

LINGUISTIC RIGHTS OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA

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ABSTRACT

LINGUISTIC RIGHTS OF THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA

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This thesis analyses linguistic policies in Bulgaria, during the Ottoman, monarchical, communist and post-communist periods and its effects on the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. The linguistic policies in Bulgaria did not follow consistent policies; on the contrary, it followed different policies in different periods. The aim of this thesis is to analyse how the Turkish minority experiences and perceives linguistic rights in the post-communist period, such as study of and in Turkish language, Turkish minority media, use of minority personal names, naming of topographical places and the status of Turkish language in official and administrative institutions.

For this purpose, in-depth interviews were carried out in *Işıklar* (Samuil) municipality in Bulgaria, where Turks constitute the absolute majority of the population. As a result of the analyses of the experiences of the Turkish minority, it was observed that (Turkish) linguistic rights and language were experienced by the Turkish minority in terms of ethnolinguistic identity. It is concluded that symbolic

power and *diglossia* relationships between Turkish and Bulgarian languages affected the ways of perception of (Turkish) linguistic rights by the Turkish minority in Bulgaria.

Keywords: Turkish Minority, Linguistic Rights, Language Policy, Bulgaria, Post-Communism, Symbolic Power, Diglossia.

ÖZ

BULGARİSTAN'DAKİ TÜRK AZINLIĞIN DİLSEL HAKLARI

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Bu tez Bulgaristan'ın Osmanlı, monarşi, komünizm ve komünizm sonrası dönemlerindeki dil politikalarını ve bunların Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığı üzerindeki etkilerini incelemektedir. Bulgaristan'da uygulanan dil politikaları zaman içinde tutarlı bir doğrultu izlememiş, tersine farklı dönemlerde farklı politikalar izlenmiştir. Bu tezin amacı, komünizm sonrası dönemde Bulgaristan'daki Türk azınlığın Türkçe eğitimi ve Türkçede eğitim, Türkçe medya, bireysel azınlık adlarının kullanımı, topografik yerlerin adlandırılması ve Türk dilinin resmi ve idari kurumlardaki statüsü gibi dilsel hakları nasıl yaşadığını ve algıladığını incelemektir.

Bu amaçla, büyük çoğunluğu Türklerden oluşan Bulgaristan'daki *Işıklar* (Samuil) Belediyesinde derinlemesine mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Türk azınlığın deneyimlerinin incelenmesi sonucunda, (Türkçe) dilsel hakların ve dilin Türk azınlık tarafından etnik-dilsel kimliğin temel bir unsuru olarak algılandığı görülmüştür. Türkçe ve Bulgarca arasındaki sembolik güç ve *diglossia* ilişkisinin Bulgaristan'daki Türk

azınlığın (Türkçe) dilsel haklarını algılama biçimlerini etkilediđi sonucuna varılmıřtır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Türk Azınlık, Dilsel Haklar, Dil Politikası, Bulgaristan, Komünizm Sonrası, Sembolik Güç, Diglossia.

To my mother and father...

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

... stranger means that he,
who is far,
is actually near.
Georg Simmel (1950: 402)

1.1. Introducing the Study:

The end of the Cold War and the dissolution of communism have made visible once again, one of the problems of nation-state building, which remained relatively hidden in particular in the second part of the 20th century: the issue of minority rights. The Western political system, however, has begun to deal with ethnicity due to an increasing immigrant population in Western European States and secessionist movements, such as ETA in Basque Country and IRA in Northern Ireland. Emergence of civil wars, and accelerated ethnic conflicts in the Eastern Europe have increased again the interest of the Western world to the problem of minorities. The issue of minorities has not only challenged the security of the European continent, but also of the Western liberal thought which neglected ethnicity by perceiving it as a marginal phenomenon that was expected to be dissolved with modernity, as a result of economic welfare, democratization, the rule of law and universal human rights (Kymlicka, 2001: 14). However, the human rights system of liberal thought failed to accommodate the needs of minorities and minority rights. For instance, the freedom of speech does not clearly include the use of minority languages.¹ Some authors, such as Stoyanov, in the Balkans still claim that it is not logical to demand to be protected by a narrow minority rights mechanism instead of the broad sense of a human rights mechanism (cited in Hacıoğlu, 2002: 21).

¹ For debates on human rights regime and minority rights see also Kymlicka, 1998.

In order to build a linguistically and ethnically homogeneous nation, the nation-state as a monopolizing power over language and linguistic institutions tries to integrate or assimilate various ethnic identities, which may have different languages, into one single national ethnolinguistic identity with one official language and even dialect, generally language and identity of the majority group, in the process of national identity formation. Although a nation is not only a linguistic community, a nation-state, however, has linked with a common shared language, which makes easier the mutual understanding, *verstehen* (Weber, 1978: 390, 395).

In the process of nation-building if everyone feels, thinks and acts like everyone else, a danger of secession decreases (Weilenmann, 1963: 42), and linguistic assimilation is seen one of the key instrument of a nation-building process to reach this goal (Deutsch, 1963: 8). Thus, it makes language policies and language itself to become one of the main instruments of nationalism and nation-building. Additionally, 'linguistic nationalism' increases awareness and attention to uniqueness and purification of the national language, and at the same time, justifies oppressions towards minorities and minority languages in terms of their language rights (Coulmas, 1991: 18 – 22).

Accelerated longstanding ethnic conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have stimulated not only ethnic diversity but also linguistic diversity as indicators of minority – majority diversification. Those conflicts, however, are not only ethnic conflicts, but also minority-majority crises. In order to deal with those conflicts and crises in CEE and to prevent future ones, the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) formed the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) in 1993. However, it is not capable to deal with minority rights issues in the long term, not only because, it was organized as a reflexive and quick response body to decrease ethnic tensions in CEE (Kymlicka, 1998: 3, 31), but also it uses diplomacy to deal with the issue rather than setting standards to avoid future conflicts and crises (Malloy 2005: 10). Needs and demands to set up minimum standards and effective mechanisms dealing with linguistic and minority rights to

prevent the spread of ethnic conflicts in CEE is responded by Council of Europe (CoE) via two important documents, which are European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) in 1992, and Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) in 1995. However, those attempts to establish minimum standards have not solved the problem, and conflicts between dominant mainstream languages and minority languages continue to exist (Kymlicka, 2001: 3 – 4).

On the state level, the liberal thought has tried to perform the myth of ‘ethnocultural neutrality’ in which states are supposed to be neutral among ethnic identities as its neutral position among religions because of secularism. By using the principle of ethnocultural neutrality, nation-state has been trying to legitimize its refusal of minority rights demands in order to protect its neutrality. Furthermore, according to Kymlicka, there is not actually state neutrality, because a state decides which language or languages can be used in various governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as in public education, public services, courts, military service and media. Majorities have been trying to inculcate the official or majority language over minority living regions (2001: 16 – 17), and consequently those decisions and language policies lead minority languages to be marginalized, to be used only among some elites or to be seen as low-status language among minority members themselves (Eidheim, 1969). This potentially leads majority language and majority identity to become desirable and attractive elements among minority-language speakers in order to not to feel deprived in the society (Dorian, 1999: 36). In addition, minorities have to be at least bilingual in order to participate completely and effectively in a national life (Kymlicka, 2001: 30 – 31) in which they are still distinguishable and vulnerable to *de facto* discrimination in terms of to their accents in majority-official language.

In order to avoid that linguistic repression of minority languages and minority members and to prevent them from *de jure* and *de facto* discriminations, multicultural and multinational approaches response mainly in three directions

while recognizing and accepting linguistic rights of minorities. First, a minority language(s) is accepted as an official language, at least where the minorities are concentrated. Second, a minority language(s) has co-equal status alongside the majority language(s). Finally, a minority language(s) is accepted as only official language(s) in the region. As a result, those policies increase capacities and abilities of speakers of minority languages to access wide range of public institutions, which after that can operate in their mother tongues, such as schools, courts, media, and local governments (Kymlicka, 2001: 4 – 5). Some of those directions have also experienced and performed by CEE Countries during the communist era; however, in the post-communist period their response has dramatically changed to reject such claims in the name of a national unity and national security.

The concept and a theory of linguistic rights are still not well defined like the broader sense of minority rights. However, as a theoretical framework I have used the multiculturalist – multinationalist theories and their critiques in order to focus on the issue both theoretically and practically. Federalism has been presented as one of the key instruments to accommodate minority rights. In addition, federalist practices vary from different political, social and economical structures. For instance, although former Yugoslavia, USSR and Czechoslovakia were officially federal states, in reality they did not function as the Western liberal approaches define multinationalism. Moreover, federalism does not always include multinationalism, i.e. in Germany and the USA. There are also multinational federal or semi-federal states in which division of federal sub-units were made according to ethnic, linguistic or religious criteria, for example Spain, Belgium and Switzerland². Consequently, understandings of minority rights and in narrower sense the linguistic rights in the Western liberal tradition and in post-communist CEE countries are different. Even though CEE Countries are on the road to integration into the Western political organizations, such as the EU, the OSCE and the NATO,

² For recognized minorities in semi-federal or quasi-federal units in multinational states, like Catalans in Spain, a new term ‘co-nation’ has began to be used instead of national minority. See for debates on the issue Malloy, 2005: 83 – 114.

there are resistances to change their former understandings on linguistic and minority rights.

Minimal standards of minority and their language rights in Europe are still trying to be accommodated via the European Human Rights mechanisms instead of newly signed agreements, such as Framework Conventions for Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) and European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML). Some of those agreements are still not signed or ratified also by the some EU member states, for instance, Greece and France have not signed FCPNM, and Belgium and Luxembourg signed but have not been ratified it. Hence, this situation decreases the possibility of those agreements to be the minimal standards in the minority rights protection system. The signatories of these agreements also choose to put some reservations on these agreements or their domestic juristic procedures nullified some of key points of these agreements. For instance, the Bulgarian Constitutional Court rejected the statement of FCPNM in which minorities have a right to self-determination of their minority identities, on the ground that being linguistically and ethnically distinct does not necessarily constitute a minority (The Bulgarian Centre for Non-Profit Law, 2001). Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 does not officially recognize any national minority and only defines them in Article 36 (2) as “citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian” (*Narodno Sabranie na Republika Balgariya*, 1991). However, setting minimal standards contains a danger that it could be misused in order to re-take already gained rights of minorities, which could be more than minimal standards requirements. The issue of establishment of the minimal standards remains controversial.

Bulgaria has implemented unique but in somehow petty similar linguistic policies with other states. Although there are no perfect linear practices of linguistic policies of Bulgaria, it is functional to examine them by dividing them into four main periods: the late Ottoman, monarchic, communist and post-communist periods.

Until the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and following its nation-building policies, Turks in Bulgaria were regarded mainly according to their religious identity. Treaties which signed when the Ottoman Empire existed and concerned their minority rights were treated them as a Muslim minority together with other Muslim minorities, such as Pomaks and Muslim Roma. Together with Bulgarian and Turkish nation-building policies, their individual identification and their social categorisations began to change over time. Firstly, Bulgarian nation-building policies did not target them because they were in the bottom of the informal minority ranking; therefore, Bulgarian nationalist policies left them into their own fate. For instance, Pomaks by reason of their linguistic closeness to the Bulgarian language were in the top position in those ranking of Muslim minorities and faced oppressive assimilatory policies since the independence of Bulgaria.

After 1923 the Turkish minority media and intelligentsia tried to announce reforms in Turkey and also tried to transform the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Those policies increased the fears of Bulgarian governments and nationalists. This divided the elites of the minority among the conservatives and reformists, which could be seen best in the disputes on alphabet.

In the post-communist period, lost connections between the Turkish minority and Turkey have re-established. For instance, in post-1989 period, Turkey has tried to support educational and religious requirements of the Turkish minority. It should be noted that, in this new era, religious rights of the Turkish minority are gained faster than ethnolinguistic ones. This was a return to the pre-communist period. However, due to atheistic propaganda and implementations of the communist regime their religious identity is weakened. Hence, their ethnolinguistic identity continues to play the major role.

In terms of education, the Turks of Bulgaria had performed *de facto* cultural autonomy from the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality until 1959 when their previously nationalized minority schools were totally closed down. Although

they had rights that were guaranteed by some international treaties, such as 1878 Berlin, 1909 and 1913 Istanbul, 1919 Neuilly and 1925 Istanbul Treaties, the Turkish Minority has continuously lost its rights. The year of 1984 was the beginning of the forced assimilation campaign or so called *vazroditelen protses*³, in which their linguistic and cultural distinctness were directly attacked. Their names were forcefully changed, Turkish usages in public and private spheres were prohibited, and all of their distinct cultural symbols were banned (Amnesty International, 1986). The Turkish Minority in Bulgaria like other national minorities in CEE Countries has considerable differences from Western Europe's national minorities, which usually do not have a kin-state next to their home country. This triangle relation of 'minorities – homeland – kin-state' (Brubaker, 1996) has made the issue more problematic than in the West. This triangle-relation leads to increase fears, suspicions and even collective paranoia towards minorities in CEE Countries. A perception of a nation-state in CEE Countries which is perceived as a *corpus mysticum* in which it should be preserved at all costs (Strayer, 1963: 21), increases those attitudes and perceptions towards minorities. Thus, not surprisingly, minorities in CEE Countries are perceived as disloyal pseudo citizens and even potential traitors towards their home country. Consequently, relations between CEE Countries and their minorities perceive as a 'zero-sum game' in which if one side gains some additional rights other side loses (Kymlicka, 2001: 64 – 67).

The concepts of ethnicity and nation are being used falsely as minority – majority dichotomies. It presupposes that minorities are ethnic groups while majorities are national groups. Furthermore, those formulations cannot explain the situations properly. Even when 'nation' is defined according to territory or state, those formerly majority ethnic groups like Turks also should be included in this formulation. As a part of the Soviet nationalities policy model, Turks in Bulgaria are citizens of Bulgaria with Turkish nationality. The categorisation of the Turkish

³ 'Revival process' or 'rebirth process' in English. The name was given by Bulgarian authorities to the forced assimilation campaign in order to refer that the campaign was not implemented by force but rather it was a voluntary and self-conscious action of the Turkish minority.

minority changed over time. They were Turks in the first years, then Turkish national minority, then Bulgarian Turks, then Turkish population and now citizens whose mother tongue is Turkish. As the Constitution of 1991 formulates minorities according to their mother tongues, the importance of language can be best understood in their social categorisation.

Are they integrated into Bulgarian society? One can argue that they are politically integrated but socially and economically not. How their integration affect their visions to their language? It is clear that Bulgarian language as an official language of the country serves as a key instrument of those integrations. This is because in the Bulgarian political view, one should leave his minority language in favour of Bulgarian language. It makes language as the major exclusion and inclusion indicator either in formal or informal relations (Boneva, 2001: 87). Language does not function only as a communication transmitter but also as a communion instrument (Le Page, 1964: 9) and it is used in variety of areas.

In my thesis, I argue that religion or namely Islam was a key marker of the identity of the Turkish minority, which was inherited from the Ottoman *millet* system. However, after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and as a result of the policies of the early communist governments, language has become the major identity marker. This is because; during the Ottoman period ethnicity was not the key component of the Muslim *millet* identity. Ethnic identification spread among the Christian *millets* of the Ottoman Empire and especially in the Balkans. Hence, nationalism and ethnicity were not very welcomed in the core of the Ottoman discourse but rather Ottomanism (*Osmanlıcılık*) was supported, which calls for the common Ottoman citizenship and equality among *millets*. From the Young Turk movement and its driving ideology, Turkish nationalism, the intelligentsia of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria began to meet the idea of nationalism. During this period, important number of Young Turks-supporter print media was located and published in Bulgarian territories, which were yet part of the Ottoman Empire until 1908. However, the ethnic Turkish identity among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria

could emerge only after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The Turkish minority intelligentsia followed the reforms that took place in Turkey and tried to adapt themselves to the ongoing reforms. In this respect, there were also struggles between the conservatives, who were against these reforms and the reformists or Kemalists who supported these reforms. Moreover, the difference between these two groups was not solely around reforms but mainly around the deconstruction of the role of religion. There is no doubt that the main driving force of Kemalism and Turkish nationalism were language and ethnicity unlike the twentieth century Balkan nationalisms, in which religion played a very important role. Hence, language slightly became the main marker of the ethnic identity of the Turkish minority. One of the most important struggles over the role of language in the Turkish minority identity could be seen in the debates on the new Turkish-Latin Alphabet in 1930s. When new Turkish-Latin Alphabet was adopted in Turkey, the Association of the Turkish Teachers in Bulgaria decided to use it in the new education year. Conservatives, mainly religious personnel, opposed to the use of Latin scripts in favour of Arabic scripts. This polarisation around the alphabet issues was actually between the role of language as a secular identity marker and religion as a traditional identity marker. The language reached a top position among the identity components during the early communist period, when the ethnic identity and its main marker language was favoured and supported by the state against the religious identity. Although as a 'secular' identity marker, language, improved its position, until the second decade of the communist rule, religion (Islam) did not lose its importance among the minority members. It never totally disappeared as an identity marker but its influence was weakened as a result of the secular/ atheist policies of the communist regime.

I assert that the Soviet nationalities policy model, which is also implemented in Bulgaria and where citizenship and nationality were not synonymous concepts. Turkish identity was able to find a space along with the Bulgarian citizenship. Turks possessed identity cards in which their *natsionalnost* was written as Turkish and their *grazhdanstvo* as Bulgarian until the abolition of the application in 1975

after the closure of the Turkish language courses (Amnesty International, 1986: 3). Furthermore, as I stated before, until communism the minority intelligentsia tried to follow the nation-building process that take place in Turkey and similarly to their kin-state, they began to transform their identity from a religious (Muslim) to national (Turkish) one. This double layer of official identification according to the Soviet model led them to preserve their ethnic Turkish identification together with being the citizens of Bulgaria.

Following the closure of Turkish language courses, I argue that oppressions towards one of the components of the ethnic identity (language) strengthened this marker. In the last two decades of the communist regime, Turkish language became the key target of the state, and in order to erode its role among the Turkish minority identity, the state started to apply coercive policies from closing down of the Turkish language courses in the first half of 1970s to the forced assimilation campaign of the second half of 1980s, where the entire usage and existence of Turkish language was targeted. In this time, identification of the Turkish minority, again, was attempted to be reorganised according to the religious base when the Bulgarian government declared that there was no Turks in Bulgaria but there were Bulgarian Muslims. This made the language an oppressed marker of the Turkish minority identity, and the main counter struggle to restore the minority rights.

I attest that the political mobilisation of the Turkish ethnic identity and the Turkish minority rights struggle was mainly on the ground of the linguistic rights, such as education of the Turkish language in public schools, restoring forcefully changed names, publishing freely in the Turkish language; hence, language accelerated its importance in the political and societal spheres. Additionally, in the post-communist period, once more, the government was relatively more enthusiastic to restore religious rights than linguistic ones. The political mobilisation of the Turkish minority has been along with the language as a secular identity symbol rather than religion. Additionally, MRF has adopted a liberal and secular view and

within this ideology language would serve better identification tool rather than religion.

Finally, I claim that even in the improvements of the linguistic rights in the post-communist period, the area of effectiveness of the Turkish language is delimited to the usages in private lives of the Turkish speakers. This resulted in devaluating the Turkish language in the economic and administrative spheres. This led, not surprisingly, the decrease of the symbolic importance of the Turkish language in the lives of the Turkish minority. I argue that the main reason of the devaluing is continuing economic problems of the Turkish minority and relative satisfaction of the Turkish minority towards their already acquired linguistic rights. For instance, education in Turkish could be perceived as inessential when the entire upward mobility is based on the Bulgarian language skills.

My main hypothesis is that even though Turkish language has been one of the key components of the ethnic identity of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, lowered status of Turkish language in economic, political and social fields in Bulgaria has led linguistic rights (Turkish) to be experienced and perceived as symbolic rights.

1.2. Methodology:

Theoretical framework of this study has been drawn according to theories of multiculturalism and their critiques on the issue of minority and linguistic rights.

Qualitative research method was used in this and in-depth interviews were carried out in order to better grasp into the details of the situation and analyze its different aspects. In-depth interviews provide useful data for understanding perceptions of individuals. In-depth interviewing gives a chance to us to understand complex situations with entire of their components, such as differentiations of perceptions according to interviewees' age, gender, occupation, income, ideological, social class and social status. Hence, in-depth interview helps us to expose those different understandings, knowledge, experiences and perceptions (Johnson, 2001: 107).

According to Johnson, in in-depth interviewing, obtaining intimacy and reciprocity of interviewees are one of the key elements, which can be better realized if a researcher is former or returning member of the researched group. In the past, researching a community that the researcher is its former or returning member was not preferential. However, current understandings not only suggest it but also extol to “start where you are”. Moreover, being a member of a researched group does not taint the research, on the contrary opens the doors to do successful research (2001: 107 – 109).

As a first generation *émigré* from Northeastern Bulgaria (*Delioroman/ Ludogorie*⁴), who migrated to Turkey in 1989 and still have been living in Turkey, I have still kept my ties and networks with the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. Those networks, such as relatives and friends, have given me a great chance to continue to get information about their situation. As a member or as a returning member of the minority, I have easily created trust, reciprocity and intimacy with interviewees during the in-depth interviews. Furthermore, first generation returned members or immigrants not only could obtain more effectively intimacy and acceptance of the researched group but also speed up this process, which gets difficult for second or next generation returned members.

In-depth interviews were carried out with the Turkish language course teachers, parents of the Turkish pupils, Turkish minority media and NGO members and Turkish minority members who are in governmental and administrative posts, i.e. municipality mayor, provincial deputy governor and MPs of the region.

This research was conducted in *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) province in North-eastern Bulgaria, or *Delioroman* (*Ludogorie*) region. I have chosen the province because, in the entire *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) province Turks constitute 47 percent of the whole

⁴ Both Turkish and Bulgarian names literary mean “Wild Forest” in English.

population. In addition, Turks have been living mainly in rural areas and municipalities instead of the provincial centre *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), and in some municipalities, they constitute an absolute regional majority. I have chosen *Işıklar* (Samuil) municipality where Turks constitute almost 80 percent of the population. The municipal mayor is from Movements of Rights of Freedoms (MRF)⁵, which was formed mostly by Turks and other Muslim minorities and is the junior partner of the governing coalitions since 2001. There are four municipality schools and in two of them Turkish language courses are offered as an optional language course.

Furthermore, I grew up in this municipality, hence, I am very familiar with their social, economical, political, cultural and geographical milieus, such as their customs, dialect of Turkish, employment and unemployment situations, political and religious affiliations and geographical feature of the municipality. This familiarity increased my chance to reach and find my interviewees and reduce rejection rates.

Monitoring reports of Helsinki Committee, and Human Rights Watch, FCPNM implementation reports and other related studies and surveys prepared by NGOs and International Organizations were also used. In addition, media news from Turkish and Bulgarian printed and electronic media in Bulgaria were considered to focus current situation, as well.

⁵ *Hak ve Özgürlükler Hareketi (HÖH)* in Turkish and *Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi (DPS)* in Bulgarian.

CHAPTER 2

LINGUISTIC POLICIES OF BULGARIA DURING THE MONARCHY

Maritsa rushes,
stained with blood,
A widow wails,
fiercely wounded...⁶

After the partial independence and two decades after the full independence of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire, her minorities have constituted a great challenge to the Bulgarian domestic and international policies with their distinctive ethnic, religious and linguistic features. In this respect, minority languages, especially Greek which had a superior status during Ottoman period over Bulgarian language and Turkish, which was the language of the ruling group, have been the key targets.

Firstly the linguistic situation of the Turks in Bulgaria during the Ottoman Empire is explained. Then minority language policies after the establishment of semi-independent Bulgarian Principality are evaluated. Finally, the shifts in policies after the declaration of the full independence in 1908 until the abolition of the monarchy were examined.

2.1. Linguistic Policies in Bulgaria during the Ottoman Rule

The expansion of the Ottoman Empire throughout the Balkans posed several problems and difficulties, such as sustaining the Ottoman reign in non-Muslim lands, supplying the scarcity of labour to open new areas for cultivation and to secure and establishing the order. In order to solve these problems, the Ottomans

⁶ From: *Shumi Maritsa* (Maritsa Rushes) a former Bulgarian national anthem between 1886 and 1944, written by Nikola Zhivkov.

needed more Turkish – Muslim population in the region. With this purpose, *sürgün* (exile) institution was set up and various *Yörüks* or Turcoman nomadic or semi-nomadic groups from Anatolia were displaced to Bulgaria since 15th century⁷ (Tekeli, 1994: 204 – 205). Leading *Yörük* groups were *Naldöken*, *Tanrıdağı*, *Oğçabolu*, *Vize* and *Kocacık* Turcomans (Yücel, 1987: 21 – 22). They settled in the various lands of nowadays Bulgaria and the entire Balkans, as well. According to the Ottoman registers, between 1490 and 1579 Turks had already constituted a great majority in most of the regions of Bulgaria⁸ (Halaçoğlu, Y., 1992: 397; Şahin, Emecan and Halaçoğlu, A. 1990: 26 – 40). Before to be *minoritised* after the Turco-Russian War of 1877 – 1878, Turks and Muslims constituted almost half of the population⁹ in *Tuna Vilayeti* (Danubean Province) and Eastern Rumelia, where the modern Bulgaria was established.

Communities of the Ottoman Empire was ruled according to *millet* system, in which Bulgarians belonged to the Orthodox Christian *millet* or community, which

⁷ Although there are some theories that the Turkish settlement in the Balkans and especially in Bulgaria has roots from 12th century during the Seljuks, those settlers were more likely descendants of nowadays Gagauzes in *Dobruca* (Dobruzhza) (For more information about those theories and their debates, see Karpat, 2004a and 2004b). Nevertheless, nowadays Turks in Bulgaria are mostly those who are descendants of the *Yörüks* or Turcoman nomads who settled during the Ottoman period.

⁸ For instance, in *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), *Yanbolu* (Yanbol), *Eski Zağra* (Stara Zagora), *Filibe* (Plovdiv), *Karınabad* (Karnobat), *Kızanlık* (Kazanlık), *Köstendil* (Kyustendil), *Silistre* (Silistra), Varna, *Eski Cuma* (Targovishte) and Sofia Turks begun to constitute a majority (Halaçoğlu, Y., 1992: 397; Şahin, Emecan and Halaçoğlu 1990: 26 – 40).

⁹ Early Ottoman Censuses included only the male population and women firstly included only since 1881 – 1882 Ottoman Census (Todorova, 1994: 287). According to on estimation by using Ottoman registers the total population of *Şumnu* (Shumen), *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), Varna and *Silistre* (Silistra) regions amounted 133 000 in the second half of the sixteenth century, in which Turks numbered 90 000 or 70 percent of the total population (Şahin, Emecan and Halaçoğlu, 1990: 37). According to the first Ottoman Census in 1831, there are 197 027 Turkish and Muslim males against 269 285 Christian males (Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks). In 1868 population numbers of *Tuna Vilayeti*, there were 610 000 Christians against 412 417 Muslims, in which 490 467 of them are Bulgarians and 359907 of them were Turks (Halaçoğlu, Y., 1992: 398). According to a Bulgarian source Turks were 40 percent and Bulgarians 45 percent in Tuna Province, in 1866 (Todorov, 1980: 353 – 354 as cited in Yücel, 1987). Official Tuna Vilayeti Register of 1876 gives Turkish male population 436 477 against 605 800 Bulgarian male population (Şimşir, 1986a: 29). Justin McCarthy gives the Muslim population of the Tuna Vilayeti and Edirne Vilayeti in 1877 was 1 501 883 that made up 37 percent of the whole population (1995: 89).

was headed by the Greek Patriarch in Istanbul, while Turks was part of the Muslim *millet*; furthermore, each *millet* had responsibility to educate its members.

2.1.1. Education and Education Policy during the Ottoman Period

Bulgaria's linguistic awareness is closely related to its way to create an independent nation-state. With rising Bulgarian nationalism, this took important progress took place after the re-establishment of the Bulgarian Church; primary education in Bulgarian gained a positive momentum. First Bulgarian secular school was opened in 1835 and after the reforms of *Islahat Fermanı* (the Edict of Reform) new ones followed. In 1837 first high school was opened in *Gabrova* (Gabrovo) (Keskiöglu, 1985: 57). In 1876, primary Bulgarian schools in the entire Balkans reached to the number of 1502, semi high schools (*klasni uchileshte*) to 50 and secondary girls' schools to 20. Furthermore, high schools, a vocational school in 1873 in *Ziştevi* (Svishtov), and religious schools continued to be opened (Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 109; Şimşir, 1986a: 29).

During the rule of Mahmud II., the primary education has become compulsory for all Muslim children, and logically to the Turkish children in Bulgaria, in 1824. In 1845, following the order of Abdülmecit, a commission was set up in order to prepare a general curriculum for The Turkish schools within the Empire. New classrooms were constructed or allocated next to the mosques (Doğru, 2000: 172; Karal, 1961: 182 as cited in Doğru, 2000: 172). In 1865, Administrative Assembly of *Tuna Vilayeti* passed a resolution which was aimed to establish one high school (*idadi*) in every densely populated municipality centres and one secondary school (*rüşdiye*) in every smaller municipality centres. Additionally, all children above six were obliged to attend the schools (Turan, 1998: 211).

After 29 years of the opening of the first Turkish secondary school in Istanbul, first secondary school of the province was opened in 1867 in Vidin, which was followed by openings of others in big centres. In 1865, in order to meet the demand of the

newly established textile manufacture industry, a girls' industrial school was opened in *Rusçuk* (Ruse), and in addition, in Sofia and in *Rusçuk* (Ruse) art schools were opened (Memişoğlu, 2002a: 34 – 35, 40 – 43, 49 – 53).

2.1.2. Turkish Minority Media in Bulgaria during the Ottoman Period

As in other parts of the empire, media newly began to spread in the province, as well. The printing house of the province was set up in the provincial capital, *Rusçuk* (Ruse) where the official gazette of the *Tuna Vilayeti* 'Tuna' (Danube) began to be published bilingually both in Bulgarian and Turkish from 16th March 1865 until it was closed after the Russian occupation in 13th June 1877.

In addition to the official gazette; in 1867, a magazine *Mecra-i Efkar* (Stream of Opinions) and in 1875 another bilingual, Turkish and French, newspaper *Güneş* (Soleil) were published in the capital of the province. (Şimşir, 1986a: 307; Şimşir, 1986b: 3).

2.2. Linguistic Policies in the Bulgarian Principality (1878 – 1908)

Emergence of the Turco-Russian War of 1877 – 1878 (*93 Harbi*), and its consequences dramatically affected many aspects of the Turks in Bulgaria as well as their lives and their educational institutions. Between 1877 and 1878, almost 17 percent (261 937) of the Turkish and Muslim population of Bulgaria lost their lives due to massacres, diseases, cold and starvation. Also about 34 percent (515 000) of them became refugees. This means that 51 percent of the population of Turks in Bulgaria (776 937 of 1 501 883) was 'cleansed' from Bulgaria (McCarthy, 1995: 89 – 91), because it was not possible to set up an ethnically homogeneous Bulgarian nation-state where Bulgarians and Turks had almost equal populations (Karpát, 1990: 2).

However, Turks remained densely in the North-eastern Bulgaria¹⁰ (in *Delirorman*, *Dobruca*, *Şumnu* (Shumen), *Ruşçuk* (Ruse) and Varna regions), because the headquarters of the Third Ottoman Army was in *Şumnu* (Shumen) and the city could not be taken by Russians forces; therefore, Bulgarian bands and Cossacks also could not cause mass destructions in the region. Additionally, the region attracted many refugees from neighbouring parts of the region which increased its Turkish population (Şimşir, 1986a: 35, 41).

During the course of war, one of the leading targets of the Russian army and its followers (Bulgarian bands and Cossacks) were Turkish and Muslim buildings, e.g. houses, mosques, *medreses* and schools. In addition to the damages in educational institutions and *vakıf* properties, important numbers of teachers, educated and wealthy members among the Turks of Bulgaria died or fled to Turkey during or after the war (Şimşir, 1986a: 33 – 35). Thus, the war affected the Turks not only in terms of political, economic, social and demographic situations but also in terms of educational ones (Ahmed, 2002: 386).

The end of the war came with the defeat of the Ottoman Army and signing the San Stefano Treaty with Russia which set up an independent Bulgaria. This situation increased the fear of the other European powers, especially Britain, that it would heighten the influence of Russia over the Ottoman Empire and over the Straits. Hence, another treaty after the Berlin Conference was signed in 1878, which divided the territory of today's Bulgaria into two: an autonomous Bulgarian Principality in the north and eastern regions, and the Eastern Rumelia or *Rumeli-i Şarki Vilayeti* in the south which was a part of the Ottoman Empire but with a semi-autonomous special status. Nevertheless, Eastern Rumelia was annexed by the

¹⁰ Although in those regions Turks remained densely, one should note that even in those regions Turkish population decreased, too. For instance, even in *Şumnu* (Shumen) there is about 35 percent decrease between 1880 and 1900 (Crampton, 1990: 59, 77).

Principality of Bulgaria after a *coup d'état*, which was organised by Bulgarian nationalists in 1885¹¹ (Crampton, 2000: 86; Turan, 1998: 62, 65).

2.2.1. Turkish Minority Schools during the Bulgarian Principality

In addition to administrative provisions, the Treaty of Berlin included important provisions about protection of minority rights of Turks, such as right to assembly, right to worship, educational rights and non-discrimination rights (Şimşir, 1986a: 365 – 7). However, in post 1877 – 78 war period, Turks in the Bulgarian Principality and in Eastern Rumelia suffered caused by inappropriate educational conditions that were inherited from wartime period. Besides the destroyed school buildings during the War, another problem was the continuity of confiscation of Turkish school buildings and their *vakıf* properties. Furthermore, those who remained in the hands of the community were not adequate for education (Turan, 1998: 215; Şimşir, 1986a: 33; Memişoğlu, 2002a: 75; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 110).

