THE POPULISM OF THE VILLAGE INSTITUTES:
A CONTRADICTORY EXPRESSION OF KEMALIST POPULISM

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the populism of the Village Institutes by comparing it with Kemalist populism. In this context it is worth to say that throughout the thesis populism is defined as *government by the people* and discussed in relation to *democracy*. In order to do so – as a first step - the democratic structure and function(ing) of the Village Institutes are discussed with reference to their fundamental principles, organizational structure, and educational program. Secondly, the contradictory conceptualization of the "people" and the separation between the "intellectual" and the "people" is tried to be analyzed with reference to the writings of İsmail Hakkı Tonguç (who is called as the architect of the Village Institutes), the memoirs of the graduates of the Village Institutes, and in-depth interviews made with their graduates. The question hereby is to what extent this understanding of populism involve in itself what can be called the "paradoxical elitism" of the populist ideology, which arises out of the tensive relation between "social-egalitarian" and "administrative-institutional" aspects of populism. It is claimed that despite the similarities with Kemalist populism, the

Village Institutes shifted the emphasis from the "administrative-institutional" to the "social-egalitarian" aspect of populism and surpassed the boundaries of Kemalist populism by implementing democratic principles like "equality" and "self-government", and encouraging participation and by attempting to create a new kind of intellectual through "education within work".

Keywords: The Village Institutes, Populism, Elitism, Kemalist Populism, Democracy.

ÖZ

KEMALİST HALKÇILIĞIN ÇELİŞKİLİ BİR İFADESİ OLARAK KÖY ENSTİTÜLERİ HALKÇILIĞI

Aytemur, Nuran

Doktora, Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yönetimi Bölümü

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Bu tez, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığını Kemalist halkçılıkla karşılaştırarak incelemektedir. Bu bağlamda, halkçılık, *halkın kendi kendini yönetmesi* olarak tanımlanmakta ve demokrasiyle ilişkilendirilerek ele alınmaktadır. Bunun için de öncelikle Köy Enstitüleri'ndeki demokratik yapı ve işleyiş, Enstitülerin işleyişindeki temel ilkeler, örgütsel yapı ve Enstitülerde uygulanan öğretim programı üzerinden tartışılmaktadır. İkinci olarak, çelişkili "halk" kavramsallaştırması ve "halk/aydın" ikiliği, Köy Enstitüleri'nin mimarı olarak nitelendirilen İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un yazılarına, Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının anılarına ve onlarla yapılan derinlemesine mülakatlara referansla çözümlenmeye çalışılmaktadır. Burada temel soru, bu halkçılık anlayışının halkçılığın "toplumsal-eşitlikçi" ve "yönetsel-kurumsal" boyutları arasındaki gerilimli ilişkiden doğan "paradoksal elitizm"i ne ölçüde içinde barındırdığıdır. Kemalist halkçılıkla benzerliklerine rağmen, Köy Enstitüleri'nin "eşitlik" ve "kendi kendini yönetme" gibi demokratik ilkeleri uygulamaya koyup katılımı teşvik ettiği ve "iş içinde eğitim" anlayışıyla yeni bir aydın tipi yaratmaya çalışarak vurguyu halkçılığın "yönetsel-kurumsal" boyutundan "toplumsal eşitlikçi"

boyutuna kaydırdığı ve bu anlamda Kemalist halkçılığın sınırlarının ötesine geçtiği iddia edilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Köy Enstitüleri, Halkçılık, Elitizm, Kemalist Halkçılık, Demokrasi.

To My Parents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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CHAPTER I

GENERAL INTRODUCTION AND THE FRAMEWORK OF THE DISSERTATION

I.1. General Introduction

The Village Institutes (VIs) were one of the most efficacious social phenomena in the history of the Turkish Republic. Despite the fact that they were in essence educational institutions, they had social, economic, political and cultural impacts on the structure of the Turkish society, and politics. Their far-reaching influence –even on the Turkish literature by producing a "village literature"- is one of the reasons for studying this subject. Indeed, despite being a short living experience, the VIs have continued to be a controversial issue and a significant subject for social scientists. They have been studied mostly in the discipline of pedagogics because of their alternative understanding of education which is still thought to be a solution to the problems of existing educational system. However, this forms just one dimension of the VIs, which, being a multi-dimensional phenomenon, provide a fertile ground for various disciplines. Thus, the training and the educational program in the VIs are included in this study mainly because of its role in –and/or contribution to - the aim of creating a new kind of intellectual in a "democratic" atmosphere (who, at the same time, would be the ideal citizen of a democratic society).

The subject of the study is to evaluate the VIs within the context of populism, *halkçılık*, and to find out whether – and if the answer is "yes" - to what extent they overcome the inner contradiction of populism between the social-egalitarian and administrative-institutional aspects the reflections of which can be found in the "paradoxical elitism" of populist ideology. In this respect, the study

concentrates on the educational program, organizational structure and functioning of the VIs which are thought to contribute to the creation of a "democratic" atmosphere in the VIs. Indeed, the VIs themselves were thought and claimed to be organized – by the architect of the project, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, and his associates -as a "model" for a future democratic society which is characterized by "government by the people". This is the point where a relationship – but a paradoxical one - between democracy and populism is formulated, and which makes the VIs Project an attractive subject for political scientists. Thus, the study aims to contribute to the academic literature on the VIs by making a critical analysis of this relationship in the case of the VIs from the political science perspective, concentrating mainly on the separation between the intellectuals (or the elite) and the people, which has been placed at the center of the debate on populism and democracy, and still remains a problematic issue.

There is a remarkable literature on the VIs, but they consist mainly of memoirs of the graduates of the VIs. Moreover, the VIs have been a controversial subject being discussed in various journals, periodicals, conferences. However, they are mostly debated within the context of village question and the educational problem which are still thought to be major problems in Turkey. This is not surprising since the VIs were established by the Republican government to solve these problems. But this should not lead one to overlook other dimensions of the VIs since, being a multi-dimensional phenomenon, they went beyond the expectations of the regime. To reduce the roles and the aims of the VIs merely into the village question and educational problem will be to do injustice to them. Therefore, differing from existing studies which usually concentrate on the two dimensions of the VIs, this study calls attention to one of the most important -but usually neglected- aspects of the VIs: generating a new type of an intellectual.

There is no consensus on the reasons behind the establishment of the VIs. In fact, the reasons behind their establishment are much more complex including pedagogical, economic and political ones. Being educational institutions, the VIs

aimed to train village teachers and spread education especially to the countryside. However, as it is generally argued, their functions cannot be limited to the pedagogical one. Some writers put the emphasis on economic causes – to increase agricultural production, develop industrialization, and create a national market economy - while others emphasize political reasons like contribution to the creation of a nation and national culture, to instill the ideology of the new regime, and to gain support to the regime. Those focusing on political causes pay attention to the continuity and similarity between the People's Houses and the VIs especially in the sense that they form a part of the project of creating a nation. Some writers view both the People's Houses and the VIs as an embodiment of Kemalist populism in general, and peasantism in particular which is considered as one of the most important components of populism of the single party period.

The present study aims to examine the VIs in relation to the Kemalist understanding of populism. The concept of populism is used to refer to "halkçılık", which was a central element of the ideological discourse of the Young Republic. Throughout the study, the term is sometimes used interchangeably with peasantism, which forms one of the components of populism. The peasantist discourse influenced Turkish intellectuals and the ruling circles in the 1930s. Especially starting from 1937, the peasantist discourse reached its peak through the debate on the land reform and the VIs. Peasantism, Karaömerlioğlu argues, was not a discourse or movement separate from, "parallel", or "opposed to", Kemalism. The peasantist discourse was articulated to Kemalism in various forms at different times, serving the latter which aimed to save the 1930s' and 1940's Turkey from the destructive effects of class differentiation, urbanization and industrialization (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 296).

As it has been already mentioned, peasantism is a component of populist ideology in general and Kemalist populism in particular. However, defining populism mainly as "government by the people", the study will focus rather on

the paradoxical elitism of populist ideologies which is a result of the contradiction between "administrative-institutional" which refers to the relationship between "rulers" and "the ruled" with special emphasis on the former as the main actors of inegalitarian power relations, and "social-egalitarian" aspect of populism which concentrates on the "ruled" side of this relationship. This contradiction between the two aspects of populism which is crystallized in the paradoxical elitism of populist ideologies can be clearly observed also in Kemalist populism. In the Turkish case, despite the use of Rousseau's concepts of "will of the nation" and "national sovereignty", populism, as being one of the Six Arrows, as Tunçay argues (1999: 212), did not develop as an "egalitarian" and "libertarian" principle, being limited to -or transformed into- nationalism through the replacement of the concept of the people with that of the nation. Indeed, Kemalist conception of populism had an ambivalent character and the social-egalitarian aspect of populism had been emphasized starting from the War of Independence until the foundation of the Republic, and more precisely, of the one party regime. Later on, the emphasis shifted rather on its administrative-institutional aspect.

In this study, the experiment of the VIs will also be examined and evaluated as an embodiment of this inner contradiction between the administrative-institutional and the social-egalitarian aspects of populism; i.e. the contradiction between the ruler and the ruled, which can be evaluated as the motor of this experiment subsequently conceived as "destructive". Although the foundation of the VIs can be considered as an embodiment of Kemalist populism, this should not necessarily lead one to conclude that the populism of the VIs[1] is a mere reflection or expression of Kemalist populism. In fact, as Engin Tonguç argues, Kemalism was the major point of reference in Turkish political life in a period during which there was no other "effective political current" and the success of any attempt was in a way based on its positive reference to Kemalism (Tonguç, E. 1970: 208).

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[1] Here, "the populism of the VIs" is used to refer both to Tonguç's understanding of populism and that of the graduates since the graduates generally seem to adopt and internalize Tonguç's understanding of populism.

However, as it will be shown in the following chapters, despite retaining the "progressive" aspects of Kemalism, the VIs surpassed the boundaries of Kemalism to a certain extent. Here, a question arises: in what sense the VIs contradicted with the expectations of the regime and went beyond them. In differentiating Kemalist populism and the populism of the VIs another question to be answered is whether and to what extent the objectives of the founders (or architects) of the VIs –especially İsmail Hakkı Tonguç- and that of the ruling class contradicted with each other. In trying to answer this question, the present study will focus on the "democratic" structure and functioning of the VIs.

In the present study the question of to what extent the VIs can be evaluated as a "radical" and "oppositional" movement will be asked and investigated. Other questions aimed to be answered throughout the study are as follows: in what senses the expected objectives of the official political authorities and the results of this experience contradict and the latter surpass the former? To what extent this conflict between the "objectives" and the "outcomes" arise from the difference between Kemalist populism, which puts an emphasis on the administrative-institutional aspect, and populism of the VIs which focuses rather on the social-egalitarian aspect with more democratic notions? Did the VIs make a contribution to the evolution and/or enrichment of this understanding of populism shifting the emphasis on the "egalitarian" aspect rather than the administrative-institutional one? Or to put it differently, can we consider the experience of VIs as a "challenge" to the "elitism" of Kemalist populism? What kind of a relationship can be established between populism and democracy? To what extent the structure and functioning of the VIs can be labelled as "democratic"? What type of intellectual were aimed to be generated by the VIs? And did they overcome the separation between intellectuals and the people by creating a new kind of an intellectual?

To answer these questions, after giving a general picture of the economic, political and social conditions of Turkey at the end of the 1930s and at the

beginning of the 1940s, examining Kemalist populism with its theoretical roots, the VIs -their predecessors, i.e. People's Houses; the reasons behind their establishment; their basic features; their closure, and their continuing impact will be analyzed. In dealing with the question of to what extent the VIs deviate from and challenge the Kemalist conception of the people and populism, the study will involve interviews with graduates, and a general overview of the realistic village literature –in terms of the reflection of village and the VIs. The main concepts used in this study are populism, peasantism, elitism, democracy, intellectual, and the people.

At this point, it is necessary to mention the limitations of the study. As it has been already stated at the beginning, the concept of populism is used to refer to different forms and practices in different historical contexts. It has been one of the dominant ideological elements within various political discourses from rightist to leftists ones. This results in a proliferation in the use of "populism" making it an ambiguous and elusive term. This study does not aim to overcome this ambiguity by giving a comprehensive and all-inclusive –comprising all ideologies and movements given this name- definition of the term. On the contrary, the objective is to focus on what all these different conceptualizations of populism share in common: a sort of elitism which arises out of an essential duality, i.e. the inner contradiction the administrative-institutional and the social-egalitarian aspects of populism. This necessarily leads us to examine populism of the VIs mainly in relation to "democracy". However, since our main objective is an examination of populism rather than democracy, the latter will be considered as a secondary subject. In other words, the notion of democracy will be used as a means to explain and question the populist discourse of the VIs. It is for this very reason that a discussion about democracy will not be included. Here, democracy is used in its simplest terms to mean "government by the people". I prefer to use this general and common sense of the term "populism" which was, at the same time, the official use of the term during the period in question. (Even İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, the architect of the VIs, himself used the concept of democracy in

the same way.) Therefore, for the sake of the manageability of this study, there is no need to examine different practices and theories of populism in detail. But, references to them will be made whenever it is thought necessary.

Both Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs will be examined in terms of, first, the separation between the intellectual and the people; second, a contradictory conceptualization of the latter by the former; and third, public participation. This division between the three aspects of populism is a methodological one to make a comparative analysis of Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs.

After examining Kemalist populism in terms of these three aspects, in the second chapter, which is an informative one, I will delineate an overall picture of the economic, political and social conditions of Turkey, in which the VIs came into existence, towards the end of the 1930s and at the beginning of the 1940s. Despite not drawing a clear line of demarcation between the social, political, and economic causes, a methodological division between them will be made. Rather than including an overall analysis of the historical conjuncture dominating the Turkish social formation throughout the 1930s and 1940s, for the purpose of the study, the focus will be especially on the agricultural policy of the government and the conditions of the peasantry, first, to pay attention to the fact that Kemalist populism was not effectively put into practice in the form of social and economic policies; and second, to display and explain the reasons for the continuing interest in village and peasants which gave rise to the foundation of the VIs. Then, the VIs -their predecessors, i.e. People's Houses, the reasons behind their establishment and their basic features will be included. This chapter involves only a general information about the VIs, excluding detailed information about the laws, rules, regulations, functioning, programs, courses, etc in the VIs. At the end of this chapter, Tonguç's peasantism will be explained in general terms.

For these reasons, this study is rather intended to be a partial and incomplete contribution to the analysis of populism and the VIs in general. Moreover, it was designed to analyze the populist discourse of the graduates of the VIs, and it did not include other aspects of the VIs like its organizational structure, laws, rules, regulations, functioning, programs, courses, etc in detail.

In chapter four, the "democratic" organization, structure, and functioning of the VIs will be examined with reference to the basic principles of organization; the principle of self-government; the principle of self-sufficiency; education within work and production-oriented education. They are discussed with special reference to Tonguç's ideas and directives which constituted the ground for the functioning of the VIs. It deserves mention that Tonguç was very sensitive and fastidious about whether the principles and directives were truly carried out.

Starting with a brief discussion concerning the conceptualization of the "intellectual" with a special emphasis on Gramsci who contributed much to this issue; the fifth chapter is placed to investigate the paradoxical elitism of the populist ideology in the case of the VIs with reference to Tonguç's writings and the interviews made with the graduates of the VIs.

The method of analysis of this study is a literature survey on the history of populism in Turkey and a comparative analysis of Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs depending on the primary sources and documents on Kemalist populism and the VIs. Since the main object of the study is not a comprehensive historical analysis of Kemalist populism, it is examined with reference to both primary – Mustafa Kemal's texts and speeches and the party documents- and secondary sources. But in examining populism of the VIs, which forms the main subject of the study, the primary sources –interviews with the graduates of the VIs, their published letters, books and articles, and memoirs- and documents –laws and regulations about the VIs- will be particularly overviewed.

A special emphasis is put on Tonguç's ideas (and writings) since Tonguç was the leading figure of the VIs project.

In order to examine the populism of the VIs, interviews with graduates of the VIs have been made. Since they were in-depth interviews, the number of the interviewees was limited to ten. Several criteria were used in choosing them. First of all, they were tried to be chosen according to the Village Institute from which they had graduated in order to reflect and evaluate various experiences in different VIs. Their date of graduation was another criterion to compare the functioning of the VIs during their initial years and that of what is called the period of collapse started in 1946 with the resignation of Hasan Ali Yücel, the Minister of Education, and İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, the Director of Primary Education and to see the changes in the functioning of the VIs. Moreover, the interviewees were tried to be chosen from among the most eminent ones, e.g. well-known writers. One of the crucial points hereby is the question whether or not and to what extent these persons themselves do represent a somehow "elitist" position. Another criterion used when selecting the interviewees was their gender. The reason for using this criterion was to answer the question of whether there was a gender discrimination between girls and boys in the VIs, and whether they had different experiences due to their gender.

When it comes to the questions asked to the graduates, they were divided into two groups. The first group includes questions about their understanding of "the people"; their approach to the village question; and their relations with peasants - both of the villages they came from and of those nearby the VIs -during their training in the VIs and their teaching service after graduation. The second set of questions were prepared to find out the functioning of the VIs through the experiences of the graduates and to see whether it was democratic or not. Thus, questions about principles –egalitarianism, self-government, participation, initiative, etc.- reading and discussion hours, discipline, relationship between students and teachers were asked. Questions about the problems the students had

been faced with in the VIs and "education within work" (*iş içinde eğitim*) were also included. The latter is important especially to understand what kind of an intellectual was aimed to be generated in the VIs.

Although the questions have been formulated carefully, prepared in two groups and enumerated accordingly, the conditions and preference of the interviewees mostly determined the course of the interviews. That is to say, some of the interviewees have preferred to get questions at first and then to talk without interruption, while others wanted me to ask questions respectively. Therefore, since I have adopted the method of in-depth interview, each interview determined its own course. Moreover, depending upon their teaching service, a few interviewees were exempted from some questions. For example, a few were not asked about their relationship with peasants after graduation since they had not worked in the villages as village teachers. An interesting point to be emphasized is that before starting interviews, a few interviewees asked my origin, and was pleased when they learnt that my parents are of village origin. This is something that seemed to earn me sympathy in the eyes of the graduates. And a question remains to be answered whether they treat me in the same way if my parents were not of village origin.

Having talked about the problem, limitations, and method of the study, now it is proper to provide a theoretical framework of the study.

I.2. Theoretical Framework: The Paradoxical Relationship Between Populism and Democracy

Many scholars agree that populism is an ambiguous and elusive concept. The ambiguity of the concept is linked to the indeterminacy of the phenomenon to which it has been attached. That is to say, it has been applied to define various ideologies and political movements with different social bases and orientations. While populism sometimes appeared in the form of "socialist", "anti-statist" and

"radical" movements formed by urban intellectuals giving reference to peasantry under the conditions of agricultural and industrial backwardness, in Latin America it arose in the form of an "urban reformist movement" taking both working class and middle class as its basis. While it sometimes constituted a part of a discourse of an "anti-statist" movement, at other times, it became an agent of sustaining "state's legitimacy". In other words, in different historical contexts, it is possible to observe different populist theories and practices (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001a: 272). All these prevent us from constructing an all-inclusive and consistent definition of populism which would embrace all ideologies and movements called "populist".

The vagueness of the concept partly results from the key term "people". "The people", as Laclau (1979: 165) argues, is the "common element" which "constitutes the analogical basis of all possible uses of the term" with different meanings. It is, however, a concept "without a defined theoretical status". The term has already been etimologically derived from the Latin word *populus*, meaning people. It means government by the people as a whole. It is in this sense that populism is contrasted with elitism which argues for government by a privileged few. Indeed, contrasting populism with elitism is a common attitude among scholars. This point will be elaborated upon in the following pages. Before that, it is necessary to briefly talk about the contradictory usages of the term.

Erdoğan pays attention to the "contingent" side of the "ways in which the subjectivity, the 'people', is constructed and imagined". That is to say, this construction depends on the "ideological complex in which it is reworked". This leads to various constructions or imaginations of the people as "conservative" or "revolutionary", "racist and warrior" or "patriot and peaceful" (Erdoğan, 1992: 41). There is another uncertainty about "whom the people are". In her examination of the current political uses of the notion of "people" in English, Canovan finds out three different senses in which the term is commonly used:

"the people as nation"; "the people as underdogs"; and, "people as everyman" (Canovan, 1984: 315). These three senses, she argues, correspond to three most familiar modern political outlooks (Canovan, 1984: 314). However, it is not possible to confine either of them to any one political group (Canovan, 1984: 320). First of all, "people" refers to a "whole political community" or "nation". This unifying or integrative rhetoric is "conservative". In its second sense, "the people as underdogs," the term is used to refer to a particular section of the community, the "less privileged majority" (Canovan, 1984: 315), the "ordinary people" who are "not rich or rightly educated" (Canovan, 1984: 324). Here, the people, i.e. the lower classes, are contrasted with some kind of "upper class" or "elite". This "anti-elitist" rhetoric, Canovan argues, is "left-wing" (Canovan, 1984: 318). In the third use, "people" –without any article- refers to individual human beings in aggregate, anyone and everyone (Canovan, 1984: 315). This rhetoric had affinities with liberalism (Canovan, 1984: 317). It is this very elastic character of the term -with fluctuating meanings- which, for Canovan, explains the conceptualization of the people as "weak" and "strong" in "radical", i.e. left-wing, populist rhetoric. While on the one hand, the people are the "underdogs, poor inoffensive creatures, constantly oppressed", they are the "mighty army of humanity against which no oppressor can stand", on the other (Canovan, 1984: 322). What all these mean is that there exist different and contradictory senses of the "people". Even the distinction between a certain 'us' and a 'them'[2] does not help us overcome the ambiguity of the concept of the "people" (Arditi, 2003: 9).

The loose definition of the concept of "the people" so as to include different social groups also prevents us from overcoming this ambiguity. The term was sometimes used to refer to the peasants, while at other times it referred different social groups, the peasants being only one of them. In both uses, the term represents an "undifferentiated totality" with its disregard of differentiation

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[2] This "them" is nothing else but an "enemy." As Laclau states, "[t]here is no populism without discursive construction of an enemy (Laclau, 2003: 6). It is because "none will fail to interpellate to some extent the 'people' against an enemy, through the construction of a social frontier" that "no political movement will be entirely exempt from populism." (Laclau, 2003: 12)

among those social groups. This can be clearly observed in Kemalist populism which rejected class differentiation in Turkey with its emphasis on unity and solidarity. It is this very rejection of the existence of different classes and conceptualization of the people as an undifferentiated totality which was equated to "nation" that a close relation between populism and nationalism was formed.

Having paid attention to the contradictory usages of the term "people", now it is appropriate to turn back to its etimological origin, the Latin word *populus* meaning government by the people as a whole, which provides the ground for formulating a relationship between populism and democracy. Once populism is defined as government by the people as a whole, elitism appears to be its opposite with its argument for a government by a privileged few who are considered to be "qualified to rule" standing above the masses. In this sense it may be possible to conceptualize populism as a sort of "anti-elitism". Dividing the society into "rulers" and "the ruled", and believing in the inevitability of elite rule[3] elitism, indeed, argues against the notion of popular sovereignty, whereas, being defined as necessarily "anti-elitist", populism is considered as "the inevitable antidote to elitist democracy".

According to Bell, it is "optimism" or "pessimism" about people's (political) ability which differentiates populism from elitism. Actually, this optimism or pessimism about people's competence is, indeed, not peculiar to populism or elitism but shared by everyone as an "intuitive part of how one looks at the world" (Bell, 1992: viii).) He defines populism as "optimism about people's ability to make decisions about their lives" and "pessimism about an elite's ability to make decisions for the people affected". Elitism, on the other hand, is used to refer to "optimism about the decision-making ability of one or more elites, acting on behalf of other people" together with "pessimism about the

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[3] For Vilfredo Pareto, the basis for elite rule is the "superiority of the elite" in terms of the psychological and personal attributes proper for government, while it is "organisational skill" rather than moral or intellectual superiority for Gaetano Mosca. (Faulks, 1999: 40)

people's ability to make decisions affecting themselves" (Bell, 1992: 3). Bell stresses that the argument between populism and elitism is a "disagreement" about people's ability to handle their affairs rather than a "form of class conflict". That is to say, being a member of an elite does not prevent one from being a "populist" (Bell, 1992:5). Another point to be emphasized is that it is possible to find a kind of pessimism about "people's political ability" among elites of the political spectrum from the right to the left. According to Bell, pessimism about "what newly enfranchised electorates would do with their power once attained" seemed to be part of being a "well-educated", "well-regarded" person –i.e., "part of elite status itself" (Bell, 1992: viii).

It is this widely-accepted definition of populism as "anti-elitism" that enables us to formulate a relationship between populism and democracy. Therefore, it is used here especially to critically examine this relationship in the case of the VIs. However, I have some reservations about conceptualization of populism simply as "anti-elitism". The most important one is about the denial of class analysis in examining the social structure. Dividing the society between "powerless" masses and "powerful" elites, and considering this separation as the main contradiction in the social structure, populism disregards class differentiation and class conflict, and fails in fully explaining the complexity of the social structure (Yalman, 1985: 20, 65). This makes populism a poor analytical tool for understanding social reality. Therefore, rather than defining populism as "anti-elitism"[4] by simply

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[4] As Yalman rightly argues, the definition of populism as "anti-elitism" negates the "class analysis" necessary to understand the complexity of social structure (Yalman, 1985: 65). That is to say, so long as populism highlights the separation between "the people" and "the elite" as the main contradiction in the social structure, it disregards class differentiation (Yalman, 1985: 20), leading to an analysis of different class formations on a common ground. Thus, "anti-elitism" becomes a common denominator for different populist movements. Another criticism directed by Yalman is related to the leading role played by "charismatic leaders" in populist movements. It is because of this very "determining" role that the leaders form a different category of "elite". From such a perspective, the political struggles in the society are reduced into a "power struggle between different elites". Furthermore, the political/social movements are characterized by the "progressive" or "conservative" quality of the elites (Yalman, 1985: 39). However, it is the definition of populism as anti-elitism which enables us to grasp and focus on the relationship between populism and democracy. Therefore, it is used here but baring in mind the flaws of this conceptualization. It should also be remembered that, in this study, populism is used to mean *halkçılık*, differing from the one criticized by Yalman.

drawing a sharp line between them, this study calls attention to the hidden connection between populism and elitism, i.e. the "paradoxical elitism" of populist ideologies. Here the term "elitism" is used in a limited sense to refer to the inner contradiction between the social-egalitarian and administrative-institutional aspects of populism. This point will be made clear especially after a critical examination of the relationship between populism and democracy in terms of the contradictory conceptualization of the term "the people", the question of political participation and representation.

As it is argued above, the definition of populism as "anti-elitism" implies formulation of a relationship between populism and democracy. Indeed, constructing a kind of relationship between populism and democracy is not a new theoretical attempt. In the late 1960s, Peter Worsley, for example, paid attention to this relationship. What is lacking in those theoretical approaches is that while emphasizing different aspects of populism including this relationship, they generally neglect the essential contradiction mentioned above. (But this negligence does not necessarily mean, or lead one to conclude, that these approaches have no important use in this study.) The present study will focus especially on the relationship between populism and democracy, putting the emphasis on what I shall call an "immanent contradiction" of populism, i.e. the "paradoxical elitism" of populist ideologies. Once populism is defined mainly as "government by the people", a kind of an interior relationship between populism and democracy seems to be established. But the immanent contradiction of populism mentioned above poses danger to this relationship because of the tension which arises between the "social-egalitarian" aspect emphasizing the base and the "administrative-institutional" aspect putting the emphasis on the rulers. This tension is explicitly seen in representative democracy, which, in Hayward's words (1996: 27), "has to live with the countervailing forces of elitism and populism". What all these mean is that the relationship between populism and democracy is a "paradoxical" and "ambiguous" one. This ambiguity can be

overcome once populism is defined as an "articulated element (moment) of an ideological complex"[5] (Erdoğan, 1992: 3).

Once this is extended to the relationship between populism and democracy, we can say that it depends on the specific ideological complex to which it is articulated. That is to say, depending on the ideology to which it is articulated, populism gains "democratic" or "undemocratic" character. Considering populism basically in its relation to democracy, I differentiate my approach to populism from others'. The need for such a differentiation, in a way, arises from the peculiarities of populism (especially Kemalist populism) in Turkey which will be given in the following part of the study. Here, the main issues to be dealt with are determined as the separation between the intellectuals and the people, a contradictory definition of the latter by the former –that is, viewing the people to be "educated", "enlightened", while "exalting" them- and political participation of the people advancing such principles as "self-government", "popular sovereignty". The immanent contradiction of populism arises at this point. That is to say, on the one hand, the intellectuals "exalt" the people with their values, traditions, etc in such a way that they generally form "the source" of the nation. Populism, as Wiles argues, is indeed based on the major assumption that "virtue resides in the simple people … and in their collective traditions" (Wiles, 1969: 166). On the other hand, the same people are seen as to be "trained", "enlightened". It is exactly the latter consideration of the people that "entails" the "help" of intellectuals. Since the people are thought of lacking the qualities of mind and character or knowledge to be attained through education, there arises a need for a group of individuals which decide and act "on behalf of" and "for them". In other words, the masses were seen as "not fit to govern for themselves", creating the need for the leadership "to govern the masses". It is this essentail duality which generates tension that were never resolved.

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[5] Defining populism in such a way, one can easily explain why "its problematic meaning radically diversifies in each historical case" (Erdoğan, 1992: 39), and why it is articulated to ideologies from rightist to leftist ones.

Here, Lavrov's arguments[6] can be mentioned to clarify the separation between the "people" and the "intellectuals". Lavrov pays attention to the "unfolding dialectics between the critically-thinking individuals and the masses", or between the "scientific vanguard" and the "backward masses" throughout history. It was only the former, "cultivated minority", the "critically-thinking individuals", who were able "to grasp the knowledge of historical progress" and "it was their duty to transfer this knowledge somehow to the masses" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1996: 135). Here, it should be emphasized that in giving such a role to the intellectuals, Lavrov did not suggest that they should also "reorganize" society. On the contrary, their role is limited to teaching the many and spreading critical thought among the masses (Pomper, 1972: 106). Lavrov thought that "the peasants themselves had to undergo a process of education" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1996: 143). However, they were not the only ones being in need of education. The revolutionaries were to educate themselves as well because of "the necessity of a long period of preparation for the education of the masses for social revolution" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1996: 134). Another point to be emphasized concerning the task of the intellectuals is its "ethical" side. That is to say, the intelligentsia owed a debt to the masses since they had gained the leisure and material comforts necessary for higher intellectual and moral development at the expense of terrible sufferings of exploited men and women, and they had to "repay" this debt to the people (Pomper, 1972: 102; Walicki, 1979: 237).

Here, what is at issue is *voluntarism*, a significant characteristic of populism, which underlines "the role of intellectuals and leaders in transforming society".

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[6] Karaömerlioğlu warns us that Lavrov's ideas do not reflect all the variants of the populist movement or the populist ideas, and so his "elitist" perspective was not the general trend among the populists (Karaömerlioğlu, 1996: 135). Similarly, Walicki argues that once R. Pipes's definition of populism as "a theory advocating the hegemony of the masses over the educated elite" is accepted, it will not be possible to call the followers of Lavrov "populists" (Walicki, 1969: 63-64). In contrast to Lavrov's writings in which anything "exalting the masses" or the "primitive" can hardly be found, his colleague Mikhailovsky considered the "primitive man" superior in many respects, such as having "direct and complete control over his own labor and means of production" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1996: 135). For the present author, however, populism should not be thought in opposition to elitism and merely as its inevitable antidote since the former has elitist connotations.

As a matter of fact, the emphasis on human will and voluntarism, as Karaömerlioğlu states, is a common characteristic of most of the populist movements of the late 19th century, particularly that of Russian populism. The populists gave considerable significance to the role of intellectuals and leaders in transforming society. Here, there is a strong belief that "there was nothing that the power of human agency could not achieve". Karaömerlioğlu draws a kind of similarity between this mentality and "faith in transforming the Turkish society with educational leadership", arguing that, in the presence of structural backwardness and objective restrictions, the expectations from the VIs, as in Stakhanovism, were "high in terms of human factors such as discipline and commitment" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 60).

Leaving the question of similarity[7] between Stakhanovism and the faith in transforming the Turkish society with educational leadership unanswered for the moment, here, the emphasis will be put rather on the thought or the belief that the transformation and development of the society would be achieved with the help – and in the vanguard - of a certain group, i.e. the "intellectuals," the "enlightened" section of the society, the rest – the "people" - being rather the objects of this transformation since they were thought to be in need of training to be able to change society. That is to say, they should have been taught what to want and have to do. The lack of trust in the "people" and the need for the leadership and/or guidance of the intellectuals were claimed to be the result of uneducatedness[8] of the people. Therefore, it was rather the "educated," "enlightened" group who would display the willpower in the name of the "people" -a phrase which recalls the question of representation- and mobilize that of the rest by the common rhetoric of "appeal to the people". This brings up arguments about the democratic notion of political participation.

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[7] This similarity will be questioned in the following chapter.

[8] Here, the term "uneducatedness" is preferred to "illiteracy" since it means more than knowing how to read and write.

I.2.1. The Question of Political Participation

Political participation is a notion common to both populism and democracy. Worsley pays attention to the "participatory" aspect of populism –an element in political action which is an "intrinsic part of the democratic process" (Worsley, 1969: 246). He suggests a definition of populism which, "without eliminating 'pseudo-participation'", could involve "genuine and effective popular participation" (Worsley, 1969: 245). This is a definition of populism which refers to popular participation in general besides "'direct' relationships between people and leadership". Here the relationship between populism and democracy is formulated. That is to say, popular participation[9], or in Worsley's terms "the conception and the praxis of the involvement of people in the governing of their own lives" –"however ineffective the achievement"- is involved in the concept of "the supremacy of the will of the people" (Worsley, 1969: 246). It is for this reason that Worsley considers "populism as 'direct' participation" as a "dimension" of the democratic and socialist traditions. But he does not formulate a necessary relation between populism and democracy. On the contrary, "the populist 'dimension'", he argues, "is neither democratic nor anti-democratic", being an aspect of a various political cultures and structures. But populism, for him, is certainly "compatible" with democracy. (Worsley, 1969: 247)

As a matter of fact, there is not a smooth relationship between populism and democracy. Arditi pays attention to the "ambiguous and often tense relation of interiority [populism] maintains with the practice of democracy", arguing that populism can grow as a "fellow traveller of democratic reform movements" and

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[9] Though populism is not based on "false consciousness" or "manipulation" of the popular masses by the populist leader, "it does not involve the autonomous and organized participation of the popular masses into the political practice" (Erdoğan, 1992: 43). Despite advocating the political participation of the "people," even Ecevitçilik, which was a specific form of populism in Turkey, does not construct the "people" as "the autonomous agent of the political practice". The people are thought to "be saved and emancipated by the leader/intellectuals" (Erdoğan, 1992: 95). While comparing populists with Rousseau, Arditi (2003: 9) also pays attention to the same point arguing that despite, similar to Rousseau, being distrustful of representation considering themselves as "the actual voice of the people," populists, unlike him, "distrust initiatives that empower citizens and that encourage their autonomous initiatives".

put democracy in danger.[10] This depicts the "paradoxical status" of the relationship between populism and democratic politics (Arditi, 2003: 18-19). Canovan (1999: 2) tries to illuminate this paradoxical relationship arguing that the sources of populism lie in the "tensions at the heart of democracy" rather than the social context that gives rise to the grievances of any particular movement. Her suggestion is that democracy has two faces, namely "redemptive" and "pragmatic"[11]. Between these "opposed" but "interdependent" faces there lies a "gap in which populism is liable to appear" (Canovan, 1999: 9). Hence, a "conception of populism that retains a relation of interiority with democratic politics". In Canovan's terms, populism is a "shadow" that follows democracy continually, rather than being its "other". (Arditi, 2003: 16)

Following Canovan, Arditi (2003: 15) argues that populism "disrupts" democracy by bringing back "the disruptive 'noise' of the people", exerting "pressures on the presuppositions of representative democracy", and warping them "through the mobilization of the people to bypass institutional constraints". He mentions critics citing the dangers which populism poses for democracy as follows:

> The cult of personality can transform leaders into quasi-messianic figures for whom accountability is not a relevant issue and the populist disregard for institutional checks and balances can encourage rule by decree and all sorts of authoritarian behaviour while maintaining a democratic façade. In addition, the distinction between good common people and corrupt elites can become an alibi for using strong-arm tactics against political adversaries, and the continual invocation of the unity of the people - as right-wing populists show us continually - can be used as a means to conjure pluralism and toleration. (Arditi, 2003: 16-17)

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[10] It is because of this "double bind" that Arditi (2003: 19) views people like Canovan, but also Worsley and Hayward, as "right" in proposing that "any inquiry about populism is at the same time an inquiry about democratic politics".

[11] At the heart of the "redemptive" face of democracy there lies the notion of "popular power" meaning that "the people are the only source of legitimate authority, and salvation is promised as and when they take charge of their own lives". From the "pragmatic" point of view, on the other hand, democracy means simply a "form of government", and so "institutions". In the former, on the contrary, there exists a "strong anti-institutional impulse", a "romantic impulse to directness, spontaneity and the overcoming of alienation". (Canovan, 1999: 10)

Actually, the tension which, for Canovan, arises between the "two faces of democracy", is embedded within populism itself. That is to say, what is called the paradoxical elitism of populism is a common characteristic of all kinds of populisms that Canovan mentions. And it is this very characteristic that forms a "threat" or poses danger to the "progressive" aspects of populism, like egalitarianism, self-government, etc.

Hayward also establishes a kind of "interior" but smooth rather than paradoxical relationship between populism and democracy arguing that "populism lays claim not merely to being democratic but to embodying the most authentic version of democracy" (Hayward, 1996: 10). Believing in the necessity of placing this claim in theoretical and historical perspective, he mentions the direct and representative forms of democratic government which have a "common derivation from public opinion", but differentiating from each other whether this can be "mediated" or "unmediated". The first conception of democracy which had appeared in the classical city state republics such as Athens, was revived in the seventeenth century. But its greatest exponent was Rousseau in *The Social Contract* (1762), with his conception of popular sovereignty expressed through the general will, which could not be represented. In contrast to Rousseau who denied representation - and so separation between the "ruler" and the "ruled"- Robespierre and the Jacobins applied this to the whole of France by "confiding all power to a representative assembly", or adopting "government by assembly". Hence, "the explicit advocacy of the superiority of indirect democracy", in which government affairs were confided by the "passive mass citizenry" to an "elite of active citizens" in the late eighteenth century[12] (Hayward, 1996: 11). The most famous representative of this idea in the first half of the twentieth century is Schumpeter. Believing in the inevitability of elite rule which is thought to be necessitated by the "supposed" irrationality, apathy and ignorance of the masses, Schumpeter considers democracy a "method of selecting elites". This is an

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[12] Hayward (1996: 11) mentions Abbé Sieyés as the leading exponent of this view. Sieyés preferred a representative system of government not only because it is "applicable" to large states but also it would "allow the more capable and committed few to rule on behalf of the many, who lacked the leisure and knowledge to govern directly".

"impoverished" view of democracy (*democratic elitism*) which, with its very reliance upon elites, discourages public participation. Here, the question of representation comes to the agenda.

I.2.2. The Question of Representation

The question of political participation necessarily brings up a discussion about representation. Here, the notion of the "people" also arises as a key term. Equating populism with politics, Laclau calls attention to the inevitability of the constitution of the "people" in the terrain of the relations of representation:

> As far as we have politics we are going to have social division. A corollary of this social division is that a section within the community will present itself as the expression and representation of the community as a whole. This chasm is ineradicable as far as we have a political society. This means that the "people" can only be constituted in the terrain of the relations of representation. (Laclau, 2003: 13)

Arditi also argues that the concept of the people involves in itself an 'acting for others' which assumes the existence of two levels, namely that of being represented and of those acting for them as representatives. Another assumption here is the existence of a "gap" between these two levels -a gap which distinguishes "representation" from "self-government" (Arditi, 2003: 8). This gap, Arditi continues, is considered to be "bridged" first, with the assumption of "the presumed immediacy of the link between the people and the leader, in which case there is no absence but only a joint presence without representation", and second, with the claim that "the trusted leader is a vehicle for the expression of the popular will, which dissolves the gap between the represented and the representatives in favour of the latter by fiat of tacit authorization". According to Arditi, here exists an "alleged double and simultaneous full presence, of the people and of those who act for them." In fact, for Arditi, the populists, like Rousseau, are arguing against the concept of representation as a "corruption of

the general will" and consider themselves more as "the actual voice of the people" than as representatives (Arditi, 2003: 9). Even populists' claim on legitimacy is grounded on the assertion that "they speak for *the people*"; "they claim to represent the democratic sovereign" (Canovan, 1999: 4). Viewing themselves as "true democrats", populists claim that they voice popular complaints, opinions, and interests (of the "silent majority") systematically ignored by governments, mainstream parties and the media. Many of them favour "direct democracy" –"political decision making by referendum and popular initiative" (Canovan, 1999: 2). However, as Arditi (2003: 8) argues, populists' claim to be "the actual voice of the people", or "to speak in the name of the people" expresses often more a "desire" than a "reality".

This explains the general populist opposition to liberal democracy. Here, it is apt to recall Russian revolutionary populists' (especially of the 1870s) distrust toward liberal democracy which for them meant nothing but "atomization of individuals"[13], "the decline of solidaristic feelings", and a "passive participation in bourgeois politics". Most of the Russian populists, Karaömerlioğlu (1996: 138) says, viewed liberal democracy, which is based on parliamentary politics, as "the

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[13] Populists compare "fragmentary"-"one-sided" personalities in complex societies where "individuals are fitted to an advanced and complex division of labour" and "estranged from each other" with "many-faceted", "integral" personalities in simple societies, and argue for a "complete man" who is "free of any burden of alienation" (MacRae, 1969: 159-160). (This argument was raised also by Turkish populists.) It is, indeed, MacRae argues, common to all populists for whom populism is "about personality in a moral sense": "Populism claims that the individual should be a complete man. Complete men, living ideally in independent agrarian virtue, would agree with one another. Their insights would be sound, healthy, bound to appropriate pieties. Their judgements would be free but would coincide. Their society would be essentially consensual and uniform. The paradigmatic man of populism is free of any burden of alienation… Because he is perfect he is free … but because he is perfect this freedom is realized in uniformity and identity of character with his fellows." (MacRae, 1969: 160). Here, as MacRae argues, "moral uniformity" is emphasized at the expense of freedom (MacRae, 1969: 162). This is, in a way, supported by the equation of the sum of "individual will[s]", each of which is a "righteous" one, to the "general will" of the community (MacRae, 1969: 160). It also deserves mention that populism does not aim at "complete equality among peasants" despite its "sympathy" for the poverty-stricken ones and its opposition to social and economic inequality produced by the institutions it dislikes. In her analysis of populism in modern Britain, Canovan pays attention to its stress on "the ordinariness of 'ordinary people' " and on their "similarities" with an assumption that they all share much the same views, which are "conformistic rather than pluralistic, traditional rather than trendy". For Canovan, this assumption resembles that of neo-Kantian philosophers like Rawls and Habermas who assume "the unanimity of all rational men" (Canovan, 1984: 326).

direct outcome of the development of capitalism"- a "stage that could be bypassed"- and so as something to be avoided with a fear that it would lead to the dissolution of the traditional solidarity of the village community and introduce "inequality" and "class war" to the countryside (Worsley, 1969: 222). This very distrust and suspicion (of liberal democracy) is also a reason for populists' dismissal of the "political revolution," meaning for them a bourgeois revolution, and for their support of the "social revolution," with a "deep economic transformation of existing relations". It should be emphasized that despite their strong opposition to capitalism and liberal democracy, not all Russian populists can be characterized as "economic romanticist".[14] That is to say, some of them, including Lavrov, believed in the necessity of industrialization for Russia but argued for an alternative, "non-capitalist" model (Karaömerlioğlu, 1996: 138). (Nor North American populism which was not opposed to capitalism called for a return to any pre-capitalist economy.) Indeed, especially small capitalists are acceptable to populism except "left-wing" one, *Narodniki* being the most prominent example (Wiles, 1969: 169). For the Russian populists, what would enable a special path to industrialization avoiding the horrors of capitalistic industrialization was the traditional peasant institutions – the *obschina* and the *mir* - (Stewart, 1969: 186, 192).[15]

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[14] This reminds us Lenin's conception of populism as "a protest against capitalism from the point of view of the small immediate producers who, being ruined by capitalist development, saw in it only a regression but, at the same time, demanded the abolition of the older, feudal form of exploitation" (Walicki, 1969: 65).

[15] Here, "populism" of Herzen, in which "populist socialism" was rooted, deserves special attention. He is called "the father of populism" in the sense that he argued for a "direct transition to socialism through the peasant commune". However, Walicki argues, it is not possible to call him a full-fledged populist because of his image of capitalism as an epoch of "final stabilization" and "equilibrium" and of the "social advance of the masses" rather than a stage of "permanent crisis" and increasing poverty and misery of the masses. His view - and criticism - of capitalism differs from that of populists and far from reflecting the "standpoint of the small producer" (Walicki, 1969: 68-69).

Similarly, Turkish populists were not characterized by their opposition to industrialization[16]. As Karaömerlioğlu argues, the distinctive characteristic of populism –and peasantism- in Turkey is opposition to "urbanization" rather than to industrialization. The opposition and/or hostility to city – which, for peasantists, represented "cosmopolitism", "class struggle", "economic crises", "strikes", etc. (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 289) - and urbanization generally ended in the glorification of the peasants and the village life. They delienated a "utopian" village life and economy. The peasants were viewed as "pure", "generous", "wise", and "open to change" (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 287). The peasantists also aimed to remove the distinction between the city and the village, and to prevent the exploitation of the latter by the former.

The contradiction between city and country and the exploitation of the latter by the former is, indeed, an important part of peasantist discourse. While city is pictured as an "alien and hostile force" exploiting peasants and so characterized by "consumption", "luxury" and "sinfulness", country is regarded as "exploited", "poor", and "in debt". Here, as Minogue points out, the contrast is made especially in "moral" terms (Minogue, 1969: 202). However, this is not always made in compliance with the original contrast between the urban and the rural. Minogue gives "the moral abstraction of exploiters and exploited" as an example. This abstraction, according to her, "destroys" the original contrast since not only the country but also the city include exploited classes. This leads populism "to become assimilated to" socialist ideology. The American populists, for example, claim to stand not only for the "impoverished" peasants but also for the "exploited" workers although they failed to make a "real alliance" with labour

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[16] In the developed capitalist countries, Karaömerlioğlu says, peasantism arose as a "direct reaction to urbanization and industrialization" at the end of nineteenth century. Thus, the peasantist current in these countries were characterized by their "reactionary" aspect and the past to turn back to (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 284). In the underdeveloped parts of the world, on the other hand, peasantism came on the scene for different reasons. While it saw in the peasantry "the basic force" of certain revolutionary movements in some countries, in others it was considered an "antidote" to the left-wing movements having "socialist" leanings. In the latter, peasantism sometimes became a "component" of agriculture-based modernization movement. When it comes to peasantism in Turkey, it is possible to find both "reactionary" and "progressive" aspects in it (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 285).

organizations. Here, Minogue states, "the [populist] ideology becomes a distorting guide to the character of the movement" (Minogue, 1969: 203). It was not only American populists who became aware of the need for alliance. Similarly, MacRae says, the Russian populists understood that such an alliance was necessary to realize their ends. But they viewed the urban industrial worker as "subordinate to the virtues of the soil, of the yeoman and the peasant". The latter were "the veridical personalities, and spontaneous, simple, and good. From them all others should learn; on them all others should be modelled." (MacRae, 1969: 161)

The urban-rural contrast, Minogue argues, is not only made in "moral" terms, but also involves "processes". The city represents the process of industrialization and capitalism, which "dehumanizes" man, while the country is thought to preserve "the old humane values" which will prevent man from "corruption". Minogue adds another point, a "historical" one, to the urban-rural contrast that "the countryside has largely been dumb throughout its history". This is, indeed, one of the reasons for "plagiarist" character of populist ideology "making do with scraps of doctrine and images largely acquired from other, better established attitudes" (Minogue, 1969: 202). The result is glorification or exaltation of the 'virtues' of the country as opposed to the 'vices' or 'evils' of the city (Stewart, 1969: 192).

