A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS ON RECENT DECENTRALIZATION PRACTICES
IN
GLOBAL AND TURKISH CONTEXTS

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Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences

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ABSTRACT

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The debates over the structure of the Turkish government in the context of Public Administration Reform that point to restructuration of state and/or to re-organization of social relations between state, market and 'civil society' have gained momentum especially since the arrival of draft law about Main Principles of Public Administration and Restructuring of Public Administration to the Turkish Parliament. This thesis attempts to analyze the debate on recent public administration reform in Turkey in the contexts of the socio-economic transformations of new capitalism/neo-liberalism within the notion of decentralization and of how/in what ways the neoliberal policies have been legitimated within the specific historical context of Turkish public administration reform. The purpose of the study is to understand the connection between the legal text of public sector reform and the social context in which these legal regulations find their meanings. For this aim, the debate on public administration reform in the Turkish

Parliament was argued as a discursive battlefield where the demands and interests of the conflicting social groups 'clash' with each other. Therefore, this study concentrates its attention on the critical analysis of the discursive acts of the Justice and Development Party government, and of the Republican People's Party on reform for understanding how both authority/legitimacy and resistance/de-legitimacy are (re)produced within the parliamentary debates/discourse.

ÖZ

SON DÖNEMDE GERÇEKLEŞTİRİLEN
ADEM-İ MERKEZİLEŞ(TİR)ME PRATİKLERİNİN
KÜRESEL DÜNYA VE TÜRKİYE ÖLÇEKLERİNDE SOSYOLOJİK ANALİZİ

Akbaş, Meral
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Devletin yeniden yapılan(dırıl)masının ve/ya devlet, pazar ve 'sivil toplum' arasındaki toplumsal ilişkilenmenin yeniden örgütlenmesinin bir ifadesi olarak Türkiye'deki yönetim ve hükümet yapılanması üzerine yürütülen tartışmaların, özellikle Kamu Yönetiminin Temel İlkeleri ve Yeniden Yapılandırılması Hakkında Kanun adını taşıyan tasarının yasalaşması amacıyla meclise taşınmasıyla hız kazandığı gözlenmektedir. Bu tez, son dönemde Türkiye'de gerçekleştirilmeye çalışılan kamu yönetimi reformunu neoliberalizmin yolaçtığı toplumsal dönüşümleri ve bu dönüşümlerin Türkiye'nin özgün tarihselliğinde nasıl ve hangi yollarla meşru kılındığını gözeterek ele elmaktadır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, hükümet partisi olarak Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin hazırladığı ve meclis tartışmalarına açtığı kamu yönetimi reformunun hukuksal metni ile bu hukuksal metnin toplumsal ilişkilerin yeniden düzenlenişi bağlamında taşıdığı anlam arasındaki ilişkiyi kavramsallaştırmaya çalışmak olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Bu ilişkilenmeyi gösterebilmek için, kamu yönetimi reformu üzerine ateşli tartışmaların gerçekleştiği

Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi birbiriyle çatışan toplumsal grupların talep ve çıkarlarının dile geldiği ve çarpıştığı söylemsel bir savaş alanı/mekanı olarak ele alınmıştır. Bu sebeple, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'nin kamu reformu üzerine yürüttüğü tartışmada söze dökülen söylemsel ifadelere ilgisini yöneltmiş bu çalışma, bu yolla otorite/meşru kılma ve karşı koyma/gayri-meşru kılma biçimlerinin parlamenter tartışmalarda ve/ya söylemde yeralışını anlamaya çalışmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ademi merkezileşme, Neoliberalizm, Kamu Yöentimi Reformu, Parlamenter Söylem, Meşrulaştırma ve Gayri-meşrulaştırma.

In memory of my grandmother. . .

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I am especially grateful to Özge Kelekçi for her sincere friendship. I will never forget her patience and delicateness in listening to me and in sharing both my worries and my happiness during my thesis process. I am waiting impatiently for her 'craziness'. I would also like express my appreciation to Mahir Kalaylıoğlu for his suggestions and comments on my thesis. He not only read and commented on the chapters, but shared my joy and pain throughout the process of writing. I owe special thanks to Yasemin Akis and Cevahir Özgüler and their encouraging eyes and thoughtfulness hidden in the smallest details, which made my pessimism to wither away many times. Additionally, I appreciate to my 'luck' since it never leaves me alone. It was so nice that it has already, when I need it, been there.

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Last but not least, I want to thank Yusuf for making me learn how to write a thesis while coping with 'other' troubles in life! No words can tell my indebtedness to him. . .

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"*. . . there are **no secrets**. Everything knows itself, but not everything says itself, publicises itself. Do not confuse silence with secrets! That which is forbidden from being said, be it external or intimate, produces an obscure, but not a secret, zone.*"

Henri Lefebvre, *Rhythmanalysis: Space, Time and Everyday Life*

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1. 1. Research Problem and Main Characteristics of the Subject

In recent years, especially since April 2003, debates over the structure of the Turkish government in the context of Public Administration Reform that point to restructuration of state and/or to re-organization of social relations between state, market and 'civil society' have gained momentum. Actually, the people living in Turkey have been 'introduced' with a draft law about Public Administration Reform in April 2003 being stressed by the Justice and Development Party government that the present public administration structure is no longer effective and efficient in satisfying the 'necessities'/imperatives of new global economy and the 'diverse' demands/needs of people as well as in carrying out its responsibilities. In accordance with the arguments of government, the state must meet the requirements of increasing international interdependence. For that reason, making governmental adjustments to the new global economy, mainly the institution-building and/or institutional restructuring for the stable functioning of the market relations, is a *sine qua non* of benefiting from the opportunities of globalization[1]. The programme of the party in power has indicated that restructuring of government will be achieved with the way of a comprehensive public

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[1] These views are explained in *Statement of Reasons of Draft Law about Public Administration Reform* presented by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Prime Minister of Turkey, to the Turkish Grand National Assembly in October 2003, available online at www.tbmm.gov.tr, last viewed on 11 February 2004.

administration reform being directed to implement the principles of participatory and pluralist democracy, and transparency, accountability and efficiency in administration[2].

The insistence on Public Administration Reform by the Justice and Development Party became one of the popular issues of the media: "*The target is 18 laws by holiday of parliament*"[3]; "*Erdoğan: no holiday! Erdoğan states that Parliament cannot be closed down for a vacation without making rudimentary laws about local administrations, municipalities and public administration*"[4]; "*The 'closing' surprise in parliament: The Justice and Development Party had the draft law about Public Administration Reform pass through the parliament in the closing session with a surprise maneuver*"[5]. That 'impatience' and 'persistence' of the government sometimes became a subject of ridicule: "*10 draft laws were enacted in no more than two days with the way of only reading the articles and of raising hands!*"[6]

While the members of parliament were raising their hands for showing their acceptance of the articles of the Law about Public Admininistration Reform, I sat down on the one of back seats of parliament and followed confusedly how the political regime of, and state organization of, Turkey had been changing. After reading out an article by one of officials, a member of opposition party, the Republican People's Party, were presenting the main critiques of his/her party related to the article. Then, the article was put to a

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[2] *The Government Report of the Justice and Development Party*, available online at www. belgenet.com, last viewed on 15 March 2004.

[3] Radikal Newspaper, 23 June 2004; Radikal Newspaper, 13 July 2004, available online at www.radikal.com.tr, last viewed on 10 August 2004: That newspaper, Radikal, evaluated this target as an effort for breaking a record in law-making.

[4] Radikal Newspaper, 23 June 2004, available online at www.radikal.com.tr, last viewed on 10 August 2004.

[5] Radikal Newspaper, 16 July 2004, available online at www.radikal.com.tr, last viewed on 10 August 2004.

[6] Evrensel Newspaper, 16 July 2004, available online at www.evrensel.net, last viewed on 10 August 2004.

vote, and was enacted by majority of members of the parliament. Consequently, the Draft Law about Main Principles of Public Administration and Restructuring of Public Administration became 'law' in July 2004. *"Parliament's a stage*, / *And all the Politicians merely players*! / *They have their exits and their entrances*"[7]: Can these words be supposed as expressive for understanding what is taken place in the Parliament? I think that the answer is / must be 'no'!

Whilst witnessing that crucial moment of re-formation of social structuring of power, I ask what the public administration reform will bring about. That question, obviously very different from being simply curious about "*so what follows*", can be re-phrased with other questions: What were the underlying dominant reason(s) for public administration reform in Turkey? Then, the other questions followed each other: What apparent reason(s) were the government and its 'followers' presented? How can we separate the 'real' aims from the apparent reasons? In what reasons are the dominant reason(s) hidden? If so, how can we reveal the 'real' reason(s)?[8] Can the articles of public administration reform and the speeches of members of government party on reform in assembly be used as giving clues about the dominant aim(s) and reason(s)? The same way of reasoning is also valid for understand why opposition party (and other opponents) object to the public administration reform: What are the dominant reason(s) in opposing to that law? These are the questions which lead me to analyze the connection between the legal text of public sector reform and the social context in which these legal regulations find their meanings. Following this argument, the aim of this thesis is to uncover the existing dominant perspectives about public sector reform in the context of decentralization of authority and to study how the discourse towards

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[7] From *The Seven Ages of Wise*, quoted in Lee Parker and Graeme Gould, "Changing Public Sector Accountability: Critiquing New Directions", *Accounting Forum*, 23 (2), 1999: 109.

[8] *In that point, it is essential to state that the dichotomy between appearance and concealed reality refers to the fact that the social facts do not 'shout' their own reality; social facts are phenomena which present distorted and suppressed forms of reality. For a social scientist, it is a necessity to relate the social phenomena with its reality through uncovering this distorted relation between appearance and reality.*

decentralization, state restructuring and market reforms was constructed and what kind of a role such a discourse assumed in neoliberalism.

For capturing the 'answers' for the main problems of this thesis, the year 1980 is mainly underlined as a turning point because of the being introduced 'stability and structural adjustment' programme in January and being implemented after the coup d'etat on September 12th. In fact, people, living in Turkey, have experienced a social transformation in economy, political life and culture deeply during 1980s. This process, which began with the military coup and new economic policies moving through the influence of social life entirely, has been going on with restructuring policies today. The liberal economic policies emphasizing market forces and market values, including deregulation, privatization, rolling-back of many of the economic and particularly social functions of the state, provided a political-economic channel for disseminating decentralization discourse to Turkey.

The decentralization policies in the context of government and/or public administration reform have been still debated in political arena. In the present thesis, the Law about Main Principles of Public Administration and Restructuring of Public Administration, which has given rise to warm debates since the arrival of draft law to Turkish Parliament, will be analyzed through this historical continuity of decentralization policies. However, the public administration reform, as an arena of political struggles of social classes or of temporary reconciliation of the social antagonisms, cannot be explained only in terms of juridical (re)organization of power, but also social (re)structuring of power[9]. Actually, despite that law-making in parliament appears a 'simple' and technical issue only between the political parties of parliament, law and/or the process of law-making are itself the product of the play and struggle of certain agents within the domestic and international spheres. The questions of which social reality reflects the law and of how the law can transform the existing social relations, will be

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[9] Onur Karahanoğulları, "Kamu Reformu Tartışmalarına Metodolojik Bir Bakış", in *Hukuk ve Adalet*, 1 (2), 2004.

anayzed in the context of this thesis. However, some policy-makers, such as Ömer Dinçer, undersecretary in Prime Ministry and 'preparer' of the draft law of public administration reform, declared that the Public Administration Reform is not ideological, but a technical issue: *"Everybody has talked about this draft; they all argue this draft in the ideological terms"[10]*. To 'spite' the words of Dinçer, Slater puts an end to his book with that statement: *"Decentralized structures of government in contemporary states. . . require political choices to be made by political elites and activists*"[11]. This remark, which is against the arguments of Dinçer and his followers who depoliticize the law-making process, emphasizes that the texts of the rules cannot be thought outside political process.

The remaining part of the words by Slater is *as if* stated for my thesis: *"Decentralized structures of government in contemporary states. . . also require social scientists to make crucial choices of method, approach and underlying assumptions about power and the state*"[12]. In fact, there are different discourses on decentralization of authority in Turkey. This study at hand is an attempt to orient its concern to the discussions on decentralization within the context of public administration reform during the process of law-making in parliament. The different discourses on decentralization policies in assembly can be stated as: The Justice and Development Party government whose discourse is extremely harmonious with the neoliberal programme of the World Bank and with TÜSİAD -Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association-, which 'fight' for the public administration reform including the extensive deconstruction and reconstruction of institutions for the sake of the market; the Republican People's Party and the president of Turkey, which criticize the reform, since they assert that this reform can 'hollow out' or 'roll back' the unitary state structure, and divide the 'integrity of

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[10] Akşam Newspaper, 11 January 2005, available online at www.aksam.com.tr, last viewed on 15 March 2005.

[11] David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization", in *Development and Change*, 20 (3), 1989: 524.

[12] Ibid.

nation'. It seems that the older center-periphery cleavage, found in earlier debate between Hüseyin Cahit and Prince Sebahattin within the Committee for Union and Progress, is replaced by state-civil society cleavage between these two groups, the Justice and Development Party government and the Republican People's Party. The group favouring the reduction of the central state power assumes that the public administration reform will provide the empowerment of civil society in the context of decentralization of authority. On the other hand, the notion of central government is generally used as a synonym of the state by the 'centralists' whose views are arised from the phrase in the 1982 Constitution about the indivisible integrity of the state with its nation and land. For them, it is impossible to recognize the 'power' of local administrations that can 'invite' the 'division of integrity'. This 'heated' discussion between 'decentralists' and 'centralists' on public administration reform takes place in the pages of several daily newspapers especially after the veto of the Law about Main Principles of Public Administration and Restructuring of Public Administration by the president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer. For instance, İsmet Berkan, chief-editor of *Radikal*, wrote critiques relating with the negative attitude of the president towards the public sector reform from August 4, 2004 to August 14, 2004. Conversely, the daily newspaper, Cumhuriyet, was published on August 4, 2004 with the title as "*Secularism Lesson by Sezer: The veto suspended the purpose of the Justice and Development Party about defying the main principles of Republic*."[13]

This study will concentrate on the critical analysis of these discourses, by referencing to assembly official reports in which the draft law had been discussed. These reports will be examined through considering the discursive acts of legitimation engaged by government party and of de-legitimation engaged by opposition party on reform during the parliamentary debates, since language and semiosis gain considerable importance in the restructuring and re-scaling of capitalism in neoliberal era, especially in

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[13] In Turkish words: "*Sezer'den Laiklik Dersi: Veto kararı, Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi'nin Cumhuriyetin ana ilkeleriyle hesaplaşma niyetini askıya aldı*", in Cumhuriyet Newspaper, 4 August 2004.

parliamentary where "*the talk is the core business of politics*"[14], than they have had in the past. As Bourdieu has pointed out, neo-liberal discourses are a significant part of the resources which are deployed in pursuing the neo-liberal project[15]. Therefore, the analysis of political discourses in parliamentary debates will be an important source to understand the restructuration and/or re-organization of social relations in capitalism. According to Fairclough, the governments present the neoliberal policies as inevitable, and represents the 'desires' of capital/market as facts[16]. The words of Bourdieu may be illuminating to understand the significance of language for "new capitalism":

> *. . . neoliberal discourse. . . is a "strong discourse" which is so strong and so hard to fight because it has behind it all the powers of a world of power relations which it helps to make as it is, in particular by orienting the economic choices of those who dominate economic relations and so adding its own -specifically symbolic- force to those power relations*[17].

1. 2. Order of Presentation of the Study

After stating research problem of this thesis and main characteristics of the subject in the *Introduction* chapter, I will present firstly a brief evaluation of the concept of decentralization. That description will present not only the definitions of the United Nations and World Bank, but also the critical analysis of that neoliberal rhetoric on the notion of decentralization including the 'interest' for capturing the relations between the neoliberal policies and discourses on effective state, decentralization and governance that have appeared in reports and proposals of the international financial organizations, in public administration literature, and in speeches of governments of the Third World in

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[14] Ineke Van Der Valk, "Right-Wing Parliamentary Discourse on Immigration in France" in *Discourse and Society*, 14 (3), 2003: 314.

[15] Pierre Bourdieu, "Utopia of Endless Exploitation: The Essence of Neoliberalism", available online at http://mondediplo.com/1998/12/08bourdieu, download on 15 March 2005.

[16] Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (New York: Longman, 1989).

[17] Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market* (New York: New Press, 1998), p. 95.

the specific historical conjuncture, in 1980s and 1990s. This chapter will be also introduced how (and in what ways) these discourses on effective state, decentralization and governance have been taken place in the public sector reform paradigms under the names of "*new public management*" and/or "*entrepreneurial government*".

In *Chapter III*, I will present, in the light of the alternative reading of the concept of decentralization, the history of Turkish public administration reform comprising from the last years of the Ottoman Empire to the days of the Great Depression and then, from the years of War to the 1980s and 1990s.

In *Chapter V*, a brief critique of the political discourses of the Justice and Development Party and the Republican People's Party on public sector reform will be presented. The debates conducted in the Law about Public Administration Reform and the discourses developed in this debate by those two parties will be classified under the following thematic categories: reform as, firstly, *only way of development and democracy*, *of transparency, accountability and effectiveness in administration* or, contrarily, *coming with more poverty for the masses living in Turkey*; secondly, reform as *'provider' for strengthening state power* or, contrarily, *for division of integrity of the state with its nation and land with the ways of infringement of the Constitution and of being subjected to the 'act of force' by international financial organizations on the public reform.* I will make an brief analysis of these different political discourses with taking into the fact that the language is a part of political struggle in which different discourses 'play' with each other for gaining power in political arena.

In the *final* chapter, I will present the main conclusions derived from the present analyses. These conclusions can be read as my answers to the questions that I have followed during my thesis.

CHAPTER II

**A CRITICAL REVIEW OF NEOLIBERAL ANALYSES OF
DECENTRALIZATION
WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF 'THIRD WORLD'[18] COUNTRIES**

In recent decades, the decentralization policies have been declared as a "*very
fashionable idea*", "*the latest fashion*", and a "*fashion of our time*" by many social actors
such as policy-makers, political parties, international financial organizations such as the
World Bank and International Monetary Fund, non-governmental organizations and
social scientists. Over the past four decades a wide-ranging, diverse and substantial
literature on decentralization, that includes theoretical analyses, individual country
studies, comparative studies of selected cases, the reports of international or non-
governmental organizations, has emerged. This rapidly increasing interest in the topic of
decentralization can be related with an extensive implementation of decentralization
policies in a number of countries since 1960s. Despite this, a review of the literature
shows that there is no common definition or understanding of decentralization. This
vagueness of the concept of decentralization worries some 'acknowledged experts on
decentralization'. They grumble about "*conflicting conceptual definitions, careless*

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[18] *There is an uncertainty how to be classified or entitled the countries named as the Third World
countries in the past, because the concept of 'Third World' seems meaningless after the fall of the Soviet
Union. There are some words used in literature as backward, developing, emerging or undeveloped
countries. However, these definitions point to 'modernization' or development or capitalization of 'other'
countries according to the route of development of advanced capitalist societies. In this thesis, the concept
of the Third World is preferred, instead of the backward, developing, emerging or undeveloped, because
of having more 'neutrality' about the scaling the economic-social positions of countries according to the
'universal' rules of capitalism.*

application of principles, and unsystematic presentations"[19], as well as "*ambiguities and inconsistencies, which lead to confusion, misunderstanding, and conflict in discourse*"[20]. For some authors, those unclear and 'chaotic' definitions make the concept of decentralization more popular: "*An ambiguous concept, its border not well defined; perhaps this ambiguity contributes to the appeal of the concept*".[21] Therefore, its 'field of application' widens to the literature on public administration, governance, democracy, civil society, state-society relations, state (re)formation.

The extensive popular interest in the concept of decentralization necessitates to deepen the different meaning(s) of this notion and context in which it happens, as there is a "*dialectical relationship between social science concepts and their historical context*"[22]. Having many meanings and implemented in different ways suggest that the decentralization opens up a new and contentious arena for ideological and political struggles. For Slater[23] and Smith[24], decentralization has different meanings according to ideologies. Pickvance and Preteceille[25] state that it implies discussion of power relations and conflicts, because the practice of decentralization influences the 'settled' relations between the main agents of society at the national, sub-national and supra-national context, and introduces new conflicts to the political arena. Following these arguments,

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[19] John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, "Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance", available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/582.pdf, download on 15 March 2005.

[20] Diana Conyers, "Future Directions in Development Studies: the Case of Decentralization", in *World Development*, 14 (4), 1986: 594.

[21] Rémy Prud'homme, "The Dangers of Decentralization", in *The World Bank Research Observer*, 10 (2), 1995.

[22] Frans J. Schuurman, "The Decentralisation Discourse: Post-Fordist Paradigm or Neo-liberal Cul-de-Sac?" in *European Journal of Development Research*, 9 (1), 1997: 150.

[23] David Slater, "Territorial Power and the Peripheral State: The Issue of Decentralization", in *Development and Change*, 20 (3), 1989.

[24] Brian C. Smith, *Bureaucracy and Political Power* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988).

[25] Chris Pickvance and Edmond Preteceille (eds.) *State Restructuring and Local Power: A Comparative Perspective* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1991).

this chapter is devoted to explain the relation between many meanings and definitions of the concept of decentralization in literature on the one hand and power relations and conflicts in society on the other.

The concept of decentralization, as a crucial issue, has been discussed in Third World countries relating to the degree of control of central governments over development planning and administration. Decentralization became an important policy during the 1970s and 1980s for governments of Asia, Latin America, and African countries. In these countries, the rationales of decentralization policies were explained as a variety of pressures, including poor governmental performance, urbanization, democratic transition, and societal demands. When the governments of diverse countries start to carry out the programs of decentralization, the 'benefits' of decentralization for economic development are stressed. They assert that decentralization creates "*more socially equitable patterns of economic growth*"[26]. Furthermore, the World Bank as well as certain other international institutions encourage decentralization policies in administration and development planning. For instance, former World Bank president Robert S. McNamara declares that "*experience shows that there is a greater chance of success if institutions provide for. . . decentralization of authority*".[27] However, if the capacity of the concept of decentralization to "*conceal more than it reveals*"[28] is kept in mind, asking about what is behind its presentation as a perfect concept by governments and international organizations can be a way of describing and analyzing the complexities of decentralization as an arena for political struggles. In this frame, it is accepted as a primary concern of this study that the decentralization is not an

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[26] Dennis A. Rondinelli, 'Decentralization of Development Administration in East Africa' in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (London: Sage Publications, 1983): p. 77.

[27] Dennis A. Rondinelli, op. cit., p. 77.

[28] J. L. Curbelo (1986), quoted in David Slater, op. cit., p. 501.

instrumental and technical term, but a policy that will "*soften resistance to the inevitable and potentially destabilizing social changes that 'development' brings about*"[29].

With the contribution of the statements and questions as introduced before, the organization of the chapter is as follows: *Firstly*, a general review of the concept of decentralization will be presented including the definitions of the United Nations and World Bank, its forms as deconcentration, delegation, and devolution, its 'motivations', 'causes', 'rationales' and characteristics as being accepted in neoliberal discourse. Before criticizing the main arguments of neoliberal discourse on decentralization, it is first necessary to define more clearly what is meant by the term of decentralization. *The other part of this chapter* will be addressed to the critical examination of neoliberal rhetoric on decentralization. The main question in this part is how and why neoliberalism, the literature on governance and 'invention' of effective / market-friendly state, and interest in decentralization policies get together in the specific historical conjuncture. The answer(s) will help for resistance to hegemonic reading(s) of decentralization. *Lastly*, in this chapter, analysis will be continued in the light of the alternative reading of the concept decentralization, the appropriate role of decentralization within the public sector reform paradigms under names such as the "*new public management*", "*entrepreneurial government*" and "*governance*" with again the critique of the neoliberal explanations on decentralization.

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[29] Brian C. Smith, ibid.

II. 1. The Concept of Decentralization

II. 1. 1. Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions

> *The literature on decentralization has produced a plethora of competing definitions*"[30]

In the beginning of this part, it will be useful to give a preliminary and simple definition of the concept of decentralization in literature. It means,

> *. . . the transfer of planning, decision-making, or administrative authority from the central government to its field organizations, local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations, local governments, or non-governmental organizations.*[31]

To say it another words, decentralization is argued as a "*process of devolving political, fiscal, and administrative powers to subnational units of government*"[32]. The United Nations and World Bank that promote decentralization as a 'development' policy for Third World countries have their own definitions of this concept in the official reports. For United Nations, the process of decentralization that points to restructuration or re-organization of authority needs a cooperation, called as *governance* or *decentralizating governance*. That policy includes a collaboration between many *geographic entities* as international, national, sub-national, and local, *societal actors* as government, the private sector and civil society, and *social sectors* as all development themes - political, social, cultural and environmental. This organization presents decentralization as a solution for

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[30] Eliza Willis, Christopher da C. B. Garman, Stephan Haggard, "The Politics of Decentralization in Latin America", in *Latin America Research Review*, 34 (1), 1999: 8.

[31] D. A. Rondinelli and G. S. Cheema, 'Implementing decentralization policies: An introduction', in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (London: Sage Publications, 1983): p. 18.

[32] Shadid J. Burki, Guillermo E. Perry, William R. Dillinger, *Beyond the Center: Decentralizing the State* (Washington: The World Bank, 1999): p.11.

"*enhancing government responsiveness, transparency and accountability*"[33], and "*creating more open, responsive, and effective local government*"[34] being sensitive to the people's needs and encourager for the participation of people in decision-making. By the same token, the World Bank, one of the propagandists of the view that decentralization has become a fashion of our time, declares that it is a 'panacea' for all social problems of world:

> *It is being considered or attempted in an astonishing diversity of developing and transitional countries. . . by solvent and insolvent regimes, by democracies (both mature and emergent) and autocracies, by regimes making the transition to democracy and by others seeking to avoid that transition, by regimes with various colonial inheritances and by those with none. It is being attempted where civil society is strong, and where it is weak. It appeals to people of the left, the center and the right, and to groups which disagree with each other on a number of other issues.*[35]

While implementing decentralization strategies and reforms, governments of Third World countries take into account growing arguments from international organizations such as the United Nations and World Bank that decentralization can help such governments to solve problems caused by "*growing demands for local empowerment, intractable problems of economic development, cyclical recessions, national debt, rising budget deficits, and growing local-level demands for goods and services*"[36]. In an

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[33] UNDP, Decentralized Governance Programme: Strengthening Capacity for People-Centered Development, Management Development and Governance Division, Bureau for Development Policy, 1997: p. 4.

[34] UNDP, *Decentralized Governance Monograph: A Global Sampling of Experiences, Management Development and Governance Division*, Bureau for Policy Development, 1998: p. 6.

[35] J. Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (Washington: The World Bank, 1999): p. 1.

[36] J. M. Cohen and S. B. Peterson, *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*, (United States of America: Kumarian Press, 1999): p. 10.

interview with Rosemary Thorp[37], she explains the main reason of persistence of the international financial organizations for applying decentralization policies in Third World countries as ". . . *overburdened and ineffective states. . . hope for greater efficiency in the use of their money*"[38].

In rhetoric of these international organizations about decentralization, several common points, especially connected with the notion of governance 'proposed' as a prerequisite for economic reform, can be noticed easily. First of them is the insistence on downsizing of public sector, reengineering of governments, transferring of provision and production of public goods and services to private institutions to establish market-oriented economies. The second point, related to the first, is giving responsibility to non-governmental organizations, civil associations and other community organizations for the provision and production of public goods and services. As stated by Litvack, Ahmad and Bird:

> *Decentralization is leading to the dispersion of political, fiscal, and administrative responsibilities across different tiers of government and between the public and the private sector.*[39]

Crucially, this re-distribution of tasks of government to sub-national actors cannot be understood as a 'death' of centralization. In most countries, a complex mix of centralization and decentralization policies emerges, and the national and sub-national actors are assumed as having complementary roles in the process of decentralization.

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[37] *Rosemary Thorp is Director of the Latin American Centre, Reader in the Economics of Latin America and a Fellow of St Antony's College. Recently she wrote an economic history of Latin America in the twentieth century. Also, she has written an economic history of Peru, and on social policy in Peru and Venezuela.*

[38] Alina Rocha Menocal, A New Wave of Decentralisation in Latin America? A Conversation with Rosemary Thorp, *Development in Practice,* 14 (6), 2004: 2.

[39] J. Litvack, J. Ahmad, R. Bird, *Rethinking Decentralization - A Discussion Pap*er (Washington: The World Bank, 1999): p. 85.

The third and last common point in rhetoric of the United Nations and World Bank is believing the finality of tensions created by ethnic, religious, or regional movements and arrival of 'eternal' democracy with the decentralization reforms because of including local-level involvement of rural and urban people to development interventions. According to discourse of the United Nations and of the World Bank, there are important links between democracy and civic pluralism, political and administrative decentralization, and public sector reform, because the emergence of decentralization in administration and politics based on local participation can invite an 'efficient' and 'effective' public sector. However, it can be necessary to state that decentralization is discussed as an issue being much more than public sector, civil service or administrative reform. The 'politics' of decentralization includes the relationships between all of the social actors, whether governmental, private sector or civil society. This can express why the concept of "decentralized governance" is preferred in reports of United Nations Development Programme.[40]

Some scholars avoid considering the 'advice' or pressure of international 'aid' agencies as the only motive for decentralization policies: "*Broadly, external agencies were less important than domestic political forces in determining the timing and scope of adjustment decisions*".[41] This view about the role played by domestic political factors in shaping policy responses relies on that no reform can be carried on in the longer time without consent of political parties, civil organizations and different groups of society. Moreover, while explaining the reasons of decentralization, some authors focus on the

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[40] There are many publications of UNDP titled with the concept of 'decentralized governance': *Decentralized Governance Programme: Strengthening Capacity for People-Centred Development* (1997); *The Global Research Framework Of The Decentralized Governance Programme* (1997); *Decentralized Governance Monograph: A Global Sampling of Experiences* (1998).

[41] J. M. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World, (Oxford: Princeton University Press 1990): p.330.

role of economic crisis, pressures from sub-national actors, and intentions of national politicians to reconstruct state-society relations.[42]

In spite of having been asserted responsively, decentralization has been discussed in a way that these policies either have been ineffectively implemented or have produced disappointing results since the early 1990s: "*The implementation of that policy has mostly failed to live up to expectations*".[43] This disappointment, instead of discontinuing the policies, brings about re-formulating of decentralization reforms and programs covering the concepts of governance, civil society, and (local) democracy. According to some authors, 'joining' of these concepts around decentralization debate provide to focus on political dimensions of decentralization. For example, Crook and Manor emphasized that it can be uneasy to carry on decentralization policies "*against contradictory forces coming from the social and political structures*"[44]. According to Samoff, "*decentralization is effective only when it is compatible with the interests of those expected to implement and defend it*".[45] Furthermore, bureaucratic problems, resistance of local elites to decentralization process, and interests of politicians has taken place in decentralization literature. Actually, some discussions have begun between 'more technocratic' and 'more political' approaches to decentralization, and some theoretical views have been criticized for neglecting the political aspects of decentralization.

