

COMPETING AND SHIFTING HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES:
THE TURKEY-EU RELATIONS BETWEEN 1999 AND 2005

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BURCU TOPKAYA

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

Prof. Dr. Sencer Ayata
Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Meliha B. Altunışık
Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes
Supervisor

Examining Committee Members

Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkes	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Fatih Tayfur	(METU, IR)	_____
Assoc. Prof. Dr. İlhan Uzgel	(AU, FPS/IR)	_____

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Name, Last name : Burcu TOPKAYA

Signature :

ABSTRACT

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Topkaya, Burcu

Master's Degree, Department of International Relations

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Mustafa Türkeş

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In this thesis, the competing and shifting hegemonic discourses in Turkey-EU relations in the period between 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005 are discussed in the framework of neo-Gramscian perspectives. In this study, initially the classic theories of European integration are analyzed and on the basis of the argument that the classic theories of European integration exhausted their potentials in explaining the European integration process, the neo-Gramscian perspectives are presented as an alternative theoretical framework. Deriving from the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations, the turning points in the related time period are defined and competing and shifting hegemonic discourses for both sides are discussed. The main argument of this thesis is that, since the very beginning of Turkey-EU relations, it has a wavering character and these relations are reproduced through the redefinition of competing and shifting hegemonic discourses with the active contribution of social actors in the related time period.

Keywords: European Union, Turkey, neo-gramscian perspectives, hegemony, competing and shifting hegemonic discourses

ÖZ

DEĞİŞKEN VE REKABETÇİ HEGEMONYA SÖYLEMLERİ: 1999-2005 ARASI TÜRKİYE-AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ İLİŞKİLERİ

Topkaya, Burcu

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Bu çalışmada, 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi ve 3 Ekim 2005 tarihleri arasında Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerinde değişen ve yeniden tanımlanan hegemonya söylemleri Neo-Gramscian perspektifleri çerçevesinde incelenmektedir. Çalışmada ilk olarak klasik entegrasyon teorileri incelenmiş ve bu teorilerin kapasitesinin Avrupa Birliği entegrasyon sürecini açıklamakta yetersiz kaldığı fikrine dayanılarak, Neo-Gramscian perspektifler alternatif olarak sunulmuştur. Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerinin değişken karakterinden yola çıkarak, belirlenen zaman aralığındaki dönüm noktaları tanımlanarak, her iki taraf içinde tanımlanan ve yenilenen hegemonya söylemleri tartışılmaktadır. Tezin ana argümanı, Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği ilişkilerinin başlangıcından bu yana dalgalı bir karaktere sahip olduğu ve bu yapının belirlenen zaman aralığına sosyal aktörlerin de katılımlarıyla değişken ve rekabetçi hegemonya söylemleri üzerinden yeniden tanımlanarak üretildiğidir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, Türkiye, neo-gramscian perspektifleri, hegemonya, değişken ve rekabetçi hegemonya söylemleri

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To my parents, my sister, my grandmother and my late grandfather

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party
ANAP	Motherland Party
AP	Justice Party
CDU	Christian Democratic Union Party
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSU	Christian Social Union Party
DISK	Turkish Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions
DP	Democratic Party
DSP	Democratic Left Party
EC	European Community
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEA	European Economic Area
EEC	European Economic Community
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
ERRF	European Rapid Reaction Force
ERT	European Roundtable of Industrialists
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ETUC	European Trade Union Confederation
EU	European Union
HAK-IS	Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions
ICJ	International Court of Justice
IKV	Economic Development Foundation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
ISO	Istanbul Chamber of Commerce
ITO	Istanbul Chamber of Industry
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
MEDA	European Programme for South Mediterranean Countries

MHP	Nationalist Action Party
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPAA	National Programme for the Adoption of the <i>Acquis</i>
NSC	National Security Council
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
PKK	Kurdish Worker's Party
SEA	Single European Act
SHP	Social Democratic People's Party
SPO	State Planning Organization
SSCs	State Security Courts
TBMM	Grand National Assembly of Turkey
TIP	Turkish Worker's Party
TISK	Turkish Confederation of Employer Association
TOBB	Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges in Turkey
TURK-IS	Turkish Confederation of Labor Unions
TUSIAD	Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association
UN	United Nations
UNICE	Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe
WTO	World Trade Organization

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Membership to the European Union (EU) has always been the objective of Turkey since 1963, by becoming an associate member of the European Economic Community (EEC). It is a clear fact that the Turkey-EU relations have a wavering character since the formalization of the relationship. It should be stressed that this wavering character have become more clear and have accelerated in the 1990s. The historical evolution of Turkey-EU relations indicates changing attitudes in both sides in certain time periods. As this study points out the wavering character increased during the 1990s. The main objective of this study is to analyze this increasing wavering character of Turkey-EU relations.

In 1997, as Turkey was not granted a candidateship status, she froze all the political dialogue with the EU. This happened two years after the realization of the Customs Union with the EU. As Turkey was granted a candidateship status and certain guarantees by the term-president, which is detailed later, the Turkish government decided to give her consent to renew political dialogue with the EU. So 1999 EU Helsinki European Council can be regarded as a turning point, in the sense that there are certain hegemonic manoeuvres before and after this summit. On the other hand, 3 October 2005 is another turning point for Turkey-EU relations if starting accession negotiations with the EU was Turkey's main objective in the post-Helsinki period, then this date can be regarded as the realization point of this objective. However when the hegemonic discourse in this period is carefully analyzed, it can be argued that although this aim was achieved, a hegemonic crisis both at the governmental and public levels occurred. So both these dates are turning points and represent the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations.

It should be noted that neo-Gramscian perspectives provide the theoretical basis of this study. Because although the classic theories of European integration tries

to draw a map of Turkey-EU relations within the framework of economics, foreign policy and security; they ignore the social changes and the role of social forces in Turkey's integration into the European structures. In this thesis, this gap is filled with neo-Gramscian perspectives.

Official roots of Turkey-EU relations date back to the signing of Ankara Agreement and Turkey becoming an associate member of the European Economic Community in 1963. Turkey has a long term objective of full membership and attempted to realize this objective in 1987, which had been rejected by the EU. However as full membership is Turkey's main aim on the road to the EU, Turkey concluded the Customs Union Agreement in 1995 with the EU, which entered into force in January 1996. Expectedly, this development increased the hopes of both politicians and the public opinion in Turkey and considered as a big step ahead for full membership. However at its summit in Luxembourg in December 1997, although the EU extended accession status to 10 states, it did not extend formal accession status to Turkey. In response to the Luxembourg decision, Turkey froze all her political dialogue with the EU and declined to participate in the European Conference convened in March 1998 for candidate countries.

Although in 1999 Helsinki European Council, Turkey was granted a candidateship status by the EU; accession negotiations would not start until 3 October 2005. So December 1999 is a turning point for Turkey-EU relations and the motivations behind this decision should be carefully examined. In December 2004 Brussels European Council, it is stated that "on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay".¹ So it was decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay on 3 October 2005.

¹ Brussels European Council on 16-17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions, p. 5. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

The atmosphere in Turkey was very optimistic until the Negotiating Framework for Turkey was issued on 3 October 2005. Because it was stated that, "the shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While having full regard to all Copenhagen criteria, including the absorption capacity of the Union, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond."² So it can be argued that on 3 October 2005, membership negotiations were symbolically opened with Turkey, which has been an associate member of the EC since 1963 and an official candidate since 1999.

This thesis attempts to analyze the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations between Helsinki European Council on December 1999 and 3 October 2005, in which accessions negotiations were opened symbolically, however both in the EU and in Turkey hopes for completion of full membership radically declined and it may even be asserted that it entered into a new crisis. Both the 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005 are turning points for Turkey-EU relations and thus require better analysis.

This thesis mainly argues that the integration process of Turkey into the European structures is an "open-ended struggle" between both national and transnational social forces and there are competing and changing hegemonic projects formulated by these social forces in Turkey-EU relations and also the Turkey-EU relations has a wavering character. Secondly, in this thesis it is argued that the EU's perspective is to formulate required hegemonic projects in order to transform a peripheral country like Turkey, and realize this objective through *transformismo*. According to Cox, elite talent from peripheral countries is co-opted into international institutions in the manner of *transformismo*. He argues that the individuals from peripheral countries may cooperate with

² Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 3 October 2005. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf > (Accessed on 20.11.2005)

international institutions for transferring the elements of modernisation.³ In this study the referred international organization is the European Union and the peripheral country is Turkey. This argument is supported by certain examples in the second and third chapters of this thesis.

As this thesis attempts to analyze the changes and continuities in Turkey-European Union relations between the period of December 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005, it is intended to discuss these changing hegemonic projects in Turkey-EU relations in the framework of neo-Gramscian perspectives. It is argued that neo-Gramscian perspectives provide a useful theoretical tool in explaining the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations.

For neo-Gramscian perspectives the concept of hegemony is very significant, which describes a type of rule which predominantly relies on *consent* alongside *coercion*. For sustaining a hegemonic project, historic bloc is very crucial. According to Cox, "the historic bloc is the term applied to the particular configuration of social classes and ideology that gives content to a historical state"⁴ and thus consists of structure and superstructure. Secondly, intellectual leadership is crucial for neo-Gramscian perspectives. They organize the social forces which they stem from and to develop a "hegemonic project" which is able to transcend the particular interests of this group so that other social forces are able to give their consent. There are three distinguishing elements of a hegemonic project: 1) Material reason, 2) Intellectual leadership and 3) Consent and coercion. Also it should be noted that once a hegemonic project is formulated it is not necessary that it is permanent, when required it can be redefined.

In his book "Production, Power, and World Order – Social Forces in the Making of History", Robert Cox defined three levels of inquiry for the evaluation of

³ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method", in Stephen Gill (ed), *Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993, p. 62

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 56

political and social conflicts, which are production, state and world order. Cox argues that these conflicts point directly to the disintegration of hegemony in world order, to a weakening of historic blocs and an opening of hegemonic crises within states and notes that the social forces shaped by production, state and world order are the shapers of tomorrow's order.⁵

Concerning the exhaustion of the classic theories of European integration and their explaining character of Turkey-EU relations in the given time period, this thesis argues that, "the classic theories of European Integration exhausted their potentials"⁶ to explain the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations and can not fully grasp the changes and continuities in Turkey-EU relations. So neo-Gramscian perspectives can be used as an alternative to the classic theories of European integration, which focus on social forces, endangered by the production process, as the most collective actors, and describes the process of European integration as the outcome of "open-ended struggle".

Also it should be noted that the analysis is on neo-Gramscian perspectives rather than the Gramsci's original writings, referring to the works of Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Andreas Bieler, Adam David Morton and Bastiann van Apeldoorn. The works of these writers provide sufficient theoretical sufficient tools and constitute a starting point to analyze the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations in the period of 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005.

This thesis consists of three main chapters, each being subdivided into sections and a conclusion part. Following the Introduction part, Chapter II sets up the theoretical framework for this thesis. In this chapter, following the assessment of the theories of European Integration, which are federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism; neo-Gramscian perspectives are presented as an alternative approach. In order to provide a better

⁵ Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987, p. 270–271

⁶ Andreas Bieler, "Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives and the Analysis of European Integration", *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 2005, p. 514

understanding of the neo-Gramscian perspectives, the key concepts of this perspective, which are *hegemony*, *historic bloc* and *passive revolution*, are clarified. These concepts are very significant for the analysis of Turkey's integration process into the EU.

Chapter III starts with the history of Turkey-EU relations, which is divided into three sub-periods and later devoted to the analysis of Turkey-EU relations from the European Union perspective with reference to the given time period. Main objective of this chapter is to analyze how the hegemonic discourse of the EU was formulated and redefined. Also the EU's material reasons over Turkey's integration into European political, economic and social structures are discussed.

In Chapter IV, initially the hegemonic discourses both in the period of 1960s and 1970s and in the period of 1997 Luxembourg European Council and 1999 Helsinki European Council are analyzed for providing a basis for the analysis of the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations. In 1960s and 1970s, the main hegemonic discourse among the Turkish elites was "they are the partners, we are the market; so we are against the EC!". If this discourse can be regarded as a hegemonic project, then in this period it can be argued that the Turkish elites formed an historical bloc. This argument is explained in this chapter. Accordingly, the same analysis is applied to the period of 1997 Luxembourg European Council and 1999 Helsinki European Council. The reasons behind the decision of freezing all the political dialogue and reformulation of hegemonic discourse are discussed. Additionally, in this chapter the societal perceptions on Turkey's membership to the EU and the role of national social forces are discussed in the post-Helsinki period. Concerning the national social forces, the changing attitudes of political parties, Turkish business organizations, labour unions and NGOs are taken into consideration in order to analyze the changing character of Turkey's hegemonic discourses.

The last chapter, the Conclusion, evaluates the general findings and the logical consequences of the thesis, which are based on the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations in the given time period.

CHAPTER II

THE CLASSIC THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION VERSUS NEO-GRAMSCIAN PERSPECTIVES IN THE ASSESSMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

*Theory helps us to see the wood for the trees. Good theories select out certain factors as the most important or relevant if one is interested in providing an explanation of an event. Theories are of value precisely because they structure all observations.*⁷

As the idea of European integration developed rapidly after the end of the Second World War, the emergence of theoretical debates on this issue started inevitably. According to Rosamond, the emergence and development of the institutions of economic integration in Western Europe after the Second World War provided a valuable site for both the application of existing theories and the development of new perspectives.⁸ Although some argue that the roots of the idea of “ever closer” Europe go back almost as far as civilization itself, in reality the post-war international system was the catalyst for the realization of regional integration in Western Europe.⁹

Before examining the classic theories of European integration, the meaning of integration as a concept should be examined. Integration is a concept whose meaning depends much more on agreeing a definitional consensus than it does on establishing any abiding or universal properties.¹⁰ There is a lack of consensus among the writers on the distinctive properties of integration. For Groom and Heraclides, integration is much more a process of becoming than it is a clear outcome or definitive political end state. On the other hand, for

⁷ David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, “Introduction” in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds.), *Theory and Method in Political Science*, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1995, p. 4

⁸ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 2000, p. 1

⁹ Michael O’Neill, *The Politics of European Integration*, Routledge, New York, 1996, p. 7–9

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11

Hughes and Schwartz, a systematic approach to the terminology of regional integration is needed and the processes of international change should be subject to empirical testing.¹¹ It can be argued that European integration theories examine the consequences of the increased interaction of long established nation states within their regional environment. According to Kahraman, Pentland treats European integration not a singular phenomenon or event but as a composite of related actions, joint outcomes and mutual responses to events within a given historical situation.¹² In sum, it can be argued that European integration is a political and economic process covers a spectrum of complex and ambiguous political, social and economic relations both at regional and supranational levels.

2.1. Analyzing the Classic Theories of European Integration

The applications of theoretical approaches to the European integration started in the early 1950s with some independent studies. Haas defines these theoretical approaches as pre-theories which have been imperfectly integrated, because they co-existed at different levels of abstraction, thus resulting in a non-addictive character.¹³ According to Kahraman much of the controversy arises as to whether integration should be regarded as a process, a condition or both. She argues that most of the approaches lie somewhere between descriptive and explanatory stages.¹⁴

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11

¹² Charles Pentland, *International Theory and European Integration*, London, The Free Press, 1973, p. 17 cited in Sevilay Kahraman, "Institutional Reform and Political Change in the European Community: From the 1950s to the 1980s", Unpublished PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 1996, p. 9- 11

¹³ Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anquish of Pretheorizing", *International Organization*, 24:4, 1970 cited in Sevilay Kahraman, *ibid.*, p. 10

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 11

Rosamond identifies four approaches in the study of European integration.¹⁵ The first approach understands the European Union as an international organization. However the EU is institutionalized and it is more than a straightforward instance of an intergovernmental organization. The second approach highlights the instance of regionalism in the global political economy in the study of European integration and underlines the notion of territoriality. The third approach aims to treat the EU as useful location for the study of policy-making dynamics and underlines the notion of supranationalism. The fourth approach regards the EU as a *sui generis* phenomenon and states that European integration cannot be theoretical testing site for the elaboration of broader generalizations.

In this thesis, the classic theories of European integration, which are federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism, are analyzed. After defining their basic characteristics, in the following part, the inabilities of these theories in explaining the nature of European integration with reference to the evolution of EC/EU are discussed.

Federalism is the first theoretical approach in the study of European integration. O'Neill argues that it represents the most radical expression of the supranational paradigm.¹⁶ However as Rosamond argues, there is no clear-cut academic school of European federalism as a result of the fact that federalism has tended to be a political project, with particular goals in mind.¹⁷ The leading writers of federalism are Karl Deutsch, David Mitrany and Ernst Haas. Also the roots of this idea can be found in the writings of Rousseau, Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham. Federalism was popular by Kalergi's idea of pan-European project in 1923. Main aim of federalists is the attainment of universal peace through political unification among states. Federalism presents a direct challenge to the nation-state system, as it is considered as the main sources of conflict; thus

¹⁵ Ben Rosamond, *op.cit.*, p 14

¹⁶ Michael O'Neill, *op.cit.*, p. 23

¹⁷ Ben Rosamond, *op.cit.*, p. 23

their solution for achieving peace is forming political and legal entities through institutionalization and establishing a world government or a regional federal government in a certain geographical area. They focused on institutional procedures for ensuring social stability and enshrining an equitable political balance of power, at the expense of explaining the logics and political consequences of social change.¹⁸ The scholars who support federalism present two advantages. The first one is the prevention of the capture of a system by any particular group. The second advantage is that the federated state becomes a stronger unit in the face of external threat.¹⁹ Also it should be noted that for federalists, like neo-functionalists, integration was clearly an elite process. During and after the Second World War, federalism was no longer perceived as a means whereby war could be averted, but later it became a strategy for supranational community building in Europe.

The second European integration theory is *functionalism*, which is the intellectual ancestor of neofunctionalist theory.²⁰ Functionalism is regarded as an approach rather than a theory. Also it should be noted that functionalism is a global approach which deals with international integration as well as regional integration. The main writer and founder of the school of functionalism is David Mitrany. Functionalism can be seen as a strategy for effecting cooperation and policy coordination between nation-states.²¹ It starts with criticizing the present multi-state system and argues that the nation-state cannot satisfy the needs of mankind. As an alternative, functionalism proposes creating a web of international functional agencies which would technically perform a number of technical functions more rationally and effectively in an already independent

¹⁸ Arend Lijphart, "Consociation and Federation: Conceptual and Empirical Links", *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 12, 1979 cited in Ben Rosamond, *ibid.*, p. 25

¹⁹ Ben Rosamond, *ibid.*, p. 27

²⁰ Paul Taylor, "Functionalism: The Approach of David Mitrany", in Arthur J. R. Groom and Paul Taylor (eds.), *Frameworks for International Co-operation*, Printer, London, 1994 cited in Ben Rosamond, *ibid.*, p. 28-29

²¹ Michael O'Neill, *op.cit.*, p. 31

world.²² Functionalism advocates the separation of economics from politics and acts in a non-political way with the aim of dealing with welfare issues through functionally specific international agencies. According to functionalists, the most important aspect of integration is the creation of a socio-psychological community which could result in the building up of institutions and power centres. Social integration must precede political integration. Actually functionalists did not deal so much with the outcome of integration.

The third European integration theory, which will be discussed in this thesis, is *neo-functionalism*. This approach has been an integral to the study of European integration in the second half of the twentieth century and for many integration theory and neo-functionalism are virtual synonyms. It is mainly focused on the Western Europe. As Kahraman argues the neo-functionalist ideas were largely originated from and shaped in the context of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and later of the EEC.²³ It includes the assumptions of federalism, idealism, behavioralism and functionalism. While Ernst Haas is among the most leading figures of neo-functionalism, the key contributors are Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman. As Kahraman points out, neo-functionalists identified economic transactions and welfare needs as the real source of positive cooperation and took the group rather than individual itself as the main unit of analysis. Also in contrast to functionalists, they regarded competition and conflict among different groups natural in social life. Haas argues that integration was conceptualized as resulting from an institutionalized pattern of interest politics, played out within existing international organizations.²⁴ According to Kahraman, neo-functionalism combines functional incrementalism with a theory of interest group politics.²⁵ Besides, neo-functionalists saw regional integration as an intrinsically political process involving the need to reconcile

²² Sevilay Kahraman, *op.cit.*, p. 19

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 20

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 21

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23

social diversities and to balance the conflicting interests that exist in all societies, within a community framework. Haas summarizes this situation as:

Regional integration was the process of how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict themselves.²⁶

Neo-functionalist approach assumes that integration starts when it is realized that certain economic problems yield higher welfare gains, if they are dealt with at the supranational level. The notion of spill-over is crucial for the neo-functionalist explanation of the process of integration. Spill-over is basically refers to the way in which the creation and deepening of integration in one economic sector would create pressures for further economic integration within and beyond that sector, and greater authoritative capacity at the European level.²⁷ Also neo-functionalism emphasizes the importance of non-governmental interest groups in the process of European integration. In sum, neo-functionalism, like federalism, is an elite-centred approach, which favours transferring authority and legitimacy to central institutions and thus achieves a peaceful change and conflict resolution through integration.

The fourth and last integration theory is *intergovernmentalism*. Intergovernmentalism restores the autonomy of the state. Their view of the state as a monolithic actor enables them to see the member governments as gate-keepers between their domestic political systems and the Community.²⁸ It implies that states are more important actors in the EC than the Community institutions themselves. Intergovernmentalism asserts that national interests determine the scope and depth of the integration process as well as the parameters of appropriate institutions. According to Kahraman, the application

²⁶ Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration...", *loc.cit.*, p. 610; Sevilay Kahraman, *ibid.*, p. 25

²⁷ Ben Rosamond, *op.cit.*, p. 60

²⁸ Sevilay Kahraman, *op.cit.*, p. 204

of intergovernmentalism to the EC in the 1970s has largely been confined to explain the changing nature of the Commission-Council relationship to the advantage of the latter. The increasing predominance of the Council and the resistance of member governments to the adoption of majority voting suggested that intergovernmentalism was a more typical feature of Community policy-making.²⁹ In sum, as Kahraman stated, intergovernmentalism is designed primarily to explain stagnation of integration and views the Community as neither above nor below the nation-state, but alongside.

2.2. Assessing the Classic Theories of European Integration

As stated in the introduction part, in this thesis, it is argued that “the classic theories of European integration exhausted their potentials to explain the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations and can not fully grasp the changes and continuities in Turkey-EU relations”. So in this part in the light of the criticisms of different scholars studying on European integration, the weaknesses and inabilities of these approaches are discussed.

For Apeldoorn, Overbeek and Ryner, the mainstream theories of European integration because of their conceptual design and assumptions are unable to achieve what should be the fundamental objectives of a political science of the EU.³⁰ Additionally, Stuart Holland had criticized the integration theories of lacking to consider the fundamentally capitalist nature of the integration and the development of multinational capital in Europe.³¹ Similarly, for Peter Cocks, integration is just an exercise of state-building to handle the dilemmas of capitalist development.³² Bieler argues that established approaches to European

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 205

³⁰ Bastiaan Van Apeldoorn, Henk Overbeek and Magnus Ryner, “Theories of European Integration: A Critique”, in Alan Cafruny and Magnus Ryner (eds.), *A Ruined Fortress?: Neoliberal Hegemony and Transformation in Europe*, Rowman and Littlefield, London, 2003, p. 17

³¹ Ben Rosamond, *op.cit.*, p. 83

³² *Ibid.*, p. 84

integration are problematic on two accounts in respect of analyzing EU enlargement against the background of globalization.³³

Federalist approach was criticized by Pentland in terms of their explanatory assumptions. He argues that the federalist approach developed over politicized conceptions of integrative change, without paying attention to the socio-political context out of which federal institutions could emerge.³⁴ Accordingly, Taylor has criticized the federalists' heavy reliance on the creative will of political actors in achieving integration. As Kahraman states, he commented that "politicians have rarely been able to agree sufficiently to undertake such a creative step together; this was particularly true when there was no serious external threat".³⁵ Also Kahraman argues that in federal thinking a common political will at the popular level is missing.³⁶

On the other hand, functionalism was criticized for their separation of economics from politics. Haas argued in this point that "power and welfare were war from separable. Indeed, the commitment to welfare activities arose only within the confines of purely political decisions, which were made largely on the basis of political considerations".³⁷ Besides Haas' criticisms, Harrison criticized functionalism on the grounds of the creation of a sentiment of world community as an outgrowth of international functional cooperation. He noted that "the dissimilarity between states in their ideologies and levels of economic development would necessitate the existence of such a sentiment, prior to functional cooperation".³⁸

³³ Andreas Bieler, "The Struggle over EU Enlargement: A Historical Materialist Analysis of European Integration", *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9:4, August 2002, p. 577

³⁴ Sevilay Kahraman, *op.cit.*, p. 18

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 18

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18

³⁷ Ernst B. Haas, "The Study of Regional Integration...", *op.cit.*, p. 23 cited in Kahraman, *ibid.*, p. 19

³⁸ Kahraman, *ibid.*, p. 21

It can be argued that by mid-1970s the influence of neo-functionalism began to decrease. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed the decline of supranational decisions and the academic commentators had downgraded neo-functionalism and theory-building attempts and rather opted for micro-level case studies hoping to construct the building blocs of a new theory.³⁹ As the Single European Act (SEA) was accomplished in the 1980s, the debates on neo-functionalism, that whether it should be revised or not, were intensified. However, for Kahraman, despite the revisions, neo-functionalism was generally conceived as theoretically and methodologically incomplete and awkward.

It is a clear fact that neo-functionalism had downsized the nation state and the role of national governments. Indeed, that weakness mainly derived from the pluralist character of the theory while the theory perceived the state as not a unified actor. Similarly, according to Kahraman, Haas had not only downgraded the role of national governments but also the assumptions of Haas about the transfer of legitimacy to the political community or the transfer of loyalties to the supranational institutions did not fit with the reality. That is why academic commentators argued that the theory should also consider the tension between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism while modifying neo-functionalism.⁴⁰ For Bieler, neo-functionalist approaches incorrectly assume an automaticity of integration through the concept of spill-over, based on an objective rationale and neglect the wider world within which integration takes place.

