

**EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND ITS OTHERS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN AND THE TURKISH CASES**

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ABSTRACT

EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND ITS OTHERS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN AND THE TURKISH CASES

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This thesis analyzes the European identity and its others with a special focus on two Eastern “Others”: the Russian and the Turk. In this context firstly the notion of identity, the role of difference in the formation of identity and the role of identity in international relations will be explored. Thereby the significance of identity in shaping the international relations will be shown. Then the development of Europe and European identity and its various others will be examined with a historical perspective. In the light of this exploration, the emergence of the East-West divide, the historical evolution of relations with the Russian and the Turk in relation with the changing connotations of the European identity will be studied. Finally the Russian and Turkish cases will be examined in a comparative way. In this way the converging and diverging points between the two cases in terms of their relationship with Europe and their place vis à vis Europe will be analyzed..

Keywords: European identity, the Other, the Turk, the Russian

ÖZ

AVRUPA KİMLİĞİ VE ÖTEKİLERİ: RUS VE TÜRK ÖRNEKLERİNİN KARŞILAŞTIRMALI İNCELEMESİ

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Bu tez, Avrupa'nın doğulu iki ötekisi, Rus ve Türk üzerine özel vurgu yaparak, Avrupa kimliğini ve onun "ötekilerini" incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, öncelikle kimlik kavramı, kimliğin oluşumunda farklılığın rolü, ve uluslararası ilişkilerde kimliğin rolü incelenecektir. Böylece, kimliğin, uluslararası ilişkileri şekillendirmedeki ortaya konulacaktır. Ardından, Avrupa'nın, Avrupa Kimliğinin ve farklı ötekilerinin gelişimi tarihsel bir perspektifle incelenecektir. Bu araştırmanın ışığında, Doğu-Batı bölünmesinin ortaya çıkışı, Avrupa'nın değişen anlamlarına bağlı olarak, Ruslar ve Türklerle olan ilişkilerin tarihsel gelişimi incelenecektir. Son olarak, Türk ve Rus ötekiler, karşılaştırmalı olarak ele alınıp, bu şekilde her iki örneğin, Avrupa'yla ilişkileri ve Avrupa'ya göre konumları açısından birbirleriyle uyuşan ve birbirlerinden ayrılan noktaları incelenecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa kimliği, Öteki, Türk, Rus

To My Husband

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1. INTRODUCTION

Identity is a subject, which has recently gained increasing importance in several branches of social sciences. Although in international relations it has been widely accepted that the self-interested states are the main actors in international relations, recently, in the study of IR, the identity has been gaining increasing importance. Especially some recent ideas put forward by some scholars like Huntington have increased interest in identity and culture in the study of International Relations. Moreover due to the developments which took place after the end of the Cold War, with the rise of ethnic nationalism, optimistic scenarios on the future of international affairs started to lose their popularity. Attempts of ethnic cleansing in Caucasia and former Yugoslavia reminded once more the importance of the national and ethnic identities in world politics.

More particularly, in the field of European Studies, in the context of discussions on the exclusive or inclusive nature of European identity, the issue of identity has become a subject of paramount importance. The importance of defining Europe and European identity gains increasing significance with the discussions on the enlargement of the European Union (EU). How far should the EU enlargement go? Which countries should be admitted to EU, which countries should not be? When trying to define European identity, the issue of non-European identities or the “other(s)” of European identity gains increasing importance. In this context, the origins of the European identity, its existence and other identities against which European identity came into being, are among the most important areas of study.

Of course Europe has had different meanings throughout its history. Parallel with these different meanings, it has had different others. However, in European history and in the context of EU enlargement, the others which are most often pronounced are probably Russians and Turks. During its history, Europe has had intense interaction with these others. Consequently, as in the case of every identity formation, these others have had important role in shaping the European identity. Equally, Europe has had important role in shaping its others' identities.

In order to acquire an understanding on discussions about European identity, it is important to have an idea on the issue of identity. The first section of the study consists of a general survey on the concept of identity, with special focus on the collective identity. Throughout this study, identity will be referring to collective identity.

The existence of a difference is a vital component of any identity formation. Each identity gains significance with the existence of difference. However the nature of difference has also a significant role in the identity formation. Sometimes the difference may result with otherization sometimes it may not. After defining concepts such as identity, personal identity, social identity, collective identity and difference, the chapter will go on with a study on the importance of difference in identity formation. As stated above, identity is a unit of study in several branches of social sciences. Studies on international relations have long witnessed the dominance of realism over other theories. However recent regional and global developments exhibit the importance of culture and identity in the formation of state interests. Finally in this section, the importance of identity and difference in the recent studies of international relations will be discussed. In this context, the challenge of cultural studies to realism will be elaborated.

Although it is with the enlargement and deepening process of EU and the discourse of Fortress Europe that discussions on European identity has gained increasing importance, today, even the existence of a genuine European identity is still a controversial debate. The existence of such an identity is questioned in several fields. Firstly, the geographical ambiguity of the so-called European continent makes it difficult to refer to the European identity as a separate continental identity. Secondly, European history has not been one characterized by European integration. Instead European history has been characterized by the divides and wars among Europe's inhabitants. Thirdly, in terms of culture, it is difficult to determine a specific culture which would define the whole continent under the same umbrella. For instance it is difficult to claim that a Swedish is more similar to an Italian compared to a Turk.

In fact, the idea of an integral Europe and European identity are deeply rooted in the history. Throughout history there have been different connotations of the concept of Europe. However it is not possible to claim that European identity is as older as the continent and the idea of Europe. European identity, if it ever exists, developed during a historical process. Each period of this process shaped the European identity in a different way. Depending on the historical period and conjuncture, European identity has been constructed around different norms and values and thus it has been constructed against different others. The second section of the study will try to provide a retrospective view on the idea of Europe and the emergence of European identity. In this context, the emergence of the idea of Europe, the geographical connotation of Europe, the definition of Europe and European identity throughout the history, will be discussed in three main periods, the Antiquity, the Middle Ages and the Modernity. Accordingly the study will start with mythological connotations of the term *Europa*, continue with the Christendom discourse of Middle Ages and Enlightenment image of the European “civilization”. The Modernity period of the chapter will cover also the period of Cold War and Post-Cold War era and will end with the discourse of European Union.

The fact that identities come into being with and against some differences which are usually called as “the other” does not mean that the classification of an identity such as the Self versus the Other is a permanent classification. Identity is a dynamic concept which does not have a static meaning and content. Thus with dynamic and variable connotations, in different historical contexts, there may be the dominance of different “other(s)” in the formation of a certain identity. Similarly European identity has had different connotations throughout the history with emphasis on different characteristics such as religion, civilization, science, democracy and so on. As a result, depending on the context, the European identity has had several others throughout the history. In the third part of the study, the evaluation of European identity and in this context the changing perceptions in Europe in terms of otherization will be discussed. Multiple others, against which European identity came into being and took shape, including internal ones or external ones, will be explored. In this exploration, a special stress will be laid on the origins of East-West

divide. Thus the emergence of the divide and the evolution of this divide will be elaborated more in detail.

With the recent developments such as the end of the Cold War, the enlargement and deepening processes of European Union, the interest in European Union and in particular in European identity has significantly increased. With the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the relations between Russia and European Union (EU) as a part of the Western world have gained a new path and have attracted more attention. Moreover with the acceleration of the enlargement process of EU and discussions on the “clash of civilizations”, the relations between EU and Turkey have become a highly popular field of study. These issues in turn, have brought into question the identity of Europe and the “other(s)” against which it has been constructed.

In this thesis among multiple others of Europe, the Russian “other” and the Turkish “other” will be elaborated together. Each of these three collectivities belongs to one of the eight civilizational categories suggested by Huntington¹, namely Western, Slavic Orthodox and Islamic civilizations.

In fact, the issue of “Turkey’s place vis à vis Europe” is a highly popular issue among especially Turkish scholars. The interminable talks on Turkey’s EU membership and the candidacy of Turkey for EU membership are probably the key factor for this increasing popularity. Similarly, as a result of the rapprochement of Russia with West in the post-Cold War era and eastern enlargement of EU, eyes turned toward Russo-European relations. This increasing interest in turn triggered discussions on the identity of Turks and Russians. Despite the intensity of interactions between Europeans and Turks on the one hand and between Europeans and Russians on the other hand, the issue of whether they are European or not, has been historically a controversial debate. Today, this debate continues to preserve its controversial nature.

Even today, between the lines of arguments against the inclusion of Russia and Turkey into the European “civilization” one can easily notice the shadow of the

¹ These eight categories refer to Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, Latin American, Western, Slavic Orthodox and Islamic civilizations, for more detailed information see Huntington, S. P., (1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993; 72, 3.

historical relations. Thus it is important to elaborate this issue from a historical perspective. On the other hand, it is important to elaborate Russian and Turkish “other” together because one can draw several parallels between them. While in some periods they have been considered as *apart from* Europe, in some periods they have been considered as *a part of* Europe. The otherization of the Turk and of the Russian and their inclusion have sometimes been on similar grounds such as religion, sometimes been on different grounds such as ideology.

In this discussion about deciding whether Russians and Turks are European or not, maybe the most important source of controversy stems from the difficulty to define Europe as a separate and proper continent. Firstly Europe can be considered as an extension of the Asian continent just like Anatolian peninsula. Secondly, even if Europe can be considered as a separate continent, the geographic boundaries of Europe in terms of its inclusion or exclusion of Russians and Turks have been vague. Both Turkish and Russian “others” are the Eastern others of Europe. Religion has been an important factor in their “otherization”. Moreover the nature of their interaction has not always been peaceful. However, this is not something special to the relations of Europe between the Turk or the Russian. The relationships in Europe have generally been characterized by conflicts. Due to the difference between cultures which emphasize different norms and values, they have both been considered as barbaric, backward, uncivilized and despotic East. Of course it does not mean that the relations between Europe and these two communities have always been based on negation and wars. There have also been periods of rapprochement. Both Russians and Turks have been important components of European history. They have both played important roles in the shaping of European identity.

The discussions on Russians’ and Turks’ place and identity vis à vis Europe does not stem only from Europe. This has also been an internally controversial issue in Russia and Turkey as it has been in Europe. In other words the place of Turkey and Russia is not ambiguous only from the side of Europeans. Instead for most Turks, Turkey and for most Russians, Russia has still an ambiguous place. In the fourth section firstly an evaluation of relations between Europeans and Russians will be provided and then, an evaluation of relations between Europeans and Turks will be provided in a historical perspective. In this context, the era during which Russians

were under the rule of the Mongols, the independence of Russians, their claim of “third Rome” and their so-called inclusion process into Europe, the Cold-War and the post-Cold War situation will be elaborated under the heading of “the Russian Other”. In the second part of the chapter, the rise of Islam at the expense of Christendom, the settlement of Turks into Asia Minor, the rise and consolidation of the Ottoman power, the passage of the banners of Islam into Ottomans, the decline of the Turkish threat and the so-called inclusion of the Turks into European state system will be elaborated. In addition the foundation of the Turkish Republic and the relations of Turkey with Europe starting from the Cold War era and the long journey of Turkey toward EU membership will be discussed. Finally that section will go on with comparing and contrasting the nature of Turko-European relations with Russo-European relations and their impact on the formation of European identity. In this context an assessment of the historical course and current situation of Turko-European and Russo-European relations will be made and prospects for the future of relations will be discussed.

In the concluding part, a general summary of the thesis will be made. This part will continue by restating the converging and diverging points between the Turk and the Russian “others” in terms of their relation with Europe. The conclusion will end by an evaluation of the current situation and future prospects for Turko-European and Russo-European relations.

CHAPTER 2

2. IDENTITY AS A GENERAL CONCEPT

Identity is an important concept which has different definitions in different fields of study. From philosophy and mathematics to sociology and psychology, it has different connotations. In a general sense, identity can be defined as the qualification of the existence². However, this concept may be referring to different kinds of identities. Thus it is possible to talk about certain identity categorizations.

One kind of identity categorization consists of the separation between innate versus acquired identities. Although it is possible to talk about innate versus acquired identities, in practice, it is not possible to talk about purely innate identities. Innate identities are those which come with the birth such as race, religion, sex, some physical characteristics such as being tall/short. Acquired identities on the other hand, are those which are acquired, learned in time through a process of socialization such as professions or family roles like motherhood. However, since identity is a social and dynamic notion, even innate identities need a process of socialization to become meaningful identities.

The fact that identification is a dynamic and continuous process has two meanings. Firstly, a certain identity may have different connotations throughout history. In different periods of the time, different characteristics may have dominance in the same identity. For instance European identity may have different connotations in different periods of history. While in some periods religion is the key component of the European identity, in other periods, religion may lose its significance and leave its place to some values such as democracy and liberty. Secondly, as life circumstances change, people may make new identifications³. For example prior to

² Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), "Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği" in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 19.

³ Bloom, W., (1990), *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 50.

the World War II, it was probably not common for an individual to identify him/herself as belonging to a European identity. However, today, due to attempts to create and establish a European Union identity, it is more probable for a citizen of a EU member country to identify him/herself as “European”. Moreover, in order to become meaningful identities and to create a degree of individual consciousness, even innate identities may need a certain degree of socialization and difference. For example sex is an innate characteristic. In order to belong to a certain sex, individuals may not need consciousness, it is sufficient to have necessary biological requirements. However, to talk about a gender identity, one needs a degree of consciousness. Thus it is indispensable to have a society and a socialization process. Otherwise, we can not talk about the existence of a gender identity; we can just talk about a biological status of a person with *xx chromosomes*. A woman, to have a ‘woman identity’ needs a society where she can internalize the values associated with woman identity, where she can identify herself with similar people with “women identity” and different people with “man identity”. This is during the socialization process that a woman internalizes the perception of her gender in the society, the roles attributed to her gender by the society and so on. Similarly a child born into a Christian family may initially be Christian but in time s/he can choose to convert into Buddhism or Islam. These examples show that even innate identities are not fixed but rather dynamic identities which can change and which need socialization process to gain significance. Thus identity is a *social* and *dynamic* concept⁴. Moreover for the existence of identity, the existence of a society, where one identity can be formed through interaction with other identity/identities is a prerequisite.

Another categorization about identity refers to categories of personal/individual, social and collective identities. Although personal and collective identities are different concepts, in fact they are closely interrelated. Individual/personal identity indicates the identity special to one person/individual consisting of the total of his/her characteristics such as his/her gender, educational background, social position, profession and so on. These characteristics help to distinguish the

⁴ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 22.

individual from the rest of individuals. One person may have several identities such as being a black, immigrant, French citizen, woman, mother and so on. This brings us to the *plurality* of identities⁵. In some situations, these identities may conflict with each other. In different situations and contexts, different identities may have dominance over others.

Social identity refers to the interaction processes in which individual identifies others and is identified by others. These processes in turn become the basis of the social identification⁶. Collective identity on the other hand, is defined in Wikipedia as follows:

*A sense of belonging to a group (the collective) that is so strong that a person who identifies with the group will dedicate his or her life to the group over individual identity: he or she will defend the views of the group and assume risks for the group, sometimes as great as loss of life. The cohesiveness of the collective goes beyond community, as the collective suffers the pain of grief from the loss of a member.*⁷

Though there is not a unique definition for this concept, collective identity is based on a shared sense of “we-ness” in interaction with one or several “others”⁸. Collective identity is a kind of social identity which is based on large and potentially important group differences⁹. This is the identity shared by the members of a collectivity such as nationhood, ethnicity, religion and so on. Collective identity is rooted in a group consciousness which in turn creates a sense of *we-ness* versus the difference from “other(s)” or them. The focus of this study will be on “collective identity”.

In the formation of a collective identity there are two important components, namely *objective elements* and *subjective elements*. Objective elements refer to the elements

⁵ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 23.

⁶ Kohli, M., (2000), “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, *European Societies*, 2(2), p. 115.

⁷ “Collective Identity”, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_identity

⁸ Snow, D., (2001), “Collective Identity and Expressive Forms”, University of California, Irvine: Center for the Study of Democracy, Paper: 01, 07, p. 4.

⁹ Kohli, M., (2000), “The Battlegrounds of European Identity”, *European Societies*, 2(2), p. 117.

shared by all members of the collectivity such as symbols, territory, language, myths, religion, ethnic roots or common history. Subjective elements in turn refer to a consciousness of the members of that collectivity in the form of sentiments, attitudes and so on which indicate that they belong to this collectivity. According to Smith, definition of the nation, which is a collectivity, ranges from those who emphasize objective elements, to those who emphasize subjective elements. While Joseph Stalin is from those who stress the objective elements, Benedict Anderson stresses the subjective elements¹⁰. However, these objective elements alone, are not sufficient for the existence of a collective identity. The objective elements gain significance and constitute a collective identity only if there is also the subjective element. In other words, members of the collectivity should internalize the objective elements and should share a sense of we-ness¹¹. To exhibit the importance of subjective elements, Benedict Anderson defines nation as “an imagined political community”. He defines nation as imagined community because he argues that even the members of the smallest nation will not know the others, they will not hear anything about most of them. However, the image of their sum continues to exist in the mind of each member¹².

For Europeans, we can talk about common objective elements such as common history or symbols such as the EU flag, the EU day, the Euro as a common currency and so on. However, the fact that the identification of EU citizens with EU identity is still not as high as expected, shows that, there is a lack of common subjective elements, that is common consciousness of belonging to the European collectivity is not yet completely established. Moreover, although today the EU is largely considered as the heart of Europe, it would be wrong to reduce the whole European identity to the EU identity.

¹⁰ Smith, A. (2001), *Nationalism*, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 11.

¹¹ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 26.

¹² Anderson, B. (1991), *Hayali Cemaatler, Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması*, İstanbul: Metis, 1995, p. 20.

Identities are constructed around a set of moral regulations. Of course, each identity is constructed around a different set of moral regulations, which makes it a unique identity among others. In other words every identity includes and excludes. Individuals internalize these values of the society during the process of socialization when they also undergo a process of identification.

For the membership of an individual to a particular collectivity, the perception of that collectivity by the individual is crucial. The perception of the collectivity as “good” or “beneficial” is an important factor for the individual to internalize the values of that collectivity and to be a member of it¹³. This perception in turn, may result with the perception of other groups as “bad”.

In order to protect their meaning, collective identities establish boundary mechanisms and boundary filters. As previously stated, collective identity helps to categorize those who are similar and those who are different from the collectivity in question. That is, the collectivity includes the similarities and excludes the differences. Thus it provides a world more meaningful and a sense of security. This sense of security does not stem only from this meaningful world created by collective identity. The “other” may constitute a threat or may be enemy to the collective identity in question, thus to the members of that collectivity. The collectivity, through its shared identity may function as an harbor for its members against the unknown “other” and its potential threats.

Although the collectivity and the collective identity provide their members a shelter, this shelter itself may need protection. As Bloom suggests every human being has an inherent drive to identify in order to achieve psychological security and people actively seek to enhance and protect the identifications they have made¹⁴. As long as a group of individuals share a common identification, there is for this group the potential to act together in order to enhance and protect the shared identity¹⁵. So

¹³ Bloom, W., (1990), *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 61.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

collective identity may function as a means for the mobilization of the collectivity. Moreover, as part of securing its existence, every collectivity seeks recognition, when denied, it can take over values, ideas and modes of expression from other collectivities, even the antagonistic ones and may end up by resembling what it contests. For instance Roman Empire which initially perceived Christianity as a threat for its existence, ended up by declaring Christianity its official religion in order to survive.

After this elaboration on the concept of identity in general and on the collective identity in particular, the next section will seek to evaluate the significance of the “other” in identity formation.

2.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCE AND THE “OTHER” FOR IDENTITY

As stated in the previous section, in the process of identification, society and socialization play important roles. In this process of socialization, individuals internalize the values of the society. However, identification involves both inclusion and exclusion of some values. So we can say that identity exists not only with similarities, but also with differences. These differences are usually incorporated in the “other(s)” of the identity in question. In order to emphasize the importance of “other(s)” in European identity formation, Delanty asserts that the dichotomy between self and other has been pivotal in the making of European identity.¹⁶

Among scholars there is an obvious compromise about the vital role played by difference in identity formation. However, in the identity formation the important issue of discussion about the role of difference stems from the nature and consequence of difference. On the one hand there are some scholars who argue that the emergence and existence of a collective identity requires the existence of an “other”. For instance, Yurdusev considers the other as a necessity for the existence of any unit of identity and identification process. He goes on by arguing that this

¹⁶ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan. p. 5.

need can be logically and historically showed¹⁷. On the other hand there are those other scholars like Abizadeh who oppose to this thesis. Although Abizadeh admits the importance of difference he opposes to the thesis that the existence of an “other” is a prerequisite for the existence of a collective identity and says “It is one thing to say that identity presupposes difference; quite another to say that it presupposes an external other.”¹⁸ However, besides asserting that the necessity of the other is a logical and historical necessity, Yurdusev emphasizes also the importance of how the other is perceived. If the other is seen only as a difference or as a stranger, it is considered as just “unfamiliar” with the identity in question. On the other hand, if it is seen as a threatening force, then the identity is formed in negative terms and through exclusion of the “other”.¹⁹ Similarly, Diez asserts that the study of identity/difference depend on possibilities of different kinds of difference, that is more or less exclusive differences and antagonistic and violent differences²⁰. In other words, it can be argued that difference may not necessarily end up by a relation of “othering”. If ever there is an “othering”, the intensity of othering may also change from one case to the other. While some otherings may just enhance the collective identity, others may end up by serious conflicts such as the conflicts lived in Bosnia or Azerbaijan.

According to Neumann, the theorist who specifically related the question of identity formation to the conceptual pair of self/other is Hegel. Hegel put forward the idea that by knowing the other, self has the power to give or withhold recognition, so as to be

¹⁷ Yurdusev, A. N., (2003), “Identity Question in Turco-European Relations”, in Tariq Ismail and Mustafa Aydın (eds.). *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, New York: 2003., p. 7.

¹⁸ Abizadeh, A., (2005), “Does Collective Identity Presuppose an Other? On the Alleged Incoherence of Global Solidarity”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99, No.1, February 2005, p. 45

¹⁹ Yurdusev, A. N., (2003), “Identity Question in Turco-European Relations”, in Tariq Ismail and Mustafa Aydın (eds.). *Turkey’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, New York: 2003, p. 8.

²⁰ Diez, T. (2004), “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.17, No.2, July 2004, p. 322.

constituted as self at the same time. Marx incorporated Hegel's idea in his reformulation of Hegelian dialectics²¹.

The difference is a prerequisite not only for collective identity but also for individual identity. To talk about a personal identity, one needs "others" in two ways. To explain this necessity, it is important to look at Mead's separation of the self into two concepts the "me" as an object and the "I" as an agent²². Firstly, the "me" for its existence, needs the perception of the self by "others". Secondly, the "I" needs "others" against which it can define itself by comparing and contrasting the "I". For example to talk about a red ball, the existence of other ball(s) which is /are not red is a prerequisite. We can talk about a red ball only if we have other green or blue balls different from it. Otherwise, we can only talk about a ball, not about its color. Thus similarity and difference or "other(s)" are crucial to the formation of identity. However, it does not mean that identity is defined merely in relation to the "other"²³.

As Delanty puts it, identities may take on a pathological form when they are constructed against a category of otherness²⁴. However, otherness should not be understood merely in pejorative terms. In deciding whether the othering is pathological or not the key indicator is the nature of the othering. That is, whether the issue is one of diversity or division, solidarity or exclusion. When the other is represented as a threatening stranger, then difference is negative.²⁵ In other words, on the one hand, the othering may be a value based process in which the "other" is perceived in pejorative terms such as a threat, thus the othering functions as a

²¹ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 3.