In addition to urbanization, industrialization was also criticized by Turkish populists, both being considered the causes of Great Depression of 1929 (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 73; 2001c: 171). There was a consensus on the need for the development of national industry but this, for populists and/or peasantists, should have been achieved without experiencing a Western way of industrialization. For peasantists, industry should have been created in the villages and serve the welfare of the peasants (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998b: 61), binding peasants to the land and preventing dissolution of the traditional relations of production (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 74; 2001c: 172). Actually, in contrast to Russian and North American "traditional" populisms, the Third World populists

eagerly desire and welcome industrialization though they were aware that they will remain agrarian societies for the visible future (Worsley, 1969: 235). As Wiles points out, even one of the great legacies – Mahatma Gandhi- of the "anti-industrial philosophy" of Russian populism in the Third World had no support in his country (Wiles, 1969: 172). Minogue argues that populism is a "movement" of those who recognizes that they belong to "the poor periphery of an industrial system", and so it might be a "reaction to industrialism". However, it is a "reaction by those whose profoundest impulse may often be to industrialize"[17] (Minogue, 1969: 209-210).

For Minogue, it is this very ambivalence on which "the intellectual emptiness" of populist movements lays (Minogue, 1969: 210). The populist ideology is "moralistic", "emotional" and "anti-intellectual", and "non-specific in its program". MacRae also pays attention to the same point viewing populism as a "special", "romantic primitivism" which is necessarily "anti-intellectual" (MacRae, 1969: 162). Similarly, Wiles defines populism as "moralistic" and "anti-intellectual". The exception is *Narodnichestvo* which was the only "all-intellectual movement" (Wiles, 1969: 174). (However, as Wiles rightly states, this does not mean that intellectuals are excluded from an ordinary populist movement (Wiles, 1969: 175).) According to Wiles, accepting the major premise of populism that "virtue resides in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions" (Wiles, 1969: 166), the Narodniki, who were an "elite", tacitly declared their own "worthlessness" (Wiles, 1969: 174-175). Populist intellectuals form this "self-denying" ideology of vicarious intellectual populism when they are "quite isolated from the masses" (Wiles, 1969: 167), and failed to form a mass movement[18]. However, Wiles argues, this

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[17] Similarly, Stewart views populist movements as a "response to crises of development" – first, a response to "the decision to industrialize and how", and second, "the current or anticipated consequences of industrialization" (Stewart, 1969: 185).

[18] Following Walicki, populism can be defined as an ideology formulated by an intelligentsia (Walicki, 1969: 67). It is not only the concept *Narod* (people) but also "the myth" about the concept of the peasant commune which were "produced" in the minds of the Russian intelligentsia in accordance with their needs and interests. That is to say, rather than a reflection of

vicarious populism which "expresses the actual sentiments of the people" is "much more noble and left-wing than ordinary populism" which involves "more nationalism, capitalism and general prejudice" in itself. Although both of them theoretically rest upon the "goodness of the people", *Narodnichestvo* differs from ordinary populism with its emphasis on the "people" rather than on "goodness" (Wiles, 1969: 175-176). Here, what is called "the Janus quality"[19] of populist movements also deserves mention. Stewart uses this metaphor to pay attention to "the synthesis of traditionalism and modernism" in populist ideology (Stewart,

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reality, both were created by this urban intelligentsia. Depending upon these assumptions and inspired by Lavrov's works, Karaömerlioğlu (1996: 133) defines populism mainly as "a theory reflecting the necessities and interests of the intelligentsia". Peter Worsley pays attention to the same point arguing that Russian populism was "outstandingly a movement of intellectuals, who 'idolized' the people (particularly the peasantry), and their institutions (particularly the *mir*), and were prepared to sacrifice their lives and their freedom in the cause of the people. But Russian populism was pre-eminently an ideology about the peasantry, not one created by them, nor one rooted in the peasantry. It preached learning from, being guided by, the people, when everything in it was created by a segment of the urban intelligentsia." This is not, however, common to all kinds of populism. Worsley mentions North American populism which, in contrast to Russian populism, was a "mass popular movement of the farmers" the "ideologists" of which were a "local" intelligentsia -rather than a national or cosmopolitan one- being "drawn from the farming community itself" (Worsley, 1969: 221).

[19] The Janus character – especially the "reactionary" face of populism – is, according to Lenin, one of the major points of difference between Russian "enlighteners" and "populists". Before explaining this difference, it is necessary to mention the characteristic features which Lenin attributed to Russian "enlighteners" of the sixties. These are: "violent hostility to serfdom and all its economic, social and legal products"; "ardent advocacy of education, liberty, Europeanization of Russia generally"; and "defence of the interests of the masses, chiefly of the peasants". These features, for Lenin, formed the essence of "the heritage of the sixties" which had nothing to do with populism. Following Koz'min, Walicki argues that this opposition which Lenin drew between "enlighteners" and "populists" is not an absolute one (Walicki, 1969: 70). Here, what Lenin tried to stress is the former's strong opposition to "those ancient institutions which the populists have taken under their protection". The "enlighteners", for Lenin, were "the ideologists of radical bourgeois democracy, fighting against the remnants of feudalism, with confidence in capitalist progress" but overlooking its inherent – and painful - contradictions (Walicki, 1969: 71), whereas the populists, being aware of those negative aspects of capitalist progress made a "big step forward" compared with the former. That is to say, although both currents of thought advocated the interests of "the people", populism differs from the "heritage" in terms of being a combination of "anti-feudal bourgeois democratism" and a "petty-bourgeois conservative reaction against bourgeois progress". It is at this point that the "reactionary" face of populism came to the scene. Regarding capitalist progress with distrust and turning one face to the past, the populists adopted "economic romanticism" and made a step backward in comparison with the "enlighteners". Walicki warns us of Lenin's use of the term "reactionary" which was used merely to describe "the error of theoreticians who take models for their theories from obsolete forms of society" (Walicki, 1969: 72). He also points out how a "reactionary" viewpoint could sometimes turn into a "vantage point" in the case of Russian populists who, thanks to the "reactionary" character of their ideals, could realize the contradictory and negative aspects of capitalist progress which were overlooked by the "enlighteners" (Walicki, 1969: 73).

1969: 191). Populism contradictorily has both a "modernist" aspect and an "anti-modernist, traditional" aspect (Hayward, 1996: 20). Arising as "responses to development 'crises'" in societies undergoing modernization – a process which was thought to be controlled so as to prevent its "disruptive" effects in the West, populist movements tries to make a synthesis between the traditional values (of the traditional culture) and the need for modernization (Stewart, 1969: 186-187, 192). On the one hand, viewing the country as a reserve of cultural traits and the "people" as an "essence" of the nation, while on the other, as in need of "being modernized", populist ideology carries in itself this very dichotomy between traditionalism and modernism. But, it should be remembered that populist ideology is very selective when it chooses which elements of the "traditional" culture will be preserved.

Having explained the paradoxical relationship between populism and democracy, its embodiment in the case of the VIs can be presented in the third chapter. This will be done by giving a portrayal of both populism developed in the VIs and of the "democratic structure and functioning" of the VIs. However, before that it is necessary to give the socio-economic and political conditions of the country which gave rise to the foundation of the VIs.

CHAPTER II

KEMALIST POPULISM

II.1. The Historical Roots of Kemalist Populism

The concept of populism appeared in the Turkish populist thought in the Second Constitutional Period. The Russian Narodnichestvo movement had an impact on the emergence and development of populist ideology in Turkey.[20] The Young Turks were indirectly influenced by this movement via the Bulgarian and Armenian revolutionary movements and the migrant Turks from Russia who later joined the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) (Berkes, 1975: 231-2; Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 57; Toprak, 1984: 69). Having been influenced by the Russian Narondnichestvo movement and its extension in the Balkans, the Ottoman populists gathered around the societies *Türk Ocağı* (Turkish Hearts) and *Milli Talim ve Terbiye Cemiyeti*, and the periodicals *Türk Yurdu* and *Halka Doğru* (Toprak, 1984: 69). During the Second Constitutional Period, Toprak argues, the term "nation" was used interchangeably with that of the "people". In *Türk Yurdu*, one of the publications of the Turkicist movement, for example, it was argued

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[20] Scholars talk about three sources of populism, namely Narodnism, French Revolution, and Solidarism. However, they differ from each other in terms of grounding populism in Turkey on one of these sources. Ahmet Makal summarizes them as follows: the first one explains populism with "Narodnik" impacts. Tekeli and Şaylan's approach is mentioned as the representative of this approach. The second one is that of Dumont which emphasizes the impact of the "solidarist" approach. For the third and the last one the main source is the French Revolution with its equation of "the nation" and "the people." Tunçay's interpretation of populism is given as an example of this approach. Criticizing approaches which try to explain populism in Turkey mainly through one of these sources, Makal argues that it is improper to ground the source of populist ideology merely upon a single source although there were periods during which one of them had been dominant. What is at issue, on the contrary, is the manifestation of populism as a combination of different factors, and this, for Makal (1999: 56-57), is one of the reasons explaining why populist ideology in Turkey could never theoretically form a coherent whole. Rather than grounding the source of populist ideology merely on a single source, the present author adopts the widely-accepted argument which periodically grounded the populist ideology in Turkey, first, on Narodnichestvo, and then solidarism (or French solidarist thought).

that it was the people's sentiments, views and creeds that formed the nation. Therefore, it was necessary to go to the people and understand them to advance the nation (Toprak, 1984: 70). In another publication of the Turkicist circle *Halka Doğru*[21], Yusuf Akçura stated that the Turkish intellectual had to turn towards the people, "integrate with them", and "educate them by going down to the level of the people" (Toprak, 1984: 71).

The principle of "going to the people" had its reflections also on the literary circles like *Genç Kalemler* and *Yeni Felsefe Mecmuası*, according to which the first condition of "going to the people" was the use of a simple language that could be understood by the common people (Toprak, 1984: 74). However, as Tekeli and Şaylan argue, the initial steps taken by these literary circles should not be merely interpreted as a "New Language" movement since it carried in itself a considerable "populist" content (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 59). Indeed, Berkes argues, this movement (*arı dil akımı*) constituted an important part of the populist movement. Since the populist movement or ideas arose interest mostly of writers, it is not surprising that the first difficulty they met with in "going to the people" was the question of language (Berkes, 1975: 233). For these writers, the gap between the people and the administrators could not be overcome only through parliamentary means like enacting a Constitution and forming an Assembly. It was also necessary to simplify the language, i.e. to use people's language (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 59). In addition to the simplification of language, "National Literature" (Milli Edebiyat), which aimed to portray the daily life of the Anatolian people in the forms of popular literature was also put on the agenda (Toprak, 1984: 75).

During World War I, the Narodnik impact disappeared and populism gained a new dimension, a solidarist outlook, under the influence of French sociology.

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[21] In the first issue (April 1913) of *Halka Doğru* included articles of many famous writers like Halide Edip, Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Tevfik Nurettin, Celal Sahir, Hüseyinzade Ali, Hamdullah Suphi, Akil Muhtar, Abdülfeyyaz Tevfik, Ali Canip, Ali Ulvi, Galip Bahtiyar, Kazım Nami, Köprülüzade Mehmed Fuat, Ziya Gökalp, Mehmed Emin, Mehmet Ali Tevfik, Memduh Şevket, all of whom were introduced as permanent authors of the periodical (Toprak, 1984: 70).

Here, the defeat in the Balkan War in 1912 played an important role, leading to a transformation of the ideology of the CUP from "Pan-Ottoman, Islamist and decentralist" one to a "Turkicist, Westernist and centralist" one. Then, populism relatively lost its "collectivist" nature, gaining a "Turkicist" dimension in Gökalp's synthesis. Here, Gökalp became the most famous figure with his conception of populism with a solidarist-corporatist outlook as an extension of French sociology (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 59). However, before examining his understanding of populism, it is necessary to mention briefly what solidarism is.

Toprak defines solidarism as a "pacifist", "reconciliatory" ideology which searchs for a "middle way" between liberalism and socialism but by protecting or respecting free enterprise and private ownership; offers state intervention in economy; puts the social regulations on its agenda, adopting "organizational solidarity" based on "agreement" and devoid of contradiction; and argues for "secularized education". In other words, it is an "evolutionist thought" which takes for granted the prevailing social structure and tries to remove social inequities through "parliamentarian" way. Denying the social change, solidarism does not go into the source of social inequalities; rather, it aims to relieve them by adopting the principle of "social justice", and replacement of the concept of class conflict with the principles of "cooperation" and "solidarity". The solidarist thought was introduced to Turkish political life by Ziya Gökalp and other Unionists like Tekin Alp, Necmettin Sadık (Sadak), M. Zekeriya (Sertel), Yusuf Kemal (Tengirşenk) (Toprak, 1977: 95). Here, Gökalp arises as the most important figure since the populism of the Second Constitutional Period was considered as a product of Gökalp's sociology who was deeply influenced by French solidarism[22] (Toprak, 1977: 92).

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[22] This leads some scholars to the conclusion that the populist thought in Turkey developed under the impact of French solidarism. Mardin (1992), for example, views the Western solidarism as the source of populist thought in Turkey.

Gökalp was an influential figure being both a "theoretician" and "ideologue". He was, at the same time, an activist and his ideology was developed in parallel with the practices of the CUP. It was also the case for his understanding of populism. Populism of that period, Tekeli and Şaylan argue, developed in two dimensions. The first one was broader popular participation in politics (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 61). The second one was related to "the prescribed social order". Gökalp removed "the class aspect" of populism, reducing it to "Turkism" and "nationalism" on the basis of Durkheimian "social solidarism" (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 62). It was through this reduction –and also definition of the nation as a "totality" without conflicting interests- that the creation of a "national economy" and a "national bourgeoisie" became an aspiration of the society as a whole. However, Tekeli and Şaylan argue that towards the end of the first half of the 1920s, as a result of the economic policies which created social unrest, Gökalp's populism gained a new dimension, "equality" –of races, nations, men and women, and classes. (This also means a shift from a "nationalist content" to an "internationalist" one with a slogan of fraternity of the nations.) Allowing only "natural" inequalities, Gökalp's populism aimed at an "egalitarian society" where class differences would disappear through "etatism". Thus, populism and etatism became "complementary" to each other, forming an "ideological totality". This, Tekeli and Şaylan argue, did not influence the Republican ideology for which etatism, despite being adopted as a principle and implemented in the 1930s, could never become an instrument to realize populism since it did not comply with the class structure of the country (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 62-64).

Giving briefly evolution of Gökalp's populism, now it is proper to examine the Gökalpian understanding of the concepts of "the people" and "the elite". The Gökalpian understanding of the concepts of "people" and "populism" had determined the Kemalist conception of populism to a large extent. For Gökalp, "people" refers to groups apart from educated elites. The people is defined as "classless", "united" and "complementary" groups without conflicting interests. This solidaristic view which carried the traits of Durkheim, who thinks of society

in terms of "harmony" rather than conflict, had impact on the Republican intellectuals, shaping the imagination of society in populist thought. Gökalp's conception of the people was advocated by the leaders of the regime during the 1920s. Aiming to distinguish themselves from both the liberal-individualist and the socialist-collectivist formulations, the leading cadres conceived people as an "authentic carrier of nationality" rather than as a "social" or "class" subject (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001a: 274-275).

However, Gökalp's conceptions of "the people" and "the elite" differ from that of the Unionists and to a certain extent Kemalists. Gökalp does not consider the people and their culture as "passive", and as an manipulable raw material. The people, for him, were both "the source" and "the end" (not "rhetorically" but "sincerely").There is nothing like "herding the people" in his theory (Parla, 2001: 136; Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 60). He did not consider the people as a "mass" with "irrational psychological motives" as it was the case in Le Bon (Parla, 2001: 136). Nor he "idealized" and/or romanticized the people and their culture, which would not be "imitated" without criticism (Parla, 2001: 137). (This differentiates Gökalp's populism from Narodnism.) The elite differs from the people only in terms of higher education and training (Gökalp, 2003). It is for this reason that Gökalp's concept of elite denies "substitutionism" (Parla, 2001: 136). In fact, it is this very "reversal" of the emphasis on the concepts of the people and the elite that differentiates Gökalp's "solidarist corporatism" from the "elitist-substitutionist and paternalist" one" (Parla, 2001: 137-8). Far from being neither "totalitarian" nor "authoritarian", Gökalp's corporatism carries "pluralist elements" in itself. It is not "elitist" in the strict sense of the word (Parla- 2001: 133-4).

In Gökalpian sense, the separation between intellectuals and the people is not based on class. For him, "the people" include all social classes accepting equality before the law. The distinction would disappear when the few go to the people (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 60). Parla argues that differing from well-known elite

theorists like Mosca and Michels who used the term "elite" mainly as a "political and organizational category", and Pareto who used it as a "psychological category", Gökalp did not place the concept of elite within his social-political theory, but rather used it as an "intermediary category" in his "nationalist populist theory" both "to explain and criticize the historical duality between the people and the administration"and "to search a way for the national-cultural revival of Turkey that would remove this duality" (Parla, 2001: 134). When Gökalp used the concept in its "negative" sense, he preferred the term "havas", while "güzide" (the "few") corresponds to its "positive" sense, referring to "the national elites" whose only point of departure from the people is their higher training (in positive sciences) (Parla, 2001: 136). Criticizing the relationship between the people and the elites, Gökalp put the blame on the Ottoman elites who despised the people as "avam" (common people) and "hevam", and their belongings as "crude" and "inferior". Neglecting "national culture", but embracing "the corrupt eastern civilization", the Ottoman elites, for Gökalp, were the party at fault, deserving to be labelled as a "public enemy" (Parla, 2001: 137-138). The "few", on the other hand, arises as a group that should "go to the people" to get (national popular) "culture" (*hars*) –since "the people is the live museum of national culture"- and to convey "civilization" (*medeniyet*) which is in fact "Western civilization" to them (Gökalp, 2003: 79-85). Gökalp uses the term "culture" to refer to something "national", and that of "civilization" to mean "international" one. In other words, "culture" is national, whereas "civilization" is international. Accordingly, there are two things in the West: "civilization" is common to all nations of the West, whereas "culture" is specific to each Western nation (Berkes, 1975: 240).[23] This is one of the differences between Gökalp and the Kemalists. The latter, as Oran

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[23] It is through this understanding that Gökalp surpasses the dominant view (since the period of Tanzimat) of considering the West as an "abstract whole". This is expected to be followed by an interest in "national economies", the conflicts between them and their reflection to the Turkish economy. However, Berkes argues, Gökalp's opposition to the West was directed only towards their "culture". For example, while criticisizing the advocates of Tanzimat (*Tanzimatçılar*), he blamed them only for bringing Western culture neglecting its "economic" outcomes. That is to say, supposing that "national economies are the reflections of national 'cultures'", Gökalp overlooks the significant impact of Western economy starting during the Tanzimat (Berkes, 1975: 240-1).

states, reject(s) Gökalp's distinction between "culture" and "civilization" which was formulated to reconcile the West and Islam during the period of Young Turks, which was a "period of transition", of a "dualist ideal circle". Having decided to follow Western path, and to remove the considerable influence of religious ideology, the Kemalists opposed to the separation between "culture" and "civilization" (Oran, 1988: 138). However, in doing this, Oran argues, Mustafa Kemal seems to contradict with his (ideas of) rejection of "imitation". In his opening speech at Education Congress on July 16, 1921 Mustafa Kemal recalled for a "culture" congruent with "national character" and national history, and "completely far from the effects of all foreign ideas, the West and the East". Again in his another speech, he argued that rather than "imitating" the West, those things considered to be "good" and "congruent with our structure" were to be "adopted" within the framework of "world civilization". Taking as a point of reference the "world civilization" or "modern civilization" which was in fact nothing else but "the Western civilization" and arguing that it was based on science which was "universal", Mustafa Kemal *rhetorically* overcome the contradiction between the equalization of "culture" and "civilization" and bringing Western civilization to the country (Oran, 1988: 139).

Tekeli and Şaylan mention three important aspects[24] of the populist ideology of the Second Constitutional Period and that of Gökalp. The first –political- one is related to the public participation. The second one, cultural aspect, is related to the question of "how to preserve people's values and aspirations" or "characteristics peculiar to the Turkish people" within the process of social change without hindering social development. The third and the last issue is "the social order" or "the structural characteristics of social system", i.e. the question of social classes. These three aspects will shed light on the debate on populism

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[24] As parallel with Tekeli and Şaylan, Toprak (1977: 95-96) mentions three dimensions of populism of the Second Constitutional Period, namely political, economic, and social one. The first one, "political populism", means political independence and nation-state building, and political rights and freedoms. The "economic" aspect refers to state intervention in economy, and argues for "state capitalism" instead of "liberal" one. The "social" aspect aims to replace class struggle with solidarity among occupational groups based on the social division of labour.

during the Republican period since they served as a basis for different interpretations of populism (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 64-65).

II.2. Kemalist Populism

In this study, Kemalist populism will be examined through making a periodical classification. The first period includes the War of Independence and the foundation of the Republic. The second one, on the other hand, corresponds to the single party period. Populism had different functions with different meanings during these periods. However, this does not mean that there was a sharp line between these different usages of populism. On the contrary, as it will be mentioned below, populism is considered to be composed of two fundamental aspects, namely administrative-institutional and social-egalitarian, and there was a shift between them depending on the historical context.

II.2.1. Evolution of Populism (from 1920s to 1930s)

Populism acquired different functions in the emergence and the foundation of the Turkish Republic. It came close to its literal meaning of "for the people, by the people" during the War of Independence. The proposal dated 24 April 1920 gives some hints for Mustafa Kemal's understanding of populism during the 1920s (Köker, 1990: 139). But even before presenting his "Program of Populism" (*Halkçılık Programı*) to the Assembly, on 12 July 1920, Mustafa Kemal declared "populism" and "People's Government" that is, "to surrender the administration to the people", as principles, thanks to which the difficulties in internal administration would be removed (Atatürk, 1945: 87).[25] After discussing

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[25] "[H]angi prensibi koyabileceğimizi düşünmekle meşgul olalım. Zannederim bugünkü mevcudiyetimizin mahiyeti asliyesi, milletin temayülatı umumiyesini ısbat etmiştir, o da Halkçılıktır ve Halk Hükümetidir. Hükümetlerin halkın eline geçmesidir... İdareyi halka teslim etmeye çalışalım. O zaman bütün müşkilatın bertaraf olacağına bendeniz kaniim. Ben bununla şahsan iştigal etmekteyim. Yakın zamanda bu noktai nazarımı ifade eden mütaleatımı Heyeti

"Program of Populism" under the label of "Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu Layihası" Encümen-i Mahsus adopted "occupational representation" (in the fourth article) as the most perfect way of principle of "people['s] actually and individually guiding their own destiny" (Köker, 1990: 140). Here, populism gained a meaning similar to direct democracy and was with reference to the category of class.[26] Mustafa Kemal, on the other hand, did not include this principle, i.e. occupational representation in his program (Köker, 1990: 143). The Program of Populism that Mustafa Kemal presented to the Assembly on 13 September 1920, on the other hand, was approved on 20 January 1921, and became the first Constitution (Arar, 1963: 11). "To render the people the true owner of administration and sovereignty", to sustain "welfare of the people" were some of the important points included in this program. The sixth article[27] states that "sovereignty belongs without reservation and conditions to the nation; the system of administration rests on the principle that the people personally and effectively direct its own destinies" (quoted in Kazancıgil, 1981: 52).

Tekeli and Şaylan (1978: 66-67) interpret Mustafa Kemal's bringing of Program of Populism to the Assembly as something "tactical"[28]. They argue that during

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Aliyenize arzedeceğim" (Atatürk, 1945: 87). According to Arar (1963: 10), this speech displays that before presenting his proposal, Atatürk tried to convert it into a Constitutional draft, and waited for presenting it to the Assembly at the right time.

[26] In a speech quoted by Selek, İsmail Suphi Soysallı paid attention to the bad and difficult conditions of Turkish peasants, like gendarme, never ending wars, and taxes. He stated that there were attempts during the period of Constitutional monarchy, when the expressions of "Towards the People" had been heard from time to time. But, he continued, the "upper class" had failed in considering, listening and understanding people's needs (Selek, 1968: 488).

[27] "Hakimiyet bilakaydü-şart milletindir. Usulü idare halkın mukadderatını bizzat ve bilfiil idare etmesi esasına müsteniddir" (quoted in Köker, 1990: 140).

[28] Oran (1988: 72) states that being a "tactician" was one of the most important characteristics of Mustafa Kemal's personality. While trying to grasp the true meanings and reasons of what he said, Oran argues, one should bear in mind this point. In Nutuk, Mustafa Kemal personally explains this characteristic. He asserted that in order to attain objectives, it was necessary to proceed by stages without revealing his own intensions in its entirety. That is to say, for the sake of success, it was both "practical" and "safe" to implement each stage "in good time". Oran mentions Mustafa Kemal's speeches about sultanate, caliphet. During the War World I, for example, he brought up these issues repeatedly since at that time the first thing to do was to save the motherland and secure independence.

the War of Independence, when the struggle for power was accelerated and when there was an increasing need for Soviet help, the concept of populism became the most important thing within the political agenda, and acquired new connotations which were mainly "tactical". Despite the fact that Mustafa Kemal tried "to base his movement upon the people" starting from the War of Independence, he did not propose a populist program until some other establishments brought "populist" programs to the Assembly. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the Populist Program which Mustafa Kemal proposed to the Assembly on 13 September 1920 (and which was accepted as "Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu Layihası") was put forward tactically to "dissolve" the opponents' front within the Assembly.

As Tekeli and Şaylan (1978: 66) argue, during the War of Independence, the populist ideology would have the function of uniting the representatives of different social classes in GNA, namely the notables, bureaucrats, religious men, and the peasants, and the large numbers of people involved in the war. Oran (1988: 110) also pays attention to the same point arguing that populism, together with the concept of "popular sovereignty", was used in order to form a "ground of legitimacy" for the "nationalist movement"[29] during the War of Independence. That is to say, taking "anti-bureaucratic, populist measures" like not to increase the number of the permanent staff within government offices and election of bureaucrats rather than appointment, the reaction of notables within the Assembly was tried to be diminished. Thus, populism functioned as calming the notables against the elites. Similarly, Kazancıgil (1981: 51) argues that Mustafa Kemal used populism "as a major ideological instrument in forging the alliance of the state elites and the civil elites" (the local notables referred as ayan, ağa, eşraf). In his populist program of 13 September 1920, "he presented populism as a way of

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[29] These two concepts together provided the basis for the nationalist movement that started with the War of Independence, and developed into a struggle for building a nation-state (Oran, 1988: 110).

overcoming the gap between bureaucracy, which was "the dominant class" in Turkey, and people.

This unsurprisingly led to a debate on a "system of representative election" during the discussion about the Program. The Special Commission examining the Constitution Draft had changed the draft in accordance with the system of "representative election". The general tendency of the deputies, Selek states, had been that, "from Tanzimat, 'civil servants', as a new class, had brought trouble to the country and the people." The way of getting rid of this trouble would be "to leave the election of bureaucrats to the people"[30] so that once the people were not pleased with the bureaucrats they had elected, they would have a right to replace them with new and better ones. Despite their multiplicity in the Assembly, the bureaucrats did not display significant reaction to such criticisms (Selek, 1968: 489). Here, Mahmut Esat Bozkurt who was against the accession of the bureaucrats into the Assembly can be mentioned. He defined bureaucrats as the ones who formed "the preeminent bourgeois stratum" and "accept to sponge on the country", and argued that the aim of "keeping the country alive" required their nonadmission to the Assembly (Selek, 1968: 490). For the deputies[31] who argued for the system of "occupational representation" and based their ideas on populism, the preceding assemblies founded in this country had been composed of a "class of elites". An authentic "people's government" (*halk idaresi*), on the other hand, needed "to bring[32] the people to the Assembly".

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[30] For Selek (1968: 489), the idea of causing the people to elect bureacracts was "erroneously" inspired by the Russian Revolution since in Russia bureaucrats were elected by the Soviets.

[31] Selek (1968: 491) gives various examples from the speeches of deputies defending the "occupational representation". According to one, for example, "country" meant "economy," and was represented by working people, like ironworker, farmer rather than politicians. Another deputy said that "We should completely grant (!) this right, that is occupational representation, to the working poors of the nation". (Here, again, "granting the right" to the people was at issue.) While, on the one hand, there were such speeches, on the other it was pointed out that there was neither capitalist nor prolerarian in the country.

[32] It is ironical that while arguing for "people's government" on the one hand, the deputies Selek mentioned were talking about "to bring the people to the Assembly", which was probably considered not capable of doing this by itself on the other. (Selek, 1968: 490)

On 13 August 1923, in his opening speech of the Second Term of the Fourth Annual Meeting Mustafa Kemal announced that the first assembly declared that "the nation had seized its own destiny", and "laid a foundation of a strong people's government" (Atatürk, 1945: 304; Çağlar, 1968: 116). Behind all successes, he continued, there had laid "the foundation of new Turkey", its fundamental principle being "people's state" in contrast to previous ones which were "monarchy" (Atatürk, 1945: 309; Çağlar, 1968: 121). In *Medeni Bilgiler*, classifying states according to how sovereignty is used –namely, monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy, Atatürk declared democracy as the most preferable form of state since "sovereignty is belonged to the people, to the majority of the people" (quoted in Mumcu, 1986: 12).

One of the most significant thing here is that Atatürk used "populism" and "democracy" as replaceable terms. Parallel to this, calling attention to the use of expressions[33] like "people's government" some scholars conclude that Mustafa Kemal used these terms to refer to "republic". According to Arar (1963: 11-12), for example, Atatürk used the expressions of "people's government" and "populism" in place of the term "Republic" because of conjunctural necessities. However, Arar stresses, Atatürk did not only use "populism" to "conceal his true aim or object", i.e. in order not to use the term of "Republic". He used it, at the same time, to refer to "new social and economic order". Similarly, Bianchi (1984: 100) states that, Atatürk first used the term "populism" during the War of Independence in place of the term of Republic "in order to express support for popular sovereignty without offending his more conservative supporters".

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[33] Frey (1965: 336) argues that although Mustafa Kemal rarely used the word "democracy" in his speeches in the early and mid-twenties, he frequently used the related concepts, like popular sovereignty, representative government, freedom, etc. Despite its more frequent use in 1930, around the time of the formation of the Liberal Party, after its demise and in changing world conjuncture, he again abandoned it to keep Turkey's neutral position in a well-foreseen conflict between the Western democracies and the dictatorships.

Populism, in this period, was equated with nationalism and anti-imperialism[34] or used as a "shorthand term embracing all of the goals of the liberation movement".

Together with Republicanism, populism is the most important "ideological element"[35] that determines the role of democracy within Kemalism. Therefore, it is not surprising that in dealing with Kemalist populism, one should relate it to the debates on democracy and/or republic(anism). It can even be argued that the political aspect which is related to public participation[36] corresponds to the principle of republicanism. That is to say, the political aspect of populism is expressed through the notion of popular sovereignty, which was considered within the principle of republicanism. During the first stage including the War of Independence and the first years of the Republic populism which was formulated through expressions like "sovereignty unrestrictedly and unconditionally belongs to the nation", and "making people sovereign over their own fate" (or "people actually and individually guiding their own destiny" – the first article of the

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[34] The National Liberation Movement was identified with the rejection of communism, which had been materialized in the Soviet Union as Bolshevism, and with the adoption of an "anti-imperalist" stand. It is also possible to find traces of an "anti-capitalistic" stand in speeches of Mustafa Kemal and a few influential members of the revolutionary elite, like İsmail Suphi (Soysallıoğlu) and Hasan Basri (Çantay), during the period of National Struggle. In his speech to the GNA on 1 December 1921, Mustafa Kemal stated that "We are a people who are convinced of the necessity of conducting our national struggle against an imperialism which wanted to destroy all of us, our entire national existence and against a capitalism which aimed to swallow us all" (Kili, 1969: 94-95). Another example of Mustafa Kemal's anti-imperialistic and anti-capitalistic discourse can be found in his opening speech of the First Assembly, at the Second Session, in 1921: "When we think in terms of social doctrines, we are a working people, a poor people, striving to save our lives and independence. Let us know ourselves. We have to work to live and to achieve our freedom. Therefore, all of us have rights. (...) But we acquire such rights only through working. In our society there is no place or rights for a person who wants to lie down and does not want to work. (...) Populism is a social doctrine which aims to base its social order on occupations. (...) To protect this right and to keep our independence secure, all of us pursue a doctrine which justifies nationwide struggle against imperialism that wants to destroy us and against capitalism that wants to devour us." (quoted in Ilgaz, 1998: 19). Kili asserts that after winning the War of Independence the revolutionary elite generally abandoned this "anti-capitalistic" stand (Kili, 1969: 95). However, as many scholars argue, anti-capitalism did not characterize Mustafa Kemal's standing since it was the capitalist path of development to be followed (Ahmad, 1981; Oran, 1988; Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978; Timur, 2001).

[35] The "ideological" character of populism will be clarified under the subheading of populism and nationalism.

[36] It is in this sense -of "people's participation in political life and administration"- that populism is considered as a "democratic principle." (Köker, 1990: 137)

constitution) was dealt with the concepts of "direct democracy" and "representative democracy" (Köker, 1990: 138).

According to Frey, for Mustafa Kemal the first object was to place certain basic reforms, while "democracy" was a "secondary" and "contingent" one. However, Frey argues, there was a "sincere and growing Kemalist commitment to democratic development" as one of the main objects for Turkish society. He mentions several examples of "the originally implicit and subsequently explicit Kemalist adherence to democratic values". One of them is the First GNA itself, "the first government in the East created by the people and acting for the people." It was a "broadly based body acting according to very democratic procedures, almost to the point of utility, and pursuant to a self-enacted constitution" which stated that "sovereignty belonged to the nation", and declared the Assembly as the national representative of a "people actually and individually guiding their own destiny" (Frey, 1965: 335-7). Like Frey, Mumcu also argues for Atatürk's commitment to democracy (democratic and republican form of state) with reference to *Medeni Bilgiler*. Republic, for Atatürk, is "the best form of state" to realize national sovereignty. It is "the complete and most prominent form" of democracy. According to Mumcu, this means the identification of "national sovereignty" with "democracy". Despite using the term "democracy" only a few times, he sometimes called it "populism". His model, according to Mumcu, was a "democratic republic" where "sovereignty belongs to the nation", and people have equal rights to elect rulers. Here, equality before the law, and/or having equal rights to elect and to be elected gains importance, and the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TGNA), members of which are elected through general and equal vote, becomes the unique organ where national sovereignty was "reflected" (Mumcu, 1986: 27-32).

However, there were speeches that nullify Frey's and Mumcu's arguments (of Atatürk's commitment to democracy). On 1 December 1921, when questioned on

the form of government, Mustafa Kemal paid attention to the uniqueness[37] of Turkish government:

> They ask whether this government is a democratic government or a socialist one, or they ask which one of the governments you have read in books so far. Gentlemen, our government is not a democratic government. And actually, it is not like any of the forms of government that can be found in books, due to the condition of 'Islamiye.' But it is the only government that realizes national sovereignty, national will (quoted in Ilgaz, 1998: 12).

In December 1922, on the other hand, Mustafa Kemal said:

> We should not forget that our form of government is not bolshevik system. Because we can neither be bolshevik nor communist, neither one nor the other. Because we are nationalistic and respectful of our religion. The form of our political regime is a democratic government and in our language this is uttered as a "people's government" (quoted in Ilgaz, 1998: 12).

In another speech, Atatürk said that there was no ground for Bolshevism in Turkey since our religion, customs, and social organization do not allow its association with "us". He continued arguing that "there was neither big capitalists, nor artizans and millions of workers in Turkey." Moreover, there was no "land question" in our country. And, lastly, "our religious principles" were not proper to the acceptance of Bolshevism" (Arar, 1963: 20). Again in another speech[38] on 14 August 1920, Mustafa Kemal pointed out the difference between

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[37] For Frey (1965: 336, 35n), here, Mustafa Kemal was speaking for tactical advantage, defending the structure of the government of the First Assembly from those who likened it to the Bolsheviks or who demanded to know why it did not resemble the more typical arrangements of Western democracies.

[38] "[B]iz ülkemizin ve ulusumuzun varlığını ve bağımsızlığını kurtarmak için karar verdiğimiz zaman kendi görüşlerimize uyuyor, kendi gücümüze dayanıyorduk. Hiçbir kimseden ders almadık. Hiç kimsenin aldatıcı sözlerine kanarak işe girişmedik. Bizim görüşlerimiz, bizim inanlarımız herkesçe bilinmektedir ki Bolşevik ilkeleri değildir. Bolşevik ilkelerini ulusumuza benimsetmek için de şimdiye kadar hiç düşünmedik. Hiçbir davranışta bulunmadık. Bizim inancımıza göre, ulusumuzun yaşayıp yükselmesi, ancak kendi içine sindirebileceği, benimseyip hazmedebilmek imkanını bulacağı ilkelere bağlıdır ... İyice incelenirse görülür ki bizim ilkemiz – ki halkçılıktır- bütün gücün, egemenliğin, yönetimin, doğrudan doğruya halka verilmesi, halkın elinde bulundurulmasıdır. Bu, hiç kuşkusuz dünyanın en güçlü ilkesidir. Böyle bir ilke, Bolşeviklerinkiyle ilk bakışta zıtlaşmayabilir ... Şu var ki Bolşevizm ulus içinde gadre uğramış bir sınıf halkı göz önünde tutar. Bizim ulusumuzsa bütünüyle gadre uğramış ve zulüm çekmiştir. Bu

their ideas and Bolshevism. He defined their principle as populism, that is, to render all the power, sovereignty, and administration directly to the people. Such a principle, he argued, might seem, at first glance, not to be opposed to that of Bolsheviks. However, in reality, Bolshevism cared about only a certain class of the people which were "treated unjustly" within the nation. In the Turkish case, on the contrary, the ones who were "treated unjustly" and "oppressed" were the nation as a whole rather than a certain part of it[39] (Atatürk, 1945: 97-98; Çağlar, 1968: 81-82).

What is seen in Mustafa Kemal's populist discourse is that despite stressing terms like "national sovereignty", "people's government", etc the emphasis he put was on "administrative-institutional" aspect of populism rather than "social-egalitarian" one. The former mainly carries "elitist" tones, which are already involved in populist discourse. This can be explicitly seen in Mustafa Kemal's speech at the Konya Turkish Heart (Türk Ocağı) on 20 March 1923. Here, he criticized intellectuals arguing that when they had failed in convincing the masses, they exerted pressure on the people, and this was, for him, the principal reason for destruction of the country. To solve this problem, he continued, intellectuals should have "approached to the people and joined with them". In this speech, Mustafa Kemal argued that in order to "drag the people to our aim," there should be a "natural harmony" between the "mentality and object" of the class of intellectuals and that of the people. In other words, "the ideals that the class of

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bakımdan ulusumuz insanlığı kurtarmaya yönelen güçlerce korunmayı hak etmiş durumdadır ... [Y]urdumuzun ve ulusumuzun kurtuluşu için ülkedeki ulusçu düzeni korumamız gerekmektedir. Her kafadan bir ses çıkarsa, her düşünce bir başka sonuca varırsa, ülke içinde türlü türlü akımlar türeyip türlü türlü durumlar ortaya çıkar. Halbuki biz, her yandan, içten ve dıştan, hele dışarının etkisiyle içerden, sayısız saldırılar ve kışkırtmalarla karşı karşıyayız. Bu durumda, bize düşen şey, gürültüye boğmadan birliği korumaktır" (Atatürk, 1945: 97-98; Çağlar, 1968: 81-82).

[39] For Prof. Gotthard Jaschke, Atatürk's speeches that seemed to be "sympathetic to communism" can be explained with his "diplomatic competence" to divert Russians; to make the communist propaganda in Turkey ineffective; and to get relief needed for the struggle given against the Westerners (Arar, 1963: 19). It was thought that being adherent of populism would secure the support of the Soviet Union, which had aided Turkey during the War of Independence (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 66).

intellectuals would instill to the people should be taken from the people's soul and conscience" (Köker, 1990: 144; Oran, 1988: 140-1).

According to Tekeli and Şaylan (1978: 76), the separation of Turkish society into "intellectuals" and "the people" does not contradict with the assumption of classless society since this separation was made according to "education variable" rather than economic one. Behind this separation, for Tekeli and Şaylan, there laid Kemalists' objective of assigning a certain role–that of bringing Western civilization to the people- and, parallel to this, giving certain "privileges" to intellectuals. To bring Western civilization to the people requires, to a large extent extent, "being in power", but since the leadership of the War of Independence had already been in power, the question for them was rather "to hold onto power". And this, for them, requires "to be sensitive" to the ideals "taken from the people's soul and conscience" while bringing Western civilization to the people so that they would take the lead in developing society without breaking off from it. However, as it will be mentioned below, they would always give precedence to the principles and the reforms[40], especially when the latter were thought to be threatened or endangered.In his speech[41] on 28

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[40] Having been the product of the Civilian Schools of the late 19th century, the Western-oriented intellectuals who fulfilled various reforms under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and appointed to key positions in the government believed that the problems Turkey tackled with could be solved only "by copying the customs and the educational, political and legal institutions of the West", overlooking the fact that they emerged from distinct cultural patterns and values. Far from helping in solving the problems of Turkey, importing Western legal systems and institutions caused serious difficulties (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 50).

[41] "[B]ir ulus yalnız kendi gücüne dayanarak varlığını ve bağımsızlığını sağlayamazsa, şunun bunun oyuncağı olmaktan kurtulamaz ... Bu nedenledir ki kuruluşlarımızda ulusal gücün etkin, ulusal istemin egemen olması ilke olarak benimsenmiştir ... Kuruluşumuzda ise köyden ve mahalleden, buraların halkından, demek ki bireyden (fertten) başlıyoruz. Bireyler düşünür olmadıkça, toplulukları istenen yönlere, şunun bunun aklına göre iyi veya kötü yönlere sürüklemek kolay olur. Bu sürüklenişten kendini kurtarabilmek için her bireyin yurt ve ulus kaderi ile ilgilenmesi gerekir. Aşağıdan yukarıya, temelden çatıya doğru yükselen böyle bir kuruluş, kuşkusuz, sağlam olur. Şu var ki, her işin başlangıcında, aşağıdan yukarıya olması istenirse de yukardan aşağıya doğru olmasından kaçınılamaz. Bütün işler böyle aşağıdan yukarıya, temelden çatıya doğru oluşup gelişselerdi bütün insanlık amaçlarının hepsine kavuşmuş olurdu. Böyle gerçekleşmelerin olanakları bugüne dek tam kavramıyle bulunamadığı için girişken kimseler, uluslara yönelmesi gereken yolu göstermekten kendilerini alamıyorlar. Böylelikle ilkin yukardan aşağıya bir oluşma başlıyor. Biz ülkemiz içindeki gezilerimizde yukarıdan aşağıya boy atıp gelişmiş ulusal kuruluşların öz başlangıca, bireye kadar indiğini ve oradan bir daha yukarıya

December 1919 with the notables of Ankara, Atatürk's support for the idea of "revolution from above"[42] was explicitly seen. In this speech, Atatürk underlined that in order not "to be tool of others", the nation should "sustain its existence and independence relying only on its own power". It is for this reason that to render "national power active", and "national will sovereign" in institutions was adopted as a "principle". Here the starting point was "individual". Unless individuals were "thinkers", it would be so easy to "drag the communities into either good or bad direction" according to one's inclination. To prevent this, "each individual should concern with the fate of national homeland and nation". Such an establishment "rising from the bottom to the top" would certainly be "strong" and more preferable. However, Atatürk goes on, at the beginning, the contrary -was "unavoidable". That is to say, founding would be unavoidably from the top to the bottom despite the opposite was preferable. Since the "possibilities" of the latter could not be provided until then, the "daring persons are unable to stop themselves from showing the way nations have to direct towards." Hence, at first, "formation from the top to the bottom" (Çağlar, 1968: 17-18).

As Oran (1988: 141) rightly stresses, the criterion for the future work was "the model which elites had in their mind" rather than "demands coming from (to be more exact, not coming) unconscious masses". This can be explicitly seen in Mustafa Kemal's words. He stated that in decisions to be taken, they would "take into consideration the inclinations of the people", and not conflict with these inclinations. But, once principles were in question, they would sacrifice themselves rather than those principles (Atay, 1969: 363).

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doğru gerçek oluşmaya başladığını sevinerek gördük. Yine de tam olgunluğa kavuştuğunu ileri süremeyiz. Bu oluşmanın, bu gelişmenin yurt ve ulus ölçüsünde istenen düzeye ulaşması için elimizden gelen çabayı harcamayı bir ulus ve yurt ödevi biliyoruz." (Çağlar, 1968: 17-18).

[42] As Oran quotes from Ziégler, Wetter introduced the term "revolution from above" to refer to make revolution or revolutionary changes through the medium of the "revolutionary" state rather than of "amorphous and unconscious masses" (Oran, 1988: 65).

Another example to Mustafa Kemal's belief in the need for "revolution from above," and his elitism is from Karlsbad memoirs.[43] Here, he argued that once he got hold of power, he might make the revolution needed in social life through a "coup" all of a sudden. He continued that after having a higher education for a long time, and expending years to gain independence, he would not "descend to the level of uneducated". He would do the contrary so that they would resemble him (Afetinan, 1983: 27).

As Tekeli and Şaylan state, the concept of populism acquired different meaning and function as a result of the changing balance of internal and external power after the War of Independence and during the foundation of the Republic. Since there was no need for the wide support of the people, and of the Soviet Union, anymore as it had been needed during the time of the War of Independence, there was a change in Kemalist understanding of populism (Tekeli and Şaylan, 1978: 71-72). In fact, this change was nothing but shift in emphasis on the two aspects of populism. It can be argued that once there was an increasing need for support of the people, the emphasis was shifted onto the social-egalitarian aspect, while during the time of establishment the administrative-institutional aspect took precedence at the expense of the former.

II.2.2. Populism During the Single Party Period

Having been used in place of the term of "Republic", meaning national-popular sovereignty, and coming close to its literal meaning of "for the people, by the people" during the first period, populism was expressed through the formula of

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[43] " Benim elime büyük salahiyet ve kudret geçerse ben sosyal yaşamımızda istenilen devrimi bir anda bir "coup" ile uygulayabileceğimi sanıyorum... Neden ben bu kadar yıllık bir yüksek öğrenim gördükten, uygar yaşamı ve toplumu inceledikten ve özgürlüğü elde etmek için hayatı ve yılları harcadıktan sonra neden cahiller derecesine ineyim? Onları kendi dereceme çıkarırım. Ben onlar gibi değil, onlar benim gibi olsunlar" (Afetinan, 1983: 27).

