

**THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL MEDIA IN WORLD POLITICS:  
A CASE OF IRAQ WAR OF 2003**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**BERRİN AŞKIN**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

**APRIL 2006**

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Science

---

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata  
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Meliha Benli Altunışık  
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı  
Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

|                            |                 |       |
|----------------------------|-----------------|-------|
| Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı    | (METU,IR)       | _____ |
| Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen    | (ÇANKAYA, PSIR) | _____ |
| Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür | (METU, IR)      | _____ |

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name : Berrin AŞKIN

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **THE ROLE OF THE GLOBAL MEDIA IN WORLD POLITICS: A CASE OF IRAQ WAR OF 2003**

Aşkın, Berrin

M. Sc., Department of International Relations

Supervisor : Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

April 2006, 124 pages

This thesis analyzes the role of the global media in world politics. The global media as a major source of information performs many functions in world politics. Due to the technological innovations both the global media and world politics has extended their scope and content. It is the aim of this thesis to explore to what extent the global media and world politics changes and to what extent the global media affect world politics. Moreover, this thesis aims to analyze the actors that play a significant role in the relation of global media and world politics. This thesis will also question the importance and effects of global media in world politics through the examples of Iraq War of 2003. This thesis argues that global media are the important actor of world politics by their agenda-setting, impediment and accelerant effects which influences public opinion. The aim of this thesis is to question the power of the global media on public opinion through the existential media structures, while showing the effects of global media by the examples of Iraq War of 2003.

Keywords: Global Media, World Politics, Iraq War of 2003, Al-Jazeera, BBC, CNN, Global Audience, Information Society, Mass Communication, Propaganda

## ÖZ

### KÜRESEL MEDYANIN DÜNYA POLİTİKASINDAKİ ROLÜ: 2003 IRAK SAVAŞI ÖRNEĞİ

Aşkın, Berrin

Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi : Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı

Nisan 2006, 124 sayfa

Bu çalışma, küresel medyanın dünya politikasındaki rolünü incelemektedir. Bilginin temel kaynağı olarak küresel medya dünya politikasında çok sayıda işlev gerçekleştirmektedir. Teknolojik gelişmeler, hem küresel medyanın hem de dünya politikasının alanını ve içeriğini genişletmiştir. Bu tezin amacı, küresel medya ve dünya politikasındaki değişimlerin ne derecede olduğunu ve küresel medyanın dünya politikasını ne derecede etkilediğini ortaya koymaktır. Dahası, bu tez küresel medya ve dünya politikası ilişkisinde önemli rol oynayan aktörlerin analiz edilmesini amaçlamaktadır. Bu tez ayrıca, küresel medyanın dünya politikasındaki etkilerini ve önemini 2003 Irak Savaşı'ndan örneklerle sorgulayacaktır. Bu tezde ileri sürülen argüman şudur; küresel medya, dünya politikasında gündem oluşturma, engelleme ve hızlandırma etkileriyle kamuoyunu etkileyen önemli bir aktördür. Bu tez, bir yandan küresel medyanın kamuoyu üzerindeki gücünü mevcut medya yapılarından hareketle sorgularken, diğer yandan 2003 Irak Savaşı'ndan örneklerle küresel medyanın etkilerinin gösterilmesini amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Küresel Medya, Dünya Politikası, 2003 Irak Savaşı, El-Cezire, BBC, CNN, Küresel Hedef Kitle, Bilgi Toplumu, Kitle İletişim, Propaganda

*To My Dear Mother Mahiye and Father İbrahim*

*and,*

*To My Sisters Nermin and Behiye*

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı for his guidance, advice, criticism, encouragements and insight throughout the research.

I would also like to thank my distinguished examining committee members, Prof. Dr. Ramazan Gözen and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Özlem Tür for their suggestions and comments.

I am also grateful to Necil Nedimoğlu and Şehnaz Bağcı for their criticisms, advices and moral supports from the beginning to the end in terms of the preparation of the thesis. Also, I would like to thank Özlem Kaplan and Firdevs Canbaz for their motivation and technical guidance.

Lastly, I would like to express my deepest thanks to my parents, Mahiye and İbrahim Aşkın, who have supported and encouraged me not only finishing this thesis but also throughout the my education. I also owe great thank to my dear sister Behiye Aşkın for giving her room during the writting period.





|         |   |     |
|---------|---|-----|
| 1.2.2.5 | State .....   | 40  |
| 1.2.2.6 | Global Audience .....                                     | 45  |
| 1.2.3   | Media Ethics and Democracy .....                          | 46  |
| 1.3     | Information Society and Its Impact on World Politics..... | 49  |
| 2.      | THE IMPORTANCE OF GLOBAL MEDIA IN WORLD POLITICS.....     | 55  |
| 2.1     | New World Information and Communication Order.....        | 57  |
| 2.2     | Point of View.....  | 59  |
| 2.3     | Propaganda.....   | 61  |
| 2.4     | The Effects of Global Media News.....                     | 63  |
| 2.4.1   | The Media as Accelerant.....                              | 64  |
| 2.4.2   | The Media as Impediment.....                              | 65  |
| 2.4.3   | The Media as Agenda- Setting Agents.....                  | 67  |
| 2.5     | Power of the Global Media.....                            | 68  |
| 3.      | HOW THE GLOBAL MEDIA PERCEIVED IRAQ WAR OF 2003 .....     | 72  |
| 3.1     | A Brief of the Iraq War .....                             | 73  |
| 3.2     | Global Media Coverage of the Iraq War .....               | 79  |
| 3.2.1   | The US Media .....  | 80  |
| 3.2.2   | The European Media.....                                   | 85  |
| 3.2.3   | The Arab Media.....                                       | 88  |
| 3.2.4   | Embedded Journalists.....                                 | 92  |
| 3.2.5   | Free Journalists.....                                     | 94  |
| 3.3     | Evaluation and Comparing.....                             | 95  |
| 3.4     | The Importance of Pluralism and Al-Jazeraa.....           | 100 |
|         | CONCLUSION.....   | 103 |
|         | APPENDICIES .....   | 108 |
|         | APPENDIX A.....   | 108 |

|                   |     |
|-------------------|-----|
| APPENDIX B.....   | 110 |
| APPENDIX C.....   | 112 |
| APPENDIX D.....   | 112 |
| APPENDIX E.....   | 113 |
| BIBLIOGRAPHY..... | 114 |

## INTRODUCTION

As a major source of information and images, the media perform many functions in society and serve numerous needs. On the other hand, due to the technological developments the media have been globalizing rapidly. Today, people not only can read global newspapers, but also watch satellite or cable TV everywhere. Iraq War of 2003 showed this clearly. We watched the footages of war from different countries' TV stations, directly or indirectly. Global media channels like CNN, BBC, Fox, Al-Jazeera, and Abu-Dhabi informed and shaped the world public opinion about events in Iraq. Also participants of the war - politicians, military experts etc.- used the media to convey their messages to the public.

The subject of my thesis is "The Role of Global Media News in World Politics in the case of Iraq War of 2003." Concerning the importance of accurate information in the democratic process, this study will search for a broader perspective and evaluation of the global media and their role in world politics as the initial source of information. After seven years of education in communication and three years in the field of international relations, I aimed to combine these two sciences and reflect their connection via this study. Identifying the relation between global media and world politics is important in order to read today's developments properly. Everyday, even every second, this interconnectiveness can be seen. However, this has to put in order and combine with scientific perspective.

This issue is more intensive than before in the agenda of world people. Yet, there is no serious study of intellectual debates. In a survey of the literature, it can be seen that most of the studies examine the relation between the media and globalization in terms of global capital and the spread of a global culture. Nearly all of literature only deals with the effects of globalization on national society and national politics. They do not consider the perspective of world politics. They also mainly examine national or Turkish media resources in their research. If we try to

categorize existing literature, they mainly deal with; international communication, cultural effects of a global media and the economy of the global media.

In international communication debates, there are two categories: One category argues that international communication links different cultures and bring the people of the world closer. These are the proponents of globalization as a tool of modernization. They mainly deal with international communication order and the news agencies. Others argue that international communication is a tool of capitalists to extend capitalism; they also see globalism as the last step of capitalism.<sup>1</sup>

The former sees international communication as cultural business and democratic communication. They argue that international communication is essential for modernization of less developed countries and the spread of Western values.<sup>2</sup> The latter criticizes the former on this point: global media represent Western and American culture and ignore others.

Mainly, the former consider media's role as a way of increasing the standard of living via educational broadcasting. Also some of them support that international communication provides pluralism by giving every culture the opportunity to be represented.<sup>3</sup> Media provide a public space in which information is shared and the public is informed.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore they consider media as a way of accepting new ideas and technologies. Critics of the media, however, underline the negative effects of foreign media in other cultures. A significant contribution to this discussion is Marshall McLuhan's 'global village'. This concept references to the universal impact of television as a way of 'global culture' or 'global civilization'.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> İrfan Erdoğan, *Uluslararası İletişim, Dünyanın Çarpık Düzeni*, (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1995) p.134

<sup>2</sup> Güliz Uluç, *Küreselleşen Medya: İktidar ve Mücadele Alanı* (İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 2003) p.95

<sup>3</sup> Jaap van Ginneken, *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998) p.103

<sup>4</sup> Adam Briggs and Paul Cobby, *The Media: An Introduction* (New York: Longman, 1998) p.65

<sup>5</sup> S. A. Schleifer, "Global Media, the New World Order-and the Significance of Failure," [http://www.adhamonline.com/Admin/articles\\_sas1b.html](http://www.adhamonline.com/Admin/articles_sas1b.html)

Second category of literature survey deals with the cultural effects of the media. This literature mainly criticizes how American music, televisions, books, magazines and especially the films are everywhere. This makes the world universal because everyone is seeing the same things.<sup>6</sup>

In their media analyses, Gitlin and Williams apply the concept of hegemony- a ruling class's domination through ideology and the molding of popular consent- with contrasting conclusions. In Gitlin's analysis, the media and other institutions formulate and uphold the dominant typographic ideology of capitalism. Although, popular opposing messages are included in the media, opposition groups and ideologies will be muffled if the challenge to the hegemonic ideology is critical.<sup>7</sup>

According to Fiske, also the media offer a preferred ideological reading that attempts to reproduce the ideology of dominant social groups, while audiences either accept the preferred reading of the media text or resist it by negotiating or opposing the dominant reading. This dominant ideology is represented in information and entertainment forms of media.<sup>8</sup>

Lastly, the literature dealing with the economics of global media underlines media ownership. According to this literature, understanding the economics of media is crucial for understanding their structure and content since economics means more than money and finance; it also involves the ownership and structure of industries, which affects how they operate and what contents they produce.

This literature argues that capital ownership in the leading companies of the main communication sectors does not allow many individuals or companies to enter the market; the largest media industry players are extremely limited. The ones having the capital are the ones that own and control the media. As a result,

---

<sup>6</sup> John Naisbitt, *Global Paradoks* (İstanbul: Sabah Yayınları, 1994) p.14

<sup>7</sup> Paul Grosswiller, "Methodology Study of Media and Ideology Orientations: Exploring Medium Theory, Critical Theory and Cultural Studies", *Canadian Journal of Communication*, vol. 22, Issue 2 (Spring 1997), p.263

<sup>8</sup> İrfan Erdoğan, "İletişim, Egemenlik, Mücadeleye Giriş", (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi, 1997) p.257

the media are generally concentrated into the hands of those businessmen and businessmen-politicians.<sup>9</sup>

This literature also deals with the increasingly occurring conglomerations in the ownership of the media and information industries that lead to new questions of monopoly, control and access to media and information services. They underline that the overwhelming majority (in revenue terms) of the world's film production, TV show production, cable channel ownership, cable and satellite system ownership, book publishing, magazine publishing and music production is provided by 50 or so firms and the first nine firms thoroughly dominate many of these sectors.<sup>10</sup> The remarkable global expansion of media corporations, facilitated by liberalization and privatization of media systems worldwide and the development of cable and satellite technologies, has reduced the state's ability to exercise power and maintain information sovereignty.<sup>11</sup>

In short, it is argued that the "global commercial media system is dominated by a small number of super-powerful, mostly U.S.-based transnational media corporations. It is a system that works to advance the cause of the global market and promote commercial values, while denigrating journalism and culture not conducive to the immediate bottom line or long-run corporate interests."<sup>12</sup> These criticisms are supported by UNESCO's verifications. According to UNESCO, "nearly two thirds of printed materials are English, Russian, Spanish, German and French."<sup>13</sup>

As seen above, the main contributions of today's literature does not directly deal with the connection between global media news and world politics.

---

<sup>9</sup> Petros Iosifides, "Methods of Measuring Media Concentration", *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol. 19, Issue 4 (1997), pp. 643-663

<sup>10</sup> Edward S. Herman, "The Global Media Giants: Firms That Dominate the World", *EDucate magazine*, October - December 2001, <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Media/GlobalMediaGiants.html>

<sup>11</sup> Nancy Morris & Silvio Waisbord, *Media and Globalization: Why the State Matters* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001) p.11

<sup>12</sup> Robert W. McChesney, "Global Media for Global Control", *EDucate magazine*, October - December 2001

<sup>13</sup> Sean Macbride, *Many Voices One World: Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order* (London: Kogan Page; New York: Unipub; Paris Unesco, 1983)

Therefore, in this study I will attempt to examine the role of global media in world politics. Where is the global media's place as an actor in world politics? Do media have a strong effect in international decision-making process? Are they truly global? Whose voices are heard in global media? Do they help to promote democracy in world politics? What must be the ethics of global media to promote democracy and pluralism to world politics? I will try to find the answers to by examining the perspectives of global media news in the Iraq War of 2003, an important international political issue that interests every country.

To answer these questions, firstly I will explore the actors of world politics and the position and importance of global media as one actor among them. Since there are structural and institutional linkages between the global media and other actors in world politics, I will then sketch the environment of global media both in international system and their actors, as camera, journalist, editor, corporation owners, audience and state. I will also outline how a news story must be prepared with consideration towards media ethics and democracy. For the aim of combining these two issues of world politics and media I will also identify the 'Information Society' concept.

Secondly, I will examine the effects of global media on world politics. In this section, I will try to put forth what the importance of global media is and which role it has in shaping people's point of view. Consequently, I will explore why the global media is a propaganda machine. This section will cover three main roles of global media news as an accelerant, an impediment and an agenda-setting agent.

Thirdly, in order to illustrate the conformity between global media and world politics, I will apply a case study on current world politics: Iraq War of 2003. With this case study, I intend to point out the different effects of global media in world politics. For this purpose, I will review different global media outlets, but I will focus on CNN, BBC, and Al-Jazeera and elaborate their attitudes towards the outcomes, implications and obligations of this war. As a final point, those media's arguments are compared with each other.

After putting down the role of the global media in world politics, in the concluding section I will discuss the contributions of Al-Jazeera to this global

communication network as a first serious challenge to Western monopoly on global news production and its role in shaping pluralist global media. Also I will try to portray the negative and positive parts of the relation between global media and world politics with some suggestions for an ideal relation. In the concluding section, the overall evaluation of the illustrated relation between global media and world politics will be summarized.



## **CHAPTER 1**

### **WORLD POLITICS AND GLOBAL MEDIA**

After the Cold War, “globalization” became a word that used in every realm, but especially for identification of a new international system. This word generally refers to the process of increasing interconnectedness between societies and states, such that events in one part of the world more and more have effects on peoples and societies far away. In my judgment, the most important outcome of the globalization is the unrestrained flow of information.

Today, in international relations, politics are not decided by a government’s politicians behind the closed doors any more. Transnational corporations, NGOs, Think-Tanks, Media and even certain individuals whose fortune is bigger than some countries’ GNPs and investor consortiums are being important as the new actors of the international system. As one of these actors, global media are essential for world politics because of its capacity to reach every home in the world.

In this chapter, the main issues of world politics and global media will be outlined before identifying their relation with and effects on each other.

#### **1.1 World Politics & Globalization**

Being different from the 1945-1990 international system, the emerging system of the 1990s is called ‘New World Order’. The 41<sup>st</sup> President of the US President George Herbert Walker Bush first spoke of a "New World Order" in his remarks to a joint session of Congress in September 1990, after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the rapid American and allied military buildup in Saudi Arabia. Over the next few months, the President continued to invoke the phrase, and was quoted extensively in all media. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and Eastern

Bloc, the phrase came to encompass the post-Cold War world and has been adopted as such even by political forces that have found the phrase suspect.<sup>14</sup>

In this new world order, everything, from economics and politics to culture and entertainment began to disseminate quickly with the help of rapid technological developments. As Marshall McLuhan stated the world nearly turn into a ‘global village’<sup>15</sup>, because advances in electronic communications resulted in a world where we could see in real time events that were occurring in distant parts of the world. According to McLuhan, the main effect of this development was that time and space become compressed to such an extent that everything loses its traditional identity. This means that the old grouping of political, economic and social organizations simply do not work anymore.

Indeed, goods and services are now produced and distributed in several places around the globe. The financial system supports these activities through the financial institutions, such as stock markets and regulatory arrangements. Millions of people move around world as tourists, professionals, workers, refugees and as migrants, both legal and illegal, even the ideas and information circulate breaching the borders, along with the norms and values.

However, if the spread of “knowledge” in all these manifestations is one of the crucial processes of globalization, so too is the weakening of boundaries, and to a remarkable degree, the growing similarity of institutions globally.<sup>16</sup> Problems like environmental pollution, health issues, global migration and immigration, refugees, violence and injustice are also globalized. Even the bedrock of the international system, the sovereignty of nation-states, is subject to severe erosion.<sup>17</sup>

Nonstate actors, such as environmental organizations and multinational corporations (MNCs), cannot be dismissed as being of merely marginal

---

<sup>14</sup> S. A. Schleifer , “Global Media, the New World Order-and the Significance of Failure”  
[http://www.adhamonline.com/Admin/articles\\_sas1b.html](http://www.adhamonline.com/Admin/articles_sas1b.html)

<sup>15</sup> Marshall McLuhan, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York:McGraw-Hill,1964)

<sup>16</sup> A. LeRoy Bennett, James K. Oliver, *International Organizations, Principles and Issues* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2002) p.14

<sup>17</sup> Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution,1974) p.1

importance, given an increasingly interdependent world economy. This weaving together of people across national boundaries through specialized groups reflects world interdependence.<sup>18</sup> Better transportation and telecommunications link people, ideas, and commodities across national borders to a degree that never before was possible. With the end of the Cold War, the linked notions of democratization and liberal capitalism have converged with pervasive impact on the world political economy, creating a condition now commonly characterized as globalization.<sup>19</sup> Globalization is not an entirely new phenomenon; in comparison, however, this new era of it is turbocharged.<sup>20</sup> This growth is a natural outcome of scientific and technological developments that shrink global distances and increase access from one part of the world to another.<sup>21</sup>

Notwithstanding the dynamism and turbulence of contemporary world affairs and proliferation of non-state actors, transnational relations, and resulting complex interdependence, states are reluctant to sacrifice sovereignty to supranational entities. It should be recalled, however, that the nation-state as we know it today was not always the basis of political affairs.<sup>22</sup>

A globalized world is one in which political, economic, cultural and social events become more and more interconnected, and also one in which they have more impact. In other words, societies are affected more and more extensively and deeply by events of other societies.<sup>23</sup> The cooperative activities of these “networks of interdependence” span the entire range of issues confronting international society.<sup>24</sup> These networks oriented around common strategies and goals epitomize the rapid expansion of "sovereignty free" actors and the coinage of the term *global*

---

<sup>18</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations* (New York: Longman, 2004) p. 264.

<sup>19</sup> A. LeRoy Bennett, James K. Oliver, p.274.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999) p. XV.

<sup>21</sup> A. LeRoy Bennett, James K. Oliver, p.294.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p.2.

<sup>23</sup> John Baylis & Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2001) p.7

<sup>24</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) p. 147.

*civil society*.<sup>25</sup> Furthermore, communication has fundamentally changed the way we deal with the rest of the world. Today, we live in a world where events in one location can be immediately observed on the other side of the world.

An appropriate example is from Antony Giddens:<sup>26</sup>

“A friend of mine studies village life in central Africa. A few years ago, she paid her first visit to a remote area where she was to carry out her fieldwork. The day she arrived, she was invited to a local home for an evening’s entertainment. She expected to find out about the traditional pastimes of this isolated community. Instead, the occasion turned out to be a viewing of *Basic Instinct* on video. The film at that point hadn’t even reached the cinemas in London.”

To repeat, globalization is a comprehensive system that affects every aspect of life. In the following sections, the focus will be on the actors of world politics in order to understand the dimensions of the new world order and the effects of globalization.

### ***1.1.1 Actors***

The international arena is crowded with large and small actors closely linked with governments. International Organizations, Multinational Corporations, Trans-National Terrorist Organizations and Trans-National Criminal Organizations are among the basic actors. Since politics is affected and shaped by various actors, an effort to understand world politics requires recognizing the actors.

#### ***1.1.1.1 States***

A state is a territorial entity controlled by a government and inhabited by a population. A state government answers to no higher authority; it exercises *sovereignty* over its territory—to make and enforce laws, to collect taxes, and so

---

<sup>25</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999) p. 199.

<sup>26</sup> Antony Giddens, *Runaway World*, (New York and London: Routledge, 1999) p.6

forth.<sup>27</sup> The first significant agreement to recognize the sovereignty of states goes back hundreds of years to The Peace of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648, and began a trend toward the replacement of the Christian Empire led by the Holy Roman Emperor and the Pope, establishing the independence of sovereign territorial states.<sup>28</sup> The first mutually agreed-upon principles for a system of juridically sovereign states were accepted by most of the key actors in Europe. Following that agreement, the growth of rules and norms accelerated, including the recognition in one state of legal acts that occurred in other states, which constitute public international law.<sup>29</sup> It is worth noting that for several centuries the state system remained largely a European form for organizing politics. Indeed, it wasn't until the period between the late 1940s and mid-1960s that most of Africa and Asia were reorganized into legally sovereign states.<sup>30</sup>

The state is the centerpiece of the work of realists. Realism is based on the assumption that states are the principal, or most important, actors. States represent the key unit of analysis, whether one is dealing with ancient Greek city-states or modern nation-states. The study of international relations is the study of relations among these units. Realists who use the concept of a system defined in terms of interrelated parts usually refer to an international system of states.<sup>31</sup>

A state is identified by certain characteristics. One of the characteristics of a state is having a territory and people. It would seem obvious that to exist, a state must have physical boundaries. Most states indeed have recognized boundaries, but on closer examination, the question of territory becomes more complex: numerous international disputes exist over border areas. It is also generally conceded that states must have an internal organization, some level of political and economic structure. Diplomatic recognition is also needed. A state is

---

<sup>27</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, *International Relations*, p. 10.

<sup>28</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) p. 145.

<sup>29</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, *World Politics into the Twenty-First Century* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003) p. 80.

<sup>30</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 22.

<sup>31</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999) p. 6.

acknowledged by other states through diplomatic relations and usually by membership in the United Nations. Another characteristic of a state is internal loyalty. This implies that a state's population has a feeling of positive identification with the state (patriotism) and that the population grants the state the authority to make rules and to govern (legitimacy).<sup>32</sup>

The single most important political characteristic of a state, however, is sovereignty. This term strongly implies political independence from any higher authority. Sovereignty also has an element of equality. If states recognize no higher authority, then it can be argued that they are all equal. Independence is the central element of sovereignty. The basic idea, then, is that a sovereign state is free to order itself internally and to make and enforce domestic law without external interference. It is free to define its foreign-policy goals and to protect its interests in any manner it chooses. Sovereignty has always been more of a legal concept than a statement of political reality.<sup>33</sup>

Neither internal nor external autonomy means that states can do whatever they want without incurring any penalty. States face retaliation from others if they act outside accepted international 'rules of the game'. Virtually all states are subject to some forms of pressure from others, depending on the issue at stake and the actors involved. How states manipulate these opportunities to alter others' behavior is a large part of what world politics is about in the international arena. Yet the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty remain very important, for they give state officials the right to make final, authoritative choices about how they will deal with those pressures.<sup>34</sup>

Robert Tucker argues that states are 'born unequal'. They possess different combinations of population, geography, resources, and other ingredients

---

<sup>32</sup> John T. Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage* (The Dushkin Publishing Group Inc.: Connecticut, 1991) pp. 110-113.

<sup>33</sup> Glenn. P. Hastedt and Kay M. Knickrehm, *Dimensions of World Politics* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1991) p. 23.

<sup>34</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 81.

that make states powerful enough to define their own national interests.<sup>35</sup> Even though all independent states are by definition juridically sovereign, they are *not* all equally viable as political units that can guarantee order, security, and economic well-being within their boundaries. Empirical sovereignty—that is, sovereignty that is viable in everyday practice—does not follow automatically from legal sovereignty. States vary widely in their ability to administer their internal affairs effectively, a fact that has crucial implications for how we think of states as actors.<sup>36</sup>

The history of world politics for the past three centuries has largely been a chronicle of interactions among nation-states. States today remain the dominant form of political organization in the world. Their interests, capabilities, and goals significantly shape world politics.<sup>37</sup> States have a legal and political status that makes them central international actors. States have the right to regulate by law anything occurring within their boundaries. Even though other international actors may at times get their way, legal control of territory gives states a form of leverage that can be highly useful in dealing with non-state actors. States also have a relationship with individual people that are distinct among international actors. Under customary international law, only states can sign treaties and legitimately use physical force.<sup>38</sup>

However, the supremacy of the state has been severely challenged. The central governments of states no longer monopolize high-stakes diplomacy in world politics. Increasingly, world affairs are being influenced by organizations that transcend national boundaries.<sup>39</sup> On economic, security, environmental, and human rights issues, diplomats representing governments' foreign, defense, and economics ministries no longer dominate international bargaining; they now

---

<sup>35</sup> Robert Tucker, *The Inequality of Nations*, (New York: Basic Books, 1977, p. 3) cited at Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 82

<sup>36</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 83.

<sup>37</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) p. 145.