There were three types of the Turkish minority schools in the Bulgarian principality; primary, secondary and *medreses* (religious schools). The *Tirnova* (Tarnovo) Constitution of 1879 stated that primary education for all school-aged children and the study of Bulgarian language were compulsory also in non-Bulgarian schools (Eminov, 1997: 123). According to Crampton, this statement was against Greek schools and it did not target The Turkish schools (1990: 58). Turan argues that with considering the Article 10 of the law, some Bulgarian nationalist and Bulgarian nationalist media lobbied the inclusion of The Turkish schools in the provisions of this article, as well (1998: 226).

The Turkish community managed the Turkish schools via its community councils since the Treaty of Berlin until nationalization wave in early communist years.

¹¹ See also Turan (2000) and Hristov (1985) for Turkish and Bulgarian views on the issue.

Those councils were inherited from the Ottoman *millet* system in which every minority or community had controlled their education process as well as the other cultural, religious and judiciary aspects (Eminov, 1997: 122 – 123). Election of the members of those councils was carried out by the Turkish community itself. However, the election processes were under the influence of the Bulgarian authorities (Turan, 1998: 221). The Education Law of Eastern Rumelia that was adopted in 1881 guaranteed these rights, as well (Vahapoğlu, 2005: 126 – 127). In Eastern Rumelia material and educational requirements were provided by the Ottoman state. However, Bulgarian officers took all the major posts in the provincial government, and they used budget of the ministry of Education mostly for the Bulgarian school expenses (Turan, 1998: 218 – 219).

The 1885 education law stressed that state was responsible for supporting and administrating the primary education. The private schools of non-Bulgarians could be established by their own expenses but under the control of the Bulgarian Ministry of Education. Article 192 of Bulgarian Education Law adopted in 1891 obliged that the Bulgarian government was responsible to allocate financial aid to Turkish private schools, as well. However, this aid was too small when compared to public or Bulgarian schools. During the 1894 – 85 school year 51 percent of the expenditures or budget of the public (Bulgarian) schools were financed by the state. In contrast, only four percent of the Turkish Private schools' budgets were financed by the state aids (Turan, 1998: 227 – 228; Eminov, 1997: 124; Şimşir, 1986a: 38 – 39). The Turkish minority had to finance its educational facilities by its own but the Turkish community was suffering from poverty, and the majority of them were living in rural areas where they were mostly working in agricultural low-paid jobs (Turan, 1998: 226 – 229). Therefore, they were not able to finance expenditures of their schools.

Moreover, the Turkish schools were not united into larger umbrella organizations which caused to be used different curricula and methods in different schools. Some local Turkish community councils, which were generally under the control of

muftis and hodjas, were reluctant to use the modern teaching methods (Turan, 1998: 220 – 223).

Table 2.1: Turkish and Muslim Primary Schools, Teachers and Students in 1894-95 Education Year

	Primary School	Teachers	Students
Turkish	1243	1404	69936
Pomak	25	38	1313
Tatar	16	18	779
Total	1284	1460	72028

Source: Şimşir, 1986a: 36

Conditions of the Turkish teachers and pupils were not independent from general backwardness of The Turkish minority education system of Bulgaria. In addition to financial problems of The Turkish schools, there were essential problems concerning statuses of Turkish teachers and pupils and the quality educational. First of all, The Turkish schools' students were not considered equal with their Bulgarian counterparts. Because, after graduation, they had to take an extra examination in order to enjoy the same rights with Bulgarian school graduates. Secondly, teachers of The Turkish schools could not benefit from the social security rights that their Bulgarian colleagues had. Their salaries, which were paid by the Muslim community councils, were too low when compared to Bulgarian teachers. Moreover, teachers of the Turkish schools in Bulgaria were not well-educated and only half of the Turkish primary school teachers had primary school graduation level, and there was no teacher with pedagogical trainings. Furthermore, there were only 57 teachers for secondary school and only three of them had higher educational degree (Turan, 1998: 220 – 221, 231). Hence, those insufficiencies created continuation of problems in terms of educational quality of The Turkish minority schools.

One of the most illiterate groups in Bulgaria was Muslims (Turks, Pomaks and Muslim Roma) (Turan, 1998: 215 – 216). Crampton claimed that low literacy rates among Turks were due to insufficient school attendance rates of Turkish community instead of hostility of Bulgarian authorities (1990: 68). However, it could be argued that one of the main reasons of the low literacy rates was insufficient socio-economical conditions of Turks in Bulgaria and inadequate governmental aid to the Turkish educational instructions. In order to help the Turkish and Muslim community, the Ottoman government tried to support the Turkish education in Bulgaria by restoring old school buildings, sending educational materials and appointing Ottoman-citizen teachers for secondary schools (Turan, 1998: 237 – 238). There were some important initiatives among the Turkish minority in order to develop the Turkish education in Bulgaria. In 1903 Muslim members of the *Sabranie*¹², prepared and presented a report concerning with the situation of the Muslims of the country, which made also recommendations to improve the situation of Muslims. In 1908, although their demands were accepted, they did not put into force because of rejection by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Moreover, in order to defend the rights of the minority more effectively, there were unsuccessful attempts to form an organisation by the members of the *Sabranie*. (e.g. *Müdafaa-i Hukuk* (Defence of Rights) and *Cemaat-i Hayriyye* (Congregation Charity) in 1908) (Turan, 1998: 239 – 240, 262 – 264).

In 1906 in *Şumnu* (Shumen), 26 Turkish teachers from 14 different cities met in the Congress, which was organised by Turkish intellectuals, and was supported by some of the Turkish minority media, in order to find solutions to educational problems of the Turkish minority, such as, standardisation of curricula, opening new schools, renovation of school buildings, translating and publishing new books and training of rural teachers during summer holidays. They made some radical changes in educational curriculum e.g. Bulgarian language was put into new

¹² The Bulgarian National Parliament.

curriculum in order to increase Bulgarian language abilities¹³ of Turks. The congress established ‘the Association of Muslim Teachers’¹⁴. However, most of the Turkish teachers could not participate in the congress because of fears of the contemporary oppression regime of Abdülhamit II. However, within years the number of participants increased gradually¹⁵. Those congresses and associations made important decisions related to the Turkish minority education until it was closed by the government in 1933. The association gave importance to the existence of autonomy of the Turkish schools to continue education in Turkish¹⁶ and to improve teaching quality¹⁷, legal rights and social status of Turkish teachers¹⁸ (Turan, 1998: 240 – 243; Keskiöglü, 1985: 103 – 107).

2.2.2. Turkish Minority Media during the Bulgarian Principality

During the Bulgarian Principality, the Turkish media continued to grow in size and quality. After the Treaty of Berlin and establishment of the principality in 1878, first Turkish publication was a magazine, *Tarla* (Field), which began to be published in 1880 in Sofia. In the same year, the Bulgarian official gazette began to be published bilingually in Bulgarian and in Turkish, as well. The importance of its

¹³ Literacy in Bulgarian was one of the main obstacles of the Turkish minority to defend their rights in the official mechanisms. For instance, most of the Muslim members of the *Sabranie* could not speak and write in Bulgarian (Turan, 1998: 258 – 259).

¹⁴ “*Muallimin-i İslamiye Cemiyet-i İttihadiyesi*”, which was renamed as “*Türk Muallimler Cemiyeti*” in 1928. For more information about the Association see Keskiöglü, 1985: 99 – 113.

¹⁵ For instance, there were 128 participants in 1912 Congress which took place in *Şumnu* (Shumen) and the number of its members reached 430 in 1921 (Keskiöglü, 1985: 103, Memişoğlu, 2002a: 143).

¹⁶ For example, in the Congress of 1928 in *Filibe* (Plovdiv), the provincial representative of the Ministry of Education demanded to be taught Bulgarian history and Bulgarian geography courses in Bulgarian but the Association did not accept that idea (Keskiöglü, 1985: 106).

¹⁷ For instance, establishing summer training courses for Turkish teachers was accepted in the Congress of 1912 in *Eski Cuma* (Targovishte) (Keskiöglü, 1985: 105).

¹⁸ In the Congress of 1924 in *Osmanpazarı* (Omurtag), the Association accepted to be set up funds in Turkish schools in order to help teachers who were fired and were not able to find another job (Keskiöglü, 1985: 107).

Turkish version was to show ‘good will’ of the Bulgarian authorities towards their Turkish citizens. However, it lasted only two years, and in 1882, its publication in Turkish was ceased.

Those years, until the Young Turks Revolution of 1908, were oppressive years of Sultan Abdülhamit II; therefore, most of the Young Turks and their supporters opted to publicise their newspapers and magazines in the hinterland of Istanbul. In those days Bulgaria as a result of her autonomous status served as ‘safe heaven’ to opponents of the Abdülhamit II’s oppressive regime. Additionally, Bulgaria, especially *Filibe* (Plovdiv) was geographically very close to Istanbul and that was made easier to distribute media through Istanbul. The Bulgarian government tended to use them as bargaining instruments against the Sublime Porte. Hence, 25 of 44 newspapers and magazines, which were published between 1878 and 1908, were supporters of the Young Turks. Furthermore, the official media organ of the Young Turks, *Le Courrier des Balcons*, was being published between 1903 and 1908 in Sofia in French.

Even though there was a limited reader potential caused by low literacy rates among the Turkish minority, the Turkish minority media had also readers in other Balkan countries and countries under the Russian domination¹⁹. The Average of Circulation numbers of Turkish media were between 800 and 3 000 (Şimşir, 1986a: 307 – 309; Şimşir, 1986b: 3; Turan, 1998: 282 – 294).

2.3. Linguistic Policies in the Bulgarian Kingdom (1908 – 1944)

In 1908, Bulgaria declared its full independence from the Ottoman Empire and the Principality became a Kingdom. In the same year, *Sabranie* adopted new Educational Law in which new restrictions took into force against the minority and

¹⁹ Moreover, one of the important figures of the Turkish world, İsmail Gaspıralı, had considerable affects on the Turkish media in Bulgaria, for instance, his newspaper *Tercüman* (Interpreter) was circulated in Bulgaria, as well (Turan, 1998: 290).

its private schools. Articles from 145 to 164 regulated the minority education, and the law stated that all Bulgarian citizens had to study Bulgarian history and geography in Bulgarian language. The Muslim schools council members and teachers had to be Bulgarian citizens in order to prevent the Ottoman assistance by sending teachers to Muslim schools (Turan, 1998: 243 – 244). Those measures could be regarded as the first implementations of more active nation-building policies.

In 1909, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed the Istanbul Treaty and its annexed protocol in which the rights of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria were accepted by the Bulgarian government. In addition, 1913 Istanbul Treaty after the Balkan Wars and 1919 Neuilly Peace Treaty guaranteed the rights of The Turkish minority in Bulgaria (Şimşir, 1986a: 368 – 376; Halaçoğlu, A., 1994: 23; Halaçoğlu, A., 2002: 302; Tuncoku, 1990: 243; Hakov, 2002: 419).

2.3.1. The Agrarian Union Rule (1919 – 1923)

In general elections of 1919, the Agrarians under the leadership of Stamboliyski took 31 percent of the votes and they formed a coalition government with democrats. However, in order to gain more seats, they went to elections again in 1920, and took nine seats less to set up an absolute majority in the parliament. However, when they annulled 13 seats and gained those seats after re-election, they were able to form a majority government. They introduced new improvements on the minority rights, with respect to the Treaty of Neuilly; in order obtain the support of the Turkish minority, who were mostly peasants. However, other actors feared that the Agrarians would form a one-party system. When the Agrarians won also the 1923 elections, the National Alliance, the Military League and even some social democrats with the assistance of the Tsar made a *coup d'état* in 1923, which was resulted with the assassination of Prime Minister Stamboliyski (Crampton, 2000: 149 – 154).

As a result of the demand in 1905, the first Congress of the Turkish Community Councils in Varna in 1909, the government decided to open a Turkish Teacher Training School, prepared its decree in 1912, and after delay by reason of the Balkan Wars, the school could be finally opened in 1918 in *Şumnu* (Shumen). Moreover, the school was a state-run school and was under control of the Ministry of Education instead of the minority. The medium of instruction had been demanded to be bilingual by Turks but it was decided to be Bulgarian except Turkish language and religious courses. It was advocated because of insufficient educational personnel among Turks to teach other subject in Turkish, and in order to improve the command of Bulgarian language among the future students. Those implementations increased suspicions about a hidden Bulgarisation agenda of the government via the school. It was planned to open two new schools but due to *coup d'état*, it could not be succeed, and in contrast existing one was closed down in 1928 (Keskioglu, 1985: 77 – 81; Şimşir, 1986a: 58 – 61, Memişoğlu, 2002a: 149).

According to the census of 1920, only 8,69 percent of the Turks of Bulgaria were literate. In order to improve The Turkish minority education in Bulgaria, the Ministry of Education of the Agrarian government, under the head of the minister Stoyan Omarchevski, passed the Education Law of 1921 by considering demands of the Turkish group in the 1919 Congress of the Agrarian Union. Some of the important points of the new law were: elimination of the compulsory Bulgarian language education, establishment of school funds to The Turkish schools, acceptance of providing financial aids to The Turkish schools whose curricula and teachers were equivalent to the Bulgarian ones, and implementing financial aids and credits to construct new buildings. Demands of the general curriculum among the Turkish schools were realized in 1920 (Şimşir, 1986a: 55 – 56; Memişoğlu, 2002a: 134 – 142).

Furthermore, between 28 and 29th May 1922, Turkish-Muslim minority organised a nationwide congress, the Agrarian Congress of Muslims of Bulgaria. In this congress delegates discussed educational problems of the minority and other

common problems, as well. For instance, they demanded to reduce 10 hour weekly Bulgarian lessons which they thought it hindered the Turkish education (Karakişla, 2001: 358 – 359).

According to Article 7 of the annexed protocol of the Istanbul Treaty of 1913, a school to supply the demand of religious staff and teachers for the Turkish minority had to be opened. However, it delayed caused by World War I and could be opened only in 1922 in *Şumnu* (Shumen) under a name *Medresetiin Nüvvab* or shortly *Nüvvab*, and under control of the Head Mufti Office. After the closure of the Turkish Teacher Training School in 1928, *Nüvvab* became the last opportunity of the Turkish minority to supply its teacher demand. Promoting a religious school and closing the teacher training school in the period, when there were no *medreses* in Turkey, accelerated the suspicions that the Bulgarian governments aim was to hinder modern education among Turks by encouraging the religious one. From the end of the Agrarian regime until the Communist one, the policy of Bulgarian governments was to prevent any interrelation of The Turkish minority with Turkey and with Turkey's education system which began to be secularised and nationalised. The Kemalist revolution and establishment of the new Turkish nation-state were perceived as threats to the Bulgarian state unity by increasing fears of possible disloyalty and spread of nationalist ideas among The Turkish minority (Keskiöglu, 1985: 85 – 93; Şimşir, 1986a: 61 – 65, 189; Yenisoy – Suleymanoglu, 1999: 134 – 135).

In 1921 – 1922 education year, there were 1673 primary and 39 high schools of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. However, as a result of the raising nationalist momentum after the assassination of Stamboliyski, Turkish primary schools were dropped to 344 and high schools were reduced to 23 in 1943 – 1944 education year. Numbers of Turkish pupils in primary schools also decreased from 51457 in 1936 – 1937 education year to 32808 in 1943 – 1944 education year. Nevertheless, there was not a dramatic change among secondary and high school students, because those policies targeted mainly villages, where most of the Turkish minority live,

and consequently their primary schools. On account of locating mainly in towns, Turkish secondary schools and their student population remained comparatively constant (Eminov, 1997: 127). The sharp decrease in the numbers of The Turkish minority schools could not be explained only by wartime consequences but as an integral part of linguistic policies of the Fascist and nationalist governments towards the Turkish minority.

In 1925, Turkey and Bulgaria signed a friendship and cooperation agreement and Bulgaria accepted the minority rights of the Turkish minority. The rights of the Turkish minority, which was drawn in Neuilly, were guaranteed and at the same time, Turkey accepted to include Bulgarian community in Turkey into minority rights related provisions of the Lausanne Treaty (Tuncoku, 1990: 243; Şimşir, 1986a: 376 – 377).

After the establishment of the Turkish Republic and its new Kemalist ideology, some Kemalist Turkish Sport Organisations began to be opened in Bulgaria. In the congresses of 1926, Turkish Sport Organisations were united. There were a Turkish sport Organisation called *Turan*²⁰ which was established in Vidin, and its charter was legally approved. Therefore, in order to escape from the possible bureaucratic obstacles *Turan* Sport Organisation was chosen as an umbrella organisation to unify other Turkish sport organisations. After the unification new branches began to be set up, even in villages, where Turks were located, and in 1934, the numbers of its branches reached to 95 with nearly 5 000 members. The Association did not only simply deal with sport but also with cultural activities and education. The association published a newspaper, called also *Turan*, in order to spread its news, decisions and ideas. Consequently, the Association began to be criticised by the Bulgarian nationalists and by anti-Kemalist persons and media, especially by *150'likler* (150'ers), who took refugee to Bulgaria after the establishment of Republic in Turkey. Not surprisingly, the Association was closed when the Fascists

²⁰ A name which was given by the Turkish nationalists to the mythical big unified country of the Turks in the entire world.

took the power in 1934 (Şimşir, 1986a: 98 – 106; Keskiöglü, 1985: 113 - 124). According to Höpken, the aim of *Turan* Association was to mobilise the Turks from being a community to being a minority (1997: 61).

The idea to organise a national congress was firstly expressed by Mehmet Celil who was the proprietor and editor of *Rehber* newspaper, and finally, between 31 October and 3 November 1929, the Turkish minority organised a national congress in Sofia in order to discuss and propose solutions to current problems of the minority. One of the most important issues of the congress was education; hence, the congress made important decisions and proposals, such as re-opening of Turkish teacher training schools, increasing the governmental financial supports and removing restrictions to open new Turkish minority schools. However, the government did not respond to their demands, on the contrary during the Fascist rule delegates were prosecuted and as a consequence, some of them had to immigrate to Turkey and some of them even suspiciously persecuted²¹ (Şimşir, 1986a: 106 – 115).

Furthermore, in their congress in Lom in 1928, in order to follow the modernisation process that took place in Turkey, the Association of Turkish Teachers accepted to use the new Latin – Turkish Alphabet in The Turkish schools²² in a date, when it was not officially accepted even by Turkey. However, there were no educational books in the new scripts and the Congress appointed some teachers to prepare new books in order to study in new Turkish alphabet in 1928 – 9 education year.

Consequently, anti-Kemalists lobbied in the Ministry of Education to prevent education in new scripts. Consequently, with a decree in 10th November 1928, the Turkish education in new Alphabet was postponed for four years. The reason was that there were not enough education materials in new Alphabet and the ministry needed more time to control newly published books. The counter lobbying was

²¹ For instance, Mehmet Celil was murdered in Sofia prison.

²² Turks of Bulgaria were the first Turkish community, outside Turkey, that accepted to use new Turkish – Latin scripts (Şimşir, 1992: 302).

done by Turkish member of *Sabranie* and by the Association of Turkish Teachers. Additionally, Turkish ambassador of Sofia, Hüsrev Gerece, made some negotiations with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. As a result, the Ministry of Education permitted again education in Turkish Alphabet in The Turkish minority schools with a decree in 14th January 1930. However, there were no restriction to use Arabic scripts, and therefore, some of the teachers and hodjas refused to use the new Alphabet. In order to solve this problem, lobbying was begun again by the Turkish Embassy, the Association of Turkish Teachers and Turkish members of *Sabranie*. Consequently, in October 1930 using Arabic scripts in the Turkish minority schools were prohibited (Şimşir, 1986a: 128 – 140; Şimşir, 1992: 301 – 325).

2.3.2. The Fascist Rule (1934 – 1944)

In 1934, when Fascists under the name of *Zveno* (Link) took the power, improvements in the Turkish minority institutions during the Agrarian Union rule began to be lost more rapidly. The new regime firstly closed *Turan* Association and the Association of Turkish Teachers. In addition, Bulgarian Ministry of Education tried to obstruct the Latin alphabet with the support of the Grand Mufti Hüseyin Hüsni Efendi, who strongly opposed to Kemalist reforms and naturally to the reform in the Alphabet. He established an association, called *Dini İslam Müdafileri Cemiyeti* (Religion of Islam's Defenders Society) in order to support the usage of Arabic scripts again. Elected members of Turkish school committees forced to resign, and supporters of the Grand Mufti took most of the posts of those committees. As a result, in 1935 there was a return to use Arabic scripts²³. According to the decree in 1935, all the books that were used in The Turkish schools had to be checked and approved by the Grand Mufti. Hence, The Turkish schools fell under the control of the Grand Mufti, which was controlled by the

²³ In Western Trace (in Greece) during the Bulgarian occupation in WW II between 1940 and 1944 education of the Turkish minority of Western Thrace was forced to be done in Arabic scripts (Batibey, n.d.: 55) when Turks in Bulgaria were permitted to use Latin one. That example shows the general attitude of the Fascist government.

Bulgarian authorities, as well. Consequently, Turkey via her Ambassador in Sofia, Şevki Berker, made some negotiations in order to prevent the return to the Arabic scripts. By his four-year-long attempts, Bulgarian government re-permitted the usage of Latin scripts in The Turkish schools, and even made it compulsory²⁴ (Şimşir, 1986a: 152 – 163).

Confiscations of the Turkish minority schools began again in 1924 and it was followed by high tax policies, which Turkish community councils could not pay. Inspectorates received a right to appoint Bulgarian teacher to The Turkish minority schools to teach Bulgarian language, history and geography and also to determine the salaries of appointed Bulgarian teachers. Those salaries were much higher than Turkish teachers' salaries and in most cases the community councils could not pay Turkish teachers' salaries in order to pay salaries of Bulgarian teachers. In some cases, some families tried to send their children to Bulgarian schools, because those schools were free of charge. In order to prevent this situation, the Ministry of Education restricted the attendance of Turkish pupils to Bulgarian schools with a decree in 1937. Consequently, most of the schools had to be closed due to insufficient financial conditions.

The aim of the Fascists was to prevent the educational improvement of the Turkish minority as stated in the report of inspectorates of the Ministry of Education in 1937. Because, according to the head inspector of the Ministry of Education, the fear was that if the minority improved itself, it would be harder to control them. In order to achieve that the Fascists supported the religious education and any other policies, which they believed that it would prevent intellectual improvement of the minority and their connections with Turkey. Furthermore, Kemalist ideology and its reforms were perceived as threats by the Fascists. Even after the re-usage of the Turkish-Latin alphabet, the situation of the Turkish minority and the Turkish

²⁴ Bulgarian Ministry of Education, circular No. 400-1-15, 12 April 1938 (Şimşir, 1986a: 162 – 163). According to Lütem, the Bulgarian authorities accepted to reuse of Latin scripts due to strategic and security reasons of pre-World War II period in order to secure her south borders with Turkey (2000: 70).

minority education retrogressed. Between 1936 and 1944 drop out rates among the Turkish pupils increased to 41 percent and the number of schools between the same dates decreased to 40 percent. Interestingly, while the Turkish schools were being closed and drop out rates were increasing, their literacy rates showed an increase, especially in urban centres. It could be explained as a result of the adoption of the new Turkish alphabet, which showed similar effects in Turkey, as well (Memişoğlu, 2002a: 187 – 200, 219; Memişoğlu, 2002b: 365; Keskiöglü, 1985: 76, Şimşir, 1986a: 160 – 165).

2.4. Re-Naming of Toponyms

By the end of the Ottoman rule, the Bulgarian authorities started to change Turkish topographical names into Bulgarian ones. Turkish topographical names were perceived negatively and have been reduced to minimum (Ilchev, 1969: 35 as cited in Grannes, 1990: 229). The changing process took place in generally six directions.

Firstly they changed names which already have more or less Bulgarian versions, e.g. *Şumnu* to Shumen, *İslimye* to Sliven, *Meriç* to Maritsa and *Ruşçuk* to Ruse. Secondly, new names were invented for the Turkish place names, e.g. Samuil for *Işıklar*, Slivengrad for *Mustafa Paşa*, and Isperih for *Kemallar*. Thirdly, hybrid names, which were changed but yet included their original sounds, were used, e.g. *Kamçı* to Kamchiya and *Yukarı Cuma* to Gorna Dzhumaya (it was changed finally to Blagoevgrad). Fourthly, the authorities used literal translation or *calque linguistique*, e.g. *Deliorman* to Ludogorie²⁵, in which *Deli* to *Ludo* (wild or mad) and *orman* to *gora* (forest). Fifthly, some topographical names were changed by using some similarities and inspirations, e.g. *Eski Cuma* to Targovishte, in which the name of the *Eski Cuma* came from its famous bazaar on Fridays, “*Cuma*”, and Targovishte comes from the *targoviya* which means trade. And finally, some names have remained unchanged with only some little changes in order to written in

²⁵ Changed in 1942 (Eren, 1987: 3, 6).

Cyrillic letters, e.g. *Kırcaali* to Kardzhali, *Burgaz* to Burgas, *Tatar Pazarcık* to Pazardzhik, *Kızanlık* to Kazanlik. Some names, i.e. Arda (river), Balkan (mountains), remained constant (Eren, 1987: 3, 6; Şahin, Emecan and Halaçoğlu Y., 1990: 37).

According to Sarafov, there were circa 150 place name changes which were implemented in 1891, in which 64 of them were adaptations of existing names, such as hybrid names, names had which already Bulgarian versions and literal translations; 68 place name changes were entirely new ones, which inspired by Bulgarian nationalist associations and incidents or participants of the 1877 – 78 Turco – Russian War. Another research indicated that between 1878 and 1912. Especially between 1906 and 1907 name changes of toponyms increased in volume, i.e. in 1906, 114 new place name changes were put into practice, and 65 of them were changes from Turkish to Bulgarian versions, and in 1907 only in Burgaz, Varna and *Eski Zağra* (Stara Zagora) names of 336 villages were changed (Sarafov, 1893: 43 as cited in Crampton, 1990: 51 – 52; Koledarov and Michev, 1973: 6 as cited in Crampton, 1990: 52; Hacısalihoğlu, 2007; Aydın, 1996: 160).

The mass and the most important place name change campaign took place when the Fascist took the power in 1934. 1971 of total 2091, which represents the 94 percent, place name changes between 1920 and 1935, were implemented by the Fascist government in 1934, on the way to form more nationalist Bulgaria also in terms of her toponyms. During this place name changes one third of names of villages were changed (Koledarov and Michev, 1973: 8 as cited in Crampton, 1990: 62; Neuburger, 2004: 150). After the occupation of southern *Dobruca* (Dobrudzha), which was under the Romanian control until 1940, 357 place names in the regions were changed, which was 83 percent of the total 432 place name changes between 1935 and 1944 (Kostanick, 1957: 68 as cited in Crampton, 1990: 62).

Changing of toponyms was not unusual policy of the nation-state, and eventually, name changes were also one of the reasons with other factors which triggered

migration waves among the Turkish minority, by being perceived as attempts to build ethnically homogeneous Bulgarian nation-state, (Crampton, 1990: 61) where there was no room for the signs of the Turkish existence. In spite of continuous changing process since 1878, most of the Turkish minority members especially in rural areas opt to use the Turkish place names, at least names of their villages.

2.5. Turkish Minority Media during the Bulgarian Kingdom

After the declaration of the full independence of Bulgaria from the Ottoman Empire in 1908, a new era started for the Turkish minority of Bulgaria and for its media, as well. The Turkish minority media was also affected by diverse policies of the Kingdom period, e.g. Agrarian Union and Fascist Rule policies. In this era, the rights of the Turkish minority were guaranteed by several multilateral and/ or bilateral agreements signed between 1909 and 1925. For instance, Article 35 of the 1919 Treaty of Neuilly guaranteed use of minority language in private and public lives and in any publications, as well.

Between 1908 and 1944, total 80 newspapers and periodicals were published. Sofia, *Filibe* (Plovdiv), *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali) and *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) were still attractive centres for the Turkish minority media in Bulgaria. Moreover, in other cities and towns, e.g. *Eski Cuma* (Targovishte), *Eğridere* (Ardino) there were some newspapers published, as well.

One of the most important features of the post-1923 period, were conflicts between Kemalist and anti-Kemalist media, as in pre-1908s between Young Turks and supporters. Anti-Kemalists were generally, opponents (*150'likler*) who fled from Turkey after 1923. They were directly or indirectly supported by the Bulgarian governments, who perceived the Kemalist revolution as threat to Bulgarian unity. Furthermore, most of the media were the supporters of the Kemalist revolution and tried to adopt and change the Turkish minority according to the Kemalist principles. After the change of the Alphabet in Turkey from Arabic to Latin scripts, a new

debate started on which script should be used in the Turkish minority media. Anti-Kemalists supported Arabic scripts, in contrast to Kemalists, naturally used and supported the newly adopted Latin one²⁶.

Another important feature of the era was the publication of the Turkish version, *Çiftçi Bilgisi* (The Agrarian Knowledge), of the official press organ of the Agrarian Union from 1919 Agrarian Rule to the beginning of the Fascist rule in 1934. After two-year publication of the official gazette in Turkish in 1880, it was the first time that the Bulgarian authorities took the Turkish minority into consideration.

With rising nationalist waves after *coup d'état* in 1923, especially during the Fascist rule, increased pressures on the Turkish minority and its media, as well. Turkish newspapers and magazines began to be closed down; editors and proprietors of them deported, arrested, imprisoned and even murdered. The authorities accused the Turkish media by being Kemalist. After closure of the last Turkish minority newspaper *Havadis* (News), which was published with Arabic scripts, in 28th February 1941, there remained only one magazine, *Hakikat Şahidi* (Witness of the Truth) which was being published in Turkish in *Kızanlık* (Kazanlık) since 1936, as a media organ of Protestant Missionaries. Hence, the Turkish minority media, which existed since 1865, ceased its publications until the communist rule (Şimşir, 1986a: 309 – 312; Şimşir, 1986b: 4 – 6, 10, 34; Akgül, 2002: 435).

²⁶ *Yenilik* (Renewal) begun to be published even before the new Alphabet was officially accepted by Turkey (Şimşir, 1986a: 138).

CHAPTER 3

LINGUISTIC POLICIES OF BULGARIA DURING THE COMMUNIST RULE

Newspeak was the official language of Oceania and had been devised to meet the ideological needs of Ingsoc, or English Socialism . . . The purpose of Newspeak was not only to provide a medium of expression for the world-view and mental habits proper to the devotees of Ingsoc, but to make all other modes of thought impossible . . . This was done partly by the invention of new words, but chiefly by eliminating undesirable words and by stripping such words as remained of unorthodox meanings, and so far as possible of all secondary meanings whatever... Newspeak was designed not to extend but to diminish the range of thought, and this purpose was indirectly assisted by cutting the choice of words down to a minimum.

George Orwell ('Nineteen forty-four', 1987: 312 – 313)

After the end of the World War II, the Kingdom was dissolved and the government was taken over by the anti-Fascist “Fatherland Front²⁷”, which was constituted of different opposition parties, e.g. Communist Party, Agrarian Party and Liberals. Even though the Bulgarian communists took control of an crucial share of the power in the Fatherland Front after the Soviet invasion, the communists were not able to control the whole power in the government until the general elections of 1948 (Memişoğlu, 2002b: 365).

The communist regime followed heterogeneous policies towards Turkish minority and their minority rights. In order to demonstrate that multiplicity of policies I explained them in four subparts. In first phase, there was a policy to integrate the Turkish minority into new socialist Bulgarian nation by promoting Turkish ethnic identity and its linguistic diversity via state provisions. Second phase illustrated tendency to integrate Turkish minority by restricting their linguistic rights. With the failure of those previous integration policies, the government came to apply forced measures to make sure of the integration of the Turkish minority. However, forced implementations of integration policies did not succeed as well as it was expected. Consequently, this led to the Bulgarian state to implement the last radical phase of

²⁷ *Othchestven Front* in Bulgarian.

the communist period; to force the Turkish minority to be assimilated into Bulgarian nation by prohibiting usage of all Turkish linguistic, cultural and ethnic symbols.

3.1. First Phase: “Promoting Ethnic Identity” (1944 – 1959)

When the Fatherland Front took the power, they needed showing their concerns towards the problems of the Turkish minority. In 27 – 28 December 1944, Fatherland Front’s Turkish Minority Congress was held. In this congress, educational, *vakıf* and religious problems of the minority were discussed, and following decisions, related to the education of the Turkish minority, were taken.

- a) Compulsory education should be spread.
- b) Except courses, which are taught in Bulgarian, e.g. Bulgarian language, history and geography, the medium of instruction in the Turkish school should be Turkish.
- c) Turkish teachers should enjoy the same rights with their Bulgarian colleagues.
- d) New Turkish-Latin scripts should be used in whole Turkish schools.
- e) Confiscated properties should be given back to the Turkish minority.
- f) New Turkish schools should be opened.
- g) Summer pedagogical courses should be organised in order to improve professional skills of Turkish teachers.
- h) Turkish schools pedagogical schools should be opened in Northern and Southern Bulgaria (Şimşir: 1986a: 174 – 175).

Those conferences and congresses continued in the first years of the communist period. In 17th August 1945 in *Pravadi* (Provadya) the Conference of the Turkish schools, in 19th September 1945 in *Lofça* (Lovech) second Fatherland Front’s Turkish Minority Congress, in 2 - 4 November 1945 in *Silistre* (Silistra) congress of heads of the Turkish community councils and teachers of *Silistre* (Silistra),

Akkadınlar (Dulovo), Tutrakan and *Kemallar* (Isperih), in 30 December 1945 in Sofia after the general congress of the Agrarian Union, the conference of the Turkish delegates of the Agrarian Union and in 26th January 1946 in *Osmanpazarı* (Omurtag) Conference of Turkish Teachers were held with similar purposes and recommended similar implementations (Şimşir: 1986a: 178; Memişoğlu, 2002a: 224 – 226).

