

THE MEMORY *OF* TIME: VIRTUALITY IN DELEUZE'S PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

THE MEMORY OF TIME : VIRTUALITY IN DELEUZE'S PHILOSOPHY

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The main objective of this master's thesis is to examine the concept of difference according to French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Henri Bergson. In order to explicate this crucial concept and its emphasis in these thinkers' philosophies, this dissertation is focused on the notion of time and memory. Through the thesis, first Deleuze's critical attitude towards representational and dialectical approaches for difference is elucidated. After the comprehensive examination for the meaning of difference according to Deleuze, the understanding of time is revealed by means of Deleuzian comprehension of repetition and Bergsonian notion of duration. Throughout the thesis what is virtually hidden beneath the arguments, what is common in

both philosophers finally is exposed as the concept of becoming. For Deleuze, whose philosophy of time is certainly dependent on Bergson, time creates a renewed conception in order for subject to be an individual as the state of permanent becoming. And an individual which is qualified as a state of becoming, is the memory of time where the latter is an infinite virtuality.

Keywords: Difference, Repetition, Becoming, Virtual, Actual, Time, Memory, Individuation, Representation

ÖZ

ZAMANIN HAFIZASI: DELEUZE FELSEFESİNDE GİZİLLİK KAVRAMI

İsmet, Burçak

Yüksek Lisans, Felsefe Bölümü

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Bu yüksek lisans tezinin temel amacı Fransız filozoflar Gilles Deleuze ve Henri Bergson'a göre farklılık kavramını incelemektir. Bu önemli kavramı açıklamak ve bu düşünürlerin felsefesindeki önemini vurgulamak için bu tez, zaman ve hafıza düşünceleri üzerine odaklanmıştır. Tezde öncelikle Deleuze'ün farklılığa tasarımcı ve diyalektik anlayışla yaklaşan metotlara karşı eleştirel tavrı açıklanmıştır. Deleuze için farklılığın ne anlama geldiğinin geniş kapsamlı incelemesinin ardından, Deleuze'ün tekrar anlayışı ve Bergson'un süre nosyonu aracılığıyla zaman anlayışı açığa çıkarılmıştır. Bütün tez boyunca argümanların altında gizliden gizliye yatan ve her iki filozof için de ortak olan şey, sonunda oluş kavramı olarak ortaya çıkar. Zaman felsefesi kesin olarak Bergson'a dayanan Deleuze'e göre zaman,

öznenin, kesintisiz bir oluş durumu olan bireye dönüşmesi adına yepyeni bir özne kavrayışı yaratır. Ve oluşun bir hali olarak nitelenen birey, sonsuz gizlilik olan zamanın hafızasını teşkil eder.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Farklılık, Tekrar, Oluş, Gizil, Edimsel, Zaman, Hafıza, Bireyleşim, Tasarım

To My Family

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Gilles Deleuze is one of the greatest thinkers in the twentieth century, especially for his admirable initiative to transform the place of the subject in philosophy. Deleuze's oeuvre is an intense reaction against ontological systems, wherein the world is reduced to by-products of subject's representations. In other words, Deleuze attempts to demolish a world, as it is represented and set up by subject's recognition, perception and understanding. What I find admirable in his project is this attempt to shift subject from its central place as the determiner of all meaning.

Throughout the history of philosophy, man has related with being from a transcendent plane. No matter how it is called; whether the God, the Idea, the Ego, the Self, the I, or Cogito, the plane of transcendence has been taken as the condition for the experience, knowledge and being during the history of Western thought. Contrary to this tendency, Deleuze seeks the conditions for the experience nowhere beyond and outside, but within the experience itself. For Deleuze, the conditions are immanent and internal to experience itself. He takes nothing into account, but the self-referential experience.

In my thesis I will focus on how Deleuze re-directs ontology from man to being. My purpose is to examine a renewed understanding of ontology, which strives to abrogate the subject-object dichotomy and intends to unify

both by means of the concept *individual*. Individual is an innovative category for the traditional philosophy, for which thought has a privilege, superiority or transcendence over object.

Gilles Deleuze tries to overcome external and superficial relationship between thought and its object and replaces this schema with an immanent and profound one by making a reform in the conception of “experience” of the traditional/metaphysical thinking. The de-centered subject of this unique ontology is called individual that is, “at the heart of Deleuze’s attempt to rethink subjectivity and steer it away from the representational and cognitive limitations of self-consciousness.”¹

“I” and “Self” represent the subject as self-identical and syllogistically situated within the universality of the species. They present the subject in a determinate form that limits the subject to these representational and cognitive strategies. In contrast, the intensities of individuation, which precede and are the conditions for the self and the I, are fields of indetermination that do not conform to these patterns of I and self. ...Individual should replace these abstract universals. ...Individual is not to be understood purely *in relation* to the identity of the I or the semblance of the self.²

While human beings, from the perspective of *living*, which excludes introspection and reflection, can be defined as individuals, those same beings are called subjects or agents when they are yielded to mere thought. Subject is a mere abstraction when compared with the living individual. I will focus on the individual, in the second chapter of my study, in order to explicate the concept *difference*, which is qualified as totally freed from representational tendencies.

¹ Simon Lumsden, “Deleuze, Hegel And The Transformation Of Subjectivity”, in *The Philosophical Forum*, V: 33, No. 2, Summer 2002, p: 150.

² Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. by Paul Patton. New York: Columbia University Press, 1994, p: 257. (Hereafter, *DR*)

Deleuze introduces a brand new system called transcendental empiricism, which is exactly adversary to representation theories. I think I should denote that, transcendental empiricism is a renewed model of thinking in order to realize difference in true ways – un-representational – by means of individuation. Difference can only be sensed truly by means of the *sensible*, which is the immanent condition for real experience.

The method of Deleuzian philosophy is a revaluation of thought and sensation. Transcendental empiricism searches for ‘the conditions for real experience’ instead of ‘the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience’ in Kantian transcendental idealism. Here I should emphasize that the concept *transcendental* does not correspond the same meaning for Deleuze and Kant. For the latter, the term means beyond or before experience; that is, there exist *a priori* forms – namely, time and space as the receptive faculties and the categories as spontaneity - as the conditions of experience, whereas for the former it means immanence.

The sensible refers to the thinking profoundly by means of living and lived reality. Thinking consists in the *real* experience. Real, because, thinking and living does not exclude one another. The conditions for experience are no longer located outside experience; instead, they become internal to experience, therefore they account for the necessity and reality of the latter. The transcendental becomes immanent by this way. Neither the subjective reason nor the ideal forms or the intellectual faculty are the conditions for experience, but only the sensible; that is to say, the conditions for real experience is found within thought’s concrete, lived and felt duration.

Deleuze finds the reality not in the rationalist ego, existentialist self or phenomenological consciousness but somewhere beneath the sensible: the living and lived experience. This does not mean, however, that he gives a privilege to object over subject; on the contrary, what he tends to do is to place the necessary condition of experience nowhere outside the experience itself. That is to say, Deleuzian kind of experience is *causa sui*.

The sensible is referred to an object which may not only be experienced other than by sense, but may itself be attained by other faculties. The object of the encounter really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense. It is not a sensible being but the being *of* the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given.³

Sensibility in this sense is an excessive state, which goes beyond the restricted boundaries of other faculties: sensation, perception, understanding and memory. The sensible is something, which can never be cognized by the help of representational faculties. The sensible is never represented but can only be sensed. The conditions for the sensible encounter are immanent and internal to itself. So that, thought becomes something that can be sensed, and thinking becomes inherent in sensation.

The transcendental refers to excessive plane where two indifferent entities (subject and object) interact, interpenetrate and change their nature as they become unified and cohesive. Every sort of dichotomy is withdrawn from this “plane of immanence”, which is one of the most Deleuzian concepts, in order to explain the ontological status of “becoming individual”, or, in Deleuze’s words: “the process of individuation”.

The reexamination of the conditions for experience entails a new theory of the subject, and consequently it brings about a renewed ontology.

³ *DR*, pp: 139-140.

The state is transformed for the sake of the individual of the sensible, instead of the knowing subject. And in this study I will discuss the correlation between sensible and duration: duration can never be known in the sense of recognition, but only be sensed as a lived and a living experience.

Deleuze situates a new problematic of experience, subjectivity and time within a reevaluated conception of the transcendental or *virtual*. Deleuze qualifies his conception of virtual as follows: “real without being actual, ideal without being abstract”⁴. I will try to reveal this theory in the third and the fourth chapter of my study, by emphasizing the reevaluation of time in Deleuzian philosophy, whose core goes back to the Bergsonian *durée*.

Time is not an a priori condition for living and lived experience; nor is it something external or distant to experience; but on the contrary it is the experience itself. In other words, time becomes something sensible. Sensible is the leitmotif of Deleuzian ontology and epistemology, which serves as an alternative for all kinds of traditional dichotomies in philosophy, like subject and object, mind and body, ideal and real, sensible and conceptual, original and copy, etc.

The effort of Deleuze against dichotomies and traditional dualisms, just like the other philosophers of *Life philosophy*, is to give the priority to the act of living itself. These thinkers suggest an innovation for the construction of the world wherein all kinds of identities become mere abstractions. Identity for Deleuze is the greatest impediment to the eternal flow of life and living experience. In philosophy we have always encountered with these identity centered systems which have always been obsessed with the question of

⁴ Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1994, p: 24.

what. This is the reason why Deleuze is against all kinds of representation theories. Representation declares the privilege of subjective reason over empirical world. The world should, as it is represented in our minds, be conformed to our intellect in order to be experienced.

Transcendental empiricism is a counter-attack against the philosophical systems, which are characterized by the primacy of identity and representation. Throughout *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze seeks to determine the conditions under which the sensible is itself possible.

It is strange that aesthetics (as the science of the possible) could be founded on what *can* be represented in the sensible. True, the inverse procedure is not much better, consisting of the attempt to withdraw the pure sensible from representation and to determine it as that which remains once representation is removed (a contradictory flux, for example, or a rhapsody of sensations). Empiricism truly becomes transcendental, and aesthetics an apodictic discipline, only when we apprehend directly in the sensible that which can only be sensed, the very being of the sensible: difference, potential difference and difference in intensity as the reason behind qualitative diversity.⁵

Deleuze criticizes aesthetics or the theory of sensibility for founding itself on what *can* be represented; in other words, for having reduced the given to passive receptivity. However, Deleuze seeks to give a genesis to the sensible instead of focusing on the receptive subject and the received object. The exact reality as difference refers to the becoming of individual. Individual is being of the sensible. Even if I will discuss this point in detail in the section of individual, here I need to conclude that, since *becoming* is the only matter

⁵ *DR*, pp: 56-57.

in Deleuzian ontology: "Difference is behind everything, but behind difference there is nothing."⁶ Difference is *causa sui*.

Although Kant is not included under a heading in this thesis, I refer to the main or even rough characteristics of transcendental idealism in this introduction part, in order to emphasize transcendental empiricism. As I intend to explain transcendental empiricism via focusing on the conditions of experience and more specifically via the conception of time, it is worth presenting the differences between transcendental idealism and transcendental empiricism.

Where Deleuze declares that experience is *causa sui*, Kant claims quite the opposite. That is to say, for the former, there exists nothing behind the experience as a substratum, where the only condition of experience is again experience itself. However, where the latter claims that experience can only properly be said to occur when there is a synthesis between concepts and intuitions, Kant, in fact searches for the conditions under which experience is possible.

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* he maintains that the pure form of time is the primary condition upon which the possibility of appearance, representation and knowledge depend. Space and time according to Kant are the forms of intuition that make the receptivity of sensible faculty possible. Kantian faculties namely, sensation, understanding and imagination (as a mediator) depend on the temporal relations and determinations which transcendental subject can reproduce. The faculty of imagination reproduces the past for the sake of the objective unity of representation and the

⁶ *DR*, p: 57.

subjective unity of self-consciousness. Therefore, the knowledge of empirical reality is attained within the temporal schemata, that is, the productive, original synthesis of imagination, by means of the reproductive synthesis of memory.

Between Kant and Deleuze, Bergson's conception of duration is the operator. Especially in *Time and Free Will* Bergson, tries to expose the true nature of time, which is overlooked by Kant. In his work, Bergson primarily deals with the psychological account of duration. He strives to discover and describe a non-spatial understanding of time internal to consciousness. Bergson argues that the real duration of our conscious lives has the attributes of heterogeneity, continuity, intensity, quality and indivisibility. That is why Bergson criticizes Kantian conception of time for making it spatialized and homogenized, quantitative, extensive, successive and discontinuous. Bergson concludes as, duration is lived experience and always different than the way it is understood or represented. The formal conception of time, as in the Kantian sense, is a distorted image of real duration.

Bergsonian *durée* will be explicated profoundly in the fourth chapter of this thesis, in which the method of *intuition* corresponding to the method of transcendental empiricism will be the pivotal point. Intuition is the Bergsonian method from which the concept *virtual* is emanated. The virtual is the leitmotif, qualifying his ontological system by means of philosophy of difference/philosophy of duration. Virtual may be explained as self-preserving, unconscious, non-representable, indeterminate, simple and indivisible, hence, it can be actualized only through its internal self-differentiation.

As long as the duration is defined in terms of virtual and provides us with a new notion of being, difference and identity, it becomes obvious why Deleuze reevaluated Bergsonian philosophy. This may also be obvious why Deleuze is interested in the real rather than the possible. This difference implies the ontological status of experience as there is no other reality outside the experience; nor is there one prior to the sensible. The reexamination of the conditions of experience entails a renewed ontological status of subject and the conception of time. Deleuze takes over the term *virtual* from Bergson, in order to qualify the conditions of the real experience.

Virtual is an alternative understanding for possible/real dichotomy in which the former determines the latter and the latter relies on the other. The possible precedes the real; therefore there is a lapse of time between them, which is to be homogeneous and countable. They exclude each other in a temporal succession and they rely on a consciousness-centered cognition by means of their causal relation. We can see that the conception of identity is still at issue within this dichotomy whereas virtual and actual exclude all forms of identity. They are both real according to Deleuze. That is to say, virtual does not precede actual, but rather they become real synchronously.

Virtual refers to the *unconscious* opposing to the strictly conscious subject of Kant and phenomenology. Deleuze's restoration of the conception of subject in terms of unconscious brings about a new ontology of time and being. In *Difference and Repetition*, *Bergsonism*, and *Proust and Signs*, Deleuze signifies the theory of novel subjectivity in which *time becomes subject*. Time, instead of man, plays the role of subject. Besides time is made sensible by means of the fact that, the conditions of experience are no longer

located outside experience. Instead, they are internal; therefore, the necessity and the reality of experience is self-determined.

These aspects contradict Kantian transcendental idealism, according to which time is a pure intuition: as the transcendental condition for the possibility of all intuitions, cannot be perceived. But, in Bergson and Deleuze time is not the condition of experience, but the experience itself. Time as duration is the real becoming, eternal differentiation and again the process of individuation.

