

LLOYD GEORGE  
AND  
THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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## ABSTRACT

### LLOYD GEORGE AND THE DISSOLUTION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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David Lloyd George, who was the Prime Minister during the period of 1916-1922, served in the British Parliament almost half-century. This thesis focuses on his foreign policy concerning the Ottoman Empire during his Premiership.

Lloyd George intruded himself into almost every aspect of the 'Turkish Question' during and after the World War I, and was at the 'centre' in determining the fate of the Ottoman Empire. Although, the effect of 'forces' of economics and social elements have replaced the 'Great Man' theory of history, as it is in this case, Lloyd George's role in the dissolution of the Empire can not be truly abandoned. In the episode of 'building' a new Europe and the dissolution of the Empire, Lloyd George worked closely with other actors such as; Clemenceau, Wilson and on domestic platform, Balfour, Curzon and Churchill who all shared the very similar views.

Lloyd George, starting from a modest and humble Welsh background, made his way in politics to the top, through his ability and persistent determination and earned rightfully to be remembered as the 'man who won the war' and as the founder of modern welfare state.

His determination to 'finish' the Ottoman Empire is often attributed to his devotion to Greece rather than to his personality and imperialistic approach; on the other hand, the British State's role in decision making process in this issue is overlooked. This study, attempts to establish the roles of Lloyd George and the British State during the attempts for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, and exemplifies the

formation and implementation of the policies towards the Ottoman Empire, an end carried out whether due to Lloyd George or otherwise.

This study traces in detail the evolution of Lloyd George's and the British State's policies in regard to the Ottoman Empire, and is based primarily on original research conducted in private and governmental documentary collections in England.

Keywords: History, The Ottoman Empire, Lloyd George, First World War, Independence War, The British Empire.

## ÖZ

### LLOYD GEORGE VE OSMANLI IMPARATORLUGUNUN PARÇALANMASI

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İngiliz parlamentosunda yarım asıra yakın bir süre görev yapan David Lloyd George, 1916-1922 yılları arasında da başbakanlık görevini üstlenmiştir. Bu tez onun, başbakanlığı döneminde geliştirerek ortaya koyduğu, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ile ilgili dış politikalarına odaklanmıştır.

Savaş sırasında ve sonrasında, 'Türk sorunu'nun her yönü ile ilgilenen Lloyd George, Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun kaderinin belirlenmesinde de önemli bir rol oynamıştır. Ekonomik ve sosyal etkiler tarihteki 'güçlü adam' kavramını değiştirmiştir. Ancak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun dağılmasında Lloyd George'un oynadığı rol tamamen yadsınamaz. İmparatorluğun yıkılması ve yeni bir Avrupa kurulması sürecinde Lloyd George, içeride Balfour, Curzon ve Churchill ile, dışarıda da Clemenchou, Wilson gibi, benzer görüşlere sahip oyuncularla işbirliği yaparak politikalarını hayata geçirmiştir.

Bazı çevrelerce, 'Savaşı kazanan adam' olarak da hatırlanan Lloyd George, yetenekleri ve iradesi sayesinde, mütavazi koşullarla hayata başladığı Galler'den gelerek politikada zirveye ulaşmış ve çağdaş bir sosyal devletin kurucusu olmuştur.

Onun Osmanlının yok edilmesi yönündeki kararlılığı, kişiliği ve emperyalist yaklaşımlarından çok, Yunanistana olan bağlılığı ile izah edilmekte ve oluşturduğu karar süreçlerinde İngiliz Devletinin etkisi gözardı edilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Osmanlının parçalanmasına yönelik politikaların oluşmasında ve uygulanmasında

Lloyd George ve İngiliz devletinin rolü incelenerek İmparatorluğun yıkılmasında her ikisinin de etkili olduğunun örnekleri incelenmiştir.

Bu çalışmada, İngiliz belgelerine dayanarak, Lloyd George ve İngiliz devletinin Osmanlı İmparatorluğuna yönelik politikaların oluşum süreçleri ayrıntılı olarak incelenmiştir.

Anahtar sozcukler: Tarih, Osmanli Imparatorlugu, Lloyd George, Birinci Dunya Savasi, Kurtulus Savasi, Britanya Imparatorlugu

To My Wife

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My wife, Canan Cilingir deserves the utmost acknowledgement for her understanding throughout this endeavour. In each and every achievement of mine, her support and bearing has been and will be my inspiration. I also wish to thank my grand son, Demir, for giving me the courage and the will to continue this undertaking.

## PREFACE

Lloyd George is one of the rare politicians who enjoyed a very wide coverage both in scientific publications and biographies. Although he came from a humble Welsh background, he had played an important role in British politics from 1890 to 1945. This thesis focuses only on very brief period of his life, mainly from 1916 to 1922, when he was the Prime Minister.

This thesis concentrates on Lloyd George's policy towards Ottoman Empire. Any analysis on the present British policies towards Turkey will be incomplete without understanding the role of Britain towards the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. In this study the effect of Lloyd George together with the other decision making authorities on shaping the British policies towards Turkey is investigated. Since this area has not been researched thoroughly by scholars and biographers, a tile was missing in the Turkish History. This work tries to fill this gap in historical information mainly referring to the British archives of the period. To elaborate, whether Lloyd George or relevant British State institutions were more influential in decision making mechanism in regard to dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the minutes of the Cabinet meetings, Parliamentary debates and correspondence of several state administrators and institutions were examined. In addition to these, relevant issues of 'The Times' were explored to find out how the implemented policies were viewed by the journalists and disseminated to general public. During this search hand-written 'side-notes' of some officials revealed precious information as regards not only to their opinions but also to their feelings.

Private collections of some dignitaries, who were influential in planning and implementing British policies towards Turkey, such as; Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Lord Beaverbrook, provided valuable insight for the reasons behind their actions.

During the study, Ottoman and Turkish archives were not searched, and the whole analysis were based on the British documents, in order to exploit the information which were not revealed to Ottoman Government, hence to understand the reasons of Lloyd George's and the Britain's attitudes towards Turkey.

This study is neither a biography of Lloyd George nor his total foreign policy, but it is the reflections of his personality and his prejudices towards Turks in forming his

policies for the Ottoman Empire and securing British interests in Middle East and in her Dominions.

Nevertheless, it is not possible to claim that all relevant documents and information were covered in this thesis. There is a possibility that some valuable information might have been missed due to some 'blacked-out' documents in the British archives. Similarly French, Italian, and Greek archives might accommodate further information with respect to the British and Lloyd George's policies towards dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

David Lloyd George was one of the most colourful and prominent figures of the 20th Century. He was a self-made politician and reached to top by his own campaign. He served fifty-five years as a member of Parliament, of which almost six years as the Prime Minister during the most difficult times in the British history. Lloyd George is also one of the very rare politicians that enjoyed a very detailed and wide variety coverage by historians and scholars, each dealing with a different aspect of his politics, to name few; '*The Young Lloyd George*', '*Lloyd George: The People's Champion*', '*David Lloyd George: A political Life. The Architect of Change, 1863-1912*', '*Lloyd George and Labour*' and '*Lloyd George and the Foreign Policy*'. None of the work gave an explicit analysis to the role of Lloyd George in the planning and implementation of the policies for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. An exemption are the '*The Partition of Turkey*' by Harry Howard of 1931, Marian Kent's as an editor of '*The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*' of 1994 and lastly Salahi Sonyel's '*Türk Kurtulus Savaşı ve Dış Politika*' of 2003. Sonyel in his excellent and voluminous work describes the foreign policy of Turkey and naturally the relations with Britain, but not specifically the outlook of Lloyd George and the British state towards the Ottoman Empire.

As the title of this dissertation suggests, the intention here is to present a thorough analysis of the policies aiming at the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, whether they were due to Lloyd George or to the British state mechanism. Therefore the definitions of *state* and *state mechanism* as they are used here is vital for these concepts constitute the back-bone of the study which focuses on reflecting these ideas and concepts in Lloyd George, and undoubtedly and undisputably one of the most prominent *statesman* of modern times.

*State* is defined as "*administrative apparatus where administration means the extraction of resources, control and coercion, and the maintenance of the political,*

*legal and normative order in society*”<sup>1</sup> In this respect the British *state mechanism*, as used in this thesis, means the formation and implementation of British foreign polic(y)(ies), where the prime institutions are Foreign Office, Imperial General Staff and to a certain extent Departments of India and Colonies.

Coming back to the thesis, this is an important area of study that has not yet been known to have thoroughly, systematically and coherently treated. Attempting such, role of Lloyd George and of British state, in a comparative manner, will be studied by analyzing the available documents. The Primary sources used in the thesis include British Foreign Office documents at National Archives, London, and the archives at the House of Lords Public Records which contains The Lloyd George papers, The Bonar Law Papers, The Beaverbrook Papers, The Davidson Papers, The John St Loe Strachey Papers and Parliamentary debates at Hansard for Commons and Hansard for Lords. Secondary sources\* referred to, include monographies, books and theses as well as articles of which plenty exists.

In the light of the above documents the British state’s policy concerning the Ottoman Empire will be taken-up by reviewing the different memorandums, minutes and side notes of Foreign Office, Imperial General Staff, Cabinet Meetings and Parliamentary debates, In this respect emphasis will be given to the side-notes, mostly supplementary hand writings, written by the ‘specialists’, correspondences and documents at the India Office and Imperial General Staff as well as the Parliamentary debates and press articles. For Lloyd George’s policy, his speeches, memorandums and Cabinet minutes will serve as major sources.

The thesis is drawn in eight chapters and covers the Turco-British relations in 1914-1922, emphasizing the period of 1916-1922 when Lloyd George was the Prime Minister. As the Prime Minister, Lloyd George had entered in a field of *foreign relations* that he was not so much either interested or involved with. Although there were some traces of thoughts for the Turks in him, coming from his childhood and early politician days, his hatred for Turks seemed to be developed during the War and especially during the peace negotiations in Paris. This thesis attempts to explain

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<sup>1</sup> Barkey and Parikh, “Comparative Perspective On the State”, Annual Review of Sociology, 1991:524,17

\* Please consult to the Bibliography for all sources

the role of the British state policy and/or Lloyd George as the determining factor for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As the Prime Minister during the phase of 1916-1918, Lloyd George was the spokesman for the Ottoman policy whether it was this policy was originated from the British state mechanism or from himself. In this thesis, it will be attempted to determine where and when these two determining factors in dissolving the Ottoman Empire were in 'harmony' or not. Therefore in each phase of the developments in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the causal significant factor will be sought whether it was due to the policy of the British state and/or Lloyd George.

This thesis is composed of Eight Chapters. The first chapter, the Introduction, deals with the definition, concept and methodology of the thesis. The second chapter introduces a brief outline on Lloyd George and his political thoughts as a politician and minister, to acquaint the reader with the character of Lloyd George. The third chapter will cover the Turco-British relations prior to the Premiership of Lloyd George. Emphasis will be drawn to the Allied partition plans of the Ottoman Empire during the war until 1916. Chapter four explains the Turco-British relations during Lloyd George's premiership. This chapter deals with the British state's and Lloyd George's policies towards the Ottoman Empire during the war including the armistice. The fifth chapter of the thesis will examine the Paris Peace Conference from the perspective of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The plans for the partition and the developments in the Turco-Greek and Turco-British relations in the time span between the Paris Conference and the Sevres Conference including London and San Remo conferences will be analyzed. Chapter six will deal with the events after the Sevres Treaty, giving emphasis to the developments during the Second London Conference and later, during the Turkish victories and their impact on the Turco-British relations. The seventh chapter deals with the attitude of Britain for the final Turkish victory and her plans for the security of the Straits and hence, the emerging Chanak crisis. This chapter will also briefly touch upon the downfall of the Lloyd George government. Chapter eight is the conclusion of the thesis which will analyze whether the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was due to Lloyd George alone or to British state policy.

Although the Arab-British relations during the war and later, during peace negotiations are related with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and hence these relations are within the scope of this thesis. But due to additional research it required, the events and policies in regard to Arab countries are not covered in this

thesis. Furthermore the Balfour Declaration in relation with the 'home for Jews' and the related policies are exempt from the scope of this thesis.

Terminology, including names of places and people used in the primary sources are employed throughout the thesis such that Britain, Great Britain and British Empire are used interchangeably; similarly, the same approach is employed for Turkey and Ottoman Empire. This exempts the Evaluation parts at the end of each chapter as well as Chapter Eight, the Conclusion.

Each chapter reflects the events without any remarks and concludes with 'Evaluation' where discussions, comments and critics of the procedures and personalities appear.

## CHAPTER II

### DAVID LLOYD GEORGE

#### II.1: David Lloyd George as a Politician

One of the most colorful and prominent figures of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, no doubt, is David Lloyd George. The question usually asked from the perspective of political and social history is whether he was a man of patronizing the early 20<sup>th</sup> century social imperialism as was suggested, or he was one of the last samples of politicians who climbed the ladder of politics to the top strictly by his own personal campaign in British History.<sup>1</sup> Lloyd George is also one of the very few politicians who enjoyed very detailed and wide variety coverage by historians and scholars. His politics with regard to social programs, labour, war time politics and peace had been covered in detail even before his death.

Lloyd George was born in a lower middle class Welsh family in 1863 in Manchester, England. His father after trying different jobs became a school teacher in Manchester. The family after the death of the father, moved to Wales to stay with the mother's brother when Lloyd George was only eighteen months old. Lloyd George practically grew up with his uncle who was earning his life from shoe making. Uncle George was among the devoted Nonconformists aiming an independent Church for Wales freed from the Church of England as majority of Welsh were, at that time and he used to go from time to time to preach at the local church. He was a liberal and strong believer of Gladstone and often got together with his friend to debate certain political issues. Uncle George had considerable influence on Lloyd George to the extent that he grew to be a devoted Christian, a Nonconformist and liberal. Lloyd George from his childhood onwards had always been a Gladstonian. When he was three and half years old, Lloyd George was sent to the village school belonging to Church of England as were most of the schools in Wales. The Nonconformist attitude was going to stay with him throughout his political campaign and early periods of his days in the Parliament until Nonconformist policy was accepted by law in the House of Commons in 1920, when he was the Prime Minister.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> P.N. Wilson, "*Lloyd George Resurgent*", *Current History* (New York), 42:1 (1935: Aug.)

<sup>2</sup> Martin Pugh, *Lloyd George*, (London: Longman, 1992), p. 23-24

When the Uncle decided for Lloyd George to be a solicitor, he had to learn Latin and French as two foreign languages were the prerequisites in the Preliminary Law Examination. After passing the Examination in 1878, he started practicing as a clerk in a law firm at Liverpool. He was going to earn his living through law business which was going to provide him an opportunity for his voice to be heard publicly especially after establishing his own law firm with his brother. This profession also enabled him to make a name as a defender of the poor people against the privileged in Wales.<sup>3</sup> This was the period that he self educated himself as a speaker and even became the Chairman of the Debating Society in his home town, Criccieth.

Lloyd George developed abilities of a good speaker and self confidence which he thought were qualities essential in politics. Years later, his brother, wrote that even when he was a child, there were times when Lloyd George used to talk to himself as "*I am special. I am astonishing! Duw! I believe I am a genius.*"<sup>4</sup> This was the conviction he never lost.

His interests in politics grew in time. He started working for the Liberal Party branch in Wales and became an important figure within the radical wing of the Liberals as he was outspoken for the poor against the privileged and a strong supporter of the Nonconformist movement. During his early days in politics he was an admirer of Joseph Chamberlain, and saw him as an idol for himself since Chamberlain was radical, with a middle class ground and had risen in the ladder of politics in the Liberal Party by himself. Therefore Lloyd George probably had seen the similarities between Chamberlain and himself. The Home Rule for Ireland was the hottest topic in politics and Lloyd George saw this as a model for the nationalist demands, especially for disestablishment of religion and agrarian policies for Wales. He delivered speeches for Ireland that it presented 'a college for Europe' meaning a college for liberty.<sup>5</sup>

His involvement in politics gave him the chance to run for a seat at the bye-election in 1890, and with a very slight majority was elected to the Parliament, after losing the first trial a year before. During the campaign Lloyd George purposely used radical solutions for the long standing problems; even he used 'class' distinction

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 10

<sup>4</sup> Peter Rowland, *Lloyd George*, (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1975), p. 6

<sup>5</sup> Pugh, p. 14

which alarmed the old liberal politicians. The approach he adopted shows that he was more in the 'left' rather than liberal. He told that; "*liberalism ...raised a man from the ditch and enabled him to face the highest in the land and to demand what was right for his labour*"<sup>6</sup> and "*every squire fought for his property, for his castle and his class*"<sup>7</sup>

He moved to London for the parliamentary work, but his wife preferred to stay behind; which was going to be used as an excuse for his behavior as a 'womanizer' in the coming years. As he was beginning to work as a politician in the 1890s, he thought that he should have an income so that he could devote himself entirely to the Parliament. His income which was a limited amount considering his expenditure back at home and in London, was through the profits of the law firm 'Lloyd George and George' was and his articles to newspapers 'Star' and 'Manchester Guardian'. He was tempted to make 'easy money' out of speculation. His known first attempt was to allow a speculator of 'Welsh Patagonian Gold Fields Syndicate' to make use of his law firm and his name to attract public to buy shares. This was in 1892 and as a result, he ended up with quite number of shares of the Syndicate which were worthless, but his name had been used for other people to risk their money. It seems that Lloyd George had not learned the lesson from this experience since he was going to get involved in speculation of the 'Marconi Scandal' in 1912 and years later the 'Honors List' scandal in 1922.<sup>8</sup>

Lloyd George until 1898 was not well known outside of Wales as a prominent politician, but the events of the South African War, usually known as Boer War, the 1902 Education Act and his Presidency of the Board of Trade were going to be the important pillars or 'milestones' of his political career.

British Imperialist expansion in South Africa was going to cause the Boer war at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Due to the rich natural resources in Natal and Boer territories of the Transvaal and Orange Free State, the British settlers in Cape Colony tried to enclave these areas and the refusal of Boer settlers for such intentions was the cause of clashes. Lloyd George campaigned vigorously against the war in South Africa since he thought that the war was unnecessary and was quoted in saying; "*I shall protest with all the vehemence at my command against the*

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid. 15-16

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, p. 16

<sup>8</sup> Chris Wrigley, *Lloyd George*, (Essex-England: Longman, 1993), p. 17

*outrage which is perpetrated in the name of freedom*".<sup>9</sup> Since then he voluntarily attended debates with delivering anti-war speeches, even once at Birmingham when he escaped by disguising himself as a policeman. Some scholars argue that the reason he was against the Boer war can not be attributed to his anti military and pacifist thinking since in his early days in politics he appreciated the necessity of the armed forces and a war could be morally acceptable providing it was fought for a purpose such as against the Turks.<sup>10</sup> He simply did not believe in the war at South Africa as he thought issues could be solved by pacifist methods. He was against the imperialist policies of Chamberlain and he criticized the conservative government's policies but hardly declared what a liberal government would do. His active anti-war involvement in the Boer War was also attributed to the romantic resemblance he might have found between Wales and Boer.<sup>11</sup> The stand of Lloyd George in the Boer war provided him to show that he was not only interested in the issues with respect to Wales, but outside too. It was argued that the criticism extended by Lloyd George was noted by the leaders of the Liberal Party that they could not afford to leave him outside of a possible cabinet as he had proved himself as a potential member of Parliamentary Liberalism.<sup>12</sup>

Another important event that pushed Lloyd George further to the leadership at least for Welsh liberalism was the Education Act in 1902, when the Conservatives faced a harsh criticism over their bill. The Bill was interpreted by the Nonconformists that the Anglican Church was out to control the schools. Lloyd George stood up with the suggestion that they should try to win the local county councils, then they should refuse to pay money to the Anglican schools, claiming they were poor. The suggestion was accepted and put into practice in Wales and therefore the applicability of the law was hindered, although the Conservative Government managed to pass the legislation in 1904. The adaptation of the Lloyd George's policy was important to the point that the Welsh revolt caused, among other reasons, led the resignation of the Balfour Conservative Government in 1905. The Boer War and Education Act made Lloyd George to be reckoned and even indispensable as a young politician full of radical views and champion of the Nonconformists.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid, p. 20-21

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, p. 22

<sup>11</sup> Please see Frank Owen, *Tempestuous Journey*, (London: Hutchinson, 1954), p. 90-118 for the details of Boer War and Lloyd George.

<sup>12</sup> Ian Packer, "Lloyd George", (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 1998), p. 15-18

The 1906 General Election resulted with a landslide victory of Liberals and Lloyd George took his first ministerial post, President of the Board of Trade, which he was going to hold until 1908. Lloyd George was successful to please both industrialists and trade unionists and he had introduced the Census of Production Act, the Merchant Shipping Act, the Port of London Act and most important of all, the Patents and Designs Act which was for the benefit of the British Industry against foreign and unfair competition. It is argued that Lloyd George was following an economic nationalism.<sup>13</sup> At the Board of Trade Lloyd George portrayed a hard working statesman full of new ideas; he was also credited with being bipartisan politician. The period from 1905 onwards is usually considered the time span Lloyd George moved from radicalism to liberalism, thus became more accustomed to the system.

1908 greeted Lloyd George with even more good news as Asquith became Prime Minister, and therefore had to vacate the post of Chancellor of Exchequer which he filled. It is argued that the appointment of Lloyd George to the Treasury proved to be the most important single decision of Asquith's career.<sup>14</sup>

Lloyd George with the help of Asquith managed to bring 'reforms' slowly but in a determined manner. His first application as a Chancellor he made, was to increase the pension for elderly as he adopted the policy; "*These problems of the sick, of the infirm, of the men who can not find means of earning a livelihood...are problems with which it is the business of the State to deal, they are problems which the State has neglected too long*"<sup>15</sup>

The early 20<sup>th</sup> century was the period when new liberalism was flourishing especially in terms of needs of urban and taxation. This was the result of the Industrial Revolution in the second halve of 19<sup>th</sup> century. It is debated that Lloyd George was not interested in new theories and approaches, and what drove him to success was pragmatism and the people in the street, both probably due to his environment in Wales while growing-up. Lloyd George enrolled in new projects as he visited Germany in the autumn of 1908 to get accustomed to the German insurance system for social security. Meanwhile there was a growing tendency both

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<sup>13</sup> Pugh, p. 40-41

<sup>14</sup> Chris Wrigley argues that the appointment of Lloyd George was the best decision that Asquith ever made in his political career. This is a very demanding statement considering that he was the Prime Minister for a long period until he, in 1916, was forced to resign by the 'plot' of Lloyd George and Conservatives in 1916.

<sup>15</sup> Wrigley, p. 40

in Germany and in Britain for a naval arms race. Admiralty was in favour of building big ships to cope with the Germans, whereas Lloyd George had the intention of cutting the army and naval expenditure to a minimum level to save money for social reforms. Lloyd George although believed that ship building might be the cure for the increasing unemployment in the country, was inclined more for building smaller ships such as cruisers and destroyers to protect the trade routes and he was going to be proven right in his judgment during the War.<sup>16</sup> He was aware that any reforms that he, with the backing of Asquith, proposed would experience a blockade from House of Lords, and even from the Cabinet, where besides Asquith; he could only have the support of Churchill who had replaced him at the Board of Trade. Nevertheless, he was quoted as saying that he did not trust Churchill at all and believed that if Churchill found an occasion he would not hesitate to pass him.<sup>17</sup>

During these developments in Britain, interestingly, in 1908 the CPU, the Committee of Progress and Union, revolted against the Sultan and the new government reestablishing constitutional regime, started a new era in Turkey. Lloyd George's approach to the new developments in Turkey was very skeptical as he said; *"that the movement is an Islamic one and when we were applauding what has taken place in Turkey we must bear in mind the effect upon ourselves in India."*<sup>18</sup> Considering Lloyd George's radical views, one may expect him to applaud the developments as it seemed that the atmosphere became more democratic with the new regime as the 1908 Revolution of CPU marked the end of the hated reign of the Sultan, and a new horizon of developments emerged, but on the contrary Lloyd George displayed a very imperialistic approach to the new regime in Turkey.

Lloyd George addressed to the Parliament in May 1909 for the new budget of 1909-1910. The budget proposed to the Parliament has been called since then as the 'People's Budget' since it brought a new approach to taxation and social reforms. It is argued that the split in the Liberal Party had been between Radicals and Imperialists, but after 1909 the question within the party was whether they were for to the new budget or against it.<sup>19</sup> Lloyd George in the budget was asking additional income tax and most important of all land property tax that a controversy started for evaluating the budget with the land tax more than anything else. The House of Commons' approval, due to the majority of Liberals in the House, was obtained in

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<sup>16</sup> Owen, p. 168-169

<sup>17</sup> Rowland, p. 208

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

<sup>19</sup> Packer, p. 24-25

September 1909 and now it was the turn of Peers, the House of Lords. It was known by the Government that the Lords would reject the new budget due to its provisions since it was against interests of large land owners who were represented at the Lords. A wide-spread anti-propaganda was emerging that the new budget was nothing but 'socialistic' proposals. Conservatives started talking about rejecting the budget, that the budget proposal was revolution and socialism.<sup>20</sup>

Lloyd George then decided to come against the Lords, and he in effect declared class war on landowners and the House of Lords. "*They were accused of being a group of parasites, leeching revenue from the rest of the society.*"<sup>21</sup> He further condemned the Lords in stating that they were forcing for a revolution, and they would get it, and the people would direct it. Anyhow the House of Lords rejected the 'People's Budget' at the end of November 1909 by a majority of 350 to 75, and as a result, the Government called for the new elections.

The January 1910 elections brought Liberals to power again but lost the majority in the House. As the Government agreed to demand from the King a guarantee that they would find a way to change the composition of the Lords unless they lifted their veto for the budget, the King died. The new King George V asked for the new elections to be held in December 1910, which gave similar result as the previous one. Upon the request of Government, the King agreed to threaten with the changing of the House of Lords, unless they endorsed the budget, consequently the House of Lords agreed to replace their veto with two year suspension until August 1911. Meanwhile between the elections Conservatives and Liberals gathered to find a compromise for the new budget but with no success. The 'People's Budget' provided a fame for Lloyd George. He was liked but also disliked very much because of his arrogance and the methods he was using.

As the problems were solved for the budget and constitutional controversy was over, Lloyd George initiated his 'pet' project of 'health and unemployment insurance'. With this scheme the workers had to contribute towards their health care. In addition to the employees, the employers had to contribute as well so that the workers received sick pay upon necessity for a certain period. This was maybe not quite a full coverage of national health scheme; nevertheless Lloyd George became one of the pillars of erecting the welfare state.

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<sup>20</sup> Chris Wrigley, p. 48

<sup>21</sup> Ian Packer, p. 26

Lloyd George's reputation had to sail in troubled waters in 1912, because of the 'Marconi Crisis'. The rumors around Lloyd George that he had made easy money came out from gossips staged to a national issue as it appeared in press and later debated in the Parliament. Asquith had to consent to have a Select Committee to look into it. The 'Marconi Case' was able to attract public attention for more than a year, from April 1912 to June 1913. British Marconi Company was given a contract for setting up a wireless telegraphy network. The Chairman of the Company, Godfrey Isaacs was the brother of Attorney-General Sir Rufus Isaacs.<sup>22</sup> There was another Marconi Company in United States, a subsidiary of the British Marconi which owned the majority of the shares of the American Company. In March 1912, the American Marconi Company went through a reconstruction and new shares were issued and another brother of Godfrey Isaacs bought 56,000 of these shares which were bound to rise in price while they were not made public yet. These shares were sold to Lloyd George and to another close friend as well as to Rufus Isaacs. Within few days time the share prices went up almost four times and Lloyd George by selling his shares and buying again made a considerable amount of profit by making use of this inside-trading. Although the contracted company in Britain was a different company whose shares bought and sold by Lloyd George, he made his easy money out of speculation. Although these transactions seemed to be legal, the press it was argued that ethically it was something that a Chancellor of Exchequer should not be involved in. Throughout the crisis Asquith backed Lloyd George and at the end, his name was cleared by the Parliamentary Enquiry Committee.<sup>23</sup> This was the second known incident that Lloyd George was seeking to make easy money out of speculation. These incidents were going to be repeated in coming years.

Lloyd George after the 'people's budget' was concerned and concentrated on the conditions of the rural especially low income people. In October 1913 he with the backing of Asquith, launched the Land Campaign. It is argued that Lloyd George had a tendency to respect the industrialists rather than the land owners. He was careful not to hurt the farmers in the land campaign, and it was claimed that he was less effective in campaigning on the land issue as it affected urban communities.<sup>24</sup> It was believed that the Land Campaign may be credited with a system of social thought and the modern state. It was designed as an attack to landowners. Some

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<sup>22</sup> Sir Rufus Isaacs was going to be appointed as Lord Chief Justice in coming years and later as Viceroy of India. He would be given a title of Lordship, and will be called as Lord Reading.

<sup>23</sup> See for details of Marconi issue, Owen, p. 226-240

<sup>24</sup> Pugh, p. 54-55

give references to Land Campaign, tracing it to his childhood and the conditions of the rural people then.<sup>25</sup>

There had been war clouds in Europe for a long time and Britain was allocating a considerable amount of her budget for the military and naval expenditures. Lloyd George throughout his early days in politics had been identified as an opponent of war and he became an anti-war hero especially after the Boer War. He was quoted in saying on 17<sup>th</sup> of July 1914 that; *"You never get a perfectly blue sky in international affairs, and there are clouds even now. But we feel confident that the common sense, the patience, the goodwill, the forbearance which enabled us to solve greater and more difficult and urgent problems last year will enable us to pull through these difficulties at the present moment."*<sup>26</sup> Britain seemed to be optimistic that she was involved in other matters such as the Irish Home-Rule and taxation problems. Lloyd George wrote in his 'War Memoirs' that the Cabinet never even discussed the possible war environment in Europe until the week before the war broke out.<sup>27</sup> In the same line, Sir Edward Grey was considering as the Foreign Secretary that a war was impossible in Europe. The tranquility in Britain could be attributed to the belief that they did not have any enemies to fight, but the war machine had already started rolling and Britain was not going to be able to escape from it. Lloyd George was aware of the intentions of Germany especially after his visit in 1908. By 1911, when there was a clash between France and Germany and the latter had chosen to ignore British representations on the issue of Morocco, he had become quite strongly against Germany and said that; *"National honor is no party question. The security of our great international trade is no party question."*<sup>28</sup> Although he believed in anti-war policy, he was inclined to erect a strong defense system as he thought the best way to put off fighting, but still quarreled with the Admiralty for the naval estimates since they were exorbitant.

## **II.2: Lloyd George as a Minister during War**

Britain had an excited week beginning with Austria's declaration of war to Serbia on 28<sup>th</sup> July 1914 and on 4<sup>th</sup> August, sent an ultimatum to Germany to respect Belgium's neutrality. As no answer was received from Germany, Britain declared

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<sup>25</sup> Bentley Gilbert, "David Lloyd George: The Reform of British Landholding and the Budget of 1914", *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Mar.,1978), 117-141

<sup>26</sup> Rowland, p. 280

<sup>27</sup> Owen, p. 261

<sup>28</sup> Pugh, p. 66

war on Germany on the same evening; to Austria on the 12<sup>th</sup> August and to Turkey on the 5<sup>th</sup> November. During the critical week before declaring war against Germany, half of the Cabinet was against war and Lloyd George seemed to be for it, believing that it was for the national interests. The responsibility of Lloyd George was to calm the financial circles. The Governor of the Bank of England had reflected the atmosphere in the 'City' as strongly against the war as he pleaded to Lloyd George that; *"Keep us out of it. We shall all be mined if we are dragged in"*<sup>29</sup> and Lloyd George was going to comment that; *"Money was a frightened and trembling thing. Money shivered at the prospect. Big business everywhere wanted to keep out"*<sup>30</sup>

Lloyd George's consent for the war while some members of the Cabinet resigned were a dilemma for a person known as a 'pro-Boer' champion of 'anti-war' campaigns. The Memoirs of Lloyd George reveals that he joined the camp of 'War' for the reasons of;

*"The Germans had signed a treaty not merely to respect but to protect the neutrality of Belgium. Would they honor their bond? Great Britain was a party to that compact. If anyone broke its terms, Britain was bound to throw her might against the invader. Would the faith of Prussia strengthened by the fear of Britain prevail? If the treaty stood, the situation might yet be saved. The policy I urged upon my colleagues was not one merely of passive non-intervention in the struggle between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Russia and France on the other. We were under no such obligation."*<sup>31</sup>

Lloyd George's mistress and private secretary Frances Stevenson in her Memoirs stated that Lloyd George had known from the start that Britain would have to go to war.<sup>32</sup> Whether he was reluctant to resign from his post or willingly due to the principles of nationalism, agreed to the entrance of Britain to war or was convinced by Churchill that the anti-Boer war was different than the German aggression hence the war was something that they could not escape, does not seem very clear, but

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<sup>29</sup> Owen, p. 297

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 263

<sup>31</sup> Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933), p. 66

<sup>32</sup> Bentley Gilbert in his paper *"Pacifist to Interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an issue"* (The Historical Journal, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Dec., 1985), 863-885) argues that Lloyd George's behavior towards the threat of Germany must be measured against the educational process he underwent during the Agarir Crisis in 1911. Although some of the biographers such as Martin Pugh showed that Lloyd George's patriotic and Empire-minded sentiments were alive even before the Boer war, there was no steep change in his behavior from anti-war to war-like attitude. Peter Rowland claims that in 1914 Lloyd George had to accept the war because of his resistance to resignation from the Cabinet. David Lloyd George states in his book of "David and Winston" that Lloyd George was still in doubt on 3<sup>rd</sup> Aug. 1914 about entrance to the War and Churchill who thought that a declaration of war was inevitable, sent a note to Lloyd George. The Note reads; *"Please study the question before you make up your mind. There are all sorts of vital and precise facts-which you can not have at your fingers' ends."* It must have been this Note that changed Lloyd George's views as he supported the Cabinet's decision the following day.

the result is that the Cabinet decided on 4<sup>th</sup> August 1914 to declare war with the partition and consent of Lloyd George as a Minister, although he might have resigned as some of his colleagues were going to do.

Lloyd George's position was rather important when Britain declared war since the war would be based on financial resources that Britain was going to provide. His first task was to calm down the tension in the 'City'. Lloyd George unlike most of his colleagues was aware that the war that they just entered was going to last much longer. Therefore the needs of the public and the army had to be met fully. It is also argued that career of this peacetime minister had developed in him the instincts and the administrative and political skills peculiarly appropriate for wartime. Indeed, the war gave Lloyd George extraordinary liberty to tackle government business in the manner to which he had been drawn before the war.<sup>33</sup>

In order to meet the expenses of the war, Lloyd George, as the Chancellor first asked for one hundred million pounds of credit from the Parliament and when it was exhausted he asked for two hundred twenty five million pound credits more. To meet the latter credit he had to double the income tax which was going to affect the middle and low income groups. The war against Germans was not going well when Churchill suggested as the First Lord of the Admiralty, to force the Straits of the Dardanelles and hence, seize Constantinople. Kitchener as the Secretary of War supported this suggestion. However during the discussions in the Cabinet, Lloyd George stood against the idea of attacking Dardanelles and instead suggested opening a new front at Salonika as the Greeks had offered, then, moving to north to unite with the Serbs to attack Austria. Lloyd George argued that with the expedition of Salonika, they would bring the Romanians to their side and also there would be the possibility of getting the Bulgarians to the Allied side or at least neutralize them. In the Cabinet the Dardanelles party won the argument and attacking Straits was decided instead of unsupported landing proposal to Salonika.<sup>34</sup>

Lloyd George before the end of the year became a fierce critic of Kitchener because of his tactics and conduct of the war. Lloyd George believed that the crucial issues affecting the war were recruitment, munitions and strategy and on these points he did not agree with Kitchener and in time the events were going to prove that he was right.

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<sup>33</sup> Stephen Constantine, "Lloyd George", (Florence, USA: Routledge, 1991), p. 47.

<sup>34</sup> Owen , p. 276-278

The Year 1915 did not bring any good news to Britain, and still worst news was to come, which were the Dardanelles and shell scandals. The attack to the Dardanelles opened on 19<sup>th</sup> February, 1915 and a quick and decisive victory as was expected by the Cabinet was nowhere in the horizon. It was hoped at the beginning of the offensive that within two weeks time they should have seized Constantinople. In the middle of May 1915, the the First Sea Lord Fisher resigned criticizing Churchill and Sir John French's criticism followed. John French, in a well publicized complaint was for the lack of munitions that he had failed in his recent offense. The publicity against the Government stirred the Conservative Party and through the negotiations of Bonar Law, the Leader of the Conservatives and Lloyd George made it possible to form a coalition with Asquith still as the Prime Minister. Lloyd George had been complaining about Kitchener about his handling the production of munitions and therefore the shortage of munitions was causing British lives in the battlefield. The new Coalition Government began its work with Churchill being downgraded from Admiralty and Lloyd George becoming the new minister of the newly formed Ministry of Munitions where he was going to be respected for doing a successful job.

Lloyd George started at the new Ministry with a single table and a chair. When Colonel House visited him on the first day of his new assignment, each party offered the chair to the other, since there was only one chair in the room, but later House was going to write to his friend Wilson, the President of United States, that; *"He [Lloyd George] was full of energy and enthusiasm, and I feel certain something will soon happen in his department...He has something dynamic within him which his colleagues have not and which is badly needed at this great hour."*<sup>35</sup>

Lloyd George approached his assignment at the new Ministry as a businessman and recruited personnel that he trusted, as he indicated; *"Its most distinctive feature was the appointment. I made of successful business man to the chief executive officers."*<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Owen, p. 289-290

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, p. 293

Lloyd George was able to create an enormous industrial machine while taking risks as he was going to say later that; "*The most formidable task I ever undertook a wilderness of risks with no oasis in sight.*"<sup>37</sup>

Although Lloyd George, faced considerable resistance from War Office, he managed to operate the existing factories for munitions. He believed that the war was going to last longer than expected and therefore the need for munitions would be much higher than anticipated by the War Office. To meet the future requirements he started planning to open new factories. With the new factories the requirements for manpower was enormous; 80,000 skilled and 200,000 to 300 000 unskilled men. He found the formulae that he was going to employ females and he guaranteed that women would be paid the same piece rates as paid as men, accordingly, bringing to an end the sordid exploitation of cheap female labour in Britain. The number of women working for the Government with the policy of Lloyd George increased to four times, totaling to 350,000. By the end of the War, the number of women working for the Government was going to be increased to 1.6 million.<sup>38</sup>

Lloyd George was opposed to the conduct of the War as a whole and especially to the tactics adopted in the Western Front and in 1<sup>st</sup> of January 1915 as the Chancellor of the Exchequers distributed a memorandum among Cabinet members. In his appreciation of war, he suggested a strictly defensive position on the Western front, and be active in other fronts in two operations. The first operation was launching a political and military front in the Balkans against the Austrians, since he believed that it was the weakest front of the Central Powers. Lloyd George suggested that their new forces should be employed in an attack upon Austria in conjunction with Romania, Serbia and the Greece. He believed that Romania alone could put up an army of 300,000 men in the field while retaining a sufficient force to keep the Bulgarians in control and in case the Bulgarians were to choose neutrality, and then Romania was able to allocate another 200,000. He pointed out that this was a considerably large army which was the Allies needed. The second operation according to Lloyd George was to initiate an offense against the Turks. Lloyd George's suggestion of an attack to Turkey involved choosing a place for an attack that was far from her supplies. He remarked that the operations could give them a chance of winning a victory which would encourage the Allies. To attack the Turks, Lloyd George suggested making use of Turk's preparations of invading Egypt; that

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<sup>37</sup> Oran James Hale, "*Lloyd George at Work*", Virginia Quarterly Review, 10:2 (Apr., 1934)

<sup>38</sup> Owen, p. 297.

they should cut off in Syria.<sup>39</sup> Lloyd George further prepared a decision paper for the War Council on 13<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1915 in accordance with the suggestions he made on 1<sup>st</sup> January but no results were obtained.<sup>40</sup>

Lloyd George was engaged in the Munitions Ministry for the full output that was going to be required in the battlefield. In the early summer 1915, the British army after the training of new recruits was off to Europe. Lloyd George after 'nationalizing' munitions production, he came cross with the problem of skilled man-power and started suggesting conscription but the Conservative members of the Cabinet were against the idea. When Kitchener demanded assigning 70 divisions by the end of 1916, Lloyd George told that there was no other solution but to have compulsory service to meet the demands of the War. When the Cabinet discussed the issue and deemed it difficult to agree on the conscription, Kitchener threatened with resigning from War Office. Asquith took the case to the Parliament at the beginning of 1916 as the first Military Service Bill, which experienced a strong opposition from the Labor Party as well as from Trade Union. Eventually the Royal Assent was received for the act on 25<sup>th</sup> May 1916 to impose a compulsory military service.<sup>41</sup>

The war was not going well; the disaster for the British at the Dardanelles and the failure along with French against Germans in Europe had been showing that the conduct of the war was not successful. Lloyd George believed the blame should rest on Lord Kitchener and therefore he should resign from his post. Asquith knowing the reputation of Kitchener in public could not afford to sack him, and then the threat came from Lloyd George on 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1915 that either he or Kitchener should leave the Cabinet. Lloyd George complained that the War Office was late in ordering artillery, ammunition and equipment and besides, the Balkan States were neglected and therefore failed to bring Romania, Greece and perhaps even Bulgaria to their side. Asquith found the solution of sending Kitchener to inspect the Dardanelles. According to rumors, Kitchener was after 'one more assault' against the Turks. Consequently the Dardanelles expedition was called off and eventually on 19<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1915 British Forces evacuated the Peninsula. The next day in the Cabinet meeting, when Curzon advised that they should stay at Dardanelles, Kitchener told that

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<sup>39</sup> House of Lords Public Records, Lloyd George Papers (Lloyd George Papers), LG/C/16/1/3,

<sup>40</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/16/1/4.

<sup>41</sup> Owen, p. 301-303

evacuation took place in the previous day. Upon hearing this, Curzon criticized the evacuation in the Parliament.<sup>42</sup>

1916 was full of events for Britain. The Easter Rising in Dublin on Easter Sunday in April 1916 brought a new dimension to Lloyd George as to negotiate for a peaceful solution for the Irish Question, but failed to accomplish peace. On 5<sup>th</sup> of June, Lord Kitchener on his way to Northern Russia was killed, when his cruiser hit the mines. The post of Secretary of State for War was given to Lloyd George after so much intrigues and talks behind scenes.<sup>43</sup>

It is argued that as Secretary of State, Lloyd George did only four things. He persuaded General Haig to let Sir Eric Geddes to deal with the transportation problem; Sir John Cowan to sort out the great Mesopotamian muddle. Thirdly, he dismissed the Master-General of Ordnance which was causing problems to the Ministry of Munitions and as the last thing he uncovered a scandal in the Army Clothing Department.<sup>44</sup>

By judging the activities of Lloyd George at the Exchequer and at the Munitions during war it looks quite peculiar that he accepted an office that his responsibilities were so limited and corresponded merely to administrative work only, even in that his hands were tied with Generals Robertson and Haig, and Lord Derby. Frances Stevenson in her Diary remembers those days with bitter memories and blames the Generals for not allowing Lloyd George to do anything. She wrote on 12<sup>th</sup> October 1916 that the War Office was a hotbed of intrigues and jealousies and the Generals would stop at nothing when they thought their prestige or their standing was being menaced. She trusted Lloyd George that he was going to beat them.<sup>45</sup>

Lloyd George's acceptance of the War Office coincided with the famous offence of the the Battle of Somme. The offense was launched on 1<sup>st</sup> July 1916 and lasted until

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid., p. 309-310

<sup>43</sup> Frank Owen discusses in detail the events behind the appointment of Secretary of War and somehow the events seem to be quite similar as laid down by Peter Rowland except for the part of Montagu's letter to Asquith. Martin Pugh argues that he had to accept the post since his prime concern was to be in the best possible position for succession when Asquith finally crumbled, which sounds the most probable reason why he had not sent the resignation letters to Asquith. When we consider, the negative aspects of the War Office such as having limited powers and accepting Lord Derby as an Undersecretary he disliked and who was known to be close to Robertson, Chief of General Staff, and the probable reason of appointment of Lord Derby as a 'watch-dog' could only be explained by Lloyd George's ulterior desires.

<sup>44</sup> Rowland, p. 343

<sup>45</sup> *Lloyd George A Diary by Frances Stevenson*, ed. A.J.P. Taylor, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1971), p. 115-117

18<sup>th</sup> November 1916 with a disaster for Allies as well as for Germany. Unlike the expectations of General Haig for a decisive victory, the Battle of Somme brought the fall of the Government in the coming weeks.

Lloyd George paid a visit to the battle field and to Paris in September 1916 for two weeks. He did not think very highly about the Generals and about the conduct of the war in the front at Somme and especially General Haig, the Commander of the British Forces in Europe who was going to be eliminated when Lloyd George became Prime Minister. General Haig did not rejoice Lloyd George's visit to France either, as he was going to write later that; "*Breakfast with newspaper men, and posing for the cinema shows, pleased him more than anything else*"<sup>46</sup>

Lloyd George frustrated with the conduct of the war, tried to persuade the Prime Minister to set up a small committee of 4 people and enhance them with full power to take decisions for the conduct of the war. He believed that the Committees so far were too crowded and indecisive that nothing came out of it.<sup>47</sup>

Meanwhile the United States was still neutral and trying to bring both sides for an early peace. Colonel House, the special envoy of the President Wilson, traveled to Paris, London, Vienna and Berlin in the hope that the peace could be attained. The Cabinet Secretary Hankey noted that as early as in May 1916 the prospect of peace with Wilson's mediation came up for the Ministers' consideration and there was a row over the issue at the War Committee. According to Hankey, Asquith, Grey, Balfour and McKenna were in favour of accepting the President as a mediator, but Lloyd George and Bonar Law resented the idea that this was not the right time for negotiations as it was clear that the Allies were rather in a weak position compared to Central Powers. Lloyd George believed that they should be in stronger position for peace otherwise the Germans would be fulfilling their desires against the Allies.

Britain and the Allies were not in a better position in the autumn of 1916, since the financial resources were exhausted, and Romania after joining the Allies on 27<sup>th</sup> of August was practically overrun by the Central Powers' armies. Russia was not able to fulfill her responsibilities because of the internal problems and lack of war

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<sup>46</sup> Rowland, p. 344

<sup>47</sup> Ian Packer argues that he had turned to the War Cabinet scheme in an effort to reassert both his claims to direct the conduct of the war and his own position in the Cabinet. His position seems to be weakened by acceptance of the War Secretary, practically with administrative powers only, and the disaster of the Battle of Somme which was launched as he became the Secretary of War. (Packer, p. 52-53)

material, and the British and French armies had encountered difficulties in Somme, were the causes for the Allies to feel pessimistic. At this juncture of time the peace mediation by President Wilson was likely to attract more attention in the British Cabinet, Lloyd George who was against peace negotiations, on his return from France gave an interview to a newspaper reporter, Roy Howard, which was going to be published in 'The Times' on 29<sup>th</sup> September. He told Howard that;

*"Britain is not prepared to stop the war because of the squealing done by Germans or done for Germans. We must fight to a finish, to a knock-out blow. There can be no outside interference at this stage. Britain, can tolerate no intervention. The enemy is whimpering and whining. With regard to the duration of the war there is neither clock nor calendar in the British army today. Time is the least vital factor. It took England twenty years to defeat Napoleon, and the first fifteen of those years were black with British defeats. It will not take twenty years to win this war, but whatever time is required it will be done!"*<sup>48</sup>

Lloyd George with this interview was trying to block the Ministers such as Lansdowne and McKenna for peace initiation. Lord Grey, the Foreign Secretary, was annoyed by Lloyd George's speech since the success in the war did not seem in close proximity, therefore the door should not be closed to peace prospects.

President Wilson offered for mediation as early as February 1916. Colonel House and Grey worked on a plan to enable President Wilson's mediation between concerned states on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Feb.1916. The House-Grey Memorandum was discussed at the War Committee on 21<sup>st</sup> of March. It is argued that Grey informed the War Committee that the President was feeling to seek a conference of the concerned states and there was a chance that the Belgium problem could be solved in accordance with the terms of Allies.<sup>49</sup> It is argued that the peace proposal was rejected and Lloyd George played a decisive part in the rejection, claiming that the public would not tolerate it. The question why Lloyd George produced his account with respect to the Memorandum is a matter of speculation since the reasons he had quoted in his Memoirs did not reflect the truth.<sup>50</sup> The reason for his rejection of the peace offer was that; *"It was probably the product of a combination of two of his best known qualities – a fertile imagination and an intense dislike for Grey."*<sup>51</sup> The peace initiative by Wilson was once more in the agenda of the War Committee on 24<sup>th</sup> of May 1916 after the response of Colonel House to Grey on 9<sup>th</sup> of May, in urging the British to take advantage of the plan. The indecisive War Committee meeting was followed with another meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> of May. The meeting was held in

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<sup>48</sup> Rowland, p. 346

<sup>49</sup> John Milton Cooper, Jr., "The British Response to House-Grey Memorandum: New Evidence and New Questions", The Journal of American History, Vol.59, No 4 (Mar 1973), p. 958-966

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

the light of President's speech on 27<sup>th</sup> of May about the freedom of high seas which was not in accordance with the British interests. Hankey was going to write later that the American peace would be more dangerous than the German war.<sup>52</sup> House's request was once more rejected by the War Committee for the very reasons as of the 21<sup>st</sup> of March. This was the end of the possibility of attaining an earlier peace and although it was the decision of the Cabinet, it seems that Lloyd George's part in rejection along with Bonar Law was considerable. It was also argued that if the negotiations had taken place the USA's involvement in the war could be attained much earlier and therefore could have been finalized at an earlier stage.

Lloyd George's relation with General Robertson, the Chief of Imperial General Staff, was also strained because of the situation in the Balkans. Lloyd George believed that the military coordination among the Allies was not how it should be, and tried to send Robertson to Russia for coordination in September but with no successes as Robertson thought that the Minister was trying to get rid of him. With the backing of Asquith and the King, he wrote to Lloyd George that he was not going. Lloyd George's desire to send Robertson to Russia was going to anger Northcliffe, the owner of 'The Times', who threatened him that he would ruin his political career if he was to continue to interfere with the military strategy.<sup>53</sup>

Lloyd George's worries for the conduct of the war were going to be overcome and therefore save him from political knock-out. Lloyd George had been close to Carson from Conservative Party who resigned from the Cabinet in 1915 and since then had become a kind of spokesman for the Conservative backbenchers who were not happy with the war effort of the Cabinet and especially of Asquith. Lloyd George tried to negotiate and agree with Bonar Law, the Leader of the the Conservative Party, about setting up a small war committee to be engaged in day-to-day conduct of the war with extensive powers was declined initially by Bonar Law. Bonar Law after seeing that Lloyd George though Carson might divide the Conservative Party through exploiting their sentiments of the backbenchers, agreed to the scheme where a Cabinet Committee of four members with presidency of Lloyd George would be set-up with powers enough to run the day-to-day events for the war. It is argued that Bonar Law personally was also resentful with the conduct of the war and the indecisive attitude of Asquith and believed in 'total victory' as Lloyd George did. Another reason for Bonar Law's acceptance of the scheme was the Lansdowne's

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Owen, p. 324-325

Memorandum which was discussed in the Cabinet and was decided that the prospect of peace should be given a careful consideration.<sup>54</sup>

Bonar Law met with Asquith concerning the 'Committee of Four' proposal on 25<sup>th</sup> November and later reported to Lloyd George that Asquith, not rejecting the proposal straightaway told that he would give his answer on 27<sup>th</sup> November. Asquith rejected the proposal with a letter to Bonar Law that he did not see the practicality of the Committee of Four unless its members included the heads of Admiralty and War Office. He commented about Lloyd George that;

*"As to LI. George, you know as well as I do both his qualities & his defects. He has many qualities that would fit him for the first place, but he lacks the one thing needful – he does not inspire trust. Here, again, there is one construction, and one only, that could be put on the new arrangement – that has been engineered by him with the purpose, not perhaps at the moment, but as soon as a fitting pretext could be found, of his displacing me. In short, the plan could not, in my opinion, be carried out without fatally impairing the confidence of loyal and valued colleagues, and undermining my own authority."*<sup>55</sup>

Lloyd George went to see Asquith to repeat the proposal that Bonar Law had already submitted with the modification that the War Committee would be composed of three members, Chief of Admiralty, War Office and another Minister without portfolio. In that respect to a certain extent he gave in to the desires of the Prime Minister and he also proposed that any of the Ministers could be the Chairman of the Committee. Lloyd George, according to Hankey, threatened that if his proposal was not to be accepted, he was going to resign and would make public the reasons of his resignation.<sup>56</sup> Asquith replied to the threat of Lloyd George on the same day with a letter. He came quite close to Lloyd George's proposal and suggested that the War Committee should be composed of four or even five persons and separately from the War Committee; he proposed to have a committee to look into domestic issues. Asquith told that it was natural that he as the Prime Minister should be the Chairman of the Committees. Lloyd George was not satisfied with the reply and believed that it was unacceptable. The Times reported on 4<sup>th</sup> December about the 'reconstruction' of the War Committee' and Asquith gave in to Lloyd George. The letters and people went to and fro between Lloyd George and Asquith and Asquith decided to submit his resignation to the King on 4<sup>th</sup> December 1916. Asquith wrote to Lloyd George about his resignation and the reasons behind it. He told that the

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<sup>54</sup> The Memorandum of Lord Lansdowne on whether it was worthwhile prolonging the war was discussed on 22<sup>nd</sup> November in the Cabinet. Lloyd George was aware that after the acceptance of 'needed careful consideration', the next move would be 'peace by negotiations'. Bonar Law's meeting with Lloyd George and agreeing the 'Committee of Four' was on 25<sup>th</sup> November.

<sup>55</sup> Rowland, p. 355

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 356-357

Prime Minister should be the final and supreme control of the Committees and conduct of any business for that matter, which was not the case with Lloyd George's offer. Lloyd George wrote two letters to Asquith on the same day and told in his second letter that he would resign with assigning the reason and would publish all the correspondence. The King asked Bonar Law to form the next Government, but he declined and finally Lloyd George was asked to be the next Premier. Lloyd George after ensuring the support of Labour Party, accepted the Premiership on 7<sup>th</sup> of December 1916 to form the Cabinet of consisting of Liberals, close to him, and Conservatives and also three Labour Ministers including the Leader of the Labour Party, Henderson.<sup>57</sup>

It is argued that the historians had disregarded the view that Asquith fell because Lloyd George conspired.<sup>58</sup> Nevertheless the split in the Liberal Party affected the Party that it never recovered itself, and since then governments have been formed either by the Labour Party or by the Conservatives.

Lloyd George became Prime Minister at the age of fifty four and was going to be in power until 1922.

### **II.3. Evaluation**

This Chapter reflects Lloyd George and his personality. It can be noted that he came from a modest background and was not able to receive elevated education, many of his colleagues received from prestigious Universities, probably compelled him to overcome this gap by his almost greedy attempts to acquire money and fame for himself. His background was reflected in the early days of his political stand. He was radical in his approaches and as he attained upper positions in politics became more liberal, and a part of the established system. His assets of being a convincing and a good speaker and success in dealing with people, earned him the reputation of an excellent 'negotiator'. His determination to replace Asquith can be regarded as an indication of his ambitious personality to occupy perhaps the most prominent position in British politics. His life until the moment he was promoted to such a position bears indications of his desire to reach final conclusions rapidly, for example he is observed as a person who does not refrain from taking drastic steps

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<sup>57</sup> For the details of the end of the Asquith Government, please see Rowland, p. 359-377, and House of Lords, Public Records, Beaverbrook Papers (BBK), BBK/G/2/32.

<sup>58</sup> Pugh, p. 80-86

to achieve easy profits; his greediness inspired him to making easy money. Such characteristics were going to accompany him until his death.

An example of Lloyd George's personality and his foreign policy may be found in French Minister Andrea Tardieu's analysis or rather in his answer to Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on Feb.19<sup>th</sup> 1923 regarding to French annexation of German Ruhr Region

“.....These errors of fact show either great ignorance or blind prejudice; they would be sufficient to discredit the whole argument of the former Primer [Lloyd George]. But his infringements of the truth do not stop there; to support his views he recklessly misstates all the history of recent years.....He claims the honor working to give peace to humanity. This is pure mockery. Was he working for peace when he launched the Greeks on their attempt to conquer Asia Minor? ...Under a thin coating of pacifism he has pursued ' since the conclusion of peace ' merely a mercantile policy, aiming at Constantinople , now at Mousul and Baku . He is ill-qualified to give today lessons in solidarity.,, for his international was inspired for three full years by the narrowest selfishness”<sup>59</sup>

It is interesting to note that Lloyd George is accused that he was carried away by selfishness and selfish mercantilist policy for Britain by one of his closed collogue.

Lloyd George displayed a dual personality such that a radical and anti-Boer war hero, the young Lloyd George differed so much from the Prime Minister Lloyd George. His pre-war days did not resemble the days in Paris during the Peace Conference. Lloyd George rightly earned the honour of erecting the modern welfare state but also received the reputation of being the 'Brutus' of British politics for his behaviour against Asquith who saved him from the 'Marconi Scandal'.

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<sup>59</sup> Andre Tardieu, "A Defence of French Policy (Reply to Lloyd George)", *Current History*(New York),18:2(1923:May).

## **CHAPTER III**

### **BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS the OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

#### **III.1: Ottoman-British Relations Prior to the War**

Ottoman-British relations were based upon two important merits, commerce and security. Commerce became even more important after the 18<sup>th</sup> century when mercantilism forced British trade to open new markets for exporting British goods and importing raw materials. To acquire an exceptional status for British trade in the Ottoman Empire and to prevent other countries to have access a better conditions were the concern of British Governments. The security of her Dominions especially India was another concern for Britain. Being an Asiatic Empire because of majority of population residing in Asia and existence of Islamic element in the population concerned, the British foreign policy set an eye on Ottoman Empire since the Ottoman Sultan became the Caliph. The access to India was another concern and therefore the security of the Suez Canal and hence Eastern Mediterranean were important parameters in the British politics. During World War I, the importance of oil became more apparent because of naval requirements. The Russian Revolution compelled Britain to look for other sources for oil since her resources and concessions in Iran and Azerbaijan were no longer controllable and hence, holding Mesopotamia became essential. These imperialistic considerations governed the relations towards the Ottoman Empire starting in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the importance of the Straits became one of the pillars of her diplomacy. There is hardly any exaggeration in saying that the British-Ottoman relations were based on the 'Straits'. The partition of the Ottoman Empire and the Straits became somehow interchangeable that the latter was considered as conjunction with the former.

The Ottoman Empire, was able to control and use Black Sea as her own domain, during the period of 14<sup>th</sup> to 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries since it was practically her own. The capitulations granted to Venice, France, Britain and other states allowed their vehicles to enter the Marmara Sea through the Dardanelles even to Constantinople for trade but never were they permitted to sail to the Black Sea. In 1774, the Kúćúk Kaynarca Treaty altered or rather forced the Ottomans to change her policies for the navigation in the Black Sea and therefore Straits. Even earlier in 1696, when Azof was captured by the Russians, the hegemony of Ottomans over the Black Sea had

ended. When in 1700, the Russian Mission to Constantinople demanded opening Black Sea for Russian trade, the answer of Porte was; “*The Sultan considers the Black Sea as his own house to which strangers can not penetrate; it is a virgin shut up in the harem, hidden from the view of strangers, and he would rather have war than permit other nations to navigate on this internal sea.*”<sup>1</sup> The Ottomans were considering that the moment foreign ships had the right to sail freely in the Black Sea; it would be the end of their Empire since their main concern was the security of the Sultan and the Constantinople. The Russians could not obtain the right to sail freely in the the Black Sea during Peter the Great’s reign, but they managed to occupy northern shores during Catherine II’s, and eventually managed to annex the territories of the Crimean Tartars and forced the Ottomans to give way for free trade in 1774, by the Kúćúk Kaynarca Treaty. Therefore the Russian vessels had the right to sail not only in Black Sea, but also through the Straits into British-Russo problems. The right to trade and therefore to sail and pass through the Straits in peace time was granted to other ‘friendly’ countries as well. With the Adrianople Treaty more concessions were granted to Russia that Russian ships were free to call any Ottoman port. The Treaty opened the Straits for free navigation for Russian and other ships trading with Russia. In time, similar privileges were granted to other countries too. Since then the Straits and the Black Sea had in times of peace been open to the commerce of all states. This freedom was also quoted in the Treaty of Paris in 1856, that; “*Freed from any impediment, the commerce in the ports and waters of the Black Sea shall be subject only to regulations of health, customs and police, framed in a spirit favourable to the development of commercial transactions*”<sup>2</sup>

There was no general rule governing to use of the Straits even for commercial navigation as the Porte had the full sovereignty of their usage. They were free to impose certain rules from time to time such as restricting navigation at night in the Straits and free passage to only ‘friendly’ states. There existed no regulations for war time and some questions were raised as for the blockade and mining as was the case in 1912 and 1913. Some questions were raised by Russia as to who was acting for the interests of Romania even when she was considered as the intervening power. During World War the Straits were closed to the Allied shipping and no ships were allowed to pass through until the armistice; the Ottomans applied mining and blockade to the Allied vessels.

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<sup>1</sup> Ismail Hakki Uzuncarsili, *Osmanli Tarihi*, Vol. 3, (Ankara: TTK,1988), p. 593; The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) FO 424/255, No: 574,

<sup>2</sup> PRO, FO 424/255, No: 574, E 1307/27/44.

The independence of the Straits, hence, Constantinople was the main concern of Great Powers since the early 19<sup>th</sup> century, involved not only the water ways and the city but the security of the entire Empire. Using Straits as a base for the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean was considered as a danger for France and Britain and likewise privilege of maintaining a free passage for these countries also posed as a danger for Russia as was the case for the Crimean War in the 1850s. Therefore the question of Straits was a tool among Powers and due to the weakness the Ottoman Empire, had become a pawn in the game. The players or rather protagonists in the game were Russia, Austria, France and Britain. Throughout the history at least since the days of Peter the Great, Russia had been aware that neither using the Straits nor the privilege extended to her by the Ottoman Empire was permanent and would be changed anytime whenever the Ottoman Empire was under pressure of other States or felt strong enough to resist them. Therefore, as far as Russia was concerned, the only remedy was to have an actual control over the Straits and the Ottoman Empire. During Catherine II era, national and religious aspirations were highlighted, since the days of Kúćúk Kaynarca Russia had the patronage of the Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. Catherine II exploiting the religious feelings of Russians constructed a foreign policy on Ottoman Empire to liberate the Orthodox Christians and have a Great Russia to enclave Ottoman territories including the Straits. Russia, by this policy stood against the interests of Western Powers although she managed to form alliance with some of the Powers from time to time. In the alliance between Russia, France and Austria in 1789, Constantinople and Straits were assigned to Russia, and Egypt to France. Britain was excluded from this alliance and the British Prime Minister William Pitt (1759-1806) concluded that the integrity of the Turkish Empire was for the British interest. William Pitt believed that for the defense of India, Britain should maintain a strong navy and therefore should hold her superiority at Levant. The only danger she would face to pursue superiority was the Russians especially if they had the Straits.

In 1912 while Ottomans were busy dealing with the Balkan crisis, the Russia's pressure upon the Ottomans and Powers started increasing gradually. Russia came out with the idea that the Western Powers should be united under an Entente to form a front against a possible enemy, therefore proposing to have an access to the Mediterranean to both France and Britain. Meanwhile the threat from Bulgaria towards the Ottomans was becoming serious. When the Bulgarian armies came all the way to Chatalja and threatening Constantinople the Russians promised to enter

Constantinople to make sure that the Ottoman Empire was to be saved against the Bulgarian aggressiveness. Russia also invited other nations to rescue provided that she would be the last one to leave the Bosphorus. By the end of 1913, the Russian approach to the Straits question was changed completely. They had become more aggressive in dealing with the issue of the Ottoman Empire since there were new rivals such as Bulgaria and Greece who shared the very similar desires for the Ottoman Empire as the Russians. Another problem they had encountered in the horizon was Germans. When Bismarck's 'Look East' policy combined with Enver Pasha's pro-Turkish and pro-Islam approach, as far as Russia was concerned posed dangers for the future.

When the war broke out in 1914, the Russians showed anxiety as to the future of Constantinople and when they were asked to join for the Gallipoli expedition they immediately, as was expected, asked for the Straits zone with Constantinople, and in March 1915, the Russia secured from Britain and France a formal acknowledgement for their demand.<sup>3</sup> The Foreign Secretary, Grey, was going to write in his Memoirs later that: "*It had always been British Policy to keep Russia out of Constantinople and the Straits. We fought for that object in the Crimean War...and it was main policy under Beaconsfield ...Of course it was our policy still [in 1915].*"<sup>4</sup> This attitude of Britain in nine months time was going to change to give her consent of allocating Straits and Constantinople to Russia.

During the nineteenth century which may be treated as 'The Longest Century' the Ottomans played a 'power-balance' game that they learned during Napoleonic wars to save the Empire by utilizing Russian, French, British and later German interests towards the Ottoman Empire. In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century the 'Eastern Question' became even more complex to resolve among Western Countries, especially after the involvement of strong and aggressive Germany in the theatre a 'power game'. Ottoman's ruling class, while maintaining of 'balanced' foreign policy, based their domestic policy on status quo rather than to introduce structural social change. With the penetration of the West and internal unrest, the Ottoman Empire entered an active and deadly phase with the Young Turk revolution in 1908, arranged by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Initially, the Young Turks, in order to

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<sup>3</sup> See PRO, FO 424/255, Doc. 574, E 1307/27/44, and E 109961/27/44 for the Russo-British Agreement of 1915 as to the future of Constantinople and Straits, prepared by History Advisor to the British Foreign Office, J.W. Headlam-Morley.

<sup>4</sup> William A. Renzi, "Great Britain, Russia and the Straits, 1914-1915", *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 42, No:1 (Mar,1970), P. 1-20

acquire support from the West, approached France and Britain since they thought by introducing constitutional regime and therefore having a system of government acceptable to Europe was instituted, necessary support should be spared by them. When they were turned down, CUP felt even more isolated especially after the incident of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg Empire. To continue of searching alliances from West, CUP sent two prominent members of the Committee, Dr. Nazim and Ahmed Riza to London to discuss the matter with the foreign minister, Sir Edward Grey. The proposal of CUP was politely rejected and Grey told them

*“...that our habit was to keep our hands free, though we made ententes and friendships. It was true that we had an alliance with Japan, but it was limited to certain distant questions in the Far East. They replied that Turkey was the Japan of the Near East, and that we already had the Cyprus Convention with Turkey which was still in force. I said that our entire sympathy in the good work they were doing in Turkey; we wished them well. And we would help them in their internal affairs by lending them men to organize customs, police, and so forth, if they wished them.”<sup>5</sup>*

Although being rejected by the British, the Ottomans still pursued their policy to get support from Britain in the hope that by doing so they would eliminate the danger of the Triple Entente, in which Britain was leading member of British, French and Russian alliance. Huseyin Hilmi Pasha, who was known as pro-British, succeeded Kamil Pasa as Grand Vizier, went personally to the British Embassy in Constantinople with the assurance that *“his policy towards England would be the same as that of his predecessors, and that he would continue to count on the support and advice of His Majesty’s Government”<sup>6</sup>*. Despite continuous efforts by CUP during the 1911 Ottoman-Italy war and the Balkan wars in 1912-1913 to get support from Britain and France were not entertained, and the Ottomans felt isolated and disillusioned. Last attempt by a leading member of CUP, Cemal Pasha who was considered to be Francophile, was not successful and his trip to Paris in July 1914 proved to be dressed only with decorations.<sup>7</sup> Meanwhile the war was approaching in Europe and CUP leaders believed that they could not possibly stay out of war since they could not afford to be isolated in another moment of crisis and also there was a problem of financial crisis as Cemal Pasha quoted ‘there exists not a single piastre to pay the salaries’.

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<sup>5</sup> Feroz Ahmad “The Late Ottoman Empire”, *The Great Powers and the end of the Ottoman Empire* ed. by Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 2<sup>nd</sup> Ed., 1966), p. 13.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 15

The message sent by Grey to the British Ambassadors in Paris and St. Petersburg on 20<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1914 gave a clear clue of the British policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire that she was not interested to take her as an Ally. The message outlined the future policy of Britain such that in case Ottoman Empire was to depart from neutrality and came out on the side of Germany and Austria, Britain should at once welcome and support Greece as an ally, and should regard to use of Greek ports and co-operation of the Greek navy as being most valuable. Britain at the same time wanted to follow the suggestion of Venizelos, such that;

*“As to Bulgaria, a point on which M. Venizelos is very particular, for the most desirable object, in our opinion, would be a confederation of the Balkan States, including Romania, as suggested by M. Venizelos the other day. We wish to help that by every means in our power, and M. Venizelos will understand that His Majesty’s Government is anxious not to be involved in any inter-Balkan conflicts.”*<sup>8</sup>

### **III.2 Ottoman Empire and Britain at War (1914-1916)**

The era of World War I and post war marked an important turning point in the history of Great Britain and therefore in the world history, such that the ‘power pendulum’ started swinging from Britain to the New World, USA, that is from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana which was going to be even more crystallized after the Second World War. In the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, after the industrial revolution which enhanced new aspects and dimensions to the British trade and the end of mercantilist trade approach, international stability became the core of British foreign policy<sup>9</sup>. To ensure international stability and hence to maintain the ‘balance of power’ throughout the world but especially in Europe was essential where the mother country, England, was a part of. The state was aware that to secure the ‘stability’, a strong military build-up and sound foreign policy to counter attack the misgivings of the other countries were essential. Britain could not afford to let stronger nations to exist to offset the world’s power balance, and hence she had no other alternative but to get involved in wars even if she was not directly affected, such as the Crimean War in the 19<sup>th</sup> century and even in the World War I in 1914. After the World War I, Britain had a chance to build up ‘his world’ through the peace negotiations. Paris, the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 experienced double playing among the members of Entente, such that regardless to the desire of a ‘weak’ Germany as aimed by France, Britain was busy in seeking to build a comparatively stronger

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<sup>8</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/4/14/15.

<sup>9</sup> F. E. Bail, “The Economics of British Foreign Policy 1825-50” *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1940), p. 449-484

Germany to secure the 'balance' in Europe. British leaders following the Lord Palmerston's policy that "*no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies, our interests are eternal, and those interest it is our duty to follow*"<sup>10</sup> established their role to lead the war, and hence, later on the Peace Conferences<sup>11</sup>. Versailles Peace Treaty with the leading role of Britain allowed 'small and weak' states to emerge rather than 'big and strong' states as was the outcome of Vienna Conference in 1815, after the turmoil of Napoleonic wars. Contrary to the European Policy, the desire to maintain the Ottoman Empire was not part of British foreign politics due to various reasons from the perspective of economics, security and even religion. To follow Gladstone's policy, British leaders did not hesitate to slice the Ottoman Empire and distribute to several states as a token of gift, even before the Peace Conference took place. The distribution of the Ottoman land was accelerated by her joining the War with Central Powers against Entente, resulting being on the side of the 'losers'.

On 4<sup>th</sup> Nov.1914 Tsar of Russia declared war against the Ottoman Empire after the incident of Goeben and Breslau in Black Sea in which Germans attacked the Russian fleet and bombarded the Russian coast. France and Britain, being the members of Entente, followed Russia in declaring war the next day. From November 1914 to the end of October 1918, the Ottoman Empire was in war with the Entente in which Italy, Greece and USA were to join later<sup>12</sup>. The Ottoman entrance to the war was seen as a suicide by Britain as Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, stated in his speech on 4<sup>th</sup> Nov.1914 as; "*The Turkish Empire has committed suicide, and dug with his own hands its grave.*"<sup>13</sup>

The war ended as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, at 22<sup>nd</sup> of Oct.1918, when Britain invited the Ottomans for an Armistice at Mudros and an Armistice Agreement was signed on 30<sup>th</sup> October. The terms of the Armistice ruled that the Straits were to be opened for a free passage to Black Sea, forts along the Straits were to be occupied by the Allies, the Ottoman forces were to be demobilized and the Allies had the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation arising which threatened the security of the Allies. There exists some controversial reasoning behind the 'reasons' for the World War 1, whether it was an outcome of the German or rather Prussian military despotism as Lloyd George told an American

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<sup>10</sup> Erik Goldstein and B.J.C. McKercher "Stability in British Foreign Policy, 1865-1965", *Diplomacy & Statecraft*, June 2003, Vol. 14 Issue 2, p. 1-22

<sup>11</sup> See for details for the role played by Britain, Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> USA joined the "Allies" in April 1917 but did not declare war against the Ottoman Empire.

<sup>13</sup> Harry Howard, *The Partition of Turkey*, p. 113, (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966)

journalist Roy W. Howard in September 1916<sup>14</sup> or assassination of a Habsburg Archduke in a Slav province giving the signal to a series of international menaces resulting the declaration of war by Germans. Another claim for the reason of the war was the arms race that German, French and Russians joined voluntarily. It was predicted that a war was foreseen as early as 1907 as was quoted in the biography of Henry White, the United States Ambassador to Italy, that according to Balfour “*We are probably fools not to find a reason for declaring war on Germany before she builds too many ships and takes away our trade*”<sup>15</sup>. Regardless to the reason ‘who started the war’, Britain did not wish to accommodate the Ottoman Empire as a part of the ‘Entente’. It seems quite clear that British, even back in 1912 made a choice between Ottomans and Balkan States on the side of the latter.<sup>16</sup> Britain, even before the War began, because of eagerness of the Greek Prime minister Venizelos, was happy to accept Greek offer for her to join the ‘Entente’ and therefore to use Greek facilities against the ‘Central Powers’ in case the Ottoman Empire departs from neutrality and come out on the side of Germany and Austria. Britain, therefore, by rejecting the Ottomans and welcoming Greece as an ally, had already started implementing his plans for the future of the Ottoman Empire and including Greece into his scenario even before the War started.<sup>17</sup> Venizelos to make sure that Greece would be a part of Allies , started taking the necessary precautions, such as helping the ‘Goeben’ to sail out of Greece<sup>18</sup> and seeking assurance from Entente that she would be safe guarded against Ottoman Empire in case of a conflict<sup>19</sup>.

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<sup>14</sup> The Times (London), 29 Sep. 1916.

<sup>15</sup> Francis Neilson and Saul K. Padover, “History vs. Patriotism: Diplomacy Up a Blind Valley”, *American Journal of Economics & Sociology*, Jul 1955, Vol. 14 Issue 4 p399-410

<sup>16</sup> A hand written letter from Grey to Lloyd George on 21.12.1912 gives an indication about British choice “*Peace negotiations between Turkey and Balkan States will go slow; I have given advice to the Balkan Delegation that they should avoid difficulties between them and the Great Powers and have (begged) them to keep a united front . We are doing what we can at Constantinople to urge the Turks to give way. But the Turks will be slow*” Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/4/14/8.

<sup>17</sup> In a letter from Erskine (British High Commissioner in Athens) to Grey on 19<sup>th</sup> August 1914, the offer extended by Venizelos was summarized as “*Venizelos placed at disposal of Entente Powers all the naval and military resources of Greece. This offer, , although extended to other members of Entente Powers such as France and Russia, but that offer was made in a special sense to His Majesty’s Government. Greece would dispose of 250 000 troops and Venizelos suggested that, in case of necessity, 50 000 Greek troops could be sent to Egypt to keep order.*” Lloyd George Papers LG/C/4/14/15.

<sup>18</sup> Daily Express published on 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 1923 a copy of a hand written letter from Venizelos to Commander of the Port of Piraeus on the night of 5<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1914 to furnish 700 tons of coal to German ships Goeben and Breslau of which helped for the ships to proceed to Dardanelles, and therefore escaping from British ships. This incident would be causing the war between Ottomans and Great Britain (House of Lords, Public Records, John St Loe Strachey Papers, STR/18/1/8). This contribution or rather intrigue of Venizelos was going to be reported by British Military Intelligence years later and also it was debated in the Parliament on 4<sup>th</sup> June 1923 as questioned by Balfour whether there was any truth behind the news of Venizelos helping those German ships or not. The question was answered by Deputy Secretary McNeil as “*the incident occurred with the consent of the British Government which was the normal procedure by international law*” (PRO, FO/286/856). Regardless to the assurance given by McNeil, no document was traced to confirm the validity of such a procedure.

### III.3 Agreements and Treaties for the Partition of the Ottoman Empire before Lloyd George became Prime Minister.

Lloyd George became Prime Minister in October 1916 to lead a coalition government which was composed of Liberal, Conservative and Labor ministers.<sup>20</sup> Before becoming the Prime Minister, throughout the war, he served as the Chancellor of Exchequers, Minister of newly formed a ministry of Munitions and Secretary of State for War. Therefore, he was to some extent was responsible for the agreements before he became Prime Minister. During Lloyd George's ministership especially after the war started, he was more interested in implementing 'total war' concept, which was to facilitate government machinery to meet the requirements of the war of which he thought was going to last for a long period. The conduct of the war, militarywise, as well as to meet the logistic requirements seemed to be more emphasized by Lloyd George rather than international politics especially one concerning partition of Ottoman Empire although he probably agreed with majority of his colleagues that Ottoman Empire was to be ended. Lloyd George criticized the Gallipoli campaign and more inclined to building a new front at Salonika. In his Memorandum to the Committee of the Imperial Defense on 1<sup>st</sup> of Jan 1915, Lloyd George indicated his view that the the Dardanelles Expedition's failure was very probable<sup>21</sup>, and further he suggested the necessity of diverting Turkish pressure from Egypt and the Caucasus and as to the Allied intervention in the Balkans in his paper submitted to Cabinet on 22<sup>nd</sup> Feb. of 1915.<sup>22</sup>

The partition of the Ottoman Empire, within the context of 'Eastern Question' had been debated among European powers since late nineteenth century but because

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<sup>19</sup> Telegram from Sir Elliot to Grey on 2<sup>nd</sup> Sep. 1914 indicates that "*Venizelos asked Russian and British Representatives in Athens whether he could count upon support of Entente Powers in the event of Ottoman attacking Greece. Russian reply was affirmative and further Venizelos inquired on what would be happened if 'Goeben' came out of Dardanelles and Elliot answered as she would be attacked by His Majesty's ships. Venizelos said that was all he wanted to know, as he must be sure of being able to transport troops by sea.*" (Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/4/14/15)

<sup>20</sup> Lloyd George's political life is elaborated in Chapter I.

<sup>21</sup> In a Memorandum submitted to C.I.D., Lloyd George suggested that new forces should be employed to attack upon Austria in conjunction with the Serbians, Romanians and the Greeks and further he suggested that , at the same time an army of 100 000 should be employed to attack Turks from Syria. (Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/16/1/3)

<sup>22</sup> Lloyd George in his Memorandum dated 22.5.1915, circulated to the Cabinet indicated that "...*The problem resolves itself into one of (i) the training and equipping of these men in the shortest space of time and (ii) the maintaining of the status quo without any appreciable aggravation until the countries are prepared to throw overwhelming forces into the battlefield.....to remedy the situation Great Britain should have 3.5 million men instead of 2 and Colonies 1.2 million instead of 100 thousand and produce more machinery and munitions and strike Austrian flank from Balkans(Salonika)*" (Lloyds George Papers, LG/E/8/1/4).

of conflict of interests among themselves; it was not crystallized until World War I. During the war, territorial concessions were given as a tribute, for the condition of joining the Entente, to Italy and Greece. The majority of territories had been split between Tsarist Russia, France and Britain but it was Britain alone to control the policy and to be the most decisive partner. During the war, Britain, France and Russia had held a number of discussions about the future of the Ottoman Empire. The Anglo-French Agreement of April-May 1916 (commonly known as Sykes-Picot Agreement, because of British and French representatives, Sir Mark Sykes and Georges Picot), laid down the terms that the two countries would divide up the Arab and Turkish speaking areas of the Empire; France having entire Cilicia into Syria. The Russians, who with the initial secret treaty concluded in 1915 had already extracted a promise to annex Constantinople and the Straits, approved this on the condition of possessing of Turkish provinces adjacent to the Russian border in the Caucasus<sup>23</sup>. The agreement left Mesopotamia (as known today as Iraq and Jordan) and a small area around Haifa to Britain and South-eastern of Turkey, Syria and Lebanon were the French shares. It was also decided that state boundaries within these areas were left to be decided on later date. The only uncovered place was the area that is known today as Palestine and it was the mutual understanding that it was for the international administration pending consultations with Russia and other powers. The Sykes-Picot agreement similar to all secret agreements was going to be ineffective after the revolution in Russia when the new Bolshevik government concluding peace with the Central Powers pronounced them as null. This complied with the declaration of Wilson when he pointed out clearly in 1917 as the USA joined the Allied front with the understanding that none of the previous agreements were going to be entertained after the war. With the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain and France became major players in the Middle East, and as the war progressed, they started to become suspicious of each other.

The Sykes-Picot agreement was conflicting with the earlier policy of Britain. Starting in 1915 Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt exchanged letters with Hussein Ali, Sharif of Hejaz, concerning the future political status of the Arab lands with an idea that these lands would be left to Arabs in return to an armed revolt to the Ottoman Empire. Mc Mahon's letter, dated 24<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1915, shows the determination in the British policy for the disintegration of Ottoman

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<sup>23</sup> The Sykes-Picot Agreement in the British Foreign Office documents is referred as the; "Arrangement of May 1916, commonly known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement", Lloyds George Papers LG/F/205/1, 11331. Margaret Macmillan, "Paris 1919" (Ankara, (in Turkish) ODTU Press, 2004), p. 376-377

Empire. McMahon's promises were seen by Arab nationalists as a pledge of an immediate Arab independence. Russia, apart from Constantinople and Straits, in accordance with the Constantinople Agreement (March 1915), with the Sykes- Picot Agreement she had the right to annex eastern provinces of Ottoman Empire, and, then called as Armenia and Kurdistan. The Italians would get certain islands in the Aegean Sea and a sphere of influence in southern part of Anatolia, particularly Adalia [Antalya] region. Italy, with a promise to territorial rights in the Adriatic peninsula and in the Ottoman Empire in accordance with the Italian Agreement signed between Britain, France and Italy, on 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1915, was brought into war against the Central Powers. Another 'token of gift' of the Ottoman Empire, from Britain was also handed to Greece through Venizelos. At the beginning, Allied position in Balkans brought some doubts about the success on their behalf. Greece, although willing to join Entente, officially declared neutrality. Lloyd George in his visit to Paris in February 1915, as had already discussed with French War Minister, Millerand in London, brought the idea of sending expeditionary force to Salonika and also sending an Allied army to Serbia. The plan of sending an expeditionary force to Salonika, after being considered at the French Cabinet was found to be acceptable to put forward to Russians to bring Greece and Romania on the side of Entente and to block the Bulgarians to join Central Powers, the Russians were also willing to accept the proposal but hesitant of building an army in the Serbian border<sup>24</sup>. Due to political disagreement with the King, Venizelos, after submitting two memorandums suggesting joining the Entente, especially in regard to Grey's offer, resigned on 5<sup>th</sup> of March. The new Greek Government was more reluctant to join the war on the side of the Entente and the Big-Three, that is Britain, France and Russia. Powers reiterated their offer on 12<sup>th</sup> of April to Greece that in case of cooperation with the Allies, she would be receiving the Aidin [Aydin] Vilayet in Anatolia once the Ottoman Empire collapsed. However Gounaris, the Prime Minister of Greece, because of the offer was so vague and Cavalla region was not mentioned preferred remaining neutral.<sup>25</sup>

The Greek elections held in June 1915, restored Venizelos to the Prime Ministry in August 1915, coinciding with the time of Bulgaria joining the Central Powers. The

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<sup>24</sup> Lloyd George Papers, Lloyd George's letter to Grey on 7<sup>th</sup> of Feb.1915, LG/C/4/14/2.

<sup>25</sup> See Howard p. 123-125 and pg 148-152. The communiqué by Greece, criticizing Entente that Cavalla region was offered to Bulgaria was answered by British Foreign Office that "... *the offer was extended to Greece for the realization of Greek territorial aspirations, and a guarantee of Greek territory during the war and for a certain period thereafter*" provided that Greece joins Entente and provides, militarily, the necessary contribution. This is done on the expense of Ottoman Territory and the offer was an open ended. Lloyd George papers, LG/C/25/11/1.

issues of Cavalla not offered to Greece and Bulgaria receiving German funds and therefore joining the Central Powers was in Lloyd George's agenda. In his letter to Winston Churchill, Minister for Admiralty, on 17<sup>th</sup> of April, he urged Churchill to ask Grey to bargain on Cavalla to acquire Bulgarian alliance, stated that "...we owe nothing to Greek King. He is essentially as hostile as he dare be and he will play with us until his help, if it ever comes. Venizelos is our friend and to give Cavalla to Greece is to ruin him for ever."<sup>26</sup> Lloyd George in his letter to Grey on 7<sup>th</sup> of February warned that Bulgaria might be joining the Central Powers due to German funding.<sup>27</sup> The Entente, and especially Britain suffering casualties in Western Front against Germans and also having an unsuccessful expedition in Dardanelles which was a 'fiasco' for the Government and also a moral disaster for the public, was trying to seek other plans.<sup>28</sup> To stabilize the Balkans, especially after Bulgaria decided to join the Central Powers in the summer and immediately mobilized in September 1915, the Entente tried to gain the support of Greece, the only country left in that region which had not yet joined the Central Powers. The Allies found Venizelos who was more than willing to become a partner. Due to the Greek pact with the Serbs, Venizelos without the consent of the King who was surely going to protest strongly for the action asked the Entente to send an army to Salonika to safeguard Serbs against the Bulgarians. The Allies more than ready to do so, sent an army of 150,000 men. Venizelos, with the support of the Allies, addressed to the nation for the intention of joining the Entente, but with the King's sanction he had no other alternative but to resign. The new Government declared the 'neutrality' of Greece. At the meantime Grey with the hope to draw Greece to their side, offered Cyprus to Greece, but with no result. Venizelos, after forming a provisional government in his stronghold island, Crete, declared war against Central Powers in November 1915. Greece was only going to join Allies in June 1917, after the abdication of King Constantine because of pressure exerted on her by British and French Governments, and finally Venizelos took over the Government and joined the War.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/3/16/30.

<sup>27</sup> Lloyd George in his letter to Grey on 7<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1915 tells about his discussions with the French officials in Paris and for Bulgarian's policy "... [News] indicate clearly that Bulgaria is hardening into opposition to the Triple Entente. There is a telegram about the success of borrowing mission to Berlin. The Germans are not much fools as to advance money without receiving some assurances to Bulgaria's action in certain contingencies" Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/4/14/2.

<sup>28</sup> Cabinet Secretary Sir H.A. Hankey in his letter to Lloyd George on 19<sup>th</sup> of March 1915, was urging for an appointment of a Joint Committee to work out the attack on the Dardanelles to estimate manpower, war machine, food etc. were required and further he wrote that "...whether your more ambitious plan (Salonika) can be brought off or not, we shall have to attack the Dardanelles, and we can't afford another fiasco due to inadequate staff preparation" Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/4/19/4.

<sup>29</sup> Howard, p. 148-177. The Greek politics during the period 1914-1917 was analyzed in "Greece at Paris Conference" by Nicholas Rizopoulos, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Yale University, 1963.

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, during the first two years of the war, 1914-1916, was planned with the initiative of Great Britain and with the consent of France, Russia and Italy. When the Prime Minister Asquith, in late 1916, asked the War Cabinet to present a paper on what they foresaw for the Peace Conference, Balfour, in his presentation declared that as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned there was no conflict, since by the agreements and pacts everything was resolved and hence non-existence of the Ottoman Empire after the war had already been determined.<sup>30</sup> Balfour was right in considering that; partition of the Empire was engineered with several agreements and pacts among Allied Powers. With these agreements and pacts, Britain was 'bound' to France;

- By the Pact of London (5<sup>th</sup> of Sep.1914) not to make peace separately nor to formulate peace terms without the consent of the other signatory powers (France, Italy and Russia)
- By the Anglo-French Agreements of April-May 1916, known as Sykes-Picot Agreement, to have the priority of enterprise in the zone marked "A" range with Arabs in the blue area
- By having the right to establish an administration or control as she should desire to arrange with Arabs in the "blue" area.
- By not allowing Britain not to cede Cyprus to a third Power without the consent of France.<sup>31</sup>

There was also a mutual agreement between Britain and France that Britain should have a free hand in Egypt and allow a free hand for France in Morocco.

Britain promised and therefore was 'bound' to Italy:

- By the Pact of London (5<sup>th</sup> Sep.1914) not to make peace separately nor to formulate peace terms without the consent of the other signatory powers [France, Italy and Russia]
- By the Italian Agreement of the 26<sup>th</sup> April 1915, Italy should obtain the territory in the Trentino and on the Adriatic as marked in blue.
- By British recognition of Italian interests in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and in the event of the partition or partial partition of the Ottoman Empire, or even the distribution of zones of interest in Turkey, Italy to obtain an 'equitable share' in the region of Adalia [Antalya].<sup>32</sup>

Italy, under the agreement, known as St. Jean de Maurienne, on 8<sup>th</sup> August 1917, was going to have more concessions.

Britain was 'bound' to Russia;

- By the Pact of London (5<sup>th</sup> of Sep.1914) not to make peace separately nor to formulate peace terms without the consent of the other signatory powers (France, Italy and Russia)

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<sup>30</sup> PRO, A.J. Balfour's Memorandum "The Peace Settlement in Europe", 4<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1916, CAB 1/20.

<sup>31</sup> The obligations of Britain in accordance with several agreements and pacts with Allied countries are given in the document G.T. 3917 as was printed for the War Cabinet in February 1918. (PRO, CAB 24/45) This document with the relevant maps is given as 'Appendix 1'

<sup>32</sup> Ibid

- By the Constantinople Agreement of March 1915, subject to the war being brought to a successful conclusion and to the desiderata of France and Britain in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realized, city of Constantinople and the dependent territory as shown in yellow was to be incorporated into the Russian Empire. The annexation of the mentioned area once more was reiterated in the Sykes-Picot Agreement.<sup>33</sup>

The agreements signed among Allies at the expense of Ottoman Empire were bound to cause some frictions between the signatories. The first friction, as early as 1916, occurred between Russia, France and Italy, whose interests in Anatolia was overlapping. When M. Cambon criticized Italy for large demands in Asia Minor, Grey recommended holding a meeting to discuss the issue since before Italy was involved in Anatolia, the other three parties, France, Russia and Britain had an understanding in the division of the Ottoman Empire and each member was happy with its own share. Both French and British Foreign Ministers then, had to find a way to 'manage' Italians<sup>34</sup>. When this issue was brought to the attention of Grey by Italians, he commented that, Britain was not in a position to support the whole of Italian claims since there were other parties concerned, such as France and the best way was to discuss the issue was in *a quatre*. Similar message was conveyed by Grey to Russian Foreign Minister, Count Benckendorff, in a conversation, that consideration should be given whether there would be any need to have an Asiatic Turkey at all, since all parties concerned required large spheres for themselves in Anatolia and as Straits, Constantinople and Armenia had already been allocated to Russia. The only obstacle was whether the Moslem world be affected by not having an independent Turkey, but Grey considered that, what Moslem people cared most for was a Moslem state to control the Holy Places and this could be achieved by the establishment of an Arab State.<sup>35</sup>

Britain also extended certain promises to Arabs and to Greece concerning Arab lands up to Alexandretta and Western Anatolia including Cyprus respectively.

The British policy regarding the dissolution of Ottoman Empire in the southern flank, known as Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine and Hejaz, had been started even before the declaration of war between Ottoman Empire and Britain. The correspondence and implementation of this dissolution was usually carried by the Arab Bureau in Cairo, but nevertheless the planning was done in Foreign Office and

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<sup>33</sup> Ibid

<sup>34</sup> PRO, Letter from Viscount Grey to Lord Bertie, British Ambassador to France, 9<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1916, CAB 1/20, Doc. 226531.

<sup>35</sup> PRO, Letter from Viscount Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Russia, 21<sup>st</sup> of Nov. 1916, CAB 1/20, Doc. 236515.

War Department and therefore Grey, Kitchener and Prime Minister Asquith were the primary actors of this intrigue as well as the Arab Leaders, especially Sheriff Hussein of Hejaz and his two sons Feisal and Abdullah. Although there was neither agreement nor pact actually signed by the parties, there existed verbal promises and written and signed letters by the officials in Cairo and London, ranging from official agents, High Commissioners to Ministers and even up to the Prime Minister. The first step for having the Arabs to revolt against Turks was conveyed by Foreign Office, by the request of Lord Kitchener, through the Cairo Office, to Sheriff Hussein to find out their attitude in case a war existed between Ottoman Empire and Britain, on 24<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1914. Sheriff Hussein's son Abdullah' answer showed that they preferred Britain rather than Ottoman Empire, Abdullah asked for guarantees from Britain that;

*"So long as she protects the rights of our country and the rights of the person of His Highness our present Emir Lord and the rights of his Emirate and its independence in all respects, without any exceptions or restrictions, and so long as it supports us against any foreign aggressions and particular against Ottomans, especially if they wish to set up anyone else as Emir with the intention of causing internal dissension – their principle of government – and provided that the Government of Great Britain would guarantee these fundamental principles clearly and in writing . This guarantee we expect to receive at the first opportunity."*<sup>36</sup>

The guarantee on behalf of Britain was given by the letter, signed by Kitchener, on 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct., stating that;

*"Lord Kitchener's salaams to Sheriff Abdullah...If the Arab nation assist England in this war that has been forced on us by Turkey, England will guarantee that no internal intervention takes place in Arabia, and will give Arabs every assistance against external aggression. It may be that an Arab of true race will assume Khalifate [Caliphate] at Mecca or Medina and so good may come by the help of God out of all evil that is now occurring."*<sup>37</sup>

This letter was sent from Cairo to Sharif with additional guarantees and promises of;

*"Great Britain is willing, recognizing and respecting the sacred and unique office of the Emir Hussein, to guarantee the independence, rights and privileges of the Sheriffiate against all external foreign aggression, in particular that of the Ottomans. Till now we have defended Islam in the person of the Turks; henceforward it shall be in that of the noble Arabs"*<sup>38</sup>

Since then, letters between Sharif and High Commissioner McMahon was exchanged to draw the frontiers for the proposed Arab State. In his third letter to McMahon on 5<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1915, Sheriff reiterated the request for an official agreement, that;

*"When the Arab knows that the Government of Great Britain is their Ally who will not leave them to themselves at the conclusion of peace, in the*

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<sup>36</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/205/2/4, GT6185.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

<sup>38</sup> Ibid

*face of Germany or Turkey, and that she will support and effectively defend them, then to enter the war at once will be, no doubt, in conformity with the general interest of Arabs*"<sup>39</sup>

In reply to Sheriff's letter, on 13<sup>th</sup> of December, McMahon, with the instruction of the Foreign Office wrote that;

*"It is most essential that you should spare no effort to attach all the Arab peoples to our united cause, and urge them to afford no assistance to our enemies. It is on the success of these efforts, and on the more active measures which the Arabs may hereafter take in support of our cause when the time for action comes, that the permanence and strength of our agreement must depend. Under these circumstances I am further directed by the Government of Great Britain to inform you that you may rest assured that Great Britain has no intention of concluding any peace, in terms of which the freedom of the Arab people from German and Turkish domination does not form an essential condition."*<sup>40</sup>

In this respect the Government of India with the instructions of London had issued a note on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1914, that holy places will be free from any action of war and this plea to the Arabs was later on re-iterated by London, on 14<sup>th</sup> of Nov. that;

*"His Majesty's Government have no intention of undertaking any military or naval operations in Arabia, or against its ports, unless such a course becomes necessary for the protection of Arabian interests against Turkish or other aggression, or in support of any attempt by the Arabs to free themselves from Turkish rule."*<sup>41</sup>

British Foreign Office with the advice of Faroki, who was an Ottoman Officer but changed sides at Gallipoli and since than was acting as an adviser to the Cairo Bureau, used religious means to influence Arabs, as claimed, on 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1916, that;

*"It remains the fixed policy of Great Britain to abstain from all interference in religious matters and to spare no effort to secure Holy Places of Islam from all foreign aggression. [It] is an unalterable point of British policy that under independent Moslem rule and authority. The present state of war places many difficulties and dangers in the way of those wishing to perform the pilgrimage, but the action taken by the Sheriff of Mecca gives rise to hopes that arrangements may be made whereby the pilgrims may in the coming year visit the Holy Shrines in peace and security."*<sup>42</sup>

Britain, with the help of officers such as T.H. Lawrence, Miss G. Bell and experts working in Arab Bureau, Cairo as well as foreign office officials, was able to convince Arabs to revolt against the Ottoman Empire. At the meantime the Sykes – Picot Agreement was being negotiated and accepted by the concerned states.

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<sup>39</sup> Ibid

<sup>40</sup> Ibid

<sup>41</sup> Ibid

<sup>42</sup> Lloyd George Papers, Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office "Memorandum on British Commitments to King Husein", LG/F/205/2/4, Doc. GT 6185. The lands required by Arabs and the British valuation of the correspondence will be dealt in the next Chapter, The developments for the "Arab cause" during Lloyd George Premiership will be covered in Chapter V

The agreements and pacts to dissolve the Ottoman Empire were mainly made during the Premiership of Mr. Asquith with Sir Edward Grey as the Foreign Secretary. Lloyd George criticized Grey for the inability of his foreign policy which had cost Britain so much as to push the country to war. According to Lloyd George;

*“His stiff and formal beckoning to them (Ottoman and Bulgaria) to cross over to our side could only to provoke ridicule. There were many obvious expedients-including the sending of a special envoy to Turkey and Bulgaria who would be empowered to promise financial support-that he might have employed to keep both or either out of war. These last two failures, which a more strenuous or resourceful Foreign Minister would have converted into success, prolonged the war by years and nearly caused the defeat of the Allies.”<sup>43</sup>*

Lloyd George drew a very incapable and irresponsible portrait of Grey by quoting Sir Hugh Bell, who was a colleague of Grey that *“Grey is a good colleague because he never takes any risk: and he is a thoroughly bad colleague for the same reason”<sup>44</sup>* and Italian writer Luigi Villari from his book of ‘The War on the Italian Front’ that *“The negotiations had been shilly and shallying for months, because Grey was holidaying”<sup>45</sup>*. Sir Grey, although had a free hand in drawing foreign policy, the Prime Minister Asquith shared his views at least as for the Ottoman Empire, as was indicated in his speech for the War Aims that he delivered in Dublin, on 25<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1914. Asquith by quoting Gladstone, he pictured the European Policy as *“The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as a governing idea of European policy”<sup>46</sup>* and further gave the example for Greece as *“must be recognized as having exactly as good title as their more powerful neighbors- more powerful in strength and wealth-exactly as good a title to place in the sun”<sup>47</sup>*. Asquith reiterated his approach in his speech in Guildhall, on 9<sup>th</sup> Nov. of 1914 that; *“Britain was not going to sheathe the sword until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation”<sup>48</sup>* and therefore once more Greece was in the agenda of the Prime Minister’s war aims.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1914-1915*, p. 87, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933).

<sup>44</sup> Ibid

<sup>45</sup> Ibid

<sup>46</sup> Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties*, Vol. I”, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1938), p.

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid

<sup>48</sup> Ibid

<sup>49</sup> See Howard, p. 176-177

Lloyd George in his paper, 'Some Further Considerations on the Conduct of the War', submitted to the Cabinet on 22<sup>nd</sup> of February 1915<sup>50</sup>, criticized both Grey and the Secretary of War Lord Kitchener that;

*"There are only two directions that we can turn with any prospect of assistance- the Balkan States and Italy. The Balkans we might conceivably have brought in some months ago, but the Allies have been unfortunate in this quarter. We have only succeeded in bringing in the Turks against us without engaging any other Balkan Power on our behalf. ....Now let us take the other contingency – the failure of the Dardanelles effort. Unless it is at once countered, such a failure will be disastrous in the Balkans, and might very well be disastrous throughout the East."*<sup>51</sup>

The events to follow in the Dardanelles were going to support Lloyd George's views, such that Bulgaria was going to join Central Powers and Greece, because of King Constantine, was still preserving 'neutrality'. The Gallipoli campaign was a joint attempt by Allies and the failure of Entente there brought, besides psychological effects on the masses, new concept that the war was going to last longer and there was no quick success in the near future.

In the Balkans, to initiate a new flank against Austria, in 1915, the only choice left for the Allies was to ensure the alliance of Greece and therefore Venizelos'. Gustave Herve in his article of 'The English at Salonika' published in '*La Guerre Sociale*', on 8<sup>th</sup> of December, criticized the British policy in the Greece that the attitude of King Constantine was due to the British attitude and "it was probable that the delays were due to difficulties that the Allies have in inducing the English Government and General Staff to give up the mad idea of deserting the Serbs and abandoning Salonika"<sup>52</sup> and further he stressed the point that Britain was considering the defense of Egypt rather than that of Allies' interests and opinions. M. Herve was considering that the abandoning Serbs, and therefore not entertaining the Pact by Greeks, that existed between Greece and Serbs was probably due to Britain and lastly he suggested that it would be better to go there alone than not to defend Serbia and Salonika to death.<sup>53</sup> Similar views were also shared by Crawford Price<sup>54</sup> in a letter sent to Lloyd George on 23<sup>rd</sup> of Sep.1915 that the serious development in the Balkans had considerably altered the situation there as a result of the British policy which was bound to affect the British Policy in Near east. He enclosed letters that he had received from Prince Nicholas, a close aide of King Constantine, that

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<sup>50</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/C/16/1/7.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid

<sup>52</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/D/20/2/65.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

<sup>54</sup> Author, specialized for Balkans, and a close friend of Lloyd George

showed how Britain had offended Greece or rather in this case, the King.<sup>55</sup> Britain and therefore the Allies were going to sacrifice the King for Venizelos; this was quite apparent in the meetings of Council of Allied Countries. In one of those meetings which was held in Paris on 15<sup>th</sup> of Nov 1916, and attended by Asquith and Lloyd George, the condition of the war on different fronts and also the position of Greece, especially on the question of recognition of Venizelos' exiled Government, were discussed. Briand, the Prime Minister of France, and the Minister of French Foreign Affairs, brought the offer extended by King Constantine, that, the King was willing to furnish the Allies of all war materials, she possessed, in return for not recognizing of Venizelos. According to Briand, if this offer was accepted, vast amount of war material would be used by the Allies, Asquith, by explaining the sympathy and respect felt for Venizelos in Britain, the King's offer, which meant abandonment of Venizelos, should not be entertained. Then, according to Lloyd George, "*the Conference generally agreed that the Allies should not let any opportunity pass to support Venizelos and his friends and to protect them wherever necessary*"<sup>56</sup>. At the end of the meeting there was no resolution and the subject was summed up, by Briand as;

*"So the Allies may expect a development which does not seem as though it can be delayed much longer, and which should be of a nature to give them satisfaction; but it still goes without saying that if the King or his Government were to adopt measures against M. Venizelos and his friends, Allies would intervene immediately with all necessary vigour to defend the great Greek patriot, who has always shown himself favourable to their cause."*<sup>57</sup>

In 1915, the events taken place in Greece showed the preference on behalf of Venizelos with respect to King and it was certain that Asquith Government favoured Venizelos. For a fact finding or even for negotiations, a businessman of Greek origin and a close friend of Venizelos, J.J. Stavridi, was sent to Greece in November 1915 on semi-official ground. On his return, he submitted a report to the Cabinet members. Stavridi seemed to be acting as a Government official defending the interests of Britain and of Venizelos even attending the Greek Cabinet meeting. His target was to secure Greece's entry to war on the side of Allies and pave the way for Venizelos<sup>58</sup>. Stavridi, being close to Members of Cabinet had the advantage of mixing with the members of the Casbinet and in a way he was going to act as a

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<sup>55</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/D/20/2/26.

<sup>56</sup> Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1915-1916*, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933), p. 343-357

<sup>57</sup> Ibid

<sup>58</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/D/25/3/1. Stavridi's report is lengthy and quite a good example of his abilities and intrigues.

'betweenor' Venizelos and British Ministers, including Lloyd George.<sup>59</sup> His relation with dignitaries would be continuing during Lloyd George's premiership and even he was going to ask Lloyd George to be decorated with the title of "Sir" in coming years<sup>60</sup>.

Another factor, contributing to overcome the difficulties caused by King Constantine for Allies was Basil Zaharoff. Zaharoff, with the advice of Briand, started financial contribution to Venizelos for his fight against the King in December 1915 and for propaganda purposes for the Allies and also for Venizelos contributed 1.5 million French Francs to initiate a mechanism, and for this purpose "Radio Agency" was founded in February 1916. Through the news agency and newly procured newspapers (*Eleftheros Typos* and *Kiriks*), the atmosphere in Athens had changed for the advantage of Venizelos and therefore for the Allies.<sup>61</sup>

### III.4 Evaluation

The question for the powers before the First World War I was to maintain their continuing superiority in the Levant since Napoleonic times. The issues of Egypt and Cyprus and particularly the opening of the Suez Canal played a prominent role in pro British shift in the Mediterranean balance. This shift of power compelled Britain to obtain economic concessions in the area. As the 20<sup>th</sup> century emerged, another power, Germany, became a threat to British interests not only in Europe but also in the East. Bismarck's policy of *Drang nach Osten*, turned Germany towards the East for her desires as she challenged British interests there.

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<sup>59</sup> Winston Churchill's preference was to get Bulgaria on their side' and he wrote to Lloyd George on 25<sup>th</sup> of June 1915, that "R. Cecil sent me the enclosed privately and you should see it before we lunch with Stavridi. I am all for playing the game right out to get the Bulgaria. She is the real prize, and it is out if and when we know she will not come. (Then) we shall consider Greek and Serbian interests. But I see no reason in (this) for not getting with touch with Venizelos. (...) I think a separate communication here will be a good thing." Lloyd George Papers, LG/D/16/8/1.

<sup>60</sup> Basil Zaharoff was decorated with Order of British Empire (OBE) and was going to carry the title of Sir, then. He was decorated by the recommendation of Prime Minister (Lloyd George) as was mentioned in Foreign Office documents. (PRO, side-note on Doc.40192, 4<sup>th</sup> March 1918, FO 372/1187), "for services which he has rendered to British interests in connection with the war" (as quoted in Lord Bertie's letter to Balfour (PRO, FO 372/1187, Doc. 40192, 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1918). Zaharoff was handed the decoration by Lord Bertie on 19<sup>th</sup> April 1918 (PRO, FO 372/1187 Doc. 72224, 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1918). Sir Zaharoff thanked Balfour in his letter of 19<sup>th</sup> April 1918, as "I beg respectfully to thank His Majesty and you Sir, for the Grand Cross of the British Empire, with which Lord Bertie of Thame has today invested me. No effort will be spared by me to do my Cross credit and I remain Dear M. Balfour, yours very obliged." (PRO, FO 372/1188 Doc.71858)

<sup>61</sup> Richard Lewinsohn, *Zaharoff – L'européen mystérieux* (Iletisim Yayinlari, 1991), p. 80-87. For the relation of Zaharoff with Lloyd George, see Chapter IV.

The economic concessions that Britain was after was the reason for the entrance of Britain to War, consequently British policy towards the Ottoman Empire was going to change. Britain, instead of her long nourished policy of a weak and disintegrated Ottoman Empire, adopted a new one, of a dissolving Ottoman Empire. The agreements and treaties she signed during the war were the reflections of this new British Ottoman policy. It was under this atmosphere that Lloyd George became the Prime Minister.

By the time Lloyd George assumed this important duty, the big powers of Europe had already formed alliances and determined their policies. As a matter of effect Britain at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had started re-considering her polity with regard to the Straits for two main reasons. One reason was that after opening of the Suez Canal, overcoming the threat to her route to India started to focus more on Egypt's defense. Meanwhile Britain had gained confidence for Mediterranean maritime superiority with respect to Russia. As for the Russians, Navarone battle had proven that the Straits were not so vital for Russian passage to warm seas, since they could sail from Baltic Sea too, although this did not decrease the importance of the Ottoman Empire. Even back in 1878 Lord Salisbury believed that the exclusion of Russian from the Mediterranean was not so great a gain to Britain as her loss resulting from being deprived from the Black Sea. The change in the circumstances convinced Britain that there was no reason to fear Russian appearance in the Mediterranean; besides, the experience during Crimean war had shown how important access to the Black Sea could be. To summarize Britain, by the opening of the Suez Canal had to reconsider her Straits and Ottoman policies.

The second reason was the threat extended by Germany and Austria at the beginning of the century. Accordingly Britain, Russia and France were obliged to conclude alliances to guard their previously acquired interests, thus, Russia exerted pressure for the opening the Straits to Russian vessels. Russia also made it clear that in case of a war, Britain and France would be in need of Russian warships in the Mediterranean which could easiest be through the Straits. However the Turkish Revolution in 1908, annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina by Austria, the Italian-Turco war in 1911 and then the Balkan war in 1912 were considered by Britain as the revitalizing of the 'Eastern Question'. Therefore as far as Britain was concerned, the cession of the Straits and Constantinople by Russia were already topics to consider in the Foreign Office even in those days before the War. Yet another reason was the growing Turkish resentment for the claimed atrocities against the Christian

population during the Abdulhamid II's reign and Balkan wars. Gladstone had become the champion of this anti-propaganda and actually based his election campaign on his politics against the Turks.

As the 1914 war was approaching, CUP which was in power at Constantinople effectively since 1912, made some efforts to make alliances with Britain and France but was turned down. The attitude of Grey, the Foreign Secretary, was quite apparent even during the Balkan Wars that he treated the Turks as the 'others' while he sided with the Balkan countries and regarded them 'us'. He offered the Turks good will but no alliance. Arguing whether the CUP could have avoided alliance with Germany and therefore refrained from entering the war on the side of the Central Powers is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless Britain, aware that the war was approaching, had made an alliance with Russia; therefore the first step was taken for the cession of the Straits and Constantinople by Russia-a step to be finalized in 1915 on the eve of Gallipoli campaign. The entrance of the Ottoman Empire or rather declaration of war against Ottoman Empire by Russia first and later by France and Britain was going to be evaluated by Britain as '*digging her grave by her own hands*' which was quite true but this digging was not done by the Turks alone.

As the war proceeded, naturally Britain concentrated on winning the war at all costs; in that respect, Lloyd George's policy after 1916 was none different than that of the Asquith Government. Lloyd George placed a high priority to opening a Balkan front especially after seeing the first disasters in Europe, and considered that no decisive victory against Germans was likely. He urged the Foreign Secretary to attract Bulgaria and Romania to join the war on their side, although there had been no effort whatsoever to have the Turks. Since Britain's efforts were towards winning the war, she had to give concessions to other forces to bring them against the Central Powers, especially the Ottoman Empire; besides, each member of the Allies held their own desires for the Ottoman Empire. More so, the Ottoman territories were going to be distributed as 'tokens' to newcomers such as Italy and Greece. The 'Arab speaking' territories were going to be shared between France and Britain and the concept of 'home for Jews' presented by Balfour for the first time, was going to be a centre for controversies in the years to come. The Straits and Constantinople was Russia's share as was expected so the Russians were going to fulfill their desires of centuries. The interesting point here is that the satisfaction Russia obtained from this share reflected on her approaches to the Gallipoli campaign in

the form of preventing the participation of states, seriously interested in the Straits such as Greece and Italy. The cession for Straits and Constantinople by Russians was accomplished through correspondence and exchange of letters from one to another government and was kept as a secret in Britain until December 1916 when the Russia Government announced it before the Parliament. According to the Agreement the entire Straits including Constantinople up to the Enos-Midia line as well as the islands of Imbros, Tenedos and the isles of Marmara Sea were to be left to Russians. Russia also requested the Black Sea coast between Bosphorus and Sakharia [Sakarya] River and a part in the Gulf of Ismid [Izmit]. Grey commented on the agreement with Russia that the cession of the Straits by Russia was the best available guarantee against the resumption of the 'Drang nach Osten'.<sup>62</sup> Russia in return for her part of the Ottoman Empire promised help for the realization of British desiderata which they had in other parts of the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere.

Another agreement was the Sykes Picot Agreement between Britain and France which held conflicting interests for the each of the signatories and Arabs. Britain began, before the War, to ignite Arabs to rebel against Ottoman Empire and promised them self-determination and independence in the Middle East. She also promised that no peace was to be signed without assurance of their independence from 'Turkish yoke' provided that they were united to fight against the Turks for their mutual cause. However, Britain, at one hand promised Arabs the very lands that the Sykes-Picot Agreement endorsed as the French zone, was going to be embarrassed years later, when the Bolsheviks made public the secret Agreements. Yet Britain failed to realize that 'double game' in the Middle East was quite difficult to attain and much later, Lloyd George and Bonar Law as Prime Ministers, were to come to the conclusion that they should get out from the area. After the disclosure of the agreements by Russia, Britain was going to assert the excuse that there was no actual formal agreement with Arabs since the promises extended to them were not results of negotiations and endorsements officially made by the British State regardless to the letters sent to King Hussein through her ministers and High Commissioners.

As to the Greeks, their involvement in the war was as not until 1917. Their participation in the war was mainly due to Venizelos, whose charisma won the hearts of Western rulers. To attract Greece into war, Britain offered Cyprus Island

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<sup>62</sup> Renzi, p. 1-20

and the Aidin Vilayet in Western Anatolia, although the very same area in Anatolia was to be allocated to Italy with St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement in August 1917.

The majority of the Agreements signed among the Entente Powers was during 1914-1916 when Lloyd George was a minister in the Cabinet which argued and endorsed these agreements. It seems that there was a mutual understanding in the Cabinet which accepted these agreements and as Balfour told there was no conflict concerning dissolution of the Ottoman Empire not only within the Allies but also in the Cabinet. There is no doubt that Lloyd George as a member of the Cabinet was aware of the plan of sharing the Ottoman Empire, although he was not directly involved neither in drawing these agreements nor in the negotiations, since his concentration was elsewhere; accomplishing 'total war' and preparing the war machinery to save the British Empire. Viscount Grey's promises to Greece for the Aidin Vilayet and even for Cyprus which was annexed to Britain with one sided decision during the war without obtaining the approval of the Ottoman Empire, could not be a self decision but in accordance with the Cabinet's, hence with the consent of Lloyd George. Similarly the Sykes-Picot Agreement and promises extended to Arabs for the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire had the approval of Lloyd George.

The dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the war, decision mainly taken within the period up to 1916, until Lloyd George became the Prime Minister, was a 'State Policy'. Asquith's approach was to observe the rights of smaller nationalities so that they could be provided better conditions; and this meant the annexation of Thrace and Western Anatolia by Greece because of the Greek population there, and also the formation of independent Armenia and Arab states.

There is no doubt that the Asquith Government as well as Lloyd George treated Venizelos whose aspirations were well known for the Ottoman Empire, as a great patriot favourable to the Allied cause. The amicable sentiments towards Venizelos were felt not only in Britain but throughout Allied Governments, and as was decided, they would do anything necessary to defend him even against the King of Greece. Venizelos was going to use these sentiments towards him during peace negotiations in Paris after the War.

## **CHAPTER IV**

### **LLOYD GEORGE at WAR**

#### **IV.1: General Policy Towards The Ottoman Empire**

Lloyd George became Prime Minister on 7<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1916, when some four and a half million men were employed as of British war effort in Europe, Mesopotamia, Egypt, West Africa and Salonika. He formed the Imperial War Cabinet as soon as he became Prime Minister. The War Cabinet consisted of Lloyd George, Bonar Law, Lord Milner, Viscount Curzon and A. Henderson, Leader of Labour Party and Sir M.P.A. Hankey acting as Secretary. WC Members, with the exception of Bonar Law, had no ministerial portfolios, therefore were able to allocate their full time to war efforts. The War Cabinet held 494 meetings, from December 1916 to the end of October 1918, while it served as a vehicle for a more vigorous prosecution of the war.<sup>1</sup> The most debatable issue behind the accusation of the Asquith Government was the conduct of the war and especially Asquith was criticized as not being up to the fulfilment of the requirements.

The British Dominions consisting of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Newfoundland, which had contributed enormously to war efforts, were complaining that they were not engaged with the decision making machinery. Lloyd George in order to overcome such criticism had to set up an Imperial War Cabinet, including members of representatives of Dominions, majority of which were represented on Prime Ministerial level. The Imperial War Cabinet (IWC) had their first meeting on 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1917, and until the end of 1918, there were altogether 48 meetings. In the 4<sup>th</sup> Meeting of IWC, held on 27<sup>th</sup> of March 1917, Lloyd George stressed the point that Allies' war aims could not be met before the end of 1918, therefore indicative of the positive foresight that the war would be continuing for a long time to come. In that meeting, Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister of Canada, reflected the sentiment of Canadian Parliament that Canada, with a population of 8 million, had raised 446.830 men and more than 12 million Pound for the war effort fund, as a direct contribution to the Allied forces. The British Government had also given definite pledges that the Dominions should be consulted

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<sup>1</sup> The National Archives of the United Kingdom: Public Records Office (PRO), CAB 23/1-8.

with regard to the Terms of Peace and that those terms should have to be defended in the respective Parliaments. Sir Borden attributing to these pledges stated that in spite of the war efforts extended by Canada Canadian Government had noticed that, the promises given to Russians concerning Dardanelles had been made without the consent of Canada<sup>2</sup>.

The Ottoman Empire was the topic for discussion in the Imperial War Cabinet, in their 13<sup>th</sup> Meeting, on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1917, and, adopted a conclusion with regard to the Ottoman Empire that called for "*The re-establishment of liberty and public right in Europe and on the high seas, the settlement of the political boundaries of Europe in accordance with the wishes of its peoples, and the liberation of the oppressed nationalities of the Turkish Empire from the Turkish yoke*"<sup>3</sup>. While these discussions were taking place, that the Dominions should be consulted with regard to terms of peace, Lloyd George was having discussions with Italians concerning the Ottoman Empire and agreed to distribute its territories after the War without neither the their consent nor knowledge.

Lloyd George, after becoming the Prime Minister had to deal with separate peace issues with Austria and Germany. In March 1917, the brother-in-law of the Austrian Emperor, Prince Sixte, approached the French President Poincare with Austria's desire for peace underlining that Austria would consent to the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France and restoration of Belgium as well as re-establishment of sovereign Serbia with access to sea through Albania. This offer, with probable approvals of Britain and France was going to be discussed at the Allied Meeting, held on 19<sup>th</sup> of April 1917 at Saint-Jean de Maurienne. Italy, with a desire to enlarge her country, was seeking territories in Dalmatian coast, Trieste and in Asia Minor.<sup>4</sup> Austria's peace offer did not encompass these expectations; therefore attempt for an early peace was rejected by Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, at that meeting. Italy, on the other hand, was successful to secure her desires for Anatolia<sup>5</sup>,

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<sup>2</sup> PRO, CAB 23/40.

<sup>3</sup> PRO, CAB 23/40.

<sup>4</sup> John Grigg, *Lloyd George, War Leader 1916-1918*, (Penguin Books,2001), p. 88-91

<sup>5</sup> Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1917*, p. 218-261, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933). Lloyd George in his War Memoirs discussed in detail the Austrian peace offer and the meetings of Prince Sixte and encloses various correspondence between Sixte, French officials and himself, but there is no mention of "offerings" to Italy on the expense of the Ottoman Empire, except the lines "...and he (Sonnino) did not respond at all to my (Lloyd George) suggestion that if Austria were eliminated Italy could then employ her strength in the realization of her desiderata in Turkey", although there was no attribution to of what that desiderata was. Grigg, in his book states that "an offer to give Italy part of south-eastern Anatolia, including Smyrna, if and when the Ottoman Empire was dismembered, seems to have been made by Lloyd George to Sonnino during the conference, in

which was going to be more clearly delineated on the 8<sup>th</sup> of August meeting, between Britain, France and Italy, however subject to Russian assent, which, after the Bolshevik Revolution, became a disputable issue and an excuse for Britain not to entertain. The suggestion at the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting, Sonnino requested the inclusion of occupied territories northern part of the Vilayet of Smyrna to the Italian zone but both Lloyd George and Ribot, the French Prime Minister, declared that this should be referred to their Governments for consultation. Sonnino also criticized both British and French Governments for concluding the Sykes-Picot Agreement without consulting at all and stated that this was the violation of the Italian Agreement, of 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1915, by which Italy joined the Allies<sup>6</sup>. Lloyd George, at the conclusion of the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting, probably to overcome the bitterness of the Italians, suggested that;

“It is understood that if at the time when peace is declared, the total or partial possession of the territories contemplated in the agreements come to between France, Great Britain, Italy and Russians to the disposal of part of the Ottoman Empire, can not be fully accorded to any one or more of those Powers, then the interests of the powers concerned will be again taken into equitable consideration, having regard to the efforts made by each of the Powers in the War”<sup>7</sup>.

Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting and its conclusions were debated in the War Cabinet on 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1917 where the Foreign Office was represented by Lord Robert Cecil, Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Lord Hardinge. In the discussions the former Foreign Secretary, Grey was attributed for having; “*undertaken that British interests in Smyrna should not be an obstacle to Italian aspirations in that quarter*”<sup>8</sup>. The Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting was also in the agenda of the War Cabinet Meeting on 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1917, and the Cabinet agreed that a draft letter, prepared by Foreign Office, to be sent to Italy, stating that “*subject to the consent of the Russian Government, the British Government agrees to the Saint-Jean de Maurienne arrangement, this being conditional on an increased effort being made by Italy*”<sup>9</sup>. The prerequisite laid down by the War Cabinet as to the conclusions of Saint-Jean de Maurienne meeting puzzled Italians and in the War Cabinet held on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1917, reported by Lord Robert Cecil that Italy did not know the nature of the ‘increased effort’. They required which according to Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, meant for Italy to be active in the war theatre against Ottoman Empire, but as the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Robertson, who was present in the War Cabinet Meeting, declared that

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*the hope that it would make him more inclined to contemplate a separate peace with Austria. Sonnino accepted the offer, but without the hoped-for response”* ( Grigg, p. 91-92, footnote 17)

<sup>6</sup> House of Lords Public Records, Lloyd George Papers (Lloyd George Papers), LG/205/2/1,

<sup>7</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/205/2/1 and PRO, CAB 23/3, War Cabinet Meeting 193(17).

<sup>8</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/205/2/1 and PRO, CAB 23/2, War Cabinet Meeting 124(17).

<sup>9</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/205/2/1, and PRO, CAB 23/2, War Cabinet Meeting.

Britain did not have any desire for the Italian cooperation in that theatre. Lord Robert Cecil clarified the understanding of the Italians by reporting his conversation with the Italian Ambassador in London. He confirmed the suspicion felt at the War Cabinet that there was some understanding between Italians and French regarding to who was going to have what; such that *“Italy was going to acquiesce in a free hand to France in Greece, while the French would support the Italian claims in Asia Minor”*<sup>10</sup>. To remedy the disagreement originating from the Italian requirement of ‘increased effort’, since the British Government did not have the desire of Italian cooperation in the Eastern Theatre against the Turks, it was clarified at the War Cabinet Meeting of 14<sup>th</sup> of June as *“Lord Robert Cecil should be authorized to inform the Italian Government that the condition of increased effort will be waived, but that, if and when the moment arrives, the British Government will expect the Italian Government to render assistance in some form in any operations taken in the East”*<sup>11</sup>. The proposition to Italy in Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting to modify to some extent what was there provisionally agreed for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, was debated between Britain and Italy. Sonnino strongly objected to the concluding part of the proposition, which was ‘...having regard to the efforts made by each of the Powers in the War’. Lord Robert Cecil, in his Memorandum, submitted to the War Cabinet at its meeting, on 23<sup>rd</sup> of July 1917, suggested a new phrase which was accepted by Sonnino, to replace the debated part of the proposition. This was accepted as; *“.... then in any alterations or adjustments of the provinces of the Turkish Empire consequential on the war, equitable consideration shall be given, to the preservation of the equilibrium in the Mediterranean in accordance with Article 9 of the London Agreement.”*<sup>12</sup> By this, Britain was accepting a modification of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, although, as mentioned in Lord Robert Cecil’s memorandum, Italy was not going to be involved in the territories Britain was concerned with, namely Mesopotamia and Palestine, and since France was going to get her share in the Eastern Mediterranean, then it was the French responsibility to deal with Italians to preserve equilibrium there. The tripartite agreement, known as Saint-Jean de Maurienne was going to be finalized in a meeting in London, with the consent of Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Robert Cecil, Sonnino and M.Margerie withholding reservation for the consent of Russia<sup>13</sup>. This

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<sup>10</sup> PRO, CAB 23/2, War Cabinet Meeting 128(17), Item 11, 1<sup>st</sup> May 1917.

<sup>11</sup> PRO, CAB 23/3, War Cabinet Meeting 163(17), Item 2, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1917.

<sup>12</sup> PRO, 23/3, War Cabinet Meeting 193(17), Appendix, GT 147.

<sup>13</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/205/2/1. The Memorandum began with “Sans réserve` de A` sentiment Russe” and ended with “Il a e`te` entendu que le présent mémorandum sera communiqué au Gouvernement Russe, afin que la Russie pourrait faire connaître ses vues’, meaning; Without

Memorandum was going to be corresponded between Governments concerned for official endorsement. As a matter of fact, Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement was going to be the basis for the Italian desiderata in Anatolia during Paris Peace Conference, causing controversies between Britain and Italy because of the Greek involvement in Asia Minor.

Britain, even before the London Conference had endorsed Italy's share in Asia Minor with the report submitted to IWC, by Lord Curzon on 28<sup>th</sup> of April 1917. The report of the Committee of Imperial War Cabinet, on territorial desiderata stated that "*It is of great importance that the Palestine and Mesopotamia should be under British control... Turkish rule should never be restored in Palestine or Mesopotamia*"<sup>14</sup> and by approving the Sykes-Picot Agreement in regard to French and Russian provisions, suggested an Arab state or states but under the protection of Britain. The Report endorsed the Italian claims as "*The claims of Italy to spheres of occupation and of influence in Asia Minor, have been agreed by His Majesty's Government, subject to certain conditions*"<sup>15</sup>. The report resembles imperialistic motives for Britain on the expense of Ottoman Empire.

Lloyd George, after becoming Prime Minister, had to deal with the German peace proposal, which appeared in a newspaper in The Hague, Holland. The War Cabinet in its meeting of 13<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1916 inquired for the text of the proposal as it appeared in the newspaper to prepare the counterproposal.<sup>16</sup>The 'note' was handed to British Government by the American Ambassador in London on behalf of German Government and the issue was discussed in the War Cabinet meeting on 18<sup>th</sup> of Dec. USA acting as a kind of mediator between Germany and the Allies, requested to have the answer from the Allies, before submission to Germans since USA was aiming to pursue with the possibility of starting negotiations to end the war. President Wilson sent the American views, as outlined in his 'Peace Note' to Allies on 20<sup>th</sup> of December, stating that, although the USA was not acting as a mediator between the Central Powers and the Allies, expressing she was interested in an early peace settlement and Wilson urged Allies that both sides should exchange views for peace. At the War Cabinet meeting, after consideration of the way and means to reply Germans, and in accordance with the memorandum of the Foreign

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reservation of "Russian feeling" and ended with " it is understood that the present memorandum will be communicated with the Russian Government, so that Russia could make its views known.

<sup>14</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/205/2/1.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> PRO, CAB 23/1, War Cabinet Meeting No: 4, 13<sup>th</sup> of Dec 1916.

Office, of 15<sup>th</sup> of December, it was decided that *“the best plan would be for the Allies to concert an identical note, which should be signed by the representatives, in Paris, of all the Allies, including the minor states, and handed by the representative of France, in the presence of his colleagues to the American Ambassador in Paris.”*<sup>17</sup> and further it was agreed that, since M. Briand, Prime Minister of France, was preparing for consideration a draft reply, it would be necessary *“to refute the statements made in the preamble of the German Note and to state that a general offer of peace, without defining terms was useless”*<sup>18</sup>. The official reply of Allies to President Wilson’s Note was written in Paris and signed by the representatives of the ten governments concerned, and was handed to the American Ambassador on 10<sup>th</sup> of Jan 1917. The answer contained reasons for declining the German proposal and also some remarks about Ottoman Empire, such that;

“...the reorganization of Europe, guaranteed by a stable settlement, based alike upon the principle of nationalities, on the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development, and also upon territorial agreement and international arrangements so framed as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjustified attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories wrested in the past from the Allies by force or against the will of their populations; the liberation of Italians, of Slavs, of Rumanians, and of Tchecho-Slovaques from foreign domination; the enfranchisement of population subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization”<sup>19</sup>.

Britain also sent an additional Note to President Wilson to enlighten some of the points in the Allies’ Note, which contained elaborated clauses for not accepting the German proposal as well as some remarks about Ottoman Empire and why it should be ended. The Note was delivered by the British Ambassador in Washington to the State Department on 17<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1917. The ‘note’, dated 13<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1917 and signed by Balfour, was pointing the desires of Britain, as;

“...It has been argued, indeed, that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe forms no proper or logical part of this general scheme. The maintenance of the Turkish Empire was, during many generations, regarded by statesman of worldwide authority as essential to the maintenance of European peace. Why, it is asked, should the cause of peace be now associated with a complete reversal of this traditional policy? The answer is that circumstances have completely changed. It is necessary to consider now whether the creation of a reformed Turkey, mediating between hostile races in the Near East, was a scheme which had the Sultan been sincere and the powers united, could ever have been realized. It certainly can not be realized now. The Turkey of ‘Union and Progress’ is at least as barbarous and is far more aggressive than the Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid. In the hands of Germany it has ceased even in appearance to be a bulwark of peace, and is openly used as an instrument of conquest. Under German Officers Turkish soldiers are now fighting in lands from which they had been long expelled, and a Turkish Government controlled, subsidized, and supported by Germany has been guilty of massacres in Armenia and Syria

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<sup>17</sup> PRO, CAB 23/1, War Cabinet Meeting No: 10, 18<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1916.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> “Text of Entente Allies’ Reply to President”, *The Current History*, 5:5 (1917: Feb.), p. 783-784

more horrible than any recorded in the history even of those unhappy countries. Evidently the interests of peace and the claims of nationality alike require that Turkish rule over alien races shall, if possible be brought to an end, and we may hope that the expulsion of Turkey from Europe will contribute as much to the cause of peace as the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, or Italia Irredenta to Italy, or any of the territorial changes indicated in the allied note.”<sup>20</sup>

The remarks appeared in both ‘Notes’, seem to be initiated from the War Cabinet, since Lloyd George in his War Memoirs indicated that “...*the Note enumerated the following items as matters which must be dealt with in any settlement*”<sup>21</sup> and out of these items that should be taken into consideration in the reply, had the policy of “*The liberation of the peoples who now lie beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks, and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, which has proved itself so radically alien to Western civilization*”<sup>22</sup>

Germany extended another peace offer to Allies in September 1917, when the spirit of winning ‘total victory’ was at the lowest level. General Haig’s offensive, initiated in September was no longer promised a decisive victory. Both Italy and France were suffering from weariness of war which was at the edge of its fourth year. The unrest in Russia, because of Bolsheviks revolution and the possibility of Russia being out of war, all contributed to the atmosphere in London that peace without victory was becoming an alternative<sup>23</sup>. German Secretary of State, through Spain let British know that German Government would be glad to make a communication relative to peace. It was a genuine offer, after Pope’s letter on 16<sup>th</sup> Aug., inviting both sides for a negotiated peace and Allies’ reply on 21<sup>st</sup> stating that they had formulated their war aims, but the Central Powers had not, and therefore, they would be awaiting should some new evidence for their sincerity for peace, and therefore in a way leaving the door open for peace negotiations.<sup>24</sup> The War Cabinet met on 24<sup>th</sup> of September to discuss the German approach, and Balfour being very suspicious of France and Italy, suggested to have a meeting of representatives of Allies. It seemed that France was considering peace seriously, and Italy would not object for an early peace settlement. Lloyd George indicated his willingness for peace negotiations to start and suggested that Russians should not be included in the negotiations. Both Balfour and Curzon objected the Prime Minister on the ground

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<sup>20</sup> “Great Britain’s Note Amplifying the Entente Reply”, *The Current History*, 5:5 (1917: Feb.) pg 786

<sup>21</sup> Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1916-1917*, p. 63-64, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933) and David Lloyd George, *The Truth About Peace Treaties* Vol. I, p. 57-59,

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>23</sup> David R. Woodward, “David Lloyd George, a negotiated Peace with Germany and The Kuhlman’s Peace Kite of September, 1917”, *Canadian Journal of History*, 6:1 (Mar 1971)

<sup>24</sup> Lloyd George, “War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1917”, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933), p. 262-319

that they could not abandon their allies. The War Cabinet decided that "...generally agreed that we could not refuse to hear what the German proposals were, but all action in regard to the reply to be made, and as to any communication with our allies, other than France, was postponed until after the Prime Minister's conversation with M. Painleve"<sup>25</sup> Lloyd George, who believed at that time that it was a genuine offer on behalf of Germany, years later was going to evaluate the peace terms, in his Memoirs as;

"Would Belgium have been restored? Perhaps- probably, on terms. Amongst those terms would certainly have been the surrender of Liege and the Congo, with the imposition of economic and military conditions in what was left for Belgium and an addition to German territory in the Baltic. Poland might have been granted autonomy under the protection of Germany, after a further slice of its territory had been cut out of the Russian provinces...Turkey would have been persuaded to concede a spurious autonomy to the Arabs- as delusive as Abdul Hamid's 'reforms' for Armenians. Bulgaria would have been rewarded for her services by chunks of Serbian and Romanian territory. A suitable present would also have been found for Constantine. He had earned it and would not have been forgotten. What a peace as a result of cruel sacrifice! Too horrible to think of!"<sup>26</sup>

Although Lloyd George evaluated the peace offer years later as horrible, but at that time, he was inclined to negotiate, and that is why Curzon, Balfour and Bonar Law had to write to him, to warn that the proposal was too dangerous even to consider. After negotiating with French, especially after Painlave's discussion with Austrians, a reply was formulated with the consent of the Allies and sent to Germans, which stated that "*His Majesty's Government would be prepared to receive any communication that the German Government may desire to make to them relating to peace and to discuss it with their allies*"<sup>27</sup>. No answer was received from Germans, and the next step was the battle field once again.

As far as Germany and Austria were concerned, the peace offers whether they were indigenous or not, were not realized, since they did not meet the war aims and expectation of 'total victory' of allies, especially for Britain. The Austrian offer, although initially treated as a positive move by France and Britain, but due to Italian attitude, was also rejected by Allies, leaving, peace offer or rather acceptance of the defeat to the third member of the Central Powers, the Ottoman Empire. Another reason to decline the German offer was the domestic policy. Lloyd George came to power mainly because of the criticism extended to Asquith Government, on being

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<sup>25</sup> War Cabinet Minutes, September 24, 1917, CAB 23/16, PRO, and also, "David Lloyd George, a negotiated Peace with Germany and The Kuhlman's Peace Kite of September, 1917" by David R. Woodward, *Canadian Journal of History*, 6:1 (1971: Mar.)

<sup>26</sup> Lloyd George, "War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1917", pg.318-319, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, p. 316

not competent for the conduct of the War, and the slogan of 'Knock-out Blow'. Therefore the British public was expecting a total victory aggressive Germans were crushed, Europe was saved and their sufferings were paid off. Accepting 'peace without victory' was too dangerous and Lloyd George had to follow his ministers and therefore rejected the German offer. The information available to the Cabinet members and the Government indicated that Germans were, in a way, were accepting the defeat, by giving concessions in Alsace Lorraine, Belgium and the colonies; hence Britain, France and Italy were getting rewards for their war effort. The only country among the Allies was the Russia who seemed to be paying for the war. Russia was in turmoil, and shortly after she was going to be classified as 'dangerous state' because of the Bolshevik Revolution. Lloyd George believed that even before the Revolution, British people would not fight for the benefit of Russia, since she was unwilling to fight.

Britain was engaged in fighting on two different arenas with the Ottoman Empire, one in the battle field and the other accomplished by means of intrigues compelling the Ottomans to accept defeat. The latter had been done through agents to attract opposition to the ruling party, CPU, and through bribery to overthrow the Government.

Britain tried Turks to get information about the atmosphere in Constantinople and Anatolia and also to get Talaat Pasha [Talat Pasa] to surrender or to make a separate peace with the Allies, leaving Germany by herself. The centre for correspondence and employment of Turks for their own purposes was Switzerland. According to Sir H. Rumbold, the High Commissioner of Britain in Berne, through their agents, Prodi and Lord Newton, the representative of Britain in Prisoner's Conference in Switzerland in December 1917, contact was established with some Turks, namely Chevky (Sevki) Bey, who was a secretary in the Turkish Legation in Switzerland, Begjet Wahby (Behcet Vehbi) Bey, who was probably an Arab living in Egypt and known as being close to Prince Said Halim, the former Grand Vizier; and most influential of all was Mouktar (Muhtar ) Bey, who was the Secretary to Ottoman Senate (Meclis-i Ayan) . It seems that Lord Newton made the acquaintance of Muhtar Bey so that he would inform Talat Pasa that "...to say that Lord Newton had given him to understand that England would be quite ready to come to an arrangement with Turkey if the latter would embark on pourparlers for a separate

peace”<sup>28</sup>. Sir Rumbold was certain that if nothing came from Muhtar Bey, “*then they had a second string for communicating with Talat Pasa in the person of Chefik Pasha, who is apparently on his way from Constantinople to Switzerland and whose interest it is to keep well with us as he possesses property in Egypt. We would, if necessary, employ him to let Talat Pasa know what the main heads of our proposals are and obtain his comments thereon.*”<sup>29</sup> According to Sir Horace Rumbold the plan was “*...in addition to other obvious arguments, the line we propose to take with Muhtar, or with any influential Turk who gives us the chance, is to tell him that Germany is our principal enemy and that we shall not desist until we have defeated her; also that Germany’s defeat will inso facto involve the defeat of Germany’s allies*”<sup>30</sup>. Sir Rumbold collected information about the conditions in the Ottoman Empire and personalities in the ruling class through his informants and passed them to London.<sup>31</sup>

Talat Pasa was not the only person that Britain was contemplating with; to persuade for a separate peace, but this time, Lloyd George was directly involved in the planning. It was through Basil Zaharoff, the famous arm dealer, acting as a go-between Lloyd George and Enver Pasha, who was the Minister of War of Ottoman Empire. The correspondence between Zaharoff and Lloyd George was carried out by Sir Vincent Caillard, Chairman of the Vickers Company. Zaharoff managed to get acquainted with a close-aide of Enver Pasha, Abdul Kerim, in early 1917, to reach Enver Pasa or rather bribe him to agree on for an early peace settlement. Abdul Kerim told Zaharoff, in their meeting in Switzerland in June 1917 that Turkey was ruined and Enver was willing to get away on ‘reasonable conditions’. Kerim requested two million dollars, payable at Morgan’s New York, immediately as a ‘retaining fee’ of which he was going to take five hundred thousand for himself as an introduction to Enver and Djavid Bey [Cavid Bey], who was the Ottoman Minister of Finance, and acting for Khalil [Halil], the Sheich-ul Islam [Şeyh-ül Islam], Emir Hussein Emir [Hüseyin], Ouzoun Ali [Uzun Ali] and Djemal [Cemal]. According to Kerim, Enver Pasha was planning to go to America, and wait for his friends there. Kerim suggesting that one and half million dollars would be at Enver’s disposal, since they needed to buy certain people who were indispensable. In addition to two

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<sup>28</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F 59/9/10, a private and confidential letter from Sir H. Rumbold to Balfour, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 7<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918, Berne.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/59/5 and LG/F/59/7, some information about the status of Talat Pasa and his views regarding the War and the relations with Germany was collected by making use of Cemil Pasa, who was Prefect of Constantinople during the Grand Vizier Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pasha.

million, as a 'retainer', Zaharoff should consider paying ten million to cover 'everything'<sup>32</sup>. As soon as the first two million was deposited, Enver, and or Djavid, Abdul Kerim and Zaharoff should meet together and decide on the issues as;

“£XXX to be paid to their nominee, when the Turkish troops have been withdrawn from the Mesopotamian Front to a line indicated by Zaharoff.

\$XXX to be paid to their nominee, when the Turkish troops in Palestine have been withdrawn to a line fixed by Zaharoff. This line not to be at a very great distance so as not to excite suspicion in Constantinople, which is as near to Palestine.

£XXX to be similarly paid when the Turkish troops on both sides of Dardanelles have allowed the Allies to land and have delivered the forts to them.

£XXX when Allied fleet has passed through the Dardanelles and the Turks have asked for an armistice, which in Enver & Co's opinion will be certain to lead to a general armistice, on account of the terrible state of Germany and Austria (not Hungary)”<sup>33</sup>

These were simple indications, according to Abdul Kerim, but details could be settled in the meeting as soon as the 'money bags' views were to be known. The 'offer' extended by Abdul Kerim, seemed to have the approval of London , the figures were determined and a copy, of 9<sup>th</sup> of Jan.1918, was passed to Sir Vincent Caillard with the initials of Davies who was the personal secretary to Lloyd George and responsible to the communications on behalf of the Prime Minister for the project. The extended version was;

“1. It is agreed that in the event of a free passage through Dardanelles being opened to British submarines and of a favourable opportunity being afforded to them to torpedo the Goeben and Breslau and to return through the Dardanelles the sum of 5 000000 will be paid.

2. It is agreed that in the event of all Turkish troops in Palestine and on the Hejaz Railway being withdrawn north of the railway line from Haifa to Deraa a sum of

\$2, 000 000 will be paid and the following guarantees will be given: - (1) The Turkish forces will not be molested while carrying out the withdrawal. (2) Palestine will not be annexed or incorporated into British Empire.”<sup>34</sup>

Sir Vincent Caillard continued his meditation for Zaharoff and gave him instructions, apparently as was agreed and dictated by Lloyd George, to help him in his meetings with the Turkish side<sup>35</sup>. The proposed meeting of Zaharoff and Enver was going to

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<sup>32</sup> In the documents, there was no quotation for the currency, it is assumed that it was in ' US Dollars'

<sup>33</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/6/1/6, Memorandum of Zaharoff's, 27<sup>th</sup> of June 1917.

<sup>34</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/17, A Note, initialed by Davies on 9<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918.

<sup>35</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/9. Sir Caillard personally wrote many private, hand written letters to Lloyd George, and during the negotiation phase between Zaharoff and Turkish side, after the British side determined the 'figures' for the Agreement wrote, on 12<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918, that:

“ Dear Mr. Lloyd George,

*I have received a note from Zaharoff saying that since your 'peace terms' for Turkey, as set forth in your recent speech, nearly corresponded to the terms he was instructed to convey privately, and as your speech is sure not to be published [can not be read] in German press, he is having a German translation made which he will hand to Enver or his envoy when he meets them at the end of this month. In the report of your speech which I [read] you did not mention that Mesopotamia, Palestine [can not be read], would remain under the Turkish flag, with not under Turkish domination. It would, I think, be effective if I instructed Zaharoff from you to confirm this. In order to save you trouble I will do this by letter on Tuesday, having unless I previously hear from you on the contrary. I am obliged to stay here till Monday morning... but shall certainly be in my office on Tuesday morning. Yours Sincerely V.*

take place in Switzerland, at Lucerne at the end of January 1918, but Zaharoff was delayed for two days due to problems at the Swiss border, but at his meeting with Abdul Kerim, he was told that Enver would be coming to Geneva next day. When Enver arrived, he was acting on the suspicion that he had been constantly watched by secret police, who would report to Berlin, and further told Zaharoff that he should stay in doors, since only the previous day the King of Greece told Enver that his staff were 'boiling to get at Zaharoff and drink his blood'. Therefore Zaharoff could not meet Enver and Abdul Kerim acted as a media for the conversation. Enver told Zaharoff that he had not given to Abdul Kerim full authority regarding the money, consequently all the money deposited by Zaharoff would be returned to him, including Abdul Kerim's share. According to Zaharoff, Enver Pasa returned the money, and further he complained about Germans and Talaat Pasa that they would have reached peace much earlier if it was not because of Talaat Pasa who changed his mind after the collapse of Russia and Romania.<sup>36</sup> Zaharoff in vain tried to pursue

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Caillard" LG/F/6/1/8, House of Lords). It seems that the request of Caillard was found to be acceptable and after some telephone conversations with Davies, he sent the instructions to Zaharoff, and later informed Davies with his letter of 15<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918.

<sup>36</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/6/1/13. Zaharoff wrote to Caillard on 29<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918, which was also conveyed to Lloyd George as "Many discussions took place about the money. At one time E. [Enver] said he might keep \$500 000 for a certain eventuality, not for himself, as if he came to grief, all that he would need would be a pistol. He afterwards said that he would return all the \$1,500,000, and it looks as if he were in earnest, because five million francs have already been placed at my disposal in Paris and enclosed I send you cheque for same sum. Although the Breslau was sunk and the Goeben disabled, before I left Monaco, I thought it wise to refer to my instructions about them, and am glad I did so. E. said that had these ships still been safe, he could not do what we wanted, because when he, found that some of the Turks, in the Dardanelles, were not up to the mark, he gave over the Straits entirely to the Germans. E. says that without making a formal promise, he can arrange for the Turkish armies in Palestine and on the Hejas Railway to be withdrawn North of the Railway line from Haifa to Deraa, but as he had not reliable map at hand, he said it would be done 'approximately', but he would not accept any payment for this, nor for anything else. E. said twice that he did not know whether British rule in Mesopotamia and Palestine would not be preferable to German rule, and he emphatically said that if the Germans won this war, Turkey would be Germany's vassal. A German victory might seem good to the present generation of Turks, but the inevitable was that they become Germans in time. (I have brought back the impression that E. is sick of it, and he is preparing the way to talk to us some day). He repeated that notwithstanding solemn promise, Germans had done nothing to relieve Mesopotamia and Palestine, and that Talaat was furious at having been deceived, and had just gone to headquarters to persuade them to act. E. said that the Kaiser had told him that 'le sort de Palestine et de la Mesopotamia serait decide sur le front Francaise.' E.'s personal opinion was that so much time had been lost, during which the British had made their fronts in Turkey so secure, that the Turks and Germans would have a very hard nut to crack. E. said that six months ago he had made every preparation for a separate peace, and that Talaat was in accord with him, but that when Russia and Romania began crumbling Talaat sold him. 'main de cela je fais mon affaire'. [Hand of it I make my business]. He regretted that I had not shown confidence in him last summer....E. certainly means to do away with Talaat in some way or other, and in any case seems to be more friendly towards us than the Germans, and if possible would like to do us a good turn, whether for money or not I can not tell. A.K. [Abdul Kerim] said that at times E. dreamt of a Turkey from the Adriatic to India, and at others seemed willing to throw up the sponge. A. K. repeatedly told me he would not return me the money. I enclose cheque for the Frs. 5,000,000, which E. returned when the balance comes, I will remit it to you, and although it may not be necessary, I think your Chairman [Lloyd George] would do well to leave the money in your hands, as he may still need it for the same object".

with the instructions he received from London and convince Enver Pasha, but with no result.<sup>37</sup>

Enver's refusal for the bribe, although Zaharoff still had hopes, killed the project and the result was conveyed to Lloyd George on 4<sup>th</sup> of February, as 'a great disappointment'. Caillard wrote Lloyd George that he "*had placed the pounds of the 5,000,000 on deposit with my bankers, and has instructed the Chairman of the bank privately how to deal with it in case of my decease*"<sup>38</sup> and for Zaharoff it was a project that he told as; "*given my heart and soul to this scheme and its failure has quite broken me*"<sup>39</sup>

Zaharoff did continue contacting Abdul Kerim, and through him, Enver Pasha. He wrote to Lloyd George through Sir Caillard that he received an invitation from Enver Pasa in August 1918 to discuss certain issues. While waiting for Enver Pasha, who was attending 'General Conseil de Ouerre' in Berlin for the first time since the War began attended by Foreign Ministers and Finance Ministers, Zaharoff spent some time, according to him five days and four nights, with Abdul Kerim, and managed to obtain some knowledge about the war conditions in the countries of Central Powers, and returned back to France probably without meeting Enver Pasha, as a British envoy was going to be in Switzerland and probably instructed by Lloyd George, not to be seen there<sup>40</sup>. Zaharoff received another request for a meeting from Enver Pasa, probably through Abdul Kerim, and then proceeded to Switzerland for the meeting. Zaharoff conveyed his meeting with the Turkish side to Lloyd George through Sir Caillard, with a letter of 3<sup>rd</sup> of Oct. In the meeting with Enver Pasa and Abdul Kerim, Zaharoff agreed to pay, at Enver Pasha's request, twenty five million francs to bribe some Turks and Hungarians to agree for an earlier settlement of peace.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/16B. Zaharoff's duty was to convince Enver to accept the conditions as set forth by Lloyd George, and to ease him, Lloyd George set out the 'rewards' for Turkey in the note of 6<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1917 which was handed to Caillard by Bonar Law, therefore suggesting that Bonar Law was also aware of the 'project'. The note stated that "*Chairman's [Lloyd George] Personal Views; To give as his personal opinion that Allies do not desire destruction of independent Ottoman State nor surrender of Constantinople but freedom of Straits to be secured. Arabia to be independent. Mesopotamia and Palestine to be Protectorates on analogy of Egypt before the war. Autonomy for Syria and Armenia. Capitulations to remain abolished and generous treatment to Turkey as finance.*"

<sup>38</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/13, Caillard's letter to Lloyd George on 4<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1918.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., Zaharoff's Letter to Caillard on 29<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918.

<sup>40</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/6/1/16, Zaharoff's Letter to Caillard on 21<sup>st</sup> Aug. 1918.

<sup>41</sup> Zaharoff in his letter of 3<sup>rd</sup> Oct. 1918 to Sir Caillard gave the details of his meeting (Lloyd George Papers LG/F/6/1/20). Zaharoff's letter was going to be sent to Lloyd George from Caillard on 10<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1918 (Lloyd George Papers LG/F/6/1/21). The Zaharoff's letter contained some interesting remarks of Enver Pasa with regard to Germans and his desire for an early peace; "*At the proper moment I*

It seems from Caillard's letter of 12<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918, to Lloyd George that Zaharoff came to London and he was anxious to see Lloyd George, and whether the reason for Zaharoff to see the Prime Minister was Enver Pasa or not is not known.

The claimed peace initiations of Enver Pasha by bribing Turks and Hungarians came to no result, since it was in its natural endeavour that the war was ending and the British had already been started drawing possible armistice terms with Turkey. The British First Admiralty and Secretary of State of War with the War Cabinet decision on 1<sup>st</sup> of October were assigned to draft Armistice terms to be applied for Turkey.<sup>42</sup> Even Supreme Council in Paris in its meeting of 5<sup>th</sup> to 9<sup>th</sup> of October discussed the armistice possibility with Turkey, since it was becoming very probable that Turkey was going to ask for an armistice, especially after news was published at the beginning of October that Germany was seeking for an armistice on the basis

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*repeated word by word your Chairman's [Lloyd George] terms about delivering the goods, ending up by saying that I was prepared to show my good faith by there and then placing \$1,000,000 at his disposal on a/c. To my surprise this proposal visibly annoyed him and he said there was a mistake somewhere, for he did not care for money, and wanted none, and that A.K. had misunderstood him and it was for this reason that he (E...) had returned me the money I had placed at his disposal, to which I replied that part only of that money had been returned to me. He became violent and cried out aloud 'every piastre' has been returned to you, and at this A. K. intervening said that a certain formality at the bank had delayed the remittance upon which E...jumped up and pushing A. K. before him said they would go to the Bank, put the matter right and return in ten minutes. They shortly returned and E...said I would find the money in Paris on my return there, adding 'I am no Talaat'....He continued that Hungary and Turkey were from time immemorial the closest friends, and that he was on the point of persuading Hungary to go with Turkey for a separate peace. He said my idea of 'delivering the goods was now small, compared to getting Turkey to come to us arm in arm, towing Austria inevitably behind them and automatically breaking the Keiser's neck. He was very enthusiastic about it and asked me what I thought of it and I naturally expressed great approval, especially as I was really very favourably struck with the idea. He then said 'this is why you French should help with money; I repeat that we all exhausted and sooner or later must succumb, and the sooner the better for all concerned. There are chauvinists in Turkey and in Hungary and if we can buy them, we will save blood, money and time; months or weeks saved are months and weeks saved, lives save are lives and the whole war will end before winter' I asked him how much executing his idea would cost and he said that although he did not know much about money he thought that ten million francs for his Turks and fifteen million francs for Hungarians would suffice[sufficient], in all Frcs 25,000,000. I jumped at his suggestion, and told him that I would within an hour, place five million francs at his disposal, which with the money he intended sending me to Paris, would be sufficient for his Turks. He accepted and the finances were arranged before luncheon. As to the 15,000,000 francs I promised to arrange that they be at his disposal on my return to Paris. He said he would go at once to Constantinople via Vienna, Buda-Pest, Bucharest, Constanza and that if he could dispose of the 15,000,000 francs (through a channel which he indicated) by the 20<sup>th</sup> to 25<sup>th</sup> instant he would settle with the Hungarians. I told him I was willing to pay A. K. handsomely for full reports of the War Councils, but he laughed and he said 'I do not suppose we will attend many more War Councils' and talking of War Councils he said the Keiser was the greatest scoundrel he ever met, untruthful, unscrupulous, false and capable of any crime; he even made the Turks blush by saying, at the last Council 'that during peace negotiations or even after Peace had been signed my U boats would find an opportunity to destroy British fleet'" E... took the enclosed cutting [it was a "Times" cutting of 23<sup>rd</sup> Sep. 1918, indicating the ill-treatment of British prisoners by the orders of Enver Pasa, and Enver blocked the release of war prisoners] out of his pocket-book and complained of it as a mean, dirty line. We agreed to take luncheon together, but when I returned from settling finances A.K. told me E... had departed in the same automobile for the frontier and had wished me bon voyage."*

<sup>42</sup> PRO, CAB 23/8, Joint War Cabinet (480) and Imperial War Cabinet (34) Meeting on 1<sup>st</sup> Oct. 1918.

of Wilson's Fourteen Points.<sup>43</sup> It seems rather probable that both sides were aware of being at the edge of an Armistice, and therefore it does not seem convincing that a person such as Zaharoff, whose life was based upon intrigues, would agree to pay ten million francs instantly and promising to pay another fifteen million francs in few days time for an adventure which, because of its nature, would take rather long time to bribe and convince 'chauvinists' to agree for an early peace. According to Zaharoff, Enver Pasa until the last meeting did not want to meet personally, but all of a sudden he turned up at the meeting of 30<sup>th</sup> of September and 2<sup>nd</sup> of October 1918<sup>44</sup> and according to Zaharoff, he was still frightened of being seen with him, since he kept on saying 'You do not know me and I do not know you'. It does not seem to be logical on the ground that Enver Pasha was after money for himself; according to Zaharoff, he even returned the deposited money, but in that meeting it was claimed that he, risking his name and reputation, was ready to take the money, may be not for himself but to distribute as bribe.

It is obvious, from the letters exchanged between Lloyd George, Zaharoff and Caillard that Britain desired to get Enver Pasha. There might be an involvement of third parties such as Abdul Kerim, trying to squeeze cash from British, but involvement of Enver Pasa in this intrigue of events is not very clear. It is very interesting to note Enver Pasa's acquaints with a person such as Abdul Kerim. Another point is the outcome of the money that was deposited in Sir Vincent Caillard's bank, with his personal instructions, suggests that instead of returning to the Treasury, where it was taken from, it be channelled to Lloyd George's account. Sir Caillard's duty to Lloyd George was not limited to only Zaharoff's work, but he was constantly writing and sending notes to him with details, such as; labour unrest<sup>45</sup>, Caliphate issue, and conferring on the Sherif of Mecca the title of King of Hedjas. He even persuaded Count Leon Catrerog, who was a legal advisor to the Sublime Porte, to submit a Note to tell the advantageous of transferring Caliphate from Ottomans to the Kureish family whom the Sherif represented.<sup>46</sup> Count, in his Note, was proposing the displacement of the centre of gravity of Pan-Islamic influence from the Turks to the Arabs by the restoration of the legitimacy of the Caliphate in the person of the Sherif of Mecca.

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid., Joint War Cabinet (484) and Imperial War Cabinet (35) Meeting on 11<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1918,

<sup>44</sup> The exact date is not known, but it is assumed that since Zaharoff, after 27<sup>th</sup> September went to Switzerland from his letter to Caillard (Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/20) and he reported on 3<sup>rd</sup> October, therefore the meeting probably took place between 30<sup>th</sup> September and 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1918.

<sup>45</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/20, Caillard's letter to Lloyd George on 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 1918.

<sup>46</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/6/1/19, Caillard's letter to Lloyd George, on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1918, and Count Catrerog's Note on 'British Empire and Mohammedans'.

## IV.2 Lloyd George and War Aims

'War Aim' of any nation indicates what they would like to achieve at the end of the war, therefore it is a state policy which embeds political, economical and military ambitions or targets that they would like to gain<sup>47</sup>. Different approaches existed in the war aims of Lloyd George, such that; when he was Minister in Asquith's Government, he portrayed a typical 'total war' concept, but without giving much emphasis to the dissolution of Ottoman Empire but after he became Prime Minister in December 1916, his approach to war started including references to Ottoman Empire.

Lloyd George, at the beginning of the war, was aiming to rescue Europe from Prussians, and there was no mention of the Ottoman Empire and the reason why they were fighting with Turks. At the 52<sup>nd</sup> anniversary dinner of the Newspaper Press Fund, Lloyd George, told that;

*"The question is repeatedly asked, how long the war will last? This question was put to Abraham Lincoln in another war full of trials, vicissitudes and moments of depression, and his answer was 'we accepted this war for a worthy object, and this war will end when it is attained' What is our supreme object? The freedom of Europe. This desolating war has been forced upon us by an arrogant military caste that sought to enslave Europe, who thought they had perfected a machine that would tear through the vitals of Europe and leave it bleeding and crushed at their feet. The Prussian meant and means, to dominate the world"*<sup>48</sup>

And soon after, in his famous speech at Bangor, Wales on 5<sup>th</sup> of Aug 1915, when he was the Minister for Munitions, he stressed more on the morale of the nation that the victory was not far ahead

*"I have no doubt that, however long victory may carry, it will ultimately come. We may have to wait for the dawn. The eastern sky is dark and lowering; the stars have been clouded over. I regard that the stormy horizon with anxiety, but with no dread. To-day I can see the new hope beginning to empurple the sky. The enemy in their victorious march knows not what they are doing....I repeat, the enemy know not what they are achieving for their apparent victim. Austria and Prussia are doing for Russia to-day what their military ancestors affected just as unwittingly for France. They are hammering a sword that will destroy them....For us, we must fight on or for ever sink as a people into impotent obscurity. Britain has another task. It is becoming clearer and our own share of it becoming greater as the months roll past. It is to see that the suffering and loss shall not be in vain. The fields of Europe are being rent by the plough shares of war. The verdure of the old civilization is vanishing in desolating upheaval of the conflict"*<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Broc Millman, "A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.36, No.2 (Apr., 2001), p. 241-270. Broc Millman, rightly describes War Aims as a Grand Strategy and dynamic that changes with conditions.

<sup>48</sup> "The Times" 8<sup>th</sup> May 1915, p. 5

<sup>49</sup> "The Times", 6<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1915, p. 8

Lloyd George in his interview with Roy W. Howard of the United Press, on 28<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1916, stressed more on the attitude of Britain and the Entente, that there would be no peace until the Prussians were crushed. He commented on;

“...But in the British determination to carry the fight to a decisive finish there is something more than the natural demand for vengeance. The inhumanity, the pitilessness of the fighting that must come before a lasting peace is possible is not comparable with the cruelty that may be involved in stopping the war while there remains a possibility of civilization again being menaced from the same quarter. Peace now or at any time before the final and complete elimination of this menace is unthinkable. No man and no nation with the slightest understanding of the temper of this citizen army of Britons, which took its terrible hammering without a whine or grumble, will attempt to call a halt now. As to how long this must go on; there's neither clock nor calendar in the British Army today. Time is the least vital factor. Only the result counts - not the time consumed in achieving it.”<sup>50</sup>

Lloyd George delivered his first speech at the House of Commons on 19<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1916, when the German peace offer was still a hot issue. Lloyd George, in his two hours speech, touched upon many issues; food shortage, Irish problem, national military service, value of a small cabinet that he had formed, need for a labour minister, nationalizing shipping, mobilization of labour resources and war situation. He told the Parliament about the German offer and indicated that there could be no ‘half-peace’ by saying that;

“I warn the nation to watch men who think there is half-way house. These are the men who think the war can be ended now by some sort of peace – the setting up of a League of Nations with conditions as to arbitration for disputes and provisions for disarmament, and with a covenant on the part of all nations to sign a treaty along these lines. That is the right policy after victory. Without victory it would be a farce. Who would sign such a treaty? I presume, among others, the people who have so far successfully broken the last. Who would enforce the new treaty? I presume the nations that have so far not quite succeeded in enforcing the last. To end the war entered upon and to enforce a treaty without reparation for infringement of that treaty merely by entering to a more sweeping treaty would, indeed, be a farce in the setting of a tragedy.”<sup>51</sup>

Lloyd George further explained approaches that actions would be taken, giving particular emphasis to Greece and Venizelos, by saying that;

“We are doing our best to make it impossible that disaster should lead to worse. That is why we have taken within the last few days, very strong action in Greece. We mean to take no risks there. We decided to take definite and decisive action, and I think it has succeeded. We have decided also to recognize the agents of that great Greek statesman, M. Venizelos”<sup>52</sup>

It is interesting to note that in Lloyd George's speech at the Parliament, there was much emphasis on Germany and Prussian militarism but no mention of the Ottoman Empire, although in the ‘Notes’ delivered to President Wilson, indicated strong wording for the Turks.

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<sup>50</sup> Lloyd George, “No Interference from Neutrals”, *The Current History (New York)*, 5:2 (1916, Nov.)

<sup>51</sup> “Lloyd George's Historic Speech”, *The Current History (New York)*, 5:5 (1917 Jan.), p. 592-600

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*

Pessimism of Allies, when Lloyd George became the Prime Minister in December 1916, was apparent, and as the time dragged the pessimism was felt even more, since failure to achieve victory then barely existed. Lloyd George in his first speech as a Prime Minister commented that;

“I am not going to paint a gloomy picture, (if I did it would not be a correct picture)...what is the urgent task in front of the Government? To complete and even more effective the mobilization of all our national resources, a mobilization which has been going on since the commencement of the war, so as to enable the nation to bear the strain, however prolonged, and to march through to victory, however lengthy and however exhausting may be the task. It is a gigantic task, and let me give this word of warning - if there be any who have given their confidence to the new Administration in expectation of a speedy victory, they will be doomed to disappointment.”<sup>53</sup>

Lloyd George, in time, grew to be more pessimistic; Russia, who contributed seven million men to the war, was in a poor shape and 1917 was going to be even worse from the Allied point of view. Allies ceased to expect great effort from her, and when socialist revolution broke out in October 1917 and the Russian Empire began to disintegrate, Allies started to feel even worse and feared that the revolution was going to strike their own country. Therefore, throughout 1917, the Allies expected not much from the Russians in the war against the Central Powers and even later on, when Bolsheviks revealed the secret Agreements as a proof of imperialistic nature of Allies, not only they felt humiliated but also started to regard the Russians as a threat for themselves. Italy was experiencing political instability and also because of lack of discipline in the army, she was not in a state to initiate offensive measures against the Central Powers. France was not in a better position, victory as was expected from Nivelle offensive in early 1917, with the full political backing of Lloyd George, on the expense of British Generals, proved to be a failure; Britain started considering that the French army was no longer a force that could be fully relied upon.<sup>54</sup> Pessimism was also growing in Britain, because of its reliance on imported food. Shortage of food in Britain was becoming a serious problem as a result of sinking of British merchant ships by German boats, and there was still resentment for full conscription and labour unrest constituted a serious problem in days to come in 1917. Lloyd George's British Government had the full support of the Dominions, but, as the Canadian Prime Minister, Borden, commented in the Imperial War Cabinet, they started inquiring whether they were fighting for annexation of

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<sup>53</sup> “Lloyd George's Historic Speech’, *The Current History* (New York), 5:5 (1917 Jan.) pg 592-600

<sup>54</sup> Broc Millman in “A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.36, No.2 (Apr.,2001),241-270

territories for the Allies<sup>55</sup>. In the discussion of the report by Lord Milner's Committee on terms of peace and the report of Curzon's Committee also on Territorial Desiderata in the terms of peace, Sir Robert Borden stated that "*...it would be necessary to keep in mind the relation between the large annexations we considered essential for our security and the proposals for permanent peace and a reduction of armaments which we might wish to bring forward*"<sup>56</sup> and raised the question whether the Dominion soldiers were going to be killed for the sake of Allies' annexation of territories. The attitude of the Dominion was also reflected in the Secretary of State for Colonies; Lord Long's, report that Dominion's did not want any peace negotiations to be started before consulting them and also to overcome the imperialistic nature of the Allies, demanded that, after the war, all the German colonies be returned back to Germany<sup>57</sup>. The situation not only in Europe but also throughout in the Colonies was alarming and, Lord Robert Cecil, the Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs warned that;

"the situation in the countries allied to us was, in my opinion, disquieting, more particularly in the case of Russia where the socialists were getting the upper hand, and that was not reassuring in France, Greece or Italy. He therefore deprecated publishing full information as it might easily lead to panic and dangerous weakening of determination in those countries to continue the war"<sup>58</sup>

He further suggested that the information related to the number of British ships sunk by German submarines should not be made public. Although Lloyd George was weary and considerate because of the conditions the Allies were in, his address to public reflected a harsh line that Britain was after a "Knock-Out Victory", but in his speeches, between lines, he referred to peace provided that the enemy made concessions. In his speech, in Glasgow on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1917, he noted "*No German statesman has ever said they would restore the independence of Belgium*"<sup>59</sup> and also on 4<sup>th</sup> of August, "*The Kaiser had not yet learned the alphabet of peace. The first letter in that alphabet is restoration. Then we will talk*"<sup>60</sup>. Lloyd George, in his speech on the same day, delivered on the occasion of the inauguration of the work of the National War Aims Committee on the third anniversary of the entry of Great Britain into the war, told the audience that they were fighting for the defeat of the

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<sup>55</sup> PRO, CAB 23/42, in a Joint Meeting of War Cabinet and Imperial War Cabinet held in London on 13<sup>th</sup> Aug., 1918, Balfour presented British War Aims and gave a general survey on the obligations of Britain to France and Italy. Canadian Prime Minister Sir Robert Borden stated that Canadian people were not willing to fight for the mere sake of extending territories of the Empire.

<sup>56</sup> PRO, CAB 23/40, 13<sup>th</sup> Imperial War Cabinet Meeting, 1<sup>st</sup> May 1917,

<sup>57</sup> PRO, CAB 24/27, Memorandum by Long, 29<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1917,

<sup>58</sup> PRO, CAB 23/2, War Cabinet Meeting No: 128, 1<sup>st</sup> May 1917.

<sup>59</sup> David R. Woodward, "David Lloyd George, a Negotiated Peace with Germany and the Kuhlman Peace Kite of September, 1917", *Canadian Journal of History/Annales Canadiennes d'histoire*, 6:1 (March 1971)

<sup>60</sup> "The Times, 6<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1917, p. 4

most dangerous conspiracy ever plotted against the liberty of nations by making reference to Germany, but with no mention of Ottoman Empire. Russian defeat at Galicia and retreat of the Russian army made a sound effect on the Allies in July 1917, but American decision to enter the war was a moral backing for the Allies and especially to Lloyd George. He welcomed the entrance of Americans as a "*final stamp and seal to the struggle against the military autocracy throughout the world.*"<sup>61</sup> He treated the contribution of Americans as a great struggle for liberty, but he failed to mention; from whom and for what benefit. War Aims of Lloyd George, as was stated in the 1<sup>st</sup> Imperial War Cabinet Meeting on 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1917, were;

(i) Germans should be driven out of the territories which they had invaded, such as France, Belgium, Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro. The freedom and independence of these countries must be restored. Poland should be also made independent. Compensation should be paid to those countries for the damages and peace should prevail in Europe. Geographical adjustment of the map of Europe, on the basis of recognizing national rights should be made so that peace for future to be maintained.

(ii) European democratization of Europe should be achieved by ending military autocracy.

