

**EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY AND ITS  
PROSPECTS**

**A THESIS SUBMITTED TO  
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES  
OF  
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY**

**BY**

**SEZEN MENGİ**

**IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS  
FOR  
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE  
IN  
EUROPEAN STUDIES**

**MARCH 2007**

Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

---

Prof. Dr. Sencer AYATA

Director

I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assist Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN

Head of Department

This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Master of Science.

---

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay KAHRAMAN

Supervisor

**Examining Committee Members**

Assist. Prof. Dr. Galip YALMAN (METU, ADM) \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sevilay KAHRAMAN (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Nuri YURDUSEV (METU, IR) \_\_\_\_\_

**I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.**

Name, Last name: SEZEN MENGİ

Signature :

## **ABSTRACT**

### **EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE DIMENSION AND ITS PROSPECTS**

Mengi, Sezen

MS., Department of European Studies

Supervisor: Associate Professor Dr. Sevilay Kahraman

March 2007, 146 pages.

This study has focused on analyzing the evolution of ESDP and developments that took place to this date concerning the European Security and Defense Dimension. Since the end of World War II and beginning of Cold War, the security and defense issue of Europe will be explored in this thesis. Later the developments that took place after the diminishment of Warsaw Pact and end of Cold War will be traced. Also the changing relationship between the US and EU with the changing global international environment will be explored in this thesis.

Keywords: European Union, ESDP, NATO, Threat, Security, Defense

## **ÖZ**

# **AVRUPA GÜVENLİK VE SAVUNMA POLİTİKASININ GELİŞİMİ VE GELECEĞİ**

Mengi, Sezen

Yüksek Lisans, Avrupa Çalışmaları Ana Bilim Dalı

Tez Yöneticisi: Doçent Sevilay Kahraman

Mart 2007, 146 sayfa.

Bu çalışma Avrupa Güvenlik ve Savunma Boyutunun var oluşu ve bugüne kadarki gelişimini incelemeye odaklanmıştır. İkinci Dünya Savaşının bitiminden ve Soğuk Savaşın başlangıcından itibaren Avrupanın güvenlik ve savunma konuları değerlendirilmiştir. Sonrasında da Soğuk Savaşın bitimi ve Varşova Paktının yıkılması ile meydana gelen gelişmelere değinilmiştir. Buna ek olarak değişen küresel uluslararası ortamda, değişen ABD ve AB ilişkileri detaylı bir biçimde işlenmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Avrupa Birliği, AGSP, NATO, Tehdit, Güvenlik, Savunma

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM .....	ii
ABSTRACT .....	iv
ÖZ .....	v
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....	vi
LIST OF FIGURES .....	viii
CHAPTER .....	
1. INTRODUCTION .....	1
2. ESDI: EU OVERSHADOWED BY NATO .....	5
2.1 Maastricht Treaty .....	17
2.2 WEU's Relations with the EU .....	18
2.3 Operational Role of WEU .....	19
2.4 NATO-WEU Cooperation under ESDI .....	24
2.5 WEU Operations .....	28
2.6 The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference .....	31
2.7 Amsterdam Treaty .....	36
3. TOWARDS ESDP: SAINT-MALO AND BEYOND .....	39
3.1 Saint-Malo Summit .....	39
3.2 Cologne Summit .....	42
3.3 Helsinki Summit .....	46
3.4 Nice Treaty .....	52
3.5 Laeken Summit .....	53
3.6 Seville Summit .....	55
4. HISTORY OF THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP .....	67
4.1 Security Issues Between US and EU within NATO .....	77

4.2	Changing Definition of Threats .....	84
4.3	Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations in post 2001 .....	91
5.	THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR .....	95
5.1	EU Operations .....	101
5.2	EU Approves anti-terror package .....	112
5.3	EU agrees on Rapid Reaction Force .....	112
5.4	Effects of Enlargement .....	117
5.5	Future of European Security: Breakthrough or Crises? .....	124
5.6	Counter Arguments to ESDP .....	129
6.	CONCLUSION .....	134
7.	REFERENCES .....	145

## LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1 ESDP Decision-making Structure .....	51
Figure 2 EU's access to NATO's capabilities .....	61

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The original impetus for the founding of the European Union was the desire to rebuild Europe after the disastrous events of World War II and to prevent Europe from ever again falling victim to the scourge of war.

In order to do this, many supported the idea of forming some form of European federation or government. Winston Churchill gave a speech at the University of Zurich on the September 19, 1946 calling for a "United States of Europe", similar to the United States of America. The immediate result of this speech was the forming of the Council of Europe. The Council of Europe however was a rather weak organization, like a regional equivalent of the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

The European Union grew out of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was founded in 1951, by the six founding members: Belgium, West Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Its purpose was to pool the coal and steel resources of the member-states, in order to prevent another European war. It was in fulfillment of a plan developed by a French civil servant Jean Monnet, publicized by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman. In fact on May 9, 1950 Schuman presented his proposal on the creation of an organized Europe stating that it

---

<sup>1</sup> Desmond D., (2004), "Europe Recast: A History of European Union" Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner pp. 50-55

was indispensable to maintenance of peaceful relations. This proposal, known as the "Schuman declaration", is considered to be the beginning of the creation of what is now the European Union. The British were invited to participate in it, but refused on grounds of national sovereignty; thus the six went ahead alone.

The ECSC was followed by attempts, by the same member-states, to found a European Defense Community (EDC) and a European Political Community (EPC). The purpose of this was to establish a common European army, under joint control, so that Germany could be safely permitted to rearm and help counter the Soviet threat. The EPC was to establish a federation of European states. However, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC treaty, which leads to its abandonment. After the failure of the EDC treaty, the EPC quietly went into a hibernation period. The idea of both institutions can be seen to live on in later developments, such as European Political Co-operation (also called EPC), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar established by the Maastricht treaty and the European Rapid Reaction Force currently in formation.

Following the failure of the EDC and EPC, the six founding members tried again at furthering their integration, and founded the European Economic Community (EEC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC). The purpose of the EEC was to establish a customs union among the six founding members, based on the "four freedoms": freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people. The EAEC was to pool the non-military nuclear resources of the states. The EEC was the most important of the three communities, so much so that it was later renamed simply the European Community (EC). It was established by the Treaty of Rome in 1957.

For many years, even decades, the European Community/European Union (EC/EU) has strived for a role on the international stage. The Union has successfully become an economic giant on a par with the United States and Japan, able to wield a great deal of influence in global economic, financial, trade and aid issues. Yet this economic influence has never been matched by political or diplomatic influence, despite several efforts to develop an international political role. Even after the EU established its Common Foreign Security Policy in 1993, it wielded such little real influence that its resulting declarations and resolutions went largely unheeded. However, as the EU enters the twenty-first century this may be about to change with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy.<sup>2</sup>

As it is well known with the end of Cold War period and diminishing of collective threat, crisis management replaced its top position on the security agenda as far as international threat and risks are concerned. Nowadays, the EU is in a position to prepare itself to struggle against crisis management and risks. With the development of ESDP it appears that the EU states, which have consistently argued that they have a significant role to play in security affairs, are admitting that they need improved military capabilities to support their political declarations if they are to be taken seriously in international security affairs and remove American presence in Europe, replacing the US dominant NATO with the ESDP. Through out my thesis I will explore this issue. What the ESDP is all about, what it is going to become in the future and its impacts on NATO and international arena. The EU, in the context of its final aims, which are to have an integrated Europe, become a leading power and have a stance of its own, will improve

---

<sup>2</sup> Trevor S., Alistair S., (2003) "Toward a European Army" Lynne Rienner Publishers

its defense dimension. I will also explore, if ESDP will be able to totally replace NATO within the next ten years or so, the reasons behind this will and its affect on international politics, in addition to if the EU's and US' strategic interests will overlap or not and will the EU be able to influence Middle Eastern and Asian countries in the next twenty years?

This thesis is going to be a hypothesis-generating study. Of course while trying to prove and support my hypothesis interpretive, analytical and critical evolutions of the prior researches will be done. Because of this, methodology that will be used does not have much of significance. Different opinions and points of views will have a large contribution to my work. What are going to be central and principal to this thesis are the treaty bases, evolution of the ESDP out of ESDI, making of such a defense dimension within the EU. I believe that ESDP is a very significant project for the future of the EU. It will have a role of determination of the union's stance in the world context.

In the first chapter of my thesis I will explore the background of the EU's defense dimension, WEU's relations with both the EU and NATO. Later I will explore the decisions taken at Summit meetings. In the second chapter I will pay attention to the operations conducted by both the WEU. In the third chapter, the significance of Saint-Malo summit for ESDP will be discussed and in the fourth chapter subject will be the changing definition of threats in the post Cold-War era, I will also explain the relationship between NATO and the European countries since the beginning of Cold War in this chapter, also in relation to that changing relationship between the EU and NATO will be handled in more detail. Lastly in the fifth chapter the future of ESDP will be evaluated

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY: EU OVERSHADOWED BY NATO**

In May 1945, after six years of war, Europe was weak and defenseless. The political and economic structures of much of Europe had largely disintegrated. The 'old continent' had lost its pre-eminent place in the international system. The experience of war and resistance generated new political and social forces and it was clear that post-war Europe would be a very different place than it had been before 1939. The collapse of the old balance of power system left the way open for the creation of a substantially new pattern of strategic and political relations on the continent. The post-war security system was thus based on a new set of political and economic relationships and involved different protagonists and institutional arrangements. The post-war devastation of Europe left a power vacuum, which the two superpowers were quickly drawn into. The continental heartland of Europe was particularly weakened: the power of Germany had been decisively crushed the old regimes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans had collapsed; and France, the other main continental great power, was a shadow of its former self. USA and the USSR, these two great nations were to become and decisive arbiters of the post-war future of Europe.<sup>3</sup> Start of Cold War, drop of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 and following that the exploitation of USSR's first

---

<sup>3</sup> Alexis de Tocqueville, "Democracy in America" trans. George Lawrence (1966) New York, Harper & Row pp. 378-79

atomic bomb, which ended US nuclear monopoly. Not only were these weapons awesome in their destructive power, but also they had penetration, speed, relative ease of delivery, and increasing accuracy. The world looked frightening: it was atomic and bipolar. The great states of Europe had once been the cauldron of international relations, but now they had to adjust to the loss of empires and the movement of truly global power to two extra-European superpowers. In addition, they had to look to the United States for their own security. Here began one of the continuing themes of European security and defense: Western Europeans needed to do something to help themselves, but they also had to rely upon the United States.<sup>4</sup>

Europe was becoming an object of the game of international politics rather than a participant in it. Many came to believe that only a united Europe would recover the continent's old greatness, significance and influence.<sup>5</sup>

So the idea of Europe having a united voice in the world was as old as integration itself. From the beginning, European integration has been concerned with issues of foreign and security policies. Indeed, its first institutional embedment was the 1948 Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self Defense. Europeans have sought to develop a common defense component independent from NATO since the European Defense Community, which was the first attempt and failed in the 1950s.

---

<sup>4</sup> Trevor S., Alistair S., (2003) "Toward a European Army" Lynne Rienner Publishers pp. 15-18

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. pp. 18-20

In 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War led to the most far-reaching European defense proposal, the EDC. Previously, several European Federalists had dreamed of an army of Europe. Next, the United States began to encourage the Europeans to contribute to their own defense that also meant the rearmament of Germany but at the time this was unacceptable by some of her neighbors, especially France. However as the Korean War continued and with China's involvement in the war opposition to rearmament lessened and it also caused France to revise its negative position towards Germany. But they still wanted to be cautious.<sup>6</sup> For the US, EDC would solve the German rearmament problem and would contribute to burden-sharing problem between European Allies and US.

In order to contain a newly armed Germany, French officials proposed the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC). This was a big chance according to German leader Adenauer at the time to increase his country's sovereignty, so he quickly agreed to join the EDC. The treaties establishing the EDC were signed in May 1952 in Bonn by the Western Allies and the Federal Republic of Germany.<sup>7</sup> The treaty defined the EDC as a "supranational European organization, supranational in character, comprising common institutions, common armed forces, and a common budget" it was supranational because its decisions would be binding, some could be taken by a majority vote, and it envisaged the "fusion" of the armed forces, not just coordination or cooperation. The EDC had an exclusively defensive remit, was to be within the NATO framework, and asserted that an attack on one member state would be regarded as an

---

<sup>6</sup> Sorin L., (1997). "Attitudes Toward European Security" *American Diplomacy*, [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD\\_Issues/amdipl\\_11/lungu.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/AD_Issues/amdipl_11/lungu.html). Accessed on 11/12/2005

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

attack on all. It would ensure the security of its members “by taking part in Western defense within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty.” However, the EDC was ultimately blocked by France's parliament, the National Assembly, because of the fact that putting French troops under foreign command was certainly unacceptable to them along with the idea of a strong Germany.

However, the efforts to create the EDC resulted in a Soviet countermeasure. The second East German proposal for talks on a possible unification of the two Germanys failed because of the Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) demands for free elections in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). After that the Soviet Union put forth a new proposal to the Western Allies in March 1952. The Soviet Union would agree to German unification if the Oder-Neisse border would be recognized as final and if a unified Germany was to remain neutral. If the proposal was to be accepted, Allied troops would leave Germany within one year, and the country would obtain its full sovereignty.

Although the offer was directed to the Western Allies, its content was aimed directly at the West German public and aroused a lively discussion about the country's future. Adenauer was convinced, however, that even if the Soviet proposal was serious, an acceptance of the plan would mean Germany's exclusion from the community of Western democracies and an uncertain future. Together with the Western Allies, which did not wish to act without his consent, Adenauer continued to demand free elections supervised by the United Nations in all of Germany as a precondition for negotiations. The Soviet Union declined and abandoned this proposal. Adenauer was harshly criticized at the time by the opposition for not having seized this opportunity for unification. However, his impressive victory in the Bundestag elections of 1953 clearly

demonstrated that Adenauer had acted according to the wishes of the overwhelming majority of West Germans.<sup>8</sup>

Adenauer's decision to turn down the Soviet proposal was a convincing evidence that the FRG intended to remain and be a part of the Western defense community. However, the French National Assembly refused to ratify the EDC treaty no matter what, which caused its vanishment. This prepared the grounds for two developments. First; the emergence of a weak Western European Union (WEU), as the sole European Defense Organization, second the consolidation of US influence and dominance with the help of NATO, in European security order that will keep on increasing as the years pass during the Cold War.<sup>9</sup>

WEU was an extension of the Brussels Treaty of 1948 with the inclusion of West Germany and Italy. By Paris Agreements of October 1954 and the reformulated Brussels Treaty Italy and Federal Republic of Germany were to join the WEU which was to be integrated militarily into the NATO framework, and a sovereign Federal Republic was to join NATO. These agreements also allowed the rearmament of West Germany, but with certain guarantees regarding the development and deployment of atomic, biological and chemical weapons. Machinery was set up to limit the size of German armed forces, which were to be the same as finally agreed in the EDC. The WEU was to monitor the situation. The new agreement involved nothing beyond intergovernmentalism and was therefore acceptable to British. It made clear that the

---

<sup>8</sup> [http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl\\_rearmament.htm](http://www.germanculture.com.ua/library/history/bl_rearmament.htm) accessed on 10/05/2004

<sup>9</sup> Ibid

WEU would work in close cooperation with NATO. These arrangements seemed to resolve the outstanding issues, but before long the WEU became NATO's junior sibling and was engulfed by it. So this resulted in WEU to go under a hibernation period since 1954.<sup>10</sup>

In the Treaties of Rome in 1957, the six member governments agreed to build the “foundation of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”, but they acknowledged that the first step now should be taken in the economic field.<sup>11</sup>

Nonetheless, the political vision (foreign policy, security, and defense) did not totally disappear. It was de Gaulle, coming to power in France in 1958, who lost no time in proposing that the members of the EEC should also engage in foreign policy discussions and cooperation.

At a summit meeting in Bonn in 1961, the six members agreed to hold at regular intervals, meetings whose aim would be to compare their views, to concert their policies and to reach common positions in order to further the political union of Europe thereby strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.

The Bonn Summit also agreed to set up a committee to study a statute for a political union, with Christian M. Fouchet as its chairman.<sup>12</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> <http://www.weu.int/History.htm> accessed on 12/10/2004

<sup>11</sup> Camps, M. (1964) Britain and the European Community 1955-1963 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 520-522

<sup>12</sup> Trevor S., Alistair S., (2003) “Toward a European Army” Lynne Rienner Publishers pp.25-30

The Fouchet talks of 1961-1962 on a treaty of political union faltered over the long time disputed issues in European cooperation: whether to move away from supranationality, to circumvent the role of the Commission, and whether to deal with defense outside the NATO context, with the divergence of views between the French and the rest of its European partners. The first plan was put forward in November 1961, bearing all of de Gaulle's views. This was to be union of "states" not of "peoples". Fouchet proposed a "common foreign policy to strengthen cooperation with other free nations, the security of the Member States against any aggression by adopting a common defense policy". Decisions were to be taken unanimously and there was to be a European Political Commission to direct its work. It was very much a Gaullist attempt to create an intergovernmental alternative to the Community method, the role of the Commission, and integration. The Political Commission was also charged with working toward a "unified foreign policy and the gradual establishment of an organization centralizing, within the Union, the European Communities. A second draft was put forward in January 1962 but this was turned down as a basis for discussion since it seemed to disregard the suggestions of others.<sup>13</sup>

The breakdown of these talks in April 1962 however did not mean the end of these issues. After the resignation of de Gaulle in April 1969, another attempt to put the integration movement back on course was made at The Hague. The main ideal that came out was: completion, deepening, and widening. Deepening embraced the objectives of "progress in the matter of political unification" and paving "the way for a united Europe

---

<sup>13</sup> Ibid

capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and its mission". Under this procedure "all major questions of foreign policy" could be discussed.

This EPC or Davignon system was clearly intergovernmental and was to run in parallel with the EC treaty system.<sup>14</sup> Some like, Ralf Dahrendorf, initially saw this as a great strength, recognizing the reality of interaction between sovereign states. However a common policy as distinct from cooperation in foreign policy remained only a long-term objective. Within the framework of the EPC the governments of the Member States agreed on informing each other of their standpoints in foreign policy and to coordinate them in as far as they were relevant for the rest of the Community. However, the EPC was not a part of the European treaties but was originally a purely informal mechanism. Cooperation on foreign affairs was strictly intergovernmental, it was the sole responsibility of the governments of the Member States. Decisions were taken only by common consent. Community institutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice had no say in foreign affairs.<sup>15</sup>

The Community under the EPC did not succeed in being taken seriously as an actor in international affairs. The procedure of reaching a consensus was too inefficient and protracted for European interests to be represented effectively. In addition, the EPC repeatedly faced the problem of particularistic national interests getting in the way of a common position.

---

<sup>14</sup> Sefanie, F. (2004). "New Impulses in European Foreign and Security Policy", Europäische Politik, Eurokolleg.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

On the other hand between 1961 and 1967 there was constant pressure from Washington for Europeans to contribute more to the common NATO defense.

On January 1, 1973 the six EC members became nine with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. After de Gaulle, the agreement of The Hague and the successful agenda-setting summit in Paris October 1972, member states said they were looking for common attitudes and where possible and desirable common action so that they could transform the whole complex of their relations into a European Union. They acknowledged that individual states could not play a “major role on the international scene alone. So that Europe must unite and speak increasingly with a single voice if it wants to make itself heard and play its proper role in the world.”<sup>16</sup>

In order to achieve this what was also necessary was a security dimension in order to be able to take care their own security and defense. Tindemans, who was former Belgian Prime Minister and author of the 1976 Tindemans report on European integration, had tried to alert his colleagues to the fact that the security of one member necessarily affects the security of others. No foreign policy can disregard threats, whether actual or potential, and the ability to meet them. Security cannot therefore be left outside the scope of the European Union and EU will not be complete until it has drawn up a common defense policy.<sup>17</sup>

The Single European Act of 1986 finally anchored the EPC officially in the Community’s treaties, thus establishing the first legal basis for a common European

---

<sup>16</sup> “The European Identity” (1973), Bulletin of the European Communities pp. 118-122

<sup>17</sup> Tindemans L., (1975) “Report on European Union” Bulletin of European Communities

foreign policy. However, this step did not alter much of the basic structures if cooperation. SEA acknowledged that those who wished to were, to be free to pursue “closer cooperation in the field of security within the framework of the WEU or the Atlantic Alliance. European foreign policy still remained in the hands of national governments and depended on their mutual agreement, which totally stands in the way of their final aim of becoming a global actor. SEA enabled EEC member governments to discuss political and economic aspects of security under the EPC.

Single European Act of 1986 underlined 2 points.<sup>18</sup>

- Identification of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)
- To start work on the harmonization of the defense policies and industries of member states.

At the beginning of 1990s, with the end of Cold War and collapse of Warsaw Pact, European countries have reached to a peaceful environment that they were never able to have in their history. In my view the risk of invasion of one country by another one has declined greatly with this development. Notwithstanding this reality, however, European countries were faced with new threats and risks concerning their national security such as, asymmetric warfare including terrorism, illegal immigration, money laundering, drug trafficking and crisis in the hot spots in and around Europe.

So during all those years, after the World War two and during the Cold War, European countries were not so much concerned about security because US dominant NATO was responsible from security issues. However, they were aware of the fact that

---

<sup>18</sup> The EU Council Decisions (1987) “Hague Declaration”

in order for a fully integrated Europe at the end, having a defense dimension was obligatory.<sup>19</sup>

In order for a united Europe both politically and in the area of security, European states should have lessened their nationalistic fragmentations. Will they be able to do this? This is also one of the reasons for NATO's increased influence on European Security through out Cold War.

The Gulf and Yugoslav crises focused attention on the WEU. With the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1988, the WEU had nine of the twelve EC states as members, but not Ireland, Denmark or Greece. France was especially keen to see a WEU role and sought to underline the close links between the WEU's security interests and the broader process of European integration.