The distinction between these two thinkers cannot satisfactorily be explained by the values they attach to experience, unless I mention the accounts they give to the concepts intelligible and sensible. While in Kant the opposition between the intelligible and the sensible occurs within the conceptual and intuitional knowledge, Deleuze strictly rejects that intuition and its givens are without intelligence. The intuitional faculty is not passive or receptive in the presence of the sensible given but on the contrary it is productive and creative as the intellectual one. In *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze follows the example of mathematics in which thought seems to actually create its mathematical objects of intuition by thinking them without a need for an object present to one of the five senses. And he claims that not only the mathematical intuitions but also all sensible givens are the result of the productive intuition that produces the objects of sense.

Deleuze consequently undermines the opposition between the universal and the particular, concepts and intuitions, or the sensible and the intelligible by replacing intelligibility in the givens of experience itself. Deleuze, as a transcendental empiricist, comes against the traditional

empiricism as well, which is based on the primacy of the given in sensible intuition as an irreducible feature of experience and ground of all subsequent knowledge. He criticizes classical empiricism for leaving the sensible given as *given* to subjective mind the former of which is still a re-presentation in the latter. The sensible is not a process, nor is it productive; it is simply a mere product of perception. Therefore this kind of empiricism is as harmful as rationalism for Deleuzian sort of reality.

According to Deleuze, on the other hand, the sensible given, the experience or the difference is a process, a becoming. The empirical given is not an origin; rather, it is that from which something must be originated. That is to say, the intuition or the sensibility does not form the origin of our knowledge. On the contrary, the conditions of experience is found within thought's concrete, lived and felt duration.

As the result of the annihilation of the subject-object dichotomy, Deleuze overcomes the opposition between being and thinking wherein thought is no longer conceived of as a representation of being but rather it is the productive of being itself. Instead of the worthless questions of presumption of a determinate identity, like "What is being?" or "How do we know?" Deleuze always focuses on the productive process of experience which finds its expression in the question like "What are the conditions of a thing that make it known for us?" or simply, "How does it become?"

For Deleuze *what is* is becoming rather than static being. That is to say, there is no stabilized identity as offered by the subjective perception, recognition or understanding, which designates the sensible as representation. Putting it differently, whereas the question "How do we

know?" refers to the formal/conceptual faculties of a Kantian subject, question of "What are the conditions of knowing?" carries us to a more wider context, in which knowing *happens* as an event. I may explicate this; the subject is no more the faculty of judgment but rather, the subject consists in the act of knowing. This event is called differentiation, pure becoming and finally duration in Deleuzian ontology.

Neither the reason/ the intellect are the conditions for experience (as a rationalist declares) nor the sensibility of the given (as in classical empiricism). Deleuze tries to blur the distinction between subject and object and criticizes the models based on recognition. His effort is to open our experience to the realm of differential relations that go beyond our habitual cognition. He naturally owns a unique and novel conception of essence. In *Difference and Repetition* he manifests a new notion of essence, which is based on *differentials* in intuition rather than the form distinguished from the matter. As I will discuss in the second chapter these essences are called multiplicities or Ideas, which have a reality independent of subjectivity. Ideas have their own intellect and belong to being itself instead of beings of a subject's thought. And Deleuzian philosophy shows the way thinking of being consists in the unfolding of these Ideas through all their possible variations.

Transcendental empiricism is an ontological attempt since the thought involved in the production of intuition is not the thought of a subject but it is thought that unfolds on the part of being itself. Therefore we do not create beings but the being creates itself. We do not think but rather the being thinks. As it is seen, Deleuze never exposes a philosophical manner that possesses a lasting desire for creating dichotomies, oppositions, and

dualisms for the sake of regarding one side of the pair as superior in terms of its explanatory power.

The second and the third chapters in this dissertation contain this ontological structure in *Difference and Repetition* in the scope of the Deleuzian understanding of the concepts: difference and repetition. Difference is an ontological concept as he proposes “difference in itself” or “internal difference” as the virtual condition of *being*. Transcendental empiricism rejects the primacy of the sensible and criticizes traditional empiricisms for confusing external difference with the internal one. Deleuzian project is an endeavor to determine the conditions under which the given is given and therefore transcendental empiricism is a projection on the difference in itself.

All Deleuze wants is to reveal the *virtual* conditions of experience, which is immanent and internal to itself. These virtual conditions are the Ideas in the intuition (therefore virtual is also real) that which become actual within the experience. These conditions are still transcendental, since they exist on the level where the subject’s intellectual boundaries are expanded through the intuition of the sensible. This means that the being is not opposed to thought since the Ideas are internal to being itself and the Ideas have their own intelligibility. This nevertheless means that we are passively exposed to the world of beings. Deleuze is not a vagrant whose goal is just to reverse the traditional dichotomies but rather he founds his system on a ground with no dichotomies. Transcendental in his manner never accompanies with external but is always immanent to the experience. Immanence is a plane wherein all the Ideas, intuitions, concepts, thoughts,

things, selves, bodies and events perform as multiple varieties/differentials. These multiple heterogeneous internal differences and their relations to each other form a unity called life. Internal difference means a difference that is not determined with reference to opposition, negation or identity; it is self-referent. That is to say, difference differs from itself rather than something external. Difference is *causa sui* and self-conditioned.

Deleuze assigns an ontological status to difference by taking over philosophy of difference from Bergson. Deleuze's relationship to Bergson is based on the innovation of the latter that regards difference in terms of a distinction between *difference in kind* and *difference in degree*. Deleuze uses Bergsonian conception of *duration* and method of *intuition* in order to arrive at an account of internal difference. In the third and the fourth chapters I will discuss this relationship through the concept of time. The third chapter will be the mediator between Deleuzian method of transcendental empiricism and Bergsonian method of intuition. The conception of difference is transformed into the conception of time by means of the mediation of *repetition* and opens a way for me to arrive at Bergsonian *durée*.

The genesis of Bergsonian philosophy from which Deleuze's philosophy of difference is evolved, is the creation of *difference in kind* vs. *difference in degree*. The first one refers to heterogeneous, continuous, indivisible, internal and qualitative nature of difference, while; the other refers to homogeneous, discrete, divisible, external and quantitative difference. Besides, Bergson denotes that time is difference in kind, while space is difference in degree.

Throughout *Time and Free Will, Matter and Memory* and *Creative Evolution* he develops his conception of time which is called duration. Duration is ascribed to the temporalizing syntheses of consciousness within which our intensive and qualitative experience of the world changes. Duration is therefore synonymous to the process of individuation or in this context, difference. Instead of a spatialized, representational cognition of abstract time, Bergson suggests the real time/duration.

Spatialized time means that the abstract idea of space is made to underlie the movement and is used for making its measurement possible. The model of space is confused with the movement itself, without taking into account the duration of the being that experiences its own change. Pure duration can be seized by means of intuition. Intuition problematizes experience that the intellect cannot automatically recognize; the problematic exactly on which transcendental empiricism is founded.

Virtual duration is a pure change, pure becoming, pure difference which brings about an innovated conception of subjectivity, experience, reality and time. In Deleuzian and Bergsonian metaphysics, time is no longer an external, transcendent form, which is a mere representation of our consciousness. Time, instead, has an intellectual consciousness in itself, just as the sensible has intelligence or as the thought has lived experience. Hereafter we are no more stabilized subjects in sequential time but we become temporal in the sense that, our essence consists of *becoming*; therefore we are subject to time essentially. "Time is not the interior in us, but

just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and change.”⁷

⁷ Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989, p: 82.

CHAPTER 2

DIFFERENCE IN ITSELF

2.1. Transcendental Empiricism

In this chapter, the discussion will be focused on the concept of difference and its nature throughout the works of *Difference and Repetition* and *Bergsonism*, wherein Deleuze makes ontology of difference, which entails a revalued understanding of subjectivity by means of the notion of individuation. The ontology of difference is the search for *true* conditions for the real experience, which is opposed to necessary conditions for all possible experience in Kantian manner of transcendental idealism. Deleuze seeks for the conditions for experience by means of the method called: transcendental empiricism.

Transcendental empiricism makes us to exceed our cognitive, perceptive, intellectual boundaries, determined by representation theories of philosophy. I will examine these kinds of theories and Deleuze's criticisms on their fallacies, in order to introduce the foundations of difference-in-itself, or, internal difference.

Deleuze develops the concept of difference and his methodology from Bergsonian conception of difference and method of intuition. I will discuss Bergson in detail in the fourth chapter, but it is worth pointing out that,

transcendental empiricism finds its roots in Bergson's philosophy of duration. In the search for conditions for experience, Deleuze relies on Bergsonian criticism of Kant's transcendental project.

As we will see in the philosophy of duration, especially in *Time and Free Will*, Bergson criticizes Kant for his spatializing time and subjecting it to transcendental subjectivity. In other words, according to Bergson, Kant handles the problem of time in terms of space. However, they differ in kind and can never be related as such. What Deleuze finds ingenious in Bergson's difference is his distinction between difference in kind and difference in degree. For now, I will focus on their function in Deleuze's system and leave their profound examination for the fourth chapter.

In Kant's transcendental idealism, the necessary condition for the possibility of experience is the transcendental subject. This subject is the ground of experience, but is not itself grounded in experience. That is to say, Kant's transcendental subjectivity is prior to experience; it judges experience from outside the given because it is that which makes experience possible. By means of the distinction of faculty of conception and intuition, experience becomes external to its conditions. Deleuze refers to Kantian duality between concept and intuition as:

Such a duality refers us back to the extrinsic criterion of constructability and leaves us with an external relation between the determinable (Kantian space as a pure given) and the determination (the concept in so far as it is thought). That the one should be adapted to the other by the intermediary of the schematism [*imagination*] only reinforces the paradox introduced into the doctrine of the faculties by the notion of a purely external harmony: whence the reduction of the transcendental instance to a simple conditioning and the renunciation of any genetic requirement. In Kant, therefore, difference remains external and such empirical and impure, suspended

outside the construction 'between' the determinable intuition and the determinant concept.⁶

Kant's distinction between understanding and sensation; concept and intuition is the pivotal point which Deleuze criticizes. The a priori conditions of understanding, together with the faculty of intuition make possible the representation of the empirical given. What is given in intuition is dependent upon and limited by a priori concepts of understanding in order that knowledge or experience of the physical world becomes possible. Therefore, for Deleuze, Kant leaves experience or knowledge external to knowing process; or in other words, thought external to thinking.

Since Kant privileges abstract and general; self-identical concepts over the singular sensible given, he is not able to account for real experience. On the other hand, transcendental empiricism "allows experience to act as a transcendental principle: a principle that does not set itself up outside the given in some grand position of detached judgment."⁷ That is to say, given experience is not grounded in a transcendental subject, existing prior to and resting outside of experience.

In addition to what is written above, Kant, in his formulation of time as the pure form of intuition, makes transcendental subject transcend the empirical reality of experience. According to Deleuze, Kant makes time internal to the subject, which means that, the empirical subject (which has the forms of intuition) is represented in time, while the transcendental subject (which has the faculty of understanding) that makes time determination possible, remained outside of it. Deleuze, like Bergson, accuses Kant for making time subject-dependent. Time is not an a priori form within consciousness but it is beyond the subject as well.

⁶ *DR*, p: 173.

⁷ Claire Colebrook, *Gilles Deleuze*, New York: Routledge, 2001, p: 88.

“Time is not the interior in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, in which we move, live and change.”⁸ Bergson, within his philosophical account of time as duration, eliminates the possibility of a subject that transcends time. Just like transcendental empiricism, wherein the conditions are *immanent* and *internal* to experience, duration of the subject is immanent to duration as a whole. And for Bergson, as we will see later, the only way to experience the real duration is the method of intuition.

2.1.1. Ideas – Intensities/ Virtual Real – Actual Real

Transcendental empiricism, which is grounded upon Bergsonian intuition, is a philosophy of immanence; it finds the conditions of actual experience within experience itself. Like every form of empiricism, Deleuze is concerned with a prioritization of the concrete experience; however, he differs from the traditional empiricists by maintaining that the *a priori* conditions of experience are themselves *a posteriori*. The *a priori* conditions of experience are given in experience, along with it, but not prior to it. The transcendental conditions for actual experience are empirically given to the senses immediately. So that, I may dare to announce that Deleuze is a philosopher of nothing but the *sensible*.

Instead of bearing upon unity of subjectivity/identity centered recognition/universal understanding as its necessary condition, experience is *causa sui*. The concept, rather than performing a generalized unity, is identical with its object. The major difference between Kant's and Deleuze's

⁸ Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p: 82.

conceptions of the *transcendental* is that, whereas the former regards the transcendental as necessary conditions for a *possible* experience, the latter qualifies as *virtual* the conditions for *actual* experience.

The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a 'realization'. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualization. Every time we pose the question in terms of possible and real, we are forced to conceive of existence as a brute eruption, a pure act or leap which always occurs behind our backs and is subject to a law of all or nothing. What difference can there be between the existent and the non-existent if the non-existent is already possible, already included in the concept and having all the characteristics that the concept confers upon it as a possibility? Difference can no longer be anything but the negative determined by the concept: either the limitation imposed by possibles upon each other in order to be realized, or the opposition of the possible to the reality of the real. The virtual, by contrast, is the characteristic state of Ideas: it is on the basis of its reality that existence is produced, in accordance with a time and a space immanent in the Idea.⁹

Deleuze is against the possible/real dichotomy because of its general and abstract structure. In this structure, the real and possible have a juxtaposed temporality and externality to each other, which ruins the univocal existence of experience and its condition. He is against the privilege of what is intellectual or intelligible over concrete reality. Deleuze seeks to relocate intelligibility within the concrete sensible itself. He also eliminates the distinction between concept and intuition in order to preserve the creative power of difference. Intuition becomes intelligible for the sake of endless production of difference; that is, the eternal process of differentiation or actualization.

⁹ DR, p: 211.

The possible and the virtual are further distinguished by the fact that one refers to the form of identity in the concept, whereas the other designates a pure multiplicity in the Idea which radically excludes the identical as a prior condition. Finally, to the extent that the possible is open to 'realization', it is understood as an image of the real, while the real is supposed to resemble the possible. That is why it is difficult to understand what existence adds to the concept. Such is the defect of the possible: a defect which serves to condemn it as produced after the fact, as retroactively fabricated in the image of what resembles it. The actualization of the virtual, on the contrary, always takes place by difference, divergence or differentiation. Actualization breaks with resemblance as a process no less than it does with identity as a principle. Actual terms never resemble the singularities they incarnate. In this sense actualization or differentiation is always a genuine creation. It does not result from any limitation of pre-existing possibility.¹⁰

The virtual is the crucial concept for Deleuze in order to qualify difference. As I will explicate it in the next section, the possible is the core of the representation theories. The virtual, therefore, is crucial for the refutation of the identity centered representative theories.

For Deleuze, the possible can be conceived only retrospectively; that is, after it is realized. In other words, the conditions for the possibility of experience can only be derived from what was given in experience and not a priori. By making the transcendental conditions virtual, instead of possible, Bergson and Deleuze make the conditions immanent to what is empirically given in actual experience.