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[42] *For a comprehensive discussion of the possible causes of decentralization, see* J. Manor, *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999).

[43] Malcolm Wallis (1991), quoted in J. M. Cohen and S. B. Peterson, op. cit., p. 1.

[44] R. Crook and J. Manor, quoted in Kent Eaton, 'Political Obstacles to Decentralization: Evidence from Argentina and the Phillippines', Development and Change, 32 (1), 2001.

[45] J. Samoff, "Decentralization: The Politics of Interventionism", in Development and Change 21(3), 1989: p.523.

II. 1. 2. The Forms of Decentralization

From the beginning of this chapter, it is emphasized that the literature on decentralization is in confusion because of many different definitions and interpretations. Interestingly, many definitions on and about decentralization, despite the fact that concepts - coming from 'analytical world' - are assumed as having definite meanings, are blurred. This uncertainty also spreads to the uses of forms of decentralization covering a broad range of concepts as demonstrating in the below table. For example, while French writers prefer the concept of decentralization, United Nations Reports underline the term devolution.

Table I: *Different Uses of the Concept(s) of Decentralization*

Terms associated with:	Deconcentration	Decentralization
Organizing Principle	Déconcentration (French writers) Deconcentration (United Nations report) Bureaucratic decentralization Administrative decentralized	Décentralisation (French writers) Devolution (United Nations report) Democratic decentralization Political decentralized
Structures in which the principle dominates	Field administration Regional administration Prefectoral administration	Local government Local self-government Municipal administration
Practice	Delegation of powers	Devolution of powers

[**Source:** P. Mawhood, 'Decentralization: the concept and the practice', in P. Mawhood (ed.) *Local Government in the Third World: The Experience of Tropical Africa*, (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1983): p.3.]

In fact, clarity in definitions relating with the notion of decentralization seems difficult to achieve. However, there are some attempts to reach agreement among international organizations, academics, and government decision-makers on the definition of the concept for promoting "*meaningful, comparative, and empirical studies on decentralization*"[46]. The works of G. Shabbir Cheema, John R. Nellis, and Dennis A. Rondinelli[47] can be evaluated as an important endeavor in forming common definitions on decentralization literature. It has been asserted that there is an agreement on the conceptual definitions of these authors.[48] Indeed, in several United Nations Development Programme publications, the forms of decentralization are explained being based on the definitions of them. Although their approach has been criticized as instrumental and technical, it will be introduced briefly in this section.

The Cheema, Nellis, and Rondinelli's approach is based on the analytical classification of decentralization by form and type. Forms of decentralization are classified on the basis of objectives: *political*, *spatial*, *market*, and *administrative*. Each form is, then, divided into types. The most elaborated approach to types is found in regard to administrative decentralization: *deconcentration*, *devolution*, and *delegation*.[49]

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[46] John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance, available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/582.pdf, download on 15 March 2005.

[47] G. Shabbir Cheema and Dennis A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983); Dennis A. Rondinelli, John R. Nellis, and G. Shabbir Cheema, *Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Staff Working Paper No. 581, 1984).

[48] John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance, available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/582.pdf, download on15 March 2005.

[49] However, as a different arrangement, it is introduced that decentralization have three dimensions as political, administrative and fiscal in some works. Additionally, deconcentration, delegation, and devolution are defined as forms of decentralization.

Political forms of decentralization is a term used by political scientists involved in transferring decision-making power to lower levels of government for encouraging citizens and their elected representatives to participate in decision-making process. *Spatial decentralization* are typically used by regional planners and geographers interested in formulating policies and programs for promoting new regional areas because of reducing excessive urban concentration in a few large cities. *Market forms of decentralization* is the focus of economists searching the ways of creation of conditions allowing goods and services to be produced and provided by market mechanisms. This form of decentralization has become more extensive due to recent trends toward economic liberalization, and privatization. Lastly, *administrative decentralization* is focused on reforming the relation between governments and the local administration units including the devolution of government responsibilities to local level of government[50].

The types of decentralization are discussed in literature relating with administrative decentralization. Three major types of decentralization are deconcentration, delegation and devolution. According to this abstracted typology of decentralized structures, the degree of decentralization increases from deconcentration to devolution, and thus, devolution is the most decentralizing one.

Deconcentration can be defined as passing -some- authority or administrative responsibility to a lower level only *within* the central government. It does not mean downward transfer of authority and autonomy from the central government, but indicates limited transfer of "*specified decision-making, financing, and management*

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[50] UNDP, Decentralization: A Sampling of Definitions, Working Paper Prepared in connection with the Government of Germany, at http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/decentralization_working_report.pdf, download on 15 March 2005; John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, Methodological Issues in the Analysis of Decentralization, available online at http://www.cuhk.edu.hk/gpa/wang_files/3050-03.pdf, download on 15 March 2005.

functions"[51] to subordinate regional or local offices "*depend directly on central government ministries*"[52]. This least extensive type of decentralization is regarded as a first stage of decentralization especially in transitional and developing countries. Another form of decentralization is the *delegation* of power of central government for performing *specific functions* to the agents that are outside of the direct control of central government structure, "*but ultimately accountable to it*"[53]. Delegation is more extensive than deconcentration in relation to transfer more broad authority for planning and implementing decisions on specific activities to such agents as semi-autonomous public or private organizations. *Devolution* of functions and authority, on the other hand, includes in creation of new independent levels or units of government which are financially and legally *outside* the direct control of central government. In this way, the central government relinquishes certain functions through devolution, and local governments, as "*autonomous, independent. . . separate levels of government*"[54], provide social services required by local citizens. The local government units have authority legally within their geographical boundaries. This type of decentralization has been discussed to link with the concepts of local participation and democracy.

In addition, together with this three types of decentralization, the concept of *divestment* as an another type of decentralization appears in literature, especially in the works of Cheema and Rondinelli[55]. It can be defined as transfer of functions from government to voluntary, private, or non-government institutions.

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[51] John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance, available online at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/582.pdf, download on 15 March 2005.

[52] The World Bank, *Decentralization in Madagascar*, (USA: World Bank Publications, 2004): p 8.

[53] Ibid.

[54] D. A. Rondinelli and G. S. Cheema, 'Implementing decentralization policies: An introduction', in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (London: Sage Publications, 1983): p. 22.

[55] D. A. Rondinelli and G. S. Cheema, op.cit., pp. 24-25.

The Cheema, Nellis, and Rondinelli approach has been criticized because of the static nature of their framework not including the dynamic and changing relations between many actors such as governmental and non-governmental institutions and organizations of decentralization process[56]. For some authors, the 'absolute' and 'technical' definitions of decentralization with fully separate forms exclude the reality that all governments use some combinations of the forms of decentralization.[57] According to these views, the process of decentralization includes a *mix of deconcentration, delegation, and devolution* in practice. That counter-argument addresses the necessity of studying individual country experiences of decentralization to achieve a more comprehensive understanding of decentralization process.

II. 1. 3. Rationale for Decentralization Policies

Much of the writings by government and international financial organization officials, and academics on forms and types of decentralization has focused on advantages of decentralized governments. They were generally agreed on some strengths of transferring more responsibility for planning and administration to local governments, voluntary organizations, and regional authorities. The reasons for promoting decentralization in Third World countries are stated by Rondinelli as follows:

> *Decentralized mode of policy and program implementation is conducive to more effective coordination and consistency, greater access to governmental activities, increased involvement of people in the development process, more efficient delivery of public services for meeting basic human needs and increased accountability of government agencies.*[58]

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[56] J. M. Cohen and S. B. Peterson, *Administrative Decentralization: Strategies for Developing Countries*, (United States of America: Kumarian Press**,** 1999).

[57] Philip Mawhood and Jerry M. Silverman term this situation as hybrid and mixed in their publications: Philip Mawhood, "Decentralisation and the Third in the 1980s', in *Planning and Administration*, 14 (1), 1983: 13-14; Jerry, M. Silverman, *Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1992): 15-16.

[58] Dennis, A. Rondinelli, "Government Decentralization in Comparative Perspective: Theory and Practice in Developing Countries", *in International Review of Administrative Studies*, 47, 1981: 133-45.

By looking at most of the literature, the advantages of decentralization can be grouped as:

- Decentralization can give opportunity for officials who are working in the local areas to adapt development plans and programs according to the needs of people living in these regions.

- Decentralization policies necessitate to have information about local problems and needs for designing 'effective' development projects and programs. For getting better information, closer contact between government officials and the local population can be increased.

- Decentralization can lead to participation of various political, religious, ethnic, and tribal groups or individual citizens to decision-making process.

- Decentralization can raise the standard of living through 'efficient management of local government'.

- Decentralization can influence or control the power of local elites who are often to hostile to national development policies.

- Decentralization can admit the participation of such new social actors as non-governmental organizations, grass-roots organizations, or business associations. Civil society and private sector are assumed as partners of governments with decentralization.

- Decentralization can develop the greater co-operation between local governments and private institutions in the regions and provinces.

- National government policies can be 'penetrated' into remote areas of country by decentralization process.

- Decentralization can secure political stability and national unity by "*giving groups in different sections of the country the ability to participate more directly in development decision-making*"[59].

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[59] D. A. Rondinelli and G. S. Cheema, 'Implementing decentralization policies: An introduction', in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (London: Sage Publications, 1983): p. 16.

Moreover, decentralization has been introduced "*a counterpoint to globalization*"[60] in publications of United Nations. According to this argument, decentralization brings decision-making from the supra-national actors back to the local levels. In this point, the role of nation-states are re-defined "*as a mediating force between the forces of globalization and localization*"[61].

However, in literature, pessimism has spread relating with the advantages of decentralization: "*The fantasy of 'getting rid of the bureaucracy' would turn into a nightmare*".[62] What is more, the individual country studies show that there is no direct link between democracy, participation in decision-making, poverty reduction and decentralization[63]. Nevertheless, the practice of decentralization as a 'political strategy' has not been criticized yet. Generally, the ineffectiveness of state "*for putting in place the appropriate institutional foundations*" for decentralization has been showed as a main reason of 'nightmare'.

Beyond all critiques in neoliberal discourse of decentralization, it can be captured easily that the decentralization debate is related with re-centralization of power and authority spreading to multiple units of government. All advantages of decentralization such as 'desire' of controlling local elites, of penetrating national policies into local areas, and of

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[60] UNDP, *Factors to Consider in Designing Decentralized Governance Policies and Programmes to Achieve Sustainable People-Centred Development, Management Development and Governance Division*, Bureau for Development Policy, 1997: p. 1.

[61] Ibid.

[62] The World Bank, *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People*, (World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003): p.55.

[63] Sylvia Bergh, "Democratic decentralisation and local participation: a review of recent research", *Development in Practice*, 14 (6), 2004: 780-790; Craig Johnson, "Local democracy, democratic decentralisation and rural development: theories, challenges and options for policy", *Development Policy Review*, 19(4), 2001: 521–532.

increasing political stability and national unity intersect with the claim that restructuration of state for the sake of the market is a necessity: "*Development - economic, social and sustainable - without an effective state is impossible. . . States should work to complement markets*"[64]. Then, it is time to go away from 'official discourse' of decentralization, and ask: What is concealed behind decentralization? If it is a mask, myth and mirage, but of what? Is decentralization really a political project which gets democracy and equality to the poor in the Third World? "*How can the alleviation of poverty, the continuance of economic growth, the encouragement of popular participation and the decentralization of authority all be combined within the same socio-political fabric?*"[65] in a society having crucial contradictions and antagonisms. In coming part of this chapter, the decentralization discourse introduced before will be criticized with the help of literature on neoliberalism, restructuration of state, and governance.

II. 2. Redefining Decentralization:
Theorizing Decentralization Discourse in Neoliberal Era

Much of the recent writings on decentralization includes theoretical formulations being narrowed to neoliberal view. According to neoliberal discourse, decentralization promises more citizen participation in the decision-making process, the alleviation of poverty and sustainable development. However, Slater states that the term of decentralization has been used as a mask to "*cover quite different objectives*"[66]. Curbelo also emphasizes "*its capacity to conceal more than it reveals*".[67] For them, the hegemonic reading of decentralization is based on the assumption that deregulation,

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[64] The World Bank, *World Development Report: State in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997): p. 48.

[65] David Slater, op. cit., pp. 517-518.

[66] David Slater, op. cit., pp. 516.

[67] J. L. Curbelo (1986), quoted in David Slater, op. cit., p. 501.

privatization, rolling-back of many of the economic and particularly social functions of the state, capitalist market mechanisms and decentralization all must go together. However, 'depoliticization' of economic management and/or "*remove of the political character of decision making*"[68], as one of political governing strategies implemented by (neoliberal) governments, give(s) a way to "*see states and market as isolated, fragmented aspects of social reality existing in a purely external and contingent manner*"[69]. For Peter Burnham, the concept of "*depoliticized form of economic management*"[70] can help to theorize the relationship between states and markets and also to understand why the decentralization and devolution of policy making has been discussed as a technical process outside the political process. According to him, that 'strategy' provides the governments to a place of maneouvre for the legitimation of putting an end to economic and particularly social functions of the state and/or of 'dismantling' the welfare state. Therefore, for Samoff, it is fundamental for an alternative vision of decentralization that "*the patterns of social conflict, the prevailing and contending ideologies, and the characteristics of the political process*"[71] should be included in theoretical considerations.

Although mainstream theoretical argumentations has widely converged around neo-liberal discourse, it can be fallacy to assume that "*dominant forms are the only ones that exist*".[72] For the Marxist analysis, the 're-scaling' of relations between global, national and local in the frame of centralization-decentralization process is nothing but "*utopia of*

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[68] P. Burnham, "New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation" in *British Journal of Economics and International Relations*, 3 (2), 2001: 128.

[69]. P. Burnham, "Globalization, depoliticization and modern economic management", in W. Bonefeld, and K. L. Psychopedis (eds.) *The Politics of Change: Globalization, Ideology and Critique* (London: Palgrave, 2000): p. 10.

[70] P. Burnham, "New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation" in *British Journal of Economics and International Relations*, 3 (2), 2001: 127-149.

[71] Joel Samoff, op. cit., p. 524.

[72] Ruth Wodak, *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis* (London: Sage Publications, 2002): p.128.

unlimited exploitation"[73] of capitalism working through the reproduction of capitalist social relations on wider scales and at deeper levels for continuous capital accumulation. In order to grasp the historical conjunction of re-interest in decentralization in 1990s and neoliberalism, the literature on governance, and effective / market-friendly state, it can be crucial to put the 1980s and 1990s in a historical perspective.

II. 2. 1. Defining Neoliberalism, The "Washington Consensus"

> *Social and political relations are reduced to economic relations, democracy is reduced to capitalism, and citizens are reduces to consumers. . . As many have shown, free-market capitalism was never intended to represent the public well; it was intended to describe how to make a return on financial investment.*[74]

Neoliberalism gained widespread prominence during the early 1980s as a political project which aims to remove the state, to put an end to economic and particularly social functions of the state, to 'dismantle' the welfare state, because it is a necessity for full development of the capitalism to remove 'obstacles' such as states with strong welfare programmes. Liberation of '*open, competitive, and unregulated markets*' from state interventions is basis of neoliberal policies:

> *In common parlance, the term neo-liberalism. . . focus(es) on a new and reduced role for government as a 'condition provider', and argue(s) that government must take a back seat to market forces.*[75]

The 'Washington consensus', defined by John Williamson, the designer of the concept, as "*the lowest common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the*

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[73] Pierre Bourdieu, 'Neoliberalism, the utopia (becoming a reality) of unlimited exploitation' in *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market* (New York: New Press, 1998).

[74] Stanley, Deetz. *Transforming Communication, Transforming Business: Building Responsible and Responsive Workplaces* (Cresskill, N.J.: Hampton Press, 1995): p. 23.

[75] Roger, King. *State, Democracy and Globalization* (USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004): pp.201-202.

Washington-based institutions to Latin American countries as of 1989"[76], frames the schema of neoliberal agenda that the IMF and the World Bank follows. The main topics of Washington consensus are as follows: Fiscal discipline, reorientation of public expenditure, tax reform, financial liberalization, a unified and competitive exchange rates, trade liberalization, openness to foreign direct investment, privatization, deregulation, secure property rights.[77] These elements can be accepted as a 'good' outline of the neoliberal economic policies of the recent decades. Neoliberalism, as a mobilization of these policies, intends to extend market relations throughout all sectors of society leading to more competition and commodification.

These main characteristics of the Washington consensus can be found in the policies of the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the United States and the United Kingdom during the 1980s. In fact, the initial rise of neoliberalism can be associated with the economic and political strategy of New Rigt policies actualizing in Britain and the US. These policies implemented by Thatcher and Reagan governments found their expressions in (a) *liberalization* of market relations with the way of constitution and extension of competition in market; (b) *deregulation* of state control over economic agents; (c) *privatization* of public services; (d) *(re-)commodification* of public sector services with the dismantling of welfare programs; (e) *internationalization* of capital mobility.[78]

Most of the 'developed' countries, such as Canada, New Zeland, Germany, France, also followed this new path of capitalist development under the rule of New Right policies.

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[76] J. Williamson, "What Should the World Bank Think about the Washington Consensus?", *The World Bank Research Observer*, 15 (2), 2000: 251.

[77] Dani Rodrik (2002) qoted in P. P. Kuczynski and J. Williamson, *After the Washington Consensus: Restarting Growth and Reform in Latin America* (Washington: Institute for International Economics, 2003): p. 268.

[78] Bob Jessop. From Thatcherism to New Labour: Neo-Liberalism, Workfarism, and Labour Market Regulation (2003) available online at http://www.comp.lancs.ac.uk/sociology/soc131rj.pdf, download on 11 February 2005.

Then, neoliberal programs of restructuring were extended through Third World countries. The 1980s was also a decade for economic policy reform for Third World countries: "*to reduce budget deficits and tighten monetary policy; to liberalize trade and exchange rate regimes; and most generally, to expand the role of market forces and the private sector*".[79] Bretton Woods institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have become the main agents / 'carriers' of various neoliberal structural adjustment programmes to the Third World countries. In fact, the politics of Third World is increasingly determined by the relations with these international organisations. By the mid-1980s, neoliberalism had become the dominant political and ideological form of capitalist globalization with widespreading of its policy agendas throughout the world.

While mobilizing the policies of neoliberalism 'throughout the world', needless to say, some significant differences between the Third World countries and the advanced capitalist countries in terms of dependency have remained. How have politics and the states in the Third World, with regard to the practice of decentralization, been affected by the continuous process of neoliberal reform in global capitalism? In 1980s, neoclassical economists stressed structural adjustment, liberalization, privatization, and decentralization as important elements of a successful development strategy for Third World countries. In these countries, insistence on the reduction of state and on the implementation of decentralization policies by IMF and World Bank associated with the mainstream literature on development. According to this literature, economic development of the Third World can be provided only with following the route of development of 'original' democracies in advanced capitalist societies. In other words, the 'formula of Western' countries for capitalist development is assumed as "*universal*

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[79] S. Haggard, and R. R. Kaufman, 'Instittutions and Economic Adjustment', in S. Haggard and R. R. Kaufman (eds.), *The Politics of Economic Adjustment: International Constraints, Distributive Conflicts, and the State* (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1992): p.3.

developmental relevance for all cultures and societies".[80] In the first place, the international organizations urged the governments of Third World that these countries had to give priority to capitalist economic development for 'reaching the civilization of West'. The development literature is based on the liberal characteristic of decentralization. The decentralization policies are introduced in order to achieve development objectives "*such as improved management and sustainability of funded programs and projects, equitable distribution of economic growth, and facilitation of grassroots participation in development processes*"[81]. However, the main arguments and assumptions of development literature relating with decentralization has been criticized in many ways. One of these critiques is from Souza that the concept of decentralization is discussed in apolitical context without any reference to broader political and economic system.[82] Decentralization is often viewed as a technical issue for increasing efficiency and effectiveness of economic and social development programs. After distmantling the welfare policies of state with decentralization policies, it seems difficult to imagine 'equitable economic development' can be realized. In addition, there is no quarantee to distribute the 'benefits' of decentralization equitably among decentralized structures: "*Is a decentralized system likely to be more effective at reducing interjurisdictional disparities than a centralized system? The answer is no*".[83]

This answer, 'no', calls for considering the legitimacy of neoliberal policies. The cuts in the welfare expenditures, dramatic increases in the unemployment ratios, increasing inequality between social classes, working against the interests and rights of working

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[80] Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, democracy and development in the Third World", *Third World Quarterly*, 14 (3), 1993: p. 605.

[81] J. M. Cohen and S. B. Peterson, op. cit., p. 1.

[82] Celina Souza, *Constitutional Engineering in Brazil: The Politics of Federalism and Decentralization*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997): p. 13.

[83] Rémy Prud'homme, op. cit., p. 203.

class has been 'provoking' the anti-capitalist protests against neoliberal policies since 1990s,

> *. . . from the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, the subsequent series of Gatherings for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism, and the December 1995 mass strikes in France to the mass protests against the WTO, the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Economic Forum in locations such as Davos, Genoa, London, Melbourne, Mumbai, Nice, Prague, Seattle, Sydney, Washington DC, and Zurich.*[84]

This growing discontent with the inequalities created by neoliberalism urged the neoliberals to re-define and re-structure neoliberal reforms to cope with the problems of crisis and legitimation. In other words, '*the Washington Consensus is dead; long live the new Washington Consensus!*'

II. 2. 2. Bring back the State? The "Post-Washington Consensus"

> ***Alina Rocha Menocal***: *What kind of role should the central government play in making decentralisation work?*
>
> ***Rosemary Thorp***: *The central government sets the rules of the game. So it must do this, and generate systematic and predictable transfer of power, responsibility and resources. It also needs to invest in building capacities at the local level. The rules of the game include things like the roles given to NGOs and other actors who can help a great deal, but a framework for a healthy relationship needs to be put in place by the central government.*[85]

By the end of the 1980s, a 'radical' shift in discourse of the World Bank on the role of capitalist state has been observed through a textual analysis of the three reports by the World Bank: Governance and Development (1992), The East Asian Miracle (1993) and World Development Report, State in a Changing World (1997). In these reports, the

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[84] Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore, 'Cities and the Geographies of "Actually Existing Neoliberalism"', in Neil Brenner and Nik Theodore (eds.), *Spaces of Neoliberalism: Urban Restructuring in North America and Western Europe*, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 2002): p. 4.

[85] Quoted from the conversation with Rosemary Thorp, by Alina Rocha Menocal, A New Wave of Decentralisation in Latin America?, *Development in Practice,* 14 (6), 2004.

main defense of the World Bank, as opposed to the period of the first stage of market reforms referring to the negative role of states for the market relations, is:

> *Development -economic, social and sustainable- without an effective state is impossible. It is increasingly recognized that an effective state - not a minimal one- is central to economic, and social development, but more as partner and facilitator than as director. States should work to complement markets not replace them.*[86]

This 'call' for bringing back the state can be explained as a sign of 'maneuver' by international financial institutions -especially the World Bank- from the policies of open markets, privatisation, deregulation, liberalisation and structural adjustment known as the Washington Consensus or first-generation reforms to the policies taking into consideration the role of state for 'effective performance' of the market known as the post-Washington Consensus or second-generation reforms. This transformation in discourse and politics of international financial institutions relating with redefining the state's role or recalling the state, in contrast with the anti-statist thesis or the defense of 'minimalist state', is associated with being recognized by these institutions that '*political and institutional foundations for programmes of structural reform*', notably after the Asian economic crisis, is so essential to protect and correct markets. At that point, it can be noticed that the economic policies of Washington Consensus for stable functioning of the market system cannot be implemented without institution-building or institutional restructuring of state apparatuses. According to Naim, creating new institutions and redefining the role of state as an institution open a door to integrate with the world economy, increase international competitiveness, maintain macroeconomic stability with the way of making rules or reforms in civil service, labor relations, decentralization of government, administration of justice, tax collection.[87] However, against the view that

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[86] The World Bank, *World Development Report: State in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997): p. 48.

[87] M. Naim, "Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion", Working Draft of a Paper Prepared for the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, (1999), available online at www.img.org, download on 15 March 2005.

'the Washington consensus is dead' and the post-Washington Consensus indicates a new era, Rose warns:

> *The post-Washington consensus is not built on a critical analysis or careful internal reconsideration of the Washington Consensus. . . The basic policy instruments continue to be based on a Washington consensus principles of free trade and privatization, with the only significant change being a reassessment of a role for the state to ensure that they can be implemented efficiently and humanely.*[88]

This view can be exemplified with a quotation from the World Bank's remarkable World Development Report for 1997, 'The State in a Changing World' that "*maintaining liberal trade, capital markets and investment regimes is essential for economic growth*".[89] What then really distinguishes this 'new understanding' of state from the neoliberal one? With post-Washington Consensus, a certain type of state "*which has moved from service provider to market regulator*"[90] for sustaining market liberalization has been developed. Therefore, restructuring of relation between state and market as complementary entities or transition to market-friendly state can be accepted as the 'heart' of post-Washington policies. The question that "*how the state's forms of intervention could be functionalised for the effective performance of the market*"[91] orientates the policies of post-Washington Consensus. The words of Stiglitz explain this 'new' tendency of neoliberal policies:

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[88] P. Rose, "From Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus: The Influence of International Organizations on Education Policy and Practice in Malawi", *Globalization, Societies and Education*, 1(1), 2003: p. 76.

[89] The World Bank, *World Development Report: State in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997): p. 48.

[90] S. H. Jacobs, "The Second Generation of Regulatory Reforms", *Paper Prepared for Delivery at the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms,* (1999), available online at www.imf.org, download on 15 March 2005.

[91] Galip Yalman, "Avrupa Sosyal Demokrat Partilerinin Siyasal ve İdeolojik Yönelimlerindeki Değişimler: İngiliz İşçi Partisi Örneği", *İktisat Dergisi*, Ağustos-Eylül 1999: p. 56.

> *. . . the choice is not whether the state should or should not be involved. Instead, it is often a matter of how it gets involved. More importantly, we should not see the state and markets as substitutes . . . the government should see itself as a complement to markets, undertaking those actions that make markets fulfil their functions better.*[92]

The economic policies of post-Washington Consensus are not 'anti-state'; rather, "*an efficient market needs strong state institutions*"[93]. O'Neill stresses this paradox saying that 'less state' is an illusive statement for neoliberalism where state action "*impels rather than reduces*"[94]. As the words of Dicken: "*The state is dead ... long live the state!*"[95] According to Tickell and Peck, the practice of neoliberalism is not based on free functioning of the market, "*but instead is associated with the extensive deconstruction and reconstruction of institutions, often in the name of or in the image of 'markets'*"[96].

To sum up, in recent decentralization literature, the 'active role' of government for establishing the rules of "*systematic and predictable transfer of power, responsibility and resources*"[97] has been emphasized strongly: "*Most careful studies of administrative decentralization conclude that a strong center is a precondition for meaningful*

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[92] Joseph Stiglitz (1998), quoted in Ben Fine, "*Neither the Washington Nor the Post-Washington Consensus: An Introduction*", available online at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wbank/2001/esrc.pdf, download on 11 February 2005.

[93] Anthony B. L. Cheung and Ian Scott, 'Governance and public sector reforms in Asia: Paradigms, paradoxes and dilemmas', in Anthony Cheung (ed.), *Governance and Public Sector Reform in Asia: Paradigm Shift or Business As Usual?*, (London: Curzon Press Limited, 2002): p. 3.

[94] P. M. O'Neill, 'Bringing the qualitative state into economic geography' in R. Lee and J. Wills (eds.), *Geographies of economies* (London: Arnold, 1997): p. 291-292.

[95] Peter Dicken, quoted in Linda Weiss, 'Globalization and the myth of the powerless state', New Left Review, I/225, September-October 1997: pp. 3-27.

[96] Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck, **"**Making global rules: globalisation or neoliberalisation?", http://www.geog.ntu.edu.tw/news/2006HGAW/round2/attachment/making%20global%20rule_tickell_peck.pdf, download on 11 February 2005.

[97] Quoted from the conversation with Rosemary Thorp, by Alina Rocha Menocal, A New Wave of Decentralisation in Latin America?, *Development in Practice,* 14 (6), 2004.

reforms"[98]. In fact, despite decentralization policies in many countries, 'doing without' state seems away from this debate.

It can be asked in what sense the role of state is important for the second-generation structural reforms. The reasons can be associated with its providing "*the essential infrastructural and juridical conditions of markets and private property*"[99], making rules for "*governing the capital movements, investment, currency exchange, and trade*"[100],creating "*consistent standards*"[101] for markets, building institutions and providing services to private actors for entering market, ensuring "*adequate investment in people, provision of competitive climate for enterprise, openness to international trade and stable macroeconomic management*"[102]. Actually, the state becomes a 'guardian' and 'guarantor' of neoliberal reforms with the way of protect neoliberal interests through competition institutions and policy tools, and market incentives. In below table, showing two stages of economic liberalization called as the Washington and post-Washington consensus, these basic components of the reforms can be found: integrating with the world economy, changing the type of production and provision of public services, increasing international competition, ensuring macro-economic stability, decentralizing public administration by making public sector reform.

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[98] John M. Cohen and Stephen B. Peterson, Administrative Decentralization: A New Framework for Improved Governance, Accountability, and Performance, at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/hiid/582.pdf, download on 15 March 2005.

[99] Atilla Güney, "*State intervention in Turkey: an assessment of the relationship between the political and the economic spheres*", (Ankara: METU, 2002): p. 164. (unpublished thesis)

[100] Ibid.

[101] The World Bank, "The Fight Against Corruption in Latin America and the Caribbean: A World Bank View", Paper prepared for the Symposium on Enhancement of Probity in Hemisphere (1998) available online at www.oas.org/juridico/spanish, download on 15 March 2005.

[102] World Bank, *The East Asian Miracle*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993): p. 84.

Table II: *Two Stages of Economic Liberalization*

	Stage I	Stage II
Priorities	• Reduce inflation • Restore growth	• Improve social conditions • Increase international competitiveness • Maintain macroeconomic stability
Reform Strategy	• Change macroeconomic rules • Reduce size and scope of the state • Dismantle institutions of protectionism and statism	• Create and rehabilitate institutions • Boost competitiveness of the private sector • Reform production, financing, and delivery of health care, education, and other public services • Create "economic institutions of capitalism" • Build new "international economic insertion"
Typical Instruments	• Drastic budget cuts and tax reform • Price liberalization • Trade and foreign investment liberalization • Private sector deregulation • Creation of social "emergency funds" bypassing social ministries • "Easier" privatizations	• Reform of labor legislation and practices • Civil service reform • Restructuring of government, especially social ministries • Overhaul of administration of justice • Upgrade of regulatory capacities • Improvement of tax collection capabilities • "Complex" privatizations • Restructuring relations between states and federal government
Principal Actors	• Presidency • Economic cabinet • Central Banks • World Bank and IMF • Private financial groups	• Public bureaucracy • Judiciary • Unions • Political parties • State and local governments • Private sector

While rebordering and rescaling of state functions, what is the role and 'importance' of decentralization referred in the table of Naim in relation with restructuring of government and restructuring relations between states and federal government? Any debate relying on this question needs to discuss the concept of governance, civil society, and democracy.

