

CONSOLIDATION OF JORDANIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY:
“RETHINKING INTERNAL UNREST AND EXTERNAL CHALLENGES IN
SHAPING JORDANIAN IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY”

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
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
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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the impact of two external challenges, the Palestinian dimension and the outbreak of *al-Aqsa intifada*, and the US war in Iraq in transforming the politics of identity in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The Kingdom of Jordan, created as a part of post-war settlement in 1921, considered as the most ‘artificial’ among all the states in the Middle East that has been successfully consolidated. Since Jordan was not the ancestral land of Hashemite family, the establishment of the Kingdom of Jordan posited the country at the core of discussions on identity and nation-building. In addition, the identity formation in Jordan offers a case that can easily be found in most parts of the Middle East where multiple *sub-state* and *supra-state* identities demarcate and shape the formulation of popular loyalties.

Given the historical and political linkage that has closely bound Jordanian and Palestinian entities, Jordanian political history as a separate entity has for the most part coincided with Palestinian national movement. The Palestinian issue has become central to Jordan’s politics of identity particularly with Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank in 1950 and the incorporation of the Palestinians

into Jordanian society. The huge influx of Palestinian community led to the emergence of an 'ethnic division' between the East Bankers (native Jordanians) and the West Bankers (Palestinian origin Jordanians). Since the annexation of the West Bank territories, the Kingdom opted to build a *hybrid* Jordanian identity to integrate Palestinian descents into Jordan.

Jordan has lately caught between two external challenges across its western and eastern borders. The outbreak of the *al-Aqsa intifada* in 2000 and the US war in Iraq in 2003 have devastatingly transformed Jordan's identity formation. The 'Jordan First, Arab Second' Campaign constitutes regime's primary response to cope with these regional crises. The 'Jordan First' initiative epitomizes a new era in the Kingdom, not only for re-building Jordanian norms and expectations, but also helps to notice the de-liberalizing efforts of the monarchy to contain and demolish any kind of opposition posed by domestic unrest. These two external disturbances will, therefore, help to illustrate that a causal relationship between identity and foreign policy can be drawn in the case of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

Keywords: Jordan, identity, foreign policy, Palestine, Iraq and the Islamic Action Front

ÖZ

ÜRDÜN ULUSAL KİMLİĞİNİN PEKİŞTİRİLMESİ: “ÜRDÜN KİMLİĞİNİN VE DIŞ POLİTİKASININ ŞEKİLLENMESİNİ İÇ HUZORSUZLUK VE DIŞ AÇMAZLAR ÜZERİNDEN YENİDEN DÜŞÜNMEK”

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Bu çalışmada, Ürdün Haşemi Krallığı'nın kimlik politikalarının şekillenmesinde etkide bulunan “*al-Aqsa intifadasının başlaması*” ile “ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali” şeklinde özetlenebilecek iki dış açmaz ele alınarak Ürdün'deki ulusal kimliğin nasıl değişime uğradığı incelenmiştir. Emirliğin 1921 yılında İngilizler tarafından ayrı bir entite olarak kurulmasından bu yana Ürdün, kimlik ve ulus oluşturma süreci açısından bir çok yazar tarafından pekiştirilmiş ‘yapay’ bir varlık olarak kabul edilmektedir. Haşemi Ailesinin Maverai Ürdün'ün yerlisi olmaması, Ürdün Krallığı'nın kurulma sürecini kimlik ve ulus inşa tartışmalarının merkezine taşımıştır. Ayrıca, Ürdün'de kimlik oluşturma süreci, Orta Doğu'da yaygın olarak rastlanan çoklu kimliklerin (alt-devlet, devlet ve ulus-üstü) toprağa dayalı kimlikleri sınırlandırması bakımından da bölge toplumlarının ulus-oluşturma süreçleriyle örtüşmektedir.

Ürdün ve Filistin varlığını oluşturan tarihsel ve siyasi bağlar göz önüne alındığında, ayrı bir entite olmak için mücadele veren Ürdün siyasal tarihi çoğunlukla Filistin ulusal hareketiyle çakışmıştır. Özellikle Ürdün'ün 1950 yılında Batı Şeria'yı ilhak etmesi ve bu kararla beraber Batı Yakalı Filistinlilerin

Ürdün'e yerleşmesi, Ürdün kimlik politikalarını derinden etkilemiştir. Filistin çoğunluğunun Ürdün'e göçü, ülkede Doğu Yakalı (yerli Ürdünlüler) ve Batı Yakalılar (Filistin kökenli Ürdünlüler) arasında bir 'etnik bölünme' yaşanmasına yol açmıştır. Batı Yakasını ilhak kararı ile, Krallık melez bir Ürdünlü kimliği yaratıp Filistinlileri Ürdün toplumuna entegre etmeyi hedeflemiştir.

Ürdün son yıllarda doğu ve batı sınırlarında yaşanan iki olay ile karşı karşıya kalmıştır. 2000 yılında başlayan ikinci Filistin ayaklanması ve 2003 yılında ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali Ürdün kimliğini son derece değişime uğratacak dinamikler getirmiştir. 'Önce Ürdün, Sonra Arap' Kampanyası rejimin, sözü geçen iki bölgesel kriz karşısında mücadele edebilmesini sağlamak için bir önlem olarak tasarlanmıştır. 'Önce Ürdün' girişiminin Krallık için yeni bir dönem olarak algılanmasının nedeni sadece Ürdün norm ve beklentilerinin yeniden yapılanması anlamında değil, ayrıca rejimin demokratikleşmeyi kısıtlayarak iç istikrarı bozacak en küçük muhalif hareketi çevreleme politikasını beraberinde getirmesi bakımından da önem taşımaktadır. Bu iki bölgesel açmaz, bu noktada, Ürdün Haşemi Krallığı özelinde kimlik ve dış politika arasında bir kuramsal ilişki kurmaya da yardımcı olmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Ürdün, kimlik, dış politika, Filistin, Irak, İslami Hareket Cephesi

To My Family

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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Given the centrality of nation-building and identity construction in shaping the politics of the Middle East, the scholars of international relations have increasingly engaged in building theoretical frameworks in linking identities and foreign policies of the states in the region. For a long period of time much of the foreign policy analyses of the region were marked either by orientalist or realist workings. Until the 1990s, the theorists of international relations left the Middle East outside theory applications and theory building due to the existence of these predominant assumptions. For the orientalists, the Middle East was so peculiar and had specificity compared with other parts of the world. Likewise, from the point of realists, the region was considered as the very 'epitome' for the application of their theoretical approach. Although Fawaz Gerges has pointed out in his article that one of the main problems in studying Middle East politics is the theoretical underdevelopment of the field¹; this understanding began to alter from the 1990s onwards with the growing literature on engaging the debates in the field of international relations.

The philosophical critique of the very foundations of realism by the Third Debate constitutes the driving force for this theoretical re-awakening in Middle Eastern affairs. Essential to these theoretical and conceptual challenges to realism and neorealism; social, political and cultural components of *national identities* of states are subject to a substantive amount of scrutiny. In this respect, constructivism seems to be relevant in analyzing Middle East politics in general and the politics of Jordanian identity in particular given those transnational identities and *permeable* ideologies shaping states' preferences.

¹ Fawaz Gerges, "The Study of Middle East International Relations: A Critique", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 18, No: 2, 1991.

1. 1 Theoretical Assumptions:

Most of the scholars of constructivist thinking engaged in examining the impact of politics of identity in shaping the foreign policies of states. Constructivism in this respect seems to be relevant in understanding the role of identities in invoking states' behaviors, because they perceive the international system working as a 'catalyst' to highlight debates over national identity. This actually reveals the fact that state and national identities are *not* coterminous in Middle East societies including the Kingdom of Jordan.² The reason behind this stems from deeply rooted regional loyalties. Due to the existence of *multiple* affiliations in the area, namely Pan-Arabist, Islamic, Palestinian, tribal, and parochial, the process of nation-building has not been a complete project in nearly all societies in the Arab world. The vacuum left behind by the Ottoman Empire in terms of loyalties has been gradually filled either by 'supra-state' (Pan-Arabism and Islamic identities) or 'sub-state' (tribal) affiliations.

Constructivism also helps to perceive the shift from *qawmiyya* (Arab nationalism) to *wataniyya* (local/ territorial nationalism) in Middle Eastern societies. The debates on the politics of identity in the Middle East depict why different foreign policy behaviors occur in the Arab-speaking world. Initially there was *one whole* Arab nation; but *multiple* foreign policies exist today. This variation in foreign policy-making convincingly explains why identity matters in the region. Ever since their independence, each Arab state demanded and searched for building their nations and states in conjunction with others. Although the degree varied from one country to another, each Arab nation-state incorporated *Arabism* or *Arab Nation* as an indispensable element of its identity. The commitment to Arab nationalist credentials was on the agenda of Arab states for more than twenty years after the end of the Second World War. In performing their foreign policies, states in the region took notice of other states' identities before setting their agendas.

² Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett, "Introduction: Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East", in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (eds), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, p. 8.

For that purpose, within the framework of emerging literature on the politics of identity, the main objective of this dissertation is not to re-assert the ‘uniqueness’ of the Middle East politics; but rather to engage in this growing literature on ‘how identity shapes foreign policy’. In this regard, one of the main purposes of this thesis is to conduct a theoretical approach within the context of emerging constructivist literature in the Middle Eastern Studies.

1.2 Statement of the Problem: ‘Jordanian Identity in *constant* re-formation’

Given the political linkage that has closely bound Jordanian entity with historical Palestine; the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan occupies a central place within the context of identity formation and foreign policy-making in Middle Eastern Studies. Since the country was created in 1921 as a British mandate, Jordan has been considered as the most ‘artificial’ of all the states in the region. Even Ilya Harik who considers Arab countries not only as old societies but also as old states argues that Iraq, Syria and Jordan are the only exceptions.³ Taking Harik’s argument one step further, M. Hassanein Heikal described Egypt as the *only* nation-state in the Arab Middle East considering the others as ‘tribes with flags’ including Jordan.

Within the context of nation-building in the Middle East, one of the fundamental problems in delineating Jordanian national identity is closely associated with the territorial integrity of Transjordan with the Mandatory Palestine under British rule and a part of Damascus *Wilayet* under the Ottoman administration. Given that Jordan is not the ancestral land of Emir Abdullah, the *East Bankers*, who settled on the eastern part of the River Jordan before independence, have been seen as the ‘native’ population of the country. For that reason, Gudrun Kramer symbolizes the creation of the Jordanian entity as “the very epitome of the *artificiality* in the region that has been successfully consolidated” as compared

³ Iliya Harik, “The Origins of the Arab State System”, in Ghassan Salamé (ed), The Foundations of the Arab State, Croom Helm, 1987, p. 35.

with other societies in the Arab world.⁴ In that respect, the fundamental objective of this study is to explore the consolidation of Jordanian national identity with respect to its *demographic imbalance, ethnic division and identity conflict*.

Given that a common sense of Jordanian national identity has not fully evolved yet, the focal point of this dissertation will be to explore the ongoing re-consolidation in Jordanian identity which is a *constant* re-building process dating back to the years of independence. In the case of Jordan, like in most of the Arab states in the region, there is *no* national narrative. Based upon Ernst Gellner's argument, national narrative can be attained by two sources; either by building unity or liberation.⁵ To cope with this obstacle of finding a *nation*, the Kingdom attempted to create national narrative sharing common myths and rituals. In this respect Jordanian nation building is associated with developing a territorial *watani* identity which is based on constructing 'a projected nation'. For this reason mobilizing Jordanian *watani* loyalties would be imperative in contending with the internal tension between Palestinians and Jordanians, and the non-settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. However creating a Jordanian identity has not been a simple project until today given the demographic reality and the regional instabilities. In Kramer's opinion, one of the basic impediments for the lack of Jordanian coherent 'national identity' derives from the impact of ethnicity and tribalism on political behavior and social organization.

In this regard, another focal point of this study will be to explore the very foundations of Jordan's shift from *qawmi* to *watani* ideals in shaping her foreign policy preferences. With the unification of the West Bank with the East Bank in 1950, the Jordanian State incorporated Arabist sentiments to define Jordan's identity until the disengagement from the West Bank in 1988. In this respect, *qawmi* or *watani* feelings were removed or added depending on the changing ideals and preferences of the Kingdom. The melting pot in *statising* the

⁴ Gudrun Kramer, "Integration of the Integrists: A Comparative Study of Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia", in Ghassan Salamé (ed), *Democracy Without Democrats*, I. B. Tauris, London, 1994. The emphasis added.

⁵ Ernst Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Cornell University Press, New York, 1983.

identities in the region entirely was the ramifications of the Six Days War and the Camp David Accords, which brought new debates about the end of Arabism. The road to Camp David in 1979 was stimulated by the variations in the regional structure which forced the countries in the region to stand for their territorial preferences. In Asher Susser's view, the erosion of Pan-Arabism boosted the legitimacy of the each particular Arab state.⁶ Anwar Sadat accordingly mobilized *watani* sentiments in normalizing Egypt's relations with Israel in 1979. The decline in Pan-Arabism by the late 1970s has hitherto paved the way for nation renovating and state formation in the Arab world. Since then domestic and foreign policies of the Arab states have begun to take shape in a new atmosphere that should be distinguished from the pre-existing one.

The features of new regional order formed in the Arab world in the post-1979 era are twofold; *more pragmatic* in terms of regime survival and foreign policy choices, and *less ideological* due to the decline in Pan-Arab socialist and nationalist objectives. The major goal of almost all Arab countries is the attainment of their self-interests in a newly established regional order. Therefore, Jordan's 'East Bank First' trend in the aftermath of the civil war (between the Jordanian army and the PLO) and the newly introduced 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' (*al-Urdun Awalan*) are overlapping with the trend towards *statising* the objectives of Arab states. The 'Jordan First Campaign' is more territorially attached to the idea of *wataniyya* rather than promoting an ideological *qawmi* identity. 'Jordanians will come first' is the underlying element of the Campaign today which would recall the endorsement of "Jordanian land for Jordanians" and correspondingly "Palestine for Palestinians" to consolidate Jordan's distinct political unity and statehood vis-à-vis the Palestinian entity.

As Fred Halliday pointed out that,

⁶ Asher Susser, "The Decline of the Arabs", *Middle East Quarterly*, Fall 2003, p. 8.

There remains a coexistence of pan-Arab and state-centered nationalism; it is not a question of it being resolved one way or the other, in the direction of a full political *wahda* [unity] or, conversely by the end of the pan-Arab dream, but rather shifts from one plane to the other.⁷

Thus, Jordan exemplifies the very epitome of this *coexistence* in the Arab Middle East.

The progression from *qawmiyya* to *wataniyya* can help to explain Jordan's peace making with Israel in 1994 as well. Thus Jordan's example will demonstrate that national goals and identities are *not* pre-given (*a priori*), but instead they are shaped and figured out by the social and historical environment in which they are embedded. If the pre-existing arguments and norms were still shaping the Arab regional system, Jordan's position during the Gulf War and in finalizing the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 could not be instigated easily and confidently. Hence each Arab state wanted to distinguish itself and its self-identity from the *other* via holding Arab nation's credentials to some degree. In this respect, the Jordanian case was a little complicated due to the lack of cohesion among *Jordanian-Jordanians* and *Palestinian-Jordanians*.

Since Jordanian identity has been seen as synonymous with the loyalty to the monarch and the Hashemite Kingdom, the huge influx of Palestinian community in the aftermath of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war was detrimental to Jordan's identity formation. For Joseph Nevo, "there was no way of preserving the dominance of the East Bank if genuine integration were allowed" by the Hashemites.⁸ Notably, the identity conflict between Transjordanians and Palestinian descents was exacerbated with the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and solidification of Palestinian national identity. The growing disparity between Jordanians and Palestinians found voice in the political landscape with King Hussein's disengagement from the West

⁷ Fred Halliday, *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2000, p. 50.

⁸ Joseph Nevo, "Changing Identities in Jordan", *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, Issue: 3, Spring 2003, p. 190.

Bank in 1988. Since then those of Palestinian descents do not feel themselves as full citizens like the East Bankers, but rather as *residents* on someone else's homeland. The discontent among Palestinians stimulated an enormous support for the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*) and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front (IAF). The uneven representation of Palestinian citizens in national politics is the major source of their resentment. Hence, Jordan from time to time tried to consolidate its territorial national identity in order to co-opt and contain the internal opposition.

1.3 Linking 'politics of identity' with 'foreign policy making':

In the case of the Hashemite Kingdom, justifying Jordan's needs and policies, and making the *unthinkable* imaginable and legitimate necessitate a theoretical approach to connect her identity with the Kingdom's foreign policy choices. Whether they serve as means or ends communal identities are significant in making Middle East politics in general. The role of identities like Arab nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Nasserism, and Ba'athism do matter in conducting and invoking foreign policy choices of Middle East states. Jordanian foreign policy-making could be more assertive, for instance, if her identity did not matter. But it does matter! Therefore, identities are taken as actors rather than factors in this study.

Stephen Saideman brings into play the significance of communal identities in the Middle East via asking the question of 'how identity shapes foreign policies of the states'.⁹ The relationship between national identity and foreign policy is an increasingly contentious discussion within the theoretical studies of Arab states-system. If the identity is the understanding of one in relationship to others, states' identities are also constructed and shaped in relation to other states. Viewed from this conceptual framework, an identity of a state is entirely dependent on its position in the international society of states. In Alexander

⁹ Stephen Saideman, "Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically about Identity and Foreign Policy", in Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (eds), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 2002, p. 170.

Wendt's words, "material sources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded"¹⁰. To analyze the foreign policy behaviors of Middle East states including Israel, identity should be brought into the theoretical discussions due to the fact that it is prominently communal identities that direct states' actions in the international system. While norms and values of the international system circumscribe the identity of a state; simultaneously states' identities inevitably inspire the way that international relations operate. In this respect, this study rejects the idea that actors' interests are *exogenously* determined, but rather tries to build a theoretical framework on the backdrop of pre-existing set of preferences and exposes how these preferences are subject to change under crises and instabilities.

In this context, connecting identity and foreign policy in the case of Jordan is the essence of this study. Thus the objective of the thesis is twofold: First, the theoretical question of 'how do demographic imbalance and identity conflict shape Jordan's foreign policy' will be addressed; and secondly, 'what is probable for the Jordanian State to pursue its foreign relations' and 'what is legitimate' and 'what is not' will be examined and explored. In analyzing the impact of Israeli identity on her foreign policy-making, Michael Barnett hypothesizes that national identity does not directly cause behavior, but helps and makes some patterns of behavior *legitimate* and not others.¹¹ Having built on this theoretical perspective, the main goal of this dissertation is to analyze how a state or a regime justifies and legitimises its foreign policy preferences and its relations with external actors via consolidating its *national identity* at home. Actors typically try to shift the cultural landscape in order to justify their foreign policy choices. National identity in this regard is not only constructing interests and external decision making, but also making some policies of state *imaginable* and *justifiable* and others not.

¹⁰ Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics", *International Organization*, Vol: 6, No: 2, 1992.

¹¹ Michael Barnett, "The Israeli Identity and the Peace Process: Re/creating the Un/thinkable", in Telhami and Barnett (eds), 2002, *op.cit.*, pp: 58-87.

The question of identity is at the core of the Jordanian case when the recent inauguration of National Agenda for political reformation under the ‘Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign’ is taken into consideration. The initiative of the regime to liberalize the political landscape put the concepts of Jordanian nation and identity into question. Today, the eclectic form of Jordanian identity is under re-construction due to the external threats across the River Jordan and the Iraqi border. Stephen Saideman puts forward several ways of how identity influences actors’ foreign policies.¹² The foremost function of identity is its impact on foreign policy as a mechanism to justify and help actors (both states and leaders) to adjust their policies and actions. Thus identities do matter, as all constructivists agree, because states are in need of speaking to their nations and alluding to specific identities under specific circumstances. Even if the driving force for that particular action includes a material interest; actors necessitate a sense of identity to adjust and justify their regional or international behaviors.

Constructivists focus on the ability of actors to frame issues or to persuade followers, and for that purpose the leaders need support to be effective either through persuasion or justification. Looked at from this framework, the Jordanian regime seeks to re-consolidate its identity in order to cope with the instabilities caused by internal tension and external challenges. Politicians attempt to uphold and sometimes build unity during political and economic crises via emphasizing ethnic kin and identity at the expense of other national identities. In formulating its foreign policy behaviors the Hashemite Kingdom tries not to risk or endanger Jordanian society’s norms and expectations.

Prior to the 1990s, Jordan having a severe identity conflict could not have advocated an assertive foreign policy behavior. The Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967 and the eventual radicalization of Palestinians called for a re-consolidation of Jordanian national identity. During the Palestinian challenge in the early 1970s, the Hashemites shifted toward *Jordanizing* the Palestinian community in order to consolidate Jordan’s credentials. The Jordanian identity

¹² Saideman, “Conclusion: Thinking Theoretically ...”, op.cit., pp: 177-183.

was subsequently devastated by the Jordanian-PLO civil war (*fedayeen* episode) throughout 1970-71. The Black September incident heralded a new embodiment in institutionalizing and solidifying Jordan's security structure vis-à-vis anti-regime forces. After the *fedayeen* episode, Jordan's close ties with the West Bank were seen as a *threat* rather than a destabilizing factor for the first time after the unification of the two banks. In this respect, with the disengagement of the two banks, Jordan opted to refer frequently to Jordanian identity to weaken both Pan-Arabist and Palestinian challenges and overriding effects of regional instabilities. The disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 represented a *transition* in the formation of Jordanian identity, which was neglected by the rationalist and realist approaches.¹³

Understanding the change in Jordanian interests and ideals has been underestimated by other theoretical assumptions with the exception of constructivism. Looked at from this framework, the detachment of the West Bank could not be explained from a rational point of view because it would simply be a strategic decision. Jordan's 'East Bank First trend' after 1988 was not only a concern for physical security; but should be analyzed from the point of to what extent Jordan appealed to her identity and justified her policy preferences. In other words, variation in the rhetoric of 'Jordan is Palestine' to 'Jordan is Jordan' and 'Palestine is Palestine' is a practice of identity re-consolidation. For that reason, the detachment from the West Bank territories presents a transition from *qawmiyya* to *wataniyya* and also a more *Jordanized* Jordan (which was followed by 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign'). The rationalist approaches of both Rex Brynen and Curtis Ryan on the contrary explain this transition from a regime survival perspective. According to this perspective, the Hashemites began to realize the existential threat caused by Jordanian claims on the West Bank in the aftermath of 1987 *intifada*. Thus they believed that the severing of ties would bring less threat and more regime security at the end. However the *intifada* is not only a domestic phenomenon, it still has regional and global effects. If rationalists are completely right in their

¹³ Marc Lynch, "Jordan's Identity and Interests", in Telhami and Barnett (eds), *op.cit.*, pp: 26-33.

analysis, King Hussein should have waited a little bit more to run the polls in order not to be faced by an overwhelming majority of anti-Israeli and Islamist deputies in the 1989 national elections. At that time it was Israel that threatened Jordanian internal security with Likud Party's slogan of 'alternative homeland' more than the Palestinian *intifada*. Since the West Bank territories had been an indispensable part of Jordan's identity and interests; it could be a better explanation to emphasize the transition in her ideals and options as a defensive impetus to justify Jordan's foreign policy choices.

In the aftermath of the *fedayeen* episode, the Hashemites realized that the PLO and the West Bank territories present a challenge to Jordanian distinct identity formation and its preferences. The political survival of Jordan thus was dependent on the utilization and mobilization of Jordanian *watani* ideals. The uneasy years of political competition and power struggle brought neither stability nor security for both sides prior to severing ties with the Palestinian lands. On the contrary, the post-1988 era brought two alternatives; 'Jordanian option' and 'Palestinian option' that would be recognized collectively by the regional actors and international society. It was in Jordan's interest to uphold Jordanian national unity to overcome her collective action problems (i.e. foreign policy choices); namely the Gulf war and the normalization of relations with Israel. Furthermore, *statising* Jordan's identity and loyalties were central in coping with the overriding effects of both 'supra-state' and 'sub-state' identities socially embedded in Jordanian society.

With the severing of ties, King Hussein gave up his country's entire claim on the West Bank territories and introduced the 1989 election law that abolished the quota ascribed to the Palestinians. The trend towards disassociating Jordan's identity from Palestinian entity through a *Jordanization* policy derived from the need to maintain national cohesion to justify Jordanian foreign policy goals without creating an overwhelming opposition. King Hussein appealed to his nation via convening the Parliament, *Majlis al-Umma*, in 1989 and holding national elections after 22 years. Launching the National Charter (*Al-Mithaq al-Watani*) in 1992, which legalized the political parties, can be regarded as a way

to consolidate and justify Jordan's changing foreign policy choices in the aftermath of the disengagement.

For Saideman, another way to connect identity with foreign policy is to look at the state's portfolio of options. State's identities should tell the state and leaders what their options and alternatives are. In other words, identities and interests motivate actors to forecast their gains, threats and other possible actions. Jordanian society is an Arab nation comprised largely of those of Palestinian descent and its identity and norms are predominated by Arabist and pro-Palestinian components. Specifically, Jordan's identity deserves attention before shaping her preferences due to the impact of the demographic majority of the Palestinian-Jordanians vis-à-vis the Jordanian-Jordanians. Since Jordan's nation-building process was impeded and diluted by the Palestinian factor particularly after the annexation of Palestinian territories into the Kingdom in 1950; Jordan's identity was forced to distinguish itself from that of the Palestinian. Ever since its establishment as a separate state by the Hashemites, Transjordan was and has been affected by the Palestinians and their national movements. The persisting ethnic conflict among Transjordanians and Palestinians was detrimental in formulating the Kingdom's foreign relations especially concerning regional issues.

The impact of persisting ethnic division between Transjordanians and those of Palestinian descents is twofold. First, the vacuum left behind as a result of the demise of Pan-Arabism is being filled by religious belief on the one level and by loyalty to the state (*qutriyya*) on the other. Jordanian identity is conditioned by the transition from Arabist (*qawmiyya*) to distinct 'territorial' identity (*wataniyya*). Secondly, *Jordanization* of those of Palestinian descent led to the process of Islamization of Palestinian identity. Since the Constitution of the Hashemite Kingdom highly discriminates against the urban area in favor of the rural, this put obstacles for political representation of Palestinians in national politics. The constitutional impediment is derived from electoral districting mechanism in the Lower House. The rural areas that constitute the source of allegiance to the monarch (largely Bedouin/ tribal origin living in the southern

part of the country) were granted the majority of the seats in Parliament. Hence the number of seats in the legislature is allotted in accordance with the loyalty to the throne rather than the population size. This led those of Palestinian descent to represent themselves within Islamist groups in the political scene, most remarkably through Muslim Brotherhood and its political party the IAF. Although there are 31 registered political parties in Jordan, the IAF is the only one that does not discriminate against Palestinian origin citizens.¹⁴ Namely the former head of the IAF was of Palestinian descent, Ishaq Fahrhan. In this regard, the Hashemite Kingdom occupies a central place within the debates of identity conflict and ethnic cleavage.

Ethnic division and tribalism are the two main sources of the regime's legitimacy and identity construction in Jordan. From the time when the Emirate of Transjordan was established, identity of Transjordan (and later Jordan) has been vigorously influenced by the existence of Palestinian migration more than it has affected the Israeli identity. As previously stated, Jordanian identity has been principally delineated by Palestinian and Arab identities. Palestinians developed a strong sense of collective and coherent national identity within Arabist discourse to confront with Zionism. With the aim of creating a single 'unitary' Jordanian identity, the Hashemite Kingdom granted *citizenship* to all Palestinian refugees. Since Palestine and Jordan were integral parts of the Palestinian territories, Israeli Likud Party's claim of "Israeli state incorporates both banks of the River" undermined Jordanian 'native' identity formation throughout the 1970s. In addition, a large Palestinian population settled in Jordan presents an inducement for the argument of 'Jordan is Palestine'. The possibility of building a coherent Jordanian identity is also precarious for the Israeli state. In this sense, the acquisition of legitimacy of a Jordanian state requires justification beyond international recognition; it necessitated a native *Jordanized* Jordanian identity.

¹⁴ Telephone Interview with Toujan Faisal, 10 January 2007.

The clear identification of a distinct national identity in Jordan is, therefore, closely tied with the different ethnic and cultural groups living within its territorial boundaries. Apart from Palestinians; Circassians (Sunni Muslims) and Christian minorities (Armenians, Greek Catholics and Greek Orthodox) constitute other ethnic groupings in Jordanian society. However, the existence of Palestinians should be treated in a different manner where their presence was instrumental in founding a separate Jordanian identity. Moreover, the Palestinian population identifies and constructs its identities and interests with the *territory of Jordan*; but on the other hand, other minority groups (which are in reality *ethnically* divided from Jordanian Arabs) represent perfect examples of the Diasporas. Is it possible to argue that ethnic cleavage may compel a *counter-hegemonic identity* in the country? In another way, to what extent internal ethnic division challenges Jordanian national identity and in turn invokes its foreign policy behavior? The transition from *qawmiyya* to *wataniyya* has its roots largely from the presence of ethnic groupings in Jordan. Ethnic distinction influences the construction of a collective identity in Jordan via creating political tension; history; and socio-economic division between “us” and “them” (others). In that respect, it is possible to argue that ethnic identity shapes allegiance and fears of extinction and Jordan is one case to illustrate this dichotomy of ‘unity of diversity’.

In responding to the internal division and growing Islamic opposition, the Jordanian regime has sought to amend the electoral law before holding national elections in 1993. The multi-voting system was replaced by ‘one-person one-vote formula’ which then undermined the political power of Islamist and Palestinian candidates while enhancing the role of tribal and pro-regime independents. The main motive for the Kingdom in amending the electoral law was directly related to the forthcoming peace with Israel. If the Parliament was left to be composed of anti-Israeli members, the recognition and ratification of the peace treaty would have been endangered.

The trend toward democratization in Jordan from 1989 onwards was a direct prerequisite for the consolidation of nationhood and carries both political

debates on the Jordanian nation and nationalism. Political reformation in the Kingdom has brought discussions on national identity and sub-identities. The questions of who is Jordanian and who is disloyal to the throne have become instrumental in determining the domestic agenda. These questions were then impeded and re-conditioned by the two regional challenges across Jordan's eastern and western borders. Holding elections in 1993, in 1997 and lately in 2003 helped the Kingdom to refer to issues like identity and democracy, and simultaneously to oversee what their preferences and limitations will be in the near future. Institutions like elections and political parties have made impacts on identity formation to construct cohesion in societies having internal tension and opposing ideas and expectations.

1.4 Aims of the Dissertation:

Jordan has lately been caught between two external challenges across its western and eastern borders. The outbreak of Al-Aqsa *intifada* in 2000 and the US war in Iraq in 2003 have devastatingly affected Jordan's identity formation. In addition, the Palestinian uprising in the Occupied Territories and the Iraqi war exemplify two cases that a causal relationship between identity construction and foreign policy making can be drawn in the case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.

The onset of Al-Aqsa *intifada* has lately re-surfaced and deepened the discussions on Jordan's identity in that Israeli Likud's claim of 'Jordan is Palestine' can be rejuvenated. 'The Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' was designed to provoke Jordanian people to focus on domestic issues. Thinking *internally* could help the regime to minimize the domestic opposition, which in turn could assist King Abdullah II to overcome Jordan's external predicaments.

Immediately after the al-Aqsa uprising, the US war on terror strategy following the September 11 attacks urged the regime to encircle and even curb the Islamic groups and Palestinian-Jordanians through repressive laws. The *de-liberalizing* efforts of the Kingdom signify a clear indication of returning to the pre-1989

period of limited room for political activities. The reliance on security forces and *mukhabarat* particularly after the outbreak of the US war in Iraq exhibited Jordan's continuance to be a close ally of the US during and after the Iraqi operation. Conducting parliamentary elections in June 2003 was a measure in re-building the bridge between Jordanian society and the state. The growing affinity with the *Salafi* Islamists and support for anti-regime opponents placed Jordan in a delicate situation in formulating her politics of identity and foreign policy-making. The challenges brought by supranational Arabist and Islamic, and sub-state sectarian identities can be contained only by strengthening a territorial state identity from the regime's perspective. This is a process whereby *overarching* Arabist and Islamic identities embedded in Jordan's norms are required to be transformed by re-consolidating *East Bank* identity at others' expense. In combating terrorism, the regime heavily relied on 'Security First' approach rather than providing an organizational base for the opposing groups. Actually the role of the IAF might be influential in fighting against radicalism as a defense mechanism.

Under the superseding effects of the Palestinian uprising and the US war in Iraq, the Jordanian regime launched 'Jordan First Campaign' in order to make her foreign policy choices legitimate and thinkable. The 'Jordan First, Arab Second' initiative was introduced in 2002 at a time when the discussions on the US strike against Iraq had risen. Disassociating Palestinian and Iraqi elements from Jordan's domestic agenda has been the key concern of the Kingdom hitherto. It's central to the regime to re-consolidate and re-think on Jordanian national identity to justify its foreign policy goals. To shift debates close to Jordanian credentials and identity is significant to overcome external disruptions. Hence, identities serve as catalysts to make the *unthinkable* thinkable and permissible. For instance, the disengagement from the West Bank in 1988 and the concluding peace with Israel in 1994 comprise two cases in making the unthinkable *imaginable* in Jordan's example.

Jordan's close relations with the US and her continuance in making peace with Israel urged King Abdullah II to enlarge the scope of *al-Urdun Awalan*. Given

the recent instabilities in the Middle East, Jordan needs to cope with new threats and challenges. In this respect, the Jordanian case demonstrates that national and state identities sometimes are *not* coterminous. Even if state and national identities agree on the same standards, their expectations and ideals could vary from one another. The debates on identity in Jordan today illustrates that the state aims to consolidate East Bank First identity with *al-Urdun Awal* and delineate the borders of Jordan's norms and ideals. On the other hand, Jordanian society highlight regional issues to stimulate public discussions and intriguingly people in the southern governorates (having East Bank population and lacking a Palestinian element) protested against the regime's policies concerning Iraq and unsettled conflicts in the Middle East.

In the meantime, the Israeli closure of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, *ghettoization* of Palestinians by the Separation Wall and new settlements for Jewish people on the West Bank immediately found voice in Jordanian society. Nevertheless Jordan is segregated due to the differences among northern-southern governorates; Palestinians-Transjordanians; or urban-rural dwellers form a single unit when 'Palestine-Israeli conflict' is put into their agenda. The 'Jordan First Campaign' is now impeded by anti-Israeli sentiment and pro-Palestinian component of Jordanian identity. Although the Campaign is aimed to disassociate Jordanians from regional constraints, Jordanians are very sensitive and quickly construct a cohesion and national unity at the expense of the Kingdom's foreign policies. Putting '*Arab First, Jordan Second*' by Jordanians has led the Hashemite regime to face a substantive amount of cost in consolidating its *watani* ideals.

As viewed from Jordanian perspective, the recent debates on political liberalization and 'Jordan First Campaign' are therefore formulating a social and legal background for a more *Jordanized* Jordanian territorial identity, because it helps to justify its foreign policy choices. In addition, the peace treaty with Israel deepened and strengthened the debate over Jordanian national identity since the Madrid Peace talks. The historical and cultural ideals and norms of Jordanian people make some actions possible and some not. The variations in

international and regional structure in which Jordan is embedded stimulate debates on the content of Jordanian identity. At this point identity conflict occurs when the competing norms of state and national identities generate conflicting behaviors.¹⁵ Jordanian foreign policy behavior is therefore central in undertaking *continuous* debates and contestations over identity. Identities are shaped by regional and systemic factors and collective action problems serve as *mechanisms* for engaging in domestic discussions and deliberations. At this point, the foreign policy of Jordan functions as a battlefield and ultimately conditions her politics of identity and preferences.

Consequently, the period after the al-Aqsa *intifada* and the war in Iraq plainly illustrated the new Jordanian strategy to silence any kind of dissent and opposition in the country. Besides, these two cases demonstrated that Jordan's national identity is at odds with the state's identity concerning her foreign policy goals. Hence, public debates on identity in the Kingdom are generally centered on three aspects; existence of an *identity conflict* between the state and the Jordanian nation; using identity as a *prop* by the regime in curbing the opposition; and finally delineating and re-defining the conceptions of Jordan's identity due to the exigencies of foreign policy preferences; i.e. reliance on external funding, normalizing ties with Israel and siding with the US.

Jordan will continue to come under attack following the onset of the *al-Aqsa* uprising and the US war in Iraq in the near future. Jordan's option to build close relations with both the US and Israel constitute an intricate situation for the Jordanian state to persuade its community to share the same norms. The alternative in such a complicated circumstance was to introduce the 'Jordan First Campaign' which aimed to encourage all Jordanian citizens to share the same values and norms; and to engage in political institutions together for the common benefit of the East Bankers. Therefore it is the state of Jordan attempting to build the conditions to galvanize a *core* state identity as a "prop"

¹⁵ Michael Barnett, "The Israeli Identity...", *ibid*, p. 62.

with the aim of filling the gap between the expectations of the state and the public at large.

1.5 Review of the Literature:

Concerning Jordanian national and state identity formation, the literature is engaged in either to define the components of communal identity, or how certain institutions help to shape post-colonial national identity, or how domestic and international public spheres constitute key components in the formulation of contested identities and interests.

Laurie Brand tries to re-define Jordanian communal identity as something stemming from the tension between the Palestinians and Transjordanians from a historical point of view.¹⁶ Her approach is associated with the formulation of a *hybrid* identity composed of Jordanian and Palestinian elements. The consequence of this kind of a hybrid identity led to the outbreak of the Jordanian civil war in the early 1970s and brought, as she named her article, a *crisis of identity*.

In his theoretical work, Joseph Massad builds conceptual thinking on the basis of how certain institutions make national identities stronger.¹⁷ The army and the constitution are taken as the core institutions in bringing Jordanian society together. His approach is not intended to provide a conceptual thinking on how identity constructs Jordanian foreign policy, but rather how a post-colonial country was successful in building its national identity by certain institutional capacities.

¹⁶ Laurie Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol: 24, No: 4, Summer 1995.

¹⁷ Joseph Massad, Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan, Columbia University Press, New York, 2001.

Marc Lynch's theoretical contribution is the most salient one in terms of building a relationship between identity and foreign policy making.¹⁸ Lynch tries to construct an international public sphere theory to explain under which circumstances changes take place in Jordan's interests and identities. It's central to Lynch's argument that national identity shapes the *definition* of Jordanian interests, i.e. it's the source of the state's foreign decision making. He looks at how the identity of the Jordanian nation is formulated and re-constructed. Then he describes public sphere approach as a bridge between rationalist and constructivist theories. Generally speaking Lynch's approach is based primarily on the fact that prior to 1988 Jordanian preferences were relatively static and stable; the regime had acquired legitimacy through the embedded norms and interests. He postulates that the emergence of nascent public sphere in the 1990s should be located at the core of Jordanian identity building. Thus Lynch aimed to analyze the re-definition in Jordanian ideals given its foreign policy-making after the 1990s and what the Jordanian identity is *not*. One of the primary objectives in this study is to go beyond Lynch's approach and incorporate *domestic unrest* and *internal components* of Jordanian identity with the aim of illustrating how Jordan is compelled to face unexpected costs. In doing that two cases will be tested to show how Jordan attempts to overcome external and internal challenges; i.e. the al-Aqsa *intifada* and the US war in Iraq.

In conducting the methodology for this thesis libraries were the main sources of data. Libraries located in Middle East Technical University and Bilkent University were researched. In addition, EBSCO and Proquest online journal search engines were used to collect most recent articles via the internet. The access to MERIP (Middle East Report), IGC (International Crisis Group) and CSS (Centre for Strategic Studies located in University of Jordan) were highly instrumental in reaching documents on Jordan. In order to obtain and see Jordanian perspective, several meetings with former ministers and a Member of Parliament were arranged in Jordan. Interviews with Adnan Abu Odeh, former Minister of Information and advisor to King Hussein and King Abdullah II;

¹⁸ Marc Lynch, State Interests and Public Spheres: International Politics of Jordan's Identity, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999.

Toujan Faisal, former Circassian deputy to Parliament and first women delegate elected to the Lower Chamber; and Kamel Abu Jaber, former Minister of Foreign Affairs were conducted in June 2006 during a research visit to Amman. I also met and talked to Jordanians, Palestinians and Circassians living in Amman and Jerash. Consequently since the beginning of 2001 I searched *Jordan Times* (Jordan's semi-official news agency) frequently and collected data on Jordan's internal and external policy making.

In the second chapter of the dissertation, the loyalty of Palestinians which has always been a matter of tension throughout the country's history will be explored. Actually some writers consider that the Palestinian factor constitutes *an impetus* in invoking a distinct Jordanian entity.¹⁹ The Palestinian dimension provided the East Bankers with an image and a phenomenon of *other* in invoking a distinct national identity. According to Tahir al-Masri, Jordan's only prime minister of Palestinian origin, the difference between Jordanian and Palestinian identity is Jordanians' commitment to *wataniyya* and Palestinians' loyalty to *qawmiyya*. The fundamental objective of this part is, therefore, to portray the pre-emptive measures undertaken by the Hashemite rule to handle identity and domestic cleavage by implementing a policy of *homogenization* of Palestinians (controlled Jordanization) after the unification of the two banks.²⁰ The chapter will end with the ramifications of the Black September Episode on Jordanian identity formation.

In the third chapter, identification of the challenges and predicaments in *making* and *unmaking* Jordanian identity will be the major focus. Before exploring the clash of identities between Transjordanians and those of Palestinian descent, the evolution of Jordanian nationalism and identity is going to be examined. The most striking part of this chapter is associated with King Hussein's decision to give up his country's all claims on the West Bank. Hussein's new policy to

¹⁹ Yezid Sayigh, "Jordan in the 1980s: The legitimacy, entity and identity", in Rodney Wilson (ed), *Politics and Economy in Jordan*, Routledge, Centre For Near and Middle Eastern Studies (SOAS), 1991.

²⁰ Arthur Day, *East Bank/West Bank: Jordan and the Prospects for the Peace*, Council of Foreign Relations, 1986, p. 60.

endorse 'Jordan is Jordan' and 'Palestine is Palestine' will be analyzed in order to illustrate how the Hashemite monarchy intends to re-consolidate Jordan's territorial identity. The chapter will end by debates on the public riot in the southern governorate of *Maan* and its impact on Jordan's identity consolidation.

In chapter four, the role of the Palestinian dimension and the impact of the Oslo peace process in invoking debates over Jordan's identity formation will be explored. This chapter will specifically focus on the influence of the non-settlement of Palestinian problem and the Muslim Brotherhood in generating debates on Jordanian identity formation and foreign policy making. The Jordanian regime realized the fact that the idea of 'Jordan is Palestine' can only be weakened by normalizing ties with Israel. Since democratization has strengthened political forces in the country, a strong opposition can help Jordan to gain the attention of outside actors, notably Israel. In this respect, the peace process and the democratic opening represent Jordan's two significant attempts that complement each other. Finally the chapter will end by discussing the change in the dynamics of domestic opposition in the country. The Anti-Normalization Campaign (ANC) trying to resist normalization with Israel is not only comprised of those of Palestinian descent, but also East Bank Jordanians. The long standing tension between those of Palestinian descent and the East Bankers has for the most part begun to be replaced by the domestic unrest derived from native Jordanians rather than merely by Palestinian-Jordanians.

In the fifth chapter, the main objective will be to explain the effects of *al-Aqsa intifada* on the re-consolidation of Jordan's identity. With the outbreak of the Palestinian uprising Jordanian streets witnessed countless marches and demonstrations in support of the *intifada*. The government then banned all demonstrations backing the Palestinian movement in October 2000. The regime sought to contain the opposition by taking measures of political repression. The Parliament was suspended in 2001 and elections were postponed to an unspecified date. The regime was not too late to build a mechanism to justify both the regime's efforts of the de-democratization and Kingdom's unenthusiastic statements in supporting *intifada*. Therefore this part will

demonstrate how the Jordanian state and national identity conflict and contradict each other on the issue of the *intifada*. In addition, the ‘Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign’ will be analyzed in detail to illustrate the fact that the Jordanian regime mobilized Jordanian *watani* identity and norms in order to cope with challenges brought by al-Aqsa uprising. Notably growing anti-Israeli attitudes led the normalization with Israel to be put publicly into question. In this respect the role of Islamist forces, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the IAF, will be examined. The riots in the southern governorate of Maan will be analyzed to show how the Kingdom of Jordan is under threat by non-Palestinian populated southern provinces. Finally, Jordan’s foreign policy making from 2000 until the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2004 will be explored to demonstrate how Jordan re-invoked and appealed to *Jordan First* idea to handle a particular foreign policy goal under the effects of al-Aqsa *intifada*.

In chapter six, another case will be examined to connect Jordan’s identity with her foreign policy choices. Since Jordan is a close ally of the United States and defends the US war on terror campaign, it was an intricate situation for King Abdullah to formulate a policy backing the US war in Iraq. It was essential to King Abdullah to deepen the scope of ‘Jordan First’. Given the Jordanian people’s opposition to any US intervention in Iraq, King Abdullah tried to persuade his citizens in order to justify Jordanian state’s foreign policy preferences. King Abdullah then mobilized the Committee for National Agenda and initiated a political reformation process. Conducting national elections in June 2003 was a part of Abdullah’s identity re-consolidation. However the main goal of this part is to illustrate how the Kingdom’s pre-emptive measures to curb the opposition was setback by debates on identity, political representation and Islam (including *Jihadi* Islam). Public debates in the aftermath of the war in Iraq were totally centered on electoral law, Islamist movements and relations with Israel. Nevertheless the regime’s priorities are also pre-occupied with internal matters; amendment of the electoral law and the issue of re-thinking of normalization with Israel are detached from the Kingdom’s agenda. The role of Islamist forces will be explored to demonstrate why they think that political

reformation will *not* work without addressing the problem of *proportional* representation. In this regard, the Jordanian example will also depict that Islamists, namely *moderate* IAF, can be a *defensive mechanism* to combat radicalism and terrorism. Jordan as an embodiment of Islamic organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, does work as a driving force for political reformation unlike other parts of the Middle East.

CHAPTER 2:

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Before the establishment of Transjordanian Emirate in 1923, the geographical area comprising today's Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan had never been known as a separate political entity. The land beyond the River Jordan was no more than a southern extension of Greater Syria. Transjordan has been characterized as the most artificial among all the Arab states by the modern scholars in the aftermath of the post-war settlement.²¹ Transjordan has used to be described as an entity possessing neither 'nation' nor 'state' prior to the partition of the Ottoman Empire. In geographical sense, Transjordan's boundaries have been drawn by the imperial powers with a ruler which has been manifested itself in straight lines. In Eugene Rogan's words,

It was the Ottoman Empire who introduced the registers of a modern bureaucracy, a regular system of taxation, a codified system of law, and a communications infrastructure to the southern extremities of their Syrian province which came to be known as Transjordan.²²

2.1 Transjordan during the Late Ottoman Rule:

As Philip Robins indicates, it's not possible to argue that the people who lived in Transjordan prior to the First World War had no experience of stateness.²³ Viewed from the late Ottoman reforms, it was neither the British nor the Hashemites; but the Ottomans who initially introduced the modern state in Transjordan by the ninetieth century. The main objective of this part is therefore to examine to what extent the Ottoman administration managed to establish the

²¹ Harik (1987), op.cit.

²² Eugene Rogan, Frontiers of the State in the Late Ottoman Empire; Transjordan 1850-1921, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, p.1.

²³ Philip Robins, A History of Jordan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004, p. 5.

very foundations of the Transjordanian entity prior to the First World War. Before the nineteenth century it was difficult to argue that Transjordanian geography was intertwined to the central Ottoman government, but the main objective of the applied reforms were to apprehend and incorporate Transjordan into the core of the Empire.

One important way to achieve this aim was to encourage the new sedentarization of Bedouin tribesmen and the development of the immigrant merchant elite, primarily from Palestinian towns. Circassian and Chechen refugees, agrarians and urban merchants from the other provinces of Greater Syria were already settled in Transjordan during the mid-nineteenth century. In this respect, it's a superficial argument to associate Jordan as a Western creation in the post-war stage. The evolution of Transjordanian state on the area of the *east* of Jordanian River is in fact twofold. First it should be emphasized that Ottoman centralization reforms during Tanzimat and other administrative policies were the first impetus to link Transjordanian towns/ villages with a centralized system. Secondly the sedentarization of eastern area of River Jordan needs to be clarified.

The eastern part of Transjordan was considered as the periphery of the Empire until the nineteenth century. With the conquest of Syria in 1516, there were no urban centers, not taxable assets. Ottoman's main focus was the pilgrimage route. In order to safeguard this area, Ottoman central administration built Mafraq, Ajlun, Salt, Karak, Qatrana and Maan in the sixteenth century. Moreover temporary agreements were signed with the dominant tribes to prevent attacks to Hajj and Caravan route.²⁴ *Bani Sakhr* was among the early Bedouin tribes that made their appearance in Transjordan about the middle of seventeenth century. By the early nineteenth century the only inhabited town was Salt. For instance, those territories between Salt and Karak were uninhabited.

²⁴ Schirin Fathi, Jordan: An Invented Nation? Tribe-State Dynamics and the Formation of National Identity, Deutsches Orient Institute, Hamburg, 1994, p. 75.

To re-assert its authority in the eastern part of the river, the Ottoman state launched series of initiatives during the mid-nineteenth century. Among the others, 1858 New Land Code and 1864 Provincial Reform Law were the main reforms adopted in this period. The new Provincial Reform Law was initially introduced in Syria in 1866, in Libya in 1867, in Hejaz in 1868, in the eastern provinces of the Arabian Peninsula in 1871 and finally in Yemen in 1872.²⁵ The aim was to create an administrative apparatus at the periphery. These laws were obviously tied to European statecraft system and aimed to establish the norms of political and social organization, which would conducive to the application of hierarchy of authority. Basically, the fundamental unit of provincial administration within the Tanzimat state was *kaza* (juridical district) and this system brought a governor as well. The Provincial Reform Law brought both bureaucratic and judicial system by civil servants and called for the election of local representatives to administrative councils, municipal councils, and court system.

This policy sought to increase the political participation via enabling local people to join in politics. In other words, the state tried to penetrate into its external frontiers through communication and transportation facilities. In addition, opening schools and hospitals were all parts of the new social re-organization. The Ottoman rule in Hejaz had a distinguishable feature as compared to other provinces. For instance, Ottoman government provided cash gifts to Hejazis as the privileged inhabitants of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina rather than extracting taxes from these areas.

This policy of penetration had reflected itself particularly in those areas located at the periphery, like the east of Jordan. Within this context, the Ottoman centralization policy marked the very beginning of a 'new state of affairs' with the expansion of the Ottoman rule towards the east providing responsibilities to each individual having residency on Ottoman lands. What sought to be created by the Ottomans was; *loyalty* and *allegiance* to the political system. To co-opt

²⁵ Rogan (1999), p. 12.

the local inhabitation was clearly noticed during this period. These policies intended to extend towards the Eastern Arabia but the reforms did not bring the expected results in the entire Middle East.

In Transjordan, those policies had found voice as compared to other areas because, the Great Power rivalry was at a minimum level and the Ottoman state could act freely to introduce its regulations. In 1867 administrative structures of Tanzimat state extended to Ajlun and Balqa and in 1893 reached to the southern districts of Karak and Maan. Thus by the late nineteenth century southern and northern parts of Syria were incorporated into Ottoman administrative policies. Namely, Ajlun was a district of Hawran Region and Salt with its capital Balqa was part of Nablus. The rivalry between tribes, like Adwan and Bani Sakhr provided the Empire an open door for playing off with the tribes against the other. Primarily with the loss of Cyprus in 1878 and Egypt in 1888 the strategic importance of Transjordanian territories increased. With the Hejaz railway Ottoman supremacy over Ajlun, Balqa and Karak were doubled.²⁶ Ottoman rule has sought to establish two main policies in order to facilitate sedentarization in the region. At the first instance, it was aimed to enhance agriculture in those uncultivated lands. Those lands were granted to Circassian and Chechen refugees. 1858 Land Law led to the registration of lands and thus reinforced a market in landed properties.²⁷

Secondly, the role of merchants should not be underestimated in this process. Their position strengthened when they diversified their economic activities in favor of money lending and accumulation of agricultural property. Merchants' activities tied the detached Transjordan to the economies of Syria and Mediterranean. In time, they evolved as a distinct social elite within the area of east of Jordan River.

²⁶ Fathi (1994), op.cit, p. 83.

²⁷ Rogan (1999), op.cit, p. 18.

2.1.1 Delineating the Frontiers of *Transjordania*:

There was no administrative unity known as Transjordan during Ottoman times. The name Transjordan came to be used for the lands, which lay beyond the River Jordan – *Trans – Jordanian lands* or *Transjordania*. Therefore, River Jordan was considered as a title for the identification of the East and West of Jordanian territory. Accordingly, there was no political community characterized as Transjordanian. The focal point of identity was embarked on being a member of kin group or village or a part of distinct religious entity.²⁸ Viewed by the inhabitants of Transjordan, Ottoman government was remote and it was difficult for it to embrace local people demands. The strategic location of Transjordan linking Damascus to Hejaz led the Ottoman state to take steps towards establishing a permanent presence over this area. Nevertheless it took sometime to apply the new rules and reforms and simultaneously the application of reforms was a long and a volatile process.

For the Ottoman state, today's Jordan was known by its districts; namely Ajlun and al-Balqa, Karak and Maan. Thus Ottoman Transjordan was landlocked, because it was separated explicitly from the Gulf of Aqaba. Due to the lack of settlement, there was no common identity and political order within the district of Transjordan. The only inhabitants were the Bedouins. Religion did not constitute an indispensable element of Jordanian society. There was a high degree of religious toleration as compared to other parts of Syria. For instance, there was no working mosque in Karak until the Ottoman government constructed one in 1896. The only exception was Maan due to its close distance to Mecca and Medina (still today). Maan also lacked Christian community unlike Balqa, Ajlun and Karak. In this period, with the exception of Ajlun district, the authority of Ottoman government was not recognized over the Transjordanian lands. Bedouins were not presenting loyalty to the Ottoman rule.²⁹

²⁸ Robins (2004), *op.cit*, p. 6.

²⁹ *Ibid*, p. 42.

During Tanzimat period, the Ottoman government launched new initiatives in Damascus to extend its authority over Transjordan, in the district of Jabal Ajlun in particular. The main objective of the Ottoman government was to sustain the security of agricultural production and collection of tax revenues, which could be endangered by the Bedouins. Bedouin tribes were not respecting the Ottoman rule in the area.³⁰ In fact, there was a short-lived district in Ibrid established in 1851. When Bedouins attacked on settled cultivators, Damascus intervened to drive out the Bedouins.

The first attempt to undertake a permanent Ottoman presence in Transjordan was in October 1851 when Administrative Council in Damascus articulated its demand to appoint Ahmet Efendi Salim as the governor of district to Sanjak of Ajlun.³¹ The petition includes the call for the Algerians for permanent sedentary. In the minds of Ottoman state, the new settlement would act as a buffer zone against the Bedouin tribes in order to strengthen region's security and remittance of taxes, from the town of Salt as well as from Ajlun. This report achieved to gain approval from Sultan Abdulmecit I in December 1851. However, some Algerians left to Jaffa and Jerusalem in this period.

The *Wilayet* Law stipulates that district (*kaza*) would have three fundamental bodies. First one was a district governor (*mufti*) to monitor religious affairs and secondly there would be a judge. Finally the law aimed to create administrative councils composed of locally elected representatives for the governor to consult and involve in the administrative decisions affecting the district. Mehmet Rashid Pasha was appointed as the governor in Damascus between 1866 and 1871. When Rashid Pasha took his position, he quickly downplayed the presence and role of Alawi community in Jabal Nusayri and Ottoman authority presided over the areas Homs and Hama. He also undertook the initiative to perform administrative districts in 'Ajlun and Salt. In other words, Ottoman administration expanded through the east of Syrian province. Rashid Pasha at

³⁰ Albert Hourani, "Osmanlı Devleti ve Dünya Tarihindeki Yeri", in Kemal Karpat (ed) *Osmanlı ve Dünya*, Ufuk Kitapları, İstanbul, 2001, p. 110.

³¹ Rogan (1999), *op.cit*, p. 47.

the outset enhanced his position in the Hawran. At the beginning residents of Salt and the Bedouin tribes were trying to resist the Ottoman force.³² The district of Ajlun was placed under the Hawran region. In addition, the district of Salt was attached to Nablus as part of a new governance of the Balqa.

2.1.2 The Circassian Settlement on Transjordan:

With the Russian expansion into the Caucasus in the 1850s, the Circassians initially settled on the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire. However with the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78, those Circassians had abandoned from Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia. The result was the settlement of some 25,000 Circassians in the southern part of Syria between February and August 1878. Basically, the majority of the Circassian community had found places in Amman and Wadi Sir in the Balqa district; Jarash in the Jabal Ajlun district and Madaba. In addition, a tiny Turcoman settled at al-Ruman during the same period. Within the first decade of the twentieth century, five new Circassian and Chechen villages founded in Na'ur, Zarqa, Sukhna, Rusayfa and Suwaylih. Circassians in time has developed close ties with the Bani Sakhr tribe in terms of supporting one another in case of aggression.

The settlement of Circassians has occupied a central place from the Ottoman's view is twofold.³³ It was a strategy to act as a buffer on the plateau against the Bedouin raids and to provide security for the peasants. Second factor was to give an impetus to agriculture. For that purpose Circassians and Chechens were granted land and tax concessions by the Ottoman Empire. In addition, a group of Christians were found places in Karak and Madaba. By 1880 one major Christian family, the Abu Jabers, settled at Yaduda.³⁴

³² *Ibid.*, p. 49.

³³ Fathi (1994), *op.cit.*, pp: 79-80.

³⁴ By the end of the 16th century Transjordan's population was 52,000 and after the new sedentarization policies. This number increased to 225,000 by 1922.

2.1.3 The Application of the Ottoman Land Law:

The main objective of new land regime was to institute title and tax for every piece of 'productive land' in the Empire. Land Law primarily applied in Ajlun and Balqa districts. In Ajlun, the peasant small shareholding was the standard unit of registration. Within Ajlun, Salt district was representing some obstacles in the application of the Ottoman Land Law. The main limitation for the functioning of the reforms in the Balqa' was the Bedouin tribes. In October 1876 with the application of the first register, Amman was founded and titled provided to Adwan and Balqawiyya tribes in the Circassian areas.³⁵ The next register was in March 1881 in which 61,400 dunums and 390 properties were endowed with titles. With the implementation of the procedure, restrictions on the resale of Bedouin title-holders were lifted. Numerous new settlements expanded through the regions along Amman and Karak. By the year 1890 Circassian settlement and Bedouin villages become visible in the Balqa district towards Madaba. Transjordanian territories during this period protected and ruled through the application of administrative reforms. For Rogan, the accomplishment of Ottoman Land Law's in Transjordan was twofold. With the increased tax revenues the cultivation prolonged rapidly and Ottomans secured local acquiescence and acknowledgment of their land regime.

2.1.4 The Revolt in Karak:

The policy of interpenetration has varied from district to district in the ninetieth century's Ottoman rule in the Middle East. When the Young Turks sought to accelerate the state's suzerainty over these territories, some of these districts were not tolerated the application of the laws. Among them, Druze and the Karakis simultaneously arranged themselves in an armed rebellion against the imposition of state's diffusion through three different ways; taxation beyond subsistence, conscription into the Empire's army and finally the disarmament of the regions. Surprisingly these two societies performed a large-scale resistance

³⁵ Fathi (1994), op.cit, p. 86.

movement in which they were settled on the periphery of the Ottoman Syrian territory.

The Karak Revolt of 1910 should be posited on a central place within the political history of Jordanian entity with respect to its nation building. Viewed from this side, Karakis Revolt should be regarded as the antecedent of the rebellions carried out during the First World War. This Revolt did not confined itself to the Karak district, it appended towards Maan and Tafila regions as well. Foremost, tax boycotts among the peasants were the first stand behind the popular resistance. Farmers of Ajlun who were challenged by the Bedouin tribes, rejected to pay taxes for the government.³⁶ After a while, peasants had persuaded to pay a reasonable amount of tax, but then they were not welcomed by the conscription to the army. This was basically manifested itself in the state schools in rural areas where the enrollment in these schools were attach to the state's books and standardized information for the need of conscription.

In fact, the Jabal Druze, Salt and Laja are those districts that inhabitants were interested in safeguarding their privileges. When force applied in Jabal Druze district between 1895-96 hundreds of Ottoman soldiers died and the population of Jabal decreased to less than one-quarter of its previous population.³⁷

In 1897 following the Ottoman government decision to initiate conscription to the Hawran, peasants quickly left the region and moved to Laja and the desert. Eventually the government decided to consult with them and the result was the exemption of the Hawran from the conscription. In 1888 the Governor of Syria, Nazif Pasha, passed a measure to increase the taxes imposed on the semi-sedentary Bedouins who settled on Salt and Karak. They first protested but the governor ordered the gendarme "to bring the Arabs into order".³⁸ Main resistance to the taxation was from Bani Hamida tribe. Thus the reduced

³⁶ Ibid., p. 185.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 186.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 189.

privileged positions and increased taxes could be substantial reasons for the tribesmen to carry out a revolt.

Among the town leaders, Majali family³⁹ did not want to endanger their status as sultans in their region and they announced that they could not recognize any other authority, which would undermine their control. Karak had been made a regional capital and they were monitoring any activity happening beside them basically the districts of Ajlun and Salt. Things began to change at a time when the Young Turks Revolution of 1908 brought a new phase in Ottoman's rule. Their main goal was not to negotiate with respect to provide any toleration to regional particularism. What they sought to create was very simple; without any distinction, registration, taxation and conscription of all Ottoman subjects should be introduced. However, in Transjordan this was not an easy project! Conscription and disarmament were unthinkable for the Bedouins. They were interested in protection of their sources of renewal with the tribal leaders.

The districts of Ajlun and Salt had been under direct rule from 1850s to 1900s. They were penetrated into the economic, social and political life of the Ottoman Syria. Karak, as compared to the others, was a part of Salt, and had a very different demographic structure. For instance, there was Circassian community who opted for serving government policies. In addition, there were very minor settlements of Palestinians and Hawranis to Karak for farming. In other words, Ottomans experienced with a hard stone in Karak where the local leadership and inhabitation did not provide a slight open door for any negotiation or compromise with the government. Majalis were very powerful and there were no any other community living there who could ask for Ottoman control. Accordingly when the Ottoman government introduced application of full rule of law, they resisted. Geographically, the presence of *Wadi Mujib canyon* constituted an important element for this popular resistance against the Ottoman rule as well. This should not be underestimated that the districts of Salt and

³⁹ During 18th and 19th centuries, there had been an irregular movement of peasants from Palestine and Egypt to Transjordan. The *Majali family* or clan was one of the most dominant moved from Hebron to Karak in the 18th century.

Karak were clearly divided by the canyon of Wadi Mujib, which effectively separated Ottoman Syria from the local Karakis. They were remote to the overall political system for a long period of time and it was inevitable for them to demand their prevailed localism.

The forthcoming Arabist movement in Damascus in the pre- and post-First World War era has its drawbacks from the Karakis resistance. The revolt in Karak had shifted ideologically towards Jerusalem, Damascus and then influenced Yemenis, Hejazis, Najdis, Iraqis and the Druze. The Karak Revolt expanded the political imagination of the Arabs, who came to see the power of the united tribes of Arabia as a mean to achieve independence from Ottoman Rule”.⁴⁰ Actually the Karakis tribesmen and towns people did not demand a secessionist movement and if it was they failed. Consequently, their position of “exceptions” has posited and Qadar Majali had returned to his communal leadership status in the aftermath of the Revolt.

2.2 The Hashemites, emergence of Arabism and the Great Arab Revolt:

The Hashemites, descendants of Prophet Muhammad, posed an overwhelming impact on the emergence of pan-Arabist movement not only in Hejaz, but also all over the Fertile Crescent. The Hashemite family, who belonged to the Meccan House of Hashem of the Quraysh tribe, granted the title of ‘Sharif’ due to their political and religious prestige in the area. Sharif Hussein Ibn Ali, Emir of Mecca, and his sons (Faisal and Abdullah) were the leading figures in the emergence and prevalence of Arab nationalist movement, but not in the sense of intellectual pan-Arabist thinking. The Mashreq was central in their Arabist movement. On the whole, the Hashemite Revolt was not totally an accomplished goal, but carrying out such a revolt was the forerunner of the Arab nationalism and state-formation in the Arab world.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Rogan (1999), op.cit, p. 216.

⁴¹ Asher Susser and Aryeh Shmuelevitz, The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1995, p. 3.

Arab nationalism was a phenomenon of the late twentieth century calling all Arabic-speaking peoples to unite under an overarching political authority. The evolution of Arabism is twofold; to have a common governmental institution and a single political community (Arab nation/ *al umma al-Arabiyya*). Since there was no clear definition of who is Arab, there was no religious precondition on Arabness. The only criterion was Arabic as their native language. For that reason, Arab nationalism and its emergence was matching with German-nation building in which all those German-speaking mini states merged together to form a unified Germany in 1871. The nomadic people of Arabia, that is to say, Bedouins basically referred to 'Arab' for a long period of time prior to the early twentieth century. Conversely, under the Ottoman rule, Arab people differentiated themselves from the Bedouins and they did not define themselves as purely Arabs.

Meanwhile, the endorsement of principle of self-determination led Britain and France to convert their old positions of colonial rules into a newer form as Mandatory Powers. The Greater Syria under Ottoman administration now divided among the mandatory powers into multiple countries that scattered along the Mashreq. Among them, the construction of Hashemite states (Iraq and Jordan) was appeared to be the most artificial and least likely to cross the *threshold* to become nation-states in Westphalian concept.

Mary C. Wilson examined the historical evolution of Arab nationalism within three chronological stages: The first stage was the emergence of the idea of Arabism by 1908 onwards in the cities of the Fertile Crescent, Damascus and Beirut in particular. The subsequent stage was the World War itself that paved the way for the establishment of an Arab Kingdom after British-Arab negotiations. Finally, the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire created an ideological vacuum in the region, which led to the coming out of a new one, Arab nationalism.⁴² In this respect, Arab nationalist credentials overlaps with

⁴² Mary C. Wilson, "The Hashemites, the Arab Revolt and Arab Nationalism", in Rashid Khalidi and Lisa Anderson (et al), The Origins of Arab Nationalism, Columbia University Press, 1991, p. 205.

the Hashemite ambitions and brought the collaboration of two into one ultimate goal, i.e. independence. Ottoman policies during Sultan Abdulhamid era challenged the position of Hussein in Hejaz basically after the construction of Hejaz Railway. Since Abdullah met with British representatives immediately before the war, therefore the independence of Arabs was confined to Hejaz. The main goal of Arabism stipulates 'an Arab nation' and 'emancipation of all the Arabs to quest for a state'.⁴³ Faisal, son of Sharif Hussein, had established good contacts with a nationalist group in Damascus called al-Fatat. When he came back from Damascus, he brought a protocol prepared by nationalist groups in Damascus. The document openly delineated the geographic boundaries of an Arab nation.

Hussein's other son; Abdullah became the member of Ottoman Majlis immediately after the Young Turk Revolution. In the form of restoration of Ottoman Constitution, representatives from Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Aleppo, Jaffa, and Jerusalem were chosen to be sent to the Assembly in Istanbul. An Ottoman-Arab Friendship Society opened branches in the Empire. A new era for Arab-Ottoman relations emerged, but did not last long due to the closure of Ottoman-Arab Society by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1909. In addition the roots of Arab resentment derived from the composition of the Parliament by CUP members and Turkish representatives at the expense of other communities of the Empire.⁴⁴ The imposition of Turkish as the administrative language as well as the trend toward pan-Turkism reflected the other causes for Arab alienation from the system. Abdullah was opposed to CUP policies and rather stands closely to Liberal Union.⁴⁵ As far as Arab community concerned, Arab nationalism grew as a nascent source of solidarity between both Muslim and Christian Arabs whom previously established a secret society of Arab nationalist Party in 1875. Concisely, Islamism marked a "source

⁴³ Ibid, p. 212.

⁴⁴ Arthur Goldschmidt, A Concise History of the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, p. 180.

⁴⁵ He was not the only representative from Mecca. Meanwhile, Sheikh Hasan was elected via defeating two-CUP candidates.

of unity” among the Arab people, but after the imposition of Ottoman centralized reforms Arabism began to serve the basis for collective identity.

By the beginning of the First World War some parts of East Jordanian River had found themselves in a position fighting against the Ottoman Empire. The Christian communities have sought for cohabitation with Russia, Britain and France. The government tended to preserve its position in the areas where Bedouin tribesmen and Muslim notables had settled via providing them *stipends*. The Egyptian-Expeditionary Force (EEF) that led by Britain and the Hashemite Arab Army did not figure out an outstanding measure of confidence among the inhabitants. This led to the maintenance of Ottoman rule over Transjordanian territories until the end of the war in 1918.

The only area in Jordan that conscription introduced was Ajlun district. In the districts of Salt, Maan and Karak, the government did not introduce conscription after the Karak Revolt. Wartime requisitions alleviated the living standard of the inhabitants of Transjordan. Meanwhile this was what has been in Syria and Lebanon as well. In some parts of Transjordan people were living of survival due to the starvation and massive famine.⁴⁶ According to the estimations ‘hundreds of thousands of Syrians and Lebanese starved to death between 1915 and 1918’.⁴⁷ This provided expediency for an Arab Revolt that could be called by Sharif of Hussein of Mecca. In addition, viewed from Hussein a wartime situation was a bid for a revolt against the Ottoman rule.

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence that took place from July 14, 1915 to January 30, 1916 put down the basis for a subsequent Arab Revolt. The correspondence between Sharif Hussein of Mecca (Emir of Hejaz as well) and Sir Arthur Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt was a watershed not only for the Transjordanians, but also for the Ottomans and the entire Arab World. The negotiation was rested on the *demarcation* of the soon to be created Kingdom of the Arabs. Hussein insisted on the implementation of

⁴⁶ Rogan (1999), *op.cit*, p. 223.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, p. 224.

Damascus Protocol that his son carried from Syria. William Cleveland, who thinks that, Islam was constituted an integral part of Arab nationalism, brings a different approach to the context. A Meccan newspaper, called *al-Qibla*, was established to support the Arab revolt in the name of avoiding Turkic elements of CUP policies.⁴⁸ Al-Qibla was criticizing the lack of Islamic solidarity, which was not in conformity with the Ottoman inclusive identity. For the Hashemites, the Arab nationalist ideology could be the only tool to acquire legitimacy for building a state. In Mary Wilson's words;

As for the Arab tribes, none would oppose the Sharif's becoming king of the Arabs since the history of the Sharifs of Mecca went back to the time of the Arab Kingdom of the Abbasids.⁴⁹

The main objective of Britain to negotiate with the Arabs was to lead an Arab rebellion against the Ottoman rule. In return, this would follow by British pledges of recognition of an Arab Kingdom under the leadership of Sharif Hussein. This correspondence basically covered the territorial ambitions of Hashemite family. Britain insisted on the exclusion of some areas, west of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and Damascus and of Mersin and Alexandretta, which were not purely Arab areas and vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, where Britain had some future plans. For Hussein, exclusion of Adana and Mersin could be tolerated, but he rejected the detachment of other areas from the soon-to-be created state of Arab Kingdom.⁵⁰ They agreed on the principal matters and left the other issues to be solved later on. For many scholars, Arab nationalism did not form an essential part as far as Middle East politics was concerned until the early twentieth century. For the Arab community, any challenge toward the Empire would undermine the position and credibility of the Ottoman administration and eventually Islamic credentials.⁵¹ Most important, the pan-

⁴⁸ Wilson (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 214.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ Mary Wilson, *King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 27.

⁵¹ As Arthur Goldschmidt noticed; Zeine N. Zeine has underlined the fact that the Christian students of American University of Beirut (AUB), who founded a secret society in 1875, were trying to struggle for Lebanon and freedom of their country; not the emancipation of the entire Arab world, p. 178.

Arabist groups founded immediately before the World War I were supported by the Arab intellectuals either in Damascus or in Istanbul, not by the Hijazis. After the conclusion of this Correspondence, Jordanian state has become dependent on British assistance, because Britain provided 50,000 sterling recipients for the Arab rebellion.

On 5 June 1916 Hussein called for an Arab revolt against the Ottoman rule. The aftermath of the Hejazi incident (known as *Hicaz Vakayi* in Ottoman documents) was the surrender of Medina and Mecca, which was one of the goals of the Arab Revolt to sever the communication line of Medina to possess the total control of Hejaz. The forthcoming target of Arab Revolt was to extend Hashemite authority into Syria, which was an integral part of “Arab Kingdom project”. The control over Ottoman garrison in Medina, which retarded Ottoman rule, increased the ability of British to open an eastern flank in order to achieve Palestine as well. In this regard Transjordan, geographically speaking, has meant a lot. Its location as a crossroad between Palestine and Hejaz led the Ottoman officials to re-think on the question. Ottoman project was to appeal to local loyalties. In Ajlun district men of service age asked to hold arms and accordingly Cemal Pasha ordered Damascus to establish local detachment volunteers (called *Mujahidin* or holy warriors). Ottomans also send officers to Irbid to train the Mujahidin. In Balqa’ district, the Circassians were the first who involved in the warfare. Since the Circassian community was loyal to the Ottoman Empire, Circassian Voluntary Cavalry of Amman was an active group of men who tried to defend Hejaz Railway line. In the most vulnerable and volatile segment of Transjordan, i.e. in Karak district, since Karakis exempted from military service, they formed a detachment from various tribes including Christians. Similarly the Karakis were acting against the Arab Army (EEF) like Circassians between the years 1917-1918. Very arguably, Qadar Majali, the forerunner of Karak Revolt, was exemplified as loyalist to the Ottoman rule. The main motive for them was the awards provided by the government including award of medals, titles and other honors. Tawfiq Majali, Husayn al-Trawna and Salama Ma’ayta were all among those who acquired medal in

Karak during 1916.⁵² For instance, Qadar Majali acquired the title “pasha” in 1916.⁵³ Largely, throughout the war most tribes of Transjordan were appeal to the Ottoman rule rather than being loyalists to the Arab Revolt. Meanwhile, being Arabist or Ottoman was not an issue on the agenda for the inhabitants resided in Transjordan.