The possible resembles the real but not vice versa. The real does not resemble the possible because the possible is only a projection into the past of what has already been realized. So, the possible does not ground, bring into existence, or anticipate reality. It is rather a way of making sense of what is real after it has already happened, while also making the events appear as

¹⁰ *DR*, pp: 211-212.

if they could have happened otherwise than the way they did. The possible is abstracted from the real after it has already actualized; therefore, it cannot explain how the real came to be.¹¹

“The virtual is real without being actual, and ideal without being abstract.”¹² This formula implies the uniqueness of Deleuzian empiricism. Unlike rest of the other empiricist models, actual experience goes beyond itself, by way of the virtual forces inherent within it. The virtual conditions the actual but does not apply to all experience; it applies only to that peculiar actualization. Transcendental empiricism searches for the singular, instead of the general; for the individual, instead of the universal; and for the contingent, instead of the causal.

Since the virtual does not resemble what it actualizes, they are different in kind. The experience is different from its conditions; therefore, there can be no representational relation between them. This is the pivotal point, on where the productive, creative power of difference is preserved.

Transcendental empiricism never adheres to any form of transcendence, but appeals only to what is empirically given to find its transcendental conditions, which force it beyond itself – to become different. “The primary philosophical illusion is the illusion of transcendence. The history of philosophy is replete with principles from Forms to God to the cogito to the categories.”¹³ Deleuze rejects the transcendent, for it negates

¹¹ Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, New York: Zone Books, 1998, pp: 97-98. (Hereafter *B*)

¹² *B*, p: 27.

¹³ Todd May, *Reconsidering Difference*, University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997 p: 177.

the immanence or the immanent experience. This is the reason why he counterattacks transcendent with transcendental.

Deleuze's starting position is the claim that a difference exists between real difference and conceptual difference. In other words, the 'sensible' differs from the 'conceptual'. In this way, transcendental empiricism is an attempt to overcome the Kantian dualism between real and possible experience.¹⁴

In his transcendental idealism, Kant seeks to articulate the conditions of the possibility of experience, which necessitates the turn to consciousness. However, Deleuze's transcendental empiricism refers to conditions of reality. "We go beyond experience, toward the conditions of experience. They are not in the Kantian sense, the conditions of all possible experience: they are the conditions of real experience."¹⁵ And as Todd May implies that, "going beyond experience refers to a going beyond conscious experience, not a transcending of all experience."¹⁶ For Deleuze, May continues, Being as difference provides the conditions of reality of all experience and those conditions are immanent to reality.

¹⁴ John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity*, London; Starling, Virginia: Plutop Press, 1998. p: 83.

¹⁵ *B*, p: 23.

¹⁶ Todd May, *Reconsidering Difference*, p: 185.

2.1.2. Difference Versus Representation

Deleuze admits that in traditional philosophy the recognition depends on representation. In order to recognize the object of faculty we must depend on representation in terms of an identity that we can conceive of, an analogy that we can judge, an opposition that we can imagine and a similarity that we can perceive.

For Deleuze, the epistemological and homogenizing function of recognition coordinates all the faculties toward a logic of identity that presupposes its universality in all subjects. Thought is presented as conforming to uniform and universalizable identity experience. Recognition as such, comes to define the very meaning of what it is to think.¹⁷

Each of the aspects of representation corresponds to an application of certain elements: In terms of the understanding, it depends on the identity of the concept. For judgment, it depends on analogy. In terms of the imagination, it depends on oppositions. Finally for perception, it depends on similarities. Representation operates on different faculties in different ways but unites all of them through judgments based on identity and the exclusion of that which cannot be identified.

...They form quadripartite fetters under which only that which is identical, similar, analogous or opposed can be considered different: *difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to a conceived identity, a judged analogy, an imagined opposition or a perceived similitude.*²⁰

¹⁷ DR, pp: 133-135

²⁰ DR, p: 138.

Just because that representation and the recognition based on it perpetuate a damaging illusion that hides reality in terms of difference in itself and repetition for itself, Deleuze rejects all kinds of these methods. True understanding of difference and repetition is excluded by representation, because it privileges its four applications: identity, opposition, analogy and similarity, over pure differences and repetition. These applications fix the eventual side of the reality and put reality into stasis with respect to concepts and identities. Deleuze enthusiastically rejects the dogmatic ontological or epistemological affirmations grounded on the validity of identity.

Representative philosophies simply refer to the external dichotomies between subject and object. The status of subject has always been privileged over object. That is to say, the conditions for the sensible given, have always been placed in the subjective thought. Instead of living and lived experience, we are stuck in the representation: "I think", "I conceive", "I judge", "I imagine", "I remember" and "I perceive".

Deleuze pushes rational faculty to exceed its limits and to leave representational boundaries behind, by means of the transcendental empiricism. He uses transcendent to describe an overarching faculty, which is beyond its limits. Exceeding the limits refers to the annihilation of dependence on recognition and on illusory identities. This methodology that serves as an alternative opposed to representation depends on a transcendental work on the conditions for change in any given faculty in

relation to others. The faculties are only about the sensations of change; that is to say, their evolutions through connections with other faculties.²¹

Thinking is not a shared universal faculty; it has particular characteristics in each of us. Our thoughts reflect the physical, biological, psychological and also the virtual repetitions that have made us individual thinkers as opposed to identical subjects and selves defined by right. Intensities and Ideas are the central and principal terms in his theory of difference, within which Deleuze comes to negate identity.

“If philosophy has a positive and a direct relation to things, it is only insofar as philosophy claims to grasp the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, in its *internal difference*.”²²

Transcendental empiricism attempts to go beyond conditions, which account for things, state of things and their mixtures given to experience. “Its object is not what is given immediately but rather the immediate given. And what is an immediate given is the unrepresentable virtual.”²³ Therefore, “transcendental empiricism is a method whereby the actual is divided according to its virtual tendencies which, in turn, constitute the sufficient reason of the actual.”²⁴

Difference and Repetition gives principles and structures that teach us to think in a new way. New methods for thought are given in new

²¹ John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity*, Chapter 4.

²² Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference” in *Desert Islands*, Los Angeles, CA: Semiotext(e), MIT Press, 2004, p: 32

²³ Ibid, p: 38.

²⁴ Ibid, p: 38.

perspectives for our most philosophical concepts; especially as time, space, idea, sensation, reality and individuality. The book searches for new ways of understanding the meaning and significance of methods in philosophy. Like Bergson, Deleuze considers traditional notions of space and time as unifying categories imposed by the subject; that is, he considers them to be forms of identity. Therefore he concludes that pure difference is non-spatio-temporal but it is virtual.

While Deleuze's virtual Ideas superficially resemble Plato's forms and Kant's categories, they are definitely not originals or models, nor are they abstract conditions of possible experience; instead, they are the conditions of real experience, the internal difference in itself. A Deleuzean Idea or concept of difference is not an abstraction of an experienced thing; it is a real system of differential relations that creates actual spaces, times and sensations. Experience exceeds our concepts by presenting novelty, and this raw experience of difference actualizes an Idea, unrestricted by our prior categories, forcing us to invent new ways of thinking.

Internal difference will have to be distinguished from contradiction, alterity, and negation. This is where the Bergsonian theory and method of difference is opposed to that other method called dialectics, as much Plato's dialectic of alterity as Hegel's dialectic of contradiction both implying the power and presence of the negative.²⁵

Deleuze's account of the structure of virtual and actual, of difference and repetition and the interrelations between them, is specifically has a form of 'conditions'. He permanently seeks for the conditions for a given thing. His one of the main questions is that: 'What is the condition for a change in

²⁵ Deleuze, "*Bergson's conception of difference*", p: 49.

actual things?' Deleuze seeks to move towards a complete account of any structure, one where no event is left unexamined with respect to its condition. In terms of classical arguments from the history of philosophy, he provides transcendental deductions, that is, arguments that deduce the form of appearance by asking what the conditions have to be for something to be given or to appear as it is. He also provides synthetic arguments based on a principle of reason; that is, any event must have a reason and an event is known better as its reasons, that is, its conditions are known better.

We should not search for a condition as a substratum beneath the events or things but they are immanent to each other. There is no priority for a condition to its event, but they are reciprocally spontaneous and impulsive with no provision before the formation of conditions and before the events occur.²⁶

Transcendental deductions allow Deleuze to describe the structure of virtual and actual without conflating them. There is no need to have an actual experience of the condition in order to know the truths about it. Thus, it is not necessary to have an experience of the virtual. The event given as the starting point for a deduction can turn out to be very different from its first appearance and commonsense views about it.

Deleuze's assertions concerning pure difference (difference in itself) and pure variations or intensities that we cannot experience depend on transcendental deductions. That is, a thing or an event is known better through its conditions or through what it expresses than through an isolated examination of what it is, of its identity or causes and effects. The three repetitions are necessary conditions for a given thing and a thing can only be

²⁶ James Williams, *Gilles Deleuze's Difference and Repetition: A Critical Introduction and Guide*, Edinburgh University Press, 2003, p: 21. (Hereafter JW)

thought properly according to its expressions, that is, capacity to relate with everything or change or differentiate.

This entire search is a search of a reciprocal determination of the virtual and the actual. It is justified by Deleuze's transcendental deductions and a complete determination.

Complete determination cannot mean knowing a thing as something fixed and well determined. We can know a thing completely only by its virtual sides rather than as it is an actual identity. We can attain knowledge about things and ourselves only by an expression of virtual intensities, by sensations and affections they make upon us; that is, we can obtain knowledge about something or someone, by focusing on the change that we are exposed to and how this change in us alters the other.²⁷

A mechanistic determination of being, while it attempts to trace the evolution of reality, destroys the necessity of being. The external difference of determination is always reliant on an "other" (as cause, end, or chance) and thus it introduces an accidental quality into being; in other words, determination implies a mere subsistent exteriority, not a substantial interiority.²⁸

Difference and Repetition is a series of varying repetitions. They involve a critical method against representation, a learning of the reciprocal determination of actual individuals and virtual intensities, a search for completeness and a chance-driven experimentation with new concepts and ways of expressing intensities.

Intensity is the determinant in the process of actualization. It is intensity, which dramatizes. It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-temporal dynamisms and determines an 'indistinct'

²⁷ JW, p: 179

²⁸ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An apprenticeship in philosophy*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2002, p: 5

differential relation in the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished extensity.²⁹

Intensity as a condition of virtuality cannot be sensed fully in an object or extension. It can be perceived as qualities in extension, but we never sense the intensity that allows us to perceive the physical change. Because it varies in what it can make us sense with the quality according to the contexts in which it is expressed. For instance, a shade of colour on the painting, or a shade in our feelings. That is, the sensations associated with that quality vary according to the other qualities that are present, according to the actual objects they appear with and according to the individual they appear in. Different contexts bring about different intensities and therefore different Ideas. This reciprocal relation of intensities, identities and Ideas is called the *asymmetrical synthesis of the sensible* and that is the production of the individual.³⁰

“Individuation is the act of intensity, determining differential relations to be actualized, according to lines of differentiation, within the qualities and extensions that it creates.”³¹ That is to say, individuation is the transcendental principle of experience, in which sensation and thought become unified. Individual is an eternal process of *becoming, differentiation, actualization* that is to say, individual is the virtual subject of Deleuzian metaphysics, who can only truly experience the *sensible*.

²⁹ DR, p: 245.

³⁰ DR, p: 242.

³¹ DR, p: 246.

2.1.3. Thought of Difference: The Sensible

Throughout the first chapter of *Difference and Repetition* Deleuze seeks to determine difference without defining it in terms of identity or representation. He detaches difference from four tendencies in the history of philosophy. First, against Aristotle, difference must not be thought as the divisions within being: categories, genres and species. Second, against Hegel, difference must not be thought as subsuming all identities and their antitheses, that is the goal of the contradiction. Third, against Leibniz, difference must not be thought as infinitely small differences and lastly fourth, against Plato, difference must not be thought as a departure from an original.

“Difference is not and cannot be thought in itself, so long as it is subject to the requirements of representation.”³² All Deleuze wants to do, is the positive and affirmative thought of difference which is totally freed from the illusory moves of representational tendency. The help of analogy, opposition, similarity and identity can never define difference. Rather, difference is that which turns all representations into illusions. This attitude becomes from his transcendental method whereby the conditions for actual and virtual things are deduced. Difference is the condition for changes in actual things and actual things are the conditions for the expression of difference as something that can be determined.

Deleuze qualifies what is represented by recognition, as a *dogmatic image o thought*. According to this image, thought has an affinity with the true; it formally possesses the true and materially wants the true. It is in terms

³² *DR*, p: 262.

of this image that everybody knows and is presumed to know what it means to think. Thereafter it does not matter, whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, with Being or with beings, as long as thought remains subject to this image, which already prejudges everything.³³

Deleuze presents an alternative for thought in order to rescue it from the limitations of a logic of recognition and representation. This alternative is called a thought of difference that is the production of a genuine thinking.

Representational or cognitive thinking finds itself only in the objects they encounter, and it is active only when it is busy with its own image. For Deleuze, on the contrary, genuine thinking is the result of an encounter, which “forces us to think”. The destruction of the imagistic thinking is due to the search of the conditions of real experience. The force that prompts thinking is not recognizable, rather it can only be sensed. The primary characteristic of thought/experience is sensibility. And sensibilities do not conform to existing ideas and concepts; in this sense they are opposed to recognition and representation. They are experienced not as a determination of being, but as the *being of the sensible*.³⁴

Deleuze’s sensibility is can be related with the revision of the notion of the subjectivity. This force of sensation underlies the thought, which conforms neither to categories nor to the unity of the faculties of the subject. When thinking is extricated from the cognitive and representational model, the traditional model of subjectivity and the character of its thinking can be transformed into *individual*. Individual is the reformed subject, which can

³³ *DR*, p: 131.

³⁴ *DR*, pp: 138-139.

never be characterized by a stabilized identity like I, Ego, or Self, but a multiple internal difference. That is to say, Deleuzian metaphysics does not consist in being but only becoming.

According to Deleuze, the conditions of a true critique and the true creation are the same: “the destruction of an image of thought which presupposes itself and the genesis of the act of thinking in thought itself.”³⁵ Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of recognition but of a fundamental *encounter*. In recognition, the sensible is not at all that which can only be sensed, but that which bears directly upon the senses in an object, which can be recalled, imagined, or conceived. The object of encounter, on the other hand really gives rise to sensibility with regard to a given sense. “It is not a sensible being but the being *of* the sensible. It is not the given but that by which the given is given. It is therefore imperceptible precisely from the perspective of the recognition.”³⁶

This sensible is nothing but the difference: the virtual Ideas or the actual intensities within the individuation. So that, difference becomes the only condition for the real experience/thought/reality/being.

³⁵ *DR*, p: 139.

³⁶ *DR*, p: 140.

³⁷ *JW*, p: 64.

2.1.4. Univocity

Difference, while is a matter of actual things; pure difference is a matter of how things become different and how they evolve, that is, pure difference is a matter of conditions of actual things. The only question worth asking for Deleuze is the “how” rather than the “what”! “To be is not to be a well-defined thing with recognizable limits – on the contrary, it is to be a pure movement or variation in relation to well-defined things. Being is both being and becoming, where becoming is the condition for being.”³⁷ Becoming as pure variation implies that being can never be identified.