Also in the minds of those discussing a CFSP were the deliberations of NATO, which led to the NATO summit in Rome in 1991, just a few days before Maastricht meeting. Rome produced the "Declaration on Peace and Security" and the Alliance's "New Strategic Concept".<sup>20</sup> It also confirmed that the Alliance's belief that it would continue to play a key role in European security, but was clear that, in the new security environment, NATO, the CSCE, the EC, the WEU and the Council of Europe all completed one another and all had a role to play if instability was to be prevented. It stressed that appropriate links would have to be established between NATO, the WEU

---

<sup>19</sup> Allen, D. and Smith, M., (1990), "Western Europe's Presence in the Contemporary International Area", Review of International Studies, vol. 16, no. 1

<sup>20</sup> "NATO Review" no. 6 (December 1991): pp. 19-22, 25-32

and the twelve EC members to ensure that all were adequately informed about decision that might affect their security. The NATO states said that they welcomed the prospect of the reinforcement of the role of the WEU, “both as a defense component of the process of European unification and as a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance”.<sup>21</sup>

Delors, known as the architect of the Single European Act, the first modification of the Treaty of Rome, and former president of European Commission, observed during the Gulf crisis that the Community had neither the institutional machinery nor the military force, which would have allowed it to act as a Community.<sup>22</sup> He later observed during the Yugoslavia crisis that EPC had only three weapons at its disposal: public opinion, the threat of withholding diplomatic recognition and economic sanctions. The community sought to bring financial and economic levers to bear. It also turned to the other instruments that Delors had identified. It did consider the military option. However, each instrument was to pose problems for policy coherence and arouse friction between the member states. It tried to arrange a peaceful settlement, sending fifty European observers to monitor a cease-fire, but they failed to bring peace. The failure of all these efforts, and the problems encountered by the monitors, led to a key

---

<sup>21</sup> Taylor, T., (1993), “NATO’s Future: Evolution not Revolution” in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

<sup>22</sup> Delors, “address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies” p. 102

disagreement among the twelve EC members over the issue of military intervention. It also led to questions about the relationship between the member states and the WEU.<sup>23</sup>

In 1991 EC foreign ministers met in The Hague and examined ways of strengthening the EC's cease-fire monitoring operation. This meeting broke new ground in the relationship between the EC and the WEU, and it became clear over the next few weeks that the WEU was, on this matter at least, becoming the military arm of the EC.<sup>24</sup>

## **2.1 Maastricht Treaty**

The European Communities were transformed into the European Union (EU) with the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in 1991. Moreover, the same Treaty had envisaged the replacement of EPC by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and established this as the second pillar of the European Union. This clearly meant that European countries were determined to give a higher priority to European cooperation in foreign affairs. According to the Maastricht treaty:

WEU Member States agree on the need to develop a genuine European security and defense identity and a greater European responsibility on defense matters. This identity will be pursued through a gradual process involving successive phases. WEU will form an integral part of the process of the development of the European Union and will enhance its contribution to solidarity within the Atlantic Alliance. WEU Member States agree to strengthen the role of WEU, in the longer-term perspective of a common

---

<sup>23</sup> Sekulic, D., (1993), "Dissolution of Yugoslavia: International Consequences" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington.

<sup>24</sup> Trevor S., Alistair S., (2003) "Toward a European Army" Lynne Rienner Publishers

defense policy within the European Union, which might in time lead to a common defense, compatible with that of the Atlantic Alliance.<sup>25</sup>

WEU will be developed as the defense component of the European Union and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. To this end, it will formulate common European defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role. Dual role of WEU reflected a compromise between Europeanists and Atlanticist.<sup>26</sup>

## **2.2 WEU's Relations with European Union**

The objective was to build up WEU in stages as the defense component of the European Union. To this end, WEU was prepared, at the request of the European Union, to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union, which have defense implications.

WEU Council decisions foresaw to take the following measures to develop a close working relationship with the Union:

- As appropriate, synchronization of the dates and venues of meetings and harmonization of working methods;
- Establishment of close co-operation between the Council the Secretariat-General of WEU on the one hand, and the Council of the Union and General Secretariat of the Council on the other;

---

<sup>25</sup> Duke, S., (1996) "The Second Death or the Second Coming of WEU", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no.2

<sup>26</sup> Maastricht Treaty

- Consideration of the harmonization of the sequence and duration of the respective Presidencies;

- Arranging for appropriate modalities so as to ensure that the Commission of the European Communities is regularly informed and, as appropriate, consulted on WEU activities in accordance with the role of the Commission in the common foreign and security policy as defined in the Treaty on European Union

- Encouragement of closer co-operation between the Parliamentary Assembly of WEU and the European Parliament.

The WEU Council shall, in agreement with the competent bodies of the European Union, adopt the necessary practical arrangements.

### **2.3 Operational Role of WEU**

WEU's operational role was to be strengthened by examining and defining appropriate missions, structures and means, covering in particular:

- WEU planning cell;
- Closer military co-operation complementary to the Alliance in particular in the fields of logistics, transport, training and strategic surveillance;
- Meetings of WEU Chiefs of Defense Staff,
- Military forces answerable to WEU. (FAWEU)

Other proposals will be examined further, including:

- Enhanced co-operation in the field of armaments with the aim of creating a European armaments agency;

- Development of the WEU Institute into a European Security and Defense Academy.<sup>27</sup>

Arrangements aimed at giving WEU a stronger operational role was to be fully compatible with the military dispositions necessary to ensure the collective defense of all Allies.

According to a declaration attached to the Maastricht Treaty signed by Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are members of the Western European Union:

‘The Member States of WEU welcome the development of the European security and defense identity. They are determined, taking into account the role of WEU as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance, to put the relationship between WEU and the other European States on a new basis for the sake of stability and security in Europe. In this spirit, they propose the following: States which are members of the European Union are invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they so wish. Simultaneously, other European Member States of NATO are invited to become associate members of WEU in a way, which will give them the possibility of participating fully in the

---

<sup>27</sup> WEU related texts adopted at Maastricht EC Summit (1991)

activities of WEU. The Member States of WEU assume that treaties and agreements corresponding with the above proposals will be concluded before 31 December 1992.’<sup>28</sup>

The declaration is important for laying down different categories of WEU membership. Greece joined the WEU and Turkey became associate member.

And also the objectives of the CFSP listed in the Article V of the Maastricht Treaty are as follows:

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- To promote international cooperation;
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The Declaration foresaw the development of WEU as the European pillar of NATO and the defense component of the EU<sup>29</sup>. The aim of European countries was to strengthen and increase their contribution to the Alliance’s missions by establishing a European military capability within NATO. In other words, Europeans were becoming

---

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> WEU Maastricht Declaration (1991)

more willing to take part in providing their own security. However, it remained true to the structures of the EPC as far as institutions and procedures were concerned. The decision-making power remained in the hands of the Council and thus of the governments of the Member States. Under the terms of the Maastricht Treaty the Commission and Parliament only received limited information and consultation rights. Neither did the Treaty provide for any independent military capabilities on the part of the EU, but stated on the contrary that security policy decisions were to be implemented through the institutions of the WEU.<sup>30</sup>

Even though the 1948 Brussels Treaty included an article on collective defense (Article 5)<sup>31</sup>, the missions that the WEU would assume, were set out in accordance with the circumstances of the current international situation in the Petersburg Declaration of 1992:

- Humanitarian operations, including rescue and evacuation operations
- Peacekeeping operations
- Task of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking.<sup>32</sup>

Following the decisions taken at Maastricht and Petersburg, steps were undertaken to develop the WEU's operational capabilities in order to provide the organization with the necessary tools to undertake the Petersburg missions. In this

---

<sup>30</sup> Simon, J., (1993), "Overview of European Security Issues" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

<sup>31</sup> Lluís M. (2000) "The Myth of Europa, A Paradigma for European Defense", published by Assembly of the WEU, p.28

<sup>32</sup> NATO Handbook, (1998) NATO office of information and Press, p. 333

context, a WEU Planning Cell was set up, under the authority of the WEU Council, to carry out planning for possible WEU operations and to establish and to keep up-to-date the list of Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU). The WEU had no standing forces or command structures of its own. However, the military units and command structures designated by WEU members and associate members could be made available to WEU for its various possible tasks. They include both national units and several multinational formations, such as the Eurocorps; the Multinational Division Central; the UK/NL Amphibious Force; Eurofor and Euromarfor; the Headquarters of the First German-Netherlands Corps; and the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force.<sup>33</sup>

Other measures aimed at developing the WEU's operational capabilities included the establishment of the Satellite Center in Torrejon, Spain, inaugurated in April 1993, to interpret and analyze satellite data for the verification of arms control agreement, crisis monitoring and management in support of WEU operations also; the creation of a Situation Center (which became operational in June 1996) to monitor crisis areas designated by the WEU Council and the progress of WEU operations; and the creation of a Military Delegates Committee and the reorganization of the military structure of the WEU headquarters in 1998, in accordance with decisions taken by WEU Ministers at their meetings in Paris and Erfurt in May and November of 1997.<sup>34</sup>

One of the differences between NATO and the WEU was that WEU had no permanent military structure. WEU had 10 full members who also belong to both the

---

<sup>33</sup> WEU Council of Ministers, Lisbon (1995)

<sup>34</sup> Simon, J., (1993), "Overview of European Security Issues" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

European Union and NATO. Only these EU and NATO members had the right to make or veto decisions in the Permanent Council. However, although EU membership was mandatory for WEU admission under the Brussels Treaty, NATO membership was an unwritten rule. There were three associate members who are NATO but not EU members and five observers who are in EU but not in NATO (except for Denmark). In addition there were 10 associate partners, making a total of 28 WEU nations.<sup>35</sup>

## **2.4 NATO-WEU Cooperation under ESDI**

As stated earlier, the objective was to develop WEU as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly WEU was prepared to develop further the close working links between WEU and the Alliance and to strengthen the role, responsibilities and contributions of WEU Member States in the Alliance. This would be undertaken on the basis of the necessary transparency and complementarity between the emerging European security and defense identity and the Alliance.

WEU Member States were to intensify their coordination on Alliance issues, which represent an important common interest with the aim of introducing joint positions, agreed in WEU into the process of consultation in the Alliance which remained the essential forum for consultation among its members and the venue for agreement on policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of Allies under the North Atlantic Treaty.<sup>36</sup>

---

<sup>35</sup> Whiting, G. M., (1997) Western European Union Operational Development, NATO ([HTTP://ISUISSE.FRANCE.COM/EMMAF2/NATO/NATOCH13.HTML](http://isuisse.france.com/emmaf2/nato/natoch13.html)) Accessed on, 04/07/2005

<sup>36</sup> Kupchan C. (2000) “In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective” Survival 42 No. 2

Cooperation between the WEU and NATO underpinned the process of the reactivation of the WEU and became progressively more intensive and more frequent. On 21 May 1992, the Council of the WEU held its first formal meeting with the North Atlantic Council at NATO Headquarters. Subsequently, the Secretary General of the WEU regularly attended ministerial meetings of the North Atlantic Council, and the NATO Secretary General likewise participated in WEU ministerial meetings. Also the North Atlantic and WEU Councils began to meet four times a year, with the possibility of further meetings if necessary. In addition to these a Security Agreement was agreed between NATO and WEU to facilitate the exchange of classified information. Other examples of enhanced practical cooperation included WEU access to NATO's integrated communications system and regular consultations between the secretariats and military staffs of both organizations.

The Strategic Concept under the ESDI heading reads “the ESDI will continue to be developed within NATO. It will enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities; and it will assist the European Allies to act by themselves as required through the readiness of the Alliance, on a case by case basis and by consensus, in order to make its assets and capabilities available for operations in which the Alliance is not engaged militarily under the political control and strategic direction either of the WEU or as otherwise agreed, taking into account the full participation of all European Allies if they were so to choose.”<sup>37</sup>

---

<sup>37</sup> NATO Washington Summit Declarations, office of information and press, 1999, NATO Strategic Concept, art.30

An important further step towards closer cooperation between NATO and WEU was taken during the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. The 16 member countries of the Alliance gave their full support to the development of a ESDI which would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance while reinforcing the transatlantic link and would enable European Allies to take greater responsibility for their common security and defense.

Arrangements made for cooperation between NATO and the WEU from 1991 to 2000 laid the groundwork for the development of a strategic partnership between NATO and the EU. These included:

- Taking WEU requirements into account in NATO's defense planning procedures for developing forces and capabilities. The WEU began contributing to the Alliance defense planning process in 1997 by providing an input to the 1997 Ministerial Guidance;
- Introducing procedures for identifying NATO assets and capabilities on which the WEU might wish to draw with the agreement of the North Atlantic Council;
- Establishing multinational European command arrangements within NATO, which could be used to prepare, support, command and conduct an operation under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU. Under these arrangements the Deputy Supreme Allied Europe Commander Europe (Deputy SACEUR) was given a distinct role, both in

normal times and in the context of WEU-led operations, in relation to the forces to be made available to the WEU;

- Introducing consultation and information-sharing arrangements to provide the coordination needed throughout a WEU-led operation undertaken with NATO support;
- Developing military planning and exercises for illustrative WEU missions.<sup>38</sup>

In practice these arrangements were designed to ensure that if a crisis arose in which the WEU decided to intervene (and the Alliance chose not to), it could request the use of Alliance assets and capabilities, possibly including a CJTF headquarters, for conducting an operation under its own political control and strategic direction.

The assets requested could then be made available for the WEU's use by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis. During the operation, NATO would monitor the use of its assets and regular political liaison with the WEU would be maintained. European commanders from the NATO command structure could be nominated to act under WEU political control. The assets would be returned to NATO at the end of the operation or when required. Throughout the operation, including its preparatory phase, NATO and the WEU would consult closely.<sup>39</sup>

---

<sup>38</sup> <http://www.shape.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0402.htm> , Accessed on 08/04/2005

<sup>39</sup> Ibid

In order to execute political and strategic control over those tasks, WEU has developed a decision making process in the Permanent Council; strengthened the planning cell under the Permanent Council; and established a situation center (SITCEN) responsible to the Secretary-General via the planning cell director and a satellite center (SATCEN) at Torrejon in Spain.<sup>40</sup>

One important difference between NATO and WEU was that WEU did not have any permanent military structures except for the planning cell. The reason for that was no forces were permanently assigned to WEU. There were three different means of forces available to its use:

- National Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU) that is potentially available for planning purposes and would be employed on a case-by-case basis.
- EUROCORPS, Multinational Division Central, MND-C, United Kingdom-Netherlands, Amphibious Force, EUROMARFOR, European Maritime Force, EUROFOR, European Force.
- With the 1996 Berlin Ministerial meeting, NATO assets and capabilities, including combined joint task force (CJTF) initiative which is was launched in late 1993 and was endorsed at the Brussels Summit of January 1994. On that occasion, Alliance Heads of State and Government directed that the further development of the concept should reflect their readiness to make NATO assets available, on the basis of case-by-case

---

<sup>40</sup> Simon, J., (1993), "Overview of European Security Issues" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

decisions by the North Atlantic Council, for operations led by the Western European Union (WEU), thereby supporting the building of the European Security and Defense Identity.<sup>41</sup>

## **2.5 WEU Operations**

At the beginning of 1990s, WEU conducted a few operations for and by the request of EU.

In July 1992, it was decided by the WEU Ministerial Council that WEU naval forces would participate in monitoring the embargo against former Yugoslavia in the Adriatic in addition to NATO forces implementing Operation Maritime Guard for the same purposes. Later in 1993, WEU and NATO decided to conduct a joint operation instead of two separate operations for the same UN Security Council Resolution. The agreement established a unified command for “Operation Sharp Guard” which was to begin on June 15<sup>th</sup>, 1993. Organized in combined task groups, NATO and WEU ships conducted continuous patrolling in the southern Adriatic Sea to enforce the embargoes. They established direct communication with masters of transiting vessels to determine the nature of their cargo, its origin and destinations. Vessels entering or leaving the territorial waters of Yugoslavia were halted and inspected to verify compliance with UN Security Council resolutions, otherwise they were diverted to an approved port or anchorage.<sup>42</sup>

According to the UNSC resolutions 1021 and 1022, the Sharp Guard mission was limited to heavy weapons and ammunition embargo enforcement.

---

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm> , Accessed on 08/10/2005

<sup>42</sup> Missiroli, A., (2000), *CFSP, Defense and flexibility*, Institute for Security Studies, WEU; Paris.

This operation ended on October 2<sup>nd</sup>, 1996. After the termination of this operation, a joint statement was released saying that NATO and WEU consider that this operation which was their first combined operation, served as a positive demonstration of the strengthening ties and intensifying cooperation between the two organizations.<sup>43</sup>

#### Police Contingent in Mostar

WEU conducted this operation in response to the request by the Ministers of EU Member States. The aim of this operation was to provide support to the planned EU administration of Mostar in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A police contingent was sent to Mostar in July 1994. WEU police contingent assisted the Bosnian and Croat parties in Mostar to set up a unified police force for the town. In May 1995, also police forces from Austria, Finland and Sweden joined the WEU forces. WEU's operation ended on October 15, 1996 with transformation of public order executive powers to the local authorities.<sup>44</sup>

#### Mission in Albania

In May 1997, the decision to send a Multinational Advisory Police Element to Albania was taken by the WEU Council. The primary aim of this MAPE was to provide advice and train instructors. MAPE was also to provide advice to the Ministry of Public Order on restructuring the Albanian police. At the end with the support of MAPE, a new State Police Law was created which contained the foundations for building a democratic police that is at internationally accepted standards.<sup>45</sup>

---

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.weu.int/History.htm> , Accessed on 09/09/2005

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

<sup>45</sup> Missiroli, A., (2000), *CFSP, Defense and flexibility*, Institute for Security Studies, WEU; Paris.

## **2.6 The 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference**

The 1996-1997 intergovernmental conference faced a number of issues and problems to be resolved in the area of foreign, security and defense policy. Most fundamentally there were divergences about the role of the EU in European security and about the very nature of security. Other issues to be tackled include the scope of CFSP, whether defense should be left to NATO and what role the WEU should have, specifically, whether it should be absorbed in the EU.

The maximalist approach wanted the EU to be able to make decisions on security and defense, to integrate the WEU and to have a real capability in the defense field, at least in the long term. In contrast, the minimalist approach looked to intergovernmentalism and the tradition of the alliances with a veto for all. For this faction NATO should be central.<sup>46</sup> Due to these very different perspectives, the IGC continued well into 1997 as the member states continued to argue for their preferred solutions and to protect what they saw as their vital interests in foreign and security policy.

During the IGC, the Benelux states of Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands all supported a greater role for the EU in security and defense. They announced their support for the development of a EU defense policy and the phased integration of the WEU into the CFSP pillar, which should also incorporate the

---

<sup>46</sup> Trevor S., Alistair S., (2003) "Toward a European Army" Lynne Rienner Publishers pp.149-150

Petersberg tasks and collective defense.<sup>47</sup> The Dutch did, however, continue to emphasize the importance of NATO, stating that the practical implementation of collective defense should remain a matter for NATO and that the EU should establish specific links in the defense field with NATO.

The French took a weaker stance in advocating the “European Europe” than they had previously. Because by this time France had observed that they have been rather marginalized in the Gulf War by their semidetached relationship with NATO.

Germans on the other hand, continued to advocate that Europeans should shoulder more responsibility. They supported proposals to increase the WEU’s operational capability and to strengthen organizational links with the EU, pending the medium-term objective of merging the WEU into the EU. Germans argued that the WEU should develop into a common defense structure capable of carrying out the Petersberg tasks.

At the beginning of the decade Italy made CFSP a priority. For them the Gulf War showed that the competencies of the Union needed to be extended “to all aspects of security without limitations” and they called for the transfer to the Union of the competencies presently being exercised by the WEU.<sup>48</sup>

For Ireland, neutrality and CFSP continued to be a very sensitive issue. Ireland would not seek membership in NATO or the WEU, or assume mutual defense

---

<sup>47</sup> European Parliament, “White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, vol. 2 Summary of Positions of the Member States of the European Union with a View to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (1996)” p. 17

<sup>48</sup> European Parliament, “White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference” Vol. 2, pp. 38

guarantees.<sup>49</sup> Ireland did, however, take up the 1992 WEU offer to become an “observer” which allowed it to attend and speak at WEU Ministerial Council meetings and participate in WEU working groups and committees.

The Danes have also been cautious about foreign policy, security and defense cooperation. Most Danish parties agreed that they did not want to include defense in CFSP. They decided to maintain their opt-out from defense matters but this will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between Members States in this are.<sup>50</sup>

The UK was another state with skeptical views on the role of the EU in defense matters. Traditional British policy is to stress the importance of NATO, especially the Article 5 commitment to mutual aid, as was the crucial commitment of the United States to European security. The UK argued that given this US commitment, it was wrong to develop separate, wholly European military structures, although the Europeans should shoulder more of the burden for European security. Thus there was support for the WEU remaining as the European pillar of NATO and as the defense component of the EU.<sup>51</sup>

Greece, during the 1990-1991 IGC, favored abandoning previous restrictions on the types of security issues that could be discussed within the EU, and the inclusion of defense. It enthusiastically joined the WEU after changes at Maastricht allowed EU

---

<sup>49</sup> Department of Foreign Affairs (Ireland), “White Paper on Foreign Policy” (Dublin 1996) par. 36.

<sup>50</sup> Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions: Edinburgh European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1992” Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992) par. 1.37.

<sup>51</sup> Trevor S., Alistair S., (2003) “Toward a European Army” Lynne Rienner Publishers

members to join the WEU as members or observers. In 1996-1997 IGC the Greeks continued their support for strengthening the EU's role in security and defense.<sup>52</sup>

Portugal was another state that approached negotiations on CFSP and defense in a cautious manner, wary of damaging NATO and transatlantic link. However, they also supported that WEU should be developed to allow it to deal with smaller-scale peacekeeping, crisis management, and other Petersberg tasks.<sup>53</sup>

Spain also believed that defense had to remain as an intergovernmental issue. While willing to see WEU developed, especially in relation to the Petersberg tasks, it regarded NATO and the US as vital to European security.

The discussions in 1996-1997 were complicated by the accession to the EU, in 1995 of Austria, Finland and Sweden were all neutral states. Austria became an observer at the WEU shortly after. It also did support CFSP developing an operational capability in the sphere of the Petersberg tasks, Austria also wanted to have civil protection added to the list though. Finland and Sweden also become observers at the WEU. They were significant players in the 1996-1997 IGC. They followed up on the WEU's 1992 Petersberg declaration "on strengthening the WEU's operational role". Finland and Sweden issued a memorandum to their colleagues on the IGC and the security and defense dimension toward an enhanced EU role in crisis management. The

---

<sup>52</sup> Ibid

<sup>53</sup> European Parliament, "White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference" vol. 2 pp. 38.

memorandum accepted the need for the European Union to enhance its role and capabilities in conflict management.<sup>54</sup>

The Fins drew a distinction between the political leadership provided by the EU and the implementation of crisis management by the WEU. They preferred the strictly intergovernmental approach on military matters.