²² Bloom, W., (1990), *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 33.

²³ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), "Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği" in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 22.

²⁴ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan. p. 5.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 5.

medium for the enhancement and consolidation of the identity²⁶. In this case, the identification is largely made by negation of the other, based on the differences from the other. On the other hand othering may be a more or less neutral process in which it functions as a category of classification for the identity. In this case identification is made not through negation of the other but based on differences and similarities with the help of categorization provided by the other.

Moreover, as identification is a dynamic and social process, the categories of self and other are not fixed. The same identity may have different primary components in different periods of the time. Parallel with this, the identity in question may have different others in relation to its primary component throughout history. It is even possible that collective identity can expand to include what was previously its constitutive other.²⁷ For example after the collapse of the Iron Curtain, Russian Federation ended up by adopting -at least in theory- market economy and democracy which was an unconceivable development during the Cold War. Moreover it is possible to observe a variation in the meaning of Europe and European identity in different contexts of the history. As a result one can encounter various others for Europe throughout history. While in some periods of the history Arabs and Turks are considered as the dominant others of (Western) Europe whose identity was defined merely in relation to religion; in other periods we can see the dominance of the Russian other against a European identity which values market economy, liberalism and democracy. Even some times, the USA came to be identified as Europe's other.

However as William Wallace argued, the most important dividing line of Europe has been the one which separated Western Christianity from Orthodox Christianity and Islam²⁸. As an example for a collective identity to include its previously constitutive

²⁶ Yurdusev, A. N., (2003), "Identity Question in Turco-European Relations", in Tariq Ismail and Mustafa Aydın (eds.), *Turkey's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: A Changing Role in World Politics*, New York: 2003, p. 6.

²⁷ Rumelili, B. (2004), "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *Review of International Studies*, p. 32.

²⁸ Quoted in Huntington, S. P., (1993), "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993; 72, 3, pp. 29-30

other, it is possible to look at the last enlargement process of EU. With the membership of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU, the Union expanded to include what was once called as the “other” of Western Europe.

2.2 IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As previously stated identity has an important place in many fields of study among which we can also cite International Relations. In fact, identity has a crucial place both in the study and the practice of International Relations.

When Huntington suggested his idea on “the Clash of Civilizations”, this idea had an enormous echo on the whole world. Although some scholars opposed his ideas, the events faced since the 1990s brought on the table once again discussions on the clash of civilizations. The atrocities that took place in Bosnia and Kosovo showed how vital national identities could still be for some people even toward the end of the 20th century. In addition, the events of September 11 emphasized once more the importance of identity in world politics. The words “the Axis of Evil” pronounced by George W. Bush, the labeling of many people because of their ethnic or religious identities as “terrorists” are some key indicators of this importance.

Probably Huntington is one of the scholars who put forward the importance of civilizational identities in world politics in the most radical way. He depicts a highly pessimistic view on the future of international affairs, based on the famous assumption about the clash of civilizations. He identifies eight major civilizations, namely, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, African, Latin American, Western, Slavic Orthodox and Islamic civilizations²⁹.

Walt defines the study of international affairs as a competition between realist, liberal and radical traditions³⁰. Realism which describes the international relations as a struggle for power among self-interested states was the dominant theory throughout the Cold War³¹. While realism and liberalism have a focus on rather

²⁹ Ibid., p. 25.

³⁰ Walt, S. M., (1998). “International Relations: One World, Many Theories”, *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1998, p. 30.

³¹ Ibid., p. 32.

material factors such as power or trade, constructivist approaches emphasize the impact of ideas. Moreover, constructivists consider the interests and identities of states as “a malleable product of specific historical processes”.³² According to Walt, the failure of realism and liberalism in predicting the end of the Cold War and their trouble in explaining it, played an important role in legitimating constructivist theories.

Similarly, in her attempts to explain the importance of culture in the International Relations, Amelia Hadfield introduces the concept of “paradigm warfare”. As she points out, this battle has long been held by realists³³. Realists argue that states seeking their interests are the key actors of International Relations. However, there is an important issue which should be emphasized: these states are not organizations independent from individuals. States consist of their citizens which are bound together with a collective identity often such as nationhood, ethnic identity etc. Parallel with this idea, Bloom suggests that international politics is not simply the relations between state structures, but is also the relations between the nations³⁴. The forces of culturalist theories, which examine how evolving cultural characteristics affect its endogenous composition, motivation and behavior complement the composition of the constructivist paradigm. Culturalist-constructivist theories provide a foundation for the role of ‘preference-based’ behavior and policy choice, operating by an endogenous rather than exogenous focus upon their sources³⁵.

The constructivist International Relations literature is divided over the significance of difference in identity formation³⁶ and it is possible to talk about two main approaches

³² Ibid., p. 40.

³³ Hadfield, A. (2004), “Paradigm Warfare: The Way of the Future for IR”, *BSIS Journal of International Studies*, No.1, December 2004, p. 54.

³⁴ Bloom, W., (1990), *Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

³⁵ Hadfield, A. (2004), “Paradigm Warfare: The Way of the Future for IR”, *BSIS Journal of International Studies*, No.1, December 2004, p. 59.

³⁶ Rumelili, B. (2004), “Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation”, *Review of International Studies*, p. 33.

in constructivism in terms of self/other interaction in IR: liberal constructivism and critical constructivism.

Liberal constructivism is rooted in the symbolic interactionism, according to which, identity formation is a process of socialization through which an individual comes to see him/herself in the way others do. For liberal constructivists, states acquire identity in the course of their interaction with other states, in other words during state socialization. This approach downplays the role of difference in identity formation. The key point of liberal constructivism is the contingency and the transformability of the self/other relationship³⁷. In contrast to liberal constructivism, the constitution of identity and meaning in relation to difference forms the basis of critical constructivism³⁸. According to critical constructivism, the democracy to be a meaningful identity category, presupposes the existence of its logical opposite, non-democracy.

Wendt who is considered as a leading constructivist scholar criticizes the assumption of realism on the *impossibility of cooperation among states* due to power struggles and the perception of human nature. Instead, he puts that intersubjective basis of social identities may be cooperative or conflictual. In addition interaction at systemic level may change state identities and interests³⁹

Diez summarizes the contributions of post-structuralism to IR theory in theorization of identity in three points. First, identities are not simply given but discursively constructed; secondly, identities can never be entirely fixed; and finally for IR, identities are always constructed against the difference of an “other”.⁴⁰ Since the identities can never be entirely fixed, the others against which the identities are constructed are not fixed neither. Thus it is possible to mention various kinds of differences in the IR: more or less antagonistic, exclusive differences, namely

³⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

³⁹ Wendt, A. (1994), “Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, *American Political Science Review*, Vol.88, No.22, June 1994, p. 384.

⁴⁰ Diez, T. (2004), “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.17, No.2, July 2004, p. 321.

temporal and geopolitical forms of othering. Accordingly, geographically defined political entities tend to be more exclusive and antagonistic.⁴¹ Diez argues that because the modern state is based on a territorial entity, the most common kind of othering in international relations has a geopolitical nature⁴². He supports Ole Wæver's argument that after the Second World War, the logic of the dominant other has been temporal. Accordingly, Europe's "other", the enemy image was not Islamic fundamentalism or the Russians but Europe's own war-torn past⁴³.

To sum up, we can say that even if the otherization is not a prerequisite for the identity formation, the identity formation needs a certain degree of difference. Otherwise there is no need to identify the existence. However, this difference may and may not produce a relationship of othering. For instance Iceland and Greece may have several different characteristics however it is difficult to claim that there is a relationship of othering between two collectivities. On the other hand if we turn toward Greek and Turkish culture, we can see less difference and more similarity due to historical background and geographical proximity of two collectivities. However, we can more easily identify a relationship of othering between these two. Thus we can say that while sometimes the relationship between self and other produces a relationship of othering it is not the case for all the times. In order to explain the reason behind this phenomenon, Rumelili identifies three constitutive dimensions along which this Self and Other relationship varies, namely the nature of difference, social distance and finally response of the other⁴⁴. The nature of difference refers to the inclusive or exclusive nature of the difference. Response of the other comprises a spectrum which varies between resistance and recognition. Finally the social distance indicates the association with or dissociation from other states in international relations.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 320.

⁴² Ibid., p. 325.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 325.

⁴⁴ Rumelili, B. (2004), "Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU's Mode of Differentiation", *Review of International Studies*, p. 27.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 37-39.

The researcher of this thesis will adopt a critical constructivist approach to her research in terms of importance given to difference in identity formation. However, the author will also take into account liberal constructivism's assertion in terms of the transformability of self/other relationship. In studying the relationship between Europe and its others -in particular with Russian on Turkish other- she will try to follow Rumelili's identification of three dimensions along which the self and other relationship varies.

CHAPTER 3

3. THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY

Before looking at the “other” of European identity, one should first look at the origins and definition of European identity and the idea of Europe. The European identity, or the idea of Europe are contested issues. Throughout history, Europe has not had concrete geographical boundaries, nor has it had fixed characteristics to define its culture. Thus it is possible to give different definitions for Europe, depending on the period and the region of Europe.

Scholars have adopted several approaches to study the origins of Europe and European identity. Leontidou mentions three regional narratives in determining the boundaries of Europe. First, the Greek myths and metaphors of Europa, second, the medieval discourses of Christendom and colonial arrogance and finally institutional/bureaucratic narratives and the globalization discourse⁴⁶. Bo Stråth talks about three mirrors in which the idea of Europe has taken shape. These are Oriental/Asian, the American and the East European⁴⁷. According to Delanty, first the idea of Europe appeared and then the European identity. He suggests that it was in adversity that the European idea emerged and this idea was sustained more by conflicts and division than by consensus and peace⁴⁸. In the emergence of this European idea, Eastern frontiers of Europe played an important role, because unlike the western frontiers, the eastern have been one of defense⁴⁹. Moreover, the importance of some elements such as Greco-Roman civilization, Christianity, ideas of

⁴⁶ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, pp. 593-617.

⁴⁷ Stråth, B. (2002), “A European Identity, To the Historical Limits of a Concept”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4), p. 391.

⁴⁸ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 2.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Enlightenment, which constitute the European legacy⁵⁰ are emphasized in the formation of Europe and European identity.

In order to evaluate all these different approaches, it is crucial to construct a historical framework in which we can study the emergence of European idea and European identity. It is possible to study the development of European idea and European identity in three main epochs. These are the Antiquity, Middle Ages and the Modernity.

3.1 ANTIQUITY

During the Antiquity, as Leontidou suggests, it was first with the Greek myths that the word Europe appeared. According to the Greek mythology, Europa was a seductive Phoenician princess who was kidnapped by Zeus from Lebanon to Crete and who married the king of Crete. Later, the name of that princess came to designate the Greek “hinterland”⁵¹. In fact Crete became the heart of the “Europa” region. In time, Europa came to include a larger sphere around the Mediterranean costs. For instance Hippocrates included Egypt in Europe due to its climate, landscape and environment⁵². In a similar way to Europe, the two other continents of Asia and Africa were named after two other goddesses which were the half-sisters of Europe, namely Asia and Libya (which later became to be known as Africa)⁵³. So we can see that the separation of Asia and Europe as two separate entities is indeed a very old debate.

Another mythological explanation of Europe’s origins stems from Christian mythology. Accordingly, Noah has three sons. Among these sons, Japheth who is above the two other sons, is the ancestor of Greeks, Gentiles and Christians; Shem is

⁵⁰ Stråth, B. (2002), “A European Identity, To the Historical Limits of a Concept”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4), p. 388.

⁵¹ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 31.

⁵² Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11., p. 597

⁵³ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p.17

the ancestor of Jewish and Arabs; Ham is that of Negroes⁵⁴. Thus in a sense, Japheth who is superior to other sons, is associated with Europe.

Prior to Middle Ages, it is possible to encounter three entities which lay the foundations of Europe: the Greek Civilization, Macedonian Empire and the Roman Empire. An important characteristic of Greek civilization was the city states encircled by hard walls⁵⁵.

During Antiquity the major explanation of Europe is its depiction as a geographical entity. Initially with Mediterranean in the center, the lands in the southern part of the Mediterranean designated Africa, those in the Eastern part referred to Asia and finally the lands that lay in the north of the Mediterranean were called as Europe⁵⁶. In the Roman era, Europe referred to approximately most of the present continent of Europe with the exception of Scandinavia, Iberian Peninsula and British Isles⁵⁷. Besides its geographical connotation it is believed that some of the contemporary European values find their roots in the Classical Antiquity. For instance the words “politics” and “polity” have their root in the Greek term polis⁵⁸. In addition, the word democracy has its roots in this era. In fact, Athens was not a genuine democracy as we understand the concept today. The conception of Greek democracy which emerged in Antiquity was defined against the “otherness” of barbarians, slaves and women⁵⁹. All those people who are non-Greeks were considered as barbarians⁶⁰. Moreover, it is not possible to talk about an appropriate idea of Europe

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 27.

⁵⁵ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11., p. 599.

⁵⁶ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 31.

⁵⁷ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 20.

⁵⁸ Pagden, A (2002), “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in *The Idea of Europe : From Antiquity to the European Union* , (ed.) Pagden, A., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 40.

⁵⁹ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 599.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 18.

in the Greek era because Greeks did not always consider themselves as Europeans but rather as belonging to a land of culture and civilization⁶¹.

Following the decline of Greek civilization, the Macedonian Empire started to emerge. In contrast to the exclusive nature of Greek city-states, Macedonian Empire introduced the first conception of the multicultural society. Alexander the Great who was the promoter of Hellenism, attacked Orient, but in the same time he admired Oriental civilizations. Thus he expanded Europe into Asia⁶². He annexed the lands in Persia and India. The East and the West were merged under the Macedonian Empire into a Hellenic culture. Delanty asserts that with the decline of classical Greek civilization and the emergence of the Macedonian civilization, the idea of Greek “superiority” over the barbarians started to extinguish while a broader concept of Europe emerged⁶³.

The third entity which was important in shaping Europe was the Roman Empire. Following the expansion of Europe into Asia during Alexander the Great’s era, the Roman Empire shifted the boundaries of Europe from East to West⁶⁴. With the expansion of the Roman Empire along the Mediterranean, a new civilization emerged, that of Greco-Roman. In the Roman era, the idea of Europe was not yet an established concept to refer to Rome or Romans. Romans had also a sense of ethnocentrism like that of Greeks. However this ethnocentrism was not yet based on the idea of Europe but rather on the idea of Rome as the center of the world⁶⁵.

Just like the Greek civilizations, Roman Empire too is the source of certain current political concepts. For instance the words “civil,” “civility,” and “civilization” have their origins in the Latin word *civitas*, which describes the same spatial, political,

⁶¹ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 19.

⁶² Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 599.

⁶³ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 19.

⁶⁴ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 599.

⁶⁵ Delanty, G. (1995), “Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality”, London: Mc Millan, p. 21.

and cultural entity⁶⁶. However, Rome was not only a political region. It was also the embodiment of the belief in the possibility of a single law for all humanity. While the Greeks gave Europe the philosophy and the mathematics from which the future scientific development took its roots, the Romans gave Europe its legislative habits. Initially, the Roman state of the period witnessed the division of the society between nobles referred as *patricians* and commons called *plebians*. Plebians had a secondary place in the social and political life compared to the privileged patricians. However, in the 5th century B.C., the struggle of plebians to fight this under-privileged status ended up with a victory in the form of “the Twelve Tables”. These Twelve Tables constitute the foundations of what is today known as the Roman law. Although the concept of Europeans as law-governed peoples originated in Greece, it was the Romans who brought the law to the place it still holds today⁶⁷. Pagden defines the Roman law as, the single most unifying feature of the continent⁶⁸. In this era, Europe is usually considered as the home of liberty and of true government. Herodotus suggests that the Greeks are the most free of peoples, because, unlike the Asians who are subject to the will of an individual, Greeks are subject only to the law⁶⁹. However it is still difficult to mention a genuine freedom and democracy in this era.

During Antiquity, the North-South divide with the Alps as the border, constituted a more significant divide than the East-West divide⁷⁰. Prior to Middle Ages, even before the rise of Islam, the first events which created a sense of European identity in the Christian Europe were the barbarian and Persian invasions. These invasions had a triple effect on Europe corresponding to transformations in psychological, ethnical and political fields. Firstly, as a psychological outcome, the fear caused by the invasions of the outsider threat among indigenous people of Europe, created a sense

⁶⁶ Pagden, A (2002), “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in *The Idea of Europe : From Antiquity to the European Union* , (ed.) Pagden, A., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 40.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 42.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 43.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 37.

⁷⁰ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 21.

of we-ness against barbarians and Persians, which lays the foundation of the future sense of European identity. Secondly, in the ethnic field, the newcomers who settled in Europe, transformed and shaped the ethnic structure of Europe. Finally, in the political sphere, these invasions resulted in the split of the Roman Empire into two parts and in the demolition of the Occidental part of the Empire.

Last but not least, religion which has a crucial place in the European history and culture found its roots in the antiquity. Initially Christianity which was born outside the so-called European territories, with its promise of equality, was considered as a threat for the Roman Empire. However, in time, ironically, the Roman Empire which once used to execute the Christians ended up by more than recognizing Christianity. In the Edict of Milan, all biased law against Christianity was abolished and the confiscated property of Christians was restored. Moreover, Christianity became a legal entity. Emperor Constantine offered important gifts to the property of the Church. Emperor Theodosius went further by declaring Christianity as the official religion in 380. Besides this declaration, Theodosius decreed the general prohibition off all pagan cults and sacrificial rites.⁷¹ Thus Christianity which for a certain period of time had been the “other” of the Roman Empire was now officially recognized by the Empire. What is more, this other was merged into the imperial identity. Thus the former “other” was incorporated into the Empire’s identity on its way to constitute the future European identity.

In this era, the division of the Roman Empire into two parts as Eastern Empire and Western Europe, plays a crucial role in the future antagonism between East and West⁷² and also in giving a cultural dimension to the idea of Europe. The first instance of division in the form of East and West came with the death of Caesar. After him, the competition between Octavian and Anthony over the rule of Rome resulted in the division of Rome. While Octavian ruled over Italy and west, Anthony ruled over the East. His unsuccessful rule and close relation with Cleopatra increased discontent of Romans about Anthony’s rule. This discontent led Romans

⁷¹ Madeley, J. T. S., (2003) “European liberal Democracy and the Principle of State Religious Neutrality”, *West European Politics*, Volume 26, Number 1, January 2003, p. 10.

⁷² Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 22.

to fight with Anthony. At the end, Anthony was fought at the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C.⁷³ Later, although the Roman state was rallied, unified, and transformed into an Empire, this trend to divide the Empire between East and West continued. This division gave a cultural dimension to Europe because, the Eastern Empire, that is the Byzantium Empire started to differentiate itself from Western Empire through different characteristics such as the Orthodoxy, the Greek language. Thus the word Europe come to designate the western part of the Empire⁷⁴ and the center of Europe shifted toward West⁷⁵.

3.2 MIDDLE AGES

The era which comprises the end of Antiquity and the early Middle Ages, witnessed the rise of new religions. Thus in the Medieval era besides new religions, new tensions emerged. The tension between paganism and Christianity, together with the tension between Christianity and Islam are important factors in the shaping of Europe. The two main characteristics of the period which can be attributed to Europe are feudalism and Christianity.

For the civilizations of Antiquity the idea of Europe was relatively unimportant and until the rise of Islam in the 7th century, it did not designate the continent of Europe. Thus it is with the second epoch, the Middle Ages, that Europe starts to designate a cultural identity. Together with barbarian and Persian invasions, Islamic invasions gave rise in the Christendom to a sense of European identity. In addition, these invasions resulted in the shift of European civilization toward North-west⁷⁶.

In time, as barbaric tribes of the North started to accept Christianity, the barbarian threat started to disappear⁷⁷ and left its place to Islam. Moreover, the barbarians who converted to Christianity such as the Franks constituted the backbone of the

⁷³ Hutton, W., (2003), *Early European History*, Project Gutenberg e-book, p. 126.

⁷⁴ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 23.

⁷⁵ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), "Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği" in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 34.

⁷⁶ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 26.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 26.

Christianity. Thus several tribes who accepted Christianity, had a common characteristic against the common threat of Islam: the Christianity. So gradually, Christianity became the territorial identity of Medieval Europe. Moreover, with the increasing significance of religion, the word Europe fell out of use and it was replaced by Christianity⁷⁸. However, it should be reminded that Christendom's geographical borders did not strictly correspond with those of "Europe" because Christian communities existed also in areas such as Anatolia. Moreover, the crusades in the Middle East were a denial of the idea of "Europe" because those who went on the crusades were called as Christians and Franks rather than as Europeans. In this respect, the impact of Islamic military challenge to Christendom was to postpone the appearance of a European identity and to maintain that of Christendom.⁷⁹

The medieval era witnessed the power struggle between the Church and the political authority. However, at least during the Middle Ages the victorious part has been the Church. Throughout the Medieval era, The Roman church increased its power and wealth.

The dominant political organization of the period was the feudalism. Due to a lack of a central authority, there was a relationship of patronage between the local authorities, that is, the lords and their vassals. However, towards the end of the Middle Ages, the development of commerce challenged this feudal structure. Instead, more central structures started to emerge. The idea of a Christian community provided legitimation for the medieval kingship and it functioned as a means for the cohesion of groups that were separated by language and ethnic traditions⁸⁰.

What made Islam to become a clear threat against Europe and more particularly against Christian Europe was a twofold phenomenon. Firstly Islam which was born

⁷⁸ Leontidou, L. (2004), "The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives", *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 601.

⁷⁹ Rich, P. (1999), "European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 438.

⁸⁰ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 33.

after Christianity has come with the claim of being the last and the ultimate religion. Secondly the Islamic conception of *jihad* which resulted in the rapid Arab expansion at the expense of Christian Europe capitalized Christian fear and hostility toward Islam.

Christianity was effectively Europeanized from the 8th century onwards. Arabs conquered most of North Africa in 7th and 8th centuries and they began to expand towards Europe. They conquered most of Iberian Peninsula. From the 8th century, until the Spanish re-conquista, the Pyrenees constituted the Western frontiers of the Christendom⁸¹. In other words, Europe defined itself along the lines of Christendom especially with the Arab expansion into Spain and Sicily in 8th and 9th centuries.

Although Christendom and the Roman Empire gave the continent a degree of religious, cultural, and linguistic unity, neither the Roman Empire, nor Christendom was, of course, identical with “Europe”⁸². In this era, one of the first instances of the pronunciation of “Europeans” was the army of Charles Martel which defeated the Muslims in the battle of Tours⁸³. In this context, Charlemagne who attempted to rebuild the empire after the fall of Rome, called himself as *pater europae*, that is “the father of the Europeans”⁸⁴. Later, the crowning of Charlemagne by Pope points out that the imperial authority was associated to the notion of Christian king⁸⁵. From the 10th century, the restored “Roman Empire” shifted from Franks to Germans⁸⁶ and came to be referred as “the Holy Roman Empire”.

However, the definition of Europe and Christianity against Muslim Arabs is not a permanent characteristic of the Medieval Europe. In time, Arabs started to decline

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 23.

⁸² Pagden, A., (2002), “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in *The Idea of Europe : From Antiquity to the European Union* , (ed.) Pagden, A., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 45.

⁸³ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 23.