II. 2. 3. Further Debates on Decentralization: *Governance, Civil Society, Democracy*

. . . governance. . . anything more than transferring old wine into new bottles?[103]

In 1988, The United Nations Development Programme declared to assist the projects and programmes preparing in the areas of institutions of governance, decentralization and local governance, public sector management and accountability, urban management and capacity development modality and tools[104]. Then, the word of 'governance' appeared in the report of Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crises to Sustainable Development[105] by the World Bank as the new strategy of the World Bank about the relation between state and market. The definition of governence was taken place in the Report on Governance and Development in 1992, as "*the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development*"[106]. After that, in 1996, the World Bank and the IMF together declared to give importance in "*promoting good governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of law, improving the accountability of the public sector, and tackling corruption*".[107]

The insistence on employing the concept of governance in literature can be associated with the transition from the approach of "states versus market" relating to Washington Consensus to the approach of "complementary relationship between state and market"

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[103] Bob Jessop, "The rise of governance and the risks of failure: the case of economic development", *International Social Science Journal*, 155, 1998: p. 30.

[104] Ian Scott, 'International agencies and public sector reform in post-crisis Asia' in Anthony Cheung (ed.), *Governance and Public Sector Reform in Asia: Paradigm Shift or Business As Usual?*, (London: Curzon Press Limited, 2002): p. 276.

[105] World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crises to Sustainable Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[106] World Bank, *Governance and Development* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

[107] C. Morris (1998), quoted in Ian Scott, op. cit., p. 277.

relating to 'new' policy paradigm of post-Washington Consensus[108]. Besides the Washington Consensus terminology of open markets, deregulation, liberalisation and structural adjustment, the governance, civil society, and democracy in the frame of decentralization have been included in the neoliberal discourse by the beginning of the 1990s. The governance, decentralization and local governance, referring mainly to civil society and democracy, get together in that 'new' reform strategies of the international organizations. The main reason of that emphasis on governance can be explained with the recognition by the World Bank, and other international organizations, that "*structural reform without the concomitant set of institutions to support such reform is likely to fail*"[109]. The strategy of institution-building or of institutional restructuring of state apparatuses finds its meaning in the concept of governance including attention paid to the role of politics in the process of implementing reforms.

The stress on 'less government, more governance', 'governance without government' or 'from government to governance' by the international organizations can be interpreted as the de-statization of state functions with transferring them to public-private partnerships, which means that the national state can no longer be taken for granted as the sovereign coordinator of economic, political, and social life. According to this argument, not only strengthened central and local governments but also the involvement of other actors from civil society organizations and the private sector in partnerships with government at all levels must be secured for the 'improved' governance:

> *Social-political forms of governing are forms in which public or private*
> *actors do not act separately but in conjunction, together, in*

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[108] P. Rose, "From Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus: The Influence of International Organizations on Education Policy and Practice in Malawi", *Globalization, Societies and Education*, 1(1), 2003.

[109] Kanishka Jayasuriya and Andrew Rosser, "Economic orthodoxy and the East Asian crisis", *Third World Quarterly*, 22 (3), 2001: p. 389.

> *combination. . . Modes of social-political governance are, in our opinion, always an outcome of public and private interaction.*[110]

In this recent literature, decentralization of authority has been discussed relating with the concept of governance defined as "*the mode of conduct of specific institutions or organizations with multiple stakeholders, the role of public-private partnerships, and other kinds of strategic alliances among autonomous but interdependent organizations*"[111]. Within this definition of governance, decentralization is generally associated with local government, democracy and equality. It is assumed that the public sector, private sector, and civil society work together as partners / 'friends' in building a stronger economy and a better society in the context of employment of governance. Decentralization of administration is accepted as the only way to construct the transition to democracy and equality in local areas. In fact, there is a growing international consensus that good governance can and should be the primary mean to eliminate poverty and inequality. It is accepted that institutions under 'control' of local government can be democratic, and can ensure political equality and participation to decision-making process for people living in local areas. Despite the consideration in 'power' of governance that eliminates poverty and inequality from society, some authors pay attention to the conflict between the call for more privatization, deregulation, and 'market' and the 'desire' for democracy and more participation in the decision-making process[112]. Öngen explains the opponent discourses of neoliberalism[113], inviting more pluralistic and participatory democracy as the political ideology on the one hand, and calling the apoliticized economy for the sake of the market as the economic ideology on

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[110] Jan Kooiman, 'Social-Political governance: Introduction' in Jan Kooiman (ed.) *Modern Governance: New Government-Society Interactions* (London: Sage, 1993): p. 2.

[111] Ibid.

[112] David Slater, op. cit., pp. 517-518; David Slater, "Decentralization, Territorial Power and the State: A Critical Response", Development and Change, 21 (3), 1990: pp. 491-500.

[113] Tülin Öngen, 'Yeni Liberal Dönüşüm Projesi ve Türkiye Deneyimi', in *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar I: Küresel Düzen: Birikim, Devlet ve Sınıflar*, 2003: 167-168.

the other hand. Nonetheless, for Öngen, the institutions of economic politics of neoliberalism eliminate the possibility of democracy in social relations. Leftwich also states that "*the evidences suggest that it is far from clear that economic liberalization will generate development and raise welfare across the board in the Third World*"[114]. The main rationale, excluding the such assertions of neoliberal literature that governance or decentralization bring more democracy and equality, can be a claim to re-bring public confidence back with more emphasis on democracy and participation. Christopher Morris, the International Monetary Fund's senior economist for the Asia and Pacific, has sustained this argument with these words: "*More and more evidence has come to light about the adverse consequences of governance problems on economic performance. . . the loss of public confidence in government*"[115]. The growing discontent with the inequalities created by neoliberalism, beyond doubt, pushed the neoliberals to design new tools and reforms to cope with the problems of crisis and legitimation. According to Manor, national politicians use decentralization to reconnect their regime with social groups by the way of "*controlling the actions of local government institutions*".[116] In addition, 'neoliberal democratization', democracy reduced liberalism, or combination of democracy and neoliberalism "*confined to a separate political sphere in which rights could be universally distributed without affecting property relations and the whole sphere of power and domination associated with them*"[117] in order to create a stable political environment for international capital investment.

Within the neoliberal framework, democracy is re-defined without any reference to the patterns of social conflict in society. The 'necessities' of democracy, such as

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[114] Adrian Leftwich, "Governance, democracy and development in the Third World", *Third World Quarterly*, 14 (3), 1993: p. 614.

[115] C. Morris (1998), quoted in Ian Scott, ibid.

[116] J. Manor, *The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1999): p.33.

[117] Ellen M. Wood, "A Tale of Two Democracies", *History Today*, 44 (5), 1994: 53.

governance, decentralization, and civil society, are assumed for benefit of every people living in society. However, decentralization in itself is no guarantee for improving the poor. Griffin states that "*it is conceivable, even likely in many countries, that power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist and applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre*".[118] In fact, this combination of governance, decentralization, democracy, and civil society are in line with the neoliberal values, and consistent with the "*capitalist regime, presided over by a minimal state which is also part of the wider governance of the New World Order*"[119]; they are the discourses of neoliberalism for continuation of neoliberal policies. For Mohanty:

> *'Empowerment', 'civil society', and 'democratization' form the new package of liberalization discourse which on their face value respond to the long-standing demands of struggling groups. In practice, however, each of them has been given a restricted meaning and has been oriented to serve the present global drive of western capitalism.*[120]

In conclusion of this part, it would not be wrong to say that decentralization has been a component of the hegemonic discourse of neoliberalism in both the Washington Consensus and post-Washington Consensus policies. In literature, there have been 'struggles over meaning, and definition' of the concept decentralization. The concepts are certainly "*the site of struggle*". This chapter can be evaluated as challenging the certain discursive emplacement and embodiment of this term and showing that there might be 'radical' definitions / discourses beyond the mainstream political discourse converged around neo-liberal discourse.

In the next part, it will be analyzed the relation between the project of neoliberal political agenda about the restructuring of state (relations) and the debate on the public sector reforms associated with the movement most often referred to as the "*new public*

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[118] K. Griffin, "Economic Development in a Changing World", *World Development*, 9 (3), 1981: p. 225.

[119] Adrian Leftwich, op. cit., p. 611.

[120] Chandra Mohanty, quoted in Frans J. Schuurman, op. cit., p. 163.

management", "*entrepreneurial government*" and "*governance*" in the discipline of public administration with the help of the critical reading of the concept decentralization, introduced before.

II. 3. Thinking about the Public Sector in Private Sector Terms:
A Critical Analysis of Decentralization[121] Policies in Public Administration

Since the early 1980s, governments in countries with both 'advanced' and 'emerging' market economies have been engaged in public sector reform including commercialization, privatization, marketization, deregulation and decentralization as ways of reducing the public sector in favor of the private sector. It can be stated that the debate on public sector restructuring is not new, but there are many references in 'public administration literature' stressing that "*this period saw wider-ranging public sector reforms than any other period of the twentieth century and with no sign of diminution of change into the early twenty-first century*"[122]. In fact, the rapidly intensifying transition in definitions and practices within public administration has been argued in literature as a 'limitless' and 'endless' process: "*Today, it is already much different from what it used to be 40, 30, and even 20 or 10 years ago. In the coming years it is going to change even more*"[123]. It is asserted that this 'period of change' has been 'employed' in the countries with different histories with similar kinds of reform efforts and strategies[124], codified as

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[121] *Decentralization, including the delegation of certain functions to the private sector or non-governmental organizations, is one of the recurrent notions in the New Public Management. In that section, the issue, decentralization, will be discussed as one of changes together with the others such as commercialization, privatization, marketization, deregulation. These changes are explained in the name of decentralization policies.*

[122] Owen E. Hughes, *Public Management and Administration: An Introduction* (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): p. vi.

[123] Eran Vigoda, *Public Administration: An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis* (New York: Marcel Dekker Incorporated, 2002): p. v.

[124] E. C. Kamack, 'Globalization and Public Administration Reform' in Joseph S. Nye (ed.) *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000):p.229, p.249-250.

the only way of getting rid of "*the rigid, hierarchical, bureaucratic form of public administration*"[125] by scholars. The changes in public sector, certainly, have brought with them 'new' political ideologies and philosophies, and 'new' conceptions / conceptualization(s) to the 'world of discipline of public administration'. That widespread change in the public sector has been discussed in the context of a paradigm shift from the traditional model of public administration or the 'old public administration' to '*reinventing government*' or '*new public management*': "*The reforms represent a paradigm shift*"[126]. Actually, the concepts of '*reinventing government*' and '*new public management*', point to introduction of decentralization policies, private sector styles of management, and privatization for deregulating government and aiming at a minimalist state[127], have dominated the debate on public administration reforms in recent years involving the issues as to whether or not there is a new paradigm, or even an old one, whether or not there is a global movement of public sector reform, and even whether or not anything has changed at all.

Accordingly, this part will continue to an introduction to, and assessment of, the theories and principles of public management, particularly the public sector reforms associated with the movement most often referred to as 'the new public management'. After reviewing the context of what has come to be termed 'new public management', the critical analysis of public sector reforms in transition being related with the neoliberal political ideology and new right governments will be included. It will be given importance to lay out the reasons that so many countries have embarked on a program of governmental reform and to lay out some of the common elements of those reforms throughout that section. The main interest in this part is to explain why there is a convergence in government management reform efforts at this point in history, the

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[125] O. E. Hughes, *Public Management & Administration* (London: Macmillan, 1994): p. 1.

[126] David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992): p. 19.

[127] Melvin J. Dubnick, 'A Coup Against King Bureaucracy', in John J. Dilulio (ed.) *Deregulating the Public Service: Can Government Be Improved?* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1994): p. 251.

1980s and 1990s, with the debate on restructuring state and, how these efforts are related to neoliberal political agenda.

II.3.1. "New Public Management", "Entrepreneurial Government","Governance": *Theoretical Background*

It is widely believed that the 1980s represented a turning point for the transformation of governments in the context of "*new forms of governance, new relationships between citizens and their governments, and between the public, private, and non-governmental sectors, new processes of policy-making*"[128]. In literature, it means that the public sector reform is not simply an institutional reform or a minor change in administration style or merely a change of name, but a 'mental'[129] / 'paradigmatic'[130] change in the role of government in society. Therefore, this 'period of change' is associated with the rise of new reform paradigm(s) in public administration under names such as the *new public management*[131], *entrepreneurial government*[132], and *governance*[133]. Although these new

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[128] Laurance E. Lynn, "A Critical Analysis of the New Public Management", *International Public Management Journal*, 1 (1), 1998: p. 108.

[129] Lee Parker and Graeme Gould, "Changing Public Sector Accountability: Critiquing New Directions", *Accounting Forum*, 23 (2), 1999: p. 111.

[130] *There has been some debate over whether or not public management, particularly the new public management, is a new paradigm for public sector organization. There are those in favour of regarding the reforms as a new paradigm* (David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992; OECD, *Public Management Reform and Economic and Social Development* (Paris: OECD, 1998). *There are others who argue against the notion of paradigm change in public sector management* (Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000; Laurance E. Lynn, "A Critical Analysis of the New Public Management", *International Public Management Journal*, 1 (1), 1998: p. 108.

[131] Christopher Hood, "A public management for all seasons?", *Public Administration*, 69 (1), 1991: pp. 3-19.

[132] David Osborne and Ted Gaebler, *Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector* (New York: Penguin Books, 1992).

[133] World Bank, The Reform of Public Sector Management: Lessons from Experience (Washington: World Bank, 1991).

reform paradigm(s) are called with different names, "*they all essentially describe the same phenomenon*"[134]: a flexible, market-based form of public management, instead of the "*rigid, hierarchical, bureaucratic form of public administration*"[135]. In point of that fact, when the literature on public sector reform is surveyed, it can be noticed that much of the discussion is construed within the 'new public management', 'entrepreneurial government', or 'governance' paradigm(s) referring to a set of public sector reforms designed to encourage the introduction of private sector practices into the public sector, privatization and deregulation, decentralization, market forces, competition, and marketization of provision of what were previously public goods. In one of Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reports, the new reform paradigm is argued with its main characteristics:

> *This new management paradigm emphasises results in terms of "value for money", to be achieved through management by objectives, the use of markets and market-type mechanisms, competition and choice, and devolution to staff through a better matching of authority, responsibility and accountability.*[136]

Within these common elements of the public sector reform, the emphasis on the 'incursion' of private sector practices into public sector is the ground / 'headstone' because of the conviction that "*if governments could function more like market organizations then the public sector would perform better*"[137]. In that connection with the 'exaltation' of greater competition in public sector governments, and of governments as 'profit-making enterprises', Gunn 'gets excited':

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[134] Owen E. Hughes, *Public Management and Administration: An Introduction* (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): p. 4.

[135] O. E. Hughes, *Public Management & Administration* (London: Macmillan, 1994): p. 1.

[136] OECD, *Public Management Reform and Economic and Social Development* (Paris: OECD, 1998): p. 13.

[137] B. Guy Peters, 'Governing in a Market Era: Alternative Models of Governing' in Eran Vigoda (ed.) *Public Administration: An Interdisciplinary Critical Analysis* (New York: Marcel Dekker Incorporated, 2002): p. 88.

> *A more recent and equally simplistic view holds that the government has everything to learn from more efficient practices in the private sector. . . this [is] the 'business management' perspective*[138]

During the 1980s and 1990s, government was often characterized as '*large*', '*bloated*', '*highly politicized*', '*excessively regulatory or controlling*', '*corrupt*', and '*parasitic*'.

> *All blamed the dead hand of bureaucracy, especially the poor performance of public bureaucracies and the daily annoyances of irksome restrictions, cumbrous red-tape, unpleasant officials, poor service and corrupt practices.*[139]

It has been discussed that bureaucratic government organizations are often inefficient and ineffective for "*the rapidly changing. . . society and economy*"[140]. These organizations are "*sluggish, inflexible and insensitive to changing human needs and novel circumstances*"[141]. Public sector institutions are 'charged' with decreasing overall productivity of countries, impairing international competitiveness, distorting labour markets with their personnel practices[142]. In addition, as monopolies and direct or sole providers of public services, the government organizations restrain the 'customer-citizens' from the options of reaching the alternative providers of the same 'public' services. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is also insistent on "*provision for client choice through the creation of competitive environments within*

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[138] L. Gunn (1988), quoted in Brian Blundell and Alex Murdock, *Managing in the Public Sector* (Oxford: Butterworth Heinemann, 1997): p. 29.

[139] Gerald Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991):p. 74.

[140] Osborne and Gaebler, op. cit., p. 12.

[141] Gerald Caiden, op. cit., p. 1.

[142] M. Naim, "Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion", Working Draft of a Paper Prepared for the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, (1999), available online at www.img.org, download on 15 March 2005.

and between public sector organizations and non-government competitors"[143], since the market is seen to be capable of providing better services in the framework of new public management paradigm[144].

According to this perspective, there are two main necessities of public sector restructuring that 'bureaucracy of the traditional model of administration' as an organizing principle must be moved away and, market (rules) should be taken as a main basis for public sector (re)organization[145]. However, this view cannot be understood as a rigid dichotomy between state and market. There are many arguments about the 'coalition' between public and private stressing the necessity of strong state institutions with devolving some of its functions to the private sector for an efficient market. Stiglitz argues about the relation between the government and the private sector in the 'new agenda' as:

> *In some circumstances the new agenda sees government as helping to create market. . . In other areas. . . it sees the government and the private sector working together as partners, each with its own responsibilities. And in still others. . . it sees government as providing the essential regulation without which markets cannot function[146].*

The call for reforms to the public sector can be heard loud and clear, especially with the 'onset' of the Thatcherism to the United Kingdom in 1979 and of the Reaganism to the United States in 1980. In this period, "*the overwhelming impression is one of change and the creation of a new agenda for the public sector. . . a fundamental re-assessment*

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[143] OECD, ibid.

[144] Lee Parker and Graeme Gould, "Changing Public Sector Accountability: Critiquing New Directions", *Accounting Forum*, 23 (2), 1999.

[145] Vincent Ostrom, *The Intellectual Crisis in American Public Administration* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1989).

[146] Stiglitz (2001), quoted in Owen E. Hughes, *Public Management and Administration: An Introduction* (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): p. 229.

has taken place"[147]. In the United Kingdom, the widespread privatization of public enterprises and cutbacks in the public sector had been implemented during the Thatcher government. Horton argues that "*during the 1980s and 1990s, the civil service moved from an administered to a managed bureaucracy and from a system of public administration to one of new public management*"[148] in the United Kingdom. By the same token, Reagan often stated that government had become '*part of the problem, not part of the solution*' in the United States. Then, the publication of 'Reinventing Government' by Osborne and Gaebler in 1992, emphasizing the business-like management, client-orientedness, and 'market-like' competition as the main principles of government policy, influences deeply public sector reform in the United States. They declared:

> *Our thesis is simple: The kind of governments that developed during the industrial era, with their sluggish, centralized bureaucracies, their preoccupation with rules and regulations, and their hierarchical chains of command, no longer work very well.*[149]

After this statement, these authors described the main characteristics of what effective governments should be in their book. According to them, firstly, governments must be "*catalytic*" with being a 'facilitator', rather than a direct or sole provider of public services. In addition, it must be "*market-oriented*" in solving problems through market forces rather than larger government programs. Moreover, public agencies should be "*competitive*" rather than monopolistic by deregulation and privatization. What is more, government structure must be "*decentralized*" by the way of 'teamwork' among government agencies at different levels and with groups outside of government for an effective government. Following the election of Bill Clinton, his vice-president Al Gore

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[147] A. Lawton and A. Rose, *Organization and Management in the Public Sector* (London: Pitman, 1991): p. 147.

[148] Sylvia Horton, 'The Civil Service' in Sylvia Horton and David Farnham (eds.) *Public Management in Britain* (1999) (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999): p. 145.

[149] Osborne and Gaebler, op. cit., p. 11-12.

prepared a report, the National Performance Review, that called for a more business-like entrepreneurial government adopting these main arguments of Osborne and Gaebler to the American federal government[150]. In literature, there has been some arguments that even left of center parties of 'First World' countries, which used to view the state as the solution to many problems, are now more willing for a smaller states. In Sweden, for instance, Flynn and Strehl write: "*Whereas public spending and state intervention were previously seen as 'solutions' they were now, for the first time, perceived as problems*"[151].

The public sector restructuring has been discussed in the context of defining the role of government, and of adopting principles of market relations such as economic liberalization, and privatization of public enterprises in the Third World countries as well as the 'First World' countries in 1990s. It is believed that the "*basic principles are relevant for every country*"[152]. Administrative downsizing / decentralization of the state, as the main part of public sector reform, is generally carried out by governments of the Third World because of structural adjustment agreements with international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. For example, the World Bank publishes numerous studies, *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance: A World Bank Strategy[153]*, *World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World[154]*, *World Development Report 2002: Building*

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[150] Walter J. M. Kickert, "Public Governance in the Netherlands: An Alternative to Anglo-American 'Managerialism'", *Public Administration*, 75, 1997: p. 731-732.

[151] Norman Flynn and Franz Strehl (eds.) *Public Sector Management in Europe* (Hempstead: Prentice Hall Europe, 1996): p. 37.

[152] M. Holmes and D. Shand, "Management Reform: Some Practitioner Perspectives on the Past Ten Years", *Governance*, 8(5), 1995: p. 577.

[153] World Bank, *Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance* (Herndon: World Bank, The Office of the Publisher, 2000).

[154] The World Bank, *World Development Report: State in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997).

Institutions for Markets[155], which all emphasize the critical importance of restructuration of public institutions. For these institutions, 'poorly functioning' public sector institutions are major constraints to 'growth' and 'equitable development' in many developing countries.

Under the 'advise' of these organizations[156] and 'implementation' of the Third World governments, many countries are adopting principles of market liberalization, including cutting the public sector and restructuring to follow the principles of public management. They have been extensively involved in public-sector reform efforts including privatization, decentralization, financial management, tax administration, civil-service and judicial reform. That public sector reform is justified in these countries by the reasons that "*strict hierarchies were the norm. . . many different layers made for an overly heavy bureaucracy typically slow to move an. . . the bureaucracy was a prestigious and relatively well-paid elite even in the poorest of countries*"[157]. After that, the people living in Third World countries found themselves undergoing various kinds of structural adjustment through international agencies and their governments. According to structural adjustment policies, state-owned enterprises should be privatized and, "*state intervention in both the management of the economy generally as well as in the provision of social services is to be minimised*".[158] In 1991, for example, the World Bank, with pointing to the high costs of public services, and the relationship between excessive state intervention and corruption in public sector, declared to be restricted the

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[155] The World Bank, *World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 2002).

[156] *Some scholars have argued that governments in the Third World have lost control of policies because of the influence of international actors* [see Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996)]. *However, the 'effective' role of governments on implementing the structural adjustment policies escapes notice of these scholars* [see for this critique: P. Q. Hirst and G. Thompson, *Globalization in Question* (Oxford: Polity, 1999)].

[157] Owen E. Hughes, *Public Management and Administration: An Introduction* (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): p. 218.

[158]Jeffrey Haynes, *Third World Politics: A Concise Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996): p. 84.

size of the public sector by the governments of Third World countries which means a stronger orientation in public sector towards the market[159].

II. 3. 2. Putting the New Public Management in a Critical Perspective: *'New Wine in Old Bottles!'*

The main rationale for public sector reform has been stated as modernization and change in society to effect social and economic transformation, and to provide a competent institutional environment for 'growth' and 'development' in the Third World countries with improving public sector performance. However, it can be found a broader ideological subtext behind these particular arguments about the public sector. The debate on reform involves specific 'discussion' positions fundamentally determined by how the positions of participants view the public sector in a general ideological sense. In connection with this point, it is emphasized that "*the motivations for the market-oriented reforms of the New Public Management are political as well as economic*"[160], contrary to the arguments that the new public management is an "*'apolitical' framework within which many different values could be pursued effectively*"[161] . Following that argument, it is crucial to understand why there is a convergence between 'rise' of the New Public Management and attempts for re-defining the role of state at a particular point in history, the 1980s and 1990s.

By the end of the 1980s, the debate on state / government shifted from 'hollowing out' or 'rolling back' the state to institutional restructuring of state apparatuses, which means that "*the debate is now not whether governments should have no role, but what that role*

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[159] World Bank, World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991): p. 128; 130-135.

[160] Linda Kaboolian, "The New Public Management: Challenging the boundaries of the management vs. administration debate", *Public Administration Review,* 58 (3), 1998.

[161] Christopher Hood, op. cit., p. 8.

should be"[162]. Then, restructuration of 'good' government for the sake of the market is needed, as Stiglitz argues: "*There is a 'special responsibility' for government to create the institutional infrastructure that markets require in order to work effectively*"[163]. In this context, 'building institutions for a capable public sector' appeared in the discourse of the international organizations such as the World Bank[164] as a way of increasing the 'effective performance' of the market. It means that after downsizing the public sector, "*whatever remained in the public sector should be better managed*"[165]. That given importance to public sector restructuring can be related with the crucial role of public sector to play in determining the legal framework to "*enforce contracts. . . regulations, taxes, permits, infrastructure, standards, conditions of employment*"[166] which are necessary for providing legitimate conditions for competition and confidence of capital in the market.

The new public management reforms, including commercialization, privatization, marketization, deregulation and decentralization, are reflections of neoliberal political agenda as a 'directive' for organizing the market around the pursuit of wealth maximization that declares the market as the only 'viable' future, especially after the dramatic fall of the Soviet Union and its socialist system. However, there are many critiques stressing that the reforms challenge the collectivist provision of social services such as education, health, community care, public transport, and welfare services by government. The critics argue that new public management reforms mean "*cutting back*

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[162] Owen E. Hughes, op. cit., p. 71.

[163] Stiglitz (2001), quoted in Owen E. Hughes, *Public Management and Administration: An Introduction* (Gordonsville: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003): p. 346-347.

[164] The World Bank, *World Development Report: State in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997).

[165] Uğur Ömürgönülşen, "The Emergence of a New Approach to the Public Sector", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 52 (1-4), 1997: p. 518.

[166] Owen E. Hughes, ibid.

to basics and producing better government for less [people]"[167]. The stress on reducing the expenditures for social services in the Third World by the reports of international financial organizations "*comes with a panoply of conditions; it is in no way a gift*"[168] especially for the poor, that is again losers, since increases in basic food prices as well as medical and education costs with the implementation of these reforms impress the lives of poor deeply: "*No scholar in the world has ever succeeded in demonstrating that service provision by the private sector is less expensive overall than by the public sector*"[169]. The protests and food riots in many countries in the 1980s point to "*social and political repercussions*"[170] of the implementation of structural adjustment programmes. Then, the rising health and education expenditures goes hand in hand with privatization and commodification of these services. With the public sector reform, marketization is being penetrated to all spaces of social relations comprising the relation between citizens and their governments. Public is redefined as 'customers', only having commercial roles in the market. The concept of 'customer-citizen' individualizes the process of reaching public goods "*with a tendency for social polarization with the possibility of either . . . collective action or social breakdown*"[171].

Since the 1980s, administrative reforms across the globe have led to privatization that means reducing the size of government - and public sector - by transferring government-owned industries to the private sector. Downsizing of the public sector with the way of privatization 'invites' the massive displacement effects for labor such as the reduction in number of personnel working in public sector including the removal of personnel to

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[167] These are the words of Al Gore, the vice-president of Bill Clinton (1993), quoted in Owen E. Hughes, op. cit., p. 5.

[168] Jeffrey Haynes, ibid.

[169] Robert Went, Globalization: Neoliberal Challenge, Radical Responses (London: Pluto Press, 2000): p. 30.

[170] Jeffrey Haynes, op. cit., p. 86.

[171] Adam Tickell and A. Jarnie Peck, "Social Regulation after Fordism: Regulation Theory, Neoliberalism and the Global-Local Nexus", *Economy and Society*, 24 (3), 1995: p. 366.

private payrolls with no employment guarantee and "*resisting union demands*"[172] or to throw the employees out of their positions.

The emphasis that administration is a technical process, the assumption that the relation between state and citizen is a producer-consumer relation, a stress on 'incursion' of private sector practices into public sector, and on reducing costs of public services, as signs, show that the new public management and the debate on restructuring state in the context of neoliberal political agenda goes *hand in hand* in literature. According to Ömürgönülşen, the 'newness' of the paradigm, new public management, is revealed in the neoliberal process of restructuring state and redefining the roles of state[173]. Because the popularity of new public management in public administration literature appears when restructuring of relation between state and market as complementary entities is argued in discourse and politics of international financial institutions. In that point, the words of Naim are expressive for understanding the main reason(s) of why public sector restructuring is crucial for reforms in neoliberal era:

> *Sound macroeconomics and a competitive private sector are necessary.*
> *But stability and market reforms are bound to be periodically derailed*
> *without a strong and efficient public sector[174].*

In conclusion of this chapter, it can be stated that the debates on public sector restructuring, with names such as "*new public management*", "*entrepreneurial government*" and "*governance*", in the around discourses of 'growth', 'development', 'anti-corruption', 'alleviating poverty', 'participation', try to legitimate the neglection of social roles by state because of strengthening its 'national' economy for international

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[172] Christopher Hood, op. cit., p. 5.

[173] Uğur Ömürgönülşen, "The Emergence of a New Approach to the Public Sector", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 52 (1-4), 1997.

[174] M. Naim, "Fads and Fashion in Economic Reforms: Washington Consensus or Washington Confusion", Working Draft of a Paper Prepared for the IMF Conference on Second Generation Reforms, (1999), available online at www.img.org, download on 15 March 2005.

competition[175]. *In latter chapter*, with keeping in mind the critical reading of the concept decentralization and 'hidden' and/or 'masked' reasons of public sector reforms, an account of the Turkish public administration system will be presented.

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[175] Bob Jessop, 'The transition to post-Fordism and the Schumpeterian workfare state', in Roger Burrows and Brian Loader (eds.) *Towards a Post-Fordist Welfare State?* (London. Routledge, 1994): p. 24.

CHAPTER III

AN EVALUATION OF TURKISH EXPERIENCE OF
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM
BEFORE AND AFTER 1980 IN TURKEY

The public sector restructuring has been discussed in literature as a common process being engaged by a large number of national governments around the world since the early 1980s. Kamack states that although they "*have different histories and different electoral systems; they are at different stages of development*", the countries are "*employing a set of reform concepts and strategies that are remarkably similar*"[176]. That 'standardization' of public sector reforms, being implemented in many countries, is being explained by the role of "*globalization. . . transnational pressures on nation states*"[177], which make way to "*erode the existing single-country distinctiveness of*

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[176] E. C. Kamack, 'Globalization and Public Administration Reform' in Joseph S. Nye (ed.) *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2000):p.229, p.249.