(iii) 'For disruption of the Turkish Empire '

Lloyd George further stated that;

"The Turks have been ruling, or rather misruling, the most fertile and the most favoured lands in the world. They have not ruled successfully any of the lands they have taken over, and I am not sure that they are not the only race in the world whom that can be said. They are ruling lands which were the cradle of civilization, the seminary of civilization, the temple of civilization, and from the material point of view, lands which at one time were the granary of civilization; and now those fair lands are a blighted desert, although once upon a time they were the richest in the world. The Mesopotamian expedition and its history is in itself the greatest reflection upon Turkish misgovernment. It proceeded through lands which were at one time about the richest under the sun and they were so swept at everything by hundreds of years of Turkish misrule that India had to supply practically everything for the expedition. They could only proceed slowly, after making railways and getting transport facilities for carrying everything there; and yet this was a country that at one time maintained countless millions of people, and even countless armies. Now the history of Mesopotamia expedition is the condemnation of Turkish misrule in that quarter of the world. The same applies to Syria, the same applies to Palestine, the same applies to Armenia- it applies to all those famed lands. Well the Turk must never be allowed to misgovern these great lands in future. We owe it to these lands, for the gifts which they have enriched mankind, that we shall do something, to restore their glory. There have been many expeditions from Christendom, in that part of the world to wrest them from the grip of the Turk. I believe this is the last, because it is the one which is going to be successful, and completely successful. It is impossible that these lands should any longer remain under Turkish Government. They have been a constant source of irritation, and friction, and war. There has been no one cause which has been so fruitful of bloodshed as the misgovernment of the

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<sup>61</sup> "The Times, 13<sup>th</sup> April 1917, p. 7.

Turkish Empire. I am not sure that even this war had not something to do with German ambition in the East.”<sup>62</sup>

Lloyd George continued blaming the Ottoman Empire as the real cause of the war underlining if it was not for the Ottoman Empire and her policy in the Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine, there would not be a war;

“In fact, as the Indian Secretary was pointing to us yesterday, there is a good deal to be said for the point of view that this was one of the main motives which inspired Germany in plunging the world into this chaos of blood. She had made up her mind to open up the road to the East, and probably to establish her dominion in the East.”<sup>63</sup>

Lloyd George saw the Ottoman Empire as a threat to mankind and the only solution was to knock and destroy the Empire, so he further continued as;

“Well, we are blocking that road and the abolition of the Turkish Empire will to a very large extent settle the European mind, and it will give the energies of these great nations to operate on which will be beneficent to mankind as a whole. It will be a great achievement to restore these lands to the great glory they enjoyed in the past and to enable them once more to make their contributions to the happiness and prosperity of the world”<sup>64</sup>

Lloyd George, in his speech delivered to the Imperial War Cabinet, pointed out War Aim no doubt was going to lead to a reconstruction of their countries in many respects, such as economical and industrial. Lloyd George saw the war as a means to establish better conditions for the mankind, and a greater solidarity of aim and action of the British Empire.<sup>65</sup> Lloyd George was not alone in thinking of abolition of the Ottoman Empire, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Balfour, not only shared his views but also was able to draw a map for the Ottoman Empire after the War. Balfour, in his report to the members of Imperial War Cabinet on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1917, commented that;

“The practical destruction of the Turkish Empire is undoubtedly one of the objects which we desire to attain. The Turks may well be left - I hope they will be left – in a more or less independent position in Asia Minor. If we are successful, unquestionably Turkey will be deprived of all that in the larger sense may be called Arabia; she will be deprived of the most important portions of the Valleys of Euphrates and the Tigris; she will lose Constantinople; and Syria, Armenia, and the southern parts of Asia Minor will, if not annexed by the Entente Powers, probably will more or less under their dominations”<sup>66</sup>

Therefore he showed his intention of believing the philosophy behind the Agreements of London and Constantinople which were signed by France, Russia and Italy. Balfour in his speech drew the attention of members to diplomatic relations

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<sup>62</sup> PRO, CAB 23/43, Procès Verbal of the First Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, 20<sup>th</sup> March 1917.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid. Procès Verbal of the Second Meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet, 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1917.

between the Allies and the Central Powers rather than the military conditions. He enquired whether the terms of peace was going to prolong the war, due to the commitments to France, Russia and Italy. It was also stressed that the War brought some ambitions for Germany in the Middle East, and therefore danger for the British Empire. According to Austen Chamberlain, Germany was after consolidating German influence in the Middle East as the source through which they could draw all the raw materials that they needed, and with the establishment of railways, they could easily menace British interests in the Suez Canal, India and the direct communication between Britain with Australasia. Therefore for British interests the linkage between Germany and the Middle East should be broken, and this required the involvement of the Ottoman Empire, and the Constantinople issue. According to the members of the Imperial War Cabinet, the consideration of the Ottoman Empire also brought the debate for the position of the Sultan, since he was the head of a religion and at the same time of the Empire. Britain proclaimed, at the start of the War, to attract Arabs to their own cause, Britain had nothing to do with the Sultan's religious position as the Caliph of the Muslim world which was the question that Muslims should decide. However, it seemed as British started wondering about the situation if the Sultan remained as the Caliph and was no longer the friend and ally of Britain, therefore not a 'humble servant' and not looking at Britain for protection. It would create an additional danger to the British position in the Middle East. According to Austen Chamberlain, turning Turks out of Constantinople, as promised to Russians, was for the interest of Britain, as the Ottomans had become a tool of German ambitions. It was also mentioned that if Russia did not want to take Constantinople and Dardanelles, as a socialist minister had proclaimed, in March 1917, there was a possibility in case Allies declared Ottomans were not to be compelled to give up Constantinople that she might be prepared to break away from Germans. The issue of Constantinople was going to be a problem that Britain had to tackle after the Turkish armistice. Regardless to the plans of the Allies to slice the Ottoman Empire and take a share for themselves, Lloyd George was claiming that they were in War because of well being of mankind. Lloyd George sent a message in 28<sup>th</sup> of December 1917, to 'The Special Conference of the British Labour Movement', making a reference to his speech at Glasgow in June 1917; "*The purpose for which the Allies are continuing the war, are not imperialistic or vindictive, but their achievement is essential to the future freedom and peace of mankind.*"<sup>67</sup> The Glasgow speech was rather important, from the perspective of delivering

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<sup>67</sup> "The Times" 29<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1917, P. 7

messages to the public not only in Britain, but in the countries of the Central Powers, Allies and neutral countries. It was very important, therefore, that these statements should represent the considered policy of the British Government, according to the War Cabinet. Lloyd George's speech in Glasgow was discussed and it was agreed by the War Cabinet that, the speech should refer to the points of;

*"In regard to the Russian formula of peace with no annexations and indemnities, it would be pointed out that Mesopotamia had never been Turkish; that its ultimate disposal would, therefore, be left to the Peace Conference; but that it could never be returned to Turkey, since that country had never been more than a trustee for its well being, and had grossly abused the trust. The same applied to Armenia"*<sup>68</sup>

The War Cabinet decided that no allusion should be made to Palestine, as this country was not under British occupation. It was pointed out in the Meeting that the wording of Lloyd George's speech should be carefully guarded, in order not to compromise the prospects of France in Alsace and Lorraine, since it was possible that a plebiscite of the actual population might give a German majority owing to the fact that the Germans had settled large numbers of their nationals in these provinces. The British official stand for the well being of humanity was taking different stands in accordance with the circumstances, so that German Colonies in Africa, plebiscite was a solution for the decision making, whereas in Alsace and Lorraine, it was not.

While Lloyd George was talking about peace of mankind in London, M. Pichon, the French Foreign Minister, was declaring in the Chamber of Deputies in Paris that the Allies would certainly not be drawn into peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk. He further stated that victory remained the foremost war aim of the Allies.

The entrance of America came as a token to Allies, especially after the withdrawal of the Russians, declaring that 'it was a war of imperialism', not that only financial requirements of the Allies was going to be met, but also it was a spiritual boost for them. Lloyd George, in an address at London, on 14<sup>th</sup> of December, stated that if the Russian democracy decided to abandon the struggle against military autocracy, American democracy was taking it up, and was declaring that there was not more powerful country in the world than the United States. Lloyd George, with this spirit, claimed that any overtures to Germany for peace before victory would be a betrayal, so Lloyd George was once more on the road for a 'total victory'<sup>69</sup>. Although Lloyd

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<sup>68</sup> PRO, CAB 23/3, Minutes of War Cabinet Meeting No: 171, 27<sup>th</sup> of June 1917.

<sup>69</sup> "Lloyd George on War Aims", *The Current History* (New York), 7:2:1 (Jan. 1918).

George was trying to give the impression that the present condition was 'Knock-out blow' to the Central Powers, although only few months ago, he was almost in agreement for a peace settlement with Germans.

Lloyd George had a positive approach, so as he claimed, at the beginning of 1918. In his speech in the Congress of Trade Union on 5<sup>th</sup> of January, he specified that he was not voicing the Government but Nation and the Empire as a whole. He further emphasized that he wanted the world to know the war aims and what he was expecting from peace. He portrayed an optimist approach that Britain was not in war for imperialistic ego but to make the world a better place to live in. Lloyd George's aim for Ottoman Empire after the war was not to 'finish' the Empire, as; "*...Nor are we fighting to destroy Austria-Hungary or to deprive Turkey of its capital, or of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace, which are predominantly Turkish in race.*"<sup>70</sup> Lloyd George further told about of a new world where peoples would decide for their future, therefore the peoples of the Ottoman Empire would be entitled to recognition of their separate national conditions. Accordingly, Lloyd George believed that the people in Arabia, Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine should be free from the Ottoman Empire. According to Lloyd George, it was essential that the passage between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea be internationalized and neutralized. His speech resembled the 'Fourteen Points' of President Wilson. The speech was going to be assessed as a move to prove that he was standing stronger behind the Labour Party than he had done for some time.<sup>71</sup>

Doubts and worries started building up in the War Cabinet meetings, as the War entered into its fourth year without a decisive victory in the Western front. On 14<sup>th</sup> of August 1918, General Smuts, being very close, and a true supporter of Lloyd George, came out openly in the War Cabinet meeting to question whether War Aims of Britain had been too ambitious. He was predicting that nothing would happen materially to affect the *status quo* in 1918 nor he had any expectation that the Allies would be able to force a decision in 1919 on the Western front. Smuts feared that Germany would concentrate a considerable effort, mainly carried out by Turkish troops, in the East, and if it was not possible to reach a decisive victory, he predicted that 1920 would be a disastrous year. Smuts believed that if war dragged on, Germany was bound to loose, but then he questioned whether it was worthy, since before the war ended British Empire would be a second-class power, compared to

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<sup>70</sup> Grigg, p. 380-382

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, 383

both America and Japan. From pragmatic point of view, according to Smuts, the best policy would be to concentrate on the areas, where the enemy was weaker, such as Turkey, and if there was to be any peace offer, he believed that it should be taken up as a serious consideration<sup>72</sup>. General Smuts' views were not shared by Curzon about the situation in Western front and also on the point that they should revise their war aims. According to Curzon, Mesopotamia should not be given back to Turks. Curzon believed that Mesopotamia's development, as a part of the future Arab State could only be realized under the guidance of the British, who were the initiators of the Arab idea, and had already taken up the work in hand<sup>73</sup>. The war aims and expectations of British Empire were summarized by A. Chamberlain. Although Chamberlain agreed with Curzon, he believed that it might be necessary to revise some of the provisional undertakings given, meaning compromises at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. He was certain that the demand for the revision should come from their Allies and not from Britain, since France and Italy, soon, would recognize whether the situation would allow them to realize fully their war aims. Chamberlain thought that, it would be fatal for the future of Britain, in Europe, if they created the impression that Britain was trying to back out of her agreements at the expense of the Allies. Chamberlain believed that whatever happened, they should not surrender Mesopotamia or Palestine, because of the security of British Empire and of its Allies, and there he drew a similarity between the old Baghdad Railway schemes and loosing Mesopotamia, both contemplated the possibility of allowing a revival of threat to India<sup>74</sup>. Lloyd George expressed the conviction that an inter-Allied Conference on war aims would lead to each nation stick to its claims with a view to subsequent bargaining, so they should wait for the end of the war. Lloyd George believed that Germany should be beaten first before discussing the peace terms with her, consequently, the terms should be drawn as a penalty. For the German colonies in Africa, Lloyd George favoured America to take the responsibility for the mandate-ship<sup>75</sup>.

Late 1918, brought victory to the Allies, and therefore for Britain, and a new episode began in Europe to end Empires and squeeze the strongest military state, Germany. The next step would be to delineate the boundaries for the new states to fulfil the desires of the Allies. It was also a new era that was going to experience rivalry among 'friends'.

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<sup>72</sup> PRO, CAB 23/42, joint War Cabinet (458) and Imperial War Cabinet (31) Meeting, 14<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1918.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid, joint War Cabinet (459) and Imperial War Cabinet (32) Meeting, 15<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1918.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

### IV.3: Towards The Finalization of War

As 1918 was entered, because of the developments in the western theatre and lack of achieving a decisive victory against the central powers, pessimism started growing in Britain about the War, and even the chances for the fulfilment of war aims were at the table for discussion especially after the German Peace offer.<sup>76</sup> Lloyd George stated; “*Nevertheless, taking East and West as a whole, on balance the land campaign had gone unmistakably in favour of the Central Powers.*”<sup>77</sup> Lloyd George with his ‘Garden Suburb’ and inner circle of the War Cabinet, namely Balfour, Curzon and Lord Milner with L. Amery and M. Hankey fulfilling the secretarial work, initiated a new approach to the war strategy as was called ‘Lloyd George’ or ‘New Eastern’<sup>78</sup>. The idea was to win in the East against Turks rather than in the Western front against German and Austrian Forces. To initiate this strategy, Lloyd George had to convince the War Cabinet but most of all, the military authorities. Military, mainly Robertson, CIGS (Commander of Imperial General Staff) and Haig, Commander BEF (British Forces in Europe) were considered ‘Westerner’, who believed the war could be finalized with a successful victory in Europe against Germans. Therefore, Lloyd George, since he could not get rid of these generals, had to find other means, and that was the appointment of General Wilson, who was considered as a believer for the new strategy, in the newly founded Supreme war Council at Versailles.

Leopold Amery, working at the Prime Minister’s Secretariat was able to do the background work for the new strategy. Amery outlined the details of the new strategy as “*The offensive against Turkey should be carried out simultaneously both in Palestine and Mesopotamia theatres, and, as far as the circumstances may permit, in Armenia*”<sup>79</sup> He urged that the offensive against the Turks should be rapid, because of the urgency of getting in touch with Russians and for psychological and

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<sup>76</sup> See Chapter III.3

<sup>77</sup> Lloyd George, “War Memoirs of David Lloyd George 1917-1918”, p.8, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1933)

<sup>78</sup> These are the Broc Millman’s description. Millman argues that the new concept of ‘New Eastern’ differs from 1915 Eastern Policy, such that, in 1915 they had been impatient for victory, but with this new approach, Lloyd George and his friends “almost despaired of Britain’s survival as a great power.....It was an entirely different war, though fought over much the same ground” (Broc Millman in “A Counsel of Despair: British Strategy and War Aims, 1917-18, *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol.36, No.2 (Apr.,2001), p. 241-270)

<sup>78</sup> PRO, CAB 23/40, 13<sup>th</sup> Imperial War Cabinet Meeting, 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1917.

<sup>79</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/2/1/11, Amery’s Memorandum of Versailles 4<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918, enclosed to a letter sent to Lloyd George on 12<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918.

military reasons. Amery suggested in his report to Lloyd George that military requirements for the offensive against Turks could be composed of the main armies of General Allenby and General Marshall in Palestine and Mesopotamia. He further suggested that the Arab Forces of King of Hejaz, the Druses, Maronites and other tribes who may rise against the Turks could also be employed to fight against them.<sup>80</sup> Amery was suggesting that the British policy should be based on using the people against the Ottoman Empire which was the 'Mother Country' to all these people, including Arabs and Armenians. According to Amery, the necessity of this offensive was to prevent Germany from dominating Russia and Turkey in a political, economical or military sense and therefore setting objectives of a new federal anti-German-Russia, with the help of anti Bolshevik forces. In order to liberate Armenian and Arab regions of the present Ottoman Empire from the Turkish control, Turkey should be forced into a peace.<sup>81</sup> The planning was done with the aim of ending the Ottoman Empire.<sup>82</sup> It seems from Amery's letters to Lloyd George that all the preparations were carried out and the obstacles were cleared, as "*Smuts who is quite convinced of the soundness of the idea of moving the campaign against the Turks and agrees to requesting in the War Cabinet...With Wilson at Versailles and the East delegated to Smuts, I don't think the old gang can give too much trouble.*"<sup>83</sup> Both Amery's and Wilson's work were fruitful, and military advisers to the Supreme Council agreed on the proposal of Britain to attack Ottoman Empire with the 'New Eastern' strategy on 27<sup>th</sup> of January 1918. The paper presented by military advisors, marked a new era for the War and also for the Ottoman Empire<sup>84</sup>. Amery welcomed the decision of military advisors with joy and he felt if he was the captain of a ship reaching a safe port<sup>85</sup>. Lloyd George was going to explain the new strategy later, in the War Cabinet Meeting on 1<sup>st</sup> May 1918, that "*...for the present our policy on the Western Front should be defensive, and that in the meantime we should use our surplus strength to clear up the situation elsewhere- in Syria for example- and eliminate first Turkey, then Bulgaria, and finally perhaps, even Austria from the war.*"<sup>86</sup> General Smuts, a true supporter of the 'New Eastern' policy, commented that, they should concentrate in the Eastern theatre to strike a decisive victory since

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<sup>80</sup> Ibid.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/2/1/12, 'note' enclosed to the letter to Lloyd George by Amery, 14<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918.

<sup>83</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/2/1/11, letter written by Amery to Lloyd George, 12<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918.

<sup>84</sup> Please see L.S. Amery, *My Political Life, Vol. 2: War and Peace; 1914-1918*, (London: Hutchinson, Stratford Place, 1953), p. 136-138 and also, Lloyd George, *War Memoirs ... 1917-1918*, p. 3-11 and p. 251-260.

<sup>85</sup> Amery, p. 137-138 and PRO, CAB 23/42, Joint War Cabinet (458) and Imperial War Cabinet (31) Meeting, 14<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1918

<sup>86</sup> PRO, CAB 23/13, War Cabinet Meeting , 128A, 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1918,

it seemed quite difficult to 'win' the war in the Western front, so that after eliminating Turks, Germany was bound to accept the peace terms as she would be left alone.

Amery was also working for the plans to secure Persia and Caucasian area for the British interests, since this area was indispensable for strategic and economical reasons and also for military purposes; so, everything had to be done to prevent the Pan-Turanian program. Amery suggested influencing Caucasian Turks to join Persia since they were both Shiite and if that was not successful, then Britain could propose an independent Moslem state for them, but anyhow the Ottoman Empire should be prevented to have access to Turkistan to implement Turanism. This way they could secure the oil reserves and Persia for the future needs of Britain.<sup>87</sup> Amery also suggested using Armenians against the Ottoman Empire for the defence of the Eastern Trans-Caucasian and Persia<sup>88</sup>. It appears that Britain had the ways and means to control and use Armenians against the Ottoman Empire even to defend Persia for British interests and also to use religion in any way possible to reach her desires. Amery worked very close to Lloyd George and saw himself as one of the gang in bringing about the Lloyd George Government and also in keeping its members in close touch with each other. Once Lloyd George told him that he was a land-grabbing imperialist, but this was the policy of the people surrounding Lloyd George, not only in theory but also in a pragmatic way. Amery was able to write personal letters to Lloyd George to influence him in his appointments and general policy making.

After the Turkish Armistice, Amery suggested in his letter to Lloyd George that; Turkey should be confined to the ethnographically Turkish territory in Europe and Anatolia and the question of the respective spheres of influence or protection in the liberated regions of Ottoman Empire should be left to mutual arrangement between the Allied Powers concerned<sup>89</sup>. Contrary to this approach, Amery once had suggested that Caucasian Turks should be encouraged to separate themselves from Ottoman Empire and if possible, join Persia who was under the protection of Britain. For Amery the interests of Britain had the priority and he had no intention of deviating from his principles, such that he suggested to Lloyd George that it would be wrong of Britain to give a concession in Palestine, simply to avoid being criticized that British territory was increased by war. According to Amery the real solution was

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<sup>87</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/2/1/16, letter written by Amery to Lloyd George, 15<sup>th</sup> of March 1918.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/2/1/31, letter from Amery to Lloyd George, 19<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

not to agree for a settlement which excluded Britain, with the fear of offending American public opinion, but to educate them, and he further suggested that such an education could be carried out by the Jews<sup>90</sup>.

Another personality within the close circle of Lloyd George was Lord Curzon. He was the Lord President of the Council and Chairman of the Eastern Committee, and was asked to prepare a memorandum on Eastern affairs for the War Cabinet. The discussion of the report of the Committee took place in the meeting of Imperial War Cabinet on 25<sup>th</sup> of June 1918. Britain, by that time, had already captured Jerusalem and Baghdad and was moving towards the north along the rivers Euphrates and Tigris. Lord Curzon shared the views of Lloyd George and Balfour as far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, when they both, had explained the British Policy for the Middle East in the Cabinet in March 1917. According to Curzon;

“No doubt the fate of Mesopotamia will be determined, in common with other acquisitions by conquest, at the Peace Conference. But one thing I hope and believe we are all firmly resolved upon, and that is that these fair countries, with all these prospects of wealth in the future, shall never be handed back to the devastating dominion of Turkey. The alternative to the Turks is the Arab. The Turks, as you know, is an interloper, who has no affinity, racial or otherwise, with the people, and the disappearance of the Turk, which is already secured, opens up a future in which we may hope, if we have the strength to do it, to create something like a new Arab State, which will be under British guidance and control, in that part of the world”<sup>91</sup>

Then, Curzon explained how fertile and valuable the areas that Britain had captured from Turks were. Curzon stated that; *“That is the region which we have captured from the Turks. And I hope that, whatever becomes of it in the future, it will never be returned to them”*<sup>92</sup> In the Curzon’s report, the first conclusion was the safety of the British Empire and that should be preserved at any cost. Curzon pointed out that, if Germany, willingly or not, was forced as a result of military operations she could easily give back Belgium, to make large concessions in respect to Alsace-Lorraine. According to Curzon, Germany was in this war to destroy the British Empire and the first and the foremost of German objectives to destroy the British Empire was not merely the destruction of British forces in Europe, but it was by rendering the British position in the East, since Germany believed that the power of Great Britain was built upon her overseas strength since the core and centre of the British power in the Eastern world was the India. Therefore it was India that Germany was striking at and hence, Germany should be definitely prevented in the East. The second conclusion Curzon drew was that Britain could not afford to give back Palestine and

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> PRO, CAB 23/43, Shorthand Notes of the Twentieth Meeting of Imperial War Cabinet, 25<sup>th</sup> June 1918,

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

Mesopotamia, as he pointed out “*Whatever happens we must not hand back a weapon of so much power to the enemy*”<sup>93</sup>

The joint meeting of the War Cabinet and the Imperial War Cabinet, held on 13<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1918 was rather important because of decisions reached concerning the new territories and states being allocated. Balfour presented Foreign Office’s war-aims as it stood for that period of time. One of the problems that concerned the Allies was the Balkan question. He believed that since the Ottoman Empire had been expelled from the Balkans, the problem of relations between the Balkan States had kept Britain on the edge of war year after year, although he had complained the misgovernment of Ottoman Empire before. The relation between Bulgarians, Serbs, Romanians and Greeks were never in harmony, and each nation blaming the others for the atrocities committed. According to Balfour;

“Greeks, under Venizelos have behaved on the whole extremely well, and we owe a great debt to Venizelos, a debt which is very difficult to overestimate. But if you suggest to Venizelos, for example, that some of the territory, which the Bulgarians now occupy is really Bulgarian, and therefore in a settlement should be handed back to Bulgarians, or left to Bulgaria, he would say to you ‘You absolutely ruin me, and you ruin my party.’, that he would tell you, is absolute ruin to the cause of Venizelos, to the cause of Greek liberalism, and to the case of Greece remaining on the side of the Allies”<sup>94</sup>

Who Balfour described was the spoiled child of Europe, and after the War, during Peace Conference; such was the attitude of Venizelos and the behaviour of British diplomats to please him. Balfour, in the joint meeting drew the attention of the members to the Middle East. East Palestine and Mesopotamia issues needed to be solved. Palestine and Syria were bound to French, with the agreement of Sykes and Picot, which was still a valid diplomatic instrument, but according to Balfour, was historically an out of date agreement. Italy, although not interested in Eastern Mediterranean, was jealous of France, and therefore inclined to resist French to have any stake in that region, unless she also held something in equivalence. For Palestine, Balfour considered Britain as the natural candidate for the protectorate, but he preferred the Americans to have that responsibility, provided that “*It is quite certain that Palestine can never be restored, or ought never to be restored to Turkish rule*”<sup>95</sup>. Mesopotamia, Balfour believed that they had a responsibility for this area, and handing over that region was out of question, due to the security reasons and fertility of the land, and also there was the oil issue that they should consider.

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> PRO, CAB 23/43, shorthand notes of the Joint Meeting of War Cabinet and Imperial War Cabinet held in London, 13th Aug. 1918.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid.

Balfour explained the importance of oil and the condition of British Empire with respect to this resource;

“In addition to the oil regions we already lease from Persia, apparently in Mesopotamia there is a geological extension of that field which makes it almost the most important oil field in the world- so it is alleged. Oil for us is becoming a vital national necessity, if only because of we are the great maritime Power. We do not produce oil for ourselves: in fact we can scarcely be said to be an oil-producing empire at all, and our main resources must be from this region, and how we are to deal with this situation when the Peace Conference comes round I am not very clear. With every desire not to acquire more territory than we can help out of this war – in that I believe I differ from some of my colleagues; I am anxious to keep down the extension of the British Empire as much as possible – I am very reluctant to see anything done, which would endanger our obtaining oil from this region. I do not care under what system we keep the oil, whether it is by a perpetual lease or whatever it may be, but I am quite clear that it is all-important for us that this oil should be available.”<sup>96</sup>

It was also pointed out that, apart from richness of the oil fields, there was also the danger of losing Baku oil, and then they would had to be content with only Mesopotamia for the oil. Lloyd George believed that they had to move towards Mosul area before the war was over to make sure that they had the facilities to control all of the oil fields<sup>97</sup>. Lloyd George was anxious to determine the fate of the colonies which were of the Ottoman Empire and Germany and to delineate who was going to do what. General approach at the meeting on 13<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1918, Britain should not have any responsibility, unless it was vital for the Empire for security purposes. The question of returning colonies in Africa back to Germany was discussed and there, Lloyd George intervened by saying that

“What view would be taken of a proposition of this kind- supposing you start by saying that ‘Well you can not restore Palestine or Mesopotamia to Turkey-that would be restoring them to people who oppress them and who have devastated these territories’ The same thing applies to the colonies. If you restore these to Germany, Germany will abuse the opportunities, and therefore you can not restore colonies to the Germans. The next question would be: What will you do with them?- Well, they must be held by someone as trustees on behalf of the nations, and especially on behalf of the natives of those territories. International trusteeships always lead to trouble, exactly as our international trusteeship of Egypt lead to trouble.”<sup>98</sup>

Lloyd George also shared the views expressed by other members of the Cabinet, and preferred American responsibility of trusteeship of Palestine and some large colonies in Africa. It was clear that anything was permissible except having the Ottoman Empire back in the Middle–Eastern region again, and even Germany might be considered to have her colonies back in Africa. This was the view that shared by the members of the Cabinet since there was nobody against it. An obstacle for the plan was President Wilson himself, since his doctrine of Fourteen Points prohibited

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<sup>96</sup> Ibid.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid.

<sup>98</sup> Ibid.

any nation to gain any territories on the expense of the central powers, as he believed that “*Nobody has the right to get anything out of this war, because we are fighting for the peace, if we mean what we say, for permanent peace*”<sup>99</sup>. Paris Peace Conference was going to display how sincere was the President Wilson, at least, for the Ottoman case.

#### **IV. 4. Armistice**

British, French and Italian Government representatives met in Paris and had series of conferences between 5<sup>th</sup> and 9<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918 to discuss the latest developments in the War. During these conferences Lloyd George received the news that the Ottoman Empire was willing to have a separate peace with the Allies. The Conference approved the conditions for an armistice with the Ottoman Empire on the basis of proposals drawn up by British Admiralty and War Office representatives in London. The conditions set for the Armistice by British and fully endorsed by the Supreme Council was very severe, even harsher than German Armistice conditions as stated in the joint meeting of War Cabinet and Imperial War Cabinet, on 11<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1918 and even Article 10 of the draft Armistice Agreement as accepted by the Supreme War Council had given the right for, “*Occupation by Allied troops of important strategically points*”<sup>100</sup>. The existing rivalries between the Allies were more apparent towards the end of the War, and especially at the time when a possible Armistice was becoming a reality. Britain was complaining that the French Government was very anxious to have the full control of an attack to Constantinople and it was decided that; naval control of Straits and Constantinople should be handled by a British Admiral, because of absence of the French Admiral in the area and also taking into consideration of the facilities provided by Britain. Although Mediterranean region was under the command of the French Admiral, British believed that all the operations against Turks, with the exception of French involvement in the Gallipoli expedition in 1915, had been conducted by British naval and military force, therefore the command both on land and sea in any attack to Constantinople should be carried out by the British<sup>101</sup>. This issue was going to be a cause of an almost political crisis between France and Britain in days to come.

It appears that for the occasion of the armistice with the Ottoman Empire, both Britain and France were trying to show their strength for who was going to control

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<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> PRO, CAB 23/42, joint Meeting of War Cabinet (484) and Imperial War Cabinet (35), 11<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

Near East in the future. The Ottoman Empire's desire for an armistice and peace to follow came to the attention of the British Government much earlier in 1918. Especially after the fall of Baghdad, Turks tried to approach British Government through British representatives in Berne, Switzerland<sup>102</sup>. Balfour considered that nothing would be gained by discussing peace proposals with any people not fully accredited by the Ottoman Government, but the actual reason for not discussing peace at that moment was the military conditions since they were heading towards Mosul and Balfour believed that they had to take over Mesopotamia before the peace negotiations started. Balfour was criticized for not accepting those in Berne as representatives of the Ottoman Government, deterred the armistice. Lloyd George on the contrary to Balfour, believed that having to finalize a separate peace with the Ottoman Government would be beneficial, since Mesopotamia would cease to be on the table for discussions with Turks at the Peace Conference. According to Lloyd George after taking over Mesopotamia, the issue would be a topic for discussions among Allies but not with Turks. This approach, as Curzon pointed out, would be against the principles as laid down by Lloyd George himself, since it was promised that Mesopotamia would be discussed in the Peace Conference with Turks, but the Prime Minister did not see any contradiction in his approach although when it was offered, it was different, and as he pointed out; "*if peace were made with Turkey now, it would be ours, not Turkey's to dispose of.*"<sup>103</sup> Timing and promises were not the only issues that Lloyd George was deviating. Once at the War Cabinet he had suggested that Palestine could be handed over to American trusteeship, but when the President Wilson commented on self determination in Turkish and Bulgarian territories, Lloyd George told that he would change his mind about Palestine and if there was a possibility of Palestine going back to the Ottoman Empire, and he further commented that he would much prefer to take it for Britain. The attitude of Lloyd George and the War Cabinet was that, if any possibility existed for Turkey regaining the lands which belonged to her prior to the war, and then the principles laid down by Britain could be altered on the expense of Turkey. Another issue was the French complains that Britain should entertain Sykes-Picot Agreement according to which the territories captured from Turks and were in French sphere of influence. France believed that arrangements should be made for handing these territories over to France. Britain's attitude with regard to separate peace settlement with the Ottoman Empire instead of armistice, and hence securing Mesopotamia for British interests was likely to disturb the French, so it was decided

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<sup>102</sup> PRO, CAB 23/14, the Draft Minutes of War Cabinet 482A, 3<sup>rd</sup> of Oct. 1918

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

in the War Cabinet that, Lloyd George should take the case up with Clemenceau, the French Prime Minister, so that the French side was not offended. It was also decided that if the French side was not happy with a separate peace, then Lloyd George would give in and agree on armistice. Another issue was the involvement of Americans, still not in war with Turkey, since it was believed that certain missionary interests and Jewish influence were pressuring the President. It was discussed whether Americans should be asked to declare war on Turkey. If Turks were not in a position to surrender, but according to Lloyd George, in case that Turks accepted the threat extended to them by Americans, since they would be in need of American capital after the War, then it would cause for Americans to have a right in the peace negotiations, in which they were not really entitled to. Lloyd George believed that "... [He was] *in favour of preserving our [British] claim to have a predominant voice in the theatres where the position of the Allies was due to British arms.*"<sup>104</sup> Along with these views it was decided not to ask the Americans to declare war against Turks, in order to minimize their involvement in the Turkish affairs. During the Cabinet meeting, since the War was coming to an end and Turks were losing, Sykes-Picot agreement was brought up for discussion. British were trying to convince the French to accept modifications on the Agreement, since for Lloyd George it was quite inapplicable according to circumstances they were in. It was also considered that as a whole the Agreement was the most undesirable for the British, but very advantageous for French. According to Lloyd George; when the Agreement was signed, they had not considered that, British position in Turkey would involve a very large British army, and negligible Allied contribution. As it stood then, Lloyd George; believed that; "... *it would not be possible for the British to go on fighting the Turks simply because the French wanted Syria or Armenia or the Italians wanted Adalia*"<sup>105</sup> By these views, at the conclusion of the War, it was apparent that the Allies were going to care for their own interests rather than principles laid down or declared openly to public through agreements and treaties. It was no longer self determination or implementation of the welfare of the peoples as was announced as the War Aim of the Allies. As was reminded to Lloyd George in the War Cabinet meeting, it had been agreed among Allies that any territories that the Allies might acquire should be pooled and should not be regarded as the property of the victorious state, since each nation was fighting in different theatres, some difficult and some easier. On the draft armistice for Turkey prepared by Admiralty and War Office, the War Cabinet decided on 'Allied occupation of Dardanelles and

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<sup>104</sup> PRO, CAB 23/14, the Draft Minutes of War Cabinet 482A, 3<sup>rd</sup> Oct. 1918.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

Bosphorus forts' rather than 'British occupation of Constantinople and Dardanelles forts as was suggested by Military, therefore, omitting Constantinople for the time being, was agreed upon<sup>106</sup>. Hence, Britain had no intention of occupying Constantinople or any part of Ottoman Empire, at least in October 1918. Mesopotamia was not in the agenda of Britain then. As was reported by Balfour, Venizelos as early as October 1918 was considering participating on issues on the Ottoman Empire actively on the side of the 'winners'. In his visit to Balfour, he told that although he agreed with the Allies that Greece would not be allowed to participate in the occupation forces in entering Bulgaria after the armistice, but currently, if the armistice was concluded with the Ottoman Empire, Greece would like to participate in the occupation 'to take her share'. Since Italy was also interested in Anatolia and over the rumours that Greek troops were to be employed to occupy Smyrna, she protested and told that it would be a violation to her war aims. Balfour told the Italian Charge d'Affaires that there was "*no immediate likelihood that of Smyrna being occupied by the Greeks, the Italian's or any other troops.*"<sup>107</sup> Britain was going to break this promise in six months time in Paris, during the Peace negotiations in a meeting in which Italy was absent.

President Wilson, evaluating the Armistice terms which were prepared by the military and naval officers, thought that they ought to be viewed with a spirit that undue humiliation would be inexcusable.<sup>108</sup> America's intervention in Bulgaria and Turkey was resented by the French. According to Lord Derby, British Ambassador in Paris, Clemenceau with a telegram to Wilson, protested the intervention by pointing out that America was not in war with Bulgaria and Turkey, therefore she had no right and was not in a position to dictate the peace terms to those who had earned the right on the field<sup>109</sup>. Italian Foreign Minister, Sonnino, also considered Wilson's remarks and his 'Fourteen Point' as 'subject to principles of security'. Lloyd George, along with French was inclined to agree with 'Fourteen Points' in so far as Germany was concerned, meaning that for Ottomans, Wilson's principles was not to be applicable<sup>110</sup>. This was just the opposite to the views of the Ottomans with regard to the armistice, since they considered that self determination would be applicable for them too, as laid down in Wilson's 'Fourteen Points'.

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> PRO, CAB 23/8, War Cabinet Meeting, 486, 15<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918, Italian Charge d'Affaires' visit to Balfour was reported in a letter sent by Balfour to Sir R. Rodd on 14<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918 (PRO, FO 406/40). Venizelos' visit to Balfour was also reported in a letter sent by Balfour to Eary Granville on 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1918 (PRO, FO 406/40).

<sup>108</sup> PRO, CAB 23/8, War Cabinet Meeting, 486, 15<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>109</sup> PRO, CAB 23/14, War Cabinet Meeting, 482A, 3<sup>rd</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>110</sup> PRO, CAB 23/42, Imperial War Cabinet, 45, 23<sup>rd</sup> of Dec. 1918.

Towards to the Armistice with the Ottoman Empire, Britain was busy moving north in the Mesopotamia in two directions, Kirkuk and along Tigris to Mosul. One day prior to the Armistice, British army was still 16 kilometres north of Aleppo and found it very difficult to move further due to the logistic problems. General Allenby suggested using Alexandretta as a base, but because of French desiderata to any landing, some problems were probable. Curzon was expecting serious trouble to arise in regard to French aspirations in Syria. According to Curzon, Syria, most probably, was going to cause great anxiety to Britain, and although they had conquered the country, but due to French desires they were torn between French and Arabs there.<sup>111</sup> Such was the relations among the 'winners', at one side there were the agreements and treaties, on the other hand, the national interests. Britain was complaining and regretting that a bound, where Syria belonged to French sphere and Italians, because of 1915 and 1917 agreements, had her desires in Balkans and in Anatolia were still valid. As the Armistice was signed, Greece also came to the arena requesting that her wishes to be satisfied.

Britain received the desires of the Ottoman Empire for an armistice during the War Cabinet Meeting on 21<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1918. The message was sent from British Admiral in north Aegean, which was conveyed by General Townsend, who was a prisoner of war after being captured in Kut-el-Amara by Turkish forces. The general conditions for the armistice were; Turkey desired above all things to be friendly to Britain, Turkey was ready to give full autonomy to the occupied territory under the sovereignty of Ottoman Sultan and wished that Britain would give financial aid to Turkey. The impact of the Ottoman armistice proposals in the War Cabinet meeting came from Balfour that Turkey was bluffing and they would be content with the retention of Constantinople and that if they would secure Turkey as an independent state<sup>112</sup>. According to Lloyd George, if the Turkish proposal was a serious one then action should be taken and this action should be taken by British and not by French. He recalled that in the Paris meeting the counter proposals were already delineated and in Paris, French had shown that they were most anxious to carry the negotiations by themselves through a French Admiral. Bonar Law, by considering that the conditions set up in Paris were very stiff, and therefore could be eased, since the new Ottoman Government was very friendly towards them. Curzon, rejecting the proposal made by Law, since Ottoman was very weak, stated that, they

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<sup>111</sup> PRO, CAB 23/8, War Cabinet Meeting, 492, 29<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>112</sup> PRO, CAB 23/14, War Cabinet Meeting, 489A, 21<sup>st</sup> Oct. 1918.

should proceed with the terms accepted in Paris, with no compromises to Turkey. Lloyd George, proposed to ask the British Admiral to conduct the negotiations on the basis of decision reached in Paris, but he would be free to bend the conditions, provided that he obtained free passage for the ships through Straits, to the Black Sea. Another condition for the Armistice, as suggested by Chamberlain, should be to secure Aleppo and Mosul for Britain. After discussing the peace initiative as requested by the Turkish side, the War Cabinet decided to send a message to the British Commander-in-Chief in Mediterranean and to instruct him that British Government would be prepared to consider, in due course, the terms of peace which could not be arranged without consulting her Allies and this would take time, therefore for the time being Britain was suggesting to discuss the conditions for an armistice, which should be finalized as soon as possible. The Cabinet also decided to send the conditions for the armistice the following day<sup>113</sup>. The approach from Turkish side that Peace terms should be discussed, rather than armistice, was not entertained by Britain, and although as General Townsend mentioned in his message to the British Government, the new Grand Vizier Izzet Pasha described himself as a 'friend and admirer of England'. The plea of the Grand Vizier did not get any reciprocity.

In the War Cabinet Meeting, held on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1918, Balfour informed the Cabinet that Clemenceau was objecting to a British Admiral commanding the fleet which it was intended to send to Constantinople, since at the beginning of the War, Naval Command of the Mediterranean was entrusted to French Admiral, and he was suggesting that the command and therefore armistice negotiations should be carried by the French Admiral.<sup>114</sup> The Cabinet decided to order the Admiral Calthorpe that, he should conduct the negotiations with the Turkish side and inform the French Admiral about the developments, and he should keep the Paris version of 'conditions' as much as possible, provided that the free passage through Straits were secured<sup>115</sup>. Admiral Calthorpe was to be instructed by Lloyd George that he should not hand over the control of negotiations to the French Admiral. France was going to protest Britain and insist on conducting the negotiations and command of naval operations in Constantinople<sup>116</sup>. The desire of France was rejected and the War Cabinet decided to follow their original policy and instructed the Secretary of State for War to inform the French Government that the British Government insisted

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid

<sup>114</sup> Ibid. War Cabinet Meeting, 489B, 22<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid. War Cabinet Meeting, 490A, 24<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

on Vice-Admiral Calthrope being in Command of the Allied Naval Forces in the event of any naval operations taking place in the Dardanelles<sup>117</sup>. Balfour brought the question of conditions of the armistice with Turkey to the attention of War Cabinet and drew an analogy with the Bulgarian armistice. He discussed that when Bulgaria accepted the terms for an armistice, she knew and was certain that she was going to keep her territory, but for Turkey, the condition was different and now if Turkey was assured on two points that Allied Forces would leave her as an independent monarchy in Asia and that Constantinople would not be taken away from her, then armistice negotiations would be done in a more speedy manner. He further discussed that if Turkey were asked, by the Allies, to give up the Straits and Constantinople, she naturally would want an assurance that all was not going to be taken away from her, and such an assurance would also help in the negotiations<sup>118</sup>. While Britain was preparing the conditions for the armistice in Mudros, Turkey approached Britain to enter negotiations at Berne, Switzerland, but was rejected by Balfour on the ground that at Berne, the meeting would have a political nature, but at Mudros, any arrangement reached between parties it would signify a military arrangement. In the Cabinet, Balfour's suggestion of assuring Turkey on these two points were discussed and it was decided that, although America and Italy would not object the assurances to be given to Turkey, but France would decline to accept, since she had her plans for Constantinople, and therefore should be consulted with her before a decision could be reached<sup>119</sup>. The Cabinet also decided to inform General Allenby that armistice negotiations were to be carried with Turkey, and therefore he should proceed promptly to occupy Aleppo and press towards Mosul.

Britain's self determination to deal with the Ottomans angered France and the sentiments were relayed to the British Government through British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Derby. Clemenceau protested against the action of the British Government in entrusting the conclusion of an armistice to the British Admiral at Mudros, but he agreed that as long as the free passage through Straits was secured by occupying the forts in Dardanelles and Bosphorus, they should not to trouble themselves with other conditions, and Clemenceau demanded that occupation should be a joint British and French occupation. Lloyd George agreed with the request and he proposed to add Italians in the occupation<sup>120</sup>. Although France agreed on the British proposal that the important clause in the Armistice would be

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<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid, War Cabinet Meeting, 491A, 25<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

the free passage through Straits, and therefore other conditions agreed in Paris could be waived at the discretion of Admiral Carlthorpe, Curzon was not happy with the decision. According to Curzon the establishment and maintenance of peace in East depended on Britain, and Turkey with reduced conditions in the Armistice would be able to hold a strong military power and therefore, Britain, probably not being able to occupy Mosul, Alexandretta and perhaps not even Aleppo, would not be in a position to hold Mesopotamia and meet the promises she extended to King Hussein. With these conditions Turks could be expected to hold her armies in Batoum, Baku and in northern Persia and would constantly dispute the Allies for their desiderata. Lloyd George, although, from the Eastern point of view, agreed with Curzon, but since that was the proposal submitted to France and her concurrence had been received, there was no way for Britain to change her mind at that stage<sup>121</sup>. Curzon was going to insist on his views in the next War Cabinet Meeting held the following day that at the Armistice negotiations they should follow the conditions as set forth in Paris and also include the Armenian protection as a condition<sup>122</sup>. Lloyd George noted that they would be free to do as they wished for the Armenians when they are in Constantinople and further pointed out that if Admiral Calthrope reached Constantinople, nothing else really mattered. Curzon insisted that as they enter Constantinople, Turks "*would at once show the greatest joy and would want us to make an alliance, and would resist the terms we wished to impose*"<sup>123</sup> With the insistence of Lloyd George, in order not to start negotiations with Italians and French on the terms for Armistice, the War Cabinet decided to keep the instructions as they were and not to send new terms to Calthrope.

In the War Cabinet, the latest 'note', sent by Wilson, in which the Allies should consider in entering into an armistice with Germany, was also discussed. Accepting the terms put down by Wilson could cause problems during the peace negotiations, since Germany would be relying on the 'Fourteen Points', and therefore some issues such as 'Freedom of Seas' could not be solved in accordance with the desires of Britain. At the Meeting it was decided that Britain should notify Washington and the rest of the Allies that British Government could not accept the doctrine of 'Freedom of the Seas', and "*considered it necessary to add certain conditions to the Fourteen Points laid down by President Wilson*"<sup>124</sup>.

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<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, War Cabinet Meeting, 491B, 26<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, War Cabinet Meeting, 491A, 25<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918.

The armistice with Turkey was signed on 30<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918, to be effective on the same day at noon. The War Cabinet, in the meeting on 31<sup>st</sup> Oct 1918, with the absence of Lloyd George, evaluated the text of conditions which was already signed by the Turkish delegates. The text was found quite acceptable and declared that *“the War Cabinet expressed very strongly the opinion that Vice-Admiral Calthorpe should be heartily congratulated on the great judgment and firmness which he had shown in carrying this Armistice to a successful a conclusion”*<sup>125</sup>, and also decided to congratulate Admiral Calthorpe. By the approval of Curzon, a telegram was sent to Admiral Calthorpe, who was going to be appointed as High Commissioner in Constantinople on 6<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1918, noting that; *“The War Cabinet desire to congratulate you on your able and successful handling of the negotiations with the Turkish Government that have resulted in an armistice between the Allied Governments and Turkey.”*<sup>126</sup> Curzon was overjoyed that Calthorpe had better terms than those expected in the War Cabinet, since only first four clauses were insisted by the Cabinet, and did not consider the rest of the clauses would be accepted by Turkey, but as it sounded almost all of the conditions were in the text. Turkish side only requested that that Greeks should not go to Constantinople or Smyrna and this request with regard to Smyrna, according to Lord Cecil, should be complied with, since Italian Government would feel very strongly if any Greek forces went to Smyrna. The most critical clauses of the terms drawn in London and later endorsed at Paris were accepted by the Turkish side with minor changes, such as in Clause 7, the wording of ‘The occupation by Allied troops of important strategically points’ to ‘The Allies to have the right to occupy any strategically points in the event of any situation arising which threatens the security of the Allies’. It was this clause that the Allies, namely, Greeks, Italians, French and British forces were going to base their occupation of certain places in Anatolia. With the accepted clauses in the armistice, Constantinople was going to be used as a naval base and Turkish commercial ships were given to Allies for their usage. The Allies obtained with Clause 24, the right of *“In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Allies reserve to themselves the right to occupy any part of them”*<sup>127</sup>

The Turkish delegates during negotiations requested that there might be no question of occupying Constantinople unless some definite necessity arose, such as the failure of the Turkish Government not to maintain order or protect the persons

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<sup>125</sup> Ibid, War Cabinet Meeting, 494A, 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

and property of Allied subjects, and to 'save their face' they enquired whether Turkish flag could be erected and the presence of Turkish soldiers in the forts during occupation by Allies. Britain was not going to contribute to Turks 'to save their face' and rejected all these requests<sup>128</sup>. For the request for Constantinople not to be occupied, there was a total rejection in the War Cabinet.

The request made by the Turkish side, about Greeks not to be sent to Constantinople and Smyrna was agreed by British although that was not going to be for a long time. Britain was going to ask the Greeks to land at Smyrna only in six months time. In the War Cabinet Meeting on 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1918, when the delegates asked that there might be no questions of occupying Constantinople unless some definite necessity arose, such as the failure of the Turkish Government to maintain order or protect the persons and property of Allied subjects. Lord Robert Cecil said that he understood that previously intimation had been given to the Turkish Government, at Paris, that it was not the intention to occupy Constantinople itself provided that an immediate armistice was concluded. Lord Cecil was strongly in favour of occupying the city if the Allies were not pledged to it. Curzon came even more strongly for the occupation. According to Curzon landing of troops in the Capital of Turkey would be a most desirable in order to show that the Turks were beaten and this was a humiliation in the eastern mentality. Secretary of State for India, Montagu, agreed on the occupation of Constantinople, but wished that in case of occupation, the Allies should renew their assurances for the protection of 'Holy Places'.<sup>129</sup> Montagu, in his letter of 25<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918 addressed to the Prime Minister, enclosing a memorandum of 24<sup>th</sup> of October which was to be distributed to the Cabinet, and urged Lloyd George that armistice should not be accepted with Turks before the occupation of Mosul. Montagu wanted Britain to stick to the Paris terms of armistice or should set up conditions to make sure that Turks were really beaten and humiliated. According to Montagu, British relations with "*Mohammedans, with Arabs, with Indians will be gravely imperilled if the Turkish flag remains flying in the Iraq and Turkey has not been beaten.*"<sup>130</sup> During the meeting it was also decided that it was most desirable to occupy Mosul, and therefore General Marshall should send a detachment to Mosul to accept the surrender of the Turkish garrison, although Armistice was in force already, therefore the principles of armistice was

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, War Cabinet Meeting, 494A, 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1918.

<sup>130</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/40/2/17.

going to be overruled by British, because of their desire to have a total Mesopotamia.<sup>131</sup>

While War Cabinet was enjoying the successful termination of the armistice negotiations, Lloyd George was in Paris to attend the Supreme War Council Meetings, which was mainly held to discuss the armistice with Germany and Austria and also to draw a line on the applicability of the 'Fourteen Points'. During the preliminary meetings, French protested on the subject of Admiral Calthorpe's negotiations for an armistice with Turkey, and against exclusion of French Admiral from negotiations and insisted that French and Italian Admiral ought to sign the armistice. Lloyd George answered the French protest saying that this decision should be decided formally at a full session of Supreme War Council and if this procedure was to be adopted, and then it should apply to all theatres concerned and therefore all the armistices should be signed by each member of Allies. This was something that French could not possibly agree with, and therefore she accepted the Turkish armistice<sup>132</sup>.

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<sup>131</sup> PRO, CAB 23/14, War Cabinet Meeting, 494A, 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1918,

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, there existed correspondence between Clemenceau and Lloyd George about the 'Arab' issue, and therefore the validity and applicability of Sykes-Picot Agreement in September and October 1918. Later the Turkish armistice became a 'hot issue' to be dealt between the two states. In answering Lloyd George's letter of 15<sup>th</sup> Oct., Clemenceau's letter of 21<sup>st</sup> Oct. was interesting to show the distrust between two states concerned. Clemenceau, in his letter argued on Lloyd George's reasoning that British played the major role in the defeat of Turkey, that "*It would be as unjust not to recognize the importance of the British victories in Asia Minor as it would be to attribute the victory under French command on the Salonika front to luck or chance.*" And further commented on the French interests in Turkey, as "*If it is a fact that Great Britain has privileged position in the regions which connect Egypt and India and which must remain so, it is none the less sure that in Constantinople France has the greatest sum of interests. France is by far Turkey's principal creditor. The Ottoman capital is the centre of public and private institutions the actions of which extend all over the Empire' the administrative centre of all the enterprises, societies and institutions which, though under French or Turkish titles' are principally French. The fact that military operations against Constantinople should be placed under the control of Great Britain both ashore and afloat, contrary to the previous agreements with regard to the balance of our respective contributions, and the safeguarding of the traditions and rights of France*". Lloyd George's answer to this letter was dated 25<sup>th</sup> Oct. but marked as 'not sent' mentioned some of the points raised by Clemenceau. Whether the letter was sent or not, it shows the policy of Britain, and therefore it is worth to quote on Lloyd George that; "*Finally, I need hardly say that the British has not the slightest desire to exercise preponderate or dominating influence at Constantinople They recognize to the full the special interests which France possesses in Turkey and especially in Constantinople*" and further Lloyd George promised that, in case Constantinople was going to be occupied, it would be by joint forces of French and British working together. The conflict was going to be solved in Paris during the Supreme War Council Meetings at the end of October 1918. (Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/50/3/39, House of Lords). According to Amery, the discussion between Lloyd George and Clemenceau was very harsh, such that "*At the first discussion with Lloyd George, Clemenceau complained that our Admiral Calthorpe, had accepted the Turkish surrender when, by pre-war agreement, the French Navy was supposed to be in command in the Mediterranean. This was too much for Lloyd George who flared up: 'What have you French ever done in the war against the Turks, whom we have beaten single-handed, except to attach half a battalion of niggers to Allenby to see that he didn't steal the Holy Sepulchre?'. No more was said*" ("My Political Life, Vol. 2: War and Peace; 1914-1918" by L.S. Amery, pub., Hutchinson, Stratford Place, London, 1953, pg 170). From the tone of the letters it is quite difficult to believe in what Amery recollected in his Memoirs that Clemenceau practically could have been told so rudely and he kept silence.

The Ottoman delegates were led by Huseyin Rauf (Orbay) who was a navy hero and the new minister of the navy. Rauf found Calthorpe, as honest, straightforward and reassuring when he promised that Britain would treat Turkey gently and Constantinople probably would not be occupied certainly not by Greeks. When Rauf arrived home, he told a reporter that; *"I assure you that not a single enemy soldier will disembark at our Istanbul."*<sup>133</sup> The British had treated them extraordinarily well: *"The armistice we have concluded is beyond our hopes."*<sup>134</sup> Even though they had accepted all the clauses put forward by the British, Rauf trusted Calthorpe, who promised that the armistice terms would not be used unfairly. The British were really only interested in free passage through the Straits; why would they want to occupy Constantinople, or indeed anywhere else? Rauf told himself that, after all, the British had already taken the Arab territories. *"I could think of no other area they would want from the point of view of their national interests and so might try to seize."*<sup>135</sup> Years later Rauf looked back. *"There was a general conviction in our country that England and France were countries faithful not only to their written pacts, but also to their promises. And I had this conviction too. What a shame that we were mistaken in our beliefs and convictions!"*<sup>136</sup> In London, definitely, this unrealistic sentiment of Rauf was not shared by the British.

Partition of the Ottoman Empire was one of the topics discussed with President Wilson in his visit to London in October 1918 before the Peace Conference. The informal meeting held between Wilson, Lloyd George and Balfour, had no notes or procès-verbal, and was reported only to Imperial War Cabinet, on 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918. The impression of Lloyd George for Wilson was that he cared only League of Nations issue before anything else at the Peace Conference, then the other topics could be tackled, such as; colonies, delineation of borders and states and economical proposals. For the Ottoman Empire, Lloyd George reported that Wilson agreed on Turks being cleared off from Europe and Constantinople. Wilson was in favour of Constantinople being taken by a small state, under the guidance of League of Nations. When Balfour asked the President if America could be the mandatory power for Constantinople, he declined and told that America was proud of their disinterested position in this war and they did not wish to be deprived from this position. According to Curzon, once League of Nations was constituted, then, America could be convinced taking responsibility for mandatory intervention. Lloyd

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<sup>133</sup> Margaret Macmillan, *Paris 1919*, p. 341-373 (Ankara: (in Turkish) ODTU Press, 2004)

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid.

<sup>136</sup> Ibid.

George told the Cabinet that although this suggestion was initiated by Balfour, he considered it dangerous to give Constantinople and Dardanelles to America and he further pointed out that he had never considered Palestine, Mesopotamia and East African colonies of Germany being under mandate of America, but, only Armenia could be allocated to America.<sup>137</sup> Therefore, as far as Britain was concerned, Lloyd George was interested in controlling the Near-Eastern Policy.

Britain, in late 1918, had to tackle problems existed among Allies to partition the Ottoman Empire, with regard to Sykes-Picot and Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreements. In the areas, which were designated to France in accordance with the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, administration was going to be a concern for the British, since she was no longer interested in assigning these areas to French. At the same time Britain was interested in keeping the harmony among Allies and to secure the 'Balance of Powers' in Europe. In a meeting held in the Foreign Office on 30<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1918, attended by the French Ambassador and Sir Sykes and M. Georges Picot, architects of Sykes-Picot Agreement, it was agreed that in the areas where France was interested, according to Agreement of 1916 Sykes-Picot, and which were or might be occupied by the Allies, the French Government was to appoint a French political advisor to the General Allenby, British Commander-in-chief. The French Political Advisor would be acting as an intermediary on political and administrative matters between Commander-in-Chief and any Arab Government or Governments, permanent and provisional, which might be set up in the area. Therefore Britain was still trying to hold the power in the French designated zone, but at the same time recognizing France as an intermediary between herself and the Arabs<sup>138</sup>. Balfour, on behalf of Britain was going to object the French proposal to appoint a 'French High Commissioner' instead of an intermediary advisor on the ground that such an appointment would cause unrest among Arabs and also interfere with General Allenby's authority in that area. Britain also did not agree with the implication of France to widen the area further to Palestine and Cilicia to be included for the 'French Zone'.<sup>139</sup> Balfour told that 1916 Agreement referred to the territories occupied or to be occupied and not to Cilicia, since that area had not been occupied and might not be occupied in the near future, therefore there would exist no question for that particular area and also for Palestine, there should not be any discussion since this area was, in the Agreement, outside of the French Zone. The

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<sup>137</sup> PRO, CAB 23/42, 47<sup>th</sup> Meeting of Imperial War Cabinet, 30<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1918.

<sup>138</sup> PRO, FO 406/40, Doc. 164945.

<sup>139</sup> PRO, FO 406/40, Doc. 176523, the letter from Balfour to M. Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, 25<sup>th</sup> of October 1918.

attitude or rather policy of Britain for the Sykes-Picot Agreement became clearer in Lord Robert Cecil's letter to French Foreign Office. Lord Cecil, while endorsing the British Government's agreement of the meeting held on 30th of Sep. 1918 between British and French delegates, pointed out the general position which existed since 1916 Agreement. Russia had gone out and America came into the War, meaning any settlement involving Middle-East, particularly Syria and Palestine should be consulted with America and even with Italy. A further difficulty, according to British Government, was the agreements made with Italy, which recognized the claims of Italy in relation with Eastern Mediterranean and to fulfil the desires of Italy would cause protests from Greece and proposed the whole issue of Asia Minor should be discussed in a meeting with the participation of Britain, France, Italy, and America.<sup>140</sup>

Meanwhile, Italy was disturbed with the news of the Greek involvement in Asia Minor, and had to bring the subject to Balfour that such a policy was the violation of the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement. Italy was also going to complain the attitude and policy of France to Britain. Italian Ambassador in London had to warn the British Foreign Office that French was doing her utmost to make trouble between Italy and Britain, such that French had told Italians that it was Britain, who invited Venizelos to come to London to discuss the future of Smyrna with him.<sup>141</sup> British Foreign Office had to try and convince the Italians that Venizelos came to London on his initiative and although he explained the Greek desires for Asia Minor, Balfour had given no pledge on the subject and had only promised that they would consider the Greek view.

The validity of Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement was going to be a concern for Italy, and was afraid that the rights she gained was going to be vanished because of the attitude of Britain. Although she agreed to attend the meeting to discuss the partition of Minor Asia and to deal with the Franco-British and the Tripartite Agreements, reiterated her position that there should be no intention of questioning the validity of the Treaty of London of 1915 and 1917 Agreement, known as Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement, and Italian desires in Anatolia, Arabia and Red Sea as secured in the Agreements were still valid legally. According to Italians, their

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid, Doc. 170193, and Doc. 172714, letter from Lord Cecil to the French Foreign Secretary, M. Pichon, 7<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918, and the letter from Balfour to the Italian Ambassador in London, Marquis Imperiali, 30<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918 respectively.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, Doc. 179417, Balfour's letter to the British Ambassador in Rome, Sir R. Rodd, 31 of Oct. 1918, mentions the visit of Marquis Imperiali to Sir Eric Drummond, Assistant Under-Secretary of British Foreign Office.

interests in those areas were not imperialistic in nature, but were dictated with the will of the peoples there.<sup>142</sup> The British response to the Italian claim for the validity of the Agreements came first as a verbal note to the Marquis Imperiali from Sir Eyre Crowe that without the consent of Russia, the 1917 Agreement was not valid<sup>143</sup> and further the position of Britain was told by Balfour to the Italian Ambassador<sup>144</sup>

Britain, also, had to deal with the Arab question, as a result of Bolshevik's publication of Sykes-Picot Agreement. Arabs were rather disturbed in learning that through Sykes-Picot Agreement, France and Britain partitioned the areas that were promised to them. King Hussein's letter of 28<sup>th</sup> of August 1918 to Sir R. Wingate, the High Commissioner of Britain in Cairo, caused a serious concern to Britain. King Hussein practically told that, unless the promises extended to Arabs that they would form an independent state, were not to be fulfilled, he was ready to resign. Sir Wingate, being aware of the danger of King Hussein's resignation, urged the Foreign Office to send a letter to the King in which the Britain should declare that France would not annex any part of Arab or Syrian territory, but French should exercise their control with object of developing local self-government and in safeguarding Arab national aspirations<sup>145</sup>. Balfour invited the representatives of the King to London to discuss the situation before the commencement of the Peace Conference and King Hussein's son Prince Feisal accompanied by Colonel Lawrence, paid a visit to Balfour. According to Feisal, Arabs would object vigorously to French and they would not hesitate fighting against them. Feisal, who seemed to Balfour as anti French and undisguised pro British, told Balfour that;

"The Arabs, he said, only wanted one protecting Power, whether in Syria or in Mesopotamia and this Power must be Great Britain. Government by any foreign nation would be intolerable, but if they had to submit to it at all, they

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<sup>142</sup> PRO, FO 406/40, Doc.191856, letter from Marquis Imperiali to Balfour, 16<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1918. The letter indicates the desires of Italy as "...*Italian Government wishes to declare that it pursues no objects in the Anatolian districts covered by the Agreement of 1917 other than to promote the establishment of a Government and national Administration supported by the free will of the people, with a view of assuring, with its support and effective assistance, the normal operation of justice, security, and civil progress, and to promote the development of the country's economic resources*"

<sup>143</sup> Ibid, Doc. 194188, Balfour's letter to Sir R. Rodd, 27<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1918.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, Doc. 191856, Balfour stated the official standing of Britain with respect to Italian's claims that Britain could not accept the validity of the 1917 Agreement, with a letter to Imperiali, 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1918. In a letter to Sir R. Rodd of 11<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1918, (Ibid, Doc. 205509), Balfour summarizes his meeting with Imperiali, that "...*According to the Italian Ambassador, M. Pichon, French Foreign Secretary shared the opinion expressed by Baron Sonnino (the validity of Agreements-SC), a fact which I learned with considerable surprise*". According to the Italians, there was an understanding between Italy and France with respect to the validity of the 1917 Agreement, which was 'news' to British. Balfour reiterated the British standing on the issue and urged the British Ambassador in Rome to try and convince the Italian Foreign Secretary Baron Sonnino. Balfour's letter to Sir R. Rodd, on 27<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918 (Ibid, Doc. 205974).

<sup>145</sup> Ibid, Telegraphic No: 1600, Sir Wingate's telegram to Balfour, 1<sup>st</sup> of Nov. 1918.

would rather endure bad government at the hands of Moslems than good government at the hands of Christians.”<sup>146</sup>

Peace Conference, to be held in Paris in early 1919, was going to bring more disillusion to Arabs, but they were content with the guardianship of Britain, as Prince told Balfour that as soon as he entered England ‘he felt at home’<sup>147</sup>

Britain’s another duty was towards Greece, or rather to Venizelos. It was through Sir Grey that a promise was extended to Greece that she could have Smyrna and its hinterland, if she joined the Allies, at the beginning of the War, on 24<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1915, but the reluctance of King Constantine to be at war against the central powers lapsed the offer. Venizelos, in September 1916, with some closed friends and advisors sailed secretly from Athens to his home island of Crete, and then to Salonika, which was already in the hands of Allied Forces. There, he proclaimed ‘National Defence Movement’ and set up the ‘Provisional Government’ with full backing of his Allied protectors<sup>148</sup>. Venizelos, from the start of the War showed his willingness to be on the side of Allies, and therefore gained admiration and ‘debt’ from the leaders of Allies. With the initiative of French, in landing at Piraeus and therefore forcing the King to leave the throne to his son Prince Alexander and Venizelos being recalled led the way for Greece to join the Allies in 1917. The Greek desires for the territories in Anatolia and European part of the Ottoman Empire as well as for Constantinople was well known. The Bolsheviks revolution in Russia, who was going to acquire Constantinople and Straits in accordance with the Agreement, signed with Britain, contributed to the Greek dreams that, since Russia was no longer an obstacle for her desiderata, and she was free then, to implement the so called “Megali Idea”. Venizelos, being on the side of Allies on the contrary to the King Constantine, had managed to receive admiration and backing from the leaders, such as Lloyd George. Lloyd George, even at his first speech in the House of Commons referred to him as ‘Great Greek Statesman’. Lloyd George was not alone in praising Venizelos, Clemenceau and the circles around Lloyd George shared the opinion that he was ‘a remarkable Greek’. As the war was getting close to end, Venizelos became outspoken for his plans regarding the partition of Ottoman Empire. Whether he came himself as British proclaimed to the Italians or invited by the British, as the Italians claimed, Venizelos arrived in London in early October 1918 to discuss the Greek claims. After the refusal by France, of Greeks to

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid, Doc. 205518, Balfour’s Memorandum of the meeting with Prince Feisal, 11<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> Nicholas Rizopoulos, “Greece at Paris Conference”, (PhD. Thesis, Yale University, 1963), p. 34

accompany the Allied forces to Bulgaria at the armistice, Venizelos was going to try his chance for Turkey to protect and 'look after' Greek origin Ottoman subjects in the Western Anatolia and in Constantinople. During his visit in London, Venizelos had the opportunity to relay his thoughts to Lloyd George and his closed circle. In the luncheon, on 15<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1918, which Venizelos had with Lloyd George, Lord Milner, Lord Reading and P.H. Kerr; he suggested that the Allies ought to press on at once by land to Constantinople, and therefore force Turkey to surrender. He advised, on the question of Lloyd George, that after the War, the city of Constantinople and Straits should be governed by an international preserve under a commission appointed by League of Nations or Great Powers. When Lloyd George questioned if it would be possible to leave Constantinople for Turks, but subject to secured free passage through Straits, Venizelos answered that Turks were incapable of governing a city and port, and he further pointed the advantages of assigning European advisors to save non-Turks and especially Greek origin people in the Empire.<sup>149</sup> Venizelos had a chance to reiterate his views with a Memorandum on the request of Lloyd George that Greeks deserved similar sympathy as of Armenians, since they had been victims of the same kind of ill treatment, even some were exterminated.<sup>150</sup> Venizelos was proposing that the settlement of the future of the Greek portion of the Western part of Asia Minor by its annexation to Greece was the only method by which Greece would be able appreciably to extend her territories. He threatened that in case Greece was not able to expand in the direction of Asia Minor, then the only solution for her to look for an extension of her frontiers would be in the direction of Thrace, all the way up to Black Sea, which would bring more trouble and concern for the Allies. Venizelos, in his Memorandum, stressed on the point that for the Greek desire, the only obstacle was the Italians, since they were both after the same territory in Anatolia, but the Italians were ahead of Greeks, since she was granted Western Asia Minor by the 1917 Agreement by France and Britain. He further argued that because of Russia's consent was no more available, and then the Agreement did not hold any longer, besides the establishment of Italy at Smyrna would result in a contradiction of the very principles in whose the Allies were conducting the War. According to Venizelos, strengthening of Greece as a Mediterranean Power would aim at assuring equilibrium in the Mediterranean and would in no way hamper the legitimate interests of Italy. With this Memorandum,

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<sup>149</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/1/10 and F/92/10/1, House of Lords Public Records

<sup>150</sup> The memorandum, of 2<sup>nd</sup> Nov.1918, signed by Venizelos and addressed to Lloyd George was important that it contained similar approaches that Britain was basing his policy for Near East. (Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/1/11). The letter sent to Lloyd George was also taken into "The Truth about the Peace Treaties" by Lloyd George Vol. II, Pg. 1228-1231.

Venizelos was stressing on the points that Britain was very delicate with, such that Britain was not in a position to build neither a strong France nor Italy in Near East, and besides a controllable State such as Greece would serve in this region as a 'buffer state' between Russia, Europe and Mesopotamia.

While Venizelos was pressurizing Britain to annex the Western Anatolia to Greece, British Foreign Office was working on alternative solutions for Thrace and Western Anatolia. In the report prepared by the Political Intelligence Department of Foreign Office proposed various alternatives for the partition and administration of the Ottoman Empire, although so many uncertain factors existed. In the proposal the ideal alternative was the entire region of the Straits and the Marmara Sea on both European and Asiatic side, to be under the sovereignty of a single state with the supervision of League of Nations. Strategically the European frontier should be extended up to Enos - Midia line, and the Report stated that in this case it would be still impossible strategically, economically and administrative wise to allocate Adrianople[Edirne], Kirk Kilise [Kirklareli] and Western Thrace to Greece, therefore with this solution Turks would be excluded from Thrace. If this alternative was to be accepted, the Western Anatolia should be given to Greece from Anatolian side of the Straits down to Smyrna, including Cheshme [Cesme] peninsula with a sufficient hinterland.

The Report summarized the proposals in Thrace as;

“(1) Partition of Eastern Thrace approximately along Enos-Midilia line between a 'Zone of the Straits' and Bulgaria. The trace of the frontier might vary in accordance with the alternative to be decided. These alternatives were whether the zone of the Straits was left under the limited sovereignty of Turkey or was constituted a separate State under the mandatory of League of Nations. The exclusion of Greece from Thrace would have to be compensated by the assignment of territory to Greece in Western Anatolia.  
(2) Integrity of Eastern Thrace, between the present Turco-Bulgarian frontier and the Bulair [Bolayir], Chatalja lines, and its assignment to Greece. This alternative has two variants:  
(a) Assignment of Eastern Thrace alone as an 'island'  
(b) Assignment of a continuous territory from the present eastern frontier of Greece to the Black Sea, including not only Eastern (Turkish) Thrace, but Western (Bulgarian) Thrace, as a corridor between Eastern Thrace and Eastern Macedonia.  
In the case of alternative (2) and especially in the case of variant (b), Greece ought to receive Adrianople and Kirk Kilise, with a frontier, between the Istranja and Rhodope massifs, approximately following the line drawn between Turkey and Eastern Rumelia in 1878.”<sup>151</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/12/1, Memorandum prepared by Political Intelligence Department, Foreign Office, 2<sup>nd</sup> Jan. 1919. This particular Report was rather important that the alternatives as set forth there contained the basic issues as was going to be debated during the Paris Peace Conference.

There was also another report, prepared by the War Office that concentrated on the partition of Ottoman Empire<sup>152</sup>. The Report did not directly involve with the Ottoman Empire, but Greek War Aims, as it stood before the Paris Peace Conference. Since the Greek War Aims concerned the partition of Ottoman Empire, the War Office's view was rather important with respect to decision making mechanism to build up the final British policy before the Conference. Greek War Aims were mainly concentrated for the territories in Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Asia Minor and Cyprus. According to the Report, Greeks claimed Thrace on ethnical grounds, the whole of the coast-line; east of the Mesta as far as the Black Sea, including the Bulgarian section between the Mesta and the Meritsa [Meriç], and also part of the inland region of Eastern Thrace, therefore excluding Bulgarians from the Aegean coast line. According to War Office, the Greek proposal to deprive Bulgaria of her Aegean coast line was economically indefensible, and the Greek population was very small, and also population wise in the whole Thrace, Turks were in majority. Therefore War Office concluded that the Greek claims for that part of Thrace were baseless, and hence Greeks could not claim the sovereignty of Thrace, at the most, municipal autonomy of Rodosto and other coast region. The Report also stressed the desires of Greeks for Constantinople that it was the historic city of their dreams, although Turks outnumbered Greeks in the Sandjak of Constantinople, it seemed that Venizelos was content in assuming that the city would be internationalized, provided that international zone included the Thracian hinterland, and if Bulgaria was excluded from the Aegean. For Asia Minor, the Report mentioned that Greeks claimed a large part of the western littoral, with Smyrna as its centre, and a considerable hinterland, on ethnological grounds. Also special treatment was requested for Greek towns and communities outside of the western Anatolian region. The report discussed the scattered population of Greeks in the Western part of Anatolia and concluded that the allocation of the whole area claimed by Greek extremists, or even of that offered her in 1915, by Grey, was ethnologically indefensible. The Report reiterated the British view that Turks were unfit to govern Europeans [Greeks], and also they had proven themselves as incapable of commerce, or of the economic development of the rich western coastland of Asia Minor.

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<sup>152</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/12/1, Memorandum on "Greek War Aims" prepared by General Staff, War Office, 18<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1919. This particular Report was rather important that the alternatives as set forth there contained the basic issues as was going to be debated during the Paris Peace Conference.

According to the War Office, the Greeks would at least demand for territorial adjustment in Asia Minor, so that, the Greek districts would as far as possible enjoy some kind of autonomy under international guarantee, and the civil rights of Greek minorities to be protected and it was the assumption that in the Turkish State of the future would be subject to a large measures of international supervision and control. The War Office, further warned that to let Italy to invade Smyrna and its hinterland as was promised in the 1917, Saint-Jean de Maurienne, Agreement would be disastrous since handing over of nearly one million Greeks in the Western Asia Minor to Italian rule was bound to create hatred between Italy and Greece and eventually end up with a war in that region. The Report lastly touched upon the issue of Cyprus. Cyprus was handed to Britain by the Ottoman Empire in 1878, and was annexed by Britain in November 1914. In October 1915, the island was offered to Greece on the condition that Greece declared war against Bulgaria, but was refused. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement, Britain agreed that she would not to cede Cyprus to a third power without the consent of France. It was requested by Italy in July 1917, but was refused, and it was the belief of the War Office that Venizelos was expecting that the island to be handed over to Greece, as he told Lord Granville, the British High Commissioner in Athens, in January 1918. War Office believed that strategically, Cyprus was indispensable and Britain should keep the island.

Before the Peace Conference, British machinery was busy in formalizing her policy towards the Ottoman Empire, that she would adopt at the Conference, and one of the sources apart from Foreign Office and War Office was the 'Arab Bureau' situated in Cairo, dealing with the Eastern policy of Britain.

It was proposed by the Arab Bureau that, the future Ottoman Empire should be concentrated only in Anatolia, since the population was most stable and solid there. The implication of the proposal was that the Turks, should be only allowed to be settled in Anatolia with capital in Brusa [Bursa] and further proposed that the 'Six Vilayets' should be detached from her and be under a European protectorate. The islands in the Aegean should be handed over to Greece and also Smyrna and a small enclave to be Greek. According to proposal, Italy had no business in Aegean, still less in Asia Minor, and her Adalia claim would lead to endless trouble in Anatolia. For North Mesopotamia, it was proposed that it should be a separate native state and distinct from Iraq, with a capital in Mosul or Urfa, and how far it should extend north, depended on the Kurds. For Armenia, the old Kingdom of

Cilicia and North Syria would be constituted and guaranteed by Britain and the proposal drew the boundaries for such a kingdom, such that, on the west it stretched from Geuk [Gök] Su mouth along the ridge of Taurus up to Gürün, up to Divrik, then down the Euphrates to the east of Kharput [Harput] and then by Suwarek [Siverek] to Birejik [Birecik] and ending at Alexandretta [Iskenderun] Bay. The proposed state of Armenia, which was comprised of majority of 'Six Vilayets' of Ottoman Empire should be manned by Armenians emigrating from the rest of 'Six Vilayets' and even from America, since the population in the delineated area was mixed and contained non-Armenian population, such as Kurds, Turks and Afghans. The proposal also tried to safeguard Armenians in future from Turkey that for the following fifty years, the state that was going to take the responsibility of mandates of the 'Armenia' should be willing to put sufficient military forces. The Mandatory Power was going to receive little return, but traditional reward of virtue.<sup>153</sup> The detailed proposal also covered the future policies to be adopted for Hedjaz, Sana'a and Syria. For Syria, it was proposed that, pending settlements with French, whom no Syrian district, even Lebanon and Beirut, would accept willingly the French annexation and even mandates. Therefore it was proposed that as the Paris Peace Conference commenced, then all the Agreements and Pacts should be ended, so that France should not find any ground to claim any part of Arab lands. The Memorandum seemed to have an effect on British Policy, such that the Sevres had a very similar approach to Middle East.

Before the commencement of Paris Peace Conference, the French and British Governments desired to reach a common policy with regard to Middle-East. Clemenceau came to London at the beginning of November 1918 and after some meetings a Memorandum was prepared to reflect the understanding of the Governments with regard to Middle-East, naturally it was based upon the Sykes-Picot Agreement. The Memorandum of 9<sup>th</sup> of November was drawn with the aim that final liberation of the peoples so long oppressed by the Turks and the establishment of National Governments and administration deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the native populations. The Memorandum was going to be referred by the Paris Conference as 'Terms of Reference' for the Commissioners in allocating the mandates for the territories of Ottoman Empire.<sup>154</sup> Behind the clauses of 'humane' approach to the peoples of Ottoman Empire there were items that were not disclosed to public. The French and British Governments had agreed to realign

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<sup>153</sup> PRO, FO/406/40, Doc. 191249, Memorandum by Commodore D.G. Hogarth, 11<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1918.

<sup>154</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/2/4.

the boundaries of Palestine and to allocate Mosul to the Mesopotamia after Lloyd George's insistence because of the richness of the area for oil.<sup>155</sup>

#### **IV. 5. Evaluation**

The Lloyd George era started in December 1916 when he became one of the leading players in the British Foreign politics. As far as the Ottoman Empire was concerned, the Allies seemed to be determined to end Ottoman Empire before the Peace Conference in Paris. The planning of partition had started even before the Conference, and the key role was carried by Britain, through her promises to Arabs and Greeks and also various Pacts and Agreements, to France, Italy and Russia. By the end of the War, Russia was no longer a player in the theatre for the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Almost coincidentally America had emerged as a new member for the Allies, but President Wilson even before joining the War, declared that the war aim of that his country was not interested in annexing any territory, hence, leaving Britain, France and Italy, in disagreement because of clashing interests, to deal with the Ottoman Empire.

Lloyd George as the Prime Minister of Britain had the responsibility to lead the war aims of his country, and therefore to 'end' the Ottoman Empire. Publicly declared War Aims included, leaving the Ottoman Empire as it was at the beginning of the war with the exception of Arab lands. Armenia was totally forgotten. Discussions of the War Cabinet meeting on 3<sup>rd</sup> of Oct. 1918, concentrated on USA approach to the Ottoman Empire; hesitations concerning American war declaration against the Ottoman Empire were later decided to the contrary. However Wilson's right to claim and apply the 'Fourteen Points' over the Ottoman Empire was debated much. Lloyd George and therefore the rest of the Ministers were in the opinion that 'Fourteen Points' were not applicable to Ottoman Empire; self-determination was regarded luxuries when it came to Turks.<sup>156</sup> Lloyd George and the War Cabinet at one stage considered that since the Turks were at their weakest and were asking for an armistice, and then the time was ripe for Britain to impose final peace terms to Turks instead of an armistice. By doing so Britain was hoping to eliminate the issue of Mesopotamia from appearing on the table at the Peace Conference. Since

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<sup>155</sup> The cession of Mosul to British was decided in a private discussion on 1<sup>st</sup> Dec.1918 at French Embassy in London between Clemenceau and Lloyd George. There was no official document to indicate the cession but it was a kind of 'gentleman's agreement'. ( Edward Peter Fitzgerald, "France's Middle Eastern Ambitions, the Sykes-Picot Negotiations, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915-1918", *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol.66, No.4(Dec., 1994), p. 697-725)

<sup>156</sup> PRO, CAB 23/14, War Cabinet Meeting of 482A, 3<sup>rd</sup> October.

Mesopotamia was already reserved as Britain's share with the Sykes Picot, then America would not have any ground to implement the 'Fourteen Points' there. Because of the fear that France would protest to such gesture Britain decided not to enforce the final peace terms to Turks at the time of armistice. Regardless to the promises and pledges Britain and especially Lloyd George offered to Turks in his speeches on War Aims during war, Britain seemed to be determined to clear Turks from Europe and Constantinople. Lloyd George discussed the issue with President Wilson during his visit to London on the way to the Peace Conference and found that the President seemed to have forgotten his 'Fourteen Points' for self-determination and agreed that the Turks should be thrown out of Europe and an independent state in Constantinople under the League of Nations should be formed.

The policy making instruments were the Cabinet, the War Office, Foreign Office and the Imperial War Cabinet, and it was in that arena that the British Policy was shaped and implemented. Lloyd George was the leading player to deal with the British Policy concerning the Ottoman Empire. The British foreign policy once formed was put into practice though institutions such as Foreign Office and Imperial General Staff, units responsible for implementing the decisions of the Government. From the minutes of the meetings of the War Cabinet and the Imperial War Cabinet, and reports dealing with British Policy, it appears that Lloyd George was not alone in considering to 'finish' Turkey, members of his Cabinet and therefore the institutions that they represented, shared his views, but among them Lord Cecil, Balfour, Lord Curzon, Lord Milner and members of his 'Garden Suburb' even to a certain extent Montagu appeared as the most dominant players in that respect<sup>157</sup>. All shared the same view of occupation of Constantinople and Mesopotamia and entertaining the agreements and treaties which were drawn by Allies, to take their part of the share in Anatolia. Promises given to Turkish side that an immediate armistice would rescue Constantinople from occupation were forgotten after securing a successful Armistice. Britain was very firm on her decision that Ottoman Empire was her share, although she did not consider taking it as a 'Dominion', but she had to secure Mesopotamia and allocate the portions of Anatolia to other states to remind the world that she was the super power. That was the policy of Lloyd George which was willingly shared by his Cabinet. Britain concluded that President Wilson's 'Fourteen Points' was not applicable for the Ottoman Empire and America had no right to dictate any policies in that part of the world, since she was not even in war with

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<sup>157</sup> Montagu, on the basis of sentiments of Muslim population in India was only interested preserving Holy Places, and from this point of view he saw a danger in the allocation of Palestine to Americans.

Turks. Britain believed that she contributed in the theatre against Turks more than any other member of the Allies, and therefore she had the right to play the major role there, that was why she came strongly against French during the negotiations for the armistice and concerning occupation of Constantinople. She was interested only in Mesopotamia to control and made sure that no other state stood in front of her. Initially British interest in Mesopotamia was due to its importance strategically because of India. As the war continued and the importance of oil became more apparent, Britain had to consider the region from economical aspect too. This involved Russia also. Because of Bolshevik revolution in Russia, Britain's interests in Baku was in danger, therefore to comply with the future requirements, she had to have a hold on Mesopotamia, and surely on Mosul too. Syria could be given to French in accordance with the Sykes–Picot Agreement, Palestine to America provided that they played the game in accordance with the rules and if there was a danger that Turkey might re-possess the given lands back, she could compromise and hold it for herself. Although she started having doubts about the Sykes–Picot Agreement, it was difficult for her to step back, where Syria was concerned for she would face resentment from French in Europe and might suffer humiliations from the Arabs, endangering her situation in Mesopotamia. Definitely she did not want any turmoil and unrest there. She had to secure Mesopotamia including Mosul, Alexandretta and Aleppo. Britain to reach her aim was going to disregard the principles of the armistice by ordering her armies to continue moving towards north. For Anatolia, since Britain was not interested to hold it for herself, the best solution would be to get a protector and America was considered as the best choice, and that was why during Wilson's visit to London, in December 1918, this was offered to America and for a long time to come American and British military personnel and diplomats were going to work on this issue.

Britain, at the end of the War, found herself in contradictions because of promises and agreements that she had extended and signed. She had promised the same territories, to Arabs and French with the Sykes-Picot Agreement and to Italy and Greece, with the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement. Therefore Britain was trying to find reasons and excuses to abolish those commitments before the Peace Conference. The excuse for the French was the changes in Syria and Palestine since Sykes-Picot Agreement was signed; hence due to the prevailing conditions, Syrian problem had to be reconsidered. For Italians; Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement, concerning Italian desiderata in Asia Minor, was no longer valid since the consent of Russia had not been secured and it was unlikely that Bolsheviks

would approve such imperialistic claims. For Arabs, there were official letters written, promising their independence, but after securing victory, Britain claimed that there existed no official agreement signed by both parties, and therefore, although Britain was trying to establish Arab State(s), there were other things to consider. The disputed area among Allies was Syria, Palestine and Western Anatolia which was the territories delineated in the 1915 London Pact, Sykes-Picot and Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreements. Britain was not really interested in this part of Ottoman Empire, and never considered to include into the British Empire as far as the security of her Empire was maintained. In the case of Mesopotamia, Britain was willing to have a direct control because of various reasons, such as security of India and oil reserves. During the negotiations before and after the armistice, Mesopotamia '*de facto*' belonged to Britain, and was made into a matter to be disputed among Allies.

As far as Anatolia was concerned, there were Italians who were interested in Adalia and Smyrna region which were given to them through the agreements, on the other hand, Greece was fighting to get her bite in the region, claiming that ethnologically, Smyrna and its hinterland belonged to them, and therefore by the principles of nationality and self-determination, which were the reasons the Allies were fighting the war for, she should have the Western Anatolia, Thrace, Cyprus, and the Dodecanese Islands. Greece, considering the compromises she had made, believed that she deserved a better treatment, and further more it was necessary to expand her territories. Britain believed that Italy could be content with the Adalia and adjacent districts in southern Anatolia, since the essence of their policy was not to be treated less favourably than other powers in the Mediterranean settlement.

The Political Intelligence Branch of Foreign Office and War Office prepared reports, separately, to find answers for the Western Anatolia and Thrace as well as Constantinople before the commencement of the Conference. Both Foreign Office and War Office held the view that the Straits and both shores of Marmara Sea should be under the sovereignty of a new state supervised by League of Nations. The European border of this new state could extend up to Enos-Midia line and therefore excluding the Turks from Thrace and Constantinople all together. Foreign Office further suggested that the Western Anatolia should be given to Greece. The War Office's suggestion was not as clear as the Foreign Office, but nevertheless it was mentioned that the whole area as claimed by Greeks was ethnologically indefensible. On the other hand, the Turks had proved themselves unfit to govern

Europeans and the Greek population should be at least given a kind of autonomy under the supervision of League of Nations if the area was not to be left to Greeks. Therefore the War Office was not so much inclined of leaving the Smyrna region to Greeks. Another report within the British State mechanism was prepared by Arab Bureau. The Arab Bureau's suggestion was almost identical with the previous reports that the Turks should be excluded from Europe and Constantinople, and the Turks should be concentrated in Anatolia with a Capital in Bursa. The western Anatolia, the Smyrna region, was to be ceded to Greece and furthermore the Six Vilayets should be detached from Ottoman Empire to be included in Armenia. The Arab Bureau also suggested forming a new state in Northern Mesopotamia separate than Iraq, under the supervision of League of Nations.

Within the British state mechanism, Foreign Office, War Department and Arab Bureau considered that the best choice for the interests of Britain was to hand Thrace and Western Anatolia over to Greece, although there was a slight difference of opinion for the Western Anatolia due to military considerations. All three institutions agreed on the Straits to be under the jurisdiction of a separate state. The reason for the allocation of a vast area to Greece was to avoid Italy as Britain did not desire a strong European power to be located in a position of controlling the Levant. It was due to the same reasoning that Britain insisted to sign the armistice to avoid France to get a foot-hold in Levant. Their preference for Greece was due to indebtedness they owed to Venizelos and Greeks and, they further believed that, compared to France and Italy, Greeks were more controllable.

Under in any circumstances, both British State Machinery and Lloyd George were convinced to 'finish' the Turks in Europe and capture them in a concentrated region in Anatolia. Furthermore the State and the Cabinet with Lloyd George were convinced that the Smyrna region should be handed to Greeks. As far as the British Policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire was concerned there was a consensus within the echelon of the State and Lloyd George. This was the plan and the attitude of Britain as they were going to attend the Peace Conference in Paris, therefore the delineation of Ottoman frontiers was almost done, and a similar map was going to be drawn in Sevres.

The problematic of this era of Lloyd George was to find a way to sort out the partition of the Ottoman Empire, taking into account of balance in Europe and also among the Allies. The typical approach of 'duality' appeared in Lloyd George's

approach as well, for example at Saint-Jean de Maurienne his idea was to 'save the day', since he knew that very same concessions had already been offered to Greece and Greece was going to join the Allies soon. His picture of the Ottoman Empire in his War Aims looked very humane, but the interests of Britain overriding everything else and the principles did not count so much as in the case of signing the armistice with Turkey, although it was within the French Commander's jurisdiction zone. The 'duality' was going to be more apparent in the next phase, in Paris.

That was the 'Eastern Policy' of Britain before the Peace Negotiations in Paris. Ottomans and Germans signing Armistices on 30<sup>th</sup> October and 11<sup>th</sup> November 1918, respectively, were entering a new era of their history, and a new shape was going to be determined for Europe in Paris.

## CHAPTER V

### LOYD GEORGE and OTTOMAN EMPIRE: ONE SIDED PEACE

The war was over, and therefore it was the time to implement the war aims and hence to reshape the Europe. The first leg for such an effort was going to take place in Paris.

#### V.1 Lloyd George at Paris

It was decided that the Peace Conference should be held in Paris after the insistence of France, therefore France was going to be tasked with the secretariat of the Conference and the French Prime Minister, Clemenceau, was going to be the president of the Conference. Lloyd George and Colonel House, a close aide of President Wilson, had argued that the Peace Conference should be held at a different location, in a more neutral place, such as Geneva, but Clemenceau argued that France as the most affected country of the war deserved its capital to be chosen as the site of the Conference. Finally, after President being persuaded by French Prime Minister, Paris was chosen.<sup>1</sup> Wilson, initially was not willing to attend the Peace Conference, but was convinced after his discussion with Clemenceau, and he decided to be present in the Conference in person.

Before the Peace Conference, both America and Britain had carried parliamentary elections. The Congressional election in America turned out to be a disaster and a failure for the President. Since no treaty signed by an American President has any validity until it secures the formal ratification of the American Senate, Congressional election was going to have its effects in the Paris decisions and make the Allies to alter their policies especially for the Ottoman Empire, because of Mandates. In Britain, a general election, because of its nature known as 'coupon election' took place and Lloyd George without a party behind to support him, managed to secure its leadership and headed the 'coalition'. The elections turned out to be a victory for Labour who contested out of Coalition, and Conservatives. Conservatives winning more seats in the Parliament was going to cause Lloyd George to resign in coming

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<sup>1</sup> Lloyd George, *The Truth About the Peace Treaties* Vol. I, p. 147-149, (London Victor: Gollancz Ltd. 1938)

years. According to Lloyd George, the elections secured him and his Cabinet the mandate for the Peace Conference and a free hand to act. The Election campaign was important from the perspective of peace negotiations since most of the issues and Lloyd George's views were tabled before the electorates. According to Lloyd George he needed a 'vote of confidence' to negotiate the Peace and to carry through a comprehensive policy of reconstruction, and asked for a mandate to conclude a just, but not a vindictive, peace. He laid down his principles for the Conference during the election campaign as;

"We must not allow any sense of revenge, any spirit of greed, any grasping desire to overrule the fundamental principles of righteousness...A mandate for this Government at the forthcoming election will mean that the British delegation to the Peace Conference will be in favour of a just peace."<sup>2</sup>

Lloyd George, with his speeches during the campaign, managed to address to the sentiments of British people in saying that; "*What is our task? To make Britain a fit country for heroes to live in.*"<sup>3</sup> This phrase was going to become, as he had pointed out, a historic slogan. Lloyd George's policy with regard to the Ottoman Empire was not openly declared, but imbedded in his speeches as;

"...And in the international settlement I would like to see the best traditions of Mr. Gladstone's life embodied in the settlement of Europe and the affairs of the world: regard for national liberty, national rights, whether nations be great or small. Let us have the best traditions of both and all parties."<sup>4</sup>

Whether he was 'just' in his attitude and for 'national rights' during Peace Conference was to be seen.

The Peace Conference was formally opened on 18<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918, and a decision making mechanism was set up as 'Council of Ten', comprising of leaders, President Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Orlando, and foreign ministers, Lansing, Balfour, Pichon and Sonnino, and in addition of two representatives from Japan. Commissions to deal with certain issues were established, such as League of Nations, Reparations, Responsibilities of the Authors of War, International Labour Legislation and International Regime of Ports, Waterways and Railways. Wilson and Lloyd George returned to their countries and therefore were absent from the Conference from mid February and mid March respectively, and on their return in April 1919, to speed up the Conference, it was decided to form an inner body,

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid, p.162

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, p. 163-164

<sup>4</sup> Ibid, p. 159, from the speech of Lloyd George at the commencement of the Election at the Central Hall.

known as 'Big Four'.<sup>5</sup> Then 'Big Four' became the decision making platform, and an arena of solving the conflicts that existed between the Allies.

Britain was represented by Lloyd George and Balfour, with Hankey acting as a secretary of the British Delegation and later on of 'Big Four', and there were a large number of experts from Foreign Office, Imperial General Staff, and from various Ministries to accompany the British Team.

Before the Conference, British Government had formed several commissions to delineate the British Policy with regard to issues to be debated in Paris, such as 'Freedom of Sea', 'Repatriation', 'Punishment of Kaiser' and 'Upper Silesia'.

In fact preparations for the peace conference had started much earlier in late 1916. A 'Preparatory Commission' within the Department of Political Intelligence of the Foreign Office, headed by Sir William Tyrell was set up and began the work, practically covering whole aspects, which were going to be the basis of Paris Peace Conference. Tyrell managed to produce 'Peace Handbook', comprising of 167 studies.<sup>6</sup>

With regard to the future of the Ottoman Empire, there was a considerable amount of work being done before the Conference, such as the reports prepared by Foreign Office and War Department.<sup>7</sup> Although British Policy was almost determined, but she was anxious about President Wilson's attitude for the future of the Ottoman Empire, since the 'Fourteen Point' declaration in January 1918 with Article XII had brought a different approach compared with British.<sup>8</sup>

### **V.1.1 Mandates for the Ottoman Empire**

Greece before Peace Conference submitted the 'Greek Proposal' on 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918. The Proposal signed by Venizelos resembled 'desires of Greeks' in Northern

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<sup>5</sup> Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas Gould, "Peace without Promise, Britain and the Peace Conferences, 1919-23", (USA, Connecticut: Archon Books, Hamden, 1981), p. 23-29

<sup>6</sup> Nicholas Rizopoulos, "Greece at Paris Conference", PhD. Thesis, Yale University, 1963, p. 67-68

<sup>7</sup> Please see Chapter IV for the Foreign Office and War Department reports of 2<sup>nd</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918

<sup>8</sup> President Wilson, on 7<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918, brought his views with regard to war and what would be the general policy that should be adopted after the war, into a single 'paper' known as 'Fourteen Point' Declaration. Article XII concerned Ottoman Empire, as; "*The Turkish portions of present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to their ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees*"

Epirus, Thrace and in Asia Minor.<sup>9</sup> Venizelos requested the whole portion of Thrace to be annexed to Greece and for Constantinople, according to Venizelos, “*With the suppression of Ottoman sovereignty, the natural solution would be to adjudge Constantinople and its Vilayet to Greece, while establishing international guarantees for the freedom of the Straits.*”<sup>10</sup> To Venizelos that was natural, since Constantinople was a Greek colony before the conquest by Turks, and also because of the location of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarch. Venizelos indicated that, Greeks’ claims could be withdrawn, if the city and a sufficient hinterland with it were to be an international state under the guardianship of League of Nations. For Asia Minor, the Greek Proposal was asking west of Brussa [Bursa], Aidin [Aydin] and Smyrna [Izmir] region to be annexed to the mother country, Greece. Venizelos was also willing to leave Trebizond [Trabzon] and Adana, to the Armenian State, though there existed a considerable Greek population. Venizelos further requested that in the region which was to be incorporated to Greece, the Turks should sell their properties to Greeks and in the region which was to be left for the future Turkey, the Greeks to be immigrated to Greek region and sell their properties to Turks. It was also proposed that Aegean islands by considering the population existed, to be annexed to the mother country. The Proposal submitted by Venizelos, had remarkably similar clauses as laid down in the memorandum sent by the British Ambassador in Athens to Balfour earlier in November 1918, therefore the ‘Greek Claims’ were not strange to Foreign Office.<sup>11</sup> Venizelos based his claims for Asia Minor on the Greek population existed in the Western Anatolia, which was over one and half million and on culture and history of the area. Venizelos was going to ‘prove’ his figures for the Greek population in Western Anatolia by using German pamphlets.<sup>12</sup>

The Greek proposal of 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918 was analyzed in a meeting at the Foreign Office on 25<sup>th</sup> of January. Balfour indicated that they should base their study on the assessment that the Turks to leave Europe, but the successor in Thrace excluding

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<sup>9</sup> House of Lords, Public Records, Lloyd George Papers (Lloyd George Papers), LG/F/92/9/1.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office (PRO), FO 406/40 Doc. No: 46. The letter sent by Sir Granville on 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1918, enclosed a memorandum, prepared by, according to Granville, “a member of my staff who has resided in Greece for many years and whose judgments, while friendly to the Greeks are not by any means prejudiced in their favour”.

<sup>12</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/147/8/11, Venizelos wrote to the ‘President of Council’ and Lloyd George on 22<sup>nd</sup> Jan. 1919 in which he enclosed a copy of an essay written by Dr. Karl Dieterich on ‘Hellenism in Asia Minor’. The essay mentioned the Greek population in Asia Mino as 1,590,000, which was, according to Venizelos, very close to his figures. Venizelos seemed overjoyed to find the ‘proof’ and he wrote as ‘...*To my mind no better testimony could be found of the correctness of my figures (in the absence of trustworthy official statements), than the adduced by a German Professor who can by no means be said to have been prejudiced of that element which has been the target of German and Turkish aggression*’.

Constantinople, which must be placed under a special regime, was a matter for discussion and not decided yet by the War Cabinet. Lord Hardinge, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Office, believed that if it were for Greece, Venizelos would be more easily satisfied in Asia Minor, but Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office, thought that what Venizelos wanted, was annexation of the Greek zone about Smyrna [Izmir], and Italians told him that they would be ready to give this up, if their zone extended to Scala Nova [Kuşadası]. Foreign Office believed that it would be difficult to make decision then, without knowing the President Wilson's proposals. Hardinge drew the attention of the danger of leaving Constantinople under a regime such as a Governor appointed by the powers which was what Venizelos proposed, probably with the hope that it would be easier for Greece, on the analogy of Crete; to intrigue and agitate until it became Greek. In general terms it was concluded that Constantinople and the Straits, owing to its position, should remain an international city, whether entrusted to one mandatory or to a council, whatever its population was.<sup>13</sup>

On Venizelos' proposal, British General staff drew their objections, such as for Thrace; the Turkish population in Adrianople [Edirne] was 500,000, and therefore whole of the Adrianople Vilayet should be included under the same jurisdiction as Constantinople. For Venizelos' proposal of annexation of Western Anatolia to Greece, General Staff believed that there was a clash between Greek and Turkish figures for Smyrna and also there was a Turkish majority of 300,000 in Aidin Vilayet. Another important aspect was the railway system, and if Turks were going to loose Constantinople, for Anatolian railway system, connecting Angora [Ankara], Konia [Konya] and Afium [Afyon], they needed to have Smyrna as an outlet. For a peaceful settlement of Anatolia, General Staff concluded that Smyrna should stay with the Turks.<sup>14</sup>

French forces, on 21<sup>st</sup> of Dec. 1918, occupied Mersina [Mersin] and Adana with the consent of Commander-in-Chief General Allenby. Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador in Rome, believed that the Italians would be forced to occupy some other Turkish regions in view of French occupation of Mersina and Adana. The reason of Italian annoyance was due to the fact that these were the places that they had fought for, so hard in connection with the Asia Minor agreements, but because of French attitude some other compensation was found in the agreement of 1917.

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<sup>13</sup> PRO, FO/608/88, Doc. 803, The minutes taken by Louis Mallet, from Foreign Office, 25<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

Britain had been telling Italy that because of unavailability of Russian consent for the 1917 agreement, it should be considered as null and was constantly proposing a revision of the Eastern agreements generally. While these were taking place, with the consent of Allenby, the occupation of Mersina and Adana would show to Italians that on one hand the Anglo-French agreement had been in force, whereas Anglo-Italian was not, and that was the contradiction of the British policy.<sup>15</sup> As expected, Italy was going to occupy Adalia [Antalya] on 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

As soon as the Armistice signed with the Ottoman Empire, the Greeks living as citizens of Ottoman Empire and throughout the world, initiated an active propaganda regarding the territories that they wished to be annexed to Greece, and started pleading to Allies. In Constantinople, the Greek press was constantly asserting that arms were being distributed among Moslems and Greeks were inclined to believe this story, and therefore were alarmed. British High Commissioner in Constantinople, Carlthorpe, was trying to take precautions to prevent the Greeks from adopting a provocative attitude towards Turks. According to Carlthorpe there appeared to be a reason to think that this was done with the view of giving rise to an incident which would call for drastic measures by the Allies.<sup>16</sup> Pleas for Greece came also from unredeemed Greek population residing in USA, asking Lloyd George to hand over Western Anatolia and Aegean islands to Greece. Pamphlets for 'Hellenism in Asia Minor' were distributed to the War Cabinet members. A Memorandum prepared by 'National Council of Unredeemed Greeks' was sent to Allied Governments, claiming for Greeks, all Maritime Provinces of Asia Minor together with Constantinople to be incorporated to Greece. Dorotheos, Metropolitan of Brussa [Bursa], in name of Holy Snod., demanded union of all unredeemed Greeks and handing over of Constantinople to Greece, by blaming Turks of destroying Greek culture and civilization.<sup>17</sup> Aspirations were pouring to the Delegates of the Peace Conference, and one of them was posted to represent 'Legitimate Representatives of Thrace and of the Committee of Greek Populations in Asia Minor'. They requested the aid of the British Delegates in securing the inclusion of Thrace and Asia Minor into their mother country, Greece, and stated that they spoke in the name of thousands of refugees.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/16/2/18, Sir Rodd's letter to Balfour, 29<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918.

<sup>16</sup> PRO, FO 406/40 Doc. No: 55, letter to Balfour from Carlthorpe, signed by Richard Webb, 29<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1918,

<sup>17</sup> PRO, FO 688/80 Doc. 925, 127767, 2465.

<sup>18</sup> PRO, FO 608/80, E 30510. Arnold Toynbee, who was an expert on Eastern Desk at the Foreign Office and a member of British Delegation at the Peace Conference, commented on this plea as "*This can hardly be accepted as an expression of the views of the people concerned. There is no evidence*

Venizelos, apart from planning of Greek Organizations to protest against Turks and Turkish rule in Ottoman Empire, and therefore paving the way for reunion with Greece, was also trying to implement his plans of 'buying Turks out' in the regions to be allocated to Greece.<sup>19</sup> The policy of Venizelos was found as dangerous and paving the way to trouble in Asia Minor by A. Toynbee. Toynbee believed that the future of the non-Turkish elements in Anatolia should be solved, not by partition and segregation, but by the appointment of a mandatory Power for the whole country. According to Toynbee, the difficulty lied in the choice of 'Mandatory', "*if it falls upon Italy (however restricted her mandate) Smyrna and a certain 'Greek Reserve' will have to be excluded from Anatolia*"<sup>20</sup> Lord Hardinge, from his conversation with Prof. Westermann, of American Delegation, had the idea that Westermann was strongly opposed to the annexation of Western Anatolia to Greece and there was a doubt on the American side about population figures as was given by Venizelos and they

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*that signatories represent them*". Arnold Toynbee was going to be known as one of the most prominent historians of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century.

<sup>19</sup> PRO, FO 608/88 Doc. 2869. The policy of Venizelos was utterly criticized by Sir Ramsey, who was from Aidin-Smyrna Railway Syndicate, in his letter to Louis Mallet, on 12<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1919, as; "*I would only add(what is sure to have already attracted your attention) that when Venizelos as indicated by his supporters in the "New Europe", speaks about calling out Greeks from the Turkish part of Anatolia into that reserved for the Greeks and buying out Turkish owners in the Greek reservation, he is denying history and running contrary to the whole tide of events and the whole current of Greek national tendency through out the last 3000 years. The function of the Greek people has been to colonize; without their colonies there would have been no Hellenism, no literate to speak of, and no Greek importance in the world. It was in the clash of nations and the conflict, peaceful or war like but especially peaceful and trading of varying nationalities that everything great in Greece arose, from the Iliad downwards. It is mournful to see a person like Venizelos, who had been credited with statesmanlike views, permits such an idea as this to be circulated by his supporters. Moreover to buy out the Turks from the tract of country which is said to be claimed by him, extending from the Marmora [Marmara] east of Panderma [Bandirma] right down to the Lycian coast (as I am informed to-day by an American diplomat friend straight from Paris) is totally impossible. There will be constant fighting and serious suffering, if the attempt is made to put the Turkish population of this region under the Greeks; and it will cost the Greeks dear in blood to enforce their sovereignty, while they could not possibly raise money enough to buy the land in the open market, if the owners were willing to sell. One can not, however, induce those mountaineers to go or sell. Moreover the Greeks of Asia Minor are not willing to give up their livelihood and come to Greek reservation. I could take you to see estates of considerable extent and value in various parts of the Turkish country now in the possession of Greek owners; and any impediment to the free flow of trade between the Turkish and the Greek reservations, which would be certain to result if there were created, such an artificial line of racial distinction between them, would destroy much of the trade of merchants in Smyrna, who are largely Greek. Those 'irredentists don't know what they are doing. They were fanatics. Also the function of the Anatolian Peninsula has since 1500 B.C. been that of a bridge across which the currents of communication between Asia and Europe flow; and to cut it up into separate parts would be the most effective way of stopping communication and impeding that free natural flow of ideas between Asia and Europe which has been, according to my historical theory, the mainspring in stimulating the progress of civilization, not always equally placed in to the outer world, but always really important and sometimes most evident.*" And the letter was ended with an additional note about Anatolian Greeks, as; "*P.S. One point seems very pertinent. In the Greco-Turkish War, about 1896, there were many Greeks in Aidin Vilayet, who were by birth Rayahs and who had succeeded through bribing Turkish Officials in being admitted to the list of Greeks of Greece proper under the protection of the Greek Consul. When the war broke out all these were given the choice of either leaving the country or going back to Greece proper, abandoning their occupation or of assuming their position as Rayahs. A few of them were possibly really by birth Greeks of Greece; they all without exception took the position of Rayahs, Turkish subjects*".

<sup>20</sup> PRO, FO 608/88 Doc. 2869, Toynbee's 'side-note', 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919.

believed that the majority of Greek population was not in existence. Prof. Westermann also was questioning the existence of local demand for union with Greece. The conclusion reached at the end of a conversation between Louis Mallet from British Foreign Office, Prof. Westermann and Toynbee for the Greek annexation of Western Anatolia, after analyzing the population proportionality of Greeks and Turks, that there should be no annexation to Greece, unless political necessity makes it a necessity. According to Louis Mallet, Prof. Westermann was opposed to cession of Western Anatolia to Greece, on the ground that Smyrna was an international port for this hinterland. In the meeting, they also drew the importance of Mender [Menderes] valley, since it was the richest in the region and Venizelos was after that part of the territory to be annexed to Greece, although Turks were in majority in that valley compared to Greeks. The note prepared by Mallet along the views expressed, was presented to Sir Robert Bowen, the Canadian Prime Minister and the head of British Delegation for the 'Greek Claim Commission', but was returned with no comment. Hardinge wrote that the British Delegates in the Greek Claim Commission should take a note to the views expressed by Mallet.<sup>21</sup>

Representatives of USA, Britain, France, Italy, and Japan had a meeting at the French Foreign Office, Quai d'Orsay, on 30<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918 to discuss the future of the Ottoman Empire, and there, certain resolutions with regard to dissolution of the Ottoman Empire were reached. The non-Turkish provinces as Arabia, Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, and Armenia should be separated from the Ottoman Empire, without prejudice to the settlement of other parts of the Turkish Empire. The resolution No: 6 was related to the partition of the Ottoman Empire, since these states had reached to a stage of development where their existence as independent nations could be provisionally recognized. It was also foreseen that these states to be formed were in need of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory power until such time that they could stand alone. The meeting laid down a principle that the mandatory power would be chosen on the base of the wishes of the nations concerned.<sup>22</sup> The responsibilities of the mandatory power was not clearly identified and on general terms it was proposed that the power was to be appointed by the League of Nations. The mandatory power, as a hidden rule, was going to be given 'advices' on every field in a similar manner to the Ottoman Depth Organization, therefore a dominion in modern term.

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<sup>21</sup> PRO, FO 608/88, E 2869, 'side notes' of Hardinge, and Louis Mallet, 1<sup>st</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>22</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 98-99

British politics with regard to the Ottoman Empire and Smyrna was almost determined as commented by Harold Nicholson, as he wrote in his diary on 31<sup>st</sup> Jan. 1918;

“Hardinge takes view that Turkey must retain Smyrna. In this he is supported by the soldiers. Crowe takes opposite view. In the end decided that it should go to Greece with a zone”<sup>23</sup>

Venizelos presented his Memorandum, circulated on 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918, to the Supreme Council on 3<sup>rd</sup> of Feb. 1919. He was sure of himself and as was Prof. Westermann was going to write later *“He made an exceedingly good impression.”*<sup>24</sup> He talked about ‘National consciousnesses’ of Greece, and reiterated Greek claims for Epirus, Thrace and Aegean Islands, while omitting the claims for Asia Minor. He told Supreme Council that Greece was expecting that in due time Britain was going to hand over the island of Cyprus to her. Venizelos appeared again the following day, on 4<sup>th</sup> February, before the Supreme Council, for the Greek territory claims and, tried to win the American sympathy. He told that they were willing to accept internationalization of Constantinople, and would make the Aegean ports, in Anatolia, international ports for Turkish utilization. At the end of the session, with the proposal of Lloyd George, it was decided to set up a committee to study the Greek claims, although Italians did not wish it. The impact of Venizelos’ performance was felt by the audience in the Supreme Council and even President Wilson applauded and commented that *“Hear! Hear! Says President Wilson clapping silent palms. Clemenceau as usual wears the half smile of an irritated, skeptical and neurasthetic gorilla”*<sup>25</sup>

Lloyd George proposed Sir Robert Bowden, the Canadian Prime Minister, and Sir Crowe as members of British members of the Committee and also Nicolson as an expert to accompany the delegates. Harold Nicholson was a third Secretary in the Embassy and was known as his pro Greek views and especially for his admiration of Venizelos. Nicolson was going to write in his ‘Diary’ that *“I support it on the whole, although line in Asia Minor is excessive...Thrace both E [Eastern] and W [Western] justified. Asia Minor justified, but not with the whole of the Aidin Vilayet and the*

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<sup>23</sup> Harold Nicholson, *Peacekeeping*, p. 253, (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1984), “Diary” 31 of January 1919. Sir Eyre Crowe was the Assistant Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office at the time of Paris Peace Conference. He was going to be the Under-Secretary after the appointment of Lord Hardinge as the British Ambassador after Lord Derby. Sir Eyre Crowe was quite active in the Greek Commission since the head of the British Delegation, Bowden, the Canadian Prime Minister, was more occupied with the domestic problems in Canada. Sir Eyre Crowe was known as pro-Hellenic.

<sup>24</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 102

<sup>25</sup> Nicolson, p. 216-217, “Diary” 4<sup>th</sup> of February 1919.

*Mender valley*<sup>26</sup> Therefore with Lloyd George's orders, Sir Eyre Crowe and Harold Nicolson both of whom known as of their pro-Greek attitudes and Sir Bowden who was pre-occupied with his domestic political problems were nominated for the fate of the Ottoman Empire.

The first meeting of the 'Greek Commission' was held on 12<sup>th</sup> of February. Venizelos' claim regarding to North Epirus was debated and especially American and Italian delegates pointed out the impossibility of a division of the territory according to language, ethnography and religion alone, to the contrary of Venizelos.<sup>27</sup> It was the view of the meeting that it was impossible to divide the administrative areas so that they would include an absolute majority of one or the other race. In the Fourth Meeting, on 20<sup>th</sup> of February, the Thrace issue was discussed and it was agreed to submit a proposal to the Supreme Council of Peace Conference that a line would be drawn in Eastern Thrace, probably Enos to Midia line, which should be decided by them. According to the proposal the eastern part of the line would belong to International State of Constantinople, and the rest of the territory should go to Greece. This proposal was reached on the assumption that there would be no Turkish state in Europe, although, especially in Eastern Thrace the majority of the population was Turkish. The delegates also assumed that Turks in Thrace preferred Greeks rather than Bulgarians, and therefore they reached the decision that Greek claims in Thrace should be met.<sup>28</sup> Asia Minor issue was debated in the Fifth Meeting, on 21<sup>st</sup> of February, and by American Delegate, Westermann, the figures as respect to Greek population in Western Anatolia was challenged. According to Westermann, only in Smyrna, Greeks were in majority, but in the rest of the regions which was claimed by Venizelos Turks outnumbered Greeks. Westermann also questioned whether Anatolian Greeks really wanted to join Greece or not. The French was in favour with the Greek proposal, since as a defeated enemy, Turkey should expect to loose her territories. British, although agreed with Venizelos' claims, but believed a lesser territory, a more restricted region around Smyrna, should be handed over to Greece. The Committee with the insistence of French Chairman, Ambassador Cambon, invited Venizelos to table his case in the next meeting, although such a policy was against the agreed procedures. The Italians objected in discussing the Anatolian issue, since Supreme

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<sup>26</sup> Nicolson, p. 250, "Diary" 27<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1919.

<sup>27</sup> PRO, FO 608/37/4, 2350.

<sup>28</sup> PRO, FO 608/37/4, 3145.

Council had not made a decision on the future of Turkey and Constantinople yet.<sup>29</sup> Venizelos attended Sixth and Seventh Meetings, on 24<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of February, to explain his part of the case, indicating that in Thrace, Turks preferred Greek regime and they were protected by the legislations there, even as a proof he read letters sent to him by the Turks.<sup>30</sup> The Committee's Report was prepared on 6<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 to be submitted to the Supreme Council.

In summary: For the Western Thrace; The American, British and French Delegations agreed in principle to accept the Greek claims with some minor modifications, whereas the Italian Delegation agreed in principle, but had their reservation with regard to frontiers. The Committee agreed unanimously to hand over the Western Thrace to Greece, with some reservations and minor modifications;

*For Eastern Thrace;* American, British and French Delegations agreed in principle to accept the Greek claims with some minor modifications, whereas the Italian Delegation agreed in principle, but had their reservation with regard to frontiers, with the hypotheses that City of Constantinople, the Sea of Marmara and the Straits be constituted by the Supreme Council into a separate zone.

*For Minor Asia;* The British and French Delegations agreed for the Western Anatolia to be united to Greece, although there were some differences of opinion for the frontiers. The American Delegation were opposed to these districts being detached from Turkey. The Italian Delegation refused even to discuss the Greek claims, since that portion of Anatolia claimed by Greece could not be separated from the general settlement, from a political, ethnic and economic point of view, of Anatolia, and in addition to this, Italians believed that Asia Minor issue should be handled by international arrangements.<sup>31</sup>

The 'Greek Claim' Report was submitted to Supreme Council on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1919, where was discussed on 9<sup>th</sup> of March, and returned back to the Commission to prepare the document in 'Treaty' form. Venizelos, knowing the criticism extended by Italians and more important by Americans, had sufficient time to work on the differences of opinions and started in convincing tours. He knew that it was not possible to convince the Italians, since they both had the same desires for the Western Anatolia, so the only choice left was the Americans, and especially President Wilson. Venizelos had carried similar convincing tours with British

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<sup>29</sup> PRO, FO 608/37/4, 3673.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid, 3662 and 3526 for the 6th and 7th Meetings,

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, and British War Cabinet W.C.P. 401.

Delegation. Venizelos met Harold Nicolson, probably for a dinner, on 13<sup>th</sup> of January to discuss the Greek claims. For Thrace, Venizelos made it quite clear that Greece expected to annex the whole of Bulgarian and Turkish Thrace, and that this claim was no way alternative to the simultaneous union with Greece of the Greek territories in Asia Minor. For Asia Minor, he stressed the view of Greek population being in majority, giving reference to German statistics of 1915. Venizelos had a similar meeting with the other member of British Delegation, Sir Eyre Crowe, on 18<sup>th</sup> of January.<sup>32</sup> It was clear that Venizelos was keeping a close surveillance of the two most prominent member of the 'Committee' and trying to influence them with his own views.

Harold Nicolson, on 26<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1919, prepared a paper giving a précis and commentary of Venizelos' memorial to Peace Conference. Nicolson considered that the Greek claim was justified as regards Dodecanese, Aegean Islands, Thrace and Northern Epirus, except as regards Koritsa. He believed that Greek claim in Asia Minor should be modified to enclave Smyrna and Aidin vilayets. Nicolson submitted his paper to Crowe for his comments, and be known if there was anything in any details that it diverged from the British Policy.<sup>33</sup> The Nicolson's document with Sir Eyre Crowe's comments and modifications was published on 28<sup>th</sup> of January for the distribution to the British and Dominion Delegation. The final document as was published and distributed for comments within British Delegation had the 'Conclusion' of;

"Northern Epirus: Greek claim justified, except as regards Koritsa, in respect to which, nevertheless some concession to Greece may have to be made.  
Thrace: Greek claim justified, except as regards Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse, which ought to go to Bulgaria.  
Asia Minor: Greek claim not justified within frontiers proposed by M. Venizelos. Preferable to modify this line as shown in red on the map.  
Islands: Greek claim justified as regards Dodecanese and Aegean Islands.  
Cyprus not be ceded."<sup>34</sup>

The comments for the Memorandum, were received from General Staff on 7<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1919. General Staff's view for the North Epirus was that the Greek claim was justified on strategically grounds, but the whole area claimed by Greece, appeared to be somewhat larger than what was really warranted by ethnical grounds. For Thrace, General Staff's comments differed from Political Section of British Delegation, such that; the proposed inclusion of Thrace to Greece would involve over half a million Turks being forced to live under Greek flag and most important of

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<sup>32</sup> PRO, FO 608/37/1, E 161,

<sup>33</sup> PRO, FO 608/37/1, E 775.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid.

all in an area where they were in majority over Greeks. General Staff believed that, it would be difficult to explain the unification of this region to Greece, on the principles of self-determination. Another objection put forward was for Adrianople and Kirk Kilisse [Kırklareli], it was commented that these towns from geographical and economical aspects were a part of the Thrace and not to Bulgaria and Bulgarian claim from ethnographic point of view was relatively negligible, whilst strategically their acquisition would be of considerable advantage to Bulgaria. In order to eliminate the possible friction in future, General Staff proposed that the Turks should be made to migrate from the area or as a second alternative; this area could be included in the internationalized state of Constantinople. General Staff as a last resort proposed that if these alternatives were not to be implemented due to political reasons, then Adrianople [Edirne] and Kirk Kilisse should not be separated from those portions of Thrace which were handed over to Greece.<sup>35</sup>

General Staff's views regarding Anatolia differed entirely from Political Section of British Delegation. The General Staff emphasized the importance of the retention of Smyrna and Asia Minor by the Turks. They believed that the handling over of Smyrna and a considerable hinterland to Greece would deprive Anatolia of its main outlet and of an important portion of its railway system. This, together with the placing of a large Turkish population under Greek rule, would give the Turks a just cause for resentment. General Staff further commented that the resentment undoubtedly would be the source of continual unrest possibly resulting in an organized attempt by the Turks to re-cover this territory. The General Staff considered that the peaceful settlement of Turkey as a legitimate military interest, and therefore urged that Smyrna should not be separated from the Turkish State of Anatolia except as an unavoidable political reason.<sup>36</sup>

Harold Nicolson was not in agreement with the General Staff's comments regarding to Thrace and Western Anatolia, and he commented on the views as;

"... (2)As regards Thrace, I can not see how the International Administration of the Straits can possibly accept responsibility for so large an area. Moreover Eastern Thrace is ethnically Greek if we exclude C'ple [Constantinople],  
(3) I do not think that the economic argument regarding Smyrna applies provided (a) the Meander [Menderes] valley is left to Turkey with Scala Nova (b) The port of Smyrna is rendered free under International guarantee"<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Ibid, E 1575

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, Nicholson's side-note, 7<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1919.

Sir Eyre Crowe was in agreement with Nicolson, and therefore disagreed with General Staff with regard to the future of the Ottoman Empire. He wrote as; *"I agree with Mr. Nicolson's views. But the military consideration will be born in mind"*<sup>38</sup>

When the 'Greek Claim' Report was returned to the Committee with instructions to finalize the Document to reach unanimity in their recommendations, at least for the Northern Epirus, Nicolson worked on different alternatives with the hope that they could achieve consensus. In his letter to Sir Eyre Crowe, wrote that, it was extremely unlikely that any unanimity could now be reached, or that, even if a concordance of views was achieved. Nicolson presented a plan which brought some compromises to both sides that would create unanimity, but while maintaining the Franco-British recommendations in regard to the Greek claims. Nicolson's proposal for the Asia Minor was to introduce a mandatory for Greek claimed area. According to Nicolson, the Americans admitted that in the Sandjak [Sancak] of Smyrna the Greeks held an absolute majority and they could not logically contest that this Sandjak should not be united with Greece so long as the necessary economic outlet was to be guaranteed to Turkey. His plan was to propose that Greece should be given an absolute possession of the port and Sandjak of Smyrna and at the same time to appoint a mandate for the whole territory claimed by Venizelos, which contained so vast a proportion of Greek population. Nicolson wrote that his proposal was not the most desirable of all solutions, since it would be throwing upon Greece a burden which that country might be unable to undertake. To remedy the situation, he proposed certain Allied financial assistance and international supervision that could be imposed upon Greece in the exercise of this mandate. Nicolson's proposal was based upon the belief that;

"feel strongly, not only that the Greek claims in Asia Minor are justified, not only that we will be morally lacking if we allow this sensitive and progressive civilization to be again subordinated to the Turks, but that the personal position of M. Venizelos will be seriously undermined if he returns to Greece without having secured the liberation of the Greeks of Anatolia"<sup>39</sup>

Sir Eyre Crowe's comment on Nicolson's letter was; *"I presume, incidentally, that failing 'unanimity' a 3-1 vote (British, French, U.S. Delegation versus the Italians) will do."*<sup>40</sup> It is doubtful that Nicolson drew his plan by himself, without the knowledge of Venizelos, since he had been seeing Venizelos regularly and there was a close relationship between them. During his visit to Venizelos on 6<sup>th</sup> of March, Nicolson found Venizelos being in stress, because of American opposition to the Greek

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid, E 1575, Sir Eyre Crowe's side-note.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, E 4392 Harold Nicolson's letter to Sir Eyre Crowe, 15<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, E 4392, side-note of Sir Eyre Crowe.

claims in Smyrna, and Nicolson had to console him in advising that they should wait for the President to come back, then to tackle him.<sup>41</sup> For Venizelos the only choice was to convince the Americans, since he knew that British and French were on his side and there was no possibility of having Italians on his side especially after his meeting with Orlando, Prime Minister of Italy, and Baron Sonnino, the Foreign Minister, in December 1918 on his way to Paris Peace Conference. Sonnino declined to discuss the Dodecanese and North Epirus issues and he told Venizelos bluntly that he would like to keep these two issues as pawns in his hands to help him in the bargaining at the Peace Conference. There was another meeting between Italians and Greeks, on the request of Sonnino and there, he made a secret proposal to Venizelos on 19<sup>th</sup> of January 1919. The Italian proposal had some conditions, which were; Greece should cede the whole coastline of Northern Epirus and a considerable hinterland with it to Italy, for return Italy, was promising to help Greeks for Dodecanese and Smyrna. Venizelos met again with Sonnino regarding the secret proposal on 26<sup>th</sup> of January. According to Venizelos, Sonnino discussed only the Epirus issue without mentioning their concessions for the Dodecanese and Smyrna, and as far Venizelos was concerned the negotiations between Italy and Greece became to an end. Venizelos told British military officials in secrecy that his foreign policy in the past had been based upon the conviction that Greece's future would always depend on Britain and for the future that was the line he would like to proceed. To show his sincerity Venizelos proposed that any naval base or port in Greek territory and in the areas to be Greek would be always at the entire disposal of Britain for any purpose they might be required.<sup>42</sup>

Representatives of all sections in the British Delegation in the Peace Conference had a meeting on 31<sup>st</sup> Jan. 1919, with the chairmanship of Lord Hardinge. "*The object of the Meeting was to present the British Plenipotentiaries with joint views on the conflicting claims of Italy and Greece in the Near East as they affected British interests.*"<sup>43</sup> Hardinge declared the Foreign Office's view that they preferred the presence of Greece in Smyrna to that of Italy. Admiralty's view was that the islands in the Aegean, including Lemnos, should be ceded to Greece and that it was essential that the Italians should not get any concessions in Anatolia if the Treaty provisions could be overcome. Representative of General Staff, General Thwaites,

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<sup>41</sup> Nicholson, p. 278, 'Diary' 6<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>42</sup> PRO, FO 608/37, E 1411, a secret report addressed to Earl Granville, British Minister in Athens, by the Naval Attaché, 3<sup>rd</sup> of Feb. 1919.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, 'Views of a Conference held at the Astoria on January 31<sup>st</sup>, 1919, between representatives of the Departmental Missions of the British Delegation' in Draft (Amended version).

suggested the retention of Smyrna by the Turks and the retention of Cyprus by Britain. The Air Ministry was in complete agreement with the Admiralty as regard to the Aegean islands. The Board of Trade's representative had no observation to make except that Smyrna-Aidin Railway should be controlled by one nation whether it is Turkey or Greece. The Meeting was concluded with the decision that;

"It was agreed that provided full economic outlet was given to the future Turkish state via Smyrna and Scala Nova, there would be no objection from the point of view of British interests to Greece obtaining a territorial zone in Smyrna and the Vilayet of Aidin"<sup>44</sup>

Supreme Council had been hesitant to tackle the 'Ottoman Empire' issue, because of its complexity. Besides, to the 'Greek claims' that caused tension among the Allies, there was also the mandatory problem waiting to be solved for Constantinople, Cilicia, and Arab lands. Emir Faisal had been getting impatient about Syria. Britain was not sure whether to keep Syria for herself or bend to the French desires for her to have a mandate over Syria. In case she wanted to keep Syria, which was what Feisal was requesting, and therefore not to leave Syria to French, had to find ways and means to convince France. The relation between France and Britain was already very tense due to the conflict of policy towards Alsace-Lorain and Poland, and therefore Britain had to try to please France in Eastern Mediterranean, but at the same time not to let Syria to go away. At this juncture Louis Mallet prepared series of memorandums on the issues of mandatory in Syria and Constantinople. Louis Mallet, in his first Memorandum on the 29<sup>th</sup> of January, stated his personal views and also of M. Victor Berard, who declared what would be acceptable to France. M. Berard suggested that General Smuts' scheme for League of Nations be accepted, so that Britain to be mandatory for Arabian countries from Amanus to Indian Ocean with the exception of Lebanon, which would be constituted as an independent member of the Arab Federation, under a governor appointed by League of Nations, instead of the Ottoman Empire. In the scheme suggested, America be charged with Armenia, Italy with Anatolia, Greece being mandatory for zone north of Scala Nova, and France be mandatory of Constantinople and Straits, with establishing Constantinople as a Free City, possibly of the League of Nations.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> PRO, FO 608/116, E 1041, Memorandum by Louis Mallet, of 29<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1919. Arnold Toynbee's reaction for the Mallet' suggestion on 10<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919 was; "*It seems as if it would be possible for M.E. [Middle East] sections of the British and American Delegations to reach agreement very much on these lines, except that France would have a mandate in Lebanon as well as Constantinople; the Greek territory in Anatolia would be cut down or even abolished, and if given, would be given not under a mandate but in full sovereignty; and that the Italian mandate, in the Turkish State of Anatolia, would*

Sir Louis Mallet's second Memorandum of 11<sup>th</sup> of February showed importance of Arab movement for British interests, together with history of previous agreements between France and Britain regarding Syria, as was clearly indicated in Sykes-Picot Agreement., was suggesting that French aspirations might be satisfied by Mandate for Constantinople, together with Mandate in Lebanon. He proposed that Syria should go to Britain, Armenia to America and Anatolia to Italy.<sup>46</sup> It seems that the idea of Mandates was flourished from Prof. Victor Berard in a public lecture in Paris. Berard's contention was that France, exhausted by the war, was not strong enough to undertake the administration of Syria. Due to the sentimental reasons, according to Berard, if the 'guardianship' of Constantinople and the Straits under a mandate from the League of Nations were given, then France would be willing to relinquish her Syrian ambitions and leave to Britain the task of guiding the Arab countries. In addition to the Straits and Constantinople, if France was given a mandate of Lebanon, Mallet, believed that she would accept such an offer. Under this scheme, it was proposed that the mandate of Armenia would go to America, and therefore relieving Britain from a considerable burden and a mandate for Turkey which would be confined only to Anatolia, could easily be given to Italy. This plan, a distribution of mandates, according to Mallet, was also favourable for General Staff. Sir Eyre Crowe made two main remarks for the Mallet's proposal, from the point of view of Mesopotamia. He did not agree with Mallet on the genesis of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. He thought that it would be found that the negotiations were not opened primarily to encourage the Arab revolt by bringing France into line, but rather to enable an offensive to be made from Egypt, without which the Arab revolt would never materialized, but which led so much greater strategic purpose to the Turkish communications with Mesopotamia and to the Turkish forces operating against the Russians. The Arab revolt, for Crowe, was an episode and he had the view that their first obligation should be towards to French not to the Arabs. Second remark Crowe made was for the nature of Arabs and their unity. He believed that the unity among Arabs did not exist in the past and very unlikely that it would ever exist, and also they were not an independent state. According to Crowe, Britain should not have the burden of all Arabs, but would rather to let France to stay in Syria.<sup>47</sup>

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*limited by the authority conferred on advisers to the Turkish Government, nominated by other Powers, on the lines of the Joint Treasury and F.O. [Foreign Office] recommendations."*

<sup>46</sup> PRO, FO 608/111, E 1902, Memorandum by Louis Mallet, 11<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1919,

<sup>47</sup> Ibid, E 1902, the 'side-note' of Sir Eyre Crowe, 26<sup>th</sup> of February and 4<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

Sir Louis Mallet reiterated his scheme of mandates for the Ottoman Empire in his Memorandum of 'Effects of a French Mandate at Constantinople' on 17<sup>th</sup> of March 1919. According to Mallet, France was bound in any case to have mandate in the Middle East. If she had Syria and held Alexandretta and Cilicia, then she would be controlling the land communications between Great Britain and the British Empire in the East and also for the local land communications between Egypt and Mesopotamia. Mallet believed that in such circumstances, France, from Cilicia and Alexandretta she would have the means to influence over Konia and the Anatolian plateau and also from Syria and Damascus to the Arab countries. Besides, Military Authorities believed on strategic grounds strong objections to the presence of France in Syria. According to Mallet, from a political point of view a division of the mandate over the Arab countries between Britain and France, no doubt, would lead to a friction, and it seemed even then that, the policy of Quai d'Orsay officials were not friendly at all. Britain was also afraid that, because of the collapse of Austrian Empire, there was a large vacuum in the Balkans and as a result of French intrigues British influence in that area would be affected adversely. It was also expected that Balkan States would be inclined to group themselves into pro-French and even pro-Italian fractions, whether France had the mandate of Constantinople or not. Therefore to have Alexandretta played an important role more than ever for the control of East. Mallet believed that disturbance in the Balkans was less dangerous to British interests than disturbance in the Middle East. Mallet suggested that, leaving aside the question whether the addition of Syria to British responsibilities would not be too considerable to contemplate and it would seem to try to find compensation for France elsewhere. For the compensation, Mallet proposed to give a mandate of Constantinople and Straits to France and Armenia and probably Caucasus to America and Anatolia to Italy. With the new scheme, Mallet was expecting less intrigue from French for the British interests.<sup>48</sup>

There were also some other proposals to let Anatolia to be under mandatory of Britain, and these requests usually came from the Turks. On 28<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919, Reshid Bey, Turkish Minister for Interior came to see Lord Hardinge with Sherif [Şerif] Pasha, who was going to nominate himself as the leader of Kurds and fight for their freedom and independence. Reshid Bey told Hardinge that he was under instructions from Grand Vizier to obtain at Paris sympathetic attitude on part of Britain. He inquired if Turkish Government requested, whether Britain would

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<sup>48</sup> PRO, FO 608/116 E 4605, the Memorandum of 'The Effects of a French Mandate of Constantinople', 17<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

undertake a similar position as she had done in Egypt. Lord Hardinge was not sympathetic to the proposal and told that the proposal implied appointment of mandatory and it was impossible to determine who that mandatory would be, He further told Reshid Bey that, personally he could not consider Britain to be the mandatory power for Turkey, considering new obligations she had been acquiring.<sup>49</sup> Later on Grand Vizier was going to complain to Carlthorpe, High Commissioner, that Reshid Bey had no official authority for his observations to discuss the future of Turkey.<sup>50</sup> Balfour was in agreement with Hardinge and instructed Foreign Office to send the memorandum to Carlthorpe, so that he would know what would be the answer, in case the Grand Vizier made a similar proposal. The next request for the Britain to be the mandatory of Turkey came from Halil Pasha, who was formerly the Governor of Beirut and at the time of meeting with Louis Mallet on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1919, was the President of Albanian Delegation for the Peace Conference. He stated that he was there to convey a message from Tewfik [Tevfik] Pasha, the Grand Vizier, and The Sultan himself that their strong wish and hope that Britain would use their influence to save the Turkish Empire from destruction and would take it under her protection and guidance in the future. Sir Louis Mallet informed him of Lord Hardinge's reply to Reshid Bey and assured him that Peace Conference would consider fairly, Turkey's claims to just treatment.<sup>51</sup> The interview of Halil Pasha was conveyed to France, Italy, and USA Delegations, so that, if they were to be approached, they should give the same answer.<sup>52</sup> The answer given by French showed that they were in agreement with the British reply. According to Arnold Toynbee, Britain was not sure of the French policy towards Turkey, whether they had some other alternatives on their mind.<sup>53</sup> The Sultan's request to meet Hohler from the British High Commission at Constantinople, to explain Turkish point of view was seen as Turks were trying to get the support of Britain and with the approval of Curzon, the invitation was turned down.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> PRO, FO 608/1111, E 3647, Lord Hardinge's Memorandum to Balfour, 5<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, E 5721, Carlthorpe's telegram to Curzon, 21<sup>st</sup> of March, which was conveyed to Balfour on 31<sup>st</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, E 3760, Louis Mallet's Memorandum to Balfour, 7<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, E 4247, Toynbee's note was; "*In view of the present proceedings of the French in Turkey, especially at Constantinople, this declaration of policy has some importance*".

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, E 5724, Curzon's answer for the Sultan's invitation on 31<sup>st</sup> of March 1919 was "*I regard invitation as an attempt to commit us to support Turks in Constantinople. I propose if you approve to discountenance any such interview*". Lord Hardinge and Sir Eyre Crowe were all in agreement with Curzon, so the meeting did not take place.

Another appeal for Britain to take the mandate of the Ottoman Empire came from Mahmoud Moukhtar [ Mahmut Muhtar] Pasha at Lausanne which was transmitted to Churchill.<sup>55</sup>

The Italians, who was not happy with the events being out of their control especially in the 'Committee of Greek Claims', visited Lloyd George on 21<sup>st</sup> of March 1919, to discuss the issue of Asia Minor. In the Meeting with the attendance of Orlando, Sonnino, Lloyd George, Hankey and Balfour, different issues were discussed, but the Italian side was more interested with the developments of Asia Minor and Greece. Lloyd George discussed different alternatives which had been discussed informally and the Supreme Council had not been able to reach a decision yet. One alternative was for Britain to have the Mandate for Mesopotamia, including Mosul and Palestine, while the French would have Syria and Cilicia. In this scheme it was proposed that America should have a mandate for Constantinople, the Straits and Armenia. Italy, according to Lloyd George, might have Caucasus, but the problem with this alternative was that the Americans were insisting to have an excess for Armenia on the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean. Lloyd George thought that America could have a port in Ayas Bay, north of Gulf of Iskenderun, whereas France to have Alexandretta. Lloyd George pointed out the objection extended by Arabs to this plan. The Arabs would not yield to the desires for France who was insisting Western line to be Damascus- Homs- Hama- Aleppo. Lloyd George's another alternative was that the French should be given the Lebanon, as well as a mandate over Asia Minor, Italy having a mandate over the Caucasus. For Lloyd George, a variant of this scheme would be for Italy to have a mandate over Asia Minor and for France to have a mandate in the Caucasus. In regard to this scheme Sonnino was not so optimistic, since he thought that French would not be willing to give up their position in Syria. Orlando had the view that in Caucasus, both Georgia and Azerbaijan desired independence therefore would not be happy with the mandatory. Lloyd George believed that the mandates in this region would have to be of a loose character, given a good deal of local autonomy. To have a mandates over Caucasus was quite difficult since, as Orlando believed that socialist groups in Italy would resent such a scheme. Orlando also raised the desire of Italy to put a garrison into Adalia and Konia for political reasons. Orlando believed that this was a matter between British and Italian Governments and could be done by General Allenby. Balfour questioned the Italians whether the desire to send troops to Adalia and

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid, E 8424, Mahmut Muhtar Pasa's letter to Churchill through Sir Horace Rumbold.

Konia were based upon military or political reasons, and if it was political then it was up to Supreme Council's decision. Italians believed that since French had already given their consent, they expected objection only from America. They agreed to discuss the Konia case from military point of view and get the view of Allenby. The following day Italians sent a message to Lloyd George that Italy agreed to have a mandate over Caucasus without prejudice to their claims elsewhere.<sup>56</sup> Lloyd George knew the resentment of America and to a certain extent of French to the Italians invading Adalia. The mandate issue came to the agenda in a meeting which was held with the participation of Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Colonel House who was replacing President Wilson in his absence from Paris. The Meeting was held on 7<sup>th</sup> March 1919, to discuss the situation in Germany and in Asia Minor. In the Meeting Lloyd George asked House whether USA would take the mandates for Constantinople and Armenia. House pointed out that America was not interested to take these mandates, but that she felt she could not shirk her share of the burden and he thought that therefore America was prepared to take mandate of Armenia and Constantinople and some sort of supervision over Anatolia. Clemenceau stated that France would be willing to take Syria and Cilicia as mandates and he further suggested that Britain should discuss the issue with Feisal for which Lloyd George declined. France believed that since they failed, the only option was left was to fight with Arabs over Syria. Lloyd George thought that it would be a disaster and although France would win at the end but it would be a very expensive one. They decided that through the help of Allenby, France should start discussing with Feisal. They agreed that Italy was in a difficult position with regard to 1915 London Agreement. If they stuck to the Agreement, the Italians should not have any interest in Fiume, but they kept on asking Fiume to be a part of Italy. On the other hand for their desires in Anatolia they kept referring to their right as delineated in the London Agreement. When Lloyd George suggested giving Caucasus to Italy, both France and America did not show any enthusiasm. At the end they decided Britain to take Mesopotamia and Palestine including Mosul, and France would be taking Syria and such parts of Cilicia as would be agreed between America and France. America would be taking Constantinople, Armenia and supervision of Anatolia and for Italy Caucasus was to be assigned. It was also agreed that they would ask Georgia whether they agree on Italians taking as a mandate.<sup>57</sup> The Minutes of the Meeting was exchanged between France and Britain and finally 'Outline of Peace Terms'

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<sup>56</sup> PRO, FO 608/83, E 5104, 'Minutes of a conversation between Italian and British delegates regarding Asia Minor', 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>57</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/147/1, Minutes of a meeting between Lloyd George, Clemenceau and House, 7<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

was written.<sup>58</sup> “The Settlement with Turkey” section as appeared in the ‘Peace Terms’ contained the clauses of;

- “1) Constantinople, Armenia, Cilicia, including Ayas Bay, and, if possible, Anatolia, to be entrusted to the United States of America as Mandatory.
  - 2) The Caucasus to be entrusted to Italy.
  - 3) Smyrna and Thrace to be incorporated in Greece.
  - 4) Palestine and Mesopotamia, including Mosul, to be entrusted to Great Britain as Mandatory.
  - 5) The destiny of Syria to await the Report of the Commission, but on no account to be taken by Britain.
- (NOTE: If the Commission reports against France’s claim, a reconsideration of Anatolian mandate will be necessary)”<sup>59</sup>

At the mean time the British Delegation prepared a memorandum for use of American Peace Commission. It seems that the request for such a memorandum covering Britain’s views with regard to Ottoman Empire and aim of Britain came from Westermann to Toynbee. According to the memorandum, Britain had three objectives with regard to Turkey; (1) to secure a just, honest and efficient Government for the people of Turkey, since there were about six million of Turks living in Anatolia, (2) to secure open door for all foreign trade in Turkey in such a way as to benefit all concerned and not a single foreign power, (3) to protect interests of pre-war creditors of Turkey. The memorandum discussed the financial situation of Turkey with the assumption that ‘a state of Turkey’ will be erected regardless to the regions and frontiers it would enclave. According to the memorandum, the Porte relied on a single expedient, that of issuing inconvertible paper currency in quantities which bore no relation to the monetary requirements of the country. After the War, Turkey became bankrupt and the Ottoman Empire was flooded with an inconvertible paper currency three times as great as its pre-war circulation, and prices have risen to 1000 per cent of their pre-war level. The memorandum blamed certain circles in Turkey to take advantage of this situation, such that, side by side with this disastrous monetary policy the junta of unscrupulous adventurers who have governed the country since the war had robbed the people at the expense of the misery of the Turkish Nation. The Memorandum then touched the problems that could be faced by the Mandatory country. The problems to be faced in Turkey, however her territory might be reduced by the Conference, was primarily the problem of providing an honest and efficient administration; secondarily, rehabilitating the economic position of the people and thirdly of helping Turkey to discharge its pre-war obligations. Any mandatory power, who would be responsible for Turkey, should be tasked with the reconstruction of Turkey and it

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<sup>58</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/147/2, the letter sent by Clemenceau to Lloyd George on 31<sup>st</sup> March 1919.

<sup>59</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/147/3/2, ‘Outline of Peace Terms’, 23<sup>rd</sup> of March 1919.

should be borne in mind that the circumstances of Turkey were peculiar. The memorandum, for the sake of argument, considered that France was tasked with the mandate to govern Constantinople and the adjoining region in Europe, Armenia for the USA and Syria and Mesopotamia for Britain. The memorandum drew the problems attached to the mandatory power who was responsible for Turkey that unless the Mandatory Power were the America or Britain, a superposition which for the sake of illustration was excluded as politically impossible, stated that it was doubtful whether any of the remaining powers could execute such a mandate with its own resources unaided for certain reasons. The memorandum, then questioned the availability of funds and the difficulties in Turkey for any other power to take the mandate of Turkey. The memorandum was concluded that the choice should be made between a very few powers and the choice should command the general assent of all, including the people to be governed, whose wishes should be respected and the power chosen should have the necessary experience for dealing with the problem and the necessary material resources. The memorandum was important in the sense that there should be no power other than the USA to be tasked with the mandates, since Britain was determined not to take any mandates other than Mesopotamia<sup>60</sup>.

The mandatory for Asia Minor was also in the agenda of Arab Bureau; Commodore Hogarth submitted a proposal concerning the future of the Ottoman Empire. He urged for Britain to reconsider taking mandate for Anatolia especially if the Syrian mandate handed to France.<sup>61</sup> Military Intelligence, along with the Commodore Hogarth's proposal, submitted another memorandum to the British Delegation in Paris for consideration. The proposal sent by General Milne, contained a report by Colonel Samson, who was stationed in Adrianople, urged Britain to consider the

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<sup>60</sup> PRO, FO 608/111 Doc. 4044, 'The Ottoman Empire and the Financial Conditions of Peace', prepared by the British Delegation for the use of the American Commission to negotiate peace.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, Doc. 5739, Commodore Hogarth, in his letter of 29<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 to the Director of Military Intelligence stated that "...that there remains only two probabilities; (a) No Mandate at all, (b) An overriding Mandate of a provisional nature. Both these alternatives, I presume, rule out standing Greek or Italian claims. In the event of (a) we shall have a miniature of the old Turkey, whether Sultanate or Republic, with continuance of the 'Eastern Question' and rival Powers contending for influence and Greek Irredention more than ever. In the event of (b) a USA Mandate naturally suggesting itself. But will the USA undertake it? And if they do, is there not considerable danger to ourself rather Powers, having Moslem subjects, of their identifying with the Turkish interests and proving an increasing source of an harassment? If France is to have the Syrian Mandate, she is out of consideration for the Anatolian one, this remains only Great Britain unconsidered. If the Syria is not out of question for us, the [...] of the Baghdad Railway might still be secured in Asia Minor, Cilicia and Syria, north of Aleppo. I need not insist on their obvious advantage ... I therefore ask you, whether, from a military point of view, you consider (a) feasible (b) desirable that Great Britain should ask for a Mandate for Asia Minor, having regard to the demand, it would make on our max. Power [...] of defense, with international situation it would create. I should not suggest a British Mandate for Asia Minor, were one for Syria attainable..."

petition for British Mandate by Moslems of Thrace. Colonel Gribbon, from the Military section of the British Peace Delegation, considered that as proposed by Samson, Britain should not withhold personnel for assisting Turkish Administration and that whatever State accepts the mandate over Constantinople, it should take over as much of Thrace as possible and at least to the Maritza [Merik], including Adrianople. The proposals from Military Intelligence were going to be treated quite differently by the Delegation. For Lord Hardinge it was “*a British Mandate for Turkey in Asia has in my opinion always been the ideal solution and would meet with the approval of the Turkish population. It needs be a mandate of a very mild character requiring chiefly advisors and officials, but do not see how under existing circumstances it could be secured.*”<sup>62</sup> Sir Louis Mallet agreed with Hardinge. Sir Eyre Crowe although was in agreement with Hardinge for the British mandate in Asia Minor but disagreed for the Thrace; “*I entirely disagree, for reasons repeatedly stated, with the proposal to leave those parts of Thrace which are predominantly Greek, within the new American State of Constantinople. Nor do the Americans themselves claim or desire this.*”<sup>63</sup> P.H. Kerr, a dominant member of the ‘Garden Suburb’ and a close aide of Lloyd George on foreign affairs, commented as; “*I have no doubt the world would be much better governed if it were governed by England!*”<sup>64</sup> Kerr further commented that, having Turkey under British responsibility would be a burden. He believed that Military’s view towards the mandate of Turkey was logical and in line to the Military Intelligence proposals, but questioned whether it would be a practical solution.

While British Government Agencies were discussing the mandate issue for British interests, Clemenceau, on 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1919, submitted a proposal for the whole Asia Minor to be designated to different States under Mandates. It was difficult for British Foreign Office to understand the logic behind the proposal. The Clemenceau’s proposal sliced Anatolia among French, Italian, British, Greek, and American spheres, as;

France: Vilayets of Brussa and Kastamani [Kastamonu] including their coast line.

Greece: The line of the Anglo-French Delegation in the Greek Commission. The area covered from North of Mender up to Aivali, covering Smyrna and some parts of Aidin Vilayet.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid, Doc. 5739, Hardinge’s ‘side-note’, 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, Sir Eyre Crowe’s ‘side-note’ note, 4<sup>th</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

Italy: Rest of Aidin Vilayet, not included in Greek zone, whole of the Konia Vilayet up to the British Delegation's proposed boundary of Armenia.

America: Vilayets of Angora and Sivas.

There were several questions from British point of view to wonder with regard to the proposal, such as the disposal of the Thrace and Constantinople, such as whether it was to remain Turkish and if so was it to be under the mandate of French, or was it to be detached from Turkey and if so, was it to be made into a separate state? Along with the mutual understanding between Allies, it was almost determined that Constantinople, Straits and the surrounding region was to be made a separate state under the mandate of America, and even British Foreign Office officials with the instruction of Balfour, had been conducting meetings with America to delineate the frontiers for such a state. There was also some debates whether the proposed state should have southern coast line of the Marmara Sea, as the Americans were demanding, whereas British were more inclined to allocate Anatolian side of The Marmara Sea to Turks for their 'get away' for economical reasons. British had doubts for excursion of Turks from the Marmara Sea since it would create an artificial state and besides it was not practical to establish such a state. French proposal was also questioned on the practicality of establishing different states in Anatolia as well as one in Constantinople under Ottoman sovereignty, but under different mandates, in the same manner as Armenia and Arab countries. Britain considered that the proposal would yield to a complete partition of Ottoman Empire, which would be unworkable from the financial and economical aspects. Britain was also against such a plan since no doubt it would stir the religious feelings through out the Moslem World, and especially in India. Britain also opposed to the boundary lines since they were drawn along the lines of Ottoman Vilayet boundaries, rather than economical and geographical considerations and most important of all French area was drawn to include the region which would supply food to Constantinople and the best of the Anatolian peasantry, the Kastamonu region.<sup>65</sup> The French proposal was also studied by Colonel Wilson, Civil Commissioner in Baghdad, and found to be unacceptable from British interests point of view. According to Wilson, Clemenceau's proposal was inconsistent with principle of self determination and could only be implemented by force. Colonel Wilson further suggested that the Ottoman Empire should be preserved from Constantinople to the Caucasus area, including Armenia and Constantinople would be under control of International body.

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid, Doc. 8163, the memorandum of 'Monsieur Clemenceau's Proposal of 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1919, for Assignment of Mandates in Turkey', prepared by the British Peace Delegation on 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1919.

He claimed that the policy on the contrary would create resentment in the Moslem world and they would join with Turks and Kurds in actively to protest against Allies for the partition of Ottoman Empire by Christian Peace Conference on selfish lines.<sup>66</sup> Commander Hogarth joined Wilson in protesting Clemenceau's proposal that "*I protest against the unwisdom of parceling out Asia Minor: but if it is to be and the USA will not take an overriding mandate for the whole, I would rather see us out of it, and parceling left to others.*"<sup>67</sup> Louis Mallet's reaction was "*...conflicts ourselves with securing our main object – namely the maintenance of the freedom of the Straits.*"<sup>68</sup> Hardinge evaluated the proposal as another example of French conspiracy. As far as British Foreign Office and Military Agencies were concerned, they resented the French proposal and were against the parceling the Asia Minor into districts of different mandates, because of France having the best parts of Anatolia and due to the fact that it would create unrest in the Moslem World, including in Mesopotamia.

French position was one of the concerns that Britain faced at the early days of the Peace Conference, such that Britain believed that, France although being an allied, was still intriguing against British interests in Asia Minor and in the Arab lands.

Greek origin people living in Ottoman Empire staged a claim that would allow them either independence or annexation to the mother country, Greece. The claims sent to Paris Peace Conference usually contained the demand for an end to the Turkish atrocities and plea to the powers, showing how badly they had been treated by the Turks. A telegram sent to Lloyd George from Trebizond, signed by Jean de Irmendjoglou in name of all Greeks of Trebizond Vilayet requested that this district to be united to the mother country, Greece, or if this was impossible, then independence might be assured to them. They were not very happy with the Venizelos' proposal that they had to be included in the proposed State of Armenia. For them, union with any other country would involve a mere change of 'masters', after being under the 'Turkish yoke'. According to Toynbee, Venizelos was obviously right in determining that the Pontic Greeks should join Armenia, since they might be 'seven times as numerous', as other Christians as they claimed, in the Trebizond Vilayet, but they were less than a third of the population. Toynbee also quoted the Turkish population as 65%, and further declared that the only sensible course for the

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, Doc. 8166, the memorandum by A.T. Wilson, 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, Doc. 8163, the memorandum of 'Monsieur Clemenceau's Proposal of 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1919, for Assignment of Mandates in Turkey', prepared by the British Peace Delegation on 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid, Doc. 8166. 'side-note' by Mallet, 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1919.

Greeks and Armenians was to hold each other and join the Armenia where there would be a mandatory power to hold the balance between the different elements.<sup>69</sup> Petitions from Greeks were flooding to Paris, and even Toynbee was going to complain that *“Both we and Americans are being flooded with these declarations, but two questions have to be considered; (i) How far do those who sign represent the Greek population they claim to speak for (ii) What percentage do these population constitute of the total population of the districts they inhabit?”*<sup>70</sup> The petitions received from Turkish population were usually not treated on the same level as Greeks’. The telegrams sent the by leading personages in Smyrna and Aidin Vilayet, protesting against any proposal to detach these districts from Turkey was treated as a claim but did not meet the point of the Greeks, since Turks were not eligible to govern alien minorities, and a foreign mandate was an essential condition for a settlement in the Turkish sense.<sup>71</sup> When a resolution was read out in Churches in Constantinople on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1919, claiming the retention ‘of the barbarian yoke of Turkey’ was intolerable and proclaiming their wish for complete national re-establishment and union with Greece, although British Foreign Office treated this news as a provocative movement of Greeks, but still as an indication of a necessity that Turkey should be under a mandate.<sup>72</sup>

### **V.1.2 FRANCE and BRITAIN; STRUGGLE for POWER over OTTOMAN EMPIRE**

The relation between French and British were tense and both sides took every opportunity to show an indication for their sphere of control. French General Franchet d’Esperey, Commander of Allied Forces in Balkans reported on 27<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1919 that owing to disturbances in Turkey, he had sent a detachment of gendarmes to Constantinople, to assist in policing the town, and he expected to send further detachment in coming days. The reaction for the French movement to Constantinople was that Britain ought to show great cordiality towards French on the question of Allied control in Constantinople, and therefore expecting from British to

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<sup>69</sup> PRO, FO 608/89 Doc: 5647.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, Doc: 6136, note by Toynbee, 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, Doc: 7682, note by Toynbee, 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid, Doc: 7662, note by Toynbee, 19<sup>th</sup> of March 1919. Greek Legation in Paris complained that the resolution read in the churches was an evidence of true and sincere feelings of the Greek population in Constantinople and therefore The Turkish Government’s attitude towards the incident was neither just nor right, and asked the British Government to take necessary steps to put promptly an end to the Turkish behavior. The Foreign Office evaluated the incident as *“I can not however conceal from you my opinion that certain actions of the Greek Community, for example, the resolution read in the Greek Churches in Constantinople on March 16<sup>th</sup>, have been of a highly provocative nature, and I had indeed already asked the Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs to bring this aspect of the question to the notice of Monsieur Venizelos in Paris”*. (Ibid, Doc. 59405/M.E./44, 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.)

wave off the suspicion that Britain was trying to take control exclusively for Britain.<sup>73</sup> Whenever British authorities took an action against the Turkish police, railways and banks to have a direct control of these facilities without notifying French authorities in Constantinople, France was suggesting immediate establishment of special Anglo-French Commission in Paris to discuss the whole question of Turkish fulfillment of Armistice terms. French Government by sending a note to Lord Derby, British Ambassador in Paris on 13<sup>th</sup> February did not hesitate to show their grievances for the British action in Constantinople. The reaction of British towards French was interesting in the sense that it seemed a battle for control of exercise.<sup>74</sup> The British Delegation in Paris evaluated the behavior of French as a direct involvement to their sphere of influence and drew an analogy between Constantinople and Syria.<sup>75</sup> The relation between France and Britain was going to

<sup>73</sup> PRO, FO 608/108/3, Doc. No: 1113.

<sup>74</sup> PRO, FO 608/108/5, 2184, 14<sup>th</sup> of Feb.1919. C.I.G.S., Imperial Chief of Staff, was entirely against holding such a meeting, they believed that the proposal involved and if accepted, would confirm the fact that French had equal standing with British *vis-à-vis* Turkey, and that was not the case. They believed that they had very special rights, claims and responsibilities and if they gave in to the French, it should be for a good reason. Lord Hardinge decided that the meeting should take place in London, rather than in Paris as was suggested by French side and an answer was sent by Balfour on 21<sup>st</sup> Feb. 1919, accordingly.

<sup>75</sup> PRO, FO 608/108/5, Doc. No: 2184, 14<sup>th</sup> Feb.1919, The paper prepared by the British Delegation (Lieut. Colonel Gribbon of CIGS) in Paris, for the action taken in Constantinople and French protest, is rather interesting to show how these two Allies were 'fighting' with each other for the control of 'East'. The paper titled "Policy vis-à-vis French in Turkey" was;

"1. It seems probable that the French are trying to make the situations at Constantinople and Syria analogous as regards exercise of control.

2. While settling themselves into Constantinople they will use their advantage in possessing the Chief Command in Turkey in Europe to force our hand in Syria by making us to allow them greater direct representation there.

3. They may thus hope to produce a *fait accompli* in both places.

4. It is for us to know whether we want the French in Constantinople as well as Syria. If we have to concede some of the latter country to them, it would be undesirable from the point of view of our position as a Mohammedan power, and inevitable French Mohammedan intrigue, to allow them into Constantinople also.

5. But apart from this question of high policy, we have to consider our own military prestige. We do not want to be the dupes of the French.

It may help us to remember that:

(i) It is we who beat the Turks and made the presence of French detachments possible in both areas;

(ii) General Wilson at Constantinople by occupying a vital post in the L. of C. to the Caucasus is in a different position to the French Commander in Syria. In fact, General Wilson is acting in a dual capacity and owes direct allegiance to General Milne as well as indirect to Franchet d'Esperey;

(iii) The French have no claim to command or control South of the Don or in Asiatic Turkey;

6. The following courses of action are open to us:

(a) To make use of General Wilson's special position and the arguments in para. 5 in refusing to recognize the analogy between Constantinople and Syria;

(b) To yield to the French in Constantinople and maintain our attitude of allowing no interference with Allenby's authority in Syria;

(c) To make concessions to the French in Syria and refuse to give way in Constantinople;

(d) To make Allenby a field Marshal in command of all operations in Asia South of the Don, (possibly excluding Mesopotamia).

7. Course (a) is the most direct;

(b) and (c) are matters of high policy;

be even tenser in coming days. General Franchet d'Esperey, according to Admiral Webb, British Deputy High Commissioner in Constantinople, informed the Minister of Interior that he was going to take over the Turkish Gendarmerie within ten days. Admiral Webb deprecated this attitude of the French General, since such a move from French would end up in introducing French officers in Asia Minor and establishment of International Gendarmerie which, as British believed proved itself as inefficient.<sup>76</sup> There was another telegram from Webb on the same day that General Franchet d'Esperey was assuming dictatorial powers and acting without consulting Allies, Allied Army in Turkey, or Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople<sup>77</sup>. The French attitude in Constantinople for a struggle of power was felt with reactions by the British Delegation in Paris. Toynbee commented that France was trying to secure paramount military control both in the Straits and Anatolia and in Syria; although in both areas the position of the Allies depended on British forces and transport. According to Toynbee, if in the political settlement, Britain wished to induce the French to take the mandate in Constantinople and leave the mandate of Syria to Britain, then it was a good opportunity for Britain to take at this stage to leave Constantinople to French, since they were very enthusiastic about it. In case of Anatolia, the situation was different, Toynbee thought that Constantinople and most parts of Anatolia had not been occupied by Allies, but considered as British military zone, therefore Britain on the condition that France was to leave Syria, then in return Britain could ask France to share the military control over Anatolia, most probably with Italy.<sup>78</sup> Louis Mallet was in the opinion that if the USA was going to take the mandate of Constantinople, then it would be not useful to let General Franchet d'Esperey to act as a supreme commander of Allies in Constantinople. Britain agreed to hold a meeting in Paris to discuss the matter with the participation of Military personnel. On 26<sup>th</sup> of February, Carlthorpe informed the British Delegation that the French High Commissioner had requested abstention of British military authorities in Asia Minor from initiating further action for present, as French Government disputed the fact that Anatolia was in the British zone.

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(d) Would necessitate Wilson moving his troops to the Asiatic side of the Straits. Allenby would have to exercise his command from his present Headquarters or from Cairo.

The French would obtain their "fait accompli" in Constantinople and we should lose much prestige; but we would have succeeded in removing the analogy between Constantinople and Syria.

8. Whatever course we adopt our policy should be to keep the Constantinople and Syrian questions apart. The consolidation of Arabia should form the bedrock of our policy."Military Section British Delegation".

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, Doc. 2411, Admiral Webb's telegram, 332, 15<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, Admiral Webb's telegram No: 333 on 15<sup>th</sup>, Feb. 1919.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid, Toynbee's 'side-note', 20<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919.

According to Carlthorpe, the French request meant the stoppage to all measures for relief, repatriation and maintenance of order, and at the meanwhile General Franchet d'Esperey was inactive in French zone in south of Russia. For Toynbee this news was very serious one and all the information that they receive from all over Anatolia emphasized the necessity for a speedy allocation of mandates. Toynbee believed that if the allocation of mandates were not to be made very soon, all effects toward reconstruction would be paralyzed till it is too late.<sup>79</sup>

M. Pichon, French Minister of Foreign Affairs, urged Britain to hold a meeting of a commission as was suggested earlier in Paris. Pichon also stated that they instructed French High Commissioner at Constantinople to take necessary steps to safeguard French interests in Turkey. He also questioned authority of General Milne to organize distinct zones of command in Anatolia. Toynbee evaluated the French move as a typical French attitude, not diplomatic machinery but to make trouble.<sup>80</sup> The reaction of the British Delegation in Paris was; *"I see no advantage in confusing Military and Financial issues, as this proposal of the French attempts to do. As for finance the policy of the Allies, if it can properly be described, is to let Turkey go bankrupt..."*<sup>81</sup> Representative of the Chief of Staff at the Delegation, Colonel Gribbon's view on French attitude was even harder. He stated in the Conclusion part of his 'note' that; *"It is no use our meeting the French in a Commission unless we are to stand up to them and put an end to nonsense and subterfuge such as trying to confuse the military, political and financial situations. If we are prepared to do this I think it would be a good thing to have a Commission, for the situation in the Near East. That is getting difficult and requires handling by ourselves who have to find most of the troops and have done all the work"*<sup>82</sup> General H. Wilson, Chief of the Military Section, was also very annoyed by French, and he wrote his views to Balfour, that; *"The French interference in our area is ridiculous and very annoying. I can not see the object of a Commission. If we want to knock the French pretensions on the head we can do so without a Commission- our case being unanswerable. If we want to give in we can also do it without a Commission. If we don't know what we want to do we can continue in that frame of mind without a Commission"*<sup>83</sup> Lord Hardinge gave his agreement to General Wilson's view that they wanted a decision not a Commission. At the end it was mutually decided that a Conference rather than

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid, Calthorpe's telegram, 424, 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid, Doc. 6839, Lord Derby's letter to the Foreign Office, 9<sup>th</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, Colonel Gribbon's evaluation 'Note' on French attitude, 14<sup>th</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, General Wilson's comment, 14<sup>th</sup> of April 1919.

a Commission to be held among Lord Curzon and M. Cambon, French Ambassador in London, in early May 1919.

The expected Meeting to examine the differences of opinion among Britain and France over Constantinople and Anatolia took place in London between Sir Graham and Cambon on 14<sup>th</sup> of May 1919. They agreed that General Franchet d'Esperey should command town of Constantinople and European part of Ottoman Empire while Asiatic Turkey should be under the British military command. Cambon proposed to have a French control of Scutari and some suburbs on the east of the Bosphorus, which were within the the British zone, but agreed to take the case to the French Government as well as the case for the terminus of Baghdad railway and access to Black Sea to the British hands. It was also agreed that General d'Esperey's intent to form Turkish gendarmerie and of French posts in Asian part of Turkey should be solved in accordance with the French and British zones as was agreed upon.<sup>84</sup>

French and British spheres of control in Turkey became a constant issue of debate and France insisted to conclude an agreement with regard to the respective zones. British War Office however considered that the appointment of Sir Milne to Supreme Command of Asiatic Turkey rendered this undesirable and therefore War Office believed that no further negotiations with the French should take place.<sup>85</sup>

### **V.1.3 GREEKS INVADING ANATOLIA**

Venizelos, with his Memorandum, distributed to the interested parties on 30<sup>th</sup> of December 1918, and debated in the Supreme Council on 4<sup>th</sup> of February 1919, demanded large territorial claims from Ottoman Empire. Major players in Big Four, France and Britain were sympathetic to Greek claims but Italy, because of his own desires for the same area of Western Anatolia, and the USA were not willing to give in to Venizelos. Therefore, these two states stood in front of Venizelos as obstacles to implement his goal of 'Megali Idea'. Italy, for Venizelos, was not possible to give her consent for Greece to fulfill his desires. The attitude of Italy became even clearer in the Greek Commission, in objecting Greek dreams of Western Anatolia. Hence the only choice left for Venizelos was to gain the consent of Americans, and for this he had to play his cards properly. Venizelos had known preferences and inclinations

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<sup>84</sup> PRO, FO 608/108, E10517, Sir Graham's letter to Lord Derby, 19<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, E17534, Foreign Office letter to Balfour, 7<sup>th</sup> August 1919.

of President Wilson towards 'League of Nations' and to his famous 'Fourteen Points'. To get acquainted with the Americans, Venizelos even planned to visit USA, before the Armistice in order to see and explain the matters to him. During Peace Conference, Venizelos did not miss any opportunity to show that he was a sincere and strong supporter of the 'League of Nations', even in his explanation of 'Greek case' at the Supreme Council on 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> of February, he tried to show how heartedly he supported the idea of the League. Venizelos was going to receive a note on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1919 from President Wilson thanking him for his efforts for the League of Nations and even when he lost the elections in Greece, he was going to be considered for the Presidency of League of Nations. Another approach Venizelos adopted was to show Americans that by humanitarian reasons Greek claims should be fulfilled, that is; they were only after, to meet the will of the people in Anatolia, and also to show that Greeks in Western Anatolia outnumbered the Turks, therefore the desire of the region was to unite the mother land, Greece. Greece initiated very well organized propaganda machinery to build a public opinion for her claims. The Greek Government's published 'Black Book' dealt with Greek Anatolian people who claimed of being suffered atrocities during 1914-1918 because of the Ottoman Policy. Greeks leaving all over the world contributed to the cause of Venizelos by sending petitions and memorandums to Lloyd George, Clemenceau and to President Wilson that they wanted to be free of 'Turkish yoke' and to be united with the mother country, Greece. British nationals took also a part of this propaganda machinery.

Venizelos sent a memorandum on 14<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 to Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George and attempted to answer some of the allegations which had been laid down against the Greek claims. Chief objections raised against Greek claims were;

“(1) Greeks of Asia Minor have not sufficiently manifested their desire for union with Greece. (2) That they do not constitute a majority over the Turkish population in the disputed districts. (3) That separation of disputed portion from rest of Asia Minor would damage economic development of reconstituted Turkey. (4) That Smyrna, separated from its hinterland, will decline from its present economic condition.”<sup>86</sup>

Venizelos examined and refused the above allegations one by one. In explaining the debated issues, he quoted the letter from President Wilson to Mr. Jackson, Chairman of the Relief Committee, showing sympathy of American people.

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<sup>86</sup> PRO, FO 608/88, Doc. No: 4519, Memorandum of Venizelos, to 'Big Three'.

Venizelos discussed in his Memorandum the figures of Greek population in claimed Western Anatolia and tried to show Greeks outnumbered the Turks there. He wrote;

“...Moreover, even those who allege a greater number for the Turkish population recognize that in the Sandjak of Smyrna the Greek population exceeds the Turkish. As the Kaza of Aivali, adjacent north of the Sandjak of Smyrna is purely Greek (46.130 Greeks against 89 Turks), it follows that from the gulf of Adramytion [Edremit] in the north, down the cape Mykale in the south, that is on a length of 200 kilometers and on a breadth which at certain points is limited to 30 kilometers, but which at other places extends to 125 kilometers, there exists a clearly proved majority of Greek against Mussulman population.

It is true of course that in three other Sandjaks of the Vilayet of Aidin (those of Magnesia, Aidin and Mendesse), which are also claimed by us, the Turkish population exceeds the Greek. But, if to the four Sandjaks claimed by us in the Vilayet of Aidin the islands of Mitylene, Chios, Samos, Rhodes and the Dodecanese's, which islands geographically, historically and economically constitute one whole, namely Western Asia Minor, it will be seen that the Greek population of this part exceeds the Turkish and consequently there is every reason why this whole should become part of the Hellenic State, since it can not be considered as a 'Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire'. ”<sup>87</sup>

Venizelos, then, drew an analogy between the Western Anatolia and Bohemia, which was a very sensitive issue in the German Peace negotiations. He even was not hesitant to elaborate and exaggerate on the number of Greeks and Armenians, suffered because of the 'uncivilized Turks'.