By 1918 some 3,000 Armenians were deported to Tafila from Cilicia and Eastern Anatolia. For French sources, only those Armenians who accepted Islam were allowed to enter Ottoman domains as refugees; namely in Hama, Homs, Damascus, Amman, Salt, Karak, and Maan.⁵⁴ After the occupation of Salt the Armenians moved to Jerusalem. Transjordan was not only a buffer zone for the Ottomans but also the main arena of Arab Revolt. The Arab Revolt operations by July 1917 transferred to Transjordan from Hejaz with the occupation of Aqaba. The commander of Northern Army, Emir Faysal, founded his headquarters in Aqaba due to its geographical closeness to Suez.

After the surrender of Aqaba, Mehmet Cemal Pasha organized a counter attack against the EEF via transferring local Transjordanian militias. The Bani Sakhr, Huwaitat (the Ibn Jazi section) and the Karakis were those tribes trustworthy to the Ottoman government. With the exception of Karaki forces, Bani Sakhr and Huwaitat, soon after, declared their support for the Hashemites. On 17 July 1917 forces from Maan collaborated with Arab Army near Kuwayra. In August 1917, British and French sources detected that tribes settled around Karak, Madaba, Salt and Ajlun were resolutely in the Ottoman camp. The forthcoming strategic goal of Edmund Allenby, the commander of Arab Army (EEF), was to tie Jerusalem to Salt and Amman. Acquiring the control over Jericho on 21 February 1918 new initiatives exhibited to found a permanent Arab Cavalry location in Transjordanian highlands. To secure Jericho-Amman axis, was in

⁵² Rogan (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 228.

⁵³ However the police arrested him when he was collaborated with Emir Faisal and his Arab Army. He stayed in prison for over 15 days and then sent back to Karak. It was suspected that Qadar Majali and the Sheikh Fawwaz Fayiz (Bani Sakhr) were also poisoned as a warning to those tribes working against the rule.

⁵⁴ Rogan (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 231.

need to serve the lines of communication of Ottomans. Consequently, the Army entered on Salt in March 1918. With the battle at Turaba (south of Khurma), Arabist ambitions of Abdullah had come to an end in 1919.

2.3 Creation of Transjordanian Entity:

During the early nineteenth century, *Bilad al-Sham* (Greater Syria) was organized into four Ottoman provinces; namely Damascus (including Transjordan), Aleppo, Tripoli and Acre (later in 1887-88 Jerusalem became the new center of new Sanjaq and Beirut set up as a separate vilayet). With the onset of the World War I, Britain and France began to partition the Ottoman territories. Sykes-Picot Agreement and Balfour Declaration led to the dissolution of Greater Syria into several political entities; Lebanon, Jordan, Syria and Palestine. In Nazih Ayubi's own words, "... in the case of Transjordan, a 'corridor' country without a distinct history, or focal point, or even a native royal family" an artificial unit is established.⁵⁵ For Ayubi, in spite of this, Iraq-isation was far more sophisticated project than that of Jordan-isation in the longer term.

Viewed from Asher Susser's perspective, the reason for the longevity of Jordanian political entity is twofold. One is related with its strategic location and the other is comparatively and relatively associated with its homogenous population. Since Jordan located at core of the Fertile Crescent, in time its position could not be isolated from the Arab-Israeli conflict. This resulted in building a geopolitical as well as strategic centrality in the Mashreq. For Susser, nearly all inhabitants of Transjordanian were Sunni Arabs (90%), which made up the most homogenous population in entire Fertile Crescent. In following decades, what might called as the antagonism among the East Bankers and West Bankers could not be exemplified as an ethnic cleavage like the cleavage between Arabs and Kurds or Shites and Sunnis like in Iraq; or Alawites and Sunnis in Syria; and also Christians and Muslims in Lebanon. This *lack* of ethnic and religious cleavages in the outset of the regional basis is one of the

⁵⁵ Nazih N. Ayubi, Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East, I.B. Tauris, London, 1995, p. 114.

fundamental explanations for the Jordanian long-lasting appearance. In Susser's own words,

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the modest remnant of a great ambition, thus continued into the 1990s to be a model of stability and a monument to Hashemite tenacity and pragmatism.⁵⁶

In the last year of the war, Abdullah remained outside Medina. Ibn Saud simultaneously had interests in Arabia and for that reason Arab nationalist ideology could not be an attainable goal in Abdullah's view. By the end of the war, Faisal began to speak out a new terminology for Arab nationalism confined only to the Fertile Crescent. Conversely, King Abdullah preserved his old definition of nationalism, which embraced his patrimony in Arabia. Two brothers and leaders of Arab Revolt were now concerned with two clashing ambitions. On one hand, Faisal attended to Peace Conference in Paris; Abdullah tried to negotiate with the British over Arabia (Jidda). In 1920 with the French capture of Damascus Faisal and his newly set up nationalist rule was overthrown, but he has granted the title of King of Iraq in 1921. Arab nationalism has served as an encompassing of all the Arab-speaking people in Iraq and played an enormous role in the nation-building process during pre- and post- independent period of the country. The driving force for Arab nationalist movement of Faisal was connected with creating one single nation. Although this goal was something theoretically attainable, whereas practically speaking Faisal's pan-Arabist project did not replaced the old system until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 which partly consolidated a pan-Arab nation building.

In the realm of Abdullah, he had to give up his ambitions in Arabia. In the minds of Arab nationalist in Damascus, Transjordan was a part of Faisal's Syria. The Damascus nationalists re-organized themselves in Amman this time following the French occupation of Syria. For them their new leader would be Abdullah, instead of Faisal. According to Mary Wilson, the long lasting British backing of Jordan and Abdullah weakened the Arab nationalist credentials put

⁵⁶ Susser (1995), "The Hashemites in the Arab World", *op.cit.*, p. 5.

down in Damascus Protocol of 1915. Furthermore, the development of Arab nationalism could be closely tied to the mandate systems rather than the revolt itself.

Faisal's claim on Syria and his administration in Damascus were created on the basis of the McMahon-Hussein Correspondence by the end of the World War I. Quite the opposite, his position in Damascus was not in conformity with the Sykes-Picot Agreement. In April 1920 at San Remo Conference, Sykes-Picot agreement between Britain and France which was a secret one now converted into a formal and an official form of the partition of old Arab provinces of Ottoman Empire. In accordance with San Remo, Britain has granted Palestine (including Transjordan) and Iraq; France acquired Syria and Lebanon. For that purpose, French ousted Faisal from Syria immediately after the Conference. In the meantime, Abdullah name was speak out for the Iraqi mandate by the British authorities. After having an armistice with Ibn Saud, Abdullah left Mecca on September 27 by a camel caravan and arrived at Maan with approximately 500-1,000 tribesmen.⁵⁷ Maan was located between Hijaz and British sphere of influence in the North. Although Maan ruled as a part of Faisal's Syria after the war, the whole scenario completely changed with the French involvement. In those years, it was not easy to answer such as question like, 'what is Syria?' or 'where it begins and ends?'. In other words, does it encompass the area of east of River Jordan including Maan, Aqaba or not? For Lord Curzon, Transjordan should be an *independent area* and *detached from Syria* to have close affinity with Palestine.⁵⁸

As far as Transjordanian territories concerned, British interests and arrangements were threefold. One proposal was establishing a Foreign Office on the east part of the River and assign Zayd (Hussein's youngest son) as a ruler. Another plan was setting up a high commissioner office for Palestine, which was the idea of Sir Herbert Samuel. In Samuel's view, Palestine and Transjordan could be governed as a single mandate. He has been known as

⁵⁷ Wilson (1990), *op.cit.*, p. 44.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

having sympathy for Zionism. The third alternative for Britain left was the occupation of Transjordan. For the purpose of endorsing local self-government, Samuel sent political officers to the districts of 'Ajlun, Salt-Amman, and Karak. On 21 August 1920, Samuel announced that he would have a meeting with Transjordanian leaders at Salt in a Catholic Church for the future of these lands.⁵⁹ His decision of excluding Transjordan from Palestine administration remarked the first step in the demarcation of Transjordanian identity with that of Palestinian one as the first occasion in the history. Amin al-Husseini became the leader of Palestine nationalist movement and Arif al-Arif became a newly growing challenge to Abdullah and his pan-Arabist policies. There would be no conscription, disarmament and annexation by Palestine in which all Transjordanians were completely satisfied by British decisions.

There was one important obstacle that the British rule did not take into consideration in executing its plans. This was Abdullah's presence in Maan and he had variety of guests from Syria, Palestine and northwest area of Transjordan. On one hand, Faisal was in London as a representative in Anglo-Hejazi negotiations, on the other Abdullah was trying to search a position in Amman. Britain realized the ongoing Arab interests and had a new proposal to allot to the sons of Hussein. British named this strategy as *Sharifian Solution*. What was in British politicians mind was to appoint two brothers to two separate Arab thrones as their rulers. In response, Britain anticipated double loyalty from the Hashemite brothers. Sir Percy Cox, the High Commissioner in Iraq, was left to take the ultimate decision. Faisal was looking forward the Iraqi throne at the expense of this brother. The main question was still remained on the future 'political' posture of Transjordan. As a result, Abdullah had to give up from Iraq in favor of Faisal, consequently Transjordan exempted from the Palestine territories.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

The Cairo Conference convened on March 21, 1921 laid down the framework for the British Middle East Policy. One of the major questions on their agenda was the delineation of Iraqi frontiers. Actually just before the Conference, the destiny of Transjordan was agreed upon in terms of British interests. Transjordan would be detached from Palestine and British administration would negotiate with Abdullah for its forthcoming status. At the same time, Wyndham Deeds, civil secretary to the government of Palestine, was having Zionist tendencies like Herbert Samuel. He argues that 'No Eastern is reliable and Abdullah is not exception'.⁶¹ Winston Churchill who became the Secretary of State for the Colonies, managed to figure out the near future of Transjordan. He went to Jerusalem on 26 March, and met with Abdullah. Samuel, Deeds, T.E. Lawrence, Churchill, Abd al-Hadi, Hubert Young and Abdullah were the participants to the meeting. Abdullah's offer was surprising for the British representatives. He recommended either the unification of Palestine and Transjordan, or the incorporation of Iraq into Transjordan under an Arab rule. At the end, Abdullah remained in charge of Transjordan; in response he would maintain the security of the area against anti-French and anti-Zionist expansions. Abdullah was granted by five thousands sterling and took the promise that there would be no British troops deployed on his area of control.

According to Abdullah-Churchill deal, Abdullah would retain the responsibility for only six months, if he could sustain the safety within the given period of time, there would be a further alternative for him. Eventually, six months control provided to Abdullah brought him a country and longevity of Kingdom for the Jordanians themselves. During the late Ottoman rule, Transjordan was a neglected part of Syrian province inhabited by the Bedouins. Now, it took the prospect to be replaced by a new separate 'state'. Meanwhile, Transjordanian population was estimated around 225,000. 54% of them were settled, while the rest was nomadic. Circassian people constituted the main non-Arab ethnic group comprising 5% of the total population. The Christian population whom divided

⁶¹ Ibid, p. 51.

among themselves as Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic and Protestant, did not exceed 10% of the whole.⁶²

In fact Transjordan comprised the first footstep of Abdullah to achieve his eventual target to obtain greater power in which he succeeded his ambition through/ via merging West Bank with the East in 1950. On the whole, Arab nationalism and its emergence were attributed only to the Fertile Crescent including, Damascus and Beirut, rather than North Africa. To put it other way round, prior to 1950s Arabs did not embrace Maghreb to their agenda. Nobody know even the Arab themselves to what extent their lives would be drastically transformed by the First World War.

2.4 The Emirate of Transjordan and Emir Abdullah's Pan-Arabist Policies:

In terms of a *political* entity, there was no Jordan prior to 1923. Before the formation of Emirate of Transjordan, eastern part of the River was not more than the southern extension of Syria. The people of Jordan did not aware of a Jordanian identity, but instead they defined themselves as shortly Arabs. The first step in the establishment of Jordanian state was 26 May 1923 at a time when Britain officially founded a mandate as the *Emirate of Transjordan*. In the untimely years of Emirate, the population was confined to the Bedouins in which the most important ones were the Huweitat, the Banu Sakhr, and the Adwan tribes.⁶³ As Malcolm Yapp reported, the half of the settled population was urban and located in twelve small towns and two hundred villages. The largest towns were Salt, Ibrid, and Karak. By 1938 population of the Emirate enlarged to three hundred thousand and after ten years it extended to four hundred thousand. By the year 1949 with the influx of Palestinian refugees the total population reached to 1,350,000.

⁶² *Ibid*, pp: 55-56.

⁶³ Malcolm E. Yapp, The Near East Since the First World War: A History to 1995, Longman, England, 1995, p. 140.

In the early years of the Emirate, Abdullah and his rule were seen as a remedy for Wahhabi agitation and the location of Transjordan was designed as a buffer against any Saudi threat. In the meantime, Abdullah recognized the enhanced position of his reign and acquired the credibility to ask for more autonomy similar to that of Iraq. Britain endorsed to implement such an 'indirect rule' idea if they satisfied by his governance. British control was exercised by Colonel Hery Cox, British representative in Amman, between the years 1924 and 1939. During this period, relations between the Emirate and Britain started to develop in political and economic terms.⁶⁴ An important territorial transformation occurred in 1926 when Aqaba and Maan incorporated into the boundaries of the Emirate. The agreement of Hadda on November 2, 1925 confirm and delineated today's borderlines between Saudi Arabia and Kingdom of Jordan.⁶⁵

In February 1928 a constitutional system was launched in an agreement signed between Britain and Transjordan. 1928 Treaty allowed Britain to handle Transjordanian security and defense facilities and in return the Emirate made extremely dependent on British financial, military and political support. With a subsequent Organic Law of 1928 a small constitutional advance provided the Emirate. The new law was one of the decisive moments for Jordanian state building. The law stipulated that there would be an elected legislative council and an executive council while the ultimate power vested in the hands of the Emir.

Given that the tribal composition of the Emirate, vast majority of the civilian bureaucrats brought from outside the country. The outcome was the secondment of Palestinians and British officials from Hijaz or Syria.⁶⁶ Simultaneously, Bani Sakhr grew as the main landowner whose members were elected for Abdullah's cabinet. Tribe of Adwan, on the contrary, was the main source of challenge to Emir's rule. Another group of regime opponents were tribesmen of the Jordan

⁶⁴ Ibid., p.141. Malcolm Yapp records that by 1941 there existed 73 government schools and 92 private schools. For higher education students go to either Palestine, or Syria, or Lebanon.

⁶⁵ Wadi al-Sirhan was left to Saudis.

⁶⁶ William L. Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, 1994, p. 200.

Valley that could be exemplified by the tension between Majalis and Tarawnas in Karak.

During the mandate years the only space for Emir Abdullah to fight for his Greater Syria project was the outcome of Peel Commission in 1937. The Peel Commission was a British-led Commission of Inquiry, which caused disturbance among the Arabs and Jewish communities in Palestine. It reported that mandate is unworkable and recommended the *partition* of the territory as the best solution to the dispute. Despite the British support and Zionist consent, the Arabs rejected the Commission's proposal. The proposed idea by the Commission was merging Arab Palestine with the Eastern part of the River. Remarkably, the Peel Commission's report constitutes the first political involvement of Transjordan into the Palestine Problem throughout the history. Some Palestinian Arab leaders, like Ragheb Nashashibi perceived Abdullah as the key player in the settlement of Palestinian problem. Emir Abdullah's political ties with Palestine became stronger and apparent by the British evacuation from the mandate. The Arab states and Palestinians did not welcome the recommendation issued by United Nations Special Commission on Palestine (UNSCOP) on August 31, 1947. On the other hand, the moderate camp of Palestinians, Amin al-Husseini's opponents and King Abdullah did not stand on the same manner with the other Arabs. The Higher Arab Committee protested the UNSCOP and its recommendation on the same day.⁶⁷

In November, Abdullah's visit to Golda Meir, acting head of political department of the Jewish agency, occupies an essential place due to King's expression of support for the partition proposed by the UNSCOP. UN's General Assembly adopted the partition plan on November 29, which establishes an Arab state and a Jewish state, and an internationally controlled Jerusalem. The Arab League and the Palestinian people addressed the central criticism. In order to terminate the mandate, Britain decided to negotiate with Transjordan and also with Iraq and Egypt, to conclude new treaties of alliances. Since the British

⁶⁷ Adnan Abu Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians & the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process, United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington D.C., 1999, p. 33.

interest matches with the UN proposal British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, explicitly depicted his policy as the enlargement of Abdullah's rule over the Arab Palestine to sustain British strategic goals. Tawfiq Abd al-Huda's visit to Bevin in February 1948 brought the termination of the mandate and more on that Abdul Huda convinced Bevin to deploy Arab Legion across the Jordan River to maintain the seizure of Arab Palestinian lands and its boundary with Transjordan.⁶⁸

However the emergence of the tension between Palestinians and Jewish people led to the organization of Palestinians and volunteers from Syria to enter Palestine by the beginning of 1948. On the contrary Haganah (Jewish military organization) tried to preserve its security on their part. Abdullah's meeting with Meir on May 1948 did not bring a solution to the conflict. Nevertheless Abdullah's proposal to Meir did not come into force, but it had an overwhelming meaning on his perception of the western part of the River.⁶⁹

The attitude of Arab League was rather close to Amin al-Husseini. Although al-Husseini was still the leader of Palestinians, he was criticized for his support for Adolf Hitler. A new era for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan began with the establishment of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948. David Ben-Gurion's proclamation of Israel in Tel Aviv in a museum led to the outbreak of first Arab-Israeli War. King Abdullah with the support of Arab Legion managed to defend the old city of Jerusalem on May 28. When the war threatened the UN partition plan, Security Council assigned Count Folk Bernadotte from Sweden, as the UN mediator, and sent him to Palestine for having investigations. On June 27, 1948 Bernadotte offered a proposal for the re-drawing of the borderlines. According to his proposal, Negev could be partially or totally included into the Arab Palestinian territory while Jewish territory would incorporate some parts or all

⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 34.

⁶⁹ Abdullah's proposal to Golda Meir could be outlined as follow: "1. Palestine and Transjordan would remain undivided, with autonomy for the areas where Jews predominate, 2. This arrangement would last for one year, after which the country would be joined with Transjordan,..., 4. There would be a cabinet that Jewish will be represented." in Adnan Abu Odeh (1999), p. 36.

West Galilee.⁷⁰ For him, Jerusalem should be given to Arabs. In June, when Israel and Arab League rejected Bernadotte's proposal, hostilities continued and followed by demonstrations in Nablus and Salt.

The Arab League, on the contrary, with Egyptian vigorous involvement into the problem, declared the establishment of the *All-Palestine* government in the Gaza Strip. The conflicting aims of Amman and Cairo led King Abdullah to organize four different conferences to decide the future of Palestinian territories under his tutelage. The most significant one was Jericho Conference in December 1948. It proclaimed the merger of Transjordan with Palestine under King Abdullah and calls for the respect for territorial integrity of Palestine. The Conference organized and held by the King, Jordanian military governors of West Bank and some Palestinian notables. The report was endorsed with a subsequent ratification by Transjordanian government on 13 December. In this respect, *Gaza* has been constituted the sole separate area for Palestinians to struggle for their liberation and national identity hitherto.

2.5 From Transjordan to Jordan: Incorporation of the West Bank with the Eastern Part of the *River Jordan*

Until his death in July 1951, Abdullah's one of the central aim was to achieve Greater Syria project.⁷¹ As Avi Shlaim expressed, "All Syria to come under the leadership of a son of House of Hashem, Transjordan was the first step".⁷² Since the British offer made him the Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah reminds what Churchill told him previously; "If you stay here [Transjordan], behave well, and manage your affairs properly here, and in Hijaz, we are hopeful that France will go back on its decision and will satisfy justice within a matter of months by returning to you Greater Syria..."⁷³ By 1933 King of Iraq, Faisal, died and

⁷⁰ Odeh (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 41.

⁷¹ Joseph Nevo, "Abdallah's Memoirs as Historical Source Material", in Susser and Shmuelevitz (eds), *The Hashemites in the Arab World*, Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1995, p. 168.

⁷² Daniel Pipes, *Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990, p. 72.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

Abdullah was the only senior Hashemi left. Abdullah came up with a proposal to London in June 1937.

His proposal depicted Britain that his particular attachment to the idea of Arab Kingdom still remains. His report entitles the unification of Syria, Transjordan, Palestine and Iraq under a single Arab Kingdom. What makes this plan different from Damascus Protocol was the exclusion of Lebanon and addition of Iraqi territories.

Abdullah's ideas inspired and appeal to some nationalist groups in Syria, like Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar and Fawzi al-Bakri that were objected to foreign domination over Syria. Shahbandar welcomed to see Abdullah as the leader of united Syria whom would bring full independence to his country. In 1941 Abdullah's cabinet passed a resolution presenting Transjordan as a part of Syria since the ancient times. The Greater Syria project of Abdullah had basically challenged by Egyptian involvement in Arab Unity discussions by March 1943. The Arab states refused to recognize Greater Syria in 1944 Alexandria Conference. However, Abdullah's speech on March 1947 portrayed the reversal of League of Arab States' decision. According to Abdullah, Syria, Transjordan, even Lebanon should be included into a state that would be governed by himself.

By October 1947, Abdullah had to abandon his ambitions in *lesser Syria* and now looked to Palestine. To integrate Palestine into Transjordan was not a new issue which dates back to March 1921 Churchill's meeting with Abdullah. In addition, Abdullah did not abandon his claims until 1947 and he tried to influence Palestinian politics actively through 1930s. For instance, Transjordanians involved in 1933 Jaffa demonstrations with the Palestinians Arabs. Looked from the framework of Peel Commission of 1937, which proposed a settlement for Palestine's destiny, Commission's proposition was the partition of Palestine into three parts, an independent Jewish state, one part united with Transjordan and one under British control. Abdullah and his Palestinians fellow, Raghib Bey an-Nashashibi, gave their consent to the plan,

but the rest of the Arab world rejected the proposal. Hence, Abdullah asked for the amalgamation of some parts of Palestine into Transjordan. Palestine's future from that time and onwards was something left to be decided by external actors in place of the inhabitants of the territory. In September 1945, British Foreign Office launched an offer to bring Palestine under Abdullah's control and Abdullah took the permission to deploy its forces in Palestine before the British withdrawal in May 1948.⁷⁴ For Abdullah "Palestine and Transjordan are *one*, for Palestine in the coastline and Transjordan the hinterland of the same country".⁷⁵

Abdullah restrained the western part of the River just before the Israeli declaration of independence. Abdullah's policy was in conformity with Count Folke Bernadotte, UN mediator for Palestine, but the proposal recommended by UN's General Assembly objected Bernadotte's plan on the attachment of Arab portions of Palestine into Transjordan. Transjordan's cabinet and Parliament approved unification of Palestine and Transjordan as a stepping-stone for Arab unity and declared Abdullah as the King of 'All Palestine' in 1948. On the contrary, the Arab world retained a critical position towards Abdullah and his followers. The annexation of West Bank constitutes a crossroads in Transjordanian political history. Foremost, it paved the way for a decisive change in country's name from *Transjordan* to *Jordan* in June 1949. Besides, it brought 670,000 Palestinians (more than half of them refugees) to the 300,000 Transjordanians. Until 1967 Palestinians made up more than two-thirds of the total population. 30% of the refugees were remained in refugee camps during 1950s and 1960s. Shaul Mishal reported that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) estimated 485,000 refugees in both Banks in August 31, 1950.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ In accordance with the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty of Alliance signed in 1948, Britain allowed to deploy its bases in Amman and Mafrq. For more information please see, W. F. Abboushi, Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th century, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1970, p. 270.

⁷⁵ Pipes (1990), op.cit., p. 79.

⁷⁶ Shaul Mishal, West Bank/ East Bank: The Palestinians in Jordan, 1949-1967, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1978, p. 2.

The territories of Palestine conquered in 1948 officially incorporated on April 24, 1950.⁷⁷ With a subsequent decree in March, the Palestinian portion of River Jordan replaced by the word West Bank and Transjordan with East Bank, which also banned the word Palestine from all official documents. Another development was the replacement of Palestinian pound with Jordan Dinar as the sole legal currency of the Kingdom. Parliamentary elections were held on April 11, 1950 including the candidates from West Bank. Previously Jordanian lower house comprised of 20 seats. With the aim of bringing equal representation of the two Banks, seats enlarged to 40. In the aftermath of the annexation Jordan doubled the composition of upper house from 10 to 20 similar with the lower chamber. In 1950 Abdullah appointed twelve East Bankers and eight West Bankers for the *Majlis al-Ayan*. The most striking element of the unification of the two Banks was vigorously associated with the idea of creating one single people on a piece of land. Therefore transforming the name of the country from Transjordan to Jordan necessitates scrutiny given the River Jordan representing the main denominator of demarcating two lands has now surpassed with the unification, at least until 1967 war.

Abdullah did not abandon his claims on lesser Syria after the end of the Second World War. For him, his primary opponent was Sukru al-Quwwatli, the prime minister of Syria, was also overthrown in 1949. According to Daniel Pipes, Abdullah's annexation of West Bank made him the only leader in the region who achieved the 'pan-Syria' goal between 1920 and 1970.⁷⁸ Theoretically speaking, the Annexation Act served as the basis for restoration of Palestine to the Arabs, but the governmental policies did not overlap with what was written in the Act. Tawfiq Abu al-Huda, Jordanian prime minister during 1950s, envisaged on June 8, 1954 that:

The government stresses that there is no peace and that are no negotiations with the Jews and that any attempt to change this policy will have no impact... The refugees are owners and allies of the

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1. As Mishal reported, the governments and newspapers in Jordan put the terms **West Bank** and **East Bank** into practice instead of Palestine and Transjordan respectively.

⁷⁸ Pipes (1990), *op.cit.*, p. 81.

land. The government will work to assure them of an honorable life and to preserve their rights in international organizations, until they regain their rights in full.⁷⁹

In examining Jordanian state building there are two points that need deep scrutiny. One is associated with the title of the country, the *Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. The emphasis is neither on the word Kingdom nor Jordan. The state formation of Jordan was centered on the Hashemite monarchy. It's not the monarchy of any other entity, but the Hashemites traced back to the family of Prophet Muhammed. Since Jordanian nation-state formation lacked an Islamic or Arabic symbol, the word Hashemities should have been emphasized. The incorporation of Old City of Jerusalem, until its capture by Israel in 1967, had filled a historic gap in the nation-building process of Jordan. In addition the word Palestine and its derivatives were excluded from the state's name as well. In this respect, the Hashemites represents who possess the state, that is to say the royal family and the citizens.⁸⁰ The Kingdom came to exist as a social contract between the state and its society. The corollary of the first, Transjordanians was recruited for the higher levels of posts, such as the army.

In the following year after King Abdullah's assassination, a new constitution was proclaimed in 1952. The new constitution, which is still in force, has been characterized as far more liberal than the previous one. In the 1946 Constitution, executive branch had a clear supremacy over the legislative branch of the government. However, in 1952 Constitution the power of the monarch was restricted to some extent; the cabinet became responsible to the Parliament. Despite his veto power in the legislation, his veto could be overridden by two-thirds majority of both houses. Nevertheless, the monarch retains most of his political prerogative and power such as in appointing and dismissing the head of the government and also he is responsible for the appointment of members of upper house. In addition to these points, the monarch can dissolve the lower house when it deems necessary.

⁷⁹ Mishal (1978), op.cit. p. 43.

⁸⁰ Odeh (1999), op.cit. pp: 49-50.

Between the years 1948-1967 hundreds of thousands of Palestinian people had to relocate to Jordanian territory, specifically they settled on West Bank. The regeneration of Jordanian state has close affinity with the arrival of the Palestinian Arabs and the three Arab-Israeli Wars hitherto. That is why, Arab-Israeli disagreement since the World War II, had an enormous impact on Jordanian political life than it disturbed the State of Israel. Since then the state-society relations have been described as a combination of both tension and allegiance, which continued for more than two decades.

In the aftermath of the annexation socio-economic differences between Palestinians and Transjordanians revealed as the most divergent element separating two communities. Transjordanians were half nomadic and only one-fifth of the total population was town or city dwellers in 1943, whilst one-third of Palestinians settled in urban areas during the same period of time. The second source of split was the level of education. In 1944 only 20% of children attended school on the East Bank whereas this percentage was 52 on the West part.⁸¹ In terms of health and other social services Palestinians had superiority over the East Bankers. Within this context, one of the vital measures that Jordanian state had to take was to replace the terms Palestine or Transjordan with West and East Bank respectively in order to preclude any possible ground for differentiation. Symbolically, East Bank and West Bank were two portions of the River Jordan that complement each other. In other words, integration of both Banks gave the impression to the whole community that, its one *single entity* and *indivisible*.

In the aftermath of the annexation, the administration in Amman managed to consolidate the integration of two banks not only in political sense but also in territorial aspect. With 5,642 square kilometers area of West Bank has to be incorporated into Jordanian borderlines. Anglo-Jordanian land policies under the mandate era served as the basis for expanding the land regime from Amman to West Bank. As far as British land policy is concerned they re-arrange Ottoman administration and abolished Ottoman tax system on the lands. Thus the

⁸¹ Mishal (1978), *op.cit*, p. 4.

registries under the mandate period re-conveyed and policies of settlement, registration and land tax were all tied to Jordanian department of lands by 1950.⁸² The West Bank was comprised of 338 villages, but with the exceptions of Jenin, area near Qalqiliya, Tujkaram, Jordan River Valley and Wadi al-Fari'a, British mandate rule did not instruct a settlement policy. Nevertheless the West Bank comprises 29% of Kingdom's cultivated land, tax revenues taken from the area was around 40% of the country's total land taxes. This gap was related with the agricultural production, like fruits and olive trees on the West Bank.⁸³

This should be noticed that Jordan did not pursue land policy on the Israeli frontier and only the lands on the Jordanian borderlines were settled during this period. The West Bank land regime and its records carried out by Jordan had a devastating importance for the implementation of West Bank citizenship. In addition, all these records and registrations of lands provide a basis for which Palestinians are *eligible* for residence in the soon-to-be created state of Palestine.⁸⁴ Jordanian installed land regime imposed between 1949-1967 still continued in West Bank. Accordingly, Jordan's land policy has been recognized when PLO and Israel had agreed on the Declaration of Principles (DOP) in September 1993. Although the land program was proclaimed to unite the West with the East part, in longer term Jordan's initiative provided a legal endorsement for the Palestinians to return to their homeland and legitimate struggle for their statehood.

⁸² Michael R. Fischbach, "Implications of Jordanian Land Policy for the West Bank", *Middle East Journal*, p. 495.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 503.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 508.

2.5.1 Interaction among Palestinians and Jordanians: A Blend of Pan-Arabist Challenge with *controlled* Jordanization

The main cause for the social division could be portrayed as a power struggle between the *Palestinians*, as a source of instability and the *Transjordanians*, as a source of stability. In order to strengthen the integration of two Banks, Jordanian army gave up its control over the West Bank in 1949 and shifted the administration to the civilians. For instance, Raghیب al-Nashashibi appointed for the district of Jerusalem, Ahmad Khalil for Ramallah, and finally Naim Abd al-Hadi for Hebron.⁸⁵ These governors were all functioning under the auspices of Ministry of Interior centered in Amman. In addition, three West Bankers were included in the cabinet in 1949, Ruhi Abd al-Hadi for Foreign Affairs; Khulusi Khayri for Trade and Agriculture and Musa Nasir for communication. Although Jordanian administration tried to take all workable measures to create a 'single citizenship' based on a united homeland, Palestinian West Bank dwellers kept their native identity.

Since almost all inhabitants were Palestinian Arabs, the homogenous demographic structure of West Bank precluded Jordan to achieve their ultimate goal of unification. In this regard, the role of United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) should be emphasized. The UNRWA was an inducement to the people to identify themselves as separately *Palestinian*. This agency worked for the distribution of food; and providing infrastructure for health and education services.⁸⁶ In fact the sense of belongingness to Palestinian territory and identity has its traces from the British mandate period as well. But for the Hashemite Kingdom the UNRWA could be a restriction for the full implementation of integration of the refugees. This should be noticed that Palestinian nationalism has never been used as a tool to weaken Jordanian one throughout the 1950s.

⁸⁵ Mishal (1978), *op.cit.* p. 6.

⁸⁶ Yapp (1995), *op.cit.* p. 302. In 1950, the UNRWA registered 960,000 Palestinian refugees and this number extended to 1,34 million after the 1967 War.

When a challenge was concerned against the Hashemite monarchy they were rather opposed under the label Pan-Arabism.⁸⁷

Prior to 1948 war and the incorporation of Palestinians into Kingdom of Jordan, certain patterns of interaction existed between two communities. Their interaction was apparent within three realms; official level, community level and they established relations at political level. On the official level, both eastern and western parts of the River governed as the constituent units of the same mandate. There was a single High Commissioner in Jerusalem who had a residency in Amman. The British indirect rule provided the mechanism for the Palestinian officials to work in the eastern part due to the lack of adequate civil servants. Another linkage at the official level was the Transjordan Frontier Force established in 1926. Although it's headquarter was in Zarqa (in the eastern part of River and 10 miles away from the capital Amman) its area of influence and command was deployed in the western part of the mandate. Second area of interaction was on the community level. Prior to 1950 Palestinians viewed the Transjordanian people as 'Arab brethren' and their relationship was based on *brotherhood*.⁸⁸ Palestinian expectation for support against Zionist threat was the main motive in shaping this positive image. From the point of Transjordanians, prior to 1948 they approached the Palestinians in almost same manner that they perceived the other Arab people.

However immediately after 1948 Transjordanian perception was rather a composition of compassion, sympathy and curiosity. King Abdullah's assassination by a Palestinian in 1951 led this sympathy to be replaced by 'wariness'. The threat against Palestinian community that came about during the mandate years has been noticed by Transjordanians. This awareness led them to brighten Transjordanian credentials and the willingness for more *independent* identity. Notwithstanding Transjordanians did not demand a merger with Palestinians or even any other Arab community which would diminish their

⁸⁷ Ilan Pappé, "Jordan Between Hashemite and Jordanian Identity", in I. Pappé and Joseph Nevo (eds), Jordan in the Middle East: The Making of A Pivotal State 1948-1988, Frank Cass Publishing, Portland-Oregon, 1994, p. 68.

⁸⁸ Odeh (1999), op.cit., p. 30.

sense of identity. As Adnan Abu Odeh rightly addressed, there were two *conflicting* ideas in Transjordan toward Palestine; the people's pattern of behavior which was based on brotherhood and the opposite of the former, the Emir's *incomplete* Greater Syria project. On the political level, Emir Abdullah felt the responsibility that he could not remain aloof from the Palestine problem as an Arab leader. His father's legacy was an important motive for him to quest for Arab unity on the territories of Fertile Crescent. As previously mentioned, Abdullah's meeting with Churchill in Jerusalem in March 1921 was a bid for his target to achieve the unification of Transjordan and Palestine. However the existence of the Balfour Declaration and migration of Jewish diaspora from Europe undermined Emir Abdullah's aim to a large extent. Hajj Amin al-Husseini who became the *mufti* of Jerusalem weakened Emir's forthcoming involvement in the administration of Palestinian territories.

In the early years of post-war Jordanian-Palestinians perceived the regime as legitimate. Between the years 1949 and 1951 only groups who refused the administration in Amman were the communists and al-Husseini supporters. Even the communists had the perception that partition plan of the UN would be manageable and a Palestinian independent state would be founded on West Bank. The Communists re-organized under the name League for National Liberation demanded to take part in Parliamentary elections in Jordan. This radical shift in Communists' attitude in 1951 was mostly connected with their new policy of the maintenance of unified banks. Accordingly, they now organized themselves under the title Jordanian Communist Party in June. The name 'Jordanian' explicitly illustrates their intention to be a part of Jordanian Kingdom. The Communist Party has been banned since the mandate period. The only public arena left for them was their alliance with the National Bloc in the period of 1956-57. This paved the way for their representation in the Parliament for a very short period of time under the umbrella of National Bloc.⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Uriel Dann, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism, Jordan: 1955-67, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989, p. 6.

In the writings of Shaul Mishal, the years between 1955-57 and 1961-67 portrayed as the time periods that conditional legitimacy among the Palestinians and Transjordanians were apparent. The conditional legitimacy put down the principles of the dialogue between two peoples of the country. In accordance with the conditions laid down, Jordan would continue its authority in the West Bank in return Palestinians interests would not be underestimated. In other words, the dialogue was based on a “social contract” among the citizens that neither Palestinians nor Transjordanians rights would be endangered. Actually Jordan’s co-optation of Palestinian refugees brought not only economic burden to the country, but also it was a political burden on the Kingdom. Integration of the refugees into Jordanian state would minimize Jordan’s power in a negotiation with Israel. From the point of Israeli authorities there was no problem of refugees. In addition, the refugees did not willingly accept both Jordanian and the presence of UNRWA on the West Bank. Since this would not be favorable for their liberation movement on Palestinian territories. Among those radical Palestinian groups, outlawed pan-Islamic *Hizb al-Tahrir* (Liberation Party) similarly opted for the return of all Palestinians to their homeland. Thus settlement on Jordanian territories would not be tolerated. As Jordanian government pursued the policy of re-location of Palestinians on Jordanian or any Arab state, their policy was in contradiction with that of radical Palestinian groups.

The construction of a Palestinian identity in West Bank was a controversial issue. There was high degree of diversity in terms of identity-formation. Pan-Islamic, Arabic, Jordanian and Palestinian identities were all indispensable ingredients in building of an identity. On the whole, the profound tension directly occurred between West Bankers and East Bankers. The reason behind this tension was far more than an antagonism/ cleavage between two different communities, like Jordanians versus Palestinians. Rather it was closely related with the pan-Arabist ideology that embraced Palestinians in the West Bank at the expense of territorial identity. In other words, 1950s and 1960s could be easily described as the period of *Arabization* of Palestinians rather than *re-*

Palestinization or (another possibility that highly expected by the Jordanian state) *Jordanization* of Palestinian descents.

The criticisms of West Bankers towards the Hashemites were rooted in their pan-Arabist credentials. A new trend began to characterize Palestinian community by the mid-1960s. While Jordan was opposed to the idea of a Palestinian separate entity, re-Palestinization spelled out by the majority of the Palestinians of West Bank. This process marked the early stages for the transition from a *transnational* (Arabism) identity toward a *national* (Palestinian) one in the consolidation of Palestinian collective character. Shaul Mishal described this clash or co-existence of these various identities as a process of ‘floating identities’ in the West Bank. For him, this trend was somehow prompted by the de-Palestinian policies of Jordan. In his own words,

In sum, floating identity allowed the Palestinian opposition to continue looking at its political destiny in Jordan [in which they established their bases in the country to fight against Israeli retaliations] as essentially transitory and at the possibility of change as involving developments beyond Jordan’s border [to return to Palestine].⁹⁰

This explains why civil war broke out by September 1970 in the Kingdom. On one hand, Amman had a vigorous attempt to contain the activities of opposition groups and Palestinian organizations and on the other Palestinian guerilla groups perceived Jordanian territory as a springboard for their liberation movement. The diversity in the perception of two sides explains the causes of Black or White September. For some reasons, King Abdullah did not consider Palestinian or pan-Arab identity which encircled West Bank as a threat. The main motive for his tolerance was based on his incomplete goal of Greater Syria, which encompasses Syria, Lebanon, Palestine and Transjordanian. Besides, the lack of a distinct Palestinian identity was in favor of his plan. His assassination and establishment of PLO were some of those factors that gradually escalated to the repudiation of Amman’s regime by the Palestinians. The repudiation then

⁹⁰ Mishal (1978), *op.cit.*, p. 91.

followed by repercussions of re-Jordanization policies of the Kingdom by 1967 onwards.

For nearly twenty years Jordanian policy was centered on de-Palestinization of Palestinians. Throughout 1950s and 1960s, Jordanian textbooks put an extraordinary prominence on Arabism and an Arab identity. The reason underlying this policy was centered on the amalgamation of West Bankers into Jordanian Arab society. Arabism was the only mean to inspire Palestinian people's loyalty to the King and the monarchy. Jordan was merely one Arab country that Palestinians were politically and officially incorporated. The loss of West Bank in 1967 rather paved the way for the emergence of a distinct Jordanian nationalism. Jordan's *watani* identity has begun to differentiate fully itself from pan-Arabist and Palestinian one immediately after the 1974 Arab League Summit at Rabat. The recognition of PLO as the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinian people has created a momentum for the Hashemites to be aloof from *qutriyya* or regional identities and search for a more *watani* one.⁹¹ King Hussein did not sever its relations with West Bank until the declaration of Palestinian statehood in 1988.

2.5.2 The uneasy days for the monarchy:

Until the establishment of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964 there was no Palestinian problem in the region. The Arab countries perceived the problem rather as a refugee problem. Viewed from Jordanian state the refugees were *Jordanian citizens*; from the point of Israel they were rather *Arabs*. The establishment of Palestinian government in September 1949 by the Arab League was a cornerstone for the maintenance of Palestinian distinct entity. More than that, various nationalist groups were set up since 1949, like Ba'athists and National Socialists. They centered on the common concern that they are loyal both to Palestine and the idea of pan-Arabism. In the meantime,

⁹¹ Fathi (1994), op.cit, p. 213.

the writings of Qadri Tuqan, a young Palestinian critic, represented Palestinian stand toward Jordanian state as,

The Jordanians feels the danger that threatens Arab existence in all the countries more than any other Arab. Moreover, there is no local patriotism or regional pride in this state, but a willingness and ability to integrate this attitude among the Palestinians.⁹²

Throughout 1950s and 1960s, Jordan had two ‘clashing’ policies. On one hand, Jordan tried to endorse a Jordanian official identity through citizenship, and on the other urged to have a pro-Arab tilt due to the regimes in Egypt and Syria and for the purpose of integrating West Bankers. These two policies in some cases could overlap, but in Jordanian case for most of its political history they did not match. Despite Palestinians and Transjordanians were administered under the same mandate, until 1950 the Palestinians and Transjordanians were living in separate piece of lands and they embodied by their own political identities to a certain extent. What differentiates one community from the other was the unique struggle of Palestinians for their independence and national identity. Jordanians were already accomplished to govern themselves via setting their state up by the 1928 Constitution. In this respect, it’s one of the fundamental divergent elements between two communities in that one of them was fighting against Zionism and tried to gain their emancipation from foreign rule.

As previously mentioned, prior to the annexation Transjordanians perceive the Palestinian people similar to the extent that they considered *any other Arab people*, like Syrians. 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a watershed in transforming this perception. When Abdullah assassinated his grandson, Hussein, who became the King for the next four decades, secured from a bullet, which was deflected. For many reasons, Palestinians did not call for the separation of the East from the West Bank during the first decade of the post-war period. One reason was Hussein’s dismissal of John Glubb in 1956 and his appointment of an Arab nationalist prime minister, al-Nablusi. However, pro-Nasserist camp was far more challenging than did the Palestinians. From the beginning pan-

⁹² Mishal (1978), *op.cit*, p. 15.

Arabist groups, like Palestinian, Nationalist and Marxist organizations were the primary opponents of Jordan's pro-Western stand during the Cold War years. In time, Palestinians grew as the major source of friction, which downgraded the role of other groups of opposition.

Nevertheless majority of Palestinian descents gave their consent for the unification of the two Banks their resentment grew due to overrepresentation of East Bankers in governmental posts. This resistance reflected itself in a memorandum to the prime minister after a consultation meeting in Nablus on July 1952. This disadvantaged position depicted itself not only in socio-political realms but also in economic sectors as well. There was a growing demand from the West Bankers to decrease the restrictions on political participation. For instance, they wanted to see the replacement of two-thirds majority for the vote of no confidence with a simple majority.

On September 6, 1951 King Talal succeeded his father. For some authors, like Robert Staloff, his ascendancy was characterized as "A Kingdom without a King".⁹³ Although he had health problems, his son Hussein was 16 years old and had to wait until 1953 to be the King of the Hashemite monarchy. Actually Talal was known as his positive attitude towards the Palestinian people. His sympathy with the West Bankers could be exemplified by his dissolution of the *Majlis al-Ayan* and re-composition of it with more Palestinian descents. His throne brought a new constitution based on more liberal elements including freedoms of speech and press. The new constitution also provided the mechanism of dismissing the cabinet by a two-thirds vote of no confidence in the Lower Chamber. The Unity Resolution passed by the Parliament enhanced the prevalent of Arab rights on the Palestinian territories. In addition the resolution confirmed that Jordan's aim is "to defend those rights by all lawful means in the exercise of its natural rights but without prejudicing the final settlement of Palestine's just case within the sphere of national aspiration, inter-

⁹³ Robert Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan In Transition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p. 13.

Arab cooperation, and international justice".⁹⁴ This resolution gave the Palestinians the impression that Jordan works for their gain and liberation of Palestine. They had the perception that they are the owners of the Palestine as well.

When King Talal abdicated on May 1953 because of his mental problems, King Hussein ascended to the throne as Jordan's third king. In the first decades of his kingship, Hussein had to manage with Israeli attack on Qibya in the West Bank. However the main source of opposition to the Monarchy was a political one. There existed two major political challenges to the throne; *conservatives*⁹⁵ and *the progressives/ nationalists/ Nasserists*. The conservatives predominantly were active in the East Bank than in the West. With the exception of Social Syrian Nationalists and Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*), from the point of all the conservative forces, Palestinian problem was a problem of frontier dated back to armistice agreement in 1949. The common concern for all was the maintenance of independence and monarchy. Thus in their view the best alternative to solve the border-dispute was to sustain the prevailing order. In contrast, anti-loyalist opposition and their ideology were centered on pan-Arabist and nationalist discourse. On March 1956 General John Glubb, the British commander of the army traced back to early years of Emirate, was dismissed.

In the meantime, nationalist and leftist groups formed the Nationalist-Socialist Bloc winning the 1956 Parliamentary elections in Jordan. The Bloc acquired the majority of the seats in the House of Representatives and had forced King Hussein to appoint their leader Sulaiman al-Nabulsi as the premier.⁹⁶ The primary discourse of the Bloc during the election campaign was based on the critique of Anglo-Jordanian Treaty signed in 1946 and developing close ties

⁹⁴ Odeh (1999), op.cit., p. 66.

⁹⁵ Those conservatives were loyal to the Hashemite Monarchy and royal family. Social Syrian Nationalists (SSN) and Muslim Brotherhood are the primary examples for those conservative groups.

⁹⁶ Avi Shlaim and Yezid Sayigh (eds), The Cold War and the Middle East, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, pp: 113-114.

with the regime in Cairo. The King then appointed al-Nabulsi as the head of the government and allowed him to form his own cabinet. Nabulsi's premiership began with the termination of Anglo-Jordanian Treaty on 14 March 1957. In addition, Jordan had to participate in Arab Solidarity Treaty with Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Thus Jordan looked to three Arab states for financial subsidies instead of British assistance. Jordan's pro-Western foreign policy trend did not help Jordan enough for its entrance in Baghdad Pact in 1955. Although Iraq was a member of the Pact (until 1958), but it deprived of Arab support, Jordan in particular, due to pan-Arabist atmosphere in the region.

Abu Nuwwar, chief of army staff replaced John Glubb who was supported by the Bloc. Abu Nuwwar and al-Nablusi had secretly agreed on a plan to overthrow King Hussein and his regime, but the King launched a counter-coup to weaken their position in the Kingdom. This incident came to be known as 'Abu Nuwwar Plot' in April 1957. Failure of Abu Nuwwar led to massive demonstrations by nationalists and leftists. Amman had to take some measures and martial law was imposed. The political parties were banned (until 1992 Political Parties Law) and this followed by severing the diplomatic relations with Egypt in June 1957. Egyptian unification with Syria in 1958 under the United Arab Republic (UAR) paved the way for the unification of two Hashemite monarchies for the first and last time in history. The Arab Federation did not last long and it was overthrown after a nationalist coup d'état in Iraq in July 1958.

2.5.3 Variation in the Perceptions and Images: From Brotherhood to Wariness

The change in mutual perceptions and images can be found in the Pan-Arab nationalist goals of Transjordanian state.⁹⁷ In incorporating Transjordan with the East Palestine, King Abdullah sought to consider the West Bank for the Jordanians rather than for the Palestinian community. In this regard, growing

⁹⁷ Mustafa Hamarneh (et al), Jordanian-Palestinian Relations Where to? Four Scenarios for the Future, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1997, p. 7.

resentment of Palestinian precisely residing in the West Bank developed a strong Palestinian nationalism. Given that the regime's homogenization policy had very little effect on the West Bankers, struggle for independence and fight against Zionism became apparent after the loss of West Bank territories in 1967 war.

Jamal Abd al-Nasser's initiative in the establishment of PLO was a turning point in terms of Jordan's relations with the majority of its citizens, i.e. Palestinian descents. Basically, King Hussein took a decisive step in 1962 and published a white paper calling for *the United Kingdom of Palestine and Jordan*. However, Egyptian attitude toward this plan was not sympathetic and Nasser organized a campaign protesting King's recommendation. In fact, Nasser's primary purpose was to sustain the control of PLO under Egypt in order to consolidate his country's position in the entire Arab world.

The PLO was set up under the auspices of the League of Arab States, and it was headed by Ahmed Shuqairi. The organization was an inducement for those Palestinians living in refugee camps to hold a Palestinian national identity and more than that to acquire military and political mechanism to re-gain their rights on Palestinian territories. King Hussein's position was threatening. He gave his approval for the PLO upon the condition that the organization would work hand in hand with the administration in Amman. Concurrently another group of Palestinians in Kuwait were organized themselves under the name *al-Fatah* (conquest) and led by Yaser Arafat. *Al-Fatah* group was set up under the tutelage of Saudi King Faisal. The latter group was searching for a safe place to coordinate their incursions in Israel. The answer was Kingdom of Jordan and they founded their bases for possible operations against Israeli reprisals.

There were several reasons in concerning Jordanian recognition of the PLO in 1964. Above all, Egypt-Jordanian relations were deteriorated due to the civil war in Yemen. For King Hussein, Egyptian backed PLO's recognition could improve the relationship between two countries. In the meantime, in the first Arab League Summit, the Arab states took some measures, which would be in

favor of Hashemite Kingdom. For instance, construction of a dam on the Yarmouk River⁹⁸ was one of the primary outcomes of the Cairo Summit. In accordance with the resolution, Jordan would be in an advantaged position to acquire the highest proportion of its irrigation water. In addition, the summit meeting agreed on the modernization of some Arab armies, Jordanian as well.⁹⁹ This point should be clarified that Jordanian state approved the establishment of the PLO based on two main principles. Jordanian historian Sulaiman Mousa records that;

1. The PLO should not carry out any activity that would lead to a cleavage between Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan, because both communities had been living together and amalgamating in social, economic, political and day-to-day life since the unification of the two banks in 1950.
2. The PLO should not stimulate Israeli retributive actions [however, the retaliations provided an open door for any anti-regime propaganda and the King had to close PLO offices and restrain the supporters of *al-Fatah*].¹⁰⁰

Based on these two pre-requisites, it was evident that King Hussein felt the forthcoming cleavages among the state and the PLO. It was a critical test and precarious situation for Jordanian regime. With the second Arab Summit held at Alexandria in September, the PLO and its military wing Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) were established. For the King, it was less difficult for his country to accept the PLO, because at least, there was *no compromise* on Jordan's sovereign rights over the two Banks. Besides, it was very clear that this was one of the most practical solutions in such an uneasy situation. With their leader Shuqairi, PLO established its organizational structure in West Bank as well. King Hussein's appointment of Tawfiq al-Tal as the premier had several purposes for Adnan Abu Odeh. One reason was related with al-Tal's participation

⁹⁸ A tributary of River Jordan.

⁹⁹ Odeh (1999), op.cit. p. 114.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

in the Arab Rescue Army in 1948. Thus he already established organizational link with the Palestinians. What's more, al-Tall had the capacity and ability to confront Nasser vis-à-vis the Palestinian question.¹⁰¹

In the third Arab Summit at Casablanca in 1965, Shuqairi pronounced the slogan of “Jordan as Palestine” and “Palestine as Jordan”. With a different will, King Hussein referred Palestine as Jordan and Jordan as Palestine. However King’s pronouncement had a distinct meaning, re-stating the *unity* and *indivisibility* of Banks dated back to 1948. Although two leaders articulated the same discourse their intentions were far away from one another. The clashing arguments could be regarded as the first incident escalating the tensions among two communities. The battle for West Bank was central in the repercussions of annexation policy of the Kingdom. In order to safeguard West Bank, Shuqairi was ready to found the bases of the PLA on Jordanian territory. Although Jordan asked for an agreement with PLO on the deployment of military units, the PLA rejected such an agreement. Then PLO was opposing to the regime and called for the divisions between East and West Banks. The dichotomy between al-Tal and Shuqairi was central to the culmination of wariness. Shuqairi kept articulating his rhetoric as Jordan is Palestine and Jordan found itself in a situation confronted by a vast majority of its citizens. Jordanian-Palestinian relations entered into a new era when Palestinian National Council reduced Jordanian representatives from 53 to 40% in December. It was the time when a more radical Ba’athist regime came to power after a coup d’etat in Syria. The new rule in Syria proclaimed the Palestinian struggle for ‘Popular Liberation’. Hafiz al-Asad became the Minister of Defense with this coup in 1966. From this time and onwards Jordan had to fend with both Egyptian backed the PLO and Syria.

In his speech on June 14, 1966 King Hussein noticed two main themes. Foremost he characterized the leaders of Syria and the PLO as “communists”. They were all enclosed by international communism under the titles of Arab nationalism and Palestinian question.¹⁰² His speech, in one sense, was a

¹⁰¹ *Ibid*, p. 118.

¹⁰² *Ibid*, p. 125.

criticism towards the Arab countries supporting the Palestinian organizations. The central theme for Hussein was his country's territorial integrity. He perceived the unification of two Banks at the core for a wider Arab unity project. Recorded from his speech, the King said that, "The unity of two banks was blessed by God and supported by the people. It is the nucleus of the broader Arab unity... Any hand to be stretched to undermine this unity or this one united country will be severed..."¹⁰³

By the onset of 1960s Arabist and Ba'athist ideologies were prevalent in Egypt, Syria and Iraq, which drastically re-constructed the Middle East political atmosphere. The ramification of regional politics led Jordan to align with Egypt before entering the third Arab-Israeli War. 1967 Six-Days War had totally transformed the balance of power already existed in the region. The Israeli capture of Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem and the West Bank has secured the frontiers of the Jewish state after the Six Days War. Viewed from Jordan, the war was devastating. It was a catastrophic event in terms of territorial re-demarcation, demographic change and economic burden due to the invasions of West Bank and Old City of Jerusalem. United Nations adopted the resolution 242 on November 22, 1967 after an emergency meeting at the Security Council, but the rejection of both Palestinians and Syria did not bring an end to the dispute. The resolution 242 calls the Israeli state to withdraw from those areas occupied in 1967.

In March 1968 the PLO had accomplished in deterring an Israeli attack in the village of Karameh. This increased the credibility and prestige of PLO and converted Jordan Valley into a wartime arena.¹⁰⁴ A new organization outgrew from the PLO, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and began to put detrimental effects on Hashemite regime. This PFLP was headed by George Habash and called for the overthrow of the Kingdom. PLO succeeded to establish *a state within a state* and then the Arab Legion started to

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 126.

¹⁰⁴ Uriel Dann, King Hussein's Strategy of Survival, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992, p. 25.

contain the regime opponents.¹⁰⁵ Another Palestinian group, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), triggered the ongoing contention spelling out that there existed ‘no authority above the authority of resistance’. Then Wasfi al-Tall and Zaid al-Rifa’i compelled the King to appoint a military government on 16 September. After this critical decision Jordan found itself in confronting against *fedayeen*. On the next day, the PLO captured and exercised its control over Jordan’s second largest city, *Irbid*. Irbid is located in the northern part of the country where Jordan has its closest frontier with Syrian Republic. This led Syria easily to intervene militarily in the war and Syrian troops were joined to the PLA forces. Hafiz al-Asad’s intervention has considered by the Israelis as a matter of *casus belli*; and Israel called Syria to evacuate from Jordan. During the events of September 1970, 40% of Jordanian military officials were Palestinian origin.¹⁰⁶ This meant that the Palestinians in Jordanian army had to fight against their fellows.

King Hussein had to accept the Cairo Agreement in 1970, which placed PLO’s presence under all-Arab supervision. On the contrary, al-Tall did not take Cairo Agreement into consideration and he accomplished in expelling the PLO forces from Jordan by 15 July 1971. The PLO groups had to move to southern Lebanon where they would be a party to another civil war. The expulsion of *fedayeen* from Jordan was culminated by the assassination of Wasfi al-Tall on November 28, 1971. He was assassinated at a time when he was preparing to attend the Arab Defense Council meeting in Cairo.

2.6 Shift from the policy of ‘one land one people’ to ‘clashing of identities’:

The civil war actually did not bring an end to Jordan’s Palestinian dimension. The civil war, or in Palestinians’ terminology the Black September episode had a detrimental effect on Jordan’s identity formation. The 1970-71 era marks the very beginning of the delineation of Jordan’s distinct identity re-construction

¹⁰⁵ Valerie York, Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria, and Israel, The End of An Era?, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988, pp: 38-39.

¹⁰⁶ Ilan Pappé (1994), op.cit, p. 74.

hitherto. The increase in reciprocal disdain among both sides led to the evolution of two distinct identities on the same land. Palestinian nationalism has become the antithesis of Jordanian one. Although the process of dichotomization of interests began with the establishment of the PLO, the civil war escalated to the idea of East Bank First trend in the Kingdom by the end of 1971.

Literally the ethnic division among Palestinians (West Bankers) and Jordanians (East Bankers) is not simply rooted in the civil war. The war has precipitated the trend that already started by the 1950 annexation. Despite there is one single Palestinian community in Jordan, they are distinguished by their political, economic and social backgrounds. The divergence among the Palestinian-Jordanians was categorized by Laurie Brand. She indicates that there are four different Palestinian groups regarding their date of migration to the Kingdom.¹⁰⁷ The first group of Palestinian refugees fled to Jordan by the end of 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars. Since Palestinian identity is very strong among these refugees, they considered Jordan as their temporary residence rather than truly homeland. Specifically after the establishment of the PLO, this group of Palestinian-Jordanians manifested opposition to the formation of hybrid Jordanian identity.

The second group embraces those Palestinians who possess a sense of Palestinian identity on the one hand, and given the political and economic benefits acquired they do not feel themselves hostile to Jordanian monarchy. The third group comprises those Palestinian citizens who have attachment to hybrid Jordanian-Palestinian identity of *Urdustini (Urdun-Filastini)*. Given that they enjoyed high ranks in political arena and acquired huge economic benefit particularly after the *fedayeen* episode, they are loyal to the throne, if not necessarily like Jordanians of East Bank origin. Finally, the last group includes those Palestinians refugees that fled into Jordan in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The Gulf returnees do strongly feel themselves as

¹⁰⁷ Laurie Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity", op.cit., p. 49.

Palestinian, not Jordanian. They were not granted citizenship, but the Kingdom provided passports as travel documents for the Gulf returnees.

Precisely for the reasons explained above, Palestinian national identity was incrementally conducive in galvanizing sub-state identities in Jordan. As Philip Robins rightly pointed, after the *fedayeen* episode, the sense of belonging to a particular tribe, village and region has not only become an important source of allegiance to the throne, but also consolidating communal identity among Jordanians of East Bank origin.¹⁰⁸ With the annexation of the West Bank, the fundamental objective of the monarchy was the entrenchment of a national identity that would encompass both communities regardless of their place of origin and birth. However the main ramification of the Jordanian civil war was the re-invigoration of Emir Abdullah's policy of Transjordanian nationalism traces back to 1920s and 1930s. Jordan in the aftermath of the war has regenerated its 'one people one land' idea at the expense of Palestinian citizens residing in Jordan or on the East Bank since 1967.

A new identity based on East Bank tribal and Islamic values, loyalty to the royal family, to the army and finally to the patriarch (the King) laid down the fundamental foundations of the East Bank First trend after the civil war. One way to introduce this idea was to mobilize mass support for a political party. The Jordanian National Union (*al-Ittihad al-Watani al-Urduni*) was established with the aim of establishing one party system, but it was dissolved in 1976.

Given the far-reaching fallout between the *fedayeen* and Jordanian security forces during 1970-71 was not a real civil war, because majority of Palestinians were not involved in the struggle. In other words, it was not a war that Jordanians fought against Palestinian civilians. This understanding led 1972 King Hussein in 1972 to culminate with the 'Arab Unity Plan'. The Plan laid down the framework for a federal solution between Jordan and Palestinian states on the West Bank and Gaza strip with two capital cities in Amman and

¹⁰⁸ Robins (2004), op.cit, p. 118.

Jerusalem.¹⁰⁹ According to his Unity Project there would be two Parliaments, but one executive body and single army. On the PLO side, PNC declared that “Jordan was an indispensable part of Palestine” on April 1974. In fact, King Hussein’s plan addressed the point that West Bankers were remained as a part of Jordanian society and would continue to be the constituent unit.¹¹⁰ The Unity Plan however then rejected by the PLO.

The Arab Summit’s Resolution in Rabat which recognized the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian community shed a light for Jordanian nationalists to promote the removal of Jordanian citizenship from the Palestinian citizens. The 1974 Arab League Resolution was a melting pot in institutionalizing East Bank First trend in that Jordanian citizenship since then refers to complete integration of Palestinians into Jordanian society. Hence, post-1974 period marks the beginning of the emergence of Jordan’s *Likud* calling for ‘Jordan for Transjordanians’. The *Jordanizing* efforts of the Kingdom left the Palestinian citizens to represent themselves with the label of Islamic identity in the political landscape. In this regard, the policy of non-discrimination of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (later the IAF) reinforced the Palestinians to identify themselves with Islamist movements.¹¹¹

Within this context, regime’s efforts in *Jordanizing* Jordan have become apparent with the loss of the West Bank and King Hussein’s subsequent detachment of Palestine from Jordan’s politics by 1988. According to Uriel Dann, Jordan’s participation into 1967 war was not a mistake; it rather paved the way for the *homogeneity* of the Jordanian society. A similar argument could be found in the writings of Asher Susser. Susser argues that civil war and the detachment of Palestine from Jordan marks the underpinning of “distinctive

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

¹¹⁰ According to Mansoor Moaddel, one of the main characteristics of Jordanian state is its ideology that stretched between different identities for a long period of time. Arab nationalism, tribal-patrimonialism, Islamic conservatism, and Western modernism were all partially took part in the formation of Jordanian state’s ideology. See M. Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative Analysis of State-Religion Relationship in Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Syria*, Palgrave, 2002, p. 27.

¹¹¹ Interview with Toujan Faisal, Amman, 20 June 2006.

Jordanian identity of East Bank political elite”.¹¹² In brief, since Jordanian *watani* identity has been consolidated specifically after the loss of West Bank in 1967, Black September and detachment of West Bank embody a turning point in Jordanian identity *re*-formation. Detecting King Hussein’s connotations as “Jordan is Jordan” and “Palestine is Palestine” by 1988, which was an inevitable consequence of the years of retrogression, could indisputably strengthen this argument.

Given that the incorporation of the West Bank and the Palestinians into the Hashemite Kingdom have vigorously determined and diluted Jordan’s identity formation, the construction of a coherent Jordanian identity is still a *constant* re-building process. The annexation of the Palestinian lands which brought two people on one land portrays the reason why Jordanian regime mobilized *qawmi* ideals in integrating Palestinians into the Kingdom through creating a hybrid identity. However the civil war which brought suspicion and skepticism among the East Bankers and the West Bankers was a melting pot in strengthening the trend toward *statising* Jordan’s identity at the expense of supra-state Pan-Arabist loyalties. It’s therefore significant to analyze the evolution of Transjordanian identity and its very definition to understand the progression from *qawmiyya* to *wataniyya* in setting both domestic and external agendas in Jordan. The next part will focus on the point of how multiple sub-state and supra-state loyalties have frequently impeded and circumscribe Jordanians’ attachment to the Jordanian state.

¹¹² Asher Susser (1995), “Introduction”, in Asher Susser and Aryeh Shumuelevitz (eds), The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World, *op.cit.*, p. 10.

CHAPTER 3:

PREDICAMENTS AND CHALLENGES IN UN/MAKING AND TRANSFORMING JORDANIAN IDENTITY

Given the historical, social and political linkage that has closely bound Jordanian and Palestinian entities, the question of identity is at the core of Jordan's nation-building.¹¹³ Jordanian identity formation offers a case that can easily be found in most parts of the Middle East where the multiple *sub-state* and *supra-state* identities limited and often negated the popular loyalty to individual states. In addition, the uniqueness and the authenticity in Jordan's politics of identity is typically stemming from the huge Palestinian exodus to Jordan and the refugee issue after the Arab-Israeli war in 1948. The evolution of Palestinian nationalism and the quest for liberation of Palestine has paved the way for solidifying and crystallizing supranational (Pan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism) and sub-state (tribal and parochial) identities in the Kingdom as well.¹¹⁴ Since its inception as an Emirate by the British colonial power, Transjordan (later Jordan) has been considered as the most artificial among all the states in the Middle East. As Nazih Ayubi indicates, "Nowhere was this 'artificiality' of entities more obvious than in the case of Jordan, a corridor country without a distinct history, or focal point, or even a native royal family".¹¹⁵ Actually, the identification with the territorial state and citizenship has been very weak in Jordan. Besides, Islam and Arabism as strong supra-state and transnational identities have overshadowed and impeded the legitimacy of the Hashemite state. One justification for the emergence of Jordan as an

¹¹³ Joseph Nevo, King Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition, St. Anthony's College, Oxford, 1996, pp: 6-8.

¹¹⁴ Robins (2004), op.cit, pp: 118-119.

¹¹⁵ Ayubi (1995), op.cit, p. 114.

artificial political entity is the *continuous* affiliation of popular loyalties with the pre-existing sub-state, parochial, and tribal identities.

Although Jordan's population was among the most homogenous in the region, the demographic imbalances and territorial re-demarcations throughout its history posited the Kingdom of Jordan in a crucial place within the context of state and nation-building. The consolidation of Jordanian identity has been the fundamental objective of almost all governments in the country due to the momentous regional instabilities. In this respect, Jordanian case will possibly help to illustrate how identities can be *constantly* and *momentarily* subjected to reformation and debates on identities can be exacerbated by events occurring externally. In addition, Jordanian example will expose how identities shift from transnational (Arab nationalism) to territorial (Jordanian) and to parochial (tribe) loyalties under certain conditions. This process of *transforming* identities is salient in Jordanian nation-building generating a dialectical synchronization of multiple identities which is endemic in the entire Arab world.

The identification of nationalism and national identity in the Arab Middle East has configured by multiple explanations, namely Arab, Islamic and tribal. Given the existence of ethnic division and tribalism as the two main sources of legitimacy and identity construction, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan occupies a central place within the discussions of identity and ethnic cleavage. For a long period of time, Jordanian identity has been delineated by Palestinian and Arab identities. Palestinians developed a strong sense of collective and coherent national identity within Arabist discourse to confront with Zionism. With the aim of creating a single 'unitary' Jordanian identity, with the incorporation of West Bank into the Kingdom, Jordan granted citizenship to all Palestinian refugees. Historically given that Palestine and Jordan were integral parts of the Palestinian territories; Israeli Likud Party's claim of "Israeli state incorporates both banks of the River" has undermined Jordanian 'native' identity formation. In addition, large Palestinian population settled in Jordan presents an inducement for the argument of 'Jordan is Palestine'. Furthermore, the huge proportion of Jordanian state is of Palestinian origin and the possibility

of a coherent Jordanian identity is precarious for the Israeli state. Since its inception, Jordanian state has necessitated a *Jordanized* Jordanian identity for the maintenance of her legitimacy, and a justification for her international recognition by the outside actors.¹¹⁶

The clear identification of a distinct national identity in Jordan is, therefore, closely tied with different ethnic and cultural groups living within its territory. Apart from Palestinians; Circassians (Sunni Muslims) and Christian minorities constitute other ethnic groupings in Jordanian society. However, existence of Palestinians should be treated in a different manner where their presence played an instrumental role in the formation of an indigenous Jordanian identity. Moreover, Palestinian population has identified and constructed their identities and interests with the territory of Jordan; but on the other hand, other minority groups (which are in reality *ethnically* divided from Jordanian Arabs) are representing perfect examples of diasporas.

Within this framework, Palestinian descents occupy a crucial place in the configuration of Jordanian identity.¹¹⁷ The ethnic distinction influences the construction of a collective identity in Jordan via creating inter-communal tension; competing norms; and socio-economic division between “us” and “them” (others). In that respect, it’s possible to argue that ethnic identity shapes allegiance and fears of extinction. Thus Jordan is one case to illustrate this dichotomy of *unity of diversity* in play with the unification of East Palestine with East Bank in 1950. According to Yezid Sayigh, socio-economic and political transformation and Palestinian phenomenon are the two main factors that have fortified the consolidation of Jordan as a separate entity.¹¹⁸ Sayigh also adds four decisive historical events where Jordanian identity specifically has evolved. These events are; the loss of West Bank in 1967, competition for power during 1970-71, increased role of the state in all segments of Jordanians’ lives, and

¹¹⁶ Lynch (1999), op.cit., p. 93.

¹¹⁷ Shibley Telhami and Michael Barnett (eds), Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, op.cit., p. 23.

¹¹⁸ Yezid Sayigh (1991), “Jordan in the 1980s: The legitimacy, entity and identity”, op.cit.

finally impact of economic recovery on Jordanians' prosperity. However the final factor has begun to be challenged by privatization policies and standstill in Jordan's economy. The repercussions of the Gulf Wars have undermined Jordan's economy and resulted in public riots including the city of Maan which constitutes the major source of stronghold of the monarchy.

Thus Jordanian entity is still in transition enrolled by predicaments and under the influence of domestic and regional strains. For Sayigh, "It's likely that Jordan will experience more conflict, internal and external, before the basis for belonging to the Jordanian entity is fully defined for all its citizens".¹¹⁹

3.1 Evolution of Transjordanian nationalism and its predicaments:

The eastern part of River Jordan was no more than the southern extension of Greater Syria during the Ottoman rule. However this is not to say that there was no political agent in Jordan at all. It was the Ottoman administrative reforms that initiated the integration of Transjordanian territories into the Empire by the late 19th century. From the time when it is established as a mandate by the British Empire in 1921, (Trans) Jordan has necessitated legitimacy in the eyes of its populace and other Arab counterparts, precisely the Palestinian mandate. The identifications of the people settled on the eastern part of River Jordan were either embarked on parochial (members of kin groups or tribes) or on supra-state religious entities.¹²⁰ Since the formation of the Emirate, the backdrop of making Jordanian national identity has built on creating loyalty either to the state-centered territorial nationalism (*wataniyya*) of Hashemite state or transnational goals of Pan-Arabism (*qawmiyya*).¹²¹ During the mandate rule, Britain recruited Palestinians to take positions in the governance of the Emirate. These people supported both the British interests and the Hashemite longevity until the unification of two Banks in 1950. Since then those who supported the Emirate

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 182.

¹²⁰ Robins (2004), *op.cit.*, p. 6.

¹²¹ Betty Anderson, "The Duality of National Identity in the Middle East: A Critical Review", *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies*, Fall 2002, 11 (2), p. 240.

were either the rulers or members of descendants of Sharif Hussein have been characterized as *King's men*.¹²² The southern parts of the country where tribesmen settled have constituted the main source of stronghold for the King and monarchy for a long period of time and it's valid to some extent today.

As Adnan Abu Odeh indicates, Jordan as a political entity is created before developing the notion of Jordanians.¹²³ Given the lack of national narrative in building Jordanian nation, Emir Abdullah sought to develop identity of Jordan synonymous with loyalty to the King and the Hashemite rule. The 'East Bankers' who settled on the eastern part of River Jordan, prior to 1948, considered as the indigenous population of Jordan regardless of their religious or ethnic backgrounds. Due to the division of loyalties between Islam, Arab, Jordanian-Palestinian, tribal, defining national identity and nationalism has not been an easy project in Jordan.¹²⁴ In response to the multiple layers of identities persistent in the Emirate, tribalism (*ashairiyya*) has built up as the backbone of the Jordanian nation-building. In this sense, tribal affiliation has become to exemplify the symbol of Jordan's national identity-formation which would be discernible from the other Arab counterparts. Since Jordanian rulers attempted to distinguish their national character from the other countries in the area, the state has cultivated a 'collective memory' that is based on the House of Hashemites (*al-Hashemi al-Bayt*)¹²⁵ and the Great Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire.¹²⁶ Actually the Hashemite family was late comers to the lands of east of River Jordan and in addition Transjordan had relatively never acquired a separate political entity until its independence in 1946 compared with the other states in the Fertile Crescent.¹²⁷

¹²² Robert B. Satloff (1994), *op.cit.*

¹²³ Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, Amman, 23 June 2006.

¹²⁴ Fathi (1994), *op.cit.*, p. 201.

¹²⁵ The Hashemite family who belonged to the Meccan House of Hashim of the *Qurasyh* tribe is the descendant of Prophet Muhammed.

¹²⁶ Linda Layne, Home and Homeland: The Dialogics of Tribal and National Identities in Jordan, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p. 103.