Even though in those conferences and congresses, the Turkish minority representatives demanded to preserve the autonomous status of the Turkish schools, the communist government's one of the first decisions related to the Turkish minority was to nationalise the Turkish Private schools in 1946, which had been private school and had autonomous status (Şimşir: 1986a: 191). This is because, according to the Soviet model of nationalities question, it should be cut the ties of Turks with religion and this aim would not be succeeded by preserving the autonomous status of the Turkish minority schools (Yenisoy – Sülemanoğlu, 1999: 139). The nationalisation of the Turkish minority schools were advocated in terms of four main arguments: decreasing burden of the Turkish community, equalising the status of Turkish and Bulgarian teachers, solving the problem of recognition of degrees in Turkish minority schools and resolving the problem of publishing education books (Şimşir, 1986a: 186 – 187). However, it is questionable whether the nationalisation of the Turkish schools was the only way to solve those problems. Hence, the Turkish minority lost their control over their educational institutions which they had enjoyed since the formation of Bulgarian Principality.

According to the new 1947 Dimitrov²⁸ Constitution, which was prepared by guidance of the 1936 Soviet Constitution, and the newly adopted Educational Law, Turkish schools were under the control of the government (Eminov, 1997: 127). Nevertheless, Article 79 of the constitution stated that the study of Bulgarian language in schools is obligatory for all Bulgarian citizens; however, “national

²⁸ The first president of People's Republic of Bulgaria.

minorities have a right to be educated in their mother tongue and to develop their national culture”²⁹ (*Narodno Sabranie na Republika Balgariya* (National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria), 1947). According to the Article 154 of the 1946 Education Law, expenses and salaries of teachers of the Turkish schools will be financed by the state, and according to the Article 155 of the same law, Ministry of Education had a right to decide which national minorities will benefit from receiving education in their mother tongues (Şimşir: 1986b: 193 – 194). This provision was probably against the Macedonian minority and to prevent education in Macedonian language, which was not accepted as a district language but as a dialect of Bulgarian language. Furthermore, even this statement did not target the Turkish minority in first decades of the communist rule, later it gave an authority to the government to close down Turkish schools in 1958 – 59 education year.

In 1952, religious lessons were discarded in Turkish schools, because the atheist education was seen as a basic and key instrument to create communist society³⁰. This was a new approach, because former governments, since 1923, had tried to encourage religious affiliations among the Turkish minority rather than national or ethnic ones in order to prevent and cut relations of Turkish minority from their historically kin-state Turkey (Eminov, 1997: 129 – 130).

The new constitution also made primary education compulsory, which firstly adopted in 1879 *Tirnova* (Tarnovo) Constitution but was not implemented efficiently especially among minorities. For this reason, there was a significant increase in attendance rates of Turkish students to schools between 1943 – 1944 education year and 1949 – 1950 education year. Within those years there were approximately three times increase in number of Turkish schools and Turkish pupils and three and a half times increase in the number of Turkish schools’

²⁹ “Националните малцинства имат право да се учат на своя майчин език и да развиват националната си култура, като изучаването на българския език е задължително.”

³⁰ It should be noted that the atheist education did not target only Turkish minority schools but also the Bulgarian schools.

teachers (Eminov, 1997: 131). Consequently, the attendance rate of school-aged Turkish children reached about 100 percent in 1952 – 1953 education year.

There were seven coeducational high schools and one girl high school in *Ruşçuk* (Ruse), and also three Turkish teacher-training institutes, which were established in 1947 in *Eski Zağra* (Stara Zagora), in 1951 in *Şumnu* (Shumen) and *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali). The aim was to supply the teacher demand of Turkish schools and to grow up new teachers who were educated and would teach new youth Turkish generation according to communist principles (Şimşir, 1986a: 235, 241 – 242).

In order to solve shortages of qualified staffs in educational, the new regime looked for collaborating with the Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan by benefiting from their vernacular education experience. This is because, as part of the Soviet nationalities policy, Azeri language had an official status in SSR of Azerbaijan, and Azeri language is closed to Turkish language. Therefore, an Azerbaijani delegation was invited to Bulgaria in order to observe and report the situation of Turkish education in Bulgaria. In this sense, an action plan was put into practice to develop conditions and quality of Turkish education. Consequently, new high schools were opened. Furthermore, Turkish Language and Literature, History and Physics – Mathematics departments were established in the University of Sofia where the medium of instruction was in Turkish (Şimşir, 1986a: 243 – 246; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 141 – 142). In order to publish Turkish educational materials, books, newspapers and magazines, a Turkish branch was established within the Bulgarian National Printing House (*Narodna Prosveta*) in Sofia (Eminov, 1997: 130 – 131).

3.1.1. Surname System of Bulgaria and the Turkish Minority

After the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality in 1878, new personal naming system was introduced. During the Ottoman rule there was a two name nonhereditary patronymic system, in which first given name and second father's name with suffixes '–ov/ ev' for males and '–ova/ eva' for females were used, for

example, Dimitar Todorov, Maria Todorova. By means of this system, surnames were not transferable and different generations had different surnames. This resulted in several problems, especially within urban merchant class importantly regarding their family relationships with each other. After the new system it was a chance to transfer surnames to next generations. However, this new system was used generally among the urban merchant class and old system was still in use in most of the rural areas (Neuburger, 2004: 146 – 147).

Nonetheless, instead of ‘-ov/ ev’ and ‘-ova/ eva’ suffixes, a Turkish suffix, ‘-oğlu’, was used among Turks and Pomaks. Nevertheless, Pomaks were forced to use Bulgarian suffixes, for example, Ahmetov instead of Ahmetoğlu. Consequently, Bulgarian surname suffixes became indicators to differentiate Turkish and Pomak identity (Mizov, 1987: 141 as cited in Neuburger, 2004: 148). During the Fascist rule, obtaining Bulgarian suffixes started to be used also among Turks; because, it was proclaimed as a sign of loyalty to Bulgarian state. Moreover, Grand Mufti, who had similar interests with the Fascist government against Kemalism, gave his support to usage of Bulgarian suffixes (Neuburger, 2004: 152 – 153).

In the early decades of the Communist period, to use Bulgarian suffixes became a rule (Neuburger, 2004: 153). However, in addition to suffix usage, there was another important problem; writing Turkish names with Cyrillic letters. As a result of unfamiliarity of Cyrillic scripts and officials in the department of Registry of Births towards Turkish names, some writing problems were observed, for example Turkish name, İbrahim, sometimes, was written as İbryam or İbram. Consequently, even father and son have the same names it appeared different ways in name and surnames, such as instead of İbrahim İbrahimov; it changed the name into İbryam İbrahimov, İbram İbryamov or İbrahim İbramov. Finally, naming issue of the Turkish minority was ‘totally solved’ by urging to adopt Bulgarian names during the mass forced name changes in the forced assimilation campaign of 1984 – 1985.

3.2. Second Phase: “Integration” (1959 – 1971)

After the 1958 – 1959 education year with a decree of Bulgarian Ministry of Education in 16th June 1960, Turkish and other minority schools were closed, and unified with or changed into Bulgarian schools. Hence, Turkish language turned into an optional mother tongue course after being used as a medium of instruction until that date. Turkish pupils had a right to take Turkish language course four hours per week in municipalities where Turkish population was dense enough. There should be at least ten Turkish students to open Turkish language course, and this process did not work properly caused by some obstructions of Bulgarian authorities³¹. Thus, the status of Turkish, as an educational language of the Turkish minority, ended (Eminov, 1997: 132; Şimşir, 1986a: 251 – 257; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 146 – 147).

In addition to the reactions among the Turkish minority, there were also some reactions from Bulgarians, who live in Turkish neighbouring areas. Some Bulgarian families opposed to let their children to study with Turks in the same schools and to be taught by Turkish teachers. Because, it was the first time in the Bulgarian history that Turks studied together with Bulgarian pupils. Furthermore, departments of History and Turkish literature in the University of Sofia and Turkish divisions in Teacher Training Institutions were closed, as well (Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 146 – 147).

One of the main reasons of the government to put into practice this policy was the failure of the expectation that the Turkish minority by studying and using their vernacular would voluntarily be a part of the new Bulgarian communist nation and would lose their ties with their historical kin-state Turkey. The Minister of Education, Nacho Papazov in one of his speeches stated:

³¹ To see similarities of Turkish language course implementations see also Chapter 4.

Until now, we opened Turkish schools in order to raise communist staff among Turks. However, those who graduated from those schools became [Turkish] nationalists. Since now, we will raise true and real communist Turkish intellectuals in Bulgarian schools (cited in Özbir, 1986: 41).

Moreover, the failure of expectations to export communist regime, as Stalin proposed, to Turkey and to raise communist staff among the Turkish minority for expected revolution in Turkey was abandoned. From that time, the government would seek to integrate Turkish minority within Bulgarian socialist society (Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 140, 146).

Increased collectivisation process in the mid 1950s was not supported by the Turkish peasants and landowners as it was expected. At that time, only 6 percent of the Turkish villagers joined in the agricultural cooperatives (TKZS). This unwillingness to participate in TKZSs among Turks was duly noted by the Bulgarian authorities and after the completion of collectivisation process at the beginning of 1960, they scrutinised their attitudes towards communism. It seemed that it would not be possible to grow up true communist citizens among Turks with Turkish education (Memişoğlu, 2002b: 365 – 367; Zhelev and Todev, 1988: 27; Neuburger, 2004: 191; Ivanova, 1988: 43). Furthermore, the stability of the new regime was sustained, and there was not any danger of civic turmoil among Turks, because possible opposition leaders were deported to Turkey between 1950 and 1951³² or imprisoned (Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 140; Crampton, 2000: 195).

Those policies did not affect only the Turkish minority, but also other ‘possible disloyal’ minorities of Bulgaria; for instance, disappearance of Macedonian minority in the census statistics after 1956 Census led the denial and obstruction of expression of the Macedonian identity (Ortakovski, 2000: 164 – 166). Hence, there was not any rival language against the monopoly of the Bulgarian language on the way of the aspiration to build an integrated Bulgarian socialist nation. Nevertheless,

³² That migration was planned in order to prevent possible resistance against the collectivisation process of agricultural lands.

there was not any important reaction from the government of Turkey as she did during the Latin – Arabic script debates in 1930s, because in those days Turkey was on chaotic days before *coup d'état* of 1960 and could not response to situations took place in Bulgaria (Lütem, 2000: 77).

There was an effort to replace Turkish words by Bulgarian counterparts, as well. There was a list of 10 000 Turkish words which would be replaced by Bulgarian and Russian ones. The Turkish poems and writers had to use those new Russo-Bulgarian words instead of Turkish equivalents in order to publish their books and articles (Eminov, 1997: 133 – 134). The leading reason of this operation was to cut linguistic ties of Turkish minority of Bulgaria with Turkey and to emerge more different dialect of Turkish, with Slavic words, which could make an easier turn to monolingual Bulgaria.

Ironically, Todor Zhivkov³³ for the 10th anniversary of *Yeni Hayat* (New Life) magazine in 1964, stated:

All possible opportunities have been created for the Turkish population to develop their culture and language freely... The children of the Turkish population must learn their mother tongue and perfect it. To this end, it is necessary that the teaching of the Turkish language be improved in schools. Now in the future the Turkish population will speak their mother tongue; they will write their contemporary literary works; they will sing their wonderful songs... (cited in Amnesty International, 1986: 4)

However, even those calming statements, serious anxiety among Turks increased after closures of the Turkish schools and they responded it by petitioning to migrate to Turkey (Şimşir, 1986a: 267 – 268).

In 1969, the Politburo took its secret decisions about Turkish language, literature, writers and poets in order to achieve one-nation-state. In those decisions, the Politburo called attention to the influence of bourgeois Turkish literature on the

³³ The third and the last president of People's Republic of Bulgaria, who also implemented the forced assimilation campaign in 1984 and 1989.

Turkish literature of Bulgaria and named it as a threat to communism. It dealt also with themes of the Turkish literature and criticised Turkish writers and poems for writing about past issues instead of future of communism in Bulgaria, trying to keep Turkish ethnic identity, not using enough Bulgarian words in their works and not being able to instil communist consciousness among Turks (Çavuş, 1988: 68 – 69 as cited in Eminov, 1997: 134 – 135).

3.3. Third Phase: “Forced Integration” (1971 – 1984)

The new Zhivkov Constitution was adopted in 1971, and caused dramatic decrease in the rights of the Turkish minority when compared to the 1947 Constitution. Article 45 (7) of the new constitution wrote that “citizens of non-Bulgarian origin, in addition to the compulsory study of the Bulgarian language, shall have a right to study also in their own language”³⁴ (*Narodno Sabranie na Republika Bulgariya*, 1971).

Furthermore, in addition to decisions of the 1956 April Plenum of the BKP, in 1971 it was stated that the goal was to “constructing mature socialism in unified socialist society”, which, in the long-run, meant homogenisation of Bulgarian population (Crampton, 2000: 198). Another initial change took place in 1975 when section in identity cards, which previously stated nationality of the holder, were abolished (Amnesty International, 1986: 3).

The Turkish education in Bulgaria, which was medium of instruction between 1946 and 1959 and an optional language course between 1959 and 1974, was totally dissolved in 1974. In 1974, all optional Turkish language courses in schools were eliminated and the Turkish Philology department in the University of Sofia was closed and changed into Arabic Philology (Eminov, 1997: 133; Şimşir, 1986a: 126; Amnesty International, 1986: 4).

³⁴ “Гражданите от небългарски произход освен задължителното изучаване на българския език имат право да изучават и своя език.”

Turkey did not show any significant response for elimination of the Turkish language, because she was engaged in the 1974 Cyprus crisis (Lütem, 2000: 82). This was a crucial point to note; the Bulgarian authorities in communist era took their decisions against the Turkish minority while Turkey was suffering from its own problems e.g. 1960, 1971, 1974 Cyprus crisis, and the 1980 *coup d'états*. In those problematic decades, Turkey did not or could not make an important response to avoid a possible Turco-Bulgarian crisis in the Cold War period.

Nonetheless, between 1956 and 1975, there was an increase in the numbers of Turks in blue collar and science, education, culture and other art jobs as a result of a parallel increase in educational levels among the Turkish minority. There were total 110291 Turkish students in 1957 – 58, 152203 in 1962 – 63, and 181279 in 1970 – 71 education year. It was noted three times increase in numbers of Turkish students in highs schools and vocational schools from circa 6 000 in 1958 – 59 education year to 21617 in 1970 – 71 education year. In 1970 – 71 education year, there were 795 Turkish students attending higher educational institutions (Memişoğlu, 2002b: 366 – 368).

3.3.1. The Turkish Minority Art, Culture and Literature in the Communist Period

Even though there had existed artistic, literary and cultural activities among the Turkish minority before communism, the ‘renaissance’ of Turkish cultural activities was from the communist rule until 1969.

There was a gradual increase in interest in cultural activities among the Turkish minority after especially establishments of Turkish theatres in *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), *Şumnu* (Shumen) and *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali). Nevertheless, the division in Sofia Theatre Higher Art Institute, “Kr. Sarafov”, which was established in order to train staff for Turkish theatres, closed in 1957. There was also an amateur Turkish

theatre group called “*Heveskarlar Kolektifi*”³⁵ (Amateur Collectives). Those developments led to increase in the numbers of Turkish population who were interested in theatrical activities³⁶ (Memişoğlu, 2002b: 369; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 150; Şimşir, 1986a: 299).

Furthermore, by 1959 poem, short story, novel³⁷ and anthology books³⁸ were published by the Turkish branch of *Narodna Prosveta* printing house³⁹. However, in 1969, the renaissance of the Turkish minority literature came to the end, and after that there was not any Turkish book (Şimşir, 1986a: 286 – 287). The style of the Turkish literature in Bulgaria was close to the genre in Turkey but the themes were influenced by Soviet and Bulgarian literatures (Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 2002: 421). The language of literature and theatrical works was Istanbul dialect of Turkish but it could be observed usage of Turkish local dialects in Bulgaria. In time, Azerbaijani and Bulgarian words started to be used as a consequence of the Politburo decisions after 1960s (Şimşir, 1986a: 292).

3.4. Fourth Phase: “Forced Assimilation” (1984 – 1989)

Promoting and preserving ethnic identity and vernacular education of the Turkish minority in the early communist period and then integration policies could not make

³⁵ Interestingly the name of the group was in Azerbaijani language, which gives clues about the Azerbaijani cooperation in the culture, as well. For instance, Turkish theatres performed some Azerbaijani operas and musicals as well as plays by other foreign writers (Şimşir, 1986a: 299 – 300).

³⁶ For instance, there were 10000 Turkish population who were interested in cultural activities in 1958 and 13200 in 1962 in the entire country and 25350 in 1966 only in *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) and *Şumnu* (Shumen) (Memişoğlu, 2002b: 369).

³⁷ The first Turkish novel written in Bulgaria was ‘*Gün Doğarken*’ (When the Sun rises), which was published in 1963 (Şimşir, 1986a: 292).

³⁸ For the whole list of the literature works that were published in Bulgaria during the communist rule, see Şimşir, 1986a: 303 – 306.

³⁹ Hence, due to improvements and promotions in the literature of the Turkish minority, the general state of art of the period could be characterised as a pessimistic view to the future (Çavuş, 1992: 581).

the Turkish minority a part of the monolingual and integrated Bulgarian nation, as it was expected. As a response, communist authorities employed more radical policies (Memişoğlu, 2002b: 366).

The terminology related to Turks of Bulgaria during the communist rule was altered time by time. In the first years “national minority” was used in the official discourse even in the Article 71 of the 1947 Dimitrov Constitution. In the 1950s it was changed to “Turkish population”, as part of the first steps of the constructing unified socialist society. In the 1960s, in addition to the former one, a merged and softened term was observed, “national groups”, which referred that Turks are part of the nation but also as a group not as a minority. With the new Zhivkov Constitution of 1971 instead of national minority or ethnic group, “citizens with non-Bulgarian origin” preferred to be used in the Article 45. In the 1970s, two new terms emerged in the academic literature, “Bulgarian Turks” and “Bulgarians with Turkish descent” (Hacıoğlu, 2002: 40 – 46).

By starting from the southern regions in December 1984 and continuing in Northern regions in March 1985, the Bulgarian government forcibly changed Turkish names of Turks into Bulgarian ones⁴⁰, and issued new identity cards with new Bulgarian names (Amnesty International, 1986: 7, 9). In order to refer to that Turks of Bulgaria are ‘in reality’ Bulgarians who forcibly converted to Islam and had replaced their names into Turkish ones, and now strongly and “collectively” demanded to restore their original Bulgarian names to unify with the socialist Bulgarian society, that forced Bulgarisation campaign officially was called “rebirth or revival process⁴¹”.

The authorities prepared a name list, in which Turks had to choose one among them. In cases when they refused to choose one, the authorities selected one for

⁴⁰ It was announced that the campaign was finished in 28th March 1985 before the Census of 1985, in which Turks were counted as Bulgarians Muslims (Amnesty International, 1986: 9, 25).

⁴¹ *Vazroditelen Protses* in Bulgarian.

them (Crampton, 2000: 209). If they totally rejected to change their names, they were sent to the labour camp in Belene Island in Danube River and to other prisons or into exile within the country. The tricky implementation was that the government forced Turks to sign a petition, in which persons accepted that they were voluntarily changing their Turkish names into Bulgarian ones in order to be a part of the unified Bulgarian socialist society. Names were changed collectively in working places, in the military service and mostly in the areas where they were living. Villages were surrounded by panzers and special military forces in order to frighten and force them to sign name changing petitions immediately (Amnesty International, 1986: 9 – 14, 37).

Names of the ancestors of Turks were changed in registers and in tombstones, as well. Because of the personal naming system of Bulgaria, citizens of Bulgaria have been using three names, first his/ her name, second his/her father's name and thirdly his/ her grandfather's name. Therefore, in order to complete the name changing campaign, the government had to change ancestors' names, as well (The Helsinki Watch Committee, 1986: 14).

Speaking Turkish language in public spaces, even in private spheres, performing and listening Turkish music, and any other cultural and religious practices, i.e. wearing *şalvar*⁴², washing of the dead before funerals, burying dead persons in Muslim graveyards and circumcision were banned. Those who could not and did not speak Bulgarian language faced serious problems in state institutions; for instance, doctors and medical staffs refused or forced to refuse to examine patients who did not or could not speak Bulgarian (Amnesty International, 1986: 7, 17; The Helsinki Watch Committee, 1986: 14).

⁴² Traditional garment of the Turkish women which is in common use among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. There were also some previous campaigns against *şalvar* in 1960s. See Neuburger, 2004: 126 – 131 for details.

As a result of suspicions towards Turkish teachers and in order to be sure that the prohibition was not violated, Bulgarian teachers were sent to schools in Turkish areas. Possession of Turkish Books became also a crime. The books in Turkish were seized from public libraries and even from personal libraries of individuals, and even destroyed (Eminov, 1997: 135; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 151; Amnesty International, 1986: 7). However, in spite of the prohibitions, Turks were continuing to speak Turkish, to use their Turkish names and to give secretly and unofficially Turkish names to their new-born children (Neuburger, 2004: 81, 165).

Forced name-changing campaigns were not strange actions in the history of modern Bulgaria. It was tested and implemented several times before 1984. In 1912, 1942 and 1964 names of Pomaks were forcibly changed; however, due to failure of those campaigns their names were restored until the last campaign that took place between 1970 and 1974. Names of the Muslim Roma were changed between 1953 and 1954 (Ortakovski, 2000: 163; Todorova, 2004: 139; Neuburger, 2004: 75, 92; Amnesty International, 1986: 27 – 28; Turan, 2000: 16 – 18).

After the report of Amnesty International of 1986, the international community, e.g. the Organisation of the Islamic Conference⁴³ and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination⁴⁴, paid careful attention to the events that took place in Bulgaria against the Turkish minority. Not surprisingly, the Bulgarian authorities was continuously rejecting that the campaign was done by force, in contrast it was voluntary. Furthermore, they advocated the idea that “there were no Turks in Bulgaria but Bulgarian Muslim”, and those claims of the international organisations were an anti-Bulgarian campaign. Even those organisations did not

⁴³ Organisation of the Islamic Conference accepted several resolutions concerning the forced assimilation campaign and sent a delegation to Bulgaria to observe the situation. In those days Bulgaria did not permitted foreign media, and even foreign diplomatic missions, to go to influenced areas (Amnesty International, 1986: 20 – 21; The Turkish Historical Society, 1989: 27).

⁴⁴ Bulgaria submitted two different reports to the Committee. In the first report of 1984 it was mentioned about the Turkish minority but in the second one of 1986 there was nothing about the Turkish minority. The second report was submitted after results of the 1985 Census was prepared (The U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 1986: 4 – 5).

have power to impose binding regulations; their activities were perceived as an ‘image’ problem by the Bulgarian authorities. Hence, in order to prove that there was no Turkish minority in Bulgaria and the name-changing was voluntary, the Bulgarian authorities organised counter-propaganda by means of books⁴⁵ and even via films⁴⁶ to justify their thesis. The government urged some Turkish intellectuals and muftis to sign declaration declaring there was not such a forced name-changing campaign (Who Worries about Moslems in Bulgaria and Why?, 1985: 13 – 15, Amnesty International, 1986: 34, 35, 41).

3.4.1. Reasons of the Forced Assimilation Campaign

In order to legalise the campaign against the Turks, the communist government’s main claim was that Turks were descendants of Bulgarians who were forced by the Ottomans to change their religion, identity and names. Hence, they finally saw the right way and demanded and decided to re-change their names with Bulgarian ones.

In fact, it was out of the historical evidences and there should be some other reasonable explanations of this policy. First one is, as Boneva states, the fear of demographic catastrophe, since the growing size of the population of the Turkish minority, and their increasing coherence as an ethnic group, escalated the fears that minorities will constitute a majority in the future (cited in Lenkova, 1999: 7; Crampton, 2000: 210).

Another anxiety was to being ‘second Cyprus’. The Cyprus operation of the Turkey caused growing fear among Bulgarians. There was a phobia to be invaded by

⁴⁵ For examples of those counterpropaganda books, see Zhivkov (1989) *Bulgaria on the Balkans, in Europe, in the World*, Sofia: Sofia Press, Kirmanova (1988) *Prohibited in Bulgaria*, Sofia: Sofia Press, and Sofia Press (1985) *Who Worries About Moslems in Bulgaria and Why?*, Sofia: Sofia Press.

⁴⁶ One of the famous propaganda movies was ‘Time of Violence’, which was based on the novel of Anton Donchev ‘Time of Parting’ (*Vreme Razdelno*). The movie was also released internationally, e.g. in the Cannes Film Festival in 1987. For debates and information about the movie, see Todorova, 2004: 148 – 156).

Turkey, especially for the Southern regions, where there is a border line between Turkey and Bulgaria where there was an important Turkish population (Crampton, 2000: 210). This collective phobia, namely Turcophobia, influenced also accusations to the Turkish minority of being ‘fifth column’ or ‘Trojan horse’ of Ankara. These fears came into surface when in 1947 it was discussed the appropriateness of the Soviet nationalities model to Bulgaria. The Soviet nationalities model required an autonomous region or republic for Turks; however, it was denied by the Bulgarian authorities for the reason that Turks would cause intervention of Turkey (Neuburger, 2004: 71 – 72, 186). Nevertheless, it should be added that nationalistic history education in Bulgaria contributed negative perceptions against the Turkish minority by using anti-Turkish elements⁴⁷.

Moreover, in those days, Turkey had problems with her Kurdish minority, and according to Dimitrov, Bulgarian authorities expected that Turkey would not be able to deal with other issues, because her military power was mainly deployed in her southern regions and she would not take a risk to increase any tension with Bulgaria. Additionally, Bulgarian authorities expected that by reason of accusations of human rights abuses within her borders, Turkey did not have enough credibility to mobilise the international community to respond to Bulgaria’s *vazroditelen protses* (2000: 12).

However, the most reasonable explanation would be to hide worsened economic situation of the country by playing nationalism card in order to manipulate society to other issues. Explosions in Varna airport and Filibe (Plovdiv) railway station were used to justify the forced assimilation policies in the eyes of the Bulgarian by condemning Turks of being terrorists (Crampton, 2000: 210). In fact, it was probable that a conspiracy was organised by the Bulgarian secret service (*Darzhavna Sigurnost*).

⁴⁷ See Kahraman, 1996: 57 – 69, 83 – 88, for some examples of anti-Turkish elements in Bulgarian historiography and literature.

In spite of the state pressures, the opposition movements were growing not only among the Turkish minority but also among Bulgarians. Some organisations under the name of discussion clubs dealt with human rights, religious rights and *ecoglasnost* were established. In 1989, Turks organised mass rallies and were protesting and demanding the restoration their rights and their Turkish names. Leading Turkish figures started a hunger strike in 1987 to protest the forced assimilation campaign (Crampton, 2000: 214 – 215; Neuburger, 2004: 81).

Zhivkov expressed in Bulgarian TV that those who prefer to live in capitalist Turkey instead of socialist Bulgaria were free to go. Zhivkov and the Politburo were not expecting that such an important population would leave the country. However, more than 350 000 Turks of Bulgaria immigrated to Turkey within three months in the summer of 1989. In 26 October 1989, during the ecological demonstrations in Sofia, tension increased between police forces and demonstrators. In order to prevent further conflicts, Petar Mladenov met Gorbachev when he was coming back from China, and after his arrival, Zhivkov forced to resign (Crampton, 2000: 215).

3.5. Turkish Minority Media in Bulgaria during the Communist Regime

After 9 September 1944 with the government of the Fatherland Front and later with the communist regime, Turkish minority media began to be reawakening by the hands of the party organs and the state. Although in the first two decades of the new regime, this policy helped to develop the Turkish-published media, after the 1960s it slowed down and lost its gains.

First Turkish newspaper of the communist era, *Vatan* (Fatherland), started to be published in 6th February 1945, and it was followed by the publication of *Işık* (Light) in 14th May 1945 both were media organs of “the Turkish Minority Commission of the Fatherland Front”. In 1946 *Eylülcü Çocuk* (Pioneer or *Sebteviyiche* in Bulgarian) as a media organ of the Children’s Organisation, in 1947

Halk Gençliği (Popular Youth) as a media organ of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Komsomol Organisation (DKMS) took first steps to their publication lives. *Işık* changed its name into *Yeni Işık* (New Light) in 1948 and was published as a media organ of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party (BKP), and finally in 1953 a monthly newspaper *Yeni Hayat* (New Life) was published.

The strategy of the government was to release three different newspapers and a magazine, *Yeni Işık* for adults, *Halk Gençliği* for youth, *Eylülcü Çocuk* for children and *Yeni Hayat* for families of the Turkish minority in order to promote communist ideology and new communist way of life among Turks and to gain their intimacy. Some regional and countrywide media were also publishing Turkish pages in their local editions, which were eliminated in 1959. In addition, there was Turkish radio broadcasting in the Bulgarian National Radio.

Until 1960 Turkish-published media was very aware of the usage of Turkish language; for instance, they tried to use the official (Istanbul) dialect of Turkish. However, after this date that awareness started to be left and instead of Turkish words and terms, Azeri and Bulgarian words began systematically to be used, especially in *Yeni Işık*. Furthermore, in contrast to *Yeni Işık*, *Halk Gençliği* attempted to use official dialect of Turkish until 1970 when it was closed. Meanwhile, it should be noted that there was a parallelism between usage of Turkish and media policies of the government; first the misuse of Turkish in *Yeni Işık* and the closure of Turkish minority schools in 1960s and later the closure of *Halk Gençliği* and the elimination of the Turkish optional courses in unified schools.

Closures continued firstly with *Eylülcü Çocuk* and later with *Yeni Hayat* in 1981. There was left only one Turkish-published newspaper, *Yeni Işık* was left behind. However, it began to be published bilingually in Turkish and Bulgarian. The share of the Turkish language usage in the newspaper was continuously decreased. Before

it started entirely to be published in Bulgarian in 31st January 1985, the average of Turkish usage in the newspaper's last bilingual publication in 29th January 1985 was only one to tenth. Consequently, there were no Turkish media in the last decade of the communism in Bulgaria. Even though this newspaper was generally used by the Bulgarian authorities as a propaganda instrument towards Turks, it had a symbolic meaning by being the only and last Turkish newspaper of the last decade of communist era (Eminov, 1997: 136; Şimşir, 1986a,: 312 – 314; Şimşir, 1986b: 6 – 7; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 145).

In this context, it could be argued that, in the short-run, state-supported and state-controlled Turkish media helped to develop Turkish language, culture and identity but in the long-run it was weakened media tradition of the Turkish minority.

CHAPTER 4

LINGUISTIC POLICIES OF BULGARIA IN THE POST – COMMUNIST PERIOD

Turkish schools will not be allowed
to exist in Bulgaria...
If they [Turks] want Turkish schools,
they are free to go to Turkey
Ilcho Dimitrov⁴⁸

After resignation of the last president of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov, on November 10, 1989, the political, social and economical restructuring of the country were introduced. One of the key issues of the post-1989 period was the restoration of the rights of the Turkish minority and other minorities, e.g. Pomaks, Roma and Macedonians, which were targeted by long-standing assimilationist policies of the ex-regime and especially the forced assimilation campaign, *vazroditelen protses*, between 1984 and 1989.

Even though the forced migration of Turks in 1989 and economically motivated migrations afterwards, according to the last Census in 2001, there are 746 664 Turks out of total 7 928 901 population of Bulgaria. It means that they still constitute 9,4 percent of the population. Furthermore, 9,6 percent of the population declared its mother tongue as Turkish. They constitute more than 30 percent of the population in five provinces (*Kırcaali/ Kardzhali, Hezargrad/ Razgrad, Şumnu/ Shumen, Eski Cuma/ Targovishte and Silistre/ Silistra*) and more than 10 percent of the population, which is the national average, in ten provinces out of 28 provinces (in addition to previously mentioned five, *Tatar Pazarcık/ Dobrich, Rusçuk/ Ruse, Burgaz, Hasköy/ Haskovo and İslimye/ Sliven*) (See Map 2 in Appendices).

⁴⁸ Former Minister of Education and Science, stated in January 1996 (cited in Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 1997).

4.1. The Post-Communist Minority Politics and MRF

In the post-communist politics, the Turkish minority has been represented by the political party, named ‘Movement of Rights and Freedoms’ (MRF). MRF was established as an ‘illegal’ organisation in 1985 as a response to forced assimilation policies after 1984 and to form an opposition movement among the Turkish minority. On January 1990, the party was officially set up. The party has sought to represent demands and interest of the Muslims, mainly the Turkish minority, in the restructuring process of the country (Özgür, 1999: 75 – 79). From the beginning until now, the leader of the movement is Ahmet Doğan.

Moreover, MRF’s constitutionality started to be put into question, when Bulgarian nationalist backlashes emerged in regions where the Turkish minority live. The first challenge was in 1990, in order to prevent participation of the party in the first free elections of the post-communist period. However, the Central Electoral Commission ruled out that MRF can participate in the elections. The second challenge was in 1992, because the Article 11 (4) of the 1991 Constitution prohibits ethnic parties. However, the Constitutional Court issued six to five⁴⁹ non-verdicts, which means the court neither rejected nor accepted claims about unconstitutionality of MRF, because seven votes are required for a decision (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee – BHC, 1992). Although, the voters of the MRF were mainly Turks, there are also important number of voters from other ethnies, i.e. Pomaks, Roma and even small numbers from Bulgarians (Özgür, 1999: 160 – 161). Moreover, allegations of being unconstitutionality as a result of being ethnic party have affected the policies of MRF; therefore, the Party continuously have to state that it is not an ethnic party. After failing of those allegations, those who were in opposition to MRF began to claim that the party was establishing an ethnic monopoly over Turkish votes. They expressed that Turks should be represented according to the ideological bases rather than ethnic affiliation. There were some

⁴⁹ Six members vote for MRF’s unconstitutionality and five for its constitutionality.

attempts to form alternative ‘Turkish’ parties but only NMRF (National Movement of Rights and Freedoms) succeeded in some regions in the local elections.

Successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party, re-named as BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party), won the elections on 1991, which was organised to establish the Grand National Assembly⁵⁰ (GNA). Unsurprisingly, its victory led anxiety of opposition parties, because the main obligation of GNA was to prepare a new constitution. Opposition parties claimed that the constitution would be the major guide in the democratisation of the country and in the integration with European and international systems; therefore, it could be neither democratic nor legitimate under BSP dominated GNA (Crampton, 2005: 214 – 215; Ragaru, 2001: 303).

Prof. İbrahim Tatarlı, MP of MRF in GNA, also agreed that the new implementations had side effects of the understandings of the former ideology (1996: 311). After all, the new Constitution of the Bulgaria was approved on 12 July 1991. Textually, the new constitution did not include new improvements on the rights of the Turks and other minorities. According to the article 36 (2) of the new constitution, citizens whose mother tongue is not Bulgarian, along with the compulsory study in Bulgarian language, have a right to learn and use their languages⁵¹ (*Narodno Sabranie na Republika Balgariya*, 1991). Furthermore, its articles related to the minority rights and linguistic rights were very similar to the former 1971 Constitution, which in fact, could not prevent the Turkish minority from the forced assimilation campaign.

Interestingly, neither 1947 nor 1971 Constitution included any statement about the official language of the state. The statement that “the official language of Bulgaria is Bulgarian” putted into the 1971 Constitution only in the beginning of the post-communist period with the amendments in the Article 11 in 1990 (*Narodno*

⁵⁰ *Veliko Sabranie*.

⁵¹ “Гражданите, за които българският език не е майчин, имат право наред със задължителното изучаване на българския език да изучават и ползват своя език.”

Sabranie na Republika Balgariya, 1971; BG Nauka, 2006). Consequently, the statement about the official language has remained in the Article 3 of the new 1991 Constitution (*Narodno Sabranie na Republika Balgariya*, 1991). Of course there were other related laws to implement Bulgarian as the official language of the state before 1990, and it did not mean that Bulgaria had no official language during the communism. However, it demonstrated that there was not any requirement or perceived threat to ensure constitutionally the official status of Bulgarian language. Democratisation in the post-communist Bulgaria meant a kind of more ‘fair’ redistribution of power, which was monopolised during communism by BKP. It was also clear that end of forced assimilation campaign and dissolution of the communist regime meant the Turkish and other minorities could take place in the new power redistribution together with other actors. In the last two decades of the communist regime Turks faced condemnations of being ‘Trojan Horse’ of other states, and not surprisingly, this led to increase of nationalistic and collective anxieties among Bulgarians towards Turks. One cannot expect that those anxieties would disappear or at least reduce rapidly; consequently, the integrity of Bulgaria became one of the key determinants of Bulgarian post-communist minority politics. Thus, putting a statement related to the official language and prohibition of ethnic parties could be highlighted as part of these anxieties, even though the 1991 Constitution had already stated the integrity of the state and prohibition of establishment of autonomous regions. One can see such a policy in reservations of Bulgaria in the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) in 1998, which Bulgaria stated that articles of the Framework Convention cannot be used against the integrity of Bulgaria, albeit FCPNM had already included such a statement.

Two of the important priorities of MRF were restoration of the Turkish names and teaching of Turkish language at public schools (for more information, see related sections below). Names were restored but study of Turkish had still had great difficulties. One of the main threats to its education policy came when Ilcho Dimitrov, who was one of the theorists of the forced assimilation campaign, took

the post of the Ministry of Education and Science. MRF strongly opposed to his appointment but could not succeed to prevent it.

Another important priority of MRF has been to improve economic backwardness of the Turkish regions, because economic instability of the restructuring period affected minorities much more than Bulgarian majority (Crampton, 2005: 223) and the party perceived it as a main barrier of social integration of the Turkish minority. Economic underdevelopment of Turks together with other minorities is still visible. For instance, unemployment rates among Turks in 2001 was circa 50,6 percent while it was 19,7 in country wide (World Bank, 2002; National Institute of Statistics of Bulgaria). Furthermore, in 2001, 21 percent of Turks live in poverty comparing to 5,6 percent of Bulgarians (World Bank, 2002: 15). In another research by UNDP (2000), municipalities that were in the lowest GDP ranking, were those with highest proportion of Turkish and Roma population.

MRF has been playing an important role in the Bulgarian political life and especially in minority related issues. It became to serve as a third political alternative among communist and anti-communist parties, and finally, became a coalition partner in the governments that were formed after 2001 and 2005 general elections. Consequently, during its administration, an action plan related to improvement of the educational situation of minorities was putted into force (BHC, 2002). However, it was also criticised by being too minimalist in its demands related to Turkish minority (Ragaru, 2001: 305, 316).

4.2. Linguistic Rights in the Post-Communist Period

With ratification of the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM) by the Bulgarian Parliament in 1998, question of minorities gained a new momentum. Even though the Bulgarian Constitution does not recognise the term 'national minority' and most of the regulations of the FCPNM are not implemented properly while only small percentage of the Turks considered

themselves as familiar to the FCPNM, the Framework Convention open a new arena to raise and defend linguistic rights issue in Bulgaria (Inter Ethnic Initiative for Human Rights Foundation (IEIHRF), 2003). In order to escape from more systematic linguistic rights provisions, Bulgaria is still not eager to sign and ratify the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML); even then they are also blurred in the ECRML as in the FCPNM.

4.2.1. Study of/ in Turkish

In the post-communist period, most of the discussions related to the minorities and especially which were about Turks, have being continuously done under the Turkish education theme. Because, education ‘in’ or ‘of’⁵² mother tongue or minority language was one of the superficial linguistic rights that are visible both for minority and majority members. According to the article 36 (2) of the new constitution, everyone has a right to study his/ her mother tongue when it is different from Bulgarian.

As a part of the restoration of *vazroditlen protses*, on February 1991, ministry of education exposed its decision to implement teaching of Turkish language four hours per week in areas where Turks densely live. This was resulted in strikes of Bulgarian teachers and protests of parents of Bulgarian pupils, who were in opposition to this implementation (Crampton, 2005: 217).

In preliminary discussions of the implementation, study of Turkish language had thought to be putted into practice out of the official educational institutions, namely in courses out of public schools. However, MRF strongly opposed to this idea on the ground that would lead discrimination when graduates of those courses would

⁵² By ‘education in mother tongue/ minority language’ I refer to study in educational institutions where medium of instruction is in minority language, and by ‘education of mother tongue/ minority language’ I refer teaching and studying minority language in educational institutions where the medium of instruction is in majority/ official language.

enter to higher educational institutions and apply to jobs (Mehmed N., 1991 as cited in Özgür, 1999: 189).

As a result of the nationalistic backlashes in southern and north-eastern regions, the government delayed the implementation to study of Turkish as facultative course and it could be started in the spring term of 1992 only after counter demonstrations and boycotts of the Turkish pupils against the postponement took place (Özgür, 1999: 189).

From 1992 until 1999⁵³ the Turkish minority pupils could study their vernacular as a facultative subject out of regular school hours in municipal schools, in which expenses and textbooks were supplied by the budgets of these municipalities. If students were under eighteen their parents had to sign petitions in which they should express their willingness that their children could take a Turkish language course. Additionally, there had to be at least thirteen pupils, and later since September 1999, there have to be a least eight pupils in order to introduce a Turkish language course (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee - BHC, 1999 and 2003b; Yenisoy – Süleymanoğlu, 1999: 160 – 161).

Educational materials of Turkish language courses tried to be supplied also by the assistances of the Turkish Ministry of Education. Turkey sent 270 000 textbooks in 1992, 305 000 in 1995, 120 000 in 1996 and 10 000 in 1997 to the Bulgarian Ministry of Sciences and Education in order to solve shortage of educational materials of the Turkish language courses (Özgür, 1999: 190; Süleymanoğlu-Yenisoy, 1999: 164).

However, those textbooks were outdated and due to continuous usage, they were physically damaged. As a result of deficiency of textbooks and having not an

⁵³ The Law on National Education of 1991 - amended in 1996, Decree No. 232 of the Council of Ministers from 5 September 1991, Article 20 of the Ordinance of the Ministry of Science and Education from 30 May 1994, Decree No. 183 of the Council of Ministers from 5 September 1994 and Article 4 of the Instruction No. 4/27 October 1994, which amended on 8 June 1998.

adequate amount of photocopy machines in municipal schools, pupils have to share these textbooks with each other (Mehmed F., 2004). Only in 2001 and 2002⁵⁴, two new textbooks for first to fourth grades were published (The Council of Europe, 2006a). Consequently, Turkish language teachers try to solve deficiency of educational materials by using Turkish youth and child magazines, such as *Filiz* and *Balon* (IEIHRF, 2003). There were also initiatives of Turkey via NGOs of immigrants from Bulgaria but they were far to reach the whole schools and solve the problems in depth (*Olay*-Newspaper, 22 February 2006).

Nevertheless, the facultative status of the Turkish language courses emerged and continuously emerges important problems. Firstly, those courses were organised out of the general school hours which means pupils those wished to study Turkish had to stay at schools after the completion of other core or main courses. If one considers the general student psychological behaviour, it can be expected that these pupils would begin to be exhausted of studying Turkish after long-hour study of other subjects. Therefore, increasing number of students lost their willingness to participate in Turkish language courses. Furthermore, the Turkish minority mostly lives in rural areas and due to low population growth and financial excuses, schools were closed down (*Standart* – newspaper, 23 July 2006). Thus, important numbers of students do not have a chance to study in schools in villages where they live, and they have to go to nearest school to continue their education. Consequently, attending facultative Turkish language courses, after general school hours, became difficult and undesirable for them, especially in winter times when sunsets were early (Mehmed F., 2004). Since gaining a obligatory selective course status, Turkish language courses begun to be introduced in some municipalities within the common educational course hours.

⁵⁴ Mehmed F. and Shyukrieva M. (2001) *A Practical Grammar in Turkish and Tests for the 1st – 4th Grade*, Sofia: Mandira Publishing House.

Metova G. and Mehmet H. (2002) *I write and read in Turkish for the first grade*, Sofia: Mandira Publishing House.

Secondly, marks obtained from facultative Turkish language courses are not considered during calculation of their GPAs, and as a result, students do not have a willingness to get higher marks in these courses, which decreased the efficiency of these courses. Some of them, not surprisingly, perceive these courses as free hours.

Thirdly, if a student chose to study his/ her vernacular language, he/ she cannot not take other foreign language courses, such as English, French and German, which are perceived as more necessary languages than Turkish for their further academic and occupational careers. It meant that Turkish language courses had to compete as a foreign language with other western languages (Süleymanoğlu-Yenisoy, 1999: 162).

Last but not least, there is a covert, in some cases even open, propaganda towards Turkish parents which states that study of Turkish would reduce the quality of Bulgarian knowledge of pupils and this would diminish their possibilities to enter universities. This is because more parents became reluctant to let their children to study Turkish language (IEIHRF, 2003; BHC, 2003b, Mehmed F., 2004).

Nonetheless, it is obvious that Turkish pupils and even their parents, especially in regions where Turks densely live, have insufficient command in Bulgarian. Recent studies showed that important numbers of Turks are illiterate in Bulgarian (*BG-Türk Haber Ajansı*, 16 January 2006), because they can learn neither Turkish nor Bulgarian completely. For instance, formally, kindergartens operate in Bulgarian; however, most of the Turkish pupils come to kindergartens without any knowledge of Bulgarian, and they have to learn Bulgarian before improving their skills in their mother tongue. Therefore, this inefficiently managed bilingualism functions as an obstacle to learn both Bulgarian and Turkish languages (Kyuchukov, 1997: 147 – 154; IEIHRF, 2003). Knowing Turkish does not mean that they are literate in Turkish, and one should be literate in his/ her mother tongue in order to learn and improve the second language. Because, it is commonly agreed that children with adequate knowledge and literacy in their mother tongues can better and more

sufficiently learn a second language (Mehmed F., 2004). According to BHC, it could be solved with bilingual education by the instruction of, at least, some other subjects in Turkish. Nevertheless, there is not any intention from Bulgarian authorities to introduce, at least, such a bilingual education (2003b).

Another problem is the shortage of qualified Turkish language teachers, because most of them were teachers of other subjects, and after completion of short-term courses organised by the ministry, they obtain a right to teach Turkish language courses. However, it is questionable whether these courses are sufficient to teach Turkish. Since 2003, having a Turkish pedagogical higher institution degree became compulsory, and according to bilateral agreements with Turkey, some Turkish language teachers also are trained in Turkey in summer training programmes in order to increase the quality and capacity of the Turkish language teachers and Turkish language education (IEIHRF, 2003; Mehmed F. 2004; Süleymanoğlu-Yenisoy, 1999: 165).

In order to meet the need of Turkish language teachers with pedagogical background, two departments at the university of *Şumnu* (Shumen) and in *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali) as a part of the University of *Filibe* (Plovdiv) were opened (BHC, 1999). Moreover, current problem is that those Turkish teachers with pedagogical background, like other teachers, have to fulfil minimum 21 teaching hours in order to receive full-time salaries. Decreasing number of Turkish language courses prevents them to reach this requirement. Moreover, these pedagogical programmes merged with other linguistic programmes, such as Turkish and Russian philology or Turkish and Bulgarian philology, in order to enable Turkish teachers to teach these additional subjects and to complete minimum teaching-hour requirements. However, graduates of these institutes or departments face an unemployment problem because of insufficient recruitment Turkish language teachers caused by the drop of demands. They have to look for working in areas out of their real specialisation. Additionally, those institutions located in hearts of the Turkish minority populated areas, and this made them attractive to Turkish students, who

want to stay close to their neighbourhoods due to low financial expenditures. Furthermore, those institutions serve such a 'secure place' to Turkish students, whose Bulgarian is not enough to pass the entrance exams of other departments or whose GPAs are not sufficient enough to apply to other departments. Hence, those institutes slightly become to serve as places to be obtained a higher education diploma rather than training Turkish teachers for Turkish language courses (IEIHRF, 2003). This situation can be underlined as a demonstration of the need for opening different university programmes operating in Turkish in order to prevent Turks to be locked in studying philology as their only chance to get university diploma.

Another major problem is lack of general curriculum for Turkish language courses. Only on April 2004, the ministry prepared a common curriculum but only for first to fourth grades. For other grades, every teacher of the course is responsible to prepare his/ her own curriculum (Mehmed F., 2004). In July 1999 with the new Law on Educational Degree, Educational Minimum and Educational Plan was adopted, and amended in 2002. By this law Turkish language courses became obligatory facultative which means that Turkish language courses will be added to GPA calculation and they will be organised within ordinary school hours. The law made possible also the instruction of Turkish language courses in high schools (IEIHRF, 2003). However, only students who wish to pursue a higher educational degree in Turkish Philology tend to choose Turkish language courses in high schools. Because, there is a quota for facultative courses, and students generally prefer to take other courses, which are considered more supplementary for their future educational degrees (Mehmed F., 2004).

According to former chief inspector of the Turkish Language Courses, Kazım Memiş, there were 92 166 petitions signed by Turkish parents in 1993, in which parents indicated their willingness of participation of their children in Turkish language courses. However, the ministry could not opened Turkish language courses for about 17 000 pupils among 92 166. This was explained due to lack of

qualified teachers and of Turkish language textbooks (cited in Özgür, 1999: 190). This means circa 75 000 pupils studied Turkish language in 1993. Even then Turkish pupils and their families showed their interest in Turkish language courses in the first years of the introduction of Turkish language courses, their interest began dramatically to drop over time. The number of pupils decreased to 55 041 in 1995 and to circa 40 000 in 1998 (UNHCHR, 1996; BHC, 1999). As it could be seen in Table 4.1., the new Educational Law promulgated in 1999 and amended in 2002, in which Turkish language courses began obligatory selective, could not and cannot stop the continuous and dramatic decline of the number of students who take Turkish language courses, the number of Turkish language teachers, the number of schools and the number of municipalities where Turkish language courses are introduced.

**Table 4.1: Number of Students, Teachers, Schools and Municipalities
in Turkish Language Education between 1999 and 2005**

	1999 -2000	2000 -2001	2002 -2003	2004 -2005
Number of Students	37 437	34 860	31 349	27 751
Number of Teachers	434	703	588	399
Number of Municipalities	21	20	20	?
Number of Schools	689	520	420	536

Source: BHC, 2003c; Pravitelstven Byuletin, 2000; The Council of Europe, 2006a

There is no single secular Turkish minority school in Bulgaria where medium of instruction is Turkish. However, there are three religious high schools in *Şumnu* (Shumen), *Rusçuk* (Ruse) and *Mestanlı* (Momchilgrad), one higher Islam Institute in Sofia and two private high schools, *Druzhiba* (Peace) and Balkan College, in Sofia, in which medium of instructions are Bulgarian, and Turkish is studied as a second foreign language, not the first. Even then there is not a legal prohibition, and there are also some other foreign schools in the country, opening a secular Turkish minority school with a Turkish medium of instruction of at least some subjects, is still a nationalistic stigma in Bulgaria (BHC, 1999). There is also not any higher

educational programme, other than philology, in which medium of instruction is Turkish. Demand about state funded Turkish university is very marginal, and it came into public discussion mainly with Menderes Küngün's ten-demand in 2006. However, MRF rejected or at least not supported the idea of opening a Turkish university in Bulgaria (Ilcheva, 2005: 6; *Standart* – newspaper, 22 February 2006; *BG-Türk Haber Ajansı*, 19 February 2006) Additionally, education of Islam as course of religion also began to be instructed in the country since 2002 in limited number of schools but again in Bulgarian language (BHC, 2003b).

Above all, minorities, especially Muslim ones, in Bulgaria are very vulnerable in educational opportunities due to their high-level drop out rates from schools and low literacy rates compare to Bulgarians. As it can be seen from the Table 4.2., Turks and Roma are in the bottom of educational pyramid, in which 8,6 percent of Turks have no education, 61 percent of them have only basic education and only 3 percent of Turks compare to 20 percent of Bulgarians have university degrees.

**Table 4.2: Highest Level of Education Attained, 2001
(% of population 15 and above)**

Ethnicity	No education	Basic	Secondary General	Secondary Technical	Secondary Vocational	University
Bulgarians	6,4	28,1	18,9	19	7,5	20,1
Turks	8,6	61	13,8	6,4	7,2	3
Roma	13,3	76,4	5,1	2,1	2,8	0,2

Source: BIHS, 2001 as cited in World Bank, 2002: 106.

4.2.2. Turkish Minority Media

In post-1989 period, Turkish minority with other minority media began to awake and several media organs published. However, most of them could not be long-lived. In this period, the general policy of the government toward the Turkish minority media is tolerant. Freedom of expression is stated in Article 39 (1) of the

1991 Constitution and in 1996 Constitutional Court interpreted “there are no constitutional limitations”⁵⁵ to publication in mother tongue (BHC, 2003b).

There is a need for Turkish minority media because Bulgarian mass media usually does not contribute the multicultural improvement of the country; in contrast it even accelerates xenophobic prejudices towards minorities, mostly towards Roma but towards Turks, as well (BHC, 2003b).

In the age of communication, the importance of the media among the Turkish minority is vital, and MRF saw that importance in the area of politics by publishing *Haklar ve Özgürlükler* (Rights and Freedoms) newspaper between December 1990 and 1998. After 1998, the newspaper continued to be published by Institute for Integrations Studies but in Bulgarian language. Finally, its Bulgarian version also ceased its publication in 2001 (BHC, 1999, 2003b and 2003c).

There were also some other Turkish minority print media in Turkish, which could be divided as newspapers, magazines and children/ youth magazines. Nevertheless, most of them were weekly and monthly publications. Some of them were: *Filiz* a monthly children magazine, which was published from 1992 until 1996 by MRF and since 1996 independently. *Gönül*, a monthly educational and cultural magazine. *Kaynak*, monthly magazine of Turkish Cultural Centre which is being published since 1999. *Deliorman*, a quarterly magazine. *Sabah*, a weekly magazine. *Müslümanlar*, an organ of the Chief Mufti which is published since 1990. *Işık* (Light), successor of the former communist weekly newspaper *Yeni Işık* (New Light), which was published between 1990 and 1992. *Çırçır*, bilingual – Turkish and Bulgarian – newspaper, published between 1992 and 1996. *Güven*, bilingual weekly newspaper which is published between 1992 and 1996. *Balon*, monthly children magazine, which has being published since 1994. *Umut*, monthly publication of the Balkan Foundation for Education and Culture (BHC 1999b and

⁵⁵ In spite of a guaranteeing statement of the publication of minority media, the court preferred to state that there is “no constitutional limitations”.

2003c). *Rodoplar*, a weekly newspaper, which has been circulated in Southern regions since 2006. There is also weekly newspaper *Zaman* published by daily *Zaman* of Turkey.

According to BHC study in 2000, the populous minorities, Turks, Pomaks and Roma, are the less organised in publication and broadcasting of their media. Although there were some governmental aid⁵⁶ via NCEDI, one of the main problems of the Turkish minority media is lack of financial resources, which is mainly supplied by NGOs and donations of the Turkish community living in Bulgaria or Turkey. Insufficient financial resources prevent usage of modern printing equipments and hiring professional staff and editors. Consequently, most of the Turkish minority media is prepared in voluntary basis by some Turkish intellectuals. It should be noted that during the exile of Turks in 1989, most of the Turkish intelligentsia fled to Turkey and did not choose to return. Hence, it affected the Turkish minority press as well as other spheres of life (BHC, 2003b; Valentovitch, 2001: 6 – 9). Key issues in the Turkish minority media are racism, xenophobia and ethnically motivated violence by having 22 percent share among other themes (Open Society Institute – OSI, 2002).

In electronic media, there is no private TV and radio station in Bulgaria, which broadcast in Turkish. In November 2000, Bulgarian National Television (BNT) began to broadcast daily ten-minute information programme in Turkish, between 17:10 and 17:20 (BHC, 2001). However, this is purely symbolic either in its length or its broadcasting time. Even though the Turkish minority does not satisfy with it (National Council for Radio and Television, 2001 as cited in IEIHRF, 2003), its symbolic meaning became vital especially after fascist coalition *Ataka* (Attack) and its leader Volen Siderov's demands to cease its broadcasting. There are some Turkish programmes in local and cable TVs, i.e. *Ludogorie TV*, and *TV-7 Dni*, in the regions inhabited mainly by Turks (BHC, 2003b; *Kırcaali Haber*, 11 April

⁵⁶ 4 000 BGN = 2 000 Euro for each.

2007). Nevertheless, most of the Turks prefer to watch TV channels of Turkey which are broadcast via satellite dishes (Valentinovitch, 2001: 10). If there is plan to set up a regional or country wide Turkish TV channel in Bulgaria, it can only compete with TVs of Turkey by focusing on the national and regional issues of the minority and the country.

Additionally, Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) is broadcast three times per a day a half-hour Turkish informational, cultural and music programmes in regions where Turks densely live. However, it fails to cover other regions where there is also a significant number of Turkish population. Furthermore, private radio station, *Darik Radyo*, prepares a programme in Turkish but broadcasting only in *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali) region (IEIHRF, 2003; BHC; 2003b).

Moreover, developments in the internet based media have being affecting the Turkish minority, as well. Most of the Turks live in rural areas where internet connection began to be newly supplied, which means they cannot have an access to these internet media. Additionally, there is few well-organised internet based Turkish minority media⁵⁷ that broadcast in Bulgaria. Internet media, thanks to its low financial requirements, would serve as an informational channel for the minority in the future.

4.2.3. Right to Use Turkish Minority Personal Names

Names of the Turkish minority were one of the key targets of *vazroditelen protses*, which were changed forcefully to Bulgarian ones during the name-change campaign between 1984 and 1985. Names are key visible indicators of their ethnic identity and their presence in the country, and not surprisingly forced name-changes

⁵⁷ For instance, *Kırcaali Haber* (Kırcaali News) on www.kircaalihaber.com, *Bulgar – Türk Haber Ajansı* (Bulgarian Turkish News Agency) on www.bg-turk.com and *Bulgaristan Haber* (Bulgaria News) on www.bajansi.com.

received much more reaction from the minority than other forced assimilation instruments of the totalitarian regime.

Mass demonstrations of Turks on May 1989 were in favour to regain their rights, and mainly their Turkish names. Hence, in the first years of the post-communist period one of the main priorities of Turks was the restoration of their forcefully changed names. On December 1989, first decision on the issue was done by the Communist Party itself. Hence, judicial procedure of restoration began with the Names of Bulgarian Nationals Act in 5 March 1990 which was amended in November 1990. People who wish to 're-change' their names had to fill petitions and send them to the municipal authorities. The procedure was quite simple but names of those who dead could not be changed by their legal successors. The law set three-year time limit to end restorations, and within three years, almost 600 000 people applied to restore their names but only circa 377 000 of them could do it (BHC, 1999 and 2003c).

By the end of the time limit of the law, people who want to re-change their names had to go to a court which meant more bureaucratic and longer procedures (BHC, 1999). These long procedures mainly affected immigrants from Bulgaria in Turkey. Because, exiled immigrants of 1989 are still Bulgarian citizens by law⁵⁸ and they obtained a right to hold both Turkish and Bulgarian citizenships. However, caused by those long-lasting procedures they could not restore their names, and had to use their Bulgarised names in their newly issued ID cards and passports. Additionally the minority have obtained a right to not use Bulgarian "-ov" and "-ova" suffixes in their surnames.

Nowadays, one can restore his/ her name in notary and without going to court. Nonetheless, the restoration of Turkish names seems problematic on the virtue of

⁵⁸ They are Bulgarian citizens because they did not lose their citizenship status when they immigrated to Turkey. It was a part of the Bulgarian policy in which totalitarian regime propagandized the exile as a 'big excursion' in order to show it was voluntary rather than forced immigration. Hence, they exiled without losing their Bulgarian citizenships.

‘the legalisation of the forced name-changes of *vazroditelen protses*’. During the forced name-change campaign, the Turkish minority members urged to sign petitions, which were prepared by the authorities, to change his/ her Turkish name to Bulgarian one. This was made in order to prove that the campaign was on voluntary basis. Therefore, restoration should be done within registers and without any procedural process if *vazroditlen protses* is accepted as an ‘illegal’ or ‘inhumane’ implementation. Although all registers and copies of original and forcefully changed names exist, there is not any will of the authorities to automatically restore names of Turkish minority or annulled the forced name-changes. Furthermore, there have been problems related to their orthographical writings. Their names are in Turkish but have being registered and written in Cyrillic scripts that do not only cause misspellings but also corrode their meanings. However, there is no special provision in the law to ensure correct spellings of Turkish names⁵⁹ (*Sofya Sayfası*, 17 March 2006).

One should note that names still serve as main ethnic indicators in Bulgaria, which cause *de facto* discrimination in the employment, education and in other spheres. There were continuous complains, even most of them remain under surface, from the Turkish and Pomak minorities about discrimination based on their names. Public or private authorities may covertly demand that if they want to get the job or to go to better schools or to get better grades, they should change their ‘Turkish’ names with Bulgarian ones. In order to connote the seriousness of the situation, one example can be given from *Lofça* (Lovech), where the court issued 173 applications to change Turkish names to Bulgarian ones in April 2000 (IEIHRF, 2003; BHC, 2001 and 2002).

⁵⁹ Bulgarian ID cards and passports contain also English transliteration in which names of the citizens of Bulgaria are written in Latin scripts. However, even there Turkish names were not written according to their original Turkish spellings.

4.2.4. Right to Use Turkish in Administrative and Judiciary Bodies

In the post-communist period, the Turkish minority began to be represented in either *Sabranie* or local governmental bodies by its two important political parties, MRF and NMRF. MRF is coalition partner since 2001 and has one district mayor, in *Kircaali* (Kardzhali), 27 municipal and 650 village mayors and more than 1 000 municipal counsellors (BHC, 2003b). Moreover, recent study shows that still circa 63 percent of Bulgarians do not want to be governed by a Turkish and/ or Romani mayor, which came into surface in 2005 with nationalistic demonstrations in several cities against appointments of Turkish governors to Burgaz and Varna (*Kircaali Haber*, 31 May 2006; BHC, 2006).

Representation of the Turkish minority in local governments does not reflect to their representation in local authorities, i.e. municipal and district authorities and law enforcement institutions. There are great differences between shares of Turkish population and their representation in local governments. For instance, even though Turks constitute 30 percents of the whole population in *Şumnu* (Shumen), Turks are represented only in three of total 32 district administration posts (9 percent). In *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) district Turks constitute 47 percent of the whole district population; however there are only 9 persons of total 37 persons working in the district administration are Turks (24 percent), and only 9 persons are Turks in total 98 municipal personnel (9 percent). The situation is not different in *Kircaali* (Kardzhali) district, where Turks constitute 61 percent of the regions population. Moreover, only 9 personnel out of a total of 39 are Turks which represents 23 percent (BHC 2003b and 2003c).

Representation of the Turkish minority in law-enforcement institutions is below from acceptable percentages, as well. In *Şumnu* (Shumen) district there are circa 400 people working in police department, and only 33 of them (8 percent) are Turks. In the District Court of *Şumnu* (Shumen) among total 40 staff, there is only one Turk, who is working as investigator. In the police department of *Hezargrad*

(Razgrad) district, Turkish staffs constitute only about 8 or 10⁶⁰ percent of the whole staff numbers. Moreover, there are only one Turkish Prosecutor and one lawyer who are working in the district court. In *Kircaali* (Kardzhali) district, the situation is relatively better but still not in acceptable lines. Head of the Police Department is a Turk and there are 53 Turkish staffs, which constitute the 13 percent, where Turks constitute 61 percent of the region. Moreover, Turkish officials in law-enforcement institutions do not occupy high positions (BHC, 2003b and 2003c; IEIHRF, 2003).

In local administration bodies, the medium of communication is officially in Bulgarian. There is not any legal implementation to guarantee the usage of Turkish; however, in local administration bodies in places where Turks densely live, authorities or staff who can speak Turkish, act as *ad hoc* interpreters if someone cannot speak Bulgarian. Additionally, all written communications are being done in Bulgarian only (IEIHR, 2003). The Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the FCPNM (2006) called Bulgaria's attention on this issue but Bulgaria rejected the idea that the Framework Convention imposes or includes any obligatory requirements about to usage of minority languages in local authorities. It was also one of the reasons of the delay of ratification of the Framework Convention by Bulgaria (IEIHR, 2003) and not signing the ECRML.

In judiciary process, the situation of using Turkish is more critical and vital. Because, according to researches, during preliminary investigations and trials most of the Turks do not have an access to free interpreters, even though it is guaranteed by laws⁶¹. The Turkish minority does not have any or at least sufficient information about its rights to use free of charge interpreter. Additionally, there are no initiatives to inform them about this right. Furthermore, speaking Turkish in

⁶⁰ *Hezargrad* (Razgrad)'s numbers are estimated because the Police Department of the district refused to give exact numbers on the ground that they do not collect ethnic statistics related to their staff. However, only the *Kircaali* (Kardzhali) Police Department, whose head is a Turk, gave those numbers (BHC, 2003b and 2003c).

⁶¹ Article 18 (1) of the Instruction No. 1 -167 of the Ministry of Interior.

preliminary investigations and trials is perceived as an attitude which would lead to make an unwanted impression; therefore, the minorities opt to speak and defend themselves in Bulgarian, even their commands in Bulgarian are really insufficient. Two of the reasons of lack of interpreters are: lack of financial opportunities and Bulgaria's insufficiently working judiciary system (BHC, 2003a, 2003b and 2003c).

Another serious problem was lack of free legal assistance, although the Code of Criminal Procedure provides this opportunity. By 1999, 58 percent of Turks did not have a lawyer in preliminary investigation and 48 percent of them did not have a lawyer during their trials (BHC, 1999). According to study of BHC, being Bulgarian increases the possibility to have a lawyer in preliminary investigation and trial (Kanev, 2003: 88). Since the approval of the new Criminal Procedure Code in 2005, the situation began to improve (BHC, 2006).

Nonetheless, Article 33 of the Law on the Execution of Penalties stated that visits in the prisons have to be conducted in Bulgarian language and if one cannot speak Bulgarian, he/ she can request an interpreter, whose charge will be paid by the prisoner. If prisoners or visitors do not obey this rule, the administration of the prison has a right to terminate the visit. It is a fact that Turks and other minorities, especially Roma, are overrepresented in prisons and this regulation negatively affects the number of visits for Turkish and Roma prisoners (The International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights – IHF, 2005: 43). This is because mostly they do not have sufficient money to hire an interpreter, even though in some cases the authorities of prisons condone speaking in Turkish or Romani languages.

4.2.5. Right to Use Turkish in Topographical and Other Places Names

Giving Turkish names to the topographical and other places, i.e. streets, urban districts, villages etc., is still a nationalistic stigma in Bulgaria (BHC, 2003b). According to the Article 11 of the FCPNM, in which Bulgaria is one of the signatory states, national minorities have a right to display topographical and other

place names in their minority language where they densely live and if there is a demand to do so. However, the Bulgarian authorities strongly opposed that there is an obligation in the mentioned article of the FCPNM. It should be noted that, the Article 11 was also one of the reasons to justify refusal of signing the FCPNM in the first half-decade of 1990s (BHC, 1996).

Even in the municipalities where Turks constitute majority, Bulgarian authorities rejected and annulled decisions to renaming place names which were approved by the local municipal councils. For instance, decisions of municipal councils of *Mestanlı* (Momchilgrad) in 1993 and 1996, *Hotan* (Fotinovo) in 1994 and Mineralni Bani of *Hasköy* (Haskovo) in 1995 were annulled by district governors. The only exceptional case took held in *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali) where one street renamed as Ömer Lütfü whose name was also given to a Turkish cultural centre in the same city (BHC, 1995, 1996 and 1999). However, giving personal names is tolerated with relatively small nationalistic reactions. For instance, there are also Turkish names given to cultural centres, i.e. Nazım Hikmet and Kadriye Latifova Turkish theatres in *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) and *Kırcaali* (Kardzhali).

