

**THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY
IN TURKEY:
THE NATIONALIST ACTION PARTY
AFTER THE 1999 ELECTIONS**

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ABSTRACT

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The main purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate whether or not the rapid rise and decline of radical nationalism between 1999 and 2002 elections may be related to an ideological identity crisis of the Nationalist Action Party. In this context, the focus will be on the transformation of the nationalist ideology, “nationalisms” in the Ottoman Empire, Kemalist/official nationalism, and transformation of Turkish nationalism to a political party ideology and its further transformation in Turkey. The reason for drawing such a framework is related to the fact that the developmental line of the nationalist phenomenon shows a three dimensional historical continuity line in influencing Turkish nationalism as a political party ideology. The possible ideological identity crisis in the NAP ideology, which has been visible between the 1999 and 2002 general elections, should be searched in the genetic categorical paradoxes and in the transformation of nationalism as a modern phenomenon, which have been influential upon all nationalism types emerged after it. The complex structure of the nationalist phenomenon, which started to be influential on the Ottoman Empire had influenced the developmental periods of “nationalisms” appeared in their original structure. Turkish nationalism, which had developed on the same line with Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, had inherited both the categorical paradoxes of nationalism and the emergence of “original” Turkish nationalism. Thus, Turkish nationalism, as a nation-state ideology, had been the carrier of these categorical inconsistencies, which had remained until the multi-party period and which were transformed to a political party ideology with the NAP in the 1960s. Therefore, throughout the thesis, the possible ideological identity crisis of the NAP ideology will be searched in its complex relation with the transformation history of political nationalism and its specific transformation in Turkey. At the end, the ideological statute of nationalism in the political spectrum will be questioned.

Key Concepts: Nationalism, Nationalist Ideology, Turkish Nationalism, Radical Nationalism as a Party Ideology, NAP, Ideological Identity Crisis, 1999 and 2002 General Elections.

ÖZ

Katırcı, Güldeniz

Yüksek Lisans, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu tezin amacı, 1999 ve 2002 genel seçimleri arasında aşırı milliyetçiliğin ani yükseliş ve düşüşünün Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi'ndeki ideolojik bir kimlik krizinin sonucu olup olmadığını göstermektir. Bu bağlamda, milliyetçiliğin dönüşümüne, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu içindeki “milliyetçilikler”e, Kemalist/resmi milliyetçiliğe, Türk milliyetçiliğinin politik parti ideolojisine dönüşümüne ve daha sonraki dönüşümlerinin değerlendirilmesine odaklanmaktadır. Böyle bir çerçevenin çizilme nedeni milliyetçiliğin gelişiminin, politik parti ideolojisi olarak Türk milliyetçiliğini etkilerken üç yönlü bir tarihsel devamlılık çizgisi gösterdiği gerçeğine bağlanabilir. MHP ideolojisinde 1999 ve 2002 genel seçimleri arasında gözle görünür olmaya başlayan olası bir ideolojik kimlik krizinin belirtileri, milliyetçiliğin, kendisinden sonra ortaya çıkan tüm “milliyetçilikler” üzerinde etkili olan genetik kategorik çelişkilerinde ve modern bir fenomen olarak dönüşümünde aranmalıdır. Milliyetçiliğin Osmanlı İmparatorluğu üzerinde etkili olan bu karmaşık yapısı burada ortaya çıkan “milliyetçilikler”in gelişim dönemlerini etkilemiştir. Osmanlıcılık, İslamcılık ve Türkçülük ile aynı çizgide gelişen Türk milliyetçiliği, milliyetçiliğin kategorik çelişkilerinin ve Türk milliyetçiliğinin ortaya çıkışının original çelişkilerinin ikisini birden devralmıştır. Böylece, Türk milliyetçiliği ulus-devlet ideolojisi olarak, çok partili hayata geçilene kadar hayatta kalan ve 1960'larda MHP ile politik parti ideolojisine dönüşen bu kategorik çelişkilerin taşıyıcısı olmuştur. Bu nedenle, tez boyunca, MHP ideolojisinin olası kimlik krizi onun politik milliyetçiliğinin dönüşüm tarihiyle olan karmaşık ilişkisinde ve ürkiye'deki özgül dönüşümünde aranacaktır. Son olarak, milliyetçiliğin siyasi yelpazedeki ideolojik statüsü sorgulanacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Milliyetçilik, Milliyetçi İdeoloji, Türk Milliyetçiliđi, Parti İdeolojisi olarak Radikal Milliyetçilik, MHP, İdeolojik Kimlik Krizi, 1999 ve 2002 Genel Seçimleri.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- CP: Conservative Party
- DLP: Democratic Left Party
- GAP: South Eastern Project
- GUP: Grand Union Party
- JP: Justice Party
- MP: Motherland Party
- NAP: Nationalist Action Party
- NF: Nationalist Front
- NP: Nation Party
- NSP: National Salvation Party.
- NWP: Nationalist Working Party
- OCNU: Officers' Council for National Unity
- PKK: Kurdistan Workers Party
- RDD: Research and Development Department.
- RPNP: Republican Peoples Nation Party
- RTP: Republican Trust Party
- TIS: Turkish Islamic Synthesis
- TPP: True Path Party
- UPP: Union and Progress Party
- WP: Welfare Party

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The 1999 general elections in Turkey had given a chance to radical nationalism through the determination of the Nationalist Action Party (NAP) to be the second best party with the vote share of 17.94. In fact, the nationalist tradition in Turkey has been one of the political realities of the country since its establishment. Its influence upon society and politics may be traced back to the beginnings of the nineteenth century when the nationalist ideology had entered in the borders of the Ottoman Empire and transformed into Turkism from Ottomanism and Islamism. Turkism had evolved into a state ideology with the emergence of modern Turkey and transformed itself into “Kemalist form of nationalism” as the “official ideology”, which is still the mere ideology of the state.

Official nationalism was the ideological unity, sheltering different political world views within available limits. Thus, different nationalism approaches with other political inclinations had the chance to live within and/or against the official state ideology until their liberation with transformation to the multi-party politics. However, it was able to organize around a political party in the mid-sixties as nationalism formed the ideology of a political party, the NAP. In this respect, it had represented the “opposition” before fifties and it had played the role of the “so called” “guardian of the state” against national unity “threatened” by communism throughout sixties and seventies. Throughout those years, it had been employed as the “anti-thesis” of communism in agenda. Strictly, with the eighties, it had been proclaimed “out of law” with the 1980 Coup. The nationalists were blamed together with the communists for being “anarchists” against the constitutional state order by the initiators of the Coup. The following period had passed for the NAP and its members with a self-questioning process concentrating on their idealism and activities in relation to their nationalisms.

Parallel to this process within the institutional structure and the nationalist philosophy of the party and its activists, nationalism had sustained its independent transformation within the country. As a consequence, many nationalism types emerged for different political parties. In other words, nationalism was able to

articulate itself to the political discourse of different parties in Turkish politics whether rightist or leftist. Two ends may emerge from this proposition. Firstly, there were many “nationalist” parties now near the NAP. Secondly, as the indirect end, the NAP has started to move gradually from “far right” to “center right” in a visible manner for being a “mass party” in the nineties. This was the long-term purpose of the party and moreover, the natural articulation of nationalism to the discourses of the different parties turned nationalism into something like a “consensus” point for different viewpoints. In other words, all different views have accepted the “natural” state of nationalism in their discourses from radical right to the radical left and have become “nationalist” according to their political inclinations. Thus, in its most general sense, nationalism of the nineties had turned to a “common ground” rather than a conflicting basis as it had been in the sixties and seventies, making the slide of nationalism to the center of the politics. It may be argued that this common ground eased its move from radical far right to the center, which made it available for the NAP to transform itself into a center right party moving within the same direction with Turkish nationalism. The surprising success of the NAP in the 1999 elections may be related both to the move of the NAP and nationalism to the center. It is interesting to see that when it was a far right ideology, it was not able to make such a peak; however, as a center ideology; it reached its best state, which may show the reason of concentration of the political parties in Turkey in the center. This was not interesting for nationalism; however, it was interesting for the NAP, which was still determining its policies based on its “radical” nationalism that was not too much different from its character before the eighties.

With the 1999 elections, for the first time, the NAP became the second party and reached a turning point for realizing its long term purpose of being a mass party. It took part in the coalition with the Democratic Left Party (DLP) of the center-left and the Motherland Party (MP) of the center-right. This coalition was formed according to the consensus on the nationalisms of the parties from radical right, center right and center left. This may confirm the importance of nationalism in the Turkish politics. However, the definition of the political cooperation from nationalism prepared the failure of the parties because despite their consensus on nationalism, they were conflicting in other views in relation to their party ideologies. Just within five years with the 2002 elections, these three parties had to face their

political failures because the electorate concentrated on the center right again; nevertheless, determined the Justice and Development Party, which is representing the “moderate Islam” as its party ideology as the first party with 34.28. The NAP fell by 9.64 to 8.36, which indicated a sharp decline. It may be useful to search the reasons for the decline of the older parties in the instability and fragility of the Turkish political structure in general. With the help of the general state of Turkish politics, the decline of the NAP may be searched in its general stand. In other words, it is arguable whether the role of NAP’s stand in the inclination of the electorate from nationalism to moderate Islam may be related to the ideological landslides of the party as the mere representative of radical nationalism since the sixties. In this respect, the main purpose of the thesis is to demonstrate whether the rapid rise and decline of radical nationalism between 1999 and 2002 elections may be related to an ideological identity crisis for the NAP. The problematic Islam-nationalism relationship shows a complex character since the Ottoman period in that nationalism started to show its influence on a state, in which social stratification was determined due to religious bonds. The outcome of the 2002 elections, the Islam-nationalism interaction and the long-term reflection of this on the ideology of the NAP may be accepted as only the one side of the coin. It is really questionable what researching the decline of radical nationalist right in Turkey may indicate; however, this may shed light upon the direction of the structural transformation in Turkish politics and electorate that such a moderate Islam is a brand-new ideological inclination peculiar to the JDP. In this respect, this thesis is thought for searching this in the example of the NAP and the time period between 1999 and 2002 when the radical nationalism had been in practice because the ideological landslides in the country may be seen parallel to the long-term ideological landslides within the NAP ideology.

Observing a radical party may be the core point for the significance of this thesis because reading the past and present situation in Turkish politics out of radical nationalism may contribute to a further democratization efforts by stressing the stability of multi-culturalism in the political arena. As known, Turkish politics has been experiencing democratization process since transition to the multi-party period. Already, this transition had made contribution to the diversity in Turkish political culture; nevertheless, it had been interrupted by military interventions, giving harm to the incorporation of democracy into the country. The last coup that did so was the

1980 military intervention, which banned all political parties, ideologies and differences in politics. These were implemented through pressure, prohibition, imprisonments and so. Such harm to Turkish democracy and politics was justified by intervening in civil politics for preventing ideological polarization. In their opinion, it was the variety in political parties and ideologies that made contribution to the transformation of social polarization into agitation, street fights and “anarchy”¹. The ban on all parties prevented the deepening of democracy in Turkey; however, it also gave the most harm to the radical political parties because radical electorate had to move to the center, where different ideologies melted. Moreover, this has contributed to centralization in both the political ideologies and electorate that were on the way of multi-culturalism in the spectrum that is integral for democracy. Such political history is still influential on Turkish politics today and the move to moderate Islam may be understood by observing the conditions which made it hard to redefine the ideologies of all parties in a clear, coherent and independent way. The NAP was one of these parties and moreover, it is a radical political party and its stand about the 1980 Coup and the subsequent developments in the party needs attention because it may be argued that the transformation of such stand made it possible to be a coalition partner; however, such a rise makes the subject interesting as radical left could not reach such an end. It is possible to see this as an example of a further step in democratization through the articulation of a radical party, taking such a high proportion in elections, to daily governance. On the other hand, the permanence of the NAP through the ideological re-definitions in its ideology may be related to nationalism because as will be seen later, this phenomenon is able to sustain its existence under all conditions through adapting itself to change. However, such a rapid decline in the next elections may refer to an inconsistency in the party ideology because, as nationalism is able to adapt itself to daily conditions, it seems that the NAP was not able to do this in the same direction and so became unsuccessful. Furthermore, this may not be accepted as advantageous for further democratization or for multi-culturalism in the political spectrum because, for instance, ambiguity of the party ideology to Islam may be a negative contribution to the Islam-laicism tension at a moment when political Islam justifies itself through relating its claims to

¹ This word is used for implying the opposite of the “order” established after the 1980 Coup, which was established by the military.

the “extension of democratic rights”. Thus, it may be claimed that ambivalence or inconsistency in a political ideology does not contribute to the ideological diversity in politics. Also, it may be stated that if there is a rapid rise, ambiguity and decline in sequence, this may give us an idea about the short-term changes in the politics in a comparative way. Thus, it may be maintained that this thesis aims at observing Turkish political structure and its further inclinations by taking a radical party ideology. As the ideology of this party is nationalism, the specific nature of nationalism and its ability to transform itself under every conjuncture represent the core complexity in this thesis because since its very emergence with modernity, it had been “revolutionary”, “conservative”, “imperialist”, “fascist”, “national-socialist”, “anti-imperialist” or “ethno-nationalist” according to different conjunctures and socio-political orders. This transformative genetics gives nationalism both instability in character and stability in existence. Moreover, it influences different regions and contributes to the emergence of various types of nationalisms around the world, which makes reaching a clear definition on the phenomenon harder. It carries opposite and irrational premises in giving the phenomenon both its strength and ambiguity resulting from its natural adaptability to different conjunctures, regions, systems or ideologies. Ottoman Turkey was one of the inheritors of this complexity in nationalism because it had lived the experience of transformation in the complex nature of nationalism in general and the transformation of the Empire by nationalism in particular; therefore it may be suggested that the modern Turkey has inherited this complex ideological structure of transformation; however, as a nation-state structure it shows another transformation state for nationalism after the Empire. In this respect, during its change to a political party ideology and after, the phenomenon has been adding its body influences of the both twentieth century international developments around globalization and local developments in Turkey together with specific historical inheritances related to the ambiguity of the nationalist ideology.²

Throughout the years when nationalism acted as a political party ideology in Turkey, the NAP had its increases and decreases around 7 per cent in the elections. However, it was the first time in its history that it made a surprise peak in 1999 but

² This sentence carries in itself the claim that it is still in transformation, through leaning on the transformative character of nationalism that will be explored in the following parts in a historical context.

the 2002 elections was a disappointment with a sharp decline. Such a visible move in proportions may correspond to instability in the party to a degree that should not be ignored, which occurred in a short time period. However, this situation also carries the possibility of an “ideological identity crisis” in relation to nationalism if evaluated in the long term, in comparison to preceding elections. In other words, this cannot be clarified only through analyzing the five years between the two elections because it is possible to argue that it may correspond to a long-term crisis in the party ideology. Moreover, it may be reflecting the inconsistencies in Turkish nationalism itself in particular and the nationalist ideology in general. In this sense, evaluating nationalism as a political party ideology becomes obligatory and additionally, this may give an idea about the reflection of the transformation of nationalism under daily globalization conditions on the radical nationalist political party in Turkey. This may also give the chance to watch Turkish politics from a global historical perspective. The evaluation of the history of nationalism and its present transformation may give an idea about the further direction of the Turkish politics.

In relation to the visible decline in the nationalist far right, the subject matter of the dissertation leans on questioning the structure of ideological transformation of the party between 1999 and 2002 while nationalism was in practice in the coalition. However, such a subject needs to be elaborated in a long-term perspective in three reference points, which are “the general ideological transformation of the nationalist phenomenon”, “nationalist condition in Turkey” and “the NAP” and which will be focused on a broad and detailed description. In this sense, the transformative nature of nationalism makes the core point in this thesis affecting the ideological redefinitions of the phenomenon. In order to show the indefinite character of nationalism during these decades on international and national levels, it is necessary to analyze the historical and the social background of the conditions that had given birth to political nationalism, to its arrival to Anatolia and to the transformation into a party ideology. Parallel to this, as the importance of nationalism is related to its transformation into a party ideology, the nationalism and ideology interaction entails to be elaborated. In this respect, for reaching to the point that the nationalism had turned to an ideology; the meaning of ideology, its differentiation in meaning due to different historical conjunctures, nationalism-ideology intersection and evolution of

nationalist ideology to political ideology, state ideology and party ideology in general and its peculiar transformation in Turkey should be shown.

The original dimension of nationalist ideology is that it could adapt itself to every kind of changes that give nationalism such stability in sustaining its existence. Thus, the influence of macro changes upon social, economic and political conditions may interest us because it is claimed that their effects in transforming the ideology of the NAP will be important determiners in evaluating the “claimed” rapid rise and the decline of nationalism as a party ideology. However, as it will be seen, nationalism’s adaptation power has not been used by the NAP. It prefers defining its ideology on the axis of three basic descriptive concepts; namely, “race”, “culture” and “religion”, but every transformation in ideology is determined by not a break off with the previous but “changes in emphasis” on the basic tenets in a crossing-over manner, which comes to the fore due to different conjunctures.³ This proposition will be clarified in the next chapters with the purpose of proving the instability of NAP nationalism and its ambiguous definition.

For a broader and an easier definition of the different transformative points in ideology, radical right Turkish nationalism and the NAP tradition are thought to be evaluated in a “chronological approach”. In doing this, development of nationalism within the Ottoman Empire will be evaluated in that it shows continuity with the nationalist tradition in the modern Turkey. Afterwards, different nationalist inclinations in the Kemalist form of nationalism and Turkish nationalism that had given birth to the ideology of the NAP will be evaluated. However, every period will be explained on the basis of continuity and they will be referred to show the reflection of the historical irrationalities to the party ideology within the transformation of nationalism on its own. “Irrationalities” in the NAP ideology are thought to be related to its failure in transforming itself despite the specific nature of nationalism that is able to adapt itself to every kind of change and they will be tried to be bounded up with the rapid increase and decrease on the electoral support of the party between the mentioned two elections. This does not mean that the ambiguity of

³ This makes one to think that change in emphasis is not a real transformation, however, throughout the thesis, this change will be expressed as transformation, and however, its character is like a chemical mixture, not a chemical compound. In every redefinition there has been a chance to turn back (except for external changes as military interventions because they contribute to structural change in the nature of politics).

nationalism is because of the failure in the ideological transformation of nationalism in the NAP but also it shows the complexity of nationalism itself.

Throughout the thesis, the outcomes of the general elections will be given special importance in their relation to the change in the NAP ideology. These may be meaningful if they are evaluated with the general ideological stand and the populist landslides and their contribution to the vote share of the party in the elections. However, as the most important time that the probability of an “identity crisis in the NAP ideology” is accepted to come to the fore, the outcomes of the 1999 and 2002 general elections will form the basic materials. Moreover, “conservatism” and “Islamism” of the right through their problematic relation to nationalism in the conditions peculiar to Turkey will be the main focal points of the discussion because they represent the ideologies in fusion with Turkish nationalism.⁴ To reach a general opinion about the determiners influential upon nationalist ideology, external and internal developments will be evaluated in their relation to the NAP nationalism because Turkish political spectrum had been normally affected by the developments related to the global and local socio-political and economic changes. 1990s saw the crisis in Balkans and Caucasus, cultural splits, newly emerging Islamic xenophobia and ethno-nationalism influential upon the transformation of the nationalist ideology. Undoubtedly, contemporary Turkish politics was shaped by these outside and inside factors, which redefined its traditional spectrum of parties, voter loyalties and values. Economic challenge in Turkey in 1994 further contributed to a politico-cultural crisis leading the public opinion to a move away from center to between center-right to far right in Turkey. Thus, 1990s developments may be related to the outcomes of the 1999 and 2002 general elections.

The relations between the “complex and paradoxical structure of nationalism”, its “transformation into Turkish nationalism within the Ottoman Empire”, its “construction as an official state ideology” and its “transformation into a party ideology” will show the specific paradoxes resulting from the natural structure of nationalism and the transformation processes. Throughout the thesis, the reflection of the irrationalities and paradoxes of nationalism and Turkish nationalism on the

⁴ For a detailed discussion on the tension or relation between conservatism, Islamism and nationalism see Tanıl Bora, *Türk Sağının Üç Hali: Milliyetçilik, Muhafazakarlık, İslamcılık*, Birikim Yay., İstanbul, 2003

NAP's ideology and their influences on the rapid rise and decline of nationalism as a party ideology between the mentioned two elections will be questioned. What is thought to be reached at the end is if there was, rapid transformation within the party ideology refers to an "identity crisis" in the party ideology or not. Reaching such an end will be helpful in projecting the future direction within the political spectrum, the role of nationalism in Turkey as a consistent ideology for the parties, articulating nationalism to their ideological discourses and the direction that the NAP, namely, the far-right goes. This will help in seeing the place of the Turkish politics and nationalism in the worldwide transformation, which has negative or positive clear bonds with the nationalist phenomenon. In short, it is planned to show the credibility of nationalism in the daily political agenda and in the future under the conditions of transformation of Turkish politics into moderate Islam and transformation of the world within globalization.

In the first chapter, firstly, nationalist theories and the hardness in evaluating the real nature of nationalism will be explored. Before doing that, the ideology phenomenon and the nationalism-ideology relation will be tried to be clarified. Secondly, the political emergence of nationalism as a modern phenomenon in practice will be put forward. Later on, the transformation of nationalism until the twenty-first century and its ideological reconstructions will be evaluated.

In the second chapter, initially, the practical arrival of nationalism to the Ottoman Turkey and its ideological reconstructions will be told because intellectual roots of the official Turkish nationalism that had been the ideology of the Republic is accepted to be found in the Empire. In doing this, its transformation of the nationalist ideology within the Empire from pan-Ottomanism against popular proto-nationalisms and pan-Islamism to pan-Turkism will be focused on because as they were inherited by the official ideology, they had formed the ideological constitution of nationalism and been influential upon the ideology of the NAP. Moreover, different inclinations in Turkish nationalism since the Empire may also show the unstable character of the NAP ideology because the nationalism of the party has inherited the irrationalities in nationalism and Turkish nationalism.

The third chapter is thought to dwell firstly on the transformation of pan-Turkism into a nation-state ideology from the last decade of the Empire until the establishment of the modern Turkey. Secondly, official nationalism that had been the

founding ideology of the Republic will be clarified. Then, its transformation into different forms and practices contributed nationalism to emerge as a party ideology will be evaluated.⁵ In doing this, evaluation of the general political environment between 1945 and 1965 and ideology of Turkism as the intellectual source of the NAP ideology was thought to be helpful. Thus, whole intellectual elements and practical events influential upon NAP ideology are thought to be synthesized.

The fourth chapter is thought to display the details of the ideological cracks that claimed to create the ideological identity crisis of the NAP nationalism. The first and the second part investigate the political nationalist tradition from the Nation Party (NP) to the NAP. The third part shows the first radical ideological reconstructions of the party on the basis of Islam, its coalition partnership and rapprochement to the official nationalism. The fourth and the fifth parts include the influence of the 1980 coup on the party and its ideology.⁶ It is thought to show the fragmentation on the basis of Islam and nationalism and further dissolution of the ideology. The sixth part is composed of ideological reconstruction according to the political developments of those years. The seventh part is composed of the change in the party leadership and its contribution to the new ideological trends starting with 1997.

The fifth chapter is thought for putting the ambiguity and identity crisis in the NAP ideology forward by an in depth analysis of the 1999 and 2002 elections. Actually, with the 1999 general elections the party had reached its best with %17 per cent of the total votes and became the coalition partner. This was a great success when the radical Turkish nationalist ideology it has been defending nearly since the half of the century is born in mind because it had never taken such a high vote share before. However, a rapid decline in the proportion of the votes had occurred with the

⁵ Here it must be noted that nationalism as a party ideology is accepted as an activist ideological movement of thought, aiming to sustain the unitary character of the state. Nevertheless, the main point here is to put the differentiation or resolution of the Turkish ultra right nationalism from official nationalism. This is very problematic because the statism of the NAP is well known that will be focused later on. It is very critical to differentiate national consciousness, political philosophy of the nation state and the activities of the NAP.

⁶ The history of the NAP after the 1980 period is based upon T. Bora,&K.Can(a), *Devlet, Ocak, Dergâh: 12 Eylül'den 1990'lara Ülkücü Hareket*, İletişim Yay, İstanbul, 2004; T. Bora,&K.Can (b) *Devlet ve Kuzgun: 1990'lardan 2000'lere MHP*, İletişim Yay, İstanbul, 2004; for the differences between the recent nationalist discourses in Turkey see T. Bora, "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey", *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102: 2/3. Spring/Summer 2003, pp.433-451.

2002 elections when compared to the previous breakthrough. In fact, in the party history, there had been no such a radical rise and decline until the 2002 elections. It may be evaluated that for a radical rightist party, this seems typical even after a coalition experience that worn out the party in a rough daily political agenda. However, in my opinion, this break point was the time for questioning the ideological approach of the NAP's nationalism; moreover, cleavages in its ideology refer to the strong defeat of NAP's nationalism within the political spectrum. This chapter is planned to evaluate if the rapid rise and decline of the NAP is related to its ambiguous nationalist ideology still visible in its identity crisis.

In the conclusion part, bearing its more than fifty years of experience in the political spectrum in the mind, the main question is to clarify the reasons for the decline of nationalism as a party ideology under the developments of recent political agenda with relating it to the complex and paradoxical nature of nationalism and their reflections on Turkish nationalism and the "claimed" identity crisis of the NAP nationalism. In doing this, the most important aim is to observe the role of nationalism as an ideology in Turkish politics and its political place considering the other ideological inclinations for the future projections in the Turkish politics.

CHAPTER 2 NATIONALISM

2.1 Theoretical Approaches towards Nationalism

The most common thing about nationalism is that it is hard to make a common definition about it because there are different forms and diverse theories of the ideology according to many different approaches. Thus, in order to draw the framework of nationalism related to this thesis, a short elaboration of different approaches may help in clarifying the phenomenon.⁷ Some important classical bourgeoisie theoreticians may be referred to as Ernest Renan and Max Weber in the twentieth century. The eighteenth and the nineteenth century scientists focusing on nationalism had been helpful in conceptualizing nationalism as a bourgeois approach because the time period they had lived was the rising period of liberalism and bourgeoisie. The authors and theoreticians of the time are J. J. Rousseau, J. Herder, J. Fichte, G. Mazzini, and M. Condorcet. The followers of the bourgeois approach are H. Kohn, C. B. Hayes and L. Snyder. Moreover, nationalism is first of all seen as a bourgeois ideology for the ones accepting the political birth date of nationalism in practice as the French Revolution. Thus, bourgeois approach may be helpful especially in evaluating the first periods of nationalism and the previous socio-political conditions giving birth to the phenomenon in this thesis accepts the birth of political nationalism in practice as the French nationalism and the historical

⁷ General elaboration of the nationalist approaches depends on the whole studying period of the first hand and the second hand readings that had been done throughout the writing of the thesis. The second hand readings had been much more helpful for the author because they were presenting concentrated and general information on the phenomenon, getting the classification chance easier. Some sources that had been beneficial in understanding the nationalist theory are; Hobsbawm, E. J., (a) *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003; (b) *Devrim Çağı: 1789-1848*, Dost Kitabevi Yay., Ankara, 2003; (c) *Sermaye Çağı: 1848-1870*, Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara, 2003; d) *İmparatorluk Çağı: 1875-1914*, Dost Kitabevi Yayınları, Ankara, 2003; Anthony D. Smith (a), *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2004; Gale Stokes, "Cognition and the Function of Nationalism", *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol.4, No. 4. (Spring, 1974), pp. 525-542; Gerard Delanty, & Patrick O'Mahony, *Nationalism and Social Theory: Modernity and the Recalcitrance of the Nation*, Sage Publications, London, 2002, Barrington, Lowell W., "'Nation' and 'Nationalism': The Misuse Key Concepts in Political Science, *PS: Political Science and Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 4. (Dec., 1997), pp. 712-716; Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London and California, 1995; Joan Cocks., "From Politics to Paralysis: Critical Intellectuals Answer the National Question", *Political Theory*, Vol. 24, No.3. (Aug., 1996), pp. 518-537; Albert, W. Dzur, Nationalism, Liberalism, and Democracy, *Political Research Quarterly*, Vol. 55, No.1. (Mar., 2002), pp. 191-121, Connor Cruise, O'Brien, "The Repeal of Enlightenment", *Transition*, No. 57. (1992), pp. 9-16

processes that contributed to the Revolution. In this sense, nationalism is a modern concept.

The contemporary bourgeois theoreticians are E. Kedourie, E. Gellner, W. Connor, K. Deutsch, J. Breuilly, A. D. Smith, C. Tilly, A. Giddens, R. Brubaker, M. Hechter and L. Greenfeld. Among these, Kedourie, Gellner and Connor are well known with their anti-Marxist views. They reject the materialism of Marxism and they define nation and nationalism through an *idealist* approach. They are strongly affected by Renan's classical statement on the "*individual will*" and his theory that establishes nationalism as a "*daily plebiscite*"⁸. In his daily plebiscite theory, Gellner determines *culture* as the primary source nourishing nationalism. It may be argued that differences among many nationalism types of various groups/states may be accepted as the outcomes of the differences among cultures. In this respect, culture becomes an important determiner of nationalism. Parallel to this, ideology is generally defined as the process of the production of ideas, beliefs and values in social life and in this sense it is near to "culture" that it indicates the whole complex of signifying practices and symbolic processes in a particular society.⁹ Thus, the things determining the differences among different nationalist ideologies are the diversifications among cultures. As there is no common world culture, there is not one type of nationalism. In fact, the widely known theory depending on the distinction of Western and Eastern types of nationalisms that will be explored in the next chapters lean on the long term accumulation of cultural differences in the East and the West. In this sense, the second assertion of this thesis depends on the premise that non-Western countries had lived transformation in relation to nationalism through the influences of both the Western culture and/or domination.

Every transformation had been influenced by exceptional cultural traits, therefore, it may be suggested that nationalisms of non-Western countries had

⁸Renan defines nationalism and nationality related to the traditions of French liberalism. "*The existence of a nation is a plebiscite of every day*", as the existence of the individual is a perpetual affirmation to life.", Ernest Renan, "The Meaning of Nationality", in Hans Kohn, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History*, D. van Nostrand Company, Inc., Canada, 1955, p.139. The view of daily plebiscite, giving equal importance to the choices of human beings both with meta-physical and theological abstractions from politics has been given importance by many academicians studying nationalism since it was first expressed in a lecture in Sorbonne on March 11, 1882 with the name "Qu'est-ce qu'une Nation (What is a Nation)".

⁹ Terry Eagleton, *İdeoloji*, Ayrıntı Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p. 55

emerged in the form of synthesized hybrid structures. They are formed both through “rejection” and “acceptance”. If the emergence of an official Turkish nationalism with the establishment of Turkish Republic is thought, it may be claimed that in the cultural context, official nationalism owes too much to the roots of the nationalism that had emerged in the last decades of the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, as the third premise, the emergence of Turkish nationalism is accepted to come into being within the framework of the Ottoman Empire in this thesis. In other words, nationalism was a Western originated ideology and its synthesis within the Ottoman culture had been effective upon the emergence of a specific Turkish nationalism.

Culture is a phenomenon whose formation depends on complex long-term compounds. Thus, there had been many other influences that contributed to nationalism’s birth as a “political ideology”. The relation of culture to the *ethnic origins* as the initial determiner of nationalism and nationalities affirm *ethno-symbolism* central to nationalism. Anti-Marxist liberalists; A. Smith, C. Tilly, D. Hechter and A. Giddens focus on “ethnicity” central to the nationalist project placed in a historical context, for which they are known as ethno-symbolists. On the other hand, Tilly, Brubaker, Hechter and L. Greenfeld share a *functionalist* approach to the phenomenon. They link *nationhood* and *identity* to *citizenship* and *democratic governance* and situate individual within the communal life and community both at local and broader levels.

These approaches as seen above had been developed through strong anti-Marxism. In fact, this is a complex situation because as will be emphasized later, nationalism had been the motive force of the revolutions in its very beginning. In other words, nationalism had acted as the most important transformative force for politics and society in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century until the 1850s. These years also mark the emergence of ideology in a political sense and the transformation of nationalism into a political world view, namely ideology. However, once the socio-political order after the French Revolution had been established in accordance with the economic dynamics available for nation-state structures pointing out imperialist proliferations leading to “colonialism”¹⁰,

¹⁰ Basic concepts on colonialism is based on Baskın Oran (a), *Az gelişmiş Ülke Milliyetçiliği: Kara Afrika Modeli*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 1997; Marion Mushkat, “Some Characteristics of Colonialism and Its Product African Nationalism”, *African Studies Review*, Vol. 14, No. 2. (Sep., 1971), pp. 219-241, Partha Chatterjee, *Milliyetçi Düşünce ve Sömürge Dünyası*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 1996.

nationalism had become the ideology of order but not transformation. In other words, it had been the ideology of the conservative bourgeoisie who were against change and the rulers of the existing order and remained its revolutionary attempts behind.¹¹ In this sense, Marxism and anti-Marxist bourgeois approaches in evaluating nationalism may help to clarify the complex situation that gives nationalism both the ideology of the order and revolution because at this point nationalism is an ideology determining the division of groups of people for or against order.

Thereafter, with the imperialist age, nationalism had been carried to different regions of the world. It had been cultivated to some dominated lands that were going to be called “Third World” later, which was also going to give birth to another nationalism genre, “Third World Nationalism”. It may be argued that the intersection point of the bourgeois and Marxist approaches gets evident in the evaluation of nationalism as a Third World phenomenon because it carries both “idealism” and “revolution” in its ideological mission there. It also shows the importance of the both approaches in evaluating the phenomenon in a detailed way. Emergence of nation-states is a direct outcome of nationalism because it played the role of forming ideology for many different proto-national structures and led them to sustain their legal stands within international politics. In other words, nationalism had inevitably been *raison d’etre* of their existences. Moreover, the “acceptance-rejection” dilemma in relation to nationalism becomes evident in its Third World type, which will be focused later on while discussing its relation to Turkish nationalism and its anti-imperialism.

As a second component, the initial proliferation of nationalism had affected the heterogeneous structures of the empires having minorities claiming for independency throughout the nineteenth century. It was the rise of ethnic-nationalism which they leaned on the “difference of their nationalities and ethnic traits” for the justification of their liberties. Today, ethno-nationalism have been on the agenda again because in the nineteenth century, imperial structures were in dissolution and today, it is claimed that nation-states and nationalism have been in decline due to the rising globalization making national boundaries uncertain from day to day. In other

¹¹ For the bourgeois life in Germany between 1835 and 1875 and the role of “work ethics” in detail see Thomas Mann, *Buddenbrooklar: Bir Ailenin Çöküşü*, Can Yay., İstanbul, 2006; for the capitalism-bourgeoisie-Protestantism relation see Max Weber, *Protestan Ahlakı ve Kapitalizmin Ruhunu*, Ayraç Yayınları, Ankara, 1999.

words, nation-states are living the same experience that had been lived by the Empires in the nineteenth century. Thus, interconnections between identity-nationhood-citizenship and democracy are on the agenda of the ones claiming the decline of nationalism and the rise of ethno-nationalism at the moment, which interests nation-state structures because in the global age what is discussed is the next phenomenon that may succeed nationalism and nation-state. As will be told later, the nation building process after the Ottoman Empire and the ethnic movements in the modern Turkey are directly related to the nation-state, ethno-nationalism, identity, nationhood, citizenship and democracy issues. This rough ground also creates the political spectrum in which political parties make their policies and construct their ideologies. Thus, these theories are thought to be helpful in evaluating the nationalist party by projecting it within a long-term historical perspective that constitutes the main subject in this thesis.

In the light of the assumptions that have been made so far, the general complex structure and chameleon-like nature of nationalism and so the same features of Turkish nationalism may be felt indistinctly. As one more step forward, concentrating on Marxist approaches may help in evaluating the revolutionary nature of nationalism and its relation to socio-economic dynamics because class struggle and nationalism relation had been influential on transformation and the evolution in the usage of ideology through practical developments in the nineteenth century. Classical Marxist theoreticians root “class” and “class struggle” as the motive force of “social change” and “social transformation”. For this reason, Marxist theoreticians generally concentrate on “nationalism-class relation”. When the rise of bourgeoisie at the end of the eighteenth century and subsequently the rise of working-class movements against bourgeoisie until the midst of the nineteenth century in relation to the conversion force of nationalism are thought, the relations between rapid social change, economic developments and the rise of nation-state may be clarified. However, this view is always criticized for its economic reductionism because it puts economy on the core of changes as the mere determiner transforming the whole socio-political order. As an alternative approach, O. Bauer focuses on nationalism as an autonomous force independent from class and class struggle. For this approach, he is strongly criticized by Lenin and other classical Marxists nationalism theoreticians because according to their views, Marxism, independent of class struggle, contradicts

with the nature of Marxist thought. On the other hand, as a mid-way, H. B. Davis gives equal importance to class and nation as forces that are functional in the separate spheres of social consciousness. All these alternative approaches also determine the form of the ideology of nationalism which will be displayed later. However, at this point it may be put forward that nationalism is a *false consciousness*¹² for them.

The contemporaries criticize classical theoreticians due to their reduction of themselves to the limited class-based views and try to show the *invented* nature of nations and nationalisms. B. Anderson insists on “*print capitalism*”¹³ as the motive force behind the establishment of nations and nationalisms. He claims that nation is an imagined community and nationalism is a product of the collective imagination which is as real as religion and cosmology. E. Nimni attacks Marxism’s alleged economic reductionism. E. Laclau echoes T. Nairn’s and Anderson’s critiques and argues that blindness to the national factor has been recurrent in the history of Marxism right from the beginning. However, Laclau is not able to offer a new vision other than old, worn-out bourgeois rationalizations on the irrationality of nationalisms’ ideological blindness. Nairn evaluates nationalism as an autonomous ideological force that is based on an idea. According to him, it is an “irrational response to general frustration”. As shown by Anderson, Nairn evaluates nationalism as the “historical failure of Marxism”. Parallel to this, he maintains that according to the general views of Marxist theoreticians, nationalism is an *anomaly*.¹⁴ E. J. Hobsbawm treats nationalism in more idealist terms. According to him, nationalism is an irrational, invented ideology which is based on an imaginary allegiance to the nation independent of any direct link to class and social processes and it is a “*false consciousness*”¹⁵. He is among the ones that are critical of class reductionism. This places him near Nairn, Laclau, Nimni, and so. In this context, if the link between nationalism and Marxism is thought, it may be seen that it had shown a different outlook in Turkey.