¹²⁷ For nation-state building in the Middle East, see: Ilya Harik, "The Origins of the Arab State System", Baghat Korany, in Ghassan Salamé, The Foundations of the Arab State, Croom Helm,

Since the territory of Jordan is not the ancestral land of Hashemite family; Emir Abdullah's policy was centered on exposition of Jordan as the homeland for *all Arabs*. The lack of demarcated frontiers led many Transjordanian inhabitants to see their future either in Palestine, Iraq, Syria, or Saudi Arabia in the early years of British rule. The traders who moved to Amman in the beginning of 1920s they all shared the common understanding that their homes actually were either in Palestine or Syria. The Hashemite family's identification as the descendants of Prophet Muhammed has served as a transnational linkage among the Arabs, precisely the Palestinian community, in the region. According to Linda Layne, Jordanian state's special emphasis on Bedouin tribal heritage has been a concern derived from external sources rather than internal in the early years of the Emirate. In this respect, Jordanian nation-building is built on an *imagined community* where "tribes came to play a central role in the way Jordanian nation is imagined".¹²⁸

Given that nationalism is created to serve the ideological interest of the nation-states, its key function is to achieve cohesion. One major common ground for the scholars of the new narrative on nations and nationalisms is the role of "socio-cultural artifact that creates an ethno-linguistic community imaging itself to be *homogenous*".¹²⁹ The concept of nationalism is perceived as a program for modernization and an indigenous culture of invented nations. For Ernst Gellner for instance, nationalism is the new form of political ethnicity. For Gellner, "nations are the artifacts of men's conviction, loyalties and solidarities".¹³⁰ In this respect, nationalism represents a homogeneity imposed by a higher authority. Nationalism in Gellner's approach is a theory of political legitimacy, where ethnic boundaries within a given state should not separate the rulers from the rest of the society. His argument is based on the assumption that nationalism

1987 and Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East, Routledge, London, 1992.

¹²⁸ Layne, op.cit., p. 105.

¹²⁹ Israel Gershoni, "Rethinking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in the Middle East, 1920-45: Old and New Narratives", in Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski (eds), Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East, Columbia University Press, New York, 1997, p. 13. The emphasis added.

¹³⁰ Gellner (1983), op.cit., p. 7.

is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness; but rather it creates nations where they do *not* exist at all. However, Benedict Anderson's approach on imagined communities do not say that states are fabricated or invented. Anderson rather argues that nations are imagined on the basis of their cultural heritages, shared past and national print languages. Likewise for Eric Hobsbawm, nations are *invented traditions* by the three main functions of the state; the expansion of state-led education, invention of public ceremonies and finally mass production of public monuments.¹³¹

Based upon the approach of Benedict Anderson, communities are distinct from one another “not by their falsity/ genuineness, but by the style in which they are *imagined*.”¹³² In this context, creation of (Trans) Jordanian identity was an imagined community constructed on the cultural heritage of the Bedouins and pan-Arab nationalist goals of the Hashemite family. Jordan has successfully employed the legacy of Sharif Hussein and Hijazi descendants with an ‘exclusive’ emphasis on Arabism and Islam in making Jordan's identity.¹³³ In developing a distinct identity, Emir Abdullah necessitated national unity and cohesion. In building that cohesion, (Trans) Jordanian nationalism was developed as an *imagined* political community with the combination of the Bedouins, struggling for Arab nationalism and fighting against Western encroachment. Tribalism and patronage has developed as the image of national narrative and heritage during 1920s and 1930s. Above all tribalism has served as the main source of shared past and national myths.

The emphasis made on the Bedouins as the symbol of nation-building has formed the prominent source of national cohesion and solidarity which distinguished Jordanians from the *other*, precisely from the Palestinians in the Kingdom, and from the other Arabs in the region. It's in this regard Eric Hobsbawm's concept of ‘invented traditions’ applies to expose the emphasis on

¹³¹ John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds), Nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 82.

¹³² Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, Verso, London, p. 6. The emphasis added.

¹³³ Uriel Dann (1989), op.cit, p. 3.

cultural heritage in constructing distinct Jordanian national identity. As Hobsbawm argues, it's the states, not the nations that make and construct nations and nationalisms. Once Britain recognized Transjordan as an independent political entity on 25 May 1923, the Arab Legion - the Jordanian army, has been instrumental in integrating Jordanian society as a whole and constituted the political stronghold for the regime. Intriguingly, the Arab Legion of Jordan is the only army in the region carrying the label 'Arab'. The head of the Legion, British John Glubb, entrusted a policy of re-defining and re-adapting the Bedouins to serve in the army. As Joseph Massad reports, this was though a *Bedouinization* policy to integrate Jordanians into the state apparatus.¹³⁴ In addition, the British rule entrenched the very foundations of Transjordanian identity with the education of the military staff. The recruitment of Bedouins into the army was central in constructing a native Jordanian nation. In this respect, for Massad, "The school system became instrumental in the production of the British-imagined Transjordanian".¹³⁵ Jordanian state, since then, has developed a peculiar attachment to tribalism. Therefore, the fundamental basis of identification was ascertained by the Legion and sub-state tribal linkages.

As previously mentioned, Jordanian territory comprises different religions and ethnic groups and sub-state identities. There were Circassians, Christians, Arabs and also Jordanians who were sub-divided among townsmen and tribesmen. Therefore John Glubb asserted the notion of non-discrimination in the army and he tried to ensure that incorporating the Bedouins into state would eventually help the transfer of loyalties from the fragmented tribes to the nation-state. In Massad's words, "Nationalizing them [the Bedouins], through territorialization [Jordanization], was part of nation-building" which constituted the roots of identity formation that found resonance in the country in coming decades.¹³⁶

In inventing the Jordanian nation, the Hashemite state engaged in the expansion of state bureaucracy and education. Since the Emirate sought to integrate

¹³⁴ Massad (2001), *op.cit.*, pp: 148-149.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp: 110-111.

compelling and fragmented tribes into the state-system, the bureaucratic expansion provided the source of procurement of tribal loyalty to the state. The recruitment of townsmen and countrymen of Jordan in the public employment led the expansion of the state countrywide. Schirin Fathi named the expansion of bureaucracy in the Emirate since 1921 until today as *Bedoucracy*.¹³⁷ Thus Bedoucracy was the main source of patronage and prestige that would shape and determine post-independent political landscape in Jordan as well. In expanding the state-led education, the number of schools enlarged from 44 to 73 between the years 1922 and 1946. The Hashemite state institutionalized the school curricula to include the parameters of being Jordanian. As Abd al-Rahman Munif reports from his work on the city of Salt, students built allegiance to their state with singing the song ‘Long Live the Emir’ every morning.¹³⁸ The government was influential in monitoring the activities of the schools with inspectors particularly by 1940s.¹³⁹

Emir Abdullah under the mandate rule gave special attention to ensure internal legitimacy. The Emir fought against Wahhabi inroads started by 1921 and southern frontiers of the Emirate was drawn by the Treaty of Hadda on November 2, 1925 with the Saudis. Transjordan extended her geography adding Aqaba and Maan while giving Wadi al-Sirhan to the Saudi state. Although Huweitat tribe fought with the Hashemites in the Arab Revolt, Emir Abdullah repressed the domestic threats derived from Huweitat and Udwan clans during 1920s. In the early years of the Emirate, Abdullah was in need of educated people for the key posts in the areas of military and politics. The officials recruited for the administrative units were substituted by migrants from Palestine and Syria at the expense of the Transjordanian inhabitants. Intriguingly the Emir obtained his legitimacy and political power from non-Transjordanian dwellers until the British granted Jordan independence in 1946.

¹³⁷ Fathi (1994), *op.cit.*, p. 185.

¹³⁸ Quoted from Betty Anderson, “The Duality of National Identity ...”, *op.cit.*, p. 242.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 242.

Given the lack of a shared memory, the making of Transjordanian national identity (later Jordanian) after 1950, has been the common concern for all leaders and governments. The delineation of political borders of other Arab entities fortified the same process for the Jordanians. However it was the establishment of Israel as a separate state that consolidated Jordan as a distinct entity. For Yezid Sayigh, state of Israel was the major force that differentiates Jordan from Palestine.¹⁴⁰ Actually this argument is totally rejected by Transjordanian nationalists like Ahmed Owaidi al-Abbadi, a former police officer and member of parliament, in the sense that Jordan has constituted a separate entity even during the 19th century. Al-Abbadi said once “Jordan is our mother and the tribes as our fathers”.¹⁴¹

Precisely for those reasons mentioned above the issue of creating Transjordanian identity deserves attention. The loyalty to Jordanian state and homeland, therefore, embodies an integral part of making a collective identity. In addition pan-Arab nationalist goals of Emir Abdullah have chosen the way toward consummating the process of Jordanization. On the one hand loyalty to homeland denotes a territorial character, Arabist sentiments of the regime signifies a more supra-state identity on the other. The Arabist trend was then necessitated for making a shared past and common national myth after the incorporation of West Bank Palestinians into the Kingdom in 1950.

There are several aspects which explain the reason why the attainment of Jordanian identity has been a highly controversial issue in the post-1950 period. Valerie Yorke justified this argument by providing four different factors concerning post-independent era. Above all, for York, Jordan’s population was not homogenous given the sub-national loyalties. Secondly Jordan was surrounded by radical regimes like Syria and Iraq and the Ba’athist rules persisted in these countries posed a threat to pro-Western conservative stand of the Kingdom. Another factor was the uneasy relationship between Jordanians and Palestinian descents. Finally Jordanian dependence on outside powers for

¹⁴⁰ Sayigh (1991), op.cit, p. 171.

¹⁴¹ Odeh (1999), op.cit, p. 244.

economic purposes imposed a constraining effect on country's maneuvering effort in achieving a territorial identity. The Palestine problem and the incorporation of the Palestinian lands placed Jordan in a vital position that would drive more interest and support from regional and international powers.

According to Yezid Sayigh,

After a long period of influx [of Palestinian refugees], the concept of a specifically Jordanian entity, combining the Transjordanian and Palestinian communities under Hashemite rule, has been progressively consolidated over the last two decades.¹⁴²

Sayigh vindicated his argument by giving two historical episodes, namely 1967 war and 1970-71 civil war. For Sayigh, Jordanian identity has been consolidated by these events and notwithstanding the precarious situation concerning the longevity of this identity retains its significance. The main limitation behind the *uncertainty* is the relationship between Jordanians and Palestinian-Jordanians. In this respect, one of the most requisite determinants of Jordanian identity has been the tension between East Bankers and West Bankers and the culmination of the strain into an 'ethnic conflict' during 1970-71. The civil war itself has carried different meanings for both sides. Palestinians named this *fedayeen* episode as *Black* September, whereas Transjordanian nationalists called it as *White* September and constitutes one of the indispensable elements of Jordanian national myth. Hence the predicaments in making and/or unmaking Jordanian identity will be explored through explaining the Palestinian dimension. However, Jordanian national identity formation is not a complete project yet and its connotation and meaning have acquired new aspects after the peace with Israel which will be an area of concern in the next chapter of this study.

3.2 Jordan's Palestinian Dimension:

The interaction between Jordanian and Palestinian identities is not a new phenomenon generated by post-Second World War developments. Historically

¹⁴² Sayigh (1991), *op.cit.*, p. 167.

Transjordan has always been connected to Palestinian politics. The fundamental manifestation of this was the mandate period between 1921 and 1939. Emir Abdullah was very careful in separating Transjordan from Palestine. British High Commissioner Herbert Samuel on August 1920 declared that Transjordan and Palestine would not be brought together and Transjordan detached from Palestine, but both lands would be governed under the same mandate rule. In maintaining Transjordan as a distinct unit, the Balfour Declaration did not cover Transjordan since Britain excluded eastern part of the River via revising the provisions of the Mandate. The Um Qays Treaty on September 2, 1920 construes the delineation of British Transjordanian mandate when they agreed on the River Jordan as the main symbol and natural boundary that segregate Transjordan from Palestine. The Um Qays talks also maintained that Zionist immigration to eastern part of the River would not be allowed.

Nevertheless two mandates were demarcated; there were common administrative policies like the same currency unit. In the early years of mandate, Egyptian Pound was used but after 1927 it was exchanged with the Palestinian Pound.¹⁴³ Transportation of goods were transferred through Palestine and in addition Jordanian cabinet included Palestinian members, like Said al-Karmi, Ahmed Tuqan and Sheikh Hussam al-Din Jarallah. In the following years Transjordanian nationalism was a state-led instrument of Emir in consolidating his rule. According to Malcolm Yapp, in the early 1920s British officials predicated that Transjordan would be amalgamated into Palestinian administration centered at Jerusalem.¹⁴⁴ Jordan only after its independence in 1946 appointed her first *native born* prime-minister Said al-Mufti in 1950.

Some scholars argue that Palestinian nationalism is not a new phenomenon that revealed by the emergence of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Arab-Israeli conflict. For Rashid Khalidi and Adnan Abu Odeh the concept of *Filastin* had already existed for a long period of time (at least since 19th

¹⁴³ Nevo (1996), op.cit, p. 9.

¹⁴⁴ Yapp (1995), op.cit, p. 141.

century).¹⁴⁵ Khalidi's argument on Palestine as a discernible entity stems from four reasons. These are; the significance of holy lands and religious attachment of inhabitants to the Palestinian territory; Ottoman administrative re-demarcation of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Hebron, Beersheba, Gaza, and Jaffa as separate districts which formed one single governing unit connected directly to Istanbul (Sanjak of Jerusalem); fighting against European colonization and then Zionism perceived as the external threat to their existence; and finally attachment to the idea of homeland which implies *patriotism* and commitment to common shared territory. Palestine as a distinct entity has its roots from Dome of the Rock, al-Aqsa Mosque, Wailing Wall, al-Harm al-Ibrahimi in Hebron and other sacred places. All these factors have emanated myths and rituals that produced significant character for *Filastin*. The residents of *Filastin* all shared national and local ceremonies and they prayed all together at fixed intervals in the same places. Transjordanian identity was also promoted by colonial interference, but not in the sense of war of independence given that the boundaries of Transjordan were already drawn by the colonial powers with the exception of fighting with the Saudis for Aqaba and Maan.

In this sense, Transjordanian identity from the beginning lacks quest for liberation unlike their Palestinian counterparts. When Abdullah arrived in Amman on March 1921 Transjordan has never been administered as a distinct unit until that day and it was governed as an integral part of *Wilayat Dimashq*, the Province of Damascus, under the Ottoman rule. Prior to Abdullah's arrival, British officials worked together with local governors in Karak, Salt, Irbid and Amman. Therefore the growth of Transjordanian nationalism is closely tied with 'colonial state imagined its domination – the nature of human being it ruled [the census], the geography of its domain [the map], and the legitimacy of its ancestry [the museum]'.¹⁴⁶ Within this context, the making of Transjordan as an entity possessing a new identity has become apparent with the creation of the Emirate by the British colonial rule.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁵ Odeh, *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁴⁷ Massad, *op.cit.*, p. 21.

3.2.1 The effects of annexation of the West Bank with the East Bank of the River Jordan: ‘Two people - One land’

When King Abdullah annexed Palestinian territories in 1950, Jordan stressed her attachment to the Greater Syria Idea. In fact, incorporation of Palestinian lands which were granted to the Palestinian Arabs under the United Nations Partition Plan in 1947 brought a *dual* identity with two people on the same land. The arrival of Palestinian community has become to be described as a threat rather than a united Arab nation in the Fertile Crescent which have its roots from the Great Arab Revolt of Sharif of Mecca. The nature of Palestinian-Jordanian relationship since the annexation of two Banks represented the primary component of making Jordanian identity. In addition, the overwhelming majority of Palestinians led the Kingdom to calculate the very fact that their regime would be under the constraining effects of Palestinian identity.

Jordan’s annexation of the West Bank did not acquire an international recognition notably by the Arab world. Nevertheless the UN mediator Count Folke Bernadotte suggested that incorporation of Arab Palestine into Transjordan would be the best option left for the settlement of the conflict, the League of Arab States condemned Jordan’s annexation verbally without taking any measure against the Kingdom.¹⁴⁸ Concurrently, King Abdullah’s separate peace negotiations and signing an armistice treaty with Israel in 1949 brought Israeli recognition of Jordan’s annexation. Israel’s gain from this agreement was a small part of Samaria in West Bank, but King Abdullah paid the separate agreement with Israel with his life in July 1951 when he was assassinated by a Palestinian in East Jerusalem.

The incorporation of the West Bank into Jordan was significant for two reasons. Jordan did not only extend the borders of the Kingdom, but also it brought considerable influence and interest by the outsiders regarding Jordanian position in the region. Therefore the West Bank has always been the crucial determinant

¹⁴⁸ James O. C. Jonah, “The Middle East Conflict: The Palestinian Dimension”, *Global Governance*, 8, 2002, p. 415.

of Jordanian-Palestinian relationship even until today. The indigenous population of Transjordan was 433,000 in 1948. The influx of 450,000 Palestinians into Jordan has almost doubled the population. Despite 75% of Palestinians decided to stay on the West Bank, some 70,000 Palestinian refugees moved to reside on the eastern part of the Kingdom. In this context, as Valerie Yorke's indicates, the fundamental obstacle for the Hashemites after the unification of both Banks was to build a *specific* Transjordanian national identity.¹⁴⁹ Since the Palestinians were outnumbering Jordanian population after the 1949 exodus, nascent Jordanian identity formation has begun to be impeded by Palestinian culture and their national movement. In his regard, the discussions on who is *Jordanian*, *Transjordanian*, *native* Jordanian, or even *Jordo-Jordanian* have gained resonance when King Hussein severed Jordan's ties with the West Bank in 1988. The question of who is Jordanian and who is not and also which state will the Palestinians will be loyal to have become crucial after the Israeli recognition of the PLO in 1993.

The name of the new state did not include the word Palestine, or any of its derivatives. The Kingdom of Jordan has granted the custody of East Jerusalem immediately after the incorporation of Palestine. Having lost Mecca and Medina to the Saudis in 1925, King Abdullah then rejuvenated the role of Hashemite family in the Old City of Jerusalem. The extension of Jordanian rule to the western part of the river had apparently illustrated King Abdullah's incomplete Pan-Arab nationalist goals and besides he felt the emergence of Palestinian entity as the imminent threat against his rule. As a result of 1948 war, it would be in favor of Jordanians to rule the Palestinian lands rather than by the Palestinians themselves.

After the inauguration of Act of Unity in 1950 the Palestinian-Jordanians have granted legal and social rights and duties under the Jordanian Constitution. The Hashemite Kingdom was the only country in the world that granted citizenship to all Palestinians living in her boundaries including the refugees. Both King

¹⁴⁹ Yorke (1988), p. 5.

Abdullah and then King Hussein tried to develop close ties with leading Palestinian families and in return to obtain their support for the throne; they captured key posts in various units of administration including the premiership. Given that Palestinians have acquired citizenship and other key posts in the Kingdom, many Palestinians thought that (which is still a common concern for them) they are treated as second class citizens and many Jordanians approach them as guests rather than permanent residents. In Jordan the family names explain who you are and which family you belong to. In other words, each citizen's ethnic background could be easily recognized with his/her family name.

3.2.2 *Controlled Jordanization Process: The period between 1949-1967*

The annexation of the West Bank by Jordan immediately after the war highlighted the socio-economic differences between the Jordanians and Palestinian descents. The Jordanian regime wanted to ensure that Palestinians are fully incorporated into Jordanian society. In order to institutionalize its legitimacy and authority, the Kingdom dissolved the Palestinian bodies that had been working under the mandate rule prior to the annexation. The Hashemite Kingdom has sought to obtain loyalty and control over the Palestinians in order to integrate them into the state apparatus. However, regime's policy of 'homogenization' of Palestinians had a very little impact on the West Bank Palestinians.¹⁵⁰

The idea of Transjordan as the 'nucleus' of the Arab state that Sharif Hussein of Mecca wanted to establish was instrumental in making Jordan's identity synonymous with Palestinian identity during the early years of the Kingdom. The Pan-Arabist goal to achieve Greater Syria created an open door for ideological cooperation between two communities. Jordan's policy of identifying the political goals of the state as restoration of Palestine, struggle against colonialism and finally commitment to Arab unity helped the Kingdom

¹⁵⁰ Day (1986), *op.cit*, p. 60.

to negate the constraining effects of Palestinian nationalism at least until the outbreak of 1967 Arab-Israeli war.¹⁵¹ On the contrary, identifying Palestine as an Arab land and Palestinians as political community impeded the very foundations of evolving Jordanian *hybrid* identity. Overall, what distinguished Amman's interests from that of Palestinians was the liberation of whole Palestine. Jordanians perceived the liberation of whole Palestine as an *all-Arab* matter that could be solved in the long-term, whereas Palestinians thought that Palestine issue should be considered as a short-term policy.

The regime developed some pre-emptive measures in reducing the potency of Palestinians and their national movement. The prohibition of the word 'Palestine' on governmental documents and community associations was a defense mechanism of the Kingdom for securing Jordan's political and demographic future. In addition, the Constitution of Hashemite Kingdom highly discriminates against the urban area in favor of rural and simultaneously it puts some indirect obstacles for the Palestinian representation in national politics. In Jordan the northern and the southern centers are totally divided in terms of their urban-rural differences and place of origin respectively.¹⁵² Today, Jordan composed of twelve governorates and 45 districts. The southern governorates like Karak, Maan and Tafila are close to Hijazi and Bedouin culture and they are differed from the north regarding the lack of adequate industrialization and urbanization. The northern cities like Salt, Irbid and Amman, on the contrary, comprises Palestinian, Syrian, Lebanese migrants and they are more industrialized and politicized.

For Quintan Wiktorowicz, Jordanian political sphere is manipulated by several factors originated from the persisting legal limitations in political representation.¹⁵³ One of the legal impediment is the provision that for a political party to be registered only fifty initial members is required which led to

¹⁵¹ Mishal (1978), *op.cit.*, pp: 113-114.

¹⁵² Dann (1989), *op.cit.*, p. 8.

¹⁵³ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Limits of Democracy in the Middle East: The Case of Jordan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 53, No: 4, Autumn 1999, p. 618.

the formation of political parties based on traditional loyalties and ties rather than ideological grounds. Today Jordan has around thirty registered political parties, but the utility and political deepening is highly questionable. Another constitutional impediment is the electoral districting mechanism in the Lower House. The number of seats in the Lower House for each district is not determined by the population size. The rural areas which constitute the source of loyalty to the reign and largely bedouin/ tribal origin living in the southern part of the country granted the majority of the number of seats in the Lower Chamber. For instance, Irbid with a population of 390,685 is allotted 9 seats, while Amman's second district (with its high Palestinian population) with a population of 391,849 has provided only 3 seats in 1993 national elections. Therefore the number of seats is disproportionately distributed in the Parliament which is determined in accordance with loyalty to the regime rather than the population size.¹⁵⁴ It is in this context that Jordanian national identity is a *state-led* project embarked on *East Bank* identity.

In understanding the main determinants of Jordanian identity formation, Laurie Brand puts forward four elements that comprise Jordanian state's identity and nationalism.¹⁵⁵ First of all, King and the monarchy constitute the prominent symbols of Jordan and source of the legitimacy. Places like Petra, Jerash and Dome of the Rock helped the Kingdom to create a common past and collective memory. Second aspect of nation-building was embarked on the commitment to Arabism. The characterization of Jordan as the home to all Arab people could be construed as the main reason why King Abdullah granted Palestinians citizenship. Another pillar is Jordan's attachment to the West Bank and East Jerusalem, and Palestinian problem. Finally unification of the two Banks was illustrated as unifying the territorial integrity of Jordan. Hence, a greater Jordanian society was formed by 1950 with the integration of West Jordan with East Jordan. The clear manifestation of this policy was the idea of United Arab Kingdom (UAK) of King Hussein in 1972. In brief Jordan was converted into a

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 619.

¹⁵⁵ Brand (1995), *op.cit.*, pp: 50-51.

bi-national society having ethnically and politically divided on the question of the future of both Jordan and Palestine, if not religiously.

Since the end of Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, the Hashemite regime pursued the policy of *controlled Jordanization*. In this respect, it's vital to remind Ilan Pappé's question "was the West Bank *Jordanized*?"¹⁵⁶ Demographically given that Jordanian society is densely dominated by Palestinians, if Jordanization process was to be succeeded there would be a Palestinian Jordan not a pure Jordanized Jordan. Nevertheless King Abdullah did not intend to build a *new* collective identity; his policy was based on complete integration of the Palestinians into the Kingdom. Given that West and East Banks constitute two parts of Jordanian society, both communities then treated as equal partners forming the Greater Jordanian family. The first stepping stone of Abdullah's policy was to eradicate all connections of Palestinian-Jordanians with pre-1950 Palestine. King Abdullah confronted with al-Husseyini and his Arab Higher Committee. In fact, until the outbreak of the civil war there was no exact or deliberate *de-Palestinization* of West Bank; instead endorsement of Jordanian state identity was the main concern on the agenda of Hashemites. In doing that major Palestinian families were attempted to co-opt by the regime. For instance former prime-minister Tahir al-Masri is a Palestinian descent. Al-Masri family has built close ties with the Hashemites and engaged in joint businesses with Transjordanians. Sabih al-Masri, brother of Tahir al-Masri, is a well-known businessman in the East Bank and the family also founded the Cairo-Amman Bank with Khalil Talhuni after the unification of the two banks.

Ilan Pappé's point is noteworthy in understanding the main challenge to the Kingdom. Pappé suggests that during 1930s Palestinians did not portrayed Palestinian nationalism in the form of a defense mechanism confronting Jordanian state. It was rather pan-Arabist ideology threatened the Kingdom that reinforced by the Palestinians, if any. Joseph Nevo presents that the amalgamation of Palestinians into Jordanian society puts forward the making of

¹⁵⁶ Pappé (1994), *op.cit.*, p. 64.

a *dual identity*, while Laurie Brand characterizes the creation of Jordanian identity as a process of *crisis of identity*.¹⁵⁷ The Palestinian population was better educated, politicized and economically powerful as compared to the East Bankers.¹⁵⁸ Palestinian identity was more conscious in terms of their struggle against Zionism and quest for liberation. The weak Arab stand for the Palestinian cause during 1940s constitutes another factor reinforcing Palestinian self-identity. The failure of international community to find a just solution for Palestine paved the way for a Palestinian sense of distinction and extinction. The political difference between Jordanians and Palestinians also reflected itself into urban-rural cleavage respectively.

The southerners and the tribes specifically in Maan not only symbolize rural population in Jordan, whilst they portray the major stronghold of the Jordanian monarchy. In order to cope with this tension Jordan neither exposed a policy of Hashemitism nor Palestinianism; instead undertook a *hybrid* identification of Jordanization. In this respect, it's noteworthy to indicate that identity of Palestinian descents attached to supra-state *qawmiyya* whereas native Jordanian one was more centered on *wataniyya* (patriotism). The main illustration of ideology of *qawmiyya* was the election campaigns conducted before the 1967 Israeli occupation. The Pan-Arabist discourses dominated the parties' slogans at the expense of nationalist/ *watani* goals. Actually one group of people think that it was the success of Hashemites to de-Palestinize the Palestinians since Arabist sentiments were employed by the state to co-opt Palestinian-Jordanians. This optimism was collapsed when Pan-Arabism revealed as an explicit challenge to the state by the late 1950s. The threat to Jordanian national security and identity in post-1950 era was twofold; Palestinian nationalism and Pan-Arab nationalism. Under these circumstances, since then the making of Jordanian-Palestinian hybrid entity was a contentious project for all the Kings of Jordan since then.

¹⁵⁷ Joseph Nevo, "Changing Identities in Jordan", *op.cit*, p. 191.

¹⁵⁸ Yitzhak Reiter, "The Palestinian-Jordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 8, No: 1, Winter 2004.

The *controlled* Jordanization policy during 1950s and early 1960s in some respects coincided with *qawmiyya* due to the necessity to integrate Palestinian community into Jordanian society. Since Jordanian state had intended and attempted to unite the country under the label of Jordanian nation; one significant component of Jordanian identity was Arabism, but not in the sense of pan-Arab ideology. Palestinians and their eastward movement fortified the symbol for understanding and describing the notion of *other*. The image of the other solidified communal identity of Jordanians in that they began to perceive and deliberate who they are, what they want and to what extent they differ. The making of Jordanian identity and preferences were motivated by an opposition to another entity. Particularly after fedayeen episode Jordanians began to call the Palestinian-Jordanians as *Baljiks* (Belgians). In time, the term *Baljik* typically symbolized the Palestinians in Jordanian society on the grounds that Jordanians and Palestinians are different and the community of *Baljiks* serves as the notion of other, precisely for the Jordanian nationalists.

In addition, rethinking and re-claiming Jordanian history was a discernible component of nation-building in Jordan. Joseph Nevo, for instance, argues that Jordanian identity has constructed with the annexation (incorporation as well) of the West Bank territories.¹⁵⁹ Jordan's annexation and attempt to encompass West Bank and East Jerusalem formed the basis of creating a Jordanian self-contained identity. Besides, ever since the annexation and merging of two banks, West Bank has become an imperishable component of Jordan's nation-building and foreign policy-making. In addition, the West Bank Palestinians were not a monolithic community where they divided among themselves. The West Bankers and refugees identified themselves as Palestinian, whereas other Palestinians living on the East Bank were more loyal to the Hashemite rule. The official policy in Jordan advocated the idea of indivisibility of the borders of Hashemite Kingdom including the West part of the River. This policy was vindicated on the grounds that Nablus, Jenin, Ramallah, and Hebron were in

¹⁵⁹ Nevo, "Changing Identities in Jordan", *op.cit*, p. 191.

Jordan and contemporary Palestinian territories were only restricted to Jaffa, Ramle, Haifa and Beisan which are under Israeli administration.¹⁶⁰

Pan-Arabism was considered as a menace to Jordanian state particularly after Abu Nuwar Plot in 1956. Pro-Nasser military officer Abu Nuwar who prepared an unsuccessful coup against the Kingdom was not a Palestinian descent, but rather an East Banker and member of Arab Legion. In the aftermath of the Plot all the political parties were banned and martial law was imposed by 1957. During this time period of severe political repressions, the main threat posed to the Kingdom was Pan-Arabist and Ba'thist ideologies and Jordan having surrounded by these radical regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood was the only association that found legal and social environment to work and organize throughout the martial law. Contrary to post-1994 period Jordan's relations with the Islamists, precisely with the *Ikhwan*, were not based on a confrontational strategy. Nevertheless pan-Arab nationalist ideologies in the region was regarded as an anti-thesis to Jordanian regime, the Brotherhood was easily co-opted specifically by King Hussein. Until 1989 elections Jordan has exemplified the only case in the Middle East that was not confronted by political Islam.

King Abdullah wanted to emphasize the fact that Palestinians could return to their homes and the Kingdom would be the main supporter of the policy of right of return under the United Nations SCR 194. The assassination of King Abdullah by a Palestinian in 1951 depicted the growing resentment against Jordanian rule and it's clearly a case for understanding Palestinian dissatisfaction. The sense of Palestinian identity has never been subjected to decay, sooner after the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1964 Palestinians began to acquire significant regional and international recognition.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid*, p. 192.

3.3 Heritages of Jordanian Civil War: Identification of who is *Jordanian* who is *not*?

One of the most striking impacts of the civil war was the consolidation of distinct national identity of Jordan. The mobilization of tribes, Transjordanian nationalists and increased role of the army solidified the growth of distinct Jordanian identity and preferences. However the responses of Palestinian-Jordanians after the Black September Episode were totally articulated in terms of hatred sentiments. Actually some analysts, like Hussein Sirriyeh, argue that enduring conflict among Jordanians and Palestinians and the civil war of 1970-71 are all rooted in the legacies of partition of Greater Syria into several units under the Mandatory Powers in 1920.¹⁶¹ Jordanians commemorate the *al-Karameh* (honor) Battle every year in which Jordanian Army fought with the Israelis in Jordan Valley in March 1968. Until 1969, the PLO was not treated as a threat to Hashemite rule. However after the ascendancy of *al-Fatah* and Yaser Arafat to the leadership of the organization Palestinians have become more radicalized and began to act as a state within Jordanian state.

As the concept of state was founded before realizing the goal of nation-building, Jordanian-Palestinian struggle for power perpetuated severe effects on Jordanian national identity formation in coming decades. Meanwhile, Jordan was not only confronted by her Palestinian community, but also Israel posed a threat concerning the sovereignty and longevity of the Kingdom. Menachem Begin, the late former prime-minister of Israel, in 1956 declared that “the kingdom that is called Jordan is not a neighbor of Israel; it is an occupied part of its country...” which came to be known as ‘Both Banks of the River’ rhetoric.¹⁶² As a counter-discourse to ‘Both Banks’ idea which incorporated Hashemite Jordan, Israeli Revisionists re-defined the borders of Eretz Israel. The borders of Israel end where Jordanian state starts. However Begin continued to confront Jordan in that West part of the River is an indispensable part of Eretz Israel and

¹⁶¹ Hussein Sirriyeh, “Jordan and the Legacies of the Civil War of 1970-71”, *Civil Wars*, Vol: 3, No: 3, Autumn 2000, p. 74.

¹⁶² Nadav G. Shelef, “From ‘Both Banks of the Jordan’ to the ‘Whole Land of Israel’: The Ideological Change in Revisionist Zionism”, *Israel Studies*, Vol: 9, No: 1, 2003, p. 130.

Jordan's claims on the West Bank was not tolerable and could not be admitted. Menachem Begin, Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu they all reformulate their thinking eventually on the basis of "Whole Land of Israel" in 1978. In line with this idea, they declared that the *River Jordan* is the natural boundary of state of Israel. Shamir's reflection was stronger when he stated that there is *no other natural border* at all.¹⁶³

Wasfi al-Tall was appointed as the prime-minister by King Hussein in February 1965. It was a critical decision taken at a time when Ahmed Shuqayri demanded some measures from the Kingdom on behalf of the PLO. Wasfi al-Tall was a Jordanian nationalist and critical of Nasser and Shuqayri. Shuqayri then proposed two things to al-Tall; a Palestinian military force to counter Israeli attacks in West Bank and 5% deduction in wages of Palestinian civil servants. Jordan rejected both suggestions and al-Tall announced his government's disapproval of Shuqayri's proposal in May 1965. Al-Tall asserted that Jordanian Arab Legion is the command of whole Jordanian population including Jordanians and Palestinians. The historical statement of King Hussein pronounced during this time period. King Hussein affirmed al-Tall's rejection with his words, 'Palestine has become Jordan, and Jordan has become Palestine'. Concerning the incorporation of West Bank with the East Bank; Shuqayri stressed the same argument but with different nuances.

It's imperative to note that transfer of power from the Muslim Brotherhood to PLO was striking among Palestinian-Jordanians, because Palestinian recruitment to political parties in Jordan was very low while they formed an important part in the membership of Brotherhood. Therefore rising of the PLO brought two conflicting notions to the Hashemite identity. One of them was performed by the Palestinians and the other sponsored by the pan-Arabist regimes, Jamal Abdul Nasser in particular. Most likely it was the pan-Arab challenge that diverted Jordan from signing a peace treaty with Israel in the meantime. The Six Days War was another watershed for King Hussein which led Jordan to shift her preferences toward an anti-Israeli stand, at least in his

¹⁶³ Ibid, p. 135.

speeches to his society. In fact, Israeli retaliation just before the war and after determined Jordan's foreign policy making.

After the 1967 war, Jordan was left not only to be totally Arabized, but also Palestinized as well. Approximately 300,000 Palestinian moved to East Bank after the loss of Palestinian lands. They basically placed in Jordanian cities like Irbid, Amman and Salt. Ilan Pappé puts forward *al-Fatah's* growing power as the first *watani* Palestinian identity challenging Hashemites in the post-1967 era. For him, the civil war perhaps was the only moment that Palestinians articulated a *watani* identity. Since Palestinians began to act as a separate state within Jordanian state, it was an imminent threat to Jordan. As a matter of fact 1967 Israeli invasion of West Bank and Gaza Strip has turned these territories into a *de facto* Palestinian homeland. The Palestinian fedayeen had operations against Israel from Jordan's frontier in the north escalated a clash between Jordan and Israel in al-Karamah village. Meanwhile, the coup d'état that has brought a stronger Ba'athist regime in Syria came out with a new slogan 'Popular Liberation for Palestine' in 1966. Hafiz al-Asad was the minister of defense of the new regime in Syria. The PLO then backed by both Egypt and Syria against Israeli operations. Shuqayri posed an imminent threat to Jordanian regime when the PLO established close links with Jordanian opposition. Subsequently, the members of Ba'athist, Communist and Arab Nationalist Movement were arrested in April 1966.

King Hussein prepared a speech in the city of Ajlun on June 14 and stated vigorously that Jordan's territorial integrity is 'indivisible' and the disintegration of the two banks is inadmissible. His strong stress on the unity of two banks was in one sense warning the PLO and Shuqayri not to fall apart Jordanian society into two competing blocs. In examining the delineation of Jordanian identity from Palestinian, the Battle at al-Karamah requires attention. The al-Karamah was a Palestinian refugee camp founded in Jordan Valley in the aftermath of the war. The Battle at al-Karamah was remarkable in the history of Jordanian-Palestinian relationship in the sense that both sides used their struggle against Israeli forces as a war of independence. The former advisor to King Hussein and

later King Abdullah and former Minister of Information, Adnan Abu Odeh's evaluation of Battle at al-Karamah requires notification;

At al-Karama, the three parties engaged in a fifteen-hour battle with Jordan and the fedayeen fighting against Israel. After the battle, the two allies continued to fight among themselves, they were embroiled in a psychological warfare over who had won it.¹⁶⁴

After al-Karamah both the Jordanian army and *al-Fatah* increased their reputation, and they gained widespread popular support.

In the meantime, Hussein asserted that there is *one* Jordan; East Jordan and West Jordan both constitute one single unit.¹⁶⁵ Therefore the activities of the PLO necessitates to work within the parameters of Jordanian constitution and Unified Arab Command. On March 1, 1966 the Cairo Agreement between Jordan and the PLO has brought a relaxation in both sides relations to some extent. Jordan was represented by Minister of Interior, Abdal Wahhab al-Majali, and the PLO by Ahmed Shuqayri. The Agreement stipulates that Jordan will allow summer camps for Palestinian military training and the camps will be controlled by Jordanian army and the PLO together and a state-led tax system will be provided to finance the organization.

George Habash who was the figure head of Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) played a key role in the elevation of 1970-71 *fedayeen* episode. The Front blew up two international aircraft in the Jordan desert and then King Hussein decided to take some measures against PLO activities. However it was too late to perform a pre-emptive measure as the PLO and Jordan army found they militarily confronting each other. For the PLO northern part of Jordan where Palestinian camps were located was liberated area of Palestinians and they quest for partition of the country. By 17 September the PLO captured city of Irbid where the war began. The interference of Syrian Armed Forces after three days deteriorated Syrian-Jordanian relations in during this period.

¹⁶⁴ Odeh, *op.cit.*, p. 171.

¹⁶⁵ Dann (1989), *op.cit.*, pp: 147-148.

The civil war in Jordan illustrates to what extent Jordan has coped with two different challenging identities. Then PLO moved to southern Lebanon and Palestinian resentment against the Hashemite rule triggered by Palestinian National Council's declaration which says Jordan was part of Palestine in 1974. The idea of 'Transjordan for the Transjordanians' reinvigorated after the Arab Summit at Rabat and an internal debate re-surfaced concerning the future of Jordanian-Palestinians in Jordan. When the Israeli Likud Party took the power in 1977 they came up with their Party's rhetoric 'Jordan is Palestine'. By 1980s Likud government reinforced Jewish settlement on the West Bank on the grounds that there is a Palestinian state in the Eastern part of the River Jordan and this policy forced the West Bankers to evacuate their lands across the Allenby Bridge to Jordan. In addition, Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba proposed a Palestinian State to replace the Hashemite Kingdom. In those years another threat to Jordanian national identity and security derived from a PLO activist at the Palestinian Research Center, arguing the establishment of a Palestinian East Jordan. King Hussein then adapted several measures policies to lessen the Palestinian nationalism through re-Jordanization process in the public sector, particularly in the foreign ministry. Within this context, Jordan found herself in a situation to cope with the retrogression of Palestinians and adopted defensive measures. The pressures, which compelled Palestinians to crystallize their distinct national identity in the Jordanian diaspora and Occupied Territories, paved the way for the formation of a sense of *pure* Jordanian one. Thus the bi-communal division has reflected itself into a case of 'ethnic' domestic polarization and conflict.

In the aftermath of the civil war Transjordanian nationalism has found its voice in several groups in the country. One of these groups expressing the idea of Transjordan as a distinct national identity was *al-Ahd Party* and its leader Abd al-Hadi al-Majali. Al-Majali defined Jordanian identity as "... the formula composed of the components of homeland (the state), the people, the territory, and the framework that was accepted by the people to live within".¹⁶⁶ According

¹⁶⁶ Odeh, *op.cit.*, p. 242.

to al-Ahd, the Hashemite monarchy is an indispensable ingredient of Jordanian identity. The nationalist expressions articulated by pro-Jordanian elite can be indisputably seen as a state sponsored nation-building project.

Based on Max Weber's definition, Gellner defined 'state' as a politically centralized unit and it is a necessary condition for cultivating nationalism. Gellner argues that nationalism does not arise when there is no state. From this point of view, since the Unity of Act the emphasis put on the Jordanian distinctiveness and this constitutes a formula for delineation of collective and coherent identity in Jordan. The traditional nation-states have sought to homogenize their population and launch a sense of community giving rise to feelings of solidarity among their citizens. Hence the strength of the access to power by the nation-states has determined to what extent they accomplish in national homogenization. Thus the role of Jordanian state is central in maintaining the correspondence between citizenship and one single national identity.

3.4 Severing ties with the West Bank: Return to the borders of 'Transjordan' and re-awakening 'East Bank First' trend

The Arab League Summit at Rabat endorsed the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian community in 1974. The Rabat Resolution also recognizes the right of Palestinian people to establish their independent national authority under the command of the PLO on the soon to be created state of Palestine. The Resolution revealed the question of loyalty of Palestinian-Jordanians to the Hashemite monarchy. As an exposition of this idea many Transjordanian people came up with a *Jordanian Likud* scheme. Pro-Jordanian people in the government ask what happens if Palestinians take over the Kingdom and establish their home in Jordan. If the UN General Assembly Resolution 194 of right of return is not going to be implemented, Jordan would feel the pressures of rhetoric 'Jordan is Palestine' which is the corollary of *al-Watan al-Badil* (alternative homeland). As Valerie Yorke suggested, post-Rabat period manifested the growing affinity with 'East Bank First' trend where

Transjordanian nationalism has received considerable response. The members of this group working with the throne were advocating severing of ties with Palestine. The exponents of East Bank First idea did not approve Jordanian involvement in any settlement for the Palestinian cause, because this would propel the country to confront with outside effects specifically from Israel.

The Palestinian first *intifada* against Israeli occupation broke out in Gaza and extended to West Bank territories in 1987.¹⁶⁷ Jordanian state and the people supported Palestinian uprising. The Algiers Summit was decisive in settling Jordan's attitude concerning the future of Palestinian lands. In Algiers, Arab states declared their support for the *intifada* through Jordanian-Palestinian Committee hitherto. The elimination of Jordan as a separate bridge for funding Palestine led King Hussein to cancel 5-year development plan for the West Bank and East Jerusalem and dissolve the Lower Chamber on July 28, 1988. Three days after King Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank, the Kingdom abolished the Ministry for the Affairs of the Occupied Lands.

King Hussein basically took special attention to national unity. On July 31, he publicly declared that 'Jordan is *not* Palestine' and an independent Palestinian state will be founded on the liberated occupied lands. Palestinian identity will be embodied and he added that Jordanian national unity forms the basis of stability and source of prosperity. Adnan Abu Odeh who wrote King's disengagement speech evaluated King's words in his remarkable book on 'Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process'. Odeh indicated that King Hussein insisted on the point of national unity to be the key component of his public speech. Odeh also added that Transjordanian nationalists had long predicted to hear from Hussein that 'Palestinian-Jordanians in Jordan would no longer be Jordanian citizens', but he has never declared such a statement.¹⁶⁸ Viewed from the point of Palestinian-Jordanians, disengagement should be interpreted as 'Jordan is Jordan' for all people living on Jordan

¹⁶⁷ Adam Garfinkle, Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1992, pp: 146-148.

¹⁶⁸ Abu Odeh, op.cit, p. 227.

regardless of their ethnic or religious background and in return West Bank is regarded for the Palestinian community.¹⁶⁹ In the meantime, Palestinians have predicted that Palestinians living in diaspora could be able to move their homeland after its liberation. For both sides at the very beginning internal strain already persisted was replaced by an inter-communal dialogue particularly after the declaration of state of Palestine by the PLO.

In case of Hashemite monarchy the idea of *al-Watan al-Badil* has lost its prominence and credibility in favor of 'Jordan is Jordan' and 'Palestine is Palestine'. For the point of Transjordanians, Palestinian descents were regarded as temporary citizens and East Bank is belonging to Jordanians for those who inhabited prior to 1967. The controversial issue of who is Jordanian and who is Palestinian is still a matter of contention given that the return of Palestinian diaspora is on the agenda of the peace process. Moreover Jordan's adherence to Resolution 194 is based on one prerequisite; the right of return should be limited to 1967 refugees.

King Hussein's decision of severing of ties by July 1988 was not simply a strategic action plan of the regime to detach Jordan from Palestine. If it happens Jordan's *Arab* identity and the detachment would freeze the ties with the US, if not, diminish Jordan's position in the eyes of the Western powers. For Joseph Nevo, King's disengagement from the West Bank territories was centered on the policy of sustaining Jordanian state and national integration.¹⁷⁰ King's judgment vindicates the lucid line in demarcating her borders from the Palestinian entity. Through this way, Jordanian legitimacy and sovereignty will be both for the most part fortified. The disengagement has constituted a defining moment in

¹⁶⁹ However, regime in Jordan is aimed to maintain a *de facto* over-representation of the East Bank constituencies with the 1986 Election Law. The 1986 Law is devised to include separate seats (total 11) for the refugee camps in the East Bank. Although the regime kept its policy of 'indivisibility' of the two Banks and did not give up her claim on representing both Banks, the election law clearly demonstrated that the Kingdom adopted a strategy of 'Jordanizing' Jordan with the instrument of unevenly allocated seats in the legislature. Thus, prior to the severing of ties with the West Bank in 1988, Jordan took some pre-emptive measures to control Palestinian majority in the Lower Chamber and in turn restrict Palestinians' domination in the political landscape. See; Schirin Fathi, "Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a 'Safety Valve'", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 41, No: 6, November 2005, p. 891.

¹⁷⁰ Joseph Nevo, "Changing Identities in Jordan", p. 197.

Kingdom's history. Jordan's verdict was an official re-demarcation of frontiers similar to pre-1948 *geography* of Jordan; but with an explicit and precarious *demographic* difference. The demography of the Kingdom retains its unbalanced structure between Palestinians and Jordanians and even after 1989 between southerners and other governorates.

Linda Layne argues that Jordan has undertaken a shift in her collective identity making 'from issues of tribalism to the discussion of the place that Jordan should hold in a divided Arab nation' immediately after the detachment from Palestine and the Gulf war policy making.¹⁷¹ The overwhelming Palestinian majority in Jordan for some people did not reinforce the idea of identification of the other, but instead presence of the other was damaging Jordanian identity in the form of a counter-hegemonic force. In examining the menace posed by counter-hegemonic identity, it's imperative to look the diversity in Palestinian population in Jordan.

Until 1988 Palestinians comprised four different groups; 1948 and 1967 refugees who were camp dwellers, urban middle class, and the Gulf returnees. The first group holds strong attachment to Palestinian 'West Banker' identity, whereas the second group migrated to eastward and they were relatively integrated into Jordanian society politically and economically as compared to the other groups. The Gulf returnees on the contrary are not Jordanian nationals and they do hold Jordanian passports for convenience and for that reason strongly attached to Palestinian identity than that of Jordanian. Given that Palestinian community did not portray a homogenous entity, it was the *fedayeen* episode that broke the chain between the state of Jordan and the PLO throughout 1970-71.¹⁷² The Black September incident not only weakened Jordan's role regarding the Palestinian problem, but also intensified the resentment of Palestinians and they became less loyal to the monarchy. According to Michael Barnett, the relationship between Palestinian entity and Jordan during the civil war was the most important challenge to the Arab regional order envisaged at

¹⁷¹ Layne, *op.cit.*, p. 103.

¹⁷² Mishal (1978), *op.cit.*, p. 114.

Khartoum Arab League Summit in 1967. Intriguingly, this should not be construed that Jordanian-Palestinian relationship was forming a self-contained collective identity. It was not. The official view was similar to the previous argument, whereas the practical relationship tells something different.

3.5 The Unrest in Maan: New Adversity - New Address

The city of Maan located at the southern part of Jordan and northern part of Hijaz was connecting the Province of Damascus with the holy cities, Mecca and Medina during the Ottoman rule. It was the passage of pilgrimage route and with the construction of Hijaz Railway by the beginning of 20th century Maan has gained a significant role as a transit center. Maan is predominantly composed by non-Palestinian population of 100,000 people and traditionally it is the significant base of support for the Hashemite monarchy. The leading families in Maan were basically Hijazis and Syrians. Following the Arab Revolt, Emir Abdullah stayed on Maan for three months just before the establishment of Transjordanian Emirate (before his arrival in Amman in 1921). This is why that for Maanis, Maan was the first capital of Jordan. The city, as mentioned previously, adhered to Transjordan by 1925.

Emir Abdullah and later King Hussein stressed the role of tribes and the Bedouins in the area through providing governmental posts and economic advantages accessed by the Port at Aqaba. Since the inception of the Kingdom, the security personnel and military officers recruited from the city. The people of Maan were the most advantageous among the Southerners since they were granted by various job opportunities. For instance, access to tourism sector (including Petra); truck transport; mineral industries; port at Aqaba; and finally governmental ranks have benefited the majority of Maanis.¹⁷³ Although Maan constitutes the popular loyalty to the Jordanian state; the city will perpetuate the forthcoming unrests throughout the country, April 1989 and November 2002 riots in particular. As Jillian Schwedler characterizes, “If Maan is well-known in

¹⁷³ “Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Maan”, *International Crisis Group (ICG)*, Middle East Briefing, 19 February 2003, p. 6. www.crisisgroup.org (date of access: 20 March 2006).

Jordan for its non-Palestinian, pro-Iraqi, anti-structural adjustment opinions, these views are widely shared, though less militarily expressed, throughout the country”.¹⁷⁴

What is more the election law precisely amended in 1993 over-represents the periphery at the expense of urban areas in the country. In Jordan, urban areas highly populated with Jordanians of Palestinian origin, whereas rural areas are composed of East Bankers who are Bedouin origin mostly live in the southern provinces like, Maan, Tafila and Karak. Beside this fact, Palestinians reflects a better educated wealth-producing element of Jordanian population, however the national politics is vested largely in the hands of East Bankers.¹⁷⁵ Nevertheless, 60-75% of the eligible East Bank population which is Palestinian origin is free to vote and can stand for the legislature; they are disproportionately and unevenly represented in the national politics.¹⁷⁶ Prior to the 1988 disengagement, both West and East Banks equally represented in the Parliament, but since then the West Bank representation has ceased which led the slightly open door for Palestinians to diminish through legal measures, like 1992 Political Parties Law and 1993 electoral law. As a direct consequence of this regulation, Palestinian membership and support for both the *Ikhwan* and IAF has intensified. Although the regime has sought to reduce the potency of Palestinian opposition through pre-emptive measures in the post-1988 era, it was rather the southerners and the East Bankers who began to confront domestic stability and communal identity in the country by 1980s onwards.

Considering Jordan’s dependence on foreign aid and external sources, the radical changes in the world oil market and regional instabilities in the Gulf by 1980s would bring severe effects on Jordan’s fragile economy. In this context, the political opening since 1989 in Jordan is directly linked to the economic crises that country faced in the late 1980s. Jordan is not an oil-producing and

¹⁷⁴ Jillian Schwedler, “Occupied Maan: Jordan’s Close Military Zone”, *MERIP*, December 3, 2006. (<http://www.merip.org/mero/mero120302.html> -date of access: 3 April 2006)

¹⁷⁵ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Profile, 1996-1997, p. 18.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid*, p. 6.

exporting country, but it is regarded as a *semi-rentier* economy concerning her reliance on external sources or ‘rents’.¹⁷⁷ For Curtis Ryan, Jordan is a semi-rentier state due to the wealth provided by Jordanian nationals working as expatriates in the Gulf oil-exporting countries, not simply because of her minimal oil supply. Since 1970s Jordan has become partially dependent on the Gulf oil economies and partly on workers’ remittances. Jordanian economy was funded by the Gulf Sheikdoms when Jordan rejected to finalize peace with Israel after Egyptian recognition of Israeli state in 1978 at Camp David.

With the collapse of the Arab oil market and the dramatic fall in the oil prices added with external debt accounted more than country’s GDP, brought austerity measures. Riots at Yarmouk University in May 1986 have started to intensify in 1988 with the devaluation of Jordanian Dinar by 45%. The government launched the deduction in subsidies and in March 1989 prime-minister Zaid al-Rifa’i introduced structural adjustment program signed with the IMF to stabilize the economy.¹⁷⁸ The IMF then agreed to supply \$125 million in credit and also the World Bank will provide more than \$100 million loan for two years period. This economic recovery also compelled the country to cut governmental expenditures. The price of basic commodities including cooking gas and gasoline has dramatically increased by 30%. The new face of the country illustrates the collapse of the old linkage between the society and the throne. The ethnic and social division among the East Bankers and Palestinian population and among urban and rural areas began to reveal immediately after the application of structural adjustment program.

The bread riots broke out at the southern city of Maan, where the majority of the population poses traditional loyal ties, and spread out to the city of Karak on the day when the reforms came into force. The center of the public riots was Maan because the truck industry of the city was the first being affected by the prices. Considering the beginning of *Ramadan* the demonstrations intensified its

¹⁷⁷ Curtis Ryan, *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 2002, p. 50.

¹⁷⁸ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, Country Profile, 1996-1997, pp: 10-11.

resonance in a very short period of time. The public anger combined with police interference brought 16 dead and many people wounded. The demonstrations were only related with economic recession and the increase in fuel prices, but the riots were the clear manifestation of the public cry for more political freedom and parliamentary politics. The public riots then expanded all around the country and this brought the replacement of prime-minister Zaid al-Rifa'i by Mudar Badran in 1989.¹⁷⁹

In the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, once again Maan were economically the most destroyed part of the country. The Gulf returnees invested their money in the areas like construction, services and finance basically favoring the population of urban areas like Amman. The regime was publicly criticized by the well known independent Islamist Layth Shubeilat with his speech in Maan. He was first sentenced to death but later released by the police. In his speech, Shubeilat disapproved corruption and shift in country's Iraqi policy.

Maan today represents the common strains that could be found anywhere in the country. Problems like law enforcement and economic development are the two main sources of domestic unrest; enduring Palestinian conflict and the US strike against Iraq epitomize the external anti-regime elements. Ever since 1989 riots, Maan was prone to three more large scale demonstrations and has become the symbol for resistance and popular solidarity. The reason why Maan constitutes the venue for the unrest can be clearly illustrated by 2000 Jordan Human Development Report which indicates that Maan is the worst among the twelve governorates in the country.¹⁸⁰ The illiteracy rate in the city is the highest in Jordan, around 19%. Another striking indicator is related with young generation. 61% of Maanis are under eighteen and they think that they are socio-economically and politically neglected by their state. The negative conditions led the Maanis to identify themselves a distinct entity having courage and

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

¹⁸⁰ According to Jordan Human Development indicators; Maanis' annual household income is 20% below the national average. The unemployment rate was 19.2% and 52% among the young women in 2000. Source: "Jordan: Red Alert in Maan", ICG Report, www.crisisgroup.org.

solidarity for their future. They think that the government has created disparities between Maan and other governorates. Notably, the city represents an armed Islamist activism following the socio-economic crises and riots. The growing dissatisfaction in Maan will be precipitated by the outbreak of al-Aqsa uprising and the Iraqi crisis. The assassination of American AID staff Laurence Foley outside his residence in Amman in 2002 demonstrated the enlarged scope of anti-American opposition precisely after the outbreak of the US war in Iraq.

It's imperative to state that ongoing socio-economic changes were prone to political reforms in the Arab world as a whole. However in the Jordanian example, one more point should be added and emphasized which is a new phenomenon for the country, i.e. the growing resentment of the rural areas. Therefore what has happened in Maan after 1990s particularly in 2002 demonstrations will serve as a *test* for Jordan in all spheres of life, but the most skeptical and volatile test will be given in the area of consolidating Jordanian national identity. Throughout King Hussein's rule, there existed a traditional hereditary linkage between the society and the royal family. However the riots started for the very first time in the areas where regime acquires its traditional popular support, this time criticizing the regime's policies. The main reason was the perception of the native Jordanians (strikingly King's men) who thought that their King has totally neglected them. After these riots King Hussein took some political measures to re-store the stability and legitimacy and he partly succeed it via conveying the *Majlis al-Nuwwab* and holding parliamentary elections after 22 years in 1989, and later in 1993, 1997 and lastly in 2003.

3.6 Re-thinking and Transforming Jordanian Identity:

As Gudrun Kramer suggests, "Against great odds and many hopes and expectations, the Jordanian entity [has] widely seen as the very epitome of the artificiality in the region, has been successfully consolidated".¹⁸¹ Likewise Adam Garfinkle accounts that Jordan has survived eight times facing with eight

¹⁸¹ Gudrun Kramer, "Integration of the Integrists", *op.cit.*, p. 218.

different challenges posed to her security.¹⁸² His analysis covers the period between 1946 until 1982. Since he wrote his essay during 1993, Garfinkle's analysis is confined to the challenge confronted by the first *intifada* and Kuwaiti Crisis as the most recent confrontations.

Jordanian national identity formation has always been squeezed between multitudes of identities; sub-state like tribal and parochial, and supra-state notably by Arabism and Islam. In addition, Jordanian identity formation has overlapped with the evolution of Palestinian national identity. The diversity and shifts in making Jordanian credentials and preferences, therefore, associated entirely with the clash of territorial nationalism (*wataniyya*) and supra-state Arab nationalism (*qawmiyya*) persisting in the region.¹⁸³ The Hashemite Jordan is not the only country that her national identity was diluted by internal forces and external developments. Almost all the countries in the Fertile Crescent (Greater Syria and Iraq) has experienced with the same transition.¹⁸⁴

Either Pan-Arabism or local nationalisms promoted new socio-economic agendas by different regimes. In this respect the influence of Jordanian National Movement (JNM) occupies a vital place in which Ba'ath Party, Communist Party and Arab Nationalists and Socialists all took part in the formation of JNM as a single unified force. The incorporation of Palestine after 1950 has reinforced the exposition of the Arab nationalist tendency and served as an instrument transforming Jordanian identity after its independence by 1946. Their main objective was to unite Jordan with other Arab states and undermine the role of *King's men*. Although the political parties were banned and political repression replaced the promising democracy of Jordan, the aims of JNM partially have culminated with the termination of Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and finalizing Arab Solidarity Agreement in 1957 under the Nabulsi government.

¹⁸² Adam Garfinkle, "The Nine Lives of Hashemite Jordan", in Robert Satloff, The Politics of Change in the Middle East, West View Press, 1993.

¹⁸³ Betty Anderson (2002), op.cit., p. 232.

¹⁸⁴ Gershoni, op.cit.

The primary building block of Jordanian identity formation was the emphasis put on school curricula and textbooks. For instance, Minister of Education published *Tarikh al-Filastin* for sixth-year students in which Hashemite Arab Revolt is examined specifically to symbolize the King and royal family as ‘paternal father figures of Jordanian nation’.¹⁸⁵ Creating images, norms and exclusive characteristics through state-led education were prominent in making a native Jordanian self-contained identity. In that respect, the consolidation of Jordanian national identity with respect to its domestic unrest and ethnic division necessitates attention. Actually a common sense of Jordanian national identity has not yet fully developed. In Kramer’s opinion, one of the basic impediments for the lack of Jordanian coherent identity derives from the impact of *ethnicity* and *tribalism* on political behavior and social organization. The Palestinian dimension in Jordan, no doubt, forms the fundamental aspect in un/making Jordan’s distinct identity.

Even after the day of independence Jordanian nation-building has never been a complete project; it’s still transforming and trying to adapt itself to changing circumstances. Hillel Frisch portrays this transformation or re-construction of Jordanian collective identity as *fuzzy* and *eclectic* due to the security problems.¹⁸⁶ Frisch indicates four key element of Jordanian collective identity; lineage and family; civic identity; the Arabist sentiments; and Islam. Although Jordan acquired its independence and obtained a common territory the project of nation-building did not complete yet. The problem of making identity is exacerbated by the influx of Palestinians after 1948 war. If the process of nation-building left to be constructed on the amalgamation of West and East Banks it would not be a pure Jordanian nation. Instead Palestinian and Arab identities and credentials would eventually dominate Kingdom’s collective identity. Therefore Jordanian state and nation-building were not contiguous projects like in the sense of nation-state system of Europe.

¹⁸⁵ Betty Anderson (2002), *op.cit.*, p. 248.

¹⁸⁶ Hillel Frisch, “Fuzzy Nationalism: The Case of Jordan”, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol: 8, No: 4, Winter 2002.

As Lisa Anderson suggests legitimacy of monarchical regimes in the Middle East denotes the early monarchical rules in European continent which was centered on the Kings' credentials. Since the borders and institutions of Jordan in this case have not consolidated yet an absolutist monarchy replaces the nation-state. This is likely to occur in such countries facing with territorial re-demarcation. Jordan's borderlines defined in 1925, re-defined in 1950 and then re-delineated in 1988 illustrate the reason why Hillel Frisch calls Jordanian nationalism as eclectic and fuzzy. Based upon the survey conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) located at the University of Jordan in Amman during 30 August and 6 September 1994, the majority of Jordanian society supported any kind of *unity* between the Hashemite Jordan and the territories of Palestine. Approximately 65.8% of native Jordanians and 78.5% of Palestinian origin Jordanians shared any kind of unity between Jordan and Palestine.¹⁸⁷ Very interestingly, before signing the peace treaty with Israel, 30.4% of native Jordanians and 37.8% of Palestinian-Jordanians shared the common understanding that they should establish a complete unity with Palestine.

The Jordanian branch of Muslim Brotherhood rejects the idea of disintegration of Jordan and Palestine because partition will prone to the *balkanization* of the Arab world into several units. Similarly the IAF which is the largest political party in the Kingdom characterizes Jordan as a temporary entity with temporary boundaries. On the contrary Abd al-Hadi al-Majali, head of *al-Ahd* Party, which is a conservative Jordanian nationalist group in the Parliament, advocates the participation of Palestinians in political life as long as they act as Jordanians. Given the norms and preferences of Jordanian state and its people differ; the dichotomy between two sides will be perpetuated both by the outbreak of *al-Aqsa intifada* in Palestinian territories by 2000 and the US war in Iraq by 2003.

According to Michael Barnett, the loss of West Bank in 1967 and the eventual radicalization of Palestinians called for a reconsolidation of Jordanian national identity. In addition, Jordanian identity then incited and devastated by the

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp: 94-96.

Jordanian-Palestinian civil war throughout early 1970s. The Black September Episode has heralded a new embodiment concerning the Jordanian state and its security needs. In brief, the civil war led to the institutionalization and solidification of state's security structure and understanding vis-à-vis the anti-regime protagonists. This brought an absolute necessity for the re-consolidation of Jordanian identity both at national and international level. The close ties to the West Bank have recognized as a *threat* rather than stability for the first time after the annexation. The disengagement from the West Bank represents a transition in the formation of Jordanian identity which was neglected by the rationalist and realist approaches.¹⁸⁸

Understanding the change in Jordan's interests and identity has been underestimated by other theoretical assumptions with the exception of constructivism. Constructivism basically argues that identities and norms are socially and historically constructed not only within domestic interactions, but also are shaped and embedded within regional and systemic structures. In this context, identities in the Middle East, Pan-Arabism in particular, was constructed both in state's domestic realms and re-defined through states' inter-communal interactions. The states in the region did not only represent their popular identities and loyalties in formulating their foreign policy behaviors; it has been rather in a way where regional and outside constraints and forces seemingly motivated states to *contain* the popular loyalties instead of expressing them freely.¹⁸⁹ These two analyses illustrate that Jordanian identity is not taken for granted, instead treated as constructed within domestic realm and regional context and also serves as a constraining effect on the Kingdom's foreign policy-making. In Jordan, the state frequently challenged by the multiple sub-state and supra-state identities where the *statising* goal of the Hashemite rule impeded by the lack of allegiance to Jordanian territorial state.

¹⁸⁸ Lynch (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 72.

¹⁸⁹ Raymond Hinnebusch, "Politics of Identity in Middle East International Relations", in Louise Fawcett (ed), International Relations of the Middle East, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005, p. 164.

Severing of ties with Palestine led Jordan and Jordanians to perceive Palestinian statehood as a source of political stability for the first time in Kingdom's history. The change in Jordan's ideals and interests then explained and shared by King Hussein before his society. Redefining Jordan's norms and preferences opened a new era in country's political liberalization where the severing of ties was totally integrated and institutionalized by the Jordanian state. Besides, detachment of the West Bank was perceived as an Arabist tendency and a pro-Palestinian stand which led the Palestinians and Jordanians to act together in the Gulf War. Thus a *Jordanized state* identity has made the process toward normalization with Israel smoother in 1994. Looked from this framework, disassociation from Palestine could not be explained from a rational point of view, because it would be simply a strategic decision.

Jordan's *de-Palestinization* process after 1988 is not only a concern for physical security but it should be analyzed from the point of to what extent Jordan re-identified her interests and preferences. In other words, transformation in the rhetoric "Jordan is Palestine" to "Jordan is Jordan" is a practice of identity formation and re-consolidation. Granting citizenship to Palestinian refugees and the incorporation of the West Bank have diluted the formation of Jordanian national identity. The role of *qawmiyya* was central in integrating Palestinian community into Jordanian society. However, in the aftermath of the disintegration of the two Banks in 1988, the Hashemite Kingdom took a decisive step to detach her identity from that of Palestine. For that reason, disengagement from the West Bank territories presents a transition from *qawmiyya* to *wataniyya* and also a more *Jordanized* Jordan which was followed by 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' by 2002 onwards.

The Israeli disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2004 re-invokes the discussion in terms of revitalizing the 'Jordanian Option' for settling Palestinian state at the expense of Jordanian entity.¹⁹⁰ Ariel Sharon's unilateral decision to evacuate from the occupied lands led King Abdullah II to warn the US for any step

¹⁹⁰ Marc Lynch, "No Jordan Option", *MERIP*, 21 June 2004.

<http://www.merip.org//mero062104.html> (date of access: 19 January 2006)

toward re-awakening the idea of 'alternative homeland'. In this respect, King Abdullah's new initiative of the 'Jordan First Campaign' is very similar with the 'East Bank First' trend of 1970s.

For that purpose, the next chapter will focus on the impact of Palestinian dimension on Jordan's politics of identity in shaping her foreign policy goals. The Oslo Peace Accords and the peace-making with Israel in 1994 made continuous debates on Jordanian identity deeper. The emergence of Anti-Normalization Campaign (ANC) in resisting normalization with Israel has boosted the political potency of the opposition in contending with Kingdom's foreign policy preferences. One of the fundamental aspects of the peace process was the regime's de-liberalizing efforts in containing the peace opponents, precisely the Islamist groups.

As long as Jordanian society's affinity with the Palestinians and enmity with Israel intensified conflicting norms of the regime and the society, the relationship between both sides will enter into a new phase regarding Jordan's interests and preferences. The re-definition of collective ideals, therefore, places Jordan's national identity at the core of discussions with regard to national agenda. It was in Jordan's interest to uphold a legitimate and coherent Jordanian identity to overcome her collective action problems (i.e. foreign policy choices namely continuous economic dependency on the West and normalizing ties with Israel) in the long run. When the growing internal unrest in the southern governorates, specifically in Maan and Karak, is taken into consideration, Jordan's responses to external and internal challenges are both incorporated and inhibited within the process of *spontaneous* and *continuous* identity adjustment.

CHAPTER 4:

THE PALESTINIAN DIMENSION: THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN JORDAN

Given the historical relationship between Palestinian and Jordanian territories under British mandate rule, Jordanian political history as a separate entity has for the most part coincided with that of Palestinian. The Palestinian issue has become central to Jordan's politics of identity particularly with the Kingdom's annexation of Palestine territories in 1950 and the incorporation of West Bank Palestinians under a citizenship law of 1954. Since the annexation of West Bank Jordan opted for building a hybrid identity to integrate Palestinian descents into the monarchy. Jordan's claim to represent West Bank Palestinians have always been confronted by the Palestinians in the Occupied Lands and Arab countries in the region especially following the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. The loss of West Bank territories in 1967 then challenged Jordan's claim on Palestine lands and weakened Kingdom's policy of representing Palestinians. Jordan did not alter its position to give up her claim on Palestine even after *fedayeen* episode during 1970-71. The Kingdom since the first *intifada* has begun to divert her claim on West Bank and shifted toward a policy of preserving the Hashemite monarchy independent on the Eastern part of the River Jordan.

The Oslo Accords which recognized the establishment of an independent Palestinian entity on the West Bank and Gaza profoundly led Jordan to fear that the stability and survival of the Kingdom could be under vehement threat. Thus the shift in Kingdom's Palestine policy after King Hussein's disengagement from West Bank in 1988 that led Jordan to call for 'two-state solution' is not only stemming from Palestinian uprising and growing Palestinian activism for national liberation, but also to decrease the challenge posed by Israeli 'Jordan

Option'. The signing of the peace treaty with Israel in 1994 only after Oslo process between Israel and PLO clearly demonstrates the presence of Palestinian issue embedded in Jordan's domestic and foreign policy-making and also signifies the vulnerability of Jordan in conducting relations with Israel. The overwhelming effects of Palestinian dimension has re-invigorated by the second *intifada* at a time when the Kingdom attempted to normalize her relations with Israeli state. In this respect, the outbreak of al-Aqsa *intifada* in September 2000 has dramatically re-weakened the position of the monarchy in the eyes of its Palestinian citizens. Looked from this framework, the fundamental backdrop of Jordanian-Israeli relations has persistently interwoven with constant identity conflict, Palestinian problem and internal unrest of the former. In this context, the regime's responses in overcoming the effects of peace process require great scrutiny given the legalization of political parties and democratic opening by 1992 onwards which has paved the way for emerging political oppositionary groups not only deriving from Palestinian descents but also from East Bankers as a new phenomenon in Kingdom's history.

4.1 The Road to Madrid and Oslo Peace Process:

The demise of the Soviet Union provided the United States an uncontested power concerning the establishment of a New Middle East initiative by the onset of 1990s. One of the leading motives for the United States to involve in the Middle East affairs was concerned with the dispute between Israel and the Arab states in the region. Conveying an international peace conference following the Gulf War illustrates the commitment of the US to find a solution for Palestine and to provide the means necessary to for the survival and maintenance of the regimes in the region, notably the Hashemite Kingdom. The Peace Conference was held in Madrid by the end of October in 1991 with the participation of Israel, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Palestinian delegates. The peace negotiations were going to be based on United Nations Resolution 242 which calls for Israeli withdrawal from West Bank and Gaza, and the principle of 'land for peace'. Syria subsequently withdrew from the talks considering the possibility that Israeli state would gain legitimacy by bilateral negotiations with Arab states.

Jordan's participation in the Madrid Peace Talks was closely related with her pro-Iraqi policy during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Jordan was the only Arab state that gave support for Iraq, if not necessarily to Saddam Hussein's rule. Jordan's Iraq policy was not only stemming from Jordan's close economic ties with Iraq, but it's more related with the PLO's support for Saddam Hussein in the early 1990s. Since Palestinian factor in Jordanian society was outraged by the ongoing repercussions of the first *intifada*, King Hussein has sought to appeal to his society via sharing the same attitude with the Palestinians. However, the post-Gulf War policy of King Hussein has moved Jordan in isolation by the Western countries, US in particular.¹⁹¹ One of the leading motives for Jordan to participate in the 1991 Middle East peace process was, therefore, to avoid the post-Cold War unsettlement and isolation caused by affinity with Iraqi state.

By the mid-1991 it was evident that Madrid Peace talks would begin soon and therefore a 'Palestinian-Arab identity' would be the best solution to initiate peace negotiations with Israeli state. King Hussein before participating in peace talks with Israeli officials urged to influence and persuades its public and domestic politics beforehand. In making the *unthinkable* imaginable (which is recognizing Israeli state), King Hussein required a reliable prime minister who would win the sympathy of the members of the Lower Chamber to ratify the treaty. Immediately before the peace negotiations in 1991 Tahir al-Masri, who is a Nablus-born Palestinian-Jordanian, appointed as the new head of the cabinet replacing Mudar Badran. Masri's appointment was vital when Jordan decided to join Madrid Peace Conference and to form a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Masri's liberal and Palestinian background was among the fundamental factors that stimulated the confidence between Jordan, the US and the Israeli authorities.¹⁹² The political group called Jordanian Arab National

¹⁹¹ For Jordan's foreign policy during the Gulf War, please see: Kamel Abu Jaber, "Jordan and the Gulf War", in Tareq Ismael and Jackline Ismael (eds), The Gulf War and the New World Order, 1994, pp: 366-382.

¹⁹² Laurie Brand, "The Effects of the Peace Process in Political Liberalization in Jordan", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol: 28, No: 2, 1999, p. 56.

Democratic Assembly (JANDA) gave support for Masri's leadership due to his pledge for political freedom at that juncture. On the contrary, the Muslim Brotherhood expressed their opposition against any peace with Israel from the beginning of the peace talks.

The Camp David Accords signed in 1979 between Israel and Egypt and subsequent overthrow of Shah in Iran have generated Islamic sources in the region namely in the Occupied Territories of Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon. The growing influence of Hamas and Islamic forces in the region led the Israeli authorities to think that a *secular* PLO (precisely *al-Fatah*) can be tolerable than a more radical Islamist groups like Hamas. If the role played by both Hamas and Islamic Jihad during the first *intifada* is taken into account, the preservation of Egyptian and Jordanian political systems as it is were the integral parts of US policy making. The change in Israeli government from Likud to Labor also accelerated the process of peace negotiations. Whereas the Likud members from the beginning rejected the idea that West Bank and Gaza Strip will not be detached from the map of Israel, Labor Party was more flexible concerning the indivisibility of Israeli lands. For instance, Yitzhak Rabin who was the leader of the Labor Party acquiesced with the idea of land for peace.¹⁹³

The Palestinians were represented as a part of Jordanian delegate since Israel did not accept to meet directly with the PLO representatives in Madrid. In addition the exclusion of the PLO was a direct result of its support for Saddam Hussein following Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Although the PLO was rejected to attend the peace talks, the Palestinian representatives under Jordanian-Palestinian joint delegation had established close contact with the PLO leaders in Tunis. The peace negotiations lasted for one and a half year and finally Jordanians were not informed by the secret talks between Israel and the PLO in Oslo. It should be stated that Jordan and non-PLO groups were surprised by the peace talks. In addition, Jordan's largest political party and the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front (IAF- *Jabhat al-Amal al-Islami*)

¹⁹³ Michael Roskin and James J. Coyle (eds), Politics of the Middle East: Cultures and Conflicts, Prentice Hall, London, 2003, p. 121.

categorically rejected the accord, labeling it a sell-out to Israel. The agreement was not welcomed by the Palestinians living in the refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria as well on the grounds that Oslo agreement does not say anything about their future status. Other opponents to the Oslo Accords joined Islamist groups in disapproving the PLO's attitude. Jordan's reaction on the state level to the PLO delegates was derived from the fact that the interim agreement of Gaza-Jericho would lead to another Palestinian exodus to Jordan.