The univocity of being, its singleness of expression, is paradoxically the principal condition which permits difference to escape the domination of identity, which frees it from the law of the Same as a simple opposition within conceptual elements.³⁸

Being is *univocal* in Deleuze means, the “is” is said of all things in the same way; has the same meaning, same function, same sense for all entities. As far as the conditions/ becomings/ individuations are concerned, instead of the essence or the identity of being, all beings belong to the same structural background as insistently called becoming. Univocity emphasizes that every sort of being is an event, is a process and the most important thing is to recognize “how” they become. Every being becomes via overcoming their internal limits, their capacity for change, individuation, and differentiation

³⁸ Michel Foucault, “Theatrum Philosophicum” in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, ed. By D. Bouchard, 165-196, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1977, p: 192.

is equal. The fixation of beings in concepts, identities or categories can never account for their change and evolution therefore must be overcome.

We must show not only how individuating difference [pure difference] differs in kind from specific difference [actual difference], but primarily and above all how individuation precedes matter and form, species and parts, and every other element of the constituted individual.³⁹

“What univocity implies is not that everything is the same, or that there is a principle of the same underlying everything, but, instead, precisely the opposite. With univocity comes difference, difference for the first time taken seriously in itself.”⁴⁰

Things must not only be approached through what they are but also in terms of how they have become and how they are undone. Difference, then, is something powerful in itself. The question of how to participate in and understand the way in which things evolve in relation to infinite processes replaces explanations in relation to categories, hierarchies and fixed concepts. The differences we can draw by negation and the representations that are necessary in order to be able to draw them from the categorical, essential, identical point, fail to grasp the power of insignificant differences in determining and undermining identity.

“There is a crucial experience of difference and a corresponding experiment: every time we find ourselves confronted or bound by a limitation or an opposition we should ask what such a situation presupposes.”⁴¹

³⁹ *DR*, p: 38.

⁴⁰ Todd May, “Difference and Unity in Gilles Deleuze” in *Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy*, ed. by Constantin V. Boundas and Dorothea Olkowski, New York; London: Routledge, 1994, p: 43.

⁴¹ *DR*, p: 50

When we experience difference by experimenting, experience becomes a radically multiple thing, that is, it is no longer the experience by a self of a set of objects. It is the temporary coming together of an infinite series of pure differences into areas of more and less clarity and obscurity, according to the experiment.⁴²

This network of differential relations cannot be viewed in terms of fixed boundaries, measures and origins. They all connect to each other but not to identities; real and true experience of difference connects with as much as possible but it does never connect objects in consciousness or memory.

An experience does not lie in the opposition of subject and object, but in a coming together that requires neither subjective nor objective identity. Oppositions and contradictions arise because we fix the movements of pure difference. And forgetting, where to forget is to leave things behind through the affirmation of something that is itself not carried on, provides the affirmation of pure difference. Forgetting as affirmation can be seen in negative terms since something is left behind, but there is no immediate consciousness of that thing – no conscious rejection of it. In every moment we should erase the identity, by means of the active forgetting. This very Deleuzian principle, enables his transcendental empiricism function, which seeks for the expressions of the conditions for the given, rather than the identity of the given.

When Deleuze privileges difference, he is engaging in the practice he calls philosophy. He is creating a concept he hopes will help shape a perspective form which we see things in a new way. His metaphysical claims are not claims about the way things are; rather, they are the structure of a new perspective.⁴³

⁴² JW, p: 76.

⁴³ Todd May, *Reconsidering Difference*, p: 176.

The transcendental field revealed by Deleuzian version of empiricism is directly opposed to the system of the subject and the object. Rather than a conventional distinction between raw experience and the mind that represents and interprets, he looks at the ways in which the mind constructs itself from the flux of the given. Therefore the transcendental does not mean 'transcendent': it refers instead to a plane of immanence which is populated only by events or becoming.⁴⁴

Deleuze's method of transcendental empiricism is a relative with Bergson's method of intuition, which I will examine, in the fourth chapter. Things and state of things are mixtures and are subject to qualifications according to differences of degree. But these actual mixtures are the products of virtual series, which unlike mixtures differ in nature or in kind from each other. Bergsonian intuition is a method for dividing the mixture according to real differences, that is to say, in Deleuzian terminology, to quest for the virtual conditions behind the actual in order for the real experience.

⁴⁴ John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity* p: 35.

CHAPTER 3

REPETITION FOR ITSELF

Re-petition opposes *re-presentation*: the prefix changes its meaning, since in the one case difference is said only in relation to the identical, while in the other, it is the univocal which is said of the different. Repetition is the formless being of all differences, the formless power of the ground, which carries every object to that extreme 'form' in which its representation comes undone. The ultimate element of repetition is the disparate, which stands opposed to the identity of the representation.⁴⁵

If the concept of "difference in itself" allows Deleuze to move away from fixed definitions and values, the concept of "repetition for itself" allows him to develop the materialistic aspects of his philosophy. Repetition is a process that underlies the forgetting of the identity, which supports the Deleuzian denial of the repetition of the same. This conception of forgetting is about the thought of difference that I mentioned in the previous chapter; that is pure difference is something happens to us but not the result of the direct actions. It forces us to think and sense, instead it is dependent upon an active force of conscious subject in representation and recognition systems.

Representation ignores the repetition as the productive power of difference. For Deleuze, repetition is not the successive instantiation of an original identity; it is not the repetition of identical individuations, equivalent with one another. Representation qualifies repetition as stripped of its real

⁴⁵ *DR*, p: 57.

internal differences and reduces it to an incessant production of self-same units. However, repetition for Deleuze is the “displacement of difference and not the reappearance of the identical.”⁴⁶

Difference is differed from itself; difference reproduces its own difference and what is differentiated is called repetition. Repetition is the actualization of the virtual difference; the former is the productive power of the latter; that is the reason, why Deleuze calls repetition, for itself. As the difference is not just recognized to reside between two instances repeated, repetition also lies between two differences: “difference inhabits repetition.”⁴⁷

“... Despite the importance of understanding actual processes, identities and evidence, we must also look deeper than this understanding, to the underlying processes of repetition that cannot be thought of in terms of identities or objective facts.”⁴⁸ The correct understanding of repetition allows us to reabsorb difference in-itself, to regenerate novelty, and reconnect with the pure empirical actuality of real experience. The power of repetition; therefore, ensures to find the conditions for the real experience; to connect with the sensible; and to make the faculties exceed their representational limits. Finally, the repetition – the differentiator of the difference – ensures that thought is brought to its transcendental limits.

The core argument behind repetition for itself is a series of deductions concerning passive synthesis of time. These syntheses are the condition for a series of actual processes analyzed from the point of view of repetition.

⁴⁶ Patrick Hayden, *Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze*, New York: P. Lang, 1998, p: 8.

⁴⁷ *DR*, p: 76.

⁴⁸ *JW*, p: 85.

Deleuze's philosophy of time stands against ones that situate time in 'the sphere of narrative or intentionality.'⁴⁹ And also reacts against philosophies of time that defend 'an objective linear historical time, within which events have to take place according to a well-measured sequence and subject to an irreversible direction of past to future.'⁵⁰

Repetition is the power that reproduces difference, generates the disparate and affirms change and becoming. Deleuze's examination of repetition is formulated around the issue of temporality and the presupposition of a subject whose basic structure corresponds to the intelligible re-presentation of sensible appearances and the subordination of diversity to the subject's continued identity. According to Deleuze, the representational model of subject as the source of all possible experience does not give the account of real experience.⁵¹

Deleuze assigns passivity to the synthesis because it does not require a representation of the series as being synthesized in an active consciousness. We have many more memories than we are conscious of at a given time. As individuals we express pure differences and intensities, but many more and differently than we can be conscious of or can capture in representations. Our conscious choice of actual possibilities does not capture what we really are as virtual and actual events.

Passive synthesis allows Deleuze to explain the necessity of the three repetitions and the relation of difference to repetition. He consistently tries to

⁴⁹ *DR*, p: 70.

⁵⁰ *DR*, p: 68.

⁵¹ Patrick Hayden, *Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze*, pp: 18-21.

cancel philosophical and commonsensical tendency that seeks a ground in consciousness. We must seek openness to pure difference in order for the passive synthesis to occur. Rather than selecting pure variations, intensities or Ideas, these must *happen* to us and make us individuals. We have to find ways to escape the hold of our senses of self, identities and categories for this *happening* to take place. We are not a kind of elector or juridical subjects, our actions are not subject to any kind of presupposition or categorical conscious faculty; we do not make the choices, but quite the opposite. We are exposed to numerous virtual events of which we are definitely not conscious agents but passively their effects. We become individuals as we let events happen and become actualized. We can never presuppose, predict or anticipate what will happen. We just live and see.

This is why Deleuze describes this passive synthesis or third kind of repetition as a 'dice throw', a risky act that does not know its outcome. He describes the self as a 'broken self' or a 'dissolved self' that we are not conscious of. "That is why the individual in intensity finds its psychic image neither in the organization of the self nor in the determination of species of the I, but rather in the fractured I and the dissolved self."⁵² He destroys the entire commonsensical consensus on different accounts of subjectivity, self, mind, reason or intelligence. The fractured self implies forgetting; in order to relate ourselves with everything, have an experience and acquire knowledge, we have to forget all our information and leave all actual events and things behind us. This is the way we take to allow difference or change to come about. Since every repetition has its own peculiar and significant intensity

⁵² *DR*, p: 259.

and sensation, they are all different from each other; this differentiation process is the process of individuation, which is first of all freed from dialectical values.

3.1. First Synthesis Of Time: Habit

Since there is no causal relationship between different members of the series, for Deleuze, repetition is not a property of the repeated things. According to him, repetition is not an objective property but something which takes place in the experiencing subject. He explains it in terms of “the previous instances in later ones, thereby creating an expectancy.”⁵³ This contraction is passive in the sense that we are not to think consciously about it for it to take place. Previous instances are contracted passively in order for there to be an expectancy. “Expectancy is not associated with a human experience; rather, it is the property of passively acquiring an unconscious relation to the future.”⁵⁴

Deleuze goes on to say that the condition for the lived present is the passive synthesis of time where the past is synthesized, or contracted in the present as a tendency towards the future. He calls this first synthesis, habit; it is what gives the present a direction from past to the future. “Passive synthesis or contraction is essentially symmetrical: it goes from the past to the future in the present, thus, from the particular to the general, thereby

⁵³ *DR*, p: 69.

⁵⁴ *DR*, p: 69.

imparting direction to the arrow of time.”⁵⁵ When we repeat an act in the past, the series of repetitions becomes synthesized in the present as a forward-looking movement.

According to Deleuze, the passive synthesis of time is not the cause of expectation, as it is the case when a particular event X is the cause of a particular event Y. Rather, any expectation is possible when there is passive synthesis of time; the past is projected into the future through the present. Expectation means a passive synthesis; that is, we do not understand any later process without understanding its relation to the prior one. By means of habit, we only have a sense of the direction from the past to the future as expectancy. “In other words, the active syntheses of memory and understanding are superimposed upon and supported by the passive synthesis of the imagination.”⁵⁶

Imagination synthesizes by consistency. Consistency provides a condition for the relation between the living, actual thing and its future as in the form of expectancy. Furthermore, Deleuze argues that nothing can be sensed unless it is sensed as something repeated. Since any experience depends on repetition, it depends on the first passive synthesis of time as habit.

Deleuze distinguishes different types of passive syntheses from active syntheses, such as representation. Firstly, there is the passive synthesis of time as condition; as habit. Any passive contraction through repetition presupposes that a series in time can be contracted into the present.

⁵⁵ *DR*, p: 71.

⁵⁶ *DR*, p: 71.

Secondly, there is the passive synthesis of repetitions of sensations into a sense. These are synthesized as they are repeated to form the sense. And this is called memory. Thirdly, there is the passive synthesis of different sensations into the sensation of a thing. The different sensations associated with a thing are brought together so that we may sense the thing as a whole. And finally, there is the active synthesis that we operate consciously.

Repetition makes things by altering them. Through time, things have no fixed identity but must be thought of as the synthesis of varying sensations.

We must distinguish not only the forms of repetition in relation to passive synthesis, but also the levels of passive synthesis and the combinations of these levels with one another and with active syntheses. All of this forms a rich domain of signs, which always envelop heterogeneous elements and animate behaviour... The manner in which sensation and perception – along with need and heredity, learning and instinct, intelligence and memory – participate in repetition is measured in each case by the combination of forms of repetition, by the levels on which these combinations take place, by the relationships operating between these levels and by the interference of active syntheses with passive syntheses.⁵⁷

In terms of this structure, Deleuze argues that there can never be a set of laws or rules that covers relations between the different levels of syntheses. Instead, each level only contains signs of others, where a sign is only an indication, something like a presentiment. All these signs and accounts of levels denote Deleuze's idea of life.

Life of intensities, wherein these levels do not serve each other in a causal fashion, because they have different contents like time, desires, expectations, sensations, senses and acts. They involve heterogeneous elements so cannot be explained in terms of causal relations.

⁵⁷ *DR*, p: 72.

However, these levels are interrelated, by means of the intensities of one level and their differentiation in other time and place in the other levels. Signs are the transitions or trans-passings within these relations of differing intensities. Signs are not objects that can be represented and fully conceptualized because they involve combinations of heterogeneous elements that rebel representations and concepts. The sign has an active meaning; it disappears when we try to know it as opposed to letting it enact. From the point of view of the levels, well-defined subjects and selves only appear on one level and cannot be viewed as well defined in terms of their relation to other levels. The conscious acts of a subject and the identity of a self, fail to capture signs and how to live with them.

Each repetition on each level is not a repetition of the same thing but variations that must be understood in terms of pure difference (pure intensity). It is like playing a game with changeable rules against an infinitely adaptive opponent. Just as fixed rules and a strategic pattern emerge, they lose efficacy, forcing us to begin to experience anew.

So repetitions on a given level are chance-driven alterations, with only a degree of certainty due to their relation to an individual and to its actual identity, sensations, intensities and ideas. The relation between levels is also a variation in repetition due to pure differences. Acts or events on one level change other levels in equally unpredictable and open-ended ways. This is to say, signs determine and set an individual into motion but they do not determine the outcome of that motion. They only give a sense of the relations

that hold on a level and between the levels and hence, give a sense of what is at play in any action.⁵⁸

Finally Deleuze announces that repetition for itself is difference. There is no repetition of the same thing for any other thing, only an open variation that occurs within an individual.

Difference inhabits repetition. On the one hand difference allows us to pass from one order of repetition to another: from the instantaneous repetition, which unravels itself to the actively represented repetition through the intermediary of passive synthesis. On the other hand, difference allows us to pass from one order of repetition to another and from one generality to another within the passive syntheses themselves.⁵⁹

This quotation underlies what difference enables within one level and among the multiple levels. The answer is repetition. Difference is the condition for synthesizing all repetitions, by which it gets its own intensities; therefore it becomes individual. Since identities are illusions that cover pure differences, repetition is really the alteration of relations between different pure differences. It is about the determination of those relations through their alteration. No representation of those relations of differences can capture them, so we must relate to repetition without the illusions of identity and we must repeat to forget.

For Deleuze, underlying the illusion of ourselves as subjects of conscious actions based on representations and the illusion of self-identity, there is passive self or more precisely, a system of passive selves.