Sweden declared that they want to see the EU move into the Petersberg area, giving the EU a peacekeeping capability, but not into collective defense.<sup>55</sup>

Towards the end of negotiations opinions on defense matters were divided as follows: on the issue of including defense in the EU, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain were broadly in favor, while Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the UK were not and on the issue of merging the WEU into the EU, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain were supportive, where as Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden and the UK were opposed.

All except Germany wished to retain the intergovernmental character of CFSP and no state formally pushed for the abandonment of unanimity in CFSP. Eventually, compromises were found and agreements reached, which were formalized in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty.<sup>56</sup>

---

<sup>54</sup> Ibid p. 38

<sup>55</sup> Ibid p. 108

<sup>56</sup> G. Edwards, (1997) "Politics of European Treaty Reform" London: Pinter

## 2.7 Amsterdam Treaty

In 1998 EU has renewed its treaty, “Amsterdam Treaty”, which includes the defense and security dimension of the EU. According to this ‘The CFSP shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy’ and assured that ‘WEU is an integral part of the development of the Union’. On the issue of military operations, the Treaty of Amsterdam retained the WEU as the body with operational capability in CFSP but went one step further than the Maastricht Treaty by suggesting that, if the European Councils so decided, the WEU could be integrated into the EU.<sup>57</sup> This also meant that ESDI could transform into ESDP meaning that it could become an internal policy and part of the Union. This treaty also outlined what sort of military operations the EU would participate in. For this the EU incorporated the so-called Petersberg tasks adopted by the WEU in 1992.

But the most important innovation was the creation of the post of High Representative for the CFSP, responsible for contributing to the formulation, preparation and implementation of political decisions in CFSP-related matters and representing the Presidency in joint foreign and security policy matters. On 18th October 1999 Javier Solana, former NATO Secretary General, took over this office for a period of five years. Policy planning and early warning unit, in Brussels jargon also known as the “political staff”, which is responsible for analyzing foreign and security policy interests is under his authority.<sup>58</sup>

---

<sup>57</sup> “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union” art. 17.1

<sup>58</sup> Sefanie, F. (2004). “New Impulses in European Foreign and Security Policy”, Europäische Politik, Eurokolleg.

This treaty also expanded the number of instruments and mechanisms available in the CFSP arena. In addition to joint actions and common positions, common strategies were introduced to cover areas where the member states all had common interests, to be decided by the European Council on recommendation of the Council. However the dominance of intergovernmentalism remained within the decision making process of CFSP. This dominance of intergovernmentalism was even stronger for all matters related to the ESDP. Another important development in 1998 concerning CESDP was the meeting of the EU defense Ministers on 03-04 November 1998 in Vienna for the first time in their history.<sup>59</sup>

Even with this treaty the EU saw little progress in developing a clearly defined and effective CFSP during the 1990s. As a result there was no progress in developing a common defense policy. Only the last eighteen months of the decade saw a marked shift in attitude, process and progress in the field of European security policy. However this shift was so swift that, even before the Amsterdam Treaty came into effect, it appeared that the changes that had been agreed for CFSP in Amsterdam were to be superseded. The period from mid 1998 to early 2000 saw a definitive shift toward the establishment of an ESDP and, more tangibly, the military capabilities to support such a policy, which in turn was to support CFSP.<sup>60</sup>

---

<sup>59</sup> Heisbourg, F., (2000), *European Defense: Making It Work*, Institute for Security Studies; Paris

<sup>60</sup> Ibid



## CHAPTER 3

### TOWARDS ESDP: SAINT-MALO AND BEYOND

#### 3.1 Saint-Malo Summit

As explained in the previous chapter, although the goal of a common security policy had already been stated in the Maastricht Treaty, at first no progress could be made in this area. The main reason for this was UK's basic refusal to consent to common initiatives in the field of defense and security.<sup>61</sup> The UK had been traditionally opposed to the development of a EU security capability on the grounds that it might weaken, or even lead to the disintegration of NATO. By autumn 1998 it became apparent that the UK was beginning to favor a EU initiative on security and defense policy on the basis that, if it improved capabilities, it could strengthen NATO and rebalance the Atlantic Alliance. Because of this St Malo Summit constitutes a milestone for European security. The talks between the heads of government of France and the UK in the French city of Saint Malo on 03-04 December 1998 added a new and significant facet to EU's defense and security dimension. The declaration issued at the end of the talks, also known as Saint-Malo declaration, reads as follows:

1. The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage. This means making a reality of the Treaty of Amsterdam, which will provide the essential basis for action by the Union. It will be important to achieve full

---

<sup>61</sup> Margarita, M., Istvan G. (1999) "Saint Malo and Beyond: Toward European Defense", The Washington Quarterly Vol. 22.

and rapid implementation of the Amsterdam provisions on CFSP. This includes the responsibility of the European Council to decide on the progressive framing of a common defence policy in the framework of CFSP. The Council must be able to take decisions on an intergovernmental basis, covering the whole range of activity set out in Title V of the Treaty of European Union.

2. To this end, the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises.

In pursuing our objective, the collective defence commitments to which member states subscribe (set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, Article V of the Brussels Treaty) must be maintained. In strengthening the solidarity between the member states of the European Union, in order that Europe can make its voice heard in world affairs, while acting in conformity with our respective obligations in NATO, we are contributing to the vitality of a modernised Atlantic Alliance which is the foundation of the collective defence of its members.

Europeans will operate within the institutional framework of the European Union (European Council, General Affairs Council, and meetings of Defence Ministers).

The reinforcement of European solidarity must take into account the various positions of European states.

The different situations of countries in relation to NATO must be respected..

3. In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO's European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).

4. Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology.

5. We are determined to unite in our efforts to enable the European Union to give concrete expression to these objectives.<sup>62</sup>

This shift in UK policy raised the debate in the rest of Europe and signs emerged that other states were moving in the same direction, with France emerging as the UK's strategic partner in this field. At the time of the St. Malo Declaration, and since, some journalists, politicians, and analysts have argued that the UK was merely posturing to gain a voice and a role in the EU after the launch of the single currency on January 1, 1999.

---

<sup>62</sup> Rutten M. (2001) "From St. Malo to Nice European defense: core documents" Institute for Security Studies Western European Union

For example its importance was evident at the NATO Washington summit on April 23-24 1999. Both the New Strategic Concept and the Washington Declaration mention enhancing military capabilities, but the true importance of this issue was highlighted at the launch of the Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI). The other significant announcement at the Washington Summit was that NATO would make its assets and capabilities available to the EU for operations in which the Alliance as a whole is not engaged militarily as an Alliance.<sup>63</sup>

### **3.2 Cologne Summit (1999)**

It was therefore becoming clear that one of the priorities among many EU governments in the late 1990s was to develop some form of security and defense cooperation within the EU. From the signing of the TEU in 1992 the WEU became more and more closely linked to the EU. Meanwhile even as the Amsterdam Treaty was entering into force on May 1, 1999, the German Presidency of the European Union was already preparing a report on strengthening the common European security and defense policy. The final version of the report was approved and adopted by the EU member states at the Cologne European Council in June 1999. The report brought a major change to the evolution of CFSP and ESDP, making far-reaching proposals on institutional, policy and capability enhancements.<sup>64</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> NATO, "Washington Summit Communiqué" press release, NAC-S (99) 64, April 24, 1999, par. 10.

<sup>64</sup> Council of the European Union, "Presidency Report on the Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense"

So, after the British-French Summit in St. Malo, with the UK getting on board, European Council was able to adopt the creation of an independent European Security and Defense Policy in the Cologne European Summit in 1999.

Here the point that, in order for the EU to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, the CFSP must be backed by credible operational capabilities was stressed again.<sup>65</sup>

However, the EU didn't give the necessary response to NATO's opening in Washington. The European Council Cologne Declaration reads as, "we want to develop an effective EU-led crisis management mechanism in which NATO members, as well as neutral and non-allied members of the EU, can participate fully and on equal bases in the EU operations. We will put in place arrangements that allow non-EU European allies and partners to take part to the fullest possible extent in this endeavor". Another important decision taken in Cologne in this regard was the "taking of the necessary decisions by the EU about the inclusion of the necessary functions of the WEU, after the completion of the purpose of WEU as an organization to the EU, by the end of the year 2000."<sup>66</sup> So the responsibility of the development of a European security and defense policy was transferred to the EU as well as the tasks assigned to the WEU previously.

It was once again underlined in Cologne Summit that the focus of the efforts was to assure that the EU has at its disposal the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis

---

<sup>65</sup> Cologne European Council, *Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions*, June 1999.

<sup>66</sup> The EU Cologne Summit Declaration para.3

management within the scope of the Petersberg tasks and that this is the area where a European capacity to act is required most urgently.<sup>67</sup>

The EU also stressed that the Atlantic Alliance remains the foundation of the collective defense of its Members. However, as we look at the new world order and the new security challenges that have come to threaten states and societies we see that collective defense does not have much of an importance any more because it is very unlikely for a state to be occupied and pulled in a war by another state, at least not in an integrated Europe.

The EU also took important steps regarding the decision making process. In the field of security and defense policy, for sure there were some necessary arrangements that must be made in order to ensure political control and strategic direction of EU-led Petersberg operations so that the EU can decide and conduct such operations effectively. Furthermore it is for sure that the EU will need a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capacity for relevant strategic planning. So they decided that it is necessary to establish:

- Regular (or ad hoc) meetings of the General Affairs Council, as appropriate including Defense Ministers,
- A permanent body in Brussels (Political and Security Committee) consisting of representatives with political and military expertise,
- An EU Military Committee consisting of Military Representatives making recommendations to the Political and Security Committee,
- A EU Military Staff including a Situation Center,

---

<sup>67</sup> Cologne European Council, *Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions*, June 1999.

- Other resources such as a Satellite Center, Institute for Security Studies.<sup>68</sup>

The EU also admitted the fact that regarding military capabilities, Member States need to develop further military forces (including Headquarters) that are suited also to crisis management operations without any unnecessary duplication of NATO's assets and capabilities. At the beginning the agreement between the US and the EU regarding this issue was as Ms. Albright explained at the time; three Ds; no duplication, no decoupling and no discrimination.<sup>69</sup> Actually many of the U.S objections were expressed in these. The US is worried about duplication, which for some is the most complex argument. The original US line was no duplication but this changed to the more elastic "no unnecessary duplication". The catch is that what is unnecessary is in the eye of the beholder. Everyone agrees that the EU must improve its capabilities. Even the CJTF concept with its "separable but not separate forces, would have meant that Europeans were beholden to the US if they wanted to act, that the US would have a veto which of course is what some US officials wanted.<sup>70</sup> However as Charles Kupchan has said, it would obviously make no sense for the EU to create an entirely new set of defense structures paralleling those of NATO. At the same time the very notion of autonomy implies a healthy measure of duplication. Decoupling perhaps was not an immediate

---

<sup>68</sup> Ibid

<sup>69</sup> Rutten M. (2001) "From St. Malo to Nice European defense: core documents" Institute for Security Studies Western European Union

<sup>70</sup> Salmon T., Alistair S., (2003) "Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?" Lynne Rienner Publishers

threat, because many US officials were aware that the real obstacles to the fulfillment of ESDP were intra-European debates and doubts about capabilities. A reason against decoupling is that the US knows that there is no Article 5 WEU or NATO guarantee in the EU. There is no formal, legal commitment for the fifteen EU states to defend one another, and without Article 5 of NATO a great deal of confusion would be sown. One interesting thing about decoupling relates to Britain and Germany. Britain has always been traditionally Atlanticist, rather than European in its orientation to security matters and it has denied that the ERRF would constitute an independent European army. However, ESDP was a British proposal and Britain maintains a pivotal positioning shaping its evolution.

Discrimination on the other hand was about the non-EU European members of NATO, which are Turkey, Norway and Iceland being squeezed out of policy and decision-making. The US was advancing concern that the EU having a caucus before NATO meetings would disrupt the traditional mechanism of NATO consensual decision-making and such discrimination would result in a division within NATO.<sup>71</sup>

### **3.3 Helsinki Summit (1999)**

The EU aims to obtain an enhanced position about security and defense issues by constructing an institutional structure on crisis management, which is able to decide and act on its own. However it was revealed once again that the EU wishes to use NATO assets and capabilities in an unlimited fashion with a minimum possible increase in their defense expenditure. At Helsinki, in December 1999, a Helsinki Headline Goal was

---

<sup>71</sup> Kupchan C. (2000) “In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective” Survival 42 No. 2

agreed. According to this, by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, EU member governments will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons) who could be deployed within 60 days at the most for a military operation lasting at least a year.<sup>72</sup>

Throughout 2000, discussions continued in the national ministries of defense, and in the interim EU committees, on how best to achieve the Helsinki Headline Goal, focusing on which states would contribute what military capabilities. These discussions came to their initial conclusion at the Capabilities Commitment Conference, held in Brussels on November 20, 2000. This conference of defense ministers established the Force Catalogue that included forces committed and available to the EU for crisis management operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged.<sup>73</sup>

Fourteen of the fifteen EU member states, including the neutrals made a commitment to provide forces toward establishing the European Rapid Reaction Force. (ERRF). In total they committed over 100,000 troops and approximately 400 aircrafts and 100 naval vessels.<sup>74</sup> This was another significant step toward giving the EU the capabilities necessary for intervening effectively in a security crisis in the regions surrounding the EU's borders, and possibly beyond by 2003.

---

<sup>72</sup> [www.europe.eu.int](http://www.europe.eu.int), The EU Helsinki Summit 1999, 10-11 Dec 99, Helsinki Headline Goal

<sup>73</sup> Council of the European Union, General Affairs, "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration" (2000) Brussels, press release, 13427/2/00, par. 1.

<sup>74</sup> Council of European Union, General Affairs, "Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration"

At Helsinki, Member States also recalled their commitment made at Cologne and their determination to give the EU appropriate capabilities, without unnecessary duplication, to be able to undertake the full range of Petersberg tasks in support of the CFSP. More effective European military capabilities will be developed on the basis of the existing national, bi-national and multinational capabilities, which will be assembled for EU-led crisis management operations carried out with or without recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. Also they agreed that, attention should be paid to developing capabilities necessary to ensure effective performance in crisis management: deploy ability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control.<sup>75</sup>

In addition to these goals in Helsinki, the decision to establish some of the necessary institutions that mentioned above was taken. Important steps on the decision making process were achieved in this summit. ESDP seeks to provide the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy with additional substance and a clear profile. Accordingly, all political and military ESDP bodies are firmly placed within the second intergovernmental pillar of the EU, in which the Council of the EU is the main decision-making body. Below are the new institutions EU has established to provide political control and strategic direction of a crisis management mission and to conduct situation and intelligence assessment and strategic planning.<sup>76</sup>

---

<sup>75</sup> Rutten M. (2001) "From St. Malo to Nice European defense: core documents" Institute for Security Studies Western European Union

<sup>76</sup> [www.pfp.ethz.ch](http://www.pfp.ethz.ch), Accessed on 10/05/2006

Political and Security Committee (PSC): The PSC (also referred to by its French abbreviation, COPS) is the key element of ESDP. It consists of the Permanent representatives of the member states, who perform day-to-day duties and meet two to three times a week in Brussels. The PSC operates under the auspices of the Council of the EU (which alone is capable of making binding decisions) and is usually chaired by the Permanent Representative of the member state holding the EU presidency. The PSC deals with a broad range of CFSP and ESDP-related issues and defines the EU's response to a crisis. It monitors international developments and the implementation of agreed policies. When it comes to a military response to crises, the PSC, under the responsibility of the Council of the EU, exercises political control and defines the strategic direction of the operation. It functions as a coordination agency and consultation forum on ESDP for a number of EU bodies, NATO institutions, and third-party states.


European Union Military Committee (MC): the EUMC is the EU's most senior military body and a forum for military consultation and cooperation between EU member states. It is made up of the 25 Chiefs of Defense Staff. Its main task is to provide the PSC with consensus-based advice on military matters and to direct all military activities within the EU framework. A four-star flag officer from an EU member state, elected by the 25 Chiefs of Defense and appointed by the Council of the EU for a period of three years, chairs the committee and attends sessions of the Council of the EU when defense-related decisions have to be made.

European Union Military Staff (MS): Under the direction of the EUMC, the EUMS provides military expertise, particularly with regard to the execution of military

crisis management operations. It is composed of some 200 officers seconded from EU member states, and it performs three main functions: early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning. It also oversees the process of delivering the military capacities identified in the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010. In order to cope with the full spectrum of missions and tasks, the EUMS is organized into six divisions: Policy and Plans, Intelligence, Operations and Exercises, Logistics and Resources, Communication and Information Systems Division and the Civilian Military Cell. Below chart explains ESDP decision-making structure.<sup>77</sup>

---

<sup>77</sup> Helsinki European Council, *Annex VI of the presidency conclusions*, December 1999



Source: [www.pfp.ethz.ch](http://www.pfp.ethz.ch), Accessed on 10/05/2006

Figure 1: ESDP Decision-making Structure

The Council had also decided that, it is appropriate to draw up an Action Plan which would show the way ahead and indicate the steps the Union has to undertake to develop a rapid reaction capability in the field of civilian crisis management using non-military instruments. In the following period, the civilian dimension of the ESDP was expanded. The Member States committed themselves to providing a 5000 strong police force for international missions. It was also agreed that a readily deployable disaster

control force and a pool of 200 experts on the rule of law (judges, lawyer, prison officers) should be formed. The Union further introduced the “Rapid Reaction Mechanism” and instrument, which provides fast financing for conflict prevention.<sup>78</sup> The issue of where the EU used its military, non-military and economic crisis management instruments will be further explored.

### **3.4 Nice Treaty (2000)**

Later came the Nice Treaty in 2000. In 2000 the EU Member States ratified and formally confirmed the security agreements reached in previous years with the Treaty of Nice. This treaty is a major turning point for the EU because with the Nice Treaty, ESDP officially became part of the CFSP, the WEU institutions and capabilities, which had already been integrated in the ESDP, were now transferred to the EU.<sup>79</sup>

However, the Swedish Presidency failed to reach an agreement on one of its central objectives, finalizing arrangements to permit guaranteed EU access to NATO assets and capabilities, as outlined at the Nice Summit but implemented the cooperation with non-EU European NATO members and EU applicant states, as described at the Nice European Council.<sup>80</sup>

---

<sup>78</sup> Flechtner S. (2004), “New Impulses in European Foreign and Security Policy”, Eurokolleg.

<sup>79</sup> Brenner, M.J., (2002), “Europe’s New Security Vocation”, Institute for National Strategic Studies; Washington

<sup>80</sup> Rutten M.(2002), “From Nice to Laeken European Defense: core documents” Institute for Security Studies vol. 2

In November 2000 the WEU Council met in Marseilles to agree a new role for itself. The resulting declaration stated that the WEU would continue as a collective defense organization for its members and would continue to host the Western European Armaments Group. (WEAG).

### **3.5 Laeken Summit (2001)**

Laeken Summit took place in 2001, just three years after the ESDP idea was relaunched. It has an important significance for CESDP in the respect that it took place shortly after 9/11. In the Presidency Conclusions CESDP was addressed declaring the ability of the EU to conduct crisis-management operations and that the Helsinki Headline Goal was achieved. This was a long waited declaration since some of the parties' thought that EU was actually ready for this more than a year ago the target date. This is a significant step in the evolution of the EU, signaling its intent to play a crucial role in European international security.<sup>81</sup> In November 2001, following the Capabilities Commitment Conference of November 2000, EU defense ministers met again in Brussels at the Capabilities Improvement Conference. This meeting was held to discuss the progress achieved toward fulfilling the Helsinki Headline Goal and remedying the fifty remaining capability shortfall areas listed at the Capabilities Commitment Conference. The defense ministers announced that new offers had been received and that these remedied the shortfalls in a further ten capability areas. The remaining forty shortfalls were divided into areas where the situation had improved and areas where no improvement was yet discernible. The important point of the Capabilities Improvement Conference is that many of these remaining forty capability shortfalls are critical to the

---

<sup>81</sup> Ibid

military effectiveness of ESDP.<sup>82</sup> The shortfalls included strategic transport, aerial refueling, precision-guided munitions, and deployable communications. The conference also agreed on a European Capability Action Plan to help remedy some of the capability shortfalls by rationalizing national defense efforts and increasing synergy between national and multinational projects.<sup>83</sup>

At the Laeken European council summit in December 2001, the ERRF was declared partially operational. The EU declared itself able to conduct some crisis management operations and to be in a position to take on progressively more demanding operations, as the assets and capabilities at its disposal continue to develop.<sup>84</sup> Declaring an initial operational capability was no great surprise, as it covered the easier potential operations, which several member states could organize from a national headquarters. Nevertheless, it was still another step toward an effective ESPD. However despite an agreement being brokered with Turkey for guaranteed access to planning capabilities, no final agreement could be announced at Laeken as the Greeks objected to the deal arranged with Turkey.

---

<sup>82</sup> Duke, S., (2002), "The Significance of Laeken for CFSP/CESDP" Eipascope, no.2, available on line at, [www.eipa.nl](http://www.eipa.nl), Accessed on 30/02/2005

<sup>83</sup> "Council of the European Union, Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defense Policy"(2002) in Council of the European Union Annexes to Presidency Conclusions: Laeken European Council, Bulletin of the European Union

<sup>84</sup> Council of European Union, General Affairs, Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities (Brussels, November 19, 2001)

### 3.6 Seville Summit (2002)

After the Laeken Summit, Seville Summit took place on June 21 2002. Seville Summit is very important regarding the ESDP and CFSP. In the Seville Summit, the EU declared that <sup>85</sup>

- The European Council, being determined to reinforce the role of the European Union in combating terrorism and recognizing the importance of the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to that end, adopted a Declaration designed to take greater account of the capabilities required to combat terrorism.
- Following the Declaration on the operational capability of the ESDP adopted at Laeken, substantial progress has been made with the development of civilian and military capabilities, implementation of the European Capability Action Plan to remedy existing shortfalls and the prospects for cooperation on armaments. The European Council asks the Ministers for Defense, in the General Affairs and External Relations Council, to continue to guide the course of those discussions on capabilities.
- The EU reaffirmed that it was in a position to take charge of crisis management operations, deciding in particular to conduct the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM), which will ensure the follow-on to the current UN operation as of 1 January 2003.