⁸⁴ Pagden, A., (2002), “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in *The Idea of Europe : From Antiquity to the European Union* , (ed.) Pagden, A., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 45.

⁸⁵ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 39.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 40.

and ceased to constitute a clear threat against Christianity. Charlemagne succeeded to stop the advance of Arabs into Europe in Poitiers. The battle of Manzikert (Malazgirt) is a cornerstone in the encounter of Europe with the Turks as a threat for Christendom. This battle symbolizes the entrance of the Turks to the Asia Minor which will constitute a springboard for their future expansion towards Europe. From the fall of Constantinople, with the passage of banners of Islam from Arabs to the Turks, Europe started to identify the Turk as Europe's anti-thesis⁸⁷.

Faced with increasing Turkish threat, Byzantium had to ask for the Pope's help. As a response to the Islamic expansion, Christian Europe decided to fight with Islam. The deep hostility toward Islam and the desire to prevent the expansion of Islam at the expanse of Christendom was materialized in the Crusades. The First Crusade took place between 1096 and 1099⁸⁸. The Crusades were supported by Christian authorities and more particularly by Pope. These military campaigns aimed to stop Islamic expansion, to support Byzantium Empire against Turkish "threat", to reconquer the Holy lands from the Muslims and finally, as a more pragmatic goal, to re-unite the divided Christian world against a common enemy.

However, Crusades could not achieve the aim of re-uniting the divided Christian world. Moreover, it is possible to observe that the Middle Ages are marked not only by conflicts of Christianity with Islam but also by conflicts within Christianity. In this period, it is possible to observe the widespread confusions on, whether to accept Orthodoxy as Christianity or as an heresy. Following the rise of Islam, the idea of Europe started to be linked to the idea of Christian West. Moreover Europe failed to integrate Latin and Greek Christianity into a unitary civilization. The split of the Roman Empire into Eastern and Western Empires in 395 was a turning point in the future antagonism between West and East⁸⁹. After the burning of the papal bull issued to excommunicate the Eastern Church in 1054, the division between Eastern Orthodox Church and western Catholic Church became permanent. Since the

⁸⁷Soykut, M. (2001), *Image of the 'Turk' in Italy: History of the 'Other' in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, p. 1.

⁸⁸ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 34.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 22.

separation of 1054, Greek orthodoxy was regarded as an *heresy* of Christianity. The culmination of this division was the invasion of Constantinople during the 4th Crusade. After the 4th Crusade, the divide between the Latin Church and Orthodox Church became almost as great as the divide between Islam and Christianity⁹⁰.

The boundaries of Europe during the Medieval era were drawn against Arabs in the South, Slavs and Turks in the East. In time, these all came to designate Orient which is considered as the primary “other” of Europe in the Middle Ages⁹¹. The importance of Middle Ages in the formation of European identity is the Christianity. Christianity was the primary characteristic of the emerging European identity of that epoch and although it lost its initial significance, it is still one of the important characteristics today⁹².

Two major events mark the end of Middle Ages and the beginning of a new era for the humanity and the development of European identity: the capture of Constantinople by Turks and the discovery of America which refers to the start of the age of discoveries.

Despite the hostility between Western Church and Eastern Church, the antagonism between Christian Europe and Islam and more specifically Ottoman Turks, reached its climax with the conquest of Constantinople by Ottomans. In 1453 Constantinople which was called as the “Second Rome” was captured by Muslim Turks. An important outcome of this conquest has been the protection of the Orthodoxy by the Ottoman Empire. After the fall of Constantinople, the Ottoman Empire embraced the role of protector for the Orthodoxy. The survival of the Orthodoxy under the Ottoman rule may have resulted in the consolidation of the pejorative Orthodox image as heretic in the eyes of Latin Christians..

⁹⁰ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 53.

⁹¹ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 600.

⁹² Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 38.

Following the fall of Constantinople, the Latin West began to look westward⁹³. They attempted to complete the expulsion of the Muslims from Europe. Europeans completed the Reconquista in 1492. The Reconquista did not only refer to the reconquest of Europeans' lands from Muslims, but also to the expulsion of Jews. According to some scholars, with the deliverance of Europe from external enemy which refers to Muslims, the function of Europe's other was transferred to internal other which refers to Jews⁹⁴.

As a result of this obligatory westward turn, due to Ottoman hegemony in the East, Europeans had to revise their trade routes. This necessity pushed them toward geographical discoveries. During modernity, these geographical discoveries played a crucial role in shaping the evolving European identity.

Another crucial characteristic of the late Middle Ages is the increasing importance of the commerce. Crusades played an important role in the rise of the commerce. In fact it was not a commerce internal to Europe, but rather a trade between West and East. However, it is important to note that until late in the Middle Ages trade existed, not between nations, but between cities⁹⁵. The major actors in these commercial activities were the Italian cities such as Venice. Venice had a significant contribution to the development of trade between East and West. This interaction between East and West had an important role in the revival of the classical tradition during Renaissance. Moreover, the commercial relations of Venice with the Ottoman Empire led Venice to establish diplomatic relations with the Ottomans.

Although in the medieval era, it is possible to refer to an idea of Europe in the form of Christendom, we should bear in mind that one of the important characteristics of Medieval Europe was the lack of central authority and the prevalence of feudalism. Thus during this period, because of this fragmented structure and lack of a central authority, it was difficult to promote a common culture outside the realm of the Christianity. However, the Renaissance changed this situation. Since it is difficult to

⁹³ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 42.

⁹⁴ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 43.

⁹⁵ Hutton, W. (2003), *Early European History*, Project Gutenberg e-book, p. 319.

give a precise time interval for it, Renaissance can be studied not only as phenomenon at the end of Medieval era, but also as a phenomenon which took place at the beginning of the Modernity. In this study due to its future influence on the Modernity, The Renaissance will be included in the Modern era.

Towards the end of the Middle Ages some dominant characteristics defining Europe, such as Christendom, feudalism started to be challenged by new concepts. After the Middle Ages the Medieval association of Europe with Christendom was replaced by that of Europe with the West. On the other hand the Medieval discourse of Christianity against Islam was replaced in the early modern period, by the discourse of the victory of civilization over nature⁹⁶.

3.3 MODERNITY AND AFTERWARDS

The key events which marked the Modern era and afterwards, are geographical discoveries, Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, The French Revolution, industrial revolution, World Wars, including the Cold War. Following these events, Europe came to be defined along relatively more secularized terms.

The 14th and 15th centuries, covering the later period of the Middle Ages, are commonly referred as the Renaissance. This French word means *rebirth* or *revival*. It is a convenient term for all the changes in society, law, and government, in science, philosophy, and religion, in literature and art which gradually transformed medieval civilization into that of modern times⁹⁷.

With Renaissance, the culture of the Antiquity was re-discovered. This culture in turn, provided a common cultural ground outside of the Christianity for the future European identity. Because in different parts of Europe, Renaissance appeared in different times, it is difficult to specify a fixed date for its emergence. Renaissance has had important influence on the transformations and developments in several fields of life from architecture, sculpture to painting and science. In fact, developments of the Renaissance did not originate merely from the Greek or Roman

⁹⁶ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 31.

⁹⁷ Hutton W. (2003), *Early European History*, Project Gutenberg e-book, p. 348.

culture. The East had important influence in the development of Renaissance and the geographic discoveries. Most of the work belonging to Antiquity was brought to Europe by the scientists and artists who left Constantinople after its conquest in 1453. Besides this, through intense interaction with the East, during Crusades and during commercial activities, Europeans met the compass and printing machine. While compass facilitated the geographical discoveries, the printing machine replaced the manuscripts and accelerated the diffusion of Renaissance works and consequently the diffusion of Renaissance ideas. These developments in turn provided a basis for the future developments toward the scientific revolution and the Enlightenment. Renaissance can be considered as the first step of the secular European identity⁹⁸. It provided a common cultural ground to the European identity different from the religious one.

In the context of geographical discoveries, besides new lands, new peoples were discovered as well. The newly encountered people were different from the Europeans. They had different norms, values, beliefs, lifestyles; in contrast to Europeans, they were still more integrated to nature. However instead of considering these people as a different “civilization”, the differences sufficed to Western Europeans to categorize them as savage, heretic people, not aware of any civilization. It was probably due to the fact that Europeans considered themselves not as a civilization among others but instead as the civilization itself⁹⁹. The encounter with these new peoples increased among Europeans awareness of their “civilization” but also promoted a sense of Eurocentric world-view.

The age of discoveries marks also the renewal of the crusading idea¹⁰⁰. It was believed that the Western Europeans had the mission to civilize and if possible to Christianize these “cannibal” and “savage” peoples. So in the newly discovered lands Christian missionary activities started. Thus a sense of civilizational superiority over other peoples began to emerge among Europeans. This superiority

⁹⁸ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 66.

⁹⁹ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), “Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği” in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 45.

¹⁰⁰ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 31.

did not refer only to superiority over the indigenous people of the new lands but also to the superiority over all other peoples including Ottomans and Russians. Delanty asserts that it was in the encounter with non-European peoples and in resistance to Ottoman expansion that the idea of Europe became the focus of European identity formation. Thus, as he continues “This era witnesses the transformation of the idea of Europe into European identity.”¹⁰¹

A key event which marked this period is the increase in the religious conflicts. As previously stated, during Middle Ages, Christianity had already witnessed a divide between Eastern Church and Western Church. This divide has never resulted in a significant armed conflict except in the Fourth Crusade. However, it was not the case for the new divides during the Reformation era. These divisions resulted in long and bloody wars. Thus Christianity was now much more fragmented than during the Medieval era.

Throughout the Middle Ages, the Catholic Church increased its wealth and became a monopoly in terms of spiritual authority. However, despite the continuing spiritual authority of the Church, among some people, an increasing discontent against the Church emerged. Criticisms were directed to such issues as the superstitions of the Church, the increasing corruption and the theological basis of indulgences. The leading figures of the Reformation era were Martin Luther, Erasmus and Calvin. Erasmus as a student of the New Testament carried humanism over into the religious field.¹⁰² Thus people rebelled and protested the Catholic Church thus laid the foundations of the Protestantism. The protestations against the Catholic Church culminated in the Thirty Years War that took place between 1618 and 1648. This bloody war was finalized with the famous Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. For many IR scholars, Westphalia has been a turning point in the modern international system. According to Buzan, Westphalia has been accorded an iconic status in IR because it represents the transformation of European international system from medieval to

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 30.

¹⁰² Hutton W. (2003), *Early European History*, Project Gutenberg e-book, p. 355.

modern form¹⁰³. One of the most important contributions of Westphalia was the establishment of equality between Catholics and Protestants. Moreover the rule of *cuius regio ejus religio*, that is *whose reign, his religion* was confirmed.¹⁰⁴

Protestantism is an important novelty for the formation of European identity for two main reasons. Firstly, by increasing the internal divides within the Christianity, it undermined the role of the religion as the mere unifying factor of Europe so paved the way for a relatively more secular European identity. Indeed Reformation can be considered as the second step of the secular European identity. Secondly, as Weber stressed in *the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* it laid some of the foundations of the capitalism such as productive activity and accumulation.

One of the outcomes of Reformation in terms of socio-political structure of Europe was the change in the balance of power between the Church and the political authority. Following the religious wars during the Reformation era, the authority of the Church was undermined to the advantage of political authority. The undermining of the Church's authority, coupled with the increase in capitalist accumulation and the rise of a new bourgeois class gave rise to the formation of territorial states with stronger central authority.

With the modernity the fear from the Turkish threat preserved its existence. However, this threat was relieved to a certain degree due to three main reasons. Firstly, in the age of discoveries, competing Europeans were preoccupied with the discovery and annexation of new lands. This period was a cornerstone in the future colonial wars among European forces. Another reason was the end of the idea about the "invincible Turk" following the battle of Lepanto in 1571. Finally the internal divides among Christians may have diverted attention from external other to the internal other(s). However, it is also possible to comment that the decline of the threat caused by Muslims channeled the interests of Europeans into their internal divides and resulted in Reformation.

¹⁰³ Buzan, B. And Little, R., (1999), "Beyond Westphalia? Capitalism after the 'Fall'", *Review of International Studies*, 25, 89-104, p. 89.

¹⁰⁴ Gross, L., (1948), "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948", *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 42, No.1, p. 22.

Although not as much powerful as in the Middle Ages, in this period, religion maintains its important role in shaping Europe and European identity. On the one hand, Christianity starts to lose its significance because it does not designate a unitary entity anymore. However, on the other hand, Christianity preserves its importance against the non-Christian others. Religion is usually used as a means to re-unite the fragmented Christian world against a common threat. The deep differences between Christian civilization and non-Christians are emphasized to divert attention from internal conflicts of Christianity toward outside enemies, the heretics.

The Enlightenment is another cornerstone in the development of Europe and European identity towards modernity. The major developments which gave rise to Enlightenment were Renaissance and Reformation. Enlightenment brought some important concepts such as science, reason and emancipation. Most importantly, after the Reformation, Enlightenment constituted the third step toward secular Europe. The enlightenment ideals advocated the secular foundation of the emancipation under the banner of reason¹⁰⁵. This emancipation referred to the break with the old feudal, traditional societies and their ideologies. Accordingly, the established belief that inequality and poverty were inevitable, was rejected¹⁰⁶.

Enlightenment enhanced the transformation of European idea. In fact what it did was not the elimination of identity. Through Enlightenment, the Church and the State were no longer considered as a symbiotic unity but as different spheres¹⁰⁷. In other words, this was not a movement directed against the Church. It did not seek directly to undermine the religion but instead to change its place. Consequently this movement has had a vital contribution to the development of a secular European identity. Instead of Christianity as a unifying characteristic, it proposed science and

¹⁰⁵ Venn, C., (2006), "The Enlightenment", *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 23 (2-3), p. 478.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p. 479.

¹⁰⁷ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 70.

reason. Indeed the last treaty in Europe with reference to the notion of *respublica Christiana* was the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714.¹⁰⁸

After the separation of the Church and the State as different spheres, the political authority gained increasing power. This led to the emergence and enhancement of absolutist regimes. The concept of *enlightened absolutism* refers to the absolutist regimes which arose as a result of enlightenment movement.

After Renaissance, certain features of European life became particularly distinctive. These were pressure of the Christianity, dynamic mercantile economy and the growth of pan-European artistic expression. However the 18th century is beyond these realms¹⁰⁹. Until 18th century the fight against the extensive powers of the Church was realized by the monarchic powers. However, from the 18th century it started to involve the other parts of the society, so the absolutist state became nationalized¹¹⁰. Until this century only a little minority used to think in European terms. Starting from the 18th century, with the participation of the bourgeoisie, the consciousness on Europe broadened¹¹¹.

The American Revolution of 1776 has had important ramification in terms of Europe. It contributed to the strengthened sense of autonomy separate from America¹¹² and constituted the notion of Europe as a civilization between America and Russia¹¹³.

Despite the ideals such as the break with the old traditions, beliefs and the attachment to science and reason, the popular discontent was still alive. The

¹⁰⁸ Rich, P. (1999), "European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 443.

¹⁰⁹ Lowenthal, D., (2000), "'European Identity': An Emerging Concept", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, No. 3., p. 316.

¹¹⁰ Yurdusev, A. N., (1997), "Avrupa Kimliğinin Oluşumu ve Türk Kimliği" in *Avrupa: Batılılaşma, Kalkınma ve Demokrasi*, (ed.) Atilla Eralp, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, p. 39.

¹¹¹ Lowenthal, D., (2000), "'European Identity': An Emerging Concept", *Australian Journal of Politics and History*, Vol. 46, No. 3, p. 314.

¹¹² Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 65.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, 78.

privileges once enjoyed by the clergy now shifted toward the aristocracy. Aristocracy became the new privileged class. The middle class which was growing through the commercial activities of the bourgeoisie was annoyed by this development and it claimed the same privileges as the aristocracy. In addition to this growing middle class, there was also dissatisfaction among the lower classes due to increasing poverty, inequality and so on. All these developments led the way toward the French Revolution. The Revolution broke out in 1789. “Liberté, égalité, fraternité” became the slogan of the Revolution and these words summarized the ideas behind the revolt to the absolutist regime. This movement was directed against the *ancien régime* that is the old, absolutist regime and the aristocracy.

However, the rest of the Europe was not happy about the Revolution. Most of the Europe was ruled by the *ancien régime*, so they were threatened by the spread of the French Revolution ideas into their own countries. In addition Napoleon wanted to expand the republican regime to the rest of Europe. With this goal, he engaged in war with the major European powers. In time, his goal of expanding republicanism throughout Europe turned to be an imperial project. To confront Napoleon’s expansion, a military alliance which called itself the Fourth Coalition was initiated in 1812 by Great Britain and Russia, and then joined by Prussia and Austria¹¹⁴. These wars were terminated with the Congress of Vienna.

The Congress of Vienna is a cornerstone in the development of the European idea because, it marks the beginning of the particular fifty years that followed the Napoleonic Wars which are usually referred to as “the Concert of Europe”¹¹⁵. Indeed the naming of that formation as “European” is really an interesting fact for two reasons. On the one hand it did not designate the whole Europe; on the other hand it involved what once was not considered as European, that is Russia. Russia which used to be considered as being outside of the Europe and even as being the “other” of Europe, was one of the major actors in this European concert. However, this was not an all-embracing concert for the entire Europe. It consisted of merely

¹¹⁴ Dupont, C., (2003), “History and Coalitions: The Vienna Congress (1814-1815)”, *International Negotiation*, Vol.8, No.1, p. 170.

¹¹⁵ Slantchev, B., (2005), “Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium”, *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 602.

great powers¹¹⁶, with some little states having secondary roles. Smaller states were situated as buffer zones and spheres of influence¹¹⁷. Even all of the great powers were not active participants. Indeed this Concert was based on the balance of power politics arising from the need to cooperate against Napoleon. Thus because it was based on pragmatic grounds, the Concert did not truly indicate which country was European and which country was not.

According to Delanty, despite the anti-French and even the anti-western nature of the Concert¹¹⁸, Europe as a normative idea, became institutionalized in the congress system of the Concert of Europe¹¹⁹. In spite of the partial representation of the Concert as a European community, it symbolized the recognition of a European community of interest and commitment to its defense¹²⁰. The Concert of Europe exhibits the emerging importance of state interests in the international relations.

However, this so-called calm atmosphere of Vienna Congress in Europe did not last for a long time. According to Elrod, after the defeat of Napoleon, from 1820s onwards an ideological divide developed between the East and the West, stemming from the anti-revolutionary consensus among the great powers¹²¹ of Holy Alliance versus the West. For Stanchev, the event which triggered the disintegration of the Concert was the Crimean War¹²². In fact among Europeans, although it was not yet deemed as a part of the Concert, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was considered

¹¹⁶ Elrod, R. B., (1976), "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System", *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 163.

¹¹⁷ Schroeder, P. W., (1986), "19th-Century International System: Changes in the Structure", *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 24.

¹¹⁸ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 73.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 77.

¹²⁰ Elrod, R. B., (1976), "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System", *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 164.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.171-171.

¹²² Slantchev, B., (2005), "Territory and Commitment: The Concert of Europe as Self-Enforcing Equilibrium", *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4, p. 565.

as a key component for the stability in Europe¹²³. Finally, at the end of the Crimean War, Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Concert¹²⁴.

The most concrete culmination of Enlightenment ideals such as reason, science and progress were reflected in the Industrial Revolution. Industrial Revolution which started in Britain and then spread to the rest of Europe had considerable impacts on the development of Europe. By facilitating and accelerating the production it contributed to the rise of capitalism. Demographic structure of the states changed with the increasing migration from rural areas to urban ones. Big cities started to emerge. In the international arena, the increasing need for raw materials for the increasing capacity of production triggered the colonial wars among European powers. The increase in the European technology made the peripheral states dependent on European technology and production. In other words it gave rise to an international division of labor. Added to the previous hostilities and polarizations within Europe, the colonial wars precipitated by the industrial revolution prepared the way for the future antagonism toward World War I and World War II.

The 20th century is a very important time for the development of the European identity. This century witnessed two atrocious world wars and a cold war which had important impact not only on the European identity but on the whole international affairs.

During the World War I, Europe was divided into two main camps between the Allies or the Entente Powers and the Central powers. In this division, Russian Empire sided with great European powers such as France and the British Empire. The Ottomans were on the other side of the division, siding with other important European powers like Austria-Hungary and Germany.

World War I was already enough destructive in terms of European peace and stability. However this war was followed with additional developments such as the Great Depression and the discontents with the Post-War status quo in Germany.

¹²³ Elrod, R. B., (1976), "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System", *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, p. 165.

¹²⁴ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 78.

Eventually these developments accelerated the coming of the World War II. During the World War II, Europe was divided between the Allies and the Axis of Berlin-Rome. After the end of this second war, Europe entered a new period, the post-World War II era or the Cold War era. This new period is a cornerstone for the development of the European identity.

The Cold War is marked by the bi-polar international system divided between the Western Block and the Eastern Block. Just like the division which dominated the whole world, in this period, Europe experienced a division between its Western part and Eastern part. While Western Europe was associated with the Western Block characterized by capitalism, democracy and “freedom”, the Eastern part was associated with the Eastern Block led by Soviet Union, characterized by communism. It is in that period that the foundation of a European union was laid. During the Cold War, the key constitutive element of the European identity was its association with the Western Block. So, almost every feature of the Western Block came to designate the European identity.

The most important step to create a union within Europe came after World War II from Jean Monnet who saw the guarantee of preserving order and peace in Europe, not in limiting the strength of Germany but in the assimilation of Germany within Europe. According to him in order to prevent misery, wars and fear, Europe had to be united. This unification in turn would be maintained not through coalitions among states but through the unification of peoples in Europe¹²⁵. With the proposal of French Minister of Foreign Affairs Robert Schuman, in 1952, European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was established. ECSC constituted the nucleus of European Economic Community and later European Union.

In order to increase the support of people for the European integration, in June 1985 Summit, the establishment of the Dooge Committee was decided. This committee had several responsibilities in the process of EU integration, such as to facilitate the crossing of borders, to establish European radio and television, to realize right of establishment, the harmonization of diplomas, to approve

¹²⁵ Karluk, R. (1994), *Avrupa Birliđi ve Türkiye*, Eskişehir:Beta, p. 6.

European flag and march¹²⁶. Besides these, attempts for transition to common currency (ECU), the fact that EU laws are superior to domestic laws, constitute the basis for European citizenship.

The most important strategy to establish a common identity was the development of the legal dimension of European identity: European citizenship. This concept of European citizenship, introduced with the Maastricht Treaty, involved commonly shared rights¹²⁷. The Treaty of the European Union or Treaty of Maastricht established the citizenship of the Union. The most important reason behind this step was, the attempt to strengthen and enhance the European identity and enhance the participation of European citizens to the integration process. With the Maastricht Treaty, the main features of the citizenship concept in Europe were determined. Accordingly, European citizenship requires first of all citizenship to one of the EU member states. Thus we can say that instead of an ethnic base for citizenship, EU proposes a civic citizenship. This concept brought the right for residence and free movement in EU and diplomatic protection by any EU member state in third countries. Besides these rights, if we look at the EU budget which includes also taxes gathered from EU citizens, we can say that, if not officially, EU citizenship imposes also *de facto* duty.

The end of the Cold War provided a more favorable climate both for the deepening and enlargement processes of European Union. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Eastern and Western Europe had the opportunity to rejoin. However at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, the Eastern Europe was perceived both as an old suspicious other and as an extension of the Western Europe. So the necessity to define the European identity arose.