Yaser Arafat's unilateral diplomacy with Yitzhak Rabin and signing the Declaration of Principles (DoP) in September 1993 ultimately detached Jordan from the Palestine question. In fact, Jordan's position would be precarious if Jordanian delegation stood for Palestinian representation. Given that Likud's Jordan Option was still alive, Jordan's bargaining power for land, water and security could be highly limited. Nevertheless Jordan's stand was centered on displeasure with PLO's peace policy; the DoP in Oslo has provided Jordan the justification and the chance for making peace with Israel. When Jordan's long-standing preference to finalize a peace agreement with Israel is accounted, an Arabist transnational (*qawmi*) identity would be inconsistent with making peace with Israel. In order to cope with this situation Jordan vigorously necessitated a territorial state (*watani*) identity to recognize a state that is an antithesis for an Arab state. Without having the obligation of representing the Palestinians, Jordan quickly urged for re-defining her interests and foreign policy choices. In this sense, normal ties with Israel would assist Jordan to act in a new regional order and would provide monarchy the tools to safeguard its borders vis-à-vis the Israeli state. This would help Jordan to acquire Israeli recognition that Jordan is *not* Palestine. In this respect, many groups supported Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty including the army, government, business elites and also the tribal members of the Parliament. Intriguingly, Israeli strategic choice to retreat from Likud's slogan of 'Jordan is Palestine' and to keep Jordan as *Hashemite* and *independent* had a far-reaching effect on Jordan's identity reformation.¹⁹⁴

¹⁹⁴ Robins (2004), op.cit., p. 184

Renunciation of Israeli slogan ‘Jordan is Palestine’¹⁹⁵ by the recognition of a new one; *Jordan is Jordan* offers a departure from Palestinian cause. The Islamist members of the Lower Chamber (precisely Muslim Brotherhood deputies) have considered the new strategy of the Kingdom as a threat to themselves. In this manner, some analysts describe the outbreak of second *intifada* as ‘the death of normalization with Israel’.¹⁹⁶ As severing of ties and peace with Israel would mean a departure from Palestine question and Likud’s slogan, the decision makers in Jordan also thought that these steps toward disassociation with Palestine will further minimize the overwhelming repercussions of Palestinian dimension on Jordan’s foreign policy choices.¹⁹⁷ It’s central to explore the means necessary to consolidate Jordan’s watani identity; peace with Israel and democratic opening. Therefore, it’s indispensable to build a theoretical relationship between Jordanian identity and foreign policy to examine the effects of the peace process on Jordan’s Palestine dimension.

4.2 The Palestinian-Jordanians, Democratization, and the Peace Process:

4.2.1 The Palestinian Dimension:

The foreign policy and political landscape of Jordan have been shaped and is still being constructed under the inspiration of Palestinian community and the Arab-Israeli dispute. Since the majority of Kingdom’s population is of Palestinian origin, Jordanian political, economic and social policies have been largely subject to changes brought by both ups and downs concerning the Middle East peace process. The frustration of Palestinians, or West Bankers, was not only derived from the Israeli invasion of West Bank and Gaza Strip, but also their resentment is profoundly caused by the disparity between East Bankers and West Bankers in Jordan. Jordanian state, precisely after the Black

¹⁹⁵ Raphael Israeli, “Is Jordan Palestine?”, *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, Issue: 3, Spring 2003.

¹⁹⁶ Russell E. Lucas, “Jordan: the Death of Normalization with Israel”, *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 58, No: 1, Winter 2004, p. 93.

¹⁹⁷ Rashid Alkadiri, “Ürdün Dış Politikasında Filistin Etkeni 1967-1988”, in Kirsten E. Schulze, Martin Stokes, and Colm Campbell (eds), Nationalism, Minorities and Diasporas: Identities and Rights in the Middle East.

September, assumed that there are two people on Jordanian territory and considered Palestinian descents as residents, more than citizens.¹⁹⁸ Nevertheless Palestinian people have acquired Jordanian passports and citizenship¹⁹⁹, prominent political positions in the Kingdom pre-dominated by the Jordanians of East Bank origin and many Palestinian-Jordanians deprived of high ranks in the governance and disproportionately represented in the political landscape.

The main theme in Jordanian politics, both domestic and external, is the *ethnic division* between Palestinians-Jordanians and Transjordanians. The division primarily represents a clash between Palestinian versus Bedouins. Albeit only 5% of Jordanian population is of Bedouin people, the construction of Transjordanian identity is highly dependent on these nomadic people. Given the presence of tribal affiliation and communal ties as the considerable sources of loyalty in Jordan; the consolidation of Jordanian national identity was centered on the Bedouins. Since the annexation of West Bank by Jordan the electoral system disadvantages Palestinian descents that constituted two thirds of the Jordanian demographic structure. Palestinian-Jordanians underrepresented in the ranks of government, civil service and the army. Ethnicity and tribalism in the political and social organization of the country were rooted in 1946 and 1952 Constitutions. The tribal loyalties were central as opposed to ideological preferences to the regime in acquiring legitimacy since the inception of Jordan as a separate entity. Jordanian entity is one of the best cases for depicting the ‘artificiality’ in the Middle East. According to Gudrun Kramer beside structural problems including socio-economic and political organization; Jordanian liberalization efforts provide a more complex figure added to the demographic pressures.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁸ Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 23 June 2006, Amman.

¹⁹⁹ A law added to the *Citizenship Law of 1928* provided under the Article 2 that; “All those who at the time when this Law goes into effect habitually reside in Transjordan or in the Western part which is being administered by, and who were holders of Palestinian citizenship, shall be deemed as Jordanian enjoying all rights of Jordanians and bearing all the attendant obligations”. Thus this provision entails that those Palestinians live in the Western part of Transjordan (West Bank) now acquired Jordanian citizenship and they are now referred as Palestinians but since then *Jordanian-Palestinians*. See, Anis F. Kassim, “The Palestinians: From Hyphenated to Integrated Citizenship”, in *Citizenship and the State in the Middle East*, p. 207.

²⁰⁰ Gudrun Kramer, “Integration of the Integrists”, *op.cit.*, p. 218.

The ethnic cleavage is also matched with urban-rural differences as well. The urban areas of the Kingdom are densely populated by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, whereas rural areas are composed of East Bankers who live in the southern provinces like Maan, Tafila and Karak. Until 1988 the West and East Banks were equally represented in the Parliament. However the electoral law was amended in 1989 following King Hussein's disengagement from the West Bank territories. The new law abolished the West Bank representation and enlarged the East Bank seats from 40 to 80.

The internal cohesion and antagonism which is rooted in ethnic division among Transjordanians of Bedouin origin and Palestinian descents then turned into a clash of political representation by 1988 onwards. The relations between Palestinians and Jordanians living on the East Bank territories have now become fragile due to the change in the allocation of parliamentary electorates. When the West Bank representation has ceased the doors for Palestinian delegates has drastically reduced through legal measures. The legal impediment is the electoral districting mechanism in the Lower Chamber. The rural areas which constitute the source of loyalty to the regime have granted the majority of the seats in the Chamber at the expense of urban areas. Therefore the number of seats is allotted in accordance with the loyalty to the throne rather than the population size. For instance, Irbid with a population of 390,685 is allotted 9 seats, while Amman's 2nd District which is densely populated by Palestinian descents with a population of 391,849 only gets 3 seats in the legislature. This clearly demonstrates how the seats are disproportionately allocated.

The reason behind this legal impediment is regime's *exclusivist* policy in the post-1988 era. Although King Hussein decided to disengage from West Bank to bury the idea of alternative homeland (*al-Watan al Badil*); his decision to disengage from the Palestinian territories does not imply Jordan's disengagement from Palestinian citizens living in Jordan. In other words, King Hussein's new Palestine policy was concerned solely with detachment from Palestinian cause rather than placing Palestinian citizens as a second class citizen in the country. However, 1989 electoral law is drawn to stimulate the

overrepresentation of East Bank population at Palestinians' expense. The regime's fear was indisputably derived from the Palestinian majority living in Jordan. In this regard, according to Palestinian-Jordanians any attempt to expand democratic opening is not real without addressing the uneven distribution of Palestinian population in the Lower Chamber. Under King Abdullah's initiative, Jordan is currently embarked on a reformation program called National Agenda. However addressing the reformation of electoral law is a red-line. This shows that Jordan's democratization process is stagnant in generating egalitarian representation among Palestinian and Jordanian citizens, and therefore not moving forward.²⁰¹

One real example of this deep-rooted ethnic conflict is Adnan Abu Odeh who played a prominent role in Jordanian politics as a Palestinian origin advisor to King Hussein. His book published on "Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process" was found highly critical of Jordanian-Palestinian relationship in 1999. He then was asked to resign from the Jordanian Upper Chamber. Nonetheless Abu Odeh was not a separatist; but he and Tahir al-Masri (former prime minister of Palestinian origin) and Jawad al-Anani (Chief of the Royal Hashemite Court) were all criticized either for their writings or electoral boycott.²⁰² Thus criticizing or even touching the political disparity and ethnic tension in Jordanian society was an extremely sensitive issue at anytime in Kingdom's history.

In the light of Palestinian factor, the sense of citizenship is very weak in Jordan. The spirit of citizenship has legally changed when King Hussein announced the detachment of West Bank from Jordanian territorial integrity. In Hussein's speech it could be visibly perceived that all those people living in the West Bank territories from now on are considered as Palestinian by Jordan. "... It has to be understood in all clarity, and without any ambiguity and equivocation, that our measures regarding the West Bank concern only the occupied Palestinian land and its people. They *naturally do not relate in any way to the Jordanian citizens*

²⁰¹ Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 23 June 2006, Amman.

²⁰² Ryan (2002), *op.cit.*, pp: 126-127.

of Palestinian origin in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. They all have the full rights of citizenship and all its obligations, the same as any other citizen irrespective of his origin”.²⁰³ Actually the severing ties acknowledged the delineation between Jordanian citizenship with that of Palestinian in 1988. The official demarcation between the East and the West was the first intimation to remark the trend toward territorialization (in the sense of *wataniyya*, rather than *qawmiyya*) of Jordanian identity. Within this context, Jordan’s judicial and administrative departure from the West Bank territories in 1988 yielded a new era in Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. The severing of ties with the West Bank led to a process of re-defining Jordanian national credentials and identity. In 1987 first *intifada*, Hashemite Kingdom still felt the responsibility for the West Bank territories. Among other things, King’s disengagement from these territories was under the pressure of the 1987 uprising. Since the first Palestinian uprising Jordan’s choices including domestic and foreign policy preferences only confined to the East Bank. King Abdullah II after his father’s death found himself surrounded by new obstacles to overcome including economic problems, peace with Israel and the US war on terrorism.

Since identity maintains its contested characteristic, the al-Aqsa *intifada* has re-surfaced and deepened the Palestinian dimension in Jordan. Post-1988 era could be best described as a shift from ‘Jordan to Transjordan’ in terms of territorial re-demarcation; and political and legal re-settlement of the Kingdom. Since the Black September Episode, the strained relationship between Jordanians and Palestinian descents has structured an ethnic division, which threatens Hashemite domestic stability and democratization to a great extent. For that reason second *intifada* exemplifies a decisive watershed in re-formation and re-building of norms and ideals of Jordan. One of the detrimental repercussions of the al-Aqsa *intifada* is the fact that ‘Jordan is Palestine’ slogan could be reiterated. The threat directed against the Hashemite monarchy can lead to an Israeli annexation of the West Bank eventually. In this respect, it was obvious for Jordanian foreign policy makers that, nevertheless the Kingdom severed its

²⁰³ Anis F. Kassim, “The Palestinians...”, *op.cit*, p. 208.

ties with the West Bank; it's still under the burden of the various implications of the Palestinian descents and refugees' attachment to their lands. As Kamel Abu Jaber, the former foreign minister of Jordan during Washington negotiations, states that although many Jordanians want to believe that peace with Israel has weakened the idea of *al-watan al-badil*, the treaty did not bury the so-called Jordan Option.²⁰⁴ Thus Jordanians and the monarchy watch every step of Israeli maneuver which can undesirably lead to revival of 'Jordan Option'.

The questions of Palestinians, their rights and citizenship have always been a contestable issue on Kingdom's political agenda. Since Jordan is the *only* Arab country that granted Palestinians citizenship, Jordanians of Palestinian origin did not benefit from the political status that the Jordanian citizens enjoyed, but rather Jordanian-Palestinians predominated the economic sector of the country. However with the recognition of PA which state Palestinians will be loyal to be still a controversial issue. For Hillel Frisch, Jordan attempts to define her citizenship on the basis of *territoriality* that would be a proper solution for the future status of Palestinian-Jordanians.²⁰⁵ This is brought by the territorial partition of East and West Bank and eventually with normalization with Israel. The fundamental difference between the first and second *intifada* is correlated with these developments. Prior to 1987 *intifada*, Jordan holds its official claim on the West Bank and there was no any "warm peace" with Israel at all. In this respect, the idea of delineation of borderlines in terms of territory and identity revealed with the outbreak of the first *intifada* and then fastened in the aftermath of the al-Aqsa uprising. Hence, there is a conflicting idea on the concept of citizenship between two sides. The PA considers all Palestinians 'irrespective of place of residence' as potential electorate, which in turn contradicts with Jordan's conception of *single citizenship*. This illustrates once more that the legal status of Jordanian-Palestinians is a matter of contention between Jordan and PA until today.

²⁰⁴ E-Mail Interview with Kamel Abu Jaber, July 2006.

²⁰⁵ Hillel Frisch, "Jordan and the Palestinian Authority: Did Better Fences Make Good Neighbors?", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 58, No: 1, Winter 2004, p. 71.

King Abdullah occasionally has problems with the PA due to the changing discourses of Palestinian leadership. Evidently, the King publicly reported that “We want the Palestinian leadership to declare clearly what it wants and not surprise us every now and then with some decisions or by accepting things that it did not accept before”.²⁰⁶ According to King Abdullah, Palestinians should specifically declare what they actually claim, because previously they demanded 98% of the Palestinian Territories, later on they accepted 50%. However, Abdullah’s criticisms are quite contradictory in two ways. Firstly, Abdullah’s disapproval of Palestinian leadership that suggests the reformation of the PA manifests anti-Palestinian course rather than placing Israel at the core of the unsettlement of the conflict. In addition, criticisms directed against the bargaining position of Arafat and Palestinians brought already disappeared phenomenon of Jordanian involvement in the Palestinian-Israeli peace negotiations. Although Jordan abrogated its ties with the West Bank territories, this implied argument of King Abdullah could remind Jordanian claim on the West Bank and hence it can re-invoke early Israeli discourse which stipulates that there is a Palestinian state in Jordan. King Abdullah’s Jordan First Campaign is in fact a measure to re-consolidate the notion that Jordan is Jordan and it’s only for the Jordanians. Abdullah’s main motive to launch the Campaign is totally coincided with de-attachment from the West Bank, for the reason that reiterates the old arguments of ‘Palestine is Jordan’ is no more valid and beneficial for both the Jordanians and Hashemite reign. However contentious status of the Palestinians in the Kingdom and in the Occupied Territories is still on the table waiting to be solved.

Therefore, Al-Aqsa *intifada* intensified and re-surfaced the ethnic imbalance in Jordanian society. Accordingly, the uneven portrayal of Palestinian descents in the political arena wrested into a new process of representation; the Islamist organizations are new labels for them. As a direct result of legal obstacles in electoral system, Islamization of Palestinian people began to evolve as another source of instability and discontent in formulating the relations between the state

²⁰⁶ *Economist Intelligence Units*, “Country Report: Jordan”, June 2001, p. 15.

and Palestinian citizens. In this respect, the political wing of *Ikhwan*, Islamic Action Front constitutes a crucial place in which Jordanian-Palestinian relationship has turned into a clash between the government and Islamist opposition predominantly symbolized by Palestinian groups. The process of Islamization of Palestinians is a new epitome in Jordan due to the fact that Jordan was the only Arab country deprived of Islamic threat unlike other Arab countries of the Maghreb. The *Ikhwan* enjoyed a privileged status and they were backed and co-opted by King Hussein during 1970s and 1980s, but it's completely difficult to reclaim the same assessment for period after the onset of *Al-Aqsa intifada*.

Given the political influence of the Palestinian legacy and the Jordanian *Ikhwan* on Jordan's policy-making, Jordanian identity has been formulated with different popular, transnational identities. The trend toward democratization after 1989 has drastically shaped Jordan's identity and its very definition. If identity does not matter, Jordan's foreign policy would have been extremely different. Therefore, settling Palestine problem and weakening the idea of Jordan is Palestine would assist Jordan to conduct a foreign policy which will not be endangered or conditioned by the Palestinian issue. Democratization was meant to disassociate Jordanian politics from that of Palestine and to reconsolidate Jordanian identity and to maintain the very foundations of the regime. In this respect, regime's political liberalization effort by 1989 onwards was a clear manifestation of Jordan's increased role in the Middle Eastern affairs. One of the most striking components of democratization has been the emergence of a strong political opposition profoundly dominated by the Islamic movement in Jordan. In this respect, Jordan's 'controlled' democratic opening would demonstrate to the external actors, Israel in particular, that Jordan occupies a crucial place in the region with a unified Islamist opposition who stand for Palestinian cause. Hence the Kingdom had the assumption that the increased role of the regime challengers would accelerate the peace initiatives to settle Palestine-Israeli conflict.

4.2.2 The Effects of Democratic Opening in Jordan:

The Hashemite Kingdom provides a significant case in the study of democratization in the entire Arab world with respect to its urban-rural cleavage and Jordanian-Palestinian dichotomy. The trend toward democratization in Jordan which dates back to 1989 is primarily correlated with the overwhelming effects of economic crisis and regime's response to frame and restrain the internal unrest.²⁰⁷ The drop in oil prices in the mid-1980s accompanied by the relative cut in economic aid from the Gulf emirates resulted in a drastic recession in Jordanian economy. The public disturbances criticizing Zaid al-Rifai government were precipitated by the structural adjustment measures under an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Given the suspension of parliamentary sessions for 22 years, the regime would be forced to convene the Parliament and reduce the political repression imposed by martial law. The regime used the Israeli invasion of West Bank since 1967 as an appropriate pretext for not holding elections and successfully justified the closure of the parliamentary politics in the eyes of the Jordanians.²⁰⁸ Since the West Bank representation in the legislature was formally ceased by the King's severing of ties in 1988, popular disaffection which has become apparent with the economic decline could easily turn into public call for more political freedom. Given that the grievances were carried out for the most part by the East Bankers, the monarchy considered the April 1989 riots as an indicator of political alienation of the regime's traditional supporters. Although the government has lacked the adequate resources to re-gain the legitimacy, the only option left behind was to initiate political liberalization as an instrument to realize the longevity of the monarchy.

Scott Greenwood argues that Jordan's economic and political liberalization is closely attributed to the exigencies of deep economic crisis posed by its *rentier*

²⁰⁷ Rex Brynen, "Monarchical Liberalism: The Case of Jordan", in B. Korany, R. Brynen, and P. Noble (eds), Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Comparative Experiences, Vol: 2, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, 1998, p. 81.

²⁰⁸ Guilan Denoeux and Robert Springboard (et al), Legislative Politics in the Arab World: Resurgence of Democratic Institutions, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1999, p. 148.

state character by late 1980s.²⁰⁹ Jordan's democratization process, in his view, is totally related with the necessity to reconstruct the relationship between the monarchy and the business elites, and Transjordanians. Since the old authoritarian rule could not solely answer to the economic requirements of the society by the economic upheavals, the Hashemite rule shifted towards creating new sources of legitimacy. Likewise, for Glenn Robinson, the transformation of Jordanian political process from authoritarianism to limited democratization can be described as *defensive democratization* which is a strategy aimed to control regime through pre-emptive measures.²¹⁰ Robinson argues that political reforms launched in country after 1989 is heavily tied to maintenance of internal stability and regime survival. Laurie Brand posits a similar approach on Jordanian democratic transition in which it can be defined as a state-led process "aged from above, part of a strategy intended to ensure the continuation of the monarchy".²¹¹

The democratic expansion by 1989 onwards in Jordan was closely intertwined with two major determinants. One of the determining aspects of political opening in the Kingdom was the economic crisis of 1988-89 and secondly it was related with external sources of threat to the Kingdom. To begin with the first cause, prior to 1988-89 the regime easily acquired its popular support predominantly from tribes, business elites and Transjordanians via providing cabinet posts without having parliamentary sessions for a long period of time. Given the presence of two conflicting ethnic communities in the post-Black September era in Jordan, the loyalty of Palestinian descents to the monarchy has been regarded as ungrateful by the Transjordanian elite. The tension between two communities, political majority (Transjordanians) and political minority (Palestinians), is exacerbated when the economic power of Palestinians are taken into consideration. The Palestinian-Jordanians clearly dominate Kingdom's economic sector through owning the majority of private capital. 60%

²⁰⁹ Scott Greenwood, "Jordan's New Bargain: The Political Economy of Regime Security", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 57, No: 2, Spring 2003, p. 248.

²¹⁰ Glenn Robinson, "Defensive Democratization in Jordan", *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 30, 1998.

²¹¹ Norton, *op.cit*, p. 17.

of the companies are possessed by Palestinian descents as compared to 29% retained by Transjordanians.²¹² For instance, Palestinians are dominating the banking and finance sector in the country including the Arab Bank, Cairo-Amman Bank, and Bank of Jordan. On the other hand, the state in Jordan has always been the main employer and the public sector is primarily controlled by Transjordanians. Approximately 50% of the work force in the country is employed by the state and 75% of this work force is of Transjordanian origin which clearly illustrates the preponderance of East Bankers working in the public sector.²¹³

Within this framework, regime's economic liberalization efforts including privatization and the removal of subsidies to basic commodities brought 'bread riots' in the southern governorates, Maan and Salt in 1989. Given the specificity of the southern governorates which granted Hashemite rule its long-standing allegiance since the inception of the Emirate, the riots were not led by Palestinian contenders as some might think, but rather generated by regime loyalists. In addition, the post-1993 period will also demonstrate the fact that the supremacy of traditional loyalists in the legislature would not be a guarantee to maintain internal stability under severe economic upheavals such as in 1996 'food riots'. Thus growing economic crisis motivated the monarchy to take some pre-emptive measures to build new areas of obtaining support and consent for the continuation of the regime.

Secondly, the 1989 democratic expansion and the peace process both constitute the two major aspects that were complementing each other in Jordanian case. Jordan's fear of Israeli threat inspired the Kingdom to reinforce the trend toward democratization. The opposition in the country has been hostile to Jordan's relations with Israel, in this sense opening the political landscape to Israeli opponents or relatively speaking to peace contenders including the Islamists, leftists and Arab nationalists, would initiate debates on Jordan's Israeli relations

²¹² Yitzhak Reiter, "The Palestinian-Transjordanian Rift: Economic Might and Political Power in Jordan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 58, No: 1, Winter 2004, pp: 77-78.

²¹³ *Ibid*, p. 86.

and will put pressure on Israeli government to minimize its threatening position against the Jordanian state. Under the negative effects of the Israeli *Jordan Option* on Jordan's political endurance, the *Ikhwan* did not join the 1989 bread riots. The *Ikhwan's* appraisal of Israeli threat on Jordan's regional identity and survival was vigorously instrumental in staying away from criticizing the governmental economic liberalization policies in late 1980s.²¹⁴

In this regard, democratization was perceived as a precondition for galvanizing the domestic front in time of an external threat. The strong opposition in the country would assist Jordan to gain attention by precisely by Israel, the Arab world and the West. The victory of the Islamists particularly in 1984 by-elections was a signal for the emergence of an Islamic threat in the country, and for that purpose in Hashemites' view, the new political opposition led by the *Ikhwan* and independent Islamists could easily alarm Israel and the outside actors to initiate peace process to solve the Palestine issue.²¹⁵ It's in this respect that the democratization and the peace process go hand in hand in the Jordanian example no matter what happened/ whatever the case may be after the signing of the peace at Wadi Arava in 1994.

The convening of parliament and organizing election campaigns which would reinforce political opening has become the new strategy of the Kingdom to regain popular legitimacy. In this sense, the outbreak of April 1989 riots in the South was instrumental in holding national elections after 22 years. The critical point, however, was the empowerment of new forces in the country. The renewal of the parliament by 1989 and opening of political landscape for new forces including political parties led these groups to articulate their interest in the electoral competition and enabled them to involve in political debates. Thus there are two significant aspects of nascent democratization in Jordan; identity conflict and opposition to the peace process. Furthermore, the trend toward political opening in the Kingdom has brought two vital consequences that would

²¹⁴ Sami al-Khazendar, Jordan and the Palestine Question: The Role of Islamic and Leftist Forces in Foreign Policy-Making, International Politics of the Middle East Series, Ithaca Press, 1997, p. 181.

²¹⁵ Ayubi, op.cit., pp: 420-421.

have enormous effects on Jordan's foreign policy making. In other words, although Jordan lifted repressive measures on the political scene to have more democratic activity, the Kingdom will be confronted by the newly empowered opposition forces.

The 1989 elections and renewal of Parliament also mark the first occasion where the West Bank representation was excluded. Following Jordan's disengagement from the Palestinian lands in 1988, the electoral law was changed which gave more power to East Bank origin Jordanian citizens at Palestinians' expense. According to Philip Robins, there were two main reasons why the regime shifted to amend the electoral law. One of the most substantial matters was the increase in the support for the Islamist groups which was a fact that particularly became apparent by the 1984 by-elections. The increase in the potency of Islamists has also demonstrated itself in the legislature when three Islamist deputies criticized governmental policies including corruption and the role of internal security services.²¹⁶ Looked from this framework, prior to the renewal of the parliamentary life in Jordan, Islamist groups have begun to put pressure on Jordan's domestic politics specifically an issue that is produced by the Islamic activism prevalent in Occupied Lands of Palestine. The overwhelming effects of the first *intifada* mobilized the Palestinian descents in Jordan in the form of anti-Israeli nationalist and Islamist sentiments.

Another significant aspect of the 1989 elections was the PLO's pressure on Palestinian-Jordanians not to vote in the elections on the ground that Palestinian participation in Jordanian national politics could stimulate the idea of alternative homeland by the Israeli authorities, i.e. Jordan is Palestine. As a result, the Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, one of the oldest and well-organized associations in Jordan, captured the majority of the seats in the legislature.²¹⁷ Since the Islamists were not adhered to most of the former

²¹⁶ Philip Robins, "Politics and the 1986 Electoral Law in Jordan", in Rodney Wilson (ed.), Politics and the Economy in Jordan, Routhledge, London, 1991, pp: 192-193.

²¹⁷ *Economist Intelligence Units*, "Country Profile: Jordan", 1998-1999, p. 8. As a consequence, the dominant party was Muslim Brotherhood which captured 21 seats, other independent

governments, they were not criticized like other candidates for corruption. The reason for their victory was derived from their status of a ‘charitable organization’ as well. As they were not registered as a political party, their activities did not affected by the martial law imposed by 1957 which banned the political parties in the country. In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood served as a social organization and expanded its facilities all around the country during the martial law. The *Ikhwan* has acquired popular support due to its educational, health and social networks for a long period of time.

Accordingly, the 1989 electoral law also benefited the Islamists to a great extent in that the British ‘first past the post, multi vote’ arrangement allotted multiple votes for each voter in accordance with the number of seats in their electoral district. This enabled Jordanians to vote for candidates they know well and cast the second or more on the basis of their ideology. Given the multiple voting procedure, the Islamist candidates captured the majority of the seats in the Lower Chamber by 1989 elections. Among eighty seats the Islamists won 34 seats including 21 allotted to Muslim Brotherhood. The leftists won 13 seats and altogether the opposition took 59% of the seats in the Parliament. Since he had close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, Mudar Badran, the former head of *mukhabarat*, was appointed as the new prime minister immediately after the elections as Kingdom’s control mechanism. Badran allotted five ministries to *Ikhwan* members in his cabinet replacing independent Islamists.²¹⁸

In addition, 1989 elections was a watershed for Jordanian women in that for the first time women electorate voted in the elections. The breakthrough in Jordan’s political landscape after 1989 came under the influence of external forces that would lead the regime to take some “pre-emptive measures” to restrain the activities of the peace opponents. One can not divorce what is happening on Palestinian lands of West Bank and Gaza from Jordan’s domestic politics given

Islamists acquired 13, neo-Baathist took 2 and other independents captured 40 seats in the lower house.

²¹⁸ Linda Shull Adams, “Political Liberalization in Jordan: An Analysis of the State’s Relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood”, *Journal of Church and State*, Summer 1996, Vol: 38, Issue: 3, p. 510.

the historical and demographic closeness of Palestinian and Jordanian entities. Jordan represents one of the most successful cases for political opening when its attempt to incorporate the Islamists into the political landscape is concerned. However, democratization in Jordan can not resist to the political upheavals concerning Palestinians and Islamization of Jordan's internal politics. Within these circumstances, Jordan's democratization suggests a case in that in spite of demographic and historical limitations embedded, the Kingdom has engaged in a political liberalization program to a great scale.

According to Quintan Wiktorowicz, Jordan offers a case study for examining the *limitations* of democracy in the Middle East.²¹⁹ Although Jordanian regime has conducted four fair and free elections since 1989 until today, Jordanian democracy is heavily limited by several factors. Among these factors, Arab-Israeli dispute and ongoing violence on Occupied Lands have increasingly stimulated a strong opposition to government's foreign policies that is at odds with Jordanian people. Jordan's democratic expansion is hindered by regime's relations with Israel, alignment with US against Iraq, and the persistence influence of Palestinians and Islamists are the other key determinants of Jordan's limited political liberalization. Having threatened by external and internal unrests, Jordanian example ironically epitomizes Islamists an impetus in democratizing political life unlike other societies of the Middle East.

4.2.2.1 Adopting the National Charter (*al-Mithaq al-Watani*): Making the *Unthinkable* (Peace with Israel) Imaginable

The onset of the Gulf Crisis in August 1990 generated an enormous public outburst in Jordan which instantly alarmed the Hashemite monarchy. When

²¹⁹ Quintan Wiktorowicz (1999), "The Limits of Democracy", *op.cit.* Wiktorowicz indicates also that democratization in Jordan is restricted by legal impediments governing voluntary organizations and political parties laws. The Law of Societies and Social Organizations, Law 33 of 1966 Article 2 which governs the activities of all voluntary organizations stipulates that voluntary organizations can be assembled "to provide social services without any intention of financial gains or other personal gains, including political.." and Political Parties Law, Law 32 of 1992 states that "The use of the premises, instrumentalities, and assets of associations, charitable organizations and clubs for the benefit of any partisan organization shall be prohibited". Wiktorowicz (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 610.

Jordan's rejection to participate in US-led coalition against Iraq is taken into consideration, the opposition has found a venue to criticize the US policies. However the defeat of Iraqi regime in the aftermath of the military sanctions demoralized the Hashemites and led King Hussein to shift his country's foreign policy toward *peace camp* via changing the government. In this respect, peace opponent Muslim Brotherhood was no more considered as a natural ally for King's policies.

Given the growing popular outpouring in the form of anti-US – pro-Iraqi public rallies in Amman and Maan during and after the Gulf War, adopting the National Charter in 1991 was a melting pot to consolidate Jordan's identity. It was central for King Hussein to persuade his public to share the same norms and expectations when Jordan's shift toward re-establishing close ties with the US after the defeat of Iraq and participating in the peace process are taken into account. The consolidation of Jordanian national identity has constituted the main component of Hashemites' measure to uphold national unity. Since Jordan's interests and identity are *not* immutable; a new movement in international system necessitated a decisive step at domestic realm. States and leaders are required to frame issues and legitimate their shifts in making their foreign policy, popular support for the regime's demands and interests should be urgently maintained. Emphasizing ethnic kin and identity through 'persuasion' is the key to justify and convince the followers. In this context, identities serve as *props* when states and leaders obliged to build unity under severe political and economic upheavals. A Royal Commission was announced on 9 April 1990 by King Hussein which was led by the former prime minister and former chief of intelligence services (*mukhabarat*), Ahmet Obeidat. The main objective of the Commission was the relaxation of political repression and inauguration of new laws to expand political liberalization. The Commission was composed of sixty members including ten Islamists of whom six were Muslim Brotherhood member, namely Ishaq Farhan, Yusuf Azzam, Abdallah al-Akaliah, Abdul Latif Arabiyyat and Majid al-Khalifa. Independent Islamists were also among the signatories.

The document finalized by the Royal Commission was a forty page National Charter (*al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urduni*) which legalized the political parties after 35 years. The Charter was aimed to consolidate a territorial nation-state with the Hashemite monarchy its legitimate ruler. The Charter symbolically embodies a design for democratic expansion in the country. Hence 24-years martial law was eventually abolished by the prime-minister Tahir al-Masri. The government also lifted anti-democratic laws imposed since 1957 to expand political activity which was followed by series of political reforms. Generally speaking, the Charter regulates the rules of the game for a pluralistic political process.²²⁰ It envisages the Kingdom of Jordan as parliamentary, monarchic and hereditary.²²¹ It's regarded as a *social pact* due to the fact that, tribal notables, urban elites, East Bankers, West Bankers, conservatives, leftists, liberals, nationalists and Islamists all signed the document.²²² It, thus, paved the way for Jordan's next multiparty elections which was held in 1993. Under the measures of the Charter, since the martial law was abolished; the ban on political parties was lifted with a new Political Parties Law adopted in 1992. Actually elections held in 1993 were regarded as the first multiparty elections since 1957 ban, because political parties did not compete in 1989 election campaigns.

In the meantime, the regime perceived the peace opponents as a threat that could undermine the newly growing democratic opening in Jordan. Masri's Palestinian identity and close ties with the leftist groups then agitated the Islamists and the conservative Constitutional Bloc dominated by Transjordanian nationalists in the Lower House. Since the Bloc supported Jordanian peace negotiations with Israel and they initiated no-confidence vote against Masri. King replaced al-Masri by Zeid Bin Shaker who was also his cousin and has a military

²²⁰ For Ranjit Singh, "The National Charter is a conserving, not democratizing, pact", because the underlying elements of the Charter is designed to divert the efforts of political parties and organizations to understand the political *process*, rather than the political *system* itself. Ranjit Singh, "Liberalization or Democratization? The Limits of Political Reform and Civil Society in Jordan", in George Joffé (ed), Jordan In Transition, 1990-2000, Hurst & Company Publishers, London, 2002, p. 80.

²²¹ Brynen, op.cit. p. 78.

²²² *Economist Intelligence Units*, "Country Report: Jordan", 1995-1996, p. 5.

background. Bin Shaker allotted significant governmental posts to conservative East Bankers whom had been previously rejected by Masri's cabinet. With the support of the new government in which Muslim Brotherhood was not included, the Kingdom passed new Political Parties Law in 1992 and subsequently the Press and Publications Law in 1993.

When the peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel concluded by the signing of Declaration of Principles in 1993, King Hussein simultaneously appointed Abdul Salam al-Majali as the prime minister and supported the election of Tahir al-Masri as the speaker of the Parliament. The Majalis are known to be one of the most influential East Bank families in Jordan. Abdul Salam al-Majali himself was a strategic choice of King Hussein due to his former posts served as the president of University of Jordan and head of the Jordanian delegation during the Middle East peace talks in Washington. The new head of government in Jordan therefore illustrated Kingdom's commitment to peace process. Majali government was deprived of *Ikhwan's* support, because the only contender to the new government was brought by the IAF due to Front's discontent with Majali's pro-peace stand.

The transition in domestic policy of Jordan from martial law toward a limited political liberalization then would be endangered by the opposition led by the Muslim Brotherhood and its political wing IAF. While King Hussein initiated the multi-party politics, he also wanted to take the peace process under control with the new election law and newly elected Assembly. Since the parliamentary elections were scheduled for November 1993, the only way to safeguard the treaty and to curb the peace opponents was to amend the electoral law. Not only Palestinians in the refugee camps and non-PLO groups in the country, but also many Transjordanians rejected the treaty, if not necessarily the peace itself. In this sense, the 1993 elections will be the first *litmus* for the Kingdom to test both the nascent trend toward democratization and peace making with Israel. King Hussein has sought to change the electoral law very quickly just before holding the elections which gained criticism from the opposition, the IAF in particular. During the period when Majali became the prime-minister Jordanian legislature

was not in session. It was the most convenient time for the regime to amend the electoral law.

Majali government inaugurated the new electoral law which was then known to be as ‘Majali’s law’. Meanwhile 16 of Jordan’s 22 political parties including leftist and Arab nationalist groups and the IAF decided to boycott the elections if the government approves the new law. The fundamental impetus for the government to amend the law was totally related with the potential victory of the peace rivals, Islamists and Palestinians, in the forthcoming elections. The new law was then approved which replaced the former multiple voting procedure for each district with *one-man one-vote*.²²³ In 1989 elections the voters can cast as many votes as the number of seats in their districts, whereas in 1993 elections they only had one vote. As the tribal linkages and communal affiliations are instrumental in country’s political culture, each voter will vote in favor of his tribe or clan, instead of casting their votes for ideology or a political party. The winners of this new arrangement will definitely be the independent and tribal candidates. According to Tahir al-Masri, regime’s main strategy in amending the law was closely tied with curbing ideological affiliations and to draw attention to kinship in order to undermine the role of Islamists.²²⁴ In this respect, the most striking outcome of the electoral law was its ability to empower regime loyalists and conservative candidates in the legislature.

The first parliamentary elections held after 22 years has brought the IAF as the largest party in the Jordanian Parliament in 1989. Although the IAF won 16 seats out of 80 in the 1993 elections they lost their former speaker of the Parliament and one of the most influential spokesmen, Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyyat. As compared to 1989 elections, the IAF reduced its potency in the Parliament due to the amendment of the electoral law. The new system mostly undermined the Islamist candidates (including the Muslim Brotherhood who got only 2 seats) and favored independent candidates, the conservative and right of

²²³ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, “Country Report: Jordan”, 1st Quarter, 1994, p. 8.

²²⁴ Scott Greenwood, “Jordan’s New Bargain”, *op.cit.*, p. 256. Author’s personal interview with Tahir al-Masri in 1995.

centre parties. Among 80 seats independents were allotted 45 while Jordanian National Alliance Party (Bedouin dominated) had 4 and Pledge Party (Transjordanian nationalists) gained 5 seats. The diversity and segregation in political parties was conducive in building alliances in the Assembly. Under the leadership of Abdul-Hadi al-Majali, who is the head of Pledge Party, the National Action Front (NAF) with 18 delegates was formed. Four conservative groups holding 9 seats also declared Jordanian National Front; and Progressive Democratic Coalition was then founded including some independents and other socialist and Arabist political groupings.

The significance of 1993 Parliament and new electoral law illustrate that peace making with Israel weakened Jordan's trend toward democratization and invoked debates on imbalanced representation in the national politics. The 1993 electoral law visibly alienated some forces in the country and led to the marginalization of the Islamists and Palestinians in Jordan. The 1995 elections which constitute the first municipal elections in Jordan's history also demonstrate that the opposing groups were determined in their electoral boycott. Although the Islamists were given substantial positions in the governance, the political room left for the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) were highly restricted by the new law which favors independent candidates in the post-1993 era. In other words, regime's efforts to liberalize politically to contain the internal unrest have generated new sources of regime contenders, namely the Palestinians and Islamist groups.

4.2.3 Jordanian State and the Society of Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*):

The Jordanian branch of Muslim Brotherhood represents one of the specificities in the Middle East context where Islamic activism does not turn into violence. The Muslim Brotherhood is a grass root organization aimed to cooperate with the Hashemite monarchy rather than to fight against the state, and therefore the state of affairs between two sides is centered on mutual interests and gains. King Abdullah I legalized the society of Jordanian *Ikhwan* in 1945. It has always been

a reform oriented movement in the Kingdom. The former head of *Ikhwan*, Abdul Majid Thunaibat once said that their aim is not to overthrow the Hashemite regime and they strongly renounce violence. King Abdullah permitted *Ikhwan* to open branches in Jordan and to extend its influence during the early years of state-formation. The *Ikhwan* has therefore become vital in building a new Jordanian entity.²²⁵

In this context, Islam constituted the main communal bond between the state and Jordanian society and the Kingdom used Islamic notions to appeal his public via utilizing Islamic identity as a 'prop'. Precisely *Ikhwan* once more presented its loyalty to the regime during the civil war years. The *Ikhwan* gave enormous support for King Abdullah's decision to annex the West Bank territories after the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. In fact, it was the Islamic *hadith* (reported saying and practices of Prophet Muhammed) which determined *Ikhwan*'s endorsement for the unification of two Banks in 1950 instead of its moderate organizational base.

The Brotherhood's conservative and religious stand has helped the Hashemites in combating leftist groups throughout 1950s.²²⁶ Notably in 1956 when the monarchy was confronted by Arab nationalist and Nasserist forces led by the prime-minister Sulaiman al-Nabulsi, the *Ikhwan* supported King Hussein in containing the opposition. The 1956-57 event explicitly illustrated King Hussein that *Ikhwan* was loyal to the monarchy. Under the overriding effects of Nasserist, Ba'thist, communist and leftist groupings, King Hussein tried to weaken the internal antagonism between the state and the opposition through establishing a common ground with the Muslim Brotherhood. During 1950s Jordan permitted Egyptian branch of Muslim Brotherhood to organize activities in the country as well. However after the Free Officers' attempt to crack down Egyptian *Ikhwan*, the Society was eventually outlawed by Jordanian state in 1954.

²²⁵ Quintan Wiktorowicz, "State, Power and the Regulation of Islam in Jordan", *Journal of Church and State*, Vol: 41, Issue: 4, Autumn 1999.

²²⁶ Emile Sahliyah, "The State and the Islamic Movement in Jordan", *Journal of Church and State*, Winter 2005, p. 113.

Since 1957 *Ikhwan* has effectively assembled and mobilized its movement under the martial law. During the martial law, imposed after the pan-Arabist challenge of 1956, all the political parties in the country were banned and the Muslim Brotherhood was the only group allowed to run with an organizational unity. The charitable organizations were allowed to work during this period and the *Ikhwan* was one of those voluntary movements that have solidified its activities. This provided the Islamists to extend their political influence in various elections in university councils, municipalities, student unions and most importantly in civil society associations. For instance, in 1992 Islamists acquired the majority of the votes in the elections of Jordanian Engineering Association and Jordanian Association of Agricultural Engineers.

The *Ikhwan* also helped the King to counter radical Islamic groups particularly the outlawed *Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami* (The Islamic Liberation Party).²²⁷ For many observers, the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan serves as a ‘defensive mechanism’ in preventing the emergence of more threatening radical movements. Jordan offers one of the exceptional cases in the region where Islamic movement has not so far engage in military strategy and underground armed forces unlike in Algeria and Egypt.²²⁸ The *Ikhwan* was perceived as a client to the monarchy. This non-confrontational relationship between the Jordanian state and the *Ikhwan* has provided Islamists governmental posts. Since Palestinian-Jordanians were deprived of significant posts in national politics; they were represented through Islamic organizations. Ishaq Farhan, a *Palestinian-Jordanian*, who was the former head of the IAF and a senior member of the *Ikhwan*, has served as the Minister of Education in 1970, Minister of Awqaf between 1983 and 1985, and also he was a member of the

²²⁷ Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami was founded by Taqi al-Din Ibrahim Yusuf al-Nabahani in 1952. Al-Nabahani headed the group until his death in 1977. Al-Nabahani rejected to unite with the Muslim Brotherhood and opted for creating an Islamic Caliphate with two missions; *Jihad* and *Dawa* (underground activity) and Islamization of *Jahili* society. When Hizb al-Tahrir asked for legalization by Jordanian monarchy, the Party’s ideological background prevented Tahrir to be a political party and its members were arrested. Its membership was accounted for 6,000 in Amman in 1955. Many attempts have made to merge Tahrir with the *Ikhwan* during 1950, but *Ikhwan*’s loyalty to Hashemite regime has always been the main obstacle. For more information see; Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, June 1998, pp. 18-20.

²²⁸ Gudrun Kramer, “Integration of the Integrists”, *op.cit.*, p. 219.

Senate (Upper Chamber) from 1989 until 1993. Another significant leader of Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Abdul Latif Arabiyyat, an East Bank Jordanian, was the speaker of Lower Chamber by the 1989 elections until 1993. Then he served as a member of Senate until 1997. In 1991 under Mudar Badran government five prominent members of *Ikhwan* were granted governmental portfolios, including the Ministries of Education, Awqaf, Health and Justice. One of the main reasons why their posts were lasted only for six months was said to derive from the prohibition of alcohol during the flights of Royal Jordanian Airlines. Basically it was the Brotherhood's declaration to segregate sexes in all schools which led King Hussein to dissolve the government. Looked from this framework, the Muslim Brotherhood has been viewed as a *loyal* or *legal opposition* due to the posts and advantages granted by the Jordanian regime for more than three decades. The integrative capacity of Islam on Jordanian society was conducive in helping Jordanian regime to formulate her foreign policy without being at odds with national agenda. The role of Muslim Brotherhood was central in creating the unity in diversity which was not evident in the region. In addition, as Glenn Robinson postulates Jordanian case demonstrates that Islamists can act as an impetus for democratic opening.²²⁹ However, peace with Israel and the outbreak of al-Aqsa *intifada* have precipitated the constraining effects of Islamic forces and led Jordan to re-shape its domestic agenda diverting external issues away from internal realm.

In the past, there were several instances in which the *Ikhwan* criticized Jordanian foreign policy. For instance close relations between Iran and Jordan before the overthrow of Shah was such a policy. King Hussein moved later toward supporting Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war on the contrary majority of Jordanians and the *Ikhwan* expressed their support for the Iranian regime. Although Muslim Brotherhood has ultimately remained loyal to the political system of the Hashemite monarchy and the King, the Palestinian Question on the other represented the most important diverging point between the regime and the *Ikhwan*. It's the foreign policy-making of the Kingdom which has undermined

²²⁹ Glenn Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan", *Middle East Journal*, Vol: 51, No: 3, Summer 1997.

the traditional bond between the *Ikhwan* and the Jordanian state. This new phenomenon has become quite apparent after *Ikhwan*'s refusal to recognize Israel when the peace process was underway by 1990s.

4.2.3.1 Palestine and Competing Norms:

Muslim Brotherhood's view on Palestine question is directly intertwined with the idea that Palestine is *one* Islamic land. This explains why the Muslim Brotherhood did not renounce Jordan's decision to annex West Bank with the East Bank in 1950. Looked from *Ikhwan*'s perspective Jordan defended the western part of Palestinian territories with King Abdullah's decision to unite two Banks. Although Islam is the key component of Jordanian national identity formation and acts as '*motivator, legitimator, or simply as justifier*'²³⁰ in formulating Jordan's foreign policy, Jordanian official policy contradicts with that of Muslim Brotherhood on the issue of settlement of Palestine-Israeli dispute. Given Palestine as an Islamic land, liberation of Palestine from Israeli occupation has been the key aspect of Muslim Brotherhood's Palestine policy. The *hadith* says to the Muslim world that "they should fight against the Jews. Muslims will settle on the east side of the River Jordan, and the Jews will be on the Western part".²³¹ Therefore, liberating Palestine has both religious and Arab nationalist grounds. Muslim Brotherhood's policy to solve Palestine problem is based on *Jihad* (Muslim people's exertion to defeat an enemy) which means freeing Palestinian territories from Zionists, i.e. *Filastin Islamiyyah* (Palestine is Islamic). *Ikhwan*'s Palestine policy is, therefore, embarked on *al-nahr ila al-bahr* (Palestine from the river to the sea). Having built on this religious argument, Hashemite Jordan should play a decisive role in liberating occupied lands in the eyes of the *Ikhwan* due to Jordan's geographical closeness to both Israel and Palestine. Thus, *Ikhwan* committed to the idea that before uniting Muslim people under one single entity, it's necessary for the time being to uphold the indivisibility of Palestine and Jordan. The Islamic ideology of

²³⁰ Quoted from Adeed Dawisha (ed), *Islam in Foreign Policy*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1986, p. 5, in Sami al-Khazendar (1997), *op.cit.*, p. 137.

²³¹ Al-Khazendar, *op.cit.*, p. 139.

Ikhwan then led to disillusionment with the PLO's Palestine agenda despite *Ikhwan*'s recognition of PLO when it was founded in 1964.

The *Ikhwan* does not make a clear difference between Jews and Israel, Jews and Zionists and has defined the *Jews* as 'dishonest', 'corrupt', 'God's adversaries' and 'deadly enemy'.²³² The images and expressions put across by the *Ikhwan* have been at odds with that of Jordanian state in this sense. On the one hand, the Brotherhood accepted those Jewish people settled on Palestine before British mandatory rule as a minority, Jordanian regime has finalized a peace treaty and attempted to normalize its relations with Israel before settling Palestinian problem on the other. The divergence among Jordanian state and the *Ikhwan* issue reverberates a similar tension between the PLO and Islamist groups in Palestine. With the onset of the first *intifada* in the Occupied Territories, Hamas has become hostile to PLO policies. Hamas defined their goals as defending the rights of Palestinians and Palestine issue not like the others (the term 'others' is basically referred to Arab governments in the region and the PLO by Hamas members).

Jordanian *Ikhwan* denies any distinction between Jordanian and Palestinian identities given the two communities have full citizenship rights under Jordanian Constitution. Yusuf Azzam, an *Ikhwan* member, who was a member of Jordanian Parliament said that "we are one people, not two" in 1984. Azzam and his fellows Arabiyyat and Farhan tried to mean that unification of two Banks was vital since there is no difference between Palestinian and Jordanian identities. Azzam signifies that there is one single identity that combines both communities under Islamic principles. This explains the reason why Muslim Brotherhood disapproved King's decision to sever ties with the West Bank in 1988. In this respect, King's disengagement decision was a melting pot for two reasons with regard to Islamists in Jordan. The first one is, after King's disengagement the 'East Bank First' trend has become vigorously institutionalized particularly with the enactment of 1989 electoral law. The 1989

²³² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

law abolished the West Bank representation and allotted the majority of the seats to East Bank origin Jordanians while decreasing Palestinian representation in the legislature. Secondly, since Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood were parts of an International Society of Muslim Brotherhood movement; Hamas became a significant actor mobilizing Palestinian-Jordanians in Jordan. In fact, some *Ikhwan* members thought that the disengagement was because of the effects of first *intifada*. After 1988, Jordan has sought to go along with the US and UN initiatives to solve Palestinian problem, whereas the Muslim Brotherhood perceived these attempts as inconsistent with Islamic *hadith*. The *Ikhwan* can not support a settlement that will bring liberation only to *some portion* of Palestine. However the formation of an independent Palestinian entity on some parts of Palestine could solely be accepted as a part of further liberation of whole Palestine.

4.2.3.2 The Palestinian-Islamist phenomenon in Jordan: Demographic re-formulation of the Islamist groups

The beginning of 1980s marked a new phenomenon in Jordanian politics. The ideological vacuum left behind by the end of pan-Arabism in the late 1970s has been fulfilled by Islamic forces at the expense of Arabist, Nasserist and Ba'athist groups. Jordan on the hand shifted toward institutionalizing a territorial state, the Islamic movement offering a transnational identity has incrementally grown on the other. Jordanian opposition dominated by an Arabist identity has now transformed into Islamic organizations accompanied by the regional developments notably Islamic Revolution in Iran. Although the Islamists were regarded as loyal opposition in the Kingdom during 1960s and 1970s, the evolution of IAF as the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood by the early 1990s was central in the solidification of Islamic opposition in Jordanian politics.

Jordan's disengagement from the Palestinian territories by 1988 and the commitment to Palestinian self-determination have accelerated the process toward East Bank First trend in the Kingdom. In fact King Hussein's 'Jordan is

for Jordanians' was not an exclusive approach regarding the Palestinian citizens, but in entrenching a separate Jordanian national identity and state the Palestinians were partially excluded from the national politics through the electoral law of 1993, if not promoted directly and willingly by King Hussein. However the bread riots broke in Maan in 1989 and Karak in 1996 had lack the Palestinian component and rather organized by native Jordanians. The question of Palestinians' loyalty and reliability has always been a contentious issue after the *fedayeen* episode in 1970-71. The fears of Palestinians led them to be parts of Islamist organizations which has become evident with the unsettlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute and continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israeli forces.

Since the term Palestine has been detached from Kingdom's official documents by the unification of two Banks²³³, the Brotherhood has constituted the only organization that Palestinian-Jordanians can join and assemble without being discriminate against because of their 'Palestinian' background.²³⁴ The membership of the *Ikhwan* and its political wing, IAF has been dominated by Palestinians. Jordan's domestic politics has begun to be re-shaped with 1988 disengagement in which the Jordanian parliament and the election law were subjected to reformulation with respect to the West Bank and representation of Palestinian-Jordanians in the national politics. The change in Palestinian representation brought debates on national identity regarding the support of Palestinians to the PLO rather than the Kingdom in the post-1988 era. The ethnic division among two communities has now verbalized into a new relationship between the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian-Jordanians in that the Palestinian community clearly demonstrates its popular support for the Palestinian cause and Islamic movement. Once the Islamic movement in Jordan, the *Ikhwan* in particular, identified their agenda with Palestinian issue, Palestinian support for the *Ikhwan* rather than the Kingdom's Palestine policy has become apparent by the onset of the peace process.

²³³ Mishal (1978), op.cit., p. 1.

²³⁴ This does not mean that Palestinian element is the only driving force for the activities of *Ikhwan* and the IAF. There are prominent Jordanians acting within both groups, namely Abdul Latif Arabiyyat is an East Banker from Salt.

With the onset of political opening in the late 1980s, the regime sought to co-opt the growing Islamist opposition. The Islamists and the Palestinians also promoted the pluralistic politics which would bring them more room to be active in Jordan's domestic realm. In this respect, democratization was a tool for both Islamists and the monarch to play with the rules of the game. The regime was aimed to check the activities of Islamist opposition, the Islamist on the other found popular venue to participate without having confrontation with the monarchy. As a by-product of this win-win game, 85% of people living in Zarqa province (overwhelmingly populated by Palestinian descents) voted in favor of IAF candidates in the 1993 elections. Likewise, in Amman's second district where Wihdat refugee camp is located 43% of the voters accounted to vote for the IAF. Nevertheless the total turn out among the Palestinians was very low (only 30%), those Palestinians who participated in elections wanted to punish both the PLO and Jordan for signing the Oslo Accords. It was clear that Palestinian refugees in Jordan thought they were betrayed by the peace process. In this sense, Sami al-Khazendar considers *Ikhwan*'s approach to 'Palestine' as a process of *Islamicizing* the Palestinian problem.²³⁵ Even though *Ikhwan* totally rejects Israeli 'Jordanian Option' like the Hashemite regime; they never acknowledged Jordanian recognition of Israel on some parts of Palestine.

Meanwhile, political reform calls from the Islamists, not only from the Brotherhood, but also from the independent Islamists has become perceivable. Laith Shubeilat who is an independent Islamist and a former member of Lower Chamber was arrested in 1992 for allegedly claim for overthrow of the government.²³⁶ Shubeilat's, an East Bank Jordanian, call for more democratic reforms were regarded as an attack to the political system. Shubeilat and his friend Yaqub Qarrash were sentenced to death, but later the King under a general amnesty forgave them.²³⁷ The case of Laith Shubeilat illustrates the very

²³⁵ Al-Khazendar, *op.cit.*, p. 142.

²³⁶ Robinson (1998), *op.cit.*, pp: 402-403.

²³⁷ Laith Shubailat was then stayed in jail for seven months in 1996 for publicly criticizing the normalization with Israel.

fact that Islamists have become to be perceived as potential threats to the monarchy in the post-1990 period.²³⁸

Glenn Robinson also made a distinction between social and political Islamists in Jordan.²³⁹ The social Islamists are tended to be East Bankers and deal with social issues like banning alcohol and segregation of sexes. The political Islamists, having East Bank activism but more Palestinian membership, handle issues related with uneven distribution of wealth, and Western and Zionist imperialism. They are criticizing the Muslim Brotherhood from time to time for their close ties with the regime. In addition there exist both moderates and hardliners within Brotherhood and the IAF. Moderates in the Front like Abdallah al-Akaliah and Bassam al-Umush believe that the *Ikhwan* is needed to participate in Jordanian political landscape and elections in order to gain political influence throughout the country. On the contrary hardliners insist on the abrogation of normalization with Israel and implementation of Shariah law. Under these circumstances, continuation of Islamicizing Palestinians and the opposition is a new phenomenon in Jordanian politics. Previously, the *Ikhwan* was dominated by the East Bank families; but increased Palestinian support for Islamists was conducive in changing the demographic representation in Jordan's Islamic movement. When 1989 election is taken into account, the Kingdom slowed down democratic opening. Then the cooptation of Islamists has become a controversial issue for the Hashemites. The Islamization of Palestinians triggered by peace treaty and US-Iraqi relations. Given the fact that Palestinian community is not allowed to form a political organization with the ethnic label 'Palestinian', the sole political arena retained by the Palestinians is the Islamist movement. Thus, the *loyalty* of Islamic opposition has become to be a matter of contention by the onset of Palestinian uprising on the Occupied Lands.

Jordan's Palestine policy has become challenged by the emergence of anti-PLO groups in Palestine and the transformation of opposition in Jordan. The

²³⁸ Asher Susser, "The Jordanian Monarchy: The Hashemite Success Story", in Joseph Kostiner (ed), *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, 2000, p. 109.

²³⁹ Robinson (1998), *op.cit*, p. 403.

emergence of Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Movement) as an outgrowth from the International Muslim Brotherhood movement in the Occupied Territories has brought a new phase in regime's relations with the Jordanian *Ikhwan* with the outbreak of first *intifada* in 1987. Until the establishment of Hamas the *Ikhwan* in Jordan considered the PLO as representing some of Palestinians if not the all. However, the growing influence of Hamas led to *Ikhwan*'s disillusionment with the PLO eventually. Since the *Ikhwan* associated all its entire political stand on the Palestinian issue, the emergence of Hamas on the Occupied Lands has generated a new external actor in shaping Jordan's domestic and foreign policy making regarding the Palestinian issue. It's in this respect why Hamas has become to be perceived as a *foreign* and sometimes *rival* participant determining Palestinian dimension in Jordan. Since the policy-making of the Muslim Brotherhood is structured by external forces, the Hamas factor would carry new sources of opposition in limiting Jordan's relations with Israel and Kingdom's relations with Palestinian citizens in the near future.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan enabled Hamas to establish organizational base especially among Palestinian-Jordanians. As it's linked to the Jordan's *Ikhwan*, the position of Hamas could be strengthened which would increase the political potency of *Ikhwan* in turn. In this sense, Jordanian state had some reservations before building relations with Hamas. When Hamas' rejection of Jordan's severing of ties with the West Bank is taken into account; Jordan's politics could be under vehement influence of Hamas hitherto. Jordan also feared the close linkage between Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas can induce popular support to latter. For instance, members of the IAF mobilized the Jordanian Assembly to comply with the call of Hamas concerning the criticism of Israeli trial of Sheikh Ahmad Yassin.

Increase in support for Hamas ultimately deepened the organizational base of *Ikhwan* in the Kingdom. The uneasy relationship between the PLO and the *Ikhwan* then deteriorated the relations between the PLO and Hamas. The growing Islamist opposition consequently removed the distance between the leftists and the *Ikhwan* as well. For instance, the *Ikhwan* supported a Popular

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP) candidate who captured a seat from Zarqa province in 1989 national elections. Therefore by the beginning of 1990s there were several areas of contention between the *Ikhwan* and the state in Jordan as compared to previous years. The first one was *Ikhwan's* rejection of Jordan's disengagement from the West Bank; secondly Jordan's recognition of the Israeli state. In this respect, democratic opening by 1989 is central to underscore domestic politics to fight against instabilities posed by external sources.

The breakdown of chain between Jordan and the West Bank was also stemming from the collapse of unity between two entities in 1988. However, the idea of Greater Palestine has always been an explicit threat to both Jordan and Israel. The Palestinian component in Israel (20% of Israeli population is of Palestinian) stimulates scenarios of threat while Jordan's fear is more than its Israeli counterpart. When Jordan disengaged from the West Bank territories, Jordanian government has clarified her position and exhibited willingness to establish diplomatic ties with Israel. However it was less likely to normalize relations unless Israel withdraws from the Occupied Territories. It's in this regard that the peace and subsequent normalization can be interpreted as a breakthrough for the Middle East politics, but has created *deviation* within Jordanian identity building.

4.2.4 The Jordanian-Israeli Peace, Anti-normalization Campaign and the Hamas factor:

The Islamists in Jordan after 1993 elections gained the leadership of two significant professional associations; Engineers Association and Agricultural Association. Although the venue for political activities for the Islamists was profoundly enlarged, the Jordanian regime has disillusioned with the Islamists (*Ikhwan*, the Front and independent Islamists) regarding the Palestine issue clearly after the peace with Israel in 1994. In fact, Muslim Brotherhood's political empowerment by 1980s onwards was the corollary of Islamization of Jordanian society. The long-standing legality of *Ikhwan* and its organizational

network permitted the organization to increase its nation-wide potency. Accordingly Hamas' *Jordan is Palestine* option and its close affinity with the *Ikhwan* have drastically impeded and slowed down Jordan's political reformation process. With the ongoing tension in the Occupied Territories and approaching the US strike against Iraq, Jordanian governments have become threatened by domestic opposition who opted either for independent Islamists or IAF candidates rather than for regime loyalists.

The policies of the PLO during early 1990s were taken as an impetus to conduct peace negotiation which could enhance Jordan's role at multilateral level. The founding of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994 as a quasi-state has paved the way for creating two separate territorial entities in the area, Palestine and Jordan. The peace atmosphere motivated King Hussein to expect an economic expansion with Israel as well. The Jordanian-Israeli Treaty included cooperation in various areas covering tourism, trade, aviation, crime, science, telecommunication, health, environment and energy. Notably, the peace treaty was expected to benefit Jordan economically. The main area that Jordan's economy was affected was tourism. The steady increase in Jordan's growth rate afterwards is not only attributed to its economic relations with Israel, but it is largely related with the free trade agreement with the US. In addition, many Israeli demands for cooperation in Jordan could not be implemented due to the lack of business partners.

However some groups within Palestinian community reacted to Jordanian agreement with Israel on the basis of the future status of Jerusalem. In fact who will acquire the right over the Muslim sites in Jerusalem is still a matter of contention. When Hussein and Rabin met at Washington to negotiate on the status of Jerusalem during July 1994 Palestinians opposed to Jordanian custody on Muslim holy places. The declaration negotiated in Washington foresees a special role to Jordanian King and the PLO rejected the provision as a clear violation of the Declaration of Principles. The PLO afterwards prohibited the distribution of *al-Nahar* newspaper and weeklies *Akhbar al-Balad* and *al-Bayan*

in Gaza. The likelihood of peace in the region has become diluted by subsequent developments as well.

The Israeli recognition of Jordan's role in Jerusalem was also an acknowledgment of *de facto* post-1988 situation. King Hussein detached Jordan from Palestine in July 1988 but continued to uphold its role in holy places, the Dome of the Rock in particular. Given Jordan's land is not the ancestral territory of the Royal Family, historic places in Jerusalem since the date of annexation has constituted an enormous impact on the identity-formation in the country. In addition, Israel's support for Jordanian custody in these places is stemming from their expectation for reducing the strain between the PLO and Israel while enhancing the problems between the PLO and the Hashemite Kingdom. Syrian dissatisfaction with the Jordanian peace with Israel, which ascribed Jordan, a 'special status' in Jerusalem led to the cancellation of Jordanian-Syrian Higher Committee meetings.²⁴⁰

An opposition front to criticize peace negotiations was formed by eight Islamist and leftist political parties in May 1994 called Popular Arab and Jordanian Committee for Resisting Submission and Normalization (CRSN). The Committee was organized by the IAF, Jordanian Communist Party, Jordanian Arab Ba'th and Socialist Party. Their fundamental purpose was to proclaim publicly "the dangers of the Zionist entity".²⁴¹ Their aim was to obstruct any constitutional amendment reinforcing cooperation with Israeli state. Since the IAF took the lead in resisting normalizing ties with Israel, its members were taken under strict control by the security forces. For instance, Abdul Mumim Abuzant, a Palestinian-Jordanian deputy of the IAF, was beaten by security forces following his speech targeting the peace treaty.²⁴²

²⁴⁰ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", 3rd quarter 1994, p. 9

²⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁴² Asher Susser, "The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 1994, p. 435.

The most noticeable element of the opposition was the participation of ‘native’ Transjordanians as well as Palestinian-Jordanians. For instance, non-Palestinians members of IAF and former Transjordanian politicians were active in coordinating the activities of CRSN. The most important name of the anti-normalization, Abdul-Latif Arabiyyat, an East Bank Jordanian, renounced the peace treaty with his words “We don’t believe the Jews respect any pact”. The Committee categorically condemned the Washington Declaration and the peace process. After signing of the peace treaty in October 1994 they initiated the mobilization of public opinion against the warm peace. In the meantime, head of National Charter Commission and former prime-minister, Ahmad Obeidat, lost his position in the Upper Chamber due to his rejection of treaty. This was a signal for the monarchy that former government pro-regime officials also adhered to the Anti-Normalization Campaign (ANC).

In exploring the ongoing domestic discontent and anti-normalization campaign against the peace process, it’s necessary to examine various pre-emptive measures taken by the Kingdom in order not to risk the ratification of the treaty. The developments after 1993 elections have manifested the very fact that King’s men visibly dominated Jordanian Parliament. King Hussein’s decision to appoint Majali as the prime minister in 1993 was directly related with Jordan’s peace-oriented foreign policy preference and commitment to settle Palestine problem. The independent Islamist, Abdel-Razzarq Thubeisat was defeated in favor of Saad Hayel Sorour as the new speaker of the Lower Chamber. Sorour was a centrist Bedouin MP strongly backing the peace process. Although Thubeisat gained the support of the IAF and announced that he was not opposing to normalization, Sorour replaced Tahir al-Masri eventually acquiring the votes of conservatives and King’s loyalists. Since more than half of the MPs were traced by independents, lack of political party affiliation has undermined the political power of the IAF and enhanced the role of small parties and tribal groups in the legislature.²⁴³ Concurrently, the political division in al-Ahd Party stemming from peace opponents led to the resignation of 16 members from its

²⁴³ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1st Quarter, 1995, p. 9.

Ajlun branch. Although Abdul Hadi al-Majali, the head of al-Ahd Party, was a Transjordanian nationalist, his Party was antagonized between the deputies supporting the peace and those opposing. The growing dichotomy between the anti-normalization bloc dominated by the IAF; and the security forces, which intensified its information services, illustrate to what extent peace opponents and supporters respectively have turned into a prolonged tension.

In the meantime, Prime Minister Abdel Salam al-Majali boosted his government through appointing ten new members to his cabinet. The head of National Action Front (Majali's brother, Abd al-Hadi al-Majali), head of Jordanian National Alliance Abdel Raouf al-Rawabadah, and veteran Islamist Abdul Baki Jammu from Democratic Progressive Coalition were included into 31-member cabinet. However it was evident that the cabinet has lacked the largest bloc in the parliament. None of the 16 members of the IAF were asked to join Majali's government. When both sides signed the treaty on 28 June 1994, dissatisfaction with the Majali government has raised. As a pre-emptive measure King Hussein appointed a new cabinet with a new head. Abd al-Karim Kabariti and his cabinet found themselves enrolled by growing internal tension and discontent. The opposition in Israel and riots in Jordan were highly detrimental for Jordanian foreign policy making and impeded both Kabariti government and the trend toward normalization in Jordan.²⁴⁴

On 9 November 1994 when the treaty was ratified by the parliaments of both countries, Jordan and Israel declared to initiate diplomatic ties and decided to send ambassadors. One critical development was Israeli delay in appointing her ambassador to Amman. Marwan Muasher, who will later be the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was sent to Tel Aviv. Muasher is from a Christian Jordanian family and was the spokesman for Jordanian delegation in Washington negotiations.

²⁴⁴ Brand, "The Effects of ..", op.cit, pp: 60-63.

Jordan's attempt to reach peace in the region was not welcomed by the Islamist forces in the country. Since the Parliament approved the peace treaty only option left to the anti-normalizers was to restrict *normalization*. In demonstrating the internal unrest in the form of public rallies, the *Ikhwan* marched against the peace treaty in Hashimiyya Square downtown in Amman on 24 October 1994. Hamza Mansour, the spokesman of IAF, stated that Jordanian government could not validate the peace and illustrated 'an unjustified oversensitivity'. The Islamists criticized the treaty and voted against it in the Lower Chamber. When the opposition forces could not prevent the ratification of the agreement, they decided to organize an anti-normalization campaign reacting to 'Zionist invasion of their culture'.²⁴⁵ Mansour also argued that 'normalization is more dangerous than war'.²⁴⁶ On the contrary, prime-minister Majali attempted to secure the treaty with Israel saying the treaty buried the rhetoric of *al-Watan al-Badil* and Jordan is no more a substitute homeland for Palestinians.

A wide range of Islamist, leftist and Arab nationalist parties which merged to form the Opposition Bloc were directly opposed to three laws, which outlawed trade and cooperation with Israelis. These were; prohibition of land sales to Israelis passed in 1973; a 1958 law which endorsed total economic ban with Israel; 1953 law of boycotting trade with Israel again. The government was necessitated to abrogate these laws to normalize Jordan's relations with her neighbor. Especially termination of 1973 law has highly alarmed many Jordanians. The historical biblical areas of Madaba (where the Christian minority live) have constituted the main place of concern for Israeli buyers. Since 1930s under the Mandate Provisions in order to restrict Jewish settlement on East Bank, it was forbidden to sell East Bank land to Jews. The death penalty was applied for those breaking the law. Meanwhile the PLO accepted Jordanian-Israeli peace on the grounds that Jordan has acquired a special role in Jerusalem and Jordan's custody would remain until a Palestinian statehood is founded on the Occupied Territories.²⁴⁷ Eventually on July 26, 1995 Jordanian Parliament

²⁴⁵ Russell Lucas, "Jordan: Death of Normalization", *op.cit.*, p. 99.

²⁴⁶ Sahliyah, *op.cit.*

²⁴⁷ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2nd Quarter 1995, p. 9.

has abrogated the laws by 51 affirmative votes to 23 (including 8 abstentions). In the Upper Chamber, only three members out of 40 senators vetoed removal of boycott laws. Three vetoes came from Abdul Majid Shuman, a Palestinian banker, Abdul Latif Arabiyyat, former speaker of Lower Chamber and former secretary general of IAF, and finally Dhuqan al-Hindawi. Since the King under Jordanian Constitution directly appoints the members of Jordanian Upper Chamber it has become apparent that some of the *King's men* began to divert away from pro-regime policy making. In addition, Ahmat Obeidat, another East Bank origin veteran politician and former director general of *mukhabarat*, designated to be the speaker in a conference organized by the ANC in May 1995, but it was then cancelled by the authorities. Therefore it has become evident that there would be a close cooperation between old East Bank elites and Palestinian-Jordanians in resisting normalization.

Given the ongoing dissatisfaction by Jordanian society, the government needed to get support enough for peace with Israel. The monarch made four basic arguments to gain support for a peace treaty. First of all, the regime presented the treaty as a strategic choice for Jordan; secondly it was argued that the peace was going to provide what Jordan needed, including water, border and security; thirdly since refugee issue could only be solved by other parties to the dispute, it was claimed that the peace with Israel foster further negotiations between Egypt, Palestine and Israel as well; and finally Jordanian fragile economy would be boosted by cooperation with Israel. On the other hand the opponents harshly criticized the treaty for four reasons. Jordan was criticized for her de-alignment from Arabist commitments specifically neglecting UN Resolutions concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, i.e. the Security Council Resolutions 194, 237, 232, and 334; for not solving Palestinian refugee problem; for Jordan's leasing of land to Israeli farmers; and also for governmental efforts to curb the opposition right after ratification of the treaty.²⁴⁸

²⁴⁸ Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, "Normalization and Anti-Normalization in Jordan: The Public Debate", *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, No: 3, Spring 2003, p. 148.

After the *warm peace* with Israel, the trust that was relatively upheld between Jordanians and Israel was set back due to the Israeli actions in the region. The situation became worse when Yitzhak Rabin took the decision to confiscate approximately 500 dunams of land around Jerusalem that would cause to an increased Jewish settlement in the area. Foreign Minister of the time, Abd al-Karim al-Kabariti denounced the statement made by Rabin and recognized the forthcoming uneasiness of the warm peace with Israel. Although the Israeli government abandoned the decision to confiscate, in conjunction with this development, Jordanian policy-makers acknowledged the negative sides of peace treaty from advance.

The continuation of the Israeli settlement on the West Bank, and condemning Palestinian authorities for their incapability and unwillingness to end strikes against Israeli people are among the major obstacles in normalizing relations. The Arab Summit meeting at Casablanca in December 1994 condemned Jordanian claim on the historical and religious places in Jerusalem. The *Filastin al-Muslima*, a monthly journal published in London and known to be sympathetic to Hamas, evaluated Jordan's peace treaty with Israel as 'a new violation of the Arab stance that supports the rights of our [Arab] people and nation as well as severing to bolster the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation on Palestinian land'.²⁴⁹ Similarly Hamas has criticized the PLO for finalizing a treaty with Israel under the Oslo Accords, which paved the way for another peace with the Hashemites.