There is a self wherever a furtive contemplation has been established, whenever a contracting machine capable of drawing a difference from repetition functions somewhere.

⁵⁸ JW, pp: 92-94.

⁵⁹ DR, p: 76.

Selves are larval subjects; the world of passive syntheses constitutes the system of the self, under conditions yet to be determined, but it is the system of a dissolved self.⁶⁰

Sensible contraction or habit forms the first synthesis of time, a passive synthesis which is also the foundation of time. While the passive synthesis of habit founds time as a living present, it is nonetheless a present which passes; a present that continually moves beyond itself. This brings about a paradox: “to constitute time while passing in the time constituted.”⁶¹ Because of that there must be another time that allows for the synthesis of the living present. Deleuze says that the foundation of time as habit must itself be grounded “by another (transcendental) passive synthesis which is peculiar to memory itself.”⁶² The passive synthesis of memory constitutes the being of the past, that is, the pure past as the ground of each present.

3.2. Second Synthesis Of Time: Memory

Deleuze’s philosophy of time is grounded on the concept of the passive synthesis and counter-intuitive ones as pure past, present past, present present and present future. Passive synthesis merely emphasizes the way of philosophizing where the dominance of subject, consciousness, reason and mind is broken down. The crucial point in Deleuzian view is the destruction of representation and what he all tries to do is to get over the illusions of representational tendency even in the understanding of time. His

⁶⁰ *DR*, p: 78.

⁶¹ *DR*, p: 79.

⁶² *DR*, p: 81.

effort may be appreciated better, when we respect him as the one offering a brand new way of philosophizing which is far away from the well known methods of rationalism, empiricism, transcendental idealism and phenomenology.

In the deduction of time as habit, Deleuze took expectancy (the projection from past to future through the present) as given, and now he assigns a different property to a living present, which is not fully accounted for by “the passive synthesis of past” and “future in the present”. “This is no longer the forward-looking expectancy, but the backward-looking sense of something falling away, yet still remaining. This is the call of archiving to capture the sense of passing into stock but as something different.”⁶³

That which passes into stock is lifeless with respect to the living present, but it is still open to return as something from the past – as archive. Deleuze here makes up a maneuver that protects properties of repetition, by means of passive synthesis. Repetition as memory is totally against the traditional experiences of memory and remembrance; when we remember an archived present through active work on traces, our memories include only representations. The enduring intuition, however, is neither a trace (no past); nor a remembering (no memory).

He insistently talks about pure past, where all events, those that have sunk without a trace, are stored and remembered as their passing away, independent of “conscious” human activity and the limitations of the physical, “identical” records. “It is with respect to the pure element of the past, understood as the past in general, as an *a priori* past that a given former

⁶³ *DR*, p: 80.

present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself.”⁶⁴ The past in itself, the pure past enables the condition for a virtual. It is the condition for the passing away of the present. The past is a virtual surface whereon every actual present can be able to pass away. “All of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which it is now past. We do not pass away with other present moments but with the passing away of all of them because the presents can never accompany us – only their passing away can.”⁶⁵

The passive synthesis of the pure past creates a construction of time as the synthesis of all past elements of present, past and future. That is why Deleuze addresses all these three to the present. Each is reformed, regained, redefined in every present moment, where these presents presuppose past presents as their virtual conditions and when they are actualized they become past away and become the element for future presents. Therefore, the passive synthesis of pure past is an a priori condition for the present passing away. It does not depend on the experience of the past but is a condition for there being any such experience: the pure past, as opposed to the past of memories and records, pre-exists the present.

What makes past actual, is the present. Past envelops virtually all sorts of actual presents but what makes past that peculiar past is this peculiar present. Also the present is founded upon the existence of a virtual past. Past is pure difference, in the sense that it provides a condition for an

⁶⁴ *DR*, p: 81.

⁶⁵ *DR*, p: 82.

actual present to get differentiated and individualized; that is, the actual present is an expression of the whole virtual past at a given moment. And it follows that, when the past is expressed it is wholly changed and can never be repeated as the same. The open link between the actual and the virtual and their reciprocal connection are still seen within the relations of past, present and future. All are interdependent and on a surface of the present, time is distinguished into two asymmetrical synchronous paths as past and future, where the latter provide the condition for the former. We can sense that a time is passing away by reference of the capability of a pure past to express itself in the present.

Virtual past is former therefore present depends upon the contingency of the past, but actual present is former in the sense of an expression of the past. The past is expressed owing to the present's passing away. Since the present is something passing away, the past can be repeated differently, hence, can be differentiated. The passing away of the present is what makes all past become actual. What pre-exists and accompanies with the present is the pure past (as it is the condition of the passing away of the present) but not the past of memories or recordings. Since the past and the present are interdependent and reciprocally existent, they are not causally related to each other and neither of them have a priority upon the other. Both refer to the one and the same time as called *Aion*.⁶⁶

The relation of the lived present to habit and memory is another issue. Habit is the contraction of a series of distinct elements; relations within one level, while memory is the contraction of the whole past; all the relations

⁶⁶ *DR*, p: 284.

among all levels. As a projection into the future, the lived present only presupposes a local contraction but, as a passing away, it presupposes a synthesis of the past that itself brings together all past contractions. The pure past, therefore, consists of all the varying degrees of contraction that ground any present. “The present can be the most contracted degree of the past which coexists with it only if the past first coexists with itself in an infinity of diverse degrees of relaxation and contraction at an infinity of levels...”⁶⁷ The pure past is the past as a whole, but it must be open to change through the occurrence of any new present. Pure past in this sense is the system of signs where the present is the signal.

For Deleuze, the relation between successive and apparently unrelated, indifferent presents through the pure past allow us to relate them. A life acquires consistency through the relations between its apparently heterogeneous elements in a relatively consistent arrangement of the pure past. The relation between the present and the pure past resolves the paradoxes encountered by a deterministic materialism. Rather than being passive with respect to the syntheses of time, we are active when we alter the contraction levels of our experience. We can alter the whole past with respect to our contraction. But our conscious activity has an effect on passive syntheses, not in the sense that we can determine their outcome but in the sense of opening up and closing down different paths.

Deleuze is a philosopher of *relations*. For him, everything is in relation with everything, so, the world is somewhere *in between*. The only important thing is the ability, tendency and capacity to relate everything and to define

⁶⁷ *DR*, p: 83.

the conditions for those relations. As I remarked in several times, we are not anymore in the realm of *what-ness* of being or we do not seek its *is-ness*, but we are in new era of ontology as the realm of *how* being becomes. Each present, each life is connected to all others in greater or lesser degrees of contraction and as we all have our own ways to express it, then we individuals share the same virtual, productive past as a condition for our presence on a contracted level and future as a surface of relaxation.

With respect to repetition, habit is the passive synthesis in which the present is the contraction of separate instants, memory is the one in which the present is the contraction of a coexisting totality of the past. Moreover, there is a third synthesis of time that corresponds to the future.

3.3. Third Synthesis Of Time: Forgetting

Deleuze introduces this synthesis by returning to a study of transcendental deductions and to the search for the conditions for a given thing. The transcendental condition allows him to determine the conditioned thing, the given. In this respect, it is time which time consists the condition and allows for the determination of the given activity or event. Time makes something determinable but we can never know how something is determined. Because the synthesis of time is the condition for activity, it is out of the reach of activity. Time (true time as duration) can never be represented by means of knowledge; rather, it has its own sense and thought inherently.

Time is a pure form, pure condition for all activities – pure, for it is not dependent on or formed by consciousness. Time is not something that gives an exact determinate meaning of what the thing is; rather, it is the very condition for the appearance of a thing. This is the crucial point of Deleuzian transcendentalism. He is persistently against of identity as a most reliable, secure and determined account for philosophy. “*What is something?*” is an irrelevant question, but what is worth questioning only are the necessary conditions, the relevant relations of something that made it appear. “This is the search for what makes the undetermined ground of a well determined given, determinable”⁶⁸. What we are searching for are not the universals, but only the individual conditions.

We can focus on a given, by means of three syntheses of time.

1) The first synthesis of time: habit or expectancy, which is the condition for the realization of past in the present. (a passive assumption that something will occur.)

2) The second synthesis of time: memory or archiving, which is the condition for present to pass away into the past as a stock of passing presents.

3) The third synthesis of time: forgetting or openness, which is the condition for actions to drive towards the new or the future.

There is the sense of the openness to the future with respect to expectancy and archiving. When we create a new work, we head towards a future that must be independent of what has already occurred; and that is what Deleuze calls forgetting.

⁶⁸ *DR*, p: 80.

In the heading towards the future and in the struggle to make it different from the past and the present, there is an implied sense of the possibility of that difference. The heading towards the new presupposes a cut in time in the sense that, the present cuts us off from the past and projects us into a completely different future. "The pure past of identifiable events is cut off from an open future that does not resemble it. Time is cut into a before and after, a pure order of time."⁶⁹

For instance, the feeling that nothing will be the same again, presupposes that the past as a whole will not return at any moment in the future. Finally with this cut, there are forms that cannot return but remain, as past forever and there are forms that return with the cut that relived with it. This third synthesis, cuts, assembles and orders; that is to say, it makes time move. Identities fall into the past but that part of them that is pure difference returns; the parts of acts and identities that are differential or in movement return eternally no matter they are in the past or the future. A cut as forgetting, cuts us from the identical experience and make us move towards the new, to something that we never know. Thus, we are always open to new experiences. Since determined identity is not in movement, it is not an issue for Deleuze.⁷⁰

Forgetting is the condition for an eternal return of difference. It is the cut of past from the future, but only via assemblage of the differentiated past events for the future. Time can only obtain an order when pure differences

⁶⁹ *DR*, p: 88.

⁷⁰ Keith Ansell Pearson, *Deleuze and Philosophy: The Difference Engineer*, London; New York: Routledge, 1997, Chapter 5.

return, when identity is consigned to the past forever and when there is the sensation of the new freed of sameness. Time should not be conceived as linear, which is congruent with the conception of sameness. Rather, it should be thought of as circular in order to explain the return of pure difference.

The insistence on three syntheses of time accounts for the importance of a philosophy of time. The philosophy allows him to explain how things acquire consistency free of conscious activity and natural law (habit), to explain how all things are connected but in a non-causal manner (memory) and to explain how the virtual and the actual are necessarily related but without being reducible to one another (forgetting/connecting).

Actual things occur in linear time but they are viewed as complete only in relation to a non-linear time. So we have to find their virtual conditions that is, we have to account for how actual events alter the pure virtual past and select pure differences that return eternally. The scope of an actual event goes much wider than its causal linear relations. Besides, it alters the significance of the past and its power to return *in* the future.

However, all syntheses are conditions for actions in the present; they all deny the priority of action over passivity. It is quite the opposite; any action presupposes the passive syntheses of the whole past, as pure past envelops all parts of time as a whole with respect to an infinite virtuality. The priority given to passivity over activity means that any action must take account of the passive syntheses that it presupposes. This is what Deleuze's principle of forgetting and connecting is designed to do. Forgetting and connecting are the methods for passive syntheses to relate active events and produce time and life. Forgetting the universals, the identity, the concepts, and the definite

knowledge about everything provides us with a connection with all things in the world without being conscious, rational or materialistic subjects.

Whenever we act towards an object taken to be real and thereby, strengthen our sense of self with respect to that object, two different processes take place at the level of the passive syntheses presupposed by that action. For any given object and action, there is a virtual object, a particular synthesis of the pure past and a selection of pure differences according to eternal return. Any action on the given object implies consequences at the level of the virtual object, though this relation is not a causal one. The re-arrangement of the syntheses at the level of the virtual object is of a different order from the causal relations at the level of actual objects. The consequences at the virtual level are then played out again at the level of the actual.⁷¹

The virtual structures are the transcendental conditions for actual things or real objects or selves, as something intense, significant and in movement. The reciprocal expression relation of virtual and actual is very far away from the representational definitions, since the objects or selves can never be known completely thanks to their virtual capacity to be changed. There is always a hidden side to any well-determined act and object. "Repetition is constituted only with and through the *disguises* which affect the terms and relations of the real series, but it is so because it depends upon the virtual object as an immanent instance which operates above all by displacement."⁷² The actual can be grasped but it is incomplete. The virtual cannot be grasped, only be operated on and the effects of this operation can only be grasped in the actual. The expression can never give the whole picture but the picture can only be seen as it is expressed.

⁷¹ JW, pp: 107-108.

⁷² DR, p: 105.

A third type of repetition explains how things change in relation to virtual becomings, to difference in itself. Deleuze claims that pure differences are the other face of actual things; that is to say, there is no such thing as well-defined actual life. All our representations, senses and concepts of identities are illusions since nothing fixed is real.

The final synthesis of time demonstrates that the past and the present are dimensions of the future, the past as its condition and the present as the intermediary agent of metamorphosis. It is the future, however, that exceeds both the past and the present, for it is only by a pure repetition that the past and the present continually return. Both the condition and the agent of the future are what they are only by not being the same; past and present continually return but never as the same. So the future itself is that which is repeated, but it is always different as well.⁷³

We only acquire habits by synthesizing earlier members of a series in later ones. And we only acquire representations in memory and in language by synthesizing earlier memories that are themselves syntheses of experiences. So the concept or an idea of a thing depends on a synthesis of prior experiences. Just as the causal explanations based on causal relations between well-defined things, an actual individual is only a synthesis of prior individuals. Furthermore, that synthesis itself continually changes with respect to other series in which it is synthesized and with respect to the pure variations it synthesizes.

Future is inseparable from the historical actions of past and present, but the transformative power of past and present and the eternal return of future always differently provide an independence and originality for time as rescued from the chains of self experience. Repetition is never reducible to

⁷³ Patrick Hayden, *Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze*, pp: 22-23.

particular historical actual events since it is the transcendental condition of the production of the new, although it is inseparable from its historical events. “Transcendental repetition is internal to empirical genesis, in contrast to the external condition of possible, representable experience as portrayed by Kant.”⁷⁴

This is why, for Deleuze, well-defined things are mere abstractions. Causal explanations are, at best, convenient illusions since they hide the continuous virtual syntheses beneath the causal chain of events. Individuals are syntheses of virtual ideas and intensities through a reciprocal determination of the actual and the virtual. The reciprocal relation between the virtual syntheses in ideas and the actual syntheses in habit and memory is performed in the third kind of repetition as a passive synthesis, which enables the creation.

Any event for Deleuze, implies, a synthesis of virtual repetitions; the synthesis of actual repetitions; and a synthesis of a reciprocal determinations of virtual and the actual in the third synthesis. The third synthesis and repetition connect the actual world to the intense virtual one and overcome the tendency of the first two repetitions to stasis. By means of the principles of forgetting and connecting, we lead to creation, while both the habit and the memory rest upon the general tendency of fixed identities and usages. Deleuzian third type of repetition makes us merely freed from knowledge and sense data, and makes us an ignorant child in every sort of experience.

⁷⁴ Patrick Hayden, *Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze*, p: 23.