Bieler and Morton in their article "Neo-Gramscian Perspectives, IPE and European Integration" define two problems concerning neo-functionalism.⁴¹ First problem is on the ahistoricism of neo-functionalism in understanding human beings as rational, utility-maximizing individuals, implying the notion of spill-over

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 202

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 223

⁴¹ Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, "Neo-Gramscian Perspectives, IPE and European Integration", in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds), *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Economy*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 13

as an inevitable, teleological process of further integration along a line of objective economic rationality. Secondly, neo-functionalism, while explaining European integration, puts emphasis on the internal dynamics of European politics, and therefore neglects the wider structure, shaped by globalization and neo-liberalism, within which European integration is situated. For example in his book, Bieler explained the revival of integration in the mid 1980s as the convergence of national interests around a neo-liberal, deregulatory program with a focus on low inflation.⁴²

On the other hand, intergovernmentalist approaches consider states to be the most important actors at the international level and consequently overlook the importance of supranational institutions, transnational actors and the independent role of ideas. For Bieler, they incorrectly concentrate on inter-state negotiations as the most important instances of integration. Secondly he argues that established approaches concentrate on the institutional development of the EU but not the content. Additionally Apeldoorn presents another aspect of European integration theories by claiming that they overlook the social purpose of European integration.⁴³

Bieler and Morton criticize intergovernmentalism for taking the international setting of integration into account. They argue that its exclusive focus on states in international arena limits change to changes in the state structure. So this means that structural changes like globalization are not taken into consideration. Additionally by accepting states as the main actors who can adapt to structural change, the approach becomes too deterministic. So they came to conclusion that intergovernmentalism cannot explain the particular choices made by states in response to structural change and they criticize the fact that

⁴² Andreas Bieler, *Globalization and Enlargement of the European Union: Austrian and Swedish Social Forces in the Struggle over Membership*, Routledge, London, 2000, p. 4

⁴³ Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, "The Struggle over European Order: Transnational Class Agency in the Making of "Embedded Neo-liberalism"", in Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton (eds), *Social Forces in the Making of the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Economy*, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2001, p. 71

intergovernmentalist approaches are too state-centric and do not take into account the transnational actors.⁴⁴

After the assessment of the classic theories of European integration, in the next part of the thesis, the application of theoretical approaches to the study of Turkey's integration process into the European structures is discussed.

2.3. The Classic Theories of European Integration and Turkey-EU Relations

Scholars studying on Turkey-EU relations are aware of the fact that there are considerable amount of articles and books on this subject. However the theoretical aspect of this issue, somehow intentionally or unintentionally, to a certain extent, neglected by Turkish academicians. After a detailed analysis, this thesis argues that there is a gap between the studies of classic theories of European integration and their application to Turkey-EU relations.

In most of the studies, Turkey's integration into the EU structures are considered as a foreign policy objective and thus mainly fell into the scope of intergovernmentalist perspective. For example, Müftüler-Bac and McLaren state that, concerning Turkey-EU relations in the period of 1997-1999, that while constructivism and historical institutionalism cannot explain the pace of the enlargement, the bargains that are stuck during negotiations, nor the specific change in policy toward Turkey, intergovernmentalism should be used to evaluate these aspects of enlargement in the light of policy preferences of the member states.⁴⁵

Erol Manisalı, Şaban Çalış and some others put emphasis on the foreign policy elements in Turkey-EU relations and argues that Turkey's integration with

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 14-17

⁴⁵ Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Mauren M. McLaren, "Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey", *European Integration*, Vol. 25, 2003, p. 17-30

Europe was opened wide by the declaration of the Marshall Plan and later of taking part in the CEEC, ERP, OEEC and the Council of Europe.⁴⁶ Additionally, Müftüler-Bac puts the objections of the EU to Turkish membership under four main headings: economic factors, the Kurdish problem, the Greek veto and the Cyprus problem and the state of Turkish democracy and human rights.⁴⁷ Although the Kurdish problem was a domestic problem of Turkey at the beginning, during the membership negotiations it has become a foreign policy issue between Turkey and the EU. Also Cyprus problem has been transformed from being a foreign policy issue between Turkey and Greece to a foreign policy problem between Turkey and the EU, which was intensified after Turkey's Declaration on Cyprus. So it can be argued that foreign policy issues from an intergovernmentalist perspective dominated the studies on Turkey-EU relations.

Accordingly, Müftüler-Bac argues that EU-Turkish relations were shaped to a great extent by the Union's policy-making mechanisms, namely the Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament.⁴⁸ She stresses the intergovernmentalist aspect of Turkey-EU relations and states that the decision-making procedure sometimes hampers Turkey's relations with the EU in instances when the Commission would like to adopt a package on Turkey but sees it blocked in the Council of Ministers by one or more of the member states.

It should be noted that intergovernmentalist perspective is more valid for the arguments of the Euro-sceptics in Turkey. According to their arguments, when EU actors call for changes in Turkey's policies, these are interpreted within an inter-state framework and represented at best as "interference in Turkey's domestic affairs" and at worst as "attempts to carve out proportions of Turkey's

⁴⁶ Erol Manisalı, *Ortak Pazar'dan AB'ye – Hayatım Avrupa*, Truva Yayınları, İstanbul, Mayıs 2006, p. 20-30; Şaban Çalış, "Turkey's Integration with Europe: Initial Phases Reconsidered", *Perceptions*, June-August 2000, p. 61

⁴⁷ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1 No. 1, Spring 2000, p. 21-35

⁴⁸ Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Turkey in the EU's Enlargement Process: Obstacles and Challenges", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 2, Summer 2002, p. 79-95

territory".⁴⁹ Also the Euro-sceptics have the concern of the EU to turn out to become a more supra-national entity in the years to come.

On the other hand, Erol Manisalı expresses his concerns related to both foreign policy and security issues and argues that:

If it [the EU] is going to take over the market, diminish the national industry, govern the bureaucracy from Brussels, make demands contrary to my national interest on Cyprus, the European Army, PKK and Armenian issues, and refuse to admit Turkey unless these demands are met, I would say `Yes, it is in my favour if the EU lets me in' *but* add that 'it is trying to divide up Turkey and make me dependent and is putting forward these conditions so as not to admit Turkey.'⁵⁰

Manisalı successfully combines these different problematic issues together. His arguments contain both functionalist and intergovernmentalist elements. Additionally, Oğuzlu develops Manisalı's arguments and defines the point of views of pro-EU and Euro-sceptic circles in Turkey in conceptualizing Turkey's relations with the European Union from geo-political and security perspectives.⁵¹ In the first approach, the pro-EU side states that Turkey, as an EU member, would be more able to pursue its geo-political interests in its neighbourhood. The second approach states that the EU accession process erodes Turkey's security base because it contributes to the weakening of Turkey's geo-political power and identity.⁵² Oğuzlu argues that there is a positive relationship between the security feelings of the EU and Turkey; the more Turkey is in secure, the more the EU will become secure.⁵³

⁴⁹ Pınar Bilgin, "Turkey's Changing Security Discourses: The Challenge of Globalization", *European Journal of Political Research*, Vol. 44, 2005, p. 175-201

⁵⁰ Erol Manisalı, *Türkiye-Avrupa İlişkilerinde "Sessiz Darbe"*, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002, p. 64-65

⁵¹ H. Tarık Oğuzlu, "How to Interpret Turkey's Accession Process with the European Union? A Clash of Discourses", *Perceptions*, December 2002-February 2003, p. 51-83

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 53-58. For further information please also see Suat İlhan, *Avrupa Birliği'ne Neden Hayır?*, Ötüken Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002.

⁵³ H. Tarık Oğuzlu, *op.cit.*, p. 51-83

Müftüler-Bac stresses another important point and argues that the divergence among EU member states over what kind of a Union they prefer – federal or intergovernmental – affects their preferences regarding Turkey.⁵⁴ For example the UK supports Turkish membership because this would hinder the process of political integration. The member states, that are sceptical to Turkey's membership, are stressing the possible negative impact that Turkey would have on the speed of European integration.

In sum, it can be argued that in the Turkish academic literature, there is a lack of studies concerning the classic theories of European integration and their application to Turkey-EU relations. There is no evidence that focuses on the federalist aspect of Turkey-EU relations. There is no doubt that the intergovernmentalist approach dominated the studies on Turkey-EU relations. Because, as it can be seen in the examples, many scholars emphasized the issues of foreign, security and defence policies, which are mainly of intergovernmental in nature. The application of functionalist and neo-functionalist perspectives into the study of Turkey-EU relations are still very rare and are only used while explaining the characteristics of market economy in Turkey. European Commission stated in 1999, that "Turkey has many of the characteristics of a market economy. It should be able to cope albeit with difficulties, with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union".⁵⁵ However although the classic theories of European integration tries to draw a map of Turkey-EU relations within the framework of economics, foreign policy and security; they ignore the social changes and the role of social forces in Turkey in Turkey's integration into the European structures. In this thesis, this gap will be filled with neo-Gramscian perspectives, which will be discussed in the coming part of the study.

⁵⁴ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *loc.cit.*, "Turkey in the EU's Enlargement...", p. 85

⁵⁵ 1999 Regular Report on Turkey. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/pdf/1999/en/turkey_en.pdf (Accessed on 03.11.2005)

2.4. Redefining the Problematique of European Integration: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives as an Alternative Approach to the Study of European Integration

In this thesis, after a detailed assessment of the classic theories of European integration, it is argued that these theories can not fully grasp the changes and continuities in Turkey-EU relations and thus exhausted their potentials to explain this process. So neo-Gramscian perspectives, as an alternative approach to the study of Turkey-EU relations “which focus on social forces, endangered by the production process, as the most collective actors, and describe the process of European integration as the outcome of open-ended struggle”, will provide the theoretical basis of this study.

2.4.1. Understanding Neo-Gramscian Perspectives

Neo-Gramscian perspectives, which were presented to the International Relations (IR) literature by Robert Cox in 1980s, focus on social forces, endangered by the production process, as the most collective actors. Secondly, for neo-Gramscian perspectives instances of European integration are as much the outcome of open-ended struggle as are other political developments. Thirdly, while the state is still considered to be an important analytical category, it is regarded as a structure within which and through which social forces operate rather than as an actor in its own right. Fourthly, neo-Gramscian perspectives take into account the independent role of ideas.

Neo-Gramscian perspectives were initially applied to the study of hegemony and the transformation of world order. Neo-Gramscian perspectives within International Relations (IR) and International Political Economy (IPE), takes the transnational nature of world politics – as embedded in the social relations of global capitalism – as its point of departure.⁵⁶ Accordingly, Apeldoorn notes that

⁵⁶ Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, *Transnational Capitalism and the Struggle over European Integration*, Routledge, London, 2002, p. 11

“this implies a fundamental break with the state-centrism that still dominates IR, not just in the guise of the long-predominant neorealist theory – which sees world politics as pure inter-state politics in which states compete in a zero-sum game for wealth and power within an anarchic system of self-help – but also in the form of many contemporary liberal theories, particularly neoliberalism, and Alexander Wendt’s state-centric social theory of international politics”.⁵⁷

Neo-Gramscian perspectives conceptualize the historical specificity of capitalism by taking the sphere of production as the starting-point of their analysis.⁵⁸ It should be noted that according to Cox, production is taken in a wide sense including the production and reproduction of knowledge, institutions and the social relations involved in the production of physical goods. Accordingly, the social relations of production are considered to engender social forces and so regarded as the most important collective actors. For Bieler, this focus on production is closely informed by Gramsci’s rejection of economism in all its forms. Hence, a neo-Gramscian analysis emphasizes class struggle “as the heuristic model for the understanding of structural change”⁵⁹ and thus, acknowledges that there are always several outcomes.⁶⁰

It can be argued that neo-Gramscian perspectives are a critical theory. This argument is also supported by Andreas Bieler. Bieler notes that neo-Gramscian perspectives are a critical theory, because of: 1) the rejection of economism and the related open-ended nature of historical development; 2) the dialectical understanding of the relationship between structure and agency; and 3) the conceptualization of ideas as the presentation of specific material interests, which makes it possible to analyze how different interests and ideas are involved

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11

⁵⁸ Andreas Bieler, “Class Struggle over the EU Model of Capitalism...”, *loc.cit.*, p. 515

⁵⁹ Robert W. Cox *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 57

⁶⁰ Andreas Bieler, *op.cit.*, p. 516

in specific instances of class struggle.⁶¹ Additionally for Cox, neo-Gramscian perspectives “does not take institutions and social and power relations for granted but calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing”.⁶²

In this thesis, neo-Gramscian perspectives are presented as an alternative to the study of European integration, as their main cognitive interest to European integration is to map transnational power relations in Europe and identify the historical specific articulations between economic, political and social processes. As Cox notes that, the attention of the approach lies on social power relations, how they are organized and articulated in the structures of the state/civil-societal complex at national, international and supranational level.

2.4.1.1. Hegemony and its Origins

For Cox, there are two main strands leading to the Gramscian idea of hegemony.⁶³ The first strand is based on the debates within the Third International⁶⁴ concerning the strategy of the Bolshevik Revolution and the creation of a Soviet socialist state, while the second strand ran from the writings of Machiavelli. Concerning the first strand, it can be argued that according to the Third International, the workers exercised the hegemony over the allied classes and dictatorship over enemy classes. What makes Gramsci’s concept of hegemony distinct from the Third International version is that, while the Third International applied the idea of hegemony only to the working class, Gramsci applied it to the bourgeoisie, to the apparatus or mechanisms of hegemony of

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 518

⁶² Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Theory”, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 165

⁶³ Robert W. Cox, *loc. cit.*, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...”, p. 50

⁶⁴ In March 1919, Vladimir Lenin organized the Third International, popularly known as Communist International, or Comintern, to promote world revolution according to the Russian communist model. The Comintern initially focused on Europe as the center for the future revolution.

the dominant class. For Cox, by doing this, distinguishing cases in which the bourgeoisie had attained a hegemonic position of leadership over the other classes from those in which it had not.⁶⁵ As the bourgeoisie hegemony was completely established in Europe, especially in Northern Europe at that time and their hegemony was strongly linked to the civil society, this perception enabled Gramsci to enlarge his definition to the state. Gramsci argued that the notion of the state would also have to include the underpinnings of the political structure in civil society. He based his argument on concrete historical terms like the church, the educational system, the press, and all the institutions which helped to create in people certain modes of behaviour and expectations consistent with the hegemonic social order.⁶⁶

The second strand, writings of Machiavelli, especially Prince, influenced Gramsci in broadening the potential scope of the application of his concept of hegemony. In Prince, Machiavelli mentioned the problem of uniting the leadership and the supporting social basis in 15th century Italy. Gramsci replaced Machiavelli's Prince with a modern one and sought a way to unite leadership and supportive basis for an alternative to fascism. Gramsci's Modern Prince can be described as the revolutionary party engaged in a continuing and developing dialogue with its own base of support. Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image of power as a centaur: half man, half beast, which was a necessary combination of consent and coercion.⁶⁷ The two concepts are vital for understanding Gramsci's concept of hegemony. Primarily consent is important in using power as in that case hegemony can prevail. On the other hand, coercion is very important in the way that it can be applied in deviant cases.

It should be noted that Gramsci's concept of hegemony is quite distinct from the neo-realist notion of hegemony, in which a hegemonic state controls and dominates other states and the international order according to its military and

⁶⁵ Robert W. Cox, *op.cit.*, p. 51

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 52

economic superiority.⁶⁸ Unlike conventional IR theory, which reduces hegemony to a single dimension of dominance based on the economic and military capabilities of states, neo-Gramscian perspectives broaden the domain of hegemony. Hegemony appears as an expression of broadly based consent, manifested in the acceptance of ideas and supported by material resources and institutions, which is initially established by social forces occupying a leading role within a state, but is then projected outwards on a world scale.⁶⁹ Additionally, in Gramsci's concept of hegemony there is a type of rule which relies on consent alongside of coercion. Cox describes this hegemony as "based on a coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective image of world order...and a set of institutions which administer the order with a certain semblance of universality".⁷⁰ For Bieler and Morton, a fundamental class exercises a hegemonic function when it transcends particular economic-corporate interests and is capable of binding and cohering diverse aspirations, interests and identities into a historical bloc. This argument presents us another important concept for this study, historical bloc (*blocco storico*), which is defined and analyzed in the next part of this chapter.

2.4.1.2. Historic Bloc (*Blocco Storico*)

The historical bloc is a dialectic concept in the sense that its interacting elements create a larger unity. Gramsci defined these interacting elements as subjective and the objective and sometimes as superstructure and structure:

⁶⁸ Robert Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984, p. 32

⁶⁹ Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, "A Critical Theory Route to Hegemony, World Order and Historical Change: Neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Relations", *Capital & Class*, No. 82, p. 87

⁷⁰ Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Order: Beyond International Relations Theory", *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, p. 139

Structures and superstructures form an "historic bloc". That is to say the complex contradictory and discordant ensemble of the social relations of production.⁷¹

For Cox, the historical bloc is the term applied to the particular configuration of social classes and ideology that gives content to a historical state and thus consists of structure and superstructure.⁷² It forms a complex, politically contestable and dynamic ensemble of social relations which includes economic, political and cultural aspects. Also the relationship between structure and superstructure are reciprocal.⁷³ According to Cox, "superstructures of ideology and political organization shape the development of both aspects of production...and are shaped by them".⁷⁴

An historic bloc cannot exist without a hegemonic social class. When the hegemonic class is the dominant class in a country or social formation, the state maintains cohesion and identity within the bloc through the propagation of a common culture.⁷⁵ A new bloc is formed when a subordinated class establishes its hegemony over other subordinated groups.

It should be noted that Gramsci underlined the importance of intellectuals in building an historic bloc. He did not regard intellectuals as a distinct and relatively classless social stratum. Indeed Gramsci saw them as organically connected with a social class. For him, they perform this function of developing and sustaining the mental images, technologies and organizations which bind together the

⁷¹ Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (eds.), *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, International Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 366

⁷² Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1987, p. 409

⁷³ Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, *Neo-Gramscian Perspectives, IPE and European Integration*, p. 20

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 20

⁷⁵ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...", *loc. cit.*, p. 56

members of a class and of an historic bloc into a common identity.⁷⁶ Also for Gramsci there are two kinds of intellectuals performing these functions. Bourgeois intellectuals perform this duty for a whole society in which the bourgeoisie is hegemonic. On the other hand, organic intellectuals of the working class would perform a similar role in the creation of a new historic bloc under working class hegemony within that society. According to Gramsci, "every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world economic production, creates together with itself, organically, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields".⁷⁷ Cox argues that everyone, for Gramsci, is in some part an intellectual, although only some perform full-time the social function of an intellectual and Gramsci defines this notion as a "collective intellectual".

Also Gramsci formulated three levels of consciousness in achieving hegemony and creating an historic bloc: the economico-corporative, which is aware of the specific interests of a particular group; the solidarity or class consciousness, which extends to a whole social class but remains at a purely economic level; and hegemonic, which brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms. Gramsci argues that the movement towards hegemony is a "passage from the structure to the sphere of the complex superstructures", by which he means passing from the specific interests of a group or class to the building of institutions and elaboration of ideologies.⁷⁸ For Cox, if they reflect hegemony, these institutions and ideologies will be universal. For example, they will not appear as those of a particular class and will give some satisfaction to the subordinate groups while not undermining the leadership or vital interests of the hegemonic class.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 57

⁷⁷ Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, "*Selections from the Prison Notebooks...*", *loc.cit.*, p. 5

⁷⁸ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...", *loc. cit.*, p. 58

It can be argued that intellectuals do not just produce ideas; their most important function is to organize the forces they stem from and to develop a "hegemonic project" which is able to transcend the particular interests of this group so that other forces are able to give their consent. This hegemonic project must be based on organic ideas, which stem from economic sphere. However it should also go beyond economics into the political and social sphere, incorporating ideas related to issues such as social reform or moral regeneration, to result in a stable political system. It "brings the interests of the leading class into harmony with those of subordinate classes and incorporates these other interests into an ideology expressed in universal terms".⁷⁹ A hegemonic project is sometimes also referred to as a "comprehensive concept of control".⁸⁰ There are three distinguishing elements of a hegemonic project: 1) Material reason; 2) Intellectual leadership and 3) Consent and coercion. When these three elements present in a society, a hegemonic project can be formulated. The term, hegemonic project is a key concept for this thesis, as according to the main focus of the thesis, Turkey's integration process into the EU structures can be defined in terms of competing and changing hegemonic projects formulated by national and transnational social forces. Also it is argued that "the classic theories of European integration exhausted their potentials to explain the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations and can not fully grasp the changes and continuities in Turkey-EU relations". In the second and third parts, how these hegemonic discourses are formulated and redefined and the counter-hegemonic projects if available are analyzed.

However it should be noted that the formulated hegemonic project may not be permanent, so it can be redefined. So, in this respect, the concept of passive revolution should be presented in order to provide a better understanding for this case.

⁷⁹ Robert W. Cox, "Production, power...", *loc.cit.*, p. 168

⁸⁰ Andreas Bieler and Adam David Morton, *op.cit.*, p. 22

2.4.1.3. Passive Revolution

Passive revolution is one of the most important concepts in Gramsci's political thought. He developed this concept by looking at non-bourgeois hegemonies in Western Europe, like Italy. He argued that in this kind of societies, the new industrial bourgeoisie failed to achieve hegemony and as a result traditionally dominant social classes started a passive revolution, in which the introduction of changes did not involve any arousal of popular forces.

The passive revolution has two strands. The first strand is caesarism, in which a strong man intervenes to resolve a stalemate between equal and opposed social forces. Also Gramsci defined two forms of caesarism which are progressive and reactionary caesarisms. In progressive caesarism the strong rule presides over a more orderly development of a new state and in reactionary caesarism, the strong rule stabilizes the existing power.⁸¹

Second strand of passive revolution for Gramsci is *transformismo*. *Transformismo* can be described as a strategy of assimilating and domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to the policies of the dominant coalition and can thereby obstruct the formation of class-based organized opposition to established social and political power.⁸²

According to Cox, the concept of passive revolution is an acronym of the concept of hegemony, in the sense that it describes the condition of a non-hegemonic society, in which no dominant class has been able to establish hegemony in Gramsci's terms.

Cox modified Gramsci's concept of hegemony in a modern sense and argued that "one mechanism through which the universal norms of world hegemony are

⁸¹ Robert W. Cox, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...", *loc. cit.*, p. 54-55

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 55

expressed is the international organization".⁸³ For Cox, international organizations function as the process through which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed. The role of international organizations in performing their hegemonic roles can be summarized as follows: 1) They embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; 2) They are the product of hegemonic world orders; 3) They ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; 4) They co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and 5) They absorb counter-hegemonic projects.⁸⁴

When the roots of the international organizations are analyzed, it can be argued that most of them are established for promoting economic expansion. Also these organizations are led by states which are economically and militarily powerful and can establish hegemony. Both powerful states and peripheral countries can be members of the same international organizations. But naturally there is a hierarchy of power among them. So the hegemony in international organizations is based on consent even it is not really the case. Because even there is a passive revolution in a peripheral country, which is against the membership of that country to that international institution, sooner or later the hegemonic project becomes successful and they become a part of that organization. Cox describes this situation as follows: "Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or later the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon".⁸⁵ So it can be argued that *transformismo* absorbs potentially counter-hegemonic ideas and transforms them into ideas that are consistent with the hegemonic doctrine.

Transformismo constitutes the basis of one of the main arguments of this thesis. In this thesis it is argued that the EU, as an international institution, realizes its formulated hegemonic projects concerning Turkey, which is a peripheral country, through *transformismo*. Because the elite talent from Turkey applied for

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 62

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 62-63

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 77

full membership to the EU for achieving the aims of modernization and Westernization. However when we look at the consequences of the Customs Union in 1996 and political and social reforms that Turkey should realize for starting membership negotiations, it can be argued that the EU only transfer elements of modernization to the peripheries, like Turkey, but only as these are consistent with the interests of established local powers. This argument is supported by certain examples in the coming parts of the thesis.

CHAPTER III

COMPETING AND SHIFTING HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FROM 1999 TO 2005

The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together.⁸⁶

3.1. Historical Background of Turkey-EU Relations

The relationship between Turkey and the EU can be described as a never-ending story for both sides. From the very beginning it has been having a wavering character. Indeed, such a long-term relationship would be inevitably wavering as both Turkey and the EU has changed in this long process. Today the EU is not the Community that had started with the Coal and Steel Community with 6 member states. From 1957 to 2006, the EU turned to Union from Community, had 19 new member states, and in addition to economic integration political and social integration is also on the EU agenda. Concerning the Turkish side, there were two military coups, transition from multiparty system to coalition governments and finally to single party government period. For during these 47 years, both sides were changed, so did the attitudes, interests, demands, policies and their hegemonic discourses.

In this chapter after a brief history of Turkey-EU relations, the EU's hegemonic discourse on Turkey's possible membership in the period of 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005 is analyzed. The history of Turkey EU relations are divided into three periods. The first period starts with Turkey's application for associate membership in 1959 and continues till 1980. Second period starts with the military coup in 1980 and 24 January 1980 decisions and

⁸⁶ Article 1 of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. See <http://europa.eu/constitution/en/1stoc1_en.htm> (accessed on 12 September 2005)

continues till the 1999 Helsinki Summit. The third period started with the 1999 Helsinki decision and turned into an open-ended process on 3 October 2005.

3.1.1. The First Period of Turkey-EU Relations

The first period of Turkey-EU relations started with the application of Turkey for associate membership to the EEC in 1959. However main motive behind this application is political, immediately after Greece's application⁸⁷, rather than economic although the EEC had been established upon economic considerations. The EEC responded this application by the signing of Ankara Association Agreement. This situation is described by Özen as "the economic dynamics of Turkey-European Community relations in the early years of the relations were quite weak, resulting from the structural problems of the Turkish economy. Both sides saw the unrealistic economic targets of this association".⁸⁸

The Ankara Association Agreement⁸⁹, which entered into force on 1 December 1964, aimed at securing Turkey's full membership in the EEC through the establishment in three phases of a customs union (preliminary, transition and final phases) that would serve as an instrument to bring about integration between the EEC and Turkey. After the completion of the preliminary period, Turkey signed the Additional Protocol in 1973 and according to this customs would be established between the EEC and Turkey in 22 years and during this process Turkey would become a full member of the club. It can be argued that "Turkey has had the longest association with the EU among the candidate countries"⁹⁰ and is the only country that realized a Customs Union on industrial products with the EU prior to full membership.

⁸⁷ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774–2000*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 2000, p. 174

⁸⁸ Çınar Özen, "Neo-functionalism and the Change in the Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations", *Perceptions*, Vol. 3, Number 3, 1998, p. 44

⁸⁹ Ankara Association Agreement. See <<http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/kitap/e-ankara.rtf>> (accessed on 08.09.2005)

⁹⁰ Meltem Müftüler-Bac and Lauren M. Maclaren, "Enlargement Preferences...", *loc.cit.*, p. 20

The fulfilment of the requirements of the Ankara Agreement and the Additional Protocol was problematic due to the 1973 Oil Crisis⁹¹ and the economic depression in the world, especially in Europe. According to Yalman, by 1973, "the Turkish economy found itself heading towards a foreign exchange crisis as a result of the quadrupling of the oil prices and the American embargo in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish intervention in Cyprus". Additionally he states that, "the government was got stuck with the threat of military coup, revision of etatist policies (transformation from etatist and planned economy to free market economy) and the anti-EU sentiments".⁹² In the 1970s, the common slogan of the public opinion in Turkey concerning Europe was that "They are the partners, we are the market; so that we are against the EC". This slogan was accepted by a wide range of social groups, including big business groups like TÜSIAD and trade unions.

