responsible for the creation of a non-Deleuzian humanism, in which the entire world is seen as a subjectively-constructed unity. Deleuze, in order to resist this, demands an important shift in our thinking, from an obsessive subjectivity to a multi-dimensional ontology of difference.

For Deleuze, "Being" can be understood as "Event" (with capital 'E') to recognize singularities and to avoid at the same time totalizing effects of the very notion of Being as it is represented in the western metaphysics. His distance to those ill conceptions of Being is apparent in *The Logic of Sense*: "There is no combination capable of encompassing all the elements of Nature at once, there is no unique world or total universe. Physics is not a determination of the One, of Being, or of the Whole" {Deleuze 1990:267}. Event or Being is the place or field of impossible repetition in Deleuzian ontology, where the very idea of simulacra lies. Deleuze, in accord with a Spinozist notion of expression, suggests that the Event is a kind of effect-generating mode, an expressive force, in every act of which 'difference' is necessarily being created.

The Event in this sense is a body of potentiality, a differentiating agency (a piece of written text, language, philosophy, literature or simply a concept) that is capable of creating two entities: events (a field of difference) and actualities (a material world). In order to understand what Deleuze means by "events" and "actualities", we must first become familiar with the idea of 'simulacrum'.

Deleuze discusses in *The Logic of Sense*'s appendices, in Simulacrum and the Ancient Philosophy, that the Platonist distinction between "real" and "copy" represents the effect of 'simulacra', which is an impossible attempt to separate what is inseparable. Out of this effect, according to Deleuze, we generate an understanding of life that assumes a distinction between an origin, essence, real or 'a model' and that what the model produces as an effect, appearance, image, virtual or "simulacra". For Deleuze, on the other hand, none of these events is more real than each other. He writes:

> So 'to reverse Platonism' means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons and copies. The problem no longer has to do with the distinction Essence-Appearance or Model-Copy. This distinction operates completely within the world of representation. Rather, it has to do with undertaking the subversion of this world... The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. {Ibid:262}

It has been Deleuze's conviction that "actuality" (in the sense of "real" or "model") and "virtuality" (in the sense of "simulacra") are never separate. They are both real and necessarily together and exist in simultaneous interaction with and in Event. Event, as I have emphasized before, must be understood as the "immanent desire", i.e a tendency to become and differentiate. This tendency, which every being or thing exposes to, represents the very power of a thing to become other than itself. Repetition, in this sense, has never been and will never be possible. Within this strong tendency towards becoming, both what we call 'virtual' and 'actual' have come to exist as by-products of 'differentiation' and 'differenciation'.

Deleuze's understanding of Being, or the differentiating force that operates within the Event, can be traced back to Heraclitus's philosophy of "panta rei". According to Deleuze, Being is "like (an) expressive agency, something like movement or force – a destabilizing or decentring force which shatters fixed identities" {Piercey 1996:273}. As a destabilizing force or power, Being expresses itself mainly in two ways. First, it is an act of determination. When Being manifests itself in becoming, it is initially directed to a particular form. In other words, it has a primordial idea at the outset about what it is to be in the end. Acting out of this idea, for Deleuze, results in differentiation. The idea gives the direction, i.e. in Spinoza's terms; Substance expresses itself in one of its two attributes. Second, and immediately after the first

expression, Substance re-expresses itself, but this time in another attribute.

Piercey's comment illuminates what Deleuze means here by this double expression:

> Deleuze has in mind the relation of substance to its attributes here. Each attribute 'expresses eternal and infinite essentiality', but in one determinate way. Thus Thought and Extension both expresses the essence of substance, but determine that essence into different forms. Once this first expression has taken place -once substance is considered under one attribute rather than another- substance re-expresses itself at a second level. {Ibid:277}

Thus, the concept of "expression" must be understood as a double movement of desiring Being: At the first stage, Being (Substance) inclines towards having certain forms, and then some of those forms come into existence as material entities {Deleuze 1994:207}. Piercey writes:

> Deleuze distinguishes expression from re-expression by distinguishing differentiation from differenciation. Differentiation is a 'formal' or 'qualitative' process. It is the 'determination of the virtual content of an Idea'... Some of these ideal structures get incarnated in the material world through the process of differenciation, which Deleuze calls 'the actualization of… a virtuality into species and distinguished parts'. {Piercey 1996:278}

Deleuze takes the three different realms – that of Being, events or virtuals and actual - as equally functional in understanding life as expressions. Besides this understanding, Deleuze's notion of expression derives out of a 'tripartite scheme' that necessitates three different ontological fields. Being an expressive and differentiating power does not need, for Deleuze, a transcendental realm from which a supra-natural Subject or God can be envisaged and provide categories of good or evil. It does not need to begin from somewhere. It begins with what Deleuze calls the "plane of immanence", which is pre-philosophical, and for which there is no need to appeal to any place of transcendence other than the plane of immanence.

All this suggests that Deleuze follows Spinoza very strictly in his account of 'ontological fields' in the sense of 'the plane of immanence'. Yet, I believe, the very idea that "an ethics without transcendental criteria is possible" still needs to be explored, perhaps through Deleuzian reading of Nietzsche as well as Spinoza.

7.2. Affirmative ethics *of* immanence

The literature shows that the traditional tendency to conceive "the Subject" as essential to "ethics" is not well justified from a Deleuzian point of view. Such theorists, according to Gatens and Lloyd

> ... have tended to conceive of human nature as transcending the rest of nature, or 'as a dominion within a dominion'. Those who look upon the powers and capacities of the human body with foolish wonder and who assume that it is constructed 'by divine, or supernatural art' fail to understand the immanent causes through which bodies constructed and therefore will be unable to understand the nature and power of the human mind. {Gatens & Lloyd 1999}

Perhaps Spinoza and Nietzsche provided the most reliable and coherent ground (read as groundless ground) on which a very powerful resistance could raise against this humanistic terror. Deleuze, with his minoritarian reading of both Spinoza and Nietzsche, disclosed possibilities of 'ethics without morality' based on immanent desire.

Chapter two in *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy* begins with a manifestation: Spinoza, for Deleuze, was maligned and hated, in fact, because of three practical theses that imply a triple denunciation: "... of 'consciousness', of 'values', and of 'sad passions'. These three causes of hatred – a scandal from the traditional point of view - were the themes to which Nietzsche was badly attracted, as well as Spinoza" {Deleuze 1988:17-29}.

Deleuze argues that both Spinoza and Nietzsche conceived the 'body' more vital than it used to be conceived in mainstream philosophy. They both claimed that our appreciation of

'consciousness' and ignorance of the 'body' are responsible for an endless talk in philosophy with no real result. What Spinoza offered was not a simple replacement between consciousness and the body: that would be repeating the same mistake at the same stage with a different cast. Rather, Spinoza saw a kind of parallelism, in which neither consciousness nor the body was superior but they co-existed.[12] Deleuze writes: "According to Ethics,... what is an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind. There is no primacy of one series over the other" {Ibid:18}.

For Spinoza, Deleuze maintains, 'proposing body as a new model' does not mean devaluating thought (one of the attributes of substance) in favor of extension (another attribute). Rather, he believes that there is something elusive both in 'thought' and 'body' that does not lend itself to any sort of comprehension by consciousness. This is to say that both thinking and the body exceed consciousness. Consciousness, with all its limits, cannot be thought free from a triple illusion: Illusions that hinder consciousness from becoming aware of the acts of conatus or immanent desire. Consciousness at best functions as an awareness of the passage, through which encounters with other bodies and their effects are

[12] Please note that the term "parallelism" is not a widely acknowledged view. It is rather simply Deleuzian, if not, also, highly controversial.

conceived –or more correctly- misconceived and distorted {Ibid:21}.

What follows from this reading of 'consciousness', according to Deleuze, is the 'devaluation of all values'. For Spinoza, concepts such as good or evil are result of our consciousness' ignorance of causes: Adam's interpretation of "eating forbidden fruit" represents how consciousness could be misleading. He first takes the apple as the source of evil (First illusion), and then he undertakes the whole responsibility for eating the fruit (Second illusion), and finally he creates a transcendent source of judgment that will govern the entire evaluative process (Third illusion). For Spinoza, on the other hand, "... all the phenomena that we group under the heading of Evil, illness, and death, are of this type: bad encounters, poisoning, intoxication, relational decomposition" {Ibid:22}. In fact, Deleuze argues, Spinoza does not see any possibility of deriving moral judgments out of what is taking place among bodies, in nature. Judgment or Good and Evil are result of illusions of consciousness: "Now, all that one needs in order to moralize is to fail to understand" {Ibid:23}. Good or Evil must be replaced with bodies-specific 'good(s)' or 'bad(s)'. What we call 'good', then, as an adjective of some 'bodies' is nothing but a signification of the fact that those bodies strive to act in accordance with what their nature demanded of them to be in agreement with our bodies, i.e. they can

increase our power of acting. This is merely related to what Spinoza calls "conatus", and the regime here is a regime of conatus.