Just like other collective identities, European identity should consist of certain objective elements. Even though it is not so easy to identify concrete and genuinely objective elements for the entire Europe, it is not the case for the

¹²⁶ Bozkurt, V. (2001), *Avrupa Birliđi ve Türkiye, Siyasal Kurumlar, Çıkar Grupları, Kamuoyu, Ortaklık Belgeleri*, Bursa:VİPAŞ, p. 144.

¹²⁷ Karluk, R. (1994), *Avrupa Birliđi ve Türkiye*, Eskişehir:Beta, p. 126.

European Union identity. As an artificial identity, for the European Union identity it is easier to distinguish some evident objective elements. These objective elements include transition to a common currency, approval for a European flag, European Constitution, European Day and so on. However, with the end of the Cold War, the necessity to distinguish Western European values from Eastern ones was materialized in the launching of the Copenhagen Criteria. Even in terms of these criteria, it is difficult to claim their validity for all of the EU members. Initially Copenhagen criteria seemed to define the requirements to be considered as “European”. Although by including these countries as full members to EU, the EU admitted these countries’ compatibility with Copenhagen Criteria, the compliance of the countries with Copenhagen Criteria can easily be questioned. Still for the newly acceding countries the compliance with these criteria is widely discussed. Even within EU 15 we can question the compliance of member states with these criteria.

Fuchs and Klingemann’s work is important to elaborate the place of democracy in different countries. They consider eastern enlargement of European Union as a factor that will make difficult to develop a European identity due to three reasons. First, the territorial limits of Europe are vague. Second, with the increase in the number of member states, cultural plurality will also increase. Finally, there is a cultural gap between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe¹²⁸.

In the recent talks on the accession of the candidates, a new criteria started to be pronounced: “the capacity to absorb the new member(s)”. If the candidate country is deemed as *absorbable* by the EU, then it can become a new member of the Fortress Europe. However, the absorbability of a country is not defined along objective criteria. Thus besides the lack of subjective elements, indeed, we can talk about the lack of an appropriate set of objective elements.

¹²⁸ Fuchs, D. and Klingemann H. D. (2002) “Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of European Union”, *West European Politics*, Vol. 25, No. 2/April 01, p. 20.

Currently the appeal of Europeanness is not homogenous in Europe. The appeal is stronger in some countries compared to others and it varies within countries. For instance in the UK the appeal is the weakest.¹²⁹

The issue of defining the objective elements for the entire Europe is much more difficult. For instance in terms of a common geography, Europe has never had fixed, concrete boundaries. In fact Europe is an extension of the Asian continent. However, the definition of Europe's borders has historically been based on political and ideological reasons instead of genuine geographic data. The history is not more integrative than the geography. European history witnessed not only wars between Europe and its other(s) but also internal conflicts among the so-called Europeans. It is even possible to observe that there are as much internal wars as the external ones. The Hundred Years War, The Thirty Years War, The Napoleonic Wars, The World War I, World War II and the Cold War have been important wars fought by Europeans against each other. Thus even if we talk about a common history, it is not a history characterized by peace and unity but instead it is as much conflictual as the European history with its other(s). The language is another factor far from uniting Europe. Throughout the Middle Ages due to its position as being the language of the Latin Christendom, the Latin has been a more or less common language for Europe. However, in time its importance declined. Later, for certain period French has been a widely used language, if not a common language, among Europeans. However, if we look at the current situation, it is difficult to specify a common language for Europe. In cultural terms Europe is not so homogenous. The cultural gap between the North and the South is maybe wider than the gap between Mediterranean countries like Italy, Greece and a non-EU member country, Turkey. Consequently it is difficult to talk about constitutive common objective elements for the European identity. The difficulty to define Europe through objective elements, made inevitable the construction of the European identity against the other(s). Without the existence of common other(s) Europe would be beyond an imagined community, just a fictional product. For the existence and survival of the European identity, so that

¹²⁹ Delanty, G. (2005), "What Does It Mean To Be A 'European'?", *Innovation*, Vol. 18, No. 1, p. 13.

it generates subjective elements such as the sense of being European, the existence of common other(s) is a crucial necessity. Thus in the next chapter, the issue of Europe's others throughout the history will be elaborated.

CHAPTER 4

4. THE OTHERS OF THE EUROPE

In the previous chapter the evolution of Europe and European identity has been explored. Just like the European identity, the other of Europe is not a permanent category. With the different connotations of Europe, European identity reflected different characteristics. In this context, Europe's other changed in relation to the changing nature of European identity.

Starting from Antiquity, during several centuries, *the barbarian* constituted the "other" of Europe. Although the barbarian remained as the other of Europe, its connotation changed through time. In the era, prior to the Christianity, Europe was not a unitary entity. However, in the region where Europe is supposed to exist today, people used to determine some people as a threat to their existence. In this period Europe was an attractive land for several peoples who continuously invaded European lands. These people were usually referred as barbarians by the inhabitants of Europe. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the invasions of these barbarians have been crucial in the emergence of Europe's historical uniqueness.

Greeks who were the inventors of the word "barbarian" used this word to refer to those people, particularly Asians, whose ignorance of Greek culture distinguished them from those who were engaged in the fashioning of Hellenic civilization. In time, this reference was transformed into an ethnocentrism.¹³⁰ However, the Greek democracy which the Greeks were so proud of, excluded also some of those living in the Greek city-states: the women and the slaves.

Indeed the divide between the self and other was very clear in the Greeks. In this era, Isocrates was probably the first to stress the idea of Europe and the opposition between Europe and Asia.¹³¹ The classical Greeks divided the world into two

¹³⁰ Jones, W. R. (1971), "The Image of the Barbarian in the Medieval Europe", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 13., No. 4, p. 378.

¹³¹ De Romilly, H., (1992), "Isocrates and Europe", *Greece and Rome*, Vol.39, No. 1, p. 2.

categories: Us and Them. These were mutually exclusive and antithetical categories.¹³² For Greeks, while the Us referred to Greeks, the Them referred to the barbarians. The main concept used to refer to the “other” was *barbarian*.

As a result of the interaction during the Persian Wars, Greeks developed a certain perception of the Persians. Accordingly Persians were considered as a threat and as barbarians. The fact that Persia was governed by a king with absolute powers in contrast to Greece as a country of “freedom” was the main criticism. In addition, according to Isocrates, despite the bigger wealth in Persia, compared to the one in Greece, there was a lack of courage.¹³³ Besides the belief in the superiority of political system, there is also a sense of racial superiority in Isocrates¹³⁴. As a matter of fact, in an address to Athenians he says:

*By yourselves, you are ahead of the others and different from them, not by your training in war matters, nor because you have the most beautiful political system, ... , but thanks to the same feature which places the nature of man above the animals and the Greek race above barbarians, namely the fact of having been better brought up for intelligence and speech.*¹³⁵

Another “other” of the Greeks in that period was the Amazons. Amazons, the women warriors, constituted a two-dimensional threat for Greeks. Firstly they were women. Women already had a secondary place in the Greek socio-political life. However, amazons were more dangerous than Greek women, because they explicitly rejected the Greek norms of female behavior thus rejected their social structure. Secondly, they were invaders.¹³⁶ Just like other barbarians coming from East, they were trying to invade the Greek lands. As a result, in some periods, Amazons were considered as the “other” of Greek civilization.

¹³² Cartledge, P. (1993), *The Greeks: A Portrait of Self and Others*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11.

¹³³ De Romilly, H., (1992), “Isocrates and Europe”, *Greece and Rome*, Vol.39, No. 1, p. 4.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹³⁶ Hardwick, L. (1990), “Ancient Amazons – Heroes, Outsiders or Women?”, *Greece and Rome*, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 18-19.

Exclusion of the non-Greeks from the civilization gradually disappears with the rise of the Macedonian Empire. However, a sense of civilizational superiority, if not as strong as in the Greek era, re-appears with the Roman Empire.

Romans, who received the word barbarian from Greeks, used it for various tribes particularly the Celts and the Germans who pressed against their widening frontiers.¹³⁷ Although the Franks and the Ostrogoths were among the mere barbarians, they seldom used this word for themselves. Instead, Gregory of Tours, a Frankish historian, used the word barbarian as a synonym for pagan.¹³⁸ So barbarian came to be used also for pagans.

The emergence of Christianity offered to Rome a new and temporary “other”: the Christians. Christians were in a sense otherized because of the values advocated by Christianity. In the Roman Empire, social relationships were usually governed by serious inequalities in economic, ideological, and political power¹³⁹. Christianity with the ideas it aspired, constituted a clear threat against the social structure of the Roman Empire. Moreover its monotheist nature was a threat for the polytheist pagan culture of the Rome. However, in time Christianity’s place shifted from the “other” of Rome to one of the its main defining characteristics.

Christianity’s role as a defining feature of Rome and Europe was reinforced as a result of the invasions toward Europe. Initially the barbarians constituted a threat for Christians, but with their conversion to Christianity, they became the new protectors of Christianity and consequently, the Christendom was strengthened.

Throughout the Middle Ages, the major threat to Christendom came from Islam. From its emergence in 7th century, Islam started to expand so rapidly that Islamic armies under the Arabs had already expanded into Iberian Peninsula until the mid-8th century. Islam constituted a threat for Christendom because it was a significant

¹³⁷ Jones, W. R. (1971), “The Image of the Barbarian in the Medieval Europe”, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 13., No. 4, p. 379.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 387.

¹³⁹ Runciman, W. G. (2004), “The Diffusion of Christianity in the Third Century AD as a Case-Study in the Theory of Cultural Selection (I)”, *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 1, p. 7.

military power which expanded into Europe at the expense of Christianity. Besides this, theologically Islam claimed to cover all the previous “religions of the book” included Christianity and Judaism and claimed to be the ultimate religion. In addition it brought some criticisms to Christianity as having lost its original form and it criticized the trinity belief which forms the basis of the Christian faith. The majority of the earliest converts to Islam were converts from Christianity.¹⁴⁰ So besides its military expansion, Islam constituted also a threat of conversion thus it was a formidable rival for Christendom. This rivalry led Christendom to otherize Islam.

Bernard Lewis specifies three waves of Muslim advance into Europe: The first one started in the 8th century and lasted until 1492 engulfing Spain, Portugal and southern Italy.¹⁴¹ The second wave was realized by Islamized Tartars who dominated over Russia and Eastern Europe. The third one was the expansion of the Seljuk and Ottoman Turks.¹⁴²

While Christian Europe was engaged in the attempt to expel Arabs from Europe, another Islamic force started to rise: The Turks. After 1071 Battle of Manzikert Turks entered the Asia Minor. A few centuries later, with the Turkish expansion into the Balkans, Turks started to constitute a serious threat for Europe. With the decline of Arabs, the fear from the Muslim Arabs was transferred on the Muslim Turks as the representative of Islam. Thus, depending upon the time and context, the Islamic threat was personified by the Arabs, Tartars or Turks as the others of firstly Christendom, later of Europe.

Just like the association of Europe with Christendom, Muslims failed to develop a clear notion of European identity. Until 17th century they came to designate the European lands as *Dar al-Harb*, in other words the land of war, the land of non-Muslims.¹⁴³ The lands under the rule of Muslims on the other hand, were referred to

¹⁴⁰ Lewis, B. (1995), *Cultures in Conflict*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 12.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

¹⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 12.

¹⁴³ Rich, P. (1999), “European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 441.

as *Dar al-Islam*, the land of Islam. Besides these two, there was also *Zimmî*, which referred to the Non-Muslim subjects, living under the protection of a Muslim state. The main purpose of the Islam was to subsume the Dar al-Harb into the Dar al-Islam and to make the *infidel*, *Harbi* convert into Islam and if this is not possible, to make them *Zimmî*.¹⁴⁴

Despite the hostility towards Islam, the Muslims did not conform to the Medieval stereotype of barbarian until 15th century, because, Islam was not viewed as a pagan religion. Instead, it was considered as a particularly hateful and dangerous corruption of the faith.¹⁴⁵ Infidel was a more popular word used to connote Muslims. Instead of Saracen or Turk, during the 13th and 14th centuries, the most familiar barbarian has been the Tartar.¹⁴⁶

Besides Islam, the internal divisions of Christianity provided Europe different others. Firstly the separation of the Christianity into Western Latin Church and Eastern Orthodox Churches created an otherized image of Orthodoxy in the eyes of Latin Christians and vice versa. Later, during the Reformation era, the rise of Protestantism enhanced the divisions and fragmentations within Christianity. After the Reformation, despite the decline of Christianity as a unifying feature of Europe, religion continued to preserve its unifying character face to the common Turkish threat.

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Renaissance provided to the European identity, a common cultural ground, different from the Christianity. Following the Renaissance, as a result of the religion's loss of importance as the mere common characteristic of Europe, besides the external threats such as Islam, Europe turned toward the internal others as well. As a result, at the end of the 15th century, besides Arabs, Jews too were expelled from Spain. From the mid-15th century onward, following the conquest of Constantinople by Turks, a new stereotype of barbarian arose. The new barbarian image was drained of much of its religious content and was

¹⁴⁴ Lewis, B. (1960), *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984, p. 327.

¹⁴⁵ Jones, W. R. (1971), "The Image of the Barbarian in the Medieval Europe", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 392.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 398.

instead used to connote ferocity, cruelty and brutality.¹⁴⁷ Thus after 1453, the word barbarian was used also for the Turks.

In addition to Jews, another significant internal other in Europe were the women. Starting from the early 14th century, until 1650, continental Europeans executed between 200,000 and 500,000 witches approximately 85% of whom were women.¹⁴⁸ Execution of the so-called-witches, in a sense enhanced the authority of the Church by stressing the internal other of Christendom.

Geographical discoveries opened a new era for the others of Europe. With the age of discoveries, Europeans encountered different geographies, peoples, life styles, values and so on. These differences reminded them what they had in common in Europe: a common civilization. However, according to Europeans, they had something beyond a common civilization. For them, instead of a common civilization, they constituted the civilization itself. This belief led them to perceive the newly encountered civilizations as the savage, uncivilized “others” of the civilization and placed Europeans at the center of a Eurocentric world-view.

Enlightenment image of Europe reinforced the Eurocentric world-view. The increasing importance of science and reason, created a sense of rational and scientific superiority over the rest of people. So the sense of the civilizational superiority was enhanced.

The French Revolution was a turning point in that it transformed the socio-political structure of Europe. As a result of the French Revolution, Europe witnessed the Napoleonic wars fought between the opponents of ancien régime and its proponents. Immediately after the revolution, the basic ideas of French Revolution and Napoleon’s attempt to expand these ideas were considered as a threat. So for a certain period France and Britain seeking to transform the old regime were considered as the “others” of Europe. In fact they were different from most of the previous others such as Arabs or savages, because France and Britain were internal others. In order to fight

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 393.

¹⁴⁸ Ben-Yehuda, N. (1980), “European Witch Craze of the 14th to 17th Centuries: A Sociologist’s Perspective”, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol.86, No.1, p. 1.

these internal others, an alliance was made in the Vienna Congress so that to include Russia. In other words, Russia which used to be Europe's other, was now admitted to the Concert of Europe.

After the Napoleonic wars, the alliance made in Europe was directed to the protection of the Ottoman Empire from potential Russian threat. In fact, this protection was not really meant to protect the Ottoman Empire, but instead to protect the European status quo. Any attack to the huge Ottoman Empire could have upset the balance of power in Europe. The increasing power of Russia was a clear threat for the rest of European powers. In this context, the Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Concert of Europe by the Paris Treaty. Just like in the case of Russia during the Vienna Congress, the Ottoman Empire was not anymore the other of Europe, but a member of its Concert.

Until the World War II, Europe witnessed several alliances and rivalries in Europe. However these were mainly related to the issue of balance of power politics driven by the interests of states. After the developments of the 19th century, the most important event which can be considered as a turning point for European fate has been the World War II.

During the World War II, Hitler went on to integrate Europe in the most pathetic way possible. During the war, the Axis of Rome-Berlin was founded against the rest of Europe. For Hitler, the real border between Europe and Asia was the one that divides the Germanic from the Slavonic world.¹⁴⁹ Europe was divided into two. In the eyes of the Rome-Berlin Axis, the other of Europe was those who resisted the revisionist policies of Hitler. In the eyes of those who resisted these policies, the other was the revisionists led by Hitler. Finally the revisionists lost the war. However, this war has had important implications for the future European integration and the emergence of a bi-polar world.

After the World War II, another war divided Europe: the Cold War. In fact the Cold War did not divide just Europe, but the entire World. The World was divided into two

¹⁴⁹ Bugge, P. (1999), "Asia and the Idea of Europe – Europe and its Others", Paper originally presented at a workshop on "Asian Values and Vietnam's Development in Comparative Perspective" Hanoi, March 24-26, 1999, p. 11.

blocks: the capitalist block in the West and the communist block in the East. During the Cold War, the other of the capitalist Western Europe was the Soviet Russia and the Eastern European countries which were the satellites of Soviet Russia. In fact, the otherization of (Soviet) Russia was not something new emerging in the Cold War era. Even before the 20th century, Russians constituted the other for Europe. Although they were Christian, their differences from the Europeans sufficed to classify them as “the other”.

In this period Europe became aware of another “other” for itself. As mentioned in the previous chapters, Europe’s history has not been one of integrity but instead one of conflicts and struggles. This historical record full of devastating, bloody wars has been highly destructive for Europe. Thus Europe’s war-torn past constituted another “other” for Europe¹⁵⁰. In this context, in order to overcome this war-torn past, initiatives to form a peaceful environment in Europe started during the Cold War with the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community.

Although in some periods of the Cold War, it is possible to consider USA as the other of Europe, the dominant other of Europe throughout the Cold War was the Soviet Union. However, especially France, under the Presidency of De Gaulle witnessed some tensions with USA. Great Britain’s application for membership to European Community, revealed this tension more clearly. Britain’s membership was vetoed by De Gaulle on grounds that Britain was the Trojan Horse of USA. With the end of the Cold War, face to the “superpower” of USA, Europe decided to go beyond a merely economic community and laid the foundation of a European Union, which besides an economic entity refers also to a political and cultural one too.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, it was not the case for the old enmities and suspicions of Europe. Despite the membership of several ex-communist Eastern European countries to such institutions as NATO and EU, the image of these countries as the “other” of Europe has not disappeared so easily. Especially after the September 11 events, in order to oppose to an immediate intervention to Iraq, France and Germany did not have to resist just to USA and Great

¹⁵⁰ Diez, T. (2004), “Europe’s Others and the Return of Geopolitics”, *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol.17, No.2, July 2004, p. 325.

Britain but also to the “New Europe”. Thus a new divide emerged between the “Old Europe” and the “New Europe”.

The same events showed once more that although both USA and Europe are considered as West, there are some tensions between them. USA continues to constitute one of the others of Europe. In order to explain this conflict, Giddens separates the West into two. West One refers to a constitutional, juridical system, a set of individual rights, the rule of impersonal law, civil liberties and so on. In terms of this West One, there is not any conflict between Europe and USA. However, the West Two is the part where there are problems. This West Two in turn, refers to a geopolitical formation.¹⁵¹

Immigration policy exhibits another experience of otherization in the contemporary Europe. During the post-Cold War era, when Europe needed cheap labor, despite the high number of immigrants, it could not get enough immigrants. Today when there is already a significant rate of unemployment in Europe, and that cheap labor is not so desirable, Europe has developed a series of rules and regulations by which it can marginalize the existing immigrants and discourage the aspiring ones.¹⁵² With the end of the Cold War, European Community entered into a new era. Increasing global inequalities, increased immigration in the relatively better-off EU countries. However, the increasing legal or illegal immigration brought also some problems. Firstly, the already increasing unemployment of EU becomes worse for EU citizens because of the “cheap, exported work force”. Secondly, the legal immigration changes the socio-cultural structure of Europe. Compared to the low growth rate of European population the immigrant population with a considerably higher growth rate may be challenging for the future socio-political and cultural structure of Europe. Finally, the inability of Europe to fully integrate or possibly assimilate the immigrants to the Europe, brings new problems. Just like the social explosion of the young immigrants in France, most of the immigrants living in bad socio-economic conditions constitute a serious internal threat or rather internal “other” for Europe.

¹⁵¹ Huntington, S. and Giddens, A. (2003), “Two Wests”, *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 2., Issue 4, p. 38.

¹⁵² Ward, I. (2002), “Identifying the European Other”, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 14, No. 2/3, p. 229.

In studying the immigration issue, Ward identifies two types of “other”: the external and internal other. The external other refers to the refugee and the aspiring immigrant against whom harsh measures are established.¹⁵³ The internal other on the other hand, refers to those who already immigrated to Europe. There are more than 10 millions of third-country nationals in Europe. However, although they live and work in the EU, they are not granted the status of EU citizenship, on grounds that they do not come from an EU member country.¹⁵⁴ Thus despite their long-term settlement in Europe, their participation in the work force, and even to the tax payment, they are in a sense otherized as a result of their exclusion from citizenship.

Among the immigrants, the Muslim ones have a special place, because after the Cold War, especially starting with the 21st century, Islam started to become once again a threat for the West. However, today, it constitutes a different threat compared to Middle Ages. Today, the threat is not based on the military power and expansion of Islam at the expense of West. Today’s threat is mainly related to increasing fundamentalism and the emerging militant Islam. The possibility of Muslim immigrants to support fundamentalist Islamic groups, the activities of which may sometimes involve terrorist attacks, is perceived as a serious threat for Europe. Thus among the already excluded immigrant groups in Europe, the Muslim immigrants are subject to particularly exclusionist practices.

4.1 EMERGENCE OF EAST/WEST DIVIDE

After having a general knowledge on the multiple others of Europe throughout the time, we should analyze the connotation of the East for Europe more in depth. Among the others, the East has a special place for Europe. The East has had an ambiguous place for Europe. To have a better understanding of this ambiguity, it is important to elaborate the origins of the divide between East and West.

In fact, the ambiguous place of the East vis à vis Europe does not stem only from cultural, political and religious differences. Geographically, as Europe can be considered as an extension of the Asian continent so it has been difficult to determine

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 229.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 233.

specific Eastern boundaries for Europe. As previously mentioned, Europe has not had fixed boundaries. It is possible to determine “natural” boundaries only in the West through Atlantic and in the South through the Mediterranean. However, for the drawing of boundaries, even for the Southern and Northern ones, political and cultural factors have been crucial. For instance during the Antiquity, the North-South divide was more important than the East-West divide.¹⁵⁵ Although during the Roman era, some parts of the North Africa were included to Europe as a result of Roman rule in these regions, in time, this situation changed. North Africa came to be identified as a frontier region where Berber states and Ottoman client rulers posed a threat to settled places of Christendom until the 17th century.¹⁵⁶ If Europe’s southern frontiers were in this way indeterminate, her eastern ones were forever undecided.¹⁵⁷ Although there were no fixed natural boundaries to determine the Eastern frontier of Europe, the two Eastern others of Europe, namely the Russians and the Turks, constituted some kind of Eastern border for Europe.

As mentioned previously, the division between East and West is in fact older than the division between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. Long before the division of Christianity, in the classical Greek era, the East was associated with the barbarians and thus was already otherized. As mentioned in the previous chapter, before the emergence of Christianity, after the death of Caesar, Rome was once divided into two, with Octavian ruling in the West and Anthony in the East. Later, after the rise of the Christianity, during the rule of Diocletian, Rome was divided into two on political grounds, because it was difficult to rule the entire Rome from one center. However, the event which marks the origins of the divide between the East and West came with the adoption of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire. Initially the division of the Empire at the end of the 4th century did not create two rival entities. However, in time Eastern part of the Empire and the Western part, acquired different characters. Latin came to be the language of the West and Greek that of the East. The West accepted the Latin Catholicism while the East accepted the Orthodoxy.