“If in Bohemia the dense German populations, which constitute a continuation of the German populations of Germany and Austria are to form part of Czecho-Slovakia on the ground that Bohemia constitutes geographically, historically and economically one whole, the same argument would apply with perhaps even greater force to Western Asia Minor, especially in view of the fact that on the one hand in Bohemia two nations face each other possessing equal civilization and equally competent to establish a well-ordered polity, whereas on the other hand, in Western Asia Minor, there are found face to face two nations of which the one is of ancient civilization and full of promise for the future, whilst the other for centuries has proved incapable of forming a well-ordered polity and which during this war has brought about the annihilation of nearly 1 500 000 Armenians and Greeks.”<sup>88</sup>

Venizelos, further discussed the sensitive part of which Wilson was most concerned with; the wishes of the people and the separation of Western Anatolia would not effect to the well being of the new Ottoman Empire.

“There is no doubt whatever that the separation of Western Asia Minor from the Turkish State will constitute a material loss to that state. But the separation also of Constantinople and of Armenia and of other portions from the Ottoman Empire will certainly materially damage the economic life of the Ottoman State, just as the separation of Alsace and Lorraine and of Posnanian will cause material loss to the German State. The right of self-determination of the peoples has already been declared as superior to the economic interests of the States to which these people were subjected and a President Wilson has stated 'no nation has the right to set up its special interests against the interests of mankind'. ”<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid.

Venizelos, then discussed how, he, as a Greek was indebted to Wilson because of the 'Relief' work that American Nation had been extended to the suffering Greeks in Anatolia. Venizelos made use of his memorandum to get Wilson on his side, therefore to eliminate the influence of the people in the American team such as Westermann.

"I am in hearty sympathy with every effort being made by the people of the United States to alleviate the terrible sufferings of the Greeks of Asia Minor. None have suffered more or more unjustly than they. They are bound by many ties to the rest of the liberty-loving peoples in the world who are fighting to free all weak and oppressed nationalities from the cruelty and oppression of strong and autocratic governments."<sup>90</sup>

Then, Venizelos brought the religion into the picture. This was the plan of winning of the support of religious people and he ended the Memorandum by quoting President Wilson from his letter to Jackson.

"Their [Anatolian Greeks] steadfast allegiance to the Christian faith in the face of every inducement and threat to abandon it, commends them most strongly to all who believe in the principles of religious freedom. And their adherence to the ideals of Constitutional Government should make them particularly the object of the cordial sympathy of the American people, the foundation stones of whose political structure are freedom and liberty."<sup>91</sup>

Next step, Venizelos was going to work on, was the survivability of the Greeks in Anatolia especially in Smyrna region, by using some petitions of the Greeks addressed to Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Venizelos claiming that Greek civilization lived in Anatolia under a constant threat of Turks, and in case more severe problems and critical situation emerged, the existing Allied forces of occupation would not be adequate to maintain order to protect Greeks. The ultimate position of Venizelos was; for the Supreme Council to appoint more extensive Allied forces, naturally Greek forces, to the Western Anatolia.

Professor Calder, who traveled extensively in Anatolia in 1908-1913 and familiar especially with Greek population there, wrote an extensive report for the Foreign Office and analyzed the Greek claims for the the Western Anatolia. Calder who had more sympathy for the Greeks, believed that Greeks in Anatolia wished for union with Greece because they considered Turkish rule was the only the other alternative. They would far more gladly accept any mandatory power that they trust, but not Italy, and he further pointed out that it would be very desirable to avoid partition of Anatolia.<sup>92</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, Doc. 4519, Venizelos' letter communicated to Lloyd George, received on 17<sup>th</sup> of March.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, Doc. 4604, Prof. Calder's letter to Sir Louis Mallet, 17<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

Toynbee disagreed with most of the points in the memorandum that Venizelos wrote on 14<sup>th</sup> of March 1919. According to Toynbee, the figures given by Venizelos for the Turkish population were suspicious and therefore debatable. He wrote that;

“...It is contrary to the principle of the settlement to deny the Turks self-determination on the ground that they are a dying race. This was the attitude of the Germans towards the Poles and Tchechoslovaks. But the Turks may well revive it relieved of their Empire and placed under good Government. They are not, as Venizelos states, a ‘complement militaire’, but of the same stock as the Anatolian Greeks-they being the Turkized and the others Graecized element of the same indigenous population. They have the same innate possibilities of development as their Graecized fellow-countryman. No one proposes to thrust the Anatolian Greeks back under Turkish rule. The alternative to M. Venizelos’ scheme is to put the whole population of Anatolia under an impartial mandatory – a solution which would give the Anatolian Greeks the freest opportunity of proving, during the next generation, whether they had greater vitality than the Turks or not. This would be fair competition between the two elements but to place both either under Greek or under Turkish Government. Would be to invite forcible Hellenisation or Turcification – and would be inconsistent with the Twelfth of President Wilson’s ‘Fourteen’ points. The mandatory solution would be quite consistent, on the other hand, with the President’s letter quoted by M. Venizelos in conclusion.”<sup>93</sup>

Commodore H.G. Hogarth was also asked to comment about the Venizelos’ Memorandum and Professor Calder’s remarks. Hogarth believed that although he agreed the homogeneous character of the Asia Minor population and the absence of obvious natural divisions, political partition of the Anatolia was undesirable. He did not agree that the irredentism of Smyrna Greeks was due to Turkish rule simply, or that it would be a safer field by the continuance of that rule under control of mandatory. He gave the example of Cyprus and Corfu to show that mandatory scheme would not last long and Greeks even under a good government would be agitated for Nationalism. He further pointed out that this mass of Anatolians, descended from the aboriginal peoples of the interior, and was racially distinguished clearly from the Ionian Greeks; therefore Hogarth was objecting the view of Venizelos that Anatolian Greeks were descended of 3000 years old civilization. Hogarth ended his remarks that even if the Greeks were to be attached to Greece, it should be confined to a district of Sokia [Söke], Smyrna [Izmir], Vurla [Urla] and Chesheh [Çeşme], and therefore extension to Maender [Menderes] valley should not be considered at all. He finally told that the Greek flag in Smyrna would not last in the long run.<sup>94</sup>

Unrest in various parts of the Ottoman Empire, although localized and seemed to be without prior arrangement started after the Armistice and at least seemed to be

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<sup>93</sup> Ibid, Doc. 4519, ‘side-note’ of Toynbee, 17<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, Doc. 4604 ‘side-note’ of Commodore H.G. Hogarth, 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

increasing in numbers after March 1919. These disturbances were either originated by Armenians because of their behaviors in the eastern part of Anatolia or due to the Greek agitations. The French newspaper on its issue of 11<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 reported that in Cilicia at Adana and in Syria at Aleppo, Armenians had been killed and the order was established by the British troops. 'Temps' commenting on the news stated that French troops because of being too few at these regions should be reinforced, since France had to maintain her prestige.<sup>95</sup> Boghos Nubar Pasha, Representative of the Joint Armenian Council at Constantinople, requested an appointment with regard to the incidences at Aleppo and Adana, from Balfour to discuss the issues. Toynbee wrote that the only cure was to assign a mandate to Armenia and an immediate occupation of the region by the troops of the mandatory power. Boghos Nubar had learned the news from M. Gout, and according to Toynbee, Boghos Nubar exaggerated the incident that it was a poisonous attempt to embroil Armenians, Arabs and British with one another. Toynbee commented that the incident in Aleppo was to earn merit for the French authorities by making it to appear that British had pressed for and French opposed the removal of disorder by the Armenian troops from Cilicia.<sup>96</sup> A similar incident had happened in Alexandretta on 22<sup>nd</sup> of February, for which French General Staff claimed that disorders followed by burnings were reported and that a state of siege had been proclaimed. According to the report from General Headquarter in Egypt, the incident happened on the night of 16<sup>th</sup> of February and trouble commenced in a café with a quarrel between Armenian soldiers of the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion Legion d'Orient. The Armenian soldiers armed themselves and picketed the streets and started burning the Turkish houses. British Authorities believed that the outbreak was a prepared plot between Armenian troops and Armenian civilians.<sup>97</sup>

Meanwhile, the British High Commission at Constantinople, Admiral Webb, relayed a message of Sublime Porte to the Foreign Office, reporting pillage and massacre on the part of Armenian soldiers serving with French troops in the army of occupation. They terrorized village of Azirlou and killed some inhabitants. Others attacked the village of Kara Kisse and killed six persons. Again Toynbee commented that; *"These reports may be true, for reprisals by the Armenians are almost inevitable, but I believe the French authorities have taken the matter of*

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<sup>95</sup> PRO, FO 608/83 Doc. No: 4089

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, Doc. 4238 'side-note' of Toynbee, 14<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, Telegram sent by G.H.Q. Egypt to War Office, 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919.

*discipline away their Armenian troops in hand.*"<sup>98</sup> For such allegations Foreign Office's comment was; "*The Armenians are doing themselves harm by this sort of thing as it all strengths French claims to administer the country*"<sup>99</sup>

News of unrest was also coming from the Kurds in the Urfa-Mardin-Diarbekir [Diyarbakir] districts. To control the Kurds, Foreign Office requested whether any assurance could be given to Kurds which might have a useful effect in counteracting the activities of the Union and Progress Leaders among Kurds.<sup>100</sup> Meanwhile Britain was receiving intelligence reports that in case of Greek occupation of Smyrna and Aidin, the Turks were preparing themselves to rise and fight.<sup>101</sup>

Greek allegations for the Turkish atrocities came from Aidin Vilayet, the most disputed region for Greek claims, through Venizelos. According to the claim reached to the British Delegation in Paris, the Turks were taking courage again because of the unstable situation, and armed themselves and formed bands. Greeks from all provinces of Aidin and Smyrna were accusing the Turks that they had been terrorized and massacres with a view to exterminating the defenseless Greeks were imminent. They were urging the Great Powers to take measures to save the Christians of Orient and slightest delay in Paris would result with a terrible delay and 'incalculable consequences'.<sup>102</sup> In Constantinople, Greeks were having demonstrations and decorating with Hellenic lags, while Turks were renounced in favour of Hellenic. Admiral Calthorpe, although his sympathies were with Greeks, was afraid that such gestures would promote trouble.<sup>103</sup> Greek Consulate in Smyrna, to have sympathizers and supporters, were distributing 'Protection Certificates' to the citizens of Germany, Austria and Bulgaria with Greek origin or in Orthodox faith. Greeks justified their doing on the ground of the Italian practice.<sup>104</sup> The news coming from Anatolia, especially from Aidin, moved Venizelos with an idea of 'striking' for the last blow. Sir Louis Mallet, with the instruction of Balfour, spoke to Venizelos on the alleged incidents in Aidin and the alternatives which might be adopted for averting them. Venizelos admitted that the situation was far from reassuring, although he was not disposed to regard massacres as a certainty. Venizelos offered to send Greek troops to be commanded by British officers, a kind

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, Doc. 6823.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid, Doc. 4931, Foreign Office's letter to Balfour, 19th of March 1919.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid.

<sup>102</sup> PRO, FO 608/83/4 Doc. 5169, the 'note' from the Greek Embassy in London to Foreign Office, 12<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid, Doc. 6354, the telegram from Admiral Calthorpe, 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid, Doc. 8374, letter from Foreign Office to Balfour.

of Anglo-Greek army to be formed for the occupation of Smyrna and for the disembarkation at Pandema [Bandirma] on Marmara Sea. Sir Louis Mallet declined this offer on the ground that such a move might overstrain of the Moslem population and lead to massacres in the interior and it was a very sensitive juncture, considering the Near East, Egypt and the whole Arab countries. Mallet also pointed out that such a move would harm the Greek case before the Supreme Council made a decision about the future of Turkey. Venizelos urged Mallet to relay the authorities for the seriousness of the situation and reach a decision as soon as possible. When Mallet offered to dispose Turkish forces to the alleged region with British officers to maintain the order there, Venizelos did not like the offer. He objected that the British officers would be placed in a position of great responsibility, and it would be difficult to get rid of the Turkish army when the Council gave the verdict for the union of Aidin to Greece. Venizelos then suggested that 40 or 50 British officers could be assigned on a tour in the province to supervise what was going on and use their influence in the interests of peace and order. Venizelos, in his dialogue, continued in suggesting that;

“...9. Venizelos then reverted to the general question of the ability of the Allies to enforce the terms of peace on Turkey. It was their policy to dismember Turkey and they must be prepared with force to do so. He eliminated the probability of it being possible to employ British troops and of the likelihood of American or other Allied troops being available. He asked Louis Mallet to let me [Balfour] know he was quite ready to put Greek troops at the disposal of the Allies- ultimately up to six or eight divisions. Equipment, etc. would presumably be provided by the Allies. He would like an intermixture of British troops but in insignificant numbers, just to color the whole. The force would be under British command.

10. Sir Louis Mallet replied that the question of the means to impose our terms had just been raised by the military authorities here and was now under discussion, and that he would pass on the offer which Monsieur Venizelos had made.”<sup>105</sup>

Curzon, Acting Foreign Secretary, answered Balfour's letter with regard to Venizelos' offers and stated that the claims were mischievous and further commented that landing of Greek troops under British officers at Smyrna and Panderma should be resisted by every means in their power. For Foreign Office it was evident that the object of the Greeks was to obtain possession of the greater part of the Aidin Vilayet and in order to cover the immorality of the move and to shift the odium on to other shoulders, they make the various proposals all of which were calculated to implicate British officers and the British Government. Foreign Office hoped that Britain would be out of this explosion for which the Asia Minor was bound

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<sup>105</sup> PRO, FO 608/89/4, E 6802 , Letter from Balfour (signed by Tyrell) to Foreign Office (addressed to Curzon), 12<sup>th</sup> April 1919.

to become in a short time.<sup>106</sup> The reaction of the Delegation in Paris to Curzon's letter was mixed, Foreign Office officials such as A.G. Adam and Robert Vansittart, considered it as 'unnecessary' and military officials thought that "*Without endeavoring to interpret M. Venizelos proposals, I am of the opinion from a military point of view that we should deprecate any suggestion which tend to increase our military commitments in the Middle East*"<sup>107</sup> Some of the Foreign Office experts believed that The Allies were free to do anything as they were pleased.<sup>108</sup> Balfour in his reply to Curzon on 2<sup>nd</sup> of May 1919 had to admit that no encouragement whatsoever was given to Venizelos for the proposal that British troops should be associated either at Smyrna or for the more extensive operations suggested by Venizelos to which there were the most obvious objections.<sup>109</sup>

While Venizelos was discussing with the British authorities for a possible invasion to Smyrna and Pandema [Bandirma], he was getting ready for the occupation and trying to associate themselves with new partners. Admiral Webb reported on 26<sup>th</sup> of February 1919 that he received news from Dr. Calep, who claimed to be the head of the local Zionism that in rapprochement going on between Jews, Greeks and Armenians, Greeks were urging Jews to lend their help in pressing Greek claims, which were, according to them, Thrace, Constantinople and Vilayets of Brussa and Aidin.<sup>110</sup> According to the intelligence reports, towards to the end of March 1919, Greece started moving his 6<sup>th</sup> Infantry Regiment of Greek Archipelago Division to Mitylene at strength of 2500 men, which was against the armistice terms, since Greece was only allowed to 1500 men to the islands.<sup>111</sup>

Greeks were really getting ready for the occupation towards the end of April 1919. Greek Red Cross units were dispatched to strategically important positions in Western Anatolia. Foreign Office after receiving the information from British High Commissioner in Constantinople, relayed intelligence reports to Paris that without any prior notice Greek Red Cross Missions were landed in Vourla, Magnesie and Macri. Similar Greek Mission also happened to be landing at Gallipoli which lead to

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid, E 8185, letter from Foreign Office (signed by Gerald Spicer on behalf of Curzon) to Balfour, 24<sup>th</sup> of April 1919.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, Military Section's view, 26<sup>th</sup> of April.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, E.G. Adam believed that "The Allies are responsible for seeing that the Turks are forced to carry out whatever terms of peace are decided upon. That as far as possible this is done without bloodshed. We can hardly wash our hands of the matter as suggested in the last paragraph", 24<sup>th</sup> of April, 1919, FO608/89, Doc. No: 8185, PRO

<sup>109</sup> Letter from Balfour to Curzon on 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1919. FO 608/89, PRO

<sup>110</sup> Telegram from Admiral Webb to Foreign Office on 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1919, FO 608/83/2 Doc. No: 3632, PRO

<sup>111</sup> Telegram from Foreign Office to Balfour on 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1919, FO 608/89/3, PRO, Doc. No: 5445, PRO

collision with Turkish Gendarmerie.<sup>112</sup> Sir Louis Mallet met Venizelos with regard to the Red Cross Missions and drew his attention to the incidences. After the Meeting, Mallet wrote a draft Note, saying that;

“Venizelos asserted with great warmth, as he had done on the occasion of Sir Louis Mallet’s visit to him on the 17<sup>th</sup> April that these Red Cross parties were not in sense the precursors of military occupation. Their mission was purely humanitarian and undertaken with the object of bringing succour to the unfortunate refugees who had suffered so cruelly during the war and who were now destitute. He had not heard of the incident at Gallipoli and would give urgent instruction in the sense ...”<sup>113</sup>

The incident at the Gallipoli was going to be handled in a Court of Inquiry and General Milne after considering evidence given, reached the decision that the blame rested with Greeks for provocative action in organizing processions on this occasion.<sup>114</sup>

After the return of President Wilson to Paris on 14<sup>th</sup> of March, ‘Big Four’ became more significant in decision making mechanism instead of Supreme Council. March and April 1919 Meetings of ‘Big Four’ were occupied with different but at the same time vital issues. German Peace settlement, Poland and Austrian issues were some of the topics that ‘Big Four’ had to tackle. As far as Anatolia and Greek claims were concerned other events to somehow related were; Bulgarian armistice, collapse of Franco-British expedition in Southern Russia and Dalmatian conflicts. In addition to these problems, there existed issues caused by Italians at Fiume and at Adalia. The news came to Paris and appeared on the newspaper of French ‘Le Matin’ on 4<sup>th</sup> of April that, without the approval of Supreme Council, Italian troops landed at Adalia on the excuse of re-establishing order and at the invitation of local citizens on 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1919. While in the Supreme Council on its meeting of 24<sup>th</sup> of March agreed that; *“It is the purpose of the Conference to separate from the Turkish Empire certain areas [in the Middle East, Armenia and Cilicia]...and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor, and to put the development of their people under the guidance of Governments which are to act mandatories of the League of Nations”*<sup>115</sup>, it is interesting that the decision reached had no reference to Greece or to any other Power which suggests that the mandatory powers were not officially determined yet, as late as 24<sup>th</sup> of March.. At this time of junction Venizelos and some of the members of the British Delegation were working hard enough to convince Americans. Harold Nicolson wrote in his ‘Diary’ that; *“Hardinge sends for me and*

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<sup>112</sup> Foreign Office letter to Balfour on 28<sup>th</sup> April 1919, FO 608/89, Doc. No: 8470, PRO

<sup>113</sup> Balfour’s letter (signed by Sir Louis Mallet) to Curzon on 1<sup>st</sup> May 1919, FO 608/89, E: 8470, PRO

<sup>114</sup> FO 608/89

<sup>115</sup> “Greece at Paris Conference” by Nicholas Rizopoulos, Unpublished PhD. Thesis, Yale University, 1963 Page160-161

asks me to negotiate direct with the Americans an agreement on all outstanding questions affecting South Eastern Europe and Turkey. Go down to see [Sidney]Mezes, who is the titular head of their [American] Delegation. We agree about Asia Minor- a semicircle line from Aivali to the north of Scala Nova. That is something”<sup>116</sup> and after two days Nicolson wrote “Work out detail scheme for partition of Turkey”<sup>117</sup> It seems that at last Americans agreed on the partition of Ottoman Empire and delineate the frontiers for Greece, when he wrote; “Venizelos comes to see me. He says that Colonel has hinted to him that United States will accept the Franco-British line in Asia Minor. He was pleased about it...Go around to see A.J.B. [Balfour] at the Rue Nitot. Explain to him about Turkey. Impossible to extract from him any answer or decision. He merely looked and looked bored. Anyhow, I got enough out of him to go on working at my partition scheme.”<sup>118</sup> Nicolson, working with Toynbee, the future of Anatolia was determined; “With Arnold Toynbee to the American Delegation. We discuss the future of Turkey. We agree upon a frontier for the future of Armenian State. We also finally agree on a joint line for the Greek Zone in Asia Minor, subject to some alteration if Italy is given a mandate in the same region. As regards the Constantinople zone, we want to bring the Turks down to the Marmara at Panderma, but the Yanks want to exclude them completely.”<sup>119</sup> At about the same time, Colonel House wrote in his ‘Diary’ on 31<sup>st</sup> March 1919 that; “Venizelos and I practically settled the Greek boundary lines, not only in Europe but for Anatolia. It took us less than half an hour. I found him fair and willing to give way upon my insistence.”<sup>120</sup>

The only one left in the American team who still believed that Greeks should not be allowed to occupy Anatolian land, was Prof. Westermann, since the rest of the team seemed to cross to the other side, to Greeks. Westermann believed that the reversal of their decision for the benefit of Greeks were due to the necessities of the international political situation and also due to the reason that they believed more strongly in the Greek side, except himself, probably because of “higher-up’s”.<sup>121</sup>

<sup>116</sup> Nicolson, p. 288, “Diary” 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>117</sup> Nicolson, p. 298, “Diary” 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>118</sup> Nicolson, p. 290, “Diary” 27<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>119</sup> Nicolson, p. 292, “Diary” 28<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>120</sup> Rizopoulos, p.160-161, Quoted in Colonel House’s ‘Diary’ on 31<sup>st</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, p. 160-161. That was the outcry of Westermann as he put it in his ‘Diary’. Westerman commented that the general disposition of the Greek territorial commission was to grant to Venizelos, who was consistently supported by the French and British professional diplomacy. He told that the American official attitude at that time was dictated by a desire to call the secret treaties into the open and register its unalterable opposition to any recognition of these as determining factors in the decisions to be made. It was indisposed to grant the Venizelist-Greek claim to any territorial control in Asia Minor. Westermann further told that; “In the Greek territorial commission it was impossible to bring the question of the secret agreements into open discussion. Only once, when the Italian delegates

The Adalia's occupation without prior endorsement of the Supreme Council by Italians came as a shock to President Wilson, although Italians discussed the issue in their visit to Lloyd George and mentioned that French consent was taken. Clemenceau was busy with his own problems and quarrels with Lloyd George with respect to the German Peace settlement. The main reason for President Wilson's anger to the Italians was the Italy's insistence for Dalmatian coast line to be annexed by them. The hot debates were coming to an end when the 'Big Four' could not reach an agreement over Fiume. Italy, because of her security was insisting to get Fiume and was claiming that the considerable portion of the population was Italian and besides the whole district was a part of Italian culture. 1916 London Pact had allocated Fiume to Serbs, and therefore Wilson, Lloyd George and Clemenceau were insisting that Italy should not insist for the region since they were afraid of, as Serbs declared, a new fighting but this time among Allies. After a hot and stormy debate with Wilson, Orlando left the meeting on 24<sup>th</sup> of April for Rome, and that marked a new episode for Anatolia.

As early as 14<sup>th</sup> of April, although Greek's claim for Western Anatolia seemed to be accepted by 'Big Three' namely America, Britain and France, the mandate issue was still yet to be solved. Nicolson wrote in his 'Diary' that;

"Toynbee and I plot together about Constantinople and the Straits. We agree: (1) that no mandatory will be able to run Constantinople without a fairly large zone behind him. On the other hand a big zone will include Greek populations, while cutting the future Turkey off from all communications with the Marmara, (2) that as we have demobilized so quickly, and as people at home are bored by the future settlement, we shall be unable to put the Greeks into Smyrna. I mean to keep them there. They can't hold it without allied support or unless the whole of Turkey behind them is split up among the Allied Powers. Yet if they do not get Smyrna Venizelos will fall from power. (3) We agree, therefore, to propose to cut the Gordian knot. Let the Turks have Anatolia as their own. Give the Greeks European Turkey only. And let the Straits be kept open by a 'Commission Fluvial' with powers analogous to those of the Danube Commission.

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*spoke of the promises made to them in the Saint Jean de Maurienne Agreement, it became apparent that Great Britain certainly, France by its silence, refused to countenance that understanding as a binding contract, on the specious plea that one of the parties which should have been signatory to the agreement, Russia had not signed. The Italian delegates thereupon withdrew from participation in the discussions of the Greek territorial commission...The French and British delegates recommended the Greek claim to Smyrna and an area about it much reduced from Venizelos's demand. The American delegates opposed the Greek desire for sovereignty in any part of Asia Minor. When Premier Orlando broke with President Wilson upon the Fiume issue and left Paris, the astute Venizelos immediately pushed forward his Smyrna claim. He was able to gain support of the American leaders at the Peace Conference, in the face of the contrary American stand as represented upon the Greek territorial commission. Under a secrecy which kept knowledge of this decision absolutely from the office of the American advisors upon Turkish affairs, he gained permission to occupy Smyrna with Greek troops..."* (Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour, What Really Happened at Paris, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), p. 176-203

Such a solution would at least have the merit of finality. All other solutions would entail trouble in the future. We put this down on paper; we sign it with our names; we send it in. It will not be considered."<sup>122</sup>

Meanwhile there had been pressure on the Peace Delegation especially on Lloyd George in Britain because of peace talks had been dragged on for a long time and people were getting impatient. Lloyd George had to fly back to Britain to address a parliamentary debate, according to Nicolson, intrigued by French through Northcliffe, because of Lloyd George's attitude towards the German-French border conflict. The situation in Southeastern Russia was another problem that Lloyd George was facing, since French-British expedition to help Denikin turned out to be a failure. The Bolsheviks, after winning a decisive victory, entered the city only four days after the French evacuated Odessa. This was quite a fortunate incident for Venizelos, since he could then allocate the three Greek divisions he had spared in Southeastern Russia, to Anatolia and/or to Bulgaria where the armistice terms according to Venizelos had been violated. The home front, Britain, was not looking bright either. Apart from the parliamentary issues, there was an enormous work needed to be done for the war stricken country. In the Cabinet there appeared some criticism for the conduct of the peace negotiations in Paris. The acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Curzon had sent a long letter to Balfour criticizing the conduct of the negotiations and policy of Britain. Curzon in his message of 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1919, strongly depreciated the policy of Peace Conference to which he described as a dangerous position in East, and which was likely to lead to further disturbances. According to Curzon the present situation was in contrast with that which had existed when the Conference was assembled, and he further criticized the various proposals for the division of the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the memorandum, Curzon submitted certain suggestions, adoption of which might still save the situation.<sup>123</sup>

Curzon in his study touched upon almost every polemic existed in Near East, from Constantinople to Mosul. He warned that the problem in Aidin Vilayet was particularly acute, because of friction between Ottoman Greeks and Moslems and especially after intrigues of Italians, French and Hellenes. In Smyrna, Greeks, Italians and Turks were ready to intervene and Italians were waiting for the right moment to intervene by their troops available in Rhodes. Curzon suggested that, Turks should be allowed to send a division of troops with British officers to keep

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<sup>122</sup> Nicolson, p. 311-312, Diary of 14<sup>th</sup> of April 1919,

<sup>123</sup> PRO, FO 608/83, E 7919 and E 8514, the letter, which enclosed a memorandum of Foreign Office to Balfour, 18<sup>th</sup> of April 1919, and printed version, 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 1919.

order there. After Italians landed in Adalia, according to Curzon, Greeks were making preparations for a descent on Smyrna. Curzon believed that the Supreme Council was intending to hand over Smyrna to the Greeks and no doubt this action was going to bring storms to the area, and already local European colony had resented such an action and British High Commissioner in Constantinople had already given his warnings. Curzon was against giving Smyrna and Aidin to Greeks, and he gave the reasoning as for Greeks, who could not keep order outside the gates of Salonika, were not able to manage such places. Besides, Curzon thought that, when Turks realized that, in addition to be expelled from Europe, their Asiatic provinces were also be parceled out among foreigners whom they despised, were bound to rebel and start fighting. The Moslem world would be also influenced, when they realize that there was no Turkish state left even the Caliphate was to be kicked out, even then, there were reports for troubles from all over Near East. Curzon suggested that, if it was not late, the Turks, naturally, should be expelled from Europe and even from Constantinople and be left in Asia. Curzon concluded that Greeks should not be allowed to land at Smyrna. Since it was understood that Americans were going to take over Armenia, then the powers should decide the future of Armenia. French and British should reach an understanding over Constantinople and Straits and these areas should be reinforced with additional forces. Curzon's memorandum had some mixed impact on the Delegation, and Lord Hardinge wrote that; "*Sitting in a comfortable armchair in Downing Street it is very easy to criticize, and although there is much force in many of Lord Curzon's views, he does not seem to value that we can not have .... our own way or rather his way in a Conference with Powers with ambitions like France and Italy or with an idealistic Power such as United States. There seems to be no necessity to answer this note.*"<sup>124</sup> The Military Section of the Delegation view for the Curzon's Note was "*This seems a most excellent and concrete appreciation of the situation as far as the military standpoint is concerned*"<sup>125</sup>. It was interesting that Sir Eyre Crowe and Harold Nicolson who were the architects of the pro-Greek policy for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and Toynbee who was the person insisting on the necessity of a mandatory over the Turks in Anatolia had no comment on the Curzon's memorandum.

Indian Moslem population was anxious on what about to come to the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference. They, being a part of the British Empire, voiced

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid, E 7919, 'side-note' of Lord Hardinge, Permanent Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

their feelings to British authorities even during the Peace negotiations as early as March 1919. Mr. Ispahani forwarded a memorial from representatives of Moslems and sympathizers, protesting against forming new states out of the Ottoman Empire. Memorial cited strength of Moslem feelings in India and urged that powers should not exploit the Asiatic unrest for their benefits and also the new proposed states should not be withdrawn from spiritual authority of Caliph. The 'note' touched upon two more points, one for Palestine for which they demanded a Moslem rule and another for Armenia that the Moslem population's rights should be safeguarded.<sup>126</sup> Indian's Moslem population through The Secretary of State for India, Montagu, was going to raise their voices even more in coming days. The atmosphere mainly created by Venizelos was getting tense and Venizelos was using all his connections to blow the last stroke to reach his goal.

While Venizelos was working very hard to convince the Delegates in Paris and to influence the public opinion for his advantage, there existed some views in drawing attention to the danger for the Greeks occupying Western Anatolia. Dr. E.J. Dillon in his article on 'Greek Subjects of the Turkish Empire in Asia Minor' which appeared in 'Daily Telegraph' on 13<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 reported that Commission on Greek Questions was disinclined to give Greece, Smyrna and other districts of the hinterland. Dillon pointed out that it came as a surprise as union of the coastal population with the Motherland was thought a foregone conclusion. Arrangement that these Greeks should be left under dominion of Turkey might gratify the Italians and please the American Missionaries and anxiety on the part of Greece seemed to be well founded.<sup>127</sup> Italians were aware that for their plan for controlling and occupying of Smyrna and its hinterland was getting difficult and the pendulum was swinging for the advantage of the Greeks in Paris and therefore they were trying to get the support of the Turks. Tom Hohler from the British High Commission in Constantinople relayed a report prepared by Area Control Officer in Smyrna and summarized the situation in Turkey. According to the Intelligence reports Turks were against the Greek claims in the Western Anatolia and had support of the Italian High

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid, E 1355, petition from Indian Moslems, 12<sup>th</sup> of March, the seriousness of the Petition was well received and Toynbee on 13<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 wrote that; "*The demand that a link should be retained between the new States and Turkey is of course directly contrary to the policy of HMG [His Majesty's Government], who attach special importance to their complete severance. It is noticeable that no reference made to the sentiments of Moslems in the territories which it is proposed to detach, but only to the Moslem feeling in other parts of the world. The proposal that the rulers of the new states should receive investiture from the Ottoman Caliph is particularly pernicious. This is a purely 'secular' and not a 'spiritual' relationship, and it can not be tolerated. As regards Armenia, safeguards for the Moslem population are being provide for in the British Delegation's draft Turkey Treaty*" Robert Vansittart's view was; "*This has no doubt been acknowledged by FO. No other action seems necessary.*"

<sup>127</sup> Ibid, E 4783.

Commissioner and British Intelligence report drew the attention for the intrigues of Italians.<sup>128</sup> Sir Ramsey, from Aidin Smyrna Railway Syndicate, sent an article on 'The Future of the Ottoman Empire' to be published in 'International Review' in April 1919 to Sir Louis Mallet. Sir Ramsey believed that there was no country other than Turkey that could be governed so easily. The disorder that seemed to exist in Anatolia was due to the misgovernment and the gravest danger that the misgovernment was going to be intensified by the disposition that the Allies thought of making in the country. The handing over of great bodies to be ruled by Greeks, Italians, French or Armenians could not be accepted by Anatolian Moslems that is the Turks. The Turks, according to Ramsey, would not submit to be ruled by any of these races and therefore they will fight to the end against it in a sort of unorganized guerilla warfare which would go on for generations. Ramsey was protesting that they did not fight this war in order to enthrone the Italians in Adalia or the French in Adana and the Athenians in Smyrna. He further stated that an independent self-government should be formed under an Imperial Government, with full freedom to all races and religions and ability, directed by the U.S. is the one cure in Anatolia and Constantinople and that would be easy, simple and certain of success.<sup>129</sup> Robert Vansittart's comment for Ramsey's letter was; "*I concur that America would be the best mandatory for Asia Minor as a whole, but did not agree that Smyrna either wanted or would live best under independent self-government.*"<sup>130</sup> Louis Mallet reiterated his position that the International Commission which was visiting other parts of Anatolia should also pay a visit to Smyrna and Americans should be urged to take the charge of Anatolia as a whole on temporary basis.<sup>131</sup> There was no comment by Sir Eyre Crowe about Ramsey's note, although he read the document.

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<sup>128</sup> Ibid, E5592, Tom Hohler's letter to Lancelot Oliphant of Foreign Office on 7<sup>th</sup> of March 1919, which enclosed a British Control Officer's intelligence report of 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 1919. The Report gave details of the conversation of Djami [Cami] Bey who was a former employee of Ministry of Interior and a Deputy of Tripoli in the Ottoman Parliament, and a Principal of a Protestant educational institution. It is interesting to note a Turkish intellect's view before the occupation of Smyrna. Cami Bey was reported to say that "*The Turks themselves now realized that they were incapable of governing without foreign assistance and guidance, and, all elements would welcome such. Mesopotamia, Syria and Palestine they looked as separated for ever from Empire and they were also resigned establishment of an independent ARMENIA. What they all felt most strongly however was that it would be a great injustice to the Turks and contrary to all principles for which the Entente claimed to have been fighting, if Greek aspirations in Asia Minor were satisfied, and part such as the Vilayets of Aidin and Broussa placed under Greek rule. They emphasized that Venizelos and the Greeks were conducting a very able campaign and feared that they had captured public opinion in France and, to a lesser extent perhaps, in England; they are afraid that decisions would be arrived at the Peace Conference in the sense desired by the Greeks, before the real facts regarding such matters as the relative numbers of the two nationalities in those provinces had been investigated, and without the Turks having been given an opportunity of stating their case. In view of the danger of this happening and of the reserved attitude maintained by England and France, many Turks would be disposed, in their extremity, to accept the assistance of any other Power willing to help them and oppose the Greek claims...*"

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, E 5052, Sir W.M. Ramsey's letter to Sir Louis Mallet, 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid, 'side-note' of R. Vansittart, 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid, 'side-note' of Louis Mallet, 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

Resentment came from Mr. A.C. James, the American Commission for Relief in the Near East. James' letter to Lord R. Cecil enclosed reports and telegrams to President Wilson and Colonel House from Relief workers and urged that because of the internal condition of Turkey, Smyrna district should not be controlled by the Greeks.<sup>132</sup>

While there was an intense traffic of communication with regard to Western Anatolia to be given to Greek or not, the Supreme Council was also having heated debates for the Adriatic coast, especially for Fiume to be allocated to Serbs or Italians. On 21<sup>st</sup> of April 1919, the Italians after being told by Wilson and Lloyd George that there was no possibility of having Fiume, left the 'Big Four' meeting and threatened to go back to Italy. President Wilson prepared a press declaration about the Italian claims and this appeared in 'Temps' on the 23<sup>rd</sup> and in the leading European papers the following day. After Orlando and Sonnino's leave in the 'Big Four' Conference, Venizelos moved in to take the advantage of the absence of his major opponents for his own claims in Western Anatolia. During the Conference of 'Big Three', since then Italy was absent, Clemenceau informed that the Italians were sending a battleship to Smyrna and Lloyd George's response was "*This is dangerous, and it would seem that the Italians want to cause crisis. It is better that we don't concern ourselves with them*"<sup>133</sup>

Admiral Bristol had already cabled Paris on 24<sup>th</sup> of April 1919 that the Italians were piling troops in Konia and there was unrest in Anatolia and therefore, was suggesting that in case the Peace Conference provided any partition of Turkey, armed occupation should precede such an announcement.<sup>134</sup> On 2<sup>nd</sup> of May 1919 in the Conference of 'Big Three', the absence of Italy was re-evaluated and President Wilson complained that Italy's sending ships to Fiume and Smyrna created an explosion and he offered to send America's biggest battleship 'George Washington' either to Fiume or to Smyrna. Wilson thought that; "*If I do it, that can produce a result- and far from me is the desire that that result should be war. But Italy's attitude is undoubtedly aggressive; she is creating a threat to the peace in the very middle of the peace conference in which she was once participated and from which she has withdrawn*"<sup>135</sup> and at the right time Lloyd George intervened to ignite even more of

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<sup>132</sup> Ibid, E 5221, Mr. A.C. James' letter to Lord R. Cecil, 15<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>133</sup> Mantaux, Vol. I, p. 422

<sup>134</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 180-181

<sup>135</sup> Mantaux, Vol. I, p. 453-454

<sup>136</sup> Ibid

anger in President in saying that Italy was not only creating trouble in Fiume but was busy in doing intrigues in Anatolia; “A dispatch received by M. Venizelos, who acquainted us with it, indicates that there is an agreement in Asia Minor between the Italians and the Turks, who are resuming their policy of terrorism against Greeks. M. Venizelos asks us to send a warship to Smyrna and proposes to send a Greek ship there himself.”<sup>136</sup> Wilson pointed out that the Italians had declared that they were sending their ships to protect their nationals, but Lloyd George offered to send ships to Smyrna jointly. Clemenceau’s remark for the Lloyd George’s offer was; “*What a beginning for the League of Nations!*”<sup>137</sup>

At the end of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of May 1919 meeting, Wilson ordered the battleship Arizona to be sent to adjacent waters of Smyrna and Admiral Bristol was notified to report any actions taking place in Smyrna waters. Lloyd George also ordered one British dreadnaught to be sent to Smyrna, and he further told Calthorpe, British High Commissioner in Constantinople, that two Greek ships were to be sent to Smyrna Region.<sup>138</sup>

Harold Nicolson dined with Venizelos in the evening of 2<sup>nd</sup> of May, and naturally the topic of conversation was Italy and Greeks in Anatolia. Nicolson wrote in his ‘Diary’ that they discussed the effect of the Italian crisis upon Greek claims, and he expressed the fear that Italy might be given compensation in Anatolia for what she was forced to surrender in the Adriatic. Venizelos did not seem to be alarmed with the possibility of adverse events and he told Nicolson that “I have received assurances of comfort and support from Lloyd George and Wilson”<sup>139</sup> It seems that ‘Big Three’ was occupied with the Italian problem on the 3<sup>rd</sup> and 4<sup>th</sup> of May Meetings, but Greek occupation of Smyrna came into discussion on 5<sup>th</sup> of May. General Henry Wilson wrote in his ‘Diary’ that;

“I began a walk at 10 AM with Lloyd George and Borden, we discussed the Balkans, and Lloyd George is convinced that the Italians are going to carry out a coup in Bulgaria, where they have the 36<sup>th</sup> Division, 30,000 strong, and in Anatolia, where they seem to have landed in several places... Then brought me to Wilson’s house, where there was a meeting. Imperiali [Italian Ambassador] arrived just after to say that Orlando and Sonnino would be back on Wednesday morning [8<sup>th</sup> May]. I could not make out, and Imperiali did not say, on what terms they are coming back, but I should think on the Treaty of London which my cousin [President Wilson] will not agree to. We shall see. Then our meeting—Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau. I showed the military situation in the Balkans and in Asia Minor, and Lloyd George pressed for a *fait accompli* in settlement to be

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<sup>137</sup> Ibid.

<sup>138</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 183-184.

<sup>139</sup> Nicholson, p. 321-322, “Diary” 2nd of May 1919.

reached before the Italians come back on Wednesday. Lloyd George still wants Italians to go to the Caucasus, although he told Wilson their presence there would create 'Hell' which pained my Cousin. Then he wants the Americans to take over Constantinople and Armenia, give Smyrna to the Greeks, Syria to the French and Palestine to us. With much nonsense, the above is in brief Lloyd George's proposal"<sup>140</sup>

The meeting of the 'Big Three' on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1919 marked an historic moment for the days to come. The conversation taking place in 'Big Three' and the possibility of a decision that might be reached was either leaked by Venizelos, to 'outside', or by the Greek Government since Venizelos had informed for such an action, as he, 6<sup>th</sup> of May, in the morning sent a telegram to Athens;

"Please contact immediately M. Repoulis [vice-premier] and ask him without fail to take all measures necessary that all available passenger and merchant vessels be ready by this evening should you receive telegram from me ordering them to sail to Salonica to receive 1<sup>st</sup> Division for landing at location to be announced"<sup>141</sup>

May 6<sup>th</sup> Meeting started with discussion of the Italian attitude, and Lloyd George insisted that Italians were still after Fiume which provoked the President who was still mad at Italians. Wilson informed the Meeting that Lloyd George's offer, previous day, to occupy the determined zones in Anatolia with the participation of French, British and American troops could not be fulfilled because of the American Constitution since the President had no right to send troops to a country that she was not at war. Then Lloyd George brought the Greek claim to the attention of the Meeting, saying that they should allow Greeks to land troops at Smyrna.<sup>142</sup> At the

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<sup>140</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 188 and Callwell p. 187-188. Mantoux gives the details of the conversation during the progress of the the decision taking by the 'Big Three' as;

"Mr. Lloyd George...We are going to find ourselves of a *fait accompli*: the Italians will be in Anatolia. The only means to guard against it is to settle the question of the mandates as soon as possible and to settle the question of the occupation immediately. That will allow us to leave the Caucasus and to send troops to Bulgaria; the Americans will occupy Constantinople and the French, Syria. We must allow Greeks to occupy Smyrna. There are massacres beginning there and no one to protect the Greek population.

M. Clemenceau: Do you know how many ships Italy now has at Smyrna? She has seven there.

Mr. Lloyd George: It is better to decide all that amongst ourselves before the return of Italians.

Otherwise, I am convinced they will beat us at it.

M. Clemenceau: I am entirely ready for it. In fact, they must find our decisions taken.

....

Mr. Lloyd George: The Italians have 30,000 men in Bulgaria; they want to put pressure on us. We are demobilizing, you are returning to America, and Italy remains armed. She can, in a few months, present us with a *fait accompli*: having occupied the greater part of Asia Minor, and she can even takes an aggressive position in the Balkans. I favour forestalling them and presenting them with a *fait accompli* In order to do that, an immediate decision is necessary. Let's call for a meeting of our military and naval experts, who will review this question of the occupation zones in Turkey' (Mantoux, Vol. I, p. 483-485)

<sup>141</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 190.

<sup>142</sup> Mantoux, p. 494-496. At the beginning of the Meeting Wilson seemed to be hesitant to reach the decision for the Greek occupation of Smyrna. Lloyd George kept on referring to the Italians that they were going to occupy most of the Anatolia, and after Italian occupation it would be difficult for the Allies to divide the country to various mandates. According to Montoux the related conversation was; "Mr. Lloyd George: *In the meantime, if we let them [Italians], the Italians will have occupied all of Anatolia. We haven't even yet discussed amongst ourselves the question of mandates for that part of Asia.*

end of the meeting it was agreed among three leaders that the Greek troops to proceed to Smyrna and to places where there was a threat of disturbance or massacre. After the meeting, Venizelos, Admiral Hope, General Belin, General Bliss and General Sir Henry Wilson had a conference and drew the plan for the occupation of Smyrna. The meeting, according to the 'Diaries' of General Wilson, had the conclusion of;

"1. The Supreme Council having agreed to the immediate dispatch of Greek troops to Smyrna and the occupation of that town by purely Greek forces, we decided:

- (a) To notify General Franchet d'Esperay
- (b) To order one Greek Division to prepare to embark at Salonika.
- (c) To order a second Greek Division to get ready.
- (d) To collect transport for the move of one Division as rapidly as possible.
- (e) To examine what steps may be necessary to safeguard the journey.
- (f) To take steps to keep up the necessary communication between Greece and Smyrna.

2. We are of the opinion that these troops are under Greek Command and in no sense under International command except possibly during the sea-transit.

3. We are of the opinion that if the Turks of the Italians or both oppose a landing we shall find ourselves in face of a difficult problem and we draw attention to this possibility.

4. We presume the Italian and Turkish Governments will be informed as we are not sure whether such an action is covered by the Armistice Terms."<sup>143</sup>

Harold Nicolson was going to write in his "Diary" on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, that; *"I hear that Lloyd George and Clemenceau are allowing Venizelos to land a Greek division at Smyrna. This means at least that the Smyrna question is settled. A personal triumph for*

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*President Wilson: I am told that the Turks want the areas inhabited by their race not to be divided, and also that there is a movement amongst them in favour of an American administration.*

*Mr. Lloyd George: That wouldn't surprise me; of all Westerners, the Americans are those against whom they have the fewest grievances.*

*President Wilson: I have no hope that American public opinion will consent to it. Hatred of Turks is unbelievable in America. What American public opinion will approve is the protection of the Armenians or of any people whatever against the Turks. It will also approve the occupation of Constantinople, if it is entrusted to us, because, in that way, Constantinople will be taken from the Turks. But, I confess that no place as turbulent a power as Italy in Anatolia seems dangerous to me, as much because of Turks and their possible reactions as because of the relations which will be established between the Italians and the neighboring mandates. As for the Italians, I don't know whether they will be altogether satisfied to have great mandates in Asia when they see what costs that will impose on their budget.*

....

*Mr. Lloyd George: I insist again that we mustn't allow Italy to present us with a fait accompli in Asia. We must allow the Greeks to land troops at Smyrna."*

*For Lloyd George's offer for Greeks to send troops to Smyrna, Wilson answered as the best weapon to stop Italians was the financial weapon and told that; "The moment might come when we will tell them that, if they don't evacuate such and such a territory, they must not expect us to provide them with the money required to remain there." But Lloyd George kept on insisting of sending Greek troops to Smyrna, in saying that; "Have we ever prevented the Turks and the Balkan Powers from making war, even though they have always suffered from lack of money? My opinion is that M. Venizelos must be told to send troops to Smyrna. We will give our admirals instructions to allow the Greeks to land everywhere there is a threat of disturbances or massacres.*

*President Wilson: Why not tell them to land now? Do you have any objection?*

*Mr. Lloyd George: None.*

*M. Clemenceau: I don't have any either. But must we notify the Italians?*

*Mr. Lloyd George: Not in my opinion."*

<sup>143</sup> Rizopoulos, p.195-196

<sup>144</sup> Nicholson, p. 327, "Diary" 6<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

Venizelos.”<sup>144</sup> The Italian Prime Minister Orlando and Foreign Secretary Sonnino arrived the same evening from Rome to attend the ‘Big Four’ Meeting on 7<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, with no knowledge of the Supreme Council’s decision with regard to Greeks’ landing at Smyrna.

To have the last touch-up for the landing at Smyrna, ‘Big Three’ met again on 7<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, at noon, without inviting the Italians although they were present in the morning session. military experts and Venizelos also attended the meeting. Venizelos told them that a Greek division, of sixteen thousand, was ready to embark at Kavala and he could take additional two divisions from Macedonia without any difficulty, but in that case they would require, in future, drawing troops from Bessarabia, to act in Thrace. With this offer Venizelos, after securing Western Anatolia, was then, aiming for Thrace. Clemenceau told that there was no question of acting in Thrace, since it was not what they wanted. At the meeting they decided that Venizelos would try to get as much ships available for the transportation and the rest transport would be made available by the British, and they will keep secret of the landing from Turks and Italians until the last moment. Lloyd George preferred that the Greeks landing at Smyrna to be under general command of French General Franchet d’Esperay but not General Allenby since it would be better not to be mixed up in this affair. When General Wilson drew the attention on the possibility of the Italians landing at Smyrna, if they had realized what the Greeks were doing, President Wilson commented that; “If the Greeks land with our mandate, the Italians can’t make a landing without making an agreement with us or without provoking a serious incident”<sup>145</sup> General Henry Wilson was going to write in his ‘Diaries’ that; “*All this is wrong, and after the others had gone I told Lloyd George he was making a lot of trouble with the Turks and the Italians for nothing; but he would not have it.*”<sup>146</sup> , and on the decision that Italians were not to be informed about the Greek landing “*What rotten behavior to a friend and Ally.*”<sup>147</sup> General Wilson was going to write on 10<sup>th</sup> of May in his ‘Diaries’ that;

*“It now appears that Venizelos is producing shipping for 14 000 men, and will be ready to push off his leading troops on Monday [May 13<sup>th</sup>]. I begged Lloyd George to tell the Italians. I told him that nobody could understand our not telling one of our greatest Allies, and that no one defends the three Frocks having secret meetings to carry out this coup and not telling the*

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<sup>145</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II p. 29-32

<sup>146</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 198-199 and Calwell p. 190 of General Henry Wilson, ‘Diaries’ 7<sup>th</sup> of May 1919.

<sup>147</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 199 and Calwell Pg. 191 of General Henry Wilson, ‘Diaries’ 8<sup>th</sup> of May 1919

*Italians what they were doing. Lloyd George agreed, and said he would speak to the other two this morning*<sup>148</sup>

In the 10<sup>th</sup> of May Meeting of 'Big Three' with the participation of Venizelos, General Bliss and General Wilson, it was decided that The Turks should be notified on Monday morning and the time of landing would be communicated to the Turks Tuesday morning, 24 hours before the operation. Although Lloyd George promised General Wilson that he agreed to notify the Italians, but at the meeting because of insistence of Venizelos, the Italians were going to be notified about Greek landing only on Monday evening, about 36 hours prior to the landing. With Venizelos insistence and the consent of Lloyd George, it was decided that Admiral Calthorpe, British High Commissioner at Constantinople was going to be present in the landing, to block Italians in case they interfered with landing. It was also decided that French would take over the forts from Turks and hand over to Greeks.<sup>149</sup> General Wilson was going to write in his 'Diaries' that; *"The whole thing is mad and bad, and I hope that it won't lead to any massacres of our people in the interior. Venizelos is using the three Frocks for his own ends. After the three Frocks had gone, Bliss, Le Bon, Fuller and I had a talk, and we all agreed we were doing a stupid thing"*<sup>150</sup>

The 'Big Three', where Balfour was substituting Lloyd George, with the participation of Venizelos met again the following day, to discuss the Greek landing. It appeared that there had been a linkage at Constantinople, and the Turks had been informed about the intention of the Greeks regarding Smyrna. Both Balfour and Clemenceau were most unhappy since the Italians could learn the decision that was taken without notifying the Italians. Clemenceau suggested postponing the landing for 24 hours and at the mean time they could notify the Italians that they were compelled to take the decision in their absence. He further told that; *"I took the time to review the Treaty of London and the agreement of Saint-Jean de Maurienne. Mr. Lloyd George said the other day that the promise to give Smyrna to Italy was contingent to Italian participation in England's military action in the Near East: now, I don't find one word about that in the convention of Saint-Jean de Maurienne. Mr. Lloyd George's memory has betrayed him."*<sup>151</sup> Balfour declared that with the Treaty of London, Italy would be entitled to receive compensation in the province of Adalia, and continued that; *"In my absence, the Italians demanded a solution instantly. I had shown my*

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<sup>148</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 201-202 and Calwell Pg. 191-192 of General Henry Wilson, 'Diaries' 10<sup>th</sup> of May 1919.

<sup>149</sup> Mantaux, Vol. I, p. 505-507

<sup>150</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 203 and Calwell p. 193.

<sup>151</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 36-37

*opposition to their pretensions towards Smyrna: at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, Mr. Lloyd George, no doubt for valid reasons, promised it to them. Indeed. The other day he said that it was in exchange for a promise of cooperation in Asia; but, as M. Clemenceau has said, his memory deceived him.*"<sup>152</sup> Clemenceau was thinking that the Italians should not get the impression that they were being 'cheated' of Fiume and then in Smyrna. Clemenceau re-iterated that the landing should be delayed for 24 hours and furthermore the action to be accomplished by Allies as a joint operation. Therefore Clemenceau's proposal was of using French, British and Italian forces landing together with a promise of re-embarking when the Greeks came to take their places. At the end of the meeting it was decided that the landing would be handled by the Greek forces, under nominal overall command of Admiral Calthorpe with the participation of 200-3000 British and French marines, and therefore excluding the Italians again. During the debate President asked whether they were firm on the decision that Smyrna should go to Greeks and both Clemenceau and Balfour answered as affirmative. During the meeting Venizelos told that the Italians landed at Scala Nova then drew back again and he told that 'Greek Claims Commission' did not allow Scala Nova and the district south of Smyrna as Greek zone, but if this area was going to be given to a European State as a mandatory, then Greece could take this mandate for a duration of at least 10 years.<sup>153</sup>

The Italians were officially told about the landing at Smyrna on Monday 12<sup>th</sup> of May 1919 by Clemenceau and Lloyd George, and Wilson were accompanying him. It appeared that they all used very soft approach to the Italians in explaining that during the absence of the Italians, the Greeks warned them of the possibility of massacres towards Greeks, so they had to decide on the landing at Smyrna. They also told Orlando that they would like to use equal number of men with the command of Calthorpe and then they would hand over the city to the guardianship of the Greeks. Orlando gave their answer in the afternoon session that they agreed to act jointly in landing and Clemenceau gave the assurance that; "*We say to you: today Smyrna belongs to no one; it is not a question of determining the fate of that city, but of carrying out a temporary operation, with a well-defined objective. I would see great difficulties in leaving French, English and Italian troops under the command of a Greek general.*"<sup>154</sup> Although the Italians insisted for a while to keep joint forces at Smyrna, but Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Wilson told them that

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<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 42-48

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, p. 48

that would not be necessary. Lloyd George, being aware of the Italian presence in Scala Nova, Marmaris and Budrum [Bodrum], pointed out that these places were the different points around Smyrna, and he also drew the attention of the meeting that; *“Every minute we receive information which indicates the urgency of the operation. According to the latest news, the Turks have fired upon the Greek quarter without any provocation and killed a number of inhabitants”*<sup>155</sup> This was the end of the meeting and it was settled that Greeks along with few French, British and Italians were going to land at Smyrna to control the Greek population from ‘massacres’. Venizelos on the same day at 5:45PM sent a telegram to Athens, saying that; *“I have been informed at this very moment that the Supreme Council of the Conference decided in today’s meeting that the expeditionary force should sail immediately toward Smyrna. The decision was unanimous. Long Live the Nation”*<sup>156</sup>

The Italians, although agreed to act jointly at the landing and afterwards hand over Smyrna to Greeks, were disillusioned that they lost the battle to Greeks for that they were aiming to get since 1916. They were aware the sentiments of Powers towards Greeks since the formation of the ‘Greek Claims’ Commission and formation of the Report in which Greek case was almost acknowledged. They tried to bring the attention of Powers that Greeks were getting ready to penetrate to Anatolia by building military force in Mitylene and in Samos and accumulating Red Cross units in the areas that possibly planned to be invaded. Italians urged the Powers to take action to prevent Greeks but with not much result. They were informed that Britain had no knowledge of such proposed action on part of Greece, and further it was pointed out to them that unauthorized Italian landing at Adalia was likely to provoke corresponding action on part of Greeks elsewhere, although for Italians their action was legitimate because of her rights as given by London and also by Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreements.<sup>157</sup> Greeks were not only sending troops to the locations to the islands that Italians were complaining, but also to the islands which were under the control of British forces. British Admiralty had to complain to Foreign Office that presence of Greek troops with no authorization, were against the Armistice rules.<sup>158</sup> Another point was the finance of the Greek troops; in 1918 the cost was £35 Million of which America contributed £5 Million and the rest was shared between France

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<sup>155</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 48-49

<sup>156</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 211

<sup>157</sup> PRO, FO 608/89 E 6909, the letter from Foreign Office (Curzon) to Sir R. Rodd, British Ambassador in Rome.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid, p. 7394. Admiralty in a letter to Foreign Office on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Ibid 1919 complained the presence of Greek forces in the islands of Lemnos, Imbros and Tenedos and urged them to take action through General Franchet d'Esperay and Greek Government.

and Britain, and Greece because of demobilization was in need of financing. Britain halted cash to be given to Greece, but they were using British stores for their logistics since early 1919. The decision for further financing the Greek army, was debated in the War Cabinet on 12<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919, and the case was left to the decision of Balfour.<sup>159</sup> Considering that Venizelos had already demanded the Smyrna expedition, financial wise, should be covered by Allies, it was to be accepted that Britain contributed for Smyrna occupation.

The crucial meeting of the 'Big Three' and the question of Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement and rights of the Italians brought to the attention of Balfour by Hankey. Hankey gave a short summary of the meeting and told that President Wilson was strongly in favour of the proposal of Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau was also in favour, although he felt some doubt as to whether it would not cause trouble with the Italians, owing to the Agreement of Saint-Jean de Maurienne. Hankey further wrote that Mr. Lloyd George had brushed aside this objections, saying that it was really only intended to apply on condition of playing a considerable part in the operations against Turkey and also on condition that Russia gave her consent. Hankey wrote that, this latter condition he had often heard quoted, although he could never remember seeing it, and could not find it in any document in his possession, and he was not quite clear himself whether M. Venizelos was to be authorized to send the troops or not, certainly as decision was taken as to who should inform M. Venizelos. Hankey further wrote that, he thought it was his duty to let Balfour, being the Foreign Secretary to know at once in case he should think it wise to take any action in the matter.<sup>160</sup>

When Balfour attended the 'Big Three' Meeting, to represent Lloyd George, he had to admit that, Lloyd George's memory deceived him with regard to the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Agreement, although he adopted the excuse given by Lloyd George and Sir Eyre Crowe that the agreement was no longer valid with the absence of Russian consent. Italy's involvement in Anatolia was not over yet and the role that she was

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<sup>159</sup> PRO, CAB 23/9, War Cabinet Meeting (531) Minutes,

<sup>160</sup> PRO, FO 608/89 E 9328, Hankey's letter to Balfour, 6<sup>th</sup> May 1919. Deputy Under-Secretary of Foreign Office and a member of British Delegation at 'Greek Claims' Committee Sir Eyre Crowe commented on Hankey's letter that on 7<sup>th</sup> May 1919 that; "*I understand that the question has since been settled by the dispatch of British and Greek ships. As regards to the Agreement of St. Jean de Maurienne, Sir M. Hankey might like to see (a) the actual reservation in the agreement as to Russian consent. (b) The correspondence between the Italian ambassador at Rome, and M. de Martino here, recording our categorical refusal to acknowledge the validity of the agreement. It is important that the Prime Minister should have this correspondence in his mind in the event of further discussion on this subject.*" It was interesting that Sir Eyre Crowe did not comment on the condition of 'Italian effort' clause, although he had known that it had been waved off, and Russian consent, regardless to its validity especially after the Bolshevik Revolution, was considered as a valid condition.

going to play was going to be put again on the agenda of the Supreme Council by Lloyd George. At the mean time the atmosphere in Constantinople and especially in Anatolia was getting tense, since Turks loosing hope in the peace negotiations were in a stage of uneasiness. Calthorpe was requesting to be warned in advance of any decisions that Supreme Council might be taken with the regard of the partition of Turkey. Balfour had to warn American, French and Italian Delegations of the urgency and gravity of the Calthorpe's message and urged them to take measures to safeguard any premature disclosure of the terms to be imposed on Turkey.<sup>161</sup>

The Supreme Council, rather the 'Big Three' had their last meeting on 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, before Orlando rejoined them on the 14<sup>th</sup>. The meeting on 13<sup>th</sup> of May was to a certain extent to find way and means to compensate Italy for Fiume, which became an acute problem of the Conference. The 'Big Three', no doubt needed to satisfy Italy, but without sacrificing Fiume, to show the 'solidarity' among the Allies to Germans who were waiting for the conclusion of the Peace Treaty and had been using the absence of the Italians for their own interests. Lloyd George commenced the discussion on the mandate issue of the Ottoman Empire and talked about the advantages of the Italian mandate in Anatolia, how good they would be in policing mountains in Anatolia. President Wilson was overjoyed to hear a way out for the problem and he approved the idea that they should give a mandate to Italy in southern Anatolia, Wilson proposed that Greece would have complete ownership of Smyrna and the territory upon which the experts agreed, along with the Dodecanese islands, and he further proposed to institute a mandate of the League of Nations, which would be entrusted to Greece, for the rest of the Vilayet of Aidin. Lloyd George had not finished in the partition of Anatolia yet, and he suggested that if America accepted the mandate of Armenia, then the northern Anatolia would be left for the mandate of France. In case American Senate rejected the mandate, then according to Lloyd George, the whole Anatolia would be given to Italy, while France held Armenia for mandate. When Wilson commented that from the information they gathered he Turks would not object to be under a mandate as long as their territories stayed as one unit, Lloyd George told that it would be impossible to find a single nation to be in a position to contribute to such a large country for the development that it required. Lloyd George further pointed out that if the Italians were to be given Southern Anatolia including the port Makri, then Greeks could extend to south of Smyrna up to Makri. Clemenceau seemed to be disturbed of

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<sup>161</sup> PRO, FO 608/98, E9475, Balfour's letter to American, French and Italian Delegation on 14<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

giving a larger territory to Greece to govern, and commented that Greeks did not have much capability of administration, but President Wilson believed that if the Greeks were to be given a chance to be a modern nation, and by showing confidence in them they could achieve the task given to them. According to Wilson they should give Greeks the ambition to do well. Lloyd George also offered to give Cyprus to Greece, and for Turks he said that he did not have any scruples towards them and Turks had no rights over a country which they were only able to turn into a desert. When Wilson mentioned that a great number of Armenians were dying of hunger, Lloyd George proposed him to use this information to build the public opinion in United States, so that the Senate could approve the mandate for Armenia. In the meeting, Lloyd George seemed to be determined to dissolve the Ottoman Empire entirely. He further commented that whatever the difficulties Britain might encounter from Indian Moslems, they should put an end to the Turkish regime. It was also discussed that the Turks were best to be placed under the mandate of Italy, and there Wilson acted very sympathetic towards Greeks that putting a power of superior administrative capability in immediate contact with the Greek zone would be a mistake and even offered to give Makri to Greeks. Lloyd George to make the offer more attractive thought of allocating mines of Heracles [Karadeniz Ereğlisi] to the Italians and he showed some doubt about giving the whole of the Aydin Vilayet to the Greeks, since the Greeks might fail to hold the Moslem population in Aidin well in hand and they were reputed to be rather intractable. At the end of the meeting 'Big Three' decided to take the offer of Anatolian mandate to Italians for the compromise of Fiume.<sup>162</sup>

Harold Nicolson in his 'Diary' gives quite different picture of Lloyd George's intrigues towards the Italians and also to the members of Supreme Council. According to Nicolson, before the 'Big Three' meeting which was scheduled for 4 PM, he went to Lloyd George's flat along with Louis Mallet, and there "*We then move into the dining room. I spread out my big map on the dinner table and they all gather around. Ll. G. [Lloyd George], A.J.B. [Balfour], Milner [Secretary Of State for War], Henry Wilson, Mallet and myself. Ll. G. explains that Orlando and Sonnino are due in a few minutes and he wants to know what he can offer them. I suggest the Adalia Zone, with the rest of Asia Minor to France. Milner, Mallet and Henry Wilson oppose it: A.J.B. neutral.*"<sup>163</sup> When Orlando and Sonnino joined the meeting, Lloyd George explained of furnishing the mandate for southern Anatolia to Italy. Italians asked for

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<sup>162</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 50-60.

<sup>163</sup> Nicolson p. 332-335, "Diary" of 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1919.

Scala Nova and Makri, but Lloyd George objected the request saying that there were more Greeks there. That was the moment that Lloyd George was confusing about the map in front of him that it was an ethnological map, and thinking that "*the green means Greeks instead of valleys, and the brown means Turks instead of mountains*"<sup>164</sup> Italians also asked for Eregli because of the coal mines there to be incorporated into the Italian Zone. At the end of the meeting Italians appeared to be ready to accept a mandate over the Adalia region, but with no mention of abandoning Fiume. Nicolson then wrote that in the afternoon there was the meeting of the 'Big Three' and he was called into the meeting and was dictated the 'resolution' of the meeting as;

"They work out as follows: (1) Turkey to be driven out of Europe and Armenia. (2) Greece to have the Smyrna-Aivali Zone and a mandate over most of the Vilayet of Aidin. (3) Italy to get a mandate over South Asia Minor from Marmarice [Marmaris] to Mersina [Mersin], plus Konia. (4) France to get the rest."<sup>165</sup>

Nicolson was later going to write another resolution for the United States accepting a mandate over Armenia and Constantinople. The decision for the partition was even for Harold Nicolson was out of reality, and he wrote in his 'Diary' that; "*It is immoral and impracticable. But I obey my orders. The Greeks are getting too much*"<sup>166</sup> The following day, 14<sup>th</sup> May, 'Big Three' was still busy with Anatolia, and they called in Nicolson to make some alterations on the Resolutions of 13<sup>th</sup> of May, such that they had decided to leave Marmarice outside the Italian Zone and therefore accepting the rest of the document as final ! Harold Nicolson was going to write on his letter that;

"*It is appalling that these ignorant and irresponsible men [President Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George] should be cutting Asia Minor to bits as if they were dividing a cake. And with no one there except me, who incidentally have nothing whatsoever to do with Asia Minor. Isn't it terrible, the happiness of millions being decided in that way, while for the last two months we were praying and begging the Council to give us time to work out a scheme?*"<sup>167</sup>

Harold Nicolson then confess for his 'injustice' approach in drawing the Report for the 'Greek Claim' Commission as; "*The funny thing is that the only part where I do come is in the Greek part, and here they have gone beyond, and dangerously beyond, what I suggested in my wildest moments.*"<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Ibid

<sup>165</sup> Ibid

<sup>166</sup> Ibid

<sup>167</sup> Ibid

<sup>168</sup> Ibid

The Anatolian issue was discussed again during the afternoon session of the 'Big Three' meeting on 14th of May 1919, and it looked like a swinging pendulum for the mandates over Anatolia. Lloyd George declared that they had not decided about the nature of mandates to be established in Anatolia. According to President Wilson, they had agreed of establishing mandates of different character one in northern and the other in the southern part of Anatolia. Clemenceau pointed out that France did not have any desires to make the Ottoman Empire a French colony and he believed that two separate states would create problems from governing point of view. Clemenceau suggested that they would prefer that all of Anatolia became an independent state rather than to see it a source of problem between two mandate states, France and Italy. Lloyd George wondered whether it would be better to leave the Sultan in Constantinople rather than sending him to Brussa, so that he could be the head of the both states. They agreed to discuss the issue with the Italians and to ask the Italians whether it would be possible to appoint a prince from Sultan's family for the Italian zone, similar to Khedive of Egypt before the war.

Nicolson's conscious was haunting him because of the outcome of the Supreme Council decisions regarding the Ottoman Empire and his contribution to the Greek cause. On 15<sup>th</sup> of May he went to see Balfour and talked to him about the moral aspect of portioning Asia Minor. He visited Balfour again the following day, 16<sup>th</sup> of May, and found that Balfour was annoyed because of decisions taken by the 'Big Three' on 14th of May and was calling the 'Big Three' as "*These three ignorant men*"<sup>169</sup> Balfour was not the only person criticizing the Prime Minister, but Montagu, Bikaner and even Curzon were threatening to resign because of the proposed partitioning of Turkey.<sup>170</sup> Harold Nicolson's 'guilt conscious' was going to be vanished in coming days and once more he was going to be joining the 'Venizelos camp' again.

Smyrna landing occurred on early hours of 15th of May, at the time the 'Big Four' was discussing the Austrian issue and there was not a single word about the landing and the Ottoman Empire did not come to the attention of Supreme Council until 17th of May. The landing was conducted by Calthorpe who came from Constantinople and was the senior naval officer in Smyrna, as planned in Paris. The landing looked like an Allied action, although British, French and Italian forces were just for show-

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<sup>169</sup> Nicolson, p. 339-340, "Diary" of 16<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid. Nicolson wrote in his 'Diary' that "*Drive back with Venizelos. He is pleased by the Smyrna landing. He says 'Greece can only find her real future from the moment when she is astride the Aegean'*"

off. The Greek ships Elle and Kelkis joined the fleet for landing which were specially dispatched from Constantinople, and Calthorpe had to stop sailing a Greek Admiral to Smyrna, since if he did, he would be the most senior Naval Officer which was against the decision of the Council of Four.<sup>171</sup> In the 17<sup>th</sup> of May meeting, Clemenceau informed that Italy had landed her troops to Scala Nova and Lloyd George told that they were ready to send troops everywhere in Turkey. Orlando replied that he was not aware of the landing but he could find out and let them know. Lloyd George accused Italians as acting on their own without notifying the Allies, besides it was a serious landing with 500 soldiers and Italian flag flying at the customhouse, and this was all carried out while they were debating the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Lloyd George further pointed out that Scala Nova was purposely left out of Greek zone, although it would probably be assigned to Greece, the reason for it since there had been no decision reached for Scala Nova, whether it should go to Greece or Italy, and therefore he expected a similar approach from the Italians and respect the mutual understanding.<sup>172</sup>

The landing according to early reports was without any serious event and in fact rather smooth, but in days to come the landing and the occupation would be known that it was a bloody event. The Report prepared by Colonel Ian Smith, Allied Commanding Officer, A.C.O., in Smyrna with regard to the Greek landing was sent from Constantinople on May 24<sup>th</sup> indicated that total number of Turks being killed was somewhere 200-300, but it was not possible, scientifically, to calculate the exact number. According to Forbes Adam, from Foreign Office, it was not clear what proportion of this number were killed by the crowd, as distinct from Greek troops.<sup>173</sup> Robert Vansittart was also going to comment on 8<sup>th</sup> of July 1919, about the bloody event in Greek landing that; "Reports of the number of Turks killed run anywhere between this figure and 700. No scientific calculation is possible because no one knows the exact number done in outside Smyrna in the immediate neighborhood. I should think this report was not far from the fact. It is confirmed by the more detailed ones we have already received from private sources. The Greeks are foolish to press for an enquiry, unless they mean to fake it."<sup>174</sup> The response of Sir Eyre Crowe was quite different, he preferred to comment on the quality of the writing and margins of paper rather than the number of Turks being killed in the landing, that he himself contributed for the decision as a member of the 'Greek Commission'.

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<sup>171</sup> PRO, FO 608/89, E 13490.

<sup>172</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 92-94.

<sup>173</sup> PRO, FO 608/89, E 14564.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid.

Crowe's comment was; "*Send the enclosures back to F.O. in my name, and say that Mr. Balfour complains seriously of the bad and close typing of the papers sent to him, which are intolerable standard or eyes of a man of 71.*"<sup>175</sup>

The afternoon session of the 'Big Four' on 17th of May, had some visitors to discuss the future of the Ottoman Empire. Montagu, Secretary of State for India, and the Delegation from India, headed by Aga Khan visited to express their and as a whole Moslem population's sentiment towards the partition of the Ottoman Empire. Aga Khan told that the fall of Turkey was due primarily to the effort of Indian troops and they fought the war because of moral principle and for justice, therefore he believed that Asia Minor which was the homeland of Turks, along with Thrace and Constantinople should be left to the Turks. Aga Khan then appealed to British and French since their interests were so closely bound to those of Islam and also to the President of United States who had bound himself with 'Fourteen Points', and urged that those principles should be applied for the Turks as well. Aga Khan also appealed for two conditions to be acknowledged by the Allies, that Turkey should be admitted to League of Nations and Moslem population's rights should be respected on equal terms as for Christians in the new proposed state of Armenia. Aga Khan further expressed his wonder that Berlin was not to be considered to be taken away from Germans and similarly Vienna not from Austria, but why Constantinople should be taken away from Turks. He pointed out that the Indians were fighting against the Turks in day time, but when the prayer time came they prayed for the Caliph, the Sultan of Ottoman Empire. Aftab Ahmed Khan, a member of the Delegation, reminded that in January 1918, Lloyd George in defining the War Aims declared that the Turks would retain their national existence and further it was declared that Allies were not fighting to deprive Turkey either from their capital or of the counties in Asia Minor inhabited by Turks. It was a question not only of the future of Caliphate, but of the future of the Turkish race. Ahmed Khan believed that the establishment of a foreign domination over Turkey would not be accepted by Moslems nor by the Turks, he warned that "*The future relations of India and the British Empire depend upon your answer, and also the attitude of the entire Mohammedan world, whose discontent would have the most dangerous consequences*"<sup>176</sup> The Maharajah of Bikaner warned the leaders that if they were to partition Turkey, they should expect the danger of disorder and hatred not only in India but in the entire world. Montagu although a minister of the British Cabinet did not hesitate to speak openly in saying

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid, E 14564, 'side-note' of Sir Eyre Crowe, 11<sup>th</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>176</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 96-97

that there was a real threat to peace if they were to decide on the partition, and further pointed out that the Turks had been treated less favorably than other enemies during Conference.<sup>177</sup> After the Indian Delegation Lloyd George seemed to be affected and he told that it would be difficult to divide Turkey proper and they would run into a risk of causing a disorder in the Moslem world. He further told that they would try to find a way to leave the Sultan in Constantinople without placing him under mandatory, at least by appearance.

The sentiments of Moslems had been discussed before in a meeting held on 3<sup>rd</sup> of April 1919 by the British Empire Delegation. Lloyd George was in the chair and the discussion was concentrated on the future of Constantinople. Montagu expressed the sentiments of Indian Moslems that they regretted not being represented in the Conference and they also had been protesting the anti-Moslem attitude of the Conference. Montagu further stated that the Indian Delegation were unable to understand the apparently ruthless spirit of Conference in treating Turkish Empire. Indians learned that Constantinople was going to be lost, and similarly Smyrna and even the coastline of the Marmara Sea. Although they had admitted that the Turks had misgoverned, but misgovernment had not been urged as a reason for taking Berlin from Germans or Vienna from Austrians.

Montagu reminded of the speech delivered by Lloyd George in which he promised that the Turks would keep Constantinople as their capital and the probable change in that decision made Indian Moslems wonder whether British Empire was embarking on a campaign which was not merely anti-Turkish but also anti-Moslems. Lloyd George replied Montagu that the policy of not depriving the Turks of their Capital, as approved by the Cabinet, was a direct invitation for the Turks to stop fighting, but they continued the war against British, therefore rejected the offer. Hence Lloyd George believed that they were no longer bound with their offer to Turks. Lloyd George also debated with Montagu's allegations for the Greeks in Western Anatolia. He stated that;

*“Smyrna was an overwhelmingly a Greek city, her population was Greek; her business was Greek. As to Constantinople even there the majority of the inhabitants were not Turks or Mohammedans; it was true that there was a larger percentage of Turks than of any other race, but there was not a vast majority. Mr. Lloyd George said that he personally was of opinion that Constantinople were handed over to a Mandatory and Anatolia was placed under the same Mandate, then the situation could be best handled if the Sultan was to remain in Constantinople. The question of Turkey had not yet been discussed by the ‘Council of Four’ but, when it came up, he suggested*

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<sup>177</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 95-100

*that the Mohammedans of India should be represented by the Maharajah and Lord Sinha. [It was agreed that this suggestion should be adopted]"*<sup>178</sup>

Montagu circulated a paper concerning the Greek population in Anatolia and challenged that the Greek figures were exaggerated and overall there was not majority of Greeks in Smyrna, although they outnumbered the Turks there, the situation was reverse in Constantinople and he urged that;

"The proposed zone may be divided from the statistical point of view into three sections: (a) the peninsulas of Tcheshe [Cesme], Phokia [Soke], and Aivali. Those are almost purely Greek and may be regarded as Greek islands on the mainland. (b) The city of Smyrna where the Greeks have a majority over each other element, but not a plurality in the total population, the balance between Greeks and Turks being held by the Levantines. The position of the Greeks, in the city of Smyrna is exactly analogous to the position of the Turks in Constantinople, and any argument which would give the city of Smyrna to the Greeks, ought to give the city of Constantinople to the Turks."<sup>179</sup>

Lloyd George, in the 'Big Three' meeting on 19<sup>th</sup> of May disclosed the details of Orlando's visit the day before. Orlando asked for a mandate for the whole Anatolia, and when Lloyd George answered it as impossible, then Orlando told that Italy could give up Anatolia, provided that Fiume to be given to them and they could build a port for Serbs. Lloyd George thought that presence of the Italians over the Turks would cause trouble and a possible revolt in the Moslem world, and he further said that he was ready to change all the plans that he had contemplated. President Wilson with the help of Indian Moslems remembered his 'Fourteen Points' and the sovereignty of the Turks, but Lloyd George commented that that was only applicable to Germans. Both Lloyd George recalled that they had made promises for the Moslems, but seemed to be forgotten. Considering the sentiments of the Moslem world and the Turks, the best solution, they debated, could be to leave the Caliph with limited powers and not to assign any mandates for the Anatolia, but France could take the task of advising on certain issues such as finance, economic development and even on international affairs to the Turkish Government.

Lloyd George, on 19<sup>th</sup> of May, before the afternoon session of Supreme Council had a meeting with his ministers present in Paris regarding Ottoman Empire. Balfour, Curzon, Montagu, Lord Milner, Churchill and Barnes along with Philipp Kerr and Hankey attended the meeting. It seemed that Lloyd George was still under the influence of the visit of Indian Moslems to the Supreme Council. He explained to his Ministers that, in the morning session, he had persuaded the Supreme Council to re-

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<sup>178</sup> PRO, FO 608/111, E 6739, Minutes of a Meeting of the British Empire Delegation held at Hotel Majestic, Paris, on Thursday, April 3, 1919 at 30 A.M.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid.

open the Ottoman Empire's partition issue and hence, he wanted to learn his colleagues' views with regard to the partition. Lloyd George explained the Italian view as expressed by Orlando the day before, and commented on the question by Montagu that it would be difficult to get the the Greeks out of Smyrna; although the Council of Four had made it clear to Venizelos that the landing of Greek troops should not prejudice the future decisions for the district. Montagu commented that the Turks might accept a mandate of a nation with clean past, but definitely not France nor Italy. Montagu further expressed the sentiments of the Moslem world and told that the partition of Turkey on the lines as was proposed in the Supreme Council would provoke the Moslem world and would probably result for a very heavy military cost for Britain. Lord Curzon was in the opinion that the Turks should not be treated gently, since they behaved very badly in the War, and further told that Turks had massacred hundreds of thousands of their own subjects, therefore he believed that Turks deserved any fate. Turks, according to Curzon, should be deprived of Arabia, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Syria, Armenia and even Constantinople. Turks especially should be thrown out of Constantinople to show Easterners that they had been defeated in the war. Curzon agreed with Montagu that partition of Turkey would be a fatal mistake, but if the Turks were to be left with full sovereignty over Anatolia then they could keep the Caliphate, since the Allies had not found any other alternative to replace him. Curzon was suggesting that they ought to leave the Sultan, a kingdom of his own, subject to such measure of control as would prevent him from misgoverning his subjects and he believed that putting Greeks in Smyrna was bound to cause friction and therefore if possible they should go back and summarized his proposal that Armenia, Straits and Constantinople should be under the mandate of America and Anatolia was to be left to Turks as a full sovereign state but with a system of control which was in operation before the war and this close control could be left to Americans. Lord Milner, Secretary of State of War, thought that it would be better to leave the Sultan in Yildiz Kiosk, since the control of Anatolia and the mandate of Constantinople were going to be rested upon America. Montagu was also against throwing Sultan out of Capital, since it would rouse indignation in the Moslem World. According to Curzon, they should take two basic elements from Turks, which were Mecca and Constantinople, the symbols of their victory in the past. Churchill was in the opinion that Anatolia should be under the Turkish sovereignty subject to advice and assistance of United States, at the same time, mandate of Constantinople for America. Balfour was also in the opinion that the Turks should be left in their true homeland which was the central block of Anatolia, but not under a mandate, instead there should be under international

control as was before, with each Power sharing a responsibility. Balfour was in favour of leaving Greeks in Smyrna and taking Constantinople from the Turks. Lloyd George summarized the views expressed by the Ministers that the best solution would be to place the United States as a mandate of both Anatolia and Constantinople and there was a general objection of putting neither French nor Italians in charge of the Turks.<sup>180</sup> Harold Nicolson was going to write in his 'Diary' that, Lloyd George was non-committal, but in the evening telegrams was sent to Greeks not to go outside Sandjak of Smyrna and Caza [Kaza] of Aivali [Ayvalık].<sup>181</sup>

In the afternoon session of Supreme Council on 19<sup>th</sup> of May, Orlando had to explain the Italian landing at Scala Nova. Orlando explained that they had landed to control the order there and besides he questioned the decision taken on 6<sup>th</sup> of May without their presence. Lloyd George told that they were compelled to reach that decision since men were being killed in the streets everyday. Orlando also warned that Greece entered Aidin which was outside of the Greek zone. Venizelos told that he was not aware of it and further requested to spread his forces whenever there was a massacre without waiting for a decision to be reached in Paris. The proposal was found to be acceptable, since Admiral Calthorpe would be on the spot. Lloyd George's proposal of; "*In future, no one- neither the Italians, nor the French, nor the English, nor the Americans, nor the Greeks- must not land anywhere, whether it be to the north or to the south of Aidin, without the consent of the Powers*"<sup>182</sup> Venizelos also was successful in obtaining permission for the return of Greeks to the Western part of Anatolia. According to Venizelos there was around 300,000 Greeks waiting to return to their homes and claimed that they had suffered during war because of being forced to leave their homes and settled in the islands. Venizelos' proposal that Greek troops had the right to intervene whenever there was an unrest or massacre, was going to be relayed to Foreign Office and also to Admiralty to inform Calthorpe on 19<sup>th</sup> of May, that Greek troops could be dispatched anywhere north of Aidin inclusive but with the approval of Senior Naval Officer of Allied Fleet in Smyrna. Greek troops might however be sent without such authority to districts within the Sandjak of Smyrna, but not south of Ayasoluk and within Kaza of Aivali for establishment of order and protection of returning refugees.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> PRO, CAB 23/44 Part II, Minutes of a Meeting held at 23 Rue Nitot at 3 PM on May 19<sup>th</sup> 1919.

<sup>181</sup> Nicholson, p. 343-344, "Diary" of 19<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

<sup>182</sup> Mantoux, Vol. II, p. 109-119.

<sup>183</sup> PRO, FO 608/89, E 10475.

Although Lloyd George explained the reason for their immediate action on Smyrna as Greeks being killed every day in the streets by Turks, the following day on 20<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, in the morning session of Council of Four, Lloyd George read a telegram from British General Headquarters, Constantinople, dated May 17<sup>th</sup>, to the effect that “Greeks on landing had been fired on by Turkish gendarmes and that firing had continued all day, the Greeks attacking and killing Turkish soldiers whenever they were seen. It was further alleged in the telegram that the wounded were killed and some of them thrown into the sea and that the Greek officers had made no attempt to restrain their men”<sup>184</sup> and it was decided by the Council to ‘inform’ Venizelos of the incident.

The ‘Council of Three’ met on 21<sup>st</sup> of May to discuss the German Treaty and partition of the Ottoman Empire. Lloyd George came to the Meeting with a proposal of which the text was distributed to members.<sup>185</sup> Lloyd George explained the scheme he was proposing for the Ottoman Empire that the Anatolia after taking off Constantinople, Armenia, Cilicia and Smyrna should be kept as a whole Turkish state and should not be divided as North, under the French mandate and South, under the Italians, since the population there was 95% Turks. Wilson seemed to be in favour of the proposal; the only drawback was the Italians, who should be compensated for Fiume. Clemenceau used this opportunity to fight with Lloyd George over Syria, on the issue that the latter promised to solve the problem which was handing Syria over to the French forces. Wilson was in favour of postponing the decision to study the proposal and the burdens it would bring to America. He stated that America had no interest in Asia Minor and they desired two things, agreement amongst the great powers and the peace of the world. According to Wilson their duty was to find a plan which would establish order in Asia Minor and maintain order

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<sup>184</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 227. This was reported ‘a copy in W. Wilson Papers’ by Nicholas. In the same document a reference was given to Admiral Bristol’s telegram on 18<sup>th</sup> May 1919, that; “Greeks, Smyrna, reported looting Turkish houses, making many arrests, occasional street fights, few killed. Christian population inland apprehensive. Greeks undertook task beyond their power”

<sup>185</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 138-140. The text of Lloyd George’s proposal practically defined a new version of Ottoman Empire. ‘Scheme for Settlement in the Turkish Empire’ defined the districts and the responsibility of mandates as; “... (1) The United States of America to have a full mandate over Constantinople and The Straits of Dardanelles and Bosphorus. Asia Minor: (2) First Alternative: The United States of America to have a light mandate over the whole of Anatolia. The Sultan and the Government to remain in Constantinople. Second Alternative: If the United States of America can not accept a mandate over the whole of Anatolia this region to remain subject to the sovereignty of the Sultan of Turkey without a mandatory. (3) In either alternative provision to be made for access from Anatolia to the Mediterranean, Sea of Marmara, and Black Sea. Smyrna: (4) The portion of the Vilayet of Aidin proposed by the Greek Commission to be united with Greece in full sovereignty. No mandate to be given to Greece over any more extended zone. Armenia and Cilicia: (5) The United States of America to have a full mandate over Armenia and Cilicia. Caucasus: (6) The mandate for Armenia to include a provisional mandate over Russian Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the whole Caucasus region pending a solution of the Russian problem. Syria: (7) France to have a provisional mandate over Syria pending the report of the Commission which is proceeding to the Near East. Mesopotamia and Palestine: (8) Great Britain to have a provisional mandate over Mesopotamia and Palestine pending the report of the Commission which is proceeding to the Near East. Arabia: (9) To be independent.” )

in the Moslem world. The rest of the meeting was covered by quarrels between Clemenceau and Lloyd George over sincerity and fulfilling promises over Syria, It seemed that Clemenceau was only interested about Syria and did not mention anything for Lloyd George's proposal about Anatolia or Greeks in Smyrna.<sup>186</sup>

Syrian issue was once more debated in the 'Council of Three' on 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 1919, this time with the participation of General Sir H. Wilson. Clemenceau explained that during his visit to London in November 1918, he was asked to give in Mosul to be included in the British zone and he agreed, as well as on the Palestine issue that it would be placed under the British protectorate. But according to Clemenceau, British was not honest on his promises that after France had given in on these issues, British had been asking additional concessions from France as for the boundary of Palestine to be extended to the north in such a way that as to make the railroad to pass entirely through the British territory. Another problem area was the Commission that France had been refusing to send any members to the expedition, and it was stated that the American commissioners' decision would be accepted for the future of Syria, since neither of France nor Britain was going to be represented in the Commission.<sup>187</sup>

The Ottoman issue was discussed in the 'Council of Four' on 30<sup>th</sup> of May 1919 session for the Grand Vizier's request for the Turkish delegation to be heard by the Commission. President Wilson was against accepting Turkish delegation, but with Lloyd George's insistence that they should be accepted, in saying that; "*Let them say what they wish; That's no great danger*"<sup>188</sup> and therefore it was decided to draft a letter to Grand Vizier to invite them to the Commission. At the Meeting Clemenceau brought the case of Greek expansion in Anatolia and told that whether it would be better to ask the Greeks not to advance far from Smyrna, since they had just occupied Magnesia. President Wilson opposing Clemenceau stated that they had decided to allow the Greeks to expand their occupation over the entire Sandjak of Smyrna and as far as Aidin.<sup>189</sup> On the 6<sup>th</sup> of June Meeting, Lloyd George brought a diplomatic incident that the reply to the Grand Vizier was handed by French representative only in Constantinople and French President of the Republic, M. Pichon had sent a telegram of thanks in reply to a ceremonial message from the Crown Prince, Abdul Medjid [Mecit] Efendi and Lloyd George criticized the French

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<sup>186</sup> Paul Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 125-140.

<sup>187</sup> Ibid, p. 160-165.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid, p. 254-255.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid.

attitude in these incidences to give hope to the Turks, as news appeared in Turkish papers on the friendship of France.<sup>190</sup> The Turkish Delegation presented the Turkish case to the 'Council of Ten' on 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1919, according to Harold Nicolson who was thinking in the same line as President Wilson, it was outrageous that the Turks were allowed to state their case while the Germans were staying behind cages of Versailles.<sup>191</sup> On the same day at the 'Council of Four' meeting, President Wilson thought that the presentation was a failure on Turkish part and they should be told to 'go back'. It was decided that Balfour should answer for their statement at the Council.<sup>192</sup>

Lloyd George was anxious to discuss the Ottoman issue, since the German Treaty was coming to an end, and therefore Paris Peace Conference was going to be terminated as President Wilson and Lloyd George were leaving for home. On 23<sup>rd</sup> of June meeting of 'Council of Four', Lloyd George proposed to discuss the Turkish affairs, since they could not any longer allow state of war with Ottoman Empire, and he wanted the Council to agree on the terms to impose on Turkey, bearing in mind that they could decide who was going to have which mandatory later on after the American's decision on assuming responsibility of mandates. President Wilson proposed that they could tell the Turks that Armenia, Mesopotamia, Syria and Smyrna no longer belong to Turkey and he further stated that the Turks should be also asked to leave Constantinople, and in time, they could decide on the distribution of the mandatories. One of the problems encountered with Wilson's proposal was, according to Lloyd George, that they did not have any troops in Cilicia, and therefore they were not be able to control the possible massacre that might take place against Armenians, and also they should solve the Italian problem in Anatolia before declaring to the Turks about their plans. Balfour shared the views of Wilson that Turks should leave Constantinople, although he had defended the opposite policy before.<sup>193</sup> 'Council of Four' again discussed the Turkish issue the following day, on 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. They stressed the importance of the presence of the Italians in Anatolia and they were advancing forward as they were pleased. Wilson had the idea of occupying the Straits and the strip around Straits and Constantinople as soon as the Senate ratified the mandate. Wilson explained that Turks were in minority in Constantinople and therefore he did not foresee any problems in governing. Lloyd George was in the state of analyzing the behavior of

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<sup>190</sup> Mantoux, Vol. II, p. 327-329.

<sup>191</sup> Nicolson p. 364 of "Diary" 17<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

<sup>192</sup> Mantoux, Vol. II, p. 476-477.

<sup>193</sup> Ibid, p. 552-554.

the Italians and how little they did in the war and whereas after the war they were inclined to ask for everything.<sup>194</sup> That was the last meeting of the Council of Four and Wilson and Lloyd George were leaving for home after signing the German Peace Treaty on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919.

Balfour and Curzon's idea and Wilson's insistence for Constantinople that it should be taken from Turks was not the first time that a debate had been initiated for the future of Constantinople, in actual case it had been debated not only in the Conference, but within Government circles and in public since Armistice and even before. Although Venizelos omitted the Constantinople issue on his Greek Claims of 30<sup>th</sup> Dec.1918 memorandum purposely, the public opinion had been tried to be built up that the Greeks living under the 'yoke' of the Ottomans, had been requesting to be incorporated the mother state, Greece. French paper 'L' Echo de Paris' published an article on 12<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 on 'The Fate of Constantinople' based on the interview of Dorotheos, Archbishop of Brussa who was in the Delegation of Ecumenical Patriarch of Constantinople to the Peace Conference. Dorotheos was drawing the attention of Conference to the sufferings of the Greeks in Constantinople which were 150,000 out of 600,000 in the city. The Archbishop with the blessing of Patriarch was asking the Conference to consider the Greeks living in Constantinople to constitute into an independent state. Archbishop told that they had been relying on French backing and the paper drew attention to the advantages which Constantinople would provide for French activities. The Archbishop of Trebizond was also in Paris visiting the leaders and conveying their wish to be an independent state or to be united with Greece, and there was a mutual understanding among Greeks and Armenians living in Anatolia. Both were complaining that they had been suffering under the Ottoman regime and Greeks desired Armenian control of Cilicia and Armenians were wishing that Constantinople, Vilayets of Aidin and Brussa and Sandjak of Bigha to be incorporated into Greece.<sup>195</sup>

Greek troops with the pretention of being a part of Allied forces landed at Smyrna on 15<sup>th</sup> of May 1919. The first reports received from the district showed that the landing had gone smoothly and order in the district was controlled. Similar messages were also sent by Admiral Bristol to the American Delegation, but after few days adverse effects of the landing started piling up in Paris.

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<sup>194</sup> Mantaux, Vol. II, p. 565-575

<sup>195</sup> PRO, FO 608/88, E4339.

Calthorpe in his message of 19<sup>th</sup> of May was complaining the outrages of Greeks in Turkey. He wrote that although he had no grief for Turks and had been showing his utmost sympathy for the Greeks, but they had been busy provoking the Turks.<sup>196</sup> It seemed that there was a lack of communications with regard to areas decided by the Supreme Council for Greeks to occupy. According to information obtained from the Italians, Greeks were planning to occupy Manissa [Manisa] and Aidin which were outside of the zone granted to Greece.<sup>197</sup> Another incident occurred at Aivali on 29<sup>th</sup> of May, that Grand Vizier complained to British High Commissioner that two Greek transports had arrived at Aivali and commenced landing at dawn. Since the Turkish Commander in the area had not received instructions, fighting broke-up. Turkish Government was asking to be informed in advance when parts of Turkish territory were going to be occupied by the foreign troops.<sup>198</sup> Porte was going to send a 'Note', and asked that in order to avoid consequences of continued exasperation of Turkish People, the Allied Powers should refuse allowing further advance of the Greek troops pending settlement of the Eastern affairs by the Peace Conference.<sup>199</sup> Greeks occupied Aidin on 27<sup>th</sup> of May and Aivali on 29<sup>th</sup> of May with no serious events.<sup>200</sup> Greeks were going to meet resistance at Eudemish [Ödemis], but they occupied the town with seven soldiers being wounded on 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 1919.<sup>201</sup> Greeks were trying to check whether they could go out of their Zone, and they tried to occupy Nazli [Nazilli] on 3<sup>rd</sup> of June. The Commodore, commanding British Aegean Squadron notified Greeks that they should obey strict orders of the Conference<sup>202</sup> and Robert Vansittart was going to comment that higher authorities should tell this incident to Venizelos.<sup>203</sup> Greek Military authorities were told to withdraw from Aidin Vilayet and were also urged that such an action would cause a bad impression locally, although it was not clear who gave the orders for withdrawal.<sup>204</sup> Greeks were planning to occupy Bergama, and locally it was going to cause concern for British.

The Greek occupation was spreading outside of the Greek zone and Calthorpe informed Balfour on 11<sup>th</sup> of June 1919 that, Ottoman Ministry of Interior had received

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<sup>196</sup> PRO, FO 608/89, E 11296, British High Commissioner's message to Foreign Office, 19<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, E 11149

<sup>198</sup> Ibid, E 11326

<sup>199</sup> Ibid, E11472, Calthorpe's message to Balfour, 31<sup>st</sup> May 1919.

<sup>200</sup> Ibid, E11473, Calthorpe's message to Balfour, 31<sup>st</sup> May 1919.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid, E11548.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid, E 11831.

<sup>203</sup> Ibid.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, E 12138.

from Governor of Bergama stating that Greeks were starting from Menemen with a view of occupying Bergama and its district. The Turkish Military authorities were also planning to resist Greeks and they were told by the Ministry that under present conditions opposition could not have any chance of success and would only build prejudice against the Turkish case at the Conference. Minister was afraid that the Ottoman Government was not homogeneous and not strong enough to control the events, and besides he believed that there existed some committee ideas and despite to all his best endeavors he almost despaired the possibility of having an outbreak sooner or later against not only to Greeks but also against Government.<sup>205</sup>

The rivalry between the Italians and the Greeks for the Western Anatolia became more apparent and the British Delegation received a position 'Note' from Italy with regard to movements of Greeks in Anatolia. The Note delivered by the Italian Ambassador Marquis Imperiali to the Foreign Office, and discussed the instructions sent on 9<sup>th</sup> of May to Admiral Calthorpe at Smyrna by the Conference and explained the instances that Greeks since then occupied without justified reasons. The only explanation was given by the Greeks was the claim of restoring order and preventing the possibility of massacres. Italians also complained that the British High Commissioner informed his Italian counterpart that he had instructed the Greeks not to send any troops south of the line Aidin-Nazli, adding that occupations outside this were to be considered temporary. For the Italians it was clear that the occupations north of Aidin- Nazli line amounted to extensive interpretation of instructions of 'Council of Four'. The Italians were also requesting the definition of 'Outside the line Aidin- Nazli' to be clarified and urged that no further occupation should be authorized and the Greek forces should be withdrawn in districts south of line Aidin-Nazli.<sup>206</sup> For the Italian Memorandum, Robert Vansittart wrote on 14<sup>th</sup> of June that;

"The necessary communication has already been made to the Greeks locally. It was thought unnecessary to do more here. This comes badly from the Italians who are themselves playing the simple game of 'animal grab' to the south of the Greeks. In fact they began it. They complain that the Greeks had no justified reason (restoration of order)! The same applies to their occupation of Adalia etc. If we say more in reply to this more than the first sentence of this minute, we ought to take advantage of this opening to do some plain talking to the Italians, though I fear it will be ineffective as long as the Greeks are there. With regard to the last Para of this, it will be much better to leave things as they are. The relation between Greeks and Italians are so envenomed that the less the better cut in the less friction there will be."<sup>207</sup>

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<sup>205</sup> Ibid, E 12377, Calthorpe's message to Balfour, 11<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid, E12503, the Italian Memorandum, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, E 12503, 'side-note' by Robert Vansittart of Foreign Office, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

The views expressed by Vansittart were found to be acceptable by Louis Mallet and Lord Hardinge too. Balfour was thinking differently, and he wrote that; "*Personally I have some doubt whether all the stories of Italian double dealing are true.*"<sup>208</sup>

The things were not going right between the Italians and the Greeks because of their desire to have the very same thing, in the Western Anatolia. The Greek Commander reported to the British authorities in Smyrna on 1<sup>st</sup> of June that the officer occupying village of Cherkees keui [Çerkezköy] on railway North-East of Sokia [Söke] had telegraphed that Italian officer with 50 men had approached village and stated that he was ordered by Italian High authorities to take possession of the village, by force, if necessary, on ground that region west of railway belonged to Italy.<sup>209</sup>

The occupation by the Greeks of railway line from Ayasoluk to Aidin incident was going to be clarified once more pro-Venizelos block that existed among the British Delegation in Paris. Commander Fitzmaurice, the Senior British officer in Smyrna, was informed that this occupation was ordered by Venizelos, who stated that it was sanctioned by Allied Councils, and therefore he was requested if he disagreed to refer to his Government for further instructions. Italians had already protested for the occupation of any part of this railway and Fitzmaurice was afraid that a collision between the Italians and the Greeks seemed very probable and he requested clarification and instructions from the Foreign Office.<sup>210</sup> E.G. Adam from Foreign Office commented on 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1919 that, from the text of the instructions, it seemed clear that the Senior Naval Officer Fitzmaurice was to decide whether the situation justified the dispatch of Greek troops to Aidin. Therefore they had to make a decision, even if it was the 'Italian game'. Louis Mallet believed that; "*I think we must act as suggested as the instructions are clear and the S.N.A.[Senior Naval Officer] Officer must be supported.*"<sup>211</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe's comment differed that; "*But if, as is suggested the withdrawal of the Greeks will only lead to further extension of the Italian occupation, I think we ought to make sure, before calling upon the Greeks to evacuate, that the Italians do not invade. Could not the Italians be requested to give assurances that they too will retire from the position they have illicitly occupied and will refrain from further [...]. Failing such assurances, I would be disposed to*

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<sup>208</sup> Ibid, E12503, 'side-note' of Balfour, 14<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid, E11611.

<sup>210</sup> Ibid, E 13128, message from Calthorpe to Balfour, 1<sup>st</sup> June 1919.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid.

*lean to Greek in the possession of railway*"<sup>212</sup> Louis Mallet commented again after Sir Eyre Crowe that; *"If the Greeks eventually have Aidin and Nazli, on the Smyrna-Aidin railway, I certainly see no object making them retire, although they have gone to more places without permission, but does it nor depend on the ultimate decision."*<sup>213</sup> According to Forbes Adam, the case was solved at a meeting with the participation of Balfour. It was decided that it was better to take no action and meanwhile Venizelos had appealed to the Conference to allow them to enlarge their limits in order to meet the Turkish hostile actions.<sup>214</sup>

The occupation of Smyrna by the Greeks had given hope for the Greeks in Anatolia and in Thrace to act against the Turks, Lord Granville, British Ambassador in Athens, had to report that Moslem population in Canea had been suffering and being disturbed by the Greeks of which he himself checked that these accusations were substantially true. The Greek Foreign Ministry denied these accusations to Granville and added that these Turks were very content and satisfied.<sup>215</sup> While Greek troops were advancing in Anatolia and occupying districts whether allocated for them or not by the 'Council of Four', Venizelos was busy in Paris to grab additional rights in Anatolia and in Thrace. He sent a Memorandum on 19<sup>th</sup> of May to Lloyd George, asking some additional concessions in Anatolia. Venizelos admitted that the lines drawn by the French and British Delegations correspond to ethnic frontier in the Memorandum. This time he asked the areas which were not granted to him by the 'Greek Commission' should be given to Greece as mandatory under the League of Nations, which were Vilayet of Aidin and Sandjak of Denizli. Venizelos also requested frontier modification in the region of Gulf of Adramid [Edremit].<sup>216</sup> Venizelos' suggestion of the mandatory area was based upon the principle of ethnic of Greek population in the Aidin Vilayet and this approach was found to be 'extremely good suggestion' by Harold Nicolson in his Note to the Delegation on 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 1919. Nicolson explained the reason as;

"In the first place it has the advantage of keeping Western Anatolia as an economic unit, an advantage which is sacrificed by the strictly ethnical line which inevitably severs the richer valleys from their exits to the sea. In the second place the Greek populations outside the predominantly Greek zone are very scattered, and although they are not sufficiently numerous to form an actual majority over the Turks yet they constitute a very important Christian minority whom it is unpleasant to leave under Turkish rule. M. Venizelos also suggests (on page 4) that the line proposed by the two Delegations should be extended so as to take in the Gulf of Edremit, and

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<sup>212</sup> Ibid, 'side-note' of Sir Eyre Crowe, 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1919.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid.

<sup>214</sup> Ibid.

<sup>215</sup> PRO, FO 608/38, E11784, Lord Granville's message to Curzon, 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 1919.

<sup>216</sup> PRO, FO 608/89, E 10460,

he suggests a frontier for this purpose. The object of this line is evidently to bring the Greek frontier opposite Mitylene while at the same time rendering the Greek zone co-terminous with the international zone of the Straits. The original line proposed by the British Delegation was practically identical with that now proposed by M. Venizelos and was only abandoned to secure unanimity with the French.

M. Venizelos' memorandum will furnish the Council of Five with an occasion to revise the somewhat unsatisfactory recommendations of the Greek Territorial Committee. The Council may find it convenient to refer the whole question for further examination to the Committee with the request that they shall endeavour to reach a unanimous, or at least a majority recommendation. This will now be much easier as in the interval which has elapsed since the Committee's report was published the Americans in principle have given way as regards the Greek zone in Smyrna and the Italians will have to accept the *fait accompli*. Moreover, the Greek Committee will in any case have to meet again in order to discuss the Thracian frontiers which are left in the air owing to the uncertainty over the fate of Constantinople."<sup>217</sup>

The 'Note' prepared by Nicolson was found quite acceptable by Sir Eyre Crowe, but it had some drawbacks, and he commented as; "*I agree. But the Greek Committee is not in a position to do anything without further [...] as present it is waiting for a decision as to Constantinople.*"<sup>218</sup> Although Nicolson was in agreement with Venizelos with regard to Aidin Vilayet and Denizli being at least under mandatory of Greece because of economical aspects and the fate of Christianity, his colleagues in the Delegation, E.G. Adam was going to comment on the same subject as; "*Ethnologically the Greek claim to the Denizli Sandjak is very weak as the figures of 1912 admit. [The comparison of population of Turks and Greeks in Denizli, Saraykoy, Buldan, Çat, Karaagaçlı and in Davas was 197,317 Turks and 70,710 Greeks] The only possible grounds are economical and military*"<sup>219</sup>

Venizelos sent a Memorandum to President Wilson on 19<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, and stated that Greek claims probably came into collision of with those of Italy. Venizelos pointed out that Vilayet of Konia should be considered as the hinterland of Adalia, which by the Treaty of London, Italy was authorized to occupy and further stated that Vilayet of Aidin, in January 1915 and again in April, was promised to Greece by Sir Edward Grey on behalf of the Allies. Venizelos further commented that there would be no excuse for the Allies not to give Aidin Vilayet to Greece.<sup>220</sup> President Wilson answered back to Venizelos on 21<sup>st</sup> of May 1919, saying that; "*I am free to say that I entirely agree with your view of the matter.*"<sup>221</sup> Venizelos, overjoyed by Wilson's letter, was going to ask Harold Nicolson "*Let LI. George know that he has*

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<sup>217</sup> Ibid, E10460, Harold Nicolson's 'Note' on Venizelos' Memorandum of 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1919.

<sup>218</sup> Ibid, E 10460, Sir Eyre Crowe's hand-written comments on 22<sup>nd</sup> May 1919, about Nicolson's Note.

<sup>219</sup> Ibid, E12160, Forbes Adam's comments on 10th June for the petition of Greeks in Denizli to be united with Greece.

<sup>220</sup> Ibid, E 20786.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid.

*had a letter from President Wilson agreeing to Greece having a mandate over the whole Vilayet of Aidin plus sovereignty over Sandjak of Smyrna and Caza of Aivali*<sup>222</sup>

At the mean time the Greek forces had been experiencing some resistance from the Turks and sometimes protests from 'her friends' that they had to retreat from the occupied areas. On 20<sup>th</sup> of June they had to withdraw from Nazli and the Turks had started awakening and were forming groups to resist the occupation. While the Greeks were withdrawing from Nazli with the instructions of Commodore of Allied Naval Forces in Smyrna, Lt. Hodder took a special train on June 21<sup>st</sup> with a letter from Vali, to advice the Turks resisting the Greek occupation, and Turks were warned that if they did not behave with moderation, Greeks would come back again. Greeks, realizing that the task they had acquired required additional forces, and with the decision that Greek troops pulled back from Caucasus a Greek division was re-routed to Western Anatolia.<sup>223</sup> The expedition of Greeks in Anatolia was not free from massacres, and a serious incident occurred at Menemen. A French Officer arriving at Smyrna from Menemen on 18<sup>th</sup> of June reported that; *"100 Turks were murdered by Greeks and there was panic among Moslem inhabitants."*<sup>224</sup> Mr. Morgan who reported this news from Smyrna suggested the arrest of late Vali of Smyrna Nouredin Pasha [Nurettin Pasa] who was leading the resistance against the Greek occupation. Nouredin Pasha was going to be arrested in coming days. The murder of 100 Turks was going to be commented by Robert Vansittart as; *"Massacre No: 3, but not such a big one"*<sup>225</sup> This incident was going to be confirmed later on by the British Naval and Military authorities.<sup>226</sup> Resistance for the occupation of Anatolia by the Greeks was growing steadily and Calthorpe was busy in reporting unrest and incidents occurring in Anatolia. British Admiralty argued that limitation to Greek troops should be maintained and definition of spheres of provisional occupation should also be drawn.<sup>227</sup>

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<sup>222</sup> Nicholson p. 347-348, "Diary" of 24<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

<sup>223</sup> PRO, FO 608/89 E 13464. The withdrawal of Greeks from Nazli was felt with 'regret' among British Delegates in Paris. Sir Louis Mallet wrote that; *"It is very unfortunate that the Greeks would have to retire from the posts which they have occupied without first warning the consent of S.N.O., if the effect is to encourage the Moslems. Nazli is on the Aidin Smyrna line. As I have said on another paper, if the intention is that the Greeks would eventually occupy this part of country, then it would ...."* E. G. Adam wrote on 26<sup>th</sup> June that they should wait the decision of the Conference.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid, p. 354

<sup>225</sup> Ibid. Vansittart's 'side-note', 20<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. Both Louis Mallet and Sir Eyre Crowe had seen the message but did not comment about the massacre.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid, E13464.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, E13490.

Venizelos seemed to be anxious for the developments in Anatolia, not only because of the resistance from the Turks which was not dissipated by the Greeks, but also the lack of disciplines in the Greek forces in Anatolia.<sup>228</sup> Venizelos was also anxious that domestic politics was not running to his advantage. As early as in March 1919, Lord Granville, British ambassador at Athens, reported that they expected probable diminution in number of Venizelist deputies in Crete at the next election and the success of Venizelos was attached to the outcome of the Peace Conference.<sup>229</sup> In April 1919, the news from Athens was not encouraging for Venizelos ; Lord Granville reported that, according to his informant there was no doubt that at fresh Greek elections ex-King Constantine would win the majority and King Alexander was only too ready to withdraw in his father's favour.<sup>230</sup>

The Greek landing at Smyrna was the pivot for Venizelos to implement his expansion in Anatolia as he told the American Ambassador in Paris. Venizelos knew that, having the Smyrna region, other sections would fall into his lap as a matter of course and he had the instruments behind him to reach his goal. Greek Patriarch, shared his views that the Greeks considered the landing at Smyrna was the starting point and a base for the Hellenic expansion in Anatolia.<sup>231</sup> Another influential backing apart from the petitions sent to the Delegates from all over the world, was Oxford University. The resident members of the University of Oxford sent a Memorandum to Lloyd George and members of Peace Conference. A copy of Memorandum was also sent to Balfour by Lord Bryce on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1919. The influential members of the University criticized the Turkish rule and the Turkish people in saying that; *"...by the event of last thirty years, that the Turkish rulers and people, whatever form of government they may have had, have shown themselves fundamentally unfit to exercise rule over members of other races and religions, and that their methods of imperial government are entirely alien to the principles of humanity and justice which it is the purpose the Peace Conference to promote."*<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Nicolson, p. 346. Harold Nicolson wrote in his 'Diary' on 21<sup>st</sup> May that; *"Venizelos is much disturbed at news which has reached him of the lack of discipline among the Greek division landed at Smyrna. They seem to have behaved pretty badly, and there are rumors of civilians having been killed and much arson and looting...But I can see that he is anxious and depressed."*

<sup>229</sup> PRO, FO 608/38, E 4677. Harold Nicolson commented on 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 about the news of Lord Granville that; *"The implication is that if M. Venizelos does not succeed in securing a satisfactory settlement of Greek claims, he will not retain his position"*

<sup>230</sup> Ibid, E7163.

<sup>231</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 253

<sup>232</sup> PRO, FO 608/111, Doc. No: 5407. Lord Bryce in his letter to Balfour re-iterated that Turks should be thrown out of Constantinople too. Bryce was a member of House of Lords and an outspoken politician for Armenians and used every opportunity to condemn Turks.

They urged the Peace Conference to decide on the expelling the Turks from Europe and also from Constantinople and converting St. Sofia from Mosque to a Church.

After establishing a foot hold at Smyrna, Venizelos placed all his energy to the expansion of the Greek occupation into Anatolia. Supreme Council was busy with the German Treaty. Germans prepared their counter proposals along with the answer of the Allied Peace of Terms for German Treaty on 29<sup>th</sup> of May 1919. The political turmoil in Italy, partly because of the failure of securing Fiume resulted with the fall of Government and Nitti became the Prime Minister of the new Government on 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. At the same time the Supreme Council was busy in finalizing the Covenant of League of Nations, which was considered as the 'baby' of the President Wilson. The leaders, namely Lloyd George, Clemenceau and Wilson were in a way happy that the Asia Minor problem was out at least for the time being. Venizelos continued his normal tactic in bombarding the Supreme Council and blaming the Turks for the massacres they were doing against Greeks and therefore Greek troops should be tasked to control further territories that were not given to her by the 'Greek Committee'. Venizelos used the atmosphere that Supreme Council was in, for his advantage, and he practically bombarded the Council with 'Notes' on 18<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup> and on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June regarding the urgency for the Greek troops to proceed further to control and to stop the 'massacre'. In his Note of 18<sup>th</sup> of June, Venizelos asked permission from the Council of Four to retard his present zone of occupation which was limited, according to Venizelos, by Aivali, Pergama, Cassaba, Magnesia, and Smyrna-Aidin Railway to Aidin to include the following roads and railways; Balikesir-Kirkagatch [Kirkagac]- Akhisar-Magnesia railway, the Magnesia-Kassaba railway as far as Alasehir or at any rate as far as Salihli, the Smyrna-Aidin railway as far as Nazli. In addition to those Venizelos further asked for the Greek troops to be allowed to occupy the branch railways as far as Sokia, apparently on the ground of an appeal from the sub governor of Turkish disorders.<sup>233</sup>

A further 'Note' of Venizelos to the President of the Council on 20<sup>th</sup> of June stated that owing to Turkish concentrations on all sides both on the north (Balikesir, Aivali, Edremid and Soma) and southeast (district of Nazli) made it necessary for the Greeks not only to occupy the railways and roads mentioned in the 18<sup>th</sup> of June Note, but to have complete liberty of action for Greek troops.<sup>234</sup> The reason Venizelos gave was the accumulation of Turkish forces under the command of

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<sup>233</sup> PRO, FO 608/89, E 13568.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid, E 13684.

Yousouf Izzet Pasha [Yusuf Izzet Pasa] between Balikezer [Balikesir] and Panderma, and also other forces being concentrated at East of Cassaba and North of Eudemish [Odemis].

With the 'note' on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of June, Venizelos stated that he assumed responsibility of Admiral Calthorpe and Council of Four for ordering the Greek naval and military authorities to have complete liberty of action in order to meet hostile Turkish concentration, the Greek troops to be eventually withdrawn within the boundaries to be laid down by the Council of Four.<sup>235</sup> Forbes Adam after analyzing these 'notes' recommended that; *"In these circumstances it seems that the Council of Four can alone pronounce on M. Venizelos' action and that we can not reply to Admiral Calthorpe's telegram until they have done so"*.<sup>236</sup>

The Greek troops evacuated Nazilli on 19<sup>th</sup> of June without making any announcement in advance and on 20<sup>th</sup> some Greek and Turkish houses were looted and certain Greeks wounded and taken prisoner. In the British Delegation some considerations were emerging to keep the Greeks to Smyrna only to have less trouble.<sup>237</sup> The important aspect of Venizelos' 'Note' on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June was its insistence of fulfilling the basic Greek desires as depicted in the 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1919 'Greek Claims'.

'Daily News' on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1919, published an article which was based on Reuter's news that the Turks were putting an offence against the Greeks around Nazilli and were advancing towards Aidin, and the situation was 'serious'. The British General Staff's comment on Turkish offence was: *"The only solution is to clear the Greeks and Italians out and put in either France or G.B., the only Powers who are capable comforting the situation"*<sup>238</sup> and *"French solution, is reasonable, but the Turk is the*

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<sup>235</sup> Ibid, E 13590.

<sup>236</sup> Ibid, E 13568, 'side-note' of E.G. Adam, 26<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid, E 14032. Forbes Adam, from Foreign Office commented on 1<sup>st</sup> of July about the incident of Nazilli that; *"We asked Admiral Calthorpe in a telegram sent on June 29<sup>th</sup> to let have his and local authorities' views as to whether the Greek troops should be temporarily given a free hand and if on what would be the limits of the new occupation zone. If both as if the last sentence of this telegram may contains the best plan for avoiding further trouble i.e. bringing all the Greek troops back within the Sandjak of Smyrna (presumably keeping them in the Kaza of Aivali). This would put them in possession of most of the country which has a Greek majority but unfortunately the Sandjak is not a good economic or geographical frontier and excludes the towns of Manissa and Aidin. We can, however wait for Admiral Calthorpe's reply."* Robert Vansittart thought in similar way and wrote that; *"I would go further and say that if the Greeks are to be kept at all they should be confined to Smyrna town...but it would be better than the present situation... At present the Greeks are going other way and seeking on various pleas to launch out even beyond the original authorization- which will be fatal."* Hardinge's view for the suggestions was; *"We would express no opinion."*

<sup>238</sup> Ibid, E 13990.

*rightful owner*<sup>239</sup>. Foreign Office's view as Forbes Adam commented, was; *"The Turk would certainly not be left to rule Greeks"*<sup>240</sup> The Turkish advance was also reported on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June from the French Embassy in Athens that the movement of the Turks was a violation of the Turkish Armistice terms and to counter attack the Turks. The Greek Government had decided to send 2<sup>nd</sup> Division from Galatz to Smyrna. The news of additional Greek troops was evaluated by British General Staff as; *"This makes 3 Greek divisions and 2 infantry either at or earmarked for the Smyrna area. Only fear of the Bulgarians prevents the Greeks from transferring her whole army."*<sup>241</sup> And Major General Thwaites from G.S. in the Delegation in Paris needed to inquire from Lord Hardinge of *"Are the Greeks going to be allowed to send all available forces to Smyrna? They are already overrunning the limits of territory assigned to them"*<sup>242</sup> and Lord Hardinge answered as it was difficult to reply for these questions.

As the allegations for the Greek forces had been built up that the civilians had been killed in the occupied area, Venizelos came out with an offer that British Liaison Officers should be appointed for the Greek Forces in Anatolia, since all British Officers had already evacuated control posts in 17<sup>th</sup> of June with the order of General Milne.<sup>243</sup> The offer of Venizelos was found by G.O.C. and High Commissioner in Constantinople as unacceptable, but in Paris the evaluation of the offer was quite different, Military's view contradicted with the Foreign Office. For Military it was a hidden trap for British, but for Foreign Office it was an offer that should be considered.<sup>244</sup> The situation in Aidin Vilayet was getting tense and the Greeks' idea was to involve British as much as possible. The Greek Government approached to British Foreign Office with the suggestion that British Officers to be sent to Aidin to convince the Turkish section to refrain themselves from attacking the Greeks troops. This suggestion was conveyed to Paris with the hope that the Greek suggestion not to be approved.<sup>245</sup> The resistance by the Turks at Aidin Vilayet was

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<sup>239</sup> Ibid

<sup>240</sup> Ibid

<sup>241</sup> Ibid, E13994.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid, E13994, 'side-note' of Major General Thwaites, 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid, p. 350

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, E 14082. General Staff considered the offer to send British Liaison Officers to Greek troops in occupied zone as; "It seems extraordinary that the G.O.C. Constantinople should fall into the same hole as the High Commissioner." Robert Vansittart commented on 1<sup>st</sup> of July about the offer as; *"...I think we are all agreed here that no British Officers should be lent for such a purpose. The configuration has reached a stage where the proposal could do us good, and we should be careful in our own interest not to shoulder more than necessary"*

<sup>245</sup> Ibid, E 14046, Sir Tyrell's letter to Balfour, 30<sup>th</sup> June 1919. Robert Vansittart's view on the suggestion was identical to the Foreign Office's, and he commented on 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1919, that; *"I should hope it will not be approved. No action is necessary to this paper, but it is well to note it, in case the*

becoming to alarm the British, and the British Officials started having doubts about the success of the Greek expedition, also they were doubtful whether Venizelos was giving the correct picture to the 'Council of Four'. Calthorpe in his telegram of 1<sup>st</sup> of 1919 wrote that;

“Although I am not altogether satisfied to the accuracy of information given to the President of the Peace Conference by M. Venizelos I feel very little doubt about root of cause of situation to which he calls attention. This cause is indefiniteness which has characterized whole situation in Aidin Vilayet during and subsequent to occupation of Smyrna. The Turks as you are aware accepted the fact of occupation with ill grace enough, but all my information tends to show they were prepared to sit down under a fait accompli on condition that occupation was well defined in limits and conducted with some measure of decency. Information so far received appears to show that neither of these conditions has been fulfilled. As far as any official information in hands of Turkish Local Authorities goes territory at present occupied by Greeks is merely a prelude to further advance and events on spot have fully borne out this conjecture. This constant menace of invasion which Turks ascribe not to decisions of Paris Conference but to exorbitant ambitions of Athens politicians coupled with contemplation of Greek behavior in areas occupied by them has roused Turks of all classes from attitude of passive surliness to one of active hostility. Without entering into details of fighting of last few days I do not consider it accurate to speak of 'Turkish heart and ....As no limits is seen to this advance so these preparation are gradually spreading throughout country...Although this state of affairs unavoidably prolonged beyond safety point I feel still fairly confident of restraining Turkish Government and through them I hope Turkish population, if definite boundary be set to Greek occupation and undertaking given that this shall not be passed without authority of British Senior Officer, who on account of his impartiality alone can be trusted to decide when and where and why this boundary may be passed.”<sup>246</sup>

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*proposal is made. It would let us in for a lot of trouble, and I have already suggested on another paper that, we all of countries should keep clear of this kind of thing”* Lord Hardinge believed in the same policy that he wrote as; *“I agree that we should keep out of it”*.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid, E 14223. Calthorpe's telegram made an impact in the Delegation and Forbes Adam, commented that; *“Admiral Calthorpe's advice amounts to this: that the Council of Four's original instructions should be rigidly enforced and M. Venizelos requested to withdraw his troops to the Sandjak of Smyrna (in the north back to Ayasuluk) and the Kaza of Aivali and only allowed to occupy parts of the Vilayet of Aidin, north of-but including- Aidin, with the prior consent of the British S.N.O. in Smyrna. This advice seems to be applied from the military point of view by the minute of the military section...It would have the additional advantage of getting the Greeks back into a zone where there is some ethnological grounds for giving them permanent political concession. The action showed however be taken urgently or the Greeks with the arrival of reinforcements and on M. Venizelos' later instructions may advance with the interior. Presumably however the action must be taken through the Council of Five (as M. Venizelos addressed his notes to the Council of Four) and not in direct as between this and the Greek Delegation. P.S. Arrange for early discussion of Council of Five.”* Robert Vansittart commented on 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 1919 as; *“Pleas see my minute on 13666 written before seeing this paper. This shows clearly that the Greek orders to advance without consulting us are another attempt to us. It was known that we should refuse on investigation- as we had indeed already imposed a veto once before. M. Venizelos should be required immediately to cancel his orders which are a direct challenge- or 'try-on'-to the decision of the Supreme Council. What this tel. describes as the 'exorbitant ambitions of Athens politicians' will, if not firmly checked, ruin Greece herself- I say nothing of our own obvious interests- by embarking her on an endless adventure, which M. Venizelos himself is short sighted enough to follow. I see on another paper the argument used that not to back the Greeks up in this folly that is playing into the hands of her enemies, will be to encourage the C.U.P. I do not think so. There are plenty of sound Turkish elements including the Government, who are [?] against the Smyrna experiment and whose position is being weakened by it. We are rather playing the C.U.P. game by the game we are allowing the Greeks to play with us. In any case it is usually lest costly to correct a failure than to perpetuate it. The experiment is not a success and the present back and forth fighting will continue in a more or less spasmodic way so long as it is persevered way. For the present we need only order M. Venizelos to keep bounds. But during the time that may elapse before we know the American decision as to mandates, we ought to consider seriously whether we shall be wise to make the Greek occupation more than temporary. At present it is labeled temporary and can be treated as*

Warning of the serious situation existed in Aidin Vilayet was constantly relayed to the Peace Delegation in Paris and to the Foreign Office from Constantinople. On 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 1919, it was reported that if the offensive action was allowed to the Greek troops beyond limits laid down, results might be most serious to the majority of the Anatolian population. The news made some of the Delegates to protest such that the General Staff's representative asked; *"There must be some authority in Paris competent to order the Greeks to confine themselves to the limits originally laid down for Greek occupation in the Smyrna area."*<sup>247</sup> Robert Vansittart was also commented as; *"Such an initiation is being privately conveyed to M. Venizelos. This and the latest tells. from Smyrna, confirm the necessity of insisting: since the Greeks are disregarding the S.N.O. I have heard the substance of this tel. from other sources."*<sup>248</sup> Similar dispatch from Calthorpe, dated 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1919' touched on the same point that the Turkish troops with the help of local civilians had driven the Greeks out of Aidin town into neighborhood of Kara Pinar, but it was reported that the Greek Generals were reinforcing Greeks with the view to advancing on Aidin. Commodore Fitzmaurice, the Senior Allied Naval Officer in Smyrna, believed that the prospect of peace in the Aidin Vilayet could be only achieved by the withdrawal of the Greek troops into Smyrna Sandjak. The Greek Officials requested British forces to takeover Aidin railway but were anxious that no Allied forces should be landed. Commodore Fitzmaurice agreed and was confident that with 300 marines he could make the necessary arrangements to keep the peace with the Turks. He was afraid that if necessary precautions were not to be taken, events would drift into war between Turkey and Greece, in which the Allies presumably would support Greeks.<sup>249</sup> Greeks were trying again to get British to be involved in the conflict between Turks and themselves, and Forbes Adam's comment on such a request was; *"The proposal that British marines should occupy the line between Aidin and Ayasoluk is out of question – but the question of the withdrawal of the Greek troops and their strict adherence to the original instructions of the Council of Four is discussed unofficially with M. Venizelos and a telegram to Admiral Calthorpe must*

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*such without loss of face (e.g. if America to take mandate the whole). Later the position will be quite different."* Hardinge, after reading the comments of Forbes Adam and Robert Vansittart, stated that; *"It is most reasonable that the Greeks should be restrained and induced to return within the limits of occupation prescribed by the Allies. But the significant offenders were the Italians, and the Greeks have simply been following their example. If we make the Greeks retire we ought to do the same to the Italians."* (FO 608/89, Doc. No: 14223, PRO)

<sup>247</sup> FO 608/89, Doc. No: 14398, PRO

<sup>248</sup> Side-note of Robert Vansittart on 7<sup>th</sup> of July 1919. FO 608/89, E 14398, PRO

<sup>249</sup> Calthorpe's telegram of 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1919, FO 608/89, E14472, PRO

await the result of that discussion.”<sup>250</sup> Robert Vansittart commented in a similar manner that; “*The proposal to use British troops and marines for the purpose here described should be vetoed. If anything of the kind is done, the force used should be inter-Allied; but that is what the Greeks don’t want. We however must on no account be drawn in alone.*”<sup>251</sup> The Greeks in coming days would be re-capturing Aidin town and the preparations were reported by Commodore Fitzmaurice on 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1919. The Greeks’ attempt to recapture Aidin without consulting Senior Naval Officer was once more reported to the Foreign Office. According to the Report, half of Aidin had been burned and about 10 000 Moslems and Christians became homeless. The Greeks’ attitude of disregarding the Senior Naval Officer, who was the Allied most senior authority in Smyrna, seemed to be annoying some of the British Delegation in Paris. Robert Vansittart commented that;

*“I have suggested on another paper that serious notice should be taken of the Greek disregard for the S.N.O. It is an equal disregard of the Supreme Council. The [...] brought in the most flourishing part of Turkey by this disastrous expedition is more than distressing. Lord Rathmore called today to ask if we knew how far the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company had suffered. On this of course we have no information; but it is unlikely that they have escaped damage either in Aidin or in the stations up to line. Their main interests are their bridge over the Meander. Some good may be done by getting the Greeks back into the Smyrna Sandjak, but I fear harm is done and it will be very hard to keep the two races from going for each other in future.”*<sup>252</sup>

Robert Vansittart wrote a ‘Note’ again on 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1919, that; “The Greeks have once again disregarded the S.N.O.’s instructions in retaking Aidin. This should not pass unnoticed. An obvious feature of this tel. is that a serious incident with the Italians might now easily arise; and this would make it the more important to get the Greeks back to the limits assigned to them.”<sup>253</sup> The railway issue was also dealt by Harold Nicolson on 24<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, when he talked to Venizelos about the railway concession in Turkey. Venizelos was more than generous to the British that not only the already ownership of Aidin-Smyrna Railway would be honored but also extended in future since Venizelos was sure of himself that the Western Anatolia belonged and owned by Greece.<sup>254</sup>

The Greek landing at Smyrna was debated in the House of Commons and in House of Lords while Lloyd George was still in Paris. On 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1919, Aubrey Herbert

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<sup>250</sup> Ibid

<sup>251</sup> Ibid

<sup>252</sup> Ibid, E 14620, ‘side-note’ of Robert Vansittart, 8<sup>th</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid, E 14508, ‘side-note’ of Robert Vansittart, 7<sup>th</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>254</sup> Nicolson, p. 347, “Diary” 24<sup>th</sup> May 1919 . Nicolson wrote in his ‘Diary’ that “*Round to see Venizelos in the morning about British rights in the Smyrna-Aidin Railway. He promises that the Turkish concession will not only be recognized by the Greek Government, but extended. He promises to see Lord Rathmore and Colonel Corbett*”.

asked the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he had any official information to the effect that the Greeks massacred their prisoners in Smyrna in full sight of the Allied warships. Cecil Harmsworth, The Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs replied as; number of Turkish officers and men had lost their lives and the case was getting earnest attention of the British Delegation in Paris, and he was sure that Greek Government was doing everything possible to prevent the recurrence. A. Herbert also touched upon the policy of the Allies that sending Greek troops to Smyrna was a direct blow to the elements favourable to British interests in Turkey and a direct encouragement to C.U.P. Another question came from Colonel Burn that since there was British navy in Smyrna, therefore the entire massacre took place with the presence of British, and they were not able to do anything.<sup>255</sup> Robert Vansittart was going to complain later on that the reply given in the Parliament was not reflecting the truth. He wrote on 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 1919 that; *"I should like to point out that the matter is not, as have stated, engaging earnest attention here. We have sent the reports of the massacres to the F.O. suggesting substance might be communicated to Greek Minister. That's all. I think it is rather dangerous of F.O. to indicate that we're taking action when we're not."*<sup>256</sup> Contrary to the answer given in the Parliament, Cecil Harmsworth was going to write to Curzon and reporting a conversation he had with Rev. Dr. McLachlane, a Canadian and the head of an Educational and Proselytizing Mission at Smyrna. He gave, according to Harmsworth a first hand account of the Greek occupation and relayed the feelings of the Turks who were blaming the British Government for the outrages that had been carried out by the Greeks under the surveillance of Admiral Calthorpe. He further added that the Jewish and Armenian opinion in Smyrna was equally hostile to Greek occupation and that even the more influential Greeks were opposed to it. Rev. McLachlane believed that the incident was bound to increase the difficulties of Britain in the Near East, India and Egypt.<sup>257</sup>

Colonel Aubrey Herbert was going to ask years later, to the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, on 17<sup>th</sup> of July 1922, that if Sir Basil Zaharoff was consulted before the Greek landing at Smyrna by the Foreign Office or by the Prime Minister. Lloyd George replied that Sir Basil Zaharoff was neither consulted, nor did he tender any advice in this matter.<sup>258</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> House of Lords Public Records, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard for House of Commons (Hansard for Commons) Vol. 117, No: 82, p. 62.

<sup>256</sup> PRO FO 608/89, E 14015.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid, E14434.

<sup>258</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 156, Column 1702, 17<sup>th</sup> of July 1922.

The preliminary work for a peace settlement with Turkey had been going on since the early days of the Conference. Supreme Council agreed to speed up the work for the peace terms and for the British team, Lord Hardinge on 25<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1919, notified the Delegation of Balfour's message that he was particularly anxious to ensure that no point which ought to be included in the preliminary terms of peace was overlooked. He asked all the sections within the Delegation should consider carefully what points affecting their special fields should be included in preliminary peace terms.<sup>259</sup> The preliminary peace terms for the peace with Turkey, according to the Resolution IV of the Council, should be handed to the Council's Secretariat by 8<sup>th</sup> March. The Resolution urged all the commissions to finalize their reports, which should cover the points of; approximate future frontiers of Turkey, the financial arrangements to be imposed on Turkey, the economic conditions to be accorded to Turkey and the responsibility for breaches of the laws of War.<sup>260</sup> The Draft Treaty of Peace between Turkey and the Allied Countries was prepared and submitted to the Secretariat.<sup>261</sup> During the preparations of the Draft form of the Treaty, Forbes Adam took a note on 8<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 that with the instructions of Sir Louis Mallet on 5<sup>th</sup> of February that, free ports should be established and indicated in the Draft since it was fairly clear that whatever mandatories might be ultimately chosen, the former Turkish Empire would be divided into the separate states. Forbes Adam indicated that these states were going to be;

“(1) Smyrna and an enclave round it either annexed to Greece or with Greeks mandatory; (2) Constantinople and a zone on each side of the Straits either internationalized or under a mandatory; (3) Armenia including probably the six Vilayets, Russian-Caucasus-Armenia, and a part of Cilicia including Mersina; (4) Anatolia as a Turkish state (minus the Greek enclave on the west and minus the territory of the international zone of the Straits) up to the western frontier of Armenia; (5) Mesopotamia including Mosul; (6) Syria including Lebanon; (7) Palestine.

On the above basis and for the purposes of discussion Sir Louis Mallet would propose that the following ports should be made free ports:

(1) Batum; (2) Poti; (3) Trebizond; (4) Samsun; (5) Haidar Pacha [Haydarpasa] (6) Smyrna (7) Scala Nova; (8) Adalia; (9) Mersina; (10) Ayas Bay (11) Alexandretta; (12) Tripoli; (13) Beirut; (14) Haifa; (15) Basrah”<sup>262</sup>

The free ports as would be appearing in the British draft of the Treaty were also analyzed by the different sections and the Military Section' remark was;

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<sup>259</sup> PRO, FO 608/116, E 3187.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid, E 3187, Resolution IV Appendix “A” (iv) of 22<sup>nd</sup> Feb. 1919 of Council with regard to Turkey.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid, the ‘Draft’ prepared by the British Delegation and submitted to Secretariat of the Conference had Eight Chapters of General Terms, Turkey, Constantinople and Straits, Armenia, Palestine, Arab States, Egypt and Finance. It proposed independence of Armenia, Kurdistan, and Arab States. The proposal asked the Palestine to be under a mandatory Power and to be home for Jews. The other states to be formed were to be under the surveillance of mandatory power. The boundaries of States were left ‘blank’ to be filled up at a later date.

<sup>262</sup> Ibid, E 4708.

“Constantinople, Batoum or Poti, Smyrna, Alexandretta, Beirut would appear to be sufficient as far as we are concerned. India Office should be consulted as to Basra”<sup>263</sup>

Sir Louis Mallet prepared a working paper for a clause to be inserted in Peace Treaty with Turkey and submitted on 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1919 to the Delegation to have the views for the military questions regarding States to be placed under mandatories. The clauses concerned gave details for maintenance of military forces and fortifications and for adherence to Arms Traffic Convention. Louis Mallet viewed that the issue was important in view of; *“The sooner the reduction takes place the better. In fact, every means should be taken which are practicable to destroy the Turkish power of offence and resistance which we are still able to do so; otherwise we may be confronted with outbreaks of massacres throughout Asia Minor and find ourselves unable to [...] anything approaching the terms of peace which are being discussed”*<sup>264</sup> The issue was then referred to the Supreme War Council to be finalized. Anyhow the Draft form of the Treaty with Turkey was almost finalized except the frontiers and mandatories, which were pending for the American Senate decision.

The German Treaty was signed on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919, on the anniversary of Sarajevo in the Hall of Mirrors of the Palace of Versailles. Dr. Tom Jones who was an important member of the ‘Garden Suburb’ was going to remark on the peace negotiations as; *“has been called a Conference which never met, and a Treaty which was a myth. There is some basis for both statements”*<sup>265</sup>

Anyhow, the negotiations, at least with Germany, were over but other issues such as the future of Turkey still was waiting for the decision of the Supreme Council. The leaders had known that the Ottoman Peace Treaty was difficult to be resolved due to its complexity and involvement of too many countries. Council of Four, on their last meeting, 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919, before departure decided that they should wait for the American Senate decision on mandate and on Italy’s situation that; *“by stating that it was no use to have a discussion with the Italian Delegation while their troops remained in Asia Minor, and that before any discussion of Italian claims took place,*

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<sup>263</sup> Ibid, 16<sup>th</sup> of March 1919.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid, E4921.

<sup>265</sup> Owen, p. 554.

*we must insist on their moving out*<sup>266</sup>, hence the Italians were not to be taken into consideration on the expense of Greeks.

Lloyd George left Paris the day after they signed the German Treaty, on 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1919, although he would be coming to Paris from time to time for conferences for substitution of Council meetings. Lloyd George received a grand welcome at the Victoria Station in London for the success he had achieved; even the King and Prince of Wales came to meet him at the station. Paris Peace Conference marked an important turning point for Turks, humiliation and success or rather agony and ecstasy days were not far away. For the Turkish Peace the ground work had been done at Paris, and then it was the time to finalize the Treaty, or to blow the last stroke to finish the Ottoman Empire.

## **V.2: Lloyd George at Conferences en route to Sevres**

As Lloyd George and Wilson returned to their countries, they had left a delicate atmosphere behind in Ottoman arena. The Italians had shown that they were determined to expand deep into Anatolia, whereas because of stubborn Venizelos, the Greeks, not being content with the territories assigned by the Supreme Council, were aiming to expand their occupation eastward to enclave the entire Aidin Vilayet and get closer to Marmara Sea. Meanwhile Turks were also awaking to the new conditions and starting to organize a resistance front. Soviets eliminating Denikin and Kolchak were waiting for the right movement to establish a Soviet regime in Caucasus.

The domestic issues in the Allied countries were pressurizing the leaders to finalize the peace treaties to be signed with the Central Powers and after Germany, next one in line was Turkey, although the preliminary work for a peace settlement which, had been going on since the early days of the Conference and required only the final touch-up, which were the determination of frontiers and mandatories.

The relationship between France and Britain preserved its tense condition and was apparent in almost every platform. The importance of oil became more apparent during the war as Admiralty stated, the navy was now dependent upon the United States of America for its vital supplies of oil to the extent of 80 per cent, and this dependence was going to continue unless and until alternative supplies could be

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<sup>266</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 268.

developed. Britain reached the conclusion that there were only two sources of supply which might be sufficiently developed to cover any large properties for their requirements and these were home production and the Persian and Mesopotamian oilfields. Because of Bolsheviks, the future of the oilfields in Baku was in danger and also the unrest in Persia directed Britain to Mesopotamia.<sup>267</sup> The French Government through her Embassy in London applied to the Foreign Office on 6<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1919 to conclude an agreement with Britain for adopting and carrying out a common policy for petroleum.<sup>268</sup> The letter was a follow-up of the meeting held in Paris on 17<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918 between French and British Officials. The intention of the French Government was to obtain a share in the Mesopotamian petroleum whose concessions belonged to the Turkish Petroleum Company, of which Deutsche Bank owned 30 per cent of. France was planning to request these shares to be allotted to them. Another interest of France was to establish a joint project for the construction of a pipe-line for Persian and Mesopotamian petroleum to the Mediterranean Sea. The proposed pipe-line would cross Syria, which, in accordance with the Sykes-Picot Agreement was in the French zone. The French Proposal was discussed in the meeting held at Admiralty on 15<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1919 and was pointed out that French Government was aiming to obtain concessions for Mesopotamian, Romania and Persian petroleum while negotiating with United States who was actively involved in securing holdings outside America. Britain was convinced that since she relied on America for its oil supply, the prospect of the United States obtaining control of Middle-East oil could not be regarded lightly. The conclusion of the meeting was that, since Britain was in need of a pipe-line for the Persian and Mesopotamian oil and this line would be crossing Syria which was the French zone, and then it would be better not to antagonize the French for her requirements before Americans.<sup>269</sup>

Montagu, Secretary of State for India and Sir Louis Mallet agreed that the French should have a share in the Turkish Petroleum Company but Mallet in expressing the Foreign Office's view put forward a condition that; *"His Majesty's Government are ready to admit a 20% to 30% French participation in this company on condition of their facilitating the construction of a pipe-line to the Mediterranean and of their admitting British participation in the development of oil fields in Algeria."*<sup>270</sup> The negotiations with regard to a common policy for the development of oilfields in

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<sup>267</sup> PRO, CAB 23/9, The Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet of 517, held at 10, Downing Street, January 17, 1919.

<sup>268</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/14/4.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid.

<sup>270</sup> Ibid, Montagu's letter to Mr. Long, First Lord of the Admiralty, on 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb. 1919, and Sir Louis Mallet's letter to Mr. Long on 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb. 1919.

certain regions were finalized and a Memorandum of Understanding was initiated by Mr. Long. The Agreement was going to be known as Long-Berenger Memorandum and would be finalized only during San Remo negotiations. Curzon in his letter to the French Embassy acknowledged that Britain approved officially the terms of the agreement.<sup>271</sup> But sooner, Lord Curzon received a telephone message from Lloyd George on 13<sup>th</sup> of June that; “ *The Prime Minister learnt quite casually the other day that some agreement was being negotiated between the French and British Governments as to the Mosul Oil Works. Neither M. Clemenceau nor the Prime Minister has been informed from these negotiations. He has already informed Mr. Balfour, who has nothing to do with the negotiations that he has given notice to the French Government that the negotiations shall be considered as cancelled.*”<sup>272</sup> Lloyd George probably believed that while he was negotiating with Clemenceau about the Syrian issue, did not want anything that might suggest that Syria was going to be under French mandate. The Turkish Petroleum Company’s concessions in Mosul and in Mesopotamia for oil were going to be debated in coming years. The cancellation of the Agreement brought mistrust to the already tensed atmosphere that existed between France and Britain.

The relation between France and Britain mainly was tense due to the Syrian issue. In September 1919, Britain felt that the situation of keeping a large army in Caucasus, Cilicia and in Syria, should not go on any longer and informed the Emir Feisal as well as Clemenceau that Britain could not accept a mandate for Syria on the ground that they would create an unpleasant atmosphere with France if they did so. Lloyd George believed that the Turkish Treaty could be resolved before they called off their army, but because of indecisiveness of Americans the Treaty was apparently going to be delayed and also because of the British public’s pressure on keeping a large army, Britain had to make a decision to call off their army.

To ease the political atmosphere in Middle-East, Emir Feisal was invited to London. Lloyd George in a meeting held on 19<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919, with the presence of Balfour, Curzon, General Allenby and Emir Feisal told that Britain were bound and respected the Agreements that they had entered with France and separately with King Hussein and treat them both equal. Lloyd George stated that the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and part of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs,

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<sup>271</sup> Ibid, Curzon,s letter, 16<sup>th</sup> May 1919.

<sup>272</sup> Ibid, Foreign Office’s letter to Philip Kerr on 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. Lloyd George sent a letter to Clemenceau in this respect on 21<sup>st</sup> of May only five days after Curzon’s acknowledgement of the Agreement.

and Aleppo could not be considered to be purely Arabs, and should be excluded from the proposed line and boundaries as was laid down in the Agreement that Britain had entered with King Hussein. Lloyd George further commented that with regard to those portions of territories, Britain would be free to act in fulfilling her obligations to France. Lloyd George gave the assurance to Emir Feisal that;

*“Subject to the above modifications [the districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and part of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, and Aleppo to be excluded from the proposed line and boundaries], Great Britain is prepared to recognize and support the independence of the Arabs within the territories proposed by Sherif of Mecca. With regard to the Vilayets of Baghdad and Basrah, the Arabs will recognize that the established position and interests of Great Britain necessitate special measures of administrative control in order to secure these territories from foreign aggression, to promote the welfare of the local population, and to safeguard our mutual economic interests”<sup>273</sup>*

Lloyd George told that the 1916 Agreement with France in 1916 provided that Damascus, Homs and Aleppo should be Arab, but the area to the west of these towns should be subject to direct or indirect administration or control as the French desire and as they may think fit to arrange with the Arab States, and therefore the eventual settlement of these territories was going to be determined in the Peace Treaty to be signed with Turkey. Lloyd George continued that they were planning to evacuate Cilicia and Syria by 1<sup>st</sup> of November, as Clemenceau was already notified. French would be taking over west of the line described and Emir Feisal would, if they wished to take over Damascus, Homs and Aleppo from General Allenby and hold them until the Treaty decided on their eventual administration. Emir Feisal explained that the areas mentioned as the French zone was a part of the promised lands to Arabs and with this arrangement Arabs, would be forced to be partitioned. Feisal commented that; *“He[Emir Feisal] could not stand before the Moslem world and say that he had been asked to wage a war against the Caliph of the Moslems and now see the European Powers divide the Arab country.”<sup>274</sup>* According to Feisal, Arabs could accept the arrangement if there was a single mandatory power and that should be Britain although they did not have any hatred towards French, but they preferred Britain. Emir Feisal further said that he would like to lay a formal protest and when the French landed in the coastline of Syria, there would be a general mobilization and every man would take up arms against them.

Lloyd George met Feisal again on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September in the War Cabinet Meeting. Emir Feisal’s insistence on the Agreement, existing between Britain and his father

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<sup>273</sup> Minutes of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street on 19<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919, CAB 23/44- Part II, PRO

<sup>274</sup> Ibid

King Hussein which allowed independence of the Arab lands was once more tabled in the meeting. Lord Curzon told that there were no agreements signed between the concerned parties. He said that the discussions between the parties had been carried on by means of correspondence but there was no agreement yet, and the 'understanding' between Britain and King Hussein arose from a series of letters. Lloyd George remarked that to reach a satisfactory solution of the question was to the benefit of Arabs and British, and he continued in saying that Britain was most anxious to be on the best of terms with the Arab people whom they admired so much. Lloyd George told that he submitted an Aide-memoiré to Clemenceau and Emir Feisal to which Hussein had referred to an agreement, but it was not an agreement and it was just showing an indication of the views of the British Government for the occupation Cilicia, Syria and Palestine and this aide-memoiré was not accepted by Clemenceau as a final settlement of the questions which affected the future administration of territories concerned, since France believed that Damascus, Homs and Aleppo were part of the French sphere and should be occupied by French troops. Lloyd George told Emir Feisal that this attitude of French was not accepted by Britain who believed that those towns were to be handed to Arabs. Lloyd George further pointed out that at the time when they evacuate Cilicia and Syria they expect France to accept the conditions as set forth in the agreement Britain had made with King Hussein and Britain wanted the Arabs to believe that they had never done anything behind the back of to Arabs.<sup>275</sup>

Lloyd George met Emir Feisal again on 13<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1919 in a War Cabinet Meeting after communications between Prime Minister, Foreign Office and Emir with regard to the Agreements for Syria. In the Meeting Emir Feisal presented an official reply to the British Government.<sup>276</sup> He asked the Syrian Question to be discussed in a meeting with the participation of French, British and Americans, since he wanted to put forward some conditions for the British evacuation of Syria. The Meeting was adjourned to invite the French and Americans.<sup>277</sup>

Lloyd George might have known that France would not be in the position to discuss the future of Syria without having determined the whole issue of the Ottoman Empire. Clemenceau in his message to Lloyd George through P.H. Kerr on 11<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1919, made it clear that dissolution of the Ottoman Empire should be handled

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<sup>275</sup> PRO, CAB 23/44- Part II, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street on 23<sup>rd</sup> Sep. 1919.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid

<sup>277</sup> Ibid, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street on 13<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1919.

as a separate issue rather than attacking Syrian, Cilicia and Palestine cases on individual bases. As of September they were still waiting for the decision of the American Senate. Clemenceau on the issue of British evacuation of the Ottoman territories thought that the general difficulties could result from the final settlement of the Ottoman question and as regards the maintenance of order from the retreat of the British troops. He pointed out that it was not possible to differentiate the question of Syria from the other questions connected with the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire and submit it to the Supreme Council independently. Clemenceau further told that there existed an imminent danger that threatened the Armenians as a consequence of the retreat of the British troops from Caucasus and the movement of the Turkish Nationalists in Asia Minor. Clemenceau thought that it was only France who had the responsibility of guarding Armenians and therefore offered to send 12,000 soldiers there, since British, American and Italian Delegation had already declared that they could not send any troops. For the Syrian issue Clemenceau believed that it was to be solved among France and Britain only without an intermediary because of 1916 Agreement. Therefore in his message on 11<sup>th</sup> September, he seemed to be determined that Syrian issue could not be separated from the Turkish question and it should be solved among Britain and France without the presence of Arabs, and France was sacrificing by sending troops to Armenia since no other power was willing to contribute to their security. Lloyd George had known that by agreeing with Emir Feisal for holding a meeting about Syrian issue could not be implemented, therefore he was trying to gain time and at the same time by showing Arabs that Britain was doing his best to please them.<sup>278</sup>

Clemenceau's views with regard to Turkey, Syrian question and the overall relation with Britain were made clear in his meeting with Lord Derby, British Ambassador in Paris, on 12<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919.<sup>279</sup> He complained that there had been much argument in the French press lately concerning Syria and Britain was not cooperating with France about this question. Britain, according to Clemenceau, had made a mistake in backing Feisal so strongly. Clemenceau remarked that Feisal had lied to both sides in telling to British that he would fight against the French while telling to the French that he would fight against the British. Feisal like all Orientals was a past master at the art of intrigue, and Clemenceau believed that they could settle the problem by the cooperation between France and Britain. He further told that he had

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<sup>278</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/51/1/37, Clemenceau's message to Lloyd George through P.H. Kerr on 11<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919.

<sup>279</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/51/1/40, Lord Derby's letter to Lloyd George on 11<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919.

reached the view that he was against the partition of Ottoman Empire. He thought that sovereignty of Turkey in Anatolia should be maintained. He told that at one time he had not held this view while Lloyd George did. He had come round to Lloyd George's view. He further pointed out that the unity among Allies should be maintained and therefore expected Britain to help France solve the Syrian issue.

Britain submitted an aide-memoiré on 13<sup>th</sup> of September to France which proposed that the territories evacuated by British troops the west of the line drawn from Aleppo, Homs, Hama and Damascus would be filled with French troops on, while Arabs would take over these towns. Clemenceau's response on 14<sup>th</sup> of October, to the proposal was negative and told British Government that in accordance with the 1916, Sykes-Picot Agreement France was entitled to claim the whole Syria as a French zone, except Mosul which was left to Britain with the agreement reached between two Prime Ministers on 8<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1918. Britain answered the response of French on 18<sup>th</sup> October saying within the context of the Agreements and the spirit of cooperation the prescribed proposal was prepared. It was pointed out that both Governments were bound by the Anglo-French declaration of 8<sup>th</sup> of November and by the Covenant of the League of Nations, that was they had pledged themselves to take into account the wishes of the population in the final settlement of the Turkish problem. Since the Peace Conference would be the final authority in the settlement, and therefore the wishes of the people would be the determining factor in the selection of the mandatory, Britain urged France that it was utmost importance for French Government to spare no pains to establish a friendly understanding with Emir Feisal and Arab people in Syria. Britain also complained that the Memorandum sent by France on 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1919, had certain allegations that were not true. It was pointed out that during the last six months, Britain had been subjected to a series of accusations from the French Government and French press in regard to its policy and its actions in Syria which they believed in every case had been proved to be without substantial foundation. One accusation forwarded to British Government was the arming of the Arabs, and Britain believed that such accusations and still more the appearance in the French press would inevitably provoke a demand for publicity and harm the relation between two friendly nations and no doubt would help the enemy.

The meeting with Clemenceau and British with the representatives of Italy and United States was going to take place in December 1919, but the situation was quite different then, since the American Senate had already given the indication that they

were going to deny the mandate for Asia Minor and Constantinople. Allies had to concentrate on the Turkish problem and therefore Syrian issue had become a second degree problem.

The Peace with the Ottoman Empire could not be finalized because of having too many uncertainties, but the major question was whether America was going to fulfill the task given to her by the Peace Conference before it was adjourned in June 1919. As the time was pressing the Allies mainly for the Middle-East mandates and the Greek advance in Western Anatolia especially after forming Turkish Nationalist movement, Britain was getting even more anxious about the probable American decision. British Cabinet before separating in August 1919 was anxious to know when the U.S.A Senate would reach a decision for the mandates but the answer received from British Delegation in Paris was still uncertainty. Robert Vansittart thought that hurrying Americans might not be beneficial for them, since there was a chance that President might move public opinion in regard to Armenia and to a satisfactory solution. He was told confidentially that Colonel Haskell and General Harbord from American Armed Forces had both been told that the President considered the balance of probability in favour of American acceptance of the Armenian mandate. Balfour, in Paris, had the impression that it was unlikely that the U.S. Government could ratify the Treaty with Germany before the end of September 1919 at earliest, and the probability of American Congress and Senate agreeing to U.S. Government accepting mandate for any part of Ottoman Empire was diminishing.<sup>280</sup> The news obtained from military attaché in Washington was also pessimistic that the U.S. War Department was not making any preparations for any action in Turkey.<sup>281</sup>

The Commission appointed by the Supreme Council to survey people's choice for mandates and to investigate the situation in Middle-East and in Turkey, known as The King-Crane Commission was essentially an American team, because of refusal of Clemenceau to appoint French delegates and after British Government's decision to follow the same suit.<sup>282</sup> The Commission spent the spring and summer of 1919 in

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<sup>280</sup> PRO, FO 608/111, E 17992.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid, Message from Washington to Foreign Office on 25<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1919.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid. The reason for France and Britain not joining the Commission was given in the French Newspaper 'Echo de Paris' on its issue of 31<sup>st</sup> Aug. 1919 as: "*Logically, President Wilson, when he proposed the sending of the Commission, should have been insisted on the preliminary withdrawal of British troops, as was done in the case of the Germans and Poles in Upper Silesia. In default of this, the French nominees refused to join in the Commission, while the British, 'taught by events in Egypt and, perhaps, thinking it better to maneuver round the Commission than in it, also abstained'. The*

investigation and returned to Paris in September 1919. The findings of the Commission were not welcomed by the Allies and were embarrassing even for the Americans.<sup>283</sup> The Commission proposed that an American mandate separately for Armenia and Asia Minor which comprised of whole Anatolia and Cilicia, and an international Constantinople state under mandate but separate from Turkish State. Contrary to the expectations of Italy and Greece, no territories were seemed to be rewarded to them. The Commission's visit during their investigation to Constantinople and making inquiries there was not going to be treated highly in Britain. 'Times' on 6<sup>th</sup> August 1919 published an article on the Commission's work in Constantinople. Commission had invited Turkish representatives to express their opinion regarding neutralization of the Straits and territorial concessions to Armenia. When the news appeared in the 'Times', Foreign Office questioned whether Commission was authorized to discuss and report regarding the future of Constantinople as stated in the 'Times'.<sup>284</sup> Delegation's view in Paris on the inquiry of Foreign Office was that the terms of reference for the inter-Allied Commission, as drafted by President Wilson covered Palestine, Syria, the Arab Countries to the East of Palestine and Syria, Mesopotamia, Armenia, Cilicia, and perhaps additional areas in Asia Minor. Therefore the terms of reference might be regarded as justifying investigation of Turkish views as to the zone of the Straits, but did not explicitly mention 'Future of Constantinople'. The Commission's investigation by inquiring the 'Future of Constantinople' was not regarded highly, since Turkish view was not binding the Allies, although it was the Turks being at stake. The most important of what the Foreign Office's consideration was that the British considered that Asia Minor was within the sphere of their control, and therefore nobody else but especially Americans had the right to interfere. It seemed that America could be utilized for British desires and that was the limit of their responsibility.

The Allies were planning to meet in October 1919 to discuss the Peace with Turkey but the decision not been taken yet at the United States Senate about the mandates, was delaying the meeting. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of United States, upon the pressure from Allies, told the British Ambassador, Viscount Grey, as late as on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1919 that he did not know how to proceed. If negotiations of the Turkish Treaty proceeded on the basis that the United States would not take any mandates, it would close the door, on the other hand negotiations on the

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*American team did not play fair*" Then the paper discussed the condition of Emir Feisal who was in the pay-roll of British Government and the Commission's report being so against the sentiments of French.

<sup>283</sup> Howard, *The Partition of Turkey* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 238-239

<sup>284</sup> PRO, FO 608/109, E 17727, Curzon's letter to Balfour, 11<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1919.

assumption that the United States might take a mandate would reset unfavorably on the the Treaty Debate in the Senate. The Secretary of State asked Grey, if they would postpone the Turkish negotiations for another ten days. He also urged no other consideration than the desire not to prejudice the Senate on reservations.<sup>285</sup> The atmosphere of the Debate in the Senate to ratify the mandate issue was swinging to and fro, such that one day it seemed favourable but the next day it was not. Grey's telegram to Prime Minister on 22<sup>nd</sup> October showed that the Secretary of State had an impression that there was no chance whatever of Congress authorizing acceptance of Mandates for Constantinople and Turkey.<sup>286</sup> At the end, the Senate did not ratify the Mandates and that was the end of the American adventure in Anatolia which was ended even before it was started.

The American views for mandates had been started even earlier within the state mechanism. A Memorandum prepared by the American Mission in Paris and sent to President and the Secretary of State, Lansing, on the 25<sup>th</sup> of August showed that in the circumstances that existed then, there was no point or the possibility of discussing mandates when the Allies had begun to talk in terms of decision and reality. The Memorandum gave reference to Clemenceau's attitude with regard to mandates that Clemenceau had not denied that the mandatory principles might apply to the disorganized Ottoman Empire but at the same time he refused to discuss the general terms of any such mandate. The reason given for Clemenceau's attitude, according to the Americans was his preference for delaying their discussions until France to be allotted her share.<sup>287</sup>

The Americans living in Anatolia, especially in Constantinople were contributing to the public awareness in the United States and most important of all they mostly became a critique of the British Policy. The British High Commissioner was

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<sup>285</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/60/3/15, Telegram from Viscount Grey to the Prime Minister, 29<sup>th</sup> of October 1919.

<sup>286</sup> PRO, FO 608/111, Telegram from Viscount Grey to the Prime Minister on 22<sup>nd</sup> of October 1919.

<sup>287</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/60/1/19. The Memorandum submitted to the President and Secretary of State with regard to mandates over Turkey is interested from the view of the Western Power's desires. The Mission's picture of Allied attitude was: "*I must confess that personally these declarations make me panic stricken, particularly when I consider the mad competition between Powers which are already disputing, arms in their hands, concerning the territory which they claim, but which has not yet given to them. When I see the almost insurmountable dangers with jeopardize the establishment of a durable peace in the Balkans, I am forced to believe that we will easily arrive at a unanimous decision concerning Turkey, unless that decision is based upon the principle of maintenance of the sovereignty of the Sultan. Within the Ottoman Empire itself the disturbance has only begun and from this point of view the enquiry which is now being independently conducted by the American Commission does not appear to have contributed to the calm placability of their people nor to have facilitated a solution*" and further described the Powers and their sincerity as; "*The evil seems to me to be exactly of the same nature*"

constantly complaining to the Foreign Office that the Americans were becoming more inclined to the cause of the Nationalist Movement in Turkey. The American Navy Radio Press was busy in broadcasting news that as far as the British policy was concerned causing some unfortunate effects. It seemed that the Americans having sympathy for notions such as 'independence' and 'freedom' were getting harmful for the British desires in the Ottoman Empire. The British authorities in Constantinople were complaining that they were credited with some deep and mysterious policy which it seemed to be the endeavor of everyone to uncertain. Consequently when some occurrence took place such as the Noel incident at Malatia [Malatya], it was not possible to keep it as secret and that was affecting the British image. British High Commission believed that the anti-British color shown was really more reflex ion of Nationalist ideas than anything else, though there was a certain amount of hereditary jealousy. The British High Commissioner was starting to believe; "... *that in good many cases, though the voice may have a strong Yankee twang, yet the sentiments are those of Mustapha Kemal and his party. The opportunity of giving another twist to the British Lion's tail is, in fact, too good to be missed.*"<sup>288</sup>

The British High Commissioner in Constantinople was going to complain to the Americans that U.S. Navy Radio Press was becoming the Nationalist Movements' and Bolsheviks' propaganda spokesman and therefore criticizing an Allied policy. Admiral Bristol answered the accusations of British, stating that the Navy Radio Press was not an official document. It was a copy of the Press dispatches that were broadcasted from different radio stations. Therefore the news thus broadcasted was public property to anyone who had been receiving this radio news.<sup>289</sup>

The anti-British atmosphere was also prevailing in France during the second half of 1919 and British policy especially for Middle-East was criticized severely, according to British this was due to the Syrian issue. There were also signs of the beginning of a concerted movement in the French Press against the dismemberment of Turkey. The 'Temps' published a leading article on 23<sup>rd</sup> of Sep. 1919 on the situation in Asia Minor and argued that in order to overcome the anarchy in Anatolia the only solution was to negotiate with the Constantinople Government and also with certain leaders of the Nationalist Movement and to tell the Turks that their country would be surviving and therefore together they should arrange an agreement to reorganize

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<sup>288</sup> PRO, FO 608/111, Admiral A.J.M. de Robeck's letter to Curzon, Foreign Office, 18<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1919.

<sup>289</sup> Ibid, Rear-Admiral M. Bristol;s letter to British High Commission, 6<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1919.

the Anatolia. 'Le Figaro also published a similar article on the same day and urged that an un-split Anatolia should be allowed to exist.<sup>290</sup> Another leading Newspaper 'Matin' in his article on 8<sup>th</sup> of September accused Britain for her policies in Asia Minor. According to Matin, the British agents were traveling through Anatolia and spreading anti-French propoganda and making out that France alone had been supporting the Greek ambitions. Matin quoted another example of British intrigue in Constantinople through a British newspaper founded in Constantinople.<sup>291</sup> 'Matin' published another article on 28<sup>th</sup> of September, criticizing French and British policies in Asia Minor. According to 'Matin', French influence in Turkey was much less than what it used to be. British Imperialism had done to French great harm in the West and had hesitated at nothing to diminish French prestige, and British propoganda had done to French enormous harm. The Matin suggested that if France agreed to give Britain the mandate, then France would be cutting and expelling herself totally from Turkey and therefore would be helping to create Pan-Britainism which sooner or later would provoke a great rebellion in the East, hence France should propose that Turkey to be administered though the League of Nations.<sup>292</sup>

While Allies were busy in their desires for the Ottoman Empire, Greece was also busy in trying to occupy as much territory as possible and present it as a 'de facto' at the Peace Conference before the Turkish Peace Treaty. Lord Curzon prepared a 'summary' of the events since the 'ill-started' landing of Greek forces in Smyrna in May 1919 for the War Cabinet on 26<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1919.<sup>293</sup> The events were categorized in two sections; Smyrna and North and South of Smyrna. According to the Curzon's Paper, Greek troops disobeyed the instructions to avoid Turkish barracks and on the excuse that a single shot was fired at them, the Greeks attacked the barracks and the Government House, and arrested 300 Turkish civilians, several of whom were subsequently butchered. The representative of the British High Commission, Mr. Morgan had reported on the following day that about 300 Turks and 100 Christians had been killed, but according to Venizelos only 63 Turks were killed. Greeks, Curzon continued, overstepped the limits laid down for them by the Peace Conference and advanced in the direction of Meander Valley and captured Aidin and Nazli, but later on by the insistence of Senior Naval Officer of Allied Forces they retreated to Aidin by evacuating Nazli. Greek troops occupied Aivali, Magnessia [Manisa], Soma, Dikili and several villages and towns. According to Curzon since

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<sup>290</sup> Ibid, George Grahame's letter to Curzon, 23<sup>rd</sup> of Sep. 1919.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid, George Grahame's letter to Curzon, 8<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919.

<sup>292</sup> Ibid, George Grahame's letter to Curzon, 28<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919.

<sup>293</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/206/4/6.

the landing at Smyrna several hundred of Turks and Greeks were killed and thousands of Turks had become homeless and as of August 1919 work at Smyrna and neighborhood had been at standstill. The landing at Smyrna had resulted anarchy and killing rather than peace as was foreseen by Venizelos and Supreme Council at the Peace Conference.

Lloyd George left Paris on 29<sup>th</sup> of June and so did President Wilson. The Supreme Council of 'Big Four' was over and rapid changes in the policies and fast decision making mechanism was ended. It is always debated that Lloyd George although it had been so tiring and painful, thoroughly enjoyed his Peace Conference days and this was the scheme he believed that could bring results. Lloyd George returned to Paris again the following month to attend a meeting with Clemenceau and Venizelos on 24<sup>th</sup> of July.<sup>294</sup> As a consequence of a suggestion made at the 'Big Four', Venizelos had a meeting with Tittoni, the Foreign Minister of Italy who replaced Sonnino at the new Government, on Greek-Italian relations. They touched several issues although the meeting originally was scheduled for the Bulgarian territory claims. Venizelos reported the decisions taken at the meeting on 23<sup>rd</sup> of July to both Clemenceau and Lloyd George. It seemed that Italy was going to support Greek claims in Thrace, agreed to put the Dodecanese under the League of Nations and the retention of Smyrna by Greeks provided that their territory did not extend as far as South of Aidin and Meander valley, and finally decided to meet Greek wishes for Epirus, Albania. That was the outcome of their meeting, but at the meeting on 24<sup>th</sup> of July, Venizelos told that the Italians had changed their mind, probably because of pressure exerted on the Italian Government from the Italian Military and Naval Authorities. Tittoni had come back for some requests such that; the island Rhodes should be handed to Italy and the mainland opposite to the island Corfu to be occupied by Italy.

For Lloyd George and Clemenceau, the last request by the Italians was not reasonable and therefore could not be accepted, but the Rhodes issue was something else since the Allies were bound to furnish this island to the Italians due to the 1916 London Agreement. President Wilson, not being bound with the London Agreement had, in private and unofficial conversation had expressed to Lloyd George his objection to handing over to Italy an island far removed from Italian shores and which was mainly peopled by Greeks. Venizelos told in the meeting that

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<sup>294</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/12/3.

he was going to have further negotiations with Tittoni and was hoping to achieve better results.

Lloyd George met Venizelos again on 5<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919 in Normandy, France. Venizelos, on the question of Lloyd George, explained the incidences in Smyrna and later in Pergamum [Bergama] that upon the shooting of civilians to the Greek soldiers, Greek troops retaliated and as a result a considerable number of Turks had been killed. According to Venizelos the situation in Smyrna in the occupation of Greek forces was quiet. He explained that in the incident of Aidin only two or three Turks had been killed by stray bullets but the Turks retaliated and massacred about 400 Greeks and burnt a quarter of the town. The figures and the events quoted by Venizelos contradicted with Curzon's evaluation but he was convincing in the sense that although he had 5 divisions of 65,000 men, the only problem was causing by the Turks outside of the occupied zone, implying that they should be allowed to expand their territories of control, to protect their nationals. Venizelos told that he did not expect any hostility from the Italians after their arrangements, and then turned the conversation to Thrace. Venizelos spent a considerable time to explain the sacrifices Greeks had by joining the War on the side of Allies and never made or proposed any definite bargain, but since the war was over she had been expecting something by her fidelity to the Allies. Venizelos bitterly criticized the American suggestion for the creation of a neutral corridor between Dedeagatch [Dedeğaç] and the Bulgarian frontier, with the object of giving Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea. Venizelos proposed, as an alternative, to constitute Dedeagatch a free port and in addition to this the railway up to the Bulgarian frontier, both being under the League of Nations.

Venizelos objected President Wilson's idea of claiming the Western Thrace as a part of the Mandatory Power for Constantinople, and told that there the Greek population was an equal number and if the Western Thrace was to be given to him, he was prepared to constitute it an autonomous province similar to the Czech-Slovakia and being aware of the existence of the Turkish population there he was also prepared to give every facility for the maintenance of the religious privileges. He further told that the latest decision of the Supreme Council that Greece was to occupy the Eastern Thrace in a military sense, while the Allies were to occupy Western Thrace was to cause some problems since there was a Greek battalion there, in Adrianople [Edirne] already. He said that if Bulgaria or Czech-Slovakia was in the place of Greece, they would not only have claimed Eastern and Western Thrace, but also

Constantinople which was not the case for Venizelos since he had not made such a demand. Venizelos also discussed his agreement with the Italians. Italy was willing to support the Greek claims in Western Thrace and in Epirus, and to cede to her the Dodecanese with the exception of Rhodes, which, however, Italy would undertake to cede if and when Britain should ever cede Cyprus to Greece, In return Greece had surrendered the Meander Valley to Italy and had agreed on the boundary between the Greek and Italian zones in Anatolia.<sup>295</sup>

It does not seem that Lloyd George argued with Venizelos on the terms of the Agreement of Greece with Italians, although by the resolutions of the Supreme Council Italians were at Anatolia against the wishes of the Powers and therefore any arrangement of Italians in delineating their zones or frontiers would be against the Supreme Council decisions.

Lloyd George was going to meet Venizelos again on the 31<sup>st</sup> of October in London to discuss the Greek position in Anatolia and overall policy of the Allies for the Ottoman Empire.<sup>296</sup> The meeting coincided to the time when it was almost certain that United States was not going to take the mandate for Turkey. Venizelos at the beginning of the meeting protested against the treatment of the Greeks by the Commission of the Investigation into the Smyrna atrocities. Greek representative, for some reason or other, was not allowed to participate, although he was going to be abstaining from deliberations of the Commission. The Commission had refused to allow the Greek representative to be present, or to communicate to him the evidences laid before the Commission, according to Venizelos this procedure adapted by the Commission was absolutely against the common principles of justice and law. Lloyd George agreed with Venizelos that any evidence found by the Commission should have been shown and discussed with the Greek representative.