However for the sake of the expansion of the capital and pursuing the existing policies, Turkey with the help of International Monetary Fund (IMF) launched a new monetary programme on 24 January 1980. The implications and aftermath developments are discussed in the next part of this study.

Although the Ankara Agreement foresaw a loose time period in order take necessary measures, as a result of the economic and political turbulence in Turkey during the 1970s and the political stance after the 1980 military coup had negative effects on Turkey-EU relations and provided a hard basis.

⁹¹ The oil shock of 1973 which had shaken the world economy also crippled the developing Turkish economy largely because of a high oil import bill, which led to overall price increase and energy bottlenecks like other oil importing countries.

⁹² Osman Galip Yalman, "Bourgeoisie and the State: Changing Forms of Interest representation within the Context of Economic Crisis and Structural Adjustment: Turkey during the 1980s", *Unpublished PhD Thesis*, University of Manchester, 1997, p. 168-169

3.1.2. The Second Period of Turkey-EU Relations

It can be argued that the second phase of Turkey-EU relations started with January 24 Decisions and the military coup in September 1980. Both of these developments deeply affected the Turkish political, economical and social life and so as the Turkey-EU relations.

In January 1980 under the supervision of IMF, a package of economic stability measures known as "24 January Decisions" were adopted to restore the worsened problems emerged in the late 1970's. In this context with these decisions, Turkey's import policies were so-called liberalized to a great extent. Expectedly, the transition to free market economy and liberalization attempts did nothing more than increasing the inflation and being advantageous only for certain business groups and also to foreign investors. Although Turkey was becoming a suitable and desirable market for foreign investors, main disadvantaged groups in Turkey, mainly low income section of society, members of trade and labour unions, continued to suffer the ill-formulated economic policies. As these new economic policies followed by the military coup in September 1980s, the overall picture of Turkey was far from promising both from the inside and also from the EC. As a result, the Turkey-EC relations nearly froze, at least informally.

Finally a symbolic attempt in order to vitalize Turkey's democratic life had taken by the realization of 1983 elections. The winner of the elections was the Motherland Party, headed by Turgut Özal, who had formulated the 24 January Decisions, by 45,14 % of the votes.⁹³

In 1987, Turkey, during the period of Özal government and Turkey re-applied for full membership to the EC. However, the Commission gave its response by issuing an opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community in

⁹³ HP took 30,46 %, MDP took 23,27 % and Independents took 1,13 % of the votes. For more information see <http://www.belgenet.net/ayrinti.php?yil_id=9> (Accessed on 23.12.2005)

1989⁹⁴, two years after Turkey's application, and stated that the EU was in the process of trying to integrate its new three member states⁹⁵ and was also at the early stages of completing the Single Market and that it could not consider new applications from any potential new applications from any potential candidates at that time.⁹⁶ Also the Commission underlined the substantial development gap between the Community and Turkey and put forward its concerns that Turkey would have great difficulty at shouldering its economic and social obligations to the Community policies. So the Commission recommended that no accession negotiations could begin until after 1993, till the completion of the Customs Union as outlined in the Additional Protocol in 1973⁹⁷.

Unfortunately, two months after Commission's response, the Council of Ministers formally endorsed the Commission's opinion and stated that Turkey had shortcomings and so Turkey should indefinitely postpone its membership plans. This rejected membership application to the EC in 1987 can be defined as a turning point in Turkey-EU relations as both sides re-evaluated their positions and began to formulate different policies. It was supposed that Turkey would take this rejection as an opportunity to fulfil the obligations of the Association Agreement and also to take necessary measures domestically for adoption of new monetary policies and new five years plan.

However, concerning the Turkish side, after this failed application attempt, it can be argued that during 1989-1992 Turkey distanced itself from her traditional

⁹⁴ European Commission's Opinion on Turkey's Request for Accession to the Community. See <<http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/opinion.html>> (Accessed on 02.10.205)

⁹⁵ These three new states are Greece (entered in 1981) and Portugal and Spain (entered in 1986).

⁹⁶ Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, *op.cit.*, p. 21

⁹⁷ The Additional Protocol of 13 November 1970 set out in detail how the Customs Union would be established. It provided that the EEC would abolish tariff and quantitative barriers to its imports from Turkey (with some exceptions including fabrics) upon the entry into force of the Protocol, whereas Turkey would do the same in accordance with a timetable containing two calendars set for 12 and 22 years, and called for the harmonization of Turkish legislation with that of the EU in economic matters. Furthermore, the Additional Protocol envisaged the free circulation of natural persons between the Parties in the next 12 to 22 years.

policy of Europeanization. Because after the end of the Cold War, the map of Europe was changed and there were newly independent former East European states.. The Gulf War and EU's attitude towards the exodus of Kurdish people from Northern Iraq was another matter of concern for the Turkish side. Also the EU's pressure on Turkey concerning the solution of the Kurdish problem, fed the fears in Ankara that the EU was not considering Turkey's territorial integrity. So in this respect, Turkey sought ways to formulate new alliances besides the EU, like newly independent Central Asian states. Also after the EC's rejection, anti-European tendencies increased in Turkey. These groups included both national and religious sides, like the Welfare Party. At that point, Turkey sought ways to establish new regional ties with its neighbourhood and aimed to become a regional player. However according to Eralp, this euphoria of regionalism did not last long, it was soon realized that expectations were set too high and Turkey did not have adequate resources and expertise in regional matters to fulfil such high expectations.⁹⁸ In this respect, it can be argued that after 1992, Turkey tried to strike a balance between new regional orientations and the traditional European policy.⁹⁹

On the EU side there were major developments concerning the future of the Community. On 7 February 1992, the Treaty on the European Union known as the Maastricht Treaty was signed, that led to the creation of the European Union.¹⁰⁰ In addition to this at the 1993 Copenhagen EU Council, the EU took an important step concerning the future enlargements. After the end of the Cold War, concerning the newly independent East European states, within the EU there were debates on enlargement. It should be noted that after the end of the Cold War, the EU had the chance to become a world player in a bipolar world where there was not further Soviet Union threat. The 1992 Maastricht Treaty is

⁹⁸ Atilla Eralp, "Turkey and the European Union in the Aftermath of the Cold War", in Libby Rittenberg (ed.) *The Political Economy of Turkey in the Post-Soviet Era: Going West and Looking East?*, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 1998, p.43

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 44

¹⁰⁰ The Treaty on European Union. See <<http://europa.eu.int/en/record/mt/top.html>> (Accessed on 04.03.2005)

a sign of this, which led to the widening of the EU by creating a three-pillar structure.¹⁰¹ Concerning widening, the EU stated in the 1993 Copenhagen European Council that, "the associated countries in Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union".¹⁰² Additionally the EU presented the Copenhagen membership criteria, the conditions that a candidate country should meet in order to become a full member of the EU, including the formal criterion of membership in the Rome Treaty. Thus all membership conditions were consolidated into a single declaration.¹⁰³ Mainly these criteria are:

- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities,
- The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union,
- Ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.

Prior to the establishment of the Customs Union with the EU, Turkey had hard times concerning the Greek veto to the Customs Union. According to Sözen and Ulusoy Turkey agreed to remain silent regarding the accession negotiations between the EU and the Greek Part of Cyprus, to ratify Customs Union without receiving financial aid to which it was entitled under the Association Agreement, and to ensure the improvement of democratic standards and human rights

¹⁰¹ The Maastricht Treaty divided EU policies into three areas, called pillars: First Pillar: The Economic and Social Policy; Second Pillar: The Common Security and Common Policy and Third Pillar: Justice and Home Affairs.

¹⁰² Copenhagen European Council on 21–22 June 1993 Presidency Conclusions. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/72921.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

¹⁰³ The European Union Membership Criteria, known as Copenhagen Criteria, was first formally introduced in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. In the Article 49 of the Treaty the geographical conditions and general policy conditions for becoming an EU member were set. However in 1993 Copenhagen EU Council, these conditions were more specifically presented.

through constitutional reform.¹⁰⁴ At the end, on 6 March 1995 the Turkey-EU Association Council¹⁰⁵ agreed on the implementation of the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in industrial and processed agricultural goods by 31 December 1995. So Turkey became the first country, who has established Customs Union before becoming a full member of the EU. The Customs Union created an organic bond between Turkey and the EU, which could be easily used as a "stick" for Turkey when Turkey could not fulfil the obligations of the Customs Union or in other issues.

Concerning Customs Union and its effects on Turkish economy, there are various different arguments. According to Turkish Under-Secretariat of Foreign Trade:

The Turkey-EU Customs Union constitutes an advanced form of integration with its far-reaching perspective and comprehensive context covering a wide range of policies. The Customs Union with the EU is the most comprehensive element that contributes to strengthening Turkey's expanding role as a business partner. An important feature of the Turkey-EU Customs Union is that Turkey is the first and only country to enter into such an advanced form of economic integration without being a full member.¹⁰⁶

It would be a right assumption that this quoted passage almost reflects the way of thinking of Turkish government at that period. The governing True Path coalition parties and the Social Democratic People's Party (SHP) supported the move toward Customs Union, declaring that it brought Turkey closer to full membership, while opposing parties questioned its value without full membership, stating that the government had given too many concessions.

¹⁰⁴ Ahmet Sözen and Veysel Ulusoy, *"The Opportunity Cost of Customs Union, The Case of Turkey Establishing Customs Union with the EU"*, Presentation in Annual Conference of the International Studies Association, February 2003, Portland, p. 9-10

¹⁰⁵ The Turkey-EU Association Council is the highest ranking organ of the association and is composed of the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and the 15 EU Member States. For more information please visit <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/en/tur-eu_relations_dosyalar/history.htm> (Accessed on 22.10.2005)

¹⁰⁶ Full text of the article. See <<http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr/ab/ingilizce/gbnot.htm>> (Accessed on 21.10.2005)

However the statistics of the same government body was portraying a different and pessimistic picture: Foreign trade deficit between Turkey and the EU increased in the disadvantage of Turkey. After the completion of the Customs Union Turkey's imports from the EU increased by 37.2 %, while her exports increased only by 4.2 % and reached to 11.5 \$. Also flow of capital for direct investment decreased Turkish trade with 3rd countries became bound to the EU decisions. In 1997, the share of Turkish imports from EU in total imports increased further reaching 51.1% and in 1998 52.5%, also the share of EU exports in total exports increased from 46.6% in 1997 to 50% in 1998.¹⁰⁷

3.1.3. The Deadlock in Turkey-EU Relations: From 1997 to 1999

As stated above Turkey has the longest association with the EU and made her first application for membership in 1987. However despite Turkey's long term commitment with the EU, when the EU embarked on its enlargement process in the 1990s, it did not include Turkey in its list of prospective candidates.¹⁰⁸ According to Öniş and Yılmaz, "for the EC/EU in the 1980s and 1990s, Turkey, rather than being a "natural insider", was an "important outsider" with whom relations ought to be developed on an arm's length basis barring full integration.¹⁰⁹ Also for Öniş, the EU in the 1990s has been far more receptive to incorporate post-communist states such as Poland and Hungary into its orbit, because these countries did not pose the kind of boundary questions for Europe that the Turkish membership appeared to entail.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁸ Lauren M. McLaren and Meltem Muftuler-Bac, "Turkish Parliamentarians' Perspective on Turkey's Relations with the European Union", in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), *Turkey and the European Union*, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 195

¹⁰⁹ Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz, "Turkey-EU-US Triangle in Perspective: Transformation or Continuity?", Revised Draft, December 2004, p. 4

¹¹⁰ Ziya Öniş, "Domestic Politics, Transnational Influences and the Impetus for Reform: The Diverse Paths of Poland and Turkey on the Road to EU Membership", in Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin (eds.), *Turkey and the European Union – Domestic Politics, Economic Integration and International Dynamics*, Frank Cass, London, 2003, p. 11

At the Luxembourg EU Council on 12 December 1997, the EU members agreed on opening up accession negotiations with 10 candidate countries – Hungary, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Malta, and Cyprus. Also the European Council has decided to convene bilateral intergovernmental conferences in the spring of 1998 to begin negotiations with Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia.

The EU reconfirmed Turkey's eligibility for eventual EU membership and tasked the Commission to produce a Progress Report, for setting up a strategy aimed at preparing Turkey for accession; however also listed the political and economical obstacles for granting Turkey full accession status. According to this list, Turkey should meet "pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN of a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions".¹¹¹

Actually, it can be argued that the signs of 1997 Luxembourg decision were given before the Council. On 4 March 1997, the European People's Party including German Chancellor Helmut Kohl declared that "European Union is a civilization project and within this civilization project, Turkey has no place".¹¹²

According to Müftüler-Bac and McLaren, Turkey did not have a patron-client relationship with any member state, like Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic

¹¹¹ Luxembourg European Council Presidency Conclusions. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

¹¹² *Guardian*, March 7, 1997, cited in Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *loc.cit.*, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe," p. 34

with Germany and Romania with France.¹¹³ In addition to this, they argue that the problematic relations with Greece have meant that Greece historically has served as a major blocking point to Turkish candidacy. Even, the French President Jacques Chirac stated that "I have a small regret regarding the summit and this is over Turkey. On the subject of Turkey, due to the objections of our Greek friends, whose oppositions I can understand, we were not able to open the doors that I, personally would have wished for".¹¹⁴

According to Park, Ankara might have been able to accept the decision if the Luxembourg Summit did not extend accession status to 11 states, 10 of them former communist states and none of them enjoyed a customs union with the EU as a pre-accession arrangement.¹¹⁵ However this decision was perceived by Ankara with anger and disappointment. As a result Ankara suspended all political dialogue with Brussels on 14 December 1997, but continued the Customs Union and did not attend to the inaugural meeting of the pan-European Conference held in London in March 1998. Also domestically anti-EU voices began to rise, like Mesut Yılmaz's, head of the Motherland Party, words: "Whether pursuit of the country's traditional European aspirations was worth the humiliation that it seemed to entail".¹¹⁶ Also Mesut Yılmaz accused Helmut Kohl for pursuing a Lebensraum policy by supporting the accession status' of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland.

For both sides, the reflections of the decision were quite disturbing. According to Buzan and Diez there was a quite widespread feeling that a major turning point in Turkish-EU relations had been reached.¹¹⁷ Rumford states that, "...the period

¹¹³ Müftüleri-Bac and McLaren, *op.cit.*, p. 22

¹¹⁴ <<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=5398>> (Accessed on 11.12.2005)

¹¹⁵ William Park, *op.cit.*, p. 35

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 35

¹¹⁷ Barry Buzan and Thomas Diez, "Turkey and the European Union", *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 1, p. 41

beginning shortly after the Luxembourg Council of December 1997 can be characterized by stunted political dialogue and mistrust on both sides".¹¹⁸

After the Luxembourg EU Council until 1999 Helsinki EU Council, the Turkey-EU relations can be described as a stalemate between two sides. According to Eralp, the reason why Turkey froze all the political dialogue with the EU is that Turkey was no longer willing to discuss Greek-Turkish tensions, Cyprus or human rights with the EU.¹¹⁹ Turkey's main disappointment was resulted from the fact that the Cyprus would eventually start the accession negotiations, as it did in March 1998. It can be argued that Turkey was feeling like cheated by the EU, as while the EU rejected Turkey's application on several grounds both in 1987 and did not give an accession status in 1997, this time was trying to find a solution to the Cyprus problem by integrating the Greek part of Cyprus into the EU. As British Foreign Minister Robin Cook stated, "the Union regrets that it has not been possible to achieve a political solution to the continuing division of Cyprus in time for the accession negotiations" and also argued that "progress towards accession and towards a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem will naturally reinforce each other".¹²⁰

On the EU side, there were tendencies towards normalization. Firstly in Cardiff European Council in June 1998, the Commission issued its first Progress Report on Turkey and stated that Turkey would be subjected to the same Copenhagen Criteria as the other candidate countries. Also in the Progress Report the Commission listed its criticisms on Turkey based on the freedom of expression, Turkish legal system and military's involvement in politics, State Security Courts (SSC), torture, Cyprus issue and rights and identities of the Kurdish people living

¹¹⁸ Chris Rumford, "From Luxembourg to Helsinki: Turkey, the Politics of EU Enlargement and Prospects for Accession", *Contemporary Politics*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 2000, p. 331

¹¹⁹ Atilla Eralp, "Turkey and the European Union in the Post-Cold War Era", in Alan Makovsky and Sabri Sayari (eds), *Turkey's New World*, Washington Institute, Washington, 2000, p. 182

¹²⁰ Carole Andrews, "EU Enlargement: The Political Process". See <<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp98/rp98-055.pdf>> (Accessed on 12.11.2005)

in Turkey.¹²¹ Also in its 1999 Progress Report on Turkey, the Commission stated that “the EU expects Turkey to resolve its problems by political means with full respect for human rights, the rule of law in a democratic society and in full accordance with Turkey’s commitments as a member of the Council of Europe”.¹²²

In Germany Schröder’s government revised its position and made attempts to undo this deadlock in Turkey-EU relations. Ecevit’s letter on 26 May 1999 is a proof of this normalization. In his letter Ecevit guaranteed that Turkey would fulfil its obligations regarding Copenhagen criteria and stated that Turkey was aware of its responsibilities towards membership and assured that Turkey would fulfil her obligations before accession negotiations.¹²³ It can be argued that Schröder used Turkey’s accession to the EU as an election campaign slogan and Germany supported Turkey in Cologne European Council despite the oppositions of Greece, Italy and Sweden. The attempts of Germany were successful as Turkey got accession status in 1999 Helsinki European Council.

There were relatively positive improvements in Turco-Greek relations. Especially after the terrible earthquake in Turkey on 17 August 1999, earthquake diplomacy had been started between Athens and Ankara. According to commentators, the major reason behind the Greek change of policy towards Turkey was that Greece had traditionally asked for concessions from other EU members on its disputes with Turkey. However by 1999 the bargaining power of Greece was weakened due to the fact that as Greece was not able to bargain on other EU policies like structural funds and the euro. So Greece had to redefine

¹²¹ 1998 Regular Report on Turkey. See
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/pdf/1998/en/turkey_en.pdf> (Accessed on 22.03.2005)

¹²² 1999 Regular Report on Turkey See
<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/pdf/1999/en/turkey_en.pdf> (Accessed on 22.03.2005)

¹²³ For detailed information see
<<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/99/06/05/gundem/01gun.htm>> and
<<http://arsiv.hurriyetim.com.tr/hur/turk/99/06/25/dunya/08dun.htm>> (Accessed on 12.01.2006)

its policies on Turkey's relations with the EU, though she did not supported Turkey's accession, did not veto it at all.

Also in the Cologne European Council, a new enlargement strategy was introduced, which is differentiation. With this principle, candidate countries would be able to negotiate according to their own merits and needs. Also the EU opened its doors to candidate countries which require different preparation phases and according to Müftüler-Bac at Cologne a strategy of "work at your own pace" was adopted.¹²⁴ It can be argued that adoption of this principle to the enlargement strategy eased the way that the EU changed its decision and would grant Turkey an accession status in 1999.

However the developments on the Turkish side were far from normalization, but not concerning the EU, concerning the domestic politics. First of all Turkey had to deal with the dissolution of the coalition government in November 1998. In addition 28th February decisions by which the Turkish Army confronted rise of political Islam at the Turkish National Security Council (NSC) and closure of the Welfare Party in January 1998 were problematic both domestically and also were followed cautiously by the EU. Later in parallel with the attempts for forming a new government and the capture of PKK Leader Abdullah Öcalan placed at the top of the Turkish agenda. However this capture was very problematic as some EU member states, namely Greece, Italy and Germany, was involved in this issue. The ongoing debates after his capture on the abolition death penalty in Turkey, clashing positions of both Turkey and the EU is discussed in detail in the coming parts of this thesis. Because these issues are related with the military's involvement in politics and judiciary and should be analyzed from different aspects.

It is debatable whether the EU gave a wrong decision by not granting a candidateship status to Turkey in Luxembourg or it was a strategy for guaranteeing further future concessions. According to German Chancellor

¹²⁴ Meltem Müftüler-Bac, *loc.cit.*, "Through the Looking Glass...", p. 36

Gerhard Schröder "The damage caused in Luxembourg was repaired in Helsinki."¹²⁵ However, it would not be a false argument that the EU reformulated its policy on Turkey and gave her a candidate status in 1999 Helsinki EU Council. Because neither the situation of Turkey in 1997 was quite different than the one in 1999, nor its relations with Greece, human rights records or democratization level. So it is obvious that both sides redefined their positions and opened up a new phase in Turkey EU relations.

Finally, the deadlock in Turkey-EU relations was undone by the 1999 Helsinki Summit decision that Turkey was recognized as a candidate country. In the Presidency Conclusions it is stated that:

Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms. This will include enhanced political dialogue, with emphasis on progressing towards fulfilling the political criteria for accession with particular reference to the issue of human rights, as well as on the issues referred to in paragraphs 4 and 9(a). Turkey will also have the opportunity to participate in Community programmes and agencies and in meetings between candidate States and the Union in the context of the accession process. An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*.¹²⁶

In sum, the 1999 Helsinki European Council is a turning point in Turkey-EU relations. In this summit, Turkey was recognized as a candidate country on the basis of the same criteria as all the other candidates; Turkey became subject to the coordinated pre-accession assistance; the EU would seek enhanced political dialogue aimed at assisting Turkey in reaching the accession criteria, particularly

¹²⁵ Gamze Avci, *op.cit.*, p. 150

¹²⁶ 1999 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions. See <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#enlargement> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

in the area of human rights; and Turkey would be included in the Community programmes and agencies.¹²⁷

For this thesis what makes the 1999 Helsinki European Council is a turning point, is not only the recognition of Turkey as a candidate country; but also is the fact that the decision in this summit is an example of the wavering characteristic of Turkey-EU relations and their formulated hegemonic discourses. The period between 1997 and 1999 is a transition and re-evaluation of policies for both sides. It can be argued that there are different elements that influenced the EU's formulation of its hegemonic discourse towards Turkey in this period. The general hegemonic project of the EU in the period between 1997 Luxembourg European Council and 1999 Helsinki European Council is trying to place Turkey in its outer space, but at the same time linking Turkey to the EU by certain tools like the Customs Union. However the fragile situation in Turkey in this period, concerning political and social aspirations and raising of anti-EU sentiments, directed the EU to take a decision like that. So during and post-Helsinki period, the EU changed its hegemonic discourse and thus reformulated it.

3.2. European Union's Hegemonic Discourse in the Period of 1999 Helsinki European Council to 3 October 2005

The decision at the 1999 Helsinki European Council was unexpected for the Turkish side as a result of the 1997 Luxembourg European Council decisions. It can be argued that this decision represents a shift in EU's policies towards Turkey; the shift which can be described as a tactical retreat strategy, which is followed by a "wait and see" policy. As the EU granted a candidateship status to Turkey although nothing was changed in Turkey positively in the period of 1997 and 1999, this can be described as a strategy that puts all the emphasis on Turkey's actions and policies, not on the EU's.

¹²⁷ Chris Rumford, *op.cit.*, p. 340

It should be stated that the Turkish side accepted the EU's tactical retreat on certain terms. For instance the main reason for coming back to table was a new insight provided by the EU through the letter of Paavo Lipponen, then term-president of the EU and Prime Minister of Finland.¹²⁸ This letter represented the shift, the tactical retreat, of the EU formulated for normalizing the relations with Turkey. In the letter, Lipponen stated that:

...Turkey the status of candidate State, on the same footing as any other candidate...in & 12 of the conclusions there was no new criteria added to those of the Copenhagen and that the reference to & 4 and 9a was not in relation with the criteria for accession but only to the political dialogue. The accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of today's Council decisions.

With this letter the EU accepted that Cyprus issue would not be a condition for Turkey's membership to the EU. Under those conditions Ecevit accepted the offer and signed the Presidency Conclusions in Helsinki. What Ecevit accepted after the Lipponen Letter was that Cyprus issue would not be used as a condition towards Turkey before and during negotiations. However in the Strategy Paper of 2003, the Commission stated that "the absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations".¹²⁹ So the EU's position has changed during this period and this change is analyzed in the coming part of this study.

The decision in Luxembourg European Council was also questioned by the Europeans. For example according to a commentator from International Herald Tribune: "The Luxembourg decision on Turkey did enormous damage to European relations with Ankara, alienated those Turks who make the case that

¹²⁸ For the full text of the Lipponen Letter, Ecevit's reply and further analysis of the problem, see Mustafa Türkes, "Cycles of Transformation of the Cyprus Question", in Nurşin Ateşoğlu-Güney (ed.), *Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey*, Ashgate, London, 2007, p. 164–165

¹²⁹ European Commission, "Continuing Enlargement – Strategy Paper and Report of the Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey", 2003. See <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0676en01.pdf> (Accessed on 12.12.2005)

the country should continue its westward orientation, and provided fodder for those who argue that Europe is an ethnic-religious club that will never accept a country of 65 million Muslims."¹³⁰ However, despite this shocking experience, the Turkish government, elites and public opinion welcomed this new decision and as a result they perceived this as a first step in realizing the long-term aim towards full EU membership.

In order to analyze the EU's hegemonic project formulation towards Turkey, the 1999 Helsinki European Council decisions should be carefully analyzed. It can be argued that the decisions of Helsinki European Council were aimed to prepare the EU and its institutions for the new international order started to be built after the end of the Cold War. This argument is justified by the EU's Millennium Declaration, by being stated as:

The quest for peace and prosperity has been the driving force of European integration. In fifty years we have come a long way towards these goals...The European Union is a unique venture, with no model in history...The Union shares a growing global responsibility for promoting wellbeing, preventing conflicts and securing peace. We shall strengthen stability and prosperity in Europe by enlarging the Union and cooperating with partner countries. We shall work for a more open and stable international economy benefiting also people in less favoured parts of the world. We shall create Union military and civil capabilities in order to manage international crises, and to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need...We must rejuvenate the idea of a Europe for all – an idea on which each new generation must make its own mark.¹³¹

In the Presidency Conclusions, the main emphasis was placed on enlargement and Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP). This was presented in the introduction part of Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions as follows:

¹³⁰ Phil Gordon, "Europe's Helsinki Summit: Now Make Turkey a Serious Offer", International Herald Tribune, 10 December 1999. See <<http://www.ihf.com/articles/1999/12/10/edgordon.2.t.php>> (Accessed on 11.11.2005)

¹³¹ Millennium Declaration in 1999 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions. See <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#enlargement> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

The European Council met in Helsinki on 10 and 11 December 1999. It adopted the Millennium Declaration. It has taken a number of decisions marking a new stage in the enlargement process. Steps have also been taken to ensure that the Union itself will have effective, reformed institutions, a strengthened common security and defence policy and a competitive, job-generating, sustainable economy.¹³²

The decisions on enlargement and ESDP are indeed very reformist, in the sense that Turkey was announced as a candidate country and also concerning ESDP, the EU took steps towards creating a separate and separable military power, when necessary to make use of NATO assets.