"for the people, despite the people" within the second stage (1930s).[44] Especially after the foundation of the Republic, rather than its "political" and/or "democratic" aspect, "cultural" and "social" (socio-economic) aspects of populism took precedence with an emphasis on "solidarity", "absence[45] of classes and/or class conflict", "nation and national unity", etc. Dumont also pays attention to the same point. After mentioning two usages of populism as a "synonym for democracy", with its classic formula of "government by the people and for the people", and as a "militant intellectual activity aimed at leading the people on the road to progress" (or to refer to "various movements mobilizing the intelligentsia for the service of the economic, cultural and social progress of the masses," the most widely known example being that of the Russian narodniki), he talks of a much more specific meaning, "a Turkish version of solidarist ideas", with a vision of a Turkish nation constituted of "solidary, closely interdependent occupational groups" rather than classes (Dumont, 1984: 31). It can be explicitly seen in Atatürk's –and other Republican leaders- speeches and declarations that there was no "clearly delimited social classes" in Turkish society which "was not yet sufficiently developed". And this character of Turkish society, it was thought, "should be taken to avoid class conflicts and to implant solidarity among the different categories of the population" so as to make them "feel like members of

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[44] The political aspect of populism during this period was again expressed within the principle of republicanism through the concept of national sovereignty. However, after the experiences of TCF and SCF which aroused a "fear of retrogression of reforms and an idea of "protecting the regime against any kind of danger", populism was formulated so as "not to allow a pluralist political regime". As Köker states, protecting or preserving national unity, wholeness and independence, and sustaining security was the most urgent thing rather than democratic character of the nation-state (Köker, 1990: 159). Here, Köker rightly asks the question of whether the defense of the idea of national sovereignty, on the one hand, and the idea that destructive dangers against the political regime, in which the nation is the sovereign, may arise within the nation itself, on the other, created a contradiction between the principle of populism and republicanism. He replies the question saying that the contradiction between the idea of "for the people despite the people" and republicanism was tried to be coped with by defining populism through Rousseausque concepts like "national will" and "national sovereignty". Köker described this as "weakening" of political aspect of populism, while giving weight to its "cultural" and "economic" aspects. (Köker, 1990: 145-149)

[45] Rejection of the existence of social classes is indeed one of the fundamental characteristics of contemporary Third World populism. For the irrelevance of the concept of class struggle in populism which is generally "conciliatory" and rarely "revolutionary" see Worsley (1969: 229).

one great family". This conception of populism, Dumont argues, was a "response to the Marxist concept of class struggle". That is to say, the solidarist ideas was adopted "to fight communism and the Bolshevik conception of class struggle" (Dumont, 1984: 33). Akural also pays attention to Atatürk's use of populism against domestic communists who claimed for the existence of class struggle in Turkey. At the RPP Congress in Izmir on 27 January 1931 he seems to answer the communist argument for the inevitability of class struggle: "Our party is an institution which is aiming to serve the rights of each class in an equal manner, without harming any one of them. Our actions have proven this" (Akural, 1984: 138).

Denying the existence of class in Turkey,[46] and being aware of the need for "national solidarity", Atatürk called his party the "People's Party" which would be based on the principle of populism and was thought to equally represent "the interests of all classes" (Akural, 1984: 138). The word "people" in the name of the Party was used to refer to the whole nation rather than to a social class. In Mustafa Kemal's words (December 1922), the Turkish nation

> does not possess various social classes that will pursue interests that are very different from one another and that will accordingly struggle with each other. The existing social classes are necessary and indispensable to one another. Therefore, the People's Party may well engage in securing the rights and well-being of all social classes. (quoted in Erdoğan, 1992: 54)

The assumption that society was composed not of social classes but of individuals who belonged to various occupational groups, such as businessmen, government officials, farmers, and craftsmen, mutually dependent on each other and having no conflicting economic interests was ended up with the denial of the multi-party

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[46] "Preparations to forestall any class struggle, when the class structure of the society was denied, can be attributed either to apprehension that conditions generating class struggle existed in the society, or to the fact that the anticipated future economic development would lead to such a struggle." (Karpat, 1959: 53)

system, which, in fact, was resulted from divergent and/or specific economic interests in society to be defended in separate political parties, there was no need for the multi-party system. The RPP was "the synthesis" and "the sole representative of all these groups", which were collectively defined as "the people", and aimed to give to all these groups "the possibility of active participation in creating general and genuine prosperity for the whole nation" (Karpat, 1959: 51-52). Mahmut Esat Bozkurt emphasizes this characteristic of the RPP as follows:

> No party in the civilized world has ever represented the whole nation as completely and as sincerely as the RPP. Other parties defend the interests of various social classes and strata. For our part, we do not recognize the existence of these classes and strata. For us, all are united. There are no gentlemen, no masters, no slaves. There is but one whole set and this set is the Turkish nation (quoted in Dumont, 1984: 33).

This was explicitly seen in Mustafa Kemal's speech at Balıkesir on 7 February 1923, too. He paid attention to the inclusive character of the People's Party, and displayed a negative attitude towards political parties. Denying the existence of different classes in the country, he declared that the People's Party included not only a part, but the nation as a whole (Köker, 1990: 146). Here, he used populism in a "solidarist" sense, meaning that in a "classless society" like Turkey "social development should be through a solidary division of labour which would benefit everyone" (Kazancıgil, 1981: 51). For Tekeli and Şaylan (1978: 72-74), the most interesting point in this speech is that Mustafa Kemal rested his understanding of populism upon the assumption of absence[47] of class differentiation in Turkish society. Denying the existence of class contradictions in Turkish society, Mustafa

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[47] Similarly, Peker (1931: 11) states that the welfare of the country would be obtained at the absence of "domination of class mentality". The way of ensuring interests within a country was not that of class formation which caused an "unfair, greedy, and fanatic class struggle" which led to constant dispute among citizens. This dispute, Peker goes on, destructs "nationalist ideas", and "the national unity" which has a vital importance in the maintenance and protection of the state. Rather, the Party believed in the realization of both individual and group interests within the framework of the general interests of the state and the country. Peker concludes that they denied and replaced the idea of class formation.

Kemal "identified" populism with "nationalism", removing its "anti-bureaucratic character" and approaching Union and Progress' initial understanding of populism. Giving reference to the same speech where Mustafa Kemal denied existence of classes in Turkey and argued for the inclusion of the whole nation in the People's Party, Eliçin pays attention to the identification of the concepts of "the people" and "the nation". This identification was followed by thinking of the nation as "people's state" or "people's government", and the idea of peculiarity of the single-party regime which was considered to be a natural outcome of being a classless society (Eliçin, 1970: 234). Similarly, Shaw and Shaw call attention to the close connection between Kemalist populism, which was a "corollary to Republicanism", that "government was of the people" –an idea manifested in accepting all the citizens of the Republic equal regardless of class, rank, religion, or occupation-(Shaw and Shaw, 1978: 378) and Turkish nationalism which served for the unification of the Turkish people around common goals, and for the prevention of class struggle and ideological divisiveness that might have resulted in a period of rapid change, by creating a "feeling of national solidarity" (Shaw and Shaw, 1978: 376).

Bianchi also pays attention to this more specific usage of populism (solidarity), that is, "populism more specifically as a description of the sociological bases of the new nation-state". He points out the similarity between Atatürk's early descriptions of the national community and its sources of solidarity, and those of Ziya Gökalp[48]. At first characterizing the new Turkey as "a society united in

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[48] Gökalp's solidaristic populism had determined the Kemalist conception of populism to a large extent. His solidaristic view which carried the traits of Durkheim, who thinks of society in terms of "harmony" rather than conflict, had impact on the Republican intellectuals, shaping the imagination of society in populist thought. Gökalp's conception of "the people" as "classless", "united" and "complementary" groups without conflicting interests was advocated by the leaders of the regime during the 1920s (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001a: 274-275). However, as it was mentioned in the previous part of the study, Gökalp's conceptualization of "the people" and "the elite" differ from that of Kemalists in terms of not being "elitist" -and/or "substitutionist"- in the strict sense of the word. Another difference between the two arises from Gökalp's understanding of "etatism coming from solidarism", which according to Berkes, "resembles an Middle Age etatism based on lonca socialism". He recalls a return to the "lonca tradition" but by "modernizing" it through the idea of "occupational representation" taken from Durkheim's solidarism. For Berkes, this, i.e. his approach to the question of economic development, is the point where "the inadequacy of Gökalp's romanticism" can be clearly observed (Berkes, 1975: 248). However, it should be

terms of race, religion and culture, filled with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice, and having a common fate and interest", he talked of "solidarity based on common cultural identity", while by 1923, he, like Gökalp in his later writings, spoke of "solidarity based on the functional interdependence of different social and economic groups". In the latter use, according to Bianchi, being removed from its meaning of "popular sovereignty" and "cultural solidarity", populism came to be "identified with the effort to encourage economic development and preserve social peace by maintaining equilibrium among the producing classes" (Bianchi, 1984: 100-101). The present author, on the contrary, does not agree with Bianchi because despite its meaning had been seemingly changing in time, populism continued to preserve its meaning of "popular sovereignty". What is at issue here is rather a shift in the emphasis from the political aspect to "cultural" and "socio-economic" ones.

In 1931, before the principle of populism was constitutionalized, Atatürk mentioned the principle of the Party as the one rejecting the notion of class:

> One of our basic principles is to consider the people of the Turkish Republic not as composed of separate classes but as a community divided among various occupations with regard to the division of labour for individual and social life. Farmers, craftsmen, labourer and workers, free professionals, industrialists, merchants and civil servants are the main working groups comprising Turkish society. The labour of each of these is indispensable to the life and well-being of the others and society in general. The goal at which our party aims with this principle is to obtain social order and solidarity instead of class conflict and to establish harmony among interests so that they will not injure one another. Interests will be balanced according to their degree of capability, knowledge and contribution. (Bianchi, 1984: 102).

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reminded that the principle of "occupational representation" had many supporters during the preparation of the first Constitution, and adopted by Encümen-i Mahsus, but encountered Mustafa Kemal's opposition.

For Bianchi, despite not indicating "any explixit hierarchical ordering of occupations", this description of populism differed significantly from Atatürk's previous affirmation of "social egalitarianism". Rather, it recalled "Ottoman statecraft's traditional concern with increasing economic prosperity by maintaining a 'weighted balance' between unequal functional categories". To this understanding of populism, Bianchi argues, accompanied a "shift toward etatist economic policy". Thus, he concludes, this conception of populism served as ideological justification for "state corporatism" during the 1930s (Bianchi, 1984: 102-103), especially

> under the leadership of Recep Peker... Under Peker's chairmanship the People's Party and the state were eventually merged into a single authoritarian apparatus that was to serve both as the supreme arbiter in social relations and as the chief organizer of economic enterprises. The People's Party soon invoked the concept of populism to describe itself as "the synthesis of the people" and as the sole authoritative interpreter of the national interest. Populists were described as "those who do not accept privileges for any family, class, group or individual". The representation of such specific interests through alternative, nonparty, or nonbureaucratic channels was regarded as unnecessary and as encouraging the acquisition of illegitimate privilege (Bianchi, 1984: 103-104).

Similarly, Parla defines Atatürk's understanding of populism as a "corporatist"[49] one which denied the existence of conflicting class interests[50], and rather claimed that there existed unity of interests among occupational groups which were represented together and in harmony under the roof of single-party.[51] It was not a

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[49] While comparing 1970's populism with 1930's Kemalist populism, Yeğen (2001: 69) defines the latter as a "corporatist populism" which considered the nation as a "source of sovereignty" and formed of a community lack of interest conflict.

[50] Parla (1991: 42) states that despite sometimes being declared as "classless", the society, in fact, was seen as being composed of classes, but deprived of class conflict.

[51] The party model that definition of "corporatist society-people" requires is the single-party that will harmoniously represent the interests of all. From the beginning, Atatürk decided to found – and the conditions of the country also necessitated- a "single-party" which would include all classes. That is to say, Turkey would sustain internal peace and political stability in a single party regime, which would be welcomed by the West with its "anti-liberal" and "anti-socialist", but

"socialist, narodnicist, middle-class, middle-peasant populism" as some claimed. It did not claim to "defend oppressed people, poor sections". On the contrary, one of its chief aims was to create a national bourgeoisie, millionaires (Parla, 1991: 42). This understanding of populism neither involve elements related to "being democratic", nor "socialist elements" (Parla, 1991: 247). Kemalist populism means "to be anti-liberal" and "anti-socialist"; it is "solidarist corporatism". Claiming to replace "liberal rationality" with "solidarist theory", Kemalist populism aimed to create an "organic", "unique" people-nation (Parla, 1991: 326).

1935 Program of the RPP preserved the previously formulated principle of "halkçılık" declaring that

> we consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the law, and who recognize no privileges for any individual, family, class or community, to be of the people and for the people (populist). It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. The farmers, handicraftsmen, labourers and workmen, people exercising free professions, industrialists, merchants, and public servants are the main groups of work constituting the Turkish community. The functioning of each of these groups is essential to the life and happiness of the others and of the community. The aims of our party, with this principle, are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be proportionate to the aptitude to the amount of work (Ahmad, 1977: 4).

The general foundations of 1931 and 1935 Program of the RPP were the same to a large extent.[52] A significant difference is restriction of individual and social

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"corporatist capitalist" character, being an "ideological and geopolitical buffer" against the Soviet Revolution (Parla, 1991: 219-220).

[52] At the third session of RPP's Büyük Kurultay held on 13 May 1935, Peker declared the main characteristic of the new program as increasing approximation of the state and the RPP, which had been working together with the state from the beginning, to each other. The fundamental qualities of the Party, namely republicanism, nationalism, populism, revolutionism, statism, and secularism had become "qualities of new Turkish state" after the approval of the new program

rights with "the boundary of the existence and authority of the state"[53] and that the activities of corporate bodies cannot contradict with the public interest. As Parla states, here, Gökalpist solidarist corporatism was surpassed and there arose an understanding of a "state 'granting' rights to individual" and that of an "individual having obligations to the state (rather than society)" (Parla, 1991: 33-34). According to Parla, here, we see the "political-administrative" dimension of Kemalist statism in addition to its "economic" dimension (Parla, 1991: 42). The former, Parla argues, was an important aspect of RPP's corporatism and had an organic relation with "populism", playing a significant role since the beginning of the 1920s. That is to say, "the understanding of unity and integrity of people/nation –state/party" had been dominant from the beginning (Parla, 1991: 221). Parla considers "one nation/people", one-state/party", "sole-chief/father" (*tek-şef/ata*) as the "preparatory principle", lying behind the "organic relations" between Kemalist populism, nationalism, republicanism, and political-administrative statism (Parla, 1991: 326).

Parallel to Parla, Kılıçbay argues that like Ottomans, the Republic also "sanctified the state", while disallowing the formation of an "individual". He goes on arguing that the Republic is perceived in the way Ottoman did: on the one hand, there is a state as an "original possessor of everything", on the other, citizens obliged to serve," i.e., "subjects". The result of this separation is "state as a geometric space of communities" rather than that of a "republic as citizens' corporation". The Republic makes the contract with "individuals", not with

(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutalgası, Ankara, Ulus Basımevi, 1935, p.45).

[53] At the conference he gave on 16 October 1931, after enumerating individual and social rights, like freedom of conscience, of thought, of property, Peker immediately paid attention to the point that while citizens were using these rights, the protection of state authority, and preventing the violation of others' liberties would be observed (Peker, 1931: 12). Again, at the Fourth Congress of the RPP, Peker stated that the boundaries of the individual interest would be determined by and be consistent with the public interest (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutalgası, Ankara, Ulus Basımevi, 1935, p.48).

communities. Since the formation of an individual was disallowed, "individual identities" are imprisoned within communities (Kılıçbay, 1994: 17-18). In the Ottoman system, Kılıçbay argues, the people had never become political actors. Rather, they remained as a "governed group" in its true sense. This factor, together with lack of philosophy would lead to coming from of all demands of "reform" and "change" from above. In order to prepare ground for a "movement" of reform and "westernization", Atatürk attempted for forming "the people" which was "nonexistent" (Kılıçbay, 1994: 61-62), by presenting them a "new alternative identity". This brings into the agenda the relationship between populism and nationalism.

II.2.2.1. Populism and Nationalism

There is a close relationship between the Kemalist understanding of populism and nationalism. During the foundation of the Republic, these two principles complemented each other, serving mainly the unification of the Turkish people around common goals, and the prevention of class struggle both with their assumption of the "absence of classes and class conflict" and with their emphasis on "solidarity" and "unity". It is through this very denial and concealment of intranational social contradictions and antagonisms[54] (along with other inequalities) under the roof of "nation" and "the people" –which were sometimes used as "replacable" terms- that both principles played an ideological role.

Being an "expression of transition from the multi-national state to a new political structure in which a single nation is dominant", Kemalist nationalism was related to -at the political level- "the legitimacy" of the state or political power, "political equality" and "people's participation in administration", and to the "idea of

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[54] "The antagonistic definition of social-political space around the popular pole and the pole of the dominant sectors was simply absent within the Kemalist discourse. Quite the contrary, the denial of the existence of social antagonisms and antagonistic social subjectivities constituted a major tenet of it" (Erdoğan, 1992: 63).

political independence". By equating[55] "nation" with the "state", and granting sovereignty to the nation, which is considered as "the most supreme power" in the society, Kemalism aimed at "presenting a new alternative identity to the people", and "placing a new understanding of legitimacy different from the Ottoman one". This brings us to the question of "determining national will", by means of which the identification between nation and state was established. There are two ways of doing this: first, adopting "direct democracy", and second, representative democracy, in which "national will" is realized through elected representatives of the nation in the representative institutions (Köker, 1990: 154-156).

Atatürk's declarations concerning the characteristics of a nation-state, Köker argues, can be evaluated as an "expression of a rule of law" which is based on the principle of equality before the law. He goes on arguing that the idea of the absence of social classes expressed in the principle of populism was tried to be completed with the idea of "political legal equality". Thus, the existence of a single political organization (or party- RPP) which would include all the people and of the sovereignty of TGNA as a "concrete expression of the spiritual existence of the nation suffices for people's participation in politics and administration". This is how the single-party regime based on the "superiority of the assembly" was legitimized. That is to say, replacement of the principle of making people sovereign over their own fate with an abstract concept of nation was, in fact, the solidification of the latter's will in the state as "the most supreme power" in the society, which was actually organized in the TGNA, formed by RPP, which was under the guidance of the administrative cadre of the party.

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[55] Without neglecting the "internationalism" of a number of populist movements, Stewart views populism as a kind of nationalism equating "the nation" and "the people". "In a populistic phase of the drive for national independence, great emphasis is laid upon mobilizing 'the people' as an essential part of the struggle… By its orientation towards the people at least in theory, and its involvement of the people at least in aspirations (activation is more important than participation in this context), populistic nationalism may be distinguished from other nationalisms chiefly characterized by economic policy and/or cultural ethos" (Stewart, 1969: 183). Stewart mentions two types of "populistic nationalism". In the first type, populism is an important phase in the struggle for national independence, while the second type characterizes "regimes" rather than "movements" (Stewart, 1969: 184-185).

Hence, identification of "nation", "state", and "party", meaning to "decide and act in accordance with what is good for the people despite the people" (Köker, 1990: 157-159). It is through this identification that

> The Republican [populism] ... had informed (and legitimized) the mono-party authoritarianism of the early Republic. This official version was nationalist in terms of its conception of political community, secularist with regard to origins of political authority, and etatist in terms of its understanding of "popular welfare". Also, official populism had been a means for legitimizing a Rousseausque kind of claim to representation: the general (solidary) will of the people had been represented directly by a solitary elite in a regime d'assemblée that had reflected in reality less the general will and more the will of the bureaucratic elites (Sunar, 1990: 749).

Karpat also pays attention to the close relationship between Kemalist principles of populism and nationalism. Populism, according to him, was "both the result of nationalism", which was at the basis of the regime, and a "social-political justification for it"[56]. It involves in itself "the idea of a government based on the people's sovereignty", which was at the basis of the nationalist movement and of the National Assembly. However, in the absence of almost "any means through which people could effectively exercise that sovereignty and have a voice in changing the government", this remained a "fictitious sovereignty" (Karpat, 1959: 51). That is to say, the obstacles to the political participation (of the people) were "theoretically removed" (Çelik, 2001: 77), whereas the fundamental social structure was to be kept, and the social, political, and economic developments

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[56] Peker's speech at the Fourth Congress of the RPP is a good expression of the close relationship established between Kemalist populism and nationalism. Here, populism appeared almost as a precondition for national unity: "[S]ınıf kavgası, tahakküm, imtiyaz fikirlerini kökünden silen bir zihniyet, bu memleketin zihniyetini tamamlayacaktır. Ancak bizim istediğimiz ve anladığımız manada halkçı olmaktır ki milliyetçiliği en temiz ve saf bir değere çıkarır. Sade milliyetçilik Türk vatanının sınırı içinde, dil birliği, kültür birliği ile mazi hatıralarına ve gelecek zamanın emellerine bağlılıkta birleşme yapar. Fakat bu anlayışta birleşmiş olsa da; içinde, sınıf, imtiyaz çarpışmaları kopmayan yani halkçı bir duygu ile birleşmemiş olan bir ulus yığını hak ve şerefte müsavi teklerden kurulmuş bir ulusal birlik kütlesi vücuda getiremez ... Ulus yığını bu saf duygularla halkçı olmalıdır ki halk yığınları ulusçuluğun yaptığı büyük kuvvetle birbirini seven birbirine bağlanan büyük bir varlık teşkil edebilsin" (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutalgası, Ankara, Ulus Basımevi, 1935, p.46).

would be realized upon the basis of the existing social organization. This meant an "implicit" approval of the continuation of social differentiation in the same old pattern, leading Karpat to label the regime "politically revolutionary" and "socially conservative"[57] (Karpat, 1959: 51).

Another important issue concerning the relationship between Kemalist principles of populism and nationalism is its contradictory character. As Köker argues, defining nation as a unity in language, culture and ideal stripped of religious characteristics, and so presenting a "new alternative identity" to the people living within the Turkish society, the Kemalist principle of nationalism contradicts with the "cultural" aspect of populism which is defined as the preservation of people's values and aspirations and of characteristics peculiar to the Turkish people" (Köker, 1990: 153) within the process of social change without hindering social development.

This contradiction is, in fact, closely related to the "instrumentalist" and "hybrid/ambigious" character of the principle of populism which expresses itself in the imagination of the relationship between "the people" and "the nation". The people, despite being "idealized" or "exalted", carries ambiguities and "inauspiciousness", which would be possible to overcome by an identification of people with nation, which would be realised through an orientation or direction of the people towards that ideal –to be a nation- going beyond being the "common people". And it is only to the extent that the people is "nationalized" and show the "will" and "performance" to be a nation that the people is seen as a "value", and as an "embryo" of the nation. Once the people is considered as an "embryo" of the nation, there arises the problem of "ripening", or "maturing". To the extent that the people is not "nationalized", it is seen as the place of ambiguities and inauspiciousness. Bora and Canefe (2001: 638-639) call this tension between the people and the nation within Kemalist nationalism as another expression of "paradoxical elitism" of populist ideologies, and consider it as a continuation of

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[57] For Karpat (1959: 51), "[t]his was true in matters of social organization, although in matters of social custom it was revolutionary."

the distinction or separation between the "common people /elite"[58], taken over from the Ottoman societal order.

This contradictory conceptualization of the people is also emphasised by Öztürkmen (1998). As she stated, while the people is displayed and exalted as the source of political sovereignty and "new values", it is defined as an "uneducated mass" to be educated in Kemalists' discourse. The "ideal of peasantism" is nothing else than the embodiment of this ambiguous and contradictory definition. As Karaömerlioğlu states, the peasantry is imagined or considered a social group who forms the "origin" of the Turkish nation, who plays a "determining" role in the national development: "pure", "honorable", "reasonable" and "open for change". In other words, villages are considered as places where the national culture is thought to be "pure" and "completely preserved" (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 287, 293-4). However, once stripped of being the carrier of national identity, the people is seen as inauspicious, as "uneducated masses", even as a "threat" to the modernization project and the social order (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001a: 282). They are viewed as that part of the society which should be transformed through various reforms. In this context, the slogan "the villager is our master" remains a slogan. As a matter of fact, in many underdeveloped countries, as Worsley argues, the populist exaltation or glorification of the peasant and the "communitarian" aspect of village society could not go beyond being simply a "part of the ideological armoury of rhetoric", called by Selznick an "unanalysed abstraction". It is included in party programs and national mythology, but has no importance in practice. (It was also the case in Kemalist populism which did not go beyond the slogan of "the villager is the master of the

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[58] Tunçay (1999: 211-17) believes that this distinction between the "common people" and the "elite" was continued through the practice and ideology of Kemalist laicism. He argues that despite being "progressive", laicism and populism conflicted with each other during the first years of the Republic. According to him, Republican laicism can be seen as one of the most important factors that incited the alienation of the elite from the common people, whereby he considers this as a conscious and purposeful action. Kemalist intellectuals put forth their wishes to remain "distinct from" -and consider themselves "superior to"- the masses in their attitudes towards religion. For intellectuals who claim to know the truth and be responsible for making the masses admit those truths –if necessary, by force- laicism became a way of distinguishing themselves from the people.

nation".) However, despite being "unrealized" or "unrealizable myths", these "unanalysed abstractions" have "social" significance providing both "major sources of powerful springs of action" and that of "legitimation, identity and meaning". Being essentially "myth", such kind of populism differs from those which are directly related to the life of the small rural producer (Worsley, 1969: 234).

All these arguments shed light onto the immanent contradiction of populism. That is to say, on the one hand, the intellectuals "exalt" the people with their values, traditions, etc in such a way that they generally form "the source" of the nation. On the other hand, the same people are seen as to be "trained", "enlightened". It is exactly the latter consideration of the people that "entails" the "help" of intellectuals. Since the people are thought of lacking the qualities of mind and character or knowledge to be attained through education, there arises a need for a group of individuals which decide and act "on behalf of" and "for them". In other words, the masses were seen as "not fit to govern for themselves", creating the need for the leadership "to govern the masses". This brings into the agenda the role of participation and/or representation.

II.2.2.2. The Role of Participation in Kemalist Populism

Following Ahmad, it is possible to argue that if we accept that the principle of mass participation is an important element of democracy, we should say that this principle had been an "inseparable element of Kemalism" being based on the conditions of the War of Independence. The key words of this ideological struggle directed against the Sultan were the "people" and the "nation", which were depicted in the National Pact. Later, in his Nutuk –the "Speech" read before the National Assembly in 1927- Atatürk evaluated populism as a mechanism which would enable to delegate power, sovereignty and administration directly to the people (Ahmad, 1999: 163-4). This, as Kili states, requires realization of

equality especially through a transition from being a "subject" to a "citizen" and providing the latter with necessary conditions for participation. Grounding the political regime on national sovereignty, improving opportunity and possibility of education, altering the Election Law, giving women and men the right to equal vote, defining the voter age as 18, giving women the right to participation into election (in 1930 participation in municipality election, in 1934 to general elections) were important steps of "participation" which is already involved in – and aimed at by- "populism". Despite the fact that these attempts prepared the ground for increasing political participation and for multi-party system accelerating "upward mobility", the "social" (social-egalitarian) aspect of populism remained inadequate since there was no sufficient changes and reforms in economic structure (Kili, 1981: 251-252). Similarly, for Selek (1968: 713), it was thought that populism would be realized through a certain number of legal formulas, which were thought to create a society where no privileges given to anybody[59]. The focus was, Selek continues, on the political aspect of populism rather than economic and social ones[60], leading to the neglect of the latter.

Here, following Akural, one must make a distinction between "political rhetoric" and "political practice". Quoting from the 1935 Program of the RPP that "We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the law, and who recognize no privileges for an individual, family, class or community to be of the people and for the people (populist)", and from Peker's speech at the Fourth

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[59] Peker, at the conference on 16 October 1931, mentions the sentence of the Party Program stating that "We consider the individuals who accept an absolute equality before the law, and who recognize no privileges for an individual, family, class or community to be of the people and for the people (populist)", and then argues that the privileges mentioned were actually non existent, and the general structure of the country was "not suitable" for such a claim (Peker, 1931: 12).

[60] Oran (1988: 202-4) also underlines the point that populism is an "ideological means" which has important socio-economic and socio-political impacts. However, having failed in carrying out certain tasks in Turkey, its function was limited to being an "instrument of nationalism". Quoting from Ergil, Oran mentions two conditions for a populist regime to be "effective" and "permanent": first, the living conditions of working people should be improved especially through income redistribution; and second, they can be organized to defend their rights against the bourgeoisie. Peron's success in Argentina during the period of 1946-55 was the result of his decision to take into consideration these two conditions.

Congress of the Republic, then Secretary General, that "We do not believe in regional interests nor in the privilege of feudalism, agalık, of families and of groups"[61] Akural raises several objections against these statements. First of all, he argues that the principle of equality before the law, and the rejection of the sultanate are not enough to call a political system populist. The second objection is the continuing socio-economic and political influence of "ağalık" throughout modern Turkish history. Criticizing Jaschke's assertion that "the peasants were the real beneficiaries of Atatürk's reforms" for having "no factual justification", and agreeing with Landau's claim that most Kemalist reforms were "focused on the cities, towns and the main provincial centers" neglecting the villages, Akural argues that despite being theoretically "imbued with egalitarian values"[62], Kemalist populism "did not in practice seek to reconstruct the economic order". "Kemalist reform policies", he states, "reflected the parochial concerns of the urbanized intellectuals" rather than "the aspirations of the peasant community" (Akural, 1984: 136-137). On 1 March 1922, in his opening speech at the GNA, Atatürk called the peasants "the real owners and masters of Turkey", and announced that his governments economic policies were devoted to "the realization of this noble goal" (Atatürk, 1945: 219). However,

> in the absence of effective price supports, agricultural goods remained artificially cheap, and the peasants experienced no appreciable economic gains throughout the Kemalist era. Primitive agricultural methods, the lack of roads and transportation facilities, inefficient marketing, the inelasticity of demand for agricultural goods, and even agricultural taxation all conspired to favor the urban consumers. (Akural, 1984: 137)

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[61] "Türkiye'de sınıf yoktur, cins yoktur, imtiyaz yoktur ... Mıntıka menfaati, derebeylik, ağalık, aile, cemaat imtiyazı fikirleri yoktur. Türkiye'de değer ancak bilgi üstünlüğü, kapasite ve çalışma ile yükselebilir... [S]ınıf kavgası, tahakküm, imtiyaz zihniyetlerini kökünden silen bir zihniyet, bu memleketin zihniyetini tamamlayacaktır" (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Görüşmeleri Tutalgası, Ankara, Ulus Basımevi, 1935, p.43).

[62] "The Kemalists, like the Young Turks and Ottoman ruling class (askeri) before them, were very comfortable with the existing elitist institution. As model elitist, they emphasized egalitarianism in its elitist aspects, but they lacked the social skills and attitudional disposition necessary for the successful practice of populism." (Akural, 1984: 138).

This unsurprisingly resulted in a widespread ignorance of Kemalist reform policies in the remote regions of Anatolia (Akural, 1984: 137). Pevsner also pays attention to the same point arguing that

> The great percentage of the population (about 80 %) consisted of peasants and farmers living in the rural parts of the country, in 40,000 villages, quite unlikely to be effected by the reforms, and unaware of the political/cultural/social/economic benefits of being citizens of the new Turkish Republic. For this sector of the population, a great deal had to be done; thus, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk felt the need to extend a theoretical (or, rhetorical) "empoverment" by declaring them to be "the masters of the country" (1 March 1922) and he tried to pave the way for their future integration into the political/economic/social/cultural system of the Turkish Republic (quoted in Ilgaz, 1998: 14-15).

Mango (1968: 56) also defines Kemalist populism as "service to the people, rather than government by the people". Despite declaring the peasant as "our master", the one(s) who "decided where the interests of the master lay" was "the ruling elite". Sunar well expresses the "exclusive" character of Kemalist populism:

> The bureaucratic state was autonomous but segregated from society. It monopolized political power, but its power was exclusive rather than inclusive (of social groups). Hence, the power which the bureaucratic elites exercised stemmed largely from the organized/centralized apparatuses of the state and the unorganized/decentralized nature of society. The early republican state was, therefore, a strong/weak state. It was strong in the sense that it was the only organized force in the land; it was weak in the sense that it was deprived of roots in society. Social groups and their energies instead of being harnessed to the state had been shut out from it (Sunar, 1990: 747).

What have been meant by "social groups" here was particularly the large peasant population, who had been "weakly linked to the state" and "excluded from participation", being left to depend on "their own traditional devices" (Sunar, 1990: 746). Although the expressions like "the peasant is the master of the nation", and "the true owner of the country" had been repeated starting from the

1920s, as Parla rightly stresses, the RPP's populism was not oriented towards the middle- and small-farmer. This was explicitly seen in the agricultural policies of the government. While, on the one hand, the aim was declared as giving landless peasants enough land for working and subsistance (through the Land Law), on the other hand, it was openly announced that the big landowners who were thought to contribute more to the national development incited. The law concerning giving land to the farmers was not constitutionalized until 1935. It was enacted in 1946, but remained "incomplete". Even this law, the main object of which was "to prevent proletarianization in agriculture" and the flow of peasants to the urban areas, was enough in itself to alarm big landowners, who had a significant place within the class alliance of the RPP. For Parla this was a "functional hesitancy" of the Kemalist RPP. That is to say, throughout the whole period, on the one hand, a "rhetoric addressing to small and middle peasants" was used, on the other, policies which were in favour of big landowners were applied (Parla, 1991: 235-236).

To sum up, it can be argued that despite the emphasis on expressions like "national sovereignty" and "people's participation in administration", and important steps –mainly "legal"- towards their realization such as foundation of the TGNA, significant changes in the Election Law, Kemalist populism was far from creating necessary conditions of people's participation through a radical change in their socio-economic conditions. Although the emphasis was put on "the unity and integrity of the people" rejecting separation or division between social classes or groups through populist discourse, the economic policies carried out by the Republican regime themselves promoted the class formation. The shift in emphasis on the different aspects of populism, on the other hand, can be explained mainly with the changing balance of internal and external power. Hence, the replacement of the expression "for the people, by the people" during the first period with that of "for the people, despite the people" within the second stage (1930s).

Populism of the VIs, as it will be seen in the following chapters, remained within the boundaries of Kemalist populism to a certain extent. This is not surprising when one considers the historical context in which they were founded and which explains their devotion to Kemalist principles. Therefore, before comparing and contrasting them, it is appropriate to delineate the social, economic and political conditions of the country which gave rise to the foundation of the VIs.

CHAPTER III

THE VILLAGE INSTITUTES

The Village Institutes (VIs) were one of the most efficacious and highly controversial social phenomena in the history of the Turkish Republic. Despite the fact that they were in essence educational institutions, they went beyond an educational undertaking, having social, economic, political and cultural impacts on the structure of the Turkish society, and politics.

There is no consensus on the reasons for the establishment of the VIs. That is to say, some writers put the emphasis on economic causes –to increase the efficiency and productivity of agriculture, to develop industrialization and to create a national market economy, while others emphasize political reasons –to instill the ideology of the new regime and to gain support to the new regime. The latter pay attention to the continuity and similarity between People's Houses and the VIs especially in the sense that they were embodiment of peasantist ideology and a part of the project of creating a nation and a national culture. Rather than putting the emphasis on either economic or political reasons, this study argues that the reasons behind their establishment are much more complex including economic and political ones. Therefore, it is necessary to begin with analyzing the historical context which gave rise to the Village Institutes experience.

In order to understand the reasons for the foundation of the VIs, it is necessary to draw a general picture of Turkey in the 1930s, focusing mainly on the social, economic and political conditions of the country. It is appropriate to start with a general observation that there was an increasing interest in the village and the peasant in the 1930s. In fact, the concern for the countryside including both agricultural development and rural education had been existed in intellectual

circles, and rhetorically involved in Mustafa Kemal's speeches during the period between 1923 and 1930. However, the peasantist discourse could not go beyond or even reach the discourse of "villager as the real master of the nation" during that period. The interest in villages and peasants was fundamentally put on the agenda in the 1930s, and in this, the regime's object and worry of increasing the political base in number and thus strengthen it –because the previous attempts of Kemalist regime to reach the villages, like People's Houses, were far from realizing its expectations (Ahmad, 1999: 171)- and the impact of the World Economic Crisis of 1929 especially on agricultural production -since Turkish economy means agriculture- played a significant role (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998b: 57-58, 63; 2001b: 285-286).

Underlying the interest in the village and the peasant in the 1930s lay the crisis of the political regime in the beginning of the 1930s, which led the leading cadre to search for increasing rural support to the regime with the help of "intellectuals"[63] (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 286). The unexpected mass support given to the new opposition party, the Free Party (*Serbest Fırka*), and the incident in Menemen displayed that the reforms had not taken root among the people. That is to say, the regime failed to win the hearts and minds of the people and that there were reactionary thoughts and movements supporting the previous regime. Thus, it was an urgent need to free the minds of the people from the impacts of such reactionary thoughts and institutions and secure the new regime. Oran argues that as it was explicitly seen in the Free Party experiment, the westernizing reforms imposed "from above" at the expense of "the people" – their "inclination" and "needs"- would cause great reactions especially in the absence of "economic prosperity" (Oran, 1988: 179). 1920s were advantageous years in terms of favourable economic conditions, which would legitimize reforms among the population. In contrast to 1920s, 1930s witnessed a great depression, and the Free

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[63]However, as Karaömerlioğlu calls our attention, the lack of interest and enthusiasm cannot be attributed only to the masses, but also to the intellectuals. Therefore, the government had to do something "to win the heart of" both masses and the elites (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998b: 57; 1999: 68-69).

Party experiment led to the arousal of people's reactions who suffered from the bad impacts of the crisis. For Oran, what the RPP learnt by this experience was that it was necessary, on the one hand, "to control the notables and the bourgeoisie" and "take economic measures", while on the other hand, to try to cope with "people's reaction" through "ideological measures" (Oran, 1988: 179-180). To do these, the RPP implemented, first, "statism", and second, "populism" (Oran, 1988: 180). These two principles aimed to cope with people's reactions so as to prevent their transformation into "class consciousness"[64] (Oran, 1988: 181). Similarly Karaömerlioğlu states that denying "class-based ideologies", peasantism argues for a "stable" society in which social differentiation would be eliminated. It was, on the one hand, thought to serve as a "means" to bar the way of "potential" mass movements, while on the other hand it tried to form an "anti-socialist mass base" for nationalism in a country with an agriculture-based economy. According to Karaömerlioğlu, it was through peasantist ideology that the demands of the peasants who were suffering from the Great Depression were tried to be met (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 285).

These measures taken by the Republican elite accompanied others like redefinition of the relationship between the Party and the state in the Third RPP Congress of 1931. From that time onwards, the Party, the state and the government were integrated. The foundation of People's Houses as an embodiment of the project of replacing any autonomous pre-existing intellectual and political associations, the strengthening of "the Party-state control of non-

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[64] Despite its claim to create a "homogeneous society", the single party regime did not seem to protect the economic interests of "the lower classes". By "homogeneous society" the single party regime actually mean "to prevent the rise of class consciousness among the lower classes. That is to say, while trying to create a "homogeneous society", "the elites' understanding of revolution from above" does not seem to pursue a political policy in favour of certain classes in a setting where "the notables were economically dominant", but "the poor classes" were passive or ineffective (Oran, 1988: 182). As a matter of fact, the (petty bourgeois) elites' choice for "free enterprise" -together with the supression of organization of "poor classes"- resulted in the further strengthening of dominant classes economically. Especially benefitting from the conditions of the Second World War, the commercial bourgeoisie and the landowners led the RPP to quit the claim of "classless society" (Oran, 1988: 183). As it is mentioned before, according to this claim or "thesis of the official ideology", in the absence of "conflicting classes", the single party (RPP) represented the society as a whole, making the foundation of others unnecessary.

state institutions" were also outcomes of this mentality (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 68).[65] Becoming aware of "the weakness" of its mass base, the RPP government sought new ways to "reach the people" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 68-69). Similar to the People's Houses, which were "to carry revolution to the people" (Çeçen, 2000: 15), the VIs were partially an outcome of this effort. Therefore, the VIs were, in a way, the attempt of the Republican regime for "reaching the masses" and "bringing up generations of revolution" (*inkılap nesilleri*). They were a "part of the project of conveying the regime and Turkish nationalism to the villages" which were thought to be partially nationalist[66] (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 286). Despite their "romantic" perception of the countryside as the reserve of "pure cultural traits" or of the national essence, the intelligentsia "viewed the peasants as the least 'nationalized' group of the people", and believed in "the necessity to spread the nationalist ideology to the countryside". Given the fact that "the national project was more of an urban phenomenon" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 53), and that "Kemalism found its supporters easily" in the towns and cities rather than in the villages where it "failed to gain the hearts and minds of the peasants", the intention of the ruling elite to use the VIs to reach the peasants, who formed the basis of the Turkish population, and consolidate nationalism can be understood (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 63-64). Indeed, the need for "Turkifying the peasants", and the role of the VIs in this task were emphasized by many writers. Here, Karaömerlioğlu mentions the Kurdish question as the most urgent issue. That is to say, to 'Turkify' the peasants was a vital task especially in the mainly Kurdish speaking area. To this end, the government attempted for "educational and economic reform in agriculture". The land reform attempt of 1937 aimed, before everything else, to remove "the political influence" of the Kurdish

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[65] Oran (1988: 181) argues that in their attempts for bringing the RPP under state control, the elites aimed to remove the influence of the notables on the provinces, and dominate the Party, preventing in a way the relative reflection of the people's demands to government policy by means of through the mediation of the notables, and so obstructing channels of communication between "the elites" and "the masses".

[66] During the debate on the bill about the foundation of the VIs, a deputy of Bingöl, Feridun Fikri, stated that the Village Teachers should have especially cope with and "improve" the "language" of the peasants, and worked "to reinforce the sentiment of nationality", and "to ensure unity and cooperation" (Goloğlu, 1974: 70).

notables and tribal chiefs in the East, and to establish "the hegemony of the nation-state" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998b: 58).

In the light of these considerations, it is possible to relate the foundation of the VIs to the peasantist ideology which had popularity among some significant figures of the time, including the architect of the VIs, Tonguç. Peasantism as an "ideological and practical discourse" was explicitly seen in the publications and activities of the People's Houses; in the experience of the VIs, and in the debate on land reform (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b).[67] Before going into the details of the reasons for the foundation of the VIs, it will be useful to open a paranthesis and briefly mention the People's Houses as an embodiment of the principle of populism in general, and peasantism in particular.

The People's Houses were established by the RPP in 1932 as adult training centers. At the end of the period between 1932-1950, the number of the People's Houses reached 478, and that of the People's Rooms –opened in 1939- 4322. At the opening of the People's Houses on February 19, 1932, believing in the superiority of the "power of thought" to the "power of weapons", Mustafa Kemal stated the aim of the People's Houses as "educating the people", and transforming them into a "mass" (Tütengil, 1999: 207-208). They were, according to Peker (1974: 11), agents of "organizing the nation" as a "conscious" mass committed to an ideal (dated 19 February 1932). As it can be explicitly understood from Peker's words, the People's Houses were one of the agents of

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[67] According to Karaömerlioğlu, the existence of the peasantist discourse during the single-party period displayed the "ambiguous" and "eclectic" character of the state policies considering the vital questions the country had been faced with. The great fear of the social and political consequences of urbanization and industrialization refrained the government from initiating consistent policies toward economic development. That is to say, on the one hand, the ruling circles aspired to industrialization. On the other hand, they feared its consequences. While, on the one hand, they argued for the necessity of transformation of the rural structure, they glorified and tried to preserve the traditional fabric of the countryside on the other. Even the debate on the land reform, Karaömerlioğlu states, aimed at, before all else, a "return to the idealized Ottoman land tenure system" rather than rural transformation. Therefore, he concludes, the reasons for the failure in the application of any kind of radical policy toward industrialization or rural transformation should be sought not only in the structural limitations but also in the ambiguous and eclectic character of the state ideology (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 85-86; 2001b: 297).

nation formation, a process which, for him, required training and/or educating the people (Peker, 1974: 10-11). But this would be a nation without classes (Peker, 1974: 6). This is where Kemalist principle of populism came into the scene. With their aim of adult training which would make them equal and conscious citizens by providing at the same time their political, cultural and moral development so that they form a nation without classes and class contradictions.

Considered as an embodiment of peasantist ideology, the People's Houses were expected to bridge the widening gap between "intellectuals" and "ordinary people", and between peasants and city dwellers (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 70). As Reşit Galip (1974: 27) states in his speech at the opening ceremony of the People's Houses, "peasantism of the People's Houses" would be aimed to increase the relationship between peasants and city dwellers, and between peasants and intellectuals. Peasantism itself had been one of the nine fields[68] of activity or clubs in the People's Houses. It had an important place among others since "the village" was one of the main concerns underlying the establishment of People's Houses (Çetin, 1999: 227). The members of the Branch of Peasantism (*Köycülük Kolu*) were charged with the duties of working for "the social, sanitary, and aesthetic development of villages", and for strengthening "the feelings of attachment and solidarity" between the peasant and the city dweller (İğdemir, 1974: 125). These would be achieved either through inviting peasants, especially those settled near the town, to general performances (*Halkevi genel müsamereleri*) of the People's Houses, or through participation of the members of the People's Houses into various festivals which would be held in the villages.[69]

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[68] The others were Language and Literature club; History and Museum club; Fine Arts club; Theatre club; Sports club; Social Help club; Public Courses club; Library and Publication club.

[69] It should be remembered that the members of the Branch of Peasantism worked for peasants not only in the villages but also in the cities. Their activities included speeches giving practical information about daily life of the peasant; representations on village life; petition days and the days of writing letters for illiterate peasants; medical treatment of peasants by doctors and dentists during village visits; placement of successful students of the villages into schools; mobile libraries; collecting local folksongs and searching for folkloric culture; organizingland feast and planting trees; informing peasants about various subjects by intellectuals and experts in various fields; organizing peasant nights on market days; publishing booklets and books for peasants many of which were provided free of charge; sports events like wrestling, javelin, horse race, etc.

It is, according to Çetin, in these ways that "the integration between the peasant and the city dweller" would contribute to the village development. As it was stated in the regulations, in doing these activities, the People's Houses would not "be a burden to peasants" during their visit to the villages (Çetin, 1999: 227).

According to Çeçen, the People's Houses were considered to be an answer to the need for a new formation or organization which would bridge the gap between the people and the intellectuals and "cause to unite" them, and would "train and direct the people within the direction of principles of revolution"[70] in compliance with the principle of populism which aimed at a new type of administration, i.e., "people's government", and the administrators would "come from among the people" (Çeçen, 2000: 77). The latter was an objective of Kemalist principle of populism, but it could not happen "spontaneously", requiring foundation of a "new organization" (Çeçen, 2000: 78). This is where the People's Houses came into the scene with their "social" function which Çeçen summarizes in the phrase of "educating and training the people".

In explaining this function, Çeçen pays attention to the political aspect of populism, i.e. popular sovereignty. He argues that until popular sovereignty was achieved, the People's Houses would "educate" and "train" the people so that they would become capable of being sovereign (Çeçen, 1974: 190). This, Çeçen continues, cannot be left to its own course since the people could neither "train" nor "rule" themselves. They are rather in need of being directed to the "true" path. Training the people means making them free from "mystical legends", "darkness of ignorance", and from viewing each other as an enemy; and to "prepare them to the realities of the life" which means nothing but progress towards the level of contemporary civilization (Çeçen, 1974: 191). (In fact, this is

during village visits; showing films about health, agriculture, etc. during village visits (Çetin, 1999: 226-227).

[70] According to Çeçen, the low level of literacy created difficulty for the people in "understanding" the reforms (Çeçen, 2000: 77). That is to say, the inadequacy of "popular education" (*halk eğitimi*) and of an "educational system" prevented the "full" reflection of Kemalist revolutions to the people "at the right time" (Çeçen, 2000: 81).

the point where elitism immanent to populism can be observed. As it can be clearly seen in the arguments mentioned above, the people are considered to be ignorant, unrealistic, unaware of the realities of the life, needing to be educated, trained, directed and governed until they become qualified to govern themselves.)

However, neither the People's Houses nor the People's Rooms established in 1939 "to control the villages from within" realized their object of transforming the countryside because of material impediments to reach widely-dispersed small villages, and the "mentality" that prevailed in the People's Houses impeding the closure of the gap between intellectuals and the peasants. The latter involved "the bureaucratic nature" of their activities which "stifled" any local initiative, and viewed peasants as "objects of social engineering" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 71-72).