[177] *Today, the phenomenon of globalization is a widely discussed topic in social sciences. Capital goes all around the world and financial flows are made between far distant places. For adding all economies in global capitalization process, the importance of multinational corporations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization increases. The relations of production, trade and finance integrate to the global economic system with the policies and programmes of these multinational corporations more rapidly. It is assumed that this phenomenon of globalization weakens the 'traditional' power and sovereignty of nation-states. According to that argument, the many aspects of globalization process are not in control for the states. In this context, many authors discuss the issue of the changing role of the nation-state. Some authors argue that the globalization process will inevitably lead to the decline of the nation-state system. Other authors refuse this argument and insist that nation-states will continue to have their powers and sovereignty. For a comprehensive discussion of that debate on the relation between nation-state and globalization see* M. Shaw, *Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished Revolution* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); E. M. Wood, 'Unhappy families: global capitalism in a world of nation-states', in *Monthly Review*, July-August, 1999; S. Smith, 'The fall and rise of the state in international politics', in G. Duncan (ed.) *Democracy and the Capitalist State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989); S. Sassen, 'Territory and territoriality in the global economy', *International Sociology*, 15:2, 2000: pp. 372-393.

public service markets"[178]. However, it is a necessity to be careful about over-generalizations on public sector reforms. Especially, the discourse on the invisible hand(s) of globalization, being used for answering nearly all questions in literature on social sciences, seems not to explain why "*there is a gap in decentralization policies between what was proposed* [by the international organizations] *and what was implemented* [in the Third World countries]"[179]; or why "*many decentralization programs fail to improve either economic or administrative efficiencies*"[180]. According to international financial organizations, the 'failure' arises from "*political and social instability, weak private sectors, and high levels of corruption in government*"[181], "*absence of managerial and technical capacity at the local government*"[182], the politicians who "*see little personal advantage and much potential harm from decentralization and devolution of the provision of goods and services*"[183]. Instead of taking account of those technical and pragmatic arguments, in that thesis the differences between the aims, emphases, ways and speed of implementing 'national' reform programmes will be explained with relating to "*country's state tradition, system of government. . . its political and administrative culture, the political leadership style in its politics*"[184]. Because it is noticed that the technical arguments point to the 'will' of

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[178] Uğur Ömürgönülşen, "The Emergence of a New Approach to the Public Sector", *Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 52 (1-4), 1997: p. 531.

[179] K. Mathur, 'Administrative Decentralization in Asia' in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (London: Sage Publications, 1983): p. 69.

[180] Jerry, M. Silverman, *Public Sector Decentralization: Economic Policy and Sector Investment Programs* (Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 1992): p. 52.

[181] Dennis A. Rondinelli and G. Shabbir Cheema, 'The competent state: Governance and administration in an era of globalization' in Dennis Rondinelli (ed.) *Reinventing Government for the Twenty-First Century: State Capacity in a Globalizing Society* (Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2003): p. 247.

[182] Jerry, M. Silverman, ibid.

[183] Anthony B. L. Cheung and Ian Scott, 'Governance and public sector reforms in Asia: Paradigms, paradoxes and dilemmas', in Anthony Cheung (ed.), *Governance and Public Sector Reform in Asia: Paradigm Shift or Business As Usual?*, (London: Curzon Press Limited, 2002): p. 9.

[184] Uğur Ömürgönülşen, op. cit., p. 532.

international organizations about extending market relations in public sector with the way of 'escaping' from any political restraints. Therefore, for a critical examination of these arguments, it is a necessity to analyze the public sector reform in the context of a field of social relations, namely, of the class struggles in country and of the international dimensions that class struggles involve in: "*Change or administrative reform in public administration in a definite time can only be carried out as a necessity of . . . class interests*"[185]. Choosing that way of explanation will provide to avoid defining change as 'something out there' "*without history, without causality, without agency*"[186], as well as to clarify what the 'fate' of public sector reform will be in specific relation(s) between the national and international contexts.

The explanations in *previous chapter*, that summarized the transition in government reform from the stress on the policies of open markets, privatization, deregulation, liberalisation and structural adjustment to the policies taking into consideration the role of state and building institutions for 'effective performance' of the market including the administrative / public sector reform, indicate the 'general line' of the formation of policies on administrative restructuring / reorganization. However, for revealing differences in the implementation of market reforms in public sector between different Third World countries, the historically specific reasons behind these differences need to be analysed profoundly in the context of individual countries. While seeking the reasons, remembering the words of Jessop that "*we should always seek to trace the circulation of power through wider and more complex sets of social relations both within or beyond the state*"[187], it will be firstly asked in what sense the demands and interests of the conflicting social groups shape the agenda of the public sector reforms.

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[185] Gencay Şaylan, 'Bir yapısal dönüşüm sorunu olarak yönetim reformu' in *Prof. Dr. Kemal Fikret Arık'a Armağan* (Ankara: Sevinç, 1973): p. 499.

[186] Norman Fairclough, Language in the New Capitalism in *Discourse and Society*, 2002, 13 (2): 163-166.

[187] Bob Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002): p. 41.

Following these issues stated above, the case of Turkey, with a depiction of its matrix of social relations and historical processes, will be introduced in framework of the present chapter. As stated in title of this chapter, the year 1980 will be analysed as a turning point, associated with the stabilization and the structural adjustment policies within new economic programme introduced in January 24, 1980 and the coup d'etat in September 12, 1980 that was a *sine qua non* of implementing neoliberal economic policies in Turkey. In fact, the 1980s, described as "*a major break from past policies*"[188] by the World Bank, witnessed the attempts "*to restore the structure and working of state and its organs, which is defined as administration*"[189]. After a brief explanation on historical development of administrative reform since the years of Ottoman Empire, post-1980 era - with referencing mainly to arrangements in administrative structure - will be discussed in this chapter. The point of departure in that part will be a defence that an analysis about the current public sector reform in Turkey calls for a debate based on laying out the aspects of the accompanying historical processes and relations that makes the neoliberal agenda about public sector restructuring viable and/or necessary.

III. 1. A Brief History of the Development of Administrative Reform in Turkey
- from the last years of the Ottoman Empire to the days of the Great Depression -

Despite the arguments that "*not until after the Second World War that idea of administrative reform as it is conceived today gained wide currency*"[190], a 'journey' for finding the words on reasons which necessitate the reorganization of the administration in history of Turkey will be continued to the centuries of Ottoman Empire, especially to

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[188] The World Bank (1988), quoted in Ziya Öniş, 'Political Economy of Turkey in the 1980s: Anatomy of Unorthodox Liberalism", in *State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University, 1998), endnote 2.

[189] Atilla Güney, "*State intervention in Turkey: an assessment of the relationship between the political and the economic spheres*", (Ankara: METU, 2002): p. 123. (unpublished thesis)

[190] Metin Heper, "Some Notes on the Assumptions of the Theory of Administrative Reform in the Ottoman-Turkish State", in *ODTU Gelisme Dergisi*, Fall, 3, 1971: p. 418.

the nineteenth century of *Tanzimat* (Regulations), in 1839-1876, when "*the central and provincial "representative" assemblies and councils*"[191] were founded. In fact, some Ottoman sultans and grand viziers made various efforts to actualize the imperial edicts, such as *Tanzimat Edict*, for the 'reorganization of administration' that can be exemplified with the proposals of Ali Pasha, introduced below, about the civil service of Ottoman Empire:

> *. . . a vast majority of civil servants are ill paid. . . The result is that skilled and talented men shun public service. The government of Your Majesty is then forced to recruit mediocre personnel whose sole aim is to improve their weak pecuniary situation . . . intelligent, hardworking, competent, and motivated individuals should direct Your Empire's civil* service *. . . It is Your Majesty's prerogative to introduce the indispensable principle of accountability, without which all progress is retarted and work inevitably destroyed.*[192]

In *Tanzimat* era, the Ottoman reformers began to make arrangements in administration, being continued to the years of decline, by the way of reorganization in structure of the provinces and of the military, and in personnel, tax and financial system, and of legalization of these changes. It was assumed that these reform attempts in administration of empire cannot be achieved without fighting against corruption. Therefore, there were articles about punishment of 'corrupt(s)' included in penal system of the Ottoman administration. The practices of period of Mustafa Reşif Pasha were, interestingly, covered to make the officials collectively not to accept bribe in front of the people with the way of being sworn to Quran[193].

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[191] Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century" in *International Political Science Review*, 1 (1), 1980: p. 82.

[192] The political testament of Ali Pasha, grand vizier to Ottoman Sultan Abdulaziz, about 1871, quoted in The World Bank, *World Development Report: State in a Changing World*, (Washington D.C: World Bank, 1997): p. 79.

[193] That oath includes the words that "*I have sworn an oath of loyalty to sultan and his rule; and of refusing the gifts except those that can be accepted by the approval of sultan; and of not to dissipate from treasury; and of not to allow for being spent from treasury without understanding that the spending is necessary; and of not to use anything belonging to treasury for my own interest; and of not to employ staff*

In literature, the studies, especially focusing on the components of 'center-periphery relations'[194], are asserted that the declarations, called as *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* (Imperial Rescript of Gülhane) and as *Tanzimat* (Regulations), and legal (re)formations were intended to "*reinforce the central power by making unfunctioned institutions work through various reforms*"[195]; "*establish a . . . centralized administration*"[196]; and, these reforms "*were motivated by the desire to strengthen the center itself*"[197]. According to those arguments, it can be found, behind declaring the equality of all citizens living in Ottoman Empire, a "*practical*"[198] relating with the efforts to "*mobilize the masses behind the state*"[199] by the way of integration of non-Moslem groups and of Moslem groups of the periphery into the state. Therefore, the assemblies and councils, that can be assumed as the places where those segmented components promoted to participate in the political system of the Ottoman Empire, were established as a part of implementation of the Tanzimat reforms after 1840. However, these assemblies and councils were assigned as "*new administrative unit*(s) *of the central government*"[200] and/or "*arms of the central*

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as a favour to someone", (Padişahıma ve devlet-i aliyelerine sadakatten ayrılmayacağıma ve padişahımın ruhsat-i seniyesi ile kabulü mecaz olan hedâyâ-yı resmiyeden başka memnu olan hediyeleri kabul etmeyeceğim ve emval-i miriyeyi irtikâb ve telef etmeyip kimseye ettirmeyeceğime ve lüzum-u hakikisi tebeyyün etmedikçe hazine-i miriyeden masraf yaptırmayacağıma ve hazine-i miriyeye ait hiç bir nesneyi zatım için kullanmayacağıma ve mücerret hatır için memur istihdamına lüzum görmeyeceğime vallahi...), quoted in Cahit Tutum, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma* (Ankara: TESAV, 2004): p. 63.

[194] In that literature, focusing on the components of center-periphery relations, 'center' points to the groups "*which try to uphold the state's autonomy and supremacy in the polity*"; on the other hand, 'periphery' refers to the groups "*who try to escape from the regulation of the state*", defined in the Metin Heper, op. cit. , p. 99.

[195] Mehmet Yılmaz, "*The strong state and local government*", (Ankara: Bilkent University): p. 56. (unpublished thesis)

[196] Metin Heper, op. cit. , p. 92.

[197] Ibid., p. 89.

[198] Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century" in *International Political Science Review*, 1 (1), 1980: p. 92.

[199] Ibid.

[200] Mehmet Yılmaz, op. cit., p. 58.

government in the localities"[201] that were controlled strictly by 'center' for collecting taxes more efficiently[202]. In that depiction of economic and social life at Ottoman Empire, the attempts to reorganization of the administration had never been realized for limiting the power of the state, *but* for restoring and reinforcing the central power[203]. The analyses based on the conflict between center and periphery argue that the ideas of enforcing the local administrations, of democracy, of participation of people to decision-making process and of achieving decentralization were considered as "*dangerous, if not a suicidal formula*"[204] because of being conducive to strengthen the separatist nationalist movements within the borders of Ottoman Empire: "*The state elites are sensitive to the crisis of integration, and therefore not sympathetic towards the periphery*"[205] that is assumed to include the attitudes/groups of being opposed to state domination. The anger of Hüseyin Cahit, spokesperson of the Committee for Union and Progress, at Prince Sebahattin who emphasized the necessity of "*free enterprise, constitutionalism, decentralization*"[206] for Ottoman Empire gives meaning to the following words of Metin Heper about state elites: "*Decentralization means to be in preparation for losing Mytilene, Chios and other islands, as Crete, and, for falling them into Greek's*

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[201] Ibid., p. 61.

[202] Metin Heper, op. cit. , p. 94; Mehmet Yılmaz, ibid.

[203] However, Mehmet Yılmaz states that the public services of Ottoman was improved in the nineteenth century -without detriment to state authority - because of economic reasons: "*The fact that the state elites were against the devolution of power did not mean that they were not interested in better organization of the public services and conducting urban affairs. In the nineteenth century, insufficient infrastructure of the cities was a barrier to the economic and social developments. Great Powers also forced the Ottoman state to have better port cities as center of economic activities which in turn necessitated better infrastructure*", see Mehmet Yılmaz, ibid.

[204] Menderes Çınar, "*An evaluation of the recent debates on restructuring of the Turkish government: Federalism and unitary state arguments*", (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1993): p. 36. (unpublished thesis)

[205] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverly: The Eothen Press, 1985): p. 98.

[206] Quoted in Birgül Ayman Güler, 'Yerel yönetimleri güçlendirmek mi? Adem-i merkeziyetçilik mi?' in Birgül Ayman Güler (ed.) *Devlette Reform Yazıları: Dünya'da ve Türkiye'de Ekonomik Liberalizasyondan Siyasi-İdari Liberalizasyona*, (Ankara: Paragraf, 2005): p. 228.

hands"[207]. In fact, while discussing about the issue of 'centralization / state 'versus' decentralization / local administration', in Turkey, the disunity within the Committee for Union and Progress in the beginning of 1900s regarding policies about centralization has given as an example in literature. In the discussions, revolving around in 1908-1914, Prince Sebahattin, in contrast to the defense of centralizing policies by Committee for Union and Progress, insisted that politically decentralized administration with the way of giving authority to provincial chambers for making laws and financial planning, and of opening a door to provinces to provide and use their own resources can be a 'panacea' for the administrative problems / 'ill's of the Ottoman state. In that discussion, the counter-proposal is that supporting decentralization means to move Ottoman society through "*failure*" and "*death*"[208], being related with the questions whether minorities will be content with administrative decentralization or ask for decentralization in the meaning of politics.

Before introducing the administrative reform attempts in the Republican era, the inclusion of criticisms on the description of confrontation between social groups in Ottoman Empire as one-dimensional form of conflict between center and periphery provides a chance of reading the history of Ottoman society and, then, of Turkish Republic, alternatively. Haldon states that it is a mistake made frequently in the context of the analysis on the 'all-powerful state'. That theoretical analysis is characterized by rejecting any explanatory primacy to social forces in producing social and economic change, and preceding the role of the state in explaining social and economic change. Therefore, for Haldon, it cannot enable to capture different social contradictions and different state policies depending on those contradictions[209]. On the contrary to Heper who argues that "*particularly from the perspective of relations between the center and*

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[207] In Turkish words: "*Adem-i merkeziyet Midilli'nin Sakız'ın vesair adaların hep birer Girit olması, hep Yunan ağuşuna atılması için birer hazırlık demektir*"; quoted in Birgül Ayman Güler, op. cit., p. 230.

[208] Ibid., p. 229.

[209] J. Haldon, *The State and Tributory Mode of Production* (Londra: Verso, 1993): p. 159.

periphery, there is an unmistakable continuity from the classical Ottoman period to the centuries of decline and into the nineteenth century"[210], some scholars stress that an analysis on the relations between producers and exploiters and, conflicts within exploiters on control of sources can reveal the complex political and social structure in Ottoman society and also historically specific conditions where/when/why the Ottoman Empire needed reforms in its administration[211]. For example, the analysis stating that there was no institution between state/center and citizen/local as a means of power cannot enlighten the examples of social conflicts as peasant riots or resistance of Ayan[212]. However, the understanding of politics with the way of basic cleavage between a dominant centre and a fragmented periphery explains the social relations in the Ottoman society through a lack of "*a tradition of multiple confrontations as a way of resolving conflicts*"[213]. In addition, the thesis on the absolute subjection of local to center is unacceptable because of that local administrations had autonomy 'vis-a-vis' the center. In other words, the local officials were not the officials of center simply, but were power groups who bargain or struggle with the officials of center[214]. These defences of authors criticize the one-dimensional assumption that "*it is significant that the initiative for the reform always came from the center and from the Great Powers*"[215].

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[210] Metin Heper, "Center and Periphery in the Ottoman Empire with Special Reference to the Nineteenth Century" in *International Political Science Review*, 1 (1), 1980: p. 98.

[211] Galip Yalman, 'Türkiye'de devlet ve burjuvazi: Alternatif bir okuma denemesi' in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): pp. 44-75; Fuat Ercan, 'Sınıftan kaçış: Türkiye'de kapitalizmin analizinde sınıf gerçekliğinden kaçış üzerine' in A. H. Köse, F. Şenses, E. Yeldan (eds.), *İktisat Üzerine Yazılar I: Küresel Düzen: Birikim, Devlet ve Sınıflar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2003): pp. 611-668; Demet Dinler, "Türkiye'de güçlü devlet geleneği tezinin eleştirisi", *Praksis*, 9, 2003.

[212] Demet Dinler, op. cit., p. 22.

[213] Metin Heper, *The State Tradition in Turkey* (Beverly: The Eothen Press, 1985): p. 149.

[214] Tarık Şengül, 'Türkiye'de kentsel gelişimin izlediği yol üzerine: Bir dönemleme girişimi', in *Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset, Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçleri Üzerine Yazılar* (İstanbul: Demokrasi Kitaplığı, 2001): p. 62.

[215] Metin Heper, op. cit. , p. 97.

Actually, when turning back to the discussion on decentralization -as a 'creator' for national disunity or for 'resurgence' of Ottoman Empire-, the claims for developing a political strategy based on centralization or on decentralization for the reorganization / reform of administration structure during the last years of Ottoman Empire pointed to the existence of different social groups within the Committee for Union and Progress. The reforms, being designed for a '(re)new(ed) society', were not 'present' in the hands of center, *but* were the issue of power struggle between social groups who gave a priority to 'the spirit of being together' on the one hand and/or chose to look for the ways of creating the economic development on the other hand[216].

That debate, then, around which formed the Turkish state[217], moved to the Grand National Assembly during the War of Independence. According to Savran, the 'site' of Assembly was witnessing the 'throes' of transition from pre-capitalist multinational formation of empire to 'modern' capitalist nation-state[218]. In this period, if being accepted 'a historical break from the empire' stated by Savran, it must be found an 'upside down' in organization of state administration for the 'sake' of capital accumulation in the new state form, the Republic. In relation with that point, there are arguments confronting each other in literature whether "*continuity rather than change characterizes Turkish political culture*"[219]. Sürgit and Toprak argue that the (re)organization of state administration, especially public administration, of period of the Republic was realized *in* 'inherited' system from the Ottoman Empire by being (re)formed according to new social conditions[220]. Although Tutum agrees with the views

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[216] Fuat Ercan, op. cit., p. 632.

[217] Ibid.

[218] Sungur Savran, '20. yüzyılın politik mirası' in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 19.

[219] Metin Heper, 'The Ottoman Legacy and Turkish Politics', *Journal of International Affairs*, 54 (1), 2000: 1.

[220] Kenan Sürgit, *Türkiye'de İdari Reform* (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 1972): p. 65; Erkan Toprak, *Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma* (Ankara: Şubat, 2005): p. 107.

that the Republican era gets the 'heritage' of administration structure from Ottoman Empire with its all officials, he emphasizes to remember the efforts for reorganization of administrative system including the establishment of new organizations at the central level[221]. It was a necessity not only for provision of 'public services' which were previously undertaken by the Ottoman state, but also for creation of the image of a new hegemonic power in the eyes of the ruled classes: *"The defeat of the Ottoman Empire. . . lead to. . . the complete erosion of its legitimacy. Under these conditions, the state could be reconstructed on the basis of a new legitima*[tion]"[222]. Then, he states that a rapid legislation period was experienced, despite being at war, in the early years of Republic[223]. The arrangements in administration made during these years were given more weight to being spread the policies of 'new' state to the people[224]. That centralist tendency towards reinforcement of the powers of central government has been explained in literature with the rationale of Republic about overcoming the 'external and internal enemies'. According to Şaylan, the functions of state were limited by the maintainance of *"order and security"* in the very first years of the Republic[225]. This argument can be connected with the statement of 'strong state' - calling the cleavage between center and periphery back to the analysis - that remains sensitive to any kind of challenge to its power. The decentralization of authority to periphery was considered - again - to be dangerous for integrating national unity during this 'political integration' and/or creation/invention of nation-state process: *"Between 1923 and 1946 the periphery. . . was suspect, and because it was considered an area of political disaffection, the political*

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[221] Cahit Tutum, Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma (Ankara: TESAV, 2004): p. 66.

[222] Haldun Gülalp, "Capitalism and the Modern State: Rethinking the Creation of the Turkish Republic", in *Journal of Historical Sociology*, 7 (2), 1994: 173.

[223] Cahit Tutum, op. cit. 67.

[224] Ibid.

[225] Gencay Şaylan, 'Cumhuriyet bürokrasisi', in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi v. II* (İstanbul: İletişim): p. 299.

center kept it under close observation"[226]. The intolerance of any opinion about the policies of decentralization has been discussed giving reference to the history of (non/un)development of local government tradition in Turkey. In respect of the views based on the duality between center and periphery, the influence of 'second group', 'representative' of periphery in the Grand National Assembly during the War of Independence, was perceived in principles of the 1921 Constitution. The principles of strengthening local government institutions and/or of decentralization of state authority with the way of giving autonomy to the provinces and provincial assemblies for the arrangement of the matters such as education, health, economy, agriculture, re-settlement and social services was/were taken place in the 1021 Constitution[227]. However, "*after the 1924 Constitution, there was no local government in Turkey in practice*"[228]. The issue of undermining national unity by the decentralization of local government 'scared' the Kemalist leadership. It was noted that "*efforts to integrate the nation both geographically and ethnically did not allow the central government to delegate much of its powers to local authorities*"[229]. Thus, the financial / political / administrative activities of local administrations were determined by the central government[230]. For instance, the principles of municipal law[231], being proclaimed in

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[226] Şerif Mardin, "Center and Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics?", *Deadalous*, 102 (1), 1973: 182.

[227] Menderes Çınar, "*An evaluation of the recent debates on restructuring of the Turkish government: Federalism and unitary state arguments*", (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1993): p. 38. (unpublished thesis)

[228] Menderes Çınar, op. cit., p. 40.

[229] Michael Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, 'Allocating of public resources in urban Turkey', in Ergun Özbudun and Aydın Ulusan (eds.), *The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey* (London: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1980): p. 313.

[230] Mehmet Yılmaz, "*The strong state and local government*", (Ankara: Bilkent University): p. 62. (unpublished thesis)

[231] That law proclaimed that "(1) *the acquisition by local government units of legal status as corporate persons and their maintaining such a status are subject to legal supervision*; (2) *the duties of the local governmental units are delineated in detail by laws enacted by the parliament*; and (3) *the central administration has close control on financial resources of the local governmental units*", stated in Metin Heper (ed.) *Dilemmas of Decentralization: Municipal Government in Turkey* (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1986): p. 15.

1930 and at work until 1980s except for some minor changes, were shaped the local government "*as the arms of central government in the periphery under strict administrative, financial and political control*"[232]. Relating with that repressive character of the Republic, Savran insists that it cannot arise from "*the ghosts of past era*", but from "*the antinomies of new period*"[233]. For encouraging private capital accumulation - as permitted by the conditions of the period - in *new* state, the Kemalists gave importance to strengthen state authority and to organize the administration for implementation of the new economic strategy based on economic liberalization[234].

After a decade of economic liberalization, in Turkey, conversely, the turning economy inwards[235] and protectionist policies were begun to implement in relation with the effects of the Great Depression in 1929. It marked a new era in which "*the state became the driving force of industrialization, establishing various essential enterprises that produced both consumption goods and essential inputs for the private sector*"[236]. The attainment of rapid growth by the state interference to economy, that lasted more than four decades, increased the importance of public sector re-organization according to this economic legal framework and to the direct state investments. The aim to increase

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[232] Mehmet Yılmaz, op. cit., p. 64.

[233] Sungur Savran, ibid.

[234] Especially, the agreement on economic liberalization for reconstructing the economy in the Economic Congress met in İzmir in 1920s is accepted as the main sign of 'break rather than continuity' in history of Turkey: "*One of the purposes of the İzmir Economic Congress was to send the Western countries a congenial message of the openness of the Turkish economy to foreign trade and investment*", stated in Haldun Gülalp, op. cit., p. 158. The words of Nas about comparison between policies of 1920s and of 1980s are interesting that "*the free-market outward-looking orientation of the economy in those years was somewhat comparable to the economic and policy environments envisaged in the 1980 program*", stated in Tevfik F. Nas, 'The impact of Turkey's stabilization and structural adjustment program: an introduction' in Tevfik F. Nas and Mehmet Odekon (eds.), *Economics and Politics of Turkish Liberalization* (Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press, 1992): p. 13.

[235] Çağlar Keyder, *The Definition of a Peripheral Economy: Turkey, 1923-1929* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[236] Tevfik F. Nas, op. cit., p. 14.

capacity and performance of public administrative systems in implementing state policies, and administrative reform attempts depending on that aim, as 'standing' issues, have taken place on the agenda of the governments especially after the Second World War.

III. 2. Looking at the Administrative Reform[237] of Turkey
After the Second World War

The administrative reform attempts in Turkey that were done after the foundation of the Republic and during the Second World War have been generally commented as studies which could not go beyond being accidental, unsystematic and disordered efforts[238]. However, the structuring/organizing new institutions and/or adapting the existing ones in line with the needs of the development process of 'modern' capitalist nation-state between the years of the foundation of Republic and of the Second World War, despite not being realized under the name of the re-arrangement of the public administration, can be included in the context of administrative reform and reorganization. The originality of the post-war period comes from the systematic efforts to public administration reform implemented by governments. It has been stated that especially after the Second World War *"the idea of administrative reform. . . gained wide currency"*[239]. In this period, some foreign experts made researchers and wrote reports, namely the *Neumark*, *Barker* and, *Martin and Cush* reports, between the years of 1947

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[237] Birgül Ayman Güler mentions that the reform of the public administration system can be analyzed in two different process. According to Güler, the pre-1980 period, when the changes in the organization in public administration were realized for increasing the capacity and performance of in implementing public policies, can be called as "administrative reform period". The post-1980 period can be taken as a transition period from the administrative reform period to the structural adjustment period under the 'aegis' of the World Bank; for more detailed analysis, see Birgül A. Güler, *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi: Yapısal Uyarlama Politikaları* (Ankara: TODAİE, 1996).

[238] Kenan Sürgit, *Türkiye'de İdari Reform* (Ankara: Türkiye ve Orta Doğu Amme İdaresi Enstitüsü, 1972): p. 66; Erkan Toprak, *Türk Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma* (Ankara: Şubat, 2005): p. 108.

[239] Metin Heper, "Some Notes on the Assumptions of the Theory of Administrative Reform in the Ottoman-Turkish State", in *ODTU Gelisme Dergisi*, Fall, 3, 1971: p. 416.

and 1959 on main 'problems' of Turkish administration. In the Neumark Report, prepared in 1947, the quality and quantity of the civil servants, red-tape and traditionalism were determined as main problems of administration[240]. The Barker Report, written by a group of members of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1951, evaluated the structure of administration and of state economic enterprises in Turkey, and discussed the encouragement of private initiative[241]. The Martin and Cush Report in, again, 1951, was written on the issues of finance and of personnel policy of Turkey[242]. The question of how these written-reports on administrative reform by the foreign experts can be explained has been related to the re-organization of state structure according to the principles of rationality and efficiency in parallel with the functioning of capitalism in Turkey articulated in international capitalism: "*We decide upon to form a rational working system in state institutions. . . For achieving this purpose, we will give importance to benefit from the experiences of foreign institutions and experts*"[243]. Consistent with these statements, it is more than just a coincidence of being prepared the Economic Development Plan of Turkey oriented to the integration of Turkey into world economy[244], and the first encouragement law of foreign direct investment in 1947. Therefore, the reports written by American technical experts also point to the needs of world economy, reconstructed after the war, including a (re)definition of the boundaries between the public and private sector for attracting foreign investment. It is noticed the same stress on arrangement of state organization

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[240] F. Neumark, *Devlet Daire ve Müesselerinde Rasyonel Çalışma Esasları Hakkında Rapor* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet Matbaası, 1949).

[241] The Mission Report, *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Programme* (John Hopkins Press, 1951); Milletlerarası İmar ve Kalkınma Bankası, *Kalkınma Planı İçin Tahlil ve Tavsiyeler* (Ankara: Akın, 1951).

[242] James W. Martin and Frank C. E. Cush, *Maliye Bakanlığı Kuruluş ve Çalışmaları Hakkında Rapor* (Ankara: Damga, 1952).

[243] The Programme of the First Saka Government in 1947, quoted in Cahit Tutum, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma* (Ankara: TESAV, 2004): p. 68.

[244] İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Savaş Sonrası Ortamda 1947 Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı* (Ankara: ODTÜ İdari İlimler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1974).

rationally in the programme of the first Menderes government: "*We find the entire re-organization of state, within the rational principles, indispensable for being fit the state according to the necessities of today*"[245]. Also, the establishment of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East, in which many empirical studies about personnel system, local government and the state economic enterprises have been conducted, in 1952 can be interpreted within that context of efforts on rational regulation of state activities. The formation of that institution for administrative reform studies can be marked as a 'sign' for needing a planning organ and/or "*a centralizing system of coordination*"[246] by the way of "*specially selected and independent authorities, consisting of experts chosen for their knowledge and specialization*"[247] so as to organize the public sector[248]. As a matter of fact, following the years of crisis and transition to a process of import substitution industrialization[249], in the latter half of the 1950s, the establishment of State Planning Organization and the (re)organization of the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East as a center / 'guider' of the administrative reform, as turning points for reforming the administration[250], were realized in the early 1960s.

The establishment of State Planning Organization, only four months after the coup d'etat of 1960, indicates the 'new' role of state, marked in the 1961 Constitution, about taking the responsibility of social and economic planning. Yalman analyzes that

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[245] The Programme of the First Menderes Government in 1950, quoted in Cahit Tutum, op. cit., p. 69.

[246] From the Final Report of the Economic Congress held in İstanbul in 1948, quoted in Zvi Y. Herslag, *Turkey: An Economy in Transition* (The Hague: Van Keulen, 1958): p. 185.

[247] Ibid.

[248] The issues of *Türkiye İktisat Mecmuası* (8, no: 80) and of *Forum* (4, no: 37) pressed in 1955 included the debate on how the planning should be worked, whether with a group composed of businessmen, their organizations, and experts or only of a small group of experts.

[249] For a comprehensive explanation of the reasons for the crisis experienced in Turkey, see Haldun Gülalp, *Kapitalizm, Sınıflar ve Devlet* (İstanbul: Belge, 1993): pp. 33-37.