Lloyd George told Venizelos of his conversation with Clemenceau in Paris that France wanted the predominant position in Constantinople to be exercised through a Consul General, together with a mandate for Turkey, subject to leaving the Italians a special sphere in the south of Anatolia. Venizelos as a good servant of Powers said that any policy adopted by France and Britain, Greece would be ready to accept, but he earnestly trusted that there was no question of the Greeks being

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<sup>295</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/12/4. In Lloyd George's memorandum of the Meeting, Western and Eastern Thrace was mixed up and Western was used instead of the Eastern.

<sup>296</sup> Ibid, "Note of an interview between the Prime Minister and M. Venizelos at 10, Downing Street, 31<sup>st</sup> October 1919".

turned out of Smyrna. Lloyd George assured Venizelos as far as he was concerned he considered that the Greeks should remain in the Smyrna region. Lloyd George also told that as far as the British was concerned they did not intend to be involved in Turkey but at the same time they did not agree with France for her to have a predominant position in Constantinople, especially in view of the fact that it carried with it the practical control of the Sultan who was the Caliph of Moslems throughout the Moslem world. Lloyd George believed that if the Americans were not prepared to undertake a mandate for Constantinople, which was appeared to be very improbable, then the Straits would have to be under an international control, probably with an American Chairman. Venizelos asked whether it was not possible to tackle the Turkish problem at an early date as the whole Eastern situation was rapidly becoming worse. Lloyd George, too, wanted to have a Supreme Council meeting soon and he called President Wilson if he could attend such a meeting. If the President would consider attending the meeting. Lloyd George stated that he would be prepared to delay the Conference until President could participate, otherwise he would call the meeting as soon as possible in London after the Italian and French elections.

Venizelos, then, discussed the issue of Thrace and told that if Constantinople was to be internationalized, the international authority to govern most of Thrace and this was most unfortunate for Greece. Venizelos tried to prove that throughout history, Thrace had always been considered Greek and even the Turkish statistics had shown that Greeks outnumbered Turks in Western Thrace. Venizelos believed that after making tremendous sacrifices for the War, for Greece apart from Smyrna none of her desires had been fulfilled and if he had to go back to Greece empty handed his political career would be finished and he would be considered a traitor to his country. Lloyd George told him that; *“He [Lloyd George] understood Venizelos’ position and that it was the policy of Great Britain to assist and support Greece, and especially M. Venizelos as a close and friendly ally”*<sup>297</sup> Lloyd George on the question of demobilization of the Greek Army, suggested that Greece, considering the unrest in the Middle-East, it was very undesirable to demobilize her Army than were absolutely necessary at the present time. Finally Lloyd George indicated that there were considerable political difficulties in Britain in the way of the transfer of the island, Cyprus, to Greece at the present time.<sup>298</sup> The request by Lloyd George of

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<sup>297</sup> Ibid.

<sup>298</sup> Ibid

demobilization of the Greek army was an indication to British desire of man power when it was needed.

The reason why Venizelos was in need of Lloyd George's help and backing for Smyrna based on the letter that he had received from Clemenceau. Venizelos seemed to be in constant worry that especially with the effect of the Smyrna Investigation Report he might be in a position of losing the Western Anatolia and especially Smyrna. The occupation of Smyrna by Greece was going to be debated whether it was on temporary or on permanent basis. Clemenceau in his reply to Venizelos's letter on 18<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1919 implied that military occupation of Smyrna by Greek forces was as far as the decision of the Supreme Council was concerned, on temporary basis pending for a decision of Peace for Turkey.<sup>299</sup> Venizelos, not being in agreement with the President of the Conference, Clemenceau, wrote to Sir Eyre Crowe on 20<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1919 to record the case of his own version of what happened at the time the decision was taken at the Supreme Council. According to Venizelos;

“When Mr. Lloyd George spoke to me first of the decision regarding the occupation, he made no mention whatever of its temporary character. And when I appeared before Mr. Lloyd George, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Wilson, in order to discuss matters relating to the carrying out of the occupation, again no mention was made of its being temporary. Only after the occupation had taken place and I appeared before the Supreme Council- M. Sonnino being present at this meeting as well- for the purpose of discussing the extent of the Greek occupation area, mention was made for the first time in that meeting of 'temporariness' concerning the extent rather than the nature of the occupation. I do not of course, infer that the occupation entrusted to Greece is equal to a definite recognition of her sovereignty over the occupied area. But I desire to state that when Greece was asked to proceed to this occupation, not only was there no mention made to me of its being temporary, but on the contrary, the very decision implied- though tacitly- that this occupation was the first step towards giving Greece part of Western Asia Minor.”<sup>300</sup>

Then Venizelos named Lloyd George as a witness for the truthfulness of his version of the events. But what Venizelos failed to recognize was the availability of even a better witness which was Sir Eyre Crowe who was soon going to become the Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Office. Sir Eyre Crowe wrote to Lord Curzon on 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1919 that the statement about the occupation of being temporary or permanent basis was taken by the French Secretariat without debating the issue in the Supreme Council, otherwise he would have interfered in the matter and he could have drawn the attention of the Council about the incorrectness of the statement. Sir Eyre Crowe further told Curzon that so far as he could gather from the records available, Venizelos' version was entirely correct. He further pointed out that the

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<sup>299</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/12/6.

<sup>300</sup> Ibid

warning as to the provisional nature of the Greek occupation having been given not at the time when Venizelos was invited to occupy Smyrna, but after he had carried the occupation.<sup>301</sup>

The views of Sir Eyre Crowe were going to contradict with the answer given to a question in the House of Commons on 10<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 for a Parliamentary question by a member, Kenworthy. He asked the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether it was intended to consult the wishes of the inhabitants of the proposed mandatory areas in Asia Minor. The question was answered by Harmsworth as he was not aware that any decision had been reached in Paris with regard to mandatory areas in Asia Minor and also he told that he did not know whether it was the intention of the Peace Conference to take any steps to consult the inhabitants of these areas directly, therefore indicating that President Wilson's Fourteen Points, especially 12<sup>th</sup> Point was not to be implemented for the Ottoman Empire although throughout the Peace Conference it was suggested that the Greeks were to occupy the regions where there was a vast majority of Greeks compared to Turks.<sup>302</sup>

British foreign policy towards Ottoman Empire and its dissolution was almost set although from time to time there had been some variations or add-ups in this policy. It was mainly based on to United States of America whether they would be taking the mandate of Armenia and Constantinople, even as an alternative, the whole Anatolia with the exception of the Western Anatolia which should go to Greece. The expectation for United States taking the mandates proceeded up to November 1919 until it became almost certain that Senate was not going to ratify the Treaty of Peace and therefore the mandates.

In the War Cabinet Meeting on 19<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1919, after discussing the Peace with Turkey, it was decided that there was no dispute that the best solution was one based on acceptance of a mandate for Constantinople and Armenia by the United States of America, although various alternatives were discussed to find another scheme in case that America declining a mandate which recent news from America had indicated as probable.<sup>303</sup> In order to overcome the misunderstanding of the decision taking at the War Cabinet on 19<sup>th</sup> of August, at the next meeting of the War

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<sup>301</sup> Ibid

<sup>302</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol. 117, Col. 1982.

<sup>303</sup> PRO, CAB 23/12, War Cabinet Meeting, 618.

Cabinet held on 20<sup>th</sup> of August, some amendments were made on the Minutes of the previous meeting, stressing on the best solution of the Turkish problem was one based on the acceptance by the U.S.A. of a mandate for Asia Minor as well as for Constantinople and Armenia. In the War Cabinet Meeting the question of Caliphate was also discussed. The Secretary of State for India, Montagu, said that he understood that to the Moslems it was necessary that the Caliph should have a sovereign power. He had seen a draft Treaty with Turkey which left the King of Hedjaz as the only independent sovereign. He was strongly of the opinion that in drawing up the mandates for Turkey, Britain had no desire or intention to force the King of Hedjaz as the only possible candidate and the War Cabinet approved Montagu's proposal and requested Curzon to take necessary action to give effect to it.<sup>304</sup>

Venizelos being successful stepping to the Anatolian soil turned his attention to his desires for Thrace. He wrote to Sir Eyre Crowe on 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 enclosing a Memorandum addressed to President Wilson. In his Memorandum, Venizelos by giving reference to the 'Greek Claims' on 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1918, tried to reply to the arguments brought by Bulgarians in their Memorandum to the Peace Conference. The Bulgarians claimed that number of deputies for the Ottoman Parliament representing Macedonia was seven Bulgarian and only four Greek. Therefore as they claimed the Bulgarian population was greater than the Greeks. Venizelos tried to show that analysis of elections in Macedonia from 1908 to 1912 had shown that this was untrue.<sup>305</sup>

The Greek occupation of Smyrna and the events followed the landing was alarming the British authorities in Constantinople, and in that respect Mr. C.D. Ussher from the 'American Committee for Relief in the Near East' complained to Balfour in his

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<sup>304</sup> Ibid, War Cabinet Meeting, 619.

<sup>305</sup> PRO, FO 608/274, E 14799, Memorandum of Venizelos, 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919, Paris. The letter sent to Sir Eyre Crowe on 4<sup>th</sup> of July 1919, was interesting to show another example of his ability to twist the events and understanding of concepts as it suited him. The problem of Greece in the Western Thrace was the distribution of the population and the insistence of United States to allocate a get away point for Bulgarians for a port on the Aegean Sea. Venizelos claimed the superiority of the Greek population over Bulgarians and Turks by the number of deputies that had been sent to the Ottoman Parliament and he made use of the definition of 'Millet' System as a basis of nationality rather than religious. He wrote that; "On the principle of self-determination, the Christian majority of the population of these two Vilayets [Monastir and Salonika, even before the introduction of the Constitution in Turkey, proclaimed themselves as belonging to the 'Roum Milleti', - that is to the 'Nation of the Roums', as the Greek race is officially called in Turkey- and afterwards they repeatedly sent to the Ottoman Chamber a Greek majority. Notwithstanding the above facts the Bulgarians, denying the right of self-determination, obstinately insist in classifying the Macedonian population on the basis of its alleged origin, disregarding and rejecting the principle of national consciousness as the chief characteristic of nationality."

letter of 15<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 that the psychological effect of the Smyrna incident was reacting in another way, and threatening very serious trouble. Mr. Ussher told that the Greeks were said to be extending their borders and they were arrogant, tactless and oppressive and he further wrote that the events might lead to an explosion any day. He told Balfour that to mention of boundaries of Armenia would be like waiving a red flag before a bull. Robert Vansittart commented on Mr. Ussher's remarks as that it had already been pointed out that events in Anatolia had given a new life to the C.U.P. and it would probably produce an uneasy expectancy whether Britain was or not going to allocate the Western Anatolia definitely under the Greeks. In any case Vansittart believed that they had not enough men for anything such as occupation. Sir Eyre Crowe commented that there was nothing new in Mr. Ussher's letter, implying that everything was in control for the Allies.

The events were proceeding beyond the Allies' expectation that even the Ottoman Government in Constantinople was going to complain to the Peace Conference about serious difficulties of administration arising from the delay of the Peace settlement, and the growing danger from the bands of Turks and refugees from the devastated areas. Grand Vizier Tewfik Pasha [Tevfik Pasa] urged the Conference to invite the Turkish Delegation for a speedy conclusion of peace. The British High Commissioner was also in full agreement with the proposal.

Robert Vansittart commented on 30<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1919 in regard to the request of the Grand Vizier that President Wilson would have to be told that the delay was making the situation worse. According to Vansittart it was 100 to 1 that America was going to take the Armenia mandate and it was very doubtful if Britain would gain anything by waiting indefinitely for America who was not at war with Turkey. In case America would not take a mandate, then Vansittart suggested that she should not be admitted to the settlement, which should proceed without her. The process of waiting for America, coupled with the madness of putting the Greeks into Smyrna was rapidly placing an eastern 'settlement' more out of reach. Vansittart was wondering if anything could be said by the Conference to the President or would it be impossible to try to hurry his 'cattle'. Vansittart was worried that Grand Vizier's complaint and regret was more than borne out of the British reports. Balfour was in the opinion that President was aware of the consequences of the delay, but as far as Britain was concerned they could not do anything in their direction.<sup>306</sup>

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<sup>306</sup> PRO, FO 608/112, E 18523

Britain, in case that America was not going to take a mandate in Turkey, was 'brain storming' on the 'Future of Turkey' and the centre of it was the new role of the Sultan and Constantinople. Adam Block who was the British representative at the Ottoman Debt Commission and was going to be in the in the Delegation for Lausanne Conference, on the request of Curzon, told his personal feelings concerning Turks and the 'Future of Turkey' with a letter to Curzon on 16<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1919. He made it clear that he had no sympathy for Turks and he believed that they were unfit to govern the alien races or even themselves, and must be placed under control. He drew attention to the mandates and discussed the Americans' view for the mandates in Turkey. According to Adam Block, Americans had begun to see that it was not only through Armenians that they could administer an Armenia, owing first to the majority of Moslems, Turks, and Kurds, in certain districts, and secondly owing to the fact that the latter were the fighting element in any newly constituted Armenia. Adam Block believed that Americans had understood that a separate Armenia would leave many Armenians and Greeks to the mercy of Turks, and therefore they might recommend a mandate for the whole Anatolia in general.

Adam Block believed that if the Sultan was forced to settle in Bursa [Bursa], there would be naturally an excuse and ground for agitation and consequently trouble in Anatolia. Adam Block was aware that it suited Britain to diminish the prestige of the Sultan and the Turk in the Moslem world, but that would be very dangerous and might lead to anarchy and bloodshed in Anatolia and the Mandatory Power might need a large army to suppress the nationalist movement. Then, Adam block suggested that in the case of keeping the Sultan in Constantinople as a puppet together with a Turkish Government under complete control, therefore they could make use of him for whatever prestige or authority to keep Anatolia in order. The Turks in Constantinople were harmless and the Sultan, Adam Block commented, did not think anything else but his 'sultanate' but still carried some weight in Anatolia. According to Adam Block if Turks had to leave Constantinople with 'bags and baggage', the task of assuring peace in Anatolia would be very difficult, people would be against the Powers but by leaving Sultan and the Government in Constantinople, they would be the hostages and at the mercy of the Mandatory Power.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>307</sup> Ibid, E 18166.

Similar resolutions were suggested by the Dragoman of the High Commission of Constantinople, Mr. Ryan in a reply to Forbes Adam on 26<sup>th</sup> of Nov.1919. Mr. Ryan considered that no part of Turkey should be left under uncontrolled Turkish rule and that if the Caliphate was to exist, the power with which the Caliphate was identified should never pass under the control of strong influence of any power other than Britain. Mr. Ryan, who was dealing with lots of intrigues in Turkey, suggested that it would be much better if Britain was to be named the mandatory power of Turkey comprising of most of Turkish Armenia and all Kurdistan not included in Syria and Mesopotamia! provided that the mandate carried real control. Ryan discussed three different alternatives; (a) to place Constantinople and Straits under an international state and Turkish state in Anatolia. (b) to give the Sultan-Caliph a kind of large Vatican in Constantinople, but to keep the Turkish state in Anatolia, with a town in Asia Minor as capital for administrative purposes. (c) to maintain a fraction of Turkish sovereignty in Constantinople and the Straits zone, and to let it continue to be the centre of Government for the Turkish state in Anatolia, in which Turkish sovereignty. Ryan believed that there were strong arguments for the 'bag and baggage' alternative that a strong resentment might start in Moslem world, and it might cause a complete knock out blow to Pan-Islamism. Ryan believed that since Islam was against the Western modernity and not compatible with the western culture, it might be better to finish political pan-Islamism once and for all.<sup>308</sup>

After the Armistice, Kurds living in the Eastern part of Anatolia were active in urging the Allies for forming a separate state and pleaded to Conference in several occasions. In September 1919, they were losing patience also because of Greater Armenia being a challenge for them in the long run. Kurdish desires somewhat was addressed by Sir Arthur Hirtzel, Assistant Under Secretary for the India Office, by submitting a Memorandum on 17<sup>th</sup> of August 1919, stating that although India Office was mainly interested in the Kurdish aspect of it, as directly affecting Mesopotamia, it was not possible to separate Kurdish issue from Armenian. The practical difficulty, according to Hirtzel, was the public opinion of the 'civilized world' who had been demanding a creation of an independent Armenian State. Sir Hirtzel then argued that in existing circumstances a contradiction of actual fact and of accepted principles of self-determination did not allow forming a 'Greater Armenia' because of numerical inferiority of Armenians everywhere. On the other hand He was arguing that if Turks were out then to form a State with Armenians and Kurds would be

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<sup>308</sup> Ibid, E 21087, PRO

possible. Sir Hirtzel based his scheme for the new Kurdish-Armenian State on the remark of Mahmud Bey, head of the Milli Kurds. Mahmud Bey had remarked that if a Kurdish Government was to be set up comprising of Armenia, then they could make use of Armenians in the Government since they were better educated compared to the Kurds. Sir Hirtzel was wondering whether it would be possible to persuade the world opinion to accept an independent Kurdistan under British, American or French mandate- preferably British. In that scheme Sir Hirtzel was considering to allocate special presentation and rights to be given to the Armenians.<sup>309</sup>

At the same time news was coming from High Commission in Constantinople that Intelligence Reports were indicating meetings between Turkish Government and Kurdish notables in Constantinople. The Report also mentioned the activities of pro-Kurdish attitude of Major Noel and how it was depreciated. High Commission was urging London to formulate a Kurdish policy urgently. It was also mentioned that Kurds were considered to be 'unreliable' and they had been in touch with some Kurds, such as Abdul Kadir, who seemed to be an important Kurdish leader and a member of the Ottoman Cabinet. British High Commission was very skeptical of

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<sup>309</sup> PRO, FO 608/95, 19025. Robert Vansittart discussed the Memorandum of Sir Hirtzel that they were slow in deciding the Armenian State and was crying out that it was too late to form a Greater Armenia and Sir Hirtzel's suggestion was also not practical. He wrote that; *"I have been urging that various measures should be taken which might have made a Greater Armenia possible. Not one of those measures has been taken, and now it is too late. I need not again go over the old ground. The long and short of it is that there are not going to be enough Armenians left. There are other reasons too. The unfortunate adventure at Smyrna has given the C.U.P. a new lease of life and has spread pan-Islamism like wildfire. The effects have reached the Kurds now. Our former influence has vanished: they are now mainly hostile and often murderous. The whole interior is like a furnace, and there is no force to put it out. To bring back and establish the Armenians i.e. to take even the first step towards to a greater Armenia, would require a very large armed force- I should say at least 80 000 men. No one has them to spare in Europe, and America almost certainly will not take the Armenia mandate (quite certainly she will not take it unless she gets Constantinople too, but there we don't want her). For no lack of sympathy, therefore and with great reluctance I say that a Greater Armenia will not be possible. It is not pleasant to think how the Armenians will have been disappointed and let down, but facts must be faced. If America is not willing to assume the expensive and now almost impossible Armenian task, we have no alternative policy. I don't think Sir A. Hirtzel's suggestion will do because we don't want, and probably can't afford, to take a Kurdistan mandate. It would be a very heavy job and a very thankless one. I don't believe that we want, or that the Government would allow us, to extend our responsibilities so far. But there seems no reason why Sir A. Hirtzel' suggestion should not be adopted in altered circumstances. France would probably also refuse unless she got Constantinople and Anatolia too, and that can not afford, and we could not possibly allow. If America refuses the Armenian mandate, there will probably be only one other solution- not a good one, a [...] perhaps, the only possible one: a lesser Armenia and for the rest 'condominium' policy as originally recommended for Asia Minor. Special arrangements can be made to adopt it for extension somewhat further east. It is still the least objectionable policy, though it will fully satisfy nobody. That however is unattainable now, even if it had ever been possible. And there is no reason why it should not work decently if the various departments are sufficiently controlled. I think the above is the real answer to this dispatch. It is sad to have to recognize that a greater Armenia is passing out of the bounds of possibility but the signs have been multiplying in the last months."* Sir Eyre commented on Sir Hirtzel's Memorandum and Vansittart's views that; *"Mr. Balfour has now left, and I see no advantage in our offering, from here, comment on Sir Hirtzel's scheme. We have better send no answer, at least for the present."*

Major Noel, especially after the Malatya incident and thought of Major Noel as a 'fanatic' and criticized him as Colonel Lawrence of Kurds.<sup>310</sup>

Kurdish appeal to Britain was initiated through Serif Pasha, who claimed himself as the Leader of the Kurds after resigning from the Ottoman Army and settled in Paris during Peace Conference, and through Abdul Kadir who got in touch with British in Constantinople as a Leader and spokesman of the 'Kurdistan Committee'. In a conversation with Admiral Carlthorpe as early as January 1919, they requested Britain to consider their claims as an independent state and asked for permission to send representatives to Peace Conference. The Committee was claiming that similar to Armenians they also had grievances against Turkey and they wanted the Conference to adjust the relations with Armenians and Kurds. Toynbee noted the British policy towards Kurds, such that Britain was proposing to give the Kurds two things; an independent Kurdish Confederation of South Kurdistan and equal rights for Kurds and all other nationalities in the new Armenia. Toynbee continued that it was geographically impossible to create a state containing all Kurds, since it would have to include non Kurdish population of superior civilization, and would violate the integrity of Persia.<sup>311</sup> The important thing for Toynbee was the integrity for Persia because of the interests of Britain due to Oil and erecting the Greater Armenia.

Serif Pasha's application on 14<sup>th</sup> of February for an independent state based upon the necessity of providing summer and winter pasture for sheep, since sheep was the principal source of trade for Kurds. Serif Pasha also claimed that it would be beneficial for Britain to use Kurds as a buffer state against Bolshevism. Toynbee's comment for Serif Pasha's claim was not promising for the Kurds. Toynbee believed that the claim for a Pan-Kurdish State, including not only Persian Kurdistan but most of Armenia was absurd.<sup>312</sup> Serif Pasha wrote to Sir Louis Mallet on 23<sup>rd</sup> of Feb. 1919, for the prospective Kurdish State and drew boundary lines. According to Toynbee, the frontier proposed between Kurdistan and Armenia approximately corresponded to the American Delegation's line, except that it went to the left bank of the Eastern Euphrates and Euphrates instead of stopping at the Tigris watershed, and therefore included in Kurdistan Kharput [Harput] and the Arghana [Ergani] mines. Serif Pasha was trying to link the Persian Kurds with the Ottoman Kurds, therefore trying to group all Kurds into one state. Uniting all Kurds was not in

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<sup>310</sup> Ibid, E18057, Mr. Hohler's letter to the Foreign Office (written to Tilley), 21<sup>st</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>311</sup> PRO, FO 608/95, E 748, Toynbee's 'note', 27<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1919.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid, E 2079.

accordance with the British Policy since Britain had been trying to prevent Persian Kurds joining the new Kurdish Federation on the Ottoman side of the parties.<sup>313</sup>

Serif Pasha came to Paris to discuss the Kurdistan issue with the British Delegation, but British authorities were starting wondering whether Serif Pasha was representing the Kurdish people. Abdul Kadir in Constantinople seemed to convince Admiral Calthorpe that he was the real representative of the Kurds.

Abdul Kadir declared that Kurd Committee stood for autonomous Kurdistan under the British protection. Kurds seemed to be anxious to be quit of Turks, but not to be ruled by Armenians.<sup>314</sup> The problem was the areas claimed by Kurds were contradicting the British and Armenian desires. Toynbee was thinking that if Britain was to take the Diarbekir [Diyarbakir] district into Mesopotamia, the great bulk of the Ottoman Kurds would be concentrated in Mesopotamia and the Kurdish problem in Armenia would be manageable, and therefore the only group, Dersimlis would be remaining in Armenia and there would not cause any problems since they had good relations with Armenians. But as it stood then there was going to be a smaller Armenia in the North and North-East, and if the French was going to have a mandate in Cilicia which would cover Kharput, Diarbekir and Dersim, and in that case the Kurds would be divided between three states, Mesopotamia, Cilicia and Persia.

The conflict in the desires of Armenia and Kurds was going to anger the Kurds. The Committee for Independence of Kurdistan sent a telegram to British Delegation in Paris on 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1919, stating their intention to yield their independence neither to Persian nor to Hejaz Kingdom. As a follow up they were threatening complete massacre of Armenians should Allies endeavour to establish independent Armenian State in the territory which was formerly comprised 7 vilayets of the Ottoman Empire.<sup>315</sup>

Greeks landing at Smyrna coincided with the unrest in the Kurdish area. Colonel Wilson from Baghdad Office was appointed for the responsibility of the area and Major Noel's mission to the Kurds in close coordination with the High Commission in Constantinople contributed in building a Kurdish policy of Britain.

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<sup>313</sup> Ibid, E 2854.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid, E 8307.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid, E 8853.

The situation in Kurdish areas was getting so tense that Britain was busy in trying to find a solution for the unrest in the Eastern provinces of Ottoman Empire. Admiral Webb from High Commission in Constantinople was in favour of meeting Kurdish desires, and believed that the important Kurdish chiefs would withdraw allegiance to Turks if guaranteed against Armenian domination and he drew the attention of the Foreign Office that if the desires of Kurds were not to be fulfilled then there would be a danger of the Kurds joining the Turks to save the Turkish Empire.<sup>316</sup>

To remedy the situation, the Foreign Office was considering that the best solution for both Kurds and Armenians and possibly not for Britain was to push up the northern boundary of Mesopotamia so as to include the whole of Kurdistan in Mesopotamia. This was what the Americans were proposing and since Britain was going to get the mandate of Mesopotamia, she would be adding to her responsibilities, but with this scheme Kurds and Armenians would be better off.<sup>317</sup>

Baghdad Office suggested boundaries for area to be recognized as predominantly Kurdish. It was believed that Kurds could not possibly be united except under a strong foreign administration and that British were more likely to be accepted than any other Power. Baghdad Office was suggesting that Trebizond [Trabzon], Erzeroum [Erzurum] vilayets should form a single Armenian State under American auspices and the remaining vilayets to form a Kurdish State under British auspices. The only alternative appeared was the re-establishment of Turkey over all six vilayets.

While Baghdad Office was suggesting British and American spheres in the Eastern provinces, Chiefs of the Milli Kurds were thinking different future for the Kurds. General idea amongst Kurds was for Princedom of Kurdistan which should be established under foreign mandatory with limited powers. It was proposed that governing classes would be chiefly Kurdish and tribal system would be the basis of Government and for Princedom there were two candidates Mahmud Bey and Abd El Rizaq Bedr Khan Bey.<sup>318</sup>

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<sup>316</sup> Ibid, E 12306.

<sup>317</sup> Ibid, E 12306, Forbes Adam's note, 12<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

<sup>318</sup> Ibid, E 14677.

Serif Pasha applied to Balfour on 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 and after reviewing the recent events and disturbances among Kurds, urged for establishment of central independent Government in Kurdistan assisted by Britain.<sup>319</sup> Forbes Adam in Paris commented on Serif Pasha's plea that; the Foreign Office was dealing with the Kurdish question through Constantinople Baghdad and Cairo so far as the actual troubles in Kurdistan were concerned. It deemed impossible to consider the future of Kurdistan until the question of Armenia and the mandate for Armenia was settled and the questions concerning boundaries was discussed by the Conference. Forbes Adam did not see any useful purpose by discussing with Serif Pasha until the Conference again took up the question of Turkish settlement which was postponed until America reached a decision regarding mandates. Robert Vansittart agreed with Adam that there was no point of seeing Serif Pasha and sending a team to Kurdistan to survey the people's wishes. He thought that Britain ought to realize that events were steadily taking a turn that would make it very difficult to set up Armenia that Armenians desired. It would be very difficult even if America took the mandate. It would probably, Vansittart considered, prove quite impossible if she didn't. Vansittart thought that it was an unpleasant fact to face, but he doubted whether enough Armenians survived the coming winter to make such a state 'viable' in any case that was whether America accepted or not. Vansittart was thinking that Britain's decision to withdraw from Caucasus was likely to cause anarchy in which the Armenians as the weakest would go under; therefore he proposed that they had to look at the Kurdish question in a different light.<sup>320</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe commented on Adam's and Vansittart's views that these considerations were only too true. These points were vigorously pointed out to the Americans by P.H. Kerr.<sup>321</sup>

In November 1919, Kurdish and Armenian representatives had several meetings to discuss the boundaries for their future States and jointly wrote to the President of the Peace Conference, stating that the Kurdish and Armenian peoples were in complete agreement regarding their demand for independence, and they further declared that as for contested territories, decision was left to Peace Conference to take.<sup>322</sup>

Britain was going to be involved in the Kurdish affairs even more after the refusal of the Americans for a mandate for Armenia. During the meetings of Peace

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<sup>319</sup> Ibid, E 16585.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid, Robert Vansittart's note, 30<sup>th</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, Sir Eyre Crowe, 31<sup>st</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid, E 20747.

Conference in London and later in San Remo the Kurdish and Armenian issues were going to be tackled by the Allies and were going to be finalized with the Sevres Treaty for the time being.

While the Eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire were in turmoil as a result of indecisive attitude of the Allies to meet the desires for Kurdistan and Armenia, the situation in Syria was becoming an arena for the conflicts between France, Britain and Arabs, and the condition in Cilicia was not better. After the news that Britain was evacuating Cilicia and French moving in, the local population started getting organized to protest against the French occupation. The Western part of the Empire was even tenser, the local incidents which were analyzed by the Smyrna Investigation Commission were in a state that each member of the Allies refused to publish the Commission's Report. It was beyond their acceptance, Greek invasion had brought agony and terror instead of peace in this part of the world. As far as Britain was concerned, to minimize the expenditure she had to decide to call their armies from Cilicia, Syria and Caucasus but with some doubts. The decision of the Cabinet brought some uncertainties to the future of these areas and for the future desires of Britain. Britain constantly had been declaring his disinterestedness in Asia Minor, but at the same time she was not in favour of French settlement in this area. For Britain, the best choice was for United States of America to have the responsibility for the burden in Anatolia but at the same time to be able to control the events there.

The news coming from Constantinople was not encouraging either. The Nationalist movement, especially after Mustafa Kemal's landing at Samsun, was becoming more organized and started attracting more support from the Turkish people. Although the Draft for the Turkish Treaty was almost ready as far as British interests were concerned, the boundaries of the 'new states' and mandatory clauses were in need to be filled up, and for this the decision of the America was required. The atmosphere in America was not encouraging for Britain; she seemed to be moving away from taking the mandates in Asia Minor. After the Greek landing, Venizelos' attitude was not so much welcomed at least by some of the Government officials, especially in Constantinople, Foreign Office and in General Staff circles, not because of being in favour of Turks and the partition of Ottoman Empire, but they were getting worried that the events were proceeding beyond their control.<sup>323</sup> The

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<sup>323</sup> PRO, FO 608/112, British Delegation's note. It is interesting to note Sir Louis Mallet's out crying at the Foreign Office in regard to the Greek advance in Anatolia. Regardless to the decision taking for

Foreign Office accepted the fact that since the Greeks were already in Smyrna, therefore they should be supported. At the beginning of July 1919, according to British Military Intelligence, There were 3 Greek Divisions and one Infantry Regiment for the Smyrna area, whereas the total native strength of the surviving Ottoman Army was 43,196, and that army was scattered over the whole of the Turkish Empire. The average rifle of a Greek Division was 11 000, therefore 2 Greek Divisions were equal in rifle strength to the rifle strength of the whole Turkish Army. There were, therefore no military justification for British troops to assist the Greek troops in the area.<sup>324</sup> General Thwaites from British Delegation had finalized the issue that any operation by British troops in the Smyrna region was entirely out of question. General Thwaites further told that there was no reason for any military operation in the direction as suggested by the Greeks.<sup>325</sup> Robert Vansittart commented on the issue that the Greeks had already made one attempt to overstep the sphere allotted to them, and had been called to order. Vansittart further commented that the Greek's attempt to widen his occupation zone, should not be allowed and he believed that the allocated area for Venizelos was already too wide and the attempted extensions were bound to be disastrous all round, and above all for Greece herself. Vansittart was also against the idea of sending British troops for assisting Greeks since it was not necessary from military point of view and also not even thinkable as sound politics for Britain.<sup>326</sup> What was important there was the application of Venizelos to be able to use British troops for his own desires by giving his usual excuse of being in danger of Turks and a probable massacre. Greeks were advancing in Aidin Vilayet and the Turks as Calthorpe wrote "*whilst received with outward tranquility, is causing them deeper and deeper resentment, and the very calm of the surface only increases my uneasiness*"<sup>327</sup> Greeks were also using the departure of Commodore Fitz Maurice, the Senior Naval Officer in Smyrna who was known as the person against the Greek occupation outside of the determined zone

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allowing the Greek landing at Smyrna, Mallet believed that Venizelos should be supported otherwise the CUP's strengthening might cause events that could not be controlled. He wrote that; "*...Until the Allies are all agree upon the terms of Peace to be imposed on Turkey and upon the military measures which will be necessary to enforce them, it will presumably be prudent to avoid all unnecessary complications [?]. But as the Greeks have been permitted to land at Smyrna, we can not afford to let them down, as there is nothing which would give greater encouragement to the C.U.P. It would however be only right to consult the High Commission and authorities on the spot, as to the extent to which Mr. Venizelos requirements would be met and thus would be done without delay, as he has authorized the advance of the Greek troops which may lead to opposition from the S.N.O. [Senior Naval Officer]*"

<sup>324</sup> Ibid, General Staff's Representative's Note in the British Delegation, 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>325</sup> Ibid, General Thwaites' Note, 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 1919.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid, Robert Vansittart's Note 3<sup>rd</sup> of July 1919. The insistence of Venizelos to act without the authority of Supreme Council. Venizelos in his application to the president of Council gave his reasoning as having the Greek troops and Greek population in Western Anatolia in danger because of accumulation of Turkish Forces under the command of Youssouf Izzet Pasha.

<sup>327</sup> Ibid, E 15968, Calthorpe's letter to Foreign Office (addressed to Curzon), 6<sup>th</sup> June 1919.

of the Council, for their own usage. The Greeks were spreading rumors that he had been replaced owing to his opposition to Venizelos' orders in the occupation of Nazli by the Greek troops.<sup>328</sup>

Meanwhile Lloyd George was occupied with internal events, such as the housing, coal miners and railway strikes and developments in Russia during July-October 1919. The policy towards the Ottoman Empire was 'on hold' pending the decision of the United States of America for mandates. Towards to the end of October 1919, the decision of America was almost felt that she was not going to take any responsibility in Asia Minor. In the Conference of Ministers on 31<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1919, a short discussion took place regarding to desirability of considering Turkish situation and Lloyd George pointed out that it was becoming clear that the United States of America would not be prepared to accept a mandate and therefore the whole situation should be considered by the Cabinet at an early date. At the Meeting, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was given the task to prepare a memorandum by considering the latest developments in Turkey.<sup>329</sup> Meanwhile petitions were pouring to the Cabinet members for the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire. On 10<sup>th</sup> of September 1919, an open letter appeared in The Times, asking Lloyd George to save the last independent Moslem State. The letter, signed by the British subjects, reminded of the speech of Prime Minister on 5<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918 that Britain was not aiming to deprive Turkey from her lands, and therefore Lloyd George was asked to fulfill this promise. Another issue within the Turkish Treaty was the Syrian problem which contributed a tension between Britain and France. For the preparation of Clemenceau - Lloyd George meeting in London on 11<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1919, M. Loucheur, who was Minister of industrial re-construction and Chief Economical Advisor to Clemenceau, visited London and held meetings with Lloyd George and Churchill on 3<sup>rd</sup> of Dec. 1919. The French press, lately had been attacking the British Government, particularly in relation to Syria, and accusing them of all kinds of bad faith. Loucheur admitted that the relations of the two countries were not at all that could be desired and said one of the reasons why he had come to London was to prepare the way for improvement. Loucheur further stated that as far as France was concerned, they were proposing Turks to stay in Constantinople and place the Straits under the Anglo-French control administratively and militarily, therefore the whole Straits would be run as an Anglo-French concern. Similarly France was

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<sup>328</sup> Ibid, Calthorpe's letter Foreign Office (addressed to Curzon), 6<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1919.

<sup>329</sup> PRO, CAB 23/37 (S-Series; S-1), Conclusion of a Conference held at 10, Downing St., October 31<sup>st</sup>, 1919.

proposing an Anglo-French Board to run the Turkish railways. Bearing in mind the Italian interests, France was also proposing to operate Heraclea Coal district by Anglo-French organization but giving the priority to Italians to purchase the products of the mines. Loucheur told that personally he was against France staying in Cilicia, and he was thinking the best way to safeguard the Armenians was to place a British or French Officer to Turkish Vali and high officials.

Lloyd George after hearing the French plan for the Ottoman Empire told that Britain desired the mandate for Mesopotamia and Palestine. He emphasized on the great importance of good relations between the two countries and hoped that no quarrel should arise with regard to these regions. Britain desired that France should come to terms with the Arabs, but they should do this without enabling the Arabs to say that they had been deserted by Britain. Another problem area with France was the boundary between Palestine and Syria. Lloyd George commented that Palestine should be extended to enclave Dan and Beeshava, but he was ready to submit it to arbitration by someone nominated by President Wilson. He stressed the importance of usage of Jordanian waters for Palestine. With regard to Mesopotamia, Lloyd George stated that Britain wanted a pipe line and a railway connecting Mosul with Haifa. Lloyd George further urged the French side to come to London with Italians to finalize the Turkish issue.<sup>330</sup>

The French issues were debated at a Conference of Ministers on 10<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1919, prior to the visit of Clemenceau. Bonar Law, Balfour who was the new Lord President of the Council, Curzon who became the new Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs, Montagu, Churchill and Fisher, the President of the Board of Education along with Philipp Kerr attended the meeting. It was agreed that invitations should be extended to the American and Italian Ambassadors when the questions of Adriatic and Turkey were discussed during the Conference to be held in the next few days. The topics for discussion with French was drawn as the attitude of French press, which was inspired by Quai d'Orsay, the situation in Morocco, since French were trying to turn Tangier into a French Naval Possession and guarantee of the integrity of French soil. As regards to the Ottoman Empire, the questions to be discussed were; whether Constantinople was to be left to Turks and if not what would be the administration needed to be set up there. French had recently changed their attitude at first they had wanted to take over the administration of

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<sup>330</sup> PRO, CAB 23/35 (S-Series; S-2), Note of a Conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Loucheur at a Luncheon at 10, Downing Street, 3<sup>rd</sup> December, 1919.

Constantinople. After America's withdrawal from mandatory for the region, French had changed their plans again, such that as M. Loucheur pointed out they were proposing an Anglo-French administration with an Anglo-French Police Force. Curzon pointed out that such a scheme in Constantinople was bound to produce friction between France and Britain and in his opinion they should eventually clear with disgust. Curzon furthermore stated that he was in favour of an International Commission administering Constantinople and the Straits and if it were necessary to make concessions to Moslems, he could transfer the capital of Turkey to Asia Minor and leave the Sultan in a 'Vatican' on the Straits. Curzon summarized two further proposals; one was to have definite spheres of economic control on the French, Italians and Greeks and the other proposal was to have one power to control the gendarmerie and another power the customs and so on. Balfour proposed that the Greeks should have Smyrna and the Italians to be granted prior economic concessions in the area allotted to them under Sykes-Picot Agreement.

Balfour did not think it was necessary to work out the details of this at present. He believed that they wanted a free passage for their goods and also they had obtained enormous fortune in Mesopotamia and at the same time Italians were receiving so little. Balfour was suggesting to stick to Agreement 1916 roughly which gave Mesopotamia to Britain, Cilicia and Syria to French and South Asia Minor to the Italians and his own view was that the Italians would accept such less than they were entitled to claim.

Montagu stated that much depended upon the way in which the negotiations were conducted. He suggested that, in granting concessions they should be careful not to give the impression that they were portioning Asia Minor among the Allies. He continued with the scheme for Constantinople. He said that if it was intended to throw Turks out of Constantinople, he did not think the 'Vatican' solution was any real solution as far as Moslem sentiments were concerned, since Moslems were claiming sovereignty, whether it was titular or shadowy, of Constantinople. He agreed with Curzon that the International Commission scheme was the solution but with a difference that the Commission to administer Constantinople and Straits in the Sultan's name. Montagu asked what would be the policy for Adrianople, another delicate issue for the Moslems, since in some areas especially north of the Straits Turks were in majority. He agreed entirely with Balfour about Italy, and he did not quarrel with the suggestion that the Greeks should be given Smyrna and also with

Curzon about the internationalization of the Straits so long as the titular sovereignty of Constantinople remained with the Turks.

Winston Churchill, Secretary of State of War commented that any solution was better than no solution and he believed that since the United States was out, the matter was simplified. Churchill thought that Britain and France could reach agreement with a fair recognition of Italian claims. He believed that although Britain controlled Straits, but a large territory lying outside in Anatolia was not. He was frightened that this area could experience Bolshevik penetration which would imperil British interests in the Middle East. Churchill believed that it was vital for their interests to come to an agreement with France.

Mr. Fisher was in favour in Balfour's suggestion for South Asia Minor to be designated to Italy, but as regards North Asia Minor and Armenia he recalled the sentiments of British people and therefore they had to show that they had taken necessary precautions to ensure the protection of Armenia. For Constantinople and Straits he favoured an International Commission to control the Straits and to exercise effective control over Constantinople, with the Sultan in nominal control.

Curzon restated his belief that if the French remained in Asia Minor, then it would be their responsibility to look after Armenians on the coast and in the strip connecting with Russian Armenia, near Erivan. Curzon further pointed out another alternative which was forwarded by Lord Bryce that if they could persuade some great or small Power to take charge of Armenia, then United States would supply the necessary funds, although they might shrink from political responsibility. Curzon did not agree with Fisher as regards to British people's sentiments towards Armenians. He did not believe that there was any serious or lasting sentiment in Britain.

Balfour still believed that they could not ignore Italians and an agreement between France and Britain wouldn't be sufficient to settle Asia Minor issue. He suggested that Prime Minister to tell Clemenceau that an Inter-Allied meeting should be held somewhere such as in Brussels with a bigger scope. He was inclined to agree with Curzon that Constantinople was not a part of the Moslem religion, but only of Moslem sentiment. In Agreement he hoped it might be possible to exhibit Italy at any rate nominally, on equal terms with France and he further stressed the point that some agreement with Clemenceau was really desired.

Bonar Law agreeing with Balfour as regards to Italians, commented that they ought first to come to some agreement with Clemenceau, and then bring in the Italians. He recalled the impact that Aga Khan and Lord Sinha attracted in Paris for the Moslem sentiments and he saw no object in taking Constantinople and handing it to an International control. He believed they could achieve their goal by setting an International Commission working with a titular sovereign State in Constantinople.

After listening his colleagues, Lloyd George stated that to control the Straits, he thought, about 30,000 international troops would be required. According to Lloyd George it was undesirable that the Sultan should not have anything more than a handful of guards himself. The question Lloyd George paused was the Sultan going to be like the Khedive in Egypt or was he to be independent, like the Shah of Persia? He believed that the latter alternative was dangerous. He further said that although, as Mr. Montagu had said, the population in northwards towards Adrianople was mainly Turkish, the people outside of Constantinople proper were overwhelmingly Greek. He thought that they should treat the Sultan as another Khedive, and keep him in Constantinople.

Curzon disagreed with Lloyd George that if they were to leave the Sultan in Constantinople, the Moslem world would never believe that he was defeated and still would be the centre of attraction and of troubles. He said that he thought they were shaping the future of Constantinople, not from the point of India, but of the future of the world.

Bonar Law disagreed with Curzon that, they were making their analysis from the point of British interests, and how it affected the British Empire, and further he believed that if they treated Turks well, no doubt it would benefit British in India, Mesopotamia and in Egypt.

Lloyd George believed that they should consider the practical aspects of the proposals and further pointed out that leaving Sultan and naturally his Ministers in Constantinople with few guards only, would make him a figure head only and open to intrigues of French and Italians. In order to overcome the problem, he thought it would be better to have a Turkish State and the Capital being Brusa or somewhere in Anatolia. Lloyd George also drew the attention that if the Sultan was to stay in Constantinople, then Turks would be guarding the Straits instead of the International Commission. He further stated that besides in Constantinople, Turks were in

minority and even more in the suburbs. On this point, Montage challenged the Prime Minister that whether he would allow having a plebiscite in Thrace, similar to the plebiscite in Poland. Lloyd George answered that the cases were rather different, and since Constantinople was at the door step to Europe, therefore should be internationalized. Montagu stated that the proposed solution was against the wishes of India and that should be recorded and further told that it would be impossible to use Indian troops to enforce a peace of this kind.

However Bonar Law expressed his wishes that the will of Turkish people should be taken into consideration. Churchill commented that the Conference brought certain resolutions, such that “(a) *That Constantinople should be internationalized: (b) That the Sultan reside there as a titular head: (c) That the government of Turkey should be exercised from Brusa, where the Sultan’s Ministers would be, with Allied Commissioners would be, with Allied Commissioners to advice them.*”<sup>331</sup> Lloyd George agreeing with Churchill told that in this way the Yildiz Kiosk would be the Sultan’s Vatican and Fisher was the other minister agreeing with Churchill’s proposal. Montagu not being happy with the suggestions, intervened to draw his objection if the Government was to be formed in Brusa, in the name of the Sultan, who would have power to reside in Constantinople. He further asked about the future of Adrianople. Curzon answered that it had been proposed in Paris that there should be an international state to be erected there and with regard to Montagu’s insistence about the sentiments of India, he had known Indian Officials who were in favour of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and throwing Turks out of Constantinople. Churchill drew the danger of letting the Sultan to be in Brusa, where he would gradually get people such as Mustafa Kemal, Enver, Trotsky and others who would help him build up a hostile force to cause troubles in Asia Minor and in the Middle East, therefore it would be wise to keep him in Constantinople. Churchill told that he was quite prepared to accept anything that was agreed by Lloyd George and Clemenceau.

Curzon summarized the fundamental topics to be discussed with Clemenceau as; General Policy in Russia, Asia Minor and the question of Mandates and lastly the question of Turks whether they would be allowed to stay at Constantinople or outside. As a final point for the Conference to discuss these issues, it was decided to ask for a Conference to be held in London. Fisher at the end of the meeting

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<sup>331</sup> PRO, CAB 23/44-Part II, (S-Series: S-4), and CAB 21/203, Notes of a Meeting held at 10, Downing Street, December 10<sup>th</sup>, 1919.

wondered that at the meeting it was generally agreed, except for a difference of opinion as to the extent of the nominal power to be vested in the Sultan. To this Curzon answered that he was in the opinion that it had been agreed that the Sultan should live in Brussa, with power to cross to the Royal Residences in Constantinople when he desired.<sup>332</sup> This last remark was going to be deleted from the Minutes after Montagu's initiation.<sup>333</sup>

Clemenceau arrived at London on 11<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1919 and proceeded to a meeting with Lloyd George. Clemenceau seemed to be rather relieved that United States had practically dropped out and further told that. He was anticipating a revolution in Italy as there was no-one in Italy with sufficient authority at all and thought that Italy would drop out of the Alliance. Lloyd George complained about the French press attacks on Britain recently and Clemenceau's response was that it was due to Poincare who was behind the Quai d'Orsay. According to Lloyd George, Clemenceau appeared to be satisfied about Syria and Cilicia and had an understanding with Feisal. For Armenia he told that he was not so worried any further. For the future of the Ottoman Empire, Lloyd George had the impression that Clemenceau did not care whether the Sultan was allowed to remain in Constantinople or not, but he told that he preferred for the Sultan to stay there with a joint Anglo-French control of the Turkish Empire. On this point Montagu intervened that probably Clemenceau wanted Britain to take the responsibility of turning the Sultan out of Constantinople. Lloyd George told in the Conference of Ministers that Clemenceau was more concerned in economical concessions and was also in favour of turning the Greeks out of Smyrna and to give Thrace instead. He also thought that the Italians would not leave Anatolia as long as the Greeks were there. Lloyd George had the impression that Clemenceau would prefer in giving some economical concessions to the Italians.<sup>334</sup>

The extracts of the Meeting between Clemenceau and Lloyd George at which Berthelot and Curzon joined later, shows the policy of France and Lloyd George at the time when there was no possibility of American involvement for Turkey were not very apart.. The Meeting probably in the afternoon session on 11<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1919 started with discussing on the future of Turkey. Clemenceau based his policy on

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<sup>332</sup> Ibid

<sup>333</sup> Ibid. Curzon's last remark on the Sultan's residing in Brusa but with a power crossing to Constantinople, was deleted after disagreement of Montagu that such a remark had not been made and with Curzon's approval. (Montagu's letter to Hankey on 16<sup>th</sup> December, and Curzon's hand-written letter on 19<sup>th</sup> December to the Secretariat).

<sup>334</sup> CAB 21/203, PRO

governing Turkey through the Sultan and if the Sultan was to govern in their interest, the more responsibility they should give to him. Clemenceau believed that it would be easier to govern through the Sultan as an intermediary and therefore it would be better to leave him in Constantinople. He believed that to remove him and send to Brusa would cause difficulties. Lloyd George told Clemenceau that he had discussed this issue with his colleagues and there were some objections on the grounds that if the Sultan stayed in Constantinople it would be difficult to place the Straits under the international control which should be maintained at all cost. The Straits would not produce sufficient revenues to cover the cost of the troops. For military infrastructure Lloyd George was thinking French, British, Italian and probably Greek troops to be included. Therefore Lloyd George told that they should include Constantinople along with the Straits under an International set-up where French and British would have the major responsibility. With the Sultan's presence and no doubt his ministers would be there too, there would be always a possibility of intrigues. They would attempt to divide Allies and playing one off against the other, and there was also possibility of playing with Germans and even Russians against Allies. Another reason why he was against the Sultan, staying in Constantinople that it would not be possible to govern the Asia Minor from there and Allied requests might not be met in Asia Minor with a weak Sultan. In this case Lloyd George believed that it would be difficult for France and also for Britain to send armies to Anatolia to control the resentment. Lloyd George told that there was another alternative and if he was not mistaken brought to his attention by Venizelos which was setting a Vatican type of administration for the Sultan in Constantinople at Yildiz Palace and the government being in Brussa, but he did not like the idea for the Sultan staying there with a half a million Turks around in the city. Curzon suggested that leaving the Sultan in Constantinople would create difficulties in future since he had been foreseeing a nationalistic movement taking shape. He said that the future policy of Turks would be the policy of CPU in a more advanced form, since some indications of their probable policy had been furnished by Mustapha Kemal, who was the principal exponent of it at the present time. He further told that if such a policy was to be around the Sultan in Constantinople they would definitely like to go back to their past golden days. Curzon pointed out that if the Sultan stayed in Constantinople, Turks living in the north in Adrianople would try to unite with the Sultan which would produce trouble.

Clemenceau believed that every alternative or proposal had its drawbacks, what he thought to do was to eliminate any possible friction which might arise between

France and Britain. Clemenceau was not so much in favour of creating another 'pope' since one was more than enough, and he believed that together they could work out something such as an Allied European set up to control both Constantinople-Straits and also Anatolia and the Turkish Government would be either at Constantinople or at Brussa but under International organization and Italy would have to be included in this scheme. Lloyd George said that he himself had leaned sometimes in one direction and sometimes in another as regards Constantinople. Both Leaders decided that Curzon and Berthelot, Political Director of French Foreign Office, should come together to propose a model for Constantinople and for Asia Minor as soon as possible.<sup>335</sup>

Announcement for the 'Conferences of the Allied and Associated Powers and of the British and French Governments held at 19, Downing Street on 11<sup>th</sup> to 13<sup>th</sup> of December 1919' was made after the Cabinet Meeting on 15<sup>th</sup> December in the Parliament. The related part for the Ottoman Empire was; "(3) *the principles of the treaty of Peace with Turkey shall be first discussed between the heads of Governments before the Conference meets to consider the necessary treaties*"<sup>336</sup> and a resolution that Lord Curzon and M. Berthelot were given the task to examine various questions and prepare alternative drafts for consideration.<sup>337</sup>

Berthelot submitted a Memorandum on 12<sup>th</sup> of December for the future of Turkey. To discuss the Berthelot's Memorandum and two other Memorandums on the same subject by Curzon and Montagu, a Conference of Ministers was held, chaired by Lloyd George, on 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1920<sup>338</sup>. General agreement was that the Berthelot's Memorandum was based on four principles; Turkish militarism should be crushed, the Straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea should be entrusted to an international organization to secure a free passage, the Armenians should be freed from Turkish domination and the Arab and Syrian populations should not be handed back to Turks.<sup>339</sup> It was generally criticized that in the Meeting with Clemenceau it had been decided that Curzon and Berthelot together were to prepare alternative plans, but the Memorandum before the Conference revealed only one plan which was to turn the Turks out of Constantinople and further the Caliph was not even to

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<sup>335</sup> Ibid

<sup>336</sup> PRO, CAB 23/18, The Conference of the Allied and the Associated Powers Report was attached to the the Cabinet Meeting 14(19) as Appendix 1. The Conclusions of Meeting of the Cabinet (14(19)) held at 10, Downing Street, December 15, 1919.

<sup>337</sup> Ibid. The Conference was held with the representatives of Britain, France, Italy, United States of America and Japan.

<sup>338</sup> PRO CAB 23/37 (Conference of Ministers No. 8).

<sup>339</sup> Ibid, Conference of Ministers No.18.

be granted a residence in Constantinople. The Memorandum further did not take into suggestions which had been put forward by Montagu and Lord Milner that the Turks should remain in nominal sovereignty over all the country, in line with the declaration of Lloyd George in January 1918, but with an alteration that she should be compelled to accept that the administration of the European portion of the Ottoman Empire to be carried by an International Commission on her behalf. It was criticized that this suggestion had apparently been dismissed without any consideration in the proposal. The Conference became an arena for a clash between Curzon and Montagu on the subject of Turkey. Montagu based his argument that the Moslem population would be more agitated in case that the Turks were to be expelled from Constantinople and Saint Sophia was to be converted to a Church. Montagu drew the attention of the Ministers to the danger of unrest in India which was similar to Sinn Fein in Ireland and would cause a threat to the British Empire especially after the situation in Syria. He asked to consider the case when Feisal joined the forces with Bolsheviks then British interest in the Middle East, in Persia and then in Turkey would be jeopardized, and this danger could be eased by allowing the Turks to be left in Constantinople. According to Montagu, France was already trying to use the situation on their advantage and lately French press was quoting that 'France was the only country to protect the interests of the Moslem World'. Montagu by referring to the Memorandum, quoted Curzon's statement that to enforce the Peace with Turkey, they should be ready to use Allied armies in Asia Minor, then Montagu urged the Conference to consider the military aspect of the question and to consider what forces and what length of time would be required to impose such a peace, since he believed that the proposal would not be a *fait accompli* as it would inevitably involve further fighting. Montagu further told that they already destroyed Austria which would create endless trouble, and it would be disastrous to destroy Turkey too, he suggested that as was discussed and agreed upon, the Turks to be stayed in Constantinople with the Sultan there and at the same time to limit Turkish army and set up an international commission and police force would make the Turks helpless.

Field Marshall Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff disagreeing with the suggestions, expressed the view that if the power was to be retained over Turks, then they should keep the Sultan in Constantinople. He further told that with the collapse of Denikin, the Caspian would fall into the hands of Bolsheviks then cause disturbance in Persia. According to Wilson the disturbance would spread to Afghanistan, Mesopotamia, India and to Turkey. They had enough troops to hold

Mesopotamia and in Constantinople but if the Kurds joined the Bolsheviks then their position would be very difficult to defend India. One alternative for the defense was Batoum-Baku line, provided that Turks were to be friendly with British. Wilson concluded that by military consideration, he opposed to ejecting Turks from Constantinople.<sup>340</sup>

Curzon as expected disagreed with Montagu that the Indians were not be affected by what was going to happen to Turks. The scheme proposed as having Turks out of Constantinople had some advantages and disadvantages as same as the second alternative which was to keep the Turks in Constantinople. It was decided that it was desirable that the C.I.G.S. to prepare what military and naval forces should be required to keep the Straits open on the assumption that Turks would be staying in Constantinople.

Montagu's comments concerning French Proposal that the Turks should be thrown out of Constantinople had already been circulated with his Memorandum on 1<sup>st</sup> of Jan 1919. Montagu commented that the French Proposal was made with reference to '*aux vues du gouvernement Britannique*' which was not the case since the British Government had never formulated any view in favour of turning the Turk out. Montagu further discussed that the Prime Minister had never lost an opportunity of assuring the members of the Cabinet that the matter was still under consideration. Montagu argued that Curzon had given the Foreign Office's view to Berthelot, but had failed to pass the India Office's comments in regard to Turks and Constantinople. Montagu argued that at the beginning the French was in favour of keeping the Turks in Constantinople but the proposal before them contained the solution of throwing the Turks out of Constantinople, implying that Curzon because of his own opinion on the issue influenced for such a proposal. According to Montagu, Curzon had no authority to reflect his own opinion as the British final position on the issue which had great consequences for Britain and in the meetings of the Cabinet and Conferences of Ministers majority of the members had the view of keeping the Turks in Constantinople.<sup>341</sup> Montagu's Memorandum did not get favourable attention from Venizelos. Venizelos sent a 'Note on Montagu's Proposals with regard to Constantinople' on 12<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 from Paris and counter-attacked Montagu's Memorandum by using his own population figures that Turks should not be left in Constantinople. He argued that in case the Turks were to be left in Europe,

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<sup>340</sup> Ibid.

<sup>341</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/172/1/112(C).

the Turkish territory should be restricted to the peninsula of Constantinople, and not beyond the lines of Chataldja. The Enos-Midia line, according to Venizelos should not even to be considered because of ethnical reasons. Venizelos suggested that if the Gallipoli peninsula was to be freed from Turkish sovereignty and given to Greece, there was nothing to prevent its military occupation by the Allied Powers which would be in charge of Constantinople and to which would be entrusted the guardianship of the Straits. He further suggested that if the Conference were to entrust to Greece the military guardianship of the Gallipoli Peninsula, it would be possible for the Allied Forces which was entrusted the protection of Constantinople and of the Straits, for the more effectual protection of the Eastern Coast of the Dardanelles and of both coasts of Bosphorus. According to Venizelos Greece could have the responsibility of Gallipoli Peninsula and therefore freeing Allied Forces from the burden of sending more troops to Gallipoli.<sup>342</sup> This 'offer' or rather the sacrifice of Greece was not going to have favourable response from British Military Authorities. General Staff commented on 14<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 that the control of the Dardanelles depended on the possession of the Gallipoli Peninsula and therefore if the Peninsula was to be given to Greece, the control of the Allies over the Gallipoli was bound to be relaxed since it would be difficult to obtain and exercise special rights over territory belonging to an Allied Power.<sup>343</sup>

The clauses of "The Treaty with Turkey" after being discussed at a Conference of Ministers on 5<sup>th</sup> of January was in the agenda of a Cabinet meeting on 6<sup>th</sup> of January 1920. Wilson explained the necessary military appreciation in the case of retention of Constantinople by Turks and as an alternative to remove the Government from Constantinople to Brusa. He argued that from military point of view it was better to retain the Sultan with his Government at Constantinople. After lengthy discussions it was decided that the Turks should be left at Constantinople. The decisions of the Cabinet were;

(a) That the Sultan and his Government should be allowed to remain at Constantinople without any Turkish force in this region under his control beyond possibly a guard and a police force:

(b) That Constantinople and the region of the Straits should be garrisoned by an international force of which the British Empire would have to contribute a part.<sup>344</sup>

The decision of the Cabinet with regard to the retention of Constantinople therefore not ejecting Turks from Europe was objected in the Cabinet meeting by Lloyd

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<sup>342</sup> House of Lords , Public Records, The Davidson Papers, DAV/160,

<sup>343</sup> Ibid

<sup>344</sup> PRO, CAB 23/20, Cabinet 1(20).

George, Balfour and Curzon and the latter circulated a Memorandum to record his related views with respect to the decision taken at the Cabinet.<sup>345</sup> Montagu commented on Curzon's Memorandum on the same subject with a Memorandum, on 8<sup>th</sup> of Jan.1920, arguing that the best solution would be to leave Turks in Constantinople and have the Straits open to all ships.<sup>346</sup> Montagu circulated another Memorandum with Indian Dignitaries in favour of keeping the Turks in Constantinople. Montagu circulated another Memorandum to the Cabinet Members on 18<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 enclosing a letter from Aga Khan on the same subject. Aga Khan in his letter of 8<sup>th</sup> of January to Montagu argued that to turn the Turk out of Europe might have been accepted by a warm and sincere Imperialist like himself if there were one single and real advantage for the British Empire but according to Aga Khan there was not one that could be advanced that would compare to its disadvantages. Aga Khan was also against furnishing the Sultan a place in Constantinople a status similar to Pope while taking Turks out of the city. He argued that no greater mistake could be made than to imagine that the Sultan would live in Constantinople as the Pope did in the Vatican.<sup>347</sup> He reasoned his argument as the Sultan's authority as the civil ruler of the city was to be taken he could not and would not be living in Constantinople and would proceed to Brusa and all Moslems throughout in the world would give him its sympathy and approval. Aga Khan further drew the frontiers for the future of Turkey as that Adrianople, Thrace, Constantinople and Asia Minor a line drawn from the North of Mosul and Rawanduz in the East

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<sup>345</sup> PRO, CAB 23/20, CP 407, Appendix IV to the Cabinet Meeting of 1(20). The objection of Curzon in on 7<sup>th</sup> of Jan 1920 was; *"The Peace with Turkey: I ask to place on record my earnest and emphatic dissent from the decision arrived at by the majority of the Cabinet yesterday- in opposition to the advice of the Prime Minister and two successive Foreign Secretaries- to retain the Turk in Constantinople. I believe this to be a shortsighted and, in the long run a most unfortunate decision. In order to avoid trouble in India- largely manufactured and in any case ephemeral and to render our task in Egypt less difficult- its difficulty being in reality almost entirely independent of what we may do or not do at Constantinople- we are losing an opportunity for which Europe has waited for nearly five centuries and which may not recur. The idea of a respectable and docile Turkish Government at Constantinople preserved from its hereditary views by a military order of the Powers- including, be it remembered, a permanent British garrison of 10,000-15,000 men- is in my judgment a chimera. Nor will it be found that the decision, if carried into effect in Paris, will either solve the Turkish problem or calm the Eastern world.*

*The Turk at Constantinople must have very different measure moral to him from the Turk at Konia. He will retain a sovereignty which will have to be a more simulacrum, and those who have saved him well, unless I am mistaken, presently discover that his rescue has neither satisfied him nor pacified Islam. But beyond all I regret that the main object for which the war in the East was fought and the sacrifice endured- namely. The Liberation of Europe from the Ottoman Turk- has after an almost incredible expenditure of life and treasure been thrown away in the very hour when it had obtained, and that we shall have left to our [...?]- who knows after how much further sacrifices and suffering [...?] from which we have flinched.*

*I may add that the refusal of the Cabinet to endorse the scheme prepared by M. Berthelot and myself was resolved upon without any consideration by those of what the rival scheme will be, in a Turkish State still centered at Constantinople but under international supervision. When produced it may come some surprise."*

<sup>346</sup> Ibid

<sup>347</sup> Aga Khan in his letter to Montagu referred to Constantinople as 'Stamboul' for the first time.

down to the Mediterranean to the North of Alexandretta and including Smyrna and then going along the Black Sea to the old Russian frontier of 1878 that was the minimum that could be acceptable to Islam.<sup>348</sup>

Venizelos being aware that French and British were discussing the future of Turkey and Constantinople and also the question was constantly debated among British Cabinet Members prepared a Memorandum with regard to the 'Future of Constantinople' to influence some members who were more sympathetic to Greece and therefore her desires. In Venizelos' Memorandum on 12<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920, Paris, it was suggested that in the event the Sultan should not remain in Constantinople, Turkey could be compensated by granting the maintenance of his suzerainty over the portion of Asia Minor in the occupation of Greece in a similar manner as Austria-Hungary in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Treaty of Berlin until 1908. Venizelos also discussed the situation if the Sultan was to remain in Constantinople. He suggested that if the latter case was to be adopted than Western Anatolia should be left to Greece to be united with the mother country, since any other alternative such as Turkish suzerainty over the area would undoubtedly cause friction between the two states similar to Crete before its full union with Greece. It was interesting that Venizelos contradicted himself in his Memorandum that suzerainty would not be an alternative at all.<sup>349</sup> Venizelos prepared another Memorandum only after two days, on 14<sup>th</sup> of January on the issues of Constantinople, the reparations to be paid off by Turkey and the rights of minorities. He suggested that in case Constantinople was to be left to Turkey, her maintenance of the city should depend on her ability in the future to conform to the requirements of European Public Law, and according to Venizelos if in the future Turkey proved herself incapable of complying with the obligations imposed upon her by the Treaty of Peace, for the protection of minorities, the League of Nations should be entitled to force Turkey to evacuate Constantinople, and limit herself to Asia Minor. Venizelos stated in his Memorandum that he was in the opinion that this constant threat would prove the most effective restraint on Turkish misconduct in the future.<sup>350</sup>

While Lloyd George and his close aides were trying to find a solution for the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the Treasury submitted a Memorandum for the 'Turkish Settlement' in which Treasury objected certain policies of the Foreign Office

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<sup>348</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/172/1/112(C).

<sup>349</sup> The Davidson Papers, DAV/160.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid

and 'Garden Suburb' with regard to Ottoman Empire. The Memorandum stated that Ottoman Empire should be reduced by taking consideration of the homogeneous peoples who had a distinct self-consciousness. Along with this definition, it proposed to take out Arabia, Syria, Palestine and no more from Ottoman Empire. The Memorandum argued that Greeks, Kurds and Armenians had a distinct national self-consciousness but they did not form homogeneous entities capable of being erected into separate states, and the Memorandum further stated that the Armenians were scattered and the Kurds could not get together. The Memorandum criticized the plan about the six vilayets to be presented to the 'Grande Armenia' and considered it as 'nonsense'. The Treasury's proposal to the Powers was if one had to choose it was better to play up to the Kurds, who feared Armenian domination, than to Turks. The practicality of the dissolution of the Empire should be limited to forming the new Ottoman Empire to enclave, Turkey in Europe, Anatolia and Armenia-Kurdistan. It proposed that the limit of Turkey in Europe could be reduced for the benefit of Greece on ethnological grounds but Greeks should leave Smyrna and her claims for the Aidin Vilayet should be refused. Smyrna might become a free port with an autonomous constitution and Italians should clear off Adalia, since they were really after obtaining concessions and raw materials. The Memorandum proposed a sovereign Turkey with no mandates and the growth of nationalist sentiment was seen as a good sign, which under sympathetic treatment would yield to far better results than CUP or the puppet cabinets set up in Constantinople since the Armistice. The Memorandum also drew the danger of a necessity of re-conquest of Turkey which could lead to nothing but disaster and to prevent this happening, it urged the Government to adopt a policy tolerable to nationalist sentiment. The greatest danger for the British Empire was the alliance between the Pan Islamic and Pan Turanian sentiments and Bolshevism which was constantly gaining ground for its expansion. According to the Treasury the best antidote to Bolshevism was peace order and trade. The Memorandum ended with self criticism of the British policy, since Armistice they had lost greatly in moral prestige, but it was believed that they could regain something of what had been lost by cooperating with the patriotic elements in Anatolia, on the lines of the scheme before the British Delegation had gone to Paris.<sup>351</sup>

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<sup>351</sup> PRO, CAB 21/203. Hankey's letter to Armitage Smith on 28<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1919 and Hankey's hand written 'note' to Chamberlain. The Memorandum was prepared by Armitage Smith from Treasury on the request by Hankey. After sending to Hankey, it seems that Chamberlain, Chancellor of Exchequers somehow learned and was told about the Memorandum and with the request of Chamberlain the Memorandum was not circulated.

Berthelot's Memorandum of 11<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 drew different alternatives for the future of Turkey. There were mainly two different proposals one prepared by himself, French Foreign Affairs and the other was the jointly prepared by him in concert with Curzon. The proposals analyzed in the Conference of Ministers on 11<sup>th</sup> of January, chaired by Lloyd George and it was felt that it would be desirable for the British Government should prepare their own scheme based on the hypothesis that the Sultan and the Turkish Government were to remain in Constantinople. It was also decided that Montagu should draw up, for the consideration of Prime Minister and his colleagues, a draft for Peace with Turkey on the basis that the Sultan and the Government of Turkey would remain in Constantinople and Armitage Smith was to be working with Montagu on the financial matters.<sup>352</sup> The proposed 'Peace with Turkey' stressed four principal problem areas, which were Constantinople and the Straits, Anatolia and Asia Minor, Armenia and as a last area Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia.

For Constantinople and the Straits; two solutions were possible, maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople or the repulsion of Turks from Europe. The alternative of the maintenance of the Sultan at Constantinople, according to the proposal, had numerous supporters, especially in France, because of her interests in Turkey, had established in investments more than any other Power, although Britain had in 1913 more than a quarter of the whole trade of Turkey and more than double that of any other Power. French economical interests, concession in railways, Ottoman Empire's debt, French institutions including schools being scattered all over Turkey and lastly the danger of growing nationalist movement which might not be challenged by the Allies because of conscription problems, therefore might disable the Allies to send large armies to Turkey could result in favour for this alternative. As a first alternative, an establishment of a State of Constantinople and the Straits was proposed in case that the Powers deciding to drive back the Ottoman State into Asia in order to ensure the freedom of Straits. It would be possible to create a State, comprising in Europe the territory situated between Sea of Marmara and the line Enos-Midia or confined to the Chatalja line and in Asia only the shores of the Straits with a frontier running to Ismid in the south and following a line about 50 kilometers from shore including the islands between Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea. The rest of the Asia would be Turkish. It was proposed that the new State would be placed in a general way under League of Nations. It would be neutralized and the

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<sup>352</sup>PRO, CAB 23/35, (S-Series: S-6).

administration of the State would be carried out by a Commission. The Commission would be composed of two representatives from France, Britain and Italy. The United States of America, if she desired, could send representatives and Russia provided that she was re-constituted could also be represented in the Commission. It was also proposed that one representative each from Romania and Greece and ultimately from Turkey would be added. The proposal defined in detail how the system in the new State would be operated.

As a second alternative, the Proposal suggested that in case the Powers decide to leave the Sultan in Constantinople, then certain conditions were to be enforced. These were; (a) An Inter-Allied force of about 30,000, supplied by Britain, France and Italy should be formed to guarantee the absolute liberty of the Straits, and no Turkish troops except body guards for the Sultan would be allowed. (b) Limitation of Turkey in Europe to the Chatalja lines and the rest of European territory to be allocated to Greece, for the compensation of her limitations in Smyrna. (c) Application of administrative reform and of Allied control over the State of European Turkey. (d) The formation of an International Straits Company of French and foreign companies for the navigation in the Straits.

*For Anatolia and Asia Minor;* It was proposed that the Ottoman Empire, whether existing in Europe or not would continue to exist in Asia Minor as an independent state. Its territory was proposed to be drawn such that; (a) To the North, by the Black Sea as far as the Lazistan frontier which would be assigned to Georgia, to the east of Trebizond [Trabzon] (b) To the West, in case the Constantinople was to be a State, to the borders of Asia, or the Asiatic side of the Straits. (c) To the South, from the borders of Diarbekir [Diyarbakir] to the Upper Euphrates, Murad Su, down to the Munzur Su. (d) To the East, along the Munzur Su as far as and along Munzur Dagh to the East of Trebizond, leaving Erzincan, but Erzurum would belong to the new state Armenia. It was proposed that the capital in which the Sultan would reside would be either Koniah [Konya], or Brussa that was if Constantinople was retained as capital. The proposal also had certain clauses with regard to military, administrative, economical and financial aspects that the Ottoman Empire should be made to adopt, which placed the Empire practically in a 'Dominion' status for the Powers.

*For Smyrna;* it was proposed that Greeks would be evacuating Smyrna, to make certain to safeguard the Greek population in the area; Turkish Authorities should

share the responsibility of governing the town with Greeks. The Port would be internationalized under the guidance of League of Nations.

*For Italian Occupied Zones;* Italian occupied areas such as Scala Nova, Koniah and Adalia would be evacuated by Italians.

*For Armenia;* it was proposed to constitute a completely independent Republic of Armenia under the high protection of the League of Nations. The new State would compose of territories of Eastern Anatolia, including Van, Bitlis and Erzurum.<sup>353</sup>

The Future of Turkey was discussed again on 13<sup>th</sup> of Jan.1920, at a Conference of Ministers in Paris. The Conference had before them a Memorandum for the Peace with Turkey prepared by Montagu on the assumption that the Sultan and the Government would be staying in Constantinople. It was agreed to give time for the Ministers to study the Memorandum and to discuss the issue at the next meeting.<sup>354</sup>

After two days the Montagu's Memorandum was again discussed in the Conference of Ministers on 15<sup>th</sup> of January. Curzon argued that it was necessary to have a close administrative and financial control of Turkey if they were to have reparation, able to collect pre-war debt that Ottoman Empire owed and to protect the Christian population from massacre and oppression. Curzon told that with Venizelos' figures there were two million non-Turkish minorities living in the Empire and it was their duty to protect them. Curzon told that he had thought the Turks would really welcome stringent financial control for a number of years as the only method of putting their country upon its legs. Montagu objected Curzon's approach for financial control.

On the discussion of the frontiers in Europe, Lloyd George told that he was strongly in favour of the Chatalja line because it would be advantage that part of the duty of patrolling the frontiers of the Sea of Marmara should be undertaken by the Greeks and not by Allies. For Lloyd George's proposal with regard to Chatalja line, Montagu reminded of the Military's objection that it would isolate the line of communication between the Allied forces occupying the Gallipoli peninsula and Bosphorus. After discussion on the subject among participants, it was generally agreed that the objection by the Military was not substantial and therefore it was the best frontier in the North.

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<sup>353</sup> PRO, CAB 23/35 (S-6), Conclusion of Conference held in Prime Minister's Office in Paris on 11<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1920 with the attendance of Lloyd George, in the Chair, Bonar Law, Curzon, Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor and Montagu. Berthelot's Memorandum is also available in full text in PRO, FO/608/272/5.

<sup>354</sup> Ibid, S-8, Conclusion of Conference held in Prime Minister's Office in Paris, 13<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 with the attendance of Lloyd George, in the Chair, Bonar Law, Curzon, Birkenhead, Lord Chancellor and Montagu.

The Smyrna issue was also discussed and the Prime Minister told that Venizelos had made it clear to him that he would not be able to remain as a Prime Minister in Greece if the Conference required the Greeks to leave Smyrna. Lloyd George further told that the new scheme, however, did not exclude the possibility of Smyrna being left under Turkish nominal suzerainty while the Greeks had the political powers within the limits of their occupation. On Smyrna issue the Conference decided that some such arrangement, to give some rights to Greece on Smyrna, might be considered. On Curzon's suggestion that the French Proposal contemplated annexing Cilicia even without pretence at a mandate, it was agreed that it was out of question to agree on this. The Conference also agreed to discuss with French of their proposal which brought very stringent control on the gendarmerie, police, justice and public forces, whether it would be possible to have a loose administration instead.

At the end of the Meeting it was decided that Curzon along with Montagu should prepare proposals in regard to the Straits and the control of Turkey on the assumption that the Turks were to be left in Constantinople, for submission to Clemenceau.<sup>355</sup> As far as Britain was concerned as of 15<sup>th</sup> of January 1919, a flexible regime with Constantinople as a Capital of Ottoman Empire was foreseen. Italians and Greeks were to evacuate Anatolia and some measures to safeguard of Greeks in Smyrna region was in the plans of Britain. In the Eastern provinces of Anatolia, a new Armenia was to be erected but the future of this new State on the issue of choosing a mandate and boundaries had still some doubts and uncertainties. The Foreign Office's response to the Berthelot's Memorandum was submitted on 15<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1920. Foreign Office agreed with some of the proposals made in the French Note, except on certain points, such as the eastern frontier of Turkey that was the western frontier of Armenia, where the French proposal was more favourable for the Armenians.<sup>356</sup>

Lloyd George met Nitti, the Italian Prime Minister on 18<sup>th</sup> of January in Paris to discuss the Eastern questions. In the press, on the same day, there was some news on the Eastern issues regarding Russians advance in Caucasus which had attracted great anxiety in the public. According to Nitti, the people in Europe was tired and fed

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<sup>355</sup> Ibid, S-9, Conclusion of Conference held in Prime Minister's Office in Paris, 15<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 with the attendance of Lloyd George, in the Chair, Bonar Law, Curzon, Birkenhead, Montagu and Philipp Kerr with Hankey as the Secretary.

<sup>356</sup> PRO, FO 608/272/5.

up with the war and that was the reason why Clemenceau had lost the French elections. Nitti probably with increasing number of sympathizers towards Bolshevism in Italy was hostile to Western intervention in Russia. The two Leaders discussed the trend of the policy of the Allies and its effects on the European situation which had fundamentally changed by Clemenceau's failure to secure election as President of the French Republic. According to Nitti there was going to be a radical change in the French point of view and the failure of Clemenceau in the election represented the end of the war spirit in the minds of the French people and France had had enough of the war and would like to get back to peaceful conditions. Clemenceau's failure in the election also marked an important turning point in the policy of the Allies towards Turkey. He also did not believe in 'throwing out' of Turks from Constantinople. Nitti considered that by driving out the Caliph from Constantinople, the Allies would antagonize the whole of Moslem opinion throughout the world.<sup>357</sup>

After the meeting with Nitti, Lloyd George chaired a Conference of Ministers to discuss the Eastern situation.<sup>358</sup> The meeting was centered on the Bolsheviks expansion to the Caucasus area and the future of Batoum-Baku line which was rather important for Britain with regard to oil supplies in Caspian, the security of India and saving Persia for themselves which was a vital importance to Britain for the oil supply. The policy of the Allies was going to be affected by the new players in France and naturally was going to have its impact in Turkey too. Britain was more concerned with the Caspian and as a whole the Caucasus area, as Churchill pointed out the control of the Caspian was an essential element for the British position in Central Asia and he feared that as the Caspian was lost to Bolsheviks, it would lay open to the Bolsheviks not only North Persia but the Caucasus and the country to the South and would probably all the way to Afghanistan and eventually India.<sup>359</sup> Churchill was in the opinion that at any cost Bolsheviks should be stopped. Churchill being on the 'hard-line' against Bolsheviks was going to secure a similar approach towards Turks in coming years.

The Draft for the Turkish Treaty prepared by Foreign Office based on the work of Berthelot and Curzon was sent to all concerned Ministries and Departments on 16<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1920 for comments. The draft was prepared on the assumption that the

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<sup>357</sup> Ibid, S-11 A.

<sup>358</sup> Ibid, S-11, 'Notes of Conference held in Prime Minister's Office in Paris on 18<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1920' with the attendance of Lloyd George, in the Chair, Bonar Law, Curzon, Birkenhead, Montagu, Long, Churchill, Earl Beatty and Sir Wilson with Philipp Kerr with Hankey as the Secretary.

<sup>359</sup> Ibid

Turks were to stay in Constantinople. The draft mainly consisted of provisions for the Turkish Peace and delineated the new states to be erected in the Ottoman Empire. In the Preamble of the Draft it was stated that the Treaty with Turkey was prepared with the object of the Allied Powers not being contemplated repression or revenge but on the contrary, it was Allies hope that a reconstructed Turkey might at no distant date find a place as a member of the League of Nations. The principle in the preparation was (a) The maintenance of an independent Turkish State, (b) No mandate and no spheres of political influence would be accorded to any specific power in the Ottoman Empire as constituted of the Peace Treaty, (c) Turkish militarism was to be suppressed, (d) The absolute freedom of the Straits was to be ensured by the Allied Forces and the management of the Straits was to be entrusted to a Commission, (e) Armenia with the frontiers laid down was to be freed from the Turkish domination and constituted as an independent State. The frontiers of Armenia was drawn up such that, the new State was having the existing territory of the Armenian Republic of Erivan and the Eastern portion of the Vilayet of Erzurum, excluding the town of Erzurum (as a result of British Military Authorities' insistence from security point of view), the plain of Mush [Mus], the district of Bitlis and the region of Lake Van up to the Persian frontier, (f) The Mesopotamian and Syrian Arab populations was to be freed from Turkish domination and would be supported in the realization of their national development upon the agreed principle of self determination. The independence of the Kingdom of the Hedjas had already been recognized and would be re-affirmed in the Treaty, (g) The declaration of the Allied Powers respecting the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine would be effectively carried out, (h) If Greece was to receive a very large area in Thrace, where it was proposed that the area to be extended up to the Chatalja line, the sovereignty of Smyrna area should remain with the Turks, subject to the institution of a predominantly Greek regime in the town of Smyrna and a similar Turkish regime, *mutatis mutandis*, should be provided in the town of Adrianople, assuming that Vilayet to be transferred to Greeks, (i) As a condition of the withdrawal of Italian troops from Southern Anatolia, Italy would be receiving economic advantages, consisting in a right of priority over all commercial enterprises in a zone to be defined at a later date as well as the coal mines of Heraclea by arrangement with French, (j) British Government observed that it was proposed by the French Government to assume charge of the greater part of the Vilayet of Adana, nearly the whole of the Vilayet of Diarbekir [Diyarbakir] and the Sandjaks of Malatia [Malatya], Marash [Maras] and Urfa although majority of the population in these regions were Turkish. It was presumed that the French Government would

assume the control of the whole of these areas only under the same conditions on which it had already been agreed to dispose of the remaining territories, e.g. of Syria and Mesopotamia which had belonged to the Ottoman Empire before the War as a Mandatory under the League of Nations, (g) Other administrative, economical, financial and juridical clauses. The comments for the Draft for the Treaty of Peace with Turkey were to be sent directly to the Secretary of the Cabinet.<sup>360</sup>

Meanwhile Foreign Office amended the draft of the 'Peace Treaty with Turkey' in line with the suggestions received from other Governmental Departments. British General Staff and War Office, during the preparation of the Draft commented on the clauses and some of the points raised for military purposes were imbedded to the Draft, such as the Erzurum issue, on 12<sup>th</sup> of January.<sup>361</sup>

British General Staff, in his comment of 12<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920 for the Draft commented that Erzurum should not be handed to Armenians for military reasons and also the town being the only outlet for Turks in the East.<sup>362</sup> The General Staff in a separate letter to the Secretary of the Cabinet also gave his comments for the other clauses of the Draft.<sup>363</sup> Meanwhile Montagu was not content with the way Curzon was handling the Peace Treaty with Turkey. In his letter to Lloyd George on 20<sup>th</sup> of January he discussed the anxiety he felt with growing Bolsheviks influence in Azerbaijan, Caucasus and in Persia and with a possible alliance of Nationalists in Turkey with Russians and the feelings among Turks and Indians that Britain was trying to implement 'bags and baggage' by throwing Turks out of Europe and Constantinople. He wrote that he saw no signs that the Foreign Office confronted with growing military importance, had a diplomatic policy which could replace in any way the force of arms which they did not possess, and he was sorry to say that Curzon had taken every step to prevent, and no step to carry out, the decision of British Government, which Lloyd George had accepted. Montagu urged the Prime Minister for the immediate publication of a denial that the British Government

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<sup>360</sup> The Davidson Papers; DAV/160, and LG/F/206/4/13.

<sup>361</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/206/4/13. The General Staff's comments were particularly concentrated for the formation of Commission and Enos-Midia line that should be accepted instead of Chatldja line. It was also proposed that Erzurum should be left to Turks and it might be advantageous for the Allies to leave some Turkish troops in addition to Sultan's bodyguards, in Constantinople to preserve order. General Staff's desire to have the Enos-Midia lines was not going to be entertained in the final Draft and the Chataldja line was preserved.

<sup>362</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/206/4/14.

<sup>363</sup> Ibid The General Staff pointed out that the Commission to control the Straits should not have any Greek members. Military also disagreed with the French proposal that the Chatalja lines as being the Western frontier for Turkey, since adaptation for the proposal would leave the Gallipoli Peninsula to Greece and therefore would make Greece to control the free passage through Dardanelles.

wanted to turn the Turks out of Constantinople, or alternatively if this was not possible, at least he should be allowed to say that although the negotiations had been interrupted, he had every reason to feel confident that the Turkish Government would retain in Constantinople.<sup>364</sup>

While French and British Officials, namely Berthelot and Curzon were busy in Paris and London to draft the Turkish Peace, French press was contemplating against British. French papers in Constantinople were publishing the news that Britain was responsible for proposal to transfer capital from Constantinople. 'Journal Des Debats' and 'Pall Mall Gazette' on 2<sup>nd</sup> and 3<sup>rd</sup> of Jan. 1920 published articles claiming that Lloyd George was responsible for the proposal to transfer capital from Constantinople and he had gone to Paris with perfectly clear plan based on that principle and he was thrusting this solution on the Allies and British view might be prevailed over that of French who had desired to maintain the Turks there.<sup>365</sup> Foreign Office commented on French attitude of blaming British as a typical French game.<sup>366</sup> Meanwhile French was trying to insert clauses in the Treaty to allow them to employ any nationality in the Companies to be operated in Turkey, since they were having difficulties in the Heraclea Mines because of insistence of the Turkish Government to employ Turkish nationals in the mines.<sup>367</sup>

The tension in Constantinople between French and British was getting tense and General Milne reported on 29<sup>th</sup> of January that General Franchet d'Esperay had withdrawn French Battalions from Milne's command and Milne was afraid that in case of a serious outbreak he would not be able to keep the order there. It was reported that the security was getting loose in Constantinople and it was claimed that Nationalists had stolen 8,500 rifles with 30 machine guns and 500,000 rounds of ammunition from Allied depot. At the Conference of Ministers on 3<sup>rd</sup> February, it was decided that "Constantinople was vital to us, and that every endeavour must be made to ensure that we should continue in control of the city and its environments"<sup>368</sup> and to replace the

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<sup>364</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/40/3/2.

<sup>365</sup> PRO FO/608/272, Decypher of a telegram from Foreign Office to Robert Vansittart in Paris, 11<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1920.

<sup>366</sup> Ibid. Robert Vansittart commented on the news in the telegram, 13<sup>th</sup> of January as; "The French will always try-since they never play the game-to blame off on us any part of the settlement unfavorable to Turkey. As it is useless to try to stop them, and as we should not lie down under it, the only thing is to beat them in their own game, and this can be done because, as admitted in this tel. any pronouncement of ours carries more weight than theirs" Curzon appeared to be in agreement with Vansittart since he had not had any comment on Vansittart's views.

<sup>367</sup> PRO, FO 608/272 B.

<sup>368</sup> PRO, CAB 23/20, 'Conclusion of a Conference of Ministers' held on 3<sup>rd</sup> Feb. 1920 which was annexed to the Cabinet Meeting on 4<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920, CAB 8(20).

French Battalions, British or Indian Battalions from Batoum should be sent to Constantinople. It was important to vacate Batoum before they were driven out.<sup>369</sup> The stolen ammunition was going to be asked in the House of Commons on 12<sup>th</sup> of February and in the answer given by Churchill, French guards were accused for the stolen ammunition.<sup>370</sup>

London Conference was scheduled to meet on 12<sup>th</sup> of February and French newly elected Premier, Millerand insisted that the Turkish Peace Treaty should be finalized in Paris, but after persuasion of Lloyd George, he involuntarily agreed to come to London for the Meeting for only few days. Millerand's decision not to stay in London for the whole duration of the Meeting was treated by the Cabinet that France was trying to make separate arrangements with Turkey, which was for Britain, would constitute a breach of the Pact of London by which Britain, France, Italy and Russia had bound themselves not to put forward peace conditions without previous agreement with each of the other Allies.<sup>371</sup>

Although the issue of Constantinople was resolved and accepted in the British Cabinet after lengthy considerations and debates and finally at the London Conference in February 1920, that it should be retained by Turks as a Capital, while the Straits and therefore the town of Constantinople itself were to be administered by the Commission which was going to be set up, comprising Delegates from Allied Countries, it was still questioned in public. Lord Robert Cecil, one of the draftsmen of the Covenant of League of Nations and later winner of a Nobel Prize for Peace in 1937, with some members of Parliament initiated in February 1920 to submit an open memorandum to the Prime Minister for rejecting the decision for Constantinople. Robert Cecil in his invitation to be a signatory to the Memorandum cited that *"...Contrary to previous declaration it is, as you are aware, now proposed to allow the Turk to remain in permanent possession of Constantinople. In recent massacres of subject races and the fact that Constantinople has for centuries been a source of international unrest, we consider it is essential that the city should no longer be left under Ottoman sovereignty"*<sup>372</sup> Robert Cecil, furthermore wrote to 'Evening Standard' which, the French paper 'Temps' on its article of 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920 was going to call as 'sensational article'. Lord Robert Cecil in his article demanded that Constantinople should be taken from the Turks. He wrote that he did

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<sup>369</sup> Ibid

<sup>370</sup> Hansard for Commons; Volume 125, Col: 261

<sup>371</sup> PRO, CAB/23/37, Conference of Ministers (Conference 25) on February 10<sup>th</sup> 1920.

<sup>372</sup> The Davidson Papers; DAV/106

not believe French opinion was unanimously opposed to the policy of taking Constantinople from the Turks. According to Robert Cecil this might be the desire in certain French financial circles, who wished that Constantinople should remain what it had been notoriously in the past, the domain of concession hunters. The 'Temps' in the article also blamed the British Labour Party for his policy on the part of Constantinople such that their desire to expel the Turks from Constantinople and also expressed the view that they were surprised that such a course should be advocated at a moment when any new explosion would risk bringing about the complete ruin of the civilized world. The Labour Party, the 'Temps' observed, did not seem to realize the danger of multiplying powder-magazines.<sup>373</sup>

Although the possession of Constantinople to Turks were made public, but Bonar Law in a debate in the House of Commons on 18<sup>th</sup> of February brought a connection and a condition to this decision that the alleged massacres of the Armenians should be stopped in Cilicia.<sup>374</sup> In the debate even a member of the Parliament suggested that if the massacres were not to be halted, the Sultan had to be punished and expelled from Constantinople.<sup>375</sup> The request of the member of the Parliament was in conjunction with the communiqué published by the Admiral de Robeck, British High Commissioner in Constantinople in accordance with the instructions from London on 16<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920, that it was proposed at the Peace Conference in London to leave the Turks in Constantinople, but this decision might have to be modified if further massacres occurred.<sup>376</sup> The Constantinople issue and the Turkish Peace Treaty were discussed in the House of Commons in a special session on 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920 with Lloyd George answering the questions.<sup>377</sup> Lloyd George explained that the decision taking to retain Turks in Constantinople was a balancing advantages and disadvantages and it was upon that balance that the Allied Conference had come to the conclusion that, on the whole, the better course for achieving a common end was to retain the Turks in Constantinople. In the debate Robert Cecil was guiding the opposition and as one member pointed out the decision of the Peace Conference to retain the Turks in Constantinople was a shock to a very large section of the public of the country and to a very large number of members of the House. The Government was criticized that the Parliament and the

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<sup>373</sup> PRO, FO 371/5181, E774, Lord Derby's letter to Foreign Office on 27<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920,

<sup>374</sup> Hansard for Commons; Volume 125, Col: 867-870

<sup>375</sup> Hansard for Commons; Volume 125, Col: 869, Sir J.D. Rees' question to Bonar Law

<sup>376</sup> Hansard for Commons; 23<sup>rd</sup> Feb. 1920, Volume 125, Col: 1279

<sup>377</sup> Hansard for Commons; 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920, Volume 125, Col: 1948-2060

Country had not been fairly treated in a manner in which this announcement about Constantinople had been made. Lloyd George answered the criticism as;

“...When the peace terms are published there is no friend of the Turks, should there be any left, who will not realize that she has been terribly punished for his follies, his blunders, his crimes and his iniquities. Stripped of more than half his Empire. His country under the Allied guns. Deprived of his army, his navy, his prestige. The punishment will be terrible enough to satisfy the bitterest foe for the sternest judge. My right hon. Friend suggested that there was a religious issue involved that would be the most dangerous thing of all, and the most fatal. I am afraid that underneath the agitation there is not only the movement for the expulsion of the Turk, but there is something of the old feeling of Christendom against the crescent. If it is believed in the Mahomedan [Moslem] world that our terms are dictated by the purpose of lowering the flag of the Prophet before that of Christendom it will be fatal to our government in India. It is an unworthy of Britain, and it is unworthy of our faith. It never conquered by force. To attempt to conquer by force is the very negation of the fundamental principles.”<sup>378</sup>

Lloyd George further stated the purpose and aims that they were trying to achieve by the Peace Treaty with Turkey, were;

“...but I refer now to the principal peace aims. The first is the freedom of the Straits. The second is the freedom of the non-Turkish communities from the Ottoman sway; and the third the preservation for the Turk of self-government in communities which are mainly Turkish, subject to two most important reservations. The first is that there must be adequate safeguards within our power for protecting the minorities that have been oppressed by the Turk in the past. The second is that the Turk must be deprived of his power of vetoing the development of the rich lands under his rule which were once the granary of the Mediterranean. Those are the main purposes of the peace”<sup>379</sup>

Lloyd George further pointed out in his speech at the House of Commons that they had hopes that America would have shared the responsibilities and she might have taken the guardianship of the Armenians or Constantinople, but America had no claims and therefore the Allies had no choice but to solve the issue by themselves.

During London Conference, America was not represented officially but they had asked if they could be informed about the developments and the decisions taken at the Conference. At the Meeting of Ministers and Ambassadors on 27<sup>th</sup> of February 1920 in Paris it had been decided to inform Americans of the developments with regard to Peace Treaties and to be invited to sign the Treaty.<sup>380</sup> Curzon had followed the suit and asked the American Ambassador, during London Peace Conference, if any help from Americans could be obtained. As Curzon explained in his Memorandum to the Cabinet on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1920, after the evacuation of Cilicia and Syria by British troops and French forces had moved in, troubles started in

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<sup>378</sup> Hansard for Commons; 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920, Volume 125, Col: 1965

<sup>379</sup> Hansard for Commons; 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920, Volume 125, Col: 1966

<sup>380</sup> PRO FO 608/276, E318.

Cilicia especially in Marash [Maras] area. According to Curzon, as January 1920 the French found themselves in great difficulties with the Turks. Curzon gave the reasoning of the difficulties as;

*“French military forces mainly composed of other than white troops, and their coloured soldiers, whether Algerians or Senegalese, were perhaps not likely to produce a great impression upon hostile or fanatical Turkish population; while, in a country where the Armenians were so little regarded, the troops belonging to the Armenian forces which had been created by France to service in those parts might have provoked even less friendly feelings. Accordingly a situation had developed in which, even before the French were beleaguered in Marash, massacres of Armenians by the Turks had begun...The figures of the victims of these massacres reported to us varied from 15,000 to 30,000. Possibly the larger totals were exaggerated, but our information tended to show that, in all probability, as many as 15,000 had perished.”<sup>381</sup>*

Curzon had called the American Ambassador in London to inform the developments in Cilicia. Curzon was considering that the situation in Marash where Americans appeared to have direct interest because of humanitarian and philanthropic reasons might get involved and therefore might change their minds about the mandate for the region. Curzon in his Memorandum also discussed the situation in Constantinople which was becoming very tense and serious according to the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck. Admiral in his message to the Government on 29<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920 discussed at length the critical and humiliating position they were in and asked for prompt and decisive action. The High Commissioner had come to the conclusion that preparation should be made at once for an effective action to be taken whenever Nationalist defiance passed the limits of endurance or when other developments in the situation might make it desirable. The High Commissioner, by ‘effective action’ meant the occupation of Constantinople, followed by such other measures as the military Authorities might consider necessary. Curzon considered that such an action might be a necessity since there was a general impression that the terms of the proposed Peace were likely to be drastic for Turks and therefore they had to be imposed by force of arms. The other possibility that the Admiral was considering, which for Curzon was very unlikely to be accepted, was the retention of Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, and of Turkish suzerainty over a portion of the region which it was proposed to give to Armenia, then he thought that the policy of creating a ‘bloc’ around Sultan, strong enough to fight the Nationalist Party. Situation in Cilicia and the humiliating condition of French there, as High Commissioners were thinking was a case apart and ought to be dealt with its own merits by itself. What the Allies in Constantinople had to face and to adjust their action was the wider issue raised by the intention of

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<sup>381</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/10.

the Nationalists to resist a drastic Peace. The Allied Conference discussed the issue on 5<sup>th</sup> of March 1920 and dispatched a telegram to their respective Representatives that the 'bloc' alternative was impracticable since the main condition of its adaptation, namely the offer to the Turks of a Peace which would leave them greater part of their possessions or power in Europe and Asia Minor was not and could not be forthcoming. The Conference decided that the Constantinople ought to be occupied at once by the Allied forces; Turkish Government should be required to dismiss Mustafa Kemal and the Turkish Government should be informed that the occupation of Constantinople would continue until the terms of the Peace Treaty had been accepted and put into execution, and lastly that if there was any recurrence of outrages, the proposed terms of the Peace Treaty would be rendered even more severe, and the concessions already made would be withdrawn.<sup>382</sup> Curzon in his discussion with the American Ambassador explained the decision of the Conference and reminded of the responsibility America had in the region and urged him to undertake it voluntarily.

Lloyd George in answering the question of Asquith on 25<sup>th</sup> of March 1920 stated that;

"We were asked not to proceed with the Turkish scheme until President Wilson had had an opportunity of consulting the United States of America and we were led to expect that he would be in a position to give us a decision in that respect by the end of August or, at least, by September. Difficulties arose in the United States at that time in respect of negotiations for the German Treaty...The result has been that we have not had any definite indication as to the attitude of the United States of America in reference to Turkish treaty...The delay has undoubtedly aggravated unrest in Turkey and has intensified the whole of our difficulties there, but I think that it is better that we should face that and work our way through than that we should create suspicion in the United States of America that we were quite willing to take United States help, but that whenever there was any question of dividing the mandates over these underdeveloped territories we instantly took advantage of some little political difficulty in America in order to divide the whole thing among ourselves."<sup>383</sup>

America commented on the Draft of the Peace Treaty with Turkey, in stating that she had no interest and therefore had no desire that a plenipotentiary should represent the United States at the Conferences, nevertheless, considering the future peace of the world, the President had thought that he should give his frank opinion on the issues of the Turkish Treaty. America was of the opinion that the arguments against retention of Constantinople were far stronger and contained certain elements which in his opinion could scarcely be ignored. The Secretary of the State

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<sup>382</sup> Ibid

<sup>383</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.:127, Col.: 656-662

writing to reflect the President's views on 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1920, stated that the Allies had often expressed their intention that the anomaly of the Turks in Europe should end and it was difficult for them to believe that the Muslim population who contributed to the war against Ottomans would then feel so strongly on the subject as to resent the expulsion of the Turkish Government. America believed that it was neither necessary nor desirable hence, necessitating the Allies a complete reversal of policy. America criticized the Southern frontier of Turkey that, if it was drawn for ethnological frontier of the Arabs, certain rectifications would be necessary, but if it was drawn for other considerations for the Allied Powers, then they requested to be supplied with the argument which had led the Powers to make this choice. America indicated his consent of forming a Commission for the Government of Constantinople and Straits and also had welcome the inclusion of Russia in the Council since without the consent of Russia, the scheme would not last longer. As regards Thrace, America favoured the frontiers drawn except the northern part of Constantinople. She believed that Kirk Kilisse [Kirkklareli] and Adrianople and the surrounding territory because of ethnical and historical reasons should be attached to Bulgaria instead of Greece. America was content with the formation of Armenia, but was doubtful that the access to the sea, which was indispensable to Armenian interests, would hardly be assured by granting special rights over Lazistan and also extended his hope that Powers would agree to grant Trebizond to Armenia. Secretary of the State indicated that they had too limited information as to the exact arrangement that was contemplated for Smyrna and the reasons for deciding for this arrangement; therefore they were not in a position to express an opinion.<sup>384</sup>

The reply to the United States was drafted by Curzon and approved on 26<sup>th</sup> of April by the Supreme Council in San Remo touched upon the points America had raised. It was stated that they felt confident that the settlement which they were about to propose to the Turkish Government would be found in harmony with the principles and ideals which had inspired them, in common with the United States, in waging war and in concluding peace with Turkey's late allies. With regard to the question for Constantinople Supreme Council stated that the advantages and disadvantages of excluding the Sultan's Government from Europe had been carefully weighed and adaptation, they believed, would entail upon them responsibilities, dangers and sacrifices which, with due regard to their national interests, they were not in a position to incur. According to Supreme Council the adaptation of the policy of

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<sup>384</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/22.

excluding Turks from Europe would have been possible if United States would be willing to share the responsibilities with the Allies. Another question raised by America was the southern frontiers of Turkey and Supreme Council gave the reason as the frontiers had been drawn after consideration of ethnical, economical and geographical factors involved. For Cilicia, Supreme Council believed that the problem was more complicated with consideration to racial factors. The decision of the Allied Governments to incorporate Eastern Thrace in Greece was in confirmation with the American policy and the population and ethnical reasons put forward in Secretary of State's letter for Kirk Kilisse and Adrianople did not coincide with the statistics they had and therefore these territories were attached to Greece rather than Bulgaria. For Smyrna it was pointed out that the scheme proposed was adopted after due considerations. According to Allied Governments prior to the forcible expulsion of the Greek population from Smyrna region, majority of Greeks existed in the Sandjak of Smyrna and in some of the neighboring kazas. Past experience of the Turkish treatment of the Greek population, according to the Supreme Council, made them to propose a Greek administration to safeguard the Greek majority in the area. With due consideration of the economical aspects of Anatolia it was proposed that Smyrna to be an international harbor for usage by Turks. It was pointed out that, after the Allies had fully weighed their conflicting considerations and had agreed upon a settlement, while placing an area securely under Greek administration, safeguarded Turkish access to the port of Smyrna and preserved Turkish suzerainty over the whole region during a period after which the population would decide for their future.<sup>385</sup>

Allied Governments were aware of the problems encountered with regard to Peace Treaty with Turkey and at the same time were hoping that somehow United States might change his policy and stepped in to take the responsibilities. One of the issues that America was concerned because of her internal politics was the Armenia. Due to the immigrant population of Armenians exerting pressure to the American politicians, Britain by knowing the situation, had been trying to convince United States to have the responsibility of mandate for the region. At the initiation of Supreme Council in a meeting in March 1920 decided to ask the League of Nations to appoint a mandatory power for Armenia.<sup>386</sup> The League of Nations in a meeting on 11<sup>th</sup> of April 1920, agreed on a memorandum that since League of Nations did

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<sup>385</sup> Ibid

<sup>386</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/22, Foreign Office's letter to Lord Derby, the President of League of Nations on 12<sup>th</sup> of March 1920.

not have any military power and since some parts of the proposed state of Armenia was under Ottoman occupation and therefore a military crash had been foreseen, it would be impossible for the League of Nations have the responsibility as proposed by the Supreme Council.<sup>387</sup> In a reply to the League of Nations, the Supreme Council in its meeting of 25<sup>th</sup> of April in San Remo, decided to make an appeal to President Wilson that the United States of America should accept a mandate of Armenia and President was also asked regardless to their decision of mandate, to arbitrate on the boundaries of Armenia with her neighboring countries.<sup>388</sup> At San Remo, the Supreme Council on 25<sup>th</sup> of April agreed that;

“c) That an article in regard to Armenia should be inserted in the Treaty of Peace in the following sense:- Turkey and Armenia and the other High Contracting Parties agree to refer to the arbitration of the President of the United States the question of the boundary between Turkey and Armenia, in the Vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, and to accept his decision thereupon , as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access to the sea for the independent state of Armenia. Pending the arbitration, the boundaries of Turkey and Armenia shall remain as at present.”<sup>389</sup>

The United States of America was going to abstain herself not only from Conferences as a plenipotentiary but also from taking the responsibility of Armenians and as Bolshevism struck Erivan, the dreams of Armenians to be a part of ‘Grande Armenia’ was ended, although it had been ended years before as the Allied Powers deserted them.

During January, February and March 1920 experts from Britain, France, Italy and Japan worked very closely to finalize the economical clauses to be inserted in the Turkish Treaty.<sup>390</sup> The Military clauses was finalized by Marshall Foch’s Commission, Allied Military Committee, and submitted on 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 1920 for final comments.<sup>391</sup> As the final form of the Draft was shaped, comments had started pouring to the Cabinet as far as the British decision mechanism was concerned. Curzon being one of the important architects of the Peace Treaty had to publish the outcry of the British High Commissioner for the Treaty. Curzon in his Memorandum of 26<sup>th</sup> of March 1920 enclosed ‘frank but exceedingly important’ letter he had received from Admiral de Robeck.<sup>392</sup> For the Admiral the proposed Peace terms for Turkey came as a ‘surprise’. He was in agreement with the proposals of the internationalization of the Straits and the imposition of a close financial control of

<sup>387</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/22.

<sup>388</sup> Ibid, Letter to League of Nations.

<sup>389</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/23,

<sup>390</sup> PRO, FO/608/276, E 185

<sup>391</sup> Ibid, E 254, PRO

<sup>392</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/17, CP 967. For details, please see Appendix III

Turkey but the proposed cession of all Thrace up to Chatalja lines to Greece and the scheme proposed for Smyrna with a valueless Turkish suzerainty made him very disturbed. British High Commissioner in Constantinople wrote that he believed strongly that the terms to be imposed on Turkey should not be incompatible with the principles for which Britain entered the war, should have the way for a lasting peace in the Near East and should be feasible of application without bloodshed and sacrifices for Allies. The Admiral analyzed the proposed Peace terms from the respect of these principles and past experience of Greek atrocities that had been happening in Smyrna and in the regions occupied by Greece. He told that cession of Smyrna and Thrace was bound to bring more bloodshed to the region where the majority of the population was Turkish and since he believed that the Muslim population would never accept the Greek administration in these regions peacefully. The decision was also against the principle of self-determination that the Supreme Council was supposed giving its adherence and the experience of Thessaly, Crete and Macedonia where it was almost impossible for the Muslims to exist. He believed that if the provisional Greek occupation of Smyrna had been canker in the Near East situation of May 1919, then he wondered how much more, so would definite annexation be the canker for years to come. He told that the implementation of the peace terms definitely require using force since Turks would never accept these peace terms and therefore the Supreme Council should be in preparation for resumption of general warfare, prepared to do violence to their owned declared and cherished principles, prepared to perpetuate bloodshed indefinitely in the Near East. He questioned the reason for this whole trouble just for Venizelos that was to maintain him in power in Greece. He further wrote that he was wondering whether it was worth to run certain risk of plunging Asia in bloodshed in order to reward Greece according to the desires of Venizelos which were very different from the desires of Greece. Admiral told that he was surprised with the attitude of Supreme Council which seemed to be contemplating another war and therefore the British Government's readiness to stage another war. He compared the case when the occupation of Baku was questioned and then abandoned because of recruiting new soldiers were very difficult and now British Government was bound to enter the war not for the benefits of the British Empire but of gratifying excessive demands of Venizelos. He questioned whether the British public was aware the situation and he believed that they would hardly appreciate being called upon to sacrifice themselves in order to join Greeks in killing Turks. Admiral de Robeck was afraid that the cession of Ottoman territories for the interests of Greece would drive the Turks into the arms of the Bolsheviks, was bound to set the Near East and Central Asia aflame

and would definitely intensify the menace of Bolshevism to the British Moslem world. Admiral de Robeck was wondering whether the recent stiffening of the Supreme Council was due to the late events in Cilicia, if this was the reason, then the Admiral was suggesting that it would be an unsound policy since the fundamental responsibility was far from established. Another reason for the Supreme Council's attitude would be the pressure exerted on the British Government by religious circles such as the Canterbury. He told that he had hoped the actions and decisions taken could be defensible by the Authorities. The High Commissioner ended his letter that he believed that Britain were not acting quite with fairness and justification and their name and reputation were at stake and honesty of dealing was probably the greatest asset they had in the Near East.<sup>393</sup>

Lord Curzon along with the Cabinet Paper enclosed the paper prepared by General Staff at the War Office.<sup>394</sup> War Office told that in normal circumstances they would feel not to comment on the issues which were practically a political matter, but since Marshall Foch's Commission had been asked to study on what military action would be necessary to enforce the proposed peace terms to Turkey; therefore they felt obliged to state their opinions in the matter. General Staff believed that, inspired by their special ambitions, the Greeks whose army was the largest concentrated force available for operations against Turkey might suggest that they were in a position to carry out the task without other Allied reinforcements, but as the terms of peace made public and because of the scattered Christian minorities in remote parts of Turkey, the Greek forces would not be sufficient to handle the uprising of Turks. Considering the situation in Turkey and the proposed peace terms, General Staff believed that serious attention should be paid to the representatives of the political advisers in Constantinople and that it might not be too late to reconsider the terms which it was proposed to impose upon Turkey, unless the British Government were prepared to face a further call for troops, since at present the military resources available had become to a dangerous extent in meeting their existing commitments. General Staff believed that the Turks should retain their position in and access to Adrianople while Smyrna should remain a part of Turkey unless the Allied Powers were prepared to make increase their forces and undertake operations to cover the whole Turkey.<sup>395</sup> General Staff finally urged the Government to alter the peace terms. General Staff further commented on Marshall Foch's report on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1920

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<sup>393</sup> Ibid. Admiral de Robeck's letter to Lord Curzon, 9<sup>th</sup> of March 1920.

<sup>394</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/17, CP 966, General Staff's Memorandum of 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1920, on Turkish Peace.

<sup>395</sup> Ibid

and discussed in detail, the requirements for troops and logistics in case the peace terms were adopted as they were.<sup>396</sup>

Both Admiral de Robeck's and General Staff's comments as circulated by Foreign Office to the Cabinet Members had their impacts. P.H. Kerr the close aide of Lloyd George on foreign affairs and a member of 'garden suburb' considered that both these memorandums were taking violently pro-Turkish view and stated that the present policy of the Allies was bound to lead to disaster. Kerr told Lloyd George that Hankey had thought that the opposite view had been placed on paper in case there was a row and therefore he had prepared a paper for circulation by the Prime Minister to record the opposite view.<sup>397</sup> The Memorandum prepared by Kerr and corrected by Lloyd George touched upon the points raised by Admiral de Robeck and General Staff. The Memorandum started with referring to these documents and the reason why the Memorandum was written, since he could not let these documents go unanswered as they seemed to be betraying an extraordinary desire of understanding of the facts of the situation. Furthermore, Lloyd George criticized Admiral de Robeck on his statement that the terms of the Treaty imposed were incompatible with the principles for which they were supposed to have been fighting. Lloyd George stated that he could only suppose that the Admiral meant that Britain had entered the war in order that Turkish rule with its hideous record of massacre and stagnation should be perpetuated over Greek, Armenian, Arab and other majorities. Lloyd George stated that he believed one of the principles for which they had been fighting was that of nationality and the liberation of national majorities from oppressive autocratic rule. Lloyd George claimed that the Turkish Government that Admiral de Robeck was so anxious to defend, massacred 800,000 Armenians, transported 100,000 Greeks from Thrace to Anatolia, and expelled a further 100,000 across the border of Thrace during the war. Therefore he stated that the population figures at present was unreliable but taking everything into account he believed that the authorities could make as the relative Greek and Turkish population in Turkish Thrace in 1914 was; Greeks: 313,000 and Turks: 225,000. He stated that these figures were confirmed by Turkish statistics of 1894 after which all racial statistics were open to suspicion. Treaty of Neuilly also quoted the population of races were; Greeks: 304,000, Muslims: 233,000 and Bulgarians: 72,000. Lloyd George stated in the Memorandum that he could not conceive on what principle Admiral de Robeck

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<sup>396</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/19, 'General Staff Comments on the Report from Marshall Foch on the Military Measures required to put into execution the Treaty of Peace with Turkey', circulated by the Secretary of State of War on 7<sup>th</sup> of April 1920 for the Cabinet.

<sup>397</sup> PRO, LG/F/90/1/4, P.H. Kerr's note to the Prime Minister, 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1920.

would argue that Thrace should be left to Turks. Similarly, Lloyd George stated that the situation in Smyrna was; Greeks: 372,000, Muslims: 325,000, Jews: 40,000 and Armenians: 15,000 and there were also other Kazas in the neighborhood of the Sandjak which were a Greek majority. Lloyd George believed that in accordance with the principles which they had applied throughout Europe, Smyrna with its Greek majority ought to be attached to Greece and detached from Turkey. Lloyd George commented also on Admiral de Robeck's accusation that the Greeks were far less competent to rule than the Turks, and therefore they ought to leave as much disputed territory to Turks. Lloyd George stated that the only reason given by the Admiral was the Smyrna atrocities and he argued that if it came to a competition in atrocities he did not think that it would be difficult to prove the Turk's superiority in the game. He stated that he was not to defend the Greek action in Smyrna, but told that the atrocities, serious as they were, were mainly committed not in cold blood as the Turkish massacres usually were, but in connection with landing. Lloyd George in the case of inquiry of massacres in Smyrna accused the Commission that they had departed from the principle observed in every Court of Justice throughout the world that evidence against an accused should be given in the presence of the accused or his representative. Lloyd George pointed out that the whole Turkish history had been the history of constant intervention by the Great Powers in order to protect subject peoples from massacres and misgovernment, and he further told that there had been no part of the Turkish Empire where there had been any political or economic progress throughout the whole history of Ottoman rule, on the other hand any territory removed from dead hand of the Turk started flourishing. Lloyd George argued that he could not conceive how Admiral de Robeck arrived at the conclusion that Turkish rule was preferable to Greek rule and he did not believe that there was a scrap of evidence to support this statement. Lloyd George quoted Balfour's statement that there was no case on record where the state of a country had not been improved by removing it from Turkish rule. Lloyd George finally commented on Admiral de Robeck's accusation that it was nonsense to say that the Peace Conference had been unduly influenced by respect for Venizelos. Lloyd George argued that the decisions of the Peace Conference had been taken with regard for the principles for which the Allies had fought and which had governed their decisions throughout Europe and with no regard for persons. According to Lloyd George the truth of the matter would seem to be that Admiral de Robeck accepted wholeheartedly the Turkish view and that he was unable to see that he was advocating a policy which was wholly inconsistent with the principles for which the Allies stood and wholly unsupported by the facts of the situation. Lloyd George

continued in blaming Admiral de Robeck that Admiral himself was in the opinion that the peace of these parts could be attained by leaving Greek majorities under Turkish minorities and to desert these who had fought with them in the war. Lloyd George did not think this was either wise or an honorable one. Lloyd George believed that there was only one policy for the Allies to pursue which was to do justice to the unfortunate peoples who had been oppressed so long by the Turks and to insist on the Turks being confined within those limits to which they were entitled on the basis of population. As soon as they did this he believed that the Turkish menace, which had distracted the world so long, would be at an end and Turkey, like Bulgaria would be able to settle down to be a healthy national state, comparatively resigned, because she would not have the strength or the resources with which to be a serious danger to her neighbors. For Lloyd George the only real question was whether the Allies had the strength to compel the Turks to accept just terms of peace and personally he believed that they had. Militarywise the Allies had 19 divisions, containing about 150,000 troops, which were available for the purpose and he believed that Venizelos could raise even more troops if necessary. Turks, he believed, were not able to put into field even half that number properly armed and organized. Therefore Lloyd George was thinking that it would be absurd to desert her Allies, to abandon her principles, and to give in to Turkish agitation because they could compel the Sultan and the Turkish Government to sign the peace and they might still find it difficult to force Mustafa Kemal to accept it. Lloyd George was considering that if there was anybody who was entitled to press them to modify the terms in favour of the Turks, were Armenians and Greeks who might suffer through Turkish reprisals, but they were the people who most insisted that the Allies should not be lenient to the Turks. But should enforce upon them the terms. Lloyd George told that he was not in the least informed of the threat of an alliance between the Turks and the Bolsheviks. According to Lloyd George, the policy of Admiral de Robeck, supported apparently by General Staff was that the Allied powers, with a force at least twice as great as that which the Turks could bring against them, with unlimited munitions and supplies whereas the Turks had practically none, with the capital of Turkey actually in their hands, should capitulate the Turkish bluff, contrary to the advice of the Armenians and the Greeks, and leave the Turks in control of areas to which they had no title, and governing majorities of nationalities which they had long massacred and oppressed. It might be that they might have trouble in enforcing the terms of peace, but Lloyd George considered that he would rather face trouble in enforcing a just peace and a final settlement than run away from bluff, desert their own principles and compromise on a peace which would settle nothing,

and simply be a prelude for a new outbreak when the younger and more vigorous nationalities decide to take the law into their own hands and throw off the strangling rule of the Turk which, they, the victorious Allies, were then invited to re-impose on them.<sup>398</sup>

Meanwhile French and British relations were getting tense especially after the defeat of Clemenceau and replacement by Millerand for the Premier. The evacuation of Cilicia and Syria by British troops and French military involvement in these areas brought trouble that France had to face with. The French press constantly had been attacking British policy and were trying to label British politicians especially Lloyd George as the cause for their troubles. 'Temps' article on 20<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920 criticizing British policy of expelling Turks from Constantinople, and recalling former instances of British attempts to secure influence in Turkey and blaming British for disturbances in Cilicia was going to be commented by British Foreign Office as "*this is disgusting French*"<sup>399</sup>. Hardinge's response for the article was; "*The last sentence is as untrue as it is unfriendly. The French press is very hostile now and the Temps, which used to be a Government-organ is one of the worst*"<sup>400</sup> and Curzon's wrote that; "*outrages*"<sup>401</sup> 'Temps' article on 27<sup>th</sup> of February was in favor of Lloyd George's attitude in opposing policy of expelling Turks from Constantinople. Another French paper 'Debates' considered the attitude of Lloyd George as he was taking a dangerous position in appearing to yield to Muslims opinion.<sup>402</sup> The Nationalist movement had started its impact on French Press and the decisions with regard to the occupation of Constantinople during London Conference were commented in the Press. 'Figaro' did not see how occupation of Constantinople would affect the Nationalists and 'Debates', known as its pro-British views with very low circulation, had considered that Turks should be deprived of Constantinople, and attacked 'Temps' which had suggested that the peace terms should be made with Nationalists.<sup>403</sup> The retention of Constantinople by the Turks was going to suggest

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<sup>398</sup> The Memorandum prepared by P.H. Kerr on 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1920 and presented to Lloyd George. It is not known whether the Memorandum was printed and circulated by the Prime Minister since no trace of the document was found among the Cabinet Papers, it is likely that the Memorandum was corrected by hand-written notes were not circulated but kept in the 'files' in case that it might be needed in future. Since it was corrected most probably by the knowledge of Lloyd George could be considered to reflect the views of Lloyd George even if not definitely Kerr's. On the other hand it is known that Kerr and Lloyd George were very close and did share the same views, and Kerr was acting as the most important player in the Turco-Greek relations. It is considered that whether it is published and circulated or not the Memorandum does reflect the Lloyd George's views on Turkish Peace terms.

<sup>399</sup> PRO, FO 371/5181, E443.

<sup>400</sup> Ibid

<sup>401</sup> Ibid

<sup>402</sup> Ibid, E775.

<sup>403</sup> Ibid, E1323.

different opinions in the French Press. An article on 18<sup>th</sup> of March 1920 in 'Figaro' deprecated retention of Constantinople by the Turks and considered that fears of universal Muslim rising was exaggerated and Constantinople should have been given to Greece.<sup>404</sup> On the other hand another article on 'Action Francaise' on 1<sup>st</sup> of April commented that the Allied occupation of Constantinople was bound to have little effect and accused British Government of leaving France to bear the responsibility of defending Armenia, wishing that both French and British Governments should act together.<sup>405</sup> British policy was going to be blamed for the problems encountered in Syria and in Cilicia and pamphlets were distributed throughout Paris in condemning Britain of ousting France from East. Tilley from Foreign Office commented as an astonishing pamphlet and for Toynbee "Nothing anti-British is astonishing in France"<sup>406</sup> Hardinge stated that it was ridiculous to limit the powers of France, although there might be legal limits in everything.<sup>407</sup> The relation between France and Britain came even tenser when French realized that Britain was getting most of what was left of Ottoman Empire. The 'Liberte' published an article on 4<sup>th</sup> of June 1920 that at San Remo France had a mandate for 100,000 whereas Britain obtained 1,000,000 square kilometers of land and besides Britain owned acquisition of oil resources in Mesopotamia and Mosul. France was feeling as if her rights in East had been exploited by British.<sup>408</sup> Whereas Britain believed that the concession of the oil fields in the Vilayet of Mosul had been granted by the Turkish Government to the Turkish Petroleum Company in June 1914 and therefore French had no concession whatever in Mosul in 1914, hence she had no claims what so ever to that portion of Mesopotamia. By the arrangement at San Remo, British and French Governments had agreed that France was to participate in 25% of the total oil production of the Mesopotamian oil fields and hence Lloyd George agreed upon the Long-Berenger Agreement which had been shelved since 16<sup>th</sup> of May 1919.<sup>409</sup> With the Agreement France was entitled to have 25% of the oil output of Mesopotamia, if the fields were to be worked by the Government, or a 25% share in any company which might be formed to develop them.<sup>410</sup> The oil concessions was going to be debated within Government circles and in press in France in coming days and Britain was going to be blamed for the 'lost fortune' for France.<sup>411</sup>

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<sup>404</sup> Ibid, E1918.

<sup>405</sup> Ibid, E2710.

<sup>406</sup> Ibid, E5171.

<sup>407</sup> Ibid, E5854.

<sup>408</sup> Ibid, E5967.

<sup>409</sup> Ibid

<sup>410</sup> PRO, FO 371/5108, E4220,

<sup>411</sup> PRO, CAB23/37, Conference of Ministers (Conf. 19). The oil issue became an important parameter in the relations between France and Britain and also between Britain and America because of interests

There were several draft versions submitted to Departments within British Government for comments and each time inputs as comments and alterations received, a new version of the Treaty was published and distributed. The Memorandum of the Turkish Treaty which covered a summary of the terms was distributed on 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1920 to the Parliament and a copy was presented to the King. The King's private secretary Stamford wrote to Sir Eyre Crowe, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office that the King had read the Memorandum with much interest and concern and found it entirely coincided with his own views.<sup>412</sup>

The final version of the Treaty with the inputs received from Meetings of the Conference of Foreign Ministers and Ambassadors was finalized by the Drafting Committee which consisted of experts from the Allied States, on 28<sup>th</sup> of April and submitted to the Allied Powers on 2<sup>nd</sup> of May for final comments and approval.<sup>413</sup> During the preparations Venizelos asked Lloyd George for his assistance on certain issues to be inserted in the Treaty. Venizelos in his letter of 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920 asked a provision to be inserted in the Treaty, to the effect that a customs union should be existed between Smyrna and Greece in order to overcome difficulties in the future. Second point Venizelos asked for insertion was a clause establishing that, in respect of eventual incorporation of Smyrna to Greece, a majority vote instead of unanimous one of the Council should be taken as decisive.<sup>414</sup>

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of American Standard Oil Company. Britain was aware of the importance of the oil in Mesopotamia and therefore was jealous of sharing her rights in the region. At the Conference of Ministers on 23<sup>rd</sup> of Jan. 1920, it was explained that there was no objection to the proposed assignment of a percentage share of the interest in the oilfields of Mesopotamia to the French Government but that nothing should be done which would result in the transfer of the interests in the oil wells of Mesopotamia to joint stock companies. At the meeting it was also suggested that the oil resources of Mesopotamia were so extensive that sufficient revenue should be forthcoming from them to pay for the whole administration of the country, and for that reason private exploitation should be prevented. It was further explained that the War Office had started to survey the oilfields of Mesopotamia and had also begun their survey of the desert for the purpose of having a pipe line and railway in the British sphere of influence. It was pointed out that the American Standard Company had shown an interest in the oil rich areas, and exclusion of the Company would cause problems. At the Meeting it was pointed out that as the country was in British occupation and the whole expenses of the campaign had been borne by the British Government and therefore the Standard Oil Company had no rights and no reason for complaints. At the Conference of Ministers which was chaired by Lloyd George decided that *"the War Office should proceed with the survey of the Mesopotamian oilfields but that all prospecting must be done on behalf of the State and not for the benefit of private companies, and should be undertaken in as such a way to attract as little attention as possible."*

<sup>412</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/12/3/25.

<sup>413</sup> PRO, FO/608/276, 274.

<sup>414</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/55/1/5. Venizelos' request for the customs union was inserted in the Final Draft of the Treaty of 28<sup>th</sup> of April 1920 as a Clause 10 in Part III, Section 3. Venizelos' second request for the decision to be majority in the Council instead of unanimous was left with no mentioning of either majority or unanimous.

Although for the Peace Treaty with Turkey had begun even before the commencement of Paris Conference in January 1919, it was formulized at the Allied Conference known as First London Conference which was held in London between 12<sup>th</sup> of February and 10<sup>th</sup> of April and completed at San Remo between 18<sup>th</sup> of April and 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1920. Out of 38 meetings held in London only 16 were attended by Lloyd George and 36 by Lord Curzon who was the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Most of the meetings were held at the Foreign Office and presided by Curzon. At San Remo all the meetings were attended by both Lloyd George and Curzon. Therefore both Curzon and Lloyd George were well aware of the terms of Peace with Turkey before it was signed at Sevres. At San Remo the mandate issue was also finalized and the Supreme Council agreed on 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1920 that the mandate for Syria to be assigned to France and Mesopotamia and Palestine to Britain.<sup>415</sup>

The British team attending San Remo Conference composed of Lloyd George and Curzon, although Montagu had appealed to be included in the team. Montagu wrote to Lloyd George that since he was appointed as plenipotentiary in respect of British Empire and India and approved by King, therefore he had the right to attend the meeting to reflect the Indian policy for the Turkish peace terms.<sup>416</sup> Montagu with the consultation with the Cabinet Secretary Hankey had withdrawn to submit a Memorandum to the Peace Conference for Adrianople that it should be a part of Turkey, since Lloyd George had the view that as a senior representative to represent the British case as a whole laid on him, therefore it would not be in order for the Indian Delegation to address the Peace Conference direct.<sup>417</sup> Lloyd George declined Montagu's request after consultation with Balfour and Curzon and wrote to Montagu on 25<sup>th</sup> of April from San Remo. Lloyd George told that he had given consideration to Indian's feelings with respect to Turkish Treaty, and further stated that;

"I recognize fully the deep interest which Indian Moslems feel in the question of the Turkish Treaty. In my reply to the Indian Caliphate Deputation I endeavored to explain how our decisions were arrived at without the slightest anti-Mohammedan bias, and in accordance with the principles applied to the rest of Europe, and made it clear that it was largely out of deference to their views and representation, that the Sultan has been allowed to remain in Constantinople. But it is clear that neither you nor any Mohammedan can expect to impose your views on the British Government nor the Peace Conference against their better judgment or have any ground

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<sup>415</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/205/2/1.

<sup>416</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/40/3/4, Montagu's letter to Lloyd George on 15<sup>th</sup> of April 1920.

<sup>417</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/40/3/4, Hankey's letter to Montagu on 7<sup>th</sup> of April 1920 and Montagu's reply to Hankey on 9<sup>th</sup> of April 1920.

for believing that your advice has not been respected because it has been overruled.

I do not propose in this letter to controvert the arguments in favour of the Turks point which you advance. I append a separate memorandum on that point which shows, I think, that your memorandum considered too exclusively the Turkish point of view, and does not pay sufficient regard to the rights of the nationalities oppressed and massacred by the Turks in the past, or to the larger and more enduring aspects of the Indian point of view with exceptional ability and persistence up to the present, you will now accept the decision which has been taken. .."<sup>418</sup>

Lloyd George further accused Montagu that he was agitating the Indian feelings with regard to Turkish Treaty and should be placing India's interest first rather than Turkey's.

Furthermore Lloyd George denied that the Supreme Council 'swallowed' Venizelos' figures in making decisions. He stated that the separation of Thrace and Smyrna and parts of the Eastern Turkish Empire were required on the principle of nationality, and on the reasons that Turkish imperialism should not prevail and non-Turkish majorities be kept separated from their fellow nationals and left to relinquish under Turkish rule. Lloyd George further stated in his Memorandum that;

"The truth would seem to be that it is difficult to realize that the war has shattered once and for all the ancient, but tyrannical and oppressive Empire of the Turks over their neighbors and that it has substituted for that Empire a series of national communities, many of them professing the same religion, but in varying degrees of development. Once nationality is accepted as the basis of the settlement of the Middle East there is no other solution possible than the proposed in the Treaty. The Turkish imperialists will naturally object to the substitutions of nationalities for Empire. But nationality is the only sure basis for an enduring settlement of the Middle East, and it is surely best to establish the peace on that basis now, than to attempt half measures, which can not last and which satisfy nobody, and which must lead to fresh unrest and fresh wars in the future."<sup>419</sup>

The Memorandum prepared by Lloyd George had an Appendix for the population. The figures quoted showed that the Greeks were in majority both in Smyrna and in Thrace.<sup>420</sup>

Montagu replied Lloyd George's letter and tried to answer some of the accusations that Lloyd George extended to him. He stated that he was not a pro-Turkish and was glad that the Conference was through with the Prime Minister's efforts, and

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<sup>418</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/40/3/5, Lloyd George's letter to Montagu on 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1920.

<sup>419</sup> Ibid, Memorandum of 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1920.

<sup>420</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/12/3/19, The population figures had been one of the most controversial issue in the debate whether the Greeks were in majority or not. The population figures were altered or manipulated as to please the defender. Curzon on 18<sup>th</sup> of March 1920 wrote a letter to Lloyd George that Venizelos had been lying even at the Supreme Council meeting that on one instant he had claimed that his troops should go ahead in Smyrna district because of the danger from the Turks, then Curzon from an intercepted telegram from Greek representative in the area found out that it was not the case. Another example he quoted in his hand-written letter that at the discussion with Nitti, there was a question of an island Castellouzo [?] to remain with Turks. Venizelos intervened and told that the island should go to Greece since the Greek population there, was in excess of 12 000, but French delegates in the meeting told that the occupation was only 1,100.

decided about Kurdistan to be in the Treaty, which he had suggested to Curzon. He was also happy to see the clause with regard to Thrace had been accepted by the Conference. The letter was in content of apologies and implications that he was insisting on some issues for the future of the British Empire.<sup>421</sup> The mistrust which had been growing since the early days of peace negotiations was going to end with Montagu's resignation in early 1922 from the Cabinet and becoming a severe critic of Lloyd George.

Lloyd George was having difficulties not only from military circles and in the Cabinet but also from the Allied front such as from France. France feeling betrayed by Britain in East was becoming a critic of British Policy for the Asia Minor. In April 1920 the French Premier at one stage considered going back on the provisional agreement in regard to the Turkish Treaty, but Millerand had changed his mind and did not intend to ask for the withdrawal of the Greeks from Smyrna or Thrace though according to Venizelos, was anxious to do some small thing to try and conciliate Turkish opinion, although he was most anxious about Armenia. According to Venizelos, Millerand's change of view was due to the fact that Briand and Poincare were in favour of backing Greece rather than Turkey and also due to the President Wilson's Note which was wholly in favour with the Greeks' desires.<sup>422</sup> Although at San Remo, France agreed upon the peace terms for the Turkish Treaty, the press had started criticizing the Constantinople regime and favoring Nationalists. Article in French paper 'Rappel' on 16<sup>th</sup> of June 1920 belittled the visit of the Grand Vizier to Paris and stated that Mustafa Kemal, was the one with whom negotiations should be carried on, and the article further commented that the revision of the Treaty as agreed upon in San Remo should be revised and annexation and aggression policy of the Allies should be abandoned. The article drew the attention to the British policy that it relied on French and Greek military strength to implement the Treaty terms to Turks. But, the paper wrote that France although indirectly was discussing with Mustafa Kemal for the Cilicia and Venizelos although given to him in San Remo was not able to enter Adrianople and was requesting finance and military aid from Allies to proceed<sup>423</sup> Another paper 'Figaro' was also discussing the revision of the Treaty although it had not been signed yet.

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<sup>421</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/40/3/6, Montagu's letter to Lloyd George on 29<sup>th</sup> of April 1920.

<sup>422</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/90/1/5, Venizelos visited P.H. Kerr on 7<sup>th</sup> of April 1920 and asked for a meeting with Lloyd George before the San Remo meeting and if not possible during San Remo negotiations. Venizelos summarized the situation in France with respect to the Turkish Peace and French attitude. He was anxious to see that everything was going smoothly and Millerand would not change his policy.

<sup>423</sup> PRO, FO 371/5181, E 6848.

British Government resentment for the French Policy became even harsher before the San Remo Conference on the event that France without obtaining unanimous consent from the Allies occupied Frankfurt and other towns in Ruhr region. Britain was going to protest the French occupation.<sup>424</sup>

Bolsheviks were gaining a foothold in Caucasus and there was the question of withdrawing of British forces from Batum. The issue was discussed in the Cabinet meeting on 5<sup>th</sup> of May 1920 and Turkish Peace came into the discussion. It was almost certain that the Peace Treaty was to arouse resistance. It was believed that in Thrace, Smyrna and Straits, it would be possible to deal with this resistance, but this was not the case in Anatolia and therefore the Cabinet decided to postpone the evacuation of Batum since it would stiffen the attitude of Mustafa Kemal and his supporters.<sup>425</sup>

Mustafa Kemal's attack on Ismid [Izmit] Peninsula was the topic for discussion in the Conference of Ministers meeting on 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1920. The Ministers considered that the situation in the Ismid Peninsula and in the region of Constantinople was serious and in order to carry out the existing policy, reinforcements were required immediately or likely to be required in near future. The Ministers considered in light of the new developments the possibilities of co-operation with Greece and it was stated that Venizelos was prepared to take such action as might be desired of him without asking for military or financial support. At that stage the Greeks were in occupation of Western Thrace and were prepared to advance Eastern Thrace. According to Venizelos, they had a large force in the Smyrna area, and were prepared to act against Mustafa Kemal. The question of Greek co-operation gave rise to a discussion as to the fundamental interests of British policy in the Near East, and it was suggested that it was to their interest definitely to support the Greeks. At the Conference of Ministers;

“It was generally agreed that, having regard to the very strong and even dramatic line of policy taken by the plenipotentiaries in regard to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, to retire from Constantinople before a bandit like Mustafa Kemal would deal a shattering blow to our prestige in the East, and that this could not possibly be contemplated.”<sup>426</sup>

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<sup>424</sup> PRO, CAB 23/21, Conclusion of a Cabinet Meeting on 8<sup>th</sup> of April 1920, Cabinet 18(20).

<sup>425</sup> Ibid, Conclusion of a Cabinet Meeting on 5<sup>th</sup> May 1920, Cabinet 18(20). At the Cabinet Meeting it was also decided that General Milne who was responsible for the military operations in Caucasus and in Constantinople, should incur no obligation, in the event of a withdrawal of the British forces, to embark Georgians or any persons other than British garrison and British civilians.

<sup>426</sup> PRO, CAB23/22, Conclusion of Conference of Ministers on 17<sup>th</sup> of June 1920.

The situation in Ismid and Constantinople was debated in the Conference of Ministers on 18<sup>th</sup> of June 1920, to which Venizelos also attended. The Ministers, being anxious to defend Constantinople and Straits, decided to move one division from Malta and a cavalry regiment from Palestine and if necessary the battalions from Batum for the disposal of General Milne. Venizelos stating that they had 90,000 men in Smyrna area and 40,000 at the Maritza [Meric] offered one Greek division being available in Thrace could be given for General Milne's commandment.<sup>427</sup> It was decided that the Greek offer should be debated in the Supreme Council meeting that was going to take place in France in coming days.

Lloyd George proceeded to France to meet Millerand, the French Premier and also to attend the Supreme Council meeting. During the meeting on 19<sup>th</sup> of June 1920, between Lloyd George and Millerand at Lymph which had been arranged with the object of discussing the disarmament of Germany, reparations and other questions in the Agenda for the Supreme Council's meeting at Boulogne, the Turkish question was raised as one of immediate and alarming urgency. The two Prime Ministers inclined to Venizelos' plan, provided their military advisers agreed. Marshall Foch and General Henry Wilson met Venizelos alone and accepted Venizelos' plan. The next day on 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1920, with the participation of Italy, Japan and Belgium, the plan was formally adopted. On this occasion Britain was represented by Lloyd George, Curzon, Chamberlain, Chancellor of Exchequer, General Henry Wilson and Lord Derby, British Ambassador in Paris, and also present in the meeting was Millerand and Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister.<sup>428</sup> With the decision of Supreme Council on 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1920, known as Boulogne Conference a new episode started for Anatolia and Turkey where Greek armies was to fight in a larger theatre against Turkish Nationalists led by Mustafa Kemal.

When the issue of involvement of Greek troops against the Turkish nationalists was tabled in the House of Commons on 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1920, whether the British Government decided to accept the military aid of Greece was true. Bonar Law as a Speaker of the House answered as there was no special statement to be made on the subject. Bonar Law further stated that Greece was one of the Allies and the issue was under consideration in Boulogne and if necessary it might be decided to use Greek troops, like others of the Allied nations concerned.<sup>429</sup>

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<sup>427</sup> PRO, CAB23/21, Conclusion of Conference of Ministers on 18<sup>th</sup> of June 1920.

<sup>428</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/205/2/1.

<sup>429</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol: 130, Col: 1734, 21<sup>st</sup> June 1920.

The same issue was going to be debated again on 24<sup>th</sup> of June, when a member asked the Prime Minister to what extent Britain was committed to supporting Greek claims on Turkish territory and whether the Prime Minister had consented to accept the help of Greek troops in the present crisis, and whether France and Italy had consented to take a share in operations against the Turkish Nationalists.<sup>430</sup> The Prime Minister replied as he had nothing to add to what he said the previous day. Lloyd George gave a long briefing on the situation the previous day, 23<sup>rd</sup> of June and stated that certain operations were being undertaken independently by the Greeks and certain other operations might be undertaken jointly by the Greek and the British forces, under British command, if they were necessary. Lloyd George in his speech at the Parliament was going to deny that it was his plan to invite Greeks to Anatolia to fight against the Turks, outside of the zone allocated to Greeks. He told that there were certain statements in the press to the effect that the plan of campaign was something which he had forced upon the military, and that Marshal Foch and General Henry Wilson were against it, and further stated that it was to the contrary and it was all planned by Marshal Foch and General Wilson and submitted to Millerand and to himself and they approved it.<sup>431</sup>

Lloyd George in his statement in the House of Commons defended the military action taken in conjunction with Greeks in Anatolia and also gave some indications for the policy they were planning for implementation in Turkey. He stated that;

“I do not think it is possible to have any peace in that quarter of the world unless we make it quite clear that the policy which we have laid down there must be carried through. The policy has been stated over and over again, not merely outside but in this House. Clearly, it is a policy of releasing all non-Turkish populations from Turkish away. That has been accepted by everybody, in the House and outside. There has been a dispute about Constantinople. There the Turk is in possession. Outside, the claim is that he is in a minority; in Thrace and in Smyrna he is in minority; The Arab States have been taken from under his dominion. The one difficulty that remains is Armenia, and I wish that that could be solved easily. That is the policy. If we allowed Mustapha Kemal, or any man of his type, to organize forces in order to break down that policy, Europe would have failed dismally in its duty. I believe- I say so after full consultation with the ablest soldier in Europe-that we shall be able to establish authority over these areas. When it is quite clear that Europe is not going to be bullied, is not going to be hustled, is not going to be frightened, even by newspaper articles, out of the deliberate policy which it has solemnly proclaimed and which it has incurred enormous obligations in order to establish and vindicate ...”<sup>432</sup>

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<sup>430</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol:130, Col; 2407, 24<sup>th</sup> June 1920,

<sup>431</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/205/4/4, House of Lords, and Hansard for Commons Vol: 130, Col: 2235-2286

<sup>432</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/205/4/4, House of Lords, and Hansard for Commons Vol: 130, Col: 2261-2262

The decision taken at Boulogne to send Greek troops to fight against Turkish Nationalists would invite a new war and this fact was brought to the attention in a debate in the House of Commons on 30<sup>th</sup> of June 1920. A member asked the Prime Minister whether any attempt had been made to negotiate between the Greek Government and Mustafa Kemal, and whether the British Government would use its power to bring about such negotiations should an opportunity offer. Bonar Law answered on behalf of Lloyd George that no negotiations had been entered into or were possible at that stage and the Greek troops were operating with the Allied forces to resist an attack delivered by a common enemy. Another question was whether if it would be possible to keep them out of fighting then the British Government should have tried to negotiate, and whether Mustafa Kemal was the head of any constituted provisional Government, Bonar Law gave the opinion that he did not know whether Mustafa Kemal was head of Government and it would not be possible for them to break the Peace Treaty after negotiating it. It was the members' consideration that the Peace Treaty would not be carried out without a great deal of fighting.<sup>433</sup>

Bonar Law was going to answer a question on whether it was desirable that the operations of the Greeks against Turks should appear to be directed by the British Government, as the Government were engaged only in resisting attacks, although the operation of Greek troops were going to be offensive rather than defensive.<sup>434</sup>

The legality of the Greeks actions in Smyrna was brought to the attention of the Government on 1<sup>st</sup> of July session of the House of Commons. A member asked the Prime Minister whether the Greek seizure of Turkish vessels and property was legal, considering that such property had no connection with Mustafa Kemal and the Turks who were fighting for Anatolia.<sup>435</sup> This was the first time that in the Parliament, the Turks were considered as the people fighting for their country. On 5<sup>th</sup> of July session the members questioned about the massacres committed by Greeks in Smyrna and the extent of Allied support of Greeks in their offensive to the Turks.<sup>436</sup> The prisoners detained at Malta, quoted by Bonar Law as 24 in numbers, were debated and these detainees were kept there with no court rule with particular emphasis to Rahmi Bey, of the Governor of Smyrna during War. British Government on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1917 had sent his appreciation for his treatment of British subjects and he was in Malta now,

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<sup>433</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol: 131, Col; 437-438, 30<sup>th</sup> June 1920.

<sup>434</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol:131, Col; 440, 30<sup>th</sup> June 1920,

<sup>435</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol:131, Col; 698, 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1920,

<sup>436</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol:131, Col;1001-1002, 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1920.

and the Members wondered whether this was in consonant with British traditions of gratitude to keep him in Malta 15 months after the Armistice.<sup>437</sup> The offensive nature of Greek operation against Turks was often questioned whether the Britain's interest was served, morally, financially, or commercially, by encouraging the Greeks to engage a new war and whether it was not a tradition of British statesmanship that faithful adherence to their pledges was the best and cheapest policy since the Prime Minister in his speech on 5<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918, declared that they were not fighting to deprive Turkey of the capital, or of the rich lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which were predominantly Turkish in race.<sup>438</sup> The Prime Minister and Bonar law constantly iterated the view that British Government had not undertaken any liability, direct or indirect, to provide any grant or loan to the Greeks in connection with their offensive in Turkey.<sup>439</sup> Meanwhile Britain was contributing to the Greek forces to occupy Thrace. In an answer given at the House of Commons it was admitted that three battleship, four destroyers, and a seaplane carrier were present and assisted at the Greek landing in Thrace on 20<sup>th</sup> of July, under the command of British admiral.<sup>440</sup>

The Final Draft for the Peace with Turkey consisted of five parts including the Covenant of League of Nations as Part One. The Draft was almost identical to the Treaty to be finalized at San Remo and later to be signed at Sevres.<sup>441</sup> Later the Draft as was handed to Turkish representatives for comments was enlarged to thirteen parts to include even the International Labour Convention.<sup>442</sup> The Treaty of Peace with Turkey presented to the Ottoman Government on 12<sup>th</sup> of May for their comments, although not expecting any changes in the Treaty, and was made public on 16<sup>th</sup> of May. For the Draft of the Treaty, Crawford Price was going to write in Sunday Times on 16<sup>th</sup> of May that; "*Almost every paragraph of the document emphasizes the decadence of the Osmanli...Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia are offered as the generous gift for independence; Britain, France and Italy receive all the plunder they can legitimately expect*"<sup>443</sup> At the meantime President Wilson was working with the Secretary of State, Colby, to undertake mandate for Armenia and to participate in control of Dardanelles and Bosphorus, although the State Department seemed to be in ignorance of the intent. Foreign Office was going

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<sup>437</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol: 131, Col; 1251, 6<sup>th</sup> of July 1920.

<sup>438</sup> Hansard for House of Commons, Vol: 131, Col; 1954, 12<sup>th</sup> July 1920.

<sup>439</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol: 131, Col; 957, 26<sup>th</sup> July 1920. During almost each session the question of British Governments' liability was tabled and the answer, given by Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Harmsworth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was in the nature that there was none.

<sup>440</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol: 132, Col; 1410, 28<sup>th</sup> July 1920.

<sup>441</sup> PRO, FO/608/276, E 274.

<sup>442</sup> Ibid, E 275.

<sup>443</sup> 'The Sunday Times' 16<sup>th</sup> of May 1920.

to comment on the news as “*Any action lending to show that U.S.A. share the Allies’ point of view in regard to the Turkish Treaty can not do harm, in so far as it does not delay the decisions of the Allies*”<sup>444</sup> and Curzon did not believe in the intent of the President. It was certain that some groups in U.S. were still trying to get a hold in the Caucasus through Armenia and Foreign Office believed that this was because of the interests of controlling oil in the area. If the Caucasian states retained their independence and Azerbaijan threw off the Bolshevik yoke then having the mandate of Armenia and a friendly Georgia then, America would be able to control the oil area.<sup>445</sup> The moves of the President considering the negative attitude of the Senate, according to the Foreign Office, had a motive of having an access to oil in future.<sup>446</sup> It was probable that the President Wilson accepted to be the arbitrator for Armenia as was proposed by the Supreme Council in San Remo because of her interest in the area for oil.<sup>447</sup>

President Wilson asked the Congress to accept the Mandate for Armenia on 25<sup>th</sup> of May but was going to be refused by eleven votes to four by the Foreign Relations Committee. The future of Armenia was often debated in the British Parliament. As soon as America decided that they would not take the mandate for Armenia, the question was put forward in the House that if there was a possibility for Britain to take this responsibility. Bonar Law answered as they would not undertake it, and at that moment a member intervened in saying that there was no oil there.<sup>448</sup>

There were two treaties, one for the Allies to sign with Turkey and the other for the three Allied States to sign among themselves, namely Britain, France and Italy. The later Agreement, known as Tripartite Agreement, was to delineate how they were going to exploit Turkey after signing the Peace Treaty with Turkey and was planned to be effective at the same time with the first one. French and Italians signed the Tripartite Agreement on 12<sup>th</sup> of May, but Britain was hesitant to sign it for various reasons and inclined to wait for the signature of the Treaty first. Britain was aware that if the Tripartite signed, then they had no excuse but to make it public. Foreign Office believed that the Treaty already had very hard conditions for Turkey and they thought that it was most likely that it would rouse strong opposition from America, for instance, there was the Financial Commission with control of concessions on which

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<sup>444</sup> PRO, FO 371/5108, E 4645.

<sup>445</sup> Ibid, E 4892.

<sup>446</sup> Ibid, E 4984.

<sup>447</sup> Ibid, E5478. On 18<sup>th</sup> of May 1920, the American Ambassador officially delivered a message from the President to Millerand that the President had accepted the task of arbitration for Armenia.

<sup>448</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol;130, Col:402, 9<sup>th</sup> June 1920.

British, French and Italians had allotted themselves special position. Vansittart believed that the Tripartite Agreement was not a very pretty looking document and its best chance for implementation was after the Americans and other possible opponents had time to get used to the terms of the Turkish Peace Treaty, therefore he proposed to delay signing the document.<sup>449</sup> Curzon agreed with Vansittart that the Tripartite Agreement should not be signed until the Turkish Treaty was signed.<sup>450</sup> The Tripartite Agreement was going to be signed by Britain, France and Italy on 15<sup>th</sup> of August.

As of May 1920, France, although was happy with the clauses of the Turkish Treaty and Tripartite Agreement, was having difficulties in Cilicia and had to withdraw from Cilicia to railway line Mersin-Adana. British Government surprised of the incident and had to make sure that the news received was true.<sup>451</sup> The British-Armenian Committee was to turn to British for help against the Turks, since the hope for French was diminishing.<sup>452</sup> Foreign Office was hoping that as the Tripartite Agreement came into force, then it would be easier to ease the tension there and make the Armenians happier.

The relation between the United States of America and Britain with regard to economical benefits to be gained on the expense of Turkey was becoming tense. United States was complaining that British were attempting to acquire monopoly of Asiatic oil supplies. For these allegations Foreign Office was going to comment on 5<sup>th</sup> of May 1920 that "*This statement shows the general situation, which presumably there is no objection to Washington knowing of our recent agreement with the French [The Agreement signed in San Remo] as arrangements under consideration with the Shell Co. The information is confidential only for [British Ambassador in Washington] Sir Geddes' guidance*"<sup>453</sup> Britain was convinced that they were following the correct policy towards United States by excluding the Standard Oil Co. from Mesopotamia, since Britain was considering that the U.S. had taken the lead in endeavoring to prevent other countries acquiring oil concessions in other parts of the world such as in Latin America, and in passing legislation to restrict foreign

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<sup>449</sup> PRO, FO 608/278, E 310, Vansittart's letter to Curzon, 11<sup>th</sup> May 1920.

<sup>450</sup> Ibid, E 311, Curzon's telegram to Lord Derby, 11<sup>th</sup> May 1920.

<sup>451</sup> Ibid, E 349. Curzon's telegram on 3<sup>rd</sup> June 1920 to Sir Graham, Paris, stated that "*I am informed that French are about to withdraw from Cilicia and have advised Armenians to come to terms with Turks*"

<sup>452</sup> Ibid, E 394. British Armenian Committee wrote to Curzon on 8<sup>th</sup> June 1920 complaining the French attitude towards Armenians in Cilicia. They wrote; "The French have failed, not only to protect the Armenians, but also to give them the means of protecting themselves. At times they have given them arms, then recalled them and in some cases even given them to the Turks instead."

<sup>453</sup> PRO, FO 371/5108, E4220.

companies working in the U.S. Britain believed that the experience of the war had shown the danger of dependence on foreign supplies and therefore U.S. had no right to complain if Britain was following their example.<sup>454</sup>

Although the Draft of the Treaty with Turkey was made public, the Drafting Committee in Paris was working to finalize the odd ends and proposing new changes on the expense of Turkey and for the advantage for Greece. The Aegean islands as a new cession by Turkey, of Imbros and Nikaria were proposed for Greece, and similarly the islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, Mitylene, Chios, Samos and Nikaria were to be given to Greece.<sup>455</sup>

Meanwhile the political situation at Constantinople was complicated and in the state of uncertainties. Turkish Cabinet of Ali Riza Pasha resigned on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 1920 as a result of, according to Admiral de Robeck, increasing evidence of impossibility of satisfying both Nationalists and Allies. Tewfik Pasha was asked to form the new Government, and had refused. Izzet Pasha who was considered by the Allies as a sympathizer of Nationalist movement or Salih Pasha who was considered by France as 'safe', were the probable candidates.<sup>456</sup> Salih Pasha was going to be selected as the new Prime Minister and he formed the Cabinet on 8<sup>th</sup> of March 1920. The British Foreign Office, considering the turmoil in politics and the advance of Nationalists, had suggested to the Admiralty that the fortifications of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles should be destructed to produce upon the Turks a moral effect. Such action as argued by the Foreign Office would be an unmistakable sign not only of the defeat of the Turks, but also of the power and determination of the Allies. It was suggested that without prior warning to the Turks, the Allied authorities should blow up the forts along the Bosphorus, and therefore deep impression to be created in the minds of the inhabitants of Constantinople.<sup>457</sup> One of the alternative as was suggested by the British High Commissioner in Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck was the occupation of Constantinople. Similarly French High Commissioner also suggested to the necessity of being prepared to enforce peace terms. French High Commissioner considered that the Allies should be strong at important points and that effective occupation of Constantinople should be carried out and to arrest of Nationalist leaders and members of CUP.<sup>458</sup>

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<sup>454</sup> Ibid

<sup>455</sup> Ibid, E 4291.

<sup>456</sup> Ibid, E 1094.

<sup>457</sup> Ibid

<sup>458</sup> PRO, FO 371/5043, E 1125.

The Supreme Council on its meeting of 10<sup>th</sup> of March 1920 approved the occupation of Constantinople and gave the full authority to act to the Allied High Commissioners and the occupation took place on the 16<sup>th</sup> of March. Meanwhile some Turkish groups were approaching the British High Commission for guidance and help. The advice given to them was that the Peace terms were settled and the best thing for them was to swallow the 'medicine' as quickly as possible and then set to work to put in order such Empire as is left to them in which task they might look for British guidance and support.<sup>459</sup> The Grand Vizier in his talk with the British High Commissioner gave a portrait of an indecisive statesman and asked if they could get Britain to secure revision in their favour of the Peace Treaty terms. The Grand Vizier also enquired what might be expected to happen if Turkey did not accept the terms. He said that if he knew this, it might help him to prepare way for acceptance and to spare his country from fresh disaster.<sup>460</sup> British High Commission in Constantinople was complaining about the anti-propaganda carried out by Nationalists for Britain and asking if the Government could stage a counter propaganda service. Foreign Office commented on this request as it was a little late to stage counter-propaganda since it was a fact that in Anatolia, Britain was identified with Greece and it had been going on for over a year. The Foreign Office suggested that the recent failure of the Nationalists in the military line was the best corrective while any verbal or printed counter-propaganda would be more properly and more effectively done by the Sultan's Government after the signature of peace, especially as the Nationalists' propaganda was of an Islamic nature and its counter would best come from Moslem sources such as the Constantinople Government. Besides the economical reasons, it was commented, it was not possible to stage counter-propaganda. Sir Eyre Crowe believed that the War Office were growing tired of their special treatment of the Turks.<sup>461</sup>

The Peace Treaty was scheduled to be signed on 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 1920 at Sevres but due to the traveling problems of the Turkish Delegates it was postponed to 10<sup>th</sup> of August. The Turkish Delegates of Hadi Pasha, Riza Tevfik Bey and Rasid Halis Bey were given the instructions from Sublime Porte to sign the Treaty on behalf of the Government. While Turkish Government had decided to sign the Treaty, the Grand Vizier had sent a 'Note' to the British High Commissioner that the Turkish

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<sup>459</sup> PRO, FO 371/5239, E 4058.

<sup>460</sup> Ibid, E 4570.

<sup>461</sup> PRO, FO 371/5272, E 8835. G.H. Fitzmaurice from Foreign Office and Eyre Crowe's comments on 26<sup>th</sup> of July 1920.

Government, nevertheless wished to make new appeal to sentiments of justice and equity of Allied Powers with the view to some modifications and declaration being introduced; *“(1) Substitution of Enos-Midia line which had been previously been fixed as Turkish frontier for Strandia-Chatalja line. (2) Exclusion in case frontier is so thrown back of shore of Sea of Marmara from neutral zone and limitation of latter to Straits. (3) Special autonomous regime for Smyrna, similar to that of free city of Hamburg. (4) Turkish Government is anxious to declare Caliphate being ‘un point d’union islamique’ and consequently religious question can have no place political.”*<sup>462</sup>

The ‘Note’ asked the High Commissioner to communicate the Turkish Government’s plea to the British Government and to use his influence to secure favourable result. The Grand Vizier, according to the British High Commissioner, was hoping that having regard to enormous sacrifices accepted by Turkey, Supreme Council would give her at least this satisfaction. The Turkish Delegates signed the Treaty eventually with no amendments and alterations, by doing so, the partition of Turkey had been accepted by the Constantinople Government, which opened a new era in the history of Turkey.

As the Treaty was signed with Turkey, it was time to set up the Commissions as requested by the Treaty to set the machinery for the governing of Turkey. There were mainly four Commissions; Financial, Straits, Judicial, and Military and Kurdish. Foreign Office was busy to appoint delegations for the Commissions and set up an understanding among the Allies to operate these Commissions effectively. Major Noel was proposed for the Kurdish Commission although at one stage he was criticized for his views for Kurds and called as ‘Lawrence of Kurds’. The Financial Commission was going to replace the Debt Department and the probable candidate was Sir Adam Block. The salaries of the Debt Commission by the Treaty were going to be borne by the Ottoman Government.<sup>463</sup> The coordination among the Allied Powers for setting the Commissions was going to cause difficulties because of the atmosphere existed among themselves. G.H. Fitzmaurice from Foreign Office believed that the feeling of mistrust between British, French and Italian officers had become so acute as to preclude the possibility of giving to the Brussa police force an international character took two and half months discussion with no result and

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<sup>462</sup> PRO, FO 608/277, E 456, Admiral de Robeck’s telegram to Foreign Office, 23<sup>rd</sup> of July 1920,

<sup>463</sup> PRO, FO 371/5272, E 9621.

the setting the Commissions was unimaginable.<sup>464</sup> Another problem was the presidency of the Commissions, who was going to get what. Hardinge commented that the most important Commission was the Financial Commission and the French would certainly try to obtain the presidency of this Commission. He wondered whether they should pursue to get the presidency and therefore oppose the French or be content with the presidency of the Military Commission. Curzon commented that the president of the Financial Commission was to control Turkey whereas the president of the Military Commission would be able to control Constantinople which was more important for Britain.<sup>465</sup> On the other hand Treasury considered that it was essential that British member on the Financial Commission should have the final voice on purely financial questions, subject only to the Chancellor of the Exchequer or the Cabinet.<sup>466</sup> The Allies were going to debate for a long time for the Commissions or rather for the sphere of power in Turkey.

### **V.3: LLOYD GEORGE after SEVRES**

The Turkish Treaty of Peace was signed on 10<sup>th</sup> of August 1920 between the Ottoman Government and the winners of the World War I. The Nationalists, rather the Angora [Ankara] Government, considered the Treaty as void and not important enough to be discussed even at the Parliament in Angora.<sup>467</sup>

Lloyd George in his speech in the Parliament on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June and in his letter to Montagu on 25<sup>th</sup> of April as well as in the Memorandum prepared by P.H. Kerr on 1<sup>st</sup> of April stressed on the point that the Turkish Treaty had been prepared on the principles employed for the other treaties such as Germany and Austria. Considering the resentment building up in Turkey, P.H. Kerr asked the Foreign Office if they could send somebody to Constantinople to tell the Turks that the Turkish Treaty, proving statistically that it was based upon the same principle as the other European peaces, namely, nationality, and that therefore they had not imposed upon Turkey anything different from what they had imposed upon their other enemies. He also asked that the Turks should be told that the Peace Terms were just and the Allies were determined to enforce it.<sup>468</sup>

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<sup>464</sup> Ibid, E 9938.

<sup>465</sup> Ibid.

<sup>466</sup> Ibid, E 10924.

<sup>467</sup> M. Kemal Ataturk, Nutuk, 454

<sup>468</sup> PRO, FO 608/272, E 299, P.H. Kerr's letter to Vansittart, 5<sup>th</sup> May 1920.

Along with the Ottoman Government, there were other circles approaching Britain for her cooperation. 'Turkish Congress' in Lausanne appealed to the Foreign Office stating that the group called themselves as 'Turk Yurdu' were responsible for creation of Nationalist movement in Turkey although not for its subsequent developments. They considered that the Islamic policy of the Ottoman Government was a mistake and urged that Britain and Turkey should combine their policies and furthermore they stated that they were not opposed to British occupation of Turkish countries, but expressed opposition to Greek acquisition of Turkish territories.<sup>469</sup> 'Turk Yurdu' who claimed themselves as the representatives of Turkish speaking peoples of Crimea, Caucasus and Turkestan promised active collaboration in realization of friendship towards Britain, even they stated that they were also ready to co-operate in bringing about counter movement in Anatolia against Nationalists in favour of Britain.<sup>470</sup> British Officials seemed to be in touch with some agents who claimed to be close to Mustafa Kemal.<sup>471</sup>

After the meetings at Sivas and Erzurum, and the formation of Angora Government, Nationalists were getting organized and preparing themselves for the independence. The material and ammunition required for the Nationalists, according to British sources, were accumulated either by smuggling from depots in Constantinople or by purchase through Switzerland.<sup>472</sup> Britain was going to accuse Italians for selling war materials to the Nationalists in coming days.

After the Boulogne Conference decision, Greek troops advanced within the areas of outside of Greek zone and proceeded to Brussa and occupied the town on 8<sup>th</sup> of July 1920 and Adrianopole on 25<sup>th</sup> of July, whereas British forces got hold of Mudania [Mudanya], and Ismid [Izmit] by 6<sup>th</sup> of July<sup>473</sup> The advancement of Greek troops was going to be commented by Damad Ferid Pasha as Greek forces could advance up to Erzurum and further stated that including the Sultan whole Turks

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<sup>469</sup> PRO, FO 371/5201, E 8867,

<sup>470</sup> Ibid, E 8971. The group called itself as the 'Turk Yurdu' seemed to be in touch with the British High Commission in Switzerland and from the comments of Foreign Office, it was regarded as merely a bunch of people having no power.

<sup>471</sup> PRO, FO 371/5225, E 10154, An agent claimed to be close to Mustafa Kemal and Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, was in touch with Foreign Office officials. The man, who called himself Mr. Stern, told various officials from War Office, Foreign Office that he was able to get Mustafa Kemal to fight with Bolsheviks and make peace with Britain on certain conditions. Mr. Stern visited P.H. Kerr and tried to convince him that he could act as a messenger between Britain and Mustafa Kemal to establish peace.

<sup>472</sup> PRO, FO 371/5262, E6549. There were reports that Nationalists were purchasing American supplies of uniform, water proofs, hospital stores etc. and also the French Government were selling at Basle, Switzerland and a certain official from Italian Consulate in Lausanne was helping the Turks.

<sup>473</sup> Gotthard Jaeschke, Turk Kurtulus Savasi Kronolojisi, (Ankara, Turk Tarih Kurumu, 1989), p. 111-114

were seeking help from Britain.<sup>474</sup> At the meantime the Angora Government was trying to persuade Russia to sign an agreement to ensure the safety of the Eastern frontiers of Turkey. A Turkish team headed by Bekir Sami was in Moscow to negotiate with the Russians.<sup>475</sup>

British prestige and popularity stood very high indeed in Athens as reported by Granville, the High Commissioner. It was believed universally that it was due to Britain alone that the Greeks had been allowed to go into Asia Minor and Thrace and Lloyd George's speech at the House of Commons on 21<sup>st</sup> of July 1920, according to Granville, was cheered with joy in the demonstrations in Athens and also in Constantinople. The capture of Adrianople made Greeks overwhelmed and the papers in Athens, the following day, started claiming Constantinople. Granville further reported that, the claim for Constantinople was discussed in the papers as if its possession were not only a future certainty but a very imminent one, and even some of them were already talking of the move of the capital from Athens to Constantinople.<sup>476</sup>

The evacuation of Batum on 9<sup>th</sup> of July by Britain and the agreement between Bolsheviks and Armenians on 19<sup>th</sup> of August opened a new phase for Caucasus.

The British Policy for the Near East, applauded by Greeks and disliked by Nationalists was criticized by the Germans. The Supreme Council, according to the Germans, was calling into existence with new wars instead of peace. Germans believed the decisions reached at the Supreme Council, was bound to cause another dispute to break out between Greece and the Turkish Nationalists. Germans believed that the French with their new European policy against Britain, wanted to make the Turks their friends, and therefore had no ill feelings towards Mustafa Kemal but Britain was in the opinion of pursuing with 'Bags and baggage' policy. The Germans believed that the solution not to have any more bloodshed, was the revision of the Peace terms in the Turkish Treaty.<sup>477</sup>

British Foreign Office was in the opinion of using the Greeks to the limit of their capacity against the Turks even before the signature of the Turkish Treaty. Britain,

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<sup>474</sup> Jaeschke, p.112. Damad Ferid Pasha had resigned from Cabinet on 30th Sep. 1919, but asked to form the Cabinet on 5<sup>th</sup> of September. Damat Ferid served as the Prime Minister for the fifth times between 31<sup>st</sup> of July and 16<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1920.

<sup>475</sup> Jaeschke, p.113

<sup>476</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/3/4.

<sup>477</sup> PRO, FO 371/5272, E8868.

according to the Germans, was convinced that that they had to make a choice between jeopardizing their future in the East or with the consent of the Allies using the Greek troops available to the utmost limit of their capacity. The question what Britain was considering, was whether the Turks would kill the Christian minorities in Anatolia during the offense that Greeks were going to stage against Nationalists. The Foreign Office's view was that the Turks had never been known to carry out a wholesale massacre of Christians at a time when a strong policy of force was applied to them and as an example; the Turks for several months after the victories of General Allenby during the war did not harm any Christians. They were suggesting that as much CUP leaders and people in Constantinople should be taken as hostages and a powerful army, although largely composed of Greeks, led by a capable British general would be able to finish the Nationalists and during this time, it was reckoned that Christians would not be harmed.<sup>478</sup> Osborne from Foreign Office was in the opinion that they should call the Greeks to their assistance only in the very last resort and he wondered if the French would agree, not that their consent was essential. Tilley from Foreign Office was considering of having the military view first and he believed that they ought not to alter an item of the Treaty. He believed that they could hold Constantinople, Thrace, the Straits and Smyrna. He further believed that time would be against Turks, and a large portion of the world especially the Americans would be hostile to the Turks, and besides it would be difficult for Russia to be friend to Turks against Armenians. Tilley believed that it would be difficult for Mustafa Kemal to maintain his army for long. Tilley commented that it was essential that they should not have the Arabs against them and he was getting inclined to put Abdullah into Mesopotamia if it could be done with the good will of the people. Lord Hardinge considered that the whole question should be discussed by the Cabinet. He was informed that it had been already decided for Greeks to go into Thrace.<sup>479</sup>

Since the distribution of the mandates for Syria and Mesopotamia was determined in San Remo Conference, the decision for the status and frontiers were the topic for discussion in Paris during October and November of 1920. Robert Vansittart was the representative of Britain in the discussions and a draft of Anglo-French Convention was prepared and submitted to London for the approval. The Draft Convention was discussed in an inter-departmental meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> of October, headed by Tilley, Assistant Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, and decided that

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<sup>478</sup> PRO, FO 371/5050, E6579.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid

the Convention as it stood was not acceptable for Britain.<sup>480</sup> The Palestine issue, the border between Palestine and Syria, was going to be solved between France and Britain and it was going to be declared as the 'Home for Jews'.

Two days after signing the Turkish Treaty, on 12<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1920, there was an attempt to assassinate Venizelos in Paris. The Greek Foreign Ministry approached to British Foreign Office for support of Greek demand to the Swiss Government to assume more control of the movements of the ex-King Constantine. The Greek Government was convinced that the King was aware of the plot against Venizelos and other Greek Ministers, although they did not have any proof. Curzon found, without any proof, there was no use of pressurizing the Swiss Government for the King.<sup>481</sup> The popularity of Venizelos, even after the Sevres Treaty, was dying because of his domestic policy in Greece. The relation between Greece and Britain was at peak and Venizelos was using the good-will extended to him.

Meanwhile the British support for Greece was strong enough to twist the British law as they pleased. In July 1920, Greece was in need of vessels that they could find and one of the ships they were after was 'Mount Athos' which had a British flag. The problem of turning the ship to Greece by law was not allowed. Venizelos by the help of Stavridi who had a role of go-between Venizelos and Lloyd George applied to Lloyd George and managed the ship to be handed over to Greece.<sup>482</sup> Venizelos also applied to Britain for coal to be used for transport for their operations in Smyrna and Thrace. With the instructions from Venizelos, the Greek Consulate applied to Curzon for Britain to supply 20,000 tons of coal per month urgently since they were not able to procure from anywhere else.<sup>483</sup> Venizelos did not hesitate to get in touch with Lloyd George for any help they had required, and similarly, Venizelos did not miss any chance to show his gratitude to Lloyd George.

Because of Lloyd George's speech at the House of Commons and the decision taken at the Boulogne Conference, Venizelos wrote to Lloyd George a personal letter to show his gratitude on 23<sup>rd</sup> of July 1920, and praised him what he had been

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<sup>480</sup> PRO, FO 608/274, 556.

<sup>481</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/1/14. Hardinge's 'Note' to Curzon, 24<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1920 and Curzon's views with regard to the request.

<sup>482</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/1/29.