After Luxembourg European Council in December 1997, in which 10 new candidate countries were announced, in Helsinki European Council, the EU announced Turkey as the new candidate country. Concerning Turkey, it is stated that:

Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.¹³³

This decision normalized Turkey-EU relations and increased the hope in Turkish side concerning full-membership to the EU. However when the strategy of the EU before and after Helsinki European Council in 1999 is analyzed, it can be argued that this decision was not more than a political and tactical retreat from

¹³² 1999 Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions. See <http://europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99_en.htm#enlargement> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

¹³³ *Ibid.*

Luxembourg European Council. Even after the Summit Tony Blair, then British Prime Minister, stated ""Turkey is not being put to the back of the queue in any way".¹³⁴

Indeed Turkey was put back to the queue, which should be done two years ago, problems continued to persist for both sides. The problems for the EU side were summarized by Patrick Wintour as follows: "Even Turkey was granted candidatureship status, a sort of ante-room in which it can start to mend its human rights record before bargaining starts. Irrespective of Turkey, the EU will expand to a single market of more than 500 million people, rendering its governing institutions unworkable unless radical reforms reduce the blocking veto, the system under which a state can halt progress by voting against measures agreed by all the others."¹³⁵

In addition to enlargement, during the Summit the EU took important decisions concerning its European Security and Defence Policy¹³⁶ (ESDP). In the Summit it is decided that:

... to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.

Also the EU emphasized that this process would avoid unnecessary duplication¹³⁷ and does not imply the creation of a European army. In addition, the EU agreed on launching the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) operational, capable of fulfilling Petersberg Tasks, by 2003, basing on the guidelines established at the

¹³⁴ Ian Black, "Turkey embroiled in EU membership crisis", The Guardian, 11 December 1999. See <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,,244684,00.html>> (Accessed on 11.11.2005)

¹³⁵ Patrick Wintour, "Blair is left out in the cold", The Guardian, 15 December 1999. See <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/GWeekly/Story/0,,249443,00.html>> (Accessed on 11.11.2005)

¹³⁶ European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is a major element of the Common Foreign and Security Policy pillar of the EU.

¹³⁷ Here the Council referred the 3D's that was put forward by Madeline Albright.

Cologne European Council. The emphasis of the EU to establish a separate military force, that can conduct peacekeeping and peacemaking operations at the international level, was emerged during the Kosovo Crisis and following NATO's military intervention to Kosovo. During this crisis the EU realized its lack of capacity to intervene to such a crisis in its backyard. Although the idea of creating a separate military identity out of NATO by using NATO assets was rejected by NATO at the beginning; the idea was later accepted in return for consent to NATO-led military intervention to Kosovo in March 1999.

It can be argued that this decision is a reflection of the EU's desire to become a global actor and to play more significant role in regional issues and capable of intervening the crisis in its neighbourhood free from the United States or NATO. In order to realize this aim, the EU would need further military capabilities apart from NATO, which could be Turkey's Third Army. So in this respect, according to Eralp, it was no coincidence that the EU's view on Turkey's bid changed, given its strategic importance in the Middle East, the Mediterranean and Eurasia.¹³⁸

As noted by many scholars, it may be stated that the integration process of Turkey into the European structures is an "open-ended struggle" between both national and international social forces and there are competing and changing hegemonic projects formulated by these social forces in Turkey-EU relations and also the Turkey-EU relations have a wavering character. As analyzed in the second chapter, according to neo-Gramscian perspectives a hegemonic project stems from economic sphere and goes beyond economic into the political and social sphere; additionally there are three distinguishing elements of a hegemonic project, which are material reason, intellectual leadership and consent and coercion.

In this part the EU's hegemonic discourse is discussed in certain time periods, which are determined according to the turning points in Turkey-EU relations and the shifts and reformulations in hegemonic discourses. In addition to time

¹³⁸ Atilla Eralp, *loc.cit.*, p. 185

periods, while analyzing the changes and continuities in Turkey-EU relations, the elements and moving conditions that the EU is using regarding the reformulation of its hegemonic discourse and also the elements that affect the process are discussed. These elements and moving conditions that have affected the EU's hegemonic discourse towards Turkey are Turkey's geographical position, military capabilities, growing economy, Islamic and cultural identity, Kurdish issue and Cyprus question.

In addition to European Commission and European Parliament documents and reports, the works of lobbying and social groups in the EU, such as ERT, UNICE, Friends of Europe, The Independent Commission on Turkey, academicians and journalists are taken into account, in order to draw a map of hegemonic discourse formulation, and as well as intellectual leadership and hegemonic bloc formation.

3.2.1. Elements of the EU's Hegemonic Discourse towards Turkey

As noted in the second chapter of this thesis, in order to realize a hegemonic project, a certain and defined material reason is required. When one or more material reasons are defined, by the leadership of the bourgeoisie a historic bloc around this reason is tried to be formed in order to realize the hegemonic project.

It can be argued that in the period between the 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005, Turkey's geographical position, military power, being a large market, economic potential and Islamic identity were the main elements that were used in shaping the EU's material reason and thus its hegemonic discourse. In the times of crisis in Turkey-EU relations, like 1999 Helsinki European Council, the intellectuals within the EU, both at the institutional level (EU Parliament and Commission) and also at the NGO level, put forward these elements and thus tried to avoid a passive revolution and a possible crisis in the EU's hegemonic discourse towards Turkey.

The European Commission summarized this fact in its report on "Issues arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective" issued on 6 October 2004 as follows:

Turkey's accession would be different from previous enlargements because of the combined impact of Turkey's population, size, geographical location, economic, security and military potential, as well as cultural and religious characteristics. These factors give Turkey the capacity to contribute to regional and international stability. Expectations regarding EU policies towards these regions will grow as well, taking into account Turkey's existing political and economic links to its neighbours. Much will depend on how the EU itself will take on the challenge to become a fully fledged foreign policy player in the medium term in regions traditionally characterized by instability and tensions, including the Middle East and the Caucasus.¹³⁹

After the end of the Cold War, Turkey's geo-strategic importance was transformed, from being a country in the border of communist threat into a country in the border of the EU, and increased. Turkey's cultural and religious characteristics, when combined with its geographical position, became an asset for Turkey's integration into the EU. So it can be argued that Turkey's geographical position was transformed from a "buffer-zone" to a "bridge" between East and West.

Similarly The Independent Commission on Turkey¹⁴⁰ underlined the same issue and stated that "if the EU is set to assume greater responsibility in world politics, Turkish accession would considerably strengthen the Union's capabilities as a foreign policy actor".¹⁴¹ In the report it is also argued that due

¹³⁹ Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf> (Accessed on 12.12.2005)

¹⁴⁰ The Independent Commission on Turkey is an independent commission which examines the challenges and opportunities presented by Turkey's possible membership in the European Union. The Commission is made up of former heads of state and government, foreign ministers and European commissioners, and other Europeans who have previously held high positions in public office. Martti Ahtisaari is the chairman of the Commission. Albert Rohan is rapporteur. The British Council is supporting the Independent Commission in partnership with the Open Society Institute.

¹⁴¹ Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?", September 2004, p. 17. See <<http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf>> (Accessed on 14.12.2005)

to its geo-strategic position, Turkey would add new dimensions to the Union's foreign policy efforts in such vitally important regions as the Middle East, the Mediterranean, Central Asia and South Caucasus. Accordingly, the Friends of Europe in their report "Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement?" states that Turkey will have an important impact on EU foreign policy interests given its borders with the Middle East, Caucasus and the Black Sea. This will shift the Union's borders to the South-East and increase the Union's range of interests in these difficult regions.¹⁴²

Accordingly, Turkey's geographical position constitutes another important element for Turkey concerning energy and its security. According to the Commission, Turkey would have a major role to play in the security of energy supply of the EU and its members, as it has neighbours with huge energy potential. They state that, "Turkey's accession could help secure access to these resources and their safe transportation into the EU single market. It would diversify possible EU supply lines offering alternative export outlets both for Russia, the Middle East and the countries around the Caspian".¹⁴³

If Turkey successfully concludes the membership negotiations, she will be the first and only Muslim member of the Community. However Turkey's Islamic identity is among the most debated characteristics of her after her size of population. Although a considerable amount of the EU's public opinion claims that the EU is a community of Christian religion and Turkey has no place in there; especially after September 11 events, a logical part in the EU acknowledges the fact that Turkey's Islamic identity is an valuable asset for the EU in the new international environment, in which Middle East is a significant regional power with its energy resources and a Muslim Turkey, being part of a

¹⁴² Kirsty Hughes, "Turkey and the European Union: Just Another Enlargement? Exploring the Implications of Turkish Accession", *A Friends of Europe Working Paper*, June 2004, p. 2. See <<http://www.friendsofeurope.org/pdfs/TurkeyandtheEuropeanUnion-WorkingPaperFoE.pdf>> (Accessed on 20.01.2006)

¹⁴³ Issues Arising from Turkey's Membership Perspective. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2004/issues_paper_en.pdf> (Accessed on 12.12.2005)

Christian Community would be used as a tool in accessing to Middle East by peaceful means.

According to the report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, "admission of Turkey to the European Union would provide undeniable proof that Europe is not a closed "Christian Club"... Europe could send a powerful message to the rest of the world that the "Clash of Civilizations" is not the ineluctable destiny of mankind".¹⁴⁴ By giving this message and allowing cultural diversity within itself, the EU may put emphasis on its common values of democracy, respect for human rights and rule of law.

Additionally, Turkey would be an asset for the EU in developing relations with Eastern countries; as well as would be a model of an Islamic, at the same time a secular country, found a place in the Western world. As the report pointed out Turkey's membership to the EU would show the Islamic world that it is indeed possible to find answers to the dilemma of combining religious beliefs with the universally accepted principles of modern societies.¹⁴⁵

However it can be argued that the importance of Turkey's Islamic identity is started to be questioned after the establishment of AKP government. Secularism, modernism and Westernization are always part of Turkish government tradition since Kemalist period, which are constantly practiced by Turkish elites and the military. But AKP's strong Islamic background and anti-secular claims overshadow their sayings that they have changed and Turkey's secular stance has started to be questioned by the EU elite.

Turkey with an army force this amount is another asset for the EU concerning the development of its ESDP. Currently Turkey is one of the strongest members of NATO and contributed to international peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-

¹⁴⁴ Report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey in Europe: More than a promise?", September 2004, p. 16. See <<http://www.independentcommissiononturkey.org/pdfs/english.pdf>> (Accessed on 14.12.2005)

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 17

Herzegovina, Croatia and Kosovo. According to the report of the Independent Commission on Turkey, "Turkey would be a great value for the European defence system. Additionally, with regard to new threats to security and stability like international terrorism, organized crime, trade in human beings and illegal migration, Turkey's EU membership would result in closer and mutually beneficial cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs".¹⁴⁶

As argued by Müftüleri-Bac, one motive for granting Turkey candidacy could be linked to the EU's security aspirations and the difficulties Turkey's exclusion would cause.¹⁴⁷ Because the EU's accession to NATO assets should also be agreed by Turkey, as this caused a problem between Turkey and the EU after 1999 Helsinki European Council and was calmed down by Berlin + Formula.

3.2.2. Hegemonic Discourse of the EU in the period of 1999 Helsinki European Council and 2002 Copenhagen European Council

This period of Turkey-EU relations, as stated before, had started with a tactical retreat of the EU, which granted Turkey a candidateship status at the Helsinki European Summit in order to bring Turkey back to the table. Although the EU did not aim full integration, the main idea behind this tactical retreat was to keep Turkey in the circle without aligning her. Because in the period of December 1997 and December 1999, the EU realized that Turkey could suspend its political dialogue with the EU, thus reformulated its hegemonic discourse and reduced the scope of its relations with Turkey as a foreign policy issue. Additionally, a "wait and see" policy was on the agenda, that granting candidateship status was not giving special rights to Turkey. Instead Turkey would need to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria like all other candidate countries.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 18

¹⁴⁷ Meltem Müftüleri-Bac and Lauren M. McLaren, *op.cit.*, p. 27

According to neo-Gramscian perspectives, it can be argued that the EU redefined its position and formulated a new hegemonic discourse. Also although in Luxembourg European Council there was a strong opposition among some EU members on the future of Turkey within the EU, they updated their positions in Helsinki European Council. For example, while Helmut Kohl was saying that "Turkish membership in the EU is not possible and the EU is a civilization project within which Turkey has no place"¹⁴⁸; he changed his attitude during the elections campaign and favoured Turkey's membership. Similarly, after Öcalan's extradition, Italy started to support Turkey in order to restore better relations. Last but not least, according to Panayotis Tsakonas, "the rationale behind Greece's concession in granting Turkey the status of an EU candidate country at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 was that strengthening Turkey's European orientation would promote an eventual process of the Turkish elite's abandoning "aggressive behaviour" toward Greece and adoption of a policy based less on geographical instruments of statecraft and more on international law and agreements".¹⁴⁹

A commentator from Guardian summarized this situation as follows, "the quake shifted Brussels debate from *whether* the Turkish candidacy would be elevated to *how* this should be done, from *whether* to loosen the purse strings for Turkey to *which* channel should be used for generous funds transfers."¹⁵⁰ Although different member states had different material reasons over Turkey, at the Helsinki European Council they updated their positions and in sum, a passive revolution concerning Turkey's integration into the European structures was somehow prevented.

¹⁴⁸ Bruce Kuniholm, "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey", p. 5. See <<http://www.pubpol.duke.edu/people/faculty/kuniholm/SAN01-24.pdf>> (Accessed on 20.12.2005)

¹⁴⁹ Panayotis J. Tsakonas, "Turkey's Post-Helsinki Turbulence Implications for Greece and the Cyprus Issue", *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2, Autumn 2001, p. 1

¹⁵⁰ The Guardian, 7 March 1997, cited in Bruce Kuniholm, , "Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Differences in European and US Attitudes, and Challenges for Turkey", p. 5, Meltem Müftüleri-Bac, "Through the Looking Glass: Turkey in Europe", *op.cit.*, p. 34

So it can be argued that with different interests and expectations, the EU member states and also ERT supported Turkey to be granted a candidateship status and thus they formed a historical bloc and thus formulated a new hegemonic project. According to Bieler, "a hegemonic project must be based on organic ideas, which stem from the economic sphere. It must however go beyond economics into the political and social sphere, incorporating ideas related to issues such as social reform, moral regeneration and national security, to result in a stable hegemonic system".¹⁵¹ As stated before EU's hegemonic discourse had some elements that have been used in shaping its hegemonic discourse and thus facilitated a process that leads to neo-liberal structuring and social transformation in Turkey.

At its Nice Summit in December 2000, the EU took a big step ahead for modifying its institutional capability after having 13 candidate countries. The Presidency Conclusions and the decisions of the Intergovernmental Conference in February 2000 provided the basis of Treaty of Nice, which was signed on 26 February 2001 and came into force on 1 February 2003. With the Treaty of Nice, the EU changed the voting system to majority voting, on 29 Articles out of 70 that was requiring unanimity. This modification in the voting system clearly reflects the EU's hegemonic discourse towards Turkey, as the weighing of votes in the European Council and number of seats in the EU Parliament was designed for only 27 member states, excluding Turkey. As Jacques Chirac stated after the Nice Summit that "this Summit has shaped the future European Union"¹⁵², it was clear that Turkey had no membership place in it.

After making modifications on the future of the enlarged Union, basing on the Helsinki decisions, the EU started to prepare the legal procedures concerning

¹⁵¹ Andreas Bieler, "The Struggle over EU Enlargement", *loc.cit.*, p. 581

¹⁵² "Chirac: AB'yi Şekillendiren Zirve", *Hürriyet*. See <<http://webarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/2000/12/11/270266.asp>> (Accessed on 23.08.2006)

Turkey's accession strategy, which was the Accession Partnership and endorsed it on 8 March 2001.¹⁵³ At the Helsinki European Summit it was stated that:

An accession partnership will be drawn up on the basis of previous European Council conclusions while containing priorities on which accession preparations must concentrate in the light of the political and economic criteria and the obligations of a Member State, combined with a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis*. Appropriate monitoring mechanisms will be established. With a view to intensifying the harmonization of Turkey's legislation and practice with the *acquis*, the Commission is invited to prepare a process of analytical examination of the *acquis*. The European Council asks the Commission to present a single framework for coordinating all sources of European Union financial assistance for pre-accession.¹⁵⁴

Also in the Luxembourg European Council it was decided that the Accession Partnership would be the key feature of the enhanced pre-accession strategy, mobilizing all forms of assistance to the candidate countries within a single framework. Main purpose of the Accession Partnership was to assist Turkey to meet the accession criteria by outlining the priorities of accession preparations that were identified in the 2000 Regular Report on Turkey, with particular reference to implementation of the *acquis* and forming the basis for programming the pre-accession assistance from Community funds. As a response to this, Turkey was expected to prepare a National Programme by giving reference to the objectives outlined in the Accession Partnership. On 12 March 2001, Turkey prepared its National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA) and issued it to the European Commission on 26 March 2001. The details of the NPAA are discussed in detail in the next chapter of this thesis. The main issues put forward by the EU in the Accession Partnership were violation of human rights, fight against torture, the role of military in Turkish political life, freedom of press, freedom of expression, improving the functioning and effectiveness of the judiciary including the State Security Courts (SSCs), abolition of death penalty and the NSC. The document set out objectives both

¹⁵³ The Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey on 8 March 2001.
<<http://www.deltur.cec.eu.int/english/apwithturkey.pdf>> (Accessed on 23.08.2006)

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

for short¹⁵⁵ and medium¹⁵⁶ term political objectives, as well as economical ones; however it should be noted that the political objectives had more crucial

¹⁵⁵ Short term objectives for enhancing the political dialogue and political criteria are:

- In accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, strongly support the UN Secretary General's efforts to bring to a successful conclusion the process of finding a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, as referred in the point 9(a) of the Helsinki conclusions.
- Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees for the right to freedom of expression in line with article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights. Address in that context the situation of those persons in prison sentenced for expressing non- violent opinions.
- Strengthen legal and constitutional guarantees of the right to freedom of association and peaceful assembly and encourage development of civil society.
- Strengthen legal provisions and undertake all necessary measures to reinforce fight against torture practices, and ensure compliance with the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture.
- Further align legal procedures concerning pre-trial detention with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and with recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
- Strengthen opportunities for legal redress against all violations of human rights.
- Intensify training on human rights issues for law enforcement officials in mutual co-operation with individual countries and international organizations.
- Improve functioning and efficiency of the judiciary, including the state security court in line with international standards. Strengthen in particular training of judges and prosecutors on European Union legislation, including in the field of human rights.
- Maintain de facto moratorium on capital punishment.
- Remove any legal provisions forbidding the use by Turkish citizens of their mother tongue in TV/radio broadcasting.
- Develop a comprehensive approach to reduce regional disparities, and in particular to improve the situation in the South-East, with a view to enhancing economic, social and cultural opportunities for all citizens.

¹⁵⁶ Short term objectives for enhancing the political dialogue and political criteria are:

- in accordance with the Helsinki conclusions, in the context of the political dialogue, under the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the United Nations Charter make every effort to resolve any outstanding border disputes and other related issues, as referred in the point 4 of the Helsinki conclusions
- Guarantee full enjoyment by all individuals without any discrimination and irrespective of their language, race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief or religion of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. Further develop conditions for the enjoyment of freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
- Review of the Turkish Constitution and other relevant legislation with a view to guaranteeing rights and freedoms of all Turkish citizens as set forth in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights; ensure the implementation of such legal reforms and conformity with practices in EU Member States.
- Abolish death penalty, sign and ratify Protocol N° 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights.
- Ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its optional protocol and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
- Adjust detention conditions in prisons to bring them in accordance with the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners and other international norms.
- Align the constitutional role of the National Security Council as an advisory body to the government in accordance with the practice of EU member states.
- Lift the remaining state of emergency in the South-East.
- Ensure cultural diversity and guarantee cultural rights for all citizens irrespective of their origin. Any legal provisions preventing the enjoyment of these rights should be abolished, including in the field of education.

significance concerning the EU's hegemonic discourse. Because it can be argued that these political objectives constitutes the tools of the EU's hegemonic discourse. These issues were used as moving conditions in Turkey-EU relations starting from the 1999 Helsinki decision and led the wavering characteristic of these relations.

When the 1999 Turkey Progress Report, 2000 Turkey Progress Report and the Accession Partnership on 2001 are carefully analyzed, it can be argued that after granting a candidateship status to Turkey and after its tactical retreat, the EU started put barriers, namely these moving conditions, on Turkey's road to full accession and redefined them during the time period. Since the EU did not clearly aimed full integration besides Helsinki European Council decisions, it put forward these moving conditions for facilitating a neo-liberal transformation process in Turkey with the support of its institutions and social forces, like NGOs, labour unions and private sector representatives.

For instance the European Roundtable of Industrialists (ERT)¹⁵⁷ was among the main pressure groups in the EU, which is an alliance of chief executives of Europe's largest companies, whose purpose is to formulate policies for adoption by the European Commission and strongly advocated further enlargement rounds before the Luxembourg European Council, in which 10 new candidate countries were announced. Additionally, the ERT supported Turkey's potential accession to the EU, which directly means new market expansion. For example the ERT sent a message to the EU leaders before the Gothenburg European Council in June 2001 and stated that:

...most ERT members have substantial investments in the applicant countries, and we have seen the positive impact of European integration on growth, trade and employment in

¹⁵⁷ European Roundtable of Industrialists was founded in 1983 and currently consisting of 45 chief executives and chairmen of major multinational companies of European parentage, covering a wide range of industrial sectors. Current chairman is Jorma Ollila from Nokia, who has been at the office since 2005. ERT's "core business" since the mid-1980s has been securing the development and implementation of the European Single Market programme. For more information please visit <http://www.ert.be>.

both West and East...The European Round Table of Industrialists believes that the European Union's enlargement process is losing political momentum in the face of opposition from special interests. A stronger political commitment and strategy are required. The ERT expects the EU to deliver on its promises, for the sake of both the existing Union and those countries aspiring to membership.¹⁵⁸

Additionally, the Confederation of European Business (UNICE)¹⁵⁹ is another pressure group that supports Turkey's integration into the European structures. For instance in their report headed "Candidate Countries' Progress towards EU Accession" the UNICE stated that "European business supports the accession of Turkey to the European Union" and continued as follows: "In order to encourage macro-economic stabilization, it is necessary for Turkey to implement structural reforms. Adoption of the national programme for adoption of the *acquis* presented by the Turkish government in March 2001 is a step forwards and the starting point for a fundamental transformation of Turkey. By meeting its commitments, it will make progress along the road to EU accession".¹⁶⁰

Concerning moving conditions, it can be argued that the EU's demands on diminishing the role of military in Turkish politics were among the most important moving conditions outlined in the Commission's progress reports on Turkey in the related period.

It is an undeniable fact that the military in Turkey has a considerable influence on domestic politics, as well as on the formulation of foreign policy. Since the foundation of Turkish Republic, even during the National War of Liberation times, the military has been influential in Turkish political life, by two military coups in 1960 and 1980, and two ultimatums in 1971 and 1997. Also as a result

¹⁵⁸ "Opening up the business opportunities of EU enlargement", ERT Position Paper and Analysis of Costs and Benefits of EU Enlargement, June 2001. See <<http://www.ert.be/doc/0038.pdf>> (Accessed on 23.09.2006)

¹⁵⁹ As of 23 January 2007, the name of UNICE is changed as BusinessEurope.

¹⁶⁰ "Candidate Countries' Progress Towards EU Accession", UNICE Task Force on Enlargement, October 2001, p. 20

of the Islamist and anti-secular political environment after 1990s, the military had issued more statements concerning the developments in domestic policies.

The position in military is constantly questioned by the EU, by claiming to be undemocratic. Svante E. Connell summarizes this situation in Turkey as follows:

...this may be seen as alien to West Europeans, but should come as no surprise given that the Turkish state was created less than 80 years ago on the basis of a popular, military-led uprising that liberated the country from (incidentally) West European occupation...As a result, the military perceives itself as having and implements a guardian role over the Turkish Republic...In the 1990s, the military indeed seemed content with a diminishing role in political affairs; however, the political situation in the country did not allow for this.¹⁶¹

When the Commission's Regular Reports on Turkey on 1999, 2000, 2001 and 2002 are analyzed, it can be argued that starting from 1999, there is a clear demand of the EU to diminish the role of military mainly in NSC and abolish the military judge in SSCs. The evolution of this issue can be traced in the Progress Reports on Turkey. For instance in the 1999 Regular Report on Turkey, concerning the NSC it is stated that:

The National Security Council continues to play a major role in political life. While the emergency courts system remains in place, the replacement of the military judge by a civilian one in State Security Courts represents a clear improvement in terms of independence of the judiciary.¹⁶²

In the 2000 Regular Report on Turkey it is stated that:

Civilian control over the military is still needs to be improved. Contrary to EU, NATO and OSCE standards, instead of being answerable to the Defence Minister, the Chief of General Staff is still accountable to the Prime Minister...The question of the

¹⁶¹ Svante E. Cornell, "The Military in Turkish Politics", in Bertil Duner (ed.) *Turkey and Europe: the Road Ahead*, Swedish Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm, 2002, p. 31-32

¹⁶² 1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1999/turkey_en.pdf> (Accessed on 23.03.2005)

State Security Courts still needs to be further addressed. No further changes have taken place since the removal of military judges from these Courts in June 1999. The functioning, powers and responsibilities, as well as other provisions relating to the proceedings of these Courts need to be brought further in line with standards existing in the EU...There has been no change in the role played by the National Security Council in Turkish political life. Its conclusions, statements or recommendations continue to strongly influence the political process, as witnessed in the recent debate over the dismissing of civil servants suspected of links with radical Islamic and separatist movements. In addition, it appears that at present the views of the National Security Council in practice seriously limit the role played by the government.¹⁶³

In the Progress Report of 2001 was more optimistic when compared with the previous reports, in the sense that the military judges in the SSCs were replaced by civilian judiciary. Additionally concerning NSC, it is stated that:

As part of the constitutional reform package, the provision of Article 118 concerning the role and the composition of the National Security Council has been amended. The number of civilian members of the NSC has been increased from five to nine while the number of the military representatives remains at five...Since the last Regular Report, the National Security Council has given its opinion on a number of governmental issues and policies including the NPAA, the Cyprus issue, European Security and Defence Policy, measures to combat anti-secularism activism, the extension of the compulsory age limit in primary education, the state of emergency in various provinces, the privatization of state companies (e.g. telecoms), recent socio-economic developments and on the constitutional reform package.¹⁶⁴

In the 2002 Progress Report, it is stated that:

Despite these limitations to the jurisdiction of State Security Courts, the powers, responsibilities and functioning of these Courts still need to be brought in line with European

¹⁶³ 2000 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, p. 12-13. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2000/tu_en.pdf> (Accessed on 22.03.2005)

¹⁶⁴ 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, p. 16-19. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/tu_en.pdf> (Accessed on 22.03.2005)

standards...The constitutional amendment introducing changes to the composition and the role of the National Security Council has been put in practice. The number of civilians has increased from 5 to 9 compared with 5 military members...The introduction of a civilian majority of members and the limitation to an advisory role, in line with the Accession Partnership priority; do not appear to have changed the way the NSC operates in practice. Although decisions are taken by majority, opinions of its military members continue to carry great weight.¹⁶⁵

The EU's efforts on diminishing the role of military in Turkish politics and abolishing of SSCs were successful in the sense that the SSCs were abolished after the reform package of constitutional amendments was accepted in the Turkish Parliament in May 2004. The SSCs were replaced by newly created Serious Felony Courts. Similarly as a part of the new constitutional amendments, the functioning and composition of the NSC were changed. The number of civilian members of the Council was increased and new advisory position has been assigned by abolishing the executive powers. So it can be argued that the EU realized a successful *transformismo* in the related subjects and used these moving conditions as a tool for Turkey's neo-liberal restructuring.