Under the severe effects of internal unrest, Jordan has apparently felt the exigencies of the peace following the Israeli decision to open a tunnel under the Al-Aqsa Mosque in September 1996. This attempt was regarded as a clear violation of Jordanian-Israeli agreement by the Jordanian authorities. Another step forward restricting normalization was brought by the Israeli Ministerial Committee which decided to construct Har Homa Housing project in Jabal Abu Ghunaym in East Jerusalem in February 1997. The intensified clashes between

²⁴⁹ Hillel Frisch, "Comparing Perspectives in the Palestinian Authority, Israel and Jordan on Jordanian-Israeli Relations", *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, No: 3, Spring 2003, p. 74.

the Palestinians and Israel then led the Palestinian authorities to outlaw selling lands to the Israelis with a decree of death punishment which was followed by boycott on Israeli commodities. As a response Israel imposed closure on these territories and did not allow the Palestinians to work in Israel. The Israeli state's attitudes were instrumental in creating annoyance among Jordanian society. The Daqamsa incident in 1997 visibly demonstrates the level of public anger in Jordan not only among Palestinians but also among native Jordanians who became highly skeptical about peace with Israel. Ahmad Daqamsa, a Jordanian soldier, gunned down Israeli schoolgirls who were picnicking in Jordan Valley. Daqamsa was declared as a hero after this incident in Jordan. King Hussein's condolences to schoolgirls' families were interpreted as unjustifiable by the conservative forces in the Parliament.

A critical development in Jordanian-Israeli peace accords has been the isolation of Hamas by the Jordanian regime. Jordan allowed Israel to establish an intelligence gathering station in Amman after the signing of peace treaty. Khalid Mashal, one of the founding members of Hamas, took over the branch in Amman in 1995 following the deportation of Musa Abu Mazruq to the US by Jordan. Israel presented Mashal as a target when the Israeli authorities accused him for being related with the bombing of the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Federation centers in Argentina in the early 1990s. Although many observers anticipated that recognition of PA would foster cooperation between Jordan and Israel, the optimism was undermined by the day time attempt to assassinate Khalid Mashal in the streets of Amman by Mossad in September 1997. The Jordanian state evaluated the attempt to kill Mashal as a violation of Jordan's security and the peace agreement signed in 1994.

Meanwhile, Hamas spokesman, Ibrahim Ghawshah detained for his speech targeting the Hashemite monarchy. This event illustrated that Hamas has become a source of threat in the eyes of Jordanian regime. The government certified that some of Hamas members would be arrested including Mashal, Ghawshah, Sami Khater and Abu Marzuq. On September 22, Mashal and his fellows were arrested at Amman airport immediately after their return from a

visit to Iran. Abu Marzuq, having Yemeni citizenship, was quickly sent to exile. However Khater, Mashal and Ghawshah are Jordanian citizens of Palestinian extraction. In order to solve this question, they were given two options; either to leave Jordan or send to trial for being a member of an illegal organization.²⁵⁰ Then they were expelled from Jordan to Qatar in November 1997. Jordan withdrew the passports of Hamas members, including Muhammed Nazzal and Ibrahim Ghawshah when Israel informed Jordan for their activities in Amman. Two of them left to decide either to hold Palestinian identity or to be Jordanian citizen under the Constitution of the Kingdom. Jordan pursued a policy of granting standard two-year travel documents (later two years was replaced by five years) to Palestinians living on the Occupied Territories after severing of ties with the West Bank.

During the deportation of Hamas, the prime-minister Rawabdah described regime's attempt to crack down Hamas as protecting Jordanian politics from the overriding influence of Islamist Hamas. King Abdullah also clearly indicated Kingdom's policy in his words, "Jordan has made itself quite clear: Hamas offices will be shut down and this what will happen...the problem has become a criminal issue".²⁵¹ The point of Palace was clear; with the deportation of Hamas from Jordan, the Kingdom wanted to demonstrate Hamas leaders that they required to support Palestine National Authority when the negotiations to settle Palestine problem was underway. Jordanian commitment to Palestine problem shows that without addressing the role and the participation of the PA, it would not be possible to achieve two-state solution. By 1998 Jordan for the first time began to arrest and detain Hamas members operating in Jordan. In May and June 1998 Jordan repudiated Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, leader of opposition in West Bank and Gaza, to enter Jordan. With the aim of establishing good neighborhood with the PA, King Abdullah cracked down the offices of Hamas in Amman and arrested 13 members including Abu Marzuq (former head of Hamas who also strongly supported the unity of two Banks), and Khalid Mashal

²⁵⁰ P. R. Kumaraswamy, "Israel, Jordan and the Masha'al Affair", *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, Issue: 3, Spring 2003, p. 120.

²⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 121.

in August 1999. The outcome of 1999 deportation was an explicit indication to Hamas leaders either to remain loyal to the regime or to be regarded as Palestinians. In fact both options suggested almost the same meaning since both cases were underpinning the independence and survival of the monarchy.

The Hamas issue once again re-invoked Palestine dimension in Jordan's domestic and foreign politics. In addition, it also indicates Jordan's commitment to disengagement from Palestinian lands, West Bank in particular. Given that Jordan realized the need for two-state solution to settle Palestinian problem, the main obstacle could be Hamas in blocking peace process. Since the Kingdom made an effort to liberalize its domestic realm politically, Hamas has become to be perceived as a threat when Jordan's normalizing ties with Israel is accounted. Hamas' opposition to Oslo Accords and the whole peace process led the Jordanian regime to characterize the organization as the 'other' and external unlike in King Hussein's era. The political opening in Jordan would have been setback by repressive laws in the near future due to the increasing Islamic activism enhanced by the position of Hamas in the Occupied Lands. This would force Jordan in taking measures to re-confirm its disengagement from the West Bank.

4.2.4.1 Justifying and legitimating a foreign policy goal:

It was previously the 1993 Parliament which provided the King a group of loyalists to seek her foreign policy goals through co-opting country's domestic unrests. The regime tried to handle the internal problems with external sources (like peace with Israel) during this period. However this was an old strategy of the King to realize the main Jordanian credentials. In the aftermath of the second *intifada*, although the threat perceived by the Hashemites are stemming from external sources, the internal ramifications of the uprising can only be disguised by internalizing Jordanian interests and norms. In this sense, the most striking element of policy-making in the Kingdom hitherto is to re-consolidate national identity through deepening and consecrating *national* and *territorial (watani)* rituals at the expense of transnational affiliations. Actually Jordanian foreign

policy calculations remain firmly oriented toward maintaining domestic stability through containing the opposition.

After Anwar Sadat of Egypt, King Hussein was the second Arab leader who took this decisive step to recognize Israeli state and subsequently managed to establish normal ties with its neighbor in the Middle East. From the beginning Jordan's King made it lucid in that any threat or criticism of the peace treaty would be construed as a threat and opposition to him. This was extremely apparent when he referred the treaty as 'his'.²⁵² By 1994 King Hussein expected to acquire huge support from public for 'his' shift. However internal opposition and Palestinian uprising put the normalization into question both by the peace opponents and ultimately several Jordanian politicians. The Hashemite regime considered the peace as a policy for abandoning its pro-Iraqi-neutral stand during the Gulf War. Many regime supporters claimed that the peace treaty could end up Jordan's isolation in international system.²⁵³ One of the most noteworthy outcomes of the peace accords was the return of Jordanian territory to Jordanian sovereignty and also claimed right for extra water resources from River Jordan and Lake Tiberias. The prime minister of the time, Abdul Salam al-Majali indicated that they all reconciled the exceptional points with Israel. On the one hand, Cecil Hourani in the opening page of the *Jordan Times* argued that the peace with Israel "puts an end, once and for all, to the possibility that a future Israeli government might revive [the idea of alternative homeland]"²⁵⁴. In other words, the peace was aimed to bury the idea of Israeli Jordan Option (substitute homeland for the Palestinians). On the other, the peace treaty was regarded as the peace of Palace rather than the peace of people in the eyes of Jordanians.

²⁵² The notion of King's peace has become evident when Israeli Embassy in Amman celebrated the Independence Day of Israel in May 1995. Although the government made it compulsory to attend, very few Jordanian officials attended the invitation. See Asher Susser, "Jordan", *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, 1997, p. 389.

²⁵³ See also, Paul L. Scham and Russell E. Lucas, "'Normalization' and 'Anti-Normalization' in Jordan: The Public Debate", *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, No: 3, Spring 2003.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid*, p. 147.

With the re-conveying of parliamentary politics, King Hussein expected to institutionalize and justify Jordan's foreign policy preferences. The Kingdom had the perception that elections and the pluralistic politics would demonstrate Israel, the West and the Palestinian-Jordanians that there is no deviation from his decision to disassociate from Palestine. After signing the peace, the regime hoped to insure that parliamentary elections would not become a *referendum* on peace and normalization with Israel by limiting the disclosure of opposition candidates in the press. When the government failed to persuade the Lower Chamber to amend the 1993 Press and Publications Law, they turned their attention to royal decree to modify the press law. Most of Jordan's weekly newspapers suspended with a newly amended law to contain peace opponents. The government without the consent of the Parliament can decree provisional laws as permitted by the Constitution. The restrictions and penalties on Jordanian press had become highly stringent with the provisional law. Nonetheless courts found government's attempt to amend the Press Law as unnecessary and took step towards freezing the Provisional Law, the decision of the court was taken right after the elections.

The agenda of the 1993 Parliament predictably was dominated by the peace with Israel. The Islamist deputies led by the IAF and some leftist members of the Chamber initiated parliamentary debates to renounce the treaty.²⁵⁵ The treaty was ratified with fifty-five affirmative votes to twenty-four rejections. The role of the legislature was central in legitimating King's peace with Israel at that juncture. Without re-conveying the parliament, the Kingdom would not have easily justified the peace treaty.

The next elections were held in November 1997, which brought an overwhelming supremacy of pro-regime candidate's vis-à-vis the opponents. The main reason underlying the victory of pro-government candidates was the decision of the opposition to boycott the elections due to the strict measures taken against them. In an interview with *Jordan Times*, the leader of the

²⁵⁵ Springboard, *op.cit.*, p. 160.

opposition and Secretary General of IAF, Abdul Latif Arabiyyat said that IAF is leading a coalition of 12 parties including independents and professional associations is now ready for cooperation with the government. This declaration of opening dialogue with the Kingdom was made immediately after the elections.²⁵⁶ Arabiyyat asked the government to resume the dialogue after replacing Ishaq Farhan. They did not intend to protest the elections, but it was a tactic for bringing various blocs together he said. For the forthcoming elections, Arabiyyat proposed a close relationship with the ruling elite to have fair elections. Arabiyyat also pointed attention to the turnout in many urban areas where it was not more than 20%. He said the boycott decision was “a trial and we passed it”, because they achieved to strengthen and unify the Front.

The electoral boycott of the IAF in 1997 was conducive in bringing regime loyalists and tribal independents to the legislature at political parties' expense. Russell Lucas considers the 1997 boycott as the corollary of the Press and Publications Law which put strict checks on publishers and writings, but specifically it was associated with the amendment of electoral law in 1993.²⁵⁷ In addition, regime's responses to downgrade the effects of opposition supplemented by the peace process were detrimental in deteriorating the relations between the opposition and the monarchy. Furthermore, anti-normalization campaign and public discontent regarding the peace with Israel revealed and invoked debates on the relationship between the regime and the citizenry which afterward paved the way for redefinition of Jordan's identity. In examining the fragile bond between the regime and the Jordanians, it's indispensable to indicate the joining of East Bank Jordanians into anti-normalization camp. Jordan's efforts to disassociate herself from Palestine politics and identity by 1988 onwards has now triggered by the newly emerging political opposition from the regime's old and strong constituencies, i.e. the East Bank tribes and business elites.

²⁵⁶ Francesca Ciriacci, “IAF Seeking Resumption of Cooperation with Government- Arabiyyat”, *JordanTimes*, January 17, 1998.

²⁵⁷ Russell Lucas, Institutions and the Politics of Survival in Jordan: Domestic Responses to External Challenges, 1988-2001, State University of New York Press, 2005, p. 140.

4.2.4.2 Joining of ‘East Bankers’ into Anti-Normalization Campaign:

In resisting normalizing ties with Israel Jordan’s professional associations, largely dominated by Palestinian descents, were instrumental in initiating debates on the negatives effects of the peace agreement. Kamal Nasir, head of Jordanian Bar Association, evaluated the peace as a reflection of ‘submission and coercion imposed by Israelis’.²⁵⁸ The King’s peace was then subjected to large scale criticisms not only among the Palestinian community residing in Jordan, but also among East Bank origin Jordanians. Nevertheless nearly 80% of Jordanians supported Washington negotiations as a source of providing just and lasting settlement for Arab-Israeli dispute before the ratification of the treaty, democratic gains of Jordanian people acquired after 1989 has been dramatically diluted by legal measures due to the anti-peace rallies. The repression of public rallies by the government in 1996 was the chief exhibition of new policy of the regime. Freeing veteran Islamist, head of the Engineers’ Association and former deputy Laith Shubeilat from jail in November 1996 can be characterized as a part of regime’s maneuver to contain the opposition. His statements like ‘Zionist scheme’ and ‘Jewish invasion’, which then regarded as threatening the monarchy, exhibited Shubeilat’s strong dissatisfaction with the peace. He once said that ‘Whoever believed that he could Judaize the people and Zionist their history was mistaken’. In addition, the Writers’ Association fired a member after having an interview with Israeli television. The Dentists’ association as well ordered its members not to treat Israelis unless it is emergent.

Thousands of Jordanians organized a public riot after a Friday prayer in Amman which was a bit different from the previous unrests prevalent in the Kingdom. Demonstrations broke out in 1997 were not directly reacted to governmental policies, corruption or prices, but rather precipitated by an outside factor. It was specifically organized to block trade and cooperation with Israel. In January 1997 Jordanian National Committee for the Cancellation of the Israeli Trade Fair was founded to protest the trade fair with Israeli firms. The objective of fair

²⁵⁸ Hillel Frisch, “Palestinian Perspectives...”, *op.cit.*, p. 76.

was to promote Israeli manufacturers and economic ties with Israeli businessmen. Since the IAF was among the critical of peace, its MP Ibrahim al-Kilani brought the issue to the National Assembly either to sever ties with Israel or call Jordanian ambassador to Israel back. For Kilani, Netanyahu government would revitalize the idea of 'Jordan is Palestine'. Members of communist, socialist, nationalist and Islamist parties they all merged to boycott the fair in the Parliament. Business associations in Jordan, which was led by Ahmed Obeidat, inaugurated the Committee for Cancellation. Obeidat was not only from an important tribe but also was prominent East Bank politician, head of internal security and chair of Royal Commission who prepared the *al-Mithaq al-Watani*. When he reacted to normalization in 1995 his term was not renewed in the Upper Chamber of Parliament due to King's rejection of his membership.

The Committee for Cancellation gained enormous support from civil society groups including business associations, trade unions and professional associations. Particularly until 1997 elections the IAF retained its political power in the Lower Chamber and acted as a major source of resistance to normalization. The Amman Chamber of Commerce (ACC), the Amman Chamber of Industry (ACI) and the Jordanian Businessmen's Association (JBA) are three key business communities in Jordan. For instance, Fakhri al-Nasir who was the director of National and International Expo Corporation was not included in none of these associations. Al-Nasir who funded the Trade Fair, was supported by Israeli Embassy in Amman and Israeli businesses. Thus Nasir's participation was not welcomed by Jordanian businesses and he was not invited to the Fair. The Committee, precisely the ACI, urged the prime-minister Abdul Karim Kabariti to initiate trade with Iraq at the expense of Israel. Concurrently, another significant development was the position of centrist al-Ahd Party that joined the CRSN's call for boycotting the Jordan-Israeli fair in 1996.

The joining of Jordanian businessmen to boycott the fair represents the first case where the business associations joined with leftists and Islamists under the same umbrella. In addition, the Committee for Cancellation called for a general strike, which did not endorse by the community members eventually. One of the key

elements underlying the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty was the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) idea which was aimed to make exports easier from the region to the US markets with tariff and tax free advantages upon the precondition that the local industries should make up minimum 35% of the exported goods.²⁵⁹ Among the local export 11.7% must be Jordanian and 7-8% must be from Israel, and the rest should source from West Bank or Gaza or the combination of US, Israel and Jordan. However, the Palestinian involvement in the QIZs was blocked by the Israeli re-occupation of the West Bank. With the ongoing instabilities in the region, the Regional Business Council (RBC) was then collapsed in 1997. The high expectations during the peace accords have subsequently begun to disappear when Jordan found it difficult to cope with the 11.7% threshold.

Ahmed Obediat also paid attention to Israeli investment in Jordan's key industries of potash and phosphate. The opposition in the Lower Chamber exposed the growing penetration of Israel into local industries and agriculture in the country. The Committee also publicly announced that Israeli investment possesses considerable share in six food and cloth factories. The proportion of Israeli asset varies from 51 to 65% in these areas. The products of these firms then exported to the USA and European countries carrying the ticket 'Made in Israel'.

Marwan Muasher, Minister of Information, stated that the Fair was not sponsored and organized by the Jordanian government and since there is peace treaty with Israel such activities could be undertaken and the opposition can

²⁵⁹ The Jordanian-Israeli peace negotiations were a direct result of US Middle East policy. In the Economic Summit, which was held in Amman in 1995, just before the opening of World Economic Forum Summit, the Regional Business Council (RBC) was established and monitored by the US. The purpose of the RBC was to serve like a chamber of commerce and aimed to ease joint business ventures among Israeli, Jordanian and Palestinian businessmen in the region. The US established the Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZs) to export goods with duty-free while bringing the idea into practice. The first area that acquired the status of QIZ is the Hassan Industrial Park at Irbid Governorate. The QIZ at Irbid works in the areas of textiles and the manufacture of jewelry and electronic equipment. The key element underlying the QIZs idea was to make exports easier from the region to the US markets with tariff and tax free advantages upon the precondition that the local industries should make up minimum 35% of the exported goods. 12 zones were established and a great majority of the industries located in these areas were non-Jordanian firms, South Asian textile and luggage manufacturers in particular.

protest the Fair under the Constitution. It was obvious that anti-normalization efforts of the opposition bloc entail a nationalist voice with an anti-Israeli sentiment. On the day when the Fair commenced almost 4,000 demonstrators from Karak, Irbid, and Zarqa merged together with hundreds of police, security and army officials. It was arranged previously that more than 200 Israeli firms were supposed to adhere but only 70 enrolled. The protestors carried various slogans like 'Say Yes to Jordan', 'End the Israeli Trade Fair now', and 'Jordan is not the Zionist Bridge to the Arab World'. The independent Circassian deputy to the 1993 Parliament, Toujan Faisal (Jordan's first women MP elected), IAF deputy Secretary General Ishaq Farhan, and Suleiman Arar from nationalist al-Mustaqbal Party made speeches to the public. The most striking element of the riot was the position of Jordanian police. The demonstrators asked to riot police 'You are betraying your nation, don't you love your country?'.²⁶⁰ The IAF deputy Abdul Allah Akalieh asserted that the demonstration was a manifestation of Jordan's national unity in reacting imminent threat posed by Israel. Under these severe circumstances, Abdul Majid al-Majali required to replace Kabariti government.

The riots both Maan in 1989 and Karak in 1996 can be considered as a direct opposition to government policies and economic unsteadiness. However the public rallies in January 1997 clearly epitomizes a phenomenon where an external threat stimulates Jordan's identity. The riot has become the first occasion, which would draw further protests in coming years backing Palestinians and Iraqi people. In this sense ongoing public discontent in Jordan has begun to disclose in slogans and rallies referring and re-invoking Jordanian national identity. Notably, almost all segments of the society including business community come together to protest Israeli trade fair. For Jillian Schwedler, the trade fair and the Committee for Cancellation present a 'spontaneous contest over the very definition of Jordan's identity'.²⁶¹ The Committee for Cancellation has reinforced a common Jordanian identity to come into view and it paved the

²⁶⁰ Jillian Schwedler, "Cop Rock: Protest, Identity, and Dancing Riot Police in Jordan", *Social Movement Studies*, Vol: 4, No: 2, September 2005, pp: 165-166.

²⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 162.

way for a breakthrough in Palestinian-Jordanian relationship in Jordan. The threat or notion of ‘other’ was a common ground to all protestors. The prolonged tension between Palestinians and Jordanians has become *partly* replaced by domestic unsteadiness stemming from the East Bankers, rather than purely from the West Bankers.

Given the public riot in 1997 the term normalization was interpreted as a ‘total annihilation’ by the Jordanian people. However some groups in the Kingdom do not share this idea of total extinction or destruction and consider the peace agreement as benefiting Jordan. A Jordanian academician, Dr. Ahmed Majduba stated that, ‘...the Jordanians were about to lose their identity, ideals, moral virtues, and their holiness’ when the peace treaty is taken into consideration.²⁶² Majduba indicated that the normalization with Israel can be interpreted as conducting relationship with any other country in the world. Therefore, for him, increased anti-Israeli sentiment of Jordanian society was an unnecessary phobia and paranoia. Asher Susser, a prominent Israeli scholar characterizes the peace as necessary not only for Jordanian Kingdom but also an important constituent of regional steadiness.²⁶³ Jordan’s warm peace with Israel was going to be instrumental in promoting cordial relations also between Israel and Iraq and Israel and Palestine. Likewise, Fahd al-Fanik, an economic analyst, Jordanian nationalists, and chairman of board of the *Jordan Times*, suggested that ‘Arab culture was not so fragile that Israel could possibly pose a threat to Jordan in the long run’ since there is no Jew in Jordan.²⁶⁴

Another riot broke out in the southern governorate of Maan on 20th February 1998 in the aftermath of a lecture given by independent Islamist Laith Shubeilat. The main catalyst for the public rallies was the regional volatility related to Iraq. The day after Shubeilat’s speech, after a Friday prayer, a small group of people marched to protest the American policies against Iraq. For that reason Jordanian

²⁶² Asher Susser, “Jordan”, in Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (ed), *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, Westview Press, 1997, Vol: XIX-1995, p. 389.

²⁶³ Laura Z. Eisenberg and Neil Caplan, “The Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty: Patterns of Negotiation, Problems of Implementation”, *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, Issue: 3, Spring 2003, p. 105.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid*, pp: 389-390.

authorities found Shubeilat responsible for the unrest and claimed that the protestors were belonging to the *Salafi* movement of Muhammed Shalabi (commonly known as Abu Sayyaf).²⁶⁵ The protest then was turned into violence between the people of Maan and security forces. A Maani university student, Muhammed Al-Khateb, died during the demonstrations, but the police did not take responsibility. The protestors set fire the municipality building, telecommunication centre and damaged ATM of Housing Bank. In the aftermath of this event, King Hussein told the Maani deputies and Senators that what happened in Maan was “a shameful act”.²⁶⁶ The crisis was ended when government enforced six days curfew, cut telephone lines and closed schools.

4.2.4.3 Regime’s Responses: Trend toward de-liberalizing the political landscape with Press and Publications Laws

As a reaction to 1993 electoral law which disadvantaged the political party candidates and disproportionately represented urban areas, the Muslim Brotherhood boycotted 1997 elections. The electoral boycott of the *Ikhwan* led to the allocation of 85% of the seats to conservative and tribal MPs in the parliament. Having a loyalist majority in the legislature, the government could easily enact Press and Publications Law to contain the peace opponents. The new law of 1997 aimed to restrict the criticisms posed to the monarchy and granted the government the right to suspend or close some newspapers and weeklies.

With the signing of the peace treaty, Jordanian press became indifferent to condemning Kingdom’s policy of normalization of relations with Israel. Country’s two major daily newspapers *al-Dustur* and *al-Ra’y* did not criticize Jordan’s ‘peace camp’ due to the fact that considerable amount of their share is controlled by the state.²⁶⁷ The Kingdom previously imposed an amendment on

²⁶⁵ “Maan: An Open Ended Crisis”, A Reported Issued by *Center of Strategic Studies (CSS)*, University of Jordan, September 2003, p. 25, can be found at <http://css-jordan.org> (date of access: 3 April 2006)

²⁶⁶ *Economist Intelligence Units*, “Country Profile: Jordan”, 1998-99, p. 12.

²⁶⁷ Odeh, *op.cit.*, p. 236.

Press and Publication Law in 1993 replacing the Law of 1973 issued under the martial law. Under the Law of 1973, weekly newspapers were required to provide JD 15,000 capital to the Ministry of Trade and Industry. With the aim of imposing strict regulations, the new Press and Publications Law increased the minimum capital requirement to JD 300,000. The capital resources needed for daily newspapers were increased from JD 50,000 to JD 600,000. As a direct result of this provision, 13 weekly newspapers were suspended by the government in September.²⁶⁸ In addition, the new law did not allow for publishing information criticizing the security services and royal family.

Given that the cabinet can decree temporary laws when it urgently deems necessary under the Article 94 of the Constitution, the High Court of Justice decided in January 1998 that amendment of 1993 Law was unconstitutional.²⁶⁹ The timing of the amendment was critical for the regime to control public rallies and their criticisms toward the regime. However the Court decided that, it was not urgently necessary to code a new law since there was no war and internal unrest. In terms of disclosing the shortcoming in Jordan's party politics and political pluralism in which press was highly depoliticized during election campaigns, the 1997 Press and Publications Law occupies a significant place. In September 1998, the new Press Law passed which reduces capital requirement to JD 100,000 for the weeklies, but most of other restrictions retained. The 1998 Law puts ban on media in publishing documents in fourteen areas; including the King, the royal family, the army, security agencies, the judiciary, the economy, heads of Arab states, and any crime at the stage of investigation or trial. The Article 37 specifically put bans on publications; criticizing the King and royal family members, any news harming security forces, any information breaks the national unity and finally any article or information criticizing the heads of Arab, Islamic or friendly nations.²⁷⁰ The new law also bans any publication slandering leaders of the Arab states. This provision is in fact refers to Yaser

²⁶⁸ Russell Lucas, "Press Laws as a Survival ...", *op.cit.*, p. 89.

²⁶⁹ Ali Kassay, "The Effects of External Sources on Jordan's Process of Democratization", in George Joffé (ed), *Jordan In Transition: 1990-2000*, Hurst & Company Publishers, London, 2002, p. 57.

²⁷⁰ Wiktorowicz (1999), *op.cit.*, p. 617.

Arafat since some weeklies in Jordan were critical of peace process and PLO's recognition of Israeli state. The 1998 Law put explicit limitations on publications damaging national unity. This provision is closely tied with the division among Jordanians and Palestinians. The increased role and potency of anti-normalization campaign has led the Hashemites to take legal measures in order to contain anti-regime forces in the country through press and publications law. For instance, Russell Lucas takes attention to the persisting *gap* between Jordan's official foreign policy and public opinion and suggests that amendment of press and publications laws are stemming from the obligation to sustain regime-survival.²⁷¹

In this regard, with 1998 law any publication or article that can strain the relationship between two communities is strongly outlawed. The 1998 Law authorizes the court to suspend or send for trial those publications damaging national unity and public order. The government is also allowed to have predominant control mechanism on the board of directors of the publications. The government has granted the right to dismiss and appoint new editors and this was then followed by the closing down of a dozen of weekly newspapers. The peace with Israel and increased Islamist and pro-Palestinian movement reinforced the throne to take legal measures to downplay the role of anti-Israeli sentiments.

A critical response to the new law was brought by the report prepared by Sa'eda Kailani, activist of Arab Archives and Studies Centre, for the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network without delay. The report was given the title of 'Black Year for democracy in Jordan: 1998 Press and Publications Law'.²⁷² Besides, the Jordanian Press Association immediately denounced the repression of the press and they declared that the amendments would bring Jordan to *pre-democracy era* under martial law where journalists were arrested and imprisoned without trial. Considering internal challenges and external

²⁷¹ Russell E. Lucas, "Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 39, No: 4, October 2003, pp: 81-98.

²⁷² Kassay, "The Effects of External ...", *op.cit.*, p. 58.

forces on the Hashemite Kingdom, the peace debate fostered the magnitude towards de-liberalization. For Laurie Brand and Jillian Schwedler, de-liberalization in Jordan was underway in the aftermath of 1994 treaty with Israel. The al-Aqsa *intifada* and the subsequent Iraqi war were perpetuated and disseminated the trend that already started. According to Brand, a specialist on Jordan, the setbacks in Jordan's political liberalization is attributed to its foreign policy choices which have become apparent by the second half of 1990.²⁷³ In Schwedler words, "... events of September 11 did not so much change the course of domestic politics in Jordan" in terms of political repression and de-liberalization.²⁷⁴ In this respect, Jordan's political liberalization is devastatingly overstepped and setback by the Palestinian factor by 2000 onwards.

Finalizing a peace treaty with Israel has posited Jordan at the core of identity politics in the Middle East. Having felt the constraining effects of Palestinian national movement, King Hussein's shift to give up Jordan's all claims on the West Bank in 1988 represents a transition from Arabism toward *statizing* Jordan's norms and preferences. It was Jordanian *watani* identity used as a "prop" to justify and legitimate Jordan's peace making with the Israeli state. The regime has sought to contain the peace opponents via amending the electoral law immediately before 1993 national elections to secure pro-regime tribal composition of the parliament at Palestinian descents' and Islamists' expense.

However, the Palestinian dimension that confronted the regime since the annexation of the West Bank has now precipitated by the newly emerged opposition in the southern governorates notably in Maan. In this respect, joining of the East Bankers into the domestic opposition for the first time in country's

²⁷³ Laurie Brand (1999), *opcit.* For more detail concerning Jordan's democratization and civil society organizations see also; Laurie Brand, "In the Beginning was the State...: The Quest for Civil Society in the Middle East", in Augustus Richard Norton (ed), *Civil Society in the Middle East*, Vol: I, E. J.Brill, Leiden, 1995 and Jillian Schwedler, "Don't Blink: Jordan's Democratic Opening and Closing", *Middle East Report* (MERIP), 3 July 2002, www.merip.org/mero070302.html (access date: 22 March 2006)

²⁷⁴ Curtis Ryan "Jordan First: Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations...". See also, Russell Lucas, "Press Laws as a Survival Strategy in Jordan, 1989-99", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 39, no: 4, October 2003, pp: 82-83.

history has vigorously alarmed the Kingdom to take some measures to cope with the new *East Bankers phenomenon*. For instance, the amendment of the Press and Publications Law in 1998 highly restricted the public debates on Palestine problem and policies of the state. In addition, the *Ikhwan* has now begun to be perceived as a threat rather than a neutral ally of the monarchy unlike in pre-1990 period. The reason behind the change in the perception of the *Ikhwan* from the point of Jordanian regime is largely stemming from the Palestine-oriented politics of the Brotherhood and the critical position of the IAF delegates during parliamentary debates on the peace treaty with Israel.

It's quite visible that the Palestine dimension still invokes Jordan's identity politics and circumscribes Kingdom's policies at abroad. In this regard, the next chapter will demonstrate how the deliberalization efforts of the regime were triggered by the outbreak of the al-Aqsa *intifada* across Jordan's western border. Furthermore Jordanian regime undertakes a new strategy in mobilizing Jordan's *watani* ideals with the adoption of the 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' in 2002 to supersede the regional constraints that posed challenge to Jordan's identity consolidation.

CHAPTER 5:

THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THE *AL-AQSA INTIFADA* AND JORDAN'S RESPONSES

The main motive in understanding the variation in Jordanian identity is closely situated within the realm of external challenges. The al-Aqsa *intifada* and the US strike against Iraq exemplify two cases that Jordan is confronted in the post-2000 period. The al-Aqsa *intifada* episode enormously caused regional instability in the Middle East and also exacerbated the tensions derived from anti-normalization camp in Jordan. On the one hand, King Hussein finalized one of the most crucial treaties of the century with Israel on behalf of the Middle East peace, on the other, Jordan's new King Abdullah II was squeezed by the question whether to normalize its relations with Israel or not, on behalf of its society. The things have become highly detrimental for Jordan when the growing tension in the West Bank led the Palestinians to flee into the borders of the East Bank. Furthermore, Israel began to acquire an expectation that its Palestinian population would demand to move to Jordan due to the insecure situation on the occupied territories. Such negative scenarios became more apparent when Ariel Sharon ascended as Israel's new prime minister. Jordan alarmed by the likelihood of Palestinian refugee influx even from Lebanon to Jordan, which would then re-invoke 'Jordan Option' as a substitute homeland.

In this context, the key to perceive the effects of *intifada* and war on terror could not be solely reduced to security analysis, but rather could be tied to the change in the very definition and meaning of Jordan's identity. Therefore second *intifada* and Palestine question will demonstrate how an external challenge combined with domestic unrest invoke and re-shape identities. Thus, it's central to build a theoretical framework to observe how the public demonstrations and opposition have paved the way for a discursive platform to deliberate Jordan's

identity. Jordan's response to domestic unrest was then built on the consolidation of Jordan's national identity through utilizing ethnic kin, national unity and communal bonds. Before explaining how Jordanian identity serves as a *prop* to overcome internal imbalances, the repercussions brought by the *al-Aqsa intifada* will be explored.

5.1 The onset of *Al-Aqsa Intifada*: 'Clashing expectations'

During second *intifada*, Jordanians organized themselves in various demonstrations calling for the termination of Jordanian-Israeli Treaty. In addition, demonstrations erupted in October and November 2000 embraced not only the Palestinians; but also non-Palestinian Jordanian citizens were adhered to the Islamist and leftist groups to support the public rallies and extended the response of the anti-normalization idea to East Bank origin citizens as well. Eventually, the capital city, Amman, has become a battleground overnight between the normalizers and anti-normalizers in the sense that these demonstrations re-surfaced the disguised political and economic upheavals persisted in the country.

The resurgence of anti-normalizers had both internal and external causes. Internally, according to data disclosed by Economist Intelligence Unit, unemployment among the Palestinian descents reached more than 30% by the year of 2000.²⁷⁵ Many Palestinians were complaining the uneven representation in security and police forces, and in other fields of civil service. Moreover, poverty and unemployment were not only confined to the Palestinian descents, living conditions of the East Bankers in the rural areas are under the poverty line. People of Maan are among those Jordanian citizens deprived of economic conditions prevailing in the urban areas.²⁷⁶ Externally, members of the anti-

²⁷⁵ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", December 2000, p. 1.

²⁷⁶ It's central to assert political, cultural and economic significance of southern governorates in Jordan. Nevertheless Jordanian monarchy acquires its major popular base from these areas; economic unsteadiness brought by the post-Gulf War era destroyed the economies of the periphery. The southern governorates, Karak, Maan and Tafila display the lowest indicators concerning human

normalization campaign were discontented by the plight situation faced by the Palestinian refugees and the unjust treatment pursued by Western, the US in particular, and Israeli foreign policies.

The overriding effects of al-Aqsa *intifada* urged King Abdullah to reshape Jordan's domestic agenda. Jordan has sought the policy of containing regime opponents including Arab nationalists, Ba'athists, and Islamists. On 2nd October, a few days after the Palestinian uprising, a huge group of demonstrators condemned Israel brutality and called the Israeli Embassy in Amman to close down. Meanwhile, the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic Action Front, has decided to suspend Abd al-Rahim al-Uqur's membership after he took a position in the government.²⁷⁷ Although Muslim Brotherhood opposed to Jordanian-Israeli peace, they retained their allegiance to the Hashemite monarchy. King Abdullah's decision to appoint Ali Abu Ragheb as prime minister in June 2000 was derived from an inclusive approach of Abu Ragheb to integrate Palestinian community into the political scene. Accordingly, Abu Ragheb's cabinet included Palestinian ministers and

development in Jordan. In accordance with the human development indicators, including level of education, life expectancy and GDP, three governorates mentioned and Mafraq altogether have the lowest values among 12 governorates in the Kingdom. While an annual income of a resident in Amman was JD 934 in 1997, the figure dropped to 575 in Mafraq, 589 in Tafila, 610 in Maan, and 752 in Karak. Following the IMF structural adjustment program more than a thousand people of Karak, marched to protest the rise in bread prices in August 1996. The public unrest first began in Karak but very quickly spread to Maan, Tafila and eventually Amman. Following police's interference the demonstrators fired some government offices, a private bank, and cars. The fundamental characteristics ascribed to 1996 unrest were stimulated and overstepped by outside forces. The economic indicators of Jordan do not depict an explicit debt or economic decline in 1996. The real GDP growth of the Kingdom was 1.7% in 1990, but this number increased to 5.2% in 1996. Among other factors, the Gulf returnees, signing of peace treaty and growing de-liberalization in the country induced anti-government opposition. The spontaneous reaction to bread prices in 1996 clearly revealed the fact that there is a growing tension between the Jordanian state and society. The delicate state-society relations have become weakened by governmental repression and regional instabilities consequently. See; "Maan: An Open Ended Crisis", CSS, University of Jordan, www.css-jordan.org p. 12.

²⁷⁷ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/805227.stm (25 June 2000).

his government aimed to amalgamate West Bankers into the country's economic sector as well. In the meantime, Abdullah asked Abu Ragheb to review the legal system. This was the first sign of Abdullah to reform the Jordanian state after his father's death.²⁷⁸ The regime allowed former *Ikhwan* member to serve as a minister of municipal, rural and environmental affairs in the new cabinet formed. The reason behind this was the co-optation of some activists of al-*Ikhwan*.

The Jordanian government initially allowed the public rallies in support of *intifada*, but the increase in violent course of protests led the government to ban demonstrations later. A teenager was killed and some others injured in a clash between anti-Israeli protestors and Jordanian police.²⁷⁹ Nearly two thousand Palestinians took part in protests at the Baqaa refugee camp near Amman against Israel. In October 2000 city of Maan, where the Hashemite regime acquired its traditional political support, witnessed by a popular protest against Israeli invasion. Two Israeli diplomats were shot and injured in Amman after three separate attacks against Israeli Embassy. When anti-Israeli demonstrations turned violent, public demonstrations were highly restricted.²⁸⁰ By November, Jordanian government announced that they banned public rallies backing *intifada*.²⁸¹ It was clear that, the antagonism between the 'normalizers' and 'anti-normalizers' had turned into a conflict among *regime* versus *public* or more accurately in constructivist thinking, *us* and *them*. Some members of the campaign were arrested and charged in the first year of the *intifada*. Meanwhile the government did not renew the term of Jordan's Ambassador to Israel. According to Ibrahim Alloush, university professor detained several times by Jordanian police for joining public rallies in support of *intifada*; "demonstrations

²⁷⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/901920.stm (29 August 2000).

²⁷⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/959815.stm (6 October 2000).

²⁸⁰ Scott Greenwood, "Jordan, the Al-Aqsa *Intifada* and America's War on Terror", *Middle East Policy*, Vol: X, No: 3, Fall 2003, p. 91.

²⁸¹ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", November 2000, pp: 14-15.

were banned because they exert pressure on the Jordanian government to do just that [closing down the Israeli Embassy]”.²⁸²

The anti-normalization campaign prepared a blacklist of individuals and organizations accused of normalizing ties with Israel and they tried to have an effective effort to initiate the return of Palestinians through Allenby Bridge but the Jordanian police did not let them to finalize their attempt. The public rallies for anti-normalization has turned to a parliamentary debate in the Lower Chamber of Jordanian Assembly. Fourteen members of the Chamber initiated an open debate to discuss the peace with Israel on December 13, 2001 which was ended without causing any trouble for the government. Due to the increased violence between Israeli and Palestinian camps, anti-normalization demonstrations accelerated their activities vis-à-vis the Jordanian state. The government often criticized and warned members of the campaign. Several Islamist groups in support of Palestinians denounced Israeli action and called for the closure of Israeli embassy in Amman. The Jordanian branch of Muslim Brotherhood rigorously condemned the foreign minister Marwan Muasher and King Abdullah for their attitudes of denunciation of “Muslim people fighting against terrorism”. King Abdullah time to time criticized some of those Palestinians for suicide attacks. The Jordanian media entitled Jordan as ‘a victim of the *intifada*’ and did not provide political support for the Palestinians, and for that reason most Jordanians chose to watch external channels like *al-Jazeera* and CNN. This process led to the banning of public demonstrations and the introduction of temporary laws like, the 2001 Electoral Law. Meanwhile, revitalizing of the idea of *al-watan al-badil* (alternative homeland) by Israel highly weakens re-Jordanization of Jordan’s credentials.

King Abdullah paid a visit to the US on April 2001 with the aim of reinforcing George W. Bush to have a step forward Palestinian-Israeli problem. Abdullah intended to promote both Jordanian and Egyptian peaces with Israel and to make them more practical in the region. Abdullah’s initiative was followed by

²⁸² Samaa Abu Sharar, “Amman Responses to Palestinian *Intifada*: A Delicate and Controversial Balancing Act”, *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol: 20, Issue: 3, April 2001.

launching a peace scheme in March, calling the end of violence, co-operation in the region and enforcement of third Israeli deployment.²⁸³ Nevertheless an Israeli retaliatory bombing of West Bank in May challenged the peace proposal. This attack was followed by the Arab League decision revoking relations with Israeli state. The Arab League's call to ban relations with Israel was considered a motive for the US to take more action in settling dispute in the region. The anti-normalizers did not only welcome it but also Jordanian government thought it could be an opportunity to encourage regional peace.

Under these circumstances, Jordanian government diverted its position away from Palestinian cause toward preserving domestic unity and welfare of its people. On 17 June 2001 King Abdullah announced to dissolve the Parliament as a critical response to Palestinian-Israeli violence and internal unrest persisted in the country.²⁸⁴ Given the strong attachment of Jordanian society to Palestinian issue criticizing Israeli and American policies; it was a delicate moment for the regime and King Abdullah whether to hold the forthcoming elections on the specified day or not. It was ostensible for King Abdullah that the severe situation could only be mitigated by postponing elections to an unspecified date. It would be very difficult for the monarchy to have election campaigns where placards of anti-Israeli slogans would be posted. In order to diminish any speculation and questions about the elections, the regime announced that they require some time for holding fair and transparent polls. Beside, in accordance with the Jordanian Constitution the King granted the right to postpone national elections for a period of not exceeding two years time. The regime decided to hold the elections in September 2002, but another formal decision subsequently postponed the elections until the spring of 2003. Since Jordanian Constitution is put into practice by the abolition of martial law and the adoption of the National Charter in 1992, the monarchy can not postpone the elections afterward.

²⁸³ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", June 2001, p. 14.

²⁸⁴ <http://ntvmsnbc.com/news/89152.asp> (24 November 2001)

5.2 Regime's increasing efforts to *de-liberalize* Jordan's nascent democracy

Considering internal challenges and external forces, the Al-Aqsa *intifada* fostered the magnitude towards de-liberalization, which already began with the oppositionary bloc resisting Jordan's normalizing ties with Israel. With the onset of the *intifada* and particularly after September 11 attacks, Jordan sought to weaken any source of domestic unrest in the form of peace opposition and anti-US rallies.²⁸⁵ In the post-1993 period, the regime has sought to contain the peace contenders rather than curbing any small source of internal unrest. In the aftermath of second *intifada*, however, regime's policy of containment has been replaced by demolition of resistance of any kind. Therefore, the US war on Iraq in 2003 strengthened the illiberal trend that already started by the peace process. In this sense, regime's response to Palestinian pressure was two-fold; banning public demonstrations in support of *intifada* and restricting public assemblies with a temporary law, and adoption of 2001 Electoral Law.

King Abdullah and pro-government delegates were having difficult time during parliamentary sessions. Among 80 parliamentarians 42 of them signed a 'petition urging the parliament to take a course action against those campaigning to end relations with Israel'²⁸⁶. The delegates proposed that despite violence and political frustration remained in the West Bank and Gaza Strip; the Jordanian government arrested and executed members of anti-normalization campaign. 'Some 22 activists have been accused of belonging to an illegal group, publishing writings and carrying out acts harmful to Jordanian citizens and property'²⁸⁷ by the State Security Court in October 2002. Within this period the government was aimed to make a proposal to increase the time allowed for detention of suspects from 24 hours to seven days in cases falling with the jurisdiction of the State Security Court. In addition, the Minister of Interior, Awad Khulaifat, put a ban on 'activities that pose a threat to security and

²⁸⁵ Clive Jones, "Terrorism, Liberation or Civil War? The Al-Aqsa *Intifada*", *Civil Wars*, Vol: 6, No: 3, Autumn 2003, p. 134.

²⁸⁶ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", June 2001, p. 15.

²⁸⁷ Ibid.

stability and hamper the people's interests' which was a clause that criticized and defined as open to wide interpretation.²⁸⁸

The ban on public rallies was met by challenges from both the opposition and members of the press. The *Ikhwan* and the Front responded to the ban by holding a public rally in Amman to commemorate the 53rd anniversary of Palestinian *Nakba* ('the catastrophe' of 1948 Arab-Israeli war). Two demonstrations held in Amman were then responded by security forces using tear gas, water cannon and dogs on May 11. Some Islamist demonstrators were injured and heavy-handed response of the security forces on the activists was then followed by a wide range rally at the Baqaa refugee camp outside Amman. The regime tolerated some demonstrations without taking any measure to calm down domestic turmoil including the rally attended by 15,000 protestors at Baqaa. During this period the government can only make symbolic gestures in support of Palestinian movement.

Following the eruption of the *intifada*, Jordan passed two temporary laws under Abu Ragheb's cabinet one month after King's dissolution of the Parliament. One of them was ban on public demonstrations to curb the opposition and the second one was the new assembly law. The government issued a law on public assembly in August 2001, which stipulates "any meeting debating *public issues* required official approval from the local governor at least 48 hours prior to its scheduled start"²⁸⁹. In addition new assembly law also stated that public demonstrations necessitate permission from the provincial governor 72 hours before the rally. King Abdullah's decision not to convey the Parliament was a critical measure in order to adjust Jordan's foreign relations without being constrained by regime adversaries and increased domestic unrest.

The instability on the Occupied Territories has undeniably determined the domestic agenda by 2000 onwards in the Kingdom. The regime strained by the anti-Israeli opponents and pro-Palestinian identity opted to amend the electoral

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

²⁸⁹ Greenwood, "Jordan, al-Aqsa *intifada* and ...", *op.cit.*, pp: 91-92.

law in 2001. The new election law that came into force in July 2001 brought further controversial debate between the regime and the opposition. The Law retains ‘one person-one vote’ formula and does not address to disproportionate allocation of the electoral districts. The government declared that due to the procedural matters coming elections needs to be postponed. The new procedure stipulates using magnetic identity cards in the ballots by the Jordanian citizens. The 2001 Law increased the number of seats in the Lower Chamber from 80 to 104 and the number districts rose from 21 to 45. In addition the law lowered the age of voting eligibility from 19 to 18.

By September, the government proclaimed that elections would not be held for more than one year as a result of regional unsteadiness. For Scott Greenwood, it would be difficult for Jordan to curb the opposition parties during American strike against Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11 as well. If Jordan had allowed the running of parliamentary elections, it would have carried risks for US-Jordanian relations in time of US war on terror.²⁹⁰ Concomitantly, 2001 Law raised debates on the issue of overrepresentation of the East Bankers living in rural areas at the expense of urban areas. For that reason, the IAF announced not to participate in the forthcoming elections. The decision of IAF was directly linked to the new electoral law which retained the uneven distribution of seats in the legislature and one person-one-vote system. However, Ali Abu al-Ragheb’s government formulated a draft electoral law to replace “one vote” with a “two-vote” system. Through this way, voters will first vote for a candidate in their district and they can cast the second vote for a candidate representing their governorate. If the proposal is going to be accepted, voters will have a third vote to elect their women candidates to the Lower Chamber.²⁹¹ The proposed electoral system is assumed to provide an opportunity for tribal candidates as it favored Islamist and tribal candidates in 1989 elections. Since there was no consensus reached, postponement of the elections due to November 2001 was utterly unavoidable. Looked from the Jordan’s identity politics, the Kingdom

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 98. The emphasis added.

²⁹¹ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, “Country Report: Jordan”, June 2001, p. 16.

has sought to withstand through not jeopardizing Jordan's embedded interests and preferences.

5.3 Jordanian-Arab Identity serves as a *Prop*:

When King Abdullah ascended to the throne, he has different preferences in his mind as compared to his father.²⁹² His father was moved to act in political sense and as the King of Arabs to some extent. The monarchy created room for ideological cooperation with its Palestinian citizens right after the annexation act in 1950 identifying common political goals for both Jordanians and Palestinians. On the other hand, King Abdullah has engaged in divergent categories like economic re-construction policies and having negotiations with the WTO and the EU for liberalizing Jordan's economy. For Abdullah economic recovery is the key for regime consolidation. King Abdullah unlike his father, moved to disassociate Palestine from Jordanian political boundaries. In achieving this end, the regime sought to take some measures to weaken the overwhelming effects of Palestinian issue. In this respect, the institutionalization of the idea of severance from the West Bank has been at the core of Abdullah's domestic agenda with the aim of gaining the trust and full allegiance of its Palestinian-Jordanian nationals. Thus the main aspects characterizing King Abdullah's era is two-fold; distancing Jordan's politics from Palestine and the Palestinians, and the corollary of the first, taking steps toward de-liberalizing the political arena so as not to be overwhelmed by the exigencies of al-Aqsa uprising.

King Abdullah's first visit to Israel on April 23, 2000 should be visibly noticed. The stalemate of Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process and the Palestinian uprising led the King to cancel his forthcoming meetings with Ehud Barak. In addition due to the public unrest and anti-Israeli attitudes of Jordanian-Palestinians the Royal Palace informed the Jordanian press to downplay the meeting of Abdullah with Barak. This was reflected to those official-line newspapers in a way that Abdullah's and his wife Queen Rania's public activities on the front pages

²⁹² Lamis Andoni, "Report from Jordan, King Abdullah: In His Father's Footsteps?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXIX, No: 3, Spring 2000, p. 77.

replaced King's visit to Israel.²⁹³ King Abdullah avoided to be seen as under the influence of Israelis.

The King was also very careful in the sense that he had a Western-elite education and he can speak English more fluent than Arabic which always brought question marks after he came to power in 1999. To act as a pure Jordanian has been the primary strategy of himself since then. In fact, Abdullah sought to fill this gap given his wife, Rania, is of Palestinian origin, which effectively helps the King to embrace all the Jordanian citizens regardless of their place of birth and ethnic background living on Jordan as their home country.

King's statements like, "Our Arab nation has for the past decades suffered from conflicts. Arab citizens have become bitter and frustrated"²⁹⁴ attempted to find out solutions to end the Palestinian suffering. His position implies the beginning of a new era in joint Arab action towards solidarity under the heat of *intifada*. Considering the impact of al-Aqsa *intifada* in overstepping the competing ideals of regime's official foreign policy and public opinion, it was no longer easy for the Kingdom to uphold national unity. Here, to understand King's position is vital to perceive the internal fear of the monarchy. Jordanian fear is not only derived from Palestinian community, but also the economic decline of East Bank Jordanians was reminding the crises of 1989 and 1996. The decrease in foreign investment and tourism revenues owing to regional confrontation was the main motive of the King to take pre-emptive measures in order to maintain his regime-survival. The first step of these measures was imposing ban on public riots. Jordan joined in October 2000 at Sharm al-Shaikh Summit with Egypt and proposed a cease-fire. Yaser Arafat also joined the discussions on peace plan by April 2001.²⁹⁵ Arafat's earlier dialogue with Abdullah al-Khatib, foreign minister of Jordan, revealed the need for a political solution for achieving peace

²⁹³ *Christian Science Monitor*, 4/24/2000, Vol: 92, Issue: 106, <http://search.epnet.com> (07.07.05)

²⁹⁴ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1245916.stm (27 March 2001).

²⁹⁵ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1307060.stm (1 May 2001).

in the Middle East. The idea of al-Khatib was re-confirmed by King Abdullah in an interview. The King said:

We will never see a true stable prosperous Middle East until the Palestinian-Israeli situation is solved and therefore it's of paramount important to all of us to be there for both sides- to try and get them past the crises that they are in at the moment and achieve an atmosphere where we can get them to sit around the peace table again.²⁹⁶

Furthermore Jordan called for an emergency meeting by the Arab League to discuss the escalation in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Backing Saudi Plan in 2002 was part of Jordan's efforts to solve Palestine problem. In the meantime, hundreds of Palestinians were demanding to enter Jordanian border via the Allenby Bridge by the mid-2002. Nevertheless Jordan has denied that it's restricting the entry of the West Bankers, the influx of Palestinians into Jordan's borders brought tension from the point of Jordanian state. One Palestinian man waiting in Jericho to pass over the border said that "I go Jordan every year but I've never seen anything like this. All I want to do is to visit my sick brother".²⁹⁷ The critical point was West Bank Palestinians would like to visit their relatives in the East Bank but this would extremely threaten Jordanian demographic structure. During this period, King Abdullah summarized the perception of threat in Jordan as follows;

...The Jordanian position has been made very, very clear that we do not accept an exodus of Palestinians out of the West Bank into Jordan. Firstly, it is detrimental to the Palestinian cause. If there are no Palestinians in the West Bank, how can they secure a future homeland for themselves? And again the limitations of Jordan- it is not just the economy – it comes simply down the amount of water that Jordan can provide its citizens and so any increase of numbers or exodus from the West Bank into Jordan is a red line for our country".²⁹⁸

²⁹⁶ BBC interview with King Abdullah, 24 August 2001.

²⁹⁷ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2122856.stm (12 July 2002).

²⁹⁸ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1507648.stm (24 August 2001)

Looking opinion polls can tell how perceptions of threat and re-modification of new preferences have formulated. According to the figures, 74% of Jordanians supported the peace treaty with Israel in 1994. In a poll conducted in 1999 and 2000, 80% opposed it and considered Israel as enemy.²⁹⁹ This explains how domestic and external variables invoke states' identities. In celebrating the 10th anniversary of the peace, Marwan Muasher (foreign minister) said, "We are not in the mood for ceremonies because of what's happening to the Palestinians". Although there are daily flights between two countries, direct trade between Israel and Jordan has become quite limited. But the US under the QIZs offers duty-free access to goods produced jointly between Israelis and Jordanians. Jordan fears that it will suffer because of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. For Muasher, Israel's construction of a barrier in and around West Bank would cause a new exodus of Palestinian refugees to Jordanian land; and he said that, "We will be punished" eventually.

Within this state of fluctuations, Marwan Muasher paid a visit to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan at the end October 2003. The foreign minister, Muasher declared publicly his country's commitment for US-backed Road Map. He stated "We should stay the course with a view to implement the roadmap and to put an end to (Israeli) occupation and to the tragic killing of civilians on both the Palestinian and Israeli sides".³⁰⁰ Since he attempted to steer the Middle East peace, Muasher has become called as 'Mr. Roadmap'. He said, implementation of the Road Map should be 'scrupulous' and 'without modifications'. Jordan's endeavor to acquire the consent of Palestinians both in and outside Jordan was meaningful; if not, all other gains of the country without achieving national unity could be pointless. Jordanian regime would always stipulate and envisage the establishment of a Palestinian state, but it should be noticed how often it's articulated by the Jordanian officials. Once the King is attempted to distance Jordan's internal matters from that of Palestine, emphasizing liberation of occupied lands and invoking the future status of Palestinian-Jordanians could carry risk in bringing debates on Palestine back to Jordan's agenda. Given the

²⁹⁹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3953617.stm (26/10/04)

³⁰⁰ <http://www.jordantimes.com/Wed/homenews/homenews3.htm> (*JordanTimes*, 9/30/2003)

impact of oppositionary forces in the country with the onset of democratization, the commitment to the Palestine issue has always been at the core of the political program of Islamist, leftist and Arab nationalist groups. Although, founding of a Palestinian state would be an end for Jordanian nation-state as some Israeli writers argue, Jordan will promote Palestinian statehood that would lead to re-acknowledgement of Hashemites standing at international system.³⁰¹

One of the schemes of the King was to seek an end to the regional conflict and more importantly to develop new policies to encompass her society vis-à-vis the challenges deriving from internal sources.³⁰² Finding a settlement for the Palestinian conflict will both end the instability in the region and also help Jordan to stabilize its Palestinian citizens. In the post-2000 era, Abdullah's discourses are therefore built on Jordanian and Arabist norms and identities. Although Jordanian regime will remain close ally of the US and will support US-backed peace proposals in the Middle East, King Abdullah obliged to pursue a pro-Jordanian and Arabist tendency in order to gain consent of Jordanians. In other words, Jordan has outwardly seen as supporting Palestinian cause, but also tried to retain its traditional pro-Western foreign policy-making. In this respect, Jordan's embedded norms and Arabist identity is used as a prop to persuade Jordanian people. The clash of expectations and ideals stemming from al-Aqsa *intifada* were therefore aimed to be mitigated by the King through frequent references to Jordan's identity. Otherwise all other obtains from the outside world would be meaningless and illegitimate.

³⁰¹ King Abdullah recently said that, Israeli withdrawal from Gaza should be followed by Israeli pullout from the West Bank, which would enable the establishment of Palestinian statehood. In addition, the King asserted the necessity for international support to restore stability in the Middle East, Iraq in particular. From; *Jordan Times*, 16-17 September 2005. King Abdullah's visit to Egyptian President Mubarak in October has called for resumption of negotiations between Palestinian and Israeli officials to eradicate obstacles to achieve peace in the region. *Jordan Times*, October 11, 2005.

³⁰² *The USA Today*, 8 May 2002.

5.4 Consolidating Jordan's National Identity: 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign'

In the aftermath of Palestinian uprising Jordanian public debates were largely centered on identity conflict. On the one hand, Jordanian public opinion gave enormous support for Palestinian *intifada* and called Jordanian state to end normalization with Israel; on the other regime made symbolic gestures backing Palestinian cause but continued to maintain relations with Israel. Given the American strike against Iraq, transfer of Palestinians from West Bank to Jordan would be exacerbated by impending refugee exodus from Iraqi border. Nevertheless King has suspended Jordanian Parliament and attempted to minimize political opposition in the legislation, the overriding effects of *intifada* led Jordan to re-think new measures to contain internal tension. In restraining public rallies and opposition forces, the Kingdom tried to take Jordanians' attention to domestic issues, instead of setting agendas like refugees, occupied lands or *intifada*.

One assurance for a stable Jordanian-Israeli relationship is attributed to a stable Palestinian-Israeli relationship. Without the latter, domestic tension and 'ethnic' division in Jordanian society and identity is unavoidable. Within this very critical epoch, Jordan's demand to protect warm peace with Israel was strictly undermined by internal opposition. For that purpose, the King announced Jordan First Campaign (*al-Urdun Awalan*) as a mechanism to strengthen national preferences and identity at home. By September 2002, Jordanian flag was posted on billboards all around the country with a slogan attached to these posters; "Al-Urdun Awalan". The Campaign symbolizes a manifesto of Jordanian's wills and priorities. Under the threat of both external and internal turmoil, Hashemite regime's endeavor was meaningful for two reasons. To begin with, the Kingdom is aimed to weaken and co-opt the opposition via consolidating unity and homogeneity on the East Bank. And the corollary of the first, King Abdullah can act more independently in maintaining close ties with the US and restoring normal relations with Israel.

Nevertheless it implies a nationalist approach to foreign policy; it's a new instrument to counter external influences directed against Jordanian internal politics. For instance, King Abdullah after the outbreak of the *intifada* started to contain transboundary ties of pro-Syrian, pro-Ba'athist and communist and Islamist parties including IAF. In order to embark on foreign pressures King Abdullah reinforced *Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign*. Through this way, Jordanian domestic policies could be more stable and less tumultuous, which would help Jordan to justify its foreign policy goals straightforwardly. To make it more seeming, Jordan First Campaign may call a nationalist tone but in fact, it's related with making Jordan *more* Jordanized and *less* Palestinized. As Curtis Ryan indicates, various sources of political opposition including secular left and religious right were considered as un-Jordanian immediately before launching Jordan First Campaign.³⁰³ In other words, Kingdom's main objective was not to foster nationalism, but instead to take opponents under control to pursue assertive policy at international system. The decision was made at a very critical time period when there were increased voices of anti-normalization campaign (ANC). During the demonstrations in Maan against US bombing of Iraq in 1998, Jordanian *mukhabarat* has noticed that some other external agitators exist. These were the groups fled through Jordanian southern border from Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the fall of Taliban regime during 2001-2. When all these external forces and constrains are taken into consideration, as Curtis Ryan has indicated, the Jordan First Campaign of the Jordanian monarchy is more a *Security First Campaign*.³⁰⁴

The Campaign is a new instrument of King Abdullah in order to create a focal premise for the Kingdom in domestic affairs. Jordan First was inaugurated to resist and fight with socio-economic development, education and political corruption. It was officially launched on October 30, 2002 on the day of second anniversary of the al-Aqsa uprising, to strengthen the very foundations of a democratic, stable and socially united nation-state. As it is written in the Foreign

³⁰³ Curtis Ryan, "Jordan First: Jordan's Inter-Arab Relations and Foreign Policy Under King Abdullah II", *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol: 26, Issue: 3, Summer 2004, p. 13.

³⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 15.

Ministry's official website the campaign is; "A working plan that seeks to deepen the sense of *national identity* among citizens where everyone acts as partners in building the Kingdom".³⁰⁵

The Campaign is a complete re-construction project of the monarchy. It's designed to enact new policies in economic development, education, and cultural and social affairs, briefly in all aspects of Jordanians' daily lives. The fundamental initiative of the Campaign is to enrich the Jordanian interests above all other issues and to re-integrate and re-construct the major tools of a democratic parliamentary system. In this respect, public freedom, supremacy of law, equal opportunities and transparency are among those considerations that the campaign takes as the primary goals. The King acknowledged and reaffirmed the time period as follows;

Jordan is for *all Jordanians* and we appreciate the role of the opposition when it is for the interest of Jordan and its political development and when it works to improve citizens' standards of living and developing Jordan.³⁰⁶

King Abdullah notified and informed the whole Jordanians that all the citizens will take part in the progress of the future of Jordanians including the upcoming parliamentary elections, which was postponed due to domestic and foreign challenges. King also recognized the Jordan's efforts to solve the Palestinian conflict and to downgrade the influence of Iraqi crisis through his statements "when we are strong, we can back our brethren in Palestine and Iraq". His words in one respect re-emphasize the Kingdom's Jordanian "Jordan First and Arab Second policy". While the regime attempts to consolidate her national identity and preferences, the constraining effects of the regional and internal obstacles condition her foreign policy behavior abroad.

Jordan as the homeland of all Jordanians, the Campaign asserts that with the young generation the country will be brought to a higher position in

³⁰⁵ www.mfa.gov.jo/ (15 September 2004)

³⁰⁶ *Ibid.* The emphasis added.

international arena. The ingredients of the concept of Jordan First can be summarized under ten categories. In clarifying the project, the first pillar is devoted to the resurrection and awakening of Jordanian society as a whole. Basically, the young Jordanians will work for their homeland that they are belonging to with their full potential. The second concern is correlated with Jordanian interests and preferences. It's stated that Jordan's interests are above all other priorities of the country, and the supremacy of law put down the framework of a *social pact* between the citizens of Jordan with that of Jordanian state. The citizens have rights and duties to perform under the Constitution. In conjunction with this perception, the third pillar is closely tied with social and political integration of all Jordanian citizens irrespective of their ethnic or religious background. In other words, the third category makes an effort to emphasize *social pluralism* in terms of a "coherent civil society". All the citizens have the same rights and obligations under a democratic, just and free parliamentary system regardless of their affinity to another nation or race. This point implicitly recalls the Palestinian descents and their rights under the new system. In addition, Jordanian regime once more remark the legal status of all displaced West Bank Palestinians that they can live under Jordanian flag with one precondition, i.e. they need to either hold Jordanian or Palestinian citizenship. Therefore, third provision in the Campaign completely overlaps with Jordanian new policy of *single citizenship*, which came into force in 1995.

Since the Campaign is aimed to embrace all citizens, it's central for all the Jordanians to attain education and training facilities without any discrimination. This idea is denoted in the forth pillar of the project and stimulates a social reconstruction of the whole society. The fifth pillar, on the other hand, envisages that the Constitution cannot be violated regardless of any purpose. It's written that, "No one is more privileged than the others except in what he/she offers to his/her Homeland and people".³⁰⁷

³⁰⁷ Ibid.

In order to re-build the political institutions for the forthcoming elections the sixth concept has been added to the Campaign. Under the slogan of ‘invitation for all institutions in Jordanian civil society’ it is designed to re-organize political parties, professional associations and labor unions. A modern Jordan can be constructed through social and economic development, which would be complemented by political awakening. Jordan First Campaign provides references to the media as a national guidance institution as well. It was explicitly stated above, all Jordanians and all institutions of the Kingdom would work together as partners to develop policies to deepen the national identity among the citizens. For that purpose the Campaign is referred to as a Renaissance and Awakening project. In order to meet this end of awakening and renaissance the media should serve the role of pluralism and cultivated professionalism. The Campaign calls the media to be objective and respectful for citizen’s intellect and rights eventually. The eighth element of the Campaign is the persistence of a nationalist opposition as an assurance for the safeguard of the Constitution and the credentials of the Nation.³⁰⁸ At this point, the nationalist opposition will not in fact oppose to the rules and laws of the country. The remaining two aspects of the project are closely tied with ensuring Jordanian national interests. The governance of the country will not fall behind the fundamental notions on the Arab Nation. The Campaign totally committed its goals for the re-assurance of Jordanian nation-state as an integral part of both Arab and Islamic circles as it is written in the Constitution; *‘the Jordanian people are part of the Arab Nation and Islam is the religion of the State’*.

Since Jordanian foreign relations were constrained between the necessities of regional and domestic tension; Jordanian regime took a decisive step toward re-consolidating country’s nation and nation-state building. The Kingdom before creating such a comprehensive dialogue with her citizens, laid down the challenges posed to the regime. The challenges were categorized in eight groups with suggested course of actions. One of the foremost threats to the monarchy was considered to be the weakness in relations’ to citizens and institutions. In

³⁰⁸ www.mfa.gov.jo/jordanfirst (15 September 2004)

other words, setting and deepening the accountability, transparency and equal opportunities comprise guidelines of the state to guarantee that all the institutions will work for the common/ collective benefit. The *Government* is therefore in charge of setting values and norms of supremacy of law, social justice and equality through consolidating public freedoms and institutionalization of democracy. The persistent extremism and polarization among the society could be only overcome by restoring *national unity*. The installation of Economic and Social Transformation Program both horizontally and vertically is an indispensable ingredient of Jordan First Campaign. The governments should ensure that unemployment and poverty would be their main concern.

Secondly the *Parliament* is another institution that will guarantee popular participation in the elections and elections will be held regularly as permitted by the Constitution every five-year. Lowering the voting age to 18 would attract the attention of young and university generation in time of elections. Quota for women candidates with the 2001 electoral law is aimed to empower and enable the Lower Chamber to serve as a venue of political pluralism. The third institution aimed to achieve the assurance of national unity is the *judiciary*. The Campaign took the attention to the inadequacy of training of judges. The judicial system is subjected to reform to attain a more independent and efficient character. The establishment of a Constitutional Court is among the top of the list.

The concept of Jordan First, since its inauguration, put the emphasis on *political parties*, professional associations and non-governmental organizations. Political parties are national institutions that must be secured and consolidated. Each political party should dispose of their external ties with the external sources. Under the framework of the Campaign; the Political Parties Law should be amended with the aim of curtailing fragmentation by increasing the minimum number of founders and requires adequate financing for political parties in accordance with 'specific controls that allow for measurement of the popularity

and influence of parties'³⁰⁹. In order to safeguard the persistence of national unity and credentials, the Campaign is committed to outlaw the establishment of political parties on the basis of region, race and religion. The Kingdom recently found a workable option for the reformation of political parties through reformulating them into three different categories; left, right and the centre.³¹⁰ The draft Political Parties Law is pending to be approved by the legislature. The growing popularity of the Islamist groups and resurgence of both Hamas and Hezbollah alarmed the monarchy to take some measures to put strict surveillance on professional associations. Given that the professional associations have gained enormous support from the majority of the Jordanians during anti-normalization campaign against Israel including the East Bankers, it has become inevitable for the regime to downgrade the role of these civil society associations.

The regime aimed to ensure that the political parties will divorce their activities from the schools and clubs. For that purpose politicization of a university or an educational institution by a political party is not permitted under the Campaign. Since *professional associations and non-governmental institutions* form an ingredient part of democratic society, Jordan First Campaign provided such suggested actions as the fifth category. The activities of associations and civil society institutions should be in line with the Constitution. One of the fundamental roles given to them is to deepen the citizen's belongingness and increase the services to the Jordanian citizens.

The potential leverage of *media and press* is also demonstrated in the Jordan First Campaign. The Campaign states that the lack of professionalism and regression must be overcome by new measures. The activities of the media should be governed by the collective goals of Jordanian State and the Homeland. Correspondingly, the word "homeland" could be recognized many times within the constituent document of the Campaign. The idea of Higher Council of Media

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*

³¹⁰ Fares Braizat, "Jordan: Why Political Reform Does Not Progress", *Arab Reform Bulletin*, Vol: 4, Issue: 6, July 2006.

is aimed to set up in order to enable the very foundations of the Jordanian State and Homeland media. Further steps will be on the way to reform the curricula in the *schools, universities* for the future of young generation. The suggested course of action to attain this goal is to re-formulate the curricula to integrate the concepts of democracy, justice, equality, citizenship and national unity. This would promote the extension of democratic values throughout the country and enable the state to embrace the whole society under the idea of ‘one nationally-united Jordan’. The final area to be re-organized under the Campaign is the *private sector*. As in all areas mentioned previously, the private sector will be reformulated with the principles and interests of the Homeland. The private sector will serve as a locomotive segment to involve in national development projects, contribute scientific research, and promote private investment and employment facilities.

The rhetoric of ‘Jordan for (Trans) Jordanians’ has a resonance in defining Jordan First Campaign. Since the severing of ties Jordan sought to consolidate her national identity through pre-emptive measures. Jordan First constitutes one of these state-led nation-building projects. Since the demographic structure of the country has vigorously shaken Jordanian political landscape several times, any symptom of Palestinian phenomenon frustrates identity-formation of Hashemite Kingdom. The resurgence of Palestinian uprising has strongly alarmed Jordanian regime and Jordan First was an inevitable outcome of both external and internal forces. The external force was quite apparent. The enmity with Israel has grown with great affinity with Palestinians on the West Bank among many Jordanians (not only among Palestinian Jordanians). Bassam Awadallah, Minister of Planning, stated that “the new national motto is meant to encourage candidates and voters to concentrate on ... domestic change, rather than focusing the whole debate and spending all energies on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the Iraq crisis”.³¹¹ In this respect Jordanian regime necessitated to contain the opposition and those who attempt to fight against state’s policies would be considered not putting Jordan First.

³¹¹ *Jordan Times*, 19 December 2002.

The internal dissent is closely associated with internal ethnic division and a new Maan phenomenon. It has become likely that there would be the US war in Iraq that would draw large-scale public rallies throughout the country. Therefore, Jordan First is a publicly reported image of King Abdullah that Jordan territorially and demographically disengaged from Palestine. In spite of this, according to Toujan Faisal, if a new identity of Jordan is required to be devised it should be *Urdustini* (a hybrid of *Urduni-Filastini* identities) under a modern Arab democratic state since majority of Jordanians feel themselves both Jordanian and Palestinian. For instance, she said that “I represented all segments of Jordanian people; Jordanians, Palestinians and Circassians. It is the regime trying to separate to rule”.³¹² Faisal also paid attention to regime’s perception that “if you are not in the government, automatically regime considers you opposition here.” Thus, drawing the scope and limits of an ideal citizen, voter and candidate under Jordan First apparently illustrates that regime feels itself insecure.

The Committee for Jordan First has devised a National Committee in charge of inaugurating the objectives of Jordan First motto. The National Agenda is divided into three main areas; administrative, social and political reforms. Among other objectives, the reformation of parliamentary politics occupies a crucial place in understanding the limits of the Campaign. The Committee is agreed upon to begin with revising the 1992 Political Parties Law which is still in force with the signing of National Charter. The former prime-minister Ali Abu Ragheb introduced a proposal to enact a new parties law.³¹³ Amending the electoral law³¹⁴ was secondary which caused a prolonged discussion among the opposition groups.³¹⁵ The IAF is the most influential group in Jordan which fosters the reformation of 1993 elections law. The Committee, however, began

³¹² Interview with Toujan Faisal, 20 June 2006, Amman.

³¹³ “King directs government to implement Jordan First Recommendations as soon as possible”, *Jordan Times*, 19 December 2002.

³¹⁴ Jordanian Parliament enacted a new Electoral Law in 2001 which retains one person-one vote formula and allocation of seats in the Lower Chamber under 1993 Law. An amendment was made afterwards granting parliamentary quota for women. Today there are 110 seats in the Lower Chamber in which 6 seats are assigned for women candidates.

³¹⁵ Anonymous interview in Amman, 21 June 2006.

with finalizing a document for the mergence of the political parties in the country. Today there are 31 registered parties and with the exception of IAF, all other political groups lack popular base. To make Jordanian politics more active, Abu Ragheb government has suggested forming three strong political parties representing the right, center and the left. In fact the reason behind to create strong political parties is correlated with regime's effort to restrain the pressures of professional associations. Kingdom's objective to reform parties law is rooted in the overwhelming effects of Anti-Normalization Campaign before and after second *intifada*. In vitalizing the idea of strong political groups in the parliament, the government will proportionately grant economic support for the political parties in accordance with their popular base. The draft law is still on the agenda of the National Committee.³¹⁶

Having fostered the magnitude toward political activism, Abu Ragheb's governance was highly found critical and anti-democratic when Toujan Faisal convicted by the State Security Court on charges of "tarnishing the Jordanian state", "uttering words" before another deemed to be "detrimental to his religious feeling", "publishing and broadcasting false information abroad which could be detrimental to the reputation of the state", and inciting "disturbances and killings."³¹⁷ She was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment under a new legislation that re-draws the scope of terrorism promulgated through a provisional royal decree two weeks after the September 11 attacks. Toujan Faisal said that "I was not threatened by the fundamentalists anymore, Abu Sayyaf..., people like me, and we are all threatened by one source [the regime]".³¹⁸ Faisal's conviction and 2003 Election Committee's denunciation of her candidacy to stand for elections were harshly condemned by Amnesty International.