<sup>38</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 22.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24.

routinely share the stage with other international players. Diverse in scope and purpose, these newly arrived actors perform independent roles and exert global influence.<sup>40</sup>

International organizations such as the United Nations may aspire to the status of independent actor, but from the realist perspective, this aspiration has not been achieved to any significant degree. Multinational corporations, terrorist groups, and other transnational and international organizations are frequently acknowledged by realists, but the position of these nonstate actors is always one of lesser importance. Other nonstate actors are excluded, down played, or trivialized in the realist perspective.<sup>41</sup> However, realists acknowledge that simply because nonstate actors are not dealt with in depth, this does not mean that they are considered irrelevant. Similarly, one realist argues “that the state... is the principal actor in international relations does not deny the existence of other individual and collective actors.”<sup>42</sup>

States remain key actors in world politics for two inescapable reasons: first, leaders of states can claim that they are the legitimate voice for all citizens who live within their boundaries more effectively than any other actors in world politics; second, even though there is wide variation in the characteristics of individual states, as a group states are the largest and most widespread form of human organization which can both make and implement policy.<sup>43</sup>

### *1.1.1.2 International Organizations*

National governments may be the most important actors in international relations, but they are strongly conditioned, constrained, and influenced by a variety of non-state actors. The term “non-state entity” covers an enormously broad range of groups. There are groups and interests within states that influence the state's foreign policy. These are *substate actors*. They are politically mobilized

---

<sup>40</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 145.

<sup>41</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, p. 84.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 85.

<sup>43</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 22.



to influence foreign policies through political action committees, lobbying, and other means.<sup>44</sup> The associational revolution<sup>45</sup> and development of civil society has progressed furthest at the domestic level. It also steadily proceeds across state borders. Increasingly, then, actors operating below the state level also operate across state borders, becoming *transnational actors* that draw on individuals or associations across states for their membership.<sup>46</sup> At the most basic level, nonstate entities are associations of individuals and/or groups that are not established by agreements among states. This broad definition includes such disparate entities as transnational corporations and the business associations they establish to promote their interests, professional associations, ethnic groups, major religious organizations, terrorist groups, and social movements.<sup>47</sup>

The realist approach broadens the international system to include not only system of states, but also international or global institutions as described above. They depend primarily on nation-states for their decisions, resources and policy implementation.<sup>48</sup> For example, the principal international organization, the United Nations, is- as its name suggests- a conglomerate of nation-states in which voting takes place on the basis of states and the rights of sovereign states are recognized above those of nonstate actors.<sup>49</sup>

In contrast with the realists, the pluralist image assumes that nonstate actors are important entities in world politics which cannot be ignored. Terrorist groups affect people's security. International relief organizations may mean the difference between life and death for refugees in war-torn states. Trans-state business enterprises shape the people's standard of living by relocating existing jobs or creating new ones. It is very difficult for a state to get new loans from

---

<sup>44</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, p. 12.

<sup>45</sup> For details see Salamon, Lester M., "The Rise of Nonprofit Sector," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1994, pp. 109-123.

<sup>46</sup> Barry B. Hughes, *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives*, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000)

<sup>47</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) p. 174.

<sup>48</sup> Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) p. 174.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 173.

foreign banks or to refinance old foreign debt unless the terms are approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).<sup>50</sup>

International organizations can be independent actors in their own right. They are more than simply forums within which states compete and cooperate with one another. The organization's own decisionmakers, bureaucrats, and other associated groups have considerable influence in areas such as agenda setting, as well as in providing information which may influence how states define their interests. International organizations may also have an important role in implementing, monitoring, and adjudicating disputes arising from decisions made by constituent states of the organization. Over time, such functions may make the international organization indispensable to member states.<sup>51</sup> The idea that the state has full and exclusive control over its destiny is increasingly questionable. Borders are porous and states are vulnerable both to external pressures and to challenges from people *within* their boundaries.<sup>52</sup>

Over the last few decades, nation-states and their relations with one another have entered into a period of profound and what some have characterized as "turbulent" and "cascading"<sup>53</sup> change. James Rosenau has suggested that this turbulence has contributed to paradoxical and reinforced dynamics of integration and fragmentation. As the rate of cascading technological change increases, political, economic, social, and cultural forces are unleashed, which seem to integrate the elements of the system in an unprecedented manner. Simultaneously, however, the cascading change that contributes to the multidimensional

---

<sup>50</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 97.

<sup>51</sup> Paul R. Viotti and Mark V. Kauppi, p. 199.

<sup>52</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997) p. 174.

<sup>53</sup> The terms are James Rosenau's. During the 1990s, Rosenau undertook a series of extended and complex discussions of the changing and increasingly problematic character of international relations. The influence of his analysis and thinking will be evident throughout this discussion of international organization. See, in particular, his *Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990; and *Along the Domestic-foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)

globalization of the system also generates enormous fragmenting stresses upon and within the nation-states that comprise the international system.<sup>54</sup>

The number of international organizations has grown more than fivefold since 1945.<sup>55</sup> This rapid growth, both in number and in scope of activity, results from various forces. Increased international contact has spurred the growth of international organizations. The revolutions in communications and transportation technologies have brought the states of the world into much closer contact. These interchanges need organizational structures in order to become routine and regulated. The world's increased economic interdependence has fostered a variety of international organizations designed to deal with this phenomenon.<sup>56</sup> Another cause of the growth of international organizations is the expansion of transnational issues. Many of the world's problems affect many states and require solutions that are beyond the resources of any single state. The continuing problems in health, food, human rights, and other areas all contribute to this increase in international organizations. Finally, the existence and successes of international organizations provide role models that have generated still others. People and countries have learned that they can sometimes work together internationally, and this has encouraged them to try new ventures in organization and cooperation.<sup>57</sup>

#### *1.1.1.2.1 International Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)*

International intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are formal international institutions whose members are states. They regulate issues that cross state boundaries. They have some ongoing administrative structure, usually created by a treaty among the founding members. This administrative structure, or

---

<sup>54</sup> A. LeRoy Bennett, James K. Oliver, p.5

<sup>55</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 147.

<sup>56</sup> John T. Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage* (The Dushkin Publishing Group Inc.: Connecticut, 1991) pp. 436-437.

<sup>57</sup> John T. Rourke, pp. 436-437.

secretariat, is what distinguishes IGOs from an ad hoc series of international conferences; it provides continuing staff support for the organization's activities.<sup>58</sup>

While more than 95 percent of the international organizations now in operation are nongovernmental, the remaining five percent of intergovernmental organizations are more important because their members are states. The IGOs that governments create and join will remain preeminent as long as the preeminence of states themselves persists because IGOs derive their importance from their characteristic as associations of states, which give them whatever authority IGOs exercise.<sup>59</sup>

The foundation of international organizations was built in ancient times, but the organizations themselves did not appear until the nineteenth century when they were created by the dominant political units of world politics, nation-states.<sup>60</sup> IGOs began to develop when states realized that managing their growing interdependence more systematically could foster economic growth. In 1821, the first modern IGO, an international commission to regulate use of the Elbe River, was created. Commissions for the Rhine and the Danube followed in 1831 and 1856. These regional bodies were followed by a geographically broader group of institutions called the Public International Unions. The International Telegraphic Bureau was created in 1868 to standardize telegraph messages. The Universal Postal Union was founded in 1874 to set general rules for mail delivery across state boundaries. Organizations to standardize weights and measures and fight communicable diseases soon followed. The League of Nations was the first major security IGO.<sup>61</sup> It was designed to safeguard the Versailles Peace Settlement of World War I, to create a collective security system that would radically reduce or eliminate war, and to manage some of the nationalities problems associated with the breakup of the Russian, Ottoman, and Austrian Empires. In the decades since

---

<sup>58</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 101.

<sup>59</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 147.

<sup>60</sup> A. LeRoy Bennett, James K. Oliver, p.1.

<sup>61</sup> The Concert of Europe did help the European great powers coordinate their diplomatic and military actions for, a time after the Napoleonic Wars, but it lacked a permanent secretariat and thus was not an IGO.

the end of the Second World War, international organizations have become both more numerous and more complex and influential.

The number of IGOs has increased seven-fold during the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Most of them deal with economic and social issues. This growth reflects a major increase in economic, social, and cultural transactions across state borders. The industrialized countries are more heavily represented in IGOs than the less economically developed countries, even though many IGOs have been created to promote economic growth in the less economically developed countries.

The main role of IGO is offering an efficient environment in which participants can bargain, by providing a predictable location and format for meetings and putting dependable staff support at the service of the group. Second, IGOs often make it more likely that states will actually comply with the agreements they make, by providing predictable rules and ways to impose them. In addition, some agreements include systematic procedures for resolving disputes about the meaning of the rules. The third role of IGOs is to signify members' approval or disapproval of some practices and ideologies in world politics. This role is similar to what happens in domestic political arenas, where political leaders try to legitimize their objectives and actions so that they can achieve their aims and minimize their political risks. Fourth, IGOs help to build coalitions on many issues in world politics, often through the involvement of secretariat personnel as facilitators or sources of expertise.<sup>62</sup>

#### *1.1.1.2.2 International Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)*

International non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are formal institutions made up of private individuals, or associations of such persons, from at least two states. Some international institutions mix public and private representation. NGOs have developed as the functional counterparts of IGOs. NGOs claim that they represent the preferences of their members in the substantive areas in which they specialize as well as, at times, the interests of non-

---

<sup>62</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 110-111.

members who are affected by policy choices. NGOs typically have a permanent staff and some organizational identity.<sup>63</sup> For example, Amnesty International (human rights) and Greenpeace (the environment) are trans-national social movement organizations that are specifically organized to carry out political goals which require globally oriented strategies.

It seems that the first NGO was the Rosicrucian Order, a mystical education group that formed in the seventeenth century, but as recently as 1850s only five NGOs existed. They then multiplied rapidly because people had more time and resources to participate in voluntary associations as the middle classes expanded, and new ways to communicate with people in other countries made such associations feasible.<sup>64</sup> There were already 170 NGOs by 1914.<sup>65</sup> The *Yearbook of International Organizations* for 2005-2006 gives data on 7552 “conventional” international organizations, of which 7306 are nongovernmental as compared with only 246 intergovernmental units. Additionally, the *Yearbook* includes information on 6909 national organizations that are internationally oriented, of which 6798 are NGOs.<sup>66</sup> Although the annual rate of increase since 1945 in the number of NGOs is probably less than half the incremental rate of growth in interpersonal transnational interactions, it is nevertheless substantial.<sup>67</sup>

NGOs can affect outcomes in world politics in two ways. First, they help set political agendas and build constituency support for policies they favor. Agenda setting is the series of steps by which issues come to command such attention. NGOs often try to influence issues within states by bringing together local constituencies and outside groups that care about the problem. Second, NGOs may have a key role in implementing policies. At times the UN or other IGOs use NGOs as their agents to deliver services in the field. This typically

---

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p. 119.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 120.

<sup>65</sup> Michael D Wallace and David Singer, “Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System 1815-1964: A Quantitative Description,” *International Organization* Vol. 24, No. 2, 1970, pp. 239-287.

<sup>66</sup> <http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf>

<sup>67</sup> For earlier comparisons see, Kjell Skjelsbaek, “The Growth of International Non- Governmental Organization in the Twentieth Century,” *International Organization*, 25 (Sun 1971), p. 425.

occurs when an NGO has some specialized expertise that an IGO or an individual government lacks, when those who are affected by the policy trust an NGO more than other actors, or when hiring NGO personnel offers more flexibility than using IGO personnel.<sup>68</sup>

### *1.1.1.3 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)*

Multinational corporations (MNCs)-business enterprises organized in one state with affiliates in at least one other state growing out of direct investment abroad-are one of the nonstate actors. They must own or effectively control a business abroad. Such control is called foreign direct investment (FDI). It is distinct from portfolio investment, which involves owning shares in someone else's business.<sup>69</sup>

Direct ownership of foreign enterprises has gone on for centuries. As early as 1200 AD, Venetian and Genoese merchants established banks abroad to finance the trade carried by their ships. The modern MNC characteristically maintains an elaborate overseas network of affiliates to coordinate manufacturing and marketing globally. Ultimately, the primary drive behind the overseas expansion of today's giant corporations is maximization of corporate growth and the suppression of foreign, as well as domestic, competition<sup>70</sup> Since World War II, MNCs have grown dramatically in scope and potential influence alongside the expansion of the world political economy.<sup>71</sup> Most MNCs are headquartered in the United States, the European Union or Japan – the so-called Triad, which also accounts for the largest share of foreign direct investment worldwide.<sup>72</sup>

---

<sup>68</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 120.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p. 121.

<sup>70</sup> Robert Gilpin, *The Political Economy of International Relations*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1987), also Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p.193

<sup>71</sup> Alan C. Lamborn and Joseph Ledgold, p. 121.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. p.123

The universe of MNCs is large, diverse and expanding. By the early 1990s, there were an estimated 37,000 MNCs in the world, with at least 170,000 foreign affiliates. Of these, 33,500 were parent corporations based in developed countries. By 2004 the number of MNCs had risen to some 70,000 with at least 690,000 foreign affiliates, with total sales by foreign affiliates amounting to almost \$19 trillion. The stock of FDI in 2004 is estimated at \$9 trillion.<sup>73</sup>

The MNCs' expansion has been facilitated by transnational banks (TNBs), which themselves have become major forces in the world political economy. In 1995 the combined assets of the world's twenty largest banks exceeded \$8.4 trillion. Reflecting other global economic trends, three-fourths of the world's top TNBs were headquartered in Japan.<sup>74</sup>

The actions of trans-state business enterprises—along with IGOs such as the International Monetary Fund—are at the heart of the controversies swirling around the globalization of the world economy.<sup>75</sup> MNCs have assisted in promoting the emergence of free trade. In this sense, they have been active participants in the process by which governments have reached agreements on rules liberalizing economic transactions in the global market place.<sup>76</sup>

As MNCs have grown in scope and power, concern has understandably been raised about whether they undermine the ability of seemingly sovereign states to control their own economies and therefore their own fates. The interests of a large company doing business globally do not correspond with any one state's interests. Such a company may sometimes act against even its home government's policies. MNCs often control greater resources, and operate internationally with greater efficiency, than many small states.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>73</sup> For details see, UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2005*, (New York, Geneva: United Nations, 2005) p.13, [http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20041c3\\_en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20041c3_en.pdf)

<sup>74</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 192.

<sup>75</sup> Alan C. Lamborn and Joseph Ledgold, p. 25.

<sup>76</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 198.

<sup>77</sup> Joshua S. Goldstein, p. 13.



In some instances, this concern has extended to MNCs' involvement in the domestic politics of their home countries, where they actively lobby their governments for policies that will enhance the profitability of their business activities abroad. In turn, both host and home governments have sometimes used MNCs as instruments in their foreign policy strategies.<sup>78</sup>

#### *1.1.1.4 Trans-National Terrorist Organizations*

Terrorists are commonly deemed as groups seeking to further their political objectives through the use of violence or the threat of violence, usually in opposition to state governments. International terrorism has been defined by United States as activities that involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life; that are a violation of the criminal laws of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of any State; appear to be intended to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping; and occur totally transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to coerce or intimidate, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.<sup>79</sup>

Terrorism was known in ancient times, as seen in the assassination of tyrants in ancient Greece and Rome, and by the Zealots of Palestine and the Hashashin of medieval Islam. The term *terror* originated with the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution. Russian anarchists also used terror, as did the Sons of the American Revolution during the revolt against Britain.<sup>80</sup> The religious, ethnic, or political movements and minorities now practicing terrorism seek through violence to obtain the advantages of the majority, and to extract

---

<sup>78</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 198.

<sup>79</sup> [http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc\\_sec\\_50\\_00001801----000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00001801----000-.html)

<sup>80</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 124.

revenge and vengeance against those states and majority populations that the terrorist groups perceive as oppressors.<sup>81</sup>

Terrorists are often the “international homeless,” whose main objective is to obtain for themselves a territory and state they can control without external interference. When viewing the activities of contemporary terrorist groups, one can safely conclude that most of these non-state actors challenge existing states and their sovereignty.<sup>82</sup>

The U.S. State Department has identified 40 Terrorist Organizations around the world in its annual terrorism report.<sup>83</sup> Designating particular organizations as terrorist is, not surprisingly, a very controversial decision. People on different sides of conflicts often have very different views about who is innocent and who is a legitimate target, and it is often hard to get agreement on whether specific people are, or are not, terrorists.<sup>84</sup>

#### *1.1.1.5 Trans-National Criminal Organizations*

Trans-national organized crime represents a new kind of nonstate actor. With their widespread use of force, trans-national criminal organizations challenge government authority, weakening both the states in which they operate and citizens’ perceptions of their security.<sup>85</sup> According to Claire Sterling in *Thieves’ World*, criminal organizations which were once local are now internationally linked in a global network that cooperates to exploit the institutional weaknesses of a decentralized state system.<sup>86</sup> A “planet-wide

---

<sup>81</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 185.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., pp. 187-188.

<sup>83</sup> U.S. Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2004”, (Washington, D.C., 2005)

<sup>84</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 124.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p. 127.

<sup>86</sup> Claire Sterling, *Thieves’ World: The Threat of the New Global Network of Organized Crime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), cited at Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 185

criminal consortium” has been established that is without precedent, running by its own rules, outside the law, to victimize the international community.<sup>87</sup>

Trans-national criminal organizations are similar to terrorist organizations in several ways. They are typically hierarchically organized with specific rules for membership and operation; use violence to achieve their goals; and they can operate fairly easily across international frontiers. Many of these organizations operate within weak states whose governments cannot resist them effectively. They have created a criminal virtually directed “state within a state” in these states.<sup>88</sup>

Thus, it can be seen that, the new system of world politics or new world order has very complex relationships within different actors. In short, globalization affects and changes world politics both in its scope and contents.

## **1.2 Global Media**

As one of the actors of world politics, the Media which is the fourth power in the domestic organizational structure of countries, (others are judicial system, executive and legislative) now can make their voice heard all over the world.

Indeed, the story of mass communications is combined with the story of technical innovation, and this is as true for global media as for anything else. First there was the radio, the capacity to transmit sound over distance, without the need for any physical connection, and with the signal available to anyone with a receiver; and then there was television, which added pictures to the sound. Both were a development of the technologies of the telegraph and the telephone, themselves the inheritors of work in electromagnetism and electricity.<sup>89</sup>

---

<sup>87</sup> Charles W. Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf, p. 187.

<sup>88</sup> Alan C. Lamborn, Joseph Ledgold, p. 126.

<sup>89</sup> Jean-Noél Jeanneney, *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Medya Tarihi*, Çeviren: Esra Atuk (İstanbul:Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), p.34

The transistor followed through by, opening up the possibility of portability and reliability, leading the microchip and its resulting computer and satellite technology. This knowledge and technology have been connected to create, with innovations in computer language, the worldwide web and the so-called ‘digital revolution’. Today vast areas of land and of populations are covered by a single geostationary satellite. The Asiasat satellite, for example, reaches 38 countries and 2.7 billion people; as such, it has access to 40 per cent of the world’s TV sets. In short, new technologies appear to be creating new possibilities for communication and new forms of existence.<sup>90</sup>

At this point, it must be seen that the route taken by technical development is not mapped by the logic of ‘progress’ but by the allocation of resources, itself the consequence of political and economic priorities. Radio was the product of military needs, a way of coordinating the movement of vast armies. In the same way, the transistor was designed to meet the needs of submarine technology; and the integrated circuit (the microchip) was needed for space exploration and security interests allied with it. The internet is also the product of corporate and state interests. Initially created as a failsafe system of communication to enable the US military to continue to function in the aftermath of a nuclear attack, the internet was developed by scientists who wanted to use the network of computers to communicate with each other.<sup>91</sup>

As a result, during the last three decades, global media have gone through major technological and structural transformations leading to significant penetrations of national media systems. This has taken place through direct-broadcast satellites (DBS); low-orbit satellites; digital telephony; and the Internet, including micromedia – audiotapes, CDs, computer laptops, palmtops, and wireless telephones. While the commercial systems dominate the content of news and entertainment, government systems- often unsuccessfully- control the flow by censorship within their own territorial sovereignties.<sup>92</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> For details see Güliz Uluç, *Küreselleşen Medya: İktidar ve Mücadele Alanı* (İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 2003)

<sup>91</sup> John Street, *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy*, (Palgrave: New York, 2001) p.168

<sup>92</sup> Majid Tehranian, “Peace Journalism Negotiating Global Media Ethics”, *Press/Politics*, vol. 7 (2), Spring 2002, p.61

Indeed, mass communication in the satellite era has reached a global figure, and these channels which offer people around the world the possibility of witnessing the same events at the same time are called global media or global mass communication channels.

Liberal pluralists see the global media as a way of providing a public space in which information is shared and the public informed. However journalist and media critic Ragıp Duran defines global media as follows:

Global media can be defined as the system and understanding, being extended by the new world order, that is post- leftist in politics, neoliberal in economics and one monopolistic idea that shapes the ideology.<sup>93</sup>

Like him, Hermann & McChesney describe global media as the:

....only one part of the overall expansion and spread of an increasingly integrated global corporate system, that complement and support the needs of nonmedia enterprises. On one hand, the global media play a central economic role, providing part of the global infrastructure for nonmedia firms, and facilitating their business just as the growth of domestic commercial media supports corporate growth within countries. The global media provide the main vehicle for advertising corporate wares for sale, thereby facilitating corporate expansion into new nations, regions, and markets. On the other hand, the global media's news and entertainment provide an informational and ideological environment that helps sustain the political, economic, and moral basis for marketing goods and for having a profit-driven social order. In short, the global media are a necessary component of global capitalism and one of its defining features.<sup>94</sup>

These approaches that look at global media as global imperialism is important to underline the role of the media in the new world order. Four major powers are needed to play the role of hyper power<sup>95</sup> like the US in this new world

---

<sup>93</sup> Ragıp Duran, *Burası Dünya Polis Radyosu: Global Medya Eleştirileri* (İstanbul: YKY,1999) p.11

<sup>94</sup> E.Hermann &R. McChesney, *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism* (London:Cassel, 1997) p.10

<sup>95</sup> This term 'hyper power' is first used by French old Foreign Minister Huber Vedrine

order. These are: military power, economic power, technological and scientific power and cultural power. Here global media and its complementary Linqua Franca, in other words speaking language, English are the most important actors of cultural power.

Language is the complementary of the media, because communication means to understand and be understandable. We can see the best example of this relationship in news agencies. At present, there are three largest news agencies, which provide the news flow all over the world. They are Reuters of England, Associated Press of the US and Agence France Presse of France. They are the agencies which gather news from all over the world and which provide news to the world. However, the mother tongue of Reuters and AP is English, France agent AFP has news flow both in English and France. Also one of the most expanded global media outlet, the internet's mail providers like yahoo, hotmail and gmail are in English.

On the other hand, global media came into existence long after the emergence of local and national media.<sup>96</sup> Although the film industry was the first media industry to serve a truly global market with the Hollywood based products, the first great mass medium was the newspaper. However, as many newspapers were mainly written for domestic audiences in the local language, their potential for export was limited. Newspapers are still the least integrated into the global media system.

The wire-based international news agencies were the first significant form of global media. The French 'Havas', German 'Wolff', and British 'Reuters' were established in the nineteenth century as domestic enterprises, but with particular interest in foreign news.

Through the 1920s radio broadcasting came into existence, and became a tool of extraordinary power for international politics during and after WWII by disseminating news and propaganda. Television stations added the power of the picture to the news. However, television reached global broadcasting merely with

---

<sup>96</sup> E.Hermann &R. McChesney, p.11

the emergence of global satellite TV channels, simultaneously rearranging the global news industry.<sup>97</sup>

Indeed, global media in the satellite era are providing the opportunity to witness the same events, exchange full information, and understand others better despite differences and to value each other while acknowledging these differences.

In conclusion, modern communications form the basis for an international civil society, people who share interests and associations across borders. The global media has made possible a set of cosmopolitan cultures elite and popular, scientific and artistic, which are linked through the medium of English as a universal rather than a national language.

### *1.2.1 How is the news prepared?*

Global media includes many components including news agencies, televisions, radios, newspapers, books, films, music and internet. Whichever medium it may be its significance is that it gives people news of their environment, their country and their world. This can be seen through the increase in 24-hour news channels.

Among them television is surely the one to which people can reach easily and rapidly. The force behind TV's power and importance is the power of picture and live broadcast. If we believe that the reason why people require news is curiosity, we can see that the ability of television in satisfying this curiosity instantly and only with touching one key makes television predominant among others. Unfortunately, the truth which watchers (audiences) ignore is that news is an edited report.

There is often only a distant relation between the original news item and the news report ultimately carried by the media. Jaap van Ginneken compares news to fish.

...fish being caught, killed, cleaned, cut, and preserved. Many characteristic parts such as the head and tail, the fins and bones are thrown

---

<sup>97</sup> For details see Jean-Noél Jeanneney, *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Medya Tarihi*, Çeviren: Esra Atuk (İstanbul:Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998)

away or ground into fishmeal. The color, taste, smell and substance of the rest may be standardized even further in the food-processing plant. It may be compressed into uniform blocks, coated with breadcrumbs, deep-frozen and packaged before being distributed and sold. Finally, it will be fried, served with a touch of lemon, parsley and mayonnaise on reaching the consumer. It is still the same fish- but then it isn't. Something is similar in the case with the news.<sup>98</sup>

Let consider the similarities: At first, the news reaches the journalist or she/he finds news and researches this news considering all sides. Then the journalist writes the news. If there is picture, the news is edited by cutting and pasting. Even while writing, the words are edited. In other words, the news is being embellished. Then the journalist shows it to the editor. Editors make some additions and/or subtractions taking into account certain ethical or other issues and common standards that govern journalism. Finally, peoples get the news.

Therefore, what is reported in papers and on television is not a product only of "events in the world" or of the observations of individual journalists. Although events and observations certainly play their part, the conditions and constraints under which journalism is practiced are equally important. One can go on to say that, Journalism is necessarily selective and partial, but the selectivity and partiality are not the product of individual values and skills or professional codes. According to structuralists like Hermann & McChesney, reporting is the product of a news-generating process. Understanding the content of news, therefore, means studying the structures that organize it: the division of labor and distribution of resources, the technology and the hierarchy within newsrooms.<sup>99</sup> 'News' is, by this explanation, what the newsrooms create and determine. A good example of this situation is the distribution of foreign correspondents. All news organizations decide about which countries they are allocated to. The allocation shapes the news from which the channel selects. On the readers and viewers side

---

<sup>98</sup> Jaap van Ginneken, *Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998) p.127

<sup>99</sup> For more details see, Edward S. Herman & Robert W. McChesney, *The Global Media*, (London, Washington: Cassel, 1997)



nothing happens in countries without foreign correspondents. The character and amount of foreign coverage is shaped by the general size of the budget and then by its allocation. This allocation of course depends on the contents of outlets.