¹² E. J. Hobsbawm (a), Ibid.

¹³ Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler*, Metis yay., İstanbul, 2004, p. 52-62 .

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

¹⁵ Hobsbawm, Ibid.

The Ottoman Empire did not live class-struggle as a transformative force because the Ottoman society was divided through religious borders and it was a classless society. Nor, had the Turkish Republic shown a structure to be evaluated through class based approaches until the midst of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, the years between fifties and eighties had been a dynamic period for the country. The struggles for establishing economic and political domination by various classes had been reflected on politics and as the outcome of the struggles; the country had been marked by a sharp political polarization between left and right. Nationalism responded to this in the political spectrum with the establishment of the NAP on the ultra-nationalist right side in 1969, recruiting for the whole rightist electorate in the long term perspective.¹⁶

The establishment of a nationalist party contributed to the two important outcomes related to the left and nationalism interaction in Turkey. Initially, the link between nationalism and Marxism for the NAP to the ideological extend constituted the main policy of the party until the 1980 Coup. Anti-Marxist or in general, an anti-left stand had been the motive force of the ideological re-construction of the party. As the second component, nationalism in general, and the nationalist ideology of the NAP in particular was employed against the whole Turkish left by ones ruling the country in those years. In a more clear sense, the NAP, its activists and ideology were articulated to the body of the official forces in their fight against the left on the common ground enabled by nationalism, nevertheless this was an unofficial cooperation but visible to the public. Also, this was a mutual relation that the NAP had formed its ideology against the whole left, strengthening its legitimization due to the statism of the party and its relation to the official state body.

If the establishment of the Republic is accepted to be a revolutionary event against the imperialist, victorious allied forces, Turkish nationalism was at the beginning a revolutionary force, which subsequently had been the ideology of the state. In fact, the transformation of nationalism into the ideology of status quo shows resemblance to the one in Europe in the nation-building process in the first half of the nineteenth century. The theories of the contemporary Marxist theoreticians are

¹⁶ For a concentrated evaluation on Turkish politics and class-struggle, see Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak, "Turkish Politics and Class Struggle: 1950-1975", *MERIP Reports*, No. 84. (Jan., 1980), pp. 14-18; for a general introduction on the subject, see Etienne Balibar&Immanuel Wallerstein, *İrk, Ulus, Sınıf: Belirsiz Kimlikler*, Metis Yay., İstanbul, 2000

important in clarifying the nation-building processes. This makes them important for this thesis in detailing the role of nationalism throughout the transformation from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic.

The focus here is that nationalism is a Western-originated ideology and its arrival in Turkey makes it a much more complex phenomenon because in this context, the theories of the Western view remain deficient. In fact, the definition problems within nationalism also lie here. For this reason, the hardness in the thesis also constitutes its subject because here, it is claimed that Turkish nationalism shows a complex structure because historically, theoretically and practically, it had to live the natural transformative steps in nationalism at the same period, varying from the West that had developed nationalism in a long process. This caused it to both resemble other nationalisms and differ from them, thus it may be claimed that the theories of nationalism remains deficient in evaluating the historical differences resulting from the specific conditions in this geography.

Therefore, it may be argued that, frequently emphasized complex structure of nationalism has been reflected in the nationalisms in the country in general in relation to nationalism and Turkish nationalism in general, and the nationalism of the NAP in particular. It may be claimed that the natural outcome of the landslides in the nationalist ideology of the party may be accepted as the reflection of the developmental crisis of nationalism and Turkish nationalism, which is thought to be the cause of its success and failure at the same time. Now, it is better to continue the subject by elaborating on the historical development of the nationalism phenomenon from its political birth to its turning to the ideology of a political party in Turkey, which underlines the specific conditions of Turkish nationalism. In addition, for clarifying the transformation of nationalism into a political party ideology in Turkey, it is initially needed to show what this thesis implies with the word of “ideology”, “nationalist ideology”, “political party ideology” and “ideological identity crisis” in the next part. In the next part, the development of the two concepts, their intersection and the motives which directed them to form the ideology of a political party together will be dealt with.

2.2 Nationalist Ideology: From the French Revolution to the 21st Century

Like nationalism, ideology is one of the terms which does not have a single definition covering an enough meaning of the concept. This is because this term has various, inter-related or unrelated functional usages. The initial meaning of the term indicated the “philosophy of mind” or “science of ideas”¹⁷, used for distinguishing the word from ancient metaphysics. This “scientific” sense was used in epistemology and linguistic theory. As nationalism is related to modernity, it is better to focus on its “modern political” meaning and the points it intersected with nationalism.

The modern meaning of the word was popularized by Napoleon, for blaming the ideologues of remaining “metaphysical”¹⁸ in relation to democracy that they guided people to sovereignty that they were not able to exercise.¹⁹ With the entire 19th century, it had been used by conservative thinkers as “false” and “abstract” thought in continuity with Marx and Engels, who implied with the term a “pejorative sense”. Marx and Engels criticized the abstraction of the word from the real process of history. For them, ideology was an “upside-down version of reality”, “unreality”, “false consciousness” or “illusion” for which they redefined the end of ideology as the “realization of the real life-conditions and real motives”, after which the consciousness of the men would become scientific that they would then be in contact with reality.²⁰ Marxist usages have been influential upon the causal analysis of cultural production and deeply influenced the contemporary usages of the term.

With Marx, it had a negative and critical meaning; however, it gradually acquired new meanings after his death. It took the form of “totality of forms of social consciousness” and “political ideas connected with the interest of a class”. Despite the lack of conceptualizing Marxism as an ideology, the sense of ideology started to

¹⁷ The term, ideology, was initially used in English by the rationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy as the direct translation of the French word, “ideologie” in 1796 as a “neutral technical word”. The ones used this meaning were known as the “Ideologists”.

¹⁸ Şerif Mardin, (a) *İdeoloji*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 1999, p. 23

¹⁹ For Napoleon, “metaphysical” meant “abstract”, “impractical” or “fanatical” in its relation to the term ideology.

²⁰ In this sense, Marx follows the usage of Napoleon but not Destutt.

become a positive concept roughly with the end of the 19th century. Approaching the phenomenon in Marxist class analysis may not be seen as a one sided view. In contrast, the evolution of the concept in connection with the interests of the classes started to imply the opposition between “bourgeois” and “socialist” ideologies. The political struggles of the last decades of the 19th century may be accepted to give the term a “neutral” meaning referring to the “political consciousness of classes” as conceptualized by Lenin. For the next generations, the meaning of the ideology was derived from its connection to the interests of the ruling class and dominated class, as it may be seen in Lukacs. Later on, Gramsci, clearly rejecting a “negative conception”, made a distinction between “arbitrary” and “organic” ideologies, concentrating on the latter. Defining ideology as more than a system of ideas, Gramsci connected the concept of hegemony to the notion, by suggesting that by and in ideology, a class can exercise hegemony over other classes, which secures the consent of the masses. Moreover, the role of the intellectuals and ideological apparatuses in the production of ideology came to the front with Gramsci.

The ideology debates of today entail the observation of Althusser, as his writings try to reconcile the Leninist and Marxist conceptualizations of ideology. He distinguishes the theory of ideology in general, which functions to secure cohesion in society and theory of particular ideologies. He accepts that the former determines the function of securing the domination of one class. In such a system, individuals as subjects accept their role within the system of the production relations. Some names like Hegel, Heidegger, Mannheim, Adorno, Bourdieu, Habermas or Sorel may be accepted as the contributors to the differentiation of the conceptualization of the term however, here, it was tried to be limited to the most direct political meanings that may constitute a relation to the development of nationalism to an ideology and its further ideological transformations.²¹

The evolution in the meaning of the term from Enlightenment up till now made it to indicate several meanings. However, for the intersection of nationalism and ideology, meanings indicating the definitions of “ideology”, “state ideology” and “political party ideology” will be used. In this respect, some definitions of ideology

²¹ General evaluations on the history of the meanings of ideology may be referred to Eagleton, *Ibid.*, pp. 100-178; Karl Mannheim, *İdeoloji ve Ütopya*, Epos Yay., Ankara, 2004, pp. 81-134; Louis Althusser, *Yeniden Üretim Üzerine*, İthaki Yay., İstanbul, 2006, pp. 121-62

currently in circulation today and which may be related to nationalist ideology are “the process of production of meanings, signs, and values in social life” which corresponds to its most general sense. “Ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power” and “false ideas which help to legitimate a dominant political power” may be accepted as referring to “the conjuncture of discourse and power” or “state ideology”. “A body of ideas, characteristics of a particular social group or class” may be accepted to constitute the ideology of a political party. Lastly, it may be practically accepted as “the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world” and as general “action-oriented sets and beliefs”, which may correspond to a certain group of people or activists concentrating on the promotion of a certain “political” thought or view, forming the base of a political party.²²

The evolution of the term from ideology to political party ideology may be related to “modernism”, “economical, social and political conditions”, “masses” and “proliferation of thoughts among masses”. In this sense, it may be suggested that the turning of nationalism to an ideology is mostly connected to its proliferation among masses. It had emerged as a successful *revolutionary* force against the older power focuses in the society at the end of the eighteenth century. The American Revolution may be expressed as the first phase for the political connection of nationalism to the revolutionary transformations. In this context, Varg evaluates the years between 1758 and 1776 as the advent of nationalism which was “*no more than a ‘self-conscious awareness’ of ‘unity’ and ‘separateness’ growing out of a common historical background and ideology*”²³ that it spread to the mother countries in Europe. In fact, there existed a long-felt opposition in Europe against the older societal systems of feudalism, nobles and clergy. However, at this point, nationalism was a self-conscious awareness in connection to the Enlightenment. Oppositional self-awareness was the common product of the Enlightenment forming the basis for the intellectual development, then, creating the grounds for economic step with the

²² Peculiar definitions belong to Eagleton, *Ibid.*, p. 18.

²³ Paul A. Varg, “The Advent of Nationalism”, *American Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 2, Part 1. (Summer, 1964), p. 170. (169-181) He identifies the emergence of the American self-awareness against home countries as first phase in the emergence of political nationalism in practice (emphasis added). On the same line, Kohn evaluates the birth of American nationalism as a common effort “...*for political rights, for individual liberty, and tolerance –English rights and traditions but now raised into inalienable rights of every man, universalized as a hope and message for the whole mankind*”. Kohn, *Ibid.*, p. 20.

Industrial Revolution and the political with the French Revolution, which were all the products of modernity.²⁴ In fact, it may be argued that economic changes preceded political ones but it was the common intellectual ground of the Enlightenment that contributed their proliferation to the continent. Feudal economy turned to industrial economy and new power focuses emerged in the society and they insisted on establishing their own systems through employing nationalism. Thus, nationalism went hand in hand with liberalism and modern nation ideal was characterized by secular, progressive and reasonable individualism, freedom and equity of mankind.²⁵ It was still “the process of production of meanings, signs, and values in social life”.

At this point, nationalism still foresees a total universal project; however, with the transformation in daily material conditions, general nationalism had turned to a narrower meaning, the world view of some mass group of people. These people, started to organize around nationalism as the ruling strata by distincting themselves from the other groups of people that were the products of modernity. Thus, nationalism had been the ideology of the new bourgeois order, putting *liberalism* and *democracy* on the central framework, composed of nation-states in their nation-building processes with the nineteenth century.

Nation building process may be accepted as the initial loss of the universal claim of nationalism. Later on, ongoing process led to further divisions among society on the basis of losers and winners within the new order because it was merely the middle classes that shared the benefits of liberalism and democracy. Oran maintains that the logic of the marriage of democracy and nationalism to colonialism

²⁴ Hobsbawm accepts the transformative forces as Industrial Revolution on economic and French Revolution on political grounds that he terms them as the “Twin Revolutions”. Hobsbawm (b),Ibid, p. 8.

²⁵ Nationalism was believed to promote ideals of “secularism”, “rationalism”, “justice”, “individualism” and “human liberty” that were the bases of the Enlightenment. These concepts had been institutionally established at the hearth of American and French Revolutions. Especially, French Revolution mobilized the minds in the name of “liberty”, “equality”, “fraternity” and sooner “democracy”. At this point, Robert Dahl’s comments that “... *since the eighteenth century advocates of democracy have generally assumed that the natural locus of democracy is the nation-state...*” and evaluates nation-state as a secure framework for the healthy development of democracy and its bounded concepts. Robert Dahl, *Democracy and Its Critics*, Yale university Press, Yale, 1989, p. 4; quoted in Charles Tilly, “States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992”, *Theory and Society*, Vol.23, No.1. (Feb., 1994), pp. 131-146, p. 138.

and capitalism lies here²⁶ because as soon as nationalism began to be the ideology of the bourgeois order, it began to be beneficial for their economic interests, and thus, it turned to the most important tool for sustaining capitalism. In this sense, nationalism had turned to the ideology of sovereign middle class and legitimizing their dominant political power. Parliamentary democracy, giving the right of practicing political rights to the middle classes helped to promote false ideas that may be accepted to sustain the conjuncture of discourse and the power of a mere class.

With the developments told above, nationalism had turned to a “conservative” ideology leaving its revolutionary past behind. With the rise of loser strata, the nation-state structures employing “nationalism as their state ideologies” in their institutionalizations were challenged by revolutionary working-class movements in the 1815s. Under their influences, nation-states had to widen the share of *democracy* and *equality* with small steps because nationalist ideology, drawing the framework of nation-states turned more to a *civic nationalism of the French Revolution*²⁷ under the insistence of the loser strata. As told by Hobsbawm, yet, the interests of the governments were bounded up strongly with the participation of the ordinary citizens or subjects to daily politics.²⁸ Thus, the problem for nationalism had turned to create an order legitimate for the state it established, which inevitably widened nationalism to a more democratic and liberal ideology under the influence of socio-political and economic transformations of the age. On the other hand this contributed to a change in belonging types and slowly, turned subjects to citizens institutionally. As a consequence, nationalism had gained a more patriotic character, which was turning to a new type of a state ideology, something like a “*civic religion*”²⁹. This obligatory

²⁶ Oran (a), *Ibid.*, p. 53

²⁷ Civic nationalism links nationhood to consent but not to religious or ethnic belongings. Right of citizenship is resulted from constitution and equality given by law. However, after French Revolution, the determiner of being French was equated only to talking French language. This is peculiar to France and this rule still continues in France today. However, the common thing about civic nationalism is that it may be constructed later. Altuntaş maintains that the discrimination between ethnic-civic nationalism is attributed to Renan. Nezahat Altuntaş, “Yıldızı Sönmeyen Bir İdeoloji: Milliyetçilik”, *Doğu-Batı*, Vol. 30, Jun. 2004/05, pp.173-189

²⁸ Hobsbawm (a), *Ibid.*, p. 81

²⁹ The function of *patriotism* within nation-state structures as a *civic religion* is used here in the meaning used by Hobsbawm that he derived from J. J. Rousseau, in which he implies the transformation of individual will to a common general will which substitutes all kinds of political loyalties. *Ibid.* p. 85. In addition to this, Kohn defines nationalism of the age as the “... *state of mind*,

turn may be accepted as a change from false ideas to the ideas still helping to legitimate a dominant political power. However, as the purpose is not to terminate the inequalities among society but to sustain domination, it may be accepted as “false consciousness” on behalf of masses. However, it is also the point that nationalist ideology started to proliferate among masses making them aware of “reality”.

1930s marked the division of nationalism according to nation-state structures, which contributed to another division within the whole European revolutionary movement and turned it weak against liberal bourgeois order.³⁰ This process indicates the division of the universality of the socialist movements on the basis of nationalist ideology. The common feature of nationalism that came to the fore after 1860s was the rejection of new proletarian socialist movements because these were non-nationalist or militantly internationalist. Nationalism and socialism were mutually exclusive and the advance of one may be seen as a retreat to the other. Therefore, the revolutionary movement had remained weak against the bourgeois order and the nation-states became the actors of the imperial age until the First World War, employing nationalism as the most important driving force behind the capitalist nation-state economies and their imperialisms.³¹ Articulation of nationalism and economy contributed to the struggles among the nation-states in upper levels in which international losers and winners emerged like it had been in the societies in micro levels within each society. The world was divided into imperialists and their dominions. Even, the forerunner reason of the First World War was the imperialist race among the developed nation-states.

Throughout the nineteenth century, various nationalism types emerged

in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be due the nation-state”. Kohn, Ibid., p. 9. This means clearly that loyalties to feudal lord, monarch and church had turned into loyalty to nation-state

³⁰ Hobsbawm (b), Ibid., p. 147. With 1930s, three main fragmented opposition emerged. Moderate liberals were representing upper middle classes and liberal aristocracy and they wanted to establish an “oligarchic parliamentary” system. Radical democrats were representing sub-middle classes, new type of producers, intelligentsia and displeased nobles, who aimed at a “democratic republicanism” that was ill disposed towards a welfare state. Lastly, socialists were representing the laboring poor and new industrial workers that acted as a main source for the modern communist movements. With the 1830s, the unavoidable rising of nationalism and fragmentation of desires had led to the emergence of a possibility that different countries may have different revolution futures.

³¹ Philosophy of nation-state concentrates on being a “self-sufficient” economy. In the process, thus, economic differentiation of nationalities was tied to rise of “national consciousness”, “nationalism” and “nation state”.

because of the proliferation of the French type of nationalism through the Napoleonic Wars. Nationalism was such an ideology that it had replicated itself in every continent and under all kinds of regimes due to different economic and social structures.³² It may be claimed that most important division within the conceptual integrity of Western nationalist ideology was the separation of it into the Eastern and the Western European forms at that time. Therefore, the main inclinations within the body of different nationalist ideologies under different conditions came to the fore. With the marriage of nationalism to the German “idealism” and “romanticism”, “ethnic” and “cultural” origins had been emphasized in the formation of a nation, which turned nationalism to a “unificatory” movement. This led to a change in the definition of a nation on the basis of “citizenship” since this type of nationalism was defined on the basis of “culture” nation as “folk”. By 1848, the nationalism started to emphasize “collective power and unity” rather than “individual liberty”. This had filled the philosophical gaps on the nationalist theory, which may be rooted to the Enlightenment thought near the socio-economic framework that contributed to its emergence. Thus, a new nationalism type leaning on “ethno-racial traits”³³ and idealizing a cultural past had emerged. The forerunners of this type of a nationalism as a state ideology were Italy and Germany that remained late in enabling their national integrations and established their states on the basis of such nationalism. Subsequently, they had taken their parts in imperialism because whether civic or ethnic, the common feature of the European nationalism was its imperialist purposes.

This practical and theoretical division was making another nation-state building type rather than the Western Europeans’ possible. This, on the one hand, was going to contribute to the emergence of many other variations in the nationalist movements due to the Western and Eastern European types, for the ones, located in more Eastern parts and in the Third World, that was going to replicate the European nationalism in the formation of their own nationalisms. In other words, crossing-over

³² Anderson, *Ibid.*, p. 176; Smith, *Ibid.*, p. 139; Altuntaş, *Ibid.*, p. 174; Peter Alter, *Nationalism*, Edward Arnold: A Division of Hodder&Stoughton Ltd, London, 1991, p. 5, 100. Moreover, proliferation of French nationalism contributed to the emergence of pro and anti-French nationalisms. On one hand, these new ideals had created enlightenment outside France, which on the other hand had turned to nationalist reaction against France. German and Spanish nationalisms exemplify such reactive nationalisms and rejected the ideals of civic nationalism.

³³ For introductory discussions on minorities, ethno-nationalism, and upper-lower identities see Baskın Oran (b), *Küreselleşme ve Azınlıklar*, İmaj Yay., Ankara, 2001

chance between different types and features of nationalism was getting higher.³⁴ However, the reflection of ethnic nationalism to the twentieth century between the two World Wars contributed to the marriage of nationalism to fascism by taking authoritarian and militaristic character.

After 1870s, with the unification of Italy and Germany, this new spirit rapidly proliferated into Eastern Europe and Asia. The heterogeneous structure of this region faced the nationalist conflicts and the pan-movements up till the First World War. The period started with the war continued with the unjust order that was established by the victorious powers and contributed to the Second World War as a consequence. Between the two wars, the nationalist ideology played three different roles. Firstly, it had been interpreted as a just right for some groups aiming at establishing their own states, which was conceptualized as *self-determination principle*.³⁵ Thus, after the

³⁴ In example, Turkish nationalism was established through civic determiners however, due to the short term nationalist tradition in Turkey; it had to employ ethnic traits of the idealist and romantic German nationalism because it had to invent its own nation. Official determiners had been strong in the form of emphasis on ethnic traits that contributed to the emergence of a pan-Turkist opposition in the 1930s that will be detailed later, which forms the source of ambiguities both in the official Turkish nationalism and the nationalism of the NAP.

³⁵ *Self-determination* may simply be defined as any body of people considering themselves forming a nation which had the right to a separate sovereign independent state for their territory. This principle was given birth with the decelerations of American and French Revolutions, which gave many proto-national groups the right of legitimization of their claims of liberations in the nineteenth century and one of the important determiners of the liberal nationalism current. However, with the First World War, self-determination principle was defined in the 14 principles of Woodrow Wilson, the American president, which enabled the justification of the establishment of nation-states after the war. Even, Turkish Republic had justified its struggle through this principle during the Turkish Independence War. With the liberation movements in the Third World, the principle again played vital role for the liberation movements in the dominions after the Second World War. In relation to ethno-nationalist movements within the poly-ethnic nation-states, self-determination principle still plays an important role because it is the mere official way of the separatist micro-nationalisms within that states. This principle may prove the frequently insisted strange, complex and irrational paradoxical structure of nationalism because in the beginning, it was the just official ground, getting the establishment of nation-states throughout the nineteenth-century. It contributed to the dissolution of the imperial structures. Against imperialism and the capitalist world order, it played a “positive” for the Third World liberation (Here, I preferred using “positive” on the ground that it was against domination.). However, with the rise of ethno-nationalist movements, on behalf of nation-state structures, it has been playing negative role because it aims separation contrary to the role of nationalism that justified the establishment of that nation-states at the beginning through this principle. For instance, it was a way to justify the establishment of Turkish nation-state however, at the moment, if Kurdish nationalist separatism is thought in a neutral manner; it does not justify their liberation movement on behalf of the Turkish state. Thus, it may be claimed that what makes nationalist claims right or wrong, what makes nationalism good or bad depends on conjuncture and point of view one person has and this may be accepted as a boring ambiguity, making all impossibilities possible and possibilities impossible in the evaluation nationalism. For detailed information on Turkish nationalism and Kurdish question see Mesut Yeğen, “Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kürt Sorunu”, in T. Bora, et al. (ed) *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. IV, İletişim Yay. İstanbul, 2004, pp.880-892

end of the war in 1918, two big empires, Habsburg and Ottoman collapsed. These both included *proto-national*³⁶ groups within their natural boundaries and thus, firstly, nationalism acted as the ideology of this new nation-building process after the war which gave birth to 26 nation-states around Europe.³⁷ In fact, the emergence of anti-imperialism against the winners of the world war was inevitable that the period after the first world had been marked by the liberation movements of the dominated parts of the world. What was interesting was the role of nationalism in this environment because as a second component, the nationalist ideology acted as the just right behind the liberating movements of the dominated Third World. However, rather than creating a common ground, nationalism had drawn big chasms between the developed countries and the underdeveloped ones at that moment. In this context, the striking feature of nationalism was its anti-imperialism until the 1960s when the Third World reached its political independence. Throughout this process, the nationalist ideology had acted as “a body of ideas, characteristics of a particular social group, as “the medium in which conscious social actors make sense of their world” and moreover, in general “action-oriented sets and beliefs” which may correspond to a certain group of people or activists concentrating on the promotion of a certain “political” thought or view. It did not mean the “ideas/false ideas helping to legitimate a dominant political power” and the nationalist ideology of the time was the most important enemy of conjuncture of discourse and power in contrast to its role in the earlier bourgeois institutionalizations. Apart from these, the other division which emerged among the developed countries may be expressed as the third important development nationalism seen in the twentieth century, containing “totalitarian”³⁸ features. It may be argued that different world views had been constituted as different political ideas or doctrines. Thus, the definition of ideology here may refer to the sum of political ideas or doctrines of a distinguishable class or group of people such as middle-class ideology, fascism or communism. In this sense,

³⁶ Hobsbawm defines a group carrying the probability of establishing a permanent political unit on the basis of common language, ethnic-origin, religion, culture and etc., as “proto-national” that I preferred using it for indicating the groups that “would be” nation-states in the future. Ibid., p. 46.

³⁷ Ibid., p.32

³⁸ From the viewpoint of the bourgeois definition of nationalism.

nationalism as a state ideology started to deepen within procedures and institutions as the body of rules for planning the future of societies, functioning in social changes.

With the twentieth century, the nationalist ideology had gained a totalitarian character, stressing the “supreme importance of purity of blood”, “inequality of human races” and “inferiority of the backward races”. Perhaps this was the peak nationalism which acted as a dividing power. It had taken the shape of “authoritarian”, “fascist” and “militarist” nationalism. It was named “national-socialism” in Germany and “fascism” in Italy. These two types had same features in representing the “extreme” forms of nationalism in that they both leaned on “expansionism” and specific policies of “folk” and “race”. They both aimed at an entire revision of the European order against the arrangements after the First World War through their “racist imperialisms” and created a catastrophe all around Europe by flaming the reasons for the Second World War. At this point, nationalist ideology had been a real disillusionment for masses. This type of nationalism may be said to act as a highly structured system of official beliefs and attitudes of social organization, influential upon unified totality of society. Thus, it is a political ideology now, as a system of political, economic and social values and ideas from which objectives are derived. In other words, here, nationalism starts to turn to a type of an ideology in which patterns of ideas, thoughts, and beliefs stimulate social and political action, preparing to make people march.

Apart from these, another ideology form emerged near nationalism was the Russian communism within an alternative state order. After the collapse of the Russian Empire, the USSR was established with the October Revolution in 1917. The importance of this event from the perspective of nationalism was that USSR was composed of many proto-national structures; however, it was able to fuse them altogether around the communist ideology rather than giving them their independencies. Thus, an alternative state-order was established against bourgeois nation-state structures established upon nationalist ideology in continental Europe to Asia. The USSR had developed as an independent body from the nation-state order until the two-poled world order which started to emerge after the World War Two. This may be seen as the second ideological practical division outside nationalism itself near ethnic-civic or Western/Eastern nationalisms threatening the existence of both types of nationalisms because these ideologies had radical systematic

transformations for the politics, economics and society. Kohn comments that communism and fascism were both the greatest authoritarian mass movements in opposition to “modern middle-class civilization”; however, beginning an inflammation of nationalism.³⁹ Thus, it may be argued here that nationalism, as a political ideology, was the mass movement of time; however, these developments were outside the state structures. In other words, nationalism was not mature enough to transform itself to a political party ideology within nation-state, yet. However, the important thing here is the power of nationalist ideology to attract and mobilize masses through fascism and national-socialism.

Within the two axis world order, nation-states were divided into two: The ones being influenced by the USA and the ones supporting the USSR; or in other words, division on the grounds of “communism” and “anti-communism”. Thus, nationalism, as the alternative of communism had created a hostile relationship between nationalism and communism or communism vice versa. Communism had become to be seen as the enemy of the nation-state structures, which led nationalism to be employed as the most important ideological weapon against communism around the world. On the other hand, mobilizing popular proto-national groups in the “post-colonial age”⁴⁰ and characterized by anti-imperialism, nationalism had been established similar to the Western type. This is the most important paradox of the anti-imperialist Third World Nationalism because; on the one hand, it had to create an original structure and specificity “against” the West and; on the other hand, it had to replicate the Western nationalism. At the end, various hybrid nationalisms emerged in practice.

The First and the Second World Wars had given birth to the world order of nation-states. However, this world was harmed by economic and social disasters after two wars that humiliated the values and the lives of human. The nation-states accorded to prevent wars for which they established *inter-national* economic or political structures and tried to solve problems on upper levels. Some established economic, political and military organizations on this purpose were the European

³⁹ Kohn, *Ibid.*, p. 78-9.

⁴⁰ For a detailed discussion on post colonial age see R. Radhakrishnan, “Postcoloniality and the Boundaries of Identity”, *Callaloo*, Vol. 16, No. 4, On “Post-Colonial Discourse”: A Special Issue. (Autumn, 1993), pp. 750-771

Coal and Steel Agreement, the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Among these, the most successful may be accepted as the European Union, established on economic in the beginning, in which a brand new concept, *supra-nationality*⁴¹ found its real meaning. The EU organization turned to a supra-national organization under the Cold War conditions, which has been continuing to transform itself into a nation-state recently. Its evolution to a socio-economic political organization decreased the importance of the division between ethnic and civic nationalisms among its members at least at the official level because through economic integration ethnic belongings have been losing importance. This is because of the transformation in “multi-cultural citizenship”, which melts the ethnic identities within civic nationalism and thus, micro-nationalism has been in transformation. However, outside the EU, for the nation-states rejecting multi-culturalism, micro-nationalism is the most important rising problem against national unity.

The end of both the Cold War and the Two Axis world order marked the beginning of the nineties, promising for the triumph of the West against the USSR with the collapse of communism and the inclusion of two German states. From the viewpoint of nationalism, this ended the other optional state order against nationalism. However, the new status quo did not mark the triumph of nation-state and nationalism. On the contrary, the new order may be accepted to be in a formation period, which also contains the time period in which this thesis is written. For this reason, the last period of nationalism contains the obvious and striking features of a transforming nationalism. Aftermath of the Cold War period is marked by another phenomenon, globalization, rising global economic and political world order, which has been eroding the nation-state structures and nationalism. The rise of supra-nationality has been obvious, however, if the EU is considered, it also contains the transformation of a supra-national structure into a new type of a nation-state because the EU is trying to establish a EU nationalism and drawing its institutional framework on the basis of a nation-state.⁴² This resembles the nation-building process that was experienced in the first level of nationalism. However, how the local

⁴¹ It is a brand new political form of integration that came into being with the European integration, leaning on neo-functionalism. It starts with economic integration and aims the proliferation of integration to other fields in the long-term.

⁴² National anthem, national flag, European citizenship, money unit may be accepted as the most striking examples for this suggestion.

bonds contradicting with globalization would be mobilized is ambiguous if “multi-culturalism” conflicting with “homogeneity” of the nation-state was thought.

On the contrary, within a global framework, local bonds have been gaining importance and nationalism has been in a transformation hand in hand with ethnic values, which has given rise to ethno-nationalism in the recent agenda. In fact, to evaluate the nationalism of the period is so hard that it shows again a paradoxical structure by integrating the conflicting features within its transformation. What is evident here is the fusion of nationalism with globalization. However, nation-state has been the most important actor for ages. As a long lasting ideology, nationalism has been on the historical scene as a modern political force since 1789. Since then, it has articulated itself to different ideologies through various and paradoxical ways. In fact the real power of nationalism is strongly related to this, which again makes it hard to deduce the real nature of nationalism. What is still clear is that it is still alive and influencing states on both local and global levels.

In Turkey, nationalism is such an important element of the structure and politics that this makes Turkey a good example due to its having a *sui generis* transformation within the nationalist phenomenon in addition to its common points with the other nationalism types around the world. Anyhow, the explanations up till now were the short preface for relating transformation of nationalism on macro level; however, the main subject is the transformation of nationalism in Turkish politics during the twentieth century, the transformation of nationalism to and as a party ideology in Turkey and the rapid rise and decline of nationalism as a party ideology between the 1999 and 2002 elections and their relation to an ideological identity crisis of nationalism as a party ideology. I believe that the rapid rise and decline in a short time period cannot be explained through referring to populism, status quo or working-out of the party as a coalition partner. Therefore, the features of the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century nationalisms were evaluated for the following observation of differences and resemblances of Turkish nationalism. Now, its transformation in Turkey may be followed for drawing the general important phases that had been influential on the construction of Turkish nationalism as the ideology of a nationalist political party in Turkey. In doing this, initially, its original roots in the Ottoman Empire and its transformation into the ideology of the Republic and its further transformation within the nation-state are planned to be helpful.

CHAPTER 3

FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO MODERN TURKEY: THE ROLE OF NATIONALISM

3.1 Nationalisms within the Ottoman Empire

When nationalism in Europe had emerged together with liberalism and bourgeois revolutions, the Ottoman Empire was in decline. Neither had there been any intellectual developments preparing the grounds for revolutions, nor a developed economic structure was available for the emergence of a bourgeoisie as the ideological carrier of liberalism and nationalism. The role of nationalism had been determined by the decline as an “elite” ideological formulation that it was not a social movement like it had been in the West. The heterogeneous structure of the Empire was in contradiction with nationalism. Religious differences were the determiners of social boundaries and there were no racial or class divisions. Apart from these, deep Islamic culture within the social and state structure was alien to racial separations, which was another defect to nationalism.

Modernity and nationalism has strong bonds. It is obvious in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire because “*modernization*”, aiming at a deep transformation in the state system and social structure, had gained strength in this century.⁴³ Territorial losses had accompanied economic mismanagement, administrative inefficiency, political corruption and policies based on group interests were the internal reasons for the decline. She had remained outside the Western intellectual progress during and after the Enlightenment, Industrial and French Revolutions. Therefore, decline had been reflected as political and social discontent within the boundaries. In this respect, the main purpose of Ottoman Westernization/Modernization was hindering “decentralization” and “disintegration”

⁴³General historical information about this period is based on Stanford Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. I, The Emperor of the Gazis: The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire, 1280-1808*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978, pp. 280-4; Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol.II, Reform, Revolution and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978; Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 2004

in which nationalism had acted as a unifying political ideology. The view that the Empire had fallen behind Europe and the superiority of West was accepted by many. In such an environment, the chasms in the society were filled up by nationalism.

Modernization eased the infiltration of nationalism into the Empire. Superiority of the West was accepted in all fields and the transformation was determined to be in accordance with the Western ones, which contributed to the official entrance of the Western institutional structures. Different communities were in interaction with outside and so, influenced by the developments in the West and new thoughts. As argued by Göktürk, modernization of the Ottoman Empire makes the one side of proliferation of capitalism and articulation of the Empire to the European system as a half-dominion,⁴⁴ and the rise of nationalism within the Empire was strongly related to its decline. Conservatives were against these reforms. However, the reforms changed the social status definition and Muslim and non-Muslim became equal in front of the law. Conservative Muslims took part in conservative insurgencies. This situation may be seen as preparing the further developmental phases in nationalism because as put forward before, nationalism was thought for preventing disintegration and it may not be surprising for the ruling class to try to invent an Ottoman nationalism. In accordance with this, the first solution was “pan-Ottomanism”/ Ottoman nationalism, trying to hold the different communities all together on the basis of an “Ottoman identity”. However, counter nationalist movements were much stronger and with the liberation of Greeks, Serbians, Bulgarians, Macedonians and Armenians, pan-Ottomanism had failed. Next cohesive element had been determined as “Islam but pan-Ottomanism was not able to prevent the liberation movements of the different Muslim communities.

Modernization of the Ottoman Empire helped the proliferation of nationalist thoughts among the Muslim population, too. The determiners of the nationalist thoughts within the Muslim community were “languages”. The definition of the group identities within the remaining parts of the Empire started to show ethno-cultural inclinations and credible nationalism turned into an “ethnic” one. With the separation on the basis of language, mere option had remained as Turkish culture and language which turned into pan-Turkism. As a consequence, it may be argued that

⁴⁴ Eren Deniz (Tol) Göktürk, “1919–1923 Dönemi Türk Milliyetçilikleri”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. IV, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, p. 104

both the discontent among non-Muslim components and the eighteenth and nineteenth century Western developments had been reflected as national liberation movements during the nineteenth century. Development of the Turkish nationalism is accepted to be found on the broken line of pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and finally in pan-Turkism because different communities started to search for new identity definitions and thus, the group to establish a Turkish nationalism was born. However, Islam still forms one of the important traits of Turkish identity and plays a problematic role within Turkish nationalism. In my opinion, the problematic point is the ambiguous definition of Islam within Turkish culture because it was told above that ideologies are determined within cultures or in its most general sense, ideology means world view. In this respect, it is possible to maintain that Islam is a deep component in the Turkish culture which makes it to be one of the main components of the political ideology. However, Islam does not define nation but a group composed of whole Muslims and does not foresee any homogeneity except for the Muslim identity. The problem of Islam's place in the Turkish identity and nationalism is one of the core points in this thesis. The roots of this problem which still continues within the official nationalism in general and the ideology of NAP in particular, which becomes visible in the pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism differentiation.