These naming decisions were annulled according to the Decree No. 1315 promulgated in 1975, which states:

The names must reflect the wealth and beauty of the Bulgarian language, to be sonorous, understandable, easy to pronounce and short, to promote a feeling of dignity and pride in the builders of the advanced ‘socialist society’⁶² (BHC, 1999).

Although the decree is outdated and there is a decision of the Constitutional Court in 1998⁶³ which stated that the FCPNM and its Article 11, as well, does not run

⁶² Even though most of the laws from communist regime were changed, as it could be seen from the quotation ‘socialist society’ in the decree, the mentioned decree is still in force and used widely to prevent decisions to use Turkish place names.

⁶³ For more information about the decisions, see <http://dev.eurac.edu:8085/mugs2/do/blob.html?type=html&serial=1049465501449>

counter to the Constitution, the Bulgarian authorities continue their oppositions and obstructions to use of Turkish toponyms (The Council of Europe, 2006b: para. 83). Hence, Turkish, even in the municipalities where Turks constitute almost the absolute majority does not exist in place names.

Furthermore, a study of Kanev in 1994 shows that 84 percent of Bulgarians were opposed to usage of signs in minority languages. However, more interestingly, 31 percent of Turks were opposed it, as well (cited in Özgür, 1999: 259). It could be explained by fears among minority that this action would instable the economy and increase political crises.

As a conclusion of this chapter, the Bulgarian laws repeated in more than 100 laws, decrees, ordinances, regulations and binding court decisions that the Bulgarian language is compulsory (OSI, 2002) . Hence, one can argue that it indicates the fear of Bulgarian authorities from minority languages. Nonetheless, contemporary rising fascist or as the Bulgarian media and literature prefer to use ‘ultra nationalistic’ waves⁶⁴ began to threat and open into discussion post-communist improvements on the linguistic rights of the Turkish minority. Furthermore, myth of ‘peaceful Bulgarian ethnic model’ is failed and its continuous mystification still coverts the urgent issues related to the linguistic rights of the Turkish minority. Finally, Bulgaria’s EU membership in the beginning of 2007 has not solved linguistic rights related problems of Turks; however, the Turkish minority and especially its political representatives still continue to hope.

⁶⁴ In the last presidential elections in 2006, Volen Siderov the leader of fascist *Ataka* (Attack) Coalition took 24 percent of the total votes.

CHAPTER 5

LANGUAGE, LINGUISTIC RIGHTS AND MULTICULTURALISM

“The power of the language is not to exclude,
but rather to include the alien ones.”
Goethe

The Study of language has attracted the attention of many important figures from different disciplines in social science, such as Saussure, Sapir, Austin, Wittgenstein, Whorf, Derrida and Bourdieu. Paying attention to the development of linguistics and referring to all of these authors are out of the scope of this chapter. The main objective of this chapter is to evaluate the relation between language and power and also discuss the relevance of the language for ethnicity and nation-building. Later in this chapter, I will focus on the issue of linguistic rights, and its accommodation via multiculturalist theory.

5.1. Language and Power

Language, according to Bruner, is “a systematic way of communicating to others, of affecting their and our own behaviour, of sharing attention, and of constituting realities to which we then adhere just as we adhere to the ‘facts’ of nature” (1983: 119 – 20). Furthermore, Sapir, with a sociolinguistic perspective, defines it as “... a historical heritage of the group, the product of long-continued social usage. ... [Therefore, it] is non-instinctive, acquired, cultural function” (1921: 2). Although language is one of the key transporters of the ethnolinguistic heritage to the next generations⁶⁵ (Bloomer, 2005: 6; Dorian, 1999: 31; Edwards, 2004: 26), it is neither solely a medium of communication nor only a cultural transmitter. It includes power relations in terms of symbolic and real power possession.

⁶⁵ Some authors also argue that the content of the language, i.e. its vocabulary and pronunciation, is more important for transmission of culture rather than the language itself (Dorian, 1999: 34).

Non-institutionalised bilingualism, where there is an official language(s) or standard code(s), generates *diglossia*, in which there are high status language(s) (H), which associated with high prestige and respect over low status one(s) (L). In *diglossia* H operates as an official language or as an official dialect (standardised code) and L as a minority language or as a local dialect. For example, German in Germany as H and Swiss-German as L, French as H and Bask language as L, and Dutch in the Netherlands as H and Frisian as L (Ferguson, 1959; Fishman, 1967). According to Fasold, *diglossia* does not emerge only between dialects but also between different languages (cited in Millar, 2005: 6), which made possible to use this theory on minority – majority languages interactions, such as in my case. According to this model, Turkish language in Bulgaria experiences double or extended *diglossia*. Firstly, Turkish (L) against Bulgarian (H) and secondly, Northern and Southern Bulgaria's Turkish dialects (L) against official Turkish (Istanbul) dialect (H) of Turkey.

There is domination and subordination relationship between H and L, and speakers of L are deprived to access to symbolic power, which associated with H. However, *diglossia* theory has been criticised by reason of missing this point and focusing on norms rather than power. Therefore, some researchers, such as Gal (1979), tend to re-define *diglossic* relations with a more developed more comprehensive approach to cover power imposition and its reproduction via institutional structures of the state (Martin-Jones, 1989: 109, 113, 118 – 119). According to Eckert, *diglossia* does not arise; on the contrary, it is imposed in the form of an administrative, ritual or standard language, and this makes it necessary for accessing power and upward mobility (cited in Martin-Jones, 1989: 120).

Bilingualism is not a new phenomenon, on the contrary it has existed since ancient times, for instance, Sumerian-Acadian Empire was bilingual (Paulston, 1998: 2). Bilingualism may be justified in terms of religious and scientific reasons, as well. Related to this, bilingualism can be divided into two categories, elitist bilingualism

and folk bilingualism. According to Anderson, in elitist bilingualism, “reading class”, a class which has an economic, social and political access to educational and scientific institutions, may prefer to use a language in scientific and literary activities different from their vernacular⁶⁶. For instance, Latin since the Roman Empire in Western Europe and Greek since the East Roman Empire in Eastern Europe were *lingua franca* of science and literature. Furthermore, the rationale behind the choice of elite languages could also be based on religion, i.e. Latin for Catholic Christianity, Greek for Orthodox Christianity and Arabic for Islamic World served as languages of religious activities and texts. Hence, by speaking of language of religion, science and literature, “reading class” could sustain its hegemony (Bloomer, 2005: 246 – 255; Anderson, 1991: 70, 76, 78; Edwards, 2004: 16; Paulston, 1998: 2).

In folk bilingualism, in contrast, ethnolinguistic minorities have found themselves in a territory where their vernacular is not recognised as a medium of communication. Usage of their vernacular is restricted to private use in certain territorial areas. Furthermore, minority language can be represented in social and economic sphere unofficially (Edwards, 2004: 26 – 27). Furthermore, subordination of minority tongue, which decreases its prestige, makes its transgeneration difficult. Minorities would face to make linguistic shifts in order to pass the linguistic borders, which were erected by holders of symbolic power (Paulston, 1998: 2).

The post-structuralist approach and mainly Bourdieu’s theory, which is relevant to explain the situation of Turks in Bulgaria, challenges the suppositions of *diglossia* theory by accepting the importance of socio-historically shaped partiality, contestability, instability, and mutability of ways in which linguistic ideologies and identities are connected to power and political structures in linguistic communities (Pavlenko and Blackledge, 2004: 10). In essence, according to Bourdieu, language

⁶⁶ Etymon of “vernacular” comes from the Latin word *verna*, which means “home-born slave, a child of free father and servile mother”. That would give an idea about the superiority of Latin and inferiority of Italian as a vernacular (Bloomer. 2005: 8).

represents, manifests and symbolises the authority. In the linguistic market or context, linguistic expressions are produced in the linguistic market⁶⁷ where they are valued and devalued in terms of their linguistic capital acquisition. We have to note also that linguistic market is not fully dominated by the dominant language; and therefore, it gives a chance to dominated linguistic speaker to participate in local linguistic markets and to gain linguistic profit (Bourdieu, 2005: 66, 71, 109).

Additionally, Bourdieu's symbolic capital is not solely 'symbolic' but it is that "the various species of capital, economic, cultural and social capital, assume when they are perceived and recognized as legitimate by the actors in a certain field" or social space (Lines, 2003: 32). Additionally, symbolic power is not a specific type of power, as Thompson states, based on Bourdieu's writings, but "rather to aspect of most forms of power as they routinely deployed in social life." In daily life "power is seldom exercised as overt physical force: instead, it is transmuted into a symbolic form, and thereby endowed with a kind of *legitimacy* that it would not otherwise have" (Thompson, 2005: 23). Thompson adds that:

"For different speakers posses different quantities of 'linguistic capital' – that is the capacity to produce expressions *à propos*, for a particular market... [T]he distribution of linguistic capital is related in specific ways to the distribution of other forms of capital (economic capital, cultural capital, etc.) which define the location of an individual within the social space... The more linguistic capital that speakers posses, the more they are able to exploit the system of differences to their advantage... (Thompson, 2005: 18)

From Bourdieu's perspective, the official language can be considered as a 'linguistic capital' which gives its users a 'symbolic power'. Official language is also a precondition for symbolic domination of the market. It imposes itself as the only legitimate language and reproduces its legitimacy mainly via family and education channels. It is dominant because dominated language speakers believe, generally unconsciously, that it is so. "Speakers lacking the legitimate competence

⁶⁷ For Bourdieu, market is not simply a place but rather a metaphor where figurative interactions take place (Myers-Scotton, 2006: 114).

are *de facto* excluded from the social domains in which the competence is required, or are condemned to silence” or “self-censorship” (Bourdieu, 2005: 45 – 62, 138, 192).

Consequently, as a leading actor in construction, legitimisation and imposition of an official language, education is “to be perceived as the only means of access to administrative positions” which propagandises the usage of the official or legitimate language even at homes or in private sphere. This is because the ‘educational market’ is under domination of linguistic products – which are, for sure, valued more than the linguistic products of the dominated class – of the dominant class. Thus, this domination is sustained generally via education system and family (Bourdieu, 2005: 49, 62).

The dominated language holders are those who most probably dispossess themselves in favour of a spokesperson to represent them. These spokespersons are those who are native speakers of the dominant language or have a capacity in that language more than others who delegate them. According to Bourdieu, there is an ‘unwritten law’ that prescribes the official language of the country “as the only acceptable and valuable language for formal speeches in formal situations” (Bourdieu, 2005: 68, 131).

Strategic use of language varies in terms of linguistic profit expectations of the users but this is not, of course, a simple cost-and-benefits “rational” calculation but an act imposed by the symbolic power of the dominant language and the dominant ideology in the form of social, political and economic rewards, or as Millar points out, by demoralisation of the individual due to low status and low prestige of their vernacular (2005: 27). Speakers of minority languages can internalise the superiority and legitimacy of the official or dominant language unconsciously, because devaluation of minority language is a covert or hidden process (Martin-Jones, 1989: 120). Therefore, linguistic identity is not a definite, homogeneous or

static identity; in contrast, it is open to changes in different circumstances (Pavlenko and Blackledge, 2004: 21 – 22).

5.2. Language and Ethnicity

Language and power have a very salient relationship. Language is more or less interrelated with ethnic identity, as well. Even though having distinctive language is not a precondition to be categorised as an *ethnos*, it is mostly one of the most important markers of ethnic identity. Language acquires its importance particularly through ethnic mobilisation during nation formation and nation-building process. It could be used as an instrument to unite and also to separate different ethnic identities.

Different approaches to the concept of ethnicity place and associate language in different functions. Primordialist approach which shaped the Soviet *ethnos* theory sets language as a key element of being an *ethnos* and acquiring an ethnic identity. Primordialists see the ethnicity as an objective realm which includes ‘given’ features. According to Geertz (1963) some of those given features are “being born into particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices”. Similarly, Shikogorov in 1922 defines *ethnos* as “a group of people, speaking the same language, who recognise their shared heritage, and have a shared complex social mores, mode of life, retained and sanctioned traditions which differentiate them from other groups” (cited in Tishkov, 1997: 2). Gumilev even stressed that *ethnoses* are biological rather than social as result of adaptation to the particular conditions of a territory (cited in Broomley and Kozlov, 1989: 430).

Another approach is social constructivism, which was pioneered by Weber. According to the social constructivist approach, ethnic group is “ what people believe or think to be; cultural differences mark ‘group-ness’, they do not cause it [and] ethnic identification arises out of and within interaction between groups”

(Jenkins, 1997: 11). With having influenced from the social constructivism, Barth (1969) developed anthropological approach in which ethnic groups create ethnic boundaries in order to identify themselves and as well as distinguish themselves from other ethnic groups. It is no doubt that language serves as a key ethnic boundary in this theory but not at all times and in all conditions. Another main feature of the constructivism is that defining of external and internal forces which affect and reshape ethnic boundaries and so the ethnic identity. Weber (1978) defines them as 'internal assimilation' and 'external differentiation', while Nagel (1994) uses 'external factors' and 'internal factors', and Jenkins (1996) as 'group identification' and 'social categorisation'.

Main motives of switching the ethnic boundaries (Ehlvert, 1997) are social, economic and political external factors. For instance, in order to find more prestigious and higher paid jobs, in order to escape from political discrimination and in order to keep ethnic identity alive in changing territorial and demographic circumstances members of the ethnic group may opt to switch their identities. The boundary switching may be strategic, defensive or utilised. For example, Eidheim (1969) found observed some Lapp groups in Norway tended to speak Norwegian in order to escape from deprivation of their vernacular and, as a result, from the social exclusion. Therefore, as a most visible subjective element of ethnic differentiation, language switching can be the first and relatively fastest way to change especially in utility-motivated switching (Smith, 1993: 22).

Although this approach and its figures try to accommodate the subjectivity of the ethnic boundaries, it is also important to include subjective perceptions of other groups towards the group in question. Karklins (1986) calls it 'ethnic perception' and stresses that some subjective elements are attached importance while some of them are neglected. One of the main subjective ethnic markers is language. It is because language, or even accent of the same language, is perceived in all of the contacts between group members. Another important marker is dress style which is closely associated with culture and also with the particular region (23 – 28).

This approach stresses that where group identification is weak, it is more likely to be followed by a language shift. However Pavlenko and Blackledge (2004), claim that it is a monolingual prejudice, which supposes ethnic groups as constructed by homogeneous individuals. However, language switching is more complex interrelationship and it could occur even among groups with strong in-group identification. They stressed again the importance of power relationships which function to legitimise and also oppress certain languages.

In contrast, Schöpflin (2000) argues that even though ethnic boundaries, especially in ethnically mixed areas, are perceived as clear and secure, close ethnic identities, i.e. having same or similar language, could find themselves, especially in transformation periods, in struggle over to keep their identities and this could raise the possibility of conflicts among them, as during dissolution of Yugoslavia between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians which have common ethnolinguistic identity and this common identity caused to religion to be the most important ethnic border. Moreover, boundaries are not stable but negotiable for repositioning, which also includes boundaries that were previously seen absolutely non-negotiable (Pavlenko and Blackledge, 2004: 20 – 21).

5.3. Language and Nation-Building

Both in French Revolution and in German Romanticism, language was perceived as a key instrument of nation-building and it was the main symbol of nationalism. Especially for those who came into nation-state formation arena relatively late, i.e. Germany and Italy, language was the main unification tool (Coulmas, 1991: 18 – 19). Membership in the modern state is defined according to citizenship. France and Germany have two different citizenship models. In France, citizenship is described according to the territory or *jus soli* while in Germany; it is defined based on ethnicity or *jus sanguinis*. French model requires assimilation of the individual into French society in order to be a ‘true’ citizen, and this assimilation is expected to

take place through francophonisation. Hence, French began to be imposed as a country wide legitimate language of administration and education. On the other hand, German model is based on ethnicity and it is differentialist in nature. For example, *Aussiedlers*⁶⁸ could automatically gain the citizenship while Germany-born immigrants have to follow long lasting bureaucratic procedures. However, nowadays the situation both in France and Germany has changed. France began to move away from *jus soli* principle while Germany has come to close it (Giordano, 1997: 176 – 180).

In addition to those two citizenship models, there is another model, Soviet nationality and citizenship model. In this model, there is difference between nationality or *natsionalnost* and citizenship or *grazhdanstvo*, which are not differentiated in the Western Europe and are used as synonyms. In this model, *natsionalnost* defines the ethnic affiliation of the individual, which is based on the parents' *natsionalnost*; on the other hand, *grazhdanstvo* defines from which Soviet Socialist Republic the individual are. For instance, one can hold Russian *grazhdanstvo* but with Azeri *natsionalnost*. *Natsionalnost* is defined according to the primordial principles and one can only change or choose his/ her *natsionalnost* in few exceptional circumstances, such as intermarriage parenthood and orphanhood (Shanin, 1996: 115; Karklins, 1986: 37 – 39). This model was used also in the former Eastern Bloc countries for a certain period (Klein and Reban, 1981: 3; Giordano, 1997: 184) when almost everything was being modelled based on the Soviet experiences.

Especially in CEE (Central and East European), languages were one of the key haulers of nationalism. Speaking a legitimate or an official language became or imposed to be perceived as a symbol of membership to a certain nation and as well as a symbol of progress and modernity (Paulston, 1998: 7; Dorian, 1999: 37; O'Reilly, 2001b: 9). This made minority languages to be perceived as threats to

⁶⁸ German repatriates from the Central and East Europe, Russia and in Central Asian Republics.

nation and its integrity (Coulmas, 1991: 22). They were restricted to be used in the private sphere or even prohibited in all, private and public, spheres. Today, there are about 200 states and only approximately 110 languages in official status. Nevertheless, according to a recent study, there are 6917 living languages (Gordon, 2005), which means that significant number of people speak non-official languages, and have to be bilingual or even multilingual in order to have an access to social, economic and political facilities (Dorian, 1999: 30 – 31).

Choice of official language is highly cyclical and this cyclical relationship between official language and nation-building becomes visible when we compare official language policies of nationalist movements of Europe, Americas, Africa and Asia. Nationalist movements of nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Europe were mainly different from anti-colonial liberation movements of Latin and North America in the eighteenth century. In Americas, there were not powerful struggles against languages of colonists. In contrast, they continued to use the language of their former colonists, i.e. Spanish and Portuguese, and rarely native languages like Guaraní in Paraguay (Gordon, 2005). Moreover, in the liberation movements in post-World War II in Africa and Asia, in order to merge different ethnic identities into new nations, the languages of the former ruling class were used as mediators between competing ethnolinguistic communities via giving an official language status to one or two of these languages. For example, English, French, Portuguese and Spanish are still official languages together with some other native languages in Africa and Asia⁶⁹. In contrast, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), new nation-states had and have extensive sensibilities to use vernacular of the new ethnolinguistic majority as an official, and with showing, somehow extreme, antagonism towards the language of their former rulers as an “enemy language” (Tishkov, 1997: 97; Judt and Lacorne, 2004: 7). Moreover, according to Connor, this monolingualism could not develop immediately but with a dialectical process

⁶⁹ For example, English is in an official status in 19 African, in 14 Americas and 4 Asian countries; French is in an official status in 21 African and in 2 Americas countries; Spanish is in an official status in 2 African and in 20 Americas countries; and Portuguese is in an official status in 5 African, in 1 Americas and in 1 Asian country.

from multilingualism to bilingualism, and from bilingualism to monolingualism (cited in Boneva, 2001: 86).

Due to important role of bourgeoisie in nationalism, it could be argued that, the language of bourgeoisie and elites generally has been approved as an official language when this ethnolinguistic community succeeds to form a nation-state. Anderson argues the role of print-media in spreading firstly, awareness of bourgeoisie from each other and secondly, ideas of nationalism. In order to spread ideas via print media, there should be a mass-education in vernacular and increase in literacy among targeted ethnolinguistic community (1991: 70 – 80). Hence hegemony of ‘sacred languages’, such as Latin, Greek and Arabic, began to be challenged via mass nationalistic education which also accelerated ethnolinguistic consciousness instead of religious one because popular support could be achieved only if the language of the ethnolinguistic community in question is used (James, 1996: 91).

5.4. Development of Linguistic Rights in Europe

First minority rights related provisions were provided to religious minorities. When nationalism spread the entire Europe, national minorities have come into the agenda. Because, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, CEE faced nationalist movements and nation-state formation struggles which were usually ended up with bloody wars. As an awakening of the ‘holy’ ancient past of the new nation-states in CEE, especially in the Balkans, the idea to re-build ancient glory or big states within their ancient territory was the main instrument to mobilise masses through war. Not surprisingly, borders of CEE countries have been drawn not according to ethnolinguistic lines but in contrast according to strategic and geographic lines, i.e. rivers, mountains (Weilenmann, 1963: 50). Consequently, this made some ethnolinguistic groups to be out of the territory of their kin.

Those strategic borders caused tensions among states, because nation sustained the look for all of their co-ethnies into single state. In post World War I period, the League of Nations and peace treaties of the World War I, i.e. Neuilly and Lausanne, were the key sources of protection of linguistic rights. However, minorities came to the agenda of the international politics once more when Germany used German minorities in neighbouring countries to justify its expansion and occupation. Therefore, under post-World War II institutions, the UN, minority rights have been attempted to be solved out through general or universalistic human rights mechanisms⁷⁰ (OHCHR, 1992: para. 3). However, those universalistic human rights provisions failed to accommodate minority rights.

Contemporary nation-states in CEE were part of empires until twentieth century, such as Ottoman Empire and Austro – Hungarian Empire, and dissolved federations of post-1989, such as USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Hence, they were subordinated ethnos which marched to build their nation-states. However, the problem of minority linguistic rights in CEE countries occur when those formerly dominated groups tends to act as their former rulers. Formerly dominated minorities, which are today's dominant majorities, have looked to eliminate either symbolic or real aspects of their former rulers (Schöpflin, 2000: 239). Kymlicka defines this kind of nationalism as an “illiberal nationalism” (2001: 54 – 60), and Dimitras and Papanikolatos named such problem as “minority rights paradox” (2001: 194). Even today, the problem is still in the agenda; for instance, ensuring the rights of ethnic minorities in Kosovo, generally Serbs as former rulers, is one of the key preconditions of the talks on Kosovo's status.

Dimitras and Papanikolatos argue that CEE countries tried to use assimilatory policies, which were implemented two centuries ago by their Western European counterparts (2001: 198). However, the twentieth century CEE nationalism could

⁷⁰ Even though in post-1989, the UN's 1992 'Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities' has tried to deal with the issue, it lacks of binding mechanisms and monitoring systems. Therefore, it cannot effectively implemented (Tsilevich, 2001: 166).

not assimilate its minorities as its Western counterpart relatively succeeded to do in the nineteenth century (Schöpflin, 2000: 233). According to Kymlicka, a nation-state, firstly, imposes an official language of administration and then secures it via language laws and education policy. Hence those instruments are demanded to be back also by the minorities as response to nation-building policies of ethnic majorities. However, those demands are generally perceived as demands to secession, which, not surprisingly, accelerates ethnic conflicts (2001: 49).

Having a neighbouring kin-state accelerates the possibility of a minority language to be perceived as a threat to unity of the state (Schöpflin, 2000: 287). For instance, Macedonian and Turkish languages are perceived as threats both by Bulgaria and Greece. On the other hand, Turkish in Macedonia, as a result of its long federal tradition during Yugoslavia, is not perceived as commonly agreed threat. Hence, due to not having a border with Turkey, Macedonia does not have anxieties and collective paranoia about ‘Turkish invasion’, as Bulgaria and Greece had before, and have nowadays by extremist, populist and fascist sentiments.

Therefore, new specialised provisions and implementations on linguistic rights are required because; language has been seen as a key cultural transmitter, a major visible identity marker and a main instrument of assimilation and oppression. Hence, it is the main issue of minority rights and new provisions were needed in order to prevent and bloody ethnic conflicts in the Balkans⁷¹. In order to stabilise the region and to promote the countries in the region to integrate into international and European systems, new provisions have been implemented mainly by my European organs (Patten and Kymlicka, 2003: 4). For example, by two important documents of the Council of Europe: European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) in 1992⁷² and Framework Convention for the Protection of

⁷¹ Western Europe has also minority problems, where only Iceland is an ethnolinguistically homogeneous country (MERCATOR).

⁷² ETS no. 148, 1992, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/148.htm>

National Minorities (FCPNM) in 1995⁷³. The European Parliament has been acting as the most interested body on minorities rights issues⁷⁴ (Malloy, 2005: 3), which accepted several important resolutions concerning linguistic rights of minorities, such as Arfé Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities in 1981⁷⁵ and Resolution on a New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism⁷⁶ in 2006. As a result of the Arfé Resolution, European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) was established in 1983 and the European Commission set up European Network for Regional or Minority Languages and Education (MERCATOR) in 1987 (Coulmas, 1991: 16 – 17).

Those conventions, charters, declarations and recommendations have been criticised due to lack of legal binding power and no monitoring systems. Even if they have monitoring mechanisms, they include blur statements, which leaves the situation to the hands of the states and make them ineffective, for instance, statements in FCPNM⁷⁷, like “adequate”, “as far as possible” or “shell endeavour”. (Varady, 2001: 143; Tsilevich, 2001: 163, 166; O’Reilly, 2001a: 12).

However, there were also alternative regional and international initiatives which aim to influence European and International bodies to create more binding

⁷³ ETS no. 157, 1995, <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm>

⁷⁴ It is understandable, because Europe has circa 60 minority languages (based on the definition made by ECRML), which are spoken by approximately 55 million people (MERCATOR). Moreover, one of the main arenas where those ethnolinguistic minorities are represented is the European Parliament. Hence, they have a chance to raise their demands. However, the European Parliament is a consultant body and it can make only recommendations not binding decisions.

⁷⁵ 16 October 1981, <http://www.ciemn.org/mercator/UE18-GB.HTM>

⁷⁶ P6_TA(2006)0488
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P6-TA-2006-0488+0+DOC+WORD+V0//EN&language=EN>

⁷⁷ Another problem of FCPNM is reservations of signatory states, in which they state for which minorities they will apply the Convention, and even some of them, like Malta and Lichtenstein, put reservations that they do not have national minorities (Tsilevich, 2001: 168 – 169).

documents on minority and linguistic rights issues. For instance, FUEN's (Federal Union of European Nationalities) Charter for the Autochthonous European National Minorities in 2006 and Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights in 1998, which was prepared in the World Conference on Linguistic Rights in 1996 and supported by the UNESCO, are among those documents.

In the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages of 1992, a minority language is defined as a language(s) that

traditionally used within a given territory of a state by nationals of that state who form a group numerically smaller than the rest of the state's population; and different from the official language(s) of that state; it does not include either dialects of the official language(s) of the state or the languages of migrants (Article 1).

States are free to choose which languages will be classified as regional or minority languages, which makes the Charter, again, less effective (Article 3 (1)).

As a consequence, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, also known as the European Convention on Human Rights⁷⁸, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) are still major mechanisms with their considerable imposition of power. Not surprisingly, those universalistic documents cannot fulfil the requirements for protection of minority linguistic rights. For instance, in *Belgian Linguistic Case*, the European Court of Human Rights stated that “the Convention grants no rights to education in a minority language, given that the State has an interest in preserving linguistic unity”⁷⁹ (Belgian Linguistic Case Series A. No. 6 (1979 – 1980) EHRR 252. as cited in Wallace, 2002: 11; de Pelsmaeker, 2003: 60 – 61).

⁷⁸ <http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf>

⁷⁹ See also COHRE (2006) *Litigating Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Legal Practitioners Dossier*, 259 – 60, <http://www.cohre.org/store/attachments/COHRE%20Legal%20Practitioners%20Dossier.pdf>

The issue of the minority linguistic rights, as well, is a new phenomenon, which is still in a developmental phase away from any conclusion yet (Malloy, 2005: 9; Paulston, 1998: 10). Today, there is no consensus even on the definition of “minority”. Even FCPNM does not include a definition of national minority. Malloy argues that the problem of national minorities in international law emerge not by reason of lack of complete and clear-cut definition but rather due to relations between national minorities and state nationalism (2005: 4). Therefore, EU is not a ‘safe haven’ for minorities but its role on the protection of the minority rights cannot be neglected, as well (Coulmas, 1991: 14). Paradoxically, the EU’s primary interest to multilingualism is as a result of high monolingualism of its member states (O’Reilly, 2001b: 10), and as it recommended by the European Parliament in Framework Strategy for Multilingualism in 2006, the EU should acknowledge multilingualism not only among official languages but also among minority languages (Specific Comments on the Framework Strategy, No. 7).

5.5. Some Basic Issues in Linguistic Rights

Currently, five main issues are discussed related to the debates around minority linguistic rights, which have both symbolic and real effects on the lives of the ethnolinguistic minorities. These are: Minority Language Education, Minority Media, Minority Language Usage before Administrative and Judicial Bodies, Minority Individual Names in Minority Languages, and Topographical and Other Place Names in Minority Languages. I have already discussed the minority language usage in official and administrative bodies in ‘Language and Power’ and ‘Language and Nation-building’ sections; therefore, I will discuss other issues and evaluate their importance and the reasons of disputes around these issues.

5.5.1. Minority Language Education

One of the most controversial and disputant issue related to the linguistic rights is education. Minorities, who are recognised, have a chance to study their languages

in public schools. However, study of a minority language is different from study in a minority language, in which medium of instruction goes through a minority language. Nation-states are not very willingly to accept the later one due to special importance of ‘national’ language in state formation and its high perception as unitary tool of the state.

The major goal of the national mass-education in the era of nationalism is to create a ‘high culture’ with its ‘new man’ or ‘standard man’ (Gellner, 1999): 28; Bourdieu, 2005): 47; James, 1996: 131). Althusser (1971) utters that education is the key ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ to train citizens and, Bourdieu and Passeron argue that by education or ‘pedagogical action’, supremacy of dominant class and universality of the dominant culture are sustained (1990: 42). Dominant class transfers the legitimate knowledge to the dominated one via mass and compulsory education, in which they are also planners and influencers of corpus, status and acquisition planning. It allocates itself the high valued symbolic goods of the market which causes to reproduce inequalities (Bourdieu, 2005: 48, 62; Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990: 5, 10, 40, 42; Millar, 2005: 99 – 100).

Another aim of states by implementing official language policies and imposing medium of instruction in official language in public schools is to achieve linguistic assimilation of ethnolinguistic minorities (Deutsch, 1963: 8; Le Page, 1964: 24; Paulston, 1998: 9), especially in CEE countries it was seen as the main instrument of assimilation (Schöpflin, 2000: 290). It was a consequence of Herderian ideology that language creates a nation, and the motto ‘true patriot should speak the national language’, which came into surface after the French Revolution (Millar, 2005: 19). The role of education in construction, legitimisation and imposition of the official language is inevitable (Bourdieu, 2005: 48). Hence, official language became

compulsory or encouraged medium of instruction in public schools⁸⁰, even in regions where ethnolinguistic minorities densely live.

The dominant class and the dominant culture do not always try to include all the elements; on the contrary, some elements are selectively neglected (Bourdieu, 1990: 41). Another possibility is that the minority parents would give up to send their children to minority schools or to minority language lessons due to high marginalisation of language and perceived better opportunities by studying in official language, which leads the justification for the closures of minority schools and minority language lessons (Schöpflin, 2000: 248).

Another highly disputant issue in minority language education is opening of state funded or private minority universities, where minority language is the medium of instruction. In general, minority language is represented in universities for pragmatic reasons, such as to match the demand for teachers, linguists and interpreters. By reason of the role of universities in nationalism (Hobsbawm, 1962: 166) and their connection with reproduction of culture and prestige of the language, they have been seen as a key symbolic power, which should be under the monopoly of the ethnolinguistic majority. At the institutional level, their graduates, due to studying in a minority language, may demand to work in state jobs in their language, which will make them equal partner of the ethnolinguistic majority and will certainly increase their ability to access to symbolic goods (Schöpflin, 2000: 235). There are some examples of state funded and private minority universities, i.e. in Catalonia, South Tyrol, Macedonia and Finland.

⁸⁰ For instance, French became obligatory in 1880 in public schools, and even in the USA, which is an immigrant based and so highly multilingual society, usages of German, French, Spanish and other languages diminished in public schools in the first decades of the twentieth century (Judt and Lacorne, 2004: 7 – 11).

5.5.2. Minority Media

Since the development of the 'print capitalism' (Anderson, 1991: 70, 77), media has served as the important tool of spreading ideologies. Media was used as a manipulator to change and direct the public opinion. Hence, right to access to information via media is guaranteed under universalistic human rights, without a special focus on minority media. Not surprisingly these provisions cannot solve the disputes over minority media circulation and broadcasting.

Nowadays, media is not only a manipulation tool but also an important profitable business. Advertisements, as the key income source of media, create a kind of paradoxical relationship. Media sees limited profit in minority market, so may advertisers see in the same way. Hence, they would not opt to publicise their advertisements in minority media. Minority media would not see entering into minority media market as a profitable investment, due not only to its smaller size but also to low income levels among minority members or consumers. Not surprisingly, the most developed media is among the minorities who are most integrated or in other words who have sufficient economical power. For instance, Armenian, Jewish and Russian minorities in Bulgaria are the most integrated minorities of the country. (Valentovitch, 2001: 6 – 9).

Furthermore, media of less integrated minorities has to find other options. Its existence is generally political, such as to defend minority rights, and amateur as a result of the lack of financial capacity generally. New media or internet media makes another option for minority media broadcasting. It is cheaper, and the steady increase in internet usage among minorities made it a reasonable option, as well⁸¹. Interestingly, increase in the internet users and of the importance of internet has begun to create another symbolic struggle, which is over country codes. For instance, in autonomous Åland Islands of Finland, internet sites functioned with

⁸¹ In order to support minority media circulation and broadcasting MERCATOR has a special division. http://www.aber.ac.uk/cgi-bin/user/merwww/index.pl?rm=e_main

country code ‘aland.fi’ which has been replaced since August 2006 with the official code ‘ax’ (ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers), 23 August 2006). This has been followed by the similar demands of the Frisian minority in Germany (Eurolang, 4 September 2006).