Jeremy Tunstall shows<sup>100</sup> how the upmarket newspapers in Britain have increased their foreign staff, from around 70 two decades ago, to more than 100 in the 1990s. The downmarket tabloids, by contrast, employ no foreign correspondents at all, which they did use ten years ago. Also important is how these correspondents are distributed. Tunstall reveals that they are concentrated in Europe and North America. Africa gets much less attention and what it does get, is heavily skewed towards South Africa. This is an example of a general phenomenon: news is a product of its sources.<sup>101</sup>

In other words, news is a collected form of the multiple ‘events’ taking place in the world. This form of selection and narration is captured by the idea of framing. Robert Entman offers this definition: ‘A *frame* operates to select and highlight some features of reality and obscure others in a way that tells a consistent story about problems, their causes, moral implications, and remedies’.<sup>102</sup> The media not only select particular events, they also have to make sense of them. They have to make them matter to the readers and viewers, and this involves setting them within a narrative, a story of social change. Also the style in news reporting is noteworthy. Anchors dress seriously and their broadcasts are introduced by music that is essential. News reporters use film and photos, experts, eye-witnesses and official sources to validate their report.

In short, a whole range of signals and conventions establish that something is news and is serious, that it is about the real world. In the same way, other codes and devices tell us that something is fictional.<sup>103</sup>

---

<sup>100</sup> Jeremy Tunstall, “Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 p.339-40 ) from J.Street p.157

<sup>101</sup> John Street, p.158

<sup>102</sup> Robert Entman, “Reporting Environmental Policy Debate: The Real Media Biases”, *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1(3), 1996, pp.77-92

<sup>103</sup> John Street, p.40

### 1.2.2 *The Actors*

At this point, the newsroom structure is important to understand this fictional progress. Understanding this progress means knowing the agents. As seen above, we can list these agents as camera, journalist, editor, corporation, state and audiences. Audiences take the news after it passes from other actors or ‘gatekeepers’<sup>104</sup>.

#### 1.2.2.1 *Camera*

News photographs and news film seem to provide us with a purely ‘naturalistic’ report of what has ‘really’ happened. Most of the time, we don’t realize the huge amount of staging and composition this involves.

About some real events, television news staff can receive huge amounts of ‘attractive’ footage which they cannot possibly refuse. On other events they receive no visual material at all. In this situation, they give space for the events which have visual materials to complete news. However this is problematic because the existence of photographs or films does not mean that they reflect ‘real events’.

The camera may register a more or less adequate picture of the world, but the picture does not necessarily coincide with the world itself. This is because the picture has a limited frame while the world does not. We can see only the subject in front of the camera, not what is behind the subject, nor what is behind the camera. We can only see the image of the moment that the shutter was open, not what happened before or after that. TV picture is like watching outside from a balcony. You can see events with the angles provided by the balcony. You can’t see other sides. For example, if a camera takes a close position, it can show a group of people as a crowd. But if it records a wide view, the result can become contradictory. Even on live broadcasting, everything is controlled by newsroom.

This goes further with selection in films and photographs. News producers and news consumers are hardly aware that cameras ‘take position’, record social power in very particular ways. In such cases, the ‘north-westerners’ are often

---

<sup>104</sup> For details about this concept see, Denis McQuail, *Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction*, (London: Sage, 1983)

presented as the helpers and saviors, whereas the ‘south-easterners’ are presented as both brutes and victims.<sup>105</sup> While some persons and places find a place in the media, others do not.<sup>106</sup>

People believe in only images that they see and they believe they are witnessing world history live even as photo and film cameras act as their substitutes. However, the camera is inextricably bound up with the culture of the person using it. Therefore, all the efforts of broadcasters and others would be wasted if the media were not susceptible to spin, if they did not use the photo opportunities or sound bites being provided.

#### *1.2.2.2 Journalist*

Another filter, the journalist, is shaped by the atmosphere where he/she lives. The points of view of an American, an African or an Asian are certainly not the same and this difference is reflected in the news.<sup>107</sup> We saw examples of this situation in the Iraq War of 2003. Media pursued and defended the official view of this war, as with other foreign political issues. The American media is accused of being a war supporter, however American journalists censored themselves by acting patriotic and populist, because they were living in America and sharing same atmosphere with other citizens. Thus they showed what people wanted to see and reported on what people wanted to hear. Willingly or not, American media institutions during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars largely acted as agents of the US government by almost exclusively relying on the government as its sources and to a certain extent an uncritical coverage of the causes, conduct and consequences of two wars.<sup>108</sup>

---

<sup>105</sup> Jaap van Ginneken, p.167

<sup>106</sup> In Appendix A, see the General Assembly of European Non-Governmental Organizations’ Code of Conduct

<sup>107</sup> For a study about the Western perceptions of Middle East and Islam see: Kai Hafez (ed.), *Islam and The West in The Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2000)

<sup>108</sup> Majid Tehranian, “Peace Journalism Negotiating Global Media Ethics”, *Press/Politics*, vol. 7 (2), Spring 2002, p.78

While this situation is considered to be ‘unethical’, it is a reality that when journalists report the news they are restricted by a lot of factors. News journalists usually work under time pressure so they tend to use language conventionally; that is, in accordance with the dominant conventions of their own culture and society. The choice of words, the phrasing of sentences, and the construction of the story make this self-evident. News stories also follow strict rules: they are often like the automatic filling in of a pre-printed form. The famous five Ws- *who, what, where, when and why*- frame the singularity of the event. The headline, the lead, the installments in successive paragraphs organizes a perspective. That perspective usually matches dominant views.<sup>109</sup>

The reality, therefore, that journalists are guided by all kinds of social patterns and mental frames in their recognition and reporting of facts is inevitable and it is better to accept it than to deny or ignore it. Professional ethics, occupational values and peer groups promote conformity, but there is little control, and most professions consider themselves free to act as they please. In short, journalists are individuals both in their different views and different skills. This means that any two journalists’ may report the same event differently, and some may do it better than others by being more resourceful or expressive than their peers.

#### *1.2.2.3 Editor*

The managerial structure is important in determining which priorities and interests dominate the character of news coverage. This may be clear in the organizational distribution of power: how editorial decisions are taken and who is involved. Media newsrooms involve both marketing and editorial interests.

At this point the question is which criteria the editor uses to examine the news. We can say that higher sales, benefits for the boss and the firm, the relations with the government, competitors, prestige and journalistic ethics are some of the editor’s concerns. These concerns are also usually the source of criticism against the global media. The reason behind these concerns is financial resources allocation.

---

<sup>109</sup> Jaap van Ginneken, p.164

To understand journalistic practices, we need to look at the pressures on the editorial budget brought about by price wars and other commercial factors, such as a need to attract advertising.<sup>110</sup> Advertisers especially prefer lifestyle features, rather than investigations. An equally important concern is the political pressure from parties and politicians who, through their techniques of media management, seek to shape the news. For a more sensitive professionalism, editors have to consider the implication of these perspectives. As a result, the chance of investigative journalism lies with managerial decisions (and the material interests behind these decisions) about how to allocate resources.

Stories cost money and the allocation of resources is an important factor in shaping the practice of journalism, such as in deploying journalists and allocating resources. With a limited budget, news organizations (and the editor) have to determine what they can afford to cover (or to put another way, what they cannot afford to ignore because of the ratings and advertising income they need to generate). In 1970, reporting the war in Vietnam cost Reuters £40,000 per annum.<sup>111</sup>

Power includes rules and constraints within which actors, with different resources and capacities, act to realize their goals. For example, Rupert Murdoch's, the owner of Fox TV, media power has commonly been linked to his power to hire and fire editors. He refused to renew the contract of the editor of *Village Voice*, a New York paper, when he took it over.<sup>112</sup> While owners will want editors who echo their politics, they still need good editors for credibility.

#### *1.2.2.4 Owners- Corporation*

Global media is not a cheap sector. This is an important characteristic of the media cartels such as, AOL Time Warner, General Electric, AT&T, Disney, Sony, News Corporation, Viacom, Seagram and Bertelsmann. What distinguishes them is that they have global distribution networks controlling about 90 percent of the

---

<sup>110</sup> John Street, p.156

<sup>111</sup> Donald Read, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters 1849-1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)p.382

<sup>112</sup> <http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1227-25.htm>

market in most media fields.<sup>113</sup> This section explores the idea that media owners wield power within and through their corporations. Corporations see newspapers and television programmes as commercially manufactured products; even news itself is a product that has a tradeable value in the market place.

For some commentators, the impact of the state on the politics of mass media is nothing compared to the impact wielded by the new breed of media moguls. Men like Rupert Murdoch, Ted Turner, Conrad Black and Silvio Berlusconi, and companies like News Corporation and Bertelsmann, appear to be the main players in the emerging media order.<sup>114</sup> Black's Hollinger International at one point owned 400 publications worldwide, with a total circulation of 11 million, until he sold some of his Canadian titles for \$2,3 billion.<sup>115</sup>

The costs of reporting on the Iraq War of 2003 are attention grabbing and illustrate the economic reality that the business of media is not cheap. There are certain fixed costs for any 24-hour news service, but the extra expense of covering the war is heavy. CNN, for instance, had about 250 staff in the Gulf region, about ten times its normal number. Not only do they need to be fed and sheltered; they also have to be supplied with videophones, satellite dishes, vehicles, security gear and so forth. Before the war, CNN spent over \$1 million on security training. It also costs \$1, 500 a day merely to link a channel up to a geo-stationary satellite from a phone on the ground. Fox TV had 100 and BCC had 200 staff in region. It can be said that covering the war costed \$1 m a day.<sup>116</sup> The cost is not a problem for Al- Jazeera because it is backed by the Emir of Qatar, but it is important for private channels.

The globalized media economy depended significantly on the 1997 decisions of the World Trade Organization to deregulate telecommunications. Without "deregulation" and "privatization", the global media networks could not operate. The outcome of these developments on the media market is an

---

<sup>113</sup> For more details see, Edward S. Herman & Robert W. McChesney, *The Global Media*, (London, Washington: Cassel, 1997)

<sup>114</sup> Thomas L. McPhail, *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002) p.124

<sup>115</sup> *The Times*, 6 October 2000

<sup>116</sup> Embedded in Iraq, *The Economist*, 3/29/2003, Vol. 366, p57

extraordinary concentration with increased control of mass communications by media conglomerates. Existing media structures began to integrate all sectors of communication.

During the 1980s and 1990s, media giants become multimedia owners of various combinations of broadcast and cable TV networks, TV and radio stations, cable TV distribution systems, satellite TV systems, movie and TV entertainment program production companies, book and magazine publishing, and internet operations, as well as the traditional mass medium of newspapers. These owners were also major players in other sectors of economy like General Electric. The ownership of the NBC TV Network, General Electric also has vast operations in consumer electronics, military contracting, nuclear and electrical power generation, financial services and aircraft engines.

AOL Time Warner, Disney, Viacom and General Electric represent the major US media owners; others include Japan's Sony, Australian-based News Corporation, France's Vivendi Universal, Matra Hachette, Canal Plus and Pathé, United Kingdom's British Sky Broadcasting and Pearson, Germany's Bertelsmann, Netherlands' VNU and Italy's Mediaset.<sup>117</sup> Even Ted Turner, a billionaire and the largest shareholder in the world's largest media company, AOL Time Warner, says the American media is far too concentrated: "There are really five companies that control 90 percent of what we read, see and hear. It's not healthy."<sup>118</sup> To understand these structures, we can look at the dominant five; however, this listing can change.

**AOL Time Warner:** It is the biggest media company in the world. The union was a 350-billion-Dollar deal completed in 2000. The combined firms have about 85.000 employees around the globe. Time merged with Warner Communications in 1989, with Turner Broadcasting in 1996, and with America Online (AOL) in 2000. AOL Time Warner now operates in six major

---

<sup>117</sup> For more details see, Thomas L. McPhail, *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends*, (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 2002) pp.47-95

<sup>118</sup> Patrick Martin, "Media Boses Admit Pro-War Bias in Coverage of Iraq", 2 May 2003, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)

communication sectors: cable, publishing, films, music, broadcasting, and the internet. Its cable system is one of the most technologically sophisticated digital fiber-optic systems available anywhere. In global markets, the union is represented by Warner Music Group and CNN International, which reaches 150 million TV-viewing households in over 212 countries and territories around world. Its major properties include CNN, Warner Brothers (150 retail outlets in the U.S., 30 stores across the Asia and more than dozen stores in Europe), Home Box Office, Cinemax movie channels, Time Warner Cable, Warner Music, Time Inc., Turner Entertainment Group, New Line Cinema and Cartoon Network. One can say that Time Warner is a textbook illustration of the new order: “It is now a major international player in book publishing, recorded music, feature film production and exhibition, satellite and cable television programming and animation, video games and children’s toy.”<sup>119</sup>

**Viacom:** Viacom has major global interests ranging from Paramount Pictures and MTV, which is particularly attractive to advertisers because of its global position market; to strong publishing interests with Simon&Schuster, as well as packed television programming on various global satellite systems. It has been active in promoting regional global markets, including Australia, Latin America, and, particularly, Asia. It is also a major player in international theatrical exhibition operations, with a number of cinemas around the globe and a strong radio presence through Infinity Broadcasting Corporation, which operates 163 radio stations.

**Disney:** Disney is the world’s third largest media empire with annual revenues of close to 25 billion dollars. The Walt Disney Company began as a small creative firm established by two brothers, Walter and Roy Disney. They were successful with the creation of popular cultural icons such as Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck. After World War II, the company began to add theme parks, first in California and later in Florida. They then expanded internationally with Disneylands in Japan and France. During the 1980s, the company expanded

---

<sup>119</sup> Thomas L.McPhail, p.55



through Disney stores and greater diversification into related fields. Then came the addition of the NHL hockey team the Mighty Ducks, of Disney Cable Channels, of Disney music, and of ABC radio & tv networks.

**Bartelsmann:** The Company was established by Carl Batelsmann in 1835 as a religious publishing house. Its revenue is now in the billions, and it has seven major operating units worldwide: music, publishing, newspapers, magazines, broadcasting, printing and host of Internet-related multimedia companies. Batelsmann Music Group (BMG) has branches in five continents and a 14 % share of the world music market. With the rights of 700.000 songs, it has offices in 27 countries. BMG studios in Germany, Austria, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan and the United Kingdom, offer Internet creations, animations, digital video processing, and classical sound recording. Batelsmann has television stations in European countries with its partner CLT-UFA, and the main channel is RTL. Thirty three percent of the company's income is from Germany, 32% comes from European countries, 24% from the US, and 8% from other countries.

**News Corporation:** The largest shareholder of News Corporation is Australian-born Rupert Murdoch, a naturalized U.S. citizen who resides in Europe. Murdoch has created an international empire of media, technology, and sports franchises. It is a global media firm with significant interests in television, film, books, newspapers, magazines, satellites, cable systems, and sports. The satellite network of company reaches every core and semiperipheral country as well as most peripheral regions, excluding Africa. FOX News, STAR TV and BskyB are main TV channels; *The Times*, *The Sun*, *The Sunday Times*, and *Independent* are some of its 132 newspapers.

The structure of ownership shows that pluralism of choice is no guarantee of a pluralism of supplier. Structural reorganization of any media business, whether in the public or the private sector, affects the programmes made by broadcasters and the coverage provided by the papers, and it determines the distribution of power within the business and whose decisions count.

From one perspective, attributing power to individuals like Murdoch or others is to miss the larger context within which shapes and makes possible their actions. Individuals do not have power, structures do.<sup>120</sup> If one claims that owners play a direct role, the operation of power within media organizations can be explainable. There is no simple correlation between economic interests and the political content of papers or the pressure they put on governments.

On the other hand, the conglomerates who dominate are not necessarily part of a comfortable group. Although they may have interests in common, they are also rivals. As the conglomerates' interests reach out in so many different directions and across ever larger areas, so inevitably they become entwined in politics.

Media power is the outcome of political decisions, values and processes. Therefore, in thinking about the political consequences of media ownership we need to examine the economic interests of media conglomerates, the practices of owners and the policies of government. We need to be always sensitive to the conception of power that emphasizes the discussion. This same order applies to another source of potential power: the State.

#### *1.2.2.5 State*

The relationship between politics and media has to be understood in terms of the institutions which manage the flow of power: the system of regulation and patterns of control that organize the media. The history of the relationship between states and media can be seen as the product of particular institutional forms which shape the media. Through the imposition of regulations and the granting of liberties, through law and policy, governments and their agents influence the media structure.

Although legislation depends on the constitution of the country and many constitutions protect content in the name of a free press, states hold on to the right to control. Otherwise their power to control is eliminated. If the transmitter is based elsewhere and corporation could provide the service, Media corporations have the capacity to reject governmental interventions due to their economic

---

<sup>120</sup> John Street, p.144

power. The power of control is important. For example, during the Cold War, both the East and West sought to win over their rival population by taking advantage of the difficulty of controlling external broadcasts (the US, with the help of the CIA, set up Voice of America, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe)<sup>121</sup>.

The threat of imprisonment is another example of the measures available to the state in its attempt to shape the politics of mass media. Every state exercises some control over media contents, either blatantly or discreetly, but all forms of public communication are subject to an element of regulation. For a time the internet seemed an exception to this rule, but there is increasing evidence of regulation here, also. The German government has, for instance, been putting pressure on internet service providers to ban anti-semitic sites. The Burmese, Indonesian and Malaysian governments have all tried - with varying degrees of success — to control the political use of the internet.<sup>122</sup>

Obvious elements of state information management; regulation, legislation, secrecy, censorship, propaganda and media management represent the capacity of states to provide or suppress the flow of information available to the media. Indeed, the state is part of a system of news production because the state establishes the forms of communication that operate within its territorial borders and regulates the content of those systems.

At one level, the state is responsible for creating the market value of knowledge. Copyright laws build a regime of rights about certain forms of knowledge or expression. These laws constitute certain kinds of 'information' as a commodity to be traded, and to set limits to its use. For example, French law recognizes the right of individuals to claim copyright to their own image. This means that papers, in printing a picture of someone without their permission, may be in breach of copyright law. Copyright law also regulates the printing or reprinting

---

<sup>121</sup> F. Stonor Saunders, *Who paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta, 2000)

<sup>122</sup> John Street, p.104

of articles and documents, as well as designating the rights of control over those artifacts.

Other state regulation comes through privacy legislation. The aim of such laws is to define areas which are protected from journalistic interference. People are divided on this issue, however. Proponents argue for the value of privacy, whereas opponents argue against investigative journalism. There are also those who see privacy laws as the advantage of the rich and powerful, rather than the protection of legal resources.

In addition to regulations, states use censorship as the most obvious form of state control. However, saying that all states censor does not mean that all states censor equally. There are places where censorship is institutionalized and extensive, others where it is more covert or ad hoc. There are, after all, many ways to censor. Spain long maintained, even after the fall of Franco, the practice of running a two-minute delay on all live broadcasts, so that offending moments could be excised.<sup>123</sup> States ruled by single parties, for instance, tend to impose tighter restrictions than those in which opposition is legitimate. And some states, like the US, formally deny the right to censorship in their constitution, but, as critics of the regime argue<sup>124</sup>, this still leaves open the possibility of de facto censorship through ways in which commercial and other interests affect what counts as 'news' and what priorities are accorded it.

Of course, one of the defining characteristics of 'democracy' is the absence of censorship. This means democratic media provide the conditions for free speech and are not subject to content control. But this is not a valid conclusion. As Simon Lee observed, 'in our everyday lives, censors are all around us. We censor one another through withering looks, subtle threats of sticks, or promises of carrots.'<sup>125</sup> And just as we practice censorship on a routine, daily basis, so too do democratic societies. This is not to say that all states censor

---

<sup>123</sup> Lorenzo Vilches, "The Media in Spain", in Anthony Weymouth and Bernard Lamizet(eds), *Markets and Myths: Forces for Change in the European Media*, (London:Longman, 1996, pp.173-201)p.180

<sup>124</sup> Edward Herman and Naom Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political economy of the Mass Media* (Newyork: Pantheon,1988)

<sup>125</sup> Simon Lee, *The Cost of Free Speech* (London: Faber&Faber, 1990,p.11) cited at John Street, p.264

equally or that all censorship is acceptable, but the point is to adopt a rather more sensitive account of censorship. Conversely, state censorship has been replaced by a system of self-censorship. Journalists abide by a strict code of conduct that includes the injunctions not to 'damage national unity' or 'spread rumors'. Breaking the code could lead to suspension of a paper. Self-censorship may indeed prove to be a much more common and insidious form of control.

According to Jim McGuigan,<sup>126</sup> there is a distinction between regulative and constitutive censorship. The former is composed of the formal institutional mechanisms for controlling the content of mass media; the latter refers to the internalized constraints- often contained in social convention and habits of thought- that regulate discourse in order to enable any society to function. On the other hand, some can think that censorship may more accurately be seen as a system of corporate *information management*. It is not an issue of the state preventing publication of facts and images, rather of organizing the publication of other facts and images. Secrecy is a key method in this process. Rather than censor, liberal states prefer to keep things secret, with the intention that the issue of a ban never arises. If journalists don't know anything, there is little need to censor them.

As seen above, countries vary in the way they control secrecy. In theory, freedom of speech in constitutions requires a practice of freedom of information, and this means that journalists can have access to any official information, provided that it does not breach national security. For example, in the UK, a civil servant, Clive Ponting was prosecuted but found not guilty of passing on Ministry of Defense documents about the Falklands War to an MP. Sarah Tisdall, also a civil servant, was prosecuted and imprisoned for leaking details to *The Guardian* of the movement of Cruise missiles.<sup>127</sup> On this issue, the UK system may be particularly restrictive, but all states, however liberal, have secrecy laws and other regulatory devices which are designed to restrict the flow of information. Australia, like Britain, operates a rule which

---

<sup>126</sup> Jim McGuigan, *Culture and the Public Sphere* (London: Routledge,1996)pp.155-61

<sup>127</sup> L.Ponting, *Whiteall: Tragedy and Farce* (London: Hamish Hamilton,1985) cited at John Street, p.108

prevents access to cabinet papers, the documentary evidence of government decisions and discussions, for 30 years.<sup>128</sup>

Some argue that the state has become an increasingly marginal political actor. Behind this marginalization there are two general processes: Technological improvements and globalization. Technological change occurs independently of political control. States do not lead technical change; they adapt to it. On the globalization side, the emergence of transnational conglomerates, empires built upon the exploitation of new technology, appears to create power bases which exist above the realm of any one nation state. As with technical change, it seems that states must adapt to these new sources of power, and in adapting they lose any claim to sovereignty and autonomy.<sup>129</sup> Nonetheless, states still remain significant actors, and to the extent that they handle power, they shape the character and content of mass communication within their borders.

The state is obviously not the only important actor in establishing the mass media infrastructure. The state is itself in continuous contact with the corporations and conglomerates that own the papers and cable systems and terrestrial stations that constitute the modern mass media. Barriers could readily be seen in monopolistic controls, technical disparities, restrictive media practices, exclusion of disadvantaged groups, blacklist and censorship. Nevertheless, a tendency toward democratization seems to be taking place. States have been increasingly aware that they must take into account not only national opinion but “world public opinion”, because today’s media are capable of diffusing “information on international questions to every part of the world.”<sup>130</sup> This shows the other important actor of media: the global audience and the growing role of public opinion.

---

<sup>128</sup> Julianne Schultz, *Reviving the Forth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p.82

<sup>129</sup> John Street, p.115

<sup>130</sup> Frank J. Lechner and Johnn Boli (Eds.), *The Globalization Reader*, (Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) p.256

### 1.2.2.6 Global Audience

News is a form of rhetoric; it is about persuading us- the readers, the viewers that something has happened. Very few people actually witness the events that are reported. When we read or see news broadcasts about Clinton becoming president, or about Saddam's trial, we do not just believe that they happened: we know they did. We are sure about these things although we have no direct corroborative evidence. We are persuaded of the news truthfulness by the different techniques they use to do this. The global media deploy their resources to particular audiences. In Castells' phrase,<sup>131</sup> we live not in a global village, but in 'customized cottages globally produced and locally distributed'.

With the decline of the historic institutions and ideologies of civil society, the media has become, indeed, the main part of civil society, the means through which society is reflected and reflects upon itself. In fact, the old institutions of civil society in the Western world such as parties, churches and unions in local, regional and national activity and organizations are increasingly dependent on the media for their ability to project themselves. Similarly, global media communicate not only information about world events, but also the debates about how 'we', as individuals, societies and states, should respond. The self-styled 'global' media – CNN supplying every national news network as well as every hotel bedroom- are less important than the global flows between national and regional television and newspaper.<sup>132</sup>

Through the publication of journals and magazines, 'public opinion' came to be known as the construction of views which had legitimacy through the fact that they were held by the people. The 'public' is the product of mass communication media and their relationship to authority. Thus, the press and broadcasters characterize themselves as the voice of the people, as a result of public communication. Opinion and information are products of the attempt to make political power responsible.

Readers and viewers certainly listen to the rhetoric of mass media. They help to legitimate the activities of journalists: sales and ratings are taken as signs

---

<sup>131</sup> Manuel Castells, *The Rise of The Network Society*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996) p.341

<sup>132</sup> Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994) p.173

of popularity and of public interest. The core assumption is that mass media reflect the tastes of those who buy their papers or watch their programmes. At the same time, for commercial and political reasons, owners and editors cannot ignore their customers. Thus, global media channels adjust themselves according to the opinion of readers and viewers rather than the whims and prejudices of the corporate executives because ignoring public opinion means risking commercial punishment.

Today, global crises play a central role in building the global consciousness which represents the awakening of a global civil society. At an institutional level, the responses are still weak, although non-governmental human rights, humanitarian aid and environmental agencies, developed from the West but with global reach are important forms in the embryonic global civil society.<sup>133</sup>

Civil society represents social interests and principles towards the conflicting dominant interests in the state system. While national civil societies may express ideologies which contradict state interests, global civil society, constructed around ideas of human rights, may express ideologies which are formally upheld within the state system. Therefore, global civil societies constitute a source of continuous pressures on the state system, although its development is in turn very much dependent on developments in the state system. Consequently, within global society, we need a conception and a programme of global responsibility, which includes both interest in and moral obligation towards the well-being of fellow human-being across the world with whom we share an increasingly common social life.

### *1.2.3 Media Ethics and Democracy*

At this point, it is important to underline that the force behind the expenditures of war coverage is credibility. While the currency of economic power is money and that of political power is legitimacy, the power of global media rest on credibility. Without credibility, global media not only lose their legitimacy but also lose audiences, power, and ultimately money. They may spend an incredible amount in one month, but they gain credibility in the long run.

---

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., p.23



If people do not believe what they see, hear and read, it is hard to identify how the contents of mass media can influence them. If people find something incredible or the source untrustworthy, they tend to discount them. Credibility is an issue not simply of ‘truth’ but of the conventions of believability within a particular type. Credibility is not based only on the broadcasting of news. The conditions for credibility and the implications of it differ according to type.