¹⁵⁵ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 21.

¹⁵⁶ Pagden, A (2002), “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in *The Idea of Europe : From Antiquity to the European Union* , (ed.) Pagden, A., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 45.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

The attempt to enforce Orthodoxy at the council of Chalcedon in 451 prepared the basis for future cleavage.¹⁵⁸ The coronation of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III in 800, despite the opposition of the Greek East, capitalized the divide between Latin Christianity and the Greek one. The Eastern Church considered the creation of the Holy Roman Empire and the participation of the Pope in the coronation of Charlemagne, as an act of schism. Differences over other theological issues also served to aggravate the growing estrangement between the Latin West and the Greek East. The definitive schism is dated from 1054 and the release of Leo IX's papal bull to excommunicate the Patriarch Cerularius of Constantinople. Although this particular event was a worth mentioning incidence, in fact it was just a formal acknowledgment of a division that existed for long in the practice if not in the institutional structure of the church.¹⁵⁹ However, according to Delanty, as a result of the delivery of the papal bull the division between Eastern Orthodox Church and western Catholic Church became permanent.¹⁶⁰

The division between the Orthodox Church and Catholic Church reached its peak during the invasion of Constantinople during the Fourth Crusade. The Holy War initiated against the Muslim enemy was finally directed to Orthodox Christians so the crusade deepened the divide between the Orthodox and Catholic world. Since the separation of 1054, Greek orthodoxy was regarded as an *heresy* of Christianity. However, after the Fourth Crusade, the situation became worse and the divide between the Latin Church and Orthodox church became almost as great as the divide between Islam and Christianity.¹⁶¹

Christianity was introduced to the Rus by two Greek monks in 988. During the period of Tartar Yoke, Russian church paid loyalty to the Patriarch of Byzantium.¹⁶² After the fall of Constantinople the Russian Church broke from the Greek tradition

¹⁵⁸ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 53.

¹⁵⁹ Russell, R. L. (2001), "Eastern Orthodox History and Faith, Religion in Romania, and Evangelism in the Orthodox Concept", Southwestern Seminary, Spring 2001, pp. 5-6.

¹⁶⁰ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 28.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

¹⁶² Neumann. I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 5.

and Russia, with its own church established in the 10th century, remained the only church that could claim leadership in Eastern Christendom. Russians were highly convinced that Moscow was the heir of Constantinople because of the marriage of Ivan the Great to Sophia, niece of the last Byzantine emperor.¹⁶³ Later, after the fall of Constantinople which used to be called as the Second Rome, Moscow came to be called by Russians as the Third Rome. Consequently the myth of *Holy Russia* was introduced. In fact, the myth of *Holy Russia* as the protector of Orthodoxy was not directed only against the Ottoman Empire but also against the West. This belief provided Russia a legitimation for its expansion toward South-East Europe. Thus Christianity became a dividing factor between Russia and Western Europe.¹⁶⁴

Besides the division originating from Orthodox-Catholic divide, Delanty traces the origins of the problems presented by Russia to Europe to two factors: long association of Russia with Mongols and Russia's eastward turn and colonization of north-eastern Asia.¹⁶⁵

Starting from the 11th century, the advance of the Turks from East to West emerged as a serious threat for the West. Thus to the negative image of the East which for long had been associated with Eastern Orthodoxy and the Russians, now the Turkish threat was added in the eyes of the West. Now, the East was not referring just to the Eastern Orthodoxy and the Russians, but also to the Turks. Especially with the decline of the Arabs and their expulsion, the threat coming from South was replaced by the Eastern one.

In the East of Europe, besides Russians and Turks, two other important civilizations existed: Indian civilization and Chinese civilization. However, these civilizations did not constitute a threat as much significant as the Turkish or Russian threat for Europe. The reasons behind this difference is mainly due to geographical proximity of the Russians and Turks to Europe. Besides these, in contrast to the universal religious

¹⁶³ Russell, R. L. (2001), "Eastern Orthodox History and Faith, Religion in Romania, and Evangelism in the Orthodox Concept", Southwestern Seminary, Spring 2001, p. 16.

¹⁶⁴ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 62.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

claims of the Russians and Turks against Europe, as Lewis puts it, Indian and Chinese civilizations were and remained largely regional.¹⁶⁶ Besides, Indian and Chinese religions did not have a universal monotheistic appeal. Thus among several Eastern civilizations, Europe chose the Russian and the Turk to be its main others.

¹⁶⁶ Lewis, B. (1995), *Cultures in Conflict*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 9.

CHAPTER 5

5. THE RUSSIAN AND THE TURKISH “OTHER”

5.1 THE RUSSIAN “OTHER”

Throughout its history, Russia has had an ambiguous place vis à vis Europe. This ambiguity is primarily reflected in geography. Even today, whether Russia belongs to the European geography or whether the Ural Mountains constitute the Eastern border of Europe is a contested issue. For Pavlov, although in geographical terms the division of the continent into Europe and Asia through the Ural Mountains, is contested, from a civilizational standpoint, this division makes sense. The lack of roads in harsh climatic environment has been an important obstacle for the development of contacts between Russians and external worlds. Russians were both unable and unwilling to force their way into Europe, because in that period, they were able to exist independently due to extensive forms and methods of sustaining and reproducing life.¹⁶⁷ However, this does not mean that Old Rus were totally isolated from Europe. It is known that in 548-549, the Goths took part together with the Russians in joint intrusions into the territory of Eastern Roman Empire. Besides this, Prussian chroniclers mentioned frequent wars between Russians and Prussians in the 6th century.¹⁶⁸

Stretching from Eastern Europe to Asian steppes the presence of Russians was troubling for Europe. Russians were sometimes considered as friend and more frequently as foe. They had many of the features of a European society, and although Orthodox, they were unquestionably Christian. However, because of the immense size of Russia and the fact that a large part of it had been ruled for a long time by

¹⁶⁷ Pavlov, N., (2003), “Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 111.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

nomadic peoples who were not considered as European, it laid beyond the formal limits of Romanized “civilization”.¹⁶⁹

According S. M. Solovyov, a 19th century Russian historian, at the beginning of the new European Christianity history, two tribes gained dominance and they divided Europe between themselves: the Germans from the north-east to the south-west and Slavs from the south-west to the north-east.¹⁷⁰

In the early 13th century, Russia fell under the Tartar Yoke, until the establishment of the Muscovite state under Ivan the Great in 1480. As a result of the rise of Mongol tribes as one of the most powerful forces in the 13th century, the entire Slavic belt was considered by West as a threat which could be used as a spring-board by despotic Asiatic powers seeking to invade West.¹⁷¹

According to Delanty, European identity was formed in opposition both to Muslims and Mongols with whom Russians have been associated.¹⁷² Thus, besides their adoption of Orthodox Christianity, this period during which they lived under the Mongols has been an important factor in the otherization of Russians.

Mongol rule has been considered in pejorative terms not only by Europeans but also by Russians themselves. However, Mongol rule over Russians has not been as much destructive as Russians claim. Against Russian criticisms of Mongols for being “primitive”, in fact, Russians absorbed many traits of Mongol culture. Language, decorative arts, strategy and customs are among the domains influenced by Mongols.¹⁷³ Mongol patronage fostered the development and extension of the trade

¹⁶⁹ Pagden, A (2002), “Europe: Conceptualizing a Continent”, in *The Idea of Europe : From Antiquity to the European Union* , (ed.) Pagden, A., New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 46.

¹⁷⁰ Pavlov, N., (2003), “Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 111.

¹⁷¹ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 60.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 58.

¹⁷³ Denisoff, E., (1950), “On the Origins of the Autonomous Russian Church”, *Review of Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 229.

routes stretching from Pacific to the Mediterranean, from which Russians profited.¹⁷⁴ Russians borrowed the commercial tax called as *tamga* the term *kazna* for treasury and perhaps the institutional structure it denoted from “primitive” Mongols.¹⁷⁵ Orthodox Russians profited from the religious tolerance under the Golden Horde rule. The khans of the Golden Horde, granted some fiscal and judicial immunities to the Russian Orthodox Church. Consequently, the Mongol religious policy fostered the growth of the ecclesiastical landholding in Russia.¹⁷⁶

In the second half of the 15th century two important themes dominated the history of Moscow: becoming a state through winning independence from Tartars, and religious emancipation through withdrawing from the guardianship of Byzantium.¹⁷⁷

One after the other, all Orthodox states fell under the rule of Muslims. However, among the Orthodox Christians, Moscow won its independence and maintained its Orthodox prince. In 1480, the Muscovite freed themselves from paying tribute to the Tartars, so one of the last remnants of a subjection which lasted more than two centuries disappeared.¹⁷⁸

Contacts between Old Russian towns and Europe were closest in the areas which lied along busy trade routes. In this context, the north of Russia with regard to the relations of Novgorod and other Russians towns with Europe has a special place. It was in this place where Germans launched a large-scale invasion of Russian lands.¹⁷⁹ Although contacts between Europe and Novgorod and Kievan Rus’ started during the High Middle Ages, contacts involving representatives of European political entities started from 16th century. The institutionalization of relations

¹⁷⁴ Halperin, C. J. (1983), “Russia in the Mongol Empire in Comparative Perspective”, *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 1, pp. 242- 243

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 256.

¹⁷⁷ Denisoff, E., (1950), “On the Origins of the Autonomous Russian Church”, *Review of Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 225.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

¹⁷⁹ Pavlov, N., (2003), “Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 112.

coincided with the spread of Renaissance to the rest of Muscovy, as well as with the Age of Discovery.¹⁸⁰

Following the Council of Florence in 1439, a temporary union was established between Rome and Byzantium Church.¹⁸¹ However, Russians strongly opposed to this union and accused Greeks for betrayal because of their submission to Rome. With the Council of Florence and the fall of Constantinople in 1453, the period referred as the “widowhood” of the Russian Church started. In this period, the Russian Church was left without spiritual heads. However, this widowhood ended with the coronation of Ivan IV in 1547 and the elevation of the Muscovite Metropolitan to the rank of patriarch in 1589.¹⁸²

Within Russia, the official position was stressing that the Muscovy was unique and superior. Moreover the doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome was asserted.¹⁸³ Accordingly Constantinople was the second Rome. After its fall, Moscow became the third Rome and there would not be a fourth Rome. In order to support this doctrine, the ruler adopted in 1547 the title of *tsar* after the Roman title of *caesar*. Moreover, at the end of the 16th century, the term “Holy Russia” was first mentioned.¹⁸⁴ This concept was directed both to the Ottomans and the West.

Russia’s entry into European politics started in the 17th century with the enthronement of the Romanovs. The Romanovs were oriented towards the West and they had strong dynastic ties with the Western royal families.¹⁸⁵ In the early 17th

¹⁸⁰Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 67.

¹⁸¹ Platania, G. (2003), “The Turkish Threat and the Idea of Crusading in the Papal Policy of the Modern Age in the Study of Some Unpublished or Rare Works of Lay or Religious Authors (15th-17th Centuries)” in *Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th Century to Present*, (ed.) Mustafa Soykut, Istanbul: The Isis Press, p. 117.

¹⁸² Denisoff, E., (1950), “On the Origins of the Autonomous Russian Church”, *Review of Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 230.

¹⁸³ Neumann, I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 7.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁸⁵ Pavlov, N., (2003), “Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 113

century, the foreigners skilled in various crafts were invited to Russia, in order to teach local population and to arrange the production of various goods.¹⁸⁶

Thirty Years War provided a formidable opportunity to Russians to be involved in the European politics. Russia to a certain degree was involved in the Thirty Years War during which the catholic group led by the Hapsburg dynasty fought with the German princes who relied on the burgher opposition. During the war, Russia provided economic assistance to countries unfriendly to the Emperor.¹⁸⁷

The dominant theme in Europe, concerning the image of Russians was *Christianity*. Although Pope Pius II considered Russians as Europeans because of their Christianity, like most of the Europeans in his time, Rabelais considered them as unbelievers.¹⁸⁸ The fact that they were orthodox made it easy in the eyes of Latin west to classify Russians as *heretics* together with Muslims. Besides *Christianity*, the themes such as *the civility* of the Russians and their *regime type* were also questioned.¹⁸⁹ In the eyes of the West, Russians were backward in all the three respects. Concerning civility, the eating and speaking habits of the Russians and their bodily practices were criticized as being barbaric and uncivilized. The regime type was regarded as being tyrannical compared to the Western regime and they were seen as despotic.

Renaissance and Reformation have been two important steps in the move towards a more secular Europe. In this period, over-seas expansion of European powers played an important role in the perception of Europe's others. With the discovery of the "wild world", Europe has come to see itself as "the civilization". Consequently, on the one hand, the "others" against which Europe defined itself such as the Russians were perceived as "uncivilized"; on the other hand, a new Other started to appear in the newly won territories.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 114.

¹⁸⁸ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 67.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 69.

Peter the Great's accession to the throne marks the beginning of a new era in the European discourse on Russia and also a new era in the Russian discourse on Europe. In this era the name "Russia" and the power Russia appeared in the European state system.¹⁹⁰

This period is marked with the efforts of Peter the Great to Europeanize Russia. Peter the Great attempted to introduce Western technologies, practices, beliefs and personnel.¹⁹¹ As a result, different comments on the discourse on Russia have risen. While some hoped that Russians could be a valuable ally against the Turk¹⁹², others like Leibniz hold that Russians could be a bridge between Europe and China.¹⁹³ Besides these, Russia came to be seen as the land of future.¹⁹⁴

In 1703 St. Petersburg was founded by Peter the Great as the new capital and the "window into Europe" for Russia.¹⁹⁵ The significance of the Moscow as the Third Rome was weakened as a result of St. Petersburg's becoming the new capital.¹⁹⁶ French replaced the Russian among the upper classes as the preferred language of communication.¹⁹⁷

As a part of westernization efforts of Russia, a need to prove Russia's Europeanness by redefining its geography arose. For many centuries, the River Don had been the boundary between European and Asian sections of Europe.¹⁹⁸ In the 18th century,

¹⁹⁰ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 75.

¹⁹¹ Neumann, I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 11

¹⁹² Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 74.

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 75.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 79.

¹⁹⁵ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 61.

¹⁹⁶ Neumann, I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 11.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

¹⁹⁸ Leontidou, L. (2004), "The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives", *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 604.

the Russian state engaged in formulation of a geographical definition of Europe which stretches from Atlantic to the Urals. Consequently the idea of European borders with Asia ending at the Urals, was first presented by a Russian geographer.¹⁹⁹ Besides this, some kind of analogy was drawn between Russia and other colonial European powers in terms of divisibility of Russia into a homeland which belonged to European civilization and a vast Extra-European colonial periphery.²⁰⁰

Behind most of the opposition to Peter the Great's modernization efforts there was religious views.²⁰¹ Thus Peter decided to put the church under the rule of the state.

Despite Peter's all modernization attempts, not all comments on his attempts were positive. Among those who criticized the Europeanization efforts of Peter the Great, there were those who like Montesquieu criticized Peter's policies as being brutal, and those who doubted the ability of Russians to internalize the western values. There was a tendency to criticize Peter the Great's means for Europeanizing Russia and the Russians. For instance Rousseau criticized Peter on grounds that he imitated Europe instead of being more creative and that "instead of making Russians, he tried to make Germans and French".²⁰²

Besides reform attempts, the 18th century witnessed also the involvement of Russia into European politics through wars. Under the Peace of Westphalia, Sweden received significant indemnities and lands. Thus an urge to recover the lands seized by Sweden, led Peter I to fight together with European allies against Sweden in the Great Northern War at the beginning of the 18th century.²⁰³ Following the victory

¹⁹⁹ Neumann. I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 12.

²⁰⁰ Bassin, M. (1991), "Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 5.

²⁰¹ Neumann. I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 11.

²⁰² Neumann. I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 83.

²⁰³ Pavlov, N., (2003), "Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons", *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 115.

over Sweden, the archaic designation of Muscovy as *tsardom* was replaced by *imperiia* along the European model and the ruler came to be called as *imperator*.²⁰⁴

The 18th century was also marked with the Enlightenment. Enlightenment has had important role in shaping the European identity. In Europe, church and states started to be seen as separate spheres. In this period, when Europe was moving towards secularism, religion preserved its importance for Russia, moreover, state and church were now more integrated as a result of Peter the Great's reforms. In the face of the Enlightenment image of Western Europe as the 'seat of civilization', for most Europeans, the East came to be seen as *uncivilized*.

After the French Revolution, Napoleon's attempt to fashion Europe in the name of France failed. When his opponents tried to restore the Old Order, they appealed to the idea of Europe. Thus the use of Europe was an anti-French and an anti-western construct because the Holly Alliance involved also Prussia, Russia and Austria.²⁰⁵ As a result of the Napoleonic Wars, following the defeat of Napoleon, Russia was recognized as a great power in Europe. Russia, with Great Britain, Austria and Prussia made an alliance against France and became a *player* in European politics during this period.²⁰⁶ In fact even in that period the acceptance of Russia to the Concert of Europe is a debatable issue. It was probably on pragmatic grounds that Russia was accepted to the Concert. Russia was considered as a key power in the European balance of power to counterbalance France and the Ottoman Empire. This consideration concerning the balance of power played an important role in the discourse on Russia as an actor in Europe. So I would comment that, rather than being accepted as one of the key actors to the European state system, Russia was accepted rather as a *Guest Player*. Supporting this claim, throughout this period we can see the theme of "barbarian at the gate" with focus on the existence of Muslims and Asiatic minorities in Russia.²⁰⁷ Thus we can say that this recognition of Russia

²⁰⁴ Bassin, M. (1991), "Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 5.

²⁰⁵ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 73.

²⁰⁶ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 86.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 90.

as a European power was basically founded on pragmatical grounds. In fact Europe did not have a common policy toward Russia. With the rise of the notion of nation-state, each nation-state tried to increase its power in the European balance of power, in favor of itself. While on the one hand Russia was used to counterbalance the Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, Ottoman Empire was supported by some European powers such as France to counterbalance Russia.

One of the key developments of the period was the crystallization and polarization of two positions in Russia on Europe. Romantic nationalists became known as *Slavophiles* while those who looked to Europe as political and economic models became known as *westernisers*.²⁰⁸

Slavophile was referring to Shishkov and his Russian tendency, which devoted itself to the purifying of the Slav roots of the Russian language. “Moscow as the Third Rome” and “Holy Russia” were ideas underlined by Slavophiles. European influence for them, was the external and internal Other from which Russia must be saved.²⁰⁹ In 1830s Slavophiles affirmed that there was something unique and definitely not western or European about Russia’s national ethos. Towards the end of the 19th century, Slavophiles were succeeded by the pan-Slavs who attacked any suggestion of European superiority and challenged the identification of Russia with Europe.²¹⁰

The task of Westernisers was on the other hand, to show how Russia was already developing along with European lines and how it should accelerate that development, despite different conditions in Russia.²¹¹

In the context of Slavophiles’ and pan-Slavs’ criticisms against the uniqueness and superiority of Europe, new geographic definitions of Europe, Asia and Russia

²⁰⁸ Neumann. I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 28.

²⁰⁹ Ibid, p. 32.

²¹⁰ Bassin, M. (1991), “Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space”, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 9.

²¹¹ Neumann. I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 35.

emerged. An example of these new definitions came from Danilevskii. By strongly arguing that Russia is not part of Europe, he criticized the view that “Europe is the most exalted expression of human social, cultural and intellectual development”. Instead, he identified the basic characteristics of European civilization as violence, malicious individualism and an uncontrolled ambition for material profit.²¹² However, Danilevskii did not propose a neutral approach instead of Euro-centrism. Just like the Eurocentrism of Europeans, he adopted a Slavo-centric world view. He stated that “After God and His Holy Church, the idea of Slavdom should be highest idea, above freedom, above science, above enlightenment and above any sort of worldly benefits.”²¹³ Besides these criticisms, he went on to argue that Europe was not a continent. According to him, on grounds that the original criterion to identify continents has been the opposition between land and water instead of a separate continent, Europe was a mere territorial appendage or peninsula of the Asian continent.²¹⁴ Thus he rejected the proposition that Urals constituted the boundary between Europe and Asia.²¹⁵

From the Europeans’ perspective, the 19th century perception of Russia was highly influenced by the rise of the United States. With the rise of the United States, Europeans had the feeling to be encircled by the rise of two great power blocks in the east and in the west.²¹⁶

It is in this context that in the following century the myth of *Eurasia* emerged in Russia. This concept was based on the belief that Russia constituted an independent historical reality between Europe and Asia.²¹⁷ This concept was developed primarily in the work of Peter N. Savitskii. Just like the pan-Slavs, he argued that Europe could not be considered as a physical-geographical continent different from Asia.

²¹² Bassin, M. (1991), “Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space”, *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 9.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²¹⁶ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 63.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

Thus there were no geographical or physical separation between Europe and Asia. It was the case for Russia too. Russia formed a unitary geographical unit and belonged neither to Asia nor to Europe.²¹⁸ Instead, Russia was part of Eurasia, not only in terms of geography but also in terms of ethnography, history, society and economy. Consequently, Russian society was a versatile and highly complex blend of Russian-Slavic, Finno-Ugric, Tatar-Turkic and Mongolian elements.²¹⁹

The revolution of 1917 involved transformation of the entire state. Russia's new means of transition to modernity was accomplished by a complete break with the past, including Europeanism. De-Europeanization of Russia was reflected in the choice of Moscow as the new capital and the renaming of St. Petersburg first as Petrograd and later Leningrad.²²⁰ Initially reactions to what is known as February Revolution were on the whole rather positive.²²¹

During the post-World War I era, Europe was constructed in opposition to Soviet communism, which sought a "world revolution". So the World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution shaped the identity of Europe as a counter-revolutionary bastion against international communism.²²² The interwar period saw a number of tentative representations of Soviet Russia. With the radical exception of Nazi discourse, Russia was seen as part of Europe, but a somewhat an *errant part*.²²³ It was only toward the end of the inter-war period that European discourse on Soviet Russia took the representation of a clear and present *threat*.²²⁴ The ideologically motivated foreign policy of Russia created fear in Europe. Moreover the discourse of

²¹⁸ Bassin, M. (1991), "Russia Between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Space", *Slavic Review*, Vol. 50, No. 1, p. 14.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

²²⁰ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p. 62.

²²¹ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 99.

²²² Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, p.107

²²³ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 101.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 102.

the Turk as the dominant Other of Europe was replaced by dominance of threat caused by Russia or rather by Soviet Union.

However, the image of Russia and Russians was not totally negative for all Europeans. An alternative representation of the Soviet Union saw this state as the deliverer of Europe from the scourge of Nazism and as a model to emulate. In this representation, Soviet Union was seen as more advanced than capitalist Europe by virtue of its politico-economic model.²²⁵ Soviet Union in the 1920s and among the communists in Western Europe supports this argument.²²⁶ However, during the Cold War, the developments in the Eastern Europe resulted in the shift of discourse on Soviet Union. Each intervention had the effect of confirming and adding to the military threat and to detracting from the attractiveness of Soviet Union as a political model.²²⁷

A crucial development of the inter-war period was the rise of fascism which prepared the ground for the World War II. The aim of the fascist European leaders was the creation of a purely European supra-national civilization. In fact, the original target of lebensraum was Jews and Soviet Russia. Fascists believed that Jews were corrupting the purity of the Aryan race and godless Bolshevism was threatening Europe.²²⁸ Thus the “operation Barbarossa” of 1941 became focused on Slavs, Jews and Soviet Communism rather than Islam and the Middle East.²²⁹

Having mobilized all their manpower and material resources, only two major countries emerged as true victors of the war: the USA and USSR. Thus the

²²⁵ Ibid., p. 104.