I may make the correlations explicit among the concepts for the sake of clarity. Just as the actual changed on the ground of virtual, present moments pass away on the ground of whole past. Again just as the virtual is expressed by the differentiation of the actual, the past is become defined by the repetitions of presents. All these acts within the plane of immanence where the whole is the sum of innumerable differentiations, endless changes and never-ending movements called in this section as time. Time is either the actor or the scene or the drama all together.

3.4. Repetition Versus Representation

These two chapters discuss the fallacies of the representationalist model, which imposes an image of thought as immobile, static, spatial, discontinuous, and externalized. Transcendental empiricism, on the other hand, introduces a thought, which prioritizes temporality over spatiality, continuity over discontinuity, and mobility over immobility. This new way of thinking also implies a new sensibility by means of the conceptions: difference and repetition.

As one of the greatest representationalist philosopher, Kant declares that sensations are synthesized into a representation by the harmonious accord of our faculties, exercised on the same, identical object. Recognition is the way that how we see, imagine, understand, remember, and think that same object, whose identity stays the same throughout time. The ideal of the conditions of experience depends on the identity of the subject as a unifying principle, which makes the experience possible.

The two poles of the dogmatic image of thought (thought, produced by representationalist models) are the objective unity of the object and the subjective unity of the self. Kant presupposes that the subject is a simple unity throughout time, that is to say, he allows the subject to identify itself with itself as the same subject. It is the process of apperception that is necessary for the formation of a unity of representation.

Contrarily, for Deleuze and Bergson, both the subject and object differ from themselves immediately: they become different in nature through the virtual conditions of duration. The subjective and objective unity, to which representation depends, is not the case, since neither of them can be unified with itself by being identical to its prior states. The object and the subject exist in a constant process of change, variety, differentiation and individuation.

Thought occurs when something is sensed, which does not have a ready-made schema for its synthesis, via the representational faculties and recognition. When an object changes its nature immediately, it forces us to think. Sensibility begins by going to the threshold of its capacity and beyond, then passing its product to memory; by transgressing memory's limit, sensibility passes its product over to the faculty of cognition, and finally the difference is raised to the level of thought, in the form of repetition.

As I will explain in the next chapter, Bergson, with his account of time and memory, and their effects on the disclosure of the object, breaks down the unitary and self-same identity of the object. The object, for Deleuze and Bergson is never the same as it was; it is always becoming different in so far as it endures. It repeats its difference in itself. Therefore, the difference is not

a mere psychological event in our perception, but besides, it is an ontological entity, since the object becomes different in-itself, in terms of its internal and virtual nature, which is constantly being differentiated and divided by itself into real and novel actualizations.

CHAPTER 4

BERGSONIAN TIME

4.1. Space: Representational Time

Deleuze makes an assemblage of his understanding of time through difference and repetition with the crucial aspects of Bergsonian theory of time. Especially in Deleuze's *Bergsonism* we can see the associations and interrelations of these two distinct philosophies. The concept of pure difference and the third kind of passive synthesis of repetition can be associated with Bergsonian *durée* or pure memory, where I will use the term memory according to Bergsonian understanding and to the third passive synthesis in Deleuze rather than the second passive synthesis as I pointed out in the previous chapter. They both construct "the ontology of difference"⁷⁵ and in this last chapter I attend to clarify how they succeed in doing this.

The prominent affinity is the non-representational account of time. For Bergson, whose major works are; *Time and Free Will* and *Matter and Memory*, time is neither unidirectional nor rectilinear; besides it is not the chronological succession of instants in consciousness or an irreversible and linear progression of psychological states. We are not with a longitudinal or

⁷⁵ Constantin V. Boundas, "Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual" in *Deleuze: A Critical Reader*, ed. by Paul Patton, Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1996, p: 91.

flat temporality, which composed of threads that run horizontally between its successive points where time becomes line. In their theories, time escapes the closure of presence, and it is open to the novelty of future. Time permits an innovative and differentiated role for memory in the lives of subjects and in relations of inter-subjectivity.

The linear account of time is deduced from our representational tendency that our habit of identifying reality with presence and our illusion that the past is derived from the present. In *Bergsonism* Deleuze severally maintains these illusions, which are the result of our erroneous habit to consider time as something quantifiable. Bergson emphasizes this error as spatialization of time that is, reducing time into space.

Kant's great mistake was to take time as a homogeneous medium. He did not notice that real duration is made up of moments inside one another, and that when it seems to assume the form of a homogeneous whole, it is because it gets expressed in space.⁷⁶

Homogeneous medium means that time does not itself alter, but it is eternally the same. Because for Kant, time is an a priori form of intuition which makes the appearance of change possible in experience, without itself changing. "Time itself does not alter, but only something that is within time."⁷⁷ This claim makes time homogeneous; because it never changes on the contrary it endures as the same. So that, time imposes upon experience a temporal sequence which is homogeneous.

Therefore, Kant's version of time has no difference within itself; time cannot pass with a different tempo or velocity, but only passes by leaping

⁷⁶ Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay On The Immediate Data of Consciousness*, New York: Harper, 1960, p: 232. (Hereafter, *TFW*)

⁷⁷ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, p: 184.

from instant to instant, state to state. Things change and pass away within time, but not itself does. Furthermore, time and space are analogous in Kant. They are both the necessary representations that ground intuition; both are the a priori form of sensible intuitions. Time depends on spatial differences for its divisibility and measurability. A moment can only be sensed by its difference from its predecessor, and the difference can only be established between two states of spatial positioning.

On the contrary, homogeneity, for Bergson, is a characteristic only of a space. Instead of time, the space is what endures the same. Space is the principle of quantitative differentiation.

For it is scarcely possible to give any other definition of space: space is what enables us to distinguish a number of identical and simultaneous sensations from one another; it is thus a principle of differentiation other than that of qualitative differentiation, and consequently it is a reality with no quality.⁷⁸

Bergson divides difference into two: difference in degree and difference in kind, to which the former is assigned: quantitative differentiation, and to the latter: qualitative differentiation. The method of quantitative differentiation is applicable to the objects observed within the medium in which they are given, that is, space; however, it cannot be applied to one's purely affective psychic states and mental images. Consciousness; therefore, is subject to a different kind of differentiation, because psychic states are not given in space; are not distinct in the way that objects in space are distinct. In space, objects appear mutually exclusive, countable, comparable, analogical, similar, oppositional; that is, identifiable. The qualitative differentiation of the

⁷⁸ *TWF*, p: 95.

states of consciousness and psyche, on the other hand, cannot be accounted by symbolical representations.⁷⁹

Here I need to explicate the correlation between Deleuze and Bergson. The sensible of Deleuze is equivalent to the duration of Bergson, in the sense that, neither of them is undone by means of recognition and representation. Either the sensible or the duration is the condition for the real experience, which is called the pure difference. As we saw that the representation not only ruined the true understanding of difference, by reducing it to commonsensical negations, oppositions, and contradictions; but also, ruined that of the repetition by reducing it to commonsensical resemblances, similarities, and analogies. And now we see that representation again ruins the true nature of something; that is duration. Duration is completely damaged as it is become spatialized.

For if time, as the reflective consciousness represents it, is a medium in which our conscious states form a discrete series so as to admit of being counted, and if on the other hand our conception of number ends in spreading out in space everything which can be directly counted, it is to be presumed that time, understood in the sense of a medium in which we make distinctions and count, is nothing but space.⁸⁰

The spatial division of duration is a tendency we have in dividing up our conscious life into instants that correspond to the states of the external world. We tend to symbolize, represent, conceptualize; hence, stabilize our immanent qualitative continuity. Therefore, the conscious states lack their movement and qualitative/sensible differences, which we immediately experience them.

⁷⁹ *TFW*, p: 87.

⁸⁰ *TFW*, p: 91.

In *Time and Free Will*, Bergson clearly asserts that time, in the Kantian manner, is impossible for us to experience. Kant's treatment of time is that space is applied to consciousness, which makes the internal stream of consciousness subject to the same quantitative differentiation that the external world and objects in space are subject to. If mental life is divided up like the material world of objects into discrete and mutually exclusive parts, we would place its states in juxtaposition to one another; hence, we would give each state a definite place in time. This is to say, we would isolate each one from the times that precede and follow it. So that, it becomes impossible for us to understand the phenomena of the *passage of time* that we regularly experience within consciousness.⁸¹

Consciousness does not admit of any spatial division or quantitative differentiation, because it is wholly different in nature than things in space. Consciousness is pure duration, for Bergson, and duration has a set of characteristics opposed to space. Duration in this sense is continuous, heterogeneous, and each of its parts permeates the whole.

Therefore, time should be freed from representational chains and should be purified of homogeneity and space. It is neither internal to consciousness nor is the memory stored within the consciousness or in the brain, rather "it is we who are internal to time to the flux of duration and who move between memories of different levels and intensities in our acts of recollection, reminiscence and perceptual recognition."⁸²

⁸¹ *TWF*, p: 100-105.

⁸² Deleuze, *Cinema 2: Time Image*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1989, p: 82.

The illusion is that we can reconstitute the past with the present; that we pass gradually from one to the other; that they are distinguished by a before and an after; and that the work of the mind is carried out by the addition of elements (rather than by changes of level, genuine jumps, the reworking of systems).⁸³

Just as the intensities in the second chapter take over the whole of Ideas and make the Ideas move and then, change the whole; the present, under different aspects and in different degrees of intensity, takes over the whole of the past and change the whole of the time as to make it non-chronological. Because the past as virtual is presupposed by the actual present and the former is the condition for the latter's existence. Their reciprocal appearance excludes time as linear, horizontal lines of succession or juxtaposition of present points in terms of their immanent coexistence. Time is qualified as an eternal becoming, differentiation, and transformation with this respect.

4.2. Duration: The Real Sensible Time

Bergson shows that abstract time is a mixture of space and duration, and that more profoundly, space itself is a mixture of matter and duration, of matter and memory. Thus there is the mixture which divides itself into two tendencies: matter is effect a tendency, because it is defined as a relaxation; duration is a tendency, being a contraction. Duration is what differs from itself. Matter, on the contrary, is what does not differ from itself, what repeats. Real time in this sense is an alteration.⁸⁴

Differenciation is essentially temporal. Hence the importance that the theory of time carries for the work of Deleuze and Bergson cannot be overestimated. Time is

⁸³ *B*, pp: 61-62.

⁸⁴ Deleuze, "Bergson's conception of difference", pp: 47-48.

duration, ...what is at stake here is the primacy of the heterogeneous time of difference over the spatialized time of metrication with its quantitative segments and instants.⁸⁵

I need to remind that differentiation is the actualization of the virtual in *Difference and Repetition*, that is to say, the actualization of virtual Idea-structures. And for to get actualized, the virtual must be differentiated from itself; only the virtual is what differs itself, therefore, the virtual is the pure difference or pure past in this sense. "Entities find their sufficient reason for their production in the Idea-structure."⁸⁶ This is the process of actualization or individuation, which makes difference creative and productive.

In the process of actualization, the virtual totality develops its parts according to diverging lines, each one of which corresponds to a certain degree of the totality. Degrees which are compossible inside the virtual no longer co-exist in the lines of actualization which begin to diverge.⁸⁷

Duration divides itself constantly, but as it divides itself it changes its nature just as the intensities change Ideas intensively and continuously rather than juxtaposed extension of divergent instants. The intensity and heterogeneity of duration implies that time cannot be infinitely divisible. Duration is always incomplete, heterogeneous and a continuous emergence of novelty. Homogeneous time would be nothing but disguised space. "What is important is that the qualitative heterogeneity of duration challenges the

⁸⁵ Boundas, Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual, p: 92.

⁸⁶ Boundas, Deleuze-Bergson: An Ontology of the Virtual, p: 91.

⁸⁷ B, p: 113.

usual distinction between the form of time and its content; therefore, positions itself against the conception of time as receptacle of being.”⁸⁸

Duration is a succession and coexistence of past, present and future. Segments of duration implicate each other; each one of them is present in all others and all of them in each one. We can no longer say that the present *is* and that the past *is no more*. The present is always already becoming and the past is ceased to act but not ceased to be. The past acquires the status of being itself.⁸⁹

According to Deleuze the importance of virtual coexistence means that repetition is reintroduced into duration and this repetition is not a physical repetition of the matter, but rather a psychic repetition of the spirit and memory. Virtual repetition is the repetition of all the levels of entire past. The leap into the past, with which every act of recollection begins, is characterized as an ontological leap because for Bergson, being is in the past. Being is of the past, not a particular past, but the eternal past in general, that past which has never been present.⁹⁰ “We really leap into being, into being in-itself, into the being in itself of the past. It is a case of leaving psychology altogether. It is a case of an immemorial or ontological memory.”⁹¹

In the third chapter of *Matter and Memory* Bergson deals with the ontological (non-chronological) account of time as memory. If I am allowed to summarize this part with one sentence, it exposes the true relations of past and present, which does not consist of conscious states or subjective

⁸⁸ Walter M. Elsasser, “A Reformulation of Bergson’s Theory of Memory”, in *Philosophy of Science*, Vol.20, No.1 (Jan, 1953), p: 14.

⁸⁹ G. Watts Cunningham, “Bergson’s Conception of Duration”, in *The Philosophical Review*, Vol.23, No.5 (Sep, 1914), p: 534.

⁹⁰ *B*, pp: 57-60.

⁹¹ *B*, p: 57.

perceptions. According to Bergson, though past and present may seem to form a psychological continuity, the one following upon the other in degrees, ontologically they are discontinuous. The only way of moving between them is by leaps. Here we arrive at Deleuze's "Paradox of the leap: we place ourselves at once, in a leap, in the ontological element of the past."⁹²

As I mentioned in the second chapter each repetition appears in different levels since each over takes, comprises and envelops the whole virtuality and whole is differentiated by every actual state, each actual state envelops such a different level in each time. Here in Bergson, past and present are no longer stated on the same line, but constitute different planes of being, related and articulated in coexistence. This coexistence means that the present already includes the past, not merely in fact but in principle, that presence implies memory and cannot be conceived without it. Deleuze emphasizes the ontological dimension of Bergson's approach with "The Bergsonian idea that each actual present is only the entire past in its most contracted state"⁹³ and also "The present that endures divides at each instant into two directions, one oriented and dilated toward the past, the other contracted, contracting toward the future."⁹⁴ This is the radical alteration that defines Bergsonian *durée*: a continual differentiation proceeding in several directions at once, a coexistence of tendencies that translate differences in kind.

⁹² B, p: 61.

⁹³ DR, p: 82.

⁹⁴ B, p: 52.

Past is not actual but virtual. It forms the whole to which the passage of the present relates. All presents pass through this whole and alter it, but meanwhile the present never passes, it 'is' at once on the ontological space of the past. For the present to pass, is needed a condition to relate, this condition is the whole past, past in general or pure past. The latter is the condition means, it makes present pass through, that is, to be actualized. When the present is actualized coexistently interacts with the virtual past and changes the whole.

The pure past is presupposed by every old and new present. It cannot be represented but without it there can be representation possible. This a-priori past, which insists in the old present and persists in the actual pre-exists every present. Therefore the entire past preserves itself and coexists with every present. This past has never been present since it cannot be constituted after the construction of the present.⁹⁵

Past is therefore, the ontological condition for present to be. Whence the present is actualized it dilates through future and contracts through past. The mostly contracted instant of the past is the present. All virtual past is also related in itself, all its planes are contracted by the actualized present, the doubled and twined movement of the relation makes the virtual and the actual coexistent and interdependent.