---

<sup>85</sup> “Council of the European Union, Draft declaration of the European Council on the Contribution of CFSP, Including ESDP, in the Fight Against Terrorism,” in Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Seville European Council, Bulletin of the European Union (2002)

- The European Council stated European Union's willingness to take over from NATO in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. It instructed the Secretary-General of the EU Council/High Representative of the CFSP and the competent EU bodies to make the necessary contacts with the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia authorities and NATO chiefs and to continue and intensify the planning measures under way in order to be in a position to take over the NATO operation at the end of NATO's current mandate, provided that the permanent arrangements between the EU and NATO (Berlin +) are then in place.
- Welcoming the progress achieved so far by the Spanish Presidency regarding the implementation of the Nice provisions on the involvement of the non-European Union European Allies, the European Council instructs the next Presidency, along with the Secretary-General/High Representative, to continue that work.
- In the civilian field, work has continued in the four priority areas (police, the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection), on both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of capabilities. ESDP structures and decision-making procedures were successfully tested during the first crisis management exercise conducted by the Union.

When also looked at the Annex V of the Presidency Conclusions, we see the declaration by the European Council on the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the fight against terrorism. Actually this topic will be explored more

extensively in the next chapter, however it is important to point out the fact that the EU here is officially recognizing terrorism as the modern threat to world peace. According to this declaration:<sup>86</sup>

“The European Council reaffirms that terrorism is a real challenge for Europe and the world poses a threat to our security and our stability. To this end, the extraordinary European Council meeting on 21 September 2001 decided to step up the action of the Union against terrorism through a coordinated and inter-disciplinary approach embracing all Union policies, including development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and making the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) operational.

Here it is understood that the EU is ready to make improvements in its capabilities and assets in order to combat terrorism. The second half of 2002 saw discussions on ESDP being chaired by Greece as Denmark, the holder of the EU presidency from July to December 2002, had opted out of participation in ESDP. The EU and NATO managed to overcome Greek and Turkish objections and conclude an agreement on the Berlin Plus arrangements. This meant that the EU was now guaranteed access to NATO planning structures and as such could contemplate undertaking crisis management operations. The European Council immediately confirmed “the Union’s readiness to take over the military operation in FYROM (Macedonia) as soon as possible

---

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

in consultation with NATO”. This is a major step for ESDP, because with this development, we actually understand that the ESDP is ready to become operational.<sup>87</sup>

Last but not least a compromised paper on ESDI especially for the participation of non-EU European allies has been finalized in Ankara on 02 November 2001 among the UK, Turkey and USA. The document has been accepted by the EU on 13 Dec 2002, under the name of “Implementation of the Nice provisions on the participation of the non-EU European Allies”. The same document has also been approved by NATO Council and entered into force immediately. The outline of the document is as follows.

88

1. Under no circumstances, nor in a crisis, will ESDP be used against an Ally.
2. The EU will have permanent and continuing consultation with the non-EU European Allies; additional 15+6 meeting will be arranged as required.
3. PSC and EUMC level 15+6 meeting will also be arranged.
4. Arrangements in NATO for non-NATO EU members (Sweden, Finland) will be taken as basis for developing appropriate arrangements for non-EU European Allies. (Which means the EU will provide posts within its Military Staff for non-EU Allies.)
5. In case of, an EU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU Allies will participate in the operation,

---

<sup>87</sup> <http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html>, Accessed on 14/10/2005

<sup>88</sup> Missiroli A. (2002) “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP” EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, France

6. In case of, an EU-led operation not requiring recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, non-EU Allies will be invited, upon the EU Council to participate in the operation,<sup>89</sup>

To sum up, and review the point that has been come up to, as far as NATO-EU cooperation is concerned:

1. The EU has got the right to use NATO planning capabilities including strategic headquarters without limit.
2. During a EU operation, using NATO assets and capabilities such as weapons, tanks, ships, aircrafts will be approved by NATO Council on a case-by-case basis.
3. There will be no duplication between the two organizations.

As mentioned above, following the agreement reached among Turkey, the USA and the UK, the EU has got the assured access to NATO's planning capabilities, mainly to Supreme Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) which is the biggest NATO headquarter in Europe, headed by four star USA general and Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is rotationally from the UK and Germany. DSACEUR has been tasked as the "strategic coordinator" for the EU issues in NATO, which means that he will take care of all the EU related issues such as demands, works and requests. The procedure for the EU's access to NATO planning capabilities is as follows:

First, European Union Military Committee (EUMC) will request the SHAPE headquarter via DSACEUR while at the same time informing the NATO Military Committee. Then DSACEUR will provide a tasking for SHAPE staff regarding the


---

<sup>89</sup> Presidency Conclusions "Brussels European Council" 24-25 October 2002 Annex II

request of EUMC. The outcome produced by SHAPE will be directly sent to EUMC via DSACEUR, while giving information to NATO MC.

During this period, there is close coordination and cooperation between SHAPE and EUMS. Staff of the EUMS is free to enter and work in SHAPE.

So, we see that the EU got a new headquarters that is not totally its own but when the steps that are taken are concerned, next step is probably towards that way. At the moment, SHAPE headquarter has two flags, same height, same size, which are NATO and EU, flags. Below chart explains the working structure of EU's access to NATO capabilities.



Source: Cornish P. (2006) "EU and NATO Cooperation or Competition" European Parliament, Brussels

Figure 2: EU's access to NATO's capabilities

The European Council has noted the significant achievements accomplished in the implementation of the Plan of Action to combat terrorism and reiterates that the fight against terrorism will continue to be a priority objective of the European Union and a key aspect of its external relations policy. Solidarity and international cooperation constitute essential instruments in the fight against that scourge. The Union will continue to maintain the closest possible coordination with the United States and other partners. The Union will seek to contribute further to those international efforts, both internally

and in its relations with third countries and international organizations, such as the UN, NATO and the OSCE.<sup>90</sup>

The Europeans also pointed out their willingness to contribute in world peace, containing regional conflicts in Europe and fighting against terrorism:

The CFSP, including the ESDP can play an important role in countering this threat to our security and in promoting peace and stability. Closer cooperation among the Member States is being put into practice to take account of the international situation created by the terrorist attacks of 11 September.

The European Council welcomes the progress achieved since 11 September on incorporating the fight against terrorism into all aspects of the Union's external relations policy. The fight against terrorism requires a global approach to strengthen the international coalition and to prevent and contain regional conflicts. The Union is:

- Strengthening EU instruments for long-term conflict prevention,
- Focusing on political dialogue with third countries on the fight against terrorism as well as on non-proliferation and arms control,
- Providing assistance to third countries in order to reinforce their capacity to respond effectively to the international threat of terrorism,
- Including anti-terrorism clauses in EU agreements with third countries,
- Re-evaluating relations with third countries in the light of their attitudes towards terrorism and taking appropriate measures accordingly and

---

<sup>90</sup> Presidency Conclusions "Brussels European Council" 24-25 October 2002 Annex II

- Implementing specific measures in the fight against terrorism in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which laid down a wide range of comprehensive steps and strategies to combat terrorism, including financial measures.

The European Council also welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the ESDP, following the Declaration on the operational capability of the European Security and Defense Policy. This progress has allowed the Union to take its first decision to establish a crisis management operation (the European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, EUPM). The EUPM is an example of the European Union's commitment to stabilizing post-conflict regions and helping to establish the rule of law. By promoting stability, including the strengthening of local law-enforcement capabilities, norms and standards, the EU helps to deny terrorist organizations the opportunity to take root. As indicated at the Laeken European Council, through the military and civilian capabilities developed by the EU for crisis management, the CFSP will become stronger and will contribute more effectively to the fight against terrorism for the benefit of the populations concerned.<sup>91</sup>

ESDP will strengthen further as Member States enhance their military and civilian capabilities for crisis management. To this end, the European Council underlines again the importance it places on the timely achievement of the Headline Goal targets which was to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range

---

<sup>91</sup> "Council of the European Union, Draft declaration of the European Council on the Contribution of CFSP, Including ESDP, in the Fight Against Terrorism," in Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Seville European Council, Bulletin of the European Union (2002)

of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons) who could be deployed within 60 days at the most for a military operation lasting at least a year cooperating together voluntarily by 2003.<sup>92</sup> In this context, the development of the ESDP must take fuller account of the capabilities that may be required, in accordance with the Petersberg tasks and the provisions of the Treaty, to combat terrorism.

Priority action for the EU, in the fields of the CFSP and the ESDP in particular, in the fight against terrorism should focus on:<sup>93</sup>

- Devoting greater efforts to conflict prevention;
- Deepening political dialogue with third countries to promote the fight against terrorism,
- Including the promotion of human rights and democracy as well as non-proliferation and arms control, and providing them with appropriate international assistance;
- Strengthening arrangements for sharing intelligence and developing the production of situation assessments and early warning reports, drawing on the widest range of sources;
- Developing our common evaluation of the terrorist threat against the Member States or the forces deployed under the ESDP outside the Union

---

<sup>92</sup> Heisbourg, F., (2000), *European Defense: Making It Work*, (Institute for Security Studies; Paris)

<sup>93</sup> Presidency Conclusions “Brussels European Council” 24-25 October 2002 Annex II

in crisis management operations, including the threat posed by terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction;

- Determining military capabilities required to protect forces deployed in European Union-led crisis management operations against terrorist attacks;
- Exploring further how military or civilian capabilities could be used to help protect civilian populations against the effects of terrorist attacks.

The European Council requests the Presidency and the Secretary-General/High Representative, and the Commission as appropriate, to step up their efforts in these priority areas by promoting coordinating work within Council bodies and with relevant international organizations, notably the UN and NATO, in order to increase the effectiveness of the contribution of the CFSP, including the ESDP, to the fight against terrorism, as well as to report to the General Affairs and External Relations Council on this matter.<sup>94</sup>

Another significance about this summit is the fact that the EU is constantly referring to ESDP and its contributions towards world peace, crisis management as an independent organization apart from NATO. As well known in the beginning it was not possible to pronounce ESDP apart from NATO however as it becomes clear now, the intention of the EU is to build a separate organization apart from NATO with its own capabilities and assets, an organization, which is totally European. This is their intention but the EU is currently short of military capabilities.

---

<sup>94</sup> <http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200206/i1031.htm> Accessed on 07/03/2005

The period 1993-2002 saw massive change in the perspectives positions of the EU member states toward developing a defense and security role for the EU. As is detailed in subsequent chapters, they have developed the institutional structures necessary for conducting a military operation, though they still need to be refined and rationalized, and have pledged military capabilities for ESDP and identified the continuing military shortfalls. Compared with the previous forty years, this appeared to be a definitive shift toward ESDP. In the next chapter, NATO-EU relationship will be explored in detail.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **HISTORY OF THE NATO-EU RELATIONSHIP**

Before the end of Cold War, European countries had neither the intention nor the means to establish a separate defense and security structure. NATO was rather responsible from the collective defense of its members. This actually was in accordance with European interests. Because at the time they were more interested in covering up from the effects of war and improving their economies. Instead of worrying about their security they allocated all their resources to the development of their countries.

However as mentioned above after the end of Cold War, at the beginning of 1990s, ideas had started to change regarding security and defense issues.

The EU took this process very slowly and on a step-by-step approach. ESDI started out as a genuine European military capability using totally the capabilities and assets of NATO by which could avoid any unnecessary duplication of the command structures, planning staffs and military assets and capabilities, which are already available in NATO. At the beginning this seemed as a good deal, because while satisfying the wish of Europeans to develop a CFSP, it also assured increased contribution to the Alliances' missions and activities by European states.

With the Maastricht Treaty of 1 November 1993, the leaders of the European Community agreed on the development of a CFSP “including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense”. This agreement also included a reference to the WEU as an integral part of the development

of the EU created by the Treaty; and a request to the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the EU, which had defense implications. At the meeting of the WEU, which took place in Maastricht in December 1991 concurrently with the meeting of the European Council, WEU Member states issued a declaration agreeing on the need for a genuine ESDI and a greater European responsibility in defense matters.

In 1994, NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed the on going developments in the field of establishing a European pillar of the Alliance. They also welcomed the close and growing cooperation between NATO and the WEU achieved on the basis of agreed principles of complementarity and transparency. They further announced that they stood ready to make collective assets of the Alliance available, on the basis of consultations in the North Atlantic Council, for WEU operations undertaken by the European Allies in pursuit of their CFSP.<sup>95</sup>

Later the North Atlantic Council started to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures might be developed in order to conduct the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, more efficiently and flexibly and also to set forth the emerging ESDI. With all these goals and intentions in mind, the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) was developed.<sup>96</sup>

In June 1996, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers met two times, in Berlin and Brussels and the decision that came out from these meetings were that ESDI should be built within NATO, as an essential part of the internal adaptation of the Alliance. It

---

<sup>95</sup> Ibid

<sup>96</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm>, Accessed on 06/03/2005

was thought that this project would enable all European Allies to make a more coherent and effective contribution to the missions and activities of the alliance. This would allow them to act on their own as required and would simultaneously reinforce the transatlantic partnership.<sup>97</sup> Taking full advantage of the CJTF concept, the strengthened European identity would be based on military principles supported by appropriate military planning, and would permit the creation of militarily coherent and effective forces capable of operating under the political control and strategic direction of the WEU.<sup>98</sup> The developments at the time were still in the interest the US and NATO in the sense that European partners taking more responsibility in burden sharing and taking action for their own defense and it was also in the interest of European countries because with these developments they got the opportunity to conduct separate operations on their own if they wanted. At the time this was quite satisfying for EU countries. So as long as the interests of both parties were protected transatlantic partnership would continue to be mutually embracing and sustaining.

Later came the Madrid Summit in 1997 in which NATO Heads of State and Government welcomed again the major steps taken within regard to the creation of the ESDI within the Alliance.

And then came the Franco-British St. Malo Summit. As mentioned before the joint decision that came out of this summit pointed out the fact that the EU must have

---

<sup>97</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961218a.htm>, Accessed on 03/06/2006

<sup>98</sup> Duke, S., (1996) "The Second Death or the Second Coming of WEU", Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no.2

the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises. Also following this, another decision supporting this idea was taken by the EU and WEU governments.<sup>99</sup> The responsibility for the future development of ESDP and corresponding structures would be assumed by the EU itself. With the Nice Treaty in 2000, the roles and tasks previously assigned to the WEU had thus been transferred to the EU. This was a necessity because the Brussels Treaty was going to expire by 1999.

As mentioned before, the 1999 NATO Washington Summit is one of the most important milestones in the future development of the ESDI. The principles, which have formed the basis for future work on ESDI, set out at the Washington Summit, are as follows:

- The Alliance acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged.
- In taking this process forward, NATO and the EU must ensure the development of effective mutual consultation, cooperation and transparency, building on the mechanisms developed for cooperation between NATO and the WEU.
- Alliance leaders applaud the determination of both EU members and other European Allies to take the necessary steps to strengthen their

---

<sup>99</sup> Rutten M. (2001) "From St. Malo to Nice European defense: core documents" Institute for Security Studies Western European Union

defense capabilities, especially for new missions, avoiding unnecessary duplication.

- They attach the utmost importance to ensuring the fullest possible involvement of non-EU European Allies in EU-led crisis response operations, building on consultation arrangements developed within the WEU.
- They are determined that the decisions taken in Berlin in 1996, including the concept of using separable but not separate NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led operations, should be further developed.<sup>100</sup>

Based on these principles, these arrangements (referred to as "Berlin plus"), which will respect the requirements of NATO operations and the coherence of its command structure, include issues such as:

- The provision of assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities able to contribute to military planning for EU-led operations;
- The presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets for use in EU-led operations;
- The identification of a range of European command options for EU-led operations and further developing the role of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, in order for him to assume fully and effectively his European responsibilities;

---

<sup>100</sup> Torbicorn K. (2003) "Destination Europe: The Political and Economic Growth of a Continent"  
Manchester University Press

- The further adaptation of NATO's defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations.<sup>101</sup>

The EU was able to get what it wanted. Because with the NATO Summit, it is evidently accepted that the EU has taken over the ESDP role over from the WEU and as far as using NATO capabilities and assets are concerned the EU gained invaluable rights such as assured access to NATO's planning capabilities.

With the increasing developments regarding the ESDP and the EU assuming more and more responsibility in this area, the relationship between NATO and the EU took on a new dimension, reflected in developments within both organizations. With the establishment of a Helsinki Headline Goal in order to be able to undertake the full range of the Petersberg tasks set out in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997. The EU started to take important measures towards the aim of developing a common European security and defense policy. As mentioned in detail before, later came the decision to create political and military structures.<sup>102</sup> With all these developments in mind, the EU started to get separated from NATO, however European countries were still in need of the Alliance's military assets.

This is one of the issues in which great importance should be paid to develop ESDP is to build up the required military capabilities. However, because of the cuts in their military budgets, European Allies face difficulties, because convincing taxpayers

---

<sup>101</sup> NATO Handbook: Evolution of the ESDI

<sup>102</sup> Lindstrom G. (2006) "The Headline Goal" Institute for Security Studies

for EU's additional defense spending will be hard at a time where Warsaw Pact as well as the Soviet threat has diminished.

For this reason, EU first of all tried to transform NATO into a pool of ready forces and instead of developing its own forces, EU member states tried to build ESDI with NATO capabilities. They made this legitimate by implying that EU member states had no intention of unnecessary duplication with NATO structures and have emphasized that these decisions do not imply the creation of a European army, however a few years later, it came to be that this agreement has no meaning because in several areas, EU duplicated NATO structures such as EU Military Committee (EUMC), EU Military Staff (EUMS), Headline Goal and Political Security Committee (PSC). Yet they established a dialogue mechanism between EU and NATO. (See chart at p. 47)

The ability of the EU to have access to necessary elements of the NATO command structure to assist the operations led by the EU was also in the interest of NATO, because this way ESDP would be "separable but not separate", since the assets could be placed under the authority of the EU while remaining as integral part of the Alliance's own military structure.

In this context, it is not possible to wholly accept the thesis that says, "EU countries already possess the required capabilities, they have enough experienced personnel and funds to move quickly into an independent structuring." Building ESDP, autonomous from NATO requires a firm policy to be supported by all EU members.

Because of the reason that this structuring will not be to the benefit of NATO, the US, Canada and non-EU allies, it is assessed that, the EU countries see the Transatlantic Link (i.e. the U.S.) as an obstacle for an autonomous European security.

Meetings of the European Council in Nice and of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels in December 2000 registered further progress. Alliance Foreign Ministers stated that they shared the goal endorsed by EU member states for a genuine partnership in crisis management between NATO and the EU. Both organizations agreed that consultations and cooperation would be developed between them on questions of common interest relating to security and effective defense and crisis management, so that crises can be met with the most appropriate military response.<sup>103</sup>

An exchange of letters took place in January 2001, between the Secretary General of NATO and the Swedish Presidency of the EU, providing for joint meetings at Ambassadorial level and Ministerial level. The arrangement envisages at least three meetings at Ambassadorial level and one meeting at Ministerial level every six months (i.e. during each EU Presidency). Both organizations are committed to stepping up consultations in times of crisis. Since February 2001, regular meetings of the EU Political and Security Committee and the North Atlantic Council take place.<sup>104</sup>

Those could be seen as the initiating steps of the EU towards an strong and effective ESDP from NATO.

On the other hand, when looked at NATO, especially in the post-Cold War era with the ESDP developments in mind, we see that the organization went through a transformation, in order to get caught up with the new international environment.

---

<sup>103</sup> Winn, N., (2002) "Whither NATO" Lindley-French

<sup>104</sup> Sloan, S R., (2000), "The United States and European Defense" Institute for Security Studies WEU, Paris

Otherwise it would become an out dated organization and slowly lose its influence and relevance. For example Partnership for Peace (PfP) program is very important in this respect. As far as NATO's PfP program is concerned, it is a step to modify its structure taking into account the changing international environment. NATO with PfP program included 20 Balkans, East-Europe, Caucasus and Asian countries into its activities and spread its influence from Europe to Central Asia.<sup>105</sup> This program aims mainly to conduct crisis management operations, and it could also be seen as rival to the ESDP, which struggles against crises. Also in recent years NATO has gone through an enlargement process in parallel with the EU. This also can be seen as a precaution against the influence of the ESDP to be strengthened in the near future because especially with the enlargement process, the EU has increased its area of influence. Concerning the ESDP, It may be assumed that the new members of the EU will provide additional, military power.

As far as all the steps that are gone through are concerned, it becomes obvious that the EU aims to obtain an acceptable position about security and defense issues by constructing a structure on crisis management, which is able to decide and act on its own. So it becomes significant to ask questions about the future of ESDP and what is going to happen to NATO? Whether or not it will remain as the sole European security organization or will the EU achieve its goal of ending US domination in European security.

---

<sup>105</sup> Ravenal, E., (1993), "Phase Out NATO" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

However, also another fact is that in the beginning Europeans were constantly repeating that they did not have the intention of building up and duplicating the institutions that have already existed and established under NATO, but as we look at the recent developments within the EU, we see that the EU is in a position to create some identical institutions such as, to build up a new EU strategic military headquarter, and a military force similar to NATO's Rapid Reaction Force (RRF), which is called the EU battle group.<sup>106</sup> So these little hints make the subject matter even more crucial because they show the intention of the EU of building a separate security institution apart from NATO. On the other hand, it is a known fact that NATO has been established for collective defense of its member states, even though it has gone through a transformation process, adopting itself to the changing global threats and new world order during the last ten years. Also yet, the EU and NATO reached to a final agreement for cooperation, there is a view among the top level authorities of the EU and its major member states that NATO is an out dated organization, established only for collective defense.

As it is well known with the end of Cold War period and diminishing of collective defense, crisis management replaced its top position on the global security agenda as far as international threat and risks are concerned. Since 1999, the EU is in a position to prepare itself to struggle against crisis management and risks. These kinds of risks are seen as falling to the scope of the ESDP. The EU, in the context of its final aims, which is to have a politically united Europe, become a leading power and have a

---

<sup>106</sup> <http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/european-battle-groups-new-stimulus-european-security/article-134085>, Accessed on 03/02/2006

stance of its own, will improve its defense dimension and remove American presence in Europe, replacing the US dominant NATO with the ESDP. In the rest of my thesis, I will explore, if ESDP will be able to totally replace NATO within the next ten years or so, the reasons behind this will and its effect on international politics. To this end the historical development of European Security Structure till 2002 was explored. In the next section changing definition of threat will be explored and the developments took place in post 2001.