[250] Kenan Sürgit, op. cit., p. 79.

institutionalization as a 'symbolic evidence' of a new alternative hegemonic strategy, "*the development of country on a planned basis*"[251]. In fact, the foundation of State Planning Organization was given importance because of a necessity of creating more effective bureaucracy to promote the planned economic development by preparing long-term and annual national development plans for the state of the years of 1960s. In that point, the administrative reform and/or reorganization of administration were needed for formulation and implementation of development plans and programs. For instance, in the First Five Year Development Plan, it was clearly stated:

> *. . . in order to be successful in the realization of the goals of the plan, it is absolutely necessary to make public administration capable of fulfilling what is expected of it, as it is the most important instrument in the implementation of the plans.*[252]

> *The administration needs to be adjusted to fit the new needs that appear in time. . . it is necessary to put the administration in order constantly.*[253]

These statements point to the substantial place of the issue of administrative reform and/or reorganizing the Turkish public administration for achieving the goals of development plans.

In that period, being consistent with the given-importance of reform in administration placed in the development plans, it is not surprising to find the 'intense' attempts at reforming the Turkish public administration system conducted by the State Planning

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[251] Galip Yalman, 'Türkiye'de devlet ve burjuvazi: Alternatif bir okuma denemesi' in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 58.

[252] The First Year Development Plan (1963-1967), quoted in Aykut Polatoğlu, *Introduction to Public Administration* (Ankara: Metu Publications, 2000): p. 139.

[253] The First Year Development Plan (1963-1967), quoted in A. Fikret Ar, "Administrative reform efforts in Turkey" in *Turkish Public Administration Annual*, 11, 1984: 160.

Organization[254], such as the Research Project on the Organization and Functions of the Central Government of Turkey, started in 1962. The main aim of that project is "*to determine the distribution of the duties of the central government, to study whether or not this distribution permits the fulfillment of the public services in the most efficient way and to develop proposals and recommendations in this regard*"[255]. That report has been interpreted in the literature on public administration as a comprehensive study that intended to rationalize and systematize the organization and procedures of administration, and of planning and coordination. However, the provincial organization of the central administration, the local administration and the state economic enterprises were not be included in the scope of the project. That project about reorganization of administration depicted the *existing* situation of the central government organization(s). However, these reorganization attempts were not included the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Turkish General Staff, Ministry of National Defence, National Security Agency, universities and state economic enterprises in the scope of the project. What is crucial to explain that project is to capture the connection between the restructuring government and the reform attempts in the administrative structure: "*The necessity of reform and reorganization has clearly appeared once more with the beginning of the planned development because of the reason that a planned development requires the fast, harmonious, qualitative and efficient working of the state organizations and agencies*"[256]. Providing a 'picture' of the existing organization of the growing and developing administrative apparatus by the help of this research project can be evaluated as a step to restructure administration as a mechanism that provides the 'effective' involvement of government to the capital accumulation process in social and economic arena.

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[254] Ali Ümit Berkman, "Planlı Dönemde İdari Reform Anlayışı ve Uygulanması", in *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi Special Issue,* 1981: 214 -215.

[255] The Organization and Functions of the Central Government of Turkey (1965), quoted in A. Fikret Ar, "Administrative reform efforts in Turkey" in *Turkish Public Administration Annual*, 11, 1984: 155.

[256] Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, *Planlı Döneme Geçişte 1962 Yılı Programı Taslağı.*

In literature based on the government programmes and the development plans, however, the administrative reform is often discussed with a reference to modernization and change in society:

> *It is evident that there is a need to bring the state organization to a level conforming to the concept of modern state, so that Turkey may develop in a speedy and continuous way.*[257]

> *We must reform in the branches of our government for eliminating the distance between us and the developed modern countries.*[258]

That stress on modernization (of state) in Turkey is explained in a more extensive context relating with the state of planning era in 1960s as the agent of "*providing rational and coherent policies for using scarce resources effectively to promote rapid capitalist growth*"[259]. In that state model of interventionism implemented in Turkey, the public and private sectors are considered as complementary to each other: "*In actual practice the state and the private sector are not opposed to each other in our country*"[260]. In the Second Five Year Development Plan, especially, the demands of private sector were included after the declaration of Süleyman Demirel, the leadership of party in power, the Justice Party, that the new development plan would be more "*flexible and elastic*" for opening a door to support the private sector by government[261]. However, the Demirel government were criticized by planners for not dealing with the

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[257] The Organization and Functions of the Central Government of Turkey (1965), quoted in A. Fikret Ar, op. cit., p. 156.

[258] The Programme of the First Coalition (İnönü) Government in 1962, quoted in Cahit Tutum, op. cit., p. 70.

[259] D. A. Rondinelli and G. S. Cheema, 'Implementing decentralization policies: An introduction', in G. S. Cheema and D. A. Rondinelli (eds.) *Decentralization and Development: Policy Implementation in Developing Countries* (London: Sage Publications, 1983): p. 10.

[260] Feroz Ahmad, *The Turkish Experiment in Democracy, 1950-1975* (London: Westview Press, 1977): p. 273.

[261] Besim Üstünel, Kalkınmanın Neresindeyiz? (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1966): p. 273.

administrative reform seriously: "*Among the reasons of failure to reach the economic and social targets of the plan, the failure to realize the reorganization of public administration comes first*"[262].

The planners were 'insistent' complainers about practices relating with the administrative reform of Turkey. Although planning "*appears no more than a*[n] . . . *efficient allocation of resources*"[263] for governments, the planners of this period gave importance to the plans and their 'ideal' applications as the 'only' way of promoting economic and social development for Turkey. However, it is important to underline the fact that in these critical views of the technicians, who prepare the reports for an administrative reform of Turkey, the administration has been taken only as an 'apolitical' organization without any reference that economic and social policies performed by state administration/organization(s) are shaped around the struggle between the social classes. Therefore, they assume the reform process as a technical procedure for increasing efficiency and effectiveness of state and/or its organizations including some problems in implementation, but not as an arena for political struggles.

In 1971, under the military rule again, the intention to the administrative reform by the first Nihat Erim government appeared in political arena through forming the Administrative Reform Consultation Board to determine the direction of the reorganization of the public sector. The report based on the evaluation of the former studies about the public administration reform prepared by the board, called as *Rearrangement of Administration, Principles and Proposals*, indicated the main / 'continued' problems of the Turkish Public Administration:

- *Turkish Public Administration is strictly tied to the legal documents which cannot give answers to changing conditions. Because of that*

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[262] Ali Ümit Berkman, op. cit., p. 209.

[263] Galip Yalman, op. cit., p.52.

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reason, the services cannot be performed rapidly, effectively, economically and qualitatively by the optimal use of the resources;

- *Public tasks are not distributed rationally among the agencies. Organizational structures of the agencies are not suitable for the aims which are expected to be realised, they are not flexible enough for adapting themselves to changing needs and conditions*;

- *Strict centralism leads to waste of time, obstacles, ignorance of the local conditions, problems in control, increases in red-tape, slowness in performing the services.*[264]

The report of the Advisory Board on Administrative Reform, with its proposals and determinations about the problems of the public administration, was introduced that the main issues stated in, especially a notion of rational management for the public sector (and also of reorganization of state as a rational and efficient ruling organization), stand similar with the former reports on the reform.

The Third Five Year Development Plan, prepared for the years between 1973 and 1977, also included complaints about the structure of public administration, and proposals for the implementation of administrative reform[265]. The fast, effective and efficient (de)functioning of the administration were, again, stated as the main problems / ills of public administration:

> *The basic principle is that the public administration should fulfill its duties quickly, effectively and efficiently*[266].

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[264] The Public Administration Institute for Turkey and Middle East, *Advisory Board Report on Administrative Reform* - İdari Reform Danışma Kurulu Raporu - (Ankara: TODAİE, 1972): pp. 15-18.

[265] When the development plans and the annual programs of development plans are analyzed, it is noticed that the titles of *Basic Problems of the Turkish Society*, and of *Principles of Development Policies* with some articles on reorganization of public sector, of *Reform in the Public Sector* are introduced as 'permanent' sections.

[266] The Third Five Year Development Plan (1973-1977), quoted in A. Fikret Ar, op. cit., p.161.

> *The public administration. . . is unable to carry on its services with the necessary quality at the requisite speed and efficiency[267].*

The (re)organization of public administration, assumed as one of essential steps for the process of development "*through industrialization at the speed and form determined by. . . the approaching integration with the West*"[268], was accepted as the duty of government. Although that plan included some principles for comprising of the provincial administration and the local administrations in, the centralization of administration for long-term industrial development seems main purpose of administrative reform stated in the pages of plan: "*With this reform, effective guidance, support and control at the central level will also be instituted*"[269].

It has been appeared that the emphasis on reform, despite being placed in the government programmes of the period between 1975 and 1980, dwindled because of "*political, economic and security problems*"[270]. In fact, in the midst of the economic crisis, setting in by the end of the decade, 1970s, and of the political crisis, in which increasingly powerful working-class movement and also industrial bourgeoisie as a dominant elements structuring the class configuration of Turkish society, and therefore, the appearance of capital-labour conflict placed in political agenda, the *government*, the *big industrial bourgeoisie*, the *international organizations* as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development were debating[271] transformation of the economy from import substitution

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[267] Ibid., p. 162.

[268] Ibid., p. 161.

[269] Ibid., p. 162.

[270] Cahit Tutum, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma* (Ankara: TESAV, 2004): p. 73.

[271] It is necessary to indicate that the representative organizations of businessmen have begun to voice their interests more powerfully through publishing periodicals, reports and establishing closer relations with governments since the early 1960s. Furthermore, the businessmen individually declared their opinions and solutions about the economic and social problems of the country. For instance, the desire for application of decisions of January 24, 1980 can be expressed in the words of Vehbi Koç, one of big industrial bourgeoisie, to Kenan Evren, the leader of military junta: "*Let Özal* [the preparer of the

industrialization to export-oriented strategy including a "*new set of relationships between different sectors as well as a new form of integration into the world division of labour*"[272] that means the 'postponed' breakdown / lost of the planning as a development strategy of Turkey during the years of 1960s[273]. In this economic and political environment, the stabilization and structural adjustment policies within new economic programme introduced in January 24 and the coup d'etat, 'steady' fate of Turkey, in September 12 came together. These two movements have been evaluated as attempts of capital to overcome the concrete bottlenecks for a new phase of capital accumulation process or/and of capitalist economic growth model: "*Both of* [them] *were different fronts of the same societal struggle, struggle to overcome the crisis of the capital accumulation*"[274]. The declaration of the military after its intervetion in September 1980 about the acceptance to the agreement by the International Monetary Fund, signed in the period of the minority government of the Justice Party in January 1980, can point to the close relation between the the coup d'etat and the direction to imposing liberal economic programme[275].

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decisions of January 24, 1980] stay in his office", quoted in Mustafa Sönmez, *Türkiye Ekonomisinde Bunalım* (İstanbul: Belge, 1987): p. 162. In addition, the words of the president of the Confederation of Employers' Unions, Halit Narin, can explain how the coup d'etat was welcomed by the bourgeoisie: "*Up until today it was the workers who rejoiced. Now it is our turn*", quoted in Sungur Savran, '20. yüzyılın politik mirası' in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 29.

[272] Haldun Gülalp, *Kapitalizm, Sınıflar ve Devlet* (İstanbul: Belge, 1993): p. 40.

[273] Fuat Ercan states that the export-oriented strategy or, with his conceptualization, 'the regime of outward-oriented capital accumulation' appeared as a necessity in the Third Five Year Plan of 1973-1977: "*There were two major orientations that proved decisive in this plan. These were, first, the orientation toward intermediate and investment goods and, secondly, the extension of activities earning foreign exchange for the economy*", in Fuat Ercan, 'Sermaye birikiminin çelişkili sürekliliği', in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Neoliberalizmin Tahribatı* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 19.

[274] Sungur Savran, '1960, 1971, 1980: Toplumsal mücadeleler, askeri müdahaleler', in *11. Tez*, 6, 1987: 153-154.

[275] Şenses argues that this stand-by agreement with the IMF covering the period between 1980 and 1983, signed in the 'secure' environment provided by the military regime, can be accepted as one of initial stages of the integration of Turkey with world capital(ist system); in Fikret Şenses, 'Labor Market Responses to Structural Adjustment and Institutional Pressure: The Turkish Case', *METU Studies in Development*, 21 (3), 1994.

Before analyzing the reorganization attempts after 1980, an experience concerning with the reconstruction of state and state authority, it will be argued after presenting the history of administrative reform in Turkey that the years coming after the military coups witnessed the active reform attempts in administration. Berkman, after confirming that argument, put forward the main reasons why administrative reforms can be employed immediately in these periods as;

> *. . . political and power considerations . . . to justify the rule of new leaders, to give a reformist image, to force the civil bureaucracy and other institutions to cooperate with the new rulers. . . rather than to promote efficiency, rationalization, development or realizing other formally expressed goals.*[276]

In fact, the administrative reform attempts gained wide currency after the coup d'etat on September 12, 1980, similar to the previous military governments. Now, it will be time to continue the journey for finding the words on reasons which necessitate the reorganization of the administration in history of Turkey, being started from the centuries of Ottoman Empire. Did this intervention of September 12 really "*mark the end of yet another phase in the social and economic development of Turkey, and the beginning of a new one*[?]"[277]

III. 3. The Reorganization of the Administrative Structure
- *in the Context of the Politics of Liberalization in Turkey during the 1980s* -

Although there are arguments that the military government preferred, instead of attempting large scale reorganization in administration, more operational studies which

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[276] A. Ümit Berkman, "The Political Aspects of Administrative Reform", in *ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi*, 16, 1977: 21.

[277] Haldun Gülalp, op. cit., 41.

seem to bring in quicker and more efficient results because of not to cost too much both economically and politically, many authors have been discussing the 1980s as a crucial turning point in the history of Turkish economic and socio-political development, especially of the structure of the state within the reorganization of the ministries and the bureaucracy. Some articles included in the programme of Ulusu Government, of the military government, that "... *practical short-term reorganizations will be made without initiating long-term reorganization efforts*"[278] and that, "... *practical methods will be developed and put into practice*"[279] may 'invite' the opinions in which the perspective of military rule about the structure and working of state and its organs were limited with 'daily' plans. However, it was a 'necessity' for the military government to restructure the state authority in the conditions of administrative crisis with the way of the arrangements of the state organization and/or of restructuring of the state, pointing to a period of political restoration that (was) started with the military intervention of September 12, 1980: "*The historic function of the 12 September regime was to prepare the Turkish... political and legal superstructure to the new path of capital accumulation predicated on a deeper integration with the world capitalist economy*"[280]. The first announcement of the National Security Council that immediately declared after the intervention was based on the depiction of working of state and its organs:

> *The state has been put into an uncontrolled situation. Political parties could not maintain unity and solidarity to rescue the state because of their unwillingness to come to an agreement and they did not take the necessary measures. Thus destructive and divisive forces increased their activities at full speed and the lives and property of the citizens have been endangered. Fanatical and other kinds of deviant ideologies were created instead of 'Atatürkçülük'. Educational institutions... the administrative system, judicial organs, internal security organization,*

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[278] From the Programme of Ulusu Government, quoted in A. Fikret Ar, "Administrative reform efforts in Turkey" in *Turkish Public Administration Annual*, 11, 1984: 167.

[279] Ibid.

[280] Sungur Savran, '20. yüzyılın politik mirası' in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 28.

workers' organizations, political parties. . . were maliciously brought into the threshold of division and civil war. In short, the state became weak. Thus, the aim of the attempted operation is to protect the totality of the country, to provide national unity and cooperation, to prevent a possible civil war, and to rebuild the authority and the existence of the state.[281]

This proclamation indicates that the military coup was a step for reshaping a 'strong' state in its relations with labour and the social opposition. The military perceived the demands of working-class and its organizations, such as the Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions, incompatible with the 'indivisible integrity of the state with its nation'. It is possible to interpret the coup as a new political strategy, being called as "*counter attack of capital*" against the achievements of popular classes in the 1970s[282] and/or against the 'uncontrolled' militant sections of the working-class and student movement, that necessitated a significant restructuring in the form of the state as a field of power relations and, in relations between state and civil society involving a radical change in the balance of social forces in opposition to the interests of working-class. Hence that strategy also means to restore the administration with institutional changes. By using the rhetoric on the anarchy as one of important reasons for economic and social 'underdevelopment' of Turkey, the military authorities intervened almost into every institution. In fact, it will be observed that the declarations of Bülent Ulusu, the military Prime Minister, for explaining the reasons of coup or justifying the coup had some common stresses with the statements of previous military Prime Ministers on problems of administration as corruption and inefficiency:

The structure of the Turkish public administration system, which has a long past, became outmoded by failing to adapt itself to innovations and new needs arising from changing conditions and lagged behind economic and social development. As a result of this, the ills of extreme centralization, imbalances in the distribution of duties, power and

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[281] The National Security Council's Announcement no. 1., September 12, 1980.

[282] Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi 1908-2002* (Ankara: İmge, 2003).

responsibilities, excessive over-employment, idle capacity, inefficiency and unnecessary formalities and red-tape developed in public administration. These ills of the Turkish public administration constitute the most important factors inhibiting the economic and social advancement of Turkey which is a developing country. Then, when the anarchic environment of the recent years was added to the general scene, the administration became incapable of providing peace and security for society.[283]

According to the governmental programme of Bülent Ulusu, that can be read as a declaration to the large scale capital and the international financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund[284], the Turkish administrative structure has been prepared 'peaceful' and 'secure' environment for economic and social (capitalist) development after eliminating the main obstacle for this development, the class struggles in Turkey, from the political arena. The stress on solving the problems of *extreme centralization*, *unnecessary formalities* and, *red-tape* in administration structure immediately can be explained as a promise by the military government for implementing the new economic programme introduced in January 24, 1980 without being caught by bureaucratic formalities. Relating with the reorganization of the public sector, in that period of the military government, in October and November 1980, a commission was formed to study on the Operational Research on the Problems of Public Personnel[285]. It is not surprising that one of initial researches on administration was realized on the employment policy of the government and, the personnel regime within reorganization

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[283] From the governmental programme of Bülent Ulusu, in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Milli Güvenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, Yayınlanan Bildiri ve Kararlar ile Önemli Mevzuat*, *v. 1* (Ankara: TBMM, 1982): p. 277.

[284] According to Fuat Ercan, the economic and political transformation in the years 1980s "*was realized on the basis of a triple alliance*": large scale capital "*which had reached a certain hegemonic position, the continuity of which was unsustainable on the basis of the available conditions*"; the state and the political structures "*which experienced a crisis of political representation*"; and, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as "*the actors of market-orinted restructuring on the world scale*", in Fuat Ercan, 'Sermaye birikiminin çelişkili sürekliliği', in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Neoliberalizmin Tahribatı* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 20.

[285] Tacettin Karaer, "12 Eylül ve Türk Kamu Yönetiminin Yeniden Düzenlenmesi", in *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 20 (3), 1987: 38.

of the public administration, especially after the complaint of Kenan Evren in one of his first speeches that "*a maítre d'hótel was being paid higher wages than himself*"[286]. However, the reports of Operational Research published in 1982 were not evaluated for later administrative arrangements. According to Ar, the decrees, as *de facto* operations, were used, "*instead of demanding research reports on reorganizations*", for organizing the administration because of their practicality and efficiency[287].

It is interesting to see firstly the 'desire' for avoiding from *extreme centralization* and/or central organization problem being worded in the programme of Ulusu Government that "*the powers of the civil and local administrations will be increased instead of the extreme centralization*"[288] in the period of military government, because the military rule (re)organized the economic and political relations according to the notion of strengthening/centralizing the executive. In that point, it can help to remember one of rationales of decentralization policies that national government policies can be 'penetrated' into all areas of country by decentralization process for securing political stability and national unity. Put differently, the decentralization[289] and/or 'escaping' from *extreme centralization* were intended for spreading *the authority* and *the existence of the state* to all social relations, but not for any decentralization of authority and of decision-making process, and decrease in power of executive. Çınar emphasizes that the type of decentralization in these years was *deconcentration* that means to pass some authority or administrative responsibility to a lower level only *within* the central government[290].

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[286] The words of Kenan Evren, leader of the military junta, quoted in Sungur Savran, ibid.

[287] Fikret Ar, op. cit., p. 157-158.

[288] From the Programme of Ulusu Government, quoted in A. Fikret Ar, ibid.

[289] It is crucial to state that the declarations of government or the reports on administration were avoided from the use of the concept of 'decentralization', because it may be thought that the concept of decentralization incompatible with the concern/'sensibility' for national integrity of Turkey.

[290] Menderes Çınar, "*An evaluation of the recent debates on restructuring of the Turkish government: Federalism and unitary state arguments*", (Ankara: Bilkent University, 1993): p. 44. (unpublished thesis)

III. 3. 1. The 1982 Constitution: Authoritarianism *Par Excellence*

The years of military government, the period of reorganization of politics and of state with the neo-liberal theoretical arguments and rhetoric on strong state and free market, were legalized with the 1982 Constitution including the description of the 'central' place of state in the society, being stated in phrase in the 1982 Constitution as 'the indivisible integrity of the state with its nation and land', and the rights/duties/responsibilities of the individuals to the state. The 1982 constitution, while explaining the rights/duties/responsibilities of the individuals, actually, restrained the basic rights and liberties in favour of expanding the sphere of intervention of military rule to all social relations. That constitution was a text in which the authority of state was strengthened with the way of increasing the control of executive power over the public administration system, of founding new centralized structures in local governments and of transferring power to the political centres such as ministers, Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers and the President. Especially, Çınar and Yılmaz argue that the reorganization of municipalities as *arms of the central government*, with using the rhetoric on national integrity/security, was one of tendencies of military reforms[291]. Moreover, the commissions established in that period can be accepted as other way for strengthening the 'center' itself over the public administration system. For example, the foundation of the State Controlling Board legally, as a place in which studies, researches and controls about all of the public institutions, and of the organizations of employers and employees had been making under the name of *improving the administration*, means that the all public administration organization was controlled by the National Security Commission. It seems that the centralization and concentration of power were welcomed by the members of the industrial bourgeoisie: "*. . . before* [that], *we had to implement decisions under a democratic parliamentary situation. And this necessitated a lengthy time in*

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[291] Menderes Çınar, ibid; Mehmet Yılmaz, "*The strong state and local government*", (Ankara: Bilkent University): p. 73. (unpublished thesis)

making decisions. . . today the proper decisions are being made at the right time”[292]. In fact, the main reason for that centralization in power and/or for the creation of a 'strong' state may be understood within the conceptualization of 'restructuring state' with its all institutions for the economic and political orientations of the new period including the implementation of the stabilization and structural adjustment program: “*State tradition affected the structural adjustment process. . . [that] a highly centralized and insulated state apparatus helped to initiate stabilization and structural adjustment and to maintain the momentum of the process during its early stages*”[293].

III. 3. 2. The Years of Turgut Özal: “*Economy is the beginning of everything!*”[294]

The Özal Government, after coming to power with the elections of November 1983, declared the party programme of Motherland Party that was not a classical party programme, but a text including the rules of how the new economic and political restructuring in Turkey can be achieved. That document was consistent with the concerns of neoliberalism that are/were about 'hollowing out' or 'rolling back' the state as a control mechanism/institution of economic relations[295]. In this programme, the all responsibility of economic crisis experienced in Turkey in the late of 1970s was related to the strategy of import substitution industrialization in which state regulates economy and its related institutions[296]. Boratav stressed that the significance of programme of the Motherland Party can be captured within the coalescence of industrial bourgeoisie and

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[292] Rahmi Koç, quoted in Atilla Güney, op. cit. p. 173.

[293] Ziya Öniş, *State and Market: The Political Economy of Turkey in a Comparative Perspective* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Catalogue Publication, 1998): p. 329.

[294] Turgut Özal, quoted in Atilla Güney, op. cit., p. 127.

[295] The Motherland Party, Anavatan Partisi Kuruluş Programı (Ankara: Anavatan Partisi, 1983): p. 2-4.

[296] A. Eralp, 'The politics of Turkish development strategies' in A. Finkel and N. Sirman (eds.) *Turkish State, Turkish Society* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990): pp. 238-239

state[297]. It is known the letter of Vehbi Koç to the leader of military junta about the 'virtues' of Turgut Özal as being aware of the problems, needs, and expectations of businessmen[298]. In fact, in the heyday of Özal's Motherland Party government from 1984 to 1988, reorganization of state with the way of legal arrangements, especially of the decrees having the force of law, was realized in line with the new economic programme based on liberalization of economy and market-oriented principles[299]. While reorganizing public institutions and establishments, conducting with decrees having force of law means to 'escape' from the bureaucratic procedures of parliament[300]. The main goals of these decrees were simplifying many bureaucratic procedures[301]; reorganizing the structure and duties of ministries[302]; structuring the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade as a central place in which the economic decisions relating with issues of exports, imports and agreements can be implemented without any bureaucratic 'barriers'[303]; transferring some important agencies as the State Personnel Chairmanship, the State Statistics Institute, the State Planning Organization to the hands

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[297] Korkut Boratav, 'Contradictions of structural adjustment: capital and the state in post-1980 Turkey', in A. Öncü, Ç. Keyder and E. İbrahim (eds.) *Developmentalism and Beyond* (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1994).

[298] A. Öncü and D. Gökçe, 'Macro-politics of de-regulation and micro-politics of banks', in *Strong State and Economic Interest Groups* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1991): p. 117.

[299] In the 1982-1990 period, the government of Özal's Motherland Party from 1984 to 1988 and, the coalition governments including also the Motherland Party from 1989 to 1991, 261 decrees with the force of law – *the 305 decrees were passed on during this period* – were issued with the public administration system, its procedures and the personnel regime, in Birgül A. Güler, *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi: Yapısal Uyarlama Politikaları* (Ankara: TODAİE, 1996): p. 63.

[300] Birgül A. Güler, 'Yapısal uyarlama reformları ve devlet', in O. Oyan (ed.), *Türk-İş Yıllığı* (Ankara: Türk-İş Yayınları, 1997): p. 77.

[301] The Empowering Law Concerning the Reorganization of Administrative Methods and Procedures, February 1984, stated in A. Fikret Ar, "Administrative reform efforts in Turkey" in *Turkish Public Administration Annual*, 11, 1984: 172.

[302] The Decree Having the Force of Law Concerning the Establishment and Operation Principles of the Ministries, December 1983, stated in A. Fikret Ar, ibid.

[303] The Decrees Having the Force of Law Concerning the Organization and Duties of the Undersecretariat of the Treasury and Foreign Trade, June 1984, stated in A. Fikret Ar, op. cit., p. 173.

of Prime Ministry[304]; reorganizing the structure and duties of the Prime Ministry, of thirteen Ministries, of eighteen public institutions and establishments and of the Public Economic Enterprises[305]. *How can these reorganization attempts*, realized immediately, *be understood within the politics of Özal Government*? The statements of Turgut Özal in one of his public speeches that "*my common point, my common language was never political. I always talked with you on the economy. Economy is the beginning of everything, an economically weak country cannot solve her problems*" may give meaning to the centralization of decision-making structures in the hands of Prime Minister. In that declaration, it is seen a naturalization of the institutional separation between economic and political spheres, and it is declared that the economy as a 'technical' issue must 'rid' of political considerations, especially of welfarism and egalitarian income distribution[306]. Furthermore, according to this argument, the politics are also identified as an arena of state and its bureaucracy with poor performance of public institutions including "*irksome restrictions, cumbrous red-tape, unpleasant officials, poor service and corrupt practices*"[307]. Actually, the state and its organs are engaged in many unsuccessful efforts for organizing the social relations. Thus, 'less' but 'strong' state for the sake of (capitalist) economy and/or of free market that is centralized in few hands of executive, of the Prime Minister, called as a new institutional framework, is assumed a necessity for providing to maintain the new pattern of capital accumulation. However, the question of how the stresses on reducing centralization situated in the programme of Özal government and the proposal on creation of regional-level units with their own decision-making councils for the specific matters of regions and "*decentralization of several functions, such as transfer of development planning, to*

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[304] These transfers were included in same Decree Having the Force of Law, June 1984, stated in Atilla Güney, op. cit., p. 172.

[305] The Decree Having the Force of Law Concerning the Establishment and Operation Principles of the Ministries, changed in June 1984, stated in A. Fikret Ar, ibid.

[306] Muharrem Tünay, "Türk Yeni Sağının Hegemonya Girişimi" in *Praksis*, 5, 2002: 190.

[307] Gerald Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991):p. 74.

the newly created metropolitan local governments"[308] by Özal government can be explained in that centralization process finds its answer(s) again behind to the rationale of providing efficiency and coordination between the local and central organizations of state for the sake of performancing market 'perfect'ly. Moreover, it is interesting to be supported anti-statism in rhetoric of government, despite the practices in the direction of centralization of the executive. For Tickell and Peck, that is the 'mythical' story of neoliberalism about the "*logical, historical and philosophical superiority of markets, and of individualised and privatised economic relations*"[309]. However, the state authority and its ongoing *deconstruction and reconstruction*, according to the strategies of capital accumulation, is a necessity for organizing of market relations. In that context, the discourse on anti-statism in Turkey during 1980s meant elimination of bureaucratic difficulties, but not to restrict the state intervention in the economy[310].

The slogan of 'less government' by the Motherland Party was quite "*reminiscent*" of the new right policies as the stresses on privatization of public enterprises and cutbacks in the public sector by Thatcher and Reagan in the beginning of 1980s[311]. Relating with that correspondence between Thatcherism/ Reaganism and 'Özalism', Yalman and Topal asserted that the history of New Right policies goes back to the years of military government in Turkey when the economic policies and legal/institutional reorganizations especially by the 1982 Constitution. That provided a secure environment for the integration of Turkey to the world market[312]. That period had continued up to

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[308] Menderes Çınar, op. cit. p. 45; 56-60.

[309] Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck, **"**Making global rules: globalisation or neoliberalisation?", http://www.geog.ntu.edu.tw/news/2006HGAW/round2/attachment/making%20global%20rule_tickell_peck.pdf, download on 11 February 2005.

[310] Muharrem Tünay, op. cit. p. 191.

[311] Galip Yalman, 'Türkiye'de devlet ve burjuvazi: Alternatif bir okuma denemesi' in Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004): p. 66; Muharrem Tünay, "Türk Yeni Sağının Hegemonya Girişimi" in *Praksis*, 5, 2002: 177-198.

[312] Galip Yalman, ibid; Aylin Topal "Küreselleşme Sürecindeki Türkiye'yi Anlamaya Yarayan Bir Anahtar: Yeni Sağ", in *Praksis*, 7, 2002: 74-78.

particularly under the governments of the Motherland Party as a 'carrier' of the economic aspects of military regime.