Despite having been principally designed to fill the gap between the educated elite at the top of Turkish society and the large uneducated masses below, through an intensive education program", the People's Houses "became and remained centers for bureaucrats and those who already had an education". From the very beginning, all government officials were told to support the Houses.[71] With the declaration of the People's Houses as "non-political organizations" by governmental decree, they were allowed to participate in the activities of the People's Houses, and did so remarkably, while the majority of uneducated people did not take part in these activities, "refusing to accept the Houses as their activity centers" (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 157).

Kirby also pays attention to the fact that, failed to become "people's centres", they served rather as "cultural centres" in the cities (Kirby, 1961: 70), focusing mainly on "raising the cultural level of the people" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 70). Just at the opening ceremony of the People's Houses, Reşit Galip (1974: 21)

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[71] The village instructors and the teachers graduated from the VIs in the 1940s formed the staff of the People's Rooms in the villages (Çetin, 1999: 228).

stated that they would be "schools of national culture". Being cultural institutions, they aimed to bring to light national merits which were thought to exist in the villages (Bayraktar, 1999). The People's Houses were, in İğdemir's words, "hearths of culture" where people were trained or educated in "the hearths of culture and people's training". Despite being tied to the RPP, they were not "political institutions" (İğdemir, 1974: 119-120).

Arguing that the programs of the People's Houses were not particularly political in nature, Başgöz and Wilson pay attention to the lack or absence of a "strong indoctrination policy" in the Houses despite the special care "taken to prohibit activities which opposed the nationalistic and secularistic principles of the State" (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 153). As against to criticism directed to the People's Houses by the Democratic Party which "charged the People's Houses with being centers of RPP propaganda[72] and sympathy", and viewing the Directors as "little more than Republican trainees for the Grand National Assembly", Başgöz and Wilson argue that despite the close relationship between the People's Houses and the RPP, it would be wrong to charge them with being "centers for RPP propaganda" especially after 1940 since they were mainly interested or engaged in "cultural" activities (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 157-158).

Contrarily, Oran argues that the People's Houses were "to systematically propagate the new ideological approach of the single party" (Oran, 1988: 180). For him, this was the very reason for the failure of the People's Houses in bridging the gap between the elites and the masses. That is to say, rather than providing intercommunication between them, the Houses functioned as conveying the instructions of the government to the masses (Oran, 1988: 181). Tütengil pays attention to the same failure of the Houses. He considers the

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[72] In his speech at the first anniversary of the People's Houses, İsmet İnönü (1974: 43-44), the Prime Minister, stated that the People's Houses were centres where the people were regularly told and informed about the principles of the RPP and their implementations, including the "newest" and safest" information about home policy and economy. From time to time, according to İnönü, they would be a place where the government would "give an account of its political performances".

practices and publications of the *Branch of Peasantism* (*Köycülük Kolları*) that he calls "Peasantism of the People's Houses" as a "new phase" in intellectuals' approach to the village questions. However, Tütengil argues, "despite all its good faith", this "adviser" peasantism, "looking at the village from outside" remained "picnics" of intellectuals (Tütengil, 1999: 208). Parallel with Oran, Çetin (1999) states that despite the claim that the People's Houses would remain outside the politics, in reality they worked as a branch of the RPP. They were in close contact with the RPP, having been established, controlled and financed by it. The administrative boards and directors of People's Houses were, at the same time, members of the Party (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 153). This can be seen, among others, in regulations prepared by the General Administrative Board of the RPP (*Umumi İdare Heyeti*). In these regulations, concerning the Branch of Peasantism, it was stated that the party programs, their propagation and ingraining formed the basis for all the workings of the People's Houses (Çetin, 1999).

Başgöz and Wilson pay attention to the failure of the People's Houses in the area of "village aid" which involved activities like "rehabilitating villages, providing medical and other needed services and helping the peasants to transact their necessary business in the towns" (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 154). Such activities, Başgöz and Wilson argue, "were only sporadically carried out, failing to realize the "populistic" objectives cited in the principles of the RPP. Being unable to "control the operations of the economic system", and to help peasants in selling their products at real value against the townsmen who tried to buy them as cheaply as possible, the activities and service of the members of the People's Houses was limited mainly to help peasants in dealing with bureaucratic inefficiency and red tape. Being "purely philanthropic in character with its major emphasis on social welfare", the village aid program of the People's Houses failed in a country where the majority of the population lived in poor conditions in small, impoverished villages cultivating an exhausted soil with primitive farm techniques (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 156). The program displayed that

improvement in the living standard of the peasants necessitated a larger reform program including mobilization of national resources (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 157). The VIs was a further step in the realization of this object. As it has been mentioned above, both the People's Houses and the VIs have been considered embodiment of Kemalist populism[73]. However, as it can be seen in the following part of the study, this was just one of the reasons for the foundation of the VIs.

III.1. Reasons for the Foundation of the VIs

One of the important reasons for the foundation of the VIs was to accomplish nationwide primary education. However, this was not an easy task for many reasons. Öztürk mentions the dispersed settlement in the country, and states that it was impossible to employ teachers[74] in all the villages because the Republic had been faced with many problems other than training the teachers. Thus, it was necessary in a short time to accomplish nationwide primary education; to achieve "village development"; "to propogate the principles of the Republic and Atatürk's revolutions to the people and the villages"; to provide the villages with teachers (Öztürk, 1980: 87); and to equip those teachers with necessary "knowledge" and "skills" so that they could endure the difficult conditions of the village life (Öztürk, 1980: 88).

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[73] According to Çeçen, both the People's Houses and the VIs led to "awakening of the peasants" by carrying "service" and "education" to the people. However, they differed in terms of their "historical functions". The People's Houses, for Çeçen, had various functions, aiming to gather all stratums of the society (workers, peasants, city dwellers, etc) under the roof of Atatürkist principles and "national merits", and to mobilize them for progress towards the level of contemporary civilization, while the main function of the VIs was widespread education of the people (Çeçen, 1974: 189). Tütengil also views the People's Houses and the VIs realization of the principle of populism, as an attempt of the RPP to reach both "the people" and "the village" (Tütengil, 1999: 207-208), while paying attention to the difference between the two in terms of their impact on intellectuals' approach to the "village".

[74] The total salary to be paid to the one hundred thousand teachers that were needed both in villages and the cities was equal to the quarter of budget (Öztürk, 1980: 87).

The concern for –and discussions on- education in general, and rural education in particular goes back to the early years of the Republic. The subject was generally handled together with the question of village development in particular. Rural education,[75] for peasantists, was a means, among others, of improving the quality of village life (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 53), and national development in general. However, during the first years of the Republic, there was no effective solutions to the problems facing the educational system in general and rural education in particular. Having been "inadequately financed and staffed", and "heavily burdened with routine administrative duties and the day-to-day crises", the Ministry of Education became ineffective in this sense.[76] Even the Educational Congresses convened by the Ministry took decisions on secondary and technical matters rather than primary ones. In the 1930s, however, the government focused more on the problem of rural education. In this, both internal and external factors –the Great Depression- played an important role. Here, the crisis in the educational system, among others, had an important place. In a country where the majority of population was uneducated, and which suffered from the lack of an effective general education organization and insufficient number of schools and teachers it was an urgent need to handle the problem of education seriously and take necessary measures mobilizing available resources.

During his Ministry of Education (1932-1933), Reşit Galip, a well-known peasantist, "made the Ministry a part of the dynamic resurgence of populism as applied to village development". He formed Village Affairs Commission, involving representatives from the Ministries of Agriculture and Health, "to elaborate theories for village rehabilitation within the context of the education program" (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 137-138). The report issued by this Commission was a forerunner of the VIs Project. However, Reşit Galip's short-term office did not allow him to do much. The educational initiative was

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[75] For initial attempts for agricultural education, see Başgöz and Wilson (1968: 182-189).

[76] However, Mustafa Necati's experiment with Zincidere Village Teachers' School from 1925 to 1928 (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 58) should be mentioned here.

accelerated especially with the appointment of Tonguç, a famous peasantist intellectual, as General Director for Elementary Education in 1935 by Saffet Arıkan, who was appointed as Minister of Education in 1934 (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 138-140).

On June 6, 1937 The Law for Village Instructors (*Köy Eğitmenleri Kanunu*) was enacted. The candidates would attend the six-month courses for training. Village Instructors were chosen from among the literate village youth who had completed their military service and engaged in agricultural works (Çetin, 1999: 228-229). The aim of this project was summarized as disseminating the principles of Republican regime to the villages; making the peasant conscious of being a citizen of the Republican regime; making use of the instructors during the military mobilization; to provide the village children Primary School education; and, pioneering the transition to scientific agriculture in the village in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture (Çetin, 1999: 229).

In the preamble of bill of the foundation of the VIs presented to the Presidency of TGNA on March 19, 1940 it was stated that the project of training village instructors had favourable results, and it had to be continued. However, this project had to be completed with the training of village teachers since it would be wrong to consider the instructors as teachers and expecting to the same tasks from them as it is expected from teachers. It was stated that until then village teachers had been trained in the Teachers' Training Schools, which had been established in accordance more with the needs of cities and towns. It was for this reason that they had failed in adapting themselves to the village conditions. They even did not want to go to (and work in) the villages. Therefore, it was necessary to educate village children according to the needs of villages; that is, by taking into account both the health, economic and natural conditions of villages, and the works peasants performed and the technique they used in doing these works (Goloğlu, 1974: 67), and send them to the villages. Learning about the problems of agricultural production and receiving practical training, these teachers of the

future would be prepared to tackle with the problems and cope with the hardships of village life (Demirtaş, 1993: 31).

In the lack of time and money needed to bring up teachers, a search for new and practical methods resulted in foundation of the VIs which were expected to be productive establishments with less burden on the state. The Law No.3803 was passed by unanimous vote (278 votes) on 17th April 1940. 148 members of the parliament including Celal Bayar,[77] Adnan Menderes and Fuat Köprülü who founded subsequently DP and closed the VIs when they came to power did not participate in voting (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005: 9).

Başgöz defines the object of the VIs as the development of the Turkish village by educators themselves (Başgöz, 1995: 218). They were an attempt for changing the natural conditions and social structure through education[78] (Başgöz, 1995:

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[77] It is interesting enough that when he visited Village Teacher Training School in İzmir-Kızılçullu on 19th August 1938, during his Prime Ministry, Celal Bayar wrote in journal that the educational system adopted to train teachers and instructors would lead to positive outcomes (Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005: 9).

[78] Eskicumalı mentions four basic theories explaining the relations between education and social change. First of all, social reconstructivist (Counts) and modernist (Inkeles, Schultz, Harbison and Myers) theories view education as "autonomous" or "relatively autonomous" factor which can bring or lead to social change. Social reconstructivist perspective arose in USA in the 1930s during which the American society experienced social and economic crisis. According to this theory, education and/or school would play a significant role in solving the problems the society had been faced with. Education was considered as the primary means of social change. Parallel to social reconstructivist perspective, modernist theories viewed education as the most important means of economic and social development and modernization. Especially in Third World countries, it was seen as the primary means of nation building and national development. Moreover, education was considered as a means of creating a new type of citizenship necessary for a democratic society with a belief that democracy was always in contradiction with illiteracy. Furthermore, the spread of education was thought to increase social and economic equality in parallel with the increase in economic development accelerated by education. The conflict theories, formulated by Marxist scholars like Young, Althusser, Bowles and Gintis, on the other hand, do not attribute any autonomous role to education in the process of social change. On the contrary, education is seen to be determined by social, economic and political power structures and relations. Being an ideological state apparatus, it serves reproduction of the capitalist system. The third approach represented by Neo-Marxist scholars like Apple, Willis, Giroux also views education as serving the interests of the dominant class(es). However, different from the second approach, this perspective considers education relatively autonomous having a potential to bring about social change. Rather than being unilateral and corresponding, the relation between the educational system and soci-economic and political structure is considered as a complicated and dynamic one. Thus, the schools are no longer seen merely as spheres of economic and cultural reproduction, but as fields of contradiction and conflict, and it is the latter which gives education a

221). Far from being "classical educational institutions", the VIs were expected to completely change the "backward" village society. Equipping the school and the teacher with technical opportunities, capital and real property, the state charged them with the duty of making "radical changes" in the villages. They would be "hearths of development" (*kalkınma ocakları*) (Başgöz, 1995: 229). According to Evren, the VIs were established to provide all the villages with schools through "more practical and efficient ways", and to achieve a complete national development. Hence, the unity between "education" and "production" in the VIs. The "one being educated" would, at the same time, be a "producer". "It is through this unity between education and production that the necessary social and economic changes in the social structure can be made" (Evren, 1992: 35). Therefore, the VIs should be considered as a "center of development and progress" which "mobilized" not only labour force needed for "social and economic development", but also means of production (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 241). The VIs were expected to be an answer to the need for increasing agricultural production to supply food for a big army since the world conjuncture and technical developments at the end of the First World War required that the country had to be "strengthened" in terms of "economy" and "defense" and one way of doing this was to spread "national education" (Öztürk, 1980: 87). Therefore, in congruence with the interests of the large landowners, the VIs were expected "to educate peasants and to make them better producers" (Timur, 2001:

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liberatory character as opposed to *oppressive* one. The last perspective, represented by John Dewey, argues for both "potentialities" and "limitations" of education to bring about social change. According to Dewey, education can play only a secondary role in social transformation. That is to say, it can induce social change only in conjunction with social, economic and political transformation. Despite being only one of the institutions which can bring about social change, the school, for Dewey, teaches the students new values conflicting with the existing ones and encourages innovations and creativity which are all necessary for the establishment of new social order. According to Eskicumalı, Turkey's case, i.e. the foundation of modern Turkish Republic and the role of education in this process provides a good example of this view. The changes in the educational system were made in parallel with social, economic and political transformation. Education was expected to play a central role in the process of nation-state building; in the establishment of a new regime; in training a new citizen –modern, rational, lay person- in accordance with the necessities and values of this new society, and the qualified labour force required by economy (Eskicumalı, 2003: 15-23). Thus, "(...) the schools became the corner stones of Kemalist policy, social and cultural transformation during the period between 1923-1946" (Eskicumalı, 2003: 23).

210-211). This was already stated in the preamble of bill about the foundation of the VIs presented by the Prime Ministry to the Presidency of TGNA on 19 March 1940. The Village Teachers were considered as "the first condition" and "the chief instrument" of realizing this object (Goloğlu, 1974: 66). Especially in conditions of poverty, the VIs, through its principle of "education based on work" (*işe dayalı eğitim*), aimed to make both the student, the teacher, and the school "producer", and to become a "way of building an independent national economy". They were expected not only to to be "self-sufficient" but also to contribute to the state budget in some region in the long run (Eyuboğlu, 1967: 95).

Başgöz argues that changes through education took long time without creating big shakes. It is for this very reason that the notables and aghas in the RPP did not consider this attempt as a threat. In fact, "the ideology of education" had never been thought of "dangerous" in the history of Republic (Başgöz, 1995: 224). Similar to Başgöz, Engin Tonguç states that for "the progressive enlightened wing"[79] in the RPP who wanted to do something "to reinforce the regime" and "stand it on a firm ground", changes in the field of education probably seemed to be "the easiest leap" in that historical context. According to them, it would be easier to convince "the conservative and reactionary forces" in the government of making changes in the field of education rather than in the infrastructure. Moreover, they were well-informed in the field of education rather than economics. However, Tonguç states, the fundamental reason was the strong opposition of the conservative and reactionary forces which discouraged the progressive wing of the RPP from its attempt to make changes in the

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[79] Engin Tonguç pays attention to the contradiction between the VIs in terms of their fundamental principles and objectives and the economic and political structure. According to him, this can be explained with reference to "internal" and "external" conditions which "temporarily strengthened a progressive wing of the government" with which the founders of the VIs cooperated (Tonguç, E.: 1970: 262). Similarly, Akçay labels the VIs as "citadels of progressivism" founded by a few progressive educators who turned the contradiction within the dominant classes to their advantage. They were, in Akçay's words, "progressive islets" in the "sea of conservatism" (Akçay, 1980: 73).

infrastructure.[80] As a matter of fact, it took a decade for the conservative and reactionary wing of the RPP to understand that works on education, especially those of Tonguç, would "cause damage to its economic interests" at last, wheras they immediately reacted against the land reform, which was a kind of infrastructural change, from the beginning (Tonguç, E. 1970: 119).

In fact, the idea of transforming society by means of education is a significant characteristic of the peasantist ideology. Peasantists viewed education as the most important factor in transforming the rural structure since, according to them, the main reason of the economic and social backwardness in villages was lack of education (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 294). They put an emphasis on "the struggle against the hardships of nature" and "the ignorance of the peasants" at the expense of social relations and social structure (Karaömerlioğlu, 1999: 80). In fact, their object was to "overcome the backwardness of the peasant", which was thought to be a result of "being helpless against nature" rather than that of social relations. (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 289-290). This reminds us another important feature of the peasantist discourse: the emphasis on "voluntarism", meaning expecting too much from human will (Karaömerlioğlu, 2001b: 294).[81] Karaömerlioğlu draws parallelism between the "work ethic and discipline" characterizing the VIs, and that of Turkish "Stakhanovism". "Stakhanovism" was

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[80] Oran explains this rather by the class position of the Turkish intellectual. Considering the attitude of the Turkish intellectual towards the "infrastructure", he argues that "the Turkish intellectual is basically petty bourgeois" and does not have any "reliable" alternative to capitalism in his/her mind. Morever, "the notables are powerful", whereas "the masses are passive". Thus, the Turkish intellectual would not tend to bring about infrastructural change. This attitude of the Turkish intellectual towards the infrastructure was in compliance with the class structure of the country", while his/her attitude to "the superstructure" contradicted with "the socio-economic structure" of the country (Oran, 1988: 64). Like the Ottoman elites, Oran argues, the Turkish intellectual chose to impose "Westernization" upon the masses. This, together with the "beyond the class" (*sınıflarüstü*) position of the Turkish intellectual, leads Oran to conclude that "the Turkish intellectual would take decisions about the infrastructure in accordance with the society (powerful classes or strata)", while the decisions about "the superstructure" would be taken "in spite of the society", making "revolution from above" depending on the socio-economic conditions of the country and the world conjuncture (Oran, 1988: 65).

[81] This can be explicitly seen in the writings of Tonguç. This strong belief in the "will" is also stated by many writers as the most important characteristic of the "idealist" directors, teachers and students of the VIs (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 34).

a phenomenon owed itself to Stakhanov, a miner breaking production records in the 1930s' Soviet Russia. It was "based on an expectation of producing miracles in productivity from physical labour by relying merely on moral and ideological campaigns in an era of technological backwardness" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 59-60). This was, according to Karaömerlioğlu, very similar to the expectations from the VIs in the sense that "[f]aith in the power of human will, voluntarism, and work with enthusiasm, devotion, diligence, and passion were perceived as the panacea to solve the problems of rural Turkey, particularly the problem of low productivity." (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 60). Özsoy criticizes this parallellism between the VIs and Stakhanovism arguing that Stakhanovism was a kind of "organization of industrial production" with an "instrumentalist" understanding of "labour" and "work" while the VIs were educational institutions where "internal relationship between work, education and social action are established" (Özsoy, 2004: 16). Instead, he proposes drawing similarity between the VIs and Communist Saturdays[82], unpaid labour voluntarily given in hours appointed for rest, in terms of the role assigned to "work" in the creation of a "new" type of person who would consider "work" not only as a "means of living" but also as a "fundamental need" for life.

In the light of these considerations, it is possible to argue that the significance of the Village Institutes goes beyond their pedagogical function. This, according to Yeğen, can be understood when we look at the Law No. 4274 concerning the organization of Village Schools and Village Institutes. Especially the 10th article of the Law which described the tasks of the teachers of educating peasants displays why the Institutes are not evaluated only as an educational institution and why there has been so much debate on them. This article, Yeğen argues, gave the state the possibility and opportunity of "keeping its eye on the villages". The village teachers were expected to inspect and organize the villages in terms of

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[82] This mobilization to work initated by the railway workers in Moscow in May 1919 was followed by participation of intellectuals, students, and young people in constructive works -road, dam, etc- and harvest work, and directing the young workers into backward regions. This help was not always given voluntarily, but supported by political propaganda involving "moral pressure" (Boratav, 1973: 125).

their economic, cultural, political and social aspects. To complete the picture, it is also necessary to look at how the duties of the villagers were defined. In the 11th article of the Law peasants are obliged to help the instructors and teachers and cooperate with them, and it is stated that disobedience would be punished. In the 25th article peasants are obliged to work at most 20 days in a year, e.g., in the construction of the schools and roads (Yeğen, 1999: 198-200). As it can be easily understood from the articles of the Law mentioned above, the Institutes were devised as the "new agents" of carrying the Republican regime to the provinces. That is to say, they are the "agents" of the "modernist-westernicist center" for inspecting and controlling the provinces to "modernize-Westernicize" them. The construction of a "national culture" forms the most important part of this task or object. This necessitates both the destruction of the cultural and political autonomy of the provinces and the replacement of the "closed and autonomous economies" of the provinces with a national market economy. What the new regime expected from Anatolian villagers was to make them view themselves as "citizen members of Turkish nation", and the Institutes, in fact, did a lot to achieve this aim (Yeğen, 1999: 200-202).

Altunya also argues that the VIs were the result of the single party regime's search for an education to "enliven the village and the peasant", and to make the latter a "citizen of the Republic" (Altunya, 1998: 45). This can be explicitly seen in the speech of Zeki Mesut Alsan, a Diyarbakır deputy. According to Alsan, the primary aim of educational system was to bring up a "good citizen" who knows the rights and duties of citizenship; serves the country with his/her productive power; and serves and acts in accordance with "the ideals of the social structure in which he/she lives" (Goloğlu, 1974: 75). In addition to this, education also aimed at sustaining "harmony" and "equilibrium" in the country. This, for Alsan, did not mean blocking class mobility. The separation between "city dweller" and "villager" in education could be acceptable only in terms of "division of labour". Being a "populist regime" necessitated to provide the opportunities "also" for village children to participate in administration (Goloğlu, 1974: 76). However,

the recruitment of students of the VIs from the villages was not equally acceptable for all. For example, after 1946 elections, during his visit to Hasanoğlan Higher Village Institute before its closure Kazım Karabekir, the then Head or President of the TGNA said that "the major danger" posed by the VIs was training of the students with the separation between "the city" and "the village", and between "the rich" and "the poor" since all the students were recruited from the villages. Against this criticism, Ferit Oğuz Bayır, Ministerial Department Chief (Bakanlık Şube Müdürü), stated that the VIs aimed to eliminate "the extreme distinction" between the city and the village. He argued that it was this very distinction that the students graduated from other Teachers' Training Schools did not want to go to villages. Thus, it was a kind of necessity to take all the students from villages, and so "to stir the village" from inside with those taken out of the village (Makal, 2001: 59).

The VIs, Türkoğlu argues, was an "educational mobilization" (Türkoğlu, 1999: 224). Behind the emphasis on education in general, and primary education in particular, lay the idea -among others- that a "healthy primary education to all the citizens was a precondition of being welfare state and of democratization" (Türkoğlu, 1999: 220). The peasantist movement in Turkey by itself would be expected to play an important role in the establishment of democracy and here education would have a central place. According to Nusret Kemal Köymen, a famous peasantist, for example, the future of the country could be safe only when "the reforms" were "appropriated to the Turkish peasant" and when the peasant became a "conscious citizen of democracy" (Çetin, 1999: 218). The VIs are also thought to make contribution in this sense by causing changes in peasants' behaviour. According to Türkoğlu, for example, the graduates of the VIs influenced peasants by their "democratic behaviour" which made the latter "conscious" of state's obligations towards the people, on the one hand, and their rights and liberties on the other (Türkoğlu, 1999: 223). In the light of these arguments, following Altunya, it is reasonable to argue that the peasantist policy and the policy of rural education pursued during the period between 1935 and

1946 should not be considered an "educational movement in the strict sense"[83]. On the contrary, this educational policy contributed to the formation of a "democratic culture" via its implementation of modern principles of education. This accounts for the fact that it was generally the teachers graduated from the VIs who have led left-wing movements - from 1946 up until now – and took part in various non-governmental organizations like TÖB-DER (Altunya, 1998: 45).

The VIs, for Kirby, undertook the transformation of the Turkish society in compliance with the objects of the Turkish Revolution. They would realize this task by contributing to the development of new social values, to the creation of a national culture, to the specialization of economic life, and to the increase in economic productivity (Yeğen, 1999: 203). Thus, far from being an "expression of existing relations", the VIs were founded to be "agents of revolution" (Kirby, 1961: 279). They were a project to achieve economic development (of the country) through education (Kirby, 1961: 278). More specifically, they were the central agents of village development (Kirby, 1961: 284). It was, Gedikoğlu (1971: 238) states, through the VIs that the village community would identify itself; know its rights and obligations, and grasp its own problems. They were

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[83] Engin Tonguç states that the VIs system cannot be reduced merely to a "literacy campaign" or to a "question of village development" (Tonguç, E. 1970: 270). It was neither an attempt for training teachers nor an attempt for school construction in itself (Tonguç, E. 1970: 265). It can be rather summarized as an "education for revolution" in order to "accelerate the revolutionary process" (Tonguç, E.: 1970, 268). in terms of its main objective, the VIs system was a "revolutionary strategy and tactics" for "rendering the proletariat conscious" and for "accelerating the revolutionary process" through participation in administration –a possibility enabled by historical conditions. That is to say, the VIs system aimed to prepare the conditions for revolution in the infrastructure by turning the working people which would "be rendered conscious" into a "political power". The "process" of making the working people conscious would be achieved only through instillation of "new value judgements" to the society, at the basis of which lay consideration of "labour" and "work" as "the highest values" (Tonguç, E. 1970: 265). The adoption of these new value judgements by the society could be realized in only in the absence of exploitation of labour. It is for this reason that collective organizations based on public ownership like agricultural fields of the schools, small industrial organizations, cooperatives, etc would be established. These organizations would not only "operate in workers' interests" by providing material support to them and ending their economic dependence on "exploiters", but also be a "basis for subsequent progressive leaps". The foundation and functioning of such organizations would be enabled by mobilizing labour power in working class' interests but without any payment to them. This was "the single way out" and for all subsequent leaps for development in such a "poor society" (Tonguç, E. 1970: 266).

embodiment of Kemalist principles of populism, nationalism, and revolutionism in the sense that they had been established "in" and "for" the villages.

As Apaydın states, with the VIs it was aimed "to develop the backward regions", and "to prevent potential migration movements" (Dündar, 2001:22). They were expected to prevent class struggle by attaching peasants to the land and prevent their migration to the city. This, as Timur argues, was in compliance with "the ideology of the period", populism, which was used "to conceal the class struggle" (Timur, 2001: 210-211). Just during the debate on the bill of the foundation of the VIs, a deputy of Manisa, Kazım Nami Duru, stated that the VIs had not aimed to bring the peasants to the city, but to attach them to the land and make them stay in the village (Goloğlu, 1974: 71).

Kirby emphasizes that the functions of the VIs could not be limited to educational and economic ones, since having had a strong and deep impact on the major – untouched- part of the Turkish society in line with the longings of Kemalist Revolution, they became, at the same time, a "social and cultural movement"[84] (Kirby, 1961: 248). Katoğlu (1989) also pays attention to the "instrumentalist" character of the VIs, defining them as institutions aiming at incorporation of peasants into the new regime, and in particular, to the attempts for Westernization.

This objective of the VIs can be seen also in the *Köy Okullarını ve Enstitülerini Teşkilatlandırma Tasarısı* which calls particular attention to the need for "awakening the national consciousness of the peasants"; for training the peasants for different tasks; and for "instilling the values of the new life" into the peasants by involving them in the various works and activities of the VIs. These should accompany the dynamic and well-functioning of the schools, turning "the stagnant village" into a "dynamic" one, the members of which are "merged". In

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[84] Kirby examines the characteristics of the VIs which make them a "social movement" under four headings: "development of new social values"; "creation of national culture"; "specialization" and "professionalization" of economic life; and, "the question of increasing economic productivity in the country (Kirby, 1961: 248).

order to do this, the instructors and the teachers are charged with the duty of "educating" the villagers, and "merging" their life with the school activities (Goloğlu, 1974: 74-75). It is in this sense that, the starting point of the VIs was, in Hasan Ali Yücel's words, "not to educate the child", but to make him/her a "leader" to his/her environment. The teacher would be the instructor, carrier, and guardian of the Republic and the Revolution in the village (quoted in Goloğlu, 1974: 77).

Similarly, Apaydın states that the VIs would bring up teachers, in a sense "local intellectual leaders", needed for "the development of the village" (Dündar, 2001:22). That is to say, the major role in the village development would be given to "the enlightened peasants" coming from that region. A peasantist writer, Selahattin Kandemir, Tütengil argues, reduced "village development" into two points: "to train the peasant", and "to train the peasantist". He gave priority to the second one since it was, according to Demirkan, the peasantist who would "educate" the peasant. (It is at this point that Lavrov, a Russian populist, assigns an "ethical responsibility" to populists) (Tütengil, 1999: 201). In fact, it is in this very distinction in peasantist discourse that elitism immanent to populism comes to the scene. That is to say, the people who are considered to be in need of education will be trained by the ones who become competent enough to cultivate and enlighten the former. It is for this reason that peasantists like Tonguç gave such an importance to create a new generation of intellectuals.

Tütengil pays attention to the important roles "peasantism of the VIs" played both in the field of training and in changing intellectuals' view to the village. He states that starting from "the village" and villager in a "realistic" way, "peasantism of the VIs" tried to create a "new generation of intellectuals". Since "the intellectual" did not want to work in the village, the solution was found in sending the village child there after training him/her (Tütengil, 1999: 208). As a result of this educational leap, there arose a "generation of peasant intellectuals", removing the need for "intellectuals" (*güzideler*) who had to "go to the people" to

get "cultural training" from the people (Tütengil, 1999: 210). For Tütengil, this was a "positive outcome" of "peasantism of the VIs". It was just stated by Dr. Ali Süha Delilbaşı, a deputy of Kütahya, during the debate on the bill about the foundation of the VIs that the VIs would be very useful in terms of "approximating the peasant to the intellectual", helping, at last, rapid development of the former (Goloğlu, 1974: 71). In fact, this is the point which leads us to question populism of the VIs in terms of its "elitist" tones. That is to say, differing from the Kemalist populism which tended to preserve the separation between the elite and the people, the VIs wanted to eliminate this separation between the people and the intellectuals. This is one of the fundamental objectives clearly stated in Tonguç's writings. However, this did not remain a matter of rhetoric, being materialized in the structure and functioning of the VIs. As Karaömerlioğlu argues, the populism of the VIs "exceeded" and "contradicted" the original expectations of the ruling elite. Despite accepting the argument that the Village Institute Project was an embodiment of Kemalist principle of populism as it is clearly seen in their objectives, the present author does not share the view –of Gedikoğlu, for example- that the VIs were "the way of awakening the people, especially the village community ... within the context of Kemalism" (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 238). They went beyond not only expectations but also the limitations of Kemalist principles especially when their outcome was taken into account.[85] These points will be clarified after examining the populism of the VIs together with their structure and functioning in detail.

Despite its positive consequences which will be mentioned in the following chapters, like all other "unilateral efforts for developing the village", the project of the VIs to enliven the village only through education could not produce the expected outcome (Tütengil, 1999: 209), failing to transform the countryside. The

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[85] This is claimed to be one of the reasons for the closure of the VIs. For Makal (2001: 8), for example, the political parties supported by the "selfish 'intellectuals'" did not want to foster "awakening of the people". Rather than stimulating active political participation, they wanted to perpetuate people's passiveness reducing participation merely into voting. Similarly, for Eyuboğlu (1967: 94), one of the reasons for the closure of the VIs was that they had found the "shortcut way of awakening the peasant".

reforms carried out and the policies implemented were far from changing the rural structure. Since the main concern here was the countryside, it is necessary to draw attention to agricultural policies of the Republican regime.

III.2. Agricultural policies of the Republican Regime

The Republican regime was founded in a "country of peasants", the majority of which was poor (Kuruç, 1987: 157). The backwardness of agriculture underdeveloped village economy and the miserable conditions of the majority of peasants led the government to search for an effective solution for these problems. It was generally accepted that unless the conditions of the peasants had been improved and agriculture had been developed, it would not have been possible to develop the country (Kuruç, 1987: 156). The Kemalists, as Ahmad also states, were aware of the importance of the countryside for national development, and appreciated "the peasant's contribution to the economy". According to them, "the driving force for development" would be "the urban economy" whereas "the fuel" would be provided by "the rural sector". Thus, Mustafa Kemal's famous statement declaring the peasant as "Turkey's real master and owner" (or "the real master of the nation") should be seen more than a "mere rhetoric". However, despite a relative improvement in the condition of the peasantry especially with the removal of the tithe (*aşar*)[86], the countryside did not experience "structural changes" like land reform (Ahmad, 1981: 153).

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[86] The abolition of the tithe already existed among the resolutions of the Economic Congress held in Izmir on April 23, 1923. The landlords played an important role in the adoption of this resolution. Indeed, the agricultural delegates were sharply criticized (a great deal of criticism) for "representing the landlords rather than the peasants". As Başgöz and Wilson quote, Ahmet Hamdi criticized this during the Congressional debates as follows: "I thought that the peasant class was very well represented at the Congress. The agrarian delegates who were in the majority were aware of the distress and poverty of the villagers. However, they gave no thought to the large number of landless peasants. When the division of the farms of the absentee landlords was proposed, the so-called agrarian representatives were the first to rebel." Considered as a whole, resolutions passed by the Congress recommended a "free enterprise system under state protection" (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 48). Together with the principles of the RPP, the resolutions of the Congress "marked the disappearance of the radical reform tendencies which had been expressed within the Populist Program of the war years". Then, it was the right time to carry

The tithe was a tax collected from peasants at 10 percent of gross agricultural product during the harvest season. It formed the biggest part of government revenues. However, the right to collect this tax was entitled to private tax farmers -large landowners, merchants, money lenders, and urban notables[87]- who appropriated a large part of the total collections from the producers (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 15). Many writers argue that the ones who benefited from the abolition of the tithe were large land-holders. It was, indeed, "a gift to those large land-holders holding a title to land, who were informed of government activities and were aware of their interests" by the Republican government (Arıcanlı, 1986: 41). It is considered as a kind of concession by the Republican regime to the large landowners who gave support to the War of Independence. However, Pamuk and Owen argue, underlying the abolition of the tithe there was also the concern for alleviating poverty and improving the material condition of the small producers on whom the tithe placed a large burden. Its abolition, indeed, relieved the tax burden on the peasants. Pamuk and Owen also pay attention to the ignorance of the fact that with the abolition of the tithe "tax farming" was also eliminated. That is to say, "the economically powerful strata of the provinces … lost an important and convenient mechanism which had enabled them to appropriate a large part of the agricultural surplus" (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 15). (From that time onwards, the transfer of the agricultural surplus to the urban sector continued but this time with the help of price mechanism (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 24).) They argue that in the long run the elimination of both the tithe and tax farming "helped consolidate small peasant ownership and production in Turkish agriculture". It should be mentioned that despite the relative decrease in the tax burden on the peasants with the abolition of the tithe, the peasants

out reforms directed against institutions like the old Islamic legal system, religious education, the political structure of the Empire, etc. (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 48-49).

[87] The local notables who provided and channeled the resources needed during the War of Independence constituted "the power base of the Ankara government". They were the ones who "had direct access to surplus in the hinterland". That is to say, "... de facto control of the source of surplus was in the hands of the notables" who "arranged tax collection and its delivery with the central government" (Ahmad, 1981: 153).

continued to suffer from other taxes. In fact, after the abolition of the tithe (and the animal tax), the government introduced new ones like indirect taxes on the basic consumer goods bought by the peasants (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 15).

Coming to the land reform, Timur argues that the abundance of uncultivated lands and a shortage of population in Anatolia hindered land reform which would help capitalist development. He relates this to the lack of a powerful big industrial bourgeoisie who would support land reform in terms of creating an internal market. The semi-feudal character of agriculture did not disturb much the commercial bourgeoisie, who were, rather than the industrial one, a strong candidate to the government, and in contrast to the latter whose interests were in conflict with the "semi-feudal landowners", the former make an alliance with them (Timur, 2001: 71). Pamuk and Owen also pay attention to the same point arguing that the availability of land helps explain "why land reform and redistribution of land did not become an important issue in Turkey during the inter-war period, except in the southeast where Kurdish tribal leaders controlled extensive tracts" (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 24). According to Ahmad, the land question in Turkey differed from that of many newly-independent Third World nations. The problem in Turkey was "the shortage of labour", deteriorated by "constant warfare" and "the loss of population", while the latter were faced with "the shortage of land". The reason for landlords' opposition to the re-distribution of land partly laid here. That is to say, land reform would have led to a considerable reduction in "the size of the agrarian labour force available to the landlords" (Ahmad, 1981: 153), meaning higher wages and decreasing land rent (Ahmad, 1981: 154).

Kuruç mentions several reasons for the difficulties facing the government in realizing land reform. He argues that this was not an easy task for the government for several reasons. First of all, as Kuruç pays attention, land ownership was observed by the 1924 Constitution and guarded by other laws, both of which were in favour of landowners but disadvantageous to the landless peasants and the

small farmers. Moreover, the Republican regime did not want to "frighten" the big landowners who were one of the coalition partners of the Republican elites. In fact, it was thought that to give land to the peasants would not harm property of the big landowners', and the ones whose land would be distributed to the landless peasants and the small farmers would be the big landowners who had intended to use their economic power against the Republican regime in the 1920s. Even the decision to give land to the poor farmers itself was limited to the eastern part of the country, and aimed to maintain the security of the regime. Avoiding frightening (and losing the support of) the big land owners, the regime decided to alleviate the "incompatibility" between the big land owners and the small producers mainly through modernization of agriculture –mechanization and the use of modern techniques, and granted tariff and tax exemptions. But the policies followed, in fact, were advantageous to the rich farmers rather than to the small producers. Even the approval of a few legal regulations –like The Law for Farm Credit Associations (*Tarım Kredisi Birlikleri Kanunu*) approved in 1924 for the foundation of the Agricultural Credit Union (*İtibari Zirai Birliği*)- providing the legal ground for foundation of some associations[88] and cooperatives caused no remarkable change or improvement in their conditions, which became even worse with the World Economic Crisis of 1929 leading to a sharp decline[89] in the prices of agricultural commodities, and thus increasing the burden of the indebted peasants, who suffered from landlords and usurers from whom they borrowed money with hig interest rates, and accelerating impoverishment of the small producers. (this fall in the price of agricultural products resulted also in high decrease in export income since agricultural goods formed the major part of Turkey's export.). For Kuruç, the most effective solution during those years would be government support in agriculture. In the lack of sufficient financial

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[88] The Agricultural Bank (*Ziraat Bankası*), being the unique institution "to reach the small farmers" should also be mentioned here, but it could not become an effective organization to implement agricultural policies of the Republican government (Kuruç, 1987: 158).

[89] Prices of the leading crops, cereals like wheat, decreased more than 60 percent from 1928/29 to 1932/33 and remained almost the same until the end of decade, while that of hazelnuts, raisins, tobacco, and cotton declined averaging around 50 percent (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 16).

power, the government decided to monopolize some products, like tobacco, which would benefit both state and producers. The ones who were disturbed by this policy were the merchants, who were worrying about the probable extension of state intervention in whole areas (Kuruç, 1987: 158-164).

The foundation of the support policies in agriculture was laid in 1932, continued to be developed during the following years, and institutionalized in 1938 with the foundation of Soil Products Office (*Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi*)[90] (Kuruç, 1987: 165-166). The World Economic Crisis of 1929 made the problems in agriculture much more explicit, leading the government to be more "realistic" in its approach to the land question. The main object was openly declared after 1933/34 as removing "the inequality in the land ownership", which, as Naşit Hakkı Bey -the deputy of Kütahya- emphasized, created a decrease in demand, and so low-level of national income (Kuruç, 1987: 167-168), deepening the Crisis. The realization of this object, i.e. land distribution, for the Republican administration which "aims to take the republican regime to the village" with both its "economy" and "administration" (Kuruç, 1987: 182) was thought to contribute to the regime's stability. That is to say, a village with farmers having their own land would mean not only a "higher level of purchasing power", but also a "stable administrative base" (Kuruç, 1987: 171-172). The land to be distributed would not be limited to public domain but include also, even mainly, large lands which were under private ownership to the landless peasants and small farmers, who would be "the owners of the regime in the village", until when everybody would have "enough land". This would lead to an increase in the purchasing power of the village,

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[90] One of the measures the government took to tackle with the Crisis was the introduction of direct and indirect support programs in wheat and tobacco. It established an independent agency, Soil Products Office, through which wheat would be purchased from producers. (This was previously done through the Agricultural Bank). However, these purchases remained limited, and ineffective in improving the terms of trade faced by the wheat producers. The government, Pamuk and Owen argue, probably viewed the lower agricultural prices as an "opportunity to appropriate the agricultural surplus in order to accelerate the industrialization process in the urban areas" (Pamuk and Owen, 1998: 22).

keeping it up with industrial economy[91] (Kuruç, 1987: 182). In order to do this, the government would make legal regulations, including the constitutional changes if necessary. In fact, the latter was compulsory to be able to give land to the peasants since the land ownership had been fully observed by the 1924 Constitution (Kuruç, 1987: 174-175). Therefore, in 1937 "to make a change in agricultural regime became one of the principles of the Republican government" (Kuruç, 1987: 175). From that time onwards, "the land question" meant "land distribution". This time the government was decisive, and this can be seen both in constitutional change and also in its claim to "continuity" in land distribution (Kuruç, 1987: 176). However, there was no consensus in the RPP about the land question (Kuruç, 1987: 182). There was no change in the "view" and "resistance" of big landowners' to the land question (Kuruç, 1987: 180), who did not want to share "the control of the village" with anybody else (Kuruç, 1987: 182). The landowners and their (political) representatives, Kuruç states, were "very sensitive" to the issue of "land ownership", reducing "the land question" into their ownership, i.e. to their own interests, and and being reluctant to make concessions (Kuruç, 1987: 158).

Ahmad views "the agrarian question" in Turkey "primarily political in nature" rather than "economic", relating its solution to "whom supported the national movement", the peasants or the landlords (Ahmad, 1981: 154). (Ahmad explains the general apathy of the peasantry, which was "more alienated from the state than from the village notables" (Ahmad, 1981: 155) by the fact that "they held the state responsible for their oppression", expecting "succour" from it (Ahmad, 1981: 154). At a critical conjuncture, and in the lack of a "politicised peasantry" and of a "peasant movement capable of being rallied to the nationalist cause"

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[91] The main motivation behind these attempts of the government was to increase agricultural production which would subsequently accelerate the process of industrialization through increase in purchasing power of peasants. As Kuruç observes, during the 1930s it was understood that industrialization necessitated increase in the purchasing power not only of cities, but also of villages. The government decided to solve the problems of villages in compliance with its approach to industrialization (Kuruç, 1987: 170). The World Economic Crisis of 1929 displayed how complementary are agriculture and industry (Kuruç, 1987: 171). That is to say, the Crisis displayed the link between agricultural development and industrialization, and the dependence of the latter on the former.

(Ahmad, 1981: 155), the Kemalists, being in search of "the support of any class", turned to the landlords rather than the peasantry. The former would serve as a mediator between the Kemalists and the peasantry. That is to say, the Kemalists would "reach the peasants through the agency of their traditional leaders, the local notables and the men of religion, the ülema", who were mostly "the local landowners". The latter was only concerned with increasing their holdings as much as possible, refraining strictly from losing their properties. Thus, the Kemalists tacitly agreed on "maintain[ing], and even strengthen[ing], the *status quo* in the countryside" at the expense of the peasantry's demands -especially for land- through the involvement of the landlords as a "powerful element" in the People's Party; by an "electoral law which guaranteed the existence of an effective landlords' lobby in the Assembly; and by "the inclusion of Article 74 in the new constitution which virtually closed the door to land reform" (Ahmad, 1981: 156). "All the radical attempts by the state to solve the agricultural problems of Turkey will conflict with the individualistic principles in the Turkish Civil Code" (Başgöz and Wilson, 1968: 50). The conditions of the peasantry, on the other hand, were tried to be improved "through education" with the hope that "in time general enlightenment would transform the situation in rural Anatolia" (Ahmad, 1981: 156).

Viewing the "Turkish Revolution" as a "bourgeois revolution" which had to "dissolve the precapitalist relations in agriculture" and "develop capitalism", Timur argues that during the single party period this was tried to be done through transforming the big landowners into "capitalist farmers" rather than through "land reform" because of the shortage of population and abundance of uncultivated land. But there were also attempts for giving land to landless peasants and small farmers, like Housing Law (*İskan Kanunu*), which, at the same time, aimed to resettle the population on the basis of "race"' (Timur, 2001: 145), and "to eliminate the feudal institutions of sheikdom and aghas" (Timur, 2001: 146). However, the Law reserved the rights of big landowners except those of aghas and sheiks in the Eastern Anatolia. Timur mentions other laws like the

Elimination of Violation of Real Estate Law (*Gayrimenkule Tecavüzün Define Dair Kanun*) - passed in 1933- guaranteeing the rights of landowners through civilian authorities and Property Law (*Tapu Kanunu*) - passed in 1934- "encourag[ing] occupation of abandoned lands within housing limits as complementary to the Housing Law. As Timur rightly argues, question of land reform cannot be solved only through land distribution, requiring other conditions like means of production, education, credit, etc. Otherwise, lands which have been distributed would "return" to the big landowners. Timur concludes once considered as a whole, all the measures taken were "in favour of" the big landowners (Timur, 2001: 147-148). That is to say, despite including a program of land reform, in practice the agricultural policy of the government served the interests of the big landowners. Timur relates "the inconsistencies and contradictions" of the agricultural policy of the government regarding the capitalization of agriculture to its "class structure", i.e. "the petty bourgeoisie" origin of the bureaucracy"[92]. With the slogan of "populism", Timur argues, the government aimed "to defend" all the classes. But this was something impossible, resulting in "contradictory" and "inconsistent" policies, which led to "waste of resources" while, at the same time, hindering "capital accumulation" to a certain extent. The government had to protect the interests of not all but certain class or classes, and until the years of depression, this was the big landowners (Timur, 2001: 149). Indeed, with the attempts for land reform during both the years of depression and war years the government aimed to secure or consolidate its "authority" and the class structure of the society. It was, Timur concludes, for this reason that "the political aspect" of the Housing Law (1934) was much more preponderant than the "economic" one (Timur, 2001: 150).

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[92] In underdeveloped countries, what the term "petty bourgeoisie" brings into mind at first is the concept of "intellectual". However, since the petty bourgeoisie is "not much differentiated" in this part of the world, the term "intellectual" includes also "intelligentsia", "bureaucrats", etc. Especially since during the period in concern the intellectuals who were limited in number generally worked in state service, it is "proper" to use the terms "intellectual" and "bureaucrat" interchangeably (Oran, 1988: 57).

III.3. Tonguç's Peasantism

Tonguç's peasantism deserves mention since Tonguç, who held the position of General Directorate for Elementary Education during the period between 1935 and 1946, was the most effective name in the VIs system. Being the architect of the VIs project, and known as one of the famous figures of peasantism –he was called "peasant İsmail" in his workplace- İsmail Hakkı Tonguç is worth special emphasis in this study. Any study about the VIs excluding his ideas will be incomplete since he was the leading figure in the formulation and foundation of the VIs experiment. Therefore, in analyzing populism of the VIs, it is necessary to examine his ideas especially about the village, the peasant (or the people), and the intellectual.