The last point Deleuze makes is that both Spinoza's and Nietzsche's positions against transcendental morality are about "sad passions". Spinoza-Nietzschean ethics draws its basic outline from 'ethology' – a theory of the capacities of the bodies for affecting and being affected {Gatens & Lloyd 1999:47}. Accordingly, Deleuze writes, Spinoza identifies two sorts of affections: One is about 'actions' that are related to the individual's essence, the degree of power for acting. The other is about 'passions' that are related to almost anything outside the individual. The first affection (actions) determines to what extent the individual might act out of her essence, i.e. power of acting, whilst the second denotes to what extent the individual is open or vulnerable to the actions of other bodies, i.e. power of being acted upon. According to Deleuze these two powers are in inverse ratio to one another {Deleuze 1988:27}.

More important is that Deleuze, in reference to Spinoza, makes another distinction within passions. Passions derive either from good encounters (those that comply with our conatus) and affect us positively, or they emerge from bad encounters (those encounters that decompose our unity) and diminish our power. Passions of the second type are "sad passions" and are responsible for 'decadence' in the Nietzschean sense.

Therefore, as we discussed before, in order to be good, an individual must organize her encounters or expand her capacity for being affected as much as possible. This is to say she must avoid bad encounters and sad passions as much as possible, while at the same time practicing her power of acting up to the degree she can.

However, Deleuze writes, Spinoza does not think that this is an easy task in any sense. Nor does Nietzsche think that the victory against sadness comes easily. Slave mentality, tyranny and religious deception go hand to hand with 'consciousness' which is already vulnerable to illusions. These sources of decadence can only be driven away by means of "joyful passions". Joyful passions come with action and sad passions can only be pushed away if the body leads an ethical life, a life that sees only joy worthwhile and defeat all those so-called values of an ill-conceived moral world.

I have discussed so far that the idea of immanence can be read 'ethically' or immanence in Spinoza is what is 'ethical' in itself. But where does Deleuze exactly stand in relation to this Spinoza-Nietzschean insight? What does Deleuze add to this picture? What, if any, are the ethical implications of the Deleuzian conception of 'becoming' and 'difference'?

For Deleuze, Hume's importance lies in asking the correct question. He does not ask "How is experience given to a subject?", rather he

asks "How is the subject constituted within the given?". Deleuze suggests in *Difference and Repetition* that

> The Humean response –that the subject (human nature) is a derivative of the principles of association- was transformed into a 'transcendental empiricism': the subject no longer is a transcendental instance that actively synthesizes experience but is constituted within a plane of immanence by syntheses that are themselves passive. {Smith 1998:259}

According to Smith, Deleuze's celebration of the Humean inversion of the subject-centered transcendence is quite relevant to his conception of 'ethics without morality'. He seeks 'an ethics of immanence' within the plane of modes of existence without appealing to any sort of transcendental subject or judgment. Yet, philosophy of immanence is not free from difficulties. One of the main difficulties is about the practical problems, about evaluation or 'criteria'. Deleuze himself points to this difficulty: "What disturbed us was that in renouncing judgment we had the impression of depriving ourselves of any means of assessing the differences between existing beings, between modes of existence, as if now on everything were equally valid" {Ibid:252}.

Deleuze's reading of Spinoza in *Expressionism*, particularly in the chapters XVI and XVII, is in fact an insisting effort to show that the immanent affirmations of the power of affectivity do not mean, in any sense, a disinterested or amoral acceptance of the actions

produced by the strong in accord with its interests. In the same way, an immanent conception of ethics and desire does not result in humiliating the weak as it is claimed in the hostile readings of Nietzsche in particular. Ethics of immanence, according to Deleuze, tells us how ignorance of true knowledge or lack of an adequate idea might make one weak or a slave. Deleuze writes: "The weak man, the slave, is not someone of lesser strength in absolute terms. The weak man is he who, whatever his strength, remains cut off from his power of action, kept in slavery or impotence" {Deleuze 1990:269}.

One of the most important points that Deleuze makes in reading Spinoza is that the ethics of immanence is not separate from knowledge in the sense of virtue. He calls us to see what is invisible, not because it is hidden somewhere beyond as implied by the variety of versions of Platonism, but invisible in the sense of the implicit, de-emphasized or unattended. What is invisible for Deleuze is what in fact is just explicit, naked and that can be seen when looking directly at reality without imposing conceptual schemes, i.e. without the deceptive effects of inadequate ideas. This is what Spinoza calls "adequate ideas" and Nietzsche calls "affirmation". All this, Deleuze claims, leads us to the notion of "machine". "Deleuze uses the concept of the machine to rethink ethics" {Colebrook 2002:55} .

Without doubt, what Deleuze means by "machinic connections" is not an invitation to Phenomenology in the classical sense. For Deleuze, concepts are not something that we are supposed to avoid in order to get in touch with the ethics of immanent desire - unless they form a totalizing ground. Quite the opposite, we can form adequate ideas and affirm immanent power by producing new concepts, by deterioration. All such new ways of connecting with other bodies means being in struggle or being active to increase our power of affectivity. For Deleuze, our machinic resonance is in a sense an ethical search to be more virtuous, to lead a more active life and to attempt to express new possibilities of connection that not only make us active (therefore good) but also increase our chances (*amor fati*) to encounter with joyful passions. Colebrook elaborates Deleuzian understanding of 'machine':

> An organism is a bounded whole with an identity and end. A mechanism is a closed machine with a specific function. A machine, however, is nothing more than its connections; it is not made by anything, is not for anything and has no closed identity. {Ibid:56}

Thus, Deleuze's notion of ethics expresses a full commitment to what is possibly to come out of 'potentiality'. Literature and philosophy, for instance, can increase our power of affectivity only if they cease to be a so-called mirror or representation of the world. They agree with our mode of existence when they let us desire and open new possibilities of encounters and express that what is to

come, that otherwise than actual. Difference, for this reason, is not merely an appreciation of diversity for the sake of diversity. It is rather seen in a Deleuzian context as the very possibility of "being active" and of "affirming power", which, taken together, bring a possibility of ethics.

Ethical affirmation of desire then requires, according to Deleuze, nothing less than creation. Creation, in a Deleuzian sense, demands an active and creative understanding of connections, assemblages and power of rhizomatic differentiation against illusions of consciousness and sad passions, slavery and decadence. Remaining within the context initially set by Foucault, Deleuze suggested that we no longer live in the societies of discipline where the main attack against life and power was organized by the disciplining apparatus of enclosure. We are recently living in the societies of control where the means of oppression and frustration have become constant communication and molar closures. Deleuze gives here another hint concerning the ethical strategy of his thinking: "What may become increasingly important in the future, Deleuze suggests, are modes of existence that are able 'to create vacuoles of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control" {Smith 1998:264}.

7.3. Embodied politics *of* immanence

Textual functionality of the concept of desire varies considerably in purpose and discourse between different ethical-political and philosophical orientations in the entire Western thought. The most naked appearance of the concept, as we have briefly touched before, is in relation to "reason", and it is in this sense that the rational subject particularly in the post-Cartesian period has come to symbolize a well-balanced resistance against his/her desires. Whether it is a rational transcendental subject of the long past or quasi-transcendental subject of the near past, in all these accounts desire has always been considered in terms of "lack", and the subject has always been monitored, evaluated and challenged by an all-encompassing morality in one's life-long attempts to fill this gap, or attain what is lacked. Textual functionality of the concept in these loosely tied instances of a long tradition, then, has served to establish a notion of desire which is 'naughty' and "apolitical" in nature, and is not "ethically guiding" in any sense.

This is important because, as Bjerke suggests, "… the discursive architecture regulates all the practices of society." This is to say, to mention a re-consideration of a Lacanian notion by Zizek that master signifiers do exist. From one point of view, Smith's notion of "market" or "invisible hand", Karl Marx's "class struggle", or Hegel's "negativity" are first and foremost master-signifiers in this sense,

and that they are mostly regulatory in the sense that emancipation of a certain kind is to follow from them. These master-signifiers are in one sense "imaginary significations", and according to Castoriadis, they "*denote* nothing at all, and they *connote* just about everything". The notion of desire as such established in the entire Platonist tradition has also functioned as a discursive architecture, and regulated the practices of society in such a way that desiring is detached from creating and differentiating. The ethical, political and psychological distance that has been put between desiring and acting is in this sense a by-product of the relevant discursive architecture that reads desire in relation to a necessary lack.

Are, then, other readings of desire which have been identified and endorsed in the present study also regulatory in this sense? Or, in other words, are we still talking – when we talk about immanent and/or embodied desire - about something which merely belongs to another discursive architecture? Is, let's say, immanent desire also an emancipatory linguistic construct operating within a specific political or philosophical community?