In comparison to the other nationalisms within the Empire and Europe, it is relatively a "late" and a fresh one. It does not embrace the historical process that nationalism had lived in the West and it shows an evolving character. The official ideologies of the Empire were not socio-political or economic programs planned to transform the character of the society; rather, they tried to copy the West. Official Ottoman ideologies were "more or less conscious disguises of the real nature of a situation"⁴⁵ for which they failed to prevent the disintegration. They were invented elite programs and this strengthens the view that at this level, nationalism is not a collective self-expression and it could not reach to the ideological level helping to legitimate a dominant political power. However, the opposite was plausible for the other nationalisms within the same structure because for the non-Muslim and non-Turkish speaking communities, nationalism had formed the ideology of the particular

⁴⁵ Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 67

social groups and the counter official ideology was false consciousness in their opinions. It played the role of the medium in which conscious social actors made sense of their worlds and it turned into action-oriented beliefs in their liberations, which was not available for Turkish nationalism yet. Lastly, the search for an available ideology against disintegration may show that even the heterogeneous monarchies had accepted the transformative reality of nationalism and tried to adapt themselves to these new political developments.⁴⁶

3.2 Pan-Turkism, Its Emergence and Transformation within the Ottoman Empire

The roots of a Turkist ideology may be seen in the Young Turks movement with the 1880s.⁴⁷ However, the origins of this movement may be traced back to the 1860s because it has continuity with the Young Ottomans who aimed at the “modernization of Islam”; thus, enabling it to become the cement ideology of the declining Empire after the failure of Ottomanism. The integration of Islam to modernization, that is to say nationalism, which was touched upon before, is an old, problematic relationship that may correspond to another categorical complexity in nationalism because Turkish nationalism was not constructed on a “secular” basis. This is another difference of it from the West. However, this greets to another hardness that will be in the nation-building process and its aftermath because it experienced a sudden secularization through its definition on the official basis. However, as it did not emerge after a social transformation together with nationalism, secularism will try to transform society against Islam as a political program of the official elite. However, as a foreword, touching upon the history of this paradox may help in clarifying the nationalism-moderate Islam interaction in the recent political agenda. Mardin

⁴⁶ Hobsbawm (a), Ibid., p. 84

⁴⁷ “Young Movements” were inspired from the “Young Italy” movement of Giuseppe Mazzini that he established just after 1830. Hobsbawm defines the “Young” movements as “self-conscious nationalist movements” as one of the products of division within the European revolutionary movement that was told before. Hobsbawm (b), Ibid., p. 147. Here, it may be claimed that, nationalism had contributed to a division in revolutionary movements in the Europe in the 1830s. However, in the periphery, it acted as a movement helping the formation of specific nationalisms as a unifying force. This may be seen in the efforts of the Young Ottoman and Young Turks movements. Moreover, they carry uncertain revolutionary tradition within their philosophies in relation to self-conscious nationalist movements. For a detailed work the Young Ottoman Thought, see Şerif Mardin (b), *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 2003.

maintains that with the Young Turks movement, the social bases of the Ottoman elite had changed because the members were divided into two on the basis of origin, the profile of the Turkish elite had started to transform due to the fact that the peripheral nationalism started to move to the center. Here, parallel to the Western developments, a current from “bottom to top” is striking in forming the elite structure. Additionally, the Ottoman elite is different from bourgeoisie because they moved up with education, not with any structural social difference or a revolution.

With the 1880s, the Turkist ideology starts to turn to a “linguistic” one⁴⁸. However, if the historical development of Turkism is taken into account, motives behind the development of a Turkish nationalism may be divided into three. Along the seventeenth century, Turkish studies outside the Ottoman Empire were previously articulated to the sinology studies concentrating on the ancient history of Turks. The second motive was the studies of the bourgeois Turkish intellectuals in Russia in that a Turkish nationalism had been previously developed by the Turks living in Russia⁴⁹ and they developed “pan-Turanism”.⁵⁰ For the first time by Yusuf Akçura, pan-Ottomanism and pan-Islamism were proclaimed invalid for preventing

⁴⁸ Şerif Mardin (c), *Jön Türkler'in Siyasi Fikirleri: 1895-1908*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2005, p.65

⁴⁹ Some comments that Hungarian nationalism against pan-Germenism establishes a parallel development way between Hungarian and Turkish nationalisms and pan movements. Ağaoğulları, Mehmet Ali, “Aşırı Milliyetçi Sağ” in I. C. Schick and E. A. Tonak et al. (eds.), *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, Belge Yayınları, İstanbul, 2003, p. 192

⁵⁰ Pan-Turanism meant the integration of all Turkic nations under the state of Turan. It has racial and geographical aspects. It was sometimes defined insisting on a *cultural integrity* around Turkish language and sometimes in *geographical* terms, from Balkans to mid-Asia, or on the basis of a *racial integrity*. Among these intellectuals having strong effects on the development of a specific Turkish nationalism, the most important are Gaspıralı İsmail defending integration among language, Ali Hüseyinzade from Azerbaijan defending a progress around Turkism, Islamism and Europeanization and Yusuf Akçura whom was the most effective upon the intellectuals of the Empire. Akçura, in his famous article “Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset” claims that the Ottomanism is no more valid for the Empire. He maintains that the mere way of to save the Empire is “integration of all Turkish communities on the basis of a racial nation” (emphasis added). Therefore, for the first time, the traditional relation of Islam and Turks was reversed to a one, defining a “religious Turkism”. This may be later on referred as the claims of constructing a Turkish or an Anatolian İslam, which both means defining İslam on a cultural basis leading to emphasis on an İslam different than that of the Arabs and employing İslam on integrating different communities in turkey like Kurds or Alavis around Anatolian İslam. This is vital for employing an ideological strategy needed for the nationalist party in an environment that ethnic and cultural values comes to fore and for widening the electoral base of the party. For more information, see Mustafa Çalık, “Hangi Milliyetçilikle Nereye Kadar”, *Türkiye Günüğü*, Vol. 80, No. 2 (Spring 2005), pp. 126-134; *Teorik Denemeler*, Cedit Neşriyat, Ankara, 1999 and Ümit Özdağ, *Yeniden Türk Milliyetçiliği*, 3OK Yay., Ankara, 2005

the disintegration.⁵¹ Thus, a “unity” focusing on a “cultural” and “linguistic” national integrity was on the scene, which was going to transform to Turanism, Kemalism and so forth. Moreover, Turkism was to lead to a great loss of the Ottoman territory; however, it was to be substituted with the integration of outside Turks and the territorial losses of the Empire. As it is seen, the variant of outside Turks was, for the first time, had been subjected to Turkish nationalism. This type of a nationalist ideology is important because it aims at mobilizing the masses despite its historical incredibility. At this point, nationalism seems like a system of thoughts and action derived from conceptions of what ought to be. It is a peculiar group ideology in this plan; moreover, it is a bourgeois ideology in theory but not in practice. The third motive was from within the Empire itself. The nationalism developed by the Ottoman intelligentsia sharply focused on the development of a national language. This may be accepted to transform the nationalist ideology to a “discursive field” because it starts to be “rhetorical” rather than an abstract elite ideal.⁵²

Under the assumptions that have been made so far, it may be put forward that the nucleus of the late Turkish nationalism in the Empire had emerged with the first half of the nineteenth century. The systematization and politicization of a Turkish nationalist ideology, which could act as the establishment ideology of the nation-state had occurred just after the proclamation of Meşrutiyet II of 1908⁵³. Meşrutiyet led to a more liberal environment for the development of the Western style nationalism⁵⁴ because the pan-Turkist liberal-bourgeoisie Turkish intellectuals from Russia had developed a “modern religion”, conceptualized a “liberation movement

⁵¹ François Georgeon(a), *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kökenleri, Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935)*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 36, 47, 53; Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*, Lotus Yay., Ankara, 2005

⁵² Eagleton, *Ibid.*, p. 56

⁵³ In fact, it can be argued that the intersection point of the development of western style nationalism may be accepted as 1908. This revolution came to life with the efforts of young intellectuals and soldiers that were trained with a European style education which had settled the bourgeois values in their cognitions. In addition, the Turkish intellectual immigrating to İstanbul with the 1908 revolution had the bourgeoisie values. They had developed a Turkish nationalism against pan-Slavism and they had brought their bourgeois intellectual values to İstanbul articulating them with the pan-Turkist movement in İstanbul. Thus, 1908 revolution may be accepted as the first “*bourgeois revolution*” in the Empire. Moreover, it is the point on which Turkish nationalism started to gain a more westernized and liberal style. Breuilly comments on the subject that the 1908 revolution was planned by the Young Turks for a secular state with a greater central power backed up by an elected parliament. John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1993, p. 246

⁵⁴ Ağaogulları, *Ibid.*, p. 196

for women” and they were also aiming at “economic” and social “progress” within their nationalism. This type of a “liberal” and “progressive” nationalism may refer to a “leftist” nationalism because it was not defending the status quo; rather, it was trying to transform its structure. Development of a radical pan-Turanism after Meşrutiyet II may display the fact that development of nationalism within the Empire had benefited from the socio-political limits and the boundaries of the imperial structure again. In other words, pan-Turkism may refer to an ideology of an empire territorially; however, this empire is composed of a homogeneous cultural, ethnic and racial group. Hence, this may be seen as the digestion of the nation-state ideology by the disintegrating Empire. If all these information on the development of nationalism in the Ottoman Turkey is put in a theoretical perspective, its similarities and differences from the other nationalisms may be seen more clearly because as told before, the proliferation of the nationalist phenomenon into the Empire had carried the genetic paradoxes of nationalism to that structure and in addition, contributed to other specific problems resulting from the development of nationalism within the Empire. Ottoman nationalisms carry both the irrationalities of nationalism and the problems emerged from the development of nationalism in the Empire. For these reasons, it both resembles to the Western genres and shows differences from them. Here, a recent survey on the development of nationalism in Europe may be helpful in the clarification of the structure of the Turkish nationalism. In this respect, Hroch divides the development of nationalism into three phases:

*In nineteenth century Europe, for which it was developed, phase A was purely cultural, literary and folkloric, and had no particular political or even national implications, any more than the researches (by non-Romanies) of the Gypsy Lore Society have for the subjects of these enquiries. In phase B we find a body of pioneers and militants of ‘the national idea’ and the beginning of political campaign for this idea. ...phase C when -and not before- nationalist programmes acquire mass support, or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they represent. The transition from phase B to phase C is evidently a crucial moment in the chronology of national movements. Sometimes as in Ireland, it occurs before the creation of a national state; probably very much more often it occurs afterwards, as a consequence of that creation. Sometimes, as in the so-called Third World, it does not happen even then.*⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Miroslav Hroch, quoted in Hobsbawm (a), Ibid., p. 12

When these gradual phases in the emergence of the political nationalism in Europe are compared to the same situation in the Ottoman Empire, it may be seen that it lived these “three phases” in nationalism together because the nationalisms within the Empire were cultural, militant and mass movements except for the Turkish nationalism. However, the late emergence of the Turkish state conformed to the tradition and just with its emergence, it started to transform within the all three periods together because it was cultural and militant; however, turned into a mass movement with the Independence War. This requires putting reserve to the third period because Turkish nationalism saw an Independence War, which forced the Turkish Republic to live these three phases at once again, just at the time of the establishment, giving the Turkish nationalism an anti-imperialist sense. The Western culture was effective upon the intellectual environment of the Empire. The reason for the Ottoman intellectuals to be influenced from the Western nationalism too much was their identity crisis sourcing from the disintegration. In other words, Ottoman Turkish intellectuals of the time, just in defense psychology against the West, were paradoxically had been limited again to the Western intellectual developments again. Thus, they had borrowed necessary views against disintegration from the Western political culture. Here, the resemblance of this to the Third World nationalism may be touched. As told before, the main paradox of the Third World Nationalism lies in the absolute necessity that it has to develop its nationalism under the influence of the Western nationalism but against it. This embraces rejection and acceptance at the same time, which we see in the nationalism that had been developed at the moment and not surprisingly becomes “racial”, “chauvinist” and “militarist”. From the “Muslim nation”, slowly, the “Turkish nation” evolved and the main cohesive element was “language” in this process. Cultural-linguistic nationalism was developed around literary products and accordingly, political organizations were established.⁵⁶

Consistent with Hobsbawm, gradual transformation of nationalism emerges mostly before the establishment of a nation-state or as the outcome of the

⁵⁶ Most important names of this current are Ali Canip, Ömer Seyfettin and later on Ziya Gökalp that were organized around the *Genç Kalemler (Young Pens) periodical* and the *Türk Ocağı* assembly that published the *Türk Yurdu*. Both of them had contributed to the broadening of the Turkish Nationalist thoughts geographically, intellectually and helped to transform it to a nation-state ideology. Here, the name of the periodical needs attention that it seems to be inspired from the Young Movements.

establishment of it.⁵⁷ Turkish nationalism seems to confirm this claim, however, its difference may be the emergence of both together, and Turkish nationalism was alive before the establishment of the Turkish nation state, which was also the outcome of its emergence because it was evolved from Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism to the Turkish nationalism. Therefore, as the last development phase, Turkish nationalism was carrying the unsolved problems of the Ottoman nationalisms. In addition, these problems were marked by the genetic paradoxical structure within nationalism and the following paradoxes emerged with its transformation into Ottoman nationalisms. Furthermore, official nationalism had to live the developments of the phase A, B and C all together because after the establishment of the Republic, Kemalist nationalism had to organize itself around cultural, literary and folkloric notions, had to campaign for national idea and tried to acquire mass support at the same time. Therefore, it may be put forward that nationalism had turned into an official state ideology with the state imperatives from top to down because despite the turning of the Turkish nationalism into a mass movement with the Independence War, it was not a mass political movement/ideology yet and it had to be organized around a nationalistic project as the cohesive element of the society. For these reasons, the development of nationalism into an official state ideology shows differences from the West and carries its own irregularities within itself.

In sum, nationalism within the Ottoman borders was developed in a hybrid style. However, the outside effects were much more fluent than the inside social, economic or political developments. The first nationalist effects were to be developed by the non-Muslim components aiming at autonomy and later on, independence. In fact, it may be described as the deepening of the borders of the “millet” system depending on religious differences. In other words, what nurtured the emergence of nationalist thoughts was the clear stand of the different religions to each other which contributed to the failure of pan-Ottomanism. When nationalist thoughts spread up to the Muslim communities, language, as the second determiner of the boundaries, had created proto-national differences between them. Thus, on the basis of linguistic nationalism or, in a more general view, cultural nationalism had emerged, clearing the divisions between the communities. Thus, it is comprehensible

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 10. He writes that “in short, for the purposes of analysis, nationalism comes before nations”.

why a cultural nationalism on the basis of Turkist values had been developed for/through pan-Turkism. Traditionally, the last community of the empire was going to try to develop a Turkish nationalism for establishing a nation-state. Furthermore, Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire was an elite movement but not a bourgeois determined fact. Therefore, the development of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire cannot be evaluated merely with a Western view because of the difference of the ruling strata and the social and economic structure; however, especially in its relation to “Islam”, “secularism” and “liberalism”; a *sui generis* development having some common features with the Western nationalism may be thought. In this sense, Turkish nationalism was not able to propose an alternative state order or ideological stand yet. A particular elite group was mobilized through nationalism but it had not proliferated among the society. Its ideological deficiency at this point may be related to the complexity resulting from the structure of the nationalist phenomenon, its development in the Empire. In addition, here, Turkish nationalism was not able to clarify its bonds with Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism because they were still alive with their own problematic existences. In the next part of the thesis as an important structural difference from the Western nationalisms, its proximity to the Third World Nationalism will be cleared up when focusing on the Turkish Independence War by referring to its anti-imperialist claim.

3.3 The Theoretical Roots of the Official Ideology: From Turkism to Turkish Nationalism

The development of the theoretical background for the official Turkish nationalism and its transformation to a mass anti-imperialist movement may be found between pan-Turkism and the end of the Turkish Independence War. These years contain the emergence of Turkism as a nation state ideology. Despite the deep influence of Islam on society, the soul of a Turkish identity depending on Turkish language had been alive until 1908⁵⁸. However, as the mere aim was to prevent the

⁵⁸ Here the influence of Cemaleddin Afgani (1836-1897) on Turkists in the second half of the nineteenth century, who tried to reconcile Islam with nationalism, must be added. Afgani was the first Islam intellectual advancing a theory on the unity of language and race in defining nations. He insisted that two uniting elements were language, namely race and religion. However, the unity depending on language (race) was more continuous than the one depending on religion. After the failure of pan-

disintegration of the Empire, Young Turks continued defending an Ottoman nationalism despite its failure against micro-nationalisms just until the afterwards of the 1908 Revolution. Gradually, their educational backgrounds, modernist views, linguistic Turkism and reactions to separatist nationalisms caused them to be Turkist. The participation of the leading civilian Turkish nationalists, representing a populist national movement, like Ziya Gökalp, Hüseyinzade Ali and Yusuf Akçura in the Young Turk movement contributed to the establishment of the link between the Union and Progress Party (UPP)⁵⁹ and the civilian national movements.

UPP included two different views on nationalism. One was the “bureaucratic nationalism” relying on state interests and the other was the nationalism resulting from “civil society” which was much more sensitive to the problem of nation. Therefore, with the addition of the civilian perspective to the elite views, Turkish nationalism started to embrace a more “populist” view. In doing this, what was planned was enabling “social solidarity” within a “corporatist state”. Parallel to this, after the establishment of the Republic, populism was defined in appositive manner, as the enlightenment of the lower classes.⁶⁰

According to Georgeon, Ziya Gökalp was the ideologist, articulating these two currents of nationalism together, especially between 1908 and 1914.⁶¹ Gökalp needs attention in the examination of the official nationalist ideology of the Republic due to his *de jure* influences on the UPP and *de facto* influences on the founders of the Republic. Güngör comments that “*the emergence of nationalism as an ideal and ideology as a guide on the way of becoming a modern nation starts with Gökalp*”⁶² for noting his importance in nationalism. Gökalp wrote two books on Turkish nationalism and in both he defends the “superiority of Turkism” and “Westernization” over Ottomanism and Islamism. Dated 1918, in “*Türkleşmek,*

Islamism, it is possible to maintain that it is unexceptional to observe nation defining efforts on the basis of language.

⁵⁹“The Union and Progress Party” (UP) is the political party of the “Young Turk” movement, which ruled the country after the 1908 Revolution.

⁶⁰This decision had been seriously institutionalized with the “*Popular-Houses*” which had been constructed by the government planning to reach the furthest villages and rural areas.

⁶¹ Georgeon (b), *Osmanlı-Türk Modernleşmesi (1900-1930)*, YKY Yay., İstanbul, 2006, p.28

⁶² Erol Güngör, *Dünden Bugünden: Tarih-Kültür ve Milliyetçilik*, Ötüken Yay., İstanbul, 2001, p.133

İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak”⁶³, he departs from Ottomanism and determines two aims for Turkish nationalism as “Turkicization” and “Islamization”, which he indicates as the mere ways for catching up the with civilization. Through Turkicization, he means the formation of the Turkish nation through developing a national culture and Ottomanism should be left behind. Moreover, he solves the Islam-nationalism problem through defining religion on the basis of culture which requires the transformation of Islam into a cultural religion, and which he names “*Turkish-Islam*”.⁶⁴ In other words, his writings did not contain an “absolute” secularism⁶⁵ that needs a strict break off from religion. If the strong influence of religion upon society is considered, this solution sounds rational. However, such a solution may shed light upon the secularist tradition of the West in relation to nationalism and the difference of Turkish nationalism from it once more. The approaches of Gökalp were transformed from theory into practice with the establishment of the Republic. In 1924, he published “*Türkçülüğün Esasları*”⁶⁶, which is known to be the basis of the official nationalism.⁶⁷ According to Ünüvar, he solves the tension between “national-identity” and “religious-identity” in favor of the former.⁶⁸ As known, Islam in the UPP ideology was articulated as the cement for social integration until its ineffectiveness was seen with the separation of the Muslim communities and the failure of pan-Islamic ideology. With the year 1924, Gökalp practically began to concentrate on “modernization”, “secularization”, “statism” (his corporatist-solidarism depends on anti-liberal views)⁶⁹ and “capitalism”, which may be accepted as the hardest problems of the Turkish nationalist ideology because all these concepts were originated in the West and they needed to be reconciled according to the modern Turkey. However, these concepts had been influential upon

⁶³ Ziya Gökalp (a), *Türkleşmek, İslamlaşmak, Muasırlaşmak*, Bordo-Siyah Yay., İstanbul, 2004

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 55

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ziya Gökalp (b), Ibid.

⁶⁷ Güngör, Ibid., p. 134

⁶⁸ Kerem Ünüvar, “Ziya Gökalp”, in T. Bora, et al. (ed) *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. IV, İletişim Yay. İstanbul, 2004, p. 33

⁶⁹ Gökalp (b), Ibid., p. 54

the formation of Turkish nationalism categorically. It may be claimed that problems which emerged in their articulation still continues; for instance, secularism and modernization continue to create problems in recent politics and in our daily lives in relation to Islam today.

If we turn to Gökalp and Islam again, it may be seen that Albanian and Arabian decomposition had obviously shown that Islam had no more effects on the remaining Muslim communities. This probably had justified Gökalp's "linguistic" and "cultural" definition of the Turkish nation and his thesis on the necessity of a Turkish-Islam. Gökalp's insistence on language is understandable in that language is one of the most important cultural characteristics of nationality. In this context, Hayes suggests that "*the rise and decline of nationalities and tribes have always been closely parallel by the rise and decline of their respective languages, and both processes still go on together*"⁷⁰ because in the formation of a nation, nationalist ideology turns to a rhetorical signification process in the formation of identities. To sum up, Parla defines Gökalp's nationalism as the synthesis of "solidarism", "cultural Turkism" and "ethical-Islamist-mysticism".⁷¹ Now, the oppositional movements that had been influential on the development of Turkish nationalism before the establishment of the Republic as the determiners of its limits may be touched on.

Before the establishment of the Republic, there had emerged two external opposite currents to the Turkish nationalism. On the one hand, there was a "religious

⁷⁰ Carlton, J. Hayes, *Essays on Nationalism*, Russel&Russel, New York, 1966, p.13-4. Hayes maintains that "*the formation of most modern nationalities has been historically dependent upon the development of particular languages*". In the Turkish case, it had been not the development of a modern language but the clarification of the original Turkish language from the Arabic and Persian words, which during the long term Ottoman Era, had been fused in the formation of a hybrid language, Ottoman. As known, the Literature and Court languages were Arabic and Persian in the Empire. However, folk culture had developed an original spoken Turkish for centuries, which soon had been standardized after the establishment of the Republic and with the *Letter Revolution*, the Latin Letters started to be used in the modern Turkey. Clarification attempts may be traced back to 1860s revolutionary attempts of the New Ottomans. This may prove the continuity of the cultural approach to the problem of nation until the years of Gökalp and the other cultural nationalists since then. Moreover, uniformity of language gives birth to like-mindedness. Thus, the formation of Turkish nationalism with the Republican Era means a literal and intellectual break up from the Ottoman literate culture too, and the importance of language in the definition of a Turkish nationalism is obvious. The literary language, which the culture was going to be defined, told and inherited to the new generations and as the language changes, he bride between the past and present was cut off strictly.

⁷¹ Quoted in Ünüvar, Ibid.

opposition”, the approach of nationalism to the Islamic community, “*ummah*”. On the other hand, there was the “statist/pan-Ottomanist” opposition, directly blaming nationalism for weakening the central authority of the state. The third division may be added by referring to Arai, who divides the different viewpoints among the Turkish nationalist intellectuals into two.⁷² Arai maintains that the first group was composed of the intellectuals who were loyal to the Ottoman political state system, defending a nationalism depending upon “education”, “culture” and “language”. The second group was the Russian-Turkish intellectuals, who were including the mid-Asian territory in their nationalist sentiments and who were the champions of “ethno-religious” nationalism. The first group was known for their cultural Turkish nationalism and they had supported the Turanist views of the second group until the beginning of the First World War. Before evaluating the First World War and its effects on Turkish nationalism, firstly, the character of the thoroughgoing transformation of the state must be evaluated.

As told before, reform in the empire did not aim at the whole transformation of the society. Young Turks, with the 1908 Revolution, took over the state as a group from the reforming strata. However, they insisted on a more detailed reform programme. They tried to establish a more secular and a centralized state backed up by an elected parliament. Moreover, they seriously worked for establishing the grounds for a national economy and a national bourgeoisie. In this context, the new rule was “anti-capitalist” and “anti-imperialist”, and economically “anti-liberalist” and “statist”. Parallel to these, in 1914, the UPP decided to abolish the capitulations unilaterally; and in 1913, it judged the promotion of national industry, related to the application of customs duties and determined the establishment of national banks on national capital.⁷³ These may prove that the Young Turk movement was assimilated to a Western type of nation state; however, bounded up with its past, it had shown differences that had gained anti-imperialist stand. Nevertheless, this nationalist ideology is still an elite ideal. It had nothing common with the masses. It is for sustaining the order and the rule of the state but not for planning a secure future for the society in that it does not have strong relation with the social facts.

⁷²Masami Arai, *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 2003, p. 20

⁷³ Gökürk, *Ibid.*, p.108

The efforts of the Young Turks had to face resistance and especially the resistance shown by Arab nationalists had provoked the reforms to turn into a nationalist reaction. However, as argued by Breuilly, the support base of this nationalism was narrow until the First World War; however, the War had transformed the situation. The proclamation of *jihad* in 1914 was not able to get the Muslims together against non-Muslim world in defending Islam,⁷⁴ which shows the decreasing influence of Islam as the cement of solidarity. If recalled, Islam was to be employed in a pragmatic way by the Young Turk government. Even, as told by Tol, the UPP government was legitimizing itself through referring to the Islamic law.⁷⁵ However, the 1916 Arab insurgence had crystallized the decrease of the effects of Islam on Muslim communities, which contributed to the gradual secularization of the government policies.

For the Turkish nationalist sentiment, the important thing was its irritation by the growing Arab nationalist resistance to the government.⁷⁶ As told above, this corresponds to a *de facto* separation with Arabs on the basis of language, which was parallel to the development of a growing cultural nationalism among the Turkish intelligentsia. Language is the most important way of homogenization and standardization and as suggested by Smith, it should be evaluated with territorial centralization and integration.⁷⁷ Indeed, as it was told above, the aim of the Young Turk government was to centralize power on the basis of secular state and for this reason, language and culture had been determined as the new cements of solidarity. This policy had been applied in the Turkish Republic too, which points out the continuity of the reformist strata which ideologically transformed itself available for the nation-state. In general, what prepared the ground for the emergence of an official nationalism were the reasons mentioned above together with the defense psychology in the Turkish Independence War, which turned nationalism into a great power mobilization power and a mass revolutionary movement.

⁷⁴ Georgeon (b) , Ibid., p. 14. For him, Islam remained deficient in responding to the challenges of modernity.

⁷⁵ Göktürk, Ibid.

⁷⁶ Breuilly, Ibid.

⁷⁷ Smith, Ibid., p.176

CHAPTER 4

TURKISH NATIONALISM

4.1 The Rise of the “National-Consciousness” in Anatolia before the Establishment of the Republic

Under the assumptions that have been made so far, it was argued that the Turkish nationalism had evolved from the Western political nationalism emerged with the 1789 revolution. Since its development displays peculiar characteristics, it carries some original aspects within its structure different from the Western genres. For these reasons, on the one hand, it had inherited the genetic categorical paradoxes in the nationalist phenomenon which had resulted from its original development in the West. For instance, it carries secular and Islamist aspects within itself at the same time. Moreover, it carries idealist aspects of the Eastern European types, which may be visible in the racist inclinations in Turkism and Turanism. Therefore, the tensions between modernization and anti-modernization in the nationalist phenomenon and the self irrationalities of the Turkish nationalism in its stand against modernization and the West may be reflected in the own structure of the Turkish nationalism. On the other hand, it shows original aspects than the all Western genres because Turkish nationalism may be accepted as the first organized, massive anti-imperialist movement of the time. This paradoxical condition again may be related to the original development of nationalism within the empire because it had to live the gradual steps in the transformation of the Western nationalism together in the historical turnovers as the collapse of the Empire and the Turkish Independence War. Therefore, it may be argued that the cultural awakening, the rise of the national consciousness and its transformation into a political mass movement in Turkish nationalism appeared at once. Moreover, official Turkish nationalism had also inherited the developmental problems in Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism and carried them to within itself which is claimed in this thesis that it resulted in the problematic ideological establishment of the NAP. In this context, this part aims to clarify the original categorical paradoxes within the Turkish nationalism that will be inherited by the Kemalist nationalism after the establishment of the Republic.

It may be suggested that the rise of national consciousness has two aspects: *practical* and *cultural-intellectual*. Its practical emergence appeared with the defeat in the First World War. The role of nationalism within the imperial structure became dysfunctional and it was Turkish nationalism, which was thought for reuniting the people of Anatolia for transforming the remaining of the Empire into a nation-state. In doing this, it had to undertake an anti-imperialist stand because of the defeat in the World War. However, what enabled a collectivity was the strong leadership factor and hostility towards the counter nationalisms of the same region in which Turkish nationalism had been transformed into a strong political power,⁷⁸ and turned to a *political mobilization* force. As told by Breuille, post-war settlements in Anatolia had contributed to the emergence of a “xenophobic” base and “communal conflict”, helping the rise of national consciousness. Hobsbawm suggests that “*national consciousness’ develops unevenly among the social groupings and regions of a country*”⁷⁹. In this context, the national congresses that were done in different cities and regions together with the people from different ethnic origins, religious sects and practices may be seen as the attempts of Atatürk for the “elevation” of national consciousness equal between different regions. Chatterjee argues that nationalism is not the recognition of self-consciousnesses; it “invents” nations if they do not exist.”⁸⁰ In this sense, it may be argued that these congresses had been effective in inventing the national consciousness before the Independence War, which may be accepted as the first moment that nationalism had acted as a political mobilizing power in Anatolia. However, this nationalism was not developed for establishing a nation-state. In other words, nationalism was not a common nation-state ideology because people of the region were still fighting for the Empire but not for a future Turkish state. Nevertheless, all nationalisms united against the enemy; however, these did not include any political projects for a future nation-state. What determined the role of the nationalist ideology were then the conditions of time. Hroch, as referred before, accepts three levels in the historical development of nationalism, which may be useful for evaluating the development of Turkish nationalism just at

⁷⁸ Smith, *Ibid.*, p. 176

⁷⁹ Hobsbawm (a), *Ibid.*, p. 12; for a detailed discussion on the subject see Anthony D. Smith, *Milli Kimlik*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 2004

⁸⁰ Chatterjee, *Ibid.*, p. 19

this point. If recalled, he argues that phase A is the nationalism of the nineteenth century Europe and consists of “cultural”, “literary” and “folkloric” traits. With phase B, “politicization” of nationalism and with phase C, its “proliferation” as a “massive” movement occurs. In this sense, it may be maintained that Turkish nationalism of the time was in its politicization moment and also it had to be prepared for a War, for which it may be accepted to live politicization, proliferation and turning to a mass movement at the same time which makes its ideological construction complex. After the Republic, the cultural and literary phase, in the sense Hroch puts it, continued with essential policies from “above”, targeting folk culture in the derivation of an “original” nationalism. Ideological reconstruction of nationalism and its synthesis with original culture continued under the heading of official nationalism. Thus, it may be mentioned that this moment in nationalism corresponds to a reconstruction or invention for constituting the production way of meanings, signs, and values in social life. This process was also for forming a nationalist state ideology in order to legitimize the existing political power. It is open to discussion whether the ideas flowing in the social life were false or true for the hegemonic domination of the state elite. However, it may be argued that, nationalism was gradually turning to a political state ideology, ready to be the discourse of the state in the nation-building process. When the nation-building process started, it accepted the underdevelopment and the superiority of the West too. Thus, this Turkish nationalism contains the implication of *oppression* in it and thus, it both accepts and rejects the Western proliferation. Parallel to these arguments, Breuilly evaluates the duration between the end of the First World War and the end of the Independence War “*in terms of a shift from co-ordination to the mobilization function as the major feature of the nationalist movement*”.⁸¹ Together with the ongoing processes of the first and the second phases, phase C had joined them with radical reforms, aiming at the transformation of the structure within the borders of the *Misak-ı Milli* into a modern nation-state after the establishment of the Republic. The passage from the second to the third phase may be said to have occurred after the War. However, in the Turkish case, it may be maintained that the developmental

⁸¹ Breuilly, Ibid.

phases did not end and with the start of phase C, all the phases started to develop hand in hand up till today.

Boundaries within which the national consciousness had to define itself were obviously defined with the military success of the Turkish Independence War. Asia Minor, which was defined as *Misak-ı Milli*,⁸² was regained. These clearly defined boundaries correspond to a *territorially* based nationalism,⁸³ which may be seen as a progress level on the concrete definition of the Turkish nation-state.⁸⁴ Smith puts the need of a motherland as the basic principal of nationalism and maintains that definition of the ethnîe on the basis of a territory gives birth to a *motherland*, which presents a concrete collective space which is a progressive level in the definition of a nation.⁸⁵ From the viewpoint of Hobsbawm, it may be claimed that for the future nation-state to be established on the basis of this territory, this proclamation may be evaluated as a connection between a territory and a nation with Hobsbawm's "*nation=state=people equation, and especially sovereign people, undoubtedly linked nation to territory, since structure and definition of states were now essentially territorial. It also implied a multiplicity of nation-states so constituted, and this was indeed a necessary consequence of popular self-determination.*"⁸⁶

Related to this, in defining the national borders, specifically, *self-determination principle* was the official basis of the territorial definition for international society. Moreover, pan-Turkist ideals and the possible ideal country of

⁸²The possible boundaries of the future nation-state, planned to be established after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, which was declared in 1920. It contains the Anatolia and some small part of the Balkan Peninsula to Edirne and the river of Meriç.

⁸³ Definition of a nation on the basis of territoriality enables a visible place for a community and eases its definition on the basis of nationalism. Practically, nation building process may be realized only through becoming the owner of a concrete territory and the members of a nation may feel their social interdependence and political integrity only in this way. Smith, *Ibid.*, pp. 209-211

⁸⁴ "Nations are imagined within some limits", Anderson, *Ibid.*, p. 21; "Ethnîe identifies itself with an evident territory. It may be symbolic rather than being physically visible", Smith, *Ibid.*, p. 53

⁸⁵ Smith, *Ibid.*, p. 210-11. Besides, in Republican Turkey, as claimed by Smith, the capital of the Hittites were accepted as one of the heritages of the Turks; for supporting the territorial definition of modern Turkey on the basis of secularism, which changed the Ottoman capital İstanbul and accepted Ankara as the new capital, trying to realize the cultural slide from İstanbul to Ankara on the basis of territoriality.

⁸⁶ Hobsbawm (a), *Ibid.*, p. 19

the entire Turks, Turan were strictly left outside *Misak-ı Milli*.⁸⁷ The invasion of the Caucasus by Russia was the second cause of leaving the pan-Turkist ideology aside. However, it is important to propose that the common aim of the Independence War was expelling the occupying forces out which created homogeneity among the different social components of the society, contributing to the ignorance of the existing ethnic differences in *Misak-ı Milli*. Yet, in the formation period, national consciousness was inventing or imagining itself within definite boundaries if expressed through the words of Anderson and Chaterjee.

As told before, nationalist inclinations in the Ottoman Empire was confined to the elite. With the necessary imperial reforms, the soldiers and bureaucratic strata had got used to the Western type of nationalism and it had gone through its original developmental stages with pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. Tol maintains that the mobilization power of nationalism was focusing on “the solidarity between Turkish-Islam and Ottoman-Islam”.⁸⁸ During the Independence War, nationalism was not a mature ideology for the emergence of the Turkish-nation within *Misak-ı Milli* that it was not common sets and beliefs yet. On the other hand, the effects of economy and nationalism relationship in the formation of national consciousness may be elaborated on. Ottoman modernization may be read from the other side as the insidious entrance of the West into the imperial structure. In other words, the history of the Empire may economically mean the history of the integration to the capitalist order and may politically mean the articulation of the Empire to the European political system as a semi-dominion since the decline started. In this respect, as touched upon before, Turkish Independence War may be accepted

⁸⁷This has radicalized pan-Turkism and pan-Turanism and caused it to turn to a *rightist* ideology. Since then, pan-Turkism had lived in the movements where nationalism ideologically articulates itself as an ultra-nationalist ideal of some politicians and intellectuals, who may be found in different ideological groupings and parties from left to right in the Turkish political spectrum. As will be touched upon later, this led to the digestion of the ideological supporters of the pan-Turkist and Turanist movements within the Republican People’s Party (RPP) on the one hand, and they were tried to be benefited by the Republican government. Their ideological views were tried to be transformed to acceptable cultural approaches which were articulated to the official Turkish History and Language Thesis. On the other hand, ideologically, pan-Turkist-Turanist movements played the role of opposition to the republican government. Either within the ruling party, or later within opposition after the multi-party regime, pan-Turkist-Turanist movement acted as the sharpest ideological view and crack within the nationalist ideology. This will be commented on when the ideological differentiation of nationalism argued and when the rebirth of the Pan-Turkist and pan-Turanist views occurred in the 1990s, with the collapse of the USSR.

⁸⁸*Göktürk*, Ibid., p. 111

as the first example of the twentieth centuries' anti-imperialist struggle against the West, trying to establish an independent nation-state depending on a national economy. In this context, modernization also means the economic and commercial proliferation of the West and its capitalism because with capitulations and commercial agreements, Western products entered into the Empire since the decline started. From the very outset of Tanzimat, "anti-Western" and "anti-modernist" currents had existed. However, with the Russian Revolution, this opposition grew stronger. On the one hand, as suggested by Georgeon, there was a "passive resistance"⁸⁹ among people against daily events. On the other hand, as told above, official measures were taken and boycotts were supported by the Young Turks. Georgeon points out that in this period, socialism and nationalism were very close to each other and what enabled the progressive character of Turkish nationalism was this socialism.⁹⁰ Even, Atatürk had sometimes become closer to Soviet Russia and uttered a clear anti-imperialist language, and Independence War meant both a struggle against Greek invaders and British imperialism. Accordingly, the War gave birth to a paradoxical situation, which is the common problem of the modernizing non-Western countries. Supporting modernization but keeping the original culture makes the core of this problem. However, Turkish nationalism may be accepted as strictly modernist and it is not anti-capitalist because the next purpose was to create a national bourgeoisie and articulate the national economy to the capitalist economy, which also differentiates the Turkish case from the Third World nationalism, which will be detailed under the heading "Kemalist nationalism".⁹¹ It may be claimed that after 1923, this "abstract" rejection/acceptation dilemma had ended to the advantage of the West, contributing to the "cultural alienation" problem and with 1945; the pro-European/Western conflict gradually took its part in official politics.

Once the Turkish Independence War ended, the Ottoman government was abolished with its entire institutions. Atatürk was able to push through a series of radical reforms with the aim of transforming the whole society. Nationalism had

⁸⁹ Georgeon (b), *Ibid.*, p. 9

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ İzmir Economic Congress in 1923 reflects the demands and precautions of the state for a more liberal and capitalist economic order.

turned to a conscious political mobilization ideology, helping to legitimate the state apparatus and it turned to a state ideology. Nationalism developed within the Ottoman Empire was firstly an elite movement and it had not been popular until the Independence War. Anatolian people, mobilized by the military elite, did not even have known what nationalism was because Turkish nationalism was the latest nationalism which emerged amongst the nationalities of the other communities. Hobsbawm suggests that “...for the purposes of analysis nationalism comes before nations”⁹²; however, the Turkish case may be an exception of this view because Turkish nationalism and Turkish nation were mutually bounded concepts, which had been the driving force behind the other. However, if the *millet* system is thought, the opposite of the Hobsbawm’s comment may seem right too. Communities, after their encountering with nationalism, had turned to nations but their nationalisms did not come before them. They become nations first and then, they had claimed their independencies. As a second component, it may be asserted that if the nationalism of time was enough to establish a nation/state and a nation, no more radical reforms may be done. In my opinion, Turkish nationalism was not as strong for the “creation/imagination/invention” of a nation which was strengthened by radical reforms. The establishment of the nation must be seen as a driving force behind the concentration of various “Turkish nationalisms”. However, among the other types of nationalisms just before and after the establishment, this exception may be born in mind for only the official Turkish nationalism of the state, which is also known as Kemalist nationalism.