#### **4.1 Security Issues Between the US and EU within NATO**

European integration has been a success story and right from the time of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the United States deserves much of the credit for supporting it. It helped plant the seed, provided succor, and defended Western Europe from an external threat. The success of European integration fulfills a commitment made at the inception of NATO.<sup>107</sup> Some in the US were frightened that Western Europe would eventually clash with US ambitions, that European ambitions were to build a state that would attain geopolitical equality with the United States, with the suggestion that the original framers wanted a European bloc, apart from the United States and USSR. For them, the United States supported European integration, but only conditioned by the framework of the Atlantic Community and US leadership. For them, a truly equal Europe would lead to a threat to US preponderance. However Presidents, Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, and Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and John Dulles, supported European integration because they believed a US presence in Europe

---

<sup>107</sup> Serfaty, S.H., (1993), "The Challenge of Continuity: Hyperboles, Hysteria, and History" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

should only be temporary, not permanent. Eisenhower, serving as SACEUR noted: “If in ten years, all American troops stationed in Europe for national defense purposes have not returned to the United States, then this whole project will have failed”.<sup>108</sup>

Forty years later, instead of there being only one major security organization in Europe, there were two. Nobody knew how they would fit together and how far European need for independence would go.

What diminished the need for security cooperation seems to be the disappearance of Soviet threat. As a result of this, it is possible to see an increasing European resentment of the American domination.

When NATO was first founded in 1949, the function of this organization was summarized by Lord Ismay, NATO’s first Secretary General as “to keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down”. During the Cold War period, for 40 years, NATO served this function well. It provided deterrence and defense against the Soviet threat, it controlled Germany and made Americans a part of European defense. However with the end of Cold War and falling apart of Warsaw Pact, the potential threat and the *raison d’etre* of NATO disappeared. Another factor for the weakening of Atlantic alliance was the reunification of Germany because with this reunification the threat of rise of Nazism and Communism vanished.<sup>109</sup>

In the William Clinton administration the principle was that there could be a European pillar of a strong transatlantic alliance, but not competing entities. As George

---

<sup>108</sup> Louis Galambos (1989) “Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower” vol. 12 “ NATO and the Campaign of 1952” Baltimore John Hopkins University Press pp.76-77

<sup>109</sup> <http://www.sipr.org/default.aspx?action=PublicationDetails&id=57> , Accessed on 26/10/2006

Robertson (NATO Secretary-General) has said the United States suffers from a sort of schizophrenia...on the one hand saying, “You Europeans have got to carry more of the burden”. And then, when the Europeans say, “Okay, we will carry more of the burden” they say, “well, wait a minute, are you trying to tell us to go home”?<sup>110</sup> The US is unsure about the mix of the political, military and economic elements of a fair and equitable sharing of the full range of security responsibilities and a proper balancing of costs and benefits.<sup>111</sup>

Another factor is the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It even made the validity of the existence of NATO more questionable. However with developments that took place in the post cold war era, it obvious that the Americans are not interested in dissolving NATO, rather what they are trying to do is to redefine the alliance with a new strategic concept. If we are to look at the developments that took place after 1990s, we see that NATO has undergone a great transformation process. It has expanded its membership to include countries from Eastern and Southern Europe and enlarged its strategic concepts to encompass regions like Central Asia, Caucasus, the Baltic and Middle East.<sup>112</sup>

---

<sup>110</sup> Karen Donfried and Paul Gallis, (2000), “ European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union” CRS Report to Congress p. 5

<sup>111</sup> Donfried K. and Gallis P. (2000) “European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union” CRS Report to Congress

<sup>112</sup> Sloan, S.R., (1995), “Nato’s Future: Beyond Collective Defense”, Institute for National Strategic Studies; Washington

With this changing perspective, the European partners started to face certain difficulties. They had difficulties in following the US global strategy. Right about in the same period, an important and eye-catching development was the integration of fifteen newly democratized European nations to the EU. The European experience of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and conflicts in Kosovo and Bosnia have made the Europeans realize that they need to improve their defense capabilities, in order to be able to take care of the problems in their back yards with in mind the changing and more global perspective of NATO on crisis management and peacekeeping. European countries realized that they should to be able to act without the US.<sup>113</sup>

However, if EU becomes an economic, political and military giant, the US will need to give up its hegemonic pretensions and tutelage. This causes some problems for those in the US who take US leadership for granted.<sup>114</sup>

As mentioned before in the post cold war era the perceptions and strategic interests of NATO have changed considerably. Now there is a diverge of interests within the alliance regarding which area NATO should preoccupy in respect to is out of region agenda. Also at the NATO Summit in Washington in 1999, the US declared its intentions of widening NATO's geographic scope and extending its functional responsibilities. Secretary of State at the time Madeline Albright, former commented "NATO should be a force for peace from the Middle East to Central Africa". This

---

<sup>113</sup> Missiroli, A., (2002), "EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP", EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris Carfax Publishing

<sup>114</sup> Trevor C. Salmon, Alistair J. K. Shepherd, (2003) "Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?" Lynne Rienner Publishers

resulted in discomfort in European capitals. Unlike the US, which has assumed global responsibilities for itself, European countries do not have collective defense commitments outside NATO. They think about security in a continental perspective rather than global.<sup>115</sup>

The core mission of the alliance during the cold war had been the collective defense of the member states, as spelled out in the Article 5. However, the operations conducted out of area have been NATO's main activities since the end of the cold war. These new responsibilities were recognized in 1991 but still did not take place in the strategic concept. There were doubts about if NATO was suitable for such a identity. What changed this was NATO's exclusive command of implementation force (IFOR) operations in Bosnia and stabilization force (SFOR) operations in Serbia and KFOR operations in Kosovo. However there are still different opinions within the alliance regarding the non-Article 5 missions. The UK and US propose their full acceptance as a core function of the organization. On the other hand most European governments prefer to look at it from a more limited approach. Different parties within NATO look at the situation differently so Americans say that these missions are "crisis response operations" which is an activist approach, Germans call them "peace support missions" meaning that such missions would only be used to support a peace agreement and French say that they are crisis management and peacekeeping missions implying that the missions must be tied to a United Nations mandate.<sup>116</sup>

---

<sup>115</sup> Sloan, S.R., (1995), *Nato's Future: Beyond Collective Defense*, (Institute for National Strategic Studies; Washington)

<sup>116</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9602-5.htm>, Accessed on 17/04/2004

One of the most striking features of the changing NATO alliance was the integration of former Warsaw pact countries to the organization. Actually this process started with the Partnership for Peace (PFP) process in 1994. PFP was a tool for engaging non-members, developing relations with them. PFP promotes increased interoperability and multi nationality. It has extended its cooperation to 25 non-NATO countries and is fostering contacts in the defense support community as well as in the civil emergency, military and defense establishments.<sup>117</sup>

Another factor in today's world is that the interests of the US and the EU started to differ from each other and because of that there is differing views on NATO enlargement. For example the US is developing good bilateral ties with these states, while encouraging greater NATO involvement however Europeans have different priorities. The reason for the US to become that interested in Central Asia and the Caucasus is involvement of US oil companies in this region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In US perceptions, Turkey holds an important and strategic position in the region. European commercial and military involvement in Central Asia and Caucasus is not as deep as that of the US and of Turkey. For example, France for historical and strategic reasons, has been more concerned with North Africa placing more emphasis on NATO's Mediterranean dialogue in 1997 and the Barcelona Process in the EU side. This is reflected in growing aid patterns by France to the North African countries. Germany

---

<sup>117</sup> Francois I., (2000) "Partnership: one of NATO's fundamental security tasks", NATO review Vol. 48, No. 1, p. 27-30

has been preoccupied with developments in Eastern Europe, while the UK has paid special attention to the Baltic States.<sup>118</sup>

As told before crisis management has become one of the most important threats to World peace and international order. At first such situation occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as you know in the heart of Europe. At the time neither UN's nor WEU's efforts were even close to being enough to settle down the crisis.

In Rome, 1992, Council of Ministers' declaration of Former Yugoslavia condemned the extremely grave situation in former Yugoslavia and especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina they expressed dismay at continuing acts of aggression and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at the unacceptable practice of "ethnic cleansing" as well as the repeated gross violations of human rights. However in spite of all these going on crimes against the Muslim population, they were contended with calling all parties to respect the principles and decisions agreed at the London Conference and to work with the UN and EC special envoys to seek a peaceful and negotiated settlement to the problems of former Yugoslavia.<sup>119</sup>

Ministers also reaffirmed the need for strict compliance with all relevant UNSC Resolutions and stressed that violations of those Resolutions would call for consideration of further measures by the UN Security Council.

What WEU did was limited to carrying out operations with its warships and aircraft and in close cooperation with NATO to monitor at sea compliance with the

---

<sup>118</sup> NATO's mixed signals in Caucasus and Central Asia', Op.cit, p 136.

<sup>119</sup> Council of Ministers, (1992)," Declaration on Former Yugoslavia", Rome

embargo established by UN Security Council Resolutions 713 and 757 and helping to UNPROFOR in the protection and delivery of humanitarian assistance to the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This was the point where WEU member states decided to study the possibility and requirements for the promotion of safe areas for humanitarian purposes.<sup>120</sup>

#### **4.2 Changing Definition of Threats**

The transformation of the European security space after 1989 reintroduced a question not asked after 1947: “Who is threatened by whom?” The events of September 11 temporarily provided an answer to that question for most Americans and Europeans. The tragedies in New York and Washington in combination with the considerable success of the US military campaign in Afghanistan demonstrate the continuing utility of military force. Yet there is presently neither a satisfactory typology of the security threats confronting Europe nor a conceptual consensus on either the content, form or agents of the threats posed. There is disagreement on what constitutes a security threat (content), the way in which threats are manifested (form), or the source of threat (agency). This conceptual dilemma has been driven in large part by the expansion of the security agenda, particularly by the efforts to include and account for the problem posed by “economic” security in the post-cold period.<sup>121</sup>

---

<sup>120</sup> Ibid

<sup>121</sup> Krichner E., Sperling J., (2002) “The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence” European Foreign Affairs Review

Prior to the end of the Cold War, the problem of economic security was treated as an adjunct to the more central problem of military security in the academic literature. Prior to September 11, many security analysts were conceptually hemmed in by a preoccupation with the interstate violence. Yugoslavia crisis constitutes an example to that.<sup>122</sup>

The complexity of the new security environment is compounded by the emergence of the new security agenda. The new security agenda has three identifiable and separable elements. The first element reflects a concern over the ability of the state to protect the social and economic fabric of society. This element is directly concerned with the ability of the state to sustain its legitimacy and the cohesion of society in the face of non-territorial threats to its security. The second element reflects the concern with the ability of a state to act as an effective gatekeeper between desirable interactions like trade and capital flows and undesirable interactions like drug trafficking or other manifestations of organized crime. The third element reflects the concern with the ability of the state in cooperation with others to foster a stable international economic and political environment in order to reinforce cooperation in the military sector as well as to extract the welfare gains of openness. State remains the primary respondent to security threats, but leaves undetermined the sources and targets of those security threats of the range of strategies adopted to meet those threats. Such a formulation has three advantages. First it recognizes the multiple sources of threat in the transformed European state system. Second, it retains the key assumption that the state performs

---

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

specific functions for which it is uniquely positioned to undertake and which sustain the state's legitimate monopoly over violence. Third it leaves open the question as to whether states must pursue multilateral solutions to meet these new security threats, because states have been compromised by the expanding scope and intensity of interstate interactions. So according to this new targets and agents of threat in the post-cold war era, can not be restricted to the traditional concern over territorial integrity, defense and deterrence.<sup>123</sup>

However, the military dimension remains critical for resolving the security challenges facing Europe. Instead, the security requirements of post-cold war European security demand a broader, holistic definition of the relationship between the new and traditional conceptualizations of security; and that the challenges of the new security agenda be fully anticipated by the institutional innovation and adaptation currently underway in Europe.

Threats can no longer be disaggregated into the capabilities and intentions of states. Rather security threats have now acquired a system-wide significance that requires an alternative conceptualization. Security does not mean the same old territorial integrity or the protection of 'national interest'. Because this kind of an attitude excludes threats made directly towards the social fabric of both domestic and international societies. A key characteristic of the Westphalian state is its territoriality. Territoriality is a hard shell protecting states and societies from the external threats and environment as described by John H. Herz. However, it has lost much of its significance

---

<sup>123</sup> Ibid

in the contemporary European state system. States no longer enjoy the luxury of immunity to external penetration.<sup>124</sup>

Also of course with this our understanding of threats along with power changes. The boundaries between states have become increasingly blurred and this suggests strongly that the new security threats may operate along channels that are no way similar to the traditional threats posed to the territorial state.

The interaction of European states increased progressively in the post-cold war era. The increasing economic, normative and political interdependence between them makes cooperative outcomes more likely and reinforces the emergence of a collective identity, which reshapes both interests and threats within a collective framework.<sup>125</sup>

This collectivity suggests that a domestic disturbance in any of the European states like ethnic strikes, environmental degradation or criminalization of national economies or weak state structures, could also disrupt the stability of neighboring state or the system itself.

Conflicts in southeastern Europe and the Balkans initiated not only repeated NATO interventions in the area, but also led to the EU-sponsored Stability Pact in 2001, which was specifically designed to redress the projection of domestic disequilibria into the European security space. Contemporary Europe may thus present us with a Kantian paradox: high levels of interaction density in combination with weak state structures,

---

<sup>124</sup> Ibid

<sup>125</sup> Sperling J. (2000) "Two Tiers Or Two Speeds?: the European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO" Manchester University Press

underdeveloped civil societies and contingent membership in international and integrative institutions, present multiple mechanisms of diffusion that facilitate the translation of domestic disturbances into system-wide threats.<sup>126</sup>

New threats can be defined, as it exists only if the threat posed to national, societal or systemic security is one of high intensity. The intensity of a threat is determined by five variables: the specificity of the threat, the closeness of the threat in time and space, the high probability of the threat being realized and the seriousness of consequences for the state, society or system.<sup>127</sup>

The solution to the problems posed by this new security agenda could take any number of forms. A first approach would be maintaining international organizations like NATO by those who aim at the continuation of NATO as a security organization.

The threats posed to the contemporary European state system cannot be reduced to a state-centric security calculus where the state is both subject and object of the analysis. The state is only one agent and target of security threats. Non-state actors play an important role as agents of insecurity, and security is sought for society, the state and the environment, it is embraced by international society. But of course conflicts that may occur and have occurred between states in Europe pose clear and present danger to the stability of the European system.

---

<sup>126</sup> Baylis, J., (1998), "European Security in the Post-Cold War Era: The Continuing Struggle Between Realism and Utopianism" European Security, vol. 7, no. 3

<sup>127</sup> Emil K., James S. (2002) "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence" European Foreign Affairs Review

The new security threats against the state are indirect rather than direct. They are generally aimed at society and threaten the social contract instead the state's ability to govern.

We can summarize the threats posed to European security space as follows: A nuclear threat, terrorism against state structures, Narcotics trafficking, ethnic conflict, macroeconomic destabilization, general environmental threats, specific environmental threats, cyber warfare of cyber vandalism against commercial structures, cyber warfare against defense structures, migratory pressures, a biological or chemical attack<sup>128</sup>

Only two of these threats fall into the category of traditional security threats. First two of the list, cyber warfare against state structures and a nuclear attack, in which both the agent and target is a state. On the other hand criminalization of economies, narcotics trafficking, general threats to the environment, cyber warfare against commercial structures and migratory pressures constitute the largest category of threats in the new security agenda, where agency is a non-state actor and the target is the society itself. The second largest group of threats is constituted by those threats that where agency is a non-state actor but the state itself is the target. These may be nuclear attacks, ethnic conflict, and cyber warfare against defense structures and terrorism against state structures. The least largest group is the one where state is the agent and society is the

---

<sup>128</sup> Sperling J., Krichner E. (1997) "Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economics Cooperation"

target of the state. It includes specific environmental threats and the consequences of macroeconomic destabilization.<sup>129</sup>

Here the question of “how these security threats should be met by the European states?” comes into mind. There is common consensus that states are more likely to achieve their security goals within multilateral institutions like NATO and EU.

Official documents and academic literature suggest that there is a convergence around the redefinition of security in the Atlantic area. It is evident that there has been a change in the target and agency of security threats and the fact that multilateral rather than national security strategies are more likely to produce an optimal outcome. The responses to the September 11, a terrorist attack supports this assessment. It maybe argued that, September 11 and the war in Afghanistan represents the historical milestone of the changing definition of threats facing whole world and the relationship between the two sides of Atlantic.<sup>130</sup>

September 11 attack on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon has underlined the point that national borders do not constitute a wall of total security anymore. It also pointed out the fact of changing nature of the security threats posed to the countries of the Atlantic area. As mentioned before, it is not likely that these new security threats may be faced unilaterally because neither the military nor the traditional economic means are very effective in coping with such problems. Because of all these, multilateral

---

<sup>129</sup> ibid

<sup>130</sup> Dershowitz A. M., (2003) “Why Terrorism Works: understanding the threat, responding to the challenge” Yale University Press

institutions seem to be the solution to these new threats. We see that by the end 20<sup>th</sup> century all the states that reasonably can be assumed to occupy a part of Europe have claimed the right to belong to either NATO or the EU or both.<sup>131</sup>

#### **4.3 Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations in post-2001**

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, European countries became more aware of the fact that same thing could happen to them. They too believed that the overthrow of Taliban in Afghanistan by the US led war, would make Europe a safer place.

Yet by the end of 2002 the US and Europe seemed further apart than they were before the destruction of the World Trade Center. There were certain disagreements about foreign and defense policies such as the Iraqi War and the Israeli-Palestinian dispute.

European leaders have become frustrated by the tendency of US to act without consulting allies. The same thing happened before in the military campaign in Afghanistan. The US by acting on its own in many cases (Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine conflict, Iraq War) actually, violated the Kyoto protocol, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the International Criminal Court and an enforcement mechanism for the Biological Weapons Convention. This is of course was not welcomed by the European allies whom actually wanted to do everything in accordance with the treaties and international organizations and also avoiding the use of hard power as much as possible which seems to be directly the opposite of US foreign policy. At the moment US is for

---

<sup>131</sup> Ibid

deploying hard sort of power rather than the softer ones like peacekeeping, economic aid and other contributions to nation building.<sup>132</sup>

The tension between the US and the EU has increased in last years. Max Boot a respected analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations criticizes Europe for being too ignorant towards what is going on in the world. He said that

Europe has a long history of appeasing terrorists and rogue rulers, from Mohamar Gadhafi to Saddam Hussein and that they felt free to ignore the threat from Iraq because they got into the habit of outsourcing their protection to the US, on issue after issue, America acts Europe acts up...The Europeans have adopted the attitude of a petulant 16 year old toward his parents. Oh well, that's what the Americans get for being the grown-up in this relationship.<sup>133</sup>

Well how did this come to be? Why have transatlantic relations become so troubled?

With the end of the Cold War era, attention shifted from Europe to the global arena where Americans and Europeans often disagree.

What they differ in is the nature and urgency of the problems in addition to deciding what sort of strategy should be used in dealing with those problems. The choices being either hard security versus soft security or unilateral approach versus multilateral approach.

September 11 clearly surfaced out these differences. Because with the terrorist attacks, world focused mainly on the global war against terrorism. This reduced America's willingness to consult allies. On the other hand, most Europeans do not feel at

---

<sup>132</sup> Goodmand M. A, Eisendrath C. R. "Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives Are Putting the World at Risk" Prometheus Books.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid

war. They worry about what they regard as an American tendency to reduce complex global problems to the neat template of the war against terror. Thus many Europeans criticized President Bush's famous "Axis of Evil" speech (of January 2002) for conflating terrorism with weapons proliferation. It is important to admit that they both are serious problems however terrorism and weapons proliferation are analytically different and should be dealt with different policy responses.<sup>134</sup>

If looked at the current problems in the world and the way the US and the EU both look at them, it will be a little easier to understand their diverging points of view.

One of the major places of conflict in today's world is Middle East. The fight between Israel and Palestine has been going on for a long time. The so-called "Quartet" consisting of Secretary of State Colin Powell, Kofi Annan from UN, Javier Solana from EU and Igor Ivanov from Russia have just about succeeded in maintaining a common front. They are determined that what should take place is an exchange of land for peace. However, differences among the US Administration itself weakened the effectiveness. One of the important issues that is influencing the policies on either side of the Transatlantic is public opinion. Public opinion on both sides care very much about this conflict but also thinks differently about what should be done.<sup>135</sup>

Europeans look at the situation from a different angle. They think that the aggressive response of the government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to the suicide bombings has made the situation much worse and that the US is not putting enough

---

<sup>134</sup> Emil K., James S. (2002) "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence" European Foreign Affairs Review

<sup>135</sup> Charles G. (2003), *Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations* [www.weltpolitik.net](http://www.weltpolitik.net)

pressure on Sharon to negotiate a peace settlement. Many Americans on the other hand support Sharon in his refusal to negotiate with Palestinians; so long that Israel is the victim of suicide bombings.

When public opinion takes interest in a foreign policy issue, it is most probably to influence politicians. On the European side, it affect resulted in the European Parliament passing a non-binding motion call for sanctions against Israel in 2004, while on the other side, Israel lobby forced George Bush to back down after he had told Prime Minister Sharon to withdraw Israeli forces from Palestinian lands “without delay”. So as more public opinion influences foreign policy on the two sides of the Atlantic the harder it becomes for senior politicians in the EU and the US to maintain a common point of view on Israel-Palestine issue.

When we look at the Iraq War, it is seen that the US and Europe had very different opinions. Most European leaders did not agree that Iraq was as big a danger to world peace as Al Qaeda. Unlike Bush and his advisors, they thought that containment and deterrence could prevent Saddam from using his weapons of mass destruction against people outside Iraq. They also feared that a war against Iraq would absorb energy and effort from the war against terrorism.<sup>136</sup>

What Europe must do is to improve their military capabilities. They need to spend more money on capabilities. EU should also overhaul the institutions of their foreign and defense policy so that the EU would become a more effective and coherent external actor. In the next chapter, EU’s effects on security issues and the steps they have taken in this area will be discussed.