Resulting from financial insufficiency, minority media highly depends on the state’s or NGOs’ supports in order to survive. On the other hand, states, even in EU, may opt to choose restriction policies by implementing or requesting some economic conditions that minority media can hardly fulfil. An up-to-date example is the newly accepted Greek Electronic Media Licensing Law, which was accepted in 5 July 2007, and requires some economic preconditions, which can be hardly sustained by relatively low-income minority media. (OSCE Press Release, 27 July 2007).

5.5.3. Minority Individual Names in Minority Languages

Right to use and give a name to her/ his offspring according to his/ her belief or ethnolinguistic identity, with no doubt, it is a fundamental human right. Names are one of the most visible symbols of ethnolinguistic identity⁸² and hence, they were also perceived as markers that should be changed in the nation-building process. There were examples about forced name changes even in the Western democracies, for instance, in USA immigrants in the early twentieth century were forced to change their names (Pavlenko and Blackledge, 2004: 21). However, the most dramatic forced names changes were experienced by the Muslim minorities of Bulgaria, namely Turks (in 1984 – 1985), Pomaks (in 1912, 1942 and 1962) and Roma (in 1953 – 1954).

Name changes may occur also ‘voluntarily’ when ethnolinguistic groups see some strategic or pragmatic economic, social or political benefits to do so. For instance,

⁸² In most of the societies personal names indicates also gender of the bearer and in feudal systems the status of the holder.

after Azeri – Armenian disputes, Armenians of Baku, according to Tishkov, opted to change their names with Azeri ones (1997: 111). However, it can be argued that those name changes also involve hidden or symbolic power imposition. Because, holding particular name would mean better opportunities in social mobility in terms of economic, social and political ones.

Another and mostly used limitation about holding ethnolinguistic names is implemented via legal provisions. For instance, article 16/4 of the Turkish No. 1587 Registration of Population Act prohibits registration of names which are against to national culture, ethnic norms, customs and traditions. The act generally has been used to prevent usages of ethnic names of Kurds (Yıldız, 2004: 50) but also other ethnic groups, except non-Muslim minorities whose rights are protected by the Treaty of Lausanne.

Other disputant issues related to personal names are their orthography and suffixes which are common in CEE countries. Because of not having right to use their own ethnolinguistic alphabet in official institutions, minority members cannot use their names according to their own linguistic orthography. This problem can be witnessed in every country where there are ethnolinguistic minorities⁸³, and it occurs especially due to wrong or inadequate transliteration and misspellings when ethnolinguistic majority and ethnolinguistic minority have different alphabets. Another related issue is enforcement of the issue of recognised last name suffixes, such as ‘-ov, -ova’, ‘-ich’, ‘-s’ and ‘-ski’⁸⁴. For example, in the Soviet and Eastern European countries, authorities forced the minorities to use suffixes which are the characteristics of ethnic majority names.

⁸³ For an African example, see Hoel H. (1997) Personal Names and Heritage: Alice Walker’s Everyday Use, conference paper presented at ASANOR’s pre-conference for high school teachers at Hamar, Norway on October 3, 1997, <http://home.online.no/~helhoel/walker.htm>

⁸⁴ For recent example, see MINELRES (2007) *Communication to the UNHRC: minority names spelling in Latvia*, 11 July 2007, <http://lists.microlink.lv/pipermail/minelres/2007-July/005184.html> retrieved on 30 July 2007.

5.5.4. Topographical and Other Place Names in Minority Languages

Official naming is a symbolic act of imposition because it is performed by the holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence: the state. The state has also the monopoly power in defining the ‘right’ and ‘the best’ names. “The management of names is one of the instruments of the management of material scarcity”. To this end, agents with practical and/ or symbolic strategies, try to maximise their symbolic profit of naming (Bourdieu, 2005: 239 – 240).

From the societal perspective, place names reflect the connection of ethnolinguistic groups to the place they live. They symbolise not only the existence of the group in the region but also carry groups’ important events and mythologies that their names derived from (Dorian, 1999: 32). Place names are not stable neither is language; they have changed over time by reason of occupations, wars, migrations and other important events. Furthermore, their spellings and writings might be changed by reason of changes and evolutions of the languages, culture and religion, and as a result of changes of the alphabets, as well. Their changes in the last two centuries were mainly caused by nation-building policies (Kymlicka, 2001: 19) in order to ensure nations’ claims and sovereignty over places in question⁸⁵. Naming the places symbolises real and symbolic power of the name givers, as well (Tishkov, 1997: 104).

In multilingual countries, where minority languages are recognised, place names are bilingual. For instance, in New Zealand and Australia some place names are both in indigenous languages and in English. In Germany, in Frissia, and in Saxony place names are both in German and Frisian and in German and Sorbian respectively. As a result of its symbolic power more and more minorities began to demand the usage

⁸⁵ See Chapter 2 for Bulgarian examples and also Yildiz K. (2004) for Turkish, Syrian, Iraqi and Iranian examples about Kurdish place names.

of bilingual place names in the places, where they densely live⁸⁶. A working example of naming of places could be found in Finland, where there were two official languages Finnish and Swedish, and place names were assigned according to demographic weight of ethnolinguistic groups in the region (UN Group of Experts on Geographical Names, 2006).

5.6. Accommodation of Linguistic Rights in Multiculturalism

Multiculturalism is a response to nationalist policies implemented by nation-states which aim to homogenise the society. It can be defined also as a way to permit liberal minority nationalisms, based on the very idea that if a majority group has a right to implement nationalistic policies, why not the minorities do have it (Kymlicka, 2001: 27, 54 – 60).

Both communism and capitalism expected that ethnolinguistic minorities will disappear, in capitalism, due to conditions of the free market and in communism, by merging into single proletariat (Gellner, 1999: 22). The western liberal approach misused the term neutrality of state towards ethnic groups, as it does towards religions via secularism. Kymlicka argues that ‘ethnocultural neutrality’ is developed in order to escape from minority rights claims by stating the country’s neutrality and its universalistic citizenship rights. He states that liberal nationalism needs single language in order to unify the national market. In this respect, ethnolinguistic minorities had four choices: migration (to their kin-states, if they have one); integration; developing their own societal culture with its political, economic and social institutions; or marginalisation. He offers a new term ‘ethnocultural justice’ rather than ‘neutrality’ in order to ensure protection of minority rights (2001: 16 – 17, 20 – 22, 34).

⁸⁶ See for recent example, petition campaign on Austria’s Carinthia / Koroška region to use Slovenian place names. <http://www.bernthaler.com/prokaernten/index-en.html>

The communist approach towards ethnolinguistic minorities varied over time. According to the communist ideology, ethnicity is a form of false consciousness and it will merge to the working class. Lenin's suggestion was that if nationalities see that Soviet state could offer more than ethnicity could do, they would eventually disappear more quickly. Hence, the Soviet state even encouraged the ethnicity construction by allowing them to enjoy their cultural and linguistic rights. During the rule of Stalin, the question of nationalities was modified in order to achieve secular utopia in which Russian was the key cement. All the control was in the hands of the communist party and the expectation was that minorities would choose assimilation. Therefore, administration of the autonomous nationalities was controlled and dictated by the party. After Stalin, with Khrushchev, CEE states had possibilities to look for an alliance with nationalists, and linguistic rights of the minorities began to be eroded while the remaining ones were only symbolic or were based on for propaganda purposes (Carrère d'Encause, 1978).

One of the central issues of multiculturalism is the problem of 'autonomy'. It could be expressed as one of the most effective ways of preserving and reproducing the ethnolinguistic identity (Patten and Kymlicka, 2003: 6). In addition, territory is a kind of 'sacred' thing for nation-states and a precondition for being a nation, which should be preserved at all costs⁸⁷ (Weilenmann, 1963: 55; Schöpflin, 2000: 287). This understanding, according to Wæver, led the minority rights to be perceived as security questions; therefore, especially in CEE, nation-states prefer war/ civil war instead of negotiating autonomy demands of the minorities (cited in Kymlicka, 2002: 20). Moreover, they also rejected referenda of minorities who want to set up autonomies (Kymlicka, 2001: 62 – 63). In CEE countries, in order to ensure numerical majority of the dominant ethnicity in the entire regions of the country, states redraw administrative borders, i.e. provinces and municipalities, or encourage the dominant majority group members to settle in the regions where minorities

⁸⁷ For instance, even though most of the international documents concerning minority and linguistic rights, such as FCPNM and ECMRL, include statements that their provisions cannot be used against territorial integrity of signatory states, some states put additional reservations in which repeat that statement, i.e. Bulgaria's reservation in FCPNM.

historically live to prevent minorities of being regional majorities in those regions. For instance, Slovakia and Croatia have redrawn internal boundaries in order to prevent minorities to be regional majority. There were two main reasons of the rejection of autonomy demands of minorities in CEE states. First is the failure of three main federations, USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and secondly having neighbouring kin-states of minorities increase fears that the autonomy will be a last step for secession or annexation. Hence, minority rights politics in CEE goes on the line where there are three basic prejudices. Firstly, the assumption is that minorities are disloyal; secondly, disempowered minorities are necessary to be a powerful and stable state; and finally, the minority rights accommodation is about the question of national security (Kymlicka, 2002: 3, 16 – 21; Schöpflin, 2000: 284). For example, Georgeoff states that minority rights could be afforded if the minorities will be loyal and they will have bonds to the Bulgarian national identity rather than their ethnic identity (1981: 50).

Moreover, multinationalism and multilingualism was not a taboo for the CEE countries and also for the Balkans. In pre-independence there were influential discussions about confederation, especially Kossuth's idea on 'Balkan Confederation', and its autonomy rights for the national minorities, in which their linguistic rights were guaranteed. However, in case of Bulgaria, after the independence, nationalists and nationalist ideology took the power those debates, which uttered mostly by men of letters lost their influence (Güngörmüş, 1998: 83 – 88).

Kin-state issue affects almost all of the policies towards minorities. If a minority has a kin-state, especially a neighbouring one, this increases the possibility of the ethnic majority to perceive the minority as a potential secessionists or *imperium in imperio*⁸⁸. This led the nation-states to attempt to form monolingualism via ethnic cleansing, such as in Bulgaria (Millar, 2005: 22). Boris Tsilevich, one of two

⁸⁸ Empire within empire or the fifth column.

moderators of MINELRES (Minority Electronic Resources), suggests renaming minorities with kin-states as diasporas (2001: 160 – 161), which is highly disputable. Because those minorities are autochthonous people of those regions and calling them diasporas would lead to classify them as people who do not actually belong to those lands or people who do not belong to the society in question.

In addition to unsuccessful federalist experiences of CEE, it cannot be asserted that the Western liberalism succeed to do. Moreover, there were either successful multinationalist examples, such as Catalonia, South Tyrol and Åland Islands, or unsuccessful ones, such as Belgium and Bask Country. However, even in those countries, conflicts between dominant and dominated languages could not be solved yet. (Kymlicka, 2001: 29 – 30; Patten and Kymicka, 2003: 4; Schöpflin, 2000: 284). It should be noted that the nation-state basically deny multilingualism in terms of social, economic or ideological reasons, because a there is an interest of ongoing hegemony of a particular, majority, language to sustain and preserve other hegemonic relations in economic, social and political spheres (Millar, 2005: 19).

Nevertheless, linguistic rights issue still continues to be a primary struggle between nation-state and minorities. Currently, former multicultural Western European states, such as the Netherlands, are on the way to cease multicultural education policies in favour of so-called ‘integration’ of their immigrant populations. Nevertheless, national minorities are involuntarily incorporated elements within nation-states and continue to being aware of their linguistic rights. Nonetheless, relative improvements in minority rights in CEEs, give a way to rise of the radical xenophobic right-wing parties in the entire Europe. In order to prevent possible ethnic based conflicts in the future, common rhetoric of ‘interethnic dialogue’ should be sustained more effectively, and if there is a genuine aim to do this, nation-states and their dominant ethnicities should take also responsibility and not leave the burden on the shoulders of the ethnolinguistic minorities.

CHAPTER 6

EXPERIENCING THE POST-COMMUNIST LINGUISTIC RIGHTS BY THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA: THE CASE OF *IŞIKLAR* (SAMUIL) MUNICIPALITY

“We live in Bulgaria, a country that belongs to someone else”

A.K.⁸⁹

There is a saying about minorities,
‘We build home on the ice’;
if the ice melts, we will go to Turkey.

Nedim Mustafov⁹⁰

6.1. Research

Settlements in *Işıklar* (Samuil) have lasted since the fourth and third centuries B.C. where Thracians and other ancient ethnic groups were the first settlers. Even before the Ottoman rule there were some Turkic tribes in the region and when the Ottomans conquered the land, they met Turkish speaking population in the region. Nowadays, *Işıklar* (Samuil) municipality is one of the six municipalities of the province of *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), which is located in the north-eastern Bulgaria (see Map 1 in Appendices). The share of Turks in the whole province is circa 47 percent and in the municipality of *Işıklar* (Samuil) circa 78 percent; additionally, 81 percent of the population in the municipality declared their mother tongue as Turkish. The municipality is totally rural area where the centre of the municipality, *Işıklar* (Samuil), has also officially a village status. The high unemployment rates in the municipality is a chronic problem and by the year 2005, unemployment rate was

⁸⁹ Capital letters in the entire chapter do not represent the actual first letters of the respondents’ names and surnames. They were changed in order to preserve the anonymity of the respondents.

⁹⁰ Mayor of *Işıklar* (Samuil) Municipality.

42 percent; in addition, during the research it was 35 percent (August). The municipality is one of the lowest in the GDP rankings among municipalities (UNDP, 2000). There were 13 villages with total 8604 population. In the province, only 1,5 percent of the total population has a university degree, which is below the average of the country. There are four secondary-status schools. The province is governed by a mayor who was elected from MRF (Movement of Rights and Freedoms). On the other hand, in the municipal assembly, MRF and NMRF (National Movement of Rights and Freedoms), which is an alternative party of Turks, are coalition partners. The main economical activity of the municipality is agriculture, and some small commercial enterprises, which are generally mini-markets. The biggest industrial enterprise is a wagon factory, *Traktsiya*, in the municipal centre.

I chose the municipality as a site for my research mainly with two reasons; first, I was born and spend 11 years of my life in of the villages of the municipality, which makes the research process easier. Secondly, the region's high Turkish composition was adequate to conduct my research.

The research was being held between 15 September 2006 and 10 October 2006. I used qualitative methodology and its in-depth interview technique. I chose in-depth interviewing to understand more properly the perceptions and experiencing of the post-communist linguistic rights by the members of the Turkish minority. I set up my sample from Turks who have at least one child who studies in on of the primary and secondary educational institutions. I chose to interview parents, because if a pupil wants to study Turkish, one of his/ her parents should sign a petition to declare his/ her willingness about it. Hence, experiencing and perceptions of the parents towards the Turkish language and education, which were two of the central issues of this research, become very important. I interviewed 25 Turkish parents from 7 different villages, including *Işıklar* (Samuil) (see Appendix B). The male-female ratio among the sample of parents was 3:2. Furthermore, in order to have some insights from political, educational and cultural perspectives, I interviewed 2

journalists, one deputy director of the Turkish Theatre in the provincial centre, 2 Turkish language teachers and 3 political figures of the region, which are mayor of the municipality, provincial deputy governor and one of the MPs of the province.

6.2. Experiencing the Current and Further Linguistic Rights

In this section I discussed the results of the research related to the experiencing the current and further or other possible linguistic rights, which are education in and of Turkish, Turkish minority media, Turkish names of the toponyms, Turkish usage in the administrative bodies and current system of the Turkish minority names.

6.2.1. Education of the Turkish Minority

There are three secondary schools and one high school in the municipality which are *Habipköy* (Vladimirovtsi), *Demirciler* (Zhelyazkovets) and *Hırsova* (Harsovo) secondary schools and *Işıklar* (Samuil) secondary and high school. Before there were primary schools almost in all of the villages; however, they were closed down owing to the decrease of the population of pupils who studied there, and pupils were transferred to the other schools. All of these schools are schools in which the medium of instruction is Bulgarian; moreover, like the general population of the municipality, the majority of population of pupils in these schools is mainly Turks.

6.2.1.1. The Bulgarian Language Skills of the Turkish Minority

Therefore, I asked questions regarding the learning of the Bulgarian language in order to understand how the Turkish minority parents perceive its importance. Not surprisingly, Bulgarian language is perceived as key indicator of educational success and a key handicap of the Turkish pupils. Turkish parents expressed that one should learn Bulgarian in order to succeed in his/ her further academic and occupational career, as it briefly stated by Ç.D. (32 years old, male, cook).

If [my son] wants to further his educational level, Bulgarian language is important.

Nonetheless, they are very aware of the hardship of learning the Bulgarian language in the region and at the school which are overpopulated by the Turkish pupils and Turkish teachers, as well. As M.S. (45 years old, male, unemployed) stated in this line that:

[For our children] there is nobody in the village to talk and practice the Bulgarian language... In other words, they cannot learn Bulgarian language... They cannot learn it, because, as I see, most of their teachers speak Turkish [at school] with them.

Another but a reverse example belongs to A.R. (31 years old, female, unemployed) who has Bulgarian neighbours.

[My daughter's] Bulgarian language ability is very well. Because, her teacher is Bulgarian, and ... my neighbour is Bulgarian, as well. She accompanied the children of my neighbours; hence, she learnt Turkish and Bulgarian at the same time.

Turkish parents have developed some strategies in order to cope with the problem of low Bulgarian language skills of their children. One of them is encouraging their children to watch Bulgarian TV channels instead of Turkish TVs. Because, most of the parents believe that watching Turkish TV improves their Turkish language skills but on the contrary, it worsens their Bulgarian language abilities. For example, A.H. (33 years old, female, housewife) pointed out that:

They [my children] had relations with our (Bulgarian) neighbours... [and] with Bulgarian [pupils] at school. However, when we set up a digital receiver [to watch Turkish TVs], their speaking [in Bulgarian] got worse... Therefore, I removed the digital receiver in order to prevent them to watch Turkish TVs. That's why, we are watching only Bulgarian TVs now...

Another strategy to improve their Bulgarian language skills would be expected to talk Bulgarian; however, very few of the Turkish parents prefer to speak Bulgarian

with their children. One of the reasons of this behaviour can be explained by unquestionable place of speaking in Turkish at homes as a result of very nature of its ethnic marker. Therefore, speaking in Bulgarian at home is generally perceived that is connected to being Bulgarian. For instance, it could be observed from the statement of S.F. (40 years old, male, tractor driver). He stated that:

There are different kinds [of people] for instance; some of them speak only Bulgarian at home, even though he is a Turk in reality... It depends on [somebody's] habituation... Bulgarian language is spoken by those who [speak] it heartily...

Lower skills in the Bulgarian language could evolve to desire of living and studying in an environment where there are more Bulgarians. Therefore, one of the responses would be a demand for desegregation of schools in which Turkish pupils are in the majority.

6.2.1.2. Ethnic Desegregation of Schools

Ethnic segregation of schools in minority neighbourhoods is pointed out as one the most crucial problems of the Bulgarian education system. Ethnically segregated schools are locked into insufficient education qualities and facilities. In order to solve the problem the Ministry of Education proposed a plan of desegregation of those schools. As it is seen, Turkish parents have also paraphrased and complained about the ethnic segregation. Therefore, I addressed questions to interviewees about segregation. The question was which school they would mostly prefer to sent their children.

- a) A school where most of the pupils are Turks.
- b) A school where there is almost 1:1 distribution among Bulgarian and Turkish pupils.
- c) And finally, a school where most of the pupils are Bulgarian.

Most of the Turkish parents stated their wishes to send their children to the second option, where there is an equal distribution of population between Bulgarian and Turkish pupils. The main reason of this choice is indicated as ‘improving Bulgarian language skills’. For example, A.İ. (40 years old, male, driver) pointed out the importance of practicing Bulgarian language for Turkish pupils with Bulgarian pupils.

The Bulgarian language skills of our pupils are poor. As a result, we live in Bulgaria. At least, he/ she can speak and practice the Bulgarian language where there is half-half distribution of Bulgarian and Turkish pupils.

Although Turkish parents expressed the importance of practicing Bulgarian language with Bulgarian pupils, they do not prefer to send their children to schools where Bulgarian pupils are in majority. One of the important reasons of this is, as it stated by A.R. (31 years old, female, unemployed), fear of xenophobic and nationalistic attitudes of Bulgarian pupils.

Maybe I would choose to send [her] to a half-half distributed school. If there are more Turkish [pupils] and a few Bulgarian [pupils]... there is not enough possibilities to practice Bulgarian [language], even if their teachers are Bulgarian. [Sending my daughter] to a school which has more Bulgarian [pupils] and a few Turkish [pupils], would be bad for the [Turkish] children, because there is nationalism [problem]. As we watch in TV, Bulgarians do not want neighbouring [Turkish] pupils in Plovdiv... Even though they [Bulgarians] claimed it is because they [Turks] will bring illness; in reality, there is also nationalism [in their behaviours]. That’s why; I do not want to send her to [school] with great proportion of Bulgarian pupils, because sometimes they would be very nationalist. Because I had already experienced it, and I prefer to send her in a half-half distribute school; both for practicing Bulgarian language and [also for enabling her to speaking] her mother tongue. Last year... daughter of our neighbours, who is in the first year of the university, had a different view, she supported them [*Ataka* (Attack)], even though we had good relations with her parents, who are also strongly opposed to [*Ataka*]. [From this example], I realised the effects of the nationalism on the youth; Siderov’s⁹¹ expressions may affect them very much. Therefore... it would be very difficult [to study], where there are too many Bulgarian [pupils].

⁹¹ The leader of *Ataka* coalition.

Similarly, A.H. (36 years old, male, electrician) worries about the same issue, by stating that:

I prefer [the school with] fifty-fifty [share]. Well, if you send [the child] to [the school, where there are mostly] Bulgarian [pupils], Bulgarian [pupils] would think that Turks are such [a not nice] people. I suppose that Bulgarian [parents] are also not sending [their children to the schools with dense Turkish population]. It should be [as current one] or mixed. In the other situation, where there are mostly Bulgarian [pupils] and lesser Turkish [pupils], they [Bulgarians] are establishing [exclusionary] groups within Turkish [pupils]. However, if it was fifty-fifty [population], there is no way, they would have to socialise with each other.

Additionally, the parents those who do not want to send their children into schools in which Bulgarian pupils are in the majority also articulated their fear of *de facto* discrimination by teachers against Turkish pupils in favour of their Bulgarian counterparts. For example, K.A (44 years old, female, elderly care) clearly expressed the experience of his daughter in a school where Bulgarian pupils are in majority.

First, I will ask to my children but if he asks me, I will send him to a school, where his friends [study]. I would send him where are Turkish [pupils]... While my daughter was studying in Razgrad, they were three Turks in the whole class. They [Bulgarian pupils] were jealous about her, because she was studying hard. Additionally, those three [Turkish pupils] were discriminated in the school. Once, she went to see the principal by reason of getting '5' [mark]. She studied until 2 o'clock in order to get '6', and they gave to her '5'⁹². She saw that one of the Bulgarian girl's [exam paper which is marked with '6'] had many mistakes. Afterwards she took both [hers and Bulgarian girl's] papers and went to see the principal. They controlled [papers] again and next day, they made the exam again. She got '6' finally. She had no mistakes! She had only one because of miswriting one word; that's why, [her teacher] had given to her '5'. Thanks God, she is bold enough and [this situation] was corrected. If someone else was [in her situation], she/ he would not succeed. Turks are discriminated, my brother! [Because of] our names!

Those who would like to send their children into Bulgarian-populated schools also have the same motivation: practicing the Bulgarian language and improvement of it. Some of the parents perceived that studying in a Bulgarian-populated school as

⁹² The highest mark in the Bulgarian educational grade system is '6' and the lowest one is '2'.

studying in the urban centres. Because, there are no such a school within the territory of the municipality and it can be found mainly in urban centres. For example, anonymity of urban centres attracted Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed) in order to escape from her perceived discrimination by teachers in favour of their friends and relatives' children.

It is better to be among Bulgarian [pupils]. I would like to send my big son to a school in Varna but I [gave up] because he did not have any friends [there]... I said to him that he should study at least this year in the city. ... [Because] he will not be well-known there. All of the students are equal there. There is no such [a differentiation made by teachers] whether this student is a child of my friend or not.

Eventually, assigning such great importance to learn and study the Bulgarian language affects the perceptions of the Turkish parents towards the Turkish language learning.

6.2.1.3. The Turkish Language Skills of the Turkish Minority

All of the respondents expressed that they have more or less Turkish writing-reading skills. However, as Eminov (1997) found in his research that most of the Turks who studied between 1974 and 1991 when there was no instruction of Turkish language courses, can read and write Turkish because they studied French as a foreign language during that period. By learning Latin scripts, they have gained ability at least reading Turkish where their writing skills are not well developed as in the example of Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed).

I know the Turkish letters, because they are very similar to French ones. I can read in Turkish but a little. I can write but very limited. [In order to] be able to write, I should be calm and attentive.

For those who did not take Turkish language course some special grammatical features of the Turkish language create difficulties especially in writing. Just like in

the situation of M.N. (40 years old, female, saleswoman), who had troubles to write and use ‘Ğ,ğ’⁹³ properly one of the most special letter the Turkish alphabet.

I can read in Turkish. [However], I don’t know how to use and where I should use ‘ğ’. [Hence] I wrote ‘i’ instead of ‘ğ’...

There are also interviewees, who were studying while Turkish language courses were being offered between 1959 and 1974 but their reading and writing abilities are still limited because of having no chance to read Turkish print materials to improve their reading skills. For instance, as articulated by M.S. (45 years old, male, unemployed):

I studied four years [Turkish]. I [almost] forgot; however, I can still write but I have some difficulties [in writing]. Reading is also difficult for me, because I haven’t read [anything] for a long time.

Additionally, some respondents learnt Turkish in alternative ways, such as by themselves, by watching Turkish TVs or in Turkey when they obliged to migrate in 1989. For instance, İ.E. (37 years old, female, unemployed) stated her willingness to learn Turkish letters during her primary school years:

It is interesting that when I was in primary school, I learnt [Turkish letters] by myself although my friends could not [write and read in Turkish]. After I learnt the Bulgarian letters, I learnt Turkish letters by myself.

As a result of limited literacy of the Turkish parents, many aspects of the linguistic rights are affected, for example, reading Turkish print materials, i.e. books, magazines and newspapers, and as well as their attitudes towards letting their children to take Turkish language course.

⁹³ A special letter of the Turkish alphabet <ğ> in principle denotes [ɣ], but has the property of lengthening the preceding vowel and assimilating any subsequent vowel.

6.2.1.4. Facultative Turkish Language Courses in the Municipal Schools

One of the major improvements of the linguistic rights of the Turkish minority is study of Turkish language, even though has some organisational and material problems. In two of the schools of the municipality, which are *Habipköy* (Vladimirovtsi) secondary school and *Işıklar* (Samuil) secondary and high school, Turkish language courses are being offered as a facultative subject. If a student would like to attend Turkish language courses, one of his/ her parents have to sign a petition that he/ she allows his/ her child to take this course.

It should be noted that almost all of the interviewees stated, even with different motivations, that the current Turkish language courses are functional or serviceable for their children. Some of the parents indicated their Turkishness as a main motivation for letting their children to take Turkish language courses, or in other words, being a Turk means learning his/ her mother tongue, as S.F. (40 years old, male, tractor driver) stated:

Of course, we would like to [allow him to participate in Turkish language classes]. Well, [how do] you call yourself a Turk without knowing how to read and write [in Turkish]...

Additionally, the Turkish language teacher ‘A’⁹⁴ connected the study of Turkish language with the period of forced assimilation campaign and the demands of the Turkish minority during the demonstrations that took place on May 1989.

As a result we are Turks and we are identifying ourselves as Turks... [The Parents] should look back and think about the 1989. At that time, we demanded [to retake] our names and [using of] our language, as well.

Even though there is a common agreement about the utility of the Turkish language courses, some parents also think that learning Turkish and Bulgarian languages

⁹⁴ There are total 3 Turkish language teachers in the municipality, and I interviewed 2 of them. Therefore, in order to protect their anonymity, I use ‘teacher A’ and ‘teacher B’ instead of giving details which would lead them to be easily recognised.

together, as a result of having different alphabets, exposes difficulties and children make mistakes in both languages. Hence, because of this reason, some of them do not let their children to participate in Turkish language courses in the first grades until a certain grade when they thought that the child is competitive well enough in Bulgarian language. For example, Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed) thought that children are confusing those two different alphabets by stating that:

[Pupils] start to learn both Bulgarian and Turkish languages together at the first grade [of the primary school]. However, after that it occurs problems between [two kinds of] letters. They use Bulgarian letters in [writing of] Turkish, and Turkish letters [in writing] of Bulgarian.

In this respect, the Turkish language teacher ‘A’ stated that in order to relieve Turkish parents, they start to teach Turkish alphabet in the second term of the first grade.

We drew back [teaching of] the [Turkish] alphabet; in other words, teaching of the [Turkish] alphabet is started in the second term. In the first term, we make only conversations; we tell [them] stories and fairy tales in order to prevent confusion of Bulgarian [and Turkish] alphabets.

However, this implementation cannot calm down the anxieties of the Turkish parents as M.S. (45 years old, male, unemployed) still think that first grade is not suitable for taking a Turkish language course.

Children with a Turkish descent should start [to learn] firstly Bulgarian language at the first grade. Now, they’re studying Turkish, Bulgarian and English; therefore, they cannot handle [the Bulgarian language]. Hence, they should start [to learn] Bulgarian language at the first grade, and only after second or third grade to [learn] Turkish language... Then he/ she will be more conscious about [the Turkish language]...

From this point of view, another related question arises: when should the Turkish language courses start? The Turkish language teacher ‘A’ explained that there were some plans to start the study of Turkish language in pre-school phase but it cannot be put into force because of reluctances of the Turkish parents.

...It is planned to start [the study of Turkish language] in pre-school education... in order to [make a chance to] improve [the Turkish skills of the children]. However, the parents do not want [that], they want that the Bulgarian language [should be taught in pre-school education].

Additionally, some of the parents, as H.İ. (43 years old, male, driver) articulated, their major excuse was that their children have already improved their Turkish language skills by watching satellite broadcasted Turkish TV channels; therefore, they do not need too much course hours to be literate in Turkish.

[My children] have already known Turkish language before starting to school. Both of them learnt [the Turkish language] more easily caused by [watching] satellite [broadcasted Turkish TVs]... They went to the Turkish language courses with some knowledge [about the Turkish language]. They do not need too much time [to study the Turkish language]. They [can] learn it within two or three years... Now, it is started to [be taught] English, a well, and it is too much [burden with the Turkish language]. Actually, they made a good [implementation] by making [the Turkish language] facultative [subject]; therefore, only those who want it can attend [to Turkish language course]... The important thing is learning the writing in Turkish. [Because] she had already known to speak in Turkish.

Another parent, Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed) stated that the pupils have to take too many course hours which overloaded their capacity; hence, there is no need for too many hours in studying of Turkish language.

[The pupils] have already seven course hours [per a day]. [Therefore] they have headache [problems]. They are still kids, and they also want to play games. If they had more [Turkish language course hours], where would be located [those course hours]... There is no time; they have too many lessons [already]. We had maximum six course hours per a day. Now, they have seven course hours [per a day] which is too much for them.

Hence, as it is articulated by the Turkish language teacher 'B', course load of the Turkish language courses is decreased as a consequence of the demands from the Turkish parents, who are in favour to be instructed more foreign language and computer courses instead of the Turkish language ones.

The [Turkish] pupils stopped to take the [Turkish language] course, because everybody inclines [to take] English courses. Some of the parents do not want to let their children to take Turkish language courses in order to take more English language courses. Last year, I had 120 pupils [who took the Turkish language course]; this year, [the number of them] decreased to 80.

As a result, since the education year of 2006 – 2007, Turkish language courses were decreased from four hours to two hour pro week. Not surprisingly, with two hour course load, the study of Turkish language cannot be instructed efficiently. The Turkish language teacher ‘A’ complained that he cannot teach properly Turkish language within two course hours, because the curriculum that they organised is according to four-hour load of the Turkish language course.

When [the Turkish language course] was [introduced] four hours [per a week], I can pay more attention [to the course]. Eventually, when [the course] was [taught] four hours, [I] could arrange one hour for grammar, one hour for literature, one hour for writing and one hour for exercises. Now, I have to teach lessons hastily within two course hours; and after that if I use remaining two or three minutes for vocabulary [exercise], [the lesson] ends.

The situation is even worse in the school of the Turkish teacher ‘B’, where for some of the grades, course hours were decreased from two to one in 2006.

Last year, first and second grades had two hours [Turkish language] courses per a week; this year they were decreased to one hour [per a week]. This [one hour] is allocated to computer lessons. Therefore, I cannot instruct my lessons properly [and] pupils cannot learn the Turkish alphabet with one hour [Turkish language course].

The ongoing problems of studying of Turkish language were also known by the politicians, as well. However, as one of the MPs of MRF (Movements of Rights and Freedoms) İlker Mustafov stated that there is not any programme to make the Turkish parents more consciousness about the Turkish language courses.

The fundamental problem is in [the opinions of] the Turkish [parents]; in other words, they are not very interested in [the situation of the Turkish language courses]. They said that... there is [not] a need for studying of Turkish; there are satellite [broadcasted Turkish TVs]; we can watch Turkish movies.