III. 4. The Administrative Reform in 1990s

In literature, there has been a general argument that the process of reorganization attempts in administration has been dwindled and, therefore, slowed after the Motherland Party governments. Tutum notices that some statements from the programme of Özal's government were repeated in the programme of Akbulut government that came into power in November 1989:

> *In the period of our* [the Motherland Party] *government, the public administration was examined completely, changed radically and, an administration reform was realized with the way of being reduced bureaucratic procedures in all level of organizational structures*.[313]

According to Tutum, not only the Akbulut government but also the Yılmaz government, the governments of Motherland Party after Özal's chairman, did not give importance to reorganization in administration. For instance, it was satisfied in the programme of Yılmaz government with only some stresses on personnel regime and bureaucratic procedures[314]. The reason for that deceleration in the reform process, for Tutum, can be found in the mentality of latter Motherland Party governments that the reform were realized in the period of Özal's government(s) and, they [the Akbulut government and the Yılmaz government] must continue to small-scale reorganization attempts in administration[315].

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[313] This statement is taken place in both the government programme of Özal and of Akbulut, stated in Cahit Tutum, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma* (Ankara: TESAV, 2004): p. 76.

[314] Cahit Tutum, op. cit., ibid.

[315] Cahit Tutum, op. cit., p. 76-77.

In the era of the coalition government of True Path Party and Social Democratic Populist Party, in November 1991, the points of "*restructuring and restoring state*" and of "*the struggle against red-tape and corruption*" again began to be discussed in the government programmes, especially emphasizing the importance of reform in the State Economic Enterprises and in personnel regime:

> *The main goals of reform in State Economic Enterprises are transforming public administration to more rational and effective-working structures with the way of reducing its power and responsibility, increasing the capacity and competition in economy, spreading capital to base*[s of society]. . . *Briefly, that reform is the basis of integration of Turkey with world* [economy]. . . *the fundamental strategy of State Economic Enterprises Reform is reorganization for effective administration. . . involving privatization.*[316]

It is noticed that 'effective' administration and/or state and the emphasis on market-oriented economy were taken place together in that programme of the coalition government. The words "*democracy in the economy*" included in the programme points an effort by government for seeking to reduce regulation and government interference in economic activities and control over movement of capital. The 'perfect' way of that is privatization of state enterprises which also means smaller central government as a 'condition provider' for the interests of market forces, being 'dreamed' in post-Washington era by international financial governments.

As a crucial attempt in organization of administration, a research on public administration that was started upon request of the State Planning Organization in 1988 and conducted by the the Public Administration for Turkey and the Middle East, and introduced in 1991 by a report titled as the *Public Administration Research Project* needs to be indicated. Some experts asserted that this report can be evaluated as an oppositional text to the neoliberal efforts in public administration because of proposing

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[316] From the programme of the coalition government of True Path Party and Social Democratic Populist Party, quoted in Cahit Tutum, op. cit., p. 77-78.

to re-debate the expanded functions of the prime ministry and its related institutions as the Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade and reorganize the division of labour between the prime ministry and ministries[317]. However, Güler argues that there was no criticism on reducing public sector and privatizations, the main lines of neoliberal attempt, in that report. It seems 'oppositional', but is "*ahistorical*" that comes from the experts preparing this report who avoid to question changes in socio-political relations[318].

Afterwards, the Çiller government in June 1993 voiced again the necessity of reform including particularly reduction in size and scope of the state for Turkey as a "*symphony without end*"[319]. Tutum states that the stress on reform in administration, a standard issue, has been situated in almost all government programmes, but it has gained importance in period of economical crises and of coups d'etat in Turkey[320]. In fact, despite loyalty of all the governments in Turkey since the 1980 military coup to the neoliberal economic program, the practice of the policies of neoliberalism has been up against the challenges of workers and public employees who have experienced the adverse effects of this proces on employment, wages, social services and the level of unionization[321]. Therefore, it may be said that the coalition and minority governments, which came into power from 1991 to *November 2002*, as the significant sign for losing

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[317] Turgay Ergun, "Yönetimin Yeniden Düzenlenmesi Gereksinmesi ve Kamu Yönetimi Araştırma Projesi", in Amme İdaresi Dergisi, 24 (4), 1991: 17-18.

[318] Birgül A. Güler, *Yeni Sağ ve Devletin Değişimi: Yapısal Uyarlama Politikaları* (Ankara: TODAİE, 1996): p. 39-41.

[319] Cahit Tutum, op. cit., p. 78.

[320] Cahit Tutum, op. cit., p. 79.

[321] It can be remembered the 'Spring Actions' of workers in 1989, the protests of miners in Zonguldak in 1990 and, the movement of public employees to unionize in 1990; for more detailed analysis, see Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Sürekli Kriz Politikaları* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004); and, Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran (eds.), *2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye: Neoliberalizmin Tahribatı* (İstanbul: Metis, 2004).

the political parties legitimacy in the eyes of masses, cannot become 'successful carriers' of neoliberal policies and/or 'faithful followers' of Özal.

In conclusion, it can be argued that the debates on public administration in Turkey has been one of *permanent* matter in political sphere. Actually, the above review of Turkey's history of public administration reform can help to answer the question stated in the beginning about in what sense the demands and interests of the conflicting social groups shape the agenda of the public sector reforms. As introduced in these pages of third chapter, firstly, discussions/discourses on administrative reform has been continued within the context of organization of administration according to the needs of development of capitalist relations in Turkey and of integration of Turkish economy into the world division of labour. The question of days of the Republic era fixed in the doubts of whether that/these re-organization(s) was/were made against the 'indivisible integrity of the state with its nation' seems not to be remembered except the periods of coups when some rationales were needed for legitimazing the military interventions to public sphere. Secondly, it is observed that the large-scale organization attempts were realized in the process of military governments coming after economic and political crises in Turkey. The military interventions seem to create 'irresistible' conditions for transition to specific economic (capitalist) growth models and for balance of class forces within the society. The administration reform being realized these intervention periods is a 'strategic' arena for capturing these changes, namely restructuring of state. Last but not least, it has been experienced the main concepts of neoliberalism, privatization, deregulation, liberalisation and structural adjustment, being materialized by the hands of state. It may be asserted that the stress on state for 'effective performance' of the market, instead of anti-statist discourse, that is known as the main principle of post-Washington Consensus or second-generation reforms developed after 1990s has not created a meaningful change in discourse of neoliberal policies of Turkey up to the *government* of *Justice and Development Party* and its proposal on the Public Administration Reform. *In fourth chapter*, that draft law about Public Administration Reform will be analyzed as a

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text and a political discourse of hegemonic struggles between 'the party of state' (the Republican People's Party) and 'the party of nation' (the Justice and Development Party)[322].

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[322] These statements of party of state and party of nation were used in debates on public administration reform by the members of parliament, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004.

CHAPTER IV

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TURKISH PARLIAMENTARY DISCOURSE IN TERMS OF RECENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM

After introducing a draft law about the Public Administration Reform in April 2003 by the government of the Justice and Development Party, the Turkish Grand National Assembly had become an arena in which the debates and polemics between the parties of assembly, the Justice and Development Party and the Republican People's Party, continued for days on main principles and/or "*ulterior motives*"[323] of the draft law. During the process of legalization of the public administration reform, the members of parliament did not leave from the sessions going on to midnights, and also they joined the discussions placed in assembly at weekends. In parliament, all articles of the Draft Law about Main Principles of Public Administration and Restructuring of Public Administration had been read, and discussed in a way that the members of party in power and of opposition party presented the negative and positive sides of administrative reform in Turkey. Generally, this process was followed by the sections where one of the ministries, who participated in the commission preparing the draft law, answered the questions of members of parliament relating to the reform. Then, the articles of draft law, one after other, were voted from *February 18*, 2004 to *February 28*, 2004 and in *July 15*, 2004. The assembly accepted that the act of legalizing attempt, claimed by government as different and 'unique' from all previous administrative reform initiatives because of aiming to meet the 'needs of change', resulted from the

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[323] The reform had been discussed by the members of the Republican People's Party - again and again - as having "*ulterior motives*" in parliamentary debates, in especially *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004.

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information age and globalization process. However, it was rejected/vetoed by the president, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, in August 3, 2004.

The negative decision of president on the public administration reform can be evaluated within a wider 'opposition' context including the Republican People's Party, such civil society organizations and democratic mass organizations as the Chamber of Commerce of Ankara, Association of Turkish Lawyers and several trade-unions, the jurists and, academics from the department of public administration in various universities. The words of Dursun Akdemir, a member of the True Path Party, expressed that prevalence of dicontent(s) and of resistance in society:

> *I want to point out that the side, from the Nationalist Action Party to the Labour Party, named as nationalist, is entirely against* [the reform]; *the Confederation of Public Servants Union is against, the Confederation of Revolutionary Labour Unions is against, the Confederation of Public Employees Trade Unions is against, the Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions is against* [the reform].[324]

The reasons of why this 'heated' discussion between 'followers' and 'opponents' of public administration reform was experienced in Turkey may be understood within the conditions realized after the general elections of November 3, 2002 that marked a new phase in the history of Turkish political life. The Justice and Development Party, that came to power after the elections, "*marginalize*[s] *radical elements among both the Islamists and secularists*"[325], because of recognition of the Justice and Development Party with its Islamic past of political leaders/founders of the party, especially Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, coming from the Welfare Party (1983-1998) and its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, who is "*uncontested leader of a string of Islamist parties*"[326]. Therefore, the

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[324] Dursun Akdemir, member of parliament from the True Path Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 318.

[325] Haldun Gülalp, "AKP's 'Conservative Democracy': A Post-Kemalist Liberalism?", presented in *American Sociological Association* (August 14-17 2004, San Francisco, ABD).

[326] Haldun Gülalp, ibid.

political projects of party in power, materialized in its party programme, public speeches in and out of government, the statuses in draft, were criticized in the context of political Islam. According to these criticisms, secularism (and/or 'individualization' of Islam), that defines the identity of the state and its main legitimazing ideology[327], was threatened by political Islam of the Justice and Development Party as an incompatible notion with the main characteristics of Turkish Republic. In that point, the issue on how the provision of goods and services produced and provided by state mechanisms would be influenced with the public sector reform was given much less importance in the criticisms of opponents, especially who asserted that the preparers of draft law, actually as "*counter-revolutionaries*"[328], have *ulterior motives* for eliminating the unitary state structure, and the 'integrity of nation'.

That opponent acts of *de-legitimation*, without any doubt, 'invite' the (re)legitimation acts/talks of the government to the political arena for defining and justifying its policies and actions. While trying to change the negative opinions about the public sector reform in the direction of neutral and/or positive opinions, the Justice and Development Party emphasized the rationale for the reform, bringing the 'recipes' for decentralization of authority by the international financial organizations to mind, as follows[329]: The public sector reform, and in this context, the strengthening of local governments would increase the efficiency of administration as well as responsiveness to the local needs because of placing government closer to the people living in the local regions. In addition, this attempt, including the participation of individual citizens to decision-making process, would provide the secure conditions of 'democratic reform' started by the Justice and

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[327] Haldun Gülalp, "The Crisis of Westernization in Turkey: Islamism Versus Nationalism" in *Innovation: The European Journal of Social Sciences*, 8 (2), 1995.

[328] Hasan Fehmi Güneş and Enis Tütüncü, members of parliament from the Republican People's Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, pp. 308-309, and p. 362.

[329] The reasons of the public sector reform are included in the text written by Ömer Dinçer and Cevdet Yılmaz, *Kamu Yönetiminde Yeniden Yapılanma: Değişimin Yönetimi İçin Yönetimde Değişim* (Ankara: Başbakanlık, 2003): pp. 9-31.

Development Party. Moreover, this reform would serve as a vehicle of integration to the new economic and political structures stemming from the information age and globalization process. The other main rationale of the reform in administration was stated in the official reports prepared by the governmental institutions that the new social actors, especially non-governmental organizations and business associations, would be included in the reform process. The co-operation between state and private institutions, pointing to the 'new' role of state, would improve the structure of current public administration with "*the poor performance of public bureaucracies. . . [including] irksome restrictions, cumbrous red-tape, unpleasant officials, poor service and corrupt practices*"[330]. In accordance with the assertions of reformers, the unity of state, with the help of reorganization in local administrations, would be strengthened, since the state would reach to all (its) citizens and satisfy their needs that mean to security, political stability and national unity in Turkey[331]. In fact, it may be argued that the political discourse of government, while presenting the main reasons of reform in and/or out of government, combines the "*authoritarian commitment*" in the context of 'desire' of government for continuing the power of state, the "*liberal commitment*" about the restructuring of state and market relations as complementary entities, and "*strong populist appeal to ordinary people*"[332] manifested in an insistent manner that "*we are legislating this reform for our all citizens. . . This bill is for people, for people!*"[333].

In this chapter, the recent debate on public administration reform will be explained with reference to some central concepts: *discourse*, *political discourse* and, *legitimation/de-*

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[330] Gerald Caiden, *Administrative Reform Comes of Age* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1991):p. 74.

[331] It is interesting to see that similar rationales were introduced for the regionalisation proposal of the Motherland Party as part of the constitutional change proposal in late 1987; see Mustafa Gönül, "Seçimli Valilik Üzerine Düşünceler", in *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 25 (2), 1992: 51-70.

[332] These three characteristics are discussed for the Thatcherist discourse in Louise Phillips, "Rhetoric and the Spread of the Discourse of Thatcherism", *Discourse and Society*, 7 (2), 1996: 211.

[333] Mehmet Ali Şahin, one of ministers from the Justice and Development Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 321.

legitimation. Firstly, discourse in this chapter will be used to refer to language use "*as a form of social practice*"[334] that is "*intrinsically political*"[335] in the sense that it is (re)produced within the struggle between legitimation and de-legitimation acts, and also used to refer to a term for describing one or more discourse(s). Although "*all discourse is political*"[336], the political discourse is narrowly defined as an discursive act(ivity) of political actors that realizes "*in and out government, communicate about political matters, for political purposes*"[337]. In fact, politics and language are closely integrated within parliamentary debates especially for gaining hegemony over the legislation process. In the parliament, the political parties defend or oppose the draft bills introduced by the government. While the party in power seeks to legitimate its proposals, the parties in opposition present their negative and positive opinions about the policies of government. When the policies and actions are challenged by the political opponents, legitimation becomes crucial and unavoidable for the government. "*Legitimation*", therefore, "*is mostly relevant in contexts of controversial actions, accusations, doubts, critique, or conflicts over group relations, domination and leadership*"[338]. Because the acts/struggles of legitimation and de-legitimation over different interpretations of the facts "*are virtually always discursive*"[339], how and in what ways the language used in political struggles and/or 'political talk' is/are (re)produced, need an critical analysis. In such an analysis, the role of language as

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[334] Norman Fairclough, *Language and Power* (New York: Longman, 1992): p. 22.

[335] David Howarth and Yannis Stavrakakis, 'Introducing discourse theory and political analysis' in David Howarth, Norval Aletta, Yannis Stavrakakis (eds.) *Discourse Theory and Political Analysis* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000): p. 4.

[336] Shapiro, 1981; quoted in John Gastil, "Undemocratic Discourse: A Review of Theory and Research on Political Discourse", in *Discourse and Society*, 3 (4), 1992: 469.

[337] Graber, 1981; quoted in John Gastil, ibid.

[338] Luisa M. Rojo and Teun A. Van Dijk, "'There was a problem, and it was solved!': Legitimazing the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse", in *Discourse and Society*, 8 (4), 1997: 528.

[339] Luisa M. Rojo and Teun A. Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 527.

inseparable part of power relations in society is to be examined both as "*practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak*"[340], and as dependent on the specific local and global socio-political contexts including the current political regime, the historical development of political culture in the country, and the social relations in which the political regime functions. It means that language not only is a reflection of social relations, but also "*has the power to shape and direct political processes*"[341].

It may be asserted that the parliament is one of places in which the language "*nudge the world a little*"[342]. In fact, as a 'playground' of the members of parliament covered with discursive practices and strategies "*including the selection of words, topics, modes of representing people, places or events, rhetorical figures*"[343], the parliament seems 'strategic' locus for capturing the relations between these sociopolitical structures and the political discourse of actors participating in these political relations within that institution. In fact, the parliament(ary debate/discourse) is a "*community of practice*"[344] and/or 'ideological bottlefield' par excellence where the discursive struggle between political parties is observed "*with its own set of formal and informal rules and regulations in which intentional and explicitly face-threatening (and face-enhancing) acts*"[345] in context of antagonism between legitimation and re-legitimation of the policies and actions of the government, and de-legitimation of government acts of the opposition parties.

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[340] Michel Foucault, *The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1972): p. 49.

[341] Hugh Mehan, "The Discourse of the Illegal Immigration Debate: A Case Study in the Politics of Representation", *Discourse and Society*, 8 (2), 1997: 259.

[342] From the play of Tom Stoppard, *The Reality*, quoted in Hugh Mehan, op. cit., p. 251.

[343] Teun A. Van Dijk, 1993, quoted in ibid.

[344] Ineke Van Der Valk, "Right-Wing Parliamentary Discourse on Immigration in France", *Discourse and Society*, 14 (3), 2003: 316.

[345] Ineke Van Der Valk, ibid.

In the context of that conceptualization, these questions can be asked for the debate on administrative reform in Turkey: How was the reform talked about? How did political actors legitimate their own view-points and policy options in the parliamentary debates, while talking about the administrative reform? What were the main points of the opponent party for criticizing the public sector reform and de-legitimazing that political action of government? How, then, were the alternative approaches of the Republican People's Party prevented, dispelled or discredited by the member of the Justice and Development Party? Which emotions, virtues, moral qualities were attached to the reform in legitimation and de-legitimation processes?

This chapter, within the context of these questions, will focus on the political discourse(s) within parliamentary debates in the process of legalization of the Draft Law about Main Principles of Public Administration and Restructuring of Public Administration. After having presented briefly the socio-economic transformations of new capitalism / neo-liberalism within the notion of decentralization in the *second chapter* and discussing the neoliberal policies historically in the specific context of Turkish public administration reform in the *third chapter*, it is time to deepen how the Turkish government define and justify the reform in administration within the official discourse. For this chapter, after examining the discussions on the reform in the Turkish Grand National Assembly from the official assembly reports, those texts, which represent the debates between two opposite parties on the public sector reform, are selected. For that analysis, the official report of February 18, 2004, first day of beginning of discussion on the public sector reform in assembly, was preferred because of the need for capturing the argumentative structure of parliamentary debates in the continuation of debates all day long. The main point will be analysis of strategies of legitimation and of de-legitimation within the discourse of these two opposite parties for understanding how both authority/legitimacy and resistance/de-legitimacy are (re)produced within discourse itself. Put differently, that analysis introduced below will present the variety of discursive acts and strategies of argumentation and counter-

argumentation, point to the reality that the parliament is the arena in which different discursive practices compete with each other.

IV. 1. Struggle between Legitimation and De-legitimation about Public Sector Reform: *Official Discourse of the Justice and Development Party and Resistance of the Republican People's Party*

The parliament, as an institution where political parties as representatives of different sections of the population are included, witnesses "*a struggle over different interpretations of the facts*"[346] in the form of parliamentary debates between different political parties. When the legitimacy of political actions of government are questioned in general by the civil institutions, such as the media, trade unions and non-governmental organizations, the censures of opposition party can be strengthened, because the thousands of people in defiance of the reform can obtain an advantage to the opposition party and/or parties over the struggle to gain hegemony in parliament. However, the government does not 'yield' to the opponents as it can be exemplified in the acts/discourses of government party in Turkey while defending the recent public sector reform. The members of party in power, during their speeches on the reform, engaged in various strategies of justification including "*semantic strategies that focus on contexts, causes and plausible reasons*"[347] for the administrative reform in Turkey. For instance, the stress that the reform would be realized for the benefits of society as a whole had been taken in official discourse for providing a legitimate basis for the reform in the eyes of the people. Besides, after being selected some events and developments from the history of public administration reform in Turkey, these historical events were pointed/re-described as the main signs of the need for a reform by the members of the Justice and Development Party. At the same time, these strategies were engaged in the conversations and debates with the opposition party. Thus, the 'de-legitimation of de-legitimation' of the arguments of the opponents by the members of government with the

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[346] Luisa M. Rojo and Teun A. Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 528.

[347] Luisa M. Rojo and Teun A. Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 534.

way of discrediting their arguments was involved in the parliamentary debates. On the other hand, members of the Republican People's Party were engaging in counter-arguments including various strategies of de-justification while criticizing the reform in public administration. In the following sections, typical examples of the various discursive strategies employed by these two opposite parties will be presented. It may be asserted that to focus on these discursive strategies can help to relate ongoing global/neoliberal transformation process with the socio-political restructuring in Turkey in terms of the meanings of phrases/sentences/words of the members of assembly.

IV. 1. 1. [Is] *Everything for our people!* [?]

While discussing the reform in parliament, the members of government, interestingly, did not avoid to state that the Justice and Development Party (or '*we*') is the party of nation, but not of the state. Some authors, who focus on the components of center-periphery relations in their analyses, assert that government party represents the 'periphery' in which some groups *try to escape from regulation of the state*. Actually, at the expense of marginalizing its/his position from one of the main legitimazing ideological points of state about the 'indivisible integrity of the state with its nation', the deputies, continuously, phrased the *party of state* and *of nation*:

(1)
Dear Güneş always said 'state' in his speech lasting approximately thirty minutes.
Sayın Güneş, 30 dakikaya yakın süren konuşması esnasında hep 'devlet' dedi.[348]

(2)
Dear friends, now it is valuable to re-examine the concept of 'state'. Please, do separate public and state from each other. The state is the whole of the energy of seventy-millions.
Değerli arkadaşlar, artık 'devlet' kavramını yeniden gözden geçirmekte fayda var. Lütfen, kamu ile devleti birbirinden ayırın. Devlet, yetmiş milyonun enerjisinin toplamıdır. [349]

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[348] Mehmet Ali Şahin, one of ministers from the Justice and Development Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 321.

[349] Asım Aykan, member of the Justice and Development Party, op. cit., p. 328.

(3)

We won thirty-four per cent of the vote as a one-yeared party. You won twenty per cent of the vote as an eighty-yeared party. Why; The Justice and Development Party is the party of nation, you are the party of state.

Biz bir yıllık parti iken yüzde 34 oy aldık, siz yüzde 20 oyu, 80 yıllık parti iken aldınız. Neden; Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi milletin partisi, siz devletin partisisiniz.[350]

(4)

We are the party of nation, are proud [of this]*; you are the party of state, therefore, you are in that* [bad] *condition. Notice that*!

Biz, milletin partisiyiz, iftihar ediyoruz; siz, devletin partisisiniz, onun için bu hallere düştünüz. Bunu bilin.[351]

The statement of *re-examining the concept of state* may be related with another argument of government about introducing reform as a reply to the globalization and information society. The positive characterization of globalization, also observed in political discourse of the Justice and Development Party, gives an account on how, in what ways and why the globalization has been spread to all over the world. However, this characterization always presents itself as an 'agentless' development that the world is changing by globalization: "*The modern world is swept by chance. New technologies emerge constantly*"[352]. In accordance with that discourse, it is a need to re-organize/restructure of the nation-state and its organizations.

(5)

. . . in our [global] *world, the centralist administration models with formalistic, rigid, hierarchical structured are left behind.*

. . . [küresel] dünyamızda. . . kuralcı, şekilci, katı, hiyerarşik yapıdaki merkeziyetçi yönetim modelleri çok gerilerde kaldı.[353]

(6)

. . . under global conditions, it is not possible for Turkey to stay outside of historical [re]formation in transformation of public administration.

. . . küresel şartlarda. . . Türkiye'nin, kamusal yönetim dönüşümünde tarihî yapılanmanın dışında kalması mümkün değildir.[354]

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[350] Asım Aykan, ibid., p. 329.

[351] Asım Aykan, ibid.

[352] Tony Blair, 1999; available online at www.ling.lancs.ac.uk/staff/norman/2003b.doc.

[353] Muzaffer Baştopçu, member of the Justice and Development Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 337.

While criticizing its opponent, the government party indicated that 'always talking about state' is a reason for why they are governing the country and why the Republican People's Party is in the position of opposition. Because the political trust and legitimacy of (party of) state has been declined and it influenced the ration of votes of the Republican People's Party negatively. These phrases of *party of state* and *of nation* call the 'souls' of Hüseyin Cahit and of Prince Sebahattin in the beginning of 1900s and also the 'older' center-periphery cleavage back to that analysis. It may be remembered the debate, from the previous chapter, between Hüseyin Cahit and Prince Sebahattin within the Committee for Union and Progress that points to tension between the necessity of decentralized administration and the defence of centralization. It is interesting that the arguments of Prince Sebahattin in the direction to give authority to provinces for providing and using their own resources were referenced by Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, a member of party in power:

(7)
Decentralization is an ideal, a dream of Turkey, and even of the Ottoman Empire; this period began from Prince Sebahattin.
Ademi merkeziyetçilik, Türkiye'nin, hatta Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun. . . bir ideali, bir hayali; Prens Sebahattin'den başlamış bu dönem.[355]

However, this position of government does not mean that they are against the authority of state. Especially after pointing to the statements of *party of state* and *of nation* and, being strongly warned by the opponents, some members of government needed to express that the reform actually would strengthen the political regime and unitariness of the state which would, in turn, deepen the loyalty of citizens to state.

(8)
The positive consequences came with the integration of nation and state that we have achieved till present is such a glory.
Devlet-millet bütünleşmemizle bugüne kadar elde ettiğimiz olumlu sonuçlara ne kadar sevinsek de azdır.[356]

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[354] Ahmet Işık, member of the Justice and Development Party, op. cit., p. 335.

[355] Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, member of the Justice and Development Party, ibid., p. 310.

[356] Muzaffer Baştopçu, ibid., p. 337.

(9)
We are more sensitive than you are about the unity of Turkey, [and] the securing of unitary structure. You cannot compete with us about protecting the Republic. . .
Biz, Türkiye'nin bütünlüğü, üniter yapısının korunması konusunda sizden daha hassasız. Cumhuriyeti koruma. . . konusunda bizimle yarışamazsınız.[357]

Stating that "*you separate public and state from each other*" may be interpreted as a declaration for 'turning back' the people, because the discourse of government party gives the notion of *party of state* meaning to move from the needs, benefits and requests of the population at large. In fact, the emphasis that the reform policies is beneficial for the society as a whole was presented in the justificatory political talk of the government.

(10)
That bill is for people, for people!
Bu tasarı halk için çıkıyor, halk için!..[358]

(11)
Dear friends, we are legislating that reform for our seventy-million nation, for making their lives easy, for promoting the quality of their lives.
Değerli arkadaşlarım, biz, bu kanun tasarısını, yetmiş milyon halkımız için çıkarıyoruz; onların hayatını kolaylaştırmak için çıkarıyoruz; onların yaşam standartlarını yükseltmek için çıkarıyoruz.[359]

The aims of reform, such as reorganizing the central and local administrations, providing the efficiency of administration, the strengthening of local governments, making the public institutions open to competition, were discussed in relation to the benefit of *nation of seventy-million*. It seems that the strong emphasis on the actions of government for the 'common good', as a well-known notion in political rhetoric, were constructed discursively against the statist/'centralist' position of opposition party, which will be presented in the following lines.

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[357] Mehmet Ali Şahin, ibid., pp. 323-324.

[358] Mehmet Ali Şahin, ibid., p. 321.

[359] Mehmet Ali Şahin, ibid.

The Republican People's Party, on the other hand, criticized the promises of government on the administrative reform by asserting that the draft bill is not compatible with the Constitution and also with the unitary structure of Turkish Republic. The political de-legitimation of opposition party is that the reform is 'illegal'. In order to justify this assertation, the opponents blamed the commission preparing the draft law for assembling illegally and blamed also the government for legislating the draft law with the method of stealing by snatching. In accordance with this 'criminalization' approach of opposition party, there are *fingerprints* on the draft bill of counter-revolutionaries, who do not believe in the 'great' existence of the secular democratic Republic.[360]

(12)
Everyone knows that illegal gathering was arranged.
Herkes biliyor, korsan toplantı oldu.[361]

(13)
Do you want to legislate the draft law, quickly, with the method of stealing by snatching. . . which has not yet discussed sufficiently, [and] has not being shared with the sections of society?
Yeterince tartışılmadan, toplum kesimleri tarafından paylaşılmadan getirilmek istenen bu yasa tasarısının, acaba, aceleye getirilerek, kapkaç usulüyle. . . geçmesini mi istiyorsunuz?[362]

This emphasis on 'illegality' gets together in critical position of the Republican People's Party with the discourse that the reorganization of public administration in the context of devolution of power to local administrations is a threat for national unity, because the strengthening local administrations means the 'hollowing out' or 'rolling back' the unitary state structure, and dividing the 'integrity of nation' included in the main principles of the Turkish Constitution. In addition, the opposition party asserted that the "*reform project based on annihilation of nation-state*"[363] is realized by the 'sacred' co-

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[360] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 308.

[361] Oya Araslı, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 300.

[362] Haluk Koç, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 293.

[363] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, ibid., p. 309.

operation between government party which tries to dissolve the Republican form of Turkey and international organizations that declare the end of nation-states.

(14)
That draft bill is not sensitive to unitary state, unitary structure.
Bu tasarı, üniter devlete, üniter yapıya duyarlı değil.[364]

(15)
Why is such-like destructive purposes regarding to nation-state supported?
Ulus devlete dönük böylesi yıkıcı bir niyetin desteklenmesi. . . niye?[365]

Although the governments generally engage the legitimation strategy about the legalization of their actions according to the laws, the Justice and Development Party preferred to build its legitimacy on 'public good'. In fact, according to Van Dijk, the stress on legal authorities, such as legal laws, during the political talk(s) can give a chance to the government for *authorization* of the process of law-making with the way of formulating a normative basis for the legitimation of its acts[366]. However, for providing a legitimate basis for its acts, the party in power seldom referred to the principles of Constitution, except that Mehmet Ali Şahin, one of ministers from the Justice and Development Party, read some articles from the 1982 Constitution for pointing out that the privatization is compatible with the Constitution. Nevertheless, the main counter-argument of opposition party about the public sector reform is 'unconstitutionality'.

(16)
The draft bill has been conflicting with the Constitution in many aspects.
Tasarı, pek çok konuda Anayasaya aykırılıkla inatlaşmaktadır.[367]

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[364] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, ibid., p. 307.

[365] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, ibid., p. 308.

[366] Luisa M. Rojo and Teun A. Van Dijk, op. cit., p. 534.

[367] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 308.

It has been observed that the members of the Republican People's Party were stating their counter-arguments self-confidently in parliamentary debates. It is probably due to the fact that they believe they are the 'speakers' who give voice to the secularism of Turkish Republic, and/or that they "*are. . . backed by institutional power*"[368] of the Republic. Put differently, it seems that they were speaking to 'feel' all authority of 'state' and its power, despite being in the opposition in the Assembly.