In undertaking this task – or answering the question - it is important to show that the notion of desire in the minor Spinozist line of thought deserves a dual strategy to deal with: First, one should show that desire in this account denotes – independently from how we come to put it in use in different types of discursive architectures

- an immanent force or power both generating finite things and dwelling in and among them. Second, once we acknowledge the necessary existence of desire of this kind (a sub-task by which what I call "peeling off" takes place), we then need to move to undertake another sub-task: One should consider reloading the notion of desire of this Spinozist kind with new and powerful expressive elements, ones that are necessary for its political deployment and functionality in the expressionist struggle of society.

My aim in this part is to undertake these two challenging tasks and let this undertaking drive me to the most distant consequence possible to follow. In dealing with the first task, I would like to follow rather a negative methodology and ask" In what ways should Spinozist desire not be taken?" Based on the findings, I would like to argue that a positive strategy is also possible: "In what ways should Spinozist desire be conceived?".

In her lengthy book entitled Subjects of Desire, Butler gives us a very brief outline of Nietzsche-Deleuzian "desire" and its relevance to anti-Hegelian politics. {Butler 1987} She argues, in the very beginning of her exposition, that Deleuze's treatment of desire follows a two interrelating strategies:

"(1) … a critique of desire as negativity, and (2) … the promotion of a normative ideal for desire as affirmation. The former project involves ideology-critique, and the latter entails a reconstruction of

Nietzsche's will-to-power and Spinoza's conatus in the service of a theory of affective emancipation" {ibid:205}. According to Butler, Deleuze employs particularly a Nietzschean notion of "will-to-power" in overcoming Hegel's so-called identical Subject and the negativity of desire as the motivating force this subject consumes in his search for victory. The negativity of Hegelian desire in this reading is a necessary consequence of the potentially identical yet actually incomplete conception of the subject: Desire is the teleological force to lead the subject to a necessary dialectical combat with the other.

Against this conception, Butler argues that Deleuze proposes "the deconstruction of that negativity (Hegelian)", and that this deconstruction "promises a liberation of that more original, bounteous desire" {ibid:206}. For Butler, all that Deleuze does in both *Anti-Oedipus* and *Nietzsche and Philosophy,* with respect to desire, is that he protects a "life-affirming" desire against the repressive forces of Capitalism and Psychoanalysis in the former, and against decadence of slave morality in the latter. Additionally, according to Butler, "This repressed desire is modeled on the will-to-power, but Nietzsche's notion is attributed by Deleuze to Spinoza's conatus…" {ibid:212}.

It is not faithful enough, I would argue, to picture the Deleuzian notion of desire as simply reactive in its very origin. Butler asks us to imagine that Deleuzian desire is merely an exercise of a reactive

reading, endorsed by a critical stance and is possibly bearing emancipation as such. Her attempts to sketch various instances of the articulation of desire in various texts fail to give an adequate and coherent account of desire in Deleuzian and Spinozist vocabulary, and reduce it simply to a Hegelian critique and a reactive re-reading. It is true that Spinozist reading of desire in Deleuze is to an important extent anti-Hegelian. It is also true that there are many occasions in which Deleuze prefers talking about desire in terms of what it is not, and it is exactly in this sense that it is not Hegelian. However, Deleuze's mostly Spinozist notion of desire is also not Butlerian for exactly the same reason. It is not simply *against* repression, nor is it *for* emancipation. The fact that Deleuze posits it sometimes as a natural force which is in agreement with something else or sometimes which is against some others should not make these conceptions exclusive: Desire in our Spinozist program is inclusive of all these conceptions, yet remains more than that and irreducible to any or all of these.

If desire after all is not necessarily against repression and is not by nature for emancipation, then can we suggest that it is not regulatory either? Then, are all these points leading us to take it as politically indifferent and useless? If it is not politically promising by itself, what is the good of thinking of and in terms of desire?

Class struggle in Marx and dialectic of negation in Hegel, from one specific point of view, are both self-regulatory and promising in their own systems of assumptions. Class struggle takes societies to a certain type of desired state without facilitation of or even despite external conditions. Likewise, Hegel's dialectic of negation is also happily regulatory in the sense that consciousness negates the other necessarily, not contingently, in its movement towards self-consciousness and enlightenment. Spinozist desire, on the contrary, does not signify necessarily a hopeful future, a future that is to come independent from man yet to be necessarily happy for man. The failure in appreciating this feature of Spinozist desire results from the lack of recognition, that is potential distinctions in Ethics remain tacit and the immanent desire is confused by other notions of desire available in *Ethics*. I would like to later discuss this distinction, which I think is evident in *Ethics* and is also activated by Deleuze unsystematically.

As I have mentioned before in the third chapter, the first and the most comprehensive notion of desire in Spinoza's *Ethics* is depicted in the first part as an act of substance. This notion of desire appears in this part mostly as organic vibrations of the single substance, and substance desires in this vocabulary much like it expresses itself. This desiring or expressing takes place within the plane of substance, and its relevance to both itself and the modes is immanent. Desiring, therefore, is the very act of substance through

which all else that exists finds the very same primordial disposition to strive for existence. Desire is immanent in this sense, and immanent desire as such is irreducible to any other notions of desire.

It is also possible to derive another distinctive yet a narrower conception of desire from Spinoza's *Ethics*. This conception, as I refer before, comes no earlier than the second part in *Ethics*. From the third chapter onward, Spinoza seems to be concerned with a different semblance of desire, this time the notion of desire is attached closely to the problems of man and human freedom. This narrower and more particular conception of desire (*cupiditas*) can be read as "embodied desire". Spinoza, in fact, differentiates "desire" into two general sub-types as will (*voluntas*), when it denotes only endeavor of mind, and appetite (*appetites*), when it denotes endeavor of both mind and body. However, he mostly works on the latter and gradually dismisses the former. The latter, as he clearly distinguishes, includes the possibility of both conscious and unconscious desiring, that is, it is "desire" when it is conscious and "appetite" when it is unconscious. These two aspects of desiring are both based clearly on the affections of body and are in this sense "embodied".

Embodied desire is therefore the second important notion that can be found from the third part onward in Ethics. The order of these

two appearances of desire (immanent and embodied) has surprisingly become a center of recent debates in radical political philosophy. One of the contemporary Spinoza scholars, Negri, has initiated an important discussion which bears important implications for the political effects of desire in terms of its different instances in Spinoza's thinking. Negri argued in *The Savage Anomaly* for the importance of appreciating two different foundations in Spinoza's thinking {Negri 1991:45-68}. The two foundations, he claims, corresponds to the two different orientations of Spinoza in Ethics, i.e. differences of chronology and philosophy. Ethics, according to him, "is not unitary but, like every other complex philosophical text, a work of several levels, variously structured and articulated" {Ibid:48}. Negri argues that books I and II (*Ethics*) represent in this sense the first foundation and books III, IV and V represent the second foundation. The first is different from the second temporally because it was first studied, according to Negri, earlier than 1665. It is different from the second also because it initially attempted to serve to a radical pantheism and celebrated a fully affirmed totality {Ibid:48}.

Negri attempts to show that the shift in Spinoza's thought from the first to the second foundation is towards liberating beings from the totality of the Being and giving beings autonomy in their own constitution. He writes:

"The first level of the *Philosophia* is therefore the affirmation of existence, of existence as essence, as power *(potentia),* and as totality. The subsequent dislocations or, more simply, the dislocation of the 1670s follows the internal history of being, which has itself constituted its new problem." {Ibid:48}

The reason behinds this shift, Negri argues, is that of the tension felt strongly between ontology of Substance and of finite modes. Monism and univocity of Spinoza assign both of these but respectively with "productivity". Negri cites two propositions from Ethics to demonstrate this tension: (P35: "Whatever we conceive to be in God's Power *(potestas],* necessarily exists"; versus P36: "Nothing exists from whose nature some effect does not follow.") {Ibid:54}. Negri suggests that Spinoza introduces the idea of "attributes" in the first foundation to overcome this tension, in the sense that the way totality of the Substance will express itself without erasing or suppressing the ways through which finite modes will express themselves. The overcoming means here no less than abandoning "… neo-Platonic emanationism in favor of a radically constructive materialism of bodies and surfaces" {Negri 2004:viii}. According to Negri, the basic role assigned to attributes in the first foundation is to "transgress the wholeness of being. It must be within but cannot be within; it can be within but must not be" {Ibid:55}.

Negri argues that Spinoza fails to be rid of this tension in the first foundation, and the contradictions that derive from this tension survive until the second foundation. He writes: "The Spinozian utopia reads this world, interprets it, but tries to impose rationality on it" {Ibid:59}.

Thus Negri points out the far-reaching importance of the second foundation, particularly in terms of politics. Spinoza, for him, reaches to the most mature level of immanence, and politics of immanence only in and after the second foundation, and more specifically in Political Treatise.