<sup>483</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/1/30.

doing for Greece.<sup>484</sup> Lloyd George delivered the speech that Venizelos was very content with, in the House of Commons on 21<sup>st</sup> of July. Lloyd George told that;

“The Turk has been living on capital which he had acquired by a long record of violent ferocity. The recent years he had dissipated that capital. The Balkan wars demonstrated that he was no longer the same formidable person... The Great Powers had kept him altogether, not because of any great confidence they had in him, but because they were afraid of what might happen if he disappeared. The late war had completely put an end to that state of things. Turkey is broken beyond repair...Turkey is no more, and nothing will put Turkey together again as an Empire. The Greeks on the other hand have shown strength, capacity restraint and statesmanship throughout the war. They have great parts, and they have the Greek gift, even to the present day, of throwing up great leaders, for M. Venizelos is a successor of great leaders. He is not merely a phenomenon, and therefore without any hesitation the Allies used the forces available at the disposal of the Greek Government for the purpose of assisting them to restore order in that part of the world and to enforce the Treaty. The experiment has been a gratifying success.”<sup>485</sup>

Lloyd George with his speech indicated that Greece was going to be supported by Britain at all cost. The ‘great parts’ and the ‘Greek gift’ that Lloyd George described the virtues of Greeks was going to be forgotten and ‘Greek gift’ considered to be hostile to the Allies in four months time when the King Constantine came to the power as the Allies was going to indicate in their message to the Greek Government which was read in the House of Commons, as;

“They have no wish to interfere in the internal affairs of Greece but they feel bound to declare publicly that the restoration to the throne one of Greece of a King whose disloyal attitude and conduct towards the Allies during the war caused them great embarrassment and loss, could only be regarded by them as a ratification by Greece of his hostile acts. This step would create a new and unfavorable situation in the relations between Greece and the Allies, and in that case the three Governments reserve to themselves complete liberty in dealing with the situation thus created.”<sup>486</sup>

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<sup>484</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/1/32, Venizelos’ letter to Lloyd George on 23<sup>rd</sup> of July 1920 was; “*My Dear Prime Minister, I do not know how to express my deep gratitude for all you said about Greece in your speech in the sitting of the 21<sup>st</sup> inst. of the House of Commons. Truly such praise, emanating from such a high authority as yours and in such a high assembly confers upon Greece a title of nobility of which she can be proud, and constitutes a stimulus for the multiplication of her energies in order to prove herself worthy of all you said about her. I wish to assure you that Greece will prove worthy of your confidence, and supported by the sympathies of the British Empire. She will be able to approach the task of the reconstruction and development of Asia Minor, where already twice in the past once in the classical age and once again in the era of the Byzantine Empire, she has proffered great services to humanity, and to-day is called upon to proffer more great services as the vanguard of European civilization. The perfect conduct of our troops during the past operations and the confidence chosen towards the Moslem elements, once more tend to prove that events of Smyrna were merely an unfortunate instance deprived of wider significance but which were sited with the object of discrediting our army. Once again, my dear Prime Minister, allow me request you to accept expression of my most gratitude, and to remain, Yours very sincerely. Venizelos [signed]*”

<sup>485</sup> ‘Morning Post’ on 22<sup>nd</sup> of July 1920. House of Lords Public Records, John St Loe Strachey (STR) Papers, ST/280/2.

<sup>486</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol; 135, Col: 1599, 2<sup>nd</sup> Dec. 1920, the speech delivered by Bonar Law.

There was news coming from Athens that there existed a strong opposition to Venizelos and even he was called a 'dictator' and this news was brought to the attention of Lloyd George<sup>487</sup>

Meanwhile the Ottoman Government especially the Grand Vizier Damad Ferid was having difficult times, because of being constantly pressurized by the Allies through their High Commissioners to ratify the Treaty and of Nationalists who seemed to control the Eastern Provinces and having victories against French and Armenians, and also by his own Cabinet. The resignation of Minister for Commerce, Ali Kemal, and Sheikh-ul-Islam on 19<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1920 was a blow-up for Damad Ferid and by a communiqué he blamed them as the source of the unrest in the Anatolia. French High Commissioner as was reported by Admiral de Robeck was pressurizing him to join in positive action to bring about change of Government.<sup>488</sup> High Commissioners in Constantinople were also discussing a mission to be sent to Angora Government. The Foreign Office approved the proposal to replace Damad Ferid and to send a mission to the Angora Government, probably with the representatives of the Allies. When the Grand Vizier was approached on the subject by the French High Commissioner, he was skeptical as to the success of the mission unless backed by threats and force and suggested that Allied representatives to be included in the mission to show the the element of force to the Nationalists.<sup>489</sup>

Foreign Office believed that probably the primary and essential condition of the pacification of Mustafa Kemal was as the French appeared to think, the elimination of Damad Ferid. For this reason it was better for Britain not to associate themselves with Damad Ferid's mission. On the other hand Foreign Office considered that provided Admiral de Robeck agreed to a meeting between a British Officer and Kazim Pasha, it would allow them to reach an understanding with the moderate Nationalists.<sup>490</sup> The War Office was considering that they could take this opportunity to discuss the exchange of prisoners.<sup>491</sup> The High Commissioners at the end

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<sup>487</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/1/38. The former Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs wrote to Lloyd George on 31<sup>st</sup> Aug. 1920 that there was turmoil in Greece and for the stabilization of the internal and the international situation of Greece; it was indispensable that the Greek people should reintegrate their regime and designate their rulers. Venizelos was criticized that he had declared that he had banned any consideration for constitutional change which was against the principles of Allies.

<sup>488</sup> PRO, FO 371/5056, E11833. For Admiral de Robeck it was very uncertain how they could trust any Government which they might bring into power to uphold Treaty. Admiral thought that Tevfik Pasha would probably be the best choice among all candidates, but Admiral considered him very weak and exposed to Nationalist influences.

<sup>489</sup> Ibid, E 11837.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid. 'Side-note' of Osborne from Foreign Office, 26<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1920.

<sup>491</sup> Ibid, E 11844.

decided on the dispatch of a Turkish Mission of Sultan accompanied by representatives of High Commissioners and Admiral de Robeck believed that it should be carried out at once. According to Admiral, the only alternative to bringing round Nationalists were further utilization of the Greek troops or using Ottoman Government as a mere tool of Allies and providing them with every kind of assistance.<sup>492</sup> Hardinge was optimistic about the mission to be accompanied by the Allied Representatives since he believed that he would not trust a purely Turkish mission.<sup>493</sup>

The request of Damad Ferid Government to raise 15,000 'special elements' and 25,000 gendarmerie was debated among Allies and Foreign Office had no objection to the Porte's demand, whereas France refused, returning to the general question of policy and suggested that all execution measures should wait for the other measures which were the replacement of Damad Ferid and the mission to Anatolia. Britain was considering that the ratification should be the first essential and Damad Ferid should be pressed to ratify it. British Foreign Office considered that in case Damad Ferid failed to ratify the Treaty, then they might find somebody else to ratify it, and once the ratification was done, they could accomplish the mission to the Nationalists. It was the War Office's wish that the 'special elements' for the Ottoman Empire to fight against Nationalists should be slowed down and the establishment of the formation of gendarmerie could be only after ratification. The Foreign Office was considering that the question of withdrawing Greek troops was becoming a matter of urgency but they should find something else to replace it.

Foreign Office proposed for the British High Commissioner to tell the Grand Vizier that until the ratification of the treaty, no real progress could be made with organizing the forces allowed by its provisions or with the necessary measures of financial relief and therefore they were hoping that the Grand Vizier would see his way to ratify at once.<sup>494</sup> Hardinge was sure that their right policy was to exert all the pressure possible to get the Turks to ratify. He believed that once it was done, the whole situation would be clearer and he agreed the scheme of applying pressure, which was threatening Damad Ferid to ratify.

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<sup>492</sup> Ibid, E 11862.

<sup>493</sup> Ibid.

<sup>494</sup> Ibid, E12101, Osborne's 'Side-note', 2<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1920.

Damad Ferid was worried not only because of the Allied Commissioner's pressure upon him, but also in the event that Nationalists came to the power. He told Admiral de Robeck that he was concerned for his personal safety, the Sultan's and persons identified with his policy. Admiral requested from Foreign Office for authorization to tell him that Britain would not tolerate any action against his person or that of the Sultan in such case.<sup>495</sup>

Britain, meanwhile had to deal with the possible abdication of the Sultan, when Admiral de Robeck telegraphed the Foreign Office that he was told by Damad Ferid that the Sultan was reaching limits of endurance and might abdicate rather than consent to work with a Government of Nationalist character. Admiral further told that he was sending a message to Ferid to the effect that, should Ferid to resign he would assist him to leave Turkey if he desired. Admiral believed that if the Sultan or Ferid be placed in position of personal danger, utmost would be done to protect their persons. Edmonds from Foreign Office noted that the High Commissioners in Constantinople already decided to try to have Ferid Pasha to be replaced by Tevfik Pasha. He believed that if the Commissioners managed it, the French would have no further ground to refuse to collaborate in the organization of the Turkish Military Force and the Nationalists might in fact feel rather more inclined to accept the Sultan's authority. Edmonds was hoping that Tevfik Pasha might be more appealing to moderate Turks with whom he carried some weight, but he was too old to be Grand Vizier at the time of crisis.<sup>496</sup> Osborne noted that it would seem that the French had got his way about Damad Ferid. He had the information from Russia that Mustafa Kemal's position was desperate that Enver Pasha was about to replace him. He believed that the time was right enough to try and detach Mustafa Kemal and his moderate followers from the extremists who were prepared to sacrifice Turkey for the Enver-Bolshevik ambitions.<sup>497</sup> The Foreign Office agreed with the High Commissioner with regard to giving assurances to Ferid and the Sultan. They believed that they could not refuse to help the Sultan to leave Turkey, but considered that he should be urged not to abdicate. Curzon considering the developments noted that he did not quite like the situation in which things were going in Constantinople, and he believed that the sooner they got an Ambassador

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<sup>495</sup> Ibid, E12184, Admiral de Robeck's telegram to the Foreign Office, 1<sup>st</sup> of Oct. 1920.

<sup>496</sup> Ibid, E12184, W.S. Edmonds' 'Note', 4<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920.

<sup>497</sup> Ibid, E12184, D.G. Osborne's 'Note', 4<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920.

there the better as he was not very happy with Admiral de Robeck's handling the situation.<sup>498</sup>

Meanwhile the French was having difficulties in Southeastern part of Anatolia and it was reported to the Foreign Office that French appeared to have reversed their policy and was recalling the Commanders back and they were reported to contemplate evacuation and restoration of the Turkish authority.<sup>499</sup> Foreign Office believed that French could only withdraw his forces provided that three powers were agreed that the Treaty provisions for the protection of inhabitants had been put into force and their execution guaranteed. Since the Armenians in Cilicia were willing to fight, Foreign Office considered that both French and Britain were committed for Armenia and therefore French obligation to maintain a protective force of occupation would appear to be gone.<sup>500</sup> At the meantime Britain was feeding Armenians with war material.

D.G. Osborne commented on the situation in Constantinople that he had heard that Venizelos had addressed the Prime Minister on the subject of a further Greek advance for the purpose of pacifying the Anatolia and securing the execution of the Treaty. He believed that in case Venizelos did not demand too high of a price or one entailing a modification of the Treaty for his own benefit and that the Allied Military Authorities were to be satisfied that the Greeks could perform the task quickly and decisively, then, the attack on Turks could be planned. He further believed that a Greek advance into Anatolia might be the best solution of the present difficulty in spite of its inherent disadvantages. Osborne, after seeing the Greek proposal, was going to note later that Venizelos was practically asking of scraping the Treaty. Osborne believed that it was a military question, therefore if there was a reasonable certainty of bringing the Nationalist forces to battle and of dissolving the whole organization by a decisive victory, there would be much in its favour. But according to Osborne, the past experience of Greek campaign had shown that the Nationalists evaded decisive military action and withdrew further into the interior and therefore exposing Greeks to guerilla warfare. Osborne was inclined to think that further operations would only have the same result and at far greater risk owing to the far longer lines of communication. He was considering that there was a possibility that the Greek advance might galvanize the expiring Nationalist movement into re-

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<sup>498</sup> Ibid, E12184, Curzon's 'Note', 5<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1920.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid, E12450.

<sup>500</sup> Ibid, E12450, D.G. Osborne's 'Note', 11<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920.

awakening the anti-Greek feeling. There was also another possibility according to Osborne that Mustafa Kemal and Kazim Karabekir could join Bolsheviks, and in that case the situation could reach to uncontrollable stage for the Allies and in any event of a military failure, Venizelos would be finished in Greece and so was Damad Ferid and even the Sultan. Osborne in his 'Note' also discussed the possibility of permitting further Greek advance and still more a modification of the Treaty in favour of Greece and to the detriment of Turkey. He believed that if they were to follow this policy, it would almost certainly mean a break with Italy over the Allied Turkish policy and France could follow the example of Italy, and therefore Britain could hardly act alone. Osborne proposed that the mission to Mustafa Kemal, should be tried first to threaten him that if he did not accept the Treaty, there would be further Greek operations for the pacification of Anatolia.<sup>501</sup>

Tilley's comment on Osborne's 'Note' on the situation was; "*...another blow [to Turks] is necessary and there is nobody to give it but the Greeks. I see no necessity to alter the Treaty and I certainly would not do so. It is not as if the Greeks had nothing to gain by knocking out the Nationalists, they have; they are securing their [precious] hold on Smyrna which, if the Nationalists are not knocked out, they will find a white elephant. I do not believe a Greek advance would lead to the attendant results expected of it*"<sup>502</sup>

Hardinge pointed out that the situation had been already discussed in the Cabinet, and no decision as to a Greek advance was taken. The question had been referred till further information had been obtained from Military Authorities.<sup>503</sup>

After negotiations, the Allies agreed on the policy to be followed in Constantinople. The policy was such that measures to be taken to secure immediate ratification of the Treaty and replacing Damad Ferid after ratification. The considered mission to Anatolia was to be after the ratification. With the French proposal it was also agreed that the ratification should be by the Extraordinary Crown Council, until such time as elections could be held and Parliamentary ratification could take place.<sup>504</sup>

The ratification was still a problem that the Allied High Commissioners had to tackle, and with the invitation of the Sultan had a meeting with the Sultan on 11<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920

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<sup>501</sup> Ibid, E12474, D.G. Osborne's 'Note', 12<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920.

<sup>502</sup> Ibid, E12474, Tilley's, Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign Office, 'Note', 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid.

<sup>504</sup> Ibid, E12475, E12597.

and discussed the issue. The Sultan insisted that the Treaty should be ratified by the Allied Parliaments first and seemed very devoted to Damad Ferid.<sup>505</sup> At that stage Damad Ferid resigned on 15<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1920 and Tevfik Pasha became the next Grand Vizier. Damad Ferid after resignation went to London to settle there.<sup>506</sup> The Sultan in his conversation with Admiral de Robeck indicated that he was inclined to abdication which was something that Britain was not happy with. Britain considered that in that case Prince Abdul Medjid would become the next Sultan who was according to Admiral de Robeck, was hostile the Treaty. It was interesting how British High Commissioner portrayed the situation in Constantinople and the bureaucracy. He wrote on 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920 to the Foreign Office as;

*“...Even if he [Prince Abdul Medjid] did not repudiate ratification by his predecessor an unconstitutional he would leave nothing undone to infuse new life into Nationalist opposition. Even if Sultan consented to remain after indignity of being forced to dismiss only Minister in whom he has personal confidence, after that Minister had been used to force him to ratify treaty, our position would be no better than the present. Ministry composed of puppets of High Commissioners would certainly possess no authority, and unless we were prepared to take over Government ourselves outcome would be Government of extreme anti-Nationalists without Ferid’s sense or responsibility or much more probable Government of definite Nationalist sympathies with whom neither we nor Sultan could work.”<sup>507</sup>*

While the Allies were discussing the urgency of the ratification and the mission to Anatolia, whether allied representatives would accompany the Turks to Angora Government or not, news reached on 23<sup>rd</sup> of November to London that Nationalists signed an agreement with Bolsheviks and the mission returned to Constantinople from Angora. As expected by the Foreign Office, the Angora Government officials were prepared to discuss with the Allies provided that they agreed to what Kemalists regarded as essential modifications of the Treaty.<sup>508</sup> For the demands of Nationalists, Edmonds commented as a bluff and that if the Nationalists had the chance they would demand at least the pre-war Turkey, but Osborne doubted if they would demand the pre-war Turkey.<sup>509</sup>

Meanwhile the effect of Nationalist movement was felt not only in Anatolia but throughout the Islam world. Viceroy of India on 23<sup>rd</sup> of November sent a Memorandum to the British Government and Montagu circulated it to the Cabinet including Lloyd George on 26<sup>th</sup> of November.<sup>510</sup> Viceroy of India evaluated the

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<sup>505</sup> Ibid, E12658.

<sup>506</sup> Ibid, E12786.

<sup>507</sup> Ibid, E12832, Admiral de Robeck’s letter to Curzon, 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1920.

<sup>508</sup> PRO, FO 371/5058, E14695,

<sup>509</sup> Ibid, E14695, Edmonds and Osborne’s ‘Notes’ on 24<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1920 respectively.

<sup>510</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/40/3/32, Montagu’s letter to Lloyd George on 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1920.

situation as quite dangerous and resentment for the British policy throughout the Moslem world. It was pointed out that Britain because of her policies towards Turks became the enemy of Islam in Asia.<sup>511</sup> Similar views were also conveyed to the Prime Minister by George Lloyd through Montagu.<sup>512</sup> Within the circle of Bureaucracy there were others who considered that Smyrna province should not be handed over to the Turks. M.P.A. Hankey wrote to Lloyd George after his conversation with Commodore Fitz Maurice who was the Senior Naval Officer during the Smyrna expedition of Greeks and according to Hankey, he was a friend of the Turks. After Hankey's explanation of the basis of British policy in the Near East and the reasons which had led Britain to back the Greeks, who were a rising race, rather than a decadent as Turkey was, Fitz Maurice talked about the importance of Smyrna and he told that the only alternative to the Greek regime in Smyrna was that the Allies should themselves occupy it. He told that the 'Turks would eat out of their hands anywhere'.<sup>513</sup>

Meanwhile the elections ended with the defeat of Venizelos on 14<sup>th</sup> of November and a new phase emerged for the relations between Greece and the Allies. Lloyd George wrote to Venizelos a sentimental letter to comfort him for the defeat.<sup>514</sup>

The defeat of Venizelist policy made its impact on the Allies. General Staff prepared a Memorandum on 19<sup>th</sup> of November for distribution to the Cabinet with regard to the military situation in Anatolia. The French and British troops in the neighborhood of Constantinople amounted to 15 battalions and one cavalry regiment and would decrease shortly by the departure of three battalions, so that the Allies was dependent on the Greek Army in Asia Minor, which amounted to eight divisions or 110,000 soldiers and was holding a line from the Black Sea, north of Ismid, to the southern end of the Smyrna enclave. Considering the financial situation of Greece, it

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<sup>511</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/40/3/33.

<sup>512</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/40/3/39, George Lloyd who was going to be the Secretary of State for Colonies under the Premier of Churchill in 1940's, at the time he wrote to Montagu, was the Governor of Bombay after serving in Egypt in 'Arab Bureau.

<sup>513</sup> PRO, CAB 21/174, M.P.A. Hankey's letter to the Prime Minister on 23<sup>rd</sup> Nov. 1920.

<sup>514</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/1/41, Lloyd George wrote to Venizelos on 17<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1920, that; *"Dear Monsieur Venizelos, I was deeply shocked and distressed to see the result of the Greek elections. It almost makes one despair of democracy. I want now to assure you of the sympathy and gratitude and admiration which the British People feel towards you for all you achieved in the last few years. No great leader could have stood more steadfastly than you have by the highest interests for his country and by the ideals for which the Allies fought in the Great War. I can assure you that our name will always be honored in this country as one of Britain's best friends and one of Europe's greatest statesman. Our hearts are with you in this difficult time. We shall never forget your tried loyalty during the great period when militarism threatened to overwhelm our liberties and when, practically alone, among the leaders of the smaller nations of Europe you never wavered in your support of the Allied causes. I hope and believe it will not be long before the people of Greece realize the mistake they have made and recall you to take of charge once more of their affairs. Yours ever. (signed)"*.

was foreseen that a reduction of the military accumulation was inevitable. With the fall of Venizelos, General Staff considered that it was impossible to forecast the impact on the Greek Army or Greek policy for Anatolia. It was concluded that it might be impossible to maintain that large army in Anatolia for Greece. The General Staff drew the attention of the Cabinet that with the new developments they had to employ a new policy and they should either send reinforcements to Constantinople, or withdraw the existing British troops and therefore re-adjust the Allied policy. General Staff proposed the possibility, taking into consideration of the situation in Greece and therefore making use of it, of changing the Allied policy towards the Turks. General Staff believed that a drastic revision of the territorial terms of the Treaty in respect of Smyrna, the province of Kars, and possibly of Thrace, would induce the Nationalists to break with Bolsheviks. By doing this, according to the General Staff, a new Turkey would be created as a buffer state between the Allies and Russia and with this new set up, Britain would be able to remove some of the ill feelings they had in India, Egypt and in Mesopotamia towards Britain.<sup>515</sup>

General Staff's memorandum was distributed along with the Memorandum of Churchill, the Secretary for War, on 23<sup>rd</sup> of Nov. 1920. Churchill commented that they ought to come to terms with Mustafa Kemal and arrive at peace with Turkey, and hence they would secure their position and interests at Constantinople. Churchill believed that by establishing peace with Turkey, they could ease the position in Egypt, Mesopotamia, Persia, and India and also they could recreate a barrier for Russia. Churchill believed that by regaining their influence over the Turks, they could do something for Armenia and for Georgia to enable her to withstand against Bolsheviks. Churchill further commented that in their present state of military weakness and financial problems they could not afford to continue to upset the Moslem world in order to hand over a greater Greece to King Constantine, even at the situation they were in Venizelos had staged a war that was beyond the capacity of Greece. Churchill pleaded to establish a just and lasting peace with the real leaders in Turkey in conjunction with French.<sup>516</sup>

The situation in Turkey was discussed in the Conference of Ministers on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Dec. 1920. The topics of discussion were the Treaty not being ratified by Turks and the military situation in Constantinople especially after the fall of Venizelos in Greece. It was pointed out that it was impossible to maintain their position except on a basis of

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<sup>515</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/3.

<sup>516</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/4.

friendly relations with Turkey, because of expenses and other difficulties connected with their troops in Turkey. It was argued that due to the alliance of Turks with Bolsheviks and the fall of Venizelos, an opportunity had risen to make peace with Turkey by making the conditions of the Treaty less heavy for them. Returning Smyrna to Turks was considered to be unacceptable for the Allies, although there was some sympathy among the ministers to the suggestion that the area could be declared as an autonomous area under the suzerainty of the Turks. It was generally agreed to wait for the developments and see if the Greeks could maintain their position in Turkey rather than to offer alterations to the Treaty. The Conference was ended with the conclusion of;

*“That His Majesty’s Government should continue to press the Turks to ratify the Treaty of Sevres, and should resist attempts to modify the Treaty directly and at once. In the event of the subsequent non-fulfillment of certain terms of the Treaty, the opportunity should be taken to reconsider the situation which could then arise, in a light more favourable to Turkey.”<sup>517</sup>*

Churchill with a ‘note’ on 10<sup>th</sup> of December objected the minutes of the ‘Conference of Ministers’ meeting that was held on 2<sup>nd</sup> of December. He wrote that at the meeting he expressed his own views and those of General Staff which was similar to the Lord Privy Seal [Bonar Law], the Chancellor of the Exchequer [Chamberlain] and the Secretaries of State for India and Colonies [Montagu and Milner]. He stated that those views were such that they should make a definite change in their policy in the direction of procuring a real peace with the Moslem world and so relieving themselves of the disastrous reaction both military and financial to which their anti-Turk policy had exposed them in the Middle East and in India, therefore there was not unanimous agreement as was quoted in the Minutes on the phrase of ‘possibility of handing back Smyrna to the Turks by the Allies could not be entertained’. Churchill commented that on the contrary he was convinced that the restoration of Turkish sovereignty or suzerainty over the Smyrna Province was an indispensable step to the pacification of the Middle East.

Another objection of Churchill to the ‘Minutes’ was on the point that there was no mention of ‘some sympathies to turn Smyrna to an autonomous area’, but it was mentioned for Thrace and he could not recollect anybody suggesting this scheme for Smyrna. He believed that the views were expressed to hand over Smyrna to Turks. A further objection was for the statement in the ‘Minutes’ that ‘It was felt that sooner or later it might possibly be desirable to enter into direct negotiations with

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<sup>517</sup> PRO, CAB 23/38, PRO and CAB 23/23, Cabinet 70(20) Appendix III, ‘Conference of Ministers’ held on 2<sup>nd</sup> Dec. 1920.

Mustafa Kemal'. According to Churchill, this was complete understatement of the general view. Churchill reminded the speech of the Prime Minister who was in favour of entering into negotiations with Mustafa Kemal. Churchill asked the Secretary of the Cabinet to distribute his 'Note' to the Ministers that had received the 'Minutes'.<sup>518</sup>

The 'Turkish Question' was once more discussed in the 'Conference of Ministers' on 10<sup>th</sup> of December on the scope of an article which appeared in India, Bombay Chronicle. The article which was going to be protested as 'a malicious rumor' by the Viceroy, commented as; "*France and Italy are urging revision of Turkish Treaty and restoration of Thrace and Smyrna to Turkey. Lord Curzon, who represents British 'nonconformist conscience' is opposing frantically and is determined to destroy the Moslem Empire and nation*"<sup>519</sup>

Britain was aware that France and Italy were in touch with Nationalists in discrete. Foreign Office by evaluating a secret report seemed to be obtained through British agents learned that Galib Kemal Bey, agent of Nationalists at Rome had written to Mustafa Kemal on 5<sup>th</sup> of September, that he was visited by the Chief of Political Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was told that the Italian Government favoured a strong Turkey to counter balance certain states which had been unduly enlarged. The Italian Official further told that they were prepared to show their friendship to Turkey and to Moslems and were prepared to mediate between the Ottoman Government and Nationalists as well as between Allies and Turks.<sup>520</sup>

British Foreign Office through French War Office learned that there was an Italian Military Mission at Angora during late October 1920, and numerous barrels of petrol from an Italian source had been sent from Adalia [Adana] into the interior of Anatolia. The French Foreign Office also received information from Nationalist source that two field guns destined to Mustafa Kemal had been sent from Adalia by Italians.<sup>521</sup> Marquis Imperiali, the Italian Ambassador in London was going to deny the presence of Italian Military Mission in Angora in his conversation with Sir Eyre Crowe. Likewise Count Sforza told Sir Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Rome, that these rumors were result of intrigues against Italy. Edmonds commented on the news they had received from French that, they had been receiving secret reports

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<sup>518</sup> Ibid.

<sup>519</sup> Ibid.

<sup>520</sup> PRO, FO 371/5056, E15089.

<sup>521</sup> PRO, FO 371/5057, E13183.

about the dispatch of Italian munitions to the Nationalists, although they had no proof.<sup>522</sup>

The claim for the Italians helping Nationalists, were made by Greece too. The Greek Delegation in London applied to Foreign Office for their help to halt the war materials to be transported to Angora Government by the Italians. They requested the British Navy to watch all such transports in order to prevent any further reinforcements reaching Mustafa Kemal.<sup>523</sup> Foreign Office had already asked the Admiralty to keep a ship at the claimed port, Trebizond, in order to increase patrolling. Greek Government on 5<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920 notified Foreign Office that they had received information that Nationalist officers were arming and training Turks at Lampseki [Lapseki], that an Italian steamer had transported arms to that district. They also pointed out that an Italian firm was said to have agreed to furnish Mustafa Kemal with war materials. The Greek Government suggested that steps to be taken at Constantinople put an end to activities directed against Greek forces.<sup>524</sup> The accusations for Italians helping Nationalists were officially relayed to the Italian Government and Italian Government with a dispatch to Buchanan, the British Ambassador in Rome told that the reports were false and scandalous. They told that they had reached, after careful enquiries, and without obtaining confirmation of alleged facts to the conclusion that the reports were due to the misplaced confidence of British Military Authorities in information supplied by the Greek agents.<sup>525</sup>

The Greek Government once more applied to Foreign Office about Turkish atrocities in Ismid area against Christians. The Greek Generalissimo for the Greek Forces in Anatolia had sent a telegram to his Government that there existed a continued persecution of Christians and stating that only means of terminating such measures would be to treat all prisoners as rebels and shoot them after a short trial. Greek Government told Foreign Office that they would be reluctant to adopt such measures, but would be obliged to if Turkish atrocities continued.<sup>526</sup> The Foreign Office did not have any comment on the approach of treatment of Turkish prisoners by Greeks.

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<sup>522</sup> Ibid

<sup>523</sup> Ibid, E13641.

<sup>524</sup> Ibid.

<sup>525</sup> FO 371/5058, E14493.

<sup>526</sup> PRO, FO 371/5057, E13837, Letter from Legation de Greece to Foreign Office, 5th of Nov. 1920.

The Italian Government's relations were also discussed in the Parliament. When a Member inquired; "*Whether Italian subjects had been supplying Nationalists with arms or money and what steps, if any, had been taken by the Italian Government to prevent their doing so. Mr. Harmsworth [Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs] replied that His Majesty's Government had received many reports of this nature and that they had been brought to the notice of the Italian Government, who had categorically denied them*"<sup>527</sup>

British Intelligence reported that Mustafa Kemal went to Rhodes, apparently in October 1920, to meet the Italian High Commissioner and on his return to Turkey he had an interview at some point on the coast with the Representative of Constantinople Government. Osborne believed that all these Reports were the indication that there were unofficial negotiations going on.<sup>528</sup> Whereas another Intelligence Report mentioned that Mustafa Kemal had been at the Headquarters of Italians to discuss the offence he was planning against Greeks.

According to the British Intelligence reports, Mustafa Kemal was active through his agents to acquire the support of Italian and Ottoman Jews. The Report indicated that the Jews might support and finance Mustafa Kemal, did they believe that the Nationalists might be able to re-establish on the South Eastern Anatolia, since Jews had acquired lands along the Bagdad Railway in the district of Urfa-Mosul<sup>529</sup>

British Intelligence reported to Foreign Office that Mustafa Kemal had written to Izzet Pasha and put forward his conditions for starting the negotiations with the Allies with a letter dated 26<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1920 delivered by his agent in Constantinople. The conditions set forth by Mustafa Kemal appeared in the 'Morning Post' on 1<sup>st</sup> of November<sup>530</sup> as; Smyrna to be administered by Straits Commission under Turkish suzerainty, Thrace to be autonomous under Turkish suzerainty, modifications in financial and other controls imposed by the Treaty, addition of Turkish Delegates to Straits Commission and separation of Caliphate and Sultanate.<sup>531</sup>

The proposals set forth by Mustafa Kemal were evaluated in the Foreign Office, as totally unacceptable. Osborne noted that Mustafa Kemal's 5 points were quite

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<sup>527</sup> Ibid, E14337, PRO

<sup>528</sup> Ibid, E13497, PRO

<sup>529</sup> PRO, FO 371/5058, E14918.

<sup>530</sup> PRO, FO 371/5057, E13497.

<sup>531</sup> PRO, FO 371/5058, E14760.

unacceptable, both the first four to the Allies and the last to the Sultan. According to Admiral de Robeck, the Cabinet in Constantinople told that until the Nationalists had been appeased, they would not ratify the Treaty. Osborne believed that this was the result of the secret negotiations with the Nationalists. He commented that they should maintain their insistence on ratification until the Treaty was ratified and when it was done then it would be a *raison d'être* to the Nationalists.<sup>532</sup>

Major Young was asked by the Foreign Office to evaluate the fifth proposal of Mustafa Kemal. Major after consulting with his colleagues noted that they had regarded it as an indication that Mustafa Kemal was definitely ranging himself on the side of Pan-Islam as apposed to Bolshevism. He thought that Mustafa Kemal considered that Bolshevism was played out and therefore realized that it had really nothing in common with Pan-Islam. The reference to a 'descendant of the Prophet' was intended to bring King Hussein on to his side. Major Young further commented that the reference, though no one but the 'old man' himself would swallow the description of himself as 'enjoying the confidence of the whole Islamic world'. Nevertheless Major Young took the report very seriously and asked the report to be circulated and inserted in the agenda of the Eastern Committee to take counter-measure without delay.<sup>533</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe and Curzon had seen the comments of Osborne and Major Young and seemed to be in full agreement.

Meanwhile with the resignation of Damad Ferid, Tevfik Pasha formed the new Cabinet. The inclusion of Izzet Pasha, ex-Premier, as the Interior Minister was welcomed by the Foreign Office because of his ties with the Nationalists and as Osborne observed that if the Cabinet containing Izzet Pasha ratified the Treaty and then appealed to the patriotism of the moderate Nationalists, then, Mustafa Kemal would have every excuse and interest to accept the Treaty and abandon their struggle.<sup>534</sup> The Minister for Foreign Affairs for Constantinople told Admiral de Robeck that they would wait for the mission to go to Angora Government for discussions to ratify the Treaty. But the chance for the acceptance of the Treaty by the Angora Government was getting less probable. According to Admiral de Robeck the latest Bolshevik and Nationalist military success would make still less disposed to accept any proposals made by the Constantinople Government. There was also a problem because of the reductions in Allied forces in Turkey. Admiral was drawing

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<sup>532</sup> PRO, FO 371/5057, E13497, Osborne's 'Note', 1<sup>st</sup> Nov. 1920.

<sup>533</sup> Ibid, E13497, Major Young's 'Note', 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1920.

<sup>534</sup> Ibid, E13178.

attention to the probable offensive of Kemalist forces along with the Bolsheviks to Ismid area and the collapse of Greek forces.

Osborne thought that they could not pay the price to Greeks simply to restore Armenia, and the Nationalists could not rescue Smyrna. He believed that Bolsheviks would not fight in Anatolia any more than British would do and he doubted if the Bolsheviks-Nationalists alliance would last long. Osborne thought that they should continue to insist on ratification and wait for developments. Another possibility was to give back Smyrna and give the Greeks Constantinople, therefore making the map of Turkey much tidier.<sup>535</sup>

Tilley was in agreement with Osborne that an increase of their force was out of the question and he was also considering that the restoration of Smyrna was out of the question. He believed that the High Commissioner's anxiety was based on the theory that they ought to somehow re-conquer Anatolia which was in his opinion an erroneous theory. He was thinking that in order to secure ratification, it might be necessary to threaten the Turks by the occupation of Constantinople by the Greeks. Eyre Crowe was in full agreement with Tilley and further stated that the Italians wanted to modify the Treaty so as to hurt Greeks, and hoped to benefit by their agreement with Mustafa Kemal.<sup>536</sup> Eyre Crowe was going to suggest threatening Italians that the occupation of Constantinople by the Greek forces might take place unless Constantinople Government ratified the Treaty soon.<sup>537</sup>

The Constantinople Government had sent a messenger to Mustafa Kemal about the mission of the Government. The messenger, Neshet [Neşet] Bey, on his return told that he was treated well by Mustafa Kemal and he was waiting the mission of Izzet Pasha to come to Angora. Neshet Bey reported that, Mustafa Kemal was anxious to come to agreement with the Central (Constantinople) Government, because of his fear of Nationalists being dominated by CPU and of spread of Bolshevism in Anatolia. Neshet considered that Mustafa Kemal would insist on return of Smyrna but would accept autonomous Thrace which would withdraw Greeks from Straits.<sup>538</sup>

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<sup>535</sup> Ibid, E14008, Osborne's 'Note', 11<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920.

<sup>536</sup> Ibid, Tilley's and Eyre Crowe's 'Notes', 11<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920.

<sup>537</sup> Ibid, E14029.

<sup>538</sup> PRO, FO 371/5058, E14823, General Harington's message to Foreign Office on 26<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920. General Charles Harington was appointed as the Commander of Allied Forces of the Occupied Constantinople on 8<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1920.

Meanwhile the Central Government was suffering from financial crisis and the Foreign Minister in his visit to Sir H. Rumbold who had taken over the High Commission from Admiral de Robeck on 17<sup>th</sup> of November, made an appeal for financial facilities to carry out the administration. Rumbold told the Foreign Minister that; *"I said although treaty had shorn Turkey of much territory, she was still a considerable State, which would become prosperous if her economic resources developed and internal peace restored. I would do my utmost to contribute to this when the treaty had been ratified."*<sup>539</sup> But his impression was that the Government would wait ratification for the mission to return from Angora.

Meanwhile the Italians openly and the French discreetly were debating the hand over of Smyrna to Turks and make peace with Mustafa Kemal. As a result of the failure of Venizelos in the Greek elections and the victories of Nationalists and Armenia's request for peace from Turks had changed the atmosphere in the Allied capitals, and especially in Constantinople. Rumbold in his message to the Foreign Office on 27<sup>th</sup> of November discussed the effect of the Greek crisis and Armenian situation to the position of Nationalists. He told that the atmosphere in Constantinople was such that the revision of the Treaty had become inevitable at least partially after the defeat of Armenians and even drastically if the Greek forces lapsed in Smyrna. He stated that unless the Allies were prepared to undertake difficult military operations in interior of Anatolia, pacification of Asia Minor could be accelerated only by going a long way to meet the Nationalists. Rumbold further suggested that the Allies might act as 'honest brokers' and act as protectors of Islam against Bolshevism"<sup>540</sup>

The situation and the Peace Treaty was brought to the attention of the Parliament on 9<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1920 when a Member asked to Prime Minister; *"if the present Turkish Agreement in the Near East contains the violation of the Allied pledges in respect to the Bulgarians, Turks, and Arabs and whether as consequence, Turkish nationalism is opposing the Allies, and if the whole of the Moslem world is restive under the imputed breaches of faith on the part of Great Britain"*<sup>541</sup> The question was answered by Harmsworth as 'negative'. Sir Eyre Crowe, who became the Under-Secretary of Foreign Office, reacted to the question as *"Reply simply: No. Sir"*<sup>542</sup>

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<sup>539</sup> Ibid, E14785, Sir H. Rumbold's message to Foreign Office, 24<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920.

<sup>540</sup> Ibid, E14960, Sir H. Rumbold's message to Foreign Office, 27<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920.

<sup>541</sup> Ibid, E15448.

<sup>542</sup> Ibid.

The voice against the foreign policy was increasing not only in the public or in the Parliament but also in the Cabinet. Montagu wrote to Lloyd Georg on 9<sup>th</sup> of December and enclosed the telegram he received from Sir George Lloyd. George Lloyd wrote that the sentiments in India were getting to a stage beyond control and he was asking whether the Government could take advantage of the Greek situation to obtain a settlement with the Turks<sup>543</sup>.

Secretary of State for War, Churchill, issued a Memorandum on 16<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1920 to be distributed to the Cabinet. Churchill drew the picture they were in Middle East due to their foreign policy. Britain was not in good terms neither with Russians nor with Turks because Britain had taken the lead against Turks and had put herself forward as the principal anti-Turkish Power. French treatment of Arabs had placed Britain in an awkward position. The return of Constantine to Greece had also severed the special relations that Britain had with Greece. Churchill pointed out that their military forces were extremely weak and maintained with great difficulty, and they had no friends even among Powers. According to Churchill, due to their disappointing foreign policy, they were alone in Middle East, and the only way to safeguard their vital interests was 'divide and rule' policy which could be achieved by means of dividing up the local Powers so that if they had some opponents, they had also at any rate some friends. Churchill believed that this was the policy they had adopted in the whole of their past history. Churchill further commented that there existed four major local power; Russia, Turkey, Arabs and Greece. He hoped that without delay, they had to choose from these four local Powers some whose interests they would favour and others for whom they could not do so much, otherwise if they followed the present foreign policy, they would end up into a very weak position which they had no adequate military power to restore. The question was which of these four local Powers they should make friends with. Churchill believed that it would be very difficult to have good relations with King Constantine, and hence it was not worth to secure an Empire for Constantine for the sake of whole Moslem world. It would be impossible to make friends with Russia since conservative and monarchical country with a communist country was not compatible. The other two powers left were Arabs and Turks and although they were divided but they had the same Moslem influence and they were compatible. Churchill suggested that Britain should initiate and pursue steadily and consistently a policy of friendship with Turkey and with the Arabs. Churchill commented that they

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<sup>543</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/40/3/39.

should allow the Greek position in Smyrna to collapse. So that they had no responsibility for what happened, and then bow to the accomplished fact. Churchill believed that they could not any longer maintain their position in Constantinople if the Greeks had to pull back their army, before Britain made some arrangements with Turks. Churchill referred to a decision that Britain had already to cut off the Greek supplies of money and with the new situation Greeks could find it very difficult to maintain such a large army in Turkey. According to the Churchill's proposal they should make peace with Turks before the collapse of Greek army. If the present situation was to drift on for few months' even weeks, Churchill was afraid that they would find themselves in a position where they had no friends and in addition they might either have to evacuate Constantinople or send a considerable army to reinforce it. He did not know where this army could be found.<sup>544</sup>

'The Times' on 27<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1920 published an article before the incoming Conference of the Allies which was going to meet on 2<sup>nd</sup> of December, quoting the previous day of 'Temps' about the impact of Greek elections. The Temps had pointed out that Greece was no longer able to act as a pacifying influence in the Near East and she had rejected the role for which Venizelos and the Treaty Sevres had given her, although Venizelos had pleaded, before he embarked the train that took him to Niece, to Allies not to punish the Greeks by taking away the territories which his influence had won for them. The Temps believed that the task assigned under the Treaty of Sevres to Greece, far from diminishing, was increasing and wondered how Greece after passing through a great crisis hoped to cope with Mustafa Kemal and possibly Enver Pasha as well.<sup>545</sup>

Lloyd George, Leygues, the Prime Minister of France, and Count Sforza, the Foreign Minister of Italy met on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Dec. 1920 to discuss the Greek problem and at the end of the meetings held in London, was communicated to Dominions and to the Press. In their communiqué, they emphasized the relation and the steps to be taken against Greece. In Lloyd George's message to the Prime Ministers of Dominions it was told that British, French and Italian Governments, had constantly in past given proof of their good-will towards the Greek people and have favoured attainment of their secular aspirations. They had been therefore surprised by recent events in Greece. They had decided to communicate with Greece through their

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<sup>544</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/24.

<sup>545</sup> 'The Times', Pg. 10, 27<sup>th</sup> No. 1920,

representatives in Athens that they were formally protesting against issue by Greek Government without authority of Powers of notes 200 million Drachmas and declaring this issue violation of financial Agreements binding upon Greece since it was not covered as the Greek Law required by corresponding credits. It was further agreed on 4<sup>th</sup> of December that in the event of return of Constantine to throne no further financial assistance would be granted to Greece.<sup>546</sup>

On 10<sup>th</sup> of December, Hankey summarized the situation in Turkey with a 'Note', stating that the situation in the Near East appeared to be very disquieting. According to Hankey, deprived of all Allies financial assistance, it was going to be very difficult for Greece to keep her armies mobilized. Hankey believed that since Mustafa Kemal solved the Armenian problem, he would not hesitate moving his armies from East to West to attack Smyrna, but Hankey did not contemplate this happening yet. Hankey believed that Constantine would play his trump card and withdraw the Greek garrison from the Ismid area, and if he did this then the very small Allied garrison would not be sufficient to deal with Mustafa Kemal in the event of his attack to the area. Their line of communication and retreat through the Dardanelles would be very dangerous as the case was before the intervention of Venizelos.<sup>547</sup>

The Greek financial situation as the Allies had known did not look healthy. The debt grew from 1216 millions of drachma at the end of 1913 to 3283 millions in May 1920. The Greek financial analysis had shown that up to the eve of Asia Minor expedition Greece was fairly free from financial difficulties, but between May to end December 1920 period, the debt grew from 3283 to 4200 million, to meet the mobilization expenses in Asia Minor. Of the additional 900 millions, nearly 500 million were represented by advances from the National Bank of Greece. The Drachma had appreciated considerably since November 1920 due to loss of confidence, which led people to get rid of Drachma and the general credit tension in Britain and America. It seemed that the Greeks had already reached the point at which they could no longer finance their Asia Minor expedition without external aid. The expedition's cost was 120 millions per month, of which 40 millions were spent abroad to purchase ammunitions in Britain and France. From the financial figures it

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<sup>546</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/24/3/28 and Hansard for Commons Vol: 135, Col: 1599-1600. The message sent to Greece was read in the Parliament by Bonar Law on 2<sup>nd</sup> Dec. 1920.

<sup>547</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/24/3/28.

was apparent that Greece would not be able to cover the cost of a large army in Anatolia without external aid.<sup>548</sup>

The financial situation of Greece was debated in the Parliament on 22nd of November and 22nd of Dec. 1920, when the Prime Minister was asked whether any subsidy had been paid to Greece in respect of the operations in Asia Minor against Turkish Nationalists. Another question was forwarded to the Chancellor of the Exchequer whether the Greek troops at Smyrna were being subsidized by the British Government at the rate of about £1 million a month, and if so, whether he would put a stop to this expenditure of taxpayers' money. The answer given by the Prime Minister and Chamberlain, the Chancellor, was 'No'.<sup>549</sup>

Harmsworth had explained on 9<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1920 that there was a Financial Agreement of February 1918 with Greece that Britain opened a book-credit in favour of Greek Government to the extent of £10 Million. The Government of Venizelos had already drawn £6.5 Million. The new Greek Government, with the decision reached in London on 3<sup>rd</sup> December had been informed that in the event of the return of the Constantine to the throne of Greece no further financial assistance would be afforded, and all further Greek drafts upon the balance of this credit would therefore had to be suspended.<sup>550</sup> Members in the House questioned the Government that it was a fact that the financial assistance to Greece had been spent on the Greek Army, although Chancellor of Exchequer announced in the House more than once that Britain was not assisting Greece. Another question was on the availability of machinery for getting back £6.5 Million from Greece.<sup>551</sup> The Government was going to be questioned once more on the assistance to the Greek Government. Harmsworth On 22<sup>nd</sup> of Dec. 1920 explained in the House of Commons that the British Government was not making any payment to the Greek Government and all the outstanding Greek claims under existing agreements were in abeyance. The cash advance since 1914 amounted to £15 Million, and interest of 5 % was added to the principal. The cash advance was payable in part, 2 years after the signature of the Peace Treaty, and in part 15 years after the Armistice of 11<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1918.<sup>552</sup>

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<sup>548</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/12.

<sup>549</sup> Hansard for Commons Vol: 135, Col.: 57 and PRO, CAB 21/174.

<sup>550</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 135, Col: 2409,

<sup>551</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 135, Col: 2413-14.

<sup>552</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 136, Col: 1750.

There was also pressure on the Government from Trade Department that the situation in Turkey was adversely affecting the trade and as 1920 it was almost at standstill, therefore The Board of Trade was urging the Government that the Treaty should be ratified as soon as possible.

The Turkish Peace and the situation in Turkey were debated almost in each session in the Parliament both in House of Commons and in The House of Lords. Lloyd George explained the assistance given to Armenia in his reply on 22<sup>nd</sup> of November that Britain had sent 25,000 rifles, 1,000 tons of oil fuel, and various kinds of munitions to Armenia and also was planning to send some more at the beginning of November 1920 but the sudden collapse of Armenia had rendered its dispatch undesirable.<sup>553</sup> The military expenditure was tabled in the House of Commons by Churchill that the cost of the military in Constantinople was £135,000 per month which was much above the figures given by Lloyd George that the forecasted expenditure was only £1,000 weekly.<sup>554</sup>

The change of the Government in Greece and its consequences in Anatolia was debated widely in December 1920. The questions were asked to the Prime Minister whether there was any object in continuing to offend their friendly fellow-subjects for the sake of the ungrateful Greeks.<sup>555</sup> Another question put forward to the Prime Minister was the consequences of the new developments in Anatolia, in view of the recent developments in Turkey and in Greece, they should consider it advisable to try and reach an agreement with both Turkish Governments on the basis of freeing Turkish majorities in the Smyrna territory from Greek control.<sup>556</sup>

The debate on Turkey with the light of the new situation in Greece took place on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Dec.1920 in the House of Commons. Members criticized the Government policy on Turkey and told that the ratification of the Sevres was not done by the Turks and it was hoped that this indicated that there was still a chance for the Allies to realize the position in Asia Minor, and were prepared to base a new policy, not on dreams, but on hard facts. Apart from the pledges that were made by the Powers in favour of self-determination and against the right of conquest, the foreseen partition

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<sup>553</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 135, Col: 50.

<sup>554</sup> Hansard for Commons Vol: 125, Col:1026, Churchill quoted the expenditure on 23<sup>rd</sup> Nov. 1920 as; Mesopotamia £1,000,000, Constantinople £135,000, Egypt £90,000 and Palestine £135,000 per month (Hansard for Commons Vol: 135, Col: 195-196), whereas on 19<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920 Lloyd George answered a question as that the average weekly cost was; military £750,000, Naval £4,500, but would be reduced to around £1000 very shortly.

<sup>555</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 136, Col: 470.

<sup>556</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 136, Col: 697, 16<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1920 session.

was impracticable owing to the fact that Anatolia was never in effective occupation. The Members pointed out that the Treaty failed because it had tried to adopt control and partition. It had secured on paper a very effective control both over the Turkish Army and the Turkish financial systems of which might be a very valuable reality if the Allied Governments had not been misled by the Greek argument. The Treaty partitioned Turkey to areas that Greece had no racial claim. The Members of the Parliament then accused the leaders who prepared the treaty of having no practical knowledge of Greeks. They had judged the strength of the Greeks by a man who had since been emphatically repudiated by Greece. Greece could not bear the burden of military effort which was involved by Britain. Venizelos had lost the election as Queen Olga had said because Greece could not stand this great strain of mobilization, and asked for peace. As a result of this as the Members claimed, the whole sanction for Allied policy in Anatolia appeared to be destroyed. They pointed out that by giving the territorial claims; Britain had lost the very valuable conditions contained in the Treaty of Sevres as to financial and military control. It was the Treaty that the flame of nationalism had flourished, and the power was with Mustafa Kemal, and the Nationalists had been driven into an unnatural alliance with Bolsheviks.

The Members of the Parliament in their speeches suggested that the Allies should try and solve this alliance between Mustafa Kemal and Bolsheviks unless they wanted the Anatolia to become a plague which easily could be spread into Mesopotamia, Syria, and Persia. Nationalism in Western Europe appeared largely to be a spent force, but it was likely to continue in the Middle East and the tendency in Britain was to ignore that fact and to divide the Near East into convenient categories, adopting rather easy classification, which was dividing them into good Christians and bad Moslems. Unfortunately it was by no means so simple to have the categorization as pro-Turk or pro-Christian. But from an earnest desire of peace they argued that it was not attainable if a Greek minority was empowered to govern and oppress majorities especially when Greeks were by any means superior in humanity or enlightenment. The Members of the Parliament commented that the continuation of this chaos was disastrous to Britain, especially as France and Italy showed every wish to reconsider the Turkish position in a manner favourable towards Turkey. They told that rightly or wrongly, the impression had been built that the only obstacle to more favourable terms to be granted to Turkey was Britain, and therefore they were getting into a position which their enemies would not hesitate to exploit. They gave the example of the speeches in the French Senate previous

week that Turks were praised and there were statements that it was not France's concern if Greece was unable to make the military and financial sacrifices necessary for the retention of Thrace and Smyrna and the French Prime Minister expressed the wish that it was not long before the Allies would agree to give Turkey an honorable peace. In view of the goodwill shown by their Allies, it was not to their interest as a Moslem Empire to insist on the Treaty as it stood. The suggestion made was to modify the Treaty, and the first step would be to get in touch with the Angora Government.<sup>557</sup>

Lloyd George answered for the criticism made on Government's Turkish policy. He told that the only *de jure* Government was the Government of Constantinople, but it was the Government they had set up. He said that this House agreed to the view that Constantinople should be retained for the Turks, and the official Government of the whole of Turkey was localized there, and therefore they had to do business with them. Lloyd George continued that;

*"We can not go behind that Government without the consent to negotiate with a general who is in revolt against the de jure Government of his country. He may have four-fifths of Anatolia behind him, and that is very important element, but we first of all have to make up our minds before we deal directly with Mustafa Kemal to throw over the Government of Constantinople unless they consent to our approaching him...Instead of negotiating with a mutinous general we should be negotiating with a Government which represented not merely the de jure authority which is vested in the Constantinople Government, but the de facto authority, which is vested in Mustafa Kemal and his associates in Asia Minor."*<sup>558</sup>

Lloyd George continued that the Turks only asked for Constantinople and it was given to them, and afterwards they started agitation for Smyrna and Thrace. He went on to say that;

*"At the present time there is a very considerable Greek force in Smyrna and the majority of the population are Greeks. Early this year it was represented that Mustafa Kemal had an overwhelming force there that would drive the Greeks into the sea on the one hand, and drive us into the Bosphorus, on the other. In ten days it was scattered by Greek forces, without the slightest difficulty, and the Greeks assured me that they could march right through to Angora. I have not the slightest doubt about that."*<sup>559</sup>

Lloyd George then explained that Greeks were good soldiers and Britain did not own Smyrna so that he could offer to Mustafa Kemal. He continued saying that;

*"Why should we make terms, in order to buy peace, with a mutinous general when there is no guarantee that we could buy peace with the Turkish people! Do not, because we have a little difficulty, rush into a worse one. We ought to go warily in this matter. You may purchase the good will of*

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<sup>557</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 136, Col: 1887-1893, House of Lords

<sup>558</sup> Hansard of Commons, Vol: 136, Col: 1893-1903, House of Lords

<sup>559</sup> Ibid

*a mutinous general who never achieved much when his country was in danger. We never heard of Mustafa Kemal's exploits when Turkey was being attacked and was on the point of being destroyed.*"<sup>560</sup>

Lloyd George told that if they gave Smyrna back to Turks, it would make no difference to the public view of Arabs, and continued;

*"Will they suddenly give up Damascus, their city of many generations and thousands of years, will they give it up for the beautiful eyes of Mustafa Kemal! Are we to found our policy upon the scraps that are picked up in newspapers about these generals who are mythical because we know nothing about them who become legends because nobody has ever seen them, and were great warriors because they never fought a battle, except against Armenians?"*<sup>561</sup>

Lloyd George pointed out that they could not deal behind their friend's back and because of the result of the elections in Greece they could not change their policy in East. He went on stating that;

*"The Mediterranean is vital to Britain. We want the friendship of the Greek people-of the Greek people, a people whose friendship is vital to us in that part of the world, whatever we do. They will multiply and wax strong; they will make their blunders, just like any other peoples, but they will grow, they will become stronger. They are a people of vital intelligence, of energy, and they have shown they have courage. They will survive their blunders."*<sup>562</sup>

Lloyd George concluded his speech in suggesting that they should wait for the developments and that it would be wrong to modify the Turkish Treaty, meaning that the Government's Eastern policy was going to be not altered. He finalized in saying that;

*"The fact that Kemal and the Bolsheviks are each seeking to control over Azerbaijan is producing a state of conflict between them, and the old secular conflict between the Turk and the Russian is reviving in that area. These are factors that we ought to wait to see the development of. Is the Turk developing in that direction or does he seek to come West; has the Greek national movement collapsed, or will it revive, and in which direction; is the Greek capable of what we thought in the Treaty of Sevres he was capable of, or is he not. All that will become visible in a very short time, but I beg the House of Commons, and I beg to the British public, do not let us rush into tearing up treaties which took a great deal of reflections which were based upon principles of policy which are vital to the British Empire, and do not let us, in tearing those treaties up, restore conditions which very nearly proved fatal to us in the great War from which we have emerged."*<sup>563</sup>

Lloyd George's speech on the Treaty of Sevres and about Mustafa Kemal on 22<sup>nd</sup> December had been received by the French press with a chorus of resentment and disapproval according to Hardinge, the newly appointed British Ambassador in Paris. The 'Temps' published an article, criticizing Lloyd George that Britain was

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<sup>560</sup> Ibid.

<sup>561</sup> Ibid.

<sup>562</sup> Ibid.

<sup>563</sup> Ibid.

protecting Constantine against France and Italy and saving Smyrna, Gallipoli and Adrianople for Greece. The article emphasized that the British policy was aiming protectorate over Constantinian Greece, the mastery of the Eastern Mediterranean and of the Straits, the establishment of Zionist State in Palestine, the encouragement of Feisal and the Hedjas, the use of Greeks against the Turks and of the Government of Constantinople against Angora. 'Temps' urged the French Government to enter into an immediate and independent agreement with the Angora Government so as to bring about the evacuation of Cilicia and the French zone of occupation in Northern Syria. The 'Temps' asked the French Government that she should reinforce the French troops in the neighborhood of the Straits. The other Papers including Figaro followed the suit and endorsed the views expressed in 'Temps'.

Hardinge believed that the sentiment in these attacks to Lloyd George was due to the disappointment that Britain had no intention to revise the Treaty of Sevres which public opinion in France regarded as necessary not only as a weapon against King Constantine, but also as the only way for France to be relieved from Syria and Cilicia.<sup>564</sup>

The article published in the French Paper 'Echo de Paris' on 30<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1920, referring to a member in the Senatorial Commission on Foreign Affairs in French Parliament, wrote that Lloyd George, although he was not against the revision, but did not desire that the question of the revision of the Treaty of Sevres to be publicly discussed at the present time especially when Izzet Pasha was having negotiations with Mustafa Kemal.<sup>565</sup>

The King of the Great Britain in his speech for the propagation of the Parliament expressed his view that; "*the definite conclusion of peace with Ottoman Empire is, I trust, near at hand.*"<sup>566</sup> Contrary to the speech of the King, the peace was still far away.

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<sup>564</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/53/1/54.

<sup>565</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/53/1/55.

<sup>566</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/90/2/5.

## V.4 Evaluation

The problematic in this phase of the developments was the uncertainty for British policy as how to divide the Ottoman Empire among the contenders. Britain did never consider the annexation of the Empire and neither attempted to take her under dominion as it was a burden. The Foreign Office considered that the availability of Greece to take over Thrace and Western Anatolia was preferable rather than to have the domination of France or Italy over Turkey which would upset the balance in the Levant. The crucial issue for Britain was the maintenance and control of the freedom of the Straits by her. Therefore the Peace Conference was the platform to implement her policies.

The Paris Peace Conference was also crucial for the Turks as well as for the Greeks, because of her desires for the Anatolia. Venizelos was successful enough to convince the Leaders of Big Three, President Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George and therefore, came very close to implementing his plans in fulfilling his goal of 'Megali Idea'. As the Peace Conference emerged, the British policy towards Ottoman Empire was almost determined. The Cabinet as well as the Foreign Office including the Arab Bureau and Colonial Office, had the view that Constantinople and Straits were to be under a newly formed state under the supervision of the League of Nations. The Smyrna region was to go to Greece and for Thrace there were some alternatives from handing it over to Greeks, to enclave it within the Constantinople state. For the Smyrna region, the General Staff from purely military point of view was more inclined to resist the area to be given to Greece because of the minority of the Greek population there, but nevertheless they were not totally in favour of Turks retaining the area.

The state policy, as far as the partition of Ottoman Empire was concerned was not clearly delineated in determining shares and mandates. The only verified policy was to hold and maintain Mesopotamia under the British rule, without direct involvement in Asia Minor. British interests for Syria, Palestine and the future of Egypt and the feelings of Moslem population within the British Empire were parameters that were going to influence British consideration for Ottoman Empire as a whole.

British policy in Europe was based upon the 'Balance of Powers' so that Germany should not be left so powerless to upset the equilibrium of forces in Europe, and therefore France should not be made as a result of Conference, powerful enough to

be the strongest state in Europe. For the expansion of France in Europe, Britain tried to block the French desires for the benefit of Germany. Britain and therefore Lloyd George viewing the importance of 'balance' in Europe, felt that even for the Ottoman Empire he had to find solutions to please his allies because of the agreements and pacts that Britain had already a part of and at the same time to maintain the 'balance' in Near East. It must be with this approach that he seemed to be debating within himself from one extreme to another. One day he was inclined to give mandate of all Anatolia to Italy, but the next day he was considering France for the same responsibility. The similar policy was also applicable for Syria. Sykes-Picot Agreement had already allocated Syria to France but at the same time he believed that the desires of Arabs should also be satisfied. There was another tendency within the state that required keeping it under British hegemony.

Harold Nicolson's story about an incident with regard to Mandate resembles the state of the European leaders and their attitude; Lloyd George without the informing Clemenceau and President Wilson, tried convince the Italians for a mandate, which required 'the consent and wishes of the people' in Southern Anatolia. Those present found such a requirement very amusing. *"How they all laugh! Orlando's white cheeks wobble with laughter and his puffy eyes fill with tears of mirth"*<sup>567</sup> It was obvious that the leaders disregarding agreements and pacts and covenants were engaged in plots to suit their own desires.

The answer for the question of the American attitude towards Greeks' occupation was usually attributed to Wilson, and he was pictured as the real 'cause' for the acceptance of Venizelos' plans. It was true that Wilson did not want to be reminded of his 'Fourteen Points' and especially the 12<sup>th</sup> Point which was designed for the Ottoman Empire, and in a Supreme Council meeting when he tried to pronounce it, Lloyd George's interruption that it was only applicable for the German case was met with silence. During President Wilson's visit to London on the way to Paris, he agreed with Lloyd George that the Turks should be driven out from Europe and Constantinople and a new state under the League of Nations but entirely against the 12<sup>th</sup> Point be established on the territories retreated. As British diplomats' view on Wilson' idealism did not cover the Ottoman case, it was argued that the President ignored expertise on the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In this respect, Admiral Bristol had warned the American Delegation even before the Smyrna occupation

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<sup>567</sup> Nicholson p. 333-334, of "Diary" 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1919.

that to allocate Smyrna and Mediterranean coast to Greece would provoke Turks' hatred and would constitute a great political and economic error.<sup>568</sup> Prof. Westermann, a specialist and a member of 'Greek Commission' who had outspoken against Greek claims, kept on writing reports for the Greek case before and after the occupation. He criticized severely the policy of Supreme Council for Greek claims and therefore the invasion of Smyrna.<sup>569</sup> His voice was not heard by Wilson, and he was not the only official unheard by the President. The anti Venizelist American Ambassador in Athens and Admiral Bristol were only two examples of the 'specialists' not being able to attract Wilson's notice. Wilson when the Turkish resistance started was going to comment, that Greek occupation was temporary and "*...that the Allied and Associated Powers are in close touch with the Greek authorities, and that the advance of the Greeks will not be authorized or attempted beyond certain fixed point.*"<sup>570</sup> He at the same time was warning Turks to stop retaliating, for "*resistance to them will only prejudice matters and make them worse*"<sup>571</sup>

The American 'Black Book', prepared by the Intelligence Section, in accordance with instructions, for the President and the Plenipotentiaries, on 21<sup>st</sup> of Jan. 1919, clearly defined the American Policy to be adopted for the Ottoman Empire. The 'Black Book' and the specialist' reports which were reflected on the 'Greek Commission Report' that the American Delegation opposed to any territory being at all detached from Turkey. More specifically, when British and French delegations agreed that Smyrna and Aivali should go to Greece, American Delegation opposed this recommendation on the basis that calculations and data of American experts indicated Greek minority in every Sandjak claimed by Greece, with the exception of Smyrna, which was due to the economic threat separation of this province from the

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<sup>568</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 158-159, Admiral Bristol wrote on 24<sup>th</sup> of March 1919, from Constantinople to the Delegation in Paris that; "*I do not think Turkish territory should be further divided. It is my opinion that the political and commercial interests of the world will be best served by leaving a strong compact Turkish Empire with Constantinople as its capital and commercial center and place over it for long term of years a mandatory either by one strong nation or a neutral mandatory, established by the League of Nations... To give Smyrna or any part of the Mediterranean sea coast of Asia Minor to Greece will only cause prolonged internal strife and hatred and would constitute a great political and economic error.*"

<sup>569</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 262-263. Westermann wrote in his 'Diary' on 20<sup>th</sup> of May 1919 that; "*My stand against the Greek claim to Smyrna will soon justify itself—perhaps too soon*" and on 2<sup>nd</sup> of July 1919 that; "*I sent in to the Commissioners an analysis of the Greek-Turkish situation, stating that the permission granted to the Greeks to occupy the Sandjak of Smyrna was a great mistake, recounting briefly its results in massacres of Turks by Greeks and the inevitable Turkish reprisals. I pointed out that with the Thracian line to be held against the Bulgarians and the Smyrna line to be held against the Turks, the Greeks were in for an awful drubbing unless the League of Nations would support the Greeks continually .I ended with this phrase : 'There are many Venizelists in Greece today, but few Venizelosos'.*"

<sup>570</sup> Rizopoulos, p. 264.

<sup>571</sup> Ibid.

rest of Asiatic Turkey would cause.<sup>572</sup> The Report explicitly defined the American policy for Smyrna, but the reason for the President's deviation from this policy could not easily be attributed to his dismay of the Italian policy of Adriatic and Fiume, or punishing Italians. His letter to Venizelos on 21<sup>st</sup> of May 1919 that he agreed with Greek policy which aimed to having a vast territory as a mandate was also a deviation of the American Policy as he himself had stated that Anatolia should not be split, but kept as a single Turkish state. Wilson after the Greek landing at Smyrna became one of the strongest supporters of Greece even at times he became ahead of Lloyd George. Could the reason of his attitude be attributable to Lloyd George? This is difficult to know. It is known that his feelings for Turks was not favourable, he once said that Turks were so much disliked in America, but as a politician, he was expected to follow the specialist's views and therefore not to entertain the Greek desires as he did in Paris. Anyhow as far as the scope of this thesis concerned, it does not involve the analysis of Wilson, and why he changed his mind even it was not so much settled before the Conference. One explanation could be Colonel House, the most intimate colleague of the President. It is known that during the absence of Wilson, House was controlling the decision making mechanism and although Wilson did not agree with him entirely in the Polish policy, House did not hesitate making decisions in his own way. House, during the absence of Wilson had meetings with Venizelos, and from Harold Nicolson's 'Diary' it is known that Venizelos and House had a meeting around 27<sup>th</sup> of March and practically agreed that America would agree on Franco-British scheme for handing over Smyrna to Greece. Harold Nicolson visited the Americans on 28<sup>th</sup> of March with Toynbee and later on he noted in his 'Diary' that they all agreed about Smyrna. It was 31<sup>st</sup> of March when House noted in his 'Diary' that House and Venizelos both agreed on settlement of Greeks in Smyrna. Then it is quite probable that Wilson, under influence of Venizelos, Lloyd George and House, inclined to accept the Greek formula.

Before the Peace Conference it was clear from the 'War Aims' and speeches delivered to the British public that Lloyd George was sure of dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, so that Turkey should give up the Arab lands, Syria, Mesopotamia, Cilicia and Thrace where it was claimed that Turkish population was in minority. Lloyd George repeated even during the War that his desire was to have Straits to be a 'free passage' for all ships. When British interests are concerned the Ottoman

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<sup>572</sup> Rizopoulos, Appendix 3..

Empire should be restricted to an Islamic Anatolian state resided by Turks alone. The question was the frontiers of this state and how Ottoman territories be shared. Another question was mandates and the position of Italy. Since the secret treaties, especially the non ratified Italian Treaty were subject to reconsideration after the Russian Revolution conflicting views emerged on British state policy with regard to Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, originating from the contents of Sykes-Picot Agreement and the views of Clemenceau and Lloyd George concerning Mesopotamia, including Mosul and Palestine. Britain in favour of maintaining a stronger Germany on the contrary to the French approach was more inclined to present Syria to France, therefore abiding her promises to Arabs. In the Foreign Office there seemed to be two different views concerning Syria. Military including the Arab Bureau preferred retaining Syria, but Lloyd George concerned for angering France, preferred handing it to France.

Same conflicts were valid for Thrace as there was some preferring to see it under Greek domination. None of these alternatives had maintenance of Thrace by Ottoman Empire. The Greek Commission on its final document proposed annexation of Western Thrace and some parts of Eastern Thrace. Yet the fate of Constantinople was still undecided, consequently both issues were set aside for later considerations.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia made an enormous effect on the Allies not only on social and political atmosphere in Europe but also on their policy for the Ottoman Empire's partition. Although to a certain extent the economical factors did not play so much influence with regard to Ottoman Empire just before the war broke out in 1914, but in 1919 the economical issues even in the partition became an important aspect. The petrol, to satisfy the needs of Admiralty became rather important therefore the interests of Britain in Caucasus, Iran and Azerbaijan and lately, as was pointed out in the Imperial War Cabinet, Mesopotamia should be maintained. The handing over Syria to French was also considered from the pipe-line point of view in addition to the power balance in East Mediterranean. Britain decided that in case, Syria was to be given to France they should alter the northern border of Palestine and make sure that the British zone should enclave the railway and pipe-line from Mesopotamia to Mediterranean. The policy for Middle East and therefore for Anatolia drawn by Foreign Office officials, during the peace negotiations, had been swinging to and fro, and under constant re-evaluations due to changing conditions and power balance. When the Allied policy with regard to Russia became to a failure

as far as backing Denikin and Kolchak, then Britain offered Caucasus to Italy although they were so envious of them in Anatolia and even at a certain stage Lloyd George thought of giving the mandate of Anatolia to Italians. The reason was the consideration of having a buffer zone between Bolsheviks and British interests especially in Mesopotamia in addition to compensation for Dalmatia.

On the other hand the destruction of the Ottoman Empire was the actual consideration of the Foreign Office, as reiterated by Balfour and Curzon who did not stand behind Greeks annexing Smyrna.

Lloyd George defined how he would like to see the new 'Turkey' in his Guildhall speech, on 5<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1918. He described the future of Turkey as the homelands of Turkish race with its capital in Constantinople, but stripped from Arabia, Mesopotamia, Syria, Palestine and Armenia with Straits being internationalized and neutralized, although he was going to deny these rights to Turks in saying that he had made these promises during the War in case that they would end up fighting. Lloyd George, behind close doors, was harsher to Turks and blamed them for misgoverning and determined to finish them.

Paris Peace Conference was an arena for the Powers to satisfy their national interests and Powers, naturally, did not hesitate to take every opportunity to acquire and satisfy their own desires. As far as Ottoman Government was concerned, she was at the mercy of Allies. Greece, as a winner, possessed similar views with France and Britain Although Venizelos hoped to eliminate Italy very soon.

The French-British-Italian and Japanese meeting at Quai d'Orsay on 30<sup>th</sup> of Jan.1919 was display of harmony among victors. This was valid for all concerning Arabia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine, Armenia and the Ottoman Empire. Only details such as mandatory remained to be worked out.

Greece took the lead in discussions for the Ottoman Empire. She brought forth claims usually for Smyrna and its vicinity and was supported or discouraged by those attending the conference. However the British and Greek schemes, although opposed by Curzon and Montagu, often matched when the Greek Claims Commission brought her desires in Anatolia officially to the table. Italy's objection was often overlooked in this harmonious stage.

It is worth mentioning at this point that with two anti Turk representatives Sir Eyre Crowe and Harold Nicolson both placed by Lloyd George in the Committee, it is very unlikely for pro Greek verdict to be declined. On the other hand Montagu because of possible resentment of the Moslems in India was not enthusiastic for the Greek landing.

The preparations for the clauses to be inserted in the Treaty with Turkey had started in the early days of the Conference, although in London some draft work had already been done. The Draft Treaty clearly indicated the partition of Ottoman Empire.

A staunch advocate of this claim was Lloyd George who was in consensus with the British State mechanism concerning the landing of Greek Troops at Smyrna. He with anti Turk sentiments constantly suspected Turkish beleaguers to Christians, even massacres. These, Venizelos cleverly made use of, even exploited from time to time, claiming the guilt of the ill treated Greeks would rest upon the members of the Supreme Council. The 'guilt' and the contribution of Italians who were thoroughly disliked by President Wilson because of their attitude in Fiume, paved the way for the Greeks to proceed to Anatolia. The 'massacre' tale was not supported by any intelligence reports except by the petitions submitted to the Conference by Greeks themselves and months later it was going to be clearly laid down by General Milne that the landing was totally unjustified in that respect.<sup>573</sup> Lloyd George was content that at least one problem was over and the Italians had lost the first round and been knocked down in their policy in Anatolia for the time being.

Lloyd George, after the landing at Smyrna, had known that, it was a provisional decision but at the same time he was aware that it would be almost impossible to ask the Greeks to go back, and therefore he had to abide the policy of Greeks to settle in Western Anatolia. The Greek expansion in Anatolia without the consent of

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<sup>573</sup> Peter M. Buzanski, "The Interallied Investigation of the Greek Invasion of Smyrna, 1919", *Historian*, 25:3 (1963: May), p. 325. General Milne's Report came to the Conference only in November 1919. "The document firmly maintained that the landing was totally unjustified in the first place: The internal situation in the Vilayet did not call for the landing of Allied troops at Smyrna. On the contrary, since the Greek landing, the situation is troubled because of the state of war existing between the Greek troops and the Turkish irregulars." Michael L. Dockrill and J. Douglas Good, *Peace without Promise* (Hamden, Connecticut, Archon Books, 1980), 200. The 'Interallied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjacent Districts' Commission which was formed by Supreme Council on 18<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 had written in the final Report that since the Armistice of Mudros, "the general situation of Christians in the vilayet of Aidin has been satisfactory. Their safety was not threatened" Therefore the excuse used by Supreme Council for the landing at Smyrna was falsified by their own Commission only after six months. The Commission, in their Conclusion told that: "The Greek occupation is not justifiable"

the Council was not debated as much as the Italian case, but nevertheless Greeks were asked to obey the rules and decisions of the Council. At one stage Lloyd George tried to please the Italians, in addition to Caucasus, offered the Southern part of Anatolia as a mandate, but that was not really a serious consideration as he changed his mind the following day. French seemed to be not to get involved so much in the Greek landing, since her concern was for Alsace-Lorraine and Syria.

The implications of the Greek policy after the landing which were reflected in the reports sent by British High Commissioner in Constantinople had no serious impact either in the Supreme Council or within the British Delegation. It was only some Foreign Office officials that complained the outrages of the Greek forces. The Turks being killed had been regarded as a 'normal events' and Delegation were only content with relaying the messages to Foreign Office. Foreign Office were reluctant to take any action and believed that since the Greek landing was decided in Paris and also Venizelos was there, therefore the necessary steps should be taken by the Delegation. Therefore Foreign Office probably with the influence of the Acting Secretary of State, Curzon, was trying not to get involved so much with the decision of the Supreme Council with regard to Greek landing. Despite the outcry of Calthorpe that partition of Turkey and Greeks' behavior in the occupied zone were going to result as an active hostility, was not going to be considered seriously neither by Foreign Office nor by the Delegation in Paris. The Greeks and along with them British, French and to a certain extent Americans were on the non- returnable path in their adventure in Anatolia.

A good question to bring up at this point is whether Greeks landed at Smyrna to safeguard the autochthon Greeks. Comparison of the anarchy before and after the landing of the Greek troops shows that security had been much better before the landing.<sup>574</sup> According to Venizelos Greeks went to Smyrna '*to have it*', as he claimed that he was told by Lloyd George that; "*Prime Minister [Lloyd George] had told him categorically that he was not being asked to send troops merely to do police work for the Powers as in the case of South Russia, but that he was asked to do so because the Supreme Council definitely intended to allot Smyrna eventually to*

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<sup>574</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/206/4/6, Lord Curzon prepared a Report on the events since the "ill-started" landing of Greek troops for the War Cabinet on 26<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1919. In the report, although quite conservative in numbers, Curzon gave the numbers of Turks and Greeks had been killed and had become homeless in the period of May-August 1919. The Report ended with "*All work in the neighborhood was reported at standstill*", meaning that the landing at Smyrna brought death and agony.

Greece”<sup>575</sup> It seems that Lloyd George was not alone in presenting on the behalf of the British Government, but Clemenceau also shared the same view. According to Granville, British High Commissioner in Athens; “*Commander Talbot tells me in this connection that M. Venizelos has carefully kept a telegram which was addressed to an intimate friend of his by M. Clemenceau at the same time saying ‘Vous avez Smyrna’ [You have Smyrna] or words to that effect*”<sup>576</sup> On the other hand Clemenceau told Italians on the Supreme Council Meeting on 12<sup>th</sup> of May 1919 that the Greeks were going there on temporary basis.

Had Lloyd George, been influenced by Venizelos for the Greek landing? It was a fact that the relation between them was based on admiration. Lloyd George in his first speech in the Parliament described him as ‘the great Greek statesman’ and this admiration increased in time. He considered Venizelos as one of the six great men in the world of their time<sup>577</sup>. He was not the only person who admired Venizelos, may be except Curzon, all thought very highly of him. It was not only his personality and charm but the sacrifices he had made for the Allies won the admiration from British Government circles. Venizelos was ‘generous’ enough to offer Military bases anywhere within Greece and concessions for railway in Anatolia. Frances Stevenson in her ‘Diary’ on 9<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, three days after the decision of Greek landing at the Supreme Council, wrote that; “*D [Lloyd George] dined with Venizelos. The two have a great admiration for each other, and D. is trying to get Smyrna for the Greeks, though he is having problems with the Italians over it.*”<sup>578</sup> Lloyd George might have known that if Venizelos was not to attain his goals to be fulfilled for Western Anatolia, according to the reports from British High Commissioner, it was most probable that he was going to lose the next election. Therefore the next question could be whether Lloyd George pushed for a decision on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1919 at the Supreme Council for the Greek landing, to save him. Although this information had probably contributed in reaching the decision on 6<sup>th</sup> of May 1919, but Lloyd George’s closeness to Venizelos and therefore not to lose a closed aide could not be considered as causally significant but parameters influencing the rapid decision at the Supreme Council. Besides, the British Foreign Office as well as the other departments within Government had all agreed for such a decision to be taken. At

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<sup>575</sup> . Lloyd George Papers LG/F/206/4/6, British High Commissioner Granville’s letter to Lord Curzon, 3<sup>rd</sup> Dec. 1919.

<sup>576</sup> Ibid.

<sup>577</sup> “*Lord Riddell’s Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and After: 1918-1923*”, (UK: Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1933) , p. 7.

<sup>578</sup> “*Lloyd George a Diary by Frances Stevenson*” Ed. By A.J.P. Taylor, (UK: Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., 1971), p. 183

later years when Venizelos was no longer the Prime Minister and King Constantine, the most hated person by the Allies, was in power, Britain was still looking after the Greeks in Anatolia, and therefore saving Venizelos could not be the causally significant factor for the decision of Greek landing. The 'Draft' Treaty was already in process, only the mandates and borders of each nation needed to be filled up, and it was expected that the Supreme Council's duty and responsibility was to fill up the 'blank' part of the Treaty, but due to the indecisiveness of the United States, this action was to wait further. The decision for landing, although provisional it might be, was the 'solution' of at least one problem as far as Supreme Council was tasked.

The supreme Council meetings after the decision taken for the Greek landing at Smyrna were like a pantomime and each session portrayed something new. As Harold Nicolson was going to write rightfully, Anatolia was cut each time to bits as if they were dividing a cake without caring for the lives of millions. One day they were offering Northern part of Anatolia to France and the Southern part to Italians for mandate, and the next day they were changing the mandates and offering the whole Anatolia to Italians but at the last minute they were considering something else. President Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George were going to be called 'ignorant and irresponsible men' by Harold Nicolson and 'these three ignorant men' by Balfour.

A very striking fact about Lloyd George lies in the very conflicting thoughts he nourished on the degree of the Italians' demands in Anatolia to be met. Similar contradictory ideas were very apparent in Lloyd George for many other matters, such as treatment of the Turks. Lloyd George seemed to be using the statistics that Venizelos provided, whereas Westermann and Montagu argued that they were wrong figures and there was not any majority of Greeks in neither of the places.<sup>579</sup> The Supreme Council discussed the partition of Ottoman Empire on 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> of June for the last time before the Paris Peace Conference was officially ended on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. The British proposal which was tabled by Lloyd George contained several alternatives from allocating Straits, Constantinople and the whole Anatolia to the mandate of USA to the sovereignty of the Sultan in Anatolia. The proposal suggested that the Greek zone was to remain same as proposed by the Greek Commission, Syria under the mandate of France and Mesopotamia to British mandate. It was also proposed to allocate the Cilicia to Armenia and to be under the

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<sup>579</sup> In the Greek Commission this was one of the points that the Greeks were not able to convince the Americans.

mandate of USA. President Wilson's suggestion to enlarge the Greek zone was not accepted by Clemenceau and Lloyd George. Furthermore Venizelos' proposal to assign certain portions outside of the Greek zone in Western Anatolia was also rejected. It looked like President Wilson was trying to please the Greeks more than British and French. It is interesting to note that Wilson's message to Venizelos was very clear that he was entirely in agreement with the Greek cause.

The atrocities committed by the Greeks were also covered up by 'the Greek gang' in the Foreign Office lead by Sir Eyre Crowe. Sir Eyre Crowe had also agreed the additional territories to be mandated by Greece before it was rejected by the Supreme Council. The expansion of Greek forces outside the Greek zone was taken lightly by the Greek lobby in the Foreign Office on the ground that the Italians were intriguing behind the Supreme Council decisions. The British Cabinet and also the Supreme Council was divided on the fate of Constantinople. Curzon, Balfour and in the Supreme Council President Wilson were insisting that it should be taken away from Turks. There were also some elements such as the teaching staff of Oxford University who was urging the Supreme Council to expel Turks from Europe and Constantinople.

There was another element in Paris that was working for the independence of the Greeks in Constantinople and urging the Supreme Council to declare Constantinople either an independent state or be annexed to Greece, and that was the Archbishop of Bursa who was authorized by the Patriarch of Constantinople. The Patriarch since the beginning of the Armistice was complaining how the Christian population had suffered under the regime of Ottomans and was willing to unite with the mother country, Greece.

The Smyrna landing and the massacres of the Turks by Greek troops was debated in the House of Commons and the criticisms answered by Cecil Harmsworth, Assistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that the all necessary precautions were taken at Paris and he was sure that the Greek Government was doing everything possible to prevent the recurrence. The statement was not reflected the truth according to some Foreign Office officials who noted that it was very wrong to indicate that they were doing everything while they were not. This was not the first and would not be the last time that the Government was giving misinformation to the Parliament. Cecil Harmsworth in coming years would be active in a campaign arranged for anti-Turks movement.

Supreme Council terminated its meetings and both President Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris after the signature ceremony of the German Peace Agreement on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. President Wilson was not going to attend to Supreme Council meetings anymore because of the decision of the Senate. American decision not to assume mandate in Anatolia became a decisive cornerstone in compelling Lloyd George to change his mind for the future plans.

Lloyd George met Venizelos several times in 1919 after the Paris Peace Conference. In one of those meetings Venizelos complained the procedures adopted by the Smyrna Commission by not allowing the Greek representative to be present and not to discuss with him about the evidences laid down before the Commission and he further told that it was not the Greeks but Turks who were committed atrocities.<sup>580</sup> Venizelos reiterated his position that procedures adopted by the Commission were absolutely against the principles of justice and law. The Report of the Commission which blamed the Greeks very harshly and pointed out the excuse used by Supreme Council for the invasion of Smyrna by Greeks was baseless since there had been no irregularities extended to the Greek population by Turks. The Report with the decision by the Supreme Council was not printed. The case was brought to the attention of House of Commons when it was asked to Lloyd George whether during the landing at Smyrna, massacres occurred and these massacres were kept in secret. Lloyd George's reply was that serious disorders took place but he was not aware that they were kept in secret. He further told that they could not publish the document of the Commission to increase the unrest in that part

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<sup>580</sup> Buzanski, p. 325, the 'Smyrna Investigations Commission' was formed with Supreme Council's decision on 18<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 when Clemenceau brought to the attention of the irregularities to the Supreme Council. Inter Allied Commission was to investigate the events and acts that had taken place during and after the Greek landing at Smyrna. The Commission was formed by representatives of USA, Britain, France and Italy. Later Greek and Turkish representatives joined the Commission on observatory status. The Commission held forty-six meetings between 12<sup>th</sup> August and 15<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1919. The meetings were held at Smyrna and in the towns occupied by Greek troops. After hearing Greek and Turkish witnesses, the Council decided to rely mostly on the hearings of other nationals. One of the findings of the Commission was the non-existence any threat to Greeks before Greek landing at Smyrna. (See Note 585 above). The Commission touched on the point of population of Turks and Greeks in the area and stated that, the Venizelos' claim was baseless and "*outside of the cities of Smyrna and Aivali, the predominance of the Turkish element over the Greek is incontestable*" The Commission blamed mostly the Greeks for the outrages committed by them and giving details on what happened at Smyrna during and after the invasion. The Final Report was submitted by the Commission to the Supreme Council and on 18<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1919 was discussed at the Council's meeting. The Council warned Venizelos that; "*...the de facto occupation by the Greek troops of Smyrna and of the neighboring districts was only decided because of existing circumstances and creates no new right for the future. This is merely a provisional measure which leaves entire liberty to the Peace Conference to settle the various problems by the Eastern Question.*" Venizelos protested the findings of the Commission on the ground that the Greek representative had not been allowed to cross examine the witnesses and that the members of the Commission were not impartial. After the debate at the Supreme Council with the persuasion of Lloyd George, it was decided not to publish the Report.

of the world and would be against the decision taken by the Supreme Council. What Lloyd George did not tell; he was the person to propose for the report not to be published at the Council's meeting.<sup>581</sup> Lloyd George as he told Venizelos, the British policy was to support and assist Greece. This explains his extreme passion for pro Greek policy he pursued until the end regardless to the atrocities.

Lloyd George was planning to hold a meeting in London to finalize the Turkish Peace Treaty but because of the indecisiveness of America and the coming elections in France and Italy was delaying the meeting. Meanwhile French suggestion to have a predominant position at Constantinople was not to be welcome by Britain since the Caliph being under the influence of French would place the British Empire in danger.

The uncertainty of mandates over Anatolia and Constantinople was causing problems in the eastern provinces of Ottoman Empire. There was a conflict of interest due to the territories between Armenians and Kurds since both of them practically were demanding the very same regions to be incorporated in the states they were hoping to establish. The Foreign Office was against the erecting an independent state which would enclave the Persian Kurds and Northern Mesopotamia Kurds since the tribal nature of Kurds did not have a common culture and language necessary to form a state and besides the territories required by Kurds should be incorporated to Armenia. The Armenian and Kurdish issues were going to become more complex when USA refused the mandate over Armenia and Soviets influence in Armenia and defeat of French in Cilicia were going to influence the Allies to adopt more moderate measures in the area with the Sevres Treaty.

As America declined mandatory, the French-British joint proposal was discussed in the Cabinet and regardless to the objection raised by Lloyd George, Curzon and Balfour, decided that the Turks should retain Constantinople. The decision was severely criticized by Curzon. The retention of Constantinople by the Turks was mainly resulted from the sentiments of Indian Moslems and military considerations. It was again due to this consideration that the Cabinet decided not to alter the usage of St. Sophia that is not to convert it to a Church again. It seems that the religion had been playing a great importance in the decision making mechanism.

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<sup>581</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol. 126, Col. 1806-1807.

There were different proposals for the 'Peace for Turkey' prepared by Berthelot, Berthelot-Curzon and Montagu. The French proposal and Montagu's proposal contemplated that for the first time, the Smyrna zone should be evacuated by Greece and when this issue was discussed at a Conference of Ministers on 15<sup>th</sup> of January, Lloyd George commented that Greek evacuation of Smyrna would be the end of political career of Venizelos. He handed over the security of the area entirely to Greeks by suggesting allowing the Greeks to patrol in the Marmara Sea. The suggestions of Lloyd George were very similar to what Venizelos proposed in his Memorandum of 12<sup>th</sup> of January. The important point was that somehow the Cabinet started discussing different aspects than what was decided in Paris, which were retaining Constantinople as the Capital of Turkey and possibility of the evacuation of Smyrna by Greeks, although there was objection by both Venizelos and Lloyd George. Therefore the decision on Constantinople was reached at the Cabinet although Lloyd George alone with Curzon and Balfour placed their objection.

The main issue of the First London Conference was the Eastern Question and discussions of this issue paved the way initially to San Remo Conference and then to the Sevres Treaty signed by the Ottoman representatives in Paris but rejected by the Nationalists.

USA expressed surprise over the retention of Constantinople by Turks, although she agreed to the formation of a Commission to administer Constantinople.

Some important events were occurring which were going to affect the Allied policy. Bolshevik regime after winning against anti-regime movements such as Western Powers backed Denikin and Kolchak was moving towards Caucasus which really frightened Europe. The political environment in Europe was under influence of Bolshevik sympathizers in each country and also due to the expansion of Soviets. The first impact was felt in France that Clemenceau lost the General election and Millerand became Prime Minister. As the Italian Prime Minister told, the people was fed up with war and was feeling that the unhappiness related with the war should be forgotten and gone with. It was because of the desire for a change that the French people did not vote for Clemenceau since he resembled the war. Both these changes were going to contribute indirectly to the Peace treaty with Turkey.

The Foreign Office for the peace terms finalized at San Remo, received severe criticisms from Montagu, Admiral de Robeck and General Staff. These “rebellious” views and the response of Lloyd George were indicative of lacking consensus within the state mechanism. There were mainly four important Departments within the British State mechanism; Foreign Office, India Office, Colonies and General Staff. Although Foreign Office, being responsible for the foreign relations, was working almost in harmony with regard to the peace terms of the Treaty, but the other departments such as India Office, headed by Montagu and General Staff, responsible from military point of view were against the terms of the Treaty. Secretary of State for Colonies, Churchill seemed to be indifferent to the Treaty but was going to join the gang of critics. The Parliament especially the Opposition headed by the former Prime Minister Asquith did not seem to be against the terms but more disturbed of prolonging the Treaty. Asquith’s stand with respect to retention of the Turks at Constantinople could be assumed to be an indication of his acceptance of the Treaty. Balfour and Curzon the two important members at the Cabinet were totally in favour of the Treaty. It may be stated that there was an overall majority for the sympathizers for the Treaty than against it within the Cabinet and in the Parliament although there was quite an important opposition to it within the state mechanism.

The criticism for the Treaty was mainly concentrated on three points; the first was rejections to the Treaty of the Moslem population within the British Empire; the next was the Britain’s sacrifice for the future of Venizelos and Greece, and lastly a possible war in Near East since the Turks would never accept the terms of the Treaty and would be drawn to Bolsheviks. It was the last reason that Churchill feared the most.

It was interesting that when Admiral de Robeck and General Staff criticized the terms in the Treaty, Lloyd George labeled them for their pro-Turkish attitude. He was going to follow the same suit against Montagu who applied to Lloyd George to attend San Remo Conference to represent the Indian people. Lloyd George rejecting Montagu’s proposal, accused him for agitating the Indian people’s feelings and denying the fact that the Supreme Council was under the ‘spell’ of Venizelos. Meanwhile some modifications to the Treaty were incorporated with the suggestion of Venizelos to Lloyd George.

The Turkish Treaty in draft form was approved by the King who was quoted as 'the Treaty as it stood was in accord with his own views'. Therefore in the upper echelon of the State, total harmony existed between the King, Government and the Parliament, with regard to the terms of the Treaty.

The attack on Ismid Peninsula by Nationalists had caused disturbance and anxiety among the Allies especially the British. There were several reasons for the anxiety such as would ruin the prestige of Britain in the East. Another reason was that Britain was determined to persuade Constantinople Government to accept the Treaty, but within Anatolia Nationalists emerging was going to resist the terms. The lack of military force to defend Constantinople especially with the tension between British and French was disturbing the British. Lloyd George, as he explained the Parliament, was determined to 'finish' the Ottoman Empire. He desired to see Turkey deprived of her army and prestige. The hatred of Lloyd George was to such an extent that such a punishment of the Turks would satisfy 'the sternest judge'.

Venizelos' under these circumstances offered to help but it is not clear whether the offer was engineered by Venizelos or by the 'Lloyd George gang'. The Conference decided to take the issue to the Supreme Council meeting soon to meet at Boulogne.

The decision taken at this meeting, after the consultation of General Foch and Wilson with Venizelos, to place the Greek troops under the command of General Milne and move them to Ismid Peninsula was one of the mile stones of the conflict. Hence the road was paved to Venizelos' dream to expand in Anatolia.

Two important considerations emerged out of developments regarding Ismid Peninsula; Initially the Parliament pronounced Anatolian developments were of nationalistic cause and titled the leader of the movement, Mustafa Kemal as a 'bandit'. Secondly Lloyd George displayed once again his determination for the implementation of 'Peace Treaty with Turkey' at any cost.

"The Peace Treaty with Turkey" was eventually signed on 10<sup>th</sup> August 1920 at Sevres. The Treaty was described in 'The Sunday Times' as generous for Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia and naturally for the Allies, whereas for 'Osmanli' a humiliating treaty. The treaty was designed to leave the Turks, according to Lloyd

George, friendless in the world. Lloyd George was convinced that Turkey was punished for her past and further more was broken beyond repair. The next step was to enforce the Constantinople Government for the ratification of the Treaty. The fear, however, rested not with Constantinople but with the Nationalists.

Meanwhile the Foreign Office not concerned about the Anatolian-Russian entanglements believed that time was against Mustafa Kemal and he would not last long against Greek offences.

Nevertheless Constantinople alarmed by the Nationalists successes, did hesitate to ratify the Treaty obliging British Foreign Office to stage the plan of replacement of Damat Ferit Pasha with Tevfik Pasha who was somewhat respected by the Nationalists. By doing so they were hoping to attract the Nationalist moderates, and hence staging 'divide and rule' policy'. In the scheme was leaving the Sultan in his place just when he started considering abdication from the throne.

Lloyd George considered the best bet was to play Venizelos, already anxious to attack Turks, against the Nationalists and with the cooperation of the Foreign Office corner Mustafa Kemal to ratify the Treaty. However the Greek elections enforced a change in the policy that Bolsheviks relations with the Nationalists started to be considered. Churchill, endorsed the views expressed by General Staff and urged the Cabinet to come to terms with Mustafa Kemal so that while they were securing their position in Moslem countries, they would be at the same time erecting a barrier between Russia and the Western world. He further urged the Government to maintain affirmative relations with them for the sake of Greece.

Mustafa Kemal's conditions set for the ratification angered the Foreign Office. Among these was the separation of Caliphate and Sultanate which was going to be interpreted as his inclination for a pro-Islamic state and his opposition to Bolshevism. Although the other conditions set by Mustafa Kemal were very close to the views pronounced at the Conference of Ministers that Churchill proposed and Bonar law, Chamberlain, Montagu and Milner agreed; the Foreign Office was still insistent on pressuring the Constantinople Government for ratification otherwise threaten them by allowing Greeks to seize Constantinople.

Meanwhile the Turks' Armenian victory and the imminence of peace with them alarmed the Allies anxiously observing the Turco-Italian and French relations

entering a favourable path for Turkey and initiated serious criticisms of the opposition within the British Cabinet and Parliament. Churchill pointed out that the conventional British 'divide and rule' policy was recently neglected, confining Britain to isolation. Criticism was also covered the leaders of the Allied States that, they had been misled by Greeks. The Government was told that the mistake they made was the assumption to judge the Greeks just by evaluating Venizelos. They should have known that Greece could not possibly handle such a war effort in Anatolia and her claims were unjust.

Lloyd George answered the criticism extended to the Government that they could not possibly negotiate with a revolting General against the legitimate Government at Constantinople. He praised the Greek soldiers and expressed his confidence that they could overcome this mutinous General Mustafa Kemal]. In order to secure the Britain in the Mediterranean, he was anticipating Greek victory over the Turks. In spite of the criticisms he was confident about the Government's pro-Greek policy. His remarks were hailed in Greece but degraded in France deepening the gap among the Allies.

The speech was a turning point in the British Near-East policy. The Foreign Office and particularly Balfour and Curzon appeared to have been left as the only supporters of Lloyd George, insisting that there should not be any modifications to the terms of the Treaty. The other stately powers, such as General Staff and the India Office seemed to have already abandoned the Prime Minister's policy.

## **CHAPTER VI**

### **THE APPROACHING TURKISH VICTORY; BRITISH POLITY AND LLOYD GEORGE**

#### **VI.1: Lloyd George and the New Greek Government**

##### VI.1.1 Towards The Paris Summit of January 1921

According to Lord Granville, the British High Commissioner in Athens, Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons on 22<sup>nd</sup> Dec. 1920 which appeared to indicate more favourable attitude towards Greece, caused excitement in Athens.<sup>1</sup> Lord Granville gave his observations on the necessity of close cooperation with French and urged that if the Government was going to enter into negotiations with Constantine that sooner they did so was the better. The Foreign Office believed that it was too early to enter into relations with King Constantine and the second Conference on Greek affairs had not yet been concluded, and urged Granville to have normal relations with the Greek Government but try to avoid the King. Meanwhile the King was planning to visit the Greek Army in Smyrna shortly, indicating that there was not a major change in their policy towards Turkey.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile Greece was strained with the embargo on war materials, for example; Greek Government's request for guns, torpedoes, various instruments and machinery as claimed to be for instructional purposes, was declined by the British Government due to the decision taken with France to suspend supplies of war materials and stores to Greece in view of the political situation in Greece.<sup>3</sup>

Harold Nicolson from Foreign Office prepared a memorandum on the Greek case on 8<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1921. The memorandum indicated that the Greeks were under the impression that Britain would finally come to their assistance, since upon British request they continued maintaining 150,000 men in Anatolia at the cost of 2 Million

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<sup>1</sup> The Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office (PRO), FO 371/6077, C 20, Lord Granville's telegram, 29<sup>th</sup> Dec 1920 to Foreign Office.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, C 32.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, C 137, Foreign Office's letter to British Admiralty, 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921.

drachmas per day. He commented that Greece was covering all the cost to maintain the army with their own resources as indication of their good faith. The Prime Minister's speech in the Parliament had assured them that their efforts had convinced Britain. Nicolson believed that the Greeks could not hold out much longer and somehow they were confident that Britain was the friend and protector of Greece.

Nicolson believed that Britain could not possibly continue French alliance and at the same time preserve the Treaty of Sevres since for the Treaty they needed the Greek support. According to Nicolson the only possibility was to help Greeks and at the same time maintain the solidarity of the Allies. The procedure that Nicolson proposed was to provide Constantine to compromise for a coalition government, and at the same time inform French and Italians that they were after getting Constantine's views. Nicolson, in essence, told that if the Sevres was their desire then they had to give a hand to the Greeks.<sup>4</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe commented on the Nicolson's Memorandum that they might very likely be driven to contemplate some changes in the Treaty of Sevres, but these might possibly be made acceptable for Greece, provided that drastic concessions to Turkey were to be avoided. The Under-Secretary's plan included some modifications of the Smyrna regime which could yet lean Greece in a special and privileged way. Crowe commented that they should omit any change from the Chatalja to the Enos-Midia line, not merely because Britain should hand over a solid body of Greeks to the Turks, but because he could not but think that Turkish reestablishment on both shores of the Dardanelles would be far more dangerous to the British interests than a mutual occupation of the two shores by Greeks and Turks. He told that they could not possibly approach Constantine before the Paris Conference, which was going to meet in two weeks, but he thought that whatever the decision was at the Summit, then Britain would have a better position to act alone.<sup>5</sup>

The Greek question along with the Treaty of Sevres was discussed at the Cabinet Meeting on 4<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1921 with the presence of Ministers; Bonar Law, Curzon, Churchill and Chamberlain. In the meeting, it was stated that the military situation preserved its importance. On the Smyrna front, the Greeks were strong enough to resist any force. For the struggles at the Brussa front, each side claimed success. It was considered that on that front another fight was inevitable in few months time.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid, C 542.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid

Since King Constantine had lacked money to pay troops, it was considered that the Greeks were really in a difficult position. The Cabinet believed that it was most unfortunate to adopt a policy of drift in their policy towards Greece, otherwise it would cost for Britain to lose French alliance, without enabling Britain to come to terms with Mustafa Kemal. To continue of their policy of ignoring King Constantine would involve further fall in the Drachma, and therefore disappearance of the British trade. On the whole, it was suggested the best course would be to revise the policy of recognizing Constantine on conditions laid down by the Allies.

At the Cabinet meeting it was also suggested that the Treaty of Sevres in its main lines should be adhered to, more particularly in respect to Thrace, the Chatalja lines, and the guardianship of the Holy Places. The question of Smyrna could be made one of the conditions of the recognition of Constantine. As the Turks attached great importance to possession of symbols of sovereignty, it might be possible to follow the precautions of the Eastern Rumelia and other former Turkish provinces in Europe. Therefore while retaining the sovereignty of the Sultan, an administration with setting up a Christian Governor in Smyrna, under the general control and supervision of the League of Nations could be implemented. This method might provide for a gradual transition of sovereignty and save the face of the Turks. Finally it was decided that the Allies, should send a mission to the Nationalists to persuade them to participate in a conference in Constantinople where the Greek Government would be represented.<sup>6</sup>

Britain, on one hand was trying to find an acceptable way to approach Greece, and on the other hand, taking precautions to prevent France and Italy from communicating with Mustafa Kemal, as Britain knew that those two countries were already seeking to find a way to discuss peace with Nationalists. The French Italian persistence on modification of Sevres, made Britain seek moderate alterations in the Sevres too. British Foreign Office was working on alternatives for the 'alteration of Sevres'. Eyre Crowe believed that Britain's difficulties were arising from the necessity of some concessions to the Kemalists, in order to get the Treaty of Sevres ratified by Turkey and by France, and also from the false position of Britain toward Greece due to the presence of Constantine on the throne. Eyre Crowe further believed that the solution lied on finding the concessions acceptable by Mustafa Kemal and Constantine. He explained that he was in agreement with Nicolson for

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<sup>6</sup> PRO, CAB 23/24, Cabinet 1<sup>A</sup> (21).

Britain's interest to maintain a strong and friendly Greece and it was very problematic whether Britain could ever win Mustafa Kemal's definite support by minor concessions. He believed that France had already realized the difficulty of comprehensive settlement with Mustafa Kemal and that they might wait for the developments in the hope that the natural divergence between Turkish Nationalism and Bolshevism make the Turks to reach a moderate and general understanding. Eyre Crowe thought that if Britain was dealing with the question of Turkish nationalism alone, he would not see great objection to a wait and see policy, but he was sure that the delay was working for Kemalists rather than the Greeks especially when the Allies refused to give assistance to Greece. Eyre Crowe considered that there was not an immediate prospect of Constantine's fall, and if he remained there, Britain had to face the question whether in her own interest, she should not revert to the policy. He believed that for the interest of Britain, they should recognize Constantine on certain conditions such as the status of Smyrna. The extent of concessions was to be determined during negotiations but Britain should try not to give too much to Turks. Eyre Crowe suggested that, Britain, after lifting off the ban for financial assistance, and promising for moral and diplomatic support to Greeks, could go and discuss with Mustafa Kemal. If Kemalists were not content with the concessions for the Sevres, then the best course, according to Eyre Crowe was the 'wait-and-see' policy, as the Greeks were not any longer in disadvantage. If Kemalists were to agree on the concessions, the Sevres would be ratified even if France or Italy were not satisfied.<sup>7</sup>

The Allies decided to meet in Paris to discuss the Greek-Turkish conflict. Before going to Paris, Lloyd George held a Cabinet meeting on 20<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921 to hear the suggestions and comments of his Ministers. The Ministers drew the point that the Treaty was not ratified by Turks and the mission sent by Constantinople to Angora to have the views of Angora Government had not returned to Constantinople and it did not seem that the Nationalists were going to tell the Constantinople Government

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<sup>7</sup> PRO, FO 371/6077, C 1339, Sir Eyre Crowe's 'Note' on 18<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921. With the instruction of Sir Eyre Crowe the modification to the clauses of Sevres was carried out, such as; "Article 69: 'The city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66 shall be constituted a separate province within the Turkish Empire and under Ottoman sovereignty. The province so constituted shall be called 'Province of Ionia'. In witness of such sovereignty the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over on outer fort in the town of Smyrna. No Greek flag shall be flown on any of the official building. Article 70: "In view of the large Christian and Greek speaking population of the Province of Ionia as above constituted, the Ottoman Government hereby undertake to invite the Greek Government to assume responsibility for the administration of the Province. The Greek Government in accepting this charge will execute the administration of the Province through a High Commissioner appointed by them subject to the approval of the Turkish Government. Such approval if not formally withheld within one month of the notification of the appointment shall be considered to have been accorded....."

to ratify the Treaty. The Cabinet underlined, in the meeting, that it was useless to insist on carrying out the Treaty with a Government incapable of enforcing its will on its own people. Ministers considered that it would be fatal to their reputation in the East if they insisted on the full maintenance of the Treaty and yet allowed the Turks to tear it up before their eyes.

The Ministers doubted, whether Mustafa Kemal would agree to any settlement which gave the Smyrna to Turks but withheld Eastern Thrace and Adrianople and also the Greeks would agree on the evacuation of Smyrna. It was certain that the public opinion would not tolerate to use forces to compel such an evacuation. The proposal made in the Cabinet Meeting on 4<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1921 was re-discussed and it was suggested that it would be convenient to hold a Conference in Constantinople, preferably with representatives of Turkish Government, who spoke for the whole of Turkey, and also with the representatives of the Arabs. It was also suggested that steps should be taken to get in touch with the present Greek Government. After some further discussion, the Cabinet decided to leave the Prime Minister and foreign Secretary free to make the best arrangement they could, according to the developments in Paris.<sup>8</sup>

The Conference was held on 25<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921 in Paris, and the Turkish-Greek problems were discussed in the afternoon session. The Italian representative produced, but did not definitely support, a proposal which was viewed as it had been prepared by Turkish representative of Turks in Rome. According to Hardinge the Italian proposal completely reflected the Kemalist views, which were the complete reversal of Treaty of Sevres. Lloyd George and Curzon pointed out that, uncertainty of any arrangement with Mustafa Kemal proving permanent and strong moral objections which existed to their purchasing peace with Turkish Nationalists at the expense of Greeks. French abstained themselves from pressing any drastic revision of the Treaty. The Conference agreed on Curzon's proposal that an Allied Conference be held in London on 21<sup>st</sup> Feb. 1921, to discuss all matters in relation with the settlement of the Eastern questions with the representation of both Greeks and Turks.<sup>9</sup> Lord Hardinge with his messages on 26<sup>th</sup> January informed the High Commissioners in both Constantinople and Athens about the prospect of the meeting in London. The message included a passage that "*The invitation to Turkish Government shall propose as a condition that Mustapha Kemal or qualified*

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<sup>8</sup> PRO, FO 371/6464, E 1132.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid, E 1207, Lord Hardinge's letter to Sir W. Tyrrell, 25<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921.

*representative of Government at Angora should be included in Turkish delegation*<sup>10</sup>, and it was added to the message sent to Constantinople that *“You should leave to Turkish Government task of notifying Angora of Allied decisions and of eliciting an immediate reply”*<sup>11</sup>

The invitation extended to Angora Government was viewed by Osborne as; *“This ought to please the Turks and more particularly the Nationalists, of whose existence and policy it is a justification. At the same time it will probably precipitate a crisis in Bolshevik-Nationalist relations. I hope an early result will be the return of Izzet Pasha, who should lead the Turkish Delegation”*<sup>12</sup> The Constantinople Government was reported to be thankful for the invitation and told that necessary steps would be taken without delay to comply with the invitation to send representatives to the Conference.<sup>13</sup>

The invitation for the Conference was treated with mixed feelings in Greece. Majority of the press expressed disappointment for the decision on Greek affairs being postponed and also for the invitation being extended to Mustafa Kemal. There were also some optimistic views that decision taken at the Conference would compel France and Italy to accept the British policy.<sup>14</sup> The Greek Government accepted the invitation to London Conference as a proof of their good will and told that the Conference would be justified in imposing on Turkey, penalties reserved by the signatories of the Treaty of Sevres.<sup>15</sup> According to Foreign Office the ‘penalty’ mentioned in the official Greek reply to the Conference indicated that Constantinople ought to be given to Greece as a penalty for the Turks.<sup>16</sup>

The invitation for the Conference was relayed to Mustafa Kemal and his answer to the Grand Vizier was intercepted by the British agents. The message conveyed the policy of the Angora Government. Mustafa Kemal replied that the only body entitled to speak on behalf of Turkey was the National Assembly of Angora though the Allies, while aware of this, would not give the recognition because they regarded the existence of a mediating body in Constantinople useful to themselves. The Angora Government sincerely desired peace on conditions related with national rights. If,

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<sup>10</sup> Ibid, E 1208.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, E 1334.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, E 1359.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid, E 1360.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, E 1360, D.G. Osborne’s ‘Note’, 31<sup>st</sup> Jan 1921.

Allies decided to solve the Turkish question at London Conference in a just and right manner, they ought to address their invitation directly to the Government of The Grand National Assembly and they further told that such an invitation would be accepted with good will.<sup>17</sup> Mustafa Kemal's answer was going to anger the British. Osborne believed that Mustafa Kemal's arrogant reply was due to the fact that he was under Bolsheviks' control. Osborne also reminded that, it should be borne in mind that the Rome Conference of Nationalists had advised concealment of any collaboration between Angora and Constantinople in the preparation of the Turkish demands. His conclusion was that, neither the Nationalists' rude and disrespectful demands for a direct invitation and for the scrapping of the Treaty, nor the Greek request of maintaining status-quo and asking for Constantinople were acceptable. Both sides, in view of the coming Conference, had assumed an extreme position in regard to possible participation. Osborne suggested that to relieve the aroused sentiments and tension in India, they could make use of the invitation to Turks. What he had in mind was a fresh Greek offensive, with a decisive success, might have an effect on Mustafa Kemal. Osborne thought whether Mustafa Kemal was a free agent, therefore his message might be intended for Bolsheviks' consumption and he might be communicating discretely with the Constantinople Government.<sup>18</sup> Curzon's evaluation for the developments and answers given was; *"Nothing to be done. These are tactical moves"*<sup>19</sup>

#### VI.1.2. Unofficial Venizelos in the Turkish-Greek Conflict

After loosing the elections Venizelos left Athens for Niece, but he was still active in politics. Harold Nicolson had a meeting with him in Paris on 27<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921. Nicolson knew that Venizelos had come to Paris with the invitation of Lloyd George. Venizelos seemed to be puzzled with the decision of the Paris Summit to extend an invitation to Mustafa Kemal. He was also concerned about on what Churchill had told him in Monte Carlo before coming to Paris that some drastic revision of Sevres was inevitable. Nicolson assured him that he needed not to be worried as to the desertion of Greece by Britain in regard to any vital Greek interests. Nicolson believed that the Conference was engineered by Curzon and it was a success as far as Britain was concerned. Venizelos was relieved with the news that it was a kind of plot against Mustafa Kemal and that the proposal naturally put him in an awkward

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<sup>17</sup> Nutuk 343, 360 and PRO, FO 371/6464, E1360, Sir R. Rumbold's telegram to Lord Hardinge, 28<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921.

<sup>18</sup> PRO, FO 371/6464, E1360, D.G. Osborne's 'Note', 31<sup>st</sup> Jan. 1921.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, Curzon's 'Note'.

position. Venizelos was certain that Mustafa Kemal would do something foolish, he would either refuse to come to the Conference or if he came, he would put forth extreme proposals which would ruin his whole case. Nicolson explained that in such circumstances it would be possible for Britain to convince the French and Italians that no hope of a peaceful settlement existed even if any drastic revision of the Treaty of Sevres to be made.<sup>20</sup>

Harold Nicolson was not alone in meeting Venizelos; P.H. Kerr also visited him in Paris on 26<sup>th</sup> Jan 1921. Venizelos told him that in his opinion, the greatest service which the Allies had rendered to civilization, had been the destruction of the Turkish Empire. According to Venizelos, to go back to the Treaty of Sevres would be to set back the clock of civilization. He believed that Mustafa Kemal was carrying out a systematic policy of extermination of the Greeks and other civilized elements and if they restored Smyrna to his control, it would mean that he would attempt to exterminate the Greeks and other Christians there too. He believed that the worst was to come if the local Greeks should fight to save Smyrna. He said that he had never asked the Allies to finance Greece during the period when the Greek army was carrying out an Allied policy, but if the Allies wanted the Greeks to help them against the Turks as it was in the Ismid case, they would have to give the Greeks the necessary financial assistance. He hoped that the Allies would continue to support Greece, because Greece was the only civilized power in the Near East, but that, she was entirely dependent upon the Allies and especially upon Britain.<sup>21</sup>

Meanwhile the Allies except Britain were using every means to have Kemalists' attendance to the meeting in London. Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, who in meeting with Lloyd George on 25<sup>th</sup> Jan.1921, asked the British Prime Minister whether he could get in touch with Talat Pasha, the fugitive leader of CPU, who was in Berlin, and ask him to put pressure on Mustafa Kemal to attend the Conference in London, and he received an affirmation from Lloyd George<sup>22</sup>

As the discussions were going on for the London Conference, Greek forces commenced an offensive on Nationalist forces, claiming that it was to forestall Turkish attack, although General Harrington had already informed the War Office that Greek Army was getting ready to attack Turks in the direction of Eskisehir to get

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<sup>20</sup> House of Lords, Public Records, Lloyd George Papers (Lloyd George Papers), LG/F/25/1/7 and PRO, FO 371/6077, C 1740, Harold Nicolson's Memorandum, 27<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921,

<sup>21</sup> PRO, FO 371/6077, C 1740, P.H. Kerr's Memorandum, 27<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1921.

<sup>22</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/25/1/7.

access to Baghdad railway. General Harrington believed that military operations undertaken were intended to influence the Conference.<sup>23</sup> Mr. Edmonds from Foreign Office wrote that if both sides were too much afraid of each other to fight, they might be inclined to accept a reasonable settlement at the Conference. Edmonds was against Britain intervention with the hope of stopping the fighting, since they would be putting forth requests, difficult to satisfy.<sup>24</sup> In view of the Greek offensive, the Cabinet decided to inform Greece that it was impossible for Britain to join the Greeks in any offensive action in view of Britain's invitation to the Turkish Nationalist leaders to take part in forthcoming London Conference.<sup>25</sup> Lord Granville confirmed the preparations for the Greek advance towards Eskisehir but he had learned that operations would not be carried out before 24<sup>th</sup> February at earliest as Greek Government feared that in case of a failure, they would suffer in the London Conference.<sup>26</sup>

Meanwhile Philip Kerr was busy negotiating with Venizelos and some other Greeks to find a way for the Greek crisis. In his Memorandum of 4<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1921, he told that Venizelos was very anxious that Lloyd George should consider taking some steps to dethrone Constantine. Kerr suggested to Lloyd George that it would be an extremely dangerous thing to put them in and also their relations with France and Italy would be harmed. Kerr mentioned his talk with Colonel Lawrence [Lawrence of Arabia] who was going to Trans-Jordania to see Abdullah. Lawrence had been in close touch with Faisal who impersonally was in touch with Mustafa Kemal. Lawrence had learned that Mustafa Kemal was anxious to come to terms with Britain because he felt torn 'between the devil of Allies and the deep sea of Bolsheviks', but he could not do so, without securing an outlet. Lawrence told Kerr that Russians were offering to support the Turks in recovering their Greek territories, but what Mustafa Kemal wanted was to get hold of Azerbaijan for the Baku oil. According to Lawrence, if Mustafa Kemal knew that Britain would give him a free hand towards Azerbaijan, provided he respected Armenia and Georgia, then he would be much easier to deal with. Kerr suggested Lloyd George to see Lawrence before his departure, since he thought that there was a good deal to be said for this course.<sup>27</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> PRO, FO 371/6507, E1872.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, E1872, Edmonds 'Note', 21<sup>st</sup> Feb. 1921.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid, E1872, War Office telegram to the G.O.C. Constantinople, 8<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1921.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, E1872, Lord Granville's message to Foreign Office, 10<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1921.

<sup>27</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/90/1/37.

### VI.1.3 The Second London Conference

The preparation for the London Conference was in progress as Kemalists and the Representatives of Constantinople Government were met in Rome to find how the two parties could cooperate for their future program. Whereas the most prominent member of the Allies, Britain, was having a Conference of Ministers on 14<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1921 to decide the policy they would follow in the Conference. With Curzon's persistence the Ministers declined to send an additional invitation to Kemalists as was requested by Count Sforza. Montagu did not see any obstacle for sending an invitation to Nationalists since the most important thing was to gather all the interested parties around the table. After further discussions, it was decided that Curzon should send a message to Count Sforza that "*Invitation to Angora Delegation has already been given, and they are well on their way. His Majesty's Government agrees with Count Sforza in thinking that it is impossible to extend a more formal invitation at this date.*"<sup>28</sup>

Curzon explained that as he believed the French were inclined to agree, the Sevres Treaty should not be sacrificed since it would reopen the whole question of the Middle-East, Mandates for Mesopotamia, Syria and the Straits. Curzon suggested that they should proceed on the basis of the Sevres but be willing to modify certain features of it. His suggestion was that certain parts of the Treaty should not be modified, such as; (i) Constantinople: i.e. that the Sultan should reside and have his Government and Capital there, (ii) The Straits: i.e. that Straits should be in the hands of an International Commission, safeguarding the passage from the Mediterranean to Black Sea, (iii) The Turkish Empire in Europe: i.e. the clauses dealing with Thrace and the demilitarized zone.

Curzon believed that Kemalists would probably insist on the latter issue, especially for the retention of Adrianople and to move the frontier to Enos-Midia line. Curzon's consideration was to resist these demands on the ground that the population there was more Greek than Turk, and in Northern Thrace, Greece would not be able to

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<sup>28</sup> PRO, CAB 23/24, Appendix 1 to Cabinet 7(21). The attendance of the representatives was a problem needed to be solved. Sir R. Rumbold asked the Foreign office whether it was possible to postpone the London Conference so that the participation of Angora Government would be secured. The Foreign Office in their message of 11<sup>th</sup> February informed Constantinople that the postponement was out of question and the Representatives of Angora Government could only be received in London as a part of the Constantinople Delegation, having no independent status or title of their own (Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/9/3/2c). The representatives of the Angora Government were going to attend the London Conference as a separate identity from Constantinople Government on the initiation of Count Sforza. (Nutuk,359-360)

maintain herself. Another important parameter in keeping the Chatalja line was not to allocate both banks of the Straits to Turks.

Curzon suggested that points of the Treaty which might open to discussion for revision focused on was; Kurdistan, Armenia and Smyrna. Although Sevres contemplated an autonomous state for the Kurds under some sort of British supervision, Curzon believed that considering the British position in Mesopotamia, this would be most difficult to arrange, hence, if there was an understanding with Kemalists, they could agree on to Turks' supervision over the autonomous State of Kurdistan. The Treaty contemplated an independent State of Armenia with a Capital at Erivan as the capital and the American President Wilson's proposal, large portion of Turkey was foreseen to be allocated to Armenia. Curzon's view was that the present circumstances did not allow this, owing to the fact that Turks captured most of the concerned area and also there was a Soviet regime in Erivan. He sought a Turco-Armenian agreement for the Turkey-Armenia border.

Smyrna was the most debatable issue at the Conference of Ministers. Curzon believed that the indication of Turkish history showed examples of provinces being slipped away to other nations, and therefore he considered that the safest method would be to act on the analogy of one of the provinces which had become detached from the Turkish Empire. The example of Eastern Rumelia [Rumeli] as created by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878 could set up a model for the Smyrna issue, since most people probably had realized that Smyrna would eventually slip away from Turkey in exactly in the same manner as Rumelia had. Curzon commented that the point was to find an interim measure to meet the present requirements, although eventually Smyrna would become a part of Greece.

In view of these considerations, Curzon outlined the scheme for Smyrna as was originally proposed by Harold Nicolson within the Foreign Office. Curzon stated that with the scheme proposed, Greece would have the entire European provinces of Ottoman Europe, and would exercise the domination in Smyrna to which her trade and her population entitled her to do so. Curzon further suggested that to please the Turks, they would call the district as 'Smyrna Vilayet'. Montagu stressed the point that they should wait for the Conference and see what claims were to be tabled rather than to decide by themselves for the final course to be adopted at the Meeting. Lloyd George inclined to agree with Montagu, stated that his conviction was that Mustafa Kemal was looking towards East rather than the West and was

planning to get hold on Azerbaijan. He asked his colleagues if the Turks could be encouraged in that direction, whether if they would prefer Turkish or Bolshevik Azerbaijan. Curzon commented that the presence of Turks rather than Bolsheviks in Azerbaijan would be less harmful to British interests. Churchill said he was prepared to hand over Azerbaijan to Turks.

Balfour, who became Lord President of the Council after handing over the Foreign Ministry to Curzon, did not think much about the Turks. He was known for stating that among the Nations, who had entered the War; Turks had the worst records, and had proven that they were hopeless, and more incompetent than any race in the world. Balfour believed that Arabs contributed to the civilization and produced the religion of Islam, whereas Turks had not achieved anything and were not even able to rule. Balfour disagreed with Curzon's proposal in regard to Smyrna, which was worse than the scheme proposed in the Treaty. The new proposal was bound to offend the Greeks who were their allies in the war. Balfour recalled what Venizelos had told him recently that the defense of Smyrna could be achieved by its own people and Mustafa Kemal had been over exaggerated. He believed that peace could not be attained in the East with the presence of Mustafa Kemal. Balfour was against any revision of the Sevres and he was convinced that Turks should remain within the Turkish boundaries.

Lloyd George recalled what Venizelos believed in for the defense of Smyrna and also the resources of Mustafa Kemal were limited. Lloyd George was against the idea of attending the Conference with the feeling that Mustafa Kemal was a power before which they had to bow. He believed that surrendering to Mustafa Kemal would not bring peace, but new trouble, in the East.

Churchill disagreed with the views expressed by Lloyd George, Curzon and Balfour, and stated that they could either make peace with the Turks or fight them. He supported Curzon's policy with difficulty and he did not believe that any solution of the problem would be solved on the lines indicated by the Prime Minister or Balfour, since the result of which would be an indefinite disorder over the all regions of East. He believed that if nothing came out of the Conference so that the status-quo of degeneration and the absence of an effective peace with the Turks, then there would not be any peace in the East. Montagu agreed with Churchill and stated that he had agreed on Sevres but became a supporter of the modification of the Treaty, since it had not brought peace. Lloyd George stated that they all shared the view of

attaining a permanent peace, but could not accept the sharp alternatives of Churchill.<sup>29</sup>

Another point of discussion was the Greek division in Ismid area which was under the command of General Harrington. Greeks applied to British War Office that they were in need of this division for their offense against Turks. The Ministers were generally agreed that Britain did not have any means to prevent the Greeks from withdrawing their forces, but Britain should make it clear that if the Division was going to be utilized for the offence against Turks, then they would not be fed from British base. Commander of the Imperial General Staff (C.I.G.S.) warned the Ministers that in case Greeks were beaten by Turks, the Allied position in Ismid and in Constantinople would be very weak to defense against Turks.<sup>30</sup>

After the Conference of Ministers, Montagu wrote to Lloyd George on 21<sup>st</sup> Feb. 1921 to reiterate his view. Montagu summarized the discussion at the Conference which resulted with only two practical suggestions, which were neither the separation of Smyrna from Turkey, camouflaged as a quasi-Rumelia arrangement, or that peace should be secured by encouraging, or at least offering no objection to Turks taking possession of Azerbaijan. Montagu believed that there was not any substance in these alternatives, and hence, he proposed two more alternatives. The first alternative was to ease the conditions, especially the financial clauses, of control of Turkey when the Treaty started to be practiced. As it stood then, it would bring a tight control of Turkey that one could not imagine a 'free Turkey'. Montagu believed that this alternative did not involve of any territories, hence there would not be any disputes. The second alternative was to determine the exact figures of population of Turks and Greeks in disputed areas, such as in Smyrna and Thrace. Montagu proposed a plebiscite by Allies. He had offered this proposal during the discussions but somehow Curzon was against it. Montagu believed that by employing plebiscite they would be honoring the pledges of the Prime Minister of 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1918 and 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1919.

Montagu's second alternative was discussed during the London Conference in a different form that a population poll, instead of plebiscite, should be carried out under the responsibility of the Allies, but it was not accepted by Greece. The Angora Government also did not find any purpose of the poll since it was not clear how

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<sup>29</sup> PRO, CAB 23/24, Appendix 1 to Cabinet 7(21).

<sup>30</sup> Ibid

these figures were going to be utilized. The news that the London Conference had proposed the appointment of an Inter-Allied Commission to examine the ethnical and similar questions in Thrace and in Smyrna, as reported by Lord Granville on 1<sup>st</sup> March 1921, had fallen like a bomb-shell in Athens, disturbing the optimistic atmosphere which had existed there.<sup>31</sup>

The article appeared in 'Daily Express' that Turkish Nationalist delegation could not be received at the London Conference, stirred some doubts about the proceedings of the coming Conference and Montagu brought the case to the attention of Lloyd George that Foreign Office should do something about it. He also wrote to Churchill about the article, stating that Foreign Office was capable of any folly and therefore he should intervene. He also blamed the Foreign Office that they were not able to compile reliable population figures of Turkey, and therefore they had to take either Greek or Turkish statistics. He believed that the independence of the Straits could only be attained with working close to the Turkish Government. Montagu repeated his proposal that Arabs should also be invited to the London Conference, and although Prime Minister agreed with the proposal but he had forgotten to tell Curzon who was against the invitation. Montagu believed that the peace in Middle East could not be maintained unless there was an understanding with Turks, Arabs, and French.<sup>32</sup>

Lloyd George had a meeting with Kalogeropoulos, the Greek Prime Minister and head of the Greek Delegation, on 16<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1921. Kalogeropoulos thanked Lloyd George for the support given to Greece in recent years and asked whether Britain had any desires or advice to the Greek Government. Lloyd George enquired whether Greece was able to defend the concessions against any attacks, and Kalogeropoulos told that Mustafa Kemal could do nothing and he was convinced that the Greek Army could scatter Mustafa Kemal as soon as they were given the right to do so by the Allied Powers. On the proposal of Allies for Smyrna having a quasi-Rumelia arrangement, Kalogeropoulos was not enthusiastic and told that it was a Greek province and they would defend it for any cost. He further commented that they could never agree on returning Smyrna or Thrace back to Turks. Lloyd

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<sup>31</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/3/11.

<sup>32</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/9/3/2.

George said that he was glad to hear this, and he relied upon the spirit of the Greeks not to surrender their legitimate rights.<sup>33</sup>

Baltazzis who was going to be the Foreign Minister, evaluated the conversation of the Greek Prime Minister had with Lloyd George, indicated that probably Lloyd George was trying to get an exact picture of the Greek people and Government in the event of Britain provoked a continuation of the struggle with Mustafa Kemal through her support. According to Baltazzis, Lloyd George had to know whether the force that Greece was accumulating was strong enough to overcome the Nationalists and pacify Anatolia.<sup>34</sup>

Churchill was worried about the possible offence of Turkish Nationalists to Mosul. He urged the Prime Minister to consider the consequences of Turks attacking Mosul, therefore they should try to make use of the possibility of a ceasefire between Turks and Greeks while the Commission was investigating the distribution of population. Churchill pointed out that perhaps ten millions Sterling of money depended on the tranquility in Mosul and the absence of external pressure.<sup>35</sup>

Lloyd George replied to Churchill about the Mosul issue after his discussion with Bekir Sami Bey who was the Foreign Secretary of the Angora Government and the Head of the Delegation at the London Conference on 16<sup>th</sup> March 1921. Lloyd George raised the question of Mosul in his discussion with Bekir Sami, and told him that they had heard that the Turks were menacing trouble in the Mosul area, and if this was true and Turks continued to do so, the British Government would be driven to assist the Greeks with supplies. Bekir Sami Bey told Lloyd George that it was not the intention of the Government to make trouble in that area, and he further told that Mesopotamia was not worth the cost of British friendship. Lloyd George had the impression that Bekir Sami Bey was anxious to re-establish good relations with Britain. Lloyd George believed that Allies had given considerable concessions to Turkey for the sake of peace and the only outstanding problem was the Smyrna issue. He believed that both sides were very determined on their desires for the area that he doubted if the Allied proposal was to be accepted. Lloyd George was not sure that it would be settled by an armed collusion between Turkey and Greece.

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<sup>33</sup> PRO, CAB 23/35, (p. 294-296). The intercepted telegram from Kalogeropoulos to Baltazzis in Athens bears the date of the meeting as 19<sup>th</sup> February 1921 (FO 371/6079 ,C 3974, PRO)

<sup>34</sup> PRO, FO 371/6079 C 3974, the intercepted telegram of Baltazzis to Kalogeropoulos on 20<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1921.

<sup>35</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/9/3/6, Churchill's letter to Lloyd George, 26<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1921.

Lloyd George believed that Angora Government would not do anything to harm against France or Britain for the time being. He also told Churchill that he could not estimate the power strength of the extremists at Angora, but he thought that Bekir Sami was an effective man and believed that he would try to induce his pro British policy of having good relations with Britain at Angora, although peace between Turkey and Greece was still at far away.<sup>36</sup>

Montagu, after seeing the terms which were to be handed to the Turks, wrote again on 11<sup>th</sup> March to warn the Prime Minister. He said that unless the Allies could do more than this, peace would be impossible in Turkey, in the whole of the Middle East, in Afghanistan and in India. Montagu told that it was the Foreign Office's intrigue, and meticulous interference in other people's affairs with respect to financial control of Turkey. He urged the Prime Minister to get rid of all these interference which were really quite unnecessary. Montagu's second objection was for Smyrna. He said that Greeks refusal meant that they had known that they could not substantiate the claims upon which the Treaty was founded. He urged the Prime Minister to go ahead with the population estimates to find out the real figures. Montagu proposed for the Prime Minister as a last resort to do; (i) To ease the financial control, thoroughly and whole-heartedly, (ii) sticking to his enquiry about Smyrna and Thrace; failing to do these, he should modify the arrangements about Greek Army in Smyrna which had committed massacres and was feared to do again. Montagu's last proposal was for the Thrace. He urged Lloyd George for an autonomous State of Thrace under the League of Nations with a Governor appointed by the Sultan, approved by the League of Nations, and a Government in proportion to the population. Montagu believed that they were represented as being against the Turks because they were Moslems, and therefore he hoped that in the proposal to be submitted to Turks, instead of a 'Christian Governor' would be changed to a 'non-Turkish' Governor' for Smyrna.<sup>37</sup> The proposals of Montagu was going to be evaluated by the Foreign Office and been commented for each clause. Foreign Office did not think most of the clauses were applicable.<sup>38</sup>

Consequently Lloyd George before the break-down of the London Conference had a meeting with the Indian Delegation on 12<sup>th</sup> March 1921 to discuss the Turkish Treaty. The Indian delegation told Lloyd George that as far as Indian people were

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<sup>36</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/9/3/9.

<sup>37</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/41/1/7.

<sup>38</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/172/1/10, Foreign Office 'Note', 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1921.

concerned, more particularly Moslems, the Treaty of Sevres was regarded cruel, hard and an 'unjust' treaty imposed upon Turks. They urged the Prime Minister to fulfill his 1918 pledge. The Indian delegation argued that Thrace was inseparable from Constantinople and the clauses in the Treaty were very harsh on Turks that it left ultimately a restricted Turkish independence. Lloyd George told them that the Turks were useless in defending their case and asked the Delegation to submit him a Memorandum on which points they were against Treaty. At one stage Aga Khan who was among the delegation proposed to form an army to fight Greeks if Britain allowed them to do so. Lloyd George told them that that would be fatal and the Treaty was a compromise among the Allies and it would be difficult to ask Greeks to leave the territories they had occupied. The meeting ended with the promise that he would reconsider the points they were going to submit.<sup>39</sup> The spokesman Imam, on his return to India told Viceroy of India that Lloyd George had told the Delegation that the French was responsible for putting the Greeks into Thrace. The recollection of Imam did not appear in the official note, but he was persistent on publishing the Prime Minister's statement since it had made an impression on his delegation.<sup>40</sup>

The London Conference ended on 12<sup>th</sup> of March 1921, on the same day that the proposal of the Allies for the modifications for the Treaty of Sevres was handed to both parties. The proposal contained some minor modifications to the Treaty of Sevres. The main points proposed by the Allies were; *League of Nations*: Turkey would be facilitated to join the League on the proof of fulfilling the requirements of Treaty, *Constantinople*: Allied threat to the independence to be withdrawn. Possibility of rapid evacuation of city and Ismid peninsula, *Straits*: Demilitarized zone would be reduced and the permanent chairman of the Commission to be a Turk, with two votes., *Kurdistan*: Modification in accord with present circumstances provided Turkey gave consent for autonomy and protection of Kurds and Assyrians, *Smyrna*: Turkish sovereignty, security would be assured by the Greek forces in Smyrna town, and by gendarmerie in suburbs, officered by Allies and recruited according to the population as reported by an Allied Commission, *Armenia*: Turkey should agree to accept the decision of the commission appointed by League of Nations on territory to be transferred to Armenia. In addition to these the Turkish military force was going to be increased.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> PRO, CAB23/35 (S-30).

<sup>40</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/41/1/13.

<sup>41</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/14 and PRO, FO 371/6467, E 3357.

The London Conference and the results were questioned in the Parliament on 14<sup>th</sup> of March, and The Prime Minister was asked whether the India Office had been consulted with regard to the modifications for the Sevres. The Prime Minister informed the members that the proposal modifications were submitted to the Turkish and Greek Delegations on the 12<sup>th</sup> of March and that the British delegates were in full possession of the views of India on the subject.<sup>42</sup>

The response in the press held mixed opinions concerning for the Allied proposal both in Turkey and in Greece. For the press who was behind the Nationalist movement in Turkey, the Allies did not really offer anything new especially for the Thrace and Smyrna provinces. Yunus Nadi who was a member of the Angora delegation and considered to be too Bolshevik by British Foreign Office was going to write in his paper of Yeni Gun in Angora that he expected nothing but enmity.<sup>43</sup> The Press in Athens rejected the proposal was resentful for Greece and unacceptable by the Government.<sup>44</sup>

The acceptance of the Allied proposals, according to the Foreign Office, was already dependant on numerous conditions, and the views of Greeks and Turks widely differed from each other. Osborne wrote that as regards Smyrna scheme, the Greeks wanted to fix the strength of their garrison on the basis of the security of the whole province whereas the Turks wanted to define on the basis of the security of the buildings of the town itself. The Turks were asking for the Governor not to be a Greek but Greece was requesting to select the Governor. Greeks were also requesting to organize the gendarmerie. Another disputed issue for Osborne was the Thrace. Turks were demanding a Commission for Thrace, while the Greeks were prepared to accept a Protocol with regard to Smyrna provided that the Turks accepted and their own modifications were to be adopted.<sup>45</sup>

The Angora Delegation left Britain on 17<sup>th</sup> of March and stopped over in Paris to have meetings with French. Britain initially offered no objections to independent France-Turkey discussions regarding Cilicia, but when the press information from Paris and Rome indicated that the French Agreement with the Nationalists conflicted with the provisions of the Treaty as regards to the frontiers of Syria and also with the provisions of the Tripartite Agreement, protested to France. Britain also considered

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<sup>42</sup> PRO, FO 371/6467, E 3355,

<sup>43</sup> Ibid, E 3401.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid, E 3415.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid, E 3483.

that the Agreement reached in Rome between Italians and Angora Government was against provisions of the Tripartite Agreement.<sup>46</sup>

The Greek Delegation visited Lloyd George before their departure on 19<sup>th</sup> March. Lloyd George told them that the Turkish Delegation promised to give their answer for the Allied proposal within 24 days, and therefore Lloyd George agreed that Greeks could wait to give their answer after the Turks. Lloyd George further told them that if Angora refused to accept the terms then a new situation would be created which would require consideration as he had explained to the Turkish side that any bloodshed would be charged on them. Greek Delegation referred the Agreement between France and Turkey and as a result of this the prisoners released by France would be transferred to the front, and even already concentrations of the Turkish Army opposite their lines were observed. Greeks told that as a consequence of this, they had decided to attack Turks the following week. Lloyd George told the Greeks that nothing should be left to chance because in the event of military operations failing, the Turks would become unmanageable. Lloyd George further told them that he had informed the Turkish Delegation that the time limit of 24 days taken by them to answer did not mean a suspension of hostilities and that the Greeks were at liberty to undertake whatever operations they thought necessary. He told that he did not only inform the Turks but also the Allies; therefore Greeks should not fear any obstacles from them. Greeks told Lloyd George that for the operation in Asia Minor, they were in need of meeting the expenses which the financial position of Greece was not able to cope. They told that they ought to recourse to an immediate issue of paper money and if the International Financial Committee was to refuse them the permission to do so, they were thinking of establishing a new bank in the territories they had occupied to issue new paper money. Lloyd George disapproved the establishment of a bank outside of the jurisdiction of the Committee which would influence the exchange rate and therefore would damage the interests represented by the International Financial Committee. Greeks asked Lloyd George to help them either by assisting them for floating a loan in the British Market or by opening credit for Greece as was done in the past to cover the issue of notes. With the advice of Lloyd George it was decided that Gounaris would stay back in London to draw up a Memorandum for the Treasury. Gounaris stayed back in London few days more to arrange the financial issue. Lloyd

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<sup>46</sup> PRO, FO 371/6467, E3401.

George told them that Britain had a special place in her heart for Greece and always was willing to assist her to return to her glory.<sup>47</sup>

## **VI.2. Lloyd George and Turkish Victory at Sakarya**

While answers were awaited from the both Governments, the Greek Army had staged the attack on Eskisehir and Ada Bazar [Adapazari]. Lord Granville reported from Athens that the press almost unanimously hailed the decision for mobilization and there was considerable talk in Athens that Greek Government had secured the loan and that Britain was supplying war material. On the 20<sup>th</sup> of March the socialists protested the mobilization and the war, and further blamed the Allies especially Britain for militarism and imperialism.<sup>48</sup>

The Greek army attacked on 23<sup>rd</sup> of March 1921. The usage of the Greek 11<sup>th</sup> Division, which was stationed in Ismid Peninsula under the command of General Harrington, but requested by the Greek army to report to Ada Bazar, caused unrest in the British War Office and in Foreign Office. War Office told General Harrington that the Cabinet had agreed that the Greeks ought to be allowed to carry out the operation if they so desired, but that neither Constantinople nor any portion of the Ismid Peninsula was to be used by them as a base or depot for such operation. Greeks asked to use the Eleventh Division, but still to be remained in General Harrington's command. The matter was taken to the Cabinet again and it was suggested that the Greeks be given the command and control of the 11<sup>th</sup> Division, the town and the port of Ismid, leaving them free to use the 11<sup>th</sup> Division as they liked.<sup>49</sup> The question of 11<sup>th</sup> Division was problematic, as Osborne noted on 23<sup>rd</sup> of March that the whole question was complicated by the fact that while the decision rested with the Cabinet, the Greeks were dealing separately with the War Office, Foreign Office and Philip Kerr. Robert Vansittart also noted on the same day that Philip Kerr's statement that 'British Government had issued orders to their Commander in Constantinople to comply with the Greek Government's request' was

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<sup>47</sup> PRO, FO 371/6467, E3483, Kalogeropoulos' message on 19<sup>th</sup> March 1921 from London to Greek Foreign Office.

<sup>48</sup> PRO, FO 371/6567, E3579, Lord Granville's message on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1921.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid, E 3579, War Office's message to Constantinople on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1921. The Cabinet met on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1921 (Cabinet 14(21)) and Item 14 was the future of the 11<sup>th</sup> Division. The decision taken in Cabinet 14(21) was; "That the War Office should inform the Military Adviser of the Greek Delegation that the British Government could not, of course, retain the 11<sup>th</sup> Division from leaving the British Command, but, as we could not concerned in any operations they might undertake, the Greek Government must make their own arrangements as regards supplies for the 11<sup>th</sup> Division from the moment it leaves the British Command" (PRO, FO 371/6567, E3706). Therefore the decision for Ismid town and Peninsula should have been taken somewhere else.

not borne out by the terms of the War Office message to General Harrington on 22<sup>nd</sup> of March. Curzon was going to comment on the same day that he was lost in the jungle.<sup>50</sup> People at the Foreign Office was going to be rescued from the 'jungle' the following day that Philip Kerr confirmed his statement in writing that the Prime Minister wished the Greeks to be given the 11<sup>th</sup> Division and usage of Ismid, then the War Office on 24<sup>th</sup> March informed Harrington accordingly.<sup>51</sup>

General impression in the diplomatic circles as well as in Turkey, was that Britain had been behind the Greek offence. Italian Ambassador in London had asked Sir Eyre Crowe on 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1921 whether there was any truth in a declaration of the Acting Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in Athens that the Greek Government had been given the understanding that a military advance at the moment had the fullest sympathy of British Government.<sup>52</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe denied such allegations and the Foreign Office issued a message to Constantinople that it was quite untrue to suggest that the Greek Government received any encouragement from the British Government to undertake any offensive operations in Asia Minor. The Foreign Office reminded that during the London Conference it was made clear to both Greek and Turkish Delegation that unless and until an agreement was reached as to the modification of the Treaty of Sevres on the lines proposed by the Allies, Powers could undertake no responsibility and hence, the responsibility should rest on those who took them.<sup>53</sup> The information sent by the Foreign Office that British Government was not involved in the Greek offence was going to be challenged by the Greeks. Lord Granville wrote to Foreign Office on 23<sup>rd</sup> of March of his conversation with the Acting Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs in Athens on the previous day. The Greek Minister in strict confidence read him a long telegram reporting interview of Kalogeropoulos and Gounaris with Lloyd George on 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> March 1921. According to the telegram Lloyd George told them that he had warned Turks that if they tried to delay 25-30 days asked for by strengthening their position as against the Greeks they would be responsible for any resulting bloodshed and he had entirely approved Greek proposal to mobilize three classes and make an attempt to counterattack Turkish concentration. Lloyd George had also encouraged them to hope to raise money in Britain and had arranged meeting for Gounaris with Chancellor of the Exchequer.<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> PRO, FO 371/6567, E 3605, Osborne's, Vansittart's and Curzon's 'Notes', 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1921.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid, Osborne's 'Note' on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1921.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, E 3579, Lord Granville's message on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1921.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, Foreign Office's message to Sir Rumbold and Lord Granville of 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1921.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, E 3653, Lord Granville's message to Foreign Office on 23<sup>rd</sup> March 1921.

Handing over the 11<sup>th</sup> Division back to Greece and more important of all leaving the Ismid Peninsula to Greek Army seemed to be engineered by Philip Kerr and Lloyd George, although Secretary of War warned that the Greek attitude was to involve Britain in the advance against the Kemalists. In their discussion the Greeks were indicating that they were fighting the Allies' battle. Secretary of War also warned that Ismid area was de-militarized zone and when they evacuated it and let the Greeks took over; they were bound to be accused of having facilitated the area and facilities to Greeks even if they did not join the offence.<sup>55</sup>

The financial situation of the Greek Government was alarming, and therefore to continue the Anatolia expedition she was in need of borrowing to meet the expenses of the military. Lord Granville reported on 12<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1921, about a dispatch from Mr. Bentinck, the British Delegate on the International Financial Commission on the economical conditions of Greece.<sup>56</sup> The dispatch reflected not only Bentinck's views but also his French colleague on the Commission and of one of the Greek permanent officials of the Commission. The dispatch had the conclusion that contrary to Venizelos' claims, Greece could not possibly maintain the struggle in Asia Minor without financial assistance from the Allies and there was even some doubt whether she could carry on unaided. According to Criezis, the Director of Exchange Department at the National Bank of Greece, the Greek Government had only 50 million drachmas left of the 400 million. Considering that the cost of maintaining the Army was almost 120 millions per month, Greece was in real financial trouble, and desperately in need of foreign aid. In a telegram sent by the Greek Government to the Greek Delegation during London Conference, the Greek Government showed the immediate measures to be taken. The Government asked the Delegation to act in accordance with the sincere desire of the Hellenic Government to regulate its policy on the basis of a close unity with the British Government and enjoy the benefit of the advice of Lloyd George on the Greek questions generally. The Greek Government asked the Delegation to explain to Lloyd George of her economical situation in view of the fact that the last resources at her disposal were being kept for the purpose of dealing with Mustafa Kemal. The message from the Greek Government also indicated that Greece would be ready, in return for the British credits to allow the continuation of their military operations in

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<sup>55</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/16/3/15, Secretary of State for War, Worthington Evans' letter to Philip Kerr on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1921.

<sup>56</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/55/3/10.

Asia Minor, to furnish full guaranties with regard to their utilization only for this purpose.<sup>57</sup>

The economical situation was also presented to Philip Kerr with a note on 8<sup>th</sup> of March 1921.<sup>58</sup> The 'Note' emphasized that it was unlikely that Greece could go on financing the Asia Minor campaign without early financial assistance and that if the campaign was to be abandoned, and the Army demobilized, she would have a reasonable prospect of putting her budget in order without external aid.

The rumor for the British financial assistance was also heard in the Foreign Office circles. Osborne wrote on 23<sup>rd</sup> of March 1921 that he had heard from an Armenian who was a source of half-truths that Greeks concluded a financial deal the day before and they had obtained all the money they wanted and they had telegraphed for the offensive to start at once. Osborne was going to comment that the news was unpleasant and he hoped it was quite untrue.<sup>59</sup> Osborne's wish did not come true and the offensive of the Greek Army started on the same day in the Brussa-Usak line.

To avoid the questions diverted and also to eliminate the rumors, Philip Kerr prepared a 'Note' and asked Robert Vansittart to send it to Constantinople and Athens. The 'Note' after the approval of Curzon was sent to the concerned High Commissions. The 'Note' denied the allegations on British support to Greek attacks, stating that;

It is quite untrue to suggest that the Greek Government has received any encouragement from the British Government to undertake any offensive operations in Asia Minor. It was clear to both Turkish and Greek Delegation at the recent Conference in London that unless and until an agreement was reached as to the modification of the Treaty of Sevres on the lines proposed by the Principal Allied Powers, those Powers undertake no responsibility for restraining either of the two parties from such movements as they might consider necessary to secure the safety of their armies, and that the responsibility for such movements must rest on those who took them."<sup>60</sup>

Meanwhile the Constantinople Government seemed to be content with the proposals extended by the Allies for the Treaty of Sevres and they were grateful at the results achieved by the Turkish delegation. They hoped that the League of

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<sup>57</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/9

<sup>58</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/12

<sup>59</sup> PRO FO 371/6507, C 3487.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, C 3613.

Nations would not select a Greek as a Governor for Smyrna. The Foreign Secretary complained that probably the Nationalists yielded too much to the Italians for the agreement they signed in Rome.<sup>61</sup>

The forthcoming offense of Greeks was in the agenda of a meeting of the French Ambassador in London with Curzon on 23<sup>rd</sup> of March 1921. Both sides exchanged their views with regard to Turkey. Both had known that Greeks were going to attack Turks on the same day. Curzon told that since fighting between Turks and Greeks would continue for some time, it was unlikely that they would agree on the terms proposed in London. The French Ambassador told that Greeks might get a bloodless victory at the beginning and Mustafa Kemal probably would retreat to Angora, to initiate guerilla war.<sup>62</sup> The French-British relations had tensed with regard to difference of opinion in the Middle East. Britain was accused of supporting Emir Feisal and Abdullah whom the relation with France were not as desired. The French Ambassador in his visit to Curzon on 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1921 commented on the French feeling that they had been regretting the British support for Emir Feisal and Emir Abdullah. Curzon explained that the relations with Feisal had been going on for a long time even before French were aware of his existence, since Britain had made the treaty which brought King Hussein into the war against Ottomans.<sup>63</sup>

The British Government was getting worried with the implications of Nationalists getting organized and been recognized by third parties which would impair the ratification of the Sevres. British Intelligence considered that certain agreements and treaties signed mostly, by the Nationalists were affecting the Sevres directly and indirectly. They believed that; Armenian-Bolshevik Treaty of 10<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1920, Alexandropoulos Treaty of 2<sup>nd</sup>-3<sup>rd</sup> of Dec.1920 between Nationalists and Armenia, Nationalist-Afghan Convention of 3<sup>rd</sup> of March 1921, and Russo-Nationalist Treaty of 16<sup>th</sup> of March 1921 were influenced directly and Russo-Persian Agreement of 18<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1920, Russo-Afghan Treaty of 28<sup>th</sup> Feb.1920, Franco-Nationalist Agreement of 17<sup>th</sup> March 1921, and Italian-Nationalist Agreement of 13<sup>th</sup> March 1921 indirectly to the Treaty of Sevres.<sup>64</sup>

Britain was aware of the Agreements of Italy and France with the Turks in March of 1921 after the London Conference and requested from these countries to send

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<sup>61</sup> PRO, FO 371/6467, E 3664.

<sup>62</sup> PRO, FO 371/6344, E 3816.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid, E 4164.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, E6943.

copies of the documents. France declined claiming that the Agreement was not ratified by the Parliament yet.<sup>65</sup> The British Foreign Office found it hard to accept this French excuse. Osborne wrote that the French had refused to tell them about their treaty with the Turks for reasons of parliamentary etiquette. He did not think they should accept this French attitude. Osborne further commented that, if it was a question of etiquette, then Britain ought to point out that it was contrary to all accepted rules for one Ally to conclude a treaty with a common enemy without notifying the other, more particularly if the Treaty in question had traversed two instruments to which the both Allies had signed.<sup>66</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe wrote a Memorandum to Curzon expressing that he was also reluctant to believe the explanation given by France and he commented that, the heads of the Allied Governments had met in a Conference to decide upon a common policy in dealing with the Turkish situation created by the refusal of the Angora Government to accept the Treaty of Sevres. He further told that the Conference agreed upon certain modifications of the Treaty which had been put before the Governments at Constantinople, at Angora as well as at Athens. He blamed the French that by taking the advantage of the presence of the Angora Delegates in London, the French Government simultaneously negotiated a separate agreement with them outside of the Conference. Britain would have thought it natural that under existing circumstances the French Government should have frankly informed them of the course and the result of these separate negotiations. Eyre Crowe continued by commenting that the French Government purposely left them in dark and eventually, British Government had learned from newspapers that the Agreement contained provisions conflicting with the Treaty of Sevres, which the Allies had not proposed to modify and also with the Tripartite Agreement. Sir Eyre Crowe accused the French Government working behind their back and the attitude of French as it had shown that such a policy of French Government coming from a partner could not be accepted. Eyre Crowe concluded his Memorandum in saying that the answer of Quai d'Orsay left him no chance but to protest against the conclusion of a secret pact by one of the Allies with one of their enemies.<sup>67</sup>

Meanwhile the Greek Army was advancing towards the interior of Anatolia. They captured Ada Bazar [Adapazari] on 26<sup>th</sup> of March and Afyon on 27<sup>th</sup>, but lost the Second Inonu battle on 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1921. The Cabinet in its meeting of 4<sup>th</sup> of April

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid, E 3613.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid, Osborne's Note on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1921.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid, Sir Eyre Crowe's 'Note' on 26<sup>th</sup> March 1921.

mostly dealt with the railway strike and bringing English troops back home. They also took precautions to give the authority to General Harrington to draw the British troops from Ismid Peninsula to the European side of the Bosphorus when he deemed necessary.<sup>68</sup> Allies were concerned about a Kemalist attack in the Ismid Peninsula which could result in taking Constantinople. General Harrington had been warning the Allies that the lack of sufficient military forces made the defense of Ismid quite difficult since the Greek 11<sup>th</sup> Division was transferred to the Greek Army.

The Greek Army after the Second İnönü battle as of 1<sup>st</sup> of April had retreated and in a reply to a question in the Parliament the Prime Minister stated that no important developments had been reported since Greek withdrawal towards Brussa and from Afyonkarahisar. The Prime Minister indicated that the Government had no information which would lead them to think that the Greek Government did not intend to continue operations.<sup>69</sup>

Questions in regard to the crisis in Asia Minor and the continuation of war between Greece and Nationalists were forwarded to the Prime Minister in the Parliament on 21<sup>st</sup> of April 1921. Lloyd George replied that further intervention at the present stage could hardly serve any useful purpose on behalf of the Supreme Council and to the question of to what extent Britain was financially committed to either side, the Prime Minister stated that Britain was in no way financially committed to either side.<sup>70</sup> On the same day another question dealt with the sufferings of the Turkish people. A member asked the Prime Minister; whether his attention had been drawn on the sufferings of the Moslem population under the regime introduced by the Greeks in the territories they had occupied in Anatolia. Another question was related with the unrest in India; if it was attributable to the situation in Smyrna and Thrace and whether the Government was planning to carry out an inquiry to be made into the conditions prevailing in these districts and to publish the results. Lloyd George replied as prepared by the Foreign Office that various allegations and counter-allegations by both parties to the present hostilities had been brought to the attention of the Government and that the question of sending officers from Constantinople to certain localities for an inquiry was under consideration.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> PRO, CAB 23/25, Cabinet Meeting of 17(21).

<sup>69</sup> PRO, FO 371/6510, E 4754.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, E 4756.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid, E 4757.

The topic of discussion in the House of Lords was also the Turkish-Greek conflict. There, Lord Lamington commented that a recent Conference was attended by both parties which were followed by the assuring remarks of the Greek Prime Minister upon his return to Greece that everything was satisfactorily arranged in London. Lord Lamington continued expressing that synchronous to this statement, their attack was launched. He furthermore stated that the allegation was made not only by the Turks but by Moslems throughout the world that British Government had been aware of the approaching this attack and, moreover, provided either money or supplies enabling it. The Lord also questioned how the Greek vessels of war were allowed to enter the Black Sea and bombarded Turkish coast, and whether that incident had the Government's permission. Explanatory response given to Lord Lamington, was that during the Conference it was made clear to Greeks and Turks that, unless and until an agreement was reached regarding the proposed modifications, the Allies could undertake no responsibility for retaining either, if the two parties from such movements as they might consider to secure the safety of their armies but that the responsibility for such movements ought to rest upon on those who took them. It was further stated that the Allied Governments had agreed upon a policy of neutrality during the present hostilities and were strictly adhering to it and therefore, British Government refrained from facilitating export of arms or ammunitions extending to either Greeks or the Turks.<sup>72</sup>

Edmonds from Foreign Office had prepared a 'talking paper' in response to Lord Lamington which it stated that they had decided that no facilities could be given for the export of war materials from Britain to either Greece or Turkey. The definition of war material for this purpose was published in the Board of Trade Journal on 24<sup>th</sup> March 1921 and covered all armaments and munitions. The Government's pursuance of the policy of neutrality in finance had continued since the accession of King Constantine and was maintained by an embargo on the remainder of their share of the France-Anglo-American book credit of 3 million Sterling which was opened under the agreement of 10<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1918. The International Financial Commission at Athens had been refusing its sanction to any further note issued by the Greek Government. The Greek Government recently issued 500 million drachmas of notes without such sanction. Edmonds continued in his note that so far as was known, no loan had been placed by the Greek Government on the British market but the British Government could not control such new issues in the Market

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid, E 4758.

here, if they were negotiated directly between the Greek Government and British firms.<sup>73</sup>

During the discussions in the Parliament, the questions diverted to the Prime Minister had started implying that the policy of Britain was on the side of Greece. For example, on 14<sup>th</sup> of April, a member in the House of Commons requested to know whether they could be sure that no British troops were involved in helping Greeks.<sup>74</sup> To another question on the 18<sup>th</sup> of April concerning the neutrality of the Straits, it was proposed to allow the Greeks the free passage of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara for naval and military operations against the Turks; and whether it was proposed to sanction the threatening or capture of Constantinople by the Greek Fleet, the Prime Minister replied that Britain with her Allies were maintaining the neutrality, therefore it would cover Constantinople which was in Allied occupation. Lloyd George stated in regard to Straits that the international arrangements concerning them had been inserted in the Treaty of Sevres which was not in force yet.<sup>75</sup> Lloyd George reminded that Constantinople was still under Allied occupation, therefore enabling neutrality to Greeks and Turks. General Harrington informed the Foreign Office on 22<sup>nd</sup> of April that the Greeks were undoubtedly using Constantinople as a supply base and they had lately brought horses, mules and military trucks. He also warned the British Government that the Greek ships were loading large quantities of stores and material at Galata-Istanbul and in Golden Horn and Senior Naval Officer had little doubt that considerable numbers of personnel were also transferred.<sup>76</sup> War Office believed that the articles appeared in the list of Britain which was prohibited to be exported to either Greece or Turkey should be also applicable for Constantinople since it was also considered to be under occupation of the Allies. Foreign Office although in accord with the War Office drew their concern to the difficulties in the application. Foreign Office noted that they did not know whether there were any restrictions on Greek ships at present, but it was perhaps the provisions should not be applied to the Greek warships.<sup>77</sup>

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid, E 4758, Osborne's 'Note' on 21<sup>st</sup> April 1921. The history of the decision making process was submitted to Lloyd George with a Foreign Office Memorandum on 22<sup>nd</sup> April 1921 (PRO, FO 371/6510, E 4746.)

<sup>74</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 140, Col.: 1289.

<sup>75</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 140, Col.: 1531.

<sup>76</sup> PRO, FO 371/6510, E 4789.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid, E 5005.

Meanwhile Greece trying to lift the embargo, had asked the Allies to permit war materials to be sent to both sides. Greece was also using other channels such as Romania to procure war materials.<sup>78</sup>

Greece issued a restrictive note on 26<sup>th</sup> of April; banning sea communication between Southern coast of Marmara and all other ports including Constantinople. Sir R. Rumbold's opinion was that the Greek Note appeared to be in direct conflict with Armistice terms and also the British policy.<sup>79</sup>

The British Intelligence made a study on Angora Government and their approach towards British Government during the first half of 1921. It was stated that sentiments of the Nationalists since inauguration of the movement had been consistently hostile to Britain. The fall of Venizelos, the defeat of Wrangel in Crimea, the complete victory against Armenia and their success against Greeks in İnönü battles had increased their hopes and confidence, and as a result, nationalist leaders expected a favourable reception for the Turkish claims with regard to modifications in the Treaty of Sevres. They considered the success of the İnönü battles not only a victory against Greeks but also against Britain who had been developed as the directing power behind Greece. The call for the London Conference as a part of the Constantinople Government was irritating for the Nationalists. The Report, contained Nationalists' attitude in the procedures before the London Conference and referred to a telegram sent by Bekir Sami, stating that during the Conference both Briand and Count Sforza had informed him that the situation was in favour of the Turks, and that he had accepted the appointment of an international commission to investigate the conditions in Smyrna and Thrace. In another telegram of 26<sup>th</sup> February, Bekir Sami mentioned that Britain was beginning to realize the benefits she had expected from Greece would not be met and some people, such as Churchill and Derby were inclined to renew Palmerston's policy. Bekir Sami thought that it would be possible to conclude a firm and lasting agreement with Britain, which would provide peace for Turkey. The conclusions of the Conference was beyond the expectations of the Nationalists and the offence of the Greeks that started on 23<sup>rd</sup> March with the British officials attached to the various Greek regiments were regarded as Britain was the power behind the Greeks. The

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<sup>78</sup> PRO, FO 371/6511, E 5081.

<sup>79</sup> Ibid, E 5187.

Report concluded that nothing at the present date could convince the Turk of Britain's neutrality with regard to the Greek operations in Anatolia.<sup>80</sup>

With this consideration, the British High Commission reported on 29<sup>th</sup> of May that British neutrality carried no convincing weight at Angora, and leaders were identifying Britain with Greece. The attitude of Angora towards French, compared to British was less hostile.<sup>81</sup> Furthermore, Angora neither cared nor was thinking it important to disguise their attitude of uncompromising hostility towards Britain.<sup>82</sup> When Rumbold reported the change in Foreign Ministry in Angora that Bekir Sami was replaced by Yusuf Kemal, Britain considered that the extremists were at power at Angora. The 'Echo de Paris' on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1921 published an article on the additional conditions imposed by the Angora Government for the ratification of the Turco-French Agreement for which the French Government decided to freeze for the time being as Hardinge reported from Paris that Berthelot had expressed his hope that Greeks would obtain a great victory over the Turks.<sup>83</sup>

British Cabinet met twice on 31<sup>st</sup> of May to discuss Turkey and the Middle East. In the morning session of the Cabinet, General Harrington was present to discuss the latest developments in Turkey. General Harrington explained the situation of the Greek Army in Asia and told that they were so far deteriorated and possibly would be driven back to Smyrna. Harrington told that there were already indications that Greeks were going to withdraw from Ismid Peninsula. If the events were going to follow this course, the Allied position in Constantinople was in danger, unless new and strong reinforcements were made. Another problem voiced was the disagreement of the Allies in the unified command under Harrington in Constantinople area and rejection of forming a Turkish gendarmerie by French and Italian Governments. In case Constantinople would be evacuated with a nucleus of officers with the Turkish Gendarmerie left behind, they would require a considerable force to occupy and defend the Dardanelles. The Cabinet then considered the problem of the concentration of Turkish Division in the Diabakr [Diyarbakir] region.

Curzon was against withdrawal of Allies from Constantinople for political implications. Curzon believed that in case they withdrew then, it would be easy for Mustafa Kemal to capture the city, then he was bound to take Smyrna and turn to

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<sup>80</sup> PRO, FO 371/6470, E 6129.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid, E 6140.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid, E 6323.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, E 6157.

Thrace and hence, they would be losing of all the benefits they had gained by defeating Turks in the War. Curzon further pointed out that Turks would revive the old habit of massacring the Christians throughout Asia Minor. Mustafa Kemal being victorious and bitterly hostile would be extremely difficult to be ejected from his position. Curzon stated that meanwhile French were carrying a policy favourable for Turks such as employing Turkish officials in Syria, and after capturing Constantinople; probably Mustafa Kemal would find French and Italians on his side. Curzon believed that the relation of Nationalists and Bolsheviks and the position of French and Italians were hampering the British position in East.

Churchill, too, was against the withdrawal from Constantinople for its implications in Mesopotamia and Palestine unless it was to be carried out as a part of a general peace with Turkey. Montagu urged to have substantial modification of the Sevres which would be acceptable and operative. The Cabinet meeting concluded with a decision that Curzon, in conjunction with Hankey, should draw resolutions to be discussed at the next cabinet meeting and the Admiralty should prepare a report for the Cabinet for the requirements of holding Dardanelles.<sup>84</sup> It was interesting that throughout the meeting Lloyd George refrained himself commenting in regard to the discussion.

The Cabinet met again in the afternoon on the same day, 31<sup>st</sup> of May, to discuss further the developments in Turkey. It was concluded that the Turkish question should be examined by a Cabinet Committee composed of Prime Minister and Secretary of States of Foreign Affairs, Colonies, War, India and Health. Another decision taken was for Curzon to take steps as he might deem advisable to receive the views of Venizelos on the present position.<sup>85</sup>

The Cabinet Committee of the 'Future of Constantinople' which was set up by the Cabinet on 31<sup>st</sup> May 1921 had its first meeting on the next day. In the first Meeting, Curzon explained that he had contacted John Stavridi who was a close friend of Venizelos, to get in touch with him and invite him to London. It was stressed that Mustafa Kemal, who, a year or two ago, had been an almost negligible factor, had grown into a formidable menace, and the position of Britain in the Near East had deteriorated within this period. Meanwhile France and Italy had been trying to approach Mustafa Kemal who then directed all his negative propoganda towards

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<sup>84</sup> PRO, CAB 23/25, Cabinet Meeting 44(21).

<sup>85</sup> Ibid, Cabinet Meeting 45(21).

Britain. It was also pointed out that in case they had to leave Constantinople for the occupation of the Nationalist Army, it would be very difficult for Britain to carry out her policy in Mesopotamia and the Middle East. There were two main suggestions at the meeting, either to prepare themselves for a fighting attitude against Mustafa Kemal and support Greeks on condition that they accepted the British advice for the military command, organization and strategy, or they should consider with the Allies, new terms of peace which would be easy for Turks to accept, and in the mean time, to employ an emissary such as Aga Khan to talk to Mustafa Kemal and to convince him. It was pointed out that one of the weaknesses of the Allies was that they each had separate policies, even conflicting at times and neither had fair play.<sup>86</sup>

The Committee had its second meeting on the following day, 2<sup>nd</sup> of June. The Imperial General Staff explained that the Admiralty could currently control the free passage through Dardanelles but it would be extremely difficult to do so in future with the Turks recapturing Ismid Peninsula and controlling the southern shores of the Straits. It was also pointed out that considerable force was required to control of both sides of Dardanelles. It was believed that the loss of the Dardanelles would be the loss of one of the most important results of the war. There were several suggestions for dealing with the situation. One method was to acquire the friendship of Mustafa Kemal by offering him not only Smyrna, Constantinople, but also Batum and Baku. The other suggestion was to approach the Greeks. It was explained that the basis of the British Policy in the Near East had been that the position at Constantinople and the freedom of the Straits could be secured only through of powerful Greece. Therefore a fresh attempt should be staged towards Greece and find out whether she had military capability. If it was found out otherwise, then they would have to evacuate Constantinople and eventually Dardanelles. There was also an emphasis on how Britain was treating Greek people, it was stated that in any offer they made, they did not give much for the Greek people to justify that Britain had betrayed them, and it was King Constantine who had ruined their prospects so they should not take the blame for it. It was mentioned that Venizelos would be coming to London and they would have to wait and see what he would say for the situation.<sup>87</sup> The suggestion Churchill made in his letter addressed to the Prime Minister on 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 1921 was discussed and it was stated that the proposals were very similar to the offer made in London Conference with the addition of

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<sup>86</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/5.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid

evacuation of Smyrna. It was felt that at the present time it would be useless to approach the Greeks with an offer of this kind.

Hankey, Secretary to the Cabinet, submitted a Memorandum to Lloyd George on 2<sup>nd</sup> of June 1921 for 'crystallization of a policy in Turkey' out of recent discussions. Hankey summarized the events and stressed on the importance of the Greek evacuation of the Ismid Peninsula which would lead to the danger of being forced to defend Constantinople in case the Greeks were to loose against the Turks. They already knew that there was no way neither to rely to French and Italians or send new reinforcement from Britain as was proposed by the British General Officer Commanding. According to Hankey, much depended on the results of forthcoming military operations between the Greeks and Turks and a decisive victory by the Greeks would relieve from threat of Turks at Constantinople. However their complete defeat would disable keeping the British forces in Constantinople and in Dardanelles, since Turks were bound to march towards Constantinople and capture Smyrna and Thrace. Hankey believed that until a decisive result was attained, there was no danger for Constantinople and also no possibility for any party willing to agree on a peace proposal. Hankey was suggesting that by considering the condition of the Greek army, they had to be cautious and make some plans in case within the next week or two the Greeks were to fail to achieve any decisive victory. In this case the Greeks would be confronted with two alternatives. The First alternative would be to prolong the war and therefore further mobilization which was the most criticized and probably the very reason for the defeat of Venizelos. This alternative brought the probability of compelling Greeks to deal with the evacuated Constantinople by the Allies and a probable capture of Constantinople and Thrace by Mustafa Kemal and therefore all their reinforcement should be allocated for the defense of Smyrna. The second alternative was for Greece to evacuate Smyrna which was a very difficult decision for the Greek Government to make.

Hankey's suggestion of a policy for Britain to follow was such that if and when the news reached to London as a first sign for a failure of the Greek forces, Britain should get in touch with the Greek Government and explain to them the difficulty of their position in Constantinople. Britain should offer them co-operation, including supplies of munitions, war material and financial support on the condition of a British guidance in the organization of their military forces and policy in regard to peace with Turkey.

Hankey further proposed to Lloyd George that, Curzon, during his visit to France the following week, should talk to Briand and convince him that it was for her own benefit to cooperate, as a united allied under such circumstances as he had outlined. In case there was a united front with Greece, France and Italy's participation, then they could convince the Turks for peace. Hankey proposed for Curzon to discuss with Briand on the concessions to be made to Turks.

Hankey believed that in order to safeguard British military forces against the risk of a disaster, such as might occur if the Greek forces at Smyrna sustained a decisive defeat or in the event of a failure of the policy he had outlined in the Memorandum, preparations should be made for an immediate evacuation of Constantinople.<sup>88</sup>

'The Cabinet Committee for the Future of Constantinople' had another meeting on 9<sup>th</sup> of June before submitting its resolution to the Cabinet. In accordance with the conclusion reached at the previous meetings, Venizelos was invited to London to discuss the situation in Turkey. Venizelos had meetings with Lloyd George, Curzon and Chief of Staff Sir Henry Wilson. Curzon told the Committee that in his meeting with Venizelos, he explained that although Britain felt uneasy about suggesting anything to Greece to sacrifice Greek claims that she had previously been admitted but the circumstances in Turkey had forced her to consider new ways in order to reach peace in Turkey. He further told that the dangers of the present military situation might result not only in the loss of Smyrna for Greece, but of the withdrawal of the Allies from Constantinople which would pave the way for Mustafa Kemal to recapture Thrace. Curzon wanted to learn from Venizelos whether Greek Government would be willing to sacrifice the Treaty of Sevres for the benefit of Turkey. Venizelos told him that he would not know the reaction of the Greek Government but he doubted that the Angora Government, under the circumstances they were in, would accept the Allied proposal. Venizelos further pressed his opinion that Allies should deal with both Angora and Constantinople Governments and in case that Mustafa Kemal rejected the Allies' offer, the Greek Government could not maintain their position in Anatolia more than six months without Allied support; but Curzon told him that the public opinion in both Britain and France were against a new war with Turkey.<sup>89</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/25/1/36, M.P.A. Hankey's Memorandum on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1921.

<sup>89</sup> PRO, CAB 23/26, The Meeting of 'Cabinet Committee on the Future of Constantinople', 9<sup>th</sup> of June, 1921.