---

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

## CHAPTER 5

### THE EU AS A SECURITY ACTOR

Creation of the European Union had a great impact on bringing peace and stability to Europe for the first time in their history.

Now European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to cooperation through common institutions. The process of being a member to the EU has secured a smooth transformation. Because over this period the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has transformed authoritarian regimes into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements have greatly contributed to Europe's peace.

However Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war is in fact still in question. Over the last decades we see that most conflicts have a tendency of being within rather than between states. Of course all of these conflicts have resulted in civilian casualties.

According to the European Security Strategy, which was adopted by the EU heads of state and government at the European Council meeting in December 2003, the EU as a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world's Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the EU is inevitably a global player.<sup>137</sup> Also EU High representative for the CFSP Javier

---

<sup>137</sup> A Secure Europe in A Better World, Brussels 2003

Solana has frequently said that Europe has a global strategic responsibility because of the size and economic power of the EU.

In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. Also the increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes it a more credible and effective actor. According to the European Strategy again, Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.<sup>138</sup>

What the post Cold War era introduced to the international environment was more and more open borders and also new types of internal and external security issues. In a way open borders are good for many people because for most of new independent countries, this meant free flow of trade and investment, development of technology and the spread of democracy but on the other hand, it increased the scope of non-state groups to play a part in international affairs.

Security is a must in order for development to take place. It is also a fact that some regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, and as a result in insecurity and poverty. Europe is big dependent and this is a great concern for European countries at the moment.

With the changing definition of threat, Europe is no longer subject to any attack or aggression, however it is in fact subject to new threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. As mentioned before, terrorism, proliferation of weapons of

---

<sup>138</sup> European Security Strategy, Brussels 12 December 2003

mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure, and organized crime are some of these new threats.

Because of these new developments in the international arena, EU realized that it is necessary to think globally and act locally. As a result the EU came up with three strategic objectives. Addressing the threats, building security in their neighborhood and establishing an international order that is based on effective multilateralism.<sup>139</sup>

It has responded after September 11 with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defense.

It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further program of action, which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions.<sup>140</sup>

The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering

---

<sup>139</sup> Baylon, A.D. and Whiteley, C., (eds.) (2000), *On the Path to Peace In Europe and Beyond* Strategic Decisions Press, USA

<sup>140</sup> Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference (24 April - 19 May 2000), New York Programme of Action on Nuclear Disarmament

democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organized crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organized crime within the EU.<sup>141</sup>

Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate worldwide: their activities in central or Southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Also global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world.

After the end of Cold War, European Union realized that the common threat of invasion was no longer valid and instead with the new kinds of threats, the first line of defense will often be abroad. So this also means that the EU in order to protect itself against all those new threats should be able act before a crisis occurs. Of course only military means are not enough in dealing with these new dangers the world is facing. Each requires a mixture of instruments.

For example proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, and judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations.<sup>142</sup>

---

<sup>141</sup> <http://www.libertysecurity.org/article986.html>

<sup>142</sup> European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003

Another policy of the EU in order to maintain its security is to make sure that countries on its borders are well governed. Neighboring countries with problems such as violent conflicts, organized crime, exploding population growth, all constitute problems for Europe. Integration of these countries to the EU is a solution however it also has a disadvantage of extending the Union's borders towards the troubled hot spots of the world. To eliminate disadvantage Europeans has developed the "Barcelona Process". In 1995, The Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was held. It was the beginning of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. It is a wide framework of political, economic and social relations between the EU Member States and the partner countries.<sup>143</sup>

The latest EU enlargement, on May 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004, has brought two partner countries Southern Cyprus and Malta into the EU. The other 10 Mediterranean Partners are Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey.

Barcelona Process is crucial regarding the foundations of the relationship between the EU and the Mediterranean countries. The three objectives of the partnership are

- Definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue.

---

<sup>143</sup> Baylon, A.D. and Whiteley, C., (eds.) (2000), *On the Path to Peace In Europe and Beyond* Strategic Decisions Press, USA

- Construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area.
- Rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies.<sup>144</sup>

In addition to these there are two other complementary dimensions to Barcelona Process, which are bilateral and regional dimensions. Bilateral dimension is the fact that the EU carries out a number of activities bilaterally with each country. In accordance with the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements, the Union negotiates with the Mediterranean Partners individually. On the other hand the regional dimension represents regional cooperation, it has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many Mediterranean Partners while it emphasizes the national complementarities. Today financial contribution to the Mediterranean region by the EU has reached 17.7 billion Euros since 1974.<sup>145</sup>

Economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts are a part of the Mediterranean area. However the EU has to be in a constant engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. Also because of the interests in that area, broader engagement with the Arab World should also be developed.

---

<sup>144</sup> [http://europa.eu.int/comm/external\\_relations/euromed/](http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/), accessed on 05/05/2005.

<sup>145</sup> Batt J., Missiroli A., Lynch D., Ortega M., Triantaphyllou D. (2003) "Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe"(2003) Institute for Security Studies

Stability in those areas is crucial for the EU. Because of that resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict has a strategic priority. Without this there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved.<sup>146</sup>

EU's policy towards the international arena is effective multilateralism and for an effective multilateralism a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is a must.

The EU has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. The Union spends more than 160 billion Euros on defense and as a result this should be used in a way to be more active in pursuing the strategic objectives.

The EU's objective is to be able to act before countries deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union, which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one, which carries greater political weight. Now the operations conducted by ESDP under EU will be explored in more detail.

## **5.1 EU OPERATIONS**

### **EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina started on 1 January 2003. It followed UN's International Police Task Force. The importance of this mission for the EU was that it was its first civilian crisis management operation.

---

<sup>146</sup> Charles G. (2003), *Security Challenges in Transatlantic Relations* [www.weltpolitik.net](http://www.weltpolitik.net)

The objective of EUPM was to establish sustainable policing arrangements by monitoring, mentoring and inspection activities. Thirty-three countries participate in this mission, which are Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, Turkey, Ukraine, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland and UK.<sup>147</sup>

The mission is established for a three-year duration and its annual budget is 38 million euros of which 20 million euros came from the Community budget.

The EUPM was established by a decision of the Council of the EU on 11 March 2002. The establishment of the mission following on from the UN has been endorsed by both the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) Steering Board and the UN Security Council Resolution 1396 of 5 March 2002.<sup>148</sup>

The EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina represents further tangible evidence of the development of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) and of the EU's contribution to the international community's efforts to promote stability and security. It was the first ESDP operation launched by the EU in 2003.<sup>149</sup>

### CONCORDIA

---

<sup>147</sup> Osland K. M. (2004) "EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina" Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

<sup>148</sup> McCarthy, J., (1993), "The Use of Military Force in Bosnia" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

<sup>149</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en), Accessed on 23/05/2006

On March 31<sup>st</sup> of 2003, the European Union took over from NATO the lead of the international military operation in Macedonia. It was called Concordia. The significance of this operation was that it was the first military operation conducted by the EU. Following the invitation of the Macedonian authorities and NATO's decision to terminate Operation Allied Harmony, this was the first EU-led operation using NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin Plus arrangements. It was initially expected to last for a period of six months, however it was agreed by the Council on 21 July to extend it for an additional period until 15 December 2003, in line with the request made by the Macedonian government to the European Union.<sup>150</sup>

As mentioned above the operation made use of NATO assets and capabilities, which was made possible by the completion of work on EU-NATO arrangements. About 400 military personnel were engaged in this operation. Fourteen non-EU countries, which are Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, participated in this operation alongside thirteen EU Member States. A Committee of Contributors (CoC) was set up for the operation. The establishment of CoC and involvement of non EU NATO countries to the decision making process was one of the most important milestones in the ESDP process. The budget for the common costs related to the operation amounted to 6.2 million euros and was managed through a specific financial mechanism. Non-common costs were met directly by participating countries on a "costs lie where they fall" basis.

---

<sup>150</sup> [www.pfp.ethz.ch](http://www.pfp.ethz.ch), Accessed on 10/05/2006

The main aim of the operation was to contribute further to a stable secure environment and to allow the implementation of the August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. The operation contributed to the efforts to achieve a peaceful, democratic and prosperous country, as part of a region of stable countries, where an international security presence is no longer needed.<sup>151</sup>

Concordia is part of the European Union's overall commitment in assisting the efforts of the Government of Macedonia to move closer towards EU integration. It represents further tangible evidence of the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and of the EU's contribution to the international community's efforts to promote stability and security. It was the second ESDP operation launched by the EU in 2003.<sup>152</sup>

### ARTEMIS

The Council adopted on June 12<sup>th</sup> 2003 a decision to launch the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The operation was called "Artemis". The significance of Artemis is that it was the first military operation conducted by the EU outside of Europe.

This decision follows the adoption by the Council on 5 June 2003 of a Joint Action on the EU military operation in the DRC. On this occasion, Javier Solana, EU High Representative for CFSP noted:

---

<sup>151</sup> <http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/Concordia%20and%20BP-NN%20v5n8.PDF> , Accessed on 31/06/2005

<sup>152</sup> Mace C. (2004) "Operation Concordia: Developing a European Approach to crisis management" Routledge

"The European Union is ready to face this important challenge. I want to thank all concerned for their efforts to make sure that we were able to react rapidly and flexibly to the UN Secretary-General's call, as well as all contributors to the operation for their generosity and in particular France for taking the lead. No one underestimates the difficulty of the mission. But we are determined to succeed in helping the UN overcome the current humanitarian and security crisis in Bunia."

Artemis was an EU-led military operation which was conducted in accordance with the mandate set out in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1484 (2003). This Resolution authorizes the deployment until 1 September 2003 of an interim emergency multinational force in Bunia (DRC). Under Resolution 1484, the aim of this multinational force was:

- To contribute to the stabilization of the security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia;
- To ensure the protection of the airport, the internally displaced persons in the camps in Bunia and, if the situation requires it, to contribute to the safety of the civilian population, United Nations personnel and the humanitarian presence in the town.

ARTEMIS is a further evidence of the development of the European security and defense policy (ESDP) and of the EU's contribution to the international community's efforts to promote stability and security. It was the third ESDP operation launched by the EU in 2003.<sup>153</sup>

---

<sup>153</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies.

## ALTHEA

According to the Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP of 12 July 2004, European Union decided on 12 July 2004 to conduct a military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). This operation was called Althea. Long term and medium term objectives of this operation was to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress towards EU integration by contributing to a safe and secure environment with the objective of signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). At the end bringing EU's executive role in peace implementation to an end and a gradual transfer of ownership to Bosnia and Herzegovina authorities will take place. Long-term objective on the other hand is to create a stable, viable, peaceful and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, cooperating peacefully with its neighbors and irreversibly on track towards EU membership.<sup>154</sup>

This EU-led operation will be part of a coherent EU approach. It will add in a significant way to the EU's political engagement, its assistance programs and its ongoing police and monitoring missions with a view to helping Bosnia and Herzegovina make further progress towards European integration in the context of the Stabilization and Association Process.

The decision by the EU to launch Althea followed the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation. Operation Althea will be carried out with NATO assets

---

<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

and capabilities, on the basis agreed with NATO ("Berlin Plus"). EUFOR took over the operation from SFOR on February 2<sup>nd</sup>, 2004.<sup>155</sup>

### EUPOL PROXIMA

The EU established a police mission in Macedonia in line with the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001). This operation was launched in line with the invitation of Macedonia's Prime Minister on 16 September 2003, for the EU to assume responsibility for an enhanced role in policing and to deploy a EU Police mission.<sup>156</sup>

This operation was carried on in a close relationship with the country's authorities. The objective of this operation was to assure the consolidation of law and orders, including the fight against organized crime, the practical implementation of the comprehensive reform of the Minister of Interior, including the police, manage the operational transition towards, and the creation of a border police, as a part of the wider EU effort to promote integrated border management, help the local police build in confidence within the population and to enhance cooperation with neighboring States in the field of policing.<sup>157</sup>

Proxima was over all a part of the European Union's commitment to assisting the efforts of the Government of Macedonia to move closer towards EU integration. It represents further tangible evidence of the development of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) and of the EU's contribution to the international community's

---

<sup>155</sup> <http://www.euforbih.org/history/history.htm>, Accessed on 25/08/2006

<sup>156</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=584&lang=en](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=584&lang=en), Accessed on 12/04/2006

<sup>157</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies.

efforts to promote stability and security. Proxima is the fourth ESDP operation launched by the EU in 2003.

#### EU RULE OF LAW MISSION TO GEORGIA

##### EUJUST THEMIS

With the decision of the Joint Council decision on 28 June 2004, the EU has decided to launch an EU Rule of Law Mission to Georgia. This operation was called EUJUST Themis. This operation is special in a way that it is the first Rule of Law Mission launched by the EU in the context of the ESDP.<sup>158</sup>

This operation started on 16 July 2004. This operation was estimated to last 12 months. The main idea behind this operation is to provide assistance to the Georgian authorities in addressing the urgent challenges in areas such as criminal justice system and help the development of a coordinated overall approach to the reform process in judicial and anti-corruption matters.

“Strengthening the rule of law” was defined as one of four priority areas in which the EU decided to establish capabilities in civilian ESDP. This decision was taken at the Feira European Council in 2000 in order to affect and assist further developments of democracy and respect for human rights in needing countries. As a result some targets were set out at the Gutenberg European Council in 2001 but these targets were exceeded at the Ministerial Capabilities Commitments Conference in November 2002 by decision

---

<sup>158</sup> [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en), Accessed on 13/04/2006

to provide almost 300 personnel for strengthening the rule of law, including judges, prosecutors, penitentiary experts and other officials.<sup>159</sup>

What is done is that senior and highly experienced personnel supported, mentored and advised Ministers, senior officials and appropriate bodies at the level of central government. These experts were located in Ministers and governmental national capital.<sup>160</sup>

#### EUPOL KINSHASA:

The Council adopted a decision to set up a European Union Police Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo under the European Security and Defense Policy on December 9<sup>th</sup>, 2004. The purpose of the mission is to monitor, mentor and advise on the setting up and the initial running of an Integrate Police Unit (IPU) in Kinshasa in order to ensure that the IPU acts following the training received in the Academy Center and according to international best practices in this field.

EUPOL KINSHASA also aims at enhancing the management capability of the IPU and monitoring, mentoring and advising the operational units in the execution of their tasks. The government of Democratic Republic of Congo has also requested assistance in the area of setting up an Integrated Police Unit to contribute to ensuring the protection of the state institutions and reinforce the internal security apparatus. The

---

<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

<sup>160</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies.

mission will cover a twelve-month period and its cost is approximately 4.3 million euros.<sup>161</sup>

#### ISAF VI

Another important mission that the EUCORPs took part in and that has important implications for the ESDP is ISAF VI.

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF VI) is an operation that is still going on in Afghanistan. It is a UN mandated operation that is conducted by NATO. But for the past six month period that has ended on February 13<sup>th</sup>, the operation was being conducted by the EUCORPs. EUCORPs are one of the main military powers of the EU, which is also available to NATO.

EUCORPs acted under NATO, however this was a very important exercise for EU as far as all the experience gained in deployment, logistics of an army, also command and control of an operation are concerned.<sup>162</sup>

All these missions at the end, especially the three of them conducted in 2003, is a significant breakthrough for ESDP. It showed EU's willingness to have a say in international matters and also that it is capable of reacting to humanitarian and/or security crises and to contribute to peace enforcement, reconstruction and stabilization.

Also another important point about the operations conducted in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia is that they are the proof of EU's commitment towards increasing and maintaining security in its own periphery. Because EU actually took over these operations from international organizations and it proves the commitment by the

---

<sup>161</sup> Ibid

<sup>162</sup> <http://www.isaf6.eurocorps.org/isaf.php>, Accessed on 13/06/2006

member states. The engagement in the Democratic Republic of Congo on the other hand shows the willingness of carrying the ESDP on to a global stage.

In addition to these, the request by the UN for the EU to intervene in Bunia shows that the ESDP was also able to gain respect from important international organizations and considered as an efficient, capable security provider.

Actually as the time period is concerned all these developments has a bad timing because of the US intervention to Iraq. Disagreements between the member states over Iraqi situation, made it really difficult for a common European response.<sup>163</sup> However the situation could be seen from a different angle. Because current ESDP operations show that EU member states continue to share common interests and are willing and successfully implementing common policies through joint actions.

However it is also important to point out that EU missions still do not have a very extended scope and leadership and commitment by major EU member states are still a must.

There is an argument against the ESDP saying that EU does not have military capabilities of its own for its disposal. It is important to point out that it is actually not that necessary either.

It does not have a permanent army at its use, however there are forces to be used in EU-led operations. The permanent arrangements implemented between the EU and NATO increased the Union's operational capabilities.

---

<sup>163</sup> Gordon, P., (1997/98), "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", International Security, vol. 11, no.3

Also there has been a great progress regarding the EU military capabilities since November 2002, through the implementation of the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP).<sup>164</sup>

## **5.2 EU approves anti-terror package**

European Union foreign ministers have unveiled tough measures to prevent terrorist attacks, following the Madrid bombings that killed 202 people in March 2004.

According to the draft declaration EU states are urged to mobilize all their resources, including military ones, to deal with the threat.

The draft also warns the neighboring countries of the risk of losing financial support if they do not do their part to fight terrorism.

The ministers also backed the proposed creation of a new EU anti-terrorism coordinator.

The problem of the EU is that they are really slow. As Jack Straw, UK Foreign Minister said; therefore there is a special responsibility on the countries, which have failed so far implementing measures to get moving.<sup>165</sup>

## **5.3 European Union aggress on Rapid Reaction Force**

Analysts say that this force proves the fact that the EU is getting more serious about contributing to global security. Also the main goal here for the EU is to be able to intervene rapidly in a conflict situation.<sup>166</sup>

---

<sup>164</sup> Schmitt, B. (2005) "European Capabilities Action Plan" Institute for Security Studies

<sup>165</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3555927.stm>, Accessed on 28/07/2005

<sup>166</sup> Preben, B. (2003) "Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy: The Ways and Means of Making It a Reality" Transaction Pub

European Union defense ministers have agreed to set up a military rapid reaction force, to be deployed at short notice to conflicts around the world in 2004.

The force will be in place within three years and will consist of a number of units each made up of 1500 troops. France, Italy, Britain and Spain will each form a unit, and other EU states will be expected to contribute troops. Ministers expect the first of the battle groups to be operational in 2007.<sup>167</sup> The development is part of an EU effort to develop an independent defense capacity that can be deployed outside of US-led NATO missions.<sup>168</sup>

UK Defense Secretary Geoff Hoon said "They are particularly intended for situations where an early intervention with a highly capable battle group-size force could deal with an emerging crisis." Rapid reaction forces could be deployed to fill a gap before UN peacekeepers can be deployed, as a French-led operation did in the Bunia region of eastern Congo in 2004.

Also the establishment of European Defense Agency (EDA) has a very important significance for EU. The European Defense Agency has been created to help EU Member States develop their defense capabilities for crisis-management operations under the European Security and Defense Policy.

The Agency will achieve its goals by:

---

<sup>167</sup> <http://www.europeanvoice.com/current/article.asp?id=27041> , Accessed on 31/03/2006

<sup>168</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4034133.stm> , Accessed on 21/01/2006

- Encouraging EU governments to spend defense budgets on meeting tomorrow's challenges, not yesterday's threats;
- Helping them to identify common needs and promoting collaboration to provide common solutions.

The Agency's success will mean:

- Better military capabilities;
- Stronger European defense industries;
- Better value for European taxpayers.<sup>169</sup>

Since last a few years, the challenge between NATO and the EU is much more visible. In 2004, we see that the international policies of many states in Europe were influenced by political processes that started in 2003. There is a great attempt among transatlantic partners to reduce the damage done to their mutual relationship caused mainly by Iraqi conflict.

The USA still attempts to set the agenda unilaterally however there are also attempts to return towards multilateral policy making means through various institutions.

NATO's efforts to heal the transatlantic split resulted in an expansion of the organization's activities outside its treaty area of operation. Nonetheless, there was continued resistance to making Iraq a NATO operation.<sup>170</sup>

---

<sup>169</sup> <http://www.eda.europa.eu/> , Accessed on 22/12/2005

<sup>170</sup> Eichenberg R. C., (2003), "Having it both ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.67, No. 627-629

It is necessary to overcome the perception that NATO is a forum for taking decisions on operations and restore its role as a central forum for political debate and decision-making. European countries see NATO as an institution mainly in charge of collective defense of its member states within the borders of its member states.

By the adoption of Headline Goal 2010 that provides increased capabilities to be used in crisis management and defense capabilities, the EU proves that the organization is moving towards becoming a credible security actor. Also another factor adding up to this is the launch of European Defense Agency and the gradually putting into practice the battle group concept as well as the EU military mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The European Neighborhood Policy is also improved and EU became closer with some of its neighbors.<sup>171</sup>

All of the 19 conflicts recorded as major armed conflicts, the ones causing over 1000 battle-related deaths in the year 2004 were classified as intra-state conflicts. Only three of these are less than 10 years old, which are the conflict against al-Qaeda, the conflict in Iraq and the conflict in Darfur, Sudan. However with the globalization in progress, intra-state conflicts are increasingly becoming international in nature and in effect. This makes it harder to determine and make a distinction between these conflicts as “internal” or “external”.<sup>172</sup>

---

<sup>171</sup> Lindstrom G. (2006) “The Headline Goal” Institute for Security Studies

<sup>172</sup> “SIPRI” (2005), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Here comes the problem whether NATO or EU should interfere with these or not? In 2004 there were 19 major armed conflicts in 17 locations. The majority of the conflicts were fought in Africa and Asia (six in each region), and three took place in Middle East, one in Europe. All the conflicts were intra-state.