Tonguç delineated the village and the peasants before the War of Independence as follows: The relationship between "the exploitative bureaucrats" and "the destructive Ottoman intellectuals", on the one hand, and the peasants, on the other hand, had become very "repulsive" and "terrible", leading the former to lose their credit with the latter. In addition to the misgovernment and injustice, the disasters like scarcity, drought, flood, and epidemic diseases worsened the condition of the peasants, leading their estrangement from "state administrators", i.e. "the class of masters", increasing "the gap between the suppressor and the oppressed" day by day (Tonguç, 1961: 82-84).[93] This "tragic event", according to Tonguç, arose from "the timidity", "ineptitude", egoism, indifference of the "semi-intellectuals" who governed the Ottoman Empire to "the people"

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[93] Although İsmail Hakkı Tonguç believed that the Republican regime would change this picture, the facts of history proved the contrary. This can be explicitly seen in what Yalçın narrates: "Biz köylü çocukları, o zaman, genelde kasabalara uzak köylerde olan insanlar, devlet memuru olarak bir jandarmayı bir de vergi memurunu bilirdik. Onun ötesinde, yukarda, işte İnönü'nün de adını duyardık, Reis-i Cumhur. 1940'lı yıllarda -ben Develi'nin Toroslar'a yakın bir köyündenim- oradaki dağ köyleri, kış mevsiminde bir köy odasında bir iddiaya girmişler 'ya İnönü ne yer?' diye. Yani reis-i cumhur ya, ne yer? Şimdi kişiler, askere gidenler var, francala ekmeği tanıyorlar, bir kez onu yer. Ama ekmeğin yanında ne yer? Uzun tarışmalardan sonra şuna karar vermişler: 'İnönü, her gün o beyaz ekmeği siyah pekmeze banar banar yer. Başka bir şey yemez." (interview with Yalçın, 2006). Contrary to Tonguç's expectations, the Republican government failed in closing the gap between the people and the ruling elite.

(especially to peasants). Even the Young Turks who had announced the Constitutional Monarchy could not change this picture because of lacking both the necessary cadre and "time and opportunity to benefit from the energy and qualities of the people". Thus, neither "the wound" nor "the trouble" could be "diagnosed" during the Constitutional Monarchy (Tonguç, 1961: 84). Sheltering in metropoles or provinces, and trying to ensure their own interests, most of the intellectuals closed their eyes to the destitution and misery of, and their ears to "the moanings of the people and the peasants" during that period, making the task of the "heroes of the Constitutional Monarchy" (*Meşrutiyet kahramanları*) difficult (Tonguç, 1961: 85).

According to Tonguç, the Republic would completely change this picture. For him, the Republic meant, among others, the end of "the separation" between the intellectuals, on the one hand, and "the people" and "the peasant", on the other; elimination of "the oppressor" and "the oppressed", "the exploitative" and "the exploited" classes[94]; involvement of "the people" and "the peasant" within the state structure; and also the adoption of modern civilization as a whole (Tonguç, 1961: 88). In order to achieve all these in a short time, it was necessary "to find and subtract new values" from within the social structure, and here the village provided the main source in which the necessary material was "embedded". From then on, it should have been "the nature", not "the peasant", to be made use of or exploited (Tonguç, 1961: 89).

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[94] According to İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, the basic deficiency of the RPP was its "ideology of 'classless society'", while, for him, the existence of "the oppressor", "the exploitative", and "the oppressed", "the exploited" classes –the peasant class forming the majority- in Turkey was the main contradiction which formed one of the major issues he continuously dealt with during his life (Tonguç, E. 1970: 118). "The pseudo progressives (*sahte ilericiler*) who seemed to adopt Kemalist principles", but in fact "defended the interests of conservative-reactionary classes knowingly or unknowingly", violated these principles, interpreting them in their own interests. Engin Tonguç gives the example of Atatürk's slogan of "classless society" having "no special privileges" (*imtiyazsız, sınıfsız toplum*). For Tonguç, this slogan expressed an "aspiration" to a society characterized by "social justice"; elimination of poverty; and absence of any privileged individuals or groups and disappearance of class differences. "The so-called intellectuals", on the other hand, interpreted it as the lack of classes in Turkish society, contributing to the maintenance of "class society" (E. Tonguç, 1970: 132-133).

Despite all these attempts to make changes and to develop the country, the village was still "unknown" to some of "the semi-intellectuals" who could not leave "the Ottoman mentality" behind since they did not come from –and were trained in- the village. Being trained in the urban schools, and learning life through the books, they were unaware of the fertility and resources of the village, and had a false conception of peasants as "coward", "exhausted", "hesitant", and unable to endure trouble, which were in fact characteristics Tonguç attributed to these semi-intellectuals (Tonguç, 1961: 89). For these "semi-intellectuals", the peasant would become a "value" on condition that he/she resembled the former. However, Tonguç states, resemblance of the peasants to these "semi-intellectuals" in terms of "character", "working capacity", and "mentality" would bring disaster to the country (Tonguç, 1961: 92). These "bookish (*kitabi*) intellectuals"[95] who could not "unchain ... the Routine and the Bureaucracy", "concealed the fact" hindering understanding of the village reality, and doing something to improve the condition in the village. This, according to Tonguç, was the major role that "semi-intellectuals" had been playing since the Tanzimat (Tonguç, 1961: 90). The peasant, on the other hand, had completely different "mentality". He/she believed that unless being able to subsist on, he/she would remain "ignorant" and "be slave". According to him/her, a "good person" was the one who performed work rather than the person who "spoke and wrote without working". The peasant considered this as the main reason of "the separation" between the peasant and "the nonworking literate" (Tonguç, 1961: 91). In fact, giving superiority to "work" rather than abstract knowledge was a characteristic of peasantist ideology. This is what is called "anti-intellectualism".

Tonguç states that the Turkish society would easily overcome "barrenness" and become a "community of creative persons" if the intellectuals ("of the asphalt

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[95] In calling these intellectuals "bookish", Tonguç seems to pay attention especially to their failure in grasping the village reality. Therefore, this should not be considered as an example to his "anti-intellectualism". In a letter dated 1945 and published in *İlköğretim*, Tonguç defined intellectual as one who "continuously" trained and developed himself/herself by reading books and newspapers, making investigations and experiments, attending courses, etc (Tonguç, 1999: 126).

streets**”**) were confronted with "the realities of the country" (Tonguç, 1961: 62). "The new generation", according to Tonguç, had to deal with the difficulties of the country, and search for solutions to these problems. It was not only "the duty" but also "the right" of the artists to arouse society by "sticking a needle" into the apathetic human beings (Tonguç, 1961: 62).

In one of his letters dated March 1957, Tonguç again criticized the intellectuals, paying attention to the difficulty in explaining to them that the fundamental problem of the country had been "to educate peasants at all costs". Far from contributing to the realization of this "ideal", some of these intellectuals had slowed it down by, for example, underestimating the task of teaching how to read and write, and by "slandering" those who worked for the sake of this ideal. Tonguç compared these intellectuals to that of Western countries, in which the peasants were well educated, and concluded that the latter had worked hard and striven for their "ideals", while the majority of the intellectuals in Turkey had chosen not to tackle the problems of the country. In a letter written on April 17, 1959 Tonguç defined the deficiency of "the educated" as lacking an ideal for which they would work (Tonguç, 1961: 69). Again in another letter dated June 16, 1960 he viewed "the intellectual who does not contemplate" as a major source of threat to the democratic regime (Tonguç, 1961: 79). The VIs aimed "to create" a kind of person similar to "the Western intellectual", who enjoyed living by fighting difficulties. In order to reach the level of Westerners, Tonguç argued, all the Turkish citizens –townsman and villager- should have gotten primary education (Tonguç, 1961: 64).

Actually, Tonguç's criticism was not only directed to the intellectuals, but also to the people of the East(ern countries) in general. The latter, he wrote in his letter dated February 3, 1958, had been "inimical" to the "goodness", and "prettiness", and enjoyed "obscurity", "poisoning" their life. In another letter written on March 26, 1958 Tonguç mentioned inactiveness as another characteristic of the East. In the atmosphere of the East, he stated, the persons had become "idle". The

mosque, *medrese* (Moslem theological school), *tekke* (dervish lodge), the school, and the family together had brought up "dull", "lethargic", and "disgusted" persons (Tonguç, 1961: 66). To save the school from "the negative impacts" of all such authorities and make them a kind of government agency had become an "ideal" of the nations which wanted to adopt the Western civilization (Tonguç, 2001: 213).

The ones aimed at "the enlivenment of the village", according to Tonguç, had to accept the fact that what was called "the Western civilization", which had been in fact the product of positive sciences, brought forth major changes in every sphere of life not only in Western societies but also in other ones. In order to disseminate knowledge and introduce innovations to individuals, there arose a need for a new institution of education, i.e. the primary school. But, since those innovations were not simultaneously introduced to the city and the village, the latter was began to be "exploited" by the former, and became "stagnant". The solution was to "educate the village people according to the requirements of the new civilization". This was exactly what Tonguç meant by "enlivenment of the village". Here, the first thing to do was to bring up "conscious" and "dynamic" persons who would "join this war". But, as Tonguç repeatedly emphasized, "enlivenment of the village" did not only mean teaching peasants how to read and write but also bringing means of "health" and "modern technics", "modern culture", "economic know-how", etc to the village. It also meant "emanation of the village source" in which "the essence of national capacity" was preserved (Tonguç, 1961: 102-105). (As it has been argued before, viewing the village and the peasants as the reserve of "pure cultural traits" or of the national essence is a characteristic of peasantist ideology.) Being a true peasantist, Tonguç believed in the necessity of "enlivening various values" still living amongst the peasants and making use of them in a "systematic" way in the course of education (this would contribute to close the gap between the city and the village). It was for this reason, i.e. to utilize and disseminate "our genuine culture" and "to reinforce

national sentiments of students" that folk dance, folk song, etc. were included in the programs in the village schools and the VIs (Tonguç, 1961: 117-118).

What Tonguç meant by "the village question" was, in fact, "the enlivenment of the village from inside[96] in a meaningful and conscious way" rather than its development in a "mechanical" way so that the peasant, like other citizens, gained and exercised their rights and that nobody could insult and "exploit" them (Tonguç, 1961: 102). This is where Tonguç's populism comes to the fore. In a society committed itself to "the ideal of people's government" all citizens should have gained equal rights so that differences which would undermine social order would be eliminated (Tonguç, 1961: 118).

In his well-known book, *Canlandırılacak Köy*, Tonguç clarifies what he meant by "the enlivenment of the village" and things to be done to enliven the village. He begins by asserting that in a country where 80 % of the population lived in the villages "the major and simplest truth" was that the village had to be the focal point of all kinds of work. Any organization which was not based on the village could neither be "efficient" nor "useful". Nor any "movement" without peasant's participation could be "strong". "A new civilization cannot be created or perpetuated without the peasant" (Tonguç, 1961: 92). The country could not "enliven" or "become beautiful" unless the enlivenment of the village was realized. In short, the cities in particular and the country in general depended on "the village" and "the peasant". At this point, Tonguç enumerates several tasks for prolongation of life and the elimination of the differences between the city and the village. First of all, it was necessary to improve conditions of the peasant so that they could meet the necessaries of life like food, cloth, shelter, and work tools. Secondly, "the new values" –principles- of the Republic should have been spread among "the peasant citizens", and appropriated to them. Third, the legal, financial, and economic affairs to be done in the village should have been

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[96] Tonguç (1999: 11) wrote in a letter dated 22 February 1936 that the ones who would "enter" and "mobilize" the village" were not "artificial intellectuals" but "elements from the village" itself.

"normalized" and become "efficient", being organized in accordance with the village structure. Fourth, the peasants should have become "good producers" and "customer confidence" for national industry, free from "negative viewpoints of life" (*menfi hayat telakkileri*) which had been, in fact, a legacy of the past, and prepared according to "the working conditions of new life". Unless all these had been achieved, Tonguç argues, nothing would have been changed. All these together formed the basis for all other tasks, and it was not "right" to educate the peasants only through "bookish knowledge" (*kitabi bilgi*) (Tonguç, 1961: 93-94). Unless the peasants had been educated so as to become "conscious", and "the new values" had been disseminated among them, "the revolution" could not have been settled down. All these tasks could be achieved with "lay citizens" who relied on their "will" and "labour" rather than "fate" and/or "religious beliefs", and who were respectful to all "good" ideas wherever it came from. Only then, Tonguç concluded, it would be possible both to create a "modern and dynamic nation", and to generate "the truly enlightened citizens" (*hakiki münevver vatandaşlar*).

Tonguç argues that in countries where the peasant population formed the majority it was necessary to introduce the products of "new civilization" to the villages. The establishment of this new civilization was heavily based on "cultured" or "enlightened" person, who would become much more "honourable", and "advocate of freedom, tolerance and human rights" by receiving "primary education" (Tonguç, 1961: 60-61). Primary education was "the sole and unique means" of transferring values like freedom of thought, freedom of expression, and equal rights which had been the well-known slogans of French Revolution to daily life (Tonguç, 2001: 211). Tonguç resembled those who received primary education (in its simplest sense) to the formerly- blind persons who later began to see all the beauties or the goodness of the world (Tonguç, 1961: 62-63). In one of the letters he sended to the teachers graduated from the VIs in 1945, Tonguç stated that in a village without any school, despite his/her eyes and ears were "open", the peasant could neither "see" nor "hear" what would benefit

himself/herself. It was for this reason that what he/she –especially if he/she was the one who just seemed to be a "peasant" or behave as if he/she defended the peasant- said could not always be accepted as "right" (Tonguç, 1999: 107).[97]

According to Tonguç, the "compulsory" and "free" primary education for all the children above certain age was, at the same time, the most important condition of "realizing people's government" (*halk idaresi*) in a country. Otherwise, "the destiny of the nation" would be passed into the hands of a person or a group of persons. But, Tonguç stressed, the role of primary education could not be reduced merely to its being a condition of "people's government". It was also "the sole means of instilling the preliminary knowledge necessary for introducing the true nature (or essential character) of the society" to the people (Tonguç, 2001**:** 211).

In one of his letters he sent to both graduates of the VIs and Teachers' Training Schools published in the periodical *İlköğretim*[98]**,** Tonguç described villages as places with "backward living conditions". He argued that unless these conditions had been improved, it would not have been possible to make necessary changes in order to bring happiness into the life of the peasants. It was for this reason that "the new village school" would be founded and would function as a "school in broad sense", extending beyond the walls of classrooms so that it could have an impact on the village life as a whole (Tonguç, 1999: 124). The village school would be that of "life" and "work" (*Hayat ve İş Okulu*) with its "practice garden", "workshop", animals, recreation and sports ground. It would also have a "producing capacity" as much as a moderate family enterprise, and a "cooperative" to answer the needs of the school (Tonguç, 1961: 119). In this school, the students would be trained in a way that prepare them for working life organized according to the village (Tonguç, 1961: 119-120). "To enliven the

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[97] "Köyünde hiç okul açılmayan köylünün gözleri açıktır, fakat o kendisine faydalı olanı göremez, kulakları duyar fakat işitemez. Onun için bu durumdaki insanların söylediklerinin hepsi her zaman doğru olarak kabul edilemez. Hele bu köylü asıl köylü değil de köylü gibi görünen veya köylüyü koruyucu sahte tavırları takınan birisi ise." (Tonguç, 1999: 107)

[98] Tonguç answered the letters sent by the teachers graduated from the VIs in this periodical both to inform them about each other's work, and to ease his task (Tonguç, 1999: 96).

village" through education meant providing the village with such a school and a teacher (Tonguç, 1961: 120). Tonguç added that "the question of education in the village" should have been treated as a kind of "national affair" above the policy games (Tonguç, 1961: 121) since it was not only an "instrument of development", but also that of "enlightenment" and "democratization" (Kuyumcu, 2003: 33). The VIs, for Tonguç, would be the forerunner of a "democratic society" providing a "model" for it with their functioning in accordance with democratic principles.

CHAPTER IV

THE DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONING OF THE VILLAGE INSTITUTES

It is argued that the Village Institutes played a significant role in settlement and establishment of democracy.[99] In order to examine the relationship between populism and democracy in the case of the VIs, the present chapter will focus on the "democratic" structure and functioning of the VIs. In examining "democratic" structure and functioning of the VIs, the emphasis will be put especially on the fundamental principles; the organizational structure and characteristics; and the educational program of the VIs.

Giving reference to Goethe who stated that "[t]he best government is the one which teaches people self-administration", Gedikoğlu argues that the functioning of "democratic order" depends on the foundation and functioning of educational institutions in accordance with "democratic order". According to him, this is the only way of obtaining the necessary means and founding organizations "to stir" and "mould" society in general, and the peasant in particular (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 239). "Democratic education" requires the existence of "democratic conditions", which refers to more than "political" and "legal" democracy (Gedikoğlu, 1980: 31). Especially in "underdeveloped" countries, "political democracy", Gedikoğlu argues, is in the service of "bourgeoisie capitalism" and serves as its "means of exploitation", perpetuating "economic slavery" of the majority of the people (Gedikoğlu, 1980: 32).

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[99] It is necessary to bear in mind that such evaluations of the VIs as "democratic" structures and the claim for their contribution to the establishment of democracy and to the "democratization" process are made from a retrospective viewpoint, far from reflecting the actual situation in the country during the period in question, when the term "democracy" was not pronounced yet. This can be related also to the "leftist" inclinations of the narrators and writers graduated from the VIs.

The history of the Turkish people, Apaydın argues, had been characterized by a government opposed to democratic one -a system in which "rulers" and "the ruled" are close to each other. In the former, "the ruler" had dominated "the ruled", and the educational system –*madrasah*- aimed to train "ever ready" person or "subject". The outcome was "easily-deceivable" or manipulable and "obeying" people who got used to "give" without "demanding". Being "ignorant" and "unconscious" and so unaware of his/her own interests, such kind of a person, Apaydın argues, cannot be a "citizen" of a democratic government. Because a "citizen" of a democratic government is a "conscious" person who can differentiate what is right from what is wrong by himself/herself; participate in cultural and artistic activities; read books, journals and periodicals; keep abreast of the current events both in the country and around the world, etc. This was, according to Apaydın, the very education put into practice (Apaydın, 1980: 91), and the atmosphere created in the VIs. Believing that the "darkness" would be "overcome" and the persons would become argumentative and critical through "reading" and "learning", the students were strongly encouraged to read much but by "contemplating" and "criticizing". Moreover, the students were "consciously" given "responsibility" and participated in administration in order "to develop" their "personality" (Apaydın, 1980: 92). Similarly, Makal argues that in the VIs there was a "democratic education" which was put into practice through everyone's participation in administration; criticism; discussions on various issues; and reading beyond textbooks, etc (Makal, 2001: 63).

Gedikoğlu, on the other hand, grounds "the democratic education" in the VIs on their "legal objective" with an emphasis on "equality of opportunity", and "social justice" in terms of recruiting village children into schools**;** organizational characteristics; and its educational program (Gedikoğlu, 1980: 32). Before going into the details of organizational characteristics and the educational program, it is necessary to mention the "populist" character of education in the VIs. During the interview, Türkoğlu emphasizes that equality of opportunity requires that the education service should be taken to the individual. To found a school in a city

and to make it accessible to everyone does not mean equality of opportunity. Here, Türkoğlu gives herself as an example saying that if one of the VIs had not been founded in Antalya, she would not have a chance to go to school. In the lack of easiness of access it was very difficult to take children, especially the girls, to another place (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). (The memoirs of the graduates of the VIs are full of examples of the difficulties the students had encountered during their travels.) The VIs were established in regions, each including 3-4 provinces. The students of each Village Institute were recruited from the region of that Institute. The criteria in determining the educational regions which were twenty-four in number were their geographical conditions, the life conditions, and cultural fabric (Özgen, 1993). Through this regional division, primary schools were tried to be distributed equally throughout the country, contributing also to the realization of equality of opportunity. This is, in fact, what differentiates "populist" understanding of education from "elitist" one. Türkoğlu criticizes the prevailing educational system in terms of its "elitist" aspect, which is materialized in the very existence of private schools and Anatolia High Schools (*Anadolu Liseleri*), and compared it with the "populist" understanding of education in the VIs. By "populist education", she means that all the population (or the people) receive the same training. It is only then that the whole talents – doctors, engineers, and the like- would come to light. Otherwise, the talented persons would not have a chance and/or opportunity to reveal themselves. Once all the people received the same training, this would contribute to the "democratic process" (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005).

All these explain why the VIs are seen by many as an attempt to eliminate or relieve social inequalities. They were educational institutions where the principle of equity was materialized to a certain extent at least by increasing equality in education sphere through positive discrimination in favour of peasants (Özsoy, 2004: 12). Özsoy mentions several reasons for considering the VIs movement as an "egalitarian" practice. First of all, it aimed to turn the peasant, "the subject in the village," into a "citizen". The second characteristic was the lack of hierarchy

between teachers, students, and directors (administrators) both in educational and administrative processes. (The administrators and teachers helped and guided students.) The arrangement of these different positions in an "equalizing" and "liberatory" manner is very important especially to foster the liberatory aspect of education rather than the oppressive one which trains individuals in line with the power relations in the social structure (Özsoy, 2004: 13). Another indicator of the egalitarian character of the VIs was their being the first coeducational boarding schools. However, the number of schoolgirls remained very low since there were very small amount of village girls who had received primary school education.

The "democratic" structure and functioning of the VIs can be observed especially in the emphasis on the principles of "egalitarianism", "responsibility", "initiative", "self-government" - which Lasch (1995: 7) calls as "democratic habits"- and "will". These principles were put into practice through "reading and discussion hours" which aimed at developing self-expression, through the meetings arranged at the weekends where everybody including directors and teachers was criticized by all, through "discipline which is not based on coercion and violence", through a relationship between students and teachers based on "work" and "duty", through absence of a strict hierarchy (or hierarchical relationship between students and teachers and instructors)[100] which is closely related to the fact that everybody worked in the Institutes, and so each one had the right to say a word about almost everything regarding the Institutes. All these points will be elaborated upon under several subheadings throughout this chapter. Since the focus of this study is the paradoxical relationship between populism and democracy in the case of the VIs, it is better to start with the principle of self-government.

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[100] In his memoirs, Apaydın (1983: 114) gives us examples of "egalitarian" and "nonhierarchical" relationship in the Institutes while portraying the director's room which is furnished with table, chair, etc. manufactured in the Institutes. Another example is given by Akçay. In the classrooms of the VIs, there was no teacher's desk placed hierarchically. On the contrary, he/she had a table and chair, around which the students gathered (Akçay, 1980: 74). This can be related to the fact that, as Akçay states, the teacher was "among them", but in a position to "direct" and "teach" the students. He/she taught the students the work to be done, and later performed it together with them (Akçay, 1980: 73).

IV.1. The Principle of Self-government

In a letter[101] sent to all the directors of the VIs on December 1944, Tonguç looked over the main principles of functioning in the VIs. The first and most important principle for the purpose of this study was "self-government". Tonguç stated that they aimed to carry the principle of "self-government", which was one of the basic principles of the State, into the VIs and tried to administer them in accordance with this principle. "The solitary means" of realizing this principle, according to Tonguç, was "division of labour" together with the right to put forward his/her ideas about works he/she participate in; well-treatment to others; and "not to interfere in each other's affairs". He continued saying that they did not want to create a kind of directors, assistant directors, head of instructor (*eğitimbaşı*), or teachers who would behave as if they were "god". Nor they wanted to "knowingly" involve the persons who "beat", "oppressed", and were inclined to "manage" others by "insulting" or "terrifying" them (Tonguç, 1999: 90-91). Again in another letter sent to all the directors of the VIs on December 13, 1943 Tonguç put an emphasis on the same point. He stated that in some VIs, the directors were of the opinion that they could manage the VIs by shouldering all the works by themselves. However, he continued, this method was of no use since the works in and functioning of the VIs necessitated a different method, that is, sharing obligations and responsibilities among the members of the VIs. The VIs, he concluded, should have become organizations managed "collectively" by all their members who would stand as protector to the VIs, rather than ones the functioning of which would depend on a "single person" (Tonguç, 1999: 68-69). Again in another letter he sent to all the directors of the VIs on August 8, 1941 Tonguç criticized some directors for undertaking all the works despite the existence of others like assistant directors, teachers, students on duty, etc.

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[101] Tonguç used both formal and informal ways in communicating with directors and teachers of the VIs. He regularly sent letters to them about the functioning, rules and regulations of the VIs. Moreover, he explained how to manage the VIs and to tackle with the problems faced with by circulars he sent to the VIs. It can be explicitly seen in continuing letters Tonguç sent to directors and teachers of the VIs that he always followed up whether those rules, regulations and principles were put into practice.

According to him, this kind of an administration caused all members to become "puppets" acting "unconsciously", and "without using their mind" or questioning. Tonguç told the directors to free the VIs from the control of a "single authority" which caused "terror" in the shortest time by giving all the members their "true" roles and responsibilities (Tonguç, 1999: 41-42).

Similarly, in another letter dated December 4, 1944 sent to all the directors of the VIs Tonguç stated that since the main object was to train the students in accordance with the principle of "self-government", all the teachers should have tried to eliminate "personal" and "arbitrary" form of management. To realize this objective, Tonguç forbade teachers, or instructors to employ students for their personal works and also for "forced labour"; "beating" and "insulting" students, etc. (Tonguç, 1999: 77-78). In a letter sent to all the directors of the VIs on December 13, 1943 Tonguç mentioned several problems in the VIs like "beating" and "threatening students with a bad mark". He severely criticized the directors for not preventing such incidents, and told them that once the conditions had not been improved, they would have been "compelled to" take "very harsh measures" about the offenders (Tonguç, 1999: 66). Again in a letter dated February 25, 1941, Tonguç warned[102] an Assistant Director of a VI that he did not have a right to "insult" anybody in the VI "as a person representing that institution". "Enlightened and cultured persons", Tonguç stated, did not behave in this manner (Tonguç, 1999: 35). In another letter he sent to Emin Soysal, the Director of *Kızılçullu Village Teachers' Training School* on November 11, 1938, Tonguç sharply criticized Soysal for his bad treatment to other members of the school arguing that the way of creating a "new" kind of a person could not be "insult" or "abuse" (Tonguç, 1999: 24).

In one of the circulars which was sent to all the VIs and ordered to be read three times (three days) in front of all the members of the VIs including teachers,

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[102] "Şahıs kim olursa olsun müessese içinde o müesseseyi temsil eden bir insan sıfatı ile kimseye hakaret edemezsin." (Tonguç, 1999: 35)

students, cooks, night-watchman, etc. Tonguç forbade teachers "to lift his/her hand against any student", "to say bad things", "to curse", and "to beat".[103] Once he/she had done this, Tonguç wrote, the student would have had "the right to respond in the same way" (Dündar, 2001: 46). He believed that such negative attitudes estrange students from the school. However, for Tonguç, it was possible to cause children "like" the school, and this was the first task of the teacher. He/she would do this mainly by treating students well, and without frightening them and doing injustices to them. To cause children "like" work, nature, animals, plants, folk dances, lessons, research, etc. Tonguç stated that once students had viewed the school as "the most favourable place" where they could realize their demands and needs, they would not have played truant from school. Tonguç held the teacher, not the students, responsible for absenteeism (Tonguç, 1999: 110-111).

The principle of self-government was widely put into practice in the VIs because of the variety of working fields and of the fact that students would have to give decisions and work alone in the villages. Each student was charged with duties and works in various fields like agricultural and construction works, workshops, class, etc. and authorized and held responsible for those works. The application of this principle, Gedikoğlu argues, was also important in terms of bringing up citizens who were aware of their obligations, rights and responsibilities (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 125). That is to say, the rights and obligations lying at the basis of democracy aimed to make both "the individual" and "the society" become "self-governing" (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 240). Similarly, Öztürk asserts that the principle of self-government was the key to democratic functioning in the VIs. This was closely related to the fact that almost all the works in the VIs were

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[103] This order seemed to be adopted by both directors and teachers as part of the pedagogical understanding put into practice in the VIs. However, it is not possible to argue that it was completely abided by all. A director of a Village Institute, for example, admitted that during his first years at the Institute he "had to resort to force" although he knew that this might not comform with pedagogical principles. He seems to legitimize his behaviour by pointing out that the students did not want to do manual work having an expectation that they would become teachers engaged only in intellectual activities (Kirby, 1961: 239). For another incident of battery against the students, see Şahhüseyinoğlu, 2005: 173-174.

performed by the students themselves, and so there were no servants employed in the VIs. For Öztürk, this is the best way of earning the children senses of "right", "obligation", and "responsibility" in a democratic society (Öztürk, 1980: 90).

The daily life and working order in the VIs were "organized in accordance with the principles of democratic administration". The relationship between the directors, instructors, students, officials, and workers were based on the principles of "function" and "division of labour"; "mutual affection and esteem"; "solidarity"; "cooperation" and "consensus"; and "codecision". Students widely participated in "daily life" and "administrative affairs" through various tasks they were assigned. They were given "responsibility" and "power". With all these characteristics, the VIs aimed to develop "democratic leadership", and to make the village school become an "effective institution" and "education and cultural center" of the village life (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 240).

Gedikoğlu argues that the order and discipline in the VIs were also based on the democratic principles. Far from being a "sheer" understanding of discipline based on "command" or "order", the discipline in the VIs depended on the principle of "self-control". Democracy, Gedikoğlu says, denies "servitude". It does not comply with "fear", "oppression", and "single authority". "The source of authority" is sought rather in laws, regulations, obligations, etc. (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 240). Akçay pays attention to the fact that in the VIs "discipline" was not only related to students' behaviour and their relationship. On the contrary, it concerned all the members of the VIs including teachers, officials, workers, and students (Akçay, 1980: 74). Considering an understanding of discipline based on "force" and "violence" as "contraditory to" democratic education, and so excluding "brutality" and "beating", the VIs did not apply to improper ways of reward and punishment. It was thought that an understanding of discipline based on rules composed of "beating", "fear", and "prohibitions" caused "servitude", making persons "fainthearted" and "submissive" or "inactive". "Fear" and "violence" resulted in "taciturnity" and "passivity" (Akçay, 1980: 75). A retired

teacher graduated from Hasanoğlan Village Institute says that they do not want the students to remain silent. On the contrary, they encouraged them to express their ideas thoroughly.[104]

The democratic character of the VIs mentioned above owed itself also to their relative autonomy from bureaucracy. As Özsoy argues, "institutional autonomy" is an indispensable element of satisfying the demands for "egalitarian education" (Özsoy, 2004: 13). The VIs used the advantage of being founded relatively out of the control of rigid bureaucracy with the help of previous experiments of Instructor Courses and the Teachers' Training Schools. Even in making laws, the VIs managed to get free of "the rigid bureaucratic methods" to a certain extent. As Güner quotes from Tonguç, if the high level bureaucrats of the Ministry of Education had "believed" and "laid claim to" the VIs movement and Instructor Courses, the organization would have been "stifled" by "the vicious circle" created by laws and regulations. Here Güner gives the example of authority of payment (*Amiri İta*). This task was given directly to the Directors of the VIs rather than being assigned to governors. According to Güner, such "facilities" which the founders of the VIs provided "knowingly" and by omitting bureaucracy pave the way for formation or organization from the base upwards. The working of the VIs without programs[105] and regulations for a period also contributed to formation of such an organization (Güner, 1980: 22). The Draft of the Working Program of the Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri Çalışma Programı Taslağı*) was just a "guide" for the VIs with its "flexible regulations", and each Village Institute could make its own program or prepare their own schedule in accordance with its "social" and "geographical" conditions. This was, in fact, a kind of necessity since in these schools which had been founded built in rural areas and so widely exposed to the impact of "natural laws", any program made

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[104] This was articulated by a single individual during a meeting of some of the graduates of Hasanoğlan Village Institute on May 25, 2007.

[105] Until 1943, there was no single education program to be applied in the VIs. The education in the VIs was standardized just with the 1943 Program which had been designed in the light of the previous experiences since 1937.

beforehand and included strict rules and regulations would be both useless and inoperative (Tekben, 1980b: 62).

According to Engin Tonguç, the foundation and functioning of collective organizations based on public ownership like agricultural fields of the schools, small industrial organizations, cooperatives, etc require alternative laws and principles in order to "free" these organizations from the "conservative effect" of "bureaucratic" ones. In addition to these collective organizations, the "working methods" and principles like "free reading and discussion" and "participation in administration" would also play a significant role in "working people's becoming conscious" or the rise of consciousness among working people by both facilitating and accelerating this process (Tonguç, E. 1970: 266). The person, in such a free environment, would find "the right way" by himself/herself (Tonguç, E. 1970: 267).

Similarly, Gedikoğlu pays attention to the same point arguing that the administrative mechanism in the VIs was founded in accordance with the "needs" and "objectives", excluding both the methods which would lead to "the waste of money, labour, and time" and "red tape" which would stifle "liveliness", and "initiative" (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 74). Since "authority" and "responsibility" were adopted as "fundamental principles" in the administration of the VIs, there was no need to get permission from –and consult- the administrative centre about each affair. In the VIs, "authority" was an instrument of performing work rather than a kind of "personal privilege". Thus, it is not surprising that directors of the VIs consult and cooperate with others –teachers, instructors, etc. (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 75).

The administrative board of the VIs consisted of the director, codirector, the heads of agriculture and art (*tarım ve sanat başları*). Other heads and group teachers were their assistants. In fact, it was not possible to distinguish between the educators from administrators since no teacher was excluded from the

administrative affairs (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 72). Even the instructors[106] were involved within the Board of Teachers. Despite being "uninformed about the theoretical methods of teaching", these instructors knew well "how to teach" the "practical" and "effective" ones. They taught "by doing" rather than using "long definitions. Gedikoğlu states that, at the beginning, their participation in the Board of Teachers, and their right to have a word and their considerable role in the working life of the VIs disturbed many teachers. However, the situation changed with the reasonable, practical and effective thoughts and suggestions of these instructors (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 73). All these were, in fact, outcome of the emphasis on the principle of "learning by doing", or "learning within work". That is to say, work was considered as important as theoretical or abstract knowledge, and sometimes it was emphasized at the expense of the latter. Thus, it is not surprising that not only teachers but also the skilled and successful persons – instructors- who were "self-educated" had the right to have a word in the functioning of the VIs. Arman gives his own experience in the Beşikdüzü Village Institute in Trabzon saying that he took his first lessons about fishing from Adem Başkuş, an instructor candidate. They started production in accordance with his suggestions and under his "leadership" (Arman, 1980: 28).

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[106] In addition to teachers, there were instructors in the VIs who were involved in agricultural and technical work. Their duties, power and responsibilities were stated in ministerial circulars about the division of labour and regulations of the VIs. According to Article 45 of the Law No. 4274, at the beginning they were employed with daily pay. After a probation period of two years, they were employed as permanent staff with monthly salary (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 72-73). The instructors were employed mainly because of the need for technical staff like carpenter, constructor, ironworker, etc. in the newly founded the VIs. Another reason Gedikoğlu mentions for the employment of instructors in the VIs was the involvement of local skilled trade, folk songs, folk dances, etc. as an educational concern in the training schedule. "The most competent persons" who would inform the students and earn them various skills, and introduce them folk songs, folk dances, etc. were the "self-educated" artisans with special skills. It was through the temporary employment of such persons in the VIs that various elements of folklore were transferred both from one VI to another, and to the villages by graduates (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 73).

IV.2. The Principle of Self-sufficiency

Another principle Tonguç mentioned, which is closely related to the first one, i.e. the principle of self-government, was to make both students and teachers become self-sufficient[107] in the sense of doing work by themselves and be able to differentiate "the good" and "the bad". The VIs were tried to be founded and operated in accordance with this principle. Thus, the VIs aimed to train a person who would decide and act by himself/herself without being ordered to serve (having initiative, he/she would be able to make decisions and take action without the help of others) and a new kind of a community based on a "sound cooperation" and "solidarity". This ideal was not specific to the VIs. On the contrary, Tonguç and his associates wanted to "transfer" it to the village, to the society through the graduates of these schools (Tonguç, 1999: 92-93), who would be representatives of a "new understanding of life", perpetually introducing "new" things (Tonguç, 1999: 113). Tonguç argued that this new kind of an "intellectual" would have a "culture" different from that of a classic intellectual in the sense that the former would not be a person who learns by rote. On the contrary, he/she would be an "intellectual" constructing buildings or producing goods in accordance with scientific laws. (It was this kind of an intellectual who could "endure" difficulties of village life.) That is to say, he/she would be able to perform what he/she knew. The aim was to develop a new kind of a society composed of such persons (Tonguç, 1999: 93). These persons were what Apaydın calls "citizen(s) of a democratic government".

According to Güner, the "practicality" of the students (of the VIs) in unexpexted situations can be explained with reference to the "realist philosophy" which formed the basis of the VIs. For him, "the democratic education", which was the most significant characteristic of the VIs, was also the result of such a "realist" approach (Güner, 1980: 20). Güner also calls attention to "organization" of the

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[107] The principle of self-sufficiency seems to be so internalized by the students that even today they continue to behave in the same way. Varlıoğlu, for example, sharply criticizes the youth for their dependence on others and the educational system for its contribution to bring up such kind of a person (interview with Varlıoğlu, 2006).

VIs in comparison with classical educational institutions. He argues that in the latter there was a strict division between the ruler and the ruled, and the latter ("the base") had to implement orders given from above and follow the instructions given from above. All laws and regulations were prepared –and "the base" was ordered to act- in accordance with these rules. The organization of the VIs, on the other hand, rested on "the base". This kind of an organization built on "the base" would not reserve "the separation between the ruler and the ruled", whereas in classical educational institutions this separation or division was the first thing to be observed carefully, preventing persons from establishing sincere relationship with each other; breaking the ties of "cooperation" and "division of labour"; and hindering the share of "responsibility" and "authority" (Güner, 1980: 24).

Güner views the practicality of students mentioned above as one of the aspects which earned the organization of the VIs a "democratic" character (Güner, 1980: 23). In addition to this aspect, the absence of a strict hierarchical division between the ruler and the ruled, and the relative autonomy of the VIs from bureaucracy which I have already mentioned had also earned the education and functioning of the VIs a "democratic" character. In Güner's words, the organization in the VIs was formed "from the base" to the top. It was formed for the provision of the necessities of life. And it was for this very reason that they were "democratic in the full sense of the word". That is to say, the VIs organization arose from the "joint proposition and behaviour" of both the ruler and the ruled (Güner, 1980: 22).

Arman bases the "democratic" character and functioning of the VIs to "the compulsory division of labour" required by the structure of the VIs themselves. This structure, according to Arman, was characterized by "equality" in all spheres of the life in the VIs; participation in production according to one's "duty", "strength", and "capacity"; and the thought of consuming according to one's own "needs". Foundation of the VIs in the middle of the villages and their

independence from the impact of "superstructure" through special laws, among others, contributed to formation of such a structure which contradicted with the prevailing social order in general and "educational superstructure" in particular.[108] This structure and functioning of the VIs which totally contradicted with the "superstructure" and "practices" of the prevailing social order, according to Arman, owed itself both to İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, a "homme du peuple", and to the necessity of being "self-supporting" depending on national resources and potential manpower during the Second World War (Arman, 1980: 29). The classical institutions of education which had nothing to do with "production" trained the young people as "consumers" and "conditioned" them to a "longing of easy life". The VIs, on the other hand, applied the principles of "learning by doing and in doing"; no education without production; "being a useful person to have around"; "giving to society at least as much as he/she gets" (Arman, 1980: 28). This brings us to another important characteristic of the VIs, education within work, which contributed to the formation of a "democratic" structure and functioning of the VIs.

IV.3. Education Within Work and Production-Oriented Education

The students of the VIs, Arman argues, were "molded" in a production environment by taking responsibilities starting from their small ages and participating in production from their earlier days in the VIs. The teachers performed the works together with the students trained in a productive environment. In doing works, they advised the students and make plans through deliberation with them. This was, according to Arman (1980), a "necessity" rather than a choice. As Öztürk also points out, the socio-economic conditions of

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[108] In his interview with Makal, Hürrem Arman stated that in the VIs, where "bureaucracy" and "hierarchy" had been eliminated, everybody "participated" both in administration and production, and consumed in proportion to his/her need. The VIs had been "regulated" in accordance with "productive work", and created an atmosphere of "equality", "complete freedom of thought", and of "solidarity" (Makal, 2001: 62). All these leads Arman to conclude that the VIs were based on the socialist philosophy (Makal, 2001: 63).

the country necessitated establishing or founding an organization which, both being a "producer" and training producers, would not "be a burden on the state too much". That is to say, in the lack of the necessary time and money to train teachers, a search for new and practical methods resulted in organization of the VIs which were expected to be productive establishments with less burden on the state. The Institute would also be an organization which would train the teachers in accordance with village conditions so that they would "comply with the village reality" and stay in the villages. Moreover, it would be a kind of establishment to train persons having "initiative" and so being capable of "effecting" the village on his/her own. All these led the VIs to be based on the principles of "job training" and of "self-government", i.e. "democratic government", which I have already mentioned (Öztürk, 1980: 88). These two principles were "complementary" -since "at the end of work something is produced, and each production is based on work" (Öztürk, 1980: 90)- and were applied together in all courses and studios (Öztürk, 1980: 89).

Another reason for the preference for practical education, or "the principle of work", in the VIs, for Öztürk, was that the founders of the VIs believed that it was "work" that "created" man (Öztürk, 1980: 88). Here, it is necessary to mention what was understood by "work". Türkoğlu states that Tonguç did not consider "work" as "being a worker" ("*amelelik*"). On the contrary, he viewed all the activities including reading, playing an instrument, singing, etc. as a kind of "work". That is to say, he used the term "work" to include not only agricultural and technical activities but also artistic ones. In saying "education within actual work" he meant "actual works of life" since, for Tonguç, education would lose its meaning when it was disconnected from life. The method of "education within and for work" was teaching and learning by doing. In the letters he sent to the directors of the VIs Tonguç explained this new method saying, for example, that music should have been taught by playing a mandolin and singing a song (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005).

Thus the VIs were shaped as "schools of work" or "production units" (Öztürk, 1980: 88), and the educational program of the VIs was prepared in accordance with the principle of "education for work" and/or "education for production", taking into account the practical necessities of the workplace. Given the increasing need for a qualified labour force in the rural side, the adoption of an education based on work rather than on general and abstract knowledge is understandable. The method of this practical education was that of "learning by doing" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 57). If one reason for this was "pedagogical", the other was the "characteristics" of the peasant, who, in Webster's words, "is quick to learn with his eyes if the lesson be written in objects rather than Arabic or Latin characters" (quoted in Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 58). Despite necessitated by the historical conditions, this aspect of the VIs, in fact, led to harsh criticisms in terms of "neglecting the cultural development" and "improvement of the intellectual abilities of the students". This exaltation of work as opposed to undervaluation of learning abstract things was, according to Karaömerlioğlu, evident of "anti-intellectualism" in the VIs (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 58).

Despite his strong emphasis on the study of courses on positive and social sciences or intellectually stimulating courses like arithmetic, history, geography, etc besides "practical works" (see, e.g. Tonguç's letter to Mustafa Engin, the Director of Hasanoğlan Village Institute, dated July 20, 1942), Tonguç himself seemed to give priority to the practical works in preference to general and abstract knowledge in the VIs whenever he thought it necessary. In one of his letters dated May 23, 1942 Tonguç told Nejat İdil that they must have given such an importance to (and exerted themselves in such manner) the agricultural works that, "if necessary", all the time would have been spent on these works obtaining food from nature (at the expense of intellectually stimulating courses) (Tonguç, 1999: 54). One reason for giving precedence to practical works can be sought in the socio-economic conditions of the country which have been already mentioned in the previous parts of the study -especially the need for increasing agricultural production. (However, despite the emphasis on the productive role or function) of

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the VIs, the education in the VIs cannot be reduced to this aspect.). Tonguç's emphasis on practical works can also be explained with the principle of "learning by doing". That is to say, criticizing the previous and the then existing understanding and education systems, Tonguç aimed to establish a new one based on the principle of "learning by doing".

Tekben calls the training method in the VIs as "learning while doing". It means learning while performing a work. Tekben differentiates this from "learning by doing" which has been practiced especially in technical schools. In order to explain the difference between these two kinds of learning, he gives an example of building brick wall. In "learning by doing" the brick wall is dismantled just after its construction whereas in "learning while doing", which was applied in the VIs, the wall was a part of a construction or building and supplied a want. Therefore, it involved "creativity", "production", and "work affection" (Tekben, 1980a: 35). Similarly, in the interview, Türkkolu pays attention to the difference between "education within work" which is reduced only to a few experiment and education in the VIs. The latter, he argues, was quite different from the former since it included "production". That is to say, in the VIs knowledge was transformed into production. The students had an opportunity to apply their knowledge (or what they had learnt). The final outcome or product would be used again to develop their knowledge. Türkkolu views this process as a "vicious circle". That is to say, "knowledge" and "production", which were the two important components of national development, would continuously develop and transform each other. In the VIs, "education" and "production" complemented each other. It is for this very reason that Türkkolu considers the closure of the VIs as a "betrayal" to the country. If the experience of the VIs was not stopped, the country would be in a different condition in terms of education and production (interview with Türkkolu, 2004).

Türkoğlu states that in adopting "job training" Tonguç aimed also at "production". Indeed, Türkoğlu argues, "production" was a natural outcome of

such education. Türkoğlu explains this point with reference to "economic" aspect of education. It is true that "production-oriented education" was adopted as one of the principles in the VIs (However, "production" was not the primary objective of the VIs.). The VIs were expected to change "the production habits of peasants", and to replace "primitive" means of production with "modern" ones. It is for this reason that the teacher candidate learnt how to produce, and was given both land and means of production when he/she was appointed as a teacher. This was, among others, a contribution to the economic cost of education. Türkoğlu relates this issue also to training in a "civilized atmosphere", which, of course, meant for Tonguç, more than "blackboard" and "chalk". In the lack of favourable material and financial conditions (and the small amount of financial government support) to create such an atmosphere, Tonguç "pushed" the boundaries of pedagogy, assigning it different functions. In the case of financial difficulties, he argues, "education should create its own civilized atmosphere on its own account, by mobilizing its own facilities. Here, the driving force would be "science", "human element", "reason", and "solidarity". All these were implemented through the experience of the VIs. That is to say, in the VIs, production accompanied education, making substantial contribution to the economic cost of education. Moreover, it contributed "qualitatively" by providing a productive education environment in the VIs. That is to say, production in the VIs led to improvement also in the quality of education. Since all the works of the VIs were done by the students themselves, the amount of expenditures declined. This savings were spent for instruments or tools like mandolin and ski which, in Türkoğlu's words, were "almost luxury" for education. It is for this very reason that she does not consider the VIs as "low-cost institutions". On the contrary, education in the VIs was a "costly" one. Despite the small amount of financial government support provided to the VIs, the VIs cost much because of high expenditure. The VIs, Türkoğlu says, were "rich" also in "course materials" and "technology" since work tools were transformed into educational appliance. The students of the VIs, for example, had an "opportunity" to learn about electricity by making use of a power plant (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005).

Türkoğlu pays attention also to the fact that, "combining life and school", the educational program of the VIs opposed the then prevailing understanding and practice of education which -together with its objectives, principles, methods, and outcomes- benefited a "minority" and surpassed its boundaries (Türkoğlu, 1980: 50). The significance and effectiveness of this educational program lies behind the principles that Tonguç emphasized. These principles which formed the bases of the educational program of the VIs were "social foundations", "economic foundations" and "psyhological-pedagogical foundations". The first one refers to taking into consideration the social realities of the country which means the condition of the peasantry forming the 80 % of the then population. The peasants were in need of not only "literacy" but also getting rid of "primitive production habits" and "fatalism" of the traditional feudal structure. Thus, education would provide them with knowledge and skills necessary for "improving their lives". This necessitated the involvement of agricultural and technical or practical studies, which would have an impact on the production habits of the peasants, in addition to intellectually stimulating courses. In determining courses, subjects and works the major concern was "necessities of the people", while in the application method were involved people's experiences, knowledge, and values which had proved themselves to be "sound" and "valid". It was also through this way that the school would function as a "laboratory" of culture by "enriching" and "propogating" these values (Türkoğlu, 1980: 51). Türkoğlu mentions "economic foundations" as the second basis of the educational program of the VIs. "Economic foundations" means "taking into account the facilities". The VIs were founded in a period during which there was an attempt for development depending on Turkey's own resources. Thus, the principle of "production-oriented education" was partly a result of the then economic condition of the country. Another reason lies behind the principle of "production-oriented education" was the duties of the graduates who were expected to affect the production habits of the peasants by providing them with new information and skills (Türkoğlu, 1980: 52).