In the meeting with Lloyd George, Venizelos insisted that in the event of Mustafa Kemal refusing to negotiate on the basis proposed, the only alternative to the Allies was to support Greece to fight with the Turks and to use the Greek army all the way to beat Mustafa Kemal. Venizelos urged the Chief of Staff of Imperial Forces, Sir Henry Wilson to impose on Greece to change their policy and use Venizelist army officers in Greek Army in Anatolia. The Committee decided to approach the Greek Government to have their consent to offer a proposal on a modification of the Treaty of Sevres similar to the one offered in London Conference. In the event that Greeks agreed on proposals, they would take the peace offer to Turks and in case that Turks refused them, then Allies would support the Greeks not in military formation but by other means, comprising a naval blockade of Black Sea, facilities for acquiring war material including airplanes, the relaxation of motion in matters of finance, and, perhaps, permission to engage ex-Service men who might be willing to join Greek forces. In case that Greeks won against Mustafa Kemal, then the offer made to Turks about Smyrna would be opened for revision. Committee also decided that the decision reached might be altered with the view of the military reports taking the defeat into account, or adjusted to the views of French Government.<sup>90</sup>

Curzon went to Paris to discuss the outstanding issues including the Greco-Turkish conflict but more for relaxing the tension existed between France and Britain because of different of opinion in Middle East. Hardinge and Rumbold accompanied Curzon and they met Briand and Berthelot at d'Orsay on 18<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> of June 1921. Curzon told the details of his trip in the Cabinet that he explained that the position had become worse in regard to British, French, and Italian relations with the Turks who had failed to deliver the prisoners and broken the Agreements. Curzon explained the condition of the Greek forces in Anatolia and a possible Turkish victory would be damaging for Allies. Briand and Curzon agreed on Smyrna that a Christian Governor with Greek army being called back when the new regime settled down there. For Thrace, Briand insistent on Enos-Midia line or forming an autonomous state in Thrace similar to Smyrna but after persuasion by Curzon he seemed to be ready to accept the Chatalja line with an outlet at the Eastern Turkey and for some financial concessions to Turks as well as a demilitarized zone up to Enos-Midia line. Curzon told that the Greeks had rejected for the Commission of Enquiry in thinking that it would give some rights to Turks therefore the offer of autonomous Thrace would be rejected by Greeks. It was decided that the Allies

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<sup>90</sup> Ibid

through their representatives would send the offer and conditions to Greeks, and if the answer was affirmative then they would try to approach Mustafa Kemal. Curzon also told Briand that they would ease the embargo for the Greeks in case the Turks rejected the peace terms or negotiations. Briand told that eventually he preferred a single Nationalist Government at Constantinople under the Sultan and on the question of Curzon stated that their representation in Angora was unofficial in nature but there was no way for them to recognize the King Constantine as a ruler in Greece. The conclusions of the meetings were relayed to the Italians so they would be aware of the developments.<sup>91</sup>

The Foreign Office had prepared a draft Working Paper on the modifications of the Treaty of Sevres on 8<sup>th</sup> of June 1921 before the discussions took place in Paris. The Working Paper prepared by W.S. Edmond touched almost each clause in the Treaty. For Smyrna and Thrace, it was proposed that; both areas to remain Turkish, the Governors of Smyrna and Adrianople and the sub-Governor of Aivali to be Ottoman Greeks appointed by the Sultan with the approval of Britain, France and Italy, the gendarmerie and police to be under British, French and Italian Officers in Turkish services, and the gendarmerie to be at least half composed of Christians. These conditions were set as the maximum that Greece could tolerate, but these were the minimum the Nationalists were likely to accept. Therefore these two districts differed from the rest of Turkey that they were to be treated to be under a different regime similar to Lebanon.<sup>92</sup>

Hardinge was going to write a personal letter to Lloyd George on 22<sup>nd</sup> of June 1921 for Curzon's visit and the gossips in Paris. Hardinge wrote that the Curzon's visit, though not productive of great results was beneficial for the Franco-British relations. For the Greco-Turkish conflict, Hardinge wrote that the situation between the French and British was not far apart, but he commented that the French was blind in their hatred of King Constantine and they wanted to do him and the Greeks as much as possible. Hardinge believed that as a consequence of their hatred they were all for turning the Greeks out of Thrace as well as from Smyrna, quite regardless of the fact that it was easier said than done and that the upsetting of the Greeks in Thrace would probably produce complications with the Bulgarians and Serbians and provoke a new Balkan War. Hardinge believed that at the end the French would

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<sup>91</sup> PRO, CAB 23/26, Appendix to Cabinet 51(21), "Summary of Statement by Lord Curzon on his visit to Paris, June 18<sup>th</sup> -19<sup>th</sup> 1921". For the Full Report, please see Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/13 or PRO, FO 371/6519, E7154.

<sup>92</sup> PRO, FO 371/6470, E6736.

accept the compromise of a demilitarized zone of a certain extent, provided that the remainder of the negotiations were successfully completed. Hardinge also conveyed the gossips that were connected with Berthelot that he had to resign because of his name being involved in a bank crisis.<sup>93</sup>

The conclusions of the Cabinet Committee and the visit of Curzon were discussed in the Cabinet meeting on 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1921. The Cabinet also considered the message from British High Commission that Mustafa Kemal had sent a note to show his desire to meet General Harrington. The Cabinet noted that it was a good opportunity to counter effect the influence of Bolshevism and also to prepare a favourable atmosphere at Angora. It was pointed out that at the moment when they were awaiting for the reply of the Greek Government, it might be too early to enter into any communication with Mustafa Kemal.<sup>94</sup> The decision for the meeting with Mustafa Kemal was going to be decided on the following day. The Cabinet also noted the telegram being sent to the representatives in Athens from Governments that the Allies were seeking to act as a mediator for the Greco-Turkish conflict.<sup>95</sup>

The Cabinet met again on 22<sup>nd</sup> of June 1921 to discuss the invitation for a meeting of Mustafa Kemal and General Harrington. It was suggested that it would be beneficial to have the meeting but the time was not ripe yet. It would be useful to get information as the exact position of the Angora Government with relations to Bolsheviks and Allies, *“and to warn it that Angora Turks would have to choose between the dangerous influences of the Bolsheviks and continued warfare on the one hand and peace and restored good-fellowships with the Entente on the other.”*<sup>96</sup> There were two views expressed at the Cabinet. On one hand some members suggested that it might be valuable and to create a favourable atmosphere for eventual official negotiations, to establish contact through an informal and unofficial meeting. Whereas some other Ministers urged that the assent of France and Italy was essential before the meeting and also stated that, *“in dealing with orientals it was always a mistake to respond to overtures with too many alacrity; that it would be essential to insist on Mustafa Kemal coming himself to Constantinople; and that, if conversation took place, they should be conducted by experienced diplomatist, who should be of rank corresponding to that of the Angora emissary”*<sup>97</sup> The cabinet, at the end, decided that

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<sup>93</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/53/2/3.

<sup>94</sup> PRO, CAB 23/25, Cabinet Meeting 51(21),

<sup>95</sup> PRO, FO 371/6519, E7154, the telegram sent to the British Representative in Athens on 19<sup>th</sup> June and repeated to Foreign Office, Rome and Constantinople.,

<sup>96</sup> PRO, CAB 23/25, Cabinet Meeting 52(21).

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

Curzon should communicate with Italy and France and find out their attitude towards the suggestion.<sup>98</sup> The request extended to General Harrington through Major Henry was going to cause some misunderstanding as Mr. Rattigan, the acting High Commissioner in Constantinople was going to comment as to Major Henry's personal attitude that exceeded his instructions. Mustafa Kemal replied for the invitation that, unless his terms which were known by British, were not to be fulfilled, then there would not be any use for a meeting and could be carried out by subordinates.<sup>99</sup> The meeting never took place and Rattigan was going to describe the incident as a complete misunderstanding. The Athenian press on hearing that the meeting between Mustafa Kemal and General Harrington was canceled was overjoyed and considered that it was an indication of British support for Greece.<sup>100</sup>

The Cabinet, at its meeting on 27<sup>th</sup> of June 1921, very briefly, discussed the reply of the Greek Government's refusal for the offer of the Allied Powers, and there was a general agreement in the Cabinet that their objective was to secure a cessation of fighting. A suggestion was made that the offer refused by the Greeks should be made to both parties, and also the Allies should intimate that a blockade would be applied to either side which refused these terms.<sup>101</sup>

The news reached London that Greeks evacuated Ismid Peninsula and Turks recaptured the area on 28<sup>th</sup> of June 1921. The measures would be taken in case the Turks attacked the neutral area, were discussed in a Cabinet Meeting on 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1921. It was decided that the Secretary of the State for War should remind General Harrington that he should warn the Turks that if they entered the neutral zone they would be considered committing an act of war against the Allies.<sup>102</sup>

The blockade of Black Sea coast was in force, although Admiralty was in doubt about the legality of the policy. Meanwhile Greek ships were sailing through the Straits with no regard to the neutrality of the area.<sup>103</sup> The question with regard to passage of the Greek ships was brought to the Parliament, and a member asked the Prime Minister on 21<sup>st</sup> of June 1921, by reminding what Lloyd George had repeatedly stated about the Dardanelles that it had been neutralized; and if this was the case, whether he would explain why Greek Naval Forces had been allowed to

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid

<sup>99</sup> PRO, FO 371/6471, General Harrington's message to War Office on 7<sup>th</sup> July 1921.

<sup>100</sup> PRO, FO 371/6522, E7972, Lord Granville's message to Foreign Office on 11<sup>th</sup> July 1921.

<sup>101</sup> PRO, CAB 23/25, Cabinet Meeting 54(21).

<sup>102</sup> Ibid, Cabinet Meeting 55(21).

<sup>103</sup> PRO, FO 371/6519, E 7155.

pass through these neutral waters and bombarded Turkish towns. Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Privy Seal, answered the question in saying that the provisions of the Turkish Treaty did not contemplate exclusion of warships of any Power from navigating these waters, so that there could be no question, even if the Treaty were already operating, of preventing passage of Greek war ships.<sup>104</sup> The Greek warships which passed through the Straits were going to bombard the towns of İnebolu, Samsoun [Samsun] and Sinope [Sinop] on Black Sea coast on 23<sup>rd</sup> of June 1921.<sup>105</sup> These towns, as Mr. Rattigan was going to be told by the Greek High Commissioner in Constantinople were not undefended and especially İnebolu contained munitions and therefore bombardment was justified.<sup>106</sup>

The answer of the Greek Government arrived to London on 26<sup>th</sup> of June 1921<sup>107</sup>, but before the news of refusal of the Greek Government, Gounaris, Greek Prime Minister had applied to come and discuss the issue with the British Government with his Foreign Minister Baltazzis.<sup>108</sup> Curzon's reply for the desire of the Greek Prime Minister was that it would be preferable that the Greek Government should formulate and forward their considered reply to the Allied proposals first.<sup>109</sup>

The reply for the Allied proposal received in London and Foreign Office considered that Greeks were not fully aware of the stand of the Allies. Osborne considered that Greece ought to be told that no longer Greece had a mission from the Allies to safeguard the Straits and to impose the original Treaty of Sevres on Turkey contrary to their belief, as appeared in the Greek answer. Both Treaty and mission which so far Greece had not been able to fulfill were modified at the London Conference when proposals for the revision were submitted to Greece and Turkey. Allies, later on adopted the position of mediators between two countries, therefore withdrawing their mandate from Greece and also the proclaimed neutrality of the Allies was the clearest indication that Greece was no longer cooperating with Allies.<sup>110</sup> The Foreign Office considered that Greeks had refused the offer of mediation because they thought they were to win the forthcoming battle and Greek public opinion had been

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<sup>104</sup> PRO, FO 371/6519, E 7156.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid, E 7243.

<sup>106</sup> PRO, FO 371/6524, E 8503.

<sup>107</sup> PRO, FO 371/6519, E 7247.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid, E 7168, The Greek Delegation in London informed the Foreign Office on 22<sup>nd</sup> June that the Prime Minister accompanied with his Foreign Minister would desire to come to London.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, E 7168, Curzon's reply on 26<sup>th</sup> June 1921.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid, E 7247, Osborne's 'Note' on 27<sup>th</sup> June 1921.

brought to believe it too.<sup>111</sup> The Daily Telegraph was going to publish an article on the Greek answer to the Allied offer as “A polite refusal”<sup>112</sup>

Meanwhile the Italians started evacuating Adalia [Antalya] on 1<sup>st</sup> of June 1921 and the French Representatives, Frank Bouillon and Sarrau, arrived in Angora on 9<sup>th</sup> of June 1921 to start the negotiations, and Britain was debating whether to let Harrington to meet with Mustafa Kemal or not. Gounaris while visiting Smyrna prepared a Memorandum on 20<sup>th</sup> of June 1921, which had received the approval of the King Constantine. The Memorandum blamed the Kemalists for the outbreak of the hostilities after the London Conference and explained the present policy of Greece on the eve of the resumption of hostilities.<sup>113</sup>

There was also some misunderstanding between Briand and Curzon on the Thrace issue. Briand in his audience with the Senate Commission on Foreign Affairs told that Britain's consent was received for a fresh and full discussion about the status of Thrace. Curzon rejected this approach saying that this was not what happened at d'Orsay. He stated that in their discussions in Paris on 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> of June 1921, he made some proposals about Thrace in which he pointed out that, were the maximum to which he could be consent in the terms to be submitted to the Greeks and Turks. Curzon furthermore told that he had never given his consent for a new policy in Thrace.<sup>114</sup>

The Greek newspapers hailed the answer given by the Greek Government, and after the answer was sent almost all the papers published in Athens, as Lord Granville reported on 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1921, referred to an article appeared on 24<sup>th</sup> of June at British 'Observer' in which the political corresponded had implied that the British Government was firmly resolved to respect their signature and therefore maintained the Treaty of Sevres. The Greek papers relying on the article in the Observer were considering that the last offer made by the Allies to act as a mediator was really intended as a friendly offer to Greece and had no intention of forcing her to accept, or punishing her if she refused. The media in Athens believed that Britain, alone of Powers, realized the danger of strengthening Kemalists position and the Greek Army was fighting not only for the maintenance of Greek rights and the protection of Christian populations but also to secure the British position at

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<sup>111</sup> Ibid, E 7247.

<sup>112</sup> 'The Daily Telegraph' of 27<sup>th</sup> June 1921.

<sup>113</sup> PRO, FO 371/6519, E 7222,

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, E 7198.

Constantinople and her vital interest in the freedom of the Straits. The Athenian papers also touched upon the British policy towards Greece in stating that Britain was maintaining her neutrality but hoped for the Greek victory which would enable to obtain the desired pacification of the Near East without any sacrifices on the part of Greece. Papers attacked the French and Italian policies and stated that these two countries were anxious to see Greece to be defeated not only because of their selfish interests in Turkey but also from their jealousy of Britain since they desired her to be ejected from Constantinople.<sup>115</sup>

Osborne from Foreign Office commented on 30<sup>th</sup> of June 1921 that he had heard that the diplomatic information in the 'Observer' came from Lloyd George. He believed it was significant that the article appeared in 'Observer' to be in accord with Greek Representative's recent reports to his Government on the attitude of the British Government in which it appeared that Britain was in agreement with Greece.<sup>116</sup>

Sir Worthington Evans, the Secretary of State for War, circulated on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 1921, a 'Study' on the Greek Army and the chances of Greek success in the coming operations as requested by the 'Cabinet Commission on the Future of Turkey' The 'Study' had been prepared by the Imperial General Staff, and showed that the Greek Army was superior in quantity and war material wise. It was believed that the morale was better in Turks especially after the recent battles. As it was planned, the Greek Operation demanded intimate cooperation and independent action by subordinates where were the weakest points of the Greek Army. The Imperial General Staff had the prediction that the Greek Army might be successful initially but saw no prospect of any decisive victory in the long run which would bring peace to Anatolia. The Imperial General Staff also considered whether the Allied support in terms of munitions, war material and money were to be supplied to Greece. They believed that without the Allied support, the Greek operations could not be continued indefinitely, but if the Turks were to receive similar support from Russia, then there was no point in not providing war material to Greeks. The Imperial General Staff pointed out that if the Allies decided to supply munitions to the Greek Army, and at the same time prevented the Turks from obtaining munitions from Russia, the Greeks could reach to a winning position if they were not war weary. The Imperial General Staff did not see any possibility to prevent Russia in feeding Turks with

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<sup>115</sup> PRO, FO 371/6520, E 7452, Lord Granville's message to Foreign Office on 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1921.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid, E 7420.

munitions. Therefore they believed that unless the Allies supported Greece in manpower, the peace could not be attained by giving war material and money to Greeks only.<sup>117</sup>

King Constantine gave the order to attack on 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1921, and on 17<sup>th</sup> they captured Kutahia [Kutahya]. Lord Granville inquired whether it was the right time for Greece to ask the Allies for mediation and the Greek Foreign Minister after hearing that they also captured Eskishehr [Eskisehir] on 20<sup>th</sup> of July gave his Government's answer as negative to the Allies. The Foreign Minister told that the Greek Army was chasing the Turks and he believed that the complete break up of Kemalist Army was imminent.<sup>118</sup> The Foreign Office evaluated the situation in Anatolia and Osborne noted that it was satisfactory that Greeks had realized that the task of eliminating the Nationalists but would not be over until the Kemalist Army was brought to battle.<sup>119</sup> The War Office was more hesitant to accept the Greek victory and thought that they were still unable to form the whole picture especially about the Turkish forces. There was conflicting news about the Turkish losses. Daily Telegraph stated that after Kutahia and Eskishehr, Turkish losses were 8,000 prisoners and 7,000 death and wounded, whereas as General Harrington reported by referring to Major Johnson who was attached to Greek Army, the Greeks did not capture any artillery.<sup>120</sup> Contrary to the publicity in Athens for the victorious Greek army, French Charge d'Affaires told that he had received information that Greek Government was not as optimistic as they were pretending.<sup>121</sup>

The Greek Army was advancing to Sivrihisar and General Harrington wrote that the Turkish Army, in his opinion was in a bad way and incapable of much further resistance and offensive and according to the intercepted correspondence, and Head Quarter of the Turkish Army was still falling back and they would stand in Sivri Hisar position.<sup>122</sup> Meanwhile the Constantinople Government was seeking to agree on the terms as Britain thought right as they had given an impression of being frightened and in a hurry.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>117</sup> PRO, FO 371/6472, E 7888.

<sup>118</sup> PRO, FO 371/6524, E 8463, Lord Granville's message to Foreign Office on 21<sup>st</sup> July 1921.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1921,

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid, E 8521.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid, E 8739-7.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid.

The Daily Telegraph reported from Smyrna on 30<sup>th</sup> of July 1921 that Gounaris had emphasized the importance of setting the Constantinople question in the interests of peace and the Greek paper Chronika said Constantinople belonged to Greece since Turks were not capable of defending and maintaining the order in the town, and therefore Greece would raise the question of Constantinople.<sup>124</sup>

D.G. Osborne prepared a Memorandum on 1<sup>st</sup> of Aug. 1921 about the British policy in Greco-Turkish relations. It was stated that Britain had not considered to have separate settlements with the Turks and stood on the Treaty of Sevres. The proposals submitted in the London Conference had been rejected by both sides for different reasons. Turks demanded in addition to the proposal an unconditional return of Smyrna and Thrace, and Greeks had refused the London solution for the Smyrna question. The Greeks after their victories had demanded compensation for their sacrifices which probably would include Constantinople, an extension of Smyrna zone and Pontus region. Osborne told that the moderate Turks in Constantinople Government had been appealing to the Allies for the terms so that they could achieve victory over Mustafa Kemal and his friends and at the same time to commit the Allies to a policy of no-compensation to Greeks. Osborne believed that it was not possible any longer, in the light of Greek victories, to disregard the Greek demands and at the same time to stick to the London proposal. Osborne believed that since the Angora Government's policy had failed to attain the full Turkish demands, and although the Constantinople Government was not responsible for the arrogance policy of Angora, it was not possible to negotiate with the Constantinople Government as nothing had happened. Osborne suggested that the time was not ripe for the Allies to intervene for peace in Anatolia. It would be better to wait until the fighting to stop since both Greeks and Turks had rejected the good offer of Allies and preferred to fight, and therefore both parties were equally responsible for the delay for peace. Osborne suggested for waiting until one of the parties came to them for negotiations, then they could invite the representatives of both Governments for a settlement.<sup>125</sup>

The Constantinople issue was debated in the Greek papers and announced that Lord Granville had given his assurances that Britain had no objections for Greece taking over Constantinople. On Lord Granville's protest that it was not the case, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs told that they had no power to control the press

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<sup>124</sup> PRO, FO 371/6524, E 8739-9, 'The Daily Telegraph' of 30<sup>th</sup> July 1921.

<sup>125</sup> PRO, FO 371/6525, E 8834.

and as far as he knew the question of advance on Constantinople had not yet been considered by the Greek Government. Osborne was going to comment on the statement in Greek Foreign Minister's speech of 'had not yet been considered' to occupy Constantinople, that, Britain should remind the Greeks the vulnerability of Piraeus from sea.<sup>126</sup> Osborne was thinking that the French and Italians being already suspicious of the relation of British with Greeks would be blaming Britain for disloyalty.

The news about Constantinople being allowed by Britain to be occupied by Greeks appeared in the French papers and 'The Daily Telegraph' run an article on 4<sup>th</sup> August stating that the issue was taken as a surprise in the circles of Paris. 'The Temps' asked whether King Constantine's Ministers had discussed this question with Britain.<sup>127</sup> Although France was blaming the British for her policy towards Greece, she was also selling munitions to Greece. Granville reported that 5 million rounds of Lebel small arms ammunition had been ordered to France by the Greek General Staff and some information had been received that 1,000 tons of munitions had arrived in an American vessel at Piraeus.<sup>128</sup>

The importance of an early intervention in the Greco-Turkish conflict was discussed in the Cabinet Meeting on 25<sup>th</sup> July 1921. The attention was drawn in the Cabinet that before the scheduled meeting of the Supreme Council, a discussion should take place with regard to the British policy in Near East. A suggestion was made to invite Greeks to London for discussion, to influence them from making excessive demands as a result of their victories against Turks.<sup>129</sup>

Meanwhile the Greek Army was stationed in Sivri Hisar and expanded towards Kutahia. General Harrington reported to the War Office on 2<sup>nd</sup> August that it seemed as if the Greeks were going to capture Angora the following week and French was obviously very concerned about the developments in Thrace.<sup>130</sup> Sir Rumbold had also reported his conversation with Grand Vizier on 3<sup>rd</sup> Aug. 1921 that he was planning to send a mission to Angora to urge them for a peace and their conditions

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid, E 8924.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid, E 8947, Lord Granville's message to Foreign Office on 4<sup>th</sup> Aug.

<sup>129</sup> PRO, CAB 23/26.

<sup>130</sup> PRO, FO 371/6525, E 8973.

for it. Rumbold told the Grand Vizier to give a hint to the Nationalists that they should not make any extravagant demands from Allies.<sup>131</sup>

The Greek papers on the 5<sup>th</sup> of August published articles by referring to the news dispatched by Reuter that Allies had warned Greece that advance on Constantinople would not be tolerated. Two Venizelist papers stated that Britain would have authorized advance but refrained from doing so in view of French and Italian opposition.<sup>132</sup> The British Authorities were cautious about the Greek victories and their condition, whereas Foreign Office was sure of the Greek superiority in the conflict. E.G. Adam from Foreign Office noted that the British Military seemed quite unable still to estimate the real extent of the Greek victory. Adam was criticizing General Harrington that they were relying on the information they had received from an informant who had been visiting Angora on behalf of U.S.A. oil interests and had probably obtained the usual promises of concessions from Mustafa Kemal and therefore could not be treated as a reliable source of information. Adam believed that unless Greeks were foolish enough to invade the Eastern part of Anatolia, it seemed improbable that they would ever meet Russian troops.<sup>133</sup>

The Supreme Council Meeting was going to take place in Paris, and before the Meeting Lloyd George had private meetings with Briand, the President of the Council of France and with Bonomi, President of the Council of Italy, accompanied by Marches della Torretta, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs. In the meeting with the Italians Near East issue was also discussed. Torretta agreed with Lloyd George that the object of the Allies should be to restore the position of the Turkish Government at Constantinople and deal with them rather than with Angora. Torretta stated that for strengthening the Constantinople Government, it was desirable to give them some territorial extension, but Lloyd George opposed to this, in view of the victories obtained by the Greeks. Lloyd George further stated that the Allies would have no right to ask the Greeks to retire from Smyrna, even if they asked to do so, it would be difficult to enforce it. Lloyd George proposed that the Greece could be let to occupy Dardanelles, since it was not possible to allow the Turks to keep it after what had happened in the war. It was difficult for the Allies to produce and keep military force at Dardanelles, and therefore the only choice left was to let Greece to occupy

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<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid, E 8990.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid, E.G. Adam's 'Note' on 8<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1921.

it. Lloyd George tried to tell the Italians the reasons behind his suggestion and Italians seemed to be inclined to the idea although they did not say it openly.<sup>134</sup>

The Supreme Council met on 9<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1921 and Lloyd George suggested that military experts should be heard on situation in Anatolia. Lloyd George raised two points that the Supreme Council should make a decision on, whether the time had come for mediation and the question of neutrality. The latter point was on the allowance of private companies to sell munitions and war material to the fighting groups.<sup>135</sup>

Lloyd George, once more, on the following day, 10<sup>th</sup> of August, raised the question of neutrality, and stated that they had gone too far and furthermore suggested that while the Governments should continue not to furnish arms to either Country, there should be no embargo on the export by private companies. Lloyd George told that they should reserve the right to follow previous interpretation of neutrality in this sense. If the Powers did not take this line they would lose their influence with Greeks whom they needed more than Turks when the time came for the mediation. He told that he would like to reaffirm the neutrality of the Governments who should give no assistance what so ever but the private companies would be free for export to either part. Briand told that in any case the Greek Government had already found means to obtain supplies. A resolution in accordance with the suggestion of Lloyd George was adopted by the Supreme Council. Briand raised the question of Greeks using Constantinople as a naval base. Lloyd George told that to prevent Greeks from using Constantinople meant obscuring them from delivering decisive blow and at the same time deny to them use of Constantinople and would imply that the Allies were taking sides against the Greeks. Because of reluctance shown by Lloyd George, the subject was closed.

The next issue of the discussion with regard to Greco-Turkish conflict was the mediation of the Allies in the conflict. It was agreed that while reserving their good will to mediate between Greece and Turkey, they had to wait for the right time. Lloyd George told that he expected Greeks would demand more than the Sevres after their victory against Turks, and there was no way that the Straits could be left to Turks and as far as Britain was concerned they would not be consent to go on meeting the heavy expense involved to safeguard the Straits by the Allied forces.

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<sup>134</sup> PRO, CAB 23/35, S-36.

<sup>135</sup> PRO, FO 371/6525, E 9102.

Briand was not so sure of the Greek success and suggested to wait for a short while but nevertheless he pointed out that the Straits was a world wide problem and could not be left to Greeks only. It was decided that the best procedure was to wait and meanwhile each member could use informal ways to find out what the Greeks and Turks were aiming at.<sup>136</sup>

Lloyd George after the decision taken at the Supreme Council informed Chamberlain that all the existing embargo on supply of war material to Greeks by private companies were lifted and therefore the leading firms should be informed accordingly.<sup>137</sup> Therefore Lloyd George was implying that the Supreme Council's decision was reached by considering Greeks only. On 16<sup>th</sup> of August the question was asked for the Prime Minister whether any blockade of Turkish coasts had been declared by either Greece or the Allies, and whether British navy was being used to protect British merchants engaged in arms traffic. Mr. Chamberlain's answer was in negative to all parts of the question. Then another question was followed; whether he was aware that unless a blockade had been proclaimed and was enforced and hence no British ship or any other ship could be stopped by Greek warships, and that a munitions ship had recently been stopped by Greek ships. Mr. Chamberlain replied that he needed to consult for the answer. As it was pointed out by a member in the House of Commons, the decision taken at the Supreme Council was practically a one-sided consequence, since Greeks had the maritime control and Turks did not have any ships at all even if they were able to purchase war materials from overseas.<sup>138</sup> The Board of Trade only after 8 days, on 18<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1921, enquired from Foreign Office, whether they were correct in interpreting Supreme Council's decision as supply of war material to the Governments of Turkey and Greece, since they had already received orders from Greek merchants for 400,000 hand grenades, 25 million rounds small arms ammunition, 150,000 service rifles and 12 machine guns. The Board of Trade was worried that the opportunity could be exploited by merchants to accumulate arms and ammunitions for purposes either of speculation in connection with the war or for purposes unconnected with the present war.<sup>139</sup>

Lloyd George in a reply to a question on 16<sup>th</sup> of Aug.1921 stated that private companies were allowed to supply war materials to Turkey. In the question, the speaker had described the Greeks as invaders and Turks as a nation defending

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<sup>136</sup> PRO, FO 371/6526, E 9145.

<sup>137</sup> Ibid, E 9159.

<sup>138</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.:146, Col.:1727.

<sup>139</sup> PRO, FO 371/6526, E 9476.

their country and Lloyd George told that he did not agree with the roles mentioned in the question.<sup>140</sup>

The decision taken by the Supreme Council was going to cause some misunderstanding. General Harrington had learned that Russia was going to hand over some Russian ships to Turks and Admiralty thought that they should be prevented, but Foreign Office believed that it was within the decision of Supreme Council, so that they should be allowed for delivery. Lord Curzon concurred with the Admiralty's proposal that the ships should be seized.<sup>141</sup>

Lloyd George gave an extensive speech in House of Commons on 16<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1921 which covered all the outstanding issues in the foreign policy, which naturally included the Greco-Turkish conflict. Lloyd George started from the Paris Conference emphasizing the Greek Claims Commission and told that by this Commission Smyrna and Thrace were assigned to Greece and the Supreme Council approved and later Supreme Council invited Greece to occupy Smyrna and Thrace. Lloyd George continued with the Treaty of Sevres and nationalist movement and how the Allies prevented Venizelos who was anxious to deal with it immediately, from fighting. Lloyd George then, explained the London Conference and the Allied proposal of which both parties rejected which in turn had produced the dilemma for the Allies. He told that there were two alternatives for the Allies; the first was to compel both which inherently brought the questions of how and with whom. The first alternative was impossible to implement, and that brought the second alternative which was to leave both of them to fight it out, since it was not possible to solve the problem in the League of Nations considering the means it had. Lloyd George told that this was the only course and the best one. He further stated how Mustafa Kemal was extravagant and thought that he could win against Greeks. According to Lloyd George, Mustafa Kemal underestimated the Greeks and their military capacity, but he was proved to be wrong. He stated that the Turks were a race who accepts a fact in the end when it is really driven into his mind. Lloyd George believed that the war had one merit; in the end teaches a respect for facts, and he was thinking that it would be easier to deal with them when their own limitations had been brought to an end. Lloyd George believed that the Treaty of Sevres would be back again but this time Greeks were bound to ask more as a winner. He stated that he sincerely trusted that Greeks would not make the mistake which Bulgaria made

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<sup>140</sup> Ibid, E 9423.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid, E 9445-6a.

in 1913, when after a series of victories insisted upon exaggerated claims which drove her to downfall. He told that as a sincere friend of Greece, he was sure that the Greek statesmen would not make that mistake.<sup>142</sup>

Arnold Toynbee after leaving Foreign Office became a correspondent for 'Manchester Guardian' and went to Turkey for the paper. He reported his views and what he had seen there in Yalova district to a friend of his at the British High Commission in Constantinople of which Sir Rumbold relayed to Foreign Office. He described the Greek atrocities and claimed that the Greek army was carrying out systematic extermination of the Moslem population in newly occupied area.<sup>143</sup> D.G. Adam's reaction for Toynbee's allegations was; "*Mr. Toynbee's information, though probably from Turkish sources, may, it is to be feared a [?] of truth in view of Greek action in the Gemlek [Gemlik]-Yalova area...*"<sup>144</sup>

Curzon was going to refer to Toynbee as who had transferred his sympathies from the Greeks to the Turks in his Memorandum of 7<sup>th</sup> of October 1921. Curzon stated that there was very little indication that the Kemalists would modify appreciably in negotiations the terms of the National Pact of February 1921. Curzon believed that the terms in the Pact differed considerably from the Treaty of Sevres and even from the proposals of London and Paris. As far as Toynbee was concerned he, as a correspondent of Manchester Guardian, through his articles in his paper let the British Government to be informed about the indications of Kemalists terms at the end of July 1921. Kemalists showed certain willingness on the modification of the Pact especially in Capitulations and finance, and possibly in the case of Straits, but, according to Curzon, there was still no sign of any abandonment of the Pact's territorial provisions which was mainly the retention of Smyrna and Thrace.<sup>145</sup>

Meanwhile Greece was in the state of believing that the Eastern Question was over once and for all and Gounaris had declared, according to Granville, that Turkey might be considered dead. Gounaris was suggesting that Europe should assist Kurds to form an independent state and for Constantinople to be an autonomous state with some sort of international control. Gounaris had the view that the best candidates for the 'international control' were Britain and Greece. Press was using

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<sup>142</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.:146, and PRO, FO 371/6526, E 9464.

<sup>143</sup> PRO, FO 371/6526, E 9471.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid, E9471, D.G. Adam's 'Note' on 20<sup>th</sup> Aug.1921.

<sup>145</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/92/13/14, and PRO, FO 371/6526 E11096/143/44.

the expense of the occupation for the Allies as an excuse for the Constantinople to be attached to Greece.<sup>146</sup>

Greeks were sure of the total victory so that they approached Granville whether Gounaris and the Foreign Minister could come to London for talks before they had to face the other members of Allies. For Foreign Office it was not the right time to have a meeting with Greeks since they were at their peak and it would be difficult to drag them to the moderate state. Foreign Office commented that to have talks with Gounaris now would destroy all the spirit of moderation in the Greeks which the Prime Minister wanted to foster and encourage.<sup>147</sup>

Lord Granville was going to be notified that Lloyd George and Curzon would like to see Gounaris in London about middle of October 1921.<sup>148</sup>

The Greek offense was in its height in July and August 1921 and it seemed that Lloyd George was getting necessary information about the combat from Greek sources rather than British sources that he complained to the Secretary of State for War, Laming Worthington Evans in his letter on 11<sup>th</sup> of July 1921. Lloyd George wrote that he had heard from Greek quarters that Eskishehr had been captured and that the Turkish Army was in full retreat. Lloyd George believed that this news had the highest importance since the future of East would very largely be determined by this offence, and so was the fortune of the British Empire. Lloyd George blamed the General Staff for not taking measures to obtain information about the war. The General Staff's assessment about the respective strength and quality of the two Armies was also criticized and Lloyd George believed that they turned out to be hopelessly wrong when the facts were investigated at the instance of the despised politicians. He continued in saying that only few weeks before they were trembling for the fate of Constantinople and even he was told that this terrible Mustafa Kemal, with his invincible army, would be there in three weeks.<sup>149</sup>

Meanwhile Mustafa Kemal was facing internal as well as the military problems due to the offense of the Greek Army and shortage of funds. On 14<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1921 he had a decree accepted at the Parliament for the requisition of 40% of all goods in Anatolia. Foreign Office was going to comment on this decision of Mustafa Kemal as

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<sup>146</sup> Ibid, E 9491.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, E9516.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid.

<sup>149</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/16/3/27.

foolish measure, which would have no results. It was believed that the complete and instantaneous disappearance from Anatolian markets of all commodities.<sup>150</sup>

There were accusations of atrocities from Greeks as well as from Angora to the High Commissioners in Constantinople. Yusuf Kemal sent reports from Angora to the High Commissioners accusing Greek troops of massacres and Greek secret societies of attempting to create diversions in Black Sea area. Yusuf Kemal also accused the British authorities in Constantinople of arming Armenian and Greek bands. Yusuf Kemal further pointed out that the responsibility for any Turkish reprisals would be resting with Greeks. Osborne noted that if the Greek mobilization order existed as was claimed by Yusuf Kemal, it would supply an answer to their protests that they had been making against Angora Government for the deportation of Greeks from Black Sea area. He believed the answers also could be found in the activities, as claimed by the Turks about the Greek societies like the Pontus and in the Greek bombardment of the Black Sea ports.<sup>151</sup> But Lindsay was thinking contrary to Osborne. He believed that the mobilization order did not matter and the Turk was never at a loss for an answer, meaning that they were making up as they liked.<sup>152</sup> The Greeks were trying to have the public opinion in condemning Turks for the atrocities they had committed for Christian population in Pontus. United States High Commissioner in Constantinople enquired about the truth behind such accusations from Angora Government and the Ecumenical Patriarchate referring to the Church of Ismid claimed that 37 villages had been destroyed, 12,493 Greeks killed and 5,451 houses burned and 2,551 Greeks had disappeared. The news was relayed to the Foreign Office by Lord Granville and Osborne noted that he would like to apply to the Greek Delegation in London for further information about the extermination of 15,000 Greeks and also enquire whether it was not a fact that the Greeks arrested in Constantinople were not refugees or persons implicated in the recent Greek atrocities against Moslems, but Lindsay prevented him doing this.<sup>153</sup>

Curzon was influenced by the Parliamentary debate on the allegations and the magnification of the events by Greeks so that he had instructed Lord Granville to warn the Greek Government to refrain themselves from such accusations otherwise they were bound to lose their friends in Britain.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>150</sup> PRO, FO 371/6526, E 9275, R.C. Lindsay's 'Note' on 16<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1921.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid, E 9282, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' of 17th Aug. 1921.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, E9282.

<sup>153</sup> Ibid, E9387.

<sup>154</sup> Ibid, E9419.

Meanwhile the fighting was going on between the Turks and Greeks. Greeks had started retreating on 5<sup>th</sup> of September and the final blow to the Greeks came on the 12<sup>th</sup> of September at Sakaria [Sakarya] and Greeks started withdrawing from the Eastern bank of Sakaria River. Sir Rumbold in his message to the Foreign Office on 20<sup>th</sup> Sep.1921, wrote that since the retreat of the Greek Army from beyond the Sakaria River, he had been negotiating with other High Commissioners whether it was the time for the Allies to intervene as a mediator between the parties He believed that the best course for the Allies was to wait for further developments and see the effects of the withdrawal of the Greek Army to the internal politics in Greece. He thought that towards the end of October 1921, the Allies might find the moment more favourable for the intervention.<sup>155</sup>

While the Allies was on wait for the right moment to intervene to the Greco-Turkish conflict, news reached to London that Franklin-Bouillon was going to visit Angora. Sir Eyre Crowe in his conversation with the French Ambassador enquired the reasons of Bouillon's visit, but was not satisfied with the answer.<sup>156</sup> Franklin-Bouillon arrived at Angora on 20<sup>th</sup> of September and the negotiations of Turco-French immediately started on 24<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1921. Britain had not been informed of the visit and Curzon urged the British Ambassador, Hardinge to obtain the purpose of the visit from Briand. He recalled that when Bouillon was in Angora, he was told by Briand on 19<sup>th</sup> of June 1921 that Bouillon had no mission from the French Government and he had gone to Angora as a journalist.<sup>157</sup>

Curzon wrote an extensive report on the intervention of Greece and Turkey on 7<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1921. Curzon outlined the recent developments in the conflict and stated that the problem was not to be solved by 'good will' and 'desire'. He told that he was in need for the assistance of the Cabinet in arriving at a decision, the main conditions of the problem, as it was then presented itself. He stated that after the retreat, the Greek Army had apparently occupied a line from Eskishehr to Afyon Karahissar. He further stated that Major Johnston, the Liaison Officer with the Greek Army, had reported that the Greeks were destroying the railway west of Sakaria by blowing up each rail. Lord Granville reported of The Greek Premier Gounaris' declaration that they should organize the occupied territory so as to defend it with the least sacrifices

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<sup>155</sup> PRO, FO 406/47, No: 45, E 10706/143/44.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid, E 10970/22/44, Sir Eyre Crowe's Memorandum of 29<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1921.

<sup>157</sup> Ibid, No: 50, E 10707/1/44.

and expense. Curzon in continuing his report stated that; *“One thing seems clear, however, namely that, in spite of some hostile symptoms, the nationalist movement, with Mustafa Kemal, either as a dictator or figurehead had a real hold in Asia Minor.”*<sup>158</sup> Curzon believed that there existed some indications that the Angora Government would probably not refuse an invitation to a Conference by the Supreme Council. Curzon commented that before such an intervention by the Allies, Allies, itself, should decide preferably with Greece on the main modifications of the Treaty of Sevres which would be reasonably satisfy Kemalists. There were two main parts in the Treaty, one concerned Greece and the other for Allies interests. Curzon believed that the most crucial problem lied on the future of Smyrna.

Curzon recalled the offer which was extended to both parties in June 1921 Conference that the Allies were in agreement. The offer was based on establishing an autonomous province in Smyrna under Turkish sovereignty, administered by a Christian Governor with the mixed gendarmerie under European officers. Curzon believed that Kemalists would never make a peace with Greece on less favourable terms than these, unless the Allies were prepared to unite in support of Greece and in hostility to Turkey. The support for Greece would include formal supply of arms and financial assistance and the blockade of the Mediterranean and Black Sea ports. Curzon doubted that France would agree on such a plan and he thought that to have some economical concessions, France would prefer to give some support to Turks. Similarly according to Curzon, the Italians also would not support Greeks in Smyrna issue, and they had already sent a delegation to Angora, probably to get some economical concessions in Southern Anatolia in return for the support of Kemalists. According to Curzon, by taking accounting of the behavior of French and Italians, it would be impossible for Britain alone to support Greece, by herself, and therefore she should try to convince Greece to agree on the terms similar to June 1921 proposal. To facilitate the acceptance by the Greeks, Curzon was considering of offering some concessions such as abolishing customs barrier between Smyrna and Greece, recognizing King Constantine and raising a loan to Greece and insisting on the Italians to return the Dodecanese to Greeks.

Curzon believed that in case the Greeks were brought to accept the Smyrna plan then it would not be reasonable to have concession in Thrace although France and Italy had insisted on the creation of an international zone during the Paris

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<sup>158</sup> PRO, CAB 24/128 , p. 416-418 and Lloyd George Papers LG/F/92/13/14

Conference in June 1921. He believed that the Northern shore of Marmara should remain in the hands of Greeks, therefore sticking to Chatalja line instead of Enos-Midia line. For the terms in the Treaty which concerned the Allies, Curzon was considering to offer a system of more and less pre-war system of Allied advisers to Turkish Ministries. Under the Treaty of Sevres the policy was to pool Turkish resources for the payment not only of the pre-war debt, but also of the cost of Allied occupation and the payment of Allied war claims for damages. The new system offered, was to form a Council of the advisors to the Ministries which would advise the Turkish Government as to how best to meet their obligations.

Curzon believed that if the Allies were to agree on the terms that he outlined, then peace in Asia Minor could be attained. The procedure that Curzon was proposing was to convince the Greeks and then to hold an Allied Conference to agree on the terms among themselves. Curzon suggested that after the agreement among Allies, Greece and Turkey could be invited for a Conference.

Curzon in his report criticized Churchill and Montagu for their proposals to the Cabinet. Churchill had proposed to offer new terms to Greece and Turkey and if one of them was to reject the modifications, then the allies would give their full support to the other party. Curzon believed that the proposed scheme by Churchill was unfair to Greece in case that she became the rejected party. According to Curzon there was no way to support the Turks against their friends, Greeks. For Montagu's criticism that the Foreign Office had prevented from exercising any influence at Angora that they could conceive of nothing but official representation there, and that the consequences of their apathy were disastrous, according to Curzon was quite unfounded. He gave the example of receiving Bekir Sami Bey when he came as the official representative of the Kemalist Government to London for the London Conference. Another example was when Mustafa Kemal had shown an inclination to get in touch with General Harrington; the Foreign Office gave authority to the General to proceed. Curzon told that nothing came of it because of Mustafa Kemal had sought to attach the acceptance of his extreme political claims as a condition for the meeting. Curzon further stated that the Italians and French had been trying to flirt with Mustafa Kemal by sending missions to Angora, but all ended with no results and humiliation for them.<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid.

The reason for Curzon's criticism of Montagu was the letter sent to him on 8<sup>th</sup> July 1921. Montagu criticized the Foreign Office of not having in touch with the Angora Government although he had been trying to persuade the British Government that they were losing a valuable opportunity. Montagu claimed that Britain because of her wrong policies had forced Kemalists to be drawn to the Bolsheviks.<sup>160</sup>

As Curzon was writing his report on 7<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1921, Franklin-Bouillon was occupied in the negotiations at Angora and concluded the Agreement on 20<sup>th</sup> October which was going to retrain the already tensed relations between France and Britain. The rumors for Franklin-Bouillon's activities in Angora were discussed briefly in a Conference of Ministers on 26<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1921. Curzon informed the Ministers that the frontier between Cilicia and Turkey agreed at Angora was, as he understood, very similar to that included in the Treaty of Sevres. The Ministers drew attention to the possible danger to Mesopotamia especially to Mosul since Turks would then be free from the problems in Cilicia.<sup>161</sup>

The problem area was not only the Mesopotamia or Mosul that any possible Turkish victory would be affected but also India. Montagu wrote to Lloyd George on 12<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1921 that he had been complaining about the British policy for Turkey and he enclosed the message that he had received from Viceroy of India, Lord Reading, who was complaining about the difficulties caused by the British Foreign Policy in India.<sup>162</sup> Lord Reading complained that it was regrettable to observe the effect which had been increasing in intensity as time passes of no action being taken not only among the Moslems but also amongst moderates and Hindus what they had regarded as their wrong treatment of Moslems. In India the general feeling was that the Italians and French were in favour of the restoration of Thrace and Smyrna to Turks but Britain alone was raising the objection for her own purposes and the objection was based upon the British determination to make Christian influence in these parts and to weaken or destroy Moslem influence.<sup>163</sup> The situation in India was starting to ring bells for independence and Gandhi was becoming noticeably an important figure.<sup>164</sup>

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<sup>160</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/41/1/19.

<sup>161</sup> PRO, CAB 23/27.

<sup>162</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/41/1/26.

<sup>163</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/41/1/27, telegram from the Viceroy to Secretary of State on 11<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1921.

<sup>164</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/41/1/31

Venizelos, although after losing the elections, retired from politics, was actively involved in the Greco-Turkish conflict. The Greek paper 'Eleutheros Typos' on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1921 published a letter from Venizelos blaming Greek Government for refusing Allies' offers of mediation and attempting to carry on hostilities without the Allied assistance. Venizelos considered that a complete Greek victory was impossible and pointed out dangers involved in open hostility of France. Gounaris gave his reply the following day justifying Greek refusal of mediation and told that Greece was enjoying liberty of action.<sup>165</sup> Venizelos was also busy in visiting the officials of the Allied Governments. After his visit to Briand, he met with Sir Eyre Crowe on the 13<sup>th</sup> of October and informed him that he had considered that the establishment of Anglo-French understanding with respect to Greece was essential. Venizelos pointed out what Briand had told him that with the presence of King Constantine in the throne was the only obstacle to the friendship with France. Venizelos suggested Britain to agree with France and therefore make it clear to Gounaris to satisfy the French requirements, meaning to throw the King out. Venizelos was also against any concessions to the Turks for Smyrna which would only increase Turkish desires against Christian Powers.<sup>166</sup>

Osborne from Foreign Office considered that the views of Venizelos were not helpful at all, since the British Policy was the exact reverse, namely to accept the King at the throne and make the Greeks to agree with the new scheme of Smyrna. Besides Osborne did not believe that the French would abandon their pro-Turkish policy on the disappearance of King Constantine, but they were using him as a good excuse.<sup>167</sup>

R.C. Lindsay, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office was thinking in a similar manner as Osborne, and he noted that he could not bring himself to agree with Venizelos' diagnosis of Franco-Greek relations. The French were thinking mainly of Syria and he knew that French Government was asking a supplementary estimate of 150 million Francs for Syria. Lindsay further commented that France had got so far committed in their dealings with the Turks that they could hardly change their attitude to Greece with or without King Constantine.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>165</sup> PRO, FO 371/6532, E 11401.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid, E11473.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid, E 11473, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' on 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1921.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid, E 11473, R.C. Lindsay's 'Note' on 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1921.

Gounaris, the Greek Prime Minister, Baltazzis, the Foreign Minister and Rangabe, the Greek Ambassador, had a meeting with Curzon at the Foreign Office in London on 27<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1921 to discuss the Greco-Turkish conflict. Gounaris told that they had the control of 100,000 square kilometers and 3 million inhabitants in Asia Minor and as long as they were in occupation of the territory and they ought to organize it. He said that he had asked Briand in his visit to Paris that no obstacles should be placed in their way and no ammunitions should be sent to Turks as he knew that France and Italy had been doing and also asked for the right to search any cargo destined to the Angora Government. Briand had told him that he would do his best not to have contraband but refused the searching. Gounaris believed that after the explanation of the military situation on the map, Briand had a better view of the strength of the Greek Army. Gounaris told Curzon as he had done to Briand that they were always ready to discuss concrete proposals as far as these were based on the recognition of the sacrifices made by the Greece and of safeguarding her position.

Curzon explained to the Greeks that Britain had, throughout, been friendly and sympathetic to Greece and if they had been always on the side of Greece and he gave the example of the Supreme Council's decision on the sale of munitions by private companies which was taken the pressure off from the Greek side. Curzon told him that the Greek Government would be wrong if she were to take steps for the administration of the conquered territory as it would give the appearance of permanent occupation. Gounaris told that they wanted to do this to relieve the financial burden.

Curzon told that the acceptance of Sevres or equivalent of it for the peace in Europe was important to Britain. There was a considerable public opinion in Britain and even stronger in India who thought that Britain was sacrificing peace and therefore the imperial interests for Greece. He told that the British policy ought to be decided by the largest considerations. Then Curzon gave a short resume of what happened since the Sevres. Curzon believed that Greece made a mistake by rejecting the Commission as proposed by the London Conference and then initiating an offence against the Turks which was ended in failure after some initial victories. According to Curzon another mistake that Greece was committed was when she declined the peace mediations proposed by the Allies after the June Meeting at Paris. As it stood then the morale of the Greeks were weak after the retreat on the contrary to the Turks. He told that the Turks would not accept peace unless something to be done

for Smyrna and Thrace. He believed that a proposal similar to one contemplated in June could be offered to the Turks. Curzon promised that for the Thrace they would do everything in their power to make the Turks accept the Sevres though it might be necessary to draw the line of Chatalja further north.

Curzon told the Greeks that he did not know whether the Turks or Allied Governments would agree on such a proposal, but he wanted to give an indication of what the British Government would be tried and to obtain for them as long as the Greeks were willing to accept the proposal.<sup>169</sup>

Curzon had another meeting with the Greeks on the same day to receive the Greeks' opinion. Baltazzis told that Briand had told them that the Treaty of Sevres neither had been nor could be presented to the French Parliament and he was sure that the Italians would be acting similarly. Curzon reminded that there had been some proposals to modify it and therefore as Lloyd George had stated, the Treaty of Sevres had been practically torn up. Therefore The Treaty with Turkey needed to be re-drawn again by the Powers and according to Curzon a practical method would be the agreement of Greece to put her case in the hands of the Powers. Gounaris answered that they were willing to place in the hands of Britain. Curzon did not want to take the responsibility alone and told that Britain would try to do her best along with France and Italy. The Greeks requested to think it over and meet again the following day.

The Third Meeting between Greeks and Curzon took place on 29<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1921. The Greeks told that the friendship of Britain would be the determining factor in the eventual Greek decision. They were in agreement with Curzon's proposal but were awaiting the decision of Athens, which would arrive within a week.<sup>170</sup>

Meanwhile the Angora Government decided to send missions to Britain, France, Italy and United States to explain the views of Nationalists, according to 'Morning Post' of 2<sup>nd</sup> Nov. 1921. The mission to United States according to the paper would be trying to secure a loan guaranteed by economic privileges. The Turkish National Assembly had passed a resolution that the Angora Government would be willing to conclude peace with all the Powers except Greece on the condition that strict

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<sup>169</sup> PRO, FO 371/6534, E11922.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

neutrality in the Greco-Turkish conflict, recognition of the complete independence of Turkey and removal of the Greek Fleet from the neutral zone, were to be met.<sup>171</sup>

Osborne prepared a memorandum on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1921 concerning the conditions for the mediation of the Allies. According to Osborne, Thrace would be probably the main difficulty for a settlement. He suggested that it was desirable that early opportunity be taken of directly communicating views of Britain to Angora and of learning their intentions. He commented that communication with Angora could be established through Colonel Rawlinson who was in touch with Angora for the exchange of prisoners or General Harrington.<sup>172</sup>

Lindsay from Foreign Office noted his views on the situation of Greco-Turkish conflict and sending mission to the Angora Government that;

*"I rather doubt the wisdom of sending any sort of mission to the Angora Turks. It is a mistake to appear in any small degree as a suppliant before them. One must approach them with a big stick. The Turks have waged many wars in the past 100 years, - never have they concluded peace except on the compulsion of a victorious friend or a victorious foe – and once on a strong mediation by the European Powers. This latter is the only real hope of bringing the Turks to reason now. If France and Italy can be induced to back whole-heartedly the terms which the Secretary of State has [? put] to the Greeks, there will then be some hope of a Turkish signature."*<sup>173</sup>

The Greco-Turkish conflict was debated in the Cabinet on 1<sup>st</sup> of Nov. 1921 on the day that Curzon had learned that the French-Turkish Agreement was concluded by Franklin-Bouillon. Curzon gave an account of the visit of the Greek Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and Curzon anticipated that, on the following morning he was expecting a definite acceptance. Curzon told that the next step would have been to communicate with France and Italy with a view of communicating to the Turkish Government and Curzon was predicting that the army of the Angora Government was exhausted and worn out and he had a very good reason to believe that the Angora Government might be prepared to come to terms with them. The Constantinople Government was also anxious for peace; therefore as far as the Angora Government accepted the terms, there would be no problems with the Constantinople. Curzon further told that they might be following the mentioned procedure to invite the parties for a Conference, but the things had been changed by the receipt from the French Government of the Treaty concluded by Franklin-Bouillon with Mustafa Kemal. The Treaty signed, Curzon commented, contained

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<sup>171</sup> PRO, FO 371/6534, E 11935-11, 'The Morning Post' of 2<sup>nd</sup> Nov. 1921.

<sup>172</sup> Ibid, E 12104.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid, E11935-11, R .C. Lindsay's 'Note' on 2<sup>nd</sup> Nov.1921.

provisions which were a breach of good faith and were most disturbing to British interests. Curzon explained that he had inquired from Briand about the mission of Franklin-Bouillon to Angora, and he was given an answer twice in writing that he was in Angora not as an emissary of the Government but as a private individual, seeking concessions from the Angora Government. Curzon further gave an outline of the Agreement which contained some provisions against 1914 Treaty, Treaty of Sevres and the Tripartite Agreement. Curzon suggested that under these circumstances it was better to postpone the preparations for the Greco-Turkish Conference until he cleared up the situation with the French Government.

It was pointed out that with the new agreement with France the way for Mustafa Kemal to carry out his activities towards Mesopotamia was then opened. It was further pointed out that the situation in Mesopotamia was far away from steadiness and had seriously affected the British relations with France without securing any gains for Britain. With the participation of Mustafa Kemal, the situation might turn out for the disadvantage for Britain especially if France was going to help the Turks. Another aspect of the situation was the fact that India's sentiments were with the Turks and after France being friendly with Turks, the only country remained was Britain to be the only country hostile to Turks, since Italy was not important in that respect. At the Cabinet it was suggested for Curzon to get in touch with France and ask for an explanation for the Agreement and for their future intentions.<sup>174</sup> The Greek Government on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1921 confirmed the acceptance of the proposal set forth by Curzon with regard to Greco-Turkish conflict.<sup>175</sup> Therefore Greece had decided to leave herself to the hands of Britain.

Curzon discussed the agreement between Turkey and France with the French Ambassador on 3<sup>rd</sup> of Nov. 1921 and with his letter of 5<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1921 he gave his warning and questions in writing. Curzon reminded of his communication with Briand when he had inquired the reason for the mission of Franklin Bouillon to Angora in earlier part of 1921 and for the second time in September 1921 and each time he was given the assurance that no general engagement had been or would be entered into by France concerning the peace with Turkey without the consent of the Allies. Curzon told that with these assurances, Britain was expecting nothing of the sort of the Agreement that had been signed between Turkey and France.

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<sup>174</sup> PRO, CAB23/27, Cabinet 84(21).

<sup>175</sup> PRO, FO 371/6534, E 12246, E 12088, the Greek Prime Minister with his Foreign Minister and Ambassador had the fourth meeting with Curzon and informed that they had received a message from Athens that they were in agreement with the British proposal of mediation with the Turks.

Curzon pointed out that the articles in the agreement which were contrary to the Franco-British Treaty of 4<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1914 and to the London Pact of November 1915. Curzon drew the attention of France that some clauses in the agreement would necessitate some modifications for the Mandate of Syria which was to be tabled in the League of Nations and also the Treaty of Sevres since France had given a large part of Anatolia to Turkey which was conquered by Britain in the War. Curzon stressed on the point that with this Agreement France had recognized the Angora Government of the legitimate representative of Turkey with no reference to Constantinople Government. Curzon finally asked the French Government to explain the agreement with its consequences on to the relations of Turkey and Allies as well as to the Franco-British.<sup>176</sup>

There were other signs that Britain was becoming the only member of the Allied to be isolated as hostile to Angora Government as the rumors reached to London that the Italian mission to Angora, Tuozzi, was following the example of Franklin Bouillon and negotiating for a separate peace with the Turkish Government. Britain had felt the necessity to instruct her Ambassador in Rome to warn the Italian Government for such an action.<sup>177</sup> The Italian Foreign Minister relaxed the British worries that the Italian mission was concerned only with the exchange of prisoners and some issues with regard to the Italian occupation.

The French reply for Curzon's letter was received on 18<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1921 and the content was discussed briefly in the Conference of Ministers' Meeting on the same day. Considering that the French reply, according to Curzon was very long, pacific and courteous, and therefore there was no time to indulge the contents, the Cabinet decided that it should be circulated and studied before it was to be tabled at the Cabinet.<sup>178</sup>

The French reply was tabled at the next Cabinet meeting of 22<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1921. Curzon informed the Cabinet that a decision should be reached on the Near East question to be followed by Britain under the new circumstances especially after the Franco-Turkish Agreement.

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<sup>176</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/206/4/29.

<sup>177</sup> PRO, FO 371/6534, E12190.

<sup>178</sup> PRO, CAB 23/27, 'Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers', 18<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1921.

Curzon had the feeling that the French Government was in alarm due to the public opinion and severe criticism not only in Britain but also in France because of questions put forward by Britain, the employment of Franklin Bouillon in this mission, acting by herself without consultation with Britain and the departure from the Treaty of Sevres, hence breaking up the spirit of the Allies.

Curzon in analyzing the French answer, mentioned that the French had given specific assurance which was found to be quite satisfactory but Curzon believed that in addition to the actual Agreement there existed secret provisions, the contents of which were not elaborated by French. Curzon commented that the French reply did not answer some of the British questions, such as; a territory of 100 000 square kilometers was left to Turks which might enable Mustafa Kemal to approach Mesopotamia, the Christian population in Cilicia was left to the Turks, hence there was a possibility of a new massacre, and by signing the agreement, they boosted the moral and increased the prestige of Mustafa Kemal. Curzon further pointed out that the Agreement was signed at a time when there was a good chance for peace since Greeks agreed to place themselves in the hands of Allies.

The Cabinet discussed the next step that should be taken for the Angora Government. Curzon suggested that after sending an acknowledgement to France, they should prepare a concrete proposal and submit it to the Allies that the Kemalists should be invited unconditionally and in general terms to a Conference. If the Allies agreed to this course, then the Angora Government should be notified by the Allies officially and let Mustafa Kemal to be aware that if there was a settlement there was a good chance that Britain would be giving some financial help by means of a loan.

The Cabinet decided that the procedure proposed by Curzon to be adopted and it was desirable to appoint a representative to the Angora Government who would act in an unofficial capacity initially but after being recognized and confidence built with the Kemalists, could be appointed as an official representative.<sup>179</sup>

Although Britain was engaged with the peace initiative between Turkey and Greece, she was still worried for the danger from Turks for Mesopotamia and especially Mosul. Britain was considering the possibility of a Turkish attack to Mesopotamia

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<sup>179</sup> PRO, CAB 23/27, Cabinet 88(21).

since she was no longer engaged in Cilicia due the agreement signed between France and Turkey. This danger was brought to the attention of the Ministers at the Conference of Ministers on 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1921.<sup>180</sup>

The Greeks after their consent to the proposal of Curzon sent a memorandum on 12<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1921, which contained some remarks, to the contrary of their decision on their readiness for Britain to look after their interests in the Greco-Turkish conflict.<sup>181</sup> The Greek Delegation visited Curzon to discuss the recent developments in the Greco-Turkish conflict on 19<sup>th</sup> of Nov. 1921. Curzon told that in their previous meeting he had understood that on the suggestion of Greece placing herself in the interests of the Powers, there was an agreement, but the memorandum sent on the 12<sup>th</sup> of November gave a different picture. The first point was on the Smyrna, such that the Greeks extended the Smyrna zone to North and to North-East, actually up to the Marmara Sea. Curzon reminded to the Greeks that they had discussed of the June 1921 proposal as a basis and there was no mention on widening the Zone. The second point of misunderstanding was the security of the Smyrna Zone. It was not contemplated, contrary to the memorandum, of the presence of the Greek Army in the Smyrna Zone. Curzon told them that he could not accept such an undertaking. Gounaris explained that they had put the important points that might come in the negotiations and they were thinking the welfare of the Christian population in Asia Minor.

As for the procedure, Curzon told them that he was still hopeful that the Angora Government would accept the Allies mediation but it depended on the offensive that might take place in winter of 1921-1922. The Greeks believed that the Turks were waiting for the ammunition that the French would transfer from Cilicia. According to Curzon, Briand had already denied the truthfulness of such rumors. Curzon told the Greeks that since the Greek memorandum was for information only, he was glad to learn that the Greeks placed themselves fully to the hands of Allies, and he further told them that they should not advertise the procedure for the Conference in the Greek Parliament.<sup>182</sup>

The Greco-Turkish question and the British policy towards the Greeks were discussed in the Parliament both in House of Commons and in House of Lords. On

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<sup>180</sup> PRO, CAB 23/27, 'Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers' of 26<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1921.

<sup>181</sup> PRO FO 406/48, No: 22.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid, No: 26.

11<sup>th</sup> of Dec. 1921, the Prime Minister was asked to answer whether Prime Minister would publish papers containing complete synopsis of doings of the British Government with Greek Government from date of armistice. Even earlier the members of the Parliament were wondering about the loan extended to Greece. On 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1921 Chamberlain, the Privy of the Council answered that; "*His Majesty's Government do not interfere with market regarding loans which it is proposed to issue in London.*"<sup>183</sup> And on 16<sup>th</sup> December to a similar question, it was answered that; "*it is not the practice of His Majesty's Government to indicate favour or disfavor to loans in the London Market*"<sup>184</sup> Although Lloyd George did indicate his consent for a loan in the London Market when the Greek Prime Minister visited him in March 1921.

The British Cabinet on the conflict of Greco-Turkish had its last meeting for 1921, on 21<sup>st</sup> of Dec. 1921. Curzon told the Ministers that the Foreign Office prepared the revision of the Treaty of Sevres and he was planning to send over to France and Italy. Curzon explained that the situation had improved lately in two aspects. The relations of Allies with one another were better, as were the relations between the Allies and the Angora Government. Curzon commented that Briand had been severely criticized in France for making the Franklin Bouillon Treaty which it was recognized was both unfriendly to Britain and was a betrayal to Armenians. Briand had assured him that the Allies could come to an agreement with Mustafa Kemal. Curzon believed that the only condition for peace with the Turks was the total withdrawal of the Greeks from Asia Minor. Curzon pointed out that they had to take into consideration of the safety of the Greek people in the region and also the interests of Greece for that region. Alternative proposals other than accepted by the Cabinet on the 22<sup>nd</sup> of November, were drawn up. The system proposed was similar to the one employed at Saar Basin where there was a governing commission appointed by the League of Nations and the Chairman being appointed by the League, or the Lebanese system where there was a Christian Governor chosen by Turkey.

It was suggested that the Saar system was better to be adopted with an American Chairman in order to involve the Americans in the area. It was also suggested that the zone should comprise of Smyrna Sandjak and Kaza of Aivali. The Conference of Ministers also decided that the Greek forces should be withdrawn from Asia Minor

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<sup>183</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 147, Col.: 1744.

<sup>184</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 148, Col.: 290.

and that a local gendarmerie should be established with its cost to be paid by Turkey.

The Conference of Ministers agreed that the question of Western Thrace should not be discussed and re-adjusting the frontiers would be necessary for the Eastern Thrace. It was suggested that with small concessions on the frontier to Turks and French and Italian guarantee for the safety of Constantinople from a Greek attack would secure the agreement of the Turks. It was decided that after several suggestions such as the Rodosto-Meritza River to be the border, the Turco-Greek frontier should be amended so as to run approximately from Rodosto to Kalatra Burnu as proposed by Curzon.

The Conference also agreed on the reduction of the demilitarized zone and the international occupation of the Straits as proposed by Curzon. Lloyd George reminded the sentiments of the Indian Moslems for the Treaty and while Aga Khan was in Paris, he suggested him to be included in the British Delegation. The financial clauses to be revised in the Treaty were left for French and Italians to draw.

Fisher, the President of the Board of Education informed the Conference that he had the information that the Greek army was in a very bad state and almost at the state of collapse. He commented that it was for the benefit of Allies that the Greek army should be kept in being until the negotiations with the Turks were completed. It was stated that the question whether the Treasury should sanction the raising of a Greek loan in the financial circles should be discussed. It was mentioned that the Treasury desired to impose a certain portion of the loan to be spent in Britain and it was told that the Greeks were aware of this and agreed to spend four-tenths of the loan raised. The Conference agreed that it was desirable that the Greek army should be kept in being until the completion of the negotiations with Turkey and the Government wished to offer no objection to the raising of loan by the financial circles by the Greek and Turkish Governments.<sup>185</sup>

After the meeting of the Conference of Ministers on the 21<sup>st</sup> of December, Montagu sent a Memorandum for the Thrace to be given back to Turks on the following day. Montagu referring to the decision taking at the Conference about the Thrace that it should remain with the Greeks argued that it was for the interests of the Britain that

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<sup>185</sup> PRO, CAB 23/27, 'Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers' of 21<sup>st</sup> Dec. 1921, and CAB 23/29, Appendix III to Cabinet 2(22).

her relation with the Angora Government should be restored. He believed that the Turks because of British mistakes in the pre-war diplomacy were compelled to fight in the War against them. Montagu pointed out that by the consideration of pledges extended by the Prime Minister on different dates, the Thrace should be given back to the Turks. He argued that he had preferred to allocate the pre-war Thrace to Turks, but if this was not possible the second alternative was to appoint a commission of enquiry to determine the wishes of the inhabitants and the arrangement of a frontier in conformity with the wishes of the people. Montagu stated that failing either of these, he would favour the suggestion that he had made at the Conference the day before but rejected by the Ministers. The proposal was to draw the frontier from Rodosto along the Meritsa River, to enclave Adrianople for the Turkish side.

Montagu believed that the suggestions he had made would be proposed by France in the coming Conference with Italian backing and Turks might request more of Thrace than envisaged by Curzon. In this case Britain would be left again to try to save the Thrace by herself. Montagu re-iterated his suggestion of setting up a commission to decide the frontier whatever the result might be.<sup>186</sup>

The Foreign Office completed the proposal for the Greco-Turkish conflict and sent it to France and Italy through her Ambassadors on 30<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1921. The proposal contained the clauses for the modifications of the Treaty of Sevres to be tabled at the coming Conference of Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and Italy scheduled for 9<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922.<sup>187</sup>

The Greek Prime Minister with his Foreign Minister on their way back to Athens stopped over in Rome to discuss the Greco-Turkish conflict. Sir Grahame reported on 31<sup>st</sup> of Dec. 1921 to Foreign Office that Gounaris' conversations with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister had not been successful and Gounaris had told that all his hopes rested on Britain. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed F.O. Lindley from Foreign Office that he believed his views coincided with those of Curzon and he thought that the Turkish Government should be brought back to Constantinople and established there under the Sultan with restored prestige. He further told Lindley that the Greeks should retire from Turkey

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<sup>186</sup> PRO, FO 371/7853, E 150.

<sup>187</sup> PRO, FO 406/48, No: 59.

and he was in favour of retaining the Capitulations and financial control exercised. The Italians were expecting their mission to Angora was to be finalized soon.<sup>188</sup>

As was expected Tuoizzi returned to Constantinople on 4<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922, disappointed that no agreement was concluded between Italy and Turkey. He reported that the position of Mustafa Kemal was strong and he was desiring to see seat of Turkish Government established outside of Constantinople. He further reported that short of money and arms were the handicap of the Turks but he doubted if Greeks were able to inflict a decisive victory. Tuoizzi stated that to have the peace and settlement, allied unity was essential.<sup>189</sup>

Osborne commented on Tuoizzi's report that it was a hopeless one. He commented that according to Tuoizzi, Mustafa Kemal's idea was to extend his dictatorship over to completely independent and purely Turkish Anatolia, distinct from Constantinople and apparently outward from the Caliphate. Osborne believed that Mustafa Kemal had to deal with a discontented country infected with armed bands, an empty Treasury, lack of war material and a thoroughly bad economic situation. Moreover the plan of dividing the Allies had failed and Russia was coming to a conference with them. Osborne stated that the only hope for Mustafa Kemal was France whose support was to take the place of that of Russia. Osborne believed that if the Allied unity was maintained and an acceptable treaty submitted and ratified by the Sultan, there would be hope that an appeal by the Sultan to the war-weary population of Anatolia would make the power of Mustafa Kemal slipping away. He further commented that Cilicia had been cleared without an effort and the Christian population of the Pontus had been largely disposed off by deportation. The Greeks were quite right in saying that the Smyrna area could not be evacuated until the Greek army had been replaced by some other force to maintain order. Osborne concluded his 'Note' as it was necessary an exchange of population with Thrace to be arranged.<sup>190</sup> Lindsay agreed with Osborne's comments that it was an interesting and true report.

British Policy for Asia Minor was criticized by the King of Faisal of Iraq who was selected by Britain for the British mandate of Mesopotamia. He told that he had condemned Franco-Kemalist Agreement as a disloyal act, and spoke of Moslem

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<sup>188</sup> PRO, FO 371/7853, E 5.

<sup>189</sup> Ibid, E 320.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid, D.G.Osborne's 'Note' on 9<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922.

feeling that France was supporting Moslems and that Britain was opposing them. He was reported as saying that British policy was not so clear, and pointed out that Britain had more to lose in the East than any other Power.<sup>191</sup> King Faisal was allowed to communicate with Mustafa Kemal through Naji Bey, provided that it was not with the object of entering into negotiations with Mustafa Kemal, but of discovering his attitude towards Iraq.<sup>192</sup> For the Faisal's view towards French was going to be commented by Osborne that Faisal's views were colored by his hatred of French.<sup>193</sup>

Lindley on his way to Athens as the new High Commissioner of Britain reported to the Foreign Office on 5<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1922 that when he was in Rome he had told Gounaris and Baltazzi that it would be advisable for Greeks to accustom themselves to the idea of withdrawal from Asia Minor. The Acting Foreign Minister of Italy informed the Greeks in a similar manner. Lindley commented that losing of Thrace would create turbulence in Greece and he believed that the French would probably advocate evacuation of Thrace and Italians seemed unlikely to oppose them.<sup>194</sup>

Meanwhile, the news coming from Angora that was not so encouraging for British Foreign Office. Rumbold reported on 5<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922 that Mustafa Kemal seemed to be determined not to bow to the foreign pressure and Bolshevik relations with Angora seemed to be improved although the financial situation in Turkey was very insecure. Rumbold believed that Angora would reject any proposals not satisfying the National Pact but the Sultan might accept settlement providing for Greek evacuation of Smyrna and part of Eastern Thrace, if the Allies were to present themselves united and showed determination to enforce their terms.<sup>195</sup> To enforce the views of Rumbold, General Harrington had reported that the transfer of authority in Cilicia and handing over of munitions to Kemalists were completed.<sup>196</sup>

Thinking that the political situation not so advantageous for Mustafa Kemal, the Sultan was busy in trying to convince the Allies to transfer the authority to the Constantinople Government. Rumbold reported on 15<sup>th</sup> of Jan.1922 that the Sultan had sent a message through Prince Sami suggesting audience to discuss the

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<sup>191</sup> Ibid, E 415.

<sup>192</sup> PRO, CAB 23/27, Conclusions of a Conference of Ministers' of 21<sup>st</sup> Dec. 1921, and PRO, CAB 23/29, Appendix III to Cabinet 2(22).

<sup>193</sup> PRO, FO 371/7853, E 415.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid, E 528.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid, E 589.

<sup>196</sup> Ibid, E 581.

question of Britain supporting Sultan's attempt to substitute authority of Angora Government. Rumbold was hoping that the prospect of the Sultan in Anatolia might be improving.<sup>197</sup>

Foreign Office was considering that Rumbold was underestimating Mustafa Kemal's difficulties at Angora which might affect his policy towards the Allies. Britain was in belief that Mustafa Kemal had lost a new friend Briand who was to replace Lenin and it was significant that while there seemed to be some disintegration at Angora, the Sultan was thinking that it was the right moment to transfer the authority to himself and assert himself against the Nationalists. The indication coming from Rumbold suggested that they should have the Sultan to ratify the Treaty and then appeal to Anatolia, but Foreign Office considered it as a dangerous move because in case the appeal extended to Anatolia was not successful, there would be still a strong army of Nationalists who was a danger to the Greeks and British. Foreign Office believed that they could not gamble with the Sultan alone and they ought to come to a settlement with Mustafa Kemal, but at the same time they were hoping that the circumstances might change.<sup>198</sup>

British Foreign Office accepted the change of Government in France happily since they had believed that, as Briand was acting to replace Lenin, as a new friend to Mustafa Kemal and therefore Mustafa Kemal had lost a strong aide in the Western world. Poincare became the Prime Minister. The planning for a meeting among Foreign Ministers of Allies had to be postponed but Curzon had a meeting with the newly elected French Prime Minister, Poincare on 16<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922 to discuss the Near Eastern problem. After the meeting, Curzon reported his meeting with Poincare that he had pressed him to arrange a meeting for the Foreign Secretaries to discuss the Near Eastern problem as Briand had agreed before him as soon as possible. Poincarè argued that the Allied task might be limited to offer of mediation and that no meeting of Supreme Council would be required. Curzon thought that they were going to have greater difficulty with Poincare than they had with Briand.<sup>199</sup>

D.G. Osborne noted that Poincare was indeed a better defender of the Turkish cause than Briand. They had anticipated that France was determined to obtain a similar view as the Nationalists but they were surprised to find the French to seek

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<sup>197</sup> Ibid, E 676.

<sup>198</sup> Ibid.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid, E 692, 'Conversation between Lord Curzon and M. Poincare at Quai d'Orsay on Monday, January 16, 1922'.

the terms of Nationalists immediately and openly as was suggested by Poincare. Osborne interpreted the attitude of Poincare as giving the Nationalists an open blank cheque, and he drew attention to what Poincare had said about the Allied interests not being at stake. Poincare had given the impression that he disregarded the Allied defense of Greeks. He believed that the French public opinion which probably cared little one way or the other was invoked in support of this policy. Poincare also gave the impression that he ignored the existence of the Sultan and the Constantinople Government and the fact that the peace to be concluded between the Allies and one of the enemies and not merely between Turkey and Greece. Poincare had the view that the Turks could easily win against the Greeks in Spring 1922 although Osborne believed that the Greeks were superior in men, money and war material compared to the Turks<sup>200</sup> R.C. Lindsay was thinking even more radical, and commented that Poincare failed to realize that the Turks would not agree to anything except under compulsion and they would increase their demands. R.C. Lindsay observed that if the French views were to be in the same manner of what Poincare was stating, then he would be blocking an immediate peace in Levant.<sup>201</sup>

'The Temps' on its article on 10<sup>th</sup> January argued that the meeting for the Greco-Turkish conflict should not be held in Constantinople as was suggested by Britain, but in a more neutral place such as Rome.<sup>202</sup>

Lloyd George along with Curzon met Gounaris and Baltazzis on 12<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1922 at Cannes, France. Lloyd George explained that there were two difficult questions with the Eastern problem, which were Smyrna and Eastern frontier of Thrace. He stated that with regard to Smyrna, no peace would be possible unless the Greek forces were to be withdrawn. The other alternative for Greece would be the continuation of the fighting. Gounaris told that they could not possibly initiate a new offence without the assistance of the Allies. For Thrace, Curzon explained that, the Greeks needed to shift their border with Turkey by about 80 miles to provide for the military security of Constantinople. Then, Lloyd George and Curzon gave the details of the proposal to the Greeks and Lloyd George told them that Britain had made a settlement of the Eastern question a condition of their Treaty of Guarantee to France and he was hoping that the Allies would accept it. He further told that this was the maximum they could do to help Greece. He praised the Greek army that they had achieved a great

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<sup>200</sup> Ibid, E 692, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' on 20<sup>th</sup> Jan. 1922.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid, E 692.

<sup>202</sup> Ibid.

deal and it was too much to expect of them to renew the offensive against Turks. Lloyd George explained that the public opinion both in France and Britain had been changed due to King Constantine, and he asked Gounaris to place himself into Curzon's hands. Gounaris' reply was affirmative. Lloyd George told that when the settlement of peace was secured, Greece would be in possession of a very considerable territory, although he was sorry that it was impossible for Greece to establish herself in Smyrna but he sincerely believed that the future was with Greece.<sup>203</sup>

Poincare decided to hold the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Allies on 1<sup>st</sup> of Feb. 1922 to discuss the Greco-Turkish question and invited the British and Italian Delegations for the meeting to Paris.<sup>204</sup>

Reuters broadcasted a telegram from Constantinople on 21<sup>st</sup> of Jan.1922 giving main features of Curzon's confidential proposal for the Greco-Turkish question, mentioning the precise line of Thracian frontier as a line starting just south of Midia on the Black Sea and ending at Rodosta on the Marmara Sea and commenting that the frontier was considered strategically unsound both in French and Turkish circles where it was believed to be prompted by a desire to save Greek *amour propre*. Curzon complained that his proposal was sent only to French and Italian Governments. Curzon in his mind was certain that it was leaked by French to Turks and he asked Hardinge to protest the incident to Poincare.<sup>205</sup>

The Cabinet met to discuss the Greco-Turkish question on 18<sup>th</sup> of Jan.1922. Curzon gave a summary of his conversation with Poincare on 16<sup>th</sup> January and found him more inclined to Turkish side compared to Briand. Poincare's style of dealing with the question also seemed to be different as he believed in using normal diplomatic channels rather than deciding in the meetings of Prime Ministers. Curzon told that he had the view that Poincare desired to keep the decision open and to drag out the negotiations until the spring 1922 and the Turks were able to resume the offensive against the Greeks, in the expectation that the Greeks would then be beaten. The Cabinet decided as was proposed by Curzon to wait for the French proposal in regard to the question and then proceed to Paris for the Meeting.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Ibid, E745.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid, E838.

<sup>205</sup> Ibid, E884.

<sup>206</sup> PRO, CAB 23/29, Cabinet 2(22).

The Cabinet was adjourned on 30<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922 to discuss the Greco-Turkish question once more. Curzon briefed the Ministers that with cooperation of Lloyd George and Bonar Law he requested from Poincare to postpone the meeting of the Foreign Ministers which was scheduled for 1<sup>st</sup> Feb.1922. The reason for the postponement was the late arrival of the French 'note' about the Greco-Turkish question which differed considerably from the British proposal and it was foreseen that it was very improbable that they could reach an agreement. Besides the response of Italians had not reached yet therefore as Curzon believed there was no point of discussing the question yet. The 'note' French had sent to Britain was the response of the Curzon's proposal.<sup>207</sup>

The 'note' sent by Poincare with regard to Greco-Turkish question, on 27<sup>th</sup> of Jan. 1922, outlined the basis of the French policy for the Greco-Turkish question and not as an answer to the British memorandum. It was pointed out that the British memorandum took into account the Greek attitude which was conveyed by Gounaris during his interviews with Foreign Office whereas the French document took account of the Turkish attitude. French people, reflected as was claimed by d'Orsay, was not in favour of imposing any conditions on Turks just for the sake of pleasing the Greeks. Poincare emphasized that the conditions at the time when the Sevres was signed, was not valid any longer. Greece was governed by a Monarch and whereas Turkey had displayed vitality and power of resistance and the Turkish people supported whole heartedly the Angora Government as their representative. Poincare stated in his 'note' that the French Government had desired to examine in the most impartial spirit, the actual respective situation of the Greeks and Turks as they were then. The French Government believed that; "*the modifications in the Treaty of Sevres proposed in June 1921, are no longer sufficient to ensure the acceptance of the Turks, who can justifiably point to the fact that since then the Greeks have suffered a serious military reverse and have, -by refusing the March proposal for a commission of enquiry, by rejecting, in June, the intervention of the powers, -committed two grave political errors of which they must bear the consequences.*"<sup>208</sup> The French Government proposed the new conditions of peace as to involve very slight diminutions of Turkish Territory, the fate of the Arab regions remaining unmodified, a limitation of military forces rather than disarmament and a supervision of Turkish Administration compatible with their right of sovereignty.<sup>209</sup>

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<sup>207</sup> PRO, CAB23/29, Cabinet 6(22).

<sup>208</sup> PRO, CAB 24/132, CP 3665.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

Poincare's proposal was something that Britain was not expecting, as a cut-line and an obstacle to the British policy.

Meanwhile at Athens, struggle between Venizelists and Royalists were in full gear. Lindley who had gone to Athens, suggested to the Foreign Office that the situation should be discussed at the forthcoming conference on Near East, and the Greek Government should be asked for full amnesty for political and military offences committed during Venizelist regime. Harold Nicolson commented on the request of Lindley that they could not do two things together which were to leave the Venizelists at the mercy of their enemies and to recognize King Constantine at the same time. He believed that they had moral obligations towards Venizelos who had joined them at the moment when it looked as if Allies were going to lose the war. Nicolson was in the opinion that as long as Venizelos was alive, they should not abandon him and his friends. Sir Eyre Crowe supported Nicolson's views.<sup>210</sup>

The importance of Venizelos for Greece was also stated by Lloyd George to the Ecumenical Patriarch Meletios on 18<sup>th</sup> Jan.1922 at London. During their meeting Lloyd George told the Patriarch that unhappily nothing could be done for Greece under the conditions they were in. Lloyd George commented that the voice of the friends of Turks had been strengthened and at the same time he had been abandoned by his colleagues and he was alone by himself for the support of Greece. Lloyd George further told him that never from the fall of Constantinople, 500 years, happened to Hellenism a greater misfortune than the fall of Venizelos and the turn of King Constantine to the throne. When Venizelos was in power, he was able to use British financial resources and stores for the war materials as if they were of Greece. When the Patriarch wondered the possibility of extending the zone of Smyrna to enclave the shores of Marmara Sea, Lloyd George told him that that would be possible if Venizelos was in power. Lloyd George asked him to work hard to bring Venizelos back to power again.<sup>211</sup> Nicolson was totally thinking in the same manner that if King Constantine was to be expelled from Athens the things would alter since it would deprive France and Italy of the excuse of regarding Greece as no longer an ally and it would also affect the public opinion in Britain for the advantages of Greece.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> PRO, FO 371/7584, C 1762.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid, C 3281.

<sup>212</sup> Ibid, C 3629.

It seemed if Britain decided to pressure the Angora Government even more for her to accept the peace terms that Britain was planning to enforce her. Curzon instructed the Foreign Office, the Eastern Department, to prepare a memorandum applicable to Turkey for possible means of applying pressure to the Turks. In accordance with the instruction, Forbes Adam and Edmonds prepared the memorandum and circulated on 6<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1922. The means to be applied were drawn under the headings of; Financial and Economical Blockade of Turkey, Financial and Military Assistance to Greece, increased stringency of other parts of a new Treaty against Turkey, separation of Angora Government from Constantinople Government and definite annexation of Turkish Territory by the Allies by unilateral declaration. It was foreseen that for any kind of financial and economical blockade to be successful, France and Italy should sincerely act along with Britain. Even if there was a strong will to apply the blockade among the Allies, as long as Russia was to supply them via Trebizond and the Caucasus, Turks would not be really affected by it. The Memorandum did not see any prospect in the naval blockade since there was the possibility of having traffic from Batoum to Trebizond. Therefore the only possibility to apply blockade against the Turks would be the co-operation between Russia and Allies.

Financial and Military Assistance was to a certain extent was in force since Britain before the Greek offensive in July 1921 had shown signs of abandoning their strict neutrality and of allowing Greece to obtain supplies in Britain. The memorandum pointed out that it seemed very unlikely that the Allies would allow their forces to fight actively on the side of Greece and very doubtful that they would feel able to make any financial advance. The only possibility was for the Allies to agree to allow Greece to purchase war material from them under an arrangement of deferred payment.

Increased stringency plan was even more difficult to exercise since unity among the Allies had shown to be very loose in this respect, besides there was the India factor which resisted so much for the termination of the Turkish rule in Constantinople. It was very hard to see the Allies going back to old days of structuring the Grand Armenia and therefore pour their resources in military and financial terms to this part of the world. Greece, even then, was having difficulties to hold the occupied zone. Therefore applying more stringer measures in the new Turkish Treaty was very unlikely.

Separation of Constantinople Government from Angora Government had been suggested by Rumbold as a last measure, hoping that the Treaty could be accepted by the Sultan and would attract the moderate Nationalists to his side. The memorandum stated that this procedure was failed once when the Sultan signed the Treaty of Sevres but Kemalists preferred to fight.

Definite annexation of Turkish territory by Allies was the last measure proposed by the memorandum. It was pointed out that this was the actual situation in Anatolia although theoretically speaking Anatolia with Thrace and Arab territories were a part of the Ottoman Empire still, therefore definite partition would not alter much from the actual state.

The Memorandum concluded that without the definite separation of Russia from Turkey, the indirect methods of pressure on Angora would not be effective and could only make provisional measures which would contribute in keeping Greeks in the field but not to end Angora's resistance. The other possibility was to offer generous concessions to Turks together with the united front of Allies and also giving some indications that they might be willing to help the Greeks against Mustafa Kemal might cause for him to yield.<sup>213</sup>

Osborne commented on the memorandum prepared by his colleagues that the best means of exerting pressure on the Nationalities was to maintain the conditions of deadlock. He believed that it might be necessary to enable the Greeks by means of financial assistance to maintain themselves in their position and never initiate a fresh offence to Turks. Osborne was in the opinion that the Nationalists were having enormous problem financially and economically and there was no way that they secure financial help but in London Market. He also believed that in time resentment would start building up against Mustafa Kemal and therefore he would be forced to come to Allies for peace. He regarded the offensive against Nationalists as a means to build a united front around Mustafa Kemal. Osborne commented that the coming conference at Genoa was rather important especially if an agreement was to be reached between Russia and Allies. In this case Allies should enforce Russians not to assist Mustafa Kemal. Osborne believed that time was against Mustafa Kemal and therefore they had to wait patiently

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<sup>213</sup> PRO, FO 371/7855, E1304.

Osborne concluded his 'note' that the most effective and least expensive method of pressure was to maintain the already applied financial and economic blockade of Anatolia until something happened at Angora.<sup>214</sup>

Britain after the stand of French against British proposal was rescued from isolation by Italy. Italy approached Britain to safeguard the Tripartite Agreement for which France was considering as a none-applicable agreement. Italians also requested for revision of financial clauses in the Treaty of Sevres. Italy was proposing that three powers should discuss the question saving Turkey from economic ruin and if considered desirable financial clauses should be revised and presented to Turks, but anyhow the financial and economic clauses should not be sacrificed. Italians were after changing the financial and economical clauses to enable them to receive repatriation from Turks. Italy was considering that the German repatriation had not been reinforced and the economical as well as the political conditions did not look very promising in Italy.<sup>215</sup> The Italian Ambassador on February 4<sup>th</sup> visited the British Foreign Office and asked Vansittart Britain not to call for Conference of Near East until Italian cabinet had been formed. He also had asked that correspondence with French Government should be communicated to Italy. On 6<sup>th</sup> of February, Sir Eyre Crowe communicated substance of correspondence with the Italian Ambassador who requested definite assurances that Britain would support the Italian thesis for the Tripartite Agreement.<sup>216</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe had seen an alliance in the move of Italians to them. He noted that the Italian Ambassador told him that Italy would value the continuous of close and confidential relation with Britain in regard to the Eastern Question, in which Italian and British interests would be best served by the two governments acting together.<sup>217</sup>

The British attitude towards Greco-Turkish question as well as a loan to the Greeks was tabled once more on 9<sup>th</sup> February in the Parliament. The Prime Minister was asked to reply whether there were any steps being taken to reconcile the conflicting interests of the Turks and Greeks in Asia Minor and whether the Greek Government had applied for a loan to Britain and the response of the British Government for this request. Lloyd George replied that the British Government was hoping to discuss the Eastern Question shortly in Paris with her Allies for the restoration of peace in Asia

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<sup>214</sup> Ibid, E1304, D.G. Osborne's 'side-note' of 6<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1922.

<sup>215</sup> Ibid, E1305.

<sup>216</sup> Ibid, E1384.

<sup>217</sup> Ibid.

Minor. Lloyd George told that the Greek Government was in negotiation for a loan in the London Market, but that no contract had been entered into. Lloyd George further told that the Greek Government had also made application to the Advisory Committee under the Trade Facilities Act for a loan with a British Government guarantee for purposes of expenditure in Britain and the application was still under consideration by the Committee.<sup>218</sup>

The loan to Greeks was asked again on 20<sup>th</sup> February for the Prime Minister to answer, whether the British Government had had before it proposals to permit Greece to obtain credits under the Trade Facilities Act with a British guarantee, and whether, in view of the hostilities in Asia Minor he would ensure the House that no further financial assistance would be given to the Greeks until peaceful relations were established between Greece and Turkey. Lloyd George answered as the application of the Greek Government was before the Advisory Committee under the Trade Facilities Act, and he could not anticipate the decision of the Committee upon the application. Lloyd George further told that there was no intention on the part of the British Government to make a loan to the Greek Government. There was also a question that the British Government had made a loan of 15 million Sterling to the Greek Government as was stated in the Parliament at the end of 1920, and the Government denied that no loan of 15 million Sterling had been granted to Greece.<sup>219</sup>

The Greek loan issue was going to be constantly debated in the Parliament. In the House of Lords, Lord Hylton made a statement on the Government's attitude towards the loan. He said that the Government had no power to prevent Greece borrowing on the London Market as was stated by Lloyd George was not true, since it was certain that unaided Greece could not raise a loan in London. He further told that the Government had signed an Agreement with the Greek Government releasing certain Greek revenues as security for a Greek Loan. Lord pointed out that this arrangement did not allow a direct loan to Greece but with the help of British Government, enabled her to secure a loan through Trade Facilities Act. Lord suggested that the Government should be questioned in the House of Commons for her act.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 150, Col.: 330.

<sup>219</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 150, Col.: 1501-1503.

<sup>220</sup> 'The Times' of 27<sup>th</sup> March 1922

Hilton Young, the Financial Secretary of Treasury stated on 27<sup>th</sup> March on the question of Greek Loan that the sanction or authority of the Government was not required for the issue of loans in the London Market. He further stated for the question whether the British Government had given any guarantee or used any pressure to facilitate the issue of the loan, such a thing had not risen. He explained that under an Agreement of February 1918, until certain advances made during the war were repaid, security could not be assigned by the Greek Government for new foreign loans without the consent of British Government, which had been given.<sup>221</sup> Somehow he failed to state that Lloyd George himself was involved in March 1921 for a loan in the London Market. Foreign Office was also going to intervene in another loan agreement by writing direct to Treasury.

Loan to be secured from the British Government was also brought to the attention of the British Government by the Greeks. Lindsay reported that he had a meeting with Gounaris and Rangabe, in London on 16<sup>th</sup> of February. Gounaris told him that the provision of money was most urgent not merely for the payment to the troops in Anatolia but also for the purchase of munitions in time for their activities in spring 1922. He pointed out that an essential condition for the floating of the loan was that its service should be undertaken by the International Commission. That would require the consent of the three powers, France, Italy and Britain. He believed that French and Italians would raise no objection. Gounaris further told Lindsay that the amount of the loan had not been settled yet but the Commission had put figure of Greek revenues at 2 Million Sterling. Gounaris also enquired if it would be possible for the British Government sell their stock of some war material to private sector from where Greece could purchase directly. Gounaris wondered if they would receive British full support in the Conference, and Lindsay replied that to a certain extent which he was not able to define himself, would be extended to Greece. Lindsay observed from his conversation that Gounaris had not mentioned of evacuating Anatolia since he was more occupied with the loan that they were desperately in need.<sup>222</sup>

Lindsay was surprised that Gounaris had not brought the subject of evacuation in their meeting, because in his letter to Curzon of 15<sup>th</sup> of Feb.1922, Gounaris had explained the condition of the Greek army in Anatolia that they were numerically inferior against Turks and they had less war materials. He commented that this

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<sup>221</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 152, Col.: 984.

<sup>222</sup> PRO, FO 371/7856, E 1932, G.C. Lindsay's 'Note' of 16<sup>th</sup> Feb.1922.

disadvantage of the Greek army would have been enhanced, had care been taken to execute the disarmament clauses of the armistice, or had the Greek force dispatched to Asia Minor with a mandate of the Supreme Council, been allowed a free hand to act as military necessities dictated. Gounaris further pointed out that under these circumstances, the Greek command in Asia Minor had stated that they could not win against Turkish offensive unless they receive reinforcements sufficient to raise the man-power, supplies of fresh war material and financial assistance as the condition of the army was desperate. Gounaris told that unless these conditions were fulfilled, the Command was suggesting the evacuation of Asia Minor completely. Under these circumstances the Greek Government would be forced to consider the request of the Greek army command for the evacuation unless her needs to be met by the Allies. It was further pointed out that in case of the evaluation took place the fate of Christian population would be left at the mercy of Turks and responsibility of the new massacres should be borne by the Allies<sup>223</sup>

D.G. Osborne noted on 16<sup>th</sup> of Feb.1922 on Gounaris Memorandum that in support of their appeal there was the usual plea of the Allied mandate to impose the peace terms on Turkey and the usual disregard of the fact that the Greeks were warned in March 1920, that they would attack at their own risk, that they nevertheless disregarded for a settlement and had recourse to hostilities, and they further refused the Allied offer of mediation.

Osborne believed that it was clear that Britain could not provide the money. Although Britain had agreed for a loan but they could not raise it in the financial circles in London Market and there could be no question of a Government loan. He continued on commenting that Britain could not give or sell them the necessary military supplies though they might obtain them if they could place a loan.

Osborne pointed out that at the first glance it was regrettable that the Greeks were going to evacuate the Asia Minor, assuming that Gounaris meant what he said. But on the other hand it might bring new opportunities. It was the first step towards satisfaction of the Nationalist demands and the *raison d'être* of the Nationalist army.<sup>224</sup>

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<sup>223</sup> PRO, PREM 1/18.

<sup>224</sup> PRO, FO 371/7855, E 1931, D.G. Osborne's 'side-note' of 16<sup>th</sup> Feb.1922.

Curzon gave his reply to Gounaris on 6<sup>th</sup> March 1922. He told that he had the hope that the military situation in Anatolia was less critical than it was stated in Gounaris' letter and he fully believed the remarkable patriotism and discipline of the Hellenic armies that would not fail them in any campaign. Curzon told that he had been informed that the Greek Government's application for a financial loan was failed due to obstacles connected with the commercial, rather than political aspects of the proposed transaction. Curzon believed that the wisest course under these circumstances was to expedite the diplomatic solution. He commented that the first subject that the Allies would tackle in the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris would be the Anatolian question and he was hoping that a solution might be found acceptable to both sides and hence would relieve Greece from her burdens.<sup>225</sup> This letter of Curzon was going to be the reason for criticisms to be extended to Curzon after the fall of Lloyd George that Curzon had encouraged the Greeks to stay in Anatolia.

Gounaris had applied to Lloyd George for a meeting on 27<sup>th</sup> Feb.1922 before his departure to Athens, to explain him the difficulties Greece was facing. Lloyd George was unable to grant him an interview that Gounaris had requested.<sup>226</sup>

The threat of Greece that they might evacuate the Anatolia was taken seriously by Britain. It was reported that evacuation would strengthen Angora Government and make them less sensitive to Allied terms and the Greek population would be in great danger.

Another consequence of the evacuation would be the impact to the security of Northern Mesopotamia since Kemalists might concentrate their forces there. It was suggested that it was essential that Greeks should be persuaded to abstain from evacuating Asia Minor.<sup>227</sup>

Italians made their proposals with regard to the modification of the Treaty of Sevres through their High Commissioner in Constantinople. Sir Rumbold reported that he had talked to the Italian High Commissioner and was told that he had seen both British and French proposals and found them quite apart from each other hence a compromise should be made to reach to a common goal. The Italian further told that

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<sup>225</sup> Ibid

<sup>226</sup> Ibid

<sup>227</sup> Ibid, E 1547.

he was more inclined to the British proposal since the French was giving everything away. He proposed that the governing commission for Smyrna district proposed in the British Memorandum might be presided over by an Italian chairman on the basis that this would to some extent be a set off to mandates for Syria and Mesopotamia. The Italian High Commissioner also suggested that the proposed League of Nations High Commissioner might be an Italian. It seemed Italy was trying to secure some advantages as he claimed that it was their right in accordance with the St. Jean de Maurienne Agreement, since Italy got nothing out of the war against Turkey and these two posts would be some compensation to Italy.<sup>228</sup>

The Italian proposals were brought to the attention once more by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Sir Graham, the British High Commissioner in Rome, and enquired whether British Foreign Office had shown any indications for their proposals. Graham was told that Italy had been pressed by Paris to take the French side and added that if Britain would agree on the Italian proposals then they could be assured of Italian co-operation. The Italian proposal and further more the insistence angered Osborne as he noted that it was pure and unashamed blackmail and therefore deserved a stinging reply but he doubted whether they could afford to give one. The inter-departmental Committee that examined the Italian proposals had suggested inviting the Greek Foreign Minister to London to discuss the proposals. Osborne believed that they could support the proposals in principle and might be considered as practical but they required further careful consideration and some elaborations and modification. Osborne had the view that at that stage they could not bind themselves to support them as they stood.<sup>229</sup> Lindsay was going to comment that that was typical Italian attitude.

Adam Block from Ottoman Debt Department and then attached to the Financial Committee was called to attend the forthcoming Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris for the modifications of the financial clause in the Treaty of Sevres wrote to Foreign Office that there should be a preliminary step to all negotiations, and that was to settle the territorial questions of Smyrna and Thrace. The reason put forward by Adam Block was his consideration that the settlement of those questions were of the greatest urgency, since if the Turkish armies were to settle them the pretensions of Mustafa Kemal would become more impossible to deal with. He was suggesting that as Greeks were out, the power of Mustafa Kemal would be slipping away and

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<sup>228</sup> Ibid, E 1586.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid, E 1673, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' of 16<sup>th</sup> of Feb.1922,

moderates would prefer to rally to the Sultan and come to terms with Constantinople. Adam Block who seemed to be written the message with Ryan, Suggested the way to deal with Turks, such that *“It is a well known principle that in dealing with the Oriental one should always leave it to him to make the first move....The more you give Mustapha Kemal the more he will ask for; whereas, if the Sultan and the moderates agree to the Treaty of Sevres with slight modifications, once the Greeks are out of Anatolia and out of Thrace, the Kemalist Party will disintegrate”*<sup>230</sup>

The meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled to meet in Paris was postponed several times but the important point was the proposals communicated by Britain, France and Italy seemed to be diverging from each other. The publication of the correspondence between France and Britain was banned although they were leaked outside and the parties involved seemed to be aware of the contents of the proposals of France and Britain. British Foreign Office, taking into account of the threat of Greeks and the possible defeat of the Greek armies, were preparing in making contingency plans for evacuation. E.G. Adam from Foreign Office drew several alternatives for the evacuation but out of these he proposed ‘evacuation of Asia Minor by Greeks by an armistice in advance of any general terms of mediation’ scheme<sup>231</sup>

Meanwhile Greeks were conducting negotiations for a loan and it seemed that British Government was pushing for the loan to be granted for Greece to eliminate the possibility of evacuation of Anatolia by Greeks. The problem that Britain foreseen were the break down of the loan negotiations hence evacuation would start without waiting for general settlement. At the Foreign Office it was also argued in some quarters that early and voluntary evacuation of Asia Minor and concentration of Greek forces in Thrace might not be a bad thing, since it would strengthen Greek position in Thrace and save her considerable expenditure.<sup>232</sup> Lindley from Athens reported on 19<sup>th</sup> of Feb.1922 that he did not believe the present Greek Government would dare to evacuate without adequate guarantees for safety for Christians, and regarded the Greek talk about immediate evacuation as something of bluff. If Greeks were not to obtain loan they might prefer an unauthorized issue of orders to evacuate without guarantees for Christians or might retire to a line easier to hold.

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<sup>230</sup> Ibid, E 1680.

<sup>231</sup> Ibid, E.G. Adam's Memorandum of 17<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1922.

<sup>232</sup> Ibid, E 1900.

Lindley was thinking that concentration in Thrace might be the wisest choice for the Greek Government, but then there was a grave risk of a general unrest in Greece.<sup>233</sup>

The meeting of long waited Ministers of Foreign Office was scheduled to be held in Paris on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1922, and meanwhile the criticism towards Greece and British policies had been increasing in France. 'Temps' in a leading article on the 20<sup>th</sup> of February argued that the territory concessions to Greeks on the expense of Turks were considered. The paper criticized Lloyd George on his attitude for the Genoa Conference for his statement that appeared in 'The Daily Telegraph' of 'to hold similar conferences every six months'. According to 'Temps' the construction of Europe was not an enterprise which could be undertaken like a game of golf, from hole to hole, implying to Lloyd George's hobby for golf. On the Eastern question, the paper, by referring to seizure by Greeks of French vessel carrying coal to Mersina [Mersin] questioned the British attitude towards these incidents and the hostilities committed by Greeks. The paper stressed on the point that the criticism extended by Gounaris towards France had its base in British policy and peace could not be reached in Anatolia before the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks.<sup>234</sup>

Prior to the Conference, the Angora Government decided to send a mission to Europe. Yusuf Kemal, the Minister of Foreign Affairs would be visiting London first after staying in Paris 24 hours en route to Britain. Rumbold interpreted the traveling plans as the Turks had given great importance for Britain which was the most powerful country in the world, and centre for solving the Near Eastern question. The interpretation for the visit, for R.C. Lindsay was that if justification was required for the reserved attitude that Britain had been taken towards Turks, it was to be found in Yusuf Kemal's speech that Constantinople was afraid of the Britain and of the Angora's plan to send him straight to London.<sup>235</sup>

Meanwhile Greece was trying to raise the loan that they were so desperately in need financially. The Greek Delegation in London pointed out the urgency of the loan in their message of 21<sup>st</sup> of February to Foreign Office. The message gave the details of the procedures for the loan that there were two conditions were needed to be fulfilled and it would take at least a month to finalize the matter, but they were afraid that even a month was too long to save the situation in Greece. Another point

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<sup>233</sup> Ibid, E 1901.

<sup>234</sup> Ibid, E 1971.

<sup>235</sup> PRO, FO 371/7856, E 2122.

raised was the war material that was required which were not available in the market but only in the Government's stock. The proposal of the Greeks was to buy them through private sector provided that British Government's consent was received to sell them to the private sector. The reaction of Sir Eyre Crowe and Curzon was; "*it is out of question for us to supply the war material to the Greek Government, even in the roundabout way suggested by Rangabe [the Greek representative in London]*"<sup>236</sup>

The financial situation and the threat of an immediate evacuation inspired the Foreign Office to draw some other plans to solve the problem Osborne tried to sketch a plan, such that a meeting could be arranged with Yusuf Kemal, Izzet Pasha, the Foreign Minister of the Constantinople Government, and Gounaris and submitting the proposals to be accepted within four weeks. The proposal that Osborne was thinking was the demobilization of the Greeks about 70% of their army and to evacuate Asia Minor within 3 months in return they would receive a loan and a reasonable assurances of the safety of the Christians. For Turks, demobilization of their army of 70%, the reoccupation the Smyrna area within 3 months, to give guarantees for Christians similar to those of Angora Agreement and to accept Allied commissions to satisfy themselves as to demobilization and execution of guarantees could be offered. Osborne's plan also had an answer for the Eastern Thrace that an impartial body preferably League of Nations to decide on the alternatives of; to retention by Greece, return to Turkey or mandate administration by a third party. The Turks would also be asked to appoint a commission to settle with the Allies other issues.<sup>237</sup>

Lancelot Oliphant and Lindsay seemed to be in agreement with Osborne's plan but suggested to wait for the Paris Conference and then to proceed.

Lindley from Athens reported that the French delegation had refused of furnishing any loan to Greece and they would do anything they could to prevent it in the International Commission. Lindley believed that there was no chance of arranging loan to Greece since Italian Government could not be counted upon to instruct their delegate to outvote French. Lindley believed that in these circumstances the only way for the Greek Government to make arrangements with bankers. Lindley was against giving Greece any loan except as a part of the settlement. He was

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<sup>236</sup> Ibid, E 2215, Sir Eyre Crowe and Curzon initialed 'Note' on 22<sup>nd</sup> Feb.1922.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid, E 2260, G.G. Osborne's 'Note' of 22<sup>nd</sup> Feb.1922.

suggesting that concrete British terms to the Greek Government could be presented and make them accept in writing before money was recorded.<sup>238</sup>

Osborne commented on Lindley's proposal that the British policy was to have the Greeks to stay in Asia Minor until they tell them to get out. Greeks had told them that they could not stay unless Britain gave them money and arms and he believed Britain gave no answer. Osborne further noted that Gounaris had gone back to Athens empty handed. Osborne believed that it would be degrading to have to ask the Greeks to stay till they were ready and the only way for them to appeal to Greeks on behalf of the Christians.<sup>239</sup>

Meanwhile, Yusuf Kemal and Izzet Pasha were coming to London separately although Rumbold had requested from Izzet Pasha that Yusuf Kemal would represent the Constantinople Government too, but was declined. Rumbold also told them that National Pact as claimed by Angora Government could not be accepted as a whole. He believed that Izzet Pasha's visit was to demonstrate that Constantinople Government was independent of Angora Government.<sup>240</sup>

British Foreign Office was glad to learn that Rauf Bey was elected as the second President of the National Assembly at Angora. Osborne commented that the appointment meant that the moderate party had got an influential leader. It would also seem to indicate that Mustafa Kemal had recognized that a dictatorship was dangerous. Osborne believed that it was very significant development. It was satisfactory that there was a moderate element in Nationalist higher command. It all made it more difficult and dangerous for Mustafa Kemal to refuse a reasonable offer.<sup>241</sup>

Rumbold was sending contradictory news regarding to Angora Government and the conditions of the army. On 6<sup>th</sup> of March he cabled that Mustafa Kemal had told that the financial resources of the Angora Government were sufficient without foreign help. He further told that Mustafa Kemal in his speech gave the impression that he might give some compromises.<sup>242</sup> Rumbold had sent another message on the same day and told that from inquiries he had made, it appeared that the strength of Greek

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid, E 2260.

<sup>239</sup> Ibid, E 2285, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' of 1<sup>st</sup> March 1922.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid, E 2329.

<sup>241</sup> Ibid, E 2447, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' of 6<sup>th</sup> March 1922.

<sup>242</sup> Ibid, E 2448.

and Turkish armies was almost identical and neither was likely to be increased. He further reported that Turkish peasants would not fight indefinitely in spite of their objective which was the rejection of Greeks from Asia Minor. According to Rumbold numerous desertions had occurred in Nationalist forces and if Greeks withdrew, dissolution would probably occur and the financial situation very unsatisfactory and depended on the support of Russia.<sup>243</sup> He sent another report on 5<sup>th</sup> March that it then became clear that the speech delivered by Mustafa Kemal was in uncompromising tone.<sup>244</sup>

British Politics had a turmoil in March 1922, by the resignation of Montagu, Secretary of State for India. Montagu had been a critic of the Government's Near Eastern policy since the armistice and tried to preserve the sentiments of the Moslem population in India by allowing Turks in Constantinople. Viceroy of India, Lord Reading, sent a message to Montagu proposing that Constantinople should be evacuated by the Allies, and that Smyrna and Thrace should be evacuated by the Greeks and restored to Turkey. The Lord Reading's message was circulated to the Cabinet on March 4<sup>th</sup> of March and on the same date Montagu gave the consent of the British Government to the publication in India of the Lord Reading's recommendations.

At the Cabinet meeting on 6<sup>th</sup> of March where Lloyd George was absent, Curzon talking casually to Montagu told that it was wrong to allow the publication and wrote an angry and threatening letter to Montagu on the same day. Curzon wrote that he should have contacted the Cabinet before authorizing the Viceroy to publish the letter since it involved the British foreign policy. Curzon concluded his letter that whether the Indian opinion always to be the final decision of the Moslem appeal and added that he had hoped that such a move of him should be the last one.<sup>245</sup>

Lloyd George arrived on 9<sup>th</sup> March 1922 in London and took immediate action. Lloyd George shouting at Montagu over the phone, asked him to come and see him. Montagu on his visit to Prime Minister delivered his resignation of which the announcement was made on the same day in the House of Commons by Chamberlain. Montagu's resignation was a turning point in the Cabinet since he was the only one being outspoken for the Turks. The resignation was debated by

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<sup>243</sup> Ibid, E 2449.

<sup>244</sup> Ibid, E 2452.

<sup>245</sup> House of Lords, Public Records, Beaverbrook Papers (BBK), BBK/G/4/76.

Curzon's speech in the House of Lords on 15<sup>th</sup> March and years later as Lord Beaverbrook was going to comment; Montagu making his speech at his Contingency rather than in the Parliament lost his case. According to Beaverbrook if Montagu appeared in the Parliament and concentrated only on the Greco-Turkish question, he might cause for the Prime Minister to resign.<sup>246</sup>

The turmoil caused by the resignation of a Member of the Cabinet especially after the debate in the House of Lords cooled down smoothly as was expressed by Chamberlain in his letter to Lloyd George. He wrote that in spite of the storms that broke around their heads they were doing very well. According to Chamberlain Curzon's answer to Montagu was complete and crushing and further told that the gods drew Montagu mad.<sup>247</sup>

Lloyd George offered the post, vacated by Montagu to Lord Reading, Viceroy of India but he declined saying that he shared the views of the Indian Government with regard to Greco-Turkish conflict for which the resignation of Montagu was for and he further added that he feared that Curzon's and his idea of foreign policy were very different that would make the co-operation with him very difficult.<sup>248</sup>

Montagu wished to send a fare-well message to India but Lloyd George feared that it might contain an unfair version of the incidents connected with Montagu's resignation, and instructed that the message to be examined before it was sent. The Cabinet discussing this issue on its meeting of 13<sup>th</sup> of March decided that Montagu's proposed message should not be published. The Cabinet also decided that the Lord Privy Seal, Chamberlain, should send to Viceroy of the message of; *"I have laid your telegram and Mr. Montagu's proposed message before Cabinet. We are quite unable to authorize publication of such a message by you or your Government. The resignation of Montagu had nothing whatever to do with anything connected with Government's Indian Policy; and if you think it desirable you are authorized to publish the fact. But we depreciate anything being said that can be misrepresented as even being in the nature of an apology on the part of His Majesty's Government"*<sup>249</sup> The Cabinet further decided for Chamberlain to send a message to Viceroy of India that; *"Have seen statement in Press that Adjournment is to be moved in Legislative Assembly tomorrow to discuss Mr. Montagu's resignation. The*

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<sup>246</sup> Ibid

<sup>247</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/7/5/8, A. Chamberlain's letter to Lloyd George of 15<sup>th</sup> March 1922.

<sup>248</sup> BBK/G/4/76, Lord Reading's letter of 11<sup>th</sup> of March 1922.

<sup>249</sup> PRO, CAB 23/29 Cabinet 17(22).

*subject obviously falls within proviso in paragraph 45 of Manual of Business allowing you to disallow Motion if it relates to a matter which is not primarily the concern of the Governor-General in Council. We preserve that unless you see strong reasons to the contrary you will exercise your power to disallow*<sup>250</sup> Lloyd George could not bear even the discussion of the reasons behind Montagu's resignation, therefore being criticized of the Government's policy of Greco-Turkish conflict. The series of events, starting with the telegram being sent by the Government of India to Montagu and giving consent for its publication were just the beginning for the unrest in India. The Cabinet on 2<sup>nd</sup> of March 1922, acknowledged the arrest of Gandhi in India, but still Britain was advancing to more troubled days.<sup>251</sup> British policy towards India was going to bear more problems and eventually would end up losing 'The Jewel of the Crown' in near future.

Montagu's resignation marked the first casualty of the Greco-Turkish conflict and the unwritten and unspoken alliance within Government against Turks brought to surface. The attitude of Lloyd George towards Curzon changed to a better relation as was clearly reflected in his letter of 9<sup>th</sup> of March to Curzon and the reply given by him on 9<sup>th</sup> March.<sup>252</sup>

Curzon received Izzet Pasha and Yusuf Kemal on 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> March respectively and discussed the Greco-Turkish conflict. The conversations and therefore the stand of Turks towards the Eastern question were debated in the Cabinet Meeting of 20<sup>th</sup> March 1922. Curzon explained that the terms put forward by Yusuf Kemal, which included the return to Turkey of Thrace as well as Asia Minor, were impossible to accept. Curzon had told Yusuf Kemal that he would use his influence with the Greeks to make a peaceful and voluntary retirement from Asia Minor provided that a settlement for the Treaty as a whole was reached. Curzon further told him that there should be a guarantee for the Christians left behind by the Greeks. Another condition for the peace as put forward by Curzon that the Allies could not surrender both shores of the Straits, although Asiatic shore could be given to Turks provided that it was within the demilitarized zone. The reason for keeping

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<sup>250</sup> Ibid

<sup>251</sup> PRO, Cabinet 14(22), CAB 23/29

<sup>252</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/3/11, Lloyd George wrote Curzon on 9<sup>th</sup> March 1922, saying that; "My Dear Foreign Secretary, I feel I must write to tell you how deeply I regret that your most difficult task has been further complicated by Montagu's folly. It is very hard on you. I am hopeful however that the prompt and decisive action taken by the Government may assist you to retrieve the position. The dismissal of Montagu will make an undoubted impression on both in Paris and Angora. I trust that a few days rest will restore you to health and vigour. I am off to my plans. Ever sincerely, (signed) Lloyd George."

the Straits was military as well as sentimental nature emerging from the dominions that they would like to keep the Gallipoli Peninsula for the graves. The third condition was the financial clauses that the Turks were expected to honor their pre-war debt and agree to pay claims arising out of the war, the cost of the Army of Occupation and similar expenditure. Apart from these conditions, Turks were not allowed to have a conscript army. Curzon explained to the Cabinet that he had not discussed about the regime to be applied at Smyrna and the borders in Thrace since these were the topics of discussion at the Ministers Meeting which was scheduled to meet in Paris in coming days. Curzon told that the only hope of a settlement appeared to be dependent on the united Allied front. He told the Cabinet that to both groups of Turks he insisted on the necessity of an immediate armistice.<sup>253</sup>

Curzon reported to the Cabinet, his meeting with Izzet Pasha which was conducted in a friendly atmosphere. The possibility of armistice during negotiations was welcome by Izzet Pasha, since it did not mean much to the Constantinople Government as they were not fighting with the Greeks, but Yusuf Kemal was hesitant as Curzon thought that the Angora Government was feared of the deserters when the armistice announced which would result disappearing of the army. Curzon realized that it was the weakest point of the Angora Government and he thought that it should be the first thing that he should stress in the Paris Meeting. Curzon explained that the evacuation would take place in 4 1/2 months and as the Greek army was cleared out, the Turks would enter the evacuated zone and gendarmerie would be set up under the Allied command. The Allied Officers were also to supervise the demobilization of the Turkish Army.

Curzon explained the procedures for the forthcoming Ministers Meeting in Paris and told that his task was extremely difficult and the probability of success was very remote. He criticized that the consistent and almost treacherous attitude of the French that the British views and documents communicated to French was passed to Turks. Curzon believed that French Generals and Foreign Office had practically been working for the Turks. Curzon told that the Italians seemed to be more closed to British due to their own difficulties with the French and also because they realized that their foreign policy in regard to Turkey had failed. Italians were after economic concessions in Turkey. The Italian Ambassador told that Turks had given them

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<sup>253</sup> PRO, CAB 23/29, Cabinet 19(22).

concessions for railways, mines and so on, and Curzon was thinking that in return Turks were expecting the Italian backing.

Curzon told that he was not hopeful about the Allies and he believed that even his position had been weakened by Government of India's publication, Montagu's resignation and about the position of the Government as there had been rumors that the Government was going to resign. Curzon also complained about the relation of the Angora Government and Bolsheviks. He had news that Mustafa Kemal was piling his army to attack Mosul so he had warned Yusuf Kemal that if Angora attacked to the interests of Britain it would be a total war between Britain and Turkey.

Churchill was worried that if there was a disturbance in Mosul area, their position in Mesopotamia would be altered completely. He believed that there could be no peace in Mesopotamia unless there was peace in Turkey. He told that they were paying for the mistakes they had done. The signing the Treaty of Sevres was one of the most unfortunate disasters in the history and as a result they contributed awakening a Power that had been at their feet. Churchill further commented that Greece was exhausted, worn out and bankrupt and the Smyrna region had been in misery for the last three years and was going to be returned to Turks again. He believed that Britain had no leverage against Turks but Turks had a leverage to use against them which was Mosul. He commented that if Curzon came back from Paris without peace he did not know how to proceed especially in Mesopotamia and gave the impression that they might loose it in very near future.

Curzon drew the attention of the Ministers to the danger of the alliance of Bolsheviks with Angora Government. He stated that they should realize that the British policy in regard to Turkey had resulted in achieving the impossible, namely the marriage of Bolsheviks and Turks in spite of the differences between them and the history. He told that they should have realized this before abandoning Caucasus as he had seen.

Churchill told that he had always been in favor of an easy policy towards Turkey and a hard policy towards Bolsheviks, but they had adopted exactly the contrary policy.

Curzon pointed out that throughout he had been absolutely impartial between the Turks and Greeks. He commented about India being represented in the Conference

in Paris that he was not going to speak against the interests of India or in favour of the Greece and he was not in favour of taking any Indian nor anybody from Dominions to the Conference in Paris.

Curzon then explained the policy to be adopted in Paris. He believed that the evacuation of Asia Minor should be accompanied by the establishment of some regime in Smyrna under Turkish sovereignty to provide for non-Turkish races. He personally was in favour of this regime being under the auspices of League of Nations, but he thought that would not be possible for the Turks to accept.

The most difficult area in the negotiations, Curzon believed, was going to be in Thrace and Straits. Thrace was under the possession of Greeks. Even if the Allies were to accept the National Pact, who was going to turn the Greeks out, considering the existence of a Greek army of 70,000 men? Curzon believed that the moment the Allies withdrew from Constantinople, the Greeks would slip in. War Office was against, returning the European shores of Dardanelles back to Turks and neither the Dominions. Curzon believed that, hence the only option for him in Paris was to fight for the Greeks to stay in Thrace. He believed that there was not even a possibility to extend the Turkish territory towards Bulgaria, since no doubt it would ignite a new Balkan War.

The Minister of Health pointed out that supposing nothing came out of the Paris Conference and the Turks and Greeks were left to fight it out, Britain had nothing to lose. He further commented that even if the Turks attacked Mesopotamia, since this country was just a mandate and not a part of the British Empire, still Britain would not lose her prestige. Curzon was not in agreement with the Minister of Health, and told that they should not to forget that Greeks had gone to Smyrna with the invitation of the Allies and later on they had fought for the Allies, therefore it was not possible for the Allies to wash their hands off the Greeks and leave them there by themselves.

Churchill told that if the worst came to worst they could evacuate Mesopotamia but he was in favor of continuing the state of war and therefore to fight against Turks rather than to leave the Straits to Turks. Minister of Education shared Churchill's views about Straits. Chamberlain suggested that it was not worthwhile to run risks in order to secure the acknowledgement by the Turks of their obligations to pay the

cost of the armies of occupation, since he believed that the Turks would never be able to pay anything.

The discussion was ended with the recommendation to leave Curzon to do his best in light of his proposals and the general intentions of the Cabinet.<sup>254</sup>

The Minister's Conference took place in Paris on 22<sup>nd</sup> March 1922 and ended on 27<sup>th</sup>, and Ministers with their experts had nine sessions to discuss the Greco-Turkish question. The final communiqué was accepted unanimously on 27<sup>th</sup> March and sent to concerned parties. In the preamble it was mentioned that Foreign Ministers of France, Britain and Italy discussed every aspect of the situation in Near East and reached the conclusion which they offered as the most equitable solution that it was in their power for the Near Eastern problem.<sup>255</sup> In the preamble they declared that they were partial to the parties and they were seeking for a just peace. Their proposals were such that the first condition was armistice and in the following days the Asia Minor was to be vacated by Greeks and Turks would be allowed to move in.

The Straits would be under the control of an International Commission and Asiatic shores of Dardanelles would be returned back to Turkey under a de-militarized zone concept. For Thrace, it was mentioned that it was a very difficult decision to make,

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<sup>254</sup> Ibid

<sup>255</sup> PRO, FO 286/832, E 3507/5/44. The preamble was interesting to show how Powers had seen the conflict. The Preamble of the proposal was; "1. *They desire to re-establish peace between the conflicting armies of Turkey and Greece, but to deal fairly with both parties, and to impose upon neither conditions of discomfiture or defeat.*

2. *They desire to re-establish the Turkish nation and the Turkish dominion in the areas which may legitimately be regarded as their own, with the historic and renowned capital of Constantinople as the center, and with such powers as may be enable them to renew a vigorous and independent national existence.*

3. *They desire to secure full and fair treatment to the followers of the creed of Islam and to maintain the secular and religious authority of the Sultan of Turkey.*

4. *They desire to compensate the Greek nation for the great sacrifices which they have accepted during the war in the cause of the Allies, and to leave them such scope for their national economic development as is demanded both by their achievements and by their legitimate aspirations.*

5. *They desire to enable both peoples, in regions where they are contiguous or where their populations are intermingled, to leave in future in conditions of mutual confidence and self-respect.*

6. *They desire to provide for the protection and security of the various minorities, whether Moslem or Christian, or of other races and creeds who, whether in Europe or Asia, find themselves placed in the midst of larger political or ethnic aggregations.*

7. *They desire to prevent the recurrence of armed conflict between the Turkish nation and the European Powers with who it was recently at war.*

8. *They desire, above all, to find a solution that shall not be suspected of partiality to one side or the other, but shall endeavour with firm hands to hold the scales even between the two."*

but nevertheless they thought to draw a line in consideration of the desires of the Allies for the Dardanelles and the status-quo where there was a overwhelming population of Greeks and a Greek army being present there. The proposed line was to extend from Ganos on the Marmora [Marmara] in a northerly and north-easterly to a point on the Bulgarian frontier in the western part of the Istranja Mountains. The frontier would leave the Greek town of Rodosto to the Turks, but it would keep Baba Eski and Kirk Kilisse [Kirkklareli] on the Greek side of the of the Greco-Turkish frontier. The Proposal mentioned that the frontier was drawn with the consideration of the topographical features of the country and would be further confirmed by the de-militarization of almost the entire area of Eastern Thrace of both Turkish and Greek sides of the frontier, hence ensuring the security of Constantinople and to prevent Turks from attacking Greeks. The inspection of the de-militarized zone would be undertaken by Allied forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the area of whose occupation would be extended eastwards to Rodosto. The proposal drew an analogy between Smyrna, which would be left to Turkey, and Adrianople that was retained by Greece, and decided that the Allies were willing to act between Greeks and Turks, in a friendly manner, to ensure that non-Moslems and non-Christian population to be presented in the Administrations of the both cities to safeguard the religious institutions. The proposal drawn by the Ministers outlined the future of Constantinople that the occupation would be terminated and it would be handed to the authority of the Government of the Sultan.

For financial clauses, Financial Commission as was in the Treaty of Sevres, would be abandoned and instead the pre-war Debt Commission would be maintained and a new organization of Allied Liquidation Commission be set up to ensure that Turkey to pay the pre-war debts and war indemnity. With regard to the existing Capitulatory System, the Allied Powers decided to set up a commission to draw a new set up by safeguarding the independence of Turkey. Turkey was allowed a total of 85 000 men force in military including gendarmerie.<sup>256</sup>

Curzon was going to explain in House of Lords on 29<sup>th</sup> March that the proposals represented the main object for which he had gone to Paris, namely, the unanimous conclusion of the three great Powers. He continued in saying that; "*They [Ministers] had not attained unity in order to see that unity destroyed by encroachments or*

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<sup>256</sup> Ibid

*infractions which would impair the general symmetry of the plan or once again place the Near East in the melting pot*<sup>257</sup>

This was the Declaration reached after seven days of work by the Ministers in Paris. The next thing was to wait and see what the parties, namely Greece and Turkey would say for the Declaration. A new era was about to emerge in the relations of both among Allies and between Greece and Turkey as well as for the relations of the Angora Government and Britain and the rest of the Powers.

### **VI.3. Lloyd George and the Allies Towards to the Final Turkish Victory**

The Paris Declaration was sent to both Greece and Turkey and was asked to attend a Conference, presumably at Constantinople to state their versions. The Declaration was delivered to both Constantinople and Angora Governments.

It was reported that the Greek Government was attacked in the Greek Chamber on 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1922 and accused for having left the Greek case in the hands of the Powers. Prime Minister refused to speak about the Allied proposal telling that it was dangerous to national interests to give any explanations.<sup>258</sup>

Rumbold reported from Constantinople that the Constantinople Government had appointed a committee to study the proposals. Grand Vizier, Tewfik Pasha [Tevfik], had told him that the weak point was the proposed frontier for Turkey in Thrace especially for Adrianople. Rumbold had the impression that both Turkish Governments were treating the proposals as a base line for attaining further territory concessions.<sup>259</sup> But Foreign Office was going to receive a message from Sofia that Yusuf Kemal was disappointed with proposed conditions and expressed conviction that they would be rejected by Angora.<sup>260</sup> The Turkish Press was also attacking the Allies that the proposal was far away from fulfilling their desires.<sup>261</sup> The Sultan seemed to be quite content with the Declaration of the Ministers, and Rumbold reported his conversation with the Grand Vizier that he was told that the Sultan was convinced that Turkey had to lean on a strong power in future, and in making his

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<sup>257</sup> House of Lords Public Records, Parliamentary Debates, Hansard for House of Lords (Hansard for Lords), Hansard for Lords, Vol. :49, Col. :985-1007.

<sup>258</sup> PRO, FO 371/7860, E 3515.

<sup>259</sup> Ibid.

<sup>260</sup> Ibid, E 3521.

<sup>261</sup> Ibid, E 3555.

proposal, Sultan had given proof of his conviction that power ought to be Britain.<sup>262</sup> The Sultan's view was welcome in Foreign Office that they authorized Rumbold to ensure the Sultan of Britain's earnest desire for close relations with the Sultan and his country after peace had been signed.<sup>263</sup>

Criticism was also extended to the Declaration from the Greek Press. They believed that modifications to the Treaty were insufficient and some of the press claimed that the proposal had marked 'the defeat of Europe by Asia'<sup>264</sup>

Lloyd George seemed to be pleased with the Declaration and the union of the Allies in coming to an understanding for the peace in Near Eastern. At the meeting of the Cabinet on 28<sup>th</sup> March 1922, he, on behalf of the Cabinet, congratulated Curzon for his contribution in the Paris Conference.<sup>265</sup>

Lloyd George met the new Italian Foreign Minister, Schanzer, on 27<sup>th</sup> March 1922, to discuss briefly about the Conference of the Foreign Ministers and Schanzer told that he was very satisfied with the meeting and had managed to take measures to protect the Christians. Lloyd George seemed very skeptical and told that he had less confidence in Turks than had some other people. He further commented that it would be a horrible thing if a new massacre broke out.

There was some news that the Greeks were moving their armies to Thrace and the Turks were complaining that the reason behind was the unsettled Thrace issue.<sup>266</sup> News reached to London that the confiscation of the merchandise at the Greek ports although they were destined to somewhere else was taking place. When the question was put up in the House of Commons on 29<sup>th</sup> March 1922, Harmsworth, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office replied that British Government did not have the right to protest against the requisitioning for military purposes by the Greek Government of goods in Greek territory, so long as adequate compensation was paid.<sup>267</sup>

Rumbold reported on 5<sup>th</sup> April that he had received a message from Yusuf Kemal that the Angora Government had accepted the armistice in principle provided that

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<sup>262</sup> Ibid, E 3518.

<sup>263</sup> Ibid, E 3570, The 'Note' signed by Osborne, Oliphant, Lindsay and Curzon on 3<sup>rd</sup> April 1922.

<sup>264</sup> Ibid, E 3561,

<sup>265</sup> PRO, Cabinet 21(22), CAB 23/29.

<sup>266</sup> PRO, FO 371/7860, E3550.

<sup>267</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 152, Col. : 1306.

evacuation of Asia Minor should be proceeded with on conclusion of armistice in view of possibility that Greeks might take advantage of the situation. Angora Government further proposed a period of four months for armistice to allow for evacuation, and the period might be expanded for another three months. Angora Government considered that it was necessary that line Eskisehr-Kutahia-Afion Kara Hissar [Eskisehir-Kutahya-Afyonkarahisar] to be evacuated in fifteen days and whole of the occupied territory within four months. Angora Government had agreed that a mixed commission should exercise the supervision of the evacuation. Angora Government requested that if these were to be accepted by the Allies, they were ready to appoint delegates to examine the peace proposals.<sup>268</sup>

On the news received from Angora, Osborne noted that they had asked both sides whether they agreed on armistice and to send delegates to examine the Allied proposals. The Greeks accepted the first one and was waiting for the second one, to send delegates for the Turkish action before they could answer. Although there was no answer from Constantinople, Osborne believed that after the Angora's decision there would be no problem in obtaining their answers as affirmative. Osborne noted that the Angora Government's answer was conditional, and he believed that their demand was reasonable that after the Allied proposals in March and June 1921, Greeks attacked immediately. Osborne also interpreted the condition of Angora as an attempt to secure Smyrna while reserving full liberty to bargain over the other proposals. Osborne believed that they could reach a compromise with the Turks on the conditions. Osborne proposed to send a message to Angora that they were hoping that Turkey would not insist on the condition but agree to an armistice and an early conference.<sup>269</sup> With Lindsay's suggestion's the High Commissioners at Constantinople were going to send a message to Angora that they should have the armistice first and during the negotiations of the proposal of the Allies, they could make the arrangements to evacuate. The attitude of the Allies was to agree on the action of the evacuation was subject to the acceptance of other clauses of general settlement.

According to 'Temps' on 7<sup>th</sup> April 1922, the reply received from Angora was very satisfactory and commented that interests of Turkey and Greece were alike and the only obstacle was the British policy. The paper claimed that Britain's insistence on maintaining control over Straits by means of division of Thrace and inter-Allied

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<sup>268</sup> PRO, FO 371/7860, E 3677.

<sup>269</sup> Ibid

occupation of Gallipoli was the desire to keep Greeks in Asia Minor as a lever against Turks.<sup>270</sup>

Rumbold reported that he had an audience with the Sultan on 6<sup>th</sup> of April 1922. The Sultan told him that the Angora Government was a reincarnation of CUP and it had disguised itself under a mask of Nationalism by exploiting the feelings of the people because of the Greek invasion. The Sultan believed that ninety per cent of the population at heart was against the Angora gang. He enquired with whom was peace going to be made, with the legitimate Government which was the Constantinople Government, or with the revolutionary organization, namely the Angora's. Rumbold told him that the Allies were confronted by a dual Government in Turkey and were hoping that the peace settlement would deprive Angora of its *raison d'être*, and there would be a single Government which was naturally the Government of the Sultan. Rumbold further told that as a proof, they, all three High Commissioners in Constantinople, had handed the peace proposal to the Grand Vizier by person, but for Angora Government it was done through its agent in Constantinople rather than by hand to the Angora Government.<sup>271</sup>

The policy of the Allies of taking the Constantinople Government as the legitimate Government and therefore dealing with Angora Government through its agent of Hamid Bey was going to be criticized by Angora. Rumbold reported on 26<sup>th</sup> April 1922 that hostility of the Angora Government towards to the Constantinople Government had been increased lately and further Angora was trying to force the Allies into the position of dealing with the Angora alone. Mustafa Kemal's recent speeches were an indication that they would not be content with the evacuation of Asia Minor but also wish to gain control of the upper hand at Constantinople. Mustafa Kemal's attitude of being recognized as the sole representative of Turkey and implementing the National Pact, Rumbold feared, could be recognized by France and to a lesser extent by Italy. According to Rumbold, Kemalists was considering Britain as the only obstacle for their goals and they were thinking that Britain was still supporting Greece even to the extent of secretly encouraging the Minor Asiatic movement.<sup>272</sup>

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<sup>270</sup> PRO, FO 371/7860, E 3727.

<sup>271</sup> PRO, FO 406/49, E 4063/5/44, No:92.

<sup>272</sup> PRO, FO 371/7863, E 4432,

The Italian Government signed an agreement with the Constantinople Government which enabled the Italians to receive concessions for railways, public works and mines on 24<sup>th</sup> of April 1922. The Italian Government notified Britain about the Agreement which was a surprise for Britain.<sup>273</sup>

Britain considered that Angora's reply on 22<sup>nd</sup> of April, which emphasized the conditions for the Conference as the meeting place should be Ismid and insistence of the commencement of armistice at the same time of the evacuation, was an indication of the Angora Government's rejection of the Paris Declaration and communicated to France and Italy. Poincare, in his reply suggested that Britain should give in to the desires of the Angora Government.<sup>274</sup> Poincare was considering that to address ultimatum would furnish extremists with excuse to continue the struggle, and therefore urged Britain and Italy to agree to a meeting at Ismid.<sup>275</sup> On Poincare's suggestion Osborne commented that it was not a question of addressing an ultimatum to Angora. Osborne believed that armistice issue was on the conditions of the Paris declaration. Osborne proposed of insisting to both Angora and Constantinople for a definite answer whether the proposals were accepted as a whole or rejected. He commented that the French and to a certain extent Italians had been acting as the advocates of Angora, so they ought to play Angora's game. Osborne suggested that if the French and Italians were to refuse the British proposal, that would mean they abolished the Paris Declaration, in that case Britain would see no reason with negotiating with either Greeks or Turks. In summary he was proposing that they should stand on the Paris proposals and if and when it broke down either as a result of refusal by the Greeks or Turks or of a refusal of the Allies, then Britain would be free to publish all the correspondence and leave things to take their course since they had done all they could for the settlement. Oliphant was in agreement with Osborne entirely. Lindsay also was in agreement and he commented further that the Paris terms were most likely to bring about a settlement if Britain could carry the French with them. He told further that if they were to lose the French cooperation the possibility of a settlement even in distant future would be very difficult. Lindsay proposed to try and convince the French once more.<sup>276</sup>

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<sup>273</sup> PRO, FO 406/49, E 4371/5/44, No:98, and FO 371/7863, E 4455.

<sup>274</sup> PRO, FO 286/832, The Angora Government's reply was handed to Rumbold by Hamid Bey on 23<sup>rd</sup> of April 1922. Rumbold relayed the response of the Angora with his message to Curzon on 25<sup>th</sup> of April 1922.

<sup>275</sup> PRO, FO 371/7863, E 4465.

<sup>276</sup> Ibid, E 4465, Osborne's and Lindsay's 'side-notes' of 2<sup>nd</sup> May 1922.

Italian Government seemed to be in agreement with the French, and Britain had started as feeling alone with respect to enforce her policies in regard to Paris Declaration. The Reuter on 24<sup>th</sup> of April reported from Constantinople that Italy was evacuating Sokia in the Vilayet of Aidin and renouncing the Tripartite Agreement in return for economic concessions. The Italian Ambassador in his visit to Foreign Office told Lindsay, in response to the verbal inquiries made to him, that they had no representative at Angora and denied the news of Reuter. The Ambassador told that they were evacuating Sokia as a part of the armistice proposals. He further told that Allies at Paris had been informed about the action. Curzon commented that he had never heard of such a thing.<sup>277</sup> The Prime Minister of Italy in his meeting with Lloyd George during the Genoa Conference was going to deny that there was not such an agreement. Lloyd George believed that allegation of Italians negotiating behind their back was unfounded.<sup>278</sup> G.C. Lindsay was going to comment on Schanzer's declaration to Lloyd George that they were all lies out of old cloth.<sup>279</sup>

The Commander in Chief, Mediterranean, reported on 3<sup>rd</sup> of May 1922 that the Italians evacuated Scala Nova [Kusadasi] and Greeks moved in.<sup>280</sup> Meanwhile Greece decided to enroll Ottoman subjects for military service although they had admitted previously that it was illegal.<sup>281</sup> Foreign Office considered that there should be a strong appeal by the united Allies to Athens to stop this practice.

Foreign Office had decided to invite Serbia, Romania and Bulgaria to the Conference, but Lindley was wondering whether it was a good idea. Originally it was Osborne's idea to invite the other parties than Turks and Greece to have support that they could give Britain as to the East Thrace question.<sup>282</sup> At the mean time there were indications that The Greek Army was working on the idea of forming a separate Government of Ionia at Smyrna.<sup>283</sup>

Angora Government's response to the Paris Declaration was considered as the rejection of peace by Turks in Greece. Lindley, the High Commissioner of Britain in Athens, reported on 4<sup>th</sup> of May that the attitude of Greek Government had hardened lately since the refusal of Angora to accept either armistice or peace proposals.

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<sup>277</sup> Ibid, E 4507, R.C. Lindsay's 'Note' of 27<sup>th</sup> April 1922.

<sup>278</sup> Ibid, E 4607.

<sup>279</sup> Ibid, E 4702.

<sup>280</sup> Ibid, E 4539.

<sup>281</sup> Ibid, E 4553.

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> 'The Times' of 28<sup>th</sup> April 1922.

Lindley further told that there was an optimistic atmosphere in Athens that he could not define the reason.<sup>284</sup>

The Daily Express on 1<sup>st</sup> of May 1922 published an interview with Aga Khan. Aga Khan praised Lord Reading and Montagu for their services and told that Turco-Greek situation could only be settled by giving Adrianople to the Turks and he characterized giving it to the Greeks as a 'crime'. He further told that unless Britain did not change her policy towards Moslems, there was bound to be a great revolution in India. In replying to a question of the Sultan in Turkey, he said that the Sultan was the puppet of the army of occupation in Constantinople, and that he had no control over the Moslems.<sup>285</sup> The Aga Khan's interview was brought for discussion in the House of Commons when a member asked whether the Secretary of State for India had seen , and whether Aga Khan's views would be taken into account in Near East settlement. The Secretary of State replied that he had seen the report but had nothing to add.<sup>286</sup>

The Greek occupation of Scala Nova was debated in the House of Commons when a member asked whether the Foreign Affairs was aware that the Greeks were strengthening their strategic position in Ionia by occupying posts evacuated by the Italians and whether this was incompatible with the terms of the Armistice. Another question was put up for an answer was whether any presentations had been made to the Greek Government on the subject in view of the attitude of the Greek Anatolian League for National Defense. The answer was given as since the armistice had not been concluded. The Greeks were not bound by its terms and were still entitled to take such military measures as they might consider desirable in Asia Minor.<sup>287</sup>

The Angora's offer about the meeting place and the time for the armistice had the backing of French contrary to Britain, and Italy seemed to be inclined more to the British policy. The meeting place as offered to be Ismid by the Angora Government was refused by Britain, they preferred anywhere in Constantinople even at Therapia [Tarabya] or Moda, while Angora was insistent on their proposal. To unlock the problem Curzon asked Hardinge to discuss the question with the French officials.

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<sup>284</sup> PRO, FO 371/7863, E 4595.

<sup>285</sup> 'PRO, FO 371/7863, E 4625, 'The Daily Express' of 1<sup>st</sup> May 1922.

<sup>286</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol. :153, Col. : 581-1582.

<sup>287</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol. :153, Col. : 1708.

Curzon's draft answer to Angora had been sent to France and Italy with a hope that the reply would be sent to Angora from a united front of Allies.

Poincare's reply for the British note of 27<sup>th</sup> of April was not very promising for Curzon. It stated that the tone of the Angora's reply manifested a clear desire to arrive at an understanding, that it was desirable to accept the proposed meeting at Ismid; therefore Poincare was not willing to accept the terms of the British reply to the Angora Note. Italy through his High Commissioner told that they were in agreement with Britain. Curzon told that it was difficult to understand the French attitude since Angora's note definitely refused acceptance of the Paris Peace proposals as a prior and essential condition of evacuation and therefore for the second time rejected the Allied offer. Curzon believed that the Allied Governments should not surrender to the Angora demand for a preliminary Conference before acceptance of the armistice and peace conditions. Curzon told that he feared that the delay in reaching an agreement would change the Greek view. He further commented that if the Allies represented at Paris were sincere in their proposals and if they meant to secure their acceptance by Greece and Turkey, there could be no excuse for the delay and should stick to the plan prepared. Curzon asked Hardinge to submit his thoughts to the French and urged them to make a further effort to extract a definite acceptance or refusal of the proposals from Angora, Constantinople, and Athens. Curzon further asked Hardinge to tell the French that he had a hope that a common allied action might be resumed in the general sense of the proposals which Britain had previously made. Curzon stated that if this attitude of his to be found impossible for acceptance by French, Britain had to deal with the matter in a different and independent way, meaning that to publish all the correspondence that had passed between the Allied Governments and the Governments of Athens, Constantinople and Angora.<sup>288</sup>

Chamberlain, the Privy Seal, in answering a question in the House of Commons on 15<sup>th</sup> of May 1922, made accusations for the Turkish atrocities on Pontus Greeks. Chamberlain read two telegrams sent by Major Yowell through Rumbold. Yowell accused Turks for the massacres during the deportation of Greeks from Black Sea area that thousands of Greeks had been killed. Chamberlain told that as soon as the news reached to Foreign Office, Curzon sent messages to Allied Governments

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<sup>288</sup> PRO, FO 286/832, E 4853/5/44, Curzon's letter to Lord Hardinge, of 10<sup>th</sup> May 1922.

including United States that they should form a commission to investigate these allegations in the Black Sea area.

Chamberlain made similar accusations against the Turks who claimed to be controlled by the Angora Government, on 18<sup>th</sup> of May. For a question of whether there was an armed rising in Pontus area and Greek bombardment on Black Sea shores and therefore killing innocent Turks, he answered that Britain had no reason to believe that the Turkish statements regarding armed risings of Greeks in Pontus were unfounded. He further told that three Greek warships bombarded Inebolu in June 1921 after the Turkish authorities had refused a demand for the surrender of arms and the destruction of munitions and a similar bombardment took place in Eregli. Chamberlain mentioned that minor bombardments were alleged to have taken place at Trebizond [Trabzon], Rizeh [Rize] and Samsun. Chamberlain agreed that there was a movement existed among the Greeks of Pontus, encouraged by Greek communities and associations of Pontic Greeks abroad, for the liberation of Pontus from Turkish misrule. Chamberlain further commented that several appeals had been received since the Armistice in 1918. Chamberlain told the Parliament that such political aspirations did not give the right to Turks for barbarous deportations of women and children which had recently carried out by the Turks.<sup>289</sup>

During the sitting of 30<sup>th</sup> of May 1922, a member pointed out that the French agreed to have an inquiry on the Turkish atrocities and expressed his wish that Britain should have an inquiry into the Greek atrocities at Smyrna, but Lloyd George had put it in a pigeon hole. He said that he had seen the report of the inquiry and it was entirely against the Greeks and he further told that he could not call it honest. The member of the Commons further told that the allegations for the Turkish atrocities were absolutely false and he hoped that the British Government would not go on the accusations and make themselves ridiculous in the eyes of the Eastern world and Europe with accepting something that had no proof. Another member was going to read a report from American Near Eastern Relief Committee that Major Yowell, who was mentioned by Chamberlain on 15<sup>th</sup> of May for the Pontis Greeks, was expelled from Turkey because of his conduct of hostile against the Turks. It was told that by relying the Relief Committee's Office in Constantinople, Major Yowell's complaint was not the result of an investigation by the Committee. The information published

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<sup>289</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol. :154, Col. : 538-539.

in New York Times and found his way to Foreign Office was fabricated out of old cloth.<sup>290</sup>

During the debate on the Near East Lloyd George was criticized because of his policy towards Turkey. Lloyd George was accused of conducting a private policy in his foreign policy especially in the Near East and the result was misery from Smyrna to Black Sea. Lloyd George was still not taking any action since any change would indicate to be an admission of the failure.

It was considered that Lloyd George's domestic policy had been very unfortunate and for this reason it had taught him to believe that he could do what he had done in foreign policy, as in the British policy. The member further commented that when you set two people at each other's throats, one could not bring peace simply by waving an olive branch. There was no peace unless Britain was prepared to admit the mistakes which they had made in the past. Lloyd George was also accused of preferring the advice of his foreign advisors, probably implying Basil Zaharoff, rather than Parliament.<sup>291</sup>

Chamberlain brought his speech of 15<sup>th</sup> of May to the attention of the Cabinet the next day and told that he had cooperated with Foreign Office and the statement had been prepared after careful consideration. The Cabinet took note of the Leader of the House's statement with regard to Turkish atrocities and approved.<sup>292</sup>

Chamberlain's speech of 18<sup>th</sup> of May appeared in every newspaper in Athens, accompanied by the most favourable comments. Greeks believed that the impact of the latest Turkish atrocities would persuade Britain to reach a better solution for them. Greeks also were in the belief that without Britain, there would be no solution for the Eastern question in a satisfactory manner.<sup>293</sup>

Hardinge, in accordance with the instructions he received from Curzon with regard to the Paris proposals and the attitude of the Angora Government, contacted the Secretary General of French Foreign Office. He was told that the French Government believed that none of the three Governments was willing to accept the conditions. Each of them wished to discuss them. At the same time the French

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<sup>290</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.:154, Col.: 2037-2062.

<sup>291</sup> Ibid

<sup>292</sup> PRO, CAB 23/30, Cabinet 27(22).

<sup>293</sup> PRO, FO 406/49, E5499/5/44, No: 139.

Government were convinced that all these Governments were keen for peace, therefore if a meeting was to be arranged at Ismid, Constantinople or anywhere else, they were certain that they could reach to peace. The French Government believed that if, after discussion one of the three Governments concerned should refuse to accept the peace conditions, then he would be blamed for the continuation of the war. They were convinced that not any of those three Governments could afford to take this responsibility. The explanation seemed to convince Hardinge, but he believed that he still needed to try and persuade Quasi d'Orsay further to agree on the British Note.<sup>294</sup>

Poincare replied to Britain on 16<sup>th</sup> June saying that they should try once more to bring the Governments to accept, by arranging a conference, the general peace terms elaborated in Paris since he felt that they were so close to establishing peace.

The Near East question was discussed in a meeting on 19<sup>th</sup> June 1922 in London with the participation of Lloyd George, Balfour and Poincare. Poincare told that the question of Near East had become rather embarrassing due to the attitude of Angora Government and Greeks, since neither of them would accept the proposals of the Allies. Poincare further told that since Italians were not in the meeting they could not possibly discuss the Near Eastern question which required at least two-three days. It was decided that they should come together in late July 1922 to discuss the matter.

Lloyd George inquired whether in the meanwhile the Commission dealing with the Turkish atrocities could be dealt. Poincare said there was a difference of opinion between the two countries. The British Government wanted an enquiry into the massacres of Greeks by Turks, while the French Government wanted an enquiry into the massacre of Turks by Greeks. He believed that they should be impartial in the matter. Balfour pointed out that the first subject to be enquired should be alleged wholesale deportations in Turkey, since it was a deliberate attempt to exterminate the Greeks there and was connected with the protection of minorities. Balfour believed that the French Government would not object to this, since he could not imagine any country to refuse to the enquiry of atrocities. Poincare said he had a few reservations to make. Balfour told that there were two commissions one for

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<sup>294</sup> Ibid, E 6136/5/44, No: 152.

Black Sea and the other for Smyrna but the question was which commission were to have the first priority.

Balfour continuing his allegations against the Turks. Remarked that he did not think Poincare would disagree that there had been attempts by the Turks to get rid of the Greek population by driving them out to the region of Lake Van where they perished and the deportations in the question had not been from the regions where fighting had taken place.

Poincare pointed out that these were what Greeks had been claiming but they did not agree with the French information. He further told that on this point as on many others the information of the two Governments did not match. Balfour told that the British information was from American sources. On this point Poincare told him that he had heard some reports of American origin but they had been contradicted by other American reports. Balfour said that he did not deny that there was a dispute about the facts but there was still the question whether the allegations was true. Poincare agreed on the necessity of finding out. Lloyd George proposed that the report should be ready by the time of their next meeting since it would have a great effect on the whole situation and it was important to enquire whether the Turks or Greeks or both were massacring. The proposal of Lloyd George was accepted.<sup>295</sup>

Britain prepared the reply for Poincare's message of 16<sup>th</sup> June and transmitted it to Hardinge to present it to Poincare on 5<sup>th</sup> July 1922. It was pointed out that the French Government's acceptance of a preliminary meeting at Ismid, without the acceptance in advance of the armistice was considered by Britain as a breach to the Paris Declaration. It was further claimed that such a procedure might show meeting Mustafa Kemal's counter-proposals and at the same time the weakness of the Allies. Curzon drew the attention of the French Government that by accepting Mustafa Kemal's approach might stiffen him even more for the Paris terms. Curzon further stated that the public opinion in Britain had been shocked by the evidence of the brutal treatment by the Kemalists of the minorities in Asia Minor. Curzon considered that Britain could withdraw their objection for a preliminary meeting as suggested by Poincare, provided that; Athens, Constantinople and Angora was to accept the armistice and the general proposals for peace as outlined in the Paris Declaration. Another condition for the acceptance of the preliminary meeting was for

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<sup>295</sup> PRO, FO 286/832, ICP-249C.

the Allies to accept the conditions; forming a united front among themselves and should abide the line as delineated in the Paris Proposals, the meeting place would be Beicos [Beykoz] or any other convenient place close to Constantinople but definitely not Ismid and as a last condition to enable the Greek Government to exercise its undoubted right to visit and search private merchantmen carrying war materials to their enemies. Further it was pointed out that unless this right was not given to Greece, the Allied Governments could not justly condemn such action by the Greek Government as the bombardment of Samsoun [Samsun].<sup>296</sup>

Lloyd George met Balfour and Vansittart in a series of meetings on 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> July 1922 to discuss and finalize the memorandum prepared and submitted by the Italian Premier Schanzer. In the meetings, by taking the views of Foreign Office, it was decided that the paragraphs concerning Near East should be as; The British and Italian Governments agreed to conform their policies on the basis of the conclusion reached at the conference held at Paris in March 1922, to expedite the establishment of peace between Greece and Turkey and between Turkey and the Allies, and particularly with a view of ensure in the eventual settlement the freedom of the Straits and the effective protection of the Minorities in the Near East.

With a view to assist the Italian Government as far as possible in ensuring the benefits recognized in favour of Italy under the Tripartite Agreement, Britain was prepared to support any reasonable claim for economic concessions in the Italian Zone within Turkey, provided that the claims did not infringe in any way the interests already acquired by British and that in particular the Italian Government pledged themselves to the Smyrna-Aidin Railway Company.

In accordance with the terms of Lloyd George's letter to Schanzer on 17<sup>th</sup> May 1922, Britain would be prepared to support any agreement between British and Italian companies for oil concessions in Northern Anatolia outside the French Zone.

It was also decided that Schanzer should be pressed about the refusal of the Italian Government to allow the Greeks to exercise the right of search on the high seas as was required in Balfour's letter to Allies as a condition for a preliminary meeting on the Near Eastern question.<sup>297</sup>

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<sup>296</sup> PRO, FO 286/832, E 6136/5/44.

<sup>297</sup> PRO, CAB 23/36, the meetings were held on 3<sup>rd</sup> of July (S-48) and 5<sup>th</sup> of July 1922 (S-50),

Britain, considering the situation in Turkey and the relations existed among the Allies, started considering evacuating Constantinople. Worthington Evans in his letter of 22<sup>nd</sup> of June told Balfour about the possibility of evacuation. Balfour in his letter to the Secretary of State for War on 3<sup>rd</sup> July 1922, considered the evacuation from political aspects, since withdrawal would be implying that the Allies were going to wash their hands of the Greco-Turkish situation and this definitely would be increasing the prestige of Mustafa Kemal. Balfour commented that there were two options for them to take, either they would support Greece or continue to be neutral. Balfour considered that if they were going to support Greeks then they should stay in Constantinople and use it as a naval base. In case they were going to maintain the neutrality, for reasons of economy, they should reduce their military in Constantinople and even to retire to Gallipoli. In this instance they might agree to consider whether it would not be in their interest to allow Greece temporarily at any rate to enter Constantinople. Balfour believed that if Greece was to be left to her own resources and abstain from the Allied veto, she could get to Constantinople. Balfour suggested that at least until the meeting of Lloyd George with Poincare in a month time, the British troops should stay at Constantinople.<sup>298</sup>

Meanwhile Poincare told Hardinge that Mustafa Kemal had told the French representative in Angora, of their readiness to meet Greeks at the Conference and they accepted the armistice. Poincare further told that it was difficult for France to agree the Curzon's proposal of giving permission to Greeks to search ships.<sup>299</sup> But Balfour was not content of Mustafa Kemal telling French representative about his readiness to meet Greeks and armistice. He believed that the Foreign Office's view was that if the Angora Government wished to proceed with this idea they should come into the open and convey the message in a more official manner.<sup>300</sup>

Poincare replied the British note on Greco-Turkish question on 13<sup>th</sup> July and gave his Governments consent for the British proposal on certain conditions. Poincare stated Mustafa Kemal's consent and urged Britain that the conference proposed should meet as soon as possible. Balfour was going to reply the Note on 27<sup>th</sup> of July criticizing French as they had forgotten the philosophy of the Paris Declaration. Balfour reiterated the British position that the meeting place could not be in the Turkish occupied region and should be conveyed at either Beicos or in a similar

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<sup>298</sup> PRO, FO 406/50, E 6293, No: 7.

<sup>299</sup> PRO, FO 406/50, E 6767, No: 14, Lord Hardinge's letter to Balfour on 7<sup>th</sup> July 1922.

<sup>300</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 32,

place. Balfour also declined to accept the French view that she was against the Greeks searching ships and told that they were just following the Supreme Council's decision of 19<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1921.<sup>301</sup>

Foreign Office reported on 18<sup>th</sup> July that it was still uncertain that the conference of Lloyd George, Poincare and Schanzer, even if they met shortly in London, would not have anytime to deal with the Eastern question. Foreign Office considered that as far as they were concerned there was in present circumstances no question of admission of Greek and Turkish delegates to this meeting with French and Italian Ministers Conference proposed at Beicos was still under discussion with the Allied Governments.<sup>302</sup>

'The Times' on 14<sup>th</sup> July reported the change of Government at Angora and the new Prime Minister was Rauf Bey [Rauf Orbay]. British High Commission, and therefore Foreign Office wondered whether it signified the loss of power for Mustafa Kemal.<sup>303</sup> On the other hand Hamid Bey, the Angora's agent at Constantinople, was reported saying that Turkey had no need of Allied control over her finances. Hamid Bey further told that the Angora Government was after having good relations with Britain, although Britain had been supporting Greece against Turks.<sup>304</sup>

Foreign Office had started considering whether it would be possible, from legal point of view, to liquidate the Ottoman Empire by a uni-lateral action of the Allies. Foreign Office considered that such uni-lateral act would eventually be communicated for approval to the League of Nations. The reason for such consideration was due to the belief which had been building, that the chances for Mustafa Kemal to accept and ratify any agreement were becoming very remote.<sup>305</sup> Sir Eyre Crowe noted that the possibility of cutting the Gordian knot of the Near Easter entanglement by unilateral action on the part of the Allies, in case of Turkey's continued refusal to conclude a peace should be borne in mind.<sup>306</sup>

Information received from different sources was indicating that it was very unlikely that Mustafa Kemal would agree on meeting at Beicos. Henderson, the Acting High

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<sup>301</sup> PRO, FO 406/50, Enclosure to No: 75.

<sup>302</sup> PRO, FO 371/7868, E 7036.

<sup>303</sup> Ibid, E 7053.

<sup>304</sup> Ibid, E 7067.

<sup>305</sup> Ibid, E7113. A Memorandum was prepared by Oliphant for legal advice on 14th July 1922 for Sir Hurst. Sir Hurst replied that considering that they were still at war such a scheme could be implemented.

<sup>306</sup> Ibid

Commissioner reported on 23<sup>rd</sup> July that there was a desire to convey a conference at Constantinople with Greeks and the Constantinople Government attending. He commented that if such a course was to be adopted, the attitude of the Angora Government might change to a favourable manner, although difficulties might arise with France and Constantinople Government. Henderson suggested that Foreign Office might approach to France with suitable reference to the growing influence of Soviets at Angora.<sup>307</sup> Osborne for Henderson's suggestion noted that it was certain the French would never agree to this and he had doubts whether there was desirability under the circumstances. On the other hand, he was not sure such a suggestion might not have some effect if Mustafa Kemal and the French maintained their insistence. Osborne suggested that the scheme that Henderson proposed could be taken by Rumbold to his Allied colleagues or directly to Poincare if he came to London shortly. Oliphant noted that he had discussed the issue with Rumbold who shared his doubt as to the need and advisability of pursuing the matter. Oliphant further commented that it might not be very beneficial to offer something entirely new to French since they were still occupied with the latest British proposal. Lindsay and Eyre Crowe agreed with Oliphant that they should not do anything then.<sup>308</sup>

The rumour about the possible Greek attack on Constantinople was getting circulated in certain circles. Henderson in Constantinople believed that as long as the Allied occupation continued, there was no danger for the Greek attack. But on the other hand it was reported by the British High Commission in Athens on 26<sup>th</sup> of July that Greek advance to Constantinople seemed to be imminent according to the late rumors. It was stated that the Greeks had obtained the British consent for the advance. Lindley had learned that preparation in stocks and military pile up had been speeded recently and the press was urging the Government to put an end to the war by occupying Constantinople. They believed that the Allies would not oppose.<sup>309</sup> The Greeks attitude was somewhat confirmed by the announcement of the Greek Foreign Office. Lindley reported from Athens on 23<sup>rd</sup> July 1922 that Baltazzi, the Foreign Minister, informed him confidentially that all information reaching Greek Government had been pointing out the improbability either of Eastern question being discussed in London or of Conference actually taking place at Beicos or elsewhere. In these circumstances Greek felt obliged to bring matters to

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<sup>307</sup> FO 371/7868, E 7258, PRO

<sup>308</sup> Osborne's 'Note' on 24<sup>th</sup> July 1922, FO 371/7868, E 7258, PRO

<sup>309</sup> FO 424/254, No: 72, PRO

an end and they were planning to inform the Allies that they should reassume liberty of action.<sup>310</sup> The readiness of Greeks was reconfirmed by Baltazzi in his letter to Balfour on 27<sup>th</sup> of July 1922.<sup>311</sup>

Foreign Office seemed to be in alarm in receiving Baltazzi's message that sent messages to British Delegations in Athens, Constantinople, Paris and Rome that they could scarcely believe that the Greek Government could do anything so insane to attack territory in Allied occupation. But the tone of telegrams they had been receiving from Athens and Constantinople were increasingly alarming therefore the delegations should take steps to prevent such an action.<sup>312</sup>

It was reported from Athens on 28<sup>th</sup> of July that the Greeks were intending to issue ultimatum to Mustafa Kemal that unless he accepted the Allied proposals of March 1922, they would occupy Constantinople. Osborne noted that this could hardly be taken seriously and Greeks had shown no willingness to accept the March 1922 terms themselves. Sir Eyre Crowe believed that some people were beginning to lose their heads.<sup>313</sup>

The Foreign Office got relieved when they heard from Greek Chief of Staff that the Greek troops had been reinforced in Thrace by newly recruited soldiers to safeguard the region in Thrace, given to them by the Treaty of Sevres and they had no intention to attack the British troops.<sup>314</sup> Osborne commented that it was a reliable news and Greeks were concentrated in Thrace for consolidation not for aggression in Thrace.<sup>315</sup>

'The Morning Post' correspondent in Athens was convinced of truth of his story that was hinted to him from a very reliable source that some months ago French offered to construct munitions factory in Greece and to supply Greeks with all munitions required. He also declared that the Italians were acting in a similar manner but Greeks had refused all offers. The correspondent who was an English man was told that one of the great powers was encouraging Greeks to advance to Constantinople.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>310</sup> PRO, FO 371/7868, E 7347.

<sup>311</sup> Ibid, E 7455.

<sup>312</sup> Ibid.

<sup>313</sup> Ibid, E 7508, Osborne and Crowe's 'Note' on 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1922.

<sup>314</sup> Ibid, E 7514, PRO

<sup>315</sup> Ibid, Osborne's 'Note' on 29<sup>th</sup> of July 1922.

<sup>316</sup> Ibid, E 7516.

Baltazzi handed a 'Note' to the Allied representatives on 29<sup>th</sup> July, stating that only occupation of Constantinople would bring peace and requested from Allies to give orders to their troops in the area accordingly.<sup>317</sup>

Baltazzi informed British High Commissioner on 29<sup>th</sup> of July that there was no cause for alarm, since Greek forces would on no account enter neutral zone without the consent of the Allies. He reminded that the Greek Government had asked for the Allied consent, and they would wait for the reply before taking further action.<sup>318</sup>

Foreign Office was warned on 29<sup>th</sup> July 1922 by Sir Lamb, the High Commissioner at Smyrna that autonomy of Asia Minor was to be declared the following day.<sup>319</sup> Proclamation was published on 30<sup>th</sup> July 1922 by the Greek High Commissioner who stated that he was authorized by the Greek Government to inform all populations of occupied countries of decision arrived at regarding future organization of Western Asia Minor, execution of which he was to undertake.<sup>320</sup>

'The Temps' on 31<sup>st</sup> of July urged that, in the interests of peace, the Greeks should abandon their policy in Thrace and in Asia Minor. Temps suggested that the Allies should act in a united manner and should ask to obey the Allied proposal of March 1922 and use the weapon of blockade for the Greek ports by the British ships.<sup>321</sup> For Temps suggestion, Osborne commented that they were hoping that the Greek policy in Thrace was harmless and they did not know exactly what Greek policy in Smyrna was. Osborne suggested that there was no need for the violence.<sup>322</sup> Oliphant and Lindsay shared the same view.

Meanwhile Fethi Bey [F. Okyar], the Minister of Interior of Angora Government was in Paris and wished to proceed to London directly to discuss certain issues with the Foreign Office. Osborne noted on 21<sup>st</sup> July that he did not believe for a moment that Fethi Bey had denied himself the pleasure of seeing Franklin Bouillon and his other French friends or that the Quasi d'Orsay were not fully aware of his demarche. Osborne believed that it was the old Turkish trick. Osborne suggested that they should reject the offer and told him that they were really sorry that their

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<sup>317</sup> Ibid, E 7517.

<sup>318</sup> PRO. FO 424/254, No: 90.

<sup>319</sup> PRO. FO 371/7868, E 7527.

<sup>320</sup> Ibid, E 7528.

<sup>321</sup> Ibid, E 7585.

<sup>322</sup> Ibid.

engagements to their Allies prevented them from granting the separate interview asked for. Osborne believed that due to their obligations not only to their Allies but also to the Sultan, the Constantinople Government and the Greeks they were bound to refuse the visit of Fethi Bey. Osborne further commented that private discussions were therefore not only impracticable but also, in his opinion, unnecessary in view of the impending preliminary conference at Beicos at which Allied policy would be explained.<sup>323</sup> Foreign Office rejecting the views of Osborne invited Fethi Bey to come to London. Fethi Bey arrived in London on 30<sup>th</sup> of July 1922, but as 'Daily Express' pointed out there was no minister at the Foreign Office to discuss with him the peace proposals he had brought. He arrived at the Foreign Office to have a meeting with Vansittart and was told that the Acting Foreign Secretary Balfour had gone to Switzerland and Curzon was out of the town, although he was received by Foreign Minister and Premier Poincare in Paris before coming to London. 'The Daily Express' commented for the arrangements that Fethi Bey could not meet anybody in London as; "*The British Empire already pays a heavy price for Mr. Lloyd George's pro-Greek policy, which does not command the confidence of this country. Has another opportunity of finding a basis for peace in the East been thrown away?*"<sup>324</sup> Curzon was going to deny the responsibility for the Turkish offense as was caused for not seeing Fethi Bey<sup>325</sup>. The visit of Fethi Bey was going to cause some dispute as Balfour and Curzon would be questioned in public opinion in September and October 1922.<sup>326</sup>

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<sup>323</sup> PRO, FO 371/7949, E 7480.

<sup>324</sup> Ibid

<sup>325</sup> PRO, FO 286/832.

<sup>326</sup> Ibid, Curzon after the criticism he received from papers that he did not care to see him during his visit to London was going to defend himself in the messages he sent to the High Commissioners in Constantinople, Athens, Rome and Paris on 13<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1922. He wrote that this absurd and belated attempt to throw responsibility for recent Turkish actions upon attitude of the British Government towards Fethi Bey had received wide circulation in press and merits emphatic repudiation. He commented that; "*No intimation was made to us that Fethy came on special mission from Kemal. He is not even Foreign Minister of that Government as was Yussef [Yusuf] Kemal Bey with whom I spent many hours in fruitless conversations in March last. He did not ask Prime Minister to see him nor did H.M.G. refuse to receive him. On the contrary after he had already had conversations with my private secretary I asked (? being) unable owing to medical treatment in the country to receive him myself, that he should be specially invited to Foreign Office to make a full statement of his case to Sir W. Tyrell and Mr. Lindsay. This he did, and when it was found that he had nothing to forward beyond terms of National PACT, it was felt unnecessary to pursue the matter, the more so as that time we were arranging for joint conference of Allied High Commissioners with Turkish and Greek representatives and that negotiations with Kemal by any single power had always being regarded (? by omitted) us as inconsistent with loyalty to alliance. You may make such use of this explanation as you think desirable.*" Fethi Bey's visit was debated in Times on 16<sup>th</sup> of Oct. 1922, with a letter to the Editor, by giving a reference to Sir William Tyrell's letter, that Fethi Bey left England with a very deep feeling that he had been treated with deliberate discourtesy and a complete lack of consideration. The letter in the Times continued stating that; "*What are the facts? My friend [Fethi Bey] traveled all the way from Angora to London with the offer of reasonable peace terms, practically identical with those now accepted, including the 'freedom of Straits'. He was refused an interview with any member of the Government, and an arrangement on the part of Lord Curzon to see him was abruptly cancelled. For days, the only official to whom Mustafa Kemal's envoy had any access was Lord Curzon's Private Secretary, and it was only after strong protests that he even secured an interview with Sir William Tyrell. As a result of the studied discourtesy extended to him by Mr. Lloyd George's Government, Fethi Bey had become*

The decision for the meeting place for the conference dragged on and Balfour asked Hardinge on 9<sup>th</sup> August, about his views for the place since parties concerned had refused Greek and Turkish soil and the latest events had made Constantinople quite dangerous, then the consideration was beamed for some place in Rhodes, Switzerland or in Italian soil.<sup>327</sup>

Meanwhile there was a change in the Italian Government, and the new Cabinet on its first meeting on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Aug. 1922, decided that their policy towards Near East was in entire agreement with French point of view, which should be supported in so far as this was possible without prejudice to their general foreign policy of good understanding with the British Government.<sup>328</sup> Osborne seemed to be annoyed with the decision of the Italians, and noted that it was very good of them. The present boycott was very salutary. Italians would want a modern Machiavelli to carry out this policy and it was difficult to ride two horses simultaneously.<sup>329</sup>

The conflict and therefore the peace between Turkey and Greece were debated almost in each session in the House of Commons. During the session on 3<sup>rd</sup> August, Prime Minister was asked whether a conference or armistice, or both had been arranged between with these two countries; and whether the British Government had made clear to the Greek Government that continuance of hostilities in Asia Minor would be looked upon with disfavor. Lloyd George answered the question with twisting the questions as he liked and said that negotiations were still proceeding between British Government and her Allies. For securing the armistice the British policy was perfectly known to these countries, since the armistice proposed by the Allies in March 1922, was accepted by the Greeks and not by the Turks. The issue of independent Ionia in Western Anatolia as claimed by the Greek Government was the question asked to Prime Minister as whether he had any information of an attempt to set up an independent Greek State in Smyrna district, under the protection of the Greek army; and whether it had been made clear to the Greek Government that any such action would receive disapproval by the British

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*convinced that the Prime Minister and his friends were determined to maintain their policy of backing the Greeks and refusing any offers of settlement proposed by the Turks. He sent a telegram to this effect to Angora, which was followed by the Ottoman attack, and within a fortnight the Greeks were in full flight, and the whole crazy [?] of Mr. Lloyd George's Near eastern policy had crumbled into ruins. Had a different treatment been accorded to Fethi Bey, the British taxpayer –to go no further –would have been saved some twenty millions of wasted money.” ( The Times of 16<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1922, 13)*

<sup>327</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 132.