This referred period had easily been considered as a transition period, in which the Turkey-EU relations were normalized after 1997 Luxembourg European Council. In this period, it can be argued that the EU updated its hegemonic discourse and tried to have Turkey in an arms length position. In this way it both started to realize its material reasons, through various moving conditions. In this period, a hegemonic bloc is applicable, in the sense that pressure groups, EU officials and heads of governments in EU member states approved Turkey's candidanship status. Although the relations were normalized in this period, in the following period as the EU became an official side of the Cyprus problem and internalized it clearly the relations tended to become tense as no substance solution was found to the problem. Also concerning the Cyprus issue, it may be stated that a hegemonic crisis was occurred within the EU as a result of different

¹⁶⁵ 2002 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, p. 24-25. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/tu_en.pdf> (Accessed on 22.03.2005)

approaches, which obviously reflects the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations and is discussed in the coming part of the study.

3.2.3. Reformulation of the Hegemonic Discourse and Emerging of the Cyprus Issue as a New Moving Condition

As the 1999 Helsinki European Council, the Copenhagen European Council on 11-12 December 2002 constitutes another turning point concerning enlargement and Turkey. In this Summit, the EU announced the completion of the process of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia, which had become members later on 1 May 2004.

Concerning Turkey, the Council repeated its decision in 1999 Helsinki European Council and further stated that:

The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.¹⁶⁶

In this period, it can be argued that Cyprus issue had been the most dominant item on the agenda both for Turkey and the EU. The decision in the Copenhagen European Council was beneficial for both sides. After a speedy reform process and national elections, there was a new government in Turkey, which used the EU membership as a tool for their elections campaign and a brand new policy on Cyprus issue with a slogan of "no solution is no solution". Concerning the EU, there was the opportunity to create a new moving condition for Turkey, which was the settlement of Cyprus problem; as Turkey had progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria.

¹⁶⁶ Copenhagen European Council on 12–23 December 2002 Presidency Conclusions. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

Finding a solution to the problem would be strategically significant for both sides; as the new AKP government in Turkey placed the EU membership and settlement of Cyprus problem at the hearth of their election campaign; while the EU wanted to solve this problem within the Community and also gaining some time before and after the coming (May 2004) enlargement. So both sides perceived each other from an instrumentalist point of view; defined their material reasons and reformulated their hegemonic discourses. However many scholars suggest that the EU pursued a tactical retreat in 1999 Helsinki EU Council and finally left Turkey in a very difficult position in December 2004 concerning Cyprus issue.¹⁶⁷

Without any doubt, the Cyprus question has always been one of the most important hegemonic projects of the EU concerning Turkey-EU relations. Concerning the Cyprus question, it can be argued that by granting a candidateship status to Cyprus in its Luxembourg European Council in 1997, the EU clearly internalized the problem and became an official partner of the problem. The EU's main hegemonic project has been to integrate Cyprus as a whole and thus to strengthen its position in the Mediterranean. However as a result of the Turkish aspect of the problem the hegemonic discourse of the EU was reformulated, which was using the Cyprus problem as a concession tool against Turkey and in order to prevent a passive revolution in Turkey to internationalize the problem by the UN involvement. Although the problem has been transformed itself since 1960, the main idea behind the EU's hegemonic project is the same. Before having a closer look to EU's hegemonic discourse on Cyprus, initially the evolution of the issue should be discussed.

The actual Cyprus question started with the signing of the 1960 Treaty which led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus by establishing a power-sharing constitutional mechanism between Turkish and Greek Cypriots under the guarantee of Turkish, Greek and British governments. Although this Treaty was regarded as a medium-term solution to the problem, the peace did not last

¹⁶⁷ Mustafa Türkes, *op.cit.*, p. 6

long, when the Greek Cypriots unilaterally try to intervene to the equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots in 1963. This unilateral intervention resulted with Turkish military intervention to the island in 1974, which led to an international crisis.

Until 1981, the sides of the problem were Turkey, Greece, Britain and the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. However the full-membership of Greece to the EU in 1981 transformed the problem and added another perspective to the issue, the Union side. From the very beginning, the actual aim of Greece and the Greek Cypriots was realizing enosis and creating a unified state. When the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus was established in 1983, the problem became more complex and additionally Turkey was presented as an occupying state in the island. In addition to this, in July 1990, the Greek Cypriots applied for EU membership and the Commission confirmed their capacity to fulfil the obligations of membership and to adopt the EU *acquis* by announcing its opinion in June 1993.

Although Ankara expressed her concerns on the evolution of the problem and urged Brussels on not to admit the Greek part of Cyprus to the EU without finding a solution to the problem, in its Luxembourg European Council in 1997, the EU decided to launch the accession process with Cyprus. In the Presidency Conclusions it is stated that:

The accession of Cyprus should benefit all communities and help to bring about civil peace and reconciliation. The accession negotiations will contribute positively to the search for a political solution to the Cyprus problem through the talks under the aegis of the United Nations, which must continue with a view to creating a bi-community, bi-zonal federation. In this context, the European Council requests that the willingness of the Government of Cyprus to include representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community in the accession negotiating delegation to acted upon¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸ Article 28 of the Luxembourg European Council on 12-13 December 1997 Presidency Conclusions. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/032a0008.htm> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

Accordingly, in the European Strategy for Turkey, the EU emphasized the solution of Cyprus problem would be a must and stated that:

The European Council recalls that strengthening Turkey's links with the European Union also depends on that country's pursuit of the political and economic reforms on which it has embarked, including the alignment of human rights standards and practices on those in force in the European Union; respect for and protection of minorities; the establishment of satisfactory and stable relations between Greece and Turkey; the settlement of disputes, in particular by legal process, including the International Court of Justice; and support for negotiations under the aegis of the UN on a political settlement in Cyprus on the basis of the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions.¹⁶⁹

This statement led to a deadlock in Turkey-EU relations and Turkey froze all the political dialogue with the EU including the Cyprus problem. It can be argued that the decision on opening up accession negotiations with Cyprus reflects the power of Greek government over the EU concerning the eastern enlargement. As enlarging to the east was significant for the EU, they could not risk this by not granting a candidateship status to Cyprus. As Mustafa Türkeş points out, "In order to gain Greek consent for the eastern enlargement process, the EU made certain deals with Greece, notably allowing the Greek Cypriots to apply for EU membership in 1990, despite the presence of unresolved problems on the island".¹⁷⁰

As stated before, the deadlock in Turkey-EU relations was solved with the decision on granting Turkey a candidateship status in Helsinki European Council and the deadlock concerning Cyprus issue was solved with the letter of Paavo Lipponen, then term-president of the EU and Prime Minister of Finland.¹⁷¹ This letter represented the shift, the tactical retreat, of the EU formulated for normalizing the relations with Turkey. With this letter the EU accepted that

¹⁶⁹ European Strategy for Turkey, *op.cit.*

¹⁷⁰ Mustafa Türkeş, *op.cit.*, p. 7

¹⁷¹ For the full text of the Lipponen Letter, Ecevit's reply and further analysis of the problem, see Mustafa Türkeş, *ibid.*

Cyprus issue would not be a condition for Turkey's membership to the EU. Under those conditions Ecevit accepted the offer and signed the Presidency Conclusions in Helsinki. What Ecevit accepted after the Lipponen Letter was that Cyprus issue would not be used as a condition towards Turkey before and during negotiations.

It should be stressed that after Helsinki European Council, the EU had clearly internalized the problem, despite the fact that a solution was being searched within the UN framework. From 1997 till present, the basis of the EU's hegemonic discourse on Cyprus issue is imposing a solution to Turkey and Turkish Cypriots which includes the recognition of Greek part of the Cyprus and extending the Customs Union to the Greek part of the island. However while the basic idea remained the same throughout the period, some revisions and reformulations were made.

In the period of 1999 Helsinki European Council and 2002 Copenhagen European Council, the EU put emphasis on finding a solution to the problem before 1 May 2004. After 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU made a statement for the first time in its Laeken European Council in December 2001 and stated that:

The European Council welcomes the recent meetings between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities and would encourage them to continue their discussions with a view to an overall solution under the auspices of the United Nations consistent with the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.¹⁷²

Additionally, the EU stated in its Copenhagen Summit in December 2002 that:

In case of a settlement of the problem, the Council, acting by unanimity on the basis of proposals by the Commission, shall decide upon adaptations of the terms concerning the

¹⁷² Laeken European Council Presidency Conclusions, 14-15 December 2001, Article 11. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/68827.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

accession of Cyprus to the EU with regard to the Turkish Cypriot community. Also in the absence of a settlement, the application of the *acquis* to the northern part of the island shall be suspended, until the Council decides unanimously otherwise, on the basis of a proposal by the Commission.¹⁷³

Despite the fact that the EU was giving support to the UN-led proximity talks started in August; promised Turkey that the Cyprus issue would not be a condition for Turkey's EU membership through Lipponen Letter, the EU tried to solve this problem through internalizing it and linking its solution to Turkey's accession into the EU. The position of the EU was confusing; as it can be seen in the Presidency Conclusions although the EU did not clearly link the solution of Cyprus problem to Turkey's accession into the EU, the Strategy Paper issued in 2003 reflected the opposite. For instance in the Strategy Paper of 2003, it is stated that:

The Commission recalls that efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem form part of the enhanced political dialogue between the European Union and Turkey. As repeatedly stressed by the European Council, Turkey, together with all parties concerned, has a decisive interest in providing determined support for efforts towards a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem. The Commission considers that there are favourable conditions for the two communities to reach a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem before Cyprus' accession to the EU on 1 May 2004. The absence of a settlement could become a serious obstacle to Turkey's EU aspirations.¹⁷⁴

This is perhaps the first and most clear expression of the EU that finding a solution to Cyprus problem would be a pre-condition for Turkey just as the Copenhagen Criteria.

¹⁷³ Copenhagen European Council Presidency Conclusions, 12-13 December 2002, Article 12-13. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/73842.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

¹⁷⁴ "Continuing Enlargement – 2003 Strategy Paper and Report of the Commission on the progress towards accession by Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey", *op.cit.*, p. 16. See <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0676en01.pdf> (accessed on 12.12.2005)

Also EU Commissioner Verheugen in his speech in March 2002 stated that Cyprus' EU accession, with or without a political solution, would strengthen stability in eastern Mediterranean, dismissing Turkey's claim to the opposite.¹⁷⁵ This may reflect the attitudes of EU elites in the Cyprus problem that despite the fact that a solution had been searched under the auspices of UN and within the EU, indeed the result had been determined from the very beginning. For instance the European Parliament, which reflects the opinions of EU citizens and acts as a source of opinion both for European Council and Commission, stated in its "Recommendation on the application by the Republic of Cyprus to become a member of the European Union" on 26 March 2003 that:

...the government of the Republic of Cyprus is the only legitimate government of Cyprus. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 541 (1983) on 18 November 1983 declaring the proclamation of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' to be legally invalid and calling on all member states not to recognize any Cypriot state other than the Republic of Cyprus. No country apart from Turkey has recognized the self-proclaimed entity of Northern Cyprus.¹⁷⁶

This clearly reflects that indeed no solution has been searched under the auspices of UN or somewhere else. Because the EU, from the very beginning, did not aim to reunite the island. So it is not necessary to debate on the outcomes of the referendum in the island on 24 April 2004 on the Annan Plan¹⁷⁷, because the intellectual leadership in the EU had shaped its hegemonic discourse towards that outcome. The result was questioned by Turkish public opinion and elites, but the spokesperson of Günter Verheugen, Jean-Christophe

¹⁷⁵ George S. Yiangou, "The Accession of Cyprus to the EU: Challenges and Opportunities for the New European Regional Order", *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Vol. 2, 2002, p. 7

¹⁷⁶ Recommendation on the application by the Republic of Cyprus to become a member of the European Union on 26 March 2003. See <[http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/D1992051C6B33054C2256D04004587DA/\\$FILE/Poos.pdf](http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa.nsf/D1992051C6B33054C2256D04004587DA/$FILE/Poos.pdf)> (03.09.2006)

¹⁷⁷ For the full text of the Plan see <http://www.hri.org/docs/annan/Annan_Plan_Text.html> (Accessed on 07.09.2006)

Filori explained this situation as follows: "What had done is done. Turkey needs to proceed if she really wants to conduct membership negotiations with the EU. So move on!"¹⁷⁸

However in order to understand the EU's hegemonic discourse in Cyprus problem, the discourse of the elites and government in Turkey should be carefully analyzed. Position of Turkish side is analyzed in the next chapter of this study.

Also the evolution of Cyprus problem clearly indicates that the EU's perception of Turkey's accession has changed compared to the previous period; because in the previous period Turkey successfully implemented the National Programme and fulfilled certain parts of the Copenhagen criteria. So as the EU's main was not full integration of Turkey, the material reason over Turkey or the so-called moving condition has been transformed into finding a solution to Cyprus problem.

When the referendum in the island failed and the accession of Cyprus into the EU was realized on 1 May 2004, without any reunification, the EU understood the fact that finding a solution to the problem within the Community would no longer be possible as the sides of the problem have changed: two member countries, Greece and Cyprus, and a candidate country, Turkey. So the EU updated its position in the period between 2004 Brussels European Council and 3 October 2005. Lastly, the EU's hegemonic discourse on the Cyprus issue can be summarized as making Turkey to finalize the problem by making a retreat. However, although Turkey had given all the possible concessions concerning Cyprus problem, as the problem has two and even three formal sides, no solution has been found yet. The latest developments in the issue are discussed in the coming part of the study.

¹⁷⁸ Private interview with Jean-Christophe Filori in European Commission, Brussels, 20 October 2006.

Concerning the time period, it is possible to sum up that the EU clearly had an instrumentalist approach towards Turkey, as Turkey successfully conducted the National Programme and had a big step ahead in fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria. At that point, the EU put the Cyprus barrier as a moving condition in front of Turkey, in which it did not clearly intend to finalize the problem.

3.2.4. Alternatives to Full Membership: Consolidation of Passive Revolution from 17 December 2004 to 3 October 2005

It is possible to argue that after the failed attempt to solve the Cyprus problem, in order to normalize that relations the EU decided to open membership negotiations in 3 October 2005, by referring to its decision in December 2002 Copenhagen European Council and stated that:

The European Council recalled its previous conclusions regarding Turkey, in which, at Helsinki, it agreed that Turkey was a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States and, subsequently, concluded that, if it were to decide at its December 2004 meeting, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.¹⁷⁹

Although this decision would be regarded as realizing a long-term objective of Turkey, the ongoing Cyprus issue and the rules and procedures that were outlined in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, shadowed the mode of the Turkish side. It is possible to argue that with the 17 December 2004 decisions and the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, the EU clearly stated that the Union does not foresee the full integration of Turkey; instead it was trying to formulate other forms of integration models, such as privileged partnership.

¹⁷⁹ Brussels European Council on 16-17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions, p. 5. See <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf> (Accessed on 21.03.2005)

Although this was the long-term aim of the EU, it was to be formalized after 17 December 2004 decisions and afterwards.

In the Presidency Conclusions, it is stated that:

The European Council welcomed the adoption of the six pieces of legislation identified by the Commission. It decided that, in the light of the above and of the Commission report and recommendation, Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria to open accession negotiations provided that it brings into force these specific pieces of legislation.¹⁸⁰

On the issue of fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, it should be noted that according to the Presidency Conclusions Turkey did not completely fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria. Although Turkey did not completely fulfil it, in order to open up accession negotiations and sustain the ongoing hegemonic discourse, the EU formulated a new concept of "sufficiently fulfil" and decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey. "Sufficiently fulfil" means that although legal modifications are completed, implementation is still problematic. According to Dr. Michael Alexander Rupp, this concept was invented by the European Commission in favour of Turkey and he argued that the Commission discriminated in favour of Turkey.¹⁸¹

Although the Commission seemed to have acted in favour of Turkey, when the decisions in the Presidency Conclusions are analyzed, it can be argued the reality was just the opposite. For instance in the Presidency Conclusions, the terms of accession negotiations are outlined and according to these: The shared objective of the negotiations is accession; however they will be an open-ended process, the outcome cannot be guaranteed beforehand. Additionally, the Commission will be free to take preventive measures, namely put benchmarks, in important issues and to recommend the suspension of the

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁸¹ Private interview with Dr. Michael Alexander Rupp, Administrator of European Parliament Committee for Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Security and Defense Policy in European Commission, Brussels, 19 October 2006.

negotiations. These conditions for opening accession negotiations clearly reflect the symbolic nature of the decision.

It would be more appropriate to discuss the developments in Turkey-EU relations after 17 December 2004 decisions, namely the extension of the Additional Protocol to ten new member states and the Negotiating Framework for Turkey should be analyzed before analyzing the hegemonic discourse of the EU in the referred time period.

Prior to opening accession negotiations with Turkey, the European Council adopted the Negotiating Framework for Turkey which points out the main rules of the negotiation process. However the rules outlined in the document was disappointing for the Turkish side in the sense that the negotiations would be an open-ended process and the result would be determined according to the absorption capacity of the EU.¹⁸²

¹⁸² Summary of the Negotiating Framework for Turkey, cited in Andreas Marchetti, "The Negotiating Framework for Turkey – Major Provisions and Misperceptions", ZEI EU-Turkey-Monitor, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2006, p. 2

1. Progress depends on Turkey's efforts to meet the requirements for membership. In due course, the Union will decide if the requirements for the conclusion of negotiations are met.
2. The objective of negotiations is accession. The process is open -ended. If Turkey fails to eventually assume membership, it shall be anchored in European structures.
3. Enlargement depends on the EU's absorption capacity.
4. Negotiations are based on the Copenhagen political criteria. The EU expects Turkey to continue its reform process accordingly. The process is monitored by the Commission.
5. If Turkey persistently violates central principles, negotiations can be suspended.
6. Advancement of negotiations depend on
 - a) progress to meet the Copenhagen criteria,
 - b) the achievement of good relations to neighbors,
 - c) a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus question
 - d) fulfilling the obligations stemming from the Association Agreement.
7. Turkey aligns its positions towards third countries and within international organizations with the EU's and its member states' positions.
8. Turkey and the EU engage in an intensive political and civil society dialogue.
9. The results of any other accession negotiations have to be accepted by Turkey.
10. Accession requires the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*.
11. Accession implies the termination of existing agreements between the EU and Turkey or of other international agreements incompatible with membership.
12. The implementation of the *acquis* is likely to necessitate special adaptations. In exceptional cases, transitional measures can be agreed on during the negotiations. Nonetheless, even permanent safeguard clauses can be considered by the EU, especially if it comes to free movement, agriculture or structural policy.
13. Negotiations can only be concluded after the establishment of the Financial Framework for 2014-2020 as Turkey's accession will have relevant financial implications.
14. Turkey will eventually participate in the economic and monetary union, however only after a non-specified derogation.

It can be argued that in this period, although the EU updated its hegemonic discourse and decided to open up accession negotiations despite the fact that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, no historic bloc is formed. From December 2004 to July 2005, the EU member states had divergent attitudes towards Turkey's integration into European structures. According to Heinz Kramer, the Union ended up launching negotiations about which only a minority of its member states have no reservations.¹⁸³ According to Kramer, the main reason of this situation is that "the EU member states have still not really reached agreement as to whether or not they actually wish to embark on what would be a long process; and interests linked to policies on integration and Europe as well as geo-strategic factors and –increasingly– domestic policy considerations are creating a thorough tangle of divergent positions from which the 25 EU member states find themselves unable to extract a common thread".¹⁸⁴

As noted before, in order to preserve its hegemonic discourse, the EU decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey and at the same time new alternatives to full accession for Turkey were started to be discussed among EU member states, especially by Germany, France and Austria. The main

15. Turkey will take over the Schengen *acquis*. Part of this, however, will only apply after later decision by the Council.

16. Environment and nuclear safety constitute important concerns of the EU in the process.

17. In order to implement the *acquis*, Turkey needs to assure an efficient and stable public administration, based on an impartial civil service and an independent judiciary.

18. An Intergovernmental Conference will conduct the substance of negotiations.

19. Negotiations start with an assessment of the *acquis* ("screening").

20. For screening and negotiations, the *acquis* is broken down in 35 chapters. Any agreement reached is not final until overall agreement has been attained.

21. The Council lays down benchmarks for the provisional closure, and, where appropriate, for the opening of chapters. Benchmarks may be updated as the *acquis* evolves during the negotiation period.

22. Turkey indicates its position in relation to the *acquis* and reports on its progress in meeting set benchmarks.

23. The Commission monitors Turkey's progress, serving as basis for further steps to be decided on by the Council. Monitoring also applies to chapters provisionally closed - they may be re-opened if deemed necessary.

¹⁸³ Heinz Kramer, "Turkey's EU Accession Negotiations at the Mercy of Conflicting Interests", *SWP Comments-German Institute for International and Security Affairs*, No. 43, September 2005, p. 1

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1-2

alternatives were the "privileged partnership" and the "extended associate membership"¹⁸⁵. For instance the privileged partnership was first introduced in 2002 by Christian democrat and conservative parties in Germany, France and Austria and has lately also been supported by Denmark and the Czech Republic.¹⁸⁶ The so-called privileged partnership envisaged the free movement of goods, services and capital, market liberalization, agricultural trade and as well as cooperation in areas related to military and foreign policy. According to Fadi Hakura, who is a specialist on Turkish affairs in Chatham House, "privileged membership is an ill-considered, unimaginative policy conferring neither "privilege" nor true "partnership". Such a partnership could lead to a potentially irreversible and dramatic rupture in Turkey-EU relations, detrimental to European strategic interests."¹⁸⁷

This idea has been supported by certain EU member states, especially then French Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, Jacques Chirac, and then leader of Germany's Christian Democratic Union Party (CDU) Angela Merkel and also by majority of public and media. For instance according to a commentator from International Herald Tribune "a privileged partnership would save Europe from "overstretch" and tie Turkey even closer to the West".¹⁸⁸

Concerning privileged partnership, it can be argued that the hegemonic position of pro-privileged partnership countries overcame the idea of Turkey's full

¹⁸⁵ The Extended Associate Membership foresees membership in the Extended European Economic Area, implying primarily an expansion of current relations to economic and commercial cooperation, with certain limitations on free movement of persons and workers. Similar to privileged partnership Turkey would not participate to decision-making process. For more information please see Cemal Karakaş, "On the Debates on Turkish EU Membership", *ZEI, EU-Turkey Monitor*, Vol. 2, No. 1, March 2006, p. 5

¹⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 5

¹⁸⁷ Fadi Hakura, "Partnership Is No Privilege – The Alternative to EU Membership Is No Turkish Delight", Briefing Paper, Chatham House, September 2005. See <<http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/europe/BPTurkeyeu.pdf>> (Accessed on 27.109.2006)

¹⁸⁸ Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, "Preserving Europe: Offer Turkey a privileged partnership instead", International Herald Tribune, 15 December 2005. See <http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/12/15/edgutzen_ed3_.php> (Accessed on 12.02.2006)

accession into the EU, as in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey it is stated that "while taking account of all the Copenhagen criteria, if Turkey is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of accession, it must be ensured that Turkey is fully anchored in the European structures through the closest possible bond".¹⁸⁹ Although the Treaty on the European Union considers only full membership, for the first time in enlargement rounds the EU was considering new alternatives for accession. This indicates the fact that most of the EU member states reluctantly accepted the guidelines for Turkey accession negotiations in December 2004 and run a strong opposition campaign and formed a hegemonic position by sharing a common material reason, for effecting the negotiations that lead to a different outcome other than full membership. For instance on 29 August the leaders of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU), Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber wrote a letter to the EU's Conservative head of state and government in a bid to ensure that Turkey's accession would provoke damaging to the EU and offered privileged partnership.¹⁹⁰

The decision of starting accession negotiations with the EU would be more than welcomed by the Turkish elites and the public opinion; if there would not be case of extending the Customs Union to 10 new member states as a condition for Turkey. The Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was not satisfied with the decision as he stated that "We did not obtain all that we wanted 100%, but we can say that it was a success."¹⁹¹

In June 2005, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EU member states held a meeting in Luxembourg and in that meeting the additional protocol that extends the Customs Union to new ten member states was signed. At the same

¹⁸⁹ Negotiating Framework for Turkey, 3 October 2005. See <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/st20002_05_TR_framedoc_en.pdf> (Accessed on 20.09.2006)

¹⁹⁰ Heinz Kramer, *op.cit.*, p. 3

¹⁹¹ "Deal struck over Turkey-EU talks", BBC News, 17 December 2004. See <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4103931.stm>> (Accessed on 21.09.2006); see also news archives on <http://www.akp.org.tr>

day, Turkey issued a declaration and stated that signing of this protocol did not refer to the recognition of Greek part of Cyprus and Turkey will pursue the same policy towards Cyprus issue until a proper solution would be found.¹⁹² Concerning Turkey's approval on the extension of the Customs Union to new ten member states, excluding Cyprus later, David Hannay noted that Turkey has allowed itself to be manoeuvred into a no-win situation over the extension of its Customs Union with the EU to the ten new member states, including Cyprus.¹⁹³

This unilateral declaration did not have significant influence on the EU's Cyprus strategy; as after many debates the EU issued a counter-declaration on 21 September 2005. In the counter-declaration the EU clearly underlined the fact that in order to continue accession negotiations in a proper manner, Turkey should implement its contractual obligations to all member states and stated that:

...The European Community and its member states regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature (Additional Protocol). The European Community and its member states make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey's obligations under the Protocol. The European Community and its member states expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol, and the removal of all obstacles to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport...Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations.