4.2 Official (Kemalist) Nationalism

Kemalist nationalism is the nationalism that the official state tradition has established. In this respect, understanding Kemalist nationalism may help to analyze the transformation of all previous nationalist streams into a Turkish nationalism. Official nationalism both benefited from these nationalist streams and excluded some

⁹² For a detailed discussion on the emergence of nations before nationalisms see Armstrong John A., *Nations Before Nationalism*, The University of North Carolina Pres, Chapel Hill, 1982

of them partially or entirely.⁹³ Therefore, two kinds of nationalisms developed in Turkey, Kemalist nationalism and the others. In addition to its chronological advantages, starting with the official framework is planned to help in determining the positions of the others within/against Kemalist nationalism which turned to political ideologies later on. Moreover, clarifying Kemalist nationalist context may help to recognize the political environment that has been designed under the influences of state tradition. Thus, general ideological resolutions within Turkish nationalism may be elaborated in that they nurtured nationalism in its transformation into a “political party ideology”. However, the original formation of the official nationalism should be clarified for putting its development in a specific line within the development of the nationalist phenomenon because Turkish type resembles the Western and the Third World nationalism; however, it is distinct from them with some original aspects.

Throughout the discussion up to now, nationalism has been accepted as a modern phenomenon and its emergence and development had been examined as a distinct line within the modernization process. Historical rupture points on the line had been observed as ideological transformation points. However, in my opinion, this approach has some weak points in it. First of all, modernization embraces the passing over of the “non-modernized”. By chance, Eurocentric views generally accept the Eastern parts of Europe as the first ring of the non-modernized territories. On the other hand, this corresponds to a distinction between the developed and the underdeveloped parts of the continent or approximately the same culture. Already, seeing the emergence of nationalism as the outcome of American, Industrial and French Revolutions smells too much modern and seems like neglecting some focal points. It relates the proliferation of nationalism to the proliferation of modernization. Accordingly, what had proliferated was the French type of a nation-state, which was established on the basis of individual liberty, equality and a cosmopolitan outlook. However, it is not enough to explain the other nationalism types which emerged after the proliferation of the French and which have no resemblance with their French companion. For instance, German-nationalism emerging approximately fifty years

⁹³ Ertekin claims that despite the official ideology severely decided cutting from the Ottoman past, official Turkish nationalism refers to a new combination of Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, tried to be produced in a new public life. Orhangazi Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları” in *T. Bora, et al. (ed) Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. IV, İletişim Yay. İstanbul, 2004, p. 359

before the establishment of the German nation-state in 1870 had revealed an ethnic and cultural character with its “anti-Western”, “anti-Enlightenment” and deeply “Romantic/idealist” premises. In other words, it may be accepted as the encountering of modern nationalism with its anti-thesis. It is possible to argue that the establishment of the German nation-state onto perfectly opposite bases had shown that the mere way of establishing a nation-state was not necessarily the French style. Thus, this also had shown that modernized and non-modernized distinction may not entirely be right in evaluating such nationalisms because Germany and Italy were coming from the same cultural and political traditions but established their nation states on opposite bases. On the other hand, the emergence of such nation-states may have filled the gap between the modernized and non-modernized states of the same continent when looked from the angle of nationalism because Germany and Italy had been established without experiencing the processes like the industrialization in Britain and the revolution in France. Even, they had been known with their economic underdevelopment. The probability of another way in the nationalist phenomenon may be said to make any exception possible. The completion of the process with romanticism and the birth of the second generation nationalisms may be seen as the other branches which emerged from the same body of a tree. Despite their antagonisms to the main branch, they were not alien to the European culture. The traditions within which they emerged had been the other strong sources of the European culture. In other words, they were anti-Western; however, they were within from the West again.

Already, if economically observed, an organic bond between these two different ideologies may be seen. In this sense, it is possible to evaluate the development of nationalism in its relation to capitalism. The emergence of Germany and Italy as nation-states had articulated them to the imperialist world of new capitalism, which was climbing higher on the shoulders of the nation-states. In the classical age of liberalism, economic development was acquiring its shape within the framework of nation-state. In other words, entering the colonization race was possible by being, first of all, a nation-state.

The colonization experience had contributed to the encountering of the West with something that was not Western. This structure in the very east of the West was entirely a different body. With the colonization experience, the real “traditional”

against the “modern” had been found, which was to be defined as the “other” of the European culture. Invasion of the East by the Western culture is related to this discussion because nationalism was one of the important things that traveled to the Orient within it. In other words, nationalism in the colonial age had taken its shape through this experience. However, an important scientific outcome of this is the distinction which came to the fore between the Western and the Eastern nationalisms. Hans Kohn makes a distinction between the “Western” from the “non-Western nationalisms” and he emphasizes the “derived” nature of the non-Western. Moreover, he adds the “inferiority complex”⁹⁴ of derived nationalisms against the “superiority” of the West. For Wolf, Kohn’s dichotomy had provided him a rationale in defending the Western liberal values against fascism and later on, communism, “*by pointing certain fundamental differences in the intellectual development of Western and non-Western areas*”, which he bases on social and economic differences.⁹⁵ This relates the development of the Eastern nationalisms to the lack of the modernization process.

Due to the view told above, the Eastern nationalism adopts the mission of transforming national culture by adjusting it to the requirements of modernization. This confirms that pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, which emerged after modernization, may be characterized as Eastern nationalisms. Afterwards, “reaching the contemporary civilization” targeted by the official nationalism shows again the original feature of the Eastern nationalism. At the same time, the missions of derived nationalisms are to preserve the traditional cultures and the distinctive identities. This paradox points out, on the one hand, the superiority of the West and tries to enable development with the help of the mechanisms of the Western thought and, on the other hand, it tries to balance this by preserving the authentic culture. Chatterjee touches on this paradox through defining nationalism as a “problem in the history of the political ideas”. He defines three stages in the development of the nationalist thought in colonial world.⁹⁶ Firstly, the *departure stage* corresponds to the “initial confrontation” with the West. It is the acceptance of the superiority of the

⁹⁴ Kohn, *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30

⁹⁵ Ken Wolf, “Hans Kohn’s Liberal Nationalism: The Historian as a Prophet”, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, Vol.37, No. 4. (Oct.-Dec., 1976), p.666

⁹⁶ Chatterjee, *Ibid.*, pp. 99-101

Western culture and backwardness may be transformed with replicating the modern. This view tries to solve the backwardness problem by defining the superiority of the West on the basis of its technical progress. Therefore, for them, the real modernization process means integrating the technical superiority of the Western “material” culture with the “spirituality” of the East. The second is the *maneuver stage*, which Chatterjee explains as “passive revolution”. It requires cultural synthesis through refined elitist programs. In doing this, popular cognition may be transformed from “top to down”. Here, modern is “condemned” and national is “glorified”. Anti-capitalism is required at the beginning for preparing the nation for the further entrance of the capitalist world. The third is the *stage of arrival*, which is the organization of nationalism as the rhetoric of order and the rational organization of the government. It ignores previous paradoxes, differences and contradictions within its body. Its mere aim is to realize the ideological unity.

If the emergence of nationalism within the Ottoman Turkey is taken into consideration, its strong relation to the modernization process may be seen. Modernization inherited by the Republic differs from the colonial modernization because the Empire had never been entirely colonized like the Third World states. On the other hand, the resemblance of the emergence of Turkish nationalism and the next stages may confirm Chatterjee’s conceptualization. Chatterjee’s first stage entails the encounter of the national consciousness with the rationalist Enlightenment thought. This is the moment when the superiority of the West and the defects of the East are determined as the causes of the backwardness. Such a moment in the Ottoman Empire had paved the way of modernization and was inherited by the Republic. In addition, this led to the emergence of reformists like Young Ottomans and Young Turks, who contributed to an *elitist* modernization. Parallel to this, Mardin proposes that nationalism which developed within the 19th century Ottoman Empire “*merely affected the Ottoman official intellectual world*”.⁹⁷

Relatively late emergence of nationalism among Turks within the Empire may be shown as a difference point because Chatterjee’s proposition does not exemplify a *semi-colonized* Empire and the Ottoman culture was not a national culture. However, coinciding with Chatterjee’s argument, with the lack of national

⁹⁷ Şerif Mardin (d), *Türkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset: Makaleler I*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 2003, p. 55.

consciousness, the reasons for the decline were determined to be neutralized by replicating the Western culture, namely, its science and technology. This project was tried by elite both in the Imperial and the Republican years, which again coincides with Chatterjee's arguments. However, the emergence of such nationalist consciousness occurred with the Turkish Independence War, through which Turkish elite tried to design a *departure stage*.

The other thing to emphasize is mentioned by Kadioğlu. She argues that “*since the days of the early Westernization efforts, the Turkish psyche has been burdened with the difficult task of achieving a balance between the Western civilization and the Turkish culture*”.⁹⁸ This was seen in the efforts of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks especially when they tried to reconcile Islam with progress and the unsolved problem of harmonization of the Islamic identity with national identity as touched upon with Gökalp. All these may show the grounds that Turkish nationalist development and modernization process resembles the ones in the twentieth century colonial world. However, stage one may be accepted to start with Tanzimat. Stage two had developed together with stage one and with the establishment of the Republic, they began to develop in the third stage. Thus, Kemalist nationalism reconciled these three stages in one with 1923, which may constitute the original aspect of Turkish nationalism. Due to its specific development, it both carries its own and common paradoxes in relation to the development of a nationalist ideology. It is possible to argue that in its own formation process, Turkish nationalism have been trying to digest both the Western nationalism and its irrational structure in its formation period and tried to transform them according to its original culture. At this point, it should be added that the formation period of Turkish nationalism is different from the ones in the colonized world because some original features nurturing Turkish nationalism were always active; however, they began to be active in the Third World after the emergence of national consciousness. This is because Turkey did not have any colonial experience. However, Turkish nationalism still carries some problems in it resulting from its formation process.

On the other hand, Güngör tries to indicate the difference between modernization and Westernization. According to him, modernization means

⁹⁸ Ayşe Kadioğlu, “The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of the Official Identity”, in Sylvia Kedourie (ed.), *Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics*, Frank Cass, London, 1996, p. 178

“transformation with preservation”; however, what the Republican elite had chosen was a strict Westernization through which they negated the original aspects of the Turkish culture.⁹⁹ As it is seen, the bonds between national and modern are complex; however, Kemalist nationalism had inherited all these historical and transformative complexity. Kemalist nationalism is one of the most important features of the entire Republican ideology. It embraces the problematic combination of Western civilization and Eastern culture in the realm of nationalism and its forward reflection in the political space. Therefore, it also embraces the awakening of Turks to national-consciousness rather than being only a top-down elite *project*. In this sense, the complexity of nationalism continues within its ideological formation process because at the point, it tries both to constitute the ideology of the order in formation and to enable a cultural and political mobilization at the beginning of the Republican years.

The contradictory mission of Kemalist nationalism was establishing a nation-state and a distinctive national identity while transforming the existing culture by adjusting it to the requirements to elevate Turkey to the level of contemporary civilization.¹⁰⁰ This required the reconciliation of “traditional” with “modern”, “civic” with “cultural”, “ethnic” with “religious”, “Enlightenment” with “Romanticism” and the “West” with the “East”. These were combined by “the compatibility of culture and civilization” premise by Gökalp. As Kadioğlu maintained, the Republican nationalism contained the “paradoxical synthesis” of “individual liberty”, “rational cosmopolitanism”, and “universalism” while, at the same time, aimed at its “own-preservation”, for which it contained both the elements of the French nationalism and the organic, anti-Western, and anti-Enlightenment inclinations of the German nationalism.¹⁰¹ For Kadioğlu, this brought about three serious problems in Turkish nationalism. Firstly, it assigned an important task to the elite for transforming the popular consciousness through a project from above. Secondly, this contributed to the emergence of an official Turkish nationalist identity

⁹⁹ Güngör, *Ibid.*, p. 22

¹⁰⁰ The culture-civilization synthesis of Gökalp, inherited by the Republic will not be repeated here again. However, it should be recalled that Gökalp wanted the establishment of a modern Turkish nation, preserving its cultural traits as a unit while adjusting itself to the level of the contemporary civilizations. It was told that as the ideologist of the Republic, Gökalp had chosen the national identity against religious.

¹⁰¹ Kadioğlu, *Ibid.*, p. 184.

within the confines of a specific Turkish nationalism, referring to Kemalism. Thirdly, it paved the way of nationalism to turn to an insoluble, complicated problem, which, together with the second problem,¹⁰² may correspond to an “ambiguity” in Turkish nationalism. They both contributed to the emergence of the Kemalist nationalism as a specific and an official ideological discourse all alone and to the construction of the other hybrid nationalist ideological discourses by replicating spontaneously some of its *sine qua non*'s. This was because being compatible with the state ideology and discourse naturally has been the way of legitimization of the political currents and parties *per se* since then. Moreover, the nationalist ideologies were able to remain non-marginalized if they articulated the official nationalist discourse to their ideologies.

The elitist efforts for transforming the society are accepted as a “project” or a “social engineering” by some academicians.¹⁰³ In fact, it is not possible to neglect the famous Turkish history and the language theses that were officially proclaimed at the beginning of the 1930s. Through this, the official ideology tried to dig the ancient past for its history and a cultural tradition. However, in my opinion, these are the compounds of the sustaining nation-building process. Due to its unsolved problems related to its formation process, nationalism still tries to reconcile the paradoxical aspects in it. For instance, institutionalization of history and language may correspond to a struggle that nationalism has with the religious past of Turks in secularization of the ideology against Islam. The Republican nationalism, referring to secularism, faced threat from Islamism in these years. Islam, while not totally disregarded, was seen as an ideological apparatus for enabling “social cohesion” and “national solidarity”. Rather than the Islamic references in the formation of the national identity, the emphasis was on the historical origins of Turks and their place in the history, which were officially manifested in the establishment of the Turkish Historical Society and the Turkish Language Society.¹⁰⁴ However, through the

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ernest Gellner, *Encounters With Nationalism*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford and Cambridge, 1996 p. 83, 87; Kadioğlu, Ibid, 188.

¹⁰⁴ Uzer and Ağaoğulları comments that, official rhetoric leaning on Turkism reached to its peak with 1930s with the establishment of these two institutions. However, Ağaoğulları mentions that official rhetoric on Turkism differs from Turanism's romantic middle-Asian rhetoric for which it emphasize on so called Anatolian-Turkish past that was tried to be derived from the Hittites. In addition, he

exaggeration of ethnic bonds, the pan-Turkist heritage had turned to a racist, expansionist approach, and an irredentist rhetoric with the 1930s within the Kemalist nationalism.¹⁰⁵ During the 1930s and 1940s, democracies were discredited at the international level and racism and authoritarianism had increased due to National-Socialism and Fascism. This caused Kemalist nationalism to carry an ethnic color within itself against religious identity formations near its territorial-civic features. However, ethnic inclinations were not free to express themselves except for the proportion that official nationalism allowed. Accordingly, in the first years, neither Kemalism nor Kemalist nationalism was officially defined except for some of its sensitive features which had been gradually clarified until the 1930s. This ideological ambiguity may reflect its purpose of holding the heterogeneous structure together. Accordingly, it was a French type “civic nationalism” and resembles the last period of nationalism defined by Chatterjee, in which all differences are ignored to form a whole.

As a consequence, with its modernism, civic features, statism, secularism and elitism, Kemalist nationalism may be accepted as a heterogeneous and ambiguous ideological structure in the Republican era because it carries many conflicting aspects in it. It seems, at this point, that the state is trying to establish its own ideology. Nationalism plays a great role in its construction; however, it is just a body of ideas/false ideas, constructed for helping to legitimate the dominant political power. This type of a nationalist ideology is not a product of the collective action/culture. Yet, there is no “collective culture” accepted by the official ideology and it is in its formation period. The social actors are not conscious enough to defend a political ideology. The ideology of the state is trying to form itself politically and also trying to legitimize itself as a “natural historical fact”. The nationalist ideology of the period is not mature enough to form a collective political consciousness.

claims that these views had no scientific bases. Umut Uzer, “Racism in Turkey: The Case of Hüseyin Nihal Atsız”, *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 1, (2002), p. 119; Ağaoğulları, *Ibid.*, p. 202, 203

¹⁰⁵ Most famous names of the Turkist current were Zeki Velidi Togan, H. Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan, Rıza Nur, Fethi Tevetoğlu, Hikmet Tanyu and Alparslan Türkeş (future founder and the leader of the Nationalist Action Party). However, some cultural features of the Turanist/Turkist approach were articulated to the official nationalism and accordingly, its ideologues were entitled in the Republican government like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmed Ağaoğlu, Rıza Nur (Well known with his opposition to the government policies and quarrels with Atatürk, for more information see Rıza Nur, *Hayat Ve Hatıratım*, İşaret Yay., İstanbul, 1992) and etc.

However, its ideological construction is engaged in establishing its ideological apparatuses for sustaining the official state system. This means that the production of meanings, signs and values in social life started to be controlled by the state and the official nationalism was one of the aspects of the whole state ideology employed in this process. As maintained by Althusser, ideology is formed by “material” processes and it exists in the apparatuses or within its practices.¹⁰⁶ In this respect, the state was both establishing its apparatuses, and nationalism was to be produced as the official ideology, forming Kemalist nationalism as a “collective cultural signifying process” to sustain its hegemony.

4.3 Nationalisms within the RPP and the Single Party Period

In accordance with its homogenization aims all around the society between different cultural parts, Kemalism had an ambiguous structure. As it has no definite definition, it is redefined on different conjunctures. In 1927, the Republican Peoples’ Party (RPP) defined the state as “republican”, “populist” and “nationalist”.¹⁰⁷ In 1937, with the acceptance of “six arrows” as the new ideology of the party¹⁰⁸, nationalism had moved to the second sequence coming after republicanism. With the 1935 congress of the RPP, nation was defined as a “linguistic, cultural and idealist unity of citizens”. In 1937, the six arrows were accepted both as the principles of the party and the state. Within these redefinitions, the official nationalism was legitimized as the basic principle of the state ideology until the 1960 Coup. Pan-Turkist/Turanist inclinations¹⁰⁹ that might indicate the external influences of Fascism

¹⁰⁶ Althusser, *Ibid.*, p. 284

¹⁰⁷ Cemil Koçak, “Kemalist Milliyetçiliğin Bulanık Suları”, in T. Bora, et al. (ed) *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol. IV, İletişim Yay. İstanbul, 2004, p. 38. Exact dates were derived from Koçak.

¹⁰⁸ The “six arrows” concept is constituted by “republicanism”, “nationalism”, “laicism”, “populism”, “reformism” and “statism”.

¹⁰⁹ A well known guide that Atatürk had written addressing the Turkish youth ends with the sentence, “*The power you need is found in the noble blood in your veins (Muhtaç olduğun kudret, damarlarındaki asil kanda mevcuttur)*”, which emphasizes the nobility of the Turkish blood and which is surprisingly an ethnic expression. However, this ethno-racist approach may be accepted not as a discriminating factor, rather an integrating factor that ignores the different racial communities within the boundaries of Turkey. In other words, it tried to terminate separating racial consciousnesses at the moment of their emergence on the favor of civic nationalist identity.

and National Socialism upon Turkish official nationalism¹¹⁰ were left behind due to the good relations with the USSR.¹¹¹ On the other hand, its “leftist” features, anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism were softened according to the free market inclinations of the time. In 1960, Kemalist nationalism was defined on the basis of initial Turkish nationalism but not Kemalism. With the 1980 coup, the mere framework was determined as the nationalism defined by Atatürk himself. However, what is clear was its sheltering of different nationalist inclinations within its body.

As suggested by Althusser, an ideology is able to give birth to other secondary ideologies as by-product.¹¹² Thus, it may be argued that Turkish nationalisms had been nurtured by the official nationalism since their births as separate ideological bodies as its by-products. After the integration and political mobilization of various nationalisms against its enemies, modern Turkey included two kinds of nationalisms, the “official” and the “others”. The official nationalism was “reformists”; however, it gradually became “chauvinist”, “autarkist” and “despotic”. The other nationalisms in opposition may be divided into two as “Anatolianism”¹¹³ and “Turkism”. Anatolianists may be defined as moderate nationalists. The Turkists were on the line of Gökalp but they were more radical than him, focusing on ethnic bonds. Between Gökalp and the Reformists, Turkism acted as the vehicle of partnership on the basis of official premises; however, it was the source of opposition for the radicals now. Radicals revealed their racist and pan-Turanist inclinations in the National Chief Years and were oppressed under the state imperatives. Its politicization process started at the point where nationalism acted as an opposition to the official ideology as an alternative political view. The official nationalism was not accepted as a natural reality and they had alternative

¹¹⁰ Resurgence of Turkism particularly happens just before the Second World War propagating through media. This may be related to the National Chief era that was entered with the death of Atatürk in 1938, in which Turkey had moved closer to the Nazi-Germany in the external politics.

¹¹¹ Especially, with Stalin, who abolished pan-Slavism, the color of the relations with the USSR had changed and tolerance to the ones supporting pan-Turkism decreased. Ağaoğulları, *Ibid*, p. 200

¹¹² Althusser, *Ibid.*, p. 289

¹¹³ Here, Anatolianism (*Anadoluculuk*) may not be confused with the *Humanist Anatolianism* that had been developed through the glorification of the Mediterranean culture and history by Cevat Şakir (known as Halikarnas Balıkcısı), Azra Erhat and Sabahattin Eyüboğlu. Later on, Turkish nationalist-left will be affected from its humanitarianism; however, the humanism of Anatolianism will be blamed for serving as an open door for the Marxist ideologies by the antagonist political currents.

“ideologies” in that nationalist ideology was no more under the monopoly of the official discourse or practice. However, it was not politicized enough to organize a social group or a class around a body of ideas

Both the Anatolianists and the Turkists are nurtured by Gökalp; however, they differ in practice. Both groups of nationalists are opposed to the history and nation thesis of the RPP; namely, they reject the direct intervention of the state to daily social life. They believe in the continuity of the Turkish history but the Turkists give much more importance to the pre-Islamic past and evaluate the Islamic era in a negative manner. The Anatolianists believe in the *Turkish-Muslim nation and state* thought. However, they accept that with the emergence of national consciousness molded by Anatolia, Turks herein have acquired a different character from the Asian Turks. It may be suggested that they were able to propose a solution to the Islam-nationalism tension sustained since the Young Ottoman Era as an alternative to the RPP opposition to Islam. Accordingly, they negate racism and defend the integrity of the Anatolian races under Anatolian Islam in that they do not accept Turan.

On the other hand, the Turkists blame Islam as a tool of Arab imperialism and believe that Islam contributed to the alienation of Turks from their original characteristics. They are committed to the pre-Islamic past and pan-Turan. They are anti-Western and for them, what counts is the authentic Asian-Turkish culture. Additionally, both some Anatolianists and Radical Turkists had to take part in the RPP because there was no other political party embracing their ideological approaches then.¹¹⁴ With the famous *3 May 1944 Racism-Turanism Incident*,¹¹⁵ leading Turkists were arrested, which proves the intolerance to other ideologies. Nevertheless, the paradoxical attitude of the government to Turkism, from one side, reinforced it among the oppositional youth, preparing a new potential for the future Turkist structure, and from the other side, this contributed it to be departed from the

¹¹⁴ Ahmed Aġaoġlu, Rıza Nur, and Yusuf Akçura are some of the important names of this group of intellectuals.

¹¹⁵ Every year, the 3rd of May is celebrated as the Turkism Day by the nationalists. In addition, close relations with the Nazi-Germany had been interrupted with the decline of Germans against Soviet forces, which contributed to the Turkish approach to the Allied Forces. The date of this captures may be evaluated together with the decline of the Nazi-Germany for clarifying the state policies related to nationalism in these years. In this context, Turkism may be accepted as a policy that is employed for or against the Soviets or the West when needed. In addition, 1940's may be accepted as the increasing years of the leftist views.

official ideological rhetoric.¹¹⁶ Until the 1950s, Turkish nationalism may be divided into three as Anatolianists, Turkists and Kemalists or as Anatolianists, pan-Turkists/Turanists, and pro-Westerns/Europeans. These three ideological inclinations in nationalism may show its authentic Anatolianist, modernist elitist and reactionary Third World nationalist features that may be a clue in evaluating its complex ideological structure.

The Kemalist era and the RPP era were, despite their characteristic differences, deeply nationalist due to the arguments told above. The purpose of Kemalism, despite some “totalitarian” inclinations of the RPP era, was to establish a rule, which was “national” and “popular” but not “bureaucratic” and “authoritarian”. Nevertheless, this does not change the fact that the official ideology tried to produce or rewrite a tradition or past by suppressing the Eastern characteristics of the society in favor of the modernization project through its direct ideological apparatuses like Turkish Hearths, Turkish History Association, Turkish Language Association, Peoples’ Houses and Village Organizations for the entire cultural transformation of the collective. On the other hand, economic policies, depending on solidarism and corporatism, and settlement policies aiming at a homogenous society may indicate the initial economic and political policies in realizing practical ideological transformation. The Turkish history and language theses which were written by transforming the old Turkish myths had given birth to Turkism, Turkish-Anatolian Islam, Humanist Anatolianism, and later on a leftist-nationalism and Turkish-Islamic synthesis, which all correspond to the “prolific”, “paradoxical” and “ambiguous” character of Kemalist nationalism in its relation to mythical past. Then, Kemalist nationalism was a symbolic and a visual one, projecting the primordial past of the Turkish history.

It is probable to point out that the birth or the diversification of nationalisms may show an identity crisis that could not be solved by Kemalist nationalism’s identity formation project. However, it also reflects the characteristic structure of nationalism in general, which articulates itself in every ideology in all conjunctures.

¹¹⁶ Aġaoġulları divides Turkism into two historical parts. The first phase embraces the Ottoman Turkism case, which was detailed as the emergence of Turkism before. The second generation, nurtured in the environment between 1920 and 1930, starts with the publishing of the “Atsız” periodical, which defended clear Turkish racism of H. Nihal Atsız, who was the famous racist figure at the time. Aġaoġulları, *Ibid.*, p. 203

Namely, productivity of Kemalist nationalism is due to the productive structure of nationalism. These nationalisms were born with the aim of solving the identity crisis within the official nationalism. These crises may be traced back to the Tanzimat era, which had continued with the emergence of different alternative nationalism types in the Ottoman Turkey, and which had been carried to the Republican era. Kemalism had acted as the ground where their seeds were sown. The emergence of different nationalisms is not limited to the Kemalist nationalism. As they had emerged in the same society, the heterogeneous and the organically bounded character of these nationalisms may both indicate the failure of the official nationalism and the complex problematic character of the derived nationalisms. Therefore, it may be argued that all these types already carry their own crisis in themselves due to their chameleon like structures. Such structures may show their ideological weaknesses or, as argued in this thesis, may be one of the reasons of their identity crises. The question here is that whether these inclinations will carry their weak ideological reconstructions to the practical politics field or not which will be tried to be answered in the following part.

4.4 Political Nationalism after the Multi-Party Period

Until the middle of the forties, Turkey was ruled by an “authoritarian single-party”¹¹⁷ regime. RPP was identified with the state and the party was the tacit coalition of the modernized elite, bureaucracy, intellectuals, some parts of the middle classes and local notables. The other parts in the society could not identify themselves with the RPP and remained unrepresented in the political arena. The elections were realized as rituals for the submission of the loyalties to the single-party. The Republican tradition had to experience deep transformative years with the multi-party period. Both the general socio-economic and political discomforts related to the Single Party regime and international developments relevant to the Cold War after the Second World War led Turkey to design a pro-Western foreign policy, requiring a liberal democratic political system and led to the transition to the multi party period with the establishment of the DP on the 7th of January, 1946. The multi

¹¹⁷ Ali Eşref Turan, *Türkiye’de Seçmen Davranışı: Önceki Kırılmalar ve 2002 Seçimi*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yay., İstanbul, 2004, p.10.

party period gave chance to nationalisms within the RPP to claim their independencies and establish their own parties. Then, they could pass from the abstract theoretical level to the practical politics. However, this is related to the evaluation of daily social facts and problems, their conversion to politics and ideological representation of their practical solutions. Accordingly, as maintained by Ögün, “national will” in the one party period refers to a patronized one but not a represented one.¹¹⁸ Therefore, it had to reconstruct itself ideologically convertible to the daily politics.

Transformation in the political arena led to the concentration of the political right within the political system and thus, the next years had witnessed the development of rightist mass parties and their governance. In fact, this was an available conjuncture for radical nationalism to reach ideological reconstruction and political mobilization. However, it was not able to organize around a political party until 1960s and it sustained its intellectual progress.¹¹⁹ Except for the official nationalism, nationalist ideology had turned to a body of ideas and the characteristics of a particular political group which in 1965 became a political party. However, what eased it to proliferate among society as a political ideology were “communism”¹²⁰ and “the increasing influence of religion” in the coming years. Proliferating among peripheral masses, anti-communism and religion were the most important premises for nationalism in forming a party ideology because its acceptance throughout the society was bounded up with covering its previous racist inclinations. Departure from racism may be accepted as a historical turning point for Turkism; however, it may be the clearest sign of the ideological reconstruction of the NAP, recruiting for the peripheral masses.

The basic premise of Turkism up to forties and fifties was its “racism”¹²¹ in

¹¹⁸ Süleyman Seyfi Ögün, *Modernleşme, Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye*, Bağlam Yay., İstanbul, 1995, p. 40

¹¹⁹ To accept 1965 as the emergence of the ultra nationalist political party is related to transformation of the RPNP ideology under the leadership of Türkeş with 1965.

¹²⁰ After 1945, anti-communism was the natural outcome of joining the Western block under the Cold War conditions. The reflection of anti-communism in politics was its strong articulation to the rhetoric of the rightist parties. However, the religion factor is bounded to the evaluation of anti-communism as atheism, which helped anti-communism to spread to the entire society. Then, both factors were available for mass parties’ rhetoric.

¹²¹ Emre Arslan, “Türkiye’de Irkçılık”, *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce: Milliyetçilik*, Vol.IV, in T Bora et al. (ed), İletişim Yay, İstanbul, 2004, p. 409-426.

that it was the successor of pan-Turkism. After the war, Turkist nationalism was divided into four branches under different leaders as Rıza Nur, H. Zeki Velidi Togan, H. Nihal Atsız and Reha Oğuz Türkkan due to their different views upon racism and action styles. Nevertheless, these far right oriented Turkist groups were small in size outside the system and were not able to organize around a political party until 1965. Nationalism remained in the narrow Turkist elitist environment; however, this was important because the second generation Turkists who had organized around the names mentioned above had influenced the official and unofficial ideology of the future NAP. Thus, it is advantageous to touch on their concentrated academic approaches on Turkism in the forties and fifties.¹²²

The ideological differences of the four groups in defining racism will not be detailed. All of their racisms were derived from the nineteenth century racist visions and afterwards its practice in the National Socialist-Germany. Racism aimed at the establishment of a state on the basis of a “pure” and “heterogeneous” Turkish nation. Their second important aim was the old *Turanism* concept. Due to the fact that it defined Turan as the natural and Turkey as the political borders, Turanism was carrying *imperialist* aims. In addition, it was aiming at saving the “slaver Turks” that may be accepted as *irredentism*. The third was its *anti-communism* in that communism was the imperialism of the Slavic race for them. Confusingly, anti-communism intersects here with anti-imperialism but their irredentist rhetoric makes this ideological approach much more paradoxical. It must be added that communism of the age was acquiring its shape under the Cold War conditions and it was much more affected by the external developments. Thus, it is possible to suggest that anti-communism, which was going to be the most important ideological component in the ideology of the NAP was defined in a different sense by the pure Turkists of the forties and fifties. The fourth was its *militarism*, thought as the carrier of the Turan ideal. Accordingly, it has been commonly accepted that all Turkish people were soldiers starting from their births. At every chance, this common view plays effective role on nationalism-society relation. However, with the evaluation of communism as a severe threat for the survival of Turkish nation and state, the importance of this common belief comes to the fore because it was easy for NAP to turn these people to

¹²² The main components of the Türkist ideology are collected from Güngör, *Ibid*, pp. 133-42, Ağaogulları, *Ibid*, pp. 210-2, Ertekin, *Ibid*, pp. 371-9.

its soldiers and mobilize them in its fighting against communism in favor of nationalism, especially in the 1970s, which will be explored in the next chapter. Its militarism caused nationalist ideology to turn itself to action oriented sets and beliefs of a political group against communism. Communism played an important role for the politicization and proliferation of nationalism among the society. The last components may generally be listed as the acceptance of traditional Asiatic values like *strong statism, hierarchical society and obedience*”, which will be reflected in the NAP tradition as the “state-nation-leader” rule. Moreover, influenced by the Nazi-Germany’s “one leader-one party-one nation state” doctrine, the ideology had some socialist components as *socialism, statism, antagonism to capitalism and liberalism* and thus, the social order the party planned was *national-socialism*. It is notable that there was no “religious” inclination in the nationalist ideology then.

Nationalism developed strong *anti-communism* throughout the Cold War conditions. Zürcher maintains that due to the Cold War anti-communism, all leftist people were reacted negatively in the years between 1948 and 1949. Even, Pan Turkist names like Atsız and Togan, who were prosecuted just after the war, were given their self esteems back.¹²³ This was parallel to the official antagonism to communism, creating a rapprochement ground to both. This caused nationalism to widen its former tolerance limits. In other words, its anti-communism enabled the legitimization of nationalism in the long run. On the other hand, the DP government had obviously shown that it had no tolerance for racism. Under the daily conditions, racism was not only unacceptable for politics, but it was an alien concept for the popular masses, too. Despite the nation-state culture and homogeneity that had been tried to be imposed upon society, Anatolian people were still the carriers of the tolerance to differences. In other words, no party had the chance to be a mass party through determining racism as an ideological premise. Therefore, the racist Turan ideal was hidden behind, has been carried to the future, which was going to awaken in the nineties after the collapse of the USSR, and articulate itself to the nationalist ideology, available for the conjuncture. Both the official attitude and the specific requirements of the Turkish electorate led nationalism to depart from racism. Even the racist cadre was officially refined in the following years. Departure from racism

¹²³ At the same time, Sabahattin Ali, who was the number one antagonist author to the Turkists and who was known by his socialist thoughts was assassinated. Eric Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İletişim Yay., İstanbul, 2004, p. 310

was neutralized by the substitution of it with the approach of Turkish-Islamic synthesis. It may be emphasized that throughout the forties and the fifties, nationalism moved from far right to a more centre rightist position, trying to normalize its affairs with state, legitimize itself and attract the Anatolian people. With the sixties, yet, it was no more an elite movement; thus, it was then organized around a political party to realize its political aims.

CHAPTER 5
THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONALISM INTO A POLITICAL
PARTY IDEOLOGY and the NAP

5.1 The Heritage of Turkism from the Nation Party and the Republican Peasants Nation Party to the Nationalist Action Party:

As put forward throughout the thesis, nationalism is a political phenomenon related to modernism, masses and conditions. It started to represent such features with 1789 after which it turned into an ideological mass movement. After this time, it represented the common ideological discourse of the masses. However, it left its cosmopolitan outlook behind when it was transformed into a bourgeois nation-state ideology. Its political function started to be determined in the nation-state structure. Therefore, it turned into the ideology of the status quo by leaving its massive features focusing on change. Then, it was institutionalized through its functions in the nation state and was transformed into political party ideologies, moving within the evident legal political limits of that state. In Turkey, inheriting the historical paradoxes of the whole nationalist transformation, nationalisms were carried within the official ideology. With an available conjuncture with transformation into the multi-party system, different nationalisms reached the chance to be institutionalized around political parties. Therefore, it turned into the ideology of an evident group, rather than being the ideology of the state and the whole society. It turned to the political ideology of an evident group; however, it had to act within the limits of the hegemonic nationalism of the state, again as an alternative world view to the premises it represented. The following parts above searched for the peculiar conditions under which Turkish nationalism had been ideologically reconstructed within a legal political party.

Contrary to the awaited democratic environment with transition to the multi party period, the DP rule had ended with a military coup in 1960. Under the DP rule, there had emerged deep economic crisis, social discontent and anti-democratic policies throughout rapid “capitalist modernization” and “cultural alienation” bounded up with the “Westernization process”. Deep socio-economic transformation

led to discontent among society and accompanied to political polarizations between the extreme right and the extreme left; it turned into political violence and economic depression in the following years. To put it more simply, the DP oppressed the pluralism of the multi party period in the name of the “will of the majority”. The DP rule and the military junta may show the fragility of the politics and democracy which will shape nationalism as a party ideology together with the categorical contradictions carried within nationalism and specific conditions of Turkish socio-cultural structure is embodied in nationalism since the 19th century.

The 1961 Constitution designed a relatively liberal political environment, except for its sensibility against the “communist and religious political movements”. The new political framework had widened the limits to more “leftist” and more “rightist” inclinations, within which nationalism had been transformed into a party ideology.¹²⁴ However, the most striking development was in the leftist movements contrary to the rightist ones that had dominated the politics since 1945. With clear ideological premises, leftist movements had widened their bases. This contributed the right to define its ideology in a clearer way, because the ideologies of the RPP and the DP did not have sharp differences.¹²⁵ The voting behavior was not influenced by the ideological premises of the parties until then. Throughout the sixties and the seventies, the Cuba Crisis, the Cyprus Crisis and the famous Johnson Letter had damaged the pro-Western foreign policy maintained since 1945, leading to anti-American and anti-Western public psychology, which also augmented nationalist sentiment in the society. It may be suggested that the conditions for nationalism to be established around a party was slowly maturing in the fifties under these conditions.