(17)
We are a revolutionary party. Mustafa Kemal had defined and guided the Republican People's Party as a political organization of the Enlightenment Revolution.
Biz, devrimci bir partiyiz. Mustafa Kemal, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisini, aydınlanma devriminin siyasal örgütü olarak tanımlamış ve yönlendirmiştir.[369]

(18)
They were us who have fighted for the National Liberation.
[Milli] Mücadeleyi biz yaptık, biz…[370]

(19)
We will continue to secure the norms of that nation. . . We have that courage.
Bu ulusun değerlerini. . . korumaya. . . devam edeceğiz. Bu cesaret bizde var.[371]

(20)
Now, by bringing that draft law, you are working for dissolving state that we had established eighty years ago.
Şimdi, siz seksen yıl önce topladığımız bu devleti. . . dağıtmaya çalışıyorsunuz getirdiğiniz tasarıyla.[372]

Following these arguments, one of discursive de-legitimation strategies of the opposition party was to refer to the political 'Islamist' past of the Justice and Development Party relating to the Welfare Party and Necmettin Erbakan. Moreover, it was criticized the relationship of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the Prime Minister and the head of the Justice and Development Party, with Nakhshibendi sheikh. In addition, there were some

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[368] Teun A. Van Dijk, 1988; quoted in John Gastil, "Undemocratic Discourse: A Review of Theory and Research on Political Discourse", in *Discourse and Society*, 3 (4), 1992: 479.

[369] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, op. cit., p. 306.

[370] Emin Koç, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 310.

[371] Haluk Koç, member of the Republican People's Party, op. cit., 295.

[372] Tuncay Ercenk, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 379.

references to the friendly relation of government with Arabian capital including in parliamentary speeches. Last but not least, the article of Ömer Dinçer, the undersecretary in Prime Ministry and 'preparer' of the draft law of public administration reform, titled as "*Islam on the global and Turkish agenda(s) at the beginning of twenty-first century*" seems as one of important 'evidences' to present the 'desire' of government for dividing the national unity.

(21)
Do not forget your own history!
Geçmişinizi unutmayın![373]

(22)
Dear Şahin, you were not talking like this, when you were with Necmettin 'Hodja'.
Necmettin Hocadayken böyle konuşmuyordun Sayın Şahin.[374]

(23)
We know how the Prime Minister had been in an intimate relationship with the Nakhshibendi sheikh in America.
[Başbakanın] Amerika'da Nakşibendi şeyhiyle ne kadar samimî olduğunu da biliriz![375]

(24)
Talk about Dubai!.. Talk about Dubai!..
Dubai'den bahset!.. Dubai'den bahset!..[376]

(25)
Ömer Dinçer also wrote an article!
Ömer Dinçer de makale yazdı![377]

The article of Ömer Dinçer, whose parts were read again and again by the opponents in parliamentary speeches, was an 'opportunity' for the opposition party to support their arguments that the draft law, "*as a project based on annihilation of nation-state*"[378], has

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[373] Hüseyin Güler, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 329.

[374] Ali Rıza Bodur, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 324.

[375] Halil Akyüz, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 351.

[376] Yılmaz Kaya, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 314.

[377] K. Kemal Anadol, member of the Republican People's Party, ibid., p. 299.

[378] Hasan Fehmi Güneş, ibid., p. 309.

the *fingerprints* of counter-revolutionaries. The following sentences from Dinçer's article were presented as 'evidences' during the parliamentary debates by the opposition party:

> *. . . in every place in which globalization exists, the local cultures begin to develop… the local culture is Islam* [in] *our country. . . the Islamization will increase as much as globalization increases. . .* [Therefore,] *we see that the principle of statism. . . and also of republic*[anism] *weakened and lost its* [social] *function.*[379]

Despite being included in political discourse of the Republican People's Party, the welfare discourse, that is the main critical point for struggling with the neoliberal discourse including restructuring of the public institutions/administration for the sake of spreading market relations, was again discussed in relation with 'unity/integrity of state'. The notion of welfare state was discussed mainly as a necessity of the principles of Constitution. It may be crucial to listen to the critical words of Mehmet Ali Şahin answering the speech of Hasan Fehmi Güneş: "*The name of your party is Republican People's Party*; [but] *you did not say anything about the people/nation*"[380]. When the speech of Hasan Fehmi Güneş is analysed, it is seen that he had used the word of people/*halk twice* (in his speech totalling *2635* words), while saying "Republican People's Party". At that point, instead of 'believing' the words of government, it may be asserted that the opposition party prefers to use a different word for defining 'the people'. In fact, it is found that the words of *society*, and of *social* in the speech of Güneş were used twenty-three times. It indicates the elitist style of politics that moves its political discourse from 'populism' based on taking the interests and opinions of ordinary people in center of politics to 'objectivity' of scientific words.

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[379] "Küreselleşmenin olduğu her yerde mahalli kültürler gelişmeye başlar. Bizim ülkemiz[de]. . . mahallî kültür İslamdır. Globalleşme ne kadar artarsa, İslamlaşma da o kadar çok artacaktır. . . devletçilik ilkesinin. . . cumhuriyet ilkesinin de zayıfladığını ve işlevini kaybettiğini görüyoruz"; available online at www. cumok.org/html/yazidizileri/alevcoskun/yirimibirinci.htm, download on 12 March 2005.

[380] "Sizin partinizin ismi Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi; konuşmanızın içerisinde hiç halktan bahsetmediniz"; in the speech of Mehmet Ali Şahin, ibid., p. 321.

IV. 1. 2. [Is] *The Reform in Administration is a Dream of Our Fathers!* **[?]**

In the parliamentary speeches, one of the political strategies of legitimation practiced by the government was to indicate that the reform in public administration was not a new development in Turkish history. In accordance with the statements of government, reorganization of the administrative structure has been taken in the political agenda of former governments. Indeed, the Republican People's Party prepared a report titled as the *Recipe for Local Problems 2000* that presented nearly same solutions for the problems of Turkish administration. The government, thus, tried to eliminate the possible critique of the opposition party by the way of referring to its political formulations and promises during the earlier election periods.

(26)
This draft bill is not only a dream of our party and government.
bu tasarı, sadece Partimizin veya Hükümetimizin bir özlemi değildi.[381]

(27)
That draft bill has been on the agenda of Turkey and of the Parliament for years.
onlarca yıldan beri, Türkiye'nin ve Parlamentonun gündeminde olan bir tasarıdır bu.[382]

(28)
We are talking about an issue being discussed from the Ottoman Empire to the years of Republic.
Osmanlı'dan beri tartışılan ve cumhuriyetle devam eden bir konuyu konuşuyoruz.[383]

(29)
[It] *is an ideal, a dream of Turkey, the Ottoman Empire; this period began from Prince Sebahattin.*
[Reform,] Türkiye'nin, hatta Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun. . . bir ideali, bir hayali; Prens Sebahattin'den başlamış bu dönem.[384]

However, the members of the Justice and Development Party bragged about having out the draft bill on the agenda of parliament as an act that needs courage. The speakers stated that the government has ventured to realize the public sector reform in Turkey

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[381] Mehmet Ali Şahin, ibid., p. 319.

[382] Eyüp Fatsa, member of the Justice and Development Party, ibid., p. 298.

[383] Asım Aykan, op. cit., p. 328.

[384] Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, member of the Justice and Development Party, ibid., p. 310.

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despite that there has not been any successful attempt/experience of former governments till now for achieving the reform in administrative structure. While talking about this 'courage' of the government, the deputies were presenting themselves as a 'this government' and/or 'the Justice and Development Party'.

(30)
The Justice and Development Party, showing that courage, have put the draft bill on the agenda of Turkish Grand National Assembly.
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi. . . bu cesareti göstererek, kanun tasarısını Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin gündemine getirmiştir.[385]

(31)
The Justice and Development Party is getting the problems of country over. . . fighting the unlawful actions and poverty. . .
Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, ülkenin. . . sorunlarını çözüyor. . . yolsuzluklarla ve yoksullukla. . . mücadele ediyor.[386]

(32)
There is the people in your behind, the people is the greatest power.
Sizin arkanızda halk var, halk; en büyük güç.[387]

In the last sentence, the speaker constructed himself as an outside, neutral and objective observer of the events. Then, he began to call to the members of government, forgetting that he is also from the government party, as: 'The people living in Turkey is together with you'. However, this position, that is backed by institutional authority of government, was sometimes supported with the personal commitments of the members of party in power, and thus, the use of first-person pronouns.

(33)
I have been in this parliament for three sessions; I know and remember speeches of the opponents.
Ben, üç dönemdir buradayım; muhalefetlerin konuşmalarını biliyorum ve hatırlıyorum.[388]

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[385] Eyüp Fatsa, ibid., p. 299.

[386] Muzaffer Baştopçu, ibid., p. 337.

[387] Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, ibid., p. 315.

[388] Mehmet Ali Şahin, ibid., p. 321.

(34)

I have been in the Turkish Grand National Assembly *for two sessions. . . I do not remember such a draft bill on which all sections of society. . . declare their views.*
İki dönemdir Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisindeyim. . . Türkiye'nin bütün kesimleri tarafından. . . görüş beyan edilmiş bir kanun tasarısını ben hatırlamıyorum.[389]

The self-confidence the government had about the reform during the parliamentary speeches, which was based on the continuity in public administration reform between the Ottoman Empire and the Republic, was de-legitimated by the Republican People's Party because of being referenced to the historical period before the establishment of Turkish Republic. Therefore, the speakers blamed the government for not giving importance to the developments in public administration reform existing in the own history of Turkish Republic: "*That is the mentality of Damat Ferit,* the spokesman of last government of the Ottoman Empire*; our mentality is the mentality of Mustafa Kemal*"[390]. It is not surprising that the deputies of the opposition party were presenting themselves as a representative party of the *secular Republican ideal* defined by Mustafa Kemal.

IV. 1. 3. *We* and *You*: *The Presentation of Opposition in Turkish Parliament*

During these parliamentary debates, the gap between *we* and *you* is evident. For gaining hegemony in parliament(ary debates), two opposite parties declare individually that We are essentially good/perfect and discredit, with pointing to negative properties, the Other party. The negative characterization of the Other, as one of the ways of excluding the opponent from the political discourse, is realized by the members of party in power to emphasize derisively that the support of the people behind the Republican People's Party is poor as indicating the percentage of votes in last election.

(35)
Why dou you fear of the people? They are the one who elected you. They do not give you power; it is different issue; the opposition is also fine.

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[389] Eyüp Fatsa, ibid., p. 299.

[390] "Bu anlayış, Damat Ferit anlayışıdır; bizim anlayışımız da, Mustafa Kemal anlayışıdır", in the speech of İzzet Çetin, op. cit., p. 350.

Niye halktan korkuyorsunuz?! Sizi seçenler onlar. İktidar yapmıyorlar; o, ayrı bir mesele; muhalefet olmak da güzel bir şey.[391]

The opposition party defended its position being engaged in three discursive strategies of emphasizing that they are the representatives of the mentality of Mustafa Kemal [*They were us who have fighted for the National Liberation*], that they are also elected by the people [*Who elect us? Do we fall from above?*], and that the government has acted anti-democratically to all opponents of reform and the opponents, especially the trade unions, has not been let to join in the sessions and listen the the discussions on the public sector reform [*You barricaded at the door of Parliament, aren't you?*]. It seems that the political conjuncture experienced in Turkey during the government of the Justice and Development Party has marginalized the position of secularists in the parliament. Although the Justice and Development Party does not offer an Islamist state; and indeed, it is denied the arguments by the government that they have Islamist political projects for the future, the Republican People's Party tried to give voice to secularism and the supremacy of law and the Constitution in all political spaces against the political Islamist background of government.

Before the concluding remarks on this thesis, it will be stated that the important question in that chapter is/was about how people *backed by institutional power* (re)produce political discourse, but not about what they should have said/done in parliament. However, it is crucial to remember that the parliamentary debates have been taken place at the 'center' of related socio-political circumstances which embraces neoliberal restructuring process experienced in all over the world on one hand, and specific social relations in Turkey on the other. That understanding creates the conditions of to consider the critical /' radical' discourses, beyond the mainstream political discourse converged around neo-liberal discourse, on the complex relationships between neoliberal market reforms, the government policies and tension within social groups in individual countries.

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[391] Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, ibid., p. 314.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

V. 1. Discussion and Conclusion

In this thesis, it was attempted to analyze the recent public administration reform in Turkey at the 'junction' of neoliberal policies and discourses on *effective state*, *decentralization* and *governance* and of historically specific processes of Turkish public administration reform. It tried to 'undermine' the neoliberal definition of concept of decentralization by the international financial institutions within what sense *decentralized authority/state* has proposed for the political agenda of the Third World countries. To present a critical analysis of neoliberal rhetoric on decentralization and/or restructuration of public administration has been a crucial starting point for the study, because it enabled us to notice that the mainstream and/or dominant definitions in literature are actually 'channels' of extending the neoliberal 'project' through all over the social relations. They point out that the same concepts/terms, as "*site*[s] *of struggle*", can have entirely opposite meanings in accordance with the different political (discursive) positions. In fact, the introduction of the concept decentralization with reference to the definitions of the United Nations and World Bank and also to the critical analysis of that neoliberal rhetoric provided us with means to capture the language of (new) capitalism in which a battle over meaning takes place in the manifestations of dominant definition(s) / discourse(s) and of 'radical' resistant ones[392]. This

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[392] According to Bourdieu, the new capitalism, as a distinctive social practice, includes an interconnection between distinctive ways of entering language in social circulation: dominance, difference and resistance;

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conceptualization of *meaning* gave the study a 'chance' for analysing the public administration reform in Turkey in an *open*[393] (discursive) battlefield where the demands and interests of the conflicting social groups 'clash' with each other.

While at the beginning the first chapter of the thesis, I indicated my own curiousity about the questions about how the 'real' aims of public sector reform can be depicted in Turkish context despite being asserted continuously by the government that the reform is "*legislating. . . for* [*our*] *seventy-million nation, for making their lives easy, for promoting the quality of their lives*"[394]. This question led me to initially discuss administrative reform in specific context of Turkey from the last years of the Ottoman Empire to the days of the Great Depression and then, from the years of War to the 1980s and 1990s. The (hi)story of reform being realized in periods of coups, as 'continued' fate of Turkish society in the years of 1960, 1971 and, 1980, reveals that the re-organization of administration was justified via some discursive rationales: "*when the anarchic environment of the recent years was added to the general scene, the administration became incapable of providing peace and security for society*".[395] At that point, I decided to seek which discursive legitimation practices the government and its 'followers' have presented as the rationale(s) of reform. The notion of legitimation, that implies the "*socio-political acts*" of the government for "*seeking normative approval for*

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for more detailed analysis, see Pierre Bourdieu, *Acts of Resistance: Against the Tyranny of the Market* (New York: New Press, 1998).

[393] The term of 'open' is referred that the 'world' of words/language is also a 'world' of struggles between two or more discourses that means not to fix the meanings totally: "*it* [discursive formation] *is never a self-contained, closed whole*", in C. Hay and D. Marsh, *Demystifying Globalization* (London: Macmillan Press, 2000): p. 19.

[394] Mehmet Ali Şahin, one of ministers from the Justice and Development Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 321.

[395] From the governmental programme of Bülent Ulusu, in Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, *Milli Güvenlik Konseyince Kabul Edilen Kanunlar, Yayınlanan Bildiri ve Kararlar ile Önemli Mevzuat*, *v. 1* (Ankara: TBMM, 1982): p. 277.

its policies or actions"[396], encouraged me to include a chapter to this study about a critical analysis of recent public administration reform in the context of Turkish parliamentary discourse. The Turkish parliament, which may be called as one of spaces of the *home of power*[397], gave me clues of that *politicians* are not *merely players*, but the words they say are constituted by the history of state tradition, and political and administrative culture in Turkey within the context of matrix of social relations and of the international dimensions that social relations involve in. It may be noted that the speakers in parliament are not only *masters* but also *slaves of language* they engage in[398]. When it is asked in which context(s) the members of parliament are/were the slaves of words, it is again time to call the 'older' center-periphery cleavage back to that analysis. Because, after examining the debate between the parties of parliament from the official reports of assembly on the public sector reform, I noticed that the older center-periphery cleavage has re-appeared in the manifestation of state-civil society cleavage that was phrased by the government as a party of state (the Republican People's Party) and of nation (the Justice and Development Party): "*We are the party of nation, are proud* [of this]; *you are the party of state*"[399].

In fact, it has been asserted that the concepts of center and of periphery are still meaningful for understanding the specific 'nature' of Turkish political life. However, in accordance with these arguments, this theoretical conceptualization needs to be renewed within the framework of "*tension axes*" and "*conflict spaces*"[400]. It is a necessity to

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[396] Luisa M. Rojo and Teun A. Van Dijk, "'There was a problem, and it was solved!': Legitimazing the Expulsion of 'Illegal' Migrants in Spanish Parliamentary Discourse", in *Discourse and Society*, 8 (4), 1997: 528.

[397] The concept used by Sartori, 1995; adapted for the Turkish political life by Levent Gönenç, "2000'li Yıllarda Merkez-Çevre İlişkilerini Yeniden Düşünmek", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 105, 2006: 131-132.

[398] The words of Roland Barthes, quoted in Louise Phillips, "Rhetoric and the Spread of the Discourse of Thatcherism", *Discourse and Society*, 7 (2), 1996: 213.

[399] Asım Aykan, member of the Justice and Development Party, in *TBMM Tutanak Dergisi*, February 18, 2004, p. 329.

[400] The concepts of Linz and Stepan, 1996; adapted for the Turkish political life by Levent Gönenç, ibid.

mention the multiple *tension axes* between agents in the same/common space and/or in the different social spaces. In the context of these axes, it may be stated three *conflict spaces*: the *home of power* including state and its institutions, the *civil society* in which the social groups, social movements and/or individuals are organized independently from the state/legal authority in political system, the *political society* where the political system is organized itself for reproducing its power in public space(s) and state apparatus[401]. That understanding is placed in the literature with the argument that there is no one comprehensive and single 'center' and/or 'periphery'. Even Şerif Mardin himself, one of doyens who gives importance to the concepts of center and periphery in his analyses on Turkish society, implies in one of later interviews that the distinction between center and periphery should be viewed as a flexible metaphor rather than an 'essential' conceptual framework[402]. Actually, to take notice of the(se) breaking points of classical center-periphery paradigm over the parliament of the Republican People's Party and the Justice and Development Party can enable to understand why it is needed by some authors to re-interpret the notion of center and periphery. Although the criticism of center-periphery dichotomy goes beyond the limit(s) of this thesis, I want to state a crucial critical point relating to that conceptual framework in the context of recent political relations in Turkey. After following the parliamentary debates from the one of back seats of parliament and also reading the dialogues between the deputies from the official reports, it is interesting to notice that the Justice and Development Party has declared continuously the intention to 'integrate with West' that is generally defended by the political groups of 'center' in Turkey. Put differently, those policies which are asserted as belonging to the center are 'voiced' by the party which is asserted as the representative of the social sections constituting periphery.

The struggle between parties in parliament seems a conflict between the views of government that the reform is *only way of development and democracy*, *of integration*

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[401] Levent Gönenç, ibid.

[402] Mardin, 2004; quoted in Alim Arlı, "Devletin Sürekliliği, Devrimin Muhafazası, Toplumun Denetimi Sorunu", *Toplum ve Bilim*, 105, 2006: 121.

with West by the way of membership to the European Union and of opposition party that it *makes by the government against the integrity of the state with its nation and land within infringement of the Constitution and being subjected to the 'act of force' of international financial organizations*. While legitimazing the reform, the government has defended the neoliberal restructuring of public administration for the sake of market within the discourse of 'the reform for all people living in Turkey'. However, it may be remarked that the government, despite presenting itself as a new political party on a platform of human rights and liberal democracy, was intolerant toward the civil society organizations, such as trade unions, that interpreted the reform attempts critically. Nevertheless, the members of the Republican People's Party, while de-legitimazing the reform, talked about their doubts on that it is a project of *annihilation of nation-state*. It points to a 'labyrinth' of *authoritarian liberal populism* of government and *statist nationalism* of opposition.

When I felt myself 'lost' in that 'labyrinth', to say that these reforms were legalized and implemented because of the 'insistence' of international financial organizations, it seemed to me to choose the easiest way of understanding social relations. I think that this view is inadequate to conceptualize the social relations, because they tended to eliminate the role of 'domestic' social/political agents forming the reform process in Turkey. Nevertheless, while examining the literature on the changes in the public administration, excluding the 'journalistic' enquiries proceed by the 'advocates' of reform and the representatives of trade unions, I noticed that the studies of jurists have analyzed the text of public administration reform as a given text, and they do not question the relation between the law and its location in broader social context. Therefore, the way of interpretation for public sector reform by jurists and academics from the department of law needs to be evaluated as problematical for the reason that they interpret the new socio-political process experienced in Turkey without establishing a coherent connection point with their social context. It means that there is still a need for further studies to make new investigations related to the public sector reform.

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Especially, to ask which criticisms have been pointed to the government by civil society organizations and/or democratic mass organizations and also what differences have been found between these different criticisms should be included in the future studies. Moreover, as different discourses on decentralization policies, the statements and reports of TÜSİAD -Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association-, that are extremely harmonious with the neoliberal content of public sector reform prepared by the Justice and Development Party, and the statements of Chamber of Commerce of Ankara - Ankara Ticaret Odası-, that have interpreted the reform as a threat to the 'integrity of nation', will be presented together. This study will help us to understand in what way(s) neoliberal market reforms has created tensions within the capital groups.

Finally, it seems that this thesis can be evaluared as one of pieces of more comprehensive analysis of the government programmes, of the development plans prepeared by the State Planning Organization, of the stand-by agreements with the International Monetary Fund, of the reports of international financial organizations and of 'domestic' political organizations, including those of the business groups, civil society organizations and democratic mass organizations. The study at hand, by providing a brief review of the socio-economic transformations of new capitalism / neo-liberalism within the notion of decentralization and of how/in what ways the neoliberal policies have been legitimated within the specific context of Turkish public administration reform, only draws the attention towards the necessity of critique and of possible different analyses to be taken for a comprehensive relational account.

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APPENDIX

THE NEWS ON PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM FROM TURKISH NEWSPAPERS

Üç günde 17 yasa hedefi

TBMM bu hafta sonunda tatile girmeden önce üç günde 17 yasa çıkararak rekor kırmayı deneyecek. TCK tasarısının çıkarılması için TBMM eylülde olağanüstü toplantıya çağrılacak

13 July, 2004
Radikal

günde tam 10 yasa tasarısı parmak kaldırma usulü ile sadece okunarak kabul edildi

Kaldır parmak indir parmak!

'Kamu reformu' kabul edildi

16 July, 2004
Evrensel

135

Meclis'te kapanış sürprizi

AKP, 'Kamu Yönetimi Temel Yasası'nı sürpriz bir manevrayla kapanış oturumunda TBMM'den geçirdi. Başbakanlık Müsteşarı Dinçer'in hazırladığı tasarı tepkiler nedeniyle askıya alınmıştı.

ANKARA - Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer'in 'veto' sinyali verdiği, CHP'nin 'üniter devlet yapısını bozacağı' gerekçesiyle karşı çıktığı tartışmalı Kamu Yönetimi Temel Yasa tasarısı, hükümetin sürpriz manevrasıyla Meclis Genel Kurulu'ndan geçirildi.

Başbakanlık Müsteşarı Ömer Dinçer tarafından hazırlanan, CHP'nin muhalefeti nedeniyle ocak ve şubattaki görüşmeleri ağır ilerleyen tasarının, geçici hükümlerine gelindiğinde görüşmeler askıya alınmış ve görüşmelerin 28 Mart yerel seçimleri sonrasına bırakılması kararlaştırılmıştı.

Son anda Genel Kurul'da

Bu yasama yılının son günü olan dün, vergi yasalarında değişiklik öngören tasarının yarım kalan görüşmelerine devam edilmesi beklenirken, hükümet, geçen şubat ayından sonra askıya alınan tasarıyı Genel Kurul gündemine taşıdı. Tasarının dokuz geçici maddesiyle yürürlük ve yürütme maddeleri yaklaşık 9.5 saat süren gö-

rüşmenin ardından kabul edildi.

Hükümetin büyük önem verdiği yasayla merkezi yönetimle yerel yönetimlerin görev yetki ve sorumlulukları yeniden belirleniyor. Yasa, Adalet, Milli Savunma, İçişleri, Milli Eğitim, Maliye ile Çalış-

ma ve Sosyal Güvenlik Bakanlıklarının illerde ve hizmetin niteliği ile ihtiyaçlar dikkate alınarak ilçelerde teşkilatlanabileceklerini öngörüyor. Kamu hizmetlerinin zorunlu durumunda birden çok ili kapsayan alanlarda, sürekli

Sezer'e veto eleştirisi

ANKARA - Başbakan Yardımcısı Mehmet Ali Şahin, Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer'in, yerel yönetimler paketi içinde yer alan İl Özel İdareler Yasası'nı veto etmesini eleştirdi. Meclis Genel Kurulu'nda konuşan Şahin 'Bir defa hem o yasa okunmamış, hem temel yasa okunmamış' dedi. CHP'liler Bakan Şahin'in bu açıklamalarına sert bir şekilde tepki gösterdi. (Radikal)

veya geçici nitelikte, kanunla bölge teşkilatı kurulabilecek. Ancak bölge düzeyinde teşkilatlanan bakanlıklar illerde, illerde teşkilatlanan bakanlıklar ise bölge düzeyinde teşkilatlanamayacak. Yasa, bakanların özel kalem müdürleri-

nin görev alanı tanımlanırken, ayrıca 'İnsan Kaynakları Daire Başkanlığı' da düzenleniyor. Böylece bakanlıklarda bugün var olan her sonel Genel Müdürlükleri, özel şirketlerdeki yapılanmalara benzer biçimde İnsan Kaynakları Daire Başkanlıklarına dönüşecek.

Yerele yetki devri

Yasayla, Sağlık, Kültür ve Turizm, Çevre ve Orman, Tarım ve Köyişleri, Sanayi ve Ticaret, Bayındırlık ve İskân bakanlıklarının taşra teşkilatları yerel yönetimlere devredilirken, Köy Hizmetleri Genel Müdürlüğü ile Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu (YDK) kapanıyor.

AKP'nin verdiği bir önergeyle hükümet, taşra teşkilatı kapanan bakanlık ya da kurumlardan yerel yönetimlere devredilecek personel konusunda yetki aldı. Buna göre ihtiyaç fazlası olarak belirlenen personel öncelikle kendi illeri içindeki mahalli idarelere, buralarda mümkün olmadığı takdirde merkezi idarenin taşra teşkilatına atanacak. (Radikal)

16 July, 2004
Radikal

Sezer'den sert veto

Kamu Yönetimi Yasası'nı türbanla ilgili uyarılar yaparak geri gönderdi

HÜKÜMETİN "Dev reform" dediği Kamu Yönetimi Kanunu'nun 22 maddesi veto yedi. Cumhurbaşkanı, yasada, kamusal alana türbanı sokmak için bilinçli boşluk bırakıldığını savundu. AKP'ye türbandan parti kapatıldığını hatırlattı. [19'da]

Hesap sorulmalı...

Milletvekilleri, Ulaştırma Bakanı için verilen gensoru oylamasında, vicdanlarının sesini dinleyerek hareket etmeli. [2'de]

— Mehmet Y. Yılmaz

Otomobillerden 2 trilyon gelir bekleniyor.

'El koyan'dan satılık otolar

TMSF, Uzanlar'a ait 20 otomobili açık artırmayla satıyor. 1998 model Ferrari'ye 180 milyar, 7.60 BMW'ye 215 milyar, 1998 model Hummer'a 60 milyar, 2002 model Aston Martin'e 180 milyar lira değer biçildi. [Sayfa 6'da]

Üst üste 3. kez eksi enflasyon

TEMMUZDA, toptan eşya fiyatları 1.52 geriledi. Böylece TEFE 3 ay üst üste eksi çıktı. Tüketici fiyatları yüzde 0.22 arttı. Yıllık enflasyon TEFE'de yüzde 9.44, TÜFE'de yüzde 9.57 oldu. [9'da]

Meclis'in 'tren kazası' sınavı

TBMM, Ulaştırma Bakanı hakkında verilen gensoruyu gündeme alıp almamayı görüşmek için toplanıyor. [18'de]

4 August, 2004
Milliyet

Sezer'den türban uyarısı

Cumhurbaşkanı, AKP'nin "reform" dediği Kamu Yönetimi Yasası'nın 22 maddesini veto etti. Sezer, türbanın önünün açılmaya çalışıldığını, bunun Anayasaya aykırı olduğunu vurguladı

ANKARA Milliyet

Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer, AKP hükümetinin "reform" olarak nitelendirdiği 61 maddeden oluşan Kamu Yönetiminin Temel İlkeleri ve Yeniden Yapılandırılması Hakkında Kanun'un 22 maddesinin yönetim biçimini değiştireceği gerekçesiyle veto etti. Sezer, yasayla türbanın önünün açılmaya çalışıldığını vurguladı. AKP'ye "türbanı destekleyen kanun olabileceğini" anımsattı.

Veto ettiği 13 maddede, merkezi idarenin yetkilerinin sınırlandığını, yerel yönetimlere genel sorumluluk verildiğini belirten Sezer, bunun Anayasa'ya aykırı olduğunu kaydetti. Sezer, böylece, "yerel devlet" modeli yerine, "yerel ağır" modeli yolunun açıldığını, bunun da amaçlanması da Anayasa'da öngörülmeyen bir yönetim modeline gelinmesine neden olabileceğini bildirdi.

Sınırsız özgürlük olmaz

Sezer, yasanın 4. maddesinde haklarına hak ve özgürlüklerinin önündeki engelleri kaldırmak" düşüncesinde hak ve özgürlüklerin ülkenin bölünmezliği, demokratik ve laik cumhuriyeti ortadan kaldırmaya yönelik etkinliklerin sınırlandırılacağına ilişkin Anayasa kuralına bilinçli olarak yer verilmediğini belirtti.

Sezer, böylece sınırları aşkın davranışların "yaptırımsız bırakılacağı tehlikesinin yaratıldığını" vurguladı.

"kamu hizmetlerinden yararlanmada ayrımcılık yapılamayacağını" düzenlendiğini anımsatan Sezer, böylece hedef kitle olarak seçilen kamu çalışanları ve öğrenciler için türban yasağının kaldırılmasının amaçlandığını vurguladı. Bunun, 4. maddeyle pekiştirildiğini kaydeden Sezer, Anayasa Mahkemesi, AİHS ve AİHM kararlarıyla kamusal alanda türbanın yasaklandığını hatırlattı.

'Laikliğin ağır ihlali'

Sezer, "Bunlar Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde türban konusunu, geriye dönülemeyecek biçimde gündemden çıkarmıştır" ifadelerini kullandı.

Sezer, Anayasa Mahkemesi'nin RP ve FP'nin kapatılmasına ilişkin kararlarında, türbanın, üniversitelerde takımının desteklenmesini ve güçlü bir siyasi sembol olarak kullanılıp TBMM'ye taşınmasını, Türkiye'de laiklik ilkesinin ağır ihlali olarak nitelendirdiğini de anımsattı.

Yasama yetkisi devri

Sezer, veto ettiği 11. maddeyle de yerel yönetimlere hizmetleri özelleştirme yetkisi tanındığını, bunun da yasama yetkisini devretme anlamına geldiğini kaydetti. Yasanın 3 ayrı maddesiyle yolsuzlukla mücadelede teftiş kurullarının yerine dış denetimin Sayıştay'a, iç denetimin üst yöneticilere verildiğini belirten Sezer, Sayıştay'a Anayasa'yla sadece "mali denetim" yetkisi verildiğinden, bunun da Anayasa'ya aykırı olduğunu vurguladı.