²²⁶ Stråth, B. (2002), “A European Identity, To the Historical Limits of a Concept”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4), p. 391.

²²⁷ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 106.

²²⁸ Delanty, G. (1995), *Inventing Europe: Ideas, Identity and Reality*, London: Mc Millan, pp. 112-113.

²²⁹ Rich, P. (1999), “European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 449.

Eurocentric world view lost its significance and the focus of the world politics shifted toward Washington and Moscow.²³⁰

The end of the World War II started a new era for the whole world. This period characterized by bi-polar power system, deepened the hostilities between liberal and communist worlds. New institution such as NATO led by USA and Warsaw Pact led by USSR were founded to feel more secure in the Cold War atmosphere. However, these new institutionalizations in line with bi-polarity severed the situation. During the Cold-War, each super power attempted to expand its zone of influence and to preserve the existing one. The Cold-War is also characterized by arms race between the two superpowers.

Leontidou states that although Europe is not a proper continent, boundaries have been drawn around it as a region and later as a group of nation-states. These boundaries were sometimes soft and sometimes hard. According to her, the hardest boundary Europe felt ran through its center and split East from West Europeans during the Cold War.²³¹

The Cold War has been the period which witnessed the sharpest otherization of Russia. Different from other periods of history when the otherization was based on historical and cultural factors, during this period the otherization was made along ideological lines. During the Cold War, we can see the pervasiveness of the representation of Soviet Union as a *military and political threat*. Soviet Union was considered as “in Europe but not of Europe”. One of the main representations of the Soviet Union was *Asiatic/barbarian political power*.²³² However the dichotomy between *democratic and totalitarian or authoritarian* started to replace the dichotomies of *civilized/barbarian* or *European/Asian*.²³³

²³⁰ Pavlov, N., (2003), “Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 116.

²³¹ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 595.

²³² Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 102.

²³³ *Ibid*, p. 103.

Despite the concept of Cold War, the relations between Western Europe and Soviet Union in this era have not always been so cold. In the 1970s, a new era started: La Détente. With this period, USSR began to turn its face toward Europe. USSR not only normalized its bilateral relations with many industrialized countries but also took an active part in political and military European forums, one of primary indicators of this, is the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 in the Conference on Security and cooperation in Europe (CSCE).²³⁴ Détente brought the recognition of political and territorial *status quo* in Germany by Brandt. In addition to this, economic relations began to develop between Western Europe and the Soviet Union. In fact we can consider the amelioration of the relations in this period as a continuation of the idea of “balance of power” of 19th century. With Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), Soviet Union sought the recognition of the *status quo* in Europe by FRG and economic agreements were made for the provision of natural gas.

Also with regard to relations with France, during the Cold War, Soviet Union sought to profit from De Gaulle’s distance from the USA. Besides these, in the 1980s, France had become the second most important trade partner of Soviet Union in Western Europe, after the FRG. Thus Soviet Union was trying to maintain the *status quo* in Europe in its favor and by establishing relatively good relations, by weakening the links between the Western Europe and USA and by showing the decrease in the Soviet threat in Europe, it was also trying to de-legitimize the presence of US troops in Europe. Toward the end of the Cold War the idea of Common European Home was introduced by Gorbachev with the aim of stopping the isolation of Soviet Union in Europe, underlining that Soviet Union was a European country and creating a zone of peace and increasing economic relations. Moreover, Gorbachev thought that the prerequisite for admission to the concert of European powers was to end Soviet Union expansionism and to end the hostile image of the Soviet Union. However, the tools he chose to realize this prerequisite prepared the collapse of the Soviet Union. *Perestroika*, the new political thinking is

²³⁴ Pavlov, N., (2003), “Russia and Europe: Pros and Cons”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 49, No. 6, p. 116.

widely criticized on the basis that the rapprochement with the West was inadequately negotiated and poorly compensated.²³⁵

In contrast to many scholars who perceive the collapse of the Iron Curtain as the melting of borders, Leontidou asserts that boundaries around the EU were soon to become more rigid in the “new world order” in the discourse of “Fortress Europe”.²³⁶

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin was considered as a democratizing figure and gained an iconic status as the first democratically-elected president of the formerly communist Russia.²³⁷ Initially Yeltsin, with his Foreign Minister Kozyrev, followed a very strong pro-Western orientation in the foreign policy of Russia.²³⁸ Under the presidency of Yeltsin, the official position of the state was rather that of the liberal position, which proposed a relationship with Europe based on partnership or apprenticeship.²³⁹ Russia had to change her pro-Western policy due to domestic criticisms and inability of Russia to cope with Yeltsin’s shock therapy. However, this change of policy was rather verbal.²⁴⁰ The most important change was on Russia’s role with regard to its near-abroad. Now Russia was claiming the role of a regional policeman²⁴¹ in its near-abroad such as Caucasian region or Moldova. This can be considered as a continuation of Russia’s historical messianic ideology.

²³⁵ Baranovsky, V. (2000), “Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?”, *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3, p. 448.

²³⁶ Leontidou, L. (2004), “The Boundaries of Europe: Deconstructing Three Regional Narratives”, *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power*, 11, p. 607.

²³⁷ Khrushcheva, N. L. and Hancox, E. J. (2006), “The New Post-Transitional Russian Identity: How Western is Russian Westernization?”, Project of the World Policy Institute, and the Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School, and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, p. 4.

²³⁸ Marrantz, P. J. (1997), “Neither Adversaries nor Partners: Russia and the West in Search for a New Relationship”, in Roger E. and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, eds., *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, London: Macmillan, p. 78.

²³⁹ Neumann, I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 200.

²⁴⁰ Marrantz, P. J. (1997), “Neither Adversaries nor Partners: Russia and the West in Search for a New Relationship”, in Roger E. and Alexander V. Kozhemiakin, eds., *The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation*, London: Macmillan, p. 86.

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 88.

Another issue where Russia wanted to assert its presence was Kosovo. Behind Russia's willingness to be involved in this issue, the Slavic roots of the Serbs and domestic criticism against West's Kosovo policy played important roles. Thus, although ideology lost its importance in Russian foreign policy, ethnicity which was important before the Soviet era and which was based on Slavic roots, still occupied an important role. However, in the post-Cold War era, confrontations between East and the West were mainly rooted in domestic and economic reasons in contrast to those of Cold War era which were rooted in ideology.²⁴²

With the Putin era, Russia has adopted a more realistic policy with emphasis on Russia's interests. Despite western criticisms on his authoritarian rule, Putin has a domestic popularity stemming from the belief that he is a strong leader. Khrushcheva and Hancox deal with this issue in their report on Russia and assert:

*Russians continue to believe, or want to believe, that their country still "matters" when it comes to world events. Many of Putin's actions internationally attempt to build on this perception. This serves both to maintain his image as a strong, decisive leader; and fills a still-existing need within the Russian psyche.*²⁴³

With the end of the Cold War, Russia's relations with western institutions entered into a new era. One of the most important issues for Russia, in terms of these institutions of Western origin has been the enlargement of NATO to include former Eastern European "satellites" or rather allies of Russia. Russia's reaction to this enlargement showed that NATO is still perceived as a challenge to the security interests of Russia.²⁴⁴ However, in time some steps to heal the post-Cold War relations with Russia were taken such as the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC). The event of September 11 has been a cornerstone in Russia's relations with the West in terms of security issues. Following this event, the

²⁴² Ibid., p. 90

²⁴³ Khrushcheva, N. L. and Hancox, E. J. (2006), "The New Post-Transitional Russian Identity: How Western is Russian Westernization?", Project of the World Policy Institute, and the Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School, and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, p. 14.

²⁴⁴ Baranovsky, V. (2000), "Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3, p. 452.

establishment of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was an indicator of the changing course of relations.

Compared to NATO enlargement, Russia's reaction to the EU enlargement has not been so nervous. This is probably due to the fact that, although the foundations of both institutions were laid during the Cold War, NATO was established against Soviet Russia, to counter-balance potential threats from the Eastern block. In other words, *raison d'être* of NATO was (Soviet) Russian threat. On the other hand, good relations with EU signified important economic benefits for Russia. In this respect, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Russia and EU has been an important step in the enhancement of relations between the two. In 1999 EU adopted its Common Strategy on Russia and Russia launched its Medium Term strategy as a response to EU's Common Strategy. EU-Russia Summits, Permanent Partnership Council Meetings constitute the major institutional framework for EU-Russia relations.

Besides EU, Russia seeks to keep good relations with other European institutions as well. For instance, besides continuing its membership to OSCE and the Council of Europe, Russia seeks to enhance its relations with these institutions. In addition to improving Russo-European relations through multilateral ways such as institutions, bilateral relations have also a large significance for Russia. In this respect, Moscow seeks to promote its bilateral relations with the key European players, namely Germany, France and UK.²⁴⁵

It is important to look at the issue from the "others" perspective as well. Igor Ivanov dealt with the issue of "the new Russian identity" in his article published in the summer of 2001. With reference to the *new Foreign Policy Concept of Russia*, he states that foreign policy of states bears the imprint of continuity determined by geopolitics, history and culture. He suggests that "the country's foreign policy should be based on national interests rather than political ideology".²⁴⁶ He defines the

²⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 454.

²⁴⁶ Ivanov, I. (2001), "The New Russian Identity: Innovation and Continuity in Russian Foreign Policy", *The Washington Quarterly*, 24:3, Summer 2001, p. 8.

foreign policy orientation of Russia, as a combination of “Russia’s traditional European orientation combined with its wish to secure its interests in Asia”.²⁴⁷ However, Kortunov who is the chairman of Foreign Policy Planning Committee (in 2003) holds that Russian Federation can not be the heir of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, because Russian imperial and Soviet communist projects were two mutually exclusive and opposing projects. According to him, Sovietization was an active anti-Russian policy, an effort to de-Russify the Russian nation. There are also critics similar to those directed to Peter the Great. Kortunov blames Gorbachev and Iakovlev for their aim of “joining the world community” without bothering about the conditions under which the Soviet Union could do this. According to him, as a result, Soviet Union “had to pay with its identity for an effort to join an alien project”, because Soviet leaders had discarded the Soviet identity without offering anything in exchange.²⁴⁸ Lebedenko asserts that Russia’s current image is an impediment to the country’s development and modernization²⁴⁹ and blames the Western media for reflecting and disseminating a negative image of Russia.²⁵⁰

Although it is not correct to reduce Europe into the EU, today, the EU is considered as the most important European institution. Moreover, although it is not correct, most people use Europe and the EU interchangeably. From this perspective, it is widely argued that following the collapse of the Soviet Union and EU enlargement to include Central and Eastern European countries, the fundamental criterion to decide whether a certain identity is eligible to become European or not has, become the Copenhagen Political Criteria. Thus today it is important to look at the democratic tendencies and practices of countries in order to evaluate their “Europeanness”. The surveys conducted by Eurobarometer justify the importance of respect for democracy and

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 10.

²⁴⁸ Kortunov, S. (2003), “Russia’s National Identity: Foreign Policy Dimension”, *International Affairs* [Moscow], August 2003, 49, 4, p. 99.

²⁴⁹ Lebedenko, V. (2004), “Russia’s national Identity and Image Building”, *International Affairs*[Moscow], August 2004, 50, 4, p. 72.

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 73.

human rights in deciding whether a country should join the EU.²⁵¹ Results of the survey show that respect for democracy and human rights is the most important criteria on the decision about the membership potential of a particular country.

Fuchs and Klingemann's work is important to elaborate the place of democracy in different countries. They consider eastern enlargement of European Union as a factor that will make difficult to develop a European identity due to three reasons. First, the territorial limits of Europe are vague. Second, with the increase in the number of member states, cultural plurality will also increase. Finally, there is a cultural gap between Western Europe and Central and Eastern Europe.²⁵² As a part of this cultural gap, they study democratic traditions and tendencies in several countries. They try to measure democratic tendencies of countries, and compare their deviation from Western Europe. To classify the countries, they choose the distinction made by Huntington between civilizations for a starting point in their study.²⁵³ The results of their research point out that Albania shows the lowest mean and thus the greatest distance to benchmark democracies. Besides this, Slavic successor countries to Soviet Union (Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia) correspond to the least benchmark democracies.²⁵⁴ Among these countries, relatively least support for democracy and relatively high support for autocracy is to be found in Russia.²⁵⁵

Other researchers such as Khrushcheva and Hancox have come to similar conclusions as those of Fuchs and Klingemann. Khrushcheva and Hancox state that the experiences of Russia with democracy have not been positive and that economic transition resulted in the concentration of the country's wealth in the hands of a

²⁵¹ Eurobarometer Survey Results, "Importance of Criteria in Deciding Whether a Country Should Join the EU", May 2001, available on world wide web:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/cf/subquestion_en.cfm

²⁵² Fuchs, D. and Klingemann H. D. (2002) "Eastward Enlargement of the European Union and the Identity of European Union", *West European Politics*, Volume 25, Number 2/April 01, 2002, p. 20.

²⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

small elite.²⁵⁶ They even assert that “democracy was seen by many as a system of chaos and uncertainty with benefits only for a small, well-connected elite”.²⁵⁷ Thus we can say that Russia could not yet manage to internalize the core European values which are considered as crucial in the formation of the European identity. Besides non-compliance with European values, another negative factor in the image of today’s Russia in the eyes of Europe is the prevalence of mafia, corruption and crime in the country. In fact these are also connected with the issue of transparency and rule of law.

Despite the image of Putin as a strong leader, Russia still seems to have difficulties in her transition to democracy and market economy. However, the recent developments in the rise of global terrorism and Russia’s rich natural gas resources have provided Russia an opportunity to strengthen its place in the world politics. Today Russia has increased her relations not only with Europe and more specifically with EU, but also with NATO. However, despite the improvement in its relations with West, the issue of whether Russia belongs to Europe still preserves its ambiguity. Today, in Europe, besides those who still stress the “otherness” of Russians vis à vis Europe, there are also a significant number of people who consider Russians as European.

5.2 THE TURKISH “OTHER”

One of the main raisons for the otherization of the Turk by Europe is probably the emergence of the Turk as a Muslim threat for Europe. Long before the encounter with the Turks, Europeans had encountered Islamic armies of Arabs. After its emergence in the 7th century, Islam had experienced a highly rapid expansion covering Middle East and Northern Africa. In these lands, Islam was expanding its territories at the expense of Christian territories and Christendom. It was expanding not only at the expense of Christendom’s territories but also at the expense of Christianity because the ultimate purpose of this expansion was not to conquer as much land as possible,

²⁵⁶Khrushcheva, N. L. and Hancox, E. J. (2006), “The New Post-Transitional Russian Identity: How Western is Russian Westernization?”, Project of the World Policy Institute, and the Graduate Program of International Affairs at The New School, and the Harriman Institute at Columbia University, p. 4.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 5.

but instead expanding the Islamic belief through *jihad*. To a large extent Islamic armies were successful in their purpose, since in most of formerly Christian lands, people had started to convert to Islam. In this sense Islam constituted a serious threat for Christendom, because as previously mentioned Islam came with the claim of being the last and the ultimate religion.

With expansion of Arabs from Northern Africa into Europe the Islamic threat for Europeans became more severe. Initially this threat was embodied in the Saracen. Later, with the decline of the Arabs and the rise of the Ottoman Turks, the threat was embodied in “Ottoman”. According to Neumann, what made these two as particular threat for Europe was their military might, physical proximity and a strong religious tradition.²⁵⁸

While in the west of Europe wars between Christendom and its enemy the Muslim Arabs were going on, in the East of Europe another power was preparing to be a key world power to shape the European history. The Islamized Seljukide Turks entered into Anatolia following the Battle of Manzikert. This battle is a cornerstone both for the history of Europe, in particular Byzantium and for the history of Turks. As a result of this war, Eastern Rome, that is Byzantium encountered the Turks which would be Europe’s centuries long enemy. In addition, 1071 represents the beginning of the permanent establishment of Turks into Anatolia or Asia Minor, which would later constitute a spring board for Ottoman expansions toward Europe. The Battle of Manzikert coincides also with the Norman conquest of Palermo, the last bastion of Norman presence in Sicily.²⁵⁹ Thus toward the end of the 11th century, the gradual passage of the banners of Islam from Arabs to Turks started.

Although the advance of the Islamic armies was stopped in 732 at Poitiers, *the infidels* still held the Holy lands. The image of the Turk as a threat, first appeared in a letter written by the Byzantine Emperor to the Earl of Flanders in 1088, indicating

²⁵⁸ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 40.

²⁵⁹ Soykut, M. (2001), *Image of the ‘Turk’ in Italy: History of the ‘Other’ in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, p. 3.

that “Christianity, wealth, security and existence of Byzantium, which was considered to be the pride of the entire Europe was in danger”.²⁶⁰

Despite the beginning of victories against Muslims in the West, the Holy lands were still in the hands of infidels. In the eyes of Europeans, to this already unpleasant situation, the advance of the Turks was added. The letter of the Byzantine Emperor underlined the significance of the newly emerging threat. Thus came the devise of holy wars under the name of the Crusades. From 1095 to 1291, Europeans organized Crusades in order to recapture Jerusalem from the Muslims and to respond to the call of Byzantine Emperor against the Seljukide expansion. The First Crusade was initiated by the preaching of Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont in 1095. It was successful and it ended up by the capture of Jerusalem by Christians in 1099. With the resurgence of Islamic power in the 12th century the expansion of Crusaders was halted and Jerusalem was recaptured by Muslims under Saladdin in 1187. While there were further crusades in the 13th century, they failed to recapture Jerusalem. The crusaders received their decisive defeat with the capture of Acre in 1291 by Muslims.²⁶¹

In terms of relations with Muslims, Crusades functioned as a presenter of the Saracen to Europe, because before the Crusades, there were just a few mention to the prophet of Islam. However after the Crusades, though not always positive, everyone in the West had a certain perception, image of Islam and its prophet.²⁶² In terms of integration among Christians, the Crusades reinforced medieval legends of Christian chivalry which diverted attention away from more direct Islamic threats to Christian power and integrity.

Although the conquest of Constantinople by Ottoman Turks is a turning point, in fact this conquest did not come as an unexpected surprise to Europeans, because until

²⁶⁰ Burçoğlu, N. K. (2003), “A Glimpse at Various Stages of the Evolution of the Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th to 21st Centuries” in *Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th Century to Present*, (ed.) Mustafa Soykut, Istanbul: The Isis Press, p. 23.

²⁶¹ Rich, P. (1999), “European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 438.

²⁶² Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 42.

1453, Turks had already conquered most of European lands in the Balkans. Constantinople had remained as a symbolic unit of territory, exhibiting the survival of Byzantium.

The Ottoman State was established after the defeat of the Byzantine army at Bapheus in 1302. The ideal of *ghaza* played an important role in the establishment and development of the Ottoman state.²⁶³ Following the establishment of the Ottoman State, on the Byzantium borders, Turks started to expand their territories as a result of this *ghaza* ideal. *Ghaza* was in a sense a Turkish Ottoman version of the Holy War conception. However, the purpose of the *ghaza* was not the destruction of the *Dar al-Harb* but instead its submission.²⁶⁴ In this context Turks engaged in several incursions into the Byzantium lands. Ottomans entered into the Balkans as an ally of Cantacuzenos.²⁶⁵ In 1362 Edirne was captured by the Turks. In 1365-1366, Ottoman allies were sent by Byzantians as reinforcement to the Bulgarian king who was pressed by the Wallachians and Magyars.²⁶⁶

With the advance of the Turks into the Balkans, the ideal of Crusades was revived. Although towards the end of 1380s, Serbia, Bulgaria and Bosnia united against the Ottomans under Murad I, they were finally defeated at the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 and the Kingdom of Serbia was captured by the Ottomans. In 1396, Crusaders were once again united to expel the Ottomans from the Balkans. However the defeat of the Crusaders in the battle of Nicopolis (Niğbolu) has been a mile stone in that, as a result of the defeat in Nicopolis, the Crusaders' enthusiasm to re-conquer the Holy Lands and the Eastern Europe was lost for good.²⁶⁷

²⁶³ İnalçık, H. (2005), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Klasik Çağ (1300–1600)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p. 12.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 17.

²⁶⁷ Soykut, M. (2001), *Image of the 'Turk' in Italy: History of the 'Other' in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, p. 110.

Although most of the Balkanic territories were already captured by Turks until 1453, the conquest of Constantinople has been a turning point in the history of Turco-European relations. The expulsion of Arabs in 1492 Spanish Reconquista coupled with the rapid rise and expansion of the Ottomans, marks a new era. In 1492 the passage of the banners of Islam from Arabs to Turks which had started in 1071, was finally completed. From the mid 15th century onwards, until the 18th century, all definitions of the Turk were deeply influenced by the Turk's image as the banner holder of Islam. Due to this strong association of the Turk with Islam, and its perception as the rival of Christianity, from 1453, the Turk came to be seen as the anti-thesis of Europe and Christendom.²⁶⁸ Thus as a result of this association, a rather negative image of the Turk emerged. Not only was the Ottoman State identified with Islam, but also Islam was identified by the Ottoman Empire. The conquest of Constantinople created the image of invincible Turk in the minds of Europeans.

The conquest of the Constantinople was followed by other conquests such as that of Trebizond and that of Otronto in 1480. After the capture of Constantinople and further Ottoman expansion, throughout Europe, various written records emerged. Besides travel accounts one kind of the most significant of these works was the *relazioni*, written by Venetian ambassadors or legates of other Italian states.²⁶⁹

In fact, European depiction of the Turk was not fixed. The Turk exhibited different image in different parts of Europe and in different periods of the history. For instance, man of the Renaissance identified the Turk with the Persian, the enemy of the Greeks.²⁷⁰ In a *relazione* written approximately in 1579, the similarity between the Turk and the Arians was underlined. Arianism was condemned in the ecumenical council of Nicaea in 325, on grounds that it was a clear heresy. Accordingly, the Turks, just like Arians, denied the full deity of Jesus, and claimed that he was created

²⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 1.

²⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 3.

²⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 5.

by God and he had the likeness of God.²⁷¹ In this context the Turks were referred to as *heretics*, just like Arians.

Pope Pius II, a humanist writer of Renaissance drew an analogy between Turks and Persians. In his book *La Discritione de L'Asia et Europa*, he asserted that the Turks are Scythic and barbarian.²⁷² Besides this, he wrote an interesting letter to Mehmed II, the conqueror of Constantinople, known as *Epistola ad Mahumetem*, inviting Mehmed II to convert to Christianity. In exchange of this conversion, he promised to put Rome under Mehmed.²⁷³

Towards the end of the 15th century, the power struggle between two brothers, Bayezid II and Cem led to internal disorder. Finally Bayezid II obtained the throne and Cem escaped. However, after his escape, Cem was kept by the Rhodes knights and sometimes was used as a trump against the Ottomans. With the death of Cem, Bayezid adopted a European policy which was not as much cautious as before. From the 16th century onward, Ottoman State started to play a role in the European politics. During the Italian wars between 1494 and 1559, each defeated country used the menace to get support from the Ottomans as a last resort²⁷⁴.