The third and the last principle and/or basis of the educational program in the VIs Türkoğlu mentions was "psyhological-pedagogical" ones referring to "implementation of the principles of modern education" (Türkoğlu, 1980: 51). She pays attention to Tonguç's idea that it was necessary "to use pedagogy in changing [material] conditions" rather than considering the lack of necessary conditions as "pedagogical flaw". In fact, this was one of the "realistic principle[s]" adopted by the VIs that in the absence of favourable conditions, in order to attain the objective it was necessary to work to prepare better conditions by using the existing resources rather than waiting for them (Türkoğlu, 1980: 53).

As a result of all these considerations, educational program in the VIs included two categories of courses. The first part of the program involved intellectually stimulating courses which were called "kültür dersleri", while the second one included "agricultural and technical courses and works"[109]. The former involved Turkish, History, Geography, Civics, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, Natural History and Hygiene, Foreign Language, Handwriting, Physical Training and National (Folk) Dances, Musics, Soldiership, Housekeeping and Child Care, and Teaching Knowledge, Economy of Agricultural Enterprises and Cooperative System. Teaching Knowledge included courses on Sociology, Job Training, Child and Work Psychology, History of Job Training, and Teaching Method and Application (Türkoğlu, 1980: 53).

The schedule in the VIs involved eight hours in a day, and forty four-hours a week for the students, including both lectures and works, while a teacher was obliged to work thirty-thirty five hours a week. Gedikoğlu pays attention to the fact that the teachers worked hard without being paid extra fee. This, as Gedikoğlu states, was partly related to the fact that the task of the teachers was not limited to the classrooms, extending beyond teaching periods and working

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[109] İsmail Hakkı Tonguç stated that the agricultural knowledge would be given a central place in the educational program, and the students were actively involved in agricultural work and/or activities (Ilgaz, 1998: 117).

hours. On the contrary, they worked in the field, klin, mill, waterway. (Here, the shortage of teacher during the war years had an important role (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 70). However, pedagogical reasons, i.e. the adoption of the method of "learning by doing", should also be taken into consideration in explaining this phenomenon. That is to say, in the case of the VIs, "teaching by doing" accompanied the method of "learning by doing", extending lectures beyond classroom walls.

Türkoğlu mentions several points taken into consideration in determining the courses and subjects in the VIs. These were the division of the program into two parts which I have already mentioned; including the "necessary" knowledge, subjects, and courses which could be put into practice; the application of intellectually stimulating courses in the fields of work and production, and their combination with production works; culmination of both the lectures and works with "education" and "production"; selection of subjects, materials and works which would be useful for the development of the students; the emphasis on the students' activity in performing all lectures and works and their participation in all spheres. Another important point taken into account was inclusion, development, and use of "our own" cultural values which were both "firm" and "needed" in the VIs (Türkoğlu, 1980: 56).

Türkoğlu states that the educational program of the VIs did not include useless subjects and knowledge which would not influence and change students' behaviours or have no reflection on their work. On the contrary, the educational program of the VIs aimed to give students general knowledge which would make students "develop" and "conscious"; change their behaviour in accordance with what they had learnt and done; and also earn them the necessary knowledge and skills for production. According to Türkoğlu, this "culture" was a product of an environment which provided a many-sided education combining "manual" and "mental" labour (Türkoğlu, 1980: 59). Operating with a different understanding of education, the VIs aimed to free teaching from memorization. To do this, the

emphasis was put on the question of "why" to find "causes". Since the basic principle of education was to bring up "creative" and "productive" persons, it was also important to find out and teach the relations between the various subjects, and their fields of application through various practices, observation and experiments (Akçay, 1980: 74).

Here, it is also necessary to briefly mention the evaluation of the students of the VIs. According to regulations, the students of the VIs would be evaluated each month in terms of their study. They would also be evaluated in terms of their character four times in a year. However, because of the shortage of teachers in proportion to courses and students, this sentence of the regulations could never be realized. Since the students were informed about these evaluations, they had a chance and "possibility to improve their negative attitude(s)". Thanks to this method, the negative outcomes or effects of "giving a grade" which often estranged the students from the teachers, and "led the former into error" like cribbing were avoided (Öztürk, 1980: 90). According to Temiz, the only criterion used when evaluating students was "labour" rather than textbook or regulations (Temiz, 1980: 68).

Thus, the educational program of the VIs did not only involve various production areas and cultural activities, but also aimed to give students knowledge and make them cultured. Here, Türkoğlu mentions "free reading hours" which were compulsory for everybody. An article[110] of the circular dated February 4, 1944 ordered that the students were to have "free readings" everyday and "absolutely" earn "reading habits" without depending on the conditions. In the VIs, special emphasis was put also on "reading", and the students were encouraged to read and discuss extracurricular reading materials[111] like novels, stories, poems, essays

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[110] "Şartlar ne olursa olsun, mevsim hangi mevsimde bulunursa bulunsun, öğrencilere her gün serbest okuma yaptırılacak ve onlara kitap okuma alışkanlığı mutlak surette kazandırılacaktır" (Tonguç, 1999: 91). For Türkoğlu, it was this very principle that underlies the rise of writers from among the graduates of the VIs (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005).

[111] Most of the books provided in the libraries of the VIs were world's classics translated and published by the Ministry of Education headed by Hasan Ali Yücel (Makal, 1995: 40-41). In

both in "free reading hours" compulsory for everbody and at their leisure times.[112] This was considered necessary to be a "democrat" person, or a "true intellectual". That is to say, textbooks were of use to pass class, and have a diploma, but inadequate to be an "intellectual". Apaydın states that the students who had a reading habit cultivated themselves, while others became "ruralized", i.e. became identical with the peasants in the villages in a few years (interview with Apaydın, 2004).

Taking into account both the memoirs and the interviews made with the graduates of the VIs, it is possible to argue that despite being compulsory for them, the students experienced reading activity rather as something enjoyable. Their reading activities went beyond compulsory reading hours. Despite being already provided with newspapers –like *Ulus*, *Cumhuriyet*- and periodicals –such as *Çınaralan*, *Yenialan*- some of the students subscribed for magazines in spite of their limited pocket-money.

Here, another important point Apaydın emphasizes is that "reading brings forth writing". He states that the masters in Turkish in the VIs told the students to read carefully by always asking the question that "if I would have been the writer of the text, in which ways I would have written", rather than "only following up the episode". This, as Apaydın argues, brings in writing (interview with Apaydın, 2004). Thus, it is not surprising that there are many writers, poets, and other

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addition to them, the students sometimes ordered books (a series of translated literature like *Selected Works from the East and the West*, *Translations from World Authors*) from some private publishers like Remzi Publishing House. The fact that most of the extracurricular reading materials were sent by the Ministry of Education to the libraries of the VIs and that the students selected from among them may lead one to ask whether the students were really free in the true sense of the term to select what to read. However, the graduates of the VIs seem not to bother about this question. On the contrary, having being trained to be the agents of an enlightenment project, they seem to be proud of reading selected books from world literature. For Türkoğlu, thanks to the selected Turkish and world classics published by the Ministry of Education that the students earned a reading habit and became interested in domestic and international affairs, developing a sound perspective (Türkoğlu, 2000: 269).

[112] This emphasis on reading was not welcomed by all. For example, Reşat Şemsettin Sirer who was appointed as the Minister of Education in 1946 criticized Tonguç for teaching the students "reading" before anything else (Makal, 1990: 12).

artists among the graduates of the VIs. The students were encouraged also to speak especially by presenting the books and the articles in the periodicals[113] they had read. Kabay says that the students had learned about many books through these presentations. He carried this practice into school during his years of teaching service. He also makes a comparison between the teachers graduated from the VIs and those from the Teachers' Training Schools in terms of reading habits and, depending on his observations especially through his inspectorship, concludes that the latter do not have knowledge, for example, about Greek, Russian, and French classics, while the graduates of the VIs are informed about Tolstoy, Dostoyevski, Gogol, Schiller, etc (interview with Kabay, 2005).

Another important point regarding cultural development of the students was the emphasis on artistic activities like music, theatre, literature, folk dances, etc. (Türkoğlu, 1980: 59). Türkoğlu emphasizes that students' activities were not limited to certain areas for the sake of production; on the contrary, they had a chance and opportunity to develop themselves in different areas. As it was stated in the regulations, all students were obliged to learn riding a bicycle and motorcycle; playing a musical instrument; singing; folk dance (Türkoğlu, 1980: 57). Türkoğlu says that the first things they met in the VI were mandolin, machine, and bicycle-motorcycle. These three, according to her, were the most important instruments of modern education. All the students of the VIs –without any gender discrimination- had to learn riding a motorcycle. This was a great novelty in the educational system. That is to say, must courses to teach both schoolgirls and schoolboys riding a motorcycle were included only in the educational program of the VIs (In the Higher Village Institute in Hasanoğlan, they –especially schoolgirls- were even taught driving (interview with Türkoğlu,

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[113] Makal (1995: 38) states that the books to be introduced to the students were selected according to the students' level. Most of them were introduced by the students and teachers of the Higher Village Institute in *Köy Enstitüleri Dergisi* (Village Institute Journal), a quarterly magazine with a circulation of 16,500.

2005). The lack of gender discrimination in the VIs –both in educational program and in daily life of the VIs- is underlined especially by the female interviewees[114].

The application of such an educational program which gave precedence to students' activity brought with it "the principle of direct participation of students in administration" (Türkoğlu, 1980: 57). Türkoğlu states that "the right to participation in administration" which university students have been struggling to gain was one of the obligatory principles of the educational program of the VIs. However, Türkoğlu emphasizes, "participation in administration" in the VIs did not refer only to "the right to have a word" or participation in the process of decision making, but also securing good running of the school by working and assuming administrative responsibility and authority. That is to say, the students had "obligatory" responsibilities and authority in administering the school and carrying out the tasks (Türkoğlu, 1980: 58).

"Even the intellectually stimulating courses necessitated participation of students in administration" since they studied also in the fields of work and production rather than being merely limited to classrooms. For example, the agricultural works were a field of application for courses like biology and mathematics. This extension of lectures beyond classroom walls to the fields of work and production resulted in a large organization which required participation of students both in work and/or production and administration. Another important point Türkoğlu mentions regarding students' participation in administration is that the students were as "authorized" and "responsible" as the officials, and worked in cooperation with them in production process from beginning to end, including the activities of producing, controlling production, and deciding what to do with products, i.e. selling, sharing, and consuming the products. Here, Türkoğlu mentions the articles about students' participation in administration in the act dated December 1, 1944 sent to the directors of the VIs by the Ministerial Office.

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[114] For the lack of gender discrimination and the friendly relationship between girls and boys see interview with Aygen (2006); Apaydın, H. (2004); Bilbaşar (2004); Gürler (2004); and Türkoğlu (2005).

According to the first article, all kinds of works like construction, agricultural works, and official and administrative tasks were carried out by teachers and students in rotation. The second article states that all the teachers and students come together and talk about the works in the VIs (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005).

This brings us to the meetings arranged at the weekends. Türkoğlu states that the multiplicity and variety of works in the VIs required not only a large number of working people but also of administrators. Therefore, the students should have participated in administration as much as they participated in work. This, for Tonguç, was the way of organizing the running of the school effectively. The participation in administration was realized especially in the headship and watch. The variety of works in the VIs led to the multiplicity of headship. However, Türkoğlu argues, these headships were not non-functional. On the contrary, they were given authority and responsibility. Since everybody worked in the VIs, and so had the right to have a word and role and responsibility in the administration of the VIs, there arose a need for talking about the works at the weekends. These meetings held at the weekends to carry out the works in the VIs turned into "critical meetings". The subjects talked about at these meetings were not limited to daily routine in the VIs. Other aspects of daily life, like the relationship between the teachers and the students, were also included. Everyone told whatever he/she wanted but within the limits of "affection" and "respect". During these meetings, not only problems but solutions to problems as well were stated clearly (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). .

Öztürk also pays attention to the role the meetings arranged at the weekends, where everybody including directors and teachers was criticized by all, played in performing works in the VIs. He argues that things go bad in the absence or lack of criticism. The principles and practices of self-government and criticism in the VIs contributed to train the students as "citizen[s] of a democratic society". The outcome was a person who had "moral courage", "initiative", and "ability to do

work on his/her own" and "to make others do the same"; "insist[ed] on his/her due"; "[did] not mince his/her words".[115] The authority and responsibility given to students in the works of the VIs both led them to criticize the director and the teacher in case of necessity, and laid themselves "open to criticism" (Öztürk, 1980: 90). This, for Türkoğlu, prepared the ground for "social criticism" since in such an environment the students would become "sensitive" –and conscious of- to social affairs, and world affairs in addition to their own problems (Türkoğlu, 1980: 52). (Thus, it is not surprising that a significant amount of graduates of the VIs participated actively in associations like TÖB-DER.)

Having clarified the relationship between the production and participation in administration in the VIs, now it is proper to mention the criticism directed towards the VIs in terms of overworking[116] the students. The VIs were sharply criticized not only by rightists[117], but also leftists in terms of "production-oriented

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[115] Many writers and scholars agree that training such a person, who became the voice of the people, the VIs disturbed or bothered not only Aghas or large landowners who made use of the illiterate, poor and suffering peasants, but also some administrators, and that this was one of the reasons for the closure of the VIs (see Öztürk, 1980: 90). The memoirs of the graduates are full of examples of conflicts with district officials and ministry of education. This, for Kirby, proves how the students of the VIs took seriously or care about the notion of "legal rights of the people". It displays, at the same time, the difference between populism of the VIs and that of "peasantists". Here, it is necessary to emphasize that Kirby differentiates Tonguç's understanding of populism from that of peasantists in general and of the People's Houses in particular. Having witnessed the failure of peasantism advocated by "intellectuals" who had been incapable of coping with the problems of the village effectively, Tonguç was "mistrustful" of them. This was proved, Kirby says, by the "betrayal of the intellectuals", thanks to (!) which a generation of "peasant intellectual" arose (Kirby, 1961: 273). Actually, attempting to "enliven" the village through "elements from the village itself" (Tonguç, 1999: 11) who knew the village reality well and were trained in a village-like atmosphere to endure the difficulties of the village life, and aiming to create a new type of intellectual from among them, Tonguç aimed to overcome the shortcomings of peasantists, especially their failure in overcoming the separation between the people and the intellectuals.

[116] Actually, this is accepted even by the graduates of the VIs and mentioned in the memoirs of both the graduates and directors of the VIs. It is depicted how much the students worked in the projects like the construction of the school building and the roads; bringing water to the Institute from a faraway source; providing electricity, etc. They worked also in construction and repair works in nearby villages. For a good portrayal of such works with photographs see Güneri (2004).

[117] For example, Sançar (1966: 178) criticized the VIs for training artisans rather than teachers. Similarly, Uygur (1966: 143) criticized the VIs for bringing up persons who enjoyed only "work", being devoid of any kind of "moral pleasure". For him, the understanding of "work" as a "source of happiness" was a product of Tonguç's "materialist" and "Marxist" viewpoint. The VIs, and their architect, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, became the target of anti-communist hysteria.

education" (*üretime dönük eğitim*) and the excessive work demands in the VIs. Kemal Tahir, for example, claimed that in the VIs the students were "overworked" and "oppressed". The VIs "benefitted from the strength of the village children". In the back cover of his book, *Bozkırdaki Çekirdek*, Tahir says that

> Given the social and political circumstances in our country, the VIs would only have resulted in a cruel exploitation of the peasant students in the most difficult tasks, and by making them endure the worst economic and social conditions. As a matter of fact, this experience proved that we, the intelligentsia, do not feel sorry for the people, rather we are hostile towards them. (quoted in Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 61).

They were "forced to work in the agricultural activities" which provided a considerable revenue of the VIs (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 62). Karaömerlioğlu gives us evidence of the overwork of the students. One of them is a letter sent to Tonguç complaining about the administrators whose "only concern was to make the students work and get the benefit of their physical labour" (Tonguç, 1999: 32-33). He also mentions the photographs of the students "verify(ing) how young the boys were who actively participated in the construction of the Village Institute buildings" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 62). The "hard working conditions", however, do not lead Karaömerlioğlu to deny "how enthusiastically the students participated in the daily routines of the institute work (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 59). All the memoirs and publications of the VIs are full of such examples.

Türkoğlu argues against this criticism that in the VIs students' labour was used for "the needs of the students themselves" even if it was transformed into investment in the plants. The production areas, plants, and the institution were places where everbody in the VIs worked and benefitted from equally. In such an institution where production was made for the sake of students there would be "equal treatment" and "solidarity" rather than "coercion" and "exploitation" (Türkoğlu, 1980: 58). In fact, this is the point which has been emphasized by graduates of the VIs. For example, while showing the difference between

Kerschensteiner and Pestalozzi, and İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, Apaydın argues that the former gave importance to "job training" (*iş eğitimi*) since there had arisen a need for "productive workers" in the factories after the development of technology, while Tonguç had a different understanding of job training. Apaydın summarizes this difference in the following sentence: "We will work for ourselves, not for someone else". That is to say, they would not be "subject" or "slave" to another persons. They would produce, but use the product for themselves. This was, Apaydın states, a point Tonguç paid special attention. He had in mind the objective of bringing up a "democrat" person, having rights, initiative and self-confidence, and doing work depending on his/her own labour. It was, Apaydın argues, for this reason that the "introverted" and "diffident" village children were encouraged to talk starting from their first years in the VIs[118] (interview with Apaydın, 2004).

Özsoy also calls attention to the difference between Kerschensteiner and Tonguç in terms of their understanding of education in general and "the principle of work" in particular. He criticizes the reduction of Tonguç's understanding of education merely into education "within working life, through and for work" (*iş hayatı içinde, iş vasıtasıyla, iş için* eğitim), disregarding his formulation of education as one aimed to bring up a "cultured generation ... relying on its own labour". For Özsoy, in order to grasp Tonguç's understanding of education, one should take into consideration both formulations. Being inspired by

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[118] There were many examples of what is called "democratic attitude" in the memoirs of the graduates of the VIs. They generally won reputation for their opposition to injustices, to oppression of the poor, and sometimes to their superiors. Such characteristics which they acquired during their studentship in the VIs caused many troubles like investigation, discharge, relegation, etc. (All the graduates interviewed had to overcome such difficulties during their mastership.) According to Gürler, the students of the VIs were inoculated with a sense of self-confidence and opposition (and revolt) to injustice, and this was one of the reasons for the difficulties they had to tackle with. They were also encouraged "to think aloud," be "articulate," and criticize what they considered "wrong". These were not welcomed by their superiors who tried to "oppress" them. Hence, investigation, discharge, relegation. However, Gürler says, such repressive practices did not discourage them. They resisted such attacks and struggled for their rights. Most of the graduates, including Gürler herself, "took revenge" by educating their children. She assumes that if there were more graduates all of whom would educate their children, Turkey would be in a different condition (interview with Gürler, 2004).

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Kerschensteiner, Tonguç developed a "principle of work". However, his principle of work differs sharply from that of Kerschensteiner in terms of being more than a "pedagogical technique". Tonguç developed a wider definition of "work"[119] in comparison with Kerschensteiner. According to him, the term "work" should be used to refer to not only manual labour but also mental one (Özsoy, 2004: 10).

Viewing "work" as part of being human (*insanı yaratan bir etkinlik olarak iş*), Tonguç opposes the distinction Kerschensteiner makes between vocational-technical education and general education, and argues rather for many-sided education. Here, the principle of work arises to transform the existing social order rather than to train the necessary labour force in accordance with the needs of the capitalist system. This is the basic point of difference between Tonguç and Dewey who restricts the aim of education with "solving problem" (Özsoy, 2004: 10). Tonguç's understanding of education cannot be comprehended in its entirety without his criticism of school. According to him, the school did not play a role as important as that of work and workplace in history since it could not train students so as to make them be able to control natural events, while the latter succeeded it to a certain extent. Believing that knowledge can only be acquired through living and working, Tonguç views the village as the most favourable place to implement the principle of work (Özsoy, 2004:10-11). He draws a distinction between the school and workplaces (and family) criticizing the former for both being ignorant of the "educative" roles and functions of the work and serving only a "privileged" part of the society rather than all (Özsoy, 2004: 12).

As a matter of fact, the aim of transforming the peasant into a better producer through an education that would provide him/her with knowledge and skills necessary for a better life in general, and for increasing his productive capacity in particular was one of the fundamental reasons for the establishment of the VIs. (This was clearly stated by İsmail Hakkı Tonguç in *İlköğretim Kavramı.)* However, as it has been strongly emphasized not only by graduates of the VIs but

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[119] "İş kelimesi, yalnızca elle çalışma manasını değil, aynı zamanda bir zihin faaliyeti manasını da ihtiva etmelidir" (Tonguç, 1999: 102).

also many scholars, the founders of the VIs, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç being the most prominent one, had expectations going far beyond this. Among them, the aim of bringing up a new kind of an intellectual was the most crucial one especially for the purpose of this study. In answering the question that why the "productive education" in the VIs had an important role in Turkey's development, Apaydın explains this point clearly. He argues that since the Ottoman Period, the educated person had been estranged from "the people", showing no interest in "the problems of the people". Apaydın defines "the people" as the "working" ones, and "the intellectuals" as those having a "desk". The intellectuals, he states, "despised" the people, always preserving their distance from the latter. "Like olive oil and water", Apaydın argues, they could never mixed with the people. It was for this reason that the founders of the VIs aimed to create a "new kind of an intellectual" who live amongst the people (and in the way they do); mix with them; and be sensitive to their problems; and row in the same boat. The students of the VIs were recruited from the villages and received such a training so that they would not "forget" the villages they came from, but sided with them. They would modernize the villages by overcoming their "darkness", "primitiveness", and "backwardness". The starting point in tranforming the villages would be the village youth[120], who would be taught modern farming, beekeeping, inoculation, ironworking, etc. (interview with Apaydın, 2004).[121]

It was urgently necessary, Apaydın argues, to transform the people who remained basically the same since the Hittites in terms of cultivation into a "modern

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[120] In a collective work presented to the Second Convention of Peasants (M.T.T.B. 2. Köylüler Kurultayı) it was stated that "the most ardent" and "the most useful element" which would save the village would be the village child. But this child would not be one whose "destiny subjected it to the land". On the contrary, it would be an "enlightened village child" who found an opportunity to express its thought, viewpoint, feelings, and "ascended by benefitting from all the rights of being a member of a nation" (Tütengil, 1999: 201).

[121] Here, it should be mentioned that Apaydın prefers to label works like ironworking, carpentry, farming, etc. as a "hobby", arguing that even sultans rode a hobby, such as writing, painting, carpentering. Apaydın gives Sultan Abdulhamit who was a carpenter as a hobby as an example. Such activities, for him, serve also for spending time –since nineteen hours left after work (interview with Apaydın, 2004).

society". To do this, a new kind of an intellectual to be a "leader"[122] of the village would be created. The village school would almost be an "innovation centre". It would also be a place always open to villagers for talk, discussion, and sharing their problems with the teacher. Being opposed to the reduction of the role of the teacher into teaching in the classroom, Apaydın argues that what the Turkish village needed was a teacher like the one trained in the VIs (interview with Apaydın, 2004).

Baring in mind the above-mentioned characteristics of the education in the VIs – the democratic functioning- it is possible to make a comparison between the understanding of education adopted and implemented by the VIs and that of Critical Pedagogy School. Critical pedagogy is rooted in Critical Theory developed by the Frankfurt School. Here, Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire, a well-known Brazilian educator, deserve mentioning because of their significant contributions to critical pedagogy through the concepts of ideology, hegemony and the intellectual. Although Gramsci did not write much on schooling, especially his conceptions of ideology and hegemony provide a fertile ground for critical pedagogy school. Gramsci's ideas will be mentioned in the following chapter. Here it is proper to briefly talk about Freire's understanding of education and critical pedagogy together with the relation between the educational system and social, economic and political power structures.

Being one of the most important agents in the socialization process, the schools – or the educational system- help training individuals in accordance with the needs of the capitalist system. (The changes in the educational system correspond to the needs of the capitalist system.) Even the attempts for mobilization to spread literacy nationwide cannot be considered independent of capitalist development. This is where the dual functions or potentials of education come to the fore. On

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[122] As it was clearly stated in the Law No. 4274 and emphasized by many writers, the students of the VIs would be trained to be "leaders" in the villages. Thus, the most important characteristic - and the condition of their appointment as teachers- they were expected to have was their ability to lead the peasants in all areas of life. Those who lacked this characteristic would be appointed as health officer (Tekben, 1980b: 62).

the one hand, socializing individuals in accordance with dominant norms and values and training them in accordance with the needs of the capitalist system, education serves or helps maintaining the status quo. However, it is not possible to reduce the schools merely into spheres of economic and cultural reproduction. The educational system is determined by social, economic and political power structures and relations and organized to serve the interests of the dominant class. But, despite these limitations, it still remains as a field of contradiction and conflict which arouse the "liberatory" potential of education. (This forms the basis on which critical pedagogy is grounded.)

Freire's theory of education is based on a "dialogue" between "subjects", learners. It is a "process" during which all teach and all learn. Here, the emphasis is no longer on the teacher's side. This can be observed in the replacement of the traditional concepts like "lecture", "school", "teacher", and "student" respectively with "dialogue", "culture circle", "coordinator", and "participant". Classrooms are no longer places where knowledge is transferred, but places where coordinators and participants investigate knowledge together. Therefore, in contrast to the "banking" method of education which reduces learners merely into "objects", i.e. passive learners who receive ready-made knowledge, liberatory education views them as "subjects" (Spring, 1997). The latter encourages "critical" approach and turns learning becomes a means of liberation.

Critical pedagogy is a "teaching approach which attempts to hold students question and challenge domination, and the beliefs and practices that dominate" including those at school, and to help them attain "critical consciousness". Critical consciousness is one aspect of "liberatory education". The other one is encouraging "creative and liberating social action for change" through "the development of appropriate skills and competencies" (Heaney, 2006). Here, Fischman and McLaren argue, the emphasis is not only on "understanding" schools and society, but also "transforming" –"democratizing" -them "through a shared praxis", calling attention, at the same time, to "the intrinsic relationship

between education and the production and reproduction of labor-power". Here, educators are to play "intellectual roles" (Fischman and McLaren, 2005).

When it comes to the liberatory education, it can be defined as a kind of education which encourages learners to challenge the "givenness" of the world and transform it through collective social action. In this sense, it is more than a solution to the problem of illiteracy. That is to say, education for liberation does not merely apply "more effective methods of instruction" and ground learning in daily experience of the people to solve the problem of illiteracy, but also connects it with broader social and political problems and encourages for transformative social action which is an expected outcome of "critical understanding". Thanks to literacy, passivity of the poor –the peasants- would end, while popular political participation would increase. This differentiates Freirean adult education from others which have paralleled the needs and advance of a technological society (Heaney, 2006). Freire developed a different perspective linking educational methods with Marxist concepts of "praxis" and "consciousness". The former, on which Freire's theory of education is based, involves a cycle of action-reflection-action, emphasizing the unity of action and reflection rather than a clear separation between the two. This means to ground learning in day-to-day experience of the people. It is again through praxis that individuals not only become conscious of their oppression but also transform the world, i.e. "humanize" it (Spring, 1997).

In the light of above arguments, it is possible to draw a similarity between Tonguç's understanding of pedagogy and the critical pedagogy school inspired by Freire's theory of education. The comparison will be completed in the conclusion part after examining paradoxical elitism of populist ideology in the case of the VIs with a special reference to the role and function of intellectuals aimed to be created in the VIs.

CHAPTER V

THE POPULISM OF THE VILLAGE INSTITUTES AS A CHALLENGE TO KEMALIST POPULISM

Having examined the democratic structure and functioning of the VIs which was based mainly on Tonguç's understanding of populism as "government by the people", now it is proper to examine paradoxical elitism of populist ideology in the case of the VIs. In the case of the Village Institutes, the paradoxical relationship between populism and democracy mentioned in the first chapter can be observed especially in the "contradictory" conceptualization of the people. Elitist notions can be found especially in phrases like to "educate", to "enlighten", to "develop", to "lead", to "rescue them from 'backwardness' and 'primitiveness'". Sometimes, the people are portrayed as "weak", "poor inoffensive", "constantly oppressed". Moreover, complaints about the "difficulty" in "educating" and "rousing" the peasants, and about some of their characteristics –which are attributed to them- like "fatalism", "ignorance", "indifference" can be found in the writings of the graduates of the VIs, despite not accusing peasants of such "deficiencies". Of course, it is possible to extend the list further to include another examples. However, before going further, it is better to deal with the question of what is meant by the term "intellectual". The subject will be discussed with special reference to Tonguç whose understanding of pedagogy in general and that of intellectual in particular shape the ideas of the graduates interviewed to a large extent.

V.1. Definition of the Term "Intellectual"

There has been a controversial debate on "intellectuals" –their characteristics, roles and functions. There are many definitions of the word. However, they are

not included in detail since the study does not focus on the category of intellectuals. The emphasis is rather on the category of "the people" with a discussion about whether and how the separation between the people and the intellectuals can be overcome -or how people themselves can become intellectuals- within the context of populism and about the role of education in this process. It is for this reason that the present study includes scholars -Gramsci being the most prominent one- who center upon these subjects rather than the category of intellectuals itself by questioning the long-standing separation between intellectual and manual activities and arguing rather for their unity.

It is proper to start with the broader sociological definition of the intellectual which refers to "those who by profession and occupation are engaged in 'intellectual', as opposed to 'manual', labour" (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997:7). For centuries, a clear line of demarcation has been drawn between intellectual and manual labour.[123] The striking point is that the former has been generally thought to be superior to the latter with a contempt for the latter one. Julien Benda who is well-known for his famous book titled *La Trahison des Clercs* (The Betrayal of the Intellectuals) defines intellectuals –the *clerks*- as those whose activity essentially is directed not to practical ends but to unworldly –spiritual- causes. Here, what is at issue is not only the superiority of unworldly causes to worldy ones but also that of intellectual activities to practical ones. The underlying assumption is that there is a clear separation between intellectual and practical activities and that the former one has an absolute superiority to the latter. Therefore, it is not surprising that Benda started to talk about "the betrayal of the intellectuals" when they were directed to practical ends under the influence of what he called "political passions" –namely "racial passions," "class passions,"

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[123] For a long time, during which populations had low level of literacy, one of the major criteria for this distinction was whether one knew how to read and write. Being literate has been considered one of the indispensable characteristics of intellectuals. It was indeed a kind of privilege of the few in societies where the level of literacy was very low. Only a few enjoyed this privilege especially until when the right to education for all was put on the agenda as a fundamental human right. It was seen, at the same time, an effective –but not the only- way of upward mobility. This brought up the relationship between education and social stratification (or class structure).

and "national passions" (Benda, 1955: 1), exalting "the particular" at the expense of "the universal" and "the practical" at the expense of "the spiritual" (Read, 1955: xxiii). That is to say, they betrayed when they replaced their main function, "the pursuit of eternal things," with that of "practical aims". The latter was attributed to masses while the former was the task of the few, intellectuals, who had a mission "to influence the layman" either by showing "an example of a life consecrated to spiritual ideals" or transforming his morality which, on its own, would make the world "barbarous". This is, indeed, what civilization requires. Although the rise of civilization was made possible both by "morality of the laymen" and that of intellectuals, the respect for "good" by the humanity of the past –of the Middle Ages- owed itself to the existence of true intellectuals. The intellectual, for Benda, is one who "protests" against the morality of the laymen "by honoring ideal or disinterested values" which are "conceived without relation to the conditions of real existence" and so "universal," "abstract," "eternal," or "infinite" (Read, 1955: xxv).

As a matter of fact, the pursuit of reality has been considered as one of the main functions of "intellectuals". Here, there is an underlying belief that there is a single reality to be apprehended or grasped by an elite of intellectuals. (This is, indeed, one of the basic postulates of Enlightenment.) It is this very function which gives intellectuals the role of leadership. Foucault is a scholar who brings down intellectuals from their ivory tower by questioning the heritage (philosophy) of the Enlightenment in terms of its claim for a "universal reason" and "universal truth" which give intellectuals a prominent role of leadership. In doing this, Foucault also denies the notion of "representation" arguing that "the masses no longer need [the intellectual] to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he" (Foucault, 1977: 207) and "can speak for themselves". Placing knowledge within life itself rather than on a distinct theoretical plane, and so considering knowledge production and the use of knowledge as acts performed by all rather than a privileged few, Foucault

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(together with Deleuze) prevents knowledge from being "monopoly" of intellectuals.

Here, what is at issue is the replacement of universalism with relativism which declares the end of universal truth. This means the trivialization of the pursuit of truth (Vergin, 2006: 28). As Jennings and Kemp-Welch rightly argue, together with the abandonment of the claim to universality, "the oppositional function of the intellectual becomes difficult to sustain. All disputes are purely local in character and all truth-claims are discredited. We are left with only discourse." (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997: 17). Then, a question arises: "[I]f intellectuals no longer lay claim to speak in the name of universal conscience, in whose name and with what authority do they now speak?" (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997: 24). This, Vergin points out, also means accepting an "ordinary" person as an "intellectual" for the sake of "specificity" and "originality" (Vergin, 2006: 28).

The argument about the pursuit of truth –a role assigned to intellectuals- brings up a discussion about the intellectuals' approach to politics. The definition of intellectual intervening in politics[124] brings up the position of relative autonomy. In fact, it is their "autonomous" position, in addition to the "nature of their work", which lies behind the "responsibility for truthfulness and towards truth" given to intellectuals. The responsibility to truth can be exercised on condition that the intellectual holds himself/herself aloof from the society, and judge it from the outside. This, for Benda, means standing apart from everyday material concerns, while Said[125] calls it "the intellectual's 'lonely condition'" (Jennings and Kemp-

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[124] At the end of the nineteenth century, the word *intellectual* acquires a specific meaning in Western Europe with the Dreyfus Affair, "constitutive" being the intervention of intellectuals in politics The intellectuals like Emile Zola, André Gide, Marcel Proust and Anatole France protested "in the name of Justice in order to secure the release of the innocent Captain Alfred Dreyfus" (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997:7).

[125] As Jennings and Kemp-Welch state, Said's understanding of the intellectual is a "contemporary restatement" of Benda's definition of the intellectual, i.e. "the guardian and possessor of independent judgement owing loyalty to truth alone". According to Said, together with the professionalization of intellectual life, the "true" intellectual had been replaced with "'policy-oriented intellectuals' who had internalized the norms of the state" and who, being no longer concerned about wider social and economic issues, had only the task of "manufacturing of

Welch, 1997: 10).[126] The argument about the so-called "autonomous" position of intellectuals will be incomplete without Mannheim's conception of "free-floating intellectual" who is "unanchored" and "unattached". It is through this stratum of intellectuals free from any class interests and ideology which, for Mannheim, is nothing other than "false consciousness" that it will be possible to attain "objective" knowledge. It is through their relative autonomy from any social class that this free-floating intellectual is capable of understanding different class perspectives and so bringing peace to the society (Mannheim, 2002).

The debate over the "proper" role and responsibility of the intellectuals had gained a new momentum with Gramsci. He argued that "Modern intellectuals were not simply talkers, but directors and organisers who helped build society and produce hegemony by means of ideological apparatuses such as education and the media." (Gramsci, 1971). It was especially through his conception of the "organic" intellectual that Gramsci argued for abandonment of the position of "detached independence". That is to say, the notion of independent intellectual was replaced with that of organic intellectual (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997: 12). In fact, in Gramscian terms, the position of detachment is that of "traditional" intellectuals who mistakenly regard themselves as "autonomous and independent of the dominant social group", and operate in an "eternal realm of truth that is somewhat separated from the rest of the world", aspiring "to be a caste apart". The organic intellectuals, on the other hand, "discover the truth through examining the thoughts of common people" (Bellamy, 1997: 34).

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consent" (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997: 1). Rather than having an unquestioning obedience to the state, the "true" intellectual should be side with "the dispossessed," "the unrepresented," and "the forgotten" (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997:2). In other words, they should "articulate the voice of the oppressed" (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997: 17).

[126] "This in turn, however, invites the charge of an Olympian detachment that results in either political impotence and collusion with bourgeois dominance or the misplaced censure of practices from a naively universalistic perspective. The 'universal' intellectual or mandarin is contrasted with the 'specific' intellectual engaged in critique from within a movement or from within a particular set of moral values." (Jennings and Kemp-Welch, 1997: 23)

Here, a question arises: who determines who is intellectual. This is an important question especially in determining the class position of the intellectuals. To have a voice in the sphere of cultural production is a kind of "privilege" and so closely related to the class structure of society in the sense that it is the dominant class who defines characteristic features of intellectuals. Becoming an intellectual, the person finds an opportunity to go up into a higher class, despite lacking real "economic" power. In fact, it is the "cultural capital" under their monopoly which gives them opportunity to enter into the dominant class. It is, in Gramscian terms, the prominent role they played in producing hegemony which renders them powerful in relation to the bourgeoisie (Vergin, 2006: 32-33).

However, the relationship between the intellectuals and the bourgeoisie is a complicated and hesitant one. On the one hand, the intellectuals hold a place amongst the bourgeoisie, while on the other, they are the servants of the very same class. This leads intellectuals to make an "uncertain," "fragile," and "ever-changeable" alliance with the people and the dominant class (Vergin, 2006: 34). This can be observed also in the Turkish case. As Oran argues, the petty bourgeois intellectuals do not form a class by itself. However, they have a powerful position –such a powerful position which leads the petty bourgeois intellectuals to identify themselves with the state- thanks to "the vacuum of power" resulted from the immaturity of social classes in their underdeveloped countries (Oran, 1988: 59). That is to say, the petty bourgeois intellectuals owe their power "to administer the state apparatus" rather than to "property relations" –possession of means of production (Oran, 1988: 56). Together with this, the "rationalist" and "reformist" character of the petty bourgeois intellectuals leads them to conflict with the ruling classes like aghas, notables, and commercial bourgeoisie whose interests would be in conflict with the "modernization" process.[127] On the one hand, the intellectuals charge themselves with "the

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[127] The basis of existence of petty bourgeoisie is to provide the maintenance of existing social order to which they owe their existence but by "improving through reforms" rather than abolishing it. In doing this, they may be in conflict with the interests of the dominant class. But this conflict is a result of their efforts to ensure the smooth functioning of capitalist system (Oran, 1988: 56).

historical mission of the bourgeoisie", while on the other they come into conflict with the "bourgeoisie" whose conservative or traditionalist characteristics are dominant (Oran, 1988: 59). However, this contradiction with the bourgeoisie should not be interpreted as the former's "opposition to ownership" (Oran, 1988: 59). On the contrary, his/her aim is to turn the former into a "national bourgeoisie" of a nation-state he/she has in mind, and to do this he/she serves the establishment of capitalism with all its economic, political, social, and cultural institutions. This, Oran argues, explicitly contradicts with the "beyond the class" character or position of the petty bourgeois intellectual. Considered as a whole, all these lead to consideration of the petty bourgeois intellectual as "backboneless" (Oran, 1988: 60).

In addition to the "beyond the class" position of the petty bourgeois intellectual, Oran talks also about his/her "interclass" (*sınıflararası*) position. Regarding the "interclass" position of petty bourgeois intellectual, Oran argues that because of his/her family background; his/her "aspiration to bourgeois community"; and a considerable amount of share he/she gets from production in his/her managerial capacity rather than possession of the means of production, this intellectual is basically "bourgeois", but one having a "complex" because of "being in a tight situation", which is a result of a "fear" of falling to the level of lower classes, and an "aspiration" to rise into the bourgeois class.[128] The petty bourgeois intellectual, Oran argues, "despises" the lower classes, and views them lacking managerial/administrative ability to participate in state government. It is also the case in Turkey. The petty bourgeois intellectuals, including those who claimed himself/herself to be "populist", viewed the lower classes, or "the people", as lacking managerial/administrative ability. The latter were thought to be in need of education or training to become competent enough to participate effectively in administrative affairs. (The VIs were expected to play a significant role, among

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[128] It is these very "fear" and "aspiration" that make the petty bourgeois intellectual "the most talented" one by causing "uneasiness" in his/her mind. Most of the scientists and especially artists come from petty bourgeoisie rather than bourgeoisie or proletariat (Oran, 1988: 59).

others, in achieving this objective.) Oran points out that this petty bourgeois intellectual has a fear that these classes which are superior in numbers would "become conscious", and take the lead. He interprets this "attitude" of the petty bourgeois intellectual as an effort "to remove the fear of proletarianization" which arises from their dispossession from the means of production. (This "fear of proletarianization" is much more evident in the case of small producers, the other section of petty bourgeoisie.) In addition to "the fear of proletarianization", there is a yearning to rise to the upper class, bourgeoisie, which is in fact less cultured than him/her. Since he/she has a bourgeois society as the single (Western) model in mind, the intellectual will apply "the program of the bourgeoisie" (Oran, 1988: 59).

It is possible to attribute the above-mentioned characteristics of the petty bourgeois intellectual to the case of the VIs to a large extent, except his/her so-called "independence" of social classes. As Gramsci argues, "the notion of 'the intellectuals' as a distinct social category independent of class is a myth" (Hoare and Smith, 1971). It is the case of both "organic intellectuals" which every class produces from within its own ranks "organically" and "traditional intellectuals" which misconceives themselves independent of the dominant class and viewed as such by society at large (Burke, 1999). Their "position in the interstices of society has a certain inter-class aura about it but derives ultimately from past and present class relations and conceals an attachment to various historical class formations" (Hoare and Smith, 1971). That is to say, the traditional intellectuals are "essentially conservative allied to and assisting the ruling group in society" (Burke, 1999). Following Gramsci, it is possible to place the petty bourgeois intellectuals in the category of traditional intellectuals and question their so-called "independence" or "autonomy" from the ruling class.

Arguing that every person is an "intellectual" and "philosopher" in terms of having intellectual and rational faculties and opposing the separation between intellectual and practical activities assuming that every human activity involves

intellectual participation, and that *homo faber,* man the maker, cannot be separated from *homo sapiens*, man the thinker, Gramsci free the intellectual realm from being confined to an "elite" and grounds it in everyday life. (Then, what differentiates intellectuals from other people is that they do this professionally.) In doing so, he brings down the intellectual from his/her ivory tower and places him/her in the practical life. Then, the mode of being of the new intellectual requires more than "eloquence", i.e. active participation in practical life (Gramsci, 1971). Here, Gramsci retained a Marxist postulate, the unity of theory and practice. All these arguments differentiates Gramsci's conception of intellectual from those having elitist notions. However, even Gramsci's understanding of intellectual itself suffers from such elitist notions especially in terms of the prominent role to be played by an "elite of intellectuals" in creating a "counter hegemony". Indeed, what characterizes "intellectual" is his/her "directive," "organisational," and/or "educative" functions in the formation of a "counter-hegemonic consciousness". Gramsci firmly believed in the need for mass participation in transition from capitalism to socialism. He also believed in the inherent capacity of human beings to understand their world and to transform it (Burke, 1999). In this sense, he distanced himself from elitists who had contempt for "the people". However, he believed in the need for the construction of an "elite of intellectuals" who would play a crucial role in turning mass consciousness which was, for Gramsci, "contradictory and formless by necessity", into critical self-consciousness which means "the construction of an elite of intellectuals" (Fischman and McLaren, 2005).[129] According to Walzer, retaining the Marxist account of history central to his thinking, Gramsci let elitism to "enter via the back door", and that his notion of intellectual resembles very much Lenin's conception of "vanguard party" (Bellamy, 1997: 26).

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[129] Gramsci's framework, Fischman and McLaren (2005) argue, challenges "the supposed categorical assumption that organic intellectuals must develop some sort of supranatural level of consciousness, avoiding or overcoming the contradictory personal and social struggles present in everyday life."

Having discussed the concept of intellectual together with his/her characteristics and roles, now it is time to examine the kind of intellectual aimed to be generated in the VIs within this theoretical framework. Being the architect of the VIs, it is better to start with Tonguç's ideas on "intellectuals" and the peasants where the traces of "paradoxical elitism" of populist ideologies can be observed.

V.2. Tonguç's Understanding of Populism

Although one cannot find out a rigid elitist discourse in Tonguç's writings, it is possible to observe the traces of paradoxical elitism of populist ideologies. The elitist notions are mostly revealed in his discussion of intellectual and the people –the peasants- and the relationship between them.

In one of his letters to the teachers graduated from the VIs, Tonguç told the teachers that they should have taught both students and peasants what they had learnt in the VIs. He continued saying that they should have made a "working scheme" combining their knowledge and that of peasants. Here, despite being a "new kind of intellectual" held responsible for teaching the people what they lacked, the teacher still had something to learn from the people (Tonguç, 1999: 101).

At this point, it is proper to open a parantheses and briefly talk about the factors which had an influence on the development of Tonguç's personality and his populist ideas. The first one Engin Tonguç mentions is his training in the Teacher's Training School. He states that the training İsmail Hakkı Tonguç received in the Teacher's Training School, first in Kastamonu, and later in Istanbul was a "typical" one. Especially the latter had the "best" staff of its era, who believed that the reason for the corruption or decay of the Ottoman Empire, and the backwardness of the country was the failure in joining the Western civilization" (Tonguç, E.: 1970: 56). Thus, they brought up a "romantic idealist

generation of teachers", who would "go to the people", and work in the villages for the sake of Westernization. To do this, the latter would be "idealist", "altruistic", and "patriotic". According to Engin Tonguç, "the weakness" of this approach was that it left some crucial questions unanswered, like how the intellectuals, the majority of which were urban middle class, would "live together with the people", "the peasants", and how they would enlighten and "westernize" the latter. The staff of the Teacher's Training School were "overly optimistic" in their idea that only "idealism" and "patriotism" would be adequate to realize the above-mentioned objectives. Underlying this, Engin Tonguç argues, lies a belief that "the people", or "the peasant", was ignorant, but could be easily manipulated "once they were told the truths". Here, the fact that the peasants had some "empirical knowledge" which they attained through their own experiences while solving problems, and that underlying the attitudes of the peasants which "seemed wrong to the intellectuals of that age" lay economic reasons were completely ignored. This was, Engin Tonguç argues, the very "doctrine" which was "imposed upon", but later "opposed" by İsmail Hakkı Tonguç (Tonguç, E., 1970: 57). Becoming aware of the deficiency of this "romantic idealism" which failed on the basis of facts, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç adopted a "realistic-materialistic" approach to events and developments (Tonguç, E., 1970: 58).

Here, Tonguç's peasant origin deserves to mention since it was, according to Engin Tonguç, the most important factor in his personal development enabling him to acknowledge the problems of both the village and the peasant during his childhood. This gave his studies "warmth", "humanism", and "sentimentality", which, for Engin Tonguç, are strictly necessary for the success or effectiveness of a new pedagogical attempt (Tonguç, E., 1970: 51). This was, at the same time, a major point of difference between İsmail Hakkı Tonguç and "classical" educated persons, whose solutions to the village questions were mostly ineffective. That is to say, having been deeply influenced by his "childhood impressions and observations", İsmail Hakkı Tonguç always dealt with village questions as an "educated peasant", adopting "much more firm and realistic criteria" compared

with those "classical" educated persons used when solving those problems. Thus, Engin Tonguç concludes, "Tonguç always remained a peasant", without neither detaching from his class nor going up into a higher class. To reinforce his argument, Engin Tonguç mentions Cevat Dursunoğlu's statement that he and his fellows called İsmail Hakkı Tonguç "peasant İsmail Hakkı" (*köylü İsmail Hakkı*) to distinguish him from his namesakes in the absence of surnames (Tonguç, E., 1970: 52).