According to Bora&Can, nationalism always existed within the official state ideology,¹²⁶ which had been valued in a cultural sense beyond the scope of the politics. To indicate the limits of this inclination, Zürcher suggests that the DP and the RPP had made clear that no tolerance may be shown to irredentism, except for the allowance for sustaining emotional and historical bonds with outside Turks.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ Mustafa Çalık, *MHP Hareketi'nin Kaynakları ve Gelişimi*, Ankara (Unpublished Phd. Thesis), 1991, p. 50

¹²⁵ Sayarı was referred to in Turan, *Ibid.*, p. 31; Zürcher, *Ibid.*, p. 309

¹²⁶ Bora&Can (a), *Ibid.*, , p. 52

¹²⁷ Zürcher, *Ibid.*, p. 347.

However, pan-Turanism has acted as a sensitive pressure mechanism; that it has have been influential upon society and politics up till now¹²⁸ because it remained convertible to daily politics within nationalist ideology, in case of emergency of the conjuncture.

After the 1945, most important factor, gathering all nationalist sentiments together was anti-communism. Anti-communism enabled nationalism to become a massive movement, however; this was so until the 1970s, because then, nationalism articulated Islam near anti-communism and targeted the “Islamist-conservative” electorate. Non-convertible to daily politics, pan-Turkists racism and irredentism were excluded from nationalism. In other words, nationalism started to move from extreme right to the center for widening its electoral base, wishing for the votes of the nationalist, Islamist and conservative electorate at the same time.

Apart from anti-communism, the other ground which turned nationalism to a reactionary ideology was the poverty of the peripheral masses. Ağaoğulları, pointing out the deep transformation in the 1960s, relates the economic face of the change to the emergence of a radical Turkish nationalism as an ideological mobilizing force.¹²⁹ In this respect, “loser-conservative” parts had reacted through inclining to radical nationalism. This group sooner made up the reactionary base of the militant nationalism, playing important role in the streets concerning the fights against leftists, Marxists and communists. Moreover, Bora&Can, for clarifying the “dual structure” of the idealist movement, distinct “elite” due to the historical continuity nurtured by the Pan-Turkist past and the “newly emerging reactionary base”¹³⁰ in the sixties. On the same line, Çalık points out the socio-cultural-economic crisis in the 1960s as the source of radicalism which nurtured the NAP base.¹³¹ Moreover, Çalık

¹²⁸ Here, 1974 Kıbrıs incident may be a good example about the outside Turks issue, which had been influential on politicians and upon the society, augmenting the national sentiments in Turkey in the 1970s.

¹²⁹ Ağaoğulları, Ibid, p.212. Bora&Can accepts the term “fascist movement” as the general use for all fascisms worldwide and the usages like “Frankism”, “national socialism” specific. For this reason, maintaining the NAP as a fascist political party, they prefer using the term “idealist movement” to indicate its specific fascism. Bora&Can (a), Ibid., p.45. Here, the terms “Far right”, “radical Turkish nationalism”, “ultra-nationalist right” and “idealist movement”, “extreme right” and the NAP will be used for indicating the same phenomenon.

¹³⁰ The division of elite and base refers to the distinction of the party, central party administration and the local organizations known as the “Ideal Hearths” to a great extent forming the base of the NAP.

¹³¹ Çalık, Ibid., p. 57.

highlights the nationalisms' ability for filling the spiritual gaps in the transformation periods.¹³² These are parallel to Althusser's claim about the relation of ideologies to material processes. In this sense, nationalism had turned into a reactionary ideology from an intellectual elite movement in that it related itself to real conditions in the society and started to transform itself under these conditions.

In addition to the socio economic conditions, the establishment of nationalism as a political party may be ideologically related to Turkism, and practically to the Republican Peasants Nation Party (RPNP) which was the predecessor of the NAP. Attracting the loser-conservative people and reactionary middle classes in general, both Bora&Can and Ağaoğulları agree upon that the NAP aimed at filling the vacuum of the "populist reaction" against the rapid "capitalist modernization" and the "cultural alienation" bounded up with the Westernization process of the 1960s, nurturing the "immature reactionary radicalism", augmented by anti-communism and daily socio-economic conditions. However, the comments of Ağaoğulları, Çalık and Bora&Can may indicate the continuing transformative structure of the Turkish nationalism since Tanzimat which has articulated itself easily to the new daily conditions.

Until the sixties, nationalism was not able to organize around a political party. 1950s' maturing intellectual development led NAP to inspire from the ongoing developments on the racist-Turanist current. 3 May 1944 Racism-Turanism Incident was a turning point in the emergence of nationalism as an oppositional current against the official nationalism. Alparslan Türkeş, who was going to be the leader of the NAP, was one of the suspects of the Racism-Turanism case for adherence to a civil demonstration. He was a colonel but any military background was a disadvantage in entering politics since military was banned from politics in the Kemalist era. Actually, in the case of Türkeş, the army and the politics intersected officially in the 1960 military Coup, in which Türkeş acted as one of the chief initiators. Türkeş was one of the members of a clique in the Officers' Council for National Unity (OCNU), insisting on a radical transformation in the political system. The refinement within the army after the coup was fulfilled by the influence of these radicals. Türkeş prepared a plan known as "Turkey Ideal and Culture Union", which was aimed at the seizure of the Ministry of National Education, Department of

¹³² Ibid, p. 55

Religious Affairs, General Directorate of Foundations, press and radio in order to have an absolute influence upon the cultural life of the entire society. As it is seen, Türkeş imagined a radical ideological intervention in the production of culture. Radicalism led Türkeş and his friends, “the Fourteens” to be expelled and sent to some diplomatic posts abroad. Türkeş decisively turned back in February 1963 and he resigned from his post in the military commission to enter civil politics. He tried to enter politics through JP, some anti-communist and Turkist associations, which he succeeded this aim by joining the RPNP with some of his friends from “the Fourteens”.¹³³

The RPNP was the successor of the Nation Party (NP). NP was established in 1948 by a number of radical Turkist deputies departing from the DP and by some nationalist associations, getting together under the leadership of Fevzi Çakmak, who was then the symbol of “radical religious nationalism”. Çınar&Arıkan evaluates the party as the coalition of small “fascist” and “proto-fascist” currents.¹³⁴ NP was closed by the government in 8 July 1953. Headed by Osman Bölükbaşı, the Republican Peasants Party was established as the successor of the NP in 10 August 1954 as a “conservative nationalist middle-class party”, leaning on a “populist” rhetoric. Its support base was composed of “peasants” and “middle classes”. The formerly established Turkey Peasants Party joined the party and the name of the party was changed to RPNP.

The RPNP became weaker with the breaking up of Bölükbaşı in the 1960s for reestablishing the NP and then, the leader became Ahmet Oğuz. For removing this blood loss, more than sixty politicians, known with their closeness to Türkeş were accepted to the party in the 18-20 November 1964 General Congress.¹³⁵ Not surprisingly, intermediating between Türkeş and the RPNP were the Turkists again

¹³³ The ones that joined the RPNP with Türkeş were Rifat Baykal, Ahmet Er, Muzaffer Özdağ and Dündar Taşer.

¹³⁴ Alev Çınar&Burak Arıkan, “The Nationalist Action Party: Representing the State, the Nation or the Nationalists?”, *Turkish Studies*, Spring 2002, Vol. 3, Iss.1, p. 26

¹³⁵ The adherence of Türkeş to the JP was thought to increase the JP influence in the military. However, he was only a member of the 27 May Junta for the JP administration and they did not want him in the JP. Moreover, his relation to the Colonel Talat Aydemir, who was the initiator of the 20-21 May 1963 Junta Attempt was mentioned, too. Türkeş wanted to lead to the Junta but this was rejected by Aydemir. He informed İnönü about this and was arrested throughout the Junta attempt.

in their adherence to the RPNP.¹³⁶ Then, Türkeş joined the party in 31 March 1965 with some names from “the Fourteens”¹³⁷ and bargained for the position of Inspector General thereof. Türkeş staged a surprise take over of the party through his contacts with the local organizations of the RPNP. In the general congress on 1 August 1965, he was elected the President of the party. The RPNP members who were opposed to the leadership of Türkeş left the party rather than having an internal struggle.

Until the 1969 Adana Congress when the name of the party was changed to the NAP, the RPNP had entered a transformation process, which makes it possible to evaluate 1965 as a rupture with the past. The “Turkist” and “anti-communist” features were incorporated into the party rhetoric. Çalık maintains that with the election of Türkeş as the RPNP leader, the party became the political and ideological representative of Turkish nationalism.¹³⁸ In this context, the inclinations accepting the establishment of the NAP as 1965 rather than the 1969 Congress seems acceptable. Moreover, Türkeş’s methods in gaining the control of the party may lead one to guess the strong effect and initiative of the party leader upon party which will be more evident in the future.

5.2 The Ideological Re-establishment of the RPNP

Türkeş set out to transform the party’s character after 1965. Here, the “Turkey Ideal and Culture Union” plan that was prepared by Türkeş after the coup when he was yet in the army may be recalled. Aiming an absolute influence on the cultural life of the entire society, it may be an important clue for determining the direction of the shift in the party’s character. Rendering an opinion about the influence of racism on the ideological shift, the contributions of the “extreme

¹³⁶ The name getting Türkeş and RPNP together was Necdet Sançar, who was the brother of Atsız and a well known figure and ideologist in the Turkist stream.

¹³⁷ Firstly, Muzaffer Özdağ, Rıfat Baykal, Ahmet Er and Dündar Taşer joined. In addition, after the election of Türkeş to the Inspector General, Mustafa Kaplan, Fazıl Akkoyunlu, Şefik Soyüce, Numan Esin and Münir Köseoğlu of the Fourteen joined the party.

¹³⁸ Çalık (a), Ibid, p. 59

rightist”, “anti-pluralist”, “anti-liberalist”, “anti-capitalist” and “anti-communist” organizations to the reconstruction of the ideology must be added.¹³⁹

In 1965, the RPNP was organized in 25 provinces, which had reached 61 until 1967. Türkeş was determined to organize nationalism around a political party; however he gave equal importance to the peripheral institutionalization, which may prove the further aim, for attracting the masses. Together with departure from racism, severe rapid institutionalization may imply the direction of the party ideology to a mass one. However, in evaluating the ideological transformation, it is possible to divide the “1965 nationalism”¹⁴⁰ into two. RPNP rhetoric included a “corporatist-progressive-modernist Kemalist restoration rhetoric”, aiming at an “organic”, “homogenized” nation under “strict state control” between 1963 and 1966. Between 1965 and 1969, “fanatic anti-communism” and “Turkism” came to the fore, which Bora&Can evaluate as the “fascist” elements of party rhetoric.¹⁴¹ However, intra-party opposition to Türkeş was focusing on his racist-Turanist past and the 1944 Incident, for which Türkeş wrote a book and needed to redefine it as a “nationalism incident” but not racist. However, this may not be seen as a sharp rupture from pan-Turanism because it was only hidden behind, augmenting the roots of the party, waiting to be invoked due to daily politics in the available further conjunctures. The Intra party opposition left the party or had been purified. Thus, the distinction between the Islamists/Anatolianists, the Islamists/nationalists and the Turkists within the party step by step became clearer until the 1969 Congress.

“Weakening of racist-Turkist elements” was parallel to the “strengthening of Islam”, which indicate a redefinition of Islam in the Turkish identity. In the 1965 election campaign and in the own speeches and writings of the leader, strong reference to laicism was striking. In the 1966 and 1968 election campaigns, Türkeş emphasized the “dangers of communism”, “sectionalism” and “sectarianism”. He manipulated a strong and aggressive anti-communism. In the 1967 Congress, the “Nine Lights” were accepted as the basic tenets of the party, which are possible to be

¹³⁹ Turkish Nationalists Union (Türkiye Milliyetçiler Birliği), Intellectuals Club (Aydınlar Ocağı), Patriotic Turkish Organization (Vatansever Türk Teşkilatı) and Struggle Against Communism Clubs (Komünizmle Mücadele Dernekleri).

¹⁴⁰ Ertekin, Ibid, p. 383

¹⁴¹ Bora&Can (a), Ibid, p. 53

reflected as “national-socialism”¹⁴² for Bora&Can, and according to Çınar&Arıkan, “communitarian nationalism”¹⁴³ in the ideological rhetoric which will be explored later. Moreover, in the same congress, Türkeş was proclaimed as the “Başbuğ” (commander) that may indicate the elevating “leader factor” of the “hierarchical structure”. The NAP named its ideology as *idealism* (ülkücülük) that had emerged due to the formation of the youth organizations, “Idealist Hearths” (Ülkü Ocakları) for fighting against communism.

Idealism is the ideal of serving one’s state, a devotion to the wellbeing of the state as the utmost embodiment of the nation. It identifies state’s interests inseparable from nation’s interests. This articulated the party a militaristic image because militants of the Idealist Hearths soon had involved in the street violence together with the Marxist and leftist groups. Most of, if not all, the leaders of the NAP began their political careers in the Idealist Hearths. Nevertheless, as the subject is the nationalism on the level of party politics, Idealist Hearths are important when they set the tone of the party’s ideological basis. Moreover, as they are the part of the institutional organization, they play important role in the hierarchical structure and the elite/base distinction which is important for the party ideology. There was not a down to top process in the NAP; however, as argued by Bora&Can, the infrastructure had an “indirect” effect on the superstructure, leading to the policies determined by the wishes of the mass base whereas the infrastructure did have no direct initiative in this process.¹⁴⁴

The complexity in the ideological articulation may possibly be resulting from the ongoing transformation process. Aiming at being the mere representative of Turkish nationalism, “pragmatism” was strongly influential on the ongoing ideological redefinition in the party at the end of the 1960s. As argued by Çınar&Arıkan, “*this flexibility has also served the NAP to almost monopolize nationalist positions on the political spectrum and to present itself as the only party that best represents the national interest and not just a particular ideology.*”¹⁴⁵ This

¹⁴² Ibid, p. 54

¹⁴³ Çınar&Arıkan, p. 27

¹⁴⁴ Bora&Can (a), Ibid, p. 83

¹⁴⁵ Çınar&Arıkan, Ibid., p. 25

makes one think that this ambiguity may be a “conscious choice” of pragmatism because up to that time, it remained a relatively unpopular party without any significant presence in the politics. In 1965; the vote share of the RPNP was 2.2 per cent and 11 seats in the parliament, in 1969, 3.3 per cent and 1 seat in the parliament. The ideological shift between 1965 and 1969 seems to make a 1.1 per cent visible rise; however, with the articulation of Islam into the ideology; the NAP targeted the Islamic electorate in central Anatolia and the electoral base of the JP and the National Salvation Party (NSP). If almost 20 per cent volatility of the electoral support in Turkey is thought¹⁴⁶, this attempt seems rational for a party trying to move to the center. What is important here is not the move of the party towards center through Islam or its efforts to be a mass party. If the social state of nationalism needed to nurture the party ideology is thought, it may be suggested that the party was not able to impose its nationalism on mass bases. In other words, nationalism was not able to be a collective ideology of a specific group or their political action yet. Moreover, the problematic articulation of Islam to nationalism was preparing grounds for further tensions.

As a consequence, it may be maintained that Islam/nationalism problem had been redefined with the aim of finding a solution by the NAP since the mid of the 1960s “again and again” up till today. However, the paradoxical ambivalence between Islam and laicism lasted long, and has been inherited by the 21st century’s NAP. In my opinion, this heterogeneous structure in ideology may be said to have contributed to daily inconsistencies indicating its “eclectic pragmatism”. It has been damaging the image, structure, reliability and consistency of the party by leading to “indecisive electorate”, “fluctuating votes” and “instability” within the political spectrum. The inconsistency of the NAP’s ideology may also prove the paradoxical situation of nationalism in general. Moreover, its problematic transformation into Turkish nationalism which can be dated back to its very hybrid emergence within racial, ethnic and cultural varieties of the Empire and the establishment of a nation-state upon this legacy seems to support this proposition. However, the ideology of a nationalist party must be as homogenous as it can be. Turkish nationalism, due to its complex historical legacy, shows a heterogeneous structure, and an ambiguous

¹⁴⁶ Ali Çarkoğlu, “The Geography of the April 1999 Turkish Elections”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 2000), p. 156

definition oscillating between cultural and ethnic definitions because the NAP is not able to choose the one among Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Kemalism because through the credibility and flexibility of representing all of these, it plays on the ambiguous definition of its nationalism to attract more electorate in every election. What the NAP does is to contribute to the long-term paradoxes of nationalism as a political party representing it in the political spectrum. In other words, it does not attempt to regulate the historical irrationalities within Turkish nationalism. Thus, it may be suggested that this definition problem in nationalism and its reflection in the political spectrum as a party ideology may probably continue if the inconsistencies in the NAP ideology is evaluated in relation to the evaluations above. In this sense, the 1970s were marked by a problematic Islam-nationalism marriage and the incorporation of the NAP to the coalition governments; nevertheless, contributing to the present defects in the Turkish political landscape through its ideology, which was one of the responsible of the socio-political tensions in Turkey.

5.3 Adana Congress and the Islamization of Turkism and the Nationalist Front Coalitions

Despite the own genetic paradoxes in the nationalist phenomenon and the problematic structure of the official nationalism and its ideological deficiency, Turkish nationalism had reached the chance to organize around a political party. This means that all the paradoxes of nationalism were inherited by the party, which institutionalized nationalism in the political spectrum. In addition, it had to establish its ideology around these paradoxes. In this respect, this part is planned to evaluate the daily conditions which gave birth to a radical nationalist party, the ideological redefinition in the NAP, its practice in the socio-political environment, its state against the other political actors and its partition in the coalition governments. This process between 1960 and 1980 may show an interesting situation both for nationalism and its ideological constitution in Turkey. The definition of the political nationalism had always been in competition between “religion”, “culture” and “ethnicity” in the 1960s Turkey. However, this may be related to the ambiguous definition of the official nationalism from one aspect because since the

establishment, the definition of Kemalism did not embrace a concrete nationalist definition but always shifted in the emphasis when needed. On the other hand, it was obligatory to stay in accordance with the official ideology to stay within the legitimate limits for a political party to act in politics. Kemalism was aiming at combining different parts of the society; however, a nationalist ideology, if it has popular aims, should not be narrow and embrace as much as it can to attract different parts in the society. This may be the best solution for a radical party to attract wider electorate by leaving the definition of its ideology “blurred” and “functional”. Within a move from radical to the center, until 1969, the NAP had moved from racist-Turkist inclinations to an Islamic redefinition. It was the Turkish-Anatolian Islam peculiar to Anatolia, showing the intellectual effects of the Anatolianist clique on the party ideology. Anatolianist Islam was preferred because, among the different inclinations, Anatolianism was addressing a wider base and this ideology was available to be a mass party in the future. Thus, the party constituted a new ideology named the Turkish Islamic Synthesis (TIS), to attract the conservative-nationalist electorate. In the long term, it was aiming to be the single party of the center right and the most credible ideological approach of these years was to articulate Islam to the party rhetoric. The sixties and the seventies marked a clear ambivalence between Islam and nationalism. The transformation in the party character, which lasted between 1965 and 1969, was established on leaving radicalism aside in the name of a wider base. However, due to the conjuncture, it had to be a radical party against the communists at the same time.

In the 1969 congress, the change in the name of the party to the NAP and in the party emblem to three crescents instead of the Grey Wolf that was a reference to the primordial Turkish past represents the direction of the change.¹⁴⁷ Nevertheless, the scarification of the radical nationalism to Islam was in contradiction with the anti-communism of the party, which was the most important motive for the radical nationalist electorate. Therefore it may be claimed that the competition between the

¹⁴⁷In fact, the party elite and the intellectuals have been known as the “Grey wolves”. They are much more concerned with the pan-Turanic past and the ethno-racial definition of the Turkish identity. They are secular and relatively far to Islam. Namely, they give Islam as an historical and cultural component. However, their views are not available for their party to be a mass one and thus, Islam superseded pan-Turan and racism in their rhetoric. Namely, this was a superficial approach to Islam but not a real converting.

racist, religious, ethnic and official definitions of nationalisms may prove the indecisive character of the NAP ideology in the sixties, which may be related to its populism for being a center right party. In this sense, that anti-communism and Turkism could not develop the party's position, and nationalism and anti-communism was combined within Islam and this tuned communism into a kind of atheism. This was a "middle way" between "religious extremism" and "nationalist radicalism" which was thought for mobilizing the conservative-religious votes because no good increase was gained in the 1960s. In other words, the aims of the NAP and its ideological tools were not conforming to each other because limiting the party to anti-communism led the NAP to fail in gaining the larger sections of the society. In this respect, the ideology seems to be influenced by daily interests, and transformation does not reflect a long term characterization in the ideology rather it is pragmatist.

From the view of Islam, party's stand to the words of Islam does not reflect a stable transformation in the short term because due to the official definition of nationalism, laicism was on the forefront until the end of the 1960s. In 1969, Islam started to be referred to as an indispensable part of the Turkish culture and the identity. This was a one step forward from the official definition because it was emphasizing the necessity of secularism in the society. Nevertheless, this may be evaluated as an attempt to benefit from the politicization of Islam and its increasing influence upon the society since the 1950s. In this respect, Türkeş defined the new place of the religion in the party ideology as follows: "*We are as Turkish as Tengri Mountain* (located in the Central Asia, the place where the NAP believes the Turks' ancestors migrated from), *and as Muslim as Hira Mountain* (located in the Muslim Holly Lands in Suudi Arabia). *Both philosophies are our principles.*"¹⁴⁸ In addition to being a political strategy in mobilizing the religious conservative electorate in Central Anatolia, Çınar&Arıkan maintains that Islam was politicized as a force that could be manipulated against the rising Marxist currents because communism was an "anti-religious" and "anti-nationalist" ideology. On the same line, Çalık states that communism was defined by some as "*antagonism to religion*" and all leftists were

¹⁴⁸ Çınar&Arıkan, Ibid., p. 27, Bora&Can (a), Ibid., p. 54

equal to communists on behalf of the ones voting for the NAP at that time.¹⁴⁹ On the other hand, the NAP, trying to legitimize itself with anti-communism, did not dare to pass the official limits determined by laicism by defining Islam as only a “deep” cultural trait. Consistently, Bora&Can thinks that Islam was not the fundamental but the secondary component of the Turkish identity, strengthening Turkism in the TIS. TIS enabled the party to enter a rising period in the eastern and central Anatolia, where Alevi-Leftist and Sunni-Rightist rivalries remained intense. For these reasons, Bora&Can evaluate the articulation of Islam to nationalism as “instrumental”¹⁵⁰, because Muslim masses were being mobilized with anti-communist sentiments specific to the conjuncture.

The ideological change had clarified the different inclinations within the party as the “Turkists”, the “Islamists”, the “supporters of Türkeş and transformation” and the “national-socialists defending anti-capitalism of fascism added to an anti-Masonic rhetoric”. As known, the racist-pan-Turkists had been expelled until the mid-1970s because they were opposed to TIS. Anti-capitalist/anti-Masonic group was jettisoned as the cost of the credibility of the NAP in the system as a legitimate actor due to its anti-communism. The group identity of the Islamists in the party was not as strong as the Turkists and they remained calm until the self-questioning process with the 1980 Coup, which contributed their distance from NAP. Çalık evaluates the 1970s’ NAP as representing “an interesting synthesis between center and periphery”, discontented by the JP and their conservative reaction was coming to life within the TIS.¹⁵¹ It may be told that the 1970’s move from radical right to the centre was marked by “intra-group conflicts”, slowing down the self-development of the party.

According to the new ideology, the NAP was not an Islamist party. TIS was laicist in that it defined religion on the basis of culture when its relations to the state required. This contributed to a dual rhetoric in the party ideology because when it targeted the conservative religious electorate the importance of the religion but not the laicism was emphasized. However, when it was the state in the front, the cultural

¹⁴⁹ Çalık (a), Ibid., p. 106

¹⁵⁰ Bora&Can, Ibid., p. 54

¹⁵¹ Çalık(a), Ibid., p. 150

importance of the religion was much more important. Under these circumstances, it may be suggested that the NAP ideology of the time was under the influence of the “official ideology”, “cyclical anti-communism”, “Islamization in the society” and “departure from radical nationalism or racism”.

When the observation continues in the macro framework, the emergence of a radical nationalist political party and the transformation in its ideology may be related to the daily conditions in a transforming society than the historical continuity principle because the sixties may be accepted as another break off point from the past. In such a society, ideology meant the differentiation in the worldviews of varying social clusters. In other words, ideology meant the cognition, which acquired a different character socially and politically. The motive of the ideology then was the differentiation in the structure of the society in relation to rapid industrialization, immigration, urbanization, lack of infrastructure and failure of people in coming up with the requirements of the socio-economic change, which led to deep polarizations; and thus, the Turkish politics had entered a period of “ideological fluctuation”¹⁵². Under these conditions, the function of ideology was determined by differentiation in the society; therefore, every part searched for new thoughts as guide to the social transformation. As the older framework of the society had no functions after the transformation, political ideologies were determined by the search for new social order. However, in the 1970s, this search was marked by the sustaining economic depression, ideological polarization, and increasing street conflicts between the extreme left and the extreme right accompanying to two military interventions in a decade. Due to these conditions, ideology turned to a political medium, in which conscious social actors made sense of their world and later on action-oriented sets and beliefs organized around political parties because as suggested by Mannheim, collective action has to be fixed through a thought system, signified and justified rationally.¹⁵³

Under these conditions, the NAP ideology was determined by its laicism, adjusting its relation to the official order and nationalism for imposing its legitimacy in public and politics. The definition of *idealist* nationalism as “devotion of one’s life

¹⁵² Mardin (a), *Ibid.*, p. 138

¹⁵³ Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 64

to state” eased this approach. Through the credibility that was served to the party by the state for its anti-communism, the “*NAP identified itself with the state like it was the civil force against communism*”¹⁵⁴ and mobilized the members of the Idealist Hearths as the guardians of the streets who were named as the “Grey wolves” against communists and Marxists. In other words, the NAP and its paramilitary street force were acting as the protectors of the order and the state and Landau maintains that their oft-repeated commando training in special summer camps drew their appellation as “commandos”¹⁵⁵ despite the negation of the *de facto* party-state relation in 1969.¹⁵⁶ It is widely known that they were supported and encouraged by the state.¹⁵⁷ However, Ağaoğulları suggests that they were pragmatically used by the state against the communist opposition among the society, which contributed to the further development of their political representation.¹⁵⁸ However, it may be suggested that political nationalism then turned to a severe action oriented belief against the whole left. On the other hand, Çalık maintains that developing nationalist struggle against communism had given an equal improvement chance to the activist left by creating a counter revolutionist environment, against which they could define their revolution aims.¹⁵⁹ Accordingly, he points out this mutual relation as the “feed back” mechanism of social terror.

The ideological reactions of both the left and the NAP may prove the crisis in the ongoing modernization process, transforming the society. Despite the ideological transformation in the party’s character, the party had leaned on the forces of the status quo and supported the 12 March memorandum. The NAP supported the 12

¹⁵⁴ Bora&Can (a), Ibid, p. 59

¹⁵⁵ Jacop M. Landau, “The Nationalist Action Party in Turkey”, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.17, No.4. (Oct., 1982), p. 590 (Table I: Voting Results in National Assembly Elections, 1965-1977: The Support for the Nationalist Action Party). p.594

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p.595.; Bora&Can (a), Ibid.; Ağaoğulları, Ibid., p. 224

¹⁵⁷ The answer of president Cemal Gürsel to İnönü about these groups were as such: “They are our boys, fighting against anti communism.” On the same line, Ağaoğulları points out that the JP had benefited from the NAP as its “striking force”, by escalating violence against leftists for holding communism threat on the agenda as an excuse to “strong state”. Ağaoğulları, Ibid., p. 227

¹⁵⁸ Ağaoğulları, Ibid., p. 213

¹⁵⁹ Çalık (a), Ibid., p. 138

March intervention because in its opinion the social crisis should be solved in an “authoritarian state” for suppressing the anarchy created by the “left”. After the intervention, the NAP authorities commented that the party was assigning its mission to the military. In fact, the NAP was evaluating a military intervention as a necessity. Çalık suggests that,

Both before and after the 12 March, the NAP was one of the political parties considering the necessity of a military coup and was ready for backing up such an incident. Supporters of the NAP were evaluating the 12 March as an ‘anti-communist military intervention’ and were hoping the incident to open new possibilities to anti-communists with the ‘cleaning up’ process in the bureaucratic hegemony centers like universities, trade unions, TRT, etc”¹⁶⁰, “on the other hand, did not take its context into consideration, postponing social problems.”¹⁶¹

This expression may show the determination of making the NAP an acceptable force in the system as a legitimate political actor of the centre right. However, it also proves the scarification of the party ideology to populism because as told before, the role of the ideology in the sixties and the seventies should be drawing the framework of the alternative order after transformation. In other words, the role of nationalism as a political party ideology could be designated by solutions to the crisis of the system rather than supporting the suppression of the crisis. However, Bora&Can discuss the reasons to support the military intervention on the pragmatic grounds. They think that one of the reasons for the NAP to support the military intervention was for establishing an organic bond with the army and the other reason was playing the candidate party role in gathering together the anti-communist reaction on the parliamentary level.¹⁶² In other words, the long-term NAP aim was governing the country by participating in the aftermath of the 12 March. The state and the military forces had given answer to the expectations of the NAP by closing its Idealist Hearths. In other words, the identification of the NAP with the state had failed and the instrumental usage of the NAP and its followers as the “anti-communist civil force near the state” had ended.

The ambivalence of the ideology between the state and the society may show

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 151

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 152

¹⁶² Bora&Can (a), Ibid.

the fact that nationalism was not yet a political alternative for the electorate if it is evaluated technically because it did not design alternative political rhetoric for the sustaining crisis and the problems of the order. It is still nurtured by a reactionary rhetoric. However, as known, political parties are not for the official state order but for the good of the people living in that social order. In this sense, the electoral support for the party may show the repercussion of the ideology in the society. In this context, 1971, 1972 and 1973 may be accepted as the “passive” years for the NAP because the NAP was excluded from the official politics, which had made it an “inactive” and an “uncreative” political actor in a compulsory unemployment. In the 1969 general elections, its vote share was 3.0 per cent. During the 1973 election campaign, the NAP highlighted themes like “nationalism”, “national culture”, “anti-communism” and “social justice”. However, its share of the votes increased only to 3.4 in the 1973 elections.

Through evaluating the ideology within a geographical framework, it may be seen that the party got its best in the Mediterranean, the mid-north and mid-south parts of the Anatolia, which were the half-industrialized¹⁶³ regions. It made its worse in the less modernized parts of the south eastern and more modernized parts of the Marmara and the Aegean regions. However, contrary to this, Çalık evaluates the NAP-modernization relation as a “positive” but a “weak” one.¹⁶⁴ When compared to the NSP, reaching to the vote share of 11.8 per cent through conceptualizing the congruent ideological elements in a more religious combination, the NAP could not show a necessary increase in its share of the votes in practice. The reason for this may be that the ideology of the NSP was clearer and it was offering an alternative to the existing social order; however, the NAP ideology was in consistence with the state and was not strong enough to carry reaction to the system. In this sense, the distinctions between these parties were the statist “laicist” stand of the NAP and its “anti-communist” mission.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, this may indicate that transformation started

¹⁶³The words modernization, Westernization or Industrialization may be accepted as the implication of the complexity of socio-economic transformation in the 1960s, indicating the same phenomenon of time.

¹⁶⁴ Çalık (a), *Ibid.*, p. 158

¹⁶⁵ NSP was highlighting its ideology as the “National View” incorporating internal peace, integration of state and society, Greater Turkey again Torch, spiritual development and material development within it and the basic difference of the National View from the Nine Lights Doctrine was its distance

to be reflected on the political level which was nurtured by “religious social opposition” strengthening in the 1970s.

Despite the weakness of the NAP ideology in practice, it was trained in the coalition governments in the 1970s. However, the first reflection of the general ideological condition around the country was the formation of a surprise RPP-NSP coalition after the 1973 elections. It was possible with the “recognition” of the “resemblances” between the NAP and RPP on “religious” and “economical” issues¹⁶⁶; however, it broke down after nine months. Then, the “Nationalist Front (NF)” government was formed with the attendance of the JP-NAP-NSP and the Republican Trust Party (RTP), uniting against the rising power of Bülent Ecevit’s RPP.¹⁶⁷

Dropped from eleven seats to one from the 1965 to the 1969 elections, the NAP improved its parliamentary representation from one to three with the 1973 elections and to sixteen with the 1977. In the NF, the NAP obtained key positions in the cabinet as Türkeş became the deputy prime minister and the other became the minister of state. Due to the participation of the NAP in the coalition government in 1975, the years between 1974 and 1977 are evaluated by many as the development period of the party.¹⁶⁸ Landau perceives the participation in this coalition as a “turning point” of the party’s career on “the official level”.¹⁶⁹ However, the most important issues for the party were on the one hand, sustaining this relative success by making it permanent through integrating the party into the system as a legitimate actor and on the other, broadening its support base at that moment. For these reasons, it tried to increase the esteem for the 1960s “union of the nationalist front against communism” on the official level, settle its cadres in the important posts within the bureaucracy, mobilize the reactionary middle-class votes in the Central and Eastern

stand to laicism. This confirms the superiority of Turkism over Islam in the TIS, reconstructed by the NAP as the Turkish Islam or the Anatolian Islam.

¹⁶⁶ Çalık (a), *Ibid.*, p. 163

¹⁶⁷ The popularity of Ecevit was in rise because of the successful 1974 military intervention in Cyprus, conducted under his decisions, leading nationalism to develop hand in hand with the RPP. At this time, nationalism was supported by a leftist party, which again may prove the articulation ability of nationalism with the daily conjuncture for lifting its effectiveness on people.

¹⁶⁸ Ağaoğulları, *Ibid.*, p. 227; Bora&Can, *Ibid.*, p. 60-4; Çınar&Arıkan, *Ibid.*, p. 28

¹⁶⁹ Landau, *Ibid.*, p. 592

Anatolia through anti-communism and religious nationalism and invest on the party's Youth Organizations. With the participation of the NAP in the coalition, it may be said that the short term purpose of the party had been realized in relation to populism because it may not be maintained that this so called "success" of the party was because of its clear nationalist stand and alternative ideology to other parties in the system. However, Landau proposes that *"even if the overall results attained by the party are none too impressive, its advance was constant in a nationwide context, and the doubling of its share of the vote between 1973 and 1977 was indeed striking"*. Thus, it may be argued that this was a quantitative success and it does not correspond to a qualitative ideological constitution because its social basis is weak; thus, the features of the electorate changes due to the shift in emphasis in every election. This may also prove that political nationalism was not a concrete ideology attracting the masses, yet.

Before the 1977 elections, the NAP tried to highlight its difference from the other parties in front of the rightist electorate. Thus, it tried to be the alternative of the parties but not the system. This may show that the radicalism of the party sustained in its rhetoric but not in practice in that it played for the centre right electorate. Targeting the economically discontented masses contrary to the NSP campaign focusing on mass-industrialization and JP, already representative of the big-bourgeoisie, the NAP focused on "anti-capitalism" and claimed that it was the mere representative of the "real" nationalism in Turkey¹⁷⁰; however, it did not define this nationalism clearly. Thus, it was not definite what the NAP nationalism promised for the daily social, economic and political problems marking the daily lives of the electorate, however, the electorate was fed up with the social polarizations and gave a chance to the NAP because participating in the former coalition as a legitimate political actor, and sustaining an electoral campaign focusing on "anti-capitalism" and "religious nationalism", the TIS helped the NAP to draw support away from the NSP. The NSP lost half of its 48 seats and the NAP attracted the traditional middle class was anxious due to the communist threat going on for decades. The central Anatolian provinces which previously voted for Islamists shifted toward the ultra-nationalists. Çakır claims that, the NSP was in a sharp

¹⁷⁰ Turan, Ibid., p. 289

decline in the cities with intense Alevi population, where the NAP votes exploded.¹⁷¹ Moreover, he maintains that the NAP, if controls the Islamization process in the Idealist Movement, gains the chance to attract the Sunni votes in the Alevi provinces in the subsequent elections.¹⁷² Thus, it may be argued that the blurred character of the ideology had filled the gaps of social reaction because the most parts of the society were fed up with the disorder. In this sense, it is obvious why all parties, except for the RPP and the NAP, lost votes in the 1977 elections, appealing to the “social democratic” and the “radical rightist” inclinations among the society.¹⁷³ Accordingly, Turan draws attention to the fact that, the NAP was using a “dual rhetoric”. It was addressing the militant cadre and reactionary electorate through anti-communism and the religious conservative electorate through “religious nationalism”.¹⁷⁴ However, as it was defining anti-communism as “atheism”, the religious and reactionary middle classes were meeting on a common ground of anti-atheism and anti-communism intersected in the NAP ideology.

After the 1977 election, the second NF coalition was formed by JP-NSP-NAP. The NAP obtained deputy Prime Minister (Türkeş), ministers of state, trade, health and social welfare, customs and monopolies. The NAP continued placing its people in different positions and extended its influence on bureaucracy. However, Çınar&Arıkan argues that despite the doubling votes in the 1977 election and improving the parliamentary representation to sixteen, the party leadership was in discontented because the party’s *“inflexible attitude toward change constrained its electoral prospects”*. Çınar&Arıkan maintains that *“rather than adopting a new strategy and a program that would tackle the problems of the Turkish society, it remained a single issue party, whose only concern was anti-Communist propaganda. Consequently, the NAP failed to gain the supports of larger sections of the society.”*¹⁷⁵

The 1977 election meant reaching to the geographical political borders for the

¹⁷¹ Ruşen Çakır, *Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye’de İslami Oluşumlar*, Metis yay., İstanbul 2002, p. 235

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 237

¹⁷³ Çalık, Ibid, p. 167

¹⁷⁴ Turan, Ibid., p. 290

¹⁷⁵ Çınar&Arıkan, Ibid., p. 28.

party. The 6.4 vote share was an increase; however, it was not on the desired level because the votes were confined to Central Anatolia, and it had shown no effect in the urban parts. In other words, all the political strategies and ideological redefinitions, together with the cyclical changes, merely helped political nationalism to have a 6.4 per cent vote rate throughout Turkey, and showed that its political tools were not enough for its aims. Anxiously, the NAP was in an alarm state for redefining itself for broadening its limits in the political map. The initial long-term aim was to organize the whole right under the leadership of the NAP, through escalating and gathering all anti-communist reaction together. By playing the civil guardian role of the state, it wished for increasing its credibility in the eyes of the military-civil bureaucracy. Developing its relations with the military, putting its strong statism forward, complaining about the loss of authority in the country and calling for the martial law and military intervention may be summarized as the new strategic plan of the NAP in these years. In fact, what the NAP wanted was the redefinition of the political environment on the basis of authority, to which it may adapt itself easily. Moreover, it wanted to form the basis of the new hegemonic structure.