Journalism ethics is important to provide credibility, but in the competitive media system, ethics is usually ignored. Whether commercial, government or public, all media need to observe four sets of critical freedom and responsibilities to gain credibility.<sup>134</sup> These are:

- ◆ Freedom from government as well as corporate censorship and pressure
- ◆ Freedoms to exercise the professional duties to inform, educate, and entertain the public at the highest possible quality
- ◆ Responsibility toward the professional duties of accuracy, veracity, fairness and respect for human rights and dignity.
- ◆ Responsibility for promoting the democratic values of free speech, free flow of information, equal access to media and information, diversity and pluralism, checks and balances, transparency, and accountability.

Providing these freedoms and responsibilities means democracy is not only for media professionals but also for audiences.<sup>135</sup> This is because of ethical behavior presumes freedom of choice. Without freedom, journalists and audiences are hostage to different information monopolies. As a result, to sustain free and tolerant dialogue, we need norms, rules and perceptions. However, these cannot be imported like technologies or commodities. This requires people believing in ethical norms and affording to establish these norms. As Aidan White says, the

---

<sup>134</sup> Majid Tehranian, “Peace Journalism Negotiating Global Media Ethics”, p. 72

<sup>135</sup> Brian McNair, *Journalism and Democracy*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2000) p.103

only power of journalists is to show the truth, and “journalists will not be independent until they win the basic respect.”<sup>136</sup>

The training of news journalists is important for the implementation of these ethics. The main problem for journalist is the distinction between ‘opinion’ and ‘fact’, a distinction that is formally reproduced in the layout of papers or the format of programmes.<sup>137</sup> Opinion is seen as the expression of a personal view; so it is biased and its bias is openly acknowledged. However, news reporting aspires to objectivity, to stating the facts; to balance and impartiality in recording competing interpretations of an event without supporting one view over another. These practices are protected in codes of performance and training manuals. For example, to be balanced is to give equal coverage to all the parties to an event, irrespective of the news value of their contributions. An objective journalist may therefore judge that it is appropriate to ignore certain views because they are marginal or insignificant to the main story. On the other hand, the journalist may feel compelled to represent the full range of views. This sort of tension is resolved or managed through the routine practices of journalists, the codes and rules which evolve to make journalism possible.

In addition to ethics, democracy is important for the mass media. Every democratic theorist generates very different positions the media’s role in a democracy. Liberal democracy argues for nation of a free, but responsible press; direct democracy for more tightly regulated media, in which there is some form of popular control; and deliberative democracy requires, according to John Thompson<sup>138</sup> ‘regulated pluralism’ to enable citizens to reach informed, collective views of the public good.

---

<sup>136</sup> Panel discussion about the “Media and War”. Participants are Aidan White, General Secretary of Federation for International Journalists, Bettina Peters, Project Director of European Journalist Center, Palestinian Journalist Dr. Kasim Ali and Assoc. Prof. Dr. Doğan Tılıç., Bilkent University, April 12<sup>nd</sup> 2003.

<sup>137</sup> For details about British media see: James Curran and Jean Seaton, *Power without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1997, First edition in 1981), For about American Media see David T. Z. Mindich, *How Objectivity Came to Define American Journalism*, (New York, London: New York University Press, 1998)

<sup>138</sup> John Thompson, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995)

Democracy means being free to inform citizens and reflect the range of ideas and views circulating within society. The realization of this ideal is captured in the notion of a 'free press' (both newspapers and television). The free press is defined as a medium which allows for diversity of ideas and opinions; it is not an agent of a single view or of state propaganda.<sup>139</sup> The media are 'free' exactly in the sense that they are not subject to centralized control. Any control of content means a loss of freedom.

Freedom of information is a fundamental feature of a democratic society. Similarly, the conditions under which politics is conducted affect the media's capacity to fulfill a useful role. Therefore democratic media do not themselves create democracy. Democratic media need a democratic polity, and vice versa.<sup>140</sup>

### ***1.3 Information Society and Its Impact on World Politics***

Globalization affected both the media and world politics as a result of numerous technological changes. Information Society is a concept that reflects these changes' effects on people. As generally understood, an information society is an advanced postindustrial society of a type found most commonly in the West. It is characterized by a high degree of computerization, large volumes of electronic data transmission, and an economic profile heavily influenced by the market and employment possibilities of information technology.<sup>141</sup>

Since the early 1970s, some social theorists have argued that contemporary society is experiencing a major shift in the focus of production. Whereas economic activity previously revolved around agriculture and manufacturing, information and knowledge are said to constitute the principal sources of wealth in the newly emerging circumstances. Computers, mass media and telecommunications are allegedly becoming the most important assets in the economy, taking precedence over land, labour, industrial plant, and money.<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>139</sup> John Street, p.253

<sup>140</sup> James Curran, "Rethinking Media and Democracy", in J. Curran&M. Gurevitch(eds.), *Mass Media and Society*, (London:Arnold, 2000,pp.120-54) p.136-7

<sup>141</sup> William J. Martin, *The Information Society*, (London: Aslib, 1988), p.37

<sup>142</sup> John Baylis& Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2001), p.21

Shaped by ‘information’, some theorists named the new society as the ‘information society’; other terms include ‘the information age,’<sup>143</sup> ‘post-industrial society,’<sup>144</sup> ‘the services economy,’<sup>145</sup> and ‘the knowledge society.’<sup>146</sup>

There are several theses of information society, but three of them are major.<sup>147</sup> The first one is known as ‘thesis of information economy.’ According to it, modern societies are characterized by a predominance of information work. This claim refers to the study of Austrian-born economist Fritz Machlup of *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*<sup>148</sup>. In this study, he argues that we shifted from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy during the nineteenth century and after World War II, we evolved into a service economy. Now, we have an information economy<sup>149</sup>. According to Machlup, information is viewed as a commodity made up of goods and services that have costs as they are created and that can be bought and sold in the information society.

Another thesis argues that modern societies are characterized by a predominance of information explosion, an exponential increase in the flow of information. This model measures the flow of telecommunication across the whole of society. Called ‘Joho Shakai’ in Japanese, it based on Tadao Umesao’s<sup>150</sup> essay “Joho Sangyo Ron (About Information Industries) and his various models on

---

<sup>143</sup> See: Manuel Castells, *Power of Identity: The Informatidn Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, (Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1997)

<sup>144</sup> See: Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, (New York: Basic Books, 1999, first ed. in 1976)

<sup>145</sup> See: Robert P. Inman, *Managing The Service Economy:Prospects and Problems*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985)

<sup>146</sup> See: Loet Leydesdorff, *A Sociological Theory of Communucation: The Self-Organization of the Knowledge Based-Society*, (Parkland, Fla: Universal Publishers, 2001)

<sup>147</sup> For details about these theses see Alistair S. Duff, *Information Society Studies*, (New York: Routledge, 2000)

<sup>148</sup> See: Fritz Machlup, *The Production and Distribution of Knowledge in the United States*, (Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962)

<sup>149</sup> Susan Crawford, ‘The Origin and Development of a Concept: The Information Society’, *Bull. Med. Libr. Assoc.*, 71(4), October, 1983

<sup>150</sup> See: Tadao Umesao, "Information Industry Theory: Dawn of the Coming Era of the Ectodermal Industry." (Hoso Asahi Jan.: 4-17, 1963)

the stages of social development and civilizations. In his study, like Machlup, he identifies the 'Joho-Shakai' -the information society- as the last stage of development.

Thirdly, there is the technological thesis, which defines information societies in terms of the 'information revolution' and the persistent impact of Information Technology. This methodological assumption underlies the Ian Miles's formulation of 'the information society qua computerized society.'<sup>151</sup> In his study, Miles emphasizes the diffusion of information technology.

Using these three arguments, in the context of existing developments in the advanced industrial nations, the information society can be defined as one in which the quality of life, as well as prospects for social change and economic development, depend increasingly on information and its exploitation due to the technological innovations. In such a society, living standards, patterns of work and leisure, the education system and the marketplace are all influenced markedly by advances in information and knowledge.<sup>152</sup> An increasing range of information-intensive products and services that communicate through a wide range of media are evidences of these advances.

Information is that which adds to our awareness or understanding of some topic, problem or event and is variously perceived as facts, intelligence, data, news and knowledge.<sup>153</sup> Thus, information is all around as a product of great value, not only for economic reasons but also for achieving the quality of social, cultural, and political life that developing countries strive for.<sup>154</sup>

At this point, communication is a key component of the information society. Information and communication are inseparable because technically, communication would not be possible without information. Communication can mean anything from the exchange of news or information between two friends in face-to-face conversation, to the transmission of live television broadcast via communications satellites.

---

<sup>151</sup> Ian Miles, *Home Informatics :Information Technology and the Transformation of Everyday Life*, (London ; New York : Pinter Publishers, 1988)

<sup>152</sup> William J. Martin, p.42

<sup>153</sup> Ibid. p.1

<sup>154</sup> Herbert S. Dordick&Georgette Wang, *The Information Society: A Retrospective View*, (London:Sage Publications, 1993), p.66

The global media system is generating its own unique new forms of influencing communication.<sup>155</sup> The development of new devices and systems has extended communication in two ways. First, they have made it faster and more efficient. Secondly, and more importantly, they have extended the scope of what can be communicated. Yet instant access and instantaneous transmission depend upon a vastly expensive infrastructure of telecommunications and broadcasting systems on the part of the providers, and acquisition of appropriate equipment on the side of the consumers.<sup>156</sup>

Access to information and to information technology is a prerequisite for achieving a high degree of information.<sup>157</sup> Thus, global media's role as the primary means for the wide distribution of information makes them important actors of both information society and world politics. Global media play such an important part in modern life, as the suppliers of news, information, entertainment, and indeed, values.

With this flood of information, the media evolved into a necessity in the concerns of its citizens. As the public realized that how much more there was to know, people began to depend increasingly on professionals to tell them what was happening. At the same time, professionals were teaching the public how much more there was to know. This natural development fed on itself, making the public increasingly dependent on the media and the media more powerful.<sup>158</sup>

The incredible information expansion hurt the media in two ways, though. First, it made the media's job of controlling information quality and content very difficult. At the same time, it made the public more conscious of the media's humanness and fallibility. Increased competition among information sources meant that the public was seeing many more, and frequently contradictory, points

---

<sup>155</sup> Marc Raboy, 'Media Policy and Public Interest', in Robin Mansell, Rohan Samarajiva and Amy Mahan (Eds.), *Networking Knowledge for Information Societies Institutions & Intervention*, (Netherlands:Delft University Press, 2002), p.316

<sup>156</sup> John Feather, *The Information Society: A Study of Continuity and Change*, (London: Library Association Publishing, 2000 (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition), p.5

<sup>157</sup> Herbert S. Dordick&Georgette Wang, p.68

<sup>158</sup> Jim Mann, *Tomorrow's Global Community: How The Information Deluge is Transforming Business and Government*, (Philadelphia: BainBridgebooks, 1998), p.140

of view.<sup>159</sup> The diversity of viewpoints makes the information society rich since they reflect the diversity of minds and results in a diversity in world politics. As mentioned earlier, the NGOs and other non-state actors are the result of this diversity. These news actors are fed by new information technologies of computers and communications. These technologies' massive effect on greater numbers of people make them powerful political tools since they can inform the people and can shape public opinion.

The increasing influence of the global media on public opinion concerns every interest group in world politics. Also, as seen previous section, global media's content is shaped by various actors and their individual concerns. Therefore, the effects of any communication upon the mass audience cannot be predicted, but only effects on individuals within these audiences can be.<sup>160</sup>

The information society also shaped a conscious global civil society that has an active role in world politics. In a globalized world, the problems are also globalized and they are helping to bring global civil society into being.<sup>161</sup> Global problems' widespread harmful effects, such as AIDS, poverty and unemployment, pollution and drought, dispossession and genocide, interest every person across the world. All political, ideological, religious, economic and cultural, either or good, world events grabs the attention of all national groups through the communication and broadcasting channels.<sup>162</sup> The global coordination of communications diffuses ideas and values which become commonly held. The growth of world politics is not just the bringing of very diffuse interests into relations with one another; it also involves the development of a common language and values (of democracy, rights, nation, etc.) in which conflicts are articulated.<sup>163</sup>

---

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. p.141

<sup>160</sup> William J. Martin, *p.21*

<sup>161</sup> For details about 'Global Civil Society' see Ramazan Gözen, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sonrası Çoğulculuk, Küreselleşme ve 11 Eylül*, (İstanbul:Alfa, 2004), pp.56-69 and Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994

<sup>162</sup> Ramazan Gözen, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sonrası Çoğulculuk, Küreselleşme ve 11 Eylül*, (İstanbul:Alfa, 2004), p.35

<sup>163</sup> Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994, p.11

Consequently, globalization has changed, and continues to change, the nature of world politics. Devices that are now part of our everyday lives such as telephones, televisions, and computers have clearly transformed the way people live and work.<sup>164</sup> Under globalization, the valuable intellectual assets of information and knowledge are becoming a principal strategic resources.<sup>165</sup> Today, used honestly or not, information affects world politics both on the national and international level by taking its place through the global media and communication systems.

---

<sup>164</sup> John Feather, p.17

<sup>165</sup> Andrei Chernov, 'Global Information Society', *International Affairs*, vol.50, 2004, pp.22-28



## CHAPTER 2

### THE IMPOTANCE OF GLOBAL MEDIA IN WORLD POLITICS

With the globalization traditional borders are breached by a system which operates at a supranational level. This face of the new international system may be found in the content of communication: the same images and icons wherever you go, the same photos of the same event appearing everywhere, such as the burnt Iraqi soldier in his tank on the Basra road or Princess Diana's funeral. Mass communication has quickly have moved from what now seems the most basic of radio communication (the crystal set) to the apparent sophistication of digital broadcasting (and the possibility of interactive television).

The political importance of global media can be evaluated in a variety of ways. Firstly, globalization can describe the power and reach of the new media conglomerates. Secondly, global media can point to changes in the ways in which national governments and nation states operate. Thirdly, it can be identified in the shifts in the way citizens of those states view themselves and others. Global media have introduced its viewers to wars and famines; audiences have become party to international negotiations and virtual participants in acts of diplomacy and peace keeping.<sup>166</sup>

Governments, the UN, relief agencies and others are all using the global media to shape political agendas and policies. Whether this has created a 'global village' or cultural imperialism is a subject of much debate, but it is apparent that perceptions of the world and access to it have been transformed, and in this and other ways globalization affects the relationship between mass media and world politics.

September 11, 2001, may be considered a defining moment in the world history. It demonstrated that we live in an interdependent and fragile global village; it also showed that the global villagers entertain profound misperceptions

---

<sup>166</sup> Susan Carruthers, *The Media at War* (Basingstoke: Macmillian,2000) p.197-205

about and abhorrence against each other. According to Majid Tehranian, as people came to live in a largely mediated world, they became hostage to the images of “the other” received through the mass media.<sup>167</sup> This makes global media important for international security and for healthy communication among world people.

Today we primarily experience the world through the lenses of science, of education, and of the media. In more countries children go school before they really enter society. In school, they are heavily socialized in a particular world-view, before they begin to think of their own. The media constantly nourishes this world-view later in life. This situation reflects how media is important for definitions of “us” and “them”. In other words, media as a tool for representing the “point of view” of others are important in international relations.<sup>168</sup> Academicians, business people, and other groups can go abroad and meet other societies in their environment. However the majority of people learn and define “them” or “others” based on how media represents “them”.

Experiences of people are central in labeling events. Thus, there is no simple and neutral way of speaking about countries and people. It is important to know who speaks about whom. However, journalists, are continually made to believe that they are “free” to think and to say whatever they want, forgetting that this act is preceded and conditioned by innumerable social and psychological mechanisms.<sup>169</sup> They have a certain world-view, which in turn conditions their view of the world. As a result, journalists see certain things and ignore others.

Even place-names are often not neutral or ‘innocent’, in the sense that they are coupled with very specific events and aspiration.

All over Africa and Asia and Latin America, historic names continue to orient present-day claims. When the pro-Western Shah ruled Iran, there was little reticence in speaking of the Persian Gulf- although key parts of it were contested and in fact subject to the armed conflict. After the anti-Western Ayatollah Khomeini took over, the prefix ‘Persian’ was often

---

<sup>167</sup> Majid Tehranian, “Peace Journalism Negotiating Global Media Ethics”, p.59

<sup>168</sup> Howard H. Frederick, *Global Communication and International Relations* (Wadsworth Publishing: California, 1993) p.131

<sup>169</sup> Jaap van Ginneken, p.66-83

intuitively dropped in the Western media and only ‘the Gulf’ was left. When Iran and Iraq subsequently got into a full-scale war, and when Saddam Hussein was considered an objective ally, occasionally the label ‘Arabian Gulf’ emerged. When Saddam Hussein turned out to be a dangerous enemy, the embarrassing label ‘the Gulf’ returned.<sup>170</sup>

In addition, in 1991 the name of operation was ‘Gulf’; however, in 2003, it was the ‘Iraqi’ operation. And now ‘Iraq’ and ‘Iran’ are using unilaterally to refer to the problems.

In short, satellite television gave an increased incentive to cover world politics. As having globally distribution of events or news, global media is important for setting and shaping world politics for global audiences. This role of mass media alerted the undeveloped states to consider their situation.

### ***2.1 New World Information and Communication Order***

States realizing the importance of media is not new. Resolutions, meetings, and manifestos calling for “a new order” in international information structures and policies became a feature of the world scene in the early 1970s and often generated intense dispute. Less developed countries pleaded their case against the domination of western media in UNESCO and other UN forums, arguing that restrictions should be placed on western cultural propaganda and that aid should go to the former colonies to improve their promising communication systems.

The debates were centered on the news-flow question. In 1976 Indira Gandhi, the prime minister of India, expressed the prevailing view: “We want to hear Africans on events in Africa. You should similarly be able to get an Indian explanation of events in India. It is astonishing that we know so little about leading poets, novelists, historians, and editors of various Asian, African and Latin American countries while we are familiar with minor authors and columnist of Europe and America.”<sup>171</sup>

---

<sup>170</sup> *ibid*, p. 11

<sup>171</sup> Frank J. Lechner and John Boli (Eds.), *The Globalization Reader*, (Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000) p288

The Non-Aligned Nations criticized the spread of transnational media systems in terms of 1) the global economic imbalance between the North and the South; 2) the Western monopoly of global news services with their content focused mainly on developed countries- when developing countries were mentioned, coverage tended to be misinformed and disparaging, or centered on conflicts, ethnic wars, dramas, floods, famines... 3)the dominance of news and entertainment programming which, because it reflected often-alien Western values, was deemed imperialist. These issues culminated in the call for a *New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO)*.

In 1976, UNESCO convened the MacBride Commission to study global communication issues and came up with solutions for ameliorating the North-South divide. Officially called the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems, it was chaired by Irish Ambassador, Director of Amnesty International, and Nobel Peace laureate Sean MacBride. The MacBride Commission's final report *Many Voices, One World*, was released in 1980. Amongst its 82 recommendations were those devoted to eliminating the media imbalances between countries; protecting the rights of journalists; reducing commercialism in the media; using the media to aid oppressed people; and supporting freedom of the press and freedom of information.<sup>172</sup>

According to MacBride:

“New World Information and Communication Order” may be more accurately defined as a process than any given set of conditions and practices. The particulars of the process will continually alter, yet its goals will be constant- more justice, more equity, more reciprocity information exchange, less dependence in communication flows, less downwards diffusion of messages, more self-reliance and cultural identity, more benefits for all mankind.<sup>173</sup>

Indeed, not only does globalization threaten to alter the capacity of states to control communications within their borders; it also affects the relationship

---

<sup>172</sup> See Appendix B for Resolution 4/19

<sup>173</sup> Sean MacBride, p. xviii

between states. The limited space available for geostationary satellites has been monopolized by the powerful players. If we think that information and communications represent a capacity to participate in creating a new world order, inequalities in the distribution of media resources constitutes a form of disproportion of authorities.

As a result, all of the problems that gave rise to NWICO are not solved. However, NWICO debates show that the importance of global media for representing differences and pluralism is a necessary objective for providing a democratic voice of people in today world communication.

## ***2.2 Point of View***

It is clear that to obtain pluralism, there need to be a pluralism of representing “point of views”, not pluralism of outlets. If we think that news is the product of the prejudices of the individual writer, this means objectivity is an incoherent idea or an impossible stance because every story is written from a ‘point of view’, which inevitably supports one set of interests or actors over another. The claim that the media are biased begins with the idea that the practices of journalist and editors result in articles and programmes which favour one view of the world over another, providing sustenance for one set of interests while undermining an alternative.<sup>174</sup>

Herman and Chomsky, in “*Manufacturing Consent*” analyze the content of the US press and explore this issue. Their hypothesis is that the US press acts to sustain the US government’s foreign policy interests, which are the product of a particular ideology and particular material interests. Herman and Chomsky’s explanation is based on the idea that the US media act as propagandist for dominant corporate interests in the US.<sup>175</sup> In their analysis they saw that, where relations of the US were friendly with a foreign country, the election of this country was seen as ‘democratic’; where they were unfriendly, the coverage was less sympathetic. In short, Herman and Chomsky assert that journalists operated

---

<sup>174</sup> John Street, p.16

<sup>175</sup> For details see E. Herman and N. Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon, 1988)

double standards. To demonstrate this bias, they also analyzed the texts in terms of the space allocated, the tone used, the expertise referred to, and etc.<sup>176</sup>

Similarly, Kellner argues that all political coverage is ideological and has to be understood and judged as such.<sup>177</sup> According to him, coverage of the 1991 Gulf War was the result of ‘media construct’ by which he means its ‘reality’ was not located in the desert battlefields. The American government, he argues, was able to control the images and information available to the press corps. The combined effect of government manipulation and journalistic practice (and prejudgement) served to create conditions that legitimized the war and US policy. Thus, the 1990s war against Iraq was a cultural-political event as much as a military one.

“Point of view” is important also in news process because this involves the creation of ‘them’ and ‘us’. The magazine *Index on Censorship* (2000) devoted a special issue to the creation of ‘them’. It was entitled *Manufacturing Monsters*, and described how ‘they’ are created in different media for different audiences, as ‘refugees’ or ‘Arabs’ or ‘gypsies’. Franklin Gilliam and his colleagues<sup>178</sup> show how in the US the media construct the fear of crime: of ‘them’ attacking ‘us’, and the way ‘they’ are configured as ‘black’. This construction of an audience, a particular ‘we’, is achieved through a series of contrasts and oppositions, through the implicit and explicit orchestration of ‘us’ and ‘them’.<sup>179</sup> National borders and political behaviors are drawn and redrawn in this way. At a trivial level, this can be discerned in sports commentary for international competitions where it is assumed that the audience is on one side or another; at a more serious level, it is involved in the construction of an enemy in the prelude to, and conduct of, war.<sup>180</sup>

As seen, since the image of “us” and “others” and social realities of life are being settled by media realities, the one-to-one society- state relationship, in which a single state constitutes the ultimate source of power and authority in a

---

<sup>176</sup> E. Herman and N. Chomsky, p. 132-6

<sup>177</sup> Douglas Kellner, *Media Culture* (London.Routledge, 1995), p.198

<sup>178</sup> F. Gilliam, S. Iyengar, A. Simon and O. Wright “Crime in Black and White: The Violent, Scary World of Local News”, *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1996 1(3), 6-25

<sup>179</sup> John Street, p.54

<sup>180</sup> Susan Carruthers, p.134

given society is changing since the concept of state power in global society seems to be confusing.

### ***2.3 Propaganda***

As mentioned above, secrecy and censorship are useful tools for states to control information flow. Propaganda is the outcome of secrecy and censorship. The selective release of information is intended to protect and promote the interests of those in power. Since the tools of propaganda are words and speech, time, place, content and characteristics of target people are important for propaganda.<sup>181</sup>

Undoubtedly, where the state owns and controls the press and broadcasting institutions, it can use them for propaganda purposes, as was the case in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union,<sup>182</sup> and more recently in Yugoslavia under President Milosevic. But in liberal regimes it is still possible to identify state efforts to use mass media for propaganda. Similarly, the argument of Herman and Chomsky's "*Manufacturing Consent*" is that all 'news' in the US (and by implication, elsewhere) is primarily propaganda.

However, it is important to keep a distinction between public relations as propaganda and the direct use of the press or television: In liberal regimes, it is assumed that nobody, including politicians, buys or dictates any particular coverage. Instead, they are in the business of persuading or pressuring journalists to provide a certain type of copy; whether journalists deliver or not depend on the relationship, but this relationship does not have the rule structure of propaganda.<sup>183</sup>

Conversely, there are times when even direct propaganda is considered as a justifiable part of the state's activities, and the media's compliance equally acceptable. These are the state's expected propaganda for the public

---

<sup>181</sup> For details see Nevzat Tarhan, "Psikolojik Savaş", (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2003)

<sup>182</sup> The power of the new forms of communication was given its most frightening representation in the propaganda machinery developed by Hitler and Stalin. The new mass media appeared to present the power to enslave entire nations.

<sup>183</sup> For details of public relation and propaganda see Sheldon Rampton & John Stauber, *Weapons of Mass Deception* (New York:Penguin, 2003)

interest: to warn against the risk of AIDS, or to notify citizens of other risks to health and safety, or to inform them of their rights and entitlements.

Another device for controlling content is the press conference. While they can serve for propaganda, press conferences or press releases can be organized in different ways. In the US there is the open, public, televised presidential press conference attended by the White House correspondents; in Britain, this system is represented by the lobby, a club which allows privileged access to government information to a select group of journalists, giving them 'exclusive' copy, and at the same time allowing the politically powerful to give a particular spin to the coverage.<sup>184</sup>

The distribution of information to journalists is certainly not characteristically conducted in an ad hoc manner. It is part of a system, one aim of which is to keep control. Carruthers<sup>185</sup> argues that coverage of government is less a direct result of the state public relations machine, and owes more to 'long-standing news routines'. Similarly, Sussman<sup>186</sup> talks of the network of institutions - 'embassies, CIA, the White House, cabinet-level department, Congress' - all of whom feed 'tips, stories and contacts to the press on a regular basis'. One incarnation of this is the 'press release'. Research conducted in the 1990s suggested that about half the articles appearing in Australian newspapers 'began as press releases'.<sup>187</sup>

Refusing access to information is one device available to a state aimed upon managing media coverage, but this same power can also be used to distribute it selectively. Susan Carruthers<sup>188</sup> records how, in both world wars, 'British propagandists recognized that their task of courting American journalists would be easier if more lenient arrangements for censorship were

---

<sup>184</sup> Nicholas Jones, *Soundbites and Spin Doctors* (London: Cassell, 1995), in J. Street, p.112

<sup>185</sup> Susan Carruthers, p.44

<sup>186</sup> Gerald Sussman, *Communication, Technology, and Politics in the Information Age* (London: Sage, 1997) p.256

<sup>187</sup> Julianne Schultz, *Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) p.56

<sup>188</sup> Susan Carruthers, p.172



introduced, and if reporters were provided with easier access to the physical location of dramatic stories."