Engin Tonguç states that İsmail Hakkı Tonguç encountered with "the corrupt Ottoman order" just in his preteens, when he first came to Istanbul to study. During those days, Tonguç observed closely and recognized through his personal experience (i.e. the difficulties he experienced in trying to continue his education) how the upper strata of the Ottoman society "despised" the peasants, viewing them "only as a means of exploitation". This, according to Engin Tonguç, was the second important factor in Tonguç's personal development.

Having had a peasant origin and always remaining sensitive to the problems of the village, Tonguç seems to equalize both sides of the relationship in these words, his following sentences which held the teacher responsible for teaching peasants everything starting from the simplest ones like "speaking, sitting, eating, drinking, working, resting, travelling, singing, playing folk dance, being clean, performing regular work" (Tonguç, 1999: 101) invalidates this equality or balance. The teachers, for Tonguç, would teach the peasants how to live, and enjoy life. Again in the same letter, they were told to introduce a "new understanding of life" together with a new "appearance" to the village, and "to mould" the peasants in accordance with this new understanding (while they were advised to give preference to "the people's interest" rather than their own interests) (Tonguç, 1999: 101) especially by serving as a good model for others. In doing this, Tonguç stated in the following letter, they should have treated peasants well, and used "soft words" to explain the matters to them. They should also have trusted in the people since it was the most important "lever" for

assigning job to the latter. Otherwise, for Tonguç, nothing could be achieved (Tonguç, 1999: 105).

Despite criticizing the previous social order and intellectuals for despising and exploiting the peasants, Tonguç himself sometimes appears to view them as a manipulable mass. In a letter he sent to the teachers graduated from both the VIs and the Teachers' Training Schools and published in *İlköğretim*, for example, he called the peasants "medieval men" who were "committed to a fictitious and unknown world" by "changing their worldview" attaching themselves to a *softa*. It was the teachers who would free them from "backward" living conditions, and find the way of making them become "free" and "happy" persons (Tonguç, 1999: 122). It was, for him, "the bad official" and "the ignorant people" which together cause "all kinds of evil" (Tonguç, 1999: 158). In another letter he sent to Refik Ahmet Sevengil on November 13, 1945, after congratulating him on publishing *Ülke*, a new newspaper, Tonguç enumerated his expectations from this newspaper. He wanted *Ülke* "to teach the people what to want" (Tonguç, 1999: 150).

In paying attention to the need for educating village girls in a letter to the teachers graduated from the VIs -published in *İlköğretim*- Tonguç charged the teachers to "enlighten", "awaken", and inform parents about social services, and to make the latter obey the "rightful" and "substantial" demands -which would also be for their benefit- of the state (Tonguç, 1999: 111-112). As it can be explicitly seen, Tonguç's understanding is in compliance with the official understanding in the sense that the obligations of an individual to the state is as important as -sometimes even more important than- his/her rights liberties.

In his letter sent to Nejat İdil on May 23, 1942, Tonguç gave advices to İdil on the works to be done. He stated that arranging and performing works required "well-organized thinking" rather than "ordinary person's methods of doing work". All the means should have been organized in accordance with such

principles, which could be "appropriated" by others in several ways -sometimes by being told "openly"; sometimes by being explained "in the course of time"; and sometimes by "threat". Tonguç called human being "animal" in the sense that he/she could reach happiness by being "herd". But his/her "conceit[edness]" prevented him/her from being aware of this fact. He/she, on the contrary, assumed that it was he/she who "drives continually" (Tonguç, 1999: 54).[130]

Having critically examined Tonguç's understanding of populism through the concepts of intellectual and the people, now it is time to concentrate on elitism which can be read between the line of what graduates narrate. An overall evaluation of paradoxical elitism of Tonguç's understanding of populism and will be presented in the conclusion part.

V.3. The Populist Discourse of the Graduates of the VIs

To begin with, it should be stated that Tonguç's ideas in general and his pedagogical understanding in particular are shared by many of the graduates of the VIs –at least by all those interviewed. His understanding of "intellectual" and "the people" are adopted by the interviewees to a large extent. Therefore, paradoxical elitism of populist ideologies is also revealed itself both in the interviews made and in the writings of graduates of the VIs. It is observed especially in the contradictory conceptualization of the people; the understanding of and separation between "intellectual" and "the people"; and the question of political participation.

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[130] "Bütün bu işleri tanzim, tertip ederek yürütebilmenin başında insan zekasının tertipli düşünmesi gelir. Her günkü ve mutavassıt insanın iş yapma metotlarına uyularak bunlar yapılamaz. Elindeki bütün vasıtaları bu esaslara göre teşkilatlandırmalısın. İnsanlara bunların bir kısmını açık açık söyleyerek, bir kısmını zamanla anlatarak, bir kısmını da onları tehdit ederek mal edebilirsin. Bu, insan denilen mahluk yok mu, bu hakikaten hayvan oğlu hayvandır. Hayvanları nasıl gütmek lazımsa bunu behemehal gütmek şartıyla saadete kavuşturmak mümkündür. Fakat o, o kadar mağrurdur ki güdüldüğünü bilmek istemez. Mütemadiyen güttüğünü zanneder..." (Tonguç, 1999: 54).

As it has been already mentioned, the kind of intellectual aimed to be generated in the VIs differed from that of "classical" one. In parallel with Tonguç's understanding of intellectual, the "intellectuals" of the Institutes separated themselves from others. We may call it a separation between the "rural rooted" and the "urban rooted intellectuals"[131]. (This separation recalls the populist comparison between "urban" and "rural", "exploitation" of the latter by the former, and "superiority" attributed to the latter) This is closely related to the fact that the urbanite intellectuals did not adopt or embrace these "rural rooted intellectuals", viewing them, in a way, as a "threat", which can be named as "peasantization of the literature". In order to understand this fear, it is sufficient to remember the reaction of the urban rooted intellectuals against the introduction of the "village" and "peasant" to the literature with their most natural condition and through the peasant's language.

Here, it is appropriate to open a parantheses and briefly talk about the entry of the "village" into the literature by the writers and novelists graduated from the VIs. The literary works of the graduates of the VIs played an important role in the grasp of "village reality", and arose intellectuals' interest in the "village". Thanks to the VIs, the "progressive" artists, educators, sociologists, and other scientists turned their attention to "the problems of village". The result was creation of a significant village literature (Gedikoğlu, 1971: 242), depicting village life in its full realism.

Indeed, it was with the experiment of the VIs that the repressed and/or hidden longings of peasants, who formed the majority of the people, emanated as a "new literature". Despite considering it as a "contribution to national literature",

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[131]This separation between the "rural rooted" and "urban rooted intellectuals" can be clearly seen in the memoirs of the graduates of the Village Institutes and in the writings of Tonguç. Perhaps the most important point of departure between them is the former's education on the principle of "learning by doing". This principle is summarized in Apaydın's (1983: 83) words as: "To know something is to do something rather than to tell". In their case, this is "to transform, to develop, to beautify the primitive life". Accusing the urban rooted intellectuals not only of exclusion of the village and the peasant in the literature, but also of the latter's misery, the former aimed at preparing the conditions of "being a leader in the village", and get the "confidence of the peasants" so that they would "change" the realities of the village. (Apaydın, 1983: 98)

Baykurt neither glorifies nor disregards this contribution (Baykurt, 1999: 202). It is, for him, as a kind of social duty. The peasants were the "most oppressed" and "exploited" segment of the society. They were "cheated" in trade, and "lulled in economic and political senses". They were not allowed to be organized. They were "deliberately left ignorant". Here, for Baykurt, it is writers' duty to draw attention of the press, intellectuals, political parties, universities, and administrators by writing on peasants' "life", "sufferings", "subconscious", "reactions", and "yearnings" (Baykurt, 1999: 204). It is, for him, "extremely necessary" to write the life of peasants, of the poor and oppressed people (Baykurt, 1999: 205).

In fact, the writers graduated from the VIs gave voice to village reality into which they had been born but which had been unknown to novel readers. They assigned themselves the responsibility for not only depicting the poor and backward living conditions of peasants and the exploitative order in the country[132], but also for finding solution to these problems. They used novel as an instrument to achieve this purpose (Moran, 2002: 243). As Moran argues with reference to Fethi Naci,

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[132] The interest in inequalities and injustices emanated from the social structure (especially in the countryside) was, according to Moran, the characteristic of what he calls the "Second Period" of the Turkish novel starting in 1950s. Until that time, the main problematic of the Turkish novel had been "westernization" (Moran, 2002: 7). The novelists and poets –other than leftist ones- had examined social relations from the perspective of official ideology, lacking concern about relations of production. The result, for Moran, was their contribution to "reproduction of dominant ideology" (Moran, 2002: 14). After 1950s, on the other hand, there was a remarkable increase in the number of novels questioning and criticising the existing social order. At the center of criticism unequal relations in the rural area (Moran, 2002: 14). Moran relates this shift in the main problematic of the Turkish novel to the formation of classes and rise of class struggle (Moran, 2002: 9), i.e. class crystallization. In addition to socio-economic conditions, he also mentions the impact of National Literature movement on the development of "village novel". (Opposing to categorization of his novels as "village novels", Baykurt argued that his novels were "about" the village life. For him, there was no genre called a "village novel" or an "urban novel" but there was a novel about "life in the village" and "life in the city". In contrast to the widely held opinion for which National Literature movement ended with the foundation of the Republic, Moran argues that it was continued as far as novel is concerned. That is to say, village novel was continuation of National Literature movement in terms of its populist character. Having been influenced by the Narodnik movement, the latter, as it was mentioned in the second chapter, argued for simplification of language to "go to the people" and to overcome the ongoing separation between the people and the intellectuals. During the Second Period of the Turkish novel, the novelists –especially those trained in the VIs-revived this "populist" spirit of National Literature movement (of its initial years), making Anatolia a distinctive feature of Turkish novel but approaching the very same subject from a different perspective (Moran, 2002: 16).

the central figures in these novels were also "instrumentalized" in depicting village conditions (Moran, 2002: 242).[133] The stereotypical characters of these novels were "poor" and "ignorant" peasants; "reactionary forces" exploiting the peasant, like agha, imam, and party man; and a "progressive-minded" character – either a teacher, a kaimakam, or a wise man- who strove to "enlighten" and "awaken" peasants (Moran, 2002: 243).

Another point to be emphasized concerning the introduction of the "village" and the "peasant" to the literature is the style and language used to describe the village reality. While replying Gezer's question why he chose to use a "style" which is "extremely severe", "straight", and simple to describe the reality of the Turkish village, Makal states that this not a question of choice. On the contrary, he argues, it is this very language and the format (with)in which he has been already placed (Makal, 2001: 9). Similarly, Baykurt's novels are characterized by the plain Turkish of the people involving regional words, proverbs, and idioms.

The kind of intellectual aimed to be created was expected to have characteristics of what Tonguç called "the new person of the Republic". First of all, he/she should have had reading habit "to become conscious" or "to be enlightened". Secondly, he/she should have been a person combining mental and manual work. Having received a new kind of training, i.e. "education within work" (*iş içinde eğitim*), this person would not have "alienated from the society" (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). Viewing themselves "of the people" living in their midst[134], the

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[133] This is, according to Moran, the weakness of "village novel" which provided explanation for its short-lived popularity owed to the "novelty" of their subject. That is to say, on the one hand, the novelists graduated from the VIs succeeded in portraying a "new", "striking" subject, i.e. the life in the village "in all its nakedness" –backwardness, poor living conditions- without "romanticizing" it, and drew reader's interest. However, Moran argues, this success led the novelists to depend too much on the subject and be contented with the portrayal of village reality which they knew well through the characters "lacking individuality". The result was decreasing interest in "village novel" (Moran, 2002: 18).

[134] The memoirs generally portray a good relationship between peasants and members of the Village Institutes -despite peasants' complaints especially about the obligations regarding the Village Institutes. This can be related to the fact that despite generally being "isolated" in terms of their locality, the members of the Village Institutes had not isolated themselves from the village(s)

graduates of the VIs differentiate themselves from "classical" intellectuals who sit in their ivory tower detaching themselves from society, and committed to the pursuit of eternal things which are external to the world of everyday experience. Türkoğlu pays attention to the fact that during her childhood, the educated person had not done manual work. He/she had not carry his/her suitcase. This had been considered something "disgraceful". The motivation behind receiving training had been to become a civil servant who had not done manual work.[135] Such kind of a person would have been alienated from his/her village society. That is to say, both the village and the family "lost its child". However, Türkoğlu says, this was not the case for the students of the VIs. On the contrary, far from being alienated from their village society as they received training, the students of the VIs introduced various innovations, e.g. new or modern agricultural implements, to their villages during their holidays. The memoirs of the graduates of the VIs are full of such examples. During her first holiday Türkoğlu, for example, sow clothes for women but by "modernizing" them. She also cut children's hair. She took her mandolin with her and played it. People from neighbouring village or high plateu came to listen her. In short, all these she had done attracted people. This disturbed and annoyed Türkoğlu's aunt who asked her that whether she was their servant (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). Probably, behind this complaint lay the above-mentioned idea that the educated person must not have done manual work and serve others in this way. The graduates of the VIs surprised the peasants by their participation in village works because this was against the widely held opinion that the intellectual or the educated did not perform manual

around. Examples of coordination between the two can be found in the memoirs, for example, of Apaydın (1983: 200), Arman (1969: 372-374), Evren (1992: 80-83). The "peasant" party of this relationship, i.e. his/her thoughts and feelings about the obligations, for example, to work in the construction of the schools, and the education in the VIs is another subject which still needs to be explored. The obligations constitute the "formal" side of this relationship while the "informal" one refers to peasants' relationship with the members of the VIs founded around their villages. References to them have been made throughout the study. However, since the graduates of the VIs, the other party, are the central figures in this study, the thoughts and feelings of the peasants still need to be given voice to.

[135] This seems also to be the case for the students of the VIs during their first year in the school. As Kirby (1961: 239) mentions, a director of a Village Institute complains about the unwillingness of students to do manual work having an expectation that they would become teachers engaged only in intellectual activities.

work. This is the point where a significant difference between "the urban-rooted" and "rural-rooted" intellectuals, or to put it differently, the common type intellectuals and the ones the VIs aimed to create arises. That is to say, introducing a new understanding of education based on the principle of "learning by doing", the VIs aimed to create a new kind of an intellectual. It is this very understanding of education and the training they had received which leads the interviewees to explain their difference from the high school students and university students in terms of their superiority rather than "inferiority". Gürler mentions the sense of "self-confidence" inoculated to the students in the VIs. According to her, it is because of this self-confidence that the graduates did not consider themselves "inferior" to the university students. On the contrary, they thought of themselves "superior" in terms of their qualifications. One advantage of university compared to the *Higher Village Institute*[136] was its "luxurious" conditions. The latter, on the other hand, was built by the students themselves, and in this regard the students had different styles of living in the VIs. However, Gürler says, this turned out to be an advantage in the long run. The Institute was characterized by "disciplined" works; cultural activities like going to the theatre and concerts at the weekends; and friendly relationship between teachers and students, etc. (interview with Gürler, 2004).

Despite their peasant origin, and the good relationship they had established with the peasants, the graduates of the VIs did not find acceptance easily in the villages where they were appointed (as teachers). Kabay says that the village society did not easily accept the graduates of the VIs who were, in fact, from within the people. On the contrary, the peasants seemed to find it very strange that there emerged educated persons (*efendi*) from within themselves. However, this situation changed in time especially when the teacher taught the children how to read and write, and introduced peasants new tools and methods that would both ease their life and raise their standard of living. For example, Kabay himself planted three thousand poplars in his village. He taught the peasants how to plant

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[136] In fact, the Higher Village Institute the aim of which was to train the teachers for the VIs was considered as a "village university".

poplars as he learned in the VIs. The income drawn from these poplars was used to buy a bus for the village. Kabay emphasizes that all the poplars produced belonged to the village -he did not have any- and so, the income was spent for the necessities of the village. In addition to poplars, Kabay taught the students – and the peasants- how to plant fruit-trees like walnut, apricot, plum, almond. The result was abundance of fruit-trees, which stopped fruit theft in the village. Kabay also introduced other things like tile and glass, which were used in the construction of houses. All these efforts Kabay made yielded good results. This can be seen, for example, when Kabay was called for help to demand assistance from the peasants for orphanage. Kabay told the watchman that he had "asked" all the peasants to come to the coffee house. All the peasants, he says, came "one and all". Kabay asked them to give a sheep, or wheat to the students of orphanage. The generosity of the peasants surprised the director of education. It was remarkable that Kabay had been working in this village only for three months, but won the heart of the peasants as a result of his success in teaching and his good relations with the peasants. Kabay says that his wife also established good relations with the peasants, and helped them in several ways like sewing their dresses. All these ambitious works for the village "increased the dialogue between the teacher and the peasant". While giving the reasons for this good relationship, Kabay says that "we do not find them repugnant. We are together with them.... We have meals together. We are not startled." (interview with Kabay, 2005).

Similarly, while narrating her first days in the VIs, Gürler attributes similar characteristics to the peasants. She pays attention to the positive and friendly attitudes of the teachers to the students. "Well, after all, they were village children. They [class teachers] tried to teach us how to eat, and rules of etiquette." (interview with Gürler, 2004). As it was mentioned before, the peasants were considered to be in need of being trained and modernized. The teachers would teach the peasants not only how to read and write, but also introduce "modern" life styles including the rules of etiquette. Of course, the

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latter was not always welcomed by the peasants. On the contrary, it seemed to increase the gap – which was, in fact, aimed to be bridged- between the peasants and the teachers. It is better to explain this point with reference to Gürler. She told that, after graduation, she wanted to change table manners by putting a dish for each person. However, she says, this was not welcomed by the peasants. On the contrary, it was criticized being considered as a kind of "despising" behaviour (interview with Gürler, 2004).

At this point, the contradictory attitude of the peasants towards the intellectual should be mentioned with reference to Gramsci. According to Gramsci, intellectuals of the rural type (lawyer, teacher, doctor, etc.) represent a "social model" for peasants with their "higher" or "different" living standards in comparison with the average peasant who wants to change or improve his condition. The peasant "respects the social position of the intellectuals" and hopes that at least one of his sons will become an intellectual and raise "the social level" of his family. However, sometimes "instinctive elements of envy and impassioned anger" accompany this admiration, leading him to feel contempt for that position (Gramsci, 1971). Focusing rather on the intellectual's side of this relationship, this study does not have much to say about such contradictory feelings and attitudes of the peasants towards intellectuals except those reported by the graduates interviewed. However, it is still possible to argue, bearing in mind that the relationship between intellectuals and the people is an unequal[137] one, that both sides of the relationship tend to have contradictory feelings and attitudes towards each other.

All these arguments brings up the third characteristic the "new person" should have: that he/she should be "refined" through culture and art. Here, the culture in question is a "national" one. "The new person", Türkoğlu argues, should be

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[137] Here, what is in question is peasants' subordination to the intellectuals. Gramsci (1971) argues that without taking into account and examining in detail this "effective subordination to the intellectuals," it is not possible to understand "the collective life of the peasantry and of the germs and ferments of development which exist within it".

excited when he/she witnesses that his/her "local" culture was "nationalized" and met with "the universal" (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). At this point, it should be emphasized that despite the emphasis on "modernization" and/or "Westernization", the term "culture" does not merely refer to "Western" one since there was also emphasis on the "local" and "national" one.[138] That is to say, the VIs were expected to contribute to the formation and development of national culture, and being an "enlightenment project" they were also thought to meet this "national" culture with the "universal"one. It was in this way that the VIs contributed to the process of nation-formation and strenghthening of nationalist ideology.

As a matter of fact, having been assigned the role of the agents of an "enlightenment project", the graduates of the VIs attach importance to science and scientific knowledge. In the *Foreword* to *A Village in Anatolia* (Bizim Köy) written by Mahmut Makal, Lewis V. Thomas (1954: xv). states that "Makal, equally with his faith in science and enlightenment, appears to regard village beliefs and rites as stupid, ignorant and deplorable". This contradicts with the exaltation of peasants and the village life. It is in this very same book that Makal praised the intelligence of peasants their considerable interpretation skills and their eagerness to learn (Makal, 1954). However, Makal's approach is consistent with the ultimate objective of modernization of peasant life and mentality, i.e. to

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[138] As it is argued before, both during the Ottoman period and the Republican period "modernization" was used to refer to "westernization". And the criterion of modernity was "the West". The attempts for westernization goes back to the Ottoman period, but accelerated after the establishment of Turkish Republic. That is to say, there is a "continuity" rather than a "rupture" in terms of westernization efforts. In fact, there was nothing like a complete rejection of the Ottoman legacy. What is in question here is not simply a replacement but reformulation of traditional elements in a new –"modern"- form. As Erdoğan (1998: 117) argues, the "national folklore" explored during the process of formation of Turkish national identity was nothing other than the domain of popular cultural practices inherited from the Ottoman. Therefore, one cannot talk about a "complete rupture" of Kemalism from the cultural tradition. Both the branches of the People's Houses and the VIs conducted studies on folklore, playing a crucial role in the formation of a "repertoire of national culture" which is an indispensable part of the process of nation-formation. The "invention of a national cultural tradition" was carried out together with "the efforts to introduce and propagate Western cultural forms with an aim of reconciling "the native" and "the foreign" elements. Thus, as Erdoğan argues, there was an effort to make popular narratives become a part of Kemalist pedagogy by "purifying" them, i.e. stripping those narratives from their "grotesque" character.

remove the detrimental thoughts and beliefs like superstitions, which were thought to be the remnants of the old regime, from the minds of the peasants (the people), and replace them with scientific knowledge.

The same contradiction can be observed also in the interviews. Türkkolu holds the politicians, the notables, and the peasants responsible for the closure of the VI. There is a contradiction in his speech in terms of which party was liable for the closure of the VIs. At first, he blames the peasants whom he served as a teacher. However, immediately afterwards he retracts his accusation and began self-criticism, saying that he himself did not awaken the peasants who had missed "the Age of Enlightenment" and "industrialization", and had been put under restraint with "sins" and left to the influence of religion. Here, Türkkolu assigns himself -and probably the intellectuals as a whole- the role of awakening peasants, and holds himself responsible for their bad life conditions (interview with Türkkolu, 2004). This attitude is in line with Lavrov's argument about the role and responsibility of intellectuals.

The contradictory character of the populist discourse of the graduates of the VIs can be observed also in the notion of people's "becoming conscious". Some writers, e.g. Niyazi Altunya, claim that the VIs aimed to train and make the people conscious. Similarly, Türkoğlu argues that receiving training, the people would become conscious and elect their true representatives from among themselves rather than landlords, notables, or frauds. With their "democratic" structure and functioning, the VIs themselves were models of democracy, or in Türkoğlu's words, "cradle of democracy". Here, Türkoğlu mentions the small groups, which were "subunits" of democratization- and the elections in the VIs. She states that the students knew well whom to elect[139]. That is to say, they elected the chairman who performed his/her work best. In the VIs, there was an organization from bottom to top (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005).

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[139] Apaydın pays attention to the same point saying that, having received an "enlightening education", he knows well for whom he vote. Having been lulled, the people, on the other hand, have continued to voted for those who have been far from being their true representatives (interview with Apaydın, 2004).

While asking the question why the peasants did not stand as protector to the VIs when they were closed, Türkoğlu argues that during that time many people were still illiterate, far from being "conscious" enough to claim for something to their advantage (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). The peasants were needed to be educated and become literate to be "conscious". Being illiterate and so unconscious, they could not realize the significance of the VIs which were to their advantage. However, while talking about the reactions of peasants to the legal obligations to give land for schools and to participate in the construction of the schools, Türkoğlu seem to argue for the contrary. She says that, in the beginning, people usually reacted such obligations. She gives an example from her own village, where some of the peasants, fearing that their lands would be appropriated, petitioned to the TGNA against founding a school in their village. She asked the headman why they had done this. He said that they feared that they would have been harmed if their lands had been appropriated for building a school. He explained their behaviour by "ignorance". As it is already mentioned, for Türkoğlu, it was the very same reason that prevented the people from realizing the importance of the VIs. However, she says, such "mistaken opinions" (of the peasants) vanished when the schools were founded, and the teachers graduated from the VIs performed useful works for the village (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). The striking point here is that the graduates tend to explain this changing opinion of the peasants about the VIs mainly by reference to their receiving training –at least primary education- and their becoming conscious**.** For the graduates of the VIs, training appears to be a necessary precondition of becoming conscious**.** When it comes to the question why the graduates did not stand as protector to the VIs, Türkoğlu states that in the lack of a "democratic atmosphere" this was not easy as it is supposed to be. The VIs were "50- years ahead" of their time, and their importance could not be realized yet (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). Indeed, being an alternative to the existing or prevailing educational system with all their novelties, the VIs went beyond their time. This is, in fact, characteristic of the countries which experienced modernization in the

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way Turkey did -"revolution from above". Despite the fact that the VIs were a result of governmental policy, the democratic character and functioning of the VIs contradicted also with the authoritarian single-party regime. This can be seen as one of the reasons explaining the continuing interest in the VIs.

Kabay, on the other hand, explains the continuing interest –of the society- in the VIs mainly by the good relationship (and "dialogue") with "the people". These institutions, for him, were appreciated and commemorated by the society, including the top-ranking officials. The teachers graduated from the VIs, he argues, are still "in demand" since "all" capped their career. The VIs trained a different kind of teacher who did not only teach reading and writing, but also introduce the peasants tools and machinery –in fact, all kinds of innovations- and give them scientific and technical information to increase production. Having 20 years of compulsory service in the village, this teacher had to stay and work in the village, and were always in close contact with the peasants. (Kabay says that the students knocked him up and asked him questions about lessons at night.) With the closure of the VIs, this kind of teacher who related to his/her job to "national development"[140] disappeared, and replaced with the one who views it only as a "means of subsistence". All these have led to appreciation of the teachers graduated from the VIs, and a longing for the VIs. The Foundation of the Village Institutes (*Köy Enstitüleri Vakfı*), for him, owes its survival to "people's affection". This, for Kabay, is mainly because of the fact that the VIs were a "product of our own". The Institutes did not only contribute to the (development of) village economy through increase in variety of agricultural products (and improvement in conditions of production), but also to the transformation of "primitive" village life into a "modern" one. Considered as a whole, the VIs were a "national development program". (This, according to Kabay, was the main reason for the closure of the VIs. The closure of the VIs was not a kind of internal

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[140] Here, Kabay gives his habit of buying domestically made products as an example. He says that he still finds buying imports very strange, and prefers to buy home produce irrespective of its "price" and "quality" (interview with Kabay, 2005).

affair. On the contrary, the VIs were closed in accordance with US demand. After the World War II, Kabay argues, Turkey took sides with the USA, which considered the VIs program as a threat to its "imperialist" demands. That is to say, taking a "nationalist position", the VIs would possibly be a "source of resistance movement" in the future.) (interview with Kabay, 2005).

Many writers link the problem of migration to the city with the closure of the VIs. Türkoğlu, for example, argues that if the VIs had not been closed, the large villages would have been probably urbanized through construction of factories there. Since the VIs were to train necessary manpower, there would not have been that much migration to the city because they laid education service at people's door. Moreover, training other personnel like health officers for the village, the VIs contributed to the improvement of village conditions, which eventually would prevent migration to the city. Since the persons migrating to the city would be already educated ones, the city would not have been "villagised". The ruralization of the city is one of the major problems Turkey is faced with. Thus, there is a need for education to become urbanized, i.e. adult training. This, indeed, was one of the functions of the VIs. The teachers graduated from the VIs were expected to teach the people how to read and write; to give them technical courses; and to introduce them modern agricultural implements and machinery. Türkoğlu continues arguing that the peasants migrated to the cities for education, work, and health. They migrated to the cities "to be cultured" (interview with Türkoğlu, 2005). Here, the words "villagisation" and "ruralization of the city" have some negative connotations. This is not surprising once one takes into account the contradictory discourse of populism which sometimes despises peasants and the village in preference to the city dweller and the city, while at other times exalting the former. This is because of the fact that the VIs project aimed, among others, to modernize the villages, and it was the city rather than the village which was considered the place of modern life. This seems to contradict with the perception of the countryside as the reserve of pure cultural traits and national essence.

As a matter of fact, the graduates of the VIs "exalt" the people (particularly peasants) especially as against the urbanite.[141] However, viewing the people to be "educated"[142], and the values, traditions, folklore to be modernized they reproduce this separation, in a way, "alienation". In fact, as Karaömerlioğlu (1998a: 59) argues, "the Village Institutes could hopefully fill the gap between the peasants and the elite by creating elites from among the peasants". In other words, they aimed at generating their "own elites" who would not only be aware of the realities of the village life, but also transform them. (One of the reasons for the establishment of the VIs, Şahhüseyinoğlu (2005: 83) argues, was "to remove the cultural differences between the intellectuals and the people".) More than being teacher training schools for village-schools, they undertook the task of generating intellectuals who played a significant role in the economic, social, and cultural transformation and development of the village (Eskicumalı, 2003: 25). To realize their ends, they would even "fight with enemies of the people", who are defined as those "deceiving" and "oppressing" the people. (In the villages, these enemies were Aghas.[143])

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[141] For comparison and contrast between the urban and the rural; "exaltation" of the rural and the peasants to the urban and urbanites; and of criticism of the latter see Apaydın (1983: 140, 172, 197, 234) and Makal (2001: 9, 13).

[142] In Tonguç's (2001) writings, there is a strong emphasis on the importance of the primary education. This significance does not only arise from its being a "means of developing, modernizing the village and the peasant", but also its being "the most important condition of achieving people's government".

[143] Karaömerlioğlu opposes this view arguing that the literature that he examined lacked "any significant evidence that there existed a struggle against the aghas". On the contrary, he argues, the VIs "cooperated with the aghas". The VIs were located in "places where most of the peasants had small landholdings" rather than ones "where aghas predominated" (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998a: 62). Moreover, Karaömerlioğlu argues, many of the "architects" of the VIs explains agricultural backwardness neither by "production relations" nor to "the exploitation of the peasants by the aghas". The reason for them was "the incompetence of the peasants" in their struggle against nature. Therefore, for them, "the impetus for the transformation of rural life" was not in the struggle with aghas, e.g., but in the struggle against nature (Karaömerlioğlu, 1998b: 71). However, both Tonguç's writings and the memoirs of –and the interviews made with- the graduates of the VIs, seem to challenge this idea especially with their emphasis on –and opposition to- exploitation (especially that of the peasants). The struggle against nature, as it was mentioned in the previous chapter, was one of the important subjects of the peasantist literature, and it is possible to find it in the writings of Tonguç and memoirs of the graduates of the VIs. However, as Özsoy argues, this does not mean that they viewed the incompetence and weakness of the peasants in their struggle against nature as the sole cause of "backwardness". In the

The question –of course, a speculative one- here is that whether the graduates of the Village Institutes succeeded in overcoming the separation between the intellectuals and the people, and if the answer is "yes" to what extent they were successful. In trying to answer this question, one should bare in mind the fact that the VIs experiment did not last long. Engin Tonguç warns the readers that the VIs should be evaluated not by taking into account its limited and short-lived practice but by considering the "system" as a whole. He argues that in examining and criticising the experience of the VIs between 1935-1946 one should not forget that this short-lived period of experience which had been stopped at its beginning formed only "a little part of the system" to be put into practice (Tonguç, E. 1970: 269-270). According to Engin Tonguç, despite being a short-lived experience, the VIs succeeded in creating a "conscious peasant intellectual" (*bilinçlenmiş köylü aydın*). That is to say, the greatest accomplishment of this short-lived experience is about twenty-twenty five thousands of conscious intellectuals who would play very important role (in Turkish political history) in the following years (Tonguç, E. 1970: 268).

"philosophy" of the VIs, he argues, nature and society do not form a "duality" as it is implied in Karaömerlioğlu's argument mentioned above. On the contrary, they are seen as components of environment which have interactive and sophisticated relations with each other (Özsoy, 2004: 15). Moreover, in the same writings and interviews, it is possible to find opposition to exploitation, i.e. criticism of the prevailing social order which was considered by many as one of the reasons for the closure of the VIs. This is what Karaömerlioğlu argues against. Despite the absence of an open struggle against the aghas, the VIs posed a threat to the existing power relations especially by creating a new type of a person (teacher) who did not only teach in the classrooms but intervened the village life in several ways. This, as it can be seen in the memoirs, disturbed the ones who benefited from the existing power relations and/or whose interests laid in the maintenance of status quo. Gürler argues that the pattern of education in the VIs disturbed especially the aghas who had a fear for losing agricultural workers who "serve(d) them with utter faithfulness and obedience". In addition to aghas, the members of parliament also feared that the VIs would lead to "awakening of the peasants" (interview with Gürler, 2004). However, it should be emphasized that neither Tonguç nor the graduates of the VIs criticized exploitation of the peasants in particular and the prevailing social order in general from a "class perspective". Rather, as it has been already argued, their emphasis was on the relationship between "the oppressor" and "the oppressed". In the light of all these arguments, and with reference to Oktay (2000), it can be argued that the contribution of populist and peasantist ideology to Turkish political life in terms of the formation of an "oppositional cadre" by educating many in the VIs should not be underestimated. However, in terms of their political and ideological outcomes, they helped rather in strengthening of social democratic ideology, leading to conceptual confusion.

In fact, it was one of the fundamental goals of the foundation of the VIs that they aimed "to create a peasant intellectual" (*köylü aydın*) who would not and/or could not break of the tie with his/her class, and would never "give up defending his/her class interests" going up into a higher class. Many of the principles carried out by the VIs, like giving land to the village teachers graduated from the VIs, providing them with earnings opportunities other than monthly salary were laid down for this objective. However, Engin Tonguç argues, the objectives of these principles were not understood well even by the VIs themselves. In contrast to some leftist arguments according to which the VIs aimed "to freeze the social progress" at the village level, the VIs, Engin Tonguç states, intended to train or bring up an "intellectual" who would "accelerate social progress" without breaking off the tie with his/her own class, and would "defend his/her class interests", being already provided with opportunities to defend those interests[144] (Tonguç., E., 1970: 56).

Here, a question arises as to whether the type of intellectual the VIs aimed to generate can be considered as an "organic" intellectual in the Gramscian sense. That is to say, whether the teachers graduated from the VIs were thought to be the "organic" intellectuals –"the thinking and organizing element" of the peasant class- who are distinguished "by their function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically belong" rather than by "their profession, which may be any job characteristic of their class" (Hoare and Smith, 1971). This question should be followed by another one: can the peasantry generate alongside itself its own "organic" intellectuals? Gramsci says "no" because

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[144] Engin Tonguç relates the end of the separation between the people and the intellectual to the removal of the main obstacle to development, i.e. the lack of a "conscious" and effective working class. With the elimination of this obstacle, he argues, the people would start to "insist on their rights" and follow their own interests which had been previously advocated by the intellectuals. The intellectual would "come from among the people" and "advocate" the interests of the latter. And then, the two would be "equal" (Tonguç, E. 1970: 267-268). Here, a fundamental question arises from the fact that it is the very term "the people" which, as Laclau points out, has the notion of "representation" bringing out a separation between intellectuals and the people (or between representatives and represented). That is to say, the intellectuals owe their existence to that of the people.

(…) the mass of the peasantry, although it performs an essential function in the world of production, does not elaborate its own 'organic' intellectuals, nor does it 'assimilate' any stratum of 'traditional' intellectuals, although it is from the peasantry that other social groups draw many of their intellectuals and a high proportion of traditional intellectuals are of peasant origin.(Gramsci, 1971)

Depending upon the above quotation from *the Prison Notebooks* and *Quaderni*, Hoare and Smith summarize Gramsci's argument as "that the person of peasant origin who becomes an 'intellectual' (priest, lawyer, etc.) generally thereby ceases to be organically linked to his class of origin. One of the essential differences between, say, the Catholic Church and the revolutionary party of the working class lies in the fact that, ideally, the proletariat should be able to generate its own 'organic' intellectuals within the class and who remain intellectuals of their class." (Hoare and Smith, 1971)

If that is the case, is it reasonable to argue, following Engin Tonguç, that the founders of the VIs especially their architect, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, aimed to generate "organic" intellectuals of the peasant class who would "remain" intellectuals of their class without forgetting their peasant origin? There are several points to bare in mind in answering this question. The first one is that being just one of the allies in the class struggle between the main actors, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the peasantry does not have an ideology of its own. However, this should not lead one to underestimate its role in the class struggle especially in the Third World countries like Turkey where the peasants formed the majority of the population. Moreover, following Gramsci, it can be argued that intellectuals of rural origin ceases to be organically linked to their class of origin. As it is seen in the case of the graduates of the VIs, having received training and adopted modern life styles, they distance themselves more from the peasants with a contempt for the latter's ignorance and life styles. As it is explicitly seen in their populist discourse, they tend to have contradictory feelings and attitudes towards the peasants.

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Here, a question arises: whether, and to what extent, the VIs can be evaluated as a "radical" and "oppositional" movement. In answering this question, it is necessary to examine their relationship with Kemalism and the RPP. According to Gedikoğlu, the Village Institutes were "a means for awakening the people, especially the village community ... within the context of Kemalism". It was, he argues, through the VIs that the village community would identify itself; know its rights and obligations, and recognize its own problems. The VIs were embodiment of Kemalist principles of populism, nationalism, and revolutionism in the sense that they had been established "in" and "for" the villages. The principles of republicanism and laicism, on the other hand, were put into practice through "self-government", "authority and responsibility", and "productive working life" (Gedikoğlu, 1071: 238).

Similarly, Engin Tonguç claims that the principles adopted and applied by the VIs were not "opposed to" the Kemalist principles. On the contrary, they were the "true" interpretation and elaboration of Kemalist principles (Tonguç, E.: 1970, 268). He argues that İsmail Hakkı Tonguç paid attention to relate his thoughts and suggestions to the Kemalist principles.[145] Engin Tonguç mentions two reasons for this. First of all, Tonguç was "truly devoted" to these "progressive" principles. The second reason, which Tonguç calls "tactical", was the lack of any "effective political current" other than Kemalism in Turkish political life during those years. Thus, no attempt like the VIs could be successful unless it was based on Kemalism (Tonguç, E. 1970: 207-208).

However, this should not lead one to conclude that the VIs were truly in the service of the RPP which established the VIs to train "militants" although they were expected to do so. According to Güner, the RPP was not successful in making such a "long-term plan". Having been used to "rule loyal masses", the

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[145] Similarly, Karaömerlioğlu (1998b: 66) argues that "Tonguç was an ardent follower of the Kemalism of his day". In contrast to leftist and left-Kemalist scholars who emphasize Tonguç's "leftist" and "populist" ideas, Karaömerlioğlu prefers to call him as a "corporatist" following the solidarist tradition of the Second Constitutional Period.

chiefs and leaders, Güner argues, might have expected the graduates of the VIs to be "loyal". The "educational principles" of the VIs, however, were not based on such "emotional requests or demands", and this was proved by the very outcomes of the VIs (Güner, 1980: 21).

A counter argument is raised by Karaömerlioğlu. Criticizing Kirby for overlooking the "vested political interest" of the RPP in the VIs project, Karaömerlioğlu claims that "the Kemalist regime in general, and the RPP in particular, had a vested interest in the VIs". He reminds us that the period in question witnessed a single-party regime, and "the recruitment of militants for the Party ideology from among the peasants of the VIs was quite normal practice". To support his idea, Karaömerlioğlu mentions a conversation between Hasan Ali Yücel and İnönü. This conversation which Hürrem Arman had witnessed led him to claim that "İnönü and some other leaders of the RPP hoped that the graduates of the VIs would be the militants of the Party, or at least support the Party in some way". Another example Karaömerlioğlu gives to prove his argument is the letters Tonguç sent to the administrators of the VIs asking for their support to the Party by all means in the 1946 election (Karaömerlioğlu 1998a: 65).

A supporting argument is raised by Yalçın who sharply criticizes the loyalty of the teachers graduated from the VIs to the RPP. He argues that failing to recognize the "class-based" character of politics, and believing that it was the RPP which recruited them from the villages and educate them, they supported the Party and remained loyal to the RPP without questioning whether the Party was of "social democratic" character. It was only with the organization (or foundation) of a socialist party, *TİP*, in its literal sense that the intellectuals –only those who had a good grasp of the subject- began to realize that the RPP was not "social democrat." However, this was not the case for most of the teachers graduated from the VIs. Only 5% or 10% of them voted for the *TİP* during the 1965 election, while most of them remained loyal supporters of the RPP. "Even then", Yalçın says, "we, the teachers, could not free from the RPP". For him,

considering historical context, their loyalty to the Party was relatively acceptable. However, in the contemporary world, remaining loyal to the RPP is "very bad" (interview with Yalçın, 2006).

Yalçın criticizes the RPP not only for its policies but also for not standing as protector to the VIs. (This criticism is, indeed, shared by many graduates of the VIs.) Here, Tonguç is exempt from criticism because of his continuous effort to "refrain from" the political concerns of Yücel and İnönü about the VIs. Yalçın emphasizes that Tonguç was "the thinker" of the VIs, while Yücel was "the political representative" of the VIs. Like İnönü, Yücel thought that the graduates of the VIs would work as "militants of the Party" in the villages, and according to Yalçın, it is partly for this reason that they supported the Institutes. Tonguç, on the other hand, did never have such opinions, and tried to avoid such "political" concerns. Despite all these, Yalçın says, the RPP did "never stand as protector to the VIs". On the contrary, it preferred to make a concession and political retreat. While Yücel was on trial with a charge of being a communist, he says, none of the deputies from the RPP come for trial to give support to him. (interview with Yalçın, 2006)

According to Yalçın, the VIs failed in creating their own intellectuals. He argues that a person cannot become an intellectual all of a sudden. For him, it is better to argue that the VIs provided the "criteria" of "how to become an intellectual?" during a decade of experimentation. Yalçın goes on arguing that the VIs failed in training the teachers as they were expected to be. Yalçın who had an active part in teachers' organizations like TÖS (Teachers' Union of Turkey), TÖB-DER (The Association of All Teachers' Unity and Solidarity) since 1964 states that the VIs were well-known for bringing up "communists," but this was not the case in reality. Among them were conservatives who had an active part – sometimes even as founder members- in right-wing associations. Yalçın blamed many of the graduates for being broken off from life. However, they were not the only ones to be held responsible for this gap. The VIs themselves could not succeed in training

the teacher they aimed to. Yalçın explains this with by unfavourable conditions in the villages where the "feudal order" continued to prevail. The teachers had to "obey" the aghas who were the dominant figures in the villages. They could not find an opportunity to convey what they had learnt in the VIs to the peasants. Encountering opposition not only of the aghas and officials, but sometimes also peasants, the teachers despaired and "became ruralized" – "return its origin"- in four or five years. That is to say, they became "fatalist," "apathetic," and "egoist". (These are, according to Yalçın, characteristics of the peasant.) In short, being under pressure and in unfavourable conditions, these teachers could not develop the skills they had acquired during their studentship in the VIs (interview with Yalçın, 2006).

The "intellectuals" aimed to be generated in the VIs were expected to understand the village reality and transform it. They were held responsible for "enlightening" peasants and "enlivening" the village. In this sense, their function goes beyond understanding reality. Far from being intellectuals who were sitting in their ivory towers devoting themselves to the pursuit of reality, these intellectuals would be prepared for a practical life combining manual and intellectual labour starting from their first years of the VIs. (The students were to be trained in a village-like atmosphere in the VIs which were intentionally located away from urban or provincial centers so that they could endure the hard conditions and difficulties of the village life, and acquired not only knowledge and capability but also self-confidence and a quality of leadership through these experiences.) As it has been mentioned in the previous chapters, they had received a kind of training which was based on the principle of "learning by doing". "Work" was valued not only because of pedagogical reasons but also because of the socio-economic conditions of the country. Therefore, there was nothing like the superiority of intellectual activities to manual ones. This was an important challenge to the dominant understanding of "intellectuals" whose activity had been reduced into the pursuit of knowledge merely on a "theoretical" plane separated from practical everyday life. The educational program in the VIs was designed not only to help

students develop their mental skills but also manual skills necessary for the transformation of village life.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

In this study, populism of the VIs has been examined in comparison with Kemalist populism to see whether the former was a challenge with its more democratic tones to "elitism" of the latter rather than being successor. In order to answer this question, populism of the VIs has tried to be understood mainly through in-depth interviews made by ten graduates of the VIs and through the readings of the articles, books, and documents written by the graduates of the VIs. The interviews involved questions about, first, the graduates' understanding of the people and their relationship with peasants during their training in the VIs and their teaching service in the villages, and second, about the functioning of the VIs to see whether it was democratic or not.

Rather than drawing a sharp contrast between populism and elitism, the study focused on pay attention to elitism immanent to populism, which arises first and foremost in the contradictory conceptualization of the people itself. Populism was used, in its simplest sense, to refer to "government by the people". Defining populism as "government by the people" or "people's government" brings up a discussion about democracy. Indeed, the basis for formulating a relationship between populism and democracy lies in the concept of the people itself, which connotes "government by the people as a whole". This necessarily leads to a debate on the issue of representation and participation, i.e. direct and indirect democracy. In fact, as Arditi states, the concept of the people involves in itself an 'acting for others' which assumes the existence of two levels, namely that of being represented and of those acting for them as representatives. Another assumption here is the existence of a "gap" between these two levels -a gap which separates "representation" from "self-government" (Arditi, 2003: 8). This

is where what is called "paradoxical elitism of populist ideologies" arises. On the one hand, the social-egalitarian aspect of populism involves and necessitates equality and popular participation. In accordance with the administrative-institutional aspect, on the other hand, equality and popular participation will be achieved "from above". This is, as it is argued before, involved in the contradictory conceptualization of the people. That is to say, despite being glorified on the one hand, the people, are considered to be in need of training and enlightening to become capable of self-government. The contradiction between the social-egalitarian and administrative-institutional aspects of populism, i.e. paradoxical elitism of populist ideologies, and which aspect dominated depends on both the specific ideological complex to which populism is articulated (Erdoğan, 1992: 3) and the historical context.

As it was mentioned before, Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs were compared in terms of three aspects of populism, namely contradictory conceptualization of the people; the separation between intellectuals and the people; and popular participation. Having mentioned Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs respectively, now it is time to compare and contrast them and see whether the latter can be considered as a challenge to the former with its emphasis on social-egalitarian aspect of populism rather than administrative-institutional one and with its objective of creating a different kind of society composed of individuals like the ones educated in the VIs.

Before making a comparison, it should be emphasized that in examining and evaluating both Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs, their historical contexts should be taken into account. That is to say, they should be evaluated within their own historical contexts. To start with the term of the people, it can be argued that both Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs suffer from the contradictory conceptualization of the people. That is to say, in both cases, the people were elevated as the reserve of pure cultural traits or the source of national merits, while they were considered as "ignorant" needing to be "educated" and

"enlightened". In this sense, populism of the VIs remained within the boundaries of "elitism" of Kemalist populism to a certain extent despite its consideration of people with more positive connotations.

When it comes to the issue of participation, it is possible to say that populism of the VIs differed from and even surpassed Kemalist populism. Actually, the issue of participation had a significant place in both. As it is widely known, the new Turkish Republic had took important steps to increase political participation (especially when it is compared to the previous attempts of the Young Ottomans and Young Turks). However, the Kemalist government fell short of increasing political participation. Despite the emphasis on the absolute sovereignty of the people, the people were considered to be unable to exercise sovereignty, needing representatives who would act in the name of the people. Moreover, Kemalist populism lacked mass mobilization, resulting in "revolution from above". Hence, reforms were imposed upon the people from top down, increasing discontent with those reforms in particular, and the regime in general. The Republican regime aimed to create a new kind of a citizen (modern, secularized), but this citizen was characterized with obligations rather than his/her rights and freedoms. Even it can be argued that the latter was acknowledged or given for the sake of the former. In the glorification of the state (and the authority) together with the emphasis on unity and solidarity, the citizen, before anything else, had to "obey" the collective interest. He/she was an object rather than subject of a positivist / enlightenment / modernization project, but would become a "subject" so long as they became civilized. Populism of the VIs, on the other hand, aimed to realize and increase participation in all spheres. Indeed, the principle of participation was respected in the structure and functioning of the VIs. That is to say, everybody worked in the VIs, and so had the right to have a word in the functioning of the VIs, including works and lectures. This was explicitly seen in the meetings arranged at weekends where everyone had the right to criticize each other about the works in -and functioning of- the VIs. All these approximate populism of the VIs to "direct democracy" rather than "representative" one. The VIs were thought to be models

for a "democratic" society. It is for this reason that the principle of "self-government" was adopted as one of the main principles in the functioning of the VIs. It deserves mention again that in a letter sent to the directors of the VIs on December 1944, Tonguç stated that they -the founders- carried the principle of self-government, which was one of the basic principles of the Republic, to the VIs and running of these schools in accordance with this principle (Tonguç, 1999: 90). It is especially in this sense that populism of the VIs went beyond the limitation of Kemalist populism. That is to say, in the case of the VIs, the principle of self-government did not remain simply part of the populist rhetoric. On the contrary, it was tried to be carried out in the functioning of the VIs.