It is important here to note, particularly from the standpoint of the thematic of desire, that Spinoza makes mention neither of "desire" nor of "conatus" in the first book. From one point of view, this might be indicative for an argument that the ways the Substance expresses itself cannot be understood in terms of acts of desiring, or of conatus. The fact that this terminology appears substantially in the third and the later books might be suggested as evidence that in the first foundation immanence is not yet established in its full sense. Therefore the terminology of "immanent desire" is useless in terms of the later employment of these terms (desire or conatus). Moreover, one might argue that if we are to seek to establish a politics of desire in a flat horizon of immanence, then what we call immanent desire, which rests on the ontology evident in the first

book, is irrelevant to - if not against - political encounters of individual bodies. Yet, is this point adequately justified?

Matheron presents in his preface to the French edition of *The Savage Anomaly* a clear objection to this assumption. {Negri 1991} He in fact accepts that Negri's arguments for the implications of what Negri calls the second foundation are valid and relevant in terms of the radical outcomes that happily followed from abandoning all post-platonic *émanatism*. He also agrees with Negri that Spinoza moves – as he goes through Ethics to Political Treatise - into a more radically immanent notion of life and politics, i.e. the Substance does not represent in any sense a transcendent origin to its modes, rather the substance and its modes appear immanently at the same plenitude, and the only reality is the actuality of the individual modes {Ibid:20}.

However, Matheron adds that this does not mean that all that Spinoza presented in his earlier analysis in the first book is no longer relevant. What takes place here is – at most - that what used to be attributed to the God in the earlier writings will now on be attributed to the modes. In almost a similar way with the Substance, the modes themselves are now considered to be individual bodies that at least partially produce effects and constitute themselves. However, Matheron reminds us that this picture of a completely anti-hierarchical plenitude is faithful to

Spinoza only when we appreciate the distinction between *Nature Naturans* and *Nature Naturata*. Additionally he makes perhaps the most important point in relation to this distinction: Despite the distinction we can still name the sphere of the latter as God, because there is unity of *potentia* in the former, and nothing but only connected and unified *potentia* of differentiated individuals in the latter. And both of these (both *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*) endeavor to persist in being, to produce as much as it can and to reproduce at the same time. {Ibid:20} For Matheron, therefore, the fact that ontology begins with the theory of conatus does not exclude the other facts that Spinoza's metaphysics of the productivity of power (*potentia*) is disseminated in all levels of his Ethics.

Negri happily revisits this discussion later in his Subversive Spinoza and expresses his debt to several other Spinoza scholars including first of all Matheron and Deleuze {Negri 2004: chapter vii}. He admits in this work that he no longer sees a "Chinese wall" between these two temporal-thematic foundations, rather they could be seen as a way to progressive maturation which will end up with clearly anti-contractarian and anti-totalitarian position taken in *Tractatus Politicus*. He writes:

> Today I remain convinced that two different structures of thought coexist in the Fifth Part of the Ethics, and I still believe that they can be referred to a probable caesura in the development of Spinoza's thought and therefore to

> a different temporality in the elaboration of the Ethics. My re-reading has nonetheless convinced me that, far from opposing one another frontally, these two lines tend to nourish one another reciprocally, and that the passage to the TP shows us precisely this convergence. In the constitution of reality, in the transformation of morality into politics, these two foundations and two structures do not diverge but rather become sutured together."{Negri 2004:101}

Finding out continuity, rather than discontinuity, in Spinoza's project is particularly important for our current purpose: The notion of desire first reveals itself in the first book, and is assigned by Spinoza with the task of constituting modifications of the substance in the sense of expressions. Immanent desire, therefore, underpins Spinoza's very metaphysics right from the first book. Spinoza himself, in fact, provides us with all the evidence – or at least the attempts - for this continuity at the beginning of the third book, where Negri believes the second foundation begins. Spinoza writes here:

> … I shall treat of the nature and force of the emotions and the power of the mind over them, in the same manner as I treated of God and the mind in the previous parts, and *I shall regard human actions and appetites exactly as if I were dealing with lines, planes, and bodies*." {Spinoza E-Boyle:83}

It is not within scope of the present study to argue for or against the possibility that Spinoza's work in its entirety is promising for a certain kind of democracy that should be proposed and defended in a clearly defined political program. Nor would it be fair within present focus to declare an explicit pessimism against any of the contemporary radical theories of Spinozist democracy. Many of these theories, I believe, have succeed to move beyond simply providing a set of optimistic inspirations under the terms of, for instance, "constituent power, ethical multitude and political autonomy" in Negri's case (*Politics of Subversion*, *The Savage Anomaly*), or "potentiality and civil rights" in Agamben's case (*Potentialities*, *Homo Socer*), or "Virtuosity" in Virno's case (*Grammar of the Multitude*). Our focus here is rather to show that the Spinozist desire and its different appearances are necessary to take into consideration, in all their continuity, if we are to think of ethics and politics in terms of immanence and non-representation. The same necessity, one might argue, applies also to thinking of "difference in itself", a Deleuzian emphasis, which suggests that human politics could be read as an effort of bringing the embodied desire of man in tune with immanent desire, an effort which demands no less than thinking desire in terms of unmediated difference.

7.4. Towards a re-reading of desire

What can we hope from thinking of desire as a necessary flow of difference in itself when imagining a new politics? In what sense can we think of embodied desire in terms of immanent encounters embedded in the very totality of the immanent desire? What can this new grammar bring us but non-representational in terms of contemporary politics?

Perhaps one of the most promising sources of inspiration comes from Deleuze in general and Deleuze & Guattari in particular. Deleuze's singular writings, which are basically in the form of a creative study of various philosophers, rarely give political hints. As Patton writes, "His work shows an almost complete lack of engagement with the central problems and normative commitments of Anglo-American political thought. Explicitly political concerns are not the largest part of his oeuvre and they emerged relatively late in his career" {Patton 2000:1}. Deleuzian hints, though they are never propositional in terms of regular politics, still convey a completely new way of looking at life, its organization and subjectivities within this plane. Desire, exactly in this sense, can be seen as an important source of hope, but a hope for a cosmic plane of immanence inclusive also of human beings' political togetherness.

As I briefly touched before in the fifth part, Deleuze's central focus, especially in his later writings, is on the correction of an enduring mistake in Western philosophy in understanding and representing "difference". This misunderstanding, which is particularly responsible for leading us to think of difference necessarily in a counter positioning, such as one *versus* another, also signals political neutralization of the notion of desire. The indirect relationship between the misconception of difference and the political neutralization of desire is established, according to Deleuze and Guattari, through an illegitimate reading of three syntheses that precede the necessary illusions of transcendence concerning "difference" and "desire". An affirmative re-reading of desire, which is truthful to Spinoza as well as Deleuze and Guattari, cannot simply be a reverse reading either of difference or its illegitimate constitution through three syntheses. It rather exceeds the very boundaries of textual territory. Therefore, the philosophical mission is never entirely a representational or hermeneutic resistance, though creation of concepts may also accomplish their tasks. They write:

> … reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier. Rather it is a productive use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts from the text its revolutionary force. {Deleuze and Guattari 1984:106}

Then, in what ways can we extract from the Deleuze-Guattarian text its revolutionary force?

The notion of difference, in Deleuzian philosophy, is explicitly different from earlier ones: Difference is neither what lies between two separate things, nor is it pure negativity as in the Hegel's case. All these notions, Deleuze argues, bear on the inevitable linkage to representation. One may argue that Hegel's emphasis on the inevitability of the negativity rightly presupposes that thinking is always necessarily coupled with dialectical negation. Therefore such negativity is the essential source of difference. Deleuze, on the other hand, rejects the idea that difference is pure negativity inherent in our conceptual makeup, and that's why it does not originate but is originated in the pure negativity of concepts. "It is not the negative which is the motor. Rather, there are positive differential elements which determine the genesis of both the affirmation and the difference affirmed" {Deleuze 1994:67}. Thinking difference otherwise, that is in terms of negative, makes difference a secondary effect of what lies behind. Quite contrary, for Deleuze, difference is the immanent affirmation. He writes, "Negation results from affirmation: this means that negation arises in the wake of affirmation or beside it, but only as the shadow of the more profound genetic element – of the affirmation" {Ibid:67}. Difference of the Hegelian kind, as well as other pre-Deleuzian kinds, falls inevitably within the realm of representation: Our concepts, which

are engineered by pure negativity, cannot help representing the world in terms of difference. Out of this representation comes "a false depth" in which no real movement takes place, for movement "implies a plurality of centers". Thus, Deleuze writes, "Representation fails to capture the affirmed world of difference" {Ibid:67}.