The first alliance between Ottomans and Europeans was made in 1536 as a result of the power struggle between François I and the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V for the Holy Roman Empire.²⁷⁵ A war between the two sides started in 1521. When in 1525 François was taken captive by Charles, French asked for the help of the Ottomans as the last resort. Ottomans saw the alliance, as a means to prevent the dominance of a single power in Europe.²⁷⁶ Thus Suleiman the Magnificent went to

²⁷¹ Ibid., p. 7.

²⁷² Ibid., p. 116.

²⁷³ Ibid., p. 20.

²⁷⁴ İnalçık, H. (2005), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Klasik Çağ (1300–1600)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p. 36.

²⁷⁵ Neumann. I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 47.

²⁷⁶ İnalçık, H. (2005), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Klasik Çağ (1300–1600)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p. 40.

the help of François. During his military expedition he besieged Vienna, the center of the Habsburgs. This event known as the First Siege of Vienna has had significant repercussions in Europe. The advance of the Turks into the heartland of the Holy Roman Empire showed once again the gravity of the Turkish threat for Europe.

In 1536 finally an alliance was made between the Ottoman Empire and François I. In fact, the approach of two sides reflected the cultural gaps between Ottomans and Europeans. While France considered the alliance as a formal treaty, the Ottomans regarded it as an *ahdname*. This difference in their approach reflected the Muslim-Ottoman view of the inferiority of the Christian Europe, because *ahdname* was a contract unilaterally granted by the sultan.²⁷⁷ The fact that Ottomans did not establish permanent embassies in Europe, while Europeans established permanent embassies in the Ottoman State is another reflection of this view on the inferiority of the Christian Europe.

1517 was an important date both for the Ottomans and Europeans. On the one hand, for Europe it signaled the protestation of Luther and the beginning of the Reformation era as a step toward a relatively more secular Europe. On the other hand, for the Ottomans, in contrast with Europe, it signaled the consolidation of religion's place in the state system. From 1517 onward, starting from Selim I, the Ottoman sultans, besides the status of emperor held also the title of *Caliph* which means successor that is, the successor of the prophet. Thus besides the political authority, sultans came to represent the religious authority as well.

Ottomans have had an important role in the Catholic-Protestant struggle. In this struggle with the request of the Ottoman ally, France, Ottomans supported Lutheran princes in their struggle against Habsburgs and encouraged them to cooperate with France against the Emperor. With this policy, Ottomans wished to impede the political union in Europe and to weaken the Habsburgs. As a result of this policy,

²⁷⁷ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 48.

Ottomans have been an important factor in the concessions made by the Habsburgs to the Protestants and in the recognition of Protestantism.²⁷⁸

During the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent, Ottomans came to dominate the Mediterranean. Although this dominance was reinforced by the capture of Cyprus in 1571, Ottomans could not preserve this dominance for long. Just one year later, with the defeat in the battle of Lepanto this dominance was lost. In terms of the invincible image of the Turk, the battle of Lepanto constitutes a turning point. In the battle of Lepanto, the coalition of the Papacy, Venice, Spain and Genoa, proved the possibility to beat the Turks through an alliance.²⁷⁹ From this date onward, the image of “the invincible Turk” was replaced by that of “the vincible Turk”.

With the Westphalian Peace, the Medieval Europe was transformed into a modern international system. However, despite the secular representation which stemmed from Westphalia, religion remained as an important factor in the relations between sovereign states. Grotius who is considered to be the founder of international law, besides asserting the legality of treaty relations with infidels, added that there was a particular bond uniting Christian states²⁸⁰. He believed that states dominated by Christians were different from states dominated by non-Christians. In this context, the Ottoman Empire was unsuited to the Westphalian system. In 1693, William Penn went further to recommend that, Ottoman Empire should be included to the European society of states only if it renounced Islam. Neumann traces an analogy between this entry requirement of the 17th century and those of the present day.²⁸¹ However, this kind of recommendation did not appear in the 17th century. As previously mentioned, after the capture of Constantinople, Pope Pius II had written a letter to Mehmed II inviting him to convert into Christianity.

²⁷⁸ İnalçık, H. (2005), *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Klasik Çağ (1300–1600)*, İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, p. 42.

²⁷⁹ Soykut, M. (2001), *Image of the ‘Turk’ in Italy: History of the ‘Other’ in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, p. 62.

²⁸⁰ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 50.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

After the defeat of Lepanto, the second shock for the Ottomans was to come with the Second Siege of Vienna in 1683. With the unsuccessful siege, the Ottoman army was once again defeated by a Holy alliance of European powers. This date has been a cornerstone in the transformation of the image of the Turk to “innocuous Turk”.²⁸²

After the lifting of the Turkish siege and the defeat of the Ottomans, the Holy League sought to expel Ottomans from Europe. As a result of the Ottoman defeat, the Treaty of Carlowitz was signed in 1699. The Treaty of Carlowitz was the first instance in which the Turk was invited to participate in a European congress.²⁸³ With Carlowitz, it became clear that Ottomans had to learn new concepts and new way of dealing with the European states.²⁸⁴ With the signature of this treaty, Ottoman Empire acknowledged formally for the first time, the existence of the non-Muslim states.²⁸⁵ However, the most important implication of this treaty for the Ottoman Empire is that, it symbolized the beginning of the end for the Ottoman Empire, in other words, with Carlowitz, the decline of the Ottoman Empire started. The relaxation of the Ottoman challenge in Europe helped facilitate the emergence of the Westphalian political order in the latter part of the 17th century.²⁸⁶ In the 18th centuries diplomatic relations between Europe and the Ottoman state increased.

Starting from the decline of the Turkish threat, from 18th century a more moderate image of the Turk was drawn. From that century onward, the image of the Turk is romanticized and depicted in the framework of exotic orient and the Ottoman Empire appears as the home of Oriental Mystery and the *feminine Orient*.²⁸⁷

²⁸² Soykut, M. (2001), *Image of the ‘Turk’ in Italy: History of the ‘Other’ in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, p. 127.

²⁸³ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 51.

²⁸⁴ Göl, A. (2003), “Turkey’s Euro-Vision”, *National Europe Centre Paper*, No. 107, p. 9.

²⁸⁵ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 52.

²⁸⁶ Rich, P. (1999), “European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment”, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 443.

²⁸⁷ Soykut, M. (2001), *Image of the ‘Turk’ in Italy: History of the ‘Other’ in Early Modern Europe, 1453-1683*, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, p. 127.

In the 18th century, the Ottoman Empire came to be referred as a part of the despotic East. In this context, the limitless power of the sultan, the fact that the *reaya* was deprived of judicial protection were issues criticized by the Europeans. However, the power of the sultan was not as much unbounded as they thought. In fact the sultan was bounded by the *sheria* and the moral obligation to protect all his subjects and to maintain them in prosperity. The *reaya* was not as much deprived from judicial protection as Europeans claimed. To prevent abuses, the sultan emitted the edicts of justice (*adaletname*), sent secret agents to make inspections in the provinces and he went himself in a disguised way to inspect the abuses.²⁸⁸

The fact that the military threat declined does not mean that the Turkish threat on the whole disappeared in this era. The siege of Vienna was scratched on the collective memories of Europeans. Thus even if in terms of military power, Turks did not constitute a serious threat; they remained as a cultural threat for Europe. Moreover, the Habsburg rulers used the potential Turkish threat for well over a century, to keep their population alert.²⁸⁹

The 18th century witnessed the development of western presence in the international trade of the Ottoman Empire. There was a large use of the capitulations to the profit of western merchants.²⁹⁰ The first conscious attempt to a westernization policy emerged in the 18th century as a result of the defeats of Carlowitz and Pasarowitz.²⁹¹ The military defeats of the Ottoman army made it clear that Ottoman state needed reform. Naturally the emphasis of the reforms was on the army and war techniques. Mahmud I was caught in the middle of this need for reform and the reaction of *janissaries* against reform. He invited Comte Bonneval who had worked in the army of Louis XIV for the renovation of the army. Comte Bonneval, who converted to

²⁸⁸ Veinstein, G. (1989), "L'Empire Dans Sa Grandeur (XVIe Siècle)", in *Histoire De L'Empire Ottoman* (ed.) Robert Mantran, Lille: Fayard, pp. 170-175.

²⁸⁹ Rich, P. (1999), "European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 444.

²⁹⁰ Mantran, R. (1989), "L'Etat Ottoman au XVIIIe Siècle: La Pression Européenne", in *Histoire De L'Empire Ottoman* (ed.) Robert Mantran, Lille: Fayard, p. 282.

²⁹¹ Lewis, B. (1960), *Modern Türkiye'nin Doğuşu*, Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1984, p. 46.

Islam and who is known as Humbaraci Ahmed Pasha renovated the bombardiers.²⁹² However, the reformation of the army to include the demolition of the *janissaries* was not so easy. It was achieved only in the 19th century, during the reign of Mahmud II, under whose rule several other reforms such as administrative and educational ones were realized.

In the 19th century, face to the rise of European powers, the Ottoman Empire was so much weakened that most of European powers considered the protection of the Ottoman Empire face to increasing rise of Russia as a prerequisite to preserve the European *status quo*. Even Tsar Nicolas alluded to the Ottoman State as “sick man of Europe”.²⁹³ In an address to Sir Hamilton Seymour, the British ambassador, Nicolas referred to the situation of the Ottoman army as “*We have on our arms a very sick man, it would be, I tell it to you a big misfortune if he escapes us, especially before that all the necessary arrangements are made.*”²⁹⁴

The Ottoman State that had refused until 19th century to take part in European international society and to observe European international law had to change its policy with the beginning of its decline in the 19th century.²⁹⁵ Especially the Russian threat made it a necessity for Ottomans to take the support of other European powers. During 19th century, Ottoman Empire introduced several reforms such as Tanzimat, Islahat and the Ottoman Constitution, both for the recovery of the empire from its backward situation and to get the support of the Western world. Face to the increasing threat to the Ottoman integrity and indirectly to the European *status quo*, France and Great Britain decided to support Ottoman State. Of course this support was not gratis for the Ottomans. In exchange of this endorsement, the allied powers asked the sultan to make egalitarian reforms. As a result, the Treaty of Constantinople was signed in March 12, 1854 and a few days later, France and Britain declared war to the army of

²⁹² Mantran, R. (1989), “L’Etat Ottoman au XVIIIe Siècle: La Pression Européenne”, in *Histoire De L’Empire Ottoman* (ed.) Robert Mantran, Lille: Fayard, p. 278.

²⁹³ Neumann. I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: ‘the East’ in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 55.

²⁹⁴ Dumont, P. (1989), “La Période des Tanzîmât (1839-1878)”, in *Histoire De L’Empire Ottoman* (ed.) Robert Mantran, Lille: Fayard, p. 501.

²⁹⁵ Göl, A. (2003), “Turkey’s Euro-Vision”, *National Europe Centre Paper*, No. 107, p. 8.

the Tsar.²⁹⁶ During the Crimean War the support of France and Britain has been of vital importance for the Ottomans. After the war, just before the opening of the peace congress in Paris, a reform edict known under the name of *Islahat Fermanı* was introduced. The great powers in Paris, met this edict with satisfaction. The satisfaction of European powers was twofold. On the one hand, the edict consisted of the introduction of a series of internal reforms; on the other hand this edict laid the foundations of the deep penetration of western influence into the Ottoman Empire.²⁹⁷ The day when the Treaty of Paris was signed in 1856, has been a cornerstone in the history of Turko-Ottoman relations. This date is usually regarded as the date when Ottoman Empire was admitted to the Concert of Europe. However, although in theory it is possible to assert that Ottoman was accepted as a part of the European state-system, in practice, it is difficult to support this assertion. Through the treaty European powers obtained the opportunity to intervene in every circumstance which according to them necessitates an intervention.²⁹⁸

The intervention of Russia into the Balkans in 1877 reflected the limits of European diplomatic consensus on the 'Eastern question'.²⁹⁹ In fact, despite the Paris Treaty, and the reform processes, the empire was never regarded in Europe as being fully civilized. The capitulations remained in effect and throughout the 19th century, the major way of legitimating the support of the European powers first autonomy and then independence for new Christian Balkan states was that removing them from Ottoman rule was the best means of civilizing them.³⁰⁰

The ambiguity of the Empire's place was clear in the practice of *belligerent occupation*. Belligerent occupation was a sort of agreement between so-called civilized states not to unilaterally challenge each other's legitimate right to rule.

²⁹⁶ Dumont, P. (1989), "La Période des Tanzîmât (1839-1878)", in *Histoire De L'Empire Ottoman* (ed.) Robert Mantran, Lille: Fayard, p. 507.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 509.

²⁹⁹ Rich, P. (1999), "European Identity and the Myth of Islam: A Reassessment", *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3, p. 448.

³⁰⁰ Mazower, M. (2006), "An International Civilization? Empire, Internationalism and the Crisis of the Mid-20th Century", *International Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 3, p. 556.

Mazower asserts that, in the case of Ottoman Empire, the Powers felt no such limitations: the Russians in Bulgaria in 1877, the Habsburgs in Bosnia in 1878, and the British in Egypt in 1882 all demonstrated in the course of their extensive rearrangement of provincial administrations, that although they would allow the Ottoman sultan to retain a symbolic sovereignty, in fact the theory of belligerent occupation did not apply in the Ottoman lands.³⁰¹ Similarly, in the Second Hague Conference of 1907, the continuing presence of extensive capitulations was used for the assignment of a second-class status to the Ottoman Empire, so that it would be prohibited from nominating a permanent member to the Court of arbitration.³⁰²

The end of the World War I has been a milestone in the history of modern Turkish Republic. With the defeat of the First World War, Ottoman Empire was subject to an intense disintegration process and the territories of the Empire which had already been shared by the victories on the paper, were now being shared in the practice. In this desperate situation for the Empire, a new movement, outside the will of the sultan emerged. The independence movement led by Mustapha Kemal was successful in recovering the Turkish independence. After the recovery of Turkish independence, Mustapha Kemal and his supporters declared the Turkish Republic. Thus the Ottoman Empire was finally replaced by the Turkish Republic from 1923 onward. After the declaration of the Republic, a process of reform started in Turkey. These included such measures as the demolition of the status of Caliphate and Sultan, the centralization and integrity of the education system, and reforms regarding the every day life such as the transformation of the legal code, the change in clothes, alphabet, measure system and calendar. These reforms were not always so much welcomed. In fact, at the societal level, these reforms had mixed success, producing what one observer called a "nationalist schizophrenia" divided between traditionalists and modernists.³⁰³ However, from that day on, a modernization process along western lines began. Thus the direction of the new Turkish Republic was evident: an independent sovereign state oriented toward western world.

³⁰¹ Ibid., p. 556.

³⁰² Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 59.

³⁰³ Kubicek, P. (2004), "Turkey's Place in the 'New Europe'", *Perceptions*, Summer 2004, p. 48.

Although the modernization process is criticized because of its “hyper-secularism” and “hyper-nationalism”, which resulted in the exclusion of certain segments of the society from active engagement into political life, in fact, it was able to achieve noteworthy industrialization and economic development. Through its hyper-secularism, it was capable of excluding the option of the Islamic political order, in a predominantly Muslim society. Within the wide parameters of this modernization plan, Turkey was able to make a transition into a democratic political order in the immediate post-war era. The key institutions of representative democracy have been established and despite periodic interruptions and military interludes, parliamentary democracy has remained the norm throughout the post-war period.³⁰⁴

Although Turkey avoided being involved in the World War II, after the war it clearly sided with the Western world. Turkey profited from the proximity of Soviet threat to approach the Western world. This is in that period that Turkey became member of several western institutions. In 1952 Turkey became a member of the NATO. Turkey’s membership to NATO made it evident that Turkey sided with western block face to Eastern one in the bi-polar Cold-War era.

This is during the Cold War that the adventurous and endless relationship of Turkey with the European Community begun. Turkey applied to the European Economic Community, the EEC, in July 1959. After this application, the Ankara Agreement was signed as the association agreement on 12 September 1963. The Ankara Agreement still constitutes today, the legal basis of the association between Turkey and the EU.

In the Additional Protocol of 13 November 1970, the way how the customs union would be established was specified in detail. However, the internal situation of Turkey, the impasse in the decision-making mechanisms of the EC, known as ‘Eurosclerosis’, and the international economic crisis following OPEC’s oil embargo delayed the further development of Turkey-EU relations. Following the military *coup d’état* of 12 September 1980 in Turkey, relations were frozen. Only after the

³⁰⁴ Öniş, Z. (2004), “Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe”, *Perceptions*, Autumn 2004, p. 7.

re-normalization of the democratic process through multiparty elections of 1983 did relations between Turkey and the Community begin to normalize.³⁰⁵

However, despite the restoration of democracy in Turkey, according to Güney, the 1980s were the years in which the roads of the EC and Turkey started to diverge. Turkey applied for full membership in 1987. The Commission stated in its Opinion of 18 December 1989 that "it would be inappropriate for the Community - which is itself undergoing major changes while the whole of Europe is in a state of flux- to become involved in new accession negotiations at this stage." It continued that "furthermore, the political and economic situation in Turkey leads the Commission to believe that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away."³⁰⁶ Despite this "unfavorable" climate for future enlargement, in 1995 the Union underwent another process of enlargement so that the new Union consisted of 15 members.

Finally the Customs Union between Turkey and EU was achieved at the end of 1995. However, Customs Union Agreement did not involve a definitive prospect of full-membership for Turkey. During the 1990s there is no doubt that the EU, with its increasing emphasis on the quality of democracy and human rights standards, was intentionally trying to generate both economic and political change in Turkey.³⁰⁷ However, the fact that the signing of the Customs Union agreement was not accompanied by the definitive prospect of full-membership, created a sense of discourage for the reforms on the Turkish side. This frustration reached its peak in the 1997 Luxembourg Summit where Turkey was expecting to obtain the candidate status.

The debates on the membership of Turkey to EU have continued so long that Turkey could obtain the status of candidate only in 1999 Helsinki Summit, which means 36 years later than Ankara Agreement and 12 years later than membership application.

³⁰⁵ Güney, A. (2004), "On Turkey's Inclusion in EU Enlargement: An Asset or a Liability?", *Perceptions*, Summer 2004, p. 140.

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 141.

³⁰⁷ Öniş, Z. (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe", *Perceptions*, Autumn 2004, p. 9.

In the membership process, the Copenhagen Criteria in general, the Copenhagen Political Criteria in particular constituted the focal point of debates between EU and Turkey. In this context Turkey engaged in a process of institutional and legal reform.

The EU's Copenhagen Summit of December 2002, is a milestone in this respect. From that point onwards, the issue of how Turkey would be accommodated as a potential member of the EU, became a concrete source of debate within European policy-making circles.³⁰⁸

The reforms undertaken by Turkey, although not complete, have initiated a process during which, Turkey has made significant progress in terms of consolidating its democracy and achieving a truly open, pluralistic and multi-cultural political order. Reforms have been remarkable in key areas such as the promotion of human rights, the protection of minorities, the role of the military and improvement of the judicial system.³⁰⁹

Compared to the EU member countries, Turkey has been the one which faced the most "tortuous journey" on its road toward EU. It has been the only member having a customs union with EU, without being a member of it. It could obtain the candidate status exactly 36 years after the Ankara Agreement and 12 year after the membership application. Moreover, today (at the end of 2006) after 7 years of the official recognition of Turkey's candidacy, despite the signal at the end of 2004 that the EU will start the negotiations, not much change took place in the status of Turkey.

Throughout its relations with EU, the major obstacles for Turkey have been the Copenhagen Political Criteria, issues arising from the division of the Cyprus into Turkish northern part and Greek southern part. In this context the recent discussions on whether to start the negotiations with Turkey or not, stemmed from the rejection

³⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

of Turkey to open its ports to (Greek) Cyprus, which is represented by Greek Cypriots.

In the light of all these historical events and these recent debates on Turkey's accession into EU, the final of this tortuous journey is still unclear for Turkey. Even if the negotiations start, it is unclear if they will eventually be finalized. The fact that the negotiations are open-ended is another widely pronounced issue. Moreover, certain parties favor the idea of a "privileged partnership" over the status of (full) membership as more appropriate for the EU-Turkey relations.

Thus although from the Ottoman period until 21st century, Turkey has been a player in the European state-system, it is impossible to wonder whether it has ever been really a part of this system or has it just been a "guest-player" in that system. Despite the rejection of fundamentalists of the western orientation of Turkey, the west still seems to constitute the official direction of the country. In spite of the unclear situation of Turkey vis à vis EU, the fact that it has been a member of the Council of Europe for more than 50 years is to a certain extent an ironical situation. However, the hesitation or even the unwillingness of the European Union to "grant" Turkey the status of membership, thus to admit Turkey's belongingness to European civilization may remind us the notion of "torn country" which Huntington has used both for Turkey and Russia.

5.3 COMPARISON OF THE TURKISH OTHER WITH THE RUSSIAN "OTHER" VIS A VIS EUROPE

The Russian and the Turk are two important Eastern others of Europe. Although at the first glance Russians and Turks seem very different, it is possible to compare and contrast them in terms of their "otherness" vis à vis Europe.

The Russian and the Turk have both have been noteworthy others of Europe. They have had a significant role in shaping the European identity. In the otherization of both of them religion has had a crucial role.

Due to the ambiguous place and perception of Turkey and Russia, Huntington classified both of them as torn countries. According to him the most profoundly torn country is Turkey and the most important torn country is Russia. Although with

communism this idea lost its significance, in the post-Cold War era it started to regain its importance.³¹⁰

In the otherization of the Turk and the Russian, religion constituted an important place. With the passage of banners of Islam to the Turks, The Turk emerged as an emerging threat against Europe. Thus the Turk came to be strongly associated by the centuries long threat of Islam. In contrast to the Turk, the Russian is Christian, but even this “Christianity” has been questioned by Europeans. The fact that Russians are Orthodox sufficed to place the Russian outside the Western European world. Furthermore, Russians like other Orthodox people, were regarded as heretics. Thus both Russian and the Turk have been considered during a period as heretics face to Latin Christians.

In fact the otherization as a result of religion was not a unilateral process stemming from the Europeans against the Turk and the Russian. Instead, this was a mutual process.

During its establishment, Ottoman state, expanded as a result of Holy Wars called as *ghaza*. In addition in the minds of the Ottomans, the lands were divided into two spheres as Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam. Similarly, religion played an important role for the development of Russian identity against the European one. While Europe was undergoing a process of secularization, in Russia religion was underlined as a unifying factor. Moreover the messianic role of Russia was underlined. The reference of the Ottomans and Russians to western Christendom is also significant. Ottomans referred to Christians in general as *kafir* which means infidel. According to Russians, western Christians were heretics. Russians even accused Greek orthodoxies for their attempt to unite with the Latins in the Council of Florence in 1439.

In Russia and the Ottoman Empire, religion occupied a different place compared to Western Europe. While throughout its history Western Europe experienced the power struggle between state and church, it was not the case in Russia or the

³¹⁰ Huntington, S. P., (1993), “The Clash of Civilizations?”, *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993; 72, 3, p. 43.

Ottoman Empire. In Latin Christianity, despite the existence of a significant struggle, state and church were considered as different spheres. However, in Russia, or “the third Rome”, the Church became the collaborator of the prince and his counselor. It was probably due to the understanding that spiritual interests were inseparable from material and administrative affairs.³¹¹ Similarly, in the Ottomans there was not a separation of the state from religion. The power of the sultan and that of the caliph (from 1517 onward) were merged in the power of The Ottoman Emperor. Moreover, the sheria (the religious law) played the key role in the judicial system of the Empire.