However, in my opinion, watching satellite [broadcasted TV] does not mean that you know the Turkish language [properly]... They said that [Turkish pupils] should learn English instead of Turkish language, because they have already known the Turkish language. Okay, [pupils] should learn English, too; it is not bad [to learn English but also Turkish]... In this respect, we should work [to increase the consciousness] among our community. Unfortunately, we do not have [such a programme].

6.2.1.5. Usage of ‘New’ Turkish Words

During the communist regime, the Turkish community had lost its links with Turkey, and this affected their spoken and written language. Therefore, some Turkish words used in Turkey could not find a way to enter into everyday speeches of Turks of Bulgaria. Especially after systematic usage of Bulgarian words instead of Turkish ones in Turkish-published media and in school books, more and more Bulgaro-Russian words find a place in the Turkish dialect of Turks in Bulgaria, such as *kombayner* (combine, in Turkish *biçerdöver*), *zavod* (factory, in Turkish *fabrika*), *yazovir* (lake, in Turkish *göl*) (Şimşir, 1986a: 236). There was no chance to read printed materials that were published in Turkey, and there was very limited Turkish media broadcasting. Watching a Turkish TV was out of question, as well. This situation and the influence of the Bulgarian language have affected the everyday speeches of the Turks; therefore, as Ş.S. (46 years old, male, unemployed) articulated, using lots of Bulgarian words became usual in the everyday speeches of the Turks.

We speak a mixed [language] here. Actually, it is very weird to speak like that... Half [of the speech] is constituted from Bulgarian [words] and half [of the speech] from Turkish [words]; [the speech] becomes spoilt.

On the contrary, in the post-communist period those restrictions were removed and most of the Turks started to watch Turkish TVs via digital receivers. As an outcome, by Turkish TV channels, the knowledge of pupils about words, which were not commonly used among the Turks of Bulgaria before, as articulated by A.H. (36 years old, male, electrician), began to change slightly over time.

Some words changed considerably. How can I say; speeches changed. Now, [for example], 'lütfen' (please) began to be used. Now, [these new words] are being used but slightly. It is not happening immediately. How it is saying; you internalise them slightly... It will happen like this; not immediately. [For example], we're using *buzdolabı* (refrigerator) not *hladilnik* [the Bulgarian one]. [However], we're [still] using *pechka* (stove) [instead of Turkish word, *soba*]. *Peralna* is being used but also sometimes *çamaşır makinesi* (wash machine) [is being used]... [Children] are learning [new words] by [watching Turkish] TVs.

Furthermore, Turkish teachers are also making some vocabulary exercises in order to teach new words, as stated by the Turkish language teacher 'A':

[I teach them and they] wrote the actual orthography of words, which we commonly use in our daily life [speeches], in separate notebooks.

Nevertheless, lack of sufficient and up-to-date text books was another problem of studying of Turkish. Text books that are being used in the Turkish language courses are outdated and physically damaged. The Turkish language teacher 'B' articulated insufficiency and inefficiency of the current educational books:

I have only 8 text books for 22 pupils at the first grade. [These] books were published in 1992 and now, they are threadbare. We could not find any [text] book in the schools and libraries of the municipality of Razgrad. There aren't any, they were lost! We asked numerous times about [at least photocopying of those books] but they could not help.

In the libraries of those two schools in which Turkish language is studied, there is not a single Turkish reading or literature book. Therefore, Turkish pupils cannot find reading materials to use out of the school, as it is stated by A.R. (31 years old, female, unemployed):

She should read [books] but now, there isn't any Turkish book in the library... If they are studying Turkish at the school, there should be Turkish books in the library. It may be difficult to make present [Turkish books] in the village's [reading house (*chitalishte*)] but there should be [Turkish books] in the school library. For example, fairy tales like 'Snow White'. I suppose there are also

Turkish versions of [those fairy tales]. Hence, [my daughter] can read both in Turkish and Bulgarian; there is not any loss for her.

Lack of supplementary reading materials are tried to be solved by using youth and children magazines published in Turkish or bilingually both in Turkish and Bulgarian. The Turkish language teacher ‘A’ also stated that he tries to substitute shortage of literature book by using magazines as supplementary materials:

The most difficult [situation] is in the literature, [because] we don’t have [reading] books. The parents can only allot money for Bulgarian books. However, there is not any place to buy, [if they would like to buy]... [As a supplementary material] there is for example a magazine called *Ümit* and *Balon*... *Balon* is generally for little children but for 6,7 and 8th grades, [we’re using] *Ümit*. It is published very nice stories and poems in *Ümit*.

Additionally, because of decreasing course hours of the Turkish language courses, Turkish language teachers cannot fulfil the 21-hour minimum teaching requirement only with teaching in Turkish language course; hence, they have to teach also other subjects, such as physical training. The Turkish language teacher ‘A’ explained the situation as below:

In order to receive a full salary, a teacher has to teach at least 21 course hours. In some schools, Turkish language course is less [than 21 course hours]; therefore, [some of the Turkish language teachers] cannot fulfil this [requirement].

Moreover, it depends on the understanding of the school and municipal administration. If they do not allowed them to teach other subjects, Turkish language teachers with below 21-hour teaching requirement can receive a salary as a part-time teacher.

6.2.2. Education in the Turkish Language as a Further Linguistic Right

The Education in mother tongue means that an education in institutions in which medium of instruction is minority vernacular and it is defined as one of the most

important and controversial linguistic rights. The Turkish minority in Bulgaria enjoyed this right until 1959 when their schools in which medium of instruction was Turkish, were merged with Bulgarian schools. In the first decades of the communist rule, there were also some departments in the University of Sofia in which medium of instruction were Turkish, as well. As further linguistic right related to education, I asked to the Turkish parents questions on the subject of education in primary and secondary, and university degrees in which medium of instruction would be in Turkish.

6.2.2.1. Turkish as a Medium of Instruction in the Primary and Secondary Education

I asked to the Turkish parents whether they are willing to send their children to primary and secondary schools where the medium of instruction is Turkish. Most of the parents expressed that they would send their children to study in those schools. Moreover, some of the interviewees could not state a detailed reason why they support the idea of opening of schools with a medium of instruction in Turkish. They usually expressed their supports with short sentences, such as “of course, I support it”, “it would be useful” and “why not”. It seems that they have not thought about the issue before. Nonetheless, I tried to encourage them to talk in details by asking further questions. For example, ‘For what reasons do you support this idea’ and ‘do you think that there is any possibility for graduates of those schools to be discriminated in labour market?’ Thereafter, they expressed more detailed answers.

However, even those who expressed detailed answers and showed the support of the idea, were generally sceptic about either possibility of opening such schools or their functionality in Bulgaria. One of the basic anxieties was the fear of discrimination towards students of those schools, as A.K. (44 years old, female, elderly care) articulated:

It would be useful but as we saw on TV, [reporters of the news] despised the [school and] the whole village near Haskovo by reason of wearing kerchiefs and being a religious school. They are really getting angry! However, nobody should be angry, [because] everyone has its own beliefs... [Such a school with medium of instruction in Turkish] is not possible, because nowadays, [the Bulgarian public opinion] has become very antagonistic towards the Turks.

Another fear of discrimination is related to the continuation of educational degree in the higher educational institutions. For example, A.R. (31 years old, female, unemployed) stated that the pupils of schools with a medium of instruction in Turkish would face difficulties in high schools and in the university entrance exams.

If a pupil studied in Turkish in the primary school, it would be difficult for [my daughter] when she would like to continue her education either in the high school or in the university. She will study the general subjects, as well, but it would be difficult caused by studying in Turkish.... It is better for her to study in Bulgarian and to have a general knowledge in Turkish [language]... She understands whatever she reads in Bulgarian language. If she goes to Turkey, [she can study in Turkish] but studying in Turkish in Bulgaria will make some problems [in the higher educational degrees].

One of the most optimistic expressions came from Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed):

Of course [such as school] will be functional. [He can choose] which one is easier for him... Then the child will decide. If he says that his Turkish skills are better [than Bulgarian], he can go to the Turkish [school]. If he says that he cannot rely on his Turkish language skills, he can go to the Bulgarian one...

One of the interviewees, A.R. (39 years old, male, official) expressed the importance of knowledge rather than the language. He believed that study in Turkish will make easier the study of Turkish pupils but he proposes that those schools should be vocational.

It doesn't matter whether he will study in Bulgarian or in Turkish but depends on his occupation. For example, he will repair a radio; the language doesn't matter [to repair it] whether he studied in Bulgarian or Turkish. In my opinion, [education in Turkish] should start after 8th grade or at first grade of high

school. At that time, he will learn Bulgarian language and [then] he will add his knowledge in Turkish [during his education in such a school]. After that it will be very easy for him... They can better understand in Turkish. For example, I am [almost] 40 years old and I can understand in Bulgarian what someone means, and the meanings of words but I do not know the exact meanings of words. However, when it is in Turkish, I can tell you immediately what [that word] means. It will be easier, [because] it is his mother tongue... If he studies in Turkish, in my opinion, he should receive a profession. In other words, he should graduate with a certain profession at this school.

Some respondents totally disagree with this idea, and thought such schools would worsen the already disadvantaged situation of the Turkish children by hindering the improvement of their Bulgarian language skills. Additionally, in the labour market they would face some obstacles. For example, A.H. (36 years old, male, electrician) states that if someone wants to live in Bulgaria, he should know Bulgarian language in order to find a job.

Here, the requirement is the Bulgarian language. I won't send [my children to those schools]. [Those schools] won't be detrimental but if he studied, where will he find a job? [Then] he must work in Turkey. He cannot arrange himself here [without Bulgarian language skills]. If he knew only Turkish, he would not buy even a ticket from Razgrad to our village... If you live in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian language is a must, isn't it?

6.2.2.2. Turkish as Medium of Instruction in the Higher Education

Opening a state funded university with a medium of instruction in Turkish, came into Bulgarian political discourse after ten-request petition of Menders Küngün in 2006. Just like the society as a whole, interviewees looked like that they have not thought the issue before. Until the petition, the discourse turned mainly around opening of philological departments in purpose to train Turkish language teachers.

Most of the interviewees found opening such a university useful but just like the idea of opening Turkish secondary schools with a precondition: the degrees would be offered by this university has to be recognised in Bulgaria. For instance, A.R. (31 years old, female, unemployed) found functional the idea of a Turkish

university and articulated the importance of the recognition of the diploma with this line:

In reality, it won't be any difference between studying either in Turkey or [in Bulgaria]; it will be helpful, as well, so why not? Because she has already knows the Bulgarian language. [It is] just like when [students] from Turkey come to [Bulgaria to study in a university] and attend preparation classes [in the Bulgarian language], [after they return to Turkey], they can use their professions [that they obtained from a Bulgarian university]. Therefore, it doesn't matter whether she will study in Turkey or in [Bulgaria in a university with a medium of instruction in Turkish]... if her diploma will be useful [or recognised].

However, some of them, as M.A. (44 years old, female, kindergartner) expressed that it would make some difficulties for graduates in the labour market:

... First, she [should] attend to the Bulgarian [university], if it won't be possible, then she can go to the Turkish [university]. However, if she lives [in Bulgaria], studying in the university in which medium of instruction is Bulgarian will be more useful for her. Attending to the Turkish [university] will be also useful, because our mother tongue is Turkish, even though we live in Bulgaria... Well, it's good to study in Turkish [university] but she cannot find a job [in Bulgaria]. In this respect, in my opinion, it is better for her to study in Bulgarian language... Because everybody [in the job interviews] checks in which [university] did you graduate [and] what did you study.

On the contrary, those who supported the idea of opening a Turkish university demonstrated that such obstacles would be handled, because the important thing is knowledge and specialisation in a certain profession. For instance, S.İ. (32 years old, female, unemployed) stated that confusion of Bulgarian and Turkish terms would not make a serious problem, because it would be organised a special course to learn special terms in Bulgarian, as well.

[It would be useful, because the school] possibly would have a kind of preparation class. It would not possibly make an obstacle [for finding a job], if he also knows Bulgarian, as well. Here, it can be organised a [special] course to teach Bulgarian [terms], for example, names of the medicines. Studying in Turkish won't make any difficulties.

As a result, the study at a university or in a primary and secondary educational institutions where all or most of the subjects will be offered in Turkish, is not well-developed idea among the Turkish minority. Their main concerns were closing the gap of Bulgarian language skills between the Turkish students and their Bulgarian counterparts. Even though most of them supported the study in Turkish at the university, their main priorities were improving the linguistic capacities of their children rather than to seek a place to accommodate their mother tongue within the educational institutions, in general.

6.2.3. The Turkish Minority Media

Right to use a minority language in media is one of the crucial linguistic rights. Moreover, the Turkish minority media in the municipality of *Işıklar* (Samuil) is underdeveloped like in the other parts of the country. In this respect, I asked questions in order to understand the reasons of its underdevelopment and as well as the views of the Turkish minority on the issue of the Turkish minority media.

6.2.3.1. Programmes in the Turkish Language in the Bulgarian National Television and Radio

As I stated before, watching Turkish TV channels among the Turkish minority via satellite receivers is very common in the region and as well as in the entire Bulgaria. Most of the people prefer to watch Turkish TVs rather than Bulgarian ones. There were mainly two air broadcasters Bulgarian National Television (BNT) and BTV, which are preferred generally for informative and news programmes, as it was stated by A.K. (44 years old, female, elderly care):

We are watching only the weather forecast on Bulgarian [TVs], [because] we are always watching [satellite broadcasted] Turkish TVs. We know what happens in Turkey but if a war occurs in Bulgaria, we will not know it (she laughed)!

Furthermore, since 2000, BNT is broadcasting ten-minute information programme in Turkish between 17:10 and 17:20, before news in Bulgarian language. Almost all of the interviewed persons stated or criticised the unsuitability of those programmes due broadcasting hours and its length. For example, M.S. (45 years old, male, unemployed) criticised the programme because of its format:

I watched it and I disliked it... Because... it does not give recent news. It gives old and outdated news... 10 minutes is not enough. If it is called as 'news', it should include news, sport, weather forecast, [as well]. It should give extensive news, world-wide news...

Even Behçet Süleyman, the provincial deputy governor of *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), stated that those programmes are not functional because they are translated versions of Bulgarian news, which is aired just after the Turkish news programme.

In my opinion, this [Turkish] programme on BNT is not serviceable, because before it, there is also news in Bulgarian; [the Turkish one] is a translated form of [Bulgarian one]. There should be interviews from the regions with a dense [Turkish] population. [They should be] about different subjects, [for instance], today about stockbreeding, tomorrow tobacco..., next day health... [It] should give news about the region. I do not have any interest in current format of the programme. I do not watch it, too... However, it is also a success, because they [*Ataka* (Attack)] do not want it, even it is only 10 minutes.

Furthermore, the length of those programmes is criticised according to citizenship and minority rights by İlker Mustafaov (MP from MRF), as well.

In Bulgaria, there are about one million Turkish speaking people, which are Turks and Turkish speaking Roma. These people are Bulgarian citizens, they work in Bulgaria, they contribute the Bulgarian GDP, they pay their taxes to the Bulgarian state; therefore, it is very normal to be [broadcasted] Turkish news. [Otherwise], how can they be informed? There are one million Turkish speaking people out of total seven million Bulgarian population. Do we deserve only fifteen-minute news [in Turkish]? In my opinion, it is very insufficient... Additionally, it is broadcasted at 4 o'clock where there is the lowest rating.

Interviewees also expressed that those programmes are broadcasting during working hours and they cannot have a chance to watch them unless they are at

home. Even when they are not at work, watching Turkish news is still difficult for them. Because, those hours, especially in the summer time, are time to take care of their animals, i.e. feeding, and waiting for shepherd or wrangler. Ş.S. (46 years old, male, unemployed) expressed that he was at work during broadcasting time of those programmes and he cannot watch it.

It cannot be watched [because], it is broadcasting too early. They're broadcasting news at 5 [o'clock]. For whom they broadcast it?

İ.R. (38 years old, male, farmer) also stated that:

We cannot watch [the programme]; we take care of our animals.

Moreover, almost all of them stated that those programmes are suitable generally for giving information about the country to the elderly who does not understand Bulgarian language. As A.K. (44 years old, female, elderly care) expressed it.

It is serviceable especially for elderly, because they don't understand anything in Bulgarian. It is only 5 or 10 minutes but it is enough for them. [Because] elderly want something in Turkish. If it is extended, it will be better.

As İ.E. (31 years old, female, unemployed) also stated, those programmes are symbolical rather than informative.

I watched it once or twice, that's all. It seems to me that it is symbolic, [due to] its short [broadcasting] time.

I asked to the interviewees whether they would like to see a Turkish language channel broadcasting in Bulgaria, and all of them stressed that opening a Turkish TV channel would be very serviceable and they will certainly watch it. Two of the interviewees stated before I asked that there should be a Turkish TV channel which will broadcast from Bulgaria. Firstly, A.R. (39 years old, male, official) expressed that there should be TV channel with an assigned frequency line as it was in other states.

I watched Turkish [programmes on BTV] but of course, 10 minutes is not enough. In another states there is daylong broadcasting in Turkish. It should be also in [Bulgaria]. For example, they should arrange a TV channel and a different frequency line [for it]...

Second responded who states, before I asked her, there should be a Turkish TV in Bulgaria is A.K. (44 years old, female, elderly care). She stated that if there is channel which belongs to a xenophobic party, *Ataka* (Attack), there should be also a channel for Turks, as well.

Look, how many TV channels are in Turkey? There are [channels] in Bulgaria, as well, but if *Ataka* (Attack) is established a channel, they [Turkish media of Turkey] should establish a channel in [Bulgaria]. The people will watch it... It should make [programmes] about Bulgaria but in Turkish...

Behçet Süleyman (the provincial deputy governor) expressed a plan of such a TV channel, which will broadcast at least from cable.

Probably, on the top [of the party] there is an idea about private [Turkish] channel that will broadcast in the cable. In other words, Turkish news, Turkish interviews, everything in Turkish.

Hence, one year later in 2007, one of the regional broadcasting companies, *Ludogorie TV*, began to broadcast not whole day but from three to four hours in Turkish.

Furthermore, Bulgarian National Radio (BNR) is also broadcasting three times per a day half-hour Turkish programmes in Turkish regions. In those programmes, it is given some news and information about the minority, and the radio plays Turkish folk, nostalgic and popular songs. Broadcasting three times per a day, increased the possibility of persons in various occupations with different working hours to listen to those programmes even at work. A.R. (39 years old, male, official) expressed that he can watch BNR's Turkish programme, because it is aired at 8 o'clock when he is at home.

For example, there is Sofia Radio (or BNR) and at 8'clock we listen to it. [I like] old songs, news [that they are broadcasting]... Whatever it has, it is a Turkish broadcast. There are salutations [*'selamlamalar'*] and other things, as well.

Many respondents expressed that the section that is called 'salutation' [*'selamlama'*] in which listeners send their greetings to their families and friends, is one of the most favourable parts of the Turkish broadcast on BNR. However, a correspondent of the provincial newspaper *Ekip 7* and the Turkish service of BNR, Gafur Mustafafov, criticised this part by reason of decreasing the quality and serviceability of the programme.

In the last times [on BNR's Turkish programmes], there are always those salutations. Okay, I understood... our Orhan celebrates his second birthday; so let's salute him! What if we do not salute him? Is his birthday very important? ... The programme should be in order and serviceable.

6.2.3.2. Print-Media in the Turkish Language

The municipality of *Işıklar* (Samuil) is a rural area and even the centre of the municipality, *Işıklar* (Samuil), is officially a village; and therefore, there is no distribution of national and regional newspapers. Hence, there is no distribution of a Turkish newspaper, as well. This issue is mainly expressed by the respondents and most of them can buy newspaper only when they go to bigger centres.

The most well-known Turkish newspaper of the municipality is a weekly *Zaman*, and it is financed and managed by Turkey's daily *Zaman* which is a religious sensitive and conservative newspaper. Most of the respondents replied that they heard about *Zaman* and most of them had a chance to read it. Last year, some of them subscribed to it but they did not renew their subscriptions in 2006. One of the reasons of not renewing their subscriptions is the subscription system itself. Yearly fee of subscription is 12 *Levas* (circa 6 Euro or 12 New Turkish Lira), and the population which live mostly in or below poverty lines cannot accommodate a

budget for a yearly subscription, even the fee seems relatively low. The newspaper is criticised by some of the respondents in terms of its weekly character, which causes publication of somehow one-week-old news. For instance, Ş.S. (46 years old, male, unemployed) in addition to the newspaper's outdated news, stated that Turkey's other newspaper should enter also into the Bulgarian media market, as they did in the Western European countries.

The newspaper is nice but its news is outdated. [News] are published one or two weeks after the situation was happened. We watch them on TV before they published it... If it is published at least bi-weekly, it will be enough. For example, they send [newspaper] to Europe; are there Turks only in Germany? Here, there are, too. They should invest also in [Bulgaria].

One of the main reasons of insufficient publication in Turkish is financial problems of the Turkish minority, as Fikri Raşidov, the proprietor of quarterly *Deliorman* stated:

Because of the privatisation and integration to the World systems, our community... faced financial problems..., especially Turks those who lives in the mixed regions [faced high rates] of unemployment. Our community tries to survive and cannot pay attention to the cultural [affairs]...

The mayor of the municipality, Nedim Mustafov, associated the issue also with the similar perspective:

Step by step we gained the rights... but our citizens do not appreciate [those improvements]. They said, 'so what if the magazine is in Turkish?' I said them you'd worked for [and] you'd dreamed about that someday we would read also a Turkish newspaper. However, they said now, [the newspaper] doesn't feed us on. Now, they are thinking about [maintaining] their food [to survive].

Another problem arises closely linked to the previous one. If the minority cannot buy the minority print-media, how these media will finance themselves? Fikri Raşiof of *Deliorman* stated that they receive aids from MRF-governed municipalities and from private companies as sponsors. Furthermore, Nedim Mustafov stated that he always tries to respond the financial aid demands from such

Turkish magazines. Moreover, he highlighted that those Turkish print-media should introduce themselves to the minority more effectively, such as via face-to-face conversations, and they have to learn to walk in their shoes.

Everyday, someone asks us help. (He show an unopened letter) *Deliorman* Turkish Cultural Foundation (the foundation that publishes the magazine *Deliorman*), now I will opened it and it will be written 'our mayor would you help us with some money'. We have already done it but I know what is written in the letter without open it. Last week, I met with a man who also engaged with [media]. I said to him it cannot continue only with our helps. You should go to near to the citizens, and [try to explain your goals]. It won't go on... by giving the magazines to the chief of villages [in order to be sold by them].

According to İlker Mustafov (MP from MRF) if there is demand for Turkish newspapers, the market will supply it.

If the market needs such a newspaper, it will [supply] it; probably there is not such a [demand] in Bulgaria. Because ... it is difficult also for me to read in Turkish. It is better to read the news in Bulgarian language. Why? Because we did not receive such [Turkish] education.

One can argue that leaving the situation in the hands of the market cannot solve the problem. Moreover, Fikri Raşidov stated, they could not find a support neither from international NGOs nor the central governmental bodies. Hence, they gave up searching for their aids.

Last time, we made a project with a Balkan Turkish foundation in *Şumnu* (Shumen). We would publish together a newspaper, Balkan, and our magazine, *Deliorman*... This project also could not attract the attention of... international NGOs... When also this project was not [succeeded], we... drew a conclusion that it won't be done by this way.

6.2.4. Usage of the Turkish Names of Toponyms

Most of the places in Bulgaria had Turkish names; however, as a result of systematic mass name changes, only few of them can exist today. In the municipality of *Işıklar* (Samuil), whose name also was changed from 'Işıklar' to

'Samuil' in 5 November 1934 ('Golden Book' of *Işıklar* (Samuil) Municipality as cited in the Official Web Site of *Işıklar* (Samuil) Municipality, www.samuil.org), there is not any name of a village that could escape from renaming. Nevertheless, Turkish names of the villages are still widely in use. All of the respondents confirmed that they use mostly Turkish names of the places. Furthermore, almost all of them made clear differentiation of Turkish and Bulgarian usages. They stated that they use Turkish names while they are talking with Turks; in contrast, they used Bulgarian names in conversations with Bulgarians.

Moreover, there is not a consistency in usages of cities, towns and municipal centres. Most of the respondents use both Turkish and Bulgarian names of big centres. Some of them even use both of them within the interview. It could be caused by assigned meaning of the places. For instance, people go to the municipal centre *Işıklar* (Samuil) generally for bureaucratic and administrative reasons, and the name that they always face in every document and in every corner is Samuil. Therefore, they can confuse names more easily. It could be argued also for other big centres. In contrast, villages are relatively apart from official life and belong mostly to the private or unofficial life. Hence, usages of their names can remain constant in Turkish. Some of the interviewees used Bulgarian names of some cities and considering them Turkish, even names of some well-known cities.

I asked to interviewees whether they would like to see the Turkish names of their villages as official ones together with Bulgarian ones. Almost all of them responded they would be very happy to see that. However, I observed that they have not thought about the issue before I asked them. Some of them, as D.A. (36 years old, female, kindergartner) understood using of Turkish name as a Latin transliteration.

It will be helpful to drivers. For example, [those who] come from Turkey to visit [their relatives]. It is written in other places, for example in Shumen, but there is not such a practice in villages. However, in the urban centres, there is such [usage] in Latin [scripts].

Some of people replied that it will not be permitted in Bulgaria; even they found the idea ‘very good’. For instance, A.K. (44 years old, female, elderly care) stated that bilingual usage of villages will not be allowed, and she is satisfied with the current Bulgarian names in favour of ending discriminatory actions.

[Bilingual usage] certainly won’t be implemented. Well, one should look into the environment that he/ she lives. Because, I know these places [belong] to Bulgaria. I know that I was born here; however, we are satisfied to this [monolingual usage]. If its [name] is Kara Mihal, it can remain as Kara Mihal... whatever it is. It is not more than the name of the village, and it will be enough just so this discrimination does not happen...

Those who stated that they would be very happy to see their villages’ names as an official one together with Bulgarian name mostly did not give details about. Except only an interviewee, A.R. (39 years old, male, official) who stated:

Its name is actually [*Işıklar*]. There is an old train station here. The name [of this station] was not Samuil; on the contrary [before it was renamed] it was *Işıklar*. In addition, there was an iron-made signboard and on it, it was written *Işıklar*. [The signboard] is still there... It is exactly the building which is now a Police station... Of course, I want to see that [both names are used]... Now, the Bulgarian [authorities] disliked the name that we gave [to our place], and changed it with her name...

Existence of a material sign could be a reason of this awareness. One should also note that road signs were erected due to building of roads, and roads were built in order to integrate region into national economy after Bulgarian independence and especially during the communist period. It is a kind of requirement to write the name of the place in order to inform drivers who passes those roads. On the other hand, *Işıklar* (Samuil) integrated into national economy and market via the construction of the railroad between *Ruşçuk* (Ruse) and Varna in 1868, long before the integration of villages via motorways. There ought to be a sign to show the name of the place is *Işıklar* (Samuil). Hence, a material sign could possibly attract the attention of the respondent.

One of the interviewees, Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed) expressed her support to bilingual signs and bilingual usage of villages' names by stating that it would help and encourage the young generation to know and use Turkish names of their villages.

Nowadays children don't know [the Turkish names of our village]. It will be nice for [information]. You're asking to children, 'where are you from?' [They replied by saying the Bulgarian name of the village]. I informed my children but there are others who don't know.

Because, as I also observed during my fieldwork research and during my personal relationships in the region, in contrast to the respondents' usage, young generation of Turks prefer to use Bulgarian names of the places due its higher 'credibility'.

There is not any single street name in Turkish or about the Turkish culture in the municipality (BHC, 2003b). During the interview with the mayor of the municipality, Nedim Mustafov, I asked this situation. He replied that there was not any attempt to do so:

The municipal assembly has a right to change street names. However, I don't know whether such situations (annulments of changing of street names in Southern regions) were happened. Until now, we've not tried to do such a thing.

It was a natural response, because even there would be any attempt to name streets related to the Turkish existence and Turkish ethnic culture would possibly be annulled by the provincial court, like decisions of the courts in the Southern municipalities between 1993 and 1996 (BHC, 1995; 1996 and 1999b)⁹⁵.

⁹⁵ See Chapter 4 for details.

6.2.5. Usage of the Turkish Language before Administrative Bodies

Using Turkish in administrative bodies is a *de facto* action and most of the respondents strongly expressed that they prefer to use Turkish in the municipality office. They made some differentiations and set up some criteria about Turkish usage in the municipality. Most of them demonstrated that they use Turkish if they know the person in contact is Turk, otherwise they prefer to use Bulgarian firstly, and a very few person believed that it should be used Bulgarian language in any cases, such as A.R. (31 years old, female, unemployed).

In the municipality, I usually used the Bulgarian language. Because, it is a formal place; however, [officials and workers] generally speak in Turkish with each other but I [prefer] to use the Bulgarian language.

Additionally, if there is a Bulgarian in the office, as Z.S. (36 years old, female, secretary) stated, they prefer to use Bulgarian as a respect to that person who does not know Turkish.

Usually, I try to use the Bulgarian language, because if there is anyone who [doesn't know Turkish], it will be an disrespectful action [towards him/ her]. If there is not a Bulgarian in the office, we can speak Turkish but if someone comes, we have to switch to use Bulgarian. Otherwise, it will be [perceived] as disrespect to other ones.

Furthermore, Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed) stated that she uses both languages and occasionally switches from one language to other one.

While we are talking, he/ she is switching from Turkish to Bulgarian, and I do the same. We speak a mixed [language]. ... [I]f the person that I talk is a Turk, we are switching to Bulgarian [too]... and than [again] to Turkish. We do it unconsciously.

Moreover, using of Turkish is not a kind of political action but rather a practical one. People prefer to use their mother tongue because they know people in the office also speak Turkish with each other. However, some respondents blame

Turkish officials if they are speaking in Bulgarian, as A.H. (33 years old, female, housewife) stated:

... There are Turks and when they got a post [in the office] they behave arrogantly and speak in Bulgarian. However, there are also some officials that you can speak with them in Turkish if you recognised them that they are Turks...

As a result, most of the Turks did not face any problems to speak in Turkish when they went to the municipality. It should be noted that they go to the municipality usually in order to take their social assistance payments or salaries. Hence, usually, they do not need to speak too much but only signing documents, as it was articulated by M.A. (44 years old, female, kindergartner):

We go there only to sign some documents... The language that we use depends on with who we are talking. However, we usually don't speak with them; they give you a document and you sign it, that's all...

6.2.6. Usage of the Turkish Minority Names without '-ov' and '-ova' Suffixes

I have asked to the interviewees their opinions about using and not using of '-ov' and '-ova' suffixes in surnames. The general attitude was to link usages of these suffixes with ethnic identity. They do not prefer to use those suffixes because they sound like Bulgarian names. For instance, A.R. (39 years old, male, official) expressed the importance of '-ov' suffixes as a symbolic marker of ethnicity:

If there is '-ov', it sounds like a Bulgarian [name] but without '-ov', I understood this [person] is a Turk...

Additionally, some of them demonstrated that there is not any difference between using and not using those suffixes. For example, İ.E. (31 years old, female, unemployed) stated that she have never thought about it, and it does not make a sense for her.

I don't know, I have never thought about it. With or without '-ov' is the same, because it can be understood [with or without '-ov/ova'] that it is a Turkish name.

A number of respondents, contrary, expressed that they prefer those suffixes because of practical reasons. For instance, M.N. (40 years old, female, saleswoman) expressed that those suffixes indicate masculinity and femininity⁹⁶ of the bearer, and she found their usages practical.

... Actually, it was better when [these suffixes] were used. One could recognise femininity and masculinity of the bearer. Now it is unrecognisable if someone calls them with their surnames. Now, you cannot understand only by seeing one's surname whether you will meet female or male.

Another problem concerning the minority rights is re-changing forcefully changed names, especially for those who live in Turkey but hold also Bulgarian citizenships. There are some bureaucratic difficulties of renaming and most importantly that renaming process is questionable because it would legalise the forced name changing campaign. This is because during the forced name changes, one forced to sign a petition that he/ she would like to change 'voluntarily' his or her name into Bulgarian name. Hence, by using the same methods or petitions, it would mean that the campaign is not annulled officially. According to İlker Mustafov (MP from MRF), such formal procedures are being used, because most of the documents from the campaign are lost.

Too many documents were destroyed in those years; therefore, some of the documents [could not be found]. Because, the communists thought that [the regime] would go on like this. Hence, such a procedure is implemented.

Nonetheless, this reason is questionable, because most of the re-naming process was done in light of the population registers, which includes forcefully changed names, as well.

⁹⁶ '-ov' refers to masculinity and '-ova' to femininity of the bearer.

6.3. Interpreting the Results: Symbolic Power of Language and *Diglossia*

One of the most interesting results of this fieldwork study is symbolic power relationship of language and *diglossic* relationships among Turkish and Bulgarian languages, and as well as among Turkish dialect of the region and official Turkish dialect.

In terms of symbolic power, I have asked to the interviewees whether they have Bulgarian friends or not, and if yes, in which language they speak to each other. As a result of predominantly Turkish composition of the region, Turkish in personal communication challenges the symbolic power of Bulgarian language. For instance, those who have Bulgarian friends prefer to communicate in Turkish, and those Bulgarians who can speak Turkish, opt to use Turkish in personal communications. For instance, A.R.. (39 years old, male, official) expressed that his Bulgarian friends or colleagues prefer to speak Turkish.

There are Bulgarians who speak very clear Turkish that one cannot understand whether he is Bulgarian or not... [Of course] I speak in Turkish [with them]. [The prohibition] of Turkish was before 1989. We speak Turkish. Here, there is a Bulgarian for instance and [he speaks Turkish]. He doesn't get angry [of speaking in Turkish]! He is getting used to it. He has a friend from *Kemallar* (İsperih) who comes here to work. He is also a Bulgarian but speaks Turkish, [as well]. It depends on time, for instance, if there is someone who does not know [Turkish], we are switching to Bulgarian. However, if we are all Turks and there is only one Bulgarian who [can speak in Turkish]... he also speaks Turkish with us.