Difference in itself, according to Deleuze, is strictly tied to the univocity of Being, that is substance in Spinoza. There is no difference in *Deus sive Natura* in the shadowy sense. Neither substance, nor its attributes and modes are different from each other as in the common sense notion of difference. Spinoza, Deleuze claims, makes no attempt to create difference upon which a dialectical representation of the world is to be established. Difference, in Spinoza, "must become the element, the ultimate unity; it must therefore refer to other differences which never identify it but rather differenciate it" {Ibid:68}. Substance, in other words, is the immanent unity where difference occurs in differing, as an expressive force, and that difference becomes.

Deleuze explicitly connects the idea of "difference in itself" to that of expressive force in Substance, i.e. differing acts of Deus sive Natura can be taken as expression of an immanent desire for affirmation of the sustained difference in itself. "With Spinoza, univocal being

ceases to be neutralized and becomes expressive; it becomes a truly expressive and affirmative proposition" {Ibid:50}. It is in this sense that Deleuze describes desire as "that of an immanent principle" {Deleuze and Guattari 1984:5}. It is also in this sense that desire is not a mere fiction or a metaphor revolving around the concept of lack, rather it "causes the current to flow, itself flows in turn, and breaks the flows" {Ibid:5}.

Thinking of difference in itself, in terms of and in accord with the immanent desire, is important in finding ways out, or lines of escape, from representational reductionism. Representational reductionism of this kind forces us into a necessary subjectivism, in this or another way, the subject is considered as exposed to an already differentiated world. Language, for instance, turns to be an origin of this already differentiated world in which the subject finds itself and keeps differentiating itself within language. Language as such is a false origin, and it is "entire ordering" {Deleuze 1990:241}. Against this predisposition, Deleuze suggests thinking difference not as a reflection or simply an effect of a so-called differentiated origin, but as a constantly differentiating plane of immanence from which all other differently perceived singularities follow. Language, then, is also one of the effects of difference in itself, and it is not the Subject who survives in previously given differences of language, but, the other way round, the differing subjectivities of *desire become,* differentiate or change just as other

things ever exist or are brought to exist in the same plane of immanence.

For Deleuze, language is neither a true origin of difference nor a true source of representing what takes place in the plane which is full of desiring, differences and becoming. As in Spinoza's substance, infinite number of attributes expresses the substance in infinite ways. It is exactly in this sense that Deleuzian difference in itself can best be understood in reference to immanent desire. Representational reductionism, on the other hand, can at best give us a world of reduced and misrepresented molar constructions.

What I call here "representational reductionism" is a barrier to imagination, i.e. imagination of a unity in which immanent desire and embodied desire are not two different processes conflicting with each other. They both are the expressions of the same plane of immanence, but, speak in terms of cartography, the former is a map of the larger scale whilst the latter is a map of the smaller scale. However, "map" must not be taken as simply a metaphor or trace to reflect a traditional functionality of maps. It should rather be read as "map in becoming" that does not zoom in and represent intensities from different levels of distance, but experiments with the earth and territory. Deleuze reminds us how we are to imagine desire at different and constantly differentiating levels of intensities:

> Make a map, not a tracing. The orchid does not reproduce the tracing of the wasp; it forms a map with the wasp, in a rhizome. What distinguishes the map from the tracing is that it is entirely oriented toward an experimentation in contact with the real. The map does not reproduce an unconscious closed in upon itself; it constructs the unconscious. It fosters connections between fields, the removal of blockages on bodies without organs, the maximum opening of bodies without organs onto a plane of consistency. It is itself a part of the rhizome. The map is open and connectable in all of its dimensions; it is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, or social formation. It can be drawn on a wall, conceived of as a work of art, constructed as a political action or as a mediation. {Deleuze and Guattari 1987:12}

The unity of embodied and immanent desire can be imagined only when liberation from representational language is achieved. This liberation is to realize that "… difference is that by which the given is given" {Deleuze 1994:280}, and all the rest that we employ in our language is just a "contraction". For Deleuze, "each contraction … constitutes a sign which is interpreted…"{Ibid:94}. Habit formation, in Deleuzian sense, is nothing more than contraction. Plane of difference is contracted and habits are formed, and thinking within the regime of representation is not other than habitus. "In essence, habit is contraction" {Ibid:94}.

Contraction, though whatever exists can also be thought as contractions, is specifically a human predisposition: "Language

reduces difference" {Colebrook 2002:38}. However, against this predisposition, Colebrook argues that the Deleuzian call lies here:

> The challenge of all thought, then, is to think these molecular differences from which 'we' emerge. But we also need to understand why the history of western thought has worked in the opposite direction, beginning with the unified subject rather than the 'genetic element' of difference itself. According to Deleuze and Guattari, the homogenisation, subordination and subjection of difference to identity have characterised the process of human history leading up to capitalism and psychoanalysis. {Ibid:39}

It is ironic to notice that both the predisposition for "contraction" and contemporary forms of the insistence on "contractual freedom" rest on the same sort of representation: miscommunication of molar identities. As Colebrook rightly suggests, "Desire is the set of passive syntheses that engineer partial objects, flows, and bodies, and that function as units of production" {Ibid:117}.

Thus, the ethico-political promise of desire is not in any sense a matter of intentional release. Rather, this promise is a call for setting ourselves, as far as possible, free of representation. Embodied desire, from this perspective, is an expressive *potentia*, that might open up lines of flights by being a bare possibility of a power of affectivity. Once it is set free of representation, embodied desire, in seeking active

affections, can connect us back in global immanence, where multitude is not less than a constant differentiation of partialities.

VIII CONCLUSION

Returning to the our focus posed at the beginning of this study, it is now possible to ask: where does the significance lie in becoming aware of and appreciating the two modes of desire, the immanent and the embodied, and in setting ourselves free from the representational forms of desire that presuppose a human subjectivity? The latter is guilty, I have argued so far, not for misrepresenting what desire in fact is, but simply for attempting to represent it, for it attempts to represent what cannot be represented at all. Out of this necessary misrepresentation has grown an ecologically insensitive humanism, and ethics of hesitation, and no doubt a politics of representation through which affectivity of bodies have been isolated behind the frozen surface of the subject and desire turns to be an inert voice, a sign of loss, the scream of a loser, an invitation to which no body will ever respond.

We need to imagine a new political subjectivity other than what we understand from "human subjectivity" in a narrow sense. Desiring and constantly differentiating bodies, temporal formations and reformations of intensities and the immanent flow of difference should inspire us and offer new possibilities of thinking ethico-political togetherness in terms of encounters, becoming and individuation. In this thinking, immanent desire denotes what has

always already in force within the plane of immanence, and how constantly differentiating bodies of intensities form, deform and reform new ones. Embodied desire, in accord with this larger plane of immanence, denotes how the affectivity of human bodies bear the possibility of a non-representational connection back to immanence.

We should give up identifying desire with any of those notions that read it necessarily in relation with an object: "desire for…" Or those that read it as an effect of a self-conscious subject: "I desire…". Desire of this kind can at best serve the political illusion that has been produced and re-produced by representation. There have always been political programs trying to make us believe that they suggest the best set of "objective values", the desire *for* which is equally meaningful to us all. And there has always been something transcendent, absent or unreachable within what "I desire…" represents. The pessimism implied by the latter will always be mismatched by the political suggestions imposed by the former.

Yet, this is not a destiny inevitable. Nor could it be a destiny for the universe. Goodchild outlines what we have come to realize today:

> At the turn of the millennium… the progress of humanism has run up against insuperable limits. The new sciences of chaos and complexity demonstrate how the behaviour of matter frequently exceeds all powers of prediction: science no longer gives mastery.

> The ecological crisis demonstrates how economic production is dependent upon a broader framework of ecological cycles to supply its resources and absorb its waste, cycles which can easily become unstable: technology no longer gives mastery. The globalisation of the capitalist free market economy demonstrates how social and personal choices are governed by autonomous processes driven by debt, profit, and control of consumer desire, rather than ordered by humane values and a substantive rationality: economics no longer gives mastery.
>
> Within this context, the narrowness and impotence of political theory is exposed. In the first place, whether or not political theory is conceived as a discourse on representation, it is practiced as a representative discourse, aiming to represent faithfully the actual or desired political constitution of reality. (Goodchild, 3-4)

As this also suggests, the current situation of ecology, terrorism and global economy can obviously be read as the basic misfortunes of humanist politics. And, according to Goodchild, "…what is required above all is a post humanist politics".

We need to experiment for non-representational forms of expression, through which bodies of intensities – each through its embodied desire - can connect to other bodies, and the total regime of bodies differentiates in tune with immanent becoming. The

problem, therefore, is one that Woodard translates for us in reference to Negri and Hardt:

> The problem… is to find a form of resistance which 'does not rely on the sovereignty of the people (which would only replicate existing problematic forms) but is based instead in the biopolitical productivity of the multitude… Is there an immanent mechanism that does not appeal to any transcendent authority'? (Woodard, 125)

In the present study, I have first discussed that non-representationally conceived desire can help us imagine and create novel forms of individuation, human as well as non-human individuation, by means of which the presupposed autonomy of the subject, his ethical and political deliberation can be undermined.