Propaganda can also be noticed in the way that national media report the activities of other countries. There is a tendency to publish stories about corruption, scandal or disasters in other countries, thereby reinforcing negative perceptions of life in these 'foreign' places.<sup>189</sup> The Gulf War of 1991 is one example of this. In the US, the administration deliberately promoted the idea that Saddam Hussein was a tyrant ('the butcher of Baghdad') and that protecting Kuwait was a cause worth fighting for. Stories about Iraqi violence were actively circulated and reproduced. Gerald Sussman<sup>190</sup> claims that the US media were used to distort the truth, misleading the public over the destruction of Scud missiles and suggesting that the US had bombed a biological weapons plant, when in fact it was an infant milk factory.

Similar events have occurred in all countries, though maybe not to the same degree. It should be noted, though, that propaganda has been used not only by states, but also by interest groups which try to make their voice heard by the public.

#### ***2.4 The Effects of Global Media News***

In recent years, observers of international affairs have raised the concern that the media have expanded their ability to affect the conduct of countries' diplomatic and foreign policy. In no other age people have people been so occupied with events in other parts of the globe. Today, global media are not passive observers to International conflicts.<sup>191</sup> Thus, a growing number of scholars and commentators have begun to question whether the media actually do have the ability to affect the international policy process as suggested. These disputes

---

<sup>189</sup> Roger Wallis, *The Known World of Broadcast News* ( London:Routledge, 1990)

<sup>190</sup> Gerald Sussman, p.156-7

<sup>191</sup> Howard H. Frederick, *Global Communication and International Relations* (Wadsworth Publishing: California, 1993) p. 228

suggest at least three conceptually distinct and analytically useful understanding of the global media's effect on the foreign policy process.<sup>192</sup> They are:

1. An accelerant to policy decision making,
2. An impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals and
3. A policy agenda-setting agent.

While, these influences are interconnected, they may be evident distinctly over time- sometimes a very short time- on a single policy issue. It is possible, for example, that the media as "policy agenda-setters" may rise the prominence of an issue, placing it before higher-level policy-makers. It may then shorten the time those policymakers have to deal with or resolve the issue (accelerant). Finally, it may then with coverage of some traumatic event or disclosure of tactically important information, impede the development or implementation of policy meant to address the problem.<sup>193</sup>

#### 2.4.1 *The Media as Accelerant*

To begin with accelerant effect, global real-time media shorten response time for decision making. Policymakers complain about the absence of quiet time to deliberate choice, reach private agreements, and shape the public's understanding. Since time for reflection is compressed, analysis and intelligence gatherings are out in the new world of global media. For instance, intelligence agencies now must compete with news organizations, so they have to speed up their assessments. They also must be ready to defend their assessments against the evidence presented on television or real time media, such as Internet and telephone. Now in crises, global media have an important accelerant effect in process, even the politicians take unwanted actions because of the lack of time or due to public pressure. However it was not always like this. For example:

During the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Kennedy administration had several days during which the public knew nothing of the threat

---

<sup>192</sup> S. Livingston's original formulation treats "CNN Effect's" not "Global Media" in Steven Livingston, "Beyond the "CNN Effect": The Media- Foreign Policy Dynamic" in Pippa Norris (Ed.) *The News Media and Their Influences*, (Colorado, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997) p 292

<sup>193</sup> *ibid.* p.293

looming over the horizon. According to historian Michael Beschloss, Kennedy's successors might well look back longingly at the episode, for "Kennedy had the luxury of operating in what they would probably consider to be the halcyon age before modern television news coverage." Kennedy used the first six days of the crisis to convene his advisers and rationally consider the options "in quiet, without public hysteria."<sup>194</sup>

Today, this is impossible. Even before a crisis begins, the media reveal the tension based on a secret news source. Additionally, when the crisis comes out the media put forward probable scenarios to manage the crisis. Even in the Iraq War of 2003, there was a new trend in which TV's private advisers commented about the war. In short, global media can play a constructive role in ending a crisis by accelerating the response time.

#### 2.4.2 *The Media as Impediment*

There are two understandings of media's role as a policy impediment. One is psychological and concerns the effects that some types of media content may have on public opinion, particularly public support for war. This is the outcome of 'physiologic war' which is described as using knowledge to change the feelings, ideas and attitudes of people both during war and peace.<sup>195</sup> The other possible way the media can interfere security; that is, the media may publicize security plans.

The media as an emotional inhibitor is an impediment to a government's attempts both to sanitize war and to make war into a video game by limiting the media's access to the battlefield. For the reason that emotional, grisly coverage may weaken morale and legitimacy.

For instance, at the beginning of the Iraq War, CNN said that Umm Qasr was in the hands of coalition forces. Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV later showed that this was not true. Iraq Information Minister, Muhammad El-Sahaf, also declared that their soldiers were fighting there. In conclusion the aim of the US was to promote their situation, and to win over the Iraqi people. But alternative media prevented this. Again, on March 23<sup>rd</sup>, the Qatari television channel aired

---

<sup>194</sup> *ibid.* p. 295

<sup>195</sup> Nevzat Tarhan, p.21

graphic footage, provided by Iraqi television, of corpses of American soldiers, and dazed American prisoners-of-war being questioned in broken English.<sup>196</sup> These images were significant because of ability to demoralize the public. The media led in questioning the legitimacy of the war which impeded the plans of the coalition.

Similarly, when U.S. officials denied that they were responsible for major civilian atrocities in two Baghdad bombings the week of March 24, 2003 reporters on the scene described witnessing planes flying overhead and in one case found pieces of a missile with U.S. markings and numbers on it. After a suicide bombing killed four U.S. troops at a checkpoint in late March, U.S. soldiers fired on a vehicle that ran a checkpoint and killed seven civilians. The U.S. military claimed that it had fired a warning shot, but a Washington Post reporter on the scene reported that a senior U.S. military official had shouted to a younger soldier to fire a warning shot first and then yelled that "you killed them" when he failed to do so.<sup>197</sup>

Global real time media constitute a threat to operational security also. While it may still be an open question whether media content, live or otherwise, has the ability to hinder the pursuit of desired policy goals because of their emotional contents, the fact remains that some operations are extremely sensitive to media exposure. Maintaining operational security during conventional war and tactical operations, such as antiterrorism operations, is essential. In these circumstances, the media have the technological capacity to hinder some types of operations simply by exposing them.<sup>198</sup> For example, if a commander sits in front of a television channel and speaks in live broadcasting, this will give a clue to enemies. As seen in the Iraq War of 2003, statements were only given by the Coalition Operation Center.

---

<sup>196</sup> Coming of Age , *Economist*, 29.3.2003, Vol. 366, Issue 8317

<sup>197</sup> Douglas Kellner, "Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks", <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

<sup>198</sup> Steven Livingstone, p. 298

### 2.4.3 *The Media as Agenda- Setting Agents*

Perhaps the most important role of global media is agenda setting. As an agenda-setting agent, the media's emotional, compelling coverage of violence or humanitarian crises reorder foreign policy priorities. In 1992 Somalia, during 1992-95 Bosnia, and in 1994 Haiti are said to be examples. In these examples, the global media's efforts to attract public attention bring these issues to the top of the agenda and governments were unable to turn a blind eye. The media, therefore, has the power to persuade its audiences to pressure and influence government policies.

At the same time, governments can also use the media to set their own agenda and to influence public opinion for their own purposes. This was seen in the Iraq War also. The global media's agenda setting role was used for shaping public opinion. At the beginning of that summer, the US administration continuously stressed on the dictatorship of the Saddam and his weapons. Although it was known that there were no weapons, the media was used for shaping public opinion. In the end this propaganda war won and on 20<sup>th</sup> of March, the war began. Despite a strong military, the US government selected to persuade world public opinion in order to have legitimacy, and after the war succeeded the US government was praised and the voices of critics were silenced. Even Iraqi people who were skeptical at the beginning confused the world, especially the Arab media, by kissing the hands of coalition soldiers.

As this section has outlined, the media has significance influence in shaping public opinion towards foreign policy issues. The problem is propaganda and censorship. Propaganda is using the "power of the word" to construct opinion of the masses.<sup>199</sup> Censorship is related to the relative power of a government to get certain things more or less into the public view and to keep other things more or less out of it. This is called information management, news management or issues management. Since the consequences of the influence of global media will be illustrated at chapter 4, this study will turn to question the importance of global media's power.

---

<sup>199</sup> Howard H. Frederick, p.230

## ***2.5 Power of Global Media***

Since the media can accelerate, hinder and even set policies, one should question how powerful the media exactly is. There are debates on this issue, but historical events suggest that the media are neither all-powerful nor all powerless. In our world today, these institutions play a significant role only when and if they link with other leading institutions such as government, business, and educational and civil society organizations.<sup>200</sup> In societies where government or business dictate or direct the media's messages, the likely outcome is loss of media credibility. Their constructions of reality often contradict the existing and social realities. That is why the media in dictatorial regimes have little credibility with their audiences.

A famous incident from US broadcasting history, Orson Wells' *War of the Worlds* is well-known proof of the power of media and the power of credibility. In 1938, an American Radio station transmitted a report that the Martians had landed. Some listeners panicked, and started to flee their homes. The report was actually only a part of his dramatization. However, it was well prepared with the atmosphere of a real news broadcast and people believed that there had been an alien landing. This drama affected the audiences highly. When it was broadcasted, radio was in its early life, but it had already established itself as an authoritative source of information and people had begun rely upon it, to believe it. What they lacked was separating the parody from the reality. They trusted the radio, and this trust was encouraged by responsible news reporting and by the absence of parody broadcast.

Today the power of the media in determining the fate of politicians and political causes and in influencing governments and their electorates is accepted as almost certain. Commentary on the media's power is commonplace. Textbooks on the political system all include a chapter on the media because it is implicitly or explicitly assumed that television, radio, the press and the new media are 'powerful'. The reason behind this is the idea of 'knowledge is power'.<sup>201</sup> In other

---

<sup>200</sup> Majid Tehranian, p.76

<sup>201</sup> N. Nisa Bayramoğlu, "The Power of Knowledge and the Media", *Dış Politika- Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the FP Institute*, Vol.XXX, 2005, Nos.1-2

words, since knowledge is a source of power, and being the primary communication tools, global media are central to this power.

Although the media's role in providing or suppressing information implicates them in the exercise of power, it might be argued that the important source of power is not so much the medium itself as those who have access to it. From discursive perspective, media power operates through the way it privileges particular discourses and constructs particular forms of reality.<sup>202</sup> Nonetheless, as global media are responsible for the circulation of particular ideas and images, they are thought to exercise discursive or ideological power.

In a democracy power is 'legitimate' because those who exercise it are representative and liable. This basic dichotomy reappears in accounts of the way the media operate. In a dictatorship, there is complete control of media, which are used to disseminate propaganda; in a democracy, control is dispersed and content is pluralistic. However, one can see real power in who controls the media and their content. One way to discover who has this power is to ask whose voices, identities and interests populate our screens and newspapers. Since the media provide a valuable resource for those who wish to promote or maintain their interests, there is the possibility of hearing only the powerful voices because of their accession to global media.

Governments' voices need media conglomerates for the provision and circulation of information. The need for such things makes governments vulnerable, limiting their capacity to regulate these media actors. For instance, imposing barriers on cross-media ownership or enforcing particular regulations on the media content can be pricey for governments because they may generate antipathy from the media conglomerates or these conglomerates may move elsewhere, to more 'liberal' regimes.

On the other hand, power can be used to marginalize certain views, either by setting the agenda in a way that favours one side or by creating the impression that one side in the dispute is less worthy or legitimate.<sup>203</sup> General distribution of

---

<sup>202</sup> John Street, p.232

<sup>203</sup> Ibid., p.237

power generally and the source of political preferences is the reason behind this skepticism about the influence of the mass media.

The power of the mass media however can be neutralized by two important considerations. Firstly, there is no power elite in any complex modern society. This means whatever power resides with the mass media, it is counterbalanced by other sources of power. Secondly, people's interests usually derive from their social location and experiences, not wholly from what they read in papers or see on television.

Similarly, where broadcasting is isolated from the market, it is liable to distort the political agenda in favour of powerful minorities rather than ordinary people. If the mass media competes in an open market, they are constrained to reflect their readers' view and represent a legitimate democratic voice because they depend on the audiences to provide more credibility and to get more income. However, from the Marxist perspective, the media operates through and on behalf of capitalism. The discourse, access and control of media resources have to be understood in terms of the interests of capital.<sup>204</sup>

At this point it is important to remember that there is no 'truth' against which media representations can be judged. All pictures of the world only portray a particular view of reality, an encoding that has to be decoded by the reader or viewer. Reality is a matter of representation or, as Hall writes,<sup>205</sup> "'True' means credible, or at least capable of winning credibility as a statement of fact.' Similarly, Tony Bennett states that "the media are not apart from social reality, passively reflecting and giving back to the world its self-image; they are a part of social reality."<sup>206</sup>

In short, it can be said that the global media are both more and less powerful: more powerful in the sense that they circulate information, images and ideas that constitute reality; less powerful in the sense that the meanings and

---

<sup>204</sup> E.Hermann &R. McChesney, p.139

<sup>205</sup> S. Hall (1982) 'The Rediscovery of "ideology": Return of the Repressed in Media Studies', in M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran and J. Woollacott(eds.), *Culture, Society and the Media* (London: Routledge, pp.56-90) p.75

<sup>206</sup> Tony Bennett, 'Theories of Media, Theories of Society', in M. Gurevitch, T. Bennett, J. Curran and J. Woollacott(eds.), *Culture, Society and the Media*, (London: Routledge, 1982) pp.30-55, p244



interpretations to which these images are subject to are not determined by their exact content.

## CHAPTER 3

### HOW THE GLOBAL MEDIA PERCEIVED IRAQ WAR OF 2003

To assess the implications of global media on world politics, especially in global crises, we will focus on the global crisis of Iraq War of 2003 and what led up to this war. With this chapter, I intend to point out the different effects of global media in world politics. But before looking at the Iraq War, we can overview how the war is still on the international agenda.

As seen in previous section, today's international order is radically different from that which we knew between 1945 and 1990. From a bipolar world, a new regime of states and international institutions is being built and with it a new relationship of state and society is being shaped. The role of war in this new world order is highly problematic.<sup>207</sup>

The changes from 'hard' politics to 'soft' politics,<sup>208</sup> taken together with the shift from nuclear armaments towards global policing and peacekeeping imply a very different context for the politics of war. Although, there is a possibility of support for anti-war politics in increasingly demilitarized societies, at the same time there are difficult dilemmas in political intervention by international institutions or Western powers. They are generally not early enough to pre-empt local or civil wars. Also, if the conflicts are under way, only military intervention may offer any real possibility of reducing vicious local or civil wars.

The idea of war to prevent war has already been seen as dangerous, even though today military interventions occur under the patronage of international institutions. Martin Shaw portrays the outcomes of war as follows: "...such wars cause immense suffering; because they block economic and political progress; because they often produce militarized and authoritarian regimes; and because

---

<sup>207</sup> Martin Shaw, p.59

<sup>208</sup> For details see Joseph Nye, *Power in the Global Information Age*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004)

they can still have a destabilizing impact on larger regional conflicts and the wider international system.”<sup>209</sup> However, he claims that, we could be continuing to see modern wars today because of peacekeeping and international security or of the national interests.

Since ‘peacekeeping’ has been the Cinderella of military power for the last forty years, the insertion of UN forces into ex-Yugoslavia, Cambodia or Nagorno-Karabakh was seen as necessary to limit terrible destruction. For example, in the case of Bosnia, there were important issues such as resistance to racism and genocide, opposition to war, and support for humanitarian relief. As seen, there were powerful reasons for UN military intervention. This option, however, deserves a great deal of thought. Political and, where necessary, military intervention on behalf of international agencies, with the object of preventing or stopping war, should be a norm rather than an exception, but the tradition of non-aggression should be maintained.<sup>210</sup>

The essential point is that the military power is legitimated only in so far as it plays a constructive part in achieving ends of international standards of democracy, human rights, minority rights and so forth. After September 11<sup>th</sup>, a new aim was added: ‘the war on terrorism’. This was the main reason behind the wars of Afghanistan<sup>211</sup> and Iraq.

### ***3.1 A Brief of the Iraq War***

In the wake of the September 11<sup>th</sup> attacks and the seemingly relative success of the US intervention of Afghanistan in 2001, the Bush administration

---

<sup>209</sup> Martin Shaw, p.162

<sup>210</sup> Ibid. p.163

<sup>211</sup> The United States invasion of Afghanistan occurred in October 2001, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, marking the beginning of its "War on Terrorism" campaign. Seeking to oust the Taliban and find Al-Qaeda mastermind Osama bin Laden, the Afghan Northern Alliance provided the majority of forces, and the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France, New Zealand, Italy, and Germany provided support. The U.S. military name of the invasion was Operation Enduring Freedom. The officially-stated purpose of the invasion was to target al-Qaeda members, and to punish the Taliban government in Afghanistan which had provided support and haven to al-Qaeda. On November 12, Kabul had fallen as a result of intense bombing operations and Taliban forces fled from the city.

felt that it had sufficient military justification and public support in the United States for further operations against perceived threats in the Middle East.

Throughout 2002, the U.S. administration made it clear that removing Saddam Hussein from power was a major goal, although it offered to accept major changes in Iraqi military and foreign policy in lieu of this. Specifically, the stated justification for the invasion included Iraqi production and use of weapons of mass destruction, alleged links with terrorist organizations, and human rights violations in Iraq under the Saddam Hussein government.

Prior to the intervention, on October 11, 2002, the United States Congress passed the "Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002", giving U.S. President George W. Bush the authority to attack Iraq if Saddam Hussein did not give up his Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). The joint resolution allowed the President of the United States to "defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq and enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."<sup>212</sup> On November 9, 2002, at the urging of the United States government, the UN Security Council passed United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441.<sup>213</sup> Significantly, the Resolution stated that the UN Security Council shall "remain seized of the matter."

---

<sup>212</sup> The Resolution cited several factors to justify a war: Iraq's noncompliance with the conditions of the 1991 cease fire; Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, and programs to develop such weapons, posed a "threat to the national security of the United States and international peace and security in the Persian Gulf region"; Iraq's "brutal repression of its civilian population"; Iraq's "capability and willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against other nations and its own people"; Iraq's hostility towards the United States as demonstrated by the 1993 assassination attempt of former President George H. W. Bush, and firing on coalition aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones following the 1991 Gulf War; Iraq's alleged connection to terrorist groups including Al Qaeda; Fear that Iraq would provide weapons of mass destruction to terrorists for use against the United States. For full text of the resolution, see [http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107\\_cong\\_public\\_laws&docid=f:publ243.107](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107)

<sup>213</sup> United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 is a resolution by the UN Security Council, passed unanimously on November 8, 2002, offering Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set out in several previous resolutions (Resolution 660, Resolution 661, Resolution 678, Resolution 686, Resolution 687, Resolution 688, Resolution 707, Resolution 715, Resolution 986, and Resolution 1284), notably to provide "an accurate full, final, and complete disclosure, as required by Resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles". Resolution 1441 threatens "serious consequences" if these are not met. It reasserted demands that UN weapons inspectors should have "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to sites of their choosing, in order to ascertain compliance.

On February 15, 2003, as a response to the imminent global catastrophe, the largest ever world-wide protests took place with 6-10 million people in over 60 countries around the world.<sup>214</sup> Despite the US claim that it intends to spread democratic values and ideals throughout the world, a survey found that war with Iraq would bring less democracy in the view of 95% of Saudis, 66% of Moroccans, 60% of Egyptians, 58% of Jordanians, and 74% of Lebanese.<sup>215</sup> Also, more than three-fourths of Egyptians, Lebanese, and an overwhelming majority (90%) of Moroccans thought that war with Iraq would bring less peace in the Middle East.<sup>216</sup>

The US President George W. Bush repeatedly claimed that weapons in Iraq posed a grave and imminent threat to the United States and its allies.<sup>217</sup> In his March 17, 2003, address to the nation, Bush demanded that Iraq President Saddam Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay leave Iraq, giving them a 48-hour deadline.<sup>218</sup> This demand was reportedly rejected.<sup>219</sup> Iraq maintained that it had disarmed as required. UN weapons inspectors from the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), headed by Hans Blix, who were sent by the UN Security Council pursuant to Resolution 1441, requested more time to complete their report on whether Iraq had complied with its obligation to disarm.<sup>220</sup> The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported a level of compliance by Iraq with the disarmament requirements. Then, the attempt of the United Kingdom and the United States to obtain a further Resolution authorizing force failed. But they were determined to go to war with or without UN backing, with or without international support. Noam Chomsky notes that this was not a failure in diplomacy, but “a failure of coercion” as the U.S. did

---

<sup>214</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2765215.stm>

<sup>215</sup> Shibley Telhami, “A View from the Arab World: A Survey in Five Countries”

<http://www.brookings.org/fp/saban/analysis/survey20030313.htm>

<sup>216</sup> *ibid*

<sup>217</sup> For his speech see <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html>

<sup>218</sup> For his speech see <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>220</sup> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,909793,00.html>

not succeed in getting the international community to bend to its will.<sup>221</sup> In the end, the US abandoned its failing efforts to get international endorsement for war against Iraq on March 17, 2003 and began the invasion on March 20, 2003.

Thus, the U.S.-led invasion began without the express approval of the United Nations Security Council, and most legal authorities regard it as a violation of the UN Charter. Several countries protested. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan said in September 2004, "From our point of view and the UN Charter point of view, it was illegal."<sup>222</sup> Proponents of the war claim that the invasion had implicit approval of the Security Council and was therefore not in violation of the UN Charter.

United States military operations were conducted under the codename *Operation Iraq Freedom*.<sup>223</sup> The United Kingdom military operation was named *Operation Telic*<sup>224</sup>, and Australia's *Operation Falconer*<sup>225</sup>. Collectively called the "Coalition of the Willing,"<sup>226</sup> they were deployed prior to the invasion to several staging areas in Kuwait.

In practice, the coalition operation structure was based on 'Shock and Awe'. In other words, the U.S. plans envisioned simultaneous air and ground assaults to decapitate the Iraq forces as fast as possible, attempting to bypass Iraq military units and cities in most cases. The assumption was that superior U.S. mobility and coordination would allow the U.S. to attack the heart of the Iraq command structure and destroy it in a short time, and that this would minimize civilian deaths and damage to infrastructure.

---

<sup>221</sup> Anup Shah, "Media Reporting, Journalism and Propaganda", <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/PostWar/Media.asp>

<sup>222</sup> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25685-2004Sep16.html>

<sup>223</sup> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030403-3.html>

<sup>224</sup> A total of 46,000 troops of all the British Services were committed to the operation at its start.

<sup>225</sup> The Australian Government was a strong and (on the public record at least) an uncritical supporter of United States policy during the Iraq disarmament crisis and one of only four nations to commit combat forces to the 2003 invasion of Iraq in any substantial numbers, under the operational codename Operation Falconer.

<sup>226</sup> Coalition of the Willing" is a phrase which has been used by the administration of US President George W. Bush to refer to the nations whose governments militarily supported the United States position in the Iraq disarmament crisis and later the 2003 invasion of Iraq and subsequent peacekeeping duties. The original list in March 2003 included 48 members. In most of those same countries the majority of the population did not support this endeavor.

After twenty days, on April 9<sup>th</sup> 2003, Baghdad was formally occupied by US forces and the power of Saddam Hussein was declared ended. However, much of Baghdad remained unsecured, and fighting continued within the city and its outskirts well into the period of occupation. Saddam was missing and his whereabouts were unknown. Many Iraqis celebrated the downfall of Saddam by vandalizing the many portraits and statues of him, together with other pieces of his personality cult.

Surely, the most memorable image of the war was the dramatic toppling of a large statue of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad's Firdos Square, directly in front of the Palestine Hotel where the world's journalists had been quartered, by a U.S. tank surrounded by dozens of celebrating Iraqis, who had been attempting to pull down the statue. During this incident, the Marines briefly draped an American flag over the statue's face, which caused consternation in the crowd. After that, the flag was replaced with an Iraq flag and the demolition continued. Iraqi citizens kicking then decapitated the head of the statue and dragged it through the streets of the city hitting it with their shoes. The destruction of the statue was shown live on cable news networks as it happened and made the front pages of newspapers and covers of magazines all over the world - symbolizing the fall of the Saddam government. On the other hand, the images of the statue falling came as a shock to many Arab viewers, who had been led to believe that Iraq was winning the war.<sup>227</sup>

A report by the Los Angeles Times, however suggested it to be a carefully staged propaganda event for the media. The article stated it was an unnamed Marine colonel, not Iraqi civilians, who had decided to topple the statue; and that an Army psychological operations team then used loudspeakers to encourage Iraqi civilians to assist and made it all appear spontaneous and Iraqi-inspired.<sup>228</sup>

The other important thing in this event is the live coverage of this scene by the global media. As transmitted to the world by US television and newspaper reports, the pictures from Firdos Square purported to show a mass of enthusiastic Iraqis hailing the US military and trampling on a huge bronze statue of Saddam

---

<sup>227</sup> <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/634/eg8.htm>

<sup>228</sup> David Zucchino, "Army Stage-Managed Fall of Hussein Statue", *Los Angeles Times*, (July 3, 2004)

Hussein.<sup>229</sup> Hours of television time and pages of newspaper coverage were devoted to these pictures, with accompanying commentary comparing the scene to the bringing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the liberation of Paris in 1944. Some stated that the destruction of a statue of Saddam Hussein on live global television provided precisely the images desired by the Pentagon and Bush administration.<sup>230</sup>

However the photographs then showed that it was an opportunity of the camera, of which role was mentioned above as a global media actor. The first images of this event were narrowly focused photographs and closely cropped frames used in the mass media. A wide-angle shot encompassing the entire expanse of Firdos Square shows that the “crowd” surrounding the statue of Saddam Hussein was anything but massive, and that the square itself had been surrounded by US Abrams tanks, cutting it off from the rest of the city.<sup>231</sup> Since Firdos Square is across the street from the Palestine Hotel, where most international journalists based in Baghdad were located, of the 200 or so people assembled, the majority was journalists and American soldiers.<sup>232</sup> The BBC reported that only “dozens” of Iraqis were involved. Some reports showed that those dozens were Ahmed Chalabi and his supporters, dispatched from Nasiriya to Baghdad to serve as an appropriate backdrop for the visuals desired by the Bush administration spin doctors.<sup>233</sup>

Documentary filmmaker Ken Burns says the repetition of the footage reminded him of the power of images to show us what we want to see. “When we repeat an image over and over again,” he says, “we’re forgetting all the other places we could also be looking at that moment. These images become

---

<sup>229</sup> See Appendix C

<sup>230</sup> Douglas Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks”, <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

<sup>231</sup> See Appendix D

<sup>232</sup> <http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2883.htm>

<sup>233</sup> Patrick Martin, “The stage-managed events in Baghdad’s Firdos Square: image-making, lies and the “liberation” of Iraq”, 12 April 2003, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)



justification, proof of what we want them to become. That's the nature of iconic images."<sup>234</sup>

On 1 May 2003 George W. Bush landed on the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln, in a Lockheed S-3 Viking, where he gave a speech announcing the end of major combat operations in the Iraq war. Bush's landing was criticized by opponents as an overly theatrical and expensive stunt. The ship was returning home off the coast of southern California near the San Diego harbor. Clearly visible in the background was a banner stating "Mission Accomplished."<sup>235</sup> The White House subsequently released a statement alleging that the sign and Bush's visit referred to the initial invasion of Iraq and disputed the claim of theatrics. The speech itself noted: "We have difficult work to do in Iraq. We are bringing order to parts of that country that remain dangerous."<sup>236</sup>

On 22<sup>nd</sup> July 2003 during a raid by the U.S. 101st Airborne Division and men from Task Force 20, Saddam Hussein's sons Uday and Qusay, and one of his grandsons were killed. Coalition forces ultimately captured Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003. Careful inspections after Iraq's defeat failed to find Weapons of Mass Destruction. Today Iraq is in a civil war, and since March 20<sup>th</sup> 2003, everyday many people have been losing their life.