<sup>328</sup> PRO, FO 371/7870, E 7861.

<sup>329</sup> Ibid, D.G. Osborne's 'Note' of 10<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1922,

Government. Lloyd George answered the question not directly, in saying that according to such information as British Government possessed, the recent Greek measures in Asia Minor did not constitute Ionia into an independent State, although some degree of local autonomy appeared to have been made to protect the local Christians from deportation and massacre. In view of the fact that any action taken by the Greeks was, obviously, subject to the provisions of a final settlement, no representations to the Greek Government on the part of British Government seemed to be called for.<sup>330</sup>

During the debate on the Near East on 4<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1922, certain members commented that Prime Minister should change his policy towards to the Greco-Turkish conflict and therefore secure peace in this part of the world.<sup>331</sup>

Lloyd George on the debate of Greco-Turkish question, delivered a very long speech that he was going to comment later in the meeting he held with the Secretary of State for War, Worthington Evans on 9<sup>th</sup> of Aug, 1922. Lloyd George told in the meeting that after his speech at the House of Commons on 4<sup>th</sup> August, there was a little risk of the Greeks advancing to Constantinople. He had made this speech as the result of most careful consideration with Balfour and Foreign Office and had chosen his words most carefully. Lloyd George believed that;

*“... as the result of his speech the Greeks will now turn the attention again to Smyrna, He agreed that there were some financial problems. But his*

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<sup>330</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 157, Col: 1657-1658.

<sup>331</sup> Hansard for Commons, Vol.: 157, Col.: 1993-1994. The parliamentarians called Lloyd George to change his policy to secure peace in Near East, in saying that; *“...Recently the Prime Minister addressed a great meeting in London, ably assisted, of course, by the Chief Secretary for Ireland. I refer to the gathering of the Free Churchmen. The Right Hon. Gentleman [Lloyd George] said in that assemblage that he proposed to devote his life to the cause of peace. It was an admirable sentence. Is the right hon. Gentleman going, in face of that, still further to estrange us from great world of Islam? There is a generation in Turkey that is taking an interest for the first time in national matters, and they know for what they are fighting for. For the first time, an observer who has recently been in Anatolia has paid a tribute to them, and says there is a recrudescence of Turkish national life. Are we alive to the dangers of force? The worst thing that can happen to us if the British Empire would be a great victory. I beg the Prime Minister now to have the courage that he praised in Lenin and to change his policy. We have been in the wrong in this matter. It is not a question of Cross against Crescent, it is not a question of helping the underdog. In this case the under-dog is the Turk, disarmed, rendered helpless by British arms, before Greece. I beg the Prime Minister to take this opportunity of restoring a great market, and perhaps to pave the way for a reconciliation between our ideas and the great world of Islam.”*

*speech would probably result in their trying again to secure a loan. They nearly succeeded in getting a loan in London before, and would probably have obtained it but for the bad handling of the matter by Gounaris. Now there were powerful interests working for them in London. As regards to the risk of an advance of Mustafa Kemal on Ismid, he pointed out that in that event General Harrington's hands would be strengthened by the presence of four Greek Divisions in Eastern Thrace. He would even transport Greek troops to the Ismid Peninsula to oppose the Turks, and in any event the Greek fleet would make it difficult for the Turks to use the coast road. He also pointed out that the risks to which a Turkish force advancing on Ismid would even at present, after the withdrawal of the Divisions from Smyrna to Thrace, he exposed from the Greek army deployed on its flank. On the whole, therefore, the Prime Minister suggested that the question should not be raised at the present Conference that he was going to have with Poincare and the new Italian Prime Minister, unless and until agreement was in sight on the main question of reparations."*<sup>332</sup>

Lloyd George's speech in the House of Commons had a joyous reception in Greece. The Government took the views of Lloyd George that their policy was fully approved by Britain.<sup>333</sup>

Baltazzi, the Greek Foreign Minister delivered a 'Note' to Britain through Bentinck, stating that it was confidential. The 'Note' expressed Greek gratitude for Britain for her efforts towards peace, and pointed out that struggle was likely to continue, but resources of Greece were exhausted and were obliged to renew efforts in London for a loan.<sup>334</sup> Osborne noted that without British Government support direct or indirect, the Greek efforts in London would be fruitless. He also noticed that the Greek army had apparently been invited to stay in Asia Minor.<sup>335</sup> Meanwhile War Office was in favour of the Greek troops to stay in Thrace, in case that an agreement was reached between the Turks.<sup>336</sup>

Meanwhile the Allies were still discussing the place for the preliminary conference and Rumbold reported on 13<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1922 that Allied Commissioners in Constantinople had decided to suggest their respective Governments that the meeting place of the Conference to be Venice and should conveyed as soon as possible.<sup>337</sup>

Osborne prepared a 'Note' on behalf of the Foreign Office. According to the Note; Foreign Office would agree with Rumbold and decide to propose Venice or possibly Trieste as the place of the preliminary meeting and let the concerned states to know

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<sup>332</sup> PRO, CAB 23/36, 'Note of a Conversation' (S-59), held on 9<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1922.

<sup>333</sup> PRO, FO 371/7869, E 7824.

<sup>334</sup> Ibid, E 7785.

<sup>335</sup> Ibid, Osborne's 'Note' of 7th of Aug.1922.

<sup>336</sup> Ibid, E 7789.

<sup>337</sup> PRO, FO 371/7870, E 8017.

their decision. Foreign Office also decided to deal with the question of the right of search and prohibition of export of arms to the countries, namely to Greece and Turkey, in a separate note with a view to bringing off the preliminary conference without further argument or delay. Another proposal of Foreign Office was the procedure as regards to safeguarding minorities. They believed that the best way was to request League of Nations to set up a special commission to study the guarantees necessary on the basis of the Paris resolution and of the eventual report of the commission of enquiry, such commission to have the authority to be determined by the Allied Governments. The commission should be tasked also to study the Armenian question, and the Greeks and Turks to be informed at the preliminary conference of this action. Foreign Office proposed to send the invitations for the conference and should be urging for an early agreement of the proposals. Foreign Office believed that the armistice should be the first item at the conference. If, as was likely, the Nationalist delegate arrived without authority to accept the armistice, they had to take the precautions and let them know that the delegates should be powered with full authority and there would not be a second item in the agenda of the conference unless the first one was accepted. The Foreign Office decided to offer the armistice for the Asia Minor to be extended to cover immobilization of the Greek army in Thrace, since this would be an argument in favor of Turkish acceptance. Oliphant was in agreement with Osborne and so was Lindsay except the proposal for the minorities, where he had made a quite new proposal. Lindsay feared that the French would and might seize this as an opportunity once more to postpone every thing.<sup>338</sup>

Foreign Office was working on different alternatives in case that an agreement was not to be reached at the forthcoming conference in line with the Paris proposals of March 1922. Edmonds from Eastern Department in Foreign Office proposed a new scheme for the Greco-Turkish question on 11<sup>th</sup> August.<sup>339</sup>

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<sup>338</sup> Ibid, E 8018, D.G. Osborne and R.C. Lindsay's 'Notes' of 14<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1922.

<sup>339</sup> Ibid, E 8154, Edmonds based his new proposal on the point that the March 1922 proposal had been rejected by Turks, therefore they had to take the consequences and Britain had to seek a settlement which they could impose instead of Turks. Since March 1922 they had proof that if the Greeks withdrew from Asia Minor, no safeguards that they could devise would in fact save the Christians from extermination. As soon as Athens started talking about Pontus, Edmonds claimed, Turks destroyed the Pontus Greeks. He feared that as Ionian became a new scheme, Turks at the first opportunity would wipe out the Ionian Christians. Edmonds concluded that there was no real way of protecting the Christians except by detaching territory. The settlement would be; (1) A Smyrna Zone, not greater than the treaty zone, to be Greek. Whether nominal Turkish sovereignty would be a detail for negotiations. (2) Eastern Thrace to be demilitarized and internationalized. Whether some Greek and Turkish sovereignty should be allowed would also be for negotiations. (3) Straits Commission to administer Eastern Thrace. (4) Maintenance of rest of March 1922 proposals. Edmonds believed that it was useless to propose such a settlement to the Turks. Edmonds proposed that they could use the Greeks

Greece replied the Note of Allied High Commissioners in Athens with respect the Powers' decision against Greek occupation of Constantinople. Greece re-iterated her belief that the occupation by Greece would end the war between Turks and themselves and was the only option left for peace.<sup>340</sup> Meanwhile France decided to reinforce her troops at Constantinople area by ordering three infantry battalions from Beirut and two squadrons from Marseilles to be transferred. Foreign Office interpreted the French decision as France would never let Greeks to occupy Constantinople.<sup>341</sup>

It was not only the French Government who had been criticizing the British policy with regard to Near East, but French press too was condemning the British policy. Cheetham, the Acting Ambassador in Paris, reported that the Paris press was almost unanimous in ascribing the attitude of Greek Government to British encouragement. It was pointed out that the suspicions of press were much increased by articles such as that which appeared in 'Daily Mail', implying that Foreign Office was under Greek influence. Osborne noted that British decisive and energetic action at Athens was ignored and if the British press in Paris led the way, there was no point of blaming the French. Osborne believed that the source of this criticism was Northcliffe and Quasi d'Orsay.<sup>342</sup>

As the preliminary meeting was almost arranged, the Foreign Office still feared of opposition they might get from French side but especially from Nationalists that the latter might not agree on the armistice and even decline to attend the conference. Osborne prepared a Memorandum on what they should do in case Nationalists were going to cause problems. The Memorandum of 18<sup>th</sup> August was based on the assumption of Franco-Turkish obstruction. Osborne had considered the possibility of Nationalists declining an armistice, or even attends a conference at which they would be asked to agree to an armistice; therefore Britain should be ready for French and Turkish obstruction on this point. Osborne believed that this, like the atrocities enquiry, was a matter on which the Turkish attitude was inexcusable and hence should be publicized. Osborne was thinking that even if the armistice was

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to enforce it by telling Greece under pain of naval coercion; to accept it as the ultimate settlement and to withdraw at once to the treaty round Smyrna that she would be most grateful, and might remain on her present line at Chatalja until the Turks accepted the whole settlement. Edmonds also suggested that if the French did not accept his proposal, then they could publish all correspondence and let the Greeks to know Britain's support for her which should boost her moral.

<sup>340</sup> Ibid, E 8168.

<sup>341</sup> PRO, FO 371/7869, E 7728.

<sup>342</sup> Ibid, E 7646.

accepted by Turks, they were bound to obscure the negotiations during atrocities enquiry.

Osborne suggested that if and when a break was obscured because of Nationalists either before or during conference, they should hold a conference at Constantinople with the participation of Greeks and the Sultan and even the Balkan states but never the Nationalists to be invited. Then an agreement could be reached between the parties and even an alternative temporary scheme for Smyrna and Thrace could be tabled.

Osborne believed that they should also insist on some investigation of the atrocities to find a practical way to judge the guilty party. According to him any party abstaining from the commission of the enquiry meant an admission of guilt. They should make Nationalist participation to the conference as a condition for the consent of investigation of atrocities by Red Cross. If the Turks failed to fulfill this condition, then they should be refused for the return of the areas with minorities, since they could not leave Christian population to the hands of Turks.

Osborne further suggested that the greatest possible publicity of the atrocities enquiry so as to show up French and Nationalist obstruction.<sup>343</sup>

Although Constantinople was to be returned to Turks, there was still hope for the Greeks to have the town for themselves. There were rumors that the Greeks in Constantinople were getting armed and The Orthodox Patriarch was involved in this arrangement. The Greek Patriarch Meletios wrote to Lloyd George stating that he had believed that it was Lloyd George's intention to allow Greeks to occupy Constantinople, but Paris proposals of March 1922 was a set-back to these intentions.<sup>344</sup>

Meanwhile Rumbold reported on 18<sup>th</sup> of August that the Red Cross Delegate, Schlemmer had arrived at Constantinople for the atrocities commission work and written to both Angora and Greek Governments for permission for a mission to Anatolia and Thrace respectively but neither had answered.<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>343</sup> PRO, FO 371/7870, E 8268.

<sup>344</sup> Ibid, E 8287.

<sup>345</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, E 8287, No: 146.

The Greek Government was pressing the British High Commissioner for the loan. Bentinck reported on 26<sup>th</sup> of Aug. 1922 that Gounaris had told him that without a loan they could not maintain the army in Asia Minor. They were asking the British Government to encourage a loan on the London market, and they had thought that Hambro's bank, which had full details with regard to securities which Greece could pledge, would be able to float the loan.<sup>346</sup> Foreign Office with a letter to the Treasury on 30<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1922 gave the consent of the British Government when and if Hambro's Bank approached the Treasury for the Government's approval.<sup>347</sup>

The Foreign Office was considering the threat extended by Greeks to occupy Constantinople was a bluff. E.G. Adam noted on 23<sup>rd</sup> of August that the Greek Government's intention was to expedite a conference or some drastic action by the Allies. Adam believed that if the Venice conference failed though it appeared likely to be postponed through French or Turkish obstruction, the Greek retirement from their occupied line to Brusa-Ushak [Bursa-Usak] line and even complete evacuation would be undertaken. Adam concluded that as far as the Venice Conference seemed likely to take place before autumn 1922 neither Greeks or Turks would probably take further drastic action.<sup>348</sup>

'Daily Telegraph' on 21<sup>st</sup> of August published an article of an interview of Hamid Bey, Angora Government's agent in Constantinople. Hamid Bey told that the French Government asked Britain to protest against creation of autonomy in Smyrna but Britain refused. Angora Government was however assured that Greek action would have no effect on peace discussions.<sup>349</sup>

The preparations for the Venice conference were going on and Angora Government had accepted the attendance of High Commissioners rather than Ministers. Oliphant commented on 25<sup>th</sup> August that an early meeting at Venice was the main point to aim at, and further discussions were to be deprecated. Lindsay also commented that the question of advancing the evacuation was really academic. Lindsay believed that they should not forget the Greeks and they could not agree to the evacuation unconditionally.<sup>350</sup>

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<sup>346</sup> Ibid, No: 160.

<sup>347</sup> PRO, FO 371/7871, E 8507.

<sup>348</sup> Ibid, E 8293.

<sup>349</sup> Ibid, E 8348.

<sup>350</sup> Ibid, E 8497.

On the same day R.C. Lindsay commented that they should try to give something to Greeks, he was not aware that Mustafa Kemal launched the Turkish offense against Greeks. A new episode was about to start in the history of Anatolia.

#### **VI.4. EVALUATION**

Venizelos' defeat in November 1920 caused some members of the Allies to introduce new policies towards to the Greco-Turkish question. King Constantine's return to Greece was used mainly as an excuse for France, to consider her policy towards Greece. He was hated in France and French looked at him as a person who prolonged the war and therefore caused for her miseries. But King Constantine was not the only reason for the change of the policy. After the evacuation of Cilicia by British troops, French had moved in and found themselves in a most difficult position. Local militia of Turkish Nationalists was active in disturbing French, and eventually local battles forced France to evacuate Cilicia. France was also affected by the British policy in the Middle-East. Although the mandate for Syria was given to France in San Remo Conference, still she was feeling insecure in Syria because of local resentment towards France. France considered that the key factor for her difficulties in Syria was Emir Feisal who was controlled by British and therefore Britain stood as an obstacle for her desires in the Middle East. France was facing difficulties in Europe too. Although peace with Germany was concluded with the Treaty of Versailles but her problems with Germany was far from being over yet. The French desires for territory in Germany and reparations that she would receive were still pending. France especially with the new Government in power with Poincare was considering Britain as a factor obstructing her desires. Keeping an army in Syria, then in Cilicia was too costly for France and she had started looking at Turkey from a different angle. She had realized that without a peace in Turkey, it was difficult to maintain the peace in the Middle East. The change of the Government in Greece and the return of Constantine to the throne gave the excuse for France to change her policy for Turkey.

Italy, similar to France, being angry to Greece because of her presence in Western Anatolia that was supposed to be hers, felt that she was entitled to do anything to harm Greece. Another problem with Greece was the conflict of interest for Dodecanese. Italy, considering her own financial problems, was more inclined to receive economical concessions in Turkey since she was almost certain that she

would not get any territorial gains in Anatolia. Italy was going to evacuate Adalia and later Scala Nova.

The return of Constantine, against whom there was so much public resentment both in France and Britain, forced Allies to reach a decision to reinforce embargo of any war materials to be exported to Greece. They also decided not to support her financially. In spite of the decision of the Allies, Britain was in dilemma in her relations with Greece. Hankey, the Private Secretary of Lloyd George and Secretary of the Cabinet occupied the most influential position in the British state mechanism, pointed out the importance of the decision of the Powers that deprived of all financial support of the Allies. He was convinced that it would be impossible for Greece to keep an army of more than 150 000 in Anatolia, meaning that if Britain was to obey the decision of the Allies strictly, the Treaty of Sevres would be off the screen. Lloyd George gave the indication of the British policy at the cross-road in his speech of 22<sup>nd</sup> of Dec. 1920. Although there was resentment against Constantine, they should differentiate between the people of Greece and the King himself. Lloyd George told that the Greek people were a nation that should be praised and were much better than the Turks. For Lloyd George, Mustafa Kemal, the leader and symbol of Nationalists was a 'mutinous General' and there was no way for Britain to come to terms with him.

Within the State mechanism, Foreign Office was in favour of close coordination with Greece. Lord Granville, the British Ambassador at Athens, was urging the Government to enter into negotiations with Constantine and the sooner they did so the better it was. Foreign Office initially instructed the Ambassador to have normal relations with the Greek Government, but try to avoid the King.

Harold Nicolson, who was an expert in Near Eastern Desk at the Foreign Office, recommended that they should help the Greeks as the only alternative if they wanted to keep Treaty of Sevres alive. Sir Eyre Crowe, the Under-Secretary of the Foreign Office, was also in favour of supporting the Greeks. He believed that there might be some minor modifications in the Treaty of Sevres provided that these changes were agreed upon by the Greeks and drastic concessions to Turkey were to be avoided. Crowe urged to keep Chatalja line in Thrace rather than Enos-Midia line which was often pronounced by French and Montagu in the Cabinet. Curzon who was in favour of handing back Smyrna to Turks under a special scheme was in agreement with Crowe for the frontiers in Thrace.

In the higher echelons of the Government the 'Big Four', namely Bonar Law, Chamberlain, Churchill and Curzon were in favour of close relations with Greece and if necessary with Constantine not only from military and political aspect but also from trade point of view. They believed that Britain could not afford to lose a good trade partner. Curzon, who was against the Greek landing at Smyrna in May 1919, was more of the opinion that the Turks should be cleared off Europe and therefore was inclined to give minor concessions to Turks in Thrace. Foreign Office as well as the Cabinet believed that they could not afford to lose France for the sake of keeping Greece on their side. Therefore a dilemma existed in the British policy. On one hand there existed a necessity to give concessions to Mustafa Kemal to make the Turks, French and Italians happy, and on the other hand to get close to Constantine and the Greeks to support against Turks without disturbing much of France. Britain was going to try riding two horses at the same time but preferred the latter case since they believed that even if they gave concessions to Mustafa Kemal, they could never be sure to receive full obedience and friendship from Nationalists and besides for the British politics it was not desirable to fulfill the conditions of the National Pact.

The British General Staff desired to reach peace in Turkey as soon as possible since keeping the army in Constantinople area was getting expensive and insufficient in quantity. Therefore, their priority was towards Mesopotamia and India where resentment was building up against Britain. To maintain the security of Straits and Constantinople and defend these territories, they were in need of additional military back up and getting help from French and Italians were almost impossible. In the Parliament especially in 1921 and 1922 there was criticism for the expense of the military in Turkey and therefore the possibility to reinforce British troops was almost non-existence. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Robert Horne, stated that the monthly cost of British Army of occupation of Constantinople was £220 000 and to recover the expenses was one of the conditions of the Treaty of Sevres which seemed to be highly improbable.<sup>351</sup>

The Allied Conference in Paris on 25<sup>th</sup> of January 1921 gave an opportunity to Britain to pronounce her policy towards Greece and Turkey. They were ready to make minor modifications in the Treaty of Sevres but at the same time keep a friendly Greece on their side. Lloyd George clearly pointed out that they were not to

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<sup>351</sup> Hansard for Commons, 16<sup>th</sup> May 1922, Vol.: 154, Col.: 209.

buy peace at the expense of Greece. In the Paris Conference to hold a meeting with the participation of all concerned parties was decided. For the preparation of the Meeting, Britain had made the first move, as an indication of her policy, that the Angora Government was not to be invited separately. For Britain the only 'de jure' government was the Central, Constantinople Government and Angora Government was only entitled to attend the meeting as a part or under the umbrella of the legitimate Government since Mustafa Kemal was a general in revolt against the 'system'. The Angora Government was going to participate in the Conference after her insistence and by manipulation of Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister. As of January 1921, the Angora Government was not recognized as an entity as far as Britain was concerned and this policy was also reflected on her rejection of sending an envoy of Allied officials to Angora along with the delegation of Izzet Pasha.

During the London Conference which would be called as the Second London Conference, British policy became even clearer that their preference was for the Greeks in the Greco-Turkish question. Britain's pretention was focused on giving minor concessions to Turks but in actual sense her desire in discreet was to help the Greeks to wipe out the Turks and force them to accept the Treaty of Sevres. For Venizelos, the London Conference was a plot against Mustafa Kemal; after all he was well briefed by Harold Nicolson about the plans of Curzon which could not possibly be different than Lloyd George, Foreign Office and the Cabinet. The British policy as of February 1921 was inclined to help Greeks to overcome the Nationalist danger in Turkey so that the Sevres could be ratified and as a next move to give some minor concessions so that the moderate Turks could be convinced and these concessions would act as an excuse for them to rejoin the Sultan. Lloyd George as a spokesman of the British policy was convinced about the success of the Greeks. His speech on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Dec.1920 was an indication of what he believed in the struggle of the Greeks and Turks. He told that some people had considered that the Turks would beat Greeks but it turned out to be that Turks were running away from the Greeks. Lloyd George believed that if the split was to occur among Nationalists, the new offensive would corner the Kemalists and force them to come to terms with the Allies or they would disappear from the scene. There was the danger of Nationalist-Bolsheviks pact, but Britain believed that religious rivalry in existence for centuries between Turks and Russians would not enable them to survive the relation for a long time and therefore it would be a temporary movement. According to the British Intelligence Reports, Mustafa Kemal was feeling as squeezed between two devils; Allies and Bolsheviks. Openly the Allies were against bloodshed but the

British Foreign Office believed that Britain should not stop the new fighting which was bound to start during or right after the London Conference. Edmond from Foreign Office was in the opinion that the fighting would be able to limit the arrogant desires of the Greeks and especially Turks.

Britain was most concerned for her reputation in the East, therefore feared that Mustafa Kemal would force them to evacuate Constantinople which would jeopardize her status among the Moslems in East and an attack by Nationalists to Mosul which would be disastrous for British interests in the oil business. To overcome the latter problem, at one stage Foreign Office considered forming a buffer state of Kurds under the supervision of Turkey so that they could safeguard Mosul area. The Cabinet also considered the proposal of Lloyd George which was originally generated by Churchill. The proposal outlined the encouragement of Nationalists to hold on Azerbaijan. The idea should have been generated by letting Turks to look 'East' rather than 'West'. Another reason could be to allow a conflict between the Turks and Bolsheviks who were busy in erecting a Bolshevik system there, and if this was to be possible then Turks would never get any Russian support in their fight against the Greeks.

Before the London Conference Lloyd George and the whole state mechanism were in favour of continuation of their good relations with Greece even if the King Constantine was on the throne. There was also an agreement for providing minor alterations to the Treaty of Sevres, meaning of giving concessions to Turks in Smyrna, in the demilitarized zone in Constantinople and relaxing administrative and financial clauses of the Treaty.

There was also some mutual understanding for the treatment of the Nationalists. The legitimate authority was the Sultan and the British state's aim was the dissolution of the Angora Government. There existed some diversions from the above line. Montagu as a Secretary of State for India was in favour of giving more concessions to Turks such as complete hand out of Smyrna and Adrianople to Turks. Montagu preferred to attack Foreign Office and therefore Curzon rather than Lloyd George for the Eastern policy. On the other hand Balfour was against giving even minor concessions to Turks and argued the full application of the Sevres. Although Balfour after resigning from Foreign Office was no longer a member of the cabinet, but being the president of the League of Nations and his past experience and standing in the Parliament had given him a special status in the British political

arena. In the Parliament, there were few Members who were in favour of offering more radical changes in the Sevres, but the bulk of the Parliament who were controlled by Bonar Law, the Leader of the Conservatives and Lloyd George were in agreement with the Government. The latter group also comprised of the pro-Greek and pro-Armenian bench and with their spokesmen such as Lord Bryce and Robert Cecil used every opportunity to criticize the Turks and made of alleged atrocities as an excuse for the punishment of Turks.

Lloyd George as a leader of the Cabinet and representative of the chorus of the people who favoured Greece and therefore dissolution of the Ottoman Empire was going to implement his policy against the Turks during London Conference and later until end of 1922.

Lloyd George's interview with the Greek Prime Minister during and after the London Conference gave a clear indication that Britain at the cross-road turned to the way leading to the Greek desires. Britain had decided to support Greeks against Turks and did not act as a neutral state contrary to the decision taken among Powers. Britain helped Greeks to solve their financial problems by securing a loan in the London Market by the intervention of Treasury and gave his full moral support. He became even more convinced for the success of Greeks after his meeting with the Greeks. He did not hesitate to agree the Greek request of moving the Greek Division from Ismid to the front, although War Office had claimed that the security of Constantinople would be jeopardized in case of a Greek defeat. Lloyd George was convinced that the Greek offense in March 1921 would drive Turks out and told the Greeks that nothing should be left to a chance and Britain would always assist her to return to her glorious days. It was quite interesting to note that at the end of the London Conference both Turkish and Greeks were told that unless and until an agreement was reached they were free to initiate a new offense, and there was no mention of armistice, although armistice was going to be insisted as a condition for a conference in August 1922.

Foreign Office, War Office and Cabinet engineered of freeing the Greek Division from Ismid Peninsula and left the whole Peninsula to the control of Greeks. This was a very crucial decision for the Greek offense since the Peninsula was going to be utilized for logistic support. Greeks were also going to use Constantinople and Straits for transferring war materials and men power for her offence and this issue

was going to be debated in the Parliament that it was contrary to the decision of neutrality which was agreed upon by the Allies.

The London Conference was the turning point for Britain. They would either join France and Italy to be impartial towards Greece, as they had decided, or help Greeks for her struggle against Turks. Britain by giving moral and financial support to Greeks, preferred to adopt the latter option.

The Greek offense was ended with Second Inonu Battle on 1<sup>st</sup> of April 1921 and Greeks retreated to Brussa-Afyon Kara Hisar line. Lloyd George explained the latest developments in the Parliament as the British Government had no information to make them believe that Greeks lost and had to retreat, although British War Office was having continuous reports about the movement of the Greek Army through their liaison officers attached to the Greeks.

The Greek 'Note' on forbidding any communication between Southern of Marmara and Constantinople, somehow, was not considered by Cabinet or by Foreign Office that it was contradiction to the Turkish Armistice, although Rumbold had warned the Foreign Office accordingly. After the Second Inonu battle and retreat of the Greek Army both Foreign Office and the Cabinet were actively involved in different alternatives to solve the Greco-Turkish question. The Cabinet formed a special committee to study the question concerned.

'Cabinet Committee of the Future of Constantinople' chaired by Lloyd George made several meetings and evaluated different proposals from inviting Turks to move East to capture Baku and Batum to having a strong Greece to safeguard British interests in Constantinople and Straits. The Committee also invited Venizelos to their meetings to see whether Greece would be eligible to implement their policy. Naturally Venizelos was after returning to power and tried to influence Lloyd George that they should exert pressure to Athens.

The June 1921 proposal of the Allies was rejected by Greece and somehow Britain was not so much surprised by the decision. The news appeared in the 'Observer' that Britain was in favour of keeping the Sevres as it was, was an indication that the Foreign Office was not so much aware of the intention of Lloyd George since it was apparent that the article was written by the request of Lloyd George. What 'Observer' wrote with regard to June 1921 offer became a fact that the offer was

extended as a friendly gesture and the rejection was not treated as to punish the Greeks. With the new offensive of Greeks in July 1921 and Greeks capturing the region up to very close to Angora, the idea of keeping the Sevres was getting more support in the Foreign Office. Foreign office within the new developments was considering that the Greek Army should have the last strike on Turks and they had no intention of having separate agreement with the Angora Government since the Treaty of Sevres was already available. Britain had no intention or desire to act as a mediator as the Greeks were winning and they decided to wait and see the result of the Greek offensive. With the victories in Anatolia, the press, probably by the influence of the Greek Government were urging for the occupation of Constantinople, since they seemed to be sure that Britain was behind of them.

In August 1921, the Supreme Council with the initiative of Curzon and Lloyd George decided to lift the embargo of selling war materials by private companies to Greece and Turkey. Before the meeting the Greek Government had applied to Foreign Office that they desired this. It was clear that the decision of lifting the embargo was taken to please the Greeks and with the Greeks request. Although to keep the policy of impartiality, the decision was also applicable to both sides. Practically the decision was going to serve Greeks only since they had the control of waterways and ports, as a member commented in the Parliament. Lloyd George commented that the Greeks would be demanding more than what they would get in the Sevres therefore paving the way of giving Straits and even Constantinople to Greeks, since as Lloyd George told Britain was not willing to bear the expense of forces of occupation.

July 1921 offence of Greeks and coming close to Angora by capturing Sivrihisar was welcome by Lloyd George and he did not miss the chance of criticizing the War Office that about the war he was receiving no information for them, indicating that he was in constant touch with the Greeks and had been injected with the information. He believed that War Office had miscalculated the strength of the Nationalists and it was only in few months' back that they were trembling with fear that Kemalists could capture Constantinople, but as it had shown the Turks were running away from the Greeks.

Meanwhile accusations for the atrocities committed by Greeks were reported to High Commissioners in Constantinople, hence to Foreign Office. Greeks did the same thing for the Turkish deportation and massacres of Pontus Greeks. Osborne from

Foreign Office could not help but noted that the Greek claims were the cover up for the mobilization of Pontus Greeks as was reported by the Turks. Lindsay, the Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office did agree with the Greeks that Turks were able to find an answer for everything and further commented that Turks only understood from sticking. Toynbee, once being an architect of the Treaty of Sevres and turning Turks from Europe reported the Greek atrocities committed in the occupied zone was going to be treated by his colleagues in Foreign Office as a pro-Turk and not to be taken seriously. Even Curzon was going to be affected by the news of the Greek atrocities and therefore warned the Greeks to refrain themselves from such accusations.

Lloyd George made a statement in the House in August 1921 and gave a brief history of Greek activities in Anatolia. Some of his statement was going to be criticized by Foreign Office officials that he was not telling the truth. Lloyd George told that the British policy was the correct and the right one. He believed that the Turks could only learn from facts when it was driven to them and that was what Greeks were doing. He told that Mustafa Kemal was an arrogant general who underestimated the strength of the Greeks and he was paying for his mistakes. He told that the Sevres was back again to the table and probably the Greeks would demand more, indicating that Constantinople and Straits would be the next item to be given to Greeks. Curzon shared the same view and so the Cabinet. The British policy was summarized by Lloyd George as to let both Greeks and Turks to fight till the end.

In September 1921, news reached to London that the Greeks were retreating again after loosing the battle of Sakaria. Curzon immediately prepared a proposal for the intervention to both parties. He believed that after the battle, the Turks would not be content with the June 1921 offer. He told that unless the Allies were to be united in helping Greece to continue in fighting against Turks they should offer better conditions for Turks. He knew that Britain alone could not support Greece alone. The interesting point was that he rejected the criticism extended to the Foreign Office and consequently to himself by Montagu and Churchill that they had failed in the Eastern policy meaning in supporting the Greeks. Curzon was going to get another surprise, rather a shock that the French-Turkish Agreement (Franklin Bouillon Agreement) was signed in Angora. Curzon had meetings with the Greek Prime Minister in London and was convinced that the Greeks were ready to accept

the mediation, the June 1921 proposals and also was prepared to leave them at the discretion of Britain.

The British policy was trying to find a new turn after the defeat of the Greeks and the conclusion of Franklin Bouillon Agreement. Foreign Office was considering that the new conditions would make Mustafa Kemal to be more insistent for the National Pact and furthermore would become more arrogant to challenge the interests of Britain directly. Curzon feared that Nationalists' next move after capturing Western Anatolia, Constantinople and Thrace would be on Mosul which would be a fatal move to the British interests. He proposed to come to terms with Allies before dealing with the Turks. Curzon insisted that they should never give any concessions in Thrace to Turks. Since both France and Italy were on the side of Turkey, Britain feeling isolated at one stage considered making a contact with the Angora Government but the Foreign Office was against the idea. Lindsay believed that there was no wisdom getting in touch with the Turks since he believed that one could only approach them with a stick. Eventually in November 1921 the Cabinet decided to send a representative initially in unofficial capacity to Angora, although in less than a year before the British Government did not even recognize the existence of it. The Foreign Office believed that it was the right time for the Allied intervention, since Foreign Office, and Cabinet including Lloyd George feared that Mustafa Kemal would strike as a last blow to Greeks in spring 1922.

As the year of 1922 was entered, Britain found herself in difficult position in foreign affairs. Her relation with France was far from being in harmony. The Turkish-Greek conflict was at dead-lock, the situation in Ireland and in India was getting out of control. With the Government change in France, Poincare became the new President of the Council and as Curzon pointed out he was more stubborn than Briand in his views towards Greece. Foreign Office was generating new alternatives to solve the Greco-Turkish conflict to propose in the forthcoming meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris. The change of the Government in Italy caused it to be delayed several times and eventually was held in March 1922.

On the eve of the Conference, Lloyd George had to deal with the problem of Montagu. Montagu was openly criticizing Foreign Office's and hence Lloyd George's policy for the Near-East. His dealing with India and publication of the Viceroy's message of criticism for the Government's policy in the Turkish-Greek conflict forced him to resign from the Government. It was believed that his resignation could have

influenced the resignation of the Government but because of his tactical errors in handling the resignation, it only marked an incident in Lloyd George's career.

The Conference in Paris was concluded with new proposals for the modification of the Treaty of Sevres. It was also decided to submit the proposals to Turkey and Greece and arrange a Conference for the participation of the parties concerned as soon as possible. Curzon returned to London content and happy that at last a united front had been formed in the Greco-Turkish conflict so that Britain could achieve her desires with a minimum losses. The meeting for the parties was delayed for months because of a dead-lock for the armistice whether it was to be announced at the time of the Greek evacuation as Turkey and France insisted, or immediately as Greece and Britain requested. The proposals had been discussed with Greece before Britain brought it to the Conference and Britain received the concurrence of Greeks, therefore she believed that the armistice should be claimed immediately to secure the Christian population in Western Anatolia. The proposal for the peace as the Conference had concluded enabled for Greece to gain a territory of 100 000 square miles. Britain had realized that the days for Greeks in Anatolia had become limited; therefore Britain was trying very hard to secure at least Thrace for Greece. The scheme also suited Curzon's initial view that the Turks should be left in Anatolia only; hence Gladstone's dream would come true. The Conference decided to propose a scheme for Smyrna, with regard to securing the fate of Christian population, which enabled the Allies to have a close supervision. As Curzon had told the Greeks there was still a hope for future that Greece would have a foot in Smyrna.

The prolong in holding the meeting due to the timing of armistice and place of the meeting, caused the Greek Government to deviate from her promise that she had left herself to the discretion of Britain. There was a domestic clash between Venizelists and the Government about the policy for the Anatolia. The Greek Government, whether for domestic reasons or to utilize the condition of the Allies, had initiated a move for the occupation of Constantinople. To attain this desire the Government had moved some of their forces to Thrace. Foreign Office interpreted the Greek desire as a bluff to Allies. Other consideration was, since Greeks had realized that they had no chance of holding Smyrna, they were after preserving Thrace against Turks.

The Greek Patriarch, involved in the Greek desiderata, was thinking that Lloyd George had intended to give Constantinople to Greeks, but found resistance from French and Italians, implying that such a promise was probably given by Lloyd George to the Greeks.

1922 was not going to be a good year for Lloyd George. The criticism extended to him from press and in Parliament had increased since his domestic and foreign policies were failing him. One of the criticisms was due to his Near Eastern policy and therefore his pro-Greek attitude. The deportation, as Yusuf Kemal complained to the High Commissioners in Constantinople, was a result of the mobilization of the Greek community in the Black Sea coastal area which took place mainly in 1921. When rumors reached to the High Commissioners in Constantinople about the deportation, they requested an explanation from both Governments of Constantinople and Angora. The Grand Vizier explained to Rumbold that the removal of all men capable of bearing arms was necessitated by Greek bombardment and insurrectionary movement in Pontus.<sup>352</sup>

The Angora Government's response to the allegations was reported by Yusuf Kemal in August 1921 that Greek troops were committed to the atrocities and massacres. He further stated that Greek secret societies were attempting to create diversions in Black Sea area and British authorities at Constantinople got involved in arming Armenian and Greek bands. Yusuf Kemal warned the High Commissioners that responsibility for any Turkish reprisals rested with the Greeks. The deportation although carried out in mainly in 1921, was somehow appeared as a hot issue to overcome the criticism and to divert the concentration on the failure of the Greek policy. The Cabinet and Chamberlain as a leader of the House as well as the certain press condemned the Turks for their behavior against the Greeks during the deportation. Even the questions put by Members in the Parliament for the Greek atrocities were answered as if the question was for the Turkish atrocities. As a move to include America, the sentimentality of Americans was to be exploited. The Commission, to investigate the atrocities under the umbrella of Red Cross was formed and included representatives of USA, with the insistence of Foreign Office. The Commission with the insistence of France was also tasked to investigate the Greek atrocities simultaneously with the Turkish one, although Foreign Office had insisted that the Turkish atrocities should be investigated first. The Greek Orthodox

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<sup>352</sup> PRO, FO 371/6526, E9144.

Patriarchate to create a public opinion, claimed that 15 000 Greeks in the Ismid area was either killed or missing.

Osborne noted that he should like to enquire Greek Delegation in London for further information about the extermination of 15 000 Greeks and also enquire whether it was not a fact that the Greeks arrested in Constantinople were not refugees or persons implicated in the recent Greek atrocities against Moslems, but Lindsay prevented him doing this.<sup>353</sup>

As the correspondence was going on to and fro between the capitals of Allies and Angora, the meeting place was fixed to be Venice with the attendance of High Commissioners instead of Foreign Ministers. Meanwhile the Greek Government claimed the formation of the Ionian set-up in the Smyrna region. It was peculiar that the Greeks claimed that it was neither an independent state nor a province of Greece, but a provisional organization to safe guard the well being and security of the Christian population. Although the claim was protested strongly by France and Italy, the British Cabinet was silence for the formation. The similar approach was seen at the claim of Constantinople.

Lloyd George was still confident about Greeks and continued underestimating Mustafa Kemal in August 1922. His speech on 4<sup>th</sup> August was deliberately chosen to boost the morale of Greeks. Lloyd George believed that there was no risk of Greek advancing to Constantinople and the Greeks should concentrate their efforts for Smyrna, although according to the decision of the Foreign Ministers the evacuation of Greeks had been foreseen. Lloyd George was hoping that after his speech that is his support, the Greeks would easily raise a loan in the London Market; therefore resist the plans of evacuation and might even initiate a new offence against Turks.

The visit of Fethi Bey to London was hardly taken seriously although Fethi Bey desired to discuss the peace with Allies and especially with Britain. Mustafa Kemal, years later was going to state that Fethi Bey's visit was the last initiative of the Angora Government to reach peace before the Turkish offense on 26<sup>th</sup> August. Neither Lloyd George nor Curzon and Balfour had time to spare for the Angora Government, since they were probably quite sure that there was no danger coming

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<sup>353</sup> Ibid, E9387.

from Nationalists and Greeks were still strong enough to uphold the Treaty of Sevres, meaning the dissolution of Ottoman Empire.

Lloyd George as the leader of the Cabinet with the full backing of Cabinet and the State mechanism seemed to be determined to continue with the British Eastern policy which was based on the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire at the eve of Turkish offense on 26<sup>th</sup> August 1922.

## CHAPTER VII

### LLOYD GEORGE and TURKISH VICTORY

#### VII.1. Lloyd George and The Turkish Victory:

Lloyd George held a 'Conference of Ministers' on 23<sup>rd</sup> August primarily to discuss the latest developments in Iraq and King Feisal's recent strange behaviour. Feisal seemed to be cooperating with extremists in Iraq and even guarding them. A topic of discussion was whether to retain the British units stationed at Chatalja line there, for the coming winter would cost £120,000 for the accommodation. Another option was to move them out of the line, in which case the French would desert them, to face the Greek possible insertions. It was pointed out that the Greek force amounted to 25,000 and an attack to Chatalja line was extremely improbable. The Conference decided that it was no longer necessary to retain British troops at the Chatalja line. The Greco-Turkish question was not discussed at all. It was apparent that a possible offense by Nationalists was not expected by the British Government.<sup>1</sup>

Turkish offence against the Greeks started on 26<sup>th</sup> of August. The Turkish offence brought a new outlook and claims for the Greeks as Greek paper Kathemerini pointed out on 29<sup>th</sup> of August, hopes of help from Britain or Venice conference were vain and therefore Greece should find a solution by herself. The paper suggested that Constantinople be liberated by the Greek army and that the Allies should vacate the city. Other Greek papers made similar comments and some even blamed France for being the obstacle for Greeks in Constantinople. They praised the attitude of the British Government.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile there were rumours that the Turks were preparing for offense to Greeks and Rumbold complained that he was having difficulties in collecting information about the Turkish offensive. On the other hand he did not seem to understand the seriousness of the situation and warned the Foreign Office that the peace conference at Venice should be held as soon as possible for general interest of peace and in order to relieve the Greeks. Rumbold suggested that the date for

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<sup>1</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, 'Conclusion of Ministers' on 23<sup>rd</sup> Aug. 1922.

<sup>2</sup> PRO, FO 371/7871, E 8593.

evacuation of Anatolia by Greeks should be brought to an advanced date, since he did not want to see the Turks as the 'winner' in the conference.<sup>3</sup>

Bentinck from Athens reported on 29<sup>th</sup> of August that the Greek General Staff accepted the evacuation of Afyonkarahisar and Kutahya as of 28<sup>th</sup> of August. Meanwhile the Constantinople Government was becoming restless under the circumstances and Rumbold reported on 2<sup>nd</sup> of September that he had been pressured by them to speed up the meeting in Venice. Rumbold interpreted the reason for the sudden offensive of Mustafa Kemal stemmed from failure of Lloyd George and Curzon to receive Fethi Bey when he was in London, implying that Britain was not interested to solve the Near-Eastern conflict by diplomatic means. He also told that this explanation had been adopted by the French paper, 'Temps' too.<sup>4</sup> Another explanation, according to Rumbold, was the fact that it had been four months since the Angora Government had sent its last note to the Allied Governments on the subject of the Paris proposals, and more than a month had elapsed since the proposal for the preliminary conference at Venice had taken shape. Considering that nothing had been done during this period, the Nationalists had lost the hope that the peace was attainable with negotiations. Rumbold further reported that Lloyd George's latest speech on 4<sup>th</sup> of August in the Parliament was an indication to the Nationalists that Britain was definitely hostile to them and they believed that Britain would try to modify the Paris proposals even further to their disadvantage.

The Turkish offense made its impact on the Foreign Office that they tried to invite the parties for a meeting in Venice as soon as possible, and advanced the date of the meeting to middle of September instead of end of the month, and also by accepting the French offer to ease the tension with French and Nationalists. They also tried to refrain themselves from a controversy with the French about telling the Kemalists what was prepared as regards to the evacuation of Asia Minor.<sup>5</sup> Rumbold's response for the Foreign Office's offer was favourable and he stated that it was important to have the conference as soon as possible both for general interest in peace and in order to relieve situation of Greeks sufficiently to deter them from contemplating desperate measures once more. Rumbold feared of Kemalists' success in the offensive and consequently came to conference in an elated mood

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<sup>3</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, NO; 175.

<sup>4</sup> PRO, FO 286/832, Sir Rumbold's letter to Curzon on 2<sup>nd</sup> Sep.1922.

<sup>5</sup> PRO, FO 371/7871, E 8607, E.G. Adam's views were shared by Lindsay and Curzon on 30<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1922.

but he considered that it was better to face this threat than to risk further delay; he was also thinking that by accepting the French offer, the conference was bound to be prolonged.<sup>6</sup> Foreign Office notified both French and Italian Governments on 1<sup>st</sup> of September that Britain anticipating to prevent the Turkish offense against Greeks had accepted the French proposal of 22<sup>nd</sup> April about the evacuation of the Greeks.

Meanwhile the Nationalist offensive was making the Constantinople Government restless and Rumbold reported on 31<sup>st</sup> August about his conversation with Izzet Pasha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs that they were not in the position to understand the reasons behind this offense since, under Paris proposals; Anatolia was to be restored to Turks in any case. He also pointed out their fear that the offense would anger the Allies and would jeopardize the preliminary conference.<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile Foreign Office's letter to the Treasury about consent for a loan to Greece on 26<sup>th</sup> of August was replied by the Treasury on 31<sup>st</sup> August that the loan in the London Market was politically advisable in view of the general position of the British Government versus the Greeks.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, Greeks were looking for reasons to justify their approach against Kemalists and started complaining about the availability of war materials. Chief of Greek General Staff told the British that Turkish concentration and attack had been made possible by the large supplies of war material sent by French and Italians. He reminded that Greece was fighting not only the Turks, but also Europeans and Bolsheviks.<sup>9</sup> Greek press had developed resentment towards the Allies except Britain for their behavior towards Greeks.

Bentinck, the Acting High Commissioner at Athens reported on 31<sup>st</sup> August that the Greek press was foreseeing another political *demarche* in requesting support, presumably from Britain, to counterbalance assistance alleged to be openly rendered to Turks by certain powers. According to the press, the request from Britain would be not only financially but in general terms.<sup>10</sup> In the coming days, Greek press was also going to publish a list of French military personnel serving in the Turkish army and even flying Turkish airplanes. The Greeks had started

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<sup>6</sup> Ibid, E 8607, Rumbold's telegram to the Foreign Office on 30<sup>th</sup> Aug. 1922.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, E 8691.

<sup>8</sup> PRO, FO 371/7871, E8729.

<sup>9</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 179.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, No: 181.

realizing that the situation in Anatolia was so grave that the Greek Government telegraphed to the Commander-in-chief to suggest for an armistice.<sup>11</sup>

Bentinck reported on 2<sup>nd</sup> of September that the Greek Government had sent two messages to Britain through their Embassy in London. The first message stated that in accordance with the impossibility of defending Smyrna against Kemalists, Powers should be warned to take urgent measures for protection of the town for the sake of their nationals. The second message stated that in view of the military situation, Greek Government would accept proposals for an armistice on the basis of an immediate evacuation of Asia Minor. Greek Government asked Britain to take immediate action as they deemed it essential under the circumstances, and further they expressed their faith in the British Government.<sup>12</sup>

Foreign Office was still hoping that the conference would be held offering the complete evacuation of Anatolia, and hence, an armistice would be obtained. Foreign Office was debating on which precautions could be taken to safeguard the Christians.

Curzon wrote a note to Tyrell and Lindsay that he was pulled out of bed at 3 in the morning on 3<sup>rd</sup> of September to receive a telegram from Greeks that an armistice had become a necessity. He instructed to cable High Commissioners in Paris, Rome, Athens and Constantinople that the complete evacuation of Asia Minor was one of terms proposed at Paris Conference, and would be the first subject to be discussed at the Venice Conference. Curzon stated that the British Government was anxious to terminate the disastrous warfare, but they also had to consider political conditions under which evacuation would take place particularly for the protection of Christian populations. He consulted Rumbold as well for the steps to be taken to communicate this offer to Turks and to secure suspension of hostilities pending an early meeting of the Conference.<sup>13</sup> By the messages sent by Foreign Office on 3<sup>rd</sup> September to Constantinople, Athens, Rome and Paris, Foreign Office was trying to find out how to get in touch with Angora, stating that; "*British Government is anxious to terminate disastrous warfare and to avoid further shedding of blood, and will gladly take any steps in conjunction with their allies to secure these objects.*"<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Ibid, No: 196.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, No: 199.

<sup>13</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/3/30.

<sup>14</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 216.

Meanwhile Greece had sent vessels for the evacuation of Greek 'personnel' from Smyrna, since they were not in a position to defend the town.

Curzon informed his Ambassadors on 4<sup>th</sup> of September, to notify France and Italy about the British proposal that the three High Commissioners in Constantinople should invite Angora Government at once to send competent military representatives to the frontier of the neutral zone to meet the Allied Commander-in-chief and his French and Italian colleagues and competent Greek military representatives with a view to an immediate conclusion of an armistice. Curzon further suggested that the Allied military representatives should, if possible, secure that immediate evacuation of Asia Minor by Greek troops in several stages and under the supervision of the Allied officers.<sup>15</sup>

Rumbold disagreed with the Foreign Office that they should get involved in offering an armistice to Kemalists. He reported on 4<sup>th</sup> September that in the minds of Kemalists, the British Government was completely identified with the Greeks. This view, according to Rumbold was fortified by Lloyd George's speech. He believed that if Britain got involved in with the offer for armistice, the Kemalists would interpret this action as the admission of defeat for not only of Greeks but of British policy. Rumbold further suggested that sympathy with the Greeks should not blind them of the fact that the collapse of Greeks was not the end for Britain in Near East. He, however commented that the immediate evacuation of Asia Minor which seemed to be inevitable, threatened their position in Constantinople and in Mesopotamia. If the Greeks had to evacuate Eastern Thrace in addition to Asia Minor, the British policy in regard to the Straits would also be threatened, and in order to have the balance with the Kemalists, Rumbold suggested that they should consider the occupation of Gallipoli Peninsula.<sup>16</sup>

Meanwhile the British Consul General at Smyrna, Lamb, suggested using Allied forces against Kemalists, was rejected by the Allied High Commissioners, as Rumbold reported to the Foreign Office on 5<sup>th</sup> of September.<sup>17</sup>

Lord Hardinge reported on 5<sup>th</sup> of September that the French official response to the British proposal. The France was in agreement with the necessity of an immediate

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<sup>15</sup> Ibid, No: 228.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid, No: 231 and 232, Rumbold's message on 4<sup>th</sup> September to the Foreign Office.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, No: 234.

armistice. She proposed to use the services of her High Commissioner to propose to Kemalists an armistice provided that Allied Powers would not cooperate to arrange and supervise the total evacuation of Greeks from Anatolia unless these troops were not transferred to Thrace and unless the Greek troops were moved to west of Enos-Midia line.<sup>18</sup> This proposition was contrary to the British proposal.

Meanwhile the Nationalists were complaining about atrocities committed by Greek forces when they were retreating to the French and Italian Governments. Rumbold in his message to the Foreign Office on 6<sup>th</sup> of September confirmed Nationalists' claims and asked the Foreign Office to complain directly to the Greek Government.<sup>19</sup>

The reports coming from Rome was indicating that the Italians were quite content with the defeat of the Greeks and the Italian press was holding Britain as responsible for the events taking place in Anatolia.<sup>20</sup>

The Greek Government resigned on 7<sup>th</sup> of September as each of the Allied Powers was sending vessels to evacuate their nationals from Anatolia. The Greeks had completed the evacuation within a few days and the last bench of the 'personnel' had departed on 8<sup>th</sup>-9<sup>th</sup> September, although it once was claimed by Britain that it would take months.

The three Allied High Commissioners, namely Pelle, Rumbold and Garroni instructed their military officers in Smyrna on 8<sup>th</sup> September to hand over the town to the Turks.<sup>21</sup> As for Thrace, the Generals inquired from their respective Governments to decide on one of the possibilities for the Greek forces to be drawn behind the lines which were Ganos-Istranja, Enos-Midia and Maritza.<sup>22</sup>

Balfour as the President of the League of Nations complained to the Secretary of the Cabinet on 19<sup>th</sup> September that;

*“Council was informed at its meeting yesterday and a telegram had been received from Kemalist representative at Rome through Red Cross Committee accusing Greek army of atrocities during their retreat and declining on behalf of Turkey all responsibility for consequences which such action might evoke. Council felt that this was intended to prepare excuses for retaliatory atrocities against Christians, and, in acknowledging receipt of*

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<sup>18</sup> Ibid, No: 244.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, No: 250.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, No: 251.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid, No: 285.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, No: 287.

*communication from the Red Cross reminded Kemalists that nothing could relieve them of the obligation to carry on war by civilized methods.*"<sup>23</sup>

The Greek troops were safely evacuated from Smyrna and it had been reported that while Turks had been chasing Greek troops towards Smyrna, they refrained themselves harming the Greeks on their escape. Curzon seemed to be content that the Greeks were safely evacuated from Smyrna and under such circumstances the Northern forces would be removed safely via Madania [Mudanya], then there would be no opportunity for the Turks to be in touch with the Greeks, therefore the next question would be guarding Thrace and the safety of Greeks in Thrace. He wrote to Rumbold on 10<sup>th</sup> of September that if the Turks refused armistice except in return for partial evacuation of Eastern Thrace, then there would be no risk in denying any additional concessions to Turks for the armistice. Curzon believed that there were still important amount of Greek forces but the in condition and morale would not allow them to threaten Constantinople. Curzon further pointed out that they should not allow the Turks to have further concessions in Europe. He believed, however, they should not allow drawing Greek forces further west of Ganos-Istranja line for the Turks so that they could use the possibility of a Greek invasion of Constantinople as a trump card against the Turks.<sup>24</sup>

Meanwhile Curzon instructed his Ministry to study the possibility of inviting the parties directly or indirectly involved in the Treaty of Sevres to a conference in London. He instructed the Foreign Office to be ready to issue the invitation for a London Conference before either the French or the Italians could take the initiative, since from his past experiences he knew that the inviting Power exercised a sort of discretion as to the invitations. But he did not want to start upon a basis from which he might be dislodged.<sup>25</sup>

The Cabinet met on 7<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1922 to discuss the situation in Anatolia. Curzon explained what the Foreign Office had been doing and accused the French for delaying the Conference since March. Curzon told that there was no chance for Greeks to hold Smyrna and therefore the British concentration had been on the maintenance of the order there. He believed that the Turks had been receiving war materials in large quantities from French and Italians. He told that The Greek Government had approached them to obtain an armistice from Turks. He told that it

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid, No: 303.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, No: 305.

<sup>25</sup> PRO, FO 371/7872, E 9054, the Note initialed by Curzon on 9<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1922.

was desirable that the fighting should be ended as soon as possible, but it was important that Britain should not act alone, both because it was desirable to avoid suspicions in the minds of their Allies, but also in view of the risk of failure in such a new role. Curzon explained that he had asked the services of the three High Commissioners in Constantinople for co-operation for the armistice, but according to Curzon this proposal was practically rejected by France by offering conditions as were not acceptable by Britain. The French offered to accept the British proposal provided that the Greek army to be withdrawn to the west of Enos-Midia line and the evacuation of the Greek forces from Smyrna to destinations but of Thrace. Due to obstacles laid down by France, there was no consensus for an armistice and French asked for Greece to apply to Turks directly. Curzon had seen the threat in applying French proposal since he was certain that the Kemalists would demand excessive conditions from Greece. Curzon pointed out his conviction that within few days the Turks would be in Smyrna and Britain had done all the preparations to evacuate the British nationals from Smyrna to Malta and Cyprus. Curzon further told that he had received reports for Greeks killing the Turks while they were retreating and he had warned the Greek Government for such behavior. Curzon posted the question whether the evacuation of Smyrna by Greek forces would contemplate the abandonment of the European part of the British policy. He reminded that the Paris Agreement in March 1922 had allocated Anatolia and Asiatic shores of Dardanelles including Constantinople to Turks. The retention of Gallipoli Peninsula by the Allied forces and Greek sovereignty over Eastern Thrace were granted in the Agreement. Curzon believed that they should not abandon the Gallipoli Peninsula or even Constantinople for the time being. He drew the attention to other signatories involved in the Treaty of Sevres, interested in the future of Straits and the French approach would never be accepted by the Dominions. Besides, they would be given 'the fruits of the war' back to the Turks again. Curzon hoped that the demarche as proposed by Rumbold along with his French and Italian counterparts for armistice could be successful. There was a fear at Constantinople that Mustafa Kemal might advance and threaten Ismid Peninsula and Constantinople, but Curzon was confident that Kemalists would not attack Constantinople since they could not confront the Allied occupation forces especially if there was an Allied solidarity. Curzon commented further that there were 400,000 Greeks in the town and they could always seek help from Greeks in case of approach.

Churchill's opinion was that they should not bind themselves to any bargain with the Turks to ensure the safety of the Greek army which would in any way to oblige the

British European policy. He further commented that the Asiatic arrangements ought to be kept separate. Churchill believed that if the Turks took the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople, they would be losing as Curzon had stated the whole fruits of their victory, and another Balkan war would be inevitable. He suggested the possibility of providing Bulgarian participation should be considered.

Lloyd George blamed King Constantine for the defeat of the Greeks when he was unable either to advance or to retreat and therefore he had moved two divisions from Anatolia to Thrace which turned out to be a disaster. He had doubts that the Greek army was destroyed completely. He still had the hope that it was possible the Greeks, under new commander, might fight and improve the situation. He entirely agreed with Curzon and Churchill that they should stand behind the Paris Agreement, and, in no circumstances should they allow the Gallipoli Peninsula to the hands of the Turks. He believed that the most important strategic position in the world should never be held by the Turks.

Lord Lee, the First Lord of the Admiralty stated that the prestige of the British for Turks was higher compared to French and Italians and suggested that they should send some troops to Gallipoli since the French and Italians who were the occupying force there would hand the Peninsula to Turks easily. He believed that their fleet at Constantinople would be sufficient to deter Mustafa Kemal from attempting to take the town. The Cabinet agreed;

“That while using every effort to bring hostilities between Turks and Greeks to a speedy end the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs should continue to base his Near East Policy on the Agreement concluded by the Allies in Paris in March last:

That the maintenance of the control of the deep sea water separating Asia and Europe was a cardinal British interest, and any attempt by the Kemalists to occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula should be resisted by force:

That some British troops should occupy the Gallipoli Peninsula along with the troops now stationed there, and the Secretary of State for War should concert the necessary arrangements with the Commander-in-Chief, Constantinople, by transferring British troops from Chanak, or a battalion from Malta, or otherwise:

That in the event of the Kemalist forces making an attack on the Ismid lines, which are at the present moment held exclusively by British troops, the Commander-in-Chief should be at liberty to withdraw the latter to Constantinople, but that any attempt on the part of Kemal to cross the Bosphorus and attack Constantinople should be resisted with the full strength of the British forces by sea and land:

That a joint report should be prepared by the War Office, Admiralty and Air Ministry on the policy to be followed in the event of Constantinople and the Ismid Peninsula being menaced by the Kemalists.”<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> PRO, Cabinet 48(22), CAB 23/31.

Curzon reiterated the British Government's decision with regard to the Gallipoli Peninsula in his message to Rumbold on 11<sup>th</sup> of September. Curzon referred to the decision taking on 7<sup>th</sup> of September and he pointed out the consensus on providing the Allied solidarity on holding of Constantinople and those concerning Gallipoli.<sup>27</sup>

Lloyd George had a conference with Worthington Evans, Secretary of State for War, Lord Lee, the First Lord of the Admiralty and Generals from War Office on 11<sup>th</sup> of September to discuss the latest events in Turkey. Worthington Evans pointed out that in view of the success of Mustafa Kemal it was probable that he would soon threaten Chanak or make a public demand that British troops should be withdrawn. He suggested that as was decided at the Cabinet meeting on the 7<sup>th</sup> of September they should draw their troops from Chanak to Gallipoli before Mustafa Kemal demanded it. He further pointed out that if the French and Italians agreed to stay with British at Chanak, then the evacuation could be postponed. Lloyd George told that it was important for them to retain the control of the Straits in case in a future war they had to fight with the Turks. He further told that there was no intention for the time being to defend Chanak by land reinforcements; therefore Harrington should be instructed to dismantle the guns available at Chanak before evacuation. He commented that the Greeks had been forced to evacuate Anatolia and Britain did not propose to stand on the Ismid Peninsula. He believed that it was essential that they should prevent troops being transferred by Kemalists to Thrace to attack Gallipoli from the North. Lloyd George compared the times when Greeks were threatening Constantinople and after Britain's intervention, they had to change their mind. He told that in actual case the Greeks were forced to fight where they were at a disadvantage. He commented that it was their duty to refuse the Turks to cross into Europe and upset the arrangement concluded by Curzon in March 1922 in Paris. The Conference agreed on the proposal of Harrington that all transport in Dardanelles and Bosphorus to be stopped from proceeding to Asiatic-Marmara ports. The Conference also noted that the battalion available in Malta would be conveyed to Constantinople by 17<sup>th</sup> of September. The Conference decided that General Harrington was to be instructed to take every action necessary to prevent the Kemalist troops being conveyed to the European shore.<sup>28</sup> The conclusion of the

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<sup>27</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 327.

<sup>28</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39.

Conference was going to be relayed by the Admiralty to the Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean on the same day.<sup>29</sup>

Curzon was worried that if the Allies did not act as a united front against Turks, they would face difficulties. He sent a hand-written note to Lloyd George on 13<sup>th</sup> September that; *"I think we are in trouble with Kemal and the Turks, if the French and Italians do not back us now. Our relation with both will become exceedingly strained..."*<sup>30</sup> Curzon felt that he had to warn Lloyd George for Greece, and he wrote to him that; *"...I see in the papers that there is some talk (perhaps untrue) about Venizelos coming over. If he comes, need to see him. I would like to be present since we must be careful about there is no divergence between you and me. I can come up any day or any time. We must be careful how to handle Greece right now."*<sup>31</sup> Lloyd George replied Curzon's letter on 15<sup>th</sup> September, and told that he was not aware of the visit of Venizelos and he had been careful not to interfere with the Foreign Office's work.<sup>32</sup>

The Cabinet Meeting was held to consider the latest developments of the Greco-Turkish situation on 15<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1922. Worthington Evans, the Secretary of State for War, explained the military situation in Bosphorus and relayed the consideration of General Harrington that unless they had the control of the Asiatic shores of Bosphorus there was no way to control the traffic from Asia to Europe as was suggested in the Cabinet Meeting of 7<sup>th</sup> of September.

Curzon explained the recent developments in the political situation. He told that he had received a message from Greek Government that there was no need for an

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<sup>29</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 331.

<sup>30</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/13/3/30.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid

<sup>32</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/3/33, Lloyd George's letter to Curzon on 15<sup>th</sup> September was; *"My Dear Foreign Secretary, I have heard nothing of Venizelos' projected visit to England except from the press. As you know I have been careful not to see anyone representing either Greece or Turkey as I have been most anxious not to interfere with the very difficult land you had to play. I saw Gounaris at Cannes at your request, but you were present at the interview and directed its course. Apart from that I have steadfastly refused to see anyone representing or preferring to represent the belligerent parties. At Genoa at your urgent suggestion I declined to see the Greeks. In the Cabinet I have confined my intervention to steadily supporting your policy. From the moment Greece threw over Venizelos and placed its destinies in the hands of Constantine I realized that a pro-Greek policy in Anatolia was drowned and I have agreed with you that the best we could hope to achieve in that quarter was to secure some protection for the Christian minorities. That hope is now slander. I also strongly support your views as to European Turkey. But I feel that we might do more to organize Balkan support for that policy. Our Ministers at Bucharest and Belgrade have been [?] extremely] important. If we secure the active support of Romania and Yugo-Slavia [Yugoslavia] – and their interests are identical with ours – then French and Italian intrigues will be neutralized. However we can discuss these questions at the Cabinet this afternoon. The country would be behind us in any steps we took to keep the Turk out of Europe. The Slavs and Romanians would gladly supply troops. Ever sincerely. (signed) Lloyd George"*

armistice as the evacuation from Anatolia was complete. He further told that the Greek army in their retreat had left behind them a trail of bloodshed. He gave an excuse for the atrocities, as these things often happened when armies were in retreat. He proposed to send a message to the British Consul General, Sir Harry Lamb, to the effect that there was no objection to entering into relations with Mustafa Kemal, since Mustafa Kemal was de facto in control at Smyrna. The proposal was accepted by the Cabinet and therefore the first step had been made to recognize the Angora Government. He further told that the French Government decided to send some troops to Chanak and France was ready to inform Angora Government that the Allied Governments expected the Neutral Zone would be respected by their troops. Curzon then discussed the meeting that they had been trying to hold since March 1922, but due to various reasons it had not been taken place. Before the Turkish recent offense it was scheduled to meet at Venice by the participation of the High Commissioners to explain the Turkish and Greek about the Paris proposals. He learned that Italians were trying to change the scope of the meeting to peace negotiations. Curzon believed that the Italian soil was not the correct place since it would harm the prestige of Britain. Another point of concern was that the Sevres was signed by number of countries and if the meeting was going to be the replacement of the Sevres, it was natural that these countries would wish to attend which would make the procedure very difficult. He proposed that those states who were especially concerned should be invited. He had Romania and Yugoslavia in mind to invite to the Conference. For the meeting place he proposed Paris as being convenient both for them and the Turks. He further told that the problem area would be the Thrace at the forthcoming Conference, presumably, at Paris. He believed that if the Conference ended as a failure then they could convey the issue to League of Nations. He heard that France and Italy were in favour of giving back the Eastern Thrace to Turks and it seemed that they were in uncompromising mood about the issue.

Churchill by joining the hard-liners in the Cabinet commented that no claim would be made on the Turks without a sufficient backing of force to support them. He said that although claims from Turks had been reduced, but still the first essential thing to do was to ascertain what forces were available to support those claims. He believed that it was no use of leaving the High Commissioners and Generals to do the best to cope with the situation, therefore he suggested that the Government should decide what support they were prepared to give. He thought that the Government was justified in insisting that the Straits should be kept open and in refusing to be thrown

out of Constantinople. He suggested that Curzon should be authorized to tell Poincare that he was prepared to reinforce the British forces in Constantinople. He further told that he did not contemplate this as a permanent arrangement, but to meet the present emergency. He was thinking that these forces would be available for holding the Chanak position as well as the Asiatic shore of Bosphorus. He agreed with Curzon that Romania, Yugoslavia and Greeks should be invited to the meeting provided that they all agreed to contribute forces for holding vital points and on the scheme of the Straits, hence he suggested that they should be approached on this question. He pointed out that they would be showing the strength of six nations against Turks. Lloyd George agreed with the suggestion that about a year ago Romania had been ready to send force if necessary and he believed that no country other than Romania had the most interest in the freedom of Straits. Churchill pointed out that the important thing was that the British Government should prepare a force to back the claims and to keep force permanently at Gallipoli for preservation of the graves. He believed that for Thrace, they should not be in a position as a sole enemy of Islam. He believed that they should try to get as much as possible for Greece provided that they were in accord with France. He believed that they should not risk for being the sole and isolated champion of the Greeks.

Chamberlain agreed with Churchill that they should have the force available to support the diplomacy. He believed that they should show their willingness to strike a blow for the sake of their vital interests. He inquired whether the force that was contemplated of sending would be on permanent basis. Churchill had the idea that it was for the present emergency, nevertheless he believed that some international force should be permanently stationed to guard Chanak, Gallipoli and Ismid Peninsula. There was also some discussion on the possibility of Mustafa Kemal would turn to Mesopotamia if he became sure that he could not attack Constantinople. The Cabinet agreed that this was not probable for the Turks since the availability of British force in Palestine would turn them off.

Lloyd George also strongly supported the dispatch of reinforcements and he believed that the Allied forces should not be driven out of their position nor run away before Mustafa Kemal. He told that nothing had happened which was inconsistent with the Paris arrangement, since the Greeks had voluntarily evacuated Asia Minor, as far as he could judge and there had been practically no fighting. He believed that Romania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were interested more than anybody else to have an open Straits, therefore they should be asked what force they would be prepared

to send and when. He suggested that it should be pointed out that the situation was more vital to them. Lloyd George commented that combining the Greek, Romanian, Yugoslavian and British forces, a considerable Army would be available to fight against Mustafa Kemal if he dared to cross the Straits. He told that the time had come to do something concrete. He told that he was purposely not been interfering with the Foreign Office work and even he had avoided any communication at Genoa. He told that he did not wish the British representative at the conference to be in the position of having to bow to the desires of French or anybody else. He further commented that he did not wish to make an immediate decision as regards the permanent occupation of the Straits but he believed that a permanent International Force might grow out of temporary arrangement and might be also placed under the League of Nations. Another suggestion of calling Australia and New Zealand to send forces was also accepted by the Cabinet.<sup>33</sup>

Meanwhile the political situation in Greece was in turmoil. Bentinck reported from Athens on 13<sup>th</sup> of September that the Commander of Military District of Athens had declared censor to all publications with regard to Anatolia.<sup>34</sup> The Greek press was recommending that the Government, in order to save the honor of the Greeks, should attack Constantinople.

The invitation, for sending forces to the Chanak and Gallipoli by the Cabinet on 15<sup>th</sup> of September by certain countries had been communicated to those states. The Italians seemed to be against the idea of getting involved in the conflict against Turks. Sir Graham reported on 18<sup>th</sup> of September that semi-official paper of 'Tribuna' had declared that they had reason to believe that Italy would not participate in the military operations which might take place in the Near East.<sup>35</sup>

Lindley reported on 18<sup>th</sup> of September that the condition in Greece was such that Britain could not possibly rely on the Greek army for the future requirements unless Britain was prepared to claim Greece as an ally openly. He told that Greece was exhausted; her moral and material resources were not in existence. He believed that the Greek army unless received aid from her allies would not be able to even defend Thrace. Lindley believed that for Britain to follow there were two courses; to treat Mustafa Kemal at once on the basis of National Pact and to inform Mustafa Kemal

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<sup>33</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31 Cabinet 49(22).

<sup>34</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No: 358.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, No: 358.

that Britain would oppose the return of Constantinople and Europe to Turks. He commented that any of these courses was better than relying to Greeks. He suggested that if the latter course was to be adopted, the Greek army would be the cheapest weapon which would be found for carrying it out provided that Greece was supplied with funds and material and possibly organizers.<sup>36</sup>

The news coming from France was not encouraging for the British policy. Lord Hardinge reported on 18<sup>th</sup> of September that the press in Paris was protesting the French Government's attitude in a 'new war' in supporting Britain. The press was complaining that France should not take part in a British attempt to establish a 'second Gibraltar' at Constantinople. Hardinge commented that if the press was a correct indication of French policy, there seemed a very small chance for France to give active support in the defense of the Dardanelles against Kemalists. The press indicated the contrast attitude by Britain to Turks and Germans where any French attempt to act against Germany had been blocked by Britain.<sup>37</sup> The 'Times' and other papers reported on 19<sup>th</sup> September that the French Government had already ordered General Pelle to evacuate within twenty-four hours, all French forces to the European side of the Straits.<sup>38</sup> The decision of the French Government to remove her forces from Asiatic shore to the Europe was going to be confirmed by Rumbold on 20<sup>th</sup> September.<sup>39</sup> On the same day Rumbold also reported that the Italians were to follow French in drawing their troops from Asia to the European side of the Bosphorus.<sup>40</sup>

Meanwhile Viceroy of India was uneasy with the developments in London towards Turks and he reported on 11<sup>th</sup> of September that Britain should take into account of sentiments of Moslems in India in drawing her policy regarding the Turks. He suggested retention of old relations between Britain and Turkey and pointed out the beneficial effects this would have in India, Afghanistan and Russia.<sup>41</sup> Viceroy sent another message on 15<sup>th</sup> of September that reported meeting of Moslem members of Indian Legislature. They had passed a resolution urging conclusion of an honorable peace whereby Turkey would retain Asia Minor and Thrace, including Adrianople with guarantees for minorities. The resolution further requested that

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid, No: 444.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid, No: 465.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid, No: 468.

<sup>39</sup> PRO, FO 371/7891, E 9639.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, E 9641.

<sup>41</sup> PRO, FO 371/7872, E 9331.

international control over Constantinople and Straits would be removed and religious position of the Sultan as Caliph of Islam should be recognized.<sup>42</sup>

During the now days, the London press informed the planned visit of Venizelos to London. Lloyd George wrote to Curzon on 15<sup>th</sup> of September, that he was not aware of the visit and just learned it from the press. Lloyd George specified that he had been careful not to see anyone representing either Greece or Turkey as he had been most anxious not to interfere in Curzon's work. He commented that the only exception was Gounaris at Cannes at Curzon's request which Curzon too attended the meeting. He said that by accepting Curzon's suggestion, he had declined to see the Greeks at Genoa. Lloyd George further told that he had confined his intention to supporting Curzon's policy. He confessed that since the fall of Venizelos, he had realized that a pro-Greek policy in Anatolia was drowned and he had agreed with Curzon that the best they could hope to achieve was to secure some protection for the Christian minorities in Turkey. He told Curzon that he strongly had been supporting Curzon's views on European Turkey. But he felt that they might do more to organize Balkan support for that policy. He believed that if they could secure the active support of Romania and Yugoslavia, since their interests were identical to British, and then French and Italian intrigues would be neutralized. He further specified that the country would be behind them in any steps they took to keep the Turk out of Europe. He believed that the Slavs and Romanians would gladly supply their troops.<sup>43</sup>

The message received from Hardinge on 18<sup>th</sup> of September, had shown that Lloyd George was wrong as far as the Serbs were concerned. Hardinge had a meeting with the Serbian Foreign Minister on 16<sup>th</sup> of September and assured him about Britain's support on the question of their participation in the conference which was to take place, on condition of the acceptance of responsibility by his government in the maintenance of the Balkan equilibrium. Hardinge urged that his government should agree to send a division of troops to be placed under General Harington's command in order to meet all eventualities. Nineitch, the Serbian Foreign Minister reply was not very encouraging for Hardinge. He told that the King and Poincare that day agreed that an end should be put to the crisis with the least possible delay. He believed that the Turks were for the moment respecting the wishes of the Allies. He iterated the policy of Serbs that they feared that Bulgarians if united with the Turks

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<sup>42</sup> Ibid, E 9576.

<sup>43</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/3/33

might cause disturbance for them. He further told that on the issue of sending troops he needed to have a discussion with the Serbian Prime Minister. He was not certain that Serbs would do as was required from her.<sup>44</sup>

A Conference of Ministers was held on 18<sup>th</sup> of September at 12 Noon to discuss the latest developments in Turkey. The Secretary of State for War reported the message he had received from General Harrington that he had informed Kemalists that the neutral zone of the Straits should be observed. He feared that unless immediate precautions were taken to strengthen the forces, Mustafa Kemal would easily march and capture Constantinople. Harrington believed that if the reinforcements from French arrived, they would hold Constantinople for three to four weeks. Lloyd George informed the members that navy in Mediterranean was notified and they had taken necessary precautions to deal with Kemalists if they attempted to cross to the European side of the Straits. Lord Lee and the First Lord of the Admiralty pointed out that according to Commander-in-Chief it was not possible to carry the surveillance sufficient enough to deter the Kemalists. He further commented that they might be compelled to use force and therefore commit an act of war against the Kemalists. The Conference agreed that the Admiralty should notify the Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean that navy was responsible for preventing of the passage of Mustafa Kemal's forces from Asia into Europe. Curzon inquired whether they could help to transport the Greek refugees amounting Hundred to Two Hundred thousand, and were waiting to be evacuated from Smyrna. The Conference decided that they should get prepared to carry the transportation if circumstances allowed them.

Worthington Evans discussed the military issue at Chanak and Gallipoli and told that the General Staff attached the greatest importance to the retention of Chanak in order to ensure the free passage of the Straits. They believed that if they were to be driven out of Chanak, then it would be difficult to defend Constantinople and besides they would require at least 20 divisions which meant a large scale of war. The Conference decided to prepare for embarkation and order the necessary shipping transport for the four battalions to the area. They also decided to ask General Allenby if he could send some of his force to General Harrington. The Conference decided that the necessary war material including howitzers were to be sent and mounted at Gallipoli and medium artillery to be transported from Malta or Gibraltar.

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<sup>44</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/208/3.

In addition to these measures Admiralty was tasked to dispatch 1,000 Royal Marines to Constantinople by the end of the week. The Air Ministry was tasked immediately to prepare and arrange shipping for a squadron of bombing airplanes and a squadron of fighters in addition to the two squadrons and the naval aircraft for which arrangements were already being made for Constantinople.<sup>45</sup>

Another Conference of Ministers was held on the same day to finalize some of the issues which were pending for further discussions. General Cavan, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff reported that one battalion had already arrived in Gallipoli and a second battalion would arrive on 21<sup>st</sup> of September. He further told that in addition, there was one British battalion, and quarter battalion of Italian troops at Chanak. He told that the two most important points to be considered were Chanak and Ismid Peninsula. It was pointed out that if Chanak could be held, they would be able to control Dardanelles and therefore communication and a free waterway. Since they would be having three more battalions at Chanak in ten days time, they believed that that force ought to be able to hold Chanak pending the arrival of further reinforcements. They were also shipping 6-inch howitzers from Malta and 1000 fully equipped marines would be arriving around 28<sup>th</sup> of September at Chanak. In addition to these a squadron from Egypt would be arriving in 10 days and two more squadrons leaving in ten days time. Lloyd George suggested that more battleships should be sent to East since a demonstration was of the highest importance as by a show off force and firmness, it was possible to prevent fighting. With the suggestion of Churchill, the Conference agreed to notify Mustafa Kemal that the advance of his troops into the neutral zone would be regarded as a hostile act, and therefore the British forces could act against the Kemalist troops the moment they infringed the zone.

Curzon told that the attitude of French at Constantinople was very different from that of the French Government at Paris. He was told that the French Navy would take no part in the naval operations against Turks and that the French Commander had no authority to cooperate with British. Poincare in his message to Curzon had told that there was no fear of aggressive action on the part of Mustafa Kemal and that therefore the precautionary measures taken by the British were not required. Poincare further pointed out that if the Maritza was to be agreed as a frontier and Turkish sovereignty over Straits, Smyrna and Adrianople then Kemalists would

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<sup>45</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 252-256.

accept it but if they were to give less then there would be a Turkish war throughout the world. Poincare also told that they had regarded the British approach to Serbs as most unfortunate and they would not in any event take part in any military operation with the Greek troops. Lloyd George commented that it was clear that Poincare had objected to their approaching the Balkan States on the question since he desired to do so himself to get them to come to the conference on his own terms.

Lloyd George considered that there was some reason to suspect that the French had believed that they were bluffing, but it was desirable that it should be made clear that Britain was serious and therefore he suggested that it would be a good thing if it became generally known in Constantinople that the action they were taking to send troops, airplanes and ships to demonstrate in Eastern Waters meant their firmness.<sup>46</sup>

Another Conference of Ministers was held on 19<sup>th</sup> of September before the departure of Curzon to Paris to evaluate the latest developments. The Government of Newfoundland consented to support the British Government that they had supported the attitude taken by the British Government against Turks. Curzon stated that Hardinge had reported from Paris that the French press was getting more critic of the British policy and it seemed that the French was unlikely to send any ships and troops against Turks. Curzon pointed out that instead of conveying a preliminary conference as was decided to be held in Venice, it would be more convenient to hold a general conference as soon as possible since the preliminary meeting would probably end-up with a dead-lock due to extreme desires of Turks. Lloyd George agreed with Curzon that he did not believe in the use of the preliminary conference and besides Turks would likely put up the terms for the final peace. Chamberlain commented that Britain could not undertake to maintain the Greeks in Thrace without the French help. Curzon stated that there was a possibility that they could ask to have a League of Nations State in Thrace and this might be extended so that a 'buffer state' could be formed. He believed that in practice no treaty could last more that ten to fifteen years, hence this buffer state was bound to be cleared off in future, but it would save them from the present problems. Curzon further stated that he was not proposing to make a fight for the Greeks in Thrace unless support from a European nation was assured. Chamberlain concluded that they should not hand Constantinople to Turks unless Turks signed the peace agreement with the Allies,

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid, p. 65-279.

but without French support they could not possibly hold Constantinople, hence they were determined to hold Gallipoli even if necessary by themselves. Curzon pointed out that in the plans of General Harrington and Rumbold the assumption was the French were to be with them and therefore if French were to be evacuating Chanak, they should evacuate Constantinople and concentrate on defending Gallipoli. Churchill was in the opinion that the French ought to be given the responsibility of Constantinople and they should concentrate on Chanak and with this scheme they would be able to control Gallipoli too. Lloyd George drew the attention that the French would be leaving Constantinople to Turks if Britain was to evacuate the town and leave the responsibility to French. He believed that with this attitude the French would be in a dominant position in this part of the world and as Curzon had pointed out the centre of the Moslem world.

Churchill reported that Canada was trying to find excuses not to support the British troops at Chanak as they had told that they would require parliamentary approval before definite assistance could be sent and New Zealand accepted to send forces for Gallipoli.

The Conference of Ministers concluded with a series of decision. It was decided that the arrangement of a Peace Conference for the reconsideration of the Treaty of Sevres was preferable to the holding of a preliminary conference. It was noted that Curzon in Paris should do his best to induce the French to cooperate in holding the neutral zone on the Asiatic side of the Straits until the Conference met.<sup>47</sup>

A statement for the British Policy with regard to Near East was distributed to the press on 16<sup>th</sup> of September. The précis of the statement was;

*“Great Britain is prepared to do her part in maintaining the freedom of the Straits and the existence of the neutral zones. To this end the British Government has decided to reinforce the troops under the command of Sir Charles Harrington and has given orders to the Mediterranean Fleet to oppose by every means any infraction of these zones or any attempt on the part of the Turks to cross to the European shore. The Powers with which Great Britain has been acting have been notified in this sense. The Ally Powers in the Balkans are also invited to take part in the defense of the zones. Also the Dominions have been invited to send contingents.”<sup>48</sup>*

The statement had a wide coverage in the papers. On the 18<sup>th</sup> of September ‘The Daily Telegraph’ and on 19<sup>th</sup> of September ‘Sunday Times’ published the latest developments and the stand of the British Government. It was stated that the

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<sup>47</sup> Ibid, p. 280-294.

<sup>48</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/209/5.

probable policy of Britain that the demands of Mustafa Kemal, if assented to, would result in total loss over Turkey in the last war. It was stated that the British Government regarded the effective and permanent freedom of the Straits as a vital necessity and for this reason the British Government had prepared to make exertions. The paper claimed that the British Government convinced that, their views were shared by France and Italy. Sunday Times stated that the question of Constantinople was quite different since it had been foreseen that almost two years ago it was left to Turks. According to Sunday Times the British Government was wishing that a conference should be held as soon as possible to secure a stable peace with Turkey and the conference could be put in danger if the Kemalists attacked the neutral zones of Constantinople, the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. It was also reported that the French and British High Commissioners had notified the Angora Government that they had the expectations that Turks would respect the neutral zone. The paper commented that the presence of Turks in Europe would provoke a situation which would lead to war in Balkans and very likely lead to bloodshed. The Sunday Times stated that the British Government had invited the three concerned states, namely Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria with a view of their taking a part in the effective defense of the neutral zones. The Government had also communicated with the Dominions to participate in the defense of the zones. The Paper further stated that the British Fleet was ordered to oppose by every means any infraction of the neutral zones by the Turks or any attempt by them to cross to the European shore. It was stated that the British Government had the intention to reinforce and if necessary to a considerable extent, the troops at the disposal of General Harington.<sup>49</sup>

Meanwhile the Foreign Office was trying to arrange the deportation of refugees from Smyrna, and reports from Armenian source indicated that thousands of Christians were murdered by Turks. This claim by Armenians was noted by Edmund from Foreign Office that; *"This Armenian account of course exaggerates the figures of killed, both British and Armenian"*<sup>50</sup> For the refugees and the Christian population in Thrace especially after Angora's request for the Thrace, made the Foreign Office to consider that; *"In view of recent Turkish policy, culminating in events at Smyrna, it would be criminal to return any more territory with a large Christian population, in E. Thrace, to the Turkish rule. The utmost publicity should be given to the Smyrna*

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<sup>49</sup> Lloyd George Papers Lloyd George/F/209/5, 'The Daily Telegraph' of 18<sup>th</sup> September and 'Sunday Times' of 19<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1922.

<sup>50</sup> PRO, FO 371/7890, E 9552.

*events and to the refugee situation general*"<sup>51</sup> Therefore propaganda machinery had already staged against the Turks to gain the public support claiming that the Turks might commit atrocities in Thrace too. The Angora Government complained on 17<sup>th</sup> of September that the refugees from Smyrna had been transported from Smyrna to build a Greek majority in Thrace and at the same time these refugees were active in committing atrocities in Adrianople area as they did before leaving Asia Minor.<sup>52</sup> Anyhow the plea from Angora was not going to be considered by the Foreign Office. Meanwhile Balfour as the President of the League of Nations applied to the British Government whether he could act as an intermediary in the Turkish-Greek conflict. Foreign Office considered that since negotiations were continuing in Paris with Poincare, intervention of Balfour might embarrass Curzon and therefore they should wait for the developments.<sup>53</sup> The Foreign Office, was considering that Eastern Thrace should not handed over to Turks before obtaining guarantees for the Straits and the nationalities.<sup>54</sup>

The Conference of Ministers met on the following day of 20<sup>th</sup> of September to discuss the issue again, since the events were taking place very rapidly. The Conference noted the message received from Curzon that the French seemed to be determined to satisfy the demands of Mustafa Kemal and were not prepared to give any military assistance. Secretary of State for War informed the conference that the Turkish cavalry might be in touch with the British cavalry on the neutral zone that day. According to Churchill, there could be no greater blow to British prestige than the rigid evacuation of Chanak. He believed that it was most desirable that Chanak should be held, even at the expense of British evacuation of Ismid and Constantinople. Lloyd George was also in favour of retaining the Chanak position even if they had to reinforce from Ismid. The Secretary of State for War suggested that the French Government to be notified that it was not possible for Britain to hold Ismid, Constantinople and Chanak at the same time, where the latter was the most important position and that they proposed of leaving Constantinople for the French protection. Lloyd George was doubtful for leaving Constantinople to French since the non-Turkish elements were available to defend the town as 20,000 Greeks had already volunteered for assistance. The Conference noted with satisfaction that New Zealand was ready to send troops to the area and already 5000 men were enrolled for service. It was also pointed that the battalions from Britain were on the way to the

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid, E 9552, W.G. Osborne's 'Note' which was approved by Oliphant and Curzon.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, E 9563.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, E 9572.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.

area and General Allenby had arranged for more support from Egypt. The conference noted that Chanak zone had been under the control of Britain ever since the armistice and even the Greek troops were not allowed to enter into the zone when they were chasing the Turkish bandits. Lloyd George thought this fact should be conveyed to the press, to show the world that Britain had not been assisting Greek aspirations in any way. The Conference discussed Balfour's message as the possible attitude of the British Delegation to the proposal of Dr. Nansen for the League of Nations to act as an intermediary in the conflict of Greco-Turkish. It was decided that with the approval of Curzon, they would have no objection to the proposal.<sup>55</sup>

A 'Conference of 'Ministers' was held again in the evening. The Ministers discussed the message sent by Curzon with regard to the meeting he had with Poincare and Count Sforza. It seemed that the French had agreed after the presentation of Curzon that a general conference for the settlement of the Turkish question should be held and further agreed to use their influence on Mustafa Kemal to abstain from any military action which might harm the success or even the meeting of the proposed conference. Curzon told in his message that he had made it clear that Britain was prepared to act alone in the defense of the Straits. He had given the preparations that Britain was carrying out which made Poincare to take up a more moderate attitude. It was decided in Paris that the basis of the proposed Conference was to be examined by the Allied ministers in Paris on 22<sup>nd</sup> September. The Conference decided to inform Harrington to be at liberty to accept offers made by the inhabitants of Constantinople for the defense of the town but with the suggestion of Chamberlain the Greeks to be enrolled, should be registered as Ottoman citizens, otherwise the Kemalists would claim that Britain was giving direct assistance to the Greek population. Lloyd George commented on the report prepared by joint forces on the same day that it was essential to maintain a footing on the Asiatic shores both on Bosphorus and Dardanelles until the threat materialized. The Military officials once more drew the importance of the necessity of reinforcement of Chanak. They were confident that the British troops would have no difficulty in beating off any attack coming from Kemalists.<sup>56</sup> Lloyd George was so content with the developments in Paris that he expressed his gratitude to Curzon.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 295-305.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid, p. 306-320.

<sup>57</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, No:4470.

The Ministers met again under the chairmanship of Lloyd George in a Conference on the following day of 21<sup>st</sup> of Sep. 1922. The Secretary of State for War informed the Conference that General Harington reported that the French and Italians had been ordered to withdraw from Chanak and Ismid. It was also reported from Smyrna that Turkish troops were moving north and according to Turkish officials, they seemed to be determined to attack the neutral zone. The Conference decided that Curzon should insist that the freedom of Straits was essential and therefore Chanak and Gallipoli should be permanently under the protection of League of Nations. The Conference gave a free hand to Curzon for the Thrace but a military resistance for the Maritza boundary should not be adopted by Curzon and he should be fully authorized to make any arrangements which would secure peace, The Conference also decided to inform Balfour that Cabinet had welcome the assistance of the League of Nations in securing a peaceful settlement in Near East.<sup>58</sup>

Meanwhile the representatives of General Council of the Trades Union Congress including leaders of the Labour Party had a meeting with the Prime Minister who was accompanied by Chamberlain, Horne and Worthington Evans, on 21<sup>st</sup> September. The meeting was important to show the thoughts of the biggest and influential civil organization such as Trades Union in Britain. Representatives were appointed by the General Council of the Congress as to express organized Labor's voice on the question of war and on the Near East position in particular. The representatives claimed that they were expressing the views of the British people and the working class as being one absolutely antagonistic to war. They told that they were not alleging the British Cabinet for war since the Ministers could not be so ridiculous, mad or stupid; but things they feared might drift as other wars had drifted. The representatives gave a detail of the conditions they were in, such that the condition of unemployment, the conditions arising out of the war and the disasters which followed to the British trade were such that it caused resentment, loss of trust and even lack of optimism in the country. They commented that the press had confused views of the case, but they believed that they stood for the freedom of the Straits or the freedom of navigation in any part of the world and they had no quarrel neither with Turks or Greeks and furthermore they were mindful of their relations with the Moslem World. They remarked that they were against the war and would organize opposition to any kind of war.

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<sup>58</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 321-326.

The woman delegate of the Congress and a member of the Representatives stated that the Government's call to the Colonies had been significant in the sense that war was considered as a means of settling religious and economic questions. The Representatives threatened the Prime Minister that no matter how united the Cabinet might be and how determined the Prime Minister was, the determined and strong labour movement in Britain would make it disastrous from the point of the Empire.

The representatives of the Congress gave their aims with regard to the Straits and the British policy. They told that in February 1918 they had agreed on the war aim of the Prime Minister as; *"It is further suggested that the peace of the world requires that the Dardanelles should be permanently and effectively neutralized and open like all the main lines of marine communication under the control of the League of Nations free to all nations without hindrance or customs duty."*<sup>59</sup> They further told that they reiterated their position in the International Congress at Lausanne in 1919 and they adopted the policy as; *"The Conference protests against the policy of the Entente in Asia Minor and especially against the military occupation by troops of the Greek Government in the pay of the Entente of the town and village of Smyrna where the Turkish population is five times greater than the Greek."*<sup>60</sup> They claimed that the speech that Lloyd George delivered in 1918 was in contradiction to his remarks in the Parliament on 29<sup>th</sup> of April 1921, which was; *"We have to guard the Straits-that is our charge-Palestine and Mesopotamia."*<sup>61</sup> The representatives pointed out that 'we' in that speech indicated Britain which was contradictory of an international control under the League of Nations. They further told that they had believed and still believed the support as a Government had given to the Greeks, and this support had been aggregating the situation. They stated that in this matter they were neither pro-Turk nor anti-Greek.

The representatives went on criticizing Lloyd George that;

*"It has been your special privilege as well as your pleasure to lecture us on many occasions about threats. I have had to sit here and in other places and to hear some very nice homilies from you as to how much better we could get our way without threats. We believe that of all the things which have contributed towards this difficulty, the chief has been your own attitude and I would conclude by saying that when we talk about the interests of the Straits, we do not mean the exclusion of either Germany or Russia. When we talk of a League of Nations, we want it to be a League of Nations, that is to say, a League of all nations."*<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Lloyd George Papers Lloyd George/F/209/6..

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

Lloyd George tried to reply in saying that they had taken strong measures in the course of the last few days and it had been because they would have the effect of averting that conflict. Lloyd George continued in stating that; *“But if we had drifted along trusting merely to verbal protests, you might have had a condition of things that would have made war inevitable, that would have carried the torch of war, pillage, outrage, and murder from Asia into Europe.”*<sup>63</sup>

Lloyd George told the delegates that they had never paid any money to Greeks and never supported them in money or in arms. He told that the Greeks had approached for a loan in the London Market, but they had failed. With a Government's guarantee they could have had it but the Government had not given this guarantee. He told that the Greeks went to Smyrna on their own expense and likewise, Italians to Adalia, and French to Cilicia. Lloyd George told that this was a part of the general policy which the Trades Unions had supported at that time. Lloyd George further told that they had not given anything to the Greeks and this was not the question of Greeks and Armenians, it was a question of preventing war spreading into Europe. Lloyd George told that they cared for the Straits to be opened for a free passage and the other issues such as minorities and borders were up to negotiations.

Curzon reported on 21<sup>st</sup> of September from Paris that the following day on 22<sup>nd</sup> of September they would be having a meeting with Poincare and Italy to decide the details of the Conference that had been decided on the previous day to hold as soon as possible to reach peace in the Greco-Turkish conflict. He believed that the Kemalists backed by France and Italy would be demanding for full acceptance of the National Pact as a condition of accepting to attend the conference and possibly other conditions such as retirement of Greeks from Thrace and place of meeting. Curzon believed that he could fight with such arguments and especially against France in arguing that; they could not possibly decide on main issues in the absence of Romania and Serbia whose attendance to the conference were essential. Another point that Curzon was thinking to make use of was the moral issues that France had deserted her Allies. Curzon discussed the problem areas for the Cabinet's consideration. Curzon proposed that for Constantinople as was decided in March 1922 it was to be retained by Turks and would be evacuated by the Allied forces pending on the ratification of peace by Turks. He had foreseen difficulties in arranging for demilitarization of Asiatic shores of Bosphorus, but he believed that steps should be taken by the League of Nations to supervise the free passage

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

through the Straits and at the same time demilitarizing of the area. Curzon stated that in his meeting with Poincare and Count Sforza, the day before, Britain declined to accept the proposed border as Maritza and he had proposed and would do the same that provided that Kemalists respected the neutral zone for Ismid Peninsula, he would accept the Enos-Istranja [Enez-Istranca], as was decided in March 1922 Conference.<sup>64</sup>

Curzon suggested that their attitude with regard to Thrace should be based on broad terms on British imperial interests, provided that they could safeguard Gallipoli which was the main interest, Curzon did not care for the exact boundary. Curzon found eligible application of the pre-considered area under League of Nations with a Turkish flag flying. He believed that Britain should insist not to fix anything at the moment and leave it for Conference to decide the final solution for Thrace. Curzon pointed out that the most difficult part in the meeting might be the Gallipoli. He proposed to discuss with Serbs and Romanians if they could provide troops for Gallipoli under the League of Nations. He believed that Poincare seemed to be hesitant to leave the place under the influence of Britain; therefore he might be willing to participate for the force. He also believed that Chanak should be either held or to be demilitarized. Curzon proposed to the Cabinet whether he would act in the line he outlined or to be directed in other form.

Churchill had a meeting on 22<sup>nd</sup> of September with Worthington Evans, Lord Lee, and representatives of War Office, Imperial General Staff and Foreign Office for consideration Lloyd George's message with regard to Turkey. In the message Lloyd George conveyed his preference to strengthening their power in Gallipoli and suggested that different size of howitzers be mounted at Chanak to disable Mustafa Kemal's moves. He brought up strengthening air power and stated that a combination of naval guns, bombing and firing they could make it impossible for the Turks to approach Chanak. He further stated that; *"It would be a great triumph if we could defeat a heavy Turkish attack alone without any assistance from the French and demonstrate to the world that even from a military point of view we are not as helpless as our enemies of every description imagine us to be."*<sup>65</sup> The Military authorities and Ministers discussed Lloyd George's suggestion and decided that the Air Ministry should make preliminary arrangements for sending to General Harington's command a squadron of Bristol fighter airplanes and consider dispatching a fresh bombing squadron to the area. Sir William Tyrell,

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<sup>64</sup> Lloyd George Papers Lloyd George/F/209/6.

<sup>65</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 336-337.

the Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign Office informed the Conference that he had received a message from Curzon that he had expressed regret that orders had been sent to the Military authorities in the area to prevent Nationalists crossing to Europe through the Straits, Marmara, or Black Sea. Curzon told that these actions seemed very provocative. The Secretary of Cabinet, Hankey gave the summary of the circumstances when the minutes were drawn for the meeting of 20<sup>th</sup> of September. He told that he had questions whether any movement of Turks in the Sea of Marmara would be considered as provocative or to be allowed. Hankey further told that he got in touch with Lloyd George and told that;

*"After consulting the Prime Minister, Mr. Davies [Lloyd George's Private Secretary] told me that the Prime Minister's view is that no Kemalists forces must be allowed to cross the salt water. The moment a Kemalists gets afloat he must be dealt with. If he believes that there is a danger of Kemalists forces crossing the Straits, the Admiral must use his discretion to take any action which he deems essential to prevent this."*<sup>66</sup>

The Cabinet was obviously trying to gain time. In an intercepted telegram on 16<sup>th</sup> of September, sent by Ferid the representative of Angora in Paris, stated that British Government's policy lacked popular support and the greater part of the press were against war. Ferid by giving reference to the Trade Unions' visit to Lloyd George also mentioned that they favoured peace too and would try to prevent a war. The Miner's Union too had stood against the Government's policy and there were some demonstrations against war.<sup>67</sup>

The loneliness of Britain among her Allies was quite apparent during Curzon's meeting with Poincare and Count Sforza in Paris. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss terms of possible general agreement between themselves as to bases of future conference, and also discuss concessions to Mustafa Kemal. Curzon first took up the problem areas, namely Thrace, Constantinople and Straits. For Thrace, Curzon was considering forming a buffer state under League of Nations in Eastern Thrace, commenting;

*"I instantly and indignantly repudiated this charge whereupon Poincare lost all command of his temper and for a quarter of an hour shouted and raved at the top his voice, putting words into my mouth which I had never uttered, refusing to permit the slightest interruption or correction, saying that he would make public the insult to France, quoting a telegram from Athens to the effect that the British Minister had asked the Greek Government to furnish 60 000 men for the defense of Thrace and the Straits, and behaving like a demented school-master screaming at a guilty school-boy. I have never seen so deplorable or undignified a scene."*<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid, p. 332-333

<sup>67</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/208/3.

<sup>68</sup> PRO, CAB 24/139, and Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/208/3, telegram from Lord Hardinge to Foreign Office on 22<sup>nd</sup> Sep.1922.

Back home, Cabinet met on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September to discuss the directives to be given to Curzon. The Cabinet decided on recognition that of the policy originally adopted by the Allies at the Paris Peace Conference that the Turks could not be trusted in future to rule races alien to them in nationality and religious and should in future be confined to the governments of purely Turkish peoples. Discussing refusals of France and United States of America to assume mandates, withdrawal of Italians from Adalia and the Greek defeat, found it inevitable to change her policy for the Eastern Thrace, and considered leaving a certain portion including Adrianople to Turkish sovereignty. In order to compromise, two conditions was demanded; (a) That it should be made perfectly clear that effective precautions for the security, protection and enjoyment by all nations of the freedom of the waters between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and Constantinople, and (b) Adequate considerations were necessary for the protections of racial and religious minorities.

The Cabinet also decided to ask Curzon that in the event if these were rejected by France and Italy, then Britain should separately and independently make her presentation to the Angora Government. With Lloyd George's initiation it was decided that Curzon should be told that in the event that France disagreed with the British proposal then the whole questions should be referred to the League of Nations. The Cabinet had approved the decisions reached by the Committee the day before to send additional troops and war material, if required, to Chanak. Another decision was for the Prime Minister to give a statement in the lines of;

*"...that the British forces at Chanak were ensuring the carrying out of the armistice with Turkey which the Turkish Nationalist Forces threatened to break, (b) that the British attitude was not in the smallest degree based on a desire to take up the [?] on behalf of Greek interests in Thrace or elsewhere, (c) that the terms of the Proclamation issued by General Harington warning to the Turkish Nationalists to avoid the neutral zone, were the same as those which he had issued when the Greeks were threatening Constantinople."*<sup>69</sup>

Churchill had a series of meeting with the Military Authorities on 23<sup>rd</sup>, 25<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> September to follow up the meeting of 22<sup>nd</sup> of September with regard to the preparations for Chanak and Gallipoli in man power and war material.

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<sup>69</sup> PRO, Cabinet 50(22), CAB 23/31, p.59-92.

Meanwhile the situation in Constantinople was getting tense and Curzon on the 24<sup>th</sup> had Sir Graham in Rome to ask for the Italian support in the city, pointing out that otherwise they might face the danger of abandoning the city.<sup>70</sup>

Churchill with the decision reached at the Cabinet informing the Dominions about the developments in Turkey as decided by the Cabinet sent a message on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September to the Dominions that Curzon, during his visit to Paris met the King, Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Serbia. The Serbs seemed to be suspicious and only wanted to make certain that Thrace never given to Bulgaria and the Serbian Parliament would never agree to participate in the garrison at Gallipoli. Later the Serbs changed their decision and told Curzon that they would be willing to send 160-200 men, and even might be increased to one or two divisions. Churchill also told that the Romania was in full support of the British views.<sup>71</sup> Churchill also informed Dominions that on the same day Curzon was consulting Poincare and Count Sforza for the invitation the Angora Government for a conference with the participation of Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece, to draw up the final treaty of peace with Turkey and settlement between Greece and Turkey. The Dominions were assured of serious peace attempts by indicating that negotiations were to be supervised under the League of Nations.<sup>72</sup>

Churchill informed the Dominions on 25<sup>th</sup> September about a report that Harington had sent. Harington reported that 2000 Turkish Cavalry had returned to Erenkeui [Erenkoy] near Chanak more than 20 miles inside neutral zone. Mustafa Kemal was being informed of this and told that Turks should withdraw from the neutral zone to prevent fighting. Turks were told to be mounting guns around Chanak, and the situation was getting quite serious. Churchill told that they were led to hope that Turks were not going to to attack the neutral zone, but the situation had been building up on the contrary to what they had believed.<sup>73</sup>

The Cabinet met on 25<sup>th</sup> of September to discuss the latest developments in Turkey. Curzon gave a brief review about the meetings he had with Poincare and Count Sforza. He told that he had achieved more than what the Cabinet had decided and further elaborated on the issues. Poincare wished to include that the Allies had agreed to insert in the 'Note' to be sent to Angora the words of 'in accordance with

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<sup>70</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/209/6, CP 4222.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid.

the full terms of the national pact'. Curzon had refused to agree with Poincare, although the Cabinet had agreed for the return of Eastern Thrace to Turkish sovereignty. Instead Curzon had insisted and succeeded in obtaining more favourable conditions in the 'Note' as 'Turkey should recover Thrace as far as Maritza and Adrianople. The Cabinet had agreed for the Greek troops to retard behind Maritza, but Curzon succeeded in arranging the line to be fixed by the Allied Generals in agreement with the Greek and Turkish Military authorities at the Mudania [Mudanya] Conference. Poincare had wished to convert the Mudania Conference into a preliminary conference, but as a result of Curzon the Mudania Conference was confined to a single issue conference which was determining the line for the Greeks to be withdrawn. The reason for Curzon resisting for to the preliminary conference in Mudania was his belief that in the Conference France, and Italy would be against each British proposal and he was hoping that at the mean time Britain might be successful in obtaining the full support of the Serbs and Romanians although they had so much fear from French.

Curzon told the Cabinet that the 'Note' was sent to Mustafa Kemal had provisions for the Turkish troops, not to enter the neutral zone before and during the conference. Curzon then explained the latest developments in the area. He warned the Cabinet that Mustafa Kemal would probably was to insist the withdrawal of the British troops from the Asiatic side and particularly from Chanak as a condition for the conference. Curzon pointed out that in this circumstances they should either abandon the idea of sending further troops or apply censor to the press coverage for the movement of the British troops. It was pointed out that to check the arrival of the reinforcement would be very dangerous. On the other hand the condition of the press was so hostile to the Government's policy for the Near East, and therefore would almost certainly refuse not to publish movements of troops. At the beginning of the crisis the papers had been told not to publish news, to a certain extent, with regard to the area, but later, they had represented that the movements of the troops were being published locally both at Britain and abroad, and lately wider publicity was being given to all such movements. The Cabinet decided that establishment of censorship was not desirable, for publishing particulars of the movement of the forces.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>74</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 51(22).

The Cabinet discussed the measures to prevent the passage of Straits by the Turkish troops. The Admiralty stated that the railway and roads to seashore of the Bosphorus from Ismid Peninsula was to be controlled by ships and the passage was under the firing distance from the ships. In addition to the ships, the Air Force was able to prevent the Turks to reach the shores of Bosphorus, provided that the Allies still held Constantinople. In the event that they had to abandon Constantinople, then an advance of Turkish troops along the Ismid Peninsula would not be prevented unless they called the naval forces from Black Sea. Instructions had been sent to Harington that Chanak and Gallipoli were their first priority, Constantinople the second and Ismid Peninsula was the third, and Harington was told to leave Constantinople as the most last resort. It was believed that in case of an attack by Mustafa Kemal to Constantinople, considering the availability of 20,000 gunned Turks in town, Harington should withdraw from Constantinople to Gallipoli.

Lloyd George expressed the view that General Harington could utilize 20,000 Greeks to form a civil guard to help for the maintenance of order in Constantinople. He further stated that if it became clear that the safety of Chanak was secured, and that no serious attack on that place was contemplated, then it might be possible to transfer some of the troops from Chanak to Constantinople and Ismid Peninsula. The Military authorities believed that as soon as Mustafa Kemal advanced along Ismid Peninsula towards Constantinople, they should withdraw from Constantinople to Gallipoli since no doubt there would be an uprising in the city and it was difficult to fight in a hostile capital. They believed that in the event of evacuating Constantinople, the blame would rest on French, Italians, Serbs and Romanians who had denied any military support them in the problem areas. The Cabinet decided that for the time being they should refrain from provocations in Constantinople such as interfering with shipping as once was considered.

The Cabinet discussed the presence of Greek war ships in Constantinople and agreed that Curzon would make presentations at Athens to withdraw them to a Greek port until there was a requirement at Constantinople. The Cabinet also decided to form a small Cabinet Committee to report directly to the Cabinet for the military matters in Chanak and Constantinople.<sup>75</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Ibid, Cabinet 51(22).

The idea of a pact of Balkan countries acting with Britain against the Turks had been proposed in the Cabinet and the Foreign Office had prepared a Memorandum on the subject. The Memorandum, prepared on 14<sup>th</sup> of September, analyzed the attitude of each nation in Balkans to contribute in preventing the Turks from recovering control over Constantinople and the Straits. It was foreseen that it was in the interest of Romania that the freedom of the Straits should be maintained and that the Black Sea should not become Russo-Turkish Lake. It was obviously in the interests of Yugoslavia to prevent Turkey and Bulgaria having a long common frontier and to avoid any possible insurgent for Macedonia. The Foreign Office commented that the policy of both Romania and Yugoslavia should be similar to the British policy against Turks. It was predicted that if these countries were to be invited to a conference on the question of Turkey, they were to be expected to be on their side and therefore adopting a policy against France and Italy. Foreign Office commented that under the circumstances they were in they required to expect not only diplomatic support from these countries but also a material such as men power support. Foreign Office suggested in the Memorandum that it was necessary to consider whether the desire of Romania and Yugoslavia to prevent the Turks returning to Europe was sufficient enough for sending their troops to assist the British or Allied forces. It was foreseen that for internal reasons Romania might hesitate to get involved in any foreign adventure and their hesitation could be increased by the fear of a possible Bolshevik movement against them. Foreign Office was more optimistic for Yugoslavia's support. It was conceivable that they might consider giving them effective support at Constantinople, but they would do it for a price. Foreign Office was predicting that the price might include loan, support for Fiume against Italians and large concessions from Greece such as in the railways from Salonika and Serbia and even a part of Salonika.

Foreign Office's prediction for Bulgaria was quite pessimistic with regard to support to Britain, since Bulgaria would be content with Turks returning to Constantinople and Thrace. They might have the planning of attacking Greece with Turks to get Western Thrace and Dedeagatch [Dedeagac]. Therefore, according to Foreign Office, to secure the Bulgarian cooperation was quite unlikely, and the most Britain could do was to prevent her turning against Britain. There was a possibility to obtain Bulgarian support offering Western Thrace, released from all reparation payments. It was pointed out that the price for the support of Bulgaria was too high to pay for the limited help since her military power was not that high.

Foreign Office also considered Greek support, but after considering that with the absence of Venizelos in power, the condition at Athens was not very promising.<sup>76</sup>

Lloyd George concentrated on obtaining the Romanian support against the Turks, and he had a meeting, accompanied by Churchill, with the Charge D'Affaires of Romania on 19<sup>th</sup> of September. Romanian Government replied his request that Romania was prepared to cooperate with the Allied Powers by sending troops to Constantinople, since she feared the possible combination of Turkey, Bulgaria and Russia. The Romanian Government emphasized the necessity that Romania should participate both in the discussion and on the decisions. Romanian Charge D'Affaires conveyed the wish of his Government that they wished to know what kind of a military detachment, the Powers expected and what measures were to be taken for securing command of the Black Sea. Lloyd George told him that Britain had a powerful navy stationed in Black Sea and Constantinople; therefore she had the means to control Black Sea, and Marmara Sea. Britain promised her that security as well as ammunition would be provided for Romania.<sup>77</sup> Romania was going to approach to Britain with quite a long shopping list, but after the fall of Lloyd George from power.

## **VII.2: Lloyd George and Chanak Crisis:**

As time progressed, it became apparent that the British foreign policy was becoming a complete failure not only in Turkey but in Iraq as well. Churchill wrote to Lloyd George on 1<sup>st</sup> of Sep.1922 that the Turkish threat and danger was getting worse and King Feisal was playing the fool and he was disturbing some of the provinces. Churchill was having difficulties in maintaining the British troops in Mosul. Being forced to keep the troops there, all throughout the year, because of the threat of the Angora Government, had already upset the program of relief and would lead to expenditures beyond provision. Churchill was aware that he could not possibly withdraw these forces without practically inviting the Turks to come in. In some parts of Northern Iraq defense against Turkish raiders and Kurdish sympathizers was a source of anxiety to him. Churchill was wondering if there was a political strength to face a disaster in Iraq since he knew that there was no possibility of sending

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<sup>76</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/13/3/32.

<sup>77</sup> PRO, CAB 23/36, S-64.

reinforcements from either Britain or India to Iraq. Churchill stated that their policy in Iraq was not supported by the public in Britain and there was no newspaper in the country which favoured their presence there. He believed that any alternative Government would gain popularity by deciding the evacuation from Iraq. He did not know really what benefits they, as Britain was concerned, were getting out of it. He thought that owing to the difficulties with the United States, no progress had been made on the oil issue and Britain was getting to the end of his resources. He proposed evacuating Iraq unless Feisal really begged them to stay and accepted the British terms in regard to efficient control. Churchill inquired from Lloyd George for definite guidance as to what he was prepared to do, since he believed that the victories of Mustafa Kemal would increase their difficulties throughout the Islamic world. He concluded in saying that they were paying eight million pound per year for the privilege of living on an ungrateful volcano out of which they were in no circumstances to get anything worth having.<sup>78</sup>

Lloyd George replied Churchill on 5<sup>th</sup> September and agreed with him that the situation in Iraq required a careful consideration, and he should bring the subject to the Cabinet's consideration. Lloyd George believed that the whole problem had risen out of the decision to attack the Turks in Mesopotamia and this was a wrong decision. To be effective, he believed that they had to leave their base on the sea for hundreds of miles in a torrid country utterly unfit for 'white people's' fighting. Lloyd George commented that they ought to concentrate on Gallipoli and Palestine or Alexandretta [Iskenderun]. Lloyd George had found the reason in somewhere else: since the decision was taken before he became the Prime Minister and was not even a member of the War Cabinet; therefore the responsibility was not on his shoulders. He believed that in provoking the Turks, they had to determine a battle ground and Mesopotamia was already the source of their present problems. He specified that when he became Prime Minister, he had no other choice but to continue fighting against the Turks there; otherwise they would have weakened their position throughout the Islamic world, especially after their defeat at Kut and withdrawal from Gallipoli. Lloyd George in a way was having a post mortem to Churchill and was trying to explain the reasons behind their Middle-East policies. He told that after the armistice they had the responsibility of liberating the Arabs from

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<sup>78</sup> The Beaverbrook Papers, BBK/G/3/4.

Turkish sovereignty, and they were bound to assist them in setting up Arab governments, if they were not prepared to govern by themselves. Lloyd George believed that if they had failed in Iraq, it was because they had not taken steps during years of occupation to prospect the possibilities of the country. He thought that if they had to leave Iraq then, they might find a year or two after they had departed that the French or Americans would be coming to hold the richest oil-fields in the world.<sup>79</sup>

Lloyd George held a press-conference on 23<sup>rd</sup> Sep.1922 to explain the situation in Turkey and the British policy with respect to the developments there. Lloyd George started his speech by saying that he wanted to make clear that no action that they had been taking during last few days, had anything to do what happened between Greeks and Turks, as he carefully refraining from pronouncing that the Greeks lost the war and had to flee from Anatolia. He still believed or wanted convince the public that they were still in control of the events there by saying that settlement to be put into in, Anatolia or Thrace, was a matter to be determined by a conference between the Allies and the concerned states. Therefore he continued in saying that their reinforcement at Dardanelles and in Bosphorus had nothing to do with the settlement between the Greeks and the Turks. He told that their action had been dictated by two essential considerations. The first consideration was their concern for freedom of the seas between the Mediterranean and Black Sea since the last war demonstrated its importance for the British Empire, commerce wise as well as for security. Lloyd George told that signing peace without securing them; it would mean that they had lost the war in this part of the world.

The second objective was to prevent the war from spreading into Europe. He explained that the Turkish army committed atrocities at Smyrna and if such an army which was prevented by its commanders from such outrages was to be allowed to cross into Europe and occupy Constantinople where hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Greeks and many thousands of Europeans lived, all these peoples' life would be put into danger. Lloyd George further commented that Turks crossing into Europe that a possible Balkan war with participation of Turks, Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs could break that would be very difficult to be extinguished or arrested. He reminded that the Great War of 1914 began in the Balkans, hence

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<sup>79</sup> Ibid

implying that by not allowing the Turks to cross into Europe, they were possibly preventing a new Great War.

Lloyd George continued his press conference by giving examples how they had been impartial to both Greeks and Turks. He mentioned that when the Greeks tried to cross into the neutral zone at Chanak while they were chasing the Turkish bandits, they had warned them off and they had to leave the area. The second example he gave was on when the Greeks threatened to march towards Constantinople few weeks before and therefore crossing the Chatalja Line, Greeks, then, were warned by the Allies and they had the retreat back, although the action of the Greeks would have been from a military point of view a formidable move for the Turkish attack to Smyrna.

Lloyd George told that from military point of view it was essential that Chanak should be held in order to secure the freedom of the Straits and they had no intention to hold Gallipoli or Chanak for the interests of Britain alone, but for the interests of all nations alike under the auspices of League of Nations.

Lloyd George told that they were refraining from the agreed policy of the Allies as of 1918. He further told that;

*“The massacres in Asia Minor in 1914 and 1915 were responsible for the death of something like one and a half millions of Christian population. That is generally accepted. There was no provocation, there was no insurrection, there was no rising against Turkish rule. It was purely wanton and cold-blooded, and the Allies, considering the position in 1919, felt that they were under an obligation to say that there should be no recurrence of these terrors.”*<sup>80</sup>

Britain seemed to be deserted in her fight for Chanak, Gallipoli and Constantinople. They had believed that French deserted her by drawing their troops from Chanak and in addition, the Italians were not supporting them for the security of Constantinople and Ismid areas. To safeguard the Dardanelles passage, from military point of view, Britain was in need of holding Chanak and Gallipoli, and on the other hand Constantinople was important to prevent the Turks passing to the European shore and also for the British prestige in the East, since they would not like to be in the position of yielding to the desires of the Turks. They were not content with the attitude of ‘friends’. Lloyd George seemed to be sure that Romania and Yugoslavia would come and support them, but they turned out to be reluctant to give military support in time although they did not deny of sending their troops to

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<sup>80</sup> ‘The Times’ of 25<sup>th</sup> Sep.1922, p. 15

save Britain in Near East. Meanwhile the British press was critic of the Government's East policy, and the most organized Trades Union and the leadership of Labour Party were openly opposing to the Government. The unemployment and the Irish question were creating unrest in the public and the worn out British society did oppose to a new war which did not really concern them. The Dominions, although backed the harsh policy of Britain were also reluctant to send any military support in time to save them from her problems. The report received from Commander-in-Chief of Mediterranean was quite clear indication of the circumstances of Britain in the Near East.

It was reported on 26<sup>th</sup> of September that the naval artillery support of military operation on Ismid Peninsula was implemented but the whole of the situation had been altered by refusal of French and Italians to cooperate and therefore it was not recommended to have an effective resistance to Turkish advances on Ismid. Harington proposed to evacuate and return to Gallipoli if attacked by Turks, since it was most impracticable to conduct war from the enemy's capital. From military point of view, in the event that Nationalists attacked Ismid and the British forces drawn to Gallipoli, the naval firing and aircrafts would delay the advance of Turks to Constantinople, but would not be sufficient to prevent them in reaching the city. It was foreseen that further naval attack would undoubtedly provoke reprisals in Constantinople. He further proposed that in the event of a Turkish attack they would evacuate Ismid and Constantinople and retire to Dardanelles and accept the fighting there and meanwhile mount the guns which were to arrive from Britain and Egypt.<sup>81</sup>

Chamberlain chaired the meeting of the Committee of Ministers on 27<sup>th</sup> September with the participation of Curzon, Worthington Evans. Secretary for War, Churchill, Secretary for Colonies and Lord Lee, the First Lord of the Admiralty, to discuss the questions arising out of General Harington's telegram of the same day.

Worthington Evans told that the telegram from Harington indicated and he believed the General Staff was likely to advice the evacuation of Chanak, subject to certain conditions and to retire to Gallipoli, leaving an advance guard at Chanak. Curzon believed that Harington was suggesting that they were to give to the Turks at once what they were going to require obtaining from the Conference. Churchill

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<sup>81</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/209/6, CP 4235.

commented that the Cabinet had to some extent, staked their prestige on holding of Chanak. He had the view that in few days time, if Kemalists were to continue in advancing into the neutral zone, there was no hesitation on their behalf that the fighting would start. If the fighting occurred, they should respond by calling up reserves and mobilizing divisions. He further told that New Zealand and Australia were willing to send troops and certainly the period of time until they arrived was important and they ought to obtain help from Greeks if it was offered to them. He believed that a large portion of the Greek army had not been demobilized and might be sufficient, for example, to hold the European side of the Bosphorus. Curzon remarked that surely they could not contemplate a war with the Turks when Greeks were their only ally.

Worthington Evans told that he believed the General Staff was making its recommendation of evacuation on the assumption that they could not allow the Turks to proceed as at present for another forty-eight hours. If they had refused to retire, that would prove that they were going to wait for larger forces, then they could bring up other forces from outside to the neutral zone. If they were to be driven out by the small available British forces, it would be in the nature of a bluff. Evans further told that the Turks could retire in the zone out of reach of British guns and come back in five days time. Another problem was the area that British troops were occupying which was hilly and a small area therefore did not allow to land and deploy any such army.

There was a possibility that Harington could bring the four battalions from Constantinople to seize the high hills to have a better location at Chanak, and he was going to have four more battalions and Marines which were on their way to the area. Evans commented that when the fighting started, no one could tell what the result might be.

Churchill pointed out that to give up Chanak would be a serious blow to the prestige of the Empire and he did not know what Lloyd George was going to say. He believed that naturally leaving was better than being forced to evacuate. Curzon reminded that about fortnight ago the Prime Minister had agreed to leave the decision to Harington for evacuation Chanak and Poincare during his visit to Paris urged that they should leave Chanak. Ministers agreed that it was an important event and decided to call Lloyd George to come back to London for a meeting in the evening.

Ministers met under the chairmanship of Lloyd George in the evening of 27<sup>th</sup> of September. Chamberlain gave a brief review of the afternoon's meeting to the Prime Minister and told that the Chief of Imperial General Staff had stated that the position held by British forces at Chanak had a perimeter of four miles and was situated such that no space was available for deploying reinforcements as and when it arrived. It was also uncertain whether it would be safe to land the reinforcements at Chanak with the Turkish opposition and further it would be difficult from military point of view to hold Chanak especially when the Turks occupied the higher hills in the vicinity of Chanak. Chamberlain further pointed out that Admiralty believed that withdrawal from Chanak would make control of Dardanelles and Sea of Marmara more difficult. It was told that at the present the British troops at Chanak numbered 5500 men, two pack batteries would be arriving on 28<sup>th</sup> of September, 6-inches Howitzers Battery and 1000 marines on 30<sup>th</sup> of September and a Battalion on 3<sup>rd</sup> of October with another three Battalions arriving on 9<sup>th</sup> of October. In addition to these there were already at least 15 airplanes in the area. It was also pointed out that Mustafa Kemal's reply was received but it was far from comforting for the presence of the Turkish troops in the neutral zone.

Lloyd George believed that although he was bitter against the British, Mustafa Kemal's telegram was not that discouraging, since the complaints in it were mainly directed towards the Greeks. Churchill stated that he was so much disturbed at the restricted position held at Chanak and he believed that the British Government had never taken up the position that Chanak was to be held at all cost. The British Government, according to Churchill, Gallipoli was of prime importance, then Chanak as an outpost of Gallipoli, then Constantinople, and lastly Ismid Peninsula. Churchill was in favour of capturing the hills around Chanak and told that in the event of serious fighting it would be necessary to mobilize. And in this case two divisions would be dispatched from Britain, first unit arriving in three weeks time. He further told that in the deplorable event they could withdraw the troops to hold Gallipoli and Constantinople and if it became necessary to evacuate Constantinople, the whole of the British forces could then be withdrawn for Gallipoli. Churchill stressed the point that successful defense of Chanak was the best policy that could be adopted and he suggested informing Harington that if the Turks attacked at Chanak, it was the intention of the British Government to mobilize and call for volunteers. He believed in such event Australia and New Zealand would provide a very considerable help and they should also consider the Greeks especially if Venizelos returned to power.

On the defense of Chanak, there were some doubts that the area they were in was not sufficient for retaliation but, Lloyd George was in the opinion that it was possible to defend Chanak regardless to its size being only four mile in perimeter.

Churchill reminded Hardinge's message which suggested that Britain should offer to evacuate the neutral zone if Mustafa Kemal would give an assurance that the Kemalists would refrain from entering the zone.

Lloyd George thought that the evacuation of Chanak would be the greatest loss of prestige which could be inflicted upon the British Empire. World public opinion would evaluate it as a defeat for Britain and their credit would entirely disappear. Churchill agreed with Lloyd George.

Curzon told that he would like to make an evaluation on the political implications of the situation. He was hopeful that Mustafa Kemal would treat the situation sensibly. There was no doubt that Mustafa Kemal did not love Britain, he was wise enough to refrain from attacking the British Empire for his own interests, and moreover the French and Italians were doing everything they could to prevent a breach. He told that as regards for Chanak, he was in favour of the retention of that position so long as there was a reasonable chance of success. He did not hold strong views on the necessity for the retention of Chanak, because he was alarmed at the possibility of a war breaking on the ground that they refused to evacuate the neutral zone. He believed that it would cause mobilization and the calling out of volunteers, and he was very doubtful whether Britain would gain anything out of this war in the long run. He told that in the event of a new war, he feared that the Government would get very little support for a war either in the country or in the parliament. He believed that no reliance could be placed on Greek military assistance, while the political consequences of accepting Greek help would be disastrous. The Dominions might be ready to help to defend Gallipoli, but he doubted whether they would be so ready to contribute for the defense of Chanak. Curzon further told that he was more in favour in the idea of retiring to Constantinople rather than to Gallipoli. From the political point of view he would be very sorry to see Constantinople to be evacuated. He further told that the evacuation of Constantinople would mean the breaking down in that part of the World of the Alliances. He believed that Britain's departure from Constantinople would bring the Allied unity to the ground. If Mustafa Kemal got to Constantinople, there would be no conference, the Sultan would be deposed and

Mustafa Kemal would be the next Prime Minister, then Kemalists would then undertake a new campaign in Thrace. Curzon commented that as the Thrace was to be occupied by the Turks, there would not be any limits for their armies. He had no doubt that Britain would be left at the Gallipoli Peninsula holding a kind of second Gibraltar. He stressed on the point that the evacuation of Constantinople would have a serious effect on their eastern Allies.

Lloyd George agreed with Curzon and Chamberlain told that he had doubts whether they could hold Constantinople if Chanak was to be evacuated.

The Military, Naval and Air Force representatives gave a briefing for Chanak in the light of the Harington's suggestion that the evacuation of Constantinople would be necessary if Chanak was to be securely held. The Generals agreed among themselves that Chanak could be held for three to four weeks after Constantinople had been evacuated with the forces available for the time being. They reported that on purely military point of view, there were no reasons for the evacuation of Chanak, provided that the Turks were not allowed to bring any artillery into the neutral zone.

The Generals were in agreement that the British Government's decision to Harington should be in line with the proposal that to hold the Chanak position necessarily involved the evacuation of Constantinople. They further told that if Gallipoli and Chanak were desired to be held, then two divisions would be required of which one of them should be dispatched immediately. The Generals told that in case of evacuating Chanak and retiring to Constantinople, it would be quite difficult to control the transportation of reinforcements and logistics through Straits and Sea of Marmara.

Lloyd George expressed his doubts on the suggestion of accepting Lord Hardinge's proposal that both British and Turks to evacuate the neutral zone. He told that Dardanelles could not be held unless Britain commanded both shores, and if they had to evacuate Chanak they would be in a very weak position and therefore this kind of concession would make it very difficult for Curzon to maintain the British position at the forthcoming conference. Lloyd George believed that Mustafa Kemal's assurances on a matter of this kind would be worthless for Britain. He believed that Hardinge's proposal probably generated from French which was originally come from the Turks. Lloyd George enquired about the military strength of the Greek army and the position of the army in Thrace. Curzon said that he was told by the War

Office that the Greeks had 34 000 men and 134 guns in Thrace but the morale of the troops were very low. Lloyd George asked to find out the Greek force in the island of Mitylene and the air force capability of Greece. He believed that with the recent revolution in Greece, the morale of the soldiers were better and he knew that the Greeks were good soldiers. The Cabinet agreed that;

“(a) that the Secretary of state for War should arrange for the dispatch to General Harington of a telegram on the following lines: ‘Your telegram Nos. 2468 and 2469 are being very carefully considered and we suspend reply until we have your answer to Mustapha Kemal’

(b) that the Secretary of State for War should arrange for a telegram to be sent to the Military Attaché at Athens asking him to report with the least possible delay as to the number and character of the Greek troops available in Athens, Thrace and elsewhere, and to give the appreciation of their probable fighting qualities.

(c) that the Secretary of State for War should send a personal letter to the Editor of the ‘Daily Mail’ informing him he had been apprised by General Harington that the morale of the troops in the Near East was being affected by the tenor of the articles appearing in the ‘Daily Mail’ protesting most strongly against the nature of these criticisms, and saying that the Government would have to take steps to see that the military position was not prejudiced. The Editor should also be reminded that the Turkish agents were making use of these activities for the purpose of Nationalist propaganda.”<sup>82</sup>

The Ministers met on the following day, 28<sup>th</sup> September, in the morning to discuss the Chanak issue.

Worthington Evans referred to a telegram that was received from Harington, which proposed to allow the Kemalist forces to enter Europe by crossing the Sea of Marmara. Lloyd George told that the situation had changed considerably within the last few days, since Admiral de Robeck, The Commander-in Chief of Mediterranean had said that he would be unable to prevent the Kemalists from crossing into Europe if Constantinople was evacuated. Lloyd George believed that they had not allowed Greeks for going to Rodosto and if the Turks were to cross the Marmara Sea, then they should not prevent the Greeks from crossing the neutral zone. He told that they should play the neutral spectator role between the Turks and Greeks. Lloyd George then gave a brief review of their transaction with Mustafa Kemal. He said that they had repeatedly granted him concessions, and had threatened him that if he violated the neutral zone, his troops be fired on. When his forces violated the neutral zone they were not fired on. Kemalist forces were reinforced, instead of firing had given him ultimatum and later the ultimatum was extended, and for the time being his troops remained in the neutral zone and had not taken any action against them. Lloyd George further told that since the agreement reached by Curzon a week

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<sup>82</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 363-282.

before, there was a revolt in Greece and the reason for the revolt was to fight against the Turks for the retention of the Eastern Thrace.

Churchill pointed out that if Kemalist forces entered the neutral zone it would be a violation of the Paris agreement, which would thereby come to an end. He further stated that it was true that they could not prevent Kemalist forces from entering Europe. He recalled the agreement of Paris that Britain had consented to the peaceful establishment of Turkish rule in Eastern Thrace. He believed that Mustafa Kemal had not fulfilled the conditions of the Paris Agreement by violating the neutral zone and crossing to Europe. He further suggested that they should stick to the position of what they had told Turks which was for the Turks being not allowed to cross the neutral zone. Another important point was the provision for the protection of the minorities in Thrace. Churchill pointed out that if they allowed Turks to enter Thrace while Kemalist forces were infringing the neutral zone, that would be to enforce the Paris Agreement as against Greeks, but not to compel the Turks to comply with the terms that unfavorable to them. He suggested that the proper answer to Mustafa Kemal would be such that as long as he was in neutral zone then they should not do anything to carry out the Paris agreement. On the withdrawal of the Kemalist troops from the neutral zone, they should request the Greeks to withdraw behind the Maritza line in Thrace. In the event that the Greeks refused to withdraw then they should inform the Kemalists that they would open a path to them across the Marmara Sea and should similarly allow the Greeks a free hand for the movement of their transports and warships in the Marmara Sea. Lloyd George reminded that the British Empire had two interests in the Near East question, which were peace and establishment and maintenance of the freedom of the Dardanelles for the nations of the world, under the League of Nations. For peace; they did not propose to use force and the whole of their influence would be directed towards securing peace between Turks and Greeks. To secure the freedom of passage through Dardanelles, they were prepared to use force, and to occupy both sides of the Dardanelles. Lloyd George further stated that if necessary, they would defend the Dardanelles alone. He recalled that they had made a public announcement to that effect and if they receded from that position they would be humiliating themselves before the whole world.

Curzon commented that in addition to what Prime Minister told there was a third British interest which was the maintenance of their relations with her allies, and he

believed that there was no peaceful solution of the Eastern question unless Britain, France and Italy were in agreement.

Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, was in the opinion that they should resist at Chanak as long as it was possible to do so. In the event of being driven by the Turks, they should withdraw to Gallipoli. He believed that the Parliament would agree with the Government on this issue. Worthington Evans on the suggestion of Lord Birkenhead told that if it was decided to resist the Turks it should be realized that mobilization would be necessary, and it was important that mobilization should not be delayed and therefore a prompt decision should be taken as soon as possible.

The Conference was concluded with a suggestion that Mustafa Kemal should be requested to withdraw his troops from the neutral zone. When the Turks were cleared off from neutral zone, the Greeks should be requested to withdraw behind the Maritza line in the Western Thrace. If the Greeks refused to withdraw, Britain should inform Mustafa Kemal that his troops would be allowed a passage into Thrace across the Sea of Marmara.

General Harington's telegram was discussed which proposed allowing the passage of Turks to Europe and withdrawal of Greek ships and warships from Constantinople and Sea of Marmara. Admiral Brock had already ordered the Greek ships to be withdrawn from Constantinople and also ordered to stop the transportation of Greeks to Rodosto. Rumbold, the High Commissioner, had similar proposals, the removal of Greek ships and allowance of Turks to cross the Marmara Sea. In the Conference with the suggestion of Lloyd George it was agreed that Britain should be impartial and to give fair play to both sides. Therefore if the Turks were to be allowed to move their armies into Thrace, Greece should not be stopped from trying to prevent them. Consequently the proposal in Rumbold's telegram that Greek ships should be withdrawn from the Sea of Marmara should not be pressed. It was noted that the Paris Agreement of 24<sup>th</sup> of Sep. 1922, in inviting Mustafa Kemal to the Conference, specifically provided that the Angora Government should not cross the Straits or the Sea or Marmara.

It was also noted that Harington's proposal contradicted the policy declared by Lloyd George to the journalists on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of September in which it was delineated that the British desire was to prevent the conflict spreading into Europe. The excuse put

forward by the Turks for crossing to Europe was the refusal of Greeks to withdraw behind the line of Maritza, could be tackled at the Mudania Conference and therefore Turks should clear the neutral zone.

The Conference decided that the Admiralty, War Office and Foreign Office should draft telegrams to be sent to Admiral Brock, General Harington and Rumbold respectively in line with the discussions took place in the conference and to meet again on the same day in the afternoon.<sup>83</sup>

The Conference of Ministers was held at 4 PM on 28<sup>th</sup> of September to discuss the Eastern question. Curzon explained the draft telegram he prepared for dispatch to Rumbold which would have the points discussed in the morning session of the Ministers. He told that the draft had taken into account of the situation which had changed owing to the Greek revolution, but Britain should not act in opposition to the Paris agreement. General Harington was being instructed to issue an invitation to a Greek General to attend the meeting. The question of the evacuation of the Eastern Thrace would have to be considered in the light of the consideration of the type of administration to be set up, whether this administration should be Kemalist or whether attempts should be made to control the territory with Allied gendarmerie. If Mustafa Kemal agreed to respect the neutral zone therefore withdrew his troops and the Greeks refused to evacuate Eastern Thrace, then Rumbold be at liberty to allow the Turkish troops to cross the Marmara Sea to Europe. At the same time embargo on the Greek Ships including the war ships should be withdrawn, and they could be free to resist the passage of Turks.

Curzon pointed out that if a change were made from the Paris agreement, it would be because; (i) it was then doubtful of Greeks would agree to withdraw, (ii) if Mustafa Kemal crossed into Europe by force, then it might be worth while to give concession to him to have the matter to be settled peacefully, and (iii) to set up the Kemalist regime in the evacuated zone in Thrace.

Lloyd George considered that they should stand by the Paris agreement. He said that he would be surprised if the Greeks did not form a considerable army equal to Mustafa Kemal's. He believed that the Paris agreement did not call for them to enforce Greeks to evacuate Eastern Thrace; therefore they should not do it.

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<sup>83</sup> PRO, CAB 23/29, Appendix 2 to Cabinet 52(22), and CAB 23/39, p. 387-396,

Chamberlain was in agreement with Lloyd George that but at the same time believed that, it was not consistent to tell Mustafa Kemal that he could not attack the Greeks while the Greeks were busy getting into preparations to fight against the Turks in Thrace. He agreed that they should not allow Turks to cross to Europe whenever he wished to do so, but in case of the refusal of Greeks, they should be allowed to do so.

Lloyd George considered that the Government had two objectives, to maintain the freedom of the Straits and to keep the war out of Europe. They were very anxious to attain the latter objective. He told that if the Greeks refused, it should be made clear that they would not make a war to force the Paris agreement in the sense of making Greeks to evacuate Eastern Thrace, but at the same time they would not use their Fleet to prevent Turks from crossing to Europe. Similarly in the event of both parties disagreed, Britain should not take any part in the fighting.

The Conference of Ministers agreed that, the War Office should be authorized to prepare a draft telegram to Harington that he had the liberty to withdraw the British Forces from Constantinople, if they were required for the defense of Chanak or Gallipoli. Harington should also warn his French and Italian colleagues that this might be necessary in future. The War Office should also inform Harington that he had the full support and if necessary reinforcements in case he was compelled to fight at Chanak. Harington should also be told that his proposals were under close consideration by the Cabinet and shortly he would receive the answer. It was also decided to meet again on the same day at 7 PM to finalize the telegrams to be sent to Harington and Rumbold.<sup>84</sup>

The Conference of Ministers discussed the latest developments at its meeting on 28<sup>th</sup> of September at 7PM. The Ministers discussed the draft telegrams prepared for Harington and Rumbold. Meanwhile a new telegram received from Harington asking for new prohibitions to be exerted to the Greek ships for their movement in Marmara Sea. Lloyd George considered that Harington could wait since the Greeks were well within their right to remain in the Sea of Marmara and further told that he would be unable to prevent the Greeks going to Rodosto until Mustafa Kemal left the neutral zone. Chamberlain considered that there were two points in the telegram that need to be studied. The first proposal was for the Greek ships to leave the Sea of

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<sup>84</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 387-396.

Marmara that had already been turned out of Constantinople. The second proposal was that the Greek ships should be prevented from entering the Dardanelles. He told that he was indifferent for the first one but he believed that they should agree with the second proposal, therefore maintaining the status quo. Sir Robert Horne, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, told that they should not maintain the status quo owing to the fact that the Greeks were already advancing. Lloyd George told that; *"We had served a notice on Kemal of which he had taken no notice. Under these circumstances we could not say to the Greeks 'We will not deprive you of the benefits of your sea power'."*<sup>85</sup> Curzon was not in agreement with Lloyd George. He told that they would be charged with favoring the Greeks by over-ruling the decision of the High Commissioners and allowing the Greeks to come in. He feared that this attitude would ruin any chance of an agreement. Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor, was in agreement with the Prime Minister and told that they had no obligation towards the Turks. He believed that there was no agreement that prevented them to stop the Greeks, and he further told that if there was a possibility of the Greeks being in a position to continue the fighting against the Turks, he did not see how they could take away their chief weapon which was the sea power. Curzon reiterated his position that the Generals were united as regards the Maritza line and that they had promised to let Turkey back into Eastern Thrace, and besides he did not believe that the Greek fighting force was reviving. Lord Birkenhead still backing the Prime Minister told that the Turks had already broken the conditions on which they had pledged themselves which was the Paris agreement. He believed that by looking at what Mustafa Kemal's actions and intentions had been, it was probable that the Turks would not accept the conditions. Chamberlain stood by Curzon in saying that the Turks might be their enemy in future, but for the time being they were not at war with them. He told that they were trying to persuade Mustafa Kemal to accept the Allied terms and so far they had banned the entry of the Turks into Eastern Thrace, and at the same time if they were to allow the Greeks to enter, it would be unfair neutrality.

Lloyd George did not agree with Chamberlain and told that they had said that they would not intervene to persuade the Greeks to withdraw from Thrace unless the Turks respected the neutral zones. Instead, the Turks had entered the neutral zone and declined to go out. He pointed out that the Kemalist forces had been equipped by her Allies, while at the same time the Greeks had been banned from using their

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<sup>85</sup> Ibid, p. 406-418.

sea power by preventing them the arrival of this power. Lloyd George recalled the time when the Greeks proposed to attack Constantinople, they had forbidden them, by stating that both French and British troops would fire on the Greeks, and General Harington stood by the Chatalja line and not allowing them to enter into Constantinople. As a result, that time the Greeks had bowed to their decision. He further told that the circumstances at present were quite different, such that they had said that they would use their influence to convince the Greeks to withdraw from Eastern Thrace, but the Turks had entered the neutral zone and were still there.

Curzon pointed out that although against the international law; they had allowed the Greeks to use their naval base at Constantinople as a concession to counterbalance the support given to Kemalists by the Bolsheviks. He further told that in view of this, Greeks could not complain of the British treatment. Curzon inquired how it was proposed that the British Government should over-rule the action that had been taken by the High Commissioners.

Lloyd George told that General Harington should be told to give notice to the Turks that they had prevented the Greek ships from entering the Sea of Marmara, but that they could not continue to do so unless the Kemalist forces withdrew from the neutral zone.

The Ministers agreed to send a telegram to Rumbold to notify General Harington and the Allied High Commissioners as well as the representative of the Angora Government that Britain on the basis of the Allied Note of 24<sup>th</sup> of September, had prohibited Greek transports from entering into the Sea of Marmara, but that if Mustafa Kemal did not retire from the neutral zone, this prohibition would be withdrawn. It was also decided that there were no grounds for expelling the Greek Fleet from the Sea of Marmara. The Ministers decided to meet again the following day in the morning.<sup>86</sup> On the same evening War Office gave instructions to General Harington with regard to Chanak in accordance with the decision reached in the Conference of Ministers. The message called for assistance planned to be given to the British troops, as; *“As soon as it is clear that our troops are seriously engaged we shall mobilize two divisions and call for extra recruits so that reinforcements may be sent to you at earliest possible moment and meanwhile, in order to reinforce Chanak, you may, if*

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<sup>86</sup> PRO, CAB 23/29, Appendix 3 to Cabinet 52(22), and CAB 23/39, p. 406-418,

*necessary, evacuate Constantinople and Ismid. Our policy is to hold Gallipoli at all costs and to hold on to Chanak so long as this can be done without undue military risk.*<sup>87</sup>

The Ministers met again in the morning of 29<sup>th</sup> of September. There was news about the Italians leaving Constantinople in the press, but according to Curzon, this was not confirmed yet. Curzon stated that he was preparing a memorandum about the definition of 'Freedom of Straits', since the phrase was used in different meaning. Churchill stated that the definition should confirm non existence of any fortifications of any kind on the Dardanelles or the Bosphorus, so that ships should always be able to sail through from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea. Even the League of Nations, if they were given the task of mandate, should not be in a position to have the right to block them. It was proposed that for the freedom of Straits, a demilitarization of about 15 kilometers on each side should be secured.

There were some reports from Constantinople indicating that the Turks were close to the barbed wire at Chanak and the Turkish troops had been increased to 5,000 cavalry. Lloyd George requested the Chiefs of the Staff should consider the situation with the light of most recent reports received. Lloyd George considered the situation was most unsatisfactory and that Mustafa Kemal was playing with them while he was bringing up his forces so as to be in superior strength.

The Chiefs of Staffs reported that if the existing situation was to be allowed to continue, then, from the military point of view, the defense of Chanak would be menaced in the event of a Turkish offense. They concluded that the time had come for General Harington to inform the local Turkish Commander that unless his forces were withdrawn at a stated time, fire would be opened by all forces at the disposal of the British Commander, which was Naval, Military and Air.

Curzon drew the attention of the Ministers to what Mustafa Kemal had said that he did not know what the boundary of the neutral zone was at Chanak since there were no Turkish officials in drawing its boundaries. Lloyd George commented that any telegram dispatched to General Harington should express surprise that the Turks had been allowed to come up to the British lines in spite of the warnings which had already been given. Lloyd George considered that it would be advisable to send instructions similar to the appreciation given by the Chiefs of Staffs. It was

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<sup>87</sup> PRO CAB 23/39, Appendix 1 to the Conference of Ministers held on 28<sup>th</sup> Sep. 1922, at 7 PM.

considered that if the airplanes were to be used, the Turks might be retreated to a greater distance of about 10,000 yards.

Lloyd George believed that the action of the Nationalists was an insult to British Empire that they should be made to withdraw to a distance coincided for suitable for the security of Chanak, and the fresh Turkish troops should not be able to enter into the neutral zone. The draft telegram was prepared with the view that the intelligence reports had indicated that Kemalists might attack on 30<sup>th</sup> of September.

The Ministers decided that;

*“That the War Office should send to General Harington, a telegram to the following effect: The Turkish Nationalists are obviously moving up troops and seeking to net your forces in. Cabinet are advised by the General Staff that if we allow continuance of this, the defensive position will be imperiled and that the moment to avert the disaster has arrived. It has therefore been decided by the Cabinet that the Officer Commanding the Turkish forces around Chanak is immediately to be notified that, if his forces are not withdrawn by an hour to be settled by you, at which our combined forces will be in place, all the forces at our disposal-naval, military and aerial will open fire. In this latter event the air force should be used so long as the Turkish forces are inside the neutral zone. The time limit should be short and it should not be overlooked that we have received warning regarding the date-September 30<sup>th</sup>, from our intelligence.”<sup>88</sup>*

The Conference of Ministers under the chairmanship of Chamberlain was held again at 10 PM on the same day. The reason of the meeting was the conversation that Curzon had with Nihad Rashid, the representative of the Angora Government in London. Nihad Rashid when he was told by Curzon about the decision taken by the Cabinet in the afternoon about Chanak that unless they cleared the neutral zone British forces would open fire, requested whether it would be possible to suspend the orders by 24 hours. Curzon considered that there were so many military considerations were involved, therefore he was hesitant to express an opinion, but, subject to this possibility there existed an opportunity for peace. He believed that if the military considerations permitted, the attempt ought to be made and that was why the meeting was arranged.

Chamberlain considered that after seeing the head lines in the press for the evening that Mustafa Kemal had accepted the Mudania Conference, the decision of opening fire might have an ill reception by the public.

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<sup>88</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p.419-448, PRO. The message was sent by War Office on the same day with a telegram of No: 91255.

Lord Birkenhead was in the opinion that the incident represented did not change the situation since the Turks were still in the neutral zone and therefore violating the Paris agreement. He told that Mustafa Kemal had known perfectly well the conditions of the Paris agreement so far as the neutral zone was concerned. He did not trust the Turks, hence was against extending the ultimatum given to Turks for 24 hours. Sir Robert Horne agreed with Lord Chancellor.

The Chief of the Imperial General Staff commented that because of timing, a counter order issued could not arrive in time to affect the situation. He believed that to launch a counter order after definite operation orders was fatal and most dangerous. Curzon expressed his view that he was not asking for issuance of counter order but to delay the order for 24 hours. Chamberlain was in agreement with Curzon that the case involved both military and political implications, but he felt that they should do everything possible to preserve peace, provided that they did not endanger their troops.

Churchill was in the opinion that it was the responsibility of Curzon to seek for peace but it seemed that it was not possible to defer action without the greatest risk. He considered that it might upset the whole situation. Consequently the Cabinet could not undo what had been done after very careful consideration. He believed that the Turks might have some casualties but it would not trigger a new war. He further commented that Mustafa Kemal was in the opinion that British could be trampled and ignored, and therefore he might get over the idea if a lesson were given him locally at Chanak. Chamberlain reported that Lloyd George was also against postponement of the order, and the Ministers overwhelmingly decided against the delay of the order.<sup>89</sup>

Meanwhile Venizelos appeared in London, probably with the consent of Lloyd George, since he was going to ask Sir Grigg and Foreign Office to visit Venizelos to get his opinion about Asia Minor and the status of the Greek army. Venizelos seemed to be in touch with the Prime Minister constantly and asked Lloyd George to help for the refugees in Anatolia.<sup>90</sup> Venizelos in his meeting with Sir Grigg and Vansittart, Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign Office, on 30<sup>th</sup> of September told

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<sup>89</sup> Ibid, p. 449-462.

<sup>90</sup> Lloyd George Papers LF/F/13/3/35, Foreign Office sent a message to Lloyd George's Private Secretary L. Sylvester on 20<sup>th</sup> Sep.1922 as an answer of his letter of 11<sup>th</sup> September concerning Venizelos's appeal to Lloyd George with regard to relieving Greek refugees who were assembling on the Southern shore of Sea of Marmara.

that the new Greek Revolutionary Government had asked him to represent Greece in abroad, but he inquired some information from them as of policy of the Government. Venizelos told that the defeat did not indicate in reality the military defeat of the whole army. He stated that there were seven Divisions which had not suffered seriously in morale and which could be very rapidly re-organized. The main difficulty with the troops was lack of equipment and supplies. He believed that the morale of the troops would be restored immediately if they learned that Britain was at war with Turkey and that they would be fighting at Britain's side. Venizelos for the involvement of Balkan States commented that Yugoslavia was under pressure by the French Government that they would not resist the wishes of France. Vansittart recalled that there was a telegram from Belgrade that France had placed a loan to Yugoslavia of 100 million francs for military equipment. Venizelos told that Greece should try everything, if possible, with the help of the Balkan states to prevent the return of Turkey to Thrace. In his opinion the French policy in Near East was not only anti-Christian and anti-European, but it was even anti-French.<sup>91</sup>

Lloyd George was going to be rather busy on 30<sup>th</sup> of September with the issues of Turkey. He was going to attend two Conferences of Ministers, one meeting with the military officials and a Cabinet meeting. The First Conference of Ministers was held at 4 PM. The Ministers first discussed the interview of Venizelos with Grigg and Vansittart. Lloyd George told that the morale of the Greek army differed from what explained by Venizelos than the army intelligence reports, but he stressed on the point that Venizelos had never misled the British Government as regards the value of the Greek army. He asked Curzon to have an interview with Venizelos to find out about the Greek army the following day. The conference instructed Curzon with Worthington Evans and an officer from General Staff, to get Venizelos' views as to the present condition of the Greek army and what might be expected from it in the defense of Thrace or elsewhere.

Curzon Informed the Ministers that he had received a message from Hardinge on the same day which contained the protest message of Poincare that British Government, without consulting the French Government had sent an ultimatum to the local Turkish Commander at Chanak. Curzon considered that they should wait for the action of Harington before answering Poincare. Curzon further pointed out that the non-consulting action of the British Government was only follow-up

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<sup>91</sup> PRO, CAB 23/36, S-66.

Poincare's example when France considered herself at liberty to withdraw the French troops from the neutral zone without referring to British Government. Curzon stated on the question of Lloyd George that he had not received an acknowledgement message from Harington with regard the Cabinet's decision on firing to Turks at Chanak.

Lloyd George referred to the news in 'Daily Telegraph' which contained the reply of Angora Government to the Allied invitation. He considered that the reply was a disquieting one, since the Nationalists apparently demanded the immediate possession of Constantinople and also Eastern and Western Thrace. Lloyd George commented that no definite decisions could be taken until a reply received by Harington with respect to telegram sent by the War Office concerning firing at Chanak. He criticized General Harington that he was paying too much attention to the political situation which was not his duty, rather than military. Curzon pointed out that he wished no fire was shot since the news received so far was encouraging. He further stated that Mustafa Kemal was more reasonable and he had shown signs that he was ready to attend a meeting at Mudania, and also the Allied Conference. He believed that Mustafa Kemal had put forward extravagant demands, but this was always the custom of the Oriental. The Conference decided that the meeting was adjourned until a reply was received from General Harington.<sup>92</sup>

The Conference of Ministers was held on the same day again at 7.45 PM to discuss the latest developments. Lord Beatty, the First Lord of the Admiralty, informed the Conference that he had received a telegram from the Naval Commander-in-Chief which was dispatched at 9.37 AM and received at 4.40 PM, to the effect that he was still stopping Greek war ships and other transports from entering the Sea of Marmara. The Admiralty wished to make sure that the action of the Naval Commander was in accord with the Cabinet's decision since the Foreign Office telegram to Rumbold was not clear on this point.<sup>93</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> PRO, CAB 23/39, p. 463-472.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 473-474, Foreign Office telegram at 10.45 PM on 28<sup>th</sup> September was to the effect that; "Rumbold was to make intimation to the Angora Government's representative at Constantinople that in accordance with the spirit of the Paris Agreement Britain had prevented and still was preventing the entry of Greek transports and war ships into the Marmara Sea and Dardanelles. If, however, Mustafa Kemal did not withdraw from the neutral zone, the justification for this prohibition would no longer exist, and it would be withdrawn." At the Conference of Ministers' it was pointed out that the Minutes of 28<sup>th</sup> September, 11 AM, Conference of Ministers also did not help to clear up the situation and appeared to require correction by the insertion of the word 'not'. Hankey, the Secretary of the Cabinet drew attention to conclusion of the Meeting of the Conference of Ministers on 28<sup>th</sup> September, at 7 PM, which prescribed the action to be taken by the Foreign Office.

On the suggestion of Lloyd George, the Conference agreed that;

“(a) that the Admiralty should inform the Naval Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean to the effect that if Mustafa Kemal complied with the demand in War Office telegram No. 91255 [the telegram for General Harington to give ultimatum to the Turkish Commander at Chanak], and the Turkish forces around Chanak were withdrawn from the neutral zone, the prohibition on the movements of Greek transports and war ships into the Sea of Marmara should be maintained; but that if on the contrary the Turkish troops were not withdrawn, then the prohibition should be lifted and the Greek transports and warships should be allowed to enter the Sea of Marmara, the Greek authorities being informed. The Greek fleet should in any event not be expelled from the Sea of Marmara.”<sup>94</sup>

The Cabinet met on the same day at 10.30 PM to discuss the Near Eastern question. Cabinet as a matter of urgency considered the messages received from Rumbold on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September. Rumbold reported that the Cabinet’s decision with regard to the ultimatum to the Turkish Commander at Chanak, War Office telegram of No; 91255, was not acted by General Harington.

The Cabinet decided that no decision could be taken until General Harington telegram was before the Cabinet. The Cabinet also decided that it was essential for a decision to make, the Cabinet should receive from the three Staffs a new report as to how far the safety and future effectiveness of the British forces would be compromised by further delay in the withdrawal of the Nationalist troops opposite of Chanak. The Cabinet meeting was adjourned to meet again the following day, 1<sup>st</sup> of October to study the report which the First Sea Lord, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Chief of the Air Staff was tasked to prepare taking into account of whether the British forces at Chanak would be endangered by further delay in the withdrawal of the local Turkish forces and whether, if in two or three days the British forces wished to take action outside the position now held at Chanak, further delay in the withdrawal of the local Turkish nationalist forces would prevent them doing so.

The Cabinet also gave some political recommendations on the following points; (a) that since Rumbold and Harington were contemplating a meeting with Mustafa Kemal at Mudania, while the Turkish Nationalists in spite of several warnings were still violating the essential conditions of Paris Agreement of 23<sup>rd</sup> of September. The Angora Government should understand not to send troops either before or during the Conference into the neutral zone. (b) Notwithstanding the attitude of Mustafa Kemal and his disregard of the Paris Note, the British authorities, besides putting

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<sup>94</sup> Ibid.

pressure on the Greeks in regard to movements of Greek warships and ships through the Straits, were anxious that the Allies should compel the Greek army to withdraw behind the Maritza line, even if the border line was not fixed yet, (c) As to the danger to peace which this attitude seemed to involve, (d) Generally, as to the apparent deterioration of the British political position and prestige, particularly from the point of the Dominions as a result of failure in her attempts for the Turks to comply with the Paris Note conditions.

The Cabinet further decided that there was a general understanding that prompt steps should be taken as an essential condition for the Peace Conference to secure that the Turks observed the conditions in the Paris Note especially by withdrawing their forces from the neutral zone. It was considered that there were methods to secure this condition which were;

“(i) that we should decline to parley with Mustapha Kemal at Mudania until his troops were withdrawn from the neutral zones. (ii) That General Harington, with the Allied Generals at Constantinople, should meet the Greek and Turkish Commander-in-Chief at Mudania as soon as possible, and that General Harington should, at the outset, as an essential condition of further parley insists on the withdrawal of Turkish forces on the neutral zones.”<sup>95</sup>

The Cabinet discussed these alternatives in length and decided that since the political question was linked with the military aspect, the decision to be postponed until the next Cabinet meeting which was scheduled for the following morning. The Cabinet also endorsed the decision reached in the Conference of Ministers at 7.45 PM.

The Cabinet met again at 10 AM on 1<sup>st</sup> of October to discuss the Near East Question. The Cabinet had before them 30<sup>th</sup> of September and 1<sup>st</sup> of October telegrams from General Harington and also one telegram from Rumbold. As was instructed, Admiral of The Fleet, Lord Beatty, reported the military aspects of the situation at Chanak. It seemed that Turks were not a threat to Chanak since the Turkish troops had moved to Ismid. Rumbold cabled the Foreign Office suggesting that General Harington's immediate obligation to instructions might damage the situation to a no-return path and therefore he did not think they were to lose anything serious by delaying action couple of days to see whether meeting at Mudania materialized.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 53(22).

<sup>96</sup> PRO, FO 424/254, 709,

The Cabinet, in accordance with the advice of the Chiefs of Staff of the three services, decided that before they could alter their decisions which were conveyed to Harington by War Office with a telegram of 29<sup>th</sup> of September, no: 91255, they were in need to know the answers of certain questions that needed to be asked to Harington with regard to the military position and dangers at Chanak. Another decision of the Cabinet was to task the Chief of the Imperial General Staff to inquire from Harington the reason for the late response to Cabinet's instructions of War Office telegram No: 91255.

The Cabinet also decided to reach a resolution for sending final instructions with regard to the War Office telegram of No: 91255 to General Harington after receiving his response concerning the safety of the British forces at Chanak.

The Cabinet also considered the Mudania Conference and decided to give the main points for political issues that Curzon was to bear in mind when preparing the draft message which was going to be discussed and finalized at the Cabinet meeting of 3 PM on the same day. The main points to be considered by Curzon in drawing the draft were;

“The main object of the Conference is to determine the line of retirement of the Greek forces in Eastern Thrace in accord with the Greek and Turkish military authorities, as prescribed in the Paris Note of September 23<sup>rd</sup>. The Angora Government in return for this intervention must undertake not to send troops, either before or during the final peace Conference, into the neutral zone and not to cross the Sea of Marmara. A representative of the Greek Forces should be present, as well as the Allied Generals. It should be made clear that no influence can be brought to bear by the Allied Governments to retire behind the line determined, until the Turkish Nationalist forces have withdrawn entirely from the neutral zone, and satisfactory arrangements have been made for the maintenance of order in Eastern Thrace until after the Conference.”<sup>97</sup>

The cabinet met at 3 PM on the same day to finalize the directives to be sent to Rumbold and Harington for the Mudania Conference. The Cabinet evaluated the draft telegrams, by Curzon and Worthington Evans regarding the political and military questions likely to arise at the forthcoming meeting at Mudania. It was decided that General Harington should be instructed not to act as outlined in the War Office telegram of No: 91555, unless the conditions demanded it. Curzon informed the Cabinet of a message received from Hardinge during the meeting. The message contained the results of the conversation of Franklin Bouillon with Mustafa Kemal and a message from Poincare that he was hoping that the British

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<sup>97</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 54(22).

Government would agree on the date of 3<sup>rd</sup> of October for Mudania Conference and the essentiality of the evacuation of Eastern Thrace by Greeks as soon as possible.

Curzon drew the attention of the Cabinet on the possibility which might arise at the Mudania Conference in regard to the extent of the neutral zone on the Asiatic shore of the Dardanelles. He inquired whether a minimized area be sufficient to provide the freedom of the Straits, in case Mustafa Kemal demanded it.

The Cabinet approved the draft messages to be sent to Rumbold and Harington. It was also decided that the First Sea Lord with the military authorities should study the required area to secure the freedom of the Straits on the Asian side and submit it to the Cabinet for a decision.<sup>98</sup>

Meanwhile Lloyd George had a meeting with the Romanian Prime Minister Diamandy concerning their stand for the expansion of Turkey to Thrace and to find out the support, Britain would get for the neutral zone in Turkey. Romania believed that the entry of the Kemalist army into Europe might upset the status quo in Europe. He stated that Mustafa Kemal should be kept out of Europe and on this point he agreed with Britain and deplored the French point of view. It was stated that Romania was threatened on three frontiers by Russia, Bulgaria and Hungary and feared that in case Turks moved into Europe there was a possibility of a Russia, Bulgaria and Turkey which would be threatening Romania. She was interested in the Eastern Question in respect to the non existence of a common frontier between Turkey and Bulgaria and the freedom of the Straits. He commented that Romania desired the demilitarization of both the European and Asiatic shores under the control of an Allied Commission.

Lloyd George told him that Curzon had approached to the representatives of both Serbia and Romania before Paris, but there seemed to be a good deal of hesitancy shown to him. Lloyd George further told that Mustafa Kemal had won not a military but only a political victory. He was undoubtedly was an intractable frame of mind, and therefore very dangerous. Lloyd George told that Mustafa Kemal might demand the right to occupy Eastern Thrace immediately which Britain could not allow. He might also demand the evacuation of Chanak for which Britain would not give consent. Lloyd George believed that Chanak was an essential feature for the

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<sup>98</sup> Ibid, Cabinet 55(22).

freedom of Straits. Lloyd George commented that they had agreed in the event of the conference taking place to ask Greeks to retire west of the Maritza, and to give Eastern Thrace to Turks. Lloyd George believed that in this case Bulgaria would then become the heir to the troubles of Thrace undoubtedly under Turkish misgovernment would be quite terrible.

Lloyd George promised to help Romania in supplying equipment and especially if she was on her side. With regard to the dispatch of Romanian troops to Turkey Lloyd George considered that if the peace was to be preserved, then Romania would certainly be asked to provide one of the contingents necessary for the international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits. If war broke out then Britain should like to know whether Romania would assist in preventing Mustafa Kemal from establishing himself in Europe. Lloyd George further told that with regard to the sea they would need Constanza [Kostence]. They agreed to meet again as the circumstances would prevail more definite direction where they were heading to.<sup>99</sup>

### **VII.3. Downfall of Lloyd George**

The Cabinet met on 5<sup>th</sup> of October to discuss the developments in the Mudania Conference. Curzon gave the Cabinet a full account of various conversations with Venizelos as Cabinet instructed him on 1<sup>st</sup> of October with Lloyd George's proposal. The first interview with Venizelos was attended by Curzon and Worthington Evans. There was also an interview of Venizelos with Sir Eyre Crowe, the Permanent Under-Secretary of Foreign Office on the same day. Curzon pointed out that after the first interview; there was reason to believe that while Venizelos fully recognized that at the Peace Conference, the Greeks would have to give up Eastern Thrace, but he had thought it impossible that the Greeks would agree to allow its immediate occupation before the Conference, by the Turks. Curzon believed that even Venizelos had contemplated that Greeks ought to fight rather than submit to this desire before the Conference. Curzon reported that Venizelos had consulted various quarters and even the American Ambassador and as a result, had taken up rather a different attitude in his interview with Sir Eyre Crowe. It seemed that Venizelos had advised the Greek Government that they should accept immediate withdrawal behind the Maritza on condition that the Greek administration should not immediately be replaced by the Turks. Venizelos was thinking that the Allies should

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<sup>99</sup> PRO, CAB 23/36, S-67.

take over the Greek administration in Eastern Thrace before the Conference. Venizelos in his interview with Crowe suggested alternative ways of dealing with the permanent problem of the Greek population. The first alternative was the complete autonomy for the region. The second alternative that Venizelos mentioned was that the whole Greek population should be allowed to return to Western Thrace. Curzon informed the Ministers that the present situation in Eastern Thrace was that Commissions of Allied officers were in different locations and the question was with the civil administration. Curzon pointed out that there was a possibility of Kemalists taking over, as Rumbold had suggested, the civil administration. It was pointed out in the Cabinet that there were some signs in France especially in the press that the British policy had been considered positively. There was a growing insistence for the Turks not to be permitted to Thrace and evacuation of Turkish troops from Asiatic shores of Dardanelles claimed as the neutral zone.

There was also news coming from America that the Government and the public were appeared to take similar views as the British Government on these questions and that American warships were on their way to the Turkish waters.

Worthington Evans called the attention on telegrams he had just received. The one from Rumbold recorded the results of a meeting of Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople which stated that the French High Commissioner had announced that the Turks were demanding Karaagatch [Karaağac], a suburb of Adrianople on the left bank of the Maritza.<sup>100</sup>

The Cabinet met again at 11 PM. Curzon informed the Cabinet that he had received a message from Rumbold just before the meeting that contained some details with respect to the Mudania Meeting.

The Cabinet decided that the information received from Rumbold and Harington were neither sufficient nor clear for instructing General Harington, therefore requested to have more information for the problem areas encountered at Mudania. It was decided to notify General Harington to wait for the instructions before attending the Mudania Conference. Since one of the outstanding issues was evacuation of Thrace by Greeks and Allied control of the Thrace, Lloyd George asked his colleagues to consider the policy to be adopted by Britain and therefore to

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<sup>100</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 56(22).

find an answer for; 'supposing that a decision was taken to instruct General Harington to allow the Turks to occupy Thrace, and supposing the Greeks declined to accept; in these circumstances, to what lengths should the British Government be prepared to put pressure on Greece'.<sup>101</sup>

The Cabinet met on the following morning on 6<sup>th</sup> October to consider the developments at Mudania Conference. Curzon explained to the Cabinet that the cable he had received from Rumbold on the previous evening, stated that Ismet Pasha [Ismet Inonu] at the last moment at Mudania, contrary to the terms of Paris Note, demanded that the Western Thrace should be handed over to Turks before the Peace Treaty, and that all the Allied contingents and missions should be withdrawn, and also had intimated that he would set his troops in motion unless the proposal was at once agreed to. Rumbold reported that with this development the Conference was adjourned to give Ismet Pasha a dead line for 11.30 A.M. Greenwich Time on the same day. The French General had told that he received instructions from Paris that he was authorized not only to sign the Protocol of the Meeting, giving great and important concessions to Turks, but also to agree to handing over Eastern Thrace to the Turkish authorities before the Peace Treaty without Allied supervision. Rumbold proposed to the Cabinet to authorize General Harington to tell the Turks that British Government would convince the Greeks to leave Eastern Thrace, and Allied troops would be sent there to replace the Greeks. Rumbold pointed out in his second telegram which was read in the Cabinet that the French High Commissioner had stated that it was desirable, if possible, to maintain the Allied Commissions and contingents in Eastern Thrace until the conclusion of peace, although their maintenance, according to French Government was not indispensable. Rumbold also reported that both the French and Italian High Commissioners were in favour of yielding to the Turkish requests and told that the questions of Karaagatch and Eastern Thrace were not so much as risk involved for hostilities. The French High Commissioner also proposed to dispatch Allied Battalions to Thrace as proof of their good will, and the Generals had agreed that without such gesture the Turks would not agree to further delays and would order their troops to advance. Rumbold reported that he had told them that there was a limit to the concessions to be given to the Turks as far as the British Government was concerned. He believed that the more that was yielded to the Turks the more would be demanded.

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid, Cabinet 57(22).

Curzon pointed out that the concrete proposal in these telegrams was that Britain should announce her intention to send Allied troops to Thrace and convince the Greeks to withdraw behind the Maritza, but at the same time the telegrams indicated the Allied solidarity and spirit was questionable as far as the Paris Note was concerned.

Curzon believed that the time had come to send an immediate representation to the French Government that France had been acting contrary to the spirit of the Paris Note, and further asked whether she was prepared to stand side by side with Britain in carrying out the policy agreed upon in the Paris Note. During the Cabinet meeting additional telegrams were received from Rumbold and Harington. General Harington intimated that he had no doubt that unless the Allied Governments acted at once, the Kemalists would march to Constantinople and could cross into the British area in three or four days. Harington inquired from the Cabinet for the defense of Constantinople with the limited forces available until reinforcements arrived, or otherwise should he evacuate at once to Gallipoli and Chanak.

The Cabinet, next, evaluated Rumbold's telegram which gave particulars of the civil administration in Eastern Thrace and gave reasoning that it would be impracticable for the Allies to organize a civil administration and the only choice was to allow the Kemalists to take over the civil administration while the Allies took precautions to avoid disturbances and panic. It seemed that to the contrary to his earlier telegrams, Rumbold contemplated a Turkish military occupation of Eastern Thrace to prevent fighting and disorder, and therefore advising the British Government to yield to the Turkish demand and admit a number of Turkish officials into the Eastern Thrace.

The Cabinet considered that one of the fundamental conditions of the Paris Note had been that the Kemalist forces should evacuate the neutral zones and they had come to a point where as it was proposed by Rumbold, they had to abandon the most important condition. It was pointed out that the responsibility for the consequences would rest with her Allies and the public opinion in Britain was not prepared in any event to undertake a war with Turkey, and particularly to keep the Turks out of Europe. It was discussed that under such circumstances, the question arose whether the British Government ought to take the responsibility of adopting military action in the Near East when her French and Italian Allies had decided that the issues at stake were not worth the contest.