As part of such a program, I argued in the second chapter that free-will or autonomy is not a necessary make-up but a historically contingent construct. Homeric societies, from this point of view, constitute evidence that the absence of autonomy or free-will in the modern sense is not a barrier for ethical formation to flourish in what is given. I also discussed in this chapter that the Greek invention of individual self-consciousness and overvaluation of human being set the stage for the rest of the modern Western philosophy. The idea of autonomous self turned to be autonomous

reason and "the subject" became the main source of transcendence and representation.

I reserved the third chapter for a critical discussion of desire in terms of the subject and subjectivity. I have argued that Hegelian influence is inevitable in the discussion of desire, especially when it comes to thinking of desire in terms of self-consciousness and the dialectic struggle between the two sources of self-consciousness. For Hegel, I have suggested, desire is accompanied by a necessary tension created and sustained between the different sources of consciousness, each of which desires recognition from and at the expense of each other. The symmetrical negativity of Hegelian philosophy attributes to "desire", on the one hand, a proactive character and in this sense it is compatible with an affirmative reception of desire. However, on the other hand, it reads desire as a source of subjectivity and reduces it to a dialectical impulse. Hegelian desire is so to speak a subjectivity-generating impulse, and he attempts to animate history out of this provocation. Desire is no longer of the cosmos, but of the subject and subjectivities.

From one point of view, most of the influential post-Hegelian philosophies can be read as a counter attack to overcome this negativity, conflicting symmetry and dialectic, and they therefore tried to erect different forms of transcendence based on the asymmetry saved after Hegel. Levinas, in this sense, placed the

ethical demand of the Other before anything else and his voice beyond everything else. His difficulty, however, in articulating most of his concepts including the Other, face, or infinity might be evidence to his appeal for ethical transcendence. Levinas, I have argued in the third chapter, chose the lifting up of the Other (transcendental trace) to question the so-called stability, presence and dominance of the Subject.

Derrida, another post-Hegelian voice, also questioned the presence and the priority of the same, and he also sought the footsteps of the Other, which was there long before but remained non-present. I have argued that Derrida's deconstruction in fact draws attention to what has already been in text: a subversive desire leading the very act of reading to proceed in such a way in which sovereignty of the subject over meaning is undermined. The quasi-transcendental aspects of deconstruction, however, still link Derridean ethics to an "experience of the impossibility". The subject, within this experience of the impossible, is first displaced and then left open to the demands of the Other. Textual evidences of deconstruction (acts of difference and differànce) provide Derrida's thinking with a worldly justification. Yet, I have argued that one finds no strong case in Derrida for either an affirmation or celebration of ethical potency.

The fourth chapter set out to determine on what bases a psychoanalytic reception of desire could be questioned and refused.

It was argued that Freud, from many respects, is a crucial milestone with regard to the configuration of libidinal desire. Prior to this, I also attempted to show that Freudian skepticism of a coherent and unified conscious self opened new channels from which desire-infected attacks of the unconscious could emanate. Psychoanalytic desire in Freud's hands, however, was reduced to the effects of a repressed libido and cut off from production and affirmation.

The Lacanian version, on the other hand, presented a wider account of desire, i.e. desire is no longer a libido-driven force or effect, but rather a "search after lack" and can best be understood in terms of symbolic realm. Lacan expanded the vision by maintaining that desire is a desperate longing after what has never been, and the subject always represents this tragedy when he urges satisfaction. Absence or lack, in Lacanian psychoanalysis, therefore connects the idea of desire to that of the symbolic loop in which no power and no resistance is possible.

In the fifth chapter, I have argued for the possibility of discovering an organic link between immanence and ethics in Spinoza's Ethics. Within Spinoza's ontology I have discussed that God or Nature's "power of existence" cannot be considered without a reference to immanence. Thus, I have introduced "immanent desire" to mean the expressive nature of God or Nature leading all things embedded in the one and the same substance to express "power of existence". I

have tried to read and re-read the first chapter in Ethics to uncover those expressive acts of the substance that can be imagined as "immanent desire". This very power which is inseparable from the plane of immanence has appeared in this study as the unique possibility of a post-humanist ethics, i.e. ethics of conatus. Ethics of conatus, in this sense, has been offered as a condition of common ontology for human and non-human bodies, as well as those non-living bodies: Each thing, in so far as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being. Thus the encounters of different and diverse bodies within the plane of immanence are the basis of this common ethico-ontology. In the same way, what I have repeatedly called "embodied desire" denotes the only medium that can link human life to the rest of the bodies and couplings in God or Nature. The regime of affectivity regulates and is regulated by this embodied desire, and it is peaceful if in accord with the immanent desire.

I reserved the sixth chapter for a detailed discussion of the Deleuzian and Deleuze-Guattarian contribution to this/the stage previously set by Spinoza and Nietzsche. First, I tried to present an outline of Deleuze's ontology, and his position against the traditional reception/perception of Being. His position, I argued, is to activate Event, rather than Being, to uncover possibilities of thinking a body of potentiality, i.e. a differentiating agency.

Based on this Deleuzian ontology, I have elaborated on the notions of "affirmation" and "affirmative ethics" by means of a relational exposition of the positions of Spinoza and Nietzsche. Both philosophers, I have argued, are important to allow us to see that traditional morality and its emphasis on subjectivity are the results of the illusions of consciousness.

All this inspired a new political question: How can we elude control? The two moods of desire, I have argued, will be the basic source of motivation if we are to drop representation and its linguistic effects, self-contained subjectivity and the repressive political practices that follow from these illusions. I have also touched but very briefly on what recent debates concerning the possibility of a non-representational politics might actually bring to deal with this challenge. I have argued, in this respect, for the possibility of imagining immediate compatibility of embodied desire with that of the immanent desire, and defended the coherence and consistency of the two foundations of Spinoza's thought: How should we live as multitudes by affirming our embodied desires and by resisting representational illusions that isolate /cut us off from expressive flows of the immanent desire.

I have suggested in the last section that this task requires no less than thinking life as a flow of difference-in-itself and desire as the

only motivating power to be aware of individuation, synthesis, and non-representational ethico-political couplings.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A. TURKISH SUMMARY

Arzu kavramı, etik ve politika üzerine yapılan felsefi tartışmalarda her zaman sıkça ziyaret edilen bir kavram olmuştur. Ancak, kavramın bu tartışmalarda ele alınış biçimi, özellikle geleneksel Batı metafizik düşüncede, arzuyu ikincil bir unsur olarak görmeye yöneliktir. Pek çok felsefi analiz açısından da etik ve politik mutluluk tam da arzuya ne ölçüde direnç gösterebilir olduğumuzla ilişkilendirilmiş, bu türden insani pratikler bütünü olarak etik ve politikada arzu giderek baştan çıkarıcı bir tehdite dönüşmüştür.

Batı felsefesi bu anlamda büyük oranda tek sesli bir koro görünümündedir: Aklımızın gösterdiği ile arzumuzun yönlendiriciliği arasında oluşan gerilim kaçınılmazdır ve etiko-politik pratik tam da bu gerilimle başa çıkma sanatıdır. Bu tek sesli koro, kimi önemli sıradışı seslere karşın, genel olarak arzuyu zorunlu olarak insana referansla düşünmek bakımından homojendir. Benzer biçimde, etik ve elbette politika da insanı merkeze koymaya koşullu bir felsefe pratiği yardımıyla düşünülmektedir. Bu güçlü ana akımda insanı merkeze koyan (anthropomorphic) farklı felsefeler Hegel öncesi

dönemde "özerk özne" (autonomous subject) ve "özgür irade"ye (free-will) vurgu yaparken, Hegel'den sonra bu türden vurgular kaybolmuş, ancak bu kez de "öznenin aşkınlığı" (transcendence of the subject) biçiminde bir hümanizm belirginleşmiştir.

Bu ana akımın dışında, hem arzuyu hem de bununla ilişkili olarak etiği zorunlu olarak insana referansla düşünmeyen ikincil, çokça yok sayılan, neredeyse dikkate alınmayan bir başka felsefe serisi uzun bir zamandır kendi yolunda sessizce ilerlemektedr. Bu alternatif gelenekte, özerk ya da aşkın öznenin herhangi bir türünden önce, başka her şeyle birlikte bugün özne dediğimiz türden varlıkları da türeten içkinlik (immanence) teması çalışılmaktadır. Arzu, bu anlamda, adına özne dediğimiz türden insan varlıklarına ikincil, ya da onlara referansla anlaşılabilecek bir unsur değildir. Arzunun varlığı, arzulayan bir özneyi gereksinmez; belki tersine, arzu, içinden başkaca her şeyin türediği bir içkinlikteki tetikleyici, farklılaştırıcı ve çoğaltıcı eyleme gücüdür. Böylece bu gelenekte insana gelindiğinde de akıl ile arzu arasındaki sözde bir gerilime yaslanan etik ya da politika kavramsallaştırmasına rastlanmaz. Arzu, olmakta olan her şeyin olmaktalığını sürdürürken başvuracağı temel kılavuza dönüşür ve her şey tek ve aynı içkinlik düzleminde varlıkta kalma arayışını aslında aynı kılavuzla sürdürür. İlk ve ana gelenekte Platon'dan başlayarak aşkıncı ya da yarı-aşkıncı çağdaş filozoflara kadar hemen herkesi sayarsak, bu geleneğin karşısında konuşlanan "içkinlik"

düşüncesinde de Spinoza, belki Hume, kesinlikle Nietzsche ve elbette Deleuze'ü görürüz.