³¹⁶ King Abdullah reiterates consolidation of Jordan's political parties into three main blocs representing the right, center and the left. He added that executive power will be given to the strongest one. 5 April 2006, *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report", www.eiu.com (access date: 3 May 2006)

³¹⁷ Stephen Glain, "Letter from Jordan: Kingdom of Corruption", *Nation*, Vol: 280, Issue: 21, 30 May 2005.

³¹⁸ Interview with Toujan Faisal, 20 June 2006, Amman.

For the monarchy, disassociating Jordan from Palestine question and consolidating Jordan's national identity through *al-Urdun Awalan* would decrease internal unrest. However it's highly debatable to argue that Jordanian identity is utilized successfully as a *prop* in legitimizing its foreign policy objectives. Adnan Abu Odeh, who is a member of International Crisis Group (ICG) centered at Brussels and former advisor to King Hussein and King Abdullah II, indicated that;

I do not think that Jordan First Campaign will encompass all the people in this country. Theoretically it might do that, but practically not. To achieve that objective [national unity] it needs trust and confidence by the people. This is not existed. There is a kind of rejectionist attitude to the regional policies of government [in the minds of Jordanians].³¹⁹

Similarly, a Jordanian told that "We don't believe that Jordan First campaign will favor all Jordanians. It will only benefit those people close to the throne".³²⁰ Actually, Jordanians do not resist to the key components of *al-Urdun Awalan*, like constructing national unity among Jordanians, Palestinians, Circassians and Christians based on citizenship and idea of homeland.³²¹ They rather think that Jordan is one and we are all Jordanian, but it's controversial and misleading for them to be disassociated from regional issues. As viewed from Jordanians' perspective, Jordan First is an adjustment and adaptation program of the regime to cope with external pressures in the form of public rallies posed by al-Aqsa *intifada*. The Kingdom wants to call the public attention to domestic issues in administrative, socio-economic development, and parliamentary politics to combat internal discontent already replicated by native Jordanians.

5.4.1 Testing the 'Jordan First' motto: Recurrent unrest in Maan

As stated above, the first march in support of Palestinian uprising by the onset of al-Aqsa *intifada* took place in city of Maan. By November 2002, one of the

³¹⁹ Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 23 June 2006, Amman.

³²⁰ Interview with an Amman resident, 17 June 2006.

³²¹ Interview with Circassians, Jerash, 22 June 2006.

worst public riots in Jordan's history was re-erupted in this remote governorate.³²² It was the economic grievances that profoundly induced residents of Maan in previous demonstrations of 1989 and 1998. However riots in the post-2000 period were neither linked to ill-treatment of Maani economy nor regime's biased policies. The US diplomat working for International Development Agency (USAID), Laurence Foley was gunned down in Amman on 28 October who was the first Western diplomat assassinated in Jordan. After the assassination of Foley, Jordanian authorities required to have large scale apprehension and questioning in the country. A local *Jihadi* militant Islamist, Muhammad Shalabi better known as Abu Sayyaf³²³ was the most wanted name since he organized a demonstration near Maan backing the policies of Osama Bin Laden on the day after Foley's assassination. Abu Sayyaf harshly disapproves the policies of Jordanian state and he advocates an Islamic state to replace the Hashemite monarchy. On 29 October 2002 when Shalabi was traveling from Amman to Maan he was detected by the police and was shot on his shoulder.³²⁴ He managed to reach Maan and stayed in a house where he was protected by his guards. The security forces, interior minister and governor of Maan met with Maani notables to find the way to detain Abu Sayyaf. Then the government decided not to enter the city for two days. Although city notables agreed to give Abu Sayyaf and found lawyers to defend him, Sayyaf could not be persuaded. This was followed by the entrance of security forces in the governorate on 9 November to seize Abu Sayyaf and was ended up by taking more than 150 people into custody. The police also arrested drug and arm

³²² *Jordan Times*, 23 January 2002, <http://www.jordanembassyus.org/01232002001.htm>. Actually disturbances in Maan did not start abruptly on November. In January 2002 an arrested local Jordanian, Suleiman Adnan Ahmad al-Fanatsah for robbery and died due to kidney failure as explained by the security forces. The Maanis alleged that he was detained because he was said to be belonging *Salafi* movement and the police should be found responsible for his death. People had the perception that he was tortured. A small scale riot was erupted after this incident and public security and municipality buildings were attacked and damaged by local residents.

³²³ The Jordanian state considered Abu Sayyaf a lawbreaker and arm smuggler, local Maanis know him as a religious opposition leader. Abu Sayyaf took part in *Salafi* movement in Amman by 1990s and also served as a cleric in the Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs in Jordan. He lost his position when he began to publicly criticize the regime. Some observers claim that Abu Sayyaf may have a linkage with *Takfir wal Hijra* movement in Egypt. A member of this group assassinated Anwar Sadat in 1981 after having finalized a peace treaty with Menachem Begin of Israel.

³²⁴ "Maan: Open Ended Crisis", CSS Report, *op.cit*, p. 26.

smugglers, and armed Islamists mainly from *Salafi* movement. However Maani people said they had never understood the requisite for state's security interference into the city. According to many Maanis, the government's intervention was directly related with the upheavals stimulated by Iraqi crisis and the regime sought to take the city under control via using Abu Sayyaf as a pretext. This incident bitterly harmed state-society relations bringing untrustworthy and indifferent Jordanians, primarily Maanis, into play.

The unrest erupted on 10th November 2002 was a spontaneous result of deteriorated economy of Maan that was exacerbated by popular support for the quandary situation persisted on occupied lands. The riots left 6 people dead (four civilians and two policemen) and many people wounded.³²⁵ The 2002 Maani incident exemplifies the growing Islamic armed activism in the country. The people of Maan demanded the closure of Jordan's Embassy in Israel and demonstrators cried out for *Jihad* for the liberation of al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.³²⁶ Besides, main upshot of the unrest regarding the Hashemite rule was considerably associated with the apprehension of Sharia Law in Jordan. The armed Islamist *Salafis* attacked to staff of local Hussein Bin Talal University and women students, which were then criticized by many Maani residents.³²⁷ This demand then led the Salafi movement to obtain a sizeable impact not only on Maani politics, but also deepened the re-thinking on state-society relations in the entire Kingdom. The increase in crimes, drugs and arms led the government to diminish its role as a security provider subsequently. In the aftermath of the violence, government declared the city as "a weapons-free zone".³²⁸ The event was followed by shutting down the office of *al-Jazeera* TV in Amman which insulted the royal family in mind of the throne.

³²⁵ "Red Alert in Jordan: Recurrent Unrest in Maan", *International Crisis Group Middle East Briefing*, 19 February 2003. www.crisisgroup.org, (access date: 20 March 2006).

³²⁶ "Maan: Open Ended Crisis", *op.cit.*, p. 25.

³²⁷ "Red Alert in Jordan...", *International Crisis Group Briefing*, *op.cit.*, p. 3.

³²⁸ "Maan declared Arms-Free Zone", *Jordan Times*, 14 November 2002.

Having being threatened by the local Maani residents where the Hashemites has traditionally acquired its popular legitimacy, the events of 2002 presents a watershed in Jordan's history. Since the Black September episode the state did not enter into a violent clash with its citizens, but this time opposition drew its protestors from the discontented native Jordanians. The unrest was not ended by the riots and extended its impact in the entire town.³²⁹ The people began not to pay their water and electricity bills and did not obey the working hours in public offices. The government's release of prisoners by 1999 led the people to think that anyone can break the law. The socio-cultural features of Maan paved the way for disregarding public officials of the Governorate including the Senators and deputies and to develop a feeling of solidarity among the residents. People's perception of residing in "a neglected town" since the events of 1989 still preserves its ramification and motivates the local people to refuse to comply with the rule of law. According a report prepared by the Centre for Strategic Studies (CSS) recurring upheavals in Maan is stemming from; "the central government believes that the crises that arise in Maan every now and then are caused by the climate whereas the people of Maan, after long experience, realize that the government rushes to meet their demands after every act of violence and that it tries to appease them either by employing their youth in the various state apparatuses or by promising them to invest in development projects in the town. The cycle of violence and appeasement recurs whenever the government seems to back down from fulfilling its promises."³³⁰ Almost 54% of residents believed that the government did not demonstrate a strong commitment to fight with corruption and 58% of them think that Jordan TV and Radio is not reliable or having very little reliability.

In fighting with Islamist threat King Abdullah attempted to expand special security forces and took some measures to restrict the Jordanian press in

³²⁹ Jillian Schwedler, "Occupied Maan: Jordan's Closed Military Zone", *Middle East Report* (MERIP), 3 December 2002, www.merip.org/mero/mero1120302.html (access date: 3 April 2006).

³³⁰ "Maan: An Open Ended Crisis", *op.cit*, p. 30.

transmitting and publicizing regional matters.³³¹ The embedded tribal affiliations and Islamic conservatism constitute two major forces on the way of King Abdullah's economic recovery program. The resignation of minister of finance, Bassam Awadallah in 2005 typically depicts the irresistible force of opposition against Abdullah's liberalization policies drew from tribal and conservative deputies and cabinet members. It seems most likely to happen that Abdullah's socio-economic reform package will be overshadowed by both the Islamist activism and conservative sources in the parliament in spite of the electoral law which discriminates Palestinian descents (to the state who are disloyal) in favor of tribal *loyalist* Jordanians.

The Maani episode embodies to what extent Hashemite rule obliged to inaugurate Jordan First Campaign to justify and adjust her foreign policy objectives. The unrest in Maan rapidly tested the making of Jordan's identity through Jordan First program. It's obvious that the Campaign was frustrated by external challenges posed by repercussions of second *intifada* and US strike against Iraq in 2003. Seeing that prolonged violence on Palestinian territories has continued to dominate and determine Jordan's domestic agenda, it has become highly skeptical for the regime to uphold national unity with the continuing public discontent. Since Jordan's foreign policy preferences during and after *intifada* was incoherent with Jordanian populace, the regime compelled to re-define and re-draw the main determinants of Jordan's identity to win public support. Thus, Hashemite rule has endowed with the legal tools and institutional capacity under the Jordan First motto to use national identity as a *prop* through political parties, electoral and press laws by 2001 onwards. The tribal and patriarchal governorate of Maan is the indicative to mark why the Kingdom necessitates to legitimate and to justify her foreign policy choices. The Maani incident also manifests that the internal unrest in Jordan is not only attributed to Maan, it has become endemic throughout the country by 1989. Therefore, outbreak of al-Aqsa *intifada* has two-side effects in relation to Jordan; increased voice of opposition found an arena to express their

³³¹ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", September 2004, p. 7. www.eiu.com (access date: 9 November 2005)

expectations vis-à-vis the Jordanian state; secondly the government is deemed to re-define the scope of Jordanian identity and re-think on Jordan's relationship with Islamists and Palestinians.

The Maani issue accompanied by the Palestinization of Jordanian politics revealed and exposed the fundamental *raison d'être* why the regime responded with the Jordan First Campaign. The East Bankers-West Bankers division seemed to correspond incrementally with growing popularity of Islamist groups and anti-American sentiments in Jordanian society. In this respect, finding a durable and just solution to the Palestine problem is recognized as an urgent necessity for the Kingdom to contain radicalization of Islamic forces in the country including the *Ikhwan*. Addressing the need for a Palestinian statehood at abroad and the East Bank identity under the umbrella of *al-Urdun Awalan* at home will possibly help Jordanian state to demolish 'Jordan Option'.

5.5 Backing the Road Map: Using Jordanian *East Bank* Identity as a prop

With the aim of separating Palestine from Jordan's politics of identity, the Hashemite Kingdom has promoted two-state solution as the official foreign policy goal by the severing of ties in 1988. As the Kingdom granted citizenship to all Palestinians by the unification of the two Banks, King Hussein insisted on the national unity to be the vital concern even after the disengagement from the West Bank.³³² It was clearly stated that "Jordan is Jordan" for all the people living on Jordan, hitherto on the East Bank, irrespective of their ethnic or religious background and in return the West Bank is regarded for the Palestinian community. After the eruption of the first *intifada*, disengaging from the West Bank was the only option left for Jordan that would liberate Jordanian politics from that of Palestinian. Jordan's shift would vigorously mean to provide support for Palestinian nationhood and uprising from this time and onwards.³³³ King Hussein's decision to disengage from the Palestinian territories was

³³² Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 23 June 2006, Amman.

³³³ Musa Braizat, The Jordanian-Palestinian Relationship: The Bankruptcy of the Confederal Idea, British Academic Press, 1998, p. 186.

regarded as ‘merely tactical’ by the Labor Party in Israel.³³⁴ Meanwhile neither the United States nor Israel considered Jordanian attempt as an enduring political maneuver that would pave the way for finalizing peace with Israel and weakening the rhetoric of *al-watan al-badil*. In this respect, severing of ties was not only a strategic action, but also a decision to demarcate Jordanian territory and in turn re-define and limit Jordan’s expectations and identity.

After 1988 Palestinian statehood has become to be perceived as a source of stability. It’s in this regard that Jordan supported all the peace proposals to end the Arab-Israeli dispute so far. Given that Jordan withdrew its ambassador from Tel Aviv by the onset of the al-Aqsa *intifada*, it became detrimental for the Kingdom to keep her ties normal with the Israeli state.³³⁵ The majority of the Jordanian people considered the al-Aqsa *intifada* as a fight against an Israeli attempt to destroy logic of the Oslo Accords and accused the state of Israel for using excessive force against Palestinians. It has therefore become apparent that the consent of Jordanian people for normalizing ties with Israel achieved by Oslo peace process has now been totally perished with the collapse of the Camp David Accords in 2000.

With the aim of ending the plight situation in Gaza and the West Bank, Jordan backed the Road Map published by the Middle East Quartet, the US, the UN, the EU and Russian Federation in April 2003. The Road Map was proposed at the Port of Aqaba on 4 June 2003 as a part of US policy of post-war settlement in Iraq. In a special session of World Economic Forum which was held in Jordan, it was declared that the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) and Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) are going to be enforced with Jordan as the main beneficiary. Jordan’s support for the Road Map for the peace in the Middle East is, therefore, embarked on there main principles³³⁶;

³³⁴ Braizat, *op.cit*, p. 187.

³³⁵ “Ten years after they made peace, Jordan and Israel are still uneasy neighbors”, *BBC News*, 26 October 2004.

³³⁶ www.mfa.gov.jo, see Key Foreign Policy Issues. (access date: 5 October 2006).

- The Road Map defines the obligations of both Palestinian community and Israel,
- It clearly sets a time table for the establishment of a viable Palestinian state,
- The Map also is based on the initiative of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah which was approved by the Beirut Arab League Summit held in March 2002 calling for the end of the occupation of Palestinian lands.

The Hashemite Kingdom strongly insisted on the full implementation of the Arab Peace Initiative better known as Beirut Declaration. The Arab Initiative was based on a balanced approach which committed to the recognition of Israeli state by the Arab states in return complete withdrawal of Israel from the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese lands which are under Israeli occupation since 1967 war. The fundamental objective of the Initiative was to find a just and viable solution to the Palestine problem and the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 194.³³⁷ The Hashemite Kingdom has perceived that without settling Palestine-Israeli dispute all other initiatives to bring stability in the region are pointless. Jordan's push forward Beirut Declaration unequivocally demonstrates that Jordan's peace with Israel and severing of ties with the West Bank are all indispensable in achieving her longstanding policy to bring an end to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.³³⁸

King Abdullah then reiterated his country's position in Aqaba Summit held in June 2003 which brought Palestinian prime-minister Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli counterpart Ariel Sharon together. Addressing the 58th session of the UN General Assembly, Jordanian foreign minister Marwan Muasher urged the world "to stay the course behind a US-backed Middle East peace plan called the Road Map".³³⁹ Muasher urged the world community to monitor the effective mechanism for achieving a durable peace in the Middle East. In his speech, the

³³⁷ www.mfa.gov.jo

³³⁸ King Abdullah reminded that the Arab League "will push for peace" and the Arab nations are to resurrect proposals for a general Middle East peace deal", *BBC News*, 7 March 2005.

³³⁹ "Jordan says 'stay the course' on roadmap", *Jordan Times*, October 1, 2003.

foreign minister specifically called the Middle East Quartet to observe the founding of a Palestinian state by the end of 2005. Muasher emphasized that the Road Map should be ‘scrupulous and without modifications’.

Due to the transformation in the meaning and the content of Jordanian identity that in play by the course of 1990s, any attempt of Jordan to grip West Bank territories is ultimately doubtful today. Addressing or claiming any role in the West Bank would mean turning the clock backward in terms of identity formation. As Marc Lynch indicates the “new identity consensus in Jordan had sweeping implications for the kingdom’s policies”.³⁴⁰ In this regard Jordan considers the Israeli Separation Barrier as illegal and threatening the creation of a Palestinian state and Jordan’s national security. King Abdullah asserted that “The security barrier ... in the long term, I think it will be tremendously damaging to the Israeli-Palestinian future, the Israeli-Arab future, the Israeli-Jordanian future and also to the future of Israel ... I think this wall is going to be disastrous for all of us”. Given that the barrier is going to separate East Jerusalem from Ramallah and Bethlehem and the rest of the West Bank and will construct 6,400 new settlement on the West Bank, the territorial integrity of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip which was endorsed by the Oslo Agreement would be sooner or later perished.³⁴¹

Accordingly King Abdullah warned Ariel Sharon in a meeting at Negev in 2004 for the Israeli separation barrier in the West Bank and called for not to reiterate Jordan Option as a substitute homeland for the Palestinians.³⁴² In Marc Lynch’s view, Jordan Option has been re-vitalized not because of Jordan’s re-claim on the West Bank, but for ‘its utility for Sharon’s unilateral disengagement from selected parts of the Occupied Territories...’.³⁴³ Particularly for Jordanian nationalists like Abd al-Hadi al-Majali, a veteran politician and head of al-Ahd

³⁴⁰ March Lynch, “No Jordan Option”, *Middle East Report* (MERIP), 21 June 2004, www.merip.org/mero/mero062104.html (3 April 2006)

³⁴¹ Sara Roy, “Praying with their Eyes Closed: Reflections on the Disengagement from Gaza”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol: XXXIV, No: 4, Summer 2005, p. 69.

³⁴² March Lynch, “No Jordan Option”, *Middle East Report* (MERIP), 21 June 2004.

³⁴³ Ibid.

Party, Fahd al-Fanik, senior journalist of Jordan Times, and Nahid Hattar, an intellectual, any Palestinian activity in the Kingdom is detrimental for Jordan's identity and political survival. They all believe that it's politically impractical and unworkable for Jordan to re-involve in the affairs of the West Bank. In the context of formulating ties with the West Bank, the preferences of Jordanian public and the regime is coterminous. Since the majority of the Jordanians think that any attachment to the western part of the River will bring more costs than benefit. Corresponding to the idea of disentangling from the West Bank, Jordan took part as an observer to host Abbas and Saron at Sharm al-Sheikh (in Egypt) in February 2005. One of the fundamental outcomes of this meeting was the joint declaration of both King Abdullah and Mubarek to return their ambassadors to Israel. Amman recalled its envoy in 2000 with the eruption of the second *intifada*.³⁴⁴ Marouf al-Bakhit, who is going to be appointed for premiership after Amman bombings in November 2005, was subsequently sent to Tel Aviv on 20th February as a direct consequence of this decision.

Jordan today hosts the largest number of Palestinian refugees outside the Palestinian territories. According to the data provided by the UNRWA in 2001, there exist more than 1.57 million Palestinian refugees living in the Kingdom. In addition, 41% of the Palestinian refugees and 90% of the displaced persons are living in Jordan and a considerable number of these people are granted Jordanian citizenship. Having felt the exigencies of the anti-normalization camp resisting against the peace with Israel, it's central for Jordan to find a solution for the Palestine problem. Jordan also considers the refugee issue as a 'final status matter' to be solved between the Palestinians and Israelis.³⁴⁵ For that reason, Jordan insists on the United Nations SCR 194 calling for the right of return of Palestinian refugees. In this sense Jordan will promote the demolition of the refugee camps established in the Kingdom and will try to rehabilitate and integrate Palestinian refugees who want to stay in Jordan. The realization of Jordan First idea is profoundly concerned with the full integration of Palestinian-Jordanians to a great extent. Actually, it has become highly vital for

³⁴⁴ http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4421387.stm (7 April 2005).

³⁴⁵ www.mfa.gov.jo

Jordan to support peace plans by the outbreak of the US war against Iraq in March 2003. The Jordan First Campaign constitutes the key component of Kingdom's domestic policy making to frame the oppositionary factions protesting the American interests in Iraq as well.

5.5.2 Israeli *Unilateral* Disengagement from Gaza: Re-invoking *Jordan Option* again?

Jordan at the outset recognizes the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza as an impetus for the resumption of the peace process in the region. Looked from Jordan's point of view, the Gaza pullout should be followed by Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank that would ultimately promote the establishment of viable Palestinian state.³⁴⁶ The Gaza pullout would only carry hopes for a final settlement even if it is endorsed in line with the Road Map.³⁴⁷ In other words, Gaza pullout should be considered as an integral part of the Road Map rather than seeing it as another option to settle the dispute. It's in this sense Jordan insists on acquiring legal foundation within the auspices of the Middle East Quartet. Accordingly, the Gaza Plan which was approved by the Israeli Knesset in November 2004 endorses the evacuation of Israeli settlement and military installations in Gaza and also four settlements in Jenin in the West Bank. However Israeli Gaza Plan does not include the parameters of establishing a Palestinian state neither on Gaza nor West Bank territories. The 'unilateralism' in Sharon's Plan was basically an answer to the international community that Israel is no longer an occupier and violator of Palestinian lands rather than a drive for achieving a final settlement.

The disengagement plan should be in parallel with the Road Map as also frequently stated by the Middle East Quartet. To establish a viable Palestinian

³⁴⁶ King Abdullah II stated that, "The Gaza pullout must be a prelude to a withdrawal from the West Bank and the creation of a viable Palestinian state" during a meeting with Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz at Aqaba in August 2005. "Pullout coordination key- King", *Jordan Times*, 5-6 August 2005.

³⁴⁷ "King talks bilateral, Mideast issues with world leaders", *Jordan Times*, 16-17 September 2005.

state or more precisely to find a ‘two state solution’ to Palestinian-Israeli problem necessitates international recognition and supervision. As Geoffrey Aronson recommends in his work, the implementation of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza Strip should gain an international definition to end the occupation similar to Israeli evacuation from Southern Lebanon in 2000.³⁴⁸ Aronson indicates that ending Israeli control over Gaza should take place within the framework of Road Map in order to secure the borders between Israel, Egypt and Palestine and later with Jordan on the West Bank. Otherwise Israeli withdrawal plan will not produce an independent and territorially integrated Palestinian state. In addition, Israeli Gaza Plan does not tell what will happen to the West Bank territories either. Taken Israeli rejection of Oslo principle that both Gaza and West Bank are ‘one territorial unit’; the evacuation from Gaza Strip can lead to Israeli annexation of the West Bank eventually. For Sara Roy “Whatever else it claims to be, the Gaza disengagement plan is, at its heart, an instrument for Israeli annexation of West Bank lands and their physical integration into Israel”.³⁴⁹

Having caught between the pressures of regional turmoil, Jordan was overshadowed with Israeli prime-minister Ehud Olmert’s initiative to re-draw Israeli borders by 2010. Olmert stated that “The borders of Israel that will be formed in the coming years will be significantly different from the territories under Israel’s control today”.³⁵⁰ King Abdullah responded to Olmert’s unilateral move with his statement, “Jordan is Jordan and Palestine is Palestine and the Kingdom will never be a substitute homeland for anybody” during his visit to Israel in June 2006.³⁵¹ It’s central for the King to address a political settlement for the Palestine question within the context of the Road Map. For some

³⁴⁸ Geoffrey Aronson, “Issues Arising from the Implementation of Israel’s Disengagement from the Gaza Strip”, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol: XXXIV, No: 4, Summer 2005, pp: 62-63.

³⁴⁹ Sara Roy, “Praying with Their Eyes Closed...”, *op.cit.*, p. 69.

³⁵⁰ “Olmert ready to redraw Israel borders on own terms”, *Jordan Times*, 5-6 May 2006.

³⁵¹ “Jordan no substitute homeland for Palestinians- King”, *Jordan Times*, 8 June 2006.

analysts, Jordan's "two-state solution" idea could be frustrated by Israel's partition of West Bank territories which might foster the third *intifada*.³⁵²

The policies of the PLO during the early 1990s were taken as an impetus to conduct peace negotiations which enhanced and relatively consolidated Jordan's identity at multilateral level. On the contrary, Hamas' divergent position with the PLO ostensibly endangers Kingdom's *watani* identity that is embarked on solely East Bank interests.

5.5.2 The Hamas Factor:

Hamas' electoral victory after the parliamentary elections held in January 2006 demonstrated that the Palestine Authority has been inadequate in providing an end to long-standing suffering of the Palestinian people in the Occupied Territories. The *Jihadi* Islamic activism stemming from the internal unrest in the West Bank incrementally endangers Jordan's politics of identity. In this regard, the growing Islamic popularity poses an imminent threat to the Hashemite monarchy which was noticeably recognized by the anti-normalization campaign after the peace with Israel. The *Ikhwan*- Hamas affinity became more apparent as the *Ikhwan* members disillusioned with the PA and supported Hamas' attacks against Israel by 1994 onwards.³⁵³ The attack of *al-Qaeda* to Jordanian port at Aqaba in August 2005 further underscored this fear in the eyes of Jordanian regime. Having felt the Islamic threat internally, King Abdullah highlighted the absolute necessity for Jordanians to participate in creating their nation and future irrespective of their religion.³⁵⁴ The adoption of Amman Message in 2004 which comprises opinion members from the Islamic world under the umbrella of Islamic initiative was a part of regime's response in re-defining the essential elements of Islam in Jordan. The Message is in fact aimed to stand against those who promote the idea of clash of civilizations. Although the situation in Gaza

³⁵² "Israel's partition- towards the third Intifada", *Jordan Times*, 25 May 2006.

³⁵³ Shmuel Bar, *The Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan*, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1998, p. 48.

³⁵⁴ "Take back Islam from extremists, King urges clerics", *Jordan Times*, 14 September, 2005.

does not pose an immediate threat to the Kingdom, what actually happens in the West Bank in terms of Islamic activism increasingly challenges Jordanian policies and preferences.

Hamas' categorical opposition to Oslo and the peace process led Jordan to perceive the organization as a threat in settling Palestine dispute and in turn as an impediment in reforming Jordan's identity. Once Jordan realized and endorsed two-state solution for the settlement of Palestinian-Israeli problem, Hamas is seen as an obstacle in making the move toward peace negotiations. Therefore the Hamas issue once again re-invoked Palestine dimension embedded in Jordanian politics. In addition, Hamas factor would drive Jordan to articulate openly her commitment to disengagement from Palestine. Since the Kingdom attempted to secure its domestic realm politically from the West Bank, Hamas has become to be regarded as a threat when Jordan's close ties with Israel are concerned. Unlike in King Hussein's era, Hamas became a source of instability and represents a deficit of acquiring legitimacy in Jordan. The preferences of Hamas, noticeably Jordan is Palestine, is vigorously conflicting with Kingdom's policy of Jordan is Jordan. In other words, the ideology that was threatening Jordan during 1970s and 1980s is now in Palestine. Hamas' emphasis on Jordan Option or Jordan is Palestine idea then is going to be influential in constructing Muslim Brotherhood's agenda in Jordan as well. Thus Hamas factor will ultimately constitute an instrumental role in re-shaping the relationship between the *Ikhwan* and the regime in the Kingdom.

Israeli premier Olmert's plan to withdraw from the selected parts of West Bank was taken right after Hamas' declaration that they do not recognize Israeli state.³⁵⁵ From the point of Israel, the attitude of Hamas, not recognizing Israeli existence in the region, led the Israeli authorities to think that the peace process was overshadowed and they lost their peace partner. Sharon's idea of 'unilateralism' embedded in Likud's Plan is now inherited by Kadima Party.³⁵⁶ Avi Dichter, a senior official of Kadima Party, stated that the final status of

³⁵⁵ Hamas still retained its attitude toward Israeli existence. "Mahmud Abbas: İsrail Tanınacak, Hamas: Tanımayacağız", *Dünya Gündemi*, 24 Eylül-1 Ekim 2006.

³⁵⁶ "Kadima'nın Tek Taraflı Çekilme Planı", *Dünya Gündemi*, 12-19 March 2006.

Israeli-Palestinian border is going to be unilaterally decided by Israel given the contentious position of Hamas. Using the lack of peace partner to promote negotiations on the table, the Kadima Party declared that Israeli withdrawal from 17 settlements, with the population of 15 thousand Jewish people, from the West Bank will be completed within four years. The final borderlines of the Israeli state will be Gush Etzion in the West Bank, Ariel region in the north, and River Jordan as the security frontier on the east.

Having recognized the unsuccessful upshot brought by the Gaza withdrawal, Jordan's emphasis on the principle of land for peace and call for stay with the Madrid Peace Conference have re-generated the potential involvement of Jordan in Palestine question. For Don Diker and Pinchas Inbari, re-energizing Jordan-West Bank federation could be one alternative to combat armed Islamic activism in Palestinian territories, the West Bank in particular, and to provide a viable state for the Palestinians.³⁵⁷ However, evoking Jordan's annexation of West Bank stands for, as a matter of fact, re-claiming Jordan as a substitute homeland for the Palestinian community which is a clear discrepancy with the Kingdom's official policy.

5.6 Concluding Remarks:

Jordan has sought to weaken any source of domestic opposition with the onset of the Palestinian *intifada*. In order to cope with the overriding restraints of popular unrest in the form of anti-Israeli and Arabist sentiments, the Kingdom attempted to use Jordanian *watani* identity as a "prop" to legitimate and justify Jordan's policy behavior at abroad. Internalizing Jordan's territorial ideals can only be attained by disassociating Jordanian domestic politics from that of Palestinian. Therefore putting Jordanian preferences *first* and the norms of Arabism *second* has been the key concern of the monarchy by 2002 onwards. Even though the trend toward stimulating Jordanian territorial identity has been underway by the disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Jordanian peace

³⁵⁷ Dan Diker and Pinchas Inbari, "Re-energizing a Jordan-West Bank Alliance", *Middle East Quarterly*, Spring 2006, p. 36.

with Israel was a watershed in *statising* Jordanian identity while detaching it from Arabist discourse. Since the peace making with the Israeli state, the Kingdom undertook several steps in de-Palestinization of Jordan's politics.

The 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' in this respect was a nation-building project to overcome external pressures posed by the outbreak of Palestinian uprising across Jordan's western border. The Campaign is designed to re-define an "ideal" Jordanian citizen, member of parliament and candidate standing for elections. Thus all those criticizing state's policies then would be considered as *not* putting 'Jordan First'. The concept of 'Jordan First' is highly controversial in that regime has begun to perceive any domestic opposition as a potential threat to the longevity of the monarchy.

The 'Jordan First' strategy is meant to disassociate Jordan from both the politics of the Arab world and the unsettlement of the Palestine problem. Although the regime is determined to consolidate Jordanian national identity which is a progressive move, whereas practically speaking it will not be able to achieve that end without addressing the *causes* of the public discontent. The unrest in Maan in 2002 clearly demonstrated that the economic problems coincided with popular support for the Palestinian uprising and anti-American sentiments in the country. The Maani episode heralds a new epitome in support for the *Salafi* Islamists in the rural areas and decrease in long-standing trust between the monarchy and the tribes. Since Maan and the other governorates of the south exemplify the strongholds of the Hashemite monarchy for a long period of time, the Maani phenomenon illustrated that the regime is not confronted only by Palestinian-Jordanians today, but also the Bedouins and tribal elements of the Kingdom (East Bankers) also become a integral part of domestic opposition.

The challenges brought by the Al-Aqsa *intifada* have subsequently precipitated by the beginning of the US war in Iraq in 2003. Given that Jordanian regime highly dependent on democratic reforms in obtaining loyalty and support for the monarchy in the post-1989 period, with the outbreak of the US war in Iraq regime totally rested on deliberalizing efforts in curbing any source of unrest at

domestic realm. The deliberalizing pre-emptive measures of the Kingdom in containing the domestic opposition, remarkably the Islamists, in the aftermath of the Iraqi war will be the main area of concern in the next part.

CHAPTER 6:

THE US WAR IN IRAQ: RE-THINKING INTERNAL UNREST AND RE-DEFINING THE LIMITS OF JORDANIAN IDENTITY

Jordan has undertaken series of legal and political measures to cope with the exigencies Al-Aqsa *intifada* since 2000. The Palestinian uprising and the unsettlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict alarmed the country to take some steps towards containing the internal opposition which formed a unified front in resisting normalization of relations with Israel. Banning demonstrations in support of *intifada* and restricting the political space for public discussions were the main tools of the regime in restraining domestic unrest. Still feeling political, social and economic pressures of the Palestinian dimension, Jordan came under attack of the war in Iraq by the course of 2003. The US-led war in Iraq has lately replicated the trend toward de-liberalization in Jordan which is underway since the signing of peace treaty with Israel. The pre-emptive measures of Jordanian monarchy included preparing two fundamental temporary laws. Firstly, demonstrations and public rallies are required to ask for permission from the provincial governors 72 hours beforehand. Secondly, the Penal Code was amended to re-define the terms of terrorism and publication crimes. The Iraqi war did not only cause strict limitations in the scope of democratization, but also deepened the identity crisis continuously remaining in the country.

In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, King Abdullah II and his government pledged profound support for US war on terror strategy. In line with Jordan's foreign policy choice, King Abdullah appointed Ali Abu al-Ragheb who followed King's political and economic reform programs unlike his predecessor Abd al-Rauf al-Rawabdah. On the other hand, the Islamic Action Front (IAF-*Jabha al-Amal al-Islami*) issued a statement condemning the

September 11 attacks and also warning Arab and Islamic governments not to join any retaliatory actions by the US. The IAF decidedly extended its anti-war policy with a “fatwa” outlawing any action on behalf of the US aggression on Islamic world.³⁵⁸ Any action with respect to war or act of violence would be regarded as an aggression against Islamic nations as a whole. Jordan, then, took some preliminary steps in order to downplay the voice of anti-war demonstrations in the country.

6.1 The Changing Nature of Jordanian Foreign Policy Preferences in the post-Gulf War Era: Role of external predicaments in invoking domestic unrest

The 1991 Gulf War and the US war in Iraq in 2003 illustrate that foreign influences do have an enormous impact on Jordan’s identity formation. Due to the political, economic and demographic vulnerabilities, Jordan has felt the exigencies of the unsettlement of the conflicts in the Middle East more than any other country in the region. The lack of adequate economic resources and the ethnic division among the Jordanians and Palestinian descents led the Kingdom of Jordan to be often alarmed by the unsteadiness in the region. This is reason why Malik Mufti characterizes Pan-Arabism, Islam and democratization as the key stepping stones of King Hussein to build Hashemite leadership.³⁵⁹

The defeat of Iraq and the UN embargoes in the aftermath of the Gulf War generated public support for Islamist groups in Jordan. In addition, immediately after the Gulf War, Kuwaiti government expelled the Palestinians due to their leadership’s support for Saddam Hussein’s rule. Approximately 250,000 Palestinians moved to Jordan from Kuwait some of whom having connections with *Salafi* Islamist movement (including Abu Muhammed al-Maqdisi). Jordan’s recognition of Israeli state after the Oslo Peace Accords as a matter of fact fortified the Islamic opposition in the country. Given that the Hashemite

³⁵⁸ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, “Country Report”, December 2001, p. 13.

³⁵⁹ For King Hussein’s policy during the Gulf War, see: Malik Mufti, “A King’s Art: Dynastic Ambition and State Interest in Hussein’s Jordan”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft*, Vol: 13, No: 3, September 2002, p.17.

regime is the very epitome of representing co-opted Islamists through the Muslim Brotherhood unlike in other societies of the Middle East, the public support for the *moderate* Islamists (primarily the Ikhwan's political wing, the IAF) changed the direction of Jordanians away from the militant Islamist groups. However, the increase in unemployment caused by privatization policies and the IMF prescriptions in the post-1990 period led to the alienation of largely co-opted Transjordanians, principally the tribes.³⁶⁰ The unpredicted upheavals in Jordanian economy posed by the UN sanctions against Iraq posited Jordan in a delicate situation in contending with unemployed young generation and increase in the prices of basic commodities.³⁶¹

Jordanian economy is extremely susceptible to the shifts and adjustments concerning regional order and international system. One positive implication of these changes was the increase in the oil prices which converted Jordan into a *quasi-rentier* state.³⁶² Despite Jordan has a tiny, negligible oil reserve, it's not an oil exporting but instead oil-importing country. However, the oil boom in the Gulf region has reinforced the economies of the entire Arab world. For Curtis Ryan, Jordanian connection with the international economy dates back to 1970s even before the IMF-backed austerity programs. The economic accumulation of expatriates has boosted Jordanian foreign exchange reserves. Very intriguingly, Jordanian state did not follow the same line with the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to sign a peace treaty with Israel upon the precondition that Jordan would be supported financially by the rentier states of the Gulf.³⁶³ Nonetheless the

³⁶⁰ The unemployment rate in Jordan is reported as 13.4 % among the active population in 2004, but the unofficial records estimates that its around 20%. See; "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism", *Crisis Group Middle East Report*, No: 47, 23 November 2005, p. 17. www.crisisgroup.org (access date: 20 March 2006)

³⁶¹ EIU, "Jordan Country Profile: Economic Outlook", 1st Quarter 1994.

³⁶² See Laurie Brand, "Economic and Political Liberalization In A Rentier Economy: The Case of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan", in Ilya Harik and Denis Sullivan (eds), *Privatization and Liberalization in the Middle East*, Indiana University Press, 1992 and Gudrun Kramer "Good Counsel to the King: The Islamist Opposition in Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Morocco", in Joseph Kostiner, *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, 2002, p. 258.

³⁶³ See Curtis Ryan, *Jordan In Transition*, *op.cit.*, p. 51. The richest states of the Gulf promised to grant financial assistance from the oil boom to Jordan in 1978 Arab League Summit. The overwhelming economic pressures of the fall of the Shah and the following Iran-Iraq war led to the emergence of harbinger of bad news from the Jordanian perspective as well. Just ten years after the Baghdad Summit, Jordan's debt was two times of its GDP.

effect of the oil boom was not expected to decline dramatically by the 1980s, unforeseen drop in workers remittances and also Arab aid caused an enormous unsteadiness in Jordanian economy. The fragile economy of Jordan was incrementally fluctuated by the devaluation in JD and eventual budget deficit. All through the uneasy years, Iraq has served as a “safety-valve” for Jordanian economy. With the onset of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980s, Iraq could not exercise its control on its ports and Jordan’s Red Sea Port at Aqaba was used by Iraq for economic purposes. Due to debt repayments, Jordan arranged a \$125 million credit agreement with IMF and \$100 loan with the World Bank in 1989. In turn, Jordan would reduce its government spending to tackle with the budget deficit.

Jordan and Iraq established close ties given both countries were ruled by the Hashemites until the overthrow of the monarchy in Iraq in 1958. Iraq remained a chief trading partner even after the regime change and until the severing of ties in 1995 Iraq has been Jordan’s ultimate oil supplier. Iraq provided approximately 80-90% of Jordan’s oil requirements. By mid-1990s some 70% of Jordan’s imports and 25% of exports passing through the Port at Aqaba transported to Iraq.³⁶⁴ These indicators illustrate that Iraq constituted Jordan’s largest trading partner. Jordan’s support for Iraq during and after Iran-Iraq war was vital for both economic survival of Iraq and the Kingdom herself. Since the Port at Aqaba was crucial for Jordan, the UN economic sanctions against Iraq were not justified in the eyes of Jordanian people.

Jordan’s pro-Iraq policy throughout 1990-91 necessitates a foreign policy analysis invoked by the shifts in domestic and regional structures. Contrary to Hafiz al-Esad of Syria, King Hussein did not join the US-led coalition against Iraq in 1991 Gulf War. Since the PLO leadership supported Saddam Hussein’s rule during the US operation, King Hussein followed the same line with the Palestinians. Given that the Kingdom conveyed the Parliament and run the polls in 1989, King Hussein could not divert monarchy’s attempt away from democratization. In responding the exigencies of the Gulf War, King Hussein

³⁶⁴ For detailed information please see; EIU, “Country Report”, 3rd Quarter 1998, p. 5.

urged the necessity to go along with the PLO leadership in order not to be confronted by domestic opposition in support of Iraqi regime.

Jordan's new foreign policy credentials have begun to condition by the collapse of bi-polarity and instigation of Middle East Peace Process.³⁶⁵ The defeat of Iraq and rescue of Kuwait by a Western coalition created new debates on Arabism and undermined the credibility of Arabist identity in the region as a whole. Jordan's pro-Iraq stand was not totally embarked on an Arabist sentiment; it was partially derived from the plight situation of many Iraqi civilians who suffered by the UN sanctions. In addition, Jordanian public opinion and precisely Palestinian descents were critical of US policy and economic predicament caused by the blockade of Aqaba. Jordan's Iraqi policy during 1990-91 offers a case to test the constructivist idea of making the *unthinkable* thinkable and justifiable. King Hussein then moved toward the US to re-build Jordan's ties and to participate in the Madrid Peace Talks. King Hussein's move was centered on displeasure with Saddam Hussein's rule and he tried to persuade his people that Iraqi leadership did not benefit the Jordanians. The first manifestation of Jordan's new foreign policy was normalization with Israel. Turn against Iraq and normalizing ties with Israel led Jordan to re-produce its interests and identity in return. For that reason, Jordan's foreign policy behavior serves as a battlefiled in re-constructing her identity. As Ernst Renan argues, debates on nationalism and national identity draw the limitations of collective identity. The political parties and professional associations in the country they all merged in 1996 and 1997 riots to share and express their expectations vis-à-vis changing policies of the state.

By 1996, King Hussein instigated an innovative policy concerning the situation in Iraq and ties with Israel. King Hussein opted to distance its relations politically from Saddam Hussein rule, but retained to import all its oil from Iraq.

³⁶⁵ For Jordan's Foreign Policy in the post-Cold War Era; George Joffé (ed), Jordan in Transition, Hurst Company, 2002; Laurie Brand, "The Effects of Peace Process on Political Liberalization in Jordan", *Journal of Palestine Studies*; and William Haddad and Mary Hardy, "Jordan's Alliance with Israel and Its Effects on Jordanian-Arab Relations", *Israel Affairs*, Vol: 9, Issue: 3, 2003.

In the meantime, Hussein sent two representatives to meet with Iraqi opposition in London to restore Iraqi integrity and to prevent any political turmoil in the country. The new assertive and proactive Iraqi policy of the King could be viewed as originating from 700 Jordanian nationals detained in Iraqi jails.³⁶⁶ King Hussein's option was a federal system structured by Kurdish, Sunni and Shiite communities. The Arab world was not in the same mood with King Hussein in that for Syrian vice-president Abdel Halim Khaddam Jordan preferred the partition of Iraqi integrity.

King Hussein's hostility toward Iraq had triggered the discontent within Jordanian society. Storing relations with Israeli government and the King's calling for a change in Iraqi government together precipitated the skepticisms among Jordanians. In addition, the King explicitly declared Jordanian access to US flights over southern Iraq. As Jordan becomes closer to the US and Israel, relations with Western liberal institutions grow accordingly. In the second quarter of 1996, government under Abdul Karim al-Kabariti's premiership endorsed to retain their economic policy in parallel with the IMF and the World Bank. Concurrently the growing dissatisfaction on the Palestinian lands exacerbated the Islamist members of the Parliament. The Islamist leader and member of the Lower Chamber, Laith Shubeilat criticized the King and his government as working on 'Zionizing Jordan' and he found guilty for his words and sentenced for three years in jail.³⁶⁷

All together, Jordan allowed the Iraqi National Accord (NAM, the Iraqi opposition group) to open an office in Amman. The declaration of Iraqi diplomat as *persona non grata* by Amman was followed by the expulsion of some members of Jordan embassy in Baghdad. The change in the nature of Jordanian-Iraqi state of affairs has triggered the deterioration of Jordanian-Palestinian relationship. King Hussein condemned the suicide bomb attacks in Israel saying 'his pain and disgust'³⁶⁸. Jordan in this period openly threatened

³⁶⁶ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 1st Quarter 1996, p. 7.

³⁶⁷ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 2nd Quarter 1996, p. 9.

³⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

the members of Hamas (Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement) if they operate activities in the kingdom. Marwan Muasher stated that there was nothing to protect them in case they broke the Jordanian law. At the same time, Jordan outlawed 415 Palestinian Islamists and expelled the two leaders of Hamas, Musa Abu Marzooq and Omad Alami. King Hussein re-affirmed his view on Hamas in a Summit met at Sharm al-Sheikh in March 1996. On the other hand, Jordanian-Israeli treaty was also under threat. The King and Crown Prince Hasan criticized the resurgence of Israeli-Palestinian violence and stated that what was happening was triggered the skepticism about the normalization. The King was clearly aware of the internal support for Palestinians and under the shadow of the bread riots in August opposition to Israel would precipitate. The King and his fellows were highly perceived the gains of the warm peace with Israel and tried to find out ways to overcome the destructive ramifications of the regional concerns including the tension in Iraqi territory. For that purpose, King Hussein avoided to involve in Iraqi unsteadiness. He implicitly indicated that, he had not intention to involve and full concern for US course of action.³⁶⁹ The King expressed his reinforcement for “the Iraqi people’s right to protect their country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”. According to EIU, King’s clear expression of ‘Iraqi people’ rather than Iraqi state or government was an illustration of severing of ties with the rule in Baghdad. Jordan also affirmed that its land would not be springboard for any intervention by any party to Iraq.

Concerning the internal economic policies, the government has reduced the bread subsidy and prime-minister Kabariti announced that liberalization will speed up. In this context, main sources of Jordanian domestic unrest were twofold. On the one hand, economic austerity measures disconcerted the people living in the rural areas where the Palestinian population is less concentrated; and on the other the effects of anti-normalization dominated by Islamist, leftist and Palestinian groups escalated. A riot resembles to the one that broke out in 1989 in Maan erupted in Karak this time in August 1996 and then spread to Maan and Tafila. The huge demonstration was held in Karak with 2,000

³⁶⁹ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 4th Quarter, 1996, p. 12.

protestors. King Hussein accused external sources for the increased unrest in the country at large. The King was not fully incorrect in blaming outside parties due to Karaki people connections with Iraqi Ba'ath Party.³⁷⁰ King took some preliminary steps towards maintaining stability and unity through having visits all around the country. His main concern was the rural areas where he has acquired intense allegiance to his rule. He met with different tribal leaders and those demonstrators arrested in the riots were then released. The IAF, dominated by an Islamic ideology, remained at odds with the King and his policies. In order to re-store the dialogue with the monarchy the IAF declared its readiness for taking actions. The Front both decided to postpone the previously agreed demonstration on August 23 and end their call for government change.³⁷¹ *Ikhwan* decided to boycott the forthcoming elections on the grounds that 'the political game in Jordan is no longer useful'.³⁷²

By the onset of 1997, debate on containment of electoral law which would downplay the representation of the Islamist candidates re-surfaced the domestic tension among the political groups. On the one hand the tribal groups and pro-regime delegates of the Parliament were in line with the new system, and Islamists and Palestinian descents on the other opposed it. The 1993 elections and new system of one-person one-vote brought enormous power for tribes and rural areas where they found a political environment to mobilize. The kingdom's primary concern was to ensure the allocation of pro-regime members in 1997 elections.

During this period Iraq was Jordan's largest trading partner; constituting 18.9% of Jordanian exports and 12.2% of imports.³⁷³ The liberal government is pledged

³⁷⁰ EIU, 4th Quarter 1996, p. 13.

³⁷¹ EIU, 4th Quarter, 1996, p. 14.

³⁷² EIU, 3rd Quarter, 1997, p. 9. The decision of Brothers not to join the elections was advocated by the right wing members of *Ikhwan* such as Hammam al-Said, Ahmed Kofahi and Abdul-Munim Abu Zant, and Ishaq Farhan. Particularly, Farhan comprehended the boycott as a part of scruples raised after the peace. In addition, representation of Islamists in the Lower House would be very likely to decrease in favor of normalizers.

³⁷³ EIU, 4th Quarter 1996, p. 5. In addition, India is second with 11.4% of Jordanian aggregate of exports and US is the second with 9.3% of country's imports.

to commence the accession negotiations with the WTO by the early 1997 and a new economic dialogue will resume with the European Union at the same time. Conversely, the turmoil in Iraq and growing turbulence by the Palestinian retaliations were incrementally damaging Jordanian economic indicators.

Jordan's standing at international level has begun to rise when the US President Bill Clinton symbolized Jordan as a non-NATO ally of USA with a special military status.³⁷⁴ Clinton's statement has meant a lot for the monarchy, because under the Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program US committed to supply \$25m for 1997 fiscal year. The modernization of Jordanian army was another outcome of this military cooperation. New choices and preferences for economic adjustment have begun to evolve with Jordan's political and economic involvement in international system after the end of the Cold War. One significant development was certainly the peace with Israel. Jordan's OSCE membership in 1998 and adherence to WTO in 1999 constitute the indispensable parts of newborn international identity with new options and preferences.

According to Curtis Ryan, Jordanian adventure of economic adjustment is 'intricately and cumulatively linked to the Kingdom's other transitions- in terms of both domestic political and foreign policy shifts (including peace with Israel), circumstances that changed considerably between 1989 and 1996'.³⁷⁵ Ryan attempted to recognize and illustrate Jordanian economic footsteps for one ultimate goal, regime survival. The changing dynamics in Jordanian economy was largely embedded in the necessity for political survival during critical periods. In other words, Jordanian stability and survival was ensured steadily during post-Cold War, post-Gulf War, and post-King Hussein eras. Thus Ryan approach is clearly associated with the fact that, Jordanian political stability entails and reinforces economic adjustment. Since country's economy is highly dependent on external aid, this approach seems to be applicable to demonstrate the role of shifting alignments. Jordanian identity and its relationship with her

³⁷⁴ EIU, 1st Quarter, 1997, p. 12.

³⁷⁵ Curtis Ryan, Jordan In Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah, Lynee Riener Publishers, 2002, p.48.

foreign policy moves require attention for different theoretical approaches. Likewise, Laurie Brand argues that Jordan's foreign policy shifts is closely tied to the concept of economic security.³⁷⁶ Since her approach is centered on internal determinants, Brand suggests that Jordanian foreign policy behavior and alliances are caused by domestic political economy instead of external sources.

As previously mentioned, Jordanian economy was enormously relied on foreign assistance and still remains as the largest recipient of US support in the Arab world. This is because Jordan lacks adequate arable land and particularly until the peace with Israel its water supply was limited. The Jordanian government's advocacy for IMF-sponsored economic adjustment program was derived from the unsteady and scarce economic character.³⁷⁷ In fact, membership in Western organizations, namely IMF and World Bank, has brought new economic stimulations like privatization. In line with this policy, the Western world also forced the Kingdom to open its economy for foreign investment.

Jordan's political stability was also relied on economic adjustment policies. However, the public support for the prime-minister Fayez Tarawneh was low during the first year of King Abdullah's rule. In addition, negotiations with Israel and Turkey have deteriorated relations with Syria. As it was mentioned in the previous section, regional instabilities and resurgence of Palestinian uprising urged the regime to constrain the public freedoms and trend toward political opening.³⁷⁸ In the meantime, the opposition called for re-scheduling the electoral law, re-alignment with the Arab solidarity and freezing ties with Israel. However the government has re-stated its concern for maintenance of relations

³⁷⁶ Her analysis which incorporates Jordanian-Syrian alliance during 1975-77; Jordanian-Iraqi alignment since 1979; peace with Israel and other foreign policy decisions are all embarked on new definitions of security, including budget security, trade and debt. Laurie Brand, "In Search for Budget Security: A Reexamination of Jordanian Foreign Policy", in L. Carl Brown (ed), Diplomacy In the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers, I. B. Tauris, 2004.

³⁷⁷ According to EIU statistics, without keeping its debt-service obligations with \$150-200m per year support from the IMF and \$120m structural adjustment loans from the World Bank, Jordan would experience payment dues reaching \$800m in 1998. EIU "Country Report", 4th Quarter 1998, pp: 8-9.

³⁷⁸ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, 4th Quarter, 1998, p. 6.

with Israel and keeps the electoral formula as it is. The government opted for restoring relations with the Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia in particular; rather than re-building close contacts with Iraq and Syria. Due to the various issues debated on Jordanian agenda, the regime opponents in Jordan were also fractured and eventually formed the Higher Committee for Coordination among Opposition Parties as a counter-force for Tarawneh's Committee for National Dialogue.

The resurgence of Palestinian dimension was on the top of Jordan's political agenda in the post-2000 era. The impact of the Palestinian uprising and postponement of 2001 parliamentary elections totally occupied Jordanian domestic priorities and foreign policy goals. The government was enrolled by the detrimental effects of the al-Aqsa *intifada* and searched for acquisition and maintenance of Arab solidarity during this period. Jordan was the home country for Arab Summit that was held in March 2001 for one primary purpose; re-affirmation of Arab commitment to the Palestinian statehood. In this context, having suspended the relations with Israeli government, re-vitalization of Jordanian-Iraqi partnership was situated at the core of Jordan's external preferences.

King Abdullah's visits to Libya and Syria and to the leaders of G-7 states within his first six months have depicted both an economic-oriented foreign policy and Arabist tendency of his rule. Since all Jordan's oil came from Iraq, Kingdom's dependency on US and British foreign aid was also clear. Before the US intervention in 2003, Iraq was supplying Jordan 100% of its oil need. More importantly half of this oil supply was granted with reduced prices, typically half price, and the other half was allowed free.³⁷⁹ Meanwhile, the premiership of Ali Abu al-Ragheb represented a neoliberal approach who worked cordially with the King. In addition, in Tahir al-Masri's view, a former foreign minister; detachment of Jordan from the Palestinian issue after the severing of ties and establishment of PNA as the sole political entity speaking on behalf of the Palestinian community led the Kingdom to embark on portfolio of new choices.

³⁷⁹ Robert J. Bookmiller, "Abdullah's Jordan: America's Anxious Ally", *Alternatives*, Vol: 2, No: 2, Summer 2003.

Nevertheless Jordanian dependency on Western aid still overrides its main priority, King Abdullah urged with a policy of mending fences with the Arab world to re-visualize Jordan's Arab credentials.

6.2 Jordan's new foreign policy preferences under King Abdullah II:

During the Iraqi war, King Abdullah attempted to raise Jordan's international position through multilateral forums and articulated policies which are in conflict with US interests. However King Abdullah had assessed the changing international parameters cautiously and he was one of the first Muslim leaders who condemned the acts of aggression against the US and offered assistance to US President. In Marwan Muasher's (Jordan's Ambassador to the US and Jordan's Foreign Minister of the time) own words, Jordanian position could be easily perceived; "We feel strongly that we can be defensive about people who practice terrorism, whatever their origin or religion is". King Abdullah's initiative to fight against terrorism hand in hand with the US was clearly declared in the White House immediately two weeks after the 9/11 attacks. King Abdullah was the first Arab leader who offered support for the US war on terror policy at Washington. This was followed by finalizing US-Jordanian Free Trade Agreement (FTA) which was already on the agenda initiated during Clinton era. Signing of FTA was a remarkable development in the sense that; Jordan became the fourth country after Canada, Mexico and Israel to conclude a free-trade agreement with the US. The *most-favored nation* policy illustrates Jordanian special relationship with the US as the first Arab and Muslim country to be able to achieve this end.

The US Senate ratified the FTA approximately four weeks after the attacks. It's noteworthy to perceive the magnitude of the FTA in Phil Gramm's statement, "... this must-do thing....we have a crisis in the world, we need to reaffirm our relationship with Jordan, a critical country in a very important part of the world when we are at this very moment beginning to look toward war with

terrorism”.³⁸⁰ For the US standpoint, to comprehend the FTA a solely trade issue is pointless; instead it goes beyond trade agreement. Looking into the volume of trade between two countries makes it clear that Jordan signifies a pro-US tilt with this bargaining. Two countries have culminated \$400m trade in 2000 and the implementation of the FTA would bring little more than this amount. According to Robert Bookmiller, since Jordan will rank only 75th in terms of US trade partners, the economic gains of this deal inhibit the political and symbolic ramifications of the FTA. The view of King Abdullah was not far from the US officials and he characterized the FTA as “transcends economic issues”.

What was directly brought by the free trade was the abandonment of quotas on Jordanian commodities and also the tariffs on industrial and agricultural products plus the services would be terminated within ten years. Although Jordan is not the largest trading partner of the US, but the US is the largest for Amman. The Qualified Industrial Zones (QIZ) that was set up previously for reinforcing foreign investment would enable the free trade to work easier. The FTA will serve as a safety-valve for the public discontent concerning the Israeli opposition since it eradicates Israeli linkage for US exports. In order to ensure Abdullah’s Socio-Economic Transformation, FTA occupies a crucial place.

The decisive trend in Jordanian-European Union relations should be added to the list as the Hashemite Kingdom is the first Mashreq country involved in association agreement. In this sense, holding the World Economic Forum at Jordan’s Dead Sea resort was not a coincidence in June 2003. The Association Agreement with the European Union by the beginning of 1999 signifies the need for selling Jordanian goods to the European countries. The completion of Association Agreement with the EU as a part of Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

³⁸⁰ Phil Gramm was Republican Senator from State of Texas. See: Robert J. Bookmiller, “Abdullah’s Jordan: America’s Anxious Ally”, *op.cit.*, p. 176.

would enable Jordan to be included in Euro-MED free-trade zone by 2010 as well.³⁸¹

This economic rapprochement no doubt will bring political alignment in return. In order to perceive and recognize King Abdullah's endeavor in this period, it's central to overlook the commitments of the Jordanian King in the aftermath of 9/11 episode. One prominent priorities of King Abdullah was to update economic liberalization as an indispensable part of WTO membership; and revitalize the trend toward political liberalization date back to 1989. After facing with the overwhelming effects of al-Aqsa *intifada*, Abdullah contended to reinforce economic reformation as one of the striking goals of the monarchy.³⁸² One distinguishable ingredient of post-*intifada* period was removing the major parameters of late de-liberalization. In this sense, Abdullah would envisage and opt for both economic and political re-formation in which these two designated goals of the Kingdom will complement each other. However, there is a growing question mark concerning the future of Iraqi state and its impact on the Kingdom's politics.

6.3 The US war in Iraq: Jordanian foreign policy as a *battlefield* in generating debates on identity

Since the late 1990s international public opinion has vigorously began to deliberate the quandary situation in Iraq. The Jordanian public has constituted one of the strongest one respected to Iraqi people. For that reason, Jordan tried to overcome this risky period by a strict response against pro-Iraqi demonstrations. The anti-US front which consisted Islamists, leftists and

³⁸¹ EIU, 1st Quarter, 1997, p. 18. Some benefits of *Euro-MED Partnership* are as follows: "Iraqi asylum seekers who travel to EU countries from Jordan; the [European] Commission insists that they should return to Jordan as the first country of arrival after they leave Iraq. This could prove to be the most intractable of the outstanding problems because of its more political and less technical nature. Intellectual property rights, especially as they apply to Jordan's lucrative and expanding pharmaceuticals industry. This may not be as problematic as might at first seem, as most output from Jordan is of products where the copyright has already lapsed certificates of origin, especially for goods made in Jordan and the products of Israeli-Jordanian joint ventures. Access to EU markets, particularly for Jordanian tomato paste; talks are currently being held up over whether 5,000 or 3,000 tons/year should be permitted to enter European markets". *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³⁸² *EIU Views Wire*, "Jordan: Key Developments", September 15, 2003.

nationalists were scattered and their demonstrations banned by the police. Several tragedies happened in Maan between 20-21st of February when a man and a university student were killed after police intervened to the rallies.³⁸³ After his father's death, King Abdullah pursued the similar policy to contain the anti-US opponents and pro-Iraqi stand while advocating diplomatic means to solve the problem to prevent war.

Given the regional instabilities and unsettlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, Jordan was one of the first countries that alarmed by the US war on Iraq in the Middle East. The two fundamental parameters determining Jordanian politics were the influx of both Palestinian and Iraqi refugees from West Bank and Iraq respectively; and domestic opposition resisting to the US-led intervention in Iraq. These two factors vigorously constrained Jordanian policy-making internally and externally. Although Jordan sent its troops to Afghanistan to support the US-led 'war on terrorism', this time King Abdullah was reluctant to participate actively in the Iraqi war. In fact the King openly manifested his position by the very beginning of 2003 during the World Economic Forum (WEF) which was held in Davos, Switzerland. Jordanian King as the only Arab leader participated in WEF declared Jordanian priority to solve the Palestinian problem and his refusal to go along with US war against Iraq.³⁸⁴

Jordan's Planning Minister of the time, Bassam Awadallah, stated "Jordanian industries and trade and transport are all highly dependent on opportunities in Iraq".³⁸⁵ Awadallah added that "We will simply not accept refugees in Jordan" and they will call for the UNHCR to help the refugees on Jordan's Iraqi frontier. One member of Jordanian National Committee for the Defense of Iraq, Rajai Nafa'a said that "A war against Iraq is a war against all Arabs and against the

³⁸³ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", 2nd Quarter, 1998, p. 12. Jordanian police did not take the responsibility of the student killed. The interior minister Nazir Rashid found the independent Islamist, Laith Shubeilat responsible for the riots and he was arrested just before the rallies.

³⁸⁴ For Key Foreign Policy Issues of Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, please see: www.mfa.gov.jo

³⁸⁵ BBC News, 3 January 2003.

future of our region”.³⁸⁶ According to a poll conducted by the Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) centered at the University of Jordan, 63% of the correspondents said that the reason for possible US attack on Iraq presents a threat to Iraq; and 69% of Jordanians think that did not support Jordan’s participation in an US-led alliance.³⁸⁷ Under these circumstances King Abdullah after having a meeting with Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gül, reiterated that Jordanian land will not be used for a strike against Iraq.³⁸⁸

Looked from this framework, the US sponsored war on terrorism would placate American state and foreign policy objectives, but on the other this provocative strategy would play a part in making those identities against the war on terrorism as *the other*. Since identities re-shaped and re-adjusted either within regional or international systems, Jordan as an Arab country preferred not to have a war in Iraq. Jordan moved toward democratization by means of opening the Parliament in 1989 which was followed by the legalization of the political parties and increased concern of Jordanians in national politics. This was a watershed in country’s history in the sense that the opening of the public spheres by the 1989 parliamentary elections have continued in the forthcoming elections and Jordanians began to deliberate their interests within the opening and closing of these public contestations. The opening of the public spheres then stimulated the *re-definition* of Jordan’s identity and interests in return.³⁸⁹ In this sense, Jordanians would certainly frustrated by a war in Iraq and displeasure of the society would manifest itself in the discourses of the political parties and large scale public rallies. In an atmosphere where democratization process was frozen and regional volatilities are prevalent, Jordanian identity will have a say to stop or alleviate the suffering of Iraqi people.

³⁸⁶ BBC News, 3 January 2003.

³⁸⁷ Center for Strategic Studies (CSS) centred at University of Jordan, www.css-jordan.org/polls/index.html

³⁸⁸ BBC News, 7 January 2003.

³⁸⁹ Lynch (1999), *op.cit.*

In this respect, it is a constructive perspective to look the re-construction of Jordanian identity squeezed from two conflicting interests and concerns; credentials of the Jordanian people on one hand and the Jordanian regime on the other. It's clear to observe the enduring dilemma or predicament in Shibley Telhami's statements before the war. Telhami argued that "in the aftermath of a possible war, the Middle East would be more repressive and unstable than it is today ... Arab public opinion is passionately opposed to the war, but it is going to be very difficult for Arab governments to be opposed in a significant and meaningful way".³⁹⁰ Likewise, 3,000 Jordanians protested the possible American-led war on Iraq in Amman which was organized by the opposition groups in the country in 2003.³⁹¹ People were shouting "down, down USA" to stop a possible war on Iraq and oppose to involvement of Jordan in an American sponsored attack. The protestors comprised mostly of Palestinian community and carrying green banners with slogans supporting Hamas.

The former director of CSS Mustafa Hamarneh suggested that the attitudes of Jordanian people has shown variation when the war erupted. For Hamarneh although the war created a big emotional collapse among Jordanians, many people though that Iraqi resistance would "bring the fore elements of Islamic and nationalist forces".³⁹² Therefore constructivist approach which entails collective and national identity of Jordan act as a mechanism to think and foresee the most *unthinkable*. To make it more clear, Jordan's foreign policy during the Iraqi crisis serve as a battlefield to overcome a collective action problem which was eventually conceived and recognized by Jordanian people. The role of opposition needs to be mentioned since Jordan's public opinion is not monolithic and concerned with National Programs inaugurated both by the King under 'Jordan First Campaign' and Jordan-EU action plan which promotes the founding National Committee for domestic agenda.

³⁹⁰ From Kathryn Westcott's interview with Shibley Telhami, www.bbc.news.co.uk (02 January 2003)

³⁹¹ http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/1/world/middle_east/ (1 February 2003)

³⁹² "Mustafa Hamarneh examines Jordanian Politics", *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*, Vol: 22, Issue: 9, November 2003.

Immediately before holding national elections, Jordan's Iraq policy works as a *venue* for deliberation and sharing common expectations for the Iraqi civilians and the end of war as soon as possible. The public opinion in Jordan can be detected in the lines of daily newspapers in country. Jordan's *al-Dustur* newspaper wrote once "...the failure of US plans in Iraq and the collapse of US plans to reconstruct and bring about freedom there" and in addition *al-Ra'y* newspaper exposed the pessimism among the Middle East societies and necessity to stop the war with the words "...the need for middle ground solution become inevitable so that the US forces can at least exist Iraq with dignity".³⁹³

6.3.1 Fears of extinction: Jordan's identity in *constant* re-formation

The repercussions of September 11 attacks embody the solidification of fears of extinction and led to the revitalization of competing identities in the form of *us* and *them*. Identifications of victims and enemies had a profound reflection and reaction in the entire Middle East. The ideological confrontation that was characterizing relations among Middle Eastern regimes during the Cold War years, now shifted towards a new centre of gravity on the basis of *failed states*. Historically, it was ideologies as social structures that divide the Middle Eastern policies from one another and motivated transnational identities to be utilized mostly by the states in the region. Following the September 11 attacks, unsettlement of Palestine problem, resurgence of radical Islamic movements and Saddam Hussein's rule in Iraq were triggered by US war on terror strategy. As a repetition of bi-polar international system, this time societies and regimes are fragmented in accordance with their *closeness* to the US war on terror campaign. In this respect, identities matter to explore the foreign policy behavior of regional actors. Formerly it was either socialist/Ba'athist regimes or pro-Western governments that were confronting Middle East policy makers. What makes the regional communal identities, Shiites, Sunnis, Palestinians or Arab nationalists to fear was the creation of counter-hegemonic identities which can surpass their ideals and political power. Today there still exist fears of extinction

³⁹³ www.bbc.news.co.uk, 29 June 2005.

which can stimulate erosion of opposing identities. For instance, King Abdullah's deportation of Hamas leaders and closure of their offices in fall of 1999 was an instant decision of the throne after US alert that Osama Bin Laden and Islamists in the Middle East could have terrorist attacks.³⁹⁴ For Lamis Andoni, Abdullah's crackdown policy of Hamas was a political maneuver to weaken the potency of domestic opposition against any possible solution to Palestinian-Israeli dispute.³⁹⁵ The September 11 attacks, therefore, lies at the core of US policy as a *catalyst* to alienate and contain different communal and counter-hegemonic forces.

The Kingdom of Jordan has sought to implement some pre-emptive measures at domestic realm in order not to be confronted with the onset of the US-led war in Iraq. Since the Iraqi crisis has brought intra-regional system issues like sectarian and confessional conflicts, no matter what the politicians wish to act; communal, ethnic and transnational identities have highlighted the ongoing situation in Iraq and entire Middle East. Although the politicians in the region are deeply constrained by the sectarian conflict in Iraq, each Arab state and leader attempted to enclose the perceptions of its citizenry through drawing attention to particular identities. In other words, debates on Iraqi identity and disaffection on the basis of sectarian line denote different outcomes and threats to the states in the region. For instance, King Abdullah's Sunni Arab cause in building Iraqi unity constitutes an antithesis for Iranian Shiite ground. The situation can get worse in heterogeneous societies having ethnic and religious divisions. In the case of Iraq, the clashing of different identities among Sunni versus Shiite, and Arab versus Kurd epitomizes the very fact that nation-building has not been a complete project in Iraq yet. Similarly, large Palestinian population in Jordan has always been a limitation for the Kingdom in exerting her policies. Jordan has always felt the fear of counter-hegemonic identity of Palestinian community which has prolonged restricted Kingdom's politicians to act as they intended.

³⁹⁴ *EIU Views Wire*, "Jordan: Political Forces", November 4, 2003.

³⁹⁵ Lamis Andoni, "King Abdallah: In His Father's Footsetsps?", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 29, No: 3, Spring 2000, p. 87.

Thus, war in Iraq makes it necessary to monitor *identities* in play and how they work as catalysts in framing disaffected populations.

As noted by Stephen Saideman the question of “under what conditions will politicians succeed in emphasizing one identity at the expense of the others?”³⁹⁶ should be placed at the core of identity conflicts. Jordan’s response to the war in Iraq, in this respect, signifies a crucial case to demonstrate regime’s efforts to repress public assembly and curb the opposition under the impact of a regional crisis. King Abdullah has formerly sought to overcome Palestinian uprising and this time attempted to minimize the overwhelming effects of Iraqi war with enlarging the tone of ‘Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign’ and holding two-years postponed parliamentary elections. It’s central to examine to what extent King Abdullah and Jordanian regime has succeed in overcoming an external challenge via consolidating Jordan’s identity at the expense of other identities (including Pan-Arabism, *Jihadi* Islam and Shiite lines).

Wars are one of the key forces that create or re-invigorate particular identities. For instance, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war led to the rise of Arab nationalism and 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war has enhanced the significance of Iraqi identity on the basis of Sunni-Arab line until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The demise of Pan-Arab nationalism by the Camp David Accords in 1979 and Gulf Crisis in 1990-91 undermined the role of Arabist identities in the region. Within this context, the US strike against Iraq and subsequent sectarian division in the country led to the political expansion of Shiite power at the expense of Iraqi national unity. Since the Iraqi independence in 1932, the 2003 US invasion has totally changed the sectarian balance of power in Iraq, allowing the Shiite majority to disclose its power politically. The shift in political landscape has then re-shaped the Sunni-Shiite relations not only in Iraq, but also in the whole Middle East enclosing the area from Lebanon to Pakistan and from Fertile Crescent to the Gulf Sheikdoms. One of the major consequences of Shiite insurgency was the emergence of a militant Sunni Islamist activism in the form of *Jihadi* movement

³⁹⁶ Stephen Saideman, “Conclusion”, *op.cit.*, p. 189.

linked to al-Qaeda, Wahhabism and Salafism. The solidification of Sunni identity was not only empowered by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's presence in Iraq, but also stemming from the schism in Muslim Brotherhood predominantly represented by Sunni Arabs.

The attacks to Shiite strongholds, Iskandaria, Najaf and Karbala illustrate that the US war in Iraq has ejected a sectarian conflict that was embedded in the region for years. For that reason, the growth in Sunni militancy and resistance was not solely brought by the US war; it was already persisted and emerged as a result of Shiite political revival in the post-Saddam Iraq.³⁹⁷ The Saudi role in enlarging the scope of Sunni identity is central in directing the American policies towards the region. In the aftermath of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia has pre-occupied with framing the effects of Shiite insurgency and Iranian influences through empowering Wahhabism. During this period of time, Wahhabi *ulema* publicized rulings that Shiites are *rafadis* (those who reject truth of Islam).³⁹⁸ The Shiite revival and Sunni insurgency is conducive to foster deeply rooted conflicts in the region. One of the key Shiite political organization, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) under the leadership of Ayatollah Abdulaziz al-Hakim and its al-Badr Brigade were said to work like Amal and Hezbollah of Lebanon supported by Iran. As a response to US-Saudi relations, al-Qaeda and the Sunni resistance in Iraq today represent the Sunni insurgency in the form of anti-Shiite and anti-Americanism at the expense of Saudi Arabia.

Very intriguingly, it's the Sunni activism and Wahhabism that threaten the American interests in the Middle East rather than Shiites where Sunnis heavily dominate the Muslim population in the world. The Sunni militancy and activism is centered on two fundamental goals; to remove the Middle East from US influences and to restore the Sunni dominance.³⁹⁹ In addition, al-Qaeda

³⁹⁷ Vali Nasr, "Regional Implications of Shi'a Revival in Iraq", *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 2004, p. 8.

³⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

³⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

constitutes the key branch of Sunni activism today. As long as the US will not negotiate with the other Shiite communities in the region, precisely Hezbollah and the Iranian Republic, the sectarian and religious tension in Iraq will cause new regional unsteadiness. The US war on terror strategy has now puzzled and disoriented after the opening of Pandora's Box in Iraq.

Within the case of Iraq, Sunni versus Shiite fragmentation heightened and today reverberated beyond Iraqi borders in the aftermath of US invasion in 2003. Having being threatened by the war on Iraq, King Abdullah has caught between Arab identity condemning US-led war on terror on the one hand and US demands to provide logistic and diplomatic support on the other. The war in Iraq has sharpened the constant fragmentation between Sunni and Shiite communities in a way that poses enormous threat to Middle East stability, Jordan in particular. Growing impact of sectarianism and division among ethnic and tribal affiliation has increasingly confronted Jordanian domestic politics and external policy-making. In addition, elections held in January and December 2005 have profoundly deepened sectarian and religious identities in Iraq. In other words, decay of Iraqi unity and Iraqi communal identity could not only lead to dismemberment of Iraq, but also create fears of extinction in the entire region.