With the rising social violence, the NAP strategy had been influential on the Central and Eastern Anatolia, where ethnic and sectarian distinctions between Alevi and Sunni citizens were evident. However, this contradicts with the former NAP ideology, envisaging the TIS as the ideological cement among the different parts of the society. However, the TIS had agitated sectarian divisions and contributed to Sunni-Alevi clashes and the Sunni parts were supporting the NAP. In this context, Bora&Can defines the TIS as “Islamic demagogy”.¹⁷⁶ On the other hand, the NAP represents itself as the guardian of the national unity. In a society, divided by social class or religious differences, there may emerge obvious tension between the solidarity needed by national unity and the antagonism provoked by religious and social class divisions as maintained by Miller.¹⁷⁷ Thus, it may be argued that, the NAP’s election strategies in the last years of the seventies leaned on the “sectarian divisions in the central Anatolia” despite its strong emphasis on “national unity” and “solidarism”; however, this is in conflict with the TIS. Moreover, Alevis may be

¹⁷⁶ Bora&Can (a), *Ibid.*, p. 82

¹⁷⁷ David Miller, *On Nationality*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1999, p. 159

accepted as the group producing the Anatolian Islam in practice because their religious belief shows characteristic differences than the Arabic Islam and it shows laicist features. Moreover, the official definition of nationalism does not accept sectarian divisions and this also contradicts with the official approach of the NAP and its laicist stand. Moreover, if Islamic order does not accept any divisions than different religious beliefs, this sectarianism is logical neither in the radical nationalism nor in the political Islam. Thus, the division between Alevis and Sunnis may not be related to Islam or TIS and it may not be evaluated merely on ideological basis.

Playing on the sectarian divisions available for the ideological polarizations in the society at the end of the 1970s had rapidly widened its support base on the basis of anti-communism and became a mass movement. In its most general sense, the radical rightist reaction against transformation was nurturing the NAP base and its nationalism became the body of ideas, which was the characteristics of a particular social group, the Idealists. However, it was not able to keep this reactionary anti-communist mass base under control. In other words, the NAP base was out of the control of the party and it was supplementing the social terror, radicalism, anarchy and the further polarization of the “left” and the “right”. Martial law was proclaimed; however, due to its role in the terror and violence incidents, the NAP rapidly lost legitimization and esteem. Thus, it may be suggested that it could not reflect its relative social improvement on the official political level because it was not invited to the formation of the 1979 minority government. As it is seen, nationalism of the NAP plays on the differentiations and the reactions among the society and these nurture its social success against communism. However, it still does not have a concrete party ideology and program for the daily problems marking ideological polarizations. Accordingly, the followers of its ideology do not seem to be conscious social actors because its ideology does not represent practical solutions.

Fifteen years of move from extreme right to the center had been interrupted by the 1980 military intervention for the NAP. Firstly, the party was known with its ambivalence between civic nationalism and racism; however, anti-communism was added to this portfolio with the 1960s. Despite the influence of these ideological premises upon the society, the NAP was not able to gain broad support and redefined its ideology on the basis of religious nationalism at the beginning of the 1970s. Its

nationalism was civic, racist, anti-communist, religious and laicist at the same time because despite the tentative redefinitions in the ideology, none of them was left out. Nationalism's ambiguous structure was easing the redefinition process because it is such an ideology which can form a whole from the contradictory elements within an ideology under different conditions. This ambiguity in the ideology helped it to recruit for the whole rightist electorate for becoming a mass-party because it formed its ideological discourse on the basis of the social inclination of those years. This type of an ideology creates question marks for the electorate; however, due to the social polarizations and economic discontent, the electorate was floating between two ideologies and was not able to vote on the basis of concrete ideological programs. In this sense, nationalism yet was not representing a consistent basis because its followers were not politically conscious actors and what mobilized them was not the context of the ideology but their daily reactions.

Secondly, by departing from radicalism, it reached an acceptable level for the regime and became the coalition partner in the seventies; however, it still remained a small party on the right. To become a mass party, the NAP had departed from racism and its nationalism was represented as an original TIS. However, racism and the pan-Turanist current was still the most important source augmenting the party on the ideological level because religion was still an unsolved ideological problem for nationalism since the young Ottomans and it was contradicting with the racist-Turanist current. Due to the religious inclinations in the ideology, it had mobilized the electorate of the centre right parties; however, the ambiguity of the ideology and transforming socio-economic milieu did not allow the NAP to put concrete, consistent alternatives as political solutions to the social transformation marking the history of the society since the 19th century. In this context, the NAP could not fill the vacuum that had remained after the refinement of racism, Islam and Ottomanism from the present time to the past. Anti-communism contributed nationalism to be confined to one narrow point because as the ideological polarization was suppressed by the military regime, it could not find an alternative basis to establish its ideology. Thus, the NAP was limited merely to anti-communism and was not able to produce any political solutions to the short and long term problems through a clear party programme, representing itself as an alternative political party. Moreover, its reactionary policies were not credible on the official politics level. However, as

Turkey was in the multi-party period and long for democracy after the Single Party Period, the social structure required political solutions to socio-economic problems rather than social polarizations on the basis of extremist ideologies. Namely, the political parties or groups should not escalate tension among the society, rendering the military interventions legitimate on the public eye. Within this context, one of the responsible of the social violence and terror was the NAP and moreover, it may be claimed that the ambiguity in its ideology contributed to the escalation of social tensions as seen in the Alevi-Sunni incidents.

Thirdly, the definition of nationalism on the basis of religion could not also fill the gaps after the superficial break off with racism because the social tension was not between the Turks and Islamists but between the leftists and the rightists. In other words, the religious and racist ideologies were not polarized among the society. Furthermore, the religion-nationalism contradiction still constitutes the most important problem within Turkish nationalism and the Turkish identity in general. It is a problem not only within political nationalism but also on the official level. Its contradiction with secularism continues. It is not easy to decrease this tension with the temporary TIS because it was not credible yet or a necessary definition for political nationalism and the role of the nationalist ideology was not determined by religion but by its stand to the left and communism. Thus, TIS was not available for the daily social conditions. Moreover, it led to further micro ideological polarizations among different sects because it was widespread among the followers of the NAP to blame Alevis and leftists as communists. Sectarian conflicts may be accepted as the reflection of the “daily” ideological ambiguity of the NAP ideology. Producing a third way between Islam and nationalism, the TIS shows the credibility of the ambiguity in the nationalist ideology because it was rapidly articulated to the anti-communism of the party although religion was not one of the categorical facets of the political polarization in Turkey at that time. However, this strategy attracted the religious conservative electorate. It may be argued that nationalism alone was not able to mobilize the conservative electorate in Turkey because Islam was an older determiner of culture despite the freshness of nationalism and its function in the cultural signification process as an ideology in its most general sense. Initially, Islam had stood against nationalism in the Young Ottoman movement as a competing concept within nationalism. Intellectually, efforts for solving this problem

concentrated on defining religion and nationalism in conformity with the Young Ottomans. Then, due to their adverse natures, neither the UPP nor the Young Turks were able to solve this problem. In addition, nationalism acted upon the other communities within the Empire as a centrifugal force. The problems in these nationalisms were inherited by the Republican state. However, the most important attempt was with the establishment of Republic, choosing Turkish nationalism against Islam by forming secularism as the most important base of the state ideology. The religious rebellions against the Republican state and the great support that the DP gained with transition to the multi-party period indicated the efficiency of Islam on the society and its convertibility to the political uses. Thus, it is easier to understand the influence of the religion among the society, which was also felt and tried to be articulated to its own body by nationalism within a political party ideology in Turkey despite its secularist history and rhetoric in the Western societies.

Islam has been one of the important determiners of Turkish politics. Thus, a party aiming at appealing to the masses feels itself, to some extent, forced to lean on Islam. What the NAP had done with the 1970s was this. However, its pragmatic dose on nationalism had made Turkish nationalism which was defended by the NAP ambiguous. This may prove the weakness of the NAP nationalism; nevertheless, it is not right to say that TIS was established on daily temporary components available for the conjuncture because TIS was not available for the conjuncture; as, there was not an obvious tension between Turkishness and Islam. Moreover, it was initially the problem of the official ideology and thus, the NAP solution would be against the state not for the state. However, despite its “ultra nationalism” and “ethno-racial” character, the NAP has never been an “anti-systemic” party. It tried to behave within the limits of the official political borders determined by the official ideology. Both the state tolerated its racial inclinations and the NAP tried to hide its features concerning the definition of Islam. By coloring it as a “cultural indispensable” of the Turkish identity, it defined Islam within the state limits under the authority of “laicism” in front of the official politics; however, it represented this rhetoric in a more conservative character in front of its mass base or in its peripheral usage. This ambiguity may be dated back to the 19th century when Islam stood against progress, in other words, when the modernization process was bounded up with the incorporation of nationalism into the country. Moreover, it may also be dated back to

the emergence of Kemalist nationalism as a state ideology which inherited the categorical paradoxes of nationalism in general through Westernization and the specific historical development problems of the Turkish nationalism in particular. The NAP, trying to act as a “third way” party between “religious extremism” and “extremist nationalism”, had struggled for the mass votes of the right electorate. As the religion played important role in their voting behaviors of the conservative-rightist strata, the NAP articulated Islam to its ideology. However, this pragmatic approach, changing from one conjuncture to the other, contributed to shifts between the “religious”, “cultural”, “ethnic” and “official” definitions of nationalism. In other words, the NAP, up till the 1980s, had carried an ambiguous stand and an unclear definition in relation to its party ideology, which may reflect the complexity of nationalist phenomenon and Turkish nationalism and its being a mass movement do not reflect a conscious devotion to the ideology.

5.4 Nationalism and the NAP after the 1980 Coup until 1992

Two inclinations in the NAP after the Coup may be accepted as the indicators of an ideological identity crisis of the party. These were its reorientation towards Islam and the fragmentation of the radical Islamist group both of which led to new narrower definitions in the ideology. In other words, such practical clarification of the Islam factor in the ideology contributed the ideological life area of the NAP narrower. The natural outcome of this was inclining to other options, to statism, secularism and racism, available in the ecclesiastical NAP nationalism.

Ideological redefinition of the 1980 Coup means the authoritarian suppression of the ideological polarizations of time. Its definition for the NAP is that it shocked the idealist movement by undermining the party ideology. In the last years of the 1970s, as remembered, the NAP demanded for martial law and a military take over. In this respect, the first reaction of the party was identifying itself with the Coup and the unconditional devotion to the state was planned to be sustained. However, the junta showed no tolerance to the NAP and it was banned together with the other political parties, and it was hit hard by the measures of the intervention, together with the left. The members and the party elite, who believed that they were serving the state by fighting against communism throughout 1970s, were put on trial. Bora&Can

explains the incident as the “criminalization” of NAP’s anti-communism¹⁷⁸ because for the official authority, the NAP was constraining its limits by making up its anti-communism as an excuse. What the military rule wanted was to take the political and social turmoil under control and later on, integrate all the actors into its system again. In doing this, the military regime drew an image in which the state was in an equal distance against the extreme left and the extreme right for which the NAP was blamed for being responsible for the socio-political anarchy together with the communists.¹⁷⁹ Besides, the NAP was blamed for its “endeavors for superseding the state’s authority” too. The reflection of the shock among the elite and the base was different. The party elite and the upper cadres chose to “identify”¹⁸⁰ themselves with the Coup and adapted themselves to the new political condition and the order. However, the “Idealists Founding’s Case” had a deep impact against this. Among 389 suspects, 49 of them, including Türkeş, were sentenced to death penalty. One of the prominent leaders’, Agah Oktay Güner’s famous “*We are in prison, yet our ideology is in government*” motto is the most remarkable expression of the astonishment of the NAP members and their simple expression of defense. Besides, the defenses by the elite included the “national reflex” thesis, which turned all the pre-1980 anti-communist-statist approach to a “natural and spontaneous reaction” for the existence of the state. It was placing all the communists against the national unity and the state, proving the so called innocence of the NAP members against the communists. However, this thesis also simplifies the last twenty years of the party ideology by weakening the ideological reconstruction of anti-communism in the rhetoric. Bora&Can suggest that this type of a defense by the elite included reconciliation with the new regime¹⁸¹, on the expense of the mass base, who believed in the party ideology because they thought that they were not guilty and they would not be treated equally with the communists. Moreover, the nationalist intelligentsia

¹⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 119

¹⁷⁹ Bora&Can(a) mention that there were some names within the Junta who were opposed to this equal treatment and wished the idealists to be protected against the leftist group. They argue that to some extend, the junta had protected them but for the sake of the system created by the military junta, it had to suppress the nationalists too. Ibid., pp. 112-114

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., pp. 105-110

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 121

remained silent against the “so called” “unjust” practices by the military regime. Sub cadres were not able to understand the reconciliation of the elite with the military regime, which led them to feel fatherless, as they used to be ruled absolutely by the “Başbuğ” and disappointed by the elite. Further fragmentation occurred in the party base and many important members joined other new parties in formation, especially the MP, which was then the mass representative of the rightist electorate.¹⁸² However, with the year 1987, some members of the NAP elite, who did not join other parties remaining radical on the eyes of the public, inclined to treat 12 September with antagonism, which by Türkeş himself was expressed with a book, entitled “*Our Suppressed Journey (Basılan Kervanımız)*”. This gave the movement one more chance to integrate the nationalists together on the basis of the party.

What was questioned first was the unconditional statism of the party ideology in that it was the basic tenet. As their existing identity was not able to solve their problems with the state, they were directed to a search for a new political identity and thus, reapproached to religion. The interrogation of statism contributed to a further rise of Islam among some of the NAP cadres because in their opinion, Islam “*was a more reliable ideal for devotion than the state and a better answer to their search for identity*”¹⁸³. With this “re-orientation towards Islam”¹⁸⁴, “*...the NAP defined Turkishness through Islam in an attempt to resolve the conflict between secular-ethnic Turkishness and Islamism. Determining that Islam was a main characteristic of ‘Turk’, the NAP claimed religious issues as its natural political domain*”.¹⁸⁵ This time, the Islamic dose in nationalism was more important than the racial ones and the cultural definition of nation was refrained in the new ideological reformulation. Maybe, a consistent TIS was on the way this time because in it, there was no statism which blurs the ideology with laicism. Initially, the thing making this Islamization process different from the 1970s’ is that this was not an election strategy, but a process experienced and chosen by the members “consciously”. As a

¹⁸² Bülent Aras&Gökhan Bacık, “The Rise of Nationalist Action Party and Turkish Politics”, *Nationalism&Ethnic Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 4, Winter 2000, p. 50

¹⁸³ Çınar&Arıkan, *Ibid.*, p. 28

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ Sultan Tepe, “Kemalism, Islamism and the Nationalist Action Party”, *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Autumn 2000), p.63

practically emerged ideology, Islamization of nationalism and a clearer stand for Islam in the ideology confirm the propositions of the thesis in relation to the blurred and ambiguous construction of the nationalist ideology. Moreover, this turns the former Islam-nationalism relation to “disillusionment” bounded up with the party ideology for the members. In this respect; ideology sometimes means the adherence of the hegemonic group to its interests, which prevents it from recognizing the notable truth that may weaken its sense of rule.¹⁸⁶

Furthermore, this time, Islamization was not defined officially by the party ideologues but emerged in the self-questioning process, especially, in the prisons. This confirms the conscious constitution of Islam within the ideology as it was not a top to down project. Maybe it was the first time that the party elite were influenced as such by the base, for which both the base and party met on the Islamization of the party. It may also be argued that, the identity crisis of the party, resulting from the religious, racial, cultural and official conceptualizations of the national identity was to be solved in the favor of religion because the conjuncture had given birth to a long term and deep transformation but not to a short term election strategy. Thus, this resulted in fragmentation, leading to the establishment of the Grand Union Party (GUP). However, it may be better to glance at the condition of the party within the political spectrum after its prohibition until the fragmentation on the basis of Islam and nationalism.

Nationalists until 1987 lived without their leader because Türkeş was in detention for almost five years. If the strong leader factor is borne in mind, the secondary leading cadres could not prevent fragmentation because the Idealist Movement was in deep confusion without its leader after the junta. However, to prevent further fragmentation in the party base, re-establishing its pre-1980 organization and gathering all nationalists together, the Conservative Party (CP) was established with Türkeş’s permission. The CP was not able to enter any elections due to the obstacles of the military regime because some of the party leaders were refused to be recognized. With the 1985 party congress, the CP changed its name to the Nationalist Working Party (NWP). After his breaking free from detention in 1987, he joined the NWP and once again became the leader of the movement. In 1987, under the leadership of Türkeş, the NWP lived its first electoral experience and

¹⁸⁶ Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 67

won 2.91 percent of the votes, which was not a particular gain at the polls, identical to its pre-1980 condition. It entered the 1991 elections in a coalition pact with the Islamist Welfare Party (WP), for passing the ten per cent threshold restriction. As a result, the NAP won 19 seats in the parliament (WP gained 43 seats). It must be added that in these years, the Islamization was sustained; however, as indicated by the 1987 election result, Islamization of the ideology did give no crops yet. However, Islam played a beneficial role in the tactical alliance with the WP, showing that Islam was creative in forming common ground between the radical WP Islam and the NWP Islam. Maybe, Turkish politics was inclining to new TIS because without any political or ideological polarizations, and the rising influence of Islam on the society that was applied officially after the military junta, Islam was promising for further tensions between official ideology and itself. However, the NWP was given a chance for further legitimization with the parliamentary representation again. After the ban on the use of political party names pre-dated 1980 was lifted in 1992, the NAP was re-established. However, the most important incidence in these years may be accepted as the most important fragmentation within the party, indicating the reflection of the Islam-nationalism tension in the 1990s.

5.5 The fragmentation on the Basis of Islam and the Dissolution of the Ideology

Since 1965 the NAP was dominated by the leader factor and the hierarchical structure; however, with the 1980 Coup, Türkeş lost his strict control over the party. Due to the Islamization process, intra-group conflicts emerged due to the different definitions of Islam and nationalism. This may correspond to a crisis for the 1969's ideological redefinitions on the basis of Islam. Moreover, this shows the unsolved tensions between the different currents in the nationalist ideology since the beginning of the multi party period. Additionally, this may be accepted as the triumph of the Islam against political nationalism within the party level. On the other hand, it also corresponds to a triumph of the conservative periphery against the secular central elite. However, in general, this was a clarification in the party ideology and an example event for the nationalism/Islam tension. Neither the racists nor the Anatolianists were overbalanced and the tension was solved in the favor of the radical-Islamist nationalists. As suggested by Çınar&Arıkan, the fragmentation

became possible with the tensions within the rank and the file of the party which increased with the revival period which the Idealist Movement entered with the winding down of the effects of the Coup.¹⁸⁷ The debates regarding the “currents forming the NAP version of Islam”¹⁸⁸ or the “definition of nationalism”¹⁸⁹ resulted in the fragmentation of the party. Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, Sivas deputy and the former nationalist youth leader, left the party along with five of his friends, and founded the GUP. Alternatively, Çınar&Arıkan suggests the fragmentation as the expulsion of the radical Islamists from the party because:

At the time Türkeş was pursuing policies that aimed to make peace with the state forces and to direct the party toward the center of the political spectrum. To achieve these goals, the expulsion of the political Islamist cadres from the party was a necessity since the state in general and the military in particular was extremely sensitive about the rising influence of Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁹⁰

Nevertheless, this may be comprehended with the ideological redefinition after the demise/expulsion of the radical Islamist cadre. As maintained by Tepe, the establishment of the GUP clarified the terms of ideological ambiguity in the definition of nationalism within the Idealist Movement. Moreover, she believes that “...although the defection of the GUP has been interpreted as an Islamization of one branch of the party, it reflects different aspects of the overall process of Islamization of the Idealist Movement”¹⁹¹. Accordingly, Yazıcıoğlu and his associates blamed the party for departing from the main Islamic principles, and they believed that the NAP Islam was not incorporated to the party ideology in a coherent way. The Nine Lights of the NAP was not including the 32 commandments of Islam to the party ideology, which in the words of Tepe, “would qualify the NAP as an Islamic-Turkish Party”¹⁹². However, the NAP never defined Islam superior to nationalism, but at most it equalized them visible with the TIS. In this sense, the NAP was neither

¹⁸⁷ Çınar&Arıkan, Ibid. P. 28-9

¹⁸⁸ Tepe, Ibid., p. 63

¹⁸⁹ Bacık&Aras, Ibid., p. 50

¹⁹⁰ Çınar&Arıkan, Ibid. P. 29

¹⁹¹ Tepe, Ibid., p. 63, 4

¹⁹² Ibid., p. 64

Islamist nor nationalist or both Islamist and nationalist. This ambiguity is due to its pre-1980 ideology, which came to the fore after the statism and anti-communism and it had no effects on the nationalist cadres. Thus, this time, Islamization of the nationalist ideology was a natural historical process. Actually, it carries deep concerns because the ideological definition of the Turkish nationalism is so wide that the new inclinations may be defined within from it again. In this respect, the Islamization of the one branch of the party may be accepted as the clearest sign of the unsolved problems in Turkish nationalism. Turkish nationalism carries the Islam-secularism tension within its body since the Young Ottomans. In fact, secularist inclinations of the Western nationalism coming from the Enlightenment tradition were contrasting with the religious structure of the society. When the state ideology evolved to Turkism, Islamism and Ottomanism were still alive because nationalist phenomenon was able to articulate itself to the competing ideologies at the same time. Despite the attempts of the Kemalist nationalism which chose laicism, Islamism in Turkish nationalism continued living in the political nationalism after the multi party period. The NAP defended to represent it and carried it to the process after the 1980 Coup. In this respect, the fragmentation on the basis of Islam may be accepted as an obligatory attempt to solve the identity crisis in the NAP through the determination of the place of Islam in the ideology. This was not a break off because the NAP defends Islam as the cultural indispensable of the Turkish identity, so the same of its identity; Nevertheless, it was seen that it was not an Islamist party because it was the WP tradition or a nationalist-Islamist party because it was the GUP. Its stand in the ideological spectrum was needed to be redefined after the fragmentation of the Yazıcıoğlu clique.

Conflict with Islam, the other irrational aspect in the ideology was the definition of the “history” and the “notion of political unity” inherited from the pan-Turkist inclination, which was in a severe conflict with the historical Islamic understanding and Islamic nation, accepting religion as the basic ideological cement. Parallel to this, the racist inclinations within the NAP concentrating on the “homogeneity of culture and the race” were also challenged by the radical Islamist clique. The conflict between the ethno-racial inclinations, religious determiners and antagonism to official laicism came to the fore with the separation of the GUP. TIS, trying to combine the concepts of “secular state”, “Islamic community” and “ethnic-

religious national unity” may be said to have failed with the Islamization of the party because, all these concepts indicate different viewpoints that are hard to combine within an ideology which will be represented by a political party in a coherent way. As known, Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism were suppressed in the favor of a Western type of nationalism within Kemalist nationalism. Nevertheless, Kemalism combined the available parts of these ideologies and constituted itself for which it carried them to the multi-party period. They were able to express themselves within evident limits in the Single Party regime in that they were nurturing Kemalism. With transition to the multi-party period, they could not establish themselves in a coherent way within a political party ideology because they were not mature ideologies to represent alternative political world views; moreover, the conjuncture was not available until the sixties. Nevertheless, dominating the nationalist inclinations and nurturing its ideology from them, the NAP claimed to be the mere owner of all these primary ideological inclinations in Turkish nationalism. Corresponding to an inconsistency between the racial, religious, cultural and official definitions of Turkish nationalism, crisis of the NAP ideology may be accepted as the inconsistency between the Ottomanist, Turkist, Islamist and Kemalist currents within the party ideology. The ambiguities between these ideologies nurture the party ideology in that it can act as the alternative of a few parties in the centre right; however, they carry their internal ideological conflicts too. Indecisiveness between Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Kemalism constitutes the daily cyclical redefinitions of the party ideology. All these may be related to the ambiguity and the complexity in the nationalist phenomenon itself because it articulated itself to the opposite ideological currents in the 19th century Ottoman Empire. This internal struggle between the conflicting ideologies was inherited by Kemalism, which was the necessary combination of the currents available for a Western type of nationalism in a technical sense for ordering a society and nation. It may be said that, Kemalism was not the solution of the conflicting identity crisis of the Empire in the favor of Kemalism because it evolved from these former ideologies and so, it could not break its ties with the Ottoman past in relation to nationalism. As put forward before, nationalism had to experience the same transformation process in the West at once in the Turkish nationalism. It is why, the competing concepts in the development of the phenomenon nurtures the emergence of a Western type of nationalism. The

contradictions between these ideologies lived by the official ideology and were inherited by the NAP. However, until the organic fragmentation of the GUP, they were subjected to daily redefinitions in the party ideology because the NAP was trying to represent all the different ideological approaches in the history of Turkish nationalism. Therefore, it was changing the emphasis on their different features, with possible combinations of conflicting elements within them available for the conjuncture. Additionally, the functional structure of the nationalist phenomenon had allowed the NAP to combine the conflicting features in Turkish nationalism, turning the ideological ambiguity into political credibility. The first success of this ideology was the 1977 elections; however, the vote share of the party was not enough to dominate the political right as a mass party. Thus, it may be claimed that the GUP was the clear fragmentation of the Islamism from the political Turkish nationalism as a party ideology, leaving aside ongoing contradictions between Ottomanism and Turkism in the NAP ideology. Moreover, according to the rising Islam in the society, Islam was going to affect this conflicting ideological structure of the NAP. It must be added that the GUP preferred being a radical party between the Islamism and nationalism and so, between the WP and the NAP did not aim at being a mass party like these parties.

The years between 1980 and 1992 may not only indicate the affects of the Coup upon an extreme political party but also make internal ideological conflicts and ambiguities apparent. The 1980 Coup was a “nationalist” intervention in the politics by the state elite; however, after the Coup, the political party, claiming to represent “nationalism” within the political spectrum was banned and charged. It may be commented on this that the definition of nationalism by the state and by the NAP were in conflict, too. It may be claimed here that there is no common definition on Turkish nationalism; rather, there are conflicting definitions. However, with the Coup, the NAP was able to identify itself with the state again, despite the differences in their nationalisms. In this context, neither state’s definition of nationalism nor the NAP’s is clear but both of them are easily combined with daily conjuncture. As strong ideology, it has articulated itself to all conditions like a liquid taking the shape of any container it is poured into. The competing conceptions within nationalism in the Turkish political geography may indicate the general complex structure of nationalism one more, related to its anachronistic birth on these lands and

particularly, the reflection of this complexity on the NAP's ideology, claiming to be the representative of all nationalisms within the one political party ideology.

5.6 Ideology and the NAP after 1992

The NAP version of Islam became relatively clearer with the breaking up of the radical Islamist clique and so it was defined on a “moderate, secular, statist basis”. The break up coincided with the 1991 elections, with which the NAP had won a few parliamentary seats challenged by the influences of the fragmentation in the polls. Despite the blood loss, the party had increased its vote share to 8 per cent with the 1994 local elections. However, the distance to religion had been determined practically through the parliamentary experience and through its’ reorientation towards the centre right that was decided due to the relations with the military and the state. Directed to more “secular” and “statist” policies and trying to attract “urban” electorate, the NAP could show only 0.6 per cent increase in the 1995 general elections; thus, could not pass the election barrier. Çınar&Arıkan argues that due to the “moderate secular rhetoric” targeting the urban electorate, the conservative rural voters were alienated; however, it was the WP that attracted them in that election.¹⁹³ This may prove that the NAP determines its election strategies in the last stand for coming to the rule because it easily alienated its electorate when a ruling chance emerged. After the 1991 elections in which it won parliamentary representation, the NAP not only realized its previously mentioned move from the extreme right to the center but it targeted the urban electorate instead of the rural. In other words, those years mark another ideological redefinition from “Islamism” to “moderate secularism and statism”. Throughout the 1990s, the two events strictly determined its ideology were the “28 February period”, which was a pseudo-military rule 14 years after the 1980 Coup, bounded up with “Kemalist reactions to the rising Islam”, and the “escalating nationalist sentiment around the country due to daily terrorist attacks” together with the rising “Kurdish nationalism” and the “anti-EU sentiments”.

Despite the growing role of Islam in the political space and the increasing

¹⁹³ Çınar&Arıkan, *Ibid.*, p. 29

sensitivity of the military and state bureaucracy due to their evaluations of the pro-Islamist policies as direct challenges to the secular state and the legacy of Atatürk, the NAP remained out of those tensions, by hiding the Islamist discourse behind and concentrated on its self-development. This isolation was the direct outcome of the failure in passing the election barrier in the last 1995 elections and by chance, it remained out of the general corruption in the political space, which had been felt as social and economic discontent among the society and had contributed to hard times for the coalition partners of the present age.¹⁹⁴ Turkish army and the Kemalist circles were anxious about the policies of the present conservative government, which was formed on the leadership of the WP with the True Path Party (TPP). Already, the political life witnessed severe conflicts between these parties in relation to “religion”, “democracy” and “secularism”. This may address the ancient Islam-secularism problem of Turkish nationalism, which had to live the developmental periods of the nationalist phenomenon at once in its establishment process. Accordingly, those conflicts between the competing concepts in different ideologies had contributed to the sharpening of the power relations in the last few years before the 28 February period between the political parties, military and state. With the National Security Council decisions in 28 February 1997, the army re-emphasized its supremacy over politics as the mere defender of the secular values of the country and the whole Islamic movements were determined to be the most dangerous threats to the secular system. In other words, this intervention may be perceived again as the supremacy of the Kemalist nationalism and its ideological combination style over the other nationalisms and over especially Islam. As told above, throughout these years, the NAP, concentrating on its self-development, *“has been highly successful in creating a new, less conflictual party image and concentrating almost exclusively on serious nationwide concerns like corruption and terrorism and almost never getting involved in non-constructive domestic tensions”*¹⁹⁵.

The supremacy of Kemalism over the other ideological inclinations led the

¹⁹⁴ The coalition government formed by the TPP (True Path Party) and the MP (Motherland Party) collapsed in the spring of 1996, when the MP leadership supported a parliamentary investigation of corruption charges against the TPP leader, Tansu Çiller. The images of the centre-right parties evolving in such unrest conditions contributed to loose authenticity and confidence on the eyes of the public. This eased the integration of the anti-systemic and ultra-nationalist parties to the political spectrum with the initiative of the voters, getting tired of the older parties.

¹⁹⁵ Bacık&Aras, Ibid., p. 50

coalition to resign. Maybe, due to its former situation in the 1980 Coup, the NAP was positioned neither in the military nor in the anti-military bloc as its stand was ambiguous this time. Neither statism nor Islam was overbalanced in the NAP ideology. However, it criticized the WP policies on the “religious education” and “headscarf” issues. This makes one think that due to its reaction to the religious party of the country, either the NAP had some alternative solutions on these problematic issues or this was a temporary stand available for its present statism. The other option together with the alternative possible solutions it presented on the religious issues may be related to its “strategic” moderate stand established to attract the conservative electorate that moved to the WP in the previous elections. Confirming this, with the next election campaign; the NAP targeted the conservative WP electorate and represented itself as the mere alternative to solve the religious problems on the political basis, for which the party insisted that these were to be solved on the parliamentary level throughout the election campaign. Here, the implication was that the NAP was the only party to develop solutions to the problems of the conservative electorate through official limits. These promises were realistic available for its rhetoric then, in which it was trying to search a middle way between its “statism”, “secularism” and “religion”, which was at the same time the oldest problem of Turkish modernization and nationalism addressing the unsolved identity crisis between Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism and Kemalism. Actually, the existing nationalisms could not solve this problem, which the NAP nationalism tried to solve in those years. This problem is still being augmented by ambiguous structure of the nationalist phenomenon and its transformation in the Empire, and its combination within Kemalism. Thus, it may not be solved by a temporary ideological rhetoric and needs a detailed approach. However, the complexity and severity of the problem did not allow it to be solved on the level of daily politics and; thus, the temporary efforts of the mere nationalist party, which could not even define its nationalism apparently seems inappropriate to find permanent solutions to the ancient tensions between religion and secularism, which can be traced back to the midst of the 19th century to the Young Ottoman movement. .

Despite the technical weakness of the present party ideology, the rise of the NAP votes had been striking between 1994 and 1999. Reasons for the rapid rise were related to the evaluation of the ideological history of the party as well as the daily

conjuncture and the political inclinations of the society, which were determined by internal and external events. If the situation after 28 February is observed, it may be seen that due to the decline in the religious freedom of those days, a large block of conservative-rightist voters decided to grant the NAP one more chance. However, this is only the one side of the coin. A few other factors played role in the NAP's success in the 1999 Elections. In addition to the stand concerning Islam and maturing in the self-developing process in the 1990s; the most important determiners of the ideology were Devlet Bahçeli's new leadership which transformed the party and the available conjunctural factors that had given rise to the nationalist sentiment around Turkey, which will be the subjects of the next part.

CHAPTER 6

AS A SECOND TURNOVER: NEW LEADER-NEW IDEOLOGY

6.1 Devlet Bahçeli and the New Ideological Trends

The leader factor is very important in the NAP ideology because it draws the form of the ideology and decides the redefinition in it. Leadership is the statute holding all the parts of the party together. Thus, it was apparent that the change in the leader would lead to problems and also new ideological inclinations, which may prove the importance and influence of the leader factor in the formation of the party ideology. After Türkeş's death in 1997, the party was shaken due to the loss of its charismatic leader. It also meant damage to the party-leader-doctrine trilogy. The nationalists were facing an uncertain future, which was reflected in the May 1997 Congress as rivalries among the candidates in order to gain party leadership. As the support to Devlet Bahçeli became obvious, Tuğrul Türkeş organized a rebellion with his militant *idealist* cadre, seizing the chair. In November 1997, after this postponed congress, Bahçeli won the party leadership. He was believed to reunite the party after the loss of the founding father. In general, he aimed at "tightening the leader control over the party", "restructuring the party organizations for reuniting the conservative electorate in the central Anatolia", "raising the party's profile among the urban electorate" and "bridging a gap between rural and urban supporters of the party", and an "ideological redefinition available for the new image and structure".

Organization among the rural periphery was planned within the framework of the Idealist Hearths. As pointed out before, this organization was involved in criminal activity with its militant image over the public and after 1980, it was associated with the Idealist mafia. However, Bahçeli decreased their number, gathered them together under one single foundation, bounded them to the party and organized the young members to draw a more qualified image by directing them to arts and cultural activities. The party severed its ties with the Idealist Hearths, so with the rural periphery, after reconstructing their image to a new and a clean one with Bahçeli. The other efforts concentrated on turning the party image to a more urban party. Many party gestures and symbols associated with the militancy of the

Idealist Movement of the 1960s and 1970s were banned by the leadership for defying the image of the militancy, carried by the party since 1970s, which were the legacies of the old anti-communist past.

As it is seen, the transformation of the external image was succeeded; however, they were tightly associated with the new leader's character. Despite Türkeş's militant image, Bahçeli was an academician. Their ideological stances were different from each other because Türkeş was pointing out "devotion to the ideology" whereas Bahçeli focused on "devotion to Turkey". Bahçeli was emphasizing the slogan "*First my country, then my party, then myself*"; nevertheless, Türkeş's slogan was "*The main goal is for the Turk and by the Turk*". Bahçeli highlights an unconditional devotion to the state even they contradict with the ones of the party. As it is seen, with Bahçeli, every ideological tenet was redefined on the basis of statism and adaptation to the official ideology. However, not only the structural changes and making up in the image was sustained but also shifts of emphasis in the party ideology accompanied to this deep transformation project. Reshaping the party base and welcoming changes available for the urban electorate acted as driving forces behind the present ideological change. What was hard was enabling the transformation through integrating rural base with urban electorate but not by alienating the peripheral potential.

The NAP is evidently known with its "statism". This is the most obvious tenet of the party ideology. From 1963 to 1969, its statism included the Kemalist rhetoric, with its "modernism", "progressivism," "corporatism". However, its nationalism was beyond the official definition because it aimed at Turanic ideals; namely, the integration of all Turks on the basis of culture and ethnicity, adding an "irredentist" potential on its ideology. This racial nationalism was not highlighted too much but continued to nurture the party ideology. With the expulsion of the radical racist clique, the party elite had taken the control of the centrifugal influence of racism on the party ideology. On the other hand, it had to act as a legitimate political actor and the official nationalism was limited to national Anatolian borders, having no irredentist claims. With the 1970s, the NAP planned to widen its electoral base but ethno-nationalism was not an available ideological component turning to votes in the political spectrum. Thus, the NAP aimed at the conservative Islamists votes in the central Anatolia and articulated Islamist rhetoric to its ideology; however, it did not

plan a strict break from the racist past. The party was not transforming into an Islamist party because political Islam, aiming at an Islamic community contrary to the racial definitions of nation was not available for the statist-secularist nationalism of the NAP. In other words, the definition of nationalism was in competition with the religious, cultural, official and racist inclinations and their weights changed day by day in the ideology because the NAP aimed at being the mere representative of the rightist electorate and embraced all the possible ideological inclinations within its ideology. However, it carried on the competing concepts within its ideological reconstruction, blurring its party identity in front of the electorate.

“Statism”, “Islam” and “nationalism” had intersected in the NAP discourse and acted as the most important enemy of “Communism”, which had been the most important enemy of the state. On the foremost throughout the 1970s, the NAP had fought against anti-communism with its members and supporters on the official level or in the streets. It also tried to move from radical nationalist right to the center and stood as a candidate for being the mere representative of the rightist electorate. Thus, it aimed at widening its limits on the official political level and on the level of its base. Its statism continued because it was trying to be a legitimate actor in front of the bureaucracy and the state. On the level of its base, it defined a religious nationalism. In doing this, it was targeting the NSP and JP electorate, which had given birth to a dual rhetoric in the party ideology. In this sense, it may be argued that what was concrete in the ideology was its statism as a main axis whether emphasized or not.