Özetlenen tarihsel gelişimin zorunlu uğraklar bütünü olduğunu ileri sürmek için yeterli nedenimiz yoktur. Bir başka deyişle, Batı felsefesi etiğin zorunlu kaynağı ve koşulu olarak özerk özneyi varsaymıştır, çünkü başka türlüsü düşünülemezdi demek çok olanaklı değildir. Homerik toplumlar bu açıdan ilginç bir karşı örnek oluşturmaktadır. Kişinin rolü onun nasıl yaşayacağını bire bir belirlemekte bu rol de kişiden çok önce toplumca oluşturulmakta, bu anlamda kişinin yapması gereken, ondan bekleneni gerçekleştirme kudreti gösterebilmesi anlamına gelmektedir: Yapabildiğin, yapman gerekendir; başarıyla yapabilen erdemlidir!

Sokrates sonrası Yunan felsefesi bu anlamda Homerik toplumdan tekil bireyi ve onun özerkliğini merkeze koyan bir düşünce miras almamış, bununla birlikte, genel bilme arayışında ağırlık merkezinin fizikten antropolojiye doğru kaymasıyla birlikte ilk kez Protogoras'ta cisimleşecek insan merkezli kozmos fikrine açıkça yönelmiştir. Modern dönemde bu anlayışın altın çağı Descartes ile başlamış, Kant ile sürmüştür. Tüm bu gelenek içinde, bilginin, iyinin ve yasanın insan-öznede verili oluşu, bu yücelikvari yanıyla insanın değilse de, öznenin her türlü doğa yasasının üstünde olması gerektiği fikri pekişmiştir. Arzu adı geçen düşünürler için akılla (reason) manipülasyonu hem olanaklı, hem de gerekli bir baştan çıkarıcı olmaya modern dönemde de devam etmiştir.

Hegel, hem öznenin statüsü, hem de arzunun özneler arası ilişkide ve bilincin kendilik bilincine doğru olan yolculuğundaki rolüne yaptığı vurgu açısından ayrıcalıklı bir yerde durmaktadır. Tekil özne ilk kez Hegel'de başka özne(ler) ile karşı karşıya getirilmiş, öznenin öznelliği bir anlamda diğer özneye bağlanmıştır. Hegel'de arzu bilincin kendilik bilincine doğru olan deviniminde hem tetikleyici, hem de ötekinden dönüp gelecek bilincin şiddet içeren bu kalkışmasında temel motivasyondur.

Hegel felsefesi, tekil öznenin sözde yüceliğini, öteki özneyle karşılaşmaya ve ancak ötekiyle karşılaşmaya bağlamak açısından uzun Batı metafiziğinde "özne tahakkümü"nü bir ölçüde sarsmıştır. Ne var ki, arzu soruşturması açısından bakıldığında, Hegel'in de insandan bağımsız bir arzu nosyonuna sahip olmadığı görülmektedir. Hegel'den sonraki felsefe, bu nedenle, bir yandan öznenin, bilincin ve egonun eleştirel okumasını yapacak, diğer yandan da etik ve politikayı öznede başlayıp biten yaşantılar değil, ancak ötekinin varlığıyla olanaklı ve ötekinden doğru anlaşılabilecek aşkın deneyimlere dönüştürecektir. Aynı sürece belki Hegel kadar ciddi bir katkı Freud'tan gelmiş, Lacan, Levinas ve Derrida gibi çağdaş Fransız felsefesinde öznenin totaliter söylemini, ötekinin temsil edilemez sesi ile parçalama yoluna gidilmiştir. Lacan'da sürekli bir eksikliğin peişinde gidişi ifade eden "arzu", Levinas'ta hesaba, dile ve belirlenime gelmeyen "öteki" ve "yüz" gibi nosyonlar, ve son olarak Derrida'da "sürekli ertelenen adalet" kavramı öznenin tüm yanıtları

kendinde mevcut totaiter ve bitirici söylemine, ötekinin "temsil edilemez hak ve taleplerinden", benzer biçimde, dildeki sonu gelmez göstergeler zincirinin sonsuzluk temsilinden güç alan br yanıttır. Bu felsefi tavır, öznenin tahakkümünü, sözde yekpare, rasyonel ve kuşatıcı imajını parçalamak, totaliter "ben" vurgusunu hafifletmekte ciddi mesafeler kaydetmiştir. Bununla birlikte, etik ve ardından politikayı, gösterilemez, somutlaştırılamaz ve güçle savunulamaz bir "ötekilik" çağrısına indirgemek nedeniyle içkin felsefe geleneği açısından sorunludur. Öznenin ya da ötekinin aşkınlığı, bu anlamda, yalnızca tedirgin bir etik duruş, eyleme gücü azaltılmış bir politik birliktelik yaratmaktadır.

Hem arzu kavramı, hem de bu kavramla ilişkili olarak betimlenen etik ve pratik "oluş" (becoming) açısından, içkinlik düşüncesi yeni kavramsal açılımlara, yeni bir esine ve pratik vizyona olanak verebilecek zengin bir dağarcığa sahiptir. Bu dağarcık, bir ölçüde ilk izleri Stoa'da görülse de, en açık ve güçlü ifadesini Spinoza'da bulur. Ethica, Spinoza düşüncesinde bildik türden etik sorunları, bunlara bağlı yaptırımları aşar, tüm varlıkların var olmak bakımından katıldıkları bir bütünlüğü, her türden temsilden bağımsız bir dolayımsızlıkla inceleme çabasıdır. Kendi kendinin nedeni olan Tanrı (ya da Doğa) fikri, bu anlamda, varlıklar arası insan merkezli bir hiyerarşiye gereksinmeyen, tersine bu türden tüm yükseltileri tek bir düzlemde rastlantısal (contingent) ve temporal (gelip geçici) engebeliklere dönüştürür. Spinoza'nın içkinlik düşüncesi, öncelikle

aşkınsal (transcendental) tanrıdan, sonra da beden-zihin ikileminden ve bu iki hedef dolayımıyla da insan-özne merkezli bir etikten kurtulma projesidir. Bu süreçte "töz" (substance) sürekli devinim, farklılaşma ve türetmenin gerçekleştiği tek ve birick gerçekliktir; olmakta olan her şeyin hem birliği, hem de farklılaşmanın aynı anda hem nedeni hem de devamıdır.

Spinoza, Ethica'nın özellikle ilk kitabında açımladığı töz ve içkinlik fikrini, var olduğu biçimiyle olmuş ve bitmiş olan bir bütünlük olarak algılamanın önünü keser: Doğa ya da Tanrı ne yalnızca üretici, ne de üründür; Doğalayan Doğa (natura naturans) ile Doğalanan Doğa (natura naturata) bir arada ve eş zamanlı oluşur; bu oluşlarda mekansal bir yükselti hiyerarşisi olmadığı gibi, zamansal bir kronolojinin de izi sürülemez. Bu vurguyla Spinoza, felsefesini, disiplinlerarası bir fizik-felsefe düzlemine oturtur. Etik ve ontoloji bir ve aynı gerçekliğin farklı sıfatlar ve tarzlar aracılığıyla türetilişinden başka bir şey değildir.

Etihica'nın ilk ve ikinci kitaplarında kurulan "tetikleyerek olagelen" içkinlik fikri, izleyen üç kitapta bu tek düzlemde cereyan eden tarzların yaşantısının daha özel, tekil ve yakın mesafeden incelemesine dönüşür. Bu anlamda, özellikle üçüncü kitap insanın kuramsal ve pratik deneyimlerinden alışık olduğu iyi, kötü, arzu ve etik gibi temaları Spinozacı bu yeni içkinlik ontolojisi içinde yeniden kurar.