6.3.2 Repercussions of de-Baathification and Sectarianism in the post-Hussein Iraq:

Prior to the war in Iraq, Iraqi unity was consolidated by the army and the Ba'ath Party. Although the Republican Guard Corps comprised of predominantly Sunni Arabs, Kurds and Shiites also thought that the army was a national institution.⁴⁰⁰ For centuries, there existed three principal identity groups in Iraq. Therefore these groups have been historically divided along ethnic and religious grounds. Among the 75% of Arab population, Shiites comprise the 65% and Sunnis embrace 35%. Kurds constitute 20% of the total population in Iraq whom most

⁴⁰⁰ "The Next Iraqi War? Sectarianism and Civil Conflict", *Crisis Group Middle East Report*, No: 52, 27 February 2006, pp: 8-9.

of them belong to Sunni section of Islam. The representation in the Interim Governing Council in 2003 illustrates that the seats were allotted on the basis of ethnic and religious grounds. The majority of the Council was chosen from Shiites and 40% were Sunnis; 68% were Arabs and Kurds constituted 24%. The Council was later replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The policies of CPA targeting democratic governance in accordance with communitarian and tribal affiliations carry an unavoidable risk which permits and authorizes a political structure under the tutelage of clashing identities and sects. This is the reason why the states in the region including some groups in Iraq do not promote a federal solution to post-war situation.⁴⁰¹

Given the sectarian character of the Iraqi army during Saddam Hussein's rule, Sunni Arab community is among the most disaffected group in post-2003 period. Historically Iraqi Arabs and Kurds have experienced a source of contention since Iraqi government has excluded the Kurds from the political power and Baath regime attempted to integrate the Kurdish community into the 'Iraqi Arab national' identity. The demise of Ba'ath Party and the political power vested in the hands of Sunni Arabs led to the abolition of Saddam Hussein's legacy. Historically, ethnic and sectarian division did not characterize Iraqi national politics. However the post-war situation on Iraqi territory resonate a civil conflict that has outgrown ethnicity and sectarianism as the main sources of political affiliation for the first time in country's history.

The identification of Iraqi people based on sectarian representation has become apparent in the political landscape by 2005. The process of de-Baathification has turned into *de-Sunnification*⁴⁰² particularly after January 2005 elections. The intensification of communal and tribal identities in Iraq is attributed to the structure of the electoral system. In the January elections the formula of proportional representation has led to the consolidation of homogeneity of each sectarian group, i.e. Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds. The Sunni Arab boycott during

⁴⁰¹ Dawn Brancati, "Can Federalism Stabilize Iraq?", *The Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2004, p. 12.

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

election campaigns has paved the way for establishing a Shiite-Kurdish executive body without representing Sunni Arabs. The existing strained relations during Hussein's period now turned into an incontestable armed conflict based on communitarian lines. The Sunni Arab community has perceived the ongoing state re-building process as threatening Iraqi national unity, on the contrary Shiite-Kurdish consensus began to involve in constitution-making of the new state. The fear of extinction of Sunni Arabs is derived from the fear that a federal government will foster Kurdish succession and later promotion of Shiite dominated rule in the nine Southern governorates. Under these circumstances, Sunnis think that they will economically and politically suffer, because Shiites will leave them landlocked with no oil reserves.⁴⁰³ Since Sunni Arabs constituted the only group in Iraqi society holding Iraqi identity, they believe that federation of Iraq in accordance with ethnic and religious lines will foster not only loss of Sunni political power, but also dismemberment of Iraqi Arab identity at the end.

In this context, it's central for Iraqi unity to be supported by the neighboring countries. The strengthening of Iraqi territorial integrity occupies a crucial place in consolidating Iraqi national unity including the US. The growing Shiite religious insurgence and political power have alarmed the Hashemite Kingdom more than any other country in the region with Saudi Arabia. From the time when the British mandate rule was ended in both Jordan and Iraq and when they acquired their independence, the Hashemite rule in Jordan established good ties with their relatives in Baghdad. In addition, in the aftermath of the overthrow of Iraqi Hashemites in 1958, Jordan continued to support the regime in Baghdad during the eight years war between Iraq and Iran. The close ties have broadened with the 1991 Gulf War until 1995. Since then Jordan exhibits full respect for the Iraqi people and reinforces the durability of Iraqi stability and public order. Thus from the beginning of the crisis Jordanian state observes the political process in Iraq and King Abdullah asserted that the international community and

⁴⁰³ Ibid, p. 12.

the United Nations should take part in case of a war to re-build Iraqi territorial integrity.⁴⁰⁴

Notification of King Abdullah in December 2004 needs to be clarified and stressed. King Abdullah has vigorously called attention to “crescent of dominant Shiite movements and governments stretching from Lebanon through Syria, Iran and Iraq to the Gulf (encircling Jordan)”.⁴⁰⁵ For that purpose, Abdullah criticized the de-Baathification campaign in Iraq thinking that the dissolution of Iraq would bring regional repercussions as well rather than reinforcing unity. Abdullah believes that Iraqi unity is not only an Iraqi internal affair, but the Iraqi people themselves should have the mean to normalize their political solidity. In the opening speech of the World Economic Forum that was held at Dead Sea of Jordan, Abdullah said that “It is also urgent for the international community to be an active partner in building a legitimate, inclusive, and effective political process in Iraq. Questions about the credibility of that process will encourage extremism and obstruct the process of regional reform... We must respect the national identity of Iraq, never forget Iraq’s historical contribution to human civilization – from the time, more than 38 hundred years ago, when it established the world’s first legal code”.⁴⁰⁶

King Abdullah’s special and frequent emphases on Iraqi unity and territorial integrity offer a thematic analysis which is embarked on the artificial frontiers of Middle Eastern countries. Since the borderlines of states in the entire Middle East has drawn by European colonizers, a modification in Iraqi territory would imply re-scheduling other frontiers in the area, precisely Jordan as a neighbor country. Jordan’s call for Arab order and international public opinion is undertaken for two purposes; securing Jordan’s territorial integrity and appealing to the anti-war opposition at domestic level.

⁴⁰⁴ www.mfa.gov.jo (See; Key Foreign Policy Issues: Jordan & Iraq)

⁴⁰⁵ “The Next Iraqi War?..”, op.cit., p. 27.

⁴⁰⁶ www.mfa.gov.jo World Economic Forum meeting was held on May 15th, 2004 (See; Key Foreign Policy Issues: Jordan & Iraq)

The fear of dismemberment of Iraq led Abdullah to be cautious during the US war on Iraq. Since there is no role for the Hashemites in West Bank and East Jerusalem, Abdullah said Iraqi people are the only people that have the right to choose their leadership. Jordan does not favor a federal government which was advocated by the US. For King Abdullah's opinion, "Iraq is the battleground, [between] the West against Iran" and since there are Shiites in Iraq who have concerns over Iran.⁴⁰⁷ For Abdullah, during the US war on Iraq the conflict within Islam among Sunnis and Shiites are not taken for granted and the total de-Baathification process is not the right path to bring Iraq unity. Marwan Muasher regularly restated the danger of a federal arrangement on the basis of ethnic and religious lines. For that purpose any solution in Iraq would be provided by a central government. Equally, Jordanian people's sentiment regarding the war in Iraq is centered on Sunni Arab cause.⁴⁰⁸ The King being aware of this feeling tries to create a balance between Jordan's Western-oriented policy-making and Jordanian people's opposition against the US role in Iraq. Abdullah occasionally indicates the positions of Sunni minority and suggests that '...an Iraq governed in the interests only of the Shiite Muslims and the Kurds is likely to remain unstable'.

Jordan has special attention to Iraqi prospect economic reasons as well since Iraqi demand for import could galvanize the port at Aqaba. For that purpose, Sunni Arab states are promoting Sunni involvement in Iraqi politics in order to avoid Iraq's dismemberment. The growing influence of Iran and her Shiite influence in the entire region including Gulf sheikdoms have triggered Sunni regimes to take steps toward supporting a 'Sunni alliance'. However, a Sunni-Arab alliance can easily hasten the process toward Sunni-Shiite conflict and eventually can foster the bad scenario falling Iraq apart based on religious and ethnic lines.

⁴⁰⁷ For Middle Eastern Quarterly's interview with King Abdullah on Iraqi war, see: "King Abdullah II: Iraq is the Battleground...", *Middle Eastern Quarterly*, Spring 2005, pp: 73-80.

⁴⁰⁸ *Economist Intelligence Unit*, "Country Report: Jordan", October 2005, pp: 1-2.

The war in Iraq, therefore, has reinvigorated and strengthened some identities and not others. The war in Iraq has led to the demolition of Iraqi central government and state where Iraqi unity has fall apart into several units, Sunni, Shiite and Kurds. Jordan is visibly influenced by the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime for several reasons. First of all, Jordan's pro-US policy-making led the Jordanian identity to put on the agenda. Since King Abdullah is forced to pursue a foreign policy-making which is not in conformity with the preferences of its populace, Kingdom's foreign policy goals serve as a battleground in changing the meaning and re-making Jordan's identity. Secondly, regime has sought to take some pre-emptive measures to gain legitimacy through using Jordan's identity as a prop. In this regard, Jordan First Campaign and political reformation are the main tools of regime consolidation under the repercussions of Iraqi crisis. Thirdly, regional instability posed by Iraqi war demonstrated that Jordan's state identity and national identity is *not* coterminous. In some cases, the absence of uniformity between state and national identities can foster tension and crystallization of both 'supra-state' (Arabist and Islamic loyalties) and 'sub-identities' (parochial or tribal affiliations). It's evident for the Jordanian people that they do not share the same preferences of the Kingdom as not condemning the war unlike the Arab consensus.

The Iraqi case also illustrates that Jordanian state has moved away from Arabist tendency toward a more territorial identity which was first noticed by the peace with Israel. So, international events, war in Iraq in this case, can serve as a catalyst for generating debates on identity at domestic realm. In this sense, war on Iraq embodies how Jordan's identity is in constant formation and in what respect it's re-defined by an external event.

6.3.3 Caught between Arabist identity and Western preferences: The shift in the meaning and the content of Jordanian identity

Jordanian identity, both national and state identities, has been predominantly conditioned by Palestinian presence. Literally, the ethnic conflict and domestic unrest can easily constrain states to act as they wish. The enduring Palestinian

dimension in Jordan's politics has always been perceived as the main source of counter-hegemonic identity since the annexation of the West Bank territories and incorporation of Palestinian community into East Bank. The identification of Palestinian descents as "the other" formulated the very foundation of nation-building in Jordan specifically after the civil war. Therefore, Jordanian identity has shaped by the ethnic division between Palestinians and Jordanians in that Jordanian Kingdom's collective identity was not shared by those Palestinians who want to keep their national identity and liberation movement. Under these circumstances, Jordan's collective identity perhaps did not collapse or decay, but rather Palestinian and later Islamic identities have begun to shape and circumscribe the *meaning* and the *content* of Jordan's national identity. Identities, national or state, are transformed and renovated with the changing systemic circumstances.⁴⁰⁹ The idea that identities and interests are in a variation is quite understandable because they are acting within and being re-formulated by the interactive processes in which they are embedded. Accordingly, identities are regarded as dependent variables rather than independent due to fluctuations in their enduring practices. For instance, Hillel Frisch describes construction of Jordan's nationalism typically as 'eclectic' generated by security matters.⁴¹⁰ However the nascent nationalism in Jordan after detachment of Palestine denotes a national and territorial character unlike Arabist identity during 1950s and 1960s. The principal goal of Abdullah's Jordan is to consolidate self-sustaining identity with its recognized credentials and frontiers embedded in a territorial entity, i.e. the East Bank of River Jordan.

The meaning of nationalism should be examined cautiously to perceive the need for re-construction of identities. Alexander Wendt asserted that nationalism as a domestic determinant of *the self-interest* refers to "... a sense of societal collective identity based on cultural, linguistic, or ethnic ties"⁴¹¹. Wendt broadens his arguments with a causal relationship between identities and

⁴⁰⁹ Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State", *American Political Science Review*, Vol: 88, No: 2, June 1994.

⁴¹⁰ Hillel Frisch, "Fuzzy Nationalism: The Case of Jordan", *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, Vol: 8, No: 4, Winter 2002, p. 87.

⁴¹¹ Wendt (1994), *op.cit.*, p. 387.

nationalism in a way that helps to perceive the *variation* in Jordanian identity. For Alexander Wendt, "... the dependence of states on their societies may be such that they cultivate nationalist sentiments in order to solidify their corporate identities vis-à-vis each other". Hence the practices of states motivate them to look to their societies once again and to acquire support, loyalty and legitimacy for their actions at abroad. Here, Wendt's definition of nationalism unlocks a slightly open door for analyzing the turbulent transformation in Jordanian domestic politics in the form of National Agenda and Jordan First rhetoric. The new way of expressing Jordanian national identity or communal ideals require scrutiny since they uphold (endorse) the *collective identity* of Jordan in conducting its external relations. Jordan re-formulated her foreign policy and interests as permitted by the variations in structural collective action. In order to achieve this end, Jordan moved toward re-defining and re-constructing her identity and interests because Kingdom's identity interactively affected by the war on terrorism.

King Abdullah said in the Arab Summit in Sharm El Sheikh on March 1st, 2003 that "Our Iraqi brethren will not alone suffer the effects and destruction of any such war. The whole region will. Jordan today stresses further the danger of this situation and warns, if the war were to erupt, of the possibility of dividing Iraq."⁴¹² King Abdullah in fact attempted to take attention to the possible dismemberment of Iraq. Before the outbreak of the war Jordanian state and national identity offer almost a common understanding and meaning. Nevertheless Jordanian public opinion does not provide an alternative to Saddam Hussein's rule; Jordanian people consider the war as evitable. As Planning Minister Bassem Awadallah suggested Jordanian people could not distinguish Palestine from Iraq, "when you speak about Iraq, immediately people mention Palestine". Given that people's reaction to Palestine is very strong; Iraq also constitutes a *symbol* for the Arab and Islamic communities after the 9/11 attacks. Possible war on Iraq would mean not only the overthrow of Saddam Hussein regime or Baath Party, but it goes beyond and represents a war

⁴¹² Archives provided at: www.mfa.gov.jo (5 September 2005)

between Middle Eastern regimes and the West. Looked from this approach, Jordan's identity does matter in analyzing shifts in Jordan's foreign policy goals.

Jordan aimed to uphold a diplomatic initiative because war should be the last resort and has to be avoided in order not to drag Iraq into a destabilized country. King Abdullah wanted to refrain from the use of force due to the fact that it would lead to the culmination of the extremist groups and their discourses. King Abdullah initiated to make their policy stronger by revitalizing diplomatic means to stop the possible war on Iraq. Abdullah's peaceful initiative included the Arab leaders to monitor the crisis over Iraq and to take a course of collective action to prevent war and end the suffering of Iraqi civilians. King Hamad Ben Isa Al Khalifa of Bahrain who held the presidency of the League of Arab States, President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Crown Prince Abdullah Ben Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia and King Abdullah, and their deliberations have converged on the tragic repercussions of the war and spotlighted Jordan's position ending hostilities in the region. Foreign Minister Muasher said "...what we are trying to do is explore the positions of all sides and try to come to a common position that would satisfy all parties and that might lead to the end of hostilities... We realize that we are small country, but we are not working alone and we have good relations with everyone, including the US, Britain, and the P5 and, of course, Arab countries"⁴¹³. Marwan Muasher's policy made during this period coincides with the country's demand to sustain Jordanian-Iraqi relations as it is. Including the Senate president of Zeid al-Rifai and several senators at the Royal Court, King Abdullah asserted her country's stance clearly as "We do not allow any country to use our airspace to launch strikes against Iraq"⁴¹⁴.

Concurrently the forthcoming parliamentary elections began to re-shape the domestic political transition in the country. The Opposition Parties' Higher Coordination Committee advocated their participation in the democratic platform in June. The Committee constitutes Jordan's largest party bloc and they

⁴¹³ Francesca Sawalha, "Jordan steps up efforts to stop war", *JordanTimes*, 26 March 2003.

⁴¹⁴ *Petra News Agency*, 25 March 2003.

decided to boycott the polls after the 1997 elections.⁴¹⁵ The main reason for boycott was to protest the electoral law which approved *one-person one-vote formula*. The melting pot in changing their attitudes was the decision of the largest party of the bloc, the IAF, to run in June 2003 elections.⁴¹⁶

In the aftermath of the US strike against Iraq, the foremost internal threat to Jordan's pro-American stand was a petition signed by a group of former prime-ministers, ministers, parliamentarians urging the Hashemite rule to declare the 'illegality' of the war in Iraq.⁴¹⁷ The King then openly condemned the onset of the war while lying emphasis on that Jordan brought all its efforts into play to stop the outbreak of the war. Having confronted by the Jordanian citizens of Palestinian origin who called the government to expel the Israeli ambassador and resist normalization with Israel, King Abdullah reluctantly but moderately condemned the war. Given that Jordan is the principal country in the region that provided diplomatic and logistic support for the US intervention, King's *warm* condemnation was related with precluding any incitement of anti-US sentiment among Jordanians.

Jordan believes that it's not the right country to send troops to Iraq, but Jordan declared to take all necessary measures to monitor the penetration from Iraqi border. King Abdullah's visit to Ankara on 17th of March manifested Jordan's fear that war on Iraq would put regional stability in danger. The King said that, "There is a danger of an ethnic war in Iraq. In fact, everybody is aware of that and is trying to prevent it"⁴¹⁸. The King's remark to the whole region and the US underlines the fact that any civil war in Iraq would not only disturb the country, but also spread to other countries in the region. Jordanian King added that the Greater Middle East Project would need to be replaced by a reform

⁴¹⁵ *JordanTimes*, 30 March 2003.

⁴¹⁶ For more information about the Organization base of Muslim Brotherhood and IAF, please see: Mansoor Moaddel, *Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Syria*, Palgrave, 2002.

⁴¹⁷ "The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratization and Regional Stability", *ICG-Middle East Briefing*, 8 October 2006, p. 12.

⁴¹⁸ www.ntvmsnbc.com (17 March 2004)

package that will be prepared by the Arab countries instead of the imposition of international community.

Jordan's position immediately after the war could be visibly seen at the 16th Arab Summit in Tunis during 22-23 May, 2004. Jordan re-endorsed her commitment not to interfere Iraqi internal affairs and re-affirmed the respect for Iraqi territorial independence. The Kingdom indicated that they will provide all the means for training Iraqi police and army to back the re-consolidation of the Iraqi government.⁴¹⁹ In a meeting with Tony Blair, King of Jordan stated that "Iraq needs international backing to its efforts to create a suitable climate for nationwide elections"⁴²⁰. The foreign minister Marwan Muasher on the same day restated his country's position with his words "We need to rebuild Iraq. Once the political process is underway it will certainly pave the way for the withdrawal of foreign forces" during his visit to Madrid. Dr. Muasher then reiterated his stance at the Brookings Institute in Washington; "We believe that there is no alternative but to give every possible support to the interim government in Iraq as they undergo this political process which will lead to elections."⁴²¹

In addition, growing tension in the region in the aftermath of 9/11 attacks has re-invigorated new sources of preferences attached to Jordan's identity which is in constant formation. The 'identity conflict' between the state of Jordan and Jordanian nation has become noticeable when the ethnic division and domestic unrest are taken into consideration. In this respect, the fundamental objective of this part is to underline the sources of identity conflict in Jordan within the context of US-led war on Iraq. Given the influence of sectarian conflict in Iraq and insurgence of a Jordanian citizen, Abdul Musab al-Zarqawi, as the leader of *Jihadi* Islamists in Iraq, the variation in the content of Jordanian identity vis-à-vis the state will be explored.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid. www.mfa.gov.jo

⁴²⁰ Ibid. King Abdullah met with Tony Blair on 5th October 2004 in London.

⁴²¹ Ibid.

The growing popularity with the Islamists has hastened by King Abdullah's extraction of Hamas leaders and the onset of al-Aqsa *intifada*. Another factor was the military intervention into Maan in 2002 that resulted in preserving conservatism and Islamic activism in the city. King Abdullah has prioritized economic liberalization and relations with the West at the tribal and ethnic constituencies' expense which has galvanized Islamic activism and re-definition of Jordanians' interests.

6.4 The Growth of *Jihadi* Islam and *Salafi* Movement in Jordan:

The idea of Pan-Arabism and Arabist nationalist policies have partially defeated by the Six Day War in 1967 and 1979 Camp David Accords in the entire Middle East. The Islamic Revolution in Iran and growth of Islamic activism in Afghanistan gave rise to new options for the vulnerable economies in the region. Abdullah Azzam was a Jenin-born Palestinian Jordanian who took part in the holy war against Soviet rule in Afghanistan.⁴²² In addition, Azzam established the Muslim Brotherhood on Palestinian territories. When the Soviet Union evacuated its forces from Afghan lands some of the holy warriors began to return back to their homes. One of them was Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaileh, commonly known as Abdul Musab al-Zarqawi. Zarqawi was not a Palestinian-Jordanian as many Western media detail, rather he was born to the Khalaileh clan which is a branch of Bani Hassan.⁴²³ The Bani Hassan is an East Bank origin tribe constituting one of the major strongholds of Hashemite rule before

⁴²² Abdullah Azzam was a prominent defender of Palestinian struggle and he moved to Jordan after 1967 war to support the idea of *international struggle to secure Islam (Jihad)*. For that reason he was disarrayed with the secular stand of al-Fatah and the PLO. By the early 1980s he went to Pakistan and established the Arab Mujahidin Services Bureau to support the Islamic movement in Afghanistan. Azzam has become known as an ideological figure in Osama Bin Laden's al-Qaeda. For Azzam, the only legitimate Jihad is for the benefit of the whole Ummah. "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism", *Crisis Group Middle East Report*, No: 47, 23 November 2005, p. 3. www.crisisgroup.org (access date: 20 March 2006).

⁴²³ Gary Gambill, "...", *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol: 2, Issue: 24, December 16, 2004, p. 2. Zarqawi was imprisoned in 1994 for weapons possession in Jordan. He was released after a general amnesty in May 1999 with the ascendancy of King Abdullah II. After his release, he went to Peshawar and then to Khandahar. Zarqawi founded his base in the western city of Herat in Afghanistan where he recruited exiled Palestinians, Syrians and Jordanians in Europe, however without having formal links with al-Qaeda. His group was named *al-Tahwid wal-Jihad* (Monotheism and Holy War). Zarqawi then decided to enlarge his attacks including Israel and Jewish targets in Europe, not only targeting the Hashemite Kingdom.

1948 Arab-Israeli war. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, has described Zarqawi as “an associate and collaborator of Osama Bin Laden and his al-Qaeda lieutenants” in 2003.⁴²⁴ Zarqawi as a Jordanian *Salafi* established his group’s - *Tandhim al-Qai’da fi Bilad al-Rafidayn* (al-Qaeda’s Organization in Mesopotamia) - activities in the Sunni areas of Iraq after US invasion in 2003.⁴²⁵ The meaning of ‘war against *Rawafidh* in Iraq’ in Zarqawi’s movement has referred to the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and Omar who accepted Ali as the Prophet Muhammed’s legitimate successor. In this regard, the term *Rawafidh* refers to Twelver Shiites in Iraq who comprises the majority of Iraqi Shiite community. Therefore, in contemporary *Jihadi Salafi* movement, ‘*takfir wa hijra*’ refers to declaring the *takfir* (apostates) and those who rejects Islam (unbelievers) and eventually separating (*hijra*) them from the Muslim world. Although a civil conflict and war could provide a more space in Iraq for Zarqawi, his policy of killing Shiites had created disaffected groups within his movement.⁴²⁶ Zarqawi’s main policy considering the Shiites as unbelievers (*kuffar*) has precipitated the Shiite insurgency which turned into a clash of identities.

After 9/11 attacks, Zarqawi moved to northern Iraq and he established a training camp linked to *Ansar al-Islam* with Jordanians. The assassination of Ali Bourjaq, a Jordanian secret police official in February 2002 was said to relate with Zarqawi’s group. The name Zarqawi was also included in the assassination of Lawrence Foley in October 2002. The attack to Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad was another operation of his group in Iraq which left at least 14 people dead in August 2003. The Jordanian security officials declared that the General Intelligence Department (GID), the Prime Ministry, the US Embassy in Amman was among the targets of Zarqawi. Jordan was informed and took security measures to prevent the attacks. Azmi al-Jayousi, a Palestinian-Jordanian, recruited by Zarqawi was the leader of the planned operation. Hussein Sharif

⁴²⁴ “Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda connection”, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol: 2, Issue: 24, December 16, 2004, p. 7.

⁴²⁵ Richard Seymour, “Out of the Shadows?”, *Middle East*, Issue: 368, June 2006.

⁴²⁶ Mathew Lewitt and Julie Sawyer, “Zarqawi’s Jordanian Agenda”, *Terrorism Monitor*, Vol: 2, No: 24, 16 December 2004.

was one of the group members who admitted after detention that Jayousi told them to “strike at Jordan and the Hashemites, a war against the crusaders and infidels”.⁴²⁷ In the meantime, another Islamist militant, Abu Sayyaf was also arrested who said to have an attempt to organize terrorist attacks against American targets in Jordan. His activities have been under security officials monitor due to his ties with the outlawed *Takfir wal-Hijra* and causing domestic unrest in Maan in 2002.

Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Palestinian-Jordanian, is the leading actor of *Jihadi Salafism* in Jordan who had served as a religious advisor to Zarqawi. For observers, before Zarqawi met with Maqdisi his network has lacked ideological background. Maqdisi is known as an ‘Afghan Arab’ since he spent some time in Afghanistan during 1980s. People from city of Zarqa, a governorate in the north of Amman, were said to adhere to Taliban forces in Afghanistan by the end of 1990s. In addition people from both Zarqa and Salt (another governorate close to Israeli border on the west), lost their lives in Iraq in suicide bombs under Zarqawi’s leadership. The ideological guidance of Zarqawi led the evolution of *Jihadi Salafi* movement in Jordan, notably among the Jordanians of Palestinian origin in the refugee camps (basically al-Ruseifeh camp near Zarqa). However, Hudayf Azzam (son of Abdullah Azzam) stated that “Zarqawi’s role has been limited to military action” and he was criticized for founding a separate organization called Al-Qaeda in Iraq.⁴²⁸

Historically speaking, idea of *Salafiyya* traces back to nineteenth century when a group of people developed a reform-oriented movement in Egypt.⁴²⁹ Salafi means follower of ancestors in Arabic and the mentor of the Salafi movement was Jamal al-Din Afghani (1838-97), an Islamic thinker. The idea first evolved in Egypt by the end of 19th century. It has become a reform oriented program to remove impurities in Islam resulted from centuries of practices attached to its interpretation. Afghani’s focal point was not launch Sharia since he was not an

⁴²⁷ Mathew Lewitt and Julie Sawyer, “Zarqawi’s Jordanian Agenda”, *Terrorism Monitor*, p. 9.

⁴²⁸ Randa Habib, “Zarqawi replaced at head of Iraq resistance”, *JordanTimes*, 3 April 2006.

⁴²⁹ “Can Saudi Arabia Reform Itself?”, *Crisis Group Middle East Report*, No: 28, 14 July 2004, p. 1, www.crisisgroup.org (2 May 2006).

activist but rather a theologian, his movement was aimed to reform Islamic principles. The Salafis believed that there should not be a hereditary power in Islam since Prophet Mohammed was succeeded by a Caliphate chosen by community. The movement perceived the fact in 1920s that to widespread *Salafiyya* popular support is urgently required.⁴³⁰ The Salafis were active especially in the Gulf States, precisely in Kuwait, with the aim of founding a democratic republican state. As a quasi-political organization the Salafi movement acquired seats in Kuwaiti Parliament by 1992.

Historical *Salafi* movement is regarded as the forerunner of the Muslim Brotherhood with the ultimate end to integrate the Muslim world with the Western system. In other words, *Salafism* has become profoundly active in adapting Islam to changing circumstances particularly the challenge posed by the Western world. *Salafism* believed that Koran and the *hadith* (Prophet Muhammad's sayings and practices) are the two "legitimate sources of religious authority and should be understood literally".⁴³¹ In the Middle East context, all of the Palestinians linked to al-Qaeda originated from the refugee families of either 1948 or 1967 wars. Olivier Roy discloses the fact that Palestinian movement for liberation has now moved toward establishing *ummah* which represents the process of 'de-territorialization' of al-Qaeda and 'de-Palestinization' of Palestinian identity in support of a *Jihadi* Islamic one.⁴³² As Olivier Roy has indicated *Salafism* is preoccupied with a conservative program in "purifying Islam from cultural influences" today. Therefore today's *Salafi* movement has very little in common with its historical thinking. However current *Salafism* is more tied to Wahhabism. For that purpose, Roy rather uses the term 'neofundamentalism' in naming the movement to distinguish its contemporary form from its predecessors.⁴³³ Thus, the fundamental objective of neofundamentalists or new *Salafiyya* is to fight against the colonial effects of the

⁴³⁰ Dilip Hiro, *Dictionary of the Middle East*, Macmillan, London, 1996, p. 284.

⁴³¹ "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing ...", *op.cit.*, p. 5.

⁴³² Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah*, C. Hurst and Co Ltd, 2004, p. 305.

⁴³³ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

West and *takfir* (unbelievers) embedded in Muslim society. Although *Salafism* historically aimed to integrate Muslims with the outside world by the 19th century onwards, contemporary *Salafiyya* is more identical with Wahhabism. Therefore it's better to distinct traditional, reformist and militant sections in Salafi movement.

6.4.1 Emergence of *Jihadi Salafism* in the Hashemite's traditional strongholds: Zarqa and Salt

There are different views in *Salafi* movement in Jordan; traditionalist (*taqlidi*), reformist (*islahi*) and violent (*Jihadi*). As Adnan Abu Odeh noticed, there are three groups in the *Salafi* movement in Jordan.⁴³⁴ The missionaries which constitute the first group are the observance of Islam and they make preaches. It's common for missionary *Salafis* to preach in condolence houses. The second group comprises of politicized Muslim Brotherhood in which they have been part of Jordanian politics as parliamentarians, ministers for many years and work within the parameters of the Constitution. The last group includes those *Jihadi Salafis* who want to change by force, not through preaches or political means.⁴³⁵ *Salafism* has become active in Jordan by Nasr al-Din Albani when he was expelled from Syria in the late 1970s. Albani then moved to Jordan and founded his base in Zarqa where he inspired many followers to 'correct Islam'. The traditionalists embrace Albani's thought; those who reject violence formed the reformists in 1995, and *Jihadis* emerged by 1992 with their mentor Maqdisi to abolish 'unbeliever (*kuffar*) regimes' through violent means notably the Hashemite Kingdom.⁴³⁶

Jordanian regime has effectively embraced and monitored the *Salafis* and Islamist activists through providing a political safe haven for the Muslim Brotherhood to act. Those opposing groups who demanded to challenge the Hashemite rule required to divert the IAF away from the political arena to obtain

⁴³⁴ Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, Amman, June 23, 2006.

⁴³⁵ This group of Islamists they mostly said to have linkage with al-Qaeda.

⁴³⁶ Crisis Group Report, No: 47, op.cit, p. 5.

popular support. This was conducive in restricting the impact of militant Islamist groups in the country. The *Ikhwan* had difficult time in managing the militant Islamists particularly when the Brothers and the IAF could not resist normalizing ties with Israel by 1994 onwards. This brought about a division in country's one single united Islamist community into two parts; 'traditionalist' Islamists who wants to use non-violent means and 'militants' those who are close to Maqdisi's *Jihadi Salafi* movement. Consistently, the peaceful branch is represented by those Jordanians of East Bank origin and the militant Islamists are embraced mostly by disaffected Palestinian-Jordanians.

The Zarqa province is considered as the birthplace and capital of *Jihadi Salafism* in Jordan. Prior to 1948 war, Zarqa was the local place of Circassians and Chechens, but the province is re-built to create an industrial city with the huge influx of Palestinians into the Kingdom. One of the local tribe called Bani Hassan was critical of the Hashemite rule. Bani Hassan then has been an instrumental force in generating an anti-Hashemite force with the participation of Palestinian contenders. The division between East and West Bankers could be easily detected in Zarqa where the majority of Palestinian refugees were settled. Zarqa after Amman is the second largest city having disaffected working class as well.⁴³⁷ In addition, some leaders of the IAF originate from this city. It's important to restate that Zarqawi, Maqdisi, Abdullah Azzam and Sheikh Nasr al-Din Albani all come from the city of Zarqa. It was claimed that more than 300,000 people from Zarqa went to Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq to fight in December 2004 and 63 of them were imprisoned either in Jordan or in Guantanamo.⁴³⁸

The alienation of the tribes, for the most part the East Bank inhabitants, in Jordan is solidified with the rise of Islamism in the country. King Hussein's decision to establish close ties with the Western institutions was also followed by his son, at the expense of the tribes which granted the Islamists a safety environment to flourish their activities and organizational bases. The tribal

⁴³⁷ Crisis Group Report, No 47, op.cit., p. 8.

⁴³⁸ Hazem al-Amin, "Jordan's Zarqawists", op.cit.

groups, which were highly devastated by economic policies of the Kingdom, found themselves neglected and totally isolated. Particularly the rise of unemployment in rural areas and weakening effects of privatization led the tribes and popular support partially to shift from *moderate* Muslim Brotherhood or its political wing the IAF towards *militant* Islamist groups. Precisely, the city of Salt, one of the major strongholds for the throne, was destroyed by the political and economic reform programs and has become a place for alcohol and drug abuse problems. It's central to assert the fact that the *Ikhwan* attract supporters and the IAF its voters from urban areas, whereas *Salafis* recruit members mostly from rural areas. In fact, the political role and impact of Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan should be located on a separate place.

During 1960s and 1970s when Jordanian political parties were banned and there were no room for political and ideological affiliation, the Brotherhood established its charitable organizations all around the country and formulated its close ties with the Hashemite regime on a non-confrontational basis. In addition, Muslim Brotherhood was instrumental in co-opting and grasping radical Islamist groups, precisely *Hizb al-Tahrir* (Liberation Party). The Brotherhood and the IAF did not target the longevity of the Hashemite Kingdom. Even though they used electoral boycotting as a political tool to put pressure on the monarchy, the *Ikhwan* tried to work within the parameters of Jordanian Constitution unlike radical militant Islamists in the region.

As a course of embracing act, King Abdullah released Maqdisi and Zarqawi from jail when he ascended to the throne in 1999. Zarqawi and his fellows then moved to Chechnya to support *Jihadi* movement against Russia. As provided by the Crisis Group Report on Jordan, Russian Intelligence Service claimed that a Jordanian Abu Hafs who fights in Chechnya has close links with Osama Bin Laden. Due to his role in Iraq, Zarqawi became US's most wanted man with a \$25 million award. The most significant characteristic of Zarqawi's movement was his explicit target to overthrow the Hashemite monarchy, not only the US. Hodayf Azzam said "Zarqawi pledged not to carry out any more attacks against Iraq's neighbors after having been criticized for these operations which are

considered a violation of Sharia”.⁴³⁹ Jordanian authorities sentenced him for death three times and he also claimed to take the responsibility of suicide bombs in Amman in 2005. Abu Musab Zarwaqi’s violent attitude led a schism in *Salafi* movement and also his mentor Maqdisi to oppose his policies.

6.5 Walking on the Iraqi tightrope: Jordan’s Responses

Perhaps King Hussein did not follow a US Iraqi policy when a multilateral coalition launched an operation called Desert Storm to force Saddam Hussein to evacuate from Kuwaiti territories in 1991. However, King Abdullah, unlike his father, without hesitating supported US invasion of Iraq, a decision which was overwhelmingly criticized by most of Jordanians, Palestinian descents in particular. King Hussein’s neutrality by 2003 has shifted towards pro-American policy-making concerning US-Iraqi relations. In conjunction with King’s policy, since the beginning of the war Jordanian *mukhabarat* has shared information with the US on terrorist groups having ties with al-Qaeda. The Washington Post has reported that Jordan would permit American warplanes to use Jordanian airspace for logistic support in time of a war. A debt-rebuilding agreement has reached in July 2002 with the Paris Club as a direct consequence of King Abdullah’s decision to permit US troops to use Jordanian land during Iraqi military operation.⁴⁴⁰

Since Jordan has been confronted by Palestinian refuges throughout its history, the US strike against Iraq would incite Iraqi refugees moving to Jordan’s eastern border. Statistically one in ten in Jordanian society is Iraqi.⁴⁴¹ Given the intricate situation in the region, Jordan’s fear was derived from Israeli maneuver to move Palestinians toward Jordan’s territory. The main threat posed to Jordanian identity could be the deportation of Palestinians from West Bank to East Bank. As the former director of Center for Strategic Studies (CSS), Mustafa Hamarneh, indicated that “Jordan would suffer almost as much as Iraq if there is

⁴³⁹ Randa Habib, “Zarqawi replaced...”, *op.cit.*

⁴⁴⁰ EIU Views Wire, Jordan: Country Outlook, December 5, 2003, www.eiu.com (date of access: 5 October 2005)

⁴⁴¹ Stephan Glain, “Jordan: The Consequences of Peace”, *Survival*, Vol: 45, No: 1, Spring 2003, p. 168.

a war. We could face massive social unrest”.⁴⁴² Jordan, particularly after the onset of al-Aqsa *intifada*, has devastatingly felt the panic of establishing a *de facto* Palestinian state on the East Bank territories. The unemployment rate is accounted for 14% by official records; however it can be close to 20% as given by unofficial sources. Under these circumstances, cross border migration from Iraq could have a devastating effect on Jordan’s vulnerable and dependent economy to absorb new refugees.

Immediately after the war in Iraq, one of the new parties in Iraq, the Royal Democratic Alliance called to form federation between the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and a Hashemite Iraqi rule under the leadership of King Abdullah II.⁴⁴³ Jordan was frustrated by the head of Iraqi Governing Council, Ahmad Chalabi⁴⁴⁴, since he was prosecuted in 1989 for committing \$300m fraud of state funds, including Bank of Petra. Jordanian government then urged Interpol to return Chalabi to stand for trial in Jordan. Jordan’s state prosecutor, Mahmoud Obeidat once said that, “He was condemned by the courts...But how can he serve 22 years if he’s a head of state?. It’s he who will imprison us”.⁴⁴⁵ For that reason, it has become highly questionable to predict Jordan’s relations with the new Iraqi state in the future during Chalabi’s presidency.

Simultaneously, the IAF has become increasingly active in protesting US intervention in Iraq. The prohibition under the pressure of the US and then permitting due to criticisms from Jordanians of Palestinian origin, the assets of Hamas in 2003 led to volatility in country’s politics.⁴⁴⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood which dominates the IAF constitutes the only strong opposition

⁴⁴² Sandler, Neal, Crock, Stan, Brady, Rose, “Why Jordan is Terrified of a US Attack on Iraq”, *Business Week*, September 23, 2002.

⁴⁴³ *EIU Views Wire*, “Jordan Politics: A delicate state of affairs”, October 3, 2003, www.eiu.com (5 October 2005)

⁴⁴⁴ Ahmad Chalabi’s father was the president of Iraqi Senate prior to 1958 coup d’etat and the relations between Jordanian Hashemites had grown during 1980 after Chalabi established the Petra Bank. With the help of Prince Hassan, Chalabi’s Petra Bank improved as the second biggest bank in the Kingdom. The collapse of Petra Bank Chalabi was sentenced for 22 years for absentia.

⁴⁴⁵ *EIU Views Wire*, “Jordan Politics”, October 3, 2003.

⁴⁴⁶ *EIU Views Wire*, “Jordan: Key Developments”, October 3, 2003.

bloc in the Kingdom. The Muslim Brotherhood was highly weak in coordinating throne's relations with Hamas. The *Ikhwan* was not effective in preventing the exclusion of Hamas leaders from the country in 1999. The US found *Ikhwan* distrustful due to its close ties with Hamas (which is enlisted as a terrorist group on the US government's agenda) and Palestinian community in Jordan in spite of Brotherhood's denunciation of September 11 attacks. Therefore, it has turned out to be apparent that the prolonged uncertainty in Iraq would stimulate hostility for US policies in the form of public outcry inside Jordan which will dramatically induce instability figuring out as clash of identities.

Prior to the US military presence in Iraq, King Abdullah both urged the US President that war should be the last resort, despite the Kingdom also did not hold with Saddam Hussein's rule like Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Although Jordanian government denied, the Kingdom has granted the US bases near Iraqi border and airspace facilities with the onset of the war in 2003. One of the driving forces that moved Jordan to act in such a way was a direct result of permitting Israel to take any part during the operation. Moreover, the US has provided \$400m aid for military purposes and an additional \$700m for financial needs by April 2003 as approved by the US Senate.⁴⁴⁷ Apart from Israel, US total aid during this period is among the largest in the region. In fact, the US government has alarmed by the suspicion that al-Qaeda could have bases in Jordan particularly when Lawrence Foley from USAID was assassinated outside his residence in Amman in 2002.

Given the continual US military presence in Jordan's next door, anti-American sentiments and resentment has begun to flourish throughout the country. King Abdullah in response to anti-US popular unrest, appointed Faisal al-Fayez as the prime minister from one of the most contending tribe, Bani Sakhr in October 2003. It was stated that the replacement of Ali Abu al-Ragheb with Fayez was directly associated with the political and economic reformation program. Although Fayez's cabinet was heavily preoccupied with liberal reformists and

⁴⁴⁷ *EIU Views Wire*, "Jordan: International Relations and Defence", November 4, 2003.

also included three women ministers, the inauguration of more than 200 temporary laws which imposed strict political repression has widely created domestic unpopularity.⁴⁴⁸ In addition, Ragheb's three year period as a premier was ineffective in fighting with corruption and unemployment.

In fact, Fayez's appointment signified Kingdom's priority for enacting a new political parties law and a democratic elections law for the forthcoming elections in 2007.⁴⁴⁹ The choice of Bassam Awadallah, a Palestinian-Jordanian, as the Planning and International Cooperation Minister illustrates that the King will have the last say in socioeconomic issues due to Awadallah's Western education and his closeness to King Abdullah. This illustrated that Jordan's economic policy will go hand in hand with the IMF prescriptions⁴⁵⁰ and trade with Iraq occupies a central place in this context. Introducing Socio-economic Transformation Plan was a direct consequence of unemployment. The government was intended to spend extra sources to rebuild health and education sectors as well.⁴⁵¹

Meanwhile, in accordance with the agreement signed between Jordan and Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) the Kingdom announced to train 30,000 Iraqi police by the end of 2003 including the guidance of Iraqi air traffic controllers.⁴⁵² The Iraqi National Council members (INC) had criticized Jordan for the training of Iraqi police staff. Marwan Muasher claimed it was the INC that responsible for the attack on the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad.⁴⁵³ The role of Chalabi as the head of INC and a member of IGC should not be overlooked during this period. Actually the Iraqi people as well were critical of Chalabi and his presidency, because they know very little about him since he was in exile. Jordan then recruited 1,650 Iraqi soldiers in Jordan Military Academy centered at Zarqa

⁴⁴⁸ *EIU Views Wire*, "Jordan: Country Outlook", November 24, 2003.

⁴⁴⁹ *EIU Views Wire*, "Jordan: New PM to push Political Reform", December 5, 2003.

⁴⁵⁰ Jordan finalized a \$119m stand-by agreement in July 2002 and the new government under Fayez leadership was willing to extend the time period with IMF.

⁴⁵¹ *EIU, Views Wire*, "Jordan: Country Outlook", December 5, 2003.

⁴⁵² *EIU, Views Wire*, "Jordan Politics: Walking the Iraqi Tightrope", December 5, 2003.

⁴⁵³ *Ibid.*

province. Besides, Jordanian International Police Training Center announced that 32,000 Iraqi police will be recruited until the end of 2007.⁴⁵⁴

When a public rally led by Islamist groups was crumbled by the security forces in May 2001, the relations between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood (including the IAF) was desperately contented. After he came to power, Fayez decided to resume dialogue with the Islamist deputies of IAF. Fayez and 17 Islamist members met in November to bring the Front and the Islamists back to political landscape. Fayez stressed the need to “provide clear solutions ...to assist the government in overcoming all domestic problems” and he also made an implicit indication that Jordan will not renounce its peace with Israel.⁴⁵⁵ The Opposition Parties’ Higher Coordination Committee participated in the democratic platform in June 2003. Previously, the Committee decided to boycott the polls after the 1997 elections as a reaction for the electoral law amended in favor of East Bank origin Jordanians in 1993.⁴⁵⁶ The melting pot in changing their attitudes was the decision of the largest party of the Committee, the IAF, to run in 2003 elections. The Front was instrumental in the resumption of political dialogue with the government.⁴⁵⁷

It’s central to consider Jordan’s foreign policy toward Iraq within the context of US war on terror strategy as a case study to analyze how identity politics and foreign policy are intertwined. In addition, the threat perceptions caused by external sources necessitates bringing identity politics back to Jordan’s agenda. In addition, in the post-2000 period hundreds of Islamists were arrested on the suspicion that they have links with al-Qaeda. In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks and the US invasion in Iraq, 1,700 people were detained due to their religious beliefs in Jordan.⁴⁵⁸ Jordan’s domestic policy after the US strike

⁴⁵⁴ “More than 1,400 Iraqi Police recruits complete training”, *Jordan Times*, January 14, 2005.

⁴⁵⁵ *EIU*, “Jordan Politics: Olive branch offered to Islamists”, December 5, 2003.

⁴⁵⁶ *JordanTimes*, 30 March 2003.

⁴⁵⁷ For more information about the Organization base of Muslim Brotherhood and IAF, please see: Mansoor Moaddel, Jordanian Exceptionalism: A Comparative analysis of State-Religion Relationships in Egypt, Iran, Jordan and Syria, Palgrave, 2002.

⁴⁵⁸ *Crisis Group Report*, No: 47, op.cit, p. 12.

against Iraq was totally centered on the idea that internal tension and problems are all caused by an outside actor; al-Qaeda. Having identified the 'external' enemy before Jordanian society, the Hashemite Kingdom's pro-US stand was not manifested as the source of domestic unrest.

Within this framework, it's imperative to ask the question how Jordan's identity affects her foreign policy and in what way? Since national identities provide a linkage between collective identity and the state, Jordan's foreign policy serves as a *battlefield* in generating debates on Jordan's identity which can reproduce the relationship between national identity and the state. In this respect, Jordan's foreign policy making demonstrates Jordanian state's identity as well. Given the role and the impact of US war on Iraq, three different outcomes can be deduced from the domestic public debates on Jordan's identity. Since state identity internalized the "public discourse, rituals, shared myths and history and ideas about the purpose of the state"⁴⁵⁹ Jordan's national identity is at odds with the state's identity concerning the US war on Iraq. Therefore public debates on identity in Jordan are centered on three aspects; an identity conflict exists between Jordanian state and Jordanian nation; using identity as a prop by the regime in curbing the opposition; and finally reproducing Jordan's identity by the means of a foreign policy preference; i.e. siding with the US.

After he ascended to the throne King Abdullah has inaugurated repressive temporary laws and restricted the public assembly. The ramifications of al-Aqsa *intifada* have devastatingly affected Jordan's political and socio-economic roadmap for reformation. According to a poll conducted, 80% of Jordanians think they can not publicly criticize the government.⁴⁶⁰ As given by a recent poll conducted, 58% of the respondents thought that they are not free to participate in demonstrations and still they believe that they will be punished if they criticize government policies.⁴⁶¹ The strict control of the media, publications

⁴⁵⁹ Marc Lynch "Jordan..." in Telhami and Barnett (eds), p. 33.

⁴⁶⁰ Marc Lynch, "Jordan: Knives Out for the National Agenda", Arab Reform Bulletin, Vol: 3, Issue: 9, November 2005.

⁴⁶¹ Alia Shukri Hamzah, "Citizens believe level of democracy not improved- CSS poll", *Jordan Times*, 26 July 2006. It should be stated that previously 74.6% of the respondents believed that

and political parties for the most part was conducive in creating an alternative source of opposition for Jordanians. In addition, 11% of the respondents indicated that the US has not interest in Jordan “becoming a democratic state”. Finally, the poll demonstrates that patronage in Jordan has not been destroyed in the eyes of the public since 71.2% of Jordanians believe that parliamentarians do not interested in public needs, but rather prioritize their personal and familial ties. Although there are 31 registered political parties in Jordan, but with the exception of the IAF, all the others do not have an organizational base and completely lack popularity. The absence of socio-cultural and political platform to assemble, deliberate domestic issues and to criticize government policies, people express and debate their dissatisfactions and criticisms through preaching in the mosques. Thus the mosques have become public gathering and debating centers in Jordan.

6.5.1 A Smooth Re-orientation: Political re-opening and 2003 Elections

Liberalizing the political landscape was on the agenda of King Abdullah after 1999, but regional parameters which have dominated external relations led to the postponement of democratic opening. Previously regime’s response to regional instabilities was the introduction of ‘Jordan First Campaign’ to alleviate the division within Jordanian society between Islamists and nationalists; Palestinians and Jordanians; and urban areas and rural areas. However the *arrested* democratic opening after the al-Aqsa *intifada* was considered as an escape from both Arabist and Islamic concerns in favor of internal stability. For Scott Greenwood, the delay in holding elections and manipulation of the election law was a direct consequence of the policy of assuring business elite and liberalization program.⁴⁶²

By September, the government proclaimed that elections would not be held for more than one year as a result of regional unsteadiness. According to Schirin

they could not criticize the government policies in public due to fear of punishment. In fact, there is a drop in Jordanians’ perceptions of fear in this respect today.

⁴⁶² Scott Greenwood, “Jordan’s New Bargain: The Political Economy of Regime Security”, op.cit.

Fathi, like other rationalist authors, Jordan has opted for postponing the elections unequivocally for security reasons.⁴⁶³ She argues that election laws are formulated as fundamental tools in sustaining Jordan's regime-survival. King Abdullah's statements in August 2002 concerning the postponement of coming elections reveal the regime's unwillingness to run the polls.⁴⁶⁴

Likewise, for Greenwood it would be difficult for Jordan to curb the opposition parties during American strike against Iraq in the aftermath of 9/11. If Jordan has allowed the running of parliamentary elections, it would carry risks for the US-Jordanian relations in time of US war on terror.⁴⁶⁵ Looked from another thematic framework, the Kingdom chose the way for not jeopardizing Jordan's embedded interests and identity. However, if the Kingdom was reluctant to hold the national elections in 2002 due to simply security reasons, it would also carry risk to run the polls next year at a moment when the war in Iraq is erupted.

Nevertheless the Islamist groups and the oppositionary parties they all joined the campaign to boycott the 1997 national elections and demanded a reform program for further democratization, the Muslim Brotherhood announced their willingness with the IAF to participate in 2003 national elections. The IAF publicly stated that they ended their boycott with a justification of preserving national interest under regional circumstances.⁴⁶⁶ The IAF having the largest membership base in country noticed possible American strike against Iraq and the plight situation in Palestinian territories. Abdul Latif Arabiyyat said that "We hope our decision to rescind the boycott will be appreciated and looked at positively by the other side [government]"⁴⁶⁷. Immediately after the decision

⁴⁶³ Schirin Fathi, "Jordanian Survival Strategy: The Election Law as a 'Safety Valve'", *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol: 41, No: 6, November 2005, pp: 893-894.

⁴⁶⁴ King Abdullah stated in August 2002 that, 'the difficult regional circumstances dictate that we postpone the elections, even if for a while, although we sincerely wish for different circumstances that would enable us to conduct elections on time'. *Jordan Times*, 16-17 August 2002.

⁴⁶⁵ Greenwood, "Jordan, al-Aqsa *intifada* and ...", Fall 2003, p. 98.

⁴⁶⁶ *Jordan Times*, 27 April 2003.

⁴⁶⁷ *Jordan Times*, 27 April, 2003.

made by the Front, the *Ikhwan* proclaimed that they are ready to join the upcoming polls which ended Brotherhood's six years electoral boycott.⁴⁶⁸

Brotherhood's *Shura* (Consultative) Council of fifty members issued a statement made available to daily *Jordan Times* which urged the Jordanian citizens to contribute Jordan's political opening. The participation of the *Ikhwan* will be associated with its political wing, the IAF. Actually the decision of the *Ikhwan* was not an unexpected incident since they want to re-store their political weight in the legislature. The first signal of their reinvigoration in party politics was the visit of Abdul Majid Thneibat, head of the Brotherhood, made to the King a week ago. Meanwhile the IAF stated that it's vital to sustain the national interest during regional instabilities enrolled by the Middle East.

The political assessment made by the Front was very critical in the sense that the traditional close relations between the government and Islamists began to re-appear.⁴⁶⁹ Following the Islamic Centrist Party's decision to participate in the polls, all other parties having hesitation whether to join or not began to work on their candidate lists. Therefore the Opposition Parties Higher Coordination Committee determined to run in the coming polls without having a shared list of candidates. The Committee spokesperson, Saeed Thiab, said their activities will be coordinated.⁴⁷⁰ It's important to notice at this point that for many observers the IAF was ready a year before having finalized their list of candidates. One reason for their interest in the elections is the demand for public support to regain political power in the eyes of the government similar to 1989 and 1993 elections. Meanwhile, the Democratic Reform Coalition, a new party prepared for coming polls, assembled members from both centrists and leftist groups.

⁴⁶⁸ By Alia Shukru Hamzah, *JordanTimes*, 29 April 2003.

⁴⁶⁹ In January 2006, the IAF re-called the government to resume the dialogue on democratic elections law. The head of *Ikhwan's* Shura Council, Abdul Latif Arabiyyat has noticed the unequal representation of the constituencies and said that "the new law must also pave the way for the creation of a Parliament capable of guiding, monitoring and questioning the government". See: Mohammed Ben Hussein, "IAF calls for democratic elections law", *Jordan Times*, 24 January 2006.

⁴⁷⁰ *Jordan Times*, 29 April 2003.

In April, King Abdullah met with Tony Blair in London to discuss Middle East issues, Palestine and Iraq in particular. King's messages included the priority of an independent Palestine before dealing with Iraq in achieving peace in Middle East.⁴⁷¹ Since the government took all the necessary measures to run elections in June, King's statement made in London was appealing to his citizens as well. The prime-minister Ali Abul Ragheb indicated two items for elections; increase job opportunities and living conditions as the major problems to be solved in the country. He also said that there is no ban on exports to Iraq.⁴⁷²

Before holding elections, King's statements related with Iraqi war should be notified. A representative of Iraqi Sunni community, Ahmad Al-Qobeissi, said that a Hashemite leadership would be the only solution to re-store stability in Iraq and this judgment is shared by most of the Sunnis and Shiites in the country. The minister of State for Political Affairs Muhammad Adwan's remark was to take free Iraqi people into account and consider that they are the only people to choose any leadership they want to have.⁴⁷³ Just before the elections King's statements related with Iraqi war needs to be countered, "... winning the war is not as important as winning the peace. I hope the Americans have planned and worked for peace in Iraq". Abdullah characterizes the parliamentary elections as a new beginning for Jordanians.

For some Jordanians, political liberalization and re-conveying of the Parliament is indispensable to combat violence and public discontent in the country. Marwan Muasher, an exponent of political re-opening, was concerned with in bridging ties and trust between the state and the society. Ahmed Obeidat, former prime-minister and current director of National Centre for Human Rights, is also vigorously backing democratization in Jordan to cope with regional instabilities for the most part. In this respect, war on Iraq might foster the trend toward democratization rather than back pedaling. Jordan's collective identity thus

⁴⁷¹ *Petra News Agency*, 25 April 2003.

⁴⁷² *Petra News Agency*, 30 May 2003.

⁴⁷³ *JordanTimes*, 28 May 2003.

could be employed as a “prop” to consolidate national unity through re-conveying *Majlis al-Nuwwab*.

Between 1989 and 1993 Jordan has achieved a certain degree of political pluralism.⁴⁷⁴ The growing political power of Islamists in the parliament has alarmed the Hashemites particularly with 1989 elections when the Islamists including the Muslim Brotherhood won 40% of the seats and the opposition parties collectively dominated the parliament with 60% of the deputies. Signing of the peace treaty with Israel however has led the regime to take pre-emptive measures to decrease the anti-peace demonstrations. The first step was to amend the electoral law in 1993 which brought one-person-one-vote formula. The current electoral law amended in 2001 preserves the same formula which favors rural centers largely populated by the East Bank Jordanians.

The 2003 elections constitute the first election in which six seats were allocated only to the women candidates. There were 801 including 55 women candidates standing for the elections. Among the 110 MPs nine seats were allotted to Christian and three seats for Circassian and Chechen minorities. Independent candidates, who represent the major tribes in the country and constitute the main source of regime loyalists, took the two thirds of the seats in the Parliament.⁴⁷⁵ Most of the Palestinian descent living in the country vote either for IAF or independent Islamist candidates. The result was 62 out of 110 seats captured by pro-regime loyalists and 17 candidates (out of 30) of the IAF elected to the legislature including Hayat Al Massimi who acquired the first seat under women’s quota. The turn outs in the urban areas of the country remained low in favor of rural areas where the pro-regime tribal candidates are elected.⁴⁷⁶ For instance, the Central Badia area is predominantly populated by Bani Shaker tribe and possesses 32,457 voters and 19 different candidates were contested in the polls. In all districts of whole Badia, (northern, southern and central) three

⁴⁷⁴ For a critical point of view: See; Andrew Shryock, “Dynastic Modernism and Its Contradictions: Testing the Limits of Pluralism, Tribalism, and King Hussein’s Example in Hashemite Jordan”, *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol: 22, Issue: 3, Summer 2000.

⁴⁷⁵ BBC News, 19 June 2003.

⁴⁷⁶ By Khalid Dalal, “Voters say politics less important than tribe”, *Jordan Times*, 18 June 2003.

tribal deputies will represent the area. On the contrary, Amman's seven districts primarily composed of Palestinian descents and center for financial and political affairs, the turn out were low due to the lack of concern.⁴⁷⁷ Most of the women candidates who were the favorites were the members of the IAF in Amman districts. However, only one of them won seat in the Parliament. Three out of six seats were elected from the southern provinces, Karak, Tafila and Madaba. Nevertheless none of the 30 registered political parties boycotted the elections the Parliament is composed primarily by independents.

King Abdullah's remarks in the day after elections was very positive and stressed one vital point for Jordan's collective identity; 'the new Parliament will turn Jordan into a model of democracy for the Arab region'⁴⁷⁸. Likewise Ragheb asserted that the Parliament will serve as a venue for all Jordanian political parties including the opposition at a moment when Jordan requires *nation-wide collaboration* for securing her interests.⁴⁷⁹ The governmental officials and the King were also convinced by the performance of the Brotherhood and the Front members.

Jordan's democratic and fair election was evaluated by Secretary of Palestinian Legislative Council Mohammad Subeih as 'Jordanian democracy is a clear answer to Israel's claim that it is the only democracy in the region' and especially appreciating quota provided for women deputies.⁴⁸⁰ King Abdullah reminded Jordan's critical stance in the 1991 Gulf Crisis and intended to disassociate his country from the situation in Iraq. Since there existed speculations about the Hashemite Option for soon to be created state of Iraq just before the war, Abdullah moved toward the way to nationalize and demarcate Jordan's position as a response to these skepticisms via holding the elections. It could be relevant to argue that re-liberalization effort of Jordan is more than a

⁴⁷⁷ By Francesca Sawadlha and Sahar Aloul, "Turnout in capital spells apathy", *JordanTimes*, 18 June 2003.

⁴⁷⁸ *Petra News Agency*, 18 June 2003.

⁴⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸⁰ *Petra News Agency*, 18 June 2003.

regime survival tactic, but return to democratization re-vitalizes Jordan's identity in time of a regional crisis. In this respect, an active-neutral foreign policy making of the Kingdom was complementing with its corporate identity at home. Yet the opposition, public opinion and the regime agree on the national identity their expectations from that particular identity and norms could vary from one another.

The Iraqi crisis denotes a symbol for different groups in the Kingdom, but revealed contestations and campaigns among Jordanian regime and the citizenry. Given the war on Iraq was a common concern for all; Jordan opted to act with her national identity rather than articulating an Arabist sentiment. Putting emphasis on *watani* agenda and campaigns by the Hashemite rule, the *Jordan Option* is attempted to demarcate and institutionalize a collective identity that embraces mostly the East Bank Jordanians. Jordan's identity was employed as a prop to make the *unthinkable* imaginable through holding national elections, but with a safety valve; the electoral law amended in 2001.

As Ryan and Schwedler indicated, Jordanian democracy is a quintessential model for "a new sort of hybrid, one in which the regime continues to proclaim its commitment to democratization while elected parliaments are made increasingly irrelevant to governance and political freedoms are harshly constrained".⁴⁸¹ The shortcomings in Jordan's political opening should not be attributed solely to regional unsteadiness; but also Jordan's ineffective nascent democracy are rooted in its demographic structure not comprising Palestinians politically, one-person-one-vote electoral formula, and overwhelming influence of tribalism instead of party affiliations.

The lack of *cohabitation* of East and West Bank Jordanians still occupy a central place in the national politics. The reason behind the shortcoming in electoral districting is the under-representation of the urban areas on the side of rural areas. Since the electoral districting formula is not determined on the basis of

⁴⁸¹ Curtis Ryan & Jillian Schwedler, "Return to Democratization or New Hybrid Regime?: The 2003 Elections in Jordan", *Middle East Policy*, Vol: XI, No: 2, Summer 2004, p.140.

population size, large industrial centers having densely populated by Palestinian-Jordanians like Amman and Zarqa are deprived of adequate parliamentary seats at the Lower Chamber. For instance, Amman and Zarqa, representing 54% of Jordanian population, has provided only 32% of the total seats by the 2001 electoral law.⁴⁸² The rural centers like Mafraq, Karak, Tafila and Maan representing 12% of the population are given 21% of the seats. The figures clearly illustrate that the political arena is primarily under the influence of East Bankers where tribal and royal affiliations override and bypass Palestinians-Islamist-leftist lines. In this manner, the parliament elected in 2003 is largely dominated by *Trans-Jordanian* Hashemite loyalists.

6.5.2 Jordan's 11/9: Amman Bombings and Jordan's 'Security First, Jordan Second' Approach

The triple suicide bombings in Amman on 9 November 2005 were central in the reshuffling of cabinet in Jordan. A coordinated terrorist attacks on the Grant Hyatt, the Radisson and the Days Inn Hotels left 67 people dead and more than 150 wounded. It was allegedly claimed that it was Abu Musab al-Zarqawi who organized suicide bombings.⁴⁸³ It was already conceived that Zarqawi has close ties with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and fights against the US presence on Iraqi territories. Jordanians were previously alerted by the missiles fired at US naval ships in Aqaba on 19 August 2005.⁴⁸⁴ The Abdullah Azzam Brigades (said to have connection with al-Qaeda) claimed the responsibility although it was not clearly verified by official sources. The security forces detained 17 people linked to al-Qaeda in Iraq in August, but the Jordanian *mukhabarat* could not prevent the attacks in Aqaba and subsequent bombings in its capital.⁴⁸⁵ Nevertheless, the *mukhabarat* has perceived al-Qaeda as a threat to US presence

⁴⁸² "The Challenge of Political Reform: Jordanian Democratization and Regional Instability", *International Crisis Group - Middle East Briefing*, 8 October 2003, p. 17.

⁴⁸³ EIU, "Jordan Politics: Caught in the Middle, as usual", November 11, 2005.

⁴⁸⁴ EIU, "Jordan Politics: Missiles fired at US naval ships in Jordan", August 19, 2005.

⁴⁸⁵ Fatih Şen, "Ürdün 2005", in Kemal İnat and Ali Balcı (eds), *Ortadoğu Yıllığı*, Nobel Yayın Dağıtım, Ankara, 2006, p. 256.

in the region; the security forces could not stop the attacks on region's long standing security centre, i.e. Kingdom of Jordan.

The Amman bombings led to create tension between Iraqi residences and Jordanians in the country. There are 400,000 Iraqis living in Jordan who think that Jordan is their second homeland.⁴⁸⁶ Since many Iraqi wealthy families moved to Amman after US invasion, Jordanians has begun to think that the rise in prices (particularly real estate), cost of living and increasing in unemployment are all sourced from new migrations from Iraq. In addition Zarqawi's connection with the resistance groups in Iraq led the Iraqis to fear from any attack to their properties and jobs. In Jordan, both Jordanians and Palestinians have mostly share the belief that "Iraqis are buying Amman".⁴⁸⁷ The enlargement of the 'Jordan First' motto expressing the idea of "we are all Jordan" denotes a clear reference to Jordanians. To what extent "we" embraces the *other Arabs*, precisely the Iraqis, is a question mark. Therefore the bombings can precipitate the tension between Jordanians and Iraqis as well.

The assessment of Toujan Faisal, former Circassian member of the parliament, regarding the bombings in Amman plainly illustrates the role of regional and systemic constraints and forces on Jordan's domestic policy-making. Faisal said, "Everybody condemned the bombings, but I condemned the *causes* of the bombings".⁴⁸⁸ Jordan's policy throughout the Iraqi war was perceived as the main source of the bombings by the Kingdom as well. For that purpose, Adnan Badran government was highly criticized and replaced by Marouf al-Bakhit on 24 November.

Jordan's relations with Israel have improved by the beginning of 2005 when Jordanian government decided to send ambassador to Tel Aviv after four years on 16 February.⁴⁸⁹ Jordan recalled her ambassador to Israel in 2000 with the

⁴⁸⁶ "Ürdün-Irak İlişkileri Sınavdan Geçiyor", *Dünya Gündemi*, 20-27 Kasım 2005.

⁴⁸⁷ Ingrid McDonald, "The War Next Door?", *American Scholar*, Vol: 75, Issue: 2, Spring 2006.

⁴⁸⁸ Interview with Toujan Faisal, Amman, 20 June 2006. The emphasis added.

⁴⁸⁹ Fatih Şen, "Ürdün 2005", p. 248.

onset of al-Aqsa *intifada* on the West Bank territories. In a summit meeting between Mahmoud Abbas and Ariel Sharon at Sharm al-Sheikh, both Husni Mubarak and King Abdullah took the initiative to re-build diplomatic relations with the Israeli state. Marouf al-Bakhit was then sent to Tel Aviv. Jordan's relations with the Arab world were extremely affected as a result of affinity with Tel Aviv and led Lebanon, Syria and Sudan to censure King Abdullah and his policies. The King then did not attend to the Arab League Summit and sent a lower level diplomat to represent Jordan.

On the other side, relations with Iraq have become worsen when a suicide bombing killed 125 people in Hille in the south of Baghdad. Since the Iraqis were informed that the attack was organized by a Jordanian, the protest targeted Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad. Jordanian government recalled its diplomat to Jordan and as a response Iraq called its ambassador back to Baghdad as well. However the tension was minimized after King Abdullah's statement to send Jordanian diplomat back to Baghdad on 22 March. The official visit by Jalal Talabani, Iraqi President, to Jordan on 7 May has revitalized the relations between two neighbors. The prime minister, Adnan Badran and Foreign Minister Farouk Kasravi visited Iraq in September to declare Hashemites' support for the Iraqi state. Badran also stated that Jordan's visit stands for manifesting Arab presence that was paused just because of security reasons. Adnan Badran is the first Arab senior official who paid a visit to Baghdad after US invasion. More importantly, Badran's visit represents a stepping stone for US efforts to legitimate and justify the new regime in Iraq.

6.5.3 Encircling Islamist Activism and Internal Opposition in the aftermath of the Amman Attacks: The National Agenda and "We are All Jordan" Commission

The Muslim Brotherhood and the IAF are among the first to organize an anti-al-Qaeda rallies in the country. However the Islamists, the IAF in particular, were kept out the government reshuffle. The new cabinet led by Marouf al-Bakhit, former ambassador to Israel and former chair of security services, was

profoundly concerned with internal security. The new government began to work hand in hand with the regime loyalists like Abdul Hadi al-Majali as the speaker of the Lower House and Zayd al-Rifai, a former prime minister as the speaker of the Upper House. Bakhit government has charged with containment of the Islamic activism in Jordan. For instance the accusation of the IAF leader Jamil Abu Bakr, “harming the dignity of the state” after his publication criticizing government policies was a clear manifestation of regime’s new policy of strict surveillance over the Islamists.⁴⁹⁰

In February 2005, several members of the IAF arrested due to their speeches in mosques. Then in March, Minister of Interior, Samir Habashneh inaugurated a draft law restricting the activities of the professional associations. The draft law is aimed to circumscribe the political activities of mostly the Islamist organizations. In addition, making political activities in mosques were outlawed by a political parties law. According to Abdul Latif Arabiyyat, former speaker of the Lower Chamber and member of the IAF, “Nasser’s crackdown in Egypt led to greater resistance. People left the Muslim Brotherhood and formed *Al-Takfir wa al-Hijra*. We fear that this could happen here. The IAF and its branches are working to explain that cooperation is the way, not radicalism”.⁴⁹¹ As Adnan Abu Odeh pointed out, if the government cracks down the Muslim Brotherhood, the reaction will be more violent.⁴⁹² In other words, if the *Ikhwan* has become to be identical with the militant *Salafis* this would be Brotherhood’s end.

In addition, Hamas’ victory in January elections in Palestine has emboldened the status of the IAF’s on the one hand and brought debates on taking substantial part in the cabinet on the other. Although the Front has a successful history in parliamentary elections since 1993, the electoral law is highly impeded and restricted the potential majority of the Front in the legislature. For the IAF

⁴⁹⁰ Curtis R. Ryan, “Jordan: Islamic Action Front Presses for Role in Governing”, *Arab Reform Bulletin*, Vol: 4, Issue: 3, April 2006.

⁴⁹¹ International Crisis Group Interview with Dr. Arabiyyat in March 2005 taken from Crisis Group Report, No: 47, op.cit., p. 15.

⁴⁹² An interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 23 June 2006, Amman.

members, if the electoral law is formulated on the basis of *proportional* representation their political weight will reach 40 to 50% of the total seats in the Lower Chamber. In this respect, the growing demands of the IAF will foster the government to take some pre-emptive measures to control and even preclude the overrepresentation of the Islamists and Palestinians in national politics.

The inauguration of the National Agenda was a direct response to growing domestic opposition and external instabilities precisely posed by the sectarian conflict in Iraq. Previously the outbreak of al-Aqsa *intifada* has overshadowed the political reformation process in the country. King Abdullah having confronted by the regional unsteadiness and internal frustration opted to institutionalize and enlarge the scope of the ‘Jordan First Campaign’ through forming a Committee on National Agenda in February 2005. The King authorized Marwan Muasher as the head of the Committee and has charged Adnan Badran government to work on socio-economic and political reformation. King Abdullah’s national policy is centered on a comprehensive reform program on education, infrastructure, employment (creating 600,000 jobs), social welfare, finance, judiciary, investment, and above all political development. The National Agenda is structured to achieve these ends within a 10 year time period. One of the most controversial issues is the amendment of the political parties and electoral law. However it has become highly questionable to what extent the Agenda would provide a national consensus in building a collective identity. The nationalist bloc in the Kingdom fear that a change in the state’s identity could foster Palestinians to gain sizeable political support that would threaten the traditional political and economic power of the East Bank elite.⁴⁹³

King Abdullah set up the “We are All Jordan” Commission in July 2006 as a measure to build national consensus and cope with domestic and external unrest derived from anti-Americanism embedded in Arab public opinion. The Commission was decided to embrace cabinet members, senators, deputies,

⁴⁹³ Marc Lynch, “Jordan: Knives out for the National Agenda”, op.cit.

political parties and media and civil society representatives to work for six major topics; the Palestine issue, political reform, external challenges, enhancing the internal front, economic reform and social security.⁴⁹⁴ The King underlined the necessity for political reform to maintain national unity and enhancing “the concept of Jordan as a country that reflects the moderate, mainstream Islam and believes in peace, coexistence, tolerance and intellectual and political pluralism”.⁴⁹⁵ In order to contend with designated goals, the King urged the ‘We are All Jordan’ Commission members to reinforce enacting draft laws including anti-terror law and laws that regulate mosque preaching and *iftaa*.

In this regard, the domestic threat perceived by Jordanian regime is profoundly related to the future dialogue with the Islamists in the country. The area of cooperation between the state and the IAF, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, has become doubtful when four IAF delegates visited Zarqawi’s funeral house in Zarqa after his death for condolence. The Jordanian Senate President called on the Front to “question the deputies for their criminal act” in June 2006.⁴⁹⁶ Muhammad Abu Fares (Amman Fifth District), Ali Abdul Sukkar (Zarqa Second District), Ibrahim Mashoukhi (Zarqa First District), and Jaafar Hourani (Zarqa Fourth District) arrested on 11 June and detained for 15 days at Al Jafer prison.⁴⁹⁷ Ali Sukkar said that “We did not go to make a political stand. It is our duty to support Zarqawi’s family at this time”.⁴⁹⁸ Prime-minister Bakhit emphasized that the state is not targeting the IAF, but rather charging those who ‘inciting violence’ in Jordan. Simultaneously, the speaker of the Lower Chamber Abdul Hadi al-Majali, a Jordanian nationalist, underlined that the majority of the Chamber want an apology from the Front. However the Secretary General of the IAF, Zaki Bani Rusheid said they will not apologize for their condolence to Zarqawi’s family. In addition, Abu Fares’ expression of

⁴⁹⁴ “National Consensus established on key issues – King”, *Jordan Times*, 28-29 July, 2006.

⁴⁹⁵ *Ibid*.

⁴⁹⁶ “4 IAF deputies detained for inciting violence”, *Jordan Times*, 12 June 2006.

⁴⁹⁷ “IAF criticizes ‘attempt to cast doubt on their allegiance to the country’”, *Jordan Times*, July 4, 2006.

⁴⁹⁸ *Ibid*.

‘Zarqawi as a martyr, while Amman bombing victims not’ has increased the tension between the state and the Front.⁴⁹⁹ The State Security Court then declared that deputies are not guilty of fuelling national discord and inciting sectarianism and should be released.

Given that the two IAF deputies, Abu Fares and Abul Sukkar, lost their membership in the legislature, the head of 15 member-IAF bloc in the Lower Chamber, Azzam Hneidi (from Amman, First District) aimed to draw attention to the future status of the two IAF deputies.⁵⁰⁰ Hneidi said that, “The Constitution clearly says only nonpolitical offenders are barred from being members of Parliament, but their [Abu Fares and Abul Sukkar] crime is political.” However, the speaker of the Lower Chamber, Abul Hadi al-Majali did not set the call of Hneidi as an agenda for the parliamentary discussions. Hneidi stated that the IAF bloc collected more than 20 signatures and will insist on their call to end the expulsion of the deputies.⁵⁰¹

Having confronted by the four IAF deputies, the conservative members of the parliament recommended draft laws to the parliamentary committees including anti-terrorism law. The IAF speaker, Nidal Abbadi, also made a counter speech saying “anti-terrorism law would turn Jordan into a police state”.⁵⁰² The anti-terrorism law passed in May 2006 authorizing security forces to monitor suspects under strict control and detain them for two weeks period which can also be renewed by court’s decision.⁵⁰³ The opposition bloc in Jordan, including the *loyal* opposition Muslim Brotherhood, the IAF and professional associations criticized the law and characterized the situation as converting Jordan into a police state to combat the US war on terrorism.