"The past and the present do not denote two successive moments, but two elements which coexist: one is the present, which does not cease to pass, and the other is the past, which does not cease to be but through which all presents pass."⁹⁶ "All of the past coexists with the new present in relation to which is now past. When we say that the past is contemporaneous with

⁹⁵ Constantin V. Boundas, *Deleuze-Bergson: an Ontology of the Virtual*, p: 94.

⁹⁶ *B*, p: 59.

the present that it *was*, we necessarily speak of a past which never was present.”⁹⁷

That past which was never present is a ‘pure past’ or a ‘past in general’. This *a priori* element of the past is “the pure element of the past in general pre-exists the passing present.”⁹⁸ This is because “the virtual past is presupposed by the actual present as the pure condition without which it would not pass.”⁹⁹

If the whole of the past coexists with every present, but also preexists the present in general, then the past is not dependent on the present for its existence. Rather the past preserves itself in itself. In this sense, it is not only with the present that the past coexists, but also priorly with itself in a state of pure and dynamic virtuality.

In the past itself there appear all kinds of levels of profundity, marking all the possible intervals in this coexistence... Each of these sections is itself *virtual*, belonging to the being in itself of the past. Each of these sections or each of these levels includes not particular elements of the past, but always the totality of the past. It includes this totality at a more or less expanded or contracted level.¹⁰⁰

The past, through the present recollection, brings being to the present, and the virtual is that which constitutes psychological consciousness and its perceptions. The past, for Bergson, is that which has *being*, and the present is that which is *becoming*; therefore *is not*. The present is always transforming itself as an opening to the future. The past in general makes

⁹⁷ *DR*, pp: 81-82.

⁹⁸ *DR*, p: 82.

⁹⁹ *B*, p: 59.

¹⁰⁰ *B*, pp: 59-60.

possible the passage of every particular present. This placing of being in the eternal past is what defines the virtual.

In *Bergsonism*, Deleuze mainly focuses on the ontological significance of duration; the unconscious being of the past. Virtual is the leitmotif of Deleuzian and Bergsonian ontology of difference, where the term refers to 'pure past' in Bergson and 'pure difference' in Deleuze. Difference is what being produces, and being is what it is, in virtue of becoming different in nature or kind. Every being is living in its alteration and difference from that which it has been, through the real movement of duration.

"Difference marks the real dynamic of being – it is the movement that grounds being."¹⁰¹ According to Deleuze and Bergson, being becomes what it is by becoming different. Being *is* becoming; the repetition of elements that occur within the pure difference or difference in-itself, which never actually, but rather virtually repeat. Eternal past of the virtual is coexistent with being; it is the condition for being present and becoming different. Virtual plane of immanence in Deleuze's philosophy corresponds to the memory in Bergson.

4.3. Memory

Bergson's probing of the duration of the consciousness and spirit leads him to an explication of memory. Memory provides the infiltration of the past in the present, constituting the duration of present perception in consciousness. In *Matter and Memory*, Bergson suggests a solution for recollection and perception dualism by declaring pure (ontological) memory.

¹⁰¹ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota press, 2002, p: 2.

The process of the actualization of the virtual explains how pure past creates a present as completely different and novel.

Memory does not mean empirical recollection, but on the contrary, it is the past in itself that has never been existed, and again, the present is the maximal contraction of entire past. Bergson carries his theory of duration from psychology to ontology. He proposes ontology as such that all kinds of dualisms – physical and psychical, body and spirit, consciousness and unconsciousness, past and present – are unified in the sense of pure memory or pure past.

The relationship between memory and perception relies upon an ontological memory, namely, pure recollection, unconsciously exhibiting an actual force of the past in-itself. The past is called forth to constitute psychological consciousness; it responds to a problem with the entirety of its eternal being, and in turn makes being become different in-itself. Actualization is a tendency of the virtual, which conditions the contraction of the present perception, and consequently, the psychological duration of consciousness.¹⁰²

As the most contracted level of past is present for Deleuze, the most contracted degree of memory is the memory of present; that is, virtual image for Bergson. That the present is already a memory allows it to come into contact with the rest of the past. Therefore, the reciprocal being of past and present is appeared on the scene of memory and memory becomes the condition for movement of time. The past seeks to come into present and to be actualized by means of remembering, but in one remembering the whole of the past can never be enveloped, the whole past cannot be actualized in one perception, that is why the whole past remains always indefinite and

¹⁰² John Mullarkey, "Forget the Virtual: Bergson, actualism, and the refraction of reality", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 37, pp: 485-486.

unknown for a conscious subject. This dark side of the past, the unconscious state of time allows memory to get renewed and varied.

The virtual image forms an internal connection between perception and the past in general. It is in this way that memories can come to be usefully actualized and inserted into present perception, rendering it concrete. The virtual image [memory of the present] makes possible concrete perception by contracting into it not only the immediate past but also the memories that resonate with this immediate past.¹⁰³

The virtual image and perception is coexistent in Bergson. Memories make perception concrete because perception is only possible by contracting the past. Without the virtual condition the perception would remain fleeting and instantaneous that is to say, barely conscious as Bergson severally points out in the first chapter of *Matter and Memory*. Memory of the present (individual memory) makes the present visible by putting it in contact with the whole past (virtual memory). The past is presupposed by perception means the memory is presupposed by the matter. Therefore, the matter is only actualized by virtual memory. Individual memories have two values: first, they connect the present to the past so that they provide a ground for actual events to realize themselves, second; they provide reality for whole virtual memory by means of expressing latter in the present.¹⁰⁴

The whole past remains virtual, means that it is not actualized. It only functions as the condition for other planes of memory, which come into contact with each other and become actualized in the present. The virtual memory addresses the non-representational thus pure past or the past that

¹⁰³ Alia Al-Saji, "The memory of another past: Bergson, Deleuze and a new theory of time", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, (2004) 37, p: 227.

¹⁰⁴ Bergson, *Matter and Memory*, New York: Zone Books, 1988, pp: 71-78.

has never been present. Memory as a virtual ground dethrones consciousness and replaces it with an immanent experience. “Consciousness cannot go through the same state twice. The circumstances may still be the same but they will no longer act on the same person, since they find him at a new moment of his history.”¹⁰⁵

Since there is no identical repetition of an event, memory is neither a passive imprint on the mind nor an inert or indifferent thing. What pure memory expresses is neither a copy of itself in the world nor a representation of the present from which it was formed; rather the pure memory is a simulacrum. Simulacrum in the sense that: the memory is purely preserved in the present as pre-existent and co-existent. There is no paradoxical account in here because pure past or memory is the virtual production of difference inside the present, that is, the condition for present to become differentiated and actualized in every moment.

Deleuze suggests that difference in itself can be thought only if one questions identity as the ground of representation. Questioning the ground of identity involves dissolving the distinction between original and copy, model and form and looking to the sign as that which interiorizes difference as the condition of its repetition. Simulacra are not copies of originals or imitations of the thing itself, but signs and things traversed by interior differences. Simulacra are the signs of disparity as the conditions of real experience, that is, of the unlimited repetition of differences themselves.¹⁰⁶

The simulacrum is built upon a disparity or upon a difference. It internalizes a dissimilarity. This is why we can no longer define it in relation to a model imposed on the copies, a model of the Same from which the copies' resemblance derives. If the simulacrum still has a model, it

¹⁰⁵ Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, Mineola, N.Y. : Dover, 1998, p: 6. (Hereafter *CE*)

¹⁰⁶ Patrick Hayden, *Multiplicity and Becoming: The Pluralist Empiricism of Gilles Deleuze*, p: 17.

is another model, a model of the Other from which there flows an internalized dissemblance.¹⁰⁷

Bergson and Deleuze jointly assert the unity in the multiplicity. Eternal repetition or pure memory refers the univocity of being and guarantees the impossibility of the repetition of the same. Heterogeneous differences cannot be subsumed by any order of identity and cannot be represented by any kind of quantity and concept. Duration (process of differentiation) can never be represented by an identity.

In its temporalizing function, intuition reminds us that thought must attempt to achieve mobility and fluidity, accepting no final definition or meaning. In seeking to turn attention away from the spatial in favour of the temporal, Bergson's theory of memory anticipates the poststructuralist concentration on the indeterminacy of meaning. We commonly believe that the past has ceased to exist and that which exists is in fact the present moment. This would be, however, to confuse being with being present.¹⁰⁸

But as we see in Deleuze, "...the present *is not*; rather, it is pure becoming, always outside itself. It is not, but it acts. Its proper element is not being but the active or the useful. The past on the other hand has ceased to act or to be useful. But it has not ceased to be. It *is* in the full sense of the word. It is identical with being in itself."¹⁰⁹

The past *is*, the past *exists* while the present *acts*. The past as a true understanding of a reality of time displaces the present, which makes memory fixed, and a stabilized archive of lived experiences. Memory in

¹⁰⁷ Nathan Widder, "The Rights of Simulacra: Deleuze and the Univocity of Being", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 34, 2001, p: 448.

¹⁰⁸ John Marks, *Gilles Deleuze: Vitalism and Multiplicity*, p: 70.

¹⁰⁹ *B*, p: 55.

Deleuzian and Bergsonian sense is the one vivid and always ready to be renewed and changed.

Memory is the coexistence of past and present, that is, of virtual and actual. It is the coexistence of degrees of difference. “The meaning of memory is to give the virtuality of duration itself an objective consistency, which enables it to realize itself. Memory is not a representation of something, but it *is*.”¹¹⁰ That is to say, memory does not represent us something which has been, but simply which is a memory of the present. “The present is only the most contracted degree of memory, it is an immediate past.”¹¹¹

Bergson’s theory of degrees founds a theory of differentiation. Two moments are differentiated in degrees in memory because at each moment duration (difference from itself) splits itself into two symmetrical spurts, one of which falls back towards the past, while the other springs forwards towards the future. So that the present is either the immediate past as it is the most contracted degree of the past, or the imminent future as the relaxation point of present.¹¹²

The reciprocal relation of past, present and future is provided by the differentiation in degrees that is, memory and what is differentiated from itself is *durée*.

If we are to understand the Bergson’s emanation of being correctly, we should not conceive it as a differentiation in space but an actualization in time. This is where Bergsonian memory comes into play. In the past, Bergson finds pure being – a recollection that is pure, virtual, impassive, inactive, *in itself*. The creative moment

¹¹⁰ Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, p: 55.

¹¹¹ Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, pp: 59-60.

¹¹² Deleuze, “Bergson’s Conception of Difference”, p: 60.

¹¹³ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p: 17.

from the past unity to the present multiplicity is the process of actualization.¹¹³

The communication of actual and virtual is what Deleuze calls the process of differentiation or actualization. The virtualities are always real in the past and in the memory, and may become actualized in the present. Furthermore, the communication of two is seen in the two movements of memory: “the recollection-memory that dilates or enlarges in an inclusive moment toward the past and the contraction-memory that concentrates toward the future as a process of particularization.”¹¹⁴ As looking backward we see the universal and looking forward we see the individual. The creative, vital power of actualization is to create a new unity towards the future.

“We do not move from the present to the past, from perception to recollection, but from the past to the present, from recollection to perception.”¹¹⁵ “In these terms the organization of the actual would have to be a movement from perception to a new recollection that would be a future memory.”¹¹⁶

The ontological past implies that the past is not conserved in us, but that it is we who find ourselves, by leaps and bounds, in the past. Then the virtual coexistence and repetition of the past have a great importance for the memory. Non-representational memory means that memory is not an image. Just as the present is a fluid continuum, memory must be a virtual whole that accompanies to the present. Since it is always applied to an actual present

¹¹⁴ B, p: 52.

¹¹⁵ B, p: 63.

¹¹⁶ Michael Hardt, *Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy*, p: 21.

and since that it is only an actualized present is represented, the memory is the ontological ground of present's existence. So that a present time can be an image, a representation but a past in general or memory can never be.

The virtual is the most widespread concept in Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, where we can accept virtual as the pure difference ontologically subtending our actual world. "The virtual becomes a *well-founded* perspectival and psychological phenomenon – an emergent product formed through the interplay between a multiplicity of actual identities including spatial and temporal continuities *and* discontinuities, identities *and* differences, quantities *and* qualities."¹¹⁷

In *Matter and Memory* we see that pure memory is a plane where whole past is entangled and coexists at different levels of contraction and expansion and an individual memory can only be extricated from a plane of the past by actualization. But as an interconnected and infinitely detailed whole, pure memory remains unconscious; it cannot be represented as such.

As we see in Deleuze's *Cinema 2: Time Image*,

There are two heterogeneous processes that divide the present into two: 1) a jet of actualization that is launched toward the future, guided by action and the attention to life; 2) a jet of virtualization that falls into the past and that is the condition for the formation of the past and the passage of the present. The two jets continue to interpenetrate and to coexist in a relation of reciprocal presupposition or reversibility: the virtual becomes actualized and inserted into new and successive presents, and the actual becomes virtualized as these presents continue to pass.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ J. Mullarkey, "Forget the virtual: Bergson, actualism and the refraction of reality", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 2004, 37: 469-493, p: 471.

¹¹⁸ pp: 81-82.

The past is changed by the present part of the past; that is, the contemporaneous virtualization of the present. All actual presents presuppose and dependent on the virtual past. The dynamism, the transformation of the past owes to the connection via the past of the present as the reorganization and the redistribution of memories on the planes of the past from an aleatory point of the present. The continuity of the present is not the successive juxtaposition of actual time-points, but it is the interpenetration and overlap of actual moments by means of a virtual dimension of past that coexists with each.

Such an ontological (non-chronological) memory is not a recollection; pure memory is not a state of consciousness or a content of the mind or brain so that a different kind of forgetting is the issue. Remembering is the way of connecting to the world and an individual's access to life. Remembering or forgetting is not one of mental, psychological or physiological states, but rather, an ontological one since they express the capacity to be affected; hence, to be differentiated and to differentiate. What we remember or forget provide us infinitely possible futures and direct us through inexact, unpredictable, entirely contingent future states. An access to memory is an entry to future. The past as a conditional ground provides a threshold of the future.

The leaps, the transition among different planes of memory is possible by the way that forgetting or remembering draws. The transformation of a past in general is only possible by this act of forgetting or remembering in order for a subject to become an individual. We can be able to left our distinct and restricted philosophical subjectivity and become as an individual via the

altered form of experiencing as Deleuze and Bergson suggest in various terms and systems. Here in understanding of time, we are not any more the conscious beings who experience time through the mediation of categories, but rather we experience time as we get temporal beings, as we are experienced in time, that is, we live *in* time by means of memory, we are time itself since we are actualized due to the conditions of time serves for us. Our individual memories are the expression of virtual anonymous time, and as we get realized through time, we reciprocally make time seen, expressed and lived. And we attain doing this by intuition according to Bergson.