By issuing this declaration the EU aimed to balance the different expectations within the Union, in the member states and within its institutions. The anti-Turkey side with the Union demanded a harsher answer to Turkey's act, and at

¹⁹² The Cyprus Declaration on 29 July 2005. See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Kibris/Deklarasyon_29Temmuz2005.htm> (Accessed on 23.02.2006)

¹⁹³ David Hannay, "Cyprus, Turkey and the EU: Time for a sense of proportion and compromise", Center for European Reform, Policy Brief, July 2006. See <http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_cyprus_hannay_july06.pdf> (Accessed on 17.07.2006)

the end the final text was far more than satisfying for them. For instance, the Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos admitted that the EU's latest declaration on Turkey may not have been exactly what he hoped for and added that in contrast he was expecting at least that "Cyprus should have threatened to veto the start of Turkish accession talks until Ankara agreed to formal recognition".¹⁹⁴

The Union's position in the problem was finalized as the Negotiating Framework for Turkey was issued. In the document it is stated that: "the fulfilment of Turkey's obligations under the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol extending the Association Agreement to all new EU Member States, in particular those pertaining to the EU-Turkey Customs Union, as well as the implementation of the Accession Partnership, as regularly revised".¹⁹⁵

It is possible to argue that the moving condition that the EU put forward in this time period is the concept of "absorption capacity" as a moving condition in Turkey-EU relations. The term was first used in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey as follows:

...In accordance with the conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council in 1993, the Union's capacity to absorb Turkey, while maintaining the momentum of European integration is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and Turkey. The Commission shall monitor this capacity during the negotiations, encompassing the whole range of issues set out in its October 2004 paper on issues arising from Turkey's membership perspective, in order to inform an assessment by the Council as to whether this condition of membership has been met.¹⁹⁶

Although the EU officials underlined the fact that this absorption capacity is not just applied especially for Turkey; instead this is a criteria for accession, this

¹⁹⁴ Tabitha Morgan, "Cyprus deals with disappointment", BBC News, 28 September 2005. See <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4290452.stm> (Accessed on 21.09.2006)

¹⁹⁵ The Negotiating Framework for Turkey, *op.cit.*

¹⁹⁶ Article 3, *ibid.*

concept is perceived by the Turkish side as a new conditionality. Concerning the absorption capacity, in this thesis, it is argued that the anti-Turkey countries established a historic bloc and realized a passive revolution for the formulation of integration alternatives other than full membership and thus the EU formulated the concept of absorption capacity, in order to create a free space to formulate new strategies on Turkey's integration into European structures and also to relax the public opinion. Because the public opinion was lack of satisfying information on Turkey's accession and various conspiracy theories were around that Turkey's accession would have a big bang effect on the EU with this size, population and religion. According to Michael Emerson there are six functional headings of absorption capacity; Capacity of goods and services market, labour market, budget, institutional decision-making functions, society and the capacity of the EU to assure its strategic security.¹⁹⁷ He argues that the concerns on the absorption capacity in the related headings are not so justified and are possible to be solved. Especially Turkey's Muslim characteristic occupies people's minds, so public opinion should better be informed that Turkey is a secularized country. Similarly Joost Lagendijk, Dutch European Parliamentarian, noted that "the concept of absorption capacity is very much focused on Turkey. Public opinion on issues like Turkish membership can change, but this requires political membership".¹⁹⁸

In sum, it can be argued that from December 2004 to 3 October 2005, the countries, which were opposing Turkey's full accession into the European structures, formed a historic bloc and realized a passive revolution with a material reason of avoiding Turkey's full integration and providing a common ground for an alternative integration model. Indeed the passive revolution began by 17 December 2004 decisions and the Negotiating Framework for Turkey issued on 3 October 2005 sustained this passive revolution. The main material reason for this passive revolution was to find alternative integration

¹⁹⁷ Michale Emerson, Senem Aydin, Julia de Clerk-Sachsse, "Just what is this absorption capacity of the EU?", CEPS Policy Briefing, September 2006, p. 1–26

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*

models for Turkey and thus prevent Turkey's possible accession to EU institutions and have a significant number of chairs in the Parliament.

This material reason seems logical enough that privileged partnership would include Turkey's extension of the Customs Union beyond free movement of goods and harmonization of competition policy to free movement of services and capital, market liberalization and more flexible agricultural policy. Also as a privileged partner Turkey would participate more actively to CFSP with her military capabilities. In sum Turkey would be integrated into CFSP and internal market, with limitations to free movement of persons, agricultural policies and decision-making mechanism. Nicolas Sarkozy explained this situation as follows: "It is not a question about rejecting Turks, but on the contrary, to associate them with us as partners on the military, political and economic level" and added ironically that "there are two ways of associating it to us: either by the status of social partner with Europe – which is rather my own thinking – or you integrate it, which is rather what I don't want".¹⁹⁹

This last period of Turkey-EU relations, which is taken into consideration in this thesis, is finalized with symbolically opening up accession negotiations and has become relatively tense. As a natural outcome of the deadlock in Cyprus problem, there occurred the possibility of suspending the accession negotiations which started on 3 October 2005. This situation was described as "EU-Turkey train crash" by many commentators.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁹ French "must vote on Turkey bid", BBC news, 24 September 2004.
<<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3693042.stm>> (Accessed on 26.05.2006)

²⁰⁰ Friends of Europe, "Turkey and the EU – Four Scenarios: From Train Crash to Full Stream Ahead", September 2006.

CHAPTER IV

COMPETING AND SHIFTING HEGEMONIC DISCOURSES OF TURKEY FROM 1999 TO 2005

*Hegemony is like a pillow: It absorbs, blows and sooner or later the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon.*²⁰¹

As stated before, since the foundation of European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, Turkey would have a long term commitment with EEC.²⁰² Today's European Union was firstly founded as European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and EEC in 1957. The founders of this idea were Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi with his manifesto on pan-Europa movement in 1923, Konrad Adenauer and Robert Schuman. Starting from the inter-war years, in order to promote peace, security and economic development, the idea of uniting Europe was aroused. After the Second World War, this idea was supported by many European countries and the United States. For instance on 7 May 1946, with the participation of over 750 delegates from Western Europe, a Congress of Europe was organized and the European Movement (*Mouvement Européen*) was established in order to organize regional integration.²⁰³ The first achievement of the European Movement was the establishment of Council of Europe on 5 May 1949, which is the oldest political organization in Europe.²⁰⁴ So it can be argued

²⁰¹ Robert W. Cox, *loc. cit.*, "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations...", p. 67

²⁰² For the sake of brevity, instead of listing different categories of studies, unless otherwise required, I would like to limit myself to giving several reference books on Turkish political history before and after Second World War can be found. Erik Jan Zürcher, *Modernleşen Türkiye'nin Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001; Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası I-II*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001; Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001; İlhan Tekeli ve Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Topluluğu 2*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 1991.

²⁰³ For more information on European Movement see <<http://www.europeanmovement.org/index.cfm>> (Accessed on 12.12.2006)

²⁰⁴ For detailed information on the Council of Europe see <<http://www.coe.int>> (Accessed on 20.12.2006)

that the idea of United Europe was supported by both politicians and also by the public opinion. It would not be a false argument to state that the European Union is a hegemonic project of major European countries, which started basically with economic motives and by the time transformed into a project at a wider scope, like political and social integration. Also it should be argued that Turkish elites tried to be a part of this project, from the very beginning even the businessmen, public opinion, academicians and media were lack of sufficient information on this issue. So the idea of integration into European structures was started as an elitist project in Turkey, later by 1980s started to be supported by other parts of the society as well. In this chapter of this study, first of all the historical evolution of the idea of European integration among Turkish elites, bureaucrats, businessmen, labour unions, NGOs and media and the changing attitudes of these social forces, in the period between Turkey's application to EEC membership and 3 October 2005 are discussed.

According to Antonio Missiroli, "the history of Turkey-EU relations has been dogged by half-hearted commitments, recurrent second thoughts and frequent non-compliance – on both sides".²⁰⁵ From the very beginning Turkey was carefully examining the developments in the European continent, both for security reasons and also for economic reasons; thus wanted to have a place in this new project. There are different views on the Turkey's main factors for her application to EEC. These views put emphasis on historical and ideological factors, such as Turkey's Western oriented foreign policy strategy since the Ottoman period and her aim of "Europeanization" and "Westernization"; and economic factors, such as hope for vitalizing the domestic economy through joining the Common Market; political factors, such as using the EEC as a tool in domestic politics.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁵ Amanda Akçakoca, "EU-Turkey Relations 43 years on: Train Crash or Temporary Derailment?", European Policy Center Issue Paper, No. 50, November 2006, p. 1

²⁰⁶ Tuğrul Arat and Çağrı Erhan, "AET'yle İlişkiler" in Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış Politikası I*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 2001, p. 813–816

The general elections held on 14 May 1950 brought an end to the single party system in Turkish political life. The new ruling party, Democrat Party (DP), under the leadership of new Prime Minister Adnan Menderes was aiming to pursue more liberal economic policies and supporting private sector investments. This was regarded as a reformulation of the hegemonic discourse after pursuing etatist policies for long years. According to Galip Yalman, "the etatist hegemonic project to establish an organic society was quite a distinctive attempt which deliberately sought to denigrate the values of possessive individualism. So was the anti-statist discourse of the Democrat Party which, by contrast, tended to promulgate the very same values, whilst increasingly curbing even the meager democratic rights that were available within the confines of an authoritarian form of the state". Additionally he argues that in 1950s the Turkish bourgeoisie was unable to emerge as a hegemonic class as a result of the fact that their unwillingness to cooperate with the working class.²⁰⁷

Indeed there were different attitudes within the Turkish elites at that period. The businessmen, labour unions and public opinion were lack of information about the newly emerging EEC; on the other hand, at the governmental level there were divergent attitudes. For instance the then Prime Minister and head to Democrat Party (DP) Adnan Menderes and President Celal Bayar were hesitant to join the EEC as there would be the risk of dependency to foreign capital as a result of the Common Market and also losing credit against the opposition groups in domestic politics. In contrast to this, then Minister of Foreign Affairs Fatin Rüştü Zorlu was arguing that the benefits of the Single Market for Turkey would strengthen the power of the ruling party, so Turkey should apply for the EEC membership immediately.²⁰⁸

While these arguments had been continuing in Turkey, Greece applied for membership to the EEC on 15 July 1959. This application was welcomed by Turkish officials with excitement and immediately changed their minds. Because

²⁰⁷ Galip Yalman, *op.cit.*, p. 158

²⁰⁸ For a detailed analysis please see Erol Manisalı, *Ortak Pazar'dan AB'ye – Hayatım Avrupa*, Truva Yayınları, İstanbul, Mayıs 2006, p. 24–30

at that period, as Greece and Turkey had similar economic characteristics, had disagreements on the Cyprus issue and wanted to have a seat in the Western camp; so Turkish bureaucrats applied for the EEC membership just after, 16 days later, Greece's application on 31 July 1959 and signed the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963, which provided the legal basis of Turkey-EU relations.

In that period, the applications of both Turkey and Greece were significant for the Europe of Six, as there are clash of interests and as a result splits within the Europe as well. For instance after the French vote against joining EEC²⁰⁹, led by United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland established European Free Trade Association (EFTA)²¹⁰ by signing Stockholm Convention in 1959 and started to be known as Europe of Seven. So Greece's application for membership to EEC, followed by Turkey, rather than to EFTA, was welcomed by the Europe of Six.

The period between Turkey's application to EEC and signing of the Ankara Agreement is problematic due to domestic developments in Turkey. The military coup took place on 27 May 1960 and the Democrat Party was suspended from the Turkish political life and this increased the tension between Turkey and the EEC. Successively the New Constitution replaced the 1924 Constitution on 9 July 1961, which extended democratic rights and provided more freedom. National elections were held on 15 October 1961 resulting with the victory of Republican People's Party. Also in 1961 the State Planning Organization (SPO) was established and Turkey-EU relations would be monitored by the SPO.

²⁰⁹ This veto is known as the "empty chair crisis".

²¹⁰ The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) is an inter-governmental organization established by United Kingdom, Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland in 1960. Its current members are Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland. The EFTA Secretariat administers the organization, in particular the EFTA Free Trade Area: EFTA's participation in the European Economic Area (EEA), which includes the European Union (EU), and EFTA's worldwide network of free trade agreements. EFTA's headquarters is in Geneva. The Secretariat also has an office in Brussels and a Statistical office in Luxembourg.

After long negotiations period, the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey and the EEC.²¹¹ The Agreement foresaw three periods, namely a preparatory stage, a transitional stage and a final stage. According to the Ankara Agreement:

During the preparatory stage Turkey shall, with aid from the Community, strengthen its economy so as to enable it to fulfil the obligations which will devolve upon it during the transitional and final stages. The preparatory stage shall last five years, unless it should be extended in accordance with the conditions laid down in the Provisional Protocol.

During the transitional stage the Contracting Parties shall, on the basis of mutual and balanced obligations:

- establish progressively a customs union between Turkey and the Community;
- align the economic policies of Turkey and the Community more closely in order to ensure the proper functioning of the Association and the progress of the joint measures which this requires.

This stage shall last not more than twelve years, subject to such exceptions as many be made by mutual agreement. The exceptions must not impede the final establishment of the customs union within a reasonable period.

The final stage shall be based on the customs union and shall entail closer coordination of the economic policies of the Contracting Parties.²¹²

Although Turkish officials signed the Ankara Agreement, there were still some hesitations. For instance, according to an anecdote before signing the agreement, İsmet İnönü asked Prof. Turan Fevzioğlu that: "In the future, do we have a chance to cancel this agreement (Ankara Agreement) and turn back?" Prof. Fevzioğlu replied as follows: "Of course. If we don't like it, we can turn back immediately."²¹³ On the other hand, ratification of the Ankara Agreement

²¹¹ For the full text of Ankara Agreement. See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/MFA_tr/DisPolitika/AnaKonular/Turkiye_AB/AnkaraAnlasmasi.htm> (Accessed on 12.09.2006) For the English version. See <http://www.abgs.gov.tr/en/tur-eu_relations_dosyalar/legal_background_dosyalar/ankara_agreement.htm> (Accessed on 12.09.2006); Avrupa Topluluklarına İlişkin Temel Belgeler – Ankara Anlaşması ve Katma Protokol, Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı Avrupa Topluluğu ile İlişkiler Genel Müdürlüğü Cilt II, Ağustos 1993. See <<http://www.dpt.gov.tr/abigm/tabii/oakp/Ankara%20Anlasmasi%20ve%20Katma%20Protokol.pdf>> (Accessed on 12.09.2006)

²¹² Articles 3,4 and 5 of the Ankara Agreement. *Ibid.*

²¹³ Erol Manisalı, *op.cit.*, p. 25

was welcomed by the public, as in Turkish press this step was defined as follows: "The most permanent and productive step in Turkey's efforts of the last 150 years to westernize and become an equal member of the Western world."²¹⁴

It can be argued that in the 1960s, thanks to 1961 Constitution, the social forces in Turkey, both businessmen, academicians and also workers, started to be organized and formed organizations which would be influential on Turkey-EU relations in the following periods, for lobbying and monitoring. Initially the SPO was established and this was followed by Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations (TİSK) in 1962 and the Economic Development Foundation (İKV) in 1965.²¹⁵ The İKV was founded with the support of Turkish private sector representatives, mainly by the initiative of Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ITO) and Istanbul Chamber of Industry (ISO), and was a significant step in the sense that an institution outside of governmental level was established solely studying EEC relations.

At that period, the SPO's attitude was sceptical to the provisions of the Ankara Agreement because the First Five Years Development Plan was operational and there were clashes between the requirements of the transitional period and the Plan. According to Erol Manisalı, all businessmen were confused and quite sceptical about the ongoing debates. For instance Vehbi Koç, in his article published in Istanbul Chamber of Industry magazine, stated that "unless the

²¹⁴ Hürriyet, 13 September 1963 cited in Dr. Zuhâl Yeşilyurt Gündüz, "Turkey's Approach Towards the EU: Views from Within", *Perceptions*, Vol. 8, No. 3, September-November 2003, p. 106

²¹⁵ The Economic Development Foundation (IKV) is a non-profit making NGO supported by the Turkish private sector. It is specialized in the European Union and EU-Turkey relations. Activities of IKV include; publication of researches, bi-monthly bulletins, weekly e-bulletins; organization of seminars; carrying out projects and execution of campaigns of communication, promotion and lobbying to enhance EU-Turkey relations with a view to membership. Its library is the oldest EU library and the only depository library of the EU in Turkey. IKV is also responsible for coordinating the Turkey Platform, a gathering of more than 250 NGOs representing almost all segments of society to convey the determination of the Turkish people to integrate with the EU. For more information please visit <http://www.ikv.org.tr>

government would guarantee that these conditions would be handled within a certain programme; our industry would collapse by the pressure of the Common Market".²¹⁶

New national elections were held in 1965 and Justice Party became the ruling party after the military coup. In 1967 Turgut Özal became the head of the SPO and as the SPO was acting body in the relations with the EEC, they issued a report on 1968, which was criticizing the provisions of the Ankara Agreement. At that period there was a clash of interests between the SPO and Ministry of Foreign Affairs in terms of conducting the relations with the EEC. The SPO had hesitations on the issues of tariff reductions which would have negative effects on Turkish industry, so the transition period should be longer. Also according to the SPO, the gap between Turkey and the EEC would be reduced "when sufficient foundations for such basic industries as metal, machinery production, oil and chemicals have been laid ... [and when] ... the economy ... has a structure of such strength, from a standpoint of quality, that it may adopt some basic structural characteristics peculiar now to the West European and North American countries".²¹⁷

The scepticism to 1960s' economic developments was increased with the disintegration of the Bretton Woods System followed by stagnation in world economy and also with the oil crisis in 1973. While being affected by these crises, Turkey also had to deal with other domestic crisis. Also as a result of the 20 July 1974 Cyprus intervention²¹⁸ and the following American embargo,

²¹⁶ I.S.O. Magazine, Common Market Special Issue, 15 December 1969, Istanbul, cited in Erol Manisalı, *op.cit.*, p. 61

²¹⁷ Selim İlkin, "A Short History of Turkey's Association with the European Community", in Ahmet Evin and Geoffrey Denton (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, Leske Verlag, Opladen, 1990, p. 42, cited in Zuhale Yeşilyurt Gündüz, *op.cit.*, p. 106-107

²¹⁸ "Mehmetçik Kıbrıs'ta", *Hürriyet*, 20 Temmuz 1974

Turkish economy had hard times during 1960s and this domestic turbulence let the discussion of Turkey-EEC relations only at the governmental level.²¹⁹

In the 1970s, like in the previous period, the organization of social forces in Turkey continued and Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TÜSİAD) were established in 1975. So, TÜSİAD, TOBB, which was established in 1952, and TİSK formed a loose and informal coalition in this period.²²⁰

However during the negotiations of the Additional Protocol starting from 1970s, different attitudes and opinions from business associations, labour unions, NGOs and political parties were put forward. The Justice Party (AP) ratified the Protocol for the sake of economic normalization; on the other hand Turkish Workers' Party (TİP) was criticizing the Turkey-EEC relations and stating that: "For an underdeveloped country like Turkey to join such a community, and to expect to benefit from it is like a lamb waiting to be eaten by the wolf ... We say no to the Common Market! We want Turkey to develop and progress by making use of its own resources and its own means as an independent entity."²²¹ Accordingly the businessmen, some trade associations, like İstanbul Chamber of Commerce and labour unions were opposing the ratification of the Additional Protocol; as Turkish industry and economy would be harmed as a result of these formations. So it can be argued that under these circumstances, these groups were united under the slogan of "They are the partners, we are the market! So we are against the EC!" and in this respect formed a historic bloc in 1970s. Their material reasons were the same protecting Turkish economy from Western interference. For instance according to İstanbul Chamber of Commerce and some businessmen like Vehbi Koç, Turkish economy was not ready for the requirements of the Additional Protocol and also import substitutions would decrease the profits and negatively affect the Turkish firms. However at the

²¹⁹ For a detailed analysis please see Atila Eralp, Muharrem Tünay and Birol Yeşilada (eds.), *The Political and Socioeconomic Transformation of Turkey*, Praeger, Westport, 1993

²²⁰ Serap Atan, *op.cit.*, p. 103

²²¹ Selim İlkin, *op.cit.*, p. 38, cited in Zuhâl Yeşilyurt Gündüz, *op.cit.*, p. 106-107

governmental level Süleyman Demirel was insisting that Turkish economy could be strengthened only by the reinforcement of integration.²²² Here it should be stated that in the first decades of Turkey-EEC relations the main emphasis was placed on economic integration by neglecting further integration alternatives.

Perhaps the harshest period of the 1970s was the Republican People's Party period in 1978, while the nationalism was at its peak point and concerning the Turkey-EEC relations, the social forces in Turkey were putting pressure on the government by stating that:

"Our present relations with the European Economic Community ... create certain obstacles for our development and industrialization efforts and prevent Turkey from pursuing a foreign trade policy in relations to the developed nations that fits well with its own economic and political interests ... but our government ... will strive to give Turkish economy a structure which is not crushed by relations with the Common Market and which strengthens the independence of Turkey."²²³

However while there debates were ongoing, as a response to the accelerating conflicts between student groups and domestic turbulence in Turkey at the end of 1970s, the third military coup was realized on 12 September 1980. Prior to the military coup, in January 1980, a package of economic stability measures known as the "24 January Decisions" were issued and adopted immediately to the Turkish economy in order to restore the economic damage of 1970s. It should be stated that these new economic policies were much more radical and so-called liberal than the previous ones and foresaw the shift from import substituting industrialization to export-led growth strategy.²²⁴ According to the programme, a stabilization programme was implemented under a stand-by

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 108

²²³ Heinz Kramer, *Die Europäische Gemeinschaft und die Türkei. Entwicklung, Probleme und Perspektiven einer schwierigen Partnerschaft*, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 1988, p. 70-71, cited in Zuhâl Yeşilyurt Gündüz, *op.cit.*, p. 109-110

²²⁴ Foreign Economic Relations Board, "Brief Historical Background for the Turkish Economy". See <<http://www.deik.org.tr/bultenler/businessguide/DEIK-BG-3-HistoricalBackground.pdf>> (Accessed on 21.12.2006)

agreement with the IMF and continued under a military government. The programme entailed a massive devaluation of the Turkish Lira and substantial hikes in indirect taxes.²²⁵

The 24 January decisions did not only let changes in the economic sphere, but also let to changes in the attitudes of social forces in Turkey. This situation is explained by Serap Atan as follows:

The peak business associations' interest in Turkey's integration with the EU emerged as a time when the functional cleavage between national commercial and industrial interests began to take shape. Till the establishment of the Customs Union in 1996, the attitude of business organizations towards the EU was mainly patterned in accordance with their positions *vis-à-vis* the national development strategies and the implications of transition to an open market economy.²²⁶

These prominent associations sought ways to integrate themselves to Europe and became successful in their own terms. For instance TOBB became an associate member of the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambres)²²⁷ in 1966. Accordingly TİSK and TÜSİAD became members of the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation of Europe (UNICE) by 1980s. By these interactions the business organizations in Turkey better understood the European affairs and also business fellows; also in order to preserve their interests started to make lobbying both in the EU and as well as in Turkey.

²²⁵ Asaf Savaş Akat, "The Political Economy of Turkish Inflation", *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1, Fall 2000, p. 2

²²⁶ Serap Atan, "Europeanization of Peak Business Organizations", in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.), *Turkey and European Integration – Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 103

²²⁷ The Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Eurochambres) represents 46 members (45 national associations of Chambers of Commerce and Industry and 1 Transnational Chamber Organization), a European network of 2000 regional and local Chambers with over 19 million member enterprises in Europe.

After this military coup, the EC unilaterally froze its relations with Turkey, by grounding its decision on the fact that the Community did not establish political dialogue with non-democratic governments. Only after six years, in 1986 the relations between Turkey and the EC were normalized and the following year Turkey submitted another application to the EC. The Ambassador to EC Özdem Sanberk explained the motives behind this application as follows: "We felt it necessary to remove the general uncertainty surrounding EC-Turkish relations and reinforce the consensus about becoming fully European, in order that the policy of economic reorientation and political and social modernization might succeeded ... Indeed, the opening of these negotiations should reassure the Turkish people that they are at the first stage of an irreversible chain of events leading to full EC membership."²²⁸

This attempt proves the commitment of the decision-makers to Turkey to European integration; as despite this deterioration in the relations, in 1987 then Prime Minister Turgut Özal submitted Turkey's second application for full membership. Accordingly it should be stated that after the chaotic atmosphere of 1970s, both politically and economically, the social forces in Turkey, mainly the business associations and even opposition parties gave consent to EC membership as they regarded this integration as a consolidation to democracy in Turkey and prevention of further military intervention.²²⁹ However Turkey hurried to apply for the EC membership, without evaluating the developments in the EC like the Internal Market and the Single European Act; but Nahit Töre argues that the prospect of a Fortress Europe could, according to the government circles in Turkey, thus be avoided through an early accession request.²³⁰

²²⁸ Marc Paoloni, "The Outlook for EC-Turkish Relations", in Mary Strang and Arlene Redmond (eds.), *Turkey and the European Community*, Forum Europe, Brussels, 1991, p. 42, cited in Zuhâl Yeşilyurt Gündüz, *op.cit.*, p. 110-111

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 111

²³⁰ Nahit Töre, "Relations between the European Community and Turkey", *European Access*, No. 3, 8–11, p. 9–10

However, Turkey's application was rejected by the European Commission on political and economical grounds.²³¹ The Commission concluded that although Turkey's eligibility to become a member was not questioned, the deepening of the economic and social integration at the Community level precluded the possibility of enlargement in the short term.²³² It can be argued that this rejection is the first signs of the precondition of absorption capacity, which was secondly put forward in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey in 2005.