⁴⁹⁹ Rana Hussein, “Prosecution urges court to convict IAF deputies”, *Jordan Times*, August 1, 2006.

⁵⁰⁰ “King opens Parliament today”, *Jordan Times*, 28 November 2006.

⁵⁰¹ “Lower House to finalize committees, press ahead with political reform bills”, *Jordan Times*, 4 December 2006.

⁵⁰² Muhammad Ben Hussein, “Extraordinary session overshadowed by Islamist issue”, *Jordan Times*, August 17, 2006.

⁵⁰³ “Jordan: Government approves anti-terrorism law”, *Arab Reform Bulletin*, June 2006. Under the current law, the suspects can be detained for 24 hours before court’s order.

In re-building close ties with the *Ikhwan* and the IAF, the Government Spokesperson Nasser Judeh announced in August, “In Jordan, it’s [the Muslim Brotherhood] a peaceful organization that believes in lawful action, rejects violence and terrorism, and is keen on domestic peace and dialogue”.⁵⁰⁴ Judeh’s statement was made in a very critical moment, and it was actually a response to Russia’s terror report which listed Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization with al-Qaeda and Taliban. The government’s reaffirmation that the Brotherhood is ‘a legitimate movement’ and works within the parameters of the Jordanian Constitution illustrate the regime’s policy to *contain* and *co-opt* the Islamist groups in the country. In addition, government’s clear expression of the legitimate status of the Brotherhood embodies the fact that its political arm, the IAF, is the legitimate opposition bloc in Jordan. In this respect, King Abdullah’s frequent calls for national unity to follow political and economic reforms then necessitate the support of IAF delegates in the Lower Chamber.⁵⁰⁵

The relations between the IAF and the regime have become highly tensed when the government attempted to expand its monitor over mosque preachers. In September the Lower Chamber ratified the draft *iftaa* law (Islamic verdicts). The *iftaa* law makes written approval from the minister of religious affairs necessary for new mosque preachers.⁵⁰⁶ The new law also imposes one month in prison and a fine of 142\$ for those who violate the legislation. In addition, government’s policy of reducing the space for political activities of the Islamists is continued with allowing only the state-appointed councils to publicize *fatwas* (religious edicts). The IAF delegates all tried to block the legislation in the parliament on the grounds that it highly limits people’s religious freedoms and beliefs.

⁵⁰⁴ “Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan Legitimate – Government”, *Jordan Times*, 25-26 August 2006.

⁵⁰⁵ “King stresses need for governmental unity to implement recommendations”, *Jordan Times*, August 15, 2006.

⁵⁰⁶ “Jordan: King pardons MPs; Parliament approves Laws”, *Arab Reform Bulletin*, Vol: 4, Issue: 8, October 2006.

6.6 Concluding Remarks:

The US war in Iraq illustrated that Jordanian monarchy attempted to inhibit the causes of the domestic unrest while exaggerating the impact of external challenges occurring Jordan's eastern and western borders. The regime initially had the perception that as long as they put external sources on Jordan's agenda, this can help the monarchy to persuade its followers in building close cooperation with the US war on terror campaign. On the other hand, the war in Iraq clearly demonstrates to what extent the Kingdom necessitates to use domestic sources in overcoming external predicaments.

Setting the National Agenda for political, economic and social reformation has been the primary concern for the regime in contending with the repercussions of the al-Aqsa *intifada* and the US war in Iraq. King Abdullah urged the necessity to build national unity via emphasizing ethnic kin to divert supra-state Arabist and Islamist tendencies away from Jordanian loyalties during Iraqi crisis. In reconstructing Jordanian *watani* ideals and preferences, the Kingdom aimed to strengthen the idea that the Hashemite Kingdom represents a peaceful, moderate Islamic society with political pluralism as its indispensable ingredient. However, the regime is highly confronted by the growing popular support for the *Salafi* Islamists. Although its birthplace is a Palestinian-dominated city of Zarqa, the rise of *Salafism* is a new phenomenon challenging the monarchy when the riots in the southern province of Maan are taken into account.

The Iraqi war once again made it clear that the Kingdom is vulnerable in coping with economic problems and call for more democratic opening. In fact the monarchy is reluctant in liberalizing political landscape, the external crises are given as the major excuses of why democratization is not moving forward. Furthermore, the regime urged the necessity to handle the sectarian and religious conflict in Iraq via mobilizing Jordanian *watani* sentiments as a response to increased domestic unrest. The inauguration of 'We are All Jordan' Commission under the National Agenda as a response to domestic opposition elucidates that

the scope and content of 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' is enlarged to encompass all those putting 'Jordan First' into practice, and *not* the others.

The Iraqi case is also an evidence for explaining Jordanian *continuous* shift from *qawmi* to *watani* ideals. Thus the war in Iraq serves as a catalyst in producing debates on national identity in Jordan and suggests that Jordanian identity is still in *constant* reformation.

CHAPTER 7:

CONCLUSIONS

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, created as a part of the post-war settlement in 1921, was considered as the most artificial among the states in the Fertile Crescent. The weakness of loyalty to the land of Jordan and territorial re-demarcations reveal the fact that the Emirate of Transjordan was created before the evolution of the notion of Jordanians. Since Jordan was not the ancestral land of Emir Abdullah, the establishment of Jordan under the Hashemite monarchy placed the country at the core of discussions on identity and nation-building. Besides, the presence of a huge Palestinian community in the Kingdom and the non-settlement of the Palestine-Israeli dispute are the major factors determining as well as impeding the making of a Jordanian identity.

The huge influx of Palestinians into the borders of Jordan after the Arab-Israeli wars comprises the main sources of socio-economic and political insecurity and imbalances persisting in the country. The ethnic division between the Palestinians (West Bankers) and the Transjordanians (East Bankers) has been the focal point in formulating Jordan's politics of identity since the incorporation of the West Bank with the Jordanian territories in 1950. Although the Kingdom often asserted the *indivisibility* of the two Banks (until 1988) and emphasized its claim on representing Palestinian-Jordanians, the division between the demographic majority of Palestinians and the minority of the *Bedouins* has constituted one of the most prominent sources of domestic instability in the country for almost five decades.

Given its geographical location and demographic imbalance, Jordan has been strongly influenced and frustrated by the developments in Middle Eastern affairs. Jordanian identity and foreign policy have been shaped and is still being

transformed by internal and external forces. Jordan has undergone a series of transitions in its identity formation and foreign policy goals during the course of the 1990s. The melting pot in Jordan's political transition began with her disengagement with the Palestinian territories, precisely the West Bank, in 1988. The shift in the Kingdom's interests and ideals towards a more territorial affiliation has ostensibly manifested itself in her shift regarding identity and foreign policy preferences. In the post-1988 era, Jordan attempted to *statinize* supranational and sub-state identities to build a territorial loyalty to the land of Jordan that would be relatively in parallel with her foreign policy behavior.

Jordan's peace making with Israel in 1994 which was *unthinkable* and *unimaginable* for a country having Palestinian demographic majority was ultimately finalized and justified. The adjustment in the content and the conception of Jordan's identity was central in making the *unthinkable* imaginable. The Jordanian regime's increasing efforts to generate *Jordanized* Jordan is mainly attributed to the exigencies of the regional constraints and mostly dependent on Western economic aid. Therefore galvanizing territorial-state formation, detached from Arabist discourse, will help Jordan in reducing her reliance on the non-settlement of the Palestine question and the sectarian conflict in Iraq.

The emphasis on Arab and Islamic identities had a devastating impact on Jordan's interests in pursuing its foreign policy choices. Jordan often employed Arabist norms and values in achieving its material interests especially when Jordanian public interest was in conflict with the state's preferences. Therefore, the Jordanian example illustrates that the main reason for identity conflict stems from the *imbalance* and the *dilemma* between regional realities and the Arab and Islamic identities embedded in the Jordanian nation's expectations. Given that supranational and parochial identities are significant in the procurement of the state's legitimacy at a domestic level; the high value put on the relations between the West and Israel in the post-Cold War era can easily turn into competing identities. This is, in fact, endemic in many societies of the Middle East. In this respect, the relationship between Jordanian identity and foreign

policy represents a clash of interests between the regime and the society. The onset of al-Aqsa *intifada* by 2000 and the US war in Iraq in 2003 clearly demonstrated that the Kingdom of Jordan attempted to overcome two external challenges through consolidating her national identity at home.

The constructivist theory offers a theoretical relationship in linking states' identities with their foreign policy-making. Since identities are shaped and constructed socially by interaction and structures that actors are embedded in, one of the major factors formulating states' identities is the external disturbances and dynamics. In this regard, one of the most prominent types of relationship between identity and foreign policy occurs when there is 'identity conflict' during a regional or international crisis. Thus, identity dilemma occurs when the *divergent* expectations of people call for competing foreign policy behaviors. This type of a relationship characterizes the contradiction in Jordan's identity and debate regarding normalization of relations with Israel, the outbreak of al-Aqsa *intifada*, the Israeli Gaza withdrawal, and finally the US war in Iraq.

Under the impact of regional events, the Jordanian State's interests and material needs often show discrepancy from the expectations of Jordanian public at large. The fundamental reason for the *gap* between state's interests and people's preferences is heavily derived from the Arabist, Palestinian and Islamic identities that historically, culturally and socially constructed Jordanian identity for a long period of time. Given the weakness of loyalty to territorial states in the region, the supranational and sub-state sectarian affiliations frequently spill over the transparent borders of the Middle East states and determine and in most cases negate each Arab state's policy-making. For instance, during the 1950s, the Ba'ath Party was more influential in Jordan than it was in its birth place, Syria.

The case of the al-Aqsa *intifada* demonstrated that developments occurring in regional structure vigorously re-produce debates on Jordanian identity and on the whole generate new conceptions of norms and limitations. At this point, one of the major implications of al-Aqsa *intifada* on Jordanian identity formation

was the transformation of the political opposition. The East Bankers, native Jordanians, were an indispensable part of the internal unrest in the Kingdom which became apparent by the riots in Maan. This is a new phenomenon in which the traditional stronghold of the monarchy has become a source of contention. The Maani episode represents a new embodiment in support of *Salafi* Islamists in the rural centers and also reveals the unexpected decrease in the role of the monarchy as patronage in the minds of Transjordanians.

The incorporation of the East Bankers in producing domestic unrest particularly with the peace with Israel showed that the trend toward democratization has strengthened many groups in the Kingdom. The Kingdom handled the growing economic recession in the country through the democratic opening and the convening of the Parliament in 1989. The peace process initiated by the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 then coincided with the political reformation and led the peace opponents to gain potency in resisting normalization with Israel. The anti-normalizers comprise not only of Palestinian-Jordanians, but also Transjordanians including former prime ministers, parliamentarians and cabinet members as well. This was a signal for the regime that the dynamics of internal opposition has been modified in the country.

Meanwhile, the Kingdom's *loyal* or *legal* long-standing opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood and its political party, the Islamic Action Front, is now perceived as a source of tension for the first time in Jordan's history. The *Ikhwan*, who supported the Kingdom's policies and saved the monarchy from Ba'athists and Pan-Arabist challenges during the Cold War years, is today considered as a threat given the growing influence of Hamas and Islamic militant activism in the Occupied Territories of Palestine since the onset of the al-Aqsa *intifada*. With the ongoing non-settlement of the Palestine problem, the Jordanian regime under the new King Abdullah II has engaged in a series of transitions which produced a departure from his father King Hussein's approach.

King Abdullah II has opted for restricting the political opening through some repressive laws which would place the opposition under strict surveillance.

Hussein's democratic opening now turned into political repression particularly through electoral law, assembly law, anti-terror law and finally *iftaa* law. King Abdullah also launched a social *re-engineering* process to re-define the limits of Jordanian national identity. Given the external disturbances posed to the survival of the monarchy, the King adopted a new program of re-building the essential elements of being a truly Jordanian citizen. The inauguration of 'Jordan First Arab Second Campaign' has been underway since 2002 which will have superseding effects on Jordan's old ideals and will re-make and re-*imagine* the Jordanian community at least in the eyes of the political leadership.

The main motive for Jordanian regime to introduce the 'Jordan First, Arab Second Campaign' is heavily dependent on what's happening in Jordan's western border, in Palestine and its eastern border, in Iraq. The re-invigoration of the Jordan Option (alternative homeland idea) was central in re-defining the borders of Jordanian identity. The failure of the peace process after the Israeli unilateral Gaza pullout re-invoked Israeli 'Jordan is Palestine' rhetoric and Jordan feared that its delicate demographic structure and unemployment will be exacerbated by the influx of new Palestinian refugees after the outbreak of al-Aqsa *intifada*. Therefore, using Jordanian *Jordanized* identity, instead of a hybrid identity that was in play before 1988, as a *prop* in overcoming an external challenge offers a case where outside factors and actors incrementally formulate and condition the internal politics of a state. Attaining a territorial state identity could be the only option left for Jordan to handle regional crises. Disassociating Jordanian internal politics from Palestine and the Palestinians can neither be maintained by supranational nor by sub-state identities, it can rather be managed through *statising* Jordanian identity at the expense of others (Arabist, Islamic, tribal and sectarian affiliations).

The case of Iraq shows the discrepancy between the Jordanian State's ideals and its public expectations as well. The sectarian and confessional conflict that was brought by the US war in Iraq raises the question of under which circumstances will the politicians succeed in empowering one identity at the expense of the others. In this framework, regional instabilities, demographic structures, wars,

and economic crises can foster particular identities and not others. The post-war situation in Iraq led Jordan to downgrade the tone of Arabist and Islamic attachments to some extent to disassociate the Kingdom's internal policy-making from the ongoing situation next door. The process of de-Baatification in Iraq motivated King Abdullah II to pursue a policy of restoration of Iraqi territorial integrity and national unity. Since the borders of the Fertile Crescent were drawn by colonial powers, any re-demarcation in Iraqi borders will ultimately recall modifications in the map of Jordan as well.

For the reasons given above, the Iraqi war illustrated that Jordan's state identity and national identity is not coterminous. The emergence of Hamas as a political leadership, radicalized *Salafi* Islamists and Palestine-oriented Muslim Brotherhood, accompanied by the economic upheavals solidified the notion of *Jihadi* Islamic movement in Jordan. The growing sympathy for the Islamist movements and enmity with the US and Israeli interests, led the regime to *contain* and mostly *curb* the opposition rather than allowing them to express their feelings freely. Intriguingly, the repressive policies of the Kingdom then fostered the crystallization of both supranational and sub-state identities in Jordan at the expense of state identity. Therefore the regime was caught between the Arabist and Western divergent ideals and preferences which in turn compelled the Kingdom to strengthen its territorial state loyalty through extending the size and the scope of 'Jordan First Campaign'. Therefore the growing tension in the region in the aftermath of September 11 attacks has revitalized new sources of preferences attached to the Jordanian identity.

Although 'Jordan First Campaign' constitutes the regime's primary response to the regional crises, in which the monarchy has no control, the Campaign has become rather a policy of demolishing any kind of opposition posed by *domestic unrest* in the country. It is for this reason that Adnan Abu Odeh and Toujan Faisal considered the *al-Urdun Awalan* as a 'Security First' approach than to be 'Jordan First'.⁵⁰⁷ In other words, while the regime urged the need for detaching

⁵⁰⁷ Interview with Adnan Abu Odeh, 23 June 2006, Amman.

its policy making from that of Palestine and Iraq; the Kingdom's policies of consolidating national unity and cohesion has become an absolute necessity to overcome and co-opt the internal unrest instead of overcoming external instabilities. Therefore, Jordan's foreign policy goals including building ties with Israel, alliance with the US, and close cooperation with Western liberal institutions, offers a platform or a battlefield for the Jordanian public where the regime's and the Jordanians' expectations are subjected to questioning and contestation. The debate on ideals and values of both sides then produce new forms and definitions of identity. In this regard, the regime's policy of delineating the limits of Jordan's identity to undermine the repercussions of external challenges is intriguingly required for obtaining national cohesion and solidarity with the 'Jordan First'.

Having felt the longstanding implications of both the al-Aqsa *intifada* and the sectarian conflict in Iraq, it is very unlikely that the Kingdom will overcome the effects of regional realities in the short term. One major reason is the lack of adequate economic capability to cope with unemployment and poverty in the country. Given the high dependency on Western aid, the US aid in particular, it is not likely for Jordan to minimize its dependence on the Western institutions like the IMF and the American funding. In addition, the regime's increasing efforts to curb the opposition mainly restricts the political potency of the Palestinian citizens. The electoral law, which came into force in 1993 and amended in 2001, highly discriminates against the Palestinian-Jordanians. The inauguration of the 'We are all Jordan' Commission and the National Agenda in charge of political reformation has not proposed the amendment of the electoral law yet. Since the Islamic movements are the only venues where people assemble and express their feelings, the *Jihadi* Islamism incrementally expands its strength day after day. To preclude Egyptian example of *Takfir wa al-Hijra*, the regime should promote Islamic participation, notably the IAF, in national politics similar to governments prior to the 1990s.

Today, Jordan tries to follow a balancing act to contend with the dichotomy between the regime's priorities and public discontent. For that reason, the

Jordanian regime should bring political reformation back to the agenda with other socio-economic priorities. Reducing poverty and unemployment which is prevalent mostly in the southern rural centers can only be effective when it is balanced by enlarging political freedoms. To achieve political participation, the uneven allocation of parliamentary seats in favor of the East Bankers in the Lower Chamber should be re-formulated in order to obtain a genuine proportional representation. The alienation of Palestinians from national politics could force them to join more radical *Salafi* Islamic groups at the expense of the *moderate* IAF.

Due to Jordan's close relations with the US and growing economic ties with Israel, King Abdullah II increases the cost of his policies. In other words, the Jordanian regime has some limitations and obstacles in enlarging the scope of *al-Urdun Awalan* stemming from the supra-state ideals and norms embedded in Jordanian identity. These components are Arabism, Islam, Palestinian factor, anti-Israeli sentiments, and anti-US attitude among many Jordanians. Consequently the regime faces the cost of reducing the capacity of *al-Urdun Awalan* caused by the divergent ideals and expectations between the Kingdom and the Jordanian society. Recent foreign policy choices of the Kingdom, including peace with Israel and US-led war on terror strategy, serve as a battlefield to raise and deepen debates over Jordan's identity. Hence the cost of the State's measure to *Jordanize* Jordan and the ultimate growing dissatisfaction in the southern parts will have to be handled and paid for in the near future.

Jordan currently seems to be handling the internal unrest well. But as Arthur Day notes "Jordanian society is a mixed picture of cohesion and conflict, of growing together and remaining apart."⁵⁰⁸ This statement which vindicates the debates on Jordan's national identity stems not only from external challenges; but also exacerbated by domestic unrest and rooted in identity conflict. For today, it also has become quite questionable as to what extent Jordan will be

⁵⁰⁸ Day (1986), *ibid.*, p. 73.

able to consolidate its identity given mounting unrest in the stronghold of the monarchy.

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APPENDICES

TURKISH SUMMARY

Ürdün ve Filistin varlığını oluşturan tarihsel ve siyasal bağlar göz önüne alındığında, “kimlik” tartışmaları Ürdün’ün ulus-olusturma sürecinde önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. Aslında Ürdün’de kimlik olusturma süreci, Orta Doğu’da yaygın olarak rastlanan çoklu kimliklerin (alt-devlet, devlet ve ulus-üstü) toprağa dayalı kimlikleri sınırlandırması bakımından bölge toplumlarının ulus-olusturma süreçleriyle örtüşmektedir. Bu noktadan hareketle, bölgedeki *geçirgen* tutunum ideolojileri ve *ulus-üstü* bağılıklar ön plana alındığında konstrüktivizm Orta Doğu genelinde ve Ürdün özelinde kimlik politikalarını incelerken en uygun kuramsal yaklaşım olmaktadır.

Ürdün Emirliği’nin kurulduğu 1921 yılından bu yana, kimlik en hassas konulardan birisini oluşturmıştır. Emirlik, 1923 yılında İngilizler tarafından ayrı bir entite olarak kurulduğunda Ürdün Nehri’nin doğu yakasında yaşayanlar o tarihten itibaren *Mavera-i Ürdünlü* olarak kabul edilmiştir. Emir Abdullah’ın *Mavera-i Ürdün*’ün yerlisi olmadığı düşünülürse, yerli halk olarak Doğu Yakalıların kabul edilmesi bir tesadüf değildir. Bu bağlamda, Ürdün kimlik ve ulus olusturma süreci birçok yazar tarafından zaman içerisinde pekiştirilmiş ‘yapay’ bir varlık olarak kabul edilmektedir. Yüzde 93 Arap nüfusu ile Ürdün bölgedeki diğer ülkelere kıyasla homojen bir toplum barındırmaktadır. Ancak Arap-İsrail Savaşları sonrası yaşanan mülteci sorunu ve sınırların yeniden belirlenmesi ülkedeki kimlik olusturma süreçlerini derinden etkilemiştir. Batı Şeria’nın Krallık tarafından 1950 yılında ilhakı ile Doğu Yakası’nın Batı Yakası ile bütünleşmesi Krallığa bölgede Birinci Dünya Savaşı sırasında yeşeren Arap milliyetçiliği ve değerlerini tekrar ön plana çıkarma fırsatı tanımıştır. Savaş sonrası Krallığa göç eden yaklaşık 700,000 Filistinli ülkedeki nüfus dengelerini tamamen değiştirmiş, *Mavera-i Ürdünlü*ler kendi ülkelerinde sayıca azınlık

konumuna düşmüşlerdir. Savaş sonrasında Filistinli göçmenlere vatandaşlık veren tek Arap ülkesinin Ürdün olması Krallık'taki kimlik politikalarının Filistin sorunu ile ne derece yeniden yapılandığını göz önüne sermektedir. Bundan dolayı, Ürdün özelinde kimlik oluşturma süreci sürekli değişime ve dönüşüme açık bir süreçtir.

Bu çalışmada, dışta yaşanan krizlerin ve bölgesel sorunların Ürdün kimlik politikalarını nasıl yeniden inşa ettiği analiz edilmiştir. Bu yapılırken, kimlik ile dış politika arasında kuramsal bir bağ kurulup kimliklerin devletlerin dış politika hedeflerini nasıl daha meşru kıldığı incelenmiştir. Bu tezin temel amacı rejimlerin dış politika amaçlarını ve önceliklerini ulusal kimliği sağlamlaştırarak nasıl daha kabul edilebilir hale getirebildiklerini analiz etmektir. Kimlikler, sadece devletlerin dış politikadaki isteklerini ve çıkarlarını belirlemekle kalmıyor, aynı zamanda devletlerin bazı davranışlarını meşru, bazılarını ise tam tersine düşünülemez ve kabul edilemez hale getiriyor.

Ürdünlü kimliği bu açıdan bakıldığında 1970-71 yıllarında yaşanan iç savaş sonrası ulus-üstü (Arapçı ve İslami) ve ulus-altı (aşiret ve yerel) kimlikleri dönüştüren yeni bir Ürdünlü kimliği yaratma yoluna gitmiştir. Yerli Ürdünlü kimliği yaratma projesi bu bağlamda Benedict Anderson'un *hayali cemaatler* tezi ile örtüşmektedir. Yerli Ürdünlü kimliğini inşa ederken çeşitli bölgesel ve tarihsel etkenler kullanılmıştır. Bunlar dört ana başlık altında toplanabilir; birincisi Kral ve monarşiye bağlılık geliştirmek; ikincisi Pan-Arap bir kimlikle hem Ürdünlüleri hem de Filistinlileri kaynaştırma duygusu (*qawmiyya*, ulus-üstü Arap milliyetçiliği) yaratmak; üçüncüsü Filistin meselesinin çözümüne yönelik siyaset üretmek; ve son olarak Batı Yakalılar ve Doğu Yakalılarında oluşan ortak bir ulus oluşturmaktadır.

Ürdün ve Filistin'in içiçe girmiş tarihleri, özellikle Batı Şeria'nın Ürdün Krallığı tarafından 1950 yılında ilhaki ile daha da karmaşık hale gelmiştir. Bu tarihten itibaren ülkedeki ulus-devlet inşası Filistin meselesinin çözümsüzlüğü ile doğrudan bağlantılı bir süreç olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Ürdün'e göç eden Filistinlilere vatandaşlık verilmesi ile *melez* bir Ürdünlü kimliği yaratılmak

istendiye de, 1970'lerin başında yaşanan “Kara Eylül” olayı Krallığın hayati önem taşıyan kararlar almasına yol açmıştır. Bu kararlar arasında rejimin kimlik politikaları fazlasıyla ön plana çıkmaktadır. Ürdün’de yaşanan iç savaş ülkedeki Filistinli-Ürdünlü ayrımını keskinleştirmiş ve bu tarihten itibaren Ürdün, Filistin Kurtuluş Örgütü (FKÖ) için bir üs olmaktan çıkmıştır. Emirliğin ilk yıllarından bu yana yaratılmak istenilen yerli Ürdünlü kimliğinde eksik kalan “öteki” kavramı, Kara Eylül olaylarıyla ortaya çıkan kutuplaşma ile ulus oluşturma sürecine ilk kez eklenmiş olunuyordu. Böylece 1950 yılından bu yana rejimin uyguladığı Batı Yakalı Filistinlileri *kontrollü* homojenleştirme çabaları, iç savaş sonrasında yerini ‘Önce Doğu Yakası’ yaklaşımına bırakmıştır. Ürdün kurulduğundan itibaren meşruiyetini Bedeviler ve aşireterden kazanmış, iç savaş sonrasında ise yerel kimlikler ve aşiretlere olan vurgu artırılarak Filistin ve Pan-Arap öğeleri kimlik oluşturma sürecinden ayrıştırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu açıdan bakıldığında, FKÖ ile Ürdün güvenlik kuvvetlerini karşı karşıya getiren iç savaş ülkedeki kimlik ve ulus oluşturma sürecine yeni bir ivme kazandırmıştır.

‘Önce Doğu Yakası’ politikası, Filistin-İsrail Çatışmasının Ürdün’e neler kaybettirdiğine ilişkin tartışmalara zemin hazırlamış oldu. Böylece rejim Filistinlilerin ve Filistin meselesinin çözümsüzlüğünün Krallığın hem kimliğini oluşturmada hem de dış politikada karar almasında ne derece sınırlayıcı etkilere yol açtığını gösterdi. Özellikle Kral Hüseyin’e yakın Maverai-i Ürdünlü milliyetçi çevreler, 1967 savaşında kaybedilen Batı Şeria’nın ve ülkede yaşayan Filistinlilerin statülerinin ne olacağı sorusunu gündeme taşıdılar. Kral Hüseyin bu dönemde Filistin kökenli Ürdünlülerin Ürdün halkının ayrılmaz bir parçası olduğunu yinelemekte ve Batı Yakası’nın Doğu Yakası ile bölünmez bir bütünlüğe sahip olduğunu vurgulamaktaydı. Arap Birliği’nin 1974 Rabat Zirvesinde FKÖ’yü resmen Filistin halkının tek ve meşru temsilcisi olarak tanınması, Ürdün Haşemi Krallığı’nı uzun vadede yeni iç ve dış politikalar üretmeye sevketti.

Ürdün kimlik politikalarında 1980’lerle birlikte muazzam değişiklikler yaşandı. 1987 yılında patlak veren birinci Filistin ayaklanması (*intifada*) ile Kral Hüseyin ülkedeki kimlik oluşturma çabalarına yeni bir yön vererek, 1988 yılının eylül

ayında Batı Yakası ile ilgili tüm haklarından vazgeçtiğini açıkladı. Krallığın Batı Yakasını Doğu Yakasından ayırma kararı temelde Ürdün kimliği yeniden üretme ve tanımlama çabasıyla doğrudan bağlantılı bir hamle olarak algılamak gerekir. Ürdün'ü tarih boyunca etkileyen ulus-üstü ve devlet-altı bağılıklar, toprağa dayalı (teritoryal) bir Ürdün kimliğinin yerleşmesini zayıflatmıştı. Bu noktada Kral'ın Batı Yakası'ndan vazgeçme politikası sadece birinci *intifadadan* kaynaklanan Filistin tehdidinden çok, Ürdün ulusunun yeniden tanımlanması ile ilintili bir karardı. Bu nedenle, 1988 yılı Ürdün iç ve dış siyaseti açısından bir dönüm noktası olmuştur. Ülkede Filistin topraklarının ilhakından bu yana var olan Batı Yakalılar ve Doğu Yakalılar arasındaki 'etnik bölünme' Krallığın dış politikada hedeflerini son derece sınırlamış, bunun temel nedeni de ülkedeki Filistin çoğunluktan kaynaklandığı düşünülmüştür. Bu noktadan hareketle, 1988 sonrası dönemde 'Önce Doğu Yakası' ile örtüşen yerli ve toprağa dayalı (*watani*) bir kimlik yaratmanın ancak Batı Yakası ile ilişkilerin kesilmesiyle mümkün olabileceği düşüncesi rejim politikalarına hakim olmuştur.

1989 yılının Nisan ayında rejimin meşruiyetini ve siyasal desteğini aldığı Maan kentindeki ayaklanmalar Ürdün'de demokratikleşme sürecini hızlandıran temel dinamiklerden birisini oluşturmuştur. 1980'lerle birlikte petrol fiyatlarındaki düşüş ve buna bağlı olarak ekonomik dengelerin bozulması, Filistin ögesi bulunmayan Maan kentini derinden etkilemiştir. 1989 yılına dek, Mavera-i Ürdünlülerin yaşadığı Maan kenti Krallığın meşruiyetini ve siyasal desteğini aldığı en önemli bölgelerden birisini oluşturmaktaydı. Maan'daki iç huzursuzluk, Zeyd al-Rifai'nin görevden alınıp, yerine Mudar Badran'ın başbakan olarak neden olmuştur.

Krallık, 1989 yılına dek patronaj sistemiyle siyasal desteğini kazanmıştır. Ancak Ürdün Dinar'ının %45 devaluasyonu ile birlikte temel tüketim maddelerinin fiyatlarındaki artış ülkede huzursuzluğa yol açtı. Rejim, yaşanan ekonomik krize demokratikleşme kararı olarak yanıt verdi. 1967'den sonra ilk kez seçimler yapılmış ve Parlamento yirmi iki yıl aradan sonra tekrar görevine başlamıştı. Bunlara ek olarak, Krallık 1957'den bu yana süregelen siyasi partiler yasağını 1992'de yeni bir Siyasi Partiler Yasası ile kaldırdı.

1989 seçimleri ve Parlatentonun yeninden açılması, Ürdün siyasi yaşanı açısından önem taşımaktadır. Bunun iki temel nedeni vardır. Birincisi, seçimler ve Siyasi Partiler Yasası ile ülkede bazı kesimler güç kazanmış ve iç politikadaki dengeleri değıştirebilecek konuma gelmişti. 1989 seçimleri sonrasında Müslüman Kardeşler Örgütü (*al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin*) 80 sandalyeli Parlamento'da 21 sandalye kazandı. İslami hareket ise Parlamento'da toplam 34 sandalye kazanmış oldu. Mudar Badran'ın başbakan olarak atanmasıyla da kabineye beş Müslüman Kardeşler üyesi alındı. Bu noktada, Badran'ın İslamcı gruplarla olan yakın ilişkisi etkili olmuştur. Müslüman Kardeşlerin, seçim zaferinin ardından, İslami Hareket Cephesi (İHC - *al-Jabhat al-Amal al-İslami*) adı altında ayrı bir siyasi partiye dönüşmesi, ülkedeki 'ılımlı' İslami hareketin Ürdün iç siyasetinde önemli bir konuma gelmesinin yolunu açmış oldu.

Krallığın demokratikleşme çabaları 1991 yılında başlayan Madrid Barış Görüşmeleri nedeniyle de önemli bir yere sahiptir. Barış görüşmelerinde Filistinlileri temsil etmesi nedeniyle Ürdün, tekrar bölgenin kilit ülkesi konumuna geldi. Bu dönemde dikkate değer bir diğer gelişme FKÖ-İsrail Barış Antlaşmasının imzalanmasına muteakip 1994'te yapılan Ürdün-İsrail Barış Antlaşması ile Ürdün Krallığının, Mısır'ın adından, İsrail'i tanıyan ikinci Arap ülkesi olmasıydı. Ürdün'ün İsrail devletini tanınması ve ilişkilerini normalleşmeye yönelmesi ülkedeki Filistinliler ve İslami gruplarca eleştirildi. Aslında Ürdün'ün İsrail'i tanınmasının temel sebeplerinden biri, Likud Partisi'nin 'Ürdün aslında Filistindir' tezini bir anlamda zayıflatıp, yok etmektir. 1970'lerin ortalarından itibaren süregelen Likud tezi, Filistin halkına Ürdün'ü alternatif bir vatan (*al-watan al-badil*) olarak sunuyordu. 'Ürdün aslında Filistindir' görüşünün ileri sürülmesindeki temel dayanak, Ürdün nüfusunun çoğunluğunu Filistin kökenli Ürdün vatandaşlarının oluşturduğu gerçeğidir. Barış anlaşması imzalanarak bu varsayımı Krallık yok saymayı hedeflemiştir. Bunu yaparken de ulus-üstü Arapçı ve İslami söylemlerden ve normlardan ayrıştırılmış yerli, teritoryal bir Ürdünlü kimliğine ihtiyaç duyulmuştur. İşte tam bu noktada, 1988 yılında Kral Huseyin tarafından alınan 'Batı Yakası'ndan vazgeçme' kararı Ürdün kimliğini dönüştürücü nitelikte olup, bölgesel ve tarihsel açıdan Ürdün

toplumunu şekillendiren çeşitli bağılıkların devlete ve Doğu Yakası toprağına bağılılık yönünde hareket etmesinin yolunu açmış oldu. İsrail devletini tanımak ancak Arapçı ve İslami söylemlerden arındırılmış *watani* bir Ürdün kimliğiyle mümkün olabilirdi.

Bu çalışmada, Krallığın 2000’li yıllarla birlikte karşı karşıya kaldığı iki olay ele alınmış ve ülkenin kimlik politikalarıyla dış politika hedefleri arasında açmaz yaratan bu olaylar baz alınarak bir bağ kurulmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu olaylardan ilki 2000 yılında patlak veren *Al-Aqsa intifadası* olarak da bilinen ikinci Filistin ayaklanmasıdır. İkincisi ise 2003 yılında ABD’nin Irak’ı işgal etmeye yönelmesidir. Her iki örnek de Ürdün Haşemi Krallığı’nın kimlik oluşturma çabaları ile rejimin dış politika önceliklerinin ne kadar ilintili olduğunu göstermede son derece yardımcı olmaktadır.

1989 sonrası dönemde demokratikleşme süreci Ürdün’de kimlik üzerine olan tartışmaları iç siyasetin gündemine taşımış ve *Al-Aqsa intifadası*nın ardından bu tartışmalar rejimi ulusal kimlik üzerine yeniden düşünmeye yöneltmiştir. Likud Partisi’nin ‘aslında Ürdün Filistinidir’ savı Filistin ayaklanmasının ardından tekrar gündeme gelmiş ve Ürdünlü kimliği üzerine olan kamu oyundaki tartışmaları derinleştirmiştir. İşte tam bu noktada Ürdün kimliğinin oluşumu sürekli değişim ve dönüşüm içeren bir süreç olduğu savı kendisini göstermiştir. ABD’nin Irak’ı işgali ise 2003 yılından itibaren Ürdün’de yükselen İslami muhalefetin terörle mücadele kapsamında ülkede nasıl kontrol altına alınmaya çalışıldığını açıkça göstermektedir. Ürdün iç ve dış politikasını etkileyen bu iki bölgesel olay Krallığı *watani* değerleri ve beklentileri ön plana çıkaran daha teritoryal bir Ürdünlü kimliği tanımlaması yoluna sevk etmiştir. Arapçı ve İslami kimliklerin devlete sadakat yönünde değişime uğraması rejimin temel hedefleri arasında yer almaya başlamıştır. Doğu Yakası kimliğini sağlamlaştırmak Ürdün Krallığı’na dış politikada daha çok manevra yapma alanı sağlayacağı düşüncesi Kral II. Abdullah’ın politikalarını belirleyici bir konuma yükseltmiştir.

Özellikle *Al-Aqsa intifadası*nın yarattığı sosyal ve siyasi açmazlar, Ürdün politikasını Filistin politikasından ayırıştırma ile azalacağı görüşü Kral II.

Abdullah'ı ve çevresindekileri kimlik politikaları üzerine yeniden düşünmeye yönlendirdi. “Ürdünlü” veya “Doğu Yakalı” olmanın temel öğelerini belirlemek Krallık için çok da zor olmadı ve 2002 yılının Ekim ayında ‘Önce Ürdün, Sonra Arap Kampanyası’ (*al-Urdun Awalan*) başlatıldı. Krallık politikalarını Ürdünleştirmek ve ülkede yaşayan tüm Ürdün vatandaşlarının dikkatini bölgede yaşanan sorunlardan uzaklaştırıp ülke içindeki sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi yapılanma projelerine çekmek rejimin Kampanyayı başlatmasındaki temel gaye oldu. ‘Önce Ürdün, Sonra Arap’ girişimi aslında yeni bir Ürdün ulusu inşası anlamına geliyordu. İdeal bir Ürdün vatandaşı, seçmeni ve aday olabilmeyen ön koşulları ortaya konulurken, diğer taraftan Ürdünlülerin toprağa bağlı daha *watani* bir aidiyet geliştirmeleri için gerekli olan tüm kurumsal alt yapıyı oluşturacağı taahhüdünde bulunuluyordu.

Özellikle 1970-71 iç savaşına kadar *qawmi* (Arap milliyetçiliği) bağlamında kimlik politikaları üretmek durumunda kalan Ürdün Haşemi Krallığı, 1988 Batı Şeria’den çekilme kararı ile Doğu Yakası toprağına aidiyet duyan yerli Ürdünlü kimliğini güçlendirmeye çalışmıştı. *Al-Aqsa intifadasının* başlamasıyla birlikte teritoryal kimlik oluşturma çabaları yeni bir ivme kazanmış ‘Önce Ürdün’ ulus-oluşturma süreciyle dış politikada alınan kararların yumuşatılıp, kamu oyu gözünde kabul edilebilir ve meşruiyet kazanabilir konuma getirilmesi hedeflenmiştir. ‘Önce Ürdün’ Kampanyasını Ürdün siyaseti açısından yegane önemi bu noktadan kaynaklanmaktadır. Filistin ve Irak meselelerinde daha güçlü bir siyaset izlemenin ancak pekiştirilmiş bir Ürdünlülük bilinciyle olabileceği düşüncesi rejimin dışta yaşanan gelişmelere yönelik ürettiği koruyucu politikaların bir göstergesini oluşturmuştur. Filistin meselesinin çözümsüzlüğünü Ürdün iç ve dış siyasetinden ayırmanın ancak bu şekilde sağlanabileceğini söylemek mümkündür.

Al-Aqsa intifadası, Ürdün’ün kimlik politikaları ve dış politikası arasında bir ilişki kurmaya yardımcı olmaktadır. Kimlikler, sosyal etkileşimler ve tarihsel süreçler sonucunda oluştuğuna göre, devletlerin kimliklerine şekil veren dinamikler arasında dış gelişmeler son derece önem kazanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda, Ürdün özelinde kimlik ve dış politika arasındaki ilişkide “kimlik

çatışması” belirleyici bir etken olarak göze çarpmaktadır. Kimlik ikilemi veya çatışması toplumun beklentileri ve normlarının rejiminkilerin aksine farklı dış politika amaçları hedeflemesiyle oluşmaktadır. Ürdün örneğinde kimlik çatışması, İsrail ile ilişkilerin 1994 yılı itibariyle normalleşmesiyle başlamış ve *al-Aqsa intifadası* ile de daha karmaşık hale gelmiştir. Bu kimlik çatışmasını analiz etmek için Ürdün’deki Filistin etkenini incelemek yerinde olacaktır.

Batı Yakası’nın Krallık ile bütünleşmesinden bu güne nüfus dengesizliği (Filistinlilerin yerli Ürdünlülerden sayıca fazla olması) Ürdün’de Filistin kökenli Ürdünlülerin bir tehdit olarak algınmasına neden oldu. Filistinliler özellikle iç savaşın ardından potansiyel bir iç istikrarsızlık kaynağı olarak görülmenin yanı sıra, Haşemi rejimine olan bağlılıkları ve sadakateri sorgulanır hale gelmişti. Özellikle 1967 savaşının ardından gücünü artıran FKÖ’nün Ürdün’de ‘devlet içinde bir devlet’ olarak hareket etmesi Krallık tarafından kontrollü homojenleştirme politikası ‘Önce Doğu Yakası’ yaklaşımının benimsenmesine neden olmuştu. 1988 Batı Yakasından çekilme kararının ardından 1989 yılında yürürlüğe giren yeni ‘Seçim Yasası’, rejimin Filistin meselesi ve Filistinlilere bakışının ne kadar değiştiğini apaçık göstermekteydi.

Yeni Seçim Yasasına göre, 80 sandalyeli mecliste Batı Yakasına ayrılan kota kalkıyor, Filistinlilerin yoğun olarak yaşadığı Amman, Zerka ve İrbid’e ayrılan sandalye sayısı, yerli Ürdünlülerin yaşadığı yerlerin lehine dengesiz olarak dağıtılıyordu. Diğer bir deyişle, meclisteki sandalye dağılımı kentlerdeki nüfus oranına göre düzenlenmemiştir. Örneğin, Filistinli göçmenlerin çoğunluğunu oluşturduğu Amman ve Zerka kentleri toplam Ürdün nüfusunun %54’ünü oluşturmasına rağmen, 2001 seçimleri sonrasında mecliste yaklaşık %32’lik bir oranla temsil edilmişlerdir. Diğer taraftan, toplam nüfusun %12’sini oluşturan Maan, Tafila, Mafrak ve Karak kentleri ise %21’lik bir oran ile temsil edilmektedir. Bu kentlerin temsiliyet oranının Filistinlilerin yaşadıkları bölgelere kıyasla daha fazla olmasının nedeni, sadece yerli Ürdünlülerin yaşadıkları yer olmalarından kaynaklanmıyordu. Bunun yanında, bu kentlerde yaşayan yerli Ürdünlülerin Kral’a ve de monarşiye olan sadakatleri son derece belirleyici bir etken olarak ön plana çıkmaktadır.

1989 seçimleri sonrasında Müslüman Kardeşler Örgütünün beklenmeyen zaferi, rejimi Seçim Yasasını değiştirmeye yöneltti. Çoklu oya dayalı olan seçim sistemi her seçmene tek oy sistemiyle değiştirildi. Buradaki temel amaç yaklaşan Barış Sürecinin ve İsrail ile yapılacak olası bir anlaşmanın Parlamento'da oluşabilecek İsrail karşıtı İslami bir muhalefet tarafından engellenmesini önlemektir. Yasadaki Filistin kökenli Ürdünlüleri siyasi arenadan dışlayıcı olarak tanımlanabilecek engel, 1989 yılından bu yana zaten ertime politikasıyla etkisi azaltılmaya çalışılan Filistin kimliğinin İslami bir nitelik kazanmasına yol açtı. 'Filistin' aidiyetiyle siyasi parti veya örgüt kurulması Ürdün'de ilhak sonrası yasak olduğundan, Filistin kökenli vatandaşlar parlamentodaki orantısız temsiliyet dolayısıyla İslami örgütlere üye olmaya başladılar. Bu örgütler arasında İHC önemli bir yer teşkil etmektedir. İHC'nin 1992 yılında siyasi partiye dönüşmesi, Ürdün'deki Filistinlilerin ayrımcı politikalara maruz kalmadan üye olabilecekleri tek oluşum niteliğini kazanmıştır. Örneğin, İHC eski başkanlarından İsak Farhan Filistin kökenli bir Ürdünlüdür. Farhan, Ürdün'deki siyasal istikrarın altını önemle çizmekte ve Haşemi Krallığı'nı asla hedef görmediklerini sürekli yinelemektedir. Bu noktadan bakıldığında, Ürdün'deki İslami hareketin büyük bir çoğunluğunu temsil eden İHC diğer Orta Doğu ülkelerine kıyasla, barışçı ve ılımlı bir İslami siyaset izlemektedir.

Ürdün'de Arapçı kimlikle şekillenmiş muhalefet, 1980'lerle birlikte siyasal İslamın Orta Doğu'da güç kazanması ile yeni bir döneme girdi. Müslüman Kardeşler 1960 ve 1970'lerde Krallık tarafından rejime bağlı muhalefet olarak algılanıyordu. *Ikhwan*'ın Oslo Barış sürecine karşı olması rejim ile arasındaki ilişkinin yeni bir biçim kazanmasının yolunu açtı. Özellikle birinci *intifada* sonrası güç kazanan Hamas ile Müslüman Kardeşler'in yakın ilişkisi göz önüne alınırsa, Arap-İsrail uyuşmazlığının çözümünde *Ikhwan* Ürdün için etkili olamayacaktı.

Ayrıca Hamas'ın Krallığın Batı Yakasını Doğu Yakasından ayırma kararını kabul etmemesi monarşiyi İslami hareketle ilişki kurmasında sınırlayan diğer bir

etkendi. Ürdün'deki İslami hareket 1994 yılında diğer muhalefet gruplarıyla birleşerek İsrail ile ilişkilerin normalleşmesi karştı bir komite kurdu. Komitenin yürütücüleri arasında İHC, Ürdün Komünist Partisi, Ürdün Arap Baas ve Sosyalist Partisi yer almaktaydı. Komiteyi daha önceki muhalif hareketlerden farklı kılan nokta ise, yerli Ürdünlülerin Filistin kökenlilerle ortak bir hareket içerisinde yer almaları oldu. İlişkilerin normalleşmesini protesto eden liderlerden biri Salt kökenli bir Ürdünlü olan İHC üyesi Abdül Latif Arabiyyat idi. Diğer bir Ürdünlü isim ise, eski başbakanlardan ve Ulusal Şart Komisyonu başkanı Ahmet Obeydat'tı.

Komite'nin çabalarına rağmen Parlamento İsrail ile barış anlaşmasını onayladı. Bunun yanı sıra, Komite, İsrail ile ekonomik ve ticari tüm ilişkileri yasaklayan yasaları da kaldırdı. Buna karşın İsrail'in Batı Şeria'da Yahudi yerleşim yerlerini artırması ve 1997 yılında Mossad'ın Amman'da Hamas lideri Halit Meşal'e suikast girişiminde bulunması Ürdün toplumunda büyük yankı buldu.

Hamas liderlerinin, Meşal dahil, sınır dışı edilmeleri *Ikhwan* ile Ürdün rejimi arasındaki ilişkileri derinden etkiledi. Hamas bürosunun kapatılması Ürdün'ün Filistin meselesine olan bağlılığının aslında 1988 yılındaki çekilme kararının ardından İsrail ile ilişkilerin geliştirilmesiyle bağlantılı olduğunu ortaya koydu. Bu bağlamda, Hamas ve Ürdün'de İslami hareket 1990'lar öncesinin tersine artık bir tehdit olarak algılanmaya başlandı. Bu noktada, Ürdün kimliğinin yeniden tanımlanma süreci iç politikada önem kazandı. Çünkü Arapçı ve İslami bir kimlikle İsrail devleti ile ilişki kurmak mümkün olmayacaktı. Mısır'ın 1979 yılında *watani* bir Mısırlı kimliği ile İsrail devletini tanıması, şimdi de Ürdün için geçerli olacaktır.

Rejimin içteki muhalefeti kontrol edebilmesi ise 1998 yılında kabul edilen yeni Basın Yayın Yasası ile oldu. Yeni yasa, Kral, kraliyet ailesi, ordu, güvenlik güçlerinin ve yargının yazılı basında eleştirilemeyeceği yönünde düzenlemeler getirmenin yanı sıra, basında yer alacak yazıların ve haberlerin ulusal birlik ve beraberliğe zarar vermeyecek nitelikte olmasını öngörüyordu. Böylece rejim, 1989 sonrası Ulusal Şart ile liberalleşen siyasal yaşamı önce 1993 seçim yasası

ile sonra da Basın-Yayın Yasası ile sıkı kontrolü altına almaya yöneldi. Filistin meselesinin çözümsüzlüğü Krallığı koruyucu çabalar almaya iterken bir yandan da dış politikadaki manevra alanını daraltıyordu. 2000 yılında patlak verecek ikinci Filistin ayaklanması bu çerçeveden bakıldığında Ürdün kimliğine yeniden şekil verecek ve onu tekrar dönüştürecek yeni dinamikler getirecektir.

2000 yılında başlayan Filistin ayaklanmasının hemen akabinde, Amman ve Maan başta olmak üzere, *intifadayı* destekleyen gösterilere sahne oldu. Filistin ayaklanmasını destekleyen gösteri ve mitinglerin ülkede yagınlaşması üzerine, iç işleri bakanı ülkede *intifadayı* destekleyen tüm gösterileri yasakladı. Ardından geçici Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Yasası kabul edilerek, ülkede iç istikrar sağlanmaya çalışıldı. Aynı zamanda, Kral Abdullah Ali Abu el-Ragıp'ı başbakan olarak atadı. El-Ragıp kabinesine, Filistin kökenli Ürdünlüleri de alarak rejimin içerseyici bir yaklaşımda olduğunun izlenimini verdi. Kral daha sonra el-Ragıp hükümetine yasal sistemin yeniden yapılanmasını öngören bir rapor sundu. Bu kararın adından, Ürdün'de üç alanda reform programı başlatıldı. Krallığın başlıca hedefleri arasında, idari, sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi alanlarda yeniden yapılanma yer alıyordu.

Rejimin *Al-Aqsa intifadasının* yarattığı sorunlar karşısında attığı adımlara rağmen, ülkede artan huzursuzluk İsrail ile ilişkilerin kesilmesi ve İsrail'in Amman Elçiliğinin kapatılması yönündeki baskıların artmasına neden oldu. Aynı zamanda, İsrail ile ilişkilerin normalleşmesi karşısı kampanya rejim üzerindeki baskısını artırmak amacıyla İsrail devleti ile ilişkilerin devamını savunlardan oluşan bir kara liste yayımladı. İçteki bu baskıların adından Kral Abdullah, 17 Haziran 2001'de yaptığı açıklamada parlamento seçimlerini ileriki bir tarihe ertelediğini ve Parlamento'yu fesh ettiğini ilan etti. ABD'nin Irak'a müdahale olasılığının aynı zamanda ülkede yarattığı Amerikan karşısı etki de göz önüne alınacak olunursa, parlamento seçimlerinin ileriki bir tarihe ertelenmesi, İsrail ve ABD ile olan ilişkilerin zarar görmesini engellemek amacını gündeme getiriyordu.

Krallık, yeni Toplantı ve Gösteri Yürüyüşleri Yasasını Ağustos 2001 yılında geçici olarak yasalaştırdı. Buna göre, kamu düzeni ile ilgi konuların görüşülmesi her kentin valisinden kırksekiz saat öncesinden alınacak izinle yapılabilecekti. Ayrıca, yeni toplantı yasaı, gösteri yürüyüşlerinin yine valiliklerinden yetmişiki saat önce alınacak izne tabi tutuluyordu. Alınan sıkı önlemlere ilaveten, yine 2001 yılında yeni seçim yasaı kabul edildi. Bu yasa uyarınca, 80 sandalyeli Ürdün Temsilciler Meclisi artan nüfus göz önüne alınarak 104 sandalyeye çıkarıldı. Buna ek olarak, kadın milletvekilleri için altı kişilik bir ek kota daha sonra seçim yasaına eklendi.

Hernekadar seçim yasaında olumlu deęişiklikler yapıldıysa da, muhalefetin ve İHC'nin tepkisini çeken yasada Filistin kökenli vatandaşlar, İslami örgütler ve sol partilerin beklentileri gündeme dahi alınmamıştı. Özellikle İHC'nin yasayı eleştirme nedeni, Parlamento'daki sandalye dağılımının ülkedeki Filistinlilerin yoğunlukta olduđu kentlerde (kuzey bölgeler) köylere (güney bölgeler) oranla daha az temsil edildikleri gerçeğinden kaynaklanıyordu. İHC ve Filistinlilerin önerisi ise Temsilciler Meclisindeki dağılımın rejime bağılılıktan çok, nüfusa dayalı bir kriterle belirlenmesiydi. Çünkü, eđer seçim sistemi daha adil olursa İHC yaklaşık olarak %40 ila %50 arasında oy alabileceğini düşünüyordu. Parlamento'daki temsiliyetin güney bölgelerini (Bedeviler ve aşiretlerden oluşan) kayırıcı bir politika ile desteklemesi sonucunda 1993'ten itibaren Parlamento, rejime sadık aşiret liderlerinin ve bağımsız milletvekillerinin çoğunlukta olduđu bir yasama organına dönüşmüştür. Bu da haliyle Krallığın politikalarıyla örtüşen bir sonuç olarak ortaya çıkmaktaydı.

Bu noktada, 2002 yılında yürürlüğe giren 'Önce Ürdün, Sonra Arap' kampanyası *al-Aqsa intifadası* sonrası iç huzursuzluğun arttığı bir ortamda ortaya atılan bir "ulus inşa" projesi olarak karşımıza çıkmaktadır. Rejim karşıtı iç dinamiklerin demokratikleşme sonrası yükselen sesi, Krallığı yeni kimlik politikaları üretmeye yöneltmiştir. Özellikle Müslüman Kardeşlerin ve İHC'nin rejime bağılı oldukları varsayımı halen daha geçerli olsa da, bölgede yaşanan sorunlar ve krizler Krallığın iç politikada yeni adımlar atmasına yol açmıştır. İşgal Edilmiş Topraklarda yaşananlar pek tabii ki bölgede en çok Ürdün'ü

etkilemiştir. Olası bir Filistin göçü ülkedeki hem sosyo-ekonomik dengeleri değiştirecek hem de Likud'un 'Ürdün aslında Filistindir' savını tekrar gündeme taşıyacaktı. Kral Abdullah 'Önce Ürdün' Kampanyası ile önce ulusal birliği sağlamayı daha sonra da bir takım reformlarla bölgesel sorunlarla başa çıkabilmek için iç istikrarı korumayı hedeflemekteydi.

'Önce Ürdün' girişiminin temelde siyasi partileri güçlendirmek, yargı sisteminin işleyebilmesi için bir Anayasa Mahkemesi kurmak ve sivil toplum örgütlerini yeniden yapılandırmak için öngördüğü çözüm, ülkede kayıtlı 31 partinin sağ, sol ve merkez olmak üzere üç ana grupta toplanması modeline dayanmaktaydı. Böylece seçimlerde en çok oyu alan siyasi grup yürütmeyi de elinde bulundurabilecekti. Kampanya'nın siyasi partilere verdiği önem ve öngördüğü mali destek, sivil toplum örgütlerinin bir noktada ülkedeki gücünü ve potansiyelini de azaltma politikasıydı. Yukarıda belirtilen hedefleri pratiğe dönüştürmek amacıyla bir 'Ulusal Gündem Komitesi' kuruldu.

Rejim, ülke için bir Ulusal Gündem Komitesinin kurulmasının ve 'Önce Ürdün' Kampanyasının başlatılmasının hayati önem taşıdığını aslında kasım ayında Maan'da yeniden başlayan ayaklanmalar ile farketmiştir. Filistin meselesinin çözümsüzlüğü ve olası Irak müdahalesi senaryoları artan işsizlik ve fakirlikle mücadele eden Maanlıları sokağa döktü. Ekim ayında USAID diplomatı Laurance Foley'in Amman'da öldürülmesi güvenlik güçlerinin ülkede bir dizi eylem yapmasına neden oldu. Halk arasında *Abu Sayyaf* olarak bilinen, Muhammed Çelebi'nin aynı zamanda Maan'da Usame Bin Ladin'i destekleyen bir gösteri yapması, rejimin dikkatini tamamıyla Maan kentine çekti. Abu Sayyaf'ın yakalanmasını bir fırsat olarak gören güvenlik güçlerinin kente girmesiyle başlayan olaylar ikisi polis memuru, dördü Maanlı olmak üzere altı kişinin ölümüyle sonuçlandı. Kenti daha sonra ablukaya alan rejim, yıllardır meşruiyetini ve siyasal desteğini aldığı Maanlılar tarafından bu tarihten itibaren tehdit edilmeye başlamış oldu. Krallık, 'Önce Ürdün' kampanyasını derinleştirecek ve de aynı zamanda demokratikleşmeyi kısıtlayacak bir takım önlemler almaya zorlandı. Bu önlemler bir yıl sonra başlayacak olan ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali ile eşgüdümlü olarak seyredecektir.

Maan olayları, Ürdün politikasını etkileyen iki önemli unsuru görmemizi sağlamıştır. Rejim, 1950’de Batı Yakası’nın ilhakı ile Filistin kökenli Ürdünlüleri iç istikrarsızlığın temel nedeni olarak görmüştür. Ancak Maan’daki gelişmeler ülkede Filistin tehdidinin yanı sıra, “Doğu Yakalı-Bedevi” kaynaklı yeni bir muhalefetin gelişmekte olduğunun sinyallerini vermesi bakımından önemlidir. Ekonomik dengelerin bozulması ve işsizlik gibi iç problemler Yerli Ürdünlüleri rejime karşı bir tutum sergilemeye yöneltmiştir. Ayrıca Yerli Ürdünlüler de Filistin kökenli Ürdünlüler kadar İşgal Altındaki Topraklar’da yaşananlara kayıtsız kalmıyorlardı. Özellikle rejimin İsrail ve ABD yanlısı bir dış politika izlemesi Maan’dan başlayarak tüm ülkede iç huzursuzluğa yol açtı. Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında, rejim için ‘Önce Ürdün’ Kampanyasının ve demokratikleşmeyi sınırlayan yeni yasaların iç istikrarı sağlamada yetersiz kaldığı anlamına geliyordu.

Likud’un 2004 yılında Gazze’den çekilme planı ile, yine ‘Ürdün aslında Filistindir’ tezi İsrail tarafından gündeme taşındı. Bunun temel nedeni, Başbakan Ariel Şaron’un Filistin topraklarından tek taraflı olarak çekilme planı ile yakından ilgiliydi. Zira, Gazze’den çekilme başlayacaktı. Bununla birlikte, Filistinlilerin yurtlarına dönüşü ve Batı Şeria’nın statüsü konusunda herhangi bir açıklama yapılmamıştı. Ürdün de Gazze’den çekilmeyi olumlu bulduğunu ifade etmekle birlikte, Filistin meselesi için kalıcı ve adil çözümün ancak Batı Şeria’dan da çekilme ile mümkün olacağını vurguluyordu. Ürdün Dış İşleri Bakanı, Marvan Muaşer, gerçekleştirilecek çekilme planının ancak Yol Haritası çerçevesinde ele alınırsa muvaffak olacağını belirtiyordu. Bu noktada, Ürdün’ün Filistin meselesinin çözümü için iki devletli bir siyaset izlemesi, 1988 yılında Batı Yakasından çekilme kararı ile ne denli örtüştüğünü göstermesi açısından önemlidir. Zira, İsrail başbakanı Ehud Olmert’in 2006 yılındaki demeçleri göz önünde bulundurulduğunda, Hamas’ın Filistin’de iktidara gelmesi ile birlikte İsrail’in İşgal Edilmiş Topraklardan tek taraflı çekilme düşüncesinin Arap-İsrail Uyuşmazlığının merkezinde yer aldığı görülmektedir.

Filistin meselesini çözümsüzlüğü devam ederken, ABD'nin terörle mücadele kapsamında Irak'ı işgali, Ürdün'ün iç ve dış siyasetini derinden etkiledi. Özellikle 11 Eylül saldırıları Orta Doğu'da farklı kimlikleri ve ideolojileri dışlayıcı bir yaklaşımla bölgenin istikrarını tehdit etmesi Ürdün'deki İslamcı, Arapçı ve Filistin eksenli siyasi parti ve örgütleri harekete geçirdi. ABD'nin 2003 yılında Irak'ı işgali, bölgedeki cemaat, etnik ve ulus-üstü kimlikler üzerine tartışmaları ön plana çıkardı. Tartışmanın bu boyutunda Stephen Saideman'ın ortaya koyduğu 'kimlikler ülkelerin dış politikalarını nasıl etkiler' ve 'politikacılar hangi koşullar altında hangi kimlikleri vurgular ve hangilerini arka plana iter' şeklindeki iki soru yanıt bulmaktadır.

ABD'nin Irak'ı işgali yıllardır süregelen ve ülkede Sünniler tarafından domine edilen güçler dengesinin Şiilerden yana değişimine neden oldu. Siyasi arenadaki Sünni-Şii ayrımı sadece Irak'taki siyasal yapıyı değiştirmekle kalmayıp, bölgedeki diğer ülkelerin de gündemlerini belirledi. Sünni-Şii çatışmasının bölge ülkeleri açısından en önemli sonucu şühesiz yükselen Şii siyasal gücüne karşı militan bir Sünni İslami hareketin Orta Doğu'da El-Kaide, Vahhabilik ve Selefilik ile bağlantılı hareket etme alanı bulmasıdır. Sünni kimliğin bu gibi cemaatler ve hareketler tarafından destek görmesi, özellikle Ürdün gibi ılımlı İslamı yıllardır ülkesinde barındıran toplumlar açısından kaygı verici bir durum yaratmıştır.

Irak savaşı öncesi ve sonrasında, Ürdün Haşimi Krallığı'nın temel politikası Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün ve ulusal birliğinin korunması yönünde şekillenmiştir. Ürdün'ün böyle bir politika izlemesinin iki temel nedeni vardır. Birincisi, bölgedeki ülkelerin sınırlarının sömürge devletleri tarafından Birinci Dünya Savaşı sonrasında belirlenmiş olması sebebiyle, Irak'ın sınırlarının yeniden çizilmesi, ileride Ürdün'ün özellikle Filistin ile olan sınırının yeniden şekillenmesi olasılığını ortaya çıkarıyor. Diğer bir deyişle, Krallık açısından Irak'ın toprak bütünlüğünün korunması aynı zamanda Ürdün'ün de sınırlarının muhafazası anlamına gelmektedir. Diğer yandan, Iraklıların haklarını savunmak ve Irak'ın ulusal birliğinin korunmasını desteklemek, Kral Abdullah ve rejimine ülke içerisinde muhalefetin gücünü azaltacak manevra alanı bırakmaktadır. Her

ne kadar yerli bir Ürdünlü kimliği ve ulusu yaratmak rejimin temel hedefleri arasında yer alsa da, tarihsel ve sosyal kimlikler Ürdün halkının beklentilerini ve ideallerini karşılamaktadır. Bu çerçeveden bakıldığında, rejim savaş ve Amerikan karşıtı İslami hareketi Arap milliyetçiliğine vurgu yaparak zayıflatmaya çalışmaktadır. Irak'ın bütünlüğünü savunarak Krallık, hem Irak'ta hem de kendi içerisinde istikrarı yakalamak istemektedir.

Irak'taki savaşın Ürdün açısından en önemli etkilerinden bir tanesi yükselen Selefi İslamcı hareketi algılamak olmuştur. Özellikle Abdul Mussab el-Zerkavi'nin Irak'ta Şiileri hedef alan *Tandhim al-Qai'da fi Bilad al-Rafidayn*'ı (Mezopotamyadaki el-Kaide Örgütü) Irak savaşının ardından kurması, Ürdün Krallığını alarma geçirmiştir. Zerkavi'nin Filistin kökenli olmayıp, Ürdün'ün yerlisi olması da önemli bir ipucunu da beraberinde getirmektedir. Ülkedeki Selefi ve Cihat hareketinin temsilcilerinin, Zerkavi'nin kendisi de dahil olmak üzere, Amman'ın kuzeyindeki Zerka kentinin yerlisi olmaları, Ürdün'de ılımlı İslami hareketin değişime uğrayabileceği sinyallerini vermektedir. Zerkavi'nin yanısıra, Filistinli göçmen olan Abu Muhammed el-Makdisi de Zerkalı olup Ürdün'deki Cihat hareketinin temsilcileri arasında yer almaktadır.

1960 ve 1970'lerde hem Filistinlileri entegre etmekte büyük rol oynayan hem de Baasçı, Nasırcı ve Arap milliyetçi muhalifleri homojenleştiren Ürdün'deki İslami hareket (özellikle Müslüman Kardeşler Örgütü), 1990'larla birlikte nitelik değiştirmiş ve Irak savaşının ardından yaşanan bu değişiklik gözle görülür hale gelmiştir. Aslında ılımlı İslami kimliğin daha radikal bir özellik kazanmasında, Krallığın dış politikada hedeflediği ABD ve İsrail yanısı politikalar belirleyici olmuştur. Bunun yanısıra, aşiretlerin ekonomik ve siyasal güçlerini 1990'larla birlikte kaybetmesi, radikal İslami ve Selefi harekete dahil olmalarının yolunu açmıştır.

Rejimin, Filistinlileri içerseyici kimlik politikalarının 1988 yılı ile birlikte yerini özelde seçim yasası ile dışarsayıcı bir yaklaşıma dönüştürmesi, Filistin kökenli Ürdünlülerin İslami harekete verdiği desteğin nedenini açıkça ortaya koymaktadır. 11 Eylül saldırılarının ardından ülkede yaklaşık 1.700 kişi dini

inançları sebebiyle göz altına alınmıştır. Krallık her ne kadar ertelediği Parlamento seçimlerini Haziran 2003 yılında gerçekleştirmişse de, seçim yasasında bir değişiklik yapılmadığından dolayı Temsilciler Meclisi bugün bağımsızların yanı sıra, Krallık taraftarı milletvekillerinin çoğunlukta olduğu bir konumdadır. İHC toplam 17 milletvekili ile temsil edilirken, 110 sandalyeli meclisin %62'sini rejime bağlı üyeler oluşturmaktadır.

2005 yılının Kasım ayında Amman'da meydana gelen bombalı saldırılar aslında Ürdün'ün Irak savaşı sonrası karşı karşıya kaldığı tehdidin dış politika odaklı olduğunu göstermektedir. Ürdün ekonomisinin büyük çoğunlukla dış yardımlarla ayakta kaldığı gerçeği, ülkenin ABD politikalarına verdiği desteğin nedenini ortaya koymaktadır. Ancak rejimin Ürdünleştirme politikaları Ürdün toplumunu ne derece homojenleştirdiği ve bölgesel meselelerden soyutladığı da bir soru işaretidir. Özellikle 2005 yılı itibariyle çıkarılan birtakım yasalar İslami muhalefetin (İHC dahil) çalışma alanını daraltmaktadır. Örneğin, camilerde siyaset yapılması yasaklanmış, buna ilk tepki de İHC eski sözcülerinden, Abdul Latif Arabiyyat'tan gelmiştir. Arabiyyat'a göre, Müslüman Kardeşler Örgütü ve onun siyasi kanadı İHC rejimle işbirliğine açık olmanın yanı sıra, radikal İslami hareketi engelleyecek bir de role sahiptir. Ancak, rejimin İslami gruplara karşı sert yaklaşımı, İHC'yi destekleyenlerden bazılarının daha radikal militan örgütlere üye olmaları Irak savaşı sonrası ülkede rejimi tehdit eden en önemli unsurlardan birisini oluşturmaktadır. Zira İHC'nin rejimle geleneksel olarak kurduğu yakın ilişki diğer İslami gruplar tarafından eleştirilmektedir.

Haziran 2006 yılında İHC'li dört milletvekilinin Zerkavi'nin evine taziye ziyaretinde bulunması, İHC (aynı zamanda Müslüman Kardeşler Örgütü ile) ve Krallık arasındaki yıllarca süren işbirliğini derinden etkiledi. İki İHC milletvekilinin görevlerini yapmaktan men edilmesinin yanı sıra, Parlamento "teröre karşı" yasayı da onayladı. Söz konusu yasa, güvenlik güçlerine terörle mücadele çerçevesinde (göz altına alma ve tutuklama sürelerinde) geniş yetkiler tanıyordu.

Irak'taki savaşın iç huzursuzluğa dönüşmemesi için, Krallık 'Önce Ürdün' Kampanyası ile ulusal dayanışmayı sağlamayı hedeflemiştir. Rejime göre, dıştaki açmazlar ile başa çıkabilmek ülkede ulusal birliği sağlamakla yakından ilgiliydi. 2006 Temmuz ayında oluşturulan "Hepimiz Ürdünlüyüz" Komisyonu bu hedefleri hayata geçirmek amacıyla ülkedeki birçok siyasetçiyi, milletvekilini ve sivil toplum örgütüne mensup üyeleri bir araya getirmiştir. Aslında bu düşüncenin ardında yatan gerçek, Ürdün toplumunun iç siyasete olan ilgisini artırıp dış meselelere olan dikkatini en aza çekebilmektir. Filistin ve Irak ögesinden arındırılmış yerli bir Ürdünlü kimliği rejimin dış politikada attığı ABD yanlısı politikaları daha "meşru" ve "tahayyül edilebilir" olmasını kolaylaştıracaktı. Yani toprağa dayalı bir kimlik, bölgesel meselerin ve olayların daha az etkisinde kalabilecekti. Bu da Krallığa dış politika tercihlerinde yardımcı olacak mekanizmayı sağlıyordu. Kimliğin bu noktada "ikna edici" bir görevi olduğu söylenebilir.

Ürdün, 1948 Arap-İsrail Savaşı sonrasında Filistin sorununun çözümsüzlüğünün yarattığı sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasal etkileri en fazla hisseden ülkedir. Bunun temel nedeni, 1950 yılında Batı Şeria'nın ilhakı sonucunda Krallığa göç eden Filistinlilerden kaynaklanmaktadır. Krallığın tüm Filistinlilere vatandaşlık hakkı tanınması ülkede yaşayan Filistin kökenlilerin tümünün kendini Ürdünlü hissetmesini sağlayamamıştır. Özellikle 1970-71 Kara Eylül olayları Ürdün'deki Filistin boyutunun ne denli Krallığın politikalarını sınırlar nitelikte olduğunu göstermektedir. Filistinliler ile Ürdünlüler arasındaki 'etnik bölünme' ülkede iç istikrarsızlığın yegane sebebi olarak algılanmaktadır.

1988 yılına kadar Kral Hüseyin, Doğu ve Batı Yakasının bölünmez bütünlüğünü savunmuştur. Ancak, birinci intifada sonrasında Krallık bu politikasından vazgeçmiştir. Bunun ardından, Krallık, Ürdün'ü Filistin meselesinden ayırıştırmak amacıyla 'Ürdün Ürdündür', 'Filistin Filistindir' yaklaşımını hem kimlik politikalarında hem de dış politikada uygulamaya başlamıştır. Filistin çözümü için iki devletli politika (Filistin ve İsrail Devletlerinin bölgede tanınması anlamında), Krallığı ayrıca İsrail açısından da bakıldığında bağımsız

bir devlet olarak görülmesini sağlayacaktı. Zaten 1994 yılında Ürdün'ün İsrail'i tanınmasının bir nedeni de alternatif vatan tezini zayıflatmaktı.

Bu çalışma, Ürdün'ün “ulus inşa” ve “kimlik oluşturma” çabaları bağımsızlık yıllarından ele alıp, ülkenin bugün içerisinde bulunduğu iki bölgesel olayla yeniden şekillenen kimlik politikalarını analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Özellikle Doğu Yakalıların iç huzursuzluğu tetikleyen dinamiklerin 1989, 1998 ve 2002'deki Maan olaylarıyla su yüzüne çıkması, Krallığı yeni kimlik politikaları izlemeye yöneltmiştir. Aslında Adnan Abu Odeh, Kral Huseyin ve Kral II. Abdullah'ın eski danışmanı, ve Toujan Faisal, Çerkez kökenli ilk kadın milletvekili, gibi isimler eğer yerli bir Ürdünlü kimliği yaratılacaksa bunun ancak ülkedeki tüm halkları kapsayacak bir siyasetle olacağı görüşünü paylaşmaktadırlar. Örneğin Faisal'a göre, yerli bir Ürdünlü kimliği *Ürdüstini* (Ürdün-Filistin) ile yani melez bir aidiyetle sağlanabilir. Abu Odeh ise eğer *ortak* bir Ürdünlülük bilinci yaratılacaksa bunun hem siyasi partiler hem de seçim yasasında yapılacak değişikliklerle mümkün olabileceğini vurgulamaktadır.

Bu olaylar karşısında rejimin temel yaklaşımı, Ürdün dış politikasının Arapçı, İslami ve cemaat kimliklerinden arındırılıp, daha teritoryal *watani* bir kimlik yaratılarak ülkenin dışta izlediği siyaseti daha “tahayyül edilebilir” kılmaktır. Çünkü kimlikler sadece aktörlerin çıkarlarını ve tercihlerini belirlemekle kalmamakta, ayrıca bazı dış politika adımlarını kabul edilebilir hale getirmektedir. Buna karşın, bazılarını meşru kılmamaktadır. Bu noktadan bakıldığında Ürdün'de ulusal ve devletin kimliğinin örtüşmediğini gözlemlemek mümkündür. Arapçı, İslami ve devlet-altı cemaat değerlerine bağlı Ürdün halkının beklentileri, *al-Aqsa intifadası* ve Irak'taki savaş göz önüne alındığında, rejimin norm ve beklentileriyle birebir aynı sınırları taşımamaktadır. Bu nokta Ürdün'de rejim ve toplum arasındaki “kimlik ikileminin” ve “çatışmasının” nedenini açıklamaya yardımcı olmaktadır. Bu çatışmayı en aza indirebilmek için de Krallık, Ürdünlü olmayı yeniden tanımlamakta ve ‘Doğu Yakası’ aidiyetine ‘Önce Ürdün, Sonra Arap’ Kampanyası ve ‘Hepimiz Ürdünlüyüz’ girişimi ile vurgu yapmaktadır.

APPENDICES

CURRICULUM VITAE

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Advanced English, intermediate German

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Learning Arabic as a foreign language, Sport, Music, Travel, Movies