The Cabinet further discussed the question that Lloyd George had tabled previous evening in the Cabinet about the extent the British Government could exert pressure upon Greek Government to withdraw from Eastern Thrace. It was pointed out that they should use the fact that they could not stop Mustafa Kemal to enter Europe and to fight with Greeks. It was also mentioned that Britain ought to maintain the security and the freedom of the Straits. On the other hand some objections were raised in stating that if Britain was to surrender to the Turkish desires with regard to Eastern Thrace, the Greeks were bound to complain that the Paris Note had been violated. It was further noted that if Kemalists were to be allowed to cross the Straits to Europe then it would be difficult to maintain the neutral zones and they would be open to the invasion by the Kemalists forces.

During the debate on allowing the Turks to cross the neutral zone, it was proposed that Curzon should go to Paris to discuss the issues with Poincare rather than make a written presentation to the French Government.

It was suggested that apart from voicing the British objections and criticisms to the French policy, it should be made clear to the French Government that Britain had come to limits in promising the Eastern Thrace to the Turks. It should be also explained that British Government recognized that it was no longer possible for Britain to carry out the full policy of the Paris Note in the absence of French and Italian support. In these circumstances it was necessary for Britain to separate herself from the Allies in this and possibly in other questions and she would proceed to occupy and hold Gallipoli and Chanak with such assistance as she could obtain from other sources. They should also tell the French that Britain would any longer take the responsibility for what might happen in Constantinople or in the Balkans or in Thrace.

It was generally accepted in the Cabinet that Curzon should have the authority to speak to Poincare in such terms as was discussed in the Cabinet if he found that the situation required it.

There was also a general agreement that in any event Chanak and the Gallipoli would have to be defended. It was pointed out that if it became necessary for Britain to adopt a neutral attitude towards the Turks and to permit them to cross the Straits, it would be essential to adopt a correspondingly neutral attitude towards the Greeks and to permit their forces, both naval and military to enter the neutral zones for the

purpose of defending the territory allocated to them in the Treaty of Sevres. It was agreed that it might be necessary to take steps that other powers maintained an equally neutral attitude towards Greece and Turkey. It was also considered that as long as the French Government maintained this attitude, then the Treaty of Neuilly and other treaties would be jeopardized.

The Cabinet agreed that Curzon was to proceed to Paris to discuss the issues as discussed in the Cabinet with Poincare and requested Curzon to notify Rumbold that General Harington should postpone his attendance to the Mudania Conference and if he had already gone to Mudania, he should not commit himself to any important point without further instructions. The cabinet also decided that the Secretary of State for War to send instructions to General Harington to the effect that unless he could rely on the French troops standing with the British troops at Constantinople, he was not to fight at Constantinople but was to have fullest discretion to withdraw from the position and from Constantinople at the moment when he was satisfied that such withdrawal was requested by the military situation. The Cabinet also decided to invite Venizelos to remain in Paris so that he might be available for the discussions between Curzon and French officials.

The Cabinet requested the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Secretary of State for War to discuss the question of the supply of arms and munitions with Diamandy, with discretion to deal with this request as they thought fit.<sup>102</sup>

The cabinet met on 7<sup>th</sup> of October at 2:30 PM to review the latest situation and Curzon's visit to France. The Cabinet had Hardinge's report dated 7<sup>th</sup> of October, giving details of the meeting between Curzon and Poincare in the afternoon of 6<sup>th</sup> October and telephone messages of 12 noon and 1:30 PM of 7<sup>th</sup> October, containing the details of the meeting between Curzon and Poincare in the morning of 7<sup>th</sup> October, and also the message received from General Harington on the same day, before them.

The Cabinet discussed the proposal that Curzon prepared to submit to Poincare, especially the part which gave 30 days provisional inter-Allied occupation of Eastern Thrace, after the evacuation by the Greek troops to maintain order and public security before the installment of the Turkish administration and Turkish police.

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<sup>102</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 58(22).

During the discussion it was mentioned that France was after securing the future safety of the French subjects and about the rights of the French holders of Turkish debt. It was probable that at the Peace Conference the French Government would be much less inclined to support extreme Turkish demands.

During the debate on Curzon's proposal some criticism extended for the proposal such as to the non existence of any limit on the number of Turkish gendarmerie to be maintained in Thrace and the endurance of the inter-Allied occupation to be limited to 30 days, although was better than Poincare's which was only 15 days, whereas originally the inter-Allied occupation was to be until, after the Peace Treaty had been signed. The proposal did not have any reference and emphasis to the evacuation by the Kemalists of the neutral zones and the due observance of these areas in future, which was the most important point of all. It was further pointed out that existence of the Allied troops on the right bank of Maritza would be helpful to have the reference on Karaagatch which had been demanded by Turks. It was mentioned that the period after the evacuation by the Greek forces had been found sufficient by Venizelos and by the Greek Delegation in London.

During the Cabinet meeting another message was received from Curzon that a new draft was agreed by Poincare that was found to be better by the Cabinet. The new resolution was;

*"The three Allied Governments agree in accepting that the Greek troops shall be invited to retire as soon as possible to the East of the Maritza. In the territories thus evacuated the Allied Governments will ensure by means of provisional inter-Allied occupation the maintenance of order and public security until the establishment in Eastern Thrace of Turkish civil administration and gendarmerie. This installation shall take place within a period not exceeding a month after the evacuation of Greek troops. At the expiry of this period, the Allied troops shall only continue to occupy during the conference certain points on the right bank of the Maritza and the places where they are at the present moment."*<sup>103</sup>

The Cabinet gave its approval for the final text provided that Poincare accepted conditions of;

(1) that any agreement on any other point must be contingent upon Turkish withdrawal from, and respect for, neutral zones.  
(2) that any agreement for admission of Kemalist gendarmerie before conclusion of Treaty of Peace must contain a limit on the numbers of such gendarmerie, failing which it might easily become in fact the Kemalist army under another name and endanger the position of the Allied occupying troops. The numbers to be allowed should be left to be fixed by the Allied Generals in consultation with the High Commissioners.

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<sup>103</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 59(22).

(3) There shall be no withdrawal of the Allied troops from Eastern Thrace before the termination of the period of thirty days agreed to by M. Venizelos unless the Allied Governments are agreed that adequate provision has been made for the maintenance of order and the protection of the non-Turkish population.”<sup>104</sup>

The next Cabinet meeting was held on 7<sup>th</sup> October. The Cabinet considered the telegrams received from Curzon indicating the conditions set forth to Poincare, had been accepted. Curzon notified the Cabinet that he wanted to make sure that he was writing to Poincare who had left Paris, informing him that an assurance had been given to British Government that all the points raised by them had been approved fully and specifically agreed to during the conversations. Curzon further informed the Cabinet that a reply in a telephone message, said he was told that the three points were ‘estendu et bien compris’ which was going to be regarded by the Cabinet as an acceptance of the conditions by France. The Cabinet decided to notify General Harington to proceed to the Mudania Conference and act in accordance with the agreed Paris Note of Curzon and Poincare.

Curzon’s message on 7<sup>th</sup> October to the Foreign Office indicated clearly that he was in touch with Venizelos in Paris even to the extent that the drafts that had been agreed between Curzon and Poincare, was shown to Venizelos for his views whether there was any discrepancies.<sup>105</sup>

The Cabinet also considered that evidence for the Turkish atrocities received from reliable sources, were accumulating. The Cabinet noted that the intention of the Kemalists was to solve the minority problems by exterminating the non-Turkish population.

The Cabinet believed that when the true facts were explained to the British public, there would be a strong revulsion of feeling in favour of the policy adopted by the Government. This policy was the only one which could save Constantinople and Thrace from becoming the scenes of similar catastrophic events that was happening in Anatolia. There was a considerable support in the Cabinet for the view that in this matter the press did not represent the view of the British people. It was believed that a strong support for the Government would be forthcoming when the state of the negotiations made it possible for the Government’s case to be fully stated.

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid

<sup>105</sup> Lloyd George Papers LG/F/208/3, Curzon’s telephone message to the Foreign Office on 7<sup>th</sup> October at 12 Noon.

The Cabinet took a note of a message received from Harington that Turks were approaching to Constantinople and therefore crossing the neutral zone. It was decided that General Harington should communicate with the French Commander and inquire whether the French had any intention of giving active military help on the defense of Constantinople, and if he received a negative reply, he should make arrangements for evacuation.<sup>106</sup>

The reason for the Cabinet's concern for the public opinion was due to the attacks to the Government in the press. The 'Daily Express' and 'Sunday Express' which were owned by Lord Beaverbrook, staged attacks against Venizelos and to a certain extent to Curzon. Being disturbed by the attacks to Venizelos, A.H. Crossfield, who was a close friend of Venizelos and Bonar Law, wrote to Bonar Law if he could a word with Beaverbrook to stop such publications. Curzon's letter to Bonar Law on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Oct. 1922 stated that the Beaverbrook was making upon Venizelos foolish and unfounded attacks. According to Crossfield, Venizelos' visit to Paris and London based upon his 'pro-British' convictions and his patriotism. He had come to London to do what could be done to save the situation in the Near East for civilization and Christianity.<sup>107</sup> It seemed that Bonar Law spoke to Lord Beaverbrook about Crossfield and therefore Venizelos' concern that he invited Crossfield for a meeting to discuss the issue and Crossfield sent a letter of appreciation to Bonar Law for his intervention in the matter on the following day.<sup>108</sup>

Crossfield also appealed to Colonel Mayes who was a close friend of Lord Beaverbrook, to influence Beaverbrook to prevent the attacks staged in the Beaverbrook's press. Curzon wrote that it was very wrong to suppose that it could be in the interests of British traders in the long run, to see the ruin of the Christian industrial population of the Near East, which controlled the almost 95% of the commerce of that region. He believed that it was not to the interests of the British Empire that Britain should bow to Kemalism. He commented that Venizelos was the best asset which the civilized communities in the Near East possessed and he regarded that the anti-Venizelos attack that had been engineered as no better than a pro-French and pro-Kemalist movement. Curzon believed that he had no doubts the attack on Venizelos was partly intended as an indirect attack upon Lloyd George and partly as a direct attempt to cut the ground from under the feet of Venizelos.

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<sup>106</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 60(22).

<sup>107</sup> House of Lords Public Records, Bonar Law Papers (Bonar Law Papers}, BL/107/2/63,

<sup>108</sup> Bonar Law Papers, BL/107/2/64.

Crossfield portrayed Venizelos as a person who was not only as true a patriot as ever lived, but also a Statesman who knew both how to be 'moderate in his strength and strong in his moderation'.<sup>109</sup>

Venizelos' plea to the British people appeared in 'The Times' on 4<sup>th</sup> of October. He urged the urgency of an action required in Thrace to save the Christian population and on the same day, he wrote to Bonar Law enclosing a clipping of his article in 'The Times'. Venizelos urged Bonar Law that if a reasonable action was not to be taken immediately, an irreparable disaster would fall upon Thrace as it had fallen upon Asia Minor. He told that he was not an exaggerated chauvinist as some papers claimed to be but a person with sincere desires to attain a lasting peace in that troubled part of the world. He was after, as he told, the security of a million innocent lives which were threatened with complete destruction.<sup>110</sup>

The Cabinet met on 9<sup>th</sup> of October to discuss the latest developments in Turkey. Curzon gave a brief explanation with regard to his visit to Paris and his meetings with Poincare. Curzon discussed the forthcoming Peace Conference and told that the Paris Note had contemplated that the invitations should be confined to the Great Powers, together with Yugoslavia and Romania with an aim that a peace treaty could be signed between the Powers who had been and still were at war with Turkey. He further told that since the Paris Note, certain countries had made claims that they should be also heard at the Conference, such as Russia, Georgia, the Ukraine and Bulgaria. There were two main questions need to be sorted out which were, peace with Turkey and the freedom of Straits. It was foreseen that the first question should be dealt in a general Peace Conference between representatives of Turkey and the Powers that had been at war with Turkey and the second one between Turkey and all those Powers who were interested in maintaining the freedom of the Straits. Curzon had proposed in Paris that the Conference should take place as soon as possible, probably at the beginning of November 1922 and be on the High Commissioners level. During the discussion in the Cabinet for the best way for the interests for Britain with regard to forthcoming Conference, it was suggested that the Cabinet members should find answers for three questions with respect to the Conference. The questions were; "(1) *would it be wise to entrust the negotiations at the Peace Conference to the High Commissioners at Constantinople?* (2) *Was it feasible or desirable to have two conferences, as had*

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Bonar Law Papers, BL/107/2/65.

*been suggested, and could the question of the freedom of the Straits be considered apart from the general question of a Turkish Peace? (3) Should Great Britain resist a demand from the Kemalists that Russia, Georgia, the Ukraine and possibly Bulgaria should be present at the Peace Conference?"<sup>111</sup>*

Cabinet met on 10<sup>th</sup> of October to discuss Turkey among other pending domestic issues. It was reported that an agreement was reached at the Mudania Conference and had been referred to Angora and Athens for confirmation. It was expected from Angora Government to give an answer by 5 PM Greenwich time. The Cabinet considered that there were number of questions connected with the forthcoming conference that needed early consideration and it was also required to evaluate the reply of the Angora Government, and hence the Cabinet decided to meet again on the same day at 5 PM.

Lloyd George reminded to the Cabinet that with Chamberlain they were to deliver speeches at the end of the week with regard to the situation in Near East. Lloyd George told that they should take this opportunity to show that the policy followed by Government gave its birth as peace in the Near East. Lloyd George gave a brief summary on the events starting in March 1915 when the agreement of Russia with which Constantinople and Straits were to be given. Then he explained the Picot-Sykes Agreement which was not even tabled at the Parliament by the Asquith Government. Somehow he did not give any reference to the Greek invasion of Smyrna and Treaty of Sevres.<sup>112</sup>

The Cabinet met again at 5 PM to discuss the Mudania Agreement and the forthcoming Conference. Lloyd George informed the Cabinet that no message had yet been received from Mudania; therefore he did not find any purpose to discuss the armistice. Curzon explained the latest developments in Thrace. He told that Turks had made a proposal that in place of an Allied occupation of 30 days, the Allies should take over the administration of Eastern Thrace for 45 days, after which it should be handed over to Turks completely. The Greeks also preferred the Turkish suggestion and had made a proposal that the line in Eastern Thrace should be that fixed in 1915 which was the east of the Maritza River. Curzon, on the inquiry of Venizelos' role in the Greek policy, told that he was the official representative of the

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<sup>111</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 61(22).

<sup>112</sup> Ibid, Cabinet 62(22).

Greek Government abroad and would probably represent Greece in the Conference.<sup>113</sup>

The results of the Mudania Conference were discussed in a Conference of Ministers on 13<sup>th</sup> of October. Secretary of State for War, Worthington Evans raised the question of reducing the number of troops in the Near East pending the forthcoming Peace Conference. He told that he was anxious to relieve some of the Battalions in order he could arrange trooping program, otherwise he stated, there would be a shortage of troops in India. He said that if it was decided that the troops were to stay, then it would be necessary to make arrangements for accommodation in Constantinople, Ismid, Thrace and Chanak. He told that accommodation had already been ordered for 7600 men on the Gallipoli Peninsula and he needed to build for another for 6000 men, and therefore was asking additional funds of £210,000 from Treasury. He told that the military strength was approximately 20,000 troops in the Near East, including 1,000 Marines. There were three Battalions each at Constantinople, Gallipoli, Ismid and Chanak.

Meanwhile the strain on the financial situation of the country forced the Chancellor of the Exchequer to suggest that unless it was assumed that we should be at the war with Turkey, the troops in Thrace and in the Ismid Peninsula could be withdrawn and accommodated in Constantinople. The Chancellor was against spending more money in the erection of huts on the Gallipoli Peninsula. He told that the military expenditure up to date was under £ 2.5 Million and the naval expenditure about £ 150,000. Worthington Evans told the Cabinet that General Harington was opposed to any reduction of the troops at the present time as he mistrusted the Turks.

It was decided that no important reduction should be made on the troops in the Near East before the Peace Conference concluded. Curzon explained why they required the British troops to stay in Near East,

*"He [Curzon] suggested that, firstly they were there to prevent an infringement of the Mudania Agreement, and it was clear that all the existing forces were required for that purpose. He mentioned that it was reported that there had been an infringement of the neutral zone by the Turkish troops on the Ismid Peninsula. Secondly we required to have sufficient forces available to resist such military pressure as the Turks might attempt to bring to bear upon us during the Peace Conference. It was quite possible that they might endeavour, by a treacherous coco to overthrow the Conference. Thirdly, the view assumed to be held that by retaining our troops in Chanak and Ismid we could ensure the decision of the question of the freedom of Straits in the sense desired by us."*<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Ibid, Cabinet 63(22).

<sup>114</sup> Ibid, Cabinet 63A (22), p. 359-371.

The Cabinet discussed the British donation for the Greek refugees as required by the League of Nations. Curzon explained that it was most urgent that Britain should provide the money asked for by the League of Nations. He told that the lives of millions of people were at stake and they were under obligations to the Greek refugees, whose misfortune were in part due to the encouragement they had received from Britain. It was decided at the Cabinet that they should send £40,000 to the League of Nations.<sup>115</sup>

The clauses of the Mudania Agreement were published in the press on 14<sup>th</sup> of October. Times reported that the Agreement as was distributed by the War Office at the night before, the Allied forces had been moving to Thrace to keep the order there and the Greek troops had been asked to evacuate Eastern Thrace. The Times also reported that there was a wide spread talk in the political circles about a general election. Chamberlain's speech dealing with domestic politics and Lloyd George also appeared in the paper. Chamberlain in his talk in Birmingham on 13<sup>th</sup> of October told that the Government had been neutral in the Near East crisis, but the Government was determined if the need arose to defend on behalf of the Empire, the freedom of the Straits and he believed that their policy had been successful.<sup>116</sup>

Venizelos to wave off the criticisms wrote to the Editor of Times appeared on 14<sup>th</sup> of October. He claimed that since the beginning of the war, Turkey had destroyed in Asia Minor between a million and a half and two million Greeks and Armenians, and pleaded to the Allies for a help in averting the extermination of yet another million upon the soil of Europe itself. Venizelos at the end accepted the fact that Turkey had become a European power.<sup>117</sup>

Montagu also wrote an article in the Times on 14<sup>th</sup> of October. He criticized the policies of Lloyd George and Foreign Office which, as he claimed, had prolonged the peace in Near East. He reminded the promises given by the Prime Minister for 'Turkey after-war' in 1918 and how he had deviated from these pledges. He wrote that;

*"But the Prime Minister departed from his solemn pledge, over persuaded the Allies, and pursued, until recently, diplomatically and by speech on every suitable occasion, the policy of a 'spread-eagled' Greece, penetrating into Asia Minor at Smyrna and into Turkish Thrace up to the confines of*

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> 'The Times' of 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1922, p.10

<sup>117</sup> 'The Times' of 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1922, p.13

*Constantinople. The Foreign Office labored to devise meticulous provisions for interference, especially financial, with the autonomy of Turkey; and a European frontier was suggested which left Constantinople at the mercy of the guns of a possible enemy within a few miles of its mosques and houses.*"<sup>118</sup>

British intellectuals also joined in the criticism of the policies of Lloyd George. The call for a war was challenged and even ridiculed by some British intellectuals such as famous playwright and writer A.A. Milne and writer E.M. Forster. Milne wrote to 'Daily News' on 4<sup>th</sup> of Oct 1922 and portrayed Lloyd George and Churchill as spoiling for a fight. He wrote that the reasons for mobilization as; "*I am told that we are to fight: (1) for England's honor; (2) for the freedom of the Straits; (3) for the sanctity of our graves in Gallipoli...Graves are sacred only when England occupies the earth in which they were dug. There were airmen who fell within the German boundaries...Foolishly we allowed the Germans to keep that land. We should be occupying it.*"<sup>119</sup> And Forster, after Milne's letter to 'Daily News', wrote to the same paper on 9<sup>th</sup> of Oct.1922 that;

"Mr. A.A. Milne's brilliant article deserves special thanks for its scathing analysis of 'the sanctity of our graves in Gallipoli.' Our rulers knew that their policy would not be popular, and in the hopes of stampeding us into it they permitted this vile appeal- the viler because the sentiment that it tries to pervert is a noble one and purifies the life of a nation when directed rightly. The bodies of the young men who were buried out there have become spirit; whether they were British or Turk, they have no quarrel with one another now, no part in our patronage, no craving for more holocausts of young men. Anyone who has himself entered, however feebly, into the life of the spirit, can realize this."<sup>120</sup>

Forster ended his letter with a wish that they might be retired at the next election. Forster's wish did come true that in fortnight time both of them would be thrown out of the Cabinet, but they were going to stay in the Parliament for years to come. Forster was going to write 'Our Graves in Gallipoli' in the 'New Leader' on 29<sup>th</sup> of October and developed the idea that on Gallipoli have found peace with each other in a sketch and condemned Lloyd George and Churchill that they were looking for land for more graves.<sup>121</sup>

The press, in overall, was critical of him and even his closed friend Lord Rothermere was criticizing him because of his policies. Then the letter of Bonar Law to the Editor appeared in the Times on 7<sup>th</sup> of October. Although he had agreed most of the Government's policy with respect to Near East while he was in the Cabinet, he criticized the policy of Lloyd George with regard to Near East that Britain could not

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<sup>118</sup> 'The Times' of 14<sup>th</sup> Oct. 1922, p.11

<sup>119</sup> David Roessel, "Live Orientals and Dead Greeks: Forster's Response to the Chanak Crisis", *Twentieth Century Literature*, Vol.: 36 No 1 (Spring 1990), p. 43-60

<sup>120</sup> 'Daily News', 9<sup>th</sup> Oct.1922, p. 6 and Roessel.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid.

own the role of 'policeman of the world'.<sup>122</sup> His long time friend Lord Beaverbrook had turned his back to Lloyd George and decided for the future of Britain he favoured to support Bonar Law.

Lloyd George defended his policy in Near East in his speech on 14<sup>th</sup> of October at the Manchester Reform Club. He told that the British people did not believe that the Government deliberately endeavored to rush Britain into war. He said that they were after peace and eventually ensured peace. They had not been *war-mongers*, but peace makers. He said that if it was not for the firmness they had displayed, they would not be able to achieve what they did, and by sending support to General Harington they were able to impress the *oriental mind*.

Lloyd George told that their object was threefold; the first was to secure the freedom of the Straits for the commerce of all nations, the second was to prevent war from spreading into Europe and the third was to prevent the repetition in Constantinople and in Thrace of the scenes of an intolerable horror which had been taken place in Asia Minor during the last six or seven years. Lloyd George told that if they did not hold Chanak and the Ismid Peninsula there would be scenes in Constantinople by the side of which the fires of Smyrna would pale. He further told that since 1914 the Turks, according to testimonies they had received and slaughtered in cold blood a million and a half of Armenians; men, women, and children, and five hundred thousand Greeks without any provocation at all. He thought it was right that before the Turkish army should be allowed to cross into Europe in the flush of victory, with the blood of Smyrna on its hands, Britain should have guarantees that there would be protection for the minorities in Europe. Then he talked about how right they were in piling troops at Chanak and at Gallipoli by praising General Harington that he had done remarkable achievements by stopping Turks from crossing to Europe. He told that Turk was a gentleman, who was very amenable to persuasion, and he quoted General Harington that;

“He [General Harington] told the Turks that conciliation had been carried to the utmost limit, and warned Ismet Pasha that Great Britain had on the spot a very large and powerful Fleet, large numbers of airplanes and guns and by no means negligible force of infantry; in fact, that Great Britain would be a very awkward enemy, but a very valuable friend. That is the sort of thing the Turks understands, and I am not at all surprised at what followed in the statement that it made a very great impression.”<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>122</sup> Kenneth O. Morgan, “Lloyd George’s Premiership: A Study in ‘Prime Ministerial Government’”, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 13. No. 1 (Mar., 1970), 130-157

<sup>123</sup> ‘The Times’, 16<sup>th</sup> Oct.1922, p.17

Lloyd George in his Manchester speech tried to answer the questions; rather criticism extended to him by Asquith, the former Prime Minister, that his Eastern policy had been a series of mistakes. He replied that his policy was to secure the freedom of Straits and relieve the Christian population from the Turkish rule whom one could not entrust to Turkish charge and told that this policy was not only his but of the Government that he had taken over in 1916. He told that;

“When I came into office in 1916, I had found a series of Agreements with Russia, France, Italy, and even Greece, which completely partitioned Turkey. Here was only a small strip of Anatolia left to Turks. Who did that? Lord Grey, Mr. Asquith. I was a member of the Government, and I approved of it, and I make no complaint about it. But I want to say it was not my policy. More than that, that policy was approved by Liberals and Conservatives, and, I think I may say, Labour leaders. They were all members of the Cabinet that dealt with it. Earl Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, Lord Lansdowne, Mr. Chamberlain, as well as Lord Grey; Mr. Asquith, Mr. Churchill, and myself we were all committed to it, but the direction was in the hands of Mr. Asquith and Lord Grey, and it was not a policy which I initiated. I came into it. Turkey had been almost completely partitioned by agreements by agreements entered into with various Powers before I ever became Prime Minister. Why did it fail...It was a very short sighted policy because, if the Russian Revolution had come after the war instead of during the war, you would have had the Bolsheviks at this moment in Constantinople. It was a mistake, but we were all in it.”<sup>124</sup>

Lloyd George also answered the criticism that the Treaty of Sevres was prepared by him, in stating that all the treaties were prepared by the Foreign Office under the guardianship of Curzon.

Lloyd George’s speech in Manchester was criticized by ‘The Times’ as a ‘disappointment’. It was stated that the speech failed completely to answer any of the main criticisms that had recently been addressed to the Government; instead Lloyd George tackled some of the problems waiting to be settled at the Peace Conference. Lloyd George’s speech was delivered in a spirit that would have been justified only were Christendom waging a holy war against the Turks. ‘The Times’ also criticized Lloyd George that he had ignored the very obligations of the Armistice Convention which Harington signed a week before.

It was stated that the representative of the Angora Government Dr. Reshad Bey left Britain probably with feelings of doubtlessness in the nature of special pleading, but The Times was certain that the impression of Lloyd George for Turks would produce in the East some negative effects. The Times further stated that if the recent crisis was managed by the Prime Minister, and by those of his colleagues in the Cabinet who had been called the ‘War Party’ in a frame of mind at all similar to that

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

displayed by Lloyd George, they should be thankful to people such as Curzon, Harington and Rumbold who had saved the country from going into war. The charge brought against Lloyd George and Ministers who shared his views was not because they sent reinforcements to the Straits and to Constantinople, but they had failed after the overthrow of Venizelos, to promote

Such a peace in the Near East as would have spared Europe the humiliation and the danger of return of the Turks. The Times challenged the Prime Minister that the questions such as his provocative speech of 4<sup>th</sup> August, he precipitated the Turkish attack upon the Greeks, which created the Near Eastern crisis, and by his statement to press on 16<sup>th</sup> of September which was believed to be jeopardized the unity of the Allies and therefore the spirit of signing the Mudania Agreement were not answered by Lloyd George at Manchester.<sup>125</sup>

The Times stressed on the necessity of a general election. Asquith also in his speech on 14<sup>th</sup> of October in answering Chamberlain's speech called for a general election as soon as possible. The press announced that a Conservative Conference of Cabinet Ministers and Members of Parliament were to be held at the Carlton Club on 19<sup>th</sup> October. 'The Times' on 18<sup>th</sup> October reiterated the necessity for an early election.<sup>126</sup>

The meeting took place on 19<sup>th</sup> October at the Carlton Club and the resolution of 'That; this meeting of Conservative members of the House of Commons declares its opinion that the Conservative Party, whilst willing to cooperate with the Liberals should fight the election as an independent party, with its own leader and with its own program.' Was passed with a majority of 100, 187 to 87 votes. Chamberlain delivered a speech as the Chairman of the party and stood against the resolution, but the decisive speech for the resolution came from Bonar Law that it passed with a vast majority. Balfour's effort for being against the split of the Government was fruitless. After the voting the Conservative Ministers had a meeting with Chamberlain and presented their resignation from the Government with an announcement that they praised the work done by Lloyd George in those difficult times in leading the country and for his services for Britain.<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup> 'The Times', 16<sup>th</sup> Oct.1922, p. 13

<sup>126</sup> 'The Times', 18<sup>th</sup> Oct.1922, p.13

<sup>127</sup> 'The Times', 20<sup>th</sup> Oct.1922, p.13. The Declaration signed by all Ministers except by Curzon. Curzon absented himself from the Carlton Club because the meeting was not a fully constituted party meeting, was going to resign later.

Lloyd George early in the afternoon went to Buckingham Palace and extended the resignation of the Government to the King.

The press on 27<sup>th</sup> of October announced that the Parliament was dissolved on 26<sup>th</sup> of October by Royal Proclamation. The elections were going to take place on 15<sup>th</sup> November and the new Parliament would assemble on 20<sup>th</sup> of November.

This was the end of Lloyd George as far as a seat whether as a Prime Minister or a Minister in the Government was concerned, although in 1940 when Churchill became the Prime Minister, there was a consideration of him to be an Ambassador to United States or a Minister, but nothing came out of it.

The Conservative Party came out as a winner from the elections and the Prime Minister Bonar Law continued to serve until his death in 1923.

After the resignation of Lloyd George and the fall of Government and especially after the elections, a kind of post-mortem was staged both in the press and in the Parliament to find out the 'persons' responsible for the humiliation of the British as a result of the collapse of the Greeks in Anatolia.

#### **VII.4. Post- Mortem Era**

'The Daily Telegraph' on 4<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1922 published the correspondence between Curzon and Gounaris while Gounaris was on trial in Greece. Lindsay, the Assistant-Under Secretary of Foreign Office commented that the extracts in the paper were from Gounaris' Memo and the summary of Curzon's reply, but there was no foundation for the statement that Curzon invited Gounaris to postpone evacuation and he asked to make inquiries on what the correspondent had based this statement.<sup>128</sup>

The case was already in the Parliament with the news on 29<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1922 that Curzon had encouraged the Greeks to stay in Asia Minor and even to advance further. The question on the same day was asked to the Bonar Law' the Prime Minister as whether he had seen the allegations against Curzon by the ministers on

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<sup>128</sup> PRO, FO 371/7917, E 13470.

trial in Greece that they had encouragement, and in one case a letter, from British Ministers and encouragement from the Foreign Secretary.<sup>129</sup> Another question to the Prime Minister was; *“whether, in view of the report that Gounaris, late Prime Minister of Greece, who has now been executed, proposed at a date subsequent to April 1921 and before the defeat of the Greek Armies in Asia Minor to withdraw on their advanced position in order to avoid disaster, and that he was dissuaded from doing so by members of His Majesty’s Government, he can make a statement which will clear His Majesty’s late Government of this grave charge?”*<sup>130</sup>

Curzon who was in Lausanne when the questioning in the Parliament took place wrote to the Prime Minister on 1<sup>st</sup> of Dec.1922 that he was astounded at the questions in the Parliament that Greek Ministers received encouragement from him to continue their advance in Asia Minor. He told that as was well known to Foreign Office he had been trying to induce them to withdraw and to place their case in the hands of Powers. He further told that his first effort was made in Paris in June 1921 when he proposed allied mediation on basis of retirement of Greek forces from Asia Minor. His second attempt was in October and November 1921 when Gounaris and Baltazzis came to London and after discussions he managed to make them agree with him that time. He continued in stating that; *“It is monstrous to detach an isolated expression of friendliness or sympathy for Greece from report of these proceedings and to cite it in a sense diametrically opposed to entire course of my policy and advice.”*<sup>131</sup> Bonar Law replied on the same day that; *“As the charges about encouraging Greeks in the past, though your Office is mentioned, the attacks are really directed against late Prime Minister, and I am sure that it would be foolish for us to take any action unless the position changes.”*<sup>132</sup> Curzon was in favour of making a statement rather than to lay all the papers and correspondence between Britain and Greece.

Hardinge reported from Paris that ‘Matin’ on 1<sup>st</sup> December criticized Lloyd George’s policy towards Greece at the time of the opening of the Greek campaign in Asia Minor. The paper quoted the leading article in the ‘Morning Post’ in which the question was asked as to how it came about that when things appeared to be going well for peace at that period, the Greek Ministers were secretly launching a war and while Lloyd George was openly working for a settlement, he gave secret

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<sup>129</sup> Hansard for Commons, 29<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1922, Col. 709.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid.

<sup>131</sup> PRO, FO 371/7917, E 13483.

<sup>132</sup> Ibid.

encouragement to the Greeks to go forward with their preparations implying the encouragement and moral support given to the Greeks during and right after the Second London Conference by Lloyd George. 'Matin' published a message dispatched by Venizelos from London on 19<sup>th</sup> of March 1920, stating that He was informed even before the signing of the Treaty of Sevres, that neither France nor Italy would support him in his policy of adventure but that Britain was prepared to give him her support though at the same time declining all the responsibilities which such policy might result with.

'Matin' continued its allegations that after Boulogne Conference in an interview with Lloyd George, Venizelos had told that to ensure the execution of the Treaty of Sevres the Greek effectiveness should be increased and even in collaboration with the British forces then in Turkey so that it might be possible to impose their will by force. Venizelos was quoted as saying that to implement this scheme he would need financial and material support from Britain. 'Matin' alleged that from that time onwards the Lloyd George-Venizelos policy prevailed in the East for a long time. It was pointed out that the proof of this plan was the support that Venizelos had received from Lloyd George.<sup>133</sup>

'Matin continued its allegations against Lloyd George on the following day, 2<sup>nd</sup> of December, and published documents which were claimed as a proof to show that Venizelos had been informed of the reservations that the French Government made on the subject of the Lloyd George-Venizelist policy. It was pointed out that it was due to the collaboration between Lloyd George and Venizelos which had caused France to sign the Treaty of Sevres.<sup>134</sup>

'Matin' continued its series of allegations on 4<sup>th</sup> December by publishing further official documents that Venizelos had understood the Italian policy as clearly as the French and knew that Lloyd George was his only supporter. The paper also published a copy of the letter of 19<sup>th</sup> of July 1919 from Venizelos to Clemenceau in which Venizelos was accused of making Lloyd George complain the British War Office about the Turkish forces being exaggerated.<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid, E 13544.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid, E 13550.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, E 13684.

Publishing official documents in 'Matin' and in 'Sunday Express' produced a panic that there would be more documents to be in the waiting list. Harold Nicolson submitted a Memo to the Foreign Office on 4<sup>th</sup> of December, stating that Venizelos was worried and wished Scotland Yard to take action, but Nicolson believed that that would be unwise.<sup>136</sup>

In December 1922 there was a debate on the allegations appeared in the press and also on Curzon that the correspondence between Gounaris and Curzon in February and March 1922 had never been neither circulated to the Cabinet nor discussed in the Cabinet. The attack was staged by Lord Birkenhead, the Lord Chancellor of the ex-Government. Foreign Office answered the allegation that all the important papers were distributed to the Cabinet members. In the case of those two communications, the Foreign Office claimed that they were circulated since some members of the late Cabinet had received them and this was the conclusive evidence of their distribution to the Cabinet.<sup>137</sup>

Bentinck, Acting High Commissioner at Athens reported on 3<sup>rd</sup> of December that General Stratigos, an ex-minister in the Gounaris' Cabinet, in his evidence declared that when Greek deputation was in London, Curzon openly declared that Britain was always favoring his regime to the former. At Gounaris' request this was given in writing and General had seen this note. General also referred to the record of conversation with LG which was presumably amongst Gounaris' papers which had been seized. The General also claimed that in December 1921 when he was in London, Gounaris had received a letter from Chancellor of Exchequer stating that British Government had decided to assist Greece and the financial blockade was raised and a draft convention had followed. Bentinck also reported that Sir R. Horne's letter that the General had mentioned appeared in the Greek press.<sup>138</sup>

In the Parliament on 4<sup>th</sup> of December it was asked to the Prime Minister that press reports had been indicating that Lloyd George was also equally responsible with the other members of the Cabinet for sending Greeks to Turkey. Bonar Law replied that it was the first time he had heard of it.<sup>139</sup>

Bonar Law wrote to Curzon on 8<sup>th</sup> of Dec.1922 that their friends his late colleagues had made almost as big a mess of

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<sup>136</sup> Ibid, E 13780,

<sup>137</sup> PRO, PREM 1/18, W.G. Osborne's Memorandum for Lord Salisbury on 9<sup>th</sup> Dec. 1922.

<sup>138</sup> PRO, FO 371/7588, C16476.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid, C16657.

it as he had seen in his whole political experience. He further told that; "A paper published extracts from a letter to you from Gounaris of the 15<sup>th</sup> February last. L.G. [Lloyd George], F.E. [Lord Birkenhead], Austen [Austen Chamberlain] and Worthington Evans – came to the conclusion that there was a weapon to be used against you to prove that it was you and not L.G. who had led the Greeks on and caused the disaster. They had risked this by trusting to their memory. A question was put to me in the House [House of Commons] whether this correspondence had been circulated to the Cabinet. I was able to reply 'Yes'. They questioned it by supplementaries but without any result. F.E. had arranged to make the attack in force in the House of Lords and apparently they had forgotten to tell him of the answer given. He, therefore, made a violent attack which was quite successfully answered by Salisbury and now a question is going to be put in the House of Lords and probably in our House too asking for confirmation of the statement made by me....but if you have had any idea that trouble might be caused to you, you may put that out of your mind."<sup>140</sup>

Curzon was very upset and worried that his name had been connected for the support of Greeks to stay in Asia Minor and for offensive policy against Turks and wrote to Bonar Law and the Cabinet on 9<sup>th</sup> of Dec.1922 that he was amazed at the attempt made by some of his recent colleagues to throw upon him blame for a policy he had been innocent. Curzon directed his allegations towards Lloyd George that as everybody knew Lloyd George carried on, sometimes in Cabinet more frequently outside it and behind the back of Foreign Office in favour of Greece, and he was quite willing that all papers should be published. He was certain that none had been withheld by him from the Cabinet as circulation was arranged automatically by Foreign Office. He told that he had persuaded Greece in October 1921 to recognize that the case was lost in Asia Minor and therefore he from that date forward was pressing allied conference to bring about retirement without bloodshed. He told that; "I am not willing that this gross and malicious travesty of my conduct, which is simply designed to cover up deplorable policy of late Prime Minister, should pass unchallenged and I am prepared to write a letter to be read by you in Parliament, or to take any other step which you may advise, to make truth known."<sup>141</sup>

Bonar Law asked the Foreign Office to notify Curzon in Lausanne that in view of his last letter to Curzon, further action on Curzon's part did not seem to be necessary for the time being.<sup>142</sup>

Bonar Law comforted Curzon with another letter on 12<sup>th</sup> of December that the Gounaris business was over for the time being but in case it came up again when Curzon returned, there was a more deadly weapon left for him than had been used

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<sup>140</sup> Bonar Law Papers, BL/111/12/42.

<sup>141</sup> PRO, PREM 1/18.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

and that was the letter from Gounaris dated 27<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1922 to Lloyd George calling attention to the letter to Curzon and mentioning all the facts contained in his letter to Curzon. Bonar Law believed that Gounaris' letter to Lloyd George was a good proof to defeat the play staged by Lloyd George.<sup>143</sup>

W.G. Osborne prepared a Memorandum on 'Greek Policy of the late Government' on 13<sup>th</sup> of December and submitted to Bonar Law. He considered that the attack on the Lloyd George's Government for supporting Greece might be a general one alleging that the British Government, or at least Lloyd George, backed the Greeks against the Turks, or it might take the form of criticism of particular acts of the late Government. He stated that as regards to the first alternative, the answer was that the policy of the Government was, not aggrandizement of Greece but to comply with the two most vital British interests in the Near Eastern settlement, which was the freedom of the Straits and the security of the Christian population. One also should remember that Turkey was the enemy that was responsible for the thousands of lives, millions of money and prolonging the war. Osborne commented on the Treaty of Sevres that it was may be not a perfect Treaty and Britain was not responsible of drawing it by herself. The Treaty was never accepted by Turkey, and then Britain was ready to modify it for the benefits of Turks in the Second London Conference in March 1921.

In the Conference an international commission was offered to enquire into the ethnical status of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace which was accepted by Turkey but rejected by Greece, then a series of modifications to the Treaty was proposed to both sides with a warning that renewal of hostilities pending the acceptance the Allied offer would be at the risk of the aggressor. The Greeks, on their return to Athens initiated an offensive and this was interpreted as British backing in money and war material, which was not the case. Britain did not give any encouragement to Greeks for the offensive. The Allies declared their neutrality in May 1921 regarding hostilities between Greece and Turkey, which could hardly be ratified as a pro-Greek policy. Since the war was not conclusive, Curzon in May 1921 had a meeting in Paris with Briand and the Italian Ambassador which resulted in another offer of mediation to the Greeks which was again refused by Greece. These attempts by Britain could be seen as securing peace rather than a pro-Greek policy and backing of Greece. In July and August 1921 the Greeks undertook further offensive in

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<sup>143</sup> Bonar Law Papers, BL/111/12/48.

Anatolia, and the second one resulted by a retreat from the Sakharía river to the positions originally occupied. In the autumn of 1921, during the visit of Gounaris and Baltazis to London, they agreed with Curzon to entrust the Greek case to the Allies at a Conference which was held in March 1922 instead of December 1921. At the meantime, at an interview at Cannes on 12<sup>th</sup> of January Lloyd George and Curzon advised Gounaris to accept Curzon's offer which included Greek withdrawal from Smyrna. Osborne told that these were the events of 1921, which showed a continuous effort from Britain to secure peace in Near East rather than towards satisfying the full Greek claims. Osborne stated that the main mile-stones of the events were; (1) The Greek landing in Smyrna in May 1919, which was the result of the Supreme Council in Paris. (2) Greek military action in Anatolia in the summer of 1920 at the request of the Allies. The French and Italian Governments together with the British Government decided for the invitation of Venizelos to the Boulogne conference in June 1920 to authorize a limited advance of Greek troops' occupation of the Smyrna zone so as to relieve a military threat by the Turks to the Allied force occupation in Ismid. (3) The award to Greece was Smyrna and Eastern Thrace under the Treaty of Sevres. This was the outcome of a favourable report by a sub-committee where Britain was represented by Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, and Sir Eyre Crowe, The Under-Secretary of Foreign Office. The Committee enquired into the Greek claims for Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, and the report was submitted to the Supreme Council which endorsed the award of these regions to Greece. (4) Greek spring offensive of 1921 immediately after the Second London Conference. (5) The reply of 6<sup>th</sup> Of March 1922 to Gounaris' note of 15<sup>th</sup> of February. (6) The dispatch of British troops to the Straits in September 1922 after the Greek disaster in Asia Minor.

Osborne further discussed in detail that Curzon's reply to Gounaris could not be interpreted as advice that the Greek army should stay in Asia Minor as had been claimed. Osborne pointed out that the Greek Government had already entrusted the case to the Allies and there was no way that Britain could jeopardize the prospects of peace when they were so close to it by supplying the Greeks with funds that was going to be spent for the war. Osborne acknowledged the fact that the British Government had provided certain facilities for the Greek Government to secure a loan in the London Market but they were not successful in securing a loan. He told that therefore it was illegitimate to regard Gounaris' note as an endeavour to induce the British Government to take further steps that would have resulted in the issue of the hoped-for loan. He further commented that Gounaris' suggestion of an

immediate evacuation was regarded as 'bluff' by the High Commissioner in Athens. To support his explanation, Osborne told that in later months when they had lost to hope to secure a loan in the London Market, they had recourse to a forced loan in Athens; there was no further talk of immediate evacuation. He believed that Gounaris or any other Government in Greece could not possibly afford politically to evacuate Asia Minor without securing the lives of Greek population in Asia Minor.

Osborne commented that sending troops to Chanak and Gallipoli was justified from the Interests of Britain. Had the British Government yielded to threat of Nationalists for the neutral zones, they would have abandoned to secure what had always been regarded as a vital British interest, and therefore they would have a different course in the subsequent negotiations.<sup>144</sup>

## **VII.5. Evaluation**

The problematic in this period were: the location of evacuation, armistice, and peace settlement of the Greco-Turkish disputes. Informing the Dominions was also a point of vital importance for Britain since the Dominions ostensibly due to religions and actually, due to the nationalistic sentiments developed among them, should be assumed to be a part of the 'family'. It was within this period that the 'family' dissolved and paved the way to their independence. The Government resorted to other means outside of the will of the public which brought the downfall of the Prime Minister.

Allied Foreign Ministers, meeting in March 1922, decided to hold the conference to determine terms with Turks in Venice. This was not a bilateral decision and the Turks, noting their wish to declare armistice corresponding to evacuation of Anatolia by Greeks was overlooked, were already piling troops along the line opposite to Greek occupation zone of Eskisehir and Afyonkarahisar. When the Turkish offense started on 26<sup>th</sup> of August, the Allies were still unaware of the seriousness of the event, and Lloyd George and Curzon still insisted that Europe should be freed from Turks; but they learned by 2<sup>nd</sup> of September that the Greek army was at the stage of dissolving. As the news reached London, the Foreign Office was in panic and Rumbold proposed advancing the date for the meeting to have an armistice to save the Greek army. Rumbold suggested that apart from these advantages for the

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<sup>144</sup> PRO, FO 371/7588, C 16657.

Greeks they could also gain time not to face Turks as a victor at the Peace Conference. The British Foreign Office, considering the seriousness of the situation, made a compromise in their approach by accepting the French proposal with regard to Asia Minor that they were ready to attend the meeting in Venice without any conditions about the armistice as long it is held in two weeks time. Curzon and Lloyd George were in agreement that Europe should be free from Turks.

It must have been difficult for Curzon to consult the High Commissioners on how to approach Mustafa Kemal as he did on 3<sup>rd</sup> of September, since he had joined Lloyd George in turning on the green light for the Greek offense and it was only couple of months ago that he prevented Kemal-Harrington meeting.

Meanwhile the British press, except few, was more interested in publishing articles for the Smyrna fire and the Turkish atrocities against Christians. The Council of League of Nations considered the claims as an excuse for Turks for their future atrocities against Christians.

The Greek army evacuated Anatolia almost within a fortnight following the since the Turkish offense, although War Office and the Foreign Office had stated previously that after necessary preparation, it would take months. Kemalists complains about atrocities committed by Greeks as they were withdrawing from Asia Minor was confirmed by Rumbold. The Council of League of Nations was concerned that this could be an excuse for Turks for their future atrocities against Christians. However, the Greeks were safely removed from Asia Minor. At that point, Curzon believed that there was no necessity for an armistice; therefore no concessions had to be granted to Turks in Eastern Thrace. He was still thinking to use Greeks as a trump card against Turks in Thrace and also for Constantinople.

Considering that the Greeks had already asked them to intervene for an armistice, the Cabinet, met 16 times to reach a decision. In the first of these meetings, on 7<sup>th</sup> September, Curzon, convinced that the British had no credit among the Kemalists, was in favour of using Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople to approach to Kemalists for an armistice. He was still optimistic since they had already agreed to give Anatolia including Constantinople to Turks in March 1922 by Paris Agreement, so he focused on preserving the status quo. Curzon was in the opinion that they should not hand Constantinople to Turks yet, and should be stopped at the Ismid Peninsula to prevent them from crossing to Europe, since if they did it would be

much harder to stop them. Curzon offered to make use of the Greek population in Constantinople for the defense of the city, in case the Turks tried to capture it. In Curzon's mind probably Constantinople was another trump card to be played in the final Conference. Curzon's proposal to use the inhabitant Greek population in Constantinople was something beyond imagination considering the consequences of an urban warfare.

Churchill shared Curzon's views that they should not abandon the British policy for Europe and under any circumstances leave Gallipoli Peninsula and İsmid to Turks and therefore loose the 'fruits of the last war'. Churchill proposed another dangerous scheme that might be adopted if the circumstances forced them, which was to make use of Bulgarians, hence initiating a new Balkan war.

Lloyd George blaming King Constantine believed that with the current change in Greece the Greek army under a new leadership could be successful against the Turks. Finally, all members of the cabinet agreed that control of the Straits was a necessity for Britain and they should defend the Gallipoli Peninsula, if required, by force. Lloyd George and the Foreign Office next turned to Balkan states for the possibility of their involvement to resist Turks entering into Europe and Lloyd George and Curzon had interviews with Romanian and Serbian leaders. Furthermore Foreign Office made enquiries about the status of Greeks. According to Poincare; Britain asked for a Greek army of 60 000 men to be stationed in Thrace, to resist Turks.<sup>145</sup>

In the meeting Lloyd George held with the Secretary of State for War, the First Lord of Admiralty and Generals from War Office, a decision was reached to accept Harington's suggestion that the Turks should not be allowed to cross the Straits to prevent a possible attack on Gallipoli from North.

Lloyd George at the meetings held during the time elapsed, seemed to be quite cordial towards Curzon and vice versa and never missed a chance to thank him. This relation was going to last until 14<sup>th</sup> October when Lloyd George delivered his famous Manchester speech. Could it be because of Lloyd George who was not sure of the stability of his position as a Prime Minister and therefore building up supports from Conservative ranks such as Curzon? The assumption that Lloyd

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<sup>145</sup> PRO, CAB 24/139, Telegram from Lord Hardinge to Foreign Office on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Sep. 1922.

George subverted the Near East policy to Curzon after the fall of Venizelos and especially after the Second London Conference probably was not far from the truth.

Lloyd George's authority over the domestic politics since March 1922 was getting strained and the failure of the Genoa Conference contributed to his instability in the Government. On international front the efforts of the recognition of Russia was turned down by Conservatives especially after strong protests of Churchill and the British-Franco relations were at the bottom after the premiership of Poincare in France. Lloyd George at the beginning of 1922 offered to resign to allow Chamberlain to be the Prime Minister, but Chamberlain declined probably to save himself from 'thorns of roses'.<sup>146</sup>

The meeting on 15<sup>th</sup> of September was held in an atmosphere of certain uncertainties for the Near East, but ended with decisions that would drive the end of the Government and Lloyd George, which was Churchill's suggestion that they had to back their demands by showing a united front to the Turks. Lloyd George who still did not believe in the defeat of Greeks and told that; "*Greeks had voluntarily evacuated Asia Minor, for, as far as he could judge there had been practically no fighting.*"<sup>147</sup> Lloyd George insisted on forming an army of Greeks, Romanians, Yugoslavians and themselves rather than inviting the French to defend the Straits to a possible Turkish attack. Curzon was not optimistic on the contrary to Lloyd George about the involvement of Romanians and Yugoslavians in the participation of defending the Straits, besides they would be asking a high price for it. The suggestion to invite Dominions to give an impression of the Empire as a front against Turks was decided.

Contrary to the expectations of the Government, to build up patriotic enthusiasm backfired. Prominent journals of the following days appeared with headlines calling to 'Stop this New War'. The anticipated armed cooperation was held back too by governments applied.

The Cabinet meeting on 18<sup>th</sup> of September was important that the Admiralty was ordered to prevent crossing of Turks across the Straits even by firing, which meant declaring a war against Mustafa Kemal. As was expected the French and Italians

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<sup>146</sup> Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/7/5/6 and F/7/5/8, Lloyd George offered his intention to resign to Chamberlain in a private letter on 27<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1922, but turned down by him on 15<sup>th</sup> Of March 1922.

<sup>147</sup> PRO, CAB 23/31, Cabinet 50(22).

withdrew from Anatolia to Constantinople and leaving British troops by themselves at Ismid Peninsula and Chanak.

Curzon, upset by the French withdrawal met Poincare to reiterate the British stand that they would act alone if they were compelled to do so while Lloyd George, thinking defense for Chanak and Gallipoli, notified the Military Committee that it would be a triumph to defeat the Turks alone without the help of French to show to the world that they were the 'greatest'.

Curzon reported that he would meet Poincare on 22<sup>nd</sup> September and he would try to maintain the March 1922 Paris Note arrangements, such that; the Greek forces to withdraw behind Enos-Istranja line and the frontiers in Thrace to be discussed in the Conference, probably hoping that the best solution would be 'save today' approach since by gaining time, the things might change then.

While in Paris, Curzon, was not so apart in his thinking from Lloyd George and told Poincare that if General Harington was forced to evacuate Constantinople the responsibility would not be his but that of those who had abandoned him, therefore implying treason of France. This was a very crucial point that Curzon had promised, according to Lord Hardinge, that he should not discuss with Poincare in order to have some progress in the negotiations, but he did. Curzon joining Lloyd George's opinion carried his parley with Poincare to the point of an argument, according to Curzon, started shouting and behaving like a demented school-master screaming at a guilty school-boy. The incident was going to be reported by Harold Nicolson in his memoirs as "*...Curzon's wide white hands upon the green baize cloth trembled violently. He could stand it no further. Rising from his seat he muttered something about an adjournment and limped hurriedly into the adjoining room. He was accompanied by his secretaries and by Lord Hardinge, then our Ambassador in Paris. He collapsed upon a scarlet settee. He grasped Lord Hardinge by the arm. 'Charley', he panted, 'I can't bear that horrid little man. I can't bear him. I can't beat him.' He wept*"<sup>148</sup> Lord Hardinge's version of the incident was; "*...Curzon provoked the wrath of Poincare and he suddenly lost his temper and shouted and screamed at Curzon, really in the most insulting manner, pouring out torrents of abuse and making the wildest statements with a flow of language like Niagara, which completely bowled over Curzon, who collapsed entirely. Curzon kept on saying to*

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<sup>148</sup> Harold Nicolson, Curzon: The Last Phase (London: Constable & Co. Ltd., 1934), 273-274

me 'What am I to do, hadn't I better go home to London, I can not go on, something must be done.'<sup>149</sup> Curzon's state of mind on 22<sup>nd</sup> of September was well reflected in the telegram sent to Tyrell, the Assistant-Under Secretary at the Foreign Office to be relayed to Harington. He wrote that owing to the availability of armed Turks and Greeks in the town it might be necessary to evacuate in a short notice unless the French and Italian Governments did not consent to the maintaining the order at Constantinople. He informed that the wives and children of British officers and men were embarking the following day and arrangements had been made to embark British colony at very short notice.<sup>150</sup> The meeting Poincare was important that he came back to London convinced that without Allies, Britain could not and should not act alone to pursue her Eastern policies and this was the turning point where Curzon drifted apart from Lloyd George's policies for Turkey.

the Cabinet, basing on discussion in Paris, decided on 23<sup>rd</sup> that Eastern Thrace was be ceded to the Turks provided, probably to 'save face' of Britain, that neutrality of the Straits and the protection of the minorities were secured and an invitation be sent to Mustafa Kemal for a meeting at Mudania. The public opinion was against a new war again in less than four years and this was well reflected to Lloyd George by the visit of the representatives of General Council of the Trades Union Congress and press which with the exception of Lord Rothermere's 'Daily Mail'.<sup>151</sup> Trade Union practically criticized Lloyd George's policy towards Near East and told that they would do anything in their power to stop the new war.

This invitation did not relieve Britain from Chanak pressure. Although Mustafa Kemal was invited for a meeting at Mudania and the Eastern Thrace including Adrianople was given to Turks, they were still close to so claimed neutral zone of Chanak and General Harington was worried that in the event of an attack they had to evacuate the area. Churchill at Conference of Ministers on 27<sup>th</sup> commented that Chanak became a prestige for Britain and therefore they should fight in the event of a Turkish attack and make use of the Greek army although Lindley, the British High

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<sup>149</sup> J. Douglass Gould, "Lord Hardinge As Ambassador to France, and the Anglo-French Dilemma over Germany and the Near East, 1920-1922", *The Historical Journal*, Vol.21, No. 4 (Dec., 1978), p.913-937.

<sup>150</sup> PRO, CAB 24/139, Lord Hardinge's telegram to Foreign Office on 22<sup>nd</sup> Sep.1922.

<sup>151</sup> Lord Rothermere was the Chief Proprietor of 'Daily Mail' and brother of Lord Northcliffe who was the owner of 'The Times'. Lord Rothermere stayed as a 'friend' of Lloyd George throughout his Premiership, unlike to Northcliffe who was one of the factor for Lloyd George becoming Prime Minister and even he was made responsible for the propaganda against the Central Powers during the War, but became one of the critics of him. After his death in 1921, the Times was still a harsh critique of Lloyd George.

Commissioner in Athens, had been reporting that the Greek army's morale was very low and especially after the Revolution in Greece there was a high political instability. There was not much diversion of opinion between Curzon and Lloyd George, except for Churchill's remark Lloyd George shared that Chanak was important from British prestige point of view, Therefore, Curzon, opposing a new armed action, proposed to retire from Chanak and proceed to Constantinople, since he believed that until the Treaty, Constantinople was more important than Chanak. Meanwhile, War Office asserted that from logistic point of view securing both Gallipoli and Chanak was crucial to hold Constantinople. Curzon came openly to criticize Lloyd George on his suggestion that the Greek war ships should not be prevented from fighting Turks in the Marmara Sea while they crossed from Constantinople to the Aegean Sea. This was the second time that seriously Lloyd George and Curzon disagreed openly and of with the insistence of Lloyd George and the 'war party', the Cabinet decided to fight the Turks if they insisted on keeping their troops adjacent to Chanak.

The cabinet gave the order to fire to the Turkish troops on 29<sup>th</sup> September after allowing a certain time for them to evacuate the neutral zone. This was a declaration of war and Curzon's final proposals of negotiating with the Angora Government, to allow them time before letting arms talk was rejected. It seemed clear that the Cabinet seemed to be determined for a new war unless they secured the neutral zone for themselves.

The crucial developments in this period were the criticisms extended to Government's Eastern policy and the isolation of the Britain. The press more than ever bombarded the Government and being at the edge of a new war triggered the Conservative Party backbenchers to force the Government to resign, hence ending Lloyd George era. Until the last moment Lloyd George never lost his hope that the Greeks would come out to fight the Turks. When, Venizelos turned out in London probably with the consent of Lloyd George. He advised the British Cabinet that the Greeks would be ready to fight against the Turks if they knew that Britain stood by them. This news was going to please Lloyd George. He believed in Venizelos and told the Cabinet that he never mislead them, therefore the background was ready for a new war, although Lloyd George knew that there existed so much resentment in the public against a new war. Could it be because he wanted to make sure his Premiership to last a little longer? As Curzon had told there was hardly anything they were going to gain from such an adventure. Could it be because he desired to

show to the world that 'they were the strongest and biggest nation'? Could it be still the philhellenic attitude to present some token from him to the Greeks? Could it be because of crushing the Turks and following the Gladstone policy of 'bags and baggage'? Could be the reason to give a lesson to the Turks as Churchill had stated? It must have been a combination of all these factors rather than a single causal significant factor.

His stubborn character did not allow him to accept the defeat and hence to ease the tension in the Turco-British relations, as he was determined to finish the Turks at least in Europe. His failure to obtain the support of Dominions and Balkan states to build a front against Turks and the political environment within the Cabinet and Parliament forced him to prepare his end, to resign from the premiership. This was the period that Lloyd George deviated from the state actors as he was practically lost the support he had been enjoying in his endeavor against Turks.

## CHAPTER VIII

### CONCLUSION

Lloyd George has been studied deeply and in detail, each researcher attempting to enlighten certain aspects of him and his policies. The foreign policy of Lloyd George towards Ottoman Empire seems to be attracted less attention. One of the biographers of Lloyd George, Prof. Gilbert Bentley, criticizes those tackling only one aspect of Lloyd George and iterates that such a study might be misleading and that it “distort(s) both man and his work.”<sup>1</sup> Albeit Prof. Bentley’s rightful assertion, this is a limited study of this famous political figure. In this thesis the emphasis is hardly on Lloyd George’s personality and his private and political life. The focus is on his foreign policy concerning the Ottoman Empire during the years 1916-1922. Accordingly, the dissertation in order to enlighten the agreements and conflicts of those around Lloyd George also highlights policies of various individuals and their applications in multiple institutions related to the Empire during the time span referred. It must be borne in mind however that no matter how deep a research is carried, a scholar always confronts the threat of encountering uncovered material. Regardless of the abundance of material encountered during the study, to draw a portrait of Lloyd George is rather difficult and one may easily fall into the ditch as once Gilbert Bentley cautioned the historians such that to define the character of Lloyd George requires brushing away the debris of speculation and confusion left by other historians where plenty of it really exists.

Lloyd George in many sources is usually identified as; ‘People’s Champion’, ‘Welsh wizard’, ‘Goat’, ‘the man who won the war’, ‘opportunist’, ‘cottage-bred boy’ and ‘Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor’. No doubt that he was a man of contradictions and therefore the scholars who study and analyze him are bound to call him as they see him. For some, he is an Edwardian Liberal, and for others ‘a Centrist’ and even ‘Social Nationalist’. But a common description all scholars agree upon is that he was stubborn and full of energy. Another important characteristic of Lloyd George was

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<sup>1</sup> Gilbert Bentley, *David Lloyd George, a Political Life: The Architect of Change, 1863-1912*, (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1987), preface

his approach to his colleagues as once Lord Beaverbrook, one of his closest friends, remarked that he; “shed(s) his friends like the ermine sheds its winter coat”<sup>2</sup>

His entrance to politics was by his personal effort and so was his climb in the stairs of politics to Premiership. His departure from politics was not as quiet as his entrance since it was by his death.

In his life, he constantly went from one extreme to another. During his campaign for the ‘people’s budget’ as the Chancellor of Exchequer, his attack to privileged and House of Lords was well remembered when he accepted the lordship and became a member of the Upper House that he had detested so much. He was the ‘cottage-bred boy’ as he described himself in his first election campaign in 1890, therefore criticizing the privileged. As he told in his speech in Trade Union Conference, he was ‘one of them’ and even after many years he told the Labour Cabinet Minister in 1931 that he could never betray the interests of the working class where he felt he belonged.<sup>3</sup> Lloyd George especially after the experience at Munitions he believed in businessman and therefore switching from his faith in state’s beneficent role in society to the concept of wealth creation rather than wealth distribution.<sup>4</sup>

Lloyd George became more enthusiastic about the state and the role of state for the welfare of the society. Therefore his approach to free trade and tariffs, dominant issue in his speeches in late 1920s could be traced back to his policy towards Russia in signing the trade agreement. While the commercial agreement was negotiated and Krassin was in London he had to answer some of the critics that they had been trading with countries which had been guilty of atrocities such as Russia and the Ottoman Empire during Abdulhamid II. He gave his reasoning that Europe was starved for raw materials and therefore they could not afford to deny themselves from access to the grain and timber of Russia. Therefore according to Lloyd George the necessities became prior to principles.

Lloyd George’s desire and preference for a strong state, oriented system was also apparent in his views for Adolph Hitler. He wrote to ‘Sunday Pictoral’ on 24<sup>th</sup> June 1934, referring to a recent ‘Black shirt’ meeting in Olympia, and praised the event without being aware of the significance and the outcome of the movement. His visit to Germany to meet Hitler in September 1936 had an important impact on Lloyd

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<sup>2</sup> ‘The Times’, 4<sup>th</sup> March 1963, p. 6

<sup>3</sup> Ian Packer, *Lloyd George*, (New York: Palgrave Publishers, 1998), p.3.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid*, 112.

George. He was impressed by Hitler and told that he was a great man. He sincerely believed that Fuhrer was the proper name for him as he was a born leader and a statesman. He was impressed not only by Hitler's personality but also with what he had accomplished in Germany and he did not see him as a threat to Europe and peace.

Lloyd George seemed to be moved away from his 'social reform' ambition, that dominated his pre-war days, to a more imperialistic and conservative mood as he collected majority of his advisors such as P.H. Kerr, L. Amery and Cecil Harmsworth to his 'garden suburb' and invited to the Cabinet, Balfour, Curzon, Fisher, and Birkenhead, and especially after 1917 Churchill, Carson, Eric Geddes, all known as stubborn, imperialist and conservative,. These characteristics reflected upon the Cabinet and were influential on Lloyd George's policies throughout his premiership. Setting up 'advisors' in the 'garden suburb' reflects Lloyd George's inclination to run the State with his own people without red tape and in a conclusive manner, resembles the Presidential system which hosts advisors, such as the one in USA, as it is also criticized as 'one man show' or even 'dictatorship'. His appreciation of the system also reflects to his inclination to 'National Socialism' that he admired in Germany during Hitler's era.<sup>5</sup> Regardless to his sharp personality, Lloyd George generally worked in conformity with the Cabinet members although he once in a while encountered severe oppositions and criticisms such as in the case of Ottoman policy he pursued.

Analyzing Lloyd George's Ottoman policy required brief references to Ottoman history particularly during the world war when the Empire was subjected to a partitioning, although on paper, by the Allies with Britain taking the lead. Therefore in the study, the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire and the role of Britain was taken up in time frames of;

- (a) 1914-December 1916 (until Lloyd George became Prime Minister),
- (b) December 1916-May 1919 (until the occupation of Smyrna),
- (c) May 1919-March 1920 (until the First London Conference),

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<sup>5</sup> Please see J.A. Turner, "The Formation of Lloyd George's 'Garden Suburb: Fabian-Like Milnerite Penetration?", *The Historical Journal*, Vol.20, No. 1 (Mar., 1977), p.165-184 for the criticism and formation of Garden Suburb. The most prominent figure of all the members which were seldom more than five was Philip Kerr because of his intrigues and influence on Lloyd George on foreign affairs. Another member being Amery who described the Asquith's Cabinet in May 1915, including Lloyd George as impotent, lifeless, and unfit to govern even in peacetime, but after almost a year he did not mind to join the 'Garden Suburb' (Michael Fry, *Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: Lloyd George Replaces Asquith: The Issues Underlying the Drama*, *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Sep., 1988), 609-627)

- (d) March 1920-June 1920 (until the Boulogne Conference),
- (e) June 1920-December 1920 (until the Lloyd George's speech in the Parliament)
- (f) December 1920-February 1921 (until the Second London Conference),
- (g) February 1921-September 1922 (until the Turkish Victory)
- (h) September-October 1922 (Chanak Crisis)

Each time frame was selected indicative to a 'turning-point' in Turco-British relations, and according to significance of effects of British State and/or Lloyd George.

British state decisions were analyzed by using memorandums, as well as the debates where applicable, of the British Foreign Office, India Office, The Imperial General Staff and Parliament, and the minutes and conclusions of Cabinet meetings, Conference of Ministers.

(a) 1914-December 1916: This is the period in which the partition of the Ottoman Empire was delineated by agreements and pacts. British policy was almost set even before the War that the maintenance of the Empire was no longer to have the priority. It was evident that even if the war did not occur, British interest and involvements in Mesopotamia required direct or indirect attention of the state in the years to follow.

The London and Sykes-Picot Agreements, during the war time, had partitioned the Empire among the Allies. The Foreign Secretary, Grey's policy of bringing Greece on the side of the Allies and promises for the Western Anatolia and Cyprus which was attached to Britain at that time, as 'tokens of appreciation' were turned down by Greece. Years later, in 1917, when Greece joined the Allies there was no solid agreement and hence, no territorial present was offered to her, but there was an understanding between Venizelos and Allies that she would acquire territorial gains at the end of the war on the expense of Ottoman Empire.

The decision for the partition of the Ottoman Empire was taken by the Asquith Government where Lloyd George was the Minister. There is no indication that he was involved directly with this policy, since as a Chancellor, his interests were elsewhere. There is no doubt that these agreements and pacts discussed in and approved by the Cabinet involved Lloyd George indirectly. The sequent events are enough to convince one that this was the state policy and therefore Lloyd George's

involvement or his influence in this policy was almost limited to being a Cabinet Member. Lloyd George on the edge of 'fall' of his Government in 1922, in his Manchester speech on 14<sup>th</sup> of October was not saying the truth when he told that when he came to power he found a series of agreements and pacts with Russia, France, Italy and even Greece which completely partitioned Turkey. He excused himself from the responsibility when he told that although Britain was committed to this policy, the direction was in hands of Asquith and Grey; and he did not initiate but came into it. He omitted telling that he was the Chancellor, practically the second strong member of the Cabinet after the Prime Minister when these agreements were negotiated and he refrained from opposing them, instead he endorsed these arrangements. This post-mortem speech for the public, in Manchester somehow missed the parts of the agreements he negotiated or decisions endorsed by him later when he was the Prime Minister.

The partition of the Ottoman Empire might have been engineered by Asquith and Grey, but nevertheless Lloyd George had the almost equal responsibility as being a member of the Cabinet.

(b) December 1916-May 1919: Lloyd George became the Prime Minister in December 1916 and accordingly, his responsibilities in foreign policy widened. Lloyd George's approach to concentrate in the Middle-East, to fight Turks, and 'knock-down' the Ottoman Empire hence was going to be staged. The territorial concessions on the expense of the Ottoman Empire to Italians were carried out in the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting in April 1917 and Smyrna region was offered on the condition of Russian acceptance of. Lloyd George in his 'War Aims' had foreseen a united Turkey as a country where Turks lived with its capital at Istanbul. These promises and 'Aims' were going to be forgotten after the armistice. These concessions, indicating that Foreign Office, India Office and General Staff were in agreement with the decision taking, did not meet any opposition from policy-making quarters and hence, a unanimous state policy had developed. This, Lloyd George stressed publicly many times.

Lloyd George's public speeches differed in their content from the ones delivered in-doors. He seemed to be quite liberal in openly declared policies towards Turks, but at in-doors, he adopted the most belligerent approach. He believed that the practical destruction of the Ottoman Empire was one of the objects that Britain desired to attain and pronounced this in his speech to the First Imperial War Cabinet in March

1917. In his speech in Glasgow in June 1917, he specified that the reason Britain was fighting for was not imperialistic or vindictive but for the future freedom and peace of mankind. His views for Turks were also shared by his colleagues, such as Balfour, his Foreign Secretary. Balfour in his letter to President Wilson concerning the German peace offer in Jan 1917, with the consent of the Cabinet, wrote that expulsion of Turks from Europe was the aim of Britain. Balfour also described the territories that would be stripped from Ottoman Empire as valleys of Euphrates and Tigris, Mesopotamia, Syria, Armenia, southern region of Anatolia and Constantinople in his 'Note' in March 1917. The British State and Lloyd George seemed to be in harmony to share the Ottoman Empire even before the war ended. But the same harmony did not exist with France.

Although the fact that French Commander de 'Esperey, as the most senior official commander was entitled to sign the October 1918 armistice with Turkey, the British trick depriving France from being the signatory was a clear indication that, Britain was determined to be the 'patronizing' power for the future of the Ottoman Empire.

Before the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George in his election campaign in 1918 claimed that Britain was going to attend the Conference neither for revenge nor greed but to accomplish a '*just* peace' and a peaceful Europe. His apparent intention for the Ottoman Empire was to implement Gladstone's 'bags and baggage' policy to remove Turks from Europe and he was ready to enforce this at Paris.

When the Peace conference met in early January, 1919, Greek territorial requests concerning the Ottoman Empire, extended to the Allies in December 1918, were being discussed by Foreign Office and General Staff. Foreign Office decided that Constantinople and Straits should be a separate state under League of Nations; however was reluctant to yield to Venizelos' request to appoint a Greek Governor to administer this state. Thrace would be handed over to Greeks and Western Anatolia could be also given to Greece. Foreign Office seemed to be in full accord with Venizelos for Greek desires. General Staff objected the Greek proposal in certain points. It was stressed that the population in Aydin Vilayet was of, Turkish majority and it would be the only port that Turks would have an outlet. In the case of Thrace, General Staff, considering the vast majority of Turks in Edirne, suggested to incorporate it to the new Constantinople State. Harold Nicolson suggested that the Greek claims for Western Anatolia should be met but with a modification. This approach of Foreign Office was also clear in the Memorandum prepared by Sir Eyre

Crowe and Nicolson. To sum up, the Foreign Office suggested to the British Delegation in Paris that Western Anatolia should be given to Greece with a modified form and Greek claims for Thrace were justified except for Edirne and Kirklareli which should go to Bulgaria.

The comments received in regard to the memorandum, from General Staff were not very different from their earlier comments that due to Turkish majority; Thrace should not be handed to Greece but enclave to Constantinople. If Thrace for political reasons was to go to Greece, then it would be preferred to attach Edirne and Kirklareli to Greece. The General staff evaluated the proposal for Western Anatolia and objected the Memorandum. They proposed that Izmir region should stay with Turks otherwise the resentment among Turks would result in a new war. Naturally both Crowe and Nicolson disagreed with General Staff's views.

It is interesting that these two pro-Greek diplomats whose views were quite clear in regard to Greek desires, were appointed to the 'Greek Claims' Committee to represent Britain by Balfour and Lloyd George. At the mean time there were some experts in the Delegation such as Toynbee who favoured a mandate for entire Anatolia including Izmir, therefore differing from the usual Foreign Office approach, but as a whole, Foreign Office was in favour of the Greek proposal.

The British Delegates had in internal meeting to reach a final decision on Izmir issue in January 1918 and decided that Izmir should be handed to Greece provided that the Greeks allowed the Turks to use the port. The representatives of concerned Ministries and Departments including General Staff, therefore, agreed on 31<sup>st</sup> of January that the Greek desire should be satisfied as far as Izmir was concerned.

At the 'Greek Claim' Committee after drawing off Italians who had claimed that the Western Anatolia was their portion in accordance with the Saint-Jean de Maurienne Meeting in April 1917, the only obstacle left, was the Americans. They were going to be influenced by Venizelos and as Sir Eyre Crowe wrote Three-to-One majority at the Committee was good enough to meet the Greek desires. The Committee did not endorse the complete version of the Greek proposal, such that instead of whole Bursa and Aydin Vilayets they were allowed to advance up to Ayvalik and only a limited area of Aydin Vilayet, nevertheless, Venizelos had succeeded in obtaining a foot-hold in Anatolia. The Committee also endorsed the Greek claims for Eastern Thrace with minor modifications, hence apart from Italy, the Allies as of March 1919

agreed that for Western Anatolia and Eastern Thrace be handed over to Greece which was going to be incorporated to the 'Peace Treaty with Turkey' after the approval of Supreme Council which was, in this case, was a formality.

The Greek desires rested on only a limited part of Ottoman Empire. There were several proposals dealing with the rest of the Empire. Sir Louis Mallet's proposal was that; Mesopotamia and Syria should be placed under British mandate while Anatolia be under Italian; Armenia under American and Constantinople and the Straits under French mandates, and Western Anatolia and Thrace be given to Greece.

Lloyd George and Balfour in their meeting with Italian leaders in March 1919 offered the mandate of Caucasus to Italians so that America could have Constantinople, the Straits and Armenia and French to have Syria and Cilicia. This was the result of Lloyd George-Clemenceau and Colonel House meeting held earlier. In that meeting provisional agreement was reached such that; the Ottoman Empire was to be divided among the Allies.

Meanwhile there were other proposals from Arab Bureau and Military authorities who urged to keep Syria for Britain and a mandate over Anatolia and Thrace which was opposed by Sir Eyre Crowe. Kerr from 'Garden Suburb' and an architect of Greco-British politics also believed that having a mandate over the whole of Anatolia would be a burden for Britain. He quoted the imperialist belief that the world would be a better place if it was to be governed by Britain.

There was another entirely different approach by France which suggested slicing the Ottoman Empire. Clemenceau proposed that Vilayets of Bursa and Kastamonu should be given to France, Ankara and Sivas to Americans and rest of Aydin Vilayet, not included in Greek zone, whole of the Konya Vilayet up to the British Delegation's proposed boundary of Armenia to Italians. The proposal of Clemenceau was regarded as incomplete and a typical French conspiracy. The relations between France and Britain were getting tense due to the uncertainty of the French position in Syria and in İstanbul. It was a game of domination especially in İstanbul as both countries were trying to hold on to more and give less to the other.

Meanwhile Venizelos was anxious to satisfy her desires for Anatolia before any change of opinion emerged to upset his plans, since there was a growing

resentment towards Greeks in some circles due to his ambitious claims. He was determined to fulfill his desires for 'Megali Idea' and staged a propaganda scheme to influence the leaders in Paris. The Leaders were receiving piles of petitions from Greeks all over the world urging them to allow Western Anatolia, Thrace, East Black Sea coast and even Constantinople to be attached to Greece. The Greek Orthodox Church was also active in Paris to detach Izmir, Thrace and İstanbul from Ottoman Empire.

Venizelos' chance to fulfill his ambitions, materialized with the attitude Italians adopted. When the Italian leaders left Paris over the row in Fiume which contradicted with the views of President Wilson, the Supreme Council agreed to dispatch Greeks to Izmir under the proclaimed umbrella of Allied forces. The decision was reached when it was reported that the Italians had sent their war-ships to Izmir. Wilson angry with the Italians, agreed with the Supreme Council. He might have been influenced by his close aide, Colonel House who already agreed with Lloyd George and Clemenceau to allocate Western Anatolia to Greeks, which was also recommended by the 'Greek Claim' Committee.

Another reason was the agitation of Venizelos that the Greeks had been murdered by Turks and somehow the allegations against Turks, had climbed towards 6<sup>th</sup> of May, the time the decision was to be reached at the Supreme Council for landing. The Supreme Council to send Greeks to save the local Christians in Izmir was staged by the 'trio', Lloyd George, Clemenceau and naturally Venizelos. Lloyd George was acting in conjunction with the British State mechanism since it was already decided within British Delegation that Izmir to be allocated to Greece. The question, later, was going to be asked whether the Supreme Council's decision was provisional or not. It was going to be claimed by France that it was on temporary basis since the Supreme Council had not debated the issue yet. On the other hand Venizelos claimed that as Lloyd George told him there was no mention of 'provisional' aspect of it. Sir Eyre Crowe was going to appear once more to save Venizelos.

The occupation of Izmir whether it was decided as a provisional step or not, was important that the Greeks landed at Izmir and from there on were going to proceed for occupation even outside of the Greek zone. The landing at Izmir brought a de facto conclusion for Greece for her claims and hence, this was the most important step for Greece.

The occupation of Izmir was a mutually agreed on by Lloyd George and the rest of British state mechanism.

(c) May 1919-March 1920 : Another crucial turning point of the involvement of Lloyd George and the British State was the First London Conference in February 1920. The Paris Conference after the signing of German Treaty was dispersed on 29<sup>th</sup> of June 1919. Before Wilson and Lloyd George left Paris, the Turkish question was brought to the attention of the Supreme Council, but with no result. It was almost determined that the 'Big Three; was in favour of Turks leaving İstanbul, but could not decide who was going to take over, since the Americans were hesitant to promise that they were to take the responsibility without the consent of the American Senate. The Senate's decision was going to delay the Supreme Council's meeting to finalize the 'Turkish Treaty'. Meanwhile Venizelos was concerned with two main issues; to secure Thrace for Greece and widen the Greek zone in Western Anatolia. In his meetings with Lloyd George, he was complaining the resistance of Turks in the occupied zone and urging Lloyd George that to break up the resistance, he should be allowed to go outside of the zone to save the Greeks there. Venizelos also complained the findings of the 'Interallied Commission of Inquiry on the Greek Occupation of Smyrna and Adjacent Districts' which was set-up by the Supreme Council's resolution on 18<sup>th</sup> of July 1919. The last thing Venizelos wanted criticism for was the atrocities the Greeks had committed in Anatolia, which was exactly that the Commission had come to agree. Lloyd George was going to help Venizelos by convincing the Supreme Council not to disclose the Commission's report. By providing such a decision Lloyd George had saved the humiliation of the Greeks and also the Allies. It is worth mentioning that Lloyd George had even kept the truth about the atrocities from his own Cabinet and Parliament.

By the end of October 1919 it was almost ascertain that the American Senate was not going to assume the plans considered at the Peace Conference in Paris to allocate mandates of İstanbul, Armenia and even Anatolia to Americans. Consequently France suggested the internationalization of İstanbul and a large portion of Thrace, and offered to appoint a French Governor there; this proposal was going to be rejected by Lloyd George. Lloyd George preferred Eastern Thrace to be allocated to Greece since Venizelos was a close aide of Britain. Here it is believed that Lloyd George preferred, naturally, to have Greek domain in Thrace that Britain could control rather than a French Governor for İstanbul and Thrace. At this difficult

time when Venizelos feared about Commission's report and loosing Thrace, Lloyd George came to his rescue once more.

Americans' decision not to assume any mandates, gave a chance to French to offer joint administration of the concerned places with Britain. Britain was reluctant to accept the French offer since it involved France, but preferred an international set-up to administer the Straits and İstanbul. Ministers discussed the future of İstanbul at a Conference in December 1919, before the visit of Clemenceau to London. They had their own view concerning İstanbul, whether to have a 'Vatican' type of system for the Sultan in İstanbul or force him to move to Bursa where the new Capital of the Empire was anticipated. It was certain for the Ministers that İstanbul was going to be administered by Allies including Greece. In any case, the consideration of keeping the Caliph at İstanbul, must be due to the desire of the Britain to have a direct control of the 'head of the Moslems'.

The fate of İstanbul was discussed in a Cabinet meeting on 6<sup>th</sup> of January 1920 and regardless to the objection of Lloyd George, Balfour and Curzon, the Cabinet adopted a resolution to retain the Turks in İstanbul. At least, for the time being, the future of İstanbul was determined. It was also agreed that an international system had to be set-up to administer the Straits. This decision of the Cabinet is important that regardless to the objections of Lloyd George and two successive Foreign Secretaries, the Ministers voted for the retention of the Turks at İstanbul. Lloyd George was not very ascertained whether to insist for the Turks to be ejected from İstanbul since this scheme, according to him, had also some drawbacks. The important point in the scheme adopted by the Cabinet was the frontier of Turkey in Europe. Lloyd George insisted the frontier of Turkey in Europe be Catalca, as proposed by Venizelos before, although military appreciation was Enos-Midia line. It seems that Lloyd George was still working very closely with Venizelos.

In a French-British proposal the evacuation of the Greeks from Western Anatolia became a mutual consideration as well as being the first suggestion of such a process. There were some objections to the Cabinet's decision for the retention of İstanbul by Turks such as Sir Robert Cecil. But his initiative to build the public opinion to throw the Turks from İstanbul did not succeed. The crucial point behind Cecil's movement was his claim for making this suggestion was for the sake of humanity and Christianity. It must be underlined that his 'humanistic' suggestion was

actually the deprivation of the Turks who had been living on these territories for centuries therefore it was not totally humanitarian as he claimed. Amazing enough, the same person was going to receive 'Nobel Prize' in coming years for his contribution to peace.

The decisive steps could not be taken during different parleys following the Paris discussions so those concerned were gradually carried to additional meetings to draw the line.

The first was the London Conference which laid down the basic principles for the Treaty with Turkey, although the Allies spent days hoping to negotiate on the previously discussed conflicts. The outlined suggestions and drafts were not enough to carry the team to peace treaty, so another meeting was held at San Remo in April.

It was crystallized at the beginning of the London Conference that the America which never entered a stage of war with Ottoman Empire was not going to take any responsibilities concerning the Turkish peace. Therefore, although an official representative would not appear in any of the following conferences, America still stayed informed through unofficial representatives.

The decisions reached at the London and the San Remo Conferences were the back-bone of the peace treaty. For the articles there was a full accord between Lloyd George, Curzon and other actors of the State (e.g. Parliament, Cabinet and Foreign Office) as to the future of Turkey

(d) March -June 1920: Lloyd George severely attacked all opposing finalized peace terms with Turkey. His reaction stemmed from rejecting anything anti Greek and embracing all anti Turk rather than the actual contents. Perhaps the only concession for Lloyd George which was not directly related to the Ottoman case was the the revitalization of the 1919 Long-Berenger oil agreement, mainly concerning the distribution of the shares for the Turkish Oil Company in San Remo.

Just to update, the Nationalists in the meanwhile had further organized and displayed serious offenses against occupation forces. This Lloyd George observed with mixed feelings due to still continuing uncertainty for peace. But at least, sending Greek forces to Izmit was unquestionably accepted and mutually decided on during

the Supreme Council at Boulogne. The decision reflects the pre determination of the Allies and especially Lloyd George's to enforce prospected peace to Turks at any cost and that they would never give-in to people such as Mustafa Kemal who was considered a bandit by the British Cabinet. It is also very pertinent in constituting a corner stone for the Allies' relations with the Turks for it was at this point that the Greeks for the first time since the Milne line drawn following the Greek occupation of Izmir were allowed to pass their reserved zone and with mutual Allied consent.

(e) June -December 1920: 'The Peace for Turkey' document was signed at Sevres in August 1920 but was disclaimed by the Nationalists immediately. Venizelos not content with the developments was more than ready to be used against Turks by Britain and also proposed replacement of the Sevres with a more severe treaty for the Turks. To his and Lloyd George's dismay he lost the general elections and of course, premiership. With the disappearance of Venizelos, Churchill and the General Staff urged the British Government to change its Eastern policy and give concessions to the Turks almost in line with the National Pact. They claimed gaining Turkish confidence would support Britain in India, Mesopotamia and throughout the Moslem world and repeated the benefit of having a Turkish buffer state against Bolsheviks—actually a role Turkey pursued until the end of the cold war. Returning to Lloyd George, crushed with the recent developments, he stubbornly persisted in backing Greeks in Anatolia and with his decreasing supporters but encouragements from the Foreign Office which was still concretely behind him, displayed determination not to give-in to Mustafa Kemal. The unanimous attitude as was seen in the previous events and during the mile-stones in the Turkish question in the state echelon seemed to be dissolving but still the 'hard liners' in the state such as King, Foreign Office, and most of the Cabinet and the Parliament seemed to be on the side of Lloyd George's Greek policy. Lloyd George was the spokesman and leader of this movement against the 'soft-liners' and his speech on 22<sup>nd</sup> of Dec. 1920 was the indication of pursuing this policy.

(f) December 1920-February 1921: The fall of Venizelos and dethroned of King Constantine brought British policy to a cross-road; either they had to back Nationalists to secure peace in Asia Minor or they had give a hand to much hated Constantine to pursue of preserving the Treaty of Sevres. Apparently there was also a danger of straining the relations of the Franco-British in case of adopting the latter policy. Britain as early as January 1920 was trying to find ways and means to

come to terms with Constantine and at the same time to prevent Italy and France from negotiating directly with Mustafa Kemal. Therefore British policy did not change much with the fall of Venizelos and the Cabinet seemed to be determined to pursue with the Greek policy and hostility against Nationalists, although she had joined with her Allied friends, Italy and France, to set an embargo for war materials and financial aid to Greece. Britain in order to attract moderate Nationalists to Istanbul, was considering pressuring Constantine to make some alterations in the Sevres as setting up an administration at Izmir with Greek forces and Christian Governor but under sovereignty of the Turks. This was just 'save the face' of Turks. The proposal of the Foreign Office was to force Mustafa Kemal to accept the scheme for Izmir, and in case it was not accepted by Nationalists, then they could fully support Greeks financially and logistically. The proposal was probably drawn by the Foreign Office to find an excuse to support Greeks, since they had known that Mustafa Kemal would not agree to anything less than the National Pact.

The invitation for the Second London Conference indicates the determination of the Foreign Office and the Cabinet that they were still opposing to take the Nationalists as an entity. The policy of the British Foreign Office could not be explained from the legality aspect, as Lloyd George agreed with Count Sforza to use Talat Pasha's assistance, who was supposed to be a fugitive, for Mustafa Kemal's attendance to the Conference. Before the Conference the Cabinet seemed to be divided with Lloyd George, Balfour and Curzon on one side whereas Churchill and Montagu on the other side, where the former group inclined a hard line to the Nationalists and the latter being in favour of making peace with the Turks. Lloyd George made another proposal to his colleagues' consideration to encourage Mustafa Kemal to occupy Azerbaijan where the Bolsheviks involvement was well known. This proposal was originated by Colonel Lawrence, Lawrence of Arabia, in his conversation with Kerr. By doing so, he probably considered to stop Bolsheviks at Azerbaijan and therefore offending the Bolshevik-Nationalist relations and at the same time distracting Mustafa Kemal from moving to West which would save the Greeks at Izmir and Thrace. The proposal was well accepted by his Cabinet members. Lloyd George did not pursue with his proposal any more in coming days, probably due to its impracticality and his conviction that the Greeks were strong enough to overcome the danger of Mustafa Kemal.

Lloyd George had private meetings with the Greek Premier during the Conference. The outcome of these meetings were important enough that he became even more

convinced about the strength of the Greek forces at Anatolia and the policy of the new Government for Anatolia. In his discussions he encouraged the Greeks to initiate their offence against the Turks. He also helped the Greek Government to have financial support in terms of a floating loan from private financial market. He seemed to be neutral as he was on equal distance from each Country, but on privately he told the Greeks that Britain would support Greece. For the new offense against Turks, he urged the Greek Prime Minister not to leave anything to chance but to have a decisive victory against Turks; otherwise the consequences would not be controllable by Britain. He also told that for the new offence there was no obstacle as he told Turks and Allies that the Greeks were at liberty to undertake whatever operations they thought necessary. Another contribution of Lloyd George and the Cabinet along with the General Staff was to allow the Greek troops stationed at Izmit to take part in the offense against the Turks.

The decision taking by Lloyd George and the Cabinet not to modify the Treaty of Sevres drastically, was the cause of the British support for the Greek offense against Turks. The London Conference did not really offer anything new in terms of peace, on the contrary, it was left to Turks and Greeks to have the last say at the battle field. The Allies and especially Britain, in a way, encouraged the fighting. This was a crucial moment in the Greco-Turkish relations that Greece could easily be pressurized for accepting new terms for the Sevres Treaty since without the financial support of Allies, Greece knew that it would be impossible to maintain a large army of more than 150,000 in Anatolia.

Lloyd George in making this decision was not alone, as he had the full backing of the Cabinet, except Montagu, and the Foreign Office. General Staff agreeing to transfer the commandship of the Greek army at Izmit, seemed to be under pressure from Cabinet and the Garden Suburb, since Kerr was the man behind engineering the transfer of the troops, but nevertheless they agreed on the Greek proposal for using the Greek troops, who were supposed to be there to defend Izmit Peninsula and therefore İstanbul. The 'hard-liners' in the Cabinet seemed to have the full control of the events and Lloyd George was content that the Greco-Turkish conflict was to be resolved for the benefit of Greeks in the battle-field.

(g) February 1921-September 1922: The Greek *offense* against Turks which started in *March 1921* with the approval Lloyd George ended with a Turkish victory. Greek forces had to retreat towards Bursa and from Afyon, but Lloyd George and Foreign

Office after the Greek defeat, at Second Inonu battle, even considered the evacuation of İstanbul since, it was certain that the Greeks would evacuate Izmit Peninsula, but Curzon was so against the idea on the grounds that they would 'lose face' in the East and did not want British reputation to be hampered by the Nationalists. In fact, the British were already hampered by not exercising their commitment to remain neutral in the Greco-Turkish conflict. There were more than one example to confirm that British policy was based upon building a powerful Greece to control İstanbul and the Straits.

The Cabinet considered the suggestion of Izmir, İstanbul, Batum and Baku to Mustafa Kemal, as long as they secured the Thrace for Greece. With Venizelos' influence, Britain was in search for excuses to support Greece as they were almost certain that the Allied proposal made at the London Conference, was not going to be accepted by Mustafa Kemal.

Greek evacuation of Izmit was not entertained positively at the Cabinet just like the probable Mustafa Kemal meeting with General Harrington, rumored to have been suggested by the Turkish leader. Lloyd George was later going to be criticized for missing this chance which at least could have been a display of neutrality since Venizelos was even invited to Cabinet meetings. The Blockade, British Admiralty exercised on Black Sea while admitting Greek ships to sail freely through the Straits was another display of the lost neutrality. Britain was aware that due to such applications as well as differences in policies the relations with France had deteriorated.

Regardless of these, Greek refusal to comply with alternative peace proposals and Allied intention of mediation was evaluated as positively by some journals as the news was channeled directly by Lloyd George in person. Slight Greek advances on the front contributed to the Premiers' supportive approaches and all joined to serve as indications that Lloyd George was still considering to observe the Sevres Treaty and was probably relying on Greece to enforce the Treaty to Turks.

The Britain's behaviour for the reply of the Greek Government to Allies refusing the peace proposal and Allied intention of mediation was evaluated as a good gesture towards Greece by 'Observer'. Observer further pointed out that Allies and especially Britain had no intention of forcing Greece to accept any modifications to

the Treaty of Sevres and they would prefer to keep the Treaty as it was. Naturally the news appeared in the paper boosted the morale of the Greek Government especially as the news channeled directly from Lloyd George himself. This shows that Lloyd George was still in the consideration of keeping the Sevres Treaty and therefore relying to the ability of Greece to enforce the Treaty to Turks.

The Greek offense in which seemed to be quite successful initially boosted the morale of Greeks as well as the British Foreign Office, although General Staff was hesitant to accept a decisive Greek victory was imminent. The Greek Prime Minister overwhelmed by mentioned Greek advances proposed İstanbul to be given to Greece which was also shared as a possibility by the Foreign Office. Various newspapers in Athens and Paris commented that Britain had given her consent to Greeks to capture İstanbul, but later because of pressure upon her from Italy and France, refrained herself and joined the Allies to warn the Greek Government that such a move would not be acceptable.

The Supreme Council's meeting in August 1921 at Paris where Lloyd George proposed to hand over Gallipoli meaning the Straits to Greeks was a victory for Lloyd George and the Greeks. . However, it is interesting that after the Inonu battles, Britain was extremely enthusiastic to end the 'bloodshed' and act as a mediator to stop the fighting.

The defeat of the Greek armies at Sakarya in September, followed by the third visit of French representative, Franklin-Bouillon, to Ankara and the conclusion of a Turco-French treaty ending hostilities were the interesting developments of fall of 1921 . The Sakarya Battle enforced Britain to reconsider her policy towards Turks too and a mission was sent to Ankara to this effect, although some of the officials at the Foreign Office disagreed, Lindsley<sup>6</sup>, commenting that Turks should be approached with a stick.

The French-Turkish Treaty angered considerably the British who were aware that the Italians would soon follow the same path leaving Britain as the only power displaying beligrance to Turkey.

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<sup>6</sup> Lindsley was going to be appointed as the Ambassador for Britain to Istanbul to the new Turkish Republic. He refused to come to Ankara and stayed back. He later was appointed as the British Ambassador to Washington.

On the other hand final developments and the financial burdens made the Greek Prime Minister approach Curzon with plans of evacuating Anatolia. The Prime Minister's letter to Curzon and his reply indirectly encouraging Greeks to await Britain's decision was going to be debated for some time after the fall of Lloyd George from power. The reason given was mainly for putting forth the concern for the safety of the Christians in Anatolia, which was believed to be a pretense, rather than anxiety over Kemalist danger at Mesopotamia, in case they evacuated before a peace settlement. The events followed had shown that it was a bluff on Greek side. The reason given by Britain does not seem to be reflecting the truth. It seems that they were frightened more of a Kemalist danger at Mesopotamia rather than the future of Christians in Anatolia, especially after the consideration of France evacuating Cilicia. Another reason was probably due to the effect that such an evacuation would make Kemalists hard to be handled at the peace negotiations. The Greeks were going to bluff again in July 1922 that they would occupy İstanbul unless Mustafa Kemal was to accept the peace proposal of March 1922. The intention to occupy İstanbul was to distract the Kemalists as well as the Allies.

Due to British inconsistency on minor issues, such as; place and scope of the meeting and proclamation of an armistice before or after the evacuation of Izmir, holding a conference, to solve the Greco-Turkish conflict, dragged on for months. Meanwhile the Foreign Office was engaged in drawing plans and proposals to pacify Mustafa Kemal. Eventually the Conference place was fixed as Venice, but it was too late, for Turkish army had started in August the action that was going to be their final offense.

Until the Turkish victory, the actors of the British state seem to be divided as the pro-Greeks and those inclined to give some concessions to the Nationalists in order to secure peace in Asia Minor. On the pro-Greek front, Lloyd George had the full backing of the Cabinet and the Foreign Office. Churchill so far an opponent of the pro-Greek camp, seemed to have joined the hard-liners and criticisms of Lloyd George and his Eastern policy of the Government had increased in the press and also in the Parliament

(h) September-October 1922: The final Turkish offense ended with the recapturing of Izmir on 9<sup>th</sup> of September. The Turkish victory encouraged the press in France and Italy to blame the British policy and Lloyd George as the cause behind the bloodshed in Anatolia. The British morale in regard to her Eastern policy was at the

lowest level, and to overcome their isolated condition they had been pressing France and Italy to communicate the Turks for an immediate armistice. Balfour as the President of the League of Nations was complaining possible Turkish atrocities against Christians, although he had been silent for the reports communicated to him about the Greek atrocities in the occupied zone and also during retreating of the Greek armies. Foreign Office and the cabinet started debating the fate of İstanbul and the Straits as their main concern at the possibility of the Turks crossing the Straits to Europe. British interests called for delaying evacuation of İstanbul until it became an absolute necessity. The neutral zones that the Allies declared covered Izmit, Gallipoli and Asiatic shores of the Dardanelles. It was believed that unless they secured both İstanbul and Dardanelles there would be no obstruction for the Turks to cross to Europe. Britain realized that both Italians and French were hesitant to contribute on holding the neutral zones in Asia to stop the Turks. The Foreign Office was right about the Italians and French that they were going to call their forces from neutral zones to İstanbul. The Cabinet on the 7<sup>th</sup> of September decided that a Kemalists attempt to occupy Gallipoli or İstanbul should be resisted by force. It was also decided that the zones later including Chanak be enlarged, in order to be able to control the Dardanelles. Sending enforcements to defend the neutral zones was also agreed on and since Allies were reluctant to join, requesting, from the Dominions and Balkan countries to send as much enforcement as possible to secure the Straits was also part of the decisions. Lloyd George was almost sure that Serbs and Romanians would be on their side to defend against any possible Turkish attack, since it was vital important to defend these areas until the enforcements arrived from Dominions. The expectation of the British Cabinet was not going to be fulfilled since only New Zealand seemed to be enthusiastic to participate. Romania and Serbia also did not seem to be willing to join Britain fully. They told that they could join the British forces to resemble their presence only. The Cabinet and especially Lloyd George were enthusiastic about the availability of the Greek forces. Lloyd George wondered whether he could still make use of the Greeks for the defense of the neutral zones, but he was going to be told that the morale and the political situation were such that it was not possible to please the British, but it was better to agree with Mustafa Kemal on the National Pact rather than to rely on the Greeks. The Cabinet and Foreign Office exercised creating a public opinion through claiming atrocities that were committed by the Turks against Christians. Lloyd George's press conference on 23<sup>rd</sup> of September was a good example for the alleged atrocities of the Turks.

When Balkan States and Dominions did not respond to the appeal, Cabinet decided to evacuate İstanbul, and to move the British troops to Gallipoli. Lloyd George outlined that already there was 20,000 armed inhabitants willing to defend the city. It is interesting that to this suggestion Chamberlain, the leader of the Conservative Government, proposed that these inhabitants should not be listed as Christians but as Ottoman citizens. This approach of both Lloyd George and Chamberlain shows how determined and cold-blooded the leaders were, to allow inviting the citizens of İstanbul for a street fighting.

On the other hand, Curzon openly opposed to Lloyd George's views with regard to defending Chanak at any cost. His view with respect to British interests was that the peace at Near-East could be attained through negotiations rather than fighting, and unlike Lloyd George he did not believe in negotiating with Venizelos. As a matter of fact, suggested to Lloyd George that he should not see Venizelos alone as he feared that Lloyd George would do something foolish.

It was not only Curzon who was against Lloyd George. The representatives of Trade Union, Independent Labour Party some Parliamentarians, religious circles as well as some prominent journals and journalists i.e. Arnold Toynbee as well as a good portion of the people openly condemned Lloyd George that his policies were bound to bring misery to Britain. Critics were on various aspects but perhaps the most destructive were those accusing him of misleading the public opinion. For example Arnold Toynbee's accusations concerning reject of Fethi Bey which in fact created one of the biggest gaps over the Straits. Lloyd George was also accused of twisting the facts and not telling the truth as viewed in the example of an article in 'The Times' concerning the Greek loan.

More important than the accusations for misleading the people and challenges to carry the world peace, all causing disappreciation of Lloyd George, was his staunch attachment to Greece and non ending persistence on Straits, and naturally Chanak within the time frames analyzed, it is certain that only during the Chanak crisis, Lloyd George drifted apart from the state policy. The reason why Lloyd George did not follow the state policy could be attributed to his conviction and determination not to bow to other forces especially to the much hated Turks. There were some still in favour of Lloyd George's policy such as the King and the Americans, but these were not enough to change the public opinion. The criticisms in the press and in the Parliament as well as in the Cabinet and in other departments were the defining

factor for his collapse. There was no doubt that there were other causes for the fall of Lloyd George such as the resentment to the coalition in public and growing discontent within Conservative Party to his leadership since 'he' was 'not' one of them but the Chanak crisis was the last drop. Even as early as November 1921, Montagu blamed Lloyd George in his letter to Lord Reading, Viceroy of India, that Lloyd George confided in very few people and conducted the Cabinet as he wished. As a matter of fact criticisms reflected on Lloyd George's personality so severely that starting from 1921 he seriously considered resigning from his post and by 1922 his future in politics had dimmed. One of his staunch supporters Lord Rothermere in a conversation with Lord Beaverbrook voiced the conviction of perhaps millions in his words that there was no chance of Lloyd George being Prime Minister after the elections.

It is believed that the war year's harmony between Lloyd George and the state ceased to exist during the Chanak crisis. This was very apparent in General Harington's refusal to carry out Cabinet orders of 29<sup>th</sup> of September to threaten Turks to open fire unless they evacuated Chanak zone. Curzon congratulating General Harington that he had "...shown rare qualities of conciliation, courage, and statesmanship"<sup>7</sup> is a good example and display of the cold fact expressing Lloyd George's final conditions.

It was the state policy and Lloyd George's view to dissolve the Ottoman Empire during the war and also during the Peace Conferences of Paris, London, San Remo and finalized in Sevres. The state and Lloyd George was in harmony during the Boulogne Conference to allow the Greek army to move outside of the Greek zone and to be used as a tool against the Nationalists. Although there were contrary views of Churchill and Montagu, the state as a whole and Lloyd George commonly decided to allow to stage offense against Turks right after the Second London Conference. It was during the Second London Conference that Britain decided to continue supporting the new regime in Greece. It was only during the Chanak crisis that there was some dissolution in the view of Eastern policy of Britain. The opposition to Lloyd George and his friends, such as Churchill, Lord Worthington Evans, and Lord Birkenhead and to a certain extent Chamberlain, had shown that Britain could not afford to be isolated in Europe and with no support from Allies, Dominions and Balkan States; they could not possibly start a new war. Certainly

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<sup>7</sup> PRO, FO 371/7902, E 10945.

Lloyd George being the Prime Minister had the power to direct the policy he believed in and as long as he was in accord with the state policy, he was determined and strong enough politically to pursue the policy, but when he differed from the state policy and the opposition was stronger than him, he lost, at least politically.

Lloyd George's hatred for Turks was so strong that he did not have any difficulty to pursue the policy of dissolution of Ottoman Empire. There are many reasons he disliked and even hated the Turks; Starting from his childhood, he was an admirer of Gladstone who despised Turks to the extent that he devoted most of his time to his policy of discarding Turks from Europe 'bags and baggage'. Lloyd George was raised up in a religious environment, and considering his rural and conservative Welsh background, it was not astonishing that he had grown up with the horror tales on Moslem and barbaric Turks as was the fashion in those days. As he wrote in his Memoirs there was 'no British statesman who did not believe as an essential condition of the peace that they should impose the redemption of the Armenian valleys for ever from the bloody misrule with which they had been stained by the infamies of the Turks'. On the contrary to the ill reputation of the Turks, it was believed that modernity flourished from the Greek civilization, and hence sympathy for Greeks was bound to end up with hatred towards the Turks.

Lloyd George in his childhood was intensely influenced by the French Revolution and liberation of nations against oppressed by absolute states might have provoked him to hate the Ottoman Empire which was known for misruling and misgoverning multiple nations. Lloyd George believed that imperialism was the system to rule without consent; and since he sincerely believed in whole hearted acceptance of British rule by Indians, by his definition, Britain was not Imperialistic but Ottomans were. Lloyd George believed in the rights of the oppressed minorities abroad as Gladstone did before him, hence Armenians, Arabs and Greeks had be liberated from 'the blasting tyranny' of Turks and that was his mission.

Meeting Venizelos in 1912, who was known in Europe as the charming 'great democrat', increased Turkish hatred in Lloyd George.

Another factor for his negative policy towards Ottoman Empire could be due to Basil Zaharoff, referred as 'munitions king', 'the mystery man of Europe', and 'merchant of death'. Zaharoff, an Anatolian Greek, who became one of the richest men in Europe, established close relations with Lloyd George when he was the Minister for

Munitions as Zaharoff was the seller and Lloyd George was the buyer for Britain. This interesting but note-worthy relationship focusing on cold cash continued throughout Lloyd George's politician years and subjected him to questionings bringing out his 'easy money' side as he meticulously attempted to conceal everything pertaining to Zaharoff and their acquaintance. The same *acquaintance* brought the two, accustomed to finding happy mediums, together on anti-Turkish sentiments when Zaharoff came across Enver Pasha through commercial relations.

Turkish belligerence verses Greek admiration had carved such deep marks in Lloyd George that he did not refrain from supporting Greece to the point of risking his career as Greece step by step approached defeat against the Turks, the Allies, their Governments, politicians, public opinion gradually turned away from the Gladstonian and Venizelist policies; accepted the Turks in Europe, complied with an independent, sovereign Turkish state but Lloyd George still advocated his pro-Greek policy against the world. Was this due to his sympathy for Greeks? Or was it a reflection of his conservative, Christian side? Yet was it a product of his extremely stubborn personality? Each of these questions can be answered affirmatively. However the explanation of the response challenges the questioned in respect to the fact that even very intensive researches as the one presented do not suffice to bring out the controversial and perverse personality of Lloyd George, It must not be forgotten that he was a person who held the strings of power in his hands during the most crucial period, therefore it is natural that touches from his politics are reflected up to the present, just like the signs of his political personality can be sought in politicians of our day. Therefore it would not be exaggerating to remark on the necessity of understanding the period 1916-1922 where much emphasis is given in this thesis. Another remark stemming from this thesis may be to point at the absolute necessity to learn and develop a real appreciation of events.

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    - The Lloyd George papers
    - The Davidson Papers
    - The Bonar Law Papers
    - The Beaverbrook Papers
    - The John St Loe Strachey Papers
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## **APPENDIX 1(A)**

'Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others'

The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office, CAB 24/45,

G.T. 3917

SECRET.

G.T.-3917.

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### Synopsis of our Obligations to our Allies and Others.

(This Synopsis deals only with pledges given by us to foreign Powers or Nationalities, and not with any obligations into which we may have entered with our Dominions or with British commercial firms or companies.)

#### TO FRANCE

We are bound—

1. By the Pact of London (5th September, 1914), whereby we undertook not to make peace separately nor to formulate peace terms without the consent of the other signatory Powers.

2. By the Anglo-French Agreements of April-May, 1916 (incorrectly called the Sykes-Picot Agreement), under which we agreed, "provided the Arabs fulfil the conditions, and that they obtain the towns of Hama, Hama, Damascus, and Aleppo" (N.B.—This reservation is to some extent invalidated by our recent assurance to the French that we had no intention of departing from the Agreement), that—

- (i.) France should have priority of enterprise and local loans, and supply advisers and public functionaries in the zone marked "A" on Map I in return for similar privileges being accorded to His Majesty's Government in the zone marked "B." Both the zones were in theory to be included within the territory of the future Arab State.
- (ii.) France should establish such administration or control as she should desire to arrange with the Arabs in the blue area on Map I in return for similar privileges to His Majesty's Government in the red area.
- (iii.) The brown area to be internationalised under a régime to be decided on after subsequent discussion.
- (iv.) We undertook not to cede Cyprus to a third Power without the consent of France.
- (v.) Haifa, which is attributed to England, to be a free port, and French goods to have free transit through the red area in return for similar assurances as regards Alexandretta and transit of British goods through the blue area.
- (vi.) We also undertook not to acquire, or to consent to a third party acquiring, any possessions in the Arabian Peninsula and not to cede to any but the Arab State our rights in the red area in return for a similar assurance on the part of France.
- (vii.) We undertook not to push the Bagdad Railway in area "B" north of Samarra until the completion of a railway from Bagdad to Aleppo, and then only with the concurrence of France. In return France promised on similar conditions not to extend the railway in area "A" south of Mosul.
- (viii.) The existing Turkish customs tariff was to remain in force throughout the red and blue areas for a period of twenty years.

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B

3. By the Decision of the Paris Economic Conference (17th June, 1917), whereby we undertook—

- (i.) To prohibit all trading with the enemy during the war.
- (ii.) To refuse most-favoured-nation treatment to the enemy and to subject his commerce to a special régime during a period to be fixed.
- (iii.) To reserve for Allies essential raw materials.
- (iv.) Generally to develop Inter-Allied trade to the detriment of the enemy.

4. By the resolutions of the Conference (Paris, October 1917), whereby the so-called policy of the *bloc* was decided upon, *i.e.*, enemy private property and interests in Allied or occupied territory at the end of the war is to be held as a pledge for Allied private property in enemy or enemy-occupied territory.

5. Apart from the above contractual obligations, we have made several official statements pledging ourselves to the evacuation of Northern France and the cession of Alsace-Lorraine. *e.g.*, Lord R. Cecil in the House of Commons, 15th November, 1917: "The restitution of Alsace-Lorraine was a well-understood war aim from the moment we entered the war" (and *cf.* Prime Minister to Trades Unions Delegates, 5th January, 1918).

6. In addition to the above, there are two agreements at present under negotiation with France which may shortly be completed:—

- (a.) A Supplementary Agreement is being negotiated whereby we would recognise that the Holy Places of Arabia and their immediate vicinity are open to foreign enterprise; the French recognising in return our predominant interests in the rest of Arabia.
- (b.) Discussions are proceeding for a mutual agreement by which in substance France will recognise for us a free hand in Egypt, and we for them a free hand in Morocco.

#### TO ITALY

We are bound—

1. By the Pact of London (see under France (i)).
2. By the Italian Agreement of the 26th April, 1915, whereby we pledged ourselves, subject to Italy employing the totality of her forces against all our enemies (a condition which has technically not been observed), that—
  - (i.) Italy should obtain the territory in the Trentino and on the Adriatic as marked blue on Map II. (The portion marked red to be neutralised, and those marked yellow to go to Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia.)  
(N.B.—This does not entail a contractual obligation towards the last three.)
  - (ii.) Italy should have sovereignty over Vallona and the Island of Sasseno with sufficient territory to secure their defence.
  - (iii.) Italy may undertake the charge of the foreign relations of the future State of Albania (*i.e.*, establish a practical Protectorate);
  - (iv.) And annex the Dodecanese;
  - (v.) And abolish the rights retained by the Sultan of Turkey over Tripoli and Cyrenaica (*i.e.*, complete annexation).
  - (vi.) That "in a general way" we recognise the interest of Italy in the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean, and that, in the event of the partition or partial partition of the Ottoman Empire, or even the redistribution of zones of interest in Turkey, Italy should obtain an "equitable share" in the region of Adalia.

- (vii.) That if we or France obtained an increase in our colonial possessions in Africa, Italy might in principle claim equitable compensation, particularly in the shape of a favourable settlement of questions affecting the frontiers between Erythraea, Somaliland, and Tripoli and the adjacent British and French Colonies;
- (viii.) And share in any war indemnity.
- (ix.) We also promised to support the objections of Italy to any proposal for papal representation at the Peace Conference or any similar negotiations.

3. Under the Agreement with Italy respecting Asia Minor (8th August, 1917), we pledged ourselves, "subject to the consent of Russia" (which has not been obtained), that—

- (i.) Italy might administer the zone coloured green on Map I. and appoint functionaries, &c., in the zone marked "C" on the same terms as France and Great Britain were allowed to administer or appoint functionaries in the blue and red zones and the zones "A" and "B" under the Sykes-Picot Agreement.
- (ii.) Italy to enjoy reciprocal commercial privileges in the Allied zones.
- (iii.) If, as a result of the war, it were found impossible to partition the Ottoman Empire to the full extent contemplated in the above agreements, then the principle of the balance of power in the Mediterranean will be observed in any distribution which takes place.

4. By the decisions of the Paris Economic Conference (see France (iii)), which, however, the Italian Government signed but have not yet ratified.

5. By the Senoussi Agreement (July 1916), under which we agreed not to conclude an arrangement with the Senoussi without a previous understanding with the Italians.

#### TO RUSSIA

We are bound (if bound at all)—

- 1. By the Pact of London.
- 2. By the Constantinople Agreement (March 1915) under which we pledged ourselves "subject to the war being brought to a successful conclusion and to the desiderata of France and Great Britain in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere being realised"—

To agree to the incorporation in the Russian Empire of the city of Constantinople and the dependent territory as shown in yellow on Map I.

- 3. By the Sykes-Picot Agreement under which we agreed that—

- (i.) Russia might annex the portion of Asia Minor coloured yellow on Map I.
- (ii.) That Powers annexing portions of the Ottoman Empire should assume a proportionate charge of the Ottoman Public Debt.

4. N.B.—The Russian Government refused to ratify the decisions of the Paris Economic Conference (1916). See under France (iii), except on certain terms, and no reply has been received to alternative proposals which were put before the Russian Government last year by the British and French Governments.

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SECRET.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE AGREEMENTS OF 1916 IN REG



A MAP OF TURKEY IN ASIA

- FRENCH SPHERE
  - BRITISH SPHERE
  - ITALIAN SPHERE
  - INTERNATIONAL SPHERE
  - RUSSIAN SPHERE
- C = Italian sphere of influence.

ROAD TO ASIA MINOR, MESOPOTAMIA, &c.

MAP 1



A & B = INDEPENDENT ARAB STATE,  
 A being in the French, and B in the British, sphere of influence.

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THE AGREEMENTS OF 1916 IN REGARD TO ASIA MINOR, MESOPOTAMIA, &c.



C = Italian sphere of influence.  
RUSSIAN SPHERE.

A & B = INDEPENDENT ARAB STATE,  
A being in the French, and B in the British, sphere of influence.



## **APPENDIX 1 (B)**

- The Partition plans of Ottoman Empire during Paris Peace Conference as of 20<sup>th</sup> of March 1919. Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/2/2.
- The Partition plans of Ottoman Empire during Paris Peace Conference as of 13<sup>th</sup> of May 1919. Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/2/6.
- The Partition plans of Ottoman Empire as of January 1920. Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/2/2.

TURKEY

1721  
Folder 9  
Box 109

I FIRST ~~PLAN~~ Alternative

- (1) We are disinterested.
- (2) Main object to avert a war between French and Arabs.
- (3) Suggested distribution of mandates.

<u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>FRANCE.</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>ITALY</u>
Palestine Mesopotamia	Turkey in Asia <sup>2</sup> Lebanon	Constantinople Armenia Cilicia Syria.	Caucasus <sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>Alternatively Caucasus to France and Turkey in Asia to Italy.

II. SECOND ~~PLAN~~ Alternative

If above cannot be settled at once, send Commission to report on Syria, and have the general distribution of mandates in abeyance till Commission reports. Allenby to remain Allied Commander-in-Chief throughout till mandates settled.

III THIRD ~~PLAN~~ Alternative.

Milner Map solution.

30th March 1919.

Instructions for Commissioners from the Peace Conference to make certain inquiries in those portions of the Ottoman Empire which are to be permanently separated from Turkey and put under the guidance of Governments acting as Mandatories for the League of Nations.

N<sup>o</sup> 4  
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Box 109

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Balfour → L.G.  
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
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
Rough Sketch of  
proposed settlement

January 1920

Box 96  
Security

No 23





1919/20  
No 5  
Folder 9  
Box 109

The following notes apply only to Anatolia  
excluding Turkey in Europe and Armenia.

(1) There is a solid Greek population around  
Smyrna as far south as Scala Nova. In the opinion  
of the British Delegation this Greek population,  
whatever else happens to it, should neither remain  
under Turkish rule nor be placed under the mandate  
of another European power.

(2) The Italians before the war had made some  
(not very explicit) arrangements with the then Turkish  
Government with regard to Adala and its neighbourhood.  
Even apart from anything in the past in connection  
with

(3) That what remains of Anatolia east of the frontier

with what is called the Sykes-Picot Agreement, there is no doubt that in Italian opinion this gives Italy a special position in parts of Southern Anatolia. In the Treaty of London it was agreed that Italy should obtain "an equitable share in the southern region bordering on the province of Adalia where Italy has already acquired rights and interests which have been the subject of an Italian-British Convention". This Convention thus misleadingly referred to is apparently an agreement between Italian and British railway groups, of which the Governments interested took note.

(3) The great mass of the really Turkish population in the region in Anatolia between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, lying to the east of the

meridian

meridian of Constantinople.

(4) If, therefore, Italy is to have mandatory rights in the region adjacent to the province of Adalia, it is clear either that Italy must have a mandate over Turkey as a whole or that Turkey must be under more than one system.

The inconveniences of this latter plan are great, but, if Italy adheres to her claims the British Delegation are inclined to recommend it.

(5) The question then arises what shall this system be.

The British Delegation suggest that we should aim at an extension and perfection of the system of financial and administrative assistance which has long been accepted

by

by the Turks and which is well understood by them.

(6) An essential part of the administrative assistance is the organisation of the gendarmerie under foreign officers. In the Italian sphere these officers would be Italian. It remains for consideration what international arrangements should be made with regard to the gendarmerie in other parts of the Turkish Empire.

(7) Financial assistance and control ought probably to include not merely the northern part of Turkey but the Italian sphere also, and no doubt the nations which have the largest share of the Ottoman Debt and the largest share of the Turkish trade would be represented.

(8) A prior right with regard to concessions

and

and what remains of the

and immigration in the Italian portion might be given to Italy. In the rest of Turkey the granting of concessions should probably be controlled by the international body which is responsible for managing the finance.

(9) If this general scheme were adopted, the position of the non-European part of the Turkish Empire would be something as follows:-

(a) All the islands of the Aegean Sea, including the Dodecanese, together with an area predominantly Greek, to be delimited round Smyrna, should become Greek in full sovereignty.

(b) There would be an Italian sphere in which Italy would have special privileges as regards policing,

administration,

suggested for Armenia shall constitute the future of

Box 109

Minister.

-6-

administration, concessions and immigration.

(c) Turkey would maintain its sovereignty both over the Italian sphere as well as over Central and Northern Anatolia. That sovereignty would only be interfered with by an improved and strengthened system of European assistance and advice modelled on that to which Turkey is already accustomed and to which it is believed she would make no serious objection.

(d) This leaves the question of Armenia and of course also of Turkey in Europe untouched; but until the British Delegation are instructed as to what responsibilities America is prepared to undertake in connection with the Turkish Empire, they do not feel qualified to offer an opinion on these aspects of the general situation.

May 13th 1919.

## **APPENDIX 2**

Lord Curzon's Memorandum of 20th of March 1920, C.P. 967, for distribution to the Cabinet which encloses letters of the British High Commissioner and War Office with regard to the 'Peace Treaty with Turkey'.

House of Lords Public Records, Lloyd George Papers, LG/F/206/4/17, CP 967

In the absence of the Secretary of State for War, I circulate to the Cabinet the

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the Cabinet. March 1920.



I THINK that I ought to circulate to my colleagues the following frank but exceedingly important letter which I have just received from our High Commissioner at Constantinople, Admiral de Robeck, concerning the terms of the proposed Peace Treaty with Turkey. There is a paper issued by the General Staff at the War Office on the same subject,\* which I have asked them to circulate also.

Foreign Office, S.W. 1,  
March 26, 1920.

C. of K.

My dear Lord Curzon,

British High Commission, Constantinople,  
March 9, 1920.

The Foreign Office telegram of the 6th March containing the basis of the peace with Turkey decided upon by the Supreme Council has, I confess, come somewhat as a surprise. With two of the proposed terms, namely, the internationalisation of the Straits and the imposition of a close financial control on Turkey, I am in entire agreement. But the proposed cession to Greece of all Thrace up to the Chatalja lines and of Smyrna (which is hardly mitigated by the retention of a nominal and probably valueless Turkish suzerainty) fills me with grave misgivings.

I have always maintained that the class which is responsible for having brought Turkey into the war, and for the hideous massacres which took place during the war, should receive drastic punishment. It is eminently right and proper that Turkey should forfeit control of the Straits, should lose all non-Ottoman provinces, should have her military element reduced to impotence, and should in general be disarmed from the position of a Great Power. But I feel equally strongly that the terms to be imposed on Turkey should—

- (a.) Not be incompatible with the principles for which we are supposed to have gone to war;
- (b.) Should pave the way for a lasting peace in the Near East;
- (c.) Should be feasible of application without further bloodshed and sacrifices on the part of the Allies.

These views are shared by my advisers here, men for the most part with life-long experience of Near Eastern affairs.

If we apply these three tests to the proposed cession of Smyrna and Thrace to Greece, what do we find? As regards (a) it means that we are placing territories overwhelmingly Turkish in population under the rule of the Turks' secular enemies, under whose rule previous experience in Thessaly, Crete and Macedonia has shown that it is almost impossible for Mussulmans to exist—a flagrant violation of the principle of self-determination, to which I was under the impression that the Supreme Council had given its adherence. As regards (b), it is unthinkable, as the Foreign Office has consistently been informed by us here, that the Mussulmans in those areas will peacefully accept Greek annexation, especially after the sample of Greek methods which they have had since the Greek occupation of Smyrna. This is made clear enough by the report of the Inter-Allied Commission on the Smyrna atrocities, but clearer still by the very existence of the nationalist movement in Asia Minor. If the provisional Greek occupation of Smyrna has been, as it undoubtedly has, the canker in the Near Eastern situation since last May, how much more so will definite annexation be the canker for years to come, the constant irritant which will perpetuate bloodshed in Asia Minor probably for generations? The position of Thrace is analogous, but there is this further consideration, that the notification of its annexation to Greece, or at least the first approach of a Greek force, will almost certainly be the signal for a stampede of the non-combatant Mussulman population.

\* C.P. 966.



Those of us who have now been grappling with the problem of housing a few thousand refugees from Southern Russia cannot but be appalled at the prospect of being faced in the near future with the problem of accommodating and feeding tens of thousands of panic-stricken "muhajirs," especially when we consider that one of the first results of nationalist opposition to our terms will be to cut us off from one of our principal and nearest sources of supply.

As regards (c), it appears from the Foreign Office telegram that the Supreme Council realise that the terms they propose must needs be imposed by force. They are quite right. The terms are such that no Turk, Committee of Union and Progress or pro-*Entente* can very well accept. The Supreme Council, thus, are prepared for a resumption of general warfare; they are prepared to do violence to their own declared and cherished principles; they are prepared to perpetuate bloodshed indefinitely in the Near East; and for what? To maintain M. Venizelos in power in Greece. I cannot help wondering if the game is worth the candle. I should wonder, even if M. Venizelos were immortal; he is not immortal, but ephemeral, and he is not only ephemeral, but, as regards Greece, a phenomenon. By that I mean that he has no successors of his own calibre. In other words, he is not Greece. He is not, strictly speaking, even Greek. M. Venizelos's deserts *vis-a-vis* the *Entente* are great; but is it wise to run the almost certain risk of plunging Asia in blood in order to reward Greece according to the deserts of M. Venizelos, which are very different from the deserts of Greece?

I confess I am amazed at the apparent light-heartedness with which the Supreme Council seem to contemplate another war, and with the apparent readiness of our Government to provide its quota of men for the purpose. Recently, when it was a question of reoccupying Baku and of defending our Indian marches, and eastern Empire generally, against imminent Bolshevik menace, the project, one of possibly vital importance to the British Empire, had to be "reluctantly abandoned" because the requisite troops could not be found. But when it is a question, not of protecting the Empire, but of gratifying the excessive demands of M. Venizelos, these difficulties apparently vanish. This inconsistency may not be obvious to the British public, but I think it would be to Allied officers and men out here, who will hardly appreciate being called upon to sacrifice themselves in order to join Greeks in killing Turks.

The British people have been stirred, very rightly, by the recent massacre of between 10,000 and 15,000 Armenians in Cilicia. But at the same time they seem to be contemplating with equanimity the entering into relations with the Bolsheviks—men who have instigated the killing, flaying alive, and otherwise torturing of probably hundreds of thousands of their own kith and kin. Perhaps they do not realise that the proposal to dimember Ottoman provinces of Turkey in the interests of Greece will drive the remaining Turks into the arms of the Bolsheviks, will set the Near East and Central Asia aflame, and will intensify the menace of Bolshevism to the British Moslem world.

If the recent stiffening of the Supreme Council as regards Turkish terms is due to the late events in Cilicia, I would say that it seems unsound policy to base what is presumably intended to be a permanent settlement on an incident, the more so when the fundamental responsibility for the incident is as yet far from established.

If, on the other hand, it is due to the thunder of the Canons of Canterbury, to the outcry of Near Eastern crooks, and to the ingenious enthusiasm of Dr. Harrows and his friends, it seems to me even less defensible.

It seems difficult to reconcile this undue severity towards the Turks, who are believed to be weak, with the undue leniency to the far more unspeakable Bolsheviks, who appear to be strong.

You will, I trust, excuse the length of this letter, but it is written with a strong feeling that we are not acting quite with fairness and justification. Our good name is at stake, and honesty of dealing is probably the greatest asset we have in the Near East.

Believe me,  
Yours sincerely,  
J. M. DE ROBECK.

SECRET.

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In the absence of the Secretary of State for War, I circulate to the Cabinet the following Note by the General Staff on the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

THE WAR OFFICE,  
1st April, 1920.

PEEL.

GENERAL STAFF MEMORANDUM ON THE TURKISH PEACE TREATY.

With reference to Memoranda circulated by the Secretary of State for War to the Cabinet on the 24th December, 1919, and 6th January, 1920—

1. The General Staff consider it necessary to draw attention to telegram No. 285, dated the 25th March, from His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople to the Foreign Office. While endorsing in every respect the High Commissioner's appeal for an early decision, they, at the same time, must represent that there would seem to be little advantage in speeding up the proceedings of the Peace Conference merely with a view to an announcement for an announcement's sake, and that more harm than good will be done to the British Empire by the premature disclosure of terms which there are no available means to enforce.

2. Therefore, the General Staff would draw particular attention to the intimation conveyed by Admiral de Robeck in the above-mentioned telegram, that terms less drastic than those which have been indicated to him and offering the prospect of a peace tolerable to the Turks, might be secured without a further armed struggle between them and the Allies, which he appears to consider otherwise inevitable.

The High Commissioner in his telegram refers to previous telegrams in which he has indicated what he believes to constitute tolerable peace terms in Turkish eyes. It is not known exactly to which telegrams he refers, but it is assumed that his telegram No. 175, dated the 29th February, is intended. This may be taken in conjunction with the identical telegram from the British, French and Italian High Commissioners, No. 211, dated the 10th March.

3. It appears that the terms, to be tolerable to the Turks, should recognize Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, including Adrianople, and suzerainty over a substantial portion of the Eastern provinces of Asia Minor.

4. In the ordinary course the General Staff would not feel it either proper, or incumbent upon them, to raise any question on what is primarily a political matter. Marshal Foch has, however, been asked what military action will be necessary to enforce the proposed peace terms, and the General Staff believe that the opinion of the Commission, presided over by the Marshal, closely coincides with their own as regards the forces required, the strength of which it is understood is so great that there is no probability that the Allied Governments can provide them.

5. They think it possible that, inspired by their special ambitions, the Greeks, whose Army is the largest concentrated force available for operations against Turkey, may suggest that they are in a position to carry out the task without other Allied reinforcements.

In their opinion such an offer, if accepted, would merely have a local effect, and further Greek ambitions without improving the general situation, while the situation of the Christian minorities and Armenians in remote parts of Turkey would be aggravated beyond hope of relief.

6. The fact that they are unable to recommend military action on a large scale with the Allied forces as at present constituted and disposed in the Near East, and that the blockade cannot be effectively applied to Turkey, combined with the fact that the first shadow of the peace terms has resulted in the withdrawal of Allied military detachments from the Anatolian Railway, appears to justify the General Staff in suggesting that serious attention should now be paid to the representations of the political advisers in Constantinople, and that it may not yet be too late to reconsider the terms which it is proposed to impose upon Turkey, unless His Majesty's Government are prepared to face a further call for troops. There are now no reinforcements available, and indeed our military resources are strained to a dangerous extent in meeting our existing commitments.

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7. Though all reports agree that the invasion of Anatolia by Greece is the greatest source of irritation to the Turks, who consider it a dishonourable breach of the Armistice, it is the future of Armenia which most concerns the General Staff. They regret that they are now, in view of Marshal Foch's opinion, unable to contemplate the present plan for the formation of an Armenian State as a practicable policy. It is true that steps are being taken to provide armament for the Armenians, but there is now no guarantee that these arms will ever reach them without the assistance of a military expedition, nor is there any likelihood that they can arrive before the middle of May at the very earliest. Months must then elapse before the armament can be distributed and the personnel trained. During this period Armenia will be exposed to Turk and Tartar attack, while the Turks will remain in the territory which has been promised to her. Even after she has been armed, her power to establish or even to defend herself has yet to be demonstrated. In short, the General Staff fail to see how the State of Armenia, if it is to include any part of the former Turkish vilayets, can be established without the goodwill of Turkey, which can hardly be obtained if the present proposals are pursued.

8. It appears, therefore, to the General Staff that the best interests of Armenia demand that her representatives should be told frankly that her existence as a self-contained State, if she desires to absorb any territory formerly Turkish, can only be guaranteed under Turkish suzerainty; there seems no reason why this should affect the interior economy of the intended State and it is believed that if these facts were once faced most of the difficulties connected with Armenia would disappear. The Turkish force at Erzerum might actually be withdrawn without an Allied expedition, while it might even be possible to secure a more favourable position for Armenia in Cilicia where they are now dependent on French protection, which has proved ineffective in spite of the comparatively large forces used for the purpose.

9. The General Staff, who are concerned only with British interests, have no desire to labour the Greek question, but desire to record their opinion that there will be no satisfactory settlement of the Turkish question and consequently no reduction in British responsibilities until Greek ambitions are curbed. It follows that the Turks should retain their administrative position in, and access to Adrianople while Smyrna should remain under the Turkish flag unless the Allied Powers are prepared to make greatly increased forces available and to undertake operations on a scale sufficient to secure the practical elimination of Turkey.

10. To sum up, the General Staff are of the opinion that to persist in the present proposals for peace with Turkey with existing forces at the disposal of the Allies is to risk a great blow to British prestige without any corresponding return and probably to cause massacres of Christians and Armenians on a scale unprecedented even in Turkey.

The remarks of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at the Conference held on the 29th March, when he stated that "the decisions of the Conference are provisional in character and subject to the approval and sanction of the Supreme Council," indicate that the opportunity for a revision of the Treaty has not yet passed; and this expression is strengthened by telegram No. 260 D, from the Foreign Office to Admiral de Robeck, dated the 30th March, in reply to his telegram No. 285, mentioned above, which gave rise to this paper.

GENERAL STAFF,  
THE WAR OFFICE  
1st April, 1920.

### APPENDIX 3

- Venizelos' letter to Lloyd George on 2<sup>nd</sup> of Nov. 1918. LG/F/55/1/11
- Venizelos' letter to Lloyd George on 26<sup>th</sup> of Feb. 1920. LG/F/55/1/27
- Venizelos' letter to Lloyd George on 26<sup>th</sup> of April 1920. LG/F/55/1/28

Yonizelos. C/9 1.



November 2, 1918.

My dear Prime Minister,

I have the honour to send you herewith the Memorandum which you were good enough to ask for, concerning the best manner of settling the questions relating to the Ottoman Empire.

In the Memorandum the question is regarded from an absolutely objective point of view. Permit me, as the leader of the Greek Government, to lay before you in this letter the more particularly Greek point of view.

It would be neither just nor politic that the Powers should concern themselves with the Arabs, the Syrians and the Armenians, and neglect the future of the Greeks in the Ottoman Empire.

The Armenians deserve the sympathy of the whole civilised world, and we could not contemplate any settlement of the Eastern Question which did not ensure their future. But the Greeks are also worthy of the same sympathy.

They are as numerous as the Armenians, and have been the victims of the same kind of maltreatment, while an enormous number of them have been exterminated. Further, tens of thousands of Greek volunteers took part in the war in Macedonia, and formed a very important part of the army of National Defence which I organised, as the head of the Salonica Government.

The settlement of the future of the Greek portion of the Western part of Asia Minor by its annexation to Greece

The Right Honourable  
DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, M.P.



is the sole method by which Greece would be able appreciably to extend her territories, at this moment when Serbia and Roumania are respectively completing their national unity. If Greece is unable to develop in the direction of Asia Minor, she will have to look for an extension of her frontiers in the direction of Thrace, which would carry her as far as the Black Sea. I fear that this solution, however, would raise still greater obstacles than those involved in an extension of Greece towards Western Asia Minor.

The principal obstacle to the extension of Greece into Asia Minor lies in the objections of Italy. By the Treaty of London of April 26, 1915, Italy received a promise that she should be able to establish herself on the southern coast of Asia Minor, in the Adelia region. Two years later, at the conference at Saint-Jean de Maurienne, when the question came up, in consequence of the letter from the Austrian Emperor to Prince Sixte de Bourbon, of the possibility of a separate peace with Austria, which did not give satisfaction to the Italian aspirations in the Adriatic, Italy was promised a sphere of influence at Smyrna.

The claims of the Italians to Smyrna were based upon the arrangements between England, France and Russia concerning Asia Minor which were concluded in 1916. These arrangements, however, in view of the Russian revolution, have now ceased to hold good. Even the agreement under which, before Italy entered the war, the Western Powers consented to the cession of Constantinople to Russia is no longer in force. It is then impossible, in view of the

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radical changes that have already occurred in regard to the future of Asia Minor, to continue to regard as valid the promise that was made with regard to Smyrna. Moreover, the establishment of Italy at Smyrna would result in a contradiction of the very principles in whose name the Allies are conducting the war. Greece would be placed in the same situation with regard to Italy that Serbia was with regard to Austria, before the war began, and her peaceful development would from this fact become impossible.

The opposition of Italy to the extension of Greece into Western Asia Minor, however, ought not to prevent this extension.

It is to the interest of Europe at large, in the fullest sense of the phrase, to consolidate the smaller states to the utmost possible extent and to render them more and more independent. Speaking more particularly, the strengthening of Greece as a Mediterranean Power would aim simply at assuring equilibrium in the Mediterranean and would in no way hamper the legitimate interests of Italy.

I fully understand that the promise of the Entente Powers in regard to the concessions to Greece in Asia Minor is not now binding on those Powers, as the promise was made under conditions that Greece has not carried out. But the Entente Powers know well that I have left no stone unturned during the war to ensure that Greece should ally her future with theirs. They are also aware that the Greek people have faithfully followed my lead. When the General Elections took place, after my first disagreement with King Constantine in February 1915, the electors who were able to vote again

gave me a great majority, notwithstanding that the choice before them was between the policy of Venizelos, who wanted war, and that of the King, who wanted peace. When, in September 1915, the ex-King, betraying his country, again entered into conflict with me, Greece did not hesitate to make a revolution, in order by this means to take part in the war.

I think I may be permitted to say there are few peoples who, in similar circumstances, would have acted in such a praiseworthy manner.

Independently of the action of the Greek people, however, the cession to Greece of the Western part of Asia Minor is called for in the name of the principles for which the Allies are now fighting, as they have on many occasions declared. Why should these principles not be applied to Greece?

Permit me to hope, my dear Prime Minister, that in the spirit of fairness and equity which presides over the decisions of the British Empire, I shall receive firm support for the defence of the legitimate interests of my country.

I have the honour to remain,

My dear Prime Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

*E. A. Venizelos*

DÉLÉGATION HÉLLÉNIQUE  
AU CONGRÈS DE LA PAIX  
LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL

No 1  
Forum 15  
Box 91

London, February 26th, 1920.

My dear Prime Minister;

May I be permitted to invoke your further kind assistance on two points relative to the decision of the Supreme Council as regards Smyrna?

The first of these points relates to the necessity of inserting in the Turkish Treaty a provision to the effect that a Customs Union shall exist between Smyrna and Greece. The omission of this provision might create many difficulties in the future.

The second point relates to the insertion of a clause establishing that, in respect of the eventual incorporation of Smyrna in the Kingdom of Greece, a majority vote = and not necessarily a

The Rt. Honourable,  
David Lloyd George,  
Prime Minister of Great Britain,  
etc., etc., etc.

unanimous one of the Council of the League of Nations shall be taken as decisive. The admission of Germany into the League within the next two years might, otherwise, endanger the satisfactory solution of this question.

I am addressing to the Supreme Council an official note embodying the two points mentioned in this letter. May I take, once more, advantage of the opportunity and express to you my deep gratitude for the hearty support you have given to the claims of Greece?

I beg to remain, my dear Prime Minister,

Yours very sincerely,

*E. Venizelos*

DELEGATION HELLENIQUE  
AU CONGRÈS DE LA PAIX  
LE PRÉSIDENT DU CONSEIL

1/25/20 No 3  
Folder 15  
Box 91

San Remo, April 26<sup>th</sup>  
1920

My dear Prime Minister,

I desire most sincerely to  
express to you, and through you  
to the British Government, my  
deep gratitude, as well as that  
of my country, for all you have  
done to enable us to obtain the

The Right Honorable  
David Lloyd George  
Prime Minister of Great Britain

an register were being allowed to such an

at unemployment among British shipmasters and

Fulfillment of our national  
unity.

I feel, however, that I am quite unable to give adequate expression to my feelings, for indeed, all that Greece has now achieved of her legitimate claims, due in major part, my dear Prime Minister, to your powerful and effective support, and no words of mine can efficiently express my country's deep sense of thankfulness to you.

I believe, that the best way of giving practical evidence of our gratitude, is to prove worthy of your trust in us, and of your expectations as regards Greater Greece, which you so well expressed in the message you were good enough to transmit to me last December, through Sir John Stavridi.

By combining the culture of her old civilisation with the vitality and spirit of her younger generations, Greece, will

sh register were being allowed to such an  
at unemployment among British abimeatans

become a factor of progress,  
of peace and of order in the  
Near East, and will thus  
prove that you have not  
given her your invaluable  
support in vain.

Believe me, my dear Prime  
Minister,

Ever yours sincerely and  
gratefully

E. H. Veniselo

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## **APPENDIX 4**

- Churchill's letter to Lloyd George of 16<sup>th</sup> of December 1920, Lloyd George Papers  
LG/F/206/4/24, House of Lords.

into the Interior because of the interruption of

This document is the property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

SECRET.

3

*Chamberlain*  
123  
K.K. 33.

### THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

#### MEMORANDUM BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR.

I must draw the attention of the Cabinet to the situation which has now developed in the Middle East. The unfortunate course of affairs has led to our being simultaneously out of sympathy with all the four Powers exercising local influence there.

- (i.) We are at variance with the Russian Bolsheviks for many grave reasons; and he is indeed a sanguine man who supposes that a satisfactory joint policy can be arranged between them and Great Britain.
- (ii.) We are at variance with the Turks because we have taken the lead against them and put ourselves forward as the principal anti-Turkish great Power.
- (iii.) Mischief has been made between us and the Arabs by the French treatment of the Arabs.
- (iv.) Finally, the return of Constantine to Greece has severed the special relations which we had with that country under Monsieur Venizelos.

Our own military forces are extremely weak, and maintained with great difficulty and expense; and we have not secured a single friend among the local Powers. It is needless to say that France and still more Italy have not hesitated to represent themselves as anxious to mitigate the lot of the Turk and to represent us as the sole obstacle. It is hardly possible to imagine a more disappointing conclusion to our foreign policy in these regions. The only way in which we can exert influence in the Middle East and safeguard our enormous and varied interests there, is by dividing up the local Powers so that if we have some opponents, we have also at any rate some friends. This is what we have always done in the whole of our past history. When Russia was our enemy, Turkey was our friend, when Turkey was our enemy, Russia was our friend. We have been accustomed to utilize to the full the division between the Arab and the Turk. When everything else had been let go, we had at least the Greeks. Now we are out of joint with the whole lot at once.

I hope, therefore, that without delay we shall endeavour to choose from these four local Powers some whose interests we shall favour and others for whom we cannot do so much. It is perfectly clear that to go on as we are, embroiled with or estranged from all four local Powers, will soon reduce us to a very weak position which we have no adequate military power to restore.

The question now arises, which of these four local Powers should we make friends with? It will be found very difficult to have good relations with the Greece of King Constantine, and certainly it would be very wrong to embroil ourselves with the Mohammedan world for the sake of securing an Empire for King Constantine and his German entourage. I am sure it will be found

impossible, however much it may be tried, to have intimate and special relations between this conservative and monarchical country and the Soviet Communist Government of Russia. The more it is tried, the more it will fail, and the more it will injure the political structure on which the present Government rests. There remain, therefore, the other two great elements in the Middle East, the Turks and the Arabs. And here it is well to observe that although they have hitherto been divided, they are both Mohammedan influences, and our attitude towards them produces reactions throughout the whole Mohammedan world. We are the greatest Mohammedan Power in the world. It is our duty, more than that of any other Government, to study policies which are in harmony with Mohammedan feeling. It would appear, therefore, that we should initiate and pursue steadily and consistently a policy of friendship with Turkey and with the Arabs, and that we should not hope for any effective assistance either from the Bolshevik Russians or the pro-German Greeks.

Neither can these decisions be long delayed. I dissent altogether from the policy proposed at the recent conference that we should allow the Greek position in Smyrna to collapse, so that we have no responsibility for what happens, and then bow to the accomplished fact. Such a course, whether wise or unwise, is not practicable. We cannot maintain our position at Constantinople if the Greek division is withdrawn before we have made good arrangements with the Turks, unless indeed we are prepared to send large reinforcements. These are not available. We have already cut off the Greek supplies of money, and their obvious reply to this will be to say that they must do their best and devote such efforts as they can make themselves to upholding their interests at Smyrna. The collapse or withdrawal of the Greek division covering Constantinople would destroy a great part of our bargaining power with the Turk. His strength would be greatly increased, and our position dangerously laid open. Similarly, to let the Greeks collapse at Smyrna will leave us confronted with a Turkish triumph, and the Turks will have got back Smyrna by their own efforts instead of as the result of a bargain with us which might well safeguard Greek Christians there as well as our own general interests in the Middle East. If we are to make a satisfactory peace with Turkey, surely we should do it before the Greek armies in the field have crumbled away or been withdrawn. We are already immensely weaker than we were, and if we allow the present situation to drift on for a few more weeks or months we shall find ourselves in a position where we have no friends, where we dislike everyone, and are ourselves extremely weak. In addition we may either have to evacuate Constantinople or send a considerable army to reinforce it. I do not know where this army can be found.

W. S. C.

THE WAR OFFICE,  
16th December, 1920.

## **APPENDIX 5**

Report of Committee on Greek territorial Claims: February 18 to March 18, 1919  
The National Archives of the United Kingdom, Public Records Office,  
FO 608/37, W.C.P. 401.

J531 = 82/11/2 ✓

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REPORT OF COMMITTEE  
ON  
GREEK TERRITORIAL  
CLAIMS.

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Paris, March 6, 1919.

## Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims.

February 18 to March 8, 1919.

## Composition:

*United States of America—*Dr. W. L. Westermann.  
Dr. C. Day.*British Empire—*The Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden, G.C.M.G. (*Vice-Chairman*).  
Sir Eyre Crowe, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.*France—*M. Jules Cambon (*Chairman*).  
M. Gout.*Italy—*M. de Martino.  
Colonel Castoldi.

## Also Present:

*British Empire—*

Hon. Harold Nicolson.

*France—*M. Laroche.  
M. Krajewski.*Italy—*Sig. Galli.  
Captain Conz.

The following witnesses were called:—

*For Greece—*

M. Venizelos.

*For the Greeks of North Epirus—*

M. Carapanos.

*For Albania—*Turkhan Pasha, | of the Provisional Government claiming to have  
Mehmed Bey Konitza, | been constituted in December 1918.  
Dr. Turtulis.*For the Greeks of Thrace—*M. Vamvacas (Deputy for Dedeagatch in the Turkish Parliament).  
M. Antoniadis (Deputy for Adrianople).*Terms of Reference.*

"That the questions raised in the statement by M. Venizelos on Greek territorial interests in the Peace Settlement shall be referred for examination in the first instance to an expert committee composed of two representatives each of the United States of America, the British Empire, France and Italy.

"It shall be the duty of the Committee to reduce the questions for decision within the narrowest possible limits, and to make recommendations for a just settlement.

"The Committee is authorised to consult representatives of the peoples concerned."

[N.B.—A detailed description of the frontiers proposed will be found in Annex 5.]

[66]—D.P.—24.3.19.

B

## REPORT.

## I. NORTHERN EPIRUS. (See Map I.)

*Proposal.*

The British and French Delegations agree on the line shown in green on the map.  
The United States Delegation are prepared to accept only the modified line as indicated.

The Italian Delegation desire to maintain the existing frontier.

*Argument.*

The British and French Delegations base their decision on the following reasons:—

- (i.) In respect of Southern Albania the statistics available offer little practical criterion of the wishes of the peoples concerned. Such statistics can be based only on the test of religion or on that of language: the former test is unfavourable to the Albanians, the latter is unfair to the Greeks. The British and French Delegations therefore feel obliged to take into prior consideration the actual reasons for which the frontier of 1913 has not met with the approbation of the peoples concerned. The course of events in Southern Albania since the delimitation of the above frontier (see historic Summary given in Annex 1) tend to show that this delimitation is unacceptable to very important elements in the regions concerned.
- (ii.) At the same time the British and French Delegations are impressed by the evidence given by MM. Venizelos and Carapanos in regard to the Hellenophile sentiments of the greater part of the population, and the economic dependence of the Koritza region on the main road leading to Santi Quaranta.
- (iii.) The British Delegation are also influenced by the consideration that the problem is in effect whether this district shall be given to Greece or to Albania or placed under the protection of some European Power; they are of opinion that for political and strategic reasons it would be unfair to Greece and Serbia to place so vital a point as Koritza under the tutelage and control of another European Power.

The Delegation of the United States is unable to accept as satisfying evidence either the history of the troubled years 1913-14, in which foreign intrigue was active, or the testimony of parties to the contest on either side. They base their conclusions on reports of observers, corroborated by such statistical evidence as is available, and state them as follows:

1. The construction of the road through Premeti to Valona enables the districts of Koritza and of Argyrocastro to be separated without economic injury.
2. In the district south-west of the Voiussa River the majority of the population appears to be Greek in sentiment and political inclination; and is naturally connected with Greece by relations of transportation and trade.
3. In the district north-east of the Voiussa River the great majority of the population is Albanian not only by speech but also by national consciousness. No sufficient grounds have been adduced for severing from Albania this district, in which the consciousness of Albanian unity and the devotion to the Albanian cause are particularly strong.

The Italian Delegation are anxious that the existing frontier should be maintained for the detailed reasons given in Annex II.

2. THRACE.

(A.)—Western (Bulgarian) Thrace.

*Proposal.*  
The United States, British and French Delegations agree in principle to accept the Greek claims with certain minor modifications as indicated on the map.

The Italian Delegation, while agreeing in principle, formulate certain reservations. (See Annex 3.)

*Opinion.*  
The Committee are of opinion, after an examination of the statistics available, that the non-Moslem population of Bulgarian Thrace is Greek rather than Bulgarian. The ethnic claims of Greece are therefore superior to those of Bulgaria.

According to the information laid before the Committee it appears that the Turkish population of Western Thrace would be more ready to accept Greek sovereignty than that of Bulgaria.

The Committee also examined the question whether the cession of Western Thrace to Greece will impose an economic servitude upon Bulgaria. **The United States, British, and French Delegates** agree that, in view of the formal undertaking given to the Committee by M. Venizelos that the Greek Government will accord to Bulgaria a guaranteed outlet to the Aegean Sea, either through Kavalla, Salonica, or even Dedeagatch, and will, if Bulgaria desires, build a railway line from Kavalla to the Bulgarian frontier, the union of Western Thrace with Greece will not damage the vital economic interests of Bulgaria. It is also noted that the situation and natural character of the harbour of Dedeagatch are such that it can never be of real commercial value to Bulgaria, and that, on the other hand, the opening of the Straits will in future secure a free passage to and from the Bulgarian ports of Varna and Bourgas.

**The Committee therefore agree unanimously** to the cession to Greece of Western Thrace, the Italian Delegates formulating, however, the special reservations embodied in Annex 3.

**The United States, British and French Delegates** further agree that the Greco-Bulgarian frontier in this district should be drawn as shown on Map I, and the British and French Delegates accept the assurances of the United States Delegates that the slight modifications proposed by them in M. Venizelos' own line (shown in green on the map) are not such as to sever the economic communications in the Arda Valley.

B. Eastern (Turkish) Thrace.

*Proposal.*  
The United States, British, and French Delegations agree in principle to accept the Greek claims with certain minor modifications as indicated on the map. (See Map I.)  
The Italian Delegation, while agreeing in principle, formulate certain reservations. (See Annex 4.)

*Opinion.*  
In formulating their recommendation the Committee proceed on the hypotheses that the City of Constantinople, the Sea of Marmora and the Straits will be constituted by the Superior Conference into a separate zone, and that it will be for the Conference itself to establish the northern frontier of that zone. The line recommended by the Committee does not, therefore, necessarily affect the question whether the Greeks are to be given access to the Black Sea, since the Conference, should it consider such access undesirable, can exclude Greece.

\* The frontiers suggested for Eastern and Western Thrace will necessarily depend on the amount of territory accorded to the zone of Constantinople, and are subject to revision and to unlimited modifications as the extent of said zone shall have been determined.  
The United States Delegation reserves the right to modify the frontier which they approve according to the disposal that may be made of the territory of Eastern Thrace.

from the Black Sea littoral by placing the northern terminus of the Enos-Midia line at some point on the southern Bulgarian frontier and not at Midia itself.

Proceeding from this assumption the Committee agree unanimously that the Greek claims to that part of Turkish Thrace which may be left outside the separate zone of Constantinople are justified, and the United States, British and French Delegations agree on the joint line as shown on Map I.

The Italian Delegation, while agreeing in principle, formulate the special reservations contained in Annex 4.

The Committee desire at the same time to record that they have obtained from M. Venizelos complete and formal assurances that the Greek Government will carefully maintain and protect the religious, cultural and civil rights of the Moslem communities, and will afford all necessary protection to the Moslem holy places and mosques. Similar assurances will be given to other non-Orthodox minorities.

These assurances should be safeguarded by suitable provisions in the Peace Treaty.

3. ASIA MINOR. (See Map II.)

Proposal.

The British and French Delegations agree that the territories comprised within the green line on the map should be united to Greece.

The United States Delegation are opposed to these districts being detached from Turkey.

The Italian Delegation refuse to discuss the Greek claims for the following reasons:—

- 1. The settlement of that portion of Asia Minor claimed by Greece cannot be separated from the general settlement, from a political, ethnic, and economic point of view, of Anatolia as a whole.
- 2. Because the regions claimed by Greece have to a large extent been the subject of international arrangements. (See Annex 5.)

Argument.

The British Delegation are fully prepared to accept the French line as regards the northern and eastern portions of the territory claimed. As regards the southern portion, however, while admitting that the French line has much to recommend it, they desire to make reservations in regard to the Turkish populations of the Meander Valley. Both the British and French Delegations, however, are of opinion that the ports of Smyrna and Aivali, with a certain dependent region, can justifiably claim union with Greece on ethnic principles (as well as for administrative and economic considerations), and they are agreed to adopt the joint line as shown on Map II.

The United States Delegation have put forward the view that the future Turkish State might be placed under the tutelage of a Mandatory Power. If that view should prevail the British and French Delegations call attention to the undesirability of placing a compact and civilised community such as that of the Hellenic colonies on the western seaboard of Asia Minor under such tutelage.

The United States Delegates are unable to join with their French and British colleagues in the above proposals for the following reasons:—

- (a) Although their estimates of the Greek population of Asia Minor are lower than those submitted by the Greek Government the difference is not so great as to make a formal protest necessary. But the American Delegation cannot accept the figures presented by the Greek Government as to the Turkish population. Their own information leads them to place the Turkish population at a figure which puts the Greeks in a decided minority in every sandjak of the area claimed by Greece, except in the sandjak of Smyrna itself. This information agrees in general with that presented by the Italian Delegation with relation to the ethnic situation in western Asia Minor.
- (b) They are also of opinion that from an economic point of view it will be inequitable to separate the coastal districts of western Asia Minor from the Central Anatolian plateau, and so to sever what remains of the Turkish Empire from its most important natural exits to the sea.

ANNEX 4.

ITALIAN RESERVATIONS REGARDING EASTERN (TURKISH) THRACE.

ON the subject of Greek claims in regard to Eastern Thrace, the Italian Delegation feel that, since it is possible that Constantinople may be incorporated in a separate State, it would be well to consider several hypotheses:—

1. The whole of this region would be included in the territory assigned to Constantinople.

2. A considerable portion of this region would be included in the territory assigned to Constantinople, resulting in a topographical anomaly between its boundaries and the Bulgarian frontier.

3. The boundaries assigned to Constantinople would leave a zone of territory between these boundaries and the Bulgarian frontier, wide enough to be composed of.

In the latter case, the Italian Delegation wished to draw the attention of the Commission to the special interest attaching to the future of the population and the question of Adrianople.

The replies given to the questions put forward by the Italian Delegation to those interested in regard to the Greek views upon the question of the ethnical rights of the non-Hellenic population and of the religious institutions, does not appear to have made it clear to the Commission as to what fate lies in store for these people.

The various summary provisions of the Greek law relating to a limited number of Moslem subjects who in the former kingdom of Greece formed an infinitesimal minority, do not appear adequate for this case, which is a special one of quite distinct importance, for it is a question now of a considerable number of Turks, Bulgars, Jews, etc., who would be included within the new frontiers.

From this district also an appeal has reached the Italian Delegation from the Moslems, asking for the occupation of the country by other than Greek troops.

Paris, March 1, 1919.

ANNEX 5.

ITALIAN STATEMENT IN REGARD TO ASIA MINOR.

THE Italian Delegation contend that no discussion concerning the Greek claims can be entered upon by the Commission, because the settlement of the territories claimed by the Greeks cannot logically be separated from the settlement of the remainder of Anatolia either from an ethnographical, economic or political point of view.

The region claimed by M. Venizelos, or at any rate a great part of this region, has been the subject of agreements between Italy on the one hand and France and Great Britain on the other, namely: Article 9 of the Treaty of London of the 26th April, 1915, and the Agreement of London of the 18th August, 1917, between France, Great Britain and Italy.

In view of these agreements, the Italian Delegation consider that the contracting Governments are not in a position to accord to Greece, even by way of suggestion, or by marking frontier lines on geographical maps, any territories which they had already admitted by previous agreements as belonging to Italy either in whole or in part. Indeed, the zone claimed by M. Venizelos, with the town of Smyrna, is comprised almost entirely in the zone attributed to Italy by the Agreement of August, 1917; and as for Article 9 of the Treaty of London of 1915, which does not contain any precise geographical delimitations, it would appear that a preliminary exchange of views between the Allies ought to take place before coming to a decision on the merits of the Greek claims.

The Italian Delegation consider that the Agreement of August, 1917, is actually valid until such time as it may be replaced by another agreement. It is true that this agreement was made subject to the consent of Russia, but this consent could not

be given, as Russia had ceased to exist. This reservation therefore fell through by force of circumstances.

The same holds good as regards the Islands of the Aegean Sea occupied by Italy. The Italian Delegation draw attention to the provisions of Article 8 of the Treaty of London of the 26th April, 1917, according to which no contrary proposal could be put forward by the Allies without the consent of Italy.

On the other hand, the Italian Delegation give their entire consent, as far as they are concerned, to the declaration of the Governments of France and Great Britain of November last, which provides for the administration in Syria and Mesopotamia, but which does not prejudice in any way the validity of the agreements between the two Governments.

For these reasons the Italian Delegation have expressed the opinion that the Committee cannot arrive at any decision concerning the Greek claims regarding the Islands occupied by Italy or regarding Asia Minor, and they have therefore formulated their reservations in regard to the safeguarding of the interests and the rights of Italy.

ANNEX 6.

A.—PROPOSALS FOR THE BOUNDARY BETWEEN GREECE AND ALBANIA IN EPIRUS.  
Reference International Map 1/1,000,000. Sheet Sofiya (North K. 34).  
3rd Provisional edition, 1918.

1. American Proposal.

LINE leaves the coast-line at a point in approximate latitude 40° 13 (Gramala Bay) and runs in an E.N.E. direction till it reaches the watershed between streams draining to the open sea on the one hand, and to the Ghiri i Vlores on the other. The line follows this watershed till it meets the crest of the Chike Dagh in a direction generally parallel to the coast-line to a point in approximate latitude 40° 8, whence it bends northward following the watershed between the Drin and Sushitse and then eastward along the watershed bounding on the north the basin in which Kardie is situated. At a point in this watershed in approximate latitude and longitude 40° 12 N.; 20° 2 E. (to be referred to below as point "A") it bends north along a spur, which it follows to its northern termination. From here the line turns E.N.E. and, crossing the Drin in approximate latitude 40° 16, and keeping this direction, ascends to the main watershed which runs nearly parallel to the Drin. The boundary then follows this watershed between the Drin on the one hand, and on the other the tributaries of the Viose, and the interior basin whose centre is in approximate latitude and longitude 40° 11 N.; 20° 12 E. until it meets the present Greek-Albanian frontier in approximate latitude and longitude 40° 3 N.; 20° 25 E.

Franco-British Proposal.

This line leaves the American line at point "A" (see above) and continues generally N.N.W. along the minor watershed to a point some 3 kilom. S.S.W. of Tepelen, whence it turns E.N.E. and descends to the confluence of the Viose and the Drin. From here it ascends the "thalweg" of the Viose to a point in longitude 20° 18 whence it runs generally N.E. to a point on the watershed between the Viose and the Lum i Beratit. It follows this watershed southwards for about 5 kilom. and then descends straight to the "thalweg" of the Lum i Beratit which it follows downstream to a point in approximate latitude and longitude 40° 27 N.; 20° 24 E. whence it follows the watershed and runs between the two tributaries draining from Ostrovitse Dagh to the Lum i Beratit generally N.E. for about 6 kilom. and then generally N. for about 10 kilom. to a point on the main crest of the Ostrovitse Dagh in about 40° 34 N.; 20° 28 E. The E.-W. watershed of this range is then followed eastward for about 15 kilom. and the line thereafter bends—still following the watershed, and travels some 7 kilom. N.N.E. to point 1147 and then about 7 kilom. N.N.W. From this point it runs generally N. by E. crossing the Devoli River at about longitude 20° 38 and continues in the same general direction up a watershed for some 11 kilom. to a point of approximate position 40° 52 N.; 20° 40 E. From this point the boundary runs generally E. for about 18 kilom. and joins the present Greek-Albanian boundary on the watershed between lakes Okhrida and Priespa in approximate latitude 40° 52. From here the line follows this frontier to its junction with the Serbian boundary.

C.—PART

Reference Index

Franco-British Propo

1. The northern b...  
...at the mouth o...  
...It will foll...  
...the portion of the...  
...the triquet boundary...  
...and will follow this...  
...of Sandringham.

2. The eastern be...  
...un-mentioned point...  
...Chas and the...  
...Chas on the...  
...There it will...  
...the railway...  
...of the...  
...of the...

B.—PROPOSED BOUNDARY BETWEEN GREECE AND BULGARIA.

Reference International Map 1/1,000,000. Sheet Istanbul (North K. 35), 1918.

At its western extremity the proposed boundary starts from the existing boundary at a point in approximate latitude and longitude 41° 22' N.; 24° 45' E. From this point it follows the crest of a spur leading to the watershed between the Arda on the one hand and the basins of the Kuru Chai and Seugudlu Su on the other. It follows this watershed to a point about 3 kilom. E. of Egridero with approximate position 41° 34' N.; 25° 11' E. From here it descends to the "thalweg" of a valley tributary to the Seugudlu Su and follows this valley till it joins the latter river about 2 kilom. east of B. Balaban. The line then follows the "thalweg" of the Seugudlu Su to its confluence with the Arda, and continues downstream along the "thalweg" of the Arda. The boundary leaves this "thalweg" at a point in approximate longitude 25° 32' E., about 1 kilom. below the confluence of a large left-bank tributary. The line then follows a minor watershed in a general N.E. direction to the main Maritsa-Arda watershed, which it reaches at a point approximately 41° 42' N.; 25° 34' E. The boundary then follows the watershed generally eastward to a summit near the eastern extremity of the Besh Tepe Dagh with approximate position 41° 42' N.; 26° 06' E. It then follows the "thalweg" of a stream which runs generally E.N.E., crosses the road from Jisr Mustafa Pasha to Adachali and continues parallel to it till both road and stream cross the railway. The boundary continues to follow this "thalweg" in an E.S.E. direction to a point N. of the railway bridge at Chermen. It now turns N. and runs to the "thalweg" of the Maritsa, which it meets W. of a northward bend. It follows the "thalweg" of the Maritsa downstream to a point in approximate longitude 26° 20' E. From here it runs N. for 2 kilom., and joining the line of the Turkish-Bulgarian agreement of 1915, it runs generally N.N.E. up the "thalweg" of the valley leading close past the E. side of Iskudar. At a point due E. of Iskudar the boundary leaves this "thalweg" and runs due E. for nearly 14 kilom. till it reaches a point on the watershed immediately W. of the Tundza, whence it turns to the N.N.E. and runs to the "thalweg" of that river, which it reaches approximately in 41° 50' N.; 26° 36' E. The boundary then follows the "thalweg" upstream to the present Turco-Bulgarian boundary, and it coincides with this frontier to a point on the Istranja Dagh (42° 04' N.; 27° 09' E.), from which it follows the watershed between the Black and Aegean Seas in a general S.E. direction, leaving Kovchas and Gedege to Bulgaria. At point 1031 the boundary leaves the main watershed and runs generally eastward down the minor watershed forming the S. limit of the river basin in which Samakov is situated. The boundary reaches the coast line of the Black Sea at a promontory approximately in latitude 41° 46' N.

C.—PROPOSED BOUNDARY BETWEEN SMYRNA AND TURKEY.

Reference International Map 1/1,000,000. Sheet Ismir (North J.35). Provisional Edition, 1916.

Franco-British Proposal.

1. The northern boundary of Smyrna leaves Adramyti Keurfezi in the Aegean Sea at the mouth of the southern of the two streams between Aivali and Geamech. It will follow the "thalweg" of this stream to the watershed formed by the portion of the Madaras Dagh north of the Kozak Chai. Here it will meet the vilayet boundary between Brusa and Ismir which runs along this watershed and will follow this boundary eastwards to the source of the Gorduk Chai (south-west of Sindirghi).

2. The eastern boundary between Smyrna and Turkey will commence at the last-mentioned point and will run southwards along the watershed between the Gorduk Chai and the Geudjili Chai on the west and the Simav Chai and the Geurdiz Chai on the east to the junction of the Geudjili Chai and the Geurdiz Chai. Thence it will run in a straight line to the centre of the northern shore of Chai. Thence it will run in a straight line to the point where the Manisa-Mermer Geul and thence in a straight line to the point where the Manisa-Alashehr railway crosses the tributary of the Gediz Chai shown five kilom. west of Salihli. Thence it will follow the "thalweg" of this tributary to its source and run eastwards along the watershed formed by the Boz Dagh and then southwards to the Bey Dagh and westwards to point 1424 so as to leave all the territory

GREECE AND ALBANIA IN EUROPE. Sheet Sofiya (North K. 34), 1918.

Approximate latitude 40° 13' (Grama) the watershed between streams the Ghiri i Vlores on the other crest of the Cluqe Dagh in at in approximate latitude 40° 13' watershed between the Dren and bounding on the north this watershed in approximate urred to below as point "A" northern termination. From in approximate latitude 40° 13' watershed which runs near this watershed between the of the Viose, and the interior longitude 40° 11' N.; 20° 12' E. in approximate latitude and

(see above) and continues int some 3 kilom. S.S.W. of confluence of the Viose and Viose to a point in longitude the watershed between the southwards for about 5 kilom. in i Beratit which it follows ngitude 40° 27' N.; 20° 24' E. e two tributaries draining N.E. for about 6 kilom. and main crest of the Ostrovise rshed of this range is then eafter bends—still follow- point 1147 and then about . by E. crossing the Devoli and general direction up a e position 40° 52' N.; 20° 40' about 18 kilom. and joins d between lakes Okhrida here the line follows this

tion, Paris, 1919.

to



...the boundary will...  
 ...Madenas Dagh...  
 ...the boundary...  
 ...at point 1031...  
 ...tributary on the east...  
 ...latitude 37° 23' S...  
 ...between the boundary...  
 ...the north and the...  
 ...it will follow the...  
 ...N. of the above-mentioned...  
 ...derez below the...  
 ...Chai S. of this...  
 ...surfezi on the S...  
 ...1000 on Kashi...  
 ...of Mendolia to...  
 ...dary will run to...  
 ...thus reaching...  
 ...ortion is defined...  
 ...e boundary will...  
 ...n which flows into...

...reaches a point on the watershed immediately W. of the Tundza, whence it turns to the N.N.E. and runs to the "thalweg" of that river, which it reaches approximately at 41° 50' N.; 26° 36' E. The boundary then follows the "thalweg" upstream to the present Turco-Bulgarian boundary, and it coincides with this frontier to a point between the Istranja Dagh (42° 04' N.; 27° 09' E.), from which it follows the watershed between the Black and Aegean Seas in a general S.E. direction, leaving Kovchas and Gedege to Bulgaria. At point 1031 the boundary leaves the main watershed and runs generally eastward down the minor watershed forming the S. limit of the river basin in which Samakov is situated. The boundary reaches the coast of the Black Sea at a promontory approximately in latitude 41° 46' N.

A Commission composed of seven members, five nominated by the five Allied and Associated Powers, one by Greece and one by Bulgaria, will be constituted fifteen days after the coming into force of the present treaty, to trace on the spot the frontier line described above. Greece shall possess this territory in full sovereignty.

ARTICLE 2.

Greece undertakes to accord to Bulgaria an outlet to the Aegean Sea, either at Cavalla or Salonica or Dedeagatch, as the Bulgarian Government may choose, and under the supervision of the five Allied and Associated Powers, to ensure the necessary facilities for enabling her to make use of the port chosen, and to have free commercial communications with the Aegean Sea.

The choice of the Bulgarian Government must be made within a period of three months.

ARTICLE 3.

Greece undertakes, under the supervision of the five Allied and Associated Powers, scrupulously to maintain and protect the civil, educational and religious rights of all the communities belonging to a Christian denomination other than the orthodox Greek Church, or to any other religion, particularly the Mohammedan, and to accord to their buildings, religious establishments, schools and hospitals, and especially the mosques and holy places of Islam, all necessary protection.

The Greek Government shall afford the necessary facilities and permits to the charitable and other foundations which may be established in the territory acquired by Greece under the present treaty, provided that these foundations have no political object or purpose.

ARTICLE 4.

Greece agrees, under the supervision of the five Allied and Associated Powers, to take the necessary measures to protect the special interests of racial and religious minorities.

ARTICLE 5.

On the coming into effect of the present treaty Bulgarian nationals habitually resident in the territories ceded by Bulgaria to Greece will *ipso facto* obtain Greek nationality and lose their Bulgarian nationality.

Bulgarian nationals, however, who became resident in these territories at a date later than the 1st January, 1913, will not acquire Greek nationality except with the special permission of the Greek Government.

ARTICLE 6.

Within a period of two years from the coming into effect of the present treaty, Bulgarian nationals more than eighteen years of age and habitually resident in the Bulgarian territories ceded to Greece will be entitled to opt for Bulgarian nationality.

Option by a husband will cover that of his wife, and option by parents will cover that of their children less than eighteen years old.

All persons who have exercised the above right to opt must within the succeeding twelve months transfer their place of residence to Bulgaria. They will be entitled to retain landed property which they owned in the ceded territories before exercising the right to opt.

They may carry with them their movable property of every description. No export or import duties or charges may be imposed upon them in connection with the removal of such property.

## ARTICLE 7.

(Reserved in view of the decisions to be taken by the Commission on Responsibility and Punishment.)

Subject to the provisions of the present treaty in respect of responsibility incurred in the course of the present war, no inhabitant of the ceded Bulgarian territories shall be prosecuted or molested, either in person or property, on account of his political or military action during the war.

## ARTICLE 8.

(Reserved in view of the decisions to be taken on Turkish financial questions.)

The proportion and nature of the financial obligations of Bulgaria which are to be assumed by Greece, and all other questions arising from the transfer of territory dealt with in the present stipulations, will be determined by special arrangements.

## **CURRICULUM VITAE**

Sedat Cilingir was born in Izmir in 1947. After graduating from Manchester University, England, where he had his B.Sc. and M.Sc. in Electronics Engineering, started working for Ministry of Communications in Ankara. He was a lecturer in Electrical Engineering Faculty in Malaysian Technical University in Kuala Lumpur during 1980-1982 and 1983-1987. He was employed in Undersecretariat for Defense Industries in 1987, where he worked as an Engineer, Head of Department and later as an Assistant-UnderSecretary. Since his retirement in 2002, he has been working as a part-time lecturer in one of the Universities in Ankara.