At the end of 2004 over 64 000 military and civilian police personnel and 4000 civilian personnel were deployed in 21 UN missions, arguably putting the UN in danger of overstretching its institutional capacities. At the same time 35 peace missions, with a total of 225,385 military and civilian personnel, were carried out by regional organizations and UN-sanctioned non-standing coalitions of states.<sup>173</sup>

Because of this it became clear that new institutions and bodies are necessary to carry out some crisis-management operations and what first comes to mind is of course the EU. The number of multilateral institutional initiatives focused on the European region has grown recently. There are two identical and in fact challenging initiatives that are being put on by NATO and the EU. NATO at its Istanbul Summit in July 2004 decided to enhance its existing Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative and to launch a new Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. The aim in doing this is to reach out to Arab countries and establish cooperation with each one of them. On the other hand the EU's new Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and Middle East attempts to link economic relations with the promotion of good governance and security related goals such as anti-terrorism and nonproliferation. <sup>174</sup>

---

<sup>173</sup> Ibid

<sup>174</sup> Baylon, A.D. and Whiteley, C., (eds.) (2000), *On the Path to Peace In Europe and Beyond* (Strategic Decisions Press, USA)

## 5.4 Effects of Enlargement

The enlargement of the European Union has been for decades a security policy on one hand because extension of the Union's norms, rules, opportunities and constraints to the applicants has made instability and conflict in the wider region much less likely. It has also helped Europe to overcome the divide that has separated the continent for almost 50 years. On the other hand, the entrants have brought and will bring in interests and skills that broaden the scope of the common external policies. This was the case with the first enlargement of the European Community, which incorporated Britain. Also the Southern enlargements of the 1980s, paved the way to the successful completion of post authoritarian transition to democracy and a significant reinforcement of the Community's presence in the Mediterranean. Finally the 1995 enlargement brought more stability to the Eastern part of the continent and strengthened the Union's drive to cooperate with the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).<sup>175</sup>

The current enlargement, however, is nothing like the previous ones. It is fundamentally different in size, scope and character. It made the EU from a fifteen member state organization one of 25, which meant an %20 increase in population but only a few points of increase in GDP. The number of small member states increased to nineteen from ten. These are countries with a population of five million or less. It is therefore likely to make radical changes in the institutional framework, the policies even

---

<sup>175</sup> Missiroli, A., (2002), "EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP", EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris Carfax Publishing

the nature of the Union. In a Union with more than 20 members, alliances and coalitions may easily shift according to the contingencies and the issues at stake.<sup>176</sup> A particular US worry was in this way. They worried that EU might create a ‘European Caucus’ within NATO. That would be very dangerous for the effective working of NATO.

Of course there are some problems with the adjustments and adaptation of new members to ESDP. For example, ESDP is founded on “Petersberg tasks” now, enshrined in article 17 of the EU Treaty, but does not entail any legal *acquis* to incorporate into national legislation. All applicants from Central Europe reacted late and defensively to its launch in 1999. They hardly understood its rationale and above all, feared that it could undermine NATO’s internal cohesion and drive Americans out of Europe.<sup>177</sup> Because some of the members before their eventual accession to the EU a member suspected that involvement in the ESDP might become as an alternative to future NATO membership or, worse as a consolation prize for not being admitted into the Alliance, which was at the time their main security goal. On the other hand, for those member that were already NATO members, the key issue was that the establishment of a clearly defined relationship with the Alliance where by all relevant decisions would be taken at 15+6 (EU members plus other European Allies). In many ways and with varying emphasis, Budapest, Prague and above all Warsaw considered ESDP acceptable only as European Security Defense Identity (ESDI), under the supervision of NATO. However, ESDP advocates hope that if there is increased coordination between the two

---

<sup>176</sup> O’ Brennan J. (2006) “The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union” Routledge, UK

<sup>177</sup> Missiroli, A., (2002), “EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP”, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris (Carfax Publishing)

organizations in the area of security policy, and once the new member states have found their roles in the EU framework, the remaining skepticism will give way to more acceptance and a stronger commitment to ESDP.<sup>178</sup>

In spite of their relatively short record of freedom of action on the international scene, we see that over the past few years all ten Central Europe member states have been increasingly engaged in peace support operations in the Western Balkans and in Iraq.<sup>179</sup> That also applies to Implementation Force (IFOR) and SFOR (Stabilization Force) since 1996. Of course, their contributions have been limited in absolute numbers and restricted in their functions however they have proved their willingness and ability to participate and perform in article 17 type peace support operations.

Several of the new members have also realized the benefits of pooling military capabilities, of specialization, of multinational complementarity of forces, and of joint procurement projects and recognize that these are the most cost-effective ways of making their own armed forces fit for deployment abroad. If the 25-member EU can rely more on increased coordination in the security and defense sector to create building blocks, the EU will have a good chance of using its huge potential to shape the future of global affairs.<sup>180</sup>

Also with the enlargement, new security problems were introduced to the EU's foreign policy agenda. These include the Cyprus issue, the position of Roma gypsies in

---

<sup>178</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>179</sup> [www.pfp.ethz.ch](http://www.pfp.ethz.ch), Accessed on 10/05/2006

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*

Eastern and Central Europe, the Baltic States' relations with Russia and the movement of the EU's frontier eastwards and its accompanying security threats such as migration and Russian organized crime. The problems, to a great extent, begin and end with "soft security."<sup>181</sup>

In most candidate countries participation in NATO-led or EU-led missions is seen as a driving factor towards some sort of role specialization. Such specialization, of course, is about making virtue out of necessity: financial, technical and human resources are scarce and have to be channeled and focused on viable objectives. This is all the more important since all the countries under consideration are in the process of overhauling and modernizing their military forces; for example some has to get rid of their equipments left over from Warsaw Pact times, especially Bulgaria and Romania. Also, one other aspect is that Slovenia and Baltic States are states with a more recent record of national independence, which means that they have to set up credible forces almost from scratch. So of the 10 Central/Middle European applicants, only the Czech republic, Bulgaria and Romania presently meet the target set by NATO, that is 2% of GDP should be allocated to defense spending. Poland, Lithuania and Slovakia almost attain it and Hungary and Slovenia are making progress in increasing their defense budgets.<sup>182</sup>

Similar constraints apply to the ten candidates' defense procumbent policy proper. While most countries are still substituting upgrading old equipment from the

---

<sup>181</sup> Shea, J.P., (1993), "Meeting the Challenge of Change" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, (National Defense University Press; Washington)

<sup>182</sup> O'Brennan J. (2006) "The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" Routledge, UK

Soviet era the need to become more interoperable with NATO allies and in perspective, EU partners is putting pressure on public budgets and decision-makers. However, as we look at the late years, we see that the trend of American firms winning almost every bid is no longer valid. This was seen as a side effect of those countries' willingness to gain Washington's support in their bids for NATO membership). But now we see that European countries have more of a chance. EU membership had a lot to do with this change however this is two-sided road because this was also what the West European countries actually wanted, to gain this market. Especially Swedish manufacturers in conjunction with British Aerospace and European Aerospace Defense and Space Company (EADS).<sup>183</sup>

Also for the Central European Member States participation in CFSP and ESDP has a significant importance. Because participation means being on an equal footing with the current members in an enlarged Union in which decision-making could become increasingly complicated.

When looked at these "new sovereign countries" we see that they became part of two different enlargements, one of NATO and the other EU. In 1997, we see that these enlargements took divergent paths. NATO's enlargement process was rather quick but selective next to the EU's slower process. This of course, made a positive effect on Central Middle European countries towards Washington. However later, the two

---

<sup>183</sup> Gordon A., (2001), "Fortress America in a changing transatlantic defense market" in *Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic defense market* edited by Burkard Schmitt, institute for security studies, WEU; Paris

processes became more similar. The EU started thinking also strategically and weighing the geopolitical and security implications of successive waves of entrants.<sup>184</sup>

With the Union acquiring a more ambitious foreign and security policy, including a defense dimension, NATO's presence has been questioned more and more. The Alliance has first gone to war in Kosovo, then refrained from making serious use of those article 5 guarantees that have long been seen as its main reason for being and now in direction of playing a more global role. Instead of serving two distinct and separate purposes like economic prosperity vs. hard security, the EU and NATO have increasingly covered the same tasks in the same geographical area. CFSP/ESDP lies exactly at the functional juncture of the two organizations this fact was also shown by the competition between the European Rapid Response Force and the NATO Response Force.<sup>185</sup>

For some Europeans, the CFSP and ESDP are part of a natural progression in that process, a complement to Europe's deepening economic and political progress. The coming of age of ESDP, at that moment of the successful launch of the Economic and Monetary Union showed how much Europe was changing. From the standpoint of Eisenhower and Dulles this was triumph, but now the US must face the reality.<sup>186</sup>

This also raises the issue how common the interests of the US and EU are and what the specific interests of the US in Europe are. Until now, it was widely accepted by

---

<sup>184</sup> Rauchhaus R. W., (2001) "Explaining NATO Enlargement" Routledge, UK

<sup>185</sup> Missiroli, A. (2002) "Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?" EU Institute for Security Studies

<sup>186</sup> Trevor C. Salmon, Alistair J. K. Shepherd, (2003) "Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?" Lynne Rienner Publishers

Americans that US well being depended in large measure on what happened in Europe, and that the US needed an economically vibrant and peaceful Europe. This is actually what lies under the belief that transatlantic security is indivisible, and that the US has permanent and vital national interests in Europe.<sup>187</sup>

It is always thought that Americans and Europeans have common interests like democracy, human rights, and the rule of law, a zone of stability with strong economic ties, wealth, prosperity, open markets and investment opportunities and security, including NATO.

Although increasingly it is being pointed out that there are differences coming out from geopolitics, history and culture, economic interests and competition for sales, among other factors, many Americans now believe that the trade, economic and financial disputes across the Atlantic are at least as important as the politico-military ones. They become concerned that the EU is moving toward protection and economic autarky. Some worry that without the glue of external threat, classic trade issues might spill over into the area of security and defense.<sup>188</sup>

Small economic issue can begin to poison the atmosphere, especially in the area of competition. Increasingly at the beginning of the twenty-first century, trade was being raised on nearly every visit between the EU and the US.

The real concern is that some in the EU, especially France, want to build the EU into a genuine counterweight to the US. The US has a historical suspicion of France,

---

<sup>187</sup> Daalder, Ivo H., (2003), "The End of Atlanticism", Survival, 45/2

<sup>188</sup> Trevor C. Salmon, Alistair J. K. Shepherd, (2003) "Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?" Lynne Rienner Publishers

believing that France has a different vision of the future. It believed that France wanted to increase the degree of European military independence from NATO and perhaps compete with the US. This notion implied closer cooperation of the armed forces of Western Europe, separate from NATO structures.

In the next section the future of the European security and NATO will be discussed in more detail.

### **5.5 Future of European Security: Breakthrough or Crises?**

At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, Europe was said to be going back to the dark days of old-style balance of power politics. However actually the new Europe is rather characterized by transnationalism, democratization, interdependence and multilateral cooperation. Traditionally, the EU has been a civilian and economic power rather than a military power. However, now as an international actor the EU is ambiguous. For decades this issue was treated as a taboo by European countries.<sup>189</sup> But now, the movement towards a regulated common European Security and Defense Policy that is separate from the US and the Atlantic Alliance with the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises, seems to be the trend in post 9/11 transatlantic relations.<sup>190</sup> According to Philip H. Gordon:

“If done right, the development of a serious EU defense force could be a good thing for all concerned, reducing American burdens in Europe, making Europe a better and more capable partner and providing a way for Europeans to tackle

---

<sup>189</sup> Daalder, Ivo H., (2003), “The End of Atlanticism”, *Survival*, 45/2

<sup>190</sup> European Council, Cologne 3-4 June 1999. Presidency Conclusions.

security problems where and when the United States cannot or will not get involved. If done badly, however, the EU project risks irrelevance as an empty institutional distraction—or even worse, a step backward toward the situation in the Balkans in the early 1990s, when separate European and American strategies and institutions led to impotence and recrimination.”

The aim of EU with the ESDP is to emerge as an important actor in crisis management and to use it as a tool in humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, which are set out as the Petersberg Tasks. At the beginning especially with the British influence the idea was to avoid detracting from the political primacy of NATO in the field of security and defense while improving the efficiency of European armed forces. The British view was that, an improved European military capacity would preferably be organized within NATO, but would have a clearer European identity within the Alliance. They supported the creation of the PSC, which is the political decision making structure for crisis management operations which could be implemented by a European capacity within the NATO framework, but reluctant on the establishment of an EU Military Staff, which they saw as an unnecessary duplication of NATO’s planning capacity.<sup>191</sup>

However what happened was just the opposite, the European Council decided to give EU the ability to decide autonomously on crisis management operations and the capacity to implement them autonomously if necessary without the necessity to use NATO assets. There are still problems though regarding the implementation of a strategic concept for ESDP because not just the EU but also NATO as well has assumed

---

<sup>191</sup> Smith, S., (2002), “US, Europe and International Security”, Jean Monnet Lecture, University College, Dublin

a new crisis management role. EU keeps repeating that the Union will only implement operations in cases where NATO as a whole is not engaged.<sup>192</sup>

This seems to indicate that the Alliance would have some sort of right of first refusal but as there is no formal division of labor between both organizations, it remains yet unclear which of them will be seized first in the event of a crisis in the European periphery.<sup>193</sup>

On the other hand, we have to keep in mind the fact that decisions in NATO are taken unanimously, which means that the EU has always the power to veto any NATO decision in favor of the EU. As mentioned before US is also afraid of EU creating a European caucus within NATO.

The attitude of the US towards international relations has changed gradually after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The US became more and more unilateral. Some analysts has argued that the world has never known a power such as the United States and that consequently Europe cannot expect the United States to be anything other than a unilateralist power.<sup>194</sup>

However there are two kinds of unilateralism; broad unilateralism which is open to the counsel of allies and capable of adjustment in the light of events and narrow

---

<sup>192</sup> European Council, Goteborg, 15-16 June 2001. Presidency Conclusions. Annex: Presidency report on the European Security and Defense Policy

<sup>193</sup> Sven B. (2002), "In Search of a Strategic Concept for the ESDP", Kluwer Law International

<sup>194</sup> Neil W. (2002) "Whither NATO" Lindley-French

unilateralism which is closed and dismissive of others, meaning a United States that prefers to use its power to export domestic policy rather than construct effective and engaged foreign and security policy. Unfortunately as we look at the developments and the US foreign policy after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, we see that United States has gone through a transformation and became more of a narrow unilateralist super power. However this trend that kind of a narrow concept of engagement does not only undermines the transatlantic security relations but also causes a separation between allies. Also Europeans by reflex, see the imbalance of power across the Atlantic as a problem. The US has started to disengage from the European continent because this type of action also implies that the US is in a strictly patron-client relationship with the European Allies on all levels which is certainly unacceptable by the European countries. But it is also a fact that strong and credible foreign policy must satisfy a few conditions: strong and unequivocal political leadership, operational military capacity and supportive public opinion.<sup>195</sup>

Events that took place in Yugoslavia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq in the last decade have highlighted an increasing gap between the military capabilities of the United States and Europe.

In October 2002, the Convention on the Future of Europe put forward proposals for a “United States of Europe” with national and European citizenship a European President and a European Foreign minister with extensive executive powers modeled on

---

<sup>195</sup> Goodman M. A, Eisendrath C. R. “Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives Are Putting the World at Risk” Prometheus Books

the U.S. Secretary of State.<sup>196</sup> As known Gaullist France has visions of creating a European “hyper power” that can make foreign policy decisions independent of Washington.

Given the new security threats enlargement seems more important to EU than anything else. However, it is for sure that EU enlargement will have the greatest long-term impact on European foreign policy and the European security order.

EU is far more complicated and far-reaching than NATO and because of that EU’s enlargement process is much more slower, more complex and complicated. With the enlargement in order to go any further the relationship between the existing Member States, the new Member States, the EU’s institutions and decision-making procedures have to fundamentally change for ESDP to go any further.

Historical forces are also impacting ESDP process in new ways. US disengagement from Europe has started in early 1990s. The unilateral point of view of Bush administration is another issue. This resulted in greater differences and worsened transatlantic relationship. If we are to ask what the US government expects from the EU? The answer is that President Bush expects Europe to contribute to its defense spending to a much greater extent than at present, and expects this to be done in the context of the Atlantic Alliance under US leadership. The question of US leadership has caused some to say that the EU should “accept the reality of the US presence as a non-

---

<sup>196</sup> <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-023.pdf> , Accessed on 27/03/2006

member member state within the EU”.<sup>197</sup> However, EU plans for an independent ESDP and this is taken by the US as a threat towards its policy hegemony in NATO.<sup>198</sup>

The best words that would define Europe are transnationalism, democratization, interdependence, and multilateral cooperation. Europe has always been seen as a civilian power, which is strong in dealing with welfare generation and economic regulations. However the EU has always been a foreign policy project and in a way always influenced world politics. The movement towards a separate ESDP will be the main tool, as far as influencing the world policy is concerned.

## **5.6 Counter Arguments to ESDP**

If we were to look at some of the counter arguments done towards ESDP, we would see that they point out the fact that EU missions do not have a large scope and they depend heavily on the leadership and commitment on the part of major EU member states. Another problem concerning the ESDP is that, EU does not have any common military capabilities of its own at its disposal.<sup>199</sup>

However, with the establishment of Helsinki Headline Goal, EU countries mainly solved this problem and organized the forces to be made available for EU operations.

---

<sup>197</sup> Trevor C. Salmon, Alistair J. K. Shepherd, (2003) “Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?” Lynne Rienner Publishers

<sup>198</sup> Sloan S., (2000) “The United States and European Defense” WEU Institute for Security Studies

<sup>199</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art2.html>

Two institutional issues are at stake here: One concerns the interaction between national capitals and the EU administration in Brussels, and the other concerns coherence across the EU's institutional pillars. Skeptics argue that gaps in legal provisions and sometimes overlapping competencies of EU institutions will lead to institutional tensions and make the delivery of an effective security policy an impossible undertaking. ESDP proponents, however, are confident that the EU will find ways to adapt its institutional framework and will emerge as a viable strategic actor.<sup>200</sup>

Another argument is the significant command and control capability shortfalls among member states that make the EU rely on NATO during any complex, high-end operation. Even though Berlin plus arrangements were implemented successfully during Concordia however, long term relationship between the two organizations still remain to be vague, also there is an uncertainty about the way a changing EU and a changing NATO will work together in the future according to some parties.<sup>201</sup>

Actually Berlin plus arrangements are perfectly well settled and very clearly cut and the fact that they were tested in EU operations conducted before proves that there were not any problems regarding neither the usage of NATO capabilities in European operation nor the command and control of those operations in the future. Important evidence to this is the EU flag in front of SHAPE, which is NATO's most valuable, headquarter because this actually means that EU has a strategic headquarter that it can command and control its operations from.

---

<sup>200</sup> [www.pfp.ethz.ch](http://www.pfp.ethz.ch)

<sup>201</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies

Moreover, EU operations while said to be important symbolically, are not seen complex operationally. None of the current operations, with the exception of Artemis, pushes EU military capabilities and political will to the limit. In this sense, the EU remains untested across the full spectrum of peace support missions.

Actually the operations conducted means a great deal to the EU as experience. They should also be seen as a starting point.

Another critical factor may soon become the financing of such EU-led operations. To date, in fact, the relevant *acquis* is minimal and the letter of the Treaty (Art.28) is extremely fuzzy: it keeps the door open to different solutions but it separates rigidly operations “having military or defense implications” from purely or mainly civilian ones. In turn, the practice for financing external actions in general has been varied and mostly ad-hoc: the first EU-led operations look no different. However, future peace building tasks are likely to be mixed, encompassing both military and civilian components and involving both EU and national resources. It is also likely that not all (present and future) member states will have the same willingness and ability to participate in them. This is why it would be particularly important to agree on both sustainable budgetary provisions and flexible arrangements based on clear mutual obligations.<sup>202</sup>

EU countries are not only responsible for providing resources for future EU operations but also for current NATO operations. It is true that this may be exhausting and harder for some countries compared to others. On the other hand, it is also a fact that

---

<sup>202</sup> Ibid

operations may bring some advantages such as with the recycling of money, new markets may be provided. This may be encouraging for participant nations.<sup>203</sup>

The differing historical experiences and the differing beliefs about national identity and national interests of the 25 EU member states are another potential impediment to collective security efforts. The two non-aligned northern EU countries Sweden and Finland, for example, have foreign policy traditions that include active participation in peacekeeping missions and a focus on the civilian aspects of crisis management. Sweden, however, deployed Special Forces within the framework of Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). France and the United Kingdom, due to their history and experiences as former colonial powers, share a strategic approach to force projection and might argue for a more global reach for ESDP. To date, the EU has mainly taken over peacekeeping missions in the Western Balkans, and has conducted more civilian and combined missions in other parts of the world since 2005. Projecting power globally, however, will require not only a consensus among the EU member states but also the readiness to meet the military demands of the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Headline Goal 2010. Critics of ESDP argue that these requirements and discrepancies may be too extensive to be bridged at a strategic level, while others point out that the process begun at St Malo and Cologne is irreversible.<sup>204</sup>

---

<sup>203</sup> Helsinki European Council Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999.

<sup>204</sup> O'Brennan J. (2006) "The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union" Routledge, UK

A final element of uncertainty has to do with the openness of ESDP operations to third parties, i.e. non-EU members. The three operations have involved a high degree of third state participation, encompassing both EU acceding or candidate countries and non-European states. The Artemis mission, for example, included South African, Canadian and Brazilian troops. The real limits of third party participation will be tested with regional powers, such as Russia, with which the EU will need to interact should it decide, for example, to deploy a OSCE-mandated peace support operation in Moldova. Arrangements for third party participation were agreed at the Seville European Council, but questions remain: How many troops are acceptable from third states in a EU-mandated operation? How involved may third states become in the development of a concept for operations? How heavy may be a third party's role in daily command and control?<sup>205</sup>

This is also not a serious problem, because the third state participation principles are categorized and to be decided by the EU. The third party involvement in the EU-led operations will provide international legal status and burden sharing for the operation I believe.<sup>206</sup>

---

<sup>205</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies

<sup>206</sup> <http://www.isiseurope.org/ftp/download/ep%20resigned%20to%20limited%20oversight%20of%20esdp%20-%20esr%2016.pdf> , Accessed on 14/11/2006

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

As a conclusion the main developments that took place that have significance for ESDP will be reviewed shortly.