### ***3.2 Global Media Coverage of the Iraq War***

The war in Iraq again showed that information management and forming public opinion is critically important for winning a war. The 1991 Gulf War which was broadcasted by CNN on air, provide new war coverage by the media. It enabled the on air broadcasting from the other side of war but, at that time there was only CNN and the coalition side used this advantage. In Iraq War of 2003, however there were alternative media outlets and Iraq administration used counter-propaganda.

---

<sup>234</sup>Matthew Gilbert and Suzanne C. Ryan, "Did iconic images from Baghdad reveal more about the media than Iraq?", August 15, 2003, [www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe\\_stories/041003\\_snap\\_judgements.htm](http://www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe_stories/041003_snap_judgements.htm)

<sup>235</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/>

<sup>236</sup> For full text see, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/01/iraq/main551946.shtml>

Clearly, the 2003 Iraq war was a major global media event constructed very differently by varying broadcasting networks in different parts of the world. While the U.S. networks framed the event as "Operation Iraq Freedom" (the Pentagon concept) or "War in Iraq," the Canadian CBC used the logo "War on Iraq," and various Arab networks presented it as an "invasion" and "occupation."

With this part I intend to cover a general tendency of global media channels and their effects on shaping world politics during this war. Therefore, this study does not include in-depth research of all global media channels; rather this part will provide a unique glimpse at how both the world outside the US and within the US viewed the war in the Iraq. The examples below will demonstrate the global media's obvious role in the Iraq war and illustrate their influences as previously mentioned. For this purpose, five media actors of the Iraq War have been selected.

- The US Media
- The European Media
- The Arab Media
- Embedded Journalists
- Free Journalist

Among them, the coverage of global media channels such as CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera will be primarily illustrated since their reports are produced in a particular country and in a certain language, but they are not primarily aimed at natives, nor do they primarily deal with domestic topics. These media's tendencies through the beginning of war and the fall of Saddam's statue will be explained by using different examples. Since like all news reporting, war coverage of media tells a story, we will look at how these stories were perceived from different 'angles', or different 'point of views', during those times.

### *3.2.1 The US Media*

The US media were key actors of the war from the very beginning. We can say that the US media (CNN, Fox, and others) played the role of agenda-setting agent to set the world public opinion for the war in Iraq. The US tried to convince

the world that there were the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and that they were potential threat for world security. Consequently, *The New York Times*, as well as many other US media, later expressed deep concern regarding their uncritical reportage on the war. A pre-war Washington Post poll in the US showed that 69% of the population thought it "likely" or "very likely" that Iraq was involved in the planning of the 9/11 attacks, although no evidence of an Iraq connection to the attack had ever been found.<sup>237</sup>

One of the examples of the US media's agenda-setting role was during US Secretary of State Colin Powell's presentation of evidence for war at the UN Security Council on February 5<sup>th</sup>, 2003. All US media repeatedly broadcasted Powell's presentations. In one frame, CNN journalist Zain Verjee interviewed the editor of Al-quds Al Arabi, Abdel Bari Atwan, as an effort to voice an alternative view from non-Western commentators. However, when Atwan stated that more time should be given to UN inspectors to actually verify the information provided by Powell which did not seem convincing enough to justify a war, the visibly annoyed CNN journalist Zain Verjee cut the interview short concluding: «Unconvincing to you Abdel Bari Atwan [turning away visibly annoyed]. We'll continue to check in with you as we dissect the body of what Colin Powell had to say this day at the UN Security Council». (CNN 05 Feb.2003, 17:48 GMT).<sup>238</sup>

In contrast, BBC World openly criticized many of the premises on which the war was considered necessary. At about the same time when CNN journalist Zain Verjee was reprimanding her Arab colleague, BBC's Nik Gowing went so far into his criticism toward Powell's alleged "evidence" to ask Trevor Findlay, arms control expert and executive director of Vertic, the following question:

(BBC) (Gowing): «Should we have assumed, should we believe that this is genuine or in other words has not been put together in a lab by the CIA or the dirty tricks department somewhere in Washington? (...) The reason I've said that is that of course if we think back to the incubator story, of the babies, where the incubators were switched off in Kuwait, we now know

---

<sup>237</sup> <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32862-2003Sep5?language=printer>

<sup>238</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, "The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting", Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

that that was all fabricated, put together by the dirty tricks department back in 1990 – 1991»

(Findlay): «Indeed ... so that is possible ...» (BBC, 05 Feb. 2003 at 17:45 GMT)<sup>239</sup>

The most popular global cable network in the United States during the war was Fox News, some of whose commentators and anchors made pro-war comments or disparaged critics of the war, such as referring to war protesters as "the great unwashed."<sup>240</sup> Fox News is as said above owned by Rupert Murdoch, a strong supporter of the war. This shows that the organizational structure of the medium influences its editorial and news perspectives. On-screen during all live war coverage by Fox News was the animation of a waving flag in the upper left corner and the headline "Operation Iraq Freedom" along the bottom. The network has shown this American flag animation in the upper-left corner since the September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 Terrorist Attack. Fox News' pro-war commentary stood in contrast to many U.S. newspapers' editorial pages, which were much more hesitant about going to war. Like other western media outlets, however, Fox did also give coverage to anti-war protests and rallies, anti-U.S. protests in Iraq, and celebrities and politicians who were against the war.

In the same way, in separate speeches in London and San Francisco, BBC Director General Greg Dyke and Ted Turner, founder of CNN, labeled the war coverage of Fox News as super-patriotic. At a conference at the University of London, Dyke said "I was shocked while in the United States by how unquestioning the broadcast news media was during this war," and continued "If Iraq proved anything, it was that the BBC cannot afford to mix patriotism and journalism. This is happening in the United States and if it continues will undermine the credibility of the US electronic news media."<sup>241</sup> As previously discussed, 'credibility' is an essential factor for global media to be considered a reliable source of information.

---

<sup>239</sup> *ibid*

<sup>240</sup> Jim Rutenberg, "Cable's War Coverage Suggests a New 'Fox Effect' on Television", April 16, 2003, New York Times, also see <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/0416-06.htm>, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/leaders/story/0,3604,951289,00.html>

<sup>241</sup> Patrick Martin, "Media Boseses Admit Pro-War Bias in Coverage of Iraq", 2 May 2003, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)

Speaking to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, a leading business forum, Turner described Rupert Murdoch as “a warmonger” who had “promoted” the war.<sup>242</sup> Nonetheless, CNN coverage of the Iraq War was not so different from the Fox News. It sought to close its ratings gap with Fox News by following the pro-war coverage of the Murdoch-owned cable network. CNN anchormen and embedded reporters regularly referred to US troops as “heroes” and “liberators,” and joined with the rest of the American media in downplaying reports of Iraqi casualties, civilian and military. CNN chief Eason Jordan, in an appearance on his own network’s program on the media, “Reliable Sources”, defended his use of military experts who had criticized US tactics and strategy during the initial stages of the invasion. But CNN made sure that any comments about the progress or difficulties in the war would be within the bounds set by the US military.<sup>243</sup> Needless to say, there were no expert commentators brought on board from the antiwar movement.

MSNBC also brought the American flag back on screen and regularly ran a tribute called "America's Bravest" which showed photographs sent by family members of troops deployed in Iraq. MSNBC also fired liberal Phil Donahue, a critic of Bush's Iraq policy, a month before the invasion began and replaced his show with Iraq war coverage hosted by Keith Olbermann.<sup>244</sup> Shortly after Donahue's firing, MSNBC hired Michael Savage, a controversial conservative radio talk show host for a Saturday afternoon show. Although Donahue's show had lower ratings than several shows on other networks and most reports on its cancellation blamed poor ratings, it was the highest-rated program on MSNBC's struggling primetime lineup at the time of its cancellation. During February "sweeps", Donahue's show averaged 446,000 viewers, compared to rival Connie Chung's 985,000 on CNN and Bill O'Reilly's 2.7 million on Fox News, according to Nielsen Media Research.<sup>245</sup>

---

<sup>242</sup> Ibid.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid.

<sup>244</sup> <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2707>

<sup>245</sup> <http://poll.imdb.com/name/nm0161202/news>

Comparing viewership from prewar to post war, MSNBC saw a 357 percent jump in ratings, while CNN went up 305 percent, and Fox News climbed 239 percent, according to Nielsen numbers.<sup>246</sup> In overall numbers, Fox News was number one, followed by CNN, and then MSNBC. It was a major success for Fox News, as many had believed CNN would reclaim the top spot since it had established itself with coverage from the 1990-1991 Gulf War.

In separate incidents, at least three different Western reporters were fired or disciplined due to their actions in covering the war. Peter Arnett, an NBC and National Geographic correspondent was fired for giving an interview with Iraqi officials in which he questioned the United States' role and said the "first war plan had failed."<sup>247</sup> Brian Walski of the Los Angeles Times was fired on March 31 for altering a photo of a U.S. soldier warning Iraqi civilians to take cover from an Iraqi airborne bombing.<sup>248</sup> Another reporter was Geraldo Rivera. As an "embedded journalist" with U.S. forces in Iraq, he drew a map in the sand during a live broadcast on the Fox News Channel, which the Pentagon felt revealed potentially damaging strategic information.<sup>249</sup> The Pentagon announced that they were forcing him out of Iraq; two days later Rivera announced that henceforth and voluntarily he would be reporting on the Iraq conflict from Kuwait. These examples show the result of impediment effect of global media both for operational security and physiological war. The Brian Walski event also shows that ethical issues are necessary for responsible journalism and that the rival media structures can provide a self-controlling system among media outlets.

The US media coverage during the Vietnam War included photographs of the flag-draped coffins of American military personnel killed in action. During the invasion and occupation of Iraq, however, as in most other US wars, the Bush administration prohibited release of such photographs and, according to Senator Patrick Leahy, scheduled the return of wounded soldiers for after midnight so that

---

<sup>246</sup> [http://www.stateofthedia.org/2005/narrative\\_cabletv\\_contentanalysis.asp?cat=2&media=5](http://www.stateofthedia.org/2005/narrative_cabletv_contentanalysis.asp?cat=2&media=5)

<sup>247</sup> Doug Ireland, "Honesty: The Worst Policy When Telling The Truth Will Get You Fired From The Networks", March 31 2003, [http://www.coalitionforworldpeace.org/news/news\\_stories/Arnet\\_4.1.3.html](http://www.coalitionforworldpeace.org/news/news_stories/Arnet_4.1.3.html)

<sup>248</sup> See Appendix E, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/essays/vanRiper/030409.htm>

<sup>249</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/01/sprj.iq.gerald/>

the press would not see them.<sup>250</sup> But MSNBC general manager Erik Sorenson confirmed the charges that the network consciously suppressed footage of Iraqi civilian and military casualties. “We were reluctant to run graphic images of any casualties, civilian or military,” he told one press interviewer. “Antiwar activists have complained to MSNBC, ‘You’ve made war seem like fun. You cleaned it up.’ We saw and experienced a lot of the power and horror of these weapons. I didn’t need to see the body literally chopped in half.”<sup>251</sup> However, a number of Dover Air Force Base photographs were eventually released. The practice of transporting wounded soldiers to the US at night was documented by both the Drudge Report and Salon.com.<sup>252</sup>

According to Kellner,<sup>253</sup> the U.S. broadcast networks, on the whole, tended to be more embedded in the Pentagon and Bush administration than the reporters in the field and print journalists. The military commentators on all networks provided little more than the Pentagon spin of the moment. As seen above, nearly all media networks, as well as the major US broadcasting networks, tended to provide highly sanitized views of the war, rarely showing Iraqi casualties, thus producing a view of the war totally different than that shown in other parts of the world.

### 3.2.2 *The European Media*

Non-US coverage sometimes differed strongly in tone and content. European coverage was more critical of the invasion and tended to put a greater emphasis on coalition arrests, losses and civilian deaths than the US media. Some argued that Arab and many European reporters, TV producers and anchormen and women, were helping Saddam Hussein's disinformation apparatus win the

---

<sup>250</sup> Andrew Buncombe, “The Hidden Cost of Bush's War”, November 14, 2003, Independent/UK, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1114-03.htm>

<sup>251</sup> Patrick Martin, “Media Boses Admit Pro-War Bias in Coverage of Iraq”, 2 May 2003, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)

<sup>252</sup> [http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/coffin\\_photos/dover/](http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/coffin_photos/dover/),  
[http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/08/night\\_flights/index\\_np.html](http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/08/night_flights/index_np.html),  
[www.drudgereport.com/dover.htm](http://www.drudgereport.com/dover.htm)

<sup>253</sup> Douglas Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks”, <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

propaganda war.<sup>254</sup> "Most Europeans do not support this war, and so the coverage is simply a reflection of that," says Giuseppe Zaffuto, project director at the European Journalism Center in Maastricht, the Netherlands.<sup>255</sup> Supporters of the war, especially American conservatives often characterized European media coverage as anti-American and "left-wing."<sup>256</sup>

In some countries, television journalists' behavior differed significantly during the conflict compared to the first Gulf War conflicts. Jean-Marie Charon said most journalists were more precautionary, using the conditional form often, and citing sources.<sup>257</sup> He noticed televisions were on the whole avoiding noisy and flashy jingles.

The crew of the HMS Ark Royal, Britain's flagship naval vessel, demanded that the BBC be turned off on the ship because of what they saw as a clear anti-Coalition or "pro-Iraq" bias.<sup>258</sup> One BBC correspondent had been embedded on the ship, but the crew said they had no complaints of his reporting specifically. The sailors on board the ship claimed that the BBC gave more credit to Iraqi reports than information coming from British or Allied sources, often questioning and refusing to believe reports coming from Coalition sources while reporting Iraqi claims of civilian casualties without independent verification.<sup>259</sup> The ship's news feed was replaced with Sky News.<sup>260</sup>

Still, national newspapers such as *the Times*, *the Sun*, *the Daily Mail* and *the Daily Telegraph* featured articles attacking the BBC as little more than a propaganda machine for the regime of Saddam Hussein. One such article appeared in the *Daily Telegraph* on March 30 entitled "Listening to the World

---

<sup>254</sup> Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Winning by Losing", March 30  
<http://www.upi.com/inc/view.php?StoryID=20030330-100840-3847r#>

<sup>255</sup> Marco R. della Cava, "Iraq gets sympathetic press around the world", USA Today, April 2, 2003, <http://www.usatoday.com/educate/iraq/war30-article.htm>

<sup>256</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4323361.stm>

<sup>257</sup> [http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id\\_article=4205](http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4205)

<sup>258</sup> <http://www.command-post.org/archives/004604.html>

<sup>259</sup> *ibid*

<sup>260</sup> <http://media.guardian.co.uk/iraqandthedia/story/0,12823,932307,00.html>



Service, I thought we were losing.”<sup>261</sup> The author stated that, “Day after day, studio-based presenters and gloomy academics criticize every nuance of the coalition’s strategy. Determined resistance by Iraqi troops has been endlessly reported, alongside lengthy discussions about how the allies failed to anticipate that the enemy might fight back.”<sup>262</sup> Most likely, the *Telegraph* article by right-wing columnist Barbara Amiel contained an unveiled threat to the BBC. It was entitled “Disinfect the BBC before it poisons a new generation.”<sup>263</sup>

Ironically, a study conducted by Professor Justin Lewis, Dr. Rod Brookes and Kirsten Brander of the Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies department of Cardiff University finds that the BBC was in fact the least “anti-war” in its news reports—even when compared with Rupert Murdoch’s Sky.<sup>264</sup> Prof. Lewis says “it is clear that the accusation of BBC anti-war bias fails to stand up to any serious or sustained analysis.”<sup>265</sup> The findings of Prof. Lewis research on the coverage of Iraq by the four main UK news broadcasters, the BBC, ITN, Channel 4 and Sky are very interesting. According to findings<sup>266</sup>;

\* Over the three weeks of conflict, 11 percent of the sources quoted by the BBC were of coalition government or military origin. This was the highest proportion of all the main television broadcasters. The BBC used government sources twice as much as ITN and Channel 4 News.

\* The BBC was the least likely to quote official Iraqi sources, and less likely than Sky, ITV or Channel 4 News to use independent sources of news such as the Red Cross. Channel 4 used these sources three times more often than the BBC, and Sky twice as often.

\* The BBC placed least emphasis on Iraqi casualties, which were mentioned in 22 percent of its stories about the Iraqi people. Numbers of casualties received most prominence on Channel 4 News, figuring in 40

---

<sup>261</sup> [http://dehai.org/archives/dehai\\_news\\_archive/mar03/0604.html](http://dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/mar03/0604.html)

<sup>262</sup> *ibid*

<sup>263</sup> Barbara Amiel, “Disinfect the BBC before it poisons a new generation”, *Telegraph*, 7 July 2003, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2003/07/07/do0701.xml>

<sup>264</sup> Justin Lewis, “Biased Broadcasting Corporation”, Friday July 4, 2003, *The Guardian*, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,991214,00.html>

<sup>265</sup> *ibid*

<sup>266</sup> Robert Steven, “Study on Iraq Coverage Shows BBC was Most Pro-War of British Network’s”, 10 July 2003, [http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/bbc-j10\\_prn.shtml](http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/bbc-j10_prn.shtml)

percent of its reports about Iraqis, compared with Sky at 30 percent and ITN at 24 percent.

\* The BBC was least likely to report on the opposition of the Iraqi population to the invasion.

\* Across all four broadcasters, the bulletins were three times more likely to present the Iraqi population as pro-invasion than anti-invasion. The exception to the ratio was Channel 4, where it was just less than two to one.

Despite the research findings, BBC's broadcastings were protested. This could most likely be because of it being a public broadcasting network. On March 29<sup>th</sup>, 2003 for example, a demonstration by 400 anti-war protesters was held outside the BBC's Oxford Road headquarters in Manchester. Those in attendance were criticizing the reportage of the BBC for its pro-government and anti-Iraq coverage.<sup>267</sup>

Professor Lewis pointed out that the survey was "comprehensive" on the basis that his previous research had found that "people are influenced by the general weight of TV coverage rather than by particular reports" from individual journalists.<sup>268</sup>

### 3.2.3 *The Arab Media*

Among the Arab broadcasting networks, the Qatar-based Al Jazeera TV satellite channel, the United Arab Republic channels Abu Dhabi and Dubai, and the Saudi-owned Middle Eastern Broadcasting Company were more popular. Being Arab channels and naturally being closer to Iraqi citizens, they were seen sympathetic to the Iraqi side. However, this probably depends on the organizational structure of the global media news which was mentioned above.

It can be said that the main reason behind this accusation was that those channels covered Iraqi civilians more than the US did. Not only Arab media, but also many European media were accused of anti-war coverage because they showed a collage of bleeding Iraqi civilians, dead children and their desperate

---

<sup>267</sup> Ibid.

<sup>268</sup> Justin Lewis, "Biased Broadcasting Corporation", Friday July 4, 2003, The Guardian, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,991214,00.html>

parents, people wounded and moaning their pain. Some argued that Arab newspapers are increased by editorializing that the problem is not Iraq or Saddam Hussein, but the United States and its dreams of global dominance. The image of the United States as a torch owner for freedom has proved environmental in Arab media. The question is frequently asked, "How long can Bush deny reality?"<sup>269</sup>

As well as pictures, the content and text of news were also different in context. Arab media broadcast scenes of civilian casualties, usually referring to them as "martyrs", press conferences with Iraqi officials claiming to be winning the war, and images of American and British POWs (Prisoner of War) which the USA media refused to run. Most Arab networks also downplayed the scenes of Iraqi citizens cheering coalition forces entering their towns. Arab networks consistently referred to U.S. and British forces as 'invading forces' while Western media referred to them as 'coalition forces'.

To answer the question of how the Arab media were seen from the Western countries, BBC's Carol Walker's news report is an illustrative answer:

«The Arab world is bombarded by news and images of the war [images from Aljazeera TV] Aljazeera is one of three Arab satellite channels broadcasting 24 hours a day. Tony Blair's assertions that Iraq will be administered by the Iraqis once Saddam has been removed made headlines news today. But often the message from London and Washington is lost amidst the pictures of death and destruction caused by their weapons. Many Arab people find it hard to believe that this is supposed to be a war of liberation [images of wounded Iraqi children and women]. The British government is courting the Arab media as never before in its effort to counter hostility to the military action [insertion Al Arabya network with critical interview to foreign ministry Jack Straw] ... [insert: critical comments by Arab journalists] ... But any media campaign can be blown off course by the reality on the ground [American shooting] ... and ultimately the Arab world will be convinced of the motives of Great Britain

---

<sup>269</sup> Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Winning by Losing", March 30  
<http://www.upi.com/inc/view.php?StoryID=20030330-100840-3847r#>

and the United States only if they leave a genuinely free and independent Iraq after the war is over ...» (BBC 3 April 2003 at 09:51-54 GMT)<sup>270</sup>

As in Afghanistan, in the Iraq War Al Jazeera gained worldwide attention with its coverage of the war. Al Jazeera's broadcasts were popular in much of the Arab world, but also to some degree in Western nations, with major American networks such as CNN and MSNBC re-broadcasting some of its coverage. Al Jazeera was well-known for its graphic footage of civilian deaths and direct broadcasts of individuals threatening the citizenry if they cooperated in establishing a new government, which American politicians, including Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and U.S. news media branded as overly sensationalistic.<sup>271</sup> Yet, Al Jazeera's popular English web site was hacked and the visitors saw an American flag in its place. The web hosting company, Akamai (who also hosts CNN and MSNBC) terminated the service and contract without giving a reason. Because of Akamai's proven technical abilities (with CNN and MSNBC), the Al Jazeera said the reason was political pressure for censorship.<sup>272</sup>

Al Jazeera's showing captured US soldiers was criticized and even said that their constant images of wounded and killed civilians amounted to propaganda. Yet, as an article suggests, some aspects of Al Jazeera's reporting was understandable and should be accepted. Al Jazeera was "just as fair as CNN"<sup>273</sup>:

...Particularly in wartime, the best a network can hope for is ... "contextual objectivity" — an attempt "to reflect all sides of any story while retaining the values, beliefs and sentiments of the target audience." Based on the recent wave of positive coverage in the American media, Al Jazeera is at least approaching that standard. It's telling the American side of the story, even as its sympathies clearly lie with the plight of the Iraqi people, whom the network, fairly or unfairly, sees as suffering under both Saddam Hussein and the American-led invasion to remove him.

---

<sup>270</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, "The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting", Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

<sup>271</sup> <http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=14887>

<sup>272</sup> New York Times, April 4, 2003, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/PostWar/Media.asp>

<sup>273</sup> Chris Suellentrop, Al Jazeera: It's just as fair as CNN, Slate, April 2, 2003

One of the important events in terms of Arab media during the war was the bombing of the Al Jazeera Bureau. On April 8, 2003, US aircraft bombed the Baghdad bureau of Al Jazeera, killing a journalist and wounding another despite the USA being informed of the office's precise coordinates prior to the incident. An Al Jazeera correspondent said that very clear signs in yellow reading "Press" covered the building from all sides and on the roof.<sup>274</sup> The US spokesmen claimed that the bombing had been inadvertent.<sup>275</sup> The attack had drawn particular criticism as the Kabul office of the same network had been bombed in the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan.<sup>276</sup> On the same day as the destruction of the Baghdad bureau of Al Jazeera, a US tank fired a heat round at what the US military later claimed was a suspected Iraqi forward artillery observer at the Palestine Hotel, where approximately 100 international reporters in Baghdad were based, killing two journalists, Taras Protsyuk of Reuters and Jose Cousa of the Spanish network Telecinco and wounding four other correspondents.<sup>277</sup>

After interviewing about a dozen reporters who were at the scene, including two embedded journalists who monitored the military radio traffic before and after the shelling occurred the Committee to Protect Journalists said the facts suggested "that attack on the journalists, while not deliberate, was avoidable."<sup>278</sup> The Committee to Protect Journalists went on to say that "Pentagon officials, as well as commanders on the ground in Baghdad, knew that the Palestine Hotel was full of international journalists and were intent on not hitting it."<sup>279</sup> The US government had repeatedly criticized Al Jazeera as endangering the lives of American troops. These examples illustrate all three effects of the global media: bombing simultaneously set an agenda on world public opinion by global media; this agenda found its comments through the global media news, which

---

<sup>274</sup> [www.islamonline.org/english/news/2003-04/08/article05.shtml](http://www.islamonline.org/english/news/2003-04/08/article05.shtml)

<sup>275</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2927527.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2927527.stm),  
<http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0206-07.htm>

<sup>276</sup> For detail comments of this event see, Tom Regan, "British paper: Bush wanted to bomb Al Jazeera", <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1123/dailyUpdate.html>

<sup>277</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2928153.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2928153.stm)

<sup>278</sup> [http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/palestine\\_hotel/palestine\\_hotel.html](http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/palestine_hotel/palestine_hotel.html)

<sup>279</sup> Ibid.

gives the space to explain and accelerate the response time; and being on the agenda, news about this event also impeded psychological war plans.