It was the conditional developments that positively affected the rise of the party because the leftist parties could not reach such success due to the politics which concentrated on the center. After 1980, a big self-questioning period in started that the supporters of the party were charged of being criminals. These correspond to a paradoxical identity crisis because neither their nationalism was identical to the states’ nor their fights against communism were valued. Thus, identity crisis was solved in the favor of Islam which superseded the statism. Their so-called “betrayal” by the state had contributed to the Islamization of the ideology once more. However, this time, as the state factor disappeared, the Islamization process, level and contours had created decomposition because without the state factor, there was not secularist weight, counterbalancing the radical Islamist inclinations. The decomposition ended

in the establishment of a new party, putting Islam over nationalism despite the religious nationalism defined culturally by the NAP. The remaining fragment of the party inclined to the former “statist-secularist” discourse, despite the political environment giving rise to the political Islam. This seems confusing because in fact, the NAP was aiming at governing the country. It needed a wider base; however, its only chance was to search for that among the conservative-Islamist electorate. In this context, it may be maintained that legitimization in front of the state was much necessary than ruling the country in the short term. However, the WP and the other center right parties had disappointed their electorate in the present coalition government; therefore, the conservative electorate moved towards the NAP base. Under the available conditions, the NAP reluctantly defined a moderate Islam and thus, to some extent, gained the chance to represent the Islamist electorate. It was credible for the state and the conservative religious electorate because radical policies, rather than solving the social problems, were augmenting the political tensions. Moreover, due to its clear image, a number of the center right electorate who get tired of the corruptions in the center right parties gave one chance to the NAP.

The 1990s had given rise to nationalist sentiment in Turkey. The issue of the terror organization PKK, its links with the Kurdish people and their relations to the EU, the EU candidate status sensitive to Kurdish issue and the Cyprus problem¹⁹⁶ were creating common problems on the EU level; they augmented nationalist sentiment and they still have the potential for doing the same. In fact, every issue related to PKK and Abdullah Öcalan¹⁹⁷ gives birth to social hatred, and complexity in the EU-Turkey affairs. From a radical nationalist party, people waited for a strong stand especially against the EU, PKK, and Cyprus problems. However, the stands of the existing political parties were so weak that the people had punished them by voting for the NAP.

From the Ottoman Empire times onwards, Anatolia has sheltered various

¹⁹⁶ Cyprus Problem is one of the most important issues concerning the foreign policy of the state since 1974 military operation. It has not been solved up till now, neither through the initiatives of the United Nations nor with the efforts of the guaranteeing countries, Turkey, Greece and Britain. With the integration of the Southern Part to the EU, TRNC problem have entered a new era. It is still tried to be solved on the official level.

¹⁹⁷ Abdullah Öcalan, known as the leader of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), which acts as a terrorist organization within the national boundaries of Turkish Republic.

ethnic races and cultures. The basic reason for nationalism to have hardness in gathering the people together may be accepted as this heterogeneous social structure. In the 1990s, the external effects of globalization giving rise to ethno-nationalism contributed some Kurdish people to define themselves free from the nation-state because due to economic unrest and cultural discontent, they have sustained their ethnic identities and they were not melted down within the official identity up to that time. As argued by Hobsbawm, “national consciousness” develops in an unequal manner among different social groups and regions,¹⁹⁸ which may be related to the fact that in Turkey there have been economic and social developmental differences between the Eastern and the Western parts of Anatolia. In this sense, the EU sees the problem as a matter of human rights and criticizes the Turkish state policies against the Kurdish citizens. However, this is at most the problem of the official nationalism which could not develop a common identity for all its citizens. Kurdish minority question and the PKK question mixes with each other and the only think that can clarify this issue is the concept of terrorism. PKK creates the image of the warrior of the independence war of the Kurdish minority against the nation-state. Both demands of the Kurdish state and the PKK issue gave rise to Turkish nationalism.

On the other hand, the downfall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the USSR gave end to the Cold War conditions. The political and militaristic boundaries among the states started to melt down. As the group of states from both sides dissolved and political communism disappeared with the downfall of the Iron Curtain, the supra national organizations and transnational economic linkages with multi-national companies have begun to develop all around the world. This wave has been affecting especially the nation-states as they are the main actors of the international arena. However, this is a detrimental effect because the global condition is eroding the nation-state structures. The most important negative effect of globalization for nation-states is that it is giving rise to ethno-nationalism. Through the eroding nation-state structures, globalization led to the development of ethnic cultures, turning them to global components. Thus, the ethnic existences within the nation-states are searching for developing their identities and searching for the chance to articulating themselves to the global wave without the mediation of the nation-state, which in Turkey gave rise to a Kurdish problem.

¹⁹⁸ Hobsbawm (a), *Ibid.*, p. 26

The other important factor effecting the redefinition of the ideology was the “reanimation of the pan-Turkism” dose on the basis of the Turkic Republics, liberated from the USSR. Previously, the important role that the racist, pan-Turanist current played in the establishment of the NAP was evaluated. After the expulsion of the racist group from the party, pan-Turanism on the basis of Turkism had been carried to the end of the 1990s as the ultimate ideal of the NAP. Pan-Turanism was not put forward because it was conflicting with the official ideology. However, Turkic states conjuncture gave the party chance to create one more common ground with the state. Due to their strategic importance in the new world order after the Cold War, Turkey defined its foreign policy aims in the Caucasus through these new Turkic states. This was the definition of the conjuncture on a common ground for official nationalism and the NAP nationalism after the end of the common anti-communism issue. Therefore, playing on the primordial common historical past, nationalism was defined on the basis of culture and race in the 1990s. Intersection of the NAP ideology with the states’ gave birth for the party further legitimization chance. Thus, through the older links with these states on the basis of culture, language and a common past, old pan-Turkist ideology acted a severe role in the redefinition of the party ideology with the 1990s. The NAP benefited from the expansionist policies, which were also employed by the official ideology because it had older and deeper links with the pan-Turkist tradition. In other words, the Turkic Republics and the pan-Turanism conjuncture was the intersection of the official ideology and the NAP ideology because expansion of the foreign policy and the trade policies to the central Asia caused the state to tolerate the irredentist nationalism of the NAP.

Ex-Soviet Republics were an important issue because as we have not seen until now, the NAP had no important views concerning economy. Sometimes, due to its statism, it represented itself as an anti-capitalist party; however, most of the time with low voice, it defended a mixed economy, directed by the state. However, in the 1990s, it played on “poverty”. As argued by Turan, throughout 1990s, it tried to articulate an economic view to its rhetoric.¹⁹⁹ The party had brought the “Eastern Anatolia Development Plan” on the agenda, against the “South-Eastern Project”

¹⁹⁹ Turan, *Ibid.*, p. 291

(known as the GAP) because according to its opinion, the central and the south-eastern parts of this geography were not taking what they deserved from the national income due to the “South-Eastern Incident”, related to the PKK and terrorism. Namely, it tried to produce a “national anxiety” from the “poverty” here and to some extent²⁰⁰, it may be claimed that it was successful in this if the 1999 elections are thought. These new states were enabling Turkey the chance of leading their progress as their elder brother. The conjuncture was giving rise to the supranational integrations and their economic values like natural gas and petroleum was contributing the states to take the chance of leading to these states in their economic and political developments. Thus, pioneered by the NAP and accepted by the state, racist rhetoric targeting these new states was given tongue at every chance. However, its stand may simply be defined as statism against privatization until its coalition experience in 1999.

Bahçeli and the NAP entered the 1999 election under such conditions told above. The statist, moderate Islamist rhetoric was colored by cyclical factors giving rise to natural sentiments. Economic approach was formed by its statism; however, difference was created with the South Eastern issue. The NAP played on PKK terrorism and the Kurdish problem and turned the social hatred against terrorism to votes. It may be argued that racist Turkism was augmented by Kurdish nationalism. Moreover, the liberation of the Turkic Republics positively affected racism and its credibility in the political and official levels. Then, it may be argued that racism was one of the important inclinations came to the fore in the party ideology. As known, radical Turkism or racism had no credibility on the level of official nationalism because both the state accepts civic nationalism and it does not have irredentist claims. However, in order to enable a common historical past and diminish the influence of Islam on the culture, ancient Turkish past and Turkism gave color to the official nationalism. Then, racism had the chance to live by Kemalism like the other nationalist inclinations. However, racism had great oppositional potential against the state and the radical racist group was suppressed in the forties. With the multi party period, racism was the most important ideological current augmenting Turkish nationalism. After the institutionalization and organization of nationalism around a

²⁰⁰ Kemal Can, “Yoksulluk ve Milliyetçilik”; in Necmi Erdoğan, et al. (ed.), *Yoksulluk Halleri: Türkiye’de Kent Yoksulluğunun Toplumsal Görünümleri*, Demokrasi Kitaplığı (WALD), İstanbul, 2002, pp. 116-133

political party, the racist current was suppressed within the party too because the party was inclined to Islam in that racism had no chance on the party politics level for a party to be a mass movement. However, it was carried to the 1990s within the official and the NAP ideologies in a blurred manner and just in the available conjuncture, it created a common ground for the both ideologies and as it had been in anti-communism in the sixties and seventies, the Turkic states conjuncture contributed to the definition of nationalism on the racial basis for both ideologies. Thus, the ideological inclination of the nineties left Islam and gained a more secular character consistent with the “statism”. Moreover, it gave the party a chance to offer its mass base pan-Turan either on the territorial or in the cultural basis. Nevertheless, it was open that nationalist ideology, after the economic crisis and corruptions in the political spectrum could offer a new alternative order and thoughts to its voters. Not only had the mass base of the party but also the reactionary electorate of the other parties were inclined to the NAP. It was surprising for racism to gain such credibility due to the conjuncture if the general condition of the Turkish politics is thought. However, the official credibility given to racism should be born in mind.

The PKK and the Kurdish issues together with terrorism gave the chance to the NAP to substitute its 1970s anti-communism with these events. Moreover, the new racist condition in the Turkish nationalism both reanimated the NAP ideology on the basis of Turkism, for which it put Ottomanist and Islamist inclinations behind. Since the organization and institutionalization around a political party, the racism of the ideology diminished; however, in the nineties, among the competing racist, cultural, religious and official definitions of nationalism, racism dominated the ideology for the first time. Therefore, it may be maintained that what was clear in the NAP ideology of the 1990s was its racist redefinition on the basis of Turkism and Turanism. In the 1999 elections, the NAP was able to get the 17.98 per cent of the votes, surprisingly exceeding the expectations of the NAP members, and it acted as the major coalition partner, which may all be related to the deep transformation process it experienced and the daily conjuncture giving rise to national sentiments around the country. However, the party ideology of the NAP was formed under the oppositional conditions and it was not for a party ruling the country. Thus, the new leader Bahçeli, once more attempted to redefine the ideology available for the NAP

as a coalition partner, which will be mentioned below as the cause of the rapid defeat in the 2002 elections.

6.2 The Nine Lights Doctrine and the Clarification of the Official Party Ideology

Until Türkeş's death, it may be suggested that the NAP ideology had shown a continuous transformation process. Party's ideological framework allowed and eased ideological shifts, concerning the change in emphasis between the basic tenets because it was organized around nationalism, having the ability to adapt itself to every conjuncture and ideological combination. It is fair to put forward that widening the base and moving to the center started with Türkeş's self initiative in the 1960s. In this sense, there is continuity between two leaders; however, effecting the structural transformation, the importance of the "leader factor" became much more influential in determining the direction of the change with Bahçeli. This was because Bahçeli was trying to be strong; however, Türkeş was a leader whose strength came from the devoted respect to his glorified leadership. This means that intra-party democracy started to decrease under the influence of strengthening leadership and the structure of the party became more authoritarian. Under Bahçeli's leadership, the party tried to draw the image of a "new party" with a "new leader". Bahçeli accepted the positive legacies of the party and eliminated the negative links with the past as shown in the previous chapter. The most important change happened in its ideological redefinition and it was as if the party was cutting off from its past.

From 1965 to 1999, the ideological tenets of the NAP and the shifts of emphasis on them were touched upon in their relation to the cyclical changes. However, the 1999 elections opened a new era in Turkish politics. It may be claimed that with such vote share, the NAP started to make more realistic future projections. For a long time, the party had attempted to be a center right mass party. For the first time, the electorate was giving it the chance to transform this extreme right party into a mass political party with a significant electoral appeal. Çarkoğlu suggests three phenomenon in highlighting the different dimensions of political change in explaining the peculiar characteristics of Turkey's party system. He points out the "dynamic electoral laws and their impact on electoral preferences", "changing voter

preferences” and “party rhetoric”.²⁰¹ Besides technical laws, it may be maintained that voter preferences and party rhetoric are influential upon each other. The determiner of the party rhetoric is the ideological construction of the party because it may be accepted as the linguistic expression of the party ideology, giving it a visible sense. In other words, it is a clearer expression of a theoretical framework, contributing to the easiest proliferation of the party ideology. In this context, contributing to shifts in the party rhetoric, transformation of party ideology may be accepted as one of the determiners of political change. The rapid rise and the decline of the NAP votes from 17.98 per cent in 1999 elections to 8.34 per cent in the 2002 elections may be observed through clarifying its relation to the indefinite expression of the ideological ambiguities in the party rhetoric. However, it should be added that it becomes harder to explain the reasons in a clear way in examining the nationalist phenomenon because nationalism sustains its credibility and flexibility by this ambiguity in character. In fact, its 8 per cent vote share in the 1995 elections and their rise to 17.98 per cent with the next elections may be confusing in this sense; however, between 1995 and 1999 elections; there is not any significant change in the party rhetoric because it had taken time to reflect the rising racist current on the ideology. It was after 1999, mainly with the sixth congress of the NAP in 2000, in which the direction of change became rather clearer in the official party ideology and rhetoric.

In its simplest sense, the party identity is the “image that citizens have in mind when they think about that party”²⁰². This also corresponds to their political identities. It has strong relation to ideology since the ideology forms the party image or identity. In this sense, the NAP represents conservative, radical nationalist, racist, Islamist and also statist and laicist electorate at the same time. In fact this is not a possible ideological reconstruction because as it is seen, there are some conflicting features among all these. If the party ideology refers to a set of literate ideas, a reasonably coherent body of notions concerning practical means of how to change and reform a given body politics and the society it orders,²⁰³ these ideological

²⁰¹ Çarkoğlu, *Ibid.*, p. 156

²⁰² Tepe, *Ibid.*, p. 55

²⁰³ Carl J. Friedrich, “Ideology in Politics: A Theoretical Comment”, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 24, No. 4. (Dec., 1965), p. 613.

premises are not available to be activated to reform given body politics. It also embraces action oriented sets and beliefs in which conscious actors make sense of their world through which its members construct their political ideologies. A political party establishes the institutional organization, within which ideology is politically constituted. Thus, a party enables an ideology to be expressed in daily politics as an alternative construction. The power of the ideology may be determined with the strength of its political hegemony project as an alternative to all other existing ideologies because as argued by Mannheim, the political conflict is the rationalized form of struggle for the social hegemony.²⁰⁴ For this reason, it has to be consistently constructed and transformed in the struggle for social hegemony because in its very nature the political arena has to be the rational environment of ideological conflicts and ideological reconstructions have to conform to this rationality in politics. In this sense, anti-communism or religious inclinations in the formation of the ideology are temporary determiners and they do not present just solutions to the existing problems in the society. For example, anti-communism of the NAP in the 1970s created action oriented sets and beliefs for its members; however, rather than contributing to the tensions, the NAP should act to solve the existing tensions among the communist and the state ideologies through constituting its ideology in the form of a solution.

The political parties may transform their ideologies in long term due to the “fluctuations” over time and the “outcome” of important events. As known, the ideological reconstruction of the NAP has inherited the ambiguous structure of the nationalisms in the Ottoman era and their internal conflicts. They were also sustained in Kemalism, which had to conform to the necessary important steps in developing the nation-state ideology and the internal struggles between Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. These ideological inclinations had formed the basis of the NAP ideology and paradoxically nurtured it, together with the official nationalism, drawing a legal framework for all of them within the political arena with the multi party period. The ideological shifts in the NAP were especially determined by the conjuncture; however, the crossing over possibilities between the features of these nationalisms were limited to the statism of the party together with its laicist stand. However, it articulated them as such that it formed an ideology through the dynamic competing features within these nationalisms which may function for the needs of

²⁰⁴ Mannheim, *Ibid.*, p. 66

daily politics. Thus, every redefinition in the ideology was not a sharp interruption but a redefinition within the same limits with necessary changes in the emphasis. For example, leaning on Islam and Turkishness of the same time but not defining itself as an entirely Islamist party was possible with this ideological structure. However, claiming to represent the whole electorate of the center right may be an “irrational” approach because its ideological situation may be a good example of instability that it is hard to state the party stable in the center. However, the 1999 elections say the opposite as an important turnover that its outcomes were influential upon a break off from the previous limited ideological shifts.

Until the 1960s, Turkish party system did have no ideological dimensions because firstly, the multi party politics had not been established properly and secondly the social fragmentation and differentiation started just in those years, leading to the emergence of new party ideologies guiding to the differentiated worldviews of the electorate. However, it should be added that until the establishment of the Turkish Workers Party in 1961 on the left, political parties were positioned in the “centre” or the “right”. This was the technical fragmentation on the political party level. With the emergence of a strict socialist ideology as a political party, the other parties had to redefine their political stands in a clearer manner because as told above, the power of a political ideology may be determined with its strength of being the alternative of the other existing ideologies. The social gaps opened the politics to the polarization of extreme ideologies, dominating the 1960s and 1970s with social violence and disorder. In this respect, what the establishment of the NAP in 1965 meant is the transformation of the political polarization into the discrepancy between communism and anti-communism. This meant further radicalization in the extreme left and right. Due to the social cognition and traditional structure, anti-communism had the potential to concentrate on all the ideologies hostile to communism within itself. Except for this radical concentration, the NAP transformed nationalism as the anti-thesis of communism. It was defending the order together with the state, which characterizes its ideology as a conservative one, which may be resembled to the nationalism in Europe after 1789, theoretically through their functions. If recalled, nationalism had turned to the ideology of the order against proletariat until the 1850s. It is possible to link this to the nature of the Turkish nationalism that had experienced conservatism and modernism at once when it was

turning to the nation-state ideology. Thus, Turkish nationalism still goes through synchronized transformation rather than a step by step one similar to the West, which gives nationalism a modernist and conservative character at the same time. The reflection of this paradox in the official nationalism and the NAP ideology is similar to each other. On the one hand, social fragmentation had occurred with rapid political and economic modernization; however, the state tried to suppress the claims of change, which are again the outcome of that modernization. Ideological polarizations in the society may be related to modernization in this sense. On the other hand, the NAP appeared as the guardian of conjuncture near the state; however, it owes its existence to the change in the system, and articulated itself to the system not as an alternative political party but as if it was the natural body part of that order. Its strong statism may be related to this instinct even if it conflicts with its ideology. Maybe for this reason, its nationalism resembled the Kemalism in the sense that it combined various ideological inclinations in itself because it did not leave any of the Ottomanist, Islamist, Turkist and Kemalist currents and tried to combine Anatolianism, Islamism and Turkism with Kemalism, recruiting for all anti-communist voters on the way of being a mass party. The ideological ambiguity among these currents and the problems resulting from the self development of Turkish nationalism and the nationalist phenomenon may be reflected from the ideological doctrine it drew, embracing all of these on a whole which may show the specific paradoxical situation of nationalism as a political party ideology.

The NAP defined the ideological tenets of the party as the “Nine Lights Doctrine” in 1967. The party’s nine basic principles were “nationalism”, “idealism”, “morality”, “social-mindedness”, “scientific mentality”, “liberalism”, “populism”, “peasant care”, and “developmentalism and industrialization”.²⁰⁵ In the first sight, it may be seen that it combines modernism, revolution and conservatism. This may prove the ability of nationalism to function in all ideological concepts because despite the traditionalist, conservative and religious base, Nine Lights nationalism aims at raising Turkey to the peak of civilization. This may be accepted as the point that the NAP intersects with Kemalism, which feeds back the statism of the party. The contradictory Turan-official nationalism relation and the ambivalence between

²⁰⁵ Information on the Nine Lights Doctrine is based on the web site of Ülkü Ocakları (Idealist Hearths). <http://www.ulkuocaklari.org.tr/uh/tg/9isik.htm>, last access, 21.07.2006.

statism and the appeal to the religious conservative electorate in relation to modernism make one confused. It is open to debate how the NAP adapts its traditionalism to modernization; or in other words, it is controversial how it reconciles Ottomanism and Islamism with Kemalism because Kemalism had solved its problem with traditions through a break off with a modernist secularism. This also corresponds to an ambiguity between religious base and the modernist elite, which leads to a dual rhetoric and an internal irrationality that nurtures the practical problems in the policy making process when ruling the country. Despite its “populism”, there is a clear distinction between the base and the elite. Therefore, the party character of is hard to describe. However, it is possible to clarify the articulation of the phenomenon to the doctrine through their determined examination.

In its most general sense, *nationalism* of the Nine Lights means “one’s love to his nation and state”. This sounds like “patriotism” and it embraces political consent reminding civic features of a Western type of nationalism. However, it highlights ethno-racial features by defining Turkishness through referring to “common history”, “religion” and “culture”. In this definition it may be extracted that unless someone is Muslim, it cannot be a Turkish nationalist conflicting with Western nationalisms. The Turkish identity is defined through a “territorial-civic nationalism”; however, this definition conflicts with its “religious approach” because it excludes the non-Muslim Turkish citizens. Despite the territorial sense, it cares for the outside Turks. It aims at Turan and defines it as the ultimate Turkish ideal.²⁰⁶ However, Turan geography does not address to the territorial-civic borders of a nation-state. As told before, Turan solves the identity problem by establishing a homogeneous Empire after the Ottomans and carries an ethno-racial aspect. This again conflicts with the religious aspect because whoever accepts Islam as his religion, he becomes the member of the mere Muslim community. Thus, it is possible to maintain that there is an unsolved tension between ethno-cultural, namely racist, civic and religious definitions of Turkishness, which makes defining the NAP nationalism rather confusing. It is clear that the NAP is indecisive among Anatolianism, Islamism and Kemalism. However, this is in conformity with its “populism” because this

²⁰⁶Accordingly, Turan means what Enosis means for the Greeks, what Pan-Slavism means for the Russians, what German Union means for the Germans, what Arabian union means for the Arabians, what pan-Aryanism means for the Iranians.

ambiguity gives the party ideology flexibility in that they can be redefined according to the different social inclinations from one election to the next.

Idealism, as touched upon before, was defined as the NAP type of nationalism. It is one's "wish" to serve one's nation and secure its independence. Its main principles are "individual and national liberty" and "equality". However, it does not define the conditions of equality in the society apparently. Through the "self-determination" principle; it aims at the freedom of the slaver Turks in the Turan geography. As it is seen, its idealism is a modern one, touching on democratic propositions. It is against the exploitation of the slaver Turks with a Third World "anti-imperialism". However, its including them to the Turan after their liberations turns this anti-imperialism to irredentism. In contrast to this wish, after the liberation of the Turkic nations with the collapse of the USSR, official nationalism and the NAP projected claims for cultural, economic and historical integration. Moreover, the Turan ideal was just about to be born for the NAP. This seems conflicting with the self-determination principle they had foreseen in Idealism.

Morality is the lifestyle of Turkish society and it protects the traditions of Turkish nation. In society-individual interaction, society is superior to individual according to the morality principle. The most important principles of morality are subordination and discipline, which forms the basis of the party, leader factor and the hierarchical rule within the party. This may clarify the individualism of the party. Accordingly, Ağaoğulları maintains that individual was melted down in the integrity of nation.²⁰⁷ It is nurtured by "Islamic beliefs" and "principles", "national history", "national morality rules" and "traditions". Morality seems to be substituting *laicism* in relation to the statism because there is no reference to laicism; however, it defines culture and history in the sense of the official nationalism. Morality combines Islam and pre-Islamic past and insists that even primordial Turkish history included some principle available for modern Islamic principles and morality expresses the idea that the concept of nation already exists in Islam because Qur'an accepts nation as a "distinct cultural group". As it is seen, there is no reference to the West or modernization rather to the Turkish past. The modernist-Kemalist nationalism and the NAP ideology are again contradictory here; however, referring to "Islam", "Turkish society" and "traditions", morality tries to show that there is not any

²⁰⁷ Ağaoğulları, *Ibid.*, p. 219

conflict between “Islam” and “ethic-nationalism” and it is the most important source for the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The party idealizes an “Anatolian Islam” as the representative of this form but the situation of the Alevi citizens, who are the focal intersection point of Islam and ethno-nationalism, is contradictory to this proposition because the TIS contributed to the Alevi-Sunni conflicts in the 1970s. The exclusion of the Alevi citizens diminishes the persuasiveness of the TIS and this constitutes the most fragile point in it. Thus, the NAP could not define a consistent definition of an ethnic-Turkish Islam or an Anatolian-Islam yet and the borders are indefinite in sense of this identity formation. In addition, the Turan ideal and the common past approach conflict with Anatolian Islam on the basis that Muslim-Turks outside Anatolia are not accepted as Turkish through this definition at least in practice. In other words, Anatolian-Islam may be an alternative to the Turan ideal and in its most general sense; it intersects with *Misak-ı Milli*. At the same time, it discriminates Turks by leaving them outside the Islamic community. Nevertheless, religious nationalism on the basis of race seems similar to the Jewish nationalism. All of these once more prove the ambiguous stance of Islamism within the party ideology and may prove that its articulation to the ideology is a popular aim because the NAP does not represent itself as an Islamist party rather as its alternative.

Social-mindedness is composed of economic and social views of the Nine Lights. The economic approach envisages rapid economic developmentalism through modernization of both agriculture and industry. In this, rapid investment, huge capital accumulation, export-oriented mass production and saving may be enabled by a “third way” or a “mixed economical” model. It includes the encouragement of “private entrepreneurship” together with “public investments”, and a “solidarist-corporatist” social structure. In its solidarist-corporatist model, Nine Lights divides the society to six sections rather than accepting a class-based society, as “peasants”, “proletariat”, “artisans”, “officials”, “employers” and “professionals”. The state organizes these six sections as “corporations”. Ağaoğulları claims that the NAP ideology aims at disintegrating and integrating the society at the same time. First, it divides the society to occupational groups; secondly every group is bounded up absolutely and interdependently to the nation. Thus, every part is functionless alone and the NAP tries to erase the differentiation among the society and reduces

everything to nation.²⁰⁸ As the second component, the social aspect of the tenet envisages the protection of the free enterprise, provision of the incentives to the holders of the small capital, and state ware organization of social welfare through social security and social transfers. In this sense, enabling the social justice, however, all of them are thought to be organized under the leadership of state. As it is seen, economic and social views both require a “paternalistic” role for the strong state organization. It does not give importance to individualism nor does it include an entire liberal aspect. Despite its rapid modernization plan through industrialization, the NAP model did not produce alternative plans for the modernization in the sixties; however, the main problem of the country was the social fragmentation due to economic industrialization as the outcome of modernization. In this, it did not put concrete economic plans for the country but took part in the political polarizations. Therefore, the economic aspect of the ideology does not serve practical solutions to the daily problems.

Scientific mentality puts science and technique on the basis of welfare, strength, military power, development of agriculture and industry. This requires a well-planned national education, focusing on national history, moral values and traditions of the nation and Turkish nationalism. The science pointed out here is the positive sciences; however, this sense of national education, except for its focusing on traditions resembles the Kemalist sense of the same concept. As known, Kemalism insists on positive sciences in the development of society; however, Kemalism does not include the moral and traditional education to the extent that it is done by the NAP. Actually, the NAP does not express the context of the national education based on positive sciences. For instance, it does not determine the limits in focusing on the religious history. The boundaries between Kemalism, religion and traditions are obviously drawn; nevertheless, in the NAP ideology it does not have a definite framework. In other words, national history resembles to the national history thesis of the Kemalist state and moreover, the reference to the pre-Islamic past is thought for balancing the influences of religion upon education; however, the NAP’s national education plan does not include a severe planning rather an ambiguous plan leaning on a nationalism for mobilizing the masses and this contradicts with positive sciences by nature.

²⁰⁸ Ibid.

Liberalism simply guarantees all conceivable freedoms for every Turkish citizen, which is detailed in the United Nations Human Rights Declaration. Liberalism puts the best method of rule as liberal democracy. However, it does not embrace an economic liberalism, nor does it define why it excluded economic aspects of the concept. Its integral part is *populism*, which, together with liberal democracy, could enable a real popular rule. It also puts forwards *individualism*; however, populism and individualism are inferior to state and society, which were put above within nationalism, idealism and morality. Its liberalism, individualism and populism do not resemble its counterparts in the West rather nationalism seems to control liberalism. Thus, it does not seem to support further democratization in the long-term; however, its emergence is related to democratization in the politics, too. In addition, it supported authoritarian military rules and the Coups at every chance that this blurs its democracy understanding. This also means the self-erosion of its reason d'être because if the Single Party rule continued, it could not emerge as a political party.

Peasant care is the other important tenet because 65 per cent of the Turkish society is composed of peasants.²⁰⁹ Thus, the principle of “progressivism” must lean on peasants who have been neglected up to now on the one hand and on the other hand, villages must be modernized through the initiative of the state because peasants are one of the sections of the society. Organization is thought for modernization of agriculture, thus prohibiting the internal migration from villages to cities. However, the NAP aims at reducing the peasant population by a step by step modernization from 65 per cent to 20 per cent through reforming agriculture and soil through switching them to industrial fields. It may be claimed that this tenet was not able to solve the migration problem came to the fore in the sixties through rapid industrialization. Caring for the peasants seems like an inheritance from the RPNP in that the NAP was established on its organizational structure in the periphery. Furthermore, this plan was for the seventies and it may not offer anything for the global economic and industrial conditions. It has to be redefined due to the recent conditions, yet the number of the peasants does not form a wide base for the party. Although nationalism is an ideology that may form itself due to the conjuncture, the

²⁰⁹ Statistics of the year 1969, found in the Nine Lights Book by Türkeş.

NAP leaves the economic aspects deficient.

The last tenet of the Nine Lights, *developmentalism and industrialization*, emphasizes progress through technical innovation. It requires evolution but not revolution. Revolution destroys everything, mainly traditions and the past. In this sense, revolution is hostile to the national traditions; however such a claim makes the ideology ambiguous between conservatism and modernism again. Moreover, it does not define how to reconcile agricultural society with industrial or the periphery with the centre. This clarifies the populism of peasant care because despite the developmentalism, industrialization and peasant care, the NAP could not reconcile the urban and rural voters on its ideology until Bahçeli's leadership and accordingly, it was weak in the urban parts for years until the 1990s. The evolutionary sense of progress is thought for reaching the contemporary level of civilization; moreover, to nuclear and space era. Together with scientific knowledge, industrialization and technical development aim at a Kemalist style of development, which may be related to the statism of the party or the replication of the Kemalist modernization rhetoric on the ideology.

NAP nationalism, due to its most aspects, does not seem to constitute a rational original ideology, in competition with the other ideological stances of the political spectrum, leaving it weak in front of the others. It is not practicle enough for daily problems marking the society and politics and it does not give an alternative world view to its followers. Whole doctrine seems as a typical "best for everyone ideology"²¹⁰, however, ambiguities and inconsistencies between propositions are rather definite. Especially, there are problems between tradition and modernization, Islam, state and laicism, base and elite, etc.; however, ambivalence between "populism" and "statism" because of "traditionalism" and "Kemalist modernization" seems striking. For this deficiency, it does not seem to be a consistent ideology. In fact, nationalism may articulate irrational and conflicting approaches in itself in a consistent way; nevertheless the NAP's is not able to do this.

²¹⁰ Landau, Ibid., p. 602

6.3 The Ideological Ambiguity and the Identity Crisis: The Rapid Rise and the Decline of the NAP between 1999 and 2002 Elections

As told before, the initial party sharing the NAP mentality may be dated back to the NP. Türkeş had taken the RPNP over, which was the successor of the NP. The RPNP had a “corporatist”, “modernist” and “Kemalist” ideological rhetoric. It may be maintained that in RPNP nationalism, the official ideology was dominant and the nationalism currents were not mature enough to form a party ideology. It appealed peasants with a conservative ideology because it was established in a period of a political transformation and social stratification was not obvious. Its establishment marks the period of the society composed of peasants and elite. Thus, the ideological transition between 1963 and 1969 under the leadership of Türkeş may be comprehended more clearly that it corresponds to the time period of the emergence of the socio-political differentiation which was influential upon the determination of the political party ideologies at that time. Until the 1969 turnover with which the ideology had been gradually modified, the RPNP had taken 2.2 per cent of the votes and 11 seats in the 1965 general elections. In the 1969 general elections, the NAP had taken 3.3 per cent of the votes and 1 seat in the parliament. Between those years, in addition to the Nine Lights, the party started to develop a strong “anti-communism within its Turkism as Turkism evaluated communism as the imperialism of the USSR. Nine lights were not applicable in practical politics and the party focused merely on anti-communism in the 1960s. Thus, it may be put that developing anti-communism and older Turkist approaches together had contributed to only a 1.1 per cent rise in the total votes. Turkism may thought to nurture anti-communism and anti-Soviet stand that Turkism evaluates communism as the imperialist expansion of the USSR. However, the distance which the leadership initiated from the Turkist past contributed to the prevention of the would-be synergy with the collaboration of anti-communism and Turkist-Turanist approach. In fact, what the NAP gained from the anti-communist stand was initially its legitimization within the political spectrum for the official ideology.

With 1969, the party had sustained its strict anti-communism; however, it departed from the racist-pan-Turkist nationalism and substituted it with a “religious

nationalism". Its "statism" came to the fore; however, statism led religiosity to be defined on the basis of "culture". In other words, Kemalist laicism had determined the color of the NAP's religious nationalism. However, as Kemalism could not solve the tension between religion and secularism, the Islamic dose in the party rhetoric was not clearly determined in front of the base; however, the party elite had a laicist stand, nurturing the emergence of a dual rhetoric later on. In the 1973 elections, the NAP took 3.4 per cent and 3 seats in the parliament. The religious rhetoric gave no important rise to the party, only a 0.1 per cent. With the 1977 general elections, the NAP sustained the same ideological rhetoric and its vote share increased to 6.4 and won 16 seats in the parliament. This was an important time point because throughout the 1970s, the NAP had acted as the civil force of the state against communism and represented itself as the mere nationalist party defending the real nationalism against the communists. In this sense, the country was divided into two as communists and anti-communists and real nationalism was anti-communism. This "real" notion carries populist aims in itself because with this stand, the NAP was appealing the whole anti-communists electorate; moreover, through articulating Islam to the ideology, the most important traditional value of the centre right electorate was targeted. It tried to widen its electoral base through Islam and tried to widen official tolerance limits through anti-communism. The purpose was to legitimize the party in the centre right leaving radical nationalism behind on the expense of racism for being a mass party. In fact, the NAP seems as an available candidate to offer a solution to the tensions between laicism and Islam due to its amorphous nationalism, conservatism and Islamism, yet, it could not form a logical nationalism which may solve these problems at that time. In addition, leaving Turkism behind may confirm that Islamism, Anatolianism and Turkism are contradictory to each other and cannot be emphasized synchronously in the party rhetoric.

With the 1980 interruption, the party re-oriented its ideology towards Islam by departing from statism due to the sanctions upon the party. Afterwards the first elections, the NAP participated in the 1987 local elections and won 2.9 seats when it departed from statism to Islam. From 1965 to 1977, the party vote share had been in rise; although, in small ratios. Between 1977 and 1987, the party had seen a great vote loss, with a decrease from 6.4 to 2.9, with about a 3.5 per cent fall. With the 1989 local elections, it gained 4.1 per cent of the votes and a 1.2 per cent rise. From

1980 to 1992, the years passed in determining the condition of Islam because the party elite was warming their relations with the state and departing from Islam again, to the extent that the state definition of Turkish Islamic synthesis allowed. This point marks one other distance point between the modernized elite, aiming to legitimate themselves within the system and the conservative base, wishing for political solutions to their disillusionment. However, it formed a pragmatic coalition pact with the extreme-religious WP in the 1991 general elections and they took 16.9 per cent in sum. The NWP had won 19 seats, near the WP, winning 43 seats. This election results are relatively important because the NAP had success with 16 seats in the parliament for the legitimization of the party. On the other hand, it came to the fore as an alternative rightist party defending nationalism and religion at the same time appealing to the conservative electorate. If recalled, nationalism owes its stability to its instable character and one more ideological shift toward Islam had been positive for the NAP in legitimizing itself as an alternative within the political spectrum. By a moderate Islam, it was acting as the alternative of radical Islam. However, this was not the domination of the Islamist clique, rather a daily shift.

In 1992, the party was divided into two as “radicals” and “moderates” in relation to Islam. Then, with the exclusion of the radicals, the party had to define its Islamic-nationalism relatively clearer. Up till now, there had been shifts in the party rhetoric; however, the last exclusion was applied to the Turkists before the Islamists and between these two events, the ideology was redefined; however, there had been no change in the ruling elite. The exclusion of the radical Islamists and the Turkists from the party in two steps may correspond not to a redefinition in the party rhetoric but to a real break off from the past because indecisive between Turkism, Islamism, Ottomanism and Kemalism, the NAP clarified the ideology by departing its ideology from radicals. This conforms to the departure from the radical right to the center. After 1992, the ideology was to be defined on moderate Islam, moderate civic Turkism, tolerant Ottomanism or Anatolianism, and Kemalism due to the components left in the NAP ideology. Subsequently, due to its move to the centre, the NAP again defined religious nationalism on the basis of “statism” and “secularism” in a moderate sense. The other factor influential upon this choice was the rising antagonism to the political Islam among the society and bureaucracy. Thus, the pragmatism of previous Islamist WP-NAP coalition pact may be visible. One

may be sure that the party benefits from the ambiguity because this gives the party an elastic change advantage due to different conjunctures. However, this makes the ideology not a concrete alternative ideological stand among the other parties. Through “moderate Islam”, with the 1994 local elections, the NAP had risen to 8.0 per cent and with a further 0.6 increase in the 1995 general elections it won 8.6 per cent. However, it was not able to enter the parliament due to the 10 per cent election barrier. The increasing trend may be accepted as the outcome of the legitimization in front of the public, confirming the importance of the parliamentary representation for a party’s image.