Although in terms of collective identity, religion has had an important role both for the Russians and the Ottomans, in fact, they differed on an important point. While for the collective identity formation of the Russian, the ethnicity played an important role, it was not the case for the Ottomans. Especially from the 18th century onward, Slavic roots and the superiority of the Slavic race were often highlighted issues in terms of Russian collective identity. However, the effort to establish a comprehensive dominant (Ottoman) identity was the official policy of the Ottoman Empire.³¹² The Ottoman society was organized in the form of *millet* system, which provided a degree of autonomy to different collectivities living in the Empire. However, instead of a particular ethnic group, the *millet* system of the Ottoman Empire was based on the implicit superiority of the Muslims. This is why, the Tanzimat with its emphasis on the equality of all religions before the law, produced discomfort among the Muslims of the Empire.

Although, the status of the Russian and of the Turk was more clear as the “other” of Europe until 18th, 19th century. From the 18th century this situation starts to change. With the development of the European identity along more secularized characteristics, religion starts to lose its significance as the primary indicative of Europeanness.

³¹¹ Denissoff, E., (1950), “On the Origins of the Autonomous Russian Church”, *Review of Politics*, Vol. 12, No. 2, p. 244.

³¹² Kalpaklı, M. (2003), “Turk and Otoman: A Brief Introduction to Their Images in the Ottoman Empire”, in *Historical Image of the Turk in Europe: 15th Century to Present*, (ed.) Mustafa Soykut, Istanbul: The Isis Press, p. 13.

With the Enlightenment, the barbarian image of the Turk and the Russian is largely replaced by the new discourse of “uncivilized”. To this uncivilized image, the concept of “despotic east” is added. Despotism has been a concept used to define the regime type of both the Russians and the Ottomans for a certain period. The discourse of despotism gained importance especially during the Enlightenment. Although it is not used particularly for Russians and Turks but used for the East in general including India and China, in this study its use in reference to the Russians and Turks as “despotic east” will be elaborated. However, Stråth talks about the merger of Enlightenment and despotism into one *Denkfigur* which was applied to both Europe and the East. She asserts that for Europe, the notion of *enlightened absolutism* was an expression of this merger.³¹³

“Despotism” implied a theory of society and a rational analysis of the intellectual and moral capacity of Orientals. It suggested a static and slavish society, a backward and corrupt polity, with arbitrary and ferocious rulers governing servile and timid subjects.³¹⁴

According to Rubiés, the discourse on oriental despotism was used for two main reasons. Firstly, it was used as a means of self criticism. Face to increasing absolutism, the image of the oriental despotism was used to argue that a monarchy could be beneficial if only it is kept within the constitutional limits of European tradition. Secondly it was used to prove European superiority and to support colonial imperialism through legitimizing colonialism over the (primitive) oriental despots.³¹⁵

Çırakman asserts that in the 18th century, the concept of despotism was employed to depict the corruption and backwardness of the Ottoman government.³¹⁶ According

³¹³ Stråth, B. (2002), “A European Identity, To the Historical Limits of a Concept”, *European Journal of Social Theory*, 5(4), p. 393.

³¹⁴ Çırakman, A. (2001), “From Tyranny to Despotism: The Enlightenment’s Unenlightened Image of the Turks”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, p. 56.

³¹⁵ Rubiés, J. P. (2005), “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu”, *Journal of Early Modern History*, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 110-111.

³¹⁶ Çırakman, A. (2001), “From Tyranny to Despotism: The Enlightenment’s Unenlightened Image of the Turks”, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 33, p. 49.

to Europeans despotic regimes were mostly recognizable for their lack of respect for private property and civil liberty. Unrestrained control of the persons of his subjects and their goods is what made a king also a despot.³¹⁷

It was in fact the Russian regime which inspired Botero to offer his most powerful definition of despotism: “The Great Duke of Muscovy rules his peoples more despotically than any other known prince, given that he can dispose with absolute discretion of the persons and the goods of all his subjects.”³¹⁸

To the traditional negative image of Russia as a space of brutality and backwardness, Montesquieu now added a new insight into her ‘sociological’ otherness. In *De l’esprit des lois* Russia was characterized as a space marked by an absence. The missing element in Russian society was the independent *intermediate corps* that in other parts of Europe were the guardians of freedom. Thus, Russia’s backwardness was explained by the lack of the very element that made Western Europe’s superiority.³¹⁹

However, from the Enlightenment era onward, balance of power politics gained increasing importance in Europe. The role played by both the Russian and the Turk increased with the growing importance of balance of power politics. This was best reflected in the Vienna Congress following the Napoleonic wars and in the Paris Treaty. While with the first event Russia was admitted to the Concert of Europe, with the second Ottoman Empire was admitted to Europe. However, the inclusion of both powers has been on political grounds, as a tool to secure the balance of power in Europe. While Russia was admitted to counterbalance French imperial expansionism in Europe after the French Revolution, The Ottoman Empire was admitted to counterbalance Russian threat and to prevent the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. However, even after their so-called inclusion to the European state

³¹⁷ Rubiés, J. P. (2005), “Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu”, *Journal of Early Modern History*, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 127.

³¹⁸ Ibid., pp.130-131.

³¹⁹ Adamovsky, E. (2003), “Russia as a Space of Hope: Nineteenth Century French Challenges to the Liberal Image of Russia”, *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 33, No. 4, p. 411.

system, Europeans preferred to stay distant to Ottomans and Russians. While the Russian support was considered as crucial to counterbalance the increasing French threat during the Napoleonic wars, Europe declared Russia as a threat for the *status quo* in Europe and decided to support the Ottoman Empire face to the Russian threat. However even after the signature of the Paris Treaty, towards the end of the 19th century, Habsburgs and British did not hesitate to set a side to principle of *belligerent occupation* which should have been used on the European territories. Thus, despite the inclusion of the Russia and Ottoman Empire into the European Concert on the paper, in reality they were not acknowledged as European. For Russia this distance was widened with the Bolshevik Revolution.

What is significant in the relations of Europe with Russia and Turkey is that, both Russia and Turkey profited from the otherness of the other, to approach Europe. In the 19th century, Russia underlined in each occasion the “non-Europeanness” of the Ottoman Empire, thus it expected to be perceived more European than the Ottoman Empire for Europe, and closer to Europe compared to the Ottoman Empire. Besides this, Russians attempted to profit from the otherness of the Ottomans to reach their political interests. For instance, in 1916, the leading Russian liberal Pavel Milyukov used the idea of “the Turks as the other” as proof that Russia was better equipped than the Ottoman Empire to take care of the straits and Constantinople.³²⁰ Similarly, Turkey profited from the Cold War hostilities to approach West in general and Europe in particular. Firstly, Turkey profited from this situation in the form of financial and military aid under the name of Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan. Later came the membership of Turkey into substantial international organizations such as the Council of Europe and NATO.

In terms of modernization or westernization, it is possible to draw parallelism between the Russian modernization and the Turkish modernization. Turks and Russians followed similar paths in their modernization processes. Both Turks and Russians have been attempted to modernize from above, along the western lines, which caused internal disputes in the countries. The Russian modernization project

³²⁰ Neumann, I. B. (1999), *Uses of the Other: 'the East' in European Identity Formation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 59.

undertaken by Peter the Great was a modernization from above and it consisted of and understanding which equalized modernization with Westernization. Similarly, the reform attempts of the Ottomans, starting from the 18th century were from above and they involved the introduction of Western technologies, personnel and so on. This trend continued during the modernization project of the Turkish Republic. The modernization was still from above and it was along western lines. In the Kemalist modernization project, modernization and westernization were usually used interchangeably. In this context, developing and promoting close relations with Europe was a natural component of the wider project of westernization.³²¹ As a part of this project even the Ottoman past was rejected.

However, it was not only the nature of the modernization which was similar for Russians and the Turks, the reactions against the modernization were similar as well. They were mainly based on the religious reasons and on the perception of the West as inferior. During the Ottoman Empire, the reform attempts to modernize the army and in particular to dissolve the *janissaries* were strongly objected by traditionalist groups. They opposed the reforms under the pretext of religion. They used the fact that Western personnel were used in the modernization and that imitation of the West, resembling the West was not compatible with the religion. This trend to oppose the reforms on the grounds of religious reasons continued in the Turkish Republic. Similarly, the opposition to Peter the Great's reforms were largely based on religious views. Accordingly, Germans and anyone who wore Western clothes, were heathen and therefore inferior and to be treated accordingly.³²²

In terms of Russia's self assessment concerning its treatment by international players, a resemblance with that of Turkey can be distinguished. Russia usually considers itself to be the victim of unfair treatment by international players, who have profited from the poor internal situation of Russia.³²³ Similarly we can talk

³²¹ Öniş, Z. (2004), "Turkish Modernization and Challenges for the New Europe", *Perceptions*, Autumn 2004, p. 8.

³²² Neumann. I. B. (1996), *Russia and the Idea of Europe*, London and New York: Routledge, p. 11.

³²³ Baranovsky, V. (2000), "Russia: A Part of Europe or Apart from Europe?", *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 3, p. 449.

about the influence of Sèvres Syndrome in the international and even domestic policies of Turkey. This syndrome is rooted in the so-called Sèvres Treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers, after the World War I in 1920. In the context of Sèvres Treaty, the policies of the Allied Powers against the Turkish people created mistrust towards the West because the allies wanted to create independent Armenian and Kurdish states in Anatolia. Sensitivity related to this historical experience, has influenced Turkish politicians in their “obsessive” protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity ever since.³²⁴

Despite all the similarities between the Russian and the Turkish other cited above, the situation of the Cold War period is rather different. In this period, the Russian is considered as the other, but this otherization is based on a deep ideological divide. In contrast to the Russian, Turkey has not been otherized along such a deep ideological divide. During Cold War era, unlike the previous periods, in the collective identity of the Russian, it is not the Slavic roots which are emphasized. Instead, in the Russian collective identity of the period the emphasis is on the Soviet identity. However for the Turkish Republic it is not the case. As a part of constructing a new country, independent from the Ottoman heritage, there are attempts to create a new nation. In this context, new institutions to make research on the Turkish history, Turkish language are founded. Although it is mentioned that “the Turkish people who founded the Republic of Turkey are called as Turks”, we can say that modern Turkey is founded on a certain nation, the Turk.

In terms of evaluating the current situation of Russia and Turkey with regard to their proximity to European culture, transition into democracy and free market economy has been a crucial factor. Although transition into market economy has not been such a difficult issue for Turkey, it is not the case for Russia. Especially the shock therapy used for transition into free market economy has not been so beneficial for Russia. Moreover, the problems which emerged as a result of these transition efforts, increased suspicions of the society against this new economic system. However, the transition into democracy has been a problematic issue both for Russia and Turkey.

³²⁴ Göç, A. (2003), “Turkey’s Euro-Vision”, *National Europe Centre Paper*, No. 107, p. 11.

In the context of Rumelili's identification of three constitutive dimensions along which the Self and Other relationship varies, it is possible to observe that there is still a certain distance between Europe and its two Others. In terms of the nature of difference it is possible to claim that, the nature of difference both for the Turk and for the Russian is rather exclusive. Most of the cultural differences between Europe and its two Others are deeply rooted in historical and cultural differences and they are not easy to surmount. In terms of relationship, the relationship of the Russian and the Turk with the European has been rather one of resistance instead of recognition. Despite the periods of rapprochement, the suspicions against the European remained in the memory of both the Turk and the Russian. In terms of social distance the Russian and the Turk differ. The Russian case does not involve total association with Europe. Russians, just like Europeans are divided on that issue between those who associate Russia with Europe and those who do not. Thus its relation may be considered rather as cooperation instead of association. Turks are also divided to some extent on the issue of association with Europe. However, in the official discourse of Turkey, there is a unilateral association. This is unilateral, because while Turkey associates itself with Europe, Europe is not as much certain as Turkey to associate itself with Turkey. Thus with regard to Rumelili's identification of three constitutive dimensions of Self and Other relationship, we can claim that the otherization of the Turk and the Russian has not perished. The survival of this otherization makes further integration with Russia and Turkey, a difficult task to achieve in the near future.

6. CONCLUSION

Towards the end of the 20th century, identity started to have an increasing significance in most branches of social sciences. In this context, it began to influence several theories including international relations theories. The international relations theories dominated for long by realism have been challenged by the introduction of cultural studies. It has been widely acknowledged that the states whose interests are determining of the international politics, in fact consist of human beings.

In the lives of human beings, identities play vital role. In the decisions, approaches and behaviors of individuals, their personal identity may be decisive. For instance in a law court the approach and decision of the person may vary upon his identity as being an attorney or a judge. Similarly, for collectivities, the collective identities have a paramount importance. In deciding whether Turkey should join the EU or not, or whether Russia is part of Europe or not, the collective identity of a person has a crucial role. For a collectivity whose identity has been constructed for centuries against the otherness of the Russian or the Turk, the inclusion of these others into the European civilization is not easy to admit. This is mainly due to the role of the difference in identity formation. In the formation of identities the existence of difference is a prerequisite. However, this may not necessarily result in the otherization of the “different”. The difference may range from being just different from the self, as having a constitutive role for the Self, to the negative image of the “Other”. The other may also constitute the Self. In addition the threat stemming from the otherness of the “different” may consolidate the Self. Construction of the identity through difference in general, through otherization in particular has been a distinct feature of the European identity.

European identity which is a dynamic concept like other identities connoted different meanings in different times. During the Antiquity it referred to the Greek and Roman “civilization”. With the rise of Christianity and the imminence of Islam, it referred to Christianity. In other words, during the Medieval era, Christianity

became the major feature of Europe and the boundaries of Europe overlapped more or less with those of Christianity. With the Renaissance, Christianity ceased to be the only factor uniting Europe. Instead the culture of the Antiquity was re-discovered as a common characteristic. The imprints of Renaissance infiltrated into the art, the literature of Europeans. Consequently Europeans possessed a common historical and cultural experience which fell outside of the merely religious field. Thus the first step toward a secular identity was completed. Second step came with the religious wars in Western Europe and the Reformation era. Finally the Enlightenment constituted the third step of this secularization. With the Enlightenment science, technology and reason came to the foreground as the principal characteristics of Europe and the concept of “civilization” came to define Europe since Europe was regarded as the civilization itself. Despite the initial reaction against the French Revolution, starting from the 19th century, the ideas which evolved from the Revolution were considered as the key components of Europe. Finally in the 20th century, the Cold War era has been crucial in the development of European identity and the most important European institution, the European Union. During this period, the values referring to Europe were more or less similar to those defining the West in general. The west in turn was mainly defined through such concepts as liberalism, individual freedom, democracy and so on.

In relation to these different connotations of Europe, mentioned above, Europe has had different others. In relation to the stress put on the Greek and Roman civilizations during the Antiquity the role of the “other” was undertaken by the barbarians and Persians. In fact in this era, especially in the Greek civilization there was the tendency to classify all those who did not belong to the Greek civilization as barbarian. In the Medieval times, with regard to the strong association of Europe with Christianity, Islam came to constitute the other of Europe. Muslims were called as infidels. Islam came to be represented largely by Arabs. Starting from the late Middle Ages the Turkish threat began to replace the Arab one. Particularly with the advance of the Turks into the Balkans and the capture of Constantinople, a centuries long otherness started for the Turks. However, in this period Arabs and the Turks were not the only others of Europe. Jews and the Orthodox have also been otherized

to a certain degree. In addition the Russian who was living under the Tartar rule was not considered as a part of Europe.

With the overseas expansions, the inhabitants of the newly discovered territories began to be considered as savage, uncivilized face to the “civilized” Europe. Beginning from the 18th, 19th centuries, the intense use of balance of power politics, made it difficult to determine the other of Europe. Even as a part of this balance of power politics, the customary Others like the Russians and the Turks have been admitted to the European state system. In the Cold War bipolarity, it was easier to determine the anti-thesis of Europe. In this time Europe came to define itself by and large against the Communist block. However, although both USA and western Europe belonged to the same block we can also notice that the relationship between USA and Europe was not characterized by a total harmony and affection, especially the relationship of USA with France under the Presidency of De Gaulle.

With the dissolution of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War, most of former Soviet block countries joined western institutions such as NATO and EU. In the context of EU or Fortress Europe discourse, the newly acceding countries occupied a distinct place in that they reflected to contrast between the old Europe versus the new one. In addition to this, the immigrants constitute an important internal other for Europe. In order to cope with the increasing immigration and the actual and potential risks produced by the immigration, EU seeks to adopt new measures and regulations. Of course, in the context of Fortress Europe, the enlargement has a crucial place. Until when and until where should the EU enlarge? The answer to this question still seems to be unclear. The Copenhagen Criteria is a key factor in deciding whether a certain country should be admitted to EU or not. However the issue of the EU members’ compliance with these criteria remains to be discussed. For instance do all EU members respect and protect minority rights? In terms of minority rights, for France and Greece even admittance of the existence of minorities (Bretons and Turkish minorities) on their lands remains as a problematic issue.

Among the various others of Europe, the East has a special place. When I mean East, I particularly refer to the Russian and the Turkish other. Although India and

China may also be considered as the Eastern others of Europe, in the formation of European identity they have not been as much influential as the Turkish and the Russian cases. The origins of the divide between the East and the West goes back to the barbarian invasions of the Greek and Roman civilizations. Later the division of the Roman Empire and the differentiation of the Western part through Latin Christianity and the Eastern part through Eastern Orthodoxy moved the division into another context. This division reached its peak during the Fourth Crusade. In the mean time the Turks in general, the Ottoman State in particular started to rise as the new banner holder of Islam. Thus to the division of the Catholic versus Orthodox, The Turkish threat was added.

What made the Turkish and the Russian case special for the development of Europe and European identity is primarily their proximity. Due to this geographical proximity Europe has had intense interaction with them throughout the history. This geographical proximity is so significant that, for most people, it is still an ambiguous question whether Russia and Turkey belongs to the European geography. Besides geographical proximity, the magnitude of Russia and the Ottoman Empire has been another crucial factor in their importance for Europe. Both Russia and the Ottoman Empire constituted politically and militarily great powers and they extended at the expense of European territories. Thus their grandeur challenged Europe.

It is possible to determine various similarities between the Turkish and the Russian in terms of their otherness vis à vis Europe. Religion is another important heading for the parallelism between the Turkish and the Russian cases. It has been one of the main reasons of mutual otherization of these cultures. Both the Russians and Turks considered the European as different and most of the times as “the other” due to religious reasons. Furthermore in the religious field, Russians through Orthodoxy, and Turks through Islam claimed to have spiritual superiority over Europe. Similarly (Western) Europeans regarded the Turk and the Russian as heretic and they otherized them because of religious differences. Besides religion the proximity and the might of the Russians and the Turks as a challenge against Europe has been another common feature.

The perception of these two “others” was transformed with the developments such as the balance of power politics and the Enlightenment. Despite the new image of uncivilized or despot, both the Russian and the Turk have been admitted to the European state-system as a result of the European balance of power politics. However, their admittance did not eliminate discussion on their ambiguous place vis à vis Europe. In fact, even after their admittance into the Concert of Europe in the 19th century, the behavior of the European powers exhibited that they were not truly admitted to the Concert and instead they were regarded as *guest actor* in the European state system.

The modernization process or rather modernization project of the Turks and the Russians have also important similarities. Although for a long time Europe had been considered as inferior by both of them, starting from the 18th century they had to follow the western lines to modernize. For both the Russians and the Turks, the westernization has been a project initiated from above. In addition, both westernization efforts, have encountered reactions of religious nature.

Each side profited from the otherization of the other side to seem more Western. In the 19th century, Russia used the discourse of “the sick man of Europe” to stress the contrast between the Turk and Europe. Similarly, during the Cold War, Turkey profited from the ideological divides between the West and Soviet Union to approach the West and to seem more European.

However, the similarities mentioned do not mean that the Russian and the Turkish cases are totally identical. They also differ on some substantial issues. In terms of collective identity there was a clear difference between the Russian and the Ottoman collective identity. While in the Russian case there was a strong emphasis on the ethnic roots, it was not the case for the Ottoman Empire where the Ottoman identity involving all *millets* living in the Empire replaced the ethnic identity. However, after the World War I and the foundation of the Turkish Republic, this situation was reversed. While Soviet Russia was emphasizing the Soviet identity instead of the Russian, in the newly emerging Turkey, the Ottoman identity and the millet system left their place to the Turkish nationality.

With the Cold War era, the otherization of the Russian and the Turk were made along totally different lines. While in the perception of the Turk, the historical enmities and cultural differences played an important role, in the Russian case there was the dominance of the ideological divide between the East and the West.

Starting from the Cold War discourse the Turk as the dominant other of Europe is replaced by the (Soviet) Russia. This era is the one during which the divide between Europe and Russia reached its peak. This wide gap provided Turkey the opportunity to approach West and to be part of its several institutions. However the end of the Cold War changed the situation. Although Europe regarded Russia with suspicions, Russia was not the ideological other it used to be during the Cold War.

Starting from 1990s, the relations of Europe with both Russia and Turkey entered a new era. They attempted to establish a free market economy through judicial and institutional reforms, privatizations. In terms of transition to free market economy, despite several economic crisis, Turkey has been relatively more successful than Russia. Russia on the other hand suffered from the shock therapy. Another crucial issue for both Russia and Turkey after 1990s has been the transition process into democracy. This is about the democratization process that both Russia and Turkey have been subject to criticisms from Europe.

If we look at the current situation, we can say that, despite exclusionary practices in some respects, Turkey and Russia are two actors of European state-system. However, it is also possible to comment that, they are considered as European enough to be members of such an institution as the Council of Europe, but not enough European to be members of the European Union. In fact, Russia has never had a prospect of membership to the EU, but it is not the case for Turkey. Despite the prospect of membership to EU for Turkey, it is not likely that this membership will happen in a near future.

Although most of the new members of the EU come from a communist past, this communist past has not been an obstacle for their membership into the EU. Debates on the success of new EU members in terms of economic and political transition make us ask “Are Turkey and Russia less able than the new EU members to succeed

in the transition process?”. They are certainly not. However for the moment the historical experiences which resulted in the otherization of the Russians and Turks seem to be an important factor in their ambiguous image in Europe. Nevermore, it does not mean that they will never be able to be members of the key European institution, the EU. Although they are not members of EU, both Russia and Turkey with their large markets and their important role in terms of international security, have important place in the continuation of the EU and European state system. In other words, it seems that it is not so easy for Europe to give up Turkey and Russia and Europe is not willing to do so.

Turkey and Russia are currently important actors not only in European state-system but also in the international state system. However, despite the inclusion of Russia and Turkey to certain western institutions, their implicit exclusion from other institutions shows that they are not yet totally admitted to the European state-system. Despite the slowness of their progress in terms of economic and/or political transformation, they gradually approach to the European standards. However, this progress is not as much appreciated as the progress made by most of the new members of EU. Moreover, this progress does not suffice to wipe out the traditional hostilities and suspicions. The same suspicions are viable on the part of Russia and Turkey as well. Both Russia and Turkey preserve old suspicions against Europe. Consequently, as a result of this mutual suspicion, despite the advances in democracy and in transition into market economy, Russia and Turkey remain to a certain degree as culturally the Other of Europe.

The fact that there is an increasing interdependence in Turko-European and Russo-European relations in terms of economic, security and political issues makes the continuation of relations indispensable. Even though in the economic and political fields the current relations are much more intense, they are not likely to end up with a complete integration, if not with further cooperation. Although in the long term further integration is not impossible, at least in a near future the relations of Europe with neither Russia nor Turkey are not likely to end up with a complete integration.

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