Like the US media, the Arab media's agenda-setting role was clear during the war. The Arab media's heroic stories of resistance and Anglo-American difficulties led hopes for Iraqi supremacy. Up to the fall of the statue of Saddam, American and British soldiers had been captured as Prisoners of War (POW), troops had failed to seize any Iraqi city and a farmer had even managed to shoot down an Apache helicopter with an old weapon. All of this was backed up by Iraqi assurance that when the "troops of evil" reached Baghdad they would be quashed.<sup>280</sup> However, on the morning of 9 April, all those feelings died down with the astonishing news that Baghdad had fallen. Along with the rest of the world, Arabs watched live images of Anglo-American troops moving through Baghdad without experiencing resistance, and the statue of Saddam Hussein being toppled without protest. As Al Ahram Weekly wrote, "Shock and awe" replaced the Egyptians' anxious hopes for an Iraqi victory.<sup>281</sup>

### 3.2.4 *Embedded Journalists*

In the war, around 600 journalists were 'embedded' with military units, 80% of them were British or American. The Pentagon's policy of 'embedding' reporters with military units allowed viewers of several channels to see US tanks rolling into Baghdad live on television, with a split screen image of the Iraqi Minister of Information claiming that US forces were not in the city. This system provided global media's accelerant effect much more influence and gave the opportunity of news from the 'coalition point of view'. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) explained "maintaining morale as well as information dominance will rank as important as physical protection." Similarly, a MoD-commissioned commercial analysis of the print output produced by embeds shows that 90% of their reporting was either "positive or neutral".<sup>282</sup>

---

<sup>280</sup> <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/634/eg8.htm>

<sup>281</sup> Ibid.

<sup>282</sup> <http://media.guardian.co.uk/Iraqandmedia/stor/Story/0,12823,1118405.html>,  
<http://www.variant.randomstate.org/19texts/comment19.html>

Thus, this was a very wise tactic from the Pentagon. There were more chances for the journalists to make favorable reports whilst in Iraq with British and American soldiers than if they had been asking questions in Washington. Also retired generals making comments on TV were important agencies in shaping war news and setting the war agenda on military tactics rather than civilian realities.

This system allowed the military to “use” the press rather than “fight” it; to ‘feed’ them with a flow of pre-recorded and carefully selected images rather than “starve” them, forcing them out in search of material.<sup>283</sup> The media centre at Camp Doha was both the technical facility in support of international media and the place where the actual control on war coverage was taking place. Most of the reports from “embedded” reporters were rather the description of technical details of the weapons systems and, in some cases, quite overt enthusiasm about allied, and especially American, superior military technology because embedded reporters experienced and interpreted the war through the eyes of the soldiers. What they could show were huge explosions blowing buildings to pieces, tanks rolling in a sandy desert, aircrafts puffing streams of sparks and foot-soldiers couching behind ruined walls. But the ideas that Baghdad was being bombed, that a British armored column was being hit by ‘friendly fire’ despite the alleged precision of Allied weaponry, and that Iraqi soldiers offered unexpected resistance in Umm Qasr were missed by them. Embedded and unilateral journalists may have covered the same war, but they experienced it in different ways.<sup>284</sup> An embedded journalist’s point of view was narrow in range.

Some argued that the embedded US network television reporters were gung ho cheerleaders and spinners for the US and UK military and lost any veneer of objectivity.<sup>285</sup> An embedded CNN reporter, Walter Rogers,<sup>286</sup> later recounted that the one time his report showed a dead Iraqi the CNN switchboard “lit up like

---

<sup>283</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, “The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting”, Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

<sup>284</sup> For embedded journalists’ memories of Iraqi War, see Bill Katovsky and Timothy Carlson, *Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq*, (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003)

<sup>285</sup> Douglas Kellner, “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks”, <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

<sup>286</sup> Rogers was interviewed on Howard Kurtz's CNN media review "Reliable Sources" programme on April 27, 2003.

a Christmas tree" with angry viewers demanding that CNN not show any dead bodies, as if the U.S. audience wanted to be in denial concerning the human costs of the war.<sup>287</sup>

Even though embedding was a somewhat new technique seen in this war, the theme of sympathy in war reporting was also highlighted as early as 1975 by Phillip Knightley, in his book, *The First Casualty*.<sup>288</sup> The use of embedded reporters was the result of the desire to be able to manage media reporting. In the past, in Vietnam, the press was not looked on favorably. In the Gulf War and Kosovo conflict, the media was managed in pools that could be fed official information from press briefings or given a media version of a tour guide to managed areas of the conflict.

As a result, in a cultural atmosphere in which news reporting is more and more affected by security restrictions, commercial imperatives and time constraints it is inevitable that opportunities for critical broadcasting and, more broadly, critical thinking are increasingly rare and hence precious. For more balanced and critical news, therefore, at least two preliminary conditions are necessary. The first is the journalists' awareness of the social implications of a given narrative model; the second is the capacity to identify and choose a narrative model which is appropriate and unambiguous in relation to the point desired to be made in covering a given event.<sup>289</sup>

### 3.2.5 *Free Journalist*

Since embeds' every posting and broadcast was censored by the military it was the independent "unilateral" journalists who provided the most accurate account of the horrors of the war and the Coalition of Two military mishaps.<sup>290</sup>

---

<sup>287</sup> Douglas Kellner, "Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks", <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

<sup>288</sup> For details see Phillip Knightley, *The First Casualty*, (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, revised edition)

<sup>289</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, "The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting", Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

<sup>290</sup> Douglas Kellner, "Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks", <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.



The most free journalist and medium is unquestionable the internet and its writers. With their global reach, web sites are penetrating borders. In the Iraqi war so many independent internet web sites including many journalists from the invading countries such as Indymedia<sup>291</sup> network, provided reports that it was difficult for any government, corporation or political party to control. In the United States, Democracy Now, hosted by Amy Goodman, also has been critical of the reasons for the 2003 invasion and the alleged crimes committed by the US authorities in Iraq.<sup>292</sup>

Independent journalists have often been looked at with suspicion, since they could not be guided and controlled as much as “embedded” journalists. For example, four independent journalists (two from Israel and two from Portugal) were beaten by American troops and expelled.<sup>293</sup>

### ***3.3 Evaluation and Comparing***

The 2003 Iraq War was portrayed in various ways by the international media. The reasons were, of course, the plurality of the journalists and their different ‘point of views’ shaped by their environments. For instance, Al Jazeera’s live coverage of the bombing of a palace belonging to the Hussein family was indeed shocking as loud explosions and blasts jolted viewers throughout the world. Whereas some Western audiences experienced this bombing positively as a powerful assault on “evil,” for Arab audiences it was experienced as an attack on the body of the Arab and Muslim people, just as the September 11 terror attacks were experienced by Americans as assaults on the very body and symbols of the United States.

Only by comparing American broadcasting networks with the BBC and other outlets can one say that two different wars were being presented. The U.S. networks tended to ignore Iraqi casualties, Arab outrage about the war, global antiwar and anti-US protests, and the negative features of the war; the BBC and

---

<sup>291</sup> <http://www.indymedia.org/en/index.shtml>

<sup>292</sup> Lizzy Ratner, “Amy Goodman's 'Empire'”, *The Nation*, May 23, 2005 Issue , <http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20050523&s=ratner>

<sup>293</sup> Anup Shah, “Media Reporting, Journalism and Propaganda”, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/PostWar/Media.asp>

others often featured these more critical themes; and, Arab media presented events as an invasion of Iraq, slaughter of its peoples, and destruction of the country.

On the whole, the US media tended to present a sanitized view of the war while European and Arab media presented copious images of civilian casualties and the horrors of war. The US television coverage tended toward pro-military patriotism, propaganda, and technological fetishism, celebrating the weapons of war and military humanism, highlighting the achievements and heroism of the U.S. troops.<sup>294</sup> Even at the beginning war was portrayed on CNN as a simple and somehow natural outcome to the crisis while the alleged causes and potential consequences of war itself were left unquestioned. Other global broadcasting networks, however, were highly critical of the coalition military and often presented highly negative spectacles of the attacks on Iraq and the 'shock and awe' hi-tech deaths. On BBC the rationale for war appeared more problematic and dissenting opinions and criticism receive far more attention.<sup>295</sup>

According to Lundsten and Stocchetti<sup>296</sup>, while the Americans considered the war as a crusade, the British looked upon it more like on a soccer game. Lundsten and Stocchetti noted that as in a soccer game between national teams, from the "us" and "them" perspective one presupposes that "we" and "they" are morally on an equal basis, at least within the limited scope of the sport. A soccer game is about who wins, but winning a soccer game does not imply ideological or religious superiority as in a crusade, which is a war between 'good' and 'evil'. Also, on the structural dimension, there was fatal false judgment since understanding the concept of crusade is strongly dependent on one's cultural heritage. In the USA, crusades are seen as limited and justified violent actions that aim at restoring or installing a justified state of affairs on foreign territory. In Western Europe, crusades are seen as malfunctioned efforts to achieve an idealistic, but in practical terms hollow cause. In the Arab world, crusades are seen as unpredictable, unjustified aggressive interference by evil forces on holy

---

<sup>294</sup> Douglas Kellner, "Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks", <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

<sup>295</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, "The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting", Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

<sup>296</sup> Ibid.

land. Again we see the importance of the global media in reproducing existing ‘points of view’.

During the war, Iraq also had attempted to control media reports, monitor foreign journalists, and even expel them (including CNN and even Al Jazeera for a while). The Iraqi government also tried to manage the news by providing alternative stories such as street dances in support of Saddam Hussein, and the Iraq Information Minister, Muhammad El-Sahaf, forever claiming that the coalition forces were nowhere near Baghdad, even when the force were present.<sup>297</sup> Much of this news by the Iraqi regime is well covered by European and Arab media outlets.

At the same time, many global media channels used computer-generated representations of high-tech warfare that provided graphic explanation of the war. This helped the efforts to control wartime broadcasting by removal of the unwanted effects of military action – namely death – from the iconic content supporting the news stories. Even the retired generals used this technology on TV, both to fabricate what would happen and to use graphics when the picture was inadequate for continuing the story. BBC foreign affairs correspondent David Shuckman similarly described the early stages of the military campaign on a computer-generated map crossed by moving allied planes and tanks:

(BBC) «We are seeing a massive escalation in the war and the pressure on Saddam Hussein’s regime has never been so intense. Waves of air strikes are underway [a little bomber flies over a computer-generated map while a flash of light simulates an explosion of a dot with a caption “Baghdad”] and they are meant to destroy any leave of power the Iraqi leader might have. So the focus is on Baghdad again [the map of Iraq dissolves into an aerial vision of Baghdad – as if the viewer was now in the bomber]. Targets tonight include presidential sites and government buildings [flashes marked Saddam’s palace, Ba’ath party H.Q. and Government buildings] Washington claims that Saddam is starting to lose control. Now these images [images of night bombardment from Abu Dhabi TV] of the bombing show immense explosions, which does mean there is a risk of

---

<sup>297</sup> Anup Shah, “Media Reporting, Journalism and Propaganda”, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/PostWar/Media.asp>

civilian casualties. Yet the Pentagon insists tonight that no war has ever been this precise [insert of Rumsfeld saying, "...the weapons which have been used today have a degree of precision that no one ever dreamed of in a prior conflict. They didn't exist. And it is not a handful of weapons. It is the overwhelming majority of the weapons that have that precision"] [back to Schukman] Well, we'll see. Now on the ground the focus is down south, the gateway to Iraq, the first real test of Iraqi resistance. ... The first attack come by air [little transport helicopters flying over a map representing the Kuwait-Iraq border region] and by sea into the Faw peninsula where oil installations were seized. And another advance [little tanks appears moving north on the map] led by the Americans and headed to the major port of Umm Qasr, a vital objective. And a third went down the main road to Basra ... So at the end of day two, the war is suddenly far more aggressive and far more widespread. It's a challenge to the Iraqi leader like never before» (BBC 21 March 2003 at 23:14-17 GMT)<sup>298</sup>

The technical, financial and organizational possibility of broadcasting live and almost simultaneously from any location in Iraq, any section of the battlefield, at any moment gave global media two distinct but equally important roles. On the one hand, they were the absolute witnesses to the events, the ultimate points of reference for getting reliable information on the overall unfolding of events. At the same time, and by virtue of their technological capacity for extensive "live" coverage, the importance of BBC and CNN broadcasting spilled over from the domain of the international media market into that of the Allied military campaign as part of the psychological warfare campaign.<sup>299</sup> This was not deliberately done by the global media channels, but as a result of both their being a reliable source and the strategy of the states.<sup>300</sup> In addition, even the BBC admitted that the pressure to provide 24-hour coverage

---

<sup>298</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, "The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting", Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

<sup>299</sup> Ibid.

<sup>300</sup> Taylor writes 'The Us defines PSYOPS as "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations, groups and individuals', in Daya Kishan Thussu and Des Freedman, eds. "War and the Media. Reporting Conflict 24/7" (London, Sage, 2003) pp.101-113, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

had led to many mistakes in their reporting and, in general, reporting the truth about war had proven difficult.<sup>301</sup>

The job of journalists during the war was not easy; they suffered from the malaise of getting too involved. According to Robert Fisk many were back to 'their old trick of playing toy soldiers'.<sup>302</sup> The former *Daily Telegraph* editor Max Hastings admits he got too close in the Falklands war: "I was accused of getting too involved with the troops – I have to plead guilty to that."<sup>303</sup> In Iraq he now worries for younger colleagues: "TV stations and newspapers tend to get overexcited in wars... It's a case of boys with toys, but the hardest thing to remember is that this is ultimately all about lives."<sup>304</sup>

As a result, BBC World and CNN International war coverage was indeed affected by the cultural and communicative influence of the "war on terror" rhetoric, and the "liberation of Iraq" propaganda awareness.<sup>305</sup> This shows that the global media's address to a world-wide audience only means their capacity of spreading their cultural, ideological and political biases world-wide. But it is clear that whether in Europe, the Arab world, or in heavily Muslim Southeast Asia, media outlets showed a vastly different war than the one Americans viewed on Fox, CNN, and other American stations. While much of the US press was heralding the coalition's swift show of force and accepted the Administration's argument that it aimed to bring about a free, more democratic Iraq, much of the media around the world has been far more skeptical about the invasion's goals, and far more focused on the tragedy of civilian casualties.<sup>306</sup>

---

<sup>301</sup> Anup Shah, "Media Reporting, Journalism and Propaganda", <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/PostWar/Media.asp>

<sup>302</sup> Robert Fisk, "The War of Misinformation has Begun", *Independent*, 16 March 2003

<sup>303</sup> David Miller, "Eliminating Truth: The Development of War Propaganda", March 28, 2003, [www.zmag.org](http://www.zmag.org)

<sup>304</sup> Ciar Byrne, "Media Mull Iraq Evacuation", *The Guardian*, Tuesday March 18, 2003 <http://media.guardian.co.uk/presspublishing/story/0,7495,916728,00.html>

<sup>305</sup> Lars Lundsten & Matteo Stocchetti, "The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting", Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

<sup>306</sup> One War, Different Media Lenses, *Business Week Online*, 4/11/2003

### 3.4 *The Importance of Pluralism and Al-Jazeera*

Running through this illustration, global media's power depends both on various societal and institutional structures and on ethical and professional norms. The way to balance these matters is pluralism. To obtain pluralism of content, to reflect the diversity and complexity of the world, pluralism of media structures at the local, national and global levels are important. Beyond ethics, pluralism is an important factor for democratic global media structures.

On the other hand, when thinking about global media, the first thing that people see is the monopoly in economic structure and cultural effects of dominant media organizations. However, globalization doesn't mean only harmful effects for media. In contrast regionalism which is a response to globalism, can be seen in media. In a pluralistic approach, Al-Jazeera is the best example of regionalism<sup>307</sup>. It is clear that in the Gulf War the world watched the war through the eyes of CNN. CNN showed a war which it defined as "clear" and "post-modern", as a show which makes beautiful motifs in darkness.<sup>308</sup> There was not much emphasis on the more grisly and genuinely unpleasant details of civilian casualties, allied mistakes or gruesome scenes in local hospital wards.<sup>309</sup> During a conference on the Gulf War, Ed Cody of the *Washington Post* observed, for instance:

An avalanche of information comes out of the U.S. government. They do it with such intensity and such volume that almost automatically it becomes the definition of what is happening. Anyone in Saudi Arabia, in Kuwait, in Baghdad who has the temerity to approach the problem from a different angle, to say wait a minute, this is the situation, I'm here, I'm talking to this person Mohammed and he tells me that is the way it looks from his point of view- that voice is not rejected, it's simply ignored or its volume is not at a level that can compete with the volume of information coming out of what is essentially the U.S government and its agenda.<sup>310</sup>

---

<sup>307</sup> Al-Jazeera is a regional channel because its language is not world-wide, so one of its plans is an English Channel that will transform it into a global TV channel.

<sup>308</sup> Ragıp Duran, p. 32

<sup>309</sup> John Schwartz, "A cast of Thousands: The Media and The Staging of Gulf War Two", *Australian Screen Education*, Issue 32, p. 53

<sup>310</sup> J. Ginneken, p 130

Globalisation also means that media can reach the dimensions where its users can't control, anymore. As a matter of fact, after ten years from Gulf War, Al-Jazeera introduced itself to World public, in Afghanistan Operation, and people saw that they could watch the events from the Arabs perspective, or point of view. As discussed, "point of view" is an important issue to underline in discussing the role of the media in world politics. This means representing differences in media, which is an important principle of journalism: views of all sides must be in the news. For example Al-Jazeera has been accused of being propagandist both by the US and Middle-East officials. However, Al-Jazeera provides both critical and plural dimensions in broadcasting which includes the mind of democracy, openness and pluralism. The broadcasts of Al-Jazeera reflected the ideas that the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein is accepted as a tragedy in the Arab World, and at the same time it questioned whether the war was for liberation and the democratization of Iraq.<sup>311</sup> Thus Al-Jazeera showed that acting according to ethics and professionalism is possible in broadcasting. It also showed that prestige and credibility or trustworthy, which are important for media's permanence, could be provided only by obeying the principles of journalism. As a result, today Al-Jazeera rivals CNN as a recognized international source of information. It is quoted by the world media, which appear to accept it as a valid and reliable source.<sup>312</sup> Its voice will be heard more by using Linqua Franca, since Al Jazeera International, 24-hour English-language news and current affairs channel will start global broadcasting in May of 2006.<sup>313</sup>

In terms of pluralism, the other outcome of the Al Jazeera example is that both Arabs and Americans, who are harmed by Al-Jazeera's broadcasting, thought that as Palestinian journalist Kasim Ali says "if we don't have control, we can rival."<sup>314</sup> In fact, there is now a proliferation of Arab satellite stations in Middle

---

<sup>311</sup>Frances S. Hasso, "El Cezire'ye Ne Dersiniz", 24.04.2003, [www.bia.net](http://www.bia.net) translated from [www.commondreams.org](http://www.commondreams.org)

<sup>312</sup> Louay Y. Bahry, "The New Arab Media Phenomenon Qatar's Al-Jazeera", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No.2, June 2001, p.91

<sup>313</sup> [http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display\\_news.asp?section=Local\\_News&subsection=Qatar+News&month=February2006&file=Local\\_News2006020465841.xml](http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=Local_News&subsection=Qatar+News&month=February2006&file=Local_News2006020465841.xml)

<sup>314</sup> "Media and War" Panel Discussion

East. In the Iraq War, Abu- Dhabi and Al-Arabiya were the alternatives. Even in the coalition side “embedded journalists” were an alternative, which reflects the military dimension of war. However, according to embedded journalist Cüneyt Özdemir, journalists in Palestinian Hotel were not free. “Because they had to take permission from three ministry to take a picture. In addition, their news was controlled, too.”<sup>315</sup>

In conclusion, it can be said that to obtain plurality of media contents, a plurality of media structures is needed. The structure is the message. Increasing the number of channels in different countries means different points of views and different messages. Also pluralistic media structures and processes can check and balance competing interests and perspectives.<sup>316</sup> However, it can be said that the existence of a strong civil society to counter the powers of the state and the market is, therefore, a precondition as well as an outcome of media pluralism.

---

<sup>315</sup> Cüneyt Özdemir, “İliştirilmiş Gazeteciler Kalemini Satmış Muhabirler Değillerdir”, 05.05.2003, [www.ilef.edu.tr](http://www.ilef.edu.tr)

<sup>316</sup> Majid Tehranian, , “Global Communication and World Politics”, ( London: Lynne Rienner, Colorada, 1999) p.70



## CONCLUSION

Through the 1990s, the concepts of ‘New World Order’ and ‘Globalization’ shaped the world politics. In a globalized world, political, economic, cultural and social events become more and more interconnected. Although the states remain key actors of world politics, globalization introduced new actors to world politics. International organizations both intergovernmental and non-governmental, multinational corporations, trans-national terrorist and criminal organizations are among these new actors. They both shape and implement new policies of world politics according to their capacity to affect its scope and contents.

It would be argued that the most important outcome of the globalization is the unrestrained flow of information which has given rise to the information society. Mass communication also reached a global figure in the satellite era. Due to the technological innovations global media offer people around the world the possibility of witnessing the same events at the same time. However, with my thesis I want to emphasize that ‘news’ is a fictional process that includes many stories and reflects the individual concerns of global media’s actors of camera, journalist, editor, corporation owners, state and global audience. My argument is that democratic and ethical media structures are important to balance all concerns of these actors for a responsible and reliable global media.

Therefore, in first chapter, the main actors of world politics and global media are defined clearly for the aim of showing the whole picture. In this chapter, I also underlined the ‘information society’ concept, which reflects the relation between global media and world politics. Not only global media, but also other products of technological innovations have made the information a crucial value of globalized society as a result of its determining role in the world politics. It would be introduced that global audience and global civil society that are effective actors of world politics are the supportive results of information society.

Since in an information society, people has become to be interested in world issues due to the helpful communication technology.

Chapter two underlines the importance of global media in world politics. Since global media provides global distribution of events or news, they are important for setting and shaping world politics for global audiences. Thus, global society has become party to international negotiations and virtual participants in acts of diplomacy and peacekeeping. These developments lead the New World Information and Communication Order debates in 1970s within the UNESCO. These debates resulted with a report of “Many Voices One World” which supports freedom of the press and freedom of information and makes recommendations for a balance and responsible information flow.

In exploring the importance of global media in world politics, the issue of “points of view” and their disseminating and shaping by news process is crucial since “point of view” involves the creation of ‘them’ and ‘us’. Thus, pluralism of points of view is necessary to balance the misinformation. In this thesis, the propaganda issue is also underlined, because it is an instrument for constructing “opinions” or “points of view” of masses by using the “power of the word”. Propaganda has been used not only by states, but also by interest groups, which try to make their voice heard by the public.

Thinking about the main effects of global media on world politics, three major roles of global media are essential. Firstly, global media is an accelerant to policy decisionmaking process by shortening the response time of actors. Secondly, they are an impediment to the achievement of desired policy goals, which includes psychological effects on public and operational security of military. Thirdly, as a policy agenda-setting agent global media can make any issue the most important issue of public agenda. In one night, they can change the political agenda by their headlines, set new priorities for the society.

These effects lead questioning the power of global media. Today the power of the media in shaping politics and in influencing governments is accepted as almost certain. However, it is clear that the global media are neither all-powerful nor all powerless. Since knowledge is a source of power, global media as being the primary communication tools are central to this power. Hence, global media’s

power requires credibility because legitimating and justification of the governmental actions become vital for the governing elite. Today, modern world politics rested on consent rather than using force, so for achieving democratic politics, establishment of an informed public opinion is a pre-requisite. At this point, public opinion is related with mass media in globalized world. To many, public opinion is captured through the media or created by them. This makes the audiences open to the manipulative effects of the global media, but since the global media need credibility for getting public support, they can not risk their credibility. Although credibility is gained in long run, it can be quickly lost by false news. Therefore, global media's power depends on free, independent, pluralistic and responsible journalism.

In order to illustrate the issues of global media and world politics, last chapter applies the case of Iraq War of 2003. In this chapter, the US media, the European media, the Arab media, embedded journalists and free journalists and their position in Iraq War of 2003 is analyzed. Iraq case has showed that information management and forming public opinion is critically central for winning a war. Briefly, the US media tended to provide highly sanitized views of the war, rarely showing Iraqi casualties whereas European coverage was more critical of the invasion and tended to put a greater emphasis on coalition arrests, losses and civilian deaths than the US media. On the Arab media side, Al Jazeera gained worldwide attention for its coverage of the war. Many European and US networks re-broadcasted some of its coverage. The Arab media accused of anti-war coverage, because they showed bad or negative angles of the war especially by covering Iraqi civilians. In the war, around 600 journalists were 'embedded' with military units and they reflected the news through the eyes of soldiers, which was questioned in terms of objectivity. And free journalists disseminate their news especially in the Internet sites such as Indymedia and Democracy Now. This pluralism in media outlets provide the opportunity of the pluralism of media contents since the war perceived from different 'angles', or different 'points of view'.

In sum, there are a large number of issues and areas that come together in the relationship between world politics and global media. This thesis is an attempt

to bring some order to them and yet still reflect their complexity and interconnectedness.

The 'new world order' does not belong to the US, to the West, or even just to states. It is an increasingly pluralist system of states, and one in which the traditional divides between international politics and national politics, between the affairs of states and those of peoples, are breaking down. The possibilities for political action and social movements to influence world politics with the help of increasing media outlets are not extreme.

Therefore, global media is very significant in world politics due to their power in terms of effecting public opinion. CNN, BBC and Al Jazeera can do things that other media outlets cannot. Only transnational broadcasting has the "power" to collapse events and their narratives at a global level. They can produce news stories whose quantity and quality have no rivals; they can pick and chose news stories from virtually every corner of the planet and show them worldwide. They can also tell stories while they are happening and give them a meaning while their outcome is still uncertain. As well as technology, finances and organization provide the conditions to impose specific interpretations of events or explanatory frames contrary to the local ones. But this not means that they are more accurate, objective or "true" than others.

Moreover, the battle for the minds and hearts of audiences is being fought in a triangular struggle between existential, media and social construction of reality. Most people depend on second-hand experiences or information for what they know or want to know about foreign countries. This causes the danger of manipulation. Mass media reporting can create a 'reality', an image, of its own, and there can be significant differences between media reality and 'reality'. The media select just a few of the countless occurrences in the world, distribute information about them and so construct on impression of social reality. On the other hand, the influence of the media is especially great when no other source of information is available; furthermore, this is unavoidable if there is no possibility of checking on media 'reality'. In this respect television appears to make a particularly powerful impact, at least on average receivers, because of its pictorial documentary character.