During the Cold War, given the threat from the East, Europe's security remained in the hands of NATO but that did not prevent differences of view between the two sides of the Atlantic, nor it did, specific instances of intra-European cooperation. While the Western European Union certainly constituted a European forum for discussing security questions, its military significance and political role were limited. Later, the threat from the East had disappeared however NATO remained in charge of European defense and discussion of European security was still blocked by historically based divergences between the major members of the Union.<sup>207</sup>

On the one hand, countries, such as the United Kingdom, who were in favor of the Alliance's primacy, while acknowledging the need for greater coordination of foreign policy, were opposed to any transfer of competence in security matters to the Union. On the other hand, France, reasserting its desire to strengthen its relationship with Germany, had suggested raising its military collaboration with its eastern neighbor to a European level. The Maastricht summit has an important significance since the

---

<sup>207</sup> Desmond D., (2004), "Europe Recast: A History of European Union" Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner

second pillar was established there. The Common Foreign and Security Policy, after long negotiations, the perspective that this common policy might in time lead to a common defense was accepted.<sup>208</sup>

However, Balkan wars, first in Bosnia, then in Kosovo, seriously put into question the weak equilibrium of European security. The failure of the Europeans to end the conflict was a serious down fall for the European project, which is based on democratic values that were flouted on its doorstep. As the European partners had failed to produce a common strategy, the former Yugoslavia should have been seen as a sufficiently serious democratic and moral issue for them to set aside individual national interests, their respective inhibitions and institutional shortcomings. The humanitarian management of the conflict was the only common denominator among Europeans, but in that respect, too, Bosnia was a painful experience.

European security was a matter of necessity during the Cold War, however now has become a matter of voluntary national choice. This renewed importance of national sovereignty marked the limits of the institutional changes ratified at Maastricht. At the same time, no individual member state could hope to deal with this type of conflict alone, so it called for a collective response. Efforts, therefore, had to be directed at cooperation on foreign policy while taking into account national prerogatives.<sup>209</sup>

---

<sup>208</sup> Shonfield, A. (1973) "Journey to an Unknown Destination" Harmondsworth: Penguin

<sup>209</sup> Krichner E., Sperling J., (2002) "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence" European Foreign Affairs Review

Here there were critical shortages though; the inadequacy of defense institutions founded on a territorial defense, the lack of professional armed forces, the absence of a common strategic culture and organizations able to anticipate events and, above all, the inability to project significant forces abroad. All these indispensable elements were missing. Europe was not ready to respond to the post Cold War world with the changing sorts of threats, with inadequate defense budgets. But the technology deficit at time between the US and EU also called for a renewed effort in European capabilities. To be effective, diplomacy must be coordinated among the main European partners and be based on a credible ability to use force.<sup>210</sup>

The crisis in Kosovo provided striking confirmation of European weaknesses. The conflict clearly demonstrated that without making an effort to improve its military capabilities, Europe's influence and responsibility would continue to be limited. But influencing America's war strategy was all the more important since Europeans had rightly realized that the subsequent reconstruction and peacekeeping would fall to them in the first instance. The crisis also confirmed both the relevance but also the singular nature of the transatlantic relationship. To improve Europe's military capabilities had become essential however, even before 11 September, the new Bush administration had concluded that Europe was of lesser strategic importance and focused on the main strategic balances in the world. This partial reading of the conflict, and the explicit exclusion of any future NATO operation like that in Kosovo, influenced Washington's views on ESDP. After Kosovo, US misgivings over European integration became more

---

<sup>210</sup> Missiroli A. "Background of ESDP (1954-1999)" Institute for Security Studies

pronounced. Europe and transatlantic relations have thus been profoundly marked by the conflicts in the Balkans. The contrast between American power and Europe's inability to resolve conflicts led to a collective realization of the need to rectify the imbalance between the reality of Europe as an economic power and its potential as a political power. That was precisely the basis of the St. Malo agreement between France and the United Kingdom.<sup>211</sup>

Close cooperation on the ground in Bosnia between British and French troops had cultivated solidarity between the military personnel. All of this led to a noticeable rapprochement between France and the Alliance in 1995. It was a matter of laying down a more balanced and, therefore, healthier basis for the relationship between EU and US. The way to save the Alliance was via Europe. In the eyes of the British, European defense had now acquired real added value. The declaration issued at the St-Malo summit referring to a capacity for autonomous action represents a compromise between these two developments: the St-Malo declaration should be seen as a turning point in ESDP. The core of the compromise lay in the effort made to improve Europeans' military capabilities and their intention to take on Petersberg missions. The Kosovo conflict opened the way to a rapid Europeanisation of the St-Malo agreement.<sup>212</sup>

At the June 1999 European Council in Cologne, member states stated their determination that the European Union shall play its full role on the international stage

---

<sup>211</sup> Sorin L., (1997). "Attitudes Toward European Security" American Diplomacy.

<sup>212</sup> Heisbourg, F., (2000), *European Defense: Making It Work*, Institute for Security Studies; Paris

and to that end, they intended to give the European Union the necessary means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding a common European policy on security and defense. The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. To achieve that several specific institutional changes were made such as the nomination of Javier Solana to the post of High Representative for CFSP, who is also Secretary-General of the European Council, creation of a Political and Security Committee, creation of a European Military Committee, creation of a European Military Staff and the inclusion of WEU functions necessary for the European Union concerning Petersberg missions.<sup>213</sup>

These institutional changes decided at Cologne, elaborated at Helsinki and finalized at Santa Maria da Feira, were to be agreed at Nice in December 2000. Also decided at Nice was the creation of autonomous agencies that would incorporate within the EU the WEU structures dealing with ESDP, i.e. the Satellite Center and the Institute for Security Studies. These two agencies were officially created by European Council Joint Actions in July 2001.<sup>214</sup>

---

<sup>213</sup> Trevor C. Salmon, Alistair J. K. Shepherd, (2003) "Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?" Lynne Rienner Publishers

<sup>214</sup> Rutten M. (2001) "From St. Malo to Nice European defense: core documents" Institute for Security Studies Western European Union

The June 2000 Feira European Council listed the four priority areas in which the Union intended to acquire concrete capabilities: the police, strengthening the rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. Member states undertook to supply police forces for international missions. Rapid progress was made and member countries' contributions were greater than the number requested. On 18 February 2002, the Union announced that it was ready, as from 1 January 2003, to take over from the UN's International Police Task Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In December 1999, scarcely a year after St-Malo, the Helsinki summit set out the ESDP process's Headline Goal objectives. The aim was to put at the Union's disposal forces capable of carrying out all the Petersberg missions, including the most demanding, in operations up to army corps level. (50 to 60,000 troops) By the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, EU member governments were going to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level who could be deployed within 60 days at the most for a military operation lasting at least a year. The missions assigned to this Rapid Reaction Force are those defined at Petersberg by WEU in 1992 and repeated in Article 17.2 of the TEU which are humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making.<sup>215</sup>

At Cologne in June 1999, the Council had stated that these tasks included the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks. At Helsinki, to fulfill these

---

<sup>215</sup> Ibid.

missions, particular attention was paid to the means necessary for effective crisis management: deployability, sustainability, interoperability, flexibility, mobility, survivability and command and control.

At Laeken, where ESDP was proclaimed operational, it was emphasized that the development of means and capabilities would allow the Union progressively to take on more demanding operations. Following the events of September 11, European Council of 21 September stated that it would fight terrorism in all its forms and that the fight against terrorism will, more than ever, be a priority objective of the European Union. ESDP could not ignore this new strategic context.<sup>216</sup>

At the June 2002 European Council in Seville, it was decided to increase the Union's involvement in the fight against terrorism through a coordinated, interdisciplinary approach embracing all Union policies, including by developing the CFSP and by making the ESDP operational. It was recalled that the CFSP, including the ESDP, can play an important role in countering this threat to our security. From a legal point of view, they now covered nearly every task except collective self-defense, which remained a NATO prerogative. In fact, it will be the Union's military capabilities that will determine the scope of these missions in practice.<sup>217</sup>

---

<sup>216</sup> Rutten M.(2002), "From Nice to Laeken European Defense: core documents" Institute for Security Studies vol. 2

<sup>217</sup> "Council of the European Union, Draft declaration of the European Council on the Contribution of CFSP, Including ESDP, in the Fight Against Terrorism," in Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Seville European Council, Bulletin of the European Union (2002)

On that front, progress has been undoubtedly slower. Several shortfalls were identified, particularly air transport, precision-guided missiles, the deployment of headquarters to relatively near theatres of operation, mobility and intelligence. In that respect any operation of any size would have to depend on the infrastructure and forces of the Atlantic Alliance. For smaller, pre-emptive deployments nearer at hand, Europe had adequate means.

So, the next stage was to address the shortfalls. In November 2001, the European Capability Action Plan (ECAP) was launched.<sup>218</sup>

The operational process is, however, encountering several obstacles too. The first and best known concerns military expenditure. Only a few countries have actually raised their defense budgets. Furthermore, it is a question of spending better by reducing operating costs, which in Europe represent an average of 60 per cent of defense spending, in order to leave a margin for equipment, research and development. Too often, social demands outweigh operational imperatives. The second obstacle has to do with the fact that it will take time to correct European military inadequacies. The third concerns the voluntary nature of national contributions. The fourth handicap is more fundamental and concerns the very definition of the headline goal. Designed on the basis of the Kosovo experience, and, therefore, corresponding to a strategic imperative of the 1990s, meaning that it was to be used essentially for crisis management in the Balkans, which are now generally peaceful, and unfortunately inadequate in view of the strategic demands of the twenty-first century. Because the international context has changed

---

<sup>218</sup> Schmitt, B. (2005) "European Capabilities Action Plan" Institute for Security Studies

dramatically since September 11. More precisely, the Bush Administration's answer to this new day of infamy revealed that Europe was on the verge of becoming irrelevant to U.S. strategic imperatives. This, in turn, had crucial implications for the security of the Union.<sup>219</sup>

Later came Iraqi crisis which was one of the most severe across the Atlantic and inside Europe, one element was left relatively untouched though, the EU-NATO cooperation following the Berlin Plus agreement of December 2002. At the height of the crisis, when the UN was deeply divided and when the NATO alliance was in disarray about assistance measures for Turkey, the cooperation between the two organizations about Berlin Plus survived. This allowed for the launch of Operation Concordia in Macedonia in March 2003.<sup>220</sup>

In ESDP, in particular, the Union made a major breakthrough. The Union for the first time in its history, has framed a common strategic concept. The Iraq crisis has thus produced a common awareness among Europe's leaders of the need for strategic thinking on international security issues. One of the major reasons why the EU was so divided in the case of Iraq was its lack of strategic reasoning. By contrast, a majority of member states addressed the issue through political motives, some internal, some external, which led to a merely reactive policy. There is also the general recognition that a divided Europe is powerless. At the same time, an enlarged Europe of 450 millions

---

<sup>219</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies

<sup>220</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies

people cannot escape its obligations and responsibilities in the world. This was the premise of the Solana document, “A Secure Europe in a Better World,” published in June for the Thessaloniki Summit. Europe’s strategy is based on three pillars: first, extending the security zone around Europe by developing the instruments for stabilization used in the Balkans to the benefit of Eastern neighbors such as Ukraine and Moldova, but also in the Mediterranean, which involves resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, second establishing effective multilateralism based on the UN, the fundamental framework of international relations, while reaffirming the need to become involved in a preventive way and act when the rules are infringed and third responding to the global threats of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and organized crime by recognizing that the traditional form of defense is a thing of the past since the end of Cold War, and that the first line of defense now lies abroad.<sup>221</sup>

First of all, Europe is at peace, not at war. Next, if the European analysis of the threats of terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is similar to that of Washington, the ways in which Europe addresses them are different. In its view, the fight against these threats cannot be limited to military force alone. While not excluding it, the Union intends to take a broader approach, combining the political and the economic. Regarding terrorism, any effective solution will have to be global. While the Union recognizes that bad governance is a major source of instability, it advocates the extension of good governance rather than regime change. The message for Washington is, therefore, from a similar analysis of the threats associated with terrorism stems a more diversified strategy, one that better reflects the European identity. Based on the

---

<sup>221</sup> A Secure Europe in A Better World, Brussels 2003

principles of international law, this approach also implies an obligation to punish offenders. Lastly, this duty implies greater responsibility for Europe, based on more active, consistent and capable involvement. It calls for diplomatic cohesion and synergy in the field of strategic and military intelligence, and it presupposes that an effort to improve European capabilities will continue.

The Union was for the first time involved outside Europe in a peacekeeping intervention in Africa. When a series of massacres in Ituri, Congo, followed the withdrawal of Ugandan troops in Spring 2003, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan called for an immediate intervention. His call was answered by the European Union under the leadership of France. The military intervention of 1,800 troops was prepared in a very short period of time, involving all the EU members in the decision-making process regarding planning and rules of engagement. Cooperation on the ground between participating nations, especially France and Sweden, was efficient. Although limited in time and scope, Artemis was an undeniable success from a military point of view.<sup>222</sup>

The Artemis operation was the first concrete step towards implementing this new security doctrine, by taking a much longer-term view on crisis management and conflict prevention.

With all these developments and evidence in mind, with cautious optimism we can say that ESDP has changed its dimension from a tool of crisis management in the Balkans and that it has become a necessary device to enhance Europe's role in the world, which will continue to improve and develop.

---

<sup>222</sup> Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies.

## REFERENCES

A Secure Europe in A Better World, Brussels 2003

Amsterdam Treaty of the European Union

Allen, D. and Smith, M., (1990), “Western Europe’s Presence in the Contemporary International Area”, Review of International Studies, vol. 16, no.1

Baylon, A.D. and Whiteley, C., (eds.) (2000), “On the Path to Peace In Europe and Beyond” Strategic Decisions Press, USA

Baylis, J., (1998), “European Security in the Post-Cold War Ear: The Continuing Struggle Between Realism and Utopianism” European Security, vol. 7, no. 3

Brenner, M.J., (2002), “Europe’s New Security Vocation”, Institute for National Strategic Studies; Washington

Batt J., Missiroli A., Lynch D., Ortega M., Triantaphyllou D. (2003) “Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe”(2003) Institute for Security Studies

Camps M.,(1964) “Britain and the European Community” 1955-1963 Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cologne European Council, *Annex III of the Presidency Conclusions*, June 1999

Cornish P. (2006) “EU and NATO Cooperation or Competition” European Parliament, Brussels

Council of the European Union, “Presidency Conclusions: Edinburg European Council, Bulletin of the European Communities 12-1992” Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992)

Council of the European Union, “Presidency Report on the Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defense”

“Council of the European Union, Declaration on the Operational Capability of the Common European Security and Defense Policy”(2002) in Council of the European Union Annexes to Presidency Conclusions: Laeken European Council, Bulletin of the European Union

Council of European Union, General Affairs, Statement on Improving European Military Capabilities (Brussels, November 19, 2001)

“Council of the European Union, Draft declaration of the European Council on the Contribution of CFSP, Including ESDP, in the Fight Against Terrorism,” in Council of the European Union, Presidency Conclusions: Seville European Council, Bulletin of the European Union (2002)

Council of Ministers, (1992), “Declaration on Former Yugoslavia”, Rome

Daalder, Ivo H., (2003), “The End of Atlanticism”, Survival, 45/2

Delors, “address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies”

Department of Foreign Affairs (Ireland), “White Paper on Foreign Policy” Dublin  
1996

Dinan D., (2004), “Europe Recast: A History of European Union” Boulder, London:  
Lynne Rienne

Duke, S., (2002), “The Significance of Laeken for CFSP/CESDP” Eipascope, no.2

Duke, S., (1996) “The Second Death or the Second Coming of WEU”, Journal of  
Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no.2

European Parliament, “White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference, vol.  
2 Summary of Positions of the Member States of the European Union with a View to  
the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (1996)”

European Parliament, “White Paper on the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference”  
vol.2

Eichenberg R. C., (2003), "Having it both ways: European Defense Integration and the Commitment to NATO", Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol.67, No. 627-629

Emil K. and James S. (2002), *The New Security Threats in Europe* European Affairs Review

Flechtner S. (2004), "New Impulses in European Foreign and Security Policy", Eurokolleg.

Francois I., (2000) "Partnership: one of NATO's fundamental security tasks", NATO review Vol. 48, No. 1

Gaultung J.,(1981) "The European Community: A Superpower in the Making" George Allen London

Gordon, A., (2001), "Fortress America in a changing transatlantic defense market" in *Between Cooperation and Competition: The Transatlantic defense market* edited by Burkard Schmitt, Institute for security studies, WEU; Paris

Gordon, P., (1997/98), "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy", International Security, vol. 11, no.3

Goodman M. A, Eisendrath C. R. "Bush League Diplomacy: How the Neoconservatives Are Putting the World at Risk" Prometheus Books  
Grevi G., Lynch D., Missiroli A. "ESDP Operations" Institute for Security Studies

Heisbourg, F., (2000), "European Defense: Making It Work", Institute for Security Studies; Paris

Karen Donfried and Paul Gallis, (2000), "European Security: The Debate in NATO and the European Union" CRS Report to Congress

Krichner E., Sperling J., (2002) "The New Security Threats in Europe: Theory and Evidence" European Foreign Affairs Review

Kupchan C. (2000) "In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective" Survival 42 No. 2

Lenzi, G., (1998), "The WEU between NATO and EU", Center for European Integration Studies, (Bonn University)

Lindstrom G. (2006) "The Headline Goal" Institute for Security Studies

Louis Galambos (1989) "Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower" vol. 12 "NATO and the Campaigning of 1952" Baltimore John Hopkins University Press

Luis M. (2000) “The Myth of Europa, A Paradigma for European Defense”,  
published by Assembly of the WEU.

Mace C. (2004) “Operation Concordia: Developing a European Approach to crisis  
management” Routledge

McCarthy, J., (1993), “The Use of Military Force in Bosnia” in *The Challenge of  
Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington  
Maastricht Treaty of the European Union

Missiroli, A., (2000), *CFSP, Defense and flexibility*, Institute for Security Studies,  
WEU; Paris.

Missiroli A. (2002) “EU-NATO Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish  
Delight for ESDP” EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, France

Missiroli, A. (2002) “Bigger EU, wider CFSP, stronger ESDP?” EU Institute for  
Security Studies

Missiroli, A., (2002), “EU Enlargement and CFSP/ESDP”, EU Institute for Security  
Studies, Paris (Carfax Publishing)  
“NATO Review” no. 6 (December 1991): 19-22, 25-32

NATO, “Washington Summit Communiqué” press release, NAC-S (99) 64, April 24, 1999

Osland K. M. (2004) “EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina” Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group

O’Brennan J. (2006) “The Eastern Enlargement of the European Union” Routledge, UK

Preben, B. (2003) “Towards a Common European Security and Defence Policy: The Ways and Means of Making It a Reality” Transaction Pub

Presidency Conclusions “Brussels European Council” 24-25 October 2002 Annex II

Ravenal, E., (1993), “Phase Out NATO” in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

Rauchhaus R. W., (2001) “Explaining NATO Enlargement” Routledge, UK

Rutten M. (2001) “From St. Malo to Nice European defense: core documents” Institute for Security Studies Western European Union

Rutten M.(2002), “From Nice to Laeken European Defense: core documents” Institute for Security Studies vol. 2

Schmitt, B. (2005) "European Capabilities Action Plan" Institute for Security Studies

Sefanie, F. (2004). "New Impulses in European Foreign and Security Policy", Europäische Politik, Eurokolleg.

Sekulic, D., (1993), "Dissolution of Yugoslavia: International Consequences" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

Shea, J.P., (1993), "Meeting the Challenge of Change" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

Simon, J., (1993), "Overview of European Security Issues" in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington  
"SIPRI" (2005), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

Sloan, S.R., (1995), "Nato's Future: Beyond Collective Defense", Institute for National Strategic Studies; Washington

Sloan, S R., (2000), “The United States and European Defense” Institute for Security Studies WEU, Paris

Sloan S., (2000) “The United States and European Defense” WEU Institute for Security Studies

Smith, S., (2002), “US, Europe and International Security”, Jean Monnet Lecture, University College, Dublin

Sorin L., (1997). “Attitudes Toward European Security” American Diplomacy.

Sperling J. (2000) “Two Tiers Or Two Speeds?: the European security order and the enlargement of the European Union and NATO” Manchester University Press

Taylor, T., (1993), “NATO’s Future: Evolution not Revolution” in *The Challenge of Change* edited by Jeffrey Simon, National Defense University Press; Washington

The EU Council Decisions (1987) “Hague Declaration”

The EU Cologne Summit Declaration

“The European Identity” (1973), Bulletin of the European Communities

Tindemans L., (1975) “Report on European Union” Bulletin of European Communities

Trevor C. Salmon, Alistair J. K. Shepherd, (2003) “Toward a European Army: A Military Power in the Making?” Lynne Rienner Publishers

Tocqueville, A. “Democracy in America” trans. George Lawrence (1966) New York, Harper & Row

Torbicorn K. (2003) “Destination Europe: The Political and Economic Growth of a Continent” Manchester University Press

Whiting, G. M., (1997) “Western European Union Operational Development”\_ NATO ([HTTP://ISUISSE.IFRANCE.COM/EMMAF2/NATO/NATOCH13.HTML](http://isuisse.iffrance.com/emmaf2/nato/natoch13.html))

Winn, N., (2002) “Whither NATO” Lindley-French

**Web Sites:**

[www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)

[www.pfp.ethz.ch](http://www.pfp.ethz.ch)

<http://www.weu.int/History.htm>

<http://www.weu.int/History.htm>

<http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-eu/evolution.html>

[http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/niis/NATO\\_EU.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/pdf/research/niis/NATO_EU.pdf)  
<http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200206/i1031.htm>  
[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3\\_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=268&lang=en)  
<http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/Download/Concordia%20and%20BP-NN%20v5n8.PDF>  
<http://www.euforbih.org/history/history.htm>  
<http://www.isaf6.eurocorps.org/isaf.php>  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1996/s961218a.htm>  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/cjtf-con.htm>  
<http://www.euractiv.com/en/security/european-battle-groups-new-stimulus-european-security/article-134085>  
<http://www.sipr.org/default.aspx?action=PublicationDetails&id=57>  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/1996/9602-5.htm>  
<http://www.libertysecurity.org/article986.html>  
<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-023.pdf>  
<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2003/issue4/english/art2.html>  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3555927.stm>  
<http://www.europeanvoice.com/current/article.asp?id=27041>  
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4034133.stm>  
<http://www.isis-europe.org/ftp/download/ep%20resigned%20to%20limited%20oversight%20of%20esdp%20-%20esr%2016.pdf>  
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European\\_Security\\_and\\_Defence\\_Policy](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Security_and_Defence_Policy)