4.4. Intuition

“Intuition gives us the thing, whose spatial transposition, whose metaphorical translation alone, is seized by the intellect.”¹¹⁹

Bergson establishes the method of intuition for the sake of the duration, which is not grasped by the intellectual knowledge. Intuitive knowledge, however, can grasp the real dynamic of actual living duration; besides, it makes the knowledge of duration not only possible, but also actual. Unlike the Kantian epistemology, intuition does not impose pre-made forms onto sensibility. Intuition immediately apprehends being in its duration; in its evolution of change, rather than viewing it as a representation under a general form, which persists in time as the same. For Bergson and Deleuze,

¹¹⁹ Henri Bergson, *The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics*, Bridgewater, NJ: Replica Books, 1999, p: 71. (Hereafter *CM*)

the intellect has fixed to the static and immobile image of reality, whose reproduction is owing to resemblance and over-generalization.

The conditions of possible experience are the intellect's method of becoming conscious of stable entities that it may shape and manipulate. In other words, the conditions of possible experience make experience appear conformable and formed in light of certain characteristics or properties as being immobile, discontinuous, discrete, quantitative and mechanistic. And for both Bergson and Deleuze, what is possible is general and abstract, which is not real since it is only an afterimage of what has been.

Bergson rejects the conceptual method which he regards as the dominant tradition in philosophy. Reality is not to be reached by any elaborate construction of thought; it is given in immediate experience as a flux, a continuous process of becoming, to be grasped by intuition. To get at reality in its living movement we must break out of the prison of concepts and immerse ourselves, as best we may, in the flux.¹²⁰

Both Bergsonian intuition and Deleuzian transcendental empiricism are searches for real and necessary conditions, which consist the liberation of experience from Kantian limitative conditioning.

If empiricism traditionally deduces the intelligible from the sensible, transcendental empiricism wants to resist validating a dogma about the essence of the mind or of reality; yet its concern does lie primarily in the concrete diversity of the sensible. Philosophical thinking for Deleuze, aims at directly at the very *Being* of the sensible in its immanence – as opposed to desperately wanting to reach sensible *beings* through a series of intellectual reductions.¹²¹

¹²⁰ Edward Douglas Fawcett, "Matter and Memory", in *Mind*, New Series, Vol. 21, No.82, Apr, 1912, p:202.

¹²¹ Valentine Moulard, "The time-image and Deleuze's transcendental experience", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 35: 325-345, 2002, p: 326

The conditions of real experience are transcendental, because they are different in kind from what they condition, yet they immediately contain their own necessity. The Kantian transcendental conditions of possibility are negative conditions of necessity in the sense that in his view, we would not be able to perceive, or for that matter, to have any experience at all, if it were not for the positing of such conditions. Kant claims that the forms of space and time are necessary conditions without which phenomenological experience would not be possible. In contrast, Bergson and Deleuze search for conditions of reality, which aims at generating the positive categories of thought rather than determining them through analysis. Beneath or beyond the negative necessity invoked by the Kantian critique, they point to the fundamental positivity of the real and its conditions: in this consists both their internal necessity and the virtually unlimited field of their transformative and creative actualization.¹²²

Bergson accuses intellectual knowledge – to which Deleuze calls representative – for its inability to explain how experience *becomes* real. It only presents us with a number of conceptions of how it would be derived from our understanding of how it already is or was. The intellect is dealt only with the general conditions; while the instinct is concerned with particular reality.

The method of intuition mediates these two distinct modes of acting and knowing: “...all concrete instinct is mingled with intelligence, as all real

¹²² Valentine Moulard, “The time-image and Deleuze’s transcendental experience”, in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 35: 325-345, 2002, p: 342.

intelligence is penetrated by instinct.”¹²³ Furthermore, he adds that: “There are things that intelligence alone is able to seek, but which, by itself, it will never find. These things instinct alone could find; but it will never seek them.”¹²⁴ And the reason why Bergson intermingle these modes: “...while instinct and intelligence both involve knowledge, this knowledge is rather *acted* and unconscious in the case of instinct, *thought* and conscious in the case of intelligence.”¹²⁵

The distinction between intellect and instinct is that, the former consciously thinks about what to do, and this leads to a distance between act and idea. On the contrary, there is no space between the act and the idea for the intellect. In its selection mode, consciousness comes to represent the world in the point of view of how it conceives itself, endowed with the power to act upon it.

Both of these modes of knowing are limited in what they can and cannot attain. Instinct may know an object or part of an object intimately and fully, which is implied in its accomplished action; yet it can only know one single object or a restricted part of it. Instinctual knowledge treats everything as unique and individual; hence omits the possibility of generalization; that is to say instinctual knowledge is a pure content. The intellectual knowledge, on the contrary, holds for a form of the experience. It expresses the tendency of

¹²³ *CE*, p: 136.

¹²⁴ *CE*, p: 151.

¹²⁵ *CE*, p: 145.

life to externalize itself and generalize its knowledge over the totality of a transcendental field.¹²⁶

Instinct is an unconscious active repetition of the past, but the repetition is never the one of the same. The past is not reproduced the same as it was and given the same influence as it had once before, because the novelty of the present is not reducible to any image of the past which resembles it. This is to say, the present cannot be made to fit into the ready-made forms reproduced from past experience without the elimination of the present's novelty.

Intellectual faculty makes experience subject to appearance through a unity of representation, which distills only a static image of the continuous and mobile reality that underlies the unified representations of experience. By contrast, in intuition, experience is fully continuous and mobile – it becomes. Therefore, the intellect cannot manage to account for the new, as it cannot conceive of real, continuous being. “We are at ease only in the discontinuous, in the immobile, in the dead. The intellect is characterized by a natural inability to comprehend life.”¹²⁷

The limited intellectual capacity of our minds has led to the confusion of space and time; we have developed the intellectual habit of representing our experience using categories, which subject experience to spatial discreteness, and this is what destroys the continuity in experience. Intuition, for Bergson, does not deny or distort the temporal and differential relations in reality. He says,

¹²⁶ *CE*, pp: 143-150.

¹²⁷ *CE*, p: 165.

...intuition may enable us to grasp what it is that intelligence fails to give us, and indicate the means of supplementing it. On the one hand, it will utilize the mechanism of intelligence itself to show how intellectual molds cease to be strictly applicable; and on the other hand, by its own work, it will suggest to us the vague feeling, if nothing more, of what must take the place of intellectual molds.¹²⁸

Intuition is an internal differentiation, bringing sensible intuition to consciousness without the help of representation via the filter of the general categories. It is an immediate apprehension of the sensible, which is brought to consciousness through reflection. Intuition is a reclaiming of immanence, as it does not depend on the application of transcendent categories, which are detached or abstracted from experience. Since implanted in the experience of movement and difference in duration, intuition immediately apprehends the sensible.

“Each line of evolution, or form of life, is seen to carry the trace (*memory*) of all the other lines or lives that have split off from it. Life continues to remember other lines of differentiation and other planes, so that we can meet on one line of evolution, the memory of what develops along other lines.”¹²⁹

We all remember the others as pure or virtual pasts that have never been present for us, this interpenetration of memory is a virtual coexistence of our actual presences, that is, our own singular degree of attention to life and our own intensity of remembering. We hold and carry the non-actualized or excluded or forgotten planes in our virtual memory. The memory of other pasts, which have never been present for us; of other lives, which we have

¹²⁸ CE, p: 177.

¹²⁹ CE, p: 120.

not lived, persists as a virtual history accompanying our actual lives and pasts. This credit given to memory makes our experiences freed from the subjective perspectives and allows this act wholly inter-subjective, interrelated, interconnected and interdependent. All these *inters* emphasize Deleuzian principle as everything in the world connects with everything in metaphysical ground.

...to think intuitively is to think in duration. Intelligence starts ordinarily from the immobile, and reconstructs movement as best it can with immobilities in juxtaposition. Intuition starts from movement, posits it, or rather perceives it as reality itself, and sees in immobility only an abstract moment, a snapshot taken by our mind, of a mobility.¹³⁰

Intuition opens us onto different histories, memories and perspectives and this intra-memorial past involves a repetition of each other from different perspectives and at different intensities and different remembering and forgettings, which allow all of us to live our own life but only as a member of a common virtual history where the memory is again nothing but ontology. Pure memory is in excess of recollection, actuality and consciousness. It is we who belong to memory, to different planes of the past. "The only subjectivity is time, non-chronological time grasped in its foundation, and it is we who are internal to time, not the other way round. Time is not the interiority in us, but just the opposite, the interiority in which we are, we move, live and change. Subjectivity is never ours, it is time, that is, the soul, or the spirit, the virtual."¹³¹

¹³⁰ *CM*, p: 34.

¹³¹ Deleuze, *Cinema 2: Time Image*, p: 82.

All around this chapter I tried to explicate that time is not only subjective for Bergson and Deleuze, moreover than that, ourselves as conscious beings or subjects are *temporal* in the sense that we are subject to time as *becoming beings*.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Throughout *Difference and Repetition* and *Bergsonism*, Deleuze explicitly or implicitly declares his method as transcendental empiricism, whose main objective is to find out the “virtual conditions for the real experience”, rather than the “necessary conditions for all possible experience”. This effort can be seen as a return to things-in-themselves, because one does not account for each thing by appeal to something other than themselves; one does not reduce them to the other, but rather one attempts to grasp them in the uniqueness of their being.

I tried to manage to explicate this method by the revelation of the relation between difference and duration. Deleuze draws his concept of pure difference from Bergson’s account of duration. Pure difference is the condition for reality as it is a concrete universal which envelops all the coexisting degrees of difference internally. Both transcendental empiricism and intuition designate us a renewed form of reality, which is entirely opposed to the representational and recognitive forms of thought.

All the systems, which have a commitment to transcendent forms, representation or ‘dogmatic image of thought’, exclude the possibility of real difference. Representation; therefore is opposed to the objectives of transcendental empiricism. Transcendental empiricism works with the

empirically given actuality of experience and seeks for the understanding of difference in the sensible. These differences, felt in the sensible, are the transcendentals or virtual conditions, making the empirical determinations of real experience actual.

Virtual conditions, by means of their differentiation, actualize the difference. Virtual is the force of difference that protects repetition from being reduced to similarity, equivalence, sameness; hence identity. Difference perpetuates its own repetition, and what repeats, is the difference in-itself. Contrary to what Kant accounted for faculties, Deleuze abolishes common sense and affirms discordance among the faculties in order to determine the profoundly different spatio-temporal relations encountered by intuition. As in “The Image Of Thought” section of *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze asserts that, thought in representational manner can never think to encounter with something completely new and different. Because common sense ensures that the faculties and their givens always accord harmoniously. On the contrary, for Deleuze, thought must be forced to think by an unexpected encounter in order to reach its internal differences. This subject as revalued and reformed, which experiences the given immanently in the sensible is called individual. The individual is the effect of the resistance to the epidemic of identity in the traditional thought of philosophy.

Deleuze aims to undermine this strong relation between commonsensical views of the world as based on fixed things and the philosophical reliance on identity. He criticizes the dominance of ‘image of thought’ in the history of philosophy, an image based on the subjection of our differing senses – as imagination, sensibility, and memory – to a unified self-

consciousness and its capacity to represent. The critique goes on the way in which difference in itself and repetition for itself have been missed or seen as secondary to the illusions of identity that result from this dominance of representation.

Deleuze tries to shift Man from his central place as the determiner of all meanings. Usurping Man from this radial point does involve re-directing ontology from Man to being, but the univocal being to which Deleuze refers is a transcendental difference. The subject is shifted by placing the source of concept creation not in the subject but in the empirical, which he understands as the domain of intensities and individuations that operate outside of the universalizing patterns of representational thinking.¹³²

The search for the 'conditions for the real experience' in the second chapter of this work is turned into the search for the 'conditions of the real time' in the third chapter. The objection through representational theories which takes difference for identity, resemblance, similarity and analogy; besides also through dialectics which takes difference for negation, opposition and contradiction is still obvious in Deleuzian understanding of time. Deleuze suggests an alternative conception of difference, by thinking difference in time. Temporalizing difference means making it into a dynamic notion, which describes the movement and becoming of time, as the transforming power that Bergson defines as duration.

The cognition of new kind of reality is based on two of the crucial concepts as virtuality and actuality in Deleuze and Bergson. As how virtuality makes difference *causa sui*, that is to say, difference is only differed from itself in its actualization process; in the structure of time, virtuality ascribes to time an account of quality rather than quantity of spatialized representation.

¹³² Simon Lumsden, "Deleuze, Hegel and the Transformation of Subjectivity", in *The Philosophical Forum*, Volume XXXIII, No.2, Summer 2002, p: 144.

The definition of the virtual most pertinent to Deleuze's ontology is in terms of Bergsonian *durée* and the virtual memory. This virtual pure memory is characterized in *Matter and Memory* as the persistence of the past, as the ongoing existence of the past after its passing and out of which new presents emerge.¹³³

Since there is nothing beyond appearance and no transcendent reality, difference and becoming are immanent to reality. This renewed state of reality is difference in itself or pure difference and virtual memory in Bergsonian sense.

Difference in itself is not given to us in the form of identity. This means that an encounter with it must occur, not means of the stable identities given to us in consciousness, but beneath or within those identities. Difference in itself is grounding for identity but does not appear as such (as difference in itself) within those identities. It is not phenomenologically accessible. Thus, a search for difference in itself must abandon the project of investigating directly the givens of experience and turn toward a more hidden realm. Deleuze discovers that realm in the nature of time.¹³⁴

The content of past which exists virtually in the present, is difference in itself. Since there can be no repetition of the same, every moment that contains the past as a virtual whole, repeats this difference in itself, and that is the virtual memory by definition. The present carries the past and its difference within it, as a constitutive moment rather than existing separately.

There is only the unfolding of difference in time and becoming is the unfolding of difference in time and as time. Being as difference is a virtually existent pure duration whose unfolding we can call becoming, but only on the understanding that the difference, which becomes is not specific something but the chaos which produces all somethings.¹³⁵

¹³³ J. Mullarkey, "Forget the virtual: Bergson, actualism and the refraction of reality", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 2004, No: 37, p: 473.

¹³⁴ Todd May, "When is a Deleuzian becoming?", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 36:2003, p: 145.

¹³⁵ Todd May, "When is a Deleuzian becoming?", in *Continental Philosophy Review*, 36:2003, p: 145.

The virtual and the actual construct the structure of time. The past is virtual in the sense that it describes the modes of existing of difference because the virtual is real, is a ground and the one exists. However, the present is actual in the sense that it is the expression of difference, it is the repetition for itself but not exists, rather acts as a differentiator of whole past or memory through future as a mediator within the eternal flux.

All these reciprocal processes through virtual and actual is called becoming. Becoming in this sense is the affirmation of being and the realization of time. We are no more conscious subjects as external to time but we are individuals as being of the sensible within duration. We are not only actual selves outside time but virtual individuals within memory.

As declared in *Bergsonism*, difference is time, so that we are subjected to time in order to become actualized. All our individual histories constitute the whole past of the true reality. All our individual but inter-subjective, inter-dependent, inter-connected, inter-related lives assign to time vitality and vivacity. Therefore, as being individuals, we all become *the memory of the time*. Every being in the world is the living state of time: the vivid, productive, creative and dynamic sort of memory. As living beings, we are the history of time. And as much that we live, time gets full of life.

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