In the Turkish side, although this rejection created tension in government and business circles, the material reason was updated from full integration to realizing the Customs Union. The business association and NGOs, mainly TÜSİAD, TOBB and the İKV strongly supported the EC membership and related policies, in the sense that the economic liberalization programme conducted after 24 January 1980 increased the exports and as a result increased the power of businessmen and thus business associations in Turkey. However on the contrary, this liberalization attempt undermined the economical conditions of small enterprises and workers. In this respect it can be argued that in the 1980s, the historic bloc of 1970s consisted of business associations, labour unions and some part of governmental institutions was dissolved and in the 1980s replaced by another hegemonic discourse with the support of business circles to governmental institutions by alienating the labour unions. Additionally by the 1980 military coup, the 1960 Constitution was replaced by a new constitution which restricts most of the rights of these unions. For instance the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-İş) and DİSK had been closed just after the military coup. Accordingly these labour unions could not adopt themselves to these changes and develop new strategies to unite the workers according to these changes. As a result of this fact the relationship between the

²³¹ For a detailed analysis of the Commission's Avis issued on 18 December 1989 see İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Türkiye ve Avrupa Birliği 3 – Ulus Devletini Aşma Çabasındaki Avrupa'ya Türkiye'nin Yaklaşımı*, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2000, p. 159–171

²³² "The Commission Opinion on Turkey's request for Accession to the Community", Brussels, 20 December 1989, SEC(89) 2290 final/2. For a detailed analysis of the report please see Erol Manisalı, *Askeri Darbeden Sivil Darbeye*, Truva Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006, p. 85–97

labour unions and the workers were weakened and by the end of the 1990s the workers movement was relatively slowed down.²³³

In the 1990s, important developments took place both for the EC and also for the Turkey-EC/EU relations. In 1992 with the Treaty of Maastricht, the EC transformed into the European Union with the establishment and reunion of three pillars, namely European Communities, Common Security and Foreign Policy and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). So the EU redefined its purpose in the new international system after the end of Cold War and transformed itself into a multi-faceted project aiming economic, political and social integration. Additionally the EU defined stricter requirements for membership, namely the Copenhagen criteria in its Copenhagen European Council in 1993.²³⁴

Concerning Turkey-EU relations, in the 1990s, the foremost issue in the agenda was establishment of the Customs Union. The negotiations between Turkey and the EU was started in 1994 and finalized on 6 March 1995 with the decision of Turkey-EU Association Council of 1/95 on the completion of Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. According to many commentators, this decision clearly reflected Turkey's unilateral and economic engagement to the EU, without including to the decision-making mechanism. Also according to Akat, the Customs Union Agreement with the EU signalled the end of the transition from a closed command economy to an open market economy.²³⁵ Additionally, Akat noted concerning the state of Turkish economy after the establishment of the Customs Union that "high inflation, and the resulting macroeconomic instability and volatility persisted, and Turkey entered the new millennium with the most

²³³ Oya Baydar, "Türkiye'de İşçi Örgütlenmesine Bir Kuş Bakışı", in Oya Baydar and Gülay Dinçel (eds.), *75 Yılda Çarkları Döndürenler*, Türk Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, İstanbul, 1999, p. 220. For a detailed analysis also see Yıldırım Koç, *AB Emperyalizmi ve İşçi Sınıfı*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, 2004

²³⁴ Copenhagen European Council on 21-22 June 1993 Presidency Conclusions, *op.cit.*

²³⁵ Asaf Savaş Akat, *op.cit.*, p. 2

serious economic crisis, with a growth rate of -6,4 % in 1999, the worst year since the early 1940s.²³⁶

According to circles that supported the Customs Union, its establishment referred to deeper economic integration of Turkey into European structures and also a sign of Turkey's commitment to European integration. However there were divergent views on this issue among political parties and labour unions. For instance, Mesut Yılmaz stated that although the Customs Union was realized, there were still ambiguities concerning the free movement and financial protocols. The leader of Workers' Party, Doğu Perinçek asserted that with the Customs Union Turkey had been given the role of a "site for dirty industry and a store of cheap labour". Additionally while the leader of DİSK, Rıdvan Budak noted that he was hoping that Turkey would join the Europe of social rights, not the Europe of capital; the HAK-İŞ stated that they feared a rapid increase in the unemployment.²³⁷

Indeed other than the realization of the Customs Union, the discrepancies between the finalized format and the Additional Protocol should be discussed in this period, such as the issue of free movement of persons. According to the Additional Protocol, the free movement of persons would be realized by 1986, however the new agreement did not include such a phase. Erol Manisalı argues on this issue that this phase had been removed after Germany put pressure on the EU member states, as Germany would be the main destination for potential Turkish workers.²³⁸ Concerning the Customs Union Ziya Öniş states that "The Customs Union clearly constituted an important development that helped to expose Turkish industry to greater competition. At the same time, however, the Customs Union *per se* hardly provided the mix of conditions and incentives

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 2

²³⁷ Zuhâl Yeşilyurt Gündüz, *op.cit.*, p. 113

²³⁸ Erol Manisalı, *Gümrük Birliğinin Siyasal ve Ekonomik Bedeli*, Bağlam Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996, p. 42–53 and also see Erol Manisalı, *Türkiye'nin Askersiz İşgali: Gümrük Birliği*, Truva Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006

needed for radical economic and political reforms. Consequently, the reform process has remained partial and incomplete."²³⁹

Concerning the position of social forces in 1990s, Ziya Öniş argues that "the 1990s in Turkey also proved to be an important period in terms of the development of civil society. In retrospect, business-based civil society organizations, such as TÜSİAD, have emerged as key elements of the pro-EU coalition, pushing actively for EU-related economic and political reforms."²⁴⁰ Especially the establishment of the Customs Union, as Atan argues marked a turning point in the business associations' interests in EU affairs.²⁴¹ Especially TÜSİAD increased its lobbying activities in the EU, especially within UNICE, in order to gain the approval of EU institutions and public opinion for granting a candidateship status to Turkey and also opened a representative office in Brussels headed by Bahadır Kaleağası.²⁴² Additionally both before Helsinki European Council and as well as Copenhagen European Council TÜSİAD visited EU capitals in cooperation with UNICE member federations for lobbying.²⁴³

The Turkey-EU relations had changed rapidly in the period between December 1997 Luxembourg European Council and December 1999 Helsinki European Council. Although Turkey froze all her political relations with the EU in these two years, after the decision taken in Helsinki, it was a matter of having Ecevit back to the table.

²³⁹ Ziya Öniş, "Diverse but Converging Paths to EU Membership: Poland and Turkey in Comparative Perspective", paper presented in Second Pan-European Conference Standing Group on EU Politics, Bologna, 24–26 June 2004, p. 10

²⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11. For a detailed analysis, see Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu, "Globalization, Civil Society, and Citizenship in Turkey: Actors, Boundaries and Discourses", *Citizenship Studies*, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2003 and Ziya Öniş and Umut Türem, "Entrepreneurs, Democracy and Citizenship in Turkey", *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2002

²⁴¹ Serap Atan, *op.cit.*, p. 104-105

²⁴² For an in-depth discussion please see Bahadır Kaleağası, *Avrupa Yolunun Haritası - Brüksel Seyir Defteri*, Dünya Yayıncılık, İstanbul, 2003

²⁴³ Serap Atan, *op.cit.*, p. 106-197

The year 1999 was a critical year for Turkish political and economical life; in the sense that initially Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the terrorist organization Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) was captured in the Greece Embassy to Kenya in February 1999. Accordingly new national elections were held in April 1999 and a coalition government, consisted of SHP, ANAP and MHP, was established. Bülent Ecevit, as the new Prime Minister and also as the first foreign contact of the new coalition government, sent a letter to German Chancellor Schröder, also then EU term president, and requested the continuation of Germany's support for Turkey's candidacy of the EU and made some commitments in order to confirm the 57th government's EU goal such as "reforms would be established to satisfy the Copenhagen criteria and rule of law".²⁴⁴

In December 1999, with the Letter of Lipponen, sent to Ecevit and stating that finding a solution to Cyprus issue would not be a condition for Turkey's membership and also some other US and EU assurances that Turkey was under no obligation to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Greco-Turkish disputes by the end of 2004.²⁴⁵

In this chapter of this study, like in the previous part, the hegemonic discourse of Turkey is divided into three parts by taking into account the turning points of Turkey-EU relations. It should be argued that starting from the 1980s; the social forces in Turkey, namely business associations, political parties, NGOs and some of the labour unions supported Turkey's integration into European structures and shaped their attitudes and actions in this way. Although some redefinitions and updates occurred in the hegemonic discourse in the referred time period, the material reason remained the same: Full membership. In the previous part, the moving conditions of the EU put forward to Turkey and the changing material reasons were discussed. Concerning Turkey, we can not discuss moving

²⁴⁴ Mehmet Uğur, "Testing times in EU-Turkey relations: the road to Copenhagen and beyond", *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, Vol. 5, No. 2, August 2003, p. 170

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 174

conditions in the sense that Turkey did not put forward any; instead Turkey tried to shape its hegemonic discourse according to the EU's moving conditions, while the material reason remained the same.

4.1. Hegemonic Discourse of the Coalition Government: Moving Conditions and National Programme for the Adaptation of the Acquis

The decision in Helsinki European Council opened a new phase in Turkey-EU relations, as the Turkish authorities were expecting this result for a long time. The members of the coalition government and Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit were hopeful that they would be successful in starting the accession negotiations with the EU after being granted the candidatuship status.

Realization of the Customs Union with the EU and having a candidatuship status created an optimistic atmosphere in Turkey and created a belief that this economic integration would accelerate the process and eventually lead to full membership. Even Bülent Ecevit stated in his speech at the Norwegian Nobel Institute on 6 June 2000 that "we can fulfil the Copenhagen Criteria in one or two years".²⁴⁶ According to Ziya Öniş, this statement reflects that in the Turkish side the aspirations of 1960s and 1970s on European integration were continuing. According to Öniş, this attitude can be explained as the "Ankara Agreement Syndrome" which means the failure to recognize the changes that have taken place within the EU over recent years, EEC was transformed into EC and then EU and the Common Market notion expanded into a multi-dimensional process.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Bülent Ecevit, "Turkey on the Threshold of the 21st Century", speech given at the Nobel Institute, Oslo, 6 June 2000, cited in Chris Rumford, "Failing the EU Test? Turkey's National Programme, EU Candidature and the Complexities of Democratic Reform", *Mediterranean Politics*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 2002, p. 52

²⁴⁷ Ziya Öniş, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EC Relations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000, p. 482 cited in Chris Rumford, *Ibid.*, p. 53

In this period, the main material reason of Turkish government with the support of TÜSİAD and İKV, was to conclude the NPAA with the ultimate success and guarantee full membership. After the Helsinki decision, Erkut Yücaoğlu, then president of TÜSİAD, stated that as a candidate country in Turkey a speedy reform process should take place and this reform process could not be succeed without the support of the private sector. Accordingly then president of İKV, Meral Gezgin Eriş, linked the Helsinki decision with the success of the Customs Union and stated that this success reflects Turkey's long-term commitments to EU membership.²⁴⁸

Just after the European Commission issued the Accession Partnership for Turkey, the Turkish side prepared a National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis* (NPAA) and submitted it to the European Commission on 19 March 2001.²⁴⁹ The NPAA is a crucial document concerning Turkey-EU relations in the sense that it sets out the commitments of Turkey on the measures which should be taken in order to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria.²⁵⁰ According to Rumford, the NPAA was a disappointment to most commentators falling well short of

²⁴⁸ "TÜSİAD: AB için özel sector desteği şart", *Hürriyet*, 14.12.1999. See <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=-118842>> (Accessed on 13.01.2007)

²⁴⁹ The National Programme for the Adoption of the *Acquis*. See <<http://www.abgs.gov.tr/indexen.html>> (Accessed on 21.09.2006)

²⁵⁰ Turkey submitted a complementary National Programme after the Accession Partnership for Turkey was issued on 25 March 2003. In the Programme some short term objectives were:

- Realization of "Public Administration Reform".
- Completion of harmonization with EU norms in the field of intellectual and industrial property rights, being party to important agreements and conventions.
- Enactment of a law providing administrative and financial autonomy to the National Agency established within the structure of the State Planning Organization responsible for the implementation of EU education and youth programmes.
- Putting into force the law aiming to gather social insurance institutions under the same structure.
- In order to prevent illegal immigration, working on development of effective border management capacity in accordance with EU legislation, and in this connection amending the Passport Law.

Some medium term objectives were:

- Work on EU harmonization will continue regarding legislation on the free movement of persons and will be completed within the framework of reciprocity principle before full membership.
- On the condition of reciprocity and compliance with security essentials, acquisition of immovable property by foreign persons and commercial companies within the borders of Turkish Republic will be permitted.
- All obstacles against foreign investment will be abolished.

adequately addressing important issues such as providing more cultural rights for minorities and the abolition of death penalty.²⁵¹

It should be noted that in this period, in addition to preparing and adopting reform packages; the government had to make decision on sensitive issues like abolition of death penalty and issuing more rights to cultural minorities. The parties in the coalition government had different opinions on these issues. For instance while Mesut Yılmaz were saying that "Turkey could be ready to grant broader cultural rights to Kurdish citizens", the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) was opposing the lifting of death penalty and granting cultural rights to citizens of Kurdish origin. Likewise, then Foreign Minister İsmail Cem was identifying the ban on Kurdish language broadcasting "as a obstacle to democracy and human rights" and stating that "everyone living in Turkey should have the right to broadcast in their own mother tongue".²⁵² On the other hand, President Süleyman Demirel stated that lifting the ban on language would pose a threat to Turkey and continued as follows: "Protecting the official language is one of the musts of being a unitary state".²⁵³

Indeed protection of human rights and extending cultural to minority groups in Turkey had been stated since 1999 in official EU documents. For instance in the 1999 Progress Report for Turkey, the Commission noted that in Turkey "there were serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities. Torture is not systematic but is still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted by authorities."²⁵⁴ Although the EU redefined its hegemonic discourse in December 1999 and granted a candidateship status to Turkey, in order to meet the Copenhagen political criteria and start accession negotiations Turkey had to make necessary arrangement on these issues. However as it can be argued from the divergent attitudes of the coalition

²⁵¹ Chris Rumford, *op.cit*, p. 53

²⁵² Financial Times, 15 December 1999 cited in Chris Rumford, *ibid.*, p. 56

²⁵³ New York Times, 27 December 1999, *Ibid.*, p. 56

²⁵⁴ 1999 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, *op.cit.*

parties, granting extended rights to minorities, especially Kurdish citizens, was a sensitive issue both for the government and for the public opinion; due to the fact that the PKK conducted many violent terrorist attacks in South Eastern and Eastern Anatolia. Although the capture of Öcalan put an halt to these attacks, abolition of death penalty which was issued for Öcalan and granting extended cultural rights for Kurdish citizens were sensitive issues for Turkish public opinion and even this sensitivity increased while these issues were debated within the EU framework.

In the period following Helsinki European Council, the EU continued its pressure on these issues. For instance Günter Verheugen in this speech on "Strategy Paper, Accession Partnership with Turkey and Progress Reports" on 8 November 2000 stated that:

In the case of Turkey we made it clear in the last report that it did not satisfy the political criteria laid down at Copenhagen. Our view has not changed. We are still concerned about the inadequate respect for human rights and the rights of minorities as well as about the constitutionally enshrined role played by the armed forces in political life via the National Security Council. The situation of the Kurds has to be improved and the state of emergency still in effect in the 4 south-eastern provinces must be lifted.²⁵⁵

The coalition government, by issuing the NPAA started the most accelerated reform programme in Turkish political history. However the divergent attitudes in the coalition government weakened the NPAA on the issue of minority rights. The NP was successfully conducted, despite the fact that the Turkish policy-makers were reluctant to adopt the necessary modifications. According to Rumford, Turkish political elites continue to propagate the fiction that it is desirable to maintain national integrity through resisting the unwanted interference of international agencies.²⁵⁶ Accordingly Öniş argues that "Turkish

²⁵⁵ Günter Verheugen, "Strategy Paper, Accession Partnership with Turkey and Progress Reports", 8 October 2000. See <<http://www.europa-kommissionen.dk/upload/application/54f49709/taletyrkiet.doc>> (Accessed on 28.12.2006)

²⁵⁶ Chris Rumford, *op.cit.*, p. 63

political elites exhibit a certain inconsistency or dichotomy over the issue of EU membership. They would like to obtain the benefits of full membership without necessarily delegating any power, authority or sovereignty over what they consider to be purely domestic political issues to Brussels or the EU itself.²⁵⁷

Despite all the counter movements and divergent attitudes, it is an undeniable fact that Turkey realized a reform programme in the period of 2000 to 2002, the most extensive one since 1970s. Till August 2002, four reform packages were passed in the TBMM. The first package on institutional reform passed on 3 October 2001, including the fundamental rights and freedoms, freedom of association, minority languages...etc. With this reform package thirty-four articles of the 1982 Constitution were changed.²⁵⁸ The second reform package was accepted in the Parliament on 6 February 2002 and consisted of modifications on Penal Code and the anti-terror law. The third package was adopted on 26 March 2002 and led the freedom of association and lastly the fourth package passed on 3 August 2002, which led the abolition of death penalty and acceptance of retrial by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and permission for broadcasting in minority languages.²⁵⁹

Additionally Turkey faced an important economic crisis in the late 2000 and early 2001. Keyman and Öniş argues that this crisis accelerated the reform process, as it reminded the potential material benefits associated with EU membership to a country experiencing its deepest economic crisis of the post-war period.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁷ Ziya Öniş, "Luxembourg, Helsinki and Beyond: Towards an Interpretation of Recent Turkey-EC Relations", *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000, p. 118 cited in Chris Rumford, *ibid.*, p. 63-64

²⁵⁸ "Siyasi Kriterlere Uyum Amacıyla Türkiye'nin Gerçekleştirdiği Mevzuat Düzenlemeleri", İKV. See <<http://www.ikv.org.tr/pdfs/adaliksureci3.pdf>> (Accessed on 28.12.2006)

²⁵⁹ Mehmet Uğur, *op.cit.*, p. 176. For detailed information on reform packages, see "Avrupa Birliği Üyeliğine Doğru: Türkiye'de Siyasi Reformlar", TÜSİAD, Ekim 2002.

²⁶⁰ Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, *op.cit.*, p. 184

While reform process had been continuing at the governmental level, in order to accelerate this process and also put some pressure on the EU countries to give a date for the opening of accession negotiations, the social forces in Turkey established a civil movement, namely "European Movement" on 9 May 2002. The European Movement was consisted of 175 NGOs with the coordination of the İKV.²⁶¹ Accordingly as a response to this attempt, more than 100 labour unionists, mainly from DİSK, and academicians, such as Suat İlhan, Atilla İlhan and Erol Manisalı, published as declaration to Cumhuriyet on 13 June 2002 and accused the proponents of EU membership of working against the economic, cultural, legal and political independence of Turkey. It can be argued that the anti-EU side in Turkey tried to formulate a passive discourse which would let to a passive revolution in this period; however they failed as all the big business associations, political parties, media and NGOs were gathered around the same material reason. As Cox stated: "Hegemony is like a pillow".

Additionally by the 1990s and at the beginning of 2000, TÜSİAD emerged as the most efficient lobbying group in Turkey. While TÜSİAD was conducting lobbying activities through its representative in Brussels and being a member of UNICE, it was continuing to pressurize the government to take necessary measures for the regulation of the NPAA. After the Helsinki European Council, TÜSİAD opened a new branch office in Ankara in order to expand the scope of its activities within the government. Additionally according to Atan, TÜSİAD's Parliamentary Affairs Committee has become an important unit that scrutinized the committee work within the Turkish National Assembly and conveyed TÜSİAD's position on related issues to relevant ministers and deputies.²⁶² Also before the Laeken Summit, in order to convince the heads of EU member states to open accession negotiations with Turkey, Tuncay Özilhan then president of TÜSİAD sent a letter.²⁶³

²⁶¹ "AB için Sivil Toplum Seferberliği", Hürriyet, 05 June 2002. See <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=76544>> (Accessed on 27.12.2006)

²⁶² Serap Atan, *op.cit.*, p. 107

²⁶³ For the full text of the letter, see <<http://www.TUSIAD.org/haberler/basin/duyuruno594.pdf>> (Accessed on 14.11.2006)

It can be argued that in the period after the Helsinki European Council and national elections on 3 November 2002, although Turkey was ruled with a coalition government with different political backgrounds, a common hegemonic discourse in Turkey on EU integration had been realized. In this period, the impact of civil society on public opinion and government is very significant; in the sense the lobbying activities of business associations and NGOs absorbed the reactions of the anti-EU segments of the society. So it can be argued in this period, political parties, TÜSİAD and İKV cooperated in this period and thus formulated a hegemonic discourse. Labour unions like Türk-İş tried challenge this hegemonic discourse however could not facilitate a passive revolution.

4.2. Redefinition of Turkey's Hegemonic Discourse after 3 November 2002 National Elections and Instrumental Approach of the Justice and Development Party Period

This new period started with the national election held on 3 November 2002, resulted with the triumph of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Copenhagen European Council in December 2002. The new government claimed that they would accelerate the transformation process of the country that was started mainly after 1980s and reached to its peak point with the realization of the Customs Union in 1996 and being granted a candidateship status in December 1999 in Helsinki.

The new elections called the end of the coalition government period in Turkish politics. The Justice and Development Party (AKP) won the national elections held on 3 November 2002 by taking % 34,28 of the votes, and took 363 seats in TBMM; while CHP took only % 19,40 of the votes and won 178 seats in the Parliament.²⁶⁴ The results were very surprising in the sense that parties in the coalition government DSP, ANAP and MHP lost almost their entire votes compared to the previous elections. According to Gamze Avci, the decline in the

²⁶⁴ For the result of the National Elections on 3 November 2002 see <<http://www.belgenet.com/secim/3kasim.html>> (Accessed on 22.09.2006)

economy and the coalition government's inability to use EU integration as an election winning issue rendered that government obsolete.²⁶⁵ For Heper and Keyman, "these results reflected Turkish people's deep anger towards the existing political system and its constituent political parties, characterized by economic populism, clientelism, corruption and democratic deficiencies".²⁶⁶

According to many commentators a new era both in Turkish domestic politics has been started with the AKP period, in the sense that for the first time in Turkish political life, a political party gained this amount of vote without forming any coalition and established the first single party government in Turkish political history. On the other hand, İlhan Uzgel defines the AKP to become the ruling party as the completion of the neoliberal transformation started with Turgut Özal, after some breakdowns in 1990s.²⁶⁷ As a complementary to this argument, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stated in his speech on 10 December 2002, just before the Copenhagen European Council, that "I really appreciate Turgut Özal, who opened Turkey and Turkish politics to world. There could be some mistakes, but I look at the full half of the glass. We [AKP] made his way a rule for ourselves."²⁶⁸

As Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had an electoral punishment and could not become the Prime Minister concerning the charges against him, the new 58th government was established with the new Prime Minister Abdullah Gül. It was certain that the new ruling party would have strong commitments towards

²⁶⁵ Gamze Avcı, "Turkish Political Parties and the EU Discourse", in in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.), *Turkey and European Integration – Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 203

²⁶⁶ Metin Heper and Fuat Keyman, "Double-faced state: Political patronage and the consolidation of democracy in Turkey", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1998, p. 259–277, cited in Fuat Keyman and Ziya Öniş, "Helsinki, Copenhagen and beyond – Challenges to the New Europe and the Turkish state", in Mehmet Uğur and Nergis Canefe (eds.), *Turkey and European Integration – Accession Prospects and Issues*, Routledge, New York, 2004, p. 175

²⁶⁷ İlhan Uzgel, "AKP: Neoliberal Dönüşümün Yeni Aktörü", *Mülkiye*, Vol. 30, No. 252, Autumn 2006, p. 7

²⁶⁸ Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, "AB almazsa biz de başımızın çaresine bakacağız". See <<http://www.akparti.org.tr>> (Accessed on 21.12.2006)

Turkey's accession into European structures and finding a solution the Cyprus problem, because the party admission put these issues at the hearth of their elections campaign. In their election sheet and party programme the AKP stated as follows:

Turkey has been in close relation with Europe both geographically and historically. For this reason, relations with European nations shall continue to be at the top of the list in Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Turkey shall rapidly fulfil its promises in its relations with the European Union and the conditions, which the union demands of other candidate nations as well. Thus, it shall prevent the occupation of the agenda with artificial problems...It is of the view that in the solution of the Cyprus issue, the presence of the Turkish population on the island, its identity and its right for self-determination cannot be ignored. It believes that the solution in Cyprus must be based on an agreement between the two States present on the island and that admission of the Greek Cypriot Section into the European Union before the solution of this problem will make this problem more complex.²⁶⁹

After the elections, the first EU challenge for the new government was the Copenhagen European Council. As stated by Gündüz, just after the elections, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan noted that cooperation with the IMF would be continued and the most important duty of the new government would be focusing on the process of accession to the EU.²⁷⁰ Two weeks after the elections, Erdoğan organized a visit to EU member states and visited almost all of them. During their visits, Erdoğan tried to guarantee the support of EU member countries for Turkey's bid for membership.

It can be argued that the new government is obsessed with having a date from the EU for starting the accession negotiations. As in the Copenhagen European Council stated that "if the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils

²⁶⁹ Justice and Development Party Programme. See <<http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.asp#6>> (Accessed on 24.04.2006)

²⁷⁰ Zuhale Yeşilyurt Gündüz, *op.cit.* p. 118

the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay".²⁷¹

The new government continued to the reform process that had been started by the coalition government. After the elections, AKP government prepared and issued four reform packages, namely "harmonization packages" for the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria. The fourth reform package was on human rights and dealt with the problem of torture and ill-treatment with a slogan of "zero tolerance to torture". The fifth package included reforms on trial process, mainly on the issues of retrial on the basis of the judgments rendered by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).²⁷² The sixth and seventh packages were based on the Accession Partnership issued by the EU on May 2003 and revised NP of the government published on 24 July 2003. According to the reform packages, the legal restrictions on freedom of expression, freedom of association, freedom of press and assembly were removed; new measures were adopted on the use of mother language other than Turkish in broadcasting both in public and private channels. The seventh package mainly focused on the moving condition of the EU discussed in the previous chapter, civil-military relations and increase of the civilian control over NSC. By the package, the character of NSC had been turned into an advisory body.²⁷³

According to İlhan Uzgel, this speedy reform process at the TBMM confirms that the AKP government consolidated and speeded up the legal basis for neoliberal transformation; as these packages are related with every aspect of society, including education, health, environment, social policy...etc.²⁷⁴ Indeed, behind this commitment to EU membership and speedy reform process, there lied some

²⁷¹ Copenhagen European Council on 12-13 December 2002 Presidency Conclusions, *op.cit.*

²⁷² Prof. Dr. Atila Eralp, "The Europeanization in Turkey". See <<http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/AUD/AUD2/Eralp%20paper.pdf>> (Accessed on 14.12.2006)

²⁷³ "MGK'da Yeni Düzen", *Hürriyet*. See <<http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/ankaragundemi/esat30.asp>> (Accessed on 27.12.2006)

²⁷⁴ İlhan Uzgel, *op.cit.*, p. 16

material reasons of the ruling party AKP. Due to its anti-secular and Islamist background the founder of AKP, mainly Erdoğan, had to assure the EU that they did not constitute any threat to democracy, rule of law and secularism. Additionally, according to Avci, this reform programme could keep both the radical secularists and any radical Islamist fringe in the AKP in check.²⁷⁵ So in order to strengthen its position in Turkish politics, diminish the role of the military in Turkish politics and also try to solve some important but sensitive problems, like turban, within the EU, AKP government put special emphasis on this reform process.²⁷⁶ So it can be argued that AKP government had an instrumentalist approach towards Turkey's membership to the EU.