'Tecrit' tartışması!

Diyarbakır'da PKK / KONGRA GEL'e yönelik başlatılan operasyonda, polisin bazı mahallelerde tecrit uyguladığını öne süren Belediye Başkanı Osman Baydemir ve bazı sivil toplum örgütleri, Diyarbakır Emniyet Müdürü Orhan Okur'a tepki gösterdi. Polis noktasına geçen çarşamba yapılan saldırının ardından Dicle Nehri kıyısında bulunan Hevsel bahçeleri ve çevresinde operasyon başlatıldı. Aramalardan şikâyet eden Şemsiler ve Kümeevler Mahallesi sakinleri İnsan Hakları Derneği'nden yardım istedi.

Baydemir'in de bulunduğu bir heyet, dün operasyon bölgesine giderek inceleme yapmak istedi. Okur da, can güvenliği gerekçesiyle izin vermedi. Bunun üzerine Baydemir ve Diyarbakır Barosu Başkanı Sezgin Tanrıkulu, Okur'la tartıştı. Heyet, polisin bölge halkına tecrit uyguladığını öne sürdü. Açıklama yapmak isteyen Tanrıkulu'nun sözünü kesen Okur, "Terör örgütüne kimse destek çıkması. Teröristleri alımamıza kimse engel olamaz" dedi. ■ DİYARBAKIR DHA

Suikast basit cinayet

Necip Hablemitoğlu

TÜRKER KARAPINAR Ankara

İçişleri Bakanlığı, 18 Aralık 2002'de evinin önünde öldürülen Doç. Dr. Necip Hablemitoğlu'nun ailesinin açtığı manevi tazminat davasında, terör veya toplumsal bir kalkışma niteliğinde olmadığını savunduğu suikastı basit bir cinayet olarak değerlendirdi.

Ankara 5. İdare Mahkemesi, Hablemitoğlu'nun can ve mal güvenliğini koruyamadığı gerekçesiyle İçişleri Bakanlığı'nı aileye 40 milyar lira manevi tazminat ödemeye mahkûm etmişti.

Tehdit yok

Bakanlığın mahkemeye dava sırasında gönderdiği savunmada, Hablemitoğlu'nun öldürülmesini basit bir cinayet olarak değerlendirdiği ortaya çıktı.

Hablemitoğlu'nun korunmasını gerektirecek tehdit aldığına dair bir bilgiye ulaşılamadığını kaydeden bakanlık, bu nedenle tazminattan sorumlu tutulamayacağını savundu. Yazıda Hablemitoğlu ailesinin talep ettiği 70 milyarlık tazminatın faiziyle birlikte istenmesinin teamüllere aykırı olduğu iddia edildi.

Tazminata itiraz eden Bakanlığın, savunmasında Hablemitoğlu'nun öldürülmesini basit bir cinayet olarak değerlendirdiği ortaya çıktı

Siyasi neden bulunamadı

Cinayet soruşturmasının eski Ankara DGM Savcısı Cengiz Köksal tarafından yürütüldüğü, ayrıca bakanlık bünyesinde Özel Çalışma ve Değerlendirme Grubu kurulduğu vurgulanan savunmada, olayın siyasi nitelikli bir suikast olduğuna dair bir tespit yapılamadığı kaydedildi.

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4 August, 2004
Milliyet

Laiklik dersi

Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer, 22 maddesini Meclis'e iade ettiği Kamu Yönetimi Yasası'nın kamusal alanda 'türban serbestisini' hedeflediğine ve parti yandaşlığının yolunu açtığına dikkat çekti

■ Baştarafı 1. Sayfada

sayfayı bulan tarihi belge niteliğindeki veto gerekçesinde AKP hükümetine, **"laiklik dersi"** verdi. Sezer'in veto gerekçeleri özetle şöyle:

Yetki devri: Yasa ile, merkezi yönetim, görev ve yetkileri sınırlandırılıp özel görevli durumuna düşürülürken yerel yönetimler genel görevli kılınmakta, merkezi yönetimin taşra örgütlerinin kimileri kaldırılırken kimileri yerel yönetimlere devredilmekte, böylece merkezi yönetim örgütsel ve işlevsel yönden zayıflatılmaktadır. Yetki genişliğine dayanan güçlü merkezi yönetim yerine, görev ayrılığına dayalı güçlü yerel yönetim yapılanmasının yolu açılmaktadır.

Kamu özelleştiriliyor: Yapılan düzenlemeler, anayasada öngörülen tekil devlet yapısına, **"idarenin bütünlüğü"**, yetki genişliği ve idari vesayet ilkelerine ve kamu yararına uygun düşmemektedir. Bu düzenlemeler, amaçlanmasa da anayasada öngörülmeyen bir yönetim modeline geçilmesine neden olabilecek niteliktedir.

Amaç türban serbestisi: Yasanın "Kamu yönetiminin kuruluş ve işleyişinin temel ilkeleri" başlıklı 5. maddesinin (d) bendinde, **"Kamu hizmetlerinin yerine getirilmesinde ve bu hizmetlerden yararlandırmada ayrımcılık; bu hizmetlerle ilgili olarak insan hak ve özgürlüklerini kısıtlayıcı düzenleme ve uygulama yapılamaz"** düzenlemesine yer verilmiştir. Genel olarak, temel hak ve özgürlüklerin önündeki engelleri kaldırmaya yönelik olumlu bir düzenleme gibi görünmekle birlikte uygulamada bu kuralın başka bir amaçla kullanılması olanaklıdır. Gerçekten de **"Kamu hizmetlerinin yerine getirilmesinde"** anlatımıyla, kamu görevlileri ve kamuda çalışanların; **"Bu hizmetlerden yararlandırma"** anlatımıyla da özellikle öğrencilerin, hedef kitle olarak belirlendiği görülmektedir.

Yine aynı kuralda, **"Ayrımcılık ve insan hak ve özgürlüklerini kısıtlayıcı düzenleme ve uygulama yapılamaz"** anlatımıyla hem düzenleme yapılırken hem de uygulamada hedef kitledekiler için türban yasağının kaldırılmasının amaçlandığı anlaşılmaktadır.

Gündemden çıktı: Öncelikle belirtmek gerekir ki, ulusal ve ulusalüstü yüksek mahkeme kararlarında açıklanan içerikleriyle gerek anayasa gerek Avrupa İnsan Hakları Sözleşmesi kuralları, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde türban konusunu, geriye dönülemeyecek biçimde gündemden çıkarmıştır.

Demokrasi, şeriatın karşıtıdır: Demokratik düzen, dinsel gerekleri egemen kılmayı amaçlayan şeriat düzeninin karşıtıdır. Dinsel gereklere dayanan düzenleme demokratik olamaz. Özgürlük, anayasal ilkelerle sınırlıdır. Laiklik ilkesine ters düşen düzenlemelerin demokratik hak içerdiğinin ileri sürülmesi anayasal düzenle bağdaşmaz. İnsan hakları ve adaletin yanında kamu düzenini, hukuk güvenliğini ve toplumsal barışı sağlamak hukuk devletinin varlık nedenidir. Bunları bozucu davranış ve uygulamalar hukuk devleti ilkesiyle bağdaşmaz.

Türban ayrımcılık yaratır: Kamu kurumlarında başörtü-

Sezer: Denetim özele devredilemez

"Yasada Sayıştay'a **"inceleme ve denetleme"** görev ve yetkisinin yasalarla verilebileceği öngörülmüşse de buradaki **"denetim"** sözcüğü de mali denetimi kapsamaktadır. Sayıştay'ın hükme bağlama yetkisinin mali denetimle ilgili olduğunda kuşku bulunmamaktadır. Bu nedenle, incelenen yasayla Sayıştay'a verilen hukuka uygunluk ve performans denetim yetki ve görevinin anayasanın 160. maddesine uygun düşmediği sonucuna varılmaktadır. Yasada Sayıştay'ın dış denetim yetkisini devretmesine olanak sağlanmıştır. Anayasaya göre, Sayıştay'ın genel yönetim ilkelerine göre yürütülen aslı ve sürekli görev olduğunda kuşku bulunmayan denetim görevini kamu görevlileri eliyle yerine getirmesi zorunludur."

süne izin verilmesi, bir kesime ayrıcalık tanınması anlamına gelir ki, bu da eşitlik ilkesine ters düşer. Dini inancı nedeniyle başını örtmek isteyenler ile farklı düşüncede olup bir zorlama karşısında bulunduklarına inananların aynı anayasal korumadan eşit olarak yararlanmaları gerekir. Kamusal kuruluşlarda ve öğretim kurumlarında başörtüsü bir ayrıcalıktan öte ayırım aracı niteliğindedir.

Yurtdışı teşkilatları: Yasa, diğer bakanlıkların yurtdışı hizmetlerinin Dışişleri Bakanlığı elemanlarınca yürütülmesini engellemektedir. Bu yönüyle düzenleme, yurtdışında hizmet yapması uygun görülen kamu kurum ve kuruluşları personelinin herhangi bir nedenle görevde bulunmaması durumunda devlet görevinin aksamasına neden olacak niteliktedir. Bu da, devletin dış politikasına zarar verecek, saygınlığının zedelenmesi sonucunu doğurabilecektir.

Teftiş kurullarına tasfiye: Yasanın 38. maddesinde denetimin tanımı yapılmış, 39. maddesinde denetimin kapsamı ve türleri belirlenmiş, 40. maddesinde de denetlemeye yetkili kurumlar gösterilmiştir. Bu maddelerin birlikte incelenmesinden kamu yönetiminde denetim sisteminin tümüyle değiştirildiği görülmektedir.

Parti yandaşlığının yolu açılıyor: Bir müsteşarın, başkanın ya da genel müdürün görevinin, hiçbir haklı neden olmadan, salt hükümetin değişmiş olmasına dayanılarak kendiliğinden sona erdirilmesi, kamu yönetiminin sürekliliği ilkesine aykırıdır, kamu hizmetinin gerekleri ve hukuk devleti ilkesiyle bağdaşmamaktadır. Getirilen düzenleme ile üst düzey kimi görevlerde bulunan kamu görevlilerinin **"devlet memuru"** kimliği yok edilmekte, parti yandaşlığı yarışının önü açılmaktadır.

Anayasal ilke gözetilmeli: Sonuç olarak belirtmek gerekir ki, kamu yönetiminde yeniden yapılandırma gereksinimi olduğu yadsınamaz bir gerçektir. Ancak, yapılacak düzenlemelerin ülke ve ulus birliğini, tekil devlet yapısını, merkezi yönetim-yerel yönetim dengesini zedelememesine, anayasal ilkelere, kamu yararına ve kamu hizmetinin gereklerine uygun olmasına özen gösterilmesi yaşamsal önem taşımaktadır.

Atatürk ilkelerine aykırı

"Anayasa Mahkemesi, kararlarında, anayasanın ve devrim yasalarının, yükseköğretim kurumlarında dinsel nitelikli giysiler giyilmesine olur vermediğini belirterek başörtüsü konusundaki görüşünü ısrarlı biçimde sürdürmüştür. Anayasa Mahkemesi'ne göre, laiklik, ulusal birliği sağlamış ve ümmetten ulusa geçmenin itici gücü olmuştur. Toplumsal birliği sağlayan din ve mezhep bağının yerini Türk ulusu bağı almıştır. Başörtüsü serbestisi, dinin, bireyin manevi yaşamını aşarak toplumsal yaşamı etkileyen eylem ve davranışa dönüşmesi anlamına gelmekte, temelini Atatürk ilke ve devrimlerinde bulan kamu hukuku istemlerine göre düzenlenmesi gereken giyim konusu dinsel kurala bağlanmış olmaktadır."

4 August, 2004
Cumhuriyet

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'Veto kararı, AKP'nin Cumhuriyetin ana ilkeleriyle hesaplaşma niyetini askıya al...'

Sezer'e büyük destek

IŞIK KANSU

ANKARA - Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer'in, AKP'nin Kamu Yönetimi Temel Yasası'nı TBMM'ye geri göndermesi, düzenlemeye karşı yaklaşık bir yıldır zorlu bir mücadele yürüten bilim insanları, demokratik kitle örgütleri ve uzmanlar tarafından olumlu karşılandı.

CHP Genel Sekreter Yardımcısı Oğuz Oyan, Cumhurbaşkanı tarafından veto edilen yasanın Türkiye'deki kamu yönetimi rejimini altüst eden, anayasada tanımlanmış kamu yönetimi tanımına uymayan ve Türkiye'yi bir yöresel özerkliğe ya da yöresel federalizme götürecek bir düzenleme olduğunu belirterek vetoyla AKP'nin

▶ Cumhurbaşkanı'nın Kamu Yönetimi Temel Yasası'nı vetosu toplumun hemen her kesimince olumlu karşılandı. Yol-İş Başkanı Fikret Barın, "Cumhurbaşkanı vetosuyla kamu çalışanlarını yok eden, Türkiye'nin üniter yapısını çözen bir yasaya geçit vermedi" dedi.

Cumhuriyet rejimi ile hesaplaşmaya dönük özel gündemi ve niyetinin askıya alındığını vurguladı. Oyan şunları söyledi: "AKP, Cumhuriyetin ana ilkeleriyle, kurumlarıyla hesaplaşabilmek için Türkiye'de oturmuş kurumsal yapıların çökertilmesi, tasfiyesini amaçlıyordu. Hızlı bir kadrolaşma istiyordu. Denetimi çok daha zor 3 bine yakın yerel yönetim birimiyle kamu hizmetlerini piyasalaştıran ve giderek denetlenemez duruma getiren bir yapı öngörüyordu. Kurumsal teftiş kurumlarının tasfiyesi ile denetime ilişkin kurumsal hafızanın silin-

mesini hedefliyordu. Kendi istediği yönde bir anayasal rejim yaratmak isteyen bu iktidar, aynı zamanda kendisine yakın radikal İslamcı eğilimleri olan bir sermaye sınıfı da yaratma yoluna gidiyordu. Sayın Cumhurbaşkanı'nın vetosu, bu niyetleri şu an için askıya aldı."

SBF Öğretim Üyesi Prof. Dr. Birgül Ayman Güler, Cumhurbaşkanı'nın, itirazı ile çeyrek yüzyıllık sömürgeleştirme projesinin ikinci dalgasını, son büyük vuruşu engellediğini savunarak "Bu veto, ulusal-üniter devleti karacak idari federalizm hesabına ve

sosyal devlet yerine küreselci-tüccar devletin yerleşmesine itirazıdır" dedi.

Yol-İş Başkanı Fikret Barın, Cumhurbaşkanı'nın, vetosuyla kamu çalışanlarını yok eden, Türkiye'nin üniter yapısını bozan bir yasaya geçit vermediğini dile getirirken, SBF öğretim görevlisi Seyhan Erdoğdu, veto edilen yasanın yaklaşık 2.3 milyon dolayındaki kamu çalışanının sayısında yüksek oranlı bir azaltma öngördüğünü anımsattı. Erdoğdu, şu değerlendirmeyi yaptı: "Yasanın ilgili maddeleri, memurlar için çalışma biçimi olarak anayasal güvencelere so-

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Sezer, veto gerekçesinde AKP'ye 'Devletin personeli ile uğraşmayın' uyarısı yaptı

'Bürokrasiyi siyasallaştırmayın'

▶ Sezer, hükümetin hazırlıklarını yürüttüğü, yaklaşık 1.5 milyon memurun sözleşmeli statüye geçirilmesini öngören yasayı da veto edeceği sinyalini verdi.

ANKARA (Cumhuriyet Bürosu)- Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer, veto ettiği Kamu Yönetimi Temel Yasası ile AKP iktidarına, kamu görevlilerinin özlük haklarının "sözleşmeyle" değil, ancak "yasayla" düzenlenebileceği uyarısında bulundu. Sezer, bu uyarısı ile yaklaşık 1.5 milyon memuru sözleşmeli statüye geçirmeye hazırlanan hükümete, Devlet Memurları Yasası'nda değişiklik öngören düzenlemeyi de veto edeceği sinyalini verdi.

Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer, Kamu Yönetimi Yasası'yla birlikte AKP hükümetinin "kamu yönetimi reformu" adı altında yaptığı 4 yasadan 3'ünü veto etti. Bu yasalardan sadece Büyükşehir Belediyeleri Yasası'nı onaylayan Sezer, İl Özel İdareleri ve Belediyeler Yasası'nı da "kısmen" Meclis'e iade etmişti.

Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer, yeni yasama yılında bu düzenlemelerin beşinci ayağı olarak "Devlet Memurları Yasası"nı Meclis'ten çıkarmayı hedefleyen AKP hükümetine, çalışanların özlük haklarına yönelik uyarılarda bulundu. Sezer, kamu görevlilerinin özlük haklarının sözleşmeyle düzenlenmesini öngören Kamu Yönetimi Temel Yasası'nın 46. maddesini veto etmesini, şöyle gerekçelendirdi:

"Kamu personel rejimi mizde, memuru ile içerecek biçimde, geniş anlamıyla kamu görevlisi, hüküme-

tin değil devletin memuru olarak düzenlenmiştir. Bu konumu nedeniyle, memurlar ve diğer kamu görevlilerinin siyasal kaygı için düşmeden hizmet vermeleri için yansız olmaları ilkesi getirilmiş ve bu ilke gereği yasal güvenceye alınmışlardır. Kamu personel rejimi, göreve alınmada ve görevde yükselmede kariyer ve liyakat ilkelerine dayanmaktadır. Memurlar ve diğer kamu görevlilerine sağlanan güvencenin temel amacı ise bu gibilerin kamu görevini hiçbir etki altında kalmadan, yalnızca kamusal çıkarları gözeterek, yerine getirmesidir.

Sezer, üst düzey bürokratların görev süresini hükümetin görev süresiyle sınırlayan düzenlemeye de itiraz etti. Bunun "devlet memuru kimliğini yok edip, parti yandaşlığı yarışının önünü açacağı" uyarısında bulundu.

SORU: Aşağıda ne oluyor?

ÇIKIŞ — GİRİŞ

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YANIT: AKP'liler HIZLANDIRILMIŞ TREN FACİASI'nın Gensoru görüşmelerini HIZLANDIRILMIŞ bir şekilde Meclis'ten geçiriyorlar...

KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Ad-Hoc Komitesi görüşmelerinden sonuç alamadı

YÖK kararından vazgeçmiyor

Eğitim Servisi - YÖK üyeleri ile KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi Ad-Hoc Komitesi üyeleri arasında KKTC'deki üniversitelere ön kayıtlı öğrenci alımının kaldırılmasıyla ilgili görüşmeden sonuç alınamadı.

Komite tarafından görüşmeden sonra yapılan açıklamada, "Bu kararın bu şekliyle kabul edilmesi mümkün değildir" denildi. Komitenin açıklaması şöyle: "YÖK'ün kararından sonra toplanan KKTC Cumhuriyet Meclisi tarafından alınan kararın gereği olıştu-

rulan Ad-Hoc komitesi, 2 Ağustos'ta YÖK üyeleriyle bir toplantı yapmıştır. Toplantıda YÖK'ün ileriye sürdüğü sorunları ortadan kaldıracak yapıcı çözüm önerileri geliştirilip, YÖK üyelerine sunulmuştur. YÖK üyeleri sunulmuş olan önerileri YÖK Başkanı ile değerlendireceklerini ve komitemiz üyeleriyle yeniden bir araya gelebileceklerini belirtmişlerdir. Ancak 3 Ağustos tarihinde toplanan YÖK üyeleri, komitemizin, TC hükümet yetkilileri, TBMM'de grubu bulunan Meclis ve CHP par-

tileriyle görüş birliğinde sundukları çözüm önerilerini değerlendirdiklerini, fakat 8 Temmuz 2004 tarihinde almış oldukları kararın geçerliliği korunduğunu komitemize bildirmiş olup, bu aşamada yeniden görüşmeye gerek duyulmadığını belirtmişlerdir. Bu bağlamda TC ile KKTC arasında yapılmış olan işbirliği, anlaşma ve protokollerin göz ardı edilerek KKTC'yi sosyal, kültürel, ekonomik, moral açıdan olumsuz etkileyecek olan kararın bu şek-

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ANKARA (ANKA) - CHP Genel Sekreter Yardımcısı Oğuz Oyan, iktidarın kendi istediği yönde bir anayasal rejim yaratmak istediğini, aynı zamanda iddia eden bir rejim yaratmak zorladı.

Oyan, "Kamu Yönetimi Reformu"nun, kamu Hizmetleri kamunun Yok Edilme...

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5 August, 2004
Cumhuriyet

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Dinçer yasasına veto

CUMHURBAŞKANI Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Başbakanlık Müsteşarı Ömer Dinçer yasası olarak anılan Kamu Yönetiminin Temel İlkeleri ve Yeniden Yapılandırılması Hakkında Kanun'u beklendiği gibi hemen veto etti. İktidarın kamuda büyük reform olarak nitelendirdiği yasayı 15 gündür inceleyen Sezer, yasa içine yerleştirilen "sakıncalı" madde ve hükümleri tek tek belirledi. Sezer, yürürlüğe girmesini uygun bulmadığı yasanın 14'ü asıl, 8'i geçici olmak üzere toplam 22 maddesinin yeniden görüşülmesi için TBMM'ye geri gönderdi. Sezer'in, bazı önemli gerekçeleri şöyle:

KASIT BAŞKA 'Kamu hizmetlerinin yerine getirilmesinde' anlatımıyla kamu görevlileri ve kamuda çalışanların 'Bu hizmetlerden yararlandırma' anlatımıyla da özellikle öğrencilerin hedef kitle olarak belirlendiği görülüyor.

AMAÇ TÜRBAN 'Ayrımcılık' 'insan hak ve özgürlüklerini kısıtlayıcı düzenleme ve uygulama yapılamaz' anlatımıyla düzenleme'de ve 'uygulama'da hedef kitledekiler için türban yasağının kaldırılması amaçlanıyor. Öncelikle belirtmeli ki, ulusal ve ulusalüstü yüksek mahkeme kararlarında açıklanan içerikleriyle gerek Anayasa gerek AİHM Sözleşmesi kuralları Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nde türban konusunu, geriye dönülemeyecek biçimde gündemden çıkardı. Birlikte öğrenim görenlerin ya da çalışanların kardeşlikleri,

arkadaşlıkları, dayanışmaları ulusal birlik yönünden son derece önemliyken; yurttaşları dinsel simgelerle ayırmak toplumda, özellikle gençler arasında sosyal görüş, din, inanç ve mezhep ayrılığını kışkırtarak bölünmelere yol açar.

TEKİL DEVLET Anayasa'da 'tekil devlet' modeli kabul ediliyor. Bu devlet modelinin yönetsel örgütlenmedeki temel ilkeleri 'merkezden yönetim', 'yerinden yönetim' ve 'idarenin bütünlüğü'dür. Yerinden yönetim, devletin ülkesi ve ulusuyla bölünmezliği ve yönetimin tümlüğü ilkeleriyle sınırlıdır. 'İdarenin bütünlüğü' tekil devletin yönetimdeki temel ilkesidir. Tekil devlet modelinde, tek bir egemenlik vardır ve tek yetkili devlettir.

DEVREDİLEMEZ Aslı ve sürekli kamu hizmetlerinin, memurlar ve diğer kamu görevlileri eliyle yürütülmesi zorunlu. Özel kesime devri Anayasa'ya aykırı.

YDK YAŞAMALI Denetim işlevsizleştiriliyor, etkisizleştiriliyor. Teftiş kurulları, yerine iç denetimin öngörülmesi yerinde değil. Anayasa'ya da aykırı. Başbakanlık Yüksek Denetleme Kurulu'nun kaldırılıp yetkisinin Sayıştay'a devredilmesi Anayasa'ya aykırı. ■ ANKARA

Sezer'in Kamu Yönetimi Yasası'nı veto gerekçeleri:

► Türban yasağının kaldırılması amaçlanıyor
► İdarenin bütünlüğü temel ilkesi bozuluyor
► Devletin egemenliği yerel birimlere devredilemez
► Teftiş kurullarının kaldırılması denetimi işlevsizleştirir

Görevimize engel oluyorsunuz

DİYARBAKIR'ın Mardinkapı semtinde geçen çarşamba akşamı polis noktasına saldırarak bekçi Abbas Yoldaş'ı şehit eden, bir polisi de yaralayan teröristlerin saklandığı öne sürülen Hevsel Bahçeleri'ne girmek isteyen Diyarbakır Büyükşehir Belediye Başkanı Osman Baydemir, Baro Başkanı Sezgin Tanrıkulu ve beraberindeki heyetle, Emniyet Müdürü Orhan Okur arasında sert tartışma oldu. Okur, heyeti, teröristleri 'zanlı', polise yönelik saldırıyı ise 'çatışma' diye lanse etmekle suçladı. Vatandaşların "tecrit uygulandığı" yönünde bir şikayeti olmadığını belirten Okur, "Siz burada görevimize engel oluyorsunuz. Burada bir tek insan hakkı ihlali yoktur. Terörle mücadele vardır" diye konuştu. Tartışmanın ardından heyet geri dönmek zorunda kaldı. ■ DİYARBAKIR/DHA

İhraç edilen 10 subay için şerh koymuşlar

BAŞBAKAN Tayyip Erdoğan başkanlığında devam eden Yüksek Askeri Şûra'nın (YAŞ) ikinci gününde terfi heyecanı devam etti. Kulislerden sızan bilgiye göre YAŞ'da dün ağırlıklı olarak tuğgenerallikten tümgenaralliğe, tümgenarallikten de korgeneralliğe yükselecek personelin durumu ele alındı. Bu yılki Şûra'da da, geçen yıl olduğu gibi, Başbakan Erdoğan ile Milli Savunma Bakanı Vecdi Gönül'ün disiplinsizlik ve irticai faaliyetlerde bulundukları gerekçesiyle Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri ile ilişiği kesilen 10 civarındaki personelle ilgili "şerh" koydukları konuşuluyor.

ERDOĞAN TAKİPTE Kulislerde ayrıca Başbakan Erdoğan'ın terfi ettirilen personelin sicil dosyasını yakından takip ettiği ve kararını verirken çoğunlukla Genelkurmay Başkanı Orgeneral Hilmi Özkök'ün değerlendirmelerini dikkatle izlediği seslendiriliyor.

Bu yıl yaş haddi nedeniyle emekliye ayrılacak olan Jandarma Genel Komutanı Orgeneral Şener Eruygur, dün Şûra üyelerine öğle yemeği verdi. Bugünkü öğle yemeğini ise Milli Savunma Bakanı Vecdi Gönül verecek. Bugün akşam da Cumhurbaşkanı Ahmet Necdet Sezer, Şûra üyelerine eşli akşam yemeği verecek. Ancak Başbakan Erdoğan'ın eşi Emine Erdoğan türbanlı olduğu için Çankaya Köşkü'nden Erdoğan'a davet eşsiz yapılacak.

MGK'YA SİVİL ATAMA YAŞ'ta alınan kararlar perşembe günü Cumhurbaşkanı Sezer'in onayından sonra kamuoyuna açıklanacak. Teamüllere göre, bu yıl emekliliği gelen Orgeneral Aytaç Yalman'ın yerine Kara Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı'na 1. Ordu Komutanı Orgeneral Yaşar Büyükanıt'ın getirilmesi bekleniyor. Bu durumda Orgeneral Büyükanıt için 2006'da Genelkurmay Başkanlığı yolu açılmış olacak. Bu yılki YAŞ'da ayrıca MGK Genel Sekreterliği'ne de sivil atama yapılacak. ■ Uğur ERGAN/ANKARA

Türbanlılara ceza TCK'dan çıkarılmalı

TBMM Adalet Komisyonu, yeni TCK raporunu TBMM Başkanlığı'na sundu. TCK'nın eylül ayında yapılacak olağanüstü toplantısında yasalaşacak olan TCK'dan türban cezasının çıkarılacağı öne sürülüyor.

TCK'nın bu haliyle yasalaşması durumunda, başörtüsü ile okula gidenlere cezai yaptırım uygulanabileceğini söyledi. Toptan, bu maddenin Genel Kurul'da değişmesi gerektiğini belirterek, aksi takdirde uygulamada herkesi rahatsız edecek bir takım gelişmelere tanık olunabileceğini söyledi. Toptan, "70 senedir verilmeyen bir cezayı vermeye başlarsak bu ceza kanununun temel yaklaşımından uzaklaşabiliriz gibi bir endişe var içimde" dedi. ■ ANKARA

Eymür'e hakaret davası açıldı

ANKARA Cumhuriyet Başsavcılığı, eski MİT Kontrterör Dairesi Başkan Vekili Mehmet Eymür hakkında MİT Müsteşarı Şenkal Atasagun'a hakaret ettiği iddiasıyla 7 aydan 4 yıla kadar hapis istemiyle dava açtı. Eymür, 14 Mayıs 2004'te internet sitesinde yayınladığı "MİT'te Temizlik" başlıklı bir yazıda, MİT Müsteşarı Atasagun'un "MİT'i zafiyete düşürdüğünü, adeta bir plan çerçevesinde çalışanları teşkilatı tamamen ülke menfaatleri aleyhinde, iş yapmayan ve saltanatını sürdürdüğü bir kurum haline dönüştürdüğünü" iddia etmişti. ■ ANKARA

Pazar günü Erciyes'in delikanlıları ile düzenlenen ve tüm "ülkücü"lere açık olduğu bilinen Zafer Kurultayı'na katılmasına bile tahammül edilemediği bildirilmekteydi.

Belli ki MHP'de genel başkana rakip olmaya kalkmak lanetlenmek için yetiyor.

Nitekim, MHP'deki nasıl bir demokratik anlayış ise... Ramiz Ongun'u yaylından kovmak üzere bulunduğu yere giden görevli heyet kendisine: Kardeşler arasında kan akmasın... Biz sizi davet etmedik. Davet olmadığınız bir yere geldiniz, gerginlik yarattınız. Şimdi derhal buradan gidin. Sizi istemiyoruz" demiş.

O da arkadaşlarıyla birlikte yayladan ayrılmış.

Bakın daha, MHP'li Devlet Bakanı Sadi Somuncuoğlu'nun, Cumhurbaşkanlığı seçiminde "partiden izin almadan" aday olmaya kalktı diye, 25 Nisan günü, üstelik TBMM'de, partili milletvekillerinin saldırısına uğraması olayını anımsamadık.

Alparslan Türkeş'in ölümü ardından yapılan Büyük Kongre'nin, çıkan kavgalar ve uçuşan sandalyeler yüzünden ertelendiğini söylemedik.

Kahta'da MHP İlçe Kongresi'ndeki rekabetin cinayetle bittiğine değinmedik (30.7.2000 Yeni Binyıl).

Sayın Şandır'ın kendi hafızasını yoklamasına ihtiyaç yok. Bu sırada yayınlanan ve MHP'nin geçmişini anlatan tefrikaları okusa yeter.

4 August, 2004
Hürriyet

4 August, 2004
Radikal

4 August, 2004
Radikal

6 August, 2004
Radikal

7 August, 2004
Radikal

13 August, 2004
Radikal