According to Bourdieu (2005), unification of the linguistic market has not completed yet, and minority languages would find spaces to increase their symbolic capitals, such as prestige, in the regional level. However, this does not mean that all of the Bulgarians in the region opt to speak Turkish. It could be argued that the superior position of the Bulgarian language sometimes is challenged in personal conversations but not at all. For example, M.N. (40 years old, female, saleswoman) stated that some Bulgarian even they know Turkish, never speaks it.

... Some of them do not know [Turkish] and some of them know but do not speak consciously. Therefore, I speak them in Bulgarian... Only elderly in the village speaks in Turkish but youngsters do not... They don't speak [Turkish] even in reality they can speak... I don't know why! There are some of them who are curious to know meanings of some words. They heard something in Turkish and ask the meaning of the word.

Superior position of the official Turkish dialect versus the regional dialect of the region is evitable as Fishmann (1967) suggests. Firstly, during my interviews, even I was born in the region and know how to speak the regional dialect of Turkish; some of the respondents tried to speak and in some cases forced themselves to speak in the official dialect of Turkish. Additionally, in some cases they also stated the inferiority of the regional dialect versus the official one, which I spoke; even I have tried not to do. For instance, as N. Y. (36 years old, female, unemployed) and A.İ. (40 years old, male, driver) demonstrated.

Y.N.: We, here, cannot speak Turkish. We cannot speak Turkish like you [in Turkey].

A.İ.: Here you see how we speak Turkish. And we suppose ourselves Turks.

Furthermore, speaking Turkish somehow interrelated not only to ethnic identification but also to rural identity [*köylülük*] and eventually, it makes Turkish as a low-prestige language compared to Bulgarian, which is interrelated with urbaneness. Respondents demonstrated that when they speak Bulgarian in urban centres, for instance, Y.N. (36 years old, female, unemployed), especially rural Turks can be easily distinguishable from their speeches.

Bulgarian is more important for us, because we live in Bulgaria. Because, when we go to the town, we can be easily identified from our accent of Bulgarian language. They are easily recognised that we are villagers. We cannot properly speak. Only from one word! Just say hello, they will understand [that you are a Turk].

M.N. (40 years old, female, saleswoman) also added:

They recognised that we are Turk. There is no chance to be not recognised. Bulgarians understood even from our dressing [style] that we are Turks.

One should note that most of the Turks live in the rural areas, and in the province of *Hezargrad* (Razgrad) only in the central municipality, which is *Hezargrad* (Razgrad), Turks are not in majority. Not surprisingly, the central municipality is also the most urbanised centre of the province.

As a conclusion of this chapter, Turks assign much more importance to the Bulgarian language compare to the Turkish language. This could be interpreted as a result of the hegemony of Bulgarian language in politics and economy. Even though the Turks in the rural areas could escape in some cases from this hegemony, they cannot resist to the status of Bulgarian language as the prestigious language. Nevertheless, the perception of the hegemonic power of the Bulgarian language is reproduced at schools, universities, in politics, economics and even in the social life. Another point is that they are not willing to resist or even to question the hegemony of the Bulgarian language; in contrast, they reproduce it via the internalisation of the superiority. This is what exactly Bourdieu suggests in his theory of symbolic power and language.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

“A problem cannot be solved with the same consciousness that created it.”
Albert Einstein

One of the central aims of this study was to evaluate and understand the perceptions and experiences of the Turkish minority members towards the present linguistic rights in the post-communist period and further possible improvements on them. Additionally, the study tries to analyse and compare the linguistic policies of Bulgaria with a socio-political perspective by focusing on the different political experiences of the country and their implications on the situation of the Turkish minority regarding the linguistic rights. In order to understand the perceptions and experiences of the minority members, I conducted a fieldwork research in the municipality of *Işıklar* (Samuil), which is one of the Turkish populated regions of Bulgaria where Turks constitute the absolute majority of the population. I used in-depth interview technique in order to generate their views towards implementations of ongoing and further linguistic rights.

The first attempt of this study was to answer how the linguistic policies in Bulgaria evolved and have been altered in different political periods, from the establishment of the Bulgarian Principality in 1878 until recent times. As one of the key instruments of the linguistic policies, how education of the Turkish minority has been organised and implemented in different periods of the Bulgarian history. Eventually, what are the main reasons of those policy changes and consistencies of the various Bulgarian governments? In this respect, in order to give a more comprehensive outlook to these questions, the study was divided basically into four parts where different periods were examined according to the linguistic policies implemented towards the Turkish minority, namely the late Ottoman rule, the era of the Bulgarian Monarchy, the communist period and the contemporary post-communist time.

Second and the main task of the study is to focus on the crucial questions via the analyses of the fieldwork research: how are ongoing linguistic policies and current linguistic rights perceived by the Turkish minority members? What are the problems of current implementations in the eyes of the minority and beyond, what are their responses to those implementations? What are the reasons behind and responses to current linguistic policies? Did the Turkish minority demand some improvements related to their linguistic rights and if yes, what kind of improvements do they demand?

Bulgarian linguistic policies related to the Turkish minority have not followed straight lines but they were rather floating and sporadic policies that are open to periodical alterations. Moreover, it can be argued that until the end of the World War I, the linguistic policies of Bulgaria were shaped by the ignorance of the Turkish minority or in other words, leaving it to its own fate. Therefore, even its deep and chronic economic backwardness, the Turkish minority could try to keep alive and manage its ethnolinguistic issues. During this period, it kept the control over its educational institutions as well as, its print media. However, by the end of World War I, under the rule of the Agrarian Union, its ignorance came to an end; and furthermore, the linguistic institutions of the Turkish minority, especially schools, began to be improved. During the three-year administration of the Agrarians not only that new Turkish minority schools are opened but also that their material and educational needs became to be supplied. First time in the Bulgarian history, Turkish educational institutions were promoted by the government.

After the overthrow of the Agrarian government, its successor governments, whose nationalistic policies evolved to fascism, which took away almost all of the gains from the Agrarian rule within about 20 years. Establishment of the Turkish nation-state next to the borders of Bulgaria was negatively perceived by the Bulgarian governments and it influenced the Bulgarian minority language policies. As the part of the pre-World War II times, minorities were addressed as one of the key

operation tools to claim mythical greater states or for the unification of all co-ethnics into one state. However, in the Balkans, if a certain state had such claims, it was very possible that another state or other states also had similar claims to its population as well. Therefore, in marching to this road, in order to escape from counter claims, minorities should be kept passive and powerless as long as it is possible. Hence, establishment of the Turkish nation-state in 1923, was perceived as a competitor with possible counter claims. In this respect, in order to decrease that perceived threat to the minimum margins, the Turkish minority had to be kept silent. In order to maintain this goal, historical ties between the Turkish minority and Turkey were attempted to be diminished. One of the appropriate examples of such policy is the restrictions and prohibitions of the usage of the new Turkish-Latin alphabet by the Turkish minority, and termination of the Turkish minority press entirely.

By the establishment of the communist regime in 1944, the linguistic rights of the Turkish minority started to be improved. Similar to the Soviet solution of nationalities problem, the new regime employed various policies that dealt with linguistic rights of the Turkish minority. Those new policies and its institutions were under the control of the state; hence, the relative autonomy of the Turkish linguistic institutions came to the end. By maintaining control over these institutions, such as Turkish schools and Turkish media, the new regime expected to rasp or ruin firstly the religious identity religious identity by promoting Turkish ethnic identity. It was suggested that the loyalty of Turkish minority would increase when their rights would be promoted by the communist regime. Moreover, they would have no need to identify themselves in terms of ethnicity but rather as a part of the working class. Nevertheless, ethnolinguistic policies during the communist regime were not stable, as well, and the first turning point came after the April Plenum in 1956. By the 1959 education year, Turkish schools were merged with Bulgarian ones, and then Turkish became an optional language course for minority pupils in Turkish regions. It can be argued that one of the reasons behind the shift in the linguistic policies was the failure of expectations of voluntary identification of

Turks within the socialist society. Hence, promoting the ethnic affiliation of Turks via separate minority schools could not increase their identification within the socialist society. Post-1959 years until 1971 were dominated by integration policies in which there was still a voluntary hope of integration. However, with the new 1971 Constitution those were abandoned, as well. While the constitution was still guaranteeing some linguistic rights of the Turks, such as education of Turkish, in reality, Turkish language courses and publication of Turkish literature were ceased in 1974. Only some minority media could remain via bilingual publications. Those measures could not meet the expectations, too. Therefore, a severe but in the eyes of the regime an absolute policy was put into force: the forced assimilation campaign of Turks. The campaign was implemented in 1984 and 1985 with forcefully changes of Turkish names into Bulgarian ones. It is followed by the prohibition of any activities related to the Turkish culture, language and ethnicity, and the existence of Turks in Bulgaria began to be denied.

As it is observed in a study of Eminov (1997), I also found in my study that various communist policies in different periods have different impacts on the Turkish minority and on its ethnolinguistic character. As the result of these policy implementations, Turkish linguistic abilities of different generations drastically differed from each other. Those who graduated at Turkish minority schools until 1958 were literate in Turkish but not all of them had literacy in Bulgarian. However, those who graduated between 1959 and 1974 at schools which merged with Bulgarian ones were bilingually literate in Bulgarian and Turkish. Furthermore, those who graduated after 1974 have limited Turkish literacy, and they could read and write only by reason of studying foreign languages, mainly French.

The collapse of the Eastern Bloc and communist regime in 1989 has opened a new era abolishing the forced assimilation campaign and its implementations. In reality, the linguistic policies in the new era were similar to those which were implemented in 1958 – 1974 rather than 1944 – 1958. The Turkish minority has a right to study

of its mother tongue but not the right to study at and open schools and universities where the medium of instruction would be Turkish. Additionally, there are ten minutes news programme in the Bulgarian National Television in weekdays and Turkish programmes in the Bulgarian National Radio three times a day. It has a right to use its mother tongue and make publications with its language.

The Turkish minority in Bulgaria had traumatic experiences, which affected their ethnic identity. Firstly, when they were part of the Ottoman Empire they belonged to the ruling ethnicity and with the establishment of the independent Bulgarian state, their status turned to be minority within new state. Their 'cure' for this traumatic circumstance was immigration to Turkey. As a result, significant numbers of Turkish population immigrated to Turkey in various periods. It should be noted that their first response to the changing conditions was also migration. For example, after establishment of the communist state, about 150 000 of them migrated to Turkey.

Another trauma which they experienced was the forced assimilation campaign in which their ethnolinguistic identity is attempted to be destroyed. Their response or 'cure' was migration, too. However, after dissolution of communism and establishment of the democratic state they had an access to the political area where they were only symbolically represented during the previous periods. Hence, MRF and politics began to be their main response to the problems that they faced in the post-communist transition period.

During the communist regime and its wide range of atheist propaganda and implementations, most of the Turkish minority members started to give lesser importance to religion. Religion was not removed from their identity totally but lost its primacy in signifying the ethnic boundaries. The new role began to be played by language. Language was one of the major targets of the forced assimilation campaign and this lead to increase its importance as main ethnic boundary marker.

Their demand to study their mother tongue was a kind of guarantee for the continuation of their language (Turkish).

Nonetheless, my study showed that Turkish language and Turkish language education were perceived as important markers of the Turkish ethnic identity. Therefore, their main motives by sending their children to take Turkish language courses were ethnic. They generated a simple conclusion: if someone identifies himself/ herself as a Turk, he/ she should learn the Turkish language and be literate in it.

The decrease in the political tensions, EU candidacy and being part of the government via their party, has been perceived by the Turkish minority members as that the stability been sustained and their ethnolinguistic identity has been secured. They responded to change their attention to economic situations rather than political ones. Hence, the attendance rates of the Turkish language courses began to drop. In the new millennium, rising of xenophobic right-wing parties affected Bulgaria, as well. After the success of the fascist Attack coalition in the general elections in 2005 and their increasing anti-Turkish discourse turned the attention of the Turkish minority again to the political problems, which has been centred among their ethnolinguistic rights. Xenophobic parties started to openly declare their opposition to the Turkish minority and its current rights, such as TV and radio broadcasting in Turkish in the Bulgarian national TV and radio, and exemption of the Turkish minority from surname suffixes that polarised the both sides. The response of the Turkish minority came in 2005 elections when MRF increased its votes and MPs. Turnover rates were also increased as a result of awareness and debates over the Turkish minority and its ethnolinguistic rights and identity.

The literature deals with minority languages in terms of Ferguson (1959) and Fishman's (1967) *diglossia* theory in which there is a high and low status relationship between official languages and its dialects, and also between official languages and minority languages. Alternatively, Bourdieu's theory (2005)

evaluates relationships in terms of symbolic power acquisition and imposition of dominant languages over dominated languages, in which dominant language controls 'linguistic market' and benefits from its symbolic profit.

One of the important conclusions of this study is that symbolic power of Bulgarian language over Turkish language in Bulgaria plays crucial role in experiencing the linguistic rights among the minority members. As Bourdieu (2005) suggests, the Turkish language cannot find a place in the 'linguistic market' where Bulgarian is an official language of the state and its institutions dominate the 'linguistic market'. Hence, perceived symbolic profit of the Turkish language in the Bulgarian 'linguistic market' is very limited. Therefore, its symbolic profit is associated to its usage in a 'market' where it has its own symbolic power, namely Turkey. Studying of and in Turkish has been perceived that it would give a symbolic power to its user in Turkey; otherwise, it would be only an extra but not an effective symbolic capital in the Bulgarian 'linguistic market'.

This perception affects linguistic rights of the Turkish minority entirely. Decreasing interest of the minority parents towards Turkish language courses is one of the results related to this perception. Parents know that learning Turkish would hardly be transformed into symbolic profit because it is not used in governmental, administrative, judiciary and educational fields, and also its usage in media is limited to visual media. Mother tongue of the minority is Turkish and it means that they have an access to visual media where speaking is dominant instrument of instruction rather than writing. For instance, they do not need to write in Turkish to follow Turkey's media from satellite receivers, which is very popular among the minority.

Furthermore, if the language has no symbolic power expectation, it would not be a surprise when the minority parents would not be willing to send their children to Turkish language courses. Because, learning Turkish has been perceived as learning of writing in Turkish; on the contrary, studying Turkish is not limited only to

learning of writing but also embraces learning of its literature, grammar and other rules. Moreover, learning how to write is not under the hegemony of the Turkish scripts; on the contrary, it could be achieved also by learning of foreign languages which make use of Latin scripts, such as English, French and German. Although ability to write in foreign languages does not give a proper writing ability, as in case of the Turkish minority members who graduated between 1974 and 1992, these limited writing skills are perceived as satisfactory for the Bulgarian 'linguistic market'.

The situation related to print media is interrelated to studying in Turkish or learning how to write in Turkish. If there is a limited minority print media and other printed publications in Turkish, it can be argued that it is due to the limited capacity of Turkish minority to read in Turkish. When there is limited print media, the need of reading in Turkish can be replaced by reading in Bulgarian. For instance, in order to read books, magazines, newspapers and other printed materials, one does not need to acquire only those which are printed in Turkish but also those written in Bulgarian. In other words, a Turkish minority member can read newspapers, magazines, and books in Bulgarian; because his/ her Bulgarian reading ability is more advanced as a result of practicing.

The situation is also applicable to the visual media. There are mainly three types of visual media which are followed by the Turkish minority. First one is Bulgarian TV and radios channels, which are followed mainly for informative purposes, i.e. watching news. Second one is constituted of TV and radio channels in Turkey, which are watched via digital satellite receivers, mainly for informative and entertainment purposes. Final one is Turkish programmes on the Bulgarian National TV and radio, whose ratings, popularity and coverage are limited. Hence one does not need to have proper writing and reading skills in order to access to informatory and entertainment via visual media.

However, as Bourdieu (2005) argues, the national ‘linguistic market’ is never totally dominated by the dominant language; in contrast, it has some spaces which allows dominated languages to get access to the linguistic capital and gain some kind of linguistic profits. Hence, there are also some spaces in the Bulgarian ‘linguistic market’, especially in the regions where Turks are in majority, such as *Işıklar* (Samuil) municipality, where my field research is conducted. It is no of doubt that Turkish is the dominant language in private sphere regarding the minority group because the domination of the official language hardly eliminates the usages of minority languages in private sphere. Hence, by being the mostly used language – of about 80 percent of the population – Turkish can find some spaces to be used in the public sphere, as well. It is used as a *de facto* medium of communication in the regional level, for instance at work and in the municipal administration. However, its usage in the public sphere is limited to communications between the minority members. In some cases, it is used also in interethnic communications among Turks and Bulgarians, those who can speak Turkish. Nevertheless, those interethnic communications also take place in private sphere instead of public one, such as during the break at work and between neighbours. One can argue that it is also a kind of *diglossic* relationship among two languages limited to the private life. However, Turkish language does not possess a high status over Bulgarian but rather it is used as medium of personal communication as the result of demographic facts since that Turks constitute the majority in the entire municipality with only a few exceptional villages and that Bulgarians who live in those Turkish populated villages may want to establish communications with their Turkish neighbours, who cannot speak Bulgarian, and/or want to set more intimate communications also with Turks who can speak Bulgarian.

One of the famous Turcologists, Tadeuz Kowalski, about 60 years ago, observed some kind of *digglossic* affects via education and media of Bulgarian language and the official Turkish (Istanbul) dialect on Danubean Turkish dialect (Kowalski, 1949) that inhabitants of *Işıklar* (Samuil) Municipality also speak. Furthermore, I

also observed *diglossic* relations among the official Turkish dialect, which is used in Turkey, and Turkish dialect of Bulgaria. The minority became to experience it especially due to increasing ratings of Turkey's TV channels and their influence on the minority members who watched it. They perceive their dialects as an inferior and speaking Turkish means speaking in the official dialect. Nevertheless, I argue that it can be explained via *diglossia* theory of Fishman (1967) rather than symbolic power theory of Bourdieu (2005). Because, the minority lives in the milieu of the Bulgarian 'linguistic market' and its connections with the Turkish 'linguistic market' of Turkey is very limited to watching Turkey's TVs, visits to Turkey, visits of Bulgaria-born Turkish immigrants from Turkey and limited, generally business related, communications with Turkey-born Turks. Additionally, even though the official dialect is perceived as a high status language it does not have considerable effects on their dialect, on the contrary, Bulgarian has more effects on minority's dialect than the official dialect of Turkish. As a result, they are more interesting to learn not only Bulgarian language but also its official dialect rather than the official dialect of Turkish.

Second important conclusion of this study is that fear of discrimination in educational institutions and the labour market is still perceived by the minority members. Bulgarian language skills and their accent as well as with their names are one of the visible indicators of being identified as a Turk. Therefore, most of them as a result of symbolic power of the Bulgarian language and in order to escape from burdens of the lower Bulgarian language skills, are very keen to learn Bulgarian. Additionally, living in the Turkish dominated regions was seen as one of the main obstacles of learning and speaking of Bulgarian properly. All of them are very interested in the improvement of Bulgarian language skills of their children and Turkish dominated schools are thought to be a barrier of learning and practicing Bulgarian with Bulgarian pupils. They do not want to send their children into Bulgarian populated schools due to fear of discrimination, and would prefer to send them into schools where population of Turks and Bulgarian students are almost equal. Additionally, if there had been schools and university in Bulgaria with a

medium of instruction in Turkish, graduates of those institutions would have faced discrimination in the labour market.

The Bulgarian governments are not eager to implement unbound requirements of the Framework Convention for Protection of National Minorities but only the Copenhagen criteria. Furthermore, constitutionally, Bulgaria does not recognise that it has minorities but rather it states that there are ‘citizens whose mother tongue is other than Bulgarian’. Although the Turkish minority has been enjoying some linguistic rights in the post-communist period, most of these rights are highly symbolic in function. For instance, ten minutes news programme in the Bulgarian National Television which is found insufficient, and study of Turkish which suffers from material and organisational insufficiencies. Therefore, those implementations seem to be done only to fulfil the EU’s accession criteria on the issue of minorities.

Furthermore, one cannot neglect the chronic economic backwardness of the Turkish minority inherited from previous governments, and which could not be changed by the contemporary regime, as well. Hence, ongoing economic underdevelopment of the Turkish regions affected their interests in linguistic rights and experiencing these rights. Their main priority has become their economic situations, such as unemployment, rather than their linguistic rights. Their economic situation affects also their decisions whether they will let their children to participate in the Turkish language courses, the study in Turkish schools and universities, because Bulgarian is perceived as the most important element of finding a better job, and improving their economic situations.

Additionally, related to the economic backwardness of the Turkish minority and *diglossic* relations between Turkish and Bulgarian languages, Turkish language was correlated with being rural which was also correlated with backwardness. My study showed this is because Turks are mainly rural inhabitants which cause ‘relative deprivation’ against urban identity and its way of life which were also correlated with speaking ‘true’ accent and dialect of the Bulgarian language.

Although further improvements on their linguistic rights, such as using bilingual place names, establishment of Turkish schools and a Turkish university, and a Turkish TV channel are called their attention, there is not any organised and high claim on these issues. As I argued, even though it is, as a result of symbolic power of Bulgarian language related to the fear of discrimination and economic problems it is also related to political problems as well. Increase in nationalist, ultra-nationalist and even fascist movements have accelerated their interests in their linguistic rights.

Because of the inheritance from the very nature of the totalitarian regime, Turkish minority NGOs are not well-developed, and they are generally cultural organisations which seek to promote ethnocultural traditions of the minority or they are organisations which intend to play a moderator and/ or integration roles. The importance of these organisations is undeniable but there is also need for NGOs which would monitor the implementations of the linguistic and other minority rights of the Turkish minority. Currently, monitoring is being done by Bulgarian and international NGOs. On the other hand, there should be also an effective Turkish minority NGO in order to represent Turkish minority perspective in depth. MRF is a political entity, and its main task especially after being a part of the government is to implement policies; therefore, monitoring should be done under the guidance of Turkish minority NGOs. Nonetheless, initiatives to establish such NGOs also have faced hindrances from the Bulgarian authorities such as in Menderes Küngün's case the *Filibe* (Plovdiv) provincial court rejected to register the association which is named *Ulusal Türk Birliği* (The National Turkish Alliance) on the ground that the association is political (*Haberler*, 23 June 2006).

It should be also noted that this study should not be interpreted in a way that the Turkish minority does not seek to further their linguistic rights. On the contrary, their linguistic rights should be developed in order to ensure its usages in wider spheres of their lives. Attachment of importance to Bulgarian language is a kind of

survival strategy, which is a response to the lowered status of Turkish. It could be interpreted from this study that linguistic rights and in general minority rights are political issues. The Turkish minority follows the directions of their representative body, their party MRF; and if their party will call for further linguistic rights it is sure that they will demand it, too. This is because there is need for other civil actors that can enhance the civil society among the Turkish minority.

Even though I find the multiculturalism-multinationalism theory applicable to the condition of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, I should note also its basic limitations, which are inherited from its counter discourses. The limitations of the multiculturalist theory stem from the fact that it is based on the demographic density in a particular territory. It presupposes that successful autonomy could be implemented only for the minorities who are concentrated in the particular regions. It assumes that these autonomous ethnolinguistic minority units should be single or big entities. However, autonomy could be implemented also in smaller administrative units while the constitution of a bigger and combined unit is not necessary. Another weakness of the theory is that it predominantly relies on numerical weights or demography, which leaves numerically smaller minorities out of the agenda of the self-administration question. It can be pointed in various studies by Kymlicka⁹⁷ when he considers that the minorities, which constitute 10 or 15 percent of the whole population of the country, are “relatively small”. It has a simple explanation, because they are minority; if they constitute 30 or 40 percent of the population, they cannot be called as minorities but maybe *minoritised* majority. Additionally, these territorial and demographic fetishisms are products of nationalist discourses, which give much importance to these two concepts, while the multiculturalist theory also falls into this same trap. There should be a new model that seeks to solve the problems of nationalism rather than the reproduction of new ones. This new model should not be based on the nationalist dominant paradigm, which states if one group is a majority in a certain territory; it has a right

⁹⁷ For example, see Kymlicka, 2001: 66 and 2002: 20.

to govern the entire territory in question. This supposition would lead to the emergence of new dominant and dominated ethnolinguistic groups. Even then Kymlicka states that within those new autonomous units, there may emerge a new kind of dominant understanding of nationalism that respects minority rights; however, this territorial and demographic fetishist model would lead to the emergence of what Kymlicka (1998) calls ‘illiberal nationalism’ rather than ‘liberal’ ones. The multiculturalist theory should be freed from the limitations of the nationalist discourse and its territory and demography-centred approach. Therefore, there should be linguistic rights for all ethnolinguistic groups independent from whether they are territorially concentrated and demographically dense or not. Furthermore, those autonomous or self-government units need not be in extensive terrains but rather in considerably smaller units, where every ethnolinguistic minority would find a place to represent and govern itself.

Throughout the study, it is apparent that the linguistic rights situation of the Turkish minority has been open to epochal alterations. The authorities of the monarchical, communist and post-communist periods implemented mainly three policies: ignorance, integration and assimilation. Nevertheless, ‘top’ level of those policies was implemented in 1984 and 1985 via forced assimilation campaign. Because of the natural phenomenon in which ‘common threats brings together’, the Turkish minority mobilised its demands in the post-communist period via its political party. Nevertheless, when the political or mainly minority rights demands have been relatively maintained, economic problems have become to be perceived more vital than political ones. As a consequence, the interest of the Turkish minority in its linguistic rights became to be dominated by the economical problems of the minority.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

THE GUIDELINE FOR THE INTERVIEWS

- 1) How old are you?
- 2) Where were you born?
- 3) Where did you grow up?
- 4) Where are you living now?
- 5) What is your profession and current job?
- 6) What is your level of education?
- 7) Did you take Turkish language course during your education?
- 8) If yes, how many hours per week were those Turkish language courses?
- 9) Do you find serviceable those Turkish language courses?
- 10) Do you think that you have sufficient proficiency in reading and writing of Turkish language?
- 11) Do you think that your Bulgarian language skills are sufficient?
- 12) How many children do you have?
- 13) How many of them are studying? Where? In which grade?
- 14) Do your children help you in housework? When? How?
- 15) Did your children take Turkish language courses? Which of them?
- 16) Did you make any suggestion or recommendations to them to take Turkish language courses?
- 17) Do you find Turkish language courses serviceable for your children? Why?
- 18) What are the strengths and weaknesses of these courses?
- 19) Do you think that Turkish language courses should be continued in high schools?

- 20) Do you think having sufficient Turkish language proficiency in reading and writing is important for your children? Why?
- 21) When and where the children should start to learn reading and writing in Turkish?
- 22) Why do you think learning Bulgarian is important for your children?
- 23) When and where did your children learn the Bulgarian language?
- 24) Have you ever spoken in Bulgarian at home with your children?
- 25) Has anybody suggested that you to speak at home in Bulgarian in order to improve your children's Bulgarian language skills?
- 26) Do you think that your children have sufficient Bulgarian proficiency? Why?
- 27) Did your children go to the pre-school education?
- 28) If yes, what were the benefits of pre-school education?
- 29) When and where should the children start to learn reading and writing in Bulgarian?
- 30) What do you expect from a school that you will send your children? What kind of facilities should a school include?
- 31) What do you think is absent from the current schools of your children?
- 32) If you had an option, to which school would you like to send your children:
 - a) To a school where Turkish and Bulgarian pupils are almost equally distributed
 - b) To a school where Turkish pupils are in majority
 - c) To a school where Bulgarian pupils are in majority.
- 33) Do you thin that pupils should speak Bulgarian at school also out of the course hours?
- 34) Which foreign languages are or will be important for your children?
- 35) Which foreign language courses are taken by your children?
- 36) Do your read newspapers and other printing media materials? If yes, which ones and in what frequency?
- 37) Have you ever read a Turkish newspaper or other printing material that is published in Bulgaria?

- 38) Do you still read Turkish printing media materials that are published in Bulgaria? If not, why?
- 39) Is it important for your children to read Turkish printing media materials? Why?
- 40) Do you want to send your children to the university degree?
- 41) In your opinion, what are the important factors in order to go to the university? Why?
- 42) Do you think proficiency in Bulgaria is the key factor to be accepted in a university? Why?
- 43) If your children cannot be accepted to a university in Bulgaria, will you let them to go to a university in Turkey? Why?
- 44) Do you expect that learning his profession in Turkish in a Turkish university will cause some problems for your children upon their return to Bulgaria? Why?
- 45) Do you find serviceable an opening of a state funded Turkish university where medium of instruction of entire departments will be English? Why?
- 46) Will you let your children to study in a school where medium of instruction will be English? Do you think that such schools will be serviceable for your children? Why?
- 47) Do you think that opening such schools is possible in Bulgaria?
- 48) Do you know whether such schools existed in Bulgaria? If yes, from which source you know it?
- 49) Would you like to live permanently in place other than your current one? Why?
- 50) Where do want to live Bulgaria? In which places?
- 51) May you say that you cannot live in certain places in Bulgaria? Where? Why?
- 52) Would you like to live permanently in a country other than Bulgaria? Why?
- 53) In which countries do you want to live?
- 54) What are the most important features that should exist in a place that you live? Why?

- 55) What are the most important features that should exist in a place that you work? Why?
- 56) Is it important for you to have at least one colleague that knows Turkish? Why?
- 57) Do you have Bulgarian friends? Since when? How can you define your relationship status? How often you meet?
- 58) Do your Bulgarian friends know Turkish? If yes, in which language you are communicating? Why?
- 59) Do you follow the Bulgarian TV and Radio stations? Which programmes? Why? How often?
- 60) Do you follow the satellite-broadcasting Turkish TV and Radio stations? Which programmes? Why? How often?
- 61) Do you follow the Turkish information programme that is broadcasting in the Bulgarian National TV? Why? How often?
- 62) Do you follow the Turkish information programmes that are broadcasting in the Bulgarian National Radio? Why? How often?
- 63) Would you like to see a Turkish TV and Radio channel that are broadcasting from Bulgaria in Turkish? Why? Do you think such an initiative will be serviceable? Why?
- 64) Does your place of live have a Turkish name?
- 65) Do you know the Turkish names of other places around?
- 66) In your daily language, which name you prefer to use? The Turkish one or the Bulgaria-official one? Why?
- 67) Which name do you use to describe your place of live to a Turk that does not live in your neighbourhood? Why?
- 68) Do you want to see that the Turkish name of your place of live is used and recognised along with its Bulgarian name? Why?
- 69) In which language do you communicate when you go to the office of the municipality? Why?
- 70) What does it mean for you having ‘-ov’ and ‘-ova’ suffixes in your middle and last names?

- 71) Do Bulgarians realise that you are a Turk? How?
- 72) Have you ever tried to hide that you are a Turk? Why? If yes, when?
- 73) Do you think that a Turk who speaks Bulgarian very well can be realised by the Bulgarians that he/ she is a Turk? Why?
- 74) Have you faced some obstacles in the post-communist period due to being a Turk?
- 75) If there is a possibility to take much more benefits than now, will you opt to change your name into Bulgarian? Why?
- 76) Do you follow the politics?
- 77) Do you talk with your family and your friends about politics? If yes, what are the main issues of discussions?
- 78) In your opinion, what are the most important problems of Bulgaria? Why?
- 79) Do you remember the 1984 – 1989 events? If yes, what is the first thing that you remember now?
- 80) Do you talk about the events of 1984 – 1989 with your family, namely your children, and with your friends?
- 81) Do you think that the children or the new generation should know these events? Why?
- 82) Do you see any possibility that similar events will re-emerge in the future? Why?
- 83) What do you think about *Ataka* (Attack)? Does it cause anxieties about your future?
- 84) Would you like to add something else?

APPENDIX B

**POPULATION OF VILLAGES OF IŞIKLAR (SAMUIL) MUNICIPALITY
BY ETHNICITY
AND DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS OF THE RESEARCH**

Village	Population	Percentage (%)			Number of Respondents (Parents)
		Turks	Bulgarians	Roma	
<i>Işıklar</i> (Samuil)	1 893	70	10	20	6
<i>Sofular</i> (Bogomiltsi)	335	-	100	-	-
<i>Habipköy</i> (Vladimirovtsi)	1 235	94.8	5	0.2	6
<i>Hasan Mahallesi</i> (Golyama Voda)	398	99	0.5	0.5	-
<i>Demirciler</i> (Zhelyazkovets)	890	42	8	50	1
<i>Dursunköy</i> (Zdravets)	453	100	-	-	-
<i>Karamal</i> (Kara Mihal)	89	15	85	-	1
<i>Topalköy</i> (Krivitsa)	313	100	-	-	-
<i>Kılıçköy</i> (Nozharovo)	666	100	-	-	5
<i>Kovancılar</i> (Pchelina)	366	100	-	-	3
<i>Kınalı</i> (Huma)	273	100	-	-	-
<i>Hırsova</i> (Harsovo)	669	33	35	32	-
<i>Abdulköy</i> (Bogdantsi)	606	89	5	6	3
<i>Kara Arnavut</i> (Golyam Izvor)	408	9	29	56	-
<i>Total</i>	8 594	78	13	9	25

Source: Obshtina Samuil, 2005

APPENDIX C


**MAP 1: LOCATION OF IŞIKLAR (SAMUIL) MUNICIPALITY
IN BULGARIA**



Source: The map was filled by the author. The blank map originally made by Lyubomir Taushanov, improved by Todor Bozhinov and released under GNU Free Documentation License (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_Free_Documentation_License for details about this licence).

APPENDIX D

**MAP 2: DISTRIBUTION OF THE TURKISH POPULATION
IN THE PROVINCES OF BULGARIA (IN PERCENTAGES)**



Source: The map was filled and coloured by the author based on the results of the Census 2001 of National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria (NSI). The blank map originally made by Lyubomir Taushanov, improved by Todor Bozhinov and released under GNU Free Documentation License.