The last point of comparing the two is the separation between the intellectuals and the people. It is possible to observe this separation in both populisms. In fact, in both Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs this separation was criticized and the previous intellectuals were blamed for being too estranged from the people. However, the difference arises when it comes to the question whether and how this separation and alienation should and could be overcome. The VIs, as it has been mentioned before especially with reference to Tonguç's writings, aimed to create a new and alternative kind of intellectual. It can be argued that this seemed to be achieved to a certain extent. That is to say, coming from the village and from among the people and considering themselves more "of the people", and so distinguishing themselves from the urban-rooted intellectuals, the graduates tried to overcome the separation between the intellectuals and the people. (To do this, for example, they chose a simple language in the literature.) Paradoxically, this would be achieved mainly through creating a new kind of an intellectual. That is to say, viewing the "people" (or the peasants) as ignorant needing "training" and the vanguard of the intellectuals, they reproduce this separation. In fact, it is this very separation to which the intellectuals owed their existence. In the interviews made with the graduates, it is possible to find expressions which contribute to the discursive reproduction of this distinction. Despite their common claim to be "of the people", the graduates sometimes think

of themselves as different from the peasants. As far as the mentality and lifestyle – the backwardness- of the peasants are concerned, this separation turns out to be a hierarchical one. Therefore, one can assume that, being attributed the leading role, the intellectuals themselves are likely to form a category of elite.

Up until now, the populist discourse of the graduates of the VIs appears to have more elitist tones. However, the leading role of the intellectuals would end with the nationwide spread of education, which was, for Tonguç (Tonguç, 2001: 211), the most important condition of realizing "people's government". This is where the egalitarian aspect of populist discourse (of the VIs) surpasses the elitist one. It is necessary to remember that, here, the term elitism is used with some reservations. In the case of populism of the VIs, there was no belief in the absolute superiority of the "few" as it is in the common use of elitism. The need for the guidance and vanguard of the few – the intellectuals- was seen as temporary, until when everybody received training and became competent enough to govern themselves. (Here, I prefer to use "education" and/or "training" rather than "literacy" since the objective of the VIs cannot be merely reduced to teach how to read and write. Being a kind of an "enlightenment project", the VIs aimed to "enlighten" the peasants and modernize the village life.)

At the nation-state building process, education played a crucial role in the formation of national identity. It is, at the same time, an indispensable way of conveying the principles -and reforms- of the regime to the people. Having established the Turkish nation-state, the Republican governments made attempts to bring up "modern" citizens of the Republic, and being aware of the role of education during such a process, they took steps for the spread of education especially in the countryside. However, in the lack –or shortage- of necessary financial and qualified human resources, this was a difficult task, and despite the initial attempts to spread education, no effective solution had been found until the foundation of the VIs. In this context, the VIs can be considered as a means of realizing this objective. That is to say, they were expected to train those who

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would propogate the principles of the regime to the people. They were founded in a period during which the Republican regime experienced economic and political crisis, and so was in need of gaining the heart of the masses. Even if it is accepted that the VIs were established for this reason, among others, and helped maintenance of existing social order, this does not mean that they only did what they were expected to do**.** On the contrary, they were claimed to exceed the expectations of the regime, sometimes even conflicting with them. (And as it is argued before, this was one of the reasons for the closure of the VIs.) Remembering that educational institutions functioning as an ideological state apparatus might sometimes yield unexpected results and leads to unforeseen changes, this is not something surprising. Despite being founded in an authoritarian regime, the VIs sometimes contradicted with and went beyond the expectations of the regime with their relatively democratic structure and functioning; their alternative understanding and practice of education which aimed to train a new kind of person having initiative; insisting on his/her due; with an inquiring mind and a critical viewpoint –not only towards what they learnt but sometimes also towards the prevailing social order with its socio-economic structure and governmental policies. However, their criticism towards the existing social order does not result in the support of an alternative one. Generally lacking a class perspective, their opposition is rather to "exploitation". Depending especially upon the values and principles adopted (in the VIs) -and still tried to be preserved by the graduates- and the ideal person tried to be brought up in the VIs, some writers view the VIs –and its architect, Tonguç, having socialist leanings. For the present author, however, it is proper to call them "leftist" rather than "socialist". Being an important part of the modernization project, the VIs were established to modernize the village and the peasant as an extension of understanding of revolution from above. That is to say, despite the claim that the VIs were structured and operated in accordance with democratic principles and be a model of a true democratic society, the founders and directors of the VIs were devoted to Kemalist principles and the Republican regime. However, this should not lead one to conclude that they were a direct

representative of the authoritarian single-party regime. If that was the case, there would not be such a democratic structure and functioning in the VIs which aimed to bring up a new kind of a person and/or citizen mentioned above. Although they seemed to be identical in terms of being an enlightened modern citizen, the kind of a person and/or citizen tried to be brought up in the VIs contradicted that of Kemalist model. As it is mentioned above, the latter was an object rather than subject of a positivist / enlightenment / modernization project, and characterized with obligations rather than rights and freedoms. The collectives –state, nation, society, and the like- took precedence over the individual, and unity, cooperation, and solidarity were emphasized at the expense of individual rights and freedoms. The same emphasis on the collectives and their preservation can be observed also in the speeches and writings of the founders, directors and graduates of the VIs. The students were brought up as idealist teachers who would contribute to changing the village reality, and to the national development. They were expected also to carry the Kemalist principles to the countryside. It is in this sense that one can talk about instrumentalization of the VIs. That is to say, they were, in a sense, agents of modernization in the countryside. However, it was the same VIs which aimed –and tried- to train students as citizens of a democratic society who would not only be conscious but also passionate advocate of their rights and freedoms – of course, besides their obligations. This can be explicitly seen in Tonguç's (2001) writings where Tonguç repeatedly emphasizes that the importance of primary education does not only come from its being a "means of developing, modernizing the village and the peasant", but also being "the most important condition of achieving people's government", i.e democracy. With a strong belief in -and emphasis on- human will to change the reality, the VIs trained the students to be not merely an object but subject of a positivist/ enlightenment / modernization project.

To sum up, both Kemalist populism and populism of the VIs had a claim to realize people's government. However, the former did not go far beyond rhetoric. Despite the discursive emphasis on phrases like "popular sovereignty" and

"government by the people", Kemalist populism failed in increasing political participation of the people. Populism of the VIs, on the other hand, aimed to achieve this objective by grounding the functioning of the VIs on democratic principles, the most significant one being "self-government", considering the Institutes as "models" for a democratic society and by creating a "new" person / teacher / intellectual of peasant origin who was expected to play a leading role in the establishment of a modern democratic society mainly by transforming the village. It is these very characteristics of the VIs which give rise to the question of whether the VIs can be evaluated as a rudimentary form of critical pedagogy.

Village Institutes: A Rudimentary Form of Critical Pedagogy?

Any discussion about the VIs brings up the question of the relationship between education and social change. Here, intellectuals are assigned a "leading role". In the case of the VIs, the role to be played by intellectuals was considered to be an ephemeral one in the sense that their task would end with the achievement of "people's government". That is to say, once everybody received training and became competent enough to govern themselves, there would no longer be a need for the guidance and vanguard of intellectuals. Therefore, the role assigned to intellectuals was not thought to result in the creation or formation of an elite of intellectuals. This is consistent with the expectation that the VIs would end the separation between the people and intellectuals. This would be achieved with the creation of a new type of intellectual, who, rather than sitting in his/her ivory tower devoting his/her life merely to intellectual activities, would combine intellectual and practical activities and/or mental and manual labour to transform the social reality and share the knowledge he/she acquired in the VIs with the people around them. (In fact, being grounded in everyday life, knowledge would become accessible to everyone rather than to a privileged few.) Having been trained according to the principle of "learning by doing", endowed with the necessary skills, and engaged in production starting from their first year in the

VIs, the students were well-prepared for difficult conditions of village life, into which they had been born. Far from being *efendi* with necktie and distancing himself/herself from society with a contempt for everyday experience, he/she would actively participate in practical life.

All these lead the present author to compare Tonguç's understanding of education which was put into practice in the VIs with critical pedagogy school inspired by Paulo Freire, of course bearing in mind their differences. The first point to be mentioned for the purpose of this study is their concern for the "oppressed", the poorest section of the society -the peasants. Both Tonguç and Freire believed in the need for spreading literacy nationwide, especially among the peasants, to increase popular participation and achieve democracy, i.e. people's government. They were aware of the relation between education and politics, and the "liberatory" potential of the former. They both underlined the need for empowering students. Here, it should be noted that underlying Tonguç's emphasis, there were reasons other than pedagogical ones. Tonguç encouraged the need for empowering students because they would have been "leaders" in the village society to transform the village reality. They were charged with the duty of modernizing and enlivening villages. This objective was in compliance with the expectations of the Republican regime which did not only aim to bring up modern and lay citizens for a democratic society but also to train the necessary qualified labor force to be mobilized for achieving economic development of the country. Tonguç was aware of the role education would have played within these processes. However, as it has been repeatedly emphasized throughout the study, the reasons for the foundation of the VIs cannot be reduced merely into economic ones. Despite the fact that Tonguç himself declared this as one of the fundamental objectives, his concerns went beyond the expectations of the government, sometimes even conflicting with the interests of the dominant class which had no concern about the destitution and misery of the peasants. In fact, the expectations of the government from the VIs themselves were contradictory in that, on the one hand, the teachers graduated from the VIs were expected to transform the village

reality but without challenging the socio-economic structure in favour of the peasants. However, the experiment reversed the expectation and the type of person brought up in the VIs was seen as a threat since he/she challenged the status quo and spoke in the name of the peasants. On the other hand, the same teachers were expected to be –and remain- loyal to the Kemalist principles and the regime without questioning them. These two expectations contradicted in the sense that the former –transforming the village reality- was, for Tonguç and his associates, a task requiring more than teaching peasants how to read and write and introduce them new techniques and tools to improve and increase agricultural production whereas the Republican government, despite carrying out some reforms to improve the life conditions of the peasants, did not take effective measures to relieve the bad impacts of social and economic inequality on peasants. As it has been argued before, the government did not want to undertake the risk of contradicting with the interests of the dominant class since it needed their support. Thus, it is not possible to view the VIs merely as an embodiment of Kemalist populism especially when the outcome of this experiment is taken into account.

Depending on the above-mentioned arguments, it is possible to argue that the understanding of pedagogy put into practice in the VIs had a "liberatory" potential. This brings up another related issue which raises the question about the role of intellectuals. Arguing for the unity of mental and manual labour and/or intellectual and practical activities, and grounding knowledge in everyday practices, both Tonguç and Freire led intellectuals to lose their throne. So long as knowledge became accessible to everyone, it would no longer be a privilege of being intellectual. The end of the separation between mental and manual labour and/or intellectual and practical activities would be a forerunner of the elimination of the following separation between intellectuals and the people through spreading literacy nationwide especially among the peasants so as to

politicize and empower them[146]. However, it is not proper to call this as "anti-intellectualism" since both pedagogists valorize theoretical knowledge and intellectual activities. What they question or challenge is its so-called superiority to practical activities and contempt for what is called common sense. Valorizing common sense[147], Tonguç and Freire distinguish themselves from elitist theoreticians.

Freire warns readers against both "theoretical elitism" and "anti-intellectualism". The former, according to him, denies validity to the common sense, i.e. knowledge acquired through experience, while the latter denies validity to theoretical knowledge acquired through "critical reasoning". Freire calls attention to the relation between these two types of knowing –and theory and practice which they imply- rather than viewing them as mutually exclusive (Freire, 2005). However, there was a continuing emphasis on the need for the guidance of intellectuals, revealing between-the-lines elitism in Tonguç's writings. The critical pedagogy school inspired by Freire also puts an emphasis on the "transformative" role of intellectuals.

Freire's understanding of education is "more than a method for literacy education", with its emphasis on the inseparability of the acts of "reading the world" and "reading the word" (Macedo and Freire, A., 2005: xiv). His method of teaching peasants how to read and write was "part of a larger goal of

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[146] Here, the way of expression used while talking about people's empowerment through education is very important. That is to say, there is a difference between the phrase of "the need to empower the people" and that of "creating structures and conditions which would enable the people empower themselves". As far as the empowerment of the students is concerned, as Macedo and Freire, A. (2005: xviii) rightly argue, the former might serve the strengthening of teachers' "privileged" position. Once the people are at issue, it might serve the strengthening of the "privileged" position of the intellectuals. In other words, the people could be empowered so long as this empowerment did not threaten the "privileged", "powerful" position of the elite (of intellectuals). As it has been argued in the fourth chapter, the elite of intellectuals owed their privileged position to their possession of what is called "cultural capital". Tonguç seems to be aware of this distinction, and generally use the second way of expression.

[147] However, it is still something to be overcome (Macedo and Freire, A., 2005: xiv).

politicizing the Brazilian peasants so that they could also read the world and connect the world with the word" (Macedo and Freire, A., 2005: xv). This would be achieved through what Freire calls "humanizing education" which is "the path through which individuals could become conscious about their presence in the world" (Macedo and Freire, A., 2005: xv.) The striking point here is that to gain critical consciousness is not enough in itself, but should be followed by transformative social action.

For many, it is also the case for Tonguç's understanding of pedagogy. To give an example, Timur (2001: 209-210) argues that, being of a rural origin and becoming fully aware of the exploitative relations in the countryside, Tonguç introduced an educational system which would help peasants to become conscious of that "exploitative mechanism". Here, it is necessary to remind Tonguç's desire to end the exploitation of the peasants. In fact, both the adoption of democratic principles in all activities of the VIs which were thought to be "models" for a future democratic society and the attempt for creating a new type of intellectual –peasant intellectual-from among this poorest section of the society so as to eliminate the continuing separation between intellectuals and the people can be evaluated as an important step towards the realization of that ideal.

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Interviewee List

Apaydın, Talip: Novelist, graduated from Çifteler Village Institute in 1943 and Hasanoğlan Higher Village Institute in 1946. (2004, Ankara)

Apaydın, Halise: Retired Teacher, graduated from Cılavuz Village Institute in 1944 and Hasanoğlan Higher Village Institute in 1947. (2004, Ankara)

Aygen, Hayriye: Retired Teacher, graduated from Hasanoğlan Village Institute in 1947 (2006, Ankara)

Bilbaşar, Elif Nesrin: Left the Gönen Village Institute without completing her studies in 1943. (2004, Ankara)

Gürler, Perihan: Retired Teacher, graduated from Çifteler Village Institute in 1944 and Hasanoğlan Higher Village Institute in 1947. (2004, Ankara)

Kabay, Ekrem: Ex-Senator (1973-1979), Burdur (RPP), graduated from Gönen Village Institute in 1949. (2005, Ankara)

Türkkolu, Mustafa: Retired Teacher, graduated from Hasanoğlan Village Institute in 1952. (2004, Ankara)

Türkoğlu, Pakize: Pedagogist, graduated from Aksu Village Institute in 1944 and Hasanoğlan Higher Village Institute in 1947. (2005, Ankara)

Varlıoğlu, Bedriye: Retired Teacher, graduated from Hasanoğlan Village Institute in 1950. (2006, Ankara)

Yalçın, Hakkı: Retired Teacher, graduated from Pazarören Village Institute in 1956. (2006, Ankara)

APPENDIX A

TURKISH SUMMARY

Köy Enstitüleri, temelde eğitim kurumları olmalarına rağmen, Türkiye toplumu ve siyasal yaşamı üzerindeki etkileri itibariyle çok tartışılan konulardan birisidir. Gerçekten de, on yıl kadar süren kısa ömrüne rağmen yarattığı toplumsal, ekonomik, siyasal ve kültürel etkiler, çok boyutlu bir olgu olan Köy Enstitüleri'ni sosyal bilimciler için oldukça cazip bir araştırma konusu haline getirmektedir. Dönemin klasik eğitim sisteminden farklı bir eğitim anlayışını benimsemiş ve uygulamış olmasıyla, Enstitüler, özellikle pedagoji disiplini için önemli bir çalışma konusu teşkil etmektedir. Bu tezde ise Enstitülerde uygulanan eğitim programı ikincil bir önem arz etmekte ve halk/aydın kopukluğunu ortadan kaldırmak üzere yeni bir aydın tipi yaratmadaki rolü açısından ele alınmaktadır. Tez, Köy Enstitüleri'ni halkçılık bağlamında ve Kemalist halkçılıkla karşılaştırarak incelemekte ve halkçılık tartışmasının temel noktalarına –çelişkili halk kavramsallaştırması, halk/aydın ikiliği ve siyasal katılım- odaklanmaktadır. Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığının halkçılık ideolojisinin "paradoksal elitizm" olarak adlandırılabilecek "toplumsal-eşitlikçi" ve "yönetsel-kurumsal" boyutları arasındaki çelişkiyi ne ölçüde içinde barındırdığı ve demokratik bir atmosfer ve "halkın içinden gelen" ve entelektüel ve pratik faaliyetleri birlikte yürüten yeni bir aydın tipi yaratarak söz konusu çelişkinin üstesinden gelip gelemediği sorgulanmaktadır. Burada temel soru, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığının Kemalist halkçılıktan hangi noktalarda ortaklaştığı ve farklılaştığıdır. Bu çerçevede, öncelikle Köy Enstitüleri'nin rejimin beklentilerini ne ölçüde karşıladığı, sonuçların bu beklentilerle çelişip çelişmediği ve onların ötesine geçip geçmediği soruları önem kazanmaktadır.

Halkçılık, bir başka deyişle popülizm, Latincede halk anlamına gelen *populus* sözcüğünden türemiştir ve halkın kendi kendini yönetmesi anlamını taşır. Halkçılığın bu şekilde tanımlanması, onun halkın küçük, ayrıcalıklı bir grup tarafından yönetilmesi gerektiğini savunan "elitizm"in karşıtı olarak nitelendirilmesine ve "elitist demokrasi"nin panzehiri olarak görülmesine yol açar. Bir başka deyişle, halkçılığın anti-elitizm olarak tanımlanması, halkçılık ile demokrasi arasında bir ilişki kurulmasını da beraberinde getirir. Tezin giriş bölümünde sunulan kavramsal çerçevede bu ilişki irdelenmekte ve halkçılık ile demokrasi arasında zorunlu ya da içsel bir ilişki değil, tam tersine paradoksal ve belirsiz bir ilişki olduğu ve bu ilişkinin halkçılığın eklemlendiği ideolojiye bağlı olarak şekillendiği öne sürülmektedir. Halkçılık ile demokrasi arasındaki ilişkinin paradoksal ve belirsiz niteliğinin, bir ölçüde, yukarda bahsedilen ve popülist ideolojilerin paradoksal elitizmi olarak adlandırılan toplumsal-eşitlikçi ve yönetsel-kurumsal boyutlar arasındaki çelişkiden kaynaklandığı iddia edilmektedir. Dolayısıyla, bu çalışmada, halkçılık ile elitizm arasında bir tür karşıtlık ilişkisi kurmaktan ziyade ikisi arasındaki bağlantıya dikkat çekilerek popülist ideolojilerin paradoksal elitizmine odaklanılmaktadır.

Tez, halkçılığı *halkın kendi kendini yönetmesi* olarak tanımlayıp demokrasiyle ilişkisi çerçevesinde ele alarak onun siyasal boyutu üzerinde odaklanmaktadır. Bu da "siyasal katılım" ve "temsiliyet" sorunsalını gündeme getirmektedir. Siyasal katılım, halkçılık ve demokrasi kavramlarını buluşturan ve bu ikisi arasındaki paradoksal ilişkinin anlaşılmasını sağlayacak olan anahtar kavramlardan birisidir. Bu nedenle, söz konusu ilişkiyi ele alan yazarların odaklandığı noktalardan birisinin bu olması tesadüf değildir. Sözgelimi Worsley (1969), halkçılığın demokratik sürecin temel unsurlarından birisi olan "katılım" boyutuna dikkat çekerek kavramın "gerçek ve etkili bir katılım"ı da içerecek şekilde yeniden tanımlanmasını önerir. Ancak Worsley, "doğrudan katılım" olarak halkçılığı demokratik ve sosyalist geleneklerin bir unsuru olarak nitelendirse de halkçılık ile demokrasi arasında zorunlu bir ilişki kurmaktan çok ikisi arasında bir "uyum" olduğunu öne sürer. Hayward (1996) ise halkçılığın yalnızca "demokratik" değil

aynı zamanda "demokrasinin en özgün biçimi" olma iddiasında olduğunu ifade ederek halkçılık ile demokrasi arasında içsel ya da zorunlu bir ilişki kurar. Bu iddiayı kavramsal ve tarihsel olarak temellendirmek üzere, demokrasinin, "doğrudan demokrasi"nin örneği olarak görülen Antik Yunan'dan yola çıkıp günümüzün "temsili demokrasi"lerine uzanan serüveninden söz eder.

Siyasal katılım tartışması temsiliyet sorununu da beraberinde getirmektedir. Laclau (2003) ve Arditi'nin (2003) belirttiği gibi, halkçılığın anahtar kavramı olan "halk", halihazırda temsiliyet nosyonunu içinde barındırmaktadır. "Halk"ın temsiliyet ilişkileri alanında oluşturulması kaçınılmazdır. Temsiliyet kavramı "başkaları için eyleme" anlamını taşır ve "temsil edenler" ve "temsil edilenler" olmak üzere iki düzeyin varlığını öngörür. Bu iki düzey arasında "temsiliyet"i "kendi kendini yönetme"den ayıran bir boşluk vardır. Yukarda sözü edilen popülist ideolojilerin paradoksal elitizmi tam da bu noktada açığa çıkar. Bir yandan, halkçılığın toplumsal-eşitlikçi boyutu "eşitlik" ve "halkın katılımı"nı içerir ve gerektirirken, öte yandan yönetsel-kurumsal boyutu bunların "tabandan" değil "yukardan" gerçekleştirilmesine işaret eder. Bu durum, "halk"ın çelişkili kavramsallaştırılmasında açıkça gözlemlenebilir. Şöyle ki; "halk" bir yandan ulusal değerlerin kaynağı olarak nitelendirilip yüceltilirken, öte yandan eğitilip aydınlatılması gereken bir kitle olarak görülür. Tam da bu nedenledir ki, "halk"ın en azından kendi kendini yönetebilir hale gelinceye kadar genelde bir seçkinler grubunun özelde ise aydınların liderliğine ihtiyaç duyduğundan söz edilmektedir. Bir başka deyişle, "halk" kendi kendini yönetmek için gereken bilgi ve nitelikten –ki bunlar çoğunlukla eğitimle kazanılabilecek niteliklerdir- yoksun olarak görüldüğünde, "halk adına" ve "halk için" karar verecek bireyler topluluğuna ihtiyaç duyulması kaçınılmaz kılınmaktadır. Bu da bizi, genelde "halk/elit" özelde ise "halk/aydın" ikiliğine getirmektedir. Bu çalışmada vurgu "halk/aydın" ikiliği üzerinedir çünkü çalışmanın konusunu teşkil eden Köy Enstitüleri, toplumun en yoksul kesimini ve çoğunluğu oluşturan köylüler arasından yaratacağı yeni aydın tipiyle aydınlar ve halk arasındaki uçurumu kapatmayı hedeflemektedir. "Klasik aydınlar"ı yaşamdan ve halktan kopuk olmakla eleştiren

İsmail Hakkı Tonguç, Köy Enstitüleri'nde, kendi sınıfından kopmayacak, kopamayacak ve bu sınıfın çıkarlarını savunmaktan vazgeçmeyecek yeni bir aydın tipini, "köylü aydın"ı, yetiştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Tam da bu amaç ve girişimi nedeniyledir ki, bazı yazarlar –örneğin Kirby- İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un köycülük anlayışının kendisinden öncekilerden ve dönemin yaygın köycülük anlayışından farklılaştığını öne sürmektedirler. Gerçekten de, kendisinden köy gerçeğini anlaması ve değiştirmesi –ki içine doğdukları bu gerçek onlara tanıdıktı- köyü "canlandırması" ve köylüyü "aydınlatması" beklenen bu yeni aydının işlevi, "gerçeği anlama"nın ötesine geçmekte; bu nedenle de bu "köylü aydın", entelektüel ve pratik faaliyetlerin iç içe geçtiği bir eğitim alarak köydeki zorlu yaşama hazırlanmaktadır. Ancak burada "iş içinde eğitim" ilkesinin benimsenmesinin yalnızca bu tür bir pratik zorunluluktan değil –ki burada ülkenin içinde bulunduğu sosyo-ekonomik durum ve tarımsal üretimi iyileştirme ve artırma çabaları da hatırda tutulmalıdır- aynı zamanda pedagojik bir gereklilikten kaynaklandığının altı çizilmektedir. Bu boyut, Köy Enstitüleri'nde öğrencilerin çok çalıştırıldığı ve üretime ve tarım ve teknik derslerine daha çok ağırlık verildiği yönündeki eleştirilerce çoğu kez göz ardı edilmektedir. (Burada, Enstitülerde "kültür dersleri" ve tarım ve teknik derslerine ayrılan zamanın eşit olduğunu ve öğrencilerin boş zamanlarında okumaya ve sanatsal faaliyetlere teşvik edildiğini hatırlatmak gerekmektedir.) Enstitülerde öğrencilerin yoğun bir şekilde çalıştırıldıklarını ve zaman zaman bundan şikayet ettiklerini, Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının anılarında görmek mümkündür. Ancak tam da bu okullarda benimsenen ve uygulamaya konulan "iş içinde eğitim" ilkesi ve üretime yönelik eğitimin demokratik bir yapı ve işleyişin yaratılmasına katkıda bulunduğu yadsınmaktadır. Şöyle ki; üretim sürecine katılmakla öğrenciler, Enstitülerdeki işleyiş hakkında söz sahibi olmakta ve öğretmenler ve yöneticiler dahil herkesi eleştirme hakkını ellerinde bulunmaktadırlar. Öğretmenler ve öğrenciler arasında "iş" ve "ödev" esasına dayalı bir ilişki, hafta sonları yapılan ve herkesin herkesi eleştirebildiği toplantılar, katı bir hiyerarşinin yokluğu, zora ve şiddete dayanmayan disiplin, "kendi kendini yönetme" ve "kendi kendine yeterlik" ilkelerine dayanan bir eğitim anlayışından yola çıkarak, Enstitülerde

demokratik bir yapı ve işleyişten söz etmek mümkün olmaktadır. Burada, Köy Enstitüleri'nin mimarı İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un, Kemalizmin altı ilkesinden birisi olan ve "kendi kendini yönetme" olarak tanımladığı halkçılık ilkesini Enstitülere taşıma iddiası ve çabasıyla, "halkın kendi kendini idaresi"ni gerçekleştirme amacı doğrultusunda bir adım attığı öne sürülebilir. Bu da, aşağıda belirtileceği gibi, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığını Kemalist halkçılıktan farklılaştıran ve onun sınırlarının ötesine geçmesini sağlayan temel unsurdur.

Burada aydınların rolüne ilişkin altı çizilmesi gereken bir diğer nokta, aydınlara atfedilen öncülük veya liderlik rolünün "geçici" olması, aydınların görevinin "halk idaresi"nin gerçekleştirilmesiyle son bulacağı iddiasıdır. Burada, eğitime büyük rol düşmektedir çünkü toplumdaki herkes eğitilip kendi kendini yönetebilir hale geldiğinde, aydınların kılavuzluğuna, öncülüğüne ihtiyaç kalmayacağına, dolayısıyla da aydınlara atfedilen rolün "elit" bir aydınlar topluluğu yaratmayacağına inanılmaktadır. Bu hedef, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un toplumun en yoksul kesimini ve çoğunluğu oluşturan köylünün kendi aydınını yetiştirerek halk/aydın ayrılığını ortadan kaldırma amacıyla uyumludur. Burada altı çizilmesi gereken noktalardan birisi de, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un halkın eğitilmesinden bahsederken bunu okuma yazma öğretmekle sınırlamadığı, eğitimin halkın kendi kendini idaresi amacını gerçekleştirmekte bir basamak olarak gördüğüdür. Tam da bu noktada, bu çalışma, Tonguç'un pedagoji anlayışıyla Paulo Freire'nin pedagoji anlayışı arasında bir paralellik kurmaktadır. Her iki eğitimci de toplumun en yoksul kesimi - köylüler- üzerine odaklanmakta, okuma yazmanın ülke genelinde, özellikle de köylüler arasında-yaygınlaşmasının, halkın siyasal katılımını artırmak ve demokrasiyi gerçekleştirmek için gerekli olduğuna inanmaktadır.

Ancak bütün bunlar, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un ve Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının halkçılık anlayışının, yukarıda belirtilen popülist ideolojilerin paradoksal elitizminden azade olduğu anlamına gelmemektedir. Bunu, Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının anılarında ve onlarla yapılan mülakatlarda görmek mümkündür.

Her ne kadar "halkın içinden" geldiği ve "halktan" olduğu iddiasıyla kendilerini kent-kökenli aydınlardan ayırsalar da, Enstitülüler söylemsel olarak halk/aydın ikiliğinin yeniden üretilmesine katkıda bulunmaktadırlar. Özellikle halkı "eğitmek", "aydınlatmak", "gerilikten ve ilkellikten kurtarmak", ona "öncülük etmek", vb ifadelerde elitist unsurlara rastlamak mümkündür. Halk bazen "güçsüz", "yoksul", "savunmasız", "sürekli baskı altında tutulan" bir kesim olarak betimlenirken, öte yandan -her ne kadar bu olumsuz niteliklerin sorumlusu olarak görülmese de- onun "cehalet"inden, "kaderciliği"nden, "kayıtsızlığı"ndan dem vurulmakta ve onu "eğitmek" ve "uyandırmak"taki güçlüklerden bahsedilmektedir. Yine, "halkın içinden" geldikleri ve "halktan" oldukları iddiasına rağmen, Enstitülüler, zaman zaman kendilerini halktan ayırmaktadırlar. Özellikle zihniyet ve yaşam şekli söz konusu olduğunda, bu ayrılık "hiyerarşik" bir nitelik kazanmaktadır. Bu da, her ne kadar bir "elit" yaratılmak istenmese de, Enstitülülerin bir elit kategorisi oluşturma eğiliminde olduklarını düşünmeye sevketmektedir. Ancak Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının halkçılık anlayışı söz konusu olduğunda, burada sözü edilen elitizmin, kavramın genel kullanımının aksine, bir seçkinler grubunun mutlak üstünlüğüne duyulan inanç anlamına gelmediğini de belirtmek gerekir.

İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un ve Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının halkçılık anlayışını kapsayan Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığının popülist ideolojilerin paradoksal elitizmini içinde barındırması, onu Kemalist halkçılıkla benzer kılan noktalardan birisidir. Bu noktada, özellikle İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un Kemalist ilkelere ve Cumhuriyet rejimine bağlılığından söz etmek gerekir. Öncelikle belirtmek gerekir ki, pek çok yazarın vurguladığı gibi, Köy Enstitüleri'nin kuruluş nedenlerinden birisi, yeni kurulan ulus-devletin "modern", "laik" yurttaşlarını yetiştirme sürecine katkıda bulunmaktır. Eğitimin böyle bir süreçte oynadığı kritik rolün farkında olan Cumhuriyet hükümeti, eğitimi yurt çapında yaymak için çeşitli girişimlerde bulunmuştur ve Köy Enstitüleri de bu girişimlerden birisidir. Özellikle kırsal kesimdeki eğitim sorununu çözmek anlamında, Köy Enstitüleri özel bir yere sahiptir. Rejimin siyasal ve ekonomik bir kriz içinde bulunduğu ve halkın kalbini

kazanma çabası içine girdiği 1930'lu yıllarda, Enstitülerden, Cumhuriyet rejimini ve ilkelerini halka yayacak ve benimsetecek unsurlar yetiştirmesi beklenmiştir. Bu anlamda, Köy Enstitüleri'nin kurucuları ve yöneticilerinin Kemalist ilkelere ve Cumhuriyet rejimine bağlılığından söz etmek mümkündür. Enstitülerde öğrenciler Cumhuriyet rejiminin modern, laik yurttaş anlayışına uygun olarak yetiştirilmeye çalışılmış ve onlardan rejimin taşıyıcıları olmaları beklenmiştir. Ancak burada belirtilmesi gereken önemli bir fark vardır. Cumhuriyet rejiminin modern, laik yurttaşı, "birlik", "beraberlik" ve "dayanışma" vurgusuna paralel bir biçimde hak ve özgürlüklerden ziyade (özellikle devlete karşı) yükümlülükleriyle tanımlanıp pozitivist bir aydınlanma/modernleşme projesinin nesnesi haline getirilirken, Enstitülerde öğrenciler daha çok bu projenin öznesi olacak şekilde yetiştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Aslında devlet, millet, toplum gibi kolektif unsurlar üzerine yapılan vurguya, Köy Enstitüleri'nin kurucularının, müdürlerinin ve mezunlarının konuşma ve yazılarında rastlamak mümkündür. Köy Enstitüleri'nde öğrenciler, özellikle köy gerçeğini değiştirerek, köyü ve köylüyü modernleştirerek ulusal kalkınmaya katkıda bulunacak "idealist" öğretmenler olarak yetiştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu anlamda Enstitülerin araçsallaştırılmasından söz edilebilir. Bir başka deyişle, onlar modernleşmenin taşıyıcılarıdır. Ancak bu, her ne kadar Cumhuriyet rejiminin ihtiyaçlarına cevap vermek üzere kurulmuş eğitim kurumları olsa da, Enstitülerin, sonuçları itibariyle, rejimle herhangi bir çelişkiye düşmeksizin bütünüyle kendilerinden beklenenleri gerçekleştirdiği anlamına gelmemektedir. Nitekim, yine aynı Köy Enstitüleri'nde, öğrencilerin yükümlüklerinin yanında sahip olduğu hakların – elbette yalnız kendilerinin değil, aynı zamanda kendi haklarının 'bilincinde olmayan' ve dolayısıyla onları savunamayan köylünün- bilincinde ve onların ateşli birer savunucusu olarak yetiştirilmeye çalışıldığı görülmektedir. Bunun yolu da öğrencilere sorumluluk ve yetki vermek, kendilerini ifade etmeyi ve inisiyatif kullanmalarını sağlamak ve onlara kendine güven duygusunu aşılamak olarak belirlenmiştir. Öyle ki, Köy Enstitülüler, hakkını arayan, haksızlıklara karşı çıkan, eleştiren ve sorgulayan insanlar olmakla ün yapmışlardır. Köy Enstitülülerin anıları, bu tür sayısız örnekle doludur. Pek çok yazar, Köy

Enstitüsü mezunlarının bu nedenle soruşturma ve kovuşturmalara uğradığını, hatta bunun Enstitülerin kapatılma nedenlerinden birisini teşkil ettiğini öne sürmektedir. Eğitim kurumlarının, her ne kadar mevcut toplumsal, ekonomik ve siyasal yapılar ve ilişkilerden bağımsız düşünülemese ve hatta devletin ideolojik aygıtları olarak işlev görse de zaman zaman beklenmeyen –ve hatta istenmeyen- sonuçlar doğurabileceği göz önüne alındığında, bu durum hiç de şaşırtıcı olmamaktadır. Bir başka deyişle, eğitim sistemi, her ne kadar bireyleri kapitalist sistemin ihtiyaçları doğrultusunda eğitip onların baskın norm ve değerlere uygun bir biçimde sosyalleşmesine katkıda bulunuyorsa da eğitim kurumlarının rolünü yalnızca ekonomik ve kültürel yeniden üretime indirgemek mümkün değildir. Köy Enstitüleri'nin yarattığı bazı sonuçlar itibariyle rejimle çelişkiye düşmesini ve tek-parti rejiminin baskıcı unsurlarını taşımasına rağmen –burada özellikle Köy Enstitüsü'nden mezun olan öğretmenlerin yirmi yıl köyde çalışma zorunluluğu ve köylülerin yılda en az 20 gün köy okullarının ve öğretmenin evinin inşasında, yol yapımında ve yasaca tanımlanan diğer işlerde çalışma zorunluluğunu hatırlamak gerekir- demokratik ilkeleri uygulamaya çalışarak eğitimin "özgürlükçü" potansiyelini harekete geçirmesini de bu şekilde açıklamak mümkündür. Buradan yola çıkılarak, bu çalışmada, Köy Enstitüleri'nde uygulanan pedagoji anlayışıyla Gramsci ve Freire'den esinlenen eleştirel pedagoji anlayışı arasında eğitimin "özgürlükçü" potansiyelini açığa çıkarma açısından bir paralellik kurulmaktadır. Aslında başlıbaşına bir çalışma konusu olabilecek bu paralellik, bu çalışmada, yalnızca söz konusu pedagoji anlayışlarının temel noktaları üzerinden kurulmaktadır. Freire'nin eğitim anlayışı üzerine temellenen eleştirel pedagoji, öğrenenleri "özneler" olarak nitelendirir ve eğitimi, eğitimci ve eğitilenlerin aynı anda öğrendiği ve öğrettiği, bilgiyi birlikte araştırdıkları bir süreç olarak tanımlar. Bu, öğreten ve öğrenenler arasındaki hiyerarşik ilişkinin ortadan kaldırılması anlamına da gelmektedir. Düşünce ve eylemin birlikteliğini, iç içeliğini ifade eden "praksis" kavramına yapılan vurguya paralel olarak, eğitimin, yalnızca bireylerin içinde bulunduğu gerçekliğe karşı eleştirel bir bakış açısı geliştirmesini değil aynı zamanda onların dünyayı dönüştürmek için eylemde bulunmasını da sağlaması beklenmektedir. Benzer vurgulara Köy

Enstitüleri'nde de rastlamak mümkündür. Gerçekten de dönemin klasik eğitim kurumlarının aksine, ezberciliği reddeden; "iş içinde eğitim" anlayışı ve "yaparak öğrenme" yöntemini benimseyen; öğrencileri okumaya, sözlü ve yazılı olarak kendini ifade etmeye ve eleştirel düşünmeye teşvik eden; onlara "kendine güven" duygusunu aşılamaya çalışan Köy Enstitüleri'nin, öğretmenler ve öğrenciler arasında "iş" ve "ödev" esasına dayalı bir ilişki tanımlayarak ve zora ve şiddete dayanan disiplin anlayışını reddederek eğitimin özgürlükçü potansiyelini harekete geçirdiğini iddia etmek mümkündür.

Bütün bu tartışmalar ışığında, tezin giriş bölümünde kavramsal bir çerçeve sunulmakta ve halkçılık demokrasi ile ilişkilendirilerek ele alınmaktadır. Ancak bu ilişkinin zorunlu ya da içsel bir ilişki değil paradoksal ve belirsiz bir ilişki olduğu ve bunun, bir ölçüde, yukarda bahsedilen ve halkçılık ideolojisinin paradoksal elitizmi olarak adlandırılan toplumsal-eşitlikçi ve yönetsel-kurumsal boyutlar arasındaki çelişkiden kaynaklandığı öne sürülmektedir. Dolayısıyla, halkçılık ile elitizm arasında mutlak bir karşıtlık ilişkisi kurulmamakta, daha ziyade ikisi arasındaki bağlantıya dikkat çekilerek popülist ideolojilerin paradoksal elitizmine odaklanılmaktadır.

Tezin ikinci bölümünde, Kemalist halkçılık, halkçılığın yukarda sözü edilen üç boyutu -çelişkili "halk" kavramsallaştırması, halk/aydın ikiliği ve katılım-açısından değerlendirilmektedir. Kemalist halkçılığın, "halk"ı bir yandan ulusal egemenliğin ve ulusal değerlerin kaynağı olarak görüp –ki bu "halk" ve "millet" özdeşleştirmesine varmaktadır- yüceltirken, diğer yandan "cahil", eğitilip aydınlatılması gereken bir kitle olarak nitelendirerek çelişkili halk kavramsallaştırmasını içerdiği ve Osmanlı'dan devralınan "elit/halk" ayrımını muhafaza ettiği iddia edilmektedir. Ayrıca, halkın siyasal katılımını sağlamak yönünde yapılan yasal düzenlemelere rağmen, bu düzenlemelerin, sosyo-ekonomik alanda gerekli ve yeterli önlemlerin alınamaması nedeniyle yetersiz kaldığı ve halkçılığın söylemsel düzeyin ötesine geçemediği öne sürülmektedir.

Yukarıda da belirtildiği gibi, bu tezde, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığı Kemalist halkçılıkla karşılaştırılarak incelenmektedir. Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığını anlamak için Enstitülerin ortaya çıktığı tarihsel bağlamı sunmak gerekliliğinden hareketle, tezin üçüncü bölümünde, Enstitülerin kuruluşunu hazırlayan toplumsal, siyasal ve iktisadi koşullara değinilmektedir. Cumhuriyet rejiminin söz konusu dönemde izlediği tarım politikaları ve köylünün içinde bulunduğu koşullar, Kemalist halkçılığın sosyo-ekonomik alanda aldığı önlemlerin yetersizliğini göstermek ve Köy Enstitüleri'nin kuruluşunda cisimleşen köye ve köylüye karşı artan ilginin nedenlerini açıklayabilmek için ele alınmaktadır. Aynı bölümde, Köy Enstitüleri'nin mimarı olarak adlandırılan İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un köycülük anlayışına da yer verilmektedir.

Halkçılığın demokrasiyle ilişkilendirilerek ele alındığı bu çalışmada, Köy Enstitüleri'nin ortaya çıktığı tarihsel çerçeve ve Enstitülerin kuruluş nedenleri irdelendikten sonra, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığını açıklayabilmek için öncelikle Köy Enstitüleri'ndeki demokratik yapı ve işleyiş tartışılmaktadır. Köy Enstitüleri'ndeki demokratik yapı ve işleyiş incelenirken, Enstitülerin işleyişindeki temel ilkeler, örgütsel yapı ve Enstitülerde uygulanan öğretim programı üzerine odaklanılmaktadır. Enstitülerin "demokratik" olarak nitelendirilmesine yol açan genel özellikleri, "kendi kendini yönetme", "kendi kendine yetme" ve "iş içinde eğitim" başlıkları altında ele alınmaktadır. Köy Enstitüleri'ndeki "demokratik yapı ve işleyiş", bilhassa "okuma ve tartışma saatleri", hafta sonları yapılan ve müdürler ve öğretmenler dahil herkesin herkesi eleştirme hakkına sahip olduğu toplantılar, "zora ve şiddete dayanmayan disiplin", öğrenciler ve öğretmenler arasında "iş" ve "ödev" esasına dayalı bir ilişki ve katı bir hiyerarşinin yokluğu ile uygulamaya konulan "eşitlik", "sorumluluk", "inisiyatif", vb ilkeler bazında incelenmektedir. Bu tartışmalar, özellikle İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un Köy Enstitüleri'nin işleyişine temel teşkil eden düşünceleri ve direktiflerine referansla yapılmaktadır.

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Köy Enstitüleri'ndeki demokratik yapı ve işleyişin incelenmesinin ardından, tezin beşinci bölümünde, İsmail Hakkı Tonguç'un ve Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının "halk" ve "aydın" anlayışı Tonguç'un yazıları ve Köy Enstitüsü mezunlarının eserleri ve onlarla yapılan mülakatlara – bu mülakatlar, mezunların köylülerle olan ilişkilerine odaklanarak onların "halk"ı nasıl tanımladıklarını ve "aydın"a nasıl bir rol atfettiklerini anlamaya yönelik sorular içermektedir- referansla tartışılmaktadır. "Aydın" kavramı üzerine yapılan kısa bir tartışmadan sonra –ki burada entelektüel ve pratik faaliyetler arasındaki ayrımı sorgulayarak onları praksis kavramında buluşturan ve entelektüel faaliyeti aydınların tekelinde olmaktan çıkaran Gramsci özel bir yere sahiptir- Enstitülerde yaratılmaya çalışılan "aydın" tipi üzerine odaklanılmaktadır. Enstitülerdeki, "iş içinde eğitim" ilkesini ve "yaparak öğrenme" metodunu benimseyen eğitim anlayışının entelektüel ve pratik faaliyetler arasındaki ayrımı reddederek yeni bir aydın tipi yaratmaya yönelik olduğu ve bu aydını toplumun en yoksul kesimleri arasından seçip yetiştirerek halk/aydın ayrılığını ortadan kaldırmayı hedeflediği iddia edilmektedir.

Bütün bu tartışmalar ışığında, sonuç bölümünde, Kemalist halkçılık ile Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığı, halkçılığın yukarda sözü edilen üç boyutu -çelişkili "halk" kavramsallaştırması, halk/aydın ikiliği ve katılım- açısından karşılaştırılmakta, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığının hangi noktalarda Kemalist halkçılıkle ortaklaştığı ve ayrıştığı ortaya konulmaktadır. Her iki halkçılığın da çelişkili "halk" kavramsallaştırmasını içinde barındırdığı; "halk"ı bir yandan yüceltirken diğer yandan "cahil", eğitilip aydınlatılması gereken bir kitle olarak gördüğü; bu anlamda, her ne kadar halkı taşıdığı olumsuz niteliklerin sorumlusu olarak görmese de Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığının Kemalist halkçılığın sınırları içinde kaldığı iddia edilmektedir. Katılım boyutu açısından karşılaştırıldığında ise, Köy Enstitüleri halkçılığının Kemalist halkçılıktan farklılaştığı görülmektedir. Aslında her iki halkçılıkta da –bu daha çok Kemalist halkçılığın "halk için, halk tarafından" şeklinde özetlenebileceği ilk dönem için söz konusudur- katılım unsuru mevcuttur. Ancak, yukarıda da değinildiği gibi, Kemalist halkçılık söz

konusu olduğunda, "halkın kayıtsız şartsız egemenliği", "halk hükümeti" gibi ifadelere yer verilmesine ve siyasal katılımını sağlamak yönünde adımlar atılmasına rağmen, bu çabanın, sosyo-ekonomik alanda gerekli değişiklik ve düzenlemelerin yapılamaması nedeniyle yetersiz kaldığı ve halkçılığın söylemsel düzeyin ötesine geçemediği iddia edilmektedir. Bunun yanında, yükümlülükleri hak ve özgürlüklerinden önce gelen ve modernleşme/aydınlanma projesinin öznesi olmaktan çok nesnesi kılınan bir yurttaş anlayışı da Kemalist halkçılığın vurguyu halkçılığın "toplumsal-eşitlikçi" boyutundan ziyade "yönetsel-kurumsal" boyuta kaydırdığının göstergesidir. Enstitülerde ise halkçılık ilkesinin etkin bir biçimde hayata geçirilmeye çalışıldığını söylemek mümkündür. Kemalist halkçılığın tersine, Köy Enstitüleri'nin, vurguyu halkçılığın yönetsel-kurumsal boyutundan toplumsal-eşitlikçi boyutuna kaydırarak, Kemalist halkçılığın sınırlarını aştığı iddia edilmekte ve bu iddia, Enstitülerde uygulamaya konulan eğitim anlayışı, demokratik yapı ve işleyişin ve yaratılmaya çalışılan yeni aydın tipi üzerine temellendirilmektedir.

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PUBLICATIONS

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