Accordingly this instrumentalist approach was mutual, as noted in the previous part the EU had instrumentalist view over the new government too. Both sides perceived each other instrumentalist and tried to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Cyprus issue is one of the most prominent agenda item in Turkish foreign policy since 1960s. The issue has been transformed many times within the time period, from a problem between Turkey, Greece and two parts of the island, to a problem between the EU, Turkey and Greece. So a foreign policy issue was transformed into a triangular crisis for Turkey by the end of 1990s.

The problem was suspended for a while, as the Greek part of Cyprus was announced as a candidate country in 1997 Luxembourg European Council and later on in December 1999 Lipponen sent a letter to Ecevit declaring that solution of the Cyprus problem would not be a pre-condition for the accession. At that period, Ecevit, who authorized the 1974 Cyprus military intervention, could not assume that this letter would turn into nothing and finding a solution to Cyprus problem would be a burden on Turkey's shoulders in return for starting accession negotiations with the EU and even the new government would give all possible concessions the accession negotiations would be temporarily suspended in eight chapters.

²⁷⁵ Gamze Avci, *op.cit.*, p. 204

²⁷⁶ For a detailed analysis see İlhan Uzgel, *op.cit.*, and Cüneyt Ülsever, *Bir Türk Liberal-Seçilmiş Makaleler 1997-2005*, Alfa Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006

Although talks had been started between Rauf Denктаş and Clerides in January 2002 and the Annan Plan was presented to both sides, no solution had been found to the problem as new government began its period after the elections. Basically, the new government had two main foreign policy aims: Starting accession negotiations with the EU and finding a solution to Cyprus problem. According to İlhan Uzgel, AKP government's strategy in Cyprus problem was finding a solution no matter of what, like in the Özal period. So AKP formulated a hegemonic position for Cyprus issue based on different slogans; domestically the issue is considered to be a "national cause"²⁷⁷ and however within the EU framework, AKP's approach to this issue was "no solution is no solution". For finding a solution, even Erdoğan proposed to implement the "Belgian Model" in the island, as there were two separate communities. However the Ministry of Foreign Affairs intervened to this situation by stating that "In Belgium there three communities; however in Cyprus we are not talking about two communities, we are talking about two states".²⁷⁸

While the talks between Denктаş and Clerides were continuing, Denктаş's position in the problem, took the attention of the government and Erdoğan changed Turkey's 43 year long Cyprus policy and started to make pressure on Denктаş to finalize the problem. This attitude was also supported by TÜSİAD, as Tuncay Özilhan stated in his speech in Greece Federation of Industrialists that "EU membership would provide many opportunities for all members of the society; so this train should not be missed because of Cyprus".²⁷⁹

²⁷⁷ "Clerides vs. Denктаş!", Turkish Daily News, 28 January 2002. See <<http://www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/archives.php?id=30979>> (Accessed on 30.12.2006)

²⁷⁸ Bilal N. Şimşir, *AB, AKP ve Kıbrıs*, Bilgi Yayınevi, Ankara, 2004, p. 40-45; also for an in-depth discussion please see Oktar Türel (ed.), *Akdeniz'de Bir Ada: KKTC'nin Varoluş Öyküsü*, İmge Yayınları, İstanbul, 2002.

²⁷⁹ Leyla Umar, "TÜSİAD: AB Trenini Kıbrıs yüzünden Kaçırılmayalım", Vatan Newspaper, 2 December 2003. See <<http://www7.vatanim.com.tr/root.vatan?exec=yazardetay&Newsid=18478&Categoryid=4&wid=55>> (Accessed on 30.12.2006)

So the government and TÜSİAD supported alternatives which would provide a solution to the problem and this was replacement of the Denктаş government by a more liberal and solution-oriented government, headed Mehmet Talat, in December 2003. Five months later after the elections, the Annan Plan was voted in a referendum held in the Island and expectedly the Greek part of the Island voted against the reunification, as this would not have negative consequences for them concerning EU membership, who became full member of the EU on 1 May 2004.

After the failed referendum, the government strengthened its position that the Turkish side and AKP government sought ways to finalize the problem, however as Uzgel argues, they could not use this result as a bargaining tool for lifting the economic embargos and isolations on Turkish Cypriots.²⁸⁰ So they could only used this as proof of their compliance with the Accession Partnership of 2003, in which resolving the Cyprus problem before the end of 2004.

In the revised Accession Partnership, the EU made it clear that there would not be any longer short term and medium term requirements, as outlined in the previous chapter; instead before the end of 2004, Turkey needed to take necessary measures on three sensitive issue, namely resolving the Cyprus problem, normalization of Greco-Turkish relations and reducing the influence of military on Turkish politics.²⁸¹ By supporting the Annan Plan the government clearly sought ways to finalize the ongoing crisis in the Island, even though this was a moving condition put forward by the EU, although it was guaranteed not to be a condition for Turkey's integration into European structures by the Lipponen Letter. Additionally by adopting the seventh harmonization package, the civilian authority in the NSC was increased, so decreased the role of military in Turkish politics. So the government, Turkish public opinion, NGOs and

²⁸⁰ İlhan Uzgel, "Dış Politikada AKP: Stratejik Konumdan Stratejik Modele", *Mülkiye*, Vol. 30, No. 252, Autumn 2006, p. 83

²⁸¹ Mehmet Uğur, *op.cit.*, p. 180

business circles started to wait for the Brussels European Council decision, thus starting the accession negotiations.

The Progress Report for Turkey issued by the Commission on 6 October 2004 increased the hopes for starting accession negotiations in Turkey as in the report concerning the fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria, it is stated that:

Turkey has achieved significant legislative progress in many areas, through further reform packages, constitutional changes and the adoption of a new Penal Code, and in particular in those identified as priorities in last year's report and in the Accession Partnership. Important progress was made in the implementation of political reforms, but these need to be further consolidated and broadened.²⁸²

TÜSİAD, by being the most effective lobbying groups in the previous and this period, continued its lobbying activities. For instance just before the Brussels European Council, on 10 December 2004, then president of TÜSİAD Ömer Sabancı sent a letter to head of the governments of the EU member states, stating that on 17 December 2004 the accession negotiations with Turkey should be opened without any conditionality.²⁸³ Additionally he based his arguments on the last progress report stating that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria and noted that a decision not complying with the EU norms would mean a huge historical responsibility and would harm the long ongoing process of Turkey's integration into European structures.

4.3. Crisis in Turkey's Hegemonic Discourse

As discussed above, the Turkish elites, mainly political parties, business associations, NGOs and some of the labour unions were united around the material reason of Turkey's integration into European structures and to start

²⁸² 2004 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession, *op.cit.*, p. 55

²⁸³ For the full text of the letter see <<http://www.TUSIAD.org/haberler/basin/duyuruno594.pdf>> (Accessed 02.01.2007)

accession negotiations with the EU in the period starting with Turkey's candidacy to EU membership, which ended with the decision at the Brussels European Council. In the Brussels European Council, the European Commission decided to open accession negotiations without any delay on 3 October 2005. So it can be argued that there was a pro-EU hegemonic discourse in Turkey between December 1999 to December 2004, which could not turn into a hegemonic bloc; in the sense that the pro-EU coalition was consisted of elites from the government and business sectors, so the labour unions and academicians who were sceptical on Turkey's integration into the EU could not form a historic bloc either.

Prior to Copenhagen European Council, the debates on whether the EU member states would agree on opening up accession negotiations intensified. What lies on the basis of these debates was the unsolved Cyprus problem. However Prime Minister Erdoğan constantly put emphasis on the issue, there was no possibility for Turkey to recognize the Greek part of Cyprus even though it was an EU member state.

Finally after the positive voting in the European Parliament, the EU heads of states agreed on opening accession negotiations with Turkey in the Brussels European Council held on 16-17 December 2004 by stating that:

...on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.²⁸⁴

Although this decision would be welcomed by the Turkish public opinion and government, the terms of the accession negotiations were confusing and doubtful. For instance in the Presidency Conclusions, it is stated that:

"The shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of

²⁸⁴ Brussels European Council on 16-17 December 2004 Presidency Conclusions, *op.cit.*

which cannot be guaranteed beforehand. While taking account of all Copenhagen criteria, if the candidate state is not in a position to assume in full all the obligations of membership it must be ensured that the candidate state concerned is fully anchored in the European structures through the strongest possible bond.²⁸⁵

As noted before, the main concern of the government before the Brussels Summit was having a starting date for accessions. However when in addition to a date, the terms of the accession negotiations were issued, a crisis occurred within Turkey. Because in this final period of Turkey-EU relations, concerning the scope of this study, the EU became successful in solving the deadlock in the Cyprus issue: Extension of the Additional Protocol to ten new member states, thus recognition of Greek part of Cyprus. Before and during the summit, the main debate was announcing a date after the signature of the Additional Protocol by Turkey. However the Turkish government did not accept this and proposed an oral statement that Turkey would extend the Customs Union to ten new member states; this time this was not accepted by the Greek part of Cyprus. Finally Turkey's commitment was formalized with a protocol which was signed by Minister of State Beşir Atalay.²⁸⁶ Thus, concerning Cyprus, in the Presidency Conclusions it is stated that:

The European Council welcomed Turkey's decision to sign the Protocol regarding the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement, taking account of the accession of the ten new Member States. In this light, it welcomed the declaration of Turkey that "the Turkish Government confirms that it is ready to sign the Protocol on the adaptation of the Ankara Agreement prior to the actual start of accession negotiations and after reaching agreement on and finalizing the adaptations which are necessary in view of the current membership of the European Union".

Abdullah Gül's comment on this issue was rather optimistic as he stated that: "Turkey will not sign any Protocol with the Greek part of Cyprus. Those circles,

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁶ Zeynep Lüle and Uğur Ercan, "Avrupa'nın Yeni Yıldızıyız", *Hürriyet*, 18 December 2004. See <<http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=282241>> (Accessed on 12.01.2007)

who would like to shadow the success of the Summit, put forward these arguments. We will solve this problem with our determinism; otherwise it would mean to pignorate the future of Turkey with a population of 70 million against a Greek Cypriot Community with 600 thousand population".²⁸⁷ According to Ali Bayramođlu, after this decision, AKP government was disappointed in the sense that they assumed that supporting Annan Plan would remove the conditionality of the Cyprus problem.²⁸⁸

As stated before, in order to preserve its credibility AKP government had to pursue policies in parallel with EU norms. However AKP needed to fulfil some duties for its pro-Islamist voters inside; and the main concern of its voters was the headscarf ban in public places and as well as universities. After the elections, one of the material reasons of AKP government over the EU was finding a solution to this problem within the EU; thus in a way to legitimize the issue. Starting by the end of the 1990s, so-called victims of the headscarf ban sued the Turkish government and related institutions concerning this ban. Surprisingly one of those claimants was the wife of Abdullah Gül, Hayrunisa Gül, who later took her law suit back. On 30 June 2004 European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) decided that there no contradictions between the headscarf ban in public places and human rights practices.²⁸⁹ This decision shocked the AKP rulers, as they had higher expectations from those sues. So it can be argued that first shock to AKP government came from ECHR with its historical decision both for AKP government and Turkish political life; second shocking decision was the one on Cyprus in the Brussels Helsinki Presidency Conclusions.

²⁸⁷ Abdullah Gül, "Bu Büyük Olayı Engellemeye Çalışanlar Vizyondan Yoksun Olanlardır", 19 December 2004.

²⁸⁸ Ali Bayramođlu, "Ak Parti Makineleri Stop Etti", Radikal, 23 March 2005. See <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=147146>> (Accessed on 13.01.2007)

²⁸⁹ Adnan Keskin, "AİHM: Türban yasađı hukuki", Radikal, 30 June 2004. See <<http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=120814>> (Accessed on 13.01.2007)
For a detailed assesment of the problem, see <<http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2005/Nov/GrandChamberJudgmentLeylaSahinvTurkey101105.htm>> (Accessed on 13.01.2007)

As a result of these negative developments for the AKP government, the government intentionally slowed down the ongoing reforms process in Turkey and started to wait for the Negotiating Framework for Turkey on 3 October 2005.

On the other hand TÜSİAD, which was the primary supporter of government's EU policies in the previous period, started to question its policies as the reform process was slowed down in Turkey and a "wait and see" attitude was on the agenda. However the business circles were supporting the continuation of the relations with the EU.

Accordingly Türk-İş issued a report in 2005, headed "Our Demands from the European Union – Trade Union Perspective" and stated the worker's opinions and demands from the EU. In the report, the EU's attitude towards free movement of labour is criticized and stated that:

The permanent or temporary restrictions to be imposed against Turkey in terms of free movement of labour are one of the major concerns of our Confederation. As it is well known the Ankara Agreement establishing "partnership" between Turkey and the European Community paved the way to Turkey for full membership. The enclosed additional protocol dated 1971 identifies the procedure and conditions of the accession process to be realized within 22 years. In accordance with the Additional Protocol our workers should have gained the right to enter the labour force market gradually starting from December 1976 till December 1986. It is impossible to accept the approach of the EU towards restricting the free movement of labour despite the definite and clear provisions of the Additional Protocol.²⁹⁰

It is interesting that the reality on the free movement of labour could not be revealed by the government or business associations, instead put forward by a trade union. Indeed Türk-İş is the oldest trade union in Turkey and based its arguments on EU on a logical basis, as it was arguing that the social rights in the EU are not superior that the rights that are foreseen by the International Labour Organization (ILO). So Türk-İş was supporting that if Turkey would fulfil the

²⁹⁰ Türk-İş International Department, "Our Demands from the European Union – Trade Union Perspective", 2005, p. 5

requirements outlined by the ILO, adoption to European social policy would become unnecessary.²⁹¹

It is possible to argue that in this last period of Turkey-EU relations, an intellectual leadership crisis took place at the governmental level, as the government was put in a difficult position by the EU concerning the Cyprus issue, extension of the Additional Protocol to ten new member countries, debates on full membership or privileged membership option²⁹², and finally the terms of accession negotiations outlined in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey. In parallel to this government policies started to be questioned by TÜSİAD, the leading business association in Turkey, as a result of government's rapprochement with MÜSİAD and stagnation in the reform process.

In this period, although the AKP government succeeded in having a date for starting accession negotiations and the strict terms of these negotiations; as well as the deadlock in Cyprus issue, led the intellectual leadership crisis that consequently could not turn into a historic bloc, as these promises were failed. In this period the Cyprus question is once more transformed itself once again with the counter-declarations both from the EU and Turkey as discussed in the previous part. Türkeş argues concerning the declarations on the Cyprus issue that "these two declarations reflected the desire of the two parties to postpone the upcoming crisis".²⁹³ However as the EU reminded to Turkey to ratify the Protocol by the end of 2006, the AKP government might reformulate its current Cyprus and take more effective decisions with the support of other social forces in Turkey; as Mustafa Türkeş argues "overlapping policies of the EU and the AKP government have seemingly entered a new phase of mutual distrust...Such a

²⁹¹ Yıldırım Koç, "Türkiye'de Sendikalaşma Hakkı ve ILO İlkeleri", in *Türk-İş Yıllığı '99 Cilt 2*, Türk-İş Araştırma Merkezi, Ankara, 1999, p. 138-157

²⁹² For a detailed discussion please see Erol Manisalı, *AB Süreci mi? Sevr Süreci mi?*, Derin Yayınları, İstanbul, 2006

²⁹³ Mustafa Türkeş, *op.cit.*, p. 170

complex and, ultimately, injurious relationship between the EU and Turkey on the Cyprus question can no longer continue."²⁹⁴

²⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 170

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Turkey and the EU are sharing a 42 year long history with cooperation, tension, reconciliations, suspensions, accelerations, updates and redefinitions. As stated at the beginning of this study, the relations in nature have a wavering character and main purpose of this study was to explain this wavering character of Turkey-EU relations and determine the cycles of transformation. In order to explain this wavering character a theoretical framework was needed; however after a detailed analysis, it is argued that the classic theories of European integration exhausted their potentials in explaining the cycles of transformation in Turkey-EU relations.

Concerning the classic theories of European integration, federalism, functionalism, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism are taken into account. According to many scholars, federalism cannot fully explain the changes and continuities in Turkey-EU relations, as it ignores the socio-political aspect of integration; instead focuses on political aspect of it. On the other hand, functionalism clearly separates economics and politics; also loose sight after 1970s. Successively, neo-functionalism undermines the role of governments and significance of nation-state. Additionally, the notion of spill-over effect is neglecting the real scope of integration. Lastly, intergovernmentalism considers states as the most important actors at the international level and consequently overlooks the importance of supranational institutions, transnational actors and the independent role of ideas.

The arguments of the many scholars studying European integration are used in outlining the lack of capacity of the classic theories of European integration; however during the research process another truth is revealed concerning some

scholars studying Turkey-EU relations. It is possible to argue that Turkey-EU relations are regarded as a foreign policy issue by some scholars; so the theoretical side is somehow neglected and the studies which determined the theoretical aspect of Turkey-EU relations as an area of study mainly discussed the issue from intergovernmentalist perspective. However discussing the Cyprus issue only from a foreign policy or intergovernmentalist perspective would lack some elements, like the influence of social forces in the process.

In this respect, in this study, neo-Gramscian perspectives are presented as an alternative to classic theories of European integration and this theoretical gap tried to be filled by taking the attitudes of social forces in Turkey-EU relations. Neo-Gramscian perspectives, which were presented to the International Relations (IR) literature by Robert Cox in 1980s, focus on social forces, endangered by the production process, as the most collective actors. Secondly, for neo-Gramscian perspectives instances of European integration are as much the outcome of open-ended struggle as are other political developments. Thirdly, while the state is still considered to be an important analytical category, it is regarded as a structure within which and through which social forces operate rather than as an actor in its own right. Fourthly, neo-Gramscian perspectives take into account the independent role of ideas.

For neo-Gramscian perspectives hegemony is crucial, which differs from its neo-realist form. According to this perspective, hegemony is based on acceptance of ideas by consent, which supported by material reasons and also by social classes. In order to organize these social classes intellectual leadership is very crucial in the sense that only organized movements would lead to hegemony. In order to reach hegemony, a hegemonic project should be formulated. There are three distinguishing elements of a hegemonic project, which are material reason, intellectual leadership and consent and coercion. When these three elements are present in a society, a hegemonic project can be formulated. The main cognitive interest of Neo-Gramscian perspectives to European Integration is to map transnational power relations in Europe and identify the historical specific articulations between economic, political and societal processes.

In this study, there were two main aims. Initially it is aimed to prove the exhaustion of the capacities of classic theories of European integration in explaining the wavering character of Turkey-EU relations and integration in general. Secondly, the defined and redefined hegemonic discourses in the related time period in Turkey-EU relations are aimed to be presented.

In this study, with reference to the turning points and key events in Turkey-EU relations, the time framework is determined as December 1999 Helsinki European Council and 3 October 2005, on which the accession negotiations for EU membership were finally started. The wavering character of Turkey-EU relations are presented by dividing the related time framework into three periods. The division led the research be based on clearer research basis, as it became easier to outline the changes in the hegemonic discourse, attempts for passive revolution, crisis in intellectual leadership and defined and redefined moving conditions by using neo-Gramscian perspectives. The logical reason for this is that the nature of Turkey-EU relations has been changed rapidly since 1963; it is not solely a foreign policy issue between Ankara and Brussels, instead it is a dynamic process, shaped not just with the involvement of government institutions; but also shaped with the contribution of social forces both in the EU and in Turkey, like NGOs, business association and trade unions.

Initially, the hegemonic discourse of the EU concerning Turkey's integration into European structures and the changing attitudes of the social forces in the European context are discussed. It should be argued that from the very beginning the Turkey's integration into EU was regarded by most member states as a foreign policy issue, not an integral part of European integration process. This argument is justified by outlining the elements that affected the EU's hegemonic discourse towards Turkey, which are Turkey's geographical position, Islamic identity, security and economy. Additionally, since the ratification of the Ankara Agreement in 1964, although the result of the relations was determined as full membership, when the moving conditions that the EU put forward to EU during the related time period it should be stated that the EU never aimed full integration of Turkey. This argument is justified again with the

17 December 2004 decisions and Negotiating Framework for Turkey issued on 3 October 2005. In these documents the Commission presented a new conditionality for Turkey: absorption capacity of the EU. Although the debate is new, the concept was not, as it was first presented in the Presidency Conclusions of Copenhagen European Council in December 1993 as: "The Union's *capacity to absorb* new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries." The revival of the notion of absorption capacity, with the inclusion of open-endedness of the accession negotiations can be linked to the passive revolution of anti-Turkey EU member states, such as France and Germany.

When the evolution of the EU's hegemonic discourse is presented, from 1997 Luxembourg European Council to 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU clearly updated its hegemonic discourse and reformulated it with the support of social forces like the ERT and UNICE, as the lack of political dialogue between Turkey and the EU would be harmful for new market expansion and economic relations. After granting a candidateship status to Turkey in 1999 Helsinki European Council, the EU started to name moving conditions for Turkey with the aim of neo-liberal restructuring of Turkey. One of the arguments of this study is that the EU, as an international organization tries to transform Turkey through EU membership, fulfilment of Copenhagen criteria and other moving conditions; thus realize *transformismo*, as stated by Robert Cox. So between 1999 and 2002, the main moving conditions became diminishing the role of military in Turkish political life, abolishing death penalty, and extending more cultural rights to Turkish citizens of different origins.

After the national elections of November 2002, the EU updated its hegemonic discourse and focused on finding a solution to Cyprus issue with the support of the new pro-EU single party government in Turkey. The more each side regarded the other instrumental in finding a solution to the problem, the more the problem finalized in favour of the EU. Currently, as Turkey refuses to extend the Customs Union to Greek part of Cyprus, eight chapters of the accession

negotiations related with the Customs Union are temporarily suspended. This result should be foreseen by the government and other social forces in Turkey since 2003; however both the government and the social forces in Turkey, especially TÜSİAD, regarded Cyprus as burden on Turkey's shoulders on the road to EU membership and tried to finalize the problem no matter of what.

In the final period of Turkey-EU relations, a passive revolution occurred within the EU, under the leadership of anti-Turkey EU member states for finding alternative ways for Turkey's integration into European structures other than full membership. When the 17 December 2004 decisions and the Negotiating Framework for Turkey issued on 3 October 2005 are analyzed, it is obvious that the passive revolution became successful with the EU, that the negotiations is open-ended and based on the Union's absorption capacity. According to Turkey's progress in the negotiations process, the EU has to update its position on the accession negotiations too. Because although it is not yet the issue, opening up accession negotiation with Turkey is a result of 48 years long relations and is a strong commitment. The EU has to deal with the intellectual leadership problem within its Commission, member states and Parliament, as the heads of the member states started to act according to their voters' wishes, rather than for the sake of the Union in general; otherwise unless this passive revolution concerning Turkey would not be updated within the EU, a hegemonic crisis which let to huge negative effects on Turkey-EU relations may occur.

In the Turkish side, significant developments occurred in these 42 years. From 1959, the first application to EC membership to 3 October 2005, the Turkish mentality on EU affairs transformed itself rapidly, so as the social basis in Turkey. Starting from 1960s, the social basis which affected to Turkey-EU relations deeply from time to time, started to be organized. Although this organized social forces turned into an anti-EU hegemonic bloc in the 1970s, by the liberalization attempts started by the beginning of 1980s, the dissolve of this bloc became inevitable. So by the 1980s, the business organizations updated their positions and began to support government's EU policies. However, this redefinition in the positions of the business associations and formulation of a

pro-EU camp in Turkey, triggered the clash on the trade unions side, which by the 1990s and 2000s led to a lack of consensus among trade unions on the future of Turkey-EU relations and as a result left the trade unions in a position far from realizing a passive revolution or forming a historic bloc.

Here it should be stated that from the 1980s onwards, concerning Turkey-EU relations a historic bloc has not been yet formed, as there is a lack of consensus among state elites, academicians, media, public opinion and civil society organizations. There is a continued anti-EU campaign at the academic, media, trade union and NGO levels, however till now the pointer was on the side of pro-EU side in Turkey. So in the period between the 1999 Helsinki European Council to 17 December 2004, a pro-EU hegemonic discourse formulated by an alliance of ruling political parties, leading business associations and certain NGOs was dominant.

As stated in the previous chapter, the trade unions and business associations in Turkey, such as TÜSİAD, Türk-İş, DİSK and TOBB, starting from the 1980s sought ways to integrate themselves to the EU and became members of their fellow and umbrella institutions in Europe, like UNICE and ETUC. So it can be argued that the national forces in Turkey formed a "*transnational alliance*" with national and transnational social forces in Europe, as they conducted collective lobbying activities together and these institutions clearly supported Turkey's EU membership.

In the period between 1999 to 3 October 2005, as discussed in detail, the EU tried to transform Turkey by formulating new moving conditions under the umbrella of Copenhagen political criteria and both the coalition government and the successor AKP government complied with these requirements with the support of leading business associations, NGOs, media and public opinion.

The political atmosphere in Turkey after the announcement of the decisions of the Copenhagen European Council held on 16-17 December 2004 till 3 October 2005 is described as a hegemonic crisis at the government and civil society level. At

the governmental level a crisis was inevitable as in the 17 December 2004 decisions extension of Customs Union to ten new member states including Greek part of Cyprus was presented as a conditionality for the opening accession negotiations with Turkey by the European Commission. This decision is considered by the AKP government as a clash to its commitment to EU policies, as before the national elections in November 2002, AKP not only based its election campaign on the solution of the Cyprus problem and also having a date from the EU for accession negotiations, but also intensively put effort on these issues. But the overall picture in the period of December 2004 to 3 October 2005 reflects a more pessimistic one, in which a government gave concessions to finalize the Cyprus problem, but in return had that problem as a barrier to start accession negotiations. In that position a hegemonic crisis became inevitable; this led to clashes between the business associations and the government.

The future of Turkey-EU relations is vaguer than it ever was. The Cyprus issue is once more transformed itself into an internal problem between a candidate country just started accession negotiation with the EU and full EU member states. The extension of the Customs Union and finding an alternative to recognition of the Greek part of Cyprus seem to be the top agenda items on the list. Accordingly if pro-Turkey countries like the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Italy and social forces like ERT and UNICE would fail to formulate a counter-hegemonic discourse for Turkey's integration into European structures, the progress of the accession negotiation in a healthy manner seems hard. The EU would formulate new moving conditions for Turkey like establishing good relations with neighbouring countries, especially with Armenia.

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