İnsanların da diğer bedenler içinde bir beden (şeyler içinde bir şey) olarak düşünüldüğü bu yeni felsefede, arzu da, içkinlik içinde şeyleri başka şeylerle zorunlu olarak karşılaştıran, onları bu karşılaşmalardan azalarak ya da çoğalarak geçip gitmeye yönelten bir itkiye dönüşür. "İçkin arzu" (immanent desire) bu bağlamda, Spinoza'nın Ethica'sındaki ilk iki kitaptan çıkarılabileceğini düşündüğümüz ilk arzu nosyonudur. Bu, bir öznenin bir nesneyi istemesi anlamında arzudan tümüyle farklıdır ve bu türden yanlış okumaları dışlar. Etik, böylece, bedenlerin zorunlu karşılaşmaları ve bu karşılaşmalardan geçerek sürecek bir "eyleme gücü" (power of acting) artış-azalışlarını yönetebilme becerisine dönşür.

Eyleme gücümüzü artıran karşılaşmalar iyi, azaltanlar kötüdür. Buradaki iyi ve kötü hiçbir biçimde mutlak değil, her bir bedenin verili karşılaşmasına görecedir. Her beden, tözün yalnızca bir modifikasyonu olmak bakımından sonludur ve varlıkta kalmayı istemesi ve bu doğrultuda çabalamasına karşın (conatus), varlıkta kalışının bir garantisi yoktur. Bir beden için varlıkta kalmadaki başarı karşılaşmalarında açığa çıkacak eyleme gücü değişimlerinin olabildiğince olumlu yönde olmasını sağlamaya çalışmaktır. Böylece, bedenler düzeyinde değerlendirildiğinde, her bir bedenin "içkin arzu" ile uyumlu olarak varlıkta kalma çabasında kulak vereceği ikinci bir arzu nosyonunun "cisimleşmiş arzu" (embodied desire) olduğu öne sürülebilir. Cisimleşmiş arzu, her bedenin –insan sözkonusu olduğunda, bedeni, tözün düşünme ve yayılım sıfatlarının birliği

olarak okumalıyız- eyleme gücünü artıracak duygulanımları ve bunlara yol açacak karşılaşmaları çoğaltma kavgasında kulak verdiği ilk ve temel kaynaktır. Spinoza'nın Ethica'da "tamuygun bilgi" dediği bilgi türü işte bu okuma çerçevesinde bakıldığında her bir bedenin kendi "cisimleşmiş arzusu"nun bir ifadesine dönüşmesi, bunu doğru başarabildiği oranda da "içkin arzu"ya katılabilmesidir.

Spinoza'ya yaslanarak resmettiğimiz bu iki arzu nosyonu ve içkinlik fikri, insan bireyleri açısından yeterli netlikte bir etik ve politik sezgi sağlamamakta, bunun yerine Deleuze'cü anlamda yeni kavramlar sağlamak yoluyla ufkumuzu genişletmektedir. Önümüze açılan bu yeni yolda biraz daha kararlı bir yöneliş geliştirebilmek ve politikaya daha fazla yaklaşabilmek içinse Deleuze ve Deleuze-Guattari'ci bir Spinoza okuması kaçınılmazdır.

Deleuze, Spinozacı içkinlik fikrini ve onun etiği ontolojiden ayırmayan naturalizmini benimser. Kendi ontolojisi, bir anlamda, Spinozacı töz, sıfatlar ve tarzlar üçlemesinin oluş (event), ayrışma (differentiation) ve farklıcisimleşme (differenciation) biçiminde bir yeniden kavramsallaştırmasıdır. Bir başka deyişle, Deleuze, Spinoza'cı tözün ifade ediş biçimini kendi kavramlarını yaratarak yeniden okur. Böylece, içkinlik düzlemindeki oluş, kendini önce –diyelim- bir fikir olarak ifade eder ve fikir olarak ayrışır, ama hemen ardından bir kez daha ama bu sefer bir cisimleşme olarak ifade eder. Verili bir anda farklıcisimleşmiş bir şey ve onun fikir olarak da

ayrışması belirir; burada olan, aslında, Spinozacı anlamda hem cisimsel hem de fikirsel olanın tek bir tözün iki ayrı ifadesi ile açığa çıkan görünümden başka bir şey değildir.

Deleuze'ün içkinlik düşüncesine ve "ahlak' olmaksızın 'etik" fikrine yaptığı asıl katkı ifade (expression), fark (difference) ve arzu (desire) kavramlarıyla ilgilidir. Deleuze, bu kavramları genişletip değiştirirken adeta geleneksel felsefedeki kullanışlarından soyar, yeni edimler için kullanıma sunar. Buna göre, Deleuze'de "ifade", dili, dolayısıyla insan-özneyi önceler: Dünya (kozmos) sürekli ifade edişlere sahnedir; her şey ifade eder. Dil söz konusu olduğunda da ifade ediş kapsamında kalırız; ama, buradaki dilsel etkinliğin temsile dayalı dilsel etkinlikten ayrılması zorunludur. İşte bu amaçla Deleuze, her yeni kavramın yeni bir ifade ediş denemesi olduğunu, sürekli yinelenecek kavram yaratma sürecinin temsili bir dile hapsolmuş insana kaçış delikleri yaratacağını söyler. Bu nedenle her kavram "cisimleşmiş arzu"yu ifade etmek, ardından da "içkin arzu"ya yöneliş için temsilden kaçış olanağı yaratmak açısından birer fırsattır, ama hepsi o kadar! Deleuze'ün felsefesi hiçbir zaman bir dil analizine yönelmemiştir.

Deleuze'cü ikinci önemli katkı "fark" kavramıyla ilgilidir. Oluş, oluşlar içinde ifade edişler, sentez, yoğunluklar ve bireyleşme tüm Deleuze öncesi felsefede benimsenen fark nosyonlarının hiçbiriyle anlaşılamazlar. Deleuze'de fark, ne iki ayrı şeyin birbirinden tümüyle

ayrı olması, ne de iki şeyin birbirine etki ederek kendini diğerinden farklılaştırmasıdır. Fark, kendi-içinde-farktır, farkoluş, farklaşagelmedir. Sürekli akış halindeki oluşta kısmi (partial), geçici (temporal) ve niceliksel (non-quantitative) olmayan bir tarz değiştirmedir. Deleuze'de arzunun üretici bir güce dönüşmesi, kendi-içinde-farkın akışında zaman içinde belli yoğunlukları oluşturan, bunların dağılmasını tetikleyen ve yeni yoğunluklara doğru iteleyen güç arzudur. Deleuze, tam da bu nedenle, arzuyu bilinçaltına hapseden, bilinçaltını ise arzuyu ara sıra dışarı kaçıran bir hapishaneye çeviren psikoanalitik okulu eleştirir. Oysa arzu üretkendir, kurar, bozar ve sürdürür…

Temsile dayalı bir dil, baktığı çevrede hazır kimlikler (özne, şu ya da bu gerçek kişi) görür. Bu kimlikler bazen kadın, bazen erkektir; sınıf arkadaşım Aysun dün kahve içtiğim Aysun'la aynıdır. Deleuze-Guattari felsefesinde ise bu, bir yoğunluğun başka bir yoğunluğa yönelik bir ifade ediş içinde olduğunu gösterir. İsimle sabitlenen bu yoğunluklar giderek temsil ile idare etmeye mecbur oluşumuzdan değil de, gerçekten de orada iki ayrı kimlik olduğununu düşünmemize yol açar: Temsil, farkı azaltır… Algılanamaz küçüklüklerin geçici bir araya gelişlerinden oluşan yoğunlukların cisimleşmiş arzular olarak kendilerini ifade etmelerini, bu ifade edişlerden yeni yoğunlukların şekillenmesini ve tahakküme hep direnecek kendiliğinden politik arzulayan makinaların dolaşımını engeller.

Felsefe, arzu açısından ele alındığında, her ikisi de insan merkezli olan "özerk özne" ve "aşkın öteki" gibi, etik ve politikada insanı eyleme gücünden koparan, onu zayıflatan ve giderek bir aradalığı sahte bir merhamet duygusuna indirgeyen okumalara artık daha mesafeli durmalıdır. Bunun yerine, temsil edilemez bir arzu tarafından birbirine çekilen, itilen ve bırakılan yoğunluklar olarak yeni bir etik ve politik olanağın izini sürmelidir. Bu çalışmada önerdiğimiz Spinoza-Nietzsche-Deleuze çizgisi, içkinlik düşüncesinin bu türden bir açılıma ne ölçüde esin kaynaklığı edebileceğini göstermeye çalışmıştır.

APPENDIX. B. CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

Surname, Name:	Çetin Balanuye
Nationality:	Turkish
Date and Place of Birth:	16 August, 1970, İzmir

EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MA	University of London Institute of Education (Phil.)	2000
MS	METU Educational Sciences	1998
BS	METU Guidance and Psychological Counseling	1994

WORK EXPERIENCE

Year	Place	Enrollment
2000-Present	Halıcı Group Informatics	CEO
1995-2000	The Ministry of Education	Coordinator of Joint Educational Projects
1994-1995	MSR Inc.	Research Executive

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English.