Evaluating the 1990s political environment may be useful in observing the volatility of nationalist votes in the right until the 1999 general elections because as exemplified by the relation of NAP’s ideological shifts to the voting behavior, Turkish electorate does not vote through long-term ideological stands. Even after the 1980 Coup suppressing the ideological polarizations in the society, people have been voting for their short term interests. Therefore, the importance of the complex ideological reconstructions has been lesser after the 1980s and daily events became much influential on the voting behavior. In the 1990s, there was a fertile atmosphere for nationalism to grow up. However, there were many nationalism types, recruiting to represent the rising nationalist sentiments around country and various nationalisms found many ideological carriers within the political spectrum. Bora maintains two basic sources in the formation of nationalism since 1990s. One is the “reactionary nationalistic movement and the other is the “pro-Western nationalistic movement”, which claims to “merge with globalization and harmonization with civilization”. First group, defending a reactionary nationalism, leaning on a “survival and threat”²¹¹ anxiety gathers the “right wing radical nationalists” and the “center left wing”, “army” and the “state elite” together. The second group gathers “new urban middle classes”, “big capital” and “media elite” together.²¹² The votes had floated between all these inclinations until the 2000s because all of them were claiming to be the mere representative of Turkish nationalism. Thus, there emerged many nationalist ideologies claiming to be the only option for the nationalist electorate after the NAP.

²¹¹ Tamil Bora, “Nationalist Discourses in Turkey”, *The South Atlantic Quarterly*, 102: 2/3, Spring/Summer 2003, p.b434

²¹² *Ibid.*, p.b436

This was eased by the categorical ambiguity of nationalism sourcing from its own structure, involving articulations and synthesis related to cultural, religious or official definitions of nationalism because 1990s was marked by a process in which nationalism created new ideological synthesis like it had been in the 19th century Turkey giving life to Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism from the same social structure. Nationalism continues to survive its life in a symbiotic existence within hybrid ideologies whether creating a common political ground or conflicts between them that is again paradoxical. On the other hand, nationalism may do this in different conjunctures and/or may shape the conjuncture itself. The most important ideological shift was towards Turkism defined on the basis of race in the 1990s conjuncture that was detailed before which shows that the ideological departure from racism was pragmatic and illusionary.

The other important factor that shaped the ideological redefinition was the sudden death of Türkeş, the highest point of the party hierarchy in 1997. As tried to be implied, the party was in transformation all time because within evident limits, the NAP was always redefining its ideology. The first influence of the death of the leader was severe “confusion” and “instability” among the party elite, supporters and sympathizers because the leader factor was important for the party organization and hierarchy. In this respect, the problem of the election of the new leader and the new leader’s task for gathering this indecisive structure together were important in determining the future of the party. Subsequently, after a few months turmoil, Bahçeli was elected the new leader.

First of all, Bahçeli brought the whole unstable structure under the strict control of the core leadership. Under Bahçeli’s autocracy, leader factor was re-established; links with the rural electorate were strengthened; local branches that gained autonomy since Türkeş’s moderate-secular policies were reorganized, guaranteeing the control of the leader, and lastly, the party image and ideology entered a new transformation. However, this time, it was a severe breaking off from the leadership past because transformation did not follow Türkeş’s instructions. Therefore, the change in leader means refraction in the ideology and this is a severe change although the party had changed only two leaders. In other words, the party moved to a new way and started to move its future from there. As the transformation of the party image was detailed before, it is better to mention the ideological

transformation.

First and foremost, the ideological transformation was determined due to “statism”. The new leader has honored the interests of the country above the party and superior to his personal interests whereas Türkeş was devoted primarily to the party ideology. However, up to that time, the NAP was defending that it was the true representative of the state and the real and the mere nationalist party. Bahçeli’s devotion in serving the state interests continued even if these interests contradict with particular party ideologies. However, this contributed to the emergence of the dual rhetoric in accordance with the ideology when it was in opposition and rule and the promises of the party that it had given to its voters could not be realized because of the strong statism. However, the political party rules the state but it is not the body part of the state. Thus, this devotion to the state does not conform to the democratization of the politics. Moreover, in such a position of statism, the party cannot offer any other ideological stand than the states’. In this sense, the glorification of Turkishness in Türkeş’s times constituted a more coherent ideology of a political party in that Bahçeli glorified the Turkish state in every chance, exaggerating the identification with the state. He was decisive in this because he contributed to the expulsion of members, who disobeyed the party rules sooner, when the NAP was in coalition after 1999.²¹³ After 1990s, with the liberation of the ex-Soviet Republics, it was told that pan-Turkism was legitimized and redefined. Pan-Turkism was articulated with the Kemalist rhetoric despite its critical and frosty stand to Kemalism. The ex-Soviet Republics conjuncture was another ground for the NAP’s Turkism to merge with Kemalist nationalism because the cyclical state policies were requiring a new type of convergence with the Turkic Republics. In addition, on the eyes of the NAP, Kemalist nationalism was reflecting a “deficient definition”²¹⁴, according to Bora&Can. In fact, making the NAP’s re-approach the official nationalism easier was the ethno-racist ambiguity and tolerance the Kemalism carried to the 21st century because Kemalism always included a racist aspect. Simply, the whole ideological redefinition was determined by this strong statism with Bahçeli. It may be maintained that the racist stand of Türkeş was

²¹³ In the discussions of the privatization of the Turkish Telecom and Turkish Airlines, the minister of transport, Enis Öksüz was asked to resign from the party because contrary to the party policies he was severely against their privatization.

²¹⁴ Bora&Can (b), p. 176

substituted by the more patriotic and civic character of Bahçeli with the 2000s because civic and patriotic nationalism of the state began to show tolerance to racist ideological combinations. In this sense, both the NAP and Kemalism redefined their nationalisms on the basis of racism. In addition, Atatürk was the greatest Turkish person and the “Grey Wolf” in the NAP rhetoric.²¹⁵ In the words of Bora&Can, these have contributed the party to blame the people against the NAP like Kemalism did. Here, the NAP’s identification with the state plays a great role because yet, “state” was the “party” and hatred to Kemalism was hatred to the NAP or vice versa. The unconditional devotion to the state on the expense of party policies may confirm this again. In this sense, the ambiguity of the official nationalism and its stand to ethnic nationalism that have been inherited from the Republican Era have contributed for the NAP on the one hand to a further legitimization and on the other, to redefine its nationalism on a common ground with the official nationalism substituting the anti-communism of the pre-1980 period. Furthermore, this assault determined a strict stand for the NAP against the religious parties near the state.

Merging with the official nationalism gained acceleration with the coalition experience after the 1999 elections. The most important factor in doing these was enabling a further legitimization for the party in the public eye and bureaucracy because as suggested by Bacık&Aras, “*unless the NAP narrows the gap between its own brand of nationalism and that of the official nationalism, suspicion of the party will endure in different branches of state administration...*”²¹⁶. However, as the base of the party is mainly composed of “conservative-nationalist” voters, identification with official nationalism and against religion may prevent the NAP from being influential in the policy-making process, create discontent among its base and contribute to the fleeing away of the conservative votes. This may prevent the long-term aim of being a mass-party. However, the dual policy designed on the basis of elite-base distinction in the short term pragmatism seems to blur the ideological stand of the party.

The influence of Islam on the society was rising and religious practices were being relatively visible. However, its reflection in the political spectrum was not consistent with the social practices because the MP and the WP were ineffective in

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 177

²¹⁶ Bacık&Aras, Ibid., p. 59

defending their claims bounded up with religion in the previous government. Losing credibility in active politics, radical Islam was not strong enough to defend its electorate and it was also excluded by the state elite. Under such conditions, NAP's moderate religious stand between state and radicals made it available for the party to remain out of the turmoil related to political Islam in the present political agenda. The NAP was defending an Anatolian Islam in public though it was sustaining laicist stand in front of the state elite. However, this moderate ideology had shown it as a hope for the disappointed religious voters in that the previous conservative parties were not able to solve their problems related to the legal tight limits concerning religious education and dress codes. This contributed large amount of conservative votes to shift their allegiance to the NAP. However, moderate Islam was dominantly a cultural one and this type of a definition was not promising for the problems of the religious conservative electorate. In conformity with the global inclination, radical ideologies had articulated their discourses to democracy and under the peculiar conditions of Turkey; existing party ideologies were not able to democratize politics and society available for them to live their Islamic beliefs independently. At this point, the NAP was the mere party to solve political religious problems in the National Assembly. In other explanation, the NAP's moderate Islam was promising for a common political ground but also it was putting a polite incentive in front of the voters meaning that it was able to solve their problems only in the parliamentary. This attitude was also acceptable for the state bureaucracy because they were really disturbed by the reactionary Islamic demonstrations in the streets. Thus, the moderate Islam won the sympathies of the conservative electorate resented by the previous government and the state bureaucracy disturbed by the present conditions. It may be put forward that, under the rising tension between Islam and state, moderate Islam was a best for every one ideology and it could be better if it was solved on the basis of democracy. However, the NAP Islam was not ready to offer such practical solutions to daily tensions because state-Islam tension was a deep problem and cultural Islam was not able to correct their problematic relationship. Thus, the rational choice was to define Islam in an ambiguous sense, for attracting more electorate and it was not able to suggest just and realistic solutions as it had proposed before the elections.

A political party has to defend a concrete economic program corresponding to

the orientation of its ideology to the economic system in a country and the global economic determiners. When the NAP entered politics in the sixties, the society was being transformed by economic changes and this was also transforming politics. Namely, the differentiation of the social classes was the outcome of the rapid economic industrialization; however, despite the left, proposing alternative transformation and system, the right was not offering any other system. Nor had the right tried to solve the existing economic problems. To indicate alternative solutions, the NAP defended a third way in the Nine Lights. The main targets of its economic program were synchronous development of the state and private enterprises. Even, the state was to support and encourage private enterprise. In this sense, the economic model defined by the NAP was a mixed one. However, how to merge the private and state enterprises was uncertain. It did not have any detailed economic suggestions then. The political polarization of the seventies was the outcome of the sixties' economic change and it had been also deepened by the deficient economic stands of the ideologies. The eighties and the nineties are known with deep economic corruptions, crisis, inflation and so, with the unrest among the society. Throughout the economic transformation in those years, the NAP did not change its economic approach. When in the coalition in 1999, there was full privatization in the agenda contradictory to its mixed economy model and thus, it was practically modified with the needs of the coalition experience. Due to the statism, what was important was the state interests, and it was above the party's economic stand. Nationalism, which corresponds to a statism, leads the NAP to conform to the daily politics easily because it redefines its ideology not only due to the conjuncture but also to the daily agenda. The liquidity of the nationalist phenomenon allows such ups and downs; however, the weakness of the economic aspect of its ideology had been a real challenge for the party in the coalition government when its electorate waited for consistency against the economic problems.

It is hard for a party to appeal to the mass electorate through a radical ideology. Through its ideological redefinitions, the party both tried to legitimize itself and move to the centre by widening its electoral base. Nevertheless, it reached its ideological geographical limits with the 1977 elections. This was put on the agenda practically by Bahçeli, which meant the transformation of the "conservative-religious-nationalist, central Anatolia electorate to the urban because the party was

severely weakest in the urban areas. This targeted a synthesis of a new electorate profile, a combination of urban and rural. This was only in the party image because the ideology was not addressing such a combination. Transformation of the image has contributed the party to be seen as alternative peculiarly among the young voters. Mainly, the NAP was popular among the university students. The party was able to recruit some academicians, established a RDD²¹⁷ and a party school which raised the party's profile among the urban population. Moreover, Bahçeli's self-image as an academician but not a militant created a new image for the party. However, this did not mean that the party was able to reach such a voter profile because the rise in 1999 represents the change in the urban voter preferences but not entirely the rural electorate. In other words, the party could not enable the rise in the rural area because only the reactionary rural electorate voted for it and the real rise had been possible with the urban voter preferences. Therefore, it may be argued that Bahçeli was able to bridge the long-term gap between the rural and urban electorate and transformed the party into an "urban party". This gave the chance to a new ideological approach, addressing the urban electorate however; it may not address that voter profile through statism and moderate Islam at the same time in the long term. For this reason, gradual orientation to the new trends around the world emphasized "democracy" and "human rights" in the new party program in 2000. As known, there was reference to the human rights in the Nine Lights; however, it had remained only in rhetoric up to that time. Yet, both rightists and leftists in the country welcomed these new ideological tenets of the NAP but evaluated them as unbelievable due to the past of the party whereas this ideological shift was peculiar to Bahçeli and it was a genuine attempt in the party history.

Due to the internal and external conjuncture, nationalist sentiment was in rise in the 1990s. Patriotism and nationalism got nearer to each other due to the Öcalan and the PKK issues. Political Islam searched for another carrier due to the failure of the MP and the WP. This time, political Islam was trying to articulate itself to nationalism. This intersected with the transformation in the NAP ideology. It targeted the rural and the urban electorate both; and through many positive conjunctural factors, the NAP, surprising even the party elite, won 17.98 per cent, revealing both the top success of the NAP's ideological transformation history and the leadership of

²¹⁷ Research and Development Department.

Bahçeli. Between 1999 and 2002, this new ideological redefinition was in practice in the coalition partnership which the NAP experienced. Çınar&Arıkan relates this victory to the ability of playing on the different definitions of nationalism:

*The NAP has become particularly skilled in playing upon the ambiguity between these two meanings of nationalism. The NAP nationalism, with its emphasis on common culture and history, leans more toward a form of cultural nationalism. However, in several NAP publications, nationalism is even more frequently defined as a love of one's country and loyalty to the state, therefore evoking the other meaning of nationalism that takes it as a relation to citizenship. Capitalizing on the ambiguity between these two meanings of nationalism, the NAP is able to tap into feelings of patriotism and presents itself as the only party –being the only nationalist party- that represents the true interests of the nation and state. In other words, this confluence of the two meanings of nationalism allows the NAP to give the impression that representing the national interests is under the monopoly of this one and only nationalist party.*²¹⁸

This may be true but a deficient comment because in its entire electoral experiences, the NAP redefined its ideology and played upon the ambiguity between the cultural, racial, religious and statist definitions of nationalism for holding a wide portfolio of electorate together. However, this time, such strategy reached its best and it was not only an important outcome for the NAP. With 1999, Turkish electorate was inclined to the right and there occurred a surprise accumulation on the right side of the political spectrum, which may be accepted as a structural transformation of the electorate. This may mean a merge in the rightist ideologies, making the nationalism of the NAP blurred one more because it was trying to move to the center and center was appealed by nationalism. Çarkoğlu comments that the rightwing parties continually increased their votes from 11 per cent in 1987 to 35 in 1999, “forming the largest ideological camp for the first time in modern Turkish history. Meanwhile, the center left consistently obtained around 30 per cent of the vote”.²¹⁹ He also comments on the changing features of the electorate as:

The 1999 General election in Turkey revealed several important characteristics of the Turkish Electorate and also signaled emerging trends in Turkish politics. First, the elections pointed to the ‘continuing electoral

²¹⁸ Çınar&Arıkan, Ibid., p. 36

²¹⁹ Çarkoğlu, Ibid., p. 154. This means that the right doubled and leaved the left behind.

fluidity and fragmentation of partisan support'; second, the 'continued growth, as well as shift, in the character of the electoral base of the pro-Islamist/nationalist extreme right in Turkish politics'; third, the 'collapse of primarily center-right'; and fourth, the 'growing recognition of the credibility between centrist parties and their constituencies'.²²⁰

The NAP entered the 1999 coalition government as a strategic coalition partner of the MP and the Ecevit's Democratic Left Party (DLP). First of all, the DLP is evaluated as a centre-left, nationalist party that may be exemplified by Ecevit's stance in the Cyprus incident in the 1970s. Accordingly, with this coalition government between "radical-nationalism", "leftist-nationalism" and "centre-right" may prove that nationalism of the years is not a dividing concept rather a common ground or it is a moment in which it again articulated itself to different ideological stands for its survival. Moreover, every non-radical ideology in Turkey may be accepted to born against the official ideology; nevertheless, they derived their ideologies from that structure. Turkish nationalisms' categorically peculiar emergence in the Republic makes the fusion of the different ideologies easier, especially on the basis of the nationalist phenomenon because it was Kemalism, which inherited the complexity of the nationalisms in the Empire, sheltering them in its structure and giving birth to them later on. In this sense, mergence of the center and radical ideologies was easier. However, for the NAP, trying to move towards the center with a radical ideology, coalition would be a problematic experience because it was the mere extreme party in comparison to the others. Nevertheless, it had a blur ideology, both in conformity and contrast to the others'. In addition, due to the historical rivalries, coalition partnership with the DLP angered many conservative-nationalists within ranks. In fact, it was a conscious choice for the NAP to start the coalition partnership with them because it was a necessity for the legitimization of the party, even with such a vote per cent. Thus, it may be seen that legitimization problem of the party was going on. Either the NAP was trying to legitimize radical Turkish nationalism by normalizing it as making it as a centre ideology or the signs of the ban on the party still continued. Other necessary thing to emphasize is the relative superiority of the official ideology on other nationalisms; especially being apparent in the election years.

The ideological ambiguity of the NAP nationalism had been visible as the

²²⁰ Ibid., p. 166

tensions between elite and base when the problems related to religious, economic and nationalist matters came to the fore in reality. There was a rising discontent around the country about religious inclinations and the NAP had promised the conservative voters to solve their problems on the official level through leaning on its nationalist Islamism throughout the 1999 election campaign. This was the reason of the volatility of the conservative-religious electorate between the NAP and the other rightwing parties. Namely, near the urban votes, the other reason for the rise was the claim of the conservative electorate waiting for religious freedom on the official level. As if the NAP was trying to legitimize religious nationalism on the parliamentary level or legitimize its Islamism in front of the religious voters, both for legitimizing itself and widening its base. However, the NAP was unable to defend their feelings in the coalition protocol. For example on the headscarf issue, it surprised many religious electorates because Nesrin Ünal, one party member, removed her Islamic headscarf before giving her oath in the National Assembly due to being in conformity with the state interests. This statist, centrist, secular elite resented the religious base, which contributed to a great criticism within the party ranks and among the voters because if this behavior meant the solution to their problems, however on the parliamentary level, they did not want such a solution. However, this strategy was available for the secular, statist stance refined on the basis of cultural Islamism with Bahçeli. This may prove the superiority of statism to both democracy and the promises given to the electorate in the campaigns. Furthermore, it may indicate the temporality and duality of the party rhetoric despite the permanency of the policies of the party elite.

Apart from these, two related matters that challenged the NAP were the death sentence of the Abdullah Öcalan and the legislation of the necessary codes for Turkey to become an EU member.²²¹ Öcalan problem refers to an “ethno-racism” problem because it is bounded up with the rise racist sentiments around Turkey. The PKK leader says that it defended the rights of the Kurds. However, the NAP defends the homogeneity of the culture, race and nation. It excludes the presence of Kurdish identity like the state and accepts a civic stand in a technical sense however makes up

²²¹ For the stand of nationalism against the EU matter see Nergis Canefe& Taml Bora, “Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism”, , “Intellectual Roots of Anti-European Sentiments in Turkish Politics: The Case of Radical Turkish Nationalism”, Turkish Studies, Spring 2003, Vol. 4 Iss. 1, pp. 127-148.

for its policies not on legal propositions but on tensions and anxieties. It takes a stricter stand than that of the state because its version of nationalism is ambivalent between civic, religious and ethnic nationalism. Moreover, despite Islam excluding racism, NAP nationalism is antagonistic to a “pluralistic civil project”. This shows that the party does not evaluate this problem as a matter of fact related to democracy and the “*NAP leaders believe that the disparate ethnic groups that comprise the Turkish nation come together through historic compromise, and that if the groups are not aware of their common national values, then it is the state’s duty to keep them united*”.²²² However, during the coalition government, they consented not to execute the death penalty, which they justified as self-scarification, for not putting Turkey in a difficult position in front of the international front. This discontented the rank and file of the party one more. NAP’s inconsistency on ethno-nationalism and religion may prove that the NAP does not have any deficient for dealing with ethno-nationalism. However, it should undertake the task of producing a solution to the problems related to ethnicity without ignoring them because as a nationalist party, it has to present some solutions in contribution to democracy and human rights available for the newly constructed ideology of Bahçeli. This may mean to redefine its ideological stand against the state that this is not an easy task to undertake. The ambivalence between the state and the party ranks may be accepted as one of the reasons of the rapid decline in the votes against the PKK terrorism. In this sense, its democracy and human rights are determined by its own homogeneous national unity definition due to “religion” and “race”. Multi-culturalism is a really strict problem for radical nationalism because it is one of the basic EU principles to show tolerance to different identities. On the other hand, the NAP sees the EU as interfering in the Turkey’s internal affairs; however, it could not take a strict stand against the EU in that it was determined as a “supra party state policy”²²³.

During the coalition partnership, economy came to the fore with two basic events. One was the economic stagnation and the rising inflation which led to the worst economic crisis of the Turkish history. However, the NAP had no obvious economic policy in relation to the present crisis. On the other hand, the most important crisis was experienced on the privatization issue. Even it created intra-

²²² Tepe, Ibid., p. 67

²²³ Bora, Ibid., p. 448

party conflict and the exclusion of the Ministry of Transport. This problem was solved due to the statist-centrist policies of the NAP once more.

In general, the NAP had shown a “low profile” in the coalition government. It was important for the party to legitimize itself on the eyes in the army, bureaucracy and big capital. As it may be seen clearly, the NAP nationalism shows an instable character; from one election to the next, from one conjuncture to the other, it is able to transform itself, according to any new conditions. 2000s new ideological approach made the base-party distinction of years visible in practice. The official party ideology, which it began to be applied on daily politics, did not conform to the general party image. In this sense, it was inevitable for the NAP to confront problems with its elite, organizational structure and electorate. The organizational structure and the party base were against the policies of the elite. However, this was the peak of the ambiguity which the dual rhetoric of the party had created since the establishment. The first crisis it contributed was the 1980s turmoil that ended with the exclusion of the radical Islamists. The second big crisis was the one appeared during and after the coalition experience of the NAP between 1999 and 2002, which ended with a rapid rise and decline in the votes between two following elections.

Up till the leadership of the Bahçeli, definition of nationalism had an ambiguity among the racial, cultural, official and religious approaches. However, its practice had shown that the crisis of the party members and the base resulted from the nationalist ideology the party defended. Moreover, this is again a complex period for the nationalist phenomenon because on the one hand it is challenged by globalization and its socio-political-economic effects and on the other hand, it is trying to adapt itself to the new world order by the rising ethno-nationalisms. In other words, through the irrationalities and paradoxes in its genetic structure, nationalism is trying to adapt itself top the new conditions. In this respect, the NAP structure is not able to adapt itself to such a change especially in the recent period because it cannot define its nationalism due to its paradoxical nature. The transformation of the nationalism from a different world view in the official ideology to a political party ideology requires it to redefine itself by solving the paradoxes in its nature because it may not continue policy making due to the ambiguity in its ideological reconstruction.

However, the NAP nationalism had been ambiguous on culture, religion and

race and it was the new redefinition which opened a new way to democracy and human rights and which implied a severe change in the party rhetoric. It still carries the oldest structural confusion between Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism, and Kemalism since the very emergence of nationalism in the Ottoman Turkey and the emergence of the nation-state. Bahçeli also proposed nationalism as the solution of the existing problems. However, nationalism carries its categorical problems within itself and for this reason; it gives birth to further problems when its problematic structure is offered as a solution to the existing problems. Nevertheless, the Turkish electorate inclining to moderate Islamic policies may show the next address of the NAP's ideological redefinition until the next elections because with the 2002 elections, the electorate chose a new party defending a moderate political Islam, the Justice and Development Party, which gained the 34.2 per cent of the votes on its own. Thus, the 2002 general elections meant a great defeat for the NAP and a rapid rise and a decline for its ideology because it fell to 8.34 as the outcome of the long-term complex structure of the Turkish nationalism, and its reflection on the NAP ideology because the NAP tries to defend Islam, Turkism, Kemalism, Ottomanism at the same time and it is indecisive between them in that their importance within the ideology changes from time to time. This fluidity is because of the peculiar structure of nationalism, which can adapt itself to every kind of ideology under different conditions. The official nationalism, which carries the unsolved problems between Islam and state for years, affects NAP's ambivalence between the both positively because it addresses the electorate appealing the both in different times. Moreover, the NAP ideology is not able to adapt itself to the global and ethno-national rising trends yet. These seem to give birth to subsequent problems in the ideological structure of the party.

CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

Since the very emergence of nationalism as a political power with the French Revolution, it has showed great orientation to historical changes and new conjunctures. Nationalism emerged as a “revolutionary” movement in 1789; it turned to a “conservative bourgeois ideology”; in fusion with “imperialism” and “capitalism”, it turned to the ideology of “colonialism”²²⁴ between the nineteenth and the half of the twentieth centuries; with the half of the twentieth century, it had turned to “fascism” and “national socialism” carrying “totalitarian” aspects; it became “anti-colonialist” and “anti-imperialist” with the rise of the Third World Nationalism and the decolonization after the Second World War; and with the beginning of the twentieth century, it transformed itself into “ethno-nationalism”. As it is seen, in a rapid manner, it has been articulating itself to new trends and ideologies whether contradictory or not. This liquid structure, on the one hand contributes it to be a long-lasting ideology; and, on the other, it acts as the cause of the emergence of many hybrid ideologies but not a specific nationalism type around the world. Every single nationalism type shows this nature, so does Turkish nationalism.

Nationalism entered into the Ottoman Empire with the nineteenth century. It was “revolutionary” for the liberation movements of some communities; however, it was again the cement ideology against “separatist” nationalisms for the Ottoman ruling class. Its most important difference from the West was its employment from “top to down” as an elite ideology; rather than its Western type that was the ideology of middle classes. In the same years, nationalism in the West was in transformation from revolutionary into conservative; however, the Empire employed nationalism as ideological cement against decentralization. As micro-nationalisms aroused, it turned to an Ottoman nationalism and evolved to pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism. As it is seen, the development of nationalism shows an evolutionary character in the Empire until the Turkism, which differentiated its transformation

²²⁴ Marion, Ibid.

career from the Western types, and which gave the Turkish nationalism its original facets. The evident mission of nationalism in the Empire lasted until its transformation into an ideology which could establish a nation-state. This contributed the proliferation of the national-consciousness among Turks quite late in comparison to the West. At this point, Turkish nationalism was trying to establish itself as a Western one and so, it had to experience the historical transformation points of the Western nationalism at once. Thus, it lived the cultural, political-ideological and institutional levels in nationalism at once. Nevertheless, Turkish nationalism was also dealing with the identity problems between Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism which were suppressed under the Kemalist form of nationalism later on. However, this was a relative suppression because official nationalism was also nurturing from the past divisions in the history of nationalism because it needed them to constitute itself as a nation-state ideology. The other thing giving birth to another irrationality between nationalism and Turkish nationalism was the impacts of modernization because as nationalism was a modern phenomenon and its transformation in the Empire and Republican Turkey meant modernization, it had to constitute itself both modernist and anti-modernist due to the fact that it had to preserve the original structure against the infiltration of the West.

On the other hand, while Ottoman Empire had been challenged by modernization and the political and economic superiority of the West, it responded all these by trying to transform itself to the ideology of an empire. This may be accepted as the earlier roots of the “anti-imperialism” of Turkish nationalism, which was going to be evident in the Turkish Independence War. In my opinion, what should be noted here is that the common point behind the Western and the Ottoman motives was nationalism. Ottoman Empire was accepting nationalism coming from the West inevitably and trying to transform it due to its needs for using it in response to the infiltration of the West and the West was trying to proliferate itself through nationalism, which again may be accepted as another complex situation within nationalism.

Turkish Republic, whose ideology had evolved in the Empire, inherited this complex structure and problems and tried to challenge with these through transforming pan-Turkism, pan-Islamism and pan-Ottomanism into a nation-state ideology. Lastly, it turned to Kemalist nationalism and tried to solve the remaining

problems from the empire in relation to nationalism through suppression or ignorance. For this reason, the problematic structure of nationalisms continued living in the body of Kemalist nationalism up till the transition to the multi-party period. In my opinion, this was welcoming another problem because Kemalist nationalism, defining itself with the compounds it had taken from the Western and the Eastern types of nationalism and the specific nationalisms in the Empire and on the one hand, it had many common features with them. On the other, it should be noted that it was established against the both.

This paradoxical situation gained another dimension with the transition to the multi-party period because as carried within Kemalist nationalism, there had emerged the chance to organize around a political party for all “other” nationalism types in Turkey. In this context, Turkish nationalism tried to establish a political party from 1945 to 1965. However; it was not probable because nationalism could not produce practical solutions for developing ideologically and politically and for passing beyond being an intellectual current. At the end, it could not organize around a party but took over another party and began to transform it according to its premises after which the NAP emerged. Here, it may be suggested that the NAP nationalism resembled the official nationalism in that it did not chose any evident inclination within the whole Turkish nationalism current. Its difference is that it did not suppress the racial, Islamic, cultural definitions of nationalism but tried to constitute an ideology, trying to embrace all of them. Moreover, for representing itself as a legal political actor, it added the statist definition of nationalism to its discourse. This type of an ideological reconstruction, which was trying to dominate all the nationalist meaning area of the ideological ground, was possible due to the genetic structure of nationalism, which is able to combine many paradoxical ideological inclinations at the same time.

Between 1960 and 1980, despite the wide portfolio of an ideological definition which was nurtured by the history of the nationalist phenomenon and Turkish nationalism, the NAP confined itself to anti-communism and moreover, articulated Islam to its anti-communist discourse. Anti-communism was targeting the conservative, nationalist, religious electorate at the same time, which led to permanent ideological landslides between statism, laicism and Islamism from one election to the other between 1965 and 1980. Until the 1980 Coup, the NAP played

on the ambiguity between these ideological premises; namely, it played on the whole legacy of Ottomanism, Islamism, and Turkism and later on, the official nationalism. The Coup led to the self-questioning process in Turkish nationalism in relation to its anti-communism and unconditional statism. The party ranks were inclined to the Islam as the outcome of this process. Thus, the Islamist-Turkist distinction became much more evident and the members, defending Islam superior to nationalism, got apart from the party and after 1990 and they established another party. This may be considered to make the nationalism of the NAP clearer; nevertheless, the party could not establish a coherent ideological approach to Islam until 1980. The fragmentation on the basis of Islamism made the one paradoxical dimension clearer; nevertheless, it was substituted by statism and secularism and a new discourse, which was accepting Islam as one of the indispensable historical cultural traits of the Turks. However, this was the failure of the great TIS, and so, the whole ideological reconstruction of the party before 1980. Moreover, it was the becoming of the pre-1980 period identity crisis apparent, which was tried to be shown throughout the thesis through the references given to the ideological redefinitions in the party ideology before every election.

After the Islamization process, the new conjuncture contributed the NAP to substitute its former anti-communism with an “anti-Kurdish” discourse due to the rise of ethno-nationalism and the terrorist attacks of the PKK, which were the new cyclical conditions augmenting the nationalist sentiment in Turkey in the 1990s. This required the redefinition of the Turkish identity against the Kurdish and this contributed to a one more departure from Islam. Therefore, the emphasis turned into the Turkish race and the ancient heroic pre-Islamic Turkish past with the 1990s conjuncture. Moreover, contributing to the “reanimation of Turkism”, the liberation of the Turkish Republics led to the rise of the ethnic dose in the NAP nationalism. Despite the global trends, the ideological stand against the West had been formed by an uncertain skepticism on the basis of the national integrity premise; however, it did not embrace an evident anti-Western dimension in the NAP ideology. This may be accepted as the reflection of the long-term ambivalence on nationalism as a political party ideology because nationalism of the NAP has to be anti-Western by nature; nevertheless, it could not show such an evident stand against the West in practice and in daily politics. This is a common problem, which it shares with the official

nationalism and which proves the fact that the historical inheritor of the tensions between modernism and anti-modernism is the NAP. In addition, the distance to Islam was determined by secularism and it may be suggested that what never changed in its discourse was its economic approaches. After the 1990s, the world and Turkey both have been in economic transformation due to the new trends which are influential especially upon the nationalisms and the nation-state structures. Moreover, for Turkey, 1990s passed with economic crisis. However, the NAP did not adapt the economic aspect of its ideology to the new economic conjuncture and so, could not adjust it to the global conditions. It did not put forward a clear, anti-global discourse as a radical nationalist party; however, the most important enemy of the existence of the nation state may be accepted as globalization now. It may be argued that in general, the newest compound of the ideology was the substitution of anti-communism by anti-Kurdish discourse in the 1990s. What strengthened the ideology was its racism, so the pan-Turkist tradition, which was the most important ideological dimension nurturing the NAP nationalism since its emergence. However, in my opinion, this was the reflection of the older paradoxes and problems together with the new ones on the window of the politics because 1980 was a sharp turning point for the NAP and this type of an ideological redefinition does not seem as a long-term plan in that it was designed by temporary references peculiar to the present conjuncture. Through its previous habits, the NAP seems to define itself according to the conjuncture again with the 1990s through the strong adaptability of the nationalist phenomenon to the different conjunctures; however, it should be noted that the party was not able to play on this natural feature of nationalism because it experienced such a rapid rise and decline between the last two elections.

Despite this negativity, the NAP won the 17.94 per cent of the votes in the 1999 elections. According to the comments above, the NAP does not seem as a party ready for ruling the country if the daily problems of the country are considered because the ideology of the 1990s does not seem to be convertible to practical politics. NAP could not solve the headscarf issue in the parliamentary; it could not preserve its stand against the EU policies and the Öcalan issue. In this sense, its statism comes to the fore as a dilemma because it was not against privatization and on the headscarf issue; it could do anything that it explained his dilemma through the tenet of the party which puts the state interests beyond the parties’.

As a party ideology means what a party defends, aims and how it shows itself off in front of public; landslides within ideological representation of a party may contribute many short term successes or failures. However, these landslides may be accepted as the inconsistencies of the party ideology on the grounds that they damage the ideology. Nationalism as the ideology of the NAP, emphasizing upon collective unity, heroic and mythical Turkish past, glorifying state power, tending to integrate all Turks on the basis of race, ethnicity and culture and leaning on weak middle class shows the features of the Eastern nationalisms. Gathering “fascist”, “authoritarian”, “totalitarian” features together irrationally and acting as a “reactionary, traditionalist and conservative” political party, it is really hard to define the NAP nationalism. In addition, it is not clear which groups of the society it reflects. The NAP emphasizes upon the official state nationalism when needed, which was established on civic nationalism and which is nearer to the Western nationalisms. This again makes to clarify its nationalism harder. However, explaining the inconsistencies of the NAP nationalism through populism or pragmatism may mean choosing the easiest way too.

Since the very beginning, the most recruiting purpose of this thesis was to reach a deeper explanation with the observation of natural inconsistent structure of nationalism as the forerunner reason of the ideological landslides of the NAP nationalism and so, as the reasons for the rapid rise and decline of the NAP between 1999 and 2002 elections because throughout the party history it never attempted to solve these tensions within the Turkish nationalism. Rather, it combined them within its ideology to appeal more electorate because it wanted to be a center right mass party. It was able to combine the paradoxical natures of different nationalisms because of the peculiar structure of the nationalist phenomenon. In fact, nationalism has the power to turn such an aim into a reality. However, it was illogical to produce an abstract nationalism, which was not a practical ideology to the daily problems. At every chance, the NAP tried to present its nationalism as a solution to the socio-economic and political problems in Turkey but it had never put forward clear and logical solutions to the problems. In fact, it employed its ideology better on the conflicting issues and conjunctures, gaining credibility from the reactionary electorate. Nevertheless, its anxious ideology did not work in the practice. In my opinion, the rapid decline in the 2002 elections was due to the propositions told

above because, NAP was not able to present alternative ideological solutions to the problems in Turkey with its weak ideological approach and it could not hold the promises it had given both to its own electoral base and the reactionary people, who enabled the rise of the votes with such acceleration. This may be accepted as the outcome of the irrational structure of nationalism itself, inconsistencies in the formation of Turkish nationalism and its transformation into a political party ideology, which all together have been inherited by the NAP ideology.

To sum up, it is possible to note that, after taking part in the coalition after the 1999 elections that it won 17.98 per cent of the total vote, the NAP was not able to produce practical solutions to the political, economic and social problems. This may prove the abstract nature of the party ideology which makes it weak in front of the alternative party ideologies. Therefore, in the 2002 elections, it won 8.34 per cent with a 9.64 per cent of decrease. In my opinion, this corresponds to the fact that the ideology of NAP was not able to solve the concrete problems of the daily politics, which may show its deficiency. Moreover, with an ambiguous nationalism and indefinite conceptualizations of the ideology due to racism, culture, religion and civic nationalism, it may not offer democratic solutions to the problems in Turkey concerning nationalism. For instance, in the ethno-nationalist definition of nationalism, the NAP should clarify its ambivalence between racism and civic-nationalism because it is Turkish nationalism that may produce permanent solutions to the problems related to ethno-nationalism in Turkey. In addition, unless it defines a realist and stable stand to the tensions between Islam and state; it acts as one other political actor flaming the social and political anxiety because Islamization in the politics or with its new conceptualization; “moderate Islam”, may be seen as the strongest alternative to the Turkish-Islam synthesis.

Under the assumptions that have been made so far, it may be claimed that the NAP should evaluate and redefine its ideological discourse seriously from 1980 to 2002 according to historical transformations of the nationalist phenomenon, the developments in Turkish nationalism, post- Cold War international developments, new global trends and due to the real problems of Turkey which may transform its ideology a concrete political alternative among the existing ones because before trying to clarify the categorical paradoxes of the nationalist phenomenon and its further developmental irrationalities in the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, the

party may be able to offer alternative dimensions to the problems resulting from nationalism and Turkish nationalism in general and nationalism as its party ideology in particular through the help of new approaches. It may articulate itself permanently to the further democratization process in Turkey because political diversity may extend possibilities of democratic expansion and consensus on many critical controversial questions making the fragile points within the Turkish politics. Lastly, it may be suggested that the “ideological identity crisis” of the radical Turkish nationalism which has been visible after the 1980s, and which had reached its peak through the rapid rise and a decline in the vote share of the party between the 1999 and the 2002 elections may turn to an “ideological vicious circle” unless it redefines its ideology.

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