Also, based on the examples of the Iraq War of 2003, it can be said that the ethical codes and freedom of journalism are not effective in international political issues if the media belong to one part of crisis. The success of Al- Jazeera depends on Qatar's not being part of Iraq and Afghanistan War. However, the emerging media outlets can balance out the spin, stereotypes and propaganda, not necessarily by providing an alternative, but by alerting the global audience and drawing their attention to forgotten angles of news coverage. This is important, since balanced coverage of global events is crucial to stabilizing an unstable world.

As a result, the global media is a significant instrument for giving information and for shaping public opinion in world politics by its effects as agenda setting, accelerating and impediment. Thus, the interaction between the media and centers of power, and how these relations take place in the process of establishing public opinion and ensuring legitimacy and consent is very considerable.

## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX- A

#### **General Assembly of European Non-Governmental Organizations'**

##### **Code of Conduct\***

In April 1989 the General Assembly of European NGOs adopted its Code of Conduct on Images and Messages Relating to the Third World. This is designed to counter fatalistic images of the Third World by providing:

more realistic and more complete information, thereby increasing awareness of the intrinsic value of all civilizations, of the limitations of our own society and of the need for a more universal development which respects justice, peace and the environment. It is the duty of NGOs to provide the public with truthful and objective information which respects not only the human dignity of the people in question but the intelligence of the public at large.

The Practical Guidelines are quoted here in full:

1. Avoid *catastrophic or idyllic images* which appeal to charity and lead to a clear conscience rather than a consideration of the root problems;
2. All people must be presented as human beings and sufficient information provided as to their social, cultural and economic environment so that their *cultural identity* and *dignity* are preserved. Culture should be presented as an integral part of development in the South;
3. *Accounts given by the people concerned* should be presented rather than the interpretations of a third party;
4. People's ability to *take responsibility for themselves* must be highlighted;
5. A message should be formulated in such a way that *generalizations*

- are avoided in the minds of the public;
6. The internal and external *obstacles* to development should be clearly shown;
  7. *Interdependence* and *joint responsibility* in underdevelopment should be emphasized;
  8. The *causes of poverty* (political, structural or natural) should be apparent in a message in order to enable the public to become aware of the history and real situation in the Third World, and the structural foundations of these countries before colonization. It is the situation today, coupled with knowledge of the past, which should be the starting point for examining ways in which extreme poverty and oppression can be eliminated. Power struggles and vested interests should be exposed and oppression and injustice denounced;
  9. Messages should avoid all forms of *discrimination* (racial, sexual, cultural, religious, socio-economic);
  10. The image of our Third World partners as dependent, poor and powerless is most often applied to *women* who are invariably portrayed as dependent victims, or worse still, simply do not figure in the picture. An improvement in the images used in educational material on the Third World evidently requires a positive change in the images projected of Southern women;
  11. *Southern partners* should be consulted in the formulation of all messages;
  12. If an NGO calls on the services of other partners (institutions, organizations or private companies) for a fund raising activity, it should ensure that the recommendations of this Code are respected by all parties. Reference should be made to the Code in the *sponsoring* contract(s) between the NGO and its partner(s).

Source: Jaap van Ginneken, "Understanding Global News: A Critical Introduction", (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1998) p.168

## APPENDIX-B

### **Resolution 4/19 adopted by the Twenty-first Session of the UNESCO General Conference, Belgrade, 1980**

The general conference considers that

(a) this new world information and communication order could be based, among other considerations, on:

- i. elimination of imbalances and inequalities which characterize the present situation;
- ii. elimination of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private, and excessive concentrations;
- iii. removal of the internal and external obstacles to the free flow and wider and better balanced dissemination of information and ideas;
- iv. plurality of sources and channels of information;
- v. freedom of the press and of information;
- vi. the freedom of journalists and all professionals in the communication media, a freedom inseparable from responsibility ;
- vii. the capacity of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own situations, notably by providing their own equipment, by training their personnel, by improving their infrastructures and making their information and communication media suitable to their needs and aspirations;
- viii. the sincere will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives;
- ix. respect for each people's cultural identity and for the right of each nation to inform the world about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural values;
- x. respect for the right of all peoples to participate in international exchanges of information on the basis of equality, justice and mutual benefit;




xi. respect for the right of the public, of ethnic and social groups and of individuals to have access to information sources and to participate actively in the communication process;

(b) This new world information and communication order should be based on the fundamental principles of the international law, as laid down in the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) Diverse solution to information and communication problems are required because social, political, cultural and economic, problems differ from one country to another and, within a given country, from one group to another.

Source: Sean Macbride, "Many Voices One World: Towards a New More Just and More Efficient World Information and Communication Order", (London: Kogan Page; New York:Unipub; Paris Unesco, 1983)

**APPENDIX- C**



**APPENDIX- D**



## APPENDIX-E



Brian Walski, a Los Angeles Times reporter, combined two photographs into one used on the newspaper's front page Monday (above). Sharp-eyed journalists at another paper spotted Iraqis at left who were repeated in the picture.



The picture is a fake – a computer-generated amalgam of two different photographs, made one after the other. In one (unmanipulated) picture, that prominently features the standing man and child, the British soldier is not gesturing and is looking away from them. In the second image (also unmanipulated), the soldier is gesturing dramatically, but the man and child are much less visible. The conclusion is inescapable: Walski deliberately combined two of his good legitimate photographs to make one superb illegitimate one. The bogusness of the picture was discovered at the Courant, after an employee noticed what appeared to be a duplication of elements and people in the image's background.





## BIBLIOGRAPHY

### BOOKS AND ARTICLES

Al-Arian, Laila, "Media Coverage of the War in Iraq", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Jul/Aug2004, Vol. 23, Issue 6

Ali, Lorraine, "Al-Jazeera From Inside", *Newsweek*, 6.14.2004, Vol. 143, Issue 24

Arı, Tayyar, *Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Dış Politika*, (İstanbul: Alfa, 2001)

Bahry, Louay Y., "The New Arab Media Phenomenon Qatar's Al-Jazeera", *Middle East Policy*, Vol. 8, No.2, June 2001

Barber, Benjamin R., "Jihad Vs. McWorld", *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1992, Vol. 269, No: 3, pp. 53-65

Baylis, John & Smith, Steve, *The Globalization of World Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2001)

Bayramoğlu, N. Nisa, "The Power of Knowledge and the Media", *Dış Politika-Foreign Policy, A Quarterly of the FP Institute*, Vol.XXX, 2005, Nos.1-2

Beinart, Peter, "Media Bias", *New Republic*, 4/14/2003, Vol. 228, Issue 14

Bennett, A. LeRoy & Oliver, James K. *International Organizations, Principles and Issues* (New Jersey: Pearson Education, 2002)

Bennett, Tony, 'Theories of Media, Theories of Society', in Michael Gurevitch, (et al.), *Culture, Society and the Media*, (London: Rothledge, 1982) pp.30-55,

Gurevitch, Michael (et. al.), *Culture, Society and the Media* (London: Rothledge, 1982)

Briggs, Adam and Copley, Paul, *The Media: An Introduction* (New York: Longman, 1998)

Brown, Seyom, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1974)

Byrne, Ciar, "Media Mull Iraq Evacuation", *The Guardian*, Tuesday March 18, 2003 <http://media.guardian.co.uk/presspublishing/story/0,7495,916728,00.html>

Carruthers, Susan, *The Media at War* (Basingstoke: Macmillian, 2000)

- Castells, Manuel, *The Rise of The Network Society* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)
- Chernov, Andrei ‘Global Information Society’, *International Affairs*, vol.50, 2004, pp.22-28
- Cohen, Eliot D.(Ed.), *Philosophical Issues in Journalism*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
- Crawford, Susan, ‘The Origin and Development of a Concept: The Information Society’, *Bull. Med. Libr. Assoc.*, 71(4), October, 1983
- Curran, James, “Rethinking Media and Democracy”, in J. Curran&M. Gurevitch(eds.), *Mass Media and Society*, (London:Arnold, 2000,pp.120-54)
- Curan, James and Seaton, Jean, *Power without Responsibility: The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*, (London, New York: Routledge, 1997, First edition in 1981),
- Dordick , Herbert S. & Wang, Georgette, *The Information Society: A Retrospective View*, (London:Sage Publications, 1993)
- Duff, Alistair S., *Information Society Studies*, (New York: Routledge, 2000)
- Duran, Ragıp, *Burası Dünya Polis Radyosu: Global Medya Eleştirileri* (İstanbul: YKY,1999)
- Duran, Ragıp; *Apoletli Medya* (İstanbul: Patika Yayınevi, 1996)
- Embedded in Iraq, *The Economist*, 3/29/2003, Vol. 366, p57
- Entman, Robert, “Reporting Environmental Policy Debate: The Real Media Biases”, *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1(3), 1996, pp.77-92
- Erdoğan, İrfan, *İletişim, Egemenlik, Mücadeleye Giriş* (Ankara: İmge Kitapevi,1997)
- Erdoğan, İrfan, *Uluslararası İletişim, Dünyanın Çarpık Düzeni*, (Kaynak Yayınları: İstanbul, 1995)
- Ewing, Jack, Shari, Michael, Mangi, Naweena A., “One War, Different Media Lenses”, *Business Week Online*, 4/11/2003
- Feather, John, *The Information Society: A Study of Continuity and Change*, (London: Library Association Publishing, 2000 (3<sup>rd</sup> Edition))
- Frederick, Howard H., *Global Communication and International Relations* (Wadsworth Publishing: California, 1993)

- Friedman, Thomas L., *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999)
- Giddens, Antony, *Runaway World*, (New York and London: Routledge, 1999)
- Gilliam, F., Iyengar, S., Simon, A. and Wright, O. "Crime in Black and White: The Violent, Scary World of Local News", *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics*, 1996 1(3), 6-25
- Gilgoff, Dan, "Everybody's Watching, but on Different Channels", *U.S. News & World Report*, 4.7.2003, Vol. 134, Issue 11
- Gilpin, Robert, *The Political Economy of International Relations* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 1987)
- Ginneken, Jaap van, *Understanding Global News: A critical Introduction* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications,1998)
- Goldstein, Joshua S., *International Relations* (New York: Longman, 2004)
- Gönlübol, Mehmet, *Uluslararası Politika*, (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2000)
- Gözen, Ramazan, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Sonrası Çoğulculuk, Küreselleşme ve 11 Eylül*, (İstanbul:Alfa, 2004)
- Graber, Dorris, McQuail, Denis and Norris, Pippa (ed.), *The Politics of News The News of Politics*, (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1998)
- Grosswiler, Paul, "Methodology Study of Media and Ideology Orientations: Exploring Medium Theory, Critical Theory and Cultural Studies", *Canadian Journal of Communication*, vol. 22, Issue 2 (Spring 1997)
- Hafez, Kai (ed.), *Islam and The West in The Mass Media: Fragmented Images in a Globalizing World*, (Cresskill, New Jersey: Hampton Press, 2000)
- Hall, S., 'The Rediscovery of "ideology": Return of the Repressed in Media Studies', in Michael Gurevitch (et. al) *Culture, Society and the Media* (London: Routledge, 1982, pp.56-90)
- Hamelink, Cees J., *The Politics of World Communication*, (London: Sage Publications, 1997)
- Hastedt, Glenn. P. and M. Knickrehm, Kay, *Dimensions of World Politics* (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 1991)
- Helal, İbrahim, "This is the news, This is our view", *Global Agenda*, Jan 2004, Issue 2, pp.12-20

- Herman, Robert and Chomsky, Naom, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political economy of the Mass Media* (Newyork: Pantheon,1988)
- Herman, Edward& McChesney, Robert W., *The Global Media: The New Missionaries of Corporate Capitalism* (London:Cassel, 1997)
- Hickey, Neil, “Perspectives on War”, *Columbia Journalism Review*, March/April 2002, Vol. 40, Issue 6
- Hirst, Paul & Thompson, Grahame (Eds.), *Globalization in Question*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996)
- Hughes, Barry B., *Continuity and Change in World Politics: Competing Perspectives* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2000)
- Iosifides, Petros, “Methods of Measuring Media Concentration”, *Media, Culture and Society*, Vol. 19, Issue 4 (1997), pp. 643-663
- Jeanneney, Jean-Noél, *Başlangıçtan Günümüze Medya Tarih*, Çeviren: Esra Atuk (İstanbul:Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1998), p.34
- Jim Rutenberg, “Cable's War Coverage Suggests a New 'Fox Effect' on Television”, *New York Times*, April 16, 2003
- Kagan, Robert, *America and Europe in The New World Order*, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003)
- Katovsky, Bill and Carlson, Timothy, *Embedded: The Media at War in Iraq*, (Guilford, Connecticut: The Lyons Press, 2003)
- Kegley, Charles W. and Wittkopf, Eugene R., *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997)
- Kellner, Douglas, *The Persian Gulf TV War*, (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992)
- Kellner, Douglas, *Media Culture* (London.Routledge, 1995)
- Kissenger, Henry, *Diplomasi*, çev.İbrahim Kurt (Ankara:Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2000)
- Knightley, Phillip, *The First Casualty*, (Baltimore, London: The John Hopkins University Press, 2002, revised edition)
- L.McPhail, Thomas, *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends* (Boston:Allyn and Bacon,2002)

Lamborn, Alan C. & Ledgold, Joseph, *World Politics into the Twenty-First Century* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003)

Lechner, Frank J. and Boli, Johnn (Eds.), *The Globalization Reader* (Massachusetts, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2000)

Livingston, Steven “Beyond the “CNN Effect”: The Media- Foreign Policy Dynamic” in Pippa Norris (Ed.) *The News Media and Their Influences* (Colorado, London:Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997)

Macbride, Sean, *Many Voices One World: Towards a New More Just and More Efficent World Information and Communication Order* (London: Kogan Page; New York:Unipub; Paris Unesco, 1983)

Malek, Abbas (Ed.), *News Media and Foreign Relations*, (Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1997)

Mann, Jim, *Tomorrow’s Global Community: How The Information Deluge is Transforming Business and Government*, (Philadelphia: BainBridgebooks, 1998)

Martin, William J., *The Information Society*, (London: Aslib, 1988)

Massing, Michael, “The Bombing of Al-Jazeera”, *Columbia Journalism Review*, May2003, Vol. 41, Issue 7

McChesney, Robert W., “Global Media for Global Control”, *EDucate magazine*, October - December 2001

McGuigan, Jim, *Culture and the Public Sphere* (London: Routledge, 1996)

McLuhan, Marshall, *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill,1964)

McNair, Brian, *Journalism and Democracy*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2000)

McPhail, Thomas L., *Global Communication: Theories, Stakeholders, and Trends* (Boston:Allyn and Bacon,2002)

Mindich, David T. Z., *How Objectivity Came to Define American Journalism*, (New York, London: New York University Press, 1998)

Morris, Nancy & Waisbord, Silvio, *Media and Globalization: Why the State Matters*, (Newyork: Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, 2001)

Movlana, Hamid, Gerbner, George and Schiller, Herbert I., *Triumph of the Image*, (Boulder, SanFrancisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1992)



- Naisbitt, John, *Global Paradoks*, (İstanbul:Sabah Yayınları,1994) p.14
- Norris, Pippa (Ed.), *The News Media and Their Influences*, (Colorado, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997)
- Nye, Joseph, *Power in the Global Information Age*, (London, New York: Routledge, 2004)
- Parenti, Christian, “Al Jazeera Goes to Jail” , *Nation*, 3.9.2004, Vol. 278, Issue 12
- Parker, Ned, “*Tiny Qatar Beams Big Signal To Arab World*”, *Christian Science Monitor*, 8/4/99, Vol. 91, Issue 174
- Poniewozik, James, “The War on TV From Both Sides”, *Time Europe*, 4/7/2003, Vol. 161, Issue 14
- Postlewaite, Susan, Teinowitz, Ira, “Al Jazeera rival hits Middle East”, *Advertising Age*, 2/3/2003, Vol. 74, Issue 5
- Real Battles In Real Time, *Time*, 3/31/2003, Vol. 161 Issue 13, p60, 2p
- Raboy, Marc, ‘Media Policy and Public Interest’, in Robin Mansell, Rohan Samarajiva and Amy Mahan (Eds.), *Networking Knowledge for Information Societies Institutions & Intervention*, (Netherlands:Delft University Press, 2002), pp. 312-317
- Rampton, Sheldon & Stauber, John, *Weapons of Mass Deception* (New York:Penguin, 2003)
- Read, Donald, *The Power of News: The History of Reuters 1849-1989* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)
- Rosenau, James, *Along the Domestic-foreign Frontier: Exploring Governance in a Turbulent World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997)
- Rourke, John T., *International Politics on the World Stage* (The Dushkin Publishing Group Inc.: Connecticut, 1991)
- Salamon , Lester M., “The Rise of Nonprofit Sector,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1994, pp. 109-123.
- Selling the War on TV, *Nation*, 3/31/2003, Vol. 276 Issue 12, p7, 2p
- Schultz, Julianne, *Reviving the Forth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1998)
- Schwartz, John “A cast of Thousands: The Media and The Staging of Gulf War Two”, *Australian Screen Education*, Issue 32

- Shaw, Martin, *Global Society and International Relations* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994)
- Skjelsbaek, Kjell, "The Growth of International Non- Governmental Organization in the Twentieth Century," *International Organization*, 25 (Sun 1971)
- Street, John, *Mass Media, Politics and Democracy* (Palgrave: New York, 2001)
- Sunders, F. Stonor, *Who paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War* (London: Granta,2000)
- Sussman, Gerald, *Communication, Technology, and Politics in the Information Age* (London:Sage, 1997)
- Şen, Alper, "Irak'ta Propaganda Savaşı", *Stratejik Analiz*, Mayıs 2003, Sayı:37, pp. 36-45
- Tarhan, Nevzat, *Psikolojik Savaş* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2003)
- Tehranian, Majid , *Global Communication and World Politics* ( London: Lynne Rienner, Colorada, 1999)
- Tehranian, Majid "Peace Journalism Negotiating Global Media Ethics", *Press/Politics*, vol. 7 (2), Spring 2002, p.61
- Telhami, Shibley, "A View from the Arab World: A Survey in Five Countries", *The Times*, 6 October 2000
- Thompson, John, *The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory of the Media* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995)
- Thussu, Daya Kishan& Freedman, Des (ed.), *War and The Media: Reporting Conflict 24/7*, (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003)
- Tomlinson, John, "Cultural Globalization: Placing and displacing the West", in H. MacKay and T. O'Sullivan (eds.), *The Media Reader: Continuity and Transformation* (London: Sage, pp-165-77,1999)
- Tunstall, Jeremy, *Newspaper Power: The New National Press in Britain* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 p.339-40 )
- Uluç, Güliz, *Küreselleşen Medya: İktidar ve Mücadele Alanı*, (İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 2003)
- Vilches, Lorenzo, *The Media in Spain*, in Anthony Weymouth and Bernard Lamizet(eds), *Markets and Myths: Forces for Change in the European Media* (London:Longman, 1996, pp.173-201)p.180

Viotti Paul R., and Kauppi, Mark V., *International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism and Beyond* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1999)

Wallace, Michael D. and Singer, David, "Intergovernmental Organization in the Global System 1815-1964: A Quantitative Description," *International Organization* Vol. 24, No. 2, 1970, pp. 239-287.

Wallis, Roger, *The Known World of Broadcast News* ( London:Routledge, 1990)

Zucchino, David, "Army Stage-Managed Fall of Hussein Statue", *Los Angeles Times*, July 3, 2004

## **NEWS AND INTERNET SOURCES**

Amiel, Barbara, "Disinfect the BBC before it poisons a new generation", *Telegraph*, 7 July, 2003,  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/opinion/main.jhtml?xml=/opinion/2003/07/07/do0701>

Arapkirli, Zafer, "Savaş Tamtamları ve Medya", [www.ntvmsnbc.com](http://www.ntvmsnbc.com)., 12 Ağustos 2002

Bahrainis Get War News From Different Windows , *Bahrain Tribune*, Apr 10, 2003

Borchgrave, Arnaud de, "Winning by Losing", March 30,  
<http://www.upi.com/inc/view.php?StoryID=20030330-100840-3847r#>

Buncombe, Andrew, "The Hidden Cost of Bush's War", November 14, 2003, *Independent/UK*, <http://www.commondreams.org/headlines03/1114-03.htm>

Chris Suellentrop, 'Al Jazeera: It's just as fair as CNN', *Slate*, April 2, 2003

Coming of Age , *Economist*, 29.3.2003, Vol. 366, Issue 8317

Della Cava, Marco R., "Iraq gets sympathetic press around the world", *USA Today*, April 2, 2003, <http://www.usatoday.com/educate/iraq/war30-article.htm>

Fisk, Robert, "The War of Misinformation has Begun", *Independent*, 16 March 2003

Gilbert, Matthew and Ryan, Suzanne, "Did iconic images from Baghdad reveal more about the media than Iraq?", August 15, 2003,  
[www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe\\_stories/041003\\_snap\\_judgements.htm](http://www.boston.com/news/packages/iraq/globe_stories/041003_snap_judgements.htm)

Hasso, Frances S., "El Cezire'ye Ne Dersiniz", 24.04.2003, [www.bia.net.tr](http://www.bia.net.tr)

Herman, Edward , “The Global Media Giants: Firms That Dominate the World”, *EDucate magazine*, October - December 2001, <http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Media/GlobalMediaGiants.html>

Iraq war: Baghdad and Beyond, *The Independent*, Apr 10, 2003

Ireland, Doug, “Honesty: The Worst Policy When Telling The Truth Will Get You Fired From The Networks”, March 31 2003, [http://www.coalitionforworldpeace.org/news/news\\_stories/Arnet\\_4.1.3.html](http://www.coalitionforworldpeace.org/news/news_stories/Arnet_4.1.3.html)

Kellner, Douglas “Spectacle and Media Propaganda in the War on Iraq: A Critique of U.S. Broadcasting Networks”, <http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/blogger.php>.

Lewis, Justin, “Biased Broadcasting Corporation”, *The Guardian*, Friday July 4, 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,991214,00.html>

Lundsten, Lars & Stocchetti, Matteo, “The War against Iraq in Transnational Broadcasting”, Finland, <http://www.sit.fi/~lars/papers/iraq.pdf>

Martin, Patrick “The stage-managed events in Baghdad’s Firdos Square: image-making, lies and the “liberation” of Iraq” , 12 April 2003, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)

Martin, Patrick, “Media Boses Admit Pro-War Bias in Coverage of Iraq”, 2 May 2003, [www.wsws.org](http://www.wsws.org)

Miller, David, “Eliminating Truth: The Development of War Propaganda”, March 28, 2003, [www.zmag.org](http://www.zmag.org)

One War, Different Media Lenses , *Business Week Online*, 4/11/2003

Özdemir, Cüneyt, “İliştirilmiş Gazeteciler Kalemimi Satmış Muhabirler Değillerdir”, 05.05.2003, [www.ilef.edu.tr](http://www.ilef.edu.tr)

Ratner, Lizzy, “Amy Goodman's 'Empire'”, *The Nation*, May 23, 2005 Issue , <http://www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20050523&s=ratner>

Regan, Tom , “British paper: Bush wanted to bomb Al Jazeera”, <http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/1123/dailyUpdate.html>

Schleifer, S. A., “Global Media, the New World Order-and the Significance of Failure,” [http://www.adhamonline.com/Admin/articles\\_sas1b.html](http://www.adhamonline.com/Admin/articles_sas1b.html)

Shah, Anup, “Media Reporting, Journalism and Propaganda”, <http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/MiddleEast/Iraq/PostWar/Media.asp>

Steven, Robert, "Study on Iraq Coverage Shows BBC was Most Pro-War of British Network's", 10 July 2003, [http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/bbc-j10\\_prn.sh](http://www.wsws.org/articles/2003/jul2003/bbc-j10_prn.sh)

[http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107\\_cong\\_public\\_laws&docid=f:publ243.107](http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ243.107)

[http://dehai.org/archives/dehai\\_news\\_archive/mar03/0604.html](http://dehai.org/archives/dehai_news_archive/mar03/0604.html)

<http://www.variant.randomstate.org/19texts/comment19.html>

<http://media.guardian.co.uk/iraqandthemedial/story/0,12823,932307,00.html>

<http://media.guardian.co.uk/Iraqandmedia/stor/Story/0,12823,1118405.html>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2765215.stm>

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4323361.stm>

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2927527.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2927527.stm),

<http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0206-07.htm>

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/2928153.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2928153.stm)

<http://poll.imdb.com/name/nm0161202/news>

<http://www.drudgereport.com/dover.htm>

<http://www.islamonline.org/english/news/2003-04/08/article05.shtml>

<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/634/eg8.htm>

<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/634/eg8.htm>

<http://www.brookings.org/fp/saban/analysis/survey20030313.htm>

<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/05/01/iraq/main551946.shtml>

<http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/10/28/mission.accomplished/>

<http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/04/01/sprj.irq.geraldo/>

<http://www.command-post.org/archives/004604.html>

<http://www.commondreams.org/views04/1227-25.htm>

[http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/palestine\\_hotel/palestine\\_hotel.html](http://www.cpj.org/Briefings/2003/palestine_hotel/palestine_hotel.html)

<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2707>

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,909793,00.html>

<http://www.indymedia.org/en/index.shtml>

<http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article2883.htm>

[http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc\\_sec\\_50\\_00001801----000-.html](http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00001801----000-.html)

[http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id\\_article=4205](http://www.rsf.org/article.php3?id_article=4205)

[http://www.stateofthedia.org/2005/narrative\\_cabletv\\_contentanalysis.asp?cat=](http://www.stateofthedia.org/2005/narrative_cabletv_contentanalysis.asp?cat=)  
[http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/coffin\\_photos/dover/](http://www.thememoryhole.org/war/coffin_photos/dover/),  
[http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/08/night\\_flights/index\\_np.html](http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/08/night_flights/index_np.html),  
[http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display\\_news.asp?section=Local\\_News&subsection=](http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/Display_news.asp?section=Local_News&subsection=)  
<http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-2004.pdf>  
[http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20041c3\\_en.pdf](http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/gdscsir20041c3_en.pdf)  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A32862-2003Sep5?language=printer>  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25685-2004Sep16.html>  
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/photo/essays/vanRiper/030409.htm>  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html>  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html>  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030403-3.html>  
<http://www.workingforchange.com/article.